The European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood Today : Politics, Dynamics, Perspectives [1 ed.] 9781443875196, 9781443871914

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The European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood Today

The European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood Today Politics, Dynamics, Perspectives Edited by

Valentin Naumescu and Dan Dungaciu

The European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood Today: Politics, Dynamics, Perspectives Edited by Valentin Naumescu and Dan Dungaciu This book first published 2015 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2015 by Valentin Naumescu, Dan Dungaciu and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-7191-5 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-7191-4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction: The New “Eastern Europe” and Cold War II ......................... 1 Valentin Naumescu The Eastern Partnership at a Crossroads: Success or Failure, Realism or Illusion? Poland and the Creation of the EaP: Between Western Preferences and Eastern Concerns ................................................................................ 26 Ruxandra Iordache Functional Aspects of the EU Eastern Partnership on Debate ................... 53 Lucian Jora Implications on the Security and Stability of the Eastern Partnership ....... 67 Sanda Cincă The Eastern Partnership and the Question of the EU’s Political Identity: The Case of Belarus................................................................................... 97 Lucian-ùtefan Dumitrescu and Darie Cristea Frozen Conflicts in South Caucasus and their Impact on the Eastern Partnership: The case of Georgia and its Break-away Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia ................................................................ 116 Laura M. Her‫܊‬a and Alexandra Sabou “Eastern Europe” Today: Weaknesses, Dilemmas and Opportunities Energy Security—A Core Issue for Consolidating the Eastern Border: The EU in Search of a New Black Sea Strategy ...................................... 156 Drago‫ ܈‬Păun and Oana Poiană EU-Ukraine: The Need for a Revisited Approach ................................... 173 Georgiana Ciceo

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Table of Contents

Ukraine at an Economic Crossroads ........................................................ 190 Cristian Con‫܊‬an Political Discourses, Search for Identity and National Imagination in the Republic of Moldova ..................................................................... 211 Vincent Henry and Sergiu Miúcoiu Romania and the Republic of Moldova: Common Assets and Challenges amid the Europe 2020 Agenda ................................................................ 249 Adrian-Gabriel Corpădean The Case for the Rebalancing of NATO on the Eastern Flank ................ 269 Octavian Manea and Paulina IĪewicz The Insecurity Concept of the EU-r-ASIAN Borderline: The Caucasus ........................................................................................... 305 Bogdan Nedea Afterword: Romanian-Russian Relations since 1989 .............................. 325 Sergiu Celac and Dan Dungaciu Contributors ............................................................................................. 357

INTRODUCTION: THE NEW “EASTERN EUROPE” AND COLD WAR II VALENTIN NAUMESCU

Abstract The pre-1989 “Eastern Europe” has become “Central Europe” and is now part and parcel of the North-Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. The new “Eastern Europe”, under the soft, Eurocratic name of “Eastern Neighbourhood”, stretching from Belarus to the North, to Azerbaijan to the South, switched from the status of Soviet republics - until 1991 - to the one of a disputed “buffer zone” between the West and Russia. Formally, the six countries included in the EU programme of the Eastern Partnership might have a more or less realistic European perspective. Three of them have signed and ratified the Association Agreements with the EU (Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia), while the other three countries (Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan) have not yet assumed this strategic option and remain, politically and economically, close to Russia. Keywords: The European Union, Eastern Neighbourhood, Eastern Partnership, Association Agreement, the United States, Russia, Ukraine, influence This is not just wordplay with the “West”, “Central” and “Eastern” Europe. It is actually a historical process of westernization of a long contested region of Europe, located essentially between Germany and Russia, which has entered its second major phase: the “absorption” of the former republics of the Soviet Union into the Euro-Atlantic system. When the post-World War II Western order advanced for first time towards the East and extended NATO’s security umbrella over 12 former communist countries (11 in the case of the EU), the Russian sphere of influence on the European continent substantially diminished. The sequence of several

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Introduction: The New “Eastern Europe” and Cold War II

enlargements of NATO (1999, 2004 and 2008) and of the European Union (2004, 2007 and 2013) pushed the strategic, political, military and economic frontier of the West closer to the Russian territory, but still kept a thin “buffer zone” between the two blocs. Launched in May 2009 at the Prague Summit1, the Eastern Partnership was based on the idea of strengthening the European Union’s political and economic relations with the abovementioned countries. President Putin saw this new step of westernization taking place in the redefined “Eastern Europe” as an “assault” against Russian strategic interests in the region and decided to combat the process of rapprochement between these states and the European Union or NATO. The new EU attempt at pushing to the East, through the Eastern Partnership and the Association Agreements, faced this time the aggressive opposition of Moscow, especially in the case of Ukraine, and probably, in the future, in that of Moldova. The dramatic events in Kyiv in the winter of 2013-2014 were followed by the ousting of then-President Yanukovych and, soon after, by the severe military crisis of Crimea, in March 2014. It was the moment when we started speaking about the “second Cold War”2. This volume is an attempt to define some major regional opportunities, vulnerabilities and dilemmas, and explore the complex perspectives of the new Eastern Europe, under its current name of the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood.

Preamble. From “Eastern Europe” (until 1989) to “East-Central Europe” (1990s), then to the European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood (after 2009) The region of Europe located between Germany and Russia underwent a process in which it was repeatedly renamed after World War II. All successive labels assigned to this group of countries had ideological connotations and, therefore, were generally associated with negative perceptions in the West.

1

Council of the European Union, “Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit”, 7 May 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf , accessed March 2014. 2 Valentin Naumescu, “Ukraine lost Crimea. The West won’t defend it militarily! The second Cold War starts”, 1 March 2014, Contributors, http://www.contributors.ro/editorial/ucraina-a-pierdut-crimeea-occidentul-nu-o-vaapara-militar-incepe-al-doilea-razboi-rece.

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In other words, for a number of generations (and, to some extent, even today), Eastern Europe has been defined rather politically than geographically. This is the reason why Prague, for instance, was for a halfcentury placed in “Eastern Europe”, whilst Vienna and Helsinki, although more eastward than Prague, were part of the “West”. The “mental map” of the continent reflected in fact, for opinion leaders as well as for ordinary citizens, the political arrangements of the post-war order. Before 1989, “Eastern Europe” was the synthetic name given in the West to the group of eight communist countries3 beyond the Iron Curtain, other than the Soviet Union, which was considered distinct. Altogether, the USSR and Eastern Europe formed the “socialist bloc”, rivalling with the Western bloc in the so-called Cold War. As per Keith Crawford’s analysis: “from the Western viewpoint there was little difference between the various countries of Soviet-dominated ‘Eastern Europe’: they were all part of what former US President Ronald Reagan once called the ‘evil empire’. […] So once they were freed from the yoke of Soviet occupation, they sought to distance themselves quickly from the idea of ‘Eastern Europe’, with all its previous, mostly negative connotations”.4

The year 1989 created the perspective of a new name for the former “Eastern Europe”, once those countries succeeded in abolishing their communist regimes and took distance from the Soviet Union. The new concept of “East-Central Europe” (ECE) reflected both a desire to return to their Central European cultural identity and a will to render it clear that none of them was an appendix of the Soviet Empire, still existing at that time. The number of states increased from eight to thirteen: East Germany (GDR, which very soon disappeared after the German reunification of October 1990), Poland, the Czech and the Slovak Republics (after the split of Czechoslovakia, effective from January 1st, 1993), Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and, later, six sovereign states emerged after the disintegration of Yugoslavia: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro. The general claim of the former “Eastern European” countries to be considered part of Central Europe (not of Eastern Europe, as in the past) had a number of historical, cultural and obviously political reasons. Milan 3

East Germany (GDR), Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania. 4 Keith Crawford, East Central European Politics Today: From Chaos to Stability?, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996, 1-2.

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Introduction: The New “Eastern Europe” and Cold War II

Kundera, the famous Czech writer and dissident, explained them in an essay entitled “The Tragedy of Central Europe”, based on the idea that Central European countries had always been closer culturally and spiritually to the West5 than to the East of the continent, but it was only the Iron Curtain and the Cold War that made them belong to “Eastern Europe”, against the will of their nations. After the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 and the proclamation of independence of the former Soviet republics, ECE was also meant to distinguish the “intermediate group” of countries (having no Soviet history) from ex-Soviet republics such as Belarus, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and, obviously, the Russian Federation itself. Thus, the ECE concept did not include the former Soviet territory. Between 2004 and 2013, 11 countries6 from East-Central Europe joined the European Union and, therefore, gained their full geopolitical place in Central Europe. After 2009, once the Eastern Partnership programme was initiated, a new “Eastern Europe” appeared: the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union, represented by six former Soviet republics: Belarus, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is where our analysis starts from.

The Eastern Partnership – integration without accession? When the Eastern Partnership was launched, at the Prague EU Summit of May 2009, it was supposed to be another success story of the European Union. The outcome was nevertheless ambiguous even in the most optimistic scenario. In official terms, it is mentioned that “the initiative aims to tighten the relationship between the EU and the Eastern partners by deepening their political co-operation and economic integration. The EaP neither promises nor precludes the prospect of EU membership to the partner states”7. In simple words, it was an attempt to expand the European model of governance and the Western economic system onto the six former USSR components, without giving them guarantees for future membership status. Nevertheless, this new potential wave of European integration faced the virulent opposition of Moscow. Despite high costs, limited capacities and 5

Milan Kundera, “The Tragedy of Central Europe”, New York Review of Books, Vol. 13, Issue 7, 16 April 1984. 6 Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. 7 Eastern Partnership Community, EaP at a glance, http://www.easternpartnership.org/content/eap-at-a-glance, accessed March 2014.

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the lack of membership prospects, the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood Policy continues to stir interest on the continent, as Julia Langbein and Tanja Borzel aim to demonstrate in their recent book, Explaining Policy Change in the European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood8. More and more voices nowadays ask Brussels to review the Eastern Partnership and consider a European perspective for the EaP countries. The new Juncker Commission does not envisage any enlargement of the European Union in the next five years (2014-2019). What essentially explains the new tension between the West and the Russian Federation amid the recent efforts of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to head for the Euro-Atlantic structures is an old but crystal-clear declaration of Russian President Vladimir Putin. “Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama”9, concluded the Russian leader in April 2005, with regard to the historical end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the communist super-power. President Putin and his government would like to see this process of disintegration end and, moreover, in vice-premier Rogozin’s words, “the broken pieces of USSR gathered again”10. The enlargement of NATO and the EU towards Eastern Europe, including some former Soviet republics (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), as well as the subsequent tensions with an undaunted Russia, had been predicted long before the first waves of enlargement. In the mid ‘90s, when the US and its Western allies were still hesitating regarding Eastern enlargement, Zbigniew Brzezinski anticipated: “some will say that the impotence to extend the Alliance could predict a Yalta II, that is a de facto recognition of a special sphere of influence of Russia on the territory of the former Soviet Union and Central Europe. […] Although a Yalta II is impossible today, according to Russia’s state and new realities in Central Europe, only a clear manifestation of the US

8 Julia Langbein, Tanja Borzel, (eds.), Explaining Policy Change in the European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood, Routledge, 2014. 9 Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”, 25 April 2005, Kremlin Archives, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_870 86.shtml, consulted in March 2014. 10 R.M., “Dmitri Rogozin: The Time Has Come to Gather the USSR Pieces Again”, Hotnews, 12 June 2014, http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international17472541-dmitri-rogozin-venit-timpul-adunam-bucatile-urss.htm, consulted on 15 June 2014.

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Introduction: The New “Eastern Europe” and Cold War II President will end the increasing temptation to treat in a populist form the relation with Russia and the future of Europe”11.

The similarities with the current situation, almost 20 years after that sharp and realistic analysis made by Brzezinski well before the Madrid NATO Summit of 1997, are shocking indeed, with the single difference that the frontiers of the West have advanced in the meantime from the former Berlin Wall to the so-called “Eastern Neighbourhood”, we may add. The former Eastern Europe is now part of Central Europe, while the new Eastern Europe is represented by the six former Soviet republics included in the Eastern partnership. The paradoxical relation between the West and Russia, seen from a historical perspective, is explained magisterially by Alain Besançon in his book Holy Russia: “The West was fascinated by Russia. From the first moment the West met Russia, it tried to understand who they really are. The West was attracted by Russia but at the same time stood in fear of it. The West tried to include Russia in its world; it also tried to exclude it. They succeeded neither the former, nor the latter.”12

The accurate observation made by the French writer is valid not only for the 18th and 19th centuries’ Russian Empire, but also for the 20th century Soviet Union, and today for the economically attractive but politically controversial Russian Federation. The tensions in the Eastern periphery of the European Union arose on the occasion of the Vilnius EU Summit of November 2013. At the end of its five-year term, the European Commission led by José Manuel Barroso wanted to present a major success story and also to prove the full potential of the European Union to work with Eastern European countries. From the total six member states of the Eastern Partnership13 (EaP), at least four were credited in the early phases with real chances to continue the political and institutional rapprochement with Brussels: Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Armenia. Belarus and Azerbaijan were accepted in the programme in order to have a complete image of the region (from the 11

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Central and Eastern Europe in the Storm of Transition, Bucharest: Diogene, 1995, 317. 12 Alain Besançon, Sfânta Rusie [Holy Russia], Bucharest: Humanitas, 2014, 7. 13 In fact, the Eastern Partnership programme numbers 34 states, given the fact that all 28 EU member states are part of it, but for the simplicity of the discussion we consider only the six non-EU countries.

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North of the continent to South Caucasus), but there were no consistent hopes to see them any time soon as associate members of the Union. Among the six EaP member states, three countries are affected by frozen conflicts (not to mention the Nagorno-Karabakh frozen conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan) and have Russian troops on their territories: the Republic of Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and, more recently, Ukraine, which has witnessed the annexation of Crimea by Russia, despite the fact that the international community does not recognise the territorial loss suffered by Ukraine. “Nobody was able to remove Russia from this territory”, according to Romanian Presidential Adviser Iulian Chifu, “either from Abkhazia, or from South Ossetia or Transnistria. […] All this ‘because we can’, ‘because you cannot make us leave’, or ‘because nobody could prevent us from staying there’.”14 In other words, Moscow used the fait accompli policy in the region. The beginning of the fall of 2013 revealed one first unpleasant surprise for the Western leaders: Armenia unexpectedly chose to follow Moscow and enter the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. “We have […] held a detailed exchange of views on issues of Eurasian integration, and I confirmed Armenia's desire to join the Customs Union and to join in the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union”15, said Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan, after a meeting with Russia’s Putin in September 2013. The short list of potentially pro-European Eastern countries thus shrunk to three: the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, less than three months before the Vilnius Summit. The other two reluctant EaP member states, namely Belarus and Azerbaijan, sided with Russia from the early phases of discussions. It therefore came as no surprise to see Minsk and Baku (the northernmost and the southernmost capital cities of the EaP programme) stay away from the perspective of initialling the Association Agreements (AAs) with the European Union. The former is an autocratic regime with a very strong pro-Russian orientation, while the latter used to be a pro-West (especially pro-US) country, recently disappointed by the lack of interest in its strategic potential showed by the United States. “In Azerbaijan you listen to their desire to be friends with the United States and bewilderment of 14

Iulian Chifu, Narciz Bălăúoiu, Radu Arghir, The East-West Black Sea-Caspian Sea Strategic Corridor, Bucharest: Romanian Academy’s Institute for Political Science and International Relations Publishing House, 2014, 15. 15 Andrew Gardner, “Armenia chooses Russia over EU”, European Voice, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2013/september/armenia-chooses-russiaover-eu/78090.aspx, 3 September 2013, accessed in March 2014.

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Introduction: The New “Eastern Europe” and Cold War II

American indifference. […] They feel let down by the United States and they are”16, noticed George Friedman in his June 2013 Stratfor analysis. The biggest drama in Vilnius was by far Ukraine, while the Republic of Moldova and Georgia were very firm and enthusiastic in initialling their AAs. President Yanukovych of Ukraine had seemed for a few months, before the Vilnius Summit, committed to siding with the EU. A proEuropean public campaign was launched by the regime of Kyiv during the months of the 2013 summer and early fall. In fact, Ukraine was even more advanced than Georgia and the Republic of Moldova from this perspective, given the fact that Ukraine had initialled the AA in the past and was in the process of signing the documents. Starting with the fall of 2013, Russia began to put economic pressure17 on pro-European countries preparing to sign/initial Association Agreements, especially Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. Moldovan wines were banned on the Russian market18. Ukraine was notified of the $20 billion debt to the Russian economy and banks, part of which it owed to the giant Gazprom. Winter was quickly approaching and, ironically or not, Russian meteorologists were predicting the harshest winter in the past 100 years… After a discrete Putin-Yanukovych meeting at a Moscow military airport in early November, the Ukrainian leader announced that he would not sign the Association Agreement with the European Union at the Vilnius Summit and would turn politically and economically to Russia. The failure to seal the deal with Ukraine stirred an angry riposte of some European media and analysts, claiming the ineffectiveness of the Germanled EU strategy on Ukraine. Many voices blamed the rigid “Free Tymoshenko” clause imposed by Berlin to Yanukovych as unrealistic and exaggerated (the EU only dropped this condition during the days of the Summit) and also criticised the lack of substantial financial support granted to Kyiv ahead of a difficult winter.

16 George Friedman, “Geopolitical Journey: Azerbaijan and America”, Stratfor, June 11, 2013, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/geopolitical-journey-azerbaijanand-america, consulted in June 2013. 17 A.O., “Ukraine and the EU: Politics of Brutal Pressure”, The Economist, 22 November 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/11/ukraine-and-eu-0, accessed in March 2013. 18 Nikolaj Nielsen, “Russia bans Moldova wines ahead of EU Summit”, EU Observer, 9 November 2013, http://euobserver.com/foreign/121388, consulted in March 2014.

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“The inability of European bureaucrats to keep up with the Kremlin's manipulations – or Kiev's political calculations – has cost the EU a trade deal with Ukraine, and severely damaged its foreign policy. […] The EU offered cooperation, free trade and financial contributions in exchange for democratic reforms. Officials in Brussels spoke enthusiastically about the emergence of a historic Eastern European policy, not unlike former German Chancellor Willy Brandt's rapprochement with the Warsaw Pact countries in the 1970s. […] The EU's other goal, even though it was not as openly expressed, was to limit Russia's influence and define how far Europe extends into the East. For Russia, the struggle to win over Ukraine is not only about maintaining its geopolitical influence, but also about having control over a region that was the nucleus of the Russian empire a millennium ago. This helped create Cold War-style grappling between Moscow and Brussels”

…concluded Der Spiegel19 in the aftermath of the devastating Kyiv announcement. The episode in Vilnius thus ended with a semi-failure of the European Union and its Eastern Neighbourhood Policy. Only two out of the six countries decided to get closer to Brussels. The biggest stake in Vilnius, as it was unanimously agreed, namely Ukraine, was eventually among the reluctant European states. The failing Eastern Neighbourhood Policy, in the light of the poor Vilnius Summit results, was extensively presented in a Report of the French Senate’s Commission for European Affairs, in December 2013, as a major malfunction of the relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation20. Looking back on the Vilnius Summit of November 2013, it is difficult to consider whether a different negotiation strategy in relation to Yanukovych could have led to a positive decision. Probably not, I suppose. With or without the request of releasing Yulia Tymoshenko from prison, then-President Yanukovych would still not have signed the Association Agreement. The main reason for not siding with Brussels was probably the Kyiv regime’s fear that Ukraine would not be able to resist in

19

Spiegel Staff, “Putin’s Gambit: How EU lost Ukraine”, Spiegel Online International, November 25, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/how-the-eu-lost-to-russia-innegotiations-over-ukraine-trade-deal-a-935476.html, accessed in March 2014. 20 The Senate of France, Information Report with regard to the Relations between the European Union and Russia, the Commission for European Affairs, http://www.senat.fr/rap/r13-237/r13-2371.pdf, 17 December 2013, consulted in April 2014.

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Introduction: The New “Eastern Europe” and Cold War II

the following months the increasing Russian economic pressures, amid its massive debt to Gazprom and Russian banks. A few days after the Vilnius Summit, when President Putin publicly promised a bailout of 2 bn. euro for the Ukrainian economy and any hope for a European perspective seemed lost, virulent protests started in Kyiv’s “Euro Maidan” and, soon after, in many Western Ukrainian cities. Angry people demanded Yanukovych’s resignation, a return to the Constitution before 2004 and an early presidential election. This is where a new and complicated chapter in Ukraine and Eastern Europe’s history was about to start.

The strategic West-Russia dispute over Ukraine: the starting point of the Second Cold War? Ukraine seems today the cornerstone of the revitalised Russian strategic thinking aiming to recover influence over the geopolitical space of the former Soviet Union. Long before the Euro Maidan revolution, Zbigniew Brzezinski had noted: “Russia confronts with the Ukrainian problem, too. For Kremlin, keeping the option of a possible re-absorption of Ukraine represents a central strategic objective.”21 In only a few months, from October 2013 to February 2014, Ukraine switched dramatically back and forth, three times, from a neutral Eastern European country to a pro-EU declarative policy (early fall of 2013), then more or less surprisingly to a Russian-oriented regime (November 2013, ahead of the Vilnius Summit), then again to a pro-West attitude (late February 2014), after the ousting of President Yanukovych. Each of these three turning points left about half of the country dissatisfied, alternatively. It is therefore not so difficult to understand that a country which can move so quickly from one political approach to the complete opposite and then back (and so on) has at least two strong, dividing political options within its society. This symptom of a hesitating and divergent societal structure, balancing between East and West, has proved to be the most proper land for a “head-on collision” between Russia and the EuroAtlantic system. We can agree that both political orientations in Ukraine have numerous supporters and, at the same time, each of them discontents large categories of people or entire regions. Both dimensions are substantial, but neither is sufficiently developed so as to make Ukraine an indistinctive part of Russia or Europe.

21

Brzezinski, Op. cit., 312.

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Essentially, there is almost consensus on admitting that the West of the country is pro-West and has a number of European cultural features, while the East is overwhelmingly pro-Russia. From language and religion (Greek Catholic in the West, Russian Orthodox in the East), architecture, culture and civilisation style, to political options, everything seems to divide the two halves of the country, with Kyiv in the centre as the main engine of the European option. Earlier in 2013, I suggested that Ukraine as a whole seemed stuck between two divergent systems, with not enough arguments and not enough sincere affinity either for Russia or for Western culture, but rather a permanent borderline between the major blocs of interest22. Eugene Chausovsky comes with an interesting connection between cultural and political cleavages within the Ukrainian society: “The east-west Ukrainian cultural divide is deep, and unsurprisingly it is reflected in the country's politics. Election results from the past 10 years show a clear dividing line between voting patterns in western and central Ukraine and those in the southern and eastern parts of the country. In the 2005 and 2010 presidential elections, Yanukovich received overwhelming support in the east and Crimea, but only marginal support in the west. Ukraine does not have ‘swing states’.”23

The Stratfor analyst goes further with his predictions: “Such internal political and cultural divisions would be difficult to overcome under normal circumstances, but Ukraine's geographic and geopolitical position magnifies them exponentially. Ukraine is the quintessential borderland country, eternally trapped between Europe to the west and Russia to the east. Given its strategic location in the middle of the Eurasian heartland, the country has constantly been – and will constantly be – an arena in which the West and Russia duel for influence”.

The text from which these two citations are extracted was published only a few days before the referendum in Crimea. On the 16th of March 2014, upon the decision of the so-called Parliament of Crimea, local authorities organised a referendum on 22

Valentin Naumescu, Issues of International Politics: Conflicts, Tensions, Debates, Cluj-Napoca: European Studies Foundation’s Publishing House, 2014, 324-27. 23 Eugene Chausovsky, “Ukraine’s increasing polarization and the Western challenge”, Stratfor, 11 March 2014, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ukrainesincreasing-polarization-and-western-challenge, consulted March 2014.

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Introduction: The New “Eastern Europe” and Cold War II

secession from Ukraine and joining the Russian Federation. Not at all surprisingly, the result was an overwhelming 96.77% in favour of secession (independence), immediately followed by an application to join Russia24. Two days later, President Vladimir Putin signed the “treaty” on Crimea’s annexation. In fact, that was an incredibly fast operation on the part of Russia, without any military resistance from Ukrainian troops. Less than four weeks after the fall of Yanukovych on February 22nd, Russia took control of Crimea, notwithstanding massive political and diplomatic protests and criticism from the United States, the European Union and almost all over the world. Even the (usually) neutral China went on record as a supporter of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and in favour of respecting the provisions of international law: “China always respects all countries’ sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The Crimean issue should be resolved politically under a framework of law and order. All parties should exercise restraint and refrain from raising the tension.”25

Nevertheless, on the eve of the Crimean referendum, Russia vetoed a resolution of the UN Security Council intending to declare the referendum unconstitutional, eventually supported by 13 member states out of 15. China abstained. If the European Union’s first reaction to the annexation of Crimea was rather timid, what about the economic, military and political levers of Russia in Ukraine and in the region? Andrew Wilson, from the European Council on Foreign Relations, reveals them, starting from the context of the Vilnius Summit and the Euro Maidan revolution in Kyiv: “Russia has been pressurizing all its neighbours since 2013 to dissuade them from closer relations with the EU. The threat of a new but anarchic democracy on Russia’s doorstep will make things even harder for Moscow to accept. At the same time, Russia cannot rely on all of the levers of influence that worked under the old Yanukovych regime, but

24

The Voice of Russia, “Crimea applied to become part of Russia following referendum”, 17 March 2014, http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_03_17/Crimeaapplied-to-become-part-of-Russia-following-referendum-2860/, consulted in March 2014. 25 Shannon Tiezzi, “China Reacts to the Crimea Referendum”, The Diplomat, March 18, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-reacts-to-the-crimeareferendum/, consulted in March 2014.

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might use some new ones that have been taboo so far – such as threatening to provoke the split up of the country.”26

Wilson mentions, among such levers, the desperate need for economic assistance and the immense debt of Ukraine to Russian banks, gas dependency, and strategic industries such as aviation, shipbuilding, metallurgy or nuclear power, all of which are dependent on Russian capital, resources or technology. Last but not least, compact Russian communities in Eastern industrialised cities like Donetsk, Kharkiv or Dnipropetrovsk represent a mass of political manoeuvre and structural vulnerability for the Ukrainian state. The episode of Crimea is more than relevant for the weakness of the Kyiv government in relation to the territories inhabited by large majorities of Russian ethnics. Although President Putin has announced he is not interested in annexing more territories, in Ukraine and in other countries in the region (Georgia, Moldova), the fear persists that the situation could repeat itself in Eastern Ukraine, Transnistria, Abkhazia or South Ossetia.

Discussions over NATO’s Eastern Pivot and Consolidation. Why different tones in Germany (Western Europe) and the US? The Crimean crisis has prompted a serious debate in the North-Atlantic Alliance with regard to Central and Eastern Europe’s defence against revitalized Russian expansionist ambitions. The vulnerability of Central European member states of the Alliance, as well as of the non-NATO but West-oriented countries in Eastern Europe (the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia) is based not only on their smaller size, in comparison to the Russian military might, but also on the scarcity of NATO military facilities in Central Europe, at the Eastern border of the Alliance. A Report of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) from March 2014 reveals this severe imbalance between the massive deployment of NATO troops and installations in Western Europe (a reminiscence of the Cold War, 1949-1990) and Central Europe (Baltic republics, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria).

26

Andrew Wilson, “Supporting the Ukrainian Revolution”, European Council on Foreign Affairs – Policy Memo, February 2014, www.ecfr.eu, consulted in March 2014.

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Introduction: The New “Eastern Europe” and Cold War II “But NATO behaviour has also fuelled CEE insecurity. Under the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which preceded the first round of eastern enlargement, Alliance members issued a joint declaration (the so-called “three Nos”) stating that they had ‘no intentions, no plans and no reason’ to place significant military assets, including especially tactical nuclear weapons, in CEE countries. While receiving the all-important Article 5 guarantee (the essence of the NATO commitment and a revolutionary improvement in security), the CEE member states have been given few physical embodiments of that guarantee. In short, their security rests more on trust than military muscle.”27

Basically, the NATO debate was trigged by the Russian annexation of Crimea and the absence of a credible political and economic response from the European Union. The discussions over possible EU sanctions against Russia only led to a visa ban affecting 33 Russian second-level officials, which was considered almost ridiculous and completely ineffective. For many analysts, the weakness of the EU’s reaction was mainly due to Europe’s strong dependency on Russian gas. Moreover, the interests of some big German companies to keep their access and connections to the Russian market and resources made Berlin’s voice quite timid during the crisis. The fact that Germany “pulled back” and became relatively quiet after Crimea’s annexation by Russia is actually contradictory with initial German exigencies with regard to Yanukovich and the regime’s brutal intervention in Euro Maidan. Their favourite former opposition leader, Vitali Klitschko, withdrew from the presidential race to run for the capital city’s mayoral position. When things went too far, Germany realised that a full-fledged Cold War II against Russia, accompanied by severe EU sanctions, would seriously damage its economic interests. The prudence of the Berlin administration to go ahead with the idea of economic sanctions was visible for many European and North-American analysts. For Vlad Mixich, it seems that: “Putin relies on its strongest allies within the most important EU member state: the giant German companies with which he makes businesses […]

27

Edward Lucas and A. Wess Mitchell (lead authors), “Central European Security After Crimea: The Case for Strengthening NATO’s Eastern Defenses”, Center for European Policy Analysis, Report no. 35,Washington D.C., March 2014.

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For instance, the President of Rotschild Deutschland, Klaus Mangold, has recently affirmed that ‘sanctions are the wrong way’”.28

Mixich comes with details in his report regarding the magnitude of BASF, Wintershall, RWE, E.on, Metro, Volkswagen or Siemens investments and connections with the Russian market. On the contrary, the US’ attitude and tone on Crimea’s annexation and Russian intrusion in Eastern Ukraine’s separatist movement was far more critical than the EU’s and it clearly stressed the necessity for international sanctions. There are at least three possible reasons for the vigorous American reaction: the traditional Democrat-Republican rivalry which gave the conservative opposition the opportunity to criticise the weakness of the Obama administration and, thus, to raise the political stakes of the issue, the US’ interests in leading NATO’s restructuring and increasing military capabilities at the Eastern European border of the Alliance, and Washington’s strategy to contain Russia, inspired by Cold War I. New York Times’ columnist Peter Baker explained, in April 2014, the old and new US policy in the region: “Just as the United States resolved in the aftermath of World War II to counter the Soviet Union and its global ambitions, Mr. Obama is focused on isolating President Vladimir V. Putin’s Russia by cutting off its economic and political ties to the outside world, limiting its expansionist ambitions in its own neighborhood and effectively making it a pariah state.”29

For Republicans, it seems that this is not enough. Arizona Senator and former presidential candidate John McCain conducts the tough musical score of the “hawks” in clear and strong words: “The first, and most urgent, is crisis management. We need to work with our allies to shore up Ukraine, reassure shaken friends in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, show Mr. Putin a strong, united front, and prevent the crisis from getting worse. This does not mean military action against Russia. But it should mean sanctioning Russian officials, isolating Russia 28

Vlad Mixich, “Putin’s Most Powerful European Ally”, Hotnews, 20 March 2014, http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-16863473-cel-mai-puternic-aliateuropean-lui-vladimir-putin.htm, consulted in March 2014. 29 Peter Baker, “In Cold War Echo, Obama Strategy Writes Off Putin”, The New York Times, 19 April 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/world/europe/incold-war-echo-obama-strategy-writes-off-putin.html?hp&_r=0, consulted in April 2014.

16

Introduction: The New “Eastern Europe” and Cold War II internationally, and increasing NATO’s military presence and exercises on its eastern frontier. It should mean boycotting the Group of 8 Summit in Sochi and convening the Group of 7 elsewhere. It should also mean making every effort to support and resupply Ukrainian patriots, both soldiers and civilians, who are standing their ground in government facilities across Crimea. They refuse to accept the dismemberment of their country. So should we”30.

In fact, the occult interference of the “other side” in the Ukrainian crisis is exactly what both US and Russian leaders are suspecting: the one of the Western powers in the Euro Maidan Revolution (as per Kremlin’s view) and the one of Russia in the separatist movements from Eastern Ukraine, in retaliation for the new pro-West orientation of Kyiv. An interesting, clear and well-balanced perspective on the US’ approach to the Ukrainian crisis is proposed by Steven Pifer. The Director of the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative defines the American response with the following main lines of action: “The U.S. government’s response has been organized along three vectors: (1) bolster the Ukrainian government; (2) reassure NATO allies unnerved by Moscow’s aggressive behavior; and (3) penalize Russia with the objective of promoting a change in Russian policy. […] Russia’s actions constitute a fundamental challenge to the post-war order in Europe. The illegal seizure of Crimea is the most blatant land-grab that Europe has seen since 1945. The United States and Europe need to respond adequately and ensure that Russia faces consequences for this kind of behavior. Otherwise, the danger is that Mr. Putin may pursue other actions that would further threaten European security and stability.”31

It is not difficult to identify in these short comments and analyses the same fears and considerations which used to underlie the Truman doctrine of containment in 1947, fuelling the onset of the Cold War. The fall of the pro-Russian regime of President Yanukovich in Kyiv, after massive and violent protests, was perceived by Moscow as the West’s obscure manoeuvre.

30

John McCain, “Obama Has Made America Look Weak”, The New York Times, 14 March 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/15/opinion/mccain-a-return-tous-realism.html?_r=0, consulted in March 2014. 31 Steven Pifer, “Ukraine, Russia and the U.S. Policy Response”, Brookings, 5 June 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2014/06/05-ukraine-russia-uspolicy-response-pifer, consulted on 11 June 2014.

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“The Russians are convinced that the uprising in Kiev was fomented by Western intelligence services supporting nongovernmental organizations and that without this, the demonstrations would have died out and the government would have survived. […] That means that they believe that Western intelligence has the ability to destabilize Ukraine and potentially other countries in the Russian sphere of influence, or even Russia itself. This makes the Russians wary of U.S. power”32

…explains George Friedman with respect to Putin’s aggressive riposte against Ukraine, immediately after the ousting of Yanukovich. The NATO Summit in Newport/Cardiff on September 4-5th, 2014, was another significant moment of Cold War II. The talks were focused on balancing the Eastern flank of the Alliance and reassuring the new NATO member states in Central Europe with regard to a full observance of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Baltic countries, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria insisted on establishing permanent military bases in the region, but the Western powers (especially Germany and France) were reluctant to this idea and evoked the 1997 promise made to Russia, just before the first decision of NATO enlargement. The Alliance decided eventually to strengthen its “Readiness Action Plan”33, to establish three regional headquarters in its Eastern periphery (most probably in Poland, Romania and Lithuania), to rotate some troops on a temporary basis in these countries and to fight against cyber espionage.

Conclusions: A Region between Lack of Economic Solutions and Prevalence of Geopolitical Interests The quadripartite34Accord of Geneva from April 17, 2014, neither resolved the crisis of Ukraine nor stopped Cold War II in Eastern Europe, between Russia and the West. Although the idea of disarming the illegal groups and vacating occupied buildings on the territory of Ukraine was fair and reasonable, just a few days later, the first victims were announced in the separatist regions. It is a clear sign that the crisis is still far from

32 George Friedman, “Russia and the United States Negotiate the Future of Ukraine”, Stratfor,http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russia-and-united-statesnegotiate-future-ukraine, April 2014. 33 For details, see Wales Summit Declaration, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm, consulted in September 2014. 34 Ukraine, Russia, the United States, the European Union.

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Introduction: The New “Eastern Europe” and Cold War II

over. In the fall of 2014, the official death toll already surpassed 3700 in the Donbass region. The perspective of a new Cold War, though officially rejected by both sides, has a number of robust arguments. The divergent and mutually criticising political discourses of Western and Russian officials, the defiance of international law and prior arrangements (such as the Budapest Memorandum on Ukraine of 199435), the tougher or softer sanctions, threats and isolation, the military manoeuvres in the region (Russian as well as NATO drills), the intelligence services’ wars, the exclusion of Russia from G8 and return to the old G7, the reinvented ideological propaganda on certain media channels etc. are among the symbolic and combatant-like gestures that remind us of the tensions before 1989. In his already mentioned analysis, Steven Pifer hits the nail on the head: “What Mr. Putin does want is a sphere of influence, which he views as a key component of Moscow’s great power status. Countries within that sphere are expected to eschew policies, such as drawing too close to NATO or the European Union that Kremlin regards as inconsistent with Russian interests.”36

However, he suggests that a quick admission of Ukraine to NATO or the European Union is not realistic, from the perspective of the West’s criteria. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Professor at Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, sees a preliminary connection of the current Cold War with the Russian-US dispute from the past years, with regard to the deployment of an American anti-missile shield in Eastern Europe, and elaborates on this idea in the context: “Can you see that the Russians were right to fear the installation of the [American] shield? But actually this is false: the Russians are not doing brilliantly, economically speaking, and it is not the right time for them to

35 The US, UK, Russia and Ukraine signed a Memorandum to guarantee Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for Ukraine’s renouncement of holding nuclear arms, inherited from the Soviet Union epoch. For details, see Terry Atlas, “Ukraine Gave Up Nuclear Arms in 1994 Deal Russia Flouts”, Bloomberg, 5 March 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-05/ukraine-gave-upnuclear-arms-in-1994-deal-russia-flouts.html. 36 Pifer, op. cit.

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openly defy everybody. This being said, the Cold War is upon us and the more sanctions we impose, the more we have to negotiate with them.”37

The tragedy of Eastern Europe, in its old and new version, is chiefly represented by the same paradoxical cleavage between high geopolitical significance and the economic weakness of the region. Albeit the former “East-Central Europe” has relatively escaped Russia’s economic influence after joining the European Union in the 2000s (although some EU member states still rely considerably on Russian gas), the countries of the “Eastern Neighbourhood” depend on the Russian market and trade to a large extent. The Economist analyses the gas dependency of the European Union in relation to Russia, affecting an average of 24% for the 28 member states, but with countries such as Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Finland completely dependent on Russian gas supply or having very high levels of dependency: Bulgaria 89%, Slovakia 83%, Hungary 80%, Poland 59% etc. According to the same analysis, the largest European economy, namely Germany, has a 37% dependency rate on Russian gas supply38. The substantial energy dependence on Russian gas resources and, in most cases, Russian imports and exports, represents a major vulnerability of the countries aspiring to Western integration. The economic aid from the West is slow and insufficient. There are no immediate solutions for the huge debts of Ukraine to the Russian economy or for the fragility Moldova is bound to face once it loses access to the immense market in the East. None of these countries are competitive enough to simply switch from the Russian market to the EU market, despite the facilities offered through the Free Economic Exchange Accord, as part of the Association Agreement. The lack of firmness and effective solutions and the hesitant response of the West to Crimea’s annexation are deeply concerning the countries in the region. According to Professor Aurel Braun from the University of Toronto: “as they witness the shrinking of the democratic space in Russia and elsewhere and the rise of extremist movements globally, the Eastern European concerns are emblematic of larger global problems. Though 37

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “ùapte idei greúite despre criza din Ucraina” (Seven Misconceptions about the Ukraine crisis), România Liberă, 3 March 2014, http://www.romanialibera.ro/opinii/comentarii/%C5%9Eapte-idei-gresite-desprecriza-din-ucraina-327667, consulted in March 2014. 38 The Economist, “Conscious uncoupling”, The Economist, 5 April 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21600111-reducing-europesdependence-russian-gas-possiblebut-it-will-take-time-money-and-sustained, consulted on 3 July 2014.

20

Introduction: The New “Eastern Europe” and Cold War II American declinism may be overstated at times and a post-Obama administration may more fully and vigorously reengage America, for the next few years the search for security depends on strengthening other sources.”39

It is not yet clear which “other sources” of European security could be taken into consideration if neither the United States nor the European Union are ready to effectively oppose the Russian strategic offensive in the former Soviet republics. Cold War II reveals the strategic potential and geopolitical attractiveness of the Eastern European periphery, as well as its fragility, limits and vulnerabilities. The West would definitely like to see these countries turn their hook upon Russia but, at the same time, neither the European Union nor the United States are prepared to help them consistently. Russia started a restructuring of the balance of power in the region, in order to restore its strategic influence, at least in the former perimeter of the defunct Soviet Union. At the end of the day, this tension will end in a new balance of power in the region. We do not yet know whether Putin’s attempt to increase the international profile of his country by “defending traditional Russian interests in the region” (as Foreign Minister Lavrov often explains) and keep the West away from the former USSR frontiers will be successful or not. What we do know for sure is the fact that, maybe for the first time in their history, countries like Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova or Georgia could have a real opportunity to decide on what direction they would like to take, albeit (for one reason or another) this decision might be far more difficult than they expected a few years ago, when the Eastern Partnership was enthusiastically launched.

Bibliography 1. A.O., “Ukraine and the EU: Politics of Brutal Pressure”, The Economist, 22 November 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/11/ukraine-and-eu0, accessed in March 2013. 2. Atlas, Terry, “Ukraine Gave Up Nuclear Arms in 1994 Deal Russia Flouts”, Bloomberg, 5 March 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-05/ukraine-gave-up-nuclear-armsin-1994-deal-russia-flouts.html, consulted in April 2014.

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Aurel Braun, “On Promoting Democracy and Security”, Democracy and Security in the 21st Century: Perspectives on a Changing World”, Editor Valentin Naumescu, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, xii.

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3. Baker, Peter, “In Cold War Echo, Obama Strategy Writes Off Putin”, The New York Times, 19 April 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/world/europe/in-cold-war-echo-obamastrategy-writes-off-putin.html?hp&_r=0, consulted in April 2014. 4. Balmforth, Richard and Vasovic, Aleksandar, “Ukraine peace deal falters as rebels show no sign of surrender”, Reuters, 21 April 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/21/us-ukraine-crisisidUSBREA3A1B520140421, consulted in April 2014. 5. Besançon, Alain, SfântaRusie [Holy Russia], Bucharest: Humanitas, 2014. 6. Braun, Aurel, “On Promoting Democracy and Security”, Democracy and Security in the 21st Century: Perspectives on a Changing World”, Editor Valentin Naumescu, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, viii-xii. 7. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Central and Eastern Europe in the Storm of Transition, Bucharest: Diogene, 1995 8. Chausovsky, Eugene, “Ukraine’s increasing polarization and the Western challenge”, Stratfor, 11 March 2014, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ukraines-increasing-polarization-and-westernchallenge, consulted March 2014. 9. Chifu, Iulian, BălăúoiuNarciz and Arghir, Radu, The East-West Black SeaCaspian Sea Strategic Corridor, Bucharest: Romanian Academy’s Institute for Political Science and International Relations Publishing House, 2014. 10. Crawford, Keith, East Central European Politics Today: From Chaos to Stability?, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996. 11. Eastern Partnership Community, “EaP at a glance”, Eastern Partnership, 2009,http://www.easternpartnership.org/content/eap-at-a-glance, accessed March 2014 12. Friedman, George, “Geopolitical Journey: Azerbaijan and America”, Stratfor, June 11, 2013, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/geopolitical-journeyazerbaijan-and-america, consulted in June 2013. 13. Friedman, George, “Russia and the United States Negotiate the Future of Ukraine”, 1 April 2014, Stratfor, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russia-andunited-states-negotiate-future-ukraine, consulted in April 2014. 14. Gardner, Andrew, “Armenia chooses Russia over EU”, European Voice, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2013/september/armenia-choosesrussia-over-eu/78090.aspx, 3 September 2013, accessed in March 2014. 15. Kundera, Milan, “The Tragedy of Central Europe”, New York Review of Books, Vol. 13, Issue 7, 16 April 1984. 16. Langbein, Julia, and Borzel, Tanja (eds.), Explaining Policy Change in the European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood, New York: Routledge, 2014. 17. Lucas, Edward and Mitchell, A. Wess (lead authors), “Central European Security after Crimea: The Case for Strengthening NATO’s Eastern Defenses”, Center for European Policy Analysis, Report no. 35, Washington D.C., March 2014. 18. McCain, John, “Obama Has Made America Look Weak”, The New York Times, 14 March 2014,

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19. 20.

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22.

23. 24. 25. 26.

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Introduction: The New “Eastern Europe” and Cold War II http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/15/opinion/mccain-a-return-to-usrealism.html?_r=0, consulted in March 2014. Mixich, Vlad, “Putin’s Most Powerful European Ally”, Hotnews, 20 March 2014, http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-16863473-cel-mai-puternicaliat-european-lui-vladimir-putin.htm, consulted in March 2014. Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina, “ùapte idei greúite despre criza din Ucraina” (Seven Misconceptions about the Ukraine crisis), România Liberă, 3 March 2014, http://www.romanialibera.ro/opinii/comentarii/%C5%9Eapte-idei-gresitedespre-criza-din-ucraina-327667, consulted in March 2014. NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm, consulted in September 2014. Naumescu, Valentin, “Ukraine Lost Crimea. The West Won’t Defend It Militarily! The Second Cold War Starts”, 1 March 2014, Contributors, http://www.contributors.ro/editorial/ucraina-a-pierdut-crimeea-occidentul-nuo-va-apara-militar-incepe-al-doilea-razboi-rece. Naumescu, Valentin, Themes of International Politics: Conflicts, Tensions, Debates, Cluj-Napoca: European Studies Foundation’s Publishing House, 2014. Nielsen, Nikolaj, “Russia bans Moldova wines ahead of EU Summit”, EU Observer, 9 November 2013, http://euobserver.com/foreign/121388, consulted in March 2014. Pifer,Steven, “Ukraine, Russia and the U.S. Policy Response”, Brookings, 5 June 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2014/06/05-ukrainerussia-us-policy-response-pifer, consulted on 11 June 2014. Putin, Vladimir, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”, 25 April 2005, Kremlin Archives, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912 _87086.shtml, consulted in March 2014. Spiegel Staff, “Putin’s Gambit: How EU lost Ukraine”, Spiegel Online International, November 25, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/how-the-eu-lost-to-russia-innegotiations-over-ukraine-trade-deal-a-935476.html, accessed in March 2014. The Economist (Editorial), “Conscious uncoupling”, The Economist, April 5th 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21600111-reducing-europesdependence-russian-gas-possiblebut-it-will-take-time-money-and-sustained, accessed in July 2014. The Senate of France, “Information Report with regard to the Relations between the European Union and Russia”, Reports – the Commission for European Affairs, http://www.senat.fr/rap/r13-237/r13-2371.pdf, 17 December 2013, consulted in April 2014. The Voice of Russia, “Crimea applied to become part of Russia following referendum”, The Voice of Russia, 17 March 2014, http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_03_17/Crimea-applied-to-become-part-ofRussia-following-referendum-2860/, consulted in March 2014.

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31. Tiezzi, Shannon, “China Reacts to the Crimea Referendum”, The Diplomat, March 18, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-reacts-to-the-crimeareferendum/, consulted in March 2014. 32. Wilson, Andrew, “Supporting the Ukrainian Revolution”, European Council on Foreign Affairs – Policy Memo, February 2014, www.ecfr.eu, consulted in March 2014.

THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP AT A CROSSROADS: SUCCESS OR FAILURE, REALISM OR ILLUSION?

POLAND AND THE CREATION OF THE EAP: BETWEEN WESTERN PREFERENCES AND EASTERN CONCERNS RUXANDRA IORDACHE

Abstract The Eastern Partnership is an instrument which appeared to be both necessary and at some point controversial for the European Union, at a time that witnessed the enlargement process towards the former communist states, whilst new perspectives and challenges in the security field emerged from the new configuration of international relations. The six countries addressed by this component of the European neighborhood security axis seem to represent, for the EU as an international organization, not only a regional bloc, but also a variety of individual actors – in a context where the dissolution of the USSR rendered the geopolitical map more complicated. The EU itself became more intricate, mixing in this puzzle old and new member states with the declared intention to achieve a single or consensual voice. It is interesting, in our view, to study the case of the EaP from the perspective of a (recent) member state – Poland – which had the initiative of creating this instrument. We shall try, in this article, to reconstitute the phases leading to the official launch of the EaP in the spring of 2009, starting from the specific profile of the foreign and security policy of Poland, both as an individual actor and as a Central European state, in the broader context of the double adhesion to NATO and the EU, and, of course, taking into account the Russian interests. What was, for Poland, the meaning of the EaP, in these permanent imbrications of interests, power and influences binding in a complex and multivalent relationship the big actors performing both as individual voices and as strong members of international organizations? How did Poland try to balance its transatlantic and European options, while permanently looking towards Russia? How did Poland bring this particular subject onto the European

Ruxandra Iordache

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agenda and how did the European institutions and the member states react? Keywords: Poland, Eastern Partnership, NATO, European Union, Russia The creation of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) represented a redefinition of the EU’s interests concerning a number of six states – Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus – situated in a much wider space, and which is currently less related to European realities, constituting a challenge for the content, the strategy and the practice of the concept of security. Through the very fact that they have formed an area of joint neighbourhood, a buffer zone between the West and Russia since the period of dismantlement of the world of bipolar rivalry, as they are unequally developed and the frontier of the Western world has been displaced more and more towards the East, over the last 20 years, attracting discontent and sanctioning reactions in the form of blackmail from Russia, the six states mark an effervescent and dynamic space. The latter is both surprising and predictable, consubstantial and heterogeneous, marked by a succession of events, actions and reactions, which prompt the continuous discussion and revaluation of a dedicated instrument, such as the EaP. Beyond the noticeable richness of events and geopolitical reassessments that offer permanent study materials, meant to theorize and verify this instrument, within the dynamics that dare the academic space to keep up, we consider that, if only to attempt to revaluate or understand the EaP, it is interesting to look back, to less than a decade ago. Meanwhile, following the Polish initiative (with Swedish support) that triggered the creation of the EaP, we are once again bringing back to light the realities of that time, as a potential invitation to ponder present-day facts. Thus, we may understand whether such dynamics that seem to unfold at full speed are merely a shallow phenomenon, vesting in more or less passing appearances the same phenomenon. This endeavour enables us to emphasize the role played by Poland in achieving the current state of this project. We consider that Poland represents a significant case for the manner in which a new member state of the European Union attempts to set on the European agenda – in fact a mosaic of older and newer states – a theme of national interest, articulated as a European interest in an emergent region.

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Poland and the Creation of the EaP

The end of the 20th century, prolonged into the first decade of the 21st century, was characterized by the ample process of political, economic, security and strategic positional change of the states from Central and Eastern Europe on the international stage, itself caught in a process of reconfiguration. This road of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe was paved as the exit from the logic of the rival blocks was marked by identity and security interrogations concerning their place and role within the new architecture of international relations1. Three parallel and interconnected processes reveal the amplitude of this change: “the global evolutions, entailing structural transformations of economies and societies, the systemic transition from the directed political and economic system toward democracy and the market economy, and the parallel extension of the two great international organizations, NATO and the EU2.”

The double Western integration of the former communist states had, at the same time, political, economic, social and cultural dimensions. It took place within an international relations context where the concept of security was in the course of reconstruction, in the light of the new postCold War realities. Their connections with the concept of risk, which covers a plurality of political, economic, demographic, ethnic, religious etc. factors, potentially generate a more or less predictable, or identifiable, or probable danger.3 These states “opted” for “strategic definitions and decisions susceptible to accommodate a pro-Western alignment… as proof of their return to democratic normality”4. Moreover, these risks emerge with regard to the variables of a new regional geography, progressively set against the background of the multi-level reconfigurations of the world map.5

1

Soloch Krzysztof, “Les pays d'Europe centrale entre solidarité européenne et préférence atlantique”, Politique étrangère, 2009/3, p. 541, DOI : 10.3917/pe.093.0541, www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2009-3-page-541.htm, 2 Tadeusz Stryjakiewicz “La nouvelle géographie de la Pologne dans le contexte de la transition économique et sociale et de l'élargissement de l'Union européenne”, in L'Information géographique, 2007/4 Vol. 71, p. 100, DOI : 10.3917/lig.714.0100, www.cairn.info/revue-l-information-geographique-2007-4-page-100.htm 3 Soloch Krzysztof, loc.cit., 2009/3, p. 544. 4 Ibidem. 5 Tadeusz Stryjakiewicz, loc.cit., p. 101.

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Compared to the changes brought to the international system by the Vienna Congress, the Versailles Conference or the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the new context seemed vaguer in its contours: “… the year 1989 did not seem decisive in itself, in the sense that it was not the year that affirmed a new paradigm. The following years remained, thus, confusing”6 and even more complex, with a sinuous and unpredictable international environment, where the enlargement of prominent international organizations generated multiple and even contradictory effects on states/regions. This is especially true of the “buffer areas”, formed out of the so-called weak states, which had the tendency to renationalize policies during a sensitive period of revaluation of the role of modern states. They were also inclined to choose a trajectory towards the West, without a complete detachment from the contrary orbit, so the fluidity of the international environment was both a cause and an effect. In this broader picture, even if specialists speak about the definitive end of the Cold War, the European security system imposed itself and continues to do so, as it has to be considered from the perspective of Russia’s reactions: “Today and in the near future, no factor has a greater importance for European security than Russia. If (the latter) continues to be haunted by the old demons, the cold is to fall over Europe. If, on the contrary, Russia becomes a partner and acts concertedly with the other states, Europe’s security can be organized according to its specific interests. Anyhow, Russian-American relations depend on the relations between Russia and the other European states.”7

The Central European states, such as Poland, have been captured by both Western integration axes, but have remained on the older track of Russian hegemony. Are they actors on an international stage where we can suppose that a harmonization of the interests of the Great Powers is possible? For that matter, we could think about deciphering the options of the states from Central Europe starting from a contrary premise, according to which the accepted end of the Cold War did not bring about the end of the rivalry between the great powers. On the other hand, of course, these great powers continue to protect each other, within a quicksand scheme imposing on smaller states consistent efforts of adaptation, tracking and 6

Soloch Krzysztof, loc.cit., p. 547. M. Stürmer, Westeuropa und Russland ein Verhältnis auf der Suche nach einer Strategie, apud Soloch Krzysztof, loc.cit., p. 548. 7

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Poland and the Creation of the EaP

response. The coordinates of Polish foreign politics can be read in both ways. The double accession, to the European Community (which became, at the beginning of the ‘90s, the European Union) and NATO was shaped in keeping with the priorities of their foreign politics and unfolded in parallel, in four stages. Referring to the Polish case, on which we are insisting, we notice that in the first stage (1989-1990), Poland opened negotiations for EU accession and entered the North-Atlantic alliance along with Hungary and the Czech Republic. The fact that NATO accession took place before European integration reveals, at least partially, the predominant orientation of these states towards the transatlantic space, as the main area providing security and as guarantor of the respect for democratic values. During the second stage (1999-2004), Poland found itself among the 8 former communist states that entered the EU8, while in terms of NATO enlargement, 7 states became members during this interval. A third stage (2004-2007) corresponds to the integration of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU, while a fourth, initiated in 2007, is germane to the debate on the potential enlargement of the EU and NATO towards three of the states that are to enter the project of the Eastern Partnership – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – in accordance with a Polish proposal launched at the beginning of this fourth stage. We can see how, in this wave of double membership, the CentralEuropean states, aiming through their foreign policies to adapt to these new realities and, why not, to contribute to the modelling of the security environment, have found themselves, since the outset of this process, in a somewhat paradoxical position: they have seen in the USA and NATO the main guarantors of their democratization and security (more concretely, they have supported the American intervention in Iraq, as well as the antimissile shield), while participating in European policies. This paradox could be understood beyond the apparent tension or option that it might suggest. The participation of Poland and the Czech Republic in the agreements on the anti-missile shield is presented for instance, by the two

8

With regard to the process of Poland’s accession to the EU, placing emphasis on the homogeneous enthusiasm of the regions of this country directed towards this foreign policy objective would be a simplification; greater support granted to European integration is reflected by a series of figures, whose graphic representation reconstitutes the map of Poland, with pro-European regions in its western side, due to an effect of proximity, and less pro-European ones in its Eastern side, but also with differences on the same coordinates between urban and rural areas.

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countries, as a contribution to European security – and not as a simple alignment to the requirements of their American ally.9 A complete profile of Poland as a player with initiative and strategy, aiming to promote its interests within the EU concert of states, is interesting to evaluate; in this study, however, our attention rests only on the Polish initiative concerning the creation of a more advanced instrument within the Common Neighbourhood Policies, namely the Eastern Partnership. Before the EaP, one Polish initiative in the Euro-Atlantic framework was 'energy NATO' (2006), which was not sufficiently consulted with any of the EU member states and was badly received once proposed and rejected immediately afterwards; the second initiative concerned the square root voting system in the Council of Ministers and was presented in the framework of the negotiations on the new treaty (2007): it was explicitly supported only by the Czech Republic and quickly withdrawn when the extension of the Nice system was proposed by Germany and France.10 We shall now attempt to retrace the steps that have shaped this initiative into a concrete instrument, but also to frame the whole approach within the context of the specific Polish interests in terms of security. Several dominant directions characterizing Poland’s actions in the first decade of the years 2000 are found under the form of certain patterns that manifest themselves at present, two decades after the fall of the Iron Curtain. These directions are in a relation of interdependency and interconnection: the transatlantic orientation – represented by the closeness to NATO and the bilateral relations with the USA; the European orientation – the efforts aiming to influence the security policy of the European Union; and the East-European direction, emphasizing the

9

Soloch Krzysztof, loc.cit., p. 551. Agnieszka K. Cianciara, “‘Eastern Partnership’ – opening a new chapter of Polish Eastern policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy?”, The Institute of Public Affairs, no.4/2008, p. 2, available on www.fride.org. On the mathematic formulae for calculating the votes in EUC see, for example: Sara Hagemann and Julia De Clerck-Sachsse, Decision-Making in the Enlarged Council of Ministers: Evaluating the Facts, in Policy Briefs, no.119, January 2009, CEPS; Frantisek Turnovec, “National, Political and Institutional Influence in European Union Decision Making”, in Acta Universitatis Carolinae Oeconomica, AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 2, no2/2008; etc. Poland’s intention was to diminish the weight of the vote of the great powers within this European decision-making institution. 10

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relationship between Ukraine and Russia.11 These patterns are reflected by the Polish initiative that led to the EaP. Beyond this interdependency of the three abovementioned axes, academic studies have emphasized Poland’s option to tip the balance in the transatlantic direction. Ever since 1989, in Poland there has been consensus among the elites on the aim of obtaining the status of NATO member as a key national security objective. The majority of the population also perceived Poland’s transatlantic option as a guarantee for the recovery of national sovereignty and for the removal of Russian domination.12 Through NATO accession, Poland, along with the other states from Central and Eastern Europe, was looking for the guarantee of American protection, accepting in exchange a certain alignment. One conclusive example is the acceptance by Poland, and also by the Czech Republic, in the summer of 2008, of the agreements pertaining to the installation of certain elements of the anti-missile shield on their territory, officially explained through the need to protect against Iranian missiles, although seen as an official means of “anchoring the American presence in Europe and at the same time stopping a Russian threat.”13 Poland has been part of the EU since 2004 and it has also manifested itself as an actor in this security environment, beyond the difficulties the EU encountered, at that time, in becoming a real and efficient actor through its foreign and common defence policies. The idea of upholding its own security interest was developed within a context populated by other actors and laden with often divergent directions – with respect to aims, as well as means – of their interests. For instance, France and Belgium wanted a reduction of the influence of the USA in Europe, while favouring the repositioning of the European project, whereas Germany exhibited a fluctuating attitude towards the USA. On several occasions, A. Michta synthesizes the essence of this Transatlantic-European interdependence and of its double connection that configures the security policy of Poland; the disparity in the power balance between Poland and the USA, on the one hand, but also between Poland and the big states of the EU, on the other hand, bears special weight in this matter: “…ultimately Poland’s value to the United States is a direct function of its influence in Europe, and conversely (…) its ability to get things done 11

Andrew A. Michta, “Polish Security Policy: keeping priorities in balance,” in: The Polish Review, no. 2/2009, p. 229, www.jstor.org. 12 Ibidem, p. 231. 13 Soloch Krzysztof, loc.cit., p. 545.

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in Brussels is significantly impacted by how close it is to the Unites States.14”

This is an interpretation of the balance that Poland needed to look for in its foreign policy on the Western axis, which included the two vectors. On its Eastern axis, one witnessed the emergence of a new strategic area situated between the two big assemblies – Russia and the West (the EU, NATO). Unable to exercise decisive influence on the area, they were forced to work in a direction of complementarities in a common near neighbourhood – indicated in an equivalent manner by phrases such as “near foreign,” “new neighbourhood,” “Eastern neighbourhood”, one which is considered crucial for the security of the continent.15 But to what extent is this truly about complementarities? This indicates rather the overlapping interests, under the sign of an ambivalent quality: on the one hand, the dependence of Europe on Russian energy resources, felt directly in moments such as the delivery halt of Russian hydrocarbons to Ukraine and Belarus in 2006 and 2007, as well as the war in Georgia; on the other hand, it was the ever growing attractiveness of the EU for the former Soviet republics – both aspects taking the form of geostrategic rivalry between the two assemblies. For the states of parted vicinity, “The European Union attracts, but it still weighs too little; Russia has a major importance, but it is feared”16; or, expressed in a slightly more elaborate manner: “there is an obvious tension between, on the one hand, the attractions of a pro-Western agenda which promises aid, technical assistance and eventual integration into the single European market if not membership, and which would have positive benefits for trade and investment, and on the other hand, cooperation with Moscow, given their dependency on Russian energy supplies, as well as the cultural and historical affinities that many of the states share with Russia.”17

14

Andrew A. Michta, loc.cit., p. 230. Laure Delcour, “Le voisinage entre l'Union européenne et la Russie, nouvelle ligne de démarcation?” Revue internationale et stratégique, 2008/4 n° 72, p. 209, DOI:10.3917/ris.072.0209, www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-et-strategique2008-4-page-209.htm 16 Ibidem, p. 216. 17 Jackie Gower and Graham Timmins, “Introduction: The European Union, Russia and the Shared Neighbourhood”, in Europe-Asia Studies, 61:10, 2009, DOI: 10.1080/02684520903282370, p. 1685. 15

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Given this intersection/overlapping of interests between the assemblies, the orientation of the foreign policy of Poland strictly towards the West could be analysed in depth starting from the imperative to consider the new strategic area and its importance for the main menace perceived from the East – Russia, but this analytical perspective can also be placed amid the recent (at that time) membership of the European Union. Regarding the EU, the intention expressed by Polish foreign minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski after independence was that Poland should contribute to the construction of a united Europe through what he called “the second great (German–Polish) reconciliation,” articulated on the American vision of a whole and united Europe, expressed by president Bush in 1989. The border between Poland and Germany became, at the beginning of the 90s, a laboratory for the process of integration of the Eastern area of Europe into the EU.18 The difficulty of this reconciliation was understood by Poland as a compulsory starting point in its attempt to constitute itself as an actor involved in the European security policy, capable of bringing to the fore and of promoting its own security interests on the European agenda, in relation to the Eastern European area. The context of the war in Georgia rendered the Polish-German closeness deeper, both in NATO and in the EU, starting from economic matters, but also with the intention of building a common platform in the Eastern area, given the better position that Germany benefitted from in discussing directly with Russia. Beyond this second great reconciliation, as it was announced in the 90s, the relations between Poland and Germany were not linear and constant, but with some fluctuations, such as the one related to the different positioning of the two in the matter of the (American) war waged in Iraq or the fact that Germany did not accept Poland’s idea of placing its historical politics under the umbrella of the European Union. Despite these differences that reflect the wider framework of divisions within the EU, Michta considers that “close Polish-German relations can be transformative for Europe as a whole”19, although, of course, the context in which the first great reconciliation took place is entirely different due to the fact that EU states are not compulsorily on the same firm position against a common enemy, Russia. The disappearance of this view brought to light, in other words, national and regional differences within the European Union under many aspects, among which one may identify matters of security – or the manner in which national security articulates 18 19

Tadeusz Stryjakiewicz, loc. cit, pp. 112-113. Andrew Michta, loc.cit., p. 236.

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with the European or the global one – i.e. an example which carries weight. Thus, Poland’s fears pertaining to the geostrategic interests of Russia in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus, but also the importance granted to the independence of Ukraine would be, for Germany, lesser priorities compared to its own interests with regard to Russia; on the other hand, Poland relates to the evolutions from the respective areas of national security, and these are linked with security at the European Union level. Also, Poland’s relationship with the USA could not be considered as set on a trajectory with a constant, one-way direction. Obama’s coming to power in the USA brought about changes in the way the country positioned itself with regard to Poland, somewhat calming the enthusiastic Polish expectations which had been shaped during the previous American administration. But this preponderant orientation of Poland towards transatlantic security perspectives becomes explicable if we take into consideration, with reference to the respective years, the inner weakness of the security instrument created by the European Union. Any re-centring of Polish security policy toward the European Union became problematic because of this permanent weakness of the European security and defence policy. As a synthesis of the situation of Poland as an actor in transatlantic relations and within the European Union, we shall say that its options continued to remain limited, also from the point of view of its economic power, as a reflection of its geographical position. The two objectives of Poland during the first years of the post-Cold War period, namely NATO and EU accession, were attained. Even though in all three directions of its external and security policy, the evolutions were rather sinuous and dependent on a multitude of variables of context, Poland would be placed under the assurances of NATO and the EU, less vulnerable as far as its security is concerned than during other historical eras. For Poland, Russia was the natural adversary in the region, to which it was linked by old but never simple relations. The foreign policy of Poland constantly operated with the concept of Eastern policy, whose contents went through a series of variations depending on the target countries, treated separately and difficult to reunite under a common denominator; these contents, though, regardless of such variations, envisioned the country’s positioning with respect to Russia. In the 1990s, Poland turned its attention especially to Ukraine and Belarus, and less to Georgia and

36

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Moldova; from this viewpoint, it seemed less focused on the area of the South Caucasus20, which it would approach later on. Interested in the EU’s policy towards its Eastern neighbours/neighbourhood, Poland had developed an ambiguous position for a while, set against the background of a rather generalized distrust of the Common Foreign and Security Policy; along with the prioritization of the Eastern policy within the CFSP, it also became a priority for the countries in Central Europe, whose geographical position, doubled by their experience in relation to the Eastern neighbours, proved to be useful for the achievement of closeness with the states from the neighbourhood of the EU. Poland articulated its foreign policy based on factors from its proximity – the turmoil in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, the regime in Belarus, Russian policies in the field of energy – with the significant nuance that Poland understood its own interests in the East as being “more a result of its position in the European Union and they should be perceived and realised through this institution”21. As a state in the course of adhesion and, implicitly, one positioned at the frontiers of the EU at the time, Poland was included, along with the Baltic States, in a European initiative towards its Eastern neighbours – the Northern Dimension (from 1997). At the beginning of the years 2000, next to Sweden, Finland and Great Britain, Poland, a candidate state at the time, launched within the EU a debate on the external consequences of the enlargement towards Central Europe, which had to bring the Union in the immediate vicinity of poorer and less democratic countries and, thus, in the proximity of new types of threats: frozen conflicts, organized crime and various types of trafficking, clandestine migration, as well as environmental problems.22 In 2002, at the European Council summit in Copenhagen, Poland presented a non-paper concerning an integrated political proposal pertaining to the Eastern neighbours, with 3 pillars: community, governmental (both bilateral and multilateral) and nongovernmental; the emphasis of the document fell on Ukraine, whose strategic importance justified, for the authors, that the relations between the EU and this state should be of the same weight as those between the EU and Russia.23

20

Agnieszka K. Cianciara, loc.cit., p. 5. Marcin àapczynski, “The European Union’s Eastern Partnership: Chances and Perspectives” in Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3 (2) – Spring 2009, p. 146, available on www.eapnationalplatform.ge 22 Laure Delcour, loc.cit., p. 210. 23 Agnieszka K. Cianciara, loc.cit., p. 5. 21

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In 2003, the EU created the instrument referred to as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – with its triple objective: security, stability and prosperity – addressed to the new borderline areas of the EU, the Southern and the Eastern.24 16 states were eligible for this instrument, among which the six that were included, a few years later, in the EaP. It is noticeable that the primary version of the ENP, originating in the DanishBritish proposal from April 2002, was addressed only to the eastern neighbours – Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. We should also underline that Turkey and the West Balkans, whose status of potential accession candidates was recognized, were not covered by the provisions of this instrument. In Poland, these nuances were received with reluctance, as proof that the ENP traced, with more or less subtlety, the de facto borders of the EU.25 In a general manner, the ENP was considered to be a step forward in establishing relations with the new Eastern actors; Russia’s self-exclusion triggered the apparition of rival agendas between the EU and Russia, all the more since the ENP coincided with the re-election of Vladimir Putin as Russian president and with a more assertive Russian foreign policy.26 From a transatlantic perspective, the ENP seemed for a change: “to be at its origins a practical combination of programmes for two regions (Southern and Eastern), whose uncomfortable juxtaposition did not satisfy either of them. The only link between the ‘neighbouring’ countries was their geographical proximity to an EU member state and not the fact that they were (already) on the path to accession.”27

From the EU’s perspective, the ENP’s paradox, notes Laura Delcour, would be that it is dissociated from a possible accession of the partner countries, expecting them all at the same time, especially through the imposition of legislative harmonization, to be able to make all the necessary reforms for the fulfilment of the accession criteria. Moreover, within the EU, experts and politicians questioned the undifferentiated treatment of the southern and eastern neighbourhoods, given the 24

For other “neighbourhoods,” the EU has built instruments such as EFTA/EEA, or the policy toward the West Balkans or Turkey, as well as the strategic partnership with Russia. 25 Agnieszka K. Cianciara, loc.cit., p. 6. 26 Jackie Gower and Graham Timmins, loc.cit., p. 1686. 27 Esther Brimmer, “Le voisinage de l'Union européenne: sphère de sécurité, réseau de connections ou mariage de convenance?” in Politique étrangère, 2008/1, p. 25-37. DOI : 10.3917/pe.081.0025, p. 25, www.cairn.info/revue-politiqueetrangere-2008-1-page-25.htm

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considerable geographical and identity-related differences between them; EU member states had different projections concerning the future of the ENP – Germany counted on free trade, tax exemption, cooperation in matters of energy, migration control, good governance, the rule of law and the internal security of ENP states, whilst France focused on energy delivery, migration control and the fight against criminality. Great Britain relied on the fight against terrorism, while Poland linked the development of the ENP to the establishment of a community of values and to the strengthening of contacts with the civil society.28 While France, through president Sarkozy, proposed the Mediterranean Union – addressed to the Southern flank, Poland attempted to extract the Eastern neighbourhood from this uncomfortable juxtaposition, by proposing a more specific approach to this region, under the dome of the EU. The actions of Polish political leaders towards the states from the Eastern neighbourhood – especially Ukraine, but also Georgia – provided a starting point for the articulation of a national interest with a European policy, and found a particular argument amid the impossibility to accept a unique concept “which encompasses relations with such countries as Ukraine and Morocco”29. The geopolitical situation of Poland generated this foreign policy approach, which had amongst its objectives the promotion of the Eastern neighbours, especially Georgia and Ukraine, in their process of democratization, as bases and arguments for their integration into Western structures. Certainly, the projections for this buffer zone met the projections of Russian interests and configured a certain profile of Russian-Polish relations, all the more complex because they unfolded against the wider background of EU-Russia relations (the strategic partnership). Anyhow, once this movement aiming to separate the approaches for two neighbourhoods was launched, it was the beginning of the end for the ENP in its original configuration, and the two vicinity areas became competitive in the negotiations game concerning the emphasis that the EU should place, either in one direction or in another. The actions of Polish political leaders traced the landmarks of this support granted to the Eastern neighbourhood of the EU. Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski had a special role in avoiding the escalation of a Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the context of the Orange Revolution from 2004. Despite the Polish (and also Baltic) support for the Orange Revolution, the EU’s reaction was rather modest; instead of the much 28 29

Marcin àapczynski, loc.cit., p. 144. Idem.

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expected future accession of Ukraine, the Commission and the CEU came forward with an Action Plan that spurred discontent both in Ukraine and in Poland. President Leon Kaczynski, elected in 2005, and prime-minister Donald Tusk, nominated after the Polish elections of October 2007, strengthened and extended the relations between Poland and Ukraine, encouraging the latter in its efforts of moving towards the West, a direction which is contrary to Russian interests30, but also to the interests of Georgia and the Baltic States, which found themselves included in a partnership meant to keep these areas at a safe distance from any Russian attack. The new president announced a fresh chapter in the foreign policy of Poland, in whose configuration several things were questioned, such as the German hegemony in the EU, but also the close German-Russian relations, impossible to reconcile, in his opinion, with the Polish interest in the Eastern neighbourhood. The tensioning of the Polish-German relations also affected the relations of Poland with other EU member states, but also with the EU taken as a whole. For a change, the coming to power of Donald Tusk, in 2007, was to trigger a more active and alliance-prone approach to European policy31, in an attempt to rebuild Poland’s relations within the EU – after two years of isolationism, to adopt the formula used by Agnesa. How can one assess the foreign policy approaches of the two Polish leaders, the president and the prime-minister? Their continuity line seemed to be built on the interest in the Eastern area of the EU, but the differences lay not only in style, but also in substance. Therefore, as long as their mandates coincided, until 2010, Polish actions in foreign policy, at least with regard to Russia, were not entirely convergent. In November 2007, Poland gave up opposing Russian membership of the OECD, and a few months later, in February 2008, prime-minister Tusk 30 We quote: “Indeed, Youshchenko’s victory offered Poland new opportunities to strengthen relations with Ukraine, with which it shared a long boundary, many cultural similarities, a historic distrust of Russia, and a heightened interest in drawing closer to the West, especially the US, to bolster the security of both states in response to a perceived Russian expansionism along the Eastern boundary with the former Soviet Union,”, Minton F. Goldman, “Polish Policy towards Ukraine: the Impact on Polish-Russian Relations in 2008-2009”, in The Polish Review, Vol. 54, No. 4/2009, Published by: University of Illinois Press, pp. 451-476, www.jstor.org. Since 2005, Poland has worked closely with Ukraine, which it has named a “strategic partner,” in the sense of strengthening the links with the West, especially in the perspective of Ukraine’s accession to NATO. 31 Agnieszka K. Cianciara, loc.cit., p. 10.

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sent foreign minister Sikorski to Moscow, with assurances that Poland would consult Russia in the matter of the installation of the anti-missile shield. The delay with which Poland accepted the plan regarding the antimissile shield was another result of its attempt to obtain more concessions from the USA, but also to calm Russian sensitivities, expressed in the form of constant blame placed on the respective plan. Within the European framework, Poland proposed, along with Lithuania, at the European Council of 2007, that the ENP should include a multilateral framework, and announced the strengthening of the cooperation between the Visegrad Group and the Baltic States, becoming, somehow, a leader in matters concerning the Eastern dimension of EU policy-making. Unable to obtain German support for its Eastern policy, and finding backing only in Lithuania, the Polish president eventually looked for a new approach, based on energy security and the reduction of the dependency on Russia. Poland stood out once again as Ukraine’s attorney in its orientation towards the West and broadened the range of the concept of Eastern policy by encompassing the South Caucasus. Hence, a deterioration of relations with Russia took place, including a Russian embargo on certain Polish products, as well as the Polish veto on the EU mandate to negotiate the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia, amid an equivocal positioning of the EU towards Russia. At the European Council of March 2008, Polish prime-minister Donald Tusk approved of the creation of the Mediterranean Union – the Southern flank of the ENP – on condition that a similar proposal be accepted for the Eastern area as well. This matter was debated during numerous consultations in Paris, Berlin, Stockholm and in the capital of Central Europe, with the intention of being reassessed at the European Council set for June 2008. The great challenges of the period – instability in Ukraine, the eruption of the war in Georgia, marked by the reprises of Russian energy blackmail – were for Poland occasions to tailor its security interests. Despite Polish support, states such as Ukraine and Georgia were less significant for other voices from the EU than the thorny matter of energy dependency on Russia. For instance, the war in Georgia was univocally condemned by the EU, but Georgia was found responsible for triggering the crisis. Offering specific details, Michta shows that the Polish endeavour in Georgia’s favour did not eventually have an impact on the relations between Russia and the European Union.32

32

Andrew Michta, loc.cit., p. 235.

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In exchange, the Polish agenda in the East seemed to have more echoes in Poland’s relations with NATO, as it results from the proceedings of the NATO Summit in Bucharest (April 2008), as well as from the ministerial meeting held within the same forum in December 2008. The war in Georgia proved once again that Polish security tended to be based especially on the guarantees provided by the famous article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Russia saw Poland become a partner of the US/NATO in a common action – an American-Polish entente – and undermined its influence not only in Ukraine, but also in other ex-Soviet states, members of the CIS, such as Georgia (this state manifesting its pro-Western option as well, since 2003). Nevertheless, according to another author, Laure Delcour, the war in Georgia placed NATO on a less prominent place. Instead, this conflict shaped EU-Russia complementarities and cooperation in a space of joint neighbourhood. With regard to this different approach, the Polish position can also appear in a different light.33 In the fall of 2008, it was clear that the EU had to accept the integration of Ukraine and Georgia. Amid the general “enlargement fatigue”, the EU had doubts concerning the irreversible democratic direction of Ukraine. Generally speaking, post-Soviet democracies were defined by a frailty that reflected the difficulty of their situation, having to choose between the Eastern and the Western axes. The whole area became more complicated due to the Russian actions in Georgia, from August 2008, drawing Kiev’s and Warsaw’s attention to the discontent provoked by the slow but constant progress of Georgia and Ukraine towards the West. If the Polish president was less preoccupied with coddling Russia at the time, already hurt by the interests intersecting in its historical area of influence, prime minister Donald Tusk – along with his foreign minister, Sikorski, took into account the fact that Poland’s political actions should consider keeping good relations with Russia: they… “tried to reassure the Kremlin of Poland’s commitment to good relations with Russia, a strategy that had the blessing of Poland’s Western allies. NATO and the European Union, as well as the US, wanted to avoid alienating Russia at a time when its cooperation was needed in resolving problems outside Europe, such as Iran’s development of nuclear weapons”.34

33 34

Laure Delcour, loc.cit., p. 216. Minton F. Goldman, loc.cit., p. 454.

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Openly criticised by the Polish president for its effects on the security of Ukraine, Georgia and, of course, Poland, the Russian intervention in Georgia was described by Polish prime-minister Tusk in more moderate terms, which placed emphasis on the circumstances that explained the respective Russian actions. The reactions of the Polish opposition, through the voices of president Kaczinsky, former premier Jaroslaw Kaczinsky and former foreign minister Anna Fotyga, portrayed a “symbolic reversal of vectors in foreign policy,” an undesired reorientation towards Russia. They asked that the visits of the Polish premier to Moscow also include meetings with the opposition. Poland supported the common position of the EU on the war in Georgia at the European Council of September 2008, while avoiding any harsh responses such as sanctions against Russia. Instead, Polish leaders tried to obtain from the EU a more open-minded position concerning a future accession of Georgia and Ukraine, and, not without importance, they underlined the need to strengthen energy security, which constituted for Russia a convenient means of blackmail against these states, but also against the West, or the EU member states. Meanwhile, the proposal concerning the Concept of Eastern Partnership, prefigured by the condition imposed by prime-minister Tusk in March 2008, to accept the Mediterranean Union project, was advanced by Poland and Sweden on 26 May 2008, through their foreign ministers, Radosáaw Sikorski and Carl Bildt, within a reunion of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council. The previous day, Sikorski had already spoken about the project in Brussels, during a press conference meant to prepare the public opinion from the EU member states. Nevertheless, political leaders, diplomats and lobbyists were brought up to speed only on the day of the reunion, at a “breakfast briefing”, with the endorsement of the European Policy Centre in Brussels. Polish premier Donald Tusk explained his interest in involving Sweden in this initiative: beyond the fact that the project became more credible emanating from more than just one member state, regardless of its experience in European affairs, the participation of Sweden would have eased the acceptance of the project in Brussels (all the more because it was to hold the EU’s presidency in the second half of 2009); furthermore, Sweden did not have a common border with any of the states from the Eastern neighbourhood of the EU. Together, Sweden and Poland underlined the necessity of balancing the EU’s interests on the Eastern flank, shadowed by the French project concerning the Southern flank; at the launch of the initiative, Sikorski emphasized the distinction between the two flanks in the following terms: “To the South, we have neighbours

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of Europe. To the East, we have European neighbours... They all have the right one day to apply [for EU membership]”35. In other words, the concept of European neighbour was central to the Polish-Swedish initiative, offering a different content to the notion of neighbourhood, with regard to the EU. The Polish-Swedish proposal36 was chiefly directed to a number of five states which would become members – Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – plus one, Belarus, as a participant at the level of experts/technicians, forerunning complete accession. Then, as it results from the EU-Belarus meetings, but also from the numerous EP debates concerning the situation in Belarus, including in the presence of president Lukashenko, the perspectives of this state to become from the very beginning a member of the EaP increased. The declared purpose of this proposal was to consolidate the relations between the EU and its eastern neighbours, through a permanent formula of bilateral and multilateral collaboration with the six states37. The nature of this bilateral cooperation included the following themes: migration; free trade area; civil society; a new generation of Action Plans with each country, with the aim of alignment to EU legislation, standards and norms; and assistance funds to the partner countries. The multilateral framework had as axes: 1) political and security (promoting democracy, common values, the rule of law, cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy, civil service and local administration; 2) borders and cross-border movement: (regulating migration, rendering visa regimes more flexible, improving border infrastructure); 3) economic and financial aspects; 4) environment; 5) social issues (cross-border co-operation, people-to-people contacts, development of co-operation between NGOs, educational programmes, joint research projects etc.). In accordance with the same initial proposal, financial support was not to weigh heavily on the EU budget, the sources of financing taking the form of credits from the EIB and the EBRD, and the voluntary contributions from certain member states of the EU or the EEA. This instrument meant, for some states which had as a common denominator, besides being placed in the same neighbourhood as the EU, 35

Marcin àapczynski, loc.cit., p. 145. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, “Polish-Swedish Proposal: Eastern Partnership,” June 2008, www.msz.gov.pl/Polish-Swedish,Proposal,19911.html 37 See the text of the Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, www.ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=ro&DosId=197721, accessed in July 2014. 36

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the fact that they “intended to further political, economic, and social reforms based on the EU models, which in turn would contribute to increased prosperity and stability in East-Central Europe”; it had a specific meaning for Poland. Quoting Minton F. Goldman: “It was Tusk’s intention to push the EU to embrace a larger presence in the so-called Eastern borderland states, notably Ukraine, and to make Poland the leader of the EU’s Eastward expansion, including ex-Soviet republics, in particular Ukraine.”38

The Polish-Swedish tandem seriously prepared the launch of the proposal, which obtained the preliminary agreement of Germany, Great Britain, Denmark and the Czech Republic; France was brought up to speed in March 2008, once it became clear that the Polish support for the Mediterranean Union would come only if France upheld a similar proposal for the Eastern flank.39 In Poland, the opposition criticized the approach led by Tusk and Sikorski from various perspectives, sustainable in general, but in the European Union’s terms, the tactics of gradual change that the two adopted for the EaP could have significant chances of success.40 By connecting the EU to its Eastern neighbourhood, the EaP became the expression of the… “convergence between the minimal European aspirations of the states from the Eastern neighbourhood of the EU and the better articulated Eastern policies of some member states of the Union, such as Poland and Sweden.”41

At the European Council of 15-16 June 2008, the Polish-Swedish initiative was accepted, and a few days later, it was welcomed by the EP, in the session dedicated to the rapport of the European Council, especially owing to the components of free circulation and free trade. Nevertheless, the document presented to the European Council did not mention the perspective of European integration for the EaP states, maybe the most important of all EaP issues. Despite this setback, Polish diplomats counted on the fact that they would able to reverse the EU’s interest from the 38

Minton F. Goldman, loc.cit., p. 451. Agnieszka K. Cianciara, loc.cit.,p. 3 40 Ibidem, p. 4 41 Gheorghe Ciascai, “The Impact of the Eastern Partnership on the relationship between the EU and the Russian Federation” in Revista de Stiinte Politice si Relatii Internationale [Political Science and International Relations Review], n..2/2011, p. 63. 39

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Southern flank towards the Eastern flank of the neighbourhood, as a trigger of the integration process, at least in the case of Moldova and Ukraine.42 The Council of June 2008 urged the Commission to work on the draft of a proposal, which was launched on 8 December 2008, with a delay caused by the activation of the conflict in Georgia, in the form of a Communication concerning the Eastern Partnership, sent to the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. The document explained the strategic and economic reasons of the new instrument and invited the two institutions from the decision-making triangle to support it in all its scope, including financially. The main axes of bilateral collaboration were taken from the Polish-Swedish proposal (with five domains: new contractual relations; gradual integration into the EU economy; mobility and security; energy security; supporting economic and social development), and multilateral ones, on four levels (meetings of the EaP heads of states/governments; meetings of ministers of foreign affairs attached to the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council; four thematic platforms: Democracy, good governance and stability; Economic integration and convergence with EU policies; Energy security; Contacts between people; panels to support the work of the thematic platforms).43 Given the Swedish backing, Poland succeeded in gaining from Brussels the recognition of the importance of the Eastern Partnership reflected in an increase in the funding allocated for its activities; certainly, the war in Georgia played a role in raising support for this instrument.44

42

Agnieszka K. Cianciara, loc.cit., p. 3 Communication of the Commission toward the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, www.ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=ro&DosId=197721, accessed in July 2014. 44 “The initiative will require supplementing the current ENPI with about €350 million for 2010-2013 as the Commission intends to progressively raise current ENPI funding for eastern partners from current €450 million to €785 million in 2013. To address the most immediate need, the Commission proposes to refocus the ENPI Regional Programme East to sustain the EaP multilateral dimension. Therefore, the funds available now under this programme could be used to start the most important initiatives immediately. The Commission proposes that €250 million could be reprogrammed for the 2010-2013 time period. According to the Commission, a total amount of €600 million, both fresh and re-programmed funds, will be devoted to the implementation of the Initiative”. Cf. Marcin àapczynski, “The European Union’s Eastern Partnership: Chances and Perspectives,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs Vol. 3 (2), 2009, p. 154. 43

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The Polish-Swedish initiative, converted into an official policy of the European Union, became a priority for the Czech presidency of the Council of the European Union, in the first half of 2009.45 EP debates on the instrument of the European neighbourhood policy, covering all the areas of the world, and chiefly as far as the EaP is concerned, were backed by the relentless activity of the Polish MPs – among whom we mention those who drafted reports, on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Commission, concerning CFSP directions (including EaP), generally appreciated in this forum plenum. The European Parliament has been paying close attention to the debates concerning the difficult situations in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Belarus, as well as to the relations between the new instrument and the Russian sensitivities, or its transatlantic interpretations – regarding NATO, but also separately, the USA. On 11 March 2009, the EU Council, in the configuration of the foreign ministers of the 27 member states, drafted the text of the common Declaration concerning the EaP, which was to be delivered at the launch of this policy to the European Council, scheduled for 9 May 200946 and prepared in the plenary meeting of the EP on 11 March 2009. The project triggered different reactions, including with regard to its principles and objectives, the overlap with previous similar initiatives, as well as the NEP or the Black Sea Synergy (from 2007), an initiative in which Romania and Bulgaria invested special efforts. Spain and Italy still preferred the Southern dimension of the neighbourhood. France (found at the presidency of the CEU in the second half of 2008) accepted the initiative, beyond the speculations concerning the launch of the EaP only as an answer to the Mediterranean Union, in the context of the Sarkozy – Tusk rivalry; Germany and especially the Czech Republic (at the presidency of the CEU in the first part of 2009) had positive reactions, as well as Great Britain and Denmark. In the EP, the vast majority of the debates focused on the topic of Belarus, whose authoritarian regime prompted opposite reactions regarding the type of instruments through which the EU should address this country. A series of European MPs – 45

Marcin àapczynski, loc.cit., p. 143; beyond this support from the Czech presidency of the EUC, the EaP has met with many obstacles since its launch, consisting of various factors, such as the financial crisis, at the debut of its cycle at the time. 46 Gheorghe Ciascai, loc.cit., p. 65. It is worth underlining the absence from this summit on the launch of the EaP of the chiefs of government from Portugal, Spain, Italy, but also the reservations expressed by Romania and Bulgaria, which sustained the initiative launched in 2007 on the Eastern space of Europe, under the phrase “Black Sea Synergy”.

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German or British, for instance – did not give credit to the project. A possible Russian reaction to the creation of an instrument for its area of strategic interest would have somehow eased the overcoming of these divergences.47 With respect to the six states invited to join the EaP, the reaction was, in general, of acceptance. There were doubts on the Ukrainian case, for example, derived from the fact that the EaP did not constitute in any way a sort of stage for future accession to the EU. Moreover, this block type approach to the states concerned – which, in fact, constituted an element of novelty brought by the Polish-Swedish proposal, meant to enhance the bilateral framework already provided by the EaP and especially, to ease the funding of the region – stirred Ukrainian sensitivities. The EaP aroused Russian discontent, which saw the European Union as attempting to draw former Soviet states out of its area of influence – Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Georgia, already caught in what Lowerhardt called in 2005 “an economic and diplomatic battlefield”48; among these, one finds Ukraine – the most developed state of the region, but also Belarus, recognized as a Russian sconce and assimilated “to the last dictatorship of Europe”. Even though both Russia and the EU remain interested in ensuring the stability of the region, the relations among them in this regard have been placed by some authors in a “gradual re-emergence of zero-sum calculations and geopolitical competition”49. Hence, the EaP did not necessarily appear as a more suitable framework for the stability of the area and the improvement of the (fluctuating) relations between the EU and Russia. A statement made by Russian foreign minister Lavrov at the end of March 2009 emphasised these aspects. He criticised the EaP as an instrument through which the EU attempted to extend its sphere of influence to its border area with Russia, including Ukraine and especially Belarus. In response, in May 2009, on the occasion of a visit to Russia, Sikorski stressed that the EaP and the ENP did not target Russia – which, he considered, could find practical reasons to take advantage of the EaP – and that no initiative of the European Union towards the states of the EaP represented an attempt to build an alliance of these six former Soviet states

47

Agnieszka K. Cianciara, loc.cit., p. 3 J. Lowenhardt, Stuck in the Middle: The Shared Neighbourhood of the EU and Russia, 2000–2005, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2005, p.5. 49 Jackie Gower and Graham Timmins, loc.cit., p. 1687. 48

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against Russia.50 We may quote, so as to underline the abovementioned aspects, from the same Polish leader, who, in 2009, spoke once again about the inherent interconnections between the EU, Russia and the states of this common neighbourhood: “If we see Russia’s future as being in partnership with the European Union, we cannot deny the same prospect to the people of the countries that make up the joint neighbourhoods of both. It would be a poor solution for the EU and Russia to be separated by a region whose contacts with Europe are less substantial than those it has with Russia.”51

In other words, the relations between the EU and Russia were the key to the development of the states from the region that separates them, or, according to this perspective, could unite them. Constructed based on the importance of Poland-Ukraine relations (amongst other aspects), the initiative aimed at the creation of the Eastern Partnership is an illustrative example meant to enlighten the interconnections of the transatlantic, European and Eastern axes, as patterns of Polish foreign policy. We can see, due to the movements unfolding, the multiple connections – parallel or overlapped – that were configured within the positioning of the actors involved: Poland’s interest in the area covered by the EaP derives from its importance in the matter of Eastern security; Poland and Ukraine seem to have significant convergence from the perspective of their positions, both on Russia and on their quest for Western partners; Poland also attempted to prove to the United States that Belarus had a special meaning for Poland; the war in Georgia was, for Poland, one occasion to strive to bring to the EU’s attention the seriousness of the Russian bellicose actions; the ambivalent relations between the EU and Russia stalled the firm sanctioning of the latter; other European states perceived the EaP from different perspectives – either from that of a different neighbourhood of interest, as in the case of Spain and Portugal, or from the viewpoint of the (useless) doubling of an already initiated instrument – the Black Sea Synergy, as in the case of Romania and Bulgaria. For Poland, this was one moment in a more ample endeavour meant to prove that it is a partner for the transatlantic bodies, credible both 50

Minton F. Goldman, loc.cit., p. 459. Radoslaw Sikorski, “The EU’s ‘Eastern Partnership’ is the Key to Relations with Russia,” in Europe’s World, 12, summer 2009, available on www.europesworld.org/TheEUsEasternPartenership.

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through its position in relation to the actors from the EU area, and through its declared option for relations with NATO and the USA. The new policy treated the six states as a regional block, for which it proposed four platforms concerning free trade, energy resources and the promotion of human rights and democratization, as well as the contribution of individuals to the area of bilateral collaboration.52 Approaching the six states as a regional block became more complicated given the fact that the respective states had different economic, modernization and social levels, but they completed each other in the deepening of bilateral relations (which already existed in the European Neighbourhood Policy), meant to tackle precisely these differences53. At the same time, the generic reference to these states as “Eastern partners” becomes relevant for the manner in which it marks the distance between the EU and the 6. In practical terms, this semi-acceptance is found in the rejection of visa liberalization for the citizens of the EaP states54 and its replacement with more modest accomplishments, such as simplifying visa procedures, on a case by case basis. However, similarly to the situation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership does not constitute a forerunning stage that announces the future integration of these states into the EU. The EU’s interests in the area seem to be marked by a sort of ambivalence deciphered by some authors as a delay of a firm decision on full integration, maintaining it in a state of close distance. One year after the launch of the EaP, in an EP debate concerning the allocation of funds, Polish MP Jacek Olgierd Kurski (ECR) uttered: “Until now, the Eastern Partnership was the first and the only initiative of foreign policy in my country, Poland, which was recently accepted by Brussels and by the whole European Community. Its real political meaning stays in attracting six ex-Soviet states into the Union. This aspect

52

There are some arguments that criticize the EaP from the perspective of the absence of a military dimension, as emphasized, for instance, by Gh. Ciascai, loc.cit, but also by Daniel Keohane, in the article 2008: une année vitale pour la défense de l’UE, in Revue internationale et stratégique, no. 1/2008, pp. 127-136, www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-et-strategique-2008-1-page-127.htm 53 Oana Mocanu, “The Eastern Partnership – A Premise for an Enhanced EUEastern Neighbours Cooperation Relationship,” RJEA, no. 4, 2009, pp. 3-5. 54 Ian Traynor, “EU pact challenges Russian influence in the east”, http://www.theguardian.com/, 7 May 2009, accessed on July 4, 2014.

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Poland and the Creation of the EaP is not mentioned in the documents drawing the programme, but we know very well what this is all about”.55

Polish EU MP Konrad SzymaĔski expressed, on behalf of the ECR Group, the following doubts in the EP: “Thus, we have two problems to resolve: first, procedural changes, and second, political changes, so that everybody would know what the idea of neighbourhood is based on. Does this fact replace the status of member? Is this one more step toward the status of member or is it quite the contrary, a step toward the weakening of the political relations between Europe and its neighbour states?”56

These kinds of questions enlighten the dual nature of the EU’s foreign relations: not only the member states, but also the EU institutions defining foreign policy stress that the conflicts among states are not abandoned in favour of the common interest of the Union. Some authors have demonstrated that these conflicts originating in national interests involve not only the old and powerful states of the EU – France and Germany being the most common examples, but also some of the new member states, among which Poland represents a special case. On the other hand, they question the very contents of this soft type answer of the EU to the Russian actions from its Western neighbourhood, overlapping with the Eastern neighbourhood of the EU. The EaP has been, beyond any critiques and doubtful evolutions, a significant action for Poland. It is the reflection of the dynamics of a pattern of multiple security complexes found one against the others, either in relations of intersection or in relations of inclusion, but never in a relation of total overlap. Thus, at the broadest level, we can speak about the complex of interdependency between the EU and Russia; however, they separately form such complexes, with different bearings: Poland is part of the EU complex, as are the EaP states, and although they are not EU members, they touch its orbit, still without being able to exit the complex which revolves around Russia. Poland also keeps a separate tangential point with the great Eastern complex. It is direct, but mediated by the joint neighbourhood, situated at the intersection between the separate complexes generated by the great assemblies. At all the levels of 55 “The future funds allocation through the European Instrument of Neighbourhood and Partnership for the budget pertaining to cross-border cooperation programmes” (debate), 23 September 2010, www.europeanparliament.com 56 Idem.

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these galaxies of connections there are actor-states or international organizations involved, characterized by friend or foe relations, sometimes ambivalent, sometimes partly, or tentatively, or mutually conditioned, which complicates once more an image in the making.

Bibliography 1. Calvocoressi, Peter (2003), Europa de la Bismarck la Gorbaciov, 2. Brimmer Esther, « Le voisinage de l'Union européenne : sphère de sécurité, réseau de connections ou mariage de convenance ? », Politique étrangère, 2008/1 Printemps, p. 25-37. DOI : 10.3917/pe.081.0025, www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2008-1-page-25.htm 3. Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 4. Cianciara, Agnieszka K., “‘Eastern Partnership’ – opening a new chapter of Polish Eastern policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy?”, The Institute of Public Affairs, no.4/2008, p. 2, available on www.fride.org. 5. Gheorghe Ciascai, “The Impact of the Eastern Partnership on the Relationship between the EU and the Russian Federation” in Revista de Stiinte Politice si Relatii Internationale [Political Science and International Relations Review], n..2/2011 6. Delcour, Laure, « Le voisinage entre l'Union européenne et la Russie, nouvelle ligne de démarcation ? », Revue internationale et stratégique, 2008/4 n° 72, p. 209-218. DOI : 10.3917/ris.072.0209, on www.cairn.info (july 2014) 7. Fischer, Sabine, Erwan Lannon, “The ENP Strategic Review: the EU and its neighborhood at a crossroads”, www.iss.europa.eu, may 2011 8. Huff, Ariella, “The Role of EU defense policy in the Eastern neighborhood”, Occasional Paper, no.9/2011, www.iss.europa.eu, may 2011 9. Goldman, Minton F., “Polish Policy towards Ukraine: the Impact on PolishRussian Relations in 2008-2009”, in The Polish Review, Vol. 54, No. 4/2009, Published by: University of Illinois Press, pp. 451-476, www.jstor.org 10. Gower, Jackie, Graham Timmins, “Introduction: The European Union, Russia and the Shared Neighbourhood”, in Europe-Asia Studies, 61:10, 2009, DOI: 10.1080/02684520903282370 11. Keohane, Daniel, « 2008 : une année vitale pour la défense de l'UE »,Revue internationale et stratégique, 2008/1 N°69, p. 127-136. DOI : 10.3917/ris.069.0127, www.cairn.info (july 2014) 12. àapczynski, Marcin, “The European Union’s Eastern Partnership: Chances and Perspectives,” in Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3 (2) – Spring 2009, p. 146, available on www.eapnationalplatform.ge 13. Michta, Andrew A, „Polish security Policy: keeping priorities in balance”, in: The Polish Review, no.2/2009, p. 230, www.jstor.org (july 2014) 14. Mocanu, Oana, “The Eastern Partnership – a premise for enhanced EU-Eastern Neighbours cooperation relationship”, Romanian Journal of International Affairs, no.4/2009, pp.48-58, www.ier.ro (july 2014)

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15. Radoslaw Sikorski, “The EU’s ‘Eastern Partnership’ is the Key to Relations with Russia,” in Europe’s World, 12, summer 2009, available on www.europesworld.org/TheEUsEasternPartenership 16. Soloch Krzysztof, « Les pays d'Europe centrale entre solidarité européenne et préférence atlantique», Politique étrangère, 2009/3 Automne, p. 541-551. DOI : 10.3917/pe.093.0541, www.cairn.info (july 2014 17. Stryjakiewicz, Tadeusz, “La nouvelle géographie de la Pologne dans le contexte de la transition économique et sociale et de l'élargissement de l'Union européenne”, in L'Information géographique, 2007/4 Vol. 71, p. 100, DOI : 10.3917/lig.714.0100, www.cairn.info/revue-l-information-geographique2007-4-page-100.htm 18. Traynor, Ian, “EU pact challenges Russian influence in the east”, http://www.theguardian.com/, 7 May 2009, accessed at July 4, 2014 19. Frantißsek Turnovec, “National, Political and Institutional Influence in European Union Decision Making”, in Acta Universitatis Carolinae Oeconomica Czech Economic Review, 2/2008 20. Polish-Swedish Proposal: Eastern Partnership, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland http://www.msz.gov.pl/Polish-Swedish,Proposal,19911.html 21. Joint Declaration at the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, www.consiliul.europa.eu, may 2009

FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EASTERN PARTNERSHIP ON DEBATE LUCIAN JORA

Abstract The emergence of EU development policies and the financial aid to implement them do not automatically translate into efficiency, unless there is a functional institutional infrastructure. The EaP analyses are often too general and affected by the so-called aspiration effect. Starting from a politically correct or politically desirable conclusion, many analysts would select only those facts and figures capable of supporting a desirable conclusion. Too many reports are drafted in offices by people who have never been on the ground/in the field or in direct contact with the subjects for a sufficient period of time, on a daily basis. Keywords: European Union, European Governance, European Eastern Partnership, EU Technical Assistance, European Neighbourhood Policy The objective of this paper is to pinpoint and debate some major weaknesses identified in the analyses and reports regarding the EaP, and to propose solutions for realistic ground-based feasibility studies as a basis for future effective policies, projects and, finally, real positive changes. The effective implementation of the EaP is undermined by the EU’s lack of real information and well-grounded analysis regarding the specific situation of every sectorial level in every particular country. Real in-depth evaluation of administrative capacities, public policies or project effects is rare. This is partly for courtesy reasons (the EU’s reports do not mean to offend its EaP partners with too aggressive and thorny formulas), on the one hand, while on the other it is hard for any public agency to recognize the failures of certain projects and policies. Many analysts have the instinctive tendency to compare the economic, administrative and political evolutions in EaP member states with those from member states from

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Central Europe. There are serious differences in terms of administrative capacity, political and administrative traditions. In political terms, while the Go West attitude was shared by the vast majority of citizens in CEE member states, EAP countries remain ambivalent and divided between Pro-Western and Pro-Russian communities. The in-depth character of these divides is proved by the frozen conflicts from Trans-Dniester and Gagauzia and the recent events in Ukraine.

Main methodological problems encountered Although there is an abundance of academic articles debating development issues from a theoretical perspective, the “empirical information” and anecdotal evidence coming from practitioners and direct beneficiaries of EU development policies are scarce in general and almost non-existent for FSU. Most of the evaluation reports are written in a certain technocratic style and also reflect the natural reluctance of the “beneficiaries” or “evaluators” to offer critical views. We should add the natural reluctance of many state departments to collaborate and provide anything more than official reports. Within the general topic of Development programmes, we are dealing here with the twinning programmes, with an emphasis on Human Resources and issues concerning the development of administrative capacity.1 How can one measure and evaluate the visibility and impact of HRD projects and policies? It is always difficult to assess and measure HRD effects, partly because of the many variables involved and because the impact can only be seen in the long term perspective. Since the New Central and Eastern EU Member States (NCEEMS) started the preparations for implementing structural funds, these funds have become central to public debate and a fascinating topic of discussion in all segments of society. Very often, the miraculous development of former new EU Member states, namely Greece, Ireland, Spain or Portugal, was attributed to the Regional Development policies practiced by Brussels in the form of Structural Funds allocation, under the Convergence criteria. A closer examination, however, reveals the fact that such success stories came from countries with solid market economies, solid administrative structures and solid 1

The EU priorities for funding Human Resources development projects in the 2007-2013 period are: 1) education and training to develop the knowledge-based economy, particularly through graduate and postgraduate education, 2) linking lifelong learning to the labour market, 3) raising the adaptability of workers and enterprises, 4) modernizing public employment services and 5) promoting active employment, social inclusion and technical assistance.

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internal public policies. The successful implementation of programmes financed by the European Social Fund was conditioned by the quality of the public administration in charge. The latter was given the task of making sure the funds are used in viable projects, with positive added value for the beneficiaries. The manner in which the structural funds were designed implicitly assumes that the new Central and Eastern European member states do not differ much from the EU-15 countries, a partially wrong assumption.2 However, even within the EU-15, the differences in terms of absorption capacity and administrative capabilities are shocking (to name just the differences between Danish administrative structures and the ones from Italy).3 Analyses are often affected by the so-called aspirational effect. Starting from a politically correct or politically desirable conclusion, many analysts would select only those facts and figures which are capable of supporting the desirable conclusion. Too many reports are drafted in offices by people who have never been in the field or in direct contact with the subjects for a sufficient period of time, on a daily basis. Access to the local language is not necessary the greatest issue here. In the case of the Republic of Moldova, many reports and analyses provided by Romanian researchers and analysts are affected either by the aspirational effect or by the lack of effective contacts with reality in the field. Ideally, the twinning projects involve effective and intensive working relations on a day-to-day basis, for a certain period of time.4 Real working relations are often neither effective nor intensive, but rather symbolic and reported as effective. The results are hard to measure and visible only in a medium and long-term perspective. Interest, motivation, trust and mutual understanding, the key conditions for an effective integration of EU experts - are often missing. Many experts even lack functional knowledge of local languages, so as to effectively integrate on a day-to-day basis. All 2

Tom Casier, Elena Korosteleva, and Richard Whitman, “Building a Stronger Eastern Partnership: Towards an EaP 2.0,” University of Kent Global Europe Center, October 2013, www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec/GEC%20Policy%20Paper.pdf, accessed on 14.06.2014. 3 The emergence of local and regional level actors in this key European policy field is thus explained within the domestic contexts of shifts from government to governance and the changing nature of the state, as the EU has developed. The emergence of local and regional actors and the implementation of the subsidiarity principle do not automatically translate into efficiency, in the absence of wellestablished institutional infrastructure. 4 Jones, M.L. and P. Blunt (1999), “Twinning as a method of sustainable institutional capacity building,” Public Administration and Development, Volume 19, 381-402, October 1999.

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projects follow a highly formalized structure, with an equally formalized outcome and artificial results which look good in reports but lack real impact. By setting on-the-spot consultancy offices, the EU can achieve a lot in terms of correcting its image revolving around complicated policies, multiple and sometimes confusing structures, and decision-making processes. Practical experience has shown that for the purpose of improving information and procedural databases, online support can help, but the average reader may get lost in that labyrinth of legislation, procedures and methodologies. During the programming phase, which from the very beginning took much longer than expected, the direct result was a loss of credibility. Another problem was related to the lack of user-friendly guides, capable of clearly explaining some of the basic conditions and what to expect after the project proposals were eventually approved. Principles such as “complementarity”, “good value for money” and “sustainability” were not explained by means of case studies and there were no concrete examples of Do’s and Don’ts. There is also the lack of benchmarks regarding the different allocation chapters within the proposed budgets of the projects, which has serious implications in terms of efficiency and number of wellintended project proposals. There is also extra precaution aimed at corruption, which sometimes turned out to be a form of paranoia. The extra-precautionary measures resulted in more rules than those requested by the EU. While it is justifiable to set in place such precautionary measures, the existence of more rules did not go hand-in-hand with solid institutional infrastructures that operate with clear regulations. The institutional framework that is supposed to implement the latter is still weak. Also, many of those rules are too general, thus creating confusion and leaving much room for interpretation. Although within the HRD/administrative capacity twinning projects, co-financing per se is not a pressing issue (most applicants need to cofinance the proposed projects with around 2% of their value), the lack of banking instruments or loans for co-financing and ensuring cash flow between reimbursements is an area of concern, which limits potentially genuine applicants.5 Despite the fact that several public consultations and participations in programming have been organized, the lack of clear information prior to consultations has reduced the number of partners invited to participate. Furthermore, the time frame is sometimes too short 5

Rinderu, P., Gherghinescu, O., Iova, C. (2009) An Econometric Model For Analysing The Structural Funds Absorption At Regional Level, 6th Management of Technological Change Conference, Alexandropoulis, Greece.

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to receive opinions, and there is also the lack of a feedback channel after the consultations. This engenders a very superficial, formalistic approach, which has negative consequences on the entire process of development assistance management.6 Also, the information provided at consultation meetings was often not tailored to specific target groups. The lack of clearly set benchmarks in the guiding and programming documents regarding efficiency often favour speculative attitudes towards those funds. Emphasis is on structures and procedures, rather than on activities, target groups and concrete results. Unfortunately, behind the façade of concern for HRD Development, the gaps and the generality of the guides were exploited by those looking at the Financial Assistance for HRD as a form of “rent seeking”, where, in the name of public interest, most funds would be assigned to private goals. The most sensitive point here seems to be the cost-benefit analysis. The tendency to use general or open-type criteria (vague, subjective) for assessing HRD projects, by definition largely interpretable, and hard to quantify and rank, has tremendously complicated the evaluation process. Some authorities have tried to mirror the Irish experience by employing external evaluators. Nevertheless, their quality and specific professional experience, alongside vague evaluation procedures, has led to contradictory decisions by different evaluation committees. The absorption capacity is one of the main indicators used to design EU development programmes, including the EaP. The absorption capacity is determined by both macro-economic indicators and several other factors related to human resources and the administrative capacity to implement assistance programmes. In the specific case of ENP target countries, macroeconomic indicators may be tricky and, ideally, they should be corroborated with additional variables in the programming and allocation phase.7 Particular functional problems pertain to those indicators which are 6

Programmes were to be prepared through close consultations between the Commission, the Member State concerned and the competent authorities designated by the latter at national, regional, local or other levels, with each party acting as a partner in pursuit of a common goal (CEC, 1988, Art. 4). This principle, in the Romanian case (at least to the extent that we are knowledgeable), meant a formal consultation, while the real decisions were taken at the central level and then adjusted or approved by the EU Commission. Even in this case, “consultancy” meant at least one year of delay with the corresponding costs in terms of credibility (and not only). 7 Strömberg, T., “Description and Analysis of Twinning between Two Network Organizations,” SIDA Working Paper No. 12, 2002.

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more difficult to assess, namely human resources and administrative capacity. There were significant amounts of money invested in training personnel whose wages are so low that they will use the first opportunity they get to leave their position and head for the private sector. Recent regulations requiring private entities not to employ within EU-funded projects former civil servants as experts in charge of the management of EU assistance for at least one year, have helped to slow down the haemorrhage of experts, but it has not solved the continuous loss of trained human resources. In any new EU member state from Central and Eastern Europe, a good absorption capacity of EU funds is somehow related to high wages for the civil servants in charge of the management of such funds. This would be the case of Poland, where a Management Authority director has a salary seven times higher than the holder of the same position in Romania. The strategic approach to fostering development is deserted for the imperative need to absorb as much as possible from the allocated funds, neglecting the identification of real needs at local and regional levels. We still consider that the “absorption” problem is not the most troubling issue in the debate; the danger is to have those funds wasted on artificial formalistic projects, whose real impact on the target group is minimal, if any. There is a need to make a distinction between quantitative and qualitative aspects. Experts draw attention to the fact that, just like any other action of development, assistance in general and above all HRD are sometimes set to work within a vicious circle. If the funds are “seeded” into bad “soil” (a metaphor for the programming phase), they do not yield the expected results and, even worse, they serve as bad premises for the next programming cycle. Again, we must emphasize the fact that twinning projects, especially those dedicated to HRD (as is the case with most projects related to administrative capacity), have a particular configuration. It is difficult to evaluate them in terms of efficiency, as their results are visible only in the medium-term perspective. Also, considering the almost two decades of implementing twinning programmes in CEE countries, the confirmation of expectations does not depend on the grants themselves, perceived as an amount of money obtained and spent, but on the processes they trigger. Related to the same paradigm we can identify two basic stages through which the success of Development assistance is measured.8 The first would be the implementation stage, in which effects are mostly recorded on the part of beneficiaries and measured according to the absorption rate of funds. At the end of the implementation stage, the 8

John Bachtler and Sandra Taylor, (2003), The Added Value of the Structural Funds, IQ-Net Report on the Reform of the Structural Funds, University of Strathclyde.

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“effects” theoretically refer to the influence on the part of providers of funds and could be measured by the new and improved (or not) macroindicators and the structural changes the interventions have fostered. However, it generally takes time, and even more so in the case of HRD. The quantitative impact also depends on many debatable variables.9 Perhaps the most pertinent success story is that of Ireland, which for 20 years, has been a major recipient of community assistance. In this period of time, GDP per capita rose from one of the lowest rates in the EU, all the way to second place, after Luxembourg. The key factors explaining the high impact rate of structural and cohesion funds do not rely on the absorption rate, but rather on the very strong leverage effect resulting from the use of this assistance. The leverage effect is perceived as the capacity of a project to generate examples of best practice or a chain effect involving several institutions and people from the target area. In the case of Ireland, however, the administrative and systemic preconditions for this success were in place at the time of accession. The EU development assistance was taken over by a reliable, qualified administration, trained in the planning exercise and accustomed to the rigorous rules of using public money for investments. Furthermore, the development assistance did not come to fill in a gap, but rather to complement the already initiated national policies and HRD investments. Also, contrary to the situation in the FSU, in the case of the CEE, most beneficiaries had a sufficiently high administrative capacity10. Also, the CEE institutions (in Poland and Hungary) in charge of ensuring the implementation of the programmes (governmental agencies or public organizations) at that time had already acquired practical experience in managing programmes, offering grants and providing assistance. Moreover, several stages of programming, contracting and monitoring the projects and their evaluation were subcontracted to reliable entities (the same tendency can be noticed in Romania, for example, albeit after three “wasted” years). Perhaps the most important detail is the following: in the case of Ireland, the payments to public and private beneficiaries were 9

Interesting further reading on this issue can be found in: Structural Funds and Their impact Signed and Sealed, but can we deliver?, European planning Studies, Carfax Publishing 2003. 10 ElĪbieta Kaca, Kinga DudziĔska, Karolina Zubel, “A Competitive Two-Speed Policy: The Eastern Partnership Beyond 2013,” PISM Policy Paper, Polish Institute of International Affairs, September 2013, http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ ISN/170189/ipublicationdocument _singledocument/0bfe3a22-ee20-44af-9583-e240a7f7ba05/en/PISM+Policy +Paper+no+27+%2875%29.pdf.

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made in a very similar way to that in which they would have been made if only national funds had been used. Financial control was managed in the same way for any public expenditure. Also, the expenditure that was not eligible for structural assistance in the case of Ireland was supported from national sources of financing. Due to this decision, the Irish administration managed to implement the programmes without delays or bottlenecks. The implementation of development funds was not governed by calls for project proposals, but relied on an already existing portfolio of governmental project and programmes. In the case of Ireland, the extensive use of information materials containing examples of “Best practice”, what to do and what not to do, with clear examples, was highly appreciated. The experience of New CEE Member States can be useful. By establishing from the very beginning clear rules, an optimal environment for the absorption of funds (in terms of necessary human resources, infrastructure and administrative capacity) was created. The excessive centralisation of decisions regarding allocation of funds created severe delays (from 6 months to two years or more). One of the major weaknesses of the twinning and technical assistance programmes was their inability to cover huge gaps in terms of average income for the same tasks between consultants and local administrative personnel. The average gap of 1:5 in the case of new CEE member states can be as much as 1:15 in the case of Twinning Projects in the Republic of Moldova. Under these circumstances, the assistance for development in some situations may be converted to assistance for getting good contracts, in the case of some well-established consultancy companies. Within a twinning programme, some of the basic preconditions are not fulfilled. The real immersion of the EU consultant into the daily activities of the consulted institution involves strong collaboration between partners and, as a basic precondition, in-depth knowledge of the local language. A good translation service may often turn out to be a functional solution, but it will increase costs. Functional solutions are there for those who want to see them. A small deduction from the already high salary of the consultant may be corroborated with the employment of recent graduates from the local market as translators, who are willing to work for very competitive prices, often around 500E (which in the Republic of Moldova is twice as much as the average salary). Also, this kind of measure will increase the added value of the twinning project, by creating an additional level of expertise for consulted institutions, in the form of translation services. Another major weakness identified so far and which should be avoided is the general objective of many twinning projects that makes the eventual

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evaluation of the results a close to impossible mission. For every particular twinning project, the objectives and the results must be very clear, specific to a certain area of activity. Assuming clear and realistic responsibilities in terms of measurable results from the twinning provider is also a must in order to ensure effectiveness. In the PHARE case, most government institutions simply could not specify, apart from some generalities, the real effect and measurable impact of various twinning projects. The impact is even harder to measure in the cases where 80% of the trained personnel will leave their positions (as is the case of Romania) within two to five years. A solution would be a compulsory fixed-term contract for civil servants, beneficiaries that are subject to training through twinning, with reasonable compensation costs in the case of defection. Practice often shows that the consultancy companies which are active within a twinning project, apart from assisting, will also perform head-hunting, attracting the best experts from various institutions just to be used for further extension in this lucrative market, in a particular country. The European Union (EU) has made use of numerous twinning projects since 1998 to facilitate the accession process for countries that wish to join its ranks. Twinning takes the form of national experts being assisted by EU experts for over a year, which includes a combination of other arrangements, such as short-term missions, training, and specific technical services (computer and translation). Twinning projects are financed by the EU under the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) for the New Independent States and the Mediterranean region. In theory, twinning facilitates the process through which the recipient organization improves its efficiency and effectiveness. It provides the recipient organization with an opportunity to learn through concrete examples and practical applications stemming directly from its more experienced “twin” organization (rather than studying reports). However, both the context and the magnitude of the current EC twinning practices are difficult to gauge, since there is no central mechanism that systematically documents these aspects of EC technical assistance projects. Twinning projects are drafted and released by IPA /ENPI states in consultation with the European Commission. The projects are awarded at the end of what is intended to be a competitive process in which interested administrative bodies from the EU member states draw up proposals. Afterwards, the latter are presented in the countries where the projects will take place. It is also possible for several EU countries to collaborate in the form of a consortium. Once a partner has been selected, a comprehensive contract between the two countries is drafted, so as to regulate the work plan for the project and its substantive contents.

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Some of the key issues to consider when twinning is employed are: (a) the selection of appropriate partners and (b) the design of the arrangement and relationship. Twinning is more likely to be successful when the following elements exist: (a) commitment of the parties; (b) a high level of competence and flexibility on the part of the supplier; (c) feasibility of designated tasks; (d) periodic follow-ups after project completion; and (e) positive work relationships. Twinning is meant to combine training with technical assistance, it offers flexible work plans and long-term cooperation and it encourages immediate acceptance of the supplier by the recipient. Major disadvantages include potential conflicts between the twins; lack of incentive; high costs; and the likelihood of being a less favourable method when problems pertain to the country’s governing administration. The factors that contribute to successful twinning include staff commitment, particularly at the senior management level; clear expectations and realistic and flexible work plans; and genuine progress reports. The factors that contribute to unsuccessful cases include the recipient party’s inability to select English-speaking staff and the lack of a good quality pre-project country analysis. The impact of twinning is often more evident at the operational level (e.g. improving technology or technical skills) and less evident at the institutional level. Both organizations conclude that successful twinning is influenced by the following: the amount of effort cooperating parties put into defining such key concepts as institutional development and sustainability, and the degree to which these concepts are put into practice; the extent to which management is involved during project formulation; and the quality of preproject analysis of the recipient partner’s institutional and governance background. Twinning is differentiated from other forms of technical aid or development assistance by the level of interaction between partners and by the learning by doing attitude and approach, universally accepted as the most effective. Also, one should notice the difference between the transfer of skills approach and the development of skills. In this case, it is essential for the provider to have real skills and positive experiences to transfer. There have been practical cases in which the level of the so-called skill transfer prepared by the supplier has been too basic, while at the higher levels, the provider’s experts have found themselves in embarrassing situations of having a lower level of expertise than those they were supposed to train. Again, the programming phase is essential here. It would be even better for the heads of various departments designated to benefit from technical assistance through twinning to select their own expertise, according to very specific needs.

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Among other distinctive features of twinning, the following can be nominated: -

Flexibility to alter the work programme according to the specific needs of the trainees; Twinning must involve not only sending experts, but also staff exchanges, with relocation of some key personnel to an EU country for a period of time. The major problem here seems to be the frequent lack of functional language abilities and the capacity for real integration into the daily activities of the host company. While the language of technology is more or less the same, twinning programmes involving administrative structures is more problematic, and more difficult to measure in terms of efficiency.

Selection of twinning Partners must have a comparatively similar structure and functions, as well as previous twinning experience, preferably in the same area. Compatibility of technology and systems is an additional issue when dealing with twinning projects in Former Soviet Union countries. EU member states which would be familiar with such systems (the Baltic States) may not exhibit the necessary level of expertise and trust among potential beneficiaries. In this case, the most functional solution would probably be to create a consortium of partners from various EU countries, in order to insure twinning in FSU. But of course, while on the one hand, the partnership consortium may solve some functional problems in terms of expertise, on the other hand its practice may complicate things, knowing that this kind of transnational partnerships often simply does not work properly. Under normal circumstances, the needs of the recipient partner need to be clarified in advance, in order to provide the adequate expertise. These needs sometimes cover more or less the entire spectrum of relevant activities. Once these particular needs have been clearly identified, the appropriate staff must be selected, or recruited. One of the major weaknesses within the system is the reluctance of consultants to employ new staff from the job market, staff with the necessary specific skills. Instead, they will prefer to work with already existing staff, even if many of those employed do not have the necessary expertise, as required. Once the staff has been nominated, they must have a very clear agenda on a daily basis, otherwise precious time may be lost. An effective system of reporting and monitoring is highly recommended. Some of the most successful twinning experiences are among peers of experts, which is great in the presence of a system of integration and replication of best practice

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from the individual to the organizational level. In this case, even if the trained expert leaves the system sooner or later, the expertise provided by twinning will be incorporated at the organizational level. Also, while professional upgrading is often possible and visible, managerial involvement and major interventions within the very structure of an organization are more difficult to obtain and not always necessary. Seeking change only for the benefit of altering something can be counterproductive, since old structures, in some particular cases, are more adaptable to the local administrative and business environment. Commitment to triggering real positive changes on the supplier’s side and the commitment to change of those to be assisted are essential, although difficult to assess. Most state institutions in FSU are notoriously reluctant to any kind of change and the apathy of state functionaries is notorious. Also, the mentality that there is a contract to win, rather than there is a hard job to be done among contractors can be nominated among the major weaknesses affecting the EU’s assistance for development. Providing technical assistance at the same time as effective training, although it sounds tempting, has occurred in reality only in a few cases. The same goes for the long-term relationship between the partners involved, which is supposed to continue long after twinning contracts end. Moreover, trust and cooperation, as psychological effects supposed to be developed by twinning, depend a lot on the quality of the individuals on a case by case basis. The major advantage of twinning programmes lies in a demonstrated good cost-efficiency rapport. According to some analysts, it can provide the same results as technical assistance, at half price. Some of the major problems encountered so far are the unfamiliarity of EU experts with developing countries and their culture, language barriers, unrealistic work plans, or a façade involvement (from both the EU expert and the host institution). Also, some of the technical assistance providers are profitoriented consultancy companies, intending to minimize costs and maximize benefits. Again, it is of paramount importance to choose the right partner from the very beginning, otherwise once a twinning project has started, it is difficult to cancel or change it. Most assisted institutions would prefer to accept an ineffective partner with a façade involvement than risk legal action in an area in which inefficiency is difficult to prove. For instance, choosing the right partner from the very beginning can make the difference between success and failure in a twinning project. Also, previous experience has shown that in many cases, within public institutions, twinning beneficiaries do not really know what to ask of the partners or what they want from their expertise, apart from some

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generalities. Identifying the initial needs down to the technical details is essential. However, identifying needs involves the existence of an efficient system of ex-ante evaluation, performed both by the institution at internal level and by an external evaluator. Other factors like willingness to learn, and real and open communication between twinning partners, involve a certain culture of learning and openness, which cannot be created overnight in FSU, but must be well acknowledged by the twinning providers, thus relying on appropriate measures for this kind of working environment. Moreover, some theoretical assumptions about the realistic understanding of the absorptive capacity of the assisted partners are difficult to implement in reality, unless they are specifically designed as such at the programming level (often affecting the cost-efficiency balance of the programme). Some recommendations regarding flexibility and more tolerable progress monitoring contradict the principles of efficiency and are just unacceptable to EC auditors, as long as they involve legally binding indicators and financial aspects. Finally, in the particular case of FSU, one must clearly understand the need to avoid the formalistic application of imposed principles like decentralization. Development will not continue in the absence of solid administrative structures (personnel, legislation, institutions and NGOs as strong partners). Decentralization and building the capacity to absorb postaccession funding need not go hand in hand. Unless the preconditions are in place in terms of administrative capacity, central governments must take a lead role.

Bibliography 1. Bachtler, J., Mendez, C. (2007), “Who Governs EU Cohesion Policy? Deconstructing the Reforms of the Structural Funds”, University of Strathclyde, JCMS, 45(3). 2. Bachtler, J., Wishlade, F., Yuill, D. (2003), “Regional Policies after 2006: Complementarity or Conflict?”, European Policy Research Paper No. 51/2003. 3. Bachtler, John; Taylor, Sandra, (2003), The Added Value of the Structural Funds, IQ-Net Report on the Reform of the Structural Funds, University of Strathclyde. 4. Balassa, Bela (ed.), (1975), European Economic Integration, Amsterdam: North Holland. 5. Baldwin, R. (1989), “The Growth Effects of 1992”, Economic Policy. 6. Baldwin, R.E., François J.F., Porter R. (1997), Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: The Impact on the EU and Central Europe.

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7. Beugelsdijk, M. and S. Eijffinger (2003) "The Effectiveness of Structural Policy in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis for the EU15 during the period 1995-2001", CEPR Discussion Paper 3879, London. 8. Boeckhout, S., Boot, L. et al, (2002), “Key indicators for Candidate Countries to Effectively Manage the Structural Funds”, Final Report, NEI, Rotterdam, February, 2002. 9. ElĪbieta Kaca, Kinga DudziĔska, and Karolina Zubel, “A Competitive TwoSpeed Policy: The Eastern Partnership Beyond 2013,” PISM Policy Paper, Polish Institute of International Affairs, September 2013, http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ ISN/170189/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/0bfe3a22-ee20-44af-9583e240a7f7ba05/en/PISM+Policy+Paper+no+27+%2875%29.pdf. 10. Horvat, A., (2004) Absorption problems in the EU Structural Funds, NARG, Ljubljana. 11. Horvat, A., (2005) Financial Absorption Rate in EU Objective 1 1994-99 and Some Lessons for the New Member States in 2004-2006, WIFO, Working Papers 259, September 2005. 12. Isărescu, M. (2008), “Attraction of European Funds in Romania (in Romanian language)”, NBR, 14 March 2008, PP Presentation at National Forum for Sustainable Development and Environment Protection, Bucharest. 13. Kalman, J. (2006), “Possible Structural Funds Absorption Problems”, Cambridge University Press. 14. Lejour, A.M., Nahuis, R. (2004), “EU Accession and the Catching Up of the Central and East European Countries”, In: Deardorff (ed.), The Past, Present and Future of the European Union, IEA Conference Volume, no.138, PALGRAVE Macmillan. 15. Polverari, L., McMaster, I. (2006), Territorial cohesion and new cohesion policy: Challenges for old and new Member States, 1st ESPON Scientific Conference, Malmo.

THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP AND THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY SANDA CINCĂ

Abstract With the enlargement wave of 2007, the European Union increased its territory, while from a geopolitical point of view it moved one step closer to the East, a very unstable area, politically and economically, which could export insecurity into the Union. The purpose of this article is to analyse how the EU could manage, through the Eastern Partnership, the security issues at its Eastern border and the type of foreign policy it approaches. To understand how the EU operates its foreign policy towards neighbouring areas, we will first present the European security complex, while identifying the main risks and threats to societal security within the EU, generated by this region, and we shall pinpoint the instruments used by the Union to secure its Eastern border. We will briefly examine trends in defining the foreign policy goals of the Eastern Partnership states and the impact of the Eastern Partnership on EURussia relations. Finally, we will present the role of the CSDP as part of the wider EU efforts to resolve conflicts in the region and we will explore the ability of the Union to continue to promote its security interests within the Eastern Neighbourhood after the Vilnius summit. Keywords: Eastern Partnership, Eastern Neighbourhood, European security complex, EU-Russia Relations, Foreign policy, CSDP The general interests of the European Union pertain to the protection of its Member States, their border stability and prosperity on the continent, through the improvement of the living conditions of the people from the immediate vicinity. A constant preoccupation of European politics as of 1957 has been to guarantee security for the areas from the immediate vicinity of its borders. This preoccupation has intensified with the fall of

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the communist regimes from Central and Eastern Europe and the dismantlement of the Soviet Union. Following these events, a vacuum of power emerged in certain regions such as the West Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Baltic States or the South Caucasus, which favoured the apparition of unstable states at the borders of the Union, threatening the stability of Europe and triggering a diminution of societal security within it. The EU has become involved in these regions in order to reduce the potential danger of a spillover with negative effects on the entire continent. In the context of globalisation and the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War, we are witnessing a shift of the focal point of our analysis, from security in the traditional sense of the word (political and military) to security in the modern sense, non-military, oriented towards the individual and society. At the general level of the EU and its Member States, there is an attempt to impose new security challenges and a need for new areas of securitisation. Although a global economic power, the EU plays a marginal role in security policy at this level, but it has acquired in time the aspect of a security complex, trying to create its own political role and its security system, in a broader regional framework.

The security complex of the EU To understand the manner in which the Union conducts its foreign policy towards the neighbouring areas, we intend to analyse the EU security complex. We shall thus define the regional security complex centred on the EU and explain its implications on the neighbouring areas and matters of interest. According to B. Buzzan and O. Waever, a regional security complex includes “a set of units whose major security or insecurity processes, or both, are interconnected so that their security problems could be analysed or resolved rationally and on an individual basis.”1 The same authors also define the concepts of “securitisation” and “de-securitisation”. Securitisation is the process by which the understanding of intersubjective discourse is constructed in a political community, so as to treat something as an existential threat to a valuable object of reference, and to enable the use of urgent and exceptional measures to confront the threat.2 On the other hand, de-securitisation is a process by which a political community decreases the importance or ceases to treat one thing as an existential 1

Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 44. 2 Ibidem, p. 491.

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threat to a valuable object of reference, and reduces or stops urgent and exceptional action to confront the threat. The process can be directly discursive, addressing the definition of the situation, but it is often indirect, when a change of orientation towards other matters decreases the attention given to the previously securitised issue.3 The new EU security complex which emerged in the early 90s, after the reunification of Germany, has three defining traits: it is centred, has the form of concentric circles and presents a key focus on institutions.4 Thus, the EU security complex is an institutionally-centred regional security complex, i.e. an integrated region through institutions rather than via a unique power, gathering other states around it.5 The institutional dimension is perceived as a way to build confidence among states and develop friendly relations between them. Within the EU, centrality is not offered by the dominance of a single power pole, but by forming groups of states which entrust some of their powers to the EU and to international institutions. The Common Foreign and Security Policy is decided by all countries of the Union, albeit sometimes they do not all follow a pattern, with some major differences in their approaches. EU centrality therefore emanates from the legitimacy provided by the Member States, as well as the institutional dimension (Parliament, Commission, Council etc.) which lies at its core and does not belong to a single power. Relations between EU Member States are based on the integration project and are built as a form of “meta-security”6. The integration project itself generates security, which encompasses “societal security” and anxiety over national identity7. The most efficient securitisation is attained through enlargement, because in this way stability is ensured – exporting community values to border regions. Through the latest enlargement waves of the European Union, a part of the security problems which emerged on the European continent and in its vicinity during the ’90s, after the collapse of the USSR, were provided with pertinent solutions.

3

Ibidem, p. 489. See O. Waever, „The Constellation of Securities”, in Aydinli Ersel, Rosenau James N. (eds.), Globalization, Security and Nation State: Paradigms in Transition, New York, State University of New York Press, 2005, p. 161. 5 B. Buzan, O. Waever, op.cit., pp. 56-59. 6 Ibidem, pp. 352. 7 B. Buzan, O. Weaver, Jaap de Wilde, Securitatea. Un nou cadru de analiză, Cluj Napoca, CA Publishing, 2011, pp. 171-180. 4

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The European Union is a centre-periphery structure, meaning that Central and Eastern Europe has been organised as a “concentric circle”8 around the western nucleus. Since these countries are enclosed in a central EU policy, security issues in this part of the continent partly follow the same pattern as in Western Europe, but cause additional complications, because their reliance on Western Europe is “as an anchor of stability and a line of intrusion”9. To operate as a security body, the EU must maintain its core intact and be protected from the effects of the national political identities of major European powers. This does not mean that the Member States should forcefully accept a concept of European identity to the detriment of their national identity, but in every European country, the terms “nation state” and “Europe” are carefully shaped so that the Union should become a combination of national tradition and European solidarity. In addition to this, the EU can intervene directly in the periphery, where non-military factors (socio-economic, ethnic etc.) do not act strongly enough to avoid conflicts.10 The regional security complex of the EU includes two elements: the insurance of security at the borders through the promotion of stability in the neighbouring states and the consolidation of communitarian cohesion via the elimination of the external threats which could put pressure on the internal security of the Union. In the context of EU enlargement, the most important challenges germane to European security are those with a strong economic and cultural content, emerging from the Southern, Eastern and Northern regions found at the borders of the Union. The answer of the Union to the security challenges arising from these directions has been the establishment of partnerships shaped as European security “dimensions”, as well as social and intellectual constructs, reflections of inter-subjective perceptions. These “dimensions” of European security could be defined as: “geographical areas whose proximity toward the EU transforms them unavoidably into areas of strategic interest for the Union, from the perspective of the actors involved (the Union and the state actors)”.

Hence, European security can be divided into sub-complexes of security, such as: Northern, Southern and Eastern. The Northern dimension deals with security in the region of the Baltic Sea, the Barents and the Arctic Ocean and it is the sub-region with the highest level of institutionalisation in the vicinity of the EU. The Southern dimension 8

O. Waever, op. cit., p. 161. B. Buzan, O. Weaver, op. cit., p. 353. 10 O. Waever, op. cit., p. 162. 9

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focuses on security in the Mediterranean and Middle East areas. The Eastern dimension is aimed at the security relations between the EU, Russia and the former Soviet republics which form Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, as well as the foreign and cross-border policies of the EU covering this region.

The EU’s approach towards its Eastern vicinity The EU’s approach towards the states situated in its Eastern vicinity originates in the theoretical framework centre-periphery. The premise is that the centre is rich, it hosts democracy, and acts as a stabilising force from a political and economic standpoint for the periphery, where there is instability. Thus, regionalisation could be seen as one of the most efficient forces for prosperity and stability in Eastern Europe. Europe aims to change from a geographical region to a geopolitical area, where the states are more efficiently interconnected, which leads to a better understanding of threats and security risks. From the EU’s standpoint, the main idea is to promote regionalisation directly at the periphery, so that the countries would prefer a regional cooperation framework to unilateral measures when they are confronted with challenges of globalisation and security threats.11 After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU met with new opportunities, threats and security challenges in its Eastern neighbourhood. The emerging unipolar order changed the agenda and global strategies of the United States, and the EU was forced to restate its Eastern neighbourhood policy. In this context, the Eastern neighbourhood has gained special political relevance. Following the last wave of EU enlargement, when the EU’s absorption capacities were almost exhausted, Brussels started to elaborate a new type of foreign policy, which was not oriented towards future enlargement, but towards establishing relations with the neighbours at its borders. The EU has initiated several projects aimed at the democratisation of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus according to the interests and foreign policy objectives in the region and depending on those states’ eastern borders. The strategic interests and objectives of the EU pertaining to the countries in the region are related either to security and stability or to 11

See Velina Tchakarova, The European Union and its European Neighborhood: Before and After the Vilnius Summit of the Eastern, AIES Austria Focus, 2013, available at http://www.aies.at/download/2013/AIES-Fokus-2013-06.pdf, (accessed on July 20, 2014).

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rebuilding global influence and status. For the EU, the Eastern neighbourhood is a source of political dilemmas, as it could be used either as a buffer zone or as a corridor meant to facilitate communication between the EU and Russia. These options still divide the EU member states. In order to face the security problems emerging at the Eastern border (“soft” threats), the EU also has a “soft” type approach, based on a mixture of policies: regional, cross-border, trade and neighbourhood. The EU’s approach towards the Eastern neighbourhood is reflected by various political documents and by concrete instruments, such as: the EU Security Strategy (2003), the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004), the Black Sea Synergy (2007), the Rapport on European Security Strategy (2008) and the Eastern Partnership (2009). All these political documents and instruments which focus on the Eastern region are aimed first and foremost at the promotion of European values (democracy, stability, prosperity) in the neighbouring states and as a security guarantee throughout this periphery. Furthermore, they show the EU’s objectives and priorities in establishing relations with the states from the Eastern vicinity, albeit without neglecting the main actor in the region, Russia, with which it maintains a strategic partnership.12 The EU’s approach aims to prevent the creation of a buffer zone and, thus, a division line between the EU and its European vicinity. The European Security Strategy (ESS) is an attempt to establish a common European perspective on international security challenges and marks an important step towards a better coordination of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The document consists of three sections: the first performs a European analysis of the current security context; the second section identifies two major strategic objectives for the EU (the focus on threats and the construction of security in the vicinity of its borders); and the last part is dedicated to policy implications for the EU.13 Subsequently, the war between Russia and Georgia emphasised the unexpected speed at which the so-called “frozen conflicts” could develop into violent confrontations. In this context, the 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy called for sustained efforts to address conflicts in the South Caucasus and Moldova. The first operational mechanism used in attaining the objectives of the EU was the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 12

Idem. European Commission, A secure Europe în a Better World. European Security Strategy, Bruxelles, December 12, 2003, pp. 6-7, available at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, (accessed on July 20 2014).

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elaborated in 2004, with the purpose of avoiding the apparition of new lines of demarcation between the enlarged EU and its neighbours, and the consolidation of prosperity, stability and security for all.14 The ENP is, in fact, the implementation of the Security Strategy of the EU and an essential component of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), endowed with an evident geopolitical meaning. Through the ENP, the Union attempted to provide its neighbouring states with an alternative to membership. The instruments and mechanisms within the ENP are concentrated on “soft” problems, as this policy is coordinated by the European Commission, the supranational body of the EU, leading to an accentuation of the supranational character to the detriment of the intergovernmental one.15 The framework of the ENP was proposed to the closest neighbours of the EU in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Middle East, offering these states a privileged relationship on the basis of a reciprocal engagement pertaining to common European values, so that in the future these states would be granted political association and a more profound economic integration. The political instruments within the ENP are oriented in such a way as to have a long-term effect on soft matters and place emphasis on the use of non-military means. With regard to the six states from the Eastern vicinity, the juridical foundation of the ENP comes from the bilateral relations between the EU and the latter, with the fulfilment of certain compulsory conditions. Nevertheless, the deepening of these relations depends on the extent to which the common values are shared and the obligations are fulfilled, according to the Copenhagen criteria.16 The ENP framework does not aim to solve the ethnic conflicts present in the EU’s direct vicinity, this topic being excluded from the wider framework of the enlargement policy of the Union, thus leading to a number of uncertainties in the long term, germane to the geostrategic interests of the EU throughout its Eastern periphery. Considering the diversity of neighbouring countries around the Union, it was necessary for the latter to elaborate supplementary initiatives at whose foundation lay the specific characteristics and geopolitical particularities of certain regions. One such initiative was the Eastern Partnership (EaP). 14

See http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/index_en.htm, (accessed on July 20, 2014). Ariella Huff, „The role of EU defence policy in the Eastern neighbourhood”, Occasional Paper, May, 2011, no. 91, European Union, The Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), available at http://www.iss. europa.eu/uploads/media/op91The_role_of_EU_defence_policy_in_the_Eastern_neighbourhood.pdf, (accessed on July 25, 2014). 16 See at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm, (accessed on July 16, 2014). 15

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The Eastern Partnership from Prague to Vilnius The Eastern Partnership represents a new approach of the EU towards its Eastern vicinity. The EaP was officially launched at the Prague Summit in 2009, as part of the ENP, and it includes a total of six post-Soviet neighbour states: three states from Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) and three from the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia).17 The EaP was a common Polish-Swedish proposal launched and discussed for the first time within the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) in May 2008, with the purpose of strengthening the relations of the EU with the countries from its Eastern vicinity.18 Through this Partnership, especially Poland, as a former communist state, was hoping to push the enlargement of the EU towards the East, so as to incorporate the neighbours from this border via strong economic connections, thus displacing Russia’s sphere of influence.19 Moreover, the war in Georgia from the summer of 2008 clearly indicated that the current policy towards the Caucasian region was not suitable for the EU’s objective of guaranteeing democracy, stability and security, such a situation posing an indirect threat to the countries from the Eastern borders of the Union. Thus, the EU was confronted with the need to assure the public opinion and the European citizens of the security of the European frontiers through efficient mechanisms, so as to prevent a repetition of the Georgian scenario on its neighbours’ territories. Furthermore, this initiative was a response to the accusation that the ENP had failed to distinguish between the eastern and Mediterranean areas, and so, it promoted a symbolic distancing of Eastern states from their southern neighbours, for which France had proposed a Mediterranean Union.20 The relations of the Union with the countries from the Eastern Partnership were established based on several aspects. Firstly, since the ’90s, the region has not experienced any major conflict similar in intensity 17

See at http://www.easternpartnership.org/content/eastern-partnership-glance, (accessed on July 16, 2014). 18 For the Eastern Partnership, see http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm, (accessed on July 16, 2014). 19 Vanessa Gera, „EU summit turns focus to bloc's eastern neighbors”, The Guardian, September 28, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9870010, (accessed on July 16, 2012). 20 Sebastian Schäffer, „The EU-Russia relations and the Eastern Partnership”, 2011, available at http://www.ssceuropeeu/english/experts/sebastian-sch, (accessed on July 15, 2014).

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to those occurring in the West Balkans for instance, but only limited conflicts, the area being characterized by relative stability, and by the existence of the so-called frozen conflicts. At regional level, in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, various tense states and conflict situations persist or increase in intensity, prompted by old disputes of ethnic or religious, territorial or separatist nature, or some which are generated by the contestation of the existing borders, or even by cross-border criminality. Secondly, although the states in this region are perceived for historical, linguistic, cultural and especially geopolitical reasons as part of Moscow’s hinterland, as these states are even nowadays economically dependent on Russia, at present there are internal debates on their identity and priorities, enabling the choice of a Western direction. The programme of the Eastern Partnership does not promise a status of future member, but it envisions the progress of the political and economic systems of these states towards EU standards, the creation and consolidation of certain common institutions, in order to ease the liberalisation of visas and cooperation in various sectors of activity, as well as the creation of a free trade area and the closing of agreements on political association and economic integration. The main objective of the EaP is to offer a long-term vision and an action plan in the relations with these states, as a response to their aspirations, and a greater involvement of the EU in the complex process of their transformation.21 This new strategic initiative covers two dimensions: the bilateral and the multilateral. At the bilateral level, the EU’s relations with each of the six partner states is determined by the degree of development of the domains included within the three thematic axes and by the progress registered in the process of transformation. The three thematic axes are dedicated to the improvement of (good) governance and of the rule of law, the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the promotion of the principles of democracy and market economy. Nevertheless, the multilateral cooperation between the EU and the participant countries facilitates the discussion of official subjects and positions concerning all the relevant issues, followed by the identification of common activities. The four principal themes of the multilateral platform refer to democracy, governance and stability; economic integration; climate change and energy security; and contacts among

21 See at http://www.easternpartnership.org/content/eastern-partnership-glance, (accessed on July 16, 2014).

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people. The platform is supported by a Civil Society Forum consisting of representatives of the EU and all countries in the East.22 As far as energy security is concerned, it was a priority for both the ENP and the EaP. The EU aims to improve the existing situation of its security area and transit routes and to concentrate its efforts in order to diversify supply sources. The Eastern Partnership provides enhanced cooperation in specific fields within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), including participation of partner countries in EU missions and coordination of diplomatic activities. Early warning security systems will be improved, with a focus on conflict areas. It also envisages closer cooperation in the export of weapons and non-proliferation. Until now, there have been three summits (Prague 2009, Warsaw 2011 and Vilnius 2013). Although it has met with some success, this Partnership has not benefitted from the support of all the member states. Not only the states, but also some European leaders and members, have repeatedly underlined that the Eastern region is not a priority, while being interested in other parts of the world. Moreover, there is a fear that the Eastern Partnership could undermine the ENP. This lack of consensus has not enabled the partnership to produce some of the effects that would have brought about substantial change within the partner countries.23 For instance, the Mediterranean area, through the Southern Partnership, was favoured in comparison with the Eastern area, and the official documents confirm it: the European Security Strategy emphasises the aim of consolidating prosperity and stability in the neighbouring Eastern countries, although it primarily describes the Mediterranean area as a zone of major importance and opportunities; the European External Action Strategy Service (EEAS) from 2010 refers to North Africa and to the Middle East as areas of strategic orientation24. The EaP summit in Vilnius took place on 28-29 November 2013, and ended in a combination of fulfilled objectives and illusions for the future. 22 See at http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/platforms/index_en.htm, (accessed on July 16, 2014). 23 Sergiy Gerasymchuk, Foreign policy transformation in Eastern Partnership countries: global impact and regional particularities, p. 1, at http://www.ucrs.uu.se/digitalAssets/35/35522_3sergiy_gerasymchuk__foreign_pol icy_transformation_eastern__europe.pdf, (accessed on July 20, 2014). 24 Alvaro de Vasconcelos, „The European Security Strategy 2003-2008: Building on Common Interests”, EUInstitute for Security Studies, February, 2009, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ISS_Report_05.pdf, (accessed on July 16, 2014).

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Among the accomplishments in Vilnius, we should mention the following: the signing of the Association Agreement and the Agreement on a Free Trade Area with Moldova and Georgia, but also the refusal of Ukraine to sign a similar agreement; the sealing of the Agreement on facilitation and liberalisation of the visa regime; the signing of a framework agreement regarding Georgia’s participation in the EU’s mission of crisis management; the signing of an agreement concerning airline services with Ukraine; multilateral cooperation in the fields of agriculture, environment, commerce, migration, security and common defence policy; social dialogues within the framework of multilateral cooperation. The participants in the Summit signed a common framework-declaration on their vision pertaining to the future of the EaP.25 As the signing of the agreement with Ukraine was the greatest stake on the agenda of EU ambitions in Vilnius, following its withdrawal, the remaining priorities include the consolidation of democracy, human rights and of the rule of law in Ukraine; the consolidation the role of the EaP in peaceful crisis management, especially after the protests in Kiev; the introduction of more infrastructure projects in the area of transport networks. Until now, Ukraine has been perceived as being involved in an equilibrium game between Brussels and Moscow, so as to obtain more action power and better positions in its negotiations with the two parties. Before Vilnius, Ukraine had sent clear political signals oriented towards the possible signing of the Association Agreement and of the Agreement on a Free Trade Area. The financial difficulties of the country and the severe economic situation constituted the pretext for the outburst of political street protests, violent demonstrations and atrocities in Kiev, the capital, and in a few other cities. In fact, the political protests from the Independence Square in Kiev occurred after the sudden refusal of Ukraine to sign the two documents, triggering the Euromaidan, which expressed the desire of the young generation to achieve the country’s integration into the EU.26 The geopolitical context of the EaP proves that not only the EU, but also Russia has high stakes in maintaining Ukraine as part of their projects

25

The third Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, available at http://www.eu2013.lt/en/vilnius-summit, (accessed on July 20, 2014). 26 Ivan Krastev, „Who Lost Ukraine?”, in Project Syndicate, December 12, 2013, available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ivan-krastev-looks-atwhat-is-at-stake-for-europe-and-russia-in-kyiv-s-massprotests#RxPMTMOWrtRRHwTi.99, (accessed on July 20, 2014).

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of regional integration27 and it is obvious that the two opposite projects are going to clash in the next years. The EU has already won the hearts and minds of the Ukrainian people through its soft power, but this is not enough in the long run, with regard to the projection of force and influence. Russia attempts to bring Ukraine closer to Eurasian integration (the Eurasian Customs Union), luring it with economic and commercial offers and with gas price incentives. It seems that neither the EU nor Russia can obtain more influence regarding this Ukrainian card in the long term, since political chaos and economic collapse in Ukraine pose a great threat to the common European neighbourhood. After Vilnius, the EU needs to improve its eastern neighbourhood strategy approach. The EU’s political agenda should be separated from the technical aspects of economic integration. Both dimensions must follow a different development logic, which can create centrifuge forces instead of synergies. In addition to this, the strategic EU-Russia partnership has to be adapted and renegotiated, so that the Eastern Partnership would progress in an acceptable manner for both the EU and Russia. The EaP’s success depends on the construction, in a strategic framework, of pragmatic bilateral relations between the EU and Russia, whilst discarding the false suggestion that both Russia and the EU want to maintain the Eastern neighbourhood within their sphere of influence.28

The impact of the Eastern Partnership on EU-Russia relations From a geostrategic standpoint, the EU and Russia are direct neighbours. Each has a strategy for a common neighbourhood: the EU has developed the ENP, while the Russians have the official doctrine of “near abroad”. These overlapping Neighbourhoods will create long-term problems because both Brussels and Moscow will often perceive them as incompatible goals, such as a “zero sum game”. These two sub-regions from the EU’s border (Eastern Europe and Caucasus) include countries which are not interested in interacting through regional cooperation. The lack of a regionalisation process can be explained by the lack of common economic and political values or the 27

J. Boonstra, B. Jarabik and colab., „The Eastern Partnership after Vilnius: stay the course and engage the people”, in Policy Brief Fride, No. 169, December 2013, available at http://www.fride.org/download/PB_169_The_EaP_after_Vilnius.pdf, (accessed on July 20, 2014). 28 See V. Tchakarova, op. cit..

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absence of the perspective of a common future. Eastern Europe cannot be seen as a regional entity due to the different problems in the region: on the one hand, because of ethnic conflicts, the existing structural problems on the internal market, the low level of economic performance and poor governance, and, on the other hand, due to the increased number of external players which have interfered with the region for their own security reasons29 From the Russian perspective, the region consisting of the states of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus is part of its vital area of interest. Control of it is part of a larger national project: the restoration of Russian influence on the system of international relations from the Soviet times. The position of the Russian Federation towards the European project has met with opposition periods and periods of stagnation, as well as open hostilities. Staging this attitude was conditioned by events and processes undergone by the system of international relations at any given time. The Russian Federation has opposed the development of EU projects in ex-Soviet states, insisting on the idea of recovering its geostrategic influence. It has focused on the projection, as a counter-weight, of its own vicinity policy toward the same member states of the EaP. The initiatives promoted have been based on Russia’s own national interests, but have differed in terms of the tools, resources and strategies adopted to achieve foreign policy objectives. In comparison with the EU or the USA, Russia's position is much more rigid, relies on ultimatums and offers fewer options and alternatives. Therefore, quite often, regional cooperation models proposed by Moscow experience a greater degree of hostility and are more difficultly accepted by states in the region. In comparison with the Eastern Partnership of the EU, which has its own strategy, but no tactics, the Russian vicinity policy is much more informal and is endowed with more substance. The advantage of Russia is that, territorially, it is closer to these states in comparison to the EU.30 The states from the Eastern neighbourhood have been connected to Russia for centuries, via a common historical patrimony, national identity, as well as through economic and cultural relations. Moscow has attempted to impede the EU’s approach towards the Eastern neighbourhood, regardless of the political or non-political instruments launched by the EU, such as CSDP, ENP or EaP. Moscow has attempted to maintain its influence in the region through institutions such as the Organization of the Treaty of Collective Security in 1992, the Economic Eurasian Community 29 30

Idem. S. Gerasymchuk, op. cit.

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in 1996, the Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2010, and, shortly after the implementation of the Eastern Partnership, Vladimir Putin announced the intention to create a Eurasian Space, so as to attract all the post-Soviet republics from the periphery of Russia and lay the bases of the future Eurasian Economic Union, with the ruble as currency and unrestricted customs.31 Russia has used its economic and energy power as disciplinary political instruments for its neighbours, with some success. We are referring here to the disputes with Ukraine on the price of gas deliveries in 2006 and 2009; we should also consider the role of Russia in the control of gas transportation systems in 2011 in Belarus; we may turn our attention to the threats of cessation of gas supplies to Moldova, since 2013, in case it continues its association endeavour to the EU; we notice that the embargo on Moldovan wines has caused important financial losses; and we also assess the threat to denounce the Friendship Pact with Kiev from 1997 etc.32 Even though these are not the only elements of the Russian project meant to recover its former status, they surely affect the long-term attitudes and placement of young actors in the region to which they belong. Moreover, Russia has become actively involved in military terms in the areas where there are frozen conflicts from the ex-Soviet space: it maintains border patrols in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and it continues to occupy 20% of the Georgian territory, it has 1 200 Russian soldiers in Trans-Dniester, a military basis in Armenia, radar stations in Belarus and it continues its weapons sales to Azerbaijan.33 Nevertheless, some of the states within the Partnership are committed to rallying to the West, which creates tensions between the EU and Russia. Amid such tensions, the common neighbourhood area represents a space of confrontation between the EU and Russia. Traditionally, EU member states have oscillated between maintaining relations with Moscow through minimizing the role of the EU in the Eastern region and deepening the relations with the countries of the Eastern neighbourhood, even with the

31

Government of the Russian Federation, „A new integration project for Eurasia: the future in the making”, October 4, 2011, at http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/, (accessed on July 22, 2014). 32 See in Alena Sakhonchik, The Implications of the Eastern Partnership Program on EU-Russia Relations, School of International Service, American University Washington, October 2013, pp. 4-5, http://www.globalinterests.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/The-Implications-of-the-Eastern-Partnership-Programon-EU-Russia-Relations.pdf, (accessed on July 22, 2014). 33 Ibidem, p. 6.

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risk of antagonizing Russia.34 States such as Germany, France and Italy – which have traditionally maintained close links with Moscow – consider that the EU’s success in the Eastern vicinity relies on good relations with Moscow.35 Both Russia, as a declining global “hard” power, and the EU, as an emerging global “soft” power, are interested in promoting a symmetrical multipolar global order. The EU and Russia are linked by consistent political and cultural ties, sharing compatible regional security interests and a common neighbourhood. Using the argument of territorial proximity, there is a strong strategic motivation supporting the need for an EU-Russia partnership. Geographically, Russia is the closest EU actor that plays the protagonist in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space. In addition, according to the argument of complementarity, Russia is the largest energy supplier and a leading supplier of raw materials to Europe, while Europe is the most important investor in the Russian economy and a key provider of technology. Therefore, if we take into account both the proximity principle and the principle of complementarity, the EU-Russia partnership is more than beneficial and more than feasible in the case of both parties. Even when their interests are not similar, they still converge or are at least compatible.36 The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership is based on several common structures: the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which includes specific provisions of a trade agreement; the EU-Russia Common Spaces (the Common Economic Space - including an environmental one; the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; the Common Space of External Security - including crisis management and non-proliferation; the Common Areas of Research and Education - including cultural aspects); and the Partnership for Modernisation. After the war of 2008 with Georgia, Russia was willing to improve bilateral relations with the EU; thus, along with Germany, it proposed the development of a new political and security structure between the EU and Russia, based on the model of the NATO-Russia Council, entitled to take practical decisions in the area of crisis management. Russia’s desire for such a partnership

34 Sabine Fischer, „The EU, Russia and the Neighbourhood”, EUISS Analysis, December 2010, p. 2. 35 Justyna Gotkowska, “Germany and the Eastern Partnership,” Centre for Eastern Studies, June 18, 2012, available at http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/oswcommentary/2010-06-18/germany-and-eastern-partnership, (accessed on July 22, 2012). 36 A. Sakhonchik, op. cit., p. 2

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provides the EU with a rare opportunity to offer concrete benefits in exchange for cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood.37 At the level of statements, the official documents of the EU show that the Eastern Partnership is going to unfold in parallel with the strategic partnership with Russia. Moscow is worried by the fact that some countries might attempt to use this partnership against it. Although President D. Medvedev declared that any partnership was better than conflict38, Russia’s reaction to the implementation of the EaP has been negative, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in 2010 that the Partnership was an instrument of the EU to extend its influence in the post-Soviet space39.

The external policy of the states within the framework of the EaP From the perspective of foreign relations, the EU’s objectives could be generally divided into two categories, as follows: the promotion of democratic values and human rights – based either on realistic up-bottom approaches, or on idealistic bottom-up oriented approaches – and of security values relying on the realistic understanding of international relations. In order to attain these objectives, the EU invests political and economic resources, following the creation of two (security) belts around the Union – democracy and security. By maintaining democracy, the Union attempts to meet the expectations of the idealists for whom this value represented the founding idea of the Union, while by ensuring

37 Derek Averre, „EU-Russia Relations and the Shared Neighborhood: An Overview European”, Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies, March 18, 2011, at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN (accessed on July 22, 2014); see and Alena Sakhonchik, op. cit., pp. 6-7. 38 See article „Russia on the Eastern Partnership: between fear and disdain”, Comunitatea Parteneriatului Estic, October 27, 2010, avilable at http://www.easternpartnership.org/community/debate/russia-eastern-partnershipbetween-fear-and-disdain, (accessed on July 20, 2014). 39 Valentina Pop, „EU expanding its „sphere of influence” Russia says”, EU Observer, March 21, 2009, at http://euobserver.com/24/27827, (accesed on July 22, 2014).

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security at its borders, the EU attempts to fulfil the rationalistic and pragmatic interests of its citizens and of the political elites.40 Below, we intend to examine the existing tendencies in defining the objectives of external policy of the states from the framework of the Eastern Partnership, in order to pinpoint the determining role that its Eastern neighbours play with regard to the external and regional political agenda of the EU and the implications on EU-Russia relations. Similarly to the case of the Visegrad Group, with approximately the same type of neighbourhood environment and with common objectives associated to EU accession, much like in the case of the Eastern Partnership, shaping up foreign policy and finding a common denominator is difficult to achieve amid the competition between the Russian Federation and the EU.41 Until now, when Ukraine is going through a crisis and the situation remains delicate, this region has enjoyed relative stability in comparison with the Mediterranean or Balkan areas, with relatively few security challenges – the Chechen conflict, the one in Trans-Dniester, or in South Ossetia – where the EU did not actively intervene and it did not play a significant role in its relations with these states, although other states and organisations did, for instance the US, NATO and OSCE. We have two groups of states, in Eastern Europe and in the South Caucasus, where, although each state plays its specific role, their foreign policies are influenced more or less by Russia. Belarus is defined as the last dictatorship in Europe: it keeps close links with Russia and it subordinates its foreign policy to Russian priorities; it has no objections concerning the Russian military units present on its territory and it depends on Russian economic support; the Belarusian civil society is underdeveloped and oppressed by the political regime. Moldova, due to the so-called “Twitter revolution”, succeeded in installing a pro-European liberal government and in improving its indicators of democracy, and through the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU, is the most advanced country on the path to accession within the Eastern neighbourhood. Ukraine is the biggest country in the EaP and has a different situation in Eastern Europe. Although it has gained visibility in Western mass-media and has declared a pro-NATO and pro-EU foreign policy line, it has a weak and corrupt judiciary system, a low institutional capacity and poor governance, while

40

Giselle Bosse, „Challenges for EU governance through Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership: the values/security nexus in EU-Belarus relations”, Contemporary Politics, Volume 15, Issue 2, 2009, p. 218. 41 See S. Gerasymchuk, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

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the events of this year demonstrate that the priorities of Ukrainian foreign policy did not change after all, with Russia still being attached.42 Armenia has strong links with Russia, tailoring its foreign policy to Russian priorities; it is dependent on Russian economic support and on Russian military presence; it is involved in the frozen conflict in NagornoKarabakh and it has complicated relations with Turkey; the Armenian civil society is underdeveloped and oppressed by the political regime. Georgia has succeeded in drawing the attention of the EU and has made progress in consolidating democracy; even after the war of 2008, its dependence on Russia has remained considerable and its democratic evolution is still debatable; its civil society is relatively well developed; at the political level, relations with Russia are almost confrontational and the country’s progress on the path to European accession is undermined. Azerbaijan is to be seen as a pivotal country, which has the biggest population in the Caucasus region; it benefits from the Eastern Partnership, but it imposes the Russian model in its foreign policy. As a Muslim state, it has close contacts with the Islamic world, but it is at the same time influenced by the Eastern neighbouring Christian countries so as to adopt Western culture; last but not least, as it is rich in natural resources and ensures European energy security.43 In conclusion, the most dependent states on Russia are Armenia and Belarus. Armenia registers low progress in approaching European standards and one cannot foresee any changes in its foreign policy due to the economic dependency and alliance with Russia in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Belarus is going through relative isolation, as the EU suspended its relations with this country in 2006 and introduced economic sanctions, maintaining only relations at the level of experts; also, political and economic reforms are absent and Moscow refuses to lose control over this country. Lately, Ukraine has been moving a lot in the same direction, although there are also political forces looking towards the West. Given the Ukrainian government's decision to suspend the initialling of the Association Agreement with the EU and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) in the fall of 2013 in Vilnius, the Ukrainian civil society, joined by pro-European parties and groups, reacted by means of organising pro-European protests both in Kiev and in other cities, thus forming the Euromaidan. The refusal to sign the Association Agreement to the EU shows that Ukraine has not changed its 42 43

Idem. Idem.

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priorities, expressing in this way its attachment to Russian foreign policy.44 Russia attempted to limit its alternative agenda and to reinvigorate its feelings towards the “glorious common history” by triggering a political crisis and launching the Russian military intervention in Crimea. The crisis continued and culminated in the annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol to the Russian Federation in March 2014. Only Georgia and Moldova have a different foreign policy approach, compared to the other countries, although it interferes directly with Moscow in the issues of separatism and frozen conflicts. If Russia maintains outbreaks of conflict unresolved, like Trans-Dniester or Moldova, this appears to be beneficial because it allows it to maintain them within its sphere of influence, whilst in the EU these actions are perceived as destabilising, aggressive and dangerous. The Trans-Dniester enclave is an ungovernable space dominated by oligarchs and organised crime, where the risk of witnessing an increasing volume of arms, people and drug trafficking is particularly high. However, Moldova has moved ahead on the Western trajectory, leaving behind Georgia and Ukraine. The Moldovan government upholds the objectives of the Eastern Partnership, declares its priorities in accordance with European values and sustains the efforts for EU accession. After the war against Russia and the de facto annexation of the Georgian territories Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the normalisation of Georgia-Russia relations is hindered. The war impeded the acceleration of Georgia’s efforts moving in the European direction, while the EU is very prudent in the evaluation of the progress made by this country, so as to avoid any supplementary tensions with Moscow. Georgia is a state lost in transition, which has neither the possibility to join the European concert for the time being, nor the willingness to reassess its relations with Russia. With respect to Azerbaijan, there are no signals of change in its foreign policy, because this state has managed to maintain a balance between local and world leaders due to its exports of energy, benefitting from the cooperation with neighbouring countries. The issue that could lead to significant changes of foreign policy in Azerbaijan is the increase in tension in Nagorno-Karabakh, with the situation potentially escalating into a confrontation between Armenia and Russia. The situation of these countries nowadays, at a regional level, shows the increase in Russian domination and reflects the fact that the Eastern Partnership of the EU has slow and complicated proceedings that do not 44

Ibidem, pp. 9-10.

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lead to more prosperity in this area, whilst only maintaining the illusion of a security belt for the EU.45

Risks and security threats at the Eastern border of the EU Although it is not a security organisation in the traditional sense of the word, the EU has security preoccupations and wants additional security within the European space. Through the European Security Strategy (ESS), it exhibits limited preoccupation with its involvement in global matters, but it admits that the Union already acts beyond its frontiers, pursuing local interests in the vicinity of its territory, including the Eastern space and the Russian Federation. The EES identifies five major interconnected threats: terrorism (Europe is both a target and a base for it); proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts, both worldwide and in the EU's neighbourhood, which can lead to extremism, terrorism; and failed states; failing states that undermine global governance and contribute to regional instability and may be associated with obvious threats like organised crime and terrorism; the former may be related to the latter and is often associated with weak or failing states.46 The most recent enlargement waves have brought some benefices for the Union, transforming it into a stronger entity, richer in human resources, whilst the ENP, as an alternative to the policy of enlargement, completed by the EaP, can also lead to enlargement, and implicitly to a greater securitisation of the Union. Although it is not threatened anymore by classic, military conflicts, the EU is menaced ever more frequently by non-military risks, as a consequence of the regional security environment, soft cross-border issues affecting its societal security, rendering it more vulnerable and obliging it to manage problems at the borders of its new Member States. The possible risks and threats to European security from the Eastern neighbourhood which can undermine the Eastern Partnership are: the persistence of unresolved crises (frozen conflicts) which present the danger of reigniting violent conflicts (especially in the Caucasus); the existence of ethnic minorities and their autonomous tendencies; the difficulties met by some states during the process of transition; the existence of weak state structures (failed states); the existence of highlevel corruption; the tendencies of some states to become regional leaders 45 46

Ibidem, p. 11. See at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

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(Ukraine); the tendencies of the Russian Federation to restore the spheres of influence it lost after the end of the Cold War and to attract some states or regions into its orbit (Belarus, Ukraine, the Trans-Dniester area, the Caucasus region); the increase in importance of the Black Sea in the process of redefinition of the new spheres of influence; the economic competition triggered by the exploitation and transport of energy resources from Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Middle East; the intensification of non-military threats to the national security of the states in the area, but also of the EU (organized crime, cross-border terrorism, illegal drug and arms trafficking, illegal immigration). The presence of Russian involvement in the region is a threat that could undermine the Eastern Partnership.

The involvement of the EU in crisis and conflict management Until now, the EU’s answer to the resolution of the crises and frozen conflicts in the countries of the region has been limited, appealing more to diplomatic and economic means and instruments than to military ones. We shall now analyse the involvement of the EU in the conflicts of the region and examine the capability of the CSDP to play a more important role as part of the wider efforts of the EU to resolve these conflicts. As of 2004, the EU’s policy towards the Eastern region was approached via the ENP and, since 2009, through the EaP – both dominated by the European Commission. But these two instruments could not include under one umbrella the whole policy towards the region, offering technical procedures for gradual long-term reform. As we have shown, the ENP functions on the basis of bilateral agreements between the EU and the participant countries, called Action Plans, which include general strategies for economic and political reforms for these countries. The European Commission monitors the implementation of the action plans and issues periodical activity reports for every country. Furthermore, the Commission offers incentives, including greater access to the internal market and integration in other programmes of the EU, and before the establishment of the European External Action Strategy Service, the Commission had had delegations in the field for each participant country. The Eastern Partnership was established to improve the economic, political and trade relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbours, based on bilateral agreements and a multilateral platform. Although it represents a sort of “ENP-plus”, the

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Eastern Partnership has not managed to raise the political profile of the EU’s relations with the Eastern neighbourhood. The EU has to be capable and willing to implement instruments in the short term, such as the CSDP, if it wants to manage crises efficiently. The EU’s activity through the CSDP should be understood as part of the context of its policy in the East, as a whole. Since its establishment, the Commission has constantly chosen to depoliticise the ENP, with Brussels describing it as a technical and non-political instrument.47 The argument was that the neighbourhood policy would be less controversial amongst the governments of the partner countries than the CSDP, which contains military means, being less antagonistic towards Russia, because it is a policy which focuses on technical, long-term aspects. By contrast, both the Council and the Commission describe the CSDP as a political instrument, even though the description is mostly made in symbolic terms. As we have shown, Russia categorised not only the ENP, but also the EaP as instruments through which the EU extends is political influence in the region. Aware of this sensitivity of Moscow, the EU leaders have rushed to declare that the Partnership does not represent a major infringement upon the Russian sphere of influence.48 The distinction between the CSDP and the ENP – a political vs. a nonpolitical instrument – has affected the capacity of the EU to combine such different tools, both in the short term and in the long term, in managing crises in its neighbourhood, leading to substantial conflicts between its institutions. The lack of coherence between the two policies meant that both the Council and the Commission, through their specific activities, failed to formulate a general strategic plan for the EU’s involvement in the region. The establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS)49 offers an opportunity for the EU in this respect. The inclusion of the CSDP structures (the Crisis Management Planning Department - CMPD, the EU Major State - EUMS and the Civil Planning and Command Committee – CPCC) into the EEAS, along with officers from the Eastern Partnership (a Director for Europe and two officers from the ENP who coordinate with the Commission’s General Directorate of the ENP) offers the EEAS the possibility to overcome the inter-institutional rivalry between the Commission and the Council, through the development of a clear set of 47

A. Huff, op. cit. pp. 13-14. Andrew Rettman, “EU leaders soothe Russia over a new Eastern club”, EUObserver, May 7, 2009, available at http://euobserver.com/?aid=28090, (accessed on July 22, 2014). 49 See at www.eeas.europa.eu. 48

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political objectives of the EU for the Eastern neighbourhood, including being able to get significantly involved in the resolution of conflicts at its borders.50 The ENP cannot conduct political missions or missions of border oversight, but as a change, the new EEAS structures, in collaboration with elements of the ENP, can examine the whole set of EU instruments so as to contribute significantly to stability in the Eastern neighbourhood and to the resolution of frozen conflicts. The collaboration between the CSDP and the ENP has to be coordinated by the EU delegations (the former delegations of the Commission) from the respective countries from the Eastern neighbourhood. The three instruments (CSDP, EEAS and the General Directorate for Enlargement from the ENP) should work together to ensure that the long-term measures foster the consolidation of progress of CSDP missions in the medium and short term. The disputes emerging in the Eastern neighbourhood need to be addressed through future answers from the EU by means of combined instruments: the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership, European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the European External Action Strategy Service (EEAS).51 Compared to the 10 CSDP missions run in Africa and in other 6 locations from the Western Balkans, the EU is conducting only three peace missions through PESA/CSDP in its Eastern neighbourhood: two civilian operations in Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS and EUMM) and a mission at the border between Ukraine and Moldova (EUBAM), which combines some aspects of the CSDP with elements of the European Technical Commission. These operations were reactions to the specific events in the region implemented as part of the wider policy of the EU towards the region rather than as a result of proactive engagements.52 The first involvement of the EU in the ex-Soviet space took place in 2004, in Georgia, after the nomination of a special representative of the EU (RSEU) for the Southern Caucasus in July 2003 to monitor the conflict in the area. The EU launched its first CSDP mission, called EUJUST THEMIS, to uphold the rule of law.53 Although established via a common 50

Štefan Füle, „European Neighbourhood Policy Review”, European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, Brussels, 26 October 2010, p. 4, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-594_en.htm?locale=en, (accessed on July 22, 2014). 51

A. Huff, op. cit., p. 11. See A. Huff, op. cit., pp. 17-24. 53 Ibidem. pp. 17-19 52

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action plan of the EU Council and the European Commission in November 2005, the second mission, EUBAM Republic of Moldova - Ukraine54, was financed and managed by the European Commission. The operation was established following a common request made by the presidents of Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova with the purpose of offering consultancy and training for the Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities, so as to establish an international customs agreement and an efficient mechanism of monitoring the border between Ukraine and the separatist region of Trans-Dniester, in the Republic of Moldova. The purpose of the mission was to manage the border in accordance with EU standards in order to fight racketeering and trafficking, through which the TransDniester regime was financially sustained, and to be able to develop better cross-border cooperation between the two countries. During the mission, the Council sent a Special Representative to the Republic of Moldova, in order to consolidate the EU’s contribution to the resolution of the conflict in Trans-Dniester, in keeping with the political aims of the Union, together with the head of the EUBAM, nominated by the European Commission. Theoretically, the involvement of the Council reflects the context of the delicate political situation and difficult security surrounding the functioning of the EUBAM, with the purpose of accomplishing the larger aim of contributing to the peaceful resolution of the Trans-Dniester conflict.55 With regard to the EU monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM)56, it was particularly important to achieve its launch in due time and to reach the major impact of preventing the subsequent burst of hostilities between Russia and Georgia. EUMM Georgia represented the EU’s answer to the immediate crisis in Georgia in 2008. The mission was an ample civilian operation and it enjoyed a high political profile. The war started between Georgia and Russia due to the increased tensions in the separatist region of South Ossetia and ended via mediation, under the leadership of the French presidency, with the signing of a ceasefire agreement, forcing Russia to withdraw its troops to the pre-war position, whilst Georgia had to bring back armed forces to their current bases. The agreement also included a compulsory international presence in the region, in order to ensure the implementation of the armistice. The mandate of the CSDP mission was to monitor, communicate with all the parties involved in the conflict and

54

See at http://www.eubam.org/en/for_everyone/overview, (accesed on July 22, 2014). 55 A. Huff. op. cit. pp. 19-22. 56 See the website of the EUMM: http://eumm.eu/en/about_eumm.

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inform the EU so as to help the decision-making process within the CSDP.57 Different in terms of degree of intensity and ambition, although they have risen to the standards of the EU, these missions have also registered deficiencies due to numerous factors: the missions were more reactive than proactive; they had too vague general objectives and too wide mandates, with regard to the limited capacities of the CSDP; there was some institutional incoherence at the level of the Union. These problems reflect the lack of a common strategy for the Eastern neighbourhood from the member states and the institutions of the Union, as well as the incapacity of the member states to agree on the manner of dealing with Russia. The CSDP missions in themselves cannot produce structural reforms in the long run and cannot solve the conflicts in the region. In Brussels, it is assumed that the policy promoted through the CSDP is often in contrast with the non-political aspects promoted by the ENP, which dominates the EU’s involvement in the Eastern neighbourhood. This dichotomy exacerbates the disagreement between the member states and Russia, because the CSDP is regarded more as a political statement than as an instrument in the short run. 58 The EU cannot bring efficient long-term contributions to stability in its neighbourhood without a basic strategy that should include the whole range of instruments. Through the EEAS, the member states could, at least, establish a set of concrete aims for the Union concerning the conflicts in the Eastern neighbourhood and set these aims against the background of the instruments which are available at the level of the EU. Ideally, the CSDP should be implemented as an instrument for a limited period of time, with specific and realistic goals, supported by political instruments in the long term, within a wider political context envisaged by the EU in the region.59 Multilateral cooperation within the EaP, by means of the Civil Society Forum, could serve as a platform for promoting contacts amongst civil society actors in the separatist regions. A series of conflicts in the separatist regions of Georgia and NagornoKarabakh persist and have to be individually evaluated by the Union. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the control of the NagornoKarabakh region and the surrounding provinces is by far the most volatile in the area and the most likely to escalate rapidly within a wider regional conflict capable of attracting not only Russia, but also Turkey. The peace negotiations between the two parties have so far been managed by the 57

A. Huff, op. cit., pp. 22-24. Ibidem, pp. 24-25. 59 Idem. 58

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Minsk Group of the OSCE60, co-presided by Russia, the USA and France, without the participation of the EU. Consequently, the prospects for significant involvement of the EU in the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh remain low in the future. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan have called for help from the EU through the CSDP for the resolution of conflicts (as Georgia and Moldova did).61 The ENP and the EaP can play a major role in the region, in the medium and short run, in the event that the Commission grants priority to measures directed specifically towards conflict resolution, next to the ampler projects concerning the promotion of economic and political reforms in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The multilateral dimension of the Eastern Partnership could encourage cooperation between the two parties in conflict – the promotion of institutionalised dialogue and initiatives of peace consolidation between Armenian and Azeri NGOs, within the Civil Society Forum. Such measures could pave the way for the European Union to get involved in the Minsk Group (although this seems highly unlikely at the moment) or to send a CSDP mission to oversee its implementation.62

Final considerations Compared to the ENP, the Eastern Partnership appears to offer more advantages, but it obviously also includes many disadvantages. This Partnership has a significant importance for the region, which plays host to many frozen conflicts, security challenges, as well as the significant dependence on the supply of natural resources. The Republic of Moldova and Georgia could follow the pattern of the Visegrad Group, which proved to be successful, serving as a locomotive, powerful enough to eventually pull along in the accession process countries such as Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, which for the time being cannot meet European standards. Among the thematic domains included in the platform of the Partnership we encounter the topic of energy security, this domain indicating the interest of the EU in the guarantee of this European soft security dimension. A powerful aspect of the Eastern Partnership is that the bilateral association agreements offer certain important advantages to the partner countries which are not applicable in the accession negotiations and have not been offered to AELS countries; it also includes the promise 60

See at http://www.osce.org/mg, (accessed on July 22, 2014). See A. Huff, op. cit., pp. 27-37. 62 Ibidem, p. 39. 61

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of cooperation in the areas of foreign policy and security policy, aiming to approach the strategic and security issues in the region.63 The Eastern Partnership remains a weak and fragmented project and it has so far had a low practical impact. The objectives of the programme are either inconsistent, owing to the heterogeneous political and economic nature of the EU member states, or the programme per se is not ready to progress. Some post-Soviet republics continue on their European integration path regardless of Moscow’s position, while others prefer to weigh all the pro and con arguments before making a final decision.64 Before the Vilnius Summit, the EaP had represented a bone of contention between Russia and the EU but, in spite of the rhetoric, it is less likely to have a significant impact on the relations between the two actors. The strategic importance of Russia in the area has determined the EU to adopt a more coherent and dynamic approach towards it than towards the other states from the region, by establishing an institutionalised political dialogue.65 The Vilnius summit is an episode that has affected the recent diplomatic history and geopolitics of the EU and has shown that divergent foreign policy interests of the Member States and the lack of vision of the European Union cannot transform it into a player on the international stage. The inability of the EU to promote the interests of its eastern border shows once again that it is not yet ready to further expand to the East and to incorporate ex-Soviet States. We have shown that the use of CSDP instruments in the Eastern neighbourhood was sporadic, incoherent and with a reduced efficiency. To a greater extent, this approach reflects the incoherence among EU institutions (the Council and the Commission, which have separately promoted different policies) and the incapacity of the member states to agree on a common position towards Russia.66 The EU benefits from a broad range of instruments of stabilisation and conflict resolution. A realistic evaluation of the limits of the CSDP and the proper implementation of CSDP decisions should reinforce this policy. CSDP operations must be short, clearly defined and with achievable 63

Anna Michalski, „The Eastern Partnership: Time for an Eastern Policy of the EU?”, SIEPS, European Policy Analysis, Issue 14, December 2009, p. 10, at http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/591-2009_14_epa.pdf, (accessed on July 22, 2014). 64 A. Huff, op. cit. 40. 65 A. Sakhonchik, op. cit. 66 A. Huff, op. cit. 40.

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mandates. The EEAS gives the Union the opportunity to examine the specific needs of its eastern neighbours and to help resolve conflicts. Theoretically, the EEAS brings together technical and EU policy instruments that foster the development of a coherent set of policy objectives in the Eastern region, based on a thorough assessment of the individual needs of each country and conflict.

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THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP AND THE QUESTION OF EU POLITICAL IDENTITY: THE CASE OF BELARUS LUCIAN-ùTEFAN DUMITRESCU AND DARIE CRISTEA

Abstract Strategically, Belarus could be the most important country to Russia in Europe. There are several reasons which may underpin such a hypothesis. Belarus brings Russia close to Kaliningrad, hosts important Russian defensive capabilities, lies on the East-West axis for military invasions, and allows Russia direct access, chiefly through its export pipelines and road links, to the core of the European Union. Moreover, Belarus lies in the closest proximity of NATO. Besides its geostrategic assets, we argue that Belarus is important to Russia from an identity perspective, too. The Russians, the Ukrainians and the Belarusians represented in pre-modern times the three branches of the so-called “inseparable union”, i.e. the same nation, a concept that the Soviet Union’s propaganda drew heavily from in order to strengthen its “nationalist in form, socialist in content” identity. Bringing under scrutiny political, religious and intellectual discourses, we intend to find out how vivid the “inseparable union” question still is in Belarus nowadays, especially in the realm of informal political culture. In other words, the text aims to unearth the power mechanisms used to project a specific political identity, but also to explain whether the “inseparable union” narrative is still legitimate in Belarus. We will also address the way the Eastern Partnership influences the matter of the EU’s political identity, considering that the EU still lacks clear-cut otherness. Seemingly, members of the Eastern Partnership could represent an intermediate form of otherness, whereas the Russian

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Federation will still be depicted as “the enemy at the gate”, namely the yardstick of the EU’s political otherness. Keywords: European Union, Belarus, identity, identification, the Othering process, borders, power For many decades, geopolitics has been depicted as a pseudo-science due to many reasons, but chiefly due to its high ideological content and lack of a clear-cut methodology. Some of these intellectual allegations are true, but others are completely beside the point. Of course, it is not our intent to side with or against geopolitics in this article. Instead, the revival of geopolitics in the very aftermath of the Cold War is rather worthy of interest. According to Merje Kuus, geopolitics has come to life again in the early ’90s, but this time using a cultural outfit. To be more precise, Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations, despite the essentialist perspective on culture shared by the author, is a good example of cultural geopolitics. The line of inquiry employed by Huntington in the early ’90s transformed NATO from a military alliance into a civilizational alliance, one that revolves around democracy, tolerance and human rights, as its pivotal political values1. Of interest to our article is that the European Union has also been depicted as a civilizational alliance, despite the massive economic and institutional gulfs between its eastern and western states, which were shrewdly and rapidly swept under the rug. What was not swept under the rug was the Othering process, which was swiftly employed by pundits who started celebrating the emergence of the European Union. Of course, the Othering process has been as arbitrary as ever2. Forging Absolute Significant Others in order to bring together a rather faltering identity has been a strategy effectively employed by different administrative centres from the very dawn of humanity. After all, it is less costly to create an Absolute Significant Other than to transform a multicultural polity into a multiculturalist one3. This time, for the European Union, the one that emerged after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which did not have the institutional coherence to choose a certain nation-state and define it as an Absolute Significant Other, every polity 1

Merje Kuus, Geopolitics Reframed. Security and Identity in Europe’s Eastern Enlargement, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 48. 2 Iver Neumann, Uses of the Other. ”The East” in European Identity Formation, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 41. 3 George Crowder, Theories of Multiculturalism. An Introduction, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2013, p. 11.

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that was slightly different from the European Union could be labelled as Otherness. “The Other is differentiated not in terms of being nonEuropean, insecure, or nondemocratic, but in terms of being not “fully” or “truly” or “not yet” European’’4. On this account, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty produced a “sacred identity” for the European Union, one anchored in the underlying assumptions that: “democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy are considered superior to other political, economic and social orders and they are constitutive for the EU”5.

This article sets out to explore the Othering process used by the European Union in order to forge its badly needed identity. From this perspective, Belarus is everything the European Union needs, considering that, politically and economically, the Lukasehnko regime is completely at odds with the EU’s sacred identity, namely democracy, human rights, the rule of law and free market. The premise that we start from in exploring the European Union’s identity is that we are not dealing with a static, predetermined or monolithic identity. True, there are some cultural and institutional constituents that are specific to European civilization, such as Greek classical culture, Christianity and its institutional expressions, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and its ideological and institutional aftermath, to name just a few. True, the aforementioned constituents belong to a cultural identity of Europe. As we have already noticed, the “sacred identity” is mostly political. It would be exaggerated to draw a clear-cut line between politics and culture, but seemingly such a line has been drawn between the cultural and political identity of the European Union, in order to make the former peter out more or less rapidly. Nevertheless, the cultural residues of European civilization will continue to be a part of the European Union’s identity formula, irrespective of what its most prominent contour would be. But, as we have stated earlier, we are not aiming to unearth the very essence of the EU’s identity, because we do not employ an ontological approach with respect to identity. It is our view that every collective identity finds itself in perpetual motion. Therefore, it will be more appropriate to talk about identification instead of identity. In other words, we need to take a closer look at the mechanisms responsible for the social reproduction of collective identities. 4

Merje Kuus, op. cit., p. 37. Thomas Risse, A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres, London, Cornell University Press, 2010, p. 28.

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In unpacking the issue of collective identities, we will employ the pattern of national identity. Obviously, we could be subject to harsh criticism, considering that the European Union does not resemble a national polity. We would argue that in post-national or supra-national polities, the mechanisms involved in forging and reproducing a collective identity are almost similar. Moreover, supra-national collective identities, just like national ones, are both inward and outward looking6. With respect to the inward dimension of national identity, its main constituents are supposed to create a sense of commonality between the members of a particular polity. Anthony Smith claims that ethnic ties, a public culture, common historical memories, a homeland and a specific legal and economic system account for the emergence of a more or less vivid sense of commonality. Regarding the outward dimension of national identity, it always presupposes the existence of a Significant Other. In other words, the Othering process, the one that usually makes the in group’s identity sharply contrast with the out group’s identity, is part of any collective identity construction process. Our theoretical stand is that the Othering process is quite salient in the case of the European Union’s identity. It is more salient because as a post-national wannabe-polity, the European Union places less emphasis on the inward looking dimension of its identity and, consequently, on its specific constituents, such as ethnicity, homeland, a sense of common ancestry etc. To sum up, there are two things that should be taken into consideration by anyone who intends to delve into the matter of European Union identity. First of all, one needs to pay attention to identification instead of identity. Second of all, considering that, as a particular polity, the European Union’s political contour is rather post-national, its inward looking dimension is underdeveloped. Therefore, one needs to pay particular attention to the Othering process employed by the European Union in order to forge its political identity.

The European Union and the Othering Process In the early 1980’s, John A. Armstrong revisited some of Fredrik Barth’s tenets regarding the importance of boundaries for the identity debate. It is already a commonplace in the realm of social sciences that the 19th century Romantic perspectives, which worked according to the 6

Anna Triandafyllidou, Immigrants and National Identity in Europe, London, Routledge, 2001, p. 26.

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premise that every ethnic group has a particular soul, tried to unearth the very immutable essences of national cultures. Armstrong noticed that nowadays, anthropological perspectives have distanced themselves from the abovementioned Romantic views, and instead of dwelling upon a “national soul”, the new lines of inquiry have highlighted the importance of boundaries for forging and preserving collective identities. Identity borders are in a state of permanent flux due to continuous efforts made by the institutions that have forced them to adapt to a continuously changing international milieu. But although identity borders are politically invented and rather porous, the very institutions, namely the nation-states which have forged them, make these identities and their borders look sacred by using specific power mechanisms. Under such circumstances, arbitrary identities are perceived as natural, given or predetermined. Another observation made by Armstrong is that identities are always antithetical. In other words, a Significant Other is required for the emergence of a certain collective identity. Differently put, collective identities have always needed strangers in order to emerge. As we have already stated, the difference between locals and strangers does not lie in objective factors. It lies rather in a continuous interaction among subjective factors, along specific identity borders which, through this steady interplay, are eventually made to look objective. Under such circumstances, identification, instead of identity, and the Othering process, come to play a pivotal role for identity studies. It is quite obvious that the presumptively pernicious character of borders has been systematically stressed by universalist discourses, which tend to overlook the minority communities’ inside borders, which heavily inflict on their disempowered members. We believe that borders are not pernicious per se. For without borders, social coherence could be disrupted. In other words, the symbolic systems responsible for the social reproduction of a certain community could be altered in the absence of borders. Steadily corroding the symbolic reproduction of a community is a fruitful approach to wracking havoc and social unrest. In the absence of borders, the Othering process, which, as already stated, is a necessary but not a sufficient constituent for any collective identity to ensue, will not be possible anymore. Thus, we may argue that borders are not pernicious per se. More important for the present debate is what borders are made to exclude and include. For a social group without borders or a social group that cannot coherently impose its borders in its interplay with other social groups is just one step away from identity implosion. Schöpflin has

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noticed that any item could be transformed into a border7. In other words, the Othering process could focus on traditional outfits and expand to a specific way of wearing traditional outfits or to local ways of preparing food, particular diet codes and so on. In modern times, language, history, social memories, myths and heroes have been the most widely used constituents in the process of forging identity borders. To sum up, the social role that borders are expected to play is that of preserving collective meanings. Most emancipatory myths have been aimed at annihilating identity borders. Social experience has proved that when identity borders are weakened, a growing insecurity culture develops, with feelings such as fear and helplessness espoused by most members of a disempowered society. Under extreme circumstances, when identity borders are severely disrupted, community members tend to become involved in a fierce opposition for the strengthening of lost community meanings. In so doing, community members overwhelmingly use essentialist perspectives on culture. If a community cannot preserve its identity borders, the entry and exit from that particular community will be so easy that social costs involved by both leaving and entering that community will be very low. Consequently, the appeal that a community exercises over its members could hit a historic low, with dire consequences regarding the allegiance that community members are willing to pledge to a certain culture. The identity process has always been a two-way street. If the members of a certain social group are to get accustomed to a particular collective consciousness, awareness of the outsiders is a must. Triandafyllidou provides a rich examination of the Othering process involved in the forging of every collective identity. The Greek sociologist believes that there are different types of Significant Others which a certain political institution could avail itself of in order to construct the much needed collective meanings for its legitimacy. First of all, Triandafyllidou differentiates between Inspiring and Threatening Significant Others. Whilst the former may be the source of admiration and esteem, the latter could be perceived as a source of insecurity. Consequently, such a Significant Other is to be avoided, or, in the worst case scenario, destroyed if necessary8. There are both Internal and External Significant Others. While the former are represented by immigrant communities and national minorities, the latter may consist of, firstly, the dominant ethnicity of an empire, secondly, a neighbouring nation-state with steadily claims on the homeland of the in group and thirdly, territorially close nation-states or 7 8

George Schöpflin, The Dilemmas of Identity, Tallinn, TLU Press, 2010. Anna Triandafyllidou, op. cit., p. 33.

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ethnic groups which stake their claim for the cultural heritage – myths, symbols, heroes – of the in group. According to Triandafyllidou, the common denominator of all different types of Significant Others is that they are mostly perceived as a source of insecurity for the in group’s specific identity9. The first conclusion that one can draw regarding European Identity is that it is neither objective nor predefined. It is rather a process. For this reason, it would be more fruitful to address the question of the European Union’s identity as identification, namely as a political process of forging a gradual Significant Other, especially by capitalizing on the ancient fault line between West and East. Following this line of inquiry, we would argue that the European Union has already forged different types of Significant Others. There is an internal Significant Other, which consists of EU member states that are not part of the Schengen area: Romania and Bulgaria, to be more precise. The European Union has also built an intermediary Significant Other, which is made up of the “little Eurasian states”10 that are included into the European Union’s Eastern Partnership, whilst the European Union strives to preserve, with little success, though, one of its absolute Significant Others, namely the Russian Federation. Granted, civilizational differences between the European Union and, for instance, China are more salient in comparison to the existing civilizational differences between the European Union and the Russian Federation. For this reason, it would be unreasonable to label the Russian Federation as the absolute Significant Other of the European Union. Depending on how the power relations will evolve in the realm of international affairs, China might become in the near future the next absolute Significant Other of the European Union, whilst the Russian Federation could be a rather intermediary Significant Other or, who knows, an internal Significant Other of the European Union. By the same token, the Russian Federation has sharply collided with the European Union’s “sacred identity”, namely democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and market economy. Nevertheless, in order to solve the pressing identity issue of the European Union, some pundits have turned their attention from geographical and political Significant Others to some prominent EU member states’ religious and national history. True, the history of the European Union is not a long one. But one can easily notice the European Union’s efforts to distance itself from the contentious national past of the 9

Ibidem, p. 38. Alexandros Petersen, The World Island. Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West, Denver, Praeger Security International, 2011. 10

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continent. Seemingly, in a post-national and post-religious European Union, national and religious reasons, which once triggered bloody conflicts, will play no role - except for a historical Significant Other role. From this perspective, one can say that the European civilization’s contentious past accounts for the only absolute Significant Other of the European Union. Considering that the European Union keeps enlarging, it will be quite difficult for pundits in Brussels to come up with an absolute political Significant Other. Under such circumstances, focusing on creating a historical Significant Other instead of forging a political one could be considered a shrewd strategy. But in the meantime, it reveals a huge drawback of the European Union’s identity. In order to last, an identity needs an institution to continuously nourish it, a social group to espouse it and borders to separate it from competing identities. Of all these usual constituents of every collective identity, the European Union seems to have none. Politically, the European Union is no church or nation-state. It is rather a supra-national institution that is fairly difficult to pin down with a concept. Moreover, the European Union has more than one demos, not to mention the non-EU immigrants, and steadily refuses to establish fixed political borders. For instance, instead of reinforcing the European Union’s political borders, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with its 55 members, and which covers swathes of land between Vancouver and Vladivostok, seems rather to dilute them. Following Anthony D. Smith’s line of inquiry, the question one needs to provide an answer to when the issue of European Union identity is subject to scrutiny would be when there is a European Union11? In other words, one should examine the identity mechanisms, such as the Othering process, specific myths, public rituals, through which a European identity could be built. Beside the Othering process, one can notice the occurrence of a banal European nationalism, with the Euro currency and the EU’s flag being the best-known supranational symbols of the European Union. Nevertheless, the Euro currency has not been adopted by all EU member states, whilst not all EU states are included in the Schengen area. Perhaps one can see glimpses of a banal European nationalism, but there is still no sign of a European consciousness. Nietzsche said once that it is more important what nations forget than what they remember. Since the memory of the two World Wars, and the climax of enmity among the nation-states of Europe, are still fresh, one can easily explain why the European consciousness has not developed yet. In addition to that, national 11 Atsuko Ichijo; Gordana Vzelac (ed.), When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism, London, Routledge, 2005.

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histories of, for instance, France, England and Germany are still more glorious than the short and mainly bureaucratic history of the European Union. For this reason, citizens of the European Union are prone to be more loyal to their nation-states than to a supra-national, still hard to define, political institution. And maybe this is the most important shortcoming of the European Union’s identity. For, as long as the political sense of the European Union is not clear-cut, one cannot assert what kind of identity better suits the European Union.

Belarus, probably the most appropriate Significant Other for the EU What really strikes the tourist who has the chance to visit Minsk is the huge amount of Soviet symbols encountered in the public space. It is quite easy for everyone slightly conversant with political sociology to split all these Soviet symbols into four large categories. The first group consists of names that are at the heart of Soviet hagiography, namely Marx, Engels and Lenin. The most prestigious avenues and streets are named after the central symbols of the Bolshevik Revolution. Symbols included in the second category, namely ideas and institutions that lie at the core of Communist ideology, such as Communism, Socialism, Komsomol, proletariat etc., are also used to name the most important streets and public places in Belarus. The third group of symbols is made up of names of Bolshevik leaders and Soviet heroes, whilst the fourth resides in dates and anniversaries of significant Soviet events. Not only street names, but also the symbols that one encounters in the public space, give the impression that Belarus is still firmly anchored in a Soviet institutional model. All these Soviet symbols “remind the passer-by that all the events, personalities and ideas relevant for modern Belarus emerged in the context of the Soviet rule”12. To those critics that might find the title of this section a bit far-fetched, we would present Verena Fritz’s depiction of Belarus: “museum of the Soviet Union”13. Granted, one might agree or disagree with Verena Fritz, but according to her, Belarus, unlike all the other former Soviet republics, has gone through the most diluted institutional change for the last 20 years. The fact that power has been preserved at the top of the institutional 12

Andrew Savchenko, Belarus. A Perpetual Borderland, Boston, BRILL, 2009, p. 24. 13 Verena Fritz, State-Building. A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia, Budapest, CEU Press, 2007, p. 212.

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system in Belarus, precisely like in Soviet times, with little to do for those political agents with feeble or no connections at the summit of the political pyramid, accounts for the weakness of the political opposition. But this is hardly surprising, considering that political opposition and civil society in ex-communist countries turned out to be almost without an identity and, thus, politically weak after a sudden political debacle triggered rather through international negotiations than through massive internal political protest. Usually, it takes more than a decade, depending on the magnitude of the political control that had been exercised over the entire society by the late totalitarian regime, to partly empower the opposition and the civil society. It is well known that in many ex-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe, although a political opposition eventually emerged and even won the presidential or parliamentary elections, the civil society is still a myth. This is a clear consequence of what happens when too much political and economic power has been stored at the top of the institutional system for decades. From this perspective, little has changed in Belarus. Political power continues to be concentrated at the summit of the political system and, therefore, one can resolutely say that Lukashenko’s regime is almost tantamount to its Soviet model. Verena Fritz, in her analysis of political transformations that took place in exSoviet republics, with a special focus on Belarus and Ukraine, goes as far as to say that Belarus has kept its Soviet institutional pedigree even more than the Russian Federation has. “Russia had already changed its state and economic system to such a degree that there was little ‘fit’ with the neoSoviet Belarusian model”14. This conclusion qualifies rather Belarus than the Russian Federation for the Absolute Significant Other status of the European Union. We will not dwell on this aspect anymore. What really has surprised us, and this is where we believe that Fritz’s conclusion is rather misleading, is the statement according to which Belarus continues to have a very weak national identity, and this partly accounts for Belarus’ pro-Russian orientation. Our conclusion runs counter to the abovementioned one, as we have found a well-articulated Belarusian political nationalism revolving around the Belarusian state, conceived as the very essence of its national identity. This kind of conclusion, which is also the main thrust of this paper, seems quite puzzling, considering the very short institutional history of the Belarusian state, only a 20th century invention, not to mention, from a cultural perspective, its massive Soviet content. And yet, the fact that it is the state, rather than the nation, which lies at the very heart of Belarusian 14

Ibidem, p. 211.

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national identity does not seem so puzzling on closer examination. From an institutional perspective, many Eastern ethnic groups have chosen to transform the state into the most prominent constituent of their national identity. This is chiefly the case of ethnic groups that performed as substate national minorities, either in the imperial polities that collapsed after WWI, or in the Soviet Union. According to Paul Roe, who tried to grasp the very gist of societal security in the case of Romania, the Romanian state, although still dysfunctional from an institutional perspective, lies at the core of the Romanian identity formula15. It is also the case of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova. Most of them have rejected the prospect of the Republic of Moldova politically joining Romania, so that the interwar Greater Romania could be reinstated, fearing they might lose the very essence of their national identity, i.e. the local statehood. The explanation for this identity propensity specific to many Eastern ethnic groups is provided, among others, by Bruce Kapferer. He claims that either the residues of the still very active dominant religion, namely Orthodoxy, which has heavily diffused its hierarchical institutional perspective, or the patriarchal profile of the local states with political leaders acting like providential saviours of the nation, have bred a particular political cosmology in which the state is depicted as the institutional guarantor of a certain ethnic group’s cosmos16. This institutional penchant of some Central and Eastern European ethnic groups runs massively counter to the European Union’s identity philosophy, which hinges upon a post-state cosmology, namely an equalitarian political culture. For this reason, the Belarusian identity formula, with its sharp focus on the state, is everything the European Union’s identity is not supposed to be. That is why, of all the states involved in the Eastern Partnership, Belarus seems to be chiefly at odds with the European Union’s post-national political project. But now, let us briefly turn our attention to the Belarusian state, which, as stated earlier, is a rather recent institutional emergence. It is not our intent to delve deeper into the history of Belarusian statehood, providing for instance a broader picture of its relationships with primeval states, such as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. We are more interested in the transformations that altered the Belarusian national identity in the late ’80s and also the ones that shaped a still massive Soviet-type identity at the end of the 90’s, under the Lukashenko regime. According to Andrew 15

Paul Roe, Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma, London, Routledge, 2005. 16 Bruce Kapferer, Legends of People, Myths of State. Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia, Smithsonian Institute, 1988.

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Savchenko, who authored Belarus. A Perpetual Borderland, there were no political or economic institutions belonging to Belarusians at the beginning of the 19th century. At that time, “the only Belarusian institution that transcended the boundaries of village community was the Uniate Church”17. For the more experienced reader, it is rather difficult to assess the Belarusianess of the 19th century Uniate Church, although at present, the Uniate Church is the only institution that fulfils its daily duties by using solely Belarusian language. We do not fully share the modernist assumptions regarding the emergence of collective identity, but we still believe that the modern state has played a pivotal role in disseminating a national public culture and in inventing national traditions, heroes and rituals, irrespective of how much the national symbols of one nation-state have drawn upon local or regional cultures in order to forge a national consciousness. Lacking a political institution that would manage the modernization process, there is no surprise that at the beginning of the 20th century, most Belarusians lived in rural areas, being involved in specific practices of peasant economies. Therefore, when it started developing, the Belarusian intelligentsia drew heavily on the Belarusian peasant culture and economy in its attempt to forge a collective Belarusian identity. Organized around Nasha Niva, a literary publication, this intelligentsia depicted the very essence of Belarusian identity revolving around rural values, such as hard work and a very developed sense of justice and equality. What should be stressed here is that in the absence of a state entrusted with conceiving a national ethos, the foundations of Belarusian nationalism were laid by “a group of literary romantics with pronounced socialist views and political aspirations”18. As already stated, the origins of the Belarusian state are rather intricate and it is not our intention to unpack them in this short text. Still, a brief examination of the roots of the Belarusian state is needed, considering that it lies at the core of nowadays’ Belarusian national identity. On March 25, 1918, the Belarusian People’s Republic was set up in Minsk by representatives of local nationalist groups. Save a military force that could preserve the newly established state’s independence, the Belarusian People’s Republic had all the necessary administrative features of a modern state, claims Savchenko. It is a contention that we would rule out as long as the founders of the Belarusian state had neither prior bureaucratic experience nor a suitable technocratic culture required to enforce the very essence of the modern state, namely the rule of law. It is 17 18

Andrew Savchenko, op. cit., pp. 55-56. Ibidem, p. 66.

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worth mentioning here that the establishment of the Belarusian People’s Republic is strongly related to Minsk’s capture by the German army, which took place in February 1918. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the administration of the Belarusian People’s Republic fled the city once the Germans started retreating at the end of the year. Another Republic was proclaimed at the beginning of 1919, once the Bolshevik armies entered Minsk. But the short-lived Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic disappeared once the Polish armies occupied Minsk on 22 May, 1919. Surprisingly, the Independence Day of Belarus has never drawn upon the political events related to WWI. It is rather inspired from events that happened in WWII, namely the liberation of Minsk from the Wehrmacht, during the Minsk Offensive that took place on July 3, 1944. “On that day the Red Army expelled German troops from the country’s capital city, Minsk, and restored Soviet power”19. The fact that The Independence Day of Belarus draws heavily on WWII, which used to also lie at the heart of Soviet identity, shows once more the huge Soviet content of the current national identity in Belarus. But this is not surprising, since national structures developed in Belarus under Soviet rule. Furthermore, celebrating the Independence Day on July 3rd reveals the central role played by WWII stories and heroes in the realm of national mythology. Jan Zaprudnik argues that statehood lies at the core of nowadays’ Belarusian national identity. His perspective rests on the conclusion drawn at a Belarusian-Polish round table on the idea of Belarusianness and Polishness. According to Zaprudnik, the Belarusian discussants defined their national identity as “a conception of a distinct national state of the Belarusian people”20. Zaprudnik’s perspective is also endorsed by an identity survey carried out in 2000, according to which 75.9 per cent of the respondents identified themselves as citizens of Belarus, whilst 12.4 per cent assessed themselves as citizens of the USSR. There is hardly anything revealing about these figures if one does not mention a prior question of the abovementioned survey. Asked to give a cultural definition of the Belarusian nation, 49.8 per cent answered that Belarus was a “separate, self-sustained nation”, whereas 42.5 per cent somehow surprisingly responded that Belarus was just “a branch of the Russian nation”21. The perspective articulated by both the Belarusian discussants and the 75.9 per cent of the respondents who identified themselves as citizens of Belarus reveals a strong loyalty to the state, and also the desire for cultural and 19

Ibidem, p. 116. Elena Korosteleva; Colin Lawson; Rosalind Marsh, Contemporary Belarus. Between Democracy and Dictatorship, London, Routledge, 2003, p. 122. 21 Ibidem, p. 115. 20

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political uniqueness, which only a strong, independent state can fulfil. This political propensity has also been noticed by Andrew Wilson, who argues about “a common east Slavic tendency to identify with their local state, ironically in part because east Slavic identities are vague and overlapping”22. But this particular distinctiveness of the statehood desired by the Belarusian discussants raises some problems. Although the 1994 constitution of the republic claims that the local state has a centuries-old history, we have already shown that local statehood is just a couple of decades old. Granted, the older the state, the greater the moral worth of a certain social group. Or, at least, this is what some intellectual streams in social theory claim. But anyone who is partly acquainted with political sociology knows that every state has a cultural content, apart from its bureaucratic contour or its history. In the case of the Belarusian state, it is precisely the local content that is rather absent, a feature that one can understand just by examining the matter of the official language. Officially, the Belarusian state has two administrative languages, namely Belarusian and Russian, in this order. Belarusian is used on national money, postage stamps, and also in foreign passports, wherein names are inscribed only in the Belarusian version. But, as it will turn out, in the case of Belarus the language argument is quite misleading. Theoretically, if we use a Herderian line of reasoning, to be Belarusian means to speak the Belarusian language. According to another identity survey, carried out in 1999, 62.8 per cent of the population claimed to speak Russian at home, whereas only 36.7 per cent of the respondents used Belarusian at home23. The figures can be elusive, because what really matters is whether the Russian language is really an impetus for the Russian identity in Belarus. Apparently it is not, considering that the rural areas, where Belarusian is frequently used, “have turned themselves into fortresses of conservatism and nostalgia for Soviet times and reintegration with Russia”24. Russian is frequently used in urban areas, and especially in Minsk, which is the capital of Belarus, and simultaneously the spearhead of a political movement for Belarus’ sovereignty and independence. In other words, Russian is by no means a carrier of Russian identity in Belarus. On the contrary, Russian is “a language of cultural renewal of the country and its independence as

22

Andrew Wilson, Belarus. The Last European Dictatorship, London, Yale University Press, 2011, p. 121-122. 23 Elena Korosteleva; Colin Lawson; Rosalind Marsh, op. cit., p. 117. 24 Ibidem, p. 115.

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Belarusian”25. Why do the Belarusians demur to use their national language? There are at least two answers to this question. First of all, the bureaucracy refuses to use the Belarusian language. And second of all, the latter is perceived as a peasant language. “In Belarus the ‘native tongue’ is still often referred to by the pre-modern label of prosta nova – the ‘simple tongue’, which is indeed ‘ours’ but is from the village, and is associated with low, not high culture”26. To make matters even worse, the Belarusian language has three versions, namely Tarashkevitsa, Narkamawka, and Tersianka. From all these versions, the most successful seems to be Tarashkevitsa, some books being published in this dialect in the early ’90s. WWII continues to provide most of the heroes and special events of national identity in the case of Belarus. Consequently, the social reproduction of national identity revolves around symbols and rituals that are related to WWII. And yet there are two important moments considered to be powerful catalysts for Belarusian national awareness. The first is the Kurapaty moment and is related to the discovery, back in the late 1980’s, of mass graves with victims of Stalinism. A civic group named the Martyrology of Belarus was set up in 1988 in order to speed up the investigation of such horrendous crimes. After the Kurapaty moment, not only were ‘our’ martyrs included in the national pantheon, but a thin identity line also started to make the difference between Belarusian heroes and Soviet heroes, within a still predominantly Soviet history. In other words, the Kurapaty moment triggered a national stream in a Sovietdominated history. Another important catalyst for Belarusian collective identity was the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, when roughly 70 per cent of the radiation landed on Belarusian soil. This figure was kept secret from the public by Soviet officials, who did not intend to spread panic amongst the local population. Definitely, this is a very bad excuse for a belated administrative response that badly affected either the health or the life of so many Belarusians. The Chernobyl moment is celebrated as a historical event when the Belarusians were betrayed by the Soviet elite, liable mostly to Moscow and only partly to Minsk. This betrayal was once again impetus for the development of a national consciousness. To sum up, Belarus is still in the process of consolidating its national identity. What really matters for this article is that especially under Lukashenko, Belarus has steadily been searching for a solid Significant Other. And the Significant Other that its official pundits have engineered is not the Russian Federation, but the European Union. Especially under 25 26

Ibidem, p. 117. Andrew Wilson, op. cit., p. 123.

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Lukashenko, Belarus has been described as “the East Slavic antemurale against the West”27.

In lieu of conclusion Granted, Belarus’ participation in the Eastern Partnership is chiefly due to geostrategic reasons. Once Poland, Lithuania and Latvia became EU member states, the European Union began sharing a common border with Belarus. There are also geo-economic reasons that account for Belarus’ presence in the Eastern Partnership. Not only does Belarus represent a potential market mainly for Western companies, but, as in all other Central and Eastern European countries that became democratic in the early ’90s, one can find in Belarus skilled, low-cost workforce. But the geostrategic and geo-economic reasons are not the only ones which make Belarus an attractive country for the European Union. At a shallow examination, Belarus’ national identity seems to be fully embedded in Soviet symbols, heroes, myths and so on. Even the contemporary political style of Lukashenko and the institutional design of the Belarusian state seem to be tantamount to the ones specific to the late Soviet regime. All these identity characteristics turn Belarus into the perfect Significant Other for a European Union that intends to be democratic, post-national and politically willing to export its institutional and identity design even to a former Absolute Significant Other of both Western and Eastern states, such as Turkey. Considering that nowadays, Belarus’ identity sharply conflicts with the European Union’s “sacred identity”, namely democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and market economy, the latter really needs the former for its Othering process in order to strengthen its current fleeting identity. At a closer examination, Belarus’ identity, despite the Lukashenko regime and a symbolically Soviet-dominated public space, has distanced itself resolutely from its Soviet past. Especially the urban dwellers use the Russian language not as a carrier of a Russian identity, but rather as a catalyst for a national independence movement. Granted, Belarus’ Absolute Significant Other is not the Russian Federation. Actually, it would have been preposterous for the Belarusian pundits assigned to design a 21st century identity for the Belarusians, if they had chosen the Russian Federation as an Absolute Significant Other. Still, there are so many identity similarities between the two countries. But despite these similarities, the Belarusians, especially the intellectual elite, are willing to forge a distinct national identity with the Belarusian state at 27

Ibidem, p. 38.

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its core. We believe that this accounts for an extraordinary independence desire shared by most Belarusians, especially the urban dwellers. Political elites from Belarus still share little interest in the European Union. First of all, unlike other former Soviet republics that actively sought independence from Moscow under Gorbachev, the political elite of Belarus strived to reinforce political relationships between Minsk and Moscow. Second of all, Belarus has also lacked the trained personnel capable of putting into practice an independent strategic vision that might have been articulated by independent elites. Thus, one might say that the European Union strongly overrated the intention of Belarus’ political elites to turn a Soviet institutional design into a democratic one. Moreover, the European Union still remains the Absolute Significant Other for both the political elite and the local society. “Lukashenko is suspicious of western financial institutions and resents what he perceived as western ‘interference’ in Belarus’ internal affairs. Such views appear to resonate with a large section of Belarusian society”28.

We would argue that apart from the geopolitical and geo-economic reasons which the Eastern Partnership rests on, the particular institutional initiative set up by the European Union in May 2009 also serves an identity purpose. More precisely, the EU’s Eastern Partnership is used to inscribe Eastness on some of the former Soviet Union republics, whilst simultaneously diluting the Eastness of some ex-communist countries, former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which are nowadays EU and NATO members. Considering that they are still out of the Schengen area, Romania and Bulgaria continue to contain, institutionally speaking, a lot of Eastness - more Eastness than, for instance, Hungary, Slovakia or the Czech Republic. But thanks to the EU’s Eastern Partnership, Bulgaria and Romania’s amount of Eastness has dwindled significantly, especially in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. All former communist countries have been forced to grapple with significant identity issues after the more or less totalitarian regimes in Central and South-East Europe collapsed in 1989. For most of the ex-communist countries, joining NATO and the EU was one way of solving the abovementioned identity issues. But considering that the doxa and habitus presupposed by Europeanness are rather hard to ingrain in a completely different institutional milieu, the European identity of the former communist countries depended on their amount of Eastness, namely institutional 28

Elena Korosteleva; Colin Lawson; Rosalind Marsh, op. cit., p. 182.

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practices and values that were embedded by the communist regimes in the hearts and minds of their political subjects. Therefore, becoming European was massively conditioned by getting rid of particular Eastern doxa and habitus, especially the ones forged under the communist regimes. But dislodging Eastness does not make one necessarily European.

Bibliography 1. Armstrong, John, Nations before Nationalism, Chapell Hill, The University of North Carolina, 1982; 2. Barth, Fredrik, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Culture Difference, Illinois, Waveland Press, Inc., 1998; 3. Bauman, Zygmunt, Intimations of Postmodernity, London, Routledge, 1992; 4. Baumann, Gerd, The Multicultural Riddle. Rethinking National, Ethnic and Religious Identities, London, Routledge, 1999; 5. Crowder, George, Theories of Multiculturalism. An Introduction, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2013; 6. Davies, Norman, Europe East&West, London, Pimlico, 2007; 7. Fritz, Verena, State-Building. A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia, Budapest, CEU Press, 2007; 8. Ichijo, Atsuko; Vzelac, Gordana (ed.), When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism, London, Routledge, 2005; 9. Kapferer, Bruce, Legends of People, Myths of State. Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia, Smithsonian Institute, 1988; 10. Korosteleva, Elena, Lawson, Colin, Marsh, Rosalind, Contemporary Belarus. Between Democracy and Dictatorship, London, Routledge, 2003. 11. Kuus, Merje, Geopolitics Reframed. Security and Identity in Europe’s Eastern Enlargement, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007; 12. Manent, Pierre, A World Beyond Politics? A Defense of the Nation-State, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2006; 13. Neumann, Iver. Uses of the Other. ”The East” in European Identity Formation, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999; 14. Petersen, Alexandros, The World Island. Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West, Denver, Praeger Security International, 2011; 15. Roe, Paul, Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma, London, Routledge, 2005; 16. Risse, Thomas, A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres, London, Cornell University Press, 2010; 17. Savchenko, Andrew, Belarus. A Perpetual Borderland, Boston, BRILL, 2009; 18. Schöpflin, George, The Dilemmas of Identity, Tallinn, TLU Press, 2010; 19. Schöpflin, George, Politics, Illusions, Fallacies, Tallinn, TLU Press, 2012; 20. Triandafyllidou, Anna, Immigrants and National Identity in Europe, London, Routledge, 2001; 21. Wilson, Andrew, Belarus. The Last European Dictatorship, London, Yale University Press, 2011;

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22. Wimmer, Andreas, Ethnic Boundary Making. Institutions, Power, Networks, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013.

FROZEN CONFLICTS IN SOUTH CAUCASUS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP: THE CASE OF GEORGIA AND ITS BREAK-AWAY REPUBLICS OF ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA LAURA M. HER‫܉‬A AND ALEXANDRA SABOU

Abstract The chapter will firstly explore social-constructivist assumptions about norm-setting, norm-diffusion, and norm-internalization and will survey different conceptual approaches on the European Union’s normative power. Secondly, the chapter will tackle the escalation of tensions between Georgia and the break-away republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and will provide a comparative perspective of the pattern of conflicts between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia followed by an outlook on the conceptualization of de facto/de jure/desired status of the two break-away republics. Thirdly, the chapter will emphasize the evolution of the European Union’s contractual ties with Georgia, from the loose Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the post-2004 inclusion of Georgia in the European Neighbourhood Policy, the inclusion of Georgia in the Eastern partnership in 2009 and to the most recent event, the signing of the EU’s Association Agreement with Georgia in June 2014. The main focus throughout the chapter revolves around EU’s contractual relations with Georgia and our main arguments will be built around a social-constructivist “reading” (or interpretation) of the evolution of these relations. Keywords: EU’s relations with Georgia-Abkhazia-South Ossetia, socialconstructivism, social learning, norm internalization

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Introduction Throughout this chapter, we will focus on the European Union’s (EU) roles of norm-setting and norm-diffusion, and on the incorporation of such norms by Georgia-Abkhazia-South Ossetia through socialization processes. The social-constructivist concept of socialization is based on ideational factors, meaning the capacity of agents to gradually internalize norms, patterns of behaviour and rules and become elements of certain structures (such as the EU). The second chief interest herein is centred on the European Union’s declared objectives towards conflicts in Georgia. Firstly, we will focus on certain social-constructivist assumptions pertaining to modalities in which organizations such as the European Union construct norms, diffuse them, and transfer them, as well as to the ways in which such a normative body is internalized through socialization. The second part will be dedicated to the brief historical background of the conflicts between Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-South Ossetia. The chief preoccupation herein is to provide a comparative perspective over the pattern of conflicts between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia and an outlook on the conceptualization of de facto/de jure/desired status of the two break-away republics through the lenses of core topics, such as independence and sovereignty. The last part of the chapter will survey the evolution of the EU’s contractual ties with Georgia, from the loose Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the post-2004 inclusion of Georgia in the European Neighbourhood Policy, the tasks taken over through the European Union Monitoring Mission in 2008, the inclusion of Georgia in the EU’s Eastern Partnership in 2009 and to the signing of the Association Agreement in June 2014. Since the main concern throughout the chapter is centred on EU’s normativity, its capacity to design and export norms, and on the degree of internalization of such norms by Georgia-Abkhazia-South Ossetia, the third part of the chapter will tackle the following research questions: 1) How do social constructivist claims (i.e. socialization) explain the EU’s relations with Georgia and its break-away republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? 2) The European Union’s normativity in Central and Eastern Europe was based on conceiving optimal behaviour for candidate countries, on expectations of compliance, and on rewards pertaining to accession. But, when future accession is not part of contractual relations, the following question is then raised: how can the EU maintain its role of norm-setter and expect the incorporation of such normativity?

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Social-constructivist assumptions on norm-diffusion and norm-internalization A great deal of constructivist theorizing is preoccupied with norms and rules. Constructivist scholars like Nicholas Onuf analyzed the way in which “rules make social life intelligible for those participating in it” and showed how rules provide human beings with “knowledgeability for survival, which simultaneously provides their lives with subjective meaning.”1 Other constructivist perspectives, like the one of Friedrich Kratochwil, distinguished between regulative and constitutive rules and argued that norms direct or strengthen decisions, but they also confer meaning to actions. Therefore, rules should not be treated as naturally given; rather they are conceived and (re)fortified through practices, communication among agents, and their successful enforcement and compliance.2 When approaching the European Union’s role in world politics, social-constructivist arguments tackle the capacity and proclivity of EU to set and export norms. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink showed that the generally accepted definition of norms refers to the “standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” and were preoccupied with the modalities in which social scientists tackle behavioural rules: “One difference between ‘norm’ and ‘institution’ (in the sociological sense) is aggregation: the norm definition isolates single standards of behaviour, whereas institutions emphasize the way in which behavioural rules are structured together and interrelate (a ‘collection of practices and rules’).”3

Constructivist assumptions explain that the international structure comprises not only obvious material facts, but, most importantly, a distribution of ideas, meanings and knowledge. According to Alexander Wendt:

1

Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making. Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989, p. 59. 2 Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 3 Martha Finnemore; Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, in International Organization, 52, 4, Autumn, 998, p. 892.

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“the character of international life is determined by the beliefs and expectations that states have about each other and these are constituted largely by social rather than material structures.”4

Hence, “shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about appropriate behaviour are what give the world structure, order, and stability” and norms tailor behaviour; the challenge rests upon explaining change triggered by “norm shifts as vehicles of transformation” or, in the words of Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, to determine “whether norms are agents of stability or change.”5 The two authors explain the norm “life cycle” as a three-stage process. The first one is “norm emergence”, whose “main characteristic is [...] persuasion by norm entrepreneurs [who] attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace norms.”6 The second stage was termed a “norm cascade”7 and implies the norm acceptance. Within this stage, norm entrepreneurs or norm leaders try to persuade other states/leaders to follow the norms; a process of socialization as well as a complex “dynamic of imitation” occur, wherein “the combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem facilitate norm cascades.”8 At this point, socialization plays a crucial role. Socialization is the mechanism through which, within the international society of states, the preferences for certain norms become obvious for all potential “norm imitators”. Then, norm adherence is induced and behaviours are shaped. Socialization produces conformity which involves what Robert Axelrod has called the “social proof” which “applies to what people decide is correct behaviour.”9 According to 4

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 20. 5 Finnemore; Sikkink, op. cit., pp. 894, 891. 6 Ibidem, p. 895. 7 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 36, The Law School, The University of Chicago, 1995, available at [http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/36.Sunstein.Social.pdf]. According to Sunstein, “societies experience norm bandwagons and norm cascades. Norm bandwagons occur when the lowered cost of expressing new norms encourages an ever-increasing number of people to reject previously popular norms, to a ‘tipping point’ where it is adherence to the old norms that produces social disapproval. Norm cascades occur when societies are presented with rapid shifts toward new norms” (pp. 9-10). 8 Finnemore; Sikkink, op. cit., p. 895. 9 Robert Axelrod, “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms”, American Political Science Review, 1986, 80 (December), p. 1105.

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Axelrod, “the actions of others provide information about what is proper for us”, meaning that “by conforming to the actions of those around us, we fulfil a psychological need to be part of a group.”10 Drawing on Axelrod’s idea, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink argued that within the international structure “states comply with norms to demonstrate that they adapted to the social environment that they - belong.”11 Finally, the third stage implies the internalization of norms, meaning that “norms may become so widely accepted that they are internalized by actors and achieve a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality that makes conformance with the norms almost automatic.”12 Internalization represents a state’s capacity to no longer question the validity or legitimacy of a norm, but to assume it as part of their identity, habitual behaviour, and interests, namely to incorporate it. One pivotal theme of past research was centred on the way in which European institutions are able to establish norms, diffuse them and act upon reactions to such normativity. Analyzing European preferences and norms, Zaki Laïdi explained that “norms are standards aiming at codifying the behaviour of actors sharing common principles” and they are meant to generate collective disciplines and to dissuade undesired conduct.13 An extended work on “the socializing potential of international institutions” was provided by Jeffrey T. Checkel who examined: “the conditions under which, and mechanisms through which, institutions in Europe socialize states and state agents, leading them to internalize new roles or group-community norms.”14

Demonstrating that “Europe’s capacity to establish and export norms should not be underestimated”, Zaki Laïdi argued that the role of normsetter, for a long time attributed to the United States, has been taken over by Europe.15 Seeing the European Neighbourhood Policy as “a process of norms diffusion in the European ‘near abroad’”, Florent Parmentier argued that: 10

Ibidem. Finnemore; Sikkink, op. cit., p. 903. 12 Ibidem, p. 904. 13 Zaki Laïdi (ed.), EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World. Normative power and social preferences, London and New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 4. 14 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework”, in Jeffrey T. Checkel (ed.), International Institutions and Socialization in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 4. 15 Laïdi, EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World, p. 8. 11

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“the ‘norms reception’ process corresponds to the norm-takers’ appropriation [...] of standards aiming at codifying their behaviour as actors on the premise of commonly accepted principles, norms and values determined at the EU level.”16

Ian Manners introduced the idea of “normative power Europe” in 2002 and explained how EU norms are diffused. He built his arguments on Rosencrance’s distinction between normative power (which sets world standards) and empirical power (which is centred on physical domination or conquest). According to Rosencrance: “Europe’s attainment is normative rather than empirical [...] it is perhaps a paradox to note that the continent which once ruled the world through the physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms.”17

The European Union’s extended normative basis has been developed ever since the 1950s, Manners showed, and five “core” norms within the ensemble of Union laws and policies can be identified: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. In addition to these, Ian Manner suggests other four “minor” norms, namely the notion of social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and the principle of good governance.18 Ian Manners then explains how EU norms are diffused, by discussing how “contagion” and “transference” function, and identifies six main factors that produce EU’s normative power. Contagion works as an exporting of a model for regional integration; informational diffusion is the product… “of the range of strategic communications, such as new policy initiatives by the EU, and declaratory communications, such as initiatives from the presidency of the EU or the president of the Commission”

16

Florent Parmentier, “The reception of EU neighbourhood policy”, in ibidem, p. 103. 17 Richard Rosencrance, “The European Union: A New Type of International Action” apud Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 40. Number 2, 2002, p. 238. 18 Manners, Normative Power Europe ..., pp. 242-243. See also, Ian Manners, “The constitutive nature of values, images and principles in the European Union”, in Sonia Lucarelli; Ian Manners (eds.), Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 32-38.

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…while procedural diffusion is centred on “institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and a third party, such as an inter-regional cooperation agreement, membership of an international organization or enlargement of the EU itself”; transference involves either the export of norms and standards or carrot-and-stick approaches; overt diffusion is produced by the physical presence of the EU in third states while cultural filter represents the “interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and political identity by the subjects of norm diffusion.”19 Normative power rests, according to Zaki Laïdi, on “legitimacy of rules, the predictability of behaviour, and especially the enforceability of accepted principles”20 and the essence of EU’s normativity is also encapsulated in the following statement of Romano Prodi: .

“It is not imperialism to want to spread these principles [i.e. democracy, the rule of law, social justice, and human rights] and to share our model of society with the peoples of Southern and Eastern Europe who aspire to peace, justice and freedom. Indeed, Europe must go further. We must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global development.”21

In what follows, we will survey the historical background of the conflicts between Georgia and the separatist entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and then we will proceed to investigating the limits, pitfalls, and results of EU’s norm-diffusion in this area.

Georgia's wars with break-away Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Historical background and development of conflicts The recent electoral events in Abkhazia and South Ossetia reveal the outcomes of the growing citizens' dissatisfaction with their own leadership and the complicated economic and political efforts that the two breakaway republics are making to keep their independence from Georgia. The large demonstrations taking over Sukhum/i in May 2014 led to the 19

Ibidem, pp. 244-245. Zaki Laïdi, Norms over Force. The Enigma of European Power, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 43. 21 Romano Prodi, “2000–2005: Shaping the New Europe,” speech before the European Parliament in Strasbourg, February 15, 2000, quoted in ibidem. 20

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resignation of the now former president of Abkhazia, Mr. Aleksandr Z. Ankvab. Together with the discussions over the independent status of South Ossetia that inflamed political debates during parliamentary elections held in June 2014, these facts are expressions of the work in the name of two ethnic groups that are caught between their “would-be nations” status, fuelled by the Russian Federation and Georgia’s claims over Abkhazia, and the historical province of Samachablo which lies entirely under South Ossetia. In order to fully understand the dynamic of the recent events taking place in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we carried out an in-depth comparative analysis of the development of the conflict relationship between Georgia and its two secessionist de facto republics. By referring to the “Republic of Abkhazia” and the “Republic of South Ossetia”, we do not intend to implicitly acknowledge legitimacy of the two de facto governments residing in Sukhum/i and Tskhinvali, but to present both perspectives of the conflicts and contextualize them in larger historical trends. In the current scholarship, it is already very common to present the conflicting nest in the South Caucasus with the narrative of the demise of the Soviet Union, followed by the crisis of state legitimacy in the Republic of Georgia, manipulation of ethnicity for political/electoral reasons which led to protracted ethnic conflicts and the development of two contested sovereign states, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, on the one hand, several scholars tried to explain the outburst of violence in the South Caucasus focusing on several variables such as the “indivisibility of territory”22, “the ethnic categorization from above”23, “the realism of the group”24, “the Matryoshka federalism”25 etc. On the other hand, other Conflict Analysis and Resolution (CAR) analysts have focused their attention on the (de)escalation of the two conflicts and the negotiations for peaceful solutions through integrative/holistic/multi-track approaches26. 22

Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory, Princeton University Press, 2005. 23 Kanchan Chandra, “What is ethnic identity and does it matter?”, in Annual Review of Political Science, no. 9 (2006): 397-424, available at http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/chandra/ars2005.pdf, last accessed August 12, 2014. 24 Rogers Brubacker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 25 Cristoph Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, New York and London: New York University Press, 2007, p. 35. 26 Susan Nan Allen, “Shifting from Coherent towards Holistic Peace Processes”, in Dennis J.D. Sandole, Sean Byrne, Ingrid Sandole-Staroste, Jessica Senehi, (eds.)

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Thus, considerable amount of ink has been spilled to provide us with reliable explanations of the conflicts and their possible resolution options. In this respect, neither do we intend to overlap our research with what has already been said, nor do we claim to cover in an exhaustive manner all the perspectives surrounding the conflicts. However, we intend to provide primo a comparative perspective of the pattern of conflicts between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia and secundo a brief overview on the conceptualization and current effects of de facto/de jure/desired status of the two break-away republics in the light of the aforementioned core topics (i.e. independence, sovereignty) that are internally shifting the republics' politics and fuelling large debates in neighbouring Georgia and Russia. Within this historical section, we are going to briefly introduce the core concepts of our research, namely self-determination, territorial integrity and status while presenting the failure of the Georgian Zviadist forces27 in bringing political and administrative units together at the beginning of the 1990s. Secondly, we are going to concentrate on the similar pattern of signing ceasefire agreements and postponing political resolution of the conflicts that has conducted undoubtedly to new skirmishes and has deepened the shift (do you mean rift?) between Georgia and the two secessionist regions. Thirdly, we are looking to address the development of the conflicts within and the current status of the two de facto republics. After doing considerable background reading on the topic, focusing on the normative features of statehood and secession and the development of the conflict relation comprising Georgia-Abkhazia-Russia and GeorgiaSouth Ossetia-Russia, we collected data for the current research using two methods: first, the analysis of the main secondary data (academic articles, statistics, official reports, conference reports, legislation etc.) and second, to a limited extent, the use of semi-structured and structured interviews with relevant actors in Georgia and Abkhazia, personal observations and records. Contested lands. Contested concepts: Since the demise of the USSR, several competing factors have contributed to a certain degree to the proliferation of ethnic and separatist conflicts in the South Caucasus. The collapse of the Soviet model increased the incentives and opportunities for independence/secession for those eager to proceed toward this endeavour. Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, New-York, Routledge, 2008, pp. 383-396. 27 Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1939-1993), the first democratically elected president of the Republic of Georgia.

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These entities do not only have an ethnic character, but they also embody a political willingness to secede from their metropolitan countries. When problematizing ethnic conflict, constructivists reject the idea that ethnic identity is a pre-given or natural phenomenon and contend that “ethnic identities are enduring social constructions” and they are “products of human actions and choices” rather than biologically given.28 According to Cristoph Zürcher, “ethnicity per se is never an explanation for conflict; rather, the way ethnicity is institutionalized and how this institutionalization becomes contested in periods of rapid social change explains conflict.”29 Valery Tishkov argued against oversimplified typologies and claimed that: “the basic methodological weakness of such theories of conflict analysis lies in their vision of groups as collective bodies with needs and universal motivation – not as situations, feelings, or acts of speech.”30

If we adopt such an approach, we then focus on single-factor understandings of the nature and dynamic of conflict. However, when we reject this reductionist typology (which is in fact quantitative), we focus on ethnic boundaries or ethnic divisions whose content, linguistic utterance and narrative are not immutable, but rather altered, interpreted and embedded in (political) speech acts. The convincing and coherent argument developed by Zürcher is that: “ethnic boundaries, while not a cause of conflict per se, become reinforced or even reinvented during conflict. The salience of ethnicity can therefore be the result of the ‘ethnicization’ of conflict. Cultural difference becomes important in the course of conflicts, for it is the material from which the barriers between groups are built.”31

In what concerns the reasons that conducted to the conflicting nexus between Georgia and its two break-away republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we can easily perceive the clash that opposes incompatible desired statuses. The incompatibility of opinions over the legal status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia comes from different understandings of the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity. Since 1991, when Georgia achieved its independence, Abkhazian and South Ossetian 28

Raymond C. Taras; Rajat Ganguly (eds.), Understanding Ethnic Conflict. The International Dimension, New York: Pearson Longman, 2008, p. 12. 29 Zürcher, op. cit., p. 54. 30 Valery Tishkov, “Ethnic Conflict in the Former USSR: The Use and Misuse of Typologies and Data”, in Journal of Peace Research, 36(5), 1999, p. 572. 31 Zürcher, op. cit., p. 55.

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secessionists have referred to international law and their right to selfdetermination, while their Georgian counterparts have quoted the same international law to highlight their right to territorial integrity. In the case of post-Soviet wars, the argument supported here is that the collapse of the Soviet system increased the incentives and opportunities for nationalist elites. The Soviet map was based on the “territorialization of ethnicity.”32 In Soviet times, while Abkhazia used to be an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR)33 with a limited degree of statehood, South Ossetia was an Autonomous Oblast (region) (AO) which does not imply any form of statehood. At the same time, North Ossetia was left under the Soviet influence, thus splitting Ossetia in two regions. The Georgians comprised around 77% out of the total population in Georgia (followed by the other non-titular groups: Armenians, Russians, Azeris, Ossets). Abkhazia’s ethnic demographic composition included a majority of Georgians (approximately 45%) while the Abkhaz represented merely 18% of the total population living in the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia. The Autonomous Oblast South Ossetia displayed a majority of Ossets (66%) and a minority of Georgians (29%).34 According to the Soviet legislation, the ASSRs used to have their internal self-rule… “subject to supervisory powers vested in the union republics in which they are located. […] But, unlike the union republics, do not possess any of the indicia of external independence (the right to secede, to maintain foreign relations etc.).”35

32

Ibidem, p. 23. After the dissolution of the Russian Empire, the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia became part of the short-lived Democratic Republic of Georgia. Relations between Georgians on one side and Abkhazians and Ossetians, on the other side have always been tense and several riots broke out in these regions between 19181921. Moreover, Menshevik Georgians accused Abkhazians and Ossetians for supporting Russian Bolsheviks and Moscow against the regime in Tbilisi. Afterwards, when Bolsheviks took power in Georgia, the republics of the region were put under the rule of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia. See Silvia Serrano, Géorgie. La sortie d’empire, CNRS Editions, Paris, 2007, pp.13-23. 34 See Zürcher, op. cit., pp. 28-31 and Pascal Marchand, « Conflits dans l’espace post-soviétique : une géographie de la décomposition impériale », dans Franck Tétart (sous la direction de), Géographie des conflits, Paris : Editions Sedes/Cned, 2011, p. 323. 35 Ferdinand Feldbrugge, Encyclopedia of Soviet Law, Springer, 1985, p. 73. 33

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Because the USSR Constitution gave these Autonomous Republics the right to have their own Constitution, in 1925, the Abkhaz SSR adopted its own Fundamental Law wherein the only mentioning of its relation with Georgia was the fact that: “the republic of Abkhazia is a socialist state of workers and peasants, united on the basis of a Union Treaty with the Georgian SSR, enters the Trans-Caucasus Soviet Federative Socialist Republic through the Georgian SSR and, as a member of the latter, the USSR.”36

The Autonomous Oblast (AO) used to represent the bottom level of the Soviet federation. Such an entity had limited autonomy and was not entitled to any state structures like the ASSR, for example. Despite the existent legislative frame of action that comprised ASSRs and AOs within the USSR, they were reduced to forms of quasi-states or quasi-provinces, with little influence and tightly restricted freedom to manoeuvre.37 Needless to say, the Soviet form of federalism was curtailed by efforts of centralization conceived by the Communist Party. However, after 1991, when Georgia declared its independence from the Soviet Union, the historical legal autonomy of these entities fostered their capacity to engage in collective action and provided them with the reasons to ask for secession. “If Georgia wants to be independent of Russia, why can’t we be independent of Georgia?”38, the question raised in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia at the end of the 1980s, was seen as a legitimate response to Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s discriminatory slogan “Georgia for (ethnic) Georgians”. The process of state-building in an ethnic-fragmented environment is by definition a conflicting one. In Georgia, it has triggered numerous controversies over the national identity of the new state composed by several ethnic and religious minority groups and coincided with 36 Basic Law (Constitution) of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia, 27 October 1926, Article 2, available at [http://abkhazworld.com/aw/reports-and-keytexts/590-basic-law-constitution-ssr-abkhazia-1926], last accessed August 15, 2014. 37 Ghia Nodia, “Causes and visions of conflict in Abkhazia”, 1997, available at [http://iseees.berkeley.edu/bps/publications/1997_02-nodi.pdf], last accessed August 15, 2014. 38 Ghia Nodia, “Political Turmoil in Georgia and the Ethnic Policies of Zviad Gamsakhurdia”, in Bruno Coppieters (ed.), Contested Borders of the South Caucasus, VUB University Press, 1996, available at http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/ch0201.htm], last accessed August 14, 2014.

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simultaneous attempts by the Abkhazians and Ossetians to take advantage of the windows of opportunity39 for secession. Surprisingly enough, neither Abkhazians nor Ossetians were the most numerous ethnic groups in Georgia. While ethnic Abkhazians represented 18% of the region of Abkhazia, 66% of the population in South Ossetia declared themselves as ethnic Ossetians.40 The weakness of the first Georgian democratically elected regime led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia marked by civil war and “sovereignty protecting nationalism”41 served as an opportunity structure to mobilize ethnically based separatist ambitions of regional leaders such as Vladislav Ardzinba (Abkhazia) and Torez Kulumbegov (South Ossetia). National mobilization in Georgia mirrored (and was also dependent on) national mobilization in the two autonomous provinces. Evidently, the strong connection between the two soon-to-be separatist regions is recognizable within their borrowed tactics, strategies and action patterns. An example of diffusion of ideas is the development of the National Language programs in Georgia, followed by similar steps taken in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The law on the Georgian language was adopted in Georgia in August 1989. The same year, in September, South Ossetia adopted a similar law concerning the use of Ossetian language; this policy was very soon adopted by Abkhazians, who in October 1989, adopted the same kind of law concerning their language. The chronology of these events highlights how the diffusion process42 might have played a

39

Magdalena Dembinska, “Reframing identity claims : European and state institutions as opportunity windows for group reinforcement”, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 18, Issue 3, pp. 417-438, July 2012, available at [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00540.x/abstract], last accessed August 14, 2014. 40 Abkhazia had a pre-conflict population of 540,000 inhabitants where 47% were ethnic Georgians, 18% ethnic Abkhazians, 18% ethnic Armenians, 13% ethnic Russians. South Ossetia had a pre-conflict population of almost 100,000 inhabitants where 66% were ethnic Ossetians, 29% ethnic Georgians, 3% ethnic Russians, 4% other nationalities (Armenians, Jews etc.) 41 Stephan Jones, “Georgia: Nationalism from under the Rubble”, in Lowell W. Barrington (ed.), After Independence. Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States, The University of Michigan Press, 2006, pp. 248-275. 42 Several “diffusion models” are offered by the scholarship. David A. Lake, Donald Rothchild, Timur Kuran, James D. Fearon (eds.), The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, Princeton University Press,

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role in the redefinition of relations between belligerents. After numerous skirmishes related to the use of the Georgian language in the public sector in all regions of Georgia, regardless their ethnic and linguistic profile, South Ossetians claimed their unification with North Ossetia and afterwards, by referendum, asked to join Russia, while Abkhazians asked for sovereignty. However, marked by a certain degree of inconsistency, the interests of Abkhazians have been wavering between obtaining sovereignty and afterwards independence from USSR/Russia and Georgia, and their referenda claims for integration in the Russian Federation (in 1995 and 2001). Since the outbreak of these conflicts, Georgia’s aim has been to keep both Abkhazia and South Ossetia as parts of its territory, claiming the principle of territorial integrity as it has been stated in the Georgian Constitution adopted in 1995 and amended in 2006. “Art.1.1. Georgia shall be an independent, unified and indivisible state, as confirmed by the Referendum of 31 March 1991, held throughout the territory of the country, including the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia and the Former Autonomous Region of South Ossetia and by the Act of Restoration of the State Independence of Georgia of 9 April 1991.43”

For both Abkhazians and Ossetians, the war with Georgia acquired the dimensions of a war for national liberation. These conflict dyadic relationships between Georgia and Abkhazia, on the one hand, and between Georgia and South Ossetia, on the other hand, has been played on the battlefield of statuses. For the Georgian authorities, Abkhazian authorities claiming their sovereignty were separatist forces, “not […] subjects of international law, but […] an illegitimate leadership which came to power by military force in one of the autonomous regions of Georgia.”44 However, the Abkhazian side has always insisted that 1998; Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 43 The Constitution of Georgia, available at [http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7523], last accessed August 15, 2014. 44 Mikeladze Levan, “Georgia and the OSCE” in Institute for Peace research and security politics at the University of Hamburg, OSCE Yearbook, 1999, available at [http://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/99/Mikeladze.pdf], p.103, last accessed August 23, 2014. Mikeladze Levan (1957-2009) was a former Georgian diplomat and envoy of Georgia to the United Nations.

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Abkhazia is not “a simple territory of Georgia, but rather a state which had to give consent before the metropolitan army had any right to be introduced into his territory.”45 The 1994 Constitution of Abkhazia proclaims that: “Art.1.The Republic of Abkhazia (Apsny) is a sovereign, democratic state established historically under the right of people to free selfdetermination, and functioning in accordance with law.46”

After the referendum organized in January 1992 in which the majority of South Ossetians declared themselves in favour of unification with Russia and independence from Georgia, South Ossetians' willingness to acquire independent status vis-a-vis Georgia led to the declaration of independence by the de facto South Ossetian parliament on May 29, 1992 and to the adoption of a new Constitution on November 2, 1993 (which was updated in April 2001 and December 2005). However, neither Abkhazia, nor South Ossetia has officially demanded that other states recognize them as independent entities until 2008. Since the 1990s, the de facto and de jure status of both break-away republics has not all the time coincided. Whatever the de facto status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (a federation within a federated state; an insurgent state; a de facto state without international recognition or a de facto state recognized by Russia only), the international community and the UN Security Council consider them a de jure part of Georgia. According to their de jure status, they were supposed to respect Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. However, this would have been hardly acceptable for the leaders in Sukhum/i and Tskhinvali. Moreover, the conflict over sovereignty and the peace process have involved not only the three main actors (namely Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia), but also neighbouring Russia and other international third party intervention actors such as the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), the Joint Control Commission (JCC), the CIS Peace Keeping Force (CIS PKF), the Group of Friends of the Secretary General of Georgia (France, Germany, the UK, the US, and Russia as a facilitator). As the stalemate 45

Viaceslav Chirikba, “Georgia and Abkhazia: Proposals for a Constitutional Model”, in Bruno Coppieters; David Darchiashvili; Natella Akba (eds.), Federal practice. Exploring Alternatives for Georgia and Abkhazia, VUB University Press, Brussels, 1999, p. 235. 46 Constitution of Abkhazia (1994), available at [http://apsnypress.info/en/constitution], last accessed August 23, 2014.

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persisted, several interpretations have been made regarding the involvement of the USSR/the Russian Federation in the two conflicts. On the one hand, under the claim of protecting its nationals living in the conflict provinces of Georgia and working on the stability of the CIS area, they were perceived as a “stabilizing factor” and a peacekeeping force that is going to secure the region.47 On the other hand, Georgians and many other international observers considered the Russian support offered to both separatist groups as a handy political tool that gives Russians the opportunity to play the role of a neighbourhood bully force rather than a peacekeeping one. The conflicting situation reveals several sets of historically intricate relations that overlap: bilateral relations between Georgia and Russia, on the one hand, and the complicated relationship between Georgia and its break-away republics, on the other hand. From the first round of negotiations that took place in September 1992 until the ceasefire Moscow agreement (September 1993) that put an end to the armed hostilities in Abkhazia, Russia played a leading role. As a consequence, the peace-keeping forces deployed in the conflict area were Russians working under the CIS umbrella. Despite the several political and diplomatic efforts and the other countless ceasefire agreements that followed the one signed in Moscow, the conflict over the desired statuses of the belligerents could not be solved.48 On the one hand, for Abkhazians the only three acceptable options remained either to gain complete independence, gain republic status within Russia, or lose confederation with Georgia while maintaining their own army, government and citizenship. On the other hand, for Georgia, the main interest was the preservation of its territorial integrity and the safe return of the Georgian IDP (Internally Displaced Persons) in Abkhazia. While the tripartite ceasefire agreement reached in Moscow in September 1993 by Georgia and the leadership of Abkhazia and Russia stipulated that the “territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia shall be ensured”, Abkhazians refused to recognize Georgia’s territorial integrity. 47 In 1992, Boris Yeltsin adopted the decree “On the protection of the Right and Interests of Russian Citizens outside the Russian Federation”. See more in Igor Zevelev, “Russia’s Policy Towards Compatriots in the Former Soviet Union”, in Russia in Global Affairs, vol. 6 (1):2008, pp. 49-62, available at [http://www.units.miamioh.edu/havighurstcenter/russianstudies/documents/compat riots.pdf], last accessed August 12, 2014. 48 Report “Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia”, vol. II, 2009, pp. 61-125, available at [http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_II.pdf], last accessed August 20, 2014.

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They showed strong willingness to consolidate their de facto status and to defend the control over their territory. In this context, for ordinary Georgians and the two Georgian leaders Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikhail Saakashvili, the integration of the two break-away republics and the territorial integrity of the country have remained a matter of unquestionable national consensus.49 On the Russian side, the bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia and South Ossetia have followed different dynamics. Only one month after the signature of the Moscow ceasefire agreement, it collapsed under the fights taking place in the Gal/i region, Sukhum/i and Tkvarcheli. In South Ossetia, Russians also took the lead. The trilateral ceasefire Sochi (Dagomys) agreement officially signed in June 1992 brought together Russians, North and South Ossetian and Georgian military forces to strengthen the peace process.50 In spite of the signature of the two ceasefire agreements orchestrated by Russians, the postponement of political resolutions of the conflict was conducive to new military crisis. The situation has changed a lot since August 2008, after the five days war when the Russian Federation recognized both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. According to the four criteria of state-building described in the 1993 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States51 (namely a defined territory, a permanent population, a government and international recognition), there are no rules in international law which state how many countries have to recognize a state in order to give the former international recognition. Nonetheless, according to the Helsinki Final Act signed by USSR and other European states in 1975, Principle I states: “The participating States will respect each other’s sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence.52” 49 When he came to power, after the Rose Revolution in 2003, the president Mikhail Saakashvili devoted his efforts to the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity. 50 The Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) 51 The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, available at [http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states /p15897], last accessed August 24, 2014. 52 The Helsinki Final Act (1975) available at [http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true], last accessed August 24, 2014. The Sochi Agreement concluded in 1992 between Georgia and the Russian

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Consequently, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia (former SSR within the USSR) have been negatively affected. As we already mentioned above, only former constituent republics of the USSR (i.e. Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan), but not territorial sub-divisions (i.e. AOs and ASSRs, such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia) were granted independence and international recognition in case of dismemberment of the USSR. The contentious legal issue resulting from ensuing international recognition to both break-away republics deteriorated the relations between Georgia and the Russian Federation53 and contributed to the already redundant tendency to reduce these relations to the strategic framework “Russia versus Georgia/ the West/ the US/ NATO”. If Russians called their military actions in Georgia “a peace enforcement operation”, Georgians and their Western supporters called it “aggression” or “invasion”. On the one hand, Tbilisi considers that the five day war started because of the bombardment of Georgian villages in South Ossetia and the illegal invasion of the Russian troops. On the other hand, Tskhinvali considers Russians a necessary presence that saved Ossetians from a possible genocide. Russians supported this statement and invoked the need to protect their own citizens living in South Ossetia as it is stated in the Constitution of the Russian Federation: “Art.61 (2) The Russian Federation shall guarantee to its citizens protection and patronage abroad.”

At that moment, the numerous peace efforts that tried to put an end to the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been reduced to the French brokered six-point peace plan. It was meant to provide the basis for a legally binding text to end the bloodshed and to pave the way for a political consensus. The clash of incompatible desired statuses of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that marked the relations between belligerents since the 1990s acquired a new dimension when Dmitry Medvedev followed the recommendation of the State Duma and the Federation Council to recognize the independence of the two break-away republics. Despite the fact that the doctrine of the privileged zone of interests of

Federation reaffirmed in its preamble “the commitment to the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act.” 53 Svante E. Cornell, Frederic Starr (eds.), The Guns of August 2008. Russia’s War in Georgia, M.E. Sharpe, 2009.

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Russia and the action based on the Kosovo precedent formula54 have been fully criticized by the international community, Russians encouraged other countries to follow the same diplomatic step and recognize both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.55 In light of the new dynamics concerning South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Georgian political standpoint on conflict transformation has considerably changed through the adoption of the Law on Occupied Territories of Georgia (2008) and the State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation (2010).56 The Law on Occupied Territories was the Georgian answer to Russia’s recognition of the two break-away republics. From the Georgian point of view, the responsibility for the failure of the peace talks with the two separatist groups remains on the “occupying force” side (the Russian Federation); however, in order to protect “Georgia’s national interests”, the Law calls for the isolation of the two “occupied territories”. The negative consequences for applying such a law and the criticism received from the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe57 made the Georgian government come up with another approach that seeks the deisolation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Strategy is based on a new attitude that “opposes the isolation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/ South Ossetia and recognizes the negative repercussions of isolating the populations living there; the government of Georgia is therefore pursuing a human-centric policy aimed at engagement with residents of these territories.”58 Even if the proposed de-isolation – aimed at bypassing political leadership – is focused on ordinary inhabitants of the “two occupied territories”, the politicized side of the documents could not be acceptable for Sukhum/i and Tskhinvali. The alienating relation between belligerents continues to put a tremendous burden on the efforts to bridge the communities and support 54 In the case of Kosovo, the Russian Federation fiercely opposed independence and gave support to the Serbian territorial integrity; however, in the case of the two break-away republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russians preferred the right to self-determination to the principle of territorial integrity claimed by Georgia. 55 The Law on Occupied Territories of Georgia (2008), available at [http://www.smr.gov.ge/docs/doc216.pdf], last accessed August 24, 2014. 56 The State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation (2010), available at [http://www.civil.ge/files/files/SMR-Strategy-en.pdf], last accessed August 24, 2014. 57 Opinion on the Law of Occupied Territories of Georgia, March 2009, [http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDLAD(2009)015-e], last accessed August 24, 2014 58 The State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation (2010), p. 6.

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the confidence building process. The young generation in Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia that has grown up in the 1990s and is nourished with images from the war did not at all experience co-existence with the other side. On the one hand, this could help at getting rid of the multiple layers of historical war memory; on the other hand, it could deepen the incompatibility gap that remains at the heart of the conflict relations: the desired status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, the absence of a political solution approved by all belligerents strengthens the ties between military and economic dependent Abkhazia/South Ossetia and the Russian Federation. Consequently, the current situation drives the war-affected republics away from Georgia and both its nationalistic and Western approach and contributes to their isolation behind dividing lines that go deep into politics and geopolitical interests. On the one hand, nowadays Georgia is playing the European card focusing on the attractiveness of the benefits available through the Eastern Partnership (2009) and the EU- Georgia Association Agreement (2014). On the other hand, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia fear the nationalistic approach of Georgia. For example, in Abkhazia, the authorities had an ambivalent policy towards the Georgian returnees in the Gal/i district.59 On the one hand, they wanted to show that they are allowing IDPs to return to their homes and live in Abkhazia in peaceful conditions; on the other hand, they feared that their return might jeopardize their future status. For Georgians, Migrelians who live on the Abkhaz side of the Ingur/i border are definitely part of the Georgian nation60; for the Abkhazian authorities, the Gal/i people are considered traitors or the fifth column of Tbilisi in Abkhazia. Thus, they share the status of a double minority in both Georgia and Abkhazia. The “passportization” phenomenon is also double-edged. One the one hand, it might be perceived as an attempt to foster social integration of the Gal/i residents; on the other hand, between 2008-2013, more than 25,000 passports have been issued for ethnic Georgians living in the Gal/i district.61 Many Abkhazian activists supporting the recently 59

The Gal/i region is home to 47,000 ethnic Georgians who decided to come back to their houses after the cessation of hostilities between Georgia and Abkhazia. 60 However, the return of Georgian IDPs in Abkhazia was perceived as a key tool for Georgia to recover Abkhazia; this is the reason why their integration in the Georgian society didn’t seem to be a priority for the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili regimes. Interview with NGO activist, Sukhum/i, 29/05/2014. 61 “ȽɪɭɡɢɧɜȺɛɯɚɡɢɢɥɢɲɚɬɩɚɫɩɨɪɬɨɜɢɝɪɚɠɞɚɧɫɬɜɚ” (Ethnic Georgians living in Abkhazia are losing their passports and citizenship, n.tr.), September 18, 2013,

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elected new president of Abkhazia, Raul Khadzimba, contested the legality of the policy of “passportization”62 and warned that it is only a tool for internal power struggle. At the end of May 2014, after almost one week of unrest, former president Alexander Ankvab resigned from office. The main reason for the protests orchestrated by his main political opponent, Raul Khadzimba, has been the passportization of the ethnic Georgians from Gal/i, unacceptable for an ultra-nationalistic part of the population and their political leaders.63 Raul Khadzimba lost twice the presidential elections mainly because of the support of the Gal/i citizens for other candidates. In 2014, Khadzimba succeed in efficiently triggering the dissatisfaction among the Abkhazian population using the passportization issue as a tool to reshuffle the deep antagonism between Tbilisi and Sukhum/i. In brief, the status-related problem igniting the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not disappear from the belligerents' agenda after the cessation of hostilities. Strictly in connection with the frozen status of the relations with Sukhum/i and Tskhinvali, the “carrots and sticks” attitude of Georgia with a certain European flavour seems double-edged. On the one hand, the dynamics of the recent electoral events taking place in Abkhazia and South Ossetia show the close ties that exist between the secessionists and the Russian Federation. The military and economic support offered by Russia exceeds the soft EU measures and policies that involve Georgia (and inter alia should be appealing to Abkhazians and Ossetians as well). Moreover, as we mentioned above, the different understanding of the core concepts (namely, the right to self-determination claimed by Abkhazians and Ossetians versus the principle of territorial integrity stated by Georgians) that nourish the conflicting atmosphere deepens the antagonistic relations and creates much more temporal and spatial distance among people. This gap is continuously fuelled with war images and an available at [http://www.mk.ru/politics/article/2013/09/18/917658-gruzin-vabhazii-lishat-pasportov-i-grazhdanstva.html], last accessed August 24, 2014. In September 2013, the Abkhazian authorities stopped issuing passports for ethnic Georgians living in Abkhazia. According to a Parliamentary Commission’s conclusions, “The presence of citizenship of a foreign state acquired by a citizen of the Republic of Abkhazia in violation of the regulations of the present Law, results in the cessation of the citizenship of the Republic of Abkhazia.” 62 For a good analysis on this issue, see Iskra Kirova, Public Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Russia, Georgia and the EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Paper 7/2012, USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School, Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, August 2012, pp. 16-18. 63 Interview with CS worker, Sukhum/i, 28/05/2014.

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ethnically-based identity struggle that reaches an intrapersonal level. And as much as we need to define the above mentioned core concepts that continue to be at the heart of all events and declarations in Tbilisi, Sukhum/i and Tskhinvali, we also need to observe the new dynamics of framing and counter-framing that shape these relations and involve new actors/projects and new levels of groupness.

Social-learning, EU’s normativity, and the impact on Georgia-Abkhazia-South Ossetia Our focus here revolves around EU’s contractual relations with Georgia and our main argument will be built around a social-constructivist “reading” (or interpretation) of the evolution of these relations. One main contention in social-constructivist literature is that agents/actors change their identities and their perceived interests through participation in common institutional structures. Thus, Nathalie Tocci emphasized that “contractual relations can affect conflict and conflict resolution also through [...] diffuse mechanisms of learning and persuasion” and pointed to the fact that via processes of social learning “domestic actors voluntarily internalize the norms and logic underpinning the EU system.”64 The European Union’s normativity in Central and Eastern Europe was based on drafting, uttering and designing optimal behaviour for candidate countries, on setting expectations of compliance, and on granting rewards pertaining to accession. But, when future accession is not included within contractual relations, the following question is then raised: how can the EU maintain its role of norm-setter and expect the incorporation of such normativity? According to Zaki Laïdi, it was against the background of this problematic issue that the entire European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was designed; the scholar explains this rationale as follows: “Europe is no longer able to or no longer wants to offer membership as a perspective to its neighbours, while leading them to believe that this fundamental change will not make a big difference to them.”65 This “policy for nonmembership” (in the words of Zaki Laïdi) was launched initially under the idea of Wider Europe in 2003 and represented the result of efforts to build up a coherent strategy. In 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy emerged, the South Caucasus was included in it and an EU special 64

Nathalie Tocci, The EU and Conflict Resolution. Promoting peace in the backyard, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 15. 65 Laïdi, op. cit., p. 14.

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representative for the South Caucasus was appointed. Throughout the 1990s the EU had not played a decisive role in the South Caucasus, but in 1999, the loose Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) came into effect. Both Georgia and the secessionist regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) were beneficiaries of EU assistance (as indicated by Natalie Tocci). In 2006, the European Union and Georgia signed the Action Plan on cooperation. Ever since the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union has set the goal of “preserving peace, preventing conflict and strengthening international security” (Art III-193 of draft Constitutional Treaty) and this objective was embedded in the EU-Georgia Action Plan, as Priority area 6 (Promote peaceful resolution of internal conflicts), with the following specific actions:

x Contribute to the conflicts settlement in Abkhazia, Georgia and

Tskinvali Region/South Ossetia, Georgia, based on respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders; [...] x The EU stresses the need for a constructive cooperation between interested international actors in the region, including the EU and OSCE Member States, on additional efforts contributing to peaceful settlement mechanisms in Tskinvali Region/S. Ossetia and Abhkazia; x Include the issue of territorial integrity of Georgia and settlement of Georgia's internal conflicts in EU-Russia political dialogue meetings.66 In what follows, we will briefly survey the EU engagement in Georgia and in its break-away republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and we will emphasize three main features pertaining to interactions between the EU and Georgia-Abkhazia-South Ossetia: “EU acting as a very fragmented presence in the South Caucasus; EU always perceived as one-sided actor; the use of different concepts in relation with belligerents (i.e. borders/administrative boundary lines; independent countries/occupied territories).”

1) EU – a very fragmented presence in the South Caucasus: In 2008, on behalf of the French presidency of the Council of the EU, the French 66 EU-Georgia Action Plan, available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/georgia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf].

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president Nicholas Sarkozy led the EU efforts in obtaining a ceasefire agreement between the belligerents. Although it was an EU intervention by its representatives, it was soon perceived as a French achievement rather than a European one. In 2008, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was deployed to Georgia and the mandate was centred on the following goals: x to ensure that there is no return to hostilities; x to facilitate the resumption of a safe and normal life for the local communities living on both sides of the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABL) with Abkhazia and South Ossetia; x to build confidence among the conflict parties; x to inform EU policy in Georgia and the wider region.67 Even though the mandate of the EU mission is to cover the entire territory of Georgia, one major pitfall is constituted by the fact that the EU monitors’ access is denied by the de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia throughout the territories under their control. According to a former EUMM monitor: “the lack of access on the territory of the break-away regions represents a big challenge when it comes to implementing the mandate, maintaining the impartiality of the mission and assess the situation on both sides of the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABL)”, but on the other hand “regular people, in particular those living in the proximity of the ABL, do interact with the monitors, share their concerns, problems and needs, hoping for a better future.”68

Other key EU actions are worth mentioning: the EU delegation in Tbilisi (2005), the EU special representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus (responsible for the EU’s relations with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), appointed in December 2003 and the EU special representative (EUSR) for the crisis in Georgia, appointed in December 2008 in order to represent the EU during the Geneva talks. Due to overlapping competences and missions, the two EUSRs had problematic relations. Thus, in 2011 the two EUSRs’ positions have been merged into one. Starting in July 2014, Herbert Salber has been appointed as EU

67

The EUMM mandate, available at [http://www.eumm.eu/en/]. Interview with Alexandra Martin, former Field Office Operations Officer within the EUMM in April 2012- September 2014. 68

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special representative for the South Caucasus and crisis in Georgia.69 After the events of August 2008 in South Ossetia, the EU deployed its fastest mission in its history, the EUMM (the European Union Monitoring Mission). Moreover, the EU established a team of experts to evaluate the facts surrounding the five day Russian-Georgian war called the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the conflict in Georgia (their report was released by the end of September 2009). The most visible European presence in Georgia remains the EUMM which has the mission to: “Monitor, analyse and report on the situation pertaining to the stabilization process, centred on full compliance with the six-point Agreement, including troop withdrawals and on freedom of movement and actions by spoilers, as well as on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.70”

The original version of the mandate established the coordination with UNOMIG (the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia) and the OSCE Mission in South Ossetia. However, the former left at the end of 2008 and the UN ended its mission in the region by June 2009.71 Since then, the EU mission has been the only international monitoring mission in the region. 2) EU – always perceived as one-sided actor: Among Abkhazians and Ossetians, the mission has always been perceived as being close to the Georgian side and Georgian government. They consider that the engagement with Europe is possible only if it does not pursue the goal of integrating the two break-away republics into Georgia. From the Abkhazians’ perspective:

69 [http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm], accessed September 20, 2014. 70 Council decision 2010/452/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), Georgia, art. 3.1., p.217, available at [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/CoreDocs-2010_EN.pdf], accessed September 22, 2014. 71 Due to the lack of consensus among UN Security Council members and the fact that Russia vetoed the continuation of both missions, UNOMIG and OSCE South Ossetia missions ended their mandate. More details in “Russia vetoes deal on OSCE monitors in Georgia”, Reuters.com, May 13, 2009, available at [http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/05/13/idUSLC300177], accessed September 22, 2014.

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“the Europeans are absent from the news and our daily lives. In Gal, they see them [the Europeans] at the border. They are not allowed in Abkhazia, though. I know that Georgians are eager to join the EU, but Abkhazians have little to do with this affair.”72

In relation with the EU/within EU terminology, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are referred to as “occupied territories”, which contributes to the impression that the EU mission stays one-sided or, in other words, shows the unconditional support for Georgia and its declared ambition to reintegrate the two break-away republics.73 After the war in South Ossetia, the policy of Georgia regarding these territories has remained based on the Law on Occupied Territories (adopted in October 2009) which called for the isolation of the “occupied territories”. The criticism of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe made the Georgians revisit their policy and determined them to conceive a new approach. However, despite the attempt of de-isolation, the vocabulary that describes the two territories stays the same. Apparently, the new approach of Tbilisi puts the human-centric (humanitarian) policy at the core of the Georgian actions in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia (i.e. The State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation). However, the idea of “occupation” of a Georgian territory does not change. Moreover, Abkhazia and South Ossetia do not perceive themselves as being treated as equal partners in this so-called “cooperation”. Following the same logic, back in 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Abkhazia stated that: “[i]t will be impossible to discuss the presence of European monitors on the sovereign territory of Abkhazia as long as the EU's biased and tendentious position dominates thus only taking into account the interests and opinion of one party in the conflict, namely Georgia. This attitude is vividly illustrated with this resolution […].”74

72

Interview with Abkhazian citizen, Sukhum/i, 29/05/2014. “Abkhazia calls biased, one-sided European Parliament Resolution”, ITARTASS News Agency, November 22, 2010, available at [http://en.itar-tass.com/archive/665047], accessed September 21, 2014. 74 Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia, in “Abkhazia calls biased, one-sided European Parliament Resolution”, ITAR-TASS News Agency, November 22, 2010, available at [http://en.itar-tass.com/archive/665047], accessed September 21, 2014. 73

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The fact that the EU has never condemned Georgia’s wars and crimes against Abkhazian and South Ossetian ethnic groups back in the 1990s and that it condemned Russia’s lifting of sanctions against Abkhazia in 2004 are two other examples that contribute to the widespread impression of the one-sided nature of the EU in the region. Another symbolic movement against the presence of the EU in Abkhazia was the denial of the now former head of the EUMM in Abkhazia75 after making unacceptable disrespectful statements towards Sukhumi. Of course, this reaction was largely symbolic, since both Abkhazian and the Russian government, in the violation of the 2008 ceasefire, have prevented the EUMM from patrolling inside Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For many Abkhazians, engagement with the EU is possible only if it does not pursue any political goals of reintegrating the region into Georgia. Another point of view is the fact that if the EU did not support Georgia’s integrationist ambitions, it would become more flexible in its relations with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, if they were recognized as independent states by the international community, their dependence on Russia would diminish a lot and would open new opportunities for the two break-away republics.76 South Ossetians, on the other hand, seem more reluctant to such collaboration when considering their integration within the Russian Federation. In relation with the triangular Georgia–Abkhazia–South Ossetia, the EU is also confronting primo, large expectations expressed by Georgians (i.e. integration in the EU and resolution of the conflicts in their favour) and secundo, the almost unbearable “euro-skepticism” shared by Abkhazians and South Ossetians that consider that the EU applies double standards in the region throughout their “engagement without recognition” policy. In this respect, it is extremely difficult to please the belligerents with incontestable objectives and policies that bring the three actors together.

75 In April 2012, Mr. Andrzej Tyszkiewicz was declared persona non-grata on the territory of Abkhazia after he made some declarations considered disrespectful towards Sukhumi. “EU expressed full confidence in EUMM leadership”, Civil.ge, April, 28, 2012, available at [http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=24707%20http://www.civil.ge/eng/article. php?id=26122], accessed September 21, 2014. 76 Interview with Abkhazian citizen, Sukhum/i, 28/05/2014.

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3) EU and the use of different concepts in relation with belligerents (i.e. borders/administrative boundary lines; independent countries/occupied territories): Another detail that highlights the opposite perspectives over the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the concept of boundaries. If Abkhazians and South Ossetians talk about their borders with Georgia, Georgians and European officials use the administrative concept of ABL (Administrative Boundary Line) to name the demarcation lines separating Abkhazians and South Ossetians from Georgians. On the one hand, Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s status prevents or makes harder the integration of Georgia in the EU and NATO. On the other hand, these objectives are definitely not shared by the leaders in Sukhum/i and Tskhinvali and any attempt of the Georgian government to use European ‘flavoured’ tools to renew relations with the two break-away republics are almost ab initio disregarded. It goes without saying that relations between the European Union and leadership officials in Sukhum/i and Tskhinvali are limited to political and legal constraints which flow from the partnership with Georgia. The EU Country Report on Georgia, issued at the end of 2013, acknowledged Georgia’s progress regarding the reform of the justice system, its “commitment to a genuine engagement with the break-away regions”, and the advancement of the “sectoral reforms and regulatory approximation to the EU acquis” and hence Georgia was invited to: x

“participate constructively in the Geneva International Discussions. Enhance Georgia’s engagement policy towards the break-away regions and take pragmatic steps to open channels of communication and to encourage trade, education, travel and investment across the administrative boundary line; review the law on occupied territories and continue close cooperation with EUMM; [...] x adopt comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation; ensure that the rights of people belonging to minorities, including religious minorities, are respected. Condemn instances of hate speech, attacks and violence against persons belonging to minorities; send clear messages of zero tolerance towards such behaviour;”77

77

EU Country Report, 2013, Georgia, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Georgia. Progress in 2013 and recommendations for action, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Brussels, 27.3.2014, p. 4, 5, available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2014/country-reports/georgia_en.pdf].

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Also, Georgia benefited from an additional allocation of EUR 27 million under the Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation Programme (EaPIC) in 2013 and steps were taken towards Georgia’s participation in EU programmes on the basis of a protocol to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.78 From an overall perspective on the European Union’s approach on this area, it has often been suggested that the EU did not assume a substantial role in drafting a political solution to the separatist disputes in Georgia and avoided to engage in “high-politics issues related to the conflict”, focusing instead on financial assistance in order to support the peace process.79 According to Nathalie Tocci, overall, the EU’s interest in South Caucasus has been “weak and sporadic” and its “impact on Georgia’s secessionist conflicts has been marginal, albeit negative.”80 One major explanation for this stems from the cautionary strategy employed by the Union in dealing with break-away entities and its constant preoccupation not to antagonize Russia. As a consequence: “despite the EU’s oft-repeated strategic interest in the Caucasus, its insufficient concern with the region goes far in explaining the absence of a concerted EU strategy to promote the resolution of its conflicts.”81

According to other analysts: “until the 2008 war, the EU did not have much of a security or political profile in the region. Projecting only soft and no hard power, Europe appeared to be a weak player in the shared neighbourhood with Russia, while maintaining a degree of impartiality in the eyes of the conflict parties.”82

A social-constructivist interpretation of the EU’s relations with Georgia-Abkhazia-South Ossetia reveals a precarious form of social learning. Socialization, as derived from sociology and symbolic interactionism, refers to a “process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new norms.”83 As visible in our case-studies, 78

Ibidem, p. 3. Cf. Popescu, op. cit., p. 17 80 Tocci, op. cit., pp. 170, 175. 81 Ibidem, pp. 175-176, 170. 82 Cf. Kirova, op. cit., p. 44. 83 Checkel, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 79

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the European community, the European values and the European norms were not appropriated insomuch as to modify conflict-related strategies attaining conflict resolution. Referring to the role of international organizations, Martha Finnemore and Michael Barnett argued that, “having established rules and norms”, they are “eager to spread the benefits of their expertise” and they “often insist that part of their mission is to spread, inculcate, and enforce global values and norms.”84 Tocci’s analysis shows that “there has not been enough time and exposure to EU actors, arguments and norms for these to be genuinely assimilated by the conflict parties.”85 Socialization is based on ideational factors, meaning that agents gradually internalize norms, patterns of behaviour and rules, and become elements of certain structures (such as the EU) irrespective of material facts (i.e. financial gains, sanctions or “carrots and sticks” relations). The two main factors that weakened norm-reception and norm-incorporation were the European Union’s reluctance to step outside traditional pathways in dealing with conflict-related issues and the reduced amount of institutional interaction, which would normally turn the formulation of expected behaviour into norm diffusion and norm-appropriation. For a successful outcome, intensified and prolonged interaction is needed, as well as voluntary, genuine and solid internalization of normativity, because of its inner value and inter-subjective meanings. Our main preoccupation at this point is to observe whether there is a shift in this respect after 2008. Could significant progress be observed in recent years? Is there a gradual, yet intensified exposure to EU’s normativity and norm internalization in Georgia-Abkhazia-South Ossetia? In explaining the development of EU norm-diffusion and the processes of norm-internalization, we will distinguish between EU-Georgia relations, on the one hand, and the relations between the de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with the EU, on the other hand. Also, we will emphasize differences between the attitudes of Abkhazians and South Ossetians in this respect. Before 2008, the European Union’s approach on Georgia’s separatist conflicts was centred on “EU’s traditional role as a development actor”, meaning the tendency “to adopt an inoffensive, development centric logic, focusing on bottom-up non-politicized initiatives.”86 However, in 2008 the EU assumed a more political role by brokering the ceasefire agreement, by 84 Michael Barnett; Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics, Ithaka and London: Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 33. 85 Tocci, op. cit., p. 169. 86 Cf. Kirova, op. cit., p. 44.

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deploying a monitoring mission and by insisting on the normalisation of the situation. The latter became the centrepiece of the EUMM. In 2009 the European Union adopted a policy of “non-recognition and engagement” and sought to provide opportunities for interaction with the populations and the local authorities from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, meaning that it embarked on finding “pragmatic solutions to influence conflict dynamics on the ground by disassociating them from the issue of status.”87 The European Union’s engagement in South Caucasus and its closer relation with Georgia is obvious starting with the 2009 Eastern Partnership. Through this framework the EU is exporting norms as well as assertiveness and commitment. European values are accompanied by support for confidence-building and inter-community initiatives in Georgia and its break-away entities. Peter Semneby, who served as EU Special Representative to the South Caucasus from 2006 to 2011, captured the gradual norm-diffusion and the linkage between European values and inducement of expected behaviour: “what the EU does best [is] to use its soft power to nudge societies in the direction of Europe while fostering a stronger European identity.”88 In 2012 the European Union made such commitment even clearer and stressed its determination in “achieving greater EU visibility in the regions and active work to promote economic and trade relations, facilitate travel and start transformative and approximation work.”89 This trend pertaining to increasing exposure to EU normativity and agents and to the EU norm-incorporation in Georgia culminated in June 2014, when the Council Decision on the signing of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Georgia acknowledged “the European aspirations and European choice of Georgia” and underlined the core European values (democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law) as being intrinsic to the envisaged political association and economic integration.90 Also, the

87

Ibidem, p. 46. Peter Semneby at “Hearing on the Consequences of the War between Georgia and Russia”, National Assembly, Paris, 17 January 2011, quoted in ibidem, p. 44. 89 Council Conclusions on the South Caucasus, Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels, 27 February 2012, available at [http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11895_en.htm] 90 See COUNCIL DECISION of 16 June 2014 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, available at 88

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document expressed confidence in both Georgia’s inclination to shape its behaviour to EU expectancy and in the consistency of the normative structure of the European Union. Hence, the Association Agreement recognizes “that Georgia, an Eastern European country, is committed to implementing and promoting these values” and “that Georgia shares historical links and common values with the Member States.”91 Additionally, the EU launched the Confidence Building and Early Response Mechanism (COBERM), which offers “accessible funds specifically for projects that enhance people-to-people contacts across the conflict divide, promote a culture of tolerance [...]”92 COBERM is a joint EU/UNDP programme that aims at fostering peaceful transformation of conflicts and “supports immediate and concrete initiatives, which seek to have an impact on confidence building within and across conflict divided communities.”93 Dialogue and increased interactions fomented within this framework produced Georgian-Abkhazian-South Ossetian encounters and also incremental, though still limited, exposure to EU agents, professionals and norms. One key constructivist assumption is that: “professions often serve as powerful and pervasive agents working to internalize norms among their members. Professional training does more than simply transfer technical knowledge; it actively socializes people to value certain things above others.”94

Interactions between Georgia and EU institutions and professionals have definitely intensified over the last years, thus indicating a gradual norm-internalization and a proclivity towards behaviour shaping in the direction of the EU’s expectations. However, social-learning in this respect is an on-going process which needs more time for the delivery of optimist results. One of our research questions tackled the capacity of the European Union to strengthen its norm-setting and norm-diffusion role without offering future accession. President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso said after meeting prime minister Irakli Garibashvili in Brussels in May 2014 that offering membership to Georgia “is not possible” now, but “a European perspective” should be offered and the [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2014:261:FULL&from=EN] 91 Ibidem. 92 Kirova, op. cit., p. 47. 93 See more at [http://www.ge.undp.org/content/georgia/en/]. 94 Finnemore; Sikkink, op. cit., p. 905.

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Association Agreement will position Georgia and the EU “as close as possible”.95 It is our interpretation that, as illustrated by EU-Georgia relations, norm-diffusion and norm-internalization depends on intensified interaction, incorporation of shared values, Brussels’ validation of appropriate shaping of behaviour as well as consistency and purposefulness of joint actions. Hence, the more Georgia acts in accordance with EU’s expectations, the more validation of such progress is uttered and emphasized in discursive practices. The more Georgia perceives that it is “as close as possible” to the EU, the more European values have been internalized and social-learning is advancing. With respect to the EU’s engagement with Georgia’s break-away republics, our research results indicate that pitfalls and drawbacks prevail rather than degrees of norm-appropriation or genuine propensity towards incorporation of the EU’s normative attributes. One distinction should be noted between South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The former is a rather closed entity; suspicions toward international contacts are predominant “as demonstrated by South Ossetia’s continued refusal to grant access to any but Russian organizations” and its “openly stated interest in joining the Russian Federation.”96 The attitude of Abkhazia is slightly different, since de facto authorities have showed readiness to assess possible opportunities provided by the EU and the West. Abkhazians are adamant in preserving an independent state and reject the status of “occupied territories” in EU terminology. On the one hand, they expressed concerns over “Russia’s overpowering presence” and “Russia’s growing economic and political influence”, but, on the other hand, they voiced disappointment with the perceived lack of Western active involvement in Abkhazia.97 Former de facto president Sergei Bagapsh, who had won the Abkhazian presidential election in 2004 against his Moscow-supported opponent, sought contacts with European countries, pursued a foreign policy that included Russia, Turkey and the European Union, and has reportedly stated that Abkhazia is “a European country”.98 However, EU assistance to Abkhazia was hampered over the years by what Nicu Popescu called the “hypertrophied role of language and toponymy” and “symbolic battles”99 over how names should be written (in Georgian spelling, Sukhumi and Gali, or in Abkhaz one, Sukhum and Gal). Also, “as a rule, Abkhaz NGOs did not want to 95

Cf. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27254. Kirova, op. cit., p. 25. 97 Ibidem, pp. 24-25. 98 Ibidem. 99 Nicu Popescu, The EU and Civil Society in the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict. MICROCON Policy Working Paper 15, Brighton: MICROCON, 2010, p. 24. 96

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participate in calls for application where they were treated as Georgian NGOs, or the region was mentioned as ‘Abkhazia, Georgia’” and de facto authorities in Abkhazia were “extremely reluctant to receive in Sukhumi the ambassadors to EU countries ‘to Georgia’.”100 The main difference between South Ossetia and Abkhazia is captured by Iskra Kirova as follows: “[...] even though South Ossetia remains heavily isolated and arguably without any scope for decision-making independent of Moscow, the de facto authorities in Abkhazia welcomed the policy of non-recognition and engagement pragmatically with a willingness to seize on the opportunity for contacts and acquiescence towards the line on non-recognition.”101

However, socialization implies a proclivity to incorporate ideas, meaning that agents gradually internalize norms, patterns of behaviour and rules, and are willing to become elements of certain normative or ideational structures (such as the EU) irrespective of material facts (i.e. financial gains, sanctions or “carrots and sticks” relations). A gap is noteworthy between such social-learning and pragmatic engagement. Also, an increasing separation between young generations of Abkhazians and South Ossetians, on the one hand, and Georgians, on the other, hampers a future common vision on conflict resolution and a common outreach toward EU. According to young voices in Abkhazia, the EU is a far-fetched project: “Back in the 1990s, when the war started, I was too little to remember something. However, I grew up with my parents’ memories, my relatives’ stories about the war; I read and learnt about it […] I made my studies in Russia, I speak Russian at home, with my fiancée, my friends and my colleagues. Russia puts lots of money in the infrastructure, schools, hospitals etc. The Europeans are absent from news and our daily lives. In Gal, they see them [the Europeans] at the border. They are not allowed in Abkhazia, though. I know that Georgians are eager to join the EU, but Abkhazians have little to do with this affair.”102

It is the authors’ conclusion that the EU normative body is almost absent in South Ossetia while in Abkhazia precarious exposure to it has led to its assessment at best. The legitimacy of European rules and the induced behaviours are not a priority for the young generations in the 100

Ibidem. Kirova, op. cit., p. 49. 102 Interview with 27 year old Abkhazian, Sukhum/i, 28/05/2014 101

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break-away entities and the engagement of EU mechanisms and funding in bridging the conflict sides has not provided ground for valuing the European norms (to the detriment of Russia’s assistance) in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

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Legal documents 49. *** Basic Law (Constitution) of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia, (27 October 1926), [http://abkhazworld.com/aw/reports-and-key-texts/590-basiclaw-constitution-ssr-abkhazia-1926], last accessed August 15, 2014. 50. *** The Constitution of Georgia, [http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7523], last accessed August 15, 2014. 51. *** Report “Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia”, vol. II, (2009), [http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_II.pdf], last accessed August 20, 2014. 52. *** The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, [http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-dutiesstates/p15897], last accessed August 24, 2014. 53. *** The Helsinki Final Act (1975), [http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true], last accessed August 24, 2014. 54. *** The Law on Occupied Territories of Georgia (2008), [http://www.smr.gov.ge/docs/doc216.pdf], last accessed August 24, 2014. 55. *** The State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation (2010), [http://www.civil.ge/files/files/SMR-Strategy-en.pdf], last accessed August 24, 2014. 56. *** Opinion on the Law of Occupied Territories of Georgia (March 2009), [http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDLAD(2009)015-e], last accessed August 24, 2014

“EASTERN EUROPE” TODAY: WEAKNESSES, DILEMMAS AND OPPORTUNITIES

ENERGY SECURITY— A CORE ISSUE FOR CONSOLIDATING THE EASTERN BORDER: THE EU IN SEARCH OF A NEW BLACK SEA STRATEGY DRAGO‫ ܇‬PĂUN AND OANA POIANĂ

Abstract The current study intends to analyse the role of energy security as a key factor for consolidating the Black Sea regional cooperation in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis. It argues that a comprehensive perspective on the region cannot be achieved overlooking the new energy politics of the Black Sea area, as energy represents a sector of utmost importance for all the riparian states and has critical geostrategic implications for the EU. In this respect, the study identifies three major events in terms of diversification, reorientation of the energy markets and pipeline project stagnation. It continues by analysing Romania’s energy status and its role as a regional pillar of Western policies within the Black Sea region. Finally, the study points out that structural geopolitical rivalry within the Black Sea region is expected to continue even though a compromise might be reached concerning the Ukrainian crisis. However, this crisis represents a stress test for the EU, which will eventually lead to the creation of a more sustainable foreign policy towards Eastern Europe. Keywords: Energy security, Energy diplomacy, Eastern Partnership, Black Sea region

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The evolution of the EU Black Sea Policies Given the current turmoil in Ukraine, the geostrategic implications in the energy sector and the extremely unstable relationship with Russia, the construction of a substantive EU strategy for the Black Sea region should be a high priority for the EU in the coming months. The 2004-2007 enlargements brought the EU closer to an unstable region which became its direct border and justified its position as a regional security actor. Accordingly, the EU has created different mechanisms, policies and strategies for this region, meant to bring stability, democracy and a better framework of regional cooperation. A clear result of the enlargement process, the first strategy that targeted the Black Sea region per se was the Black Sea Synergy (2007), which was affected by limited funding, the reluctance of several states to cooperate under its framework and thus, it did not progress beyond its efforts to create sectoral partnerships.1 The context of its creation was a more stable one, the frozen conflicts within the region had not yet been ignited and it allowed the EU to build a very ‘light’ policy framework, which instead of being a strategy failed even on being a synergy. Similarly, the Eastern Partnership (2008) was created as a response to the Russian-Georgian war in a radically altered geopolitical context and triggered one of the most severe crises of the post-war period. Although it benefits from increased funding and includes both the bilateral and the regional tracks, it represents another cautious attempt that emphasized “a constant concern of the EU to spare the susceptibilities of the Russian federation.” 2 The only success story of the Eastern Partnership was Moldova’s and Georgia’s signing of the Association Agreement with the EU. Meanwhile, in 2011 there was an unsuccessful EU attempt to forge a strategy for this region but it was abandoned. Taking into consideration the current realities, the fact that the EU had not been able to launch the already voted strategy for the Black Sea Region, although more than 3 years have passed since its initiation, does not come as a surprise. Now, after the Crimean conflict and the sanctions imposed on Russia, everyone is expecting an EU strategy for this region and implicitly for its 1

Fernando GARCÉS de LOS FAYOS, The EU´s Black Sea policy: Where do we stand ?, Policy Briefing, p. 6 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2013/491519/E XPO-AFET_SP(2013)491519_EN.pdf [accessed: 10 September 2014] 2 Gheorghe Ciascai, The Eastern Partnership of the EU-the challenges and the opportunities in the context of the Ukraine’s crisis, CES Working papers, volume VI, Issue 2A, p. 34

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eastern border. Looking back, unlike Russia, the EU seems to be able to create only post-conflict strategies and they are never long-term strategies, which questions its regional engagement and betrays its lack of vision in this area. Given the intricate nature of pipeline politics, the geopolitical competition and commercial rivalry present in the Black Sea Region, one cannot expect profound positive changes in terms of regional cooperation. The velocity of geopolitical reconfigurations and the political actions based on riposte, along with the intricacy of national interests, the numerous frozen conflicts and the fight over energy resources, represent just a few of the factors that explain why envisioning a strategy for this area might seem an impossible mission.

Energy diplomacy at the core of the Black Sea strategy The Black Sea Region represents at the moment probably one of the most neuralgic points on the geopolitical world map, being the location of very dynamic competitions between several major international actors. In the last six years alone, we have witnessed two relatively large-scale military confrontations: the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, which resulted in the Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and a more recent violent outburst in Ukraine, which led to annexation of Crimea and prompted another Russian gas cut-off. The Wider Black Sea region represents the most promising energy provider for Europe and Asia and as such, any major regional event has a geopolitical undertone and any conflict has an energy-related interest hidden under rhetoric. At the moment, the main challenge of the region may not be the obvious one - the frozen conflicts - but the actual cause that underpinned all the tensions and expansionist actions appears to be the fight over energy resources. When analysing the Crimean conflict, one must keep in mind the fact that Ukraine represents a pivotal country that provides control over energy routes and that approximately 60% of Russian gas exports to the EU are transiting its territory. The Black Sea Region is currently the location where the future of European energy security is being shaped and the latest events have clearly proven it. The last three years have been very intense in terms of critical decisions taken in the energy sector. Firstly, we have encountered a very concerned EU, which has sought to identify solutions for its fragmented internal energy market by constructing more interconnector pipelines (see the Bulgaria-Romania, Romania-Moldova and Bulgaria-Greece interconnectors) in order to

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ensure a European-wide energy supply grid as soon as possible. In May 2014, the European Commission also issued a new energy security strategy proposal containing emergency plans that would increase the EU’s capacity to overcome a major disruption during the winter of 2014/2015. Secondly, the two major competing pipeline projects that have laid the foundations of Russian and EU energy strategies are now more or less obsolete. Both parts seem to fight for their revival but with little success. If the Nabucco project was abandoned and replaced by the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (which connects with the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline), South Stream registered significant progress and was expected to be finalized by 2015. However, a recent investigation of the European Commission could stall the project for a long period of time since Bulgaria has been accused of non-compliance with the norms included in the Third Energy Package. The United States have also expressed strong criticisms concerning the potential infringement of EU law and pressured the Bulgarian government to freeze South Stream’s further development. Consequently, at the beginning of June 2014, the Bulgarian Prime Minister announced that the investment would be suspended until the European Commission completed its investigation. Thirdly, in the context of a changing international environment, the European energy strategy has been reoriented towards Iran, which could deliver gas to Europe via Turkey. This option may represent a serious alternative for diversification, since recent estimates indicate Iran as having the world’s largest natural gas reserves (33.6 trillion cubic meters of blue fuel).3 Turkey has now got all the incentives to expand its regional influence and become a crucial energy hub, since not only the EU, but also Russia is expected to consider it as an alternative transit route for delivering gas to Europe, now that Ukraine can no longer be considered a viable option. Nonetheless, as if all these new arrangements were not confusing enough for the energy market, the recent gas deal between Russia and China most likely marks a fundamental Russian energy strategy shift, which will undoubtedly impact the European energy market as well. This sudden energy market reorientation can be considered a safety measure amid EU sanctions imposed on Russia following the Crimean crisis. 3 http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/iranian-gas-to-europe-via turkey?utm_source=Natural+Gas+Europe+Newsletter&utm_campaign=914397fde 4RSS_EMAIL_CAMPAIGN&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_c95c702d4c914397fde4-307755997 [accessed: 20 September 2014]

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As Helm argues, both the EU and Russia are mutually dependent in the energy game. Russia has a monopoly over supply, but its economy highly relies on its energy exports (more than 70% of its exports are energy exports and more than 50% of the government’s revenue comes from oil and gas), while the EU has a monopoly over demand, which can be used to stop Gazprom’s price discrimination for its eastern member states.4 In this respect, the European Commission started in 2011 an antitrust investigation on Gazprom’s unfair practices of inflating gas prices and preventing its European costumers from diversifying their supply. Although three years have passed since then, the European Commission has not presented any official results. Moreover, the antitrust case seems to have entered a stage of stagnation which reflects the EU’s uneasiness about imposing energy sanctions. Considering the ongoing tensions created by the Crimean conflict, deciding upon formal antitrust charges becomes a diplomatically sensitive matter that might have serious repercussions for the European customers this winter.5 In order to understand the economic and political relationship that Russia has with the countries it supplies, one must solely analyse the prices these countries pay for Russian gas and their level of dependency on Russian energy supplies, as these are the most obvious indicators that reflect not only a state’s “closeness” to Russia, but also the effectiveness of EU engagement with a particular state, if we refer to non-members. Moreover, the fluctuation of prices is usually triggered not only by the changing economic environment, but also by politically contextualised situations. We can notice that EU member states and countries like Moldova and Ukraine, which in 2013 expressed their commitment to continue negotiations for the Association Agreement with the EU, pay a higher price, while Armenia and Belarus, countries which decided to join the Eurasian Economic Union (an economic integration project initiated by Russia) benefit from lower gas prices. Although an EU candidate, Turkey pays a slightly lower price than the latter category, given the clear Turkish-Russian rapprochement. Therefore, in October 2014, Russia 4

Dieter Helm, Ukraine, Europe and Energy, 2014 http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk/sites/default/files/Ukraine,%20Europe%20and%20En ergy.pdf [accessed 19 September 2014] 5 James Kanter, Stalled Gazprom Antitrust Case May Suggest Unease for Energy Sanction, 2014: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/business/international/stalled-gazpromantitrust-case-may-signal-unease-in-eu-for-energy-sanctions.html [accessed 11 September 2014]

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agreed to increase gas flow to Turkey via Blue Stream and Turkey asked Russia for gas price cuts as a “reward” for approving the Russian pipeline project, South Stream.6 Table 1-Gazprom gas pricing and Russian natural gas dependency for the recipient states in the Wider Black Sea Region, in 2013 EaP recipient countries

Gas import dependency

Gas price/1000 cm

Armenia

100%

~189$

Belarus

100%

~166$

Moldova

100%

~ 368$

Ukraine

72%

~ 485$

Wider Black Sea recipient countries non EaP Bulgaria Greece Romania Turkey

100% 54% 24% 62%

~501$ ~478$ ~432$ ~407$

Type of involvment with the EU or Russia Eurasian Economic Union Eurasian Economic Union Ratified Association Agreement Cancelled Association Agreement

EU member EU member EU member EU candidate country

Source: http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/gazprom-russia-gas-leverage europe/25441983.html [accessed 7 September 2014]

6

Reuters, Turkey, Russia agree on gas flow increase, 2014 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-russia-agree-on-gas-flowincrease.aspx?pageID=238&nID=72421&NewsCatID=348 [accessed 1 October 2014]

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Energy Security—A Core Issue for Consolidating the Eastern Border

After the annexation of Crimea, Russia took control of the port of Sevastopol and suspended the 2010 deal with Ukraine, which extended the stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for another 25 years, in exchange for a ten-year discount on its exports of energy supplies. In addition to this, Ukraine experienced the third gas interruption in less than 10 years in June 2014, when Russia decided to cut off gas exports to Ukraine amid a price dispute. After four months of negotiations, Ukraine and Russia have reached an agreement on a shortterm gas deal which includes lowering prices. Ukraine will pay 385$ per one thousand cubic metres of gas purchased until January and $365 per one thousand cubic metres between January and March. This agreement comes in a very sensitive political context if we are only to mention the EU’s decision to maintain the sanctions imposed on Russia and Russia’s intention to recognize the parliamentary elections that are currently underway in the separatist regions of Ukraine.7 Given the post-Vilnius environment, which is characterized by a drastic deterioration of EU-Russia relations and an increased US presence within the Black Sea region, the creation of a coherent EU strategy that can develop thorough regional cooperation in key areas, notably energy, is undoubtedly necessary. Another fact that echoes the urgency of such a strategy is the Russian air and naval presence in the Black Sea region and NATO’s wish to create a military ground presence in the same region. On 29 October 2014, NATO announced the detection of… “Russian aircraft flying over the Black Sea in international air space, including 2 Tu-95 Bear-H bombers and 2 Su-27 Flanker fighter jets. Fighters from the Turkish Air Force have intercepted the Russian aircraft and NATO is continuing to track them in international airspace.”8

Now that the chance for a fresh start in West-Russia relations does not represent an option, each part is seeking regional alleys. There are two Black Sea countries that might play the role of game changers in the new geopolitical paradigm shift. The first and probably the most important 7

Vanessa Mock and Laurence Norman, Ukraine, Russia Reach Deal on NaturalGas Dispute. Agreement Averts Threat of Gas Shortages in Europe This Winter, Europe News, 2014 http://online.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-russia-to-resume-talks-thursday-1414655294 [accessed 2 October 2014] 8 NATO tracks large-scale Russian air activity in Europe, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_114274.htm [accessed 2 October 2014]

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regional ally for all three actors (the EU, Russia and NATO) is Turkey, which has developed as a critical country not only in terms of energy transit, but also as a military and economic regional power. However, Turkey has never been a supporter of an increased NATO presence within the Black Sea region and has perceived American involvement as a potential weakening of its regional power status. Although it is a NATO member and probably the only Black Sea country that can challenge Russia’s regional expansion, it is still heavily dependent on energy supplies from Russia. In the course of last year alone, Russia delivered 26,61 billion cubic metres of natural gas to Turkey, making it the second largest consumer of Russian gas after Germany.9 Another key Black Sea regional actor for the Western strategy could have been Bulgaria, which is an EU and NATO member country. However, because of its unsecure energy status and its dual energy strategies (it has been a supporter of both Nabucco and South Stream), Bulgaria is perceived as an unreliable partner. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian Parliament has recently consented to modify the energy law, so that it would create legal ground for the implementation of South Stream, which now has “a similar statute as gas interconnectors, exempting it from 3rd party access rules of the EU.”10 Early this year the German magazine Spiegel published the content of several German intelligence reports which claim that Bulgaria’s economy is directly influenced by Russia and that “amendments to Bulgaria’s Energy Act affecting the South Stream gas pipeline project were drafted by Russian gas firm Gazprom.”11 The second EU and NATO Black Sea member country that has the potential to become the main recipient of Western support and a regional geostrategic pivot is Romania. The next section of our study will emphasize why Romania is likely to affirm itself as a critical regional actor for the promotion and accomplishment of the Western Black Sea strategy.

9

Gazprom statistics: http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/ [accessed 2 September 2014] 10 Natural Gas Europe, Bulgarian Parliament Considers Changes to the Energy Act Due to South Stream’s Statute, 2014 http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/bulgaria-energy-act-south-stream-statue [accessed 2 September 2014] 11 The Sofia Globe, Spiegel: Germany concerned Bulgaria is Russia’s bridgehead in EU http://sofiaglobe.com/2014/05/12/spiegel-germany-concerned-bulgaria-is-russiasbridgehead-in-eu/ [accessed 2 September 2014]

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Romania as a Western regional pillar within the Black Sea region In the aftermath of the Crimean conflict, Romania can be perceived as the third Black Sea regional power, after Russia and Turkey. As such, it is expected that both the EU and NATO will keep the country at the centre of their regional strategies. According to Friedman, the USA’s Black sea strategy is primarily centred on Romania, because: “apart from being a potential base for aircraft for operations in the region, particularly in Ukraine, supporting Romania in building a significant naval force in the Black Sea - potentially including amphibious ships would provide a deterrent force against the Russians and also shape affairs in the Black Sea that might motivate Turkey to cooperate with Romania and thereby work with the United States.”12

As shown in the previous section, now that Bulgaria’s and Turkey’s strategic reliability as NATO allies is being questioned, Romania remains the main pillar of the West, offering many strategic advantages that might prevent Russia from further extending its power range. Also, unlike Bulgaria, which has always shown historical gratitude to Russia, Romania has been less pro-Russian. Additionally, probably the best strategic asset that Romania holds is its low degree of dependency on Russian energy supply. Out of the all Black Sea countries (excepting Russia), Romania would be able to resist an eventual Russian gas cut off this winter. It is the… ”third-most energy-independent state in the European Union, with a mix including gas, coal, hydro, nuclear and renewable energy and, unlike many of its emerging European peers, it imports only a fifth of its gas needs from Russia.”13

Furthermore, as argued by Energy Minister Razvan Nicolescu, “Romania will have by 2020 more gas than Romania and Moldova

12

George Friedman, Ukraine, Iraq and a Black Sea Strategy, Stratfor, 2014 http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ukraine-iraq-and-black-sea-strategy [accessed 5 October 2014] 13 Reuters, Romania to become gas independent by 2020: Energy Minister, 2014 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/01/us-romania-energyidUSKCN0HQ4QG20141001 [accessed 5 October 2014]

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consume overall, assuming consumption will not change from current levels.”14 Although its energy independence plan may seem too ambitious, Romania has rapidly developed its renewable energy sector, already producing over 30 per cent of its energy and it is “the largest producer of oil and gas in Central Europe, holding five percent of Europe’s proven oil reserves and 1.2 percent of the proven gas reserves”.15 Moreover, in 2012, Romania discovered a natural gas deposit in its Black Sea waters that could cover its needs for 20 years. ExxonMobil and OMV-Petrom are currently working to create the technological structures of exploitation and the transportation system of the gas reserves to shore. Taking into consideration the fact that Romania pays one of the highest prices in the region for Russian gas imports, the perspective of a 20-year energy independence not only has great economic effects on the country, but also improves its stance with regard to Russia.16 In the last year, the European Union has once again experienced energy dependence on Russia. Even though the EU planned to make a switch in the energy sector in the future, by setting ambitious targets in the 2020Agenda, the political crisis that was generated in Ukraine has put most of the countries in a very difficult position. On the one hand, they see the European Union as a stability factor and share European values, but on the other hand they are deeply integrated into the Russian economy and rely on Russian energy resources. See Table 2 so as to have an overview of the net energy imports, as a percentage of the energy used. As we can see from the abovementioned table, there are a few countries that are independent when it comes to energy consumption. Even with the thresholds of the 2020 Agenda, there are a few countries that could face an energy crisis. In our study we have taken a closer look at the Romanian energy market that in the last few years, which has proven to be one of Europe’s main investment opportunities. Net investments have doubled over a timeframe of 5 years between 2008 and 2012, because of a very attractive support scheme put in place by the Romanian government (see table 3). 14

Idem. Margarita Assenova, Bulgaria and Romania: Pursuing Energy Security in a Changing Environment. Centre for European Policy Analysis, 2013, http://cepa.org/content/bulgaria-and-romania-pursuing-energy-security-changingenvironment [accessed 18 October 2014] 16 Silviu Molnar, Black Sea Discovery Could Cover Romania’s Natural gas Needs for 20 Years, 2012 http://naturalgaseurope.com [accessed: 20 September 2014] 15

51,48

44,24

Slovenia

Ukraine

43,33

51,90

64,90

35,89

27,86

-133,38

96,70

62,40

57,27

26,73

85,80

27,68

46,48

-102,97

33,51

2005

39,55

52,98

64,48

38,09

30,01

-107,78

96,71

62,18

53,57

26,82

86,34

26,28

46,05

-185,40

35,26

2006 37,28

40,58

52,67

66,52

36,57

30,27

-99,48

96,47

61,74

56,45

26,30

85,76

30,55

50,42

-330,68

37,38

52,55

64,95

36,04

26,86

-106,29

96,19

60,32

56,45

26,77

85,81

28,85

48,18

-340,44

37,16

2008

30,66

48,35

64,52

32,74

18,76

-133,29

95,90

55,72

53,36

25,72

84,95

28,16

43,78

-441,15

34,68

2009

40,50

48,42

65,18

32,07

21,57

-110,56

96,20

56,96

50,73

28,20

85,02

32,19

40,82

-465,47

37,88

2010

Source: World Bank Database, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.IMP.CONS.ZS/countries accessed 1.09.2014

33,22

64,84

Slovak Republic

26,67

Romania

Serbia

96,46

60,86

Hungary

-126,0

56,10

Croatia

Kazakhstan

24,09

Czech Republic

Moldova

25,39

86,50

Bulgaria

Belarus

45,46

Azerbaijan

Bosnia and Herzegovina

31,78

-56,92

Central Europe and the Baltics

2004

Country Name

2007

Energy Security—A Core Issue for Consolidating the Eastern Border

Table 2: Energy imports, net value as % of energy usage

166

32,38

48,08

63,01

30,96

23,04

-105,05

96,31

56,82

55,14

26,17

85,44

34,87

35,62

-377,34

36,77

2011

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Table 3: Net Investments in the Romanian economy between 2008 and 2014. Branch of the economy

Agriculture, forestry and fishing Mining Manufacturing

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Million lei

Million lei

Million lei

Million lei

Million lei

3.393,3

2.919,5

2.659,8

3.285,1

3.371,7

4.477,2

3.639,4

2.797,2

4.581,7

4.747,0

21.113,9

15.492,9

12.753,2

17.497,2

17.371,2

5.103,3

5.039,2

9.895,4

9.326,2

11.497,1

1.377,1

1.508,4

1.741,9

1.703,6

1.904,4

13.538,0

9.175,5

9.228,3

12.649,1

13.049,6

14.403,6

8.974,7

6.840,9

8.389,3

8.632,3

8.656,9

5.959,7

4.381,6

6.775,5

5.564,4

1.993,4

1.353,3

1.528,2

1.134,2

1.223,3

4.824,7

3.395,3

2.438,7

2.844,2

2.729,5

1.382,3 3.388,0

879,4 3.650,0

829,1 3.795,0

600,4 3.159,2

588,3 3.666,4

3.262,8

1.909,4

1.273,3

2.285,0

2.359,0

2.053,2

1.194,1

1.347,3

2.257,8

1.664,7

Energy Water distribution, waste and waste management Construction Trade Transport and storage Hotel and restaurant Information Technology and Communication Financial intermediation and insurance Real estate Professional and technical services Administrative and support services

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Energy Security—A Core Issue for Consolidating the Eastern Border

Public administration, defense and public social securities Education

6.180,3

6.551,3

8.064,9

8.199,1

7.901,4

2.087,8

1.064,0

919,3

1.005,1

570,8

1.223,5

1.275,6

980,5

943,9

1.283,5

430,9

381,5

359,0

273,5

210,2

635,4 576,1 Source: National Institute for Statistics

461,1

905,7

757,5

Healthcare and social services Showbiz, entertainment and recreation Other Services

These massive investments in the energy sector have led to the production of renewable energy, which is being delivered in the grid. Because consumption in Romania has not changed much in the last years, we have noticed that renewable energy has only substituted classic ways of producing energy (see table 3) After assessing Romania’s potential for renewable energy (wind farms, solar plants, bio gas etc.), we would like to analyse whether the price of Romanian energy would be competitive in comparison with other markets. This is an important issue to be discussed because if we wanted Romania to become a major player in the energy exporting industry, we would have to ensure that Romania has not only the capacity to produce energy, but also to produce it at an affordable price. The issue of production does not need to be mentioned as a maximum function for the years in which we have analysed the production of energy (2008-2013). This has shown that within perfect conditions, Romania has the capacity to produce at least 9,65 TWh / month. Even if it is difficult to imagine that energy producers will manage to deliver energy at maximum capacity, it would not be difficult to deliver between 7 and 8 TWh. There is also a discussion about increasing wind farm projects, which will improve this capacity in time. But with the introduction of renewable energy, will the price still be competitive? We have analysed the prices of energy in Romania over the last years (2008-2013) and we have compared the average maximum price of the Romanian OPMCOM market to the prices on Energy Exchange Austria (EXXA). The result shows a difference of more than 22 euro with the average maximum price on EXXA 98, 14 euro/MWh and the average maximum price on OPCOM 76, 81 euro/MWh.

4,173333333

4,3375

4,355833333

4,375833333

2009

2010

2011

2012

20,3%

19,53%

19,88%

20,58%

17,82%

Nuclear

2013 4,386666667 20,8% Source: National Agency for Energy Regulation

4,55125

2008

Energy consumption

27,7%

39,6%

40,13%

33,64%

37,08%

39,44%

Solid

0,2%

0,9%

0,98%

0,91%

1,92%

1,03%

Liquid

Table 4: Energy consumption and types of energy produced (as %)

Drago‫ ܈‬Păun and Oana Poiană

14,1%

12,5%

11,51%

9,94%

10,92%

13,35%

Gaz

29,3%

23,4%

25,96%

35,67%

29,50%

28,35%

Hydro

8,0%

3,6%

1,88%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

Wind

169

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Energy Security—A Core Issue for Consolidating the Eastern Border

We have noticed that even though there was an increase in the price of energy after the introduction of renewable energy - the price paid by consumers is dependent on the source of production (see Drago‫ ܈‬Păun – presentation at ELSEDIMA conference, 10th edition) - the average price in Romania is well below the price of electricity in the neighbouring countries and also on international markets. The exports of energy totalled 19,02 TWh between January 2008 and January 2014, with an average of 0,331 TWh/month. In the light of the above, we can only presume that the question of Romania being a factor a stability in energy production and distribution in the region is not dependent on the production of energy, but more on the lack of infrastructure for storage and export. It is also imaginable that investments could continue due to the fact that Romania has not yet reached its potential in producing renewable energy (solar, wind and bio-mass). With investments in infrastructure, we can imagine that Romania may sustain part of the energy consumption of the region. The transport infrastructure of electricity that is used was built several years ago and needs improvement. There is also the case of compatibility between the networks of the neighbouring countries and their willingness to get involved in a more integrated regional form of cooperation. Taking into consideration the analyses above, Romania has all the incentives to assert itself as a new Black Sea regional power, which will support Western strategies within the region.

Conclusions The current tensions involving Ukraine represent just the beginning of what could evolve as the “energy cold war”, having the Black Sea as its epicentre. Although Russia and the EU are aware of their mutual economic and energy dependency, their external policies resemble a “mutually assured destruction” strategy. Due to the current geopolitical context, our study argues that the EU is obliged to advance to a new stage and configure an inclusive, comprehensive and well-thought-out long-term Black Sea Strategy, which would be able not only to diffuse its norms and policies to the Eastern neighbourhood, but also to keep EU-Russia economic and energy cooperation in place. Unless it succeeds in doing so, the EU’s fight for constructing a bastion of peace might result in one of the most terrible conflicts in recent history. The EU should be able to learn from tactical mistakes and the difficulties met by previous policy frameworks (BSS and EaP) and fundamentally rethink its strategy using contextualised internal as well as external lenses. More precisely, the new

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Black Sea strategy should respond to the specific needs and capacities of each Black Sea country and take into consideration their regional ties, while calibrating the sanctions imposed on Russia, so that it would convince its president to stop his provocative military actions that exploit the frozen conflicts of the Black Sea region. In order to achieve this goal, the EU should learn first how to counter Russia’s many leverage mechanism and its coercive tools and prevent the escalation of future conflicts. At the moment, there seems to be a common understanding that if there is something that could be used to drastically challenge the Russian strategy in the Black Sea region, which may well be the destabilization of its energy market. A comprehensive perspective on the region cannot be achieved overlooking the new energy policies of the Black Sea area, since energy represents a sector of utmost importance for all the riparian states and has critical geostrategic implications for the EU. Structural geopolitical rivalry within the Black Sea region is expected to continue even though a compromise might be reached concerning the Ukrainian crisis. However, this crisis represents a stress test for the EU, which will eventually lead to the creation of a more sustainable foreign policy towards Eastern Europe. For this purpose, there is a need for EUNATO regional concerted action and the support of regional allies. Among the Black Sea countries, Romania stands out as a central partner that has the necessary means to support an eventual new Western regional strategy. To do so, Romania needs to gain the support of its regional peers and the military protection of NATO. There is definitely a convergence in expectations amongst the Black Sea states, but there is a great divergence of preferences that stems from their variety of regime types, their different memberships in systemic structures, their disproportionate economies, their lack or abundance of natural resources, their frozen conflicts, their national security policies and their military alliances. All these factors must be taken into consideration in order to move out of this limbo. Observed from outside, the Black Sea region might seem caught in a strategic inertia, but in fact the strategies within the region are shifting so rapidly that no common decision can be taken without expecting the risk of various repercussions.

Bibliography 1. Assenova, Margarita, Bulgaria and Romania: Pursuing Energy Security in a Changing Environment. Centre for European Policy Analysis, 2013, http://cepa.org/content/bulgaria-and-romania-pursuing-energy-securitychanging-environment [accessed 18 October 2014]

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2. Ciascai, Gheorghe, The Eastern Partnership of the EU-the challenges and the opportunities in the context of the Ukraine’s crisis, CES Working papers, volume VI, Issue 2A 3. George Friedman, Ukraine, Iraq and a Black Sea Strategy, Stratfor, 2014 http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ukraine-iraq-and-black-sea-strategy [accessed 5 October 2014] 4. Garces de los Fayos, Fernando, The EU´s Black Sea policy: Where do we stand ?, Policy Briefing http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2013/49151 9/EXPO-AFET_SP(2013)491519_EN.pdf [accessed: 10 September 2014] 5. Helm, Dieter, Ukraine, Europe and Energy, 2014 a. http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk [accessed 19.09.2014] 6. Kanter, James, Stalled Gazprom Antitrust Case May Suggest Unease for Energy Sanction, 2014 7. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/business/international/stalled-gazpromantitrust-case-may-signal-unease-in-eu-for-energy-sanctions.html [accessed 11.09.2014] 8. Mock,Vanessa and Laurence Norman, Ukraine, Russia Reach Deal on Natural-Gas Dispute. Agreement Averts Threat of Gas Shortages in Europe This Winter, Europe News, 2014 http://online.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-russia-toresume-talks-thursday-1414655294 [accessed 2 October 2014] 9. Molnar, Silviu, Black Sea Discovery Could Cover Romania’s Natural gas Needs for 20 Years, 2012 http://naturalgaseurope.com [accessed: 20 September 2014] 10. Gas Europe, Bulgarian Parliament Considers Changes to the Energy Act Due to South Stream’s Statute, 2014 http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/bulgariaenergy-act-south-stream-statue [accessed 2 September 2014] 11. NATO tracks large-scale Russian air activity in Europe http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_114274.htm [accessed 2 October 2014] 12. Reuters, Turkey, Russia agree on gas flow increase, 2014 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-russia-agree-on-gas-flowincrease.aspx?pageID=238&nID=72421&NewsCatID=348 [accessed 1 October 2014] 13. Reuters, Romania to become gas independent by 2020: Energy Minister, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/01/us-romania-energyidUSKCN0HQ4QG20141001 [accessed 5 October 2014] 14. Natural Gas Europe http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/iranian-gas-to-europevia-turkey?utm_source=Natural+Gas+Europe+Newsletter&utm_campaign= 914397fde4-RSS_EMAIL_CAMPAIGN&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_ c95c702d4c-914397fde4-307755997 [accessed: 20 September 2014] 15. Gazprom statistics: http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/ [accessed 2 September 2014] 16. The Sofia Globe, Spiegel: Germany concerned Bulgaria is Russia’s bridgehead in EU http://sofiaglobe.com/2014/05/12/spiegel-germanyconcerned-bulgaria-is-russias-bridgehead-in-eu/ [accessed 2 September 2014]

EU-UKRAINE: THE NEED FOR A REVISITED APPROACH GEORGIANA CICEO

Abstract As early as the 1990s, successive Ukrainian governments have expressed the country’s willingness to participate in European integration. Even though Ukraine is poorer and less stable than many of its Central European neighbours that have already acceded to the European Union and is falling short of many European standards, there is no way in which its “Europeanness” in geographical, cultural or historical terms can be questioned. The EU can hardly deny this reality, but up to this year’s crisis in Ukraine, it had tackled these relations rather cautiously, as part of a wider project for dealing with all countries lying in its immediate neighbourhood. On the other hand, despite publicly advocating increased integration into the EU, Ukraine’s political leadership has often been criticized for not embracing a more vigorous policy of Europeanization. For the purpose of this article, we intend to explore whether the EU has tackled these complex relations with Ukraine with enough finesse and acumen, given the sensitiveness of the issues at stake for both sides, the ambivalence and the many turns in the positions of its “priority partner country within the European Neighbourhood Policy” over time. The underlying assumption from which we will proceed is that there is still huge potential for relations that is yet to be uncovered, as well as a mutual need for reliability and trust. Keywords: EU, Neighbourhood Policy, Ukraine, Association Agreement Ever since its independence, Ukraine has regularly conveyed its willingness to deepen its relations with the European Union. The first step in this direction was taken on June 14, 1994, when the two signed a

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Partnership and Cooperation Agreement1 which, despite a protracted ratification process, entered into force on March 1, 1998. Prior to its termination in 2008, it had served as a basis for a Joint EU-Ukraine Action Plan, endorsed by the European Council on February 21, 2005, after the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of the EU had emerged, in response to the changed geopolitical landscape after the 2004 enlargement. Ukraine’s relation with the EU has become increasingly relevant particularly during these past ten years, not only as a consequence of their immediate proximity, but also particularly after the 2004 Orange Revolution. The EU has recognized Ukraine as its “priority partner country within the European Neighbourhood Policy”2. At the same time, Ukraine has been one of the six post-Soviet states invited to cooperate with the EU within the multilateral framework of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which supplemented the ENP and tried to address some of its misgivings3. In February 2008, the EU and Ukraine started negotiations aimed at establishing a free trade area, providing a legal framework for closer economic cooperation and enhanced political dialogue. A few months later, the EU and Ukraine agreed that the free trade area should be part of an Association Agreement designed to succeed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Although upon his election in February 2010, Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych made EU integration a priority, 1

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the European Communities and their Member States and Ukraine provided a comprehensive and ambitious framework for cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. For an outline of the political and legal foundations of the PCA, as well as its institutional framework, see Mission of Ukraine to the European Union, Ukraine - EU Relations (30 September 2014) . 2 See European External Action Service, Fact Sheet: EU - Ukraine Relations, Brussels, 12 September 2014 (30 September 2014) . 3 The European Union’s Eastern Partnership includes the post-Soviet states of Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Poland joined forces with Sweden to propose this project, officially launched on 7 May 2009. It aims to improve political and economic trade relations of the six strategically important partner countries and strives to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law. See European External Action Service, Eastern Partnership (30 September 2014) . See also, Elena Korosteleva, “The Eastern Partnership Initiative: A New Opportunity for the Neighbors?”, in Eastern Partnership: A New Opportunity for the Neighbors?, (ed.) Elena Korosteleva (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012) 2-3.

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plans for the free trade area and Association Agreement stalled in late 2011, as a result of the EU’s criticism of what it perceived as the politically motivated trial of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. On 10 December 2012, the Council of the EU adopted Conclusions on Ukraine, which affirmed the EU’s commitment to signing the Agreement as soon as Ukraine had taken determined action and made tangible progress towards achieving the benchmarks set out in the Conclusions. On 21 November 2013, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine took the decision to suspend preparations to sign the Association Agreement at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, but under the pressure of unprecedented public support for political association and economic integration into the EU, it had to reverse this decision. On 21 March 2014, the EU and Ukraine signed the political provisions of the Association Agreement. Following the completion of technical preparations, the EU and Ukraine signed the remaining part of the EUUkraine Association Agreement (AA), together with a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) in Brussels, on 27 June. The aim was to start applying certain provisions (including nearly all the DCFTA section) from 1 November 2014. Nevertheless, less than two months before this date, the parties agreed to delay until 31 December 2015 “the provisional application of the DCFTA, while continuing autonomous trade measures of the EU to the benefit of Ukraine during this period”4 in order to address Russia’s concerns over the adverse impact of the agreement on its own trade with Ukraine. This thesis researches the complex relationship between the EU and Ukraine. It examines how the EU has tackled the relations with its most important neighbour at its Eastern border, a country belonging to a region for which “the EU has a special responsibility to support” on the “difficult and demanding path of transition towards democracy and more inclusive societies”5. So far, the keyword for the EU has been engagement or anything short of enlargement. The EU’s support for the countries of the region, in general, and for Ukraine, in particular has been manifold. It has 4

European Commission, Joint Ministerial Statement on the Implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA, Brussels, 12 September 2014 (30 September 2014) . See also Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Ukraine, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 20 October 2014 (30 September 2014) . 5 European Commission, Press release: Neighborhood at the crossroads – taking stock of a year of challenges,

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offered better trade relations, closer cooperation in various policy areas, improved travel and study opportunities, increased networking between communities (business, research, universities, arts, culture etc.), and improved support for the civil society. It has embraced a package of measures, including EUR 11 billion in financial assistance to Ukraine over many years announced by the Commission on 5 March 2014 and access to a new European Neighbourhood Instrument that became part and parcel of the 2014-2020 financial framework, designed so as to provide the neighbour countries with up to EUR 15.4 billion. The EU has assisted Ukraine in institutional capacity building and helped its neighbour to develop policies in areas such as migration, justice, health and consumer protection. Above all, it has offered an alternative mode of cultural and social development. It has become a reliable partner for political, economic, technological and cultural cooperation. The question that will be asked regards the extent to which the endeavours undertaken up to now have supported the overall goals of the EU in relation to Ukraine, meant to “create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration”, to “promote stability and multilateral confidence building” and to “maintain and bolster the course towards reforms”6. Special emphasis will be placed on the manner in which the policies designed by the EU have so far delivered and on whether they have been up for the various current challenges facing the Eastern neighbourhood of the EU, as a result of the new strategic context. In doing so, we will first examine the mechanisms employed by the EU for inducing change in the Central and Eastern European countries and drawing from this experience, we will then attempt to identify how these can be best employed in the special case of Ukraine. Thus, the present study will aim to analyse the extent to which the economic rewards of single market access and aid have the potential to offer enough scope to prompt Ukraine to open and reform its economy, boost democratic standards, protect human rights and, overall, maintain its enthusiasm for European integration. The fundamental issue is how the mechanisms of conditionality and socialization can be best employed by the EU in its relations with Ukraine, given the fact that there is no membership perspective at stake and the country is exposed to adverse pressures from a dominant Russia, which does not share the same regard 6

Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, 8435/09 (Presse 78) Prague, 7 May 2009, (30 September 2014) .

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for European norms. Given the Russian strategic goal to “create friendly, neutral units with maximum freedom in cultural, economic, and social spheres, but strategically dependent upon Moscow” and to “prevent the military and political dominance of other countries in the territory of the former Soviet Union”7, the mission of exporting European norms to Ukraine can already be regarded as problematic, but it has proved to be even more difficult if we take into consideration the fact that “Ukraine always played a critically important geopolitical role in Russian history” and “losing Ukraine in 1991 was probably the most painful wound sustained by Russia in the course of the Soviet Union’s disintegration”8. The EU’s normative power had been regarded as an evident expression of its transformative potential, in relation to various other countries, but above all, to the states of Central and Eastern Europe9. Later, it came to be extended to countries outside the European Union, without an unambiguous membership perspective. The studies on these issues are part of a wider research on Europeanization and focus on what German political scientists Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse have defined as the “domestic impact of Europe” beyond its borders10 or the external governance of the EU. According to Frank Schimmelfennig, the responses to how the mechanisms of Europeanization come to produce effects follow two different judgments – a logic of consequences (“do X to get Y”11) and a logic of appropriateness (“good people do X”12), each based on different mechanisms for imprinting an EU impact on neighbouring countries: conditionality and socialization, respectively13. Along these lines, an extensive body of literature documenting the capacity of the EU to promote the establishment of transparent forms of governance, viable market mechanisms and strong civil societies has developed over the 7

Marko Mihkelson, “Russia’s Policy toward Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the Baltic States” in Toward an Understanding of Russia. New European Perspectives, (ed.) Janusz Bugajski (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002) 98-99. 8 Ibid, 100. 9 Ian Manners, “The normative ethics of the European Union”, International Affairs 84, 1 (2008): 45-60. 10 Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe”, in The Politics of Europeanization, (ed.) Keith Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 57-80. 11 Peter Simmons, “Review Commentary: The State of the Art in the EU Democracy Promotion Literature”, Journal of Contemporary European Research 7, 1 (2011): 133. 12 Ibid. 13 Frank Schimmelfennig, “Europeanization beyond the member states”, Zeitschrift für Staats - und Europawissenschaften 8, 3 (2010): 325-328.

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years. Conditionality has been used to explain how “the EU seeks to disseminate its governance rules by setting them as conditions that external actors have to meet in order to obtain rewards and to avoid sanctions from the EU”14. Over the years, wide varieties of rewards have been employed by the EU, from trade agreements to preferential access to the EU market and financial aid, but the most tempting and efficient so far has been the membership perspective. As such, the conditionality literature follows a rationalist logic and is based on the external incentives model15. The key assumption of this model is that “a state adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adaptation costs”, whereas the cost-benefit balance depends on (i) the determinacy of conditions, (ii) the size and speed of rewards, (iii) the credibility of threats and promises, and (iv) the size of adoption costs16. In contrast, the socialization model is founded on core principles of social constructivism and assumes that “external actors adopt and comply with EU rules if they are convinced of their legitimacy and appropriateness and if they accept the authority of the EU”17. Socialization gives consideration to issues like “social learning”, “constructive impact” and “communication”18. The convincing abilities of the EU are in close connection with the legitimacy of EU rules (mostly as a consequence of the fact that they are embedded in those of other international organizations), the degree of identification of the target state with the EU and the resonance of EU rules with existing domestic rules19. As we have already mentioned, the EU’s ability to alter the practices of states without offering the prospect of membership has only recently come into focus. Although the mechanisms that support a logic of consequences, as well as those that prop up a logic of appropriateness have been considerably refined over the years20, it is considered that conditionality and socialization remain the most powerful mechanisms for endorsing the external governance of the EU and its transformative power in the neighbouring countries21. The ENP has incorporated features of both. 14

Ibid, 326. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy 11, 4 (2004): 671. 16 Ibid, 671-675. 17 F. Schimmelfennig, “Europeanization beyond the member states”, 327. 18 Idem, “Europeanization beyond Europe”, Living Reviews in European Governance 7, 1 (2012): 8. 19 F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, op. cit., 675-676. 20 F. Schimmelfennig, “Europeanization beyond Europe”, 8-10. 21 Idem, “Europeanization beyond the member states”, 328. 15

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Albeit the coexistence of the two mechanisms within the ENP was expected to be problematic and to “undermine their respective potential”22, and both of them, as defined in the ENP, are sufficiently weak to be credible (conditionality because of limited incentives, weak credibility and high adaptation costs, and socialization because of weak norm resonance in the neighbouring countries)23, the present analysis intends to build on the results of those studies that indicate that ENP has the potential to stimulate change in the neighbouring countries, although not in a predictable future. Gwendolyn Sasse has demonstrated that by understanding conditionality “as a process rather than a clear-cut variable”, the ENP can be considered both an “external reference point” and a “loose framework for socialization”24, which can prove to be useful for analysing how the EU can recalibrate its relations with neighbouring countries. Tina Freyburg highlighted in her research how the ENP, despite its obvious weaknesses, can impact on the neighbouring countries. Accordingly, in cases of functional cooperation between the EU and ENP countries, the former can induce neighbouring countries to incorporate policy-specific democratic governance provisions into domestic legislation, especially in those areas where EU rules are strongly codified and institutionalized25. In the following section, we will attempt to identify the best methods in which the EU can contribute to the transformation of Ukraine, proceeding from the experience already gained in the process of transformation of CEE countries. Given the size imposed to this study, we will focus our research strictly on the democratic transformation of 22

Ulrich Sedelmeier, “The European Neighborhood Policy: A Comment on Theory and Policy”, in Governing Europe’s Neighborhood, (eds.) Katja Weber, Michael E. Smith and Michael Baun, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007) 201. 23 F. Schimmelfennig, “Europeanization beyond Europe”, 20. See also Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff, “Much Ado About Nothing? The European Neighborhood Policy in Context”, in The European Neighborhood Policy in Perspective Context, Implementation and Impact (ed.) Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 12-13. 24 Gwendolyn Sasse, “The European Neighborhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU's Eastern Neighbors”, Europe-Asia Studies 60, 2 (2008): 296. 25 Tina Freyburg, “Demokratisierung durch Zusammenarbeit. Funktionale Kooperation mit autoritären Regimen und Sozialisation in demokratischen Regieren”, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, 18, 1 (2011): 31-32. See also Tina Freyburg, „Transgovernmental networks as catalysts for democratic change? EU functional cooperation with Arab authoritarian regimes and socialization of involved state officials into democratic governance”, Democratization 18, 4 (2011): 1017.

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Ukraine. As governance has evolved over the past 20 years, democracy, as approached by the EU, has endured profound transformations, since the EU no longer seeks to address “the question of how authority is exercised and who is in power”, but is rather concerned with “optimizing local life through participatory practices”. It is less political institutions that are sought to be democratized rather than the “coping and management capacities of individuals, communities and societies”26.

EU use of conditionality In order to accurately evaluate the transformation processes in CEE countries, the EU has developed a policy of democratic conditionality. This conditionality tool set hurdles in the accession process of CEE countries. The underlying idea has been to induce them to comply with specific standards. These hurdles originated in the Copenhagen criteria, which were further elaborated on in the European Commission’s avis of 1997 and from 1998, in the annual regular reports on candidate countries. They were also tied to EU programmes of financial assistance, accession partnerships and twinning for the training of pre-accession civil servants by advisers from the Member States27, in return for compliance with the standards imposed. Aware of this reality, the EU has used this policy of democratic conditionality in different ways: timing the accession process (start of negotiations, determining the date of full accession), ranking the applicant’s overall progress, benchmarking in specific policy areas, providing examples of best practice, assessing the applicant’s administrative capacity and institutional ability to implement and enforce the acquis communautaire28. After the latest rounds of enlargement, the attention has gradually shifted to the transformative power of the EU in its new neighbourhood, as it continued to be perceived as the “success story of an advanced idea with high fascinating potential, powers of persuasion and export value”29. It is 26 Jessica Schmidt, “From transformation to reality: the role of local context in EU democracy promotion”, International Relations 27, 2 (2013): 246. 27 Their task was to help CEE countries to import know-how on the implementation of the acquis to national and local administrations and the whole pre-accession strategy. 28 Heather Grabbe, “How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality, diffusion and diversity”, Journal of European Public Policy, 8, 6 (2001): 1028-1029. 29 Michael Gehler, Europa: Ideen, Institutionen, Vereinigung, (München: Olzog, 2005) 344.

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true that in the case of the neighbours, conditionality was deprived of its main reward, namely the membership perspective, and so: “conditionality appears to be far less effective with countries that are either not willing or not capable of adopting European ideas because they do not resonate with domestic structures and identities or they lack the necessary capacities to introduce required changes”30

…but we consider that outright dismissing its transformative power would be a mistake. In this endeavour, we will proceed from the assumption that conditionality is rather a process than a clear-cut variable, as suggested by Sasse, and we will focus on the functional cooperation between the EU and the ENP countries, as recommended by Freyburg. The EU faces increasing levels of interdependence with the regions at its borders in a multitude of spheres - from trade and energy cooperation, to the joint management of security challenges and migration. In the eastern neighbourhood, the cornerstones of EU policy are the bilateral and multilateral arrangements embedded in the ENP and EaP, as well as the Association Agreements, which contain provisions on the establishment of deep and comprehensive free trade areas. Although meant to “further push the frontiers of the West to the East, through a quite ambiguous form of political and economic collaboration”, devoid of any pledge for future accession31, all these arrangements preserve asymmetrical interdependence, by offering certain incentives in exchange for accepting the EU acquis. Even though the EU’s approaches to its neighbouring regions have proved to be both inconsistent and inefficient, the EaP countries have manifestly indicated their willingness to adopt EU rules in the hope that they would get accepted someday into the club and because the outline of the EU’s external governance appears to be more tolerable than Russia’s. However, the evident difference between the EU’s ambition to transform Ukraine into a stable and reliable partner and Russia’s attempts to maintain control over the region has become manifest in a number of policy areas, such as trade, energy security and foreign policy. For instance, although Ukraine already has a free trade agreement with the CIS, and only in 2014 did it 30 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, “The Transformative Power of Europe: The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas”, Kolleg-Forschergruppe: ”The Transformative Power of Europe”, Freie Universität Berlin, Working Paper 1 (2009): 10. 31 Valentin Naumescu, "The European Union and the United States' Strategic Approaches on the Ukrainian Crisis: A New Cleavage in the Transatlantic Relations?", Online Journal Modelling the New Europe 11 (2014): 93.

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sign and ratify a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU, Russia has pressured Ukraine to join its customs union, despite the fact that from an Ukrainian standpoint, the finest way out, not only economically, but also politically, would be to have free trade agreements with both. Moreover, Russia managed to persuade the EU and Ukraine to put on hold until 2015 those provisions of the DCFTA and AA that were meant to enter into force with celerity, before the ratification process was completed. These adverse tendencies highlighted unambiguously some of the shortcomings of the EU’s approach to its relations with Ukraine: disregard of local sensitivities, inflexibility and condescension. The EU tried to address some of these misgivings by introducing the principle of joint ownership of policy agendas and mutual commitments. Nevertheless, given the complexity of the situation, in order to support the democratic transformation of Ukraine and the encapsulation of EU values in domestic policy-making, the EU needs a more energetic and considerate approach to conditionality in order to overcome domestic opposition. Only then can it pretend to offer orientation to Ukraine and act as an anchor for the latter’s economic and political reform efforts. The EU drew the harshest criticism for not appreciating the “depth of Russian anxieties about the economic and geopolitical impact of Ukraine's accession to the EaP” and did little to “assuage Russia's concerns about the EU's eastward creep even though it lacked NATO's military dimension”32. By making use of soft power instruments, the EU pushed for an overambitious agenda that ranged from democracy promotion and good governance to energy security and environment, but it was motivated to do so primarily by security concerns for stabilizing the countries in its close neighbourhood. In doing so, the EU apparently downplayed Russia’s apprehensions vis-à-vis Ukraine, best expressed by Zbigniew Brzezinski: “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians, who would then be resentful of the loss of their recent independence and would be supported by their fellow Islamic states to the south”33.

32

Jeanne Park, “The European Union's Eastern Partnership”, Council on Foreign Relations (2014): 3. 33 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, (New York: Basic Books, 1997): 46.

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EU promotion of socialization In the highly emotional atmosphere of the beginning of the ’90s, a sense of moral responsibility seemed to prevail among Western European policy-makers, who, while deploring the division of the continent, often stated that the absence of Central and Eastern European states from the European project would render it incomplete. In the face of the events of 1989, the European Community decided to assume a leading role in relation to CEE states. This idea was best expressed in the Declaration of the European Council held in Strasbourg in December 1989: “the Community remains the foundation of a new European architecture”. The idea was enthusiastically greeted by CEE states, insisting on the idea of their “return to Europe”, which from a rationalist perspective may sound like a hollow construction for advancing the cause of EU membership, but from a socio-constructivist perspective, it involved a natural right to accession to the EU34. However, the solutions concerning the manner of handling relations with CEE countries evolved only gradually from the beginning of ’90s to the end of the century – from avoiding the issue of enlargement to increasingly accepting it, at the price of the EU’s own embarking on a difficult process of internal reform. The EU’s decisions with regard to Central and Eastern European countries were favoured by the gradual development of the idea of shared values, understood not only as collective identity constructions about Europe, but also as common cultural traditions and historical experiences, common development of distinct Western constitutional and political principles, as well as a definite sense of what constitutes Europe’s ‘others’, which started to forge their way and shape the discussion on Eastern enlargement. These shared values paved the way for the criteria laid down in Copenhagen, seen as a precondition for embarking on the process of accession, whereas the acquis came to provide the normative basis for this latest round of enlargement. The criteria bore the imprint of the shared foundation of European culture and Western Christianity. They proceeded from the assumption that liberal human rights are the fundamental values of this community. In the domestic sphere, they were translated into a social and political order based on social pluralism, the rule of law, democratic political participation and representation, as well as private

34

Nicolae Păun and Waldtraudt-Georgiana Ciceo, “The limits of Europeanness. Can Europeanness stand alone as the only guiding criterion for deciding Turkey’s EU membership?”, Eurolimes - Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies 9 (2010): 94-95.

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property and a market based economy35. The European Union proved to be a powerful magnet, shaping the aspirations of candidate countries36. As far as the CEE states are concerned, the accession perspective set in motion a very complex and profound range of adjustment processes, with the aim of socializing with the dominant mores and values of the EU. As gaining international approval is an important way of legitimizing political choices in the post-communist context, embracing European values enabled CEE countries to achieve ’democracy by convergence’. This was part of a broader process of Europeanization that went hand in hand with the process of domestic transformation of their communist regimes and rigid command economies into democratic pluralistic regimes with market economies. As the idea of enlargement gained momentum, the two processes - the regime transformation and advancement towards full-EU membership - increasingly became not just simply parallel, but also deeply interconnected. They came to be so intricately linked that they depended on each other and even more, they fed each other37. The reform process of Central and Eastern European countries thus took a particular form, due to the foreign policy decision they made in favour of accession to the EU and the necessity to meet the Copenhagen criteria. They had nothing else to do but to align themselves with the standards imposed on them by the European Union. In sum, the latest rounds of enlargement were primarily centred on the constitutive values of the European political order, reflecting a common identity and manifested as such in the Copenhagen criteria. In comparison with the previous rounds of enlargement, when the political and economic factors had played key roles in the decision making process, this time the driving forces were generated by the moral responsibility of bringing the other Europe within a comprehensive European order and the necessity of adapting the countries of the region to the core values of the European Union, given their long exposure to a set of values fundamentally different from the one accepted in Western Europe. What is also important to be mentioned in this context is the fact that in the case of the latest rounds of enlargement, we speak about the accession of countries whose belonging 35

Georgiana Ciceo‚”The Merits and Limits of Socio-Constructivism in Explaining Eastern Enlargement”, Studia Europaea L, 2-3 (2005): 97-98. 36 Helen Wallace, “EU Enlargement: A Neglected Subject”, in: The State of the European Union: Risks, Reform, Resistance, and Revival (eds.) Maria Green Cowles and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 151. 37 Walter Matli and Thomas Plümper, “The Internal Value of External Options – How the EU Shapes the Scope of Regulatory Reforms in Transition Countries”, European Union Politics 5, 3 (2004): 307-308.

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to Europe could not be denied, albeit it did raise fears concerning a possible altering of the core European values. Their admission triggered an inward looking search for defining what is specific to those belonging to the European family and what differentiates them from others. EU discourse on democracy promotion has been significantly altered over the past 20 years, drifting away from democratic politics towards democratic governance. Nowadays, the focus is no longer on “institutional arrangements for the democratic control over the exercise of authority”, but it has become closely linked to “subjective behaviour and relationships”, to “local ownership, capacity-building and enabling participation and inclusion.”38 The EU’s external governance, especially when it involves institutionalized frameworks for political dialogue, networks or non-state actors, contrasts with the manner in which Russia handles the countries in its near abroad. Whilst the EU emphasizes the virtues of forms of organization that go beyond hard notions of external and internal sovereignty39, Russia employs either existing institutional commitments (CIS legal framework or any other bilateral or multilateral arrangements), or sheer power politics40. Apparently, the logical assumption would be again that the EU’s external governance comes to be perceived as more acceptable than what Russia has to offer. However, in the absence of “genuine political competition and elite consensus with respect to the rules of the game and the goals of reforms”41, the EU’s capacity to persuade Ukrainians on the validity of its variant of external governance has remained limited. EU critics of how it handled relations with Ukraine pinpointed the limited incentives offered to its neighbour, so as to help the democratic transformation of the country and its emancipation from the Russian attempts to dominate it. As long as political competition “continues to be seen as a zero sum game” and “every elite group presents its own version of the ‘national interest’”, the EU’s capacity to motivate the region’s

38

J. Schmidt, “From transformation to reality: the role of local context in EU democracy promotion”, 249. 39 Sandra Lavenex, “EU external governance in 'wider Europe'”, Journal of European Public Policy 11, 4 (2004): 682. 40 Antoaneta Dimitrova and Rilka Dragneva, “Constraining external governance: interdependence with Russia and the CIS as limits to the EU’s rule transfer in the Ukraine”, Journal of European Public Policy 16, 6 (2009): 854 41 Iryna Solonenko, “External democracy promotion in Ukraine: the role of the European Union”, Democratization 16, 4 (2009): 709-731.

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ongoing democratization will suffer from a long-lasting deterioration process42.

Conclusions The eastern neighbourhood has been and will certainly remain a strategic priority area for the foreign policy zone of the EU. However, handling its relations with the region has proved to be a difficult test for the EU, because of the shared neighbourhood with Russia, also a strategic partner. The EU’s aim was to have a stable and prosperous neighbour at its borders, which will progressively become a reliable economic and political partner, by supporting the transformation of the Ukrainian governance structures by means of conditionality and socialization. However, these EU aims have been contradicted by Russia’s power politics in the region. Some policy areas have been particularly adversely exposed to these conflicting trends, such as trade, energy security and foreign policy. Considering the complexity of the situation, the EU has been too cautious in providing Ukraine with the necessary backing for maintaining a proreform path, although it has explicitly indicated that this is in its best interest too. For many Ukrainian intellectuals convinced of their country’s Europeanness and of the fact that this is the “driving force behind Ukraine’s effort to come closer to the EU”43, the European response was disappointing. It is true that the appeal of economic integration may boost Ukraine’s reform process and help trim opposition to it, especially after this gains momentum, but in the long run, it cannot be deemed sufficient for propelling Ukraine’s enthusiasm about the EU. Given the EU’s limitations as a hard power, capable of standing up to Russia’s foreign policies and military capabilities, its model of integration may also fade as an instrument of attraction if it closes its doors to further enlargement44. “Europe” needs to become a political project45 and in this respect, the EU has to come up with initiatives capable of engaging the minds and values of the people. If European integration is to become a key driving force for 42

Alexander Bogomolov and Alexander Lytvynenko, “Ukraine’s Bottom-Up Democracy“, in Democracy’s Plight in the European Neighborhood. Struggling Transitions and Proliferating Dynasties (eds.) Michael Emerson and Richard Youngs, (Brussels: Centre for European Political Studies, 2009) 84-85. 43 Kataryna Wolczuk, “Ukraine after the Orange Revolution”, Centre for European Reform, Policy Brief (2005): 2. 44 Janusz Bugajski, Conflict Zones: North Caucasus and Western Balkans Compared, (Washington: The Jamestown Foundation, 2014) 82. 45 K. Wolczuk, “Ukraine after the Orange Revolution”,

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reform, the EU needs to come up with a more vigorous and sympathetic approach to conditionality. In the absence of a membership perspective even for the very distant future, the EU has little choice but to strengthen the position of pro-reform forces that advocate a European model of development for Ukraine.

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(30 September 2014). 4. European Commission. Joint Ministerial Statement on the Implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA. Brussels, 12 September 2014.

(30 September 2014). 5. European External Action Service. Eastern Partnership. (30 September 2014). 6. European External Action Service, Fact Sheet: EU - Ukraine Relations. Brussels, 12 September 2014

(30 September 2014). 7. Mission of Ukraine to the European Union. Ukraine - EU Relations. (30 September 2014). Secondary sources: 1. Bogomolov, Alexander and Alexander Lytvynenko. “Ukraine’s Bottom-Up Democracy“. In Democracy’s Plight in the European Neighborhood. Struggling Transitions and Proliferating Dynasties edited by Michael Emerson and Richard Youngs, 79-87. Brussels: Centre for European Political Studies, 2009. 2. Börzel, Tanja A. and Thomas Risse. „Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe”. In The Politics of Europeanization edited by Keith Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli, 57-80. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 3. Börzel, Tanja A. and Thomas Risse. „The Transformative Power of Europe: The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas”. Kolleg-Forschergruppe:

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EU-Ukraine: The Need for a Revisited Approach ”The Transformative Power of Europe”, Freie Universität Berlin, Working Paper 1 (2009). Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books, 1997. Ciceo‚ Georgiana. ”The Merits and Limits of Socio-Constructivism in Explaining Eastern Enlargement”. Studia Europaea L, 2-3 (2005): 91-115. Dimitrova, Antoaneta and Rilka Dragneva. “Constraining external governance: interdependence with Russia and the CIS as limits to the EU’s rule transfer in the Ukraine”. Journal of European Public Policy 16, 6 (2009): 853–872. Freyburg, Tina. “Demokratisierung durch Zusammenarbeit. Funktionale Kooperation mit autoritären Regimen und Sozialisation in demokratischen Regieren”. Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 18, 1 (2011), 5-46. Freyburg, Tina. “Transgovernmental networks as catalysts for democratic change? EU functional cooperation with Arab authoritarian regimes and socialization of involved state officials into democratic governance”. Democratization 18, 4 (2011): 1001-1025. Gehler, Michael. Europa: Ideen, Institutionen, Vereinigung. München: Olzog, 2005. Grabbe, Heather. “How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality, diffusion and diversity”. Journal of European Public Policy 8, 6 (2001): 1013-1031. Korosteleva, Elena. “The Eastern Partnership Initiative: A New Opportunity for the Neighbors?”. In Eastern Partnership: A New Opportunity for the Neighbors? edited by Elena Korosteleva, 1-23. Abingdon: Routledge, 2012. Lavenex, Sandra. “EU external governance in 'wider Europe'”. Journal of European Public Policy 11, 4 (2004): 680-700. Manners, Ian. “The normative ethics of the European Union”. International Affairs 84, 1 (2008) 45-60. Matli, Walter and Thomas Plümper. “The Internal Value of External Options – How the EU Shapes the Scope of Regulatory Reforms in Transition Countries”. European Union Politics 5, 3 (2004): 307-330. Mihkelson, Marko. “Russia’s Policy toward Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the Baltic States”. In Toward an Understanding of Russia. New European Perspectives edited by Janusz Bugajski, 97-115. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002. Naumescu, Valentin. "The European Union and the United States' Strategic Approaches on the Ukrainian Crisis: A New Cleavage in the Transatlantic Relations?". Online Journal Modelling the New Europe 11 (2014): 90-109. Park, Jeanne. “The European Union's Eastern Partnership”. Council on Foreign Relations (2014). Păun, Nicolae and Waldtraudt-Georgiana Ciceo. “The limits of Europeanness. Can Europeanness stand alone as the only guiding criterion for deciding Turkey’s EU membership?”. Eurolimes - Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies 9 (2010): 92-106.

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19. Sasse, Gwendolyn. „The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU's Eastern Neighbours”. Europe-Asia Studies 60, 2 (2008): 295-316. 20. Schimmelfennig, Frank. „Europeanization beyond the member states”. Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften 8, 3 (2010): 319-340. 21. Schimmelfennig, Frank. „Europeanization beyond Europe”. Living Reviews in European Governance 7, 1 (2012): 1-31. 22. Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. „Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe”. Journal of European Public Policy 11, 4 (2004): 669-687. 23. Schmidt, Jessica. “From transformation to reality: the role of local context in EU democracy promotion”. International Relations 27, 2 (2013): 246-253. 24. Sedelmeier, Ulrich. “The European Neighborhood Policy: A Comment on Theory and Policy”. In Governing Europe’s Neighborhood, edited by Katja Weber, Michael E. Smith and Michael Baun, 195-208. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007. 25. Simmons, Peter. “Review Commentary: The State of the Art in the EU Democracy Promotion Literature”. Journal of Contemporary European Research 7, 1 (2011): 129-142. 26. Solonenko, Iryna. “External democracy promotion in Ukraine: the role of the European Union”. Democratization 16, 4 (2009): 709-731. 27. Whitman, Richard G. and Stefan Wolff. “Much Ado About Nothing? The European Neighborhood Policy in Context”. In The European Neighborhood Policy in Perspective Context, Implementation and Impact edited by Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff, 3-29. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 28. Wallace, Helen. “EU Enlargement: A Neglected Subject”. In: The State of the European Union: Risks, Reform, Resistance, and Revival edited by Maria Green Cowles and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 149-163. 29. Wolczuk, Kataryna. „Ukraine after the Orange Revolution”. Centre for European Reform, Policy Brief (2005).

UKRAINE AT AN ECONOMIC CROSSROADS CRISTIAN CON‫܉‬AN

Abstract The failure at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November 2013 to sign the Association Agreement, including its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the European Union and Ukraine led eventually to the most serious crisis in the West-Russia relations since the end of the Cold War. But before it became an international and regional security problem, Ukraine’s tragedy had been fuelled by a very difficult economic situation. Hundreds of billions of US dollars as potential loss for the Ukrainian economy in the coming years was the figure President V. Ianukovich put forward when justifying its decision to “suspend the preparation for the signing of the Association Agreement” in Vilnius. The focus on economic, trade and financial measures both as economic coercion and assistance packages in the aftermath of the events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine left no doubt that at the end of the day, the struggle was about the economy just as much as it was about geopolitics, minorities, international posture etc. A Eurasian Economic Union built on the Russia-led Customs Union without Ukraine appears to be just as unappealing as the Eastern Partnership with Ukraine drifting apart. An overview of the role of the economic aspects in the context of the EU-Ukraine-Russia relations therefore becomes relevant and necessary, so as to fully understand the triggers, implications and aims of the actors involved in the Ukrainian crisis. The analysis of the economic environment could provide at least partial answers as to Kyiv’s capacity and determination to escape its economic dependency on Russia at a time when relying either on the euro or on the Russian rouble seems to carry systemic financial and structural economic risks. Keywords: Ukraine, EU, Eastern Partnership, Vilnius Summit, Customs Union

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The views expressed in this article are entirely and solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or any other institution the author might work for.

Context At the moment of writing this paper - June 2014 - the Russian Federation has just cut off its gas supplies to Ukraine over a long dispute on Ukrainian unpaid gas imports and the related gas price. This comes amid a political and security crisis in Eastern Europe, with some international spillover sparked around Ukraine’s decision to tighten its political and economic ties with the European Union and Russia’s violent response. The crisis is seen by many analysts as the most serious one since the end of the Cold War. Since the beginning of 2014, observers have flagged the possibility that a new Ukraine -Russia gas crisis similar to the ones in 2006 and 2009 could occur at any time. Meanwhile, the Crimean crisis took place with the annexation of the peninsula by Moscow and, for a short term, one could have thought the Russian Federation would not dare challenge further the international security architecture. However, tensions, escalation, the spread of violence and constant deterioration of the economic and security climate continued in the Eastern parts of Ukraine both before and after the Presidential elections in mid-May. The relations between the EU and NATO, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other hand, have worsened up to a point where the dialogue between them seemed sometimes meaningless. Solutions to the current geopolitical crisis appear to be, therefore, out of reach at present, unless a change in the post-Cold War paradigm is somehow reached. Meanwhile, Ukraine is living a nightmare, remaining caught between ever tougher economic pressures from its Eastern neighbour and a desperate need for foreign aid, especially large financial injections from the European Union and other international financial institutions.

Relevance Thus, having a look at the EU economic and financial support over the last half a year might prove very useful both from a retrospective point of view, as a stock-taking exercise, and in an attempt to assess the real leverage of the European aid, as opposed to the growing challenges Ukraine is facing. This analysis might be necessary to the ones claiming that the European Union is not doing much or enough to ease the difficult

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economic situation in Ukraine, and to other actors that may have in the future to prove to their constituencies that they have done everything in their power to stand by Ukraine’s European choice and to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Ukrainian people.

The EU narrative on DCFTA vs. Russia’s narrative In November 2013, former Ukrainian President Viktor Ianukovich surprised the whole Europe by putting on hold the signature of the Association Agreement (AA) between his country and the EU, citing national security interests and the need to protect Ukrainian trade with CIS countries. Going against the will of the Ukrainian society, V. Ianukovich prompted a determined response from the “Maidan movement”, which eventually led to his dismissal. Tragic events unfolded and a major security crisis emerged in Russia-Ukraine relations. Negotiated and already initialled, the Agreement was meant to bring Ukraine closer to the European system of values and norms, both politically and economically. Armenia’s sudden U-turn towards the Russia-Kazakhstan-Belarus Customs Union in September 2013, taken under strong political pressure from Russian President Vladimir Putin, should have been a warning shot for the whole world. It was not the case, but the Ukrainian shift several months later left no doubt Russia would play a different game from there on. As Ulrich Speck from Carnegie Europe mentioned1, it was the end of Western hopes that Russia would pursue a path towards liberal democracy and a market economy and that it would eventually become a fully fledged member of the democratic community. The 160 billion USD was the cost of Ukraine’s signing the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU because of the potential reduction in its trade with Russia and the need to adapt Ukraine’s economy to EU standards, according to some Ukrainian officials. Compensations from the EU were being asked. Such figures were rapidly dismissed by the European Commission as totally unrealistic: “These figures lack any credibility and have neither been explained nor corroborated by any reliable evidence”2. The 160 billion USD represented 1

Speck, Ulrich, “Russia’s new challenge to Europe”, 2014, [http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/04/17/russia-s-new-challenge-to-europe/h8dy], 4 June 2014. 2 See the European Commission document Myths about the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Setting the facts straight, 2014,

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in fact the size of Ukraine’s GDP in 2010 and no state that has had to align to the EU acquis has ever been required to spend so much money. These huge figures that were most probably inspired by Russian “specialists” led the EU realise it was necessary and almost vital to react to the Russian propaganda which blamed the DCFTA and praised the benefits of Ukraine’s joining the Russian-led Customs Union. Therefore, an active public diplomacy endeavour started, centring its message on convincing the Ukrainian society that closer economic ties with the European Union would not entail costs, but a necessary investment in a democratic and prosperous future. Also, the EU better highlighted the support it was offering to Ukraine, so as to meet the conditions linked to the Association status. A look at the main arguments against the DCFTA and the respective EU counterarguments as outlined in the EC document “Myths about the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Setting the facts straight”3 may be useful, in order to fully understand the invisible information war that has been going on in Ukraine around its decision to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union. One allegation was related to the immediate economic difficulties Ukraine would face after the entry into force of the DCFTA. However, while the opening of the EU and Ukraine markets is expected to be reciprocal, this will not take place at the same time and transition periods have been granted to Ukraine to better prepare itself for the competition with European goods. On the other hand, the EU market will open completely and the Ukrainian economic agents that meet EU export regulations (e.g. safety conditions, phito-sanitary norms etc.) will be able to start bringing their goods to European consumers immediately. It is true, however, that Russia could retaliate and in fact it did, but the DCFTA is not to be blamed for that political choice. Another argument against the DCFTA was that signing it would prevent Ukraine from joining the Russia-Kazakstan-Belarus Customs Union. This is actually an example of reverse logic applied to Ukrainian economic relations: in fact, joining the Customs Union would imply the end of all the free trade areas Ukraine has with other partners, including the DCFTA. Keeping preferential economic relations both with the EU and the Customs Union would not go against signing a DCFTA, because Ukraine would still be able to conclude a free trade area agreement with the Customs Union. However, becoming a member of the Customs Union [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/january/tradoc_152074.pdf], 2014. 3 Ibidem.

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would mean, inter alia, a transfer of sovereignty to a supranational body which would regulate the Customs tariff policy of its members. And, as seen with the creation of the Russian-led Customs Union, what happens in fact is that smaller members have to align their tariff regimes to the Russian one, which is higher and, basically, this leads to increased trade protectionism. The pro-Russian media has also spread the rumour that once the DCFTA has been signed, Ukrainian companies will have to adapt to EU standards and this will negatively affect their exports to Russia, as well as their cooperation with Russian companies. Needless to say that there are already many Ukrainian companies trading both with the EU and Russia and neither these entities nor European companies have faced any problems due to EU standards and regulations. It was not hard to perceive behind these allegations the signs of future restrictive economic measures and bans operated by Moscow on political grounds. The concrete benefits of concluding a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area for the Ukrainian citizens were called into question, as well. And this came surprisingly against all evidence of the positive effects the Association Agreements have had on other Central and Eastern European countries. The European Commission used independent studies showing that: “the simple implementation of the agreement would bring benefits of +6% of additional GDP over the medium run and +12% in terms of increased welfare for the Ukrainian people”4.

A fear of EU goods flooding the Ukrainian market the day after the signing of the Association Agreement has been instilled by Russian propaganda. The text of the AA/ DCFTA to be signed by the EU and Ukraine has hundreds of pages, 15 Chapters, 14 annexes and 3 protocols, all of which make it unappealing to a reader who is not an expert. So it was not difficult to play the song of the “disadvantages of the DCFTA” and purposely overlook the asymmetrical and gradual openings of the two markets and the generous transitional periods for the most sensitive sectors of the Ukrainian economy which had been agreed on. For instance, the transitional period for the automotive sector granted to Ukraine is 15 years until full liberalisation of import tariffs, whereas the EU will abolish its respective tariff regime within 7 years5.

4 5

Ibidem. Ibidem.

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One last argument worth noticing was the misinformation that former Soviet bloc countries from Central and Eastern Europe had not benefited from closer economic links with the EU until they were granted candidate status. On the contrary, a close look at the figures shows that all countries had actually had very good economic trends (with regard to their GDP, export and investments) as a direct or indirect consequence of signing Free Trade Areas with the EU well before they became EU members6.

Ukraine’s economy in 2013 The reluctance of the Government in Kiev to pursue important economic reforms led to the impossibility to access international loans and brought a less encouraging economic perspective. A poor Gross Domestic Product, an increase in its current account deficit and an added 6,5% of GDP to its fiscal deficit characterised the Ukrainian economy in 2013. The 3 billion US dollars received by ex-President Ianukovich from Russian President V. Putin in December 2013 as a first tranche of a larger financial package to meet Ukraine’s debt servicing needs did not make much difference to an economy in need for in-depth structural reforms. World Bank Doing Business 2014 ranked Ukraine 112 out of 189 countries around the globe, making it the worst performer in the Eastern Partnership region with respect to its business climate. As for its energy dependence, Stratfor’s CEO George Friedman thinks that: “in an energy-hungry world, Russia’s energy exports are like heroin. It addicts countries once they start using it. Russia has already used its natural gas resources to force neighbouring countries to bend to its will”7.

Unfortunately, Ukraine can easily serve as a good example to this comparison.

Concrete EU support The total European financial support to Ukraine (loans, grants, technical assistance, and macroeconomic support) has reached over 6 billion euro since the first years of EU-Ukraine cooperation. 6

Ibidem. Friedman, George, „Ukraine and the 'Little Cold War'”, 2014, [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ukraine-and-little-cold-war#axzz355ygfPXH], 1 April 2014.

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In June 2014, Ukraine is expected to sign the economic chapters of the Association Agreement with the European Union, after it signed the political ones three months earlier. Some politicians, experts and observers see this step in EU-Ukraine relations from the viewpoint of compensation logic, as it would be difficult to imagine that under normal circumstances a state with so many problems like Ukraine would ever manage to obtain EU consensus on political association and economic integration. In March 2013, shortly after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, when the political provisions of the Association Agreement were signed, EC President JMD Barroso clearly stated8 that this was indeed part of the EU’s extended support to Ukraine. He added that the DCFTA would be signed after the Presidential elections due in May. Signing the DCFTA was envisaged to be followed immediately by its provisional applications until all the states (EU and Ukraine) ratified the Agreement. That would make the economic advantages available to the economic agents from Ukraine as of the following day. But the EU economic and financial support started much earlier than the current crisis, as Brussels and Kiev sought means to pave the way for the implementation of the Association Agreement. A quick look at the EUUkraine Association Agenda9 offers a large spectrum of areas in which cooperation and support were already under way before Ianukovich’s decision. Billions of euros had been earmarked for Ukraine under several financial instruments. After the Association Agreement negotiations between Brussels and Kiev had been launched in 2007, a financial envelope of almost 500 million euro was made available by the EU for the next three years, under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)10. The reform in the energy sector was also targeted by the EU in 2008-2010, through 22 million euro in financial support11. Between 2011 and 2013, the ENPI sums made available reached again almost half a billion euro12. In the same period and with a direct link to the preparations for the entry into force of the Deep and Comprehensive Free 8

European Commission President JMD Barrosos speaking the end of the European Council on 21 March 2014 (2014), [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH14-242_en.htm], 3 April 2014. 9 See the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda (2013), [http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/docs/eu_ukr_ass_agenda_24jun2013.pdf], 15 April 2014. 10 See the ENP Country Progress Report 2013- Ukraine (2014), [http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2014/country-reports/ukraine_en.pdf], 22 May 2014. 11 Ibidem. 12 Ibidem.

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Trade Area, Ukraine was provided with 470 million euro worth of aid from the European Union, under the National Indicative Programme.13 If we consider this financial support as also leveraging other international loans, we see that in a context of great economic and financial strains within the European Union, Ukraine still managed to secure a significant amount of money. Whether it also managed to access and actually use it is another matter, as much of the EU help came with conditions of reform on the Ukrainian side. Just like in the case of the pre-accession funds or that of the EU funds earmarked for each member state under the EU multiannual budget, the loans or grants are released under certain conditions related to adopting and implementing the necessary reforms: e.g. improving public finance management or tackling corruption. The absence of an Agreement between Ukraine and IMF because of insufficient reform progress prevented the former from receiving both IMF loans and large amounts of money from the European Union in 2012 and 2013. The EU’s financial and economic support became more visible, however, in the wake of the Eastern Partnership Summit in December 2013, when the negotiations between the EU and the Ukrainian Government to sign the Association Agreement failed. The EU’s support has been increasing since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine crisis. If before the EaP Summit, the focus of the Brussels-Kiev dialogue was mainly on the issue of selective justice and the independence of the judiciary14, the unfolding tensions between Russia and Ukraine made it clear that dark clouds would come over Ukraine, which would need to be heavily assisted by the international community and especially by the EU. Increasing the price of gas imported from Russia from 265 USD in the last days of the Ianukovich regime to 485 USD raised its cost to the highest level any European country pays to Gazprom. The dispute over the Ukrainian gas debt and the gas price, as well as the Crimean crisis, caused tremendous financial problems to Ukraine. The new prime-minister, A. Iatseniuk, found the State treasury empty in February 201415. Having a still widely unreformed economic sector, an investment climate in need of

13

Ibidem. See 10 Dec 2012 EU Foreign Affairs Conclusions on Ukraine, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/1341 36.pdf], 8 May 2014 15 Iatseniuk, Arseniy, the Ukrainian Prime-minister: “The state coffers are robbed and empty”, 2014, [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b6489e98-9fd1-11e3-9c6500144feab7de.html#axzz351JI8P00], 2 April 2014. 14

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improvement, widespread corruption16 and social inequity, Ukraine began once again to see the European choice as the only way out of its desperate situation. A whole range of economic measures were designed, adopted and implemented then by the EU to help stabilise the economic and financial situation in Ukraine, encourage EU-related reforms and promote inclusive development throughout the Ukrainian regions. Less than one month after the annexation of Crimea, the European Commission announced a financial package of approximately 11 billion euro17. 1 billion euro in medium-term loans took the form of macro-financial assistance. The aid from the EU was coordinated with the International Monetary Fund which at its turn offered a standby credit for Kiev of 10-13 billion euro. The IMF standby credit is expected to mobilise amounts up to 20 billion euro in the next two years.18 Severe conditions were attached to this support. They required the Government to deal with unpopular but necessary measures, like a 50% raise in the price of domestic gas, gradually eliminating energy subsidies in the next two years and accepting a flexible exchange rate 19. Areas such as public administration or the fight against corruption were financially covered by the European Union from a 355 million euro development assistance package also supporting justice reform, electoral legislation and constitutional reform. What marked, however, an unprecedented step forward in the relations between the EU and a partner country was the decision to temporarily remove customs duties on Ukrainian exports to the EU market. This measure actually furthered the implementation of the DCFTA tariff section before its signing, so that Ukrainian economic agents could be helped against a backdrop of growing challenges in their trade with Russia 16

Dunay, Pal, Dr., Director of Geneva Centre for Security Policy's International Training Course in Security Policy assessing the situation in Ukraine: “However, if everyone in Ukraine that was corrupt made deals that were not in the interest of the state or used political power for personal enrichment were behind bars, the country would now be obliged to build a brand-new political class from scratch. The state was hijacked and oligarchs used politicians as transmission belts until they could join the oligarchy themselves or via their families.”, 2014, [http://www.gcsp.ch/Leadership-Crisis-Conflict-Management/ProgrammeNews/Web-editorial-Ukraine-Misunderstood-by-Dr-Pal-Dunay], 6 April 2014. 17 See the Annex European Commission's support to Ukraine. 18 Euractiv.com, “IMF extends generous assistance to Ukraine”, 2013, [http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/imf-extends-generous-assistanceukraine-301186], 2 April 2014. 19 Ibidem.

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and granted preferential access to the EU market. The removal of customs duties by the European Union was unilateral and that is what made it unique. Kiev did not have to open its market to EU exports, but only to maintain its current tariff regime towards the European Union until the DCFTA comes into force or until November 2014. The opening of the EU market to Ukrainian exports will be total or partial, depending on the sector, and it will cover almost all Ukrainian industrial goods and all its agricultural exports. For a country like Ukraine, whose external trade with the European Union accounts for one third of its total external trade, this measure came not just as a form of support in a difficult period, but also as a strong incentive to carry on its EU path. The total economic benefit to Ukraine following this measure has been evaluated at around 500 million euro per year20. Since EU energy security is strongly dependent on the Ukrainian gas transit routes, this area received special attention from the European Commission and the EU member states, from the very beginning of the Ukraine-Russia crisis. A disruption of gas flows from Russia to Europe, as well as maintaining the stability and security in Ukraine, including through the diversification of gas suppliers, have been on the agenda of the Europeans, too. Despite inherent political, legal technical and economic obstacles, alternative ways to reroute the Russian gas imported by some EU member states towards Ukraine, still cheaper than the one imported directly, were found. When Ukraine and Slovakia reached an agreement for reverse gas flows at the end of April 2014, the EU Commissioner for Energy, G. Oettinger, underlined in his statement that this… “deal marks a milestone […]. Gas via Slovakia will bring a considerable addition to the volumes that Ukraine can already import from Hungary and Poland. Deliveries from EU member states offer Ukraine access to gas priced on the basis of fair and transparent principles”21.

It was clear from the start that such options could not satisfy all Ukrainian economic needs, but it was a strong political sign given by the EU to Ukraine and to Russia. Russian Gazprom reacted negatively at the beginning of the Slovakian-Ukrainian negotiations on reverse gas flows. The EU, which was brokering this deal, had to use its influence on Bratislava and Kiev to secure the agreement and, eventually, Russian 20

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-250_en.htm, 11 April 2014. See the European Commission Press Release Commission welcomes breakthrough leading to gas flows from Slovakia to Ukraine, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-487_en.htm], 29 May 2014.

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Foreign Minister S. Lavrov accepted the situation22. The fact was that Russia still had some good cards in her hand and it was not long until it decided to corner Ukraine by halting its gas exports that had not been paid in advance.

Conclusions The outline of the EU’s support might look impressive and, in fact, it is if we compare it to the aid other Eastern Partnership countries have received. Even if Ukraine is the biggest country in the Eastern partnership region, it is obvious that EU involvement has gone beyond considerations related to its size or population. In a time of crisis, the EU has stood by Ukraine in its efforts to avoid the default. Whether or not the EU has been using its full capacities, we may need more time to assess. There is no doubt, however, that Ukraine needs much more than what it has already been offered by the EU, the US23 and international financial institutions. But neither the EU nor the Association Agreement, with its economic benefits, could replace 20 years lost by Kiev in not reforming its economy. Further deep reforms are necessary and related social costs should be expected, too. What the EU, along with other international actors, could do is to help and guide the Ukrainian steps of reform. Former chief economist at the U.S. State Department Crebo-Rediker and former member of the Executive Board of the IMF Douglas Rediker consider that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has a significant role to play in Ukraine24. Through its unique feature stated in article one of its founding Charter, which links its lending operations to upholding the democratic values and market economy of the recipient country, the EBRD could step up its activities in Ukraine from now on. As to the resources needed, the two analysts point to Russia, which should stop receiving EBRD loans for obvious reasons. Since Russia accounts for 22

New York Times, “Russia Says No Complaints Over Slovakia's Reverse Gas Flows to Ukraine”, 2014, [http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2014/05/19/world/europe/19reuters-russiaukraine-slovakia-gas.html?ref=world&_r=0], 20 May 2014. 23 See the White House Document U.S. Crisis Support Package for Ukraine, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/21/fact-sheet-us-crisissupport-package-ukraine], 19 April 2014. 24 Crebo-Rediker, Heidi; Rediker, Douglas, “How to Reform Ukraine's Economy”, 2014, [http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/reform-ukraines-economy/p32702], 7 April 2014.

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nearly one quarter of the EBRD’s lending and investment portfolio, large sums of money could be shifted in the future to Ukraine. If at the end of 2013, some politicians and analysts in Ukraine could still see as positive the idea of joining the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union, the annexation of Crimea by Russia in early 2013 left no doubts about the real “benefits” of Russia’s embrace. Furthermore, Iana Dreyer and Nicu Popescu, from the EU Institute for Security Studies, do not place their bets on the long term economic benefits the Customs Union/ Eurasian Union will bring to its members25. Russia clearly dominates the other members as it accounts for 86% of the group’s GDP and 84% of its population. Beside these factors, the insufficiently developed Russian economy adds to the fact that the member states’ economies are not complementary, so conflicts and tensions stemming from the transfer of wealth to the centre-pole could be expected. In conclusion, Ukraine’s situation is not bright at the moment, especially in the context of the Crimean crisis, the violence and tensions in its Eastern regions, as well as its dispute with Russia over gas imports. When writing this article, there are only few signs of genuine Russian commitment to stop destabilising Ukraine. We hear mostly nice words which have been heard before, too. The Ukraine-Russia crisis has been internationalised and is placed today at the centre of the West-Russia talks, so Ukraine is not alone in its struggle for avoiding a possible dismantling of the country. What colour Ukraine’s future will have is too early to say. However, what could be regarded as possibly the single positive aspect in this entire gloomy picture is that, for certain, Ukraine has ceased to play its dual East-West geostrategic game. Ukraine’s economic and security options could no longer be others than the European Union and the West. It will certainly be a long and rocky way for Ukraine to reach the level of internal development of EU member states, but there seems to be no alternative if it wants a democratic, secure and prosperous future in the long run.

25

Dreyer, Iana; Popescu, Nicu, “The Eurasian Customs Union: The economics and the politics”, 2014, [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_11_Eurasian_Union.pdf], 2 June 2014.

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Annex – European Commission Memo – “European Commission's support to Ukraine”, 5 March 2014 This document sets out the main concrete measures that the Commission is proposing for the short and medium term to help stabilise the economic and financial situation in Ukraine, assist with the transition, encourage political and economic reforms and support inclusive development for the benefit of all Ukrainians. These measures combined could bring overall support of at least €11 billion over the coming years from the EU budget and EU based international financial institutions (IFIs) in addition to the significant funding being provided by the IMF and World Bank. All these measures should be seen as the Commission's contribution to a European and international effort at providing a sustainable way out of Ukraine's difficult economic situation and to support its economic and political transition. The action of Member States in complementing and reinforcing what the Commission can mobilise on its own is crucial. The participation of partner countries as well as of the international financial institutions, notably the IMF, the EIB, the EBRD and the World Bank, is essential to leverage what we can all offer, increase the visibility of our collective action and improve its impact. All elements and instruments need to be pulled together to ensure an effective and coherent European Union and international response. Part of the EU's effort is to support Ukraine on its path towards political and economic reform, including those set out in the Association Agreement /Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), which we stand ready to sign. It is essential to raise public awareness in Ukraine as well as in third countries on the benefits and opportunities that such reforms can offer both for Ukraine and the region as a whole. Key elements of the package: x €3 billion from the EU budget in the coming years, €1.6 billion in macro financial assistance loans (MFA) and an assistance package of grants of €1.4 billion; x Up to €8 billion from the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; x Potential €3.5 billion leveraged through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility; x Setting up of a donor coordination platform;

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x Provisional application of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area when Association Agreement is signed and, if need be, by autonomous frontloading of trade measures; x Organisation of a High Level Investment Forum/Task Force; x Modernisation of the Ukraine Gas Transit System and work on reverse flows, notably via Slovakia; x Acceleration of Visa Liberalisation Action Plan within the established framework; Offer of a Mobility Partnership; x Technical assistance on a number of areas from constitutional to judicial reform and preparation of elections.

Economic and Financial Assistance Economic support takes the form of both macro financial and development assistance. The Commission is ready to mobilise some €3 billion from the EU budget in the coming years with the undertaking that a substantial amount of money can be made rapidly available to help Ukraine address its more urgent needs, including stabilising the financial situation and supporting the functioning of the new administration. Macro-Financial Assistance: A total of €1.6 billion is foreseen for macro financial assistance (MFA). In the short term, the Commission is ready to mobilise €610 million in loans under MFA which has already been agreed but is conditional on the signature of an agreement between the government and the IMF. The Commission is willing to propose further MFA of up to €1 billion. The Commission has already deployed a mission on the ground to assess Ukraine's financial needs and to prepare the ground for such MFA. This team is working closely with the IMF. Development assistance: Over the next seven years, a development assistance package to Ukraine in the form of grants could amount to a minimum of €1.4 billion. The Commission is currently preparing a new €140 million programme for 2014 that would aim at improving the financial capability of the government and support the institutional transition, thus reinforcing the foreseen impact of the MFA. This would be complemented by actions aimed at supporting civil society. The size of such a programme could be increased up to €200 million if there were to be redeployment from within the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and if Ukraine were to benefit from the umbrella programme ("more for more") on the basis of proven progress in deepening democracy and respect of human rights.

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For the remaining period of 2015-2020, a yearly bilateral envelope of approximately €130 million is currently foreseen as part of the ENI with an additional €40-50 million per year from the afore-mentioned umbrella programme ("more-for-more") subject to proven progress in deepening democracy and respect of human rights and further significant funding from the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) described below. As far as existing programmes are concerned, the Commission is currently funding a number of on-going sector budget support and technical assistance programmes which will provide input to the new Government in key areas such as economic development, public financial management and justice. This represents approximately €400 million. In addition, the NIF will be mobilised in favour of bankable investment projects in Ukraine. Experience with the implementation of the NIF in the East over the past programming period has shown that, for an amount of €200-250 million of grants foreseen for Ukraine for blending, one could expect a leverage effect that would generate loans of up to €3.5 billion. The participation of International Financing Institutions (IFIs) will be crucial to allow this leveraging and to exploit its full potential. Within the NIF framework, the Commission is now working on the possibility of setting up a dedicated window to support the implementation of the AA/DCFTA for the relevant countries. This would allow our partners to have access to a guaranteed and dedicated envelope to support investment in sectors crucial for modernisation and the adoption of EU standards (in areas such as environment and energy). We are also looking at using this facility to further leverage the investment opportunities in the private sector. The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), formerly the Instrument for Stability, could be deployed to target urgent actions, for example, on police reform and electoral support. Up to €20 million could be mobilised quickly if appropriate actions are identified and a further €15 million could be added from the CFSP budget to support measures in relation to security sector reform. Finally, Ukraine is the most important country for the EU for operations in the area of nuclear safety and security. Currently, projects are being implemented under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation for a total amount of €50 million, in the field of nuclear waste management and social projects in the affected area around the Chernobyl exclusion zone. In addition, a further envelope of €36.5 million can be contracted in the very short term for actions in this field.

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The programming period for the new financial period is on-going, which will allow the EU efforts in this area to be further stepped up. The Commission reiterates its readiness to establish an EU Trust Fund should Member States support such an initiative. This would create a vehicle that would allow Member States to make substantial further financial contributions and would increase the visibility of the EU, including its Member States, and contribute to an effective, swift and coordinated disbursement of funds. The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the EU's own policy-driven bank and already has a project pipeline in Ukraine of up to €1.5 billion for the next three years. The EIB could significantly scale this up, without diverting from other regions, if adequate guarantee provisions were to be granted and if the political and operational conditions allow. The EIB could then provide financing for long-term investments of up to €3 billion for 2014 – 2016 in support of both the local private sector and economic and social infrastructure. After the Mid-Term Review of the EIB External Lending Mandate planned by end 2016, the EIB could further increase its activity until 2020 via the activation of the €3 billion optional mandate already foreseen, subject to the agreement of additional funding by the budgetary authority. In its operations, the EIB works closely together with the other IFIs active in the region thereby contributing to a significant leverage effect. The Commission will also explore the opportunity for ring fencing and front loading some of the additional guarantees for the EIB funds secured with the FEMIP reflows for AA/DCFTA related lending. For its part, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is an IFI in which the EU and its Member States account for a majority of the shareholding. As part of a coordinated financial assistance programme in support of credible structural and macroeconomic reforms, the EBRD could make €5 billion available over the same period, though that amount could be exceeded if economic circumstances permit. INTERNATIONAL DONOR CO-ORDINATION MECHANISM: The Commission remains in close contact with both the IMF and the World Bank on the ground in Ukraine and at Headquarters. In order to help ensure effective delivery and maximise the impact of the EU economic and development assistance described above, as well as heighten its visibility, the Commission is exploring avenues to enhance international donor coordination by setting up, together with the international community and IFIs, an ad hoc donor coordination mechanism. Such a mechanism could take work forward on the basis of a needs assessment and of the reform programme prepared by the Ukrainian

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authorities, and provide a sustainable way out of Ukraine’s difficult economic situation supporting economic and political transition. This donor coordination mechanism could take the form of an international platform based in Kiev which would meet regularly to closely coordinate donor efforts to address the economic situation of the country. The political guidance will be provided by high level coordination meetings of the international platform. The Commission is willing to host the meetings in Brussels. This mechanism is open to the participation, namely, of EU Member States, IMF, World Bank, EBRD, EIB, and interested third countries. EU participation would be led on the ground by the EU Delegation.

Trade and Investment While economic and financial assistance are essential, trade and investment are also key instruments in helping secure long term sustainability for Ukraine. All Ukrainians stand to benefit enormously from the ambitious DCFTA trade deal with the EU. For example, Ukrainian exporters will save almost half a billion euros annually due to reduced EU import duties; Ukrainian agriculture will benefit from cuts in duties on agricultural and processed agricultural products of almost €400 million. The different levels of economic development of the EU and Ukraine are reflected by the asymmetrical nature of the Agreement. It is designed to provide Ukraine with favourable treatment, for example, through the faster and broader opening of the EU market by the front loading of tariff dismantlement granted by the EU combined with a longer period for similar measures on the Ukrainian side. The Commission stands ready to react quickly to ensure the rapid provisional application of the AA/DCFTA once a decision on its signature has been made. In the meantime, the Commission is ready to offer the early application of those provisions of the agreement related to the imports of goods (i.e. the reduction of tariffs and opening of tariff rate quotas) by proposing a draft Council/Parliament Regulation on such so called 'autonomous trade measures'. These transitional trade measures, unilateral in nature from the EU side, would allow Ukraine to benefit substantially from many of the advantages offered by the Agreement already now, that is to say, in the period until it could be signed and provisionally applied. However, the rapid implementation of such support measures would require a clear commitment by the Council and the EP to fast track the approval process.

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As part of the effort to mobilise all of its assets and instruments in support of Ukraine at this exceptional time, the High Representative and the Commission are also ready to convene a High level Investment Forum/Task Force to explore investment and co-operation possibilities in Ukraine. This should bring together a wide range of private and public economic actors, Ukrainian and EU and IFIs together with the host country to maximise their collective impact and ensure a sustainable, democratic and prosperous future for the people of Ukraine. Such an event would also provide an opportunity to help Ukraine to maximise the benefits of autonomous trade measures and the AA/DCFTA.

Energy and Transport Energy and energy security, and affordable prices, are essential for the stability and security of Ukraine. The EU will work with the new government in Ukraine, including through budget support, to ensure long term diversification of supplies and to make sure that the Ukrainian gas transmission system continues to be an essential transit route for gas supplies to the Europe. As such, the Commission will continue to work with the government in Ukraine to modernise its gas transmission system in co-operation with the EIB, EBRD and World Bank, as gas sector reforms in line with the Energy Community commitments are carried out. Provided that certain conditions are fulfilled, an initial loan could be possible in the near future. In the short term, the Commission is ready to assist Ukraine in diversifying its gas supply routes, notably by ensuring that reverse flows with the EU, notably via Slovakia (in addition to Poland and Hungary as is currently the case), can be operationalised as soon as possible. The Commission should ensure, together with Slovakia, that the Ukrainian and Slovakian transmission system operators establish the necessary rules and process that allows gas to flow from EU to Ukraine in increased capacities in order to enhance the security of supply in Ukraine. The text of a Memorandum of Understanding between the transmission system operators of Slovakia and Ukraine for the physical reverse flow via the Ukraine-Slovak pipeline was brokered by the Commission in December 2013 but was not signed. The Commission is ready to facilitate the signature by the two operators if requested. The Commission remains committed to continue working with the relevant Member States to facilitate the creation of additional reverse flow corridors to Ukraine via Bulgaria and Romania and via Croatia and Hungary.

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Ukraine at an Economic Crossroads

In the medium term, should circumstances allow, the Commission continues to be ready to promote a trilateral approach (between EU, Russia and Ukraine) for the modernisation of the Ukrainian gas transmission system. With regard to transport, following the initialling of the EU-Ukraine Common Aviation Area Agreement at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, the Commission is advancing rapidly in preparatory work to allow the Council to take a decision on the signature of the Agreement and stands ready for its early implementation. The Commission is determined to continue working on the enhancement of the EU-Ukraine transport relations, in particular in the framework of the Eastern Partnership Transport Panel. […] Support to Ukraine: Indicative Assistance Package Source I. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014-2020) I.1 Overall development assistance (grants) Bilateral envelope, where: - Annual Action Programme (AAP) for 2014 - AAPs (average) - for 2015-2020 - Umbrella programme (“more for more”) for 2015-2020 Neighbourhood Investment Facility Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) CFSP I.2 Macro financial assistance (loans)

Indicative amounts / ranges (in € million)

1,565

140-200 780 240-300 200-250 20 15 1,610

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I.2 EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EIB EBRD

up to 3,000 5,000

GRAND TOTAL

11,175

Source: European Commission website [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ MEMO-14-159_en.htm], 7 June 2014.Bibliography Books 1. Friedman, George, The Next 100 Years, Anchor Books, 2009. 2. Naumescu, Valentin, (Ed.), Democracy and Security in the 21st Century: Perspectives on a Changing World, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014. 3. Popescu, Nicu, EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts. Stealth intervention. New York: Routledge Publ., 2011. Articles in journals 1. Crebo-Rediker, Heidi and Rediker, Douglas, “How to reform Ukraine’s economy”, Council on Foreign Relations – Op-Ed, April 2014, www.cfr.org, consulted on 7 April 2014. 2. Dreyer, Iana and Popescu, Nicu, “The Eurasian Customs Union: The economics and the politics”, European Union Institute for Security Studies Brief, www.isss.europa.eu, consulted on 2 June 2014. 3. Dunay, Pál, “Ukraine: Misunderstood?”, Geneva Centre for Security Policy – Web editorial, www.gcsp.ch, consulted on 6 April 2014. 4. Kahn, Robert; Tananbaum, Steven A., “Global Economics Monthly: April 2014. The Sanctions Dilemma”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/economics/global-economics-monthly-april-2014/p32699, consulted on 15 May 2014. 5. Socor, Vladimir, “The Question of Political Power in Ukraine’s East”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 11. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42372&no_ca che=1, consulted on 1 June 2014. 6. Speck, Ulrich, “Russia’s new challenge to Europe”, Carnegie Europe – Article, April 2014, www.carnegieeurope.eu, consulted in April 2014. Websites 1. European Commission. 2014. “Myths about the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Setting the facts straight”. Accessed on 1 June 2014. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/january/tradoc_152074.pdf 2. European Commission Press Release. 2014. “Commission welcomes breakthrough leading to gas flows from Slovakia to Ukraine”. Accessed on 29 May 2014. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-487_en.htm

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3. European External Action Service. 2014. “EU-Ukraine Association Agenda”. Accessed on 15 April 2014. http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/docs/eu_ukr_ass_agenda_24jun2013.pdf 4. European External Action Service. 2014. “Country Progress Report on implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Ukraine (2013)”. Accessed on 22 May 2014. http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2014/countryreports/ukraine_en.pdf 5. 2012. “3209th EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting – Conclusions on Ukraine”. Accessed on 8 May 2014. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/13 4136.pdf 6. 2014. “Remarks of the European Commission President JMD Barroso at the end of the European Council on 21 March 2014”. Accessed on 3 April 2014. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-242_en.htm 7. 2014. White House. “U.S. Crisis Support Package for Ukraine”. Accessed on 19 April 2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/21/factsheet-us-crisis-support-package-ukraine

POLITICAL DISCOURSES, SEARCH FOR IDENTITY AND NATIONAL IMAGINATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA VINCENT HENRY AND SERGIU MI‫܇‬COIU

Abstract Stuck between Russia and the European Union, the Republic of Moldova is a young state arisen from the collapse of the USSR. Its recent history is marked by a chaotic transition aggravated by a deep identity crisis. This crisis has divided the society and the political scene of the country since its independence and has almost become indicative of this fragile Republic. The frequent analysis of the evolution of this society reveals it is unfortunately often subjected to the same divisions. In order to analyse more objectively the evolution of the identity construction of Moldova, we have chosen to use tools offered by the discourse theory, so as to decrypt the contents of the speeches of its highest-ranking dignitaries over the last 25 years. Keywords: Moldova, discourse theory, Moldovan politics, national identity, nation building, European integration.

Introduction: Discourse Theory and Moldovan Politics The shakings that took place in the seventies within the scientific community allowed the emergence of the postmodern and of the poststructuralist approaches. Discourse theory belongs to the family of these alternative approaches, meaning that it contributed, in successive stages, to the dismantlement of the great convictions held by the preexisting scientific framework.

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If the starting point of discourse theory was the work of Michel Foucault1 and Jacques Derrida2, literature discusses about the existence of three generations of this school of thought. The first two generations were rather tributary to the genuine visions and concentrated on the linguistic and semantic aspects of discourse, in a narrow sense.3 On a contrary, prompted by the weakening of the classical ideologies after the end of the Cold War, the approach of the third generation has been intimately related with the apprehension of politics. Two of the most salient representatives of this generation, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe4, have concentrated on the study of the discursive representation of the power relations, mainly on the constitution, confrontation, destruction and restructuring of the dominant networks of power through the dynamics of the discursive placements, displacements and replacements. Grosso modo, discourse theory is based on an anti-essentialist ontology and anti-foundationalist epistemology.5 In the first place, the adepts of discourse theory consider that there is no pre-existing and self-determining essence of the world. Religion, capitalism, class struggle, rationality or, more recently, the global warming theory are as many false essences that pretend to offer a final explanation of mankind destiny. Following Foucault and Lyotard, the discourse theorists see behind the efforts deployed to achieve a unique and final representation of the world the desire to establish a political hegemony. The purpose of discourse theory is to search for the deepest consequences of the absence of a Centre capable to structure and to manage the world.

1 For a synthesis of Foucault’s view on discourse, see Michel Foucault, “L’Ordre du Discours” in Michel Foucault, Philosophie. Anthologie, (Anthologie établie et présentée par Arnold I. Davidson et Frédéric Gros), Paris: Gallimard, 1999, pp. 6179. 2 Jacques Derrida, L’écriture et la différence, Paris: Seuil, 1967, especially the chapter « L’écriture, le signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines », pp. 409-428. 3 Norman Fairclough, the founder of Critical Discourse Analysis, is one of the most salient representatives of the second generation. His main concern was related to the approach of the linguistic techniques used by speakers in their efforts to impose a certain conclusion if the contradictory debates. See Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, London, Longman: 1995. 4 See, especially, Ernesto Laclau, Grammaire de l’émancipation, Paris: La Découverte, 2000 and Chantal Mouffe (ed.), Deconstruction and Pragmatism, New York: Routledge, 1996. 5 See David Howarth, Jacob Torfing (ed.), Discourse Theory in European Politics. Identity, Policy and Governance, Palgrave: Macmillan, 2005, p. 13.

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Secondly, the epistemology of discourse theory is rather relativist. Its starting point seems to be Richard Rorty’s idea according to which the existence of reality does not guarantee the existence of truth.6 Truth seems to be conditioned by a truth regime, which, as Foucault put it, is coextensive with power itself. The claim of an absolute truth has to be abandoned once and for all. Discourse theorists show that truth is elastic and ephemeral and depends of the truth regime that holds the rules for assessing the truth claim of a certain sentence. That is why we cannot have the necessary means to declare that a statement is true per se, but we can only have the possibility to measure its alleged truth consistency in relation to a certain context and to our own perception of the outer world. For discourse theorists, the application of these two premises necessarily results into a polymorphous system of relations, within which the identities of the actors are always established via interaction. Thus, identity construction through the discursively analyzable social interactions becomes the essential object of discourse theorists. The central idea of discourse theory is that identity is constituted by subject’s selfdetermination in relation to its non-identities, or, in other words, to the identities of the others. This operation is quasi-discursive, meaning that we produce (and we consciously or unconsciously reproduce) descriptions and analyses which allow us to identify ourselves in relation to the outer world. This way, discourse is both the creator and the alterator of identity, as, through the mechanisms of representation, it invisibly and temporarily establishes the social positions and places occupied by individuals and groups. The domain of politics is the first to be concerned by this discursive constraint, as its way of functioning is based on the permanent negotiation of the principles of government. Discourse theorists have been trying to apply their hypotheses in various fields of political science and politics. However, it seems that they succeeded only in a limited area of subfields, including the study of identity politics. The reasons of this explicative predilection of discourse theory for identity politics are numerous. In the first place, the resurgence of the nationalist, populist and more generally extremist political groups coincided with the emergence of the third generation of discourse – at the beginning of the 1990s. Then, discourse theory looks for explanations that are exterior to the area of the mechanic determinations of the social world, whereas the most of the analyses based on social determinism have failed to offer a satisfactory 6

See Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge: University Press, 1989.

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explanation for the emergence, the evolution and the decay of identitybased groups and movements. And, finally, discourse theory was able to include and to make understandable the multidimensional aspects of identity and nationalism, by combining linguistic and semantic approaches, insights from social psychology and from behaviourist sociology and methods inspired from political anthropology.7 In our case, by applying discourse theory to the study of identity emergence in Moldova, we will follow the way in which the new Moldovan identity has been built through discursive representation. Without any doubt, the main promoters of identity building (and at the same time the first to legitimate their positions through identity building) have been the heads of states, all over post-communist ex-soviet area. Therefore, we will concentrate on the way identity building was discursively imagined and accomplished, in different and in some cases opposing phases, by the heads of state of the Republic of Moldova. With the approach described above, we propose to analyze the speeches of the highest dignitaries of the Republic of Moldova following its independence on August 27, 1991.We will try to highlight the terms and phrases used to define, to name the people and the country whose leaders are in charge and have the liberty and capacity to outline a political project for the country. We will see that the evolution of these discourses and terms used, beyond personalities and political orientations, being either real or circumstantial, thus accompanies the evolution of the dominant political representations along the different historical and social stages of the Moldovan transition. We will also witness a certain degree of professionalization in the realm of political communication. We have roughly divided the Moldovan transition period in three (four) large epochs which seem to correspond to four different discursive phases.

The March towards Independence "Compared to the other republics of the Union, the MSSR was one of the most quiet and peaceful ones in terms of manifesting national sentiments. In Moldova, the friendship between peoples was blooming, and the local people, they did not know what nationalism meant."8

7

An example of the discursive approach of radical politics is Ernesto Laclau’s, On Populist Reason, London: Verso, 1997. 8 In Timpul, the September 21, 2001, cited in Un État en quête de nation by Cazacu et Trifon. Paris. Edition Non Lieu.2010.

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This was the statement made in 2001 by the KGB officer in charge of Chiúinău between 1979 and 1989, Gavril Volkov, in order to evoke the calm of the situation and the degree of attachment of the Moldovan SSR to the Soviet “ensemble” until the last years of the USSR. Yet, between 1987 and 1991, the year of the independence, a profound movement of national awakening will gain ground, being crystallized particularly around the issue of language. In 1988, Moldovan writers and reformist intellectuals gather in a Moldovan Democracy Movement the stated purpose of which is to support the development of perestroika. More specifically, a claim emerges very clearly: Moldova's democratic movement seeks the recognition of the Moldovan language to have the same status as that of the Russian language, alongside the right to use the Latin alphabet. Meanwhile, another movement is taking place; the Cenacle Mateevici organizes discussion meetings on the social changes affecting the Union and on issues related to national identity. These meetings are quickly becoming highly popular and gain a large number of attendees, attracting also a large number of students. Initially organized in the apartments of the members of the Cenacle, they are slowly beginning to unfold in a public place, as a rule, quite symbolically, before the bust of the Romanian national poet Mihail Eminescu. The young magazine Literatura úi arta becomes the voice of this effervescent movement. Within months, the influence of these movements kindled from the midst of intellectuals and academics is considerably growing. Using the voice of its secretary-general, Semion Grossu, the Moldovan Communist Party denounces what it considers to be "irresponsible nationalist" movements. The awakening of the national and identity consciousness is carried out by some prominent figures such as writers Grigore Vieru, Leonida Lari, Anatol Salaru or singers Doina and Ion Aldea-Teodorovici. The national ideal that is forming around them is characterized by its romanticism. The country and its culture are mythologized, perceived as ideals to be achieved. Romania is a promised land that can only be entered by rediscovering a lost identity. Grigore Vieru, following his first and only trip to Romania during the Soviet era, wrote in his notes: "If some people’s dream has been or is to travel into outer-space, the dream of my entire life has always been to cross the Prut." Since 1989, the claims of the Cenacle Mateevici and those of the Moldovan democracy movement take a more explicit political turn. Thousands of people demonstrated on several occasions in the early

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months of the year, chanting "Down with colonialism", "Language, alphabet" and "Down with the Communists".9 On May 20, the different branches and organizations of the movement unite and take the name of the Popular Front of Moldova. Since the multyparty system at the time was still banned, the movement is recognized as a public organization. The Popular Front of Moldova (FPM) is conceived in the beginning as a multiethnic movement eager to support the democratization of society, taking as example the groups operating in the Baltic Republics. Therefore, in the first months of its existence, the congress of the organization allows members of different ethnic communities living in Moldova to join them. This multi-ethnic character will not last, because of the claims that are more and more openly proRomanian, which in turn will make other nationalities to also create movements on an ethnical, cultural and linguistic basis; Edinstvo10 for Russians and Gök-O÷uz Halki for the Gagauz11. The first big success of the Popular Front of Moldova is the organization on August 27 of a massive demonstration of 300.000 people in the center of Chiúinău. The participants of this manifestation claim the passing of a law recognizing the Moldovan as the state language and the right to use the Latin alphabet for writing. On August 31, the Supreme Soviet of Moldova, yielded to the claim, passing a law that recognizes the Moldovan language written with Latin characters as the state language and the Russian as the second language of interethnic communication and as the language of communication with the Soviet authorities. The similarity between the Moldovan and the Romanian languages is also recognized. Even today, on August 31st "the day of language" is celebrated in Moldova. On February 25, 1990, the first democratic elections to the Supreme Soviet of the MSSR consecrate the Popular Front, which now became a political party. Its candidates won 27% of the votes, while in the subsequent weeks several communist MPs joined the FPM. In April a new national flag is adopted, it is a tricolor; yellow, blue and red like the colors of the neighboring country Romania. On May 6, 1990 a highly symbolic event took place, organized by the association Bucharest-Chiúinău and known under the name of the "Bridge of Flowers": The borders of Soviet Moldova are opened to Romanians, themselves recently freed from under the Ceausescu regime for a few hours and for the first time since the war. Tens of thousands of Romanians 9

Especially on the 12th of March Unity in russian. 11 The Gagauz people in Turkish language. 10

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enter in Moldova by the eight open border posts to meet their Moldovan "brothers". In the spring of 1990, following multiple transfers of members of the Communist Party to the Popular Front, the latter finds itself to be in the majority on the Supreme Soviet. On May 25, an influential member of the FPM is appointed Prime Minister of the MSSR, while on September 3 Mircea Snegur - then Secretary General of the Supreme Soviet - was elected the President of the Republic of Moldova. The attitude of defiance towards the Union was continuing to grow. The Moldovan Parliament rejects the Treaty of Union envisaged by Moscow, the name of the republic is modified and loses the epithets of Soviet and Socialist, all the Moldovan deputies retire from the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies, with one single exception. In February 1991, the Moldovan Parliament refuses to organize a referendum for whether or not to remain in the Soviet Union. On August 27, after the failed coup against Gorbachev, the independence of the Republic of Moldova was proclaimed.

Nationalist Rhetoric and Historical Romanticism An analysis of a speech of Mircea Druc, delivered in front of the Romanian Parliament on November 28, 1991, allows us to trace the atmosphere of nationalist romanticism that accompanies the birth of the young republic and clearly explains the objective of the majority of the FPM members, namely union with Romania. The rhetoric of Mircea Druc in this speech corresponds to an organic nationalism that could be defined by a romantic and unconditional attachment to an ancestral land with which the Moldovans should be reunited. The inhabitant of Moldova is described as an unfortunate being, who lost his country, a man without a country, living among strangers. We will thus find throughout the speech a series of references to the land, to ancestors and a series of organic metaphors, in the proper sense of the word, that make the Romanian nation a body waiting to be pieced together again.12 Therefore, we have chosen to locate in the discourse of Mircea Druc the metaphors he uses to describe the country in order to highlight the very emotional and very carnal attachment he expresses. It is this metaphor of the flesh that we find also in another series of metaphors,

12

See: http://www.rgnpress.ro/rgn_11/politic/3932-un-discurs-cat-o-istoriemircea-druc-acum-20-de-ani-in-parlamentul-romaniei-reunirea-alt-soluie-nuexistq.html

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is that which refers to separation, the fact that the Romanian territory is split in two, is amputated. For Mircea Druc, this situation must be remedied; the different ways of expressing this goal is enumerated in the column "goal" in which we will not see any another goal except reunification. Finally, to explain this need we will find in the "expression of need" column the reasons why the reunification is essential. We find again here the use of metaphors which play on emotions and a notion of natural inevitability which is based on both biological and religious metaphors. The phrase defining homeland

Goal

Expression of the need

Metaphors of separation

Romanian land

Reunion 5 occurences

All the nations gather

Crippled men

Ancestral territorie

RReconstitution seeking their 5 occurences roots

our God-given land

We want the Self-preservation Amputated leg reconstruction of instinct the country.

Our house

Reconstruction of the country

Ancestral hearth

Amputation syndrome

There is no other Stolen ancestral solution lands This is the will of God

Through the parliamentarians whom they address, it is the whole Romanian nation that Mircea Druc wants to convince about this great design, about this absolute necessity of the union between Moldova and Romania. We isolated the subjects of Mircea Druc’s discourse to highlight the identification that he makes between a first person singular "I" and a "we", in which the entire “Romanian nation” is included. All messianic discourses must set a goal but they also need to explain the way forward, the obstacles that need to be overcome and the enemies that need to be defeated. We have again highlighted these three elements. It should be noted that the speech delivered two types of obstacles and enemies. The hardest thing to overcome is a near enemy because it is the Romanians themselves, or at least a certain type of Romanians. External barriers are considered less important. However, Druc also takes into account the consequences of a failure. This gives him the opportunity to use an entire

Vincent Henry and Sergiu Miúcoiu Speaking subject / topic struggling

Main opponents / main obstacles

I

The Foreign pathological occupation fear inside the bones of Romanians

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Real What to do to What would secondary achieve its happen in obstacles goal case of failure or obstacles assumed of the opponents who are listed against Combat

a new Northern Ireland

A decisive combat

A new Lebanon

Us Romanians Those who believers want to be masters of a sheepfold and three counties

A test

A new Cyprus

Mircea Druc, the son of simple Romanian peasants

The elites of Bucharest

A natural selection

“Libanization”

Confident Romanians

A certain type of Romanians who complain incessantly

Psychotherapy to alleviate the traum

Moldovan shepherd Mioritic Romanians (reference to the ballad MioriĠa)

Endless suffering

Us Romanians Foreigners and timorous Romanians

Égocentrism and politicianism

Moscova, the West, Kiev, Budapest

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new set of medical metaphors, but also to make worrisome comparisons with other similarly judged geopolitical situations. Since the nonreunification was an opposition to the supreme will of the people and, ultimately, to God, it would have consequences that would take on apocalyptic dimensions.

A Time of Separation The rise of Moldovan nationalism in the late ‘80s, or even the fear of reunification with Romania advocated by some of the members of the Popular Front of Moldova gave rise also to the fear of many citizens of Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian minorities of finding themselves strangers in their own country. In February 1991, a referendum to maintain the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova in the Soviet Union is boycotted by the Moldovan Parliament, still, it is nevertheless organized in two regions; Transnistria and the land that would eventually become Gagauzia. In both regions, voters reaffirm their commitment to the USSR. Regrouped in about fifteen communes in the southern part of the Republic, the Gagauz people are a Turkic-speaking people, but of Christian Orthodox religion. Largely russified from the cultural point of view, they still speak, alongside Russian, a language close to Turkish, but marked by Russian Romanian and Bulgarian lexical inputs. The Gagauz population is deeply intertwined with the Bulgarian minority, 160,000 people (82.5% of the Gagauz people) have more or less become united in their relative positioning to the majority population. In August 1991, the Republic of Moldova declares its independence, the representative of the community, Stepan Topal, and the “Assembly of the Gagauz rural soviets” also proclaim their own independence. The situation is complicated: The ex-Soviet leaders have abandoned the idea of maintaining the USSR. Tensions with the Moldovan authorities are quite strong as a result of this unilateral proclamation. Being isolated and representing only a few rural communities in the south, it has only a few economic assets outside its tobacco production. It will move swiftly on to choosing a status of autonomy within Moldova. This status will be endorsed by the Parliament in December 1994 by the new Constitution. The city of Comrat and its 75,000 inhabitants will become the capital of the autonomous region. The reaction of the majority of the inhabitants of Transnistria will have an entirely different impact on the future of the new Moldovan republic.

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The Transnistrian Conflict From the late ‘80s, there were some slogans hostile not only to the Soviet Union, but also against Russia and against the Russian-speaking minority in Moldova13. Distrust is created between communities but also between the two shores of the Dniester, since the population of Transnistria is composed mostly of Russian speakers14. On September 2, 1990, Transnistria votes to separate from Moldova and announces that it will continue its existence in the USSR as the "Moldovan Dniester Republic." Igor Smirnov15 is appointed president. Sporadic incidents broke out between Moldovan police and inhabitants of Transnistria, and the first militias were formed. On March 17, 1991, the referendum on the future of the USSR, organized in Transnistria, led to a massive vote in favor of maintaining the Union. In response to the proclamation of independence of Moldova, a new referendum was held in December 1991 in Transnistria, at which point the population was in favor of a permanent separation from the new Republic of Moldova. The violent incidents multiplied between Moldovan police and Transnistrian residents who received the reinforcement of "Cossack" volunteers who came from Ukraine or Russia. Withdrawing much of the XIVth Russian Army until MSSR based stops also in Transnistria, they settled down in Tiraspol and Bender16, on the other shore of the river. In 1992, the situation quickly escalated. In March, Moldova, who has just been recognized by the UN, organizes its government and raises its troops. At the highest point of the conflict, it will align over 30 000 men, a diverse band of soldiers, reservists, policemen, Moldovan but as well Romanian volunteers, at this point the conflict waking feverish nationalism in both countries. On the other side of the river, Transnistria relies on 14 000 professional soldiers of the Fourteenth Army, many of whom are from the region from which nearly 9 000 volunteers from Russia and Ukraine came to their aid. In spring the tensions were intensifying scattered with occasional clashes but increasingly violent until the summer of 1992. During the summer, the young Moldovan military faces the Fourteenth Army and is met with a

13

e.g; the most well-known was «The luggage, the train-station, Russia». i.e: Ukrainans and Russians aproximately 55% of the population. 15 Igor Smirnov is the leader of the trade union OSTK. 16 Tighina in Romanian 14

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stinging defeat in her attempt to regain Bender17. A cease-fire is signed on the 31st of July 1992 between Moldova and Russia.18 The Transnistrian conflict had several contributing factors; the ethnic, linguistic and cultural factor was the one most relied on to explain its tragic turn. It hides, however, several economic motivations as the area was more industrialized than the rest of Moldova, or geopolitical motivations, since Russia had a military presence there and was reluctant to the idea of losing its influence in the region. Nevertheless, the main reason was the desire of building a state that will be led by local elites.

The Assertion of the Moldovan State From every standpoint, the early years of independence in a territory controlled by central authorities are chaotic. Mircea Snegur, who was elected president of the MSSR in September 1990 and then confirmed in his post after the independence would have to manage this catastrophic situation. Despite strong statements against Russia and the Soviet past of Moldova, Mircea Snegur opposes the hard line of the Popular Front. In fact, Snegur will reaffirm the importance of building a Moldovan state for all citizens regardless of their national origin or their native language. He will temper the nationalist impulses of the succeeding governments of Mircea Druc and then of Valeriu Muravschi before their removal from power and will continue after the cease-fire signed with Boris Yeltsin with a prime minister approved by Andrei Sangheli. We find in Mircea Snegur’s speech the issues of the moment. In a speech delivered on September 3rd, 1991 on the occasion of the creation of the Moldovan Army, he recalls, without ever naming, or using the “Soviet” or “Russian” terms, that the socialist era was a time of great suffering for Moldovans (confiscation of lands, organized starvation, forced collectivization) and attacks against national values again with a list of these attacks (lies, demagoguery, deceit, assimilation process, directed migration). The independence of the state is seen as a manner of bringing justice to the people. It is interesting to note that Snegur (rarely) uses the term Moldovan to describe this people. “The farce of the Kremlin of August 2nd, 1940 concerning the creation of a Moldovan socialist republic was made without any legal base, it constitutes a total challenge towards the will of the people. The socialist 17 18

Especially during the battle of the Gerbovetskii forest in June 1992. The “authorities” of Tiraspol do not appear in this agreement.

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time began for the Moldovans with a theft of territory, an organized famine, a forced collectivization. The lie, the demagoguery, the duplicity weakened the national values. We encouraged processes of assimilation, steered migrations, which had for objective the change of the national and demographic structures of this territory. The declaration of independence became an imperative for our people’s soul. The time came to return the justice to our people. To understand better the advantages of a national independence it is necessary to remember the coups against the nation to which we were subjected within the sphere of the imperial interests.”

In fact, very soon Mircea Snegur adopts a different position from that of the Popular Front of Moldova (which becomes the Christian Democratic Popular Front of Moldova starting with February 1992) concerning the national question. In a speech (Mircea Trifon) he states that the Republic of Moldova cannot be the homeland of one people in the ethnic sense of the term but the Homeland of Moldovans, be they Romanians, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians or Gagauz. In fact, he quickly opposes any idea of union with Romania, he is an independent candidate who is re-elected president of the independent Moldovan Republic on December 8, 1991. This renewed mandate opens the way for a long episode of "nation building." The Republic of Moldova cannot succeed as the republic of one single people but as the homeland of the Romanians, the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Bulgarians, the Gagauz etc... All of them are equal citizens all of them are Moldovans, while belonging to the languages, the histories, the cultures of the Romanian, Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian or gagaouze peoples. In 1994, two major events will confirm the precise direction of the country. The Agrarian Democratic Party of Moldova, supported by President Snegur wins the elections. This new majority will allow the Snegur government to propose a referendum, called "sociological survey, consultation with the people" in which the following question is asked: “Are you favorable to the fact that the republic of Moldova develops as an independent and unitarian state, in the borders recognized in the day of the proclamation of the independence of Moldova ( 23.06.1990 ), in the fact that it promotes a politics of neutrality, that it maintains advantageous economic relations with all the countries of the world and that it guarantees equals rights to all his citizens, in accordance with the standards of the international law?”

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On March 6, 1994, 95.4% of Moldovan citizens said yes. We discussed a great deal on the manner in which the question was worded assuming that some voters did not realize that by answering yes to the independence of their country, they excluded any possibility of future union with Romania. On June 29, 1994, the Parliament adopts a new constitution. Moldova abandons the Romanian anthem for another national anthem, "Limba Noastra". Strangely, the new anthem never names the language in question. Nevertheless, the new Constitution does. The official language of the Republic Moldova is Moldovan. The Constitution also provides the status of an autonomous region based on which the law on the special status of Gagauzia will be voted in December of the same year. Strengthened its position as an independent country, Moldova will try to find its place on the international stage, to reinvent a social and economic model but also to assert a different national identity. Romania officially deplores the referendum but the most pragmatic politicians seemingly adapted quite well to the situation. At the end of 1994, Ion Iliescu declared that relations with Moldova are still cordial. The doctrine known as the "Two States" is required, it consists of considering that Moldovans and Romanians form a uniform ethnic entity but the capriciousness of history have made sure that this nation is divided into two separate states.

A Place between East and West A top priority for Moldova in 1991 is the establishment of a new basis for relations with the countries of the Soviet Union. Moldova joined the CIS from its creation by signing through its Chairman the Minsk agreement on December 8, 1991 and the Alma-Ata Declaration, the founding acts of the CIS. Initially, the Parliament, dominated by the very nationalist Popular Front, refuses to ratify this commitment. The same parliament will eventually approve the membership of Moldova to the Commonwealth of Independent States in April 1994. It is, however, an association mainly concerned with economic and trade cooperation.19 The beginning of improved relations with Moscow allows in October 1994 for the signing of an agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria. However, in the end the Duma will not ratify the agreement despite the cease-fire in place and despite the involvement of 19

Especially the military and security cooperation are excluded.

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the OSCE and the United Nations. The Transnistrian conflict becomes then stabilized, frozen somehow. It will, however, continue to influence the evolution of the young state. Eager not to retreat into the Russian-Romanian game and find international support for its development and for the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, the Moldovan diplomacy begins a campaign for membership in multilateral structures. Between 1993 and 1995, Moldova joins the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the International Organization of the Francophonie, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe. The country also becomes member of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Bank for Cooperation and Development. However, the Moldovan Constitution passed two years later will insist on the neutrality of the country and Moldova will not be a candidate for membership in NATO. Again in 1994, it signs an agreement of cooperation and partnership with the European Union which seeks at that moment to stabilize its relations with the countries of the former Soviet Union.Despite its beginnings being marked by a virtual quasi civil war, despite the difficulties associated with its history and its geographical isolation, Moldova manages in a few years to be recognized by 170 states worldwide. In the process of nation building, this recognition of Moldova on the international stage will play a significant role. In the presidential elections of December 1996, the President of Parliament20, Petru Lucinschi creates the surprise and defeats the President Snegur. The former secretary general of the Moldovan Communist Party between 1989 and 1991 converted to social democracy becomes, on January 15 1997, the second elected President of the Republic of Moldova. Internally, the mandate of Petru Lucinschi is marked by a paralyzing political instability and chaotic pursuit of economic and social reforms. Lucinschi faces constant parliamentary instability fueled by the strong opposition of the nationalist right and that of a resurgent Communist Party. Parliament drops its governments several times in four years Lucinschi must line up no less than five Prime Ministers, all moderately reformists.21 Public opinion is becoming quickly hostile to him. It must be said at the end of the 90’s, Moldova does not take off, quite the contrary. The Lucinschi years were marked by a deepening economic and social crisis in the young republic since its independence. Inflation, economic collapse, 20

Who in Moldova has the title of speaker i.e: Ion Ciubuc, Serafim Urecheanu, Ion Sturza, Valeriu Bobutac, Dumitru Braghis 21

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general impoverishment of the population reach alarming proportions in 1998, following the ruble crisis that hits the main trading partner, Russia. Lucinschi also has to face an almost permanent political crisis that pitted him against a very turbulent parliament and a virulent opposition on two fronts, the pro-Romanian nationalist Popular Christian Democrat Party and the resurgent Communist Party. The two successive presidents were nevertheless following the path of the construction of a new state, by focusing on the legal and democratic construction, but also on the steps of its international recognition. In fact, from the standpoint of the leaders of this period, the Moldovan state does not build itself, but is built because of the recognition it received from others.

The Communist Era Widespread popular dissatisfaction with the government, the economy, the reform process leads to a surprising result in the election of February 2001. These elections which are recognized by the international observers as having taken place under the proper conditions led a massive vote in favor of the Moldovan Communist party winning 71 of the 101 seats in Parliament. With this absolute majority, the Communist deputies elect their leader, Vladimir Voronin, President of Moldova on April 4 2001, while he is also staying the head of his party.22 The victory of the Communist Party is even more important because from the 31 existing political parties only 3 were able to exceed the 6% threshold to be represented in Parliament. Moldova becomes the first state from the former Soviet space to see return to power an unreformed communist party whose discourse was maintaining an openly Marxist line.

The Causes of the Rebirth of the Communist Party The target audience for the Communist Party in 2001 is wide, the PCRM has two main targets, the Russian-speakers whose advocate of linguistic and cultural rights he is and who is perceived as a vague heir of a deceased system in which they were not considered foreigners and perceived by a part of the population as being responsible for the country’s situation. PCRM did not hesitate during the 2001 campaign, to consider unification with Russia and Belarus. It will receive the strong support of

22

After the go-ahead of the Constitutional Court

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the movement of the Russians from Moldova, who are very hostile to Romania, Unitate-Edinstvo. He also aims to address those who are disappointed of the democratic transition; pensioners, rural population, unemployed or under-employed urban population, declined officials but more generally speaking, any citizen concerned with the social and economic difficulties in which the country has gotten itself in. In response to these legitimate anxieties, the PCRM plays on some simple levers. z The myth of the providential man, who due his energy and integrity

is capable to restore order in the country's affairs. z The denunciation of guilty people: Former leaders issued from the

independence, responsible for the division of the nation, the deterioration of the public services because of their inability to govern and by their desire to enrich themselves at the expense of the population. z The nostalgia of the protective state solution in the areas of social protection, security, health and education, as well as the order and predictability of life’s path. We must also add the regret of the loss of the national pride sentiment and the regret of not belonging anymore to a great power. z The PCRM also wants to be the heir of a policy of friendship between peoples and is targeting those they consider to be eager to maintain divisions on ethnic and linguistic bases, namely the 'unionist' and "pro-Romanian" accused of xenophobic drift (which should must obviously be understood as anti-Russian). The doctrine of the Communist Party is the one of Moldova's sovereignty by promoting a distinctive Moldovan identity from the Romanian identity, echoing the Soviet doctrine that prevailed since the creation of the first MSSR. Politically, the PCRM claims the heritage of the USSR while acknowledging its errors. He openly declares himself as being a Leninist but pertaining to a "modern" Leninism, adapted to the problems of a modern society.

«Statehood» and «moldovenism» To complete the implementation of its modern communism, PCRM will first insist on delimiting the field of application, being that of the

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Moldovan nation, an eternal territory that will strive hard to demonstrate its specificity. As so often in Moldova, this means the reopening the hostilities on the front of the war of languages. For PCRM, in Moldova Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Gagauz and Moldovan are spoken. The debate on language and identity gets more inflamed than ever before since the accession to power of the PCRM.

The War of Languages The tension further increases in early 2002, when – as previously announced during the election campaign - the president is trying to assign the Russian language the status of second official language and to reintroduce its teaching as a mandatory requirement in all schools. He also insists that the official language is strictly and consistently called Moldovan, causing a strong clash with Roumanophone intellectuals. In addition, the Department of Education changes the school curriculum of history, wanting to change the very symbolical title of "History of Romanians" adopted in the early 90's, into the "History of Moldova". In response to these measures, for several months (from January 9 to April 24, 2009) the streets of Chiúinău were the scene for some major student and school demonstrations, widely supported by the educational body and the Romanian-speaking intelligentsia. These events will rapidly acquire a nationalist and anti-Russian overtone. Faced with this strong reaction from a segment of civil society, the government ends up defying those who accused it of authoritarian abuses and prefers to step back on the issue of the stats of the Russian language and managed to make it mandatory again in the entire education system, but with only one or two hours of classes per week. Legally, the Moldovan government insists, however, to maintain the Moldovan vocabulary to as the official language.

The Big Game of Symbols Another part of the cultural policy of PCRM will be to declaim certain national monuments supposed to be symbolic of the eternal Moldova, so that the people can admire and learn about its past. Some historic buildings are renovated with big expenses, fortresses but especially monasteries; the most important of which is Capriana23 which Voronin "will inaugurate"

23

Monastery founded in the 15th century

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with great fanfare alongside the metropolitan bishop of Moldova and businessmen who contributed financially to the work. It also dramatically renews monuments of entirely different natures, including the memorial dedicated to Soviet soldiers who died during the Second World War in Chiúinău. Also rehabilitated at great expense was a chapel, an act very representative of Soviet realism. Once again, the work is unveiled by the President on May 9, before the veterans and in the presence of generous benefactors. According to our understanding, the Moldovan communism is characterized more by its extreme pragmatism than its ideological orthodoxy. Promoting "moldovenism" and "national sovereignty" will be a high point of the policy pursued by Voronin during his two terms. It often was for the least baroque; but it turned to be beneficial for its promoter. The moldovenism, an old Soviet scientific theory meant for those less fragile, is dressed up in much more modern clothes, compatible with European values, those of multiculturalism and multilingualism. National minorities therefore find themselves paradoxically in the position to defend the Moldovan national idea, the unity of the country against foreign agents; the Romanian speaking opposition. It therefore supports the idea of an open Moldovan identity, a melting pot of peoples and languages that would form the true nature of the country, a nature that the pro-Romanian fight against serving the imperialist and chauvinist ambition of a foreign power. This reversal of roles that barely hides the vengeful objectives of Russian speakers under the highly presentable mask of multiculturalism, confronts nevertheless the opposition with its shortcomings: their inability, in his pathetic quest of a clear identity, to address more than a third of the citizens of Moldova. The first round of post-independence census is launched in 2004. From the 2,638,125 people who declared themselves Moldovans or Romanians (78.3% of the total population), 97.2% declared themselves of Moldovan nationality and 2.8% of Romanian nationality. 76.3% of them declared that their mother tongue is other than the Moldovan, against 21% who consider themselves as having Romanian for their mother tongue.

Voronin's Second Term, a Shift towards the European Union At the parliamentary elections from 2005, the Communist Party is running for office with a less ideologically marked program than in 2001. The big innovation of a somewhat diverse agenda and a contradictory one in many aspects is an obvious desire for rapprochement with Europe. At

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the risk of contradicting itself, the other stated objective in their foreign policy plan is to improve the relationship with Russia, relations that had deteriorated significantly during the first term due to the Transnistrian issue. However, the second objective of the campaign is being undermined by the Moldovan authorities as soon as they express their refusal to receive the CIS observers at the polls. This decision deteriorated the relations between Russia and the Moldovan government. Since 2005, the government of Vasile Tarlev and the European Union agreed on an action plan within the framework of the neighborhood policy. The entry visas in Moldova are waived for EU nationals. Always eclectic and eager to attract younger voters, the Communist Party abandoned the Soviet imagery that it used for its campaign in 2001 and adopted the slogan "EU votez", a word game which can mean both "I vote" and "I vote for the European Union", on a poster representing a hammer and sickle on a blue background, featuring the yellow stars of EU. On March 6, the Moldovan Communist Party collects 46% of the vote and obtained 56 of the 101 parliamentary seats, the Moldovan Democratic Coalition got 34 seats and a score of 28.5% and the Christian Democratic People's Party won 11 seats with 9% of the vote. On April 4, Vladimir Voronin was reelected for a second mandate less fractured than the first one on issues of internal policy, because it was more framed by its European obligations and marked by economic difficulties in its deteriorated relation with Russia. In 2007, with the entry of Romania into the European Union, Moldova suddenly finds itself in the immediate vicinity of the European border and is receiving an increased support from the European Union. Bucharest is proposed to be an "advocate" of its integration. A mobility partnership is set up for easier access to EU countries.

Despite the difficult relations with Romania The pro-Western orientation of the new government will not prevent a very complicated relationship with Romania. Bilateral relations between the two countries, passionate by nature, will be complicated because of the bloody and little civilized character of the two presidents. The relations between Băsescu and Voronin are marked by warm reconciliation but also by vengeful statements made in undiplomatic terms. For the Voronin government, Romania is clearly a threat against the Moldovan nation whose existence it challenged, it is becoming the reference of its worst political enemies. The problem will worsen in 2007 with the entry of Romania into the EU. Since the 90’s, Bucharest leads a

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fairly liberal policy for the attainment of Romanian citizenship24, from 2007, the attainment of nationality opens not only the doors towards Romania, but is at the same time a passport for Europe. In 2007, some 100,000 Moldovans are also Romanian citizens, but tens of thousands of others were also pending to obtain it. The speed with which these requests are processed or not, becomes a pressure weapon against the government from Chiúinău, since we are talking about a potential hemorrhage of the labor force, a sign of failure in the sense of belonging to the Moldovan nation and a tool of electoral pressure25. The policy of massive allocation of Romanian citizenship is repeatedly denounced in violent campaigns by President Voronin himself who, through the press and official statements26, is accusing Romania of imperialism and of trying to violate the sovereignty of the Moldovan state. Despite its new officially pro-European orientation, the PCRM is facing a more organized opposition at the end of its term and a fraction of the population is becoming increasingly critical of the continuous corruption and archaic governance of the ruling party. In April 2009, a defensive game is played, by presenting its parliamentary candidates in order to obtain a governing majority for the third consecutive time. These elections will trigger an unprecedented political crisis.

The Crisis of April 2009 Official results mark the victory of the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM). The PCRM of Vladimir Voronin, the President of the Republic in power since 2001, obtained 49.48% of the vote, or 60 of the 101 seats in Parliament. Theoretical, the victory empowered the communist deputies to elect the President of the Parliament and to appoint a government. On the evening of April 5, 2009, the Party of Communists is confirmed to be the leading political force in the country, but it lacks one parliamentary seat from being able to elect alone the President of the Republic. By then, it was thought that getting one extra vote would have been a formality. The following days, however, were to decide things in a different manner. The announcement of the results fuel rumors of massive fraud, recurrent 24

i.e. All persons who could prove that at least one of their grand-parents was Romanian could ask to be given the appropriate papers. 25 In Moldova, but also in Romania. A strong supporter of this attainment of citizenship, Train Basescu collected in 2009 almost 90% of the votes of Romanians living in Moldova 26 Including during meetings with EU officials

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rumors in the majority of countries of the former Soviet space, but the frustration of some urban youth exasperated by a power considered corrupt and archaic will go this time beyond the usual chicanery and will shake up the political game. On April 7, thousands of young people organize protests heavily using social networks and take the streets of Chiúinău to call for new elections. Overwhelmed and surprisingly non-reactive, the security forces let them get into the parliament building and that of the Presidency, which they ransacked. Enthusiastic, the protesters hoisted the colors of Romania and the European Union. The so-called "twitter" revolution which engulfed Moldova makes us inevitably think of the Ukrainian or Georgian "color revolutions". The power, no doubt convinced of its legitimacy, imposes a quick and brutal return to order which will stop the protest in the street despite strong criticism from the European Union and heightened tension with neighboring Romania who was openly supporting the protests. This short "Moldovan spring" has three important consequences: it proves the emergence of a determined civil society within the political scene, it raises the interest of the European Union, which challenged the whimsical Voronin regime and form an opposition which sees an opportunity to turn the situation to its advantage: In early May, after the recounting of votes, the election results are confirmed and Vladimir Voronin, who after two consecutive terms could not claim his succession to the head of state, is elected Speaker of Parliament. The forward march of the Communist Party stops on May 20. Zinaida Greceanii, the former prime minister and successor designated by Voronin, presents its candidacy to the presidential election. Feeling strong about the 60 votes held by the Communist deputies, they hope a withdrawal will allow them to reach the 61 votes needed. The long-awaited withdrawal does not take place, the united opposition blocked her election by boycotting the election. On June 2, the Party of Communists cash another shot - Marian Lupu, Prime Minister approached in case of victory of Greceanii, leaves the party, declaring loudly that the party was non-democratic and it cannot be reformed. Former Speaker of Parliament and former Minister of Economy, Lupu - considered by many as the embodiment of the future of the PCRM - adheres to a new party, the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM). The next day, Zinaida Greceanii presents herself again before the Parliament; still, unsurprisingly, her application was rejected. Voronin, President of the Republic by default and Chairman of an out of control Parliament, must solve matters by calling early elections in

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order to reshuffle the cards of the political game and aid in the reemergence of a majority. New elections are convened on July 29. After a particularly bitter campaign, the weakened PCRM loses 12 seats, but remains the largest party in the country. The Democratic Party of Marian Lupu makes a remarkable entrance in the parliament with 13 seats. At the beginning of the month and after long negotiations, the Democratic Party of Moldova joins forces with the main opposition parties, the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), the Liberal Party (PL) and forms the Alliance "Our Moldova "(ANM) in order to form a governing coalition - the Alliance for European Integration (AIE)." The IEA's objective is to overcome the economic and social crisis, to ensure the economic growth, to reincorporate Transnistria, to join the European Union and to promote a balanced foreign policy. The Alliance parties nevertheless divided the main functions of the state. Thus, a veteran of the Moldovan political, Mihai Ghimpu (PL), was elected Speaker of Parliament after many adventures due to the fierce opposition of the PCRM; Vlad Filat (PLDM) was appointed Prime Minister on 25 September. Marian Lupu (PDM) was nominated to run for the position of head of state. Welded into a posture of systematic blocking, the Communist opposition thwarted repeatedly and using all the means available to them Lupu's election to the presidency of the Republic. A veteran of the political scene, it was the Liberal Mihai Ghimpu who became interim President. He is assumed to be in favor of a union with Romania and plays the card of a rabid anti-communist to the extreme. During his term, the attacks against his political opponents increased. He wants to formally and indiscriminately condemn the crimes of the communist regime in Moldova, prohibit any organization to make reference to this era or to claim it and proposes the creation of a commemorative day of the "Soviet occupation." His attitude and the one of his party divided the country more than ever. Some of his allies also view his initiatives as to be unfavorable, him being judged counter-productive. To get out of the political crisis and try to impose himself, Ghimpu decides to hold a referendum to change the constitution and to allow the election of the president by direct universal vote. Organized on September 5, 2010, the referendum has to be invalidated due to insufficient turnout. Noting the failure of the ruling coalition, Ghimpu dissolved Parliament. Early parliamentary elections are set to 28 November 2010, it is the third round of elections in less than a year and a half. The PLDM, PDM and PL get all 59 seats, the PCRM - 42. The following polling negotiations highlight the fragility of the Alliance. The party of Marian Lupu first negotiates with the Party of

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Communists before doing so with its partners from IEA. An agreement was finally reached within the Alliance, however, this agreement will mark the decline of the Liberal Party in the coalition. Vlad Filat is reconfirmed as Prime Minister, Marian Lupu is elected Speaker of Parliament and holds the position of Head of State ad interim. The choice of Marian Lupu, who shares neither the pro-Romanian nationalism nor the hostility to Russia of its predecessor, marks a quest for political compromise and a willingness to chill the social tensions. The political debate in Moldova is not characterized by the consistency of his public speeches. Too many public statements are only "sound bites" released in certain circumstances in front of reporters who are in search of anecdotes. The majority of the speeches of political leaders revolve around the political strategies of the moment; there is little room to display a clear and coherent political project. The search for a meaningful word often proves to be difficult or unsatisfactory. To overcome this difficulty we have so far used the speeches of successive presidents of Moldova at the official ceremony marking the 20th Independence of the Republic of Moldova in August 2011. These speeches were made during the tenure of President Acting Marian Lupu, in other words, after the long depression that followed the 2009 parliamentary elections, the fall of the Voronin government and the coming chaos of the Alliance for European Integration. We justify this choice by presenting several arguments. The solemn ceremonial dimension forced the five presidents and former presidents to give an elocution that was more detached from the political contingencies of the moment, requiring them to present their vision of Moldova, to take stock of their actions and to establish guidelines for a long-term project. The audience, length and format of the speeches also have the advantage of being quite similar in the 5 cases. These five speeches seem able to illustrate and clarify each other's positions regarding the identity of Moldovans and the place of Moldova on the European continent.

Mircea Snegur’s speech to Parliament on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of independence27 In the speeches given by the first two presidents, we wanted to highlight three elements. The first two of these are a manner of taking stock of the failures and achievements of each of their terms. In addition, it is quite interesting the names they use to describe their country and its people. 27

see:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=54soRUDxx2U (accessed on 11/07/2014)

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Failure / regret

Achievement

Designation of Moldova or Moldovans

Lack of experience

National Revival

Independent and democratic state

Villages mourning their inhabitants

First democratic elections Independent Moldovan Republic

Land without owners

State unity

Our republic

Children without parents

Independance

Our citizens

Difficult living conditions Territorial integrity

Our people

Attributes of the State State unity Rule of Law Recognition by the world and the United Nations Cohesion

Petru Lucinschi’s speech to Parliament on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of independence28 Failure / regret

Achievement

Designation of Moldova or Moldovans

Economic collapse

National revival

Our State

Inflation

Entry into the WTO

Our republic

Ruble crisis

Entering the OIF

Our country

Nepotism

Entry into the Danube Commission

Our citizens

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see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3Tvi6DRjm8 (accessed on 11/07/2014)

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Corruption

Development of democracy

Massive emigration

Internal peace and stability No ethnic conflict Development of a free press Infrastructures and schools

In their speeches, the two presidents adopt a common discursive tactic to recount how they came to power: Justification or regret and the achievements reached despite difficulties. The achievements are the foundation of the establishment of the rule of law for Snegur, they become more technical and precise for Lucinschi, marking a type of continuity in the construction and development of the country. We can also find the systematic use of the possessive plural nouns to refer to the people or the country, which often remains unnamed.

Vladimir Voronin’s speech to Parliament on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of independence 29 The speech of President Voronin is a more complex one from the standpoint of construction. It starts from the observation, the division of the country. We will therefore highlight the parts of his speech that shows the causes and consequences of this division. Voronin counterposes past achievements to this division, but he also presents the wishes of his party for the future. Finally, we have also highlighted, for comparison purposes, the names used to refer to the country and the people of which he was in charge.

29

see:.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kCBKv3h0qic (accessed on 11/07/2014)

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Causes of division

Consequences Achievements Names given of these of to the country divisions communists and the people

That are the wishes of president Voronin and his party

End of the USSR Release for some, for others a cruel shipwreck

Threat to independence and statality

Modernization Our country legislative

A national unitary project

Privatization and liberalization of the economy; for some fundamental liberty for other destruction of the economic potential

Risk of collapse of society

Political stability

Unification of the country

Some say they Apathy and Increases in are Romanians indifference of salaries and other citizens pensions Moldovans Using populism referring to a historical past (to the treaties that rot) Absurd search of a final victory of one side over the other

Independent and fully sovereign Moldova

The Moldovan Save the name people of our country

Developing the Our people economic potential

Developing our country

Create a sovereign Moldova

Make a united people giving a new face to the world

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Political Discourses, Search for Identity and National Imagination Improving public services and making modern cities Getting closer to European standards without departing from Moscow, Kiev and Astana Not just admiring our heroic ancestors but providing a future for the people

The speech of President Voronin therefore emphasizes the divisions of the country, its people being many and of different kinds: Nostalgics of the USSR / Those who celebrate his death, supporters of the economic liberalization / those who regret the loss of control over production tool, those who perceive themselves as Romanians / those who perceive themselves as Moldovans. He denounces the fact that these divisions are exploited to achieve a final victory of one side over the other, of one vision over the other. For Voronin, to insist on these divisions could represent a deadly threat to the unity and the existence of Moldova described as sovereign, independent and whole. We note the insistence of Voronin on the notion of sovereignty and the regular use of the possessive pronoun "our" (our people, our country). Vladimir Voronin recalls what he considers the successes of his mandate (economic and legislative improvements) and calls to design a future for Moldova the main goal of which is the unity of the country, maintaining of its independence and its particularity. Here we have all the elements of "moldovenism" defined above. We also note the concern of Voronin not to choose sides between the east and west, to get closer to the EU without getting away from the Russian world.

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Mihai Ghimpu’s speech to Parliament on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of independence30 The speech of Mihai Ghimpu is quite close to that of his opponent Voronin from the standpoint of structure. He also uses the cause/consequence opposition to highlight the country's difficulties. Unlike Voronin, however, he does not refer to past achievements, but only to actions that need to be taken and the results to be expected from those actions. Causes difficulties

Current Designation Actions, consequences of the attitudes to inhabitants of adopt Moldova and their language

Purpose, the results of actions

106 tsarist humiliation

We are the Romanians poorest people from in Europe Bessarabia

Establishing the truth

Home and food on everyone’s table

50 SovietCommunism

Destruction of Romanians our national (many consciousness occurrences)

Affirmation of Truth about ourselves ourselves from the cap up to clogs.

Deportation to Siberia

We've always been and we stay always Romanians

Solving the Transnistria conflict and ending the occupation period

European integration

organized famine

Truth which is like a spring

Soviet army in our land

Truth is like water, air, and the bread that God gives us

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see:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-R3WIHa3ozc (accessed on 7/07/2014)

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Goulag

Fundamental truth

Russian as official language School closures in Romanian Study of the history of Russia as a national history Turkish yoke Policy of lie since independence

The rhetoric of Mihai Ghimpu relies greatly on a view of history that considers the people of Moldova as the victims of successive external forces (the Soviet Union and its communist ideology but also Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire). We can distinguish two types of historical damages; the "physical" damage (occupations, starvation, deportation) and the "moral" damages (attacks against the language, memory and national consciousness, humiliation, lying over the identity of the people). In the vision of Ghimpu, these historical injustices also have simple material and moral consequences (poverty, destruction of national consciousness) both of them inextricably linked. For Mihai Ghimpu, this abused people has a name, they are Romanians. According to him, the main action that needs to be takes is to restore a retracted historical truth and the affirmation of the identity of the inhabitants of Moldova as Romanians. We note the folkloric metaphor "Romanian from the hat to the clogs". We note also that other nationalities – such as the Russians, the Turks - are clearly identified as the guilty parties. The clear statement of this fundamental truth is the prerequisite to move forward. A series of metaphors come to describe this absolute truth (Truth as a source, truth like water, the air and the bread that is given to us

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by God). His recovery will result in more tangible results; the European integration and houses and bread for everyone.

Marian Lupu’s31 speech to the Parliament on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of independence32 The speech of the president in August 2011 is logically the one that can seems the most consensual. We have identified three axes. The first one is how he refers to the recipient of his message, his country and his people. He then engages in a fairly classic though vibrant exercise of "balance" (achievements of the country in 20 years) and "perspectives" (what the country needs to become). To whom is the speech addressed and thanks expressed by Marian Lupu

Accomplishments of the What should be the country during the 20 country, to which he years of independence must tend

His Excellency the Formation of State people of the Republic of conscience Moldova

Harmony among all citizens of the country regardless of how they identify themselves, what language they speak and their political beliefs

Citizens of the sovereign Sovereignty and state of the Republic independence Moldova

Intelligence, mutual respect, tolerance regardless of nationality (Moldave Romanian, Russian, Gagauz, Ukrainian and Bulgarian)

Our state the Republic of Democratic and pluralist Moldova state

Only the path to democracy civilized ensure economic growth, prosperity and rising living standards

Together we are Moldovans, citizens of this country

31

Freedom of expression

The interim President at that time see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QT-Cz6-txmI (accessed on 07/07/2014)

32

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Political Discourses, Search for Identity and National Imagination Moldova is not a temporary project or an intermediate step is a state by definition MR received for the anniversary of its independence congratulations from 50 countries (cited EU, Russia, USA, Romania and Ukraine) The RM is a sovereign state globally recognized A recognized and trusted partner

In his speech, Marian Lupu proposes a more conciliatory vision of "moldovenism" than the one proposed by Voronin. The former communist president used to insist on the factors of the division of the society, when, by addressing directly his speech to the Moldovan people, Lupu salutes the country's achievements in 20 years of independence. We note that he resumes quite extensively the arguments used by Lucinschi or Snegur, those for an international recognition. It is partly thanks to this recognition that Moldova can be perceived as a homogeneous entity, sovereign and sustainable, as a state, having all the attributions of such an entity and tending towards the standards of a pluralist democracy. The future designed by Lupu, president at the time of this intervention, is the future of a country united, multicultural and multilingual at the same time. President Lupu is being careful in naming each cohabiting nationality and full member of the community of Moldovan citizens. This coexistence according to Lupu is the only "civilized way" towards democracy and growth. Lupu proposes a modernized version of moldovenism, insisting on a form of multiculturalism inherent to the project proposed.

A hard alliance to maintain Despite the confrontations taking place between the main leaders of the AEI, it is possible to identify clear lines in the policies of the Alliance. They are the liberalization of the country and an unconditioned rapprochement to the EU.

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Despite its real achievements, the Alliance for the European Integration is facing serious internal difficulties that compromise its future, despite good macroeconomic indicators; the population is not clearly feeling the benefits of renewed growth. Supporters of the Alliance, more and more free to express themselves and challenge the status quo are critical, especially since all the bad habits related to corruption and misappropriations of funds are far from over. At the reopening of Parliament, the AEI seems near to explosion torn by internal rivalries among its leaders. The irrevocable first party of the country, the PCRM, despite its internal divisions that are increasingly obvious, seems to bide its time. The presidential election game is re-launched in November; several candidatures are mentioned, including those of Marian Lupu and the Zinaida Greceanii. A new election attempt takes place on December 16, Marian Lupu is the only candidate, this being another failure. He decided not to be a candidate for this seat anymore. The beginning of 2012 debuts in a sense of urgency, the EU’s loss of confidence is difficult to hide, since the government of the AEI and the AEI itself resist mainly due to this strategic support. The erosion of external support, the disappearance of the image of a successful transition may worsen the peripheral country status of Moldova, driving away a perspective of rapid and irreversible progress.

The thin path of Nicolae Timofti The Alliance is in the absolute obligation to find a candidate that can achieve consensus, a personality that is not marked by the partisan conflicts of the past. The AEI therefore decided to submit to the Parliament an almost unknown candidate to the general public, the President of the Superior Council of Magistrates, a former judge who had never been involved in politics, Nicolae Timofti. On March 16, Nicolae Timofti was elected President of the Republic of Moldova with 62 votes. He agrees to respect a number of compromises such as maintaining the neutrality of the country, the balance of relations between EU and CIS, confirming the specificity of the culture and of the Moldovan language with regard to Romania, personal non-affiliation to a party or another. A few days after his election, he reaffirmed his desire to continue all the commitments to the European Union. Moldova welcomed with relief the coming to power of the polished man of 63. He must nevertheless

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manage a determined opposition with a very weak majority, as the interests of each part are different. President of a country caught between a European Union more and more interventionist and a Russia increasingly less inclined to compromise, Nicolae Timofti must show a lot of skills in order to lead the country. In 2013, the AEI and the Government of Vlad Filat falls due to a no confidence vote in Parliament. A new government is formed through a new alliance, the pro-European coalition. This new coalition takes away the most pro-Romanian nationalists close to Ghimpu elements. The government is headed by Iurie Leanca, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, appointed prime minister April 25, 2013. The rapprochement with the European Union under his leadership experiences a major step forward. On, June 27, 2014, Prime Minister of Moldova, Iurie Leanca, the President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, and the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso signed in Brussels the Agreement of the Association the Republic of Moldova to the European Union. We resort here to two speeches; the first was given by President Timofti after the Treaty of Vilnius, February 13, 2014, in front of the Moldovan parliament, a few weeks after the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, which also marks the beginning of the political crisis in neighboring Ukraine. The second was given by Prime Minister Iurie Leanca, June 27 at the signing ceremony of the Agreement of the Association the Republic of Moldova to the EU in Brussels33. We note that these two speeches, voluntarily or not, complete each other, both having a deeply pedagogical purpose. In both cases, the choice is made; the rapprochement with the European Union is left out of the discussion. It is a state of inescapable fact to be explained. In the speech of president Timofti, we have the explanation of the project followed by the authority of the power that provides the motives for the choices made. It also explains what the European Union is and what it brings to Moldova. We are also committed to depict the qualifiers used to describe the supporters of an alternative route.

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see:http://www.presedinte.md/rom/discursuri/discursul-presedintelui-republiciimoldova-nicolae-timofti-la-sedinta-inaugurala-dinsesiunea-primavara-vara-aparlamentului (accessed on 11/07/2014)

Vincent Henry and Sergiu Miúcoiu Project

What brings the EU

Name given Qualification to Moldova, of opponents to its Citizens and alternative projects

Our Area of detachment of security and a long postprosperity Soviet transition period

Western values

Our society

Those who dispute the benefits of integration are either malicious or too busy with politics

Permanently anchored in the European area

Friendship and The citizens unprecedented support

Those who talk of joining the Eurasian Union pretend not to see that we lived in a similar union.

Ending the east-west oscillation

What is the EU

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Developed and civilized world

Enormous potential to improve the lives of citizens

An integral Gagauz part of the autonomy modern world referendum .. an illegal action games unconstitution al ...

Modernization Our people policy in all regions

Geostrategic projects without perspective, illusory

Fundamental right of free movement

Narrow party interests, petty or of foreign origin

Political, financial and moral support A Better Life

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The speech of Nicolae Timofti is a statement of a choice that requires a break from the past (the post-Soviet transition) and a definite anchoring of Moldova to the “modern” European world, “developed and civilized”. This implies a clear break from the past and an “East” that would oppose such a modern, civilized world. Those who oppose this rupture wish to stay in this “East” with no future, and with no prospects in order to benefit their own interests, against the best interest of the people. This rupture will bring the benefits of the western world to Moldova, from an economic but also moral standpoint. Nationality is no longer an issue in the presidential discourse, the main point regards the people and a society the main characteristic of which is to belong not to a country but to a European culture and a modern world.34 Meaning of the Agreement

Current situation

What Objectives to What remains to be reach characterizes done the members of the neighbouring pact

Future (4 occurrences)

Various problems persist

Challenge to take

Essential objective

Strong tension in the whole region

Choice

The changing things in the good way

Path

To become a full member of this big family of the European Union.

The founding values of the European integration are the more often tested.

Definitive choice

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Demanding path

see:http://www.moldavie.fr/spip.php?article2629

The most determined supporters the European integration

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We do not have the right to hesitate or to make concessions Reform and modernize Moldova Deepen their democracies; ensure the economic development and the integration in the European market.

The speech Iurie Leanca restates these themes but does not mention any possible opponent in his remarks, the choice made is the future and such a choice is irreversible. Leanca talks about the obstacles that need to be overcome but not of opponents who need to be convinced, as if they no longer existed internally. We note the dominant idea of projection into the future and its irresistible progress (future, path, objective). It also includes words that could be described as technocratic including certain elements of the EU language (reform, modernization, market integration, and economic development) and the absence of any national or ethnic reference. Moldova is also presented as part of a European "region" subject to high external tensions, as in the speech of Timofti, Russia is not named but it is quite clear that this final "choice" is also made with respect to Russia.

Instead of conclusions The analysis of these few speeches which seemed representative of the turbulent political history of the Republic of Moldova since its independence allows us to identify some striking changes. At a high level of responsibility (Presidents and Prime Ministers) we will have noted a significant decrease of aggressions or conflicts in speeches thanks to the emergence, over time, of a coherent unifying project and assumed the rapprochement with the EU. There are no more

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struggles to overcome, but to follow the steps of a process. We have also noted changes in the way in which the country and its people are described. The first speeches talk about Romanians but the very existence of the country and its political existence oblige to accept a country, Moldova and its people, Moldovans. These words are often used by presidents Snegur, Lucinschi, Voronin and Lupu. We also know that the concept of "moldovenism" is often suspected of hostility to Romania, of nostalgia of the Soviet era, nostalgia widely used by Vladimir Voronin, for example. As such, it is interesting to see how the notion of Moldovan "patriotism" has become confiscated by supporters of PCRM or the Moldovan Socialist Party35. To solve the problem, we will note that in the speech of Timofti and Leanca the name of the country is not mentioned in favor of vague and consensual terms as "our society." This consensus is also reflected in the style of speeches, major combat and messianic declarations, long references to history and traditional values of the people are replaced by a call to future efforts and unity, by a search for material prosperity, in hopes of peaceful society. The glorious and painful is gradually replaced by a hopefully calm and reasonable future. The nationalist and populist rhetoric disappears before technocratic speeches, lyrical elements become the “elements of language”. Given these evolving speeches, it will be interesting to see what will be their evolution during the next elections. It would also be interesting to compare the differences between the official speeches and those put forward by the citizens themselves. A confrontation that will no doubt make us realize that the European choice is not yet a final one.

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i.g. Rhetoric sites like www.moldoveni.md

ROMANIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA: COMMON ASSETS AND CHALLENGES AMID THE EUROPE 2020 AGENDA ADRIAN-GABRIEL CORPĂDEAN

Abstract The latest multiannual strategy adopted within the framework of the European Union has the merit of being approached in a way that fosters the more or less balanced division of tasks amongst its 28 member states. Hence, the contribution of East-Central Europe becomes of paramount importance, given the ambitious - albeit fairly realistic - targets set by the European Commission for the member states belonging to this so-called New Europe. In light of the above and given the recent Association Agreement to the EU signed by the Republic of Moldova, if becomes essential to assess the potential of this country to comply with the longterm priorities of the supranational framework it wishes to join. Moreover, a parallel evaluation of key indicators in Romania and the Republic of Moldova will undoubtedly reveal interesting perspectives for collaboration between the two states, meant to trigger would-be future projects and endeavours, under the auspices of the agenda set by the European Union for the current decade. Such a comparison is also likely to establish an innovative methodological approach, which may be further utilized in order to evaluate the likelihood of future compliance with the multiannual indicators tackled by the EU, in the case of other potential candidate countries from the Eastern neighbourhood, such as Georgia, Armenia or the ever challenging Ukraine. Keywords: Europe 2020, Romania, Moldova, education, environment

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Europe 2020 - an ongoing reform endeavour The partial failure of the Lisbon Strategy left the European Union in an obvious state of doubt regarding the manner in which it was appropriate to establish multiannual goals amid an ever more complicated economic and, why not, geopolitical context. Nevertheless, some lessons appear to have been learnt from the somewhat idealistic Lisbon Strategy and the unfavourable auspices of the economic crisis left a surprisingly positive imprint on the newest ten-year strategy adopted by the EU.1 This paradoxical statement may be explained if one is to look at Europe 2020 from various angles, as the complicated dimensions of the economic downturn in Europe, manifesting itself in the form of the financial crisis, or the sovereign debt one, enabled the artisans of the new agenda to take into account principles that one may check using a tool specific to the complex area of project management. To elaborate on this, a research question arises, namely whether the Europe 2020 Strategy (we shall use either the aforementioned term or Agenda, both of which reflect, to a large extent, the contents of the endeavour) is able to stand the test of the ever more popular SMART acronym. Let it be stated from the very beginning that it is not our intention to subject the agenda to a thorough evaluation, from the standpoint of its objectives, indicators and institutional background, placed under the generic term of European Semester, as we have already tackled such topics in previous research.2 On the other hand, our focus is on the extent to which Europe 2020 is a SMART agenda for Central and Eastern Europe, and, particularly, Romania, so as to make viable assessments of the liaisons between the goals of this strategy and one particular country belonging to the Eastern Partnership, namely the Republic of Moldova. The reasons for turning our comparative perspective to these two neighbouring countries obviously lies in the considerable historical, cultural and linguistic heritage they share, all the more because Romania has emerged as a strong supporter of the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the EU in the foreseeable future.3 Talks of reunification, albeit scarcely 1

Steffen Lehndorff, A triumph of failed ideas: European models of capitalism in the crisis, ETUI, 2012, pp. 252-253. 2 See: Adrian-Gabriel Corpădean, Europe 2020 - An Agenda for Citizens and States, in Democracy and Security in the 21st Century: Perspectives on a Changing World, ed. Valentin Naumescu, Cambridge Scholars, London, 2014, pp. 267-283. 3 Elsa Tulmets, East Central European Foreign Policy Identity in Perspective: Back to Europe and the EU’s Neighbourhood, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 121.

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audible on occasions, overly-patriotic sometimes, or contradictory, do persist and it would be interesting to calculate the degree to which the Republic of Moldova would be in fact capable of playing a role in the multiannual strategies of the Union. As a potential future member and as a new partner of the European Union, the country’s economic, social and political backgrounds have to adjust to the demanding nature of the acquis communautaire, on the eve of what one may expect to be prolonged, even sinuous negotiations. The common assets of Romania and its eastern neighbour, stemming from undeniable closeness in some regards, which not even the tumultuous course of history was able to erase, are undoubtedly joined by considerable challenges in terms of adapting to the expectations of a European Union that has to adjust to the current global context. Such challenges are quite visible in Romania, a member of the Union since 2007, and even more in the Republic of Moldova, where political turmoil rendered the choice of a pro-European path extremely difficult.4 This being said, a comparative analysis of the situation in the two countries, one from within the Union and the other knocking more or less convincingly at its door, should provide an interesting insight into the specific reflections of Europe 2020’s implementation in what we are quite likely entitled to call The New Europe. Coming back to the essence of the agenda, we aim to start from the premise that its state of implementation, along with the manner in which it is conceived and, last but not least, its monitoring mechanisms, enable us to conclude that it is indeed a SMART institutional endeavour. Comprising national, intergovernmental and, chiefly, supranational procedures, Europe 2020 is essentially complex and, unlike its predecessor, the manner in which is functions corresponds to the five attributes of the abovementioned acronym. Albeit the latter is mostly used in the area of project management, it is our view that its analytical nature applies to the Europe 2020 framework. In the following paragraphs, we intend to prove our point, by resorting to concrete aspects pertaining to the current state of affairs in the European Union in this respect. Hence, the objectives set out for the agenda are specific (S) all the more because, unlike in the case of the much more idealistic Lisbon

4

Elena Semenova, Michael Edinger, Heinrich Best, Parliamentary Elites in Central and Eastern Europe: Recruitment and Representation, Routledge, 2013, pp. 219-220.

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Strategy, this time, the priorities are clearly stated, in the form of several quantifiable targets5: x an employment rate of the EU population aged between 20 and 64 attaining the value of 75%; x a decrease in school dropout rates to 10%; x 40% of Europeans aged 30-34 completing third level education; x 3% of the EU’s GDP invested in the essential sector of Research and Development; x greenhouse gas emissions cut by 20%, compared to 1990, or even by 30%, if the circumstances favour the latter; x 20% of the energy consumed originating from renewable sources; x 20% better energy efficiency; x 20 million people relieved from poverty across the EU. Albeit 20 appears to be a “magical number” in this assessment, so as to poetically be in keeping with the desired completion year of the agenda, truth be told, compared to the initial state of affairs, the goals embedded in the strategy appear to be clearly stated, and, what is perhaps more important, measurable (M). To elaborate on the connexion between the first two attributes, we clearly notice the concrete delimitation of priorities, as the European Semester explains what each actor should be in charge of, whilst the numerical data enables both the EU itself and us, as scholars, to accurately analyse the progress of the endeavour. Of course, not everything which is expressed through numbers is necessarily fully measurable - a case in point is the last indicator on the list, namely the poverty level, which is quite difficult to pinpoint throughout the European Union, in the absence of economic and social cohesion amongst all 28 member states.6 Nevertheless, the “measurable” criterion is formally met, as is the case of the “achievable” attribute. For the latter to be in keeping with Europe 2020, it is to be proven that the objectives it relies on are backed by concrete activities and means that indisputably lead to their accomplishment. As we shall see in detail, the concrete activities in this regard are guided in each member state by the so-called Country Specific Recommendations, while the intricate procedure of the European Semester enables all EU institutions, along with consultative bodies like the 5

Europe 2020. A European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020, Brussels, 2010, p. 3. 6 Owen Parker, Cosmopolitan Government in Europe: Citizens and Entrepreneurs in Postnational Politics, Routledge, 2013, p. 156.

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European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, together with the member states themselves, to play an active role in the process.7 The question that arises at this point is: what makes Europe 2020 relevant (R)? This criterion is always connected to the context in which the endeavour is initiated and, later, implemented. As we have already underlined, the auspices of the economic downturn, quite visible in 2010, when Europe 2020 took shape, polished it to fit the needs of a European economy in need of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. It appears that the priorities, revolving around paramount areas such as education, energy efficiency, environmental protection and quality of life are in keeping with the current needs of the Community. The seven Flagship Initiatives8 reflect such a comprehensive approach, as does the 2014-2020 multiannual budget of the EU. Without slipping into idealism or making a point of praising the relevance of Europe 2020, which would be contrary to our previous critical approach, it remains evident that, at least on paper, it sums up those priorities which are on everybody’s lips, when they refer to the actions of the EU. Perhaps the easiest of all, the time (T) criterion is embedded in the very name of the agenda, following the ten-year pattern inaugurated in 2000 in Lisbon. Nevertheless, amid a rapidly changing geopolitical and economic context, one should not be so naive as to consider that the implementation thread is to remain unaltered and must follow some sort of symmetry, regardless of the ups and downs occurring, say, on the market. This was, in fact, one of the flaws of the Lisbon Strategy, which failed to adapt and tackle the damaging effects of the crisis, despite the worrying reports predicting its failure, like the Wim Kok report.9 This analysis of Europe 2020, as well as the overall picture presented, is meant to enable us to turn our attention to the state of its implementation in Romania, as a useful case study, indicative of the situation in EastCentral Europe in this regard. This assessment will then make it possible 7

Eric Marlier, David Natali, Europe 2020: Towards a More Social EU?, Peter Lang, 2010, pp. 24-25. 8 Paul Copeland, Dimitris Papadimitriou, The EU's Lisbon Strategy: Evaluating Success, Understanding Failure, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 219. 9 See: Facing the challenge. The Lisbon strategy for growth and employment. Report from the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok, November 2004. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/research/evaluations/pdf/archive/fp6-evidencebase/evaluation_studies_and_reports/evaluation_studies_and_reports_2004/the_lis bon_strategy_for_growth_and_employment__report_from_the_high_level_group. pdf. Last access: 20 September 2014.

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to emit a series of hypotheses germane to the potential exhibited by a state of the Eastern Partnership, the Republic of Moldova, in eventually tackling such a complex agenda as Europe 2020.

Europe 2020 in Romania. A current diagnosis Romania’s implementation of the Europe 2020 Agenda has been guided by the Country Specific Recommendations, which, at their turn, should be in keeping with the Annual Growth Surveys and the priorities set therewith. The Annual Growth Survey for 2014, namely the one we are chiefly interested in so as to assess the degree of readiness of Romania for coping with the future challenges of the Agenda, becomes the focus of our attention at this time. Issued on the 13th of November 2013, the document acknowledges the recovery of the European economy, exhibited through macroeconomic indicators and enhanced reform, albeit the use of the phrase “reform fatigue” still justifies itself in the case of some policy areas. Furthermore, the “legacy of the crisis” and high unemployment levels remain significant challenges to date, whilst five major priority areas germane to the provisions of the Agenda remain to be tackled in the course of 2014, namely: the adjustment of fiscal measures to the general growth priority, the restoration of lending to the economy, the promotion of competitiveness, both at present and in the long term, the fight against unemployment and the modernisation of public administrative systems.10 As it becomes apparent, the guidelines set in the Annual Growth Survey for 2014 revolve around two keywords, which can be regarded, to a large extent, as leitmotivs of Europe 2020, growth and competitiveness. What is to be commended is the fact that perhaps for the first time, the correlation between the principal goals of the agenda and the sources of financing made available by the European Union for the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework has been established in a comprehensive manner. The idea of funding clearly-defined priorities is undoubtedly a plus in creating what the artisans of the Annual Growth Survey for 2014 refer to as “synergies” within the intricate set of mechanisms commonly known as the European Semester. According to the document, one of the beneficial effects yielded by this process revolves around the thorny chapter of fiscal consolidation, in terms of reform, containment of public

10

Communication from the Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2014, COM(2013) 800 final, Brussels, 13 November 2013, pp. 3-4.

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debt and stability of the euro. For instance, the value of the fiscal deficit was halved between 2009 and 2013, when it stood at 3.5%.11 On the other hand, the degree of effectiveness of the measures adopted by member states pertaining to youth unemployment remains somewhat modest, amid the need to further increase the flexibility of the market, from the standpoint of its three sectors. According to Eurostat, which provides the latest available data, in March 2014, redundancy within EU28, lay at 10.5%, i.e. a fall of 0.4% compared to the previous year. The same encouraging, albeit slow-paced trend, accounts for the evolution of the unemployment rate of the Eurozone countries, traditionally higher than in the whole Union. Hence, in March 2014, the figure stood at 11.8%, marking some progress compared to 12 months before, when it was estimated at 12.0%, but without any noticeable improvement since December 2013. In light of this, it becomes useful to assess this paramount indicator both in Romania and in the Republic of Moldova, so as to see the degree to which unemployment represents a concern at this time. Moreover, the specific problem of youth unemployment remains a major issue in the Europe 2020 Agenda, as the current data (from April 2014) exhibits the figure of 22.5% in EU-28 (down from 23.6 in April 2013) and 23.5 in the Eurozone (compared to 23.9% in April 2013), i.e. ten percent above the general value.12 In the context of such worrying figures, but given the existence of some progress attained through the correct implementation of the European Semester, the Annual Growth Survey for 2014 reiterates some guidelines which are meant to further develop the process, from a general perspective. The latter include: more involvement on the part of national and regional institutions, as well as the civil society, better coordination of member states participating in the common currency area and, perhaps most importantly, more involvement of member states in terms of implementing the recommendations set out through the country-specific recommendations. This is set against the background of the persistence of other problems than the high unemployment levels, namely the debt of numerous member states, dysfunctional fiscal measures and unsustainable social protection systems.13 The need for investment chiefly covers those sectors which lie at the core of the Europe 2020 Agenda, whose situation is also worthy of being investigated in the two countries that our study focuses on, namely 11

Ibidem, p. 6. Eurostat news release euro indicators, 83/2014, 3 June 2014. 13 Communication from the Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2014, op. cit., pp. 6-7. 12

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Romania and the Republic of Moldova. Such priority areas include education, research & development, energy and climate change, along with the reduction of poverty. That said, it becomes essential to conduct an up-to-date analysis on how Romania is doing with regard to the major indicators of Europe 2020 and to propose some pertinent explanations for its setbacks, while drawing the guidelines for its future performance. This needs to be followed by a comparative approach aimed at the Republic of Moldova, so as to assess the presence of potential synergies, but also notable differences between the two neighbours, albeit the latter does not participate per se in the implementation of the strategy. Why is this useful? Because the Republic of Moldova has made a decisive step towards EU integration, amid the tense geopolitical climate in the EaP region, and its readiness to embrace the major guidelines of the European Union needs to be ascertained at this time. As far as Romania is concerned, its implementation of Europe 2020 comes amid an improved macroeconomic situation, to the extent that the excessive deficit procedure was discontinued in 2013. While unemployment in itself is not a major concern, youth redundancy rates remain somewhat high, which is one of the indicators that have to be taken into account in the implementation of the strategy. With regard to the country specific recommendations issued for 201314, Romania managed to mend its overall financial situation, it improved the absorption rate of structural funds and it continued reform in paramount sectors such as justice, tax collection, energy and healthcare. An analysis of the areas in which the country still has to make adjustments reveals the leitmotivs of the entire reform process, encompassing poverty, social exclusion, infrastructure, competitiveness, corruption and administrative efficiency, to name just a few. In the light of the country specific recommendations for Romania in 2014, several priority areas arise, including the implementation of a precautionary financial assistance package of no more than 2 billion euros until 2015, meant to tackle the vulnerability of the banking sector. Additional priorities refer to tax collection, given the current rate of undeclared workers and fraud; healthcare problems, due to informal payments and insufficient access; the need to strengthen the active ageing strategy and enhanced integration of young people on the labour market, considering that youth unemployment was situated at a worrying 17.3% in 2013; comprehensive minimum wage setting criteria; improved access to 14

Council Recommendation on Romania’s 2014 national reform programme and delivering a Council opinion on Romania’s 2014 convergence programme, COM(2014) 424 final, Brussels, 2 June 2014.

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vocational education and training, as well as high dropout rates, chiefly amongst the Roma minority; growing social inequality; an increase in administrative capacity; the low absorption rate of structural funds; fighting corruption; energy markets; and transport infrastructure.15 The analysis performed by the European Commission is mature and addresses roughly all the key areas in which progress is needed at this time, whilst the concrete recommendations are somewhat general, the elaborate measures meant to implement them remaining to a large extent in the hands of government. To elaborate, with a 7.3% unemployment rate in 2013, Romania’s economy stands out as moderately recovered after the economic downturn, but if one considers that youth unemployment stands 15% higher, it becomes apparent that immediate measures are needed.16 The third level education indicator is 22.8%, the second poorest result in the EU, which is somewhat in keeping with the youth unemployment problem, albeit countries such as Spain exhibit more worrying trends in this regard.17 Another relevant indicator is the budget allocation for research and development, which, in Romania, is no more than 0.49% of GDP (data available for 2012)18, which is particularly worrying, as there is only one EU country, Cyprus, which spends less on this key sector of Europe 2020.19 The prospects for Romania refer to a 2% allocation before the deadline of the strategy is met. Much better results are attained by Romania in terms of energy consumption, with a 22.9% share of renewable energy in the gross final energy consumption, compared to its target of 24% for 2020. On the other hand, the rate of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion is alarmingly high in Romania, standing at an incredible 41.7%, surpassed only by our southern neighbour, Bulgaria, where nearly half the population is exposed to this danger.20

15

Ibidem. Romanian National Institute of Statistics, Press Release no. 95 of 17 April 2014. 17 Eurostat news release, Europe 2020 education indicators in the EU28 in 2013, 57/2014, 11 April 2014. 18 Romanian National Institute of Statistics, Press Release no. 277 of 12 November 2013. 19 According to Eurostat, Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&langua ge=en&pcode=t2020_20. Last access: 20 September 2014. 20 Data provided by Eurostat, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe2020-in-your-country/romania/progress-towards-2020-targets/index_en.htm. Last access: 20 September 2014. 16

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This rather technical assessment of Romania’s progress towards the achievement of the goals of Europe 2020 reveals the feasibility of the project and the fact that its goals are tailored according to the specifics and potential of the Romanian economy and administrative capacity. One may also notice the balance that the European Commission has attempted to instil into these priorities, shifting the effort from chapters such as energy efficiency, where Romania is given generous targets, towards sensitive areas, like education and the ever challenging research & development expenditure. Conceived amid the thorny economic downturn and the sovereign debt problems (the latter affects Romania to a relatively small extent, due to controversial historical reasons), Europe 2020 is a genuine agenda for both Old and New Europe, a dichotomy that we favour for academic purposes. For the first time in their tumultuous history, the ex-communist states have been made part of a major multiannual planning endeavour of the European Union, one which takes into account their potential and attempts to exploit the beneficial contribution they can have to the furtherance of the integration process. As far as Romania is concerned, the economic reality is reflected chiefly in a narrative manner, taking the form of the rather useful country specific recommendation, whilst the social status of the country finds an echo in the indicators of the Europe 2020 strategy, in such cases as poverty or school dropout rates. Apart from being an interesting study document for researching Romania’s stance within the EU at this time, the progress report on the country’s implementation of the most recent strategy at the Community level exhibits a social, economic and even political context in need of more transparency, commitment and maturity, if the long-term indicators are to be reached.

The Republic of Moldova – performance indicators in the light of Europe 2020 It is in no way our intention to outline the fact that the Republic of Moldova is an active part of the Europe 2020 agenda or that it is required in a formal way to adopt a set of indicators pertaining to this strategy, much like the 28 EU member states. On the contrary, the Republic of Moldova has neither the official quality nor the ability to make a point of guiding its economic and social policies in accordance with the precepts of Europe 2020. Nevertheless, in the light of the Eastern Partnership and Moldova’s ever closer ties with the EU, it becomes important to assess the country’s potential from a macroeconomic perspective, but also in terms

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of policy making and adjustment to the requirements of the Community, in the long term. On the 29th of November 2013, at the infamous Vilnius Summit, the Republic of Moldova initialled the Association Agreement with the European Union, while on the 27th of June 2014, it signed this crucial document paving the way for a pro-western future of the country. In a record-setting move, the Moldavian Parliament completed the ratification process no later than on the 2nd of July21, amid strong opposition on the part of the Communist Party; it was followed by Romania, whose Parliament ratified the treaty the next day, restating its support for the integration of the Republic of Moldova into the EU. The importance of this act goes beyond the geopolitical sphere, as it encompasses a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, commonly known as DCFTA, enabling Moldavian products to gain a different status on the common market and, thus, providing some commercial security to a country whose main trading partner remains the Russian Federation. In the words of Moldavian President Nicolae Timofti: “definite prospect of EU membership should be the next keynote step of Moldova”, a statement which comes as no surprise, albeit some suspense does surround the outcome of the next general elections, scheduled for the 30th of November 2014. The pro-European President added: “we are determined to advance towards Europe because the people of Moldova deserve to live in a fashion other European people do”, which makes us even more determined to evaluate the potential exhibited by the Republic of Moldova in the current state of affairs, from the viewpoint of the Europe 2020 agenda.22 The market economy of the Republic of Moldova is characterised by a set of unique features, one of the most important being the high contribution of Moldavians working abroad to the revenues of the country, accounting for more than 1.5 billion dollars per year.23 This is undoubtedly due to a cultural feature of the nation, Moldavians being prone to keep in touch with their extended families and properties. The country’s economic

21

European Parliament. Delegation to the EU-Moldova Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. Notice to members. Information note on the work of the delegation to the EU-Moldova parliamentary cooperation committee, DG for External Policies of the Union, July 2014, p. 3. 22 Moldova sets record in ratifying EU association agreement, Euractiv, 2 July 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/moldova-sets-recordratifying-eu-association-agreement-303249. Last access: 20 September 2014. 23 Dmitri Katsy, International Relations: from Local Changes to Global Shifts, St. Petersburg State University Press, 2007, p. 80.

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growth is substantial, statistically speaking, amounting to 8.9% in 201324, compared to the previous year, albeit nominally, GDP per capita stands as $3.800, the lowest of any EaP country.25 In fact, due to the size and nature of its economy, the country exhibited only one year of recession amid the economic crisis, namely 2009.26 The balance between the sectors of its economy reveal a clear dominance of the third sector, with about 66.2%, followed by a relative tie between industry and agriculture, although the latter accounts for most of the country’s exports.27 This being said, the productivity levels of the Moldavian agricultural sector are particularly low, compared to those of the EU member states, while other problems include the ban on wine exports to Russia, following the signing of the Association Agreement, a punishment which had already been administered to the Republic of Moldova by the Kremlin in 2006. Given the fact that the contribution of the wine industry to the GDP of the country is substantial, the European Union immediately responded by opening up its market to Moldavian wines28, whilst PM Iurie Leancă lobbied in favour of wine trade in the USA too, in 2014.29 The fact that the Republic of Moldova possesses a small economy renders its macroeconomic indicators somewhat less relevant, which is why one should not jump to conclusions after superficially analysing such 24 National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Gross Domestic Product in the Republic of Moldova in 2013, http://www.statistica.md/newsview.php?l=en&id=4350&idc=168. Last access: 20 September 2014. 25 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Moldova, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/md.html. Last access: 20 September 2014. 26 Republic of Moldova: Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation, Fifth Reviews Under the Extended Arrangement and Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, and Requests for Waivers for Non-Observance and Modification of Performance Criteria, IMF Country Report No. 12/288, Washington DC, October 2012, p. 4. 27 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Moldova, loc. cit. 28 Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with the Prime Minister of Moldova, Iurie Leancă, Joint press conference, Chi‫܈‬inău, 12 June 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-453_en.htm. Last access: 20 September 2014. 29 Iurie Leancă: Preúedintele SUA, Barack Obama, va face o vizită la Chiúinău până la finalul mandatului, Timpul.md, 14 March 2014, http://www.timpul.md/articol/iurie-leanca-presedintele-sua-barack-obama-va-faceo-vizita-la-chisinau-pana-la-finalul-mandatului-56414.html. Last access: 20 September 2014.

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data as the 18% public debt or 5% unemployment rate, compared to much more worrying figures in most EU member states. The fact that 40% of the country’s population is employed in agriculture is one problematic aspect, given the poor efficiency of this unmodernised sector. Furthermore – and this is where the data become particularly relevant for our research –, the absolute poverty indicator for 2009 stands at 26.3%, according to a report issued by the IMF in 201130, which translates to roughly 875.000, according to the Europe 2020 calculation method, dealing with absolute values. If one considers that the national indicator for Romania is to reduce the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by 580.000 in the ten-year time frame, at a population roughly six times more numerous than that of the Republic of Moldova, then the indicator becomes challenging for the latter. However, it is worth noting that the similar reports illustrate that the poverty rate of the Republic of Moldova is following a downward trend, which accounts for an optimistic prospect. Continuing down the path to Europe 2020, we should turn our attention to the quality of education in the country, which is witnessing a constant decrease in the number of university graduates over the last few years31, reaching 24.848 students in 2013, according to the National Statistics Office, at a population of 301.781 aged 30-34. An approximation would enable us to predict that one third of Moldavians in this age group have graduated from higher education, which is considerable, given the EU 2020 target of 40%. While the Republic of Moldova spends 9,5% of its modest GDP on education, compared to the 5,5% EU average, the effects of this measure do not have a significant impact on such indicators as the school dropout rate, one of the major concerns of the Europe 2020 strategy. Hence, the most recent data available in this regard, dating from 2010, show the figure of 24.5%32, which is far higher than the EU 2020 target, set at less than 10%. The fact that the country is predominantly rural does play an important role in the analysis of this indicator, since 30

Republic of Moldova: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—Progress Report, IMF Country Report No. 11/94, Washington DC, April 2011, p. 5. 31 National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Statistical Report no. 1-SGL, nr. 2-prof, nr. 3-colegiu, nr. 4-IS (INV0102), http://statbank.statistica.md/pxweb/Dialog/view.asp?ma=INV0102&ti=Elevi%2Fst udenti+by+Indicatori%2C+Institutii+and+Ani&path=../quicktables/RO/07%20IN V/INV01/&lang=1. Last access: 21 September 2014. 32 Moldova 2020. Strategia Naаională de Dezvoltare a Republicii Moldova (The National Development Strategy of the Republic of Moldova), p. 11. http://particip.gov.md/public/files/strategia/Moldova_2020_proiect.pdf. Last access: 21 September 2014.

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there are 196.000 students enrolled in rural schools, compared to 156.000 in urban ones. Faulty educational policies, slow reform and poor conditions in schools, combined with a precarious overall standard of living, are undoubtedly among the factors that account for this situation which requires immediate attention on the part of the Moldavian government. To sum up, an analysis of the education-based criteria of Europe 2020 applied to the situation of the Republic of Moldova reveals various contradictions, as school dropout remains particularly high, whereas the rate of university attendance is considerable. Nevertheless, albeit the country does implement the Bologna Process mechanisms at this time (it adhered to the Bologna process in May 2005)33, strong reform is needed in the area of quality and compatibility with EU education, in order to ensure that the mutual recognition of qualifications will be properly applied in the not too distant future. With regard to the protection of the environment, as a key means of ensuring sustainable development, the data available for the Republic of Moldova indicate that the country is currently implementing various European directives in this respect. A government directive from 200734 draws the guidelines of the energy strategy of the country until 2020 and aims to implement a renewable energy share of 6% of the total energy consumption of the country by 2010, and 20% by 2020, exactly the same figure provided by the Europe 2020 agenda (Romania’s goal is set at 24%, given the high potential of the country in this regard, chiefly in terms of wind power). This would lead to an annual decrease in CO2 emissions amounting to 167-210 thousand tonnes. In fact, according to the abovementioned document, the CO2 emissions indicator of the Republic of Moldova decreased by 70% between 1990 and 2007. If we take into account the fact that the EU 2020 target is to lower carbon dioxide emissions by 20%, or 30%, if the conditions are favourable, compared to the reference milestone of 1990, the performance of the Republic of Moldova becomes considerable and its potential to converge with the requirements of the strategy becomes apparent, at least within the energy efficiency chapter. The next question that arises in our research is: how much does the Republic of Moldova spend on research and development, one of the 33

Education Policies for Students at Risk and those with Disabilities in South Eastern Europe, OECD Publishing, 2006, p. 232. 34 HG 958/21.08.2007 regarding the Energy strategy of the Republic of Moldova until 2020, Government of the Republic of Moldova, http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&id=325108. Last access: 21 September 2014.

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major priorities of Europe 2020? According to the Research and Development Strategy of the Republic of Moldova until 202035, in 2008, the government allocated 0,8% of its GDP to this area, while the priority for 2020 is 1.5%, i.e. half of what the Europe 2020 strategy plans for the European Union, taken as a whole. Nevertheless, if we consider the fact that the priority for Romania stipulates a value of 2%, the goal set by the Moldavian government becomes somewhat balanced and rational. Let us not forget that at present, Romania spends less that 0.5% of its GDP on this paramount sector, as we have clearly presented above. This being said, the Republic of Moldova needs to improve its citizens’ access to postuniversity studies, chiefly PhDs and postdoctoral programmes, by providing supplementary grants and initiating prominent research projects. Even though the number of PhD holders has trebled in the last ten years, there is still a need to develop the range of research initiatives, both in the area of exact sciences and in that of humanities. The last major indicator that we need to turn our attention to, in order to complete this brief analysis of the Republic of Moldova’s compatibility with the priorities of the most recent multiannual agenda drawn by the European Union refers to the employment rate of the population aged 20 to 64. In this case, the target for the EU is set at 75%, while for Romania, it amounts to 70%. As far as the Republic of Moldova is concerned, the situation seems gloomy, as the overall employment rate stands at 41.9%, in the age group 15-64, for which data are available, in accordance with the Eurostat criteria.36 With a 5.1% unemployment rate, the situation is once again fairly controversial, as numerous Moldavians are working abroad and illegal/undeclared labour is blossoming, while there is a descending trend in the last semester with regard to the employment rate. Major social discrepancies occur in the cleavage between urban and rural areas, as well as between men and women, while child labour remains problematic. Active ageing is insufficiently implemented, whereas the generalisation of the retirement age for both men and women is set for the year 2034. The current retirement age stands at 57 for women and 62 for men, which is no longer in keeping with the priorities of the European 35

The Research and Development Strategy of the Republic of Moldova until 2020, Government of the Republic of Moldova, http://www.gov.md/public/files/ordinea_de_zi/20.11.2013/Intr04.pdf. Last access: 21 September 2014. 36 National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Labour force in the Republic of Moldova: employment and unemployment in the I-st quarter 2014, 6 June 2014, http://www.statistica.md/newsview.php?l=ro&idc=168&id=4419. Last access: 21 September 2014.

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Union, whose aim is to push the retirement age towards the value of 65 or even beyond. Romania is already implementing the strategy, which has so far led to an increase in the retirement age to 59 for women and 64 for men.

Conclusions This research has followed two main pathways, both of which revolve around the implementation of the Europe 2020 agenda in extenso. The former has dealt with the concrete progress of Romania, as a member state of the European Union, in meeting its specific targets related to the agenda, as shown in the country specific recommendations issued by the European Commission. The latter, albeit largely based on quantitative data and document analyses, remains largely hypothetical, as it presents a simulation of how a non-EU member state would comply with the objectives of the aforementioned strategy. Nevertheless, we stand by our conviction that the validity of this research endeavour is explained by the fact that the pro-European government of the Republic of Moldova has managed to implement numerous directives and recommendations of the European Commission to date, drafted in accordance with the guidelines set by Europe 2020. It is our firm belief that this ambitious ten-year strategy of the Community has become a paramount set of principles, whose application is the duty of not only the 28 member states, but also of the candidate countries, as well as the aspiring candidates, the latter category encompassing the Republic of Moldova. Hence, the assessment of the progress the country has made so far in areas germane to the complex set of priorities of Europe 2020 exhibits added value to the state of research in this regard. Some parallels have been drawn during this study, chiefly between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, pertaining to concrete indicators inscribed in the Europe 2020 strategy. This approach has enabled us to outline some common challenges, but also notable differences between two countries that are connected by a broad range of cultural elements, while differing substantially in terms of size, economic strength, demographics and policy making. Not surprisingly, despite the fact that the Republic of Moldova, unlike its larger neighbour, is under no obligation to formally adopt the requirements of Europe 2020, its willingness to integrate numerous provisions of the document into its long-term strategies and the act of drafting 2020-based initiatives reveals the interest of its government to prepare for EU membership by means of such long-term planning tools.

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The macroeconomic indicators of the Republic of Moldova are somewhat difficult to translate into success or failure in comparison with the guidelines of Europe 2020, because of the specific traits of the country’s economy. However, pertinent conclusions may be drawn with regard to the assets and shortcomings the country exhibits at this time, either by comparing them to Romania’s case, or by directly taking into consideration the figures that make up the EU’s agenda. Thus, the Republic of Moldova still confronts with a difficult situation in the thorny area of education, albeit some reforms and progress have become noticeable in the last five years. While Romania does struggle with school dropout, the Republic of Moldova is in a particularly worrying situation with respect to this key indicator for future growth and social inclusion. Both countries have a significant part of their population situated in poorly developed rural areas, which accounts for this phenomenon and prompts swift action from their policy makers. Moreover, tertiary education in the two states requires supplementary attention, although compared to the total number of high school graduates, the situation is not necessarily grave. Judging, however, in absolute terms, it is clear that access to universities needs to be enhanced in both cases and the quality of higher education requires immediate attention, especially in the Republic of Moldova. This situation reflects itself in the quality of labour force and, inevitably, in the employment rate. While unemployment per se is not a major concern in either country subjected to our analysis, youth redundancy rates are worrying, as is active ageing, notably in the case of the Republic of Moldova. The discrepancy between Romania and the Republic of Moldova with regard to the employment criterion remains alarmingly high, although both countries struggle with phenomena such as brain drain, emigration in general and undeclared labour, costing their national budgets millions of euros every year. Remaining in the area of factors which impact long-term smart growth, the matter of public expenditure on research and development remains particularly thorny both in Romania and in the Republic of Moldova, as the two countries are amongst the worst performers in Europe in this respect. Nevertheless, while Romania has significantly improved its absorption of European funds dedicated to research projects and has begun implementing paramount initiatives, such as the Măgurele Platform, the opportunities for the Republic of Moldova are greatly restrained, given its current stance in international affairs. Albeit it has not been our intention to examine the current geopolitical climate as a background of either Romania’s or the Republic of Moldova’s performance in the areas covered by Europe 2020, one should not ignore,

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in the latter case, the current Ukraine crisis or the ever challenging TransDniestr issue. Finally, in the complex dossier of environmental issues, the potential of both countries subjected to our scrutiny is particularly high, which is why the targets set for Romania with regard to energy efficiency, CO2 emissions and green energy consumption are ambitious. The progress attained by the Republic of Moldova over the last decade is equally impressive, as is its potential to generate clean, renewable energy, which is why a large degree of optimism may characterise the country’s prospects pertaining to this chapter. Either seen through the lens of the Eastern Partnership, or amid the current geopolitical context, the closeness between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union is welcome and stands on ever more solid bases, as our analyses have shown. As European integration has proven to be the solution for Romania, as it results from our assessment of its progress in the key areas of the Europe 2020 agenda, so too it should become for its smaller neighbour. It is clear that much improvement and an equal amount of assistance are needed from the European Union and Romania in particular, so as to maintain the pro-western climate amongst the dominant political class of the Republic of Moldova, especially given its tumultuous political life, but the outcome of this endeavour begins to yield positive results.

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9. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Moldova, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/md.html. 10. Communication from the Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2014, COM(2013) 800 final, Brussels, 13 November 2013. 11. Council Recommendation on Romania’s 2014 national reform programme and delivering a Council opinion on Romania’s 2014 convergence programme, COM(2014) 424 final, Brussels, 2 June 2014. 12. Education Policies for Students at Risk and those with Disabilities in South Eastern Europe, OECD Publishing, 2006. 13. Europe 2020. A European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020, Brussels, 2010. 14. European Parliament. Delegation to the EU-Moldova Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. Notice to members. Information note on the work of the delegation to the EU-Moldova parliamentary cooperation committee, DG for External Policies of the Union, July 2014. 15. Eurostat data, http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-your-country/ romania/progress-towards-2020-targets/index_en.htm. 16. Eurostat news release euro indicators, 83/2014, 3 June 2014. 17. Eurostat news release, Europe 2020 education indicators in the EU28 in 2013, 57/2014, 11 April 2014. 18. Eurostat, Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&lan guage=en&pcode=t2020_20. 19. Facing the challenge. The Lisbon strategy for growth and employment. Report from the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok, November 2004. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/research/evaluations/pdf/archive/fp6-evidence-base/ evaluation_studies_and_reports/evaluation_studies_and_reports_2004/the_lisb on_strategy_for_growth_and_employment__report_from_the_high_level_grou p.pdf. 20. HG 958/21.08.2007 regarding the Energy strategy of the Republic of Moldova until 2020, Government of the Republic of Moldova, http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&id=325108. 21. Iurie Leancă: Preúedintele SUA, Barack Obama, va face o vizită la Chiúinău până la finalul mandatului, Timpul.md, 14 March 2014, http://www.timpul.md/articol/iurie-leanca-presedintele-sua-barack-obama-vaface-o-vizita-la-chisinau-pana-la-finalul-mandatului-56414.html. 22. Moldova 2020. Strategia Naаională de Dezvoltare a Republicii Moldova (The National Development Strategy of the Republic of Moldova). 23. Moldova sets record in ratifying EU association agreement, Euractiv, 2 July 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/moldova-sets-recordratifying-eu-association-agreement-303249. 24. National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Gross Domestic Product in the Republic of Moldova in 2013, http://www.statistica.md/newsview.php?l=en&id=4350&idc=168.

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25. National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Labour force in the Republic of Moldova: employment and unemployment in the I-st quarter 2014, 6 June 2014, http://www.statistica.md/newsview.php?l=ro&idc=168&id=4419. 26. National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Statistical Report no. 1-SGL, nr. 2-prof, nr. 3-colegiu, nr. 4-IS (INV0102), http://statbank.statistica.md/pxweb/Dialog/view.asp?ma=INV0102&ti=Elevi% 2Fstudenti+by+Indicatori%2C+Institutii+and+Ani&path=../quicktables/RO/07 %20INV/INV01/&lang=1. 27. Remarks by President Barroso following his meeting with the Prime Minister of Moldova, Iurie Leancă, Joint press conference, Chi‫܈‬inău, 12 June 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-453_en.htm. 28. Republic of Moldova: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—Progress Report, IMF Country Report No. 11/94, Washington DC, April 2011. 29. Republic of Moldova: Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation, Fifth Reviews Under the Extended Arrangement and Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, and Requests for Waivers for Non-Observance and Modification of Performance Criteria, IMF Country Report No. 12/288, Washington DC, October 2012. 30. Romanian National Institute of Statistics, Press Release no. 277 of 12 November 2013. 31. Romanian National Institute of Statistics, Press Release no. 95 of 17 April 2014. 32. The Research and Development Strategy of the Republic of Moldova until 2020, Government of the Republic of Moldova, http://www.gov.md/public/files/ordinea_de_zi/20.11.2013/Intr04.pdf.

THE CASE FOR A NATO PIVOT ON THE EASTERN FLANK OCTAVIAN MANEA AND PAULINA IĩEWICZ

Abstract This chapter will explore the state of affairs in the transatlantic relations before the emerging of the Ukrainian crisis in early 2014, with special emphasis on the security policies adopted by European frontline states as a consequence of a new structural geopolitical reality in their immediate neighbourhood. In this context, the paper will highlight and discuss the impact of the US rebalancing towards Asia, of the defence sequestration in Washington, but also of the Russian military modernization programme for the NATO CEE allies. Overall, the authors will identify practical recommendations that NATO should bear in mind when rethinking its security posture after the Crimea annexation. At the same time, they discuss in detail the outcome of the latest NATO summit with an emphasis on why the reassurance package adopted by the Alliance is not sufficient in the absence of a real NATO pivot on the Eastern Flank. In the end, a rebalanced NATO presence on the Eastern flank of the Alliance, combined with a clear programme for investing in an antiaccess/area denial regional portfolio seems to become an imperative for keeping Russia at bay and restoring the Alliance’s deterrence potential. Keywords: NATO, Ukraine, United States, Russia, Eastern flank We are again at a geopolitical turning point. As the 2012 National Intelligence Council report predicted: “the present recalls past transition points—such as 1815, 1919, or 1945— when the path forward was not clear-cut and the world faced the possibility of different global futures. In all those cases, the transition was

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The Case for the Rebalancing of NATO on the Eastern Flank extended and re-balancing was partly a matter of trial and error,”1

It is a context where “the first thing that we need to do is to go to basics and define what the problem is,” as RAND expert Stephen Larrabee put it. It was precisely that approach which made NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement, and in general the whole strategic project underwriting it, successful. In light of Russia’s actions in Crimea in March 2014 and, subsequently, in eastern Ukraine, this task has been, in essence, completed largely without NATO’s involvement. In the run-up to the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, the discussion had been primarily focused on reviving the Alliance and finding a new rationale for its continuity post-Afghanistan. The aggregate effect of the latest trends observed in the Euro-Atlantic ecosystem – increased expeditionary fatigue and parochial inward focus, the culture of Atlanticism in full retreat, sharp decline in defence budgets, the rebalancing of the American strategic priorities, US fiscal unpredictability – were creating a structural context in which “a long established security system that has worked extremely well [is] slowly being hollowed out.”2 In the absence of a clearly defined strategic adversary, which was the cornerstone of the Alliance when it was first created, NATO appeared to suffer a crisis of identity. For many years, arguments had been stated that NATO had to “go out-of-area or go out of business” - a perfectly valid premise until this spring. Since then, however, the strategic context has undergone such a tectonic shift that NATO’s original raison d’être has been restored almost completely, save “keeping the Germans down.”3 But how should we define this turning point in global politics? Last year, Walter Russell Mead published a piece in The American Interest whose title captures symbolically the essence of our time: The end of history ends. His thesis was that we had reached a new stage in world history, where a coalition of great powers (China, Russia) with anti-statusquo ambitions began to gain ground and they were preparing the stage to challenge up-front the traditional order favoured by the US and its allies4. 1

National Intelligence Council, “Global trends 2030: alternative worlds”, 2012, p. 105. 2 Lawrence Freedman, “The Primacy of Alliance: deterrence and European security”, IFRI Security Studies Center, March-April 2013, p. 28. 3 As the first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay stated that the organization's goal was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down". 4 Walter Russell Mead, “The end of history ends”, The American Interest, December 2nd, 2013, http://www.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/12/02/2013the-end-of-history-ends-2/, consulted in September 2014.

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Seen from this perspective, there is an emerging common denominator associated with the virtual membership in this revisionist coalition: all have grievances against the Pax Americana; all are engaged in massive modernization processes of their military forces, especially in what they see as their comparative, asymmetrical advantages, the anti-access/area denial postures. Moreover, the Russian-Georgian war, the establishment of the Chinese ADIZ over the Senkaku islands and even the annexation of Crimea show that the preferred way to contest the liberal international order is through low-intensity challenges (none of them was designed as a large scale form of aggression), whose purpose, in part, is to test the US’ security commitment and willingness to help its allies and also to see how far they can go5.

The broader context of a “communication exercise” Especially in times of geopolitical transition, statecraft is about stagecraft - about communicating and sending the appropriate message to a regional or global audience. In fact, it is precisely this strategy that has been employed by the Obama administration in its rebalancing policy towards the Indo-Pacific region - it has placed emphasis on the flexible reposturing of the US military around the region and has sent this message through the Air Sea Battle concept. Similarly, during the early days of the Cuban missile crisis, the whole purpose of enforcing the US blockade against Cuba was “to ensure that the demonstration of American resolve sent the proper message to the Soviets.”6 It was conceived more as a “communication exercise” rather than just a military operation. This idea was also captured in the 2001 iconic movie “Thirteen days”, in a conversion between Robert McNamara and Admiral Anderson: “You don't understand a thing, do you, Admiral? This isn't a blockade. This, all this, is language, a new vocabulary the likes of which the world has never seen. This is President Kennedy communicating with Secretary Khrushchev.”

In the same vein, for a few years now, NATO’s Eastern periphery has been the target of a concerted multidimensional Russian “communication 5

This is an emerging geopolitical pattern monitored closely by Wess Mitchell (president of the Center for European Policy Analysis) and Jakub Grygiel (Professor at Paul H. Nitze SAIS) in their forthcoming book. 6 Colonel H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, 1998, p. 31.

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exercise”, using a flexible toolbox of hard and soft power assets. Energy suspension, trade wars, cyber probing, complex offensive military exercises (some of which, like the Zapad 2009, simulated the use of nuclear weapons against Warsaw) and now hybrid warfare in Ukraine have all become part of what could be called an awakened great power’s signature at NATO’s periphery. The timing was also wisely chosen: Europe was no longer at the forefront of US foreign policy, there was no overarching core project for NATO in a post-Afghanistan world, and the Euro-Atlantic bond was no longer booming. Added to this were: sharp defence budget contraction, overseas operational fatigue and a gradual US retrenchment in European affairs. To say that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine reversed all these trends would be an overstatement; however, it has initiated a corrective course in key areas. But how did we get here?

Misreading the rebalancing effect In the past few years, the “rebalancing” mantra became the strategic Zeitgeist in Washington. Designed in the early days of first term of the Obama administration, at a time when the US was still engaged in two land wars (Iraq and Afghanistan), its main emphasis was on rebalancing from nation-building overseas to nation-building at home. Moreover, it signalled the need for a larger recalibration of US global commitments and, in general, an administration more willing to lead from behind. In part, this was an answer to the public mood. After more than a decade of permanent war, the fatigue internalized at the level of the public opinion seems to have degenerated into a sort of isolationist tendency, a parochial domestic focus that questions and jeopardises the entire post-WW2 strategic culture that prepared the intellectual ground for America to become the custodian of the international system. There are visible signs that the traditional internationalist bipartisan foreign policy consensus is no longer taken for granted and is becoming more questionable. For many on the Hill, the US’ traditional alliances (like NATO or the bilateral ones in the Far East), which for more than 60 years have provided stable regional security ecosystems, are increasingly perceived as being too expensive, and many of the allies are deemed free riders on the back of the US tax payers’ money. In his farewell speech that he gave in Brussels, Secretary Robert Gates made a stark warning: “the blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are

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apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defence. Nations apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden left by reductions in European defence budgets. (…) Future US political leaders– those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me – may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO (and in other alliances for that matter-my note) worth the cost.”

For an entire new generation of politicians, alliances, these essential regional public goods and central tools of US statecraft, are becoming expendable assets. Overall, the US fiscal deficits, the unpredictability of the sequestration and its ripple effects, the retrenchment calls, the political gridlock in Washington, all these trends create an environment not very well suited for reassuring in the long term the US’ regional allies. In the end, rebalancing is about sending the right message about America’s purpose in the world to a global audience. The prominent question becomes: what kind of signal do you want to send to the rest of the world in terms of America’s role in the world? The problem is that when connecting the dots between the rebalancing and the other significant domestic political trends (sequestration of the DoD budget, which affects the immediate readiness of the US military and creates the potential for a hollow one later, down the road, a broken bipartisan foreign policy consensus, failing to follow through its own established redline), the effect is, by default, a PR message that rebalance is about retrenchment and retreat of the US from the world. And more than anywhere else, in international relations, perception matters and remains a key symbolic currency. In time, the biggest problem with misreading the rebalance as a gradual retrenchment of the US from the world is the fact that it might be perceived by opportunistic powers (like Iran, Russia and China) as an invitation to seize the moment to exploit the apparent retreat of the US or the lack of a US core interest, by expanding their soft and hard influence in their geopolitical “near abroad”. What we have seen over the last few years as an emerging trend is a clear-cut pattern of probing and testing the American weakness and willingness, especially at the peripheries of US global commitments, when there is a perception of US reluctance to engage or stand by its most exposed allies, or a lack of US leadership. As Robert Kaplan put it: “They are testing the US because Obama has been what I call a Realist president, actually in the vein of George H.W. Bush. But there is a difference. George H.W. Bush fought in WW2, he had experienced the

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The Case for the Rebalancing of NATO on the Eastern Flank Cold War in government. He was an active Realist. Obama is an inactive Realist. Obama is much more I don’t want to get involved in any tragic military adventures. That’s fine as far as it goes. But what is being tested is his resolve. His resolve in North-Eastern Europe or in the Pacific basin.7”

Overall, when surveying the current strategic environment, Robert Kaplan points out a few trends that are coming together and make probing and testing more likely in the context of the military rise of traditional regional superpowers: “a president who makes very cold, unsentimental decisions, which is very good, but on the other hand is not an activist in foreign policy; the US economy is seen as fragile; the US public is seen as being tired of overseas involvement because of the history of the 9/11 decade8.”

In this context, as we move forward, what we should expect from the leadership of the opportunistic powers is a careful assessment of perceived shifts in the relative regional balances of power, changes in the political will to back-up positions on issues related to core interests of the opportunistic powers, as key highlighters of future moves against the status-quo: “they will create incidents and probe relentlessly when circumstances suggest that something may have changed, whether timing, leaders, or resources. When met with convincing capability—provided that they do not perceive gratuitous humiliation or threats to the most vital of interests—they typically retreat. When insufficiently opposed, they see how far they can push9.”

In other words, probing and testing is the new game in town, it is the new normal. In this sense, the biggest problem with the rebalancing (mis)read as retreat, retrenchment or weakness is that:

7

Personal interview with Robert D. Kaplan, December 16th, 2013. Ibid. 9 Testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, Associate Professor at the Strategic Research Department of the U.S. Naval War College, on “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications and Recommendations” to Subcommittee on Sea Power and Projection Forces, December 11th, 2013, House Armed Services Committee, http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearingsdisplay?ContentRecord_id=FA9EE283-A136-4C44-B489-F1814AFAB9EA 8

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“if you back away from the most exposed members of the American global footprint, the message signalled to the rising opportunistic powers is that low-cost revisionism is available - and available immediately. And low-cost revisionism is what the opportunistic powers want to grab, as much as political and military influence, with the least trouble10.”

The impact of US defence choices on frontier allies In addition to the abovementioned trends, there has been a constant message projected by core voices in the US defence establishment about the need for US frontline allies to assume the burden of becoming first responders: “a new value proposition might put more emphasis on enabling allies with the capabilities they need to defend their sovereignty more effectively, with less reliance on US forces as the first responders.(…) A new division of labour may emerge whereby frontline allies field needed capabilities to deny adversaries the ability to succeed in an initial invasion or coercive missile campaign11”

…while the US becomes more of a last resort reinforcer by providing a strong retaliatory capability and critical enablers.12

10

Personal interview with Wess Mitchell, “Against US world retrenchment”, in Small Wars Journal, July 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/against-usworld-retrenchment 11 Personal interview with Jim Thomas, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, “Challenging the Conventional Wisdom on US traditional alliances from protectorates to partnerships”, Small Wars Journal, June 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/interview-with-jim-thomas 12 Further complicating the issue was the emergence in the US Congress of a generation of politicians who did not have in their DNA the tradition of Atlanticism as a decisive formative experience and one that increasingly did not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost. One such example was provided by US Congressman Mike Coffman, known for the “Coffman amendment”, who called for the retreat of all US forces from Europe. In early 2012, he sent a letter to the US Secretary of Defense, arguing that there was no strategic reason to maintain the heavy permanent forces in Germany that are a relic of the Cold War. (…) Nothing demands that we maintain any standing force in Europe. On a broader scale, this tendency might highlight the recession of a larger Spykman-ian oriented “strategic culture”, one that anchored the whole postWW2 international liberal order, whose central insight was that without robust

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In fact, the idea of the US being able to swing its forces between regional theatres to provide reinforcements for allies fits within the larger framework highlighted lately by General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the US Joint Force 2020 – a force able to assemble “quickly and apply decisive force anywhere in the world with a wide array of partners” and to “operate as a decentralized network that can aggregate on demand and dial capabilities up or down”, on a case by case basis. This intellectual construct suggests the emergence of a new US global posture aimed at “assuring access” to key theatres (mainly the hinge point regions in the Persian Gulf and East Asia) and an overall regional defence posture focused on creating - in conjunction with local allies land, “air and sea denial networks that would make aggression difficult, costly and unattractive.”13 According to this scenario, the US is to lead from behind, in an enabling or supporting role, building it on key comparative advantages: its air and sea power. The logical conclusion drawn from all these trend-describing statements is “the expectation that European countries will accept greater responsibility for their own security and that of their backyard.”14 Two shifts in US presence in Europe are widely seen as the most representative of this relative retrenchment. In 2009, the Obama administration adopted a new approach with respect to ballistic missile defence in Europe. In doing so, it scrapped the Bush administration’s plans centred on ground-based interceptors in Poland and a radar installation in the Czech Republic, and replaced it with the European Phased Adaptive Approach. While the shift of focus from long-range to short- and intermediate-range missile threats did not represent a qualitatively detrimental change, its symbolic value was a cause for concern. As former Polish president Lech WaáĊsa put it, “It's not that we need the shield, but it's about the way we're treated here.”15 This policy shift was also subject to a PR blunder, as it was announced on the anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland at the beginning of World War II. balances of power in the Old World, the liberties of the New World cannot be maintained. 13 Andrew Krepinevich, “Strategy in a time of austerity: Why the Pentagon should focus on assuring accesss”, Foreign Affairs, November 2012 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138362/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/strategyin-a-time-of-austerity# 14 Lawrence Freedman, “The Primacy of Alliance: deterrence and European security”, IFRI Security Studies Center, March-April 2013, p. 25. 15 Marc Champion and Peter Spiegel, "Allies React to U.S. Missile U-Turn," The Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2009.

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The second significant change of US posture in Europe was announced in 2012, when a new Pentagon defence strategy envisioned the removal of two US Army combat brigades from Europe, a draw-down of about 10,000 personnel. At present, about 67,000 US forces are stationed in Europe, down from the peak of 400,000 during the Cold War.16 What is often overlooked, however, is the quiet build-up of infrastructure which has laid the foundations for NATO’s response in recent months. To compensate for the withdrawal of the brigades, a USbased rapid reaction force was established with the purpose of rotating to Europe for joint training. Moreover, a U.S. Air Force Aviation Detachment was established in 2012 at the àask Air Base in Poland, the first of its kind in Eastern Europe. In March 2014, 12 F-16 fighter jets from Aviano Air Base’s 555th Fighter Squadron in Italy were deployed there at the request of Poland, in light of the events in Crimea. It was suggested that other NATO allies could also be rotated through the facility.17 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) remains the cornerstone of US engagement in Europe. While it consists of US assets, it is to operate under NATO command and control. Some elements have already been deployed in Phase 1: the command and control node in Germany, a radar site in Turkey, and the first of the four planned Aegis destroyers has arrived at its new home port in Rota, Spain, in February 2014. Interceptor sites are to be deployed in Romania in 2015 and in Poland in 2018. Although both the United States and NATO have frequently emphasized that this system is neither aimed at nor capable of defending against an attack from Russia, calls have been made for speeding up Phase 3 of EPAA, by up to two years.18 Although due to technical, financial and political reasons, this will likely not come to fruition, a series of conventional measures have been developed on an ad-hoc basis in order to reassure allies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and an additional package was officially announced during the NATO Summit in Wales on September 4-5, 2014.

16 Paul Belkin, Derek E. Mix, Steven Woehrel, "NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe," Congressional Research Service, July 31, 2014, 21. 17 Samuel Charap and Lee Feinstein, "Obama’s Quiet Offensive," Project Syndicate, April 3, 2014. 18 Rachel Oswald, "GOP Pushing to Speed Up Deployment of Advanced Interceptors in Poland," Global Security Newswire, May 6, 2014.

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The geographical pivot of the frontline allies Furthermore, a quiet rebalance of some US frontline allies, like Poland, has taken place. In August 2013, Polish President Bronisáaw Komorowski highlighted a shift in the nation’s defence priorities from expeditionary missions to a more homeland-centric focus, calling for a national posture more aligned with: “Polish capacities, Polish interests and Polish needs and an end to the overzealous, reckless (...) expeditionary policy of sending our troops to the other side of the world.19”

It is a shift of strategic attention from out-of-area operations (the landmark of post-9/11 environment) to a posture that emphasizes in-area operations and preventing war. This emerging security mind-set outlines the need to invest the bulk of resources in a specific posture that has at its core a “deterrence by denial” focus, consistent – and to some extent complementary – with the idea of returning to a more basic, traditional notion of territorial defence. To some extent, the Polish reorientation is a reminder that “history does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme”. A similar debate was at the heart of NATO’s strategy to counteract Soviet Russia in the 1950s, when… “denial meant preventing gain, by means of a demonstrable ability to stop aggression in its tracks, reducing the potential aggressor’s confidence in a successful invasion.”20

Such a strategy is centred on making it “harder for the adversary to translate its operational means into political ends that it desires.”21 It is, in fact, a way to communicate to the other party and make them conclude “that victory on their side is improbable”, at least not without costs that by far exceed any expected benefits. In the classic framework of ends-waysmeans, the purpose of deterring the adversary (the end) is organically 19

Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Poland brings defense focus back home”, Defense News, October 20th, 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131020/SHOWSCOUT04/310200009/Pola nd-Brings-Defense-Focus-Back-Home 20 Lawrence Freedman, “The Primacy of Alliance: deterrence and European security”, IFRI Security Studies Center, March-April 2013, p. 12. 21 Bradford A. Lee, Theory and history for practitioners, in Competitive Strategies for the 21st century: Theory, history and practice, edited by Thomas G. Mahnken, Stanford University Press, 2012.

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linked with a very specific way that emphasizes building an antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) bubble in Central Europe. This is precisely the security logic that seems to guide and underwrite the most recent Polish defence investments. While visiting Washington in June 2012, Polish Foreign Minister Radosálaw Sikorski (a former Minister of Defence) pledged $40 billion for defence procurement by the end of the decade, with a focus on hardware (the means) usually associated with an A2/AD umbrella. The Polish shopping list reflects an interest in procuring antiship missiles, submarines equipped with tactical missiles, multi-rocket launcher systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as developing a new integrated air-missile defence system.22 In addition, it is expected that the helicopter fleet will be completely modernized along with 128 Leopard 2A4 tanks (soon to be doubled by the acquisition of another 128 Leopard tanks), which will transform Poland into the “heaviest army in both Central and Western Europe.”23 But the centre of gravity of the Polish A2/AD programme is what is dubbed the “Polish Fangs”, emphasizing a Coastal Defence Missile Battalion, combat drones and semi-stealth cruise missiles for the F-16 and a submarine fleet. Overall, these are game-changing capabilities that… “should be perceived as a good example of the leading edge of so-called A2/AD systems, which are raising the costs for potential adversaries to project power and pursue their objectives.24”

This shift, initiated by Poland, might signal a new normal for US global allies placed in geopolitically seismic regions. Homeland territorial deterrence is becoming of essence again: “If one could name one unique novel element in the Polish strategy, it would be the recurrence of deterrence”25, said Dominik Jankowski, an expert analyst for the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland. In the end, the well-established trend of investment in anti-access capabilities designed “to buy time by increasing costs to the assaulting army and by denying it the benefit of a

22

All these items are detailed in CEPA’s issue brief, Beyond air and missile defense: modernization of the Polish Armed Forces, by Dominik P. Jankowski, September 2013, http://www.cepa.org/content/beyond-air-and-missile-defensemodernization-polish-armed-forces 23 CEPA’s issue brief, Beyond air and missile defense: modernization of the Polish Armed Forces, by Dominik P. Jankowski, p. 2. 24 Ibidem, p. 5. 25 Ibidem, p.4.

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quick fait accompli”26 is rapidly becoming the menu of choice for the most exposed states like Taiwan, Japan or Poland. This niche specialization of frontier states highlights an emerging defence/offense division of labour, where (defence/offense) the US allies focus on procurements of defensive capabilities tailored for regional denial/interdiction, while the US provides back-up offensive leverage - deployable, high-end military capabilities geared towards deep strikes on an opponent’s territory. As Elbridge Colby put it: “The US role should be the big high-tech guy, at the upper-end of the escalatory chain. If it is a burglary in the neighbourhood, the Poles should be there, but they always know that they can call in the SWAT teams.”27

The PR message of Russian military modernization In a 2011 speech before Parliament, presenting the foreign policy framework of his country in the second decade of the 21st century, Radosáaw Sikorski emphasized that: “first and foremost, we must realistically assess our resources – be they intellectual, social, economic or military – vis-à-vis those of our rivals. We must establish the correlation of power.”28

The question arises, where is Russia in this correlation of power? Last year, the US had a defence budget of around $645.7 billion (4.12% of GDP), 11 times more than Russia, with its $59.9 billion (around 3.06% of GDP). Over the past year, Russia announced a major modernization plan of its military forces (SAP-2020), envisioning a designed investment of around 23 trillion roubles ($770 billion) by the end of the decade. This is more than the US’ yearly defence budget, and 19 times more than what Poland is prepared to spend on military defensive acquisitions until 2020. The strategic missile troops and aerospace defence forces will receive the bulk of the resources (42%), while the ground

26

Jakub J. Grygiel, “Europe: Strategic drifter”, The National Interest, June 25th, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/article/europe-strategic-drifter-8644 27 Author’s interview with Elbridge Colby, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses’ Strategic Initiatives Group, where he focuses on strategic deterrence, August 2013. 28 The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy for 2011, http://www.mfa.gov.pl/resource/86efef22-d645-4dd8-9532-9e244ed41b1e:JCR

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forces and airborne troops around 13%.29 There is also increasing emphasis on research and development (R&D) investment, which is expected to rise well above the level of 1.04% and 1.25% of GDP spent on R&D recorded in 2008 and 2009, respectively.30 Moreover, the ground forces missile systems are expected to be completely modernized by the end of the decade - 85% of the helicopter fleet, 79% of the artillery and 82% of the armoured vehicles. What would these assets be used for? Last year’s Zapad exercise provides a snapshot of these scenarios. Media reports suggested that the aim of this exercise was to test the ability of Russia’s armed forces to operate across domains (land, sea, air) in joint operations.31 The nature of the scenarios rehearsed (“amphibious landing and anti-landing operations, air and ground strikes on enemy targets, antisubmarine warfare, missile strikes with long-range precision strike assets, airborne and air assault operations”32 combining elements of urbanwarfare with large scale conventional theatre operations) might suggest that the Russian military is, in fact, preparing for an Air Sea Battle (ASB) style of operations, aimed at breaching and defeating an A2/AD bubble. The proximity of the military exercise, symbolically named “West”, close to the Baltic and Polish frontiers, renders clear the intended audiences. These trends should be considered against the backdrop of US retrenchment from European affairs, the sharp decline of European defence budgets and capabilities. In this context, Moscow’s adventurism is somewhat expected. As Josef Joffe puts it: “traditionally, the might of nations was hemmed in by others in an endless game of pressure and counter-pressure.(…) So don’t blame Mr Putin for what ambitious powers always do, which is to probe their rivals’ positions on the periphery.”33

These are no longer the days of General Ogarkov’s 1981 Zapad, when 29 Amit Kumar, “Russian Military Reforms: An Evaluation”, issue brief for Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, May, 2013, p.3 30 Ibid. 31 Stephen Blank, “What do the Zapad 2013 Exercises reveal?”, in Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 177, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4144 9#.Uma90TlgPzI 32 Ibid. 33 Josef Joffe, “Exploiting Obama’s foreign policy retreat”, in Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324635904578643663020 328162

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the aim of the Soviet forces was to reach “the Channel in less than 20 days - and without using nuclear weapons.”34 But what if a quicker, more effective, more agile, and more lethal Russian military, combined with a more nationalist oriented elite mind-set, decides to probe a weak NATO periphery? In the end, as Ian Brzezinski, a former deputy assistant secretary of defence for Europe and NATO policy in the first George W. Bush administration, said: “I am not worried about Russian tanks taking over Europe. I am worried of a crisis breaking out and all of a sudden for irrational reasons they use their force quickly and decisively at the periphery and the Alliance needs to deal with that.35”

Or, as the British historian Lawrence Freedman put it: “the challenges may at first be ambiguous, a probe to test alliance resolve and cohesion, rather than a full-on assault. Some action in one of the Baltic States may appear inflammatory or a crisis elsewhere in Russia’s near abroad may lead to violence that becomes difficult to contain.”36

NATO’s response to the events in Ukraine In March 2014, during his speech at the Brussels Forum, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that Russia’s actions in Ukraine were “the most serious crisis in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall”, and concluded that NATO could “no longer do business as usual with Russia”.37 As result, NATO suspended almost all civil and military cooperation with Russia, while leaving the diplomatic channels open for discussion. It has subsequently focused on reassuring Central and Eastern European Allies through, primarily, air defence and surveillance, maritime deployments and military exercises. These measures include, among others:

34

Gordon S. Barrass, “The Renaissance in American Strategy and the ending of the Great Cold War”, in Military Review, January/February 2010, p. 105 35 The remarks were made during CEPA’s 5th US-Central Europe Strategy Forum, October 3-4, 2013, Washington DC. 36 Lawrence Freedman, “The Primacy of Alliance: deterrence and European security”, IFRI Security Studies Center, March-April 2013, p. 28. 37 “A Strong NATO in a Changed World,” Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Brussels Forum,” March 21, 2014.

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• The Baltic Air Policing mission was increased from 4 to 16 fighter jets.

• Canada deployed jets to Romania for joint training. • Since mid-March 2014, NATO airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft have been conducting flights over Poland and Romania, on a twice-daily basis, to monitor the events in Ukraine. • Since April 2014, a group of mine clearance vessels has been patrolling the Baltic Sea. A contingent of frigates has been patrolling the Mediterranean since May. In mid-July, another maritime group participated in exercises in the Black Sea. Other exercises, like Steadfast Javelin 1 and 2, have also been conducted. Further measures have been taken by the United States, under the umbrella of the US European Command’s Operation Atlantic Resolve. These measures have focused primarily on increased troop rotations and joint military exercises: deployment of an additional 6 F-15 fighters to the Baltic Air Policing mission; deployment of 12 F-16s and 300 personnel to àask Air Base; deployment of 175 marines to Romania; deployment of 150 paratroopers each to Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia38 Additionally, four US naval vessels have been deployed in the Black Sea for naval exercises, and one has conducted exercises and port visits in the Baltic Sea.39 During his visit to Poland in June 2014, US president Barack Obama announced that he would ask Congress for approval of the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), aimed at assuring allies and bolstering the security and capabilities of NATO partner countries. The funding request totals $925 million in the Department of Defence FY2015 budget. The specifics of the initiative, however, have not been fully developed yet.

The outcome of the NATO Wales Summit In the run-up to the NATO Summit in Wales, scheduled to take place on 4-5 September, 2014, pressure was mounting on the Alliance to increase its presence on the Eastern Flank. Allies from Central and Eastern Europe called for a larger US and NATO military presence in the region; 38

Paul Belkin, Derek E. Mix, Steven Woehrel, "NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe," Congressional Research Service, July 2014, p.7. 39 Ibid., p.8.

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Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radek Sikorski, for instance, suggested that Warsaw would be "fully satisfied" if NATO stationed two heavy brigades in Poland.40 These calls for a permanent allied presence were unlikely to garner wide support, as some NATO member states, like Germany or Italy, considered such a move unnecessarily incendiary in NATO’s relations with Russia.41 Indeed, the Readiness Action Plan adopted at the Summit in Wales comprises “continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, both on a rotational basis [emphasis added].”42 This is to be reinforced by the enhancement of relevant infrastructure and preposition equipment and supplies.43 At the same time, the regional posture will be altered through the addition of rapid reaction forces, ready to reinforce the Eastern flank of the Alliance. In this context, NATO will take measures to “enhance the responsiveness” of the NATO Response Force (NRF). This will be achieved through the development of a spearhead force within the NRF, officially called the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which will be deployable within “a few days” and able to respond to challenges that arise particularly at the periphery of NATO’s territory.44 The exact size of the force package is yet unknown; reports suggest it is to comprise approximately 4,000 personnel. In addition, the Alliance will support the establishment of an adequate command and control infrastructure on the territories of eastern Allies, while the member states will “further enhance NATO’s ability to quickly and effectively reinforce those Allies, including through preparation of infrastructure, prepositioning of equipment and supplies, and designation of specific bases.”45 The Baltic States, Romania and Poland signalled readiness to host elements of the command and control infrastructure; the headquarters of the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, Poland, is a widely mentioned location.

40

"Poland's PM says NATO to boost military presence within weeks," Reuters, April 5, 2014. 41 See, for example, Christopher Chivvis, “What Can Obama’s $1 Billion Investment in European Security Actually Buy?” Rand Corporation, June 9, 2014; and “Troops In,” The Economist, June 7, 2014. 42 Wales Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, September 5, 2014, par. 7. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid, par. 8. 45 Ibid.

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Why the Wales summit is not enough The measures adopted at the Wales Summit are certainly a step in the right direction. However, they stop short of a real NATO pivot on the Eastern Flank. First, it is very clear that NATO opted for developing the new reassurance package within the old framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. This, in itself, sends a very specific message about the existing political consensus inside the Alliance. The members could have chosen to go beyond a framework that was designed in a time of geopolitical pause, when Russia was perceived as a partner capable of cooperation within the European security architecture. The reading of the NATO-Russia Founding Act at the time of its creation was somewhat different than the current interpretation by some NATO members states – like Germany or the United States – would suggest. As Madeleine Albright describes it: “The Founding Act also does not limit NATO's ultimate authority to deploy troops or nuclear weapons in order to meet its commitments to new and old members. All it does is to restate unilaterally existing NATO policy: that in the current and foreseeable security environment, we have no plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons in the new member countries, nor do we contemplate permanently stationing substantial combat forces. The only binding limits on conventional forces in Europe will be set as we adapt the CFE treaty, with central European countries and all the other signatories at the table, and we will proceed on the principle of reciprocity.46”

A similar reading on the nature of the commitment lying at the core of the NATO-Russia Founding Act was offered at the time by Thomas Pickering, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs: “The Founding Act imposed no restrictions on NATO's military doctrine, strategy, or deployments. The unilateral statements of NATO's military policy are just that-unilateral statements of policy that NATO had previously adopted outside the context of NATO-Russian discussions. The Founding Act in no way works to the detriment of NATO's new members. They will come into the Alliance the way all the other allies did - as full

46

Testimony of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on NATO enlargement before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 7, 1997, http://19972001.state.gov/www/statements/971007.html, consulted in September 2014

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Today, after its incursions in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia is a revisionist actor with no qualms about the use of force to change borders in Europe, one that rejects the foundational principles found at the core of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and other agreements, like the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris or the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The relatively benign security environment of the 1990s is no longer there. In short, Russia has become a permanent spoiler of the European security order. As Iulian Fota, the national security adviser of the Romanian President, said: “When you are a declining power from the perspective of demography, industrial base, when you don’t have the mobilization capacity of the former Soviet Union, in order to preserve your relevance in the global power play, you must have and show the ability to spoil the game of the others.48”

It is significant that at a time when Russia once again became an obstructionist power, NATO chose to act within a cooperative framework that excludes permanent presence of significant combat forces on the Eastern flank. Second, at the very core of the reassurance package developed during the Wales summit lies the idea of a spearhead force inside the NRF. However, this concept has been troubled from its very inception. In order to be deployed, the NRF needs to receive the political validation of a consensus-oriented decision making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). As the Crimea “blitzkrieg“ showed, time is of the essence. In an age when Moscow’s preferred tactic is to impose and create fast new facts on the ground, there might be almost no room for debate inside the NAC on the central question: is this an Article 5 contingency? Moreover, such a debate would take place in an Alliance where optic cleavages already exist, stemming from dramatically different threat assessments among the member states. It is unclear whether a Crimea-style incursion into one of the Eastern Flank states would help nullify such diversity of threat 47

Testimony of US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Thomas Pickering, on NATO-Russia relations before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 30, 1997, https://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/105s/46832.txt, consulted in September 2014 48 Personal interview with Iulian Fota, National Security Advisor of the Romanian President, September 2014.

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perception among the Allies. Comments made on these issues in July 2014 by General Sir Richard Shirreff, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, are of note: “NATO would find it very difficult to respond sufficiently quickly if, for example, Russia decided to attack and mount an airborne desant operation, for example, on Riga, Tallinn or Vilnius. The fact is that there is a Russian aviation base within 40 minutes’ flying time of Riga so, unless NATO has stationed forces in the Baltic states, I think it is highly unlikely that NATO could respond quickly to a sudden, surprise attack. (…) the honest answer, as we speak now, is that NATO would be very pushed to respond sufficiently quickly in the event of a sudden surprise attack. (…) The other aspect of the NATO response force, and where it has come up against problems again and again, is that it lacks credibility, because the North Atlantic Council has never been able to agree on its deployment. It depends on a consensus agreement for all 28 nations before it can be deployed.49”

Ten years after having achieved its Initial Operational Capability, the NRF has received mixed reviews; it is unclear whether the VJTF will become an asset of real operational value. At a conference in Vilnius about two weeks after the NATO Summit, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, allegedly questioned some of its foundational characteristics. He reportedly said that “readiness for action in 48 hours is unrealistic” and that soldiers “would have to sleep in uniforms” in order to meet those requirements.50 Third, there is a big weakness with NATO’s deterrence capital that Moscow is currently testing. Traditionally, NATO’s security strategy was based on in-depth defence. In other words, in the event of a threat emanating from the Eastern Flank, sufficient time to react through the reinforcement of the most exposed and vulnerable allies had to be assured. This is still the main idea found at the core of NATO’s spearhead force emphasized during the Wales summit. “We will lay out a plan for the forward presence of command and control and key enablers, so that we have the capability to rapidly reinforce our eastern flank, together with plans to regularly exercise that capability” 49 Testimony of General Sir Richard Shirreff, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO before Defense Committee, House of Commons on The Next Defense and Security Review, July 9th, 2014. 50 "NATO's swift defense of Poland 'unrealistic'?" Polska Agencja Prasowa, September 29, 2014.

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…said Alexander Vershbow, the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, just a few days ahead of the Wales summit.51 The problem with the “jab and grab” technique used by Moscow in the case of Crimea to establish new facts on the ground is that it will be politically unfeasible for some of the member states to contemplate the use of NATO’s military power to reverse the new territorial gains. Wess Mitchell and Jakub Grygiel made a similar assessment about the Alliance’s lack of credible forward presence to deter limited war on the Eastern flank: “Overreliance on extended deterrence would confront NATO with the same problem now facing Ukraine, but on a wider scale. Without the ability to defend against a limited attack in its initial stages, NATO would be forced to rely on defence-in-depth techniques that would trade space for time. This is the concern that many Central and Eastern European states have - that they would have to absorb the loss of territory while awaiting relief forces that, for political or military reasons, might never come.52”

Fourth, the expeditionary solution that the NATO summit brought forth in order to fix the vulnerability of the Eastern Flank via the spearhead force, might prove inadequate in a time of maturing antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) complexes. Over the past 25 years, forces of denial have increasingly won the competition with the forces of what used to be called traditional expeditionary power projection. The A2/AD forces are neutralizing many of the assumptions that used to be at the core of the US power projection, particularly the ability to: “flow large, heavy ground units and vast quantities of logistical supplies through major allied ports; conduct strikes from allied airbases close to an adversary’s own territory; maintain uncontested control of the skies; manoeuvre amphibious ships right off an adversary’s coastline to land assault forces; and communicate and conduct command and control with little fear of our networks being disrupted.53” 51

Remarks by NATO Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, “NATO and Russia: a new strategic reality” at the conference on “NATO after the Wales Summit”, Cardiff University, September 2nd , 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_112406.htm, consulted in September 2014. 52 Jakub Grygiel and Wess Mitchell,”Limited war is back”, The National Interest, September-October 2014, tp://nationalinterest.org/feature/limited-war-back-11128, consulted in August 2014 53 Jim Thomas, “From Protectorates to Partnerships”, The American Interest, Summer (May/June 2011), p. 39.

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These traditional features, very similar to what the NRF spearhead force is envisaged to comprise, are becoming outdated because of the keep-out zone that Russia is building by investing in its own A2/AD capabilities. Simply put, Russian denial forces can keep at bay any promised NATO reinforcement. As Jim Thomas, Vice President and Director of Studies of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), put it: “Since World War II, the US military has really seen itself as the world premiere expeditionary force. When it is a crisis we react and we flow forces across oceans to the theatres where we conduct operations. But the A2/AD maturation suggests that there is a real limitation with that model in the future, not only for the US, but also for its allies. Everyone who has been in the power projection business faces the same problem, which is in a crisis to dispatch an expeditionary force may be highly destabilizing and in a conflict may be simply impossible because those forces would not have protected ports and airfields that they could flow into. There is a lack of permissive environment. I am very sceptical of the idea of the super rapid NATO reaction force because it fails to understand the changing military competition in the security environment.54”

The emerging A2/AD Russian bubble over the Black Sea Although all the eyes are currently focused on the Baltic region and the Northern Flank of NATO, the Black Sea might become a proving ground for NATO’s credibility in the near future. In recent years, the traditional modes of power projection that gave the US the ability to gain access, operate and be forward present in key strategic regions of the world have been challenged. Over the past decade, states like Russia, Iran and China seemed very interested in gradually developing anti-access (A2)55 and area-denial (AD)56 postures. The capabilities are aimed at building keepout zones or regions where the traditional freedom of action can be denied. The maturation of these access-denial complexes will make it harder for the US to deploy, project power, gain access and even operate in certain theatres. A clear-cut example is East Asia, where: 54 Personal interview with Jim Thomas, Vice President at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), October 2014, Washington, D.C. 55 “Those actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area”, in Sam Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare. Countering A2/AD strategies, Naval Institute Press, 2013. 56 “Those actions and capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed to limit its freedom of action within the operational area”, in Ibidem.

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The Case for the Rebalancing of NATO on the Eastern Flank “the People’s Liberation Army of China has been building up an area denial network for the past 15 years or so with the intent of denying any country trying to project power in the region for being able to operate militarily, and that increasingly will make it more difficult for other countries to operate or maintain freedom of navigation in the coastal waters near the Eastern Coast of China. China is the first manifestation of this trend of countries, and even non-state actors developing anti-access bubbles.57”

A recent book by Robert Haddick suggests that: “the goal is to build forces and infrastructure that will give China the military capacity to dominate a deep air and maritime buffer zone beyond its coast, which ultimately would prevent the arrival of adversary strike and expeditionary forces.58”

At the same time, protected by this A2/AD umbrella, China will be increasingly incentivized to gradually alter the geography of the region, operating under the threshold of a formal casus belli. Recent developments in the South China Sea, as well as the establishment of an Air Defence Identification Zone in the East China Sea, seem to validate this assessment. The annexation of Crimea is already shifting the geography of the Black Sea region. It used to be called a Russian lake; now it is becoming an A2/AD Russian bubble. James Sherr, an Associate Fellow at Chatham House, summed up the new strategic reality very well when he said in the House of Commons: “the Russian Black Sea fleet has, in the past, been constrained by various agreements about what it could and could not do as for operation, modernisation and the kinds of weaponry - nuclear and conventional deployed there. Those constraints no longer exist. A massive modernisation programme has been announced. That includes, in short order, the deployment of Russia’s most advanced long-range area denial weapons, which affect a large part of Turkish air space and extend right out to the Bosphorus and, perhaps, beyond. It raises new questions about

57

Interview with Jim Thomas, “Collective defense in the age of anti-access bubbles” in Small Wars Journal, November 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/interview-with-jim-thomas-collective-defencein-the-age-of-anti-access-bubbles, consulted in August 2014. 58 Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water. China, America and the future of the Pacific, Naval Institute Press, September 2014.

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the vulnerability of any surface assets that we send into the Black sea.59”

The facts:

• Crimea is becoming the centre of gravity of the Russian A2/AD Black Sea posture.

• By the end of the decade, Russia's Black Sea force will tally 206 ships.60 • By 2016, the Black Sea Fleet will receive six brand-new Kilo-class submarines, which will be stationed in a new base at Novorossiisk.61

In addition, Tu-22M3 long-range strategic bombers will be deployed in the region.62

• Overall, by the end of the decade, Moscow plans to spend US $151

billion to modernize its navy and the Black Sea Fleet is one of its highest priorities. The modernization will emphasize the emergence of a counter-intervention capability for the Black Sea along the lines of the A2/AD logic, including submarines, anti-ship, antisurface and anti-air capabilities. At the same time, the annexation of Crimea will add long-range land-based missile systems (like the S-400 SAM system), including the Iskander surface-to-surface missiles that have an operational range of 400 kilometres.63

As Russia is developing its access-denial posture, the freedom of movement might be in jeopardy inside the Black Sea, with all the evident consequences on the energy security of the region. At the same time, any effort to reinforce a NATO maritime presence might be out of the 59 Testimony of James Sherr, Associate Fellow, Chatham House before the Defense Committee, House of Commons on The Next Defence and Security Review, July 9th, 2014. 60 Matthew Bodner, “Russia's Black Sea Fleet Will Get 80 New Warships to Repel NATO”, The Moscow Times, September 23rd, 2014 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-s-black-sea-fleet-will-get80-new-warships-to-repel-nato/507682.html 61 Ibid. 62 Igor Delanoe, “Russia’s Plans for Crimea: the Black Sea Fleet”, Russian International Affairs Council, July 23rd, 2014 http://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/igor_delanoe/?id_4=1305 63 Ibid.

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question, as Russia acquires the capability to transform the Black Sea into a no-go area. In sum, these different layers of long-range, anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, together with the long-range S-400 land-based missile systems, suggest “a large spectrum of capability to strike ground targets, interdict maritime traffic and impose a no-fly zone.”64 That, in effect, means a zone free of NATO influence. In the Chinese case, there seems to be a correlation between the gradual development of the A2/AD capabilities and the coercive salamislicing tactics employed in the South China Sea. Consequently, as Russia becomes a mature A2/AD power, it may also employ similar tactics inside the Black Sea.

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as a tool of reassurance In the reassurance portfolio of the Alliance, tactical nuclear weapons have a special role to play. US tactical nuclear weapons were introduced into the European theatre during the Cold War, with the aim of counterbalancing the superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union. Since then, their numbers have significantly decreased - from the peak of 7,300 weapons in 1971 to an estimated 200 at present.65 The most significant series of reductions took place in 1986-87, when 2,000 weapons were withdrawn from Europe, and in 1991-93, when the arsenal shrank by more than 3,000. Some of these reductions took place under the George W. Bush administration, from 480 at the beginning of the term to approximately 200 by 2007.66 At present, a sizable portion of this arsenal is kept at the Aviano Air Base in Italy and the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey; the remainder is spread across the Büchel Air Base in Germany, the Ghedi Torre Air Base in Italy, the Kleine Brogel Air Base in Belgium and the Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands. The weapons are in the custody of the US Air Force’s Munitions Support Squadrons (MUNSS) and slated for delivery by F-16A/B, F-16C/D and PA-200 Tornado aircraft owned by the host nations. An exception to this arrangement is a portion of the weapons 64

Ibid. The precise number of these weapons in unknown, as NATO does not make this information public. Leading estimates suggest an arsenal of between 150 and 200 weapons; a reference made by US Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Jim Miller during a July 2009 NATO briefing largely validates this estimate. Robert S. Norris, Hans M. Kristensen, "US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 6, 2011. 66 Ibid. 65

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stored at the Incirlik Air Base, which, if needed, would be delivered by US aircraft. Curiously, the US Air Force does not have a fighter wing at Incirlik, which would necessitate a pick-up by aircraft from other bases.67 Before Russia’s incursion in Ukraine, some of the host countries (Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands), joined by others, had increasingly questioned the utility of US tactical nuclear weapons forwarddeployed in Europe. These weapons remain a highly divisive issue within the Alliance. Countries in Central and Easter Europe generally ascribe greater value to their continued deployment, as they tend to see them as a symbol of NATO’s unity. These views have received a significant boost as a result of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Central and Eastern European allies are in more need of reassurance now than at any other point since the end of the Cold War. Forward-deployed US tactical weapons, long touted as the utmost symbol of the Alliance’s cohesion, are seen is some capitals as a vital tool of strategic communication vis-à-vis Russia. Calls have been made for the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and their delivery aircraft on the territory of the countries bordering Russia. However, as Kingston Reif aptly assesses such a step: “[it] would be ineffective, provocative, divisive, expensive, and counterproductive.”68 First and foremost, the current and future threats emanating from Russia are not nuclear by nature. Although nuclear weapons are an important component of the Russian military doctrine, what the Alliance is likely to face in the future are more Crimea-style tactics, which would not merit a nuclear response. Thus, their deterrence value is very low, as it simply lacks credibility. Moreover, if deployed near the Russian border, these weapons would be highly vulnerable in the event of conflict and thus make little sense from a military planning perspective. As Reif also points out, “A significant shortcoming of these weapons is that the aging NATO dual capable aircraft would likely be shot down by advanced Russian air defence systems before making it to their target.”69 Any attempt to reposition those weapons would require significant infrastructure to be created in countries where it is does not currently exist. This implies great investment by governments which, with few exceptions, do not place a premium on defence spending, and whose economies would not be able to support it. The United States, which already bears the lion’s 67

Ibid. Kingston Reif, speaking at the Project on Nuclear Issues debate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, "The Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Responding to the Crisis in Crimea," May 19, 2014. 69 Ibid. 68

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share of the cost of NATO’s nuclear posture, would be pressed hard to foot the bill. Exacerbating are those political considerations which make such a policy shift ultimately unpalatable to most NATO allies. Even the discussion on this issue within the Alliance could undermine its cohesion. It is worth remembering that NATO’s current nuclear posture does not represent a true consensus - it is highly unlikely that such a radical step would be widely agreed upon. Ultimately, calls for deploying tactical nuclear weapons in the CEE countries will probably not receive serious consideration. More importantly, however, such a discussion creates an unnecessary distraction from the areas on which NATO should focus, so as to provide real reassurance value - conventional capabilities relevant to the threats the Alliance is likely to face in the near future. There is almost universal agreement that tactical nuclear weapons serve little to no military value. Consequently, the only context in which these weapons have been discussed after the end of the Cold War is their symbolic value. Even the proponents of increasing the number of tactical nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe speak of it primarily in those terms.70 At a time when NATO could derive greater benefit from conventional capabilities of real value in countering the threats it is likely to face, investing billions of dollars in a military capability of mostly symbolic value might merit some revaluation. To begin this discussion amidst the current crisis would be unadvisable - as Tom Nichols rightly points out, optics do matter.71 However, it cannot be postponed indefinitely either, as disarmament by political and financial default is a very real possibility.72 70

See, for example: Michaela Dodge, Tom Nichols, "NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons Must Go - But Not Today," The National Interest, August 23, 2014. 72 Kingston Reif, speaking at the Project on Nuclear Issues debate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Two things are worth noting in this context. Some recent reports suggest that Russia has discussed plans to move some of its tactical nuclear weapons into Crimea; whether those plans will come to fruition, or even whether they have been seriously discussed, is unclear. (See: Bill Gertz, “Russia Deploying Tactical Nuclear Arms in Crimea,” The Washington Free Beacon, October 10, 2014.) At the same time, a Track 2 discussion between Russian and American experts facilitated by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies was launched at the beginning of October in Vienna. Critics have suggested that the Obama Administration may use these talks to lay groundwork for future discussion about cuts in tactical nuclear weapons. While the timing may appear somewhat inappropriate, it highlights the fact that the 71

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All five member states currently hosting US tactical nuclear weapons plan the retirement of the dual-capable aircraft (DCA) assigned to the nuclear mission in the 2020s or earlier. Belgium has not yet made the decision with regard to the replacement aircraft and it is thus unknown whether it will be nuclear-capable. Turkey, Italy and the Netherlands chose the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter; however, it is unclear whether the nuclear-capable variant will be delivered. The F-35 programme, already plagued by significant delays, faces further uncertainties. In 2013, the US Congress denied the Pentagon $10 million in funding for the research and development to make the F-35 nuclear-capable. As Reif points out: “The cost of the dual capability, estimated to be at least in the hundreds of millions, will compete with the conventional role of the program, which is behind schedule and over-budget.73”

Although Germany has decided to retain its DCA until the 2020s, their replacement aircraft, the Eurofighter Typhoon, is not nuclear-capable. During a congressional hearing in March 2014, Air Force Chief of Staff General Mark Welsh suggested that in a scenario in which DCA are retired and not replaced in kind, allied aircraft will assume that role. However, as Hans Kristensen suggests, only the United States has the military capability to fulfil such a role.74 Consequently, if the nuclear burdensharing scheme - touted as cementing Allied cohesion - collapses, political support may gradually wane, making the forward deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons far from a forgone conclusion. In this context, continued calls for the deployment of these weapons in CEE states could be highly counterproductive and negatively impact the very area they seek to strengthen. It is thus important that this discussion is not continued. What is more, the opposite course of action should be considered in the long term. As Nichols rightly points out: “Keeping nuclear weapons in Europe isn’t a coherent strategy, but rather represents a

presence of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe is still a matter of debate, even despite the current crisis. 73 Kingston Reif, "U.S. Nukes in Europe Are Useless," Real Clear Defense, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/09/05/us_nukes_in_europe_are_use less_107414.html, September 5, 2014. 74 Rachel Oswald, "U.S. Tactical Nuclear Arms Mission Could Shift Among NATO Jets," Global Security Newswire, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/aircraftcould-be-given-nato-tactical-nuclear-arms-mission/, March 26, 2014, consulted in September 2014.

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cobbling together of fragments of various strategies from the past.”75 Recent events support this assertion on two counts. In June, when the need for reassurance involving nuclear weapons arose, the United States sent its strategic bomber, the B-2 Spirit, to deliver the message. It is worth noting that this strategy was also employed in March this year to send a similar message to a belligerent North Korea. It highlights the role of highly visible strategic assets in times of crisis – a role which cannot be fulfilled by weapons stored in underground vaults at officially unknown locations. It is also important to pinpoint that the majority of reassurance measures requested by the CEE countries after Russia’s annexation of Crimea were conventional in nature and aimed at an Allied presence which could act as a trip-wire in the event of an escalation against a NATO member state. In Wales, NATO adopted a series of measures of this precise nature. As their implementation begins, and as new capabilities are considered, it will become increasingly clear that the financial assets now assigned to nuclear deterrence achieved by the US tactical weapons in Europe could be better spent on capabilities with a more tangible deterrence value. Although during the summit the Allies pledged to increase their defence spending, it will take time and their resources will, in most cases, remain limited. Investing them in capabilities reminiscent of the Cold War strategic environment will not increase NATO’s security and could, in the long term, have the exact opposite effect.

A time for rebalancing the US posture in Europe The current strategic environment highlights certain weaknesses in the credibility of the Article 5 commitment by NATO allies. However, it also offers an opportunity to rethink the US defence posture in Europe in a way that would be able to marry the US fiscal constraints with a sound and credible military footprint. The time has come to go beyond the taboo of the 1990s and consider a significant deployment of US military units in the CEE countries. In other words, it is time for a pivot of the US military presence from Western Europe to Eastern Europe. “An Eastward pivoting will fix NATO’s post-Cold War original sin. It will close, once and for all, the historical legacy of the security gap between the Western and Eastern parts of NATO.”

75

Tom Nichols, "NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons Must Go—But Not Today”, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato’s-tactical-nuclearweapons-must-go—-not-today-11137, August 2014, consulted in September 2014.

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Since the first post-Cold War enlargement round, NATO has maintained an artificial division between the original members and the socalled New Europe. In fact, the idea of an indivisible security was true only on paper, but not in practice. As Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas puts it: “the paradoxical division of the Atlantic Alliance along the line of Iron Curtain is the reason why Central European states perceive their membership in NATO as substandard in value.76”

At the time, a compromise was brokered with the new Eastern members which received an informal pledge from SACEUR that a certain number of combat forces would be dedicated to the task of reinforcing the Eastern flank in the case of a collective defence emergency and that there would be significant investments in upgrading the military infrastructure needed to receive such a reinforcement capability.77 The US pledge was tailored to accommodate not only the traditional security fears of the new member states, but also the spirit and the letter of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act: “NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.78”

This state of affairs was perpetuated until the Russia-Georgia war in 2008. This was a game changer in terms of threat perception on NATO’s Eastern Flank. After years of neglect, without any collective exercises, contingency plans to defend the New Europe, and without any visible 76

Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas, “Alliance with the United States: how much is it worth?”, in Aspen Review, No. 2, 2013, p.51. 77 As Ron Asmus, one of the key architects of the NATO enlargement, told one of the authors in 2010, Given the low threat environment when NATO enlarged, we decided NATO did not need to forward deploy troops on their territory. Instead, we pledged to create a reinforcement capability that could be deployed in times of crisis. I personally sat at the table in the mid-1990s as Washington promised Polish leaders NATO would have a corps sized or three division reinforcement capability to provide for their security in a future crisis. We never fulfilled that pledge”. 78 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, May 1997, Consulted in September 2014 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm?selectedLocale=en

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reassurance measures in the region, NATO and the West internalized and developed a massive credibility crisis.79 Until the end of his life, Ron Asmus fought to fix this credibility crisis. In part, some symbolic aspects were addressed through the most recent Strategic Concept, under which the Alliance will carry out… “the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies.”80

To this end, in 2013, the NATO Response Force (NRF) participated in the most important territorial defence exercise since the end of the Cold War, Steadfast Jazz. At the same time, there is a robust exercise policy in place designed to provide “visible assurance.” Additionally, a US Brigade Combat Team (BCT) will be made available to the NATO Response Force for rotational exercises, in order to provide a “reinforcement” capability in the case of a collective defence emergency. Moreover, for the first time in the history of the Alliance, contingency plans were drafted for the defence of NATO’s Eastern members. However, part of the problem that Ron Asmus attempted to fix is still there: “many allies have simply lost faith in NATO's own capabilities”. The Polish A2/AD search is a consequence of this; it is also exacerbated by the New Europe - Old Europe division within NATO. “A visible US military footprint on NATO’s frontier will have a deterrent effect with regard to any coercive attempt directed against the allies located in a sensitive hingepoint region.” The credibility of the deterrence posture is generally a measure of the willingness to underwrite the security of a third party and of the operational ability to carry out this commitment - US rebalancing on the Eastern flank will boost and enhance the perception of a credible deterrence posture, by providing a visual testimony and demonstration of the US’ commitment, political will and 79 As Ron Asmus said during the same interview, Certain Central and Eastern European countries have doubts about the West actually coming to their defense in a crisis. The latter is our own fault because we pledged to take certain steps to reassure them that we never followed through on. So we have a crisis of confidence. A defense plan in SHAPE is important but it does not in itself solve the problem. It is after all a piece of paper. It needs to be backed up. Poland is more worried about the lack of solidarity and whether those pledges and forces would actually materialize in a crisis.” 80 NATO’s Strategic Concept, adopted at the Alliance’s Lisbon summit, 2010, p.15.

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solidarity on the ground. In the end: “the more you believe in the West and western solidarity, the less hardware you need. If you don't believe in the West, you do need clear signals that its forces are coming to your defence. At the end of the day, the key ingredient of article 5 is political will and solidarity.81”

The same point was also made recently by a British historian, Lawrence Freedman: “More than force ratios and weapons systems characteristics, political relationships are at the heart of deterrence in Europe. (…) the Alliance’s deterrence credibility lies primarily with the solidarity between its members and the willingness of the US to remain committed to European security.82”

An Eastward rebalancing of US forces will help allay the crisis of confidence that Poland internalized over the years vis-à-vis NATO’s lack of solidarity and reassure the frontline allies that, in the case of a crisis, forces located in the same neighbourhood will come to their defence. Moreover, the net effect of an Eastward pivot will be the shaping of a regional environment that ultimately deters by leveraging “partners and populations to enhance local and regional stability.”83 As an added benefit, the more secure the frontline states are, the more likely they are to operate alongside US forces in overseas contingencies. In this context, such regional allies will act as a force multiplier. Conversely, if they do not feel secure, they will invest primarily in capabilities designed for territorial, static defence of little or no use in expeditionary or power projection operations.

Conclusion The annexation of Crimea has signalled a major paradigm shift inside the Alliance. The aggression against a sovereign European state is an attack against the core norms, principles and rules found at the heart of the post-1990 European security order. In this context, the somewhat flip 81

Author’s interview with Ron Asmus, 2010. Lawrence Freedman, “The Primacy of Alliance: deterrence and European security”, IFRI Security Studies Center, March-April 2013, p. 19. 83 Strategic landpower: winning the clash of wills, a document signed in May 2013 by General Raymond Odierno, General James Amos and Admiral William McRaven, p. 3. 82

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prescriptions for NATO’s continued relevance in the post-9/11 world - “go out-of-area or out-of-business” - are no longer enough. Crimea is a tectonic event that should trigger a “learn and adapt” moment for NATO. In its 65 years of history, NATO has always shifted in accordance with its security environment. Today, NATO needs to rethink its global and regional posture in a way that balances its expeditionary role with a more “back in business, back in area” focus, in order to protect the norms and rules of the European security order. In the light of the annexation of Crimea, NATO should reaffirm its Article 5 collective defence role, but at the same time take specific steps to invest in strategic reassurance and “old-fashioned” deterrence by denial. The time has come for a NATO rebalance on the Eastern Flank, through a more even distribution of its military infrastructure beyond the Fulda Gap. Such a move will fix the security deficit and structural imbalance between Old and New Europe. In recent years, this security gap has pushed the CEE states to search for additional strategic reassurance measures from the United States, like the development of contingency plans for the Baltic states and Poland, the deployment of the Patriot batteries and the F-16 detachment in Poland, or ballistic missile defence (through EPAA), with infrastructure in Poland and Romania. When rethinking its posture on the Eastern Flank, NATO should borrow a page from the East Asian playbook, where US allies are massively investing in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. NATO should build on one of the most important trends in today’s world, where military competition is set to favour the forces of denial over the forces of control. In this context, CEE states should be incentivized to invest in A2/AD capabilities, so as to create a sustainable regional accessdenial system able to act as a trip-wire for potential aggressors. Furthermore, it is extremely important to understand that deterrence still matters. The Air Sea Battle concept, which has gained some notoriety in recent years, is a reflection of the old maxim: vis pacem para bellum. As Robert Kaplan put it, “If you are prepared for ASB, the chances are that you’ll never have to use it.” It needs to be borne in mind, however, that it is not a matter of choice between A2/AD and ASB capabilities both will be needed. In a perfect scenario, regional allies would build their own deterrence by denial bubbles and transform themselves into A2/AD porcupines, “who only gradually convince the carnivorous beast of prey that he is not a fit object of attack”, as George Kennan used to say. At the same time, the US and NATO should invest more broadly in ASB capabilities designed to sustain operations inside the adversary’s A2/AD envelope. In particular, the Alliance should develop tailored packages of

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NATO Response Forces closer to the offensive Air-Sea battle/Air-Land battle style of operations and be able to back-up/reinforce/support a local access denial posture on the Eastern Flank84. In the end, without ASB, the US would not be able to deploy an adequate deterrent in order to provide strategic reassurance to its regional allies - A2/AD capabilities alone would be sufficient for the allies to endure but not sufficient for active defence. For this reason, tailored investments in ASB capabilities designed to outmanoeuvre and counterbalance the A2/AD complexes are of the essence in order to properly reassure the allies.

Bibliography Documents: 1. “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation”, NATO, May 1997, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm?selectedLocale=en 2. “NATO’s Strategic Concept”, adopted at the Alliance’s Lisbon summit, 2010. 3. “Global trends 2030: alternative worlds”, US National Intelligence Council, 2012. 4. “Strategic landpower: winning the clash of wills”, a document signed in May 2013 by General Raymond Odierno, General James Amos and Admiral William McRaven. 5. “Wales Summit Declaration”, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, September 5, 2014. Interviews: 1. Mitchell, Wess “Against US world retrenchment”, in Small Wars Journal, July 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/against-us-world-retrenchment 2. Thomas, Jim “Challenging the Conventional Wisdom on US traditional alliances from protectorates to partnerships”, Small Wars Journal, June 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/interview-with-jim-thomas 3. Thomas, Jim “Collective defence in the age of anti-access bubbles” in Small Wars Journal, November 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/interviewwith-jim-thomas-collective-defence-in-the-age-of-anti-access-bubbles Testimonies, speeches: 1. Albright, Madeleine, testimony of US Secretary of State on NATO enlargement before US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 7, 1997, http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/971007.html 84

Edward Lucas and Wess Mitchell, “Central European Security After Crimea: The Case for Strengthening NATO's Eastern Defenses”, CEPA policy brief, March, 2014, p. 7, http://www.cepa.org/content/case-strengthening-natos-eastern-defenses.

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2. Erickson, Andrew S., Associate Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College, testimony of on “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications and Recommendations” to Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, December 11th, 2013, House Armed Services Committee, a. http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord _id=FA9EE283-A136-4C44-B489-F1814AFAB9EA 3. Pickering, Thomas, testimony of US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs on NATO-Russia relationship before US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 30, 1997, https://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/105s/46832.txt, consulted in September 2014 4. Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, NATO Secretary General, “A Strong NATO in a Changed World,” at the Brussels Forum,” March 21, 2014. 5. Reif, Kingston speaking at the Project on Nuclear Issues debate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, "The Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Responding to the Crisis in Crimea," May 19, 2014. 6. Sherr, James, Associate Fellow, Chatham House, testimony before Defence Committee, House of Commons, July 9th, 2014. 7. Shirreff, Richard, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, testimony on NATO before Defence Committee, House of Commons, July 9th, 2014. 8. Vershbow, Alexander, NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador, “NATO and Russia: a new strategic reality” at the conference on “NATO after the Wales Summit”, Cardiff University, September 2nd , 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_112406.htm, consulted in September 2014 Books: 1. Haddick, Robert, Fire on the Water. China, America and the future of the Pacific, Naval Institute Press, September 2014. 2. Lee, Bradford A. Theory and history for practitioners, in Competitive Strategies for the 21st century: Theory, history and practice, edited by Thomas G. Mahnken, Stanford University Press, 2012. 3. McMaster, H.R., Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, 1998. 4. Tangredi, Sam, Anti-Access Warfare. Countering A2/AD strategies, Naval Institute Press, 2013. Articles and policy briefs: 1. Barrass, Gordon S. “The Renaissance in American Strategy and the ending of the Great Cold War”, in Military Review, January/February 2010. 2. Belkin, Paul, Mix, Derek E., Woehrel, Steven "NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe," Congressional Research Service, July 2014.

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3. Freedman, Lawrence, “The Primacy of Alliance: deterrence and European security”, IFRI Security Studies Center, March-April 2013. 4. Grygiel, Jakub and Mitchell, Wess, ”Limited war is back”, The National Interest, September-October 2014, tp://nationalinterest.org/feature/limitedwar-back-11128 5. Jankowski, Dominik P., “Beyond air and missile defense: modernization of the Polish Armed Forces”, CEPA Policy Brief, September 2013, http://www.cepa.org/content/beyond-air-and-missile-defense-modernizationpolish-armed-forces 6. Krepinevich, Andrew, “Strategy in a time of austerity: Why the Pentagon should focus on assuring accesss”, Foreign Affairs, November 2012 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138362/andrew-f-krepinevichjr/strategy-in-a-time-of-austerity# 7. Kumar, Amit, “Russian Military Reforms: An Evaluation”, issue brief for Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, May, 2013. 8. Lucas, Edward and Mitchell, Wess, “Central European Security After Crimea: The Case for Strengthening NATO's Eastern Defenses”, CEPA policy brief, March, 2014, http://www.cepa.org/content/case-strengthening-natos-easterndefenses 9. Mead, Walter Russell, “The end of history ends”, The American Interest, December 2nd, 2013, http://www.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/12/ 02/2013-the-end-of-history-ends-2/ 10. Nichols, Tom "NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons Must Go—But Not Today”, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato’stactical-nuclear-weapons-must-go—-not-today-11137, August 2014. 11. Thomas, Jim “From Protectorates to Partnerships”, The American Interest, Summer (May/June 2011). Media articles: 1. Adamowski, Jaroslaw, “Poland brings defense focus back home”, Defense News, October 20th, 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131020/SHOWSCOUT04/310200009/ Poland-Brings-Defense-Focus-Back-Home 2. Blank, Stephen “What do the Zapad 2013 Exercises reveal?”, in Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 177, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D= 41449#.Uma90TlgPzI 3. Bodner, Matthew “Russia's Black Sea Fleet Will Get 80 New Warships to Repel NATO”, The Moscow Times, September 23rd, 2014 a. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-s-black-sea-fleet-willget-80-new-warships-to-repel-nato/507682.html 4. Champion, Marc and Spiegel, Peter, "Allies React to U.S. Missile U-Turn," The Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2009. 5. Charap, Samuel and Feinstein, Lee, "Obama’s Quiet Offensive," Project Syndicate, April 3, 2014.

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6. Chivvis, Christopher, “What Can Obama’s $1 Billion Investment in European Security Actually Buy?” Rand Corporation, June 9, 2014; and “Troops In,” The Economist, June 7, 2014. 7. Delanoe, Igor , “Russia’s Plans for Crimea: the Black Sea Fleet”, Russian International Affairs Council, July 23rd, 2014 http://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/igor_delanoe/?id_4=1305 8. Joffe, Josef, “Exploiting Obama’s foreign policy retreat”, in Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324635904578643663 020328162 9. Kostrzewa-Zorbas, Grzegorz, “Alliance with the United States: how much is it worth?”, in Aspen Review, No. 2, 2013. 10. Oswald, Rachel, “GOP Pushing to Speed Up Deployment of Advanced Interceptors in Poland," Global Security Newswire, May 6, 2014. 11. Oswald, Rachel "U.S. Tactical Nuclear Arms Mission Could Shift Among NATO Jets," Global Security Newswire, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/aircraft-could-be-given-nato-tactical-nucleararms-mission/, March 26, 2014. 12. Reif, Kingston, "U.S. Nukes in Europe Are Useless," Real Clear Defense, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/09/05/us_nukes_in_europe_are _useless_107414.html, September 5, 2014.

THE INSECURITY CONCEPT OF THE EU-R-ASIAN BORDERLINE: THE CAUCASUS BOGDAN NEDEA

Abstract In the past six years we have witnessed a new emerging security paradigm formed around Russia’s new geopolitical ambitions, in which both Ukraine and the South Caucasus are playing key roles. In the face of this new paradigm, NATO, which has mismanaged its relations with Russia along the years, appears to have been caught off guard. The central area around which the situation started and continues to develop is the South Caucasus, a converging point of interests and causalities for Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, the US, the EU, Armenia and Georgia, a point where force has been employed and sides have been taken. Furthermore, it continues to be an important point of interest where negotiations are held at missile point, due to its importance as the bottleneck access into Asia and irreplaceable part of the EU’s energy security strategy. Keywords: new security paradigm, convergence point, causality, revolution export, energy security, insecurity concept When discussing new security paradigms it is of utmost importance to take into consideration the new, ever-changing realities that create them. Therefore, when the annexation of a territory of a state by another state goes from theory to precedent, when military invasion goes from historical example to realpolitik and when security guarantees become subject to pecuniary interests, that is the moment when an entire generation raised within a system developed around a couple dozen kilograms of signed papers over a few decades, realizes that contemporary realities coincide with facts that have been considered to be history.

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If 2008 brought forth the face of the new Russian warfare, complete with a very well played blame-game that found the international community unprepared to react to a de facto invasion and left with nothing else but observing the independence declarations of the two Georgian breakaway republics (thus motivating its own passiveness), seven years later the situation is similar on both sides. So far, the western democracies have shown no sign of being able to understand the reasons behind Moscow’s actions and have settled for adopting Cold War period similar stances and rhetoric. Throughout history Russia was protected by the depth of its territory and by the harsh conditions of the steppe climate, protection that was lost with the fall of the USSR that transformed key defence points and strategic locations, like the city of Smolensk for example, into mere border-cities. Moscow was now just 500 km from the border and the decision-makers in Kremlin were still under the impression that distance was relevant (as it was in the age of land invasions). This distance became more important when the Baltic States joined NATO and when countries like Republic of Moldova and Ukraine stated their intentions of joining NATO. In 2008, the year when the international community froze in mid-summer, Ukraine almost received an MAP at the Bucharest Summit which would have laid the tile on its path to NATO thus bringing Moscow to just 499 km to the borders of its (at best) competitor on the international scene. In modern history the Russian territory has witnessed two western invasions both determined to erase the Slavic heritage. One of the main reasons for the failure of these invasions was the inability and unpreparedness of the invaders to face the steppe winter. These historical lessons to which we can add the promise of a NATO expansion eastward could have provided the sufficient reasons for the development of an aggressive long-term policy of the Russian Federation. We are used to looking at the map from the West. If you turn the map and try to look from the East, looking westward you see “the biggest military alliance in history1” (led by, and most of time acting according to the interests of your main competitor and former adversary in the Cold War – the United States), built as a defensive alliance and purposed to prevent major threats (like another World War), overstepping its defensive mandate during the last decade and deploying against regimes and into regions that could “threaten its borders”. These internationally approved interventions take place, most of the time, in your “near abroad” against 1

Defense Secretary Warns NATO of ‘Dim’ Future, The New York Times, THOM SHANKER, June 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/world/europe/11gates.html?_r=0

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your traditional partners and it’s followed by a regime change, increase of western influence in the region and a sudden shift in bilateral relations between your country and the country in question. Furthermore, the same military alliance is expanding increasingly closer to your borders or provides military equipment and know-how to countries in your immediate vicinity while constantly rejecting your objections and threat perceptions as archaic and unfounded. Continuing the “defence” rhetoric the same alliance begins building the BMD (which is after all still a cluster of missiles capable of going in any direction, not only up) and takes positions in Eastern Europe. So, under these circumstances it is only fair to ask ourselves if we (and by “we”, I mean NATO), by any chance, have created the impression of developing an isolationist policy against Russia or if the West didn’t actively participated to the evolution of the events we are witnessing today in Ukraine (or have witnessed in Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Armenia or Azerbaijan) by placing Russia in a strategically vulnerable position and by holding it captive to capabilities and any possible intentions of NATO. Looking from the West we might be sure of the peaceful intentions of the alliance and may find it difficult to understand some actions Russia undertakes but as far as Russian national security threats go, the paradigm expressed above, is absolutely valid: theory becomes precedent and historical examples become realpolitik. Therefore, when developing a security or a defence strategy, good intentions are the last thing taken into consideration by Kremlin’s strategists. What they will take into consideration are hard facts like two invasions from the west in less than 150 years, the last one by a country (Germany) who was economically collapsed at the beginning of 1932 and besieging Stalingrad in 1941. A Russia who was forced to acknowledge its technological inferiority will be forced to make it its number one priority to regain the strategic advantages it had during the Soviet era by recreating the security ring it lost in 1991, a ring that would be able to protect it both military and economically. Looking at the map we see this ring, or buffer zone taking shape in the last 20 years from North to South: Kaliningrad – Belarus – Trandsniestr – Crimea – Abkhazia - South Ossetia – Armenia (including Nagorno-Karabakh) and to the east, the undaunted devotion of the “stan” countries. Most of the points on the defence belt were created through an export of revolution, influenced by the energy dependence of the countries and assisted by the lack of involvement from the West. Russia has even created a political project to define its new strategy: The Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) revives an image of the USSR built with modern tools and

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that gives a “face” to the vertical interdependencies system that Moscow created. Once Moscow realised that some actors cannot be “tempted” to remain in its “near abroad” as president Medvedev defined its country’s interests in 20102, and that “temptations” were higher in other places (weather it was NATO or EU) it began eliminating the option for the countries it wanted. Moscow (it would be safer to say President Putin) counted on the West’s “lethargic condition” and created frozen conflicts in all the countries touched by “imperialistic” influence making them unattractive. And he was right, the EU and NATO found it too much of a responsibility and hassle to continue taking on countries that have territorial disputes. The latest “brush” added to this intricate painting is Ukraine, and one of the reasons it is happening could be because nothing happened in 2008. The Caucasus region is the best example of the frozen conflict policy, divided between the orthodox imperialistic influence of Moscow and Islamic ambitions of Turkey, most of the times, a victim of the policies and interests built around it. The region and events that led to its shaping in the current form should have served as an example for the West but, it didn’t, even though the situation is similar. Eastern Europe and the Caucasus are part of the military-economic defence strategy of Russia and apparently they share the same fate determined by the same plan. Each region has a pawn of Moscow whose unquestionable loyalty makes it unapproachable by the West: in Europe its Belarus and in the Caucasus, Armenia. Both regions have countries that have a direct border with Russia, are gas transit countries and have territorial disputes with breakaway regions: Georgia and Ukraine and last but not least both regions have frozen conflicts in which one of the actors involved is a declared ally of Moscow: Nagorno-Karabakh and Trandsniestr. The importance of the Caucasus region for Moscow comes from the same historic geopolitical reasoning tracing back to Ekaterina the Great, when Tartars burned Moscow and was still valid in Dughin’s writing, Karaganov reasoning and Arbatov’s group thinking, a reasoning that focused around Russia’s claims to needing space around to see the enemy coming and have the possibility to take troops out of Moscow, as the Russian plains offered no natural defensible barrier. As the Caucasus Mountains and Central Asia can be such natural barriers, Moscow still appears to link its security paradigm to dominating these regions and the 2

NEAR ABROAD AND BEYOND - Three factors that bear on the Ukraine crisis, The Telegraph, Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, March 15, 2014, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1140315/jsp/opinion/story_18080551.jsp#.VEdikP mUelE

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respective countries. In the case of the Caucasus Russia is competing against both the West and Turkey over it and has found Armenia to be a key state for its regional recurrence3.

The causality convergence in the South Caucasus In the Caucasian congruence point we find three major actors disputing their interests: Russia, who has historically dominated and tried to subdue the region, the EU that has discovered its Caucasian ambitions along with its energy diversification need and Turkey with its newfound regional leadership ambitions. This status quo of the region is a rather recent development (10 to 15 years is recent when discussing international affairs): initially, in the postsoviet era, Russia dominated the region weather through energy dependence, military strength or cultural links reminiscent of the communist rule. In the time frame between the collapse of the USSR and the beginning of the revolution period (early 2000’s) when the Russian influence in the region was a given, Turkey, an emerging country that struggled with its own internal challenges, was seeking Euro-Atlantic integration. The NATO integration of Turkey, which could be described more as a US need rather than Ankara’s ambitions and need for security, came rather quickly and remained just that: a strategic occurrence that did not benefit from a follow-up plan as the Western organizations failed to respond to the countries’ development needs. As Turkish leaders saw the need for social and economic development they were faced with a series of rejections from the EU while the relation with NATO remained at a minimal level. This has resulted in the first causality effect in the Caucasus: Turkish decision-makers began seeking alternatives to EU and NATO and turned toward its old regional foes, Iran and Russia instead4. Although the notion was not taken seriously at the time5 the “Eurasianism”6 as a geopolitical

3

Colibasanu A., "Regiunea extinsa a Marii Negre, intre UE si Eurasia" chapter of the "7 teme fundamentale ptr. Romania", Ed. Rao, 2014 4 The Economist, “A general speaks his mind,” (March 14, 2002); J. Gorvett, “Turkish General Causes Controversy with Call for Turkey to Stop Seeking European Union Membership,” Eurasianet, (March 12, 2002); I. D. Da÷Õ, “Competing Strategies for Turkey: Eurasianism or Europeanism,” CACI Analyst, (May 8, 2002). 5 E. Akçali and M. Perinçek, “Kemalist Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey,” Geopolitics, (July 1, 2009).

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discourse found its way into Turkish political life and almost a decade later, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) leader Recep Tayyip Erdo÷an is seriously considering abandoning the bid for EU membership to join the China-led and Russia-supported Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)7. Evidence of the shift in foreign policy was given in September 2013 when Turkey shocked its NATO allies when it chose a US-sanctioned Chinese firm to co-produce a $3.4 billion longrange air and missile defence system8. We can locate the beginning of this policy in 1998 when under the leadership of then Chief of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) General Hüseyin KÕvrÕko÷lu, Turkey released a Defence White Paper that represented a major shift in Turkish national security strategy, by articulating a Forward Defence concept to pre-emptively solve problems and stabilize neighbours before they could have an impact on Turkey9. His successor, General Hilmi Özkök, was also committed to maintaining the basic tenets of the 1998 White Paper, but in 2003 when Turkey and the United States fell out over the Iraq invasion and the United States was able to conduct a “decapitation” strike without using Turkey’s territory, it signalled to the Turks that they were no longer relevant in the security architecture drawn by the US in the region10. Furthermore, US attempts to change Turkish foreign and defence policy had resulted in the creation of ill will in Turkey, and forwarded the notion that Turkey had to become an independent security actor. 6 Eurasianism (AvrasyacÕlÕk in Turkish) stands for a political, economic, and cultural alliance with non-western “Eurasian countries” such as Russia, Iran, Turkic countries in Central Asia, Pakistan, India, and China. Russian author Aleksandr Dugin in his work Foundations of Geopolitics (1997) first discussed Russian Eurasianism of creating a “supra-national Empire,” in which ethnic Russians will occupy a “privileged position.”After the demise of the Soviet Union, the Turks discovered their kinship with this geography and kindled a wave of panTurkish sentiment. Turkey’s president at the time, Süleyman Demirel spoke often of a “Turkish World from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China,” referring to almost all territories of Turkic states in the Caucasus and Central Asia, but also former Ottoman territories in the Balkans and possibly the Arabian peninsula. 7 I. Da÷Õ, “Turkey’s quest for a Eurasian Union,” Today’s Zaman, (January 27, 2013); Hürriyet Daily News, “Turkish PM Erdo÷an to Putin: Take us to Shanghai,” (November 22, 2013). 8 At the time of writing in June, Turkey had selected a Chinese firm, but not yet finalized the deal due to NATO’s continued objections. 9 E. J. Erickson, “Turkey as Regional Hegemon - 2014: Strategic Implications for the United States,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, (Autumn 2004), p. 31. 10 Ibid, p.33.

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A similar result can be found when discussing Turkey’s approach to the EU. Faced with a stalled EU accession process the ruling Turkish elite as well as the population have reconsidered their choices and turned to Eurasia, a place where Ankara cannot only impose itself as an economic power but has the cultural means to relate. Once these elements and course were established the European influence (especially economic) dropped significantly with the flow of EU investment funds decreasing in recent years and a declining share of EU countries in Turkish trade. In 2003, more than 55 percent of Turkey’s trade was with EU countries whilst today it is only 40 percent11. As a result to Turkey’s newfound direction the relation scale with the EU tilted in its favour as Brussels continued to rely on Ankara for the development of its energy diversification strategy. In a short period of time Turkey became relevant to both sides of the Caucasus: westward for the EU that had come to realise its importance as a transit country and eastward for the ever-growing energy-exporter Azerbaijan, becoming a link between the two. Its growing importance and expanding economy quickly allowed it to aspire to being a regional leader, a founder of regional projects (Trans-Anatolian Pipeline, the Baku-TbilisiKars railway which is going to be an extension of the East-China Highway etc.) and a security provider that has and projects its own interests in the Caucasus region, even competing against Russia for regional influence. We can identify the sum of these elements as the first causality effect: Turkey’s emergence in the region. The second Caucasian causality is the western interest in the region. The western policy-makers have defined the Caucasus as a region, a geographically correct term but from a geopolitical point of view the correct term would be neighbourhood. We would prefer this definition first and foremost due to cultural, religious and organizational differences in a relatively small area. These differences originate also in the fact that the countries in the South Caucasus have a rather pragmatic approach, closer to Realism in international relations, as a result of being closer to dramatic realities like recent armed conflicts. As such, the collective memory plays a heavy role in the political assessment and decision– making system, as it does in the minds of the citizens12. However, the main element that builds the neighbourhood rather than a region is that the three countries have different threat perceptions, see their

11

G. Sadik, “Can Euroskepticism propel Turkey toward Russia?,” Today’s Zaman, (March 3, 2013). 12 Iulian Chifu, Narciz Balasoiu, Radu Arghir, The East –West Caspian Sea – Black Sea Strategic Corridor, ISPRI Publishing house 2014

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wellbeing in varying ways, and have contrasting visions of themselves13. After the Vilnius Summit the international expert community has assessed the event as a failure for the EU as just two of the six countries have had concrete results within the program. Denying the effects of a six-year long partnership based on the outcome of a singular event, that indeed carried an undeniably important message for the partner countries but was a mere formality from the EU integration point of view, is a mistake. The Eastern Partnership has produced and even forced a number of positive reforms in some of the partner countries and if we were to assign blame we could only accuse the way Brussels mismanaged the impact of the project had and the block-mentality that prevented individual approaches for each partner country, elements that lead to communication gaps and a general strategy for similar but fundamentally different cases. The EU officials understood too late the need for special policies in relation to every country and have considered the EaP countries from the East European point of view. When it comes to Caucasian countries EU is most of the times a choice between sustainable development and immediate needs offering the questionable tools with which to build a success story versus providing aid for urgent matters which in non-member states (especially those vulnerable to Russian propaganda) usually means regime changes. If we discuss the hard policies of Russia as a counterbalance to European policies, then Armenia is the perfect case-study as this country’s lack of option in the international theatre was “enriched” by Moscow’s pressure in the autumn of 2013 when the price for the imported gas was raised by 50% only to be dropped by 35% in early November as part of the Customs Union accession of Yerevan14. Armenia’s strategic importance for Russia was proven in 2013 when, on Russia’s whim, Yerevan left the DCFTA and instead chose the Custom Union. Another country that took a step back (this time voluntarily) from the EU was Azerbaijan, due to a number of conditions – especially democratic but also related to human rights and the necessity of a competitive multiparty system. The step back stemmed from the fact that Baku didn’t need the funds that EU could provide and even more, it was Brussels that needed the Azeri oil and gas. The interdependence created by energy imports and common projects determined Baku ask for a special form of

13

Temuri Yakobashvili, Is the South Caucasus a Region?, Caucasus Analytical Digest, June 17, 2013 14 Russia Reduces Gas Prices for Armenia, ARMENPRESS, December 2, 2013, http://armenpress.am/eng/news/742286/russia-reduces-gas-price-for-armenia.html

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strategic partnership between the EU and Azerbaijan, one that could better portray the bilateral relation. Last but not least, Georgia’s relation with the West is the most developed one, benefiting from the presence of the NATO-Georgia Commission and a very ambitious Individual Action Plan. Furthermore, after the 2013 Vilnius Summit, Georgia remained the only country in the Caucasus maintaining its path and commitments towards the EU and signing the initiation of the Association Agreement and the DCFTA. The country’s democracy has flourished in the past two years, according to European standards, but has done so without a real check of things behind the scene, which makes it doubtful. And doubtful we might call it, as the political scenery of the country, at the moment, depicts a Georgia which could be described as a case of state capture by a single wealthy individual, who skilfully capitalized on massive public disappointment against the incumbent regime, defeated it in elections, took power, manned the new regime with his loyalists, and receded backstage from where he chooses to rule the country. Moreover, as of mid-November 201315, the country is formally be ruled by two politically inexperienced virtual unknowns—overshadowed by Georgia’s richest man. Even so Georgia has a clearly declared goal to join the European Union and pragmatic considerations are driven by its belief that, to paraphrase one Baltic diplomat, “if NATO is about life, the EU is about the good life.” If we should look at all three cases we can see that success in any of the cases is just an effect of local determination and not of the European “group policies”. The Western increasing involvement in the Caucasus region has led to the shaping of the region and not always in a positive sense: in one case -Armenia- it led to a deepening dependence on Russia, for Azerbaijan it determined the strengthening of the nationalist policies and for Georgia a realization of its vulnerabilities. In fact none of the three countries have actually developed closer to the EU but was rather destabilized by the high demands of the association process. This only proves that the EU has yet to learn about approaching former USSR countries and that it has neither the instruments nor the internal political consensus to become an influential player in the Caucasus but that its actions initiated in offices in Brussels have real consequences on the ground in the Caucasus. Last but not least the third regional causality effect is energy: energy dependence, energy security, energy transport and most important energy 15

The end of Saakashvili’s reign, The Economist, Nov 2nd 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21588949-georgia-elects-new-lesspowerful-president-end-saakashvilis-reign

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as a weapon. We would be simple-minded to sum up the two causalities as influence (power) and interests and the third as money but in their quintessence that is what they add up to. And energy is the backbone of the Caucasus but a backbone that has developed curved by the hard policies that forced it. The energy backbone of the Caucasus region has grown on a harsh environment: a 23-year long security vacuum left by the USSR has yet to be filled and is now being deepened by the entity that created it: Russia. By seizing Crimea as its own, Moscow has started a new doctrine of irredentism and intervention in former Soviet-ruled territories a doctrine which it had tested six years earlier in the Caucasus. The game in this case is not just about influence over the region but control over transit routes as the Caucasus is an important lane on the road to alternative energy import sources for Europe. Up to this point Moscow was able to successfully deter and counter EU’s plans regarding gas imports from the East by creating a gap in the security loop of the South Caucasus trough the 2008 Georgia war, which proved to the investors that the transit region is volatile, only to promote its own South Stream pipeline and selling it to the same investors. Russia’s air and missile strikes that bracketed the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline in August 200816 were the first shots in a Kremlin gambit designed to choke the East-West Corridor. With this and by making good use of its energy monopole in liable transit countries, the Kremlin was able to put a strain on the first Nabucco project and force a commitment for South Stream. The same thing happened with Nabucco II, when Moscow made a full display of force on Azebaijan’s borders (three consecutive military exercises: in the North Caucasus - Kavkaz 2013, one in Armenia – Rapid Response of the CIS Countries and one in the Caspian Sea) just two months before Baku made its choice regarding the pipeline project that would benefit from the resources extracted from the Shah Deniz II gas field. Eventually, Baku chose the TAP17 (Trans-Adriatic-Pipeline18), a private joint venture over 16

Georgia says Russian missiles struck BP pipeline, Energy-pedia, August 14, 2008, http://www.energy-pedia.com/news/georgia/eorgia-says-russian-missilesstruck-bp-pipeline17 Azerbaijan Chooses TAP over Nabucco to Provide Gas Pipeline to Europe, Caitlin Del Sole, The European Institute, August 2013, http://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/ei-blog/181-august-2013/1771azerbaijan-chooses-tap-over-nabucco-to-provide-gas-pipeline-to-europe-88 18 Trans Adriatic Pipeline is a pipeline project to transport natural gas from the Caspian sea (Azerbaijan), starting from Greece via Albania and the Adriatic Sea to Italy and further to Western Europe. Trans Adriatic Pipeline AG is a joint venture company registered in Baar, canton Zug, Switzerland, with a purpose of planning,

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the heavily politicized European project. With low political will, lack of commitment from investors and almost no influence in Azerbaijan, Europe’s strategic adventure to diversifying its gas import sources appeared to be sinking until June 26, 201219 when Azeri President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo÷an signed a binding intergovernmental agreement on the financing of TANAP (TransAnatolian-Pipeline) and took it upon themselves to finance it up to the Black Sea. This was the game-changing moment of the energy relevance of the Caucasus region as the direct involvement of the two actors, both aspiring to be regional leaders, not only complicates the game for Moscow but it gives the EU a new perspective over the region. On their part, the Azeri and the Turks regard it as a foothold in the energy security architecture of Europe not just as modest supplier and transit country, but as direct contributors, thus securing the full attention of the EU (and US) in the long run. The project lacks the recurrent political flaws, is safe from any of the divergent opinions, multi-level interests and politicallymotivated, time-consuming decisions (the case of the Nabucco in the EU) and comes with its own investors, has real money behind it and is driven by sound national interests. The deal could be viewed as historical due to two points: first is that it could change entirely the security and political overview of Eurasia and second that it could bring up a new type of interdependence between two Muslim countries (whose resources are needed in Europe) and a still Muslim-skeptic Europe. Moreover regional success could inspire countries from the eastern, wider Caspian Sea region, like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, to join the project and even speed up the process of solving divergent elements like the demarcation of the Caspian Sea paving the way for the completion of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline. The Azeri-Turkish bridgehead project can also encourage Kazakhstan to take its resources west, especially under the circumstances in which Moscow was unwilling to offer a profitable deal forcing Astana to take its resources to China. This is where Moscow’s problems begin: both Azerbaijan and Turkey are independent from Russian energy imports and could not be constrained or deterred from the TANAP project trough Moscow’s ‘conventional’ means. Russia acting on Europe is useless at this

developing and building the TAP pipeline. Shareholders of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline are BP (20%), SOCAR (20%), Statoil (20%), Fluxys (19%), Enegas (16%) and Axpo (5%) 19 TANAP Agreement a Step to Make the Southern Gas Corridor a Reality, Natural Gas Europe, June 27th, 2012, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/tanap-agreementsouthern-gas-corridor

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point as the pipeline will still happen and gas will be available on the Black Sea coast regardless. These definitive terms could complicate the situation in the Caucasus region as the only lever Russia is left with is Georgia, an important piece of the puzzle in the Caucasian transit route. Georgia strives to fully exploit its geographic advantage (as a gateway to eight land-locked countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, five Central Asian countries, and Afghanistan) while continuing to be the key to effective energy transport to Europe. In this regard the Russian– Georgian war in August 2008 was a strategic wake-up call, indicating, in particular, the limits and challenges of the capacities of the EU’s external action and responsiveness and determination. The August war posed challenges not only for the EU but for other two ends of the interdependencies web in the region: Azerbaijan and Turkey. For Azerbaijan, a land-locked country, Georgia represents the means for exporting its energy products while for Turkey it represents cheap electricity (Georgia is net exporter of electricity to Turkey – by the end 2014 a 300V line will be built20) and substantial revenues in gas transport fees. Furthermore, against the background of the ongoing ArmenianAzerbaijani conflict and subsequent blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey, Georgia provides the shortest land connection for Azerbaijan to its ally Turkey and for Armenia to its ally Russia. Consequently, it does matter a great deal for the Caucasian states where Georgia stands. Georgia’s foreign policy orientation largely determines which state becomes isolated in the conflict-ridden and divided South Caucasus. That is why, under the developments in Ukraine, Georgia’s future is uncertain especially it has already seen the Russian hard policy, first hand. In order to better understand the Caucasus and the stake it holds we have to look at two neighbouring countries that even though they share an almost identical history they are substantially different today: Armenia and Georgia.

Armenia’s insecurity perceptions: The tri-factor Thucydides describes human motivations as driven by three factors: fear (phobos), gain or self-interest (kerdos) and common belief (doxa). Extending this philosophy to state level (a state is nothing more than an organised group of humans) we find the same three factors and in Armenia’s case they are easy to recognize. 20 Iulian Chifu, Narciz Balasoiu, Radu Arghir, The East –West Caspian Sea – Black Sea Strategic Corridor, ISPRI Publishing house 2014

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Fear (Phobos) Armenia’s land-locked position and its complicated relations with two neighbours, Azerbaijan and Turkey, offers limited options for international trade and relations and leaves Yerevan with one ally and one main trade partner: Russia. Its trade routes are limited to Georgian ports and the narrow Megri corridor to Iran a situation that has forced the Armenians to see themselves differently in the economic mapping of the South Caucasus. The 20 year embargo has made Armenia completely dependent of one supplier, the Russian Federation, which is at the same time owner of 80%21 of its energy capacities and transit pipelines, as well as the owner of the most lucrative industries linked to gas consumption. Under the Soviet Union influence, Armenia had developed its industrial sector by supplying manufactured goods, machine tools, textiles and other products to Soviet republics in exchange for energy resources, today, after nineteen years of independence, Armenia is facing a weak economy. Armenia has limited energy resources to satisfy its needs a fact that translated into a inherent lack of parity in Armenia’s “strategic partnership” with Russia which has been mostly one-sided and out of which Yerevan has had few advantages. Over time, the gradual expansion of Russian power and influence has only enhanced Armenia’s over-dependence on Russia. Although close relations with Russia are essential for Armenia on the longer term, the asymmetry of the bilateral relationship has become increasingly evident. What Armenia is faced with at the moment is the Belarus scenario. In 2011 when Belarus asked for a decrease in the price of gas from Moscow it was faced with pressure for selling22 the main industrial assets of the country: the transit system and the two oil refineries that process almost half of the raw oil Russia exports. Taken into consideration that Belarus is an important ally of Russia as the main distribution pipelines to Germany and Czech Republic run through its territory (and not to mention the last European ally of Moscow in Europe), there are slim chances that the scales might tilt in Armenia’s favour any time soon.

21 The Long Goodbye: Waning Russian Influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, James Nixey, Chattamhouse, June 2012, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%2 0and%20Eurasia/0612bp_nixey.pdf 22 Dispute looms as Russia suspends Belarus energy supplies, The Guardian, Tim Webb, January 3 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/jan/03/russiasuspends-belarus-energy-supplies

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Moreover, after a questionable “asset-for-debt” agreement between Armenia and Russia in 2002–200323, whereby Russia acquired several key strategic enterprises, Russia has gained control over key sectors of the Armenian economy, including much of the country’s energy sector, and its sole nuclear power plant, after securing the consent of overly-compliant Armenian officials. More recently, Russia has also widened its economic leverage by taking over the Armenian railway network, acquiring a significant share in the mining sector and gaining a serious share in the country’s telecommunications sector24. Moscow not only possesses the power over Armenian economy but also uses it: July 1st 2013, Russia announced an increase in gas prices for Armenia by 50% (from 180 to 270 dollars) only to reduce that price by 35%25 in October when the “negotiations” for the Customs Union took place. Yerevan is a captive audience to Moscow not only from an economic point of view but also from a military one. Azerbaijan’s defence budget is the size of the entire GDP of Armenia and the only reason Baku doesn’t move to take Nagorno-Karabakh back is the presence of 5000 Russian soldiers in Armenia. Russia also administrates the air defences of the entire Armenia therefore a sudden shift in relations would be negative for Yerevan. The uncertain situation is positive for Moscow’s intentions for the region, because, in its view, the volatile status quo as a way to keep the South Caucasus under its control. And if we should consider the situation, it might just do that: the unresolved conflict guarantees that Armenia will not ask Russian forces to leave and as long as Russia has troops on the ground it possesses another mean to pressure Armenia to stay away from the West.

Gain/Self Interest (Kerdos) Even if Armenia would have had the political will to join the EU, from an economic standpoint it would have suffered as only the gas prices reduction (following the raising) brings 140 million dollars more revenue26 23

ARMENIA SELLING MORE INFRASTRUCTURE, INDUSTRY TO RUSSIA, Vladimir Socor, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 3 Issue: 206, November 7, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32210&no_cache= 1#.VEeADPmUelE 24 Idem 23 25 Idem 14 26 Armenia’s economic choice: Customs Union vs. DCFTA?, MSHAK.org, December 25 2013, http://mshak.org/2013/12/25/armenias-economic-choicecustoms-union-vs-dcfta/

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to state budget than the DCFTA would have brought overall. Moreover, Armenia can be competitive on the Russian market and the Asian markets it opens to rather than European where foreign products aren’t received as well. The expected growth of GDP after the first year in the Customs Union is an expected 4%27. What Armenia really gains from its relation with Moscow is in fact its survival as a state as the international isolation it finds itself in offer no alternatives.

Common Belief (Doxa) Armenia has always pursued a “small state” strategy of pursuing policies designed to maximize its options and expand its room to manoeuvre amid much larger regional powers. More specifically, for much of the past decade, Armenian foreign policy has successfully bridged the division between its “strategic partnership” with Russia and its deepening ties and orientation with the West. This particular foreign policy, termed “complementarity28,” incorporates Armenia’s strategic imperative of security, based on a reliance on its strategic alliance with Russia and a positive relationship with Iran, while simultaneously expanding its role within Western and Euro-Atlantic security structures. Moreover, this policy of complementarity, although seemingly contradictory, is in fact a natural result of Armenia’s historical and geopolitical considerations. The strategic partnership with Russia is both rooted in history and necessity, especially given the closure of the country’s Turkish and Azerbaijani borders, which has forced Armenia to look beyond its traditional trade and export routes, thereby encouraging ties with Iran. The concept disappeared in November 2013 when Armenia chose the Customs Union over the DCFTA and began severing ties with the EU while maintaining a formal relation with NATO. Armenia is heavily dependent on Russia, but in economic and sometimes even political terms there was some interest in European integration. As a result, the Armenian elite was and still is, divided between the opposition, which wants less dependence on Russia and more integration with Europe, and the ruling elite, acknowledging dependence on Russia, but interested in European financial aid. Broadly speaking, the Armenian interest in the 27

Idem 26 The End of ‘Complementarity’ in Armenia’s Foreign Policy, Vladimir Socor, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 165, September 18, 2013, http://www.jamestown.org/regions/thecaucasus/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5 D=41374&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=643&cHash=d0a5f9ce2c130e7a7cf9062f0 d28b8e1#.VEeCiPmUelE

28

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EU is concentrated around the potential geopolitical impact of solving the Nargorno-Karabakh conflict. Nevertheless, Armenians, due to the abovementioned geographic constraints and historic or political factors, rely heavily on the partnership with the Russian Federation and their membership in political or economic projects will almost, by default, coincide with Russocentric ones, whether the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or the Eurasian Union. Nearly monoethnic, Christian Armenia has very few choices where to seek affiliation, unless something dramatic happens to Russia or Georgian membership in NATO and the EU membership prospect becomes a reality.

The Georgian Knot In the complicated power scheme of the interdependence web of the South Caucasus, Georgia plays a decisive role due to its bridge-like geographical position that makes it a vital transit country and an important piece of the entire energy architecture of the South Caucasus and of the energy corridor towards Europe. Under these circumstances Georgia is the most susceptible to any kind of Russian pressure. After the 2008 war the country managed to stay on its democratic pro-western path but not lacking any pressure from Moscow or continued provocations from separatist provinces. It is no accident that Russia amassed a powerful security contingent in each region (approximately 4000-5000 troops) and deployed tactical ballistic missiles in South Ossetia (Tochka-U) and air defence missile systems in Abkhazia (S-300)29. It also worked to modernize its air access infrastructure in South Ossetia (helipad near Dzhava) and to expand its foothold on Abkhazia’s Black Sea shore (in the port of Ochamchira). As a result, from a military point of view, the separatist enclaves are safe from a conventional attack, while Russia, if needed, is able to split Georgia in two in several hours, by cutting the transport infrastructure (main highways and railways) linking the western and the eastern parts of the country, and to rapidly reach with ground troops the outskirts of Tbilisi. The military security gap these facts create is a guarantee for Moscow that the cooperation the country has with the West will remain at the level it finds itself now and that the US will refrain from pursuing a NATO integration

29

Russian S-300 systems in Abkhazia threaten regional balance of forces Georgia, RiaNovosti, August 11, 2010, http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20100811/160161949.html

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of Georgia, as it confirmed in September 2014 at the Chicago Summit when Georgian did not receive a MAP again. So in this case, Georgia appears to be more or less on its own. As a result its strategic position is its greatest asset. In the past 15 years Georgia changed its dependence on Russian oil to Azeri oil and gas, considered to be a more reliable source of supply, especially in the light of the close relations between the two countries and the strategic partnership. In spite of its links to the US, the definition of energy security in Georgia is more a German-oriented one, meaning interdependence between transit and producer countries. Basically, its security stands on the interdependence of Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as on the one of Armenia and Russia. Both are offering enough supplies for its gas consumption. In this case, the diversification of energy sources for Armenia would mean the weakening of the energy security of Georgia as a result of the interdependence effect of the region. Under these circumstances Georgia finds itself in a paradoxical position: it needs to issue alerts regarding threats to its security without discouraging investors and stifling economic development. And economy is a weakspot of Georgia at the moment as we have seen a decrease of FDI (which was mostly US) in the past two years and a government failure in economic reforms. The new Georgian leadership has built an openness policy towards Russia, a policy that has yet to benefit it greatly. The only step forward in the bilateral relations was the fact that the majority of Georgian wines and agricultural products have returned to the Russian market and economic relations with Russia have been revived partially without renouncing Tbilisi’s declared course toward integration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union. However, all these achievements were made with a number of concessions from the new government to Moscow while no concession has been received. Russia has yet to renounce its recognition of breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia and even more so the Russian military has been expanding its presence in these former Georgian autonomies; and preparations on new agreements with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali are currently underway30. The two breakaway republics, even after six years into a frozen conflict are still a game-changer for the security architecture of the region, and now, even more so in the respect of the situation in Ukraine. It was only a matter of time until other Russia-created breakaway republics 30 Russia and Abkhazia create a new general outline of Defense, Segodnia, August 28th, 2014, http://www.segodnia.ru/news/146152

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would aspire to the same status as Crimea. In some cases, like Trandsniestr or South Ossetia, Russia would gain nothing by annexing the territory as they are much more valuable as havoc-creators but in other cases, like Abkhazia (or Crimea) the benefits are undeniable: access to the Black Sea (and with Crimea, Russia dominates the Northern part of it), trade routes and important military positions in the region. That is why, a request forwarded to the parliament by new Abkhaz president Raul Khadjimba on October 13th 2014 could prove important for the South Caucasus region: Khadjimba asked the asked the Abkhazian parliament to analyse and vote on the possible integration of the republic into the territory of Russia. The request comes after only one month since the president started its term after the ousting of Alexander Ankvab following street protests that accused him of mismanagement and corruption31. It was speculated that the real reason behind its ousting was that, Ankvab, a true patriot and believer in the independence of Abkhazia refused to make his country a pawn for Russian interests in the region and refused to forward the annexation proposal. Under these given circumstances if the proposal should be adopted by the Abkhaz parliament and considered by Moscow (although it is very likely that it will keep it in the “closet” for when needed) Abkhazia would be at the centre of defining the security paradigm in the South Caucasus. As a Russian territory it would nullify the importance of Georgia as a transit corridor and it would bring close to zero its chances of ever ascending to NATO (not that now those chances are considerably higher). It is very possible that the situation we now find Georgia in, is related to the commitment of the new leadership of the country to cautiously approach (one could even call it a servile tone) Russia, an attitude that was revealed in regard to the situation in Ukraine as well. Tbilisi never openly condemned Russia as the aggressor but instead, chose to emphasize the need to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and advise for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, stance that hardly reflects the attitude of a formerly aggressed state and the deep Georgian-Ukrainian ties. In this case, if the Tbilisi leadership would continue its mellow rhetoric towards Russia it only stands to lose, both what the former governance created but also the support of its allies and of the population.

31 Exit Alexander Ankvab, The Economist, June 4th 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/06/abkhazia

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Bottom line We could be inclined to consider that the game-changer in the South Caucasus is Armenia and the ever-warming conflict with Azerbaijan but, in fact, this conflict is subject to more than one international interests: first, the involvement of the EU (the Minsk group) that, in fact has done very little to solve the problem but has managed to maintain a state of equilibrium between the two countries by venting steam with the talks. Second is the involvement of the US in the region especially in Georgia and Turkey that makes Baku reconsider any aggressive approach towards Yerevan. In this respect Baku is more interested in promoting itself as a reliable commercial partner for the EU (and attractive for the investors which to some extent it relies on for its future projects) and as a “balanced strategic partner” for the US and NATO. The balanced part of the military partnership comes from Azerbaijan’s desire of placing itself in a privileged position in the region: it would like to be considered a bridgehead for the dialogue between Europe and Asia on the topic of energy security while considering its own ambitions as a regional leader of the Muslimcountries. This implies that its cooperation with the West must not overstep certain boundaries (from both military and democratic points of view) and maintain open relations with Muslim neighbours. At the same time Azerbaijan is interested in resolving its own issues (Caspian Sea demarcation, Nagorno-Karabakh), without over aggravating Russia in the process. In fact, the game-changer of the Caucasian region is Georgia, and not because of the security gap that the two heavy-militarized breakaway regions produce or because of the permanent tension in which the region finds itself in (because of two frozen conflicts less than 500 km away from each other), but because of the key position of the country. To Georgia’s existence as an independent state depend many things: Azerbaijan links its commercial might and financial independence to the transit trough Georgia (without Georgia the landlocked state couldn’t sell gas to Europe and Turkey and would be forced to return to selling to Russia at the prices imposed by Moscow), it is Georgia that is the final piece of the puzzle in the East-China Highway32 and crucial to the export of Central-Asia and 32

The East China Highway is a highway that links the Black Sea Georgian bank to Azerbaijan and continues to the Caspian Sea and further into Kazakhstan and finally China. The project (the Georgian side - 500 km) is half built and it would take approximately two more years to complete and the financing for it has already been allocated. The project once finished would increase the ease goods are being transported from one port to another.

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Chinese products to Europe (offering an alternate more direct commercial route for the countries there), it is Georgia that Turkey depends on for its energy33 security (electrical and gas) and for extended commercial gains trough the BTK34 (Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway) and Georgia is also the transit country on which Romania and Ukraine count on for their energy diversification needs (Romania trough the AGRI – Azerbaijan-GeorgiaRomania-Interconnector – project and Ukraine for the LNG land-sea-landsea gas imports from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). On the other hand, for Russia, Georgia is not only just the near abroad but also the means to control all the above-mentioned routes and countries giving it direct involvement in the policies they produce. As for Armenia, Georgia is the only path to its gas imports from Russia, so Georgia completes the circle and serves both friend and foe trough its geographic positioning. Therefore it is Georgia that is a central piece of the Europe-Asia connection although small and at times disregarded and the faster the West realises that its support is needed (internally and externally), the better.

33 Energy lines to Turkey – (for energy exports) are an important subject for Georgia, a country that produces more electricity than needed, due to FDI’s in HPP’s. Even so, the country’s hydro potential is used only 16% and investments in HPP’s continue to develop from both inside and outside the country. 34 The BTK (Baku-Tbilisi-Kars) railway project envisages the construction of a roughly 65-mile railway link between the city of Kars in northeastern Turkey and the city of Akhalkalaki, in southern Georgia. Furthermore, it includes plans for the rehabilitation of the existing railway link within Georgia between Akhalkalaki and the town of Marabda, in the southeastern corner of the country, close to the Azerbaijani border. From there it will link up with the railway line running through Azerbaijan all the way to its capital Baku on the Caspian Sea. The 516-mile-long railway, which will cost around $600 million, eventually will have the capacity to annually transport over 15 million tons of freight and 3 million passengers. The project will be completed in 2014

AFTERWORD: ROMANIAN-RUSSIANS RELATIONS SINCE 1989 SERGIU CELAC AND DAN DUNGACIU

Abstract This paper is a revised and updated version of the Romanian contribution to a massive two-year research project covering the relations between the Soviet Union/Russian Federation and eight countries of East Central Europe since 1989: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia (Visegrad Four), Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (Baltic Three), and Romania. The project was initiated, in April 2011, and coordinated by Dr Andrei Zagorski, professor at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and generously supported by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of Germany. Teams of experts representing the scientific and academic communities from all partner countries and Russia were designated to present their respective views on the subject. A single template was agreed for all contributions to ensure thematic symmetry and methodological unity. Five conferences of the authors were held in Moscow (17 May 2011), Riga (2023 October 2011), Bucharest (4-7 March 2012), Sankt Petersburg (10-11 July 2012) and Berlin (12-13 March 2013). At the Berlin meeting, the introductory chapter to the book was circulated as a separate brochure.1 The text was drafted by Dr Zagorski and signed as co-authors, following the incorporation of all observations and additional suggestions, by all contributors (except the Russian authors of the chapter on Russian-Romanian relations). Prior to the planned publication of the book, the Russian colleagues chose to make public their paper on Romania on the portal of the Moscow State Institute of

1

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Russia and East Central Europe: A Fresh Start, Berlin, FES, March 2013.

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International Relations.2 The whole project was abandoned without explanation in the summer 2013. The present paper is an original piece of research by the authors and was never published before or otherwise made public before as a whole or in part. Keywords: Romania, Russia, Warsaw Treaty, NATO, European Union

Historical legacy In a way, relations between Romania and Russia have been problematic not just for the past twenty-odd years, but over the course of a long and complicated common history. For as long as the two countries (and their precursors and successors for that matter) have shared a common neighbourhood, there have been moments in history when they were on the same side as well as times when they found themselves on opposite sides. Whole swathes of territory (populated mostly by Romanians) changed hands several times. An ally of Russia in World War I, Romania fought against the Soviet Union in the early part of World War II, then, in August 1944, joined the Allied forces and fought alongside the Red Army until the final defeat of Nazi Germany. The legacy of past contention, which occasionally resurfaces even today, was compounded by the more recent history of confrontation and mutual suspicion even during communist times, when the two countries supposedly shared the same ideology and strategic purpose. In the absence of any significant political base for the Romanian communists in the immediate aftermath of Wold War II, it was predominantly the Soviet Union’s military presence and overwhelming political pressure which led to the rapid elimination of democratic institutions, the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a totalitarian communist dictatorship in Romania. This regime change was accompanied in Romania, as in the other Soviet satellite countries, by brutal repression, detention, deportation and dispossession on a massive scale. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in July 1958, the more national-minded segments of the Romanian communist leadership, even while professing their allegiance to doctrinal purity, stepped up efforts to assert a position of increasing autonomy from the USSR. This was done 2

Kirillov, Victor and Putintsev, Igor, “Otnoshenia Rossii i Rumynii posle 1989 goda v kontekste vneshnepoliticheskikh prioritetov dvukh stran”, in Perspektivy, Moscow, MGIMO, 06/07/2012.

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gradually and incrementally, by opposing Khrushchev’s integration schemes in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), taking a neutral stance in the “ideological” dispute between the Soviet Union and China, establishing diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, maintaining official ties with Israel after the war of 1967, condemning the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, limiting participation in Warsaw Treaty activities, and breaking ranks on several crucial votes at the United Nations, and in the process leading to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Moreover, the gradual build-up of economic exchanges and political dialogue with the Western world, marked by high-level visits to and from the United States, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, etc. were negatively viewed in Moscow and produced sharp responses and retaliatory measures.3 This tit-for-tat policy was further inflamed by official propaganda on both sides, resulting in an abiding perception of mutual mistrust which was not easily erased or forgotten. In addition to geopolitical considerations and international circumstances, domestic developments also played a significant role in shaping the relationship between Romania and the Soviet Union. Once a proponent of reform, openness and outreach to the outside world in the 1960s and early 1970s – even while keeping within the confines of the communist doctrine and system – Romania became, during the last decade of Nicolae Ceausescu’s personal dictatorship, a bastion of conservative, narrowminded thinking and harsh oppression of the worst kind against its own people. While democratic awakening was taking root in some of the other socialist countries (the Solidarnost movement in Poland, “goulash communism” in Hungary, “ecological” activism in Bulgaria), Romania sank deeper into political and economic stagnation, impoverishment and international isolation in the 1980s. Not surprisingly, the reaction of the Romanian communist leaders to Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost was one of hostility and retrenchment in the old ideological clichés. The violent character of the regime change in December 1989 and its confusing aftermath were thus the result of accumulated tensions within Romanian society in a dynamic international environment. Unlike other 3 Georgescu, Vlad. Istoria românilor de la origini până în zilele noastre (History of the Romanians from Origins to the Present Day), 3rd edition. Bucharest: Humanitas, 1992. See also for events and dates: Calafeteanu, Ion, (Ed. Istoria politicii externe româneЮti în date (Chronology of Romanian Foreign Policy), Bucharest, Funda‫܊‬ia Europeană Titulescu, Editura Enciclopedică, 2003.

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former communist countries of East-Central Europe, Romania did not experience a “velvet revolution” but rather a violent uprising resulting in an almost total breakdown of state institutions and the threat of economic collapse. Political transformation had to start from scratch, as it were, in a difficult and often painful transition to functional democracy and market economy. The momentum of change soon swept away any illusion about the possibility of gradual reform. The Soviet model of perestroika was never considered seriously by any of the main contenders for political power in Romania. Even though a Polish-style shock therapy was deemed to be inapplicable to the specific conditions prevailing in Romania, the popular demand for change went much deeper, calling for a total break with the communist past and a return to democratic Europe. All this, plus the excitement of domestic political battles and election campaigns, had an impact on foreign policy and was reflected in the shifting attitudes towards relations with the Soviet Union and, later, with the Russian Federation. With Romanian-Russian relations having been “out of synch” for such a long time in terms of policies and resultant perceptions, it is no wonder that those relations today are still affected not only by diverging interpretations of historical facts but also by persistent disagreements about the very existence of some of those facts. Until very recently, the condition of Romanian-Russian state-to-state relations could be characterized as normal and stable in formal terms but unsatisfactory in terms of substance. Part of the explanation could be found in the limited agenda and level of political dialogue over the past decade or so. An impartial and pragmatic re-examination of the current state of bilateral relations and the realistic prospects for their development is long overdue. The current serious tensions between the Transatlantic community, of which Romania is a part, and the Russian Federation over the latter’s offensive strategic action in and around Ukraine has given pause to any illusion about a substantive improvement of Romanian-Russian relations in the short to medium term. Nevertheless, in the view of the mainstream Romanian academic and scientific community, once the crisis blows over, which it must, step-by-step progress is, indeed, possible and desirable in the bilateral relations with Russia, provided that adequate (and probably tough) political decisions are made on both sides with an eye to the future.

The basic treaty The first official document of the new administration that emerged after the fall of Ceausescu’s regime, the Communique to the Country

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issued by the Provisional Council of the National Salvation Front on the evening of 22 December 1989, stated that Romania would observe its existing international commitments, including those relative to the Warsaw Treaty.4 That position was reiterated during the visit to Romania of Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, on 6 January 1990. However, the need to re-examine the entire legal framework of bilateral relations was also mentioned on that occasion and became the main object of the official talks during the visit of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergiu Celac to Moscow on 8 March 1990. Talks focusing primarily on the preparation of a new draft basic Treaty meant to replace the Treaty signed in Bucharest on 7 July 1970 were conducted at expert level (Moscow, 17-18 January 1991) and finalized during the visit to Romania of Yuly Kvitsinsky, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR (Bucharest, 8-11 March 1991). The text of the Treaty was initialled during the visit to Moscow of Adrian Nastase, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, on 21-22 March 1991.5 The Treaty on Cooperation, Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendship between Romania and the USSR was eventually signed on the occasion of the visit to Moscow of the Romanian President Ion Iliescu on 5 April 1991. The document was never submitted for ratification by the legislative bodies of the two countries and fell into oblivion after the events of August 1991 leading to the eventual dissolution of the USSR. The opaque character of the negotiations elicited a sharply negative response from the opposition parties, large segments of the media and the public in Romania, especially when it became known that the text contained provisions denying Romania’s sovereign right to choose its own security arrangements in keeping with its national interest. Although the Treaty never came into force, the controversy surrounding it continued in the Romanian political scene long afterwards and flared up time and again

4 The original Romanian text in Sava, Constantin and Monac, Constantin, (Eds), Revoluаia română în decembrie 1989 retrăită prin documente Юi mărturii (The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 Brought Alive in Documents and Testimonies), Bucharest, Editura Axioma, 2001, pp. 323-325; English version from Ionescu, Mihail, (Ed.), Romania-NATO Chronology 1989-2004, Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 2004, p. 461. 5 Năstase, Adrian, România după Malta (Romania after Malta), volumes 1-7, Bucharest, Funda‫܊‬ia Europeană Titulescu, 2006-2009; a record of A. Năstase’s conversation with A. Bessmertnykh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, in Moscow on 22 March 1991 can be found in Op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 161-174.

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in the electoral campaigns of 1996, 2000 and 2004.6 Mainstream Romanian historians and political analysts still regard the signing of that draft treaty as a serious error of judgement in terms of both timing and substance. A second phase of discussions on a bilateral basic Treaty began in 1993. After several rounds of on-and-off exploratory talks with long pauses for further consultations with appropriate national authorities, a draft text was finally agreed at the level of senior officials and was deemed ready for initialling in April 1996. Even though the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yevgeny Primakov, travelled to Bucharest especially for that purpose, the ceremony had to be cancelled at the last minute. It had become obvious that the document had virtually no chance of being accepted and ratified by the Romanian Parliament, particularly considering the mounting pressures of political campaigning in the run-up to the parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 November 1996.7 There were several contentious issues which eventually scuttled the renewed attempt to conclude a bilateral basic Treaty, this time with the Russian Federation: the reluctance of the Russian side to accept the nullity of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the consequences of its secret protocol of 23 August 1939, Russia’s refusal to recognize even the existence of a dispute over the Romanian treasure of gold and other valuables deposited for safekeeping in Russia in 1916-1917 during World War I, and the insistence on formulations precluding Romania’s accession to the North Atlantic Alliance. After two failed attempts to conclude a basic Treaty that would have reflected the new political realities, the question apparently slipped down the list of priorities in the two countries and lay dormant for the next five years. The third phase of the formal normalization process began after the visit to Moscow of Mircea Geoana, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania and Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, on 23-24 October 2001. Negotiations proceeded apace, though not without some friction, and were effectively concluded at the expert level by April 2002. The agreed text was initialled on 5 May

6

Abraham, Florin, Transformarea României 1989-2006. Rolul factorilor externi (The Transformation of Romania 1989-2006: The Role of External Factors), Bucharest, Institutul Na‫܊‬ional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2006, pp. 191; the chapter on Romanian-Russian relations. pp. 184-211. 7 It is to be noted that by that time several East-Central European countries had managed to conclude their respective basic treaties with the Russian Federation in 1992: Czechoslovakia (1 April), Poland (22 May), Bulgaria (4 August).

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2003, during the visit to Romania of Igor Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Changed domestic and international circumstances had contributed to the resumption of that process. Extensive consultations with all parliamentary parties under the aegis of the Romanian Presidency produced a national consensus on the practical steps and procedures to be followed in preparation for joining NATO and the European Union. On 13 December 2002, the leaders of the European Union agreed in Copenhagen to set a target date for Romania’s accession in 2007. The NATO summit in Prague (21 November 2002) decided to extend a formal invitation to Romania to join the Alliance.8 The prevailing feeling among the Romanian political elite at the time was that the conclusion of the basic Treaty with the Russian Federation, in addition to its intrinsic value for bilateral relations, would also reinforce Romania’s bid for accession to both NATO and the EU by sending a strong signal to the effect that Bucharest had no residual outstanding problems with its neighbours. The fact that other countries in transition had concluded such treaties with Russia without prejudice to their European and Atlantic aspirations as early as 1992 also played a role. The suggestion made by US President George W. Bush during his visit to Bucharest on 23 November 2002 that Romania should become a bridge to the new Russia further strengthened that argument and provided an incentive to expedite the process of bilateral normalization. The Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation was finally signed on 4 July 2003 by Presidents Ion Iliescu and Vladimir Putin during the official visit of the Romanian President to the Russian Federation (3-5 July 2003). It was duly ratified by the legislative bodies of the two countries (State Duma of the Russian Federation on 23 January 2004 and Parliament of Romania on 17 February 2004) and entered into force on 27 August 2004 following the exchange of the relevant legal instruments during the official visit to Moscow of Adrian Nastase, Prime Minister of Romania. The agreed text placed no limitation on Romania’s ability to join any political-military alliance or integrated political-economic structure or to accept the stationing of allied military forces or bases on its territory. A separate political statement of the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs equally condemned the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Romania’s participation in

8

Agen‫܊‬ia Na‫܊‬ională de Presă Agerpres (Romanian News Agency Agerpres), România. Date Юi fapte 1989-2009 (Romania: Dates and Facts 1989-2009), Bucharest, 2010.

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the war against the Soviet Union on the side of Nazi Germany.9 With regard to the Romanian treasure of gold and other assets deposited in Russia during World War I it was agreed that the issue should be further explored by a joint multidisciplinary commission.

Romania’s foreign policy agenda Looking back on the evolution of Romanian foreign policy since December 1989, we can distinguish several phases in terms of conceptual approach and priorities for external action which approximately mirror the developments on the domestic political scene. Those periods are not neatly separated and may partially overlap in certain respects. However, an attempt to set some conventional landmarks may serve as a useful methodological tool enabling us to see also how Romanian-Russian relations evolved in the context of the political developments both in Romania and in the broader geopolitical environment.

Phase One: Opening up December 1989 to 1 February 1993 - the signing of the Europe Agreement with the EU Until a fully legitimate structure of governance came into effect after the presidential and parliamentary elections of 20 May 1990, Romania was governed by an interim administration: the Provisional Council of the National Salvation Front chaired by Ion Iliescu (from 22 December 1989), then the Provisional Council of National Unity, a multi-party ad-hoc legislative assembly (from 9 February 1990). The executive branch of the government with Petre Roman as Prime Minister held its first formal meeting on 31 December 1989. The political scene was dominated by efforts to fill the political, constitutional and legal vacuum, to get the basic institutions of the state into working order and to cope with the consequences of a difficult and painful transition to functional democracy and market economy. The country, which had already been in recession for two years before 1989, experienced a sharp fall in GDP accompanied by rampant inflation and serious social problems, a situation that it took about a decade to overcome.

9 Buga, Vasile and Chifu, Iulian, România-Rusia: intrarea în normalitate (Romania-Russia: Advent of Normality), Bucharest, Casa NATO, 2003.

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The main foreign policy concerns during the early part of that period were to break out of the self-imposed isolation of Ceausescu’s regime and to establish meaningful political contacts with the outside world, presenting the situation in Romania and revealing the intentions and anticipated actions of the new authorities.10 The rebalancing of external relations took the form of opening up in every respect, with a special emphasis on the “return to Europe”. On 16 March 1990, Romania officially announced its intention to join the Council of Europe and, following the required procedures, became a full member on 7 October 1993. In 1991, official contacts took place with the Western European Union, resulting in the acquisition of associate partnership status for Romania (11 May 1994), then full membership for the duration of that organization. After years of stagnation in relations with international financial institutions and other multilateral organizations, agreements were signed for the establishment of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (May 1990, effective as of 15 April 1991) as well as with the International Monetary Fund (11 April 1991), UN Development Program (23 January 1991), UNICEF (2 June 1991) and other international agencies. Following the first free elections on 20 May 1990, some progress toward functional democracy on the domestic political scene and the dissolution of the COMECON (30 June 1991) and the Warsaw Treaty (1 July 1991)11, Romanian foreign policy began to acquire a new sense of purpose. After the attempted coup in Moscow and the proclamation of independence by the former Soviet republics, Romania extended recognition to Estonia, Georgia, Latvia and Lithuania (26 August 1991), the Republic of Moldova (27 August 1991) and then to all the other new states, offering to establish diplomatic relations.12 10

In the first two months following the regime change, Romania received the visits of more than thirty foreign ministers or other senior dignitaries from partner countries and international organizations. 11 At the informal meeting of the Warsaw Treaty foreign ministers held on 12 February 1990 in the margins of the Open Sky Conference in Ottawa, Romania declined to host the next regular meeting of the Consultative Political Committee of the Treaty, invoking domestic political circumstances. On that occasion the ministers of Romania and Poland were the only ones to support the prospect of German reunification as legitimate and historically inevitable. 12 For a critical analysis of the Romanian policies toward its Eastern neighbours during that period and relations first with the Soviet Union then with Russia and Ukraine see Gosu, Armand.“Sur le poids de l’histoire: Les relations de la Roumanie avec l‘Est”, in Geopolitique, No. 90, April-July 2005. pp. 48-58.

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Official contacts with NATO and the European Communities became more frequent and gained in substance. Diplomatic demarches were initiated to establish official relations with NATO; on 23 October 1990 the Romanian Prime Minister paid a visit to the Allied Headquarters, followed by other exchanges at senior level. An agreement on trade and economic cooperation with the European Economic Community was signed in Luxembourg on 22 October 1990.13 The negotiations for the conclusion of the Association Agreement between Romania and the European Communities (Europe Agreement) started on 18 May 1992; the text was initialled on 17 November 1992, signed on 1 February 1993 and entered into force on 1 February 1995. Bilateral relations with the USSR and then with Russia were characterized at that time by a mutual effort to adapt to the new political circumstances and to adjust the legal framework accordingly. A certain deterioration occurred in the aftermath of the proclamation of independence by the Republic of Moldova (27 August 1991), which was immediately recognized by Romania, and especially in connection with the violence that erupted in that country in the summer of 1992 involving combat units of the Russian 14th Army.14

Phase Two: Apprenticeship 1 February 1993 to 25 April 2005 – the signing of EU Accession Treaty The general elections of 27 September 1992 produced a more balanced representation in Parliament and brought about a relative stability in the political system. This also entailed a more active phase of Romanian involvement in international affairs, marked by frequent high-level exchanges and the conclusion of new accords. On 26 January 1994, Romania was the first East Central European country to sign the Framework Agreement for the Partnership for Peace initiated by NATO. Romania’s determination to prepare for eventual membership was officially stated in a message from the Romanian President to the NATO Secretary General on 11 October 1996. After extensive consultations carried on by the President of Romania with political parties represented in Parliament, an expert commission 13

In fact, the history of Romania’s relations with the EEC dates back to the early 1960s, when several technical agreements were concluded and a Joint Commission was established, which amounted to a de facto recognition of the EEC as a political entity. 14 Dungaciu, Dan, Cine suntem noi. Cronici de la Est la Vest (Who We Are: Chronicles from East to West), Chisinau, Editura Cartier, 2009.

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(established on 8 March 1995) produced a national strategy for the accession of Romania to the European Union, which was submitted together with the formal application for membership on 22 June 1995. The general and presidential elections on 3 November 1996 produced a new centre-right parliamentary majority. Emil Constantinescu became the new President of Romania and assumed office on 29 November 1996. As a result of the elections of 26 November 2000, Ion Iliescu was re-instated as President (after the second round on 10 December 2000) and the social democrats formed the government. Both elections showed the growing maturity of the Romanian political system, with smooth transition from one parliamentary majority and presidency to the next. The main concerns of Romanian diplomacy at that time were full normalization of relations with the neighbouring countries,15 a more activist stance in regional affairs16 and, most importantly, preparations for NATO and EU accession. The failure to obtain an invitation for membership at the NATO Madrid summit of 8 July 1997 was a rude awakening for the Romanian authorities, calling attention to the need to accelerate the pace of domestic reform in order to comply with the alliance’s standards and procedures. On 28 March 1998 the Romanian mission to NATO became operational. During the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999, Romania abstained from participation in the NATO-led air campaign and, later, from extending official recognition to that province as a sovereign state. Romania was among the first countries to designate a military contingent for participation in the NATO-led ISAF operations in Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attack against the United States on 11 September 2001 and, from 2003, in the allied military presence in Iraq. At the NATO summit in Prague, on 21 November 2002, Romania received a formal invitation to join the Alliance and eventually, after ratification by all 19 member and 7 candidate states, became a full member on 2 April 2004. On 23 March 1998, Romania officially submitted its national plan of accession to the European Commission. Following the decision of the European Council in Helsinki on 10-11 December 1999, accession negotiations with Romania and other candidate countries began on 15 February 2000. The EU summit in Copenhagen on 13 December 2002 decided to accept as members ten candidate countries and to set a target 15

After long and difficult negotiations, basic Treaties were finally signed with Hungary (16 September 1996) and Ukraine (2 June 1997). 16 Especially the Central European Initiative, Central European Free Trade Agreement, Black Sea Economic Cooperation; trilateral cooperative arrangements were agreed with Ukraine-Moldova; Bulgaria-Turkey and Greece-Bulgaria.

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date for the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Intensive consultations conducted by the Presidency with all parliamentary parties spurred the internal preparations for membership into a more active stage. Accession negotiations proceeded apace and were concluded for all chapters on 8 December 2004. The Treaty of Accession was formally signed in Luxembourg on 25 April 2005. As a result of the parliamentary and presidential elections of 28 November 2004 (second round on 12 December), Traian Basescu became President of Romania (re-elected on 6 December 2009) and Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu assumed his duties as Prime Minister until 22 December 2008, followed by several cabinets led by Emil Boc. In relations between Romania and Russia, despite the two aborted attempts to conclude a political Treaty and the pressure of a period of radical transformation in the domestic and foreign policies of the two countries, some positive developments were recorded, marked by mutual visits at senior governmental and parliamentary levels and the signing of new agreements that were better adapted to the changed circumstances. For several years in the latter half of the 1990s, bilateral relations appeared to settle into a pattern of mutual political indifference, though the climate improved for a while after the conclusion of the basic Treaty in 2003. Still, high-level political dialogue continued with the visits to Moscow of Presidents Ion Iliescu (9 May 1995 for the celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II and 3-5 July 2003 for the signing of the basic Treaty) and Traian Basescu (14-15 February 2005). Prime Ministers Nicolae Vacaroiu (27-29 September 1993 and 25 October 1996), Radu Vasile (25-26 November 1999) and Adrian Nastase (21 February 2002 and 27 July 2004) also held talks in Moscow. Romania was visited by the First-Deputy Prime Ministers of the Russian Federation Yuri Yarov (20-24 April 1994) and Oleg Soskovets (29-30 June 1995), and by Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov (27-28 March 2003). Ministerial exchanges included 9 visits at the level of Foreign Ministers (4 to Romania and 5 to Russia) plus 15 visits by other members of the two governments. 17 visits at senior parliamentary level also took place. On 28 March 1994 a bilateral military cooperation agreement was signed at the level of defence ministers. Contacts between cultural, ecclesiastical and scientific bodies as well as between various specialized agencies were also intensified. 16 intergovernmental agreements in various fields were signed during that period.17 17 Statistics compiled by special request, courtesy of Agerpres, Romanian State News Agency, 3 September 2011.

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Phase Three: Integration with the NATO and EU Systems (25 April 2005 and thereafter) Compared to the other Central European candidates in the first and second waves of EU enlargement, Romania had to make more strenuous efforts in order to comply with the requirements of membership and to transpose the acquis communautaire into its national legislation and practice of governance.18 During the process of ratification of the Accession Treaty and before its entry into force on 1 January 2007 important adjustments were necessary to the organization and functioning of existing institutional structures and operational procedures. External policies also faced new dimensions through the creative participation of Romania in the shaping and implementation of the common EU foreign, security and defence policies.19 Romania’s involvement in NATO activities followed a normal course. It actively participated in the elaboration of the New Strategic Concept of the Alliance and had a well-appreciated contribution to NATO out-of-area missions. After six years of steady GDP growth, well above the EU average, Romania was hit particularly hard by the effects of the world financial and economic crisis and had to negotiate a sizeable financial assistance package with the European Commission and international financial institutions to the tune of about Euro 20 billion. The agreed austerity measures led to reductions in public spending, higher value-added tax and considerable cuts in wages and pensions, resulting in diminished purchasing power for the population. The recovery has been slow and fragile, and the danger of further shocks still remains. The very low absorption rate of the EU cohesion and solidarity funds, which was partially improved in the past two years, has further compounded the existing difficulties. Nevertheless, Romania has managed to maintain macroeconomic stability and to avoid falling into a double-dip recession. In the context of the continued financial and economic difficulties in the European Union, the Eurozone in particular, the post-recession recovery in Romania was slow and hesitant but still managed to post a 3.5% GDP

18

For a comprehensive survey of the process and the difficulties that had to be overcome see Orban, Leonard, “Romania’s Accession Negotiations with the EU: A Chief Negotiator’s Perspective”, in Phinnemore, David, (Ed.), The EU & Romania: Accession and Beyond, London, The Federal Trust, 2006, pp. 78-92. 19 Celac, Sergiu, “Romania, the Black Sea and Russia”,.in: Phinnemore, (Ed), Op. cit, pp. 145-151.

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growth in 2013, significantly above the regional average. The major rating agencies gave Romania investment-grade status, with a positive outlook. Following a vote of non-confidence in the government dominated by the Democrat-Liberal Party (27 April 2012) and the emergence of a new parliamentary majority of social-democrats, liberals and conservatives (USL), a new cabinet led by Victor Ponta came into office on 8 May 2012. An attempt to impeach the president in a referendum (29 July 2012), although approved by a vast majority of voters, was declared null and void because it failed to meet the required quorum. The general elections of 9 December 2012 confirmed that trend, giving a landslide victory to the Social-Liberal Union (USL). The second Ponta government took office on 21 December 2012. Serious differences soon developed within the governing coalition; on 24 February 2014, the National Liberal Party withdrew from the Social-Liberal Union and went into opposition. The third Ponta government came into office on 5 March 2014 relying on a comfortable parliamentary majority supported by the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR), the Conservative Party (PC) and the National Union for Romania’s Progress (UNPR). Relations with the Russian Federation were marked by the visit to Moscow of President Traian Basescu (9 May 2005, to participate in the events commemorating 60 years since the end of World War II) and his meeting with President Vladimir Putin in the margins of the NATO summit and NATO-Russia Council in Bucharest (4 April 2008). Parliamentary exchanges continued with the official visit to Romania of Sergei Mironov, President of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (10-12 October 2007) and other contacts at working level. During the period there were 4 working visits at the level of ministers of Foreign Affairs: Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu (11-12 October 2005 for the inauguration of the Romanian Consulate General at Rostov-on-Don; 31 October - 1 November 2006), Cristian Diaconescu to Russia (27 February 2009) and Sergei Lavrov to Romania (8 November 2005). Seven other bilateral ministerial contacts took place in the margins of international events, including the meeting of ministers Teodor Baconschi and Sergei Lavrov during the UN General Assembly session (21 September 2011). Several agreements were signed on those occasions, covering in particular the status of military cemeteries in the two countries (the fourth meeting of the relevant joint committee took place in Moscow on 27-30 November 2012 and the fifth in Bucharest in April 2013) and cooperative partnerships with various regions of the Russian Federation (Rostov and Tyumen).

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On 8-10 July 2013, the Foreign Minister of Romania Titus Corla‫܊‬ean paid a visit to the Russian Federation in an attempt to revitalize bilateral relations on a pragmatic basis and to explore new ways and mechanisms for tackling subjects of mutual interest. During the talks, he reiterated the intention of the Romanian Government to promote a positive, pragmatic and constructive agenda with an emphasis on more substantial and balanced economic exchanges and on regional cooperation. Regular consultations at the level of state secretary/deputy foreign minister on bilateral relations and international subjects of mutual interest have been held annually since 2011. The bilateral Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Technological and Scientific Cooperation held more or less regular sessions, with some interruptions after 2005. A Declaration on Partnership for Modernization between the two governments was adopted at the regular meeting of the Commission in Moscow on 4 October 2011. The eleventh session of the Commission took place in Bucharest, 18-19 April 2013. New agreements to replace the older ones on economic cooperation (1991) and mutual protection of investments (1993) are being negotiated to bring them in line with Romania’s commitments under the EU acquis in terms of substance and procedures. Trade exchanges totaled $ 4,986.7 million in 2013 with Romanian exports accounting for $ 1.8 billion and imports for $ 3.1 billion. It is to be noted that, while Romania still had a considerable trade deficit, it narrowed down from an average $3.8 billion in 2005-2008 owing mainly to a rise of Romanian exports to Russia (from $ 231 million in 2005 to $1.8 billion in 2013). An agreement to establish a Romanian Cultural Institute in Moscow and a Russian Centre for Culture and Science in Bucharest was signed and entered into force in 2013. Sectoral contacts at the level of ministers or high officials continued in the margins of international conferences on topics related to science and technology, education, legal affairs and law enforcement.20 Political contacts other than diplomatic ones came to a virtual standstill after the political and military intervention of the Russian Federation in Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea in spring 2014.

20 Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania www.mae.ro, country file on Russia, consulted on 18 September 2014.

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Impact of NATO and EU accession It is important to note that official Romanian documents consistently stated from the very beginning that membership in NATO and the European Union was in no way directed, explicitly or implicitly, against Russia or its legitimate interests. The main incentive for Romania’s decision to join NATO and the EU was in effect a return to the fold of European democratic institutions and shared values to which it traditionally belonged.21 From the perspective of most Romanian policy makers and analysts, the fact that Romania has become a member of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union appears as an incentive rather than an obstacle to better and more constructive relations with the Russian Federation. The prevailing opinion is that NATO outreach and EU enlargement may have actually alleviated some of Russia’s legitimate security concerns and improved the prospects for mutually beneficial economic and other forms of cooperation by providing additional elements of predictability and stability along its western borders.22 It should be noted that, according to a multi-annual series of opinion polls, the accession to NATO and the European Union has consistently enjoyed the overwhelming support of the Romanian public (in the range of 75-90%)23 and has remained solid over the years. This is why some of the strongly-worded statements coming out of Moscow at the senior political level against the Euro-Atlantic community and practical action opposing, for example, the aspirations of Ukraine or the Republic of Moldova to develop closer ties with the EU tend to be interpreted by analysts in Bucharest as expressions of an anachronistic nostalgia for the Russian imperial past and former spheres of influence. The fact that few persuasive signals have emerged from Moscow to dispel this possible misapprehension has further reinforced that view. The sporadic character and limited agenda of bilateral political talks at an appropriate level may also have been a contributing factor. 21

Buga, Vasile, “Rumynia v novom geopoliticheskom izmerenii” (Romania in a New Geopolitical Dimension), in Vestnik Evropy, vol.IX, Moscow, 2003. 22 For an extensive analysis of the international circumstances that shaped the transformation of NATO, its attitude toward Moscow, the outreach to East-Central Europe and the role of the Partnership for Peace see Vlad, Constantin, Diplomaаia secolului XX (Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century), Bucharest, Funda‫܊‬ia Europeană Titulescu, 2006, pp. 675-696, 707-715. 23 Barany, Zoltan, The Future of NATO Expansion. Four Case Studies,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003,.p. 225.

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In the process of EU enlargement, the Russian side raised certain specific objections regarding the accession of countries that were still regarded as belonging to its sphere of special interest prior to the eventual signing of the two relevant EU-Russia Joint Statements (April 2004 and April 2007.)24 While with regard to the Baltic states the issues raised concerned the status of Kaliningrad and of the Russian-speaking population (particularly for Estonia and Latvia), in the case of Romania (and Bulgaria) the issues were related to steel production, terms of trade in farm produce and intellectual property rights over military hardware allegedly produced under Soviet-era licences. Alongside the other NATO and EU members, Romania repeatedly stated its interest in working more closely together with a strong, prosperous, stable and democratic Russian Federation. This was stated time and again in the official policy documents of both the EU and NATO. Moreover, it is important to note that Romania’s commitment to such joint policies of constructive engagement toward Russia stemmed not only from group discipline and allied solidarity but also from the fact that they are consonant with the well-conceived national interest of Romania. Like all other countries in East Central Europe, Romania has been an active participant in shaping the consensual allied strategic concepts and current policies on all major issues, including relations with the Russian Federation. Therefore, any meaningful progress in bilateral relations between Romania and Russia was also likely to be reflected in the common positions of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. That approach certainly stood valid until the sudden change of course by the Russian Federation over the events in and around Ukraine. With regard to the rationale, legal status and technical arrangements for US forward operational sites or joint training, logistical and transit facilities, including missile defence installations on the territory of Romania in accordance with its NATO commitments and strategic partnership with the United States, the authors have ascertained that the Romanian authorities are prepared to offer the necessary clarifications, if so required by the Russian side. In fact, the US-Romania BMD agreement, signed in Washington on 13 September 2011, specifically reiterated the exclusively defensive character of the envisaged system and its use in conformity with the United Nations Charter. For the broader geo-strategic implications of such allied decisions, the Russian Federation is in a 24

Q.v. Joint Statement on EU Enlargement and Russia-EU Relations, Luxembourg, 23 April 2007, at http://www.russianmission.eu/userfiles/file/joint_statement_on_eu_enlargement_a nd_russia_eu_relations_2007_english.pdf.

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position to use the continuing bilateral high-level dialogue and politicalmilitary channels of communication with the United States as well as the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, of which Romania is also a member. In the considered view of most Romanian analysts, the evolving context of the US-Russia dialogue, the NATO-Russia cooperative framework and the EU-Russia strategic partnership could have favoured a more stable and constructive relationship also between Romania and the Russian Federation. An improvement in the international and regional political climate is believed to be conducive to more realistic attitudes allowing for mutual accommodation of legitimate national interests. Understandably, Romania has a stake in the success of the EU regional programs in the common neighbourhood, such as the Eastern Partnership, the Black Sea Synergy and the Danube Initiative. The positive involvement of the Russian Federation in those cooperative endeavours could have really made a difference as would have meaningful progress toward a new, comprehensive EU-Russia arrangement to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997. All those promises have now been shattered and reversed by the Russian actions in blatant violation of international law and accepted practice. As a member state of NATO and EU, Romania has been an active participant in shaping the joint positions of those organizations, in particular the Summit Declaration of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, 4-5 September 2014, strongly condemning those aggressive actions and imposing an agreed sanctions regime. Recent events have once more confirmed the wisdom of Romania’s decision to join the Transatlantic community of democratic nations as a fundamental condition of its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security. Considering the burden of the historical legacy, the state of affairs prior to the regime change of 1989-1991 in both countries and new tensions close to Romania’s eastern borders, it is fair to say that, other than harsh rhetoric from Moscow and an occasional freeze of high-level political contacts, Romania’s demarches for accession and then actual membership in NATO and the EU prompted no major shift in bilateral relations with the Russian Federation but rather served as elements of stability in a complicated and potentially dangerous regional environment..

Romanian domestic political discourse Official Romanian policy documents and authorized statements by state leaders and senior officials have generally followed the course of

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bilateral relations with the USSR and then the Russian Federation. Over the years, they have also increasingly reflected the common positions agreed to in the framework of NATO and the European Union. The common denominator has been Romania’s readiness to pursue normal and constructive relations with Russia proceeding from the recognition of the new realities after the end of the Cold War, respect for each other’s political choices and legitimate interests, and a pragmatic, businesslike approach in seeking mutually acceptable solutions to existing problems with an emphasis on economic exchanges and other forms of cooperation. It was repeatedly emphasized that the burden of past history, while not forgotten, should not be seen as an insurmountable obstacle to better relations now and in the future. With insignificant variations, this official position has remained essentially unchanged for the past two decades. The National Security Strategy of Romania (2007) made no specific reference to relations with the Russian Federation other than in the context of regional stability and security (Chapter V) or the Black Sea cooperation (Chapter VI).25 The National Defence Strategy (2010) contains in Chapter 5, on the international security environment, a reference to the “conflict in the summer of 2008 between the Russian Federation and Georgia”, serving as a reminder that “the risks and threats that we deemed to be things of the past are coming back onto our security agenda”.26 Further on, in relation to the Republic of Moldova, the document states: “The stationing of foreign troops without the agreement of the host country is a threat to national security; for this reason Romania will continue to be actively involved in promoting solutions aimed at the demilitarization of the region through the withdrawal of the unlawfully stationed troops and armaments.”27

With regard to the missile defence initiative, the National Defence Strategy proceeds from the premise that Romania is in no position to develop such a system through its national efforts alone and states that “the bilateral project that is being put in place with the United States will be a concrete contribution to the development of the anti-missile defence envisaged by NATO”.28 25 Presedintia Romaniei, Strategia de Securitate Nationala a Romaniei, Bucuresti, 2007, at www.presidency.ro. 26 Strategia Nationala de Aparare, Bucuresti, 2010, at www.presidency.ro. 27 Ibidem, Chapter 7, section 7.1. 28 Ibidem, section 7.2.

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The country file on the Russian Federation posted on the official website of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides a factual synopsis of political and other contacts after the conclusion of the basic Treaty of 2003 and presents a brief description of the existing legal framework for economic, cultural and scientific cooperation.29 The text also mentions that, according to the census of 2010, in the Russian Federation there were 3,201 ethnic Romanians, plus about 156,000 persons who stated their nationality as Moldovan, Bessarabian or Vlach. The most authoritative source for recent public pronouncements at the highest political level have been the speeches of the President of Romania at the annual meetings with the chiefs of Romanian diplomatic and consular missions (every September) and the diplomatic corps accredited to Bucharest (every January). With reference to the Russian Federation they have essentially reiterated the position that acknowledges the existence of certain differences but calls for a pragmatic approach, especially in the economic sphere: “In the following period, we think it appropriate to work together also with the Russian Federation in promoting the values of the European spirit, following the positive developments already seen in bilateral economic relations. As I have repeatedly mentioned before, Romania wishes to consolidate its dialogue with Russia in order to take advantage of the opportunities for cooperation on a pragmatic and comprehensive basis, in an open and European spirit that takes into consideration both the international standing and the interests of each state”.30 The official public discourse in Romania on the current state of affairs and future prospects for relations with the Russian Federation have generally followed that pattern.31 There have been some exceptions however, mostly related to the domestic political agenda on either side or the pressures of electoral campaigns with occasional rhetorical outbursts that may have been destined to score points against internal political opponents or to send signals to third parties. Although the impact on 29

www.mae.ro Basescu, Traian. Speech at the annual meeting with the heads of diplomatic missions accredited to Romania, 19 January 2012, available at the official site of the Presidential Administration www.presidency.ro. 31 For more details and a critical assessment of the references to relations with the Russian Federation in official Romanian documents and statements see Chifu, Iulian, “The Perception of Russia in Romania: August 2008-April 2010”, in Chifu, Iulian; Nantoi, Oazu; Suchko, Oleksandr, The Perception of Russia in Romania, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, in English and Romanian, Bucharest, Editura Curtea Veche, 2010, pp. 9-17. 30

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bilateral relations has been limited, such pronouncements have the perverse effect of inciting the other side to respond in kind. A former Romanian ambassador to Moscow recalled that, when he presented his credentials to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was confronted with a file of public statements made by Romanian officials over the past ten years, which the Russian side found to be objectionable. He was then informed that, even if such declarations were to cease, it could take another five years before Russia would be ready to reconsider its position with regard to Romania.32 That kind of rhetoric became sharply confrontational, on both sides, after the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014 and its political-military intervention in southeastern Ukraine. It stands to reason that a climate of civility is essential for any meaningful political dialogue. Perceptions may easily have a detrimental effect on the substance of bilateral relations. This applies in particular to Romanian-Russians relations, where the emotional charges of past history, the conflicting interpretations of events or facts and the conceptual differences concerning the conduct of international affairs remain present and even become more acute in the thinking of today.

Public Perceptions of Romania-Russia Relations Against the background of abiding historical memories, residual problems and the unimpressive recent record of bilateral relations, it should not be surprising to learn that, according to professional opinion polls, Russia was perceived to be among the countries most unfriendly to Romania even before the Ukrainian crisis. In 1999, about 46 per cent of the respondents had a negative or very negative opinion of Russia.33 Roughly the same figure was registered in 2005.34 However, in-depth studies conducted prior to the spring of 2014 revealed a somewhat more nuanced picture. A report on a study monitoring the coverage of Russia and Romanian-Russian relations in the Romanian media (4 television channels and 6 dailies with national reach 32

Prunariu, Dumitru-Dorin, „Pe lista gri a Moscovei” (On Russia’s Grey List), in Foreign Policy Romania, July-August 2011, p. 78. 33 Barometrul de opinie publică România (Barometer of Public Opinion in Romania), Cluj, Metro Media Transilvania, May 1999, p. 46, at www.osf.ro. 34 Percepаia opiniei publice din România asupra politicii externe Юi relaаiilor internationale (Perceptions of the Public Opinion in Romania on Foreign Policy and International Relations), Bucharest, Institutul de Politici Publice, October 2005, p. 68.

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or distribution) between 1 August 2008 and 20 April 2010 counted an average of 400 items per media outlet. In qualitative terms, political news and analytical editorial comments tended to have a predominantly negative bent vis-à-vis Russian policies, while reports on cultural, scientific and sports events were mostly positive. On the whole, the favourable, neutral and unfavourable references (about one-third each) seemed to be almost evenly balanced, and variations mirroring the editorial policies of individual publications did not significantly alter the statistical average.35 Professional opinion polls conducted in Romania in April and August 2010 revealed that 39% and 38% of the respondents, respectively, had a very favorable or rather favorable attitude toward Russia as a country, 35% and 38% somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable, with about 25% not decided. The figures for Russia were quite similar to those for Ukraine. The positive ratings among the Romanian public were considerably higher for the Republic of Moldova (55%), the United States (66%) or the EU (73%). However, when questioned about their view of the Russians as persons, the Romanian respondents gave a consistently positive rating of over 50%.36 Some 40% of the respondents described the quality of relations between Romania and the Russian Federation as good in April 2010, though this number dropped to 28% in August 2010. The same holds true for expectations about an improvement in bilateral relations in the next 12 months (30% in August, down from 42% in April 2010).37 The main concerns of the Romanian public were related to the country’s dependence on Russian energy resources (about 41% felt worried about that in April and 47% in August 2010) and the behavior of the Russian Federation toward its neighbors (29% in April and 34% in August 2010).38 A survey (released on 14 September 2011) conducted in 14 countries by the German Marshall Fund of the US showed a somewhat different picture. About 50% of the Romanian respondents had a favorable opinion of Russia, roughly equal with the rating for Brazil and ahead of India (40%) and Pakistan (20%) but below the 81% for the US or 69% for China. The rate of approval for the Romanian Government’s handling of relations with the Russian Federation stood at 50%, equal to that of Poland

35

Chifu, Iulian et al.Op. cit, pp. 17-22. For a detailed presentation of the themes that elicited the most attention in the Romanian media see also the research paper by Cucu-Popescu, Vlad. Ibidem, pp. 24-42. 36 Ibidem, Tables, p. 57. 37 Ibidem, Tables,.p. 61. 38 Ibidem,Tables, p. 62.

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and Spain but well below the average of the sampled countries.39 According to an opinion poll taken by the Romanian Institute for Evaluation and Strategy (IRES) on 19-21 December 2012, only about 7% of the Romanian respondents believed that relations with Russia should be given priority (compared to 38% for Germany and 20% for the US).40 The discrepancies in the findings of the various polls, which seem to be statistically reliable, may be attributable to the different methodologies used, but they may also indicate a slight positive shift in the perceptions of Russia among the Romanian public before the Ukrainian crisis of 2014. Although conducting similar polls in the Russian Federation on popular perceptions of Romania and bilateral relations is unrealistic and may not even be productive, it could be useful to explore systematically the opinions of scholars and analysts who are familiar with the subject. This can be done periodically on the basis of an agreed questionnaire resulting in a dynamic record of mutual perceptions over time.41

Open issues and controversial interpretations The Consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its Additional Protocol Both Romania and the Russian Federation need to face a new reality: following the dissolution of the USSR, the two countries no longer share a common border for the first time in centuries. For this reason, most of the bilateral problems that were formally part of the historical legacy, including those caused by the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939, have been automatically transferred to Romania’s current immediate neighbours, the sovereign states of the Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. By the very act of welcoming the independence of those states and establishing diplomatic relations with them, Romania thereby acknowledged their sovereignty and territorial integrity within their internationally recognized borders, further confirmed by the conclusion of bilateral treaties. 39

Ghinea, Cristian, “Key Findings for Romania”, Presentation based on Transatlantic Trends 2011, The German Marshall Fund of the US, at www.transatlantictrends.org. 40 Ora nouă online, 16 January 2013, at www.oranoua.ro. 41 For a sample of how this method can be applied in practice, see Cojocariu, Tudor and Toma, Bianca. Narrowing the perceptions gap: Views from Bucharest and Kyiv, Policy Memo, Bucharest: Romanian Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2012. Available at www.crpe.ro.

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This has been the official position of Romania and it stands as stated. Consequently, any insinuations (occasionally mooted in the Russian media and research papers) concerning Romania’s alleged dark designs or territorial claims against its immediate neighbours are totally devoid of foundation in fact or intention. The conclusive proof is the final settlement of the issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones between Romania and the Ukraine by a unanimous verdict of the International Court of Justice in the Hague, delivered on 3 February 2009 following the agreement of the two litigants to submit the case to the Court’s jurisdiction. Notably, the negotiations on that subject had dragged on with the Soviet Union for twenty years (1967-1987) and took another 34 rounds of talks with the Ukraine before reaching that mutually satisfactory conclusion.42 One can only hope that similar cases, specifically the protracted conflicts in which Russia is directly involved, may find equally fair solutions in line with the established tenets of international law and justice. The current borders of Romania were set by the Paris Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947 and remain unquestioned. But the moral responsibility for carving up the map of Central Europe as a direct consequence of the secret conspiracy between Hitler and Stalin has not yet been fully assumed. Romanian historians are puzzled by the fact that the propaganda brochure Falsifikatory istorii. Istoricheskaia spravka, which was released in Moscow in 1948 in response to the publication earlier that year by the US State Department of the authentic documents on Germany’s foreign policy in 1939-1941, including the Additional Protocol to the MolotovRibbentrop Pact, is still regarded today by a significant segment of the Russian historical community as a valid scientific source for the interpretation of those events.43 According to mainstream Romanian historical research, the Soviet ultimatum to Romania of 26-28 June 1940 went even beyond the 42

Dungaciu, Dan, Basarabia e România? Dileme identitare Юi (geo)politice în Republica Moldova (Is Bessarabia Romania? Identity and (Geo)political Dilemmas in the Republic of Moldova), specifically “Lec‫܊‬iile deciziei de la Haga” (Lessons from the Hague Decision), Chisinau, Editura Cartier, 2011, p. 89. 43 This is persuasively illustrated in the even-handed presentation of the on-going debate between the “critics” and the “traditionalists” in contemporary Russian historical research, q.v. Smirnov, V.P., “Miunkhenskaia konferentsia i sovetskogermanski pakt o nenapadenii v diskussiakh rossiskikh istorikov”, in Narinski, M.M. and Dembski, S., (Eds), Mezhdunarodnyi krizis 1939 goda v traktovkakh rossiskikh i polskikh istorikov, Moscow, MGIMO, 2009, pp. 9-45; references to Romania on pages 42, 44.

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provisions of the Additional Protocol by forcing the cession to the USSR not only of the province of Bessarabia but also Northern Bucovina and the Hertza Land, which had never before been parts of Russia. This was followed, on 2 August 1940, by the decision to incorporate into the newly established Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova only the central portion of Bessarabia and only half of the former Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republic of Moldova (MSSAR) on the left bank of the Nistru (Dniestr), while including the rest of the newly acquired territories within the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR.44 Quite a few Romanian historians and political analysts are still unhappy about the fact that the statement accompanying the basic Treaty of 2003 condemned equally the MolotovRibbentrop Pact and Romania’s participation in the war against the Soviet Union – considering that the latter decision was intended to redress the injustice caused precisely by the Pact.45 But they also tend to agree that the move of the Romanian armed forces into Soviet territory beyond the river Nistru as far as Stalingrad in 1941-1943 was a fatal error, which had no precedent in the conduct of Romanian policy in peace or war since the time of the Middle Ages. Apart from placing the historical facts in accurate perspective, those past events have lessons to offer that are relevant today for the respective attitudes of Romania and Russia toward the Republic of Moldova and the lingering conflict over Transnistria which, unlike other conflicts in the former Soviet space, is not ethnic but eminently political.46 In the wake of military confrontations which also involved Russian forces stationed on the left bank of the Nistru, a quadripartite mechanism including Russia, Ukraine, Romania and the Republic of Moldova was established in April 1992 to supervise the ceasefire and to mediate a solution. This was replaced by Russian-Moldovan bilateral talks and, in 2005, by a 5+2 format involving Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, the Republic of Moldova and 44

Dungaciu, Dan, Op cit., Note 43 supra, pp. 211-215; See also Dungaciu, Dan, Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact – Symbolic and Juridical Aspects, Research paper prepared for the purpose of this project, 4 September 2011. 45 Q.v., for instance, Chifu, Iulian, “Lungul drum de la dialog la cooperare” (The Long Way from Dialogue to Cooperation), in Buga and Chifu, Op. cit., pp. 26-29. 46 For detailed presentations of the current situation in Transnistria and civil society involvement in seeking imaginative and constructive solutions, q. v. the research papers presented at the meeting of the Civil Society Dialogue Network on Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, Bucharest, 28 June 2011: Beyer, John, Routes across the Nistru. Transnistria: People’s Peacemaking Perspectives; Cristescu, Roxana and Medvedev, Denis, Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention in Moldova: The Role of the EU, available at http://www.eplo.org/civil-society-dialogue-network.html.

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the Transnistrian separatist authorities, plus the United States and the European Union as observers. So far, the on-and-off negotiations have made little progress, mainly because of stonewalling by the Transnistrian side.47 The prevailing sentiment among Romanian analysts is that the separatist regime in Tiraspol is entirely dependent upon Russia and that its every move is inspired and tightly controlled, officially or unofficially, by Moscow. The rationale for that policy has never been satisfactorily explained. The official position of Romania is to provide firm support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders and its aspiration to become more closely associated with the European Union. This expression of solidarity is only natural considering the common linguistic, ethnic and cultural identity that has remained intact despite a complicated historical legacy. The steady improvement of relations with the Republic of Moldova in all fields is a priority that is shared by the entire spectrum of political forces in Romania and is considered to be in the fundamental interests of the two countries. Romania was the first EU member state to ratify, on 3 July 2014, the Association Agreement of the Republic of Moldova with the European Union (AA), including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), initialed at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius on 29 November 2013 and signed in Brussels on 27 June 2014. The same applies to the Europe Agreements with Georgia and Ukraine. The protracted conflict over Transnistria is seen as a direct consequence of the continued Russian military presence in the province without the consent of the host country or a proper peacekeeping mandate, contrary to the explicit commitments of Russia under the OSCE and in violation of the constitutional terms of the Republic of Moldova.48 That presence is also regarded in Bucharest as a legitimate national security concern. Although Romania is not a party to the current negotiating format for Transnistria, many Romanian analysts think that, sooner or later, the broader implications of the issues related to that breakaway province will have to be discussed also bilaterally, at the official level between Romania and the Russian Federation with a view to removing residual misapprehensions and seeking mutual accommodation with due respect for the territorial integrity and sovereign rights of the Republic of Moldova, its 47

Dungaciu, Dan, Op. cit. See Note 43 supra. Celac, Sergiu, “Printsipy mezhdunarodnogo prava i spetsificheskie situatsii”, Interview with Sergey Markedonov, in Caucasus Times, 19 October 2010, at http://www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=20439. 48

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legitimate aspiration to be more closely associated with the European Union, and the general interests of security, stability and cooperation in Europe. In any event, the inclusion of Romania, as an immediate neighbour and interested party, in any future negotiating format on the Transnistrian issue is deemed to be logical and desirable.

Romanian treasure of gold and other valuables This issue has been on the bilateral agenda since the Paris Conference of 1919, was raised again after the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Romania and the USSR in 1934 and was officially tabled once more in 1965 at the highest policy-making level. As a result of long and difficult negotiations, the statement attached to the basic Treaty of 2003 specifically mentioned the agreement of the two sides that a joint multidisciplinary commission should further explore the issue.49 The facts are simple. During World War I, in the last few months of 1916, following a coordinated offensive of German, Austrian, Hungarian and Bulgarian forces, most of the territory of Romania was occupied, including the capital city of Bucharest. The government moved to Iasi in North-East Romania. On 14 (27) December 1916, a convention was signed between the governments of Romania and Russia, then an ally in the Entente, and the first shipment of the Romanian National Bank treasure, consisting of gold bullion and crown jewels, was sent to Moscow for safekeeping. A second shipment consisting of gold and other valuables deposited by private individuals with the National Bank was sent on 27 July (9 August) 1917 and a proper protocol of receipt was signed by representatives of the two governments.50 In this respect the situation of the Romanian treasure substantially differs, in historical and legal terms, from the question of cultural assets unlawfully taken from the territory of another country, as stipulated in specific agreements that were concluded by the Russian Federation with some Central European states. It is important to mention in this context 49

For an insider’s view of those negotiations see Diaconescu, Cristian, “Cum se negociază un tezaur” (How to Negotiate a Treasure). Cover-story interview with Floriana Jucan in Q Magazine, No. 108, 13-26 June 2011. 50 For a collection of relevant authentic documents and a historical record of the case, q..v. Păunescu, Cristian and ‫܇‬tefan, Marian, Tezaurul Băncii Naаionale a României la Moscova (The Treasure of the National Bank of Romania in Moscow) with a Foreword by Academician Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the NBR, Bucharest, Editura Oscar Print, 2011.

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Afterword: Romanian-Russian Relations since 1989

that some valuable artifacts belonging to the national heritage, part of the treasure evacuated during World War I, were returned to Romania by the Soviet Government in 1935 and 1956 as a gesture of good will. Over the years, the case elicited a lot of speculation in the media in Romania and elsewhere. There were also press reports of informal demarches, allegedly sanctioned by the relevant Russian authorities but conducted by third-party companies or individuals in 2004 and 2005, aimed at seeking practical solutions to compensate Romania for the loss of the treasure through private business deals amounting to a total US$ 10 billion.51 Such attempts were firmly rejected by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So far, the Joint Commission established according to the political statement attached to the basic Treaty of 2003 has met three times and managed to clarify some aspects related to the Romanian treasure. But the main question is still pending. It is not merely about retracing the trail of the Romanian treasure of gold and other assets but rather the simple principle of the restitution of property for which certificates of receipt were duly signed. Discussions on that subject naturally remain sensitive and require careful consideration, but ultimately a satisfactory resolution calls for a political decision based on a rational understanding of the longterm mutual interest of preserving and enhancing the friendly relationship between the two countries. It was therefore encouraging that, after long delays which were not properly explained, the commission co-chairmen were able to meet in Moscow on 24 October 2012 and agreed to prepare an interim report and to set a tentative date for the next regular meeting of the Joint Commission. That never happened. The prevailing opinion among Romanian historians and political analysts is that the Romanian authorities should not expedite a settlement until the requisite conditions are in place for a fair and reasonable resolution in line with the letter and spirit of international law and accepted practice. In the meantime, the issue of the Romanian treasure, as well as other questions on which the views and interpretations of the two sides may still differ, should not be an impediment to normal and constructive, good neighbourly relations between Romania and the Russian Federation in a more propitious international climate, after the Ukrainian crisis is settled in a satisfactory manner.

51

Petrescu, Lucian, “Rela‫܊‬iile romaâno-ruse. Istorie-actualitate-viitor” (RomanianRussian Relations. History-Present-Future), in Anghel, Ioan; Petrescu, Lucian; Tudor, Valeriu, (Eds)., Pagini din diplomaаia României (Pages from Romanian Diplomacy), vol. I, Iasi, Editura Junimea, 2009, pp. 104-107.

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Current state of affairs and prospects The predominant view among Romanian historians and political analysts (which, incidentally, appears to be shared by colleagues in other East Central European NATO and EU member countries) is that the region as a whole has not until very recently been a priority for Russian foreign policy. Russia apparently preferred to reach out to the major actors in Western Europe (Germany, France, Italy), and enlist their support in promoting Russian interests in the region. The inclination of the Russian Federation to deal with the United States rather than NATO or with individual European countries rather than the EU was perceived as a pattern of behaviour that a country like Romania could hardly be comfortable with. It is also true that Romania, like other countries in the region, tended to focus primarily on relations with its Western allies and friends, and was late to explore the very real opportunities that existed for more substantive cooperation with traditional partners such as Russia. In the absence of a clear expression of interest or any meaningful offer from the Russian side, it should come as no surprise that Romanian analysts wonder if there is any real point in making a particular effort and contemplating further concessions for the sake of superficially improving the political atmosphere in relations with the Russian Federation. Some have even gone so far as to suggest that the correct attitude in such circumstances would be that of “strategic indifference”.52 Other, far more sceptical views have also been expressed with regard to the historical background and the prospects for Romania’s relations with Russia.53 To be fair, there are also voices, especially among informed analysts and veteran diplomats with hands-on experience of Romanian-Russian relations, who believe that a wait-and-see attitude and continued postponement of practical action in anticipation of better days is apt to be counterproductive and to cause further disappointment to those who sincerely wish for a substantial re-launch of the relationship between the two states based on the realities of the twenty-first century.54 52

This sentiment transpires in particular from the collection of essays Rusia de azi. Cum arată ‫܈‬i ce vrea (Russia Today: What It Looks Like and what It Wants). Ghinea, Cristian, ed. Published as a supplement to the journal Dilema veche, year VIII, issue 392. Bucharest, 18-24 August 2011. 53 Q.v., for example, Preda, Aurel. Memoriile unui diplomat oarecare (Memoirs of an Ordinary Diplomat). Bucharest: Editura Victor, 2009; Victor Roncea blog in Ziari‫܈‬ti Online Portal, http://roncea.ro. 54 See, for example, Buga, Vasile,.”Rela‫܊‬iile româno-ruse. Stadiu ‫܈‬i perspective” (Romanian-Russian Relations: Present State of Affairs and Future Prospects), in

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Over the past two years or so there were some signs that gradual progress in overcoming the stereotypes of the past and opening new areas of constructive dialogue could greatly contribute toward building a reliable foundation for better relations in the future. Speaking on behalf of the Government, the current Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated: “In our dialogue and cooperation with the Russian Federation, we shall continue to identify the points we have in common both bilaterally and in the European context, considering in particular that the Russian Federation is engaged in a partnership for modernization with the European Union. We certainly have to be able to cultivate relevant political contacts at the governmental level, starting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and going up to the level of Prime Ministers. Romania’s diplomatic efforts will remain dedicated to the consolidation of relations with Russia based on a positive and constructive agenda. We aim to engage in the kind of cooperation that can give transparency and predictability to our relations.”55 Despite the limited and relatively low-calibre political agenda, encouraging developments could be detected in several specific fields of activity, especially in the economic sphere. There was an increasing awareness on the part of Romanian officials and the business community that vast, yet untapped, opportunities for the development and diversification of bilateral economic relations should be further explored and taken advantage of. High expectations were voiced in connection with the activities of the newly established bilateral Business Councils in Russia (14 December 2010) and Romania (22 February 2011) to promote and support the development of mutual investment and bilateral economic exchanges. Encouraging steps were taken to revitalize traditional areas of bilateral cooperation and to develop new ones. Some notable progress was made in enhancing mutual knowledge through high-profile cultural events.56 The Romanian public and media appreciated in particular the series of cultural festivities organized by the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Bucharest (23 November - 7 December 2012), including the donation to the Romanian Academy of a set of 25 volumes of the series of complete Buga and Chifu. Op. cit,. p. 23. For a succinct presentation of the main landmarks of Romanian-Russian relations q.v. Petrescu, Lucian, Op.cit.. pp.. 83-108. 55 Corla‫܊‬ean, Titus. Speech at the Annual Assembly of Romanian Diplomacy, 3 September 2012. Available at www.mae.ro. 56 The Russian Spiritual Culture Days in Romania (2011) and the Romanian Culture Days in the Russian Federation (24 September - 18 November 2012), including tours of leading philharmonic orchestras, opera, theatre and film shows, folk art and various exhibitions in the national capitals and other major cities.

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manuscripts by the eighteenth century Romanian scholar Prince Dimitrie Cantemir.57 A Romanian branch of the Russkiy Mir Foundation was opened in Bucharest on 4 December 2009, with extensions in other university centres. Preparations were well underway for the inauguration of the Romanian Cultural Institute in Moscow and the Russian Center for Culture and Science in Bucharest. Under the terms of the Agreement (24 May 1993) between the Romanian Academy and the Russian Academy of Sciences, a joint committee of historians has been meeting (with some interruptions) on a yearly basis and has successfully tackled some joint projects, such as the publication of collections of historical documents regarding bilateral relations.58 The international conference on “Russia and Romania after 20 years: Perceptions, realities, perspectives”, which was organized by the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Romanian Academy in Bucharest, on 4 October 2012, was another important landmark demonstrating once more the usefulness of scientific debate in exploring and clarifying the current issues on the bilateral agenda, no matter how politically complex they may be.59 Unfortunately, the strategic change of course apparently decided by the leaders of the Russian Federation toward militant nationalism, neoisolationism and disregard of the basic principles of international law not only poses a major challenge to Euro-Atlantic security system but also risks to annul the fragile elements of progress in bilateral relations that have been patiently built over the past two decades. Still, there is a feeling in the Romanian intellectual and scientific community that, even at a time of serious tension with a sizable military component of the kind we are currently facing, continuing dialogue and negotiations in good faith can be instrumental in seeking reasonable, mutually acceptable solutions, no matter how hard that may seem to be. When the time is ripe, considerably more could be done by placing onto 57

Special credit for this remarkable achievement is due to Alexander Churilin, the former Russian Ambassador to Bucharest, and Viktor Kirillov, Vice Rector of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Q.v. Prof. Constantin Barbu, coordinator of the Cantemir project, Interview for the Romanian news agency Mediafax, 21 November 2012. 58 Two such bilingual volumes were published in 2000 for the period 1917-1934 and in 2003 for the period 1935-1941. The third volume covering the years 19411947 is in the process of being completed. 59 More than 20 scientific research papers by scholars from Romania, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova were presented on that occasion, some of them available at www.ispri.ro.

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the agenda of bilateral contacts – both officially and at the level of the academic community and civil society – some of the substantive issues of Romania-Russia relations. Informed debate based on solid facts and using the instruments of science, even on subjects that may still be controversial and open to various interpretations, can go a long way towards building mutual trust and generally improving the political atmosphere. We see our task as scholars not just to reveal and explain the existing differences as a matter of record, but rather to seek workable solutions that may help the political decision makers to chart a more realistic and constructive way forward.

CONTRIBUTORS

Sergiu Celac is a Romanian diplomat, career ambassador, former Minister of Foreign Affairs. MA Bucharest University School of Languages (1961). Diplomatic career from 1961, director of Policy Planning (1968-74), chief political adviser to the Minister (1974); counsellor at the State Council (1974-78). Dismissed for ideological reasons (1978), he made a living as a book editor and professional translator of poetry and fiction (1978-89). Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first post-communist Government (Dec. 1989 - June 1990). Ambassador to the United Kingdom and Ireland (199096). Ambassador at Large (1996-2000), missions as Special Envoy to the Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. Director, Romanian Institute of International Studies (2001-03, 2009-). Alternate Director General, International Centre for Black Sea Studies, Athens (2003-07). Current positions: Senior Adviser, National Centre for Sustainable Development; Vice President, Romanian Association for the Club of Rome; Board member Black Sea University Foundation, member Writers’ Union of Romania. Bibliography: “Issues of Energy Security in the Black Sea Region”, in Gheorghe, Adrian and Liviu Muresan, Energy Security, Springer, 2011. “Dimensiunea strategico-militară a conflictelor înghe‫܊‬ate din regiunea extinsă a Mării Negre” [The military-strategic dimension of the frozen conflicts in the wider Black Sea region], “Beneficiile ‫܈‬i limitele Parteneriatului Estic al UE” [Benefits and limitations of EU Eastern Partnership], in Dungaciu, Dan; Iuga, Vasile; Soian, Marius (Eds), Эapte teme fundamentale pentru România 2014 [Seven fundamental topics for Romania 2014], Bucharest, Editura RAO, 2014; joint editor of chapter on Moldova. Institutional and Regulatory Support for the Big Shift toward Sustainability, presentation to the Club of Rome International Annual Assembly, Bucharest, 2 October 2012. Georgiana Ciceo is an Associate Professor with the Faculty of European Studies of Babe‫܈‬-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania. She specialises in international relations and European studies. She currently teaches decision-making processes in the European Union, theories of European integration and public policies of the European Union at both undergraduate and graduate levels. Her current research focus is on the public policies of the European Union, with special emphasis on the

358

Contributors

Common Foreign and Security Policy, its institutional setup and the mechanisms of transfering European norms and values outside the European Union. She has published extensively in academic journals and volumes at prestigious printing houses, such as Nomos and Cambridge Scholars Publishing. She currently holds the position of Director of the Department of European Studies and Governance and is actively involved in the effort aimed at the internationalization of the Faculty of European Studies’ educational programmes. She benefits from 12 years of experience in diplomacy and the professional courses undertaken in this period at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna and with the foreign ministries of Germany and India. Sanda Cincă is a scientific researcher at the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations within the Romanian Academy and a PhD candidate in sociology at the University of Bucharest. Her research priorities include security studies, the Common Foreign Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU, as well as Romania's political history. She is the author-coordinator of the volume entitled Post-Lisbon NATO and Regional Challenges (with Dan Dungaciu, 2011), the author of several articles and studies published in the Romanian Journal of Political Sciences and International Relations and co-author of several books, among which the most recent are Democracy and Security in the 21st Century: Perspectives on a Changing World, (2014), Institutions, International Organisations and Romania (two volumes, 2013), The EU after the Lisbon Treaty (2012), International Relations Reflected in Romania's Parliament Debates (two volumes, 2011, 2012). Cristian Con‫܊‬an, during the 10 years of his diplomatic career, has held various diplomatic positions, including Head of the Office for Relations with the Republic of Moldova. He also served as advisor to the Deputyministers of Foreign Affairs in charge of Public Diplomacy and Strategic Affairs. Currently, Cristian Con‫܊‬an deals with policy planning regarding the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood within the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For a short period of time, in 2013, Mr Con‫܊‬an also worked as seconded national expert to the European External Action Service in Brussels. He has various post-graduate specialisations in international relations and international security, including a Master of Advanced Studies at the European Institute of the University of Geneva.

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Adrian-Gabriel Corpădean is a Lecturer at the Faculty of European Studies, Babeú-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca. He graduated from the aforementioned institution with a degree in International Relations and European Studies. He holds a PhD in History from Babeú-Bolyai University and another from Université de Cergy-Pontoise, both Magna cum laude. His research priorities include the History of European Integration, Communication within the European Union and the Management of European Projects. To elaborate on this, he teaches the History of European Integration course at the English line of Studies at his Faculty, as well as courses of European Communication and Project Cycle Management, at the BA and MA levels. He is professionally active in the areas of European Documentation and Publications, within the European Documentation Centre of Babe‫܈‬-Bolyai University, and he participates in various European projects, in areas such as curriculum development, joint research initiatives and professional convergence between education and active life, having graduated from a MA in European Affairs and Project Management. Dr Corpădean is fluent in English, French and Italian and benefits from considerable international experience, in the areas of research, conferences and projects. He is part of the editorial teams of three international journals focusing on EU integration studies. Some of his most relevant publications include: Le message européen de la diaspora roumaine de France après 1945, EFES, Cluj-Napoca, 2013, 370p.; Moyens d’expression culturelle-politique du message européen de la diaspora roumaine de France. La Maison Roumaine - une étude de cas, in Modelling the New Europe, no. 7, Cluj-Napoca, 2013. Darie Cristea has a PhD in sociology and works as a lecturer at the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work. He works at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Romanian Academy, too. He is a project coordinator at INSCOP, a private undertaking in political marketing. His latest book, entitled A Century of International Relations, was published at the end of 2013. Lucian-ùtefan Dumitrescu works at the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy. He also works as an associate lecturer at the Faculty of Sociology, University of Bucharest, where he teaches classes on history of sociology, political sociology, societal security, international relations etc. He has a PhD in Sociology awarded by the Faculty of Sociology, University of Bucharest. He is also involved with The Department - UNESCO Chair in Inter-cultural and Inter-religious Exchanges at the University of Bucharest, where he

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Contributors

delivers classes on Globalization and European Cultural Identity. His latest book, Geopolitics and Security, has recently been published (2013). Dan Dungaciu is full Professor at the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Sociology - University of Bucharest. He is Director of the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Romanian Academy and President of the Black Sea University Foundation. He is also the coordinator of the Master of Security Studies at the University of Bucharest. In 2006 he served as Undersecretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In 2010, he was the presidential adviser for international relations and European integration of the President of the Republic of Moldova. He studied and worked as a associate researcher in various Western institutions: Fernand Braudel Institute (Binghamton, USA), Max Weber Centre for Advanced Cultural and Social Study (Erfurt, Germany), Department of Political Science and Public Administration - Law, Economics and Political Sciences' School of Athens (Athens, Greece), Central European University (Budapest, Hungary), Department of Social Sciences - England Polytechnic University (Cambridge, UK), Institut für die Wissenschaften we Menschen (Vienna, Austria), Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology (Halle, Germany), Triangle Research Centre (North Carolina, USA) etc. He is the author of numerous specialized studies and works in the field, among which: Bessarabia is Romania? (2011) and Elements for a theory of nation and nationalism (2012). Vincent Henry is a PhD student in political sciences at Paris-Est University. Graduate of the Institute of the International and strategic Relations (IRIS-Paris), he is a project manager at the French Institute in Romania and teaches French litterature and History at the Faculty of Letters of Babe‫܈‬-Bolyai University. He has led the main part of his career in Central and Eastern Europe, having successively worked for the cultural departments of the Embassy of France in Bulgaria, in Moldova, then in Romania, before joining the Central and Eastern Europe Office of the University Agency of the Francophony, where he was a programme manager. He is a regular correspondent of the on-line magazine "Regard sur l’Est". Laura Her‫܊‬a is Lecturer in International Relations within the Faculty of European Studies, Department of International Relations and American Studies (Babe‫܈‬-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca). She teaches lectures on Introduction to the Study of International Relations, Analysis of International Relations and The Internationalisation of Ethnic and

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Religious Conflicts. She has a BA in European Studies, another BA in Journalism, an MA in International Relations and a PhD in Contemporary History. She is the editor of the academic journals Studia Europaea and Romanian Review of International Studies. She is the vice-president of the NGO Centre of Political Studies and International Relations (CESPRI) and a member of the Centre for African Studies (CESTAF) within Babe‫܈‬Bolyai University. Her field of scholarly interests includes: socialconstructivism in International Relations; the new wars – old wars dichotomy; sociology of violence and civil wars; peace-keeping operations and humanitarian intervention; ethnic conflicts. Laura Her‫܊‬a has published a book on the development of bilateral relations (From the RomanianSerbian Relations to the Romanian Yugoslav Relations. Constructivist Interpretations, Cluj-Napoca: EFES, 2012) and several articles and book chapters, such as: “Humanitarian Intervention and Human Security – Sociological, Critical, and Constructivist Approaches to (In)security in Africa”, in Valentin Naumescu (ed.), Democracy and Security in the 21st Century: Perspectives on a Changing World, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014; “The Sociology of New Wars”, in The Development of Political Science: European Practices and National Perspectives, Chernivitsi: Bukrek Publishing House, 2013; “Intra-state violence in DR Congo and Human Security – Perspectives from International Relations Theories”, in Human Security Perspectives, European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (ETC), Graz, 2014. Ruxandra Iordache is undertaking doctoral studies in sociology (20132016), she has political science studies (master and bachelor). She is a researcher at the Romanian Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations (Romanian Academy). Recent publications: The performance of the Romanian members of the European Parliament. The case of the Agriculture and Development Commission, in “The European Union after the Lisbon Treaty” (coord. Dan Dungaciu, Cristina Vohn), ISPRI, Bucharest, 2012, pp. 16-41; NATO intervention in Kossovo, in “NATO after Lisbon and the regional challenges” (coord. Dan Dungaciu, Sanda Cinca), ISPRI, Bucharest, 2011, pp. 188-201; The Participation of the Romania Authorities to the EU Decision Making Process. The Multiannual Financial Framework case, in “The Romanian Political System. Actors, Institutions, Challenges” (coord. Constantin Nica, Aristide Cioaba), ISPRI, Bucharest, 2014, pp. 781-806; The International Institutions and Organisations, and Romania (co-author), ISPRI, Bucharest, 2013; The Senate in the time of the Revisionism and World War

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Contributors

II (pp. 325-414) and Between the two Dictatorships (pp. 309-384), in “The International Relations reflected by the Romanian Parliament debates. 1864-2000”, vol. I, II, ISPRI, Bucharest, 2010 and 2011. Paulina IĪewicz is an analyst at the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), where she focuses on the Iranian nuclear program, illicit nuclear trade and global stockpiles of fissile materials; her work in this field has been referenced by Reuters, the Los Angeles Times and other media outlets. Together with David Albright, she is the author of the ISIS report focused on “Iran’s Centrifuge Research and Development Program”, published in January 2014. She has also written about the U.S. rebalance to Asia, NATO's raison d'être before Russia's incursion in Ukraine, and maritime disputes in the South China Sea. She holds an MA in Law from the University of Wroclaw (Wroclaw, Poland), with a specialization in Forensic Science, and an MA in International Relations from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, with a specialization in Global Security and certification in Security Studies. She is a Fulbright alumna. Bogdan Lucian Jora has been, since 1998, a researcher at the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy, and served between 2006-2010 as a senior counsellor within the Romanian Ministry of Education at the Department in charge with the European Union financial assistance for Human Resources Development. Mr Jora has worked as an associate professor with various courses on applied development policies, project circle management, cultural diplomacy and valorization of historical heritage for development at Shandong University in China, Copenhagen University, Bucharest University and Babe‫܈‬-Bolyai University. Octavian Manea is an editor on foreign policy and defense issues at 22 weekly (since 2007) and at Foreign Policy Romania (since 2010), where he has written extensively on Euro-Atlantic security affairs. He is a contributor to Small Wars Journal, where he interviewed key counterinsurgency practitioners like Generals David Petraeus and John Allen and theoreticians like John Nagl and David Kilcullen. He worked as a research assistant at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington DC, where he contributed to the CEPA report, “Central European Security after Crimea: The Case for Strengthening NATO’s Eastern Defenses”, published in March 2014. He holds an MA in International Relations from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public

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Affairs at Syracuse University, with a specialization in Global Security and certification in Security Studies from the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT). Octavian is the recipient of the 2011 Freedom House Romania award for Young Journalist of the Year in Foreign Policy and a research associate of the Romanian Energy Center (ROEC). He is a Fulbright alumnus. Sergiu Mi‫܈‬coiu is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of European Studies, Babe‫܈‬-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (Romania), where he chairs the Department of International Relations. He holds one PhD in Political Science (University of Paris-East Marne-la-Vallée), another PhD in History (Babe‫܈‬-Bolyai University), and a habilitation in Political Science (University of Paris-East). His main research interests are the constructivist and the alternative theories applied to the nation building processes, to populism and to the political dynamics of the European and African public spaces. Valentin Naumescu is Associate Professor Dr of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, Security Studies and Comparative Politics at the Department of International Relations and American Studies from the Faculty of European Studies, Babeú-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca. He obtained his doctoral degree in political science at the same university (2000). Among his books: Democracy and Security in the 21st Century: Perspectives on a Changing World (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), Foreign Policy and Diplomacy: An Introduction (EFES, 2014), Themes of International Politics: Conflicts, Tensions, Debates (EFES, 2014), Canadian Politics and Government: An Introduction (Maple Red Publishing House Toronto, 2010) etc. Valentin Naumescu was Secretary of State in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005-2007) and served as Consul General in Toronto (2008-2012), having the diplomatic rank of minister counsellor. Dr Naumescu is the founder (2013) and chairman of the “Citadel – Group of Reflections and International Analysis”, a think tank specialized in international politics at Babeú-Bolyai University. Bogdan Nedea is a Strategic Analyst and an external politics analyst with the GlobalFocus Center in Bucharest. He has an MA in Conflict Resolution and European Administration and is an expert in former Soviet Union countries like Georgia, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Azerbaijan and also, he is familiar with the dynamics of the North Caucasus Region. He was an analyst with the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in Bucharest, where he covered the post-

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Contributors

Soviet space and wrote analytical articles for Romanian decision-makers and embassies. He is also a correspondent for the Foreign Policy Magazine in Romania and a guest editor for the Adevarul national newspaper. He has been part of a significant number of books and occasional papers of which we can mention the most important: NATO and the New Strategic Concept. Romania’s Priorities (Curtea Veche Publishing House, Bucureúti, 2009), The Russian-Georgian War - Decision Makers Reactions during the Crisis (Curtea Veche Publishing House, 2010) along with hundreds of analysis articles published in CPC-EW, Strategic Decision Bulletin distributed to Romanian decision makers and Bucharest-based Embassies. Also he is the co-author of the Energy Security Strategies in the Wider Black Sea Region (Iulian Chifu, Adriana Sauliuc, Bogdan Nedea, Curtea Veche Publishing house, 2010) and Religion and Conflict, Radicalization and Violence in the Wider Black Sea Region (Iulian Chifu, Oana Popescu, Bogdan Nedea, ISPRI Publishing house 2012) published projects. One of the latest projects he participated in is The East –West Caspian Sea – Black Sea Strategic Corridor (Iulian Chifu, Narciz Balasoiu, Radu Arghir, ISPRI Publishing house 2014). Drago‫ ܈‬Păun is an Assistant Professor in finance at Babe‫܈‬-Bolyai University and also an expert accountant member of the Romanian Body of Experts and Licensed Accountants. Drago‫ ܈‬Paun is also a visiting professor at Ecole de Management de Normandie and was a guest lecturer at Fachhochschule Dortmund and Université Paul Sabatier Toulouse III. He holds a PhD in Finance from Babe‫܈‬-Bolyai University. He is the author/co-author of 4 books and 16 scientific articles published in Romania and abroad. Among his books: Romania’s Road towards the Euro (Cluj University Press 2011). Drago‫ ܈‬Paun is the module leader of the Jean Monnet Module Managing the EU: Taxation, Economics and Governance. Oana Poiană is a PhD candidate in International Relations and European Studies at Babe‫܈‬-Bolyai University, Faculty of European Studies, ClujNapoca, Romania. She conducted research at the Central European University in Budapest (Hungary) and Otto von Guericke University in Magdeburg (Germany). Her research interests focus on European Energy Security, regionalization in the Wider Black Sea Area, Eurasian politics and Foreign Policy of the European Union. She is currently teaching a seminar on EU strategy for the Black Sea and Danube region at Babe‫܈‬Bolyai University, Faculty of European Studies. Among her publications: A constructivist Approach to the security of the European Natural Gas

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Supply. The Black Sea Region and its Geopolitical Significance (VDM Publishing House, 2010), The EU strategy for the Black Sea Region and the duality paradox of the regionalization process (Romanian Journal of International Studies, 2011), Regional Cooperation and National Preferences in the Black Sea region: A zero sum game perpetuated by energy insecurity? (in press, Peter Lang, 2014) etc. Alexandra Sabou is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Faculty of European Studies (Babe‫܈‬-Bolyai University). She is currently finalizing her doctoral paper on “Identity construction in the borderlands: The case of Georgia and its break-away Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” She holds a BA in European Studies, an MA degree in Comparative Political Studies from Paris-Est MNVL and Babe‫܈‬-Bolyai University and an MA in Auditing and Financial Management of EU Funds from Babe‫܈‬-Bolyai University. Her professional experience is related to education management (as a study abroad counsellor within Educativa Group in Romania), intercultural communication (as a trainer in intercultural communication). Her research interests focus on nationalism, reporting, monitoring and evaluation of ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus. Due to a scholarship offered by UNDP Bratislava and Arcadia, she conducted fieldwork research in Georgia and Abkhazia in May-June 2014. Moreover, she has been part of several projects and training sessions in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. She is the editor of the Romanian International Development Review and has published several articles and book chapters. Her most recent contribution is the book chapter “Discourses of ‘nationhood’ in Central and Eastern Europe” (Institutul European, Iaúi, 2014).