The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe: Second-Order Euroscepticism [1st ed.] 9783030408572, 9783030408589

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xv
Theorising East-Central European Euroscepticism in the Light of the European Parliament Elections (Vít Hloušek, Petr Kaniok)....Pages 1-16
Republic of Bulgaria (Dragomir Stoyanov, Plamen Ralchev)....Pages 17-38
Croatia (Goran Čular, Marijana Grbeša)....Pages 39-60
Czech Republic (Vít Hloušek, Petr Kaniok)....Pages 61-82
Estonia (Piret Ehin, Tõnis Saarts, Mari-Liis Jakobson)....Pages 83-105
Hungary (Krisztina Arató)....Pages 107-130
Latvia (Daunis Auers)....Pages 131-150
Lithuania (Liutauras Gudžinskas, Tomas Bekišas)....Pages 151-174
Poland (Aleks Szczerbiak)....Pages 175-199
Romania (Sorina Soare, Claudiu D. Tufiș)....Pages 201-227
Slovakia (Marek Rybář)....Pages 229-251
Slovenia (Alenka Krašovec, Damjan Lajh)....Pages 253-275
Euroscepticism, Parties, Voters and Politicisation in the 2019 Campaigns for the European Parliament Elections in Central and Eastern Europe (Vít Hloušek, Petr Kaniok)....Pages 277-292
Back Matter ....Pages 293-297

Citation preview

The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe Second-Order Euroscepticism Edited by Vít Hloušek · Petr Kaniok

The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-­Central Europe

Vít Hloušek  •  Petr Kaniok Editors

The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe Second-Order Euroscepticism

Editors Vít Hloušek Department of International Relations and European Studies Masaryk University Brno, Czech Republic

Petr Kaniok Department of International Relations and European Studies Masaryk University Brno, Czech Republic

ISBN 978-3-030-40857-2    ISBN 978-3-030-40858-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Alex Linch / shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 Theorising East-Central European Euroscepticism in the Light of the European Parliament Elections  1 Vít Hloušek and Petr Kaniok 2 Republic of Bulgaria 17 Dragomir Stoyanov and Plamen Ralchev 3 Croatia 39 Goran Č ular and Marijana Grbeša 4 Czech Republic 61 Vít Hloušek and Petr Kaniok 5 Estonia 83 Piret Ehin, Tõnis Saarts, and Mari-Liis Jakobson 6 Hungary107 Krisztina Arató 7 Latvia131 Daunis Auers 8 Lithuania151 Liutauras Gudžinskas and Tomas Bekišas v

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9 Poland175 Aleks Szczerbiak 10 Romania201 Sorina Soare and Claudiu D. Tufiș 11 Slovakia229 Marek Rybář 12 Slovenia253 Alenka Krašovec and Damjan Lajh 13 Euroscepticism, Parties, Voters and Politicisation in the 2019 Campaigns for the European Parliament Elections in Central and Eastern Europe277 Vít Hloušek and Petr Kaniok Index293

Notes on Contributors

Krisztina  Arató is Professor of Political Science at Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of Law, Institute of Political Science in Budapest, Hungary. She is the President of the Hungarian Political Science Association. Her research focuses on the history of European integration, East-Central Europe in the EU and civil society. She has published with Routledge and Palgrave Macmillan among others. Daunis  Auers (Phd, London) is Associate Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Latvia. He has been a Fulbright Scholar at the University of California-Berkeley (2005–2006) and a Baltic-American Freedom Foundation Scholar at Wayne State University in Detroit (2014). He has published widely on political parties, elections and referendums as well as populism and the radical right in Baltic and European politics. His most recent book—The Comparative Government and Politics of the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 21st Century—was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2015. Tomas  Bekišas  is an attaché at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania and alumnus of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University. He is primarily interested in public opinion on the European Union (EU), EU decision-­ making, EU policies and their effect on the EU member states, including their party systems. Goran Cˇular  is an associate professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Croatia. His research interests include political parvii

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

ties, party systems, electoral behaviour and democratic consolidation. His most recent book chapters include “Organizational structures of political parties in Croatia” (2016), co-authored with Dario Nikić Čakar, “Stability and permissiveness: Party regulation and party competition in Croatia” (2018) and “Institutionalisation of a charismatic movement party: The case of Croatian Democratic Union” (2019), co-authored with Dario Nikić Čakar. Piret Ehin  is a senior researcher at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu, Estonia. Her main research interests include democracy, legitimacy and political support, European integration and international relations in the Baltic Sea region. Her work has appeared in the European Journal of Political Research, Journal of Common Market Studies, Cooperation and Conflict, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties and the Journal of Baltic Studies. Marijana  Grbeša is an associate professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb. She teaches courses in media, political marketing and strategic communication in politics. She regularly presents at the biggest international conferences in political science, media and communications. She has published with Routledge, Palgrave and Lexington Books, among others. Her articles appeared in a number of international peer-reviewed journals. She is a recipient of several academic and professional grants and awards. Liutauras Gudžinskas  is Associate Professor of Comparative Politics at Vilnius University, Lithuania, also editor-in-chief of the Baltic Journal of Political Science. In his research, he mainly focuses on the post-communist transformation and Europeanization in East-Central European countries. Among various contributions, more recently, he edited a monograph on confidence in state institutions in Lithuania. Vít Hloušek  is Professor of European Politics at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. His research focuses on contemporary European political history, political and party systems of European countries and Europeanization. He has published with Routledge, Edward Elgar Publishing and Palgrave Macmillan among others. His articles appeared in Europe-Asia Studies, East European Politics and Societies and Perspectives on European Politics and Society.

  NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 

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Mari-Liis  Jakobson is Associate Professor of Political Sociology at Tallinn University, Estonia. Her research focuses on transnational politics and migration, populism and political discourse. She has published with Routledge, Springer and Palgrave Macmillan among others. Her articles have appeared in Europe-Asia Studies, Journal of Social Science Education and Acta Politica Estica. Petr  Kaniok  works as an associate professor at the Faculty of Social Science, Masaryk University, Czechia. His current research focuses on Visegrad cooperation within the EU, Euroscepticism and impact of Brexit on EU member states. His most recent work has been published by East European Politics, Parliamentary Affairs and European Politics and Society. Alenka Krašovec  is Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. Her research focuses on political institutions and processes. Her articles have appeared in edited books published by prominent international publishing houses (Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, Palgrave Macmillan, Routledge) and her articles have appeared in different journals, for example West European Politics, Problems of Post-Communism, Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Damjan Lajh  is Associate Professor of Policy Analysis and Jean Monnet Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. His research interests encompass public policies and policymaking processes in the national and EU context, Europeanization processes, interest groups and lobbying, and new forms of governance in the EU.  His articles have been, among others, published in West European Politics, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies and Journal of Contemporary European Research. Plamen  Ralchev is Associate Professor and Head of Department of International Relations at the University of National and World Economy in Sofia. His research interests focus on foreign policy, European politics and security, identity politics, public diplomacy and strategic communications. He is an author of books on international communications of the EU, external relations of the EU, and British foreign policy. He has published in Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies and

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

in edited volumes on problems of East European transition politics, democratization, democracy audit, and minority politics, EU and NATO enlargement. Marek  Rybář  is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science of Faculty of Social Studies of Masaryk University (Brno, the Czech Republic). His research focuses on political parties, party competition and political institutions in Central and Eastern Europe. He has published numerous chapters in edited volumes and studies in various journals, including East European Politics and Societies, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Regional and Federal Studies, and Electoral Studies. He is working on a research project examining patterns of ministerial recruitment in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Tõnis  Saarts  is Associate Professor of Comparative Politics at Tallinn University. His research interests include political parties, party systems, electoral cleavages and comparative politics of Central and Eastern Europe. He has recently published in European Societies, East European Politics and Studies of Transition States and Societies. Sorina Soare  is Lecturer of Comparative Politics (University of Florence). She works in the area of comparative politics and her research interests include political parties, the concept of populism and the democratization process. Among her most recent publications: Gherghina S., Iancu A., & Soare, S., (eds.) (2018), Party Members and Their Importance in Non-EU Countries. A Comparative Analysis, Routledge and Gherghina, S: and Soare, S. (2019). Electoral performance beyond leaders? The organization of populist parties in postcommunist Europe. Party Politics (Online First). Dragomir Stoyanov  is a PhD researcher at the University of Sussex. His research interests are in political parties, elections, Europeanization and democratization, with a special emphasis on Eastern and Central European politics. His current research project is on Euroscepticism and democratic backsliding in Eastern Europe. Some of his work has appeared in Problems of Post-Communism, East European Politics, East European Quarterly, as well as chapters in volumes published by Palgrave Macmillan and Lexington. Aleks  Szczerbiak  is Professor of Politics and Contemporary European Studies at the University of Sussex. He is author of Poles Together? The

  NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 

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Emergence and Development of Political Parties in Post-communist Poland (2001), Poland Within the European Union: New Awkward Partner or New Heart of Europe? (2012) and (with Paul Taggart) EU Enlargement and Referendums (2005) and Opposing Europe: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism in Contemporary Europe (2008). Claudiu D. Tufiș  is Associate Professor of Political Science (University of Bucharest). He works in the area of comparative politics and his interests include political parties, political participation, political culture and democratization. Among his most recent publications: Soare, S. & Tufiș, C. (2019). Phoenix Populism: Radical-Right Parties’ Mobilization in Romania after 2015. Problems of Post-Communism and Voicu, B. &. Tufiș, C. (2017). Migrating Trust: Contextual Determinants of International Migrants’ Confidence in Political Institutions. European Political Science Review.

List of Graphs

Graph 2.1

Graph 2.2 Graph 3.1 Graph 3.2 Graph 4.1 Graph 4.2 Graph 5.1

Graph 5.2

Bulgarian public support for the EU membership (%). Answers to the question: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (our country’s) membership of the European Union is a good thing or a bad thing?’. (Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB), and Standard Eurobarometer) 19 Trust in European and National Institution in Bulgaria. (Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB), and Standard Eurobarometer) 20 Attitude towards the European Union among Croatian citizens. (Source: Eurobarometer) 41 Trust in the European Union in Croatia. (Source: Eurobarometer)41 Satisfaction with Czech EU membership. (Source: Authors’ elaboration based on CVVM) 63 Trust in the European Commission in Czechia. (Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurobarometer) 64 Popular trust in the EU in Estonia. Note: Data points are percentage values based on responses to the following question: ‘For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: The European Union’. (Source: European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 2004–2018) 86 The EU’s image among the population of Estonia. Note: Data points are percentage values based on responses to the following question: ‘In general, does the European Union

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List of Graphs

Graph 6.1 Graph 6.2 Graph 7.1 Graph 7.2 Graph 8.1 Graph 8.2 Graph 10.1 Graph 10.2 Graph 11.1 Graph 11.2 Graph 11.3 Graph 11.4 Graph 12.1

Graph 12.2

Graph 12.3

conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?’ (Source: European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 2004–2018) 87 Generally speaking, do you think that Hungary’s membership of the EU is…? (Source: Eurobarometer) 110 Trust in the European Commission in Hungary. (Source: Eurobarometer)110 % of Latvians that ‘tend to trust’ the European Union. Latvia and EU average, 2004–2018. (Source: Eurobarometer)135 % of Latvians that ‘tend to trust’ European Parliament and national parliament, 2014–2018. (Source: Eurobarometer) 135 Lithuanians’ view of the state of European unification. (Source: European Social Survey 2019) 153 Share of population having a fairly negative or very negative view of the EU in Lithuania. (Source: European Commission 2019a) 154 The image of the EU among Romanians. (Source: Eurobarometer)205 Trust in the European Commission in Romania. (Source: Eurobarometer)208 Benefits of EU membership in Slovakia. (Source: Standard Eurobarometer)232 Trust in the European Union in Slovakia. (Source: Standard Eurobarometer)233 Trust in the European Commission in Slovakia. (Source: Standard Eurobarometer) 233 Slovakia would easier face the future outside the EU (Source: Standard Eurobarometer) 234 Image of the European Union in Slovenia. Question: ‘In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?’ (Source: Eurobarometer) 256 Satisfaction about the way democracy works in the European Union in Slovenia. Question: ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU?’ (Source: Eurobarometer) 256 Trust in the European Commission in Slovenia. Question: ‘Trust in European institutions. And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? The European Commission.’ (Source: Eurobarometer) 257

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 5.1 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 7.1 Table 8.1 Table 9.1 Table 10.1 Table 10.2 Table 11.1 Table 12.1 Table 12.2 Table 13.1

Results of the parliamentary and the EP elections in Bulgaria (2001–2019)22 Results of the parliamentary and EP elections in Croatia, 2011–201956 Prominent topics discussed in the Czech manifestos for the 2019 elections 71 Results of the parliamentary and the EP elections in the Czech Republic 79 Results of parliamentary and EP elections in Estonia 102 Prominent topics discussed in the Hungarian manifestos for the 2019 elections 120 Results of parliamentary and EP elections in Hungary 125 Results of parliamentary and European Parliament elections in Latvia 147 Results of the parliamentary and EP elections in Lithuania 170 Results of the parliamentary and the EP elections in Poland 197 EU vision in Romanian parties’ manifestos (2019) 214 Results of parliamentary and EP elections in Romania (2007–2019)223 Results of the parliamentary and the EP elections in Slovakia 249 Prominent topics discussed in the written documents of Slovenian parties (only topics mentioned by at least two parties are included) 264 Electoral results to the National Assembly and the European Parliament in Slovenia in the period 2000–2019 272 Turnout in the 2019 EP elections in Central and Eastern European EU member states 279 xv

CHAPTER 1

Theorising East-Central European Euroscepticism in the Light of the European Parliament Elections Vít Hloušek and Petr Kaniok

It has been more than 15 years since the first eight formerly communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe entered the European Union. Today, the so-called Eastern enlargement has expanded the number of EU members by eleven, which means that the number of empirical cases of elections to the European Parliament has also increased. For the countries that entered in 2004 or in 2007, the 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections will be the fourth in a row; Croatia has voted only three times since the country entered the EU in 2013. The question might emerge as to why compare only among the ‘new’ EU members with a post-communist background. Does the East-West ‘cleavage’ as a specific version of the centre-periphery cleavage, reinforced by cultural differences (Heidar 2003: 13–15) in European politics, still apply? What is the merit of looking at only one cross-section of EU

V. Hloušek (*) • P. Kaniok Department of International Relations and European Studies, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 V. Hloušek, P. Kaniok (eds.), The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9_1

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countries? Besides the practical issues related to doing the necessary research and orchestrating the collective of authors for a collaborative work such as this, there are strong arguments for the view that a study dedicated to the Central Eastern European (CEE) countries still matters. Even a casual look at Czechia, Hungary or Poland, for example, will confirm for an observer of CEE politics that these countries remain specific. The CEE governments often adopt a rather critical approach to various important EU policies and activities, such as the Euro currency and migration. Even the CEE member states (MS) participating in the Eurozone are still the net receivers of EU funds, which shape their policy preferences at the EU level as well as domestic ‘European’ debates. Public opinion towards the EU and its important policy areas differs in the ‘old’ MS compared to the ‘new’ MS from Central and Eastern Europe (Dostál 2011), as does the very perception of the EU and European identity (Ilonszki 2010). The majority of CEE countries have faced swift and profound changes in their party systems, which some authors have labelled ‘hurricane season’ (Haughton and Degan Krause 2015). The lower level of stability of political actors makes these countries more vulnerable both in terms of contestation concerning the quality and efficiency of democracy and in terms of contesting membership in the EU or participation in some EU policies. The CEE countries are demonstrating, in contrast to Western European Member states, the so-called democratic backsliding. And despite profound Europeanisation in some countries (Havlík et  al. 2017), Euroscepticism has generally become bolder in the party systems of the ‘new’ member states and it still bears many idiosyncratic features to be demonstrated and analysed in the context of the European elections campaigns. The ‘democratic backsliding’ that has brought on neo-authoritarian politics (Greskovits 2015), in particular, as well as the rise of illiberal and protest politics in many ‘new’ member countries of the EU, in general, are two current arguments for the special attention we must pay to this region. Both challengers of ‘Western’ liberalism, like Viktor Orbán and Jarosław Kaczyński, and the challengers of established political elites, like Andrej Babiš, typically use anti-EU appeals to attract voters dissatisfied with the performance of national political institutions and who are prone to accept explanations based on allegedly adversarial policies imposed on the CEE countries by ‘Brussels’ (Ágh 2018; Schlipphak and Treib 2017). The illiberal democratic turn in Central and Eastern European politics increases rifts in the EU itself, as the diverging stances on European

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migration policies for example show. It does not apply to ‘sectoral’ policies only. The increasing illiberalism among the CEE member states even undermines the power capacity of the EU as an actor in international relations (Meunier and Vachudova 2018: 1639–1643). Some authors (Hooghe and Marks 2018) argue that the Euro crisis in combination with the migration crisis has already demonstrated a potential to create a strong transnational cleavage in European party politics. As Hooghe and Marks (2018: 123) remind, ‘[e]very country in Europe has been deeply affected by the political fallout of the crises, but the way in which party systems have responded varies widely’. However, the response of CEE party systems has been different compared to that in both Western and Southern Europe. In the former case, far-right parties have capitalised on the votes coming from the losers in these crises; in the latter case, the radical left parties took the role of advocates of the losers. We will examine the strong presence and persistence of far-right rhetoric and politics within the ‘new’ member states and their impact on the European elections in 2019. The possible emergence of new transnational cleavages used by the far-­ right parties relates to the second major concern of this volume. That is analysis of the recent scope and trends of Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe. Scholarly literature on the multi-speed Europe or differentiated integration (see Schimmelfennig et al. 2015 for a comprehensive account of the debate) stresses some areas of this, which are of prominent importance for Central and Eastern Eurosceptic discourse. Although some ‘new’ member countries are closer to the ‘core’ of the EU (typically through membership in the Eurozone), the ‘lower speed’ prevails in the region, be it in respect to the countries outside the Schengen Area, or outside the Eurozone etc. There is a link, which we will examine closer in our country chapters, between the specificities of Central and Eastern European Euroscepticism and the continuing East-West divergence in the EU. The diversity is manifested in such policy areas as migration policy, discussion on the priorities of the new financial framework, as well as basic discussions on the general values of the EU and their applicability, the last one especially concerning the triggering of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Euroscepticism, envisaged by some authors to foster populism inside the EU political debate (Mudde 2005), has reshaped the centre-­periphery cleavages in Central and Eastern member states in a substantial way and replaced post-communist rhetoric with new EU-rejecting, or at least questioning, party positions (Pisciotta 2016).

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This information alone provides sufficient cause to analyse and compare the 2019 EP elections, the campaigns, the parties, the manifestos and, of course, the results among these eleven CEE Member states of the EU. In this analysis we intend to follow the contributions of scholars who have covered previous rounds of EP elections in the Eastern part of the EU and placed them within a general, EU-wide perspective (Lodge 2010; Schmitt 2010; Schmitt and Teperoglu 2016; Viola 2016; Holtz-Bacha et  al. 2017). There are books covering Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe (Rulikova 2010; Fuchs et  al. 2009; Havlík et  al. 2017) that can be updated and augmented by our research. Our analysis therefore focuses on the features of the EP elections derived from the concept of second-order elections (SOE; see Golder et al. 2017; Hassing Nielsen and Franklin 2017) and we examine to what extent and in what particular features this still holds true in the set of countries that, typically, show far lower electoral turnout for EP elections (Cabada and Hloušek 2009) than the Western European ‘club’ of older members. We also intend to demonstrate the continuing trend of higher party-electoral volatility compared to the original EU-15 (Cabada et al. 2014). This is, however, only the secondary aim of our study, as we would like primarily to place the EP elections 2019 in Central and Eastern Europe and their outcomes into the context of party Euroscepticism, which has been reinforced and fed in the recent period mainly by the Eurozone and migration crises (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2018). The EP elections have been a very useful window of opportunity for the voicing of both soft and hard Eurosceptic stances and positions widely taken by different Eurosceptic parties across the EU. The main aim of this book is therefore to describe, analyse and compare the positions and performance of Eurosceptic parties in the eastern part of the EU. We would particularly like to find out whether soft and hard positions represent specific degrees of the same phenomenon—that is, Euroscepticism— or whether each of them stands for a distinctive approach towards the EU. The reality of Central and Eastern European party politics and the way the parties treat EU issues reveals that the most typical example of soft Eurosceptic behaviour is not consistent with a general notion of the need for profound reform of the EU as a polity. Sometimes, the parties criticise some specific policies such as migration policy or the budgetary policy of the EU. Sometimes, the criticism addresses just one of the EU institutions, most typically the European Commission. We cannot generalise, however, about the prevailing ‘targets’ of soft Eurosceptic parties and politicians since there

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are still many national idiosyncrasies we must explore before we try to take a comparative look at what it means in praxis to be a Central European soft Eurosceptic politician. The structure of the book corresponds to this aim. First, the introductory chapter presents and operationalises concepts that the authors use in the analysis of the country studies. This includes the theory of second-­ order Elections and Euroscepticism, as well as Europeanisation, which is a process that has affected not only the pro-European parties, but that also transforms, as we will show, the rhetoric, arguments, tactics and strategies of Eurosceptic actors as well. After the introduction, eleven country chapters follow. They cover all countries that have acceded to the EU since 2004, in alphabetical order, and which also had belonged to the communist USSR-dominated bloc in Europe during the second half of the twentieth century. This means the inclusion of Bulgaria (written by Dragomir Stoyanov and Plamen Ralchev), Croatia (Goran Č ular and Marijana Grbeša), Czechia (Vít Hloušek and Petr Kaniok), Estonia (Piret Ehin, Tõnis Saarts and MariLiis Jakobson), Hungary (Krisztina Arató), Latvia (Daunis Auers), Lithuania (Liutauras Gudžinskas and Tomas Bekišas), Poland (Aleks Szczerbiak), Romania (Sorina Soare and Claudiu Tufis), Slovakia (Marek Rybář) and Slovenia (Alenka Krašovec and Damjan Lajh). All the country chapters are written by local experts who have extensive research experience in European and party politics and who therefore can couple the highest academic standards with an intimate comprehension of all relevant idiosyncratic conditions important for understanding and interpreting the local context. All the country chapters have the same focus and therefore follow a similar structure. First, the authors describe the basic characteristics of the electoral system and electoral procedure of EP elections (including possible changes since the first elections in 2004/2007/2013). Second, each chapter discusses the general context of developments of public and party Euroscepticism after admission of the country to the EU, including an analysis of changing patterns of public Euroscepticism since accession, which is based mainly on Eurobarometer data to assure comparability of results. The contextualisation also includes identification of soft and hard Eurosceptic parties and their electoral performance in both first-order and EP elections after accession. Third, the authors deliver an analysis of the electoral campaigns from the perspectives of SOE-based assumptions, level of Euroscepticism, level of Europeanisation of the content, and main

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competitors (both in terms of parties and leading personalities). A brief comparison between the 2004/2009/2014 campaigns is included where possible. Fourth, the chapters offer interpretations of Eurosceptic strategies used in the 2019 campaign and answer the question, to what extent was it a strategic choice or a position adopted ‘from the heart’? The analyses include a brief discussion of particular parties using Euroscepticism in terms of their incumbent/challenger position. Fifth, the results of the elections are compared and include the previous elections to the EP as well as a focus on the SOE-relevant features and performance of soft and Eurosceptic parties. Every chapter ends with a summary and conclusions that include discussion about the implications of the election results for Eurosceptic politics in each country. The final chapter provides a comparison of the electoral results; a comparison of the electoral campaigns in terms of content and especially the presence of soft and hard Euroscepticism; a comparison of the basic features of SOE in the 2019 elections, including the levels of Europeanisation and performance of the ruling parties; a comparison of soft and hard Eurosceptic parties, and the respective reasons for their Euroscepticism in the campaigns; a comparison of long-term trends in public and party Euroscepticism in CEE, including the performance of Eurosceptic parties in the 2004/2007, 2009, 2014 and 2019 EP elections. Finally, and importantly, the editors of the book discuss the state of the art and suggestions for further research and theorising on CEE EP elections.

1.1   Statement of Aims and Research Goals The main ambition of the analysis is to uncover and interpret the performance of Central and Eastern European Eurosceptical political parties in EP elections. According to the concept of second-order elections, as well as according to the empirical observations, Euroscepticism works well both as an ideology of principled opposition (hard Euroscepticism) and strategic choice (soft Euroscepticism) for moderate opposition parties to contest local incumbents. Therefore, we expect that Eurosceptic rhetoric will be fostered in the EP 2019 campaign, and we will explain why and how the parties used soft and hard Euroscepticism in this election round. The secondary ambition of the authors is to bring fresh information on the campaigns, the political parties participating in the elections, and the outcomes of elections. Another goal is to compare the similarities in

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patterns of Euroscepticism in CEE member states as well as the differences within the region. It is both interesting and important to find out whether and to what extent there is still any common ‘post-communist’ pattern more than 15 years after the first big-bang eastward enlargement. To analyse this, the authors use the lenses of two important concepts developed in relation to the EP elections and to the way political parties in member states elaborate on issues related to European integration in general and EU membership in particular. The first interpretive framework is bound to the concept of second-­ order elections. SOE, as developed since the first direct elections to the EP in 1979, points to the specific features of elections that break national electoral cycles, where there is less at stake from the perspective of both voters and campaigning political parties and where European issues are typically highlighted rather than merely blended with domestic politics. The second framework considers the rising phenomenon of both public and party Euroscepticism. Save for a few countries (the Czech Republic being the leader in this respect), the ‘new’ CEE members of the EU have demonstrated significant levels of support for integration. This applies both to public opinion towards the EU and to the prevailing positions held by the political elites. The multiple crises the EU has faced since 2008 have caused damage to many of its ‘new’ members’ rosy and uncontested picture of the EU, however. We test these assumptions on individual cases, and the discussion in the concluding chapter compares all the cases by combining the concept of the EP elections as a classic example of SOE with our focus on the elements of soft and hard Euroscepticism. Euroscepticism can be adopted not only for ideological reasons but, as Sitter argues (2001), it can also be a product of government-opposition competition. In this context, we hypothesise that Euroscepticism was used in 2019 in the following ways: 1. Soft Euroscepticism was used by moderate opposition parties in the 2019 EP election campaigns to contest the domestic governmental incumbents. This hypothesis is confirmed if the moderate parties, which neither belong to the far right nor the far left, in their campaigns attack the pro­EU stances of incumbents or use clear elements of soft Eurosceptic rhetoric to attract voters.

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2. In the countries with a long-term trend of high levels of Euroscepticism amongst the public (the Czech Republic being a typical case), even some moderate ruling parties used soft Euroscepticism as a strategic tool to increase popular support. If the negative trend in attitudes towards the EU (measured according to Eurobarometer data on the assessment of the country’s membership in the EU as positive or negative and the benefits of membership) is long-­ term and persistent (since the Eurozone crisis onwards), even incumbents will be tempted to use soft Eurosceptic language in order not to lose voters. 3. Support for hard Eurosceptic parties using Euroscepticism as a part of their ideology and political identity will score better in the EP elections than in the first-order elections. We test this assumption by assessing the presence of hard Eurosceptic parties in each nation’s party system and comparing their electoral returns in the EP elections of 2019 with the returns from the preceding parliamentary elections. 4. Parties strongly espousing soft Euroscepticism will score better in the EP elections than in the first-order elections. We test the last assumption by assessing the presence of parties employing a soft Eurosceptic campaign in the 2019 EP elections in each nation’s party system and comparing their electoral returns in the EP elections 2019 with the returns in the preceding parliamentary elections. 5. The significant presence of hard and soft Eurosceptic parties will lead to increased ‘Europeanisation’ of the EP electoral campaign in general. By Europeanisation we mean the strong presence and political relevance of topics related directly to the EU. In other words, the greater the presence of hard and soft Eurosceptic discourse among the campaigning parties, the lower the SOE features of the campaign, such as focusing solely on a national agenda, will be.

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1.2   Conceptual Background of the Volume In the remaining parts of this chapter, we will discuss the concepts important for examining the validity of our assumptions and we will operationalise our research accordingly. We start with a brief introduction of the concept of Euroscepticism, particularly focusing on the division between hard and soft versions (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008), as this division represents the key issue for this volume. In the same vein, we lay out the key elements of the European elections. They—as typical second-order elections—are the landscape in which both soft and hard Eurosceptics operate and where we analyse their behaviour. Distinction between various forms and degrees of opposition to the process of European integration is the key question of this volume. In this sense, even though party-based Euroscepticism (particularly) has been as a topic for political science research for at least the last two decades, it still represents an issue where opinions are contested. There are three areas where major conflicts arise. The first conflict surrounds how Euroscepticism can be conceptualised and measured. Existing research has built two distinctive approaches (Mudde 2012). Whereas the first approach—called the North Carolina School—departs from the assumption that EU approaches, including critical ones, can be measured on a linear scale, the second camp—the Sussex school—works with predefined categories and typologies and applies them to political empirics. Definitions and typologies of Euroscepticism are the second key area of dispute. Particularly in the beginning of the twenty-first century, several competing models were created (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008; Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Vasilopoulou 2013) as a result of intensive efforts to theorise emerging disapproval with the process of European integration (Taggart 1998; Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Conti 2003; Riishøj 2004; Flood and Usherwood 2005; Szcerbiak and Taggart 2008).1 The typology that distinguishes between hard and soft versions 1  Probably the most promising effort to conceptualise party-based approaches to the EU, apart from Taggart and Szczerbiak’s approach, was the Kopecký and Mudde (2002) typology. Based upon two principles—support for or opposition to ceding sovereignty from nation states to the EU and support for/opposition to further extension of EU sovereignty—they created the following four categories. First, Euroenthusiasts agree with both principles and stand as the most pro-EU type. Second, Europragmatists are against the principle of ceding sovereignty, but agree with the current EU trajectory, that is with the extension of EU powers. Third, what Kopecký and Mudde call Euroscepticism is an approach

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of Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008) can be seen as the most successful of these models. We adopt it for the purposes of this volume. Thus, we define hard Euroscepticism as ‘principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU, in other words, based on the ceding or transfer of powers to [a] supranational institution such as the EU’ and soft Euroscepticism occurs when ‘there is not a principled objection to the European integration project of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition to the EU’s current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make’. The third issue regards whether Euroscepticism and approaches to the EU in general create a new, distinctive cleavage or whether they are just a by-product of pre-existing conflicts and polarities. In this sense, Sitter (2001) argues that Euroscepticism is a product of party competition—and is, both in its origins and development, the politics of opposition. This means that Euroscepticism is hardly a single coherent stance on the EU as a polity, but rather a term that covers a multitude of ideological and interest-­ driven stances. As a phenomenon, it is therefore better understood in terms of government-opposition relations. The presence of Euroscepticism also indicates pressure for change and developments in party-based Euroscepticism, driven by competition for votes as well as office. The relevant question in the case of elections is to what extent party-­ based Euroscepticism can be considered a new cleavage, one that adds new topics into party competition. The European elections create a unique landscape, which is typically described as ‘second-order elections’ (SOE). Reif and Schmitt (1980) initially developed this model to analyse the first direct voting in 1979. They assert that the national arena is the most important in European states, and hence elections for national public office are normally most salient. Other elections, such as those for local and state offices are less important—they are ‘second-order elections’. The most important distinction between the two types is that in SOE ‘there is less at stake as compared to first-order elections’. Yet these SOEs are characterised by the same party system and are fought by the same parties as in the first-order, which makes the relationship between first- and second-­order elections particularly interesting. Reif and Schmitt (1980) combining support for the principle of ceding sovereignty, but opposing any further increase of EU powers. Fourth, Eurorejects, as the clear antitype to Euroenthusiasts, oppose both the founding principle of European integration as well as any plan to extend EU sovereignty.

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go on to assert that second-order elections cannot be separated from firstorder elections conducted in the same political system and claim that second-­order elections are ostensibly about something quite different. Of particular importance is the political situation of the first-order arena at the moment when the second-order election is held. The validity of the SOE model holds across time (Hix and Marsh 2011), although authors such as Schmitt (2005) and Koepke and Ringe (2006) have pointed out some differences among western and eastern EU member states. Combining the SOE concept with a model of soft and hard Euroscepticism opens up several interesting research avenues for an analysis of the 2019 EP elections. The first hypothesis will be tested using a content analysis of soft Eurosceptic parties’ electoral manifestos in CEE countries. This provides an answer to the question of whether they challenge the approach of pro-EU governmental parties during their campaigns. Such behaviour would suggest that Euroscepticism in the CEE region has—at least in the context of the SOE case—strong strategic appeal and is associated with governmental-opposition dynamics. When it comes to the third hypothesis, the potential of Euroscepticism as second-­order ideology is addressed; in other words, it is an approach that can be more easily voiced and gain support under specific SOE conditions. This would be confirmed if either soft or hard Eurosceptics received stronger support in respective national SOEs than in the first-order national elections.

1.3   The Concept of Europeanisation in Terms of Party Competition and Campaign Before the EP Elections The fifth assumption is that a significant presence of hard and soft Eurosceptic parties will lead to increased ‘Europeanisation’ of the EP electoral campaign, that is EU related topics will be present and highly relevant in both party manifestos and campaigns. The presence of Eurosceptic parties that are prone to taking critical stances towards the EU in particular or European integration in general will force the pro-European parties to compete on the ‘European’ topic even if they would prefer to focus on other issues. This applies especially in countries where the level of public Euroscepticism is high or demonstrated an increasing trend prior to the 2019 EP election. To operationalise the testing of this assumption, we have to define the concept of Europeanisation for the purposes of our study. We can build on

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the long tradition of research of the Europeanisation of political parties and party politics, especially those debates focusing on the adaptation of national political parties and party systems to developments in European integration, including party positions towards the EU (Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004). Due to the political crisis around the Constitution for Europe and the economic and social crises in the Eurozone and other EU countries, Peter Mair’s (2004: 343–345) argument about the depoliticisation of European issues no longer holds. Instead, we witness the increasing political relevance and salience of issues related to the transformation of ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’ (Down and Wilson 2008; Hooghe and Marks 2009), which are also increasingly polarising (Mair 2013: 109–114; Kriesi 2008). As a starting point for examining these issues, we can draw on Robert Ladrech’s studies (Ladrech 2002: 396–400; Ladrech 2010: 134–140) which define key areas of interest in connection with the Europeanisation of political parties, from which we focus on changes in: (1) programmes and (2) patterns of party competition. We can expect Europeanisation to impact the electoral manifestos in a growing number of references to the various areas of European integration, but also, and in fact foremost, the ‘European’ issues can penetrate into what were traditionally ‘domestic’ policies. Furthermore, references to European integration and its role in domestic policy tend to become more detailed and sophisticated. References to European party federations and their political groups in the European Parliament might appear as well. First, we will analyse the prevailing formal political narratives2 of the pro-European as well as Eurosceptic parties based on their manifestos and prominent discourses in the campaign prior to the 2019 EP elections. An analysis of narratives was selected because it emphasises understanding the content and the discourse priorities expressed by the political actors. Narrative creates a ‘story’ (Patterson and Renwick Monroe 1998: 315–316) that the parties and their leaders deliver to the public in order to turn people into voters. As Patterson and Renwick Monroe (1998: 322) put it, ‘[t]he political importance of commonly shared narratives means they often become the focus of political debate’; and exactly that strategy is typically adopted by the Eurosceptic parties, which try to place their Eurosceptic narratives in the centre of the political debate prior to the EP elections.

2  ‘Formal political narrative’ means a narrative ‘created within an official political framework or by political speakers’ (Shenhav 2006: 247), which means political parties in our cases.

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We will set the narratives of different parties into the context of development since the enlargement and we will map the narratives to create a conceptual map of the 2019 EP pre-electoral discussion on EU-related issues, especially those stressing the soft and hard Eurosceptic narratives and their main elements. For that reason, we will supplement the narrative analysis with a qualitative content analysis, one that favours description and understanding (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1279–1281; Veyne 1996). The goal here is to identify the main Eurosceptic arguments proposed by the parties under study. The coding of manifestos will be done in the simplest possible way. A manifesto published for the 2019 EP election will provide a unit of coding for us. The codes will include pro-European stance, indifferent stance on the EU/European integration, soft Euroscepticism and hard Euroscepticism (as operationalised above). In the last two cases, we will use sub-codes delimiting whether the motive for a Eurosceptic stance is either idiosyncratic or Europeanised. One example of an idiosyncratic motivation is the anti-European narrative of the Czech communists, which is substantiated by the fear of a return of the Sudeten German population. The Europeanised narratives show elements of the primary general motives that are currently used throughout Europe by Eurosceptic parties, such as Brexit-related issues, securitised anti-migrant opposition, or economic opposition based on experiences with the Eurozone (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2018). Another way of detecting Europeanised narratives is by examining the direct references to other Eurosceptic parties in another countries, downloads of internationally published Eurosceptic documents etc. We have to stress here that these motives are, logically, not mutually exclusive. Acknowledgements  The editors would like to express their thanks to the following people. First of all to the authors of country studies for their expertise and excellent cooperation. Benjamin Vail proofread the entire volume and helped a lot to clean its English. We are thankful to editorial team at the Palgrave Macmillan, especially to Anne-Kathrin Birchley-Brun. The common disclaimer concerning mistakes and errors in the book being the responsibility of the editors and authors applies, of course. The book was written as a part of the research project ‘Perspectives of European Integration in the context of global politics II’ (MUNI/A/1044/2019) funded by the Masaryk University.

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References Ágh, A. (2018). The ‘Populist Explosion’ in the West and Its Effect on the NMS.  The Polish and Hungarian Blind Alley of Populism Compared. Czech Journal of Political Science, 25(1), 45–63. Cabada, L., & Hloušek, V. (Eds.). (2009). Eurovolby 2009: Prostor pro evropeizaci politických stran ve středovýchodní Evropě? Plzeň : Aleš Č eněk. Cabada, L., Hloušek, V., & Jurek, P. (2014). Party Systems in East Central Europe. Lanham: Lexington Books. Conti, N. (2003). Party Attitudes to European Integration: A Longitudinal Analysis of the Italian Case. SEI Working Paper, No. 70. Brighton. Dostál, P. (2011). Multi-Speed European Union Differentiated Integration and Spatial Development in Public Opinion. Prague: Č eská geografická společnost. Down, I., & Wilson, C. J. (2008). From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus: A Polarizing Union? Acta Politica, 43(1), 26–49. Flood, C., & Usherwood, S. (2005). Positions, Dispositions, Transitions: A Model of Group Alignment on EU Integration. Paper Presented at 55th Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, University of Leeds. Fuchs, D., Magni-Berton, R., & Roger, A. (Eds.). (2009). Euroscepticism. Images of Europe among mass publics and political elites. Opladen: Barbara Budrich. Golder, S. N., Lago, I., Blais, A., Gidengil, E., & Gschwend, T. (2017). Multi-­ Level Electoral Politics: Beyond the Second-Order Election Model. Oxford: OUP. Greskovits, B. (2015). The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East Central Europe. Global Policy, 51(6), 28–37. Hassing Nielsen, J., & Franklin, M.  N. (Eds.). (2017). The Eurosceptic 2014 European Parliament Elections: Second Order or Second Rate? London: Palgrave. Haughton, T., & Degan Krause, K. (2015). Hurricane Season: Systems of Instability in Central and East European Party Politics. East European Politics and Societies, and Cultures, 29(1), 61–80. Havlík, V., Hloušek, V., & Kaniok, P. (2017). Europeanised Defiance: Czech Euroscepticism since 2004. Opladen: Barbara Budrich. Heidar, K. (2003). Parties and Cleavages in the European Political Space. ARENA Working Paper, 07/2003. Oslo. Hix, S., & Marsh, M. (2011). Second-order Effects Plus Pan-European Political Swings: An Analysis of European Parliament Elections Across Time. Electoral Studies, 30(1), 4–15. Holtz-Bacha, C., Novelli, E., & Rafter, K. (Eds.). (2017). Political Advertising in the 2014 European Parliament Elections. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. British Journal of Political Science, 39(1), 1–23.

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Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2018). Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(1), 109–135. Hsieh, H.-F., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. Qualitative Health Research, 15(9), 1277–1288. Ilonszki, G. (Ed.). (2010). Perception of the European Union in New Member States: A Comparative Perspective. London/New York: Routledge. Koepke, J.  R., & Ringe, N. (2006). The Second-order Election Model in an Enlarged Europe. European Union Politics, 7(3), 321–346. Kopecký, P., & Mudde, C. (2002). The Two Sides of Euroscepticism. Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe. European Union Politics, 3(3), 297–326. Kriesi, H. (2008). West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Ladrech, R. (2002). Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis. Party Politics, 8(4), 389–403. Ladrech, R. (2010). Europeanization and National Politics. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Lodge, J. (Ed.). (2010). The 2009 Elections of the European Parliament. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Mair, P. (2004). The Europeanization Dimension. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(2), 337–348. Mair, P. (2013). Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy. London: Verso. Meunier, S., & Vachudova, M.  A. (2018). Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Illiberalism and the Potential Superpower of the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies, 56(7), 1631–1647. Mudde, C. (2005). EU accession and a New Populist Center-Periphery Cleavage in Central and Eastern Europe. Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper/ Harvard University, No. 62. Mudde, C. (2012). The Comparative Study of Party-Based Euroscepticism: The Sussex Versus the North Carolina School. East European Politics, 28(2), 193–202. Patterson, M., & Renwick Monroe, K. (1998). Narrative in Political Science. Annual Review of Political Science, 1, 315–331. Pisciotta, B. (2016). The Center-Periphery Cleavage Revisited: East and Central Europe from Postcommunism to Euroscepticism. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 22(2), 193–219. Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-Order National Elections. A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal for Political Research, 8(1), 3–44. Riishøj, S. (2004). Europeanisation and Euro-Scepticism. Experiences from Poland and the Czech Republic. Středoevropské politické studie, 6(4), 1–44.

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Rulikova, M. (2010). Euroscepticism in EU Candidate Countries. Variability in Political Elite Resistance to EU Accession in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Saarbrücken: VDM. Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., & Rittberger, B. (2015). The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: Interdependence, Politicization and Differentiation. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(6), 764–782. Schlipphak, B., & Treib, O. (2017). Playing the Blame Game on Brussels: The Domestic Political Effects of EU Interventions Against Democratic Backsliding. Journal of European Public Policy, 24(3), 352–365. Schmitt, H. (2005). The European Parliament Elections of June 2004: Still Second-order? West European Politics, 28(3), 650–679. Schmitt, H. (2010). European Parliament Elections After Eastern Enlargement. London/New York: Routledge. Schmitt, H., & Teperoglu, E. (Eds.). (2016). The 2014 European Parliamentary Elections in Southern Europe: Still Second-order or Critical Contest? London/ New York: Routledge. Shenhav, S.  R. (2006). Political Narratives and Political Reality. International Political Science Review, 27(3), 245–262. Sitter, N. (2001). The politics of opposition and European integration in Scandinavia: Is Euroscepticism a government-opposition dynamic? West European Politics, 24(4), 22–39. Szcerbiak, A., & Taggart, P. (2008). Introduction: Researching Euroscepticism in European Party Systems: A Comparative and Theoretical Research Agenda. In A. Szczerbiak & P. Taggart (Eds.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives (pp. 1–27). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taggart, P. (1998). A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems. European Journal of Political Research, 33(3), 363–388. Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2004). Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Party Systems of the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 43(1), 1–27. Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2018). Putting Brexit into perspective: The Effect of the Eurozone and Migration Crises and Brexit on Euroscepticism in European states. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(8), 1194–1214. Vasilopoulou, S. (2013). Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça change? Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(SI), 153–168. Veyne, P. (1996). Comment on écrit l’histoire. Paris: Seuil. Viola, D. M. (Ed.). (2016). Routledge Handbook of European Elections. London: Routledge.

CHAPTER 2

Republic of Bulgaria Dragomir Stoyanov and Plamen Ralchev

2.1   The Electoral System The Bulgarian Law on the Election of Members of the European Parliament (EP) was adopted and enacted in 2007 and was amended more than half a dozen times by 2011 because of partisan struggles in the national parliament, where different majorities at different times imposed their own drafts, disregarding opposition views (Cheresheva 2016). Then in 2014 the Electoral Code was adopted, which has also been amended several times despite opposition both inside and outside Parliament (Transparency International-Bulgaria 2018). Criticism and discontent with electoral rules discouraged voters and strengthened the perception that majorities in power adjust rules in order to secure victory in the next elections. According to Bulgaria’s Accession Treaty to the European Union (EU), the country had 18 members in the European Parliament (MEPs) until

D. Stoyanov (*) University of Sussex, Brighton, UK e-mail: [email protected] P. Ralchev University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 V. Hloušek, P. Kaniok (eds.), The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9_2

17

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the 2009 European elections. Their number was then reduced to 17, due to a general reduction in the number of MEPs in the European Parliament. All Bulgarian citizens above the age of 18 have the right to elect MEPs for the Republic of Bulgaria. Voters must “have resided in the Republic of Bulgaria or in another member state of the EU at least during the last three months” (Election Code 2019: Art. 350.). MEPs for the Republic of Bulgaria are “elected according to a proportional election system from national candidate lists of political parties and coalitions, or nomination committees” (Election Code 2019: Art. 353.). In voting for the “candidate list of a political party or coalition, the voter may mark a preference for a candidate in the candidate list, thus expressing his/her preference on the order of arrangement of the candidates on the candidate list” (Election Code 2019: Art.353.). The supreme authority responsible for the organisation and holding of elections is the Central Electoral Commission. To participate in elections the EP, “political parties, coalitions of political parties and nomination committees pay a non-interest-bearing deposit into an account with the Bulgarian National Bank” (Election Code 2019: Art.129.).1 The Central Election Commission refunds the deposit to the political parties and the coalitions that gain not less than 1% of the valid votes at the national level. For the distribution of mandates between the parties, coalitions and nomination committees, the method of the largest balance—the Hare-Niemeyer method at the national level—is used.

2.2   General Context of Public and Party-Based Euroscepticism in Bulgaria Bulgaria became an EU member state on 1 January 2007 as part of the second wave of the EU Eastern Enlargement, together with Romania. During the negotiation and pre-accession period Bulgaria was governed by a clearly pro-European establishment. Thus, the pro-European Union of Democratic Forces (SDS)-led coalition, named the ‘United Democratic Forces’ (ODS), started the Bulgarian negotiations with the EU in 2000, followed by the centrist National Movement Simeon II (NDSV) and Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) government which 1  The deposit for political parties and coalitions is 2500 Bulgarian lev (€1250), and for nomination committees100 lev (€50).

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energetically negotiated the Bulgarian accession, and the government of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), NDSV and DPS, which signed the Accession Treaty in 2007. Membership in the EU has been largely perceived by the general public with optimism, and positive attitudes towards the EU have been overwhelming (Graph 2.1). Opinion surveys show steady levels of trust and approval of European institutions (specifically the European Commission and European Parliament), which are higher than levels of trust in national political institutions, both before and after accession (Graph 2.2). The strategic move of Bulgaria to join the EU was supported by more than half of the population. Yet, there were certain segments of Bulgarian society with a kind of binary thinking with regard to Russia and the EU (either with Russia, or with the EU, but not both), others who were both pro-EU and pro-Russian, and third group who believed membership in the EU would be devastating for traditional Bulgarian-Russian relations (Bechev 2016). Against the background of this amalgam of public

90 73 65

60

59

54

50

50

53

55

9

9

Fall 2006

70

70

Spring 2006

80

55

52

51

48

51

54

40

Fall 2005

5

8

7

7

7 Fall 2010

Spring 2005

Good

8

Spring 2009

9

Fall 2008

7

Fall 2007

6

Spring 2007

6

Fall 2004

3

Spring 2004

0

3

Fall 2003

10

Spring 2003

20

Spring 2008

30

Bad

Graph 2.1  Bulgarian public support for the EU membership (%). Answers to the question: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (our country’s) membership of the European Union is a good thing or a bad thing?’. (Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB), and Standard Eurobarometer)

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D. STOYANOV AND P. RALCHEV

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

2004

2007

2009

European Commission National Parliament

2014

2019

National Government National Political Parties

Graph 2.2  Trust in European and National Institution in Bulgaria. (Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB), and Standard Eurobarometer)

perceptions about the Bulgarian posture in the EU, it clearly stands out that joining the EU was an elite-driven process. The main political parties during the transition process from both the right and the left side of the political spectrum supported accession (Smilov 2008; Zapryanova 2011). This political consensus continued after the accession, and Bulgaria has never had a mainstream Eurosceptic party. At the same time, being aware of dormant proxies in Bulgaria, Russia re-activated its influence after 2012. It is not surprising that manipulations of public opinion (stirring fears for example about rising electricity prices as a result of closure of several facilities at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant, or claims that the EU imposes double standards on food quality in new member states are being exploited by some political parties for anti­EU and pro-Russian rhetorical purposes (Cholakov 2019). The strongest proponent of Russia’s energy projects in Bulgaria is ex-President Parvanov’s Alternative for Bulgarian Revival (ABV) party, but also BSP, which traditionally appeals for close ties with Russia and is outside the EU social-­ democratic mainstream. Interestingly enough, these two parties, despite their links and devotion to Russia, share a pragmatic approach to the EU—they are not optimistic about the EU, but are aware that Bulgaria

2  REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA 

21

has certain benefits from membership. They are representative of those social segments mentioned above that have an ambiguous and utilitarian view of Bulgaria’s membership in the EU.  Therefore, though showing some signs of Euroscepticism and a critical view of the EU, BSP and ABV maintain a moderate stance unlike nationalist parties like ATAKA, the National Front for Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Bulgarian National Movement (VMRO-BND) (coalition partners in the incumbent Bulgarian government). The Eurosceptic positions of the latter three parties require a special consideration of their evolution and ideological nuances. After accession, these parties have had a fluctuating public influence (see Appendix (Table 2.1) for details).

2.3   The EP Campaigns 2007–2014 The EP campaigns from 2007 to 2014 largely echoed the domestic political agenda and the results are indicative of the performance and support for incumbent parties in power, most of which tended to show a strong pro-EU stance and enthusiasm. Expectations for swift welfare improvement, however, did not happen at the desired pace, which gave rise to disenchanted populist and Eurosceptic voices. Thus, Eurosceptic parties in Bulgaria heavily employed public disappointment and discontent with mainstream national politics to blame the EU for opportunities lost. The ATAKA party launched its campaign for the 2007 EP elections with an obituary video, which clearly demonstrated the party’s disposition towards the EU. The two-minute video presents impressions of life and efforts doomed to misfortune and failure, and it is obviously the message associated with the EU  (ATAKA 2007a). The party won mandates for three MEPs, who joined the far-right Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty Group (ITS) at the EP. After the ITS Group was dissolved, ATAKA MEPs remained non-attached/independent. In the 2009 EP elections, the party received 11.96% of the votes and won two seats in the EP. In the 2014 MEP elections, ATAKA received 66,210 votes (2.957%) and failed to meet the threshold and gained no mandate for the EP. ATAKA frequently accuses the EU of curbing Bulgaria’s sovereignty, as in the case with its protest against the closure of the Kozloduy nuclear power station as a condition for Bulgaria’s accession to the EU (Taleva 2007). This and many other occasions gave reasons for ATAKA leaders to use the party slogan ‘To Get Bulgaria Back’ (ATAKA 2007b). Applying

30.95

– 12.81 19.88 7.68 5.19

6.44 6.06 8.14 – – – – – – – – – – –

17.15

– 7.45 42.74 18.18 3.63

– – – – – – – – – – – – – –

CfB/ BSP GERB DPS NDSV UDF VMRO-­ BND DSB BPS ATAKA BC RZS LIDER NFSB DBG RB BBC ABV PF UP VOLYA DABG DOST NR

4.35 – 14.2 – 0.47 – – – – – – – – –

21.68 20.26 6.27 4.74 –

21.41

BG EP 2005(%) 2007(%)

BG 2001(%)

Party

– – 3 – – – – – – – – – – –

5 4 1 – –

5

EP 2007 seats

BC – 9.36 6.76 4.13 3.26 – – – – – – – –

39.72 14.45 3.02 BC –

17.7

BC – 11.96 7.95 4.67 5.70 – – – – – – – –

24.36 14.14 7.96 BC 2.25

18.50

– – 2 1 – – – – – – – – – –

5 3 2 – –

4

BG EP EP 2009(%) 2009(%) 2009 seats

2.92 – 7.29 – 1.67 1.73 3.70 3.25 – – – – – –

30.53 11.3 – 1.37 1.88

26.60

BG 2013(%)

RB – 4.52 – – – PF RB 8.89 5.69 4.15 7.28 – –

32.67 14.84 0.24 RB PF

15.40

RB – 2.95 – – – 3.05 RB 6.45 10.65 4.02 – – –

30.40 17.26 0.91 RB BBC

18.93

– – – – – – – – 1 2 – – – –

6 4 – – –

4

BG EP EP 2014(%) 2014(%) 2014 seats

Table 2.1  Results of the parliamentary and the EP elections in Bulgaria (2001–2019)

NR – UP – – – UP – 3.14 – 1.59 UP 9.31 4.26 2.96 2.94 2.54

33.54 9.24 – – UP

27.93

DB – 1.07 – – – 1.15 – – – 0.86 – – 3.62 DB 0.36 DB

31.07 16.55 1.09 GERB 7.36

24.26

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

5 3 – 1 2

5

BG EP EP 2017(%) 2019(%) 2019 seats

–

DB

–

–

EP 2007 seats –

–

–

BG EP EP 2009(%) 2009(%) 2009 seats –

BG 2013(%) –

–

–

BG EP EP 2014(%) 2014(%) 2014 seats –

6.06

1

BG EP EP 2017(%) 2019(%) 2019 seats

Party abbreviations: NDSV (National Movement Simeon II), UDF (United Democratic Forces), CfB/ BSP (Coalition for Bulgaria)—a left-wing coalition led by Bulgarian Socialist Party, DPS—Movement for Rights and Freedoms, VMRO—VMRO Bulgarian National Movement, DSB—Democrats for Strong Bulgaria, BPS—Coalition “Bulgarian People’s Union”—Union of Free Democrats, Bulgarian Agrarian Union-People’s Union, VMRO-Bulgarian National Movement, BC—The “Blue Coalition” consisting of former members of the United Democratic Forces (UDF), RZS—Red, zakonnost i spracedlivost (Order, Law and Justice), Lider—Political Party Lider, RB— Reformers’ Bloc, BBC—“Bulgaria without Censorship”, ABV—Alternative for Bulgarian Revival, PF—Patriotic Front (NFSB + VMRO-BND), UP—United Patriots— coalition of VMRO-BND, ATAKA and NFSB in 2017 Parliamentary elections, VOLYA, DABG—“DA” Bulgaria movement, NR—“New Republic”—coalition led by Democrats for Strong Bulgaria (DSB), DB—Democratic Bulgaria—a coalition between “DA” Bulgaria and Democrats for Strong Bulgaria (DSB)

Note: BG indicates elections to the Bulgarian Parliament, EP denotes the European Parliament. Results in italics denote a soft Eurosceptic party, bold italics for a hard Eurosceptic party

–

BG EP 2005(%) 2007(%)

Source: https://results.cik.bg/

BG 2001(%)

Party

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D. STOYANOV AND P. RALCHEV

this approach, they have tried to identify and play a ‘name-and-blame’ game against what they call ‘external intruders’ and their ‘domestic proxy’. ATAKA’s list of perceived threats seems rather long, ranging from immanent warnings about Turkey and pressures on Bulgaria from the EU and NATO to fulfil certain obligations, to suspicions of George Soros’ Open Society-funded NGOs and hate speech against minority groups. ATAKA, through its party TV station Alfa, waged a propaganda campaign against NATO and the EU, labelling them neo-colonisers. As the single alternative, ATAKA advocates for national self-reliance and cooperation with Russia. The most flamboyant demonstration of this political course was the visit of Volen Siderov in Moscow where he launched the party’s campaign for the 2014 MEP elections. In 2018 during a visit to Crimea, he predicted a Euro-Asian future for Bulgaria, rather than a Euro-Atlantic one (Offnews 2018). These positions taken by the party and its leader have branded ATAKA as a hard Eurosceptic party ever since its emergence (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002). During the period 2007–2014, the party continued to heavily criticise almost every aspect of the EU integration process and often called for the withdrawal of Bulgaria from European supranational cooperation. The party is extremely critical of Turkey, the DPS party (labelled by ATAKA as a Turkish ethnic party), the proliferation of Islam, and the use of Turkish language on Bulgarian national TV. In 2009, ATAKA waged its EP election campaign with the motto ‘NO to Turkey’s Membership in the EU’ (Ivanova 2009). Dimitar Stoyanov, MEP from ATAKA, in a one-­ minute speech at the opening of the plenary session of the EP, called for recognition of the “five-hundred year Turkish genocide” of the Bulgarian population. Stoyanov insisted on the official recognition of the Turkish genocide before opening negotiations for the membership of Turkey in the EU. ATAKA maintains that this recognition should be among the crucial conditions for Turkey’s membership (Vesti 2009). In general, ATAKA is very sceptical about the capacity of the EU to survive critical challenges like migration flows, external border control, and refugee resettlement within the EU. Therefore, the party maintains that Bulgaria should strictly adhere to its narrow national interests and should not rely too much on solidarity within the EU (Mihailov 2018). In 2011, after a split from ATAKA, the NFSB party was established. Both parties followed their different paths, but they still have some common approaches and techniques in addressing the public at large. Beyond the similar social background of ATAKA and NFSB supporters, what

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stands out is the problem of identifying the ideological orientation of these two parties. There are occasions when an observer could categorise them among extreme right wing parties—when it comes to immigration, the Turkish and Roma minorities, national security, and protection of domestic businesses—but there are also many other areas where both parties could be characterised as belonging to the extreme left (Ghodsee 2008)—regarding, for example, social policy issues and increased government control and spending in general. Thus, ATAKA and NFSB present a syncretistic fusion of left and right political messages and policy ideas. They both claim to support domestic businesses as well as social welfare for elderly people and for youngsters and children, but not social payments to the Roma minority. One of their significant differences is connected to their understanding of the role of the EU in Bulgaria. As mentioned above, ATAKA is a classic example of a hard Eurosceptic party, while on the other hand NFSB can be classified as a national populist soft Eurosceptic party. The party does not support Bulgarian exit from the EU but the establishment of economic relations, which maximally profit the country from its membership. Thus, NFSB can be described as a ‘pragmatic balancer’ (Stoyanov 2019a) in its attitudes towards the EU. After its split from ATAKA, NFSB could not secure a seat in 2014 EP elections. The party of Valery Simeonov received 68,376 votes (3.05%). Later, before the national parliamentary elections in 2014, VMRO-BND and NFSB formed the Patriotic Front, which won 19 seats in the national parliament. Nationalist populism is the dominant feature of their rhetoric. Unlike ATAKA and NFSB, VMRO-BND better fits the genuine nationalist party pattern. It is more on the right-wing side of the political spectrum and has inherited a party track record from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Bulgarian history, which is a source of legitimacy in the eyes of some voters. There is also another difference between VMRO-BND on one side, and ATAKA and NFSB on the other. While VMRO-BND influence was growing slowly but steadily in the 1990s and after 2000, ATAKA and NFSB grew out of political engineering aimed at capturing, mobilising and galvanising the votes of discontented people who largely shared perceptions of lost social status or social and economic disadvantages due to the questionable political and economic transition period in Bulgaria after 1990. VMRO-BND launched a campaign of “No to Votes from Turkey for Bulgarian Members of the European Parliament” aimed at preventing Bulgarian emigrants in Turkey from participating in the EP elections in

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2007. VMRO-BND suggested an amendment to the law on the election of MEPs to stipulate that Bulgarian citizens who have lived in Bulgaria or countries of the EU for less than six months before the date of an election should have no right to vote; such a right should be granted only to Bulgarian citizens from Bulgaria and other EU countries, and voting should be obligatory (Mediapool 2007). Among other topics, VMRO-BND vehemently defends its position on the necessity for a new and more resolute and restrictive policy towards Roma minority in Bulgaria. VMRO-BND considers the integration of Roma people, refugees and immigrants as a major national security issue. In a similar security discourse, the party perceives Turkish votes in Bulgarian elections and the activities of the DPS party. VMRO-BND traditionally adheres to Orthodox Christianity as an official religious affiliation in Bulgaria. Promoting social conservative values, VMRO-BND resolutely denounces any forms of public manifestation of LGBT rights and upholds an uncompromising position on minority rights in general (VMRO-BND 2015). In the 2009 EP elections, VMRO-BND participated in another coalition—NAPRED (‘Forward’)—along with the Agrarian People’s Union, the Gergiovden Movement, and the Ensembled People’s Party (EPP). The coalition received 57,931 votes (2.25%) and did not win a mandate. In the 2014 EP elections, VMRO-BND was in coalition with the ‘Bulgaria without Censorship’ Movement, the Gergiovden Movement and the Agrarian People’s Union. The votes cast for the coalition—238,629 (10.656%) secured two mandates—for Nikolay Barekov, leader of ‘Bulgaria Without Censorship’, and Angel Dzhambazki from VMRO-BND, who joined the ECR group. What could be identified as the common approach was that the three parties employed social populism garnished with nationalistic rhetoric, xenophobia, anti-immigrant, anti-minority and anti-Roma discourses. They also shared a special appeal to retired military people, which is particularly visible in the case of ATAKA and NFSB as well. VMRO-BND advanced the proposal for restoring compulsory conscript military service as a source of national mobilisation and integrity (VMRO-BND 2016). The three parties also maintain positions against negotiations for membership of Turkey in the EU, as well as a critical stance on membership for Macedonia and Serbia in the EU. VMRO-BND, ATAKA and NFSB share anti-NATO and anti-US rhetoric, but only ATAKA has an explicit pro-­ Russian attitude.

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In conclusion, during the EP election campaigns in 2007, 2009 and 2014, what was typical of all three parties—ATAKA, VMRO-BND and NFSB—was that they attracted votes from people who were somewhat dissatisfied or lost in the conventional left-right divide and searching for an appealing alternative. The three parties shared certain common understandings, yet they had some specificities as well. Social populism and sensitivity to the impoverished middle and lower-middle classes, and security concerns about collective national identity as opposed to real or imagined threats from the external environment, formed their platform. As far as critical opposition discourses to the EU, Turkey, NATO and the US are concerned, the hard-Eurosceptic ATAKA was a front-runner, while also vociferously favouring Russia. On the other hand, the soft-Eurosceptic VMRO-BND and NFSB were no less critical of Turkey, NATO and the US, but took a more pragmatic and cautious stance on the EU (Stoyanov 2019a), which didn’t make them entirely pro-European either, but this special nuance deserves attention. What ATAKA, NFSB and VMRO-BND brought as an innovation to Bulgarian politics was using their own TV channels for public outreach strictly in tune with the parties’ political agenda, thus maintaining direct and unmediated communication with the target audience and electorate even beyond the regular election cycle. The use of new public communication techniques was another explanation for their steady presence in Bulgarian politics. Yet, they relied primarily on attracting the marginal votes, while the mainstream parties and coalitions maintained their pro-EU rhetoric and refrained from appealing to disenchanted marginal voters who tended to support Eurosceptic nationalist parties.

2.4   Euroscepticism in Bulgarian Electoral Manifestos 2019 The main party in government—Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB)—started its election campaign in the middle of a corruption scandal, which became known as ‘Apartmentgate’. The start of the campaign was not very successful since the party’s EP 2019 elections slogan turned out to be taken from NDSV’s EP 2014 election campaign, and after brief hesitation, GERB decided to campaign without a slogan. Interestingly, the party also campaigned without an electoral programme but with a PowerPoint presentation. At the very beginning of these slides,

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the party represented the EU as a big family that shares a common family budget, and the role of the Bulgarian government in this family is to be maximally effective in attracting EU funds: ‘The investments that Bulgaria makes in the EU budget return to the Bulgarian economy four-fold’ (GERB 2019). From these slides we can understand that the position of the party did not changed in the last 10  years and that it strongly supported the country’s joining the Schengen area and Eurozone as soon as possible. In this respect, GERB strongly supported the EU’s common external policy and the common defence policy, but only as a part of NATO. Regarding GERB’s position towards Russia, the party supported the common EU position, which was based on respecting international agreements and territorial integrity. GERB self-identified as a right-wing pro-European party and on the basis of their vision we can argue that it was one of the most pro-European parties in the country. At the same time, we need to mention that, putting aside the declared positions of the party regarding the Eurozone and Schengen area, the party’s priority was not the reform of the country in order to bring Bulgaria to the core of the Union, but the use of EU funds. The electoral programme of the BSP’s ‘Vision for Europe’ was a document highly representative of the current ideological tension within the party. From one side, the party wanted this document to demonstrate that the organisation was a classical mainstream party, which was pro-European and situated at the centre of the political system. However, the document hinted at the soft Eurosceptic and nationalist-populist positions of its leader, Kornelia Ninova. The BSP programme began with a criticism of the EU that ‘Europe is very far from the ideas and values which inspired European citizens for decades’ (p. 1). After that, the party focused its critique on the bureaucratic character of the EU which distances the organisation from the everyday lives of its citizens. According to the party document, ‘the EU is losing its middle class, citizens are becoming poorer and poorer, and the Union looks increasingly disunited’ (BSP 2019). The solution was a ‘well-functioning and socially oriented EU’, which BSP believed could only be achieved if member states were more active in regulating the economy and the social sphere, and were more supportive and protective of national companies. The party was also against discrimination on the basis of race, nationality, ethnicity, religion etc., but at the same time, this seemingly pro-­ European statement was combined with the BSP’s strong opposition to the Istanbul Convention (the Council of Europe Convention on

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preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence), and the UN compact on refugees, and migration. The party expressed its support for Bulgaria becoming a member of the Eurozone and Schengen area, but did not advocate reforms in related sectors. The BSP position was that the EU’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) for Romania and Bulgaria, which has monitored the two countries in areas of judicial reform, corruption and organised crime since 2007, was a symbol of political double standards in the Union and needed to be lifted. The party was in favour of a common EU defence policy but at the same time strongly opposed EU sanctions on Russia. Thus, the spirit of the document could be summarised by the party position expressed at the end of the document, which was that BSP opposed a neoliberal approach to the economy and widespread social-liberal politics, conservative ideas and far-right nationalism. The three Eurosceptic parties from the governing coalition did not present their electoral programmes for the 2019 elections. This could be a result of their strong focus not on policy suggestions and ideas but on the personal characteristics of the leaders of their election lists. For the EP elections of 2019, VMRO-BND accepted the charter of patriotic values entitled ‘A Different Europe is Possible’ and used it in its campaign to describe the position of the leader of the party list, Angel Djambazki. Known as a politician with strong nationalistic and xenophobic views, before the elections Djambazki published a document titled ‘Bulgaria for Bulgarians, Europe for Europeans’. This document can be easily characterised as a soft Eurosceptic programme combining harsh critiques of global liberalism, liberal ‘fascism’, political correctness and hypocritical multiculturalism, and praise for the nation state. Although not arguing for Bulexit, Djambazki defended the position that Bulgaria would benefit from a weak EU in which member states would reclaim most of their own policy competencies. According to Djambazki, the EU needed to be a ‘Europe of fatherlands’ where nation states cooperate on the basis of national treaties and agreements. Thus, he advocated for a less but better Europe. In this document the EU was characterised as a ‘utopian liberal project’ that threatened the existence of nation states. Djambazki’s position on Turkey was that it should not be part of Christian and modern Europe. Regarding migration, he argued that ‘we need to defend our countries’; thus, migration needed to be stopped.

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D. STOYANOV AND P. RALCHEV

2.5   Campaign and Results 2019 If we try to analyse the key messages of the 2019 EP election campaign, we can easily confirm the opinion of some Bulgarian politicians that the elections for EP are nothing more than a trial performance before the local elections (Stoyanov 2019b). Thus the main topics of the EP 2019 campaign were predominantly domestic issues, such as poor economic development and rising social inequality in the country, the critical situation of the public healthcare system, education reform and in particular the development of the corruption scandal called ‘Apartmentgate’. ‘Apartmentgate’ was a corruption scandal that started as a result of a Radio Free Europe publication about the purchase of apartments by some leading figures of the governing party GERB at very low prices. This information was published before the start of the election campaign but was neglected by the governing party for a certain period, and developed into a serious crisis (Alpha Research 2019a) that had a significant impact on the whole campaign process. Thus, the EP election transformed into a vote for support or opposition to the prime minister and GERB. As a result, European topics were hardly visible during the campaign. GERB, seriously hurt by the scandal, tried to motivate its supporters by outlining the successful governing, in the party’s view, of Prime Minister Boyko Borissov. One of their main campaign messages was that GERB was the party that could guarantee political and economic stability and that if the party lost this election, dramatic changes in the country could happen. Thus, the party and Borissov personally appealed to the fears of the voters and their bad experience with the government of BSP and DPS (2013–2014) when long-lasting civic protests against government politics brought GERB to power. This appeal, used in previous electoral campaigns, was successful one more time and some voters decided to support the ruling party although they were sceptical about its governing capabilities. GERB also stressed that the role of Prime Minister Borissov was very important for the success of the party. Thus, in the second phase of the campaign, Borissov engaged the public actively. Meeting the people personally and promising EU money for their regions, Borissov succeeded in stabilising party support and limiting the negative effect of the corruption scandal (Alpha Research 2019b). On the other hand, with the slogan ‘Justice-Now!’ the BSP and its leader Kornelia Ninova tried to capitalise on the endangered position of the government and Prime Minister Borissov, calling for early

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parliamentary elections if GERB lost the EP elections. During its campaign, BSP accentuated governing failures in the areas of the economy (Bulgaria is the poorest country in the EU), the country’s public health care system, and education sector crises. The very low income level of the majority of Bulgarian citizens and increasing income gap between different groups of the population were part of the critiques as well. The parties from the nationalistic and Eurosceptic bloc ‘United Patriots’ offered its supporters a different sort of campaign. The three parties (VMRO-BND, NFSB and ATAKA) didn’t pay attention to the corruption scandal and left GERB to manage the issue by itself. Instead, the nationalistic parties focused their campaigns on issues that were a standard part of their repertoire, such as salaries, the Roma minority, multiculturalism and defence of national identity, LGBT rights and future relations with Russia. Very important for their campaigns was the fact that the three nationalistic parties decided to participate separately in the election. As a result, the EP elections of 2019 turned into a patriotic competition for the heart of Bulgarian nationalists and Eurosceptics. The three parties chose different political strategies. ATAKA, in search of broader support and popularity, organised a TV casting call for candidates in the elections. This broadcast was a kind of reality show where different people competed for the vote of TV viewers in demonstrating their rhetorical skills. At the end, not surprisingly, the party composed an electoral list closely responding to the Eurosceptic and national populist profile of the party. Thus, Georgi Dimov, the leader of the list of ATAKA, was someone who tried to imitate the ATAKA leader Volen Siderov both in behaviour and rhetoric. In his public appearances Dimov constantly criticised the EU, describing it as a bureaucratic and elitist imperial organisation. According to his rhetoric, the EU’s main goal was to destroy countries from the CEE and especially Bulgaria both economically and socially. During the campaign, he insisted that EU quotas in different sectors of the economy needed to be eliminated because they hindered Bulgaria’s economic development. According to Dimov, the role of Bulgaria is to be a bridge between East and West. In Asia, he sees enormous economic opportunities and argues that this region should be a priority for Bulgaria. During the campaign, ATAKA insisted that sanctions against Russia must be lifted and Bulgaria should re-­establish close relations with its Slavic brother. Being in a very competitive nationalistic environment, the success of this campaign was low and ATAKA received only 1.07%, supported by an only a little more than 20,000 voters.

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The position of ATAKA in the governing coalition became complicated shortly after the elections when its partners (NFSB and VMRO-BND) decided to exclude the leader of ATAKA and some other ATAKA MPs from the parliamentary group of the coalition. Having in mind the conflicts in the group, which started long before the election campaign, and the poor result of ATAKA in these elections, the decision of VMRO-BND and NFSB to continue without the party was expected and rational. Thus, most probably the far-right ATAKA will continue to support the government by guaranteeing the parliamentary majority for the coalition government and at the same time will use any opportunity to criticise its patriotic competitors. NFSB chose a different strategy. The electoral campaign of this nationalistic party was strongly personalised by focusing its attention on the leader of the party and his two-year period (2017–2018) as a vice prime minister. During the whole campaign, the party accentuated the role of NFSB as a party that puts the interests of Bulgaria in first place, and is ready to defend this interest by any means. As mentioned above, the NFSB campaign was leader-centred and the coalition the party formed, with the fringe ‘Middle European Class’ (SEK), was thus named ‘Patriots for Valeri Simeonov’. One of the priorities of the NFSB was the defence of Bulgarian small and medium-size enterprises. According to the party, the obligation of the government is to protect these companies, since they are the basis of economic development. Again, the results for the party were disappointing for its leader (see Appendix ) and the survival of the party was in question if snap elections should take place. Shortly after the election, the leader of the party stated that the coalition government was not functioning well and the coalition agreement with GERB needed to be revised (Paunovski 2019). In addition to this rhetoric, the expectations were that the party would continue to support the government in the future, waiting to see the local election results before taking its strategic decision. The most visible and successful campaign of the national populist and Eurosceptic parties was conducted by VMRO-BND. This party is usually part of some coalition formations (see above), but this time decided to run alone, and this decision turned out to be successful. The leader of the party list was Angel Dzhambazki, who ran a very personalised electoral campaign. Thus, the VMRO-BND campaign was significantly shaped by Dzhambazki’s rhetoric taking an aggressive position on immigrants, ethnic and cultural minorities and the LGBT community (Stoyanov 2019b). The leitmotif of the VMRO-BND campaign was the defence of the

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national interest. The slogan of the campaign, ‘We Defend Bulgaria’, expressed the position of the party that the country was endangered by illegal immigrants, LGBT groups, multiculturalism and ‘gender ideology’. The organisation said that enemy external forces were threatening to destroy the state and the nation by using multiculturalism and foreign (hostile) cultural ideas and practices. The role of the party was to mobilise all Bulgarian patriots to stop these forces. Another accent of the campaign related to the topic of the EU was that Bulgarians were being treated by other EU countries as ‘second class’ citizens regarding their professional and personal rights. As an example, the so-called ‘Macron package’ was shown (i.e. the European Commission Mobility Packages 1, 2, and 3) which, according to VMRO-BND, limited the rights of Bulgarian transport companies to provide services in other EU countries and served the interests of the bigger countries and their transport companies. Being one of the hot topics of the political agenda in the period 2014–2017, migration was not such an important issue in 2019. Instead, party politicians preferred to focus their attention on the Roma community. Thus, the VMRO-BND actively campaigned for limits on social security support for unemployed Roma and proposed a strategy for Roma integration that offered public measures intended to stimulate the seeking of abortion among Roma women and to severely penalise criminal acts committed by Roma people. Part of the campaign involved the destruction of several Roma neighbourhoods in different cities as a demonstration of the power of the law to people who do not have legal documents for their property. The few NGOs that reacted were described by the party officials as traitors to the country. It can be stated that the VMRO-BND campaign was one of the most visible and recognisable during the campaign period. As a result, the party received 7.36% and was supported by more than 140,000 voters. VMRO-­ BND also succeeded in sending two MEPs to the EP. These MEPs will be part of the European Conservatives and Reformists group, which the party joined before the elections. These electoral results established VMRO-BND as the most influential soft Eurosceptic and nationalist-­ populist party in the country, making it an attractive coalition partner both for small and big formations. A small surprise in 2019 was the positive results of the extra-­ parliamentary opposition coalition ‘Demokratichna Bulgaria’ (Democratic Bulgaria), which, with a strong pro-European campaign and criticisms of the government, succeeded in attracting voters and sending one MEP to

34 

D. STOYANOV AND P. RALCHEV

the EP. Democratic Bulgaria supports a stronger Europe, which they see as a community with common policies for defence and security, energy, and the fight against corruption in the member states through common judicial institutions. Being situated on the centre-right side of the political spectrum and constantly attacking the GERB government for corruption and violation of the rule of law, this small coalition is not an easy opposition for the governing party. The campaign of the coalition was clearly focused and well organised, sending a clear message to the middle class citizens of Sofia and other big cities that the party wants Bulgaria to be a core part of the EU.

2.6   Conclusions Bulgaria is one of the countries with the highest levels of support for the EU. Bulgarian citizens are usually positive about the relationship with the EU and they still hope that it will transform the country into a modern and economically well-developed state. However, when we pay attention to the importance and role of the EP elections in Bulgarian politics we can state that these elections are regarded both by the political parties and voters as second order elections (SOE). For example, if we pay attention to voter turnout in the period after accession we notice that there is a significant difference in voter participation in national and EP elections. The lowest result for national elections was measured in 2014 (49%), and the highest result was in the national parliamentary election in 2009 (60%). At the same time, the highest level of voter participation in EP elections was in 2014 (36%) and the lowest was in 2007 (29%). The turnout for the 2019 EP election was 33%. There are several reasons scholars point to when they want to explain this low turnout. Most are well known, such as the fact that the EP elections are not elections for governments, and they do not have a direct impact on government formation and policies. The other reason frequently cited by scholars is the fact that more than ten years after accession, for the majority of Bulgarians, the institutions of the EU and their functions are not clearly understandable. Thus, Bulgarians simply do not understand the purpose of EP elections. The other usual explanation is that Brussels and EU politics are far away from the everyday life of the majority of Bulgarian citizens, who also consider Brussels very distant and bureaucratic. We will add one more reason to the above-­ mentioned explanations, and this is the fact that in Bulgarian society we

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can observe widespread political cynicism and apathy in general (Stoyanov 2019b). If we turn our focus to the candidate lists of the political parties and their interest in EP elections, we see that political parties pay less attention to these elections than to national ones. The fact that these elections do not have a direct impact on the formation of the government and do not distribute political positions and power in the country, makes parties not very active during their electoral campaigns. Thus, some of the parties do not prepare electoral manifestos for the EP elections, or their manifestos are very laconic. The composition of the electoral lists of the parties also indicates the SOE character of EP elections. Usually the party lists name politicians who are at the beginning of their political career and who do not have strong influence within their parties. If we turn our attention to the media coverage of these elections, we see that media do not allocate much time and space to European election issues and campaigns. Usually they focus on domestic topics and EU issues are rarely attractive for the media. In this respect, EP elections are of lower importance for the established mainstream parties and provoke more interest on the part of more radical political formations. EP campaigns require fewer resources than national elections and parties with fewer resources can engage more actively. Thus, EP elections are an arena where far-right and Eurosceptic parties have the opportunity to propagate and defend their political positions and fight for better electoral results. Because of the low turnout, smaller political formations have a chance to become more visible if they can mobilise their supporters. Parties like ATAKA, NFSB and VMRO-BND have their opening to demonstrate their positions and to try to strengthen their electoral support. However, the stability of citizens’ support for the EU limits Eurosceptic rhetoric only to the radical political parties, and mainstream parties prefer not to criticise the EU institutions and policy very aggressively. The 12 years of Bulgarian membership in the EU, which coincide with the 10 years of GERB-led governments, have not brought the majority of citizens the reforms and changes that they expected. Bulgaria is still the poorest country in the Union; its democracy is backsliding; the rule of law still has not been achieved. Thus, after the protests in 2013 and the fact that these protests failed to bring about significant political change, Bulgarians on average are no longer politically active. At the same time, a plethora of new nationalistic parties is emerging and they are using increasingly radical rhetoric to get attention.

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Appendix References Alpha Research. (2019a). Reputazionni shteti za GERB ot skandala s apartamentiote i paritet v elektoralnite naglasi za evrovota. https://alpharesearch.bg/ post/950-reputacionni-shteti-za-gerb-ot-skandala-s-apartamentite-i-paritet-velektoralnite-naglasi-za-evrovota.html. Accessed 13 Oct 2019. Alpha Research. (2019b). Na finala na predizbornata kampania: GERB vuzvrushta prednina pred BSP. https://alpharesearch.bg/post/952-na-finala-napredizbornata-kampania-gerb-vuzvrushta-prednina-pred-bsp.html. Accessed 13 Oct 2019. ATAKA. (2007a). 2007 EP Election Campaign Video of ATAKA Party. https:// youtu.be/VH-OTXC4ikA. Accessed 2 Oct 2019. ATAKA. (2007b). Official Website of ATAKA. http://www.ataka.bg/. Accessed 2 Oct 2019. Bechev, D. (2016). Russia’s Influence in Bulgaria. London: The Foundation for European Reform. https://www.newdirection.online/files/ND-reportRussiasInfluenceInBulgaria-preview-lo-res_FV.pdf. Accessed 9 Oct 2019. BSP. (2019). Vizia za Evropa. http://bsp.bg/news/view/15764-viziya_za_ evropa.html. Accessed 13 Oct 2019. Cheresheva, M. (2016, April 26). Bulgarians Protest Against New Voting Rules, Balkan Insight. https://balkaninsight.com/2016/04/26/bulgarians-standup-against-new-voting-rules-04-25-2016/. Accessed 13 Oct 2019. Cholakov, P. (2019). Russia’s Proposed TurkStream 2 Pipeline Sparks Bulgaria, EU Energy Worries. https://www.dw.com/en/russias-proposed-turkstream2-pipeline-sparks-bulgaria-eu-energy-worries/a-47726458. Accessed 13 Oct 2019. Election Code. https://www.cik.bg/bg/8. Accessed 13 October 2019. GERB. (2019). Platforma za Evropeiski izbori 2019. http://www.gerb.bg/bg/ pages/otcheti-za-predizborni-kampanii-88.html. Accessed 13 Oct 2019. Ghodsee, K. (2008). Left Wing, Right Wing, Everything: Xenophobia, Neo-­ totalitarianism, and Populist Politics in Bulgaria. Problems of Post-Communism, 55(3), 26–39. Ivanova, I. (2009, May 15). News Report S “Ne na Turzia v ES” Ataka trugva na izbori. https://news.bg/politics/s-ne-na-turtsiya-v-es-ataka-tragva-na-izbori. html?sort=desc&page=7. Accessed 13 Oct 2019. Law on the Election of Members of European Parliament from the Republic of Bulgaria. https://www.lex.bg/laws/ldoc/2135545857. Accessed 3 Oct 2019. Mediapool. (2007, February 7). Kampania na VMRO sreshtu uchastieto na izselnitsi ot Turzia v Evrovota, VMRO Position. https://www.mediapool.bg/kam-

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paniya-na-vmro-sreshtu-uchastieto-na-izselnitsi-ot-turtsiya-v-evrovotanews125790.html. Accessed 13 Oct 2019. Mihailov, D. (2018, July 9). Natzionalniat coordinator na Ataka: Liderite na ES sa nesposobni da se spraviat s migrantite Interview with the National Coordinator of ATAKA. http://www.vestnikataka.bg/2018/07/%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%BD%D0%B8%D 1%8F%D1%82-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%B D%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%BB%D0%B8/. Accessed 13 Oct 2019. OFFNEWS. (2018, April 25). News article Tzvetanov za vizitata na ‘Ataka’ v Krim: Siderov ne iska Bulgaria da izleze ot ES. https://offnews.bg/politika/ tcvetanov-za-vizitata-na-ataka-v-krim-siderov-ne-iska-balgaria-da-i-679400. html. Accessed 13 Oct 2019. Paunovski, G. (2019). Valeri Simeonov: GERB da reshi koi da mu bude partniyor, ako iska DPS, da zapovjada. https://www.dnevnik.bg/politika/2019/06/21/3928145_valeri_simeonov_gerb_da_reshi_koi_da_mu_ bude_partnyor/. Accessed 10 Oct 2019. Smilov, D. (2008). Bulgaria In Meseznikov, G., Gyárfásová, O., and Smilov, D.  Populist politics and liberal democracy in central and eastern Europe. Institute for Public Affairs. Bratislava. Stoyanov, D. (2019a). Bulgarian Strategic Culture Between Europe and Russia: Past and Present. In K.  Miklóssy & H.  Smith (Eds.), Strategic Culture in Russia’s Neighbourhood: Change and Continuity in an In-Between Space (pp. 141–161). Lanham: Lexington Books. Stoyanov D. (2019b). The Bulgarian European Parliament Elections of 2019  – Domestic Battles as Usual. https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file. php?name=bulgaria-ep2019-ds-final.pdf&site=266. Accessed 11 Oct 2019. Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2002). Europeanisation, Euroscepticism and Party Systems: Party-based Euroscepticism in the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 3(1), 23–41. Taleva, R. (2007, June 14). Ataka dava na suda v Luxemburg kaszusa “Kozlodui” News article. https://news.bg/politics/ataka-dava-na-sada-v-lyuksemburgkazusa-kozloduy.html. Accessed 13 Oct 2019. Transparency International-Bulgaria. (2018, November 28). Position of Transparency International  – Bulgaria. https://transparency.bg/en/newsen/position-of-ti-bulgaria-on-the-proposed-changes-to-the-electoral-legislation/. Accessed 05 Oct 2019. Vesti. (2009, March 26). News Report “Ataka”: Ne na chlenstvoto na Turzia v ES. https://www.vesti.bg/bulgaria/politika/ataka-ne-na-chlenstvoto-na-turciia-v-es-2044011. Accessed 13 Oct 2019.

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VMRO-BND (2015). NMK s deklrarazia sreshtu gei parade VMRO Position. http://www.vmro.bg/нмк-с-декларация-срещу-гей-парада/. Accessed 13 Oct 2019. VMRO-BND (2016). VMRO shte iska vrashtane na zadaljitelnata voenna slujba VMRO Official Position. http://www.vmro.bg/вмро-ще-иска-връщане-назадължителната-военна-служба/. Accessed 13 Oct 2019. Zapryanova, G.M. (2011). Looks can be deceiving: explaining Euroscepticism in central and east Europe (Doctoral dissertation). University of Pittsburgh.

CHAPTER 3

Croatia Goran Č ular and Marijana Grbeša

3.1   Electoral System in the Elections for the European Parliament (EP) Croatian Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are elected in a proportional system with one optional preferential vote and with the whole country serving as a single electoral unit. All Croatian citizens older than 18, regardless of whether or not they have permanent residence in the country, as well as European citizens with permanent or temporary residence in Croatia who satisfy certain conditions, can vote and stand in the EP elections. Lists can be nominated by parties, party coalitions and groups of voters (in the latter case a list needs to collect 5000 signatures). Although nominations should take into consideration gender equality, there are no sanctions for the lists that do not comply with the rule.1 1  According to the Law on Gender Equality, electoral lists should comprise at least 40% of each gender. However, since the law also delays the period for the prescribed fines, penalties can be legally applied for the first time only in the 2024 EP elections. In the 2019 EP elections, 24% of electoral lists had fewer than 40% of women nominees (Gong 2019: 12–13).

G. Č ular (*) • M. Grbeša Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 V. Hloušek, P. Kaniok (eds.), The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9_3

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Seats are allocated according to the D’Hondt method with a 5% legal threshold. Since voters can cast one preferential vote on an elected list, the final order of elected candidates is determined by preferential votes, but only if a candidate gets at least 10% of the total votes won by the list. If an elected candidate does not accept the mandate or resigns, he or she will be replaced by the next candidate on the list. A special law regulates financial matters for parties and candidate lists. Beside regulation of public funding of parties for regular activities and annual limitations on donations (Č ular 2018), the law allows for public compensation of electoral campaign costs (only for lists that scored at least 5% of the votes, proportionally to the number of seats obtained), but also limits electoral expenditures. Just several days before the 2019 EP elections were announced, the ruling coalition raised the spending limit from 200,000 EUR (1,500,000 HRK), as it was in the 2013 and 2014 EP elections, to around 530,000 EUR (4,000,000 HRK) per electoral list.

3.2   Political Context and Attitudes of Croatian Citizens Towards the EU Croatia became a member state of the European Union on 1 July 2013, after Croatian citizens supported accession to the EU in a national referendum in January 2012. The turnout was around 44% with two-thirds voting ‘for’ and one-third ‘against’ accession.2 Compared to other countries that joined the EU within the fifth wave of enlargement, Croatia demonstrated the lowest support for accession (Č ular 2010: 25). The decision itself, as well as the overall political atmosphere surrounding the referendum, adequately reflects the general attitude of the public towards the EU, starting in 2004 when Croatia first became a candidate country up until today. This mood of the public towards the EU could be best described as a ‘mild support, weak opposition’. Graphs 3.1 and 3.2 cover some aspects of the general public’s attitudes towards the EU in Croatia, before and after Croatian accession. During this period, the image of the EU among the Croatian citizenry has been predominantly neutral, neither positive nor negative, with a mixture of 2  The Croatian Constitution was changed in 2010 to include a chapter on EU matters that would legally enable the accession. On that occasion, the constitutional requirements for a positive referendum outcome were loosened, from a majority of all registered voters to a simple majority of votes, regardless of the turnout.

60%

In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative, or very negative image? Croatia (from 10/2004 to 06/2019)

50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

10/2004 05/2005 10/2005 03/2006 09/2006 04/2007 09/2007 03/2008 10/2008 06/2009 10/2009 05/2010 11/2010 05/2011 11/2011 05/2012 11/2012 05/2013 11/2013 05/2014 11/2014 05/2015 11/2015 05/2016 11/2016 05/2017 11/2017 03/2018 11/2018 06/2019

0%

Fairly positive (4.0)

Very positive (5.0)

Fairly negative (2.0)

Very negative (1.0)

DK - Don't know

Neutral (3.0)

Graph 3.1  Attitude towards the European Union among Croatian citizens. (Source: Eurobarometer)

I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it, or tend not to trust it. The European Union Croatia (from 10/2004 t 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 10/2004 05/2005 10/2005 03/2006 09/2006 04/2007 09/2007 03/2008 10/2008 06/2009 10/2009 05/2010 05/2011 11/2011 05/2012 11/2012 05/2013 11/2013 05/2014 11/2014 05/2015 11/2015 05/2016 11/2016 05/2017 11/2017 03/2018 11/2018 06/2019

0%

Tend to trust

Tend not to trust

DK - Don't know

Graph 3.2  Trust in the European Union in Croatia. (Source: Eurobarometer)

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trust and distrust towards the EU as an institution. It seems that the population’s perception of the EU became more favourable in the days preceding Croatia’s formal accession: the image of the EU slightly improved and the tendency to distrust no longer prevailed. This was the atmosphere surrounding the referendum on the accession as well as the two first EP elections. However, since 2015 the image of the EU among the Croatian electorate has deteriorated again. Interestingly, such an indifferent attitude of the citizens was not fuelled by political parties, which were expressing a virtual consensus of support for accession. This ‘EU fatigue’ at the citizens’ level was rather contextual, mediated by and contingent on attitudes towards national identity, general distrust of political institutions and lack of information (Blanuša 2006, 2011; Henjak 2016; Landripet 2015; Štulhofer 2006). The only parliamentary party that promoted an outright ‘No’ vote in the referendum was the Croatian Party of Rights—Ante Starčević (Hrvatska stranka prava— dr. Ante Starčevic ́, or HSP-AS). However, the influence of the party was very limited at the time—it had only one MP and represented a rather fragmented and divided radical right scene in Croatia. The support of the relevant political parties for accession expressed during the negotiation period (Blanuša 2006: 342; Henjak 2016: 62–63) has mostly continued since Croatia joined the EU. The two biggest parties, the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) and the Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske, SDP) who led the way, together with their partners, got 11 out of 12 MEPs in 2013, 10 out of 11 in 2014 and 8 out of 12 MEPs in the 2019 EP elections. Although some attempts to challenge the unanimous support for the EU featured in all three EP elections, the votes for Eurosceptic parties cannot be entirely attributed to their Euroscepticism, but primarily to the dynamics of the domestic party system and their position within it. Based on expert surveys in 2010 and 2014, Henjak (2016: 62–63) argues that the attitudes of political parties towards the EU are pretty much in line with the dominant left-right divide in Croatia. As party competition in Croatia has been structured by a unidimensional axis of culturally defined Left and Right and political identities rooted in historical cultural cleavages (Henjak 2007; Henjak et al. 2013; Zakošek and Č ular 2004), the EU was just another issue that overlapped with the pre-existing dimension of competition, with the liberal parties being more in favour of the EU, and conservative parties less so.

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As for the relationship between popular attitudes towards the EU and party vote, the data from the 2012 survey show that there were no significant differences among voters for different parties. Only voters for three smaller parties, the agrarian Croatian Peasants’ Party (Hrvatska seljac ̌ka stranka, HSS), the Croatian Pensioners’ Party (Hrvatska stranka umirovljenika, HSU) and the radical right Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska stranka prava, HSP), were more likely to vote against rather than in favour of accession. Similar findings confirmed this several years later when respondents were asked about their trust in the EU. It was again hard to find significant and consistent differences among voters for different parties.3 In the months preceding the 2019 elections, support for the EU in Croatia, taken in a comparative perspective, was rather weak. With 44% of citizens considering Croatian membership a good thing and 52% who would vote for Croatia to remain in the Union, Croatia was far below the EU average (62% and 66%, respectively), and among three countries with the lowest support for the EU.  At the same time, 66% of respondents thought that Croatia benefited from its membership (the EU average being 68%). However, the most important findings refer to participation indicators. Croatia had the lowest turnout in the EP elections, after Slovakia; Croatians had the lowest level of belief that voting in the EP elections was important (along with Slovakia and the Czech Republic); and they declared themselves (along with Portugal, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) the least ready to cast a ballot in the 2019 EP elections.4 This all implies that Euroscepticism in Croatia has been a rather diffuse phenomenon that lacks strong and principled political mobilisation but has been latently present at the citizens’ level, mostly under the guise of ‘indifference’.

3.3   Second-Orderedness of the EP Elections and Their Role in the National Party System The EP elections in Croatia demonstrate all the characteristics of second-­ order elections (SOE). Firstly, the turnout in EP elections is the lowest of all types of elections in Croatia, including local. While national elections 3  Data from the Croatian National Election Survey in 2012, 2016 and 2018 (Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb). 4  All the data have been derived from the EP (2018).

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(both presidential and parliamentary) attracted between 50% and 60% of registered voters in the last electoral cycles and regional and local elections between 40% and 50%, the turnout for EP elections ranged from 20% to 30%. Secondly, new and smaller parties regularly score better in EP elections than in national ones. Remarkable in this respect is the case of Sustainable Development of Croatia (Održivi razvoj Hrvatske, ORaH), which won an EP seat in the 2014 election and never won another seat in national elections again. Thirdly, in the EP elections there have regularly been more invalid ballots (ranging from 2.68% to 5.07%) than in the national parliamentary elections (less than 2%). Fourthly, the main opposition parties (HDZ in the 2013 and 2014 EP elections, and SDP in the 2019 EP elections) either won the elections or were even with the governing party (for detailed data see Appendix (Table 3.1)). Finally, the results of a number of studies that point to low visibility of European topics in the EP elections and generally, dominance of national topics and actors over EU issues (e.g., Anderson and McLeod 2004; De Vreese et al. 2006a, b), has been confirmed in Croatia as well, especially in 2013 and 2014, and to a lesser extent in the 2019 elections. The SOE nature of the EP elections in Croatia is particularly important in understanding how EU issues are incorporated in the main dimension of competition in the national party system. It is equally important to understand how the EP elections foster changes in the national party competition. This sheds light on almost all the features of the EP contest, from real sources of manifest Euroscepticism to party coalition strategies and interpretation of voters’ behaviour in the EP elections. In this respect, the changes that have occurred in the party system since the national parliamentary elections in 2015 represent a crucial turning point that changed the structural position of the EP elections in the national political arena. From 2000 to 2015, the Croatian party system was a stable multiparty system dominated by two moderate parties, Christian Democratic HDZ and the leftist SDP. Despite great instability and fragmentation at the periphery of the party system, the core remained more stable than in other CEE countries. Exactly this constellation of the stable core and fragmented periphery facilitated the government formation process and durability of the governments (Č ular 2018: 268–277). Although dissatisfaction with the parties and frustration with the bi-polar nature of the party system and the functioning of democratic institutions was present in the public discourse throughout the whole period, it did not find channels to be adequately articulated, except for a steady trend of decline in electoral

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participation. Attempts by some parties (e.g. the Croatian Labourists— Party of Labour, Hrvatski Laburisti—Stranka rada, HL) to undermine the duopoly by using moderate anti-establishment and populist appeals, did not really affect the existing structure of the system. However, after the 2015 and early 2016 parliamentary elections the party system started to change. For the first time anti-establishment and populist parties (The Bridge, Most nezavisnih lista, Most and The Human Shield, Živi zid) concentrated anti-system votes. Živi zid won 1 seat in 2015 and 8 seats in 2016 but rejected any possibility to join in forming the government with ‘corrupt and inept’ elites. Unlike them, Most, with its 19 MPs in 2015 and 13 in 2016, played a crucial role in the formation of HDZ’s governments in both years. At this point, Croatia, although a latecomer, joined other CEE countries that experienced the breakthrough of an anti-establishment politics, and for similar reasons (Hanley and Sikk 2016; Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015; Henjak 2018: 385–387). In consequence, Croatia was for the first time faced with an increased political and institutional instability that eventually led to the fall of the government and early elections in 2016. Moreover, new anti-establishment and populist parties encouraged development of the similar discourse among existing radical right parties as well as among several civic-political initiatives, both on the far right and far left. In sum, the unidimensional cultural cleavage politics that decisively determined the structure of the party system in Croatia until 2015 was changed by the emergence of the cross-cutting establishment-anti-­ establishment divide. This change is, among other factors, prompted by younger generations of voters and dissatisfied citizens who refuse to see politics in existing culturally defined left-right terms (Henjak 2018). Therefore, our analysis of the EP electoral campaigns, party-based Euroscepticism and the implications of the 2019 EP elections in the rest of the chapter should be read bearing in mind that the 2019 EP elections took place in a very different national political context than the 2013 and 2014 EP elections. The following sections focus on the parties and coalitions that demonstrated different levels of Euroscepticism in the 2013, 2014 and 2019 EP elections: HSP-AS, the Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja (Hrvatski demokratski savez Slavonije i Baranje, HDSSB), The Oak—Movement for Successful Croatia (Hrast—pokret za uspješnu Hrvatsku, Hrast), HL, a coalition Croatian Sovereigntists (Hrvatski

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suverenisti), Independents for Croatia (Neovisni za Hrvatsku, NHR), Most and Živi zid. The Euroscepticism of all these parties and coalitions has been identified as ‘soft’.

3.4   The 2013 and 2014 Campaigns The first European Parliament elections were held in Croatia on 14 April 2013, only a few months before the nation’s accession to the EU. At that time, Croatia was governed by the left-wing coalition led by SDP. Out of 28 lists that stood in the elections, only three secured their place in the European Parliament: HDZ’s coalition won six seats, the ruling SDP with its partners five and HL one seat. The turnout was exceptionally low, only 20.84%, which is one of the lowest turnouts in the history of European elections. In a post-election survey conducted by IPSOS PULS, most of the voters explained their abstinence by general dissatisfaction with politicians (51.6%), lack of interest in European elections (37.1%), the absence of a proper electoral atmosphere and adequate information that would encourage them to vote (34.7%) or some other private reasons (22.2%) (Gong 2013). The second European elections took place only a year later, on 25 May 2014. The turnout was slightly higher than in 2013 but still very low (25.2%). Out of 25 lists that competed, again only three won European mandates—HDZ with its partners won six, SDP won four and ORaH won one seat. The 2013 campaign is best described as ‘Euro-indifferent’ (Jović 2012), both on the side of the media and political parties. According to the only scholarly analysis of the 2013 electoral coverage by Grbeša and Tomičić (2014), the Croatian press was not particularly interested in the European competition. Only two articles throughout the campaign discussed the work of the European Parliament, while European issues were absolutely overshadowed by national topics. As for the election campaign, there is no scholarly account that would shed light on the marketing strategies used in the first European election. Šimunjak and Milanović (2017: 158) report that the media described the campaign as ‘invisible’ while a civil society organisation Gong (2013: 9) assessed that there was ‘no real election campaign’ whatsoever. Similarly, the accounts of the 2014 elections suggest that media reports about the European Parliament (its role, responsibilities and procedures) were exceptionally rare. Vilović (2017: 66) observes that the EP ‘was

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intriguing only to the extent to which the authors could use it as a reason to criticise the work of the Prime Minister, the Government and the ruling party’. Even though the campaign was more dynamic in terms of advertising than in 2013, it still failed to address EU issues. Based on their analyses of 19 posters and six election videos that appeared throughout the campaign, Šimunjak and Milanović (2017: 159) established that the campaign was very personalised and that it ‘focused on national topics and actors, largely ignoring everything related to the EU’. Gong’s analysis similarly revealed that 72% of statements made by candidates and leaders pertained to national topics and only 28% to the European elections (Gong 2014). In these two elections, Euroscepticism was expressed mainly in the discourse of conservative parties that positioned themselves to the right of the HDZ. They accepted Croatian membership mainly as a ‘necessary evil’ and although they did not express clear demands for Croatia to leave the Union, they developed a sort of realistic and instrumental approach to Croatian membership. Since they are primarily nationalist parties, they tend to see the EU as a threat not only to national sovereignty, but also to the traditional and conservative values of the Croatian people and culture. Indicative in this respect is the case of the most successful Eurosceptic candidate, Ruža Tomašić. She was first elected in 2013 and then again in 2014 as a candidate of the minor right-wing party HSP-AS, that was part of the broad pro-European coalition led by the HDZ. At that time, the HDZ was led by Tomislav Karamarko, who pushed the party strongly to the right. Karamarko’s strategy was to demonstrate the strength of the right political bloc, comprising the centre-right to far right, and to prevent the waste of votes for the fragmented far right. Ironically, HDZ, a loyal EPP member, helped Ruža Tomašić to become the first and only Croatian MEP in the ECR parliamentary group for the 2013–2014 term. Other Eurosceptic parties on the right were HDSSB and Hrast. They shared the same type of Euroscepticism as Ruža Tomašić. HDSSB is a regionalist Slavonian party, founded as a HDZ splinter party. In the 2013 EP elections it stood as the leading party of a coalition of three parties; in the 2014 contest it joined the Alliance for Croatia (Savez za Hrvatsku), along with Hrast and a number of other right-wing parties and initiatives. The Alliance promised to protect Croatian national interests in the EU. Although it passed the threshold with 6.9%, the Alliance did not win a seat in the EP. Due to its organisational and leadership problems, the HDSSB turned away from Euroscepticism (HDSSB 2017: 6) and skipped

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the 2019 EP competition, while Hrast and some other minor parties supported Ruža Tomašić in 2019 (see next section). In general, all far-right parties in Croatia express some level of soft Euroscepticism. Even the parties that opposed accession in the 2012 referendum, such as HSP-AS, eventually accepted the EU at least for instrumental reasons and none of them advocate some form of ‘Croexit’. Their criticism of the EU is mostly concerned with a perceived trend of building the EU into a supra-state. They appreciate the EU as a common economic market but prioritise protection of national interests over common EU institutions and policies. They perceive the relationships among different countries in the EU as unjust and nations as having unequal standing. The EU’s multicultural ideology is also seen as a threat to traditional and conservative social values. This discourse stems from their general ideological positions based on nationalist, sovereigntist and conservative appeals, but equally serves as a strategic tool for their positioning within the national party system. Besides right-wing parties, elements of Euroscepticism were present in the manifesto of the HL both in 2013 and 2014. It was one of the first parties that positioned itself on an anti-establishment reformist pole and articulated strong criticism of representative democracy as an institutional framework for corruption and clientelism. HL entered the political arena in the 2011 parliamentary elections, when they won six seats. The 2013 and 2014 EP elections were an opportunity to confirm or even increase the party’s political strength. They succeeded by winning a seat in the 2013 EP, but not in 2014. Consequently, the party president and the former MEP resigned from all party positions and eventually left the party. Since then, HL has remained invisible and become rather irrelevant. However, in the first two cycles of the EP elections HL demonstrated elements of the leftist type of soft Euroscepticism. They argued that the EU political class and bureaucracy had lost touch with citizens, that the EU serves the needs of big business, bankers and multinational companies, that it suffers from a democratic deficit and that it supports social and economic inequality. Also, the party supported a more transparent system of decision-making, with better parliamentary control over the EC and with more direct and deliberative democracy at the level of the EU. However, the party is not for the United States of Europe, but for gradual unification of the European peoples, based on the principles of social equality, justice and solidarity (HL 2014). The party’s only MEP in

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the mandate for 2013–2014 worked within the EUL/NGL parliamentary party group. In sum, in the 2013 and 2014 EP elections soft Euroscepticism was vaguely present in the discourse of several right-wing parties and the pioneer left-populist party, the Croatian Labourists.

3.5   The 2019 EP Elections: Results and Campaign The political and socio-economic context of the 2019 campaign was changed in comparison to the previous two EP elections. The economy had improved and unemployment was slashed, but the inability of the country to seize the opportunities of EU membership and to manage its own economic growth consigned Croatia to the group of EU countries with the lowest GDP per capita (Henjak 2019: 103). In addition, accession to the EU sparked a huge emigration wave towards the more prosperous Western European countries, turning demographic decline into one of the most important topics on the public agenda. At the time of the election, the country was governed by HDZ, which took over leadership in 2015 and which was confirmed in a 2016 snap election. This is when Andrej Plenković, a former MEP and reputable career diplomat, became leader of HDZ and prime minister. Since then, the party has significantly shifted to the centre, which prompted vociferous discontent among more conservative factions of the party. The EP elections themselves were marked by a higher turnout of 29.85% and overall greater visibility of the campaign and EU topics. Out of 33 lists that stood in the election, 6 made it to the European Parliament. The ruling HDZ won four seats, which came as a disappointment to its supporters since most polls were pointing towards five or six seats. This loss of support should probably be attributed to the frustration of HDZ’s more conservative electorate with Plenković’s moderate views but also with the list itself that was led by young Plenković’s protégé, Karlo Ressler and that mainly excluded HDZ’s veterans. The main opposition party SDP also won four seats but this was perceived as a positive boost to the otherwise declining credibility of the party, caused by ineffective party leadership and internal conflicts. One seat was won by the populist Živi zid, one by a coalition of seven liberal and centrist parties called the ‘Amsterdam coalition’ (see Appendix), one by the ‘Croatian Sovereigntists’, a coalition of four right-wing parties (see Appendix), and, finally, one by an independent list of the populist rising star Mislav Kolakušić. Although

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the candidates were vying for 12 mandates, the 12th mandate belonging to SDP is to be awarded only after Brexit. In general, the results of the 2019 EP elections point to further fragmentation of the Croatian party system, caused primarily by the rise of populist actors and consequent dissolution of the HDZ-SDP duopoly, whose combined vote share plunged from over 60% before the 2015 parliamentary election to around 40% in the 2019 EP election (Henjak 2019: 104). Also, the number of lists that got more than 2% doubled in 2019 compared to the previous elections. The same is true for the lists that won at least one seat in the parliament, while in the 2013 and 2014 EP elections only three lists won seats, in the 2019 elections six lists gained representation. As far as the campaign is concerned, initial reports indicate that the media were much more interested in EU-related topics than in the previous elections. The media dedicated more time and space to covering topics related to EU institutions, debates about the future of the EU and some specific topics such as introduction of the Euro, the use of EU funds and further enlargement of the EU. However, specific EU policies were only rarely mentioned while media coverage was for the most part characterised by horse-race journalism, that is who’s ahead and who’s behind in election polls, and trivial campaign hoopla. Besides, it was a lengthy campaign that lasted 45  days and the poor regulation of electoral coverage discouraged the organisation of attractive media events, such as TV debates, which sedated the campaign and possibly de-motivated voters. Šimunjak et al.’s (2019) preliminary analysis suggests that Europe was much better represented in the messages of political lists and parties than in the previous EP elections. HDZ, SDP and the Amsterdam coalition were campaigning on very coherent pro-European messages. They all extensively emphasised the financial benefits of EU funds (HDZ) and the potential benefits if Croatia only knew how to withdraw and manage these funds (Amsterdam coalition and SDP). While the Amsterdam coalition campaigned mostly on European values and criticism of the ruling HDZ, the SDP wisely pushed its veteran MEPs, Tonino Picula and especially Biljana Borzan to the forefront of the campaign. Voters awarded their apparent efforts as MEPs, especially Borzan’s struggle for equal quality of products in all EU countries. Šimunjak et al. (2019) report that the parties and lists focused their campaign efforts mostly on social media. Although most of the key players produced traditional materials (posters, TV ads

3 CROATIA 

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etc.), the majority of these were released only in the final two weeks of the campaign. Soft Euroscepticism was detected in the campaigns of the two right-­ wing options, the Croatian Sovereigntists and NHR, and the two populist parties, Živi zid and Most. Mislav Kolakušić, who surprisingly won a seat in the EP, remained mostly secretive about his views of the EU throughout the campaign. However, his harsh and critical speeches in the EP after the elections imply that his Euroscepticism is possibly yet to be fully revealed and therefore he deserves a mention. The Croatian Sovereigntists campaigned with the slogan ‘Strong values, strong nations, strong Europe’. The face of the coalition was soft Eurosceptic-profiled Ruža Tomašić, a veteran MEP who first entered the European Parliament as a candidate of HSP-AS on the list of HDZ’s coalition in 2013 and then again in 2014. Andrej Plenković’s centrist and Europhilic politics provoked Ruža Tomašić to distance herself from HDZ and help build a rival coalition in 2019. Voters evidently complemented her performance in the EP and she won the most preferential votes of all candidates. She identified herself as ‘Eurorealist’ and stood for a ‘Europe of equal Member states’. The Croatian Sovereigntists articulated very strong conservative values and insisted on protection of national interests, but in the words of Hrvoje Zekanović, one of the coalition leaders, they were not against Europe; they rather were fighting for ‘Europe with a clear Christian identity’ (T-portal 2019). Their strong nationalist and conservative appeals attracted a significant number of disenchanted HDZ voters and they won 8.52% of the votes, which is exactly double the percentage projected by the IPSOS poll two days before the elections. The results of the 2019 EP elections exposed the ideological rift within the ruling HDZ. HDZ voters, otherwise very loyal to the party, regardless of ideological changes in the leadership, shifted away from HDZ and voted for Tomašić and the other two right-wing lists, NHR and the independent list of Marijana Petir (IPSOS Exit Poll, May 2019). The context of a SOE contest certainly facilitated such voting decisions that primarily reflect voters’ attitudes towards the current HDZ leadership rather than point to their firm belief in Euroscepticism. Independents for Croatia emerged as a project of two politicians, Bruna Esih and Zlatko Hasanbegović, who left HDZ in a revolt against Plenković’s centrist party leadership. They refused to join Ruža Tomašić’s list in the 2019 EP elections and were post hoc accused by other right-­ wing politicians that with their 4.4% of votes they could have contributed

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to winning a second seat for right-wing Eurosceptics. Since their Euroscepticism was not any different from that of the other right-oriented Eurosceptic parties (NHR 2019), their main reasons for refusing to partner with other right-wing options were their slightly different ideological emphases (more nationalistic, revisionist and anti-communist and less conservative), ambition to position themselves within the domestic party system, and, finally, personal antagonisms which eventually led to a dramatic breakup between Esih and Hasanbegović. Unlike radical right actors before 2010, today the new actors on the right generally use strong anti-establishment rhetoric and Euroscepticism as a powerful tool to emphasise their deviation from the mainstream parties, especially the centre-right HDZ. The SOE nature of the European elections helped them achieve political goals that otherwise would be difficult to reach, to snatch away voters from HDZ and to prepare ground for the unification of the traditionally rather divided rightist party scene in Croatia. Their Euroscepticism stems from their ideological position and they strategically use it as a weapon to highlight their ideological opposition to the leading centre-right HDZ. None of these parties use Euroscepticism as their first point of reference, but the EP elections, as SOE, provide a nice opportunity to win significantly more votes than in the national parliamentary elections (see Appendix). Most and Živi zid belong to a new generation of anti-establishment political parties. They tend to avoid the dominant left-right divide issues in Croatian politics (historical and church-related issues, women’s rights, abortion, same-sex marriages, national minorities’ rights etc.), criticise all mainstream parties and condemn the bipolar nature of the party system. In doing so, they use populist rhetoric, albeit to a different extent: while the populist discourse of Most is less aggressive, the populist rhetoric of Živi zid is much stronger and permeates all their political activities (Grbeša and Šalaj 2018: 181–235). Moreover, Živi zid belongs to the economic left, with strong criticism of economic elites, banks, capitalism and unjust economic and social relationships, and opts for a bigger role of the state in economic relations, while Most insists on free enterprise, a free market and private initiative, and sees the state as a burden on the domestic economy.5 5  We could, of course, find many more differences between these two parties. Most is more pluralistic, while ŽZ demonstrates an authoritarian style of organisation and advocates more radical solutions. Most and ŽZ both make nationalistic appeals but Most articulates stronger conservative values than ŽZ and tends to view politics partly in a technocratic manner.

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Most first started as a national network of local independent politicians. After their unexpected success in 2015, they became minor partners in two HDZ governments (2015–2017). However, their conflict with Prime Minister Andrej Plenković pushed them into the opposition. They are now very critical of their former partner HDZ but their popular support has significantly declined. In their programme for the 2019 EP elections, they expressed tough criticism of the EU’s current trajectory mainly in terms of (a) protection of national interests and sovereignty and opposition to any form of supranational decision-making and (b) lack of transparency and democratisation. They saw the EU primarily as a common economic market with international cooperation and not as a political community. The party advocates better use of direct and e-democracy when it comes to European issues, but only at the national level, and supports better control over the EU executive with a prominent role for national parliaments in it (Most 2019). Their main slogan was ‘A country worth of fighting’ and their position is best described in a FB status update from the party leader Božo Petrov: ‘Vote for those who kneel only in front of God and not in front of the Brussels bureaucracy’ (FB, 22/05/2019). Most was very close to the threshold (4.67%) but did not make it into the EP. Živi zid is probably the most Eurosceptical party in Croatia. The party is generally the most rigid populist party with a range of radical solutions to social and political problems. The party emerged out of a civic organisation that based its social and political activities on civil disobedience. Unlike Most, they refuse to partner with any of the mainstream parties. Similar to Most, their attitudes towards the EU combine nationalism and demands for direct democracy, but similar to the Croatian Labourists, the party condemns the perceived protectionism by the EU of rude capitalism, big business and the dominance of banks. Therefore, they ask for basic material resources to be available to all the citizens, justice for all social strata and political equality for all the member states. Since the party openly demands simpler exit procedures and sometimes publicly suggests such a solution for Croatia, it could possibly be considered as straddling the borderline between being a hard and soft Eurosceptic party. However, before the 2019 elections, Živi zid partnered with populists from Italy (the Five Star Movement), Poland (Kukiz’15), Greece (Akkel) and Finland (Likke Nyt) and signed their European Manifesto. Since the group explicitly said that they are not against the EU, we still regard Živi zid as another soft Eurosceptic party. The main focus of their 2019 EP campaign was harsh criticism of the national political elites.

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Mislav Kolakušić, a judge on the commercial court who resigned to stand in the elections, campaigned on strong populist messages targeting national political elites and addressing corruption. His slogan ‘Every mafia meets its end!’ together with a cleverly designed Facebook page called ‘Citizens for Mislav Kolakušić’, a web page allegedly dedicated to anticorruption, and the wise use of Google ads, proved quite effective. He won 7.89% of the votes despite his low visibility in the mainstream media. However, his views of the EU remain rather unclear. Although he avoided EU topics, a few available statements, mostly prompted by journalists, suggest he might be Eurosceptic (e.g. ‘I don’t think we need the Euro’). However, on other occasions, he spoke favourably of the EU: ‘We don’t need old-fashioned ambassadors, we need modern ambassadors, and those are representatives in the EP’ (Dubrovački dnevnik 2019). Although his position towards the EU was not clearly expressed during the campaign, his loud criticism of German and French hegemony in EU institutions and insistence on remaining an independent MEP in order not to ‘sell his soul’ (Index 2019) indicate that his views might be Eurosceptical after all. Our analysis of the 2019 European elections revealed that soft Euroscepticism was present in the discourse of the four relevant parties and coalitions—the Croatian Sovereigntists, Independents for Croatia, Most and Živi zid. Hard Euroscepticism was only vaguely present in the rhetoric of Živi zid although their overall Euroscepticism was still classified as soft. Interestingly, Euroscepticism was more commonly advanced in the news statements or social media posts of populist and conservative politicians, rather than in their paid advertising. Most of the Eurosceptic messages involved playing the card of protecting national interests or addressing inequalities between member states. Although the general support for Eurosceptic parties remained rather steady during the 2013–2019 period,6 the rise of ideologically mixed Euroscepticism, which should be explained by recent changes in the Croatian party system and the rise of anti-establishment and populist options, is significant. Although it seems that support for the right-wing Eurosceptic parties has decreased, one should bear in mind that their seats in 2013 and 2014 were won on the list led by HDZ while for the first time in 2019 they won a seat as a separate rival coalition, independent from HDZ. 6  Right-wing Eurosceptic parties obtained 17.8% in 2013, 18.5% in 2014 and 12.9% in 2019. Left-wing Eurosceptics obtained 5.8% (2013) and 3.4% (2014), while 10.3% in 2019 went to Most and Živi zid. In sum, the electoral returns of Eurosceptics varied between 21.9% (2014) and 23.6% (2013).

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3.6   Conclusion Our analysis of Croatian EP elections indicates that the 2019 elections were quite different from the two previous EP elections. The findings in this respect are threefold. Firstly, the 2019 campaign was more Europeanised than any before it. Even though national topics were still overwhelmingly present, European topics were better represented than in previous EP elections, both in the content of party campaigns and the media coverage, which consequently contributed to their greater visibility among voters. Although most of the relevant parties produced at least some traditional materials (posters, TV ads etc.), parties and lists invested most of their resources in social media, online marketing and grassroots campaigning. The enhanced prominence of the EU among voters can be explained by this apparent shift in persuasion strategies but also by some other, more general processes. After six years of being an EU member, the EU has been increasingly integrated into national politics, as well as into the economic and social lives of the citizens. Besides, the voters have become familiar with the prominent Croatian MEPs who have come to represent the face of the ‘Croatian delegation in the European Parliament’. In consequence, the electoral turnout has increased by 50% when compared to the first EP elections. It needs to be said that this increase is primarily a result of national changes and trends rather than a consequence of the ‘populist threat’ campaign at the EU level. Secondly, the Europeanisation of elections did not alter the SOE nature of the EP elections. To the contrary, the 2019 EP elections, if anything, even more clearly confirmed the second-orderedness of the EP elections. Since the 2019 elections took place in a structurally changing domestic political environment, more political parties, many of them completely new, used that opportunity to position themselves in the national party system. By doing so, they had much stronger impact on domestic party relations than was the case in the first two electoral cycles. The 2019 EP elections, therefore, should be understood as an important factor in the structural transformation of the Croatian party system. Finally, although there is no proof that Euroscepticism in the electorate has been on the rise since 2013, party Euroscepticism in Croatia, despite certain variations, shares some common characteristics: it has an anti-­ establishment orientation and is being propagated by newer parties in the system. Since parties of the first generation and mainstream parties are

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equally supportive of the EU, the EU has continued to be perceived as a project of the political establishment and another controversial issue within the newly forming establishment-anti-establishment political divide. Although the EU is not the core issue for any of the Eurosceptic parties, their sceptical stance helps them to confirm and develop their ideological profile and their anti-establishment position. For HL and Živi zid the EP elections served as yet another arena in which they could emphasise the importance of the left’s socio-economic ideological positions, which is a dimension of competition that has long been overshadowed by symbolic and cultural issues. Yet, for the ‘classical’ radical right the EP elections have also had an important strategic value, particularly in relation to the HDZ, a movement-type party that for a long time captured a significant portion of the far right electorate.

Appendix Table 3.1  Results of the parliamentary and EP elections in Croatia, 2011–2019 Party/list

CRO

EP

EP

CRO

CRO

EP

2011

2013

2014

2015

2016

2019

%

%

%

%

HDZ SDP HL HSS HSLS IDS

23.9 40.7a 5.2 3.0 3.1 (SDP)

32.9a 32.1a 5.8 3.9a (HSS) 3.8b

0b

34.6a 33.4a (SDP) (HDZ) (HDZ) 1.9

36.6a 33.5a 0.3 (SDP) (HDZ) 2.3a

HDSSB

2.9

3.0a

0

1.2

22.7 18.7 (AK) (AK) 0.5 (AK) 5.2 –

HSP HSP-AS Hrast

3.1 2.8a 1.3

1.4 (HDZ) 2.6

0

Ind. List Ivan Grubišić BUZ ORaH Most Živi zid

2.8 2.8a – – –

Seats % 6 5 1 0

Seats %

Seats

41.4a 29.9a 3.4 (HDZ) 2.4a (SDP)

6 4 0

0

1.4

0

(SzH) 6.9 (SzH) (HDZ) (SzH)

–

–

–

–

0.6 0.7 (NHR) (HDZ) 0.6 (HS) (HDZ) (HDZ) (HS) 8.5 – – –

(HDZ) – – –

– – –

(HDZ) 9.4 – –

1 – –

(HDZ) 1.8 0.8a 13.6 9.8 4.3 6.2a

0

1.8a 4.7 5.7

4 4

0 1 –

1 –

0 0 1

(continued)

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Table 3.1 (continued) Party/list

BM 365 Pametno NHR Ind. List Marijana Petirc Ind. List Mislav Kolakušić Others

CRO

EP

EP

CRO

CRO

EP

2011

2013

2014

2015

2016

2019

%

%

%

%

– – – –

– – – –

– – – –

– – – –

– – –

3.4a 0.3 – –

4.0 2.0a – –

2.0 1.4a 4.4 4.4

0 0 0 0

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

7.9

1

8.4

14.5

0

6.6

0

4.7

2.0

12.1

0

Seats %

Seats %

Seats

Source: State Electoral Commission of Croatia (authors’ own calculations) Note: Parties and independent lists are listed by chronology of competition. The table includes all the lists that got either at least 2% of votes in any national parliamentary election or at least one seat in any EP election. Percentage of votes in the national parliamentary elections for each party/list/coalition refers to the total percentage of votes that the party/list/coalition won in ten national and one diaspora electoral districts. Abbreviations in the parentheses indicate the leading party of the coalition that the party was part of or the name of the electoral coalition. Italics indicate soft Eurosceptic party Party abbreviations: HDZ—Croatian Democratic Union; SDP—Social Democratic Party of Croatia; HL—Croatian Labourists–Party of Labour; HSS—Croatian Peasant Party; HSLS—Croatian Social Liberal Party; IDS—Istrian Democratic Assembly; HDSSB—Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja; HSP—Croatian Party of Rights; HSP-AS—Croatian Party of Rights—Ante Starčević; Hrast—The Oak—Movement for Successful Croatia; BUZ—Bloc of United Pensioners; ORaH— Sustainable Development of Croatia; Most–Bridge of Independent Lists; Živi zid–Human Shield; BM 365–Bandić Milan 365–Party of Labour and Solidarity; Pametno–Smart; NHR–Independents for Croatia Coalition abbreviations: SzH—Alliance for Croatia (electoral coalition of HDSSB, Hrast, HSP and five other parties and initiatives); AK—Amsterdam Coalition (electoral coalition of IDS, HSS, HL and four other political parties); HS—Croatian Sovereigntists (electoral coalition of Hrast, HSP-AS, HKS— Croatian Conservative Party, UHD—United Croatian Patriots and two civic organisations) Indicates that a party won votes and seats competing in coalition with other parties Percentage and number of seats refer to independent list of Ivan Jakovčić, the then president of IDS; IDS did not compete in the elections c Marijana Petir was a member of HSS elected in the 2014 EP elections for MEP on the coalition list led by HDZ, in she was expelled from HSS in 2017 a

b

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References Anderson, P., & McLeod, A. (2004). The Great Non-communicator? The Mass Communication Deficit of the European Parliament and its Press Directorate. Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(5), 897–917. Blanuša, N. (2006). Euroskepticizam: razine istraživanja i oblici iskazivanja. Anali hrvatskog politološkog društva, 3(1), 325–346. Blanuša, N. (2011). Euroskepticizam u Hrvatskoj. In I. Šiber (Ed.), Hrvatska i Europa: strahovi i nade (pp. 11–46). Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti. Č ular, G. (2010). Odluke i rituali: kolika će nas većina uvesti u Europsku Uniju? Politicke ̌ analize, 1(1), 22–26. Č ular, G. (2018). Stability and Permissiveness: Party Regulation and Party Competition in Croatia. In F.  Casal Bértoa & I. van Biezen (Eds.), The Regulation of Post-Communist Party Politics (pp.  257–289). New  York/ London: Routledge. De Vreese, C. H., Banducci, S. A., Semetko, H. A., & Boomgaarden, H. G. (2006a). The News Coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary Elections Campaign. European Union Politics, 7(4), 477–504. De Vreese, C.  H., Lauf, E., & Jochen, P. (2006b). The Media and European Parliament Elections: Second-Rate Coverage of a Second-Order Event? In W. van der Brug & C. van der Eijk (Eds.), European Elections and Domestic Politics: Lessons from the Past and Scenarios for the Future (pp. 116–130). Paris: University of Notre Dame Press. Dubrovački dnevnik. (2019). Kolakušić se predstavio Dubrovc ̌anima. https:// dubrovackidnevnik.rtl.hr/vijesti/grad/kolakusic-se-predstavio-dubrovcanimaostale-stranke-se-bave-uhljebljivanjem-svog-kadra-a-mi-mozemo-stati-izaonoga-sto-govorimo. Accessed 17 June 2019. EP. (2018). Parlemeter 2018: Taking Up the Challenge – From (Silent) Support to Actual Vote. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/beheard/eurobarometer/2018/parlemeter-2018/report/en-parlemeter-2018. pdf. Accessed 1 May 2019. Eurobarometer. http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index. cfm/General/index. Accessed 1 May 2019. Europski parlament 2013. godine. https://www.gong.hr/media/uploads/gong_ izvjetaj_eu_izbori_konacni.doc. Accessed 30 Mar 2019. Gong. (2013). Izvještaj o izbornom procesu za izbore c ̌lanova u Gong. (2014). Osvrt na kampanju za europske izbore. https://www.gong.hr/hr/ izborni-sustav/europski/osvrt-na-kampanju-za-europske-izbore/. Accessed 15 June 2019. Gong. (2019). Izvještaj o izborima za Europski parlament. https://www.gong.hr/ media/uploads/20190716_izborni_izvje%C5%A1taj_ep_2019_gong.pdf. Accessed 29 July 2019.

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Grbeša, M., & Šalaj, B. (2018). Dobar, loš ili zao? Populizam u Hrvatskoj. Zagreb: TIM Press. Grbeša, M., & Tomičić, T. (2014). Izbori za Europski parlament u hrvatskim medijima: analiza sadržaja izvještavanja tiska o europskim izborima 2013. u Hrvatskoj. Mediaeval Studies, 5(9), 19–42. Hanley, S., & Sikk, A. (2016). Economy, Corruption or Floating Voters? Explaining the Breakthroughs of Anti-Establishment Reform Parties in Eastern Europe. Party Politics, 22(4), 522–533. Haughton, T., & Deegan-Krause, K. (2015). Hurricane Season. Systems of Instability in Central and East European Party Politics. East European Politics and Societies, 29(1), 61–80. HDSSB. (2017). Program Hrvatskog demokratskog saveza Slavonije i Baranje. http://hdssb.hr/files/PROGRAM_HDSSB.pdf. Accessed 17 June 2019. Henjak, A. (2007). Values or Interests: Economic Determinants of Voting Behavior in the 2007 Croatian Parliamentary Elections. Politic ̌ka misao, 44(5), 71–90. Henjak, A. (2016). Odnos prema nacionalnoj politici i odluka o pristupanju EU na referendumu 2012. godine. Anali hrvatskog politološkog društva, 13(1), 55–82. Henjak, A. (2018). Nose li parlamentarni izbori 2015. i 2016. godine promjenu političkih rascjepa u Hrvatskoj? Društvena istraživanja, 27(3), 383–406. Henjak, A. (2019). Croatia: Towards Further Fragmentation of the Party System. In L. De Sio, M. N. Franklin, & L. Russo (Eds.), The European Parliament Elections of 2019 (pp. 103–108). Rome: Luiss University Press. Henjak, A., Zakošek, N., & Č ular, G. (2013). Croatia. In S. Berglund, J. Ekman, K.  Deegan-Krause, & T.  Knutsen (Eds.), The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe (3rd ed., pp. 443–480). Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar. HL. (2014). Deklaracija o Europskoj uniji. https://laburisti.com/programi/ deklaracija-o-europskoj-uniji/. Accessed 18 June 2019. Index. (2019). Kolakušic:̌ Europski parlamentarci koji nisu nezavisni prodaju svoju dušu. https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/kolakusic-europski-parlamentarci-koji-nisu-nezavisni-prodaju-svoju-dusu/2104516.aspx. Accessed 15 July 2019. Jović, D. (2012). Euroravnodušnost. Politicke ̌ analize, 9(3), 63–65. Landripet, I. (2015). Public Support for European Integration in Croatia: Utilitarian, Identity-Based, Institutionally Driven or All of the Above? In P. Maldini & D. Pauković (Eds.), Croatia and the European Union: Changes and Development (pp. 93–115). Farnham: Ashgate. Most. (2019). Program za izbore za EU parlament 2019. https://most-nl. com/2019/04/06/program-izbore-europski-parlament-2019/. Accessed 18 June 2019.

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NHR. (2019). Programska polazišta za pregovore s europskim strankama. http:// www.neovisni.hr/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/NHR-20190515-ENFnon-paper-HR-objava.pdf. Accessed 15 June 2019. Šimunjak, M., & Milanović, L. (2017). The First Time for Everything: Political Advertising in a New Member State. In C. Holtz-Bacha et al. (Eds.), Political Advertising in the 2014 European Parliament Elections (pp. 153–168). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Šimunjak, M., Nenadić, I., & Žuvela, L. (2019). Country report: Croatia. In E.  Novelli & B.  Johansson (Eds.), 2019 European elections campaign. Brussels: EEMC. Štulhofer, A. (2006). Euroskepticizam u Hrvatskoj: s onu stranu racionalnosti. In K.  Ott (Ed.), Pridruživanje Hrvatske Europskoj Uniji  – izazovi sudjelovanja (pp. 135–154). Zagreb: Institut za javne financije & Zaklada Friedrich Ebert. T-portal. (2019). Ruža Tomašic:̌ Ispunila sam sva obec ́anja, ocekujem ̌ reizbor. https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/ruza-tomasic-ispunila-sam-sva-obecanja-ocekujem-reizbor-20190517. Accessed 15 June 2019. Vilović, G. (2017). An Overshadowed Campaign in Two Croatian Dailies. In R. Boicu et al. (Eds.), Political Communication and European Parliamentary Elections in Times of Crisis (pp. 57–68). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Zakošek, N., & Č ular, G. (2004). Croatia. In S.  Berglund, J.  Ekman, & F.  H. Aarebrot (Eds.), The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe (2nd ed., pp. 451–492). Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar.

CHAPTER 4

Czech Republic Vít Hloušek and Petr Kaniok

4.1   The Electoral System The electoral system for the European Parliament elections has remained almost without any changes since March 2003 when the applicable Law was adopted.1 The elections are held according to the list proportional system. There is only one constituency comprising the entire Czech Republic. Polling stations are open on Friday afternoon and Saturday morning. Parties and coalitions are establishing the lists that are registered by the Ministry of Interior 66 days ahead of the elections at the latest. The number of elected deputies has varied from 24  in 2004 through 22  in 2009 to 21  in 2014 and 2019. There is an electoral threshold of 5% nationwide which applies to the single party lists as well as to the coalitions. The lists are opened, which means that the voter can express two preference votes for the particular candidates. When the particular candidate 1  Law 62/2003 On the European Parliament Election and on Changes of Some Laws (in the current version).

V. Hloušek (*) • P. Kaniok Department of International Relations and European Studies, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 V. Hloušek, P. Kaniok (eds.), The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9_4

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reaches at least 5% of the votes cast for the party as a whole, he or she will move to the top of the list when such candidates are ranked according to number preferences. The seats are allocated according to the D’Hondt method of the highest average. Membership in the European Parliament is not compatible with the simultaneous holding of a position in an EU institution or as a Member of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, Czech Government, President of the Czech Republic, Czech judge or state prosecutor, or Czech Ombudsman. Campaign costs must be reported via a transparent bank account and the total sum of expenditures per list shall not exceed 50 million Czech Crowns (circa 1.9 million Euros). Every party obtaining at least 1% of the vote is entitled to obtain compensation for electoral campaign costs in the sum of 30 CZK (circa 1.15 Euro) per vote.

4.2   General Context of Public and Party-Based Euroscepticism in Czechia The Czech Republic became an EU member state on 1 May 2004 as part of the EU’s eastern enlargement. Even though at the moment of accession the country was led by a pro-European centre-left cabinet consisting of Social Democrats (Č SSD), Christian Democrats (KDU-Č SL) and the Union of Freedom (US–DEU), a substantial part of the subsequent years of Czech EU membership have been overseen by governments at least toying with Euroscepticism. In particular, the two governments of Miroslav Topolánek (September 2006—May 2009) and the government of Petr Nečas (July 2010–June 2013) were perceived in the EU as Eurosceptical and troublemakers’ cabinets. And last but not the least, in the period from March 2003 to March 2013, the Czech Republic had an active and loud Eurosceptic head of state. Although the Czech constitution does not empower office of the Czech president with any specific authority in foreign or European affairs, Václav Klaus was, particularly during his second term, visibly present in Czech European policy (Havlík and Mocek 2018). It is not surprising that such a configuration of key figures had connotations both for the public perception of the integration process as well as for its reflection in party politics. Starting with public opinion, both diffuse and specific Euroscepticism have always been present among Czech citizens, though in various waves. Regarding the former form of Euroscepticism—diffuse—Graph 4.1

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45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5

Not satisified

Satisfied

Neither

April 2018

April 2017

April 2016

April 2015

April 2014

April 2013

April 2012

April 2011

April 2010

April 2009

April 2008

January 2007

April 2006

April 2005

0

DK

Graph 4.1  Satisfaction with Czech EU membership. (Source: Authors’ elaboration based on CVVM)

reports how Czech voters have been satisfied with EU membership between April 20052 and April 2018. Graph 4.1 shows that an increase in dissatisfaction with Czech EU membership can be associated with the time when the Eurozone crisis erupted in earnest. Between April 2009 and April 2012 the number of dissatisfied respondents more than doubled. Although dissatisfaction with membership decreased in subsequent years—with the migration crisis between 2015 and 2016 as the second peak—it did not return to the values before the Eurozone crisis. Data on EU membership satisfaction also show remarkable volatility: for satisfied as well as dissatisfied voters, the differences between individual measurements have amounted to five or more percentage points over time. The only exception seems to be the group of ‘don’t know’ (DK) respondents whose numbers have been pretty stable since 2010. As Havlík et  al. argue (2017: 80), it seems that (dis-)

2

 ‘How are you satisfied with Czech EU membership?’

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satisfaction with Czech EU membership reflects evaluations of current EU developments, rather than comprehensive evaluations of Czech membership. When it comes to specific Euroscepticism, it can be measured using trust in EU institutions, particularly using the European Commission as the most suitable proxy (Graph 4.2). Trust in the Commission has changed significantly in the years of Czech EU membership. Whereas the first years were characterised by a high level of support, reaching its peak at almost 60%, the start of the Eurozone crisis reversed this trend. Between autumn 2000 and autumn 2011 levels of trust and distrust converged, leading to a mutual exchange of positions from 2011 until spring 2017. Since then, most likely as a reaction to Brexit, the level of trust has appeared to increase again. But as in the case of diffuse Euroscepticism, its specific form has increased remarkably if we compare values from the early years and the most recent period. If we take both indicators into account and compare them with the same values across the whole EU, it is obvious that the Czech public is among the most Eurosceptic nations in the EU.  At the same time, as 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

October 2004 June 2005 October 2005 April 2006 September 2006 May 2007 October 2007 April 2008 October 2008 June 2009 November 2009 June 2010 November 2010 May 2011 November 2011 May 2012 November 2012 May 2013 November 2013 June 2014 November 2014 May 2015 November 2015 May 2016 November 2016 May 2017 November 2017 March 2018 November 2018

0

No

Yes

DK

Graph 4.2  Trust in the European Commission in Czechia. (Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurobarometer)

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Havlík et  al. (2017: 85–90) claim, Czech Eurosceptic voters have ‘Europeanised’ themselves during the membership period. Whereas after accession it was very difficult to identify any solid factors explaining why some voters tended to oppose the EU, after 10 years of experience with the EU, the Czech Eurosceptics seemed to follow the same patterns as their EU-wide fellows. At the party level, Euroscepticism has been always echoed not only by a large number of minor political parties but also by mainstream Czech political forces. As in the case of public Euroscepticism, party manifestations of soft and hard Euroscepticism have also changed particularly due to multiple EU crises since 2008. Traditionally, the parties identified as Eurosceptic have been the Communist Party of Czech and Moravia (KSČ M) and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). While the former is predominantly classified as hard Eurosceptical party (Pridham 2008; Havlík et  al. 2017), the latter is labelled as soft Eurosceptic (Haughton 2009: 1371–1392; Hanley 2008). Operating in two opposing corners of the party scene—the KSČ M represents the traditional left while the ODS can be classified as a liberal-­ conservative party—both parties for a long time represented the two most solid pillars of Czech party-based Euroscepticism. Concerning the EP competition level, in the 2004 EP elections they were accompanied by a small single issue movement called the Independent Democrats (NezDem) that made only one breakthrough, caused by the fact that its list was led by Vladimir Železny, the influential former director of the biggest private Czech TV channel, TV NOVA. The ODS, the first traditional Czech Eurosceptic party, has faced serious challenges in recent years. After the fall of Petr Nečas’ government in 2013, the ODS substantially declined. Its leading position in the right wing of the party system disappeared. This was due not only to the scandals of ODS-led cabinets; the image and reputation of the party was much damaged by similar problems at the regional level, weak leadership and internal quarrels. Though the party has been slowly recovering since the 2017 parliamentary elections, it still can only dream about possessing the same strength as in the 1990s. In terms of ideology, ODS is usually described as moderate conservative (Cabada et  al. 2014: 93) or conservative-­liberal (Havlík 2011: 134). Before the 2009 EP election, ODS was a member of the European People’s Party–the European Democrats (EPP-ED) political group, but in 2009 it started to participate in the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, profiling itself as providing a Eurorealist alternative view of EU integration.

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The reputation of ODS as a Eurosceptic or soft Eurosceptic party was always associated with the influence of ODS ‘founding father’ and former leader Václav Klaus. Even after Klaus resigned as party leader in 2002, he was still active within ODS, serving for many party politicians as an ideal. Klaus’ Euroscepticism has been confirmed several times (Havlík et al. 2017; Kaniok and Hloušek 2014; Hloušek and Kaniok 2014a, b), but it was not the only source for ODS EU policy. The majority of ODS MEPs were profiled in a similar vein. Moreover, ODS Euroscepticism was always inspired by the British tradition of focusing on economic cooperation and criticising further transfer of competencies from member states to the EU. Yet, the party never contested the general principles of European integration and never considered withdrawal of the Czech Republic from the EU. ̌ has represented the second traditional Eurosceptic party The KSCM force in Czechia. Its role constitutes quite a unique feature of the Czech system—the Communists neither changed their name, nor ever fully cut themselves off from the legacy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Thus, the party has been for a long time been living on collecting protest votes and on nostalgia for the former communist regime. Concerning the ̌ has criticised European integration from various party’s EU profile, KSCM perspectives, taking into account both the political and economic shortcomings of the EU as well as reflecting on old regime nostalgia, which obviously collides with EU membership. The party’s opposition to EU membership prior to the 2004 enlargement was therefore more an effect of the party’s overall approach to liberal democracy and market economy than a result of proper evaluation of the pros and cons of membership. Even though in recent years the party has widened its anti-EU arguments and left behind a purely national narrative, its overall stance towards the EU has not changed (Havlík et  al. 2017: 100). Within the EP, Czech Communists have always been involved with the GUE-NGL party group. Before the 2014 EP elections, two new Eurosceptical parties with potential to get MEPs emerged. One was the Dawn of Direct Democracy (Dawn), a party founded at the beginning of 2013 by the then-Senator and aspiring Czech presidential candidate Tomio Okamura (Kovář and Kovář 2013a, b). Dawn called for a substantial switch from representative to direct democracy as a panacea for everything that was wrong with Czech politics. Concerning the EU, pretty much as for the KSČ M, Dawn’s the EU critique was rather a consequence of its general populist profiling. Dawn criticised the EU for the uncontrolled spread of immigration and requested a referendum on further extension of EU competencies (Kaniok

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2016). Even though Dawn did not succeed in the 2014 EP elections, its successor, called Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD)—led again by Tomio Okamura—which replaced Dawn after internal conflicts, made a breakthrough in the 2017 national elections with a very hard Eurosceptic profile; one of the slogans used by SPD was ‘EU, We Leave in the English Way!’ The second Eurosceptic party that prior to the EP election could have expected to be represented in the EP was the Party of Free Citizens (SSO). SSO tried to address right-wing Eurosceptical voters, as the party was founded in early 2009 as a reaction by various former ODS members to the then softening ODS stance towards the Lisbon Treaty. SSO profiled itself as libertarian party trying to emphasise that it was not a single issue Eurosceptical party, arguing that its stance towards the EU was just a consequence of its general position on regulation and centralisation. However, in political debate, SSO has been known almost only in the context of questions about European integration. The party has argued that the EU should be replaced by a purely intergovernmental organisation and it requested that the Czech Republic should leave the EU (Kaniok 2017).

4.3   Second Order Euroscepticism: The EP Campaigns 2004–2019 There is no need to describe the typical features of second-order elections (SOE) here (see Kovář 2016: 23–44 for a comprehensive survey of existing literature and debates). The authors dealing with the topic stress characteristics such as lower turnout; better results for minor, new or specific parties ‘compensated for’ by losses for governing parties; less focus on European issues in the campaign; and, in general, less intensive media coverage. All this stems from the less-at-stake dimension of the SOE (Reif and Schmitt 1980). In terms of turnout, the EP elections in the Czech Republic correspond clearly to the SOE characteristics. The turnout was 28.3% in 2004, which was a disappointing result even within the context of new member states (Baimbridge 2005). Five years later, the turnout dropped to 28.2% and only 18.2% in 2014 and returned to “stabdard” level of 28.72% in 2019. The EP is less important for Czech voters than any other elected institution save for the second tier of elections to the Senate, the upper house of the Czech Parliament (Č SÚ 2019). The media coverage of the EP elections has been very low compared to first-order elections (Kovář and

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Kovář 2013b). One explanation for this beyond the conventional less-at-­ stake hypotheses is the lower political profile of EP candidates in Czechia across the party spectrum (Kovář and Kovář 2013a). The characteristics of Czech SOE are somewhat blurry in terms of the performance of opposition parties and the successes of small and specific parties. The elections in 2004 proved to be a disaster for the ruling Social Democrats and sign of the rise of the main opposition Civic Democrats. The atmosphere of the 2009 EP elections was specific because of the caretaker cabinet replacing the centre-right coalition amidst the Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU in March 2009 (Hloušek and Kopeček 2014: 1339–46). Contrary to the SOE assumption, the former ruling parties scored better than the main challenger, the Social Democrats. It is not easy to interpret the 2014 EP elections which took place roughly a year after snap parliamentary elections. SOE assumption did not apply much, and the EP elections confirmed the marginal decline of the ruling parties but failed to bring gains to the opposition parties. In terms of extra-­ parliamentary parties scoring well in EP elections, there were two that entered the EP in 2004 and one in 2014. In 2009, no new or specific party gained any seat. When we take the extremely low turnout into account, it is not surprising since the more established parliamentary parties were disposed with a larger core of loyal voters supporting the parties even in SOE (Linek 2004: 28). The 2004 campaign was flavoured by the fresh entry of the Czech Republic into the EU, as well as the domestic context. Václav Klaus, who was elected to become the Czech President in January 2003, sent ambiguous messages about the EU, and the ruling coalition had to deal with the deteriorating popularity of Prime Minister Vladimír Špidla,3 as well as with problems inside the junior coalition party Union of Freedom. The main opposition party, soft Eurosceptic ODS, framed the campaign as saying ‘No’ to the government. In general, the campaign was not intense and marked by a lack of clear understanding of what was at stake in the EP among some parties and especially among the voters. Domestic topics prevailed. The communists used the campaign to advocate withdrawal from NATO, and together with the ODS these two Eurosceptic parties addressed some EU related topics as well, such as the unequal position of the new members in CAP and the labour force’s temporally blocked access to the single market. Neither of the parties cared about the future of the  The very poor performance of Č SSD in the EP elections exacerbated Špidla’s problems and contributed a lot to his replacement by Jiří Paroubek in spring 2005. 3

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EU in general; all stressed only the representation of Czech interests (Pitrová 2007; Rulíková 2004). The campaign of 2009 was a clear example of a SOE campaign, too, although some European issues had a clear conflict potential in the 2008–2009 period such as the complicated process of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty due to the obstructions of President Klaus. The main rivals—the Civic and Social Democrats—continued their disputes over the assessment of the performance of Topolánek’s (ODS) government, the economic crisis and other issues typical for the national electoral arena. Among the parties to make it into the EP, only KDU-Č SL provided voters with a somewhat Europeanised manifesto. A higher level of Europeanisation was present only in the manifestos of the Greens and small Eurosceptic parties criticising the Lisbon Treaty or common currency. These parties failed to attract enough voters to get into the EP, however. In the campaign, some ‘Euro-specialists’ ran at the top of the lists but only ODS tried to benefit from the successful pre-election talks with the British Conservatives, leading after June 2009 to the secession of some conservative parties from the EPP-ED faction to the newly created ECR group. Otherwise, the campaign was lively but focused mainly on domestic issues despite the fact that some heavyweight EU politicians explicitly supported their local fellow travellers, like Gerhard Schröder in the case of the Social Democrats and Declan Ganley for the local Libertas.cz (Hloušek and Kaniok 2009; Hricová 2009). The fact that the manifestos of the main parties covered EU issues quite well (Kovar 2013) did not change the SOE character of political communication. The 2014 EP election took place in the shadow of snap Czech parliamentary elections in 2013 which followed a deep crisis of the centre-right coalition government (Hloušek and Kaniok 2014a, b). In 2010 and even more so in 2013, the Czech party system experienced a kind of ‘Hurricane Season’ of parliamentary elections (Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015) uprooting the dominance of established parties and opening an opportunity window for new and (mainly) populist challengers. The coalition government of Social Democrats, ANO, and KDU-Č SL was still in the first phase of the electoral cycle, so the tenor of the political disputes in May 2014 resembled that of October 2013. Therefore, as Petr Kaniok (2015: 14) aptly wrote, ‘EP election 2014 campaign was probably the least visible and interesting campaign in modern nation-wide elections held in the Czech Republic’. Both incumbents and opposition parties relied on empty slogans and colourless phrases as far as their manifestos and campaigns were concerned. For the first time in Czech history, however, both

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campaigns and manifestos were Europeanised in the sense that they referred to the EU level of governance (Havlík 2014). This does not, however, mean there was any profound and conceptual debate on the visions of EU integration. Many issues discussed by the parties were ‘European’ but failed to be pertinent to the powers of the EP (Charvát 2017: 120). The campaign of ODS against adoption of the common currency at a time when this was not part of any real political agenda is a perfect example. The main concerns covered economics, which is again hardly any surprise given the ongoing context of the economic recession which hit Czechia as well. The campaign was not really contentious on the EU or any other issue. Hard Eurosceptics as well as soft Eurosceptics were visible as in 2009 but attracted less attention; an example is the populist entrepreneurial party ANO which sent vague and ambiguous messages about Czech national interests and prosperity in Europe in a somewhat confusing way from the point of view of its place in the pro- and anti-EU spectrum of party competition. Voters were apparently tired and esteemed the EP as not important. Parties were financially exhausted by the campaigning in the previous year, providing the voters, therefore, with only a low intensity of campaigning. Media coverage remained very weak and the vicious cycle of ignorant politicians, apathetic voters and completely uninterested media was not broken at all (Charvát 2017). The only feature pointing to recognition of the importance of the EP elections by the Czech political parties was the presence of many top ranking experts and politicians among the candidates and elected MEPs.4 Summarising the trends, the Czech Republic’s EP elections confirm the assumptions of the SOE theory. Very low turnout matches with very low media coverage and (typically, though with some exception in 2014) candidates of lighter political weight. The performance of mainstream governmental and opposition parties in the EP elections can always be explained by the changing context of domestic politics, not their EU positions and policies. The manifestos have Europeanised since 2004 yet the parties fail to grasp the real ‘stakes’ of the EP, or ignore them. Eurosceptic parties from the fringes of the party spectrum scored well in 2004 and 2009 compared to the national elections, but it did not help these parties (NezDem, SSO) to institutionalise at the level of national politics or to create a core of interested voters. 4  The most prominent of them, former EU Commissioner Pavel Telička, however, defected from ANO in 2017 because of scandals surrounding the boss of ANO, Andrej Babiš.

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4.4   Euroscepticism in the Czech Electoral Manifestos in 2019 If there were only two slogans to characterise the Czech party manifestos issued prior to the EP 2019 elections, the slogans would read ‘reform’ and ‘Czech interests’, typically put together. We can see the emphasis on reform not only among soft Eurosceptic parties but also among the pro-­ European parties too, such as the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and TOP09-STAN coalition. In the following analysis, we take into account relevant parties currently represented in the Czech parliament plus some minor hard Eurosceptic subjects. According to the manifestos, we can recognise the following prominent topics voiced by the Czech parties as shown in the following Table 4.1. Even the pro-European moderate right- and left-wing parties demanded reforms. The Social Democrats framed the reform in their manifesto For a Fair Europe: Self-Confident Assertion of Czech Interests in terms of more fairness (Č SSD 2019). They rejected Czexit as well, and denied that the EU compromises Czech sovereignty and stressed instead cooperation with socialists in other EU countries. Compared to previous manifestos, there are clear signs of ‘mainstreaming’ a more critical stance but not into the territory of soft Euroscepticism yet. Similar increased criticism combined with generally positive approach can be found in the manifesto of the Christian Democrats For a Better Europe (KDU-Č SL 2019). The unusual Table 4.1  Prominent topics discussed in the Czech manifestos for the 2019 elections Topic Migration and security of the EU’s external borders Environmental protection and/or climate change Debate on euro currency Softening of the bureaucratic burden in the EU Double standards on the quality of food Digital economy Economic cooperation within the single market Fostering the principle of subsidiarity

Reflected by Č SSD, KDU-Č SL, TOP-STAN, pirates, ODS, ANO, SPD, KSČ M Č SSD, KDU-Č SL, TOP-STAN, pirates, ODS, ANO, KSČ M Č SSD, KDU-Č SL, TOP-STAN, ODS, SPD, KSČ M KDU-Č SL, ANO, ODS, SPD, KSČ M Č SSD, KDU-Č SL, ANO, SPD Č SSD, KDU-Č SL, TOP-STAN TOP-STAN, ODS, ANO KDU-Č SL, TOP-STAN, pirates

Source: compiled by the authors on the base of party manifestos

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emphasis on modern technologies and digitalisation is an interesting innovation demonstrating that even the Christian Democrats, whose electorate is typically composed of older voters living in small cities and countryside, are slowly trying to modernise the party agenda. The Christian Democrats, together with the Alliance of TOP09 and STAN (Spojenci pro Evropu 2019), was the only party to support openly and without hesitation the introduction of the Euro currency in Czechia. The last party that can be labelled as generally pro-European are the Pirates who signed the common manifesto of the European Pirates Party (2019) stressing the democratic deficit of the EU and the will to augment the democratic basis of integration via more subsidiarity and more participation by citizens via new online channels of communication and more transparency of decisions via ‘open government’. Emphasis on education, culture, preservation of (digital) privacy and free software corresponds with the typical profile of young Pirates supporters Europe-wide (Brunclík 2010: 23–24). In the Czech context, a rather friendly approach to migration from outside Europe distinguishes the Pirate manifesto from all other Czech parties, which stress a harder approach. The traditionally well-elaborated manifesto presented by the soft Eurosceptic Civic Democratic Party (ODS 2019), which self-declared its approach as ‘Eurorealistic’, clearly rejected Czexit but devoted the rest of the manifesto to a profound critique of the EU for being over-­bureaucratic and overly oriented towards unification. In this respect, the manifesto built on a document titled Strong Czechia in the Strong Europe (Fiala et al. 2017), a kind of long-term list of ODS’s visions of European reform. The EU is depicted as an institution which does not function properly, which is facing many interconnected crises (economic, migration and security crises, as well as the crisis of trust). Centralisation should be replaced with more subsidiarity, reinforcement of the veto power of the member states, and especially with emphasis on flexible integration (Fiala et al. 2017: 14–16). Flexible integration, applicable to practically all policies save for the single market, was presented as the tool to reform the EU in such a way that the Czech Republic would remain outside the core of integration including the Eurozone (ODS 2019). In accordance with the Czech mainstream, the Civic Democrats emphasised protection of the external borders of the EU and the sovereignty of member states in the issues pertaining to asylum and migration policies. A very important feature of the Civic Democratic manifesto was the rhetoric of Czech national interests including reinforcement of the national authorities in the process of drawing from EU cohesion funds. Even more emphasis, however, was put on

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economic progress and the way the Czech Republic can benefit from economic cooperation, which corresponds well with the reduction of integration mainly to participation in the single market. There was an innovation present in the Civic Democratic manifesto too, namely the emphasis on environmental protection—framed, of course, in a conservative way and implicitly criticising the mainstream discourse of EU elites and ‘setting goals and commitments that are impossible in practice’ (ODS 2019). When we compare ANO manifestos from the 2014 (ANO 2014) and 2019 (ANO 2019) EP elections, we can see a clear shift of the framing in the direction of soft Euroscepticism in 2019. The programme We Will Protect Czechia: Hard and without Compromise, the preamble uses suggestive language of global threats offending the ‘splendid country’ of the Czech Republic. The EU is framed as a ‘splendid project’ a natural space of peace and prosperity which unfortunately suffers and needs ‘a profound reform’ in the direction of less competences but more efficiency, reinforcement of intergovernmental institutions at the expense of supranational ones. Its basic message is very similar to that of the Civic Democrats: ‘The EU shall do less but much more effectively’ (ANO 2019: 4). The stance of ANO on adoption of the Euro currency remained implicitly negative. The distribution of cohesion funds should be managed and controlled by the member states only. This point has a bittersweet flavour vis-à-vis accusations that Babiš’s holding company Agrofert misused EU financial contributions. Fighting double standards on the quality of food was a topic that ANO poached from the Social Democrats. There were robust soft Eurosceptic elements in the 2014 manifesto, too, but the general framing was more positive about the EU than the in the 2019 manifesto. Simplifying just a bit, ANO now occupies a position very similar to that of ODS, thus reinforcing the mainstream Czech soft Eurosceptic discourse. The Communist programme (KSČ M 2019) was longer and more comprehensive than its EP election manifestos from previous elections. Using suggestive language, the Communists depicted the gloomy picture of the ‘European Union under decay while the USA and their economic interests are clapping their hands’. According to KSČ M, Europe needs ‘a radical change’. Practically speaking, this means less bureaucracy, more transparency and democracy, and revision of the Lisbon Treaty to reinforce the veto power of member states. There is a strong emphasis on social justice to be achieved across the EU, redistribution of wealth and curbing of economic liberties. Environmental protection gained prominence, too, which reflects the fact that Communists invited candidates from small far-left parties to run for the EP chairs under their label, many of whom are

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strongly post-materialistic, contrary to KSČ M itself. The same applies to the claim to foster ‘freedom of Internet’, which does not match with traditional communist emphasis on security and surveillance. Very traditional is rejection of migrant quotas as well as the rhetoric of peace and cooperation on the global scale by replacing NATO. Hard Eurosceptic SPD declared in its manifesto The Czech Republic in 1st Place (SPD 2019) that the Lisbon Treaty should be cancelled and instead of the EU, there should emerge a loose ‘cooperation of sovereign national states based on the free market and free movement of citizens of the European states’ (SPD 2019: 1). Other typical views of the European far right are present in the manifesto, too, such as warning of the threat of Islam and migrants and fighting multiculturalism in general, and rejection of the Euro currency. In the Czech context, the claim to demand World War II reparations from Germany might prove catchy for far-right nationalist voters. Interesting is that some parts of the manifesto briefly and very vaguely addressed cooperation within the framework of the EU but without the institutions of ‘Brussels’. There was a bunch of hard Eurosceptic ‘Czexiteers’ which together obtained only 2.32% of the vote and none of whom obtained even 1%.5 These parties’ manifestos were typically composed of only posters with some bullet points leaving literally nothing to be analysed here. When we compare the content and focus of the manifestos, we can conclude that EU-related issues are a prevalent theme. Although we can find some repercussions of domestic party competition, we might reject the assumption stemming from SOE theory that the electoral manifestos will primarily reflect national issues. In this respect, we can say that among the relevant parliamentary parties, the manifestos demonstrated quite high degrees of Europeanisation. What about the campaign?

4.5   Campaign and Results 2019 The campaign surrounding the 2019 elections substantially differed from previous cases and confirmed trends we have identified in previous elections. The most general impression was that major and particularly mainstream parties did not know how to sell their message to voters, as they 5  National Democracy—The Reasonables (0.78% of the vote), Party of Free Citizens (0.65), Party of Independence of the Czech Republic (0.40), Rally for the Republic— Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (0.18), Workers Party of Social Justice (0.18), Alliance of National Forces 2017 (0.08), and Patriots of the Czech Republic (0.05).

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appeared to focus on very similar issues. Most of the players launched their campaigns only by the beginning of May, the relevant parties focusing on very similar agendas: fighting double standards of food quality in the EU, migration and defence of common external borders, or making the vague claim that the EU has to be reformed. No less vague statements were made by literally all parties that they would defend Czech national interests (no matter that almost no concrete vision of what this means, except for that by ODS, was presented). Appeals to reform and adjust the EU were more pronounced than in 2014. The EU as such was no longer portrayed as a land of ‘milk and honey’, but rather as an arena where Czech interests had to be defended. This was evident even for parties which previously used more Europhile language, such as Č SSD and KDU-Č SL. This is not to say that these parties became more critical, only that they increasingly emphasised Czech narratives and downplayed European narratives. The broad coalition including TOP 09 represented an exception, but its impact on the tenor of the debate was marginal. All this was flavoured by the traditional ‘grand’ debate on whether or not to be in the EU. Among the parliamentary parties, only SPD claimed that the EU should be dissolved. Smaller hard Eurosceptics such as Svobodni—running under the label ‘Joyful Czechia’ with leader Vít Jedlička, president of the self-­ proclaimed country of Liberland and trying to defend one MEP—as well as SPD did not even try to reach voters beyond their base. The generally low profile campaign was caused by a combination of factors. First, key EU issues sounding across the continent such as Brexit, the approach to the migration crisis or the Eurozone, and the EU economy represented uncontroversial topics in Czechia: no one wanted to join the Eurozone, no one questioned the approach of government policies to migration or Brexit. Perhaps TOP 09’s broad coalition was a bit more open on the Euro as well as more liberal on migration. Thus, there were no topics to steer the discussion and effectively mobilise voters. Second, all major players bet on experienced MEPs as leaders (KDU, Č SSD, ANO, ODS, TOP 09) which had a moderating effect on the campaign, since this type of politician generally prefers a rather consensual approach. Third, the major parties knew that the European elections are a SOE contest and not worth the money. After a financially exhausting campaign for the 2017 parliamentary elections, it was beyond the reach of most parties to spend make considerable investments just ‘for the sake of Brussels’. Fourth, the EP campaign was partially overshadowed by the scandals and accusations of fraud concerning the use of cohesion funds by the holding company of Prime Minister Babiš. Many opposition politicians used the EU card to

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strengthen their attacks on the prime minister, which to some extent a priori excluded genuine treatment of European issues even when making genuine European points. Babiš himself used Eurosceptic rhetorical figures of speech to try to deflect the rising critique coming from the EC as well as ‘his’ EP faction, ALDE. Contrary to the manifestos’ analysis, the campaign confirmed the subordinated SOE character of the EP elections in Czechia. The results, which were announced the day after polling stations closed, impacted Czech party politics in several ways. Firstly, Č SSD for the first time since 1992 dropped below the 5% threshold—before the 2019 elections, this had never happened both at the national and European level. With such disastrous results, the Social Democrats confirmed the decline that had started in the 2010 national elections. Since then, many traditional party voters had defected to other alternatives— ANO in particular attracted a substantial number of Socialist supporters by moving towards centre-left rhetoric and policies. Second, ANO scored a worse result than expected even when compared to the 2014 elections, when the number of MEPs held by ANO increased. Taking into account that the ANO/Č SSD government was supported in a vote of confidence by KSČ M, which suffered a serious decline, as well, the SOE ‘law’ that governmental parties are punished in SOE was again confirmed. Vice versa, the relative gains of the main challengers to the incumbent coalition, the Civic Democrats and Pirates, strengthened their opposition activities directed against the government. The same confirmation of the SOE character applies to voter turnout, which was higher than in 2014 (28.72%), but still far below the level of interest in national elections as well as below the EU average. When it comes to hard Eurosceptics and their performance in the 2019 elections, only SPD managed to make a breakthrough and for the first time gained seats in the Brussels/Strasbourg assembly. Minor hardliners advocating Czexit or EU dissolution, such as the Independence Party of the Czech Republic (SNČ R) or Patrioti (Patriots), obtained only thousands of votes and did not even reach the 1% level of support. The same applies to Svobodní—a party defending 1 MEP interested only 0.65% of voters, sending it back into the group of non-relevant parties and movements. Far better was the outcome of the elections for the soft Eurosceptics. The Civic Democrats doubled their number of MEPs after the May 2019 contest, and openly Eurosceptic ANO won six mandates (two more than

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in 2014). The number of Communist MEPs decreased to one third of the previous period. If we take into consideration the fact that the soft Eurosceptic parties represent different poles of the party spectrum as well as different sectors of the Czech electorate, we can conclude that the soft Eurosceptic discourse has remained in the mainstream of Czech party stances towards European integration.

4.6   Conclusion As we outlined several hypotheses in the introductory chapter, the conclusion of the Czech case will follow their logic. Such an approach enables us to evaluate the general performance of Eurosceptics not only in the 2019 elections, but also in their results across all EP elections already held in Czech Republic, summarise differences between two basic camps—soft and hard Eurosceptics—and the impact of Eurosceptics on the party scene as such. Taking our starting point with the latter—the general impact of Euroscepticism on the Czech party system—the content and tune of the 2019 campaign as a whole could lead to the impression that, more or less, all mainstream parties in Czechia (except TOP 09) could be labelled as a bit soft Eurosceptic. Compared to previous elections, this is a change. Even though the Czech party system has always been famous for the strong and persistent presence of Eurosceptics, there were always parties which clearly and openly advocated for EU development with almost no reservations, such as the Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and a variety of liberals. Even ANO, in 2014, strongly supported further supranationalisation of the EU. In 2019 this picture broke into pieces—it was, for example, almost impossible to differentiate between the rhetoric of ANO and ODS, while parties like KDU-Č SL and Č SSD at least flirted with topics such as a strong Czech Republic or defence of national interests, and toned down their previously clearly pro-EU language. The clear line cutting between parties supporting the EU and parties opposing it— both in the soft and hard versions—hence disappeared. It seems that both unconditional approval and rejection of the EU became fringe views within Czech politics and the majority of currently relevant parties can be found in the more or less grey cloud of what is called soft Euroscepticism. As a result, we can’t identify substantial differences between governmental and opposition parties in the 2019 elections, nor can we speak about the

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increased relevance of EU topics as a consequence of the strong presence of hard and soft Eurosceptic parties. The question remaining is, of course, how to cope in such a context with the assumptions raised in the Introduction. The first way could be to look at the Czech context—where, as already mentioned, the majority of big EU issues were depoliticised—in which both the government and opposition pursue the same policy goals on issues like migration, Eurozone membership and migration. Such a situation problematises the opportunities which SOE usually provides to opposition parties; if governmental EU policy is not unconditionally EU-supportive, but much in line with what at least part of the opposition prefers, the opposition can hardly attack or challenge the government. Apart from the visible de-politicisation of major EU issues in Czechia, part of the explanation can also be found in the minority status of the current Czech government which sometimes— particularly in the case of voting in Chamber of Deputies—works as a coalition of ANO, SPD and KSČ M. This again blurs distinctions between government and opposition as Č SSD—formally part of government— sometimes remains excluded from decisions approved by this alternative majority. But the somewhat specific Czech context is not all that matters to understand the 2019 results. Since 2014, but perhaps even as far back as the Eurozone crisis of 2008, the situation in the EU has been changing dramatically. Multiple crises, including long-lasting phenomena such as the economic crisis, Brexit and immigration, have affected EU politics not only at the EU level, but also within member states. Turbulence in party systems, causing, for example, the severe decline in the traditional centre-­ left across the EU and increased support for EU-challenging parties, has transformed both EU narratives across Member states and has influenced the content of what was traditionally accepted as the EU mainstream or an EU-supportive approach. All this leads us to the conclusion that the soft Euroscepticism category as such is inevitably dependent on both the particular national situation as well as the wider EU context. Considering the number of conflicts in current EU politics, it is idealistic to assume that if a party can be classified as pro-EU, it must approve everything the EU does (Table 4.2).

– 24.5 – – – 14.3 18.5 30.2 – 2.8 – 2.4 – –

ANO ODS Piráti STAN SPD KDU-Č SL KSČ M Č SSD SSO SNK-ED NezDem SZ TOP09 VV

– 30.0 – – – 7.2 20.3 8.8 – 11.0 8.2 3.2 – –

EP 2004% – 9 – – – 2 6 2 – 3 2 0 – –

EP 2004 seats – 35.4 – – – 9.0 12.8 32.3 – 2.1 0.7 6.3 – –

CZ 2006% – 31.5 – 2.3 – 7.6 14.2 22.4 1.3 1.7 0.5 2.1 – 2.4

EP 2009% – 9 – 0 – 2 4 7 0 0 0 0 – 0

– 20.2 0.8 – – 4.4 11.3 22.1 0.7 – – 2.4 16.7 10.9

EP 2009 CZ seats 2010% 18.7 7.7 2.7 – 6.9 6.8 14.9 20.5 2.5 – – 3.2 12.0 –

CZ 2013% 16.1 7.7 4.8 – 3.1 10.0 11.0 14.2 5.2 0.5 – 3.8 16.0 –

EP 2014% 4 2 0 – 0 3 3 4 1 0 – 0 4 –

29.6 11.3 10.8 5.2 10.6 5.8 7.8 7.3 1.6 – – 1.5 5.3 –

EP 2014 CZ seats 2017% 21.2 14.54 14.0 11.7 9.1 7.2 6.9 4.0 0.7 – – – – –

EP 2019%

6 4 3 3 2 2 1 0 0 – – – – –

EP 2019 seats

Note: CZ indicates elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, EP denotes the European Parliament. Only parties achieving at least one mandate in one election are considered. Results in italics denote a soft Eurosceptic party, bold italics for a hard Eurosceptic party Party abbreviations: ANO = ANO 2011; Piráti = Czech Pirates Party; ODS = Civic Democratic Party; Č SSD = Czech Social Democratic Party; KDU-Č SL = Christian and Democratic Union—Czechoslovak People’s Party; TOP09 = Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity (in 2014, TOP09 ran in an electoral coalition with the party of Mayors and Independents; in 2019, as part of a coalition with Mayors and Independents and the Green Party); KSČ M = Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia; SPD = Freedom and Direct Democracy (in 2013 and 2014, the results for the former Dawn of Direct Democracy party of Tomio Okamura is shown); SSO = Party of Free Citizens; SNK-ED = Association of Independent Candidates—European Democrats (in 2010, 2013, 2017 and 2019 a small number of candidates ran on the lists of other parties); SZ = Green Party (on the list of the STAN/TOP09 coalition in 2019); NEZ = Independents; STAN = Mayors and Independents (in 2010, 2013, and 2014 on the list of TOP09; as the leader of the coalition with TOP09 and smaller parties in 2019)

Source: Č SÚ (2019)

CZ 2002%

Party

Table 4.2  Results of the parliamentary and the EP elections in the Czech Republic

Appendix

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References ANO. (2014). ANO v Evropě: Náš program pro volby do Evropského parlamentu. https://www.anobudelip.cz/cs/o-nas/eurovolby/detailni-program/. Accessed 26 Nov 2019. ANO. (2019). Č esko ochráníme. Tvrdě a nekompromisně: Program hnutí ANO pro volby do Evropského parlamentu. https://www.anobudelip.cz/file/edee/kestazeni/ano-cesko-ochranime.pdf. Accessed 26 Nov 2019. Baimbridge, M. (2005). EUphoria to Apathy: EP Turnout in the New Member States. In J.  Lodge (Ed.), The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament (pp. 45–54). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Brunclík, M. (2010). Pirátské strany: Nový fenomén v politice. Naše společnost, 8(1), 21–29. Cabada, L., Hloušek, V., & Jurek, P. (2014). Party Systems in East Central Europe. Lanham: Lexington Books. Charvát, J. (2017). Content Emptiness, Low Media Coverage, Exhausted Parties and Indifferent Voters: An Invisible 2014 European Parliamentary Election Campaign in the Czech Republic. In R. Boicu, S. Branela, & A. Stefanel (Eds.), Political Communication and European Parliamentary Elections in Times of Crisis (pp. 115–132). London: Palgrave. Č SSD. (2019). Č SSD pro férovou Evropu: Sebevědomé prosazování českých zájmů! https://www.cssd.cz/data/files/volby-do-ep-argumentar.pdf. Accessed 26 Nov 2019. Č SÚ. (2019). Czech Statistical Office  – Results of Elections and Refererendums. https://www.volby.cz/index_en.htm. Accessed 1 Apr 2019. European Pirates Party. (2019). Pirate Common European Elections Programme 2019. https://wiki.ppeu.net/doku.php?id=programme:ceep2019. Accessed 26 Nov 2019. Fiala, P., Zahradil, J., Dvořák, P., Kadlecová, A., & Krutílek, O. (2017). Silné Č esko v silné Evropě: Pozice ODS k EU. https://www.ods.cz/docs/volby2017/silne_ cesko_v_evrope_21_stoleti.pdf. Accessed 26 Nov 2019. Hanley, S. (2008). The New Right in the New Europe: Czech Transformation and Right-Wing Politics, 1989–2006. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. Haughton, T. (2009). For Business, for Pleasure or for Necessity: The Czech Republic’s Choices for Europe. Europe-Asia Studies, 61(8), 1371–1392. Haughton, T., & Deegan-Krause, K. (2015). Hurricane Season: Systems of Instability in Central and East European Party Politics. East European Politics and Societies, 29(1), 61–80. Havlík, V. (2011). A Breaking-up of a Pro-European Consensus: Attitudes of Czech Political Parties Towards the European Integration (1998–2010). Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 44(2), 129–147.

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Havlík, V. (2014). The Czech Republic: Where Have All the Voters Gone? In L. de Sio, V.  Emanuele, & N.  Maggini (Eds.), The European Parliament Elections of 2014 (pp. 167–172). Roma: Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali. Havlík, V., & Mocek, O. (2018). Václav Klaus as a Driver of Czech Euroskepticism. In T. Hashimoto & M. Rhimes (Eds.), Reviewing European Union Accession: Unexpected Results, Spillover Effects, and Externalities (pp.  96–112). Leiden: Brill. Havlík, V., Hloušek, V., & Kaniok, P. (2017). Europeanised Defiance  – Czech Euroscepticism since 2004. Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers. Hloušek, V., & Kaniok, P. (2009). The 2009 European Parliament Election in the Czech Republic, June 5–6 2009. European Parliament Election Briefing, No. 29. Hloušek, V., & Kaniok, P. (2014a). Strategic or Identity-Based Euroscepticism? The Euro Discourse of Vaclav Klaus. Romanian Journal of Political Science, 14(1), 35–60. Hloušek V., & Kaniok P. (2014b). Europe and the 2013 Czech Parliamentary Election, October 25–26 2013. EPERN Election Briefing, No. 74. Hloušek, V., & Kopeček, L. (2014). Caretaker Governments in Czech Politics: What to Do about a Government Crisis. Europe-Asia Studies, 66(8), 1323–1349. Hricová, H. (2009). Č eská republika. In L. Cabada & V. Hloušek (Eds.), Eurovolby 2009: prostor pro evropeizaci politických stran ve středovýchodní Evropě? (pp. 41–66). Pilsen: Aleš Č eněk. Kaniok, P. (2015). The Czech Republic 2014 European Parliament Election: Voters Gone Out, New Parties. Political Preferences, 9, 7–21. Kaniok, P. (2016). Eurosceptics We Remain? Czech Republic, Euroscepticism and 2014 EP Election. In P. Moreau & B. Wassenberg (Eds.), European Integration and New Anti-Europeanism II.  The 2014 European Election and New Anti-­ European Forces in Southern, Northern and Eastern Europe (pp.  147–162). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. Kaniok, P. (2017). Free Citizens’ Party – From Brussels to Prague? East European Politics, 14(1), 433–449. Kaniok, P., & Hloušek, V. (2014). Shaping of Czech Debate on the Euro: Position of Václav Klaus in 1999–2002 Period. Romanian Journal of European Affairs, 14(2), 42–62. KDU-Č SL. (2019). Pro lepší Evropu: Program KDU-Č SL pro volby do Evropského parlamentu 2019. https://www.kdu.cz/aktualne/ruzne/program-kdu-cslpro-volby-do-evropskeho-parlamentu#3. Accessed 26 Nov 2019. Kovar, J. (2013). The Supply Side of Second-Order Elections in the Czech Republic: A Light at the End of the Tunnel? Romanian Journal of European Affairs, 13(1), 57–82. Kovář, J. (2016). Revisiting the Second-Order Election Model and Its Application to European Parliament Elections in Central and Eastern European Countries. Prague: Metropolitan University Prague Press.

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Kovář, J., & Kovář, K. (2013a). Candidate Quality across Different Orders of Elections: The Cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. East European Politics, 29(2), 152–174. Kovář, J., & Kovář, K. (2013b). Towards the European(-ised) Public Sphere: The Case of EP Elections in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 9(5), 696–722. KSČ M. (2019). Volební program KSČ M k volbám do EP v roce 2019. https://www. kscm.cz/cs/nase-strana/program/volebni-program-kscm-k-volbam-do-ep-vroce-2019. Accessed 26 Nov 2019. Linek, L. (2004). Analýza voleb do Evropského parlamentu 2004 v Č R. Platí stále teorie voleb druhého řádu? Naše společnost, 2(2), 25–29. ODS. (2019). Program ODS pro volby do Evropského parlamentu 2019. https:// www.ods.cz/volby2019. Accessed 26 Nov 2019. Pitrová, M. (2007). Populism in the First European Elections in the Czech. European Integration Online Papers, 11(1), 2–12. Pridham, G. (2008). European Party Cooperation and Post-Communist Politics: Euroscepticism in Transnational Perspective. In A.  Szczerbiak & P.  Taggart (Eds.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives (pp.  76–102). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-Order National Elections  – A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Elections Results. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3–44. Rulíková, M. (2004). 2004 European Parliament Election Briefing: The European Parliament Election in the Czech Republic, June 11–12 2004. European Parliament Election Briefing, No. 9. SPD. (2019). Č eská republika na 1. místě. https://volimespddoep.cz/. Accessed 26 Nov 2019. Spojenci pro Evropu. (2019). Naše vize pro Evropu. https://spojenciproevropu.cz/. Accessed 26 Nov 2019.

CHAPTER 5

Estonia Piret Ehin, Tõnis Saarts, and Mari-Liis Jakobson

5.1   The Electoral System Estonia joined the European Union in 2004, and has conducted European Parliament elections in 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019. The electoral procedures of the EP elections are based on the European Parliament Election Act, which was first adopted in 2002 and has been repeatedly amended. In the first three EP elections, the number of MEPs elected in Estonia was six. Reapportionment related to Brexit raised the number of MEPs elected in Estonia in 2019 to seven. The entire country is a single constituency.

The research that informs this chapter was supported by project IUT20–39, financed by the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research. P. Ehin University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] T. Saarts (*) • M.-L. Jakobson Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 V. Hloušek, P. Kaniok (eds.), The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9_5

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The law provides for advance voting (both inside and outside the voter’s district of residence), postal voting and electronic voting. Remote Internet voting using ID cards or Mobile ID has been used in  local, national and EP elections in Estonia since 2005.1 This voting mode continues to grow in popularity and enjoys high levels of public trust. In the 2009 EP elections, 14.7% of all votes cast in Estonia were electronic votes. The respective figure for the 2014 elections was 31.3%, while in 2019, the share of e-voters reached 46.7%. The voting age is 18, and the minimum age to stand as a candidate is 21. Voter lists are drawn up on the basis of the population register. The right to vote is limited to citizens of Estonia, as well as EU nationals permanently residing in Estonia. This means that permanent residents of Estonia who are citizens of the Russian Federation (about 7% of the population) and people of undetermined citizenship (former Soviet citizens who have not obtained citizenship of Estonia or any other country, about 6% of the population) do not have the right to vote in EP elections. Candidates may be nominated by political parties. Independent candidates may also run. In the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections, the maximum allowed number of candidates on each party’s list was 12. According to a legal amendment adopted in 2018, the number of candidates on a party list may exceed the number of MEPs elected in Estonia by two, limiting the number of candidates per party list to 9 in the 2019 EP election. The number of parties that have presented candidate lists has varied from 8 in 2014 to 11 in 2009. A deposit is required for candidate registration. In 2019, the deposit amounted to 2700 EUR per candidate. The deposit is returned to independent candidates or political parties who receive at least 5% of the votes nationally. There are restrictions on campaigning. Outdoor political advertising is prohibited during the period of active election campaigning which starts on the last day for the registration of candidates. The rationale for this restriction—which also applies to national and local elections—is to keep campaign expenditures under control and to reduce the role of money in obtaining political power. The electoral system used in Estonia is open-list proportional representation—except in 2009, when closed lists were used. The change from 1  Estonia has one of the most highly developed national ID card systems in the world. The ID cards are equipped with a chip that carries embedded files, and use 2048-bit public key encryption.

5 ESTONIA 

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open to closed lists was criticised for increasing the influence of backroom party politics, whilst diminishing the influence of voter preferences (Ehin 2016: 497). Unprecedented support for an independent candidate in the 2009 EP election (Indrek Tarand won a quarter of all votes cast) was widely interpreted as resulting, at least partly, from voter rejection of the closed-list system, an electoral novelty in the Estonian context. Open lists were reintroduced shortly after the 2009 elections. Thus, similarly to general elections, voters cast a vote for a specific candidate. Candidates are re-ranked in the list of the political party according to the number of votes cast for each candidate. Mandates are distributed according to the D’Hondt method. There is no electoral threshold. The EP Election Act also specifies the list of persons who may not serve as MEPs, including members of the national parliament, the national government, mayors and members of municipal councils. However, major Estonian parties routinely field prominent candidates occupying these positions in order to attract votes. As some of the candidates have openly declared that they do not intend to take up a seat in the EP—and some have turned down an EP seat after being elected—the lack of transparency about candidates’ intentions is widely regarded as a significant problem with EP elections in Estonia.

5.2   General Context of Public and Party-Based Euroscepticism While a significant share of Estonia’s residents had doubts about the benefits of EU membership before accession, public support for the EU increased rapidly from 2005 until the onset of the economic crisis (see Graph 5.1). Although in 2003 and early 2004, survey results consistently placed Estonia among the most Eurosceptic candidate countries (Lust 2006; Pettai 2005a), the accession referendum, held in September 2003, produced a two-thirds majority in favour of accession. High levels of support during the first five years of membership were fuelled not only by rapid economic growth but also by intensified perceptions of the Russian threat following both the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 as well as the so-­ called Bronze soldier crisis of spring 2007, in which the frustration of local Russian speakers with the Estonian government’s decision to relocate a Soviet-era monument from downtown Tallinn culminated in massive riots and led to further deterioration of Estonian-Russian relations. The EU’s

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

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Oct/Nov 2004 May 2005 Oct 2005 March 2006 Sept 2006 April 2007 Sept 2007 March 2008 Oct 2008 June 2009 Oct 2009 May 2010 Nov 2010 May 2011 Nov 2011 May 2012 Nov 2012 May 2013 Nov 2013 May 2014 Nov 2014 May 2015 Nov 2015 May 2016 Nov 2016 May 2017 Nov 2017 March 2018 Nov 2018

86 

EST: trust EU

EST: do not trust EU

EU average: trust EU

EU average: do not trust EU

Graph 5.1  Popular trust in the EU in Estonia. Note: Data points are percentage values based on responses to the following question: ‘For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: The European Union’. (Source: European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 2004–2018)

strong support for Estonia in this context seems to have been greatly appreciated: according to a Eurobarometer survey conducted around the time of the Bronze Soldier crisis, 70% of Estonian respondents said they feel more secure because Estonia is a member of the EU, a significant increase compared to previous surveys (European Commission 2019). Although the economic and migration crises took a toll on the EU’s image among the Estonian population, trust in the EU remained well above the EU average throughout the crises (Graph 5.1). As a small, open economy, Estonia was particularly hard hit by the crisis: its GDP contracted by 15% year-on-year in 2009, leading the government to drastically cut public spending and impose severe austerity measures. Unemployment levels peaked in 2010 at about 17%. In a context where the crisis had brought down inflation, budgetary discipline enabled Estonia to finally meet the convergence criteria. The country switched over to the Euro on January 1, 2011 — a move supported by about 60% of the population at the time (European Commission 2019). However, the years 2011 and 2012 marked a low point in Estonians’ support for the EU (see Graphs 5.1 and 5.2), reflecting both the steady stream of bad news about economic and financial stability in the EU, as well as persisting problems, such as

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high unemployment, at home. Satisfaction increased again in 2013–2014, a development likely due to economic recovery, as well as Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, which intensified security concerns and highlighted the importance of East-West geopolitics in the broader region. The migration crisis provoked a strong popular response in Estonia. Although Estonia is removed from the main migration routes in Europe, a significant share of the Estonian public feared mass migration and opposed refugee relocation quotas imposed by the EU.  Trust in the EU plummeted to 40% in November 2015 — the lowest recorded level since Estonia joined the Union. Since then, however, the percentage of Estonians who have a positive image of the EU has corresponded closely to the EU average, while negative views are much less prevalent than in the EU as a whole (Graph 5.2). Trust in the Union remains higher than the EU average, and the share of Estonian respondents who tend not to trust the EU is only about a half of the EU average (see Graphs 5.1 and 5.2). According to survey 60 50 40 30 20

0

Oct/Nov 2004 May 2005 Oct 2005 March 2006 Sept 2006 April 2007 Sept 2007 March 2008 Oct 2008 June 2009 Oct 2009 May 2010 Nov 2010 May 2011 Nov 2011 May 2012 Nov 2012 May 2013 Nov 2013 May 2014 Nov 2014 May 2015 Nov 2015 May 2016 Nov 2016 May 2017 Nov 2017 March 2018 Nov 2018

10

EST: EU image positive

EST: EU image negative

EU average: EU image positive

EU average: EU image negative

Graph 5.2  The EU’s image among the population of Estonia. Note: Data points are percentage values based on responses to the following question: ‘In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?’ (Source: European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 2004–2018)

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data collected in February and March 2019, 88% of residents of Estonia believe that the country has benefited from EU membership, while three quarters of respondents consider EU membership to be a ‘good thing’ (European Parliament 2019). Public support for the common currency in Estonia is well above the Eurozone average (European Commission 2018). The positions of Estonian political parties have, overall, reflected the prevalence of pro-EU sentiments among the general population. The general level of party-based Euroscepticism has been low in Estonia: to the extent it has existed, it has been mostly of the soft variety (Ploom and Veebel 2017). The prevailing pro-EU consensus in the Estonian society was broken only recently as a result of the rise of the Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE), an illiberal and openly xenophobic group which first gained representation in the national parliament in 2015 and unexpectedly became part of a the three-party coalition government formed after the March 2019 elections, after having obtained 18% of the vote and almost one-fifth of the seats in the legislative assembly (Estonian National Electoral Committee 2019a, b). EKRE remains the only parliamentary party in Estonia that has expressed hard Eurosceptic views. The party has called for a referendum on Estonia’s membership in the EU, and its leaders have lamented the erosion of sovereignty brought about by supranational governance in the EU. While the government formed in April 2019 has pledged that there will be no change in Estonia’s foreign policy orientation and its commitment to EU and NATO membership, having a Eurosceptic party in government signifies a highly unexpected turn of events in the context of prevailing strong support for the EU among both the Estonian public and the political mainstream. Prior to the rise of EKRE, Euroscepticism was largely limited to extra-­ parliamentary fringe parties or some colourful politicians and public personas with negligible impact on decision-making and public debate. Only occasionally have some prominent politicians from the mainstream parties put forward pragmatic economic Eurosceptic arguments, depicting the EU as a threat to the Estonian free market economic model, or criticising some specific policies or infrastructure projects such as Rail Baltic, a major railway infrastructure project, or the Common Agricultural Policy (Ploom and Veebel 2017; Veebel 2017). In this respect, Estonia has been similar to the other Baltic States, where significant Eurosceptic movements and parties have been largely absent (Austers and Bukovskis 2017). This outcome has often been attributed to underlying geopolitical and security

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reasons: membership in Western institutions is seen as vitally important for the small and vulnerable Baltic states considering the persistence of the perceived Russian threat. However, soft Eurosceptic views have been occasionally embraced by the mainstream parties. A case in point is the social-liberal Estonian Centre Party (KE), which, under the leadership of Edgar Savisaar, decided not to take a clear position on Estonia’s EU accession in 2003 (Lust 2006; Pettai 2005a, b). Although the party has never made bold and blunt hard Eurosceptic statements or put forward a clearly Eurosceptic platform for EP elections, many prominent party members have expressed unenthusiastic and lukewarm support to European integration (Ploom and Veebel 2017). This may be explained by the party’s strategy of appealing to socio-­ economic groups left behind in the transition and globalisation process, as well as to Russian-speakers—a sizeable minority group in Estonia, accounting for close to 30% of the population—which, according to some accounts, tends to be more susceptible to Eurosceptic arguments than the ethnic majority group (Austers and Bukovskis 2017; Lust 2006). However, there was a considerable change in the party’s tone concerning the EU in 2016, when Jüri Ratas replaced Edgar Savisaar as the party leader and became the prime minister of Estonia. Ratas’ government adopted a very pro-European stance—notably during Estonia’s presidency of the Council of the EU in 2017—and Eurosceptic statements virtually disappeared from the party’s (official) discourse. The Centre Party’s main contender, the neo-liberal Reform Party (RE), was mildly Eurosceptic in the 1990s when it adopted positions mirroring those of the British Conservatives and criticised the EU for unnecessarily complex bureaucracy and excessive regulations stifling free market competition. However, the Reform Party’s soft Euroscepticism quickly faded away in the 2000s with the EU accession referendum approaching. Two other major parties, the left-wing Social Democratic Party (SDE) and the national conservative Isamaa (known as Pro Patria and Res Publica Union [IRL] until 2018), have been in the pro-EU camp since the 1990s. This is particularly true of the SDE, which is the only party in Estonia which strongly supports the deepening of political integration and is conditionally willing to consider the federalisation of the EU.  While Isamaa was previously not considered to be a Eurosceptic party, it has recently emphasised the need to better defend Estonia’s national interests in the EU and expressed principled opposition to the idea of a federal Europe. To summarise, over the 15 years of EU membership, Estonian politics has been characterised by low levels of popular Euroscepticism and a solid

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consensus among the political elites about the desirability of EU membership. 2019, however, signifies a break with the past, with nearly a fifth of the votes in national elections going to a hard Eurosceptic party which subsequently entered the government, and with an Estonian Eurosceptic party for the first time gaining representation in the EP.

5.3   EP Elections 2004–2014: Second-Order and Broadly Pro-EU The history of EP elections in Estonia conforms closely to the empirical predictions of the second-order national elections model. Electoral participation has been consistently lower than in national parliament elections. While turnout in Riigikogu elections has ranged from 58% to 65% between 2003 and 2019, only slightly more than a quarter (27%) of eligible voters in Estonia cast their vote in the first EP elections in 2004. In 2009, turnout in EP elections reached 43.9%, while in 2014, 36.5% of eligible voters took part. The expectation that parties represented in government will lose votes in EP elections compared to preceding national elections is confirmed in the case of Estonia (see Ehin 2019). The leading government party has generally been the main loser. This was the case in 2004, when the governing Res Publica Party failed to win any seats in the EP, and in 2009, when the ruling Reform Party’s vote share was almost halved compared to what it obtained in national elections two years prior. In the 2014 EP elections, the leading government party—Reform—held up quite well, losing only 4.3 percentage points of the vote compared to its result in the 2011 national election. In line with the predictions of the second-order national election thesis, opposition parties and small and marginal political actors have performed well in EP elections. However, EP elections results in Estonia exhibit some peculiar traits. The 2009 and 2014 contests were marked by unprecedented levels of support for independent candidates. In 2009, amidst the economic crisis, independent candidate Indrek Tarand, who ran on an antiparty platform, won a quarter of all votes cast, receiving a mere thousand votes less than the winning Centre Party. Tarand’s campaign had a strong domestic orientation and was notably devoid of articulated positions on EU issues. Upon taking up his seat in the EP, he joined the Greens/ European Free Alliance group and his parliamentary activities since 2009 have reflected a clear pro-European stance. In 2014, independent

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candidates took 20.1% of the vote, with Tarand securing re-election. The unprecedented success of independent candidates can be attributed to the voters’ propensity to punish government parties in low-stakes mid-­term elections where vote-switching to mainstream opposition parties was hindered by significant and persistent cleavage patterns (Ehin and Solvak 2012). While the aggregate elections results for 2004–2019 lend strong support to the thesis that EP elections are second-order low-stakes contests dominated by domestic political realities, issues and concerns, a qualitative analysis of campaign content allows us to detect the presence and evolution of EU-related stances and issues. Although turnout in the very first EP elections was disappointingly low at 27%, the 2004 electoral campaigns were relatively intensive, with significant attention paid to European, as opposed to purely domestic, matters (Ehin 2009; Sikk 2009). Seeking to capitalise on popular fears related to the consequences of EU accession, the incumbent Res Publica organised an expensive, massive campaign that emphasised readiness to firmly defend Estonia’s national interests in Brussels. Their message, however, did not resonate with the voters, who preferred to elect a competent, pro-European ‘Estonian ambassador to the EU’ (Ehin 2009, 2016), as evident from the massive support given to former Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves. The 2009 elections took place in a very different context: at the height of the economic crisis and in the middle of the electoral cycle. Despite the difficult times, the parties did not engage in any significant EU-bashing and the overall tone of the campaigns was staunchly pro-European. The ruling Reform Party highlighted its EU-related competence and the strong credentials of its candidates. The party supported rapid accession to the euro, opposed EU-wide taxation, and emphasised energy security and the imperative to develop a common policy towards Russia. Campaigning under the slogan ‘Right decisions at a difficult time’, Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL) defended economic liberalism and fiscal conservatism, while the Centre Party, the main opposition force, insisted on the need for change and blamed the government for the economic crisis and social problems, including the hardships brought by budget cuts (Ehin 2016). The Social Democrats were mostly concerned with employment and welfare issues in the context of the economic crisis. In the end, however, the show was stolen by the anti-party independent candidate Indrek Tarand whose campaign had very little to do with the EU. Tarand got a quarter of the votes, and took up a seat in the EP. The Centre Party got two seats, while Reform, IRL and SDE obtained one seat each.

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The 2014 EP elections took place in the context of the geopolitical crisis focused on Ukraine which accentuated the major underlying cleavage in Estonian party politics—the ethnic divide or the ‘Russian question’ (see Saarts 2016). The crisis heightened perceptions of the Russian threat among Estonian voters and, for many, underlined the importance of EU and NATO membership as a guarantee of Estonia’s security and independence. Topics related to geopolitical orientation and national security gained prominence also because Edgar Savisaar, chairman of the Centre Party and a controversial ‘grand old man’ of Estonian politics with murky ties to the Kremlin, had decided to run in these elections, alongside fellow-­ Centrist Yana Toom, a prominent, vocal representative of the Russian-­ speaking minority. On the other side of the ‘clash the Titans’ stood Andrus Ansip (Reform Party) who had resigned from the position of prime minister—after nine years in office—a few months before the EP elections in order to run and vie for the position of a European Commissioner. Known for his principled positions on Putin’s Russia, Ansip was strongly disliked by the majority of Estonia’s Russian-speakers—notably because of his statements and actions during the 2007 Bronze Soldier crisis. In this context, some politicians sought to portray these elections as a test of loyalties entailing a choice between continuing Estonia’s long-term Western orientation and embracing Putin’s Russia. The remaining major parties also put forward well-known veteran politicians such as Marju Lauristin (SDE) and Tunne Kelam (IRL). The results were fairly predictable: the Reform Party won two seats, while SDE and IRL each took one seat. Surprisingly, Savisaar did not win a mandate—Russian-speaking voters preferred Yana Toom over Savisaar. Independent candidate Indrek Tarand was also re-­ elected, although his vote share was cut in half compared to 2009. His re-election suggests that Tarand had managed to consolidate his protest-­ minded vote base, and that no serious contenders in this niche had emerged (Sikk 2015). All in all, over the first ten years of Estonia’s EU membership, EP elections remained a relatively low-stakes and broadly pro-EU affair. Hard Eurosceptic voices from the fringes of the political spectrum were barely audible, and the mainstream parties’ flirtation with varieties of soft Euroscepticism generally failed to win followers, making pro-EU positioning a much more promising electoral strategy. The major internal and external crises that occurred during this decade—from the domestic Bronze Soldier riots to the economic and financial crisis to Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine—generally strengthened commitment to EU

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membership because of the prevalent perception that as a small country, Estonia needs allies, especially during difficult times and in the presence of significant external threats.

5.4   2019 EP Elections in Estonia: Context, Campaigns and Manifestos As the EP elections took place less than three months after the 2019 general election, the campaign period was relatively short and the campaign itself was notably overshadowed by domestic political issues. In a ‘remarkable failure of mainstream politics’ (Walker 2019), Estonia’s two main parties, Reform and Centre—both members of the ALDE group in the EP—failed to cooperate in the process of government formation. Rejecting Reform’s overtures, the Centre Party formed a coalition with two right-­ wing parties: Isamaa and EKRE. By the time of the EP election, the new government had been in office for less than a month and was already marred by a series of scandals involving senior EKRE politicians.2 Critics of the new government claimed that EKRE’s illiberal and racist posturing was tarnishing Estonia’s image, weakening the country’s international position and undermining its security. In this context, the growing polarisation in the domestic political arena overshadowed any discussion of EU issues or security concerns related to Russia, which had been central to EP campaigns in 2014. Yet, the intensity of the EP campaigns was considerably lower than in 2014 and in 2009 due to election fatigue among both the voters and the politicians. Moreover, the parties had already spent considerable sums of money on their national election campaigns. With bills and loans to pay, they simply lacked the resources for expensive and attractive campaigns. Nine parties contested the EP election, including five that were represented in the national parliament (RE, KE, EKRE, SDE and Isamaa) along with four extra-parliamentary parties (Eesti 200, the Greens, United Left, and Richness of Life) and five independent candidates. With opinion surveys continuing to register high levels of popular support for the EU, a  For example, the Minister of Foreign Trade and Information Technology (EKRE) was forced to resign after only one day in office due to domestic violence allegations. His successor (also from EKRE) quickly got into a controversy over a remark that she wished to travel as little as possible and speak only in Estonian abroad. Also, a member of the parliament and two cabinet ministers used controversial gestures (that could be interpreted as white supremacist) during their oath of office ceremony. 2

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pro-EU stance remained the norm for the majority of the parties. However, Eurosceptic positions were embraced by two parliamentary parties on the right of the political spectrum—EKRE (hard Eurosceptic) and Isamaa (soft Eurosceptic). Notably, none of the extra-parliamentary parties can be labelled as a clearly Eurosceptic force, although the manifesto of the marginal Richness of Life (ERE) party called for reducing euro-bureaucracy and promised to prioritise Estonia’s development over that of the EU and to find allies who will help ensure that Estonia retains its sovereignty in the Union (ERE 2019). While contestation over issues remained low-key, the parties employed rather different campaign strategies. Four main campaign strategies can be distinguished: the personalised, the party-centred, the second-order and endorsement campaigns. Personalised campaigns are a logical response to features of the electoral system (single nation-wide constituency, small number of mandates, open-list PR) that make EP elections in Estonia highly candidate-centred. In the past, both the Social Democrats and the Reform Party have run campaigns centred on a prominent lead candidate. In 2019, the two parties opted for the same strategy. The electoral list of the Social Democrats was led by former high-ranking diplomat Marina Kaljurand, who had enjoyed wide popular support as a presidential candidate in 2016 but was not elected by the electoral college. Virtually the entire campaign of the Social Democrats—from TV ads to street campaigns—was built around her character and experience (the key slogan of the party was ‘Marina Kaljurand – mother, grandmother, diplomat’) (SDE 2019). The Reform Party ran TV ads focused on former long-term Prime Minister and European Commissioner Andrus Ansip. MEP Yana Toom was the central figure in the Centre Party campaign: on the party’s campaign billboards, all other candidates posed next to Toom—a frequently used tactic in Estonian campaign practice which again focuses on the persona of the lead candidate. The campaigns described above were primarily pro-EU, emphasising the values of openness and cooperation: the EU was depicted as a community of Estonia’s ‘friends’ who ‘support us’ (RE 2019) and guarantee the republic’s independence (KE 2019). The campaigns also emphasised that as a member of the EU, Estonia is bigger and more influential than ever before (ibid). Candidates further down the parties’ electoral lists also used personalised campaigns. However, unlike the lead candidates, they largely had to cover campaign expenses from their own pockets. Occasionally, self-­ financing has translated into more autonomous campaign messages,

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including Eurosceptic ones. For instance, Centre Party candidate3 Igor Gräzin ran a personal social media campaign that contradicted the official party line (he had been doing the same in the Reform Party ranks until 2018). In his campaign videos, he characterised his Euroscepticism as a common sense position, comparable to Estonians’ scepticism towards the Soviet Union’s failed agricultural innovations (‘winter rye and square planting’) and referred to the trivial and technocratic nature of the issues the EU deals with (‘sinks, bins, potato preservation, /--/ banana curves’), concluding that neither national governments nor the EU should ‘tell people how to be happy or teach them how to live’ (Gräzin 2019). Hence, Gräzin’s Euroscepticism can be regarded as primarily libertarian (praising the free market, personal freedom and the  minimal  state) but hard in essence—unlike EKRE that wishes to radically reform the EU, Gräzin does not appear to believe in the necessity of the Union in any form. The two conservative parties—Isamaa and EKRE—ran more ideological and party-centred campaigns which contained notable Eurosceptic or EU-cautious elements. For instance, Isamaa used its affiliation with the European People’s Party as their core selling argument, claiming that as a member of the EP’s largest and most influential party group, the party is better able to defend Estonia’s interests than all the other Estonian parties affiliated with smaller EP groups. While generally regarded as a pro-­ European party with a strong and persisting geopolitical orientation towards the West, Isamaa’s manifesto for the 2019 elections—both national and European—contained new EU-cautious notes. While the party’s main slogan echoed that of the other mainstream parties—‘Isamaa defends Estonia’s interests!’—it also emphasised EU-related threats that the other parties did not. For instance, Isamaa promised to defend a ‘Europe of independent nation states’, along with ‘European lifestyle and cultural heritage’ and ‘freedom of speech’ (Isamaa 2019). However, their manifesto stipulated only incremental reforms and hence their Euroscepticism can be labelled as soft. The theme of defending a Europe of nation states was also central for EKRE, which campaigned on a primarily national conservative stance. Their manifesto included several Eurosceptic positions, including a call to repeal the Lisbon Treaty and opposition to common migration and 3  Igor Gräzin was previously a member of the Reform Party but decided to run on the list of the Centre Party for the EP elections in 2019. However, even in the ranks of the Reform Party he vigorously expressed hard Eurosceptic views which were often at odds with the party’s pro-European agenda.

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asylum policies, copyright law (which allegedly restricts freedom of speech and a free Internet), a common defence policy (which is juxtaposed to NATO) etc. The programme also repeatedly emphasised that the EU treats its member states differently — for example the Common Agricultural Policy favours the older member states — and proposed that all member states should have equal representation in the EP (EKRE 2019a). Hence, EKRE’s policy proposals have features of hard Euroscepticism. Its Eurosceptic campaign was founded on the narrative that the EU is a project of leftist and liberal elites. The issues of immigration and overregulation were central to their campaign: Even more immigrants, even fewer native people and even less freedom of speech. This is the kind of society European socialists and liberals are building. We must fight back! And we are not alone in this battle. More and more people all across Europe want to decide for themselves whom to allow into the country and how curved a banana has to be. EKRE’s delegates will stand in Europe for freedom and Estonia’s sovereignty! (EKRE 2019b). A few months prior to the EP election, EKRE had woven EU politics into their national election campaign where their primary antagonist was the Estonian liberal elite that ‘gets their instructions from Brussels’ (EKRE 2019c) and ‘treats Estonia as private property that is given to them as a fief by the European Commission and the powerholders of Berlin and Paris’ (EKRE 2019d). This indicates that there was a consistent narrative between the two campaigns. However, EKRE’s EP election campaign appeared to be more ideological and constructive, while the national election campaign was more populist and more harshly critical of the European project. A possible explanation of this relates to how the party positioned itself differently within the two campaigns. While in the national elections EKRE campaigned against all established parties (who have been in power and thus also implementing the aquis of the EU), their EP campaign emphasised possible cross-European alliances with other national conservative forces. Still, on both occasions, the most Eurosceptic party in Estonia campaigned on a platform of transforming the Union, rather than leaving it (although their manifesto concluded that member states ought to be able to exit the Union in a dignified manner). One reason why the campaigns of Isamaa and EKRE were more party-­ centred had to do with the absence of suitable star politicians around whom personalised campaigns could be constructed. EKRE’s list was topped by father and son Mart and Martin Helme, both of whom had

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assumed ministerial positions in the government led by Jüri Ratas. With no intention to take up seats in the EP, they served as ‘decoy ducks’, while the actual frontrunner was candidate number 3, the much less-known Jaak Madison. However, many of the campaign formats (e.g. interviews with candidates, candidate debates etc.) were still conducted with the candidate formally listed as number one on the party list. Isamaa’s frontrunner was the former commander of the Estonian Defence Forces, General Riho Terras, a political newcomer, whose support in the ratings remained relatively modest (ERR 2019). On occasion, the campaigns diverted their attention from the personae and party ideologies and instead focused explicitly on domestic political tensions—a practice consistent with the second-order elections hypothesis. The Reform Party most prominently used this campaign strategy. Their campaign depicted Estonia as being at the cross-roads between ‘decadence’ brought about by the incumbent Centre-led government which would lead Estonia into international isolation and endanger its security, and a ‘better future’, promised by the Reform Party. The second-order aspect was particularly manifest in the mobilising phase of the Reform Party’s campaign, where they urged their voters to go and vote ‘against the coalition born out of a lie’—a claim referring to Centre Party’s pre-­ election promise not to cooperate with EKRE (RE 2019). Domestic matters also often took centre stage in election debates, overshadowing EU-level issues. Finally, a campaign strategy that is relatively new in Estonia, yet used by various parties and candidates in the 2019 EP election, was endorsements by politicians abroad. Previously, endorsements had been mostly used on the domestic level (i.e. Estonian celebrities endorse specific parties, or senior politicians endorse junior candidates). Endorsements were used in both the personalised as well as party-centred campaigns. For instance, the Reform Party candidate (and former prime minister) Taavi Rõivas aired video testimonials by former Secretary General of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen, as well as former prime ministers of Finland, Malta and Greece (Matti Vanhanen, Joseph Muscat and Antonis Samaras, respectively) in order to demonstrate his international credentials and prominence in EU level politics (Rõivas 2019). The more Eurosceptic candidates used a similar strategy, albeit with a different goal. Throughout their EP election campaign, EKRE emphasised its prospective alliances with Eurosceptic parties abroad. During the campaign, EKRE’s leadership hosted Marine Le Pen, the leader of the

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National Rally of France, as well as politicians from the populist Finns Party in Tallinn. Also, EKRE’s online campaign channels aired a video address by the leader of Italy’s Lega Nord, Matteo Salvini, who promised ‘to work together [with EKRE] for a unified Europe that protects its borders, life and work’ (Salvini 2019). The same strategy was used by Igor Gräzin, who aired his interview with Nigel Farage. Thus, while substantive EU-level political issues did not loom large in the 2019 EP campaign in Estonia, connections to and prospective alliances with European partners appeared to constitute sought-after political capital.

5.5   2019 EP Elections in Estonia: Results and Implications for Eurosceptic Politics At 37.6%, turnout was well below the EU average (51%) while remaining at the same level as in 2014 (36.5%). Electoral participation was highest in the two largest cities and the county surrounding the capital, while reaching only 24.3% in the predominantly Russian-speaking northeast of the country. The low turnout among Russian-speakers was widely attributed to their growing alienation from the Centre Party—traditionally the main magnet of minority votes. This alienation had to do both with the voters’ condemnation of the Centre’s decision to form a coalition with EKRE (whose illiberal rhetoric had not spared the Russian-speaking minority), as well as conflicts between the party’s central office and its regional branches in northeastern Estonia (Jaagant 2019). The results were broadly in line with the second-order model of European elections. The overall winner was the leading opposition force, the Reform Party, which obtained 26.2% of the national vote and two seats in the EP (Table  5.1). Owing their success to the immense popularity of the lead candidate, Marina Kaljurand, the Social Democrats also fared remarkably well, securing 23.3% of the vote and two seats in the EP. The electoral performance of the parties in government proved to be modest: the Centre Party received 14.4% (one seat), EKRE 12.7% (one seat) and Isamaa 10% of the vote (one seat). Thus, the coalition parties obtained only 37.4% of the votes, while the parliamentary opposition won almost a half of the vote (49.5%). In fact, the Centre Party was the main loser of the election, seeing its vote share drop from 23.1% in the March 2019 general election to 14.4% in the EP election. Moreover, the party owed even its meagre success to its ‘internal opposition’: more than half of all votes cast for the Centre Party went to Yana Toom, a spokesperson for the Russian-­speaking minority who

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had spoken out against her party’s alliance with EKRE. Extra-parliamentary parties and independent candidates, none of whom managed to secure a seat, got a total of 13.1% of the vote — a considerably lower percentage than in previous elections. Indrek Tarand, who ran on the SDE’s electoral list, got only 2857 votes (compared to 43,369 votes in 2014). The most popular independent candidate was Raimond Kaljulaid, a popular former Tallinn city official who had left the Centre Party shortly prior to the election over the Centre’s alliance with EKRE. Openly critical of the incumbent government, Kaljulaid aspired to attract younger and protest voters, as did the opposition parties. He ended up with 6.2% of the vote—a remarkable result on its own, but nevertheless thousands of votes short of winning an EP mandate. Overall, these results fit the second-order theory of EP elections, although it is noteworthy that governing parties suffered significant losses in such an early phase of the electoral cycle—a fact that can only be explained by voter dissatisfaction with the composition of the governing coalition that took office a mere month before the EP contest. Three elected MEPs (from RE and KE) have joined the liberal Renew Europe group in the EP. Two elected candidates from SDE became members of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D). Jaak Madison, the EKRE politician elected to the EP, joined the new Eurosceptic group called Identity and Democracy (ID). Riho Terras (Isamaa), who took up an EP seat after the UK left the Union on January 31, 2020, joined the EPP. Remarkably, the Greens, one of the rising stars across Europe in the 2019 elections, got only 1.8% of the vote in Estonia (see Table 5.1). While overall the results brought few surprises, the 2019 EP elections did break new ground for Eurosceptic politics in Estonia. Eurosceptics performed substantially better than in any previous European elections and for the first time in history, a hard Eurosceptic party—EKRE—gained representation in the EP. If one sums up the votes cast for EKRE and for Igor Gräzin (who obtained 3% of the national vote), it can be concluded that political forces embracing clearly Eurosceptic positions secured approximately 15% of the national vote. While the rise of EKRE as a radical right Eurosceptic party is certainly key to this development, it is important to note that EKRE obtained fewer votes in the EP election than in the national election three months earlier (13% of votes compared to 19% in the national election). It is also not clear how important the party’s Euroscepticism is for its voters, relative to other positions and features that distinguish EKRE from its competitors, such as social conservatism, Christian values, nationalism, an anti-elite stance and a focus on rural

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voters who have been largely neglected by the other parties. Overall, the results of the 2019 EP election demonstrate that pro-European sentiments still clearly prevail among the Estonian voters. While with the rise of EKRE, Eurosceptic forces managed to break out from obscurity and gain representation in both the national parliament and the EP, an overwhelming majority of Estonian voters continues to support pro-­European mainstream parties and the popular appeal of Euroscepticism remains limited. Intensified ties to the Europe-wide Eurosceptic movement is another major legacy of the 2019 EP election in Estonia. Hitherto, these ties had been weak, as no major Estonian party had ever tried to cultivate a ‘special’ relationship with populist Eurosceptic political actors. Consequently, the Estonian public had limited knowledge of Eurosceptics abroad, perceiving their activities as a distant affair. By forging links to international leaders of the Eurosceptic movement, EKRE broke completely new ground. Joining the ID group, which is dominated by well-known radical right parties such as Matteo Salvini’s Northern League and Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, could have both positive and negative consequences for the party. One the one hand, such links could provide opportunities for political learning, allowing EKRE to elaborate and consolidate their ideas about European integration. New connections to powerful allies on the European level could enable EKRE to legitimise and strengthen the Eurosceptic movement in Estonia. On the other hand, it would be very complicated and even risky for EKRE to belong to a party group whose prominent members are seen as friends of Putin’s Russia. How would an EKRE MEP vote when the EP discusses the extension of sanctions against Russia—would he follow the official line of the group, or defect? There is a clear risk for EKRE that the Estonian public would begin to associate the Eurosceptic movement in Europe with a Russia-friendly political orientation. Such a development would cause significant damage to the Eurosceptic enterprise at home, providing plenty of ammunition to EKRE’s domestic opponents.

5.6   Conclusion Throughout the first decade of EU membership, Euroscepticism in Estonia remained weakly developed—it had no prominent proponents, no institutional platform, and very limited appeal to the general public. Hard Eurosceptic parties were virtually absent from the political scene, with no parliamentary representation. This state of affairs can be explained by a

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range of specific contextual variables, including a strong and stable societal consensus on the imperative of integration with Western structures combined with a rejection of alternative geopolitical orientations, the persistence of the perceived Russian threat, intensified by conflicts and crises in the post-Soviet space, as well as high levels of economic growth in the first decade of the millennium, boosted by accession to the single market as well as generous allocations from the EU budget. The first significant cracks in this pro-European consensus emerged in 2015 when a new Eurosceptic party—EKRE—gained representation in the national parliament. Four years later, it almost tripled its vote share, securing a fifth of the seats in the Riigikogu, and became a member of the governing coalition. In the 2019 EP elections, about 15% of the vote went to political forces with a clearly Eurosceptic agenda, with an Estonian Eurosceptic party for the first time obtaining a seat in the EP. A prospective alliance with the hard Eurosceptic movement in Europe entails both opportunities and risks for EKRE: connections to powerful allies may strengthen and legitimise the Eurosceptic movement in Estonia—or derail it in case the newfound allies turn out to be too Russia-friendly for the sensitive palate of the Estonian voter. More broadly, it remains to be seen how EKRE will square its inflammatory rhetoric and Eurosceptic orientation with the obligations of a government party in a country whose security depends on the willingness of its Western allies to defend it. One of the clearly identifiable reasons for the emergence of hard Euroscepticism in Estonia is the European migration crisis. Although Estonia is removed from the main contemporary migration routes, migration remains a particularly sensitive topic due to the country’s small size and negative experience with uncontrolled immigration during the half-­ century of Soviet occupation. Framing the EU’s refugee relocation scheme as a supranational dictate overriding national sovereignty allowed EKRE to mobilise support. Migration-related concerns led several other mainstream parties to denounce federalisation and emphasise sovereign control over borders. Despite specific reservations about the EU, however, the overall disposition of Estonian society—both among the public and the political elites—remains strongly pro-European, and there is a clear recognition of the multiple benefits of EU membership. In this context, a significant strengthening of Eurosceptic forces remains unlikely in the foreseeable future—bar any new reality-altering crises.

17.7 25.4 7.0 24.6 7.3 – – 13.0 – – – – 58.2

12.2 17.5 36.8 6.7 10.5 – – 8.0 – – – – 26.8

1 1 3 0 1 – – 0 – – – – –

15.3 26.1 8.7 – – 12.2 – 2.2 2.7 25.8 – – 43.9

1 2 1 – – 1 – – – 1 – – –

28.6 23.3 17.1 – – 20.5 – 2.1 3.8 – – – 63.5

24.3 22.4 13.6 – – 13.9 – – 0.3 13.2 4.0 – 36.5

2 1 1 – – 1 – – – 1 – – –

27.7 24.8 15.2 – – 13.7 – – 0.9 – 8.1 8.7 64.2

28.9 23.1 9.8 – – – 11.4 – 1.8 – 17.8 1.2 63.7

26.2 14.4 23.3 – – – 10.3 – 1.8 – 12.7 – 37.6

Party abbreviations: RE = Estonian Reform Party; KE = Estonian Centre Party; SDE = Social Democratic Party (named Moderates until 2004); RP = Res Publica (merged with Isamaaliit in 2006), Isamaaliit = Pro Patria Union (merged with RP in 2006); IRL = Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (2006–2018, known as Isamaa since 2018); ERL = Estonian People’s Party; Rohelised = Estonian Greens (founded in 2006); Tarand = Indrek Tarand (independent candidate, a member of the Greens/European Free Alliance in the EP); EKRE = Estonian Conservative People’s Party (founded in 2012; includes remnants of the ERL); EVA = Estonian Free Party (founded in 2014)

Note: EE indicates elections to the Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu). The percentages represent the share of valid votes cast for the given party or independent candidate. Only parties and independent candidates achieving at least one mandate in one of the elections are included in the table. Results in italics denote soft Eurosceptic parties, while results obtained by hard Eurosceptic parties are marked in bold italics.

27.8 26.1 10.6 – – 17.9 – 7.1 7.1 – – – 61.9

2 1 2 – – – 1 – – – 1 – –

EE EP EP 2004 EE EP EP 2009 EE EP EP EE EE EP EP 2019 2003 vote 2004 vote seats 2007 vote 2009 vote seats 2011 vote 2014 vote 2014 2015 vote 2019 vote 2019 vote seats share share share share share share seats share share share

Source: Estonian National Electoral Committee

RE KE SDE RP Isamaaliit IRL Isamaa ERL Greens Tarand EKRE EVA TURNOUT

Party

Table 5.1  Results of parliamentary and EP elections in Estonia

Appendix

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References Austers, A., & Bukovskis, K. (Eds.). (2017). Euroskepticism in the Baltic States: Uncovering Issues, People and Stereotypes. Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs – Zinātne. Ehin, P. (2009). Estonia. In W. Lehmann (Ed.), The Selection of Candidates for the European Parliament by National Parties and the Impact of European Parties (pp.  75–88). Brussels: Policy Department C  – Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament. Ehin, P. (2016). Estonia. In D. M. Viola (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of European Elections (pp. 491–506). London/New York: Routledge. Ehin, P. (2019). Riigikogu valimistsükli mõjud Euroopa Parlamendi valimistele. In M. Mölder (Ed.), Riigikogu valimised 2019. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus. Ehin, P., & Solvak, M. (2012). Party Voters Gone Astray: Explaining Independent Candidate Success in the 2009 European Elections in Estonia. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties, 22(3), 269–291. EKRE. (2019a). EKRE platvorm 2019. aasta Euroopa Parlamendi valimisteks. https://ekre.ee/ekre-programm-2019-aasta-euroopa-parlamendi-valimisteks/. Accessed 20 June 2019 EKRE. (2019b). EKRE toetab rahvusriikide Euroopat. https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=GVkmm_-Cl0g. Accessed 10 June 2019. EKRE. (2019c). EKRE: Eesti eest. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=v7R5gUQoY3c. Accessed 10 June 2019. EKRE. (2019d). Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond. https://www.facebook. com/rahvuspartei/videos/2169169673402266/. Accessed 10 June 2019. ERE. (2019). Euroopa Elurikkaks. https://elurikkuseerakond.ee/ere-euroopaparlamendi-valimiste-valimisprogramm/. Accessed 15 June 2019. ERR. (2019). Europarlamendi valimistel on populaarseim kandidaat Marina Kaljurand. https://www.err.ee/932314/europarlamendi-valimistel-on-populaarseim-kandidaat-marina-kaljurand. Accessed 24 June 2019. Estonian National Electoral Committee. (2019a). Toimunud valimiste arhiiv: Valimised ja rahvahääletused 1992–2019. https://www.valimised.ee/et/toimunud-valimiste-arhiiv. Accessed 28 Apr 2019. Estonian National Electoral Committee. (2019b). Euroopa Parlamendi valimised 2019. https://www.valimised.ee/et. Accessed 28 Apr 2019. Euroopa Parlamendi valimise seadus (European Parliament Election Act), (adopted December 18, last amended December 12, 2018). https://www.riigiteataja.ee. Accessed 2 Apr 2019. European Commission. (2018). Flash Eurobarometer 473: The Euro Area, November 2018. Brussels: European Union. https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion. Accessed 27 Apr 2019.

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European Commission. (2019). Standard Eurobarometer 2004–2019. Brussels: European Union. https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion. Accessed 29 Apr 2019. European Parliament. (2019). Eurobarometer Survey 91.1 of the European Parliament: A Public Opinion Monitoring Study. Brussels: European Union. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2019/parlemeter-2019/report/en-parlemeter-2019.pdf. Accessed 29 Apr 2019. Gräzin, I. (2019). Skeptitsism. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XgOqp L77o9A. Accessed 25 June 2019. Isamaa. (2019). Isamaa kaitseb Eesti huve! Isamaa programm Euroopa Parlamendi valimisteks. https://isamaa.ee/iwp/wp-content/ uploads/2019/04/ISAMAA-EP-2019_HH.pdf. Accessed 15 June 2019. Jaagant, U. (2019). Reformierakonna toetus sööstis kõrgusse. Postimees. https:// poliitika.postimees.ee/6708997/reformierakonna-toetus-soostis-korgusse. Accessed 28 June 2019. KE. (2019). Eesti keskerakonna valimisplatvorm Euroopa Parlamendi valimistel. https://www.keskerakond.ee/files/Eesti-Keskerakonna-valimisplatvormEuroopa-Parlamendi-2019-valimistel.pdf. Accessed 15 June 2019. Lust, A. (2006). Worstward Ho: Explaining Estonian Euroskepticism. Problems of Post-Communism, 53(5), 15–27. Pettai, V. (2005a). Unfounded Worries? Euroskepticism Prior to the Referendum. In V.  Pettai & P.  Ehin (Eds.), Deciding on Europe: The EU Referendum in Estonia (pp. 24–38). Tartu: Tartu University Press. Pettai, V. (2005b). Estonia. European Journal of Political Research, 44(7–8), 1002–1007. Ploom, I., & Veebel, V. (2017). Emulated Euroskepticism in Estonian Politics. In A. Austers & K. Bukovskis (Eds.), Euroskepticism in the Baltic States: Uncovering Issues, People and Stereotypes (pp. 51–68). Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs – Zinātne. RE. (2019). Parema Eesti eest Euroopas! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjs5sJB2w8. Accessed 15 June 2019. Rõivas, T. (2019). Taavi Rõivas’ Facebook page. https://www.facebook.com/pg/ TaaviRoivas/videos/?ref=page_internal. Accessed 24 June 2019 Saarts, T. (2016). The Ethnic-Colonial Communist Legacy and the Formation of the Estonian and Latvian Party Systems. Trames. A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 20(2), 115–143. Salvini, M. (2019). Matteo Salvini videopöördumine. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=R8uLmLAQgIk. Accessed 24 June 2019. SDE. (2019). Vali Marina Kaljurand Euroopa Parlamenti! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbTpSSna-tQ. Accessed 15 June 2019.

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Sikk, A. (2009). The 2009 European Elections in Estonia. http://www.sussex. ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-2.html. Accessed 26 Apr 2019. Sikk, A. (2015). Estonia. European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook, 54(1), 94–100. Veebel, V. (2017). Pragmatic economic euroskepticism in Estonia. In A. Austers & K.  Bukovskis (Eds.), Euroskepticism in the Baltic States: Uncovering Issues, People and Stereotypes (pp. 113–122). Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs – Zinātne. Walker, S. (2019, May 21). Racism, Sexism, Nazi Economics: Estonia’s Far Right in Power. The Guardian.

CHAPTER 6

Hungary Krisztina Arató

6.1   The Electoral System The electoral system that applies to European elections in Hungary dates back to 2003 (Act. No. CXIII) and the core of the regulation has remained unchanged since. European elections are held in a proportional representation system—the whole country is one single constituency and voters have one vote that can be given to a non-preferential party list of their choice. Party lists can be run by registered political parties (or party coalitions) that are able to present at least 20,000 signatures from citizens supporting them. Elections are traditionally held in Hungary on Sundays—thus, EP elections are held on the final day of the period provided for EP elections in the EU.  The number of seats for Hungary has changed since accession—24 seats in 2004, 22 in 2009 and 21 in 2014 and 2019. Seats are allocated according to the D’Hondt method. There is an electoral threshold of 5%, which applies to single party lists as well as to coalitions— the highest possible threshold in EP elections, which is applied in 9 countries in the EU including all the Visegrád Group countries (Bíró-Nagy 2019).

K. Arató (*) Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 V. Hloušek, P. Kaniok (eds.), The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9_6

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Hungarian citizens can vote in EP as well as national elections from a minimum age of 18. Apart from the application of the general rules of participating in EP elections for EU citizens, since the amendment of the legislation in December 2018, Hungarian citizens without permanent residence in Hungary or elsewhere in the European Union are entitled to vote in European elections. The law refers to Council Decision 2018/994 (Council 2018) that allows member states to grant citizens residing outside the European Union the right to vote in line with their national electoral rules. In the case of Hungary, this amendment gives an opportunity to vote in EP elections to Hungarian minorities residing in neighbouring non-EU countries like Serbia, but also for example in the United States. Since past national elections with similar non-resident voting participation (in 2014 and 2018 Hungarian citizens across the border were entitled to vote in national elections) show that the vast majority of these votes go to the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance (FIDESZ) party, this change has led to political debates (Körtvélyesi 2019). The law also gives an opportunity to Hungarian citizens without permanent residence to vote.

6.2   General Context of Public and Party-Based Euroscepticism in Hungary From the systemic changes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) of 1989/90 until EU accession, the three priorities of Hungarian foreign policy (Euroatlantic integration, good relations with neighbours and support for Hungarian minorities outside Hungary) remained stable (Dunay 2006). The strategy of ‘returning to Europe’ was widely supported in the Hungarian Parliament and across governments. EU accession negotiations between 1998 and 2002 were managed by the first Orbán government (comprised of FIDESZ, MDF and FKGP1) and completed by Medgyessy’s government (MSZP and SZDSZ) without significant Eurosceptic views being voiced. The only Eurosceptic party then was the emerging radical right Jobbik, which registered as a party in autumn 2003. After the critical 2010 elections, which resulted for the first time a supermajority for FIDESZ (in alliance with the Christian Democrats, KDNP), the party system shifted to FIDESZ in the centre and a divided opposition (Enyedi and Benoit 2011). This situation continued in 2014 1  The Independent Smallholders’ Party, an agrarian party that was present in the Hungarian Parliament between 1990 and 2002.

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and 2018—the FIDESZ/KDNP coalition won a two-thirds majority in the parliament in three consecutive elections. The nature of the post-2010 Hungarian political system has been widely analysed from the perspectives of populism in government (Enyedi 2015) and the nature of Hungarian democracy (Enyedi and Krekó 2018). Since the 2010 elections, the rise of Euroscepticism in politics has been inexorable. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, as early as 15 March 2011 (when Hungary held the presidency of the Council of the European Union) in his ceremonial speech celebrating the anniversary of the 1848 revolution in Hungary, stated that no dictates from ‘Brussels’ would be accepted and the rhetoric of fighting for freedom started to be used against, among others, the European Union (Orbán 2011). His (and his government’s) Eurosceptic rhetoric increased sharply in 2014/15 (Danaj et al. 2018) and has prevailed since. Jobbik, the radical right party gaining seats in the European Parliament in 2009, built its political strategy on hard Euroscepticism—in the early 2010s they burnt EU flags and argued that Hungary should leave the European Union. However, after 2016 they started to move to the political centre, abandoning their hard Eurosceptic stance. According to one Jobbik leader, Márton Gyöngyösi, FIDESZ and Jobbik changed places in the international arena (Zord 2018). Regarding public opinion, Hungarians have had a changing opinion on EU membership since accession. Graph 6.1 shows that before and at the time of accession Hungarians had a high opinion about EU membership, but it started to decline after it became a fact. The number of those who thought membership was a bad thing did not increase significantly, yet the number of those having neither-nor opinions rose sharply. After a brief improvement around 2006, there was a steady decline and by the time of the 2008 crisis around 45% of Hungarians were indifferent on the question of membership. However, after 2012 a steady increase began just as the second Orbán government started to return to the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ rhetoric and identifying EU actors and ‘Brussels’ as enemies. By 2018, membership as a ‘bad thing’ reached a record low and indifference started to decline. It is also worth looking at how the European Union appears in the eyes of the public. For the purposes of this volume, we use trust in the EU institutions, particularly in the European Commission, as a proxy. Graph 6.2 shows that while trust in the European Commission was as high as 60% at the time of accession, it started to drop—but only by 5% by 2009. However, the number of those who did not trust increased more

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70 60 50 40 30 20 10

Bad thing

Spring 2018

Autumn 2018

Autumn 2017

Autumn 2016

Autumn 2015

Spring 2013

Autumn 2014

Spring 2012

Spring 2011

Spring 2010

Autumn 2010

Spring 2009

Neither good nor bad

Autumn 2009

Spring 2008

Autumn 2008

Spring 2007

Autumn 2007

Spring 2006

Autumn 2006

Spring 2005

Good thing

Autumn 2005

Autumn 2004

Spring 2004

Autumn 2003

0

Don't know / Missing

Graph 6.1  Generally speaking, do you think that Hungary’s membership of the EU is…? (Source: Eurobarometer) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Tend to trust Tend not to trust Don't know / Missing

Graph 6.2 Trust in the European Commission in Hungary. (Source: Eurobarometer)

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sharply. 2009 and 2010 brought a turn and trust started to increase followed by a sharp decline. As a possible reason we can think of the rather problematic year of 2009 (e.g. the global economic crisis and the change in prime minister of the minority MSZP government) and after the 2010 elections we see a sharp decline. Recently, trust seems to have stabilised at 50% and distrust at 40%. We have to add here that Hungarians still trust EU institutions more than national political institutions or political parties (see e.g. Eurobarometer 90 2018). The most typical characteristic of these data is volatility, also in regional comparison. When the popularity of membership dropped around 2008, Hungary was the member state in CEE with the lowest ‘popularity’ of EU membership (Koller 2014). The sharp increase and steady high level of positive attitudes towards membership is one of the highest both in the CEE region and in the EU 28. Trust in the European Commission has declined since 2010 but still higher than some member states (like the Czech Republic) in CEE. Party-level Euroscepticism in Hungary has been visible on the right of the political spectrum. Left and liberal parties have, since 1989, been consistently pro-EU; left-liberal governments showed adaptive attitudes towards European integration. Thus, when discussing Euroscepticism in Hungary, we need to have a closer look at two parties: FIDESZ and Jobbik. However, in the development of the programmes of these parties, we see considerable changes over time. We can detect non-Eurosceptic to Eurosceptic turns, from soft to hard Euroscepticism and also vice versa. At the time of EU accession, FIDESZ could be seen as a functional Europeanist party—the party viewed the EU as serving pragmatic political goals, with no general commitment to further integration (Conti 2003). However, we can find several inconsistencies in the party’s understanding of the EU already in 2004. They stated many times that the party agrees with the ‘Europe of nations’ conception of European integration. However, they also argued that more cooperation was needed in e.g. foreign policy. They acted as the defender of national sovereignty but welcomed every critique from European institutions of the Socialist governments. This mixed programme led to the success of the party in the 2004 EP elections, when it won half of the Hungarian seats in the EP (Enyedi 2006). Being in the opposition between 2002 and 2010, the 144-page programme of FIDESZ for the 2009 EP elections was written as a preparatory document for the 2010 national elections (Antal 2009). It included a

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critical analysis of the first years of Hungary’s EU membership as managed by the Socialist governments and a collection of pro-European views. It says that the EU is a source of protection for Hungary amidst the economic crisis—and that the crisis showed the advantages of Eurozone membership in the region. It claimed that the EU protects the rule of law and democracy in Hungary, and that it is necessary to have EU procedures to guarantee these common values on the national level. It states that Brussels is not Moscow—referring to the fact that every member state, including Hungary, participates in the decision-making process and is not subject to the dictates of an outside agency. It stated that all should be interested in a strong European Union—though it is unclear what that means since the document expressed a wish to leave ‘theories’ (such as supranationalism vs. intergovernmentalism) behind (FIDESZ 2009). The attitudes of FIDESZ towards the EU, despite the explicitly pro­EU 2009 EP electoral programme and the 2011 Hungarian foreign policy strategy that stressed the importance of a strong Europe built on the dominance of the community method (MFA 2011), started to run contrary to those principles. We have to analyse the post-2010 FIDESZ on the basis of the actions taken and statements made by the government it formed, since the party has not published electoral programmes for national or European elections since then. As early as December 2010, the Hungarian Parliament amended the media legislation, which led to serious Europe-­ wide debates followed by similar conflicts about the new constitution (Basic Law), the new electoral system, and laws connected to unorthodox economic policies (Gazdag 2014: 225–228). These developments led to the questioning of whether the basic values of the EU were being respected in Hungary—e.g. the rule of law, democracy and human rights—in politics and in academia. The Sargentini report of 2018 initiated the procedure regulated in Article 7 in the Treaty of Lisbon (Sargentini 2019). Serious conflicts arose as a result of the migration crisis after 2015—apart from policy differences within the EU, the Hungarian government and FIDESZ built a securitisation strategy around this issue for electoral reasons (Szalai and Gőbl 2015). The ongoing conflicts also affected the place of FIDESZ in their EU party family; the European People’s Party in March 2019, two months before the 2019 EP elections, suspended the membership of FIDESZ, blocking the Hungarians from being present at any EPP meeting, to speak or vote at EPP meetings, or to propose candidates for posts (EPP 2019). After FIDESZ won a third supermajority in the 2018 national elections, a new

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area of conflict opened between Hungary and the EU; there were several EU foreign policy documents that Hungary alone refused to sign (Euronews 2019a, b). To the list of political and policy level conflicts with and within European institutions, the communication campaigns run by the post-2010 governments of FIDESZ have to be added. As the 2010 landslide electoral victory smashed the political left and their fragmentation continued, FIDESZ was left without a serious domestic political opponent. The very active and permanent government communication campaigns (e.g. billboards, radio and TV spots and also national consultations) frequently stressed that the government was successfully defending Hungary from a threat (Batory and Svensson 2019). These outside ‘enemies’ were many—the International Monetary Fund, immigrants, George Soros, but also the EU.  In 2013 the Hungarian government ‘defended’ the nation from ‘Brussels’ by attacking the lowering of public utility costs; in 2017 there was a national consultation with the title ‘Let’s Stop Brussels’; and in February 2019 a billboard campaign throughout the country showed the images of George Soros and Jean-Claude Juncker, hinting that they were preparing a secret plan to implement immigrant-friendly policies. While the European Commission usually refrains from entering into open political debates with member states, both in the case of the 2017 national consultation and in the case of the 2019 billboard campaign, the EC published leaflets refuting the statements of the Hungarian government (European Commission 2017, 2019). Thus, FIDESZ after 2010 dropped its functional Europeanist approach to European integration. Once in government they did not merely strenuously represent Hungarian interests, but expressed outright hostility to European institutions. According to the definitions of types of Euroscepticism in this volume, the FIDESZ government in 2010–2014 can be categorised as soft Eurosceptic, while in the post-2014 period FIDESZ has definitely turned towards hard Euroscepticism in its views and actions. Jobbik was founded in 2003 and was built on the tradition of a previous radical right party (MIÉP2), and thus established as a radical right party. In its founding manifesto it defined itself as a ‘value-centred, conservative, patriotic Christian party with radical methodology’ (Jobbik 2003). Their 2  MIÉP—Magyar Igazság és Élet pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party) was founded in 1993 but lost its political significance around 2000.

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radicalism was manifested among other things in anti-­Semitism and xenophobia. They strengthened after 2006—the time of Ferenc Gyurcsány’s Őszöd speech—and as a result of the 2009 EP elections and the 2010 national elections they became the third biggest party in Hungary (after FIDESZ-KDNP and MSZP). In their 2009 electoral programme (titled: ‘Hungary is for the Hungarians!’) they claimed that the EU was antidemocratic, bureaucratic, corrupt, neoliberal and secretly building an empire. They claimed that Hungary should leave the EU (Jobbik 2009). There were several reports in the early 2010s—as mentioned before—that Jobbik events included the burning of European flags (Lázár 2015). The 2014 Jobbik programme for the European elections bore the title ‘Europe of Nations’. It developed the position expressed in the 2009 elections—that power should be returned to member states, and the EU has to be transformed or else Hungary should leave. This programme—and also other factors in the competition like the further fragmentation of the left-wing parties—made Jobbik the second biggest party in Hungary both in the national and EP elections of 2014, held in April and May. As FIDESZ and Jobbik both targeted right-wing Eurosceptic voters, by 2014 it was obvious that the two parties—the main competitors in the Hungarian political system—could grow only at each other’s expense. FIDESZ started to carry out measures listed in the Jobbik programmes, thus moving from the political centre to the right, and at the same time Gábor Vona, the leader of Jobbik, started to move the party to the centre (Róna 2016; Krekó 2017). Jobbik decided to become a real people’s party—and with this decision they had to leave hard Euroscepticism behind. In 2016 the extreme right leaders in the party were not re-elected to the board, and the party dropped its anti-Semitic and xenophobic rhetoric. It seems that after 2016 FIDESZ and Jobbik changed places—FIDESZ went hard Eurosceptic and Jobbik became functional Europeanist. Having been a hard Eurosceptic party since 2009, Jobbik dropped Euroscepticism entirely by 2019 as part of their strategic move to the political centre.

6.3   Second-Order Euroscepticism: The EP Campaigns 2004–2014 In Hungary, electoral turnout was below the EU average between 2004 and 2014 and showed a steady decline (38.5% in 2004, 36.31% in 2009 and 28.92% in 2014). The entire CEE region has been characterised by

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low EP electoral turnout—while the Baltic States and Bulgaria had turnouts close to EU average, other CEE countries (such as the other V4 countries) had even lower turnouts than Hungary in these three elections (Arató and Koller 2015). While the 2004 EP elections were right in the middle of the electoral mandate of the MSZP-SZDSZ government (between 2002 and 2006), and the 2009 EP elections were also somewhat in between national elections (2006 and 2010), the 2014 EP elections were held one and half months after the national elections. Thus, the drop in turnout can be explained by a certain election fatigue (Koller 2017). These facts not only support the SOE theory of low turnout but also demonstrate the importance of the timing of EP elections. The SOE hypothesis of successful non-incumbent parties is finds both confirmation and rejection in the Hungarian case. The 2004 EP election results underline this statement: in the summer of 2004 the Medgyessy government (MSZP-SZDSZ) faced its most serious coalition crisis which led to the resignation of the prime minister. The new PM Ferenc Gyurcsány took over in September that year. The crisis was deepened by the EP election results: 47.4% of the votes cast went to the biggest opposition party, FIDESZ (12 mandates out of 24), while the bigger governing party MSZP received 34.3% of the votes (nine mandates). The second Gyurcsány government faced a serious crisis in 2008 that led to the breakup of the coalition. In April 2009, with a constructive vote of no confidence, Gordon Bajnai became prime minister with the support of both MSZP and SZDSZ. Again, in the midst of the coalition crisis, the 2009 EP elections brought the biggest opposition party FIDESZ (now in coalition with its satellite party KDNP) to a winning position (56.3%, 14 mandates). These results also showed the shrinking of MSZP (17.37%, four mandates) and MDF (5.31%, one mandate) and the appearance of hard Euroscepticism with Jobbik (14.77%, 3 mandates). In 2014, FIDESZ was in power but still was able to win the EP elections—they received 51.48% of the votes, which was less than previously when in the opposition, but still an absolute majority. Other parties (MSZP, DK, Együtt, LMP and Jobbik) did not get even close to that result—Jobbik had the second best showing with almost exactly the same number of votes as in 2009. Thus, the thesis predicting successful non-incumbent parties was true in 2004 and 2009 for FIDESZ, but it has not applied to FIDESZ since forming a government in 2010. SOE theory does not apply to MSZP, which scored worse and worse in EP elections whether in government or the opposition.

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The more successful small party SOE thesis is also double-faced in Hungary. The potential for analysis is limited here since many small parties (MDF, KDNP, SZDSZ etc.) ran in the EP or national elections in coalition with other (bigger) parties. What we can definitely say is that in the period of 2004–2014, Jobbik, Hungary’s hard Eurosceptic party at the time, did slightly better in EP elections that in national ones. Concerning the issues in EP elections, we need to briefly analyse the campaigns. In 2004, FIDESZ while in the opposition used the EP electoral campaign to express criticisms against the governing MSZP-SZDSZ coalition, thus, domestic issues prevailed (Bátory and Husz 2006). FIDESZ criticised the government for having overly accommodationist EU strategies and weak representation of the national interest. They argued for a more ‘emancipatory’ EU strategy for Hungary—saying that the automatic acceptance of initiatives coming from the EU was not for the benefit of the country. However, truly Eurosceptic campaign statements were characteristic of the two extreme parties (MIÉP on the right and the communist Munkáspárt)—and neither of them were able to reach the 5% electoral threshold (Arató and Koller 2015). The 2004 election resulted in 12 mandates for FIDESZ, nine for MSZP, two for SZDSZ and one for MDF. The 2009 EP electoral campaign took place with Hungary in a deep economic and political crisis. After the 2006 elections when the MSZP-­ SZDSZ coalition led by Ferenc Gyurcsány was re-elected, the infamous ‘lie-speech’ of the Prime Minister (Gyurcsány 2006) triggered an ongoing political crisis that led to the breakup of the coalition. Meanwhile, the economic crisis also hit Hungary hard. According to polls, it was already obvious in 2009 that the coming 2010 national elections would bring the success of FIDESZ; the only unknown factor was whether it would be with an absolute majority or with a supermajority. All parties prepared for the next national elections with the EP campaign. While they tried to argue that EP electoral campaigns should tell voters something about Europe (which could be a sign of Europeanisation in the campaign), in fact they talked mostly about domestic politics (Ughy 2010). FIDESZ, as described above, published a lengthy 2009 electoral programme that could be described as functional Europeanist, underlining the importance of member states in the EU but also giving great emphasis to common values and policies. In the campaign they concentrated on criticism of the government, using slogans like ‘Enough’ and ‘Hungary is able to achieve more’. Viktor Orbán travelled to many European

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countries, which gave him the image of a European politician (Mihályffy 2010: 50). Jobbik, the radical right party that in this period definitely belonged to the category of hard Euroscepticism, rejected supranationalism, wanted to save Hungary for Hungarians, and called the European Union an empire led from Brussels. As a result, FIDESZ won 14 mandates (two more than in 2004); MSZP four (five less than in 2004, a considerable loss); MDF, the system-changing party of the first postsocialist Prime Minister József Antall, one mandate (no change); and the newcomer Eurosceptic Jobbik, three. The 2014 EP elections (on 25 May) in Hungary were held right after the national elections on 6 April. The second Orbán government, using its constitutional majority, had altered the electoral system in December 2011, and the 2014 national election was the first when the new system was used. Accepted without an all-party consensus, the new electoral system (which was a mixed system of regional representation and party lists) was applied to the reduced number of MPs (now 199). The political and professional debates about the new system focused on gerrymandering (Kovács and Vida 2015), winning votes compensation and the voting rights of Hungarian citizens without permanent residence in Hungary (95% of whom voted for FIDESZ, resulting in one mandate) (Tóth 2015). While these rules did not apply to European elections, the rules for which remained unchanged, there were criticisms about the regulation and implementation of other elements connected to the electoral process that might have had an impact on the 2014 EP elections, which took place in close proximity to the national elections. OSCE reported that ‘the main governing party enjoyed an undue advantage because of restrictive campaign regulations, biased media coverage and campaign activities that blurred the separation between political party and the State’ (OSCE 2014: 1). Since the national electoral campaign was almost inseparable from the EP campaign, these criticisms may be valid for the EP contest as well. The party system moved further in the process that started in 2010: a huge win for FIDESZ (with satellite KDNP), with two-thirds of the seats, and an even more scattered left (MSZP, DK, Együtt, Párbeszéd), a new small Green Party (LMP), and Jobbik on the radical right declining slightly compared to 2010. The EP campaign was very modest as both parties and voters were tired of political battles. FIDESZ (similarly to the national elections) did not publish a programme—they also avoided open debates with opposition parties (Koller 2017). For the FIDESZ-led government, the biggest opponent (in everyday political communication) was the EU

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or, as they phrased it, ‘Brussels’. The government went back to the pre-­ accession distinction between ‘us’ (Hungarians) and ‘them’ (the EU). Prior to accession the EU had been desirable and had a very positive image in the discourse of all Hungarian parties, but now—with a slight case of schizophrenia—FIDESZ treated the EU as ‘them’, that is, an institutional system that the country was part of. Compared to the 2009 FIDESZ campaign, this was a radical turn away from a moderate ‘emancipation’ strategy to assuming the existence of an enemy on the EU side (Koller 2017). This is the point when FIDESZ started to fit the definition of hard Euroscepticism. The other, traditionally hard Eurosceptic party, Jobbik, prepared a detailed programme. While they still wanted to radically defend Hungarian interests and Hungarian soil, they began to slightly move away from extreme statements. They no longer proposed the exit of Hungary from the EU and there were no burning EU flags anymore, but they wanted to ensure European wages for Hungarians in the middle of Europe (Koller 2017). The scattered leftist parties (MSZP, DK, Együtt and Párbeszéd) and the new green LMP were all far from Euroscepticism; moreover, DK, the party of Ferenc Gyurcsány, the previous prime minister, proposed the establishment of a United States of Europe (Arató and Koller 2015). The election results show the structure of the Hungarian party system of this time—twelve seats for FIDESZ-KDNP and on the left MSZP two seats, DK two, Együtt two, the green LMP one, and Jobbik scored three, the same as in 2009. Summarising the trends concerning the elements of SOE theory on national vs. European issues in EP campaigns, we can say that in the 2004 and 2009 EP elections, domestic politics defined the electoral competition in Hungary. This supports SOE theory. There were European issues in the electoral programmes and also in the campaigns but the logic of national competition defined the electoral process. The analysis of the 2014 campaign is more challenging, though—the EU (‘Brussels’) appeared in the EP (and also national) elections campaigns very significantly. However, it did not appear in the debate as part of the discourse—for example ‘What kind of EU do we want?’—but as an enemy in the communication strategy of the government parties, which enjoyed a supermajority in the Hungarian parliament and also had 12 seats out of 21 in the EP. On the other hand, it was the first time that a party (DK) came up with the idea of a United States of Europe, which can be explained as a slight Europeanisation of the campaign issues.

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6.4   Euroscepticism in the Hungarian Electoral Manifestos 2019 The general climate in Hungary before the 2019 EP elections was influenced by public discourse revolving around the question how big the electoral success of the government parties would be. The preparations on the opposition side included two strategic questions both before the 2018 and the 2019 elections—whether electoral cooperation was feasible among the small left-oriented parties and/or whether the left should or should not co-operate with Jobbik (Krekó 2017). This latter question is especially significant when looking at Euroscepticism—the left parties being not in the least Eurosceptic but Jobbik formerly being hard Eurosceptic party. On the non-Eurosceptic opposition side, MSZP and Együtt-PM ran in the elections in coalition but only MSZP published a programme, titled ‘Patria, love, Europe’. They supported the deepening of the European Union especially in areas like healthcare, education and social affairs, and they supported Hungarian Eurozone membership and rejected the hostile discourse and steps taken by the Hungarian government towards the EU (MSZP 2019). In their programme ‘Europe, we are staying!’ the Democratic Coalition (DK) claimed that Hungary now had to choose between Orbán and Europe. Apart from their policy-related programme elements, the core message was support for a United States of Europe (DK 2019). Momentum was a new player in Hungarian politics. Established as a party in 2017, their first political action was a campaign collecting signatures for a referendum on the Hungarian bid for the 2024 summer Olympics. The campaign called ‘NOlimpia’ was successful, the party collected more than 266,000 signatures (Végh 2017) and the Orbán government withdrew the bid. Momentum ran in the 2018 national elections but was unable to reach the electoral threshold of 5% (it reached 3.06%). After the 2019 elections, Momentum became a member of ALDE, the liberal party family in Europe (Momentum 2019). When analysing party manifestos in the 2019 EP campaign in Hungary, we have difficult task since not all parties had a programmatic statement. The electoral manifesto of FIDESZ/KDNP was non-existent, just like in 2014. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán gave a speech on 7 April 2019 in a big event (at the Bálna venue) in Budapest launching the EP campaign and offering the programme of the party coalition. He started by saying, ‘let’s face up to the fact that past elections to the European Parliament never

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seemed to be of pivotal importance’ (Orbán 2019). Contradicting SOE theory, he argued that much was at stake in 2019—the future EU being for or against immigration. The entire speech was organised only around migration, which at the end of the speech he summarised in seven points: migration policy should revert back to member states; no country should be obliged to accept migrants; no one should be allowed into Europe without a valid ID; migrant cards should be eliminated; Brussels should not give any money to George Soros’s immigration organisations, but instead reimburse the costs of border defence; no one should be discriminated against for being Christian; and EU institutions should appoint anti-­ immigration leaders (Orbán 2019). The speech and the seven points reinforced FIDESZ’s characterisation of European institutions as enemies of Hungary from which the government must save the nation. While the FIDESZ ‘manifesto’ could only be included in Table  6.1 (which summarising the elements of manifestos) on only one row (migration), other parties provided voters with more detailed programmes. The formerly Eurosceptic party Jobbik, following its strategy of moving to the political centre, presented a non-Eurosceptic programme titled ‘Safe Europe, free Hungary’ (Jobbik 2019). They were still critical about EU crisis management in several areas including migration, but advocated finding common solutions. They wanted to look beyond the traditional Table 6.1  Prominent topics discussed in the Hungarian manifestos for the 2019 elections Topic

Reflected by

Migration and security of the EU external borders

FIDESZ, MSZP, DK, Momentum, Jobbik MSZP, DK, Momentum, Jobbik MSZP, DK, Momentum

Environmental protection and/or climate change More competences to the European Union / institutional reform Social Europe Labour market, wages, jobs Stronger EU control of democracy in member states Education/Erasmus Healthcare Competitiveness and economic efficiency Eurozone Anti-corruption, EPPO Source: Author based on party campaigns

MSZP, DK DK, Jobbik MSZP, DK, Momentum MSZP, DK, Momentum MSZP, DK MSZP, Momentum MSZP, DK, Momentum Momentum, Jobbik

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duality of federalism vs. national sovereignty (see the 2009 FIDESZ programme)—moreover, they wanted to maintain EU authority in areas where collective action offers better solutions, such as in environment and social affairs. The Jobbik manifesto quoted and showed pictures of the founding fathers of the EU (Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer), praising them and demanding a new compromise—between EU institutions and member states, and between old and new member states. In summary, we can say that the only hard Eurosceptic party in Hungary in the 2019 elections was the incumbent FIDESZ/KDNP coalition, which did not publish a programme. While the traditionally pro-European leftist parties continued to stress their Euro-optimism (and DK even its federalism), the formerly radical right and hard Eurosceptic Jobbik detached itself from its previous stances and left Euroscepticism behind. The newcomer Momentum was also pro-European. Electoral programmes for the 2019 EP elections were mainly centred on European issues and policies and the opposition parties connected their ideas of Europe with their criticism of the Orbán government and its EU stance.

6.5   Campaign and Results 2019 The 2019 EP electoral campaign started with two important factors. First, the control by the National State Audit Office over (only) opposition party budgets that was started before the 2018 national elections continued and as problems were identified, some opposition parties had their state finances suspended at the beginning of 2019 (Hungarytoday 2019). While in the case of some opposition parties (e.g. Momentum) state aid was provided later, this still caused significant problems when preparing for the 2019 EP campaign. Second, a billboard campaign was launched by the government/FIDESZ in February 2019 that had the smiling faces of European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and Hungarian-­ American George Soros saying ‘you have the right to know what Brussels is up to’. The image hinted that the Commission is heavily influenced by Soros (against whom there had been a government billboard campaign previously) and that ‘Brussels’ was preparing something that would have a negative effect on the people. The billboard campaign caused great political disturbances in Hungary (it was timed before the official start of the electoral campaign) and in Europe as well (the EPP was in the final stages of its internal disputes concerning the membership of FIDESZ) (Davies

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et  al. 2019). After the suspension of FIDESZ in the EPP (EPP 2019), FIDESZ started a lukewarm EP campaign with billboards saying ‘Let’s support the programme of Viktor Orbán, let’s stop immigration!’. Most of the opposition parties—probably because of their financial problems— concentrated their campaigns in the month of May, the last month before the elections. All of them put their criticisms of the government and the praise for a European Hungary in the centre in their campaign videos and other appearances. Apart from that, the coalition of MSZP-PM emphasised their ability to join forces (working together has been a long-term issue among small left-wing parties). DK (their party list was led by Klára Dobrev, the wife of Ferenc Gyurcsány) underlined the European minimum wage and the concept of a United States of Europe. Jobbik talked about corruption and called the prime minister a liar in their videos, claiming that instead of fighting immigration, the government had brought immigrants to Hungary. Momentum connected their EP campaign to the collection of signatures to join EPPO (the European Public Prosecutor’s Office), which the Hungarian government opposed (Arató 2018). While the campaign concentrated on May, and the opposition had limited resources, electoral turnout was record high in the history of EP elections in Hungary (43.36%) It is nevertheless much lower than turnout for the 2018 national elections (70.22%), so SOE theory is still supported. As expected, FIDESZ/KDNP, the government parties, won the elections with an absolute majority. They received 1% more than in 2014 and increased their presence in the European Parliament by one MEP—13 out of 21 places is an outstanding result across Europe. For Jobbik, it seems that the move to the centre was unsuccessful—they only managed to secure one seat in the EP instead of the previous three. MSZP-PM managed to reach the threshold and share one seat, which was considered a major loss for both parties (they won three seats when running separately in 2014). Two parties celebrated after the results were announced: DK and Momentum. DK was so unprepared to win four seats (16.05%) that they did not even have a photo at hand of Attila Ara-Kovács, their fourth place candidate, on election eve. For Momentum, after failing to enter the Hungarian parliament in 2018, two seats (9.93%) in the European Parliament was a result they had not expected. We also need to mention two parties that did not pass the 5% threshold: LMP and a new party, ‘Our Country Movement’ (Mi Hazárnk Mozgalom). LMP, the small green party, which had one MEP in 2014 and has had a

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small party faction in the Hungarian Parliament since 2018, failed to get any EP seats in 2019. The new Our Country Movement party was registered in the summer of 2018 and its leaders were those radical politicians that lost their places in Jobbik. However, having existed for less than one year, they scored 3.29% in the EP elections. This result obviously did not lead to a mandate but shows that there is an electorate in Hungary for radical right politicians. Their programme included the proposal to re-­ negotiate the accession treaty and to have a referendum about membership (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom 2019). In summary, the hard Eurosceptic incumbent parties in Hungary won an absolute majority in the 2019 EP elections in circumstances where access to financial resources and the media was not equal for all competing parties. Other parties were either originally not Eurosceptic (on the left of the political spectrum and the new centrist-liberal Momentum) or abandoned Euroscepticism (Jobbik). However, a brand new party (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom), established less than a year before the elections, reached 3.29%, which shows that hard Euroscepticism outside the government might have a chance in the future.

6.6   Conclusions The Hungarian EP elections present a puzzle in the framework of SOE theory. While, consistent with SOE theory, we can observe the importance and effects of timing and that there is lower voter turnout in EP than in national elections, the focus on national issues declined only in 2019. The EU appeared more significantly in the campaign not because the nature of the EU was debated but because the hostility of the government towards ‘Brussels’ provoked opposition parties to underline the significance of Hungarian EU membership and defend the EU as a whole. The SOE hypothesis that non-incumbent parties will be more successful is not proven in Hungary—while MSZP was less successful when in government and even less successful (together with other left-leaning parties) in opposition. We can observe that FIDESZ won with a big majority all four recent EP elections whether in opposition or in government. The relative success of small parties can only partly be proven: Jobbik did slightly better in the EP elections of 2009 and 2014 than in the national elections and DK performed significantly better in 2019 than in 2018, while LMP and MSZP did worse.

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We have a special case in Hungary concerning Euroscepticism as well. This concept appeared in Hungarian politics in the 2009 EP elections (when Jobbik got three seats), which supports the SOE view that Euroscepticism, especially the hard type, is typical for parties of political extremes. However, the post-2010 period presented fundamental changes. The incumbent FIDESZ party moved away from functional Europeanism and by 2014, we observe hard Euroscepticism in government, which is unusual in the history of Euroscepticism—traditionally small opposition parties belong to the Eurosceptic family. In our case it is a big, incumbent party. Jobbik, on the other hand, in the post-2014  years changed its extreme right political strategy including hard Euroscepticism, just as FIDESZ started to use their programme and rhetoric in general—Jobbik moved to the centre, leaving their hard Eurosceptic values and politicians behind. The changes in Jobbik, however, were not welcomed by their voters—they lost two thirds of their EP seats and gave way to a new emerging hard Eurosceptic party. When analysing the 2019 EP elections in Hungary, we should keep in mind that the nature of the Hungarian political system—whether it is still democratic, or moved away from the democracy paradigm is highly debated in politics and academia. This is important in the analysis of the 2019 EP elections since the OSCE found in the 2018 national elections that while the technical administration of the elections was professional and transparent, media bias and problematic campaign financing (e.g. the pervasive overlap between state and ruling party resources) hindered voters’ ability to make a fully informed choice (OSCE 2018). Neither the regulations nor practices related to this were changed before the 2019 EP elections. This might pose a problem not only for Hungary, since EP mandates won in free and fair elections guarantee the legitimacy of the European Parliament (Jakab 2019).

– 34.3 7.74 – 47.4 5.33 – – – – – – – – – – – – –

48.7 46.11 4.92 0.26 – – – – – – – –

–

– – – – – –

EP 2004 (%)

– – – – – –

–

– 9 2 – 12 1 – – – – – –

EP 2004 seats

– – – – – –

–

– 48.19 4.66 1.55 – 2.85 42.49 0.26 – – – –

H 2006 (%)

– – – – – –

–

– 17.37 – – – 5.31 56.36 – 14.77 – – –

EP 2009 (%)

– – – – – –

–

– 4 – – – 1 14 – 3 – – –

EP 2009 seats

– – – – – –

–

– 15.28 – – – – 67.88 – 12.18 0.26 4.15 0.26

H 2010 (%)

– – – – –

19.1

– – – – – – 66.83 – 11.56 – 2.51 –

H 2014 (%)

7.25 9.57 – – – –

–

– 10.9 – – – – 51.48 – 14.67 – 5.04 –

EP 2014 (%)

1 2 – – – –

–

– 2 – – – – 12 – 3 – 1 –

EP 2014 seats

– 4.52 0.5 10.05 0.5 –

–

– – – – – – 66.83 – 13.07 0.5 4.02 –

H 2018 (%)

– 16.05 – 6.61 – 9.93

–

– – – – – – 52.56 – 6.34 – – –

EP 2019 (%)

– 4 – 1 – 2

–

– – – – – – 13 – 1 – – –

EP 2019 seats

(continued)

Note: H indicates elections to the Hungarian Parliament, EP denotes the European Parliament. Only parties achieving at least one mandate in one election

Source: National Election Office (www.valasztas.hu)

FIDESZ/MDF MSZP SZDSZ MSZP/SZDSZ FIDESZ MDF FIDESZ-KDNP Somogyért Jobbik Independent LMP FIDESZ-KDNP-­ MVMP MSZP-EGYÜTT-­ DK-PM-MLP EGYÜTT-PM DK EGYÜTT MSZP-PM MNOÖ MOMENTUM

H 2002 (%)

Table 6.2  Results of parliamentary and EP elections in Hungary

Appendix

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are considered. Hungarian election result data show the share of mandates in the Parliament. Results in italics denote soft Eurosceptic parties, bold italics for hard Eurosceptic parties Party abbreviations: FIDESZ (Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance), DK (Democratic Coalition), EGYÜTT (Together—Party for a New Era), Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary), KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s Party), LMP (Politics Can Be Different), MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum), MLP (Hungarian Liberal Party), MNOÖ (Minority Council of Germans in Hungary) MOMENTUM (Momentum), MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party), MVMP (Party of Entrepreneurs), SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats), PM (Dialogue for Hungary), Somogyért Egyesület (Association for Somogy)

Table 6.2  (continued)

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MSZP. (2019). Haza. Szeretet. Európa. Európában hazánk érdekeiért, itthon az európai értékekért. A Magyar Szocialista Párt programja a 2019. évi európai parlamenti választásra. https://mszp.hu/dokumentumok. Accessed 14 July 2019. Orbán, V. (2011). 1848 és 2010 is megújulást hozott. Orbán Viktor ünnepi beszéde, Budapesten. https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/1848-es-2010-is-megujulast-hozott. Accessed 5 July 2019. Orbán, V. (2019). Viktor Orbán Introduces His Programme for the EU Elections – Full Speech. https://visegradpost.com/en/2019/04/07/viktor-orban-introduces-his-programme-for-the-eu-elections-full-speech/. Accessed 13 July 2019. OSCE. (2014). Hungary. Parliamentary Elections 6 April 2014. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report. https://www.osce.org/ odihr/elections/hungary/121098?download=true. Accessed 13 July 2019. OSCE. (2018). Hungary. Parliamentary Elections 8 April 2018. OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report. https://www.osce.org/ odihr/elections/hungary/376639?download=true. Accessed 13 July 2019. Róna, D. (2016). A Jobbik-jelenség. A Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom térnyerésének okai. Budapest: Könyv&Kávé. Sargentini, J. (2019). Draft Report on a Proposal Calling on the Council to Determine, Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the Existence of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by Hungary of the Values on which the Union Is Founded (2017/2131(INL)). Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Szalai, A., & Gőbl, G. (2015). Securitizing Migration in Contemporary Hungary. CEU Center for Enlargement Studies Working Paper 1–33. Tóth, C. (2015). Választási rendszer. In A. Körösényi (Ed.), A magyar politikai rendszer – negyedszázad után (pp. 231–248). Budapest: Osiris. Ughy, M. (2010). Kötött pályán: az MSZP kampánya. In Z. Mihályffy & G. Szabó (Eds.), Árnyékban. Az európai parlamenti választási kampányok elemzése (pp. 17–36). MTA Politikatudományi Intézet: Budapest. Végh, M. (2017). NOlimpia: Budapest Against the Olympics. https://cafebabel.com/en/article/nolimpia-budapest-against-the-olympics-5ae00ba2f 723b35a145e7b8c/. Accessed 14 July 2019. Zord, G. (2018). Gyöngyösi Márton: Nemzetközileg Fidesz-Jobbik helycsere történt. Magyar Nemzet, 28 January 2018. https://magyarnemzet.hu/archivum/ belfold-archivum/gyongyosi-marton-nemzetkozileg-fidesz-jobbik-helycseretortent-3865614/. Accessed 5 July 2019.

CHAPTER 7

Latvia Daunis Auers

7.1   The Electoral System Latvia uses an open-list, preferential, proportional representation system with a 5% threshold in elections for representation in both the national parliament and European Parliament. In both cases seats are calculated with the Saint-Laguë divisor. Preferential voting provides voters with the opportunity to rank candidates according to their own personal preference. This leads to personalised, individual campaigning as candidates battle for positive marks from voters. The biggest difference between the two elections is that, with only eight seats allocated to Latvia in the European Parliament, parties compete in a single national-level constituency in the European elections. An electoral register ties voters to the closest polling station according to their place of residence. Latvian citizens are automatically enrolled but other EU citizens must register as voters one month before the poll. One serious hitch in 2019 came when many voters complained that they had not received formal notification identifying their registered polling station—a post-election survey found

D. Auers (*) Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, Riga, Latvia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 V. Hloušek, P. Kaniok (eds.), The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9_7

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that 28% of voters had not received the notification (SKDS 2019: 15). However, voters did have the opportunity to change their polling station, either online or in person, up to 18 days before voting day on Saturday 25 May. Registered political parties and party alliances with a membership of at least 500 people (300 more than the 200 needed to simply register as a party) could submit lists of up to sixteen candidates, who needed to be over 21 years of age, between 6 and 21 March. Spending limits for the election were fixed at €430,221 for each party, with expenses attributed to the election campaign beginning from 26 January 2019. The 2019 European election also saw electoral authorities pay particular attention to voters living abroad, with 44 polling stations set up in 38 different countries. Polling stations were open from 7:00 am until 8:00 pm on Saturday 25 May, with voters needing to present a passport or national identity card. There was also an option to vote early. However, this system did not work very efficiently as technical problems led to the Central Election Commission first reversing earlier instructions that voters could cast an early ballot at any open and available polling station, but then reversing this later instruction and informing people that they could vote at any open polling station. These technical issues led to Parliament passing a special law that extended voting hours on the Friday before the poll to 8:00 pm. 11.2% of voters took the opportunity to vote early, with 33.5% of the electorate eventually turning out to vote.

7.2   General Context of Public and Party-Based Euroscepticism in Latvia Latvia joined the EU in May 2004, as one of the ten ‘Big Bang’ accession countries. The last decade and a half of membership has established Latvia as one of the more Europhile members of the EU. The public has been generally supportive of European integration processes, with the attempt to build a common European asylum policy and relocate asylum-seekers to Latvia being the only policy to have mobilised opposition (and even this failed to result in major anti-EU demonstrations or rallies, with opposition confined to Internet commentators, radio call-ins and small rallies of a few dozen elderly demonstrators). This popular rejection of common asylum policies was also reflected in party programmes for the 2019 EP election. No major Eurosceptic parties have emerged in Latvia in this period and only a few have flirted with the ‘Euro-realist’ rhetoric of soft criticism. At

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the political level in recent years criticism of the EU has typically been expressed in terms of advocating intergovernmental responses to European problems (Bukovskis 2018). However, Latvia’s status as a strongly pro-­ European state is also reflected in policy outcomes—Latvia is very much at the core of the European project, having adopted the Euro currency and joined the Schengen area. Indeed, the Latvian public has consistently greater levels of trust in European institutions than domestic Latvian ones. Bukovskis (2018) argues that there are two main reasons for these almost uncritical pro-European attitudes. First, the EU, in combination with membership of NATO, is seen as the only serious instrument that minimises Russian influence in Latvia. If it were not for EU membership, politicians argue, Latvia would likely be a state living in the grey zone between Russian and European influence, such as Belarus and Moldova. This fear of a pernicious Russian influence, based on the nearly fifty-year experience of Latvia being occupied by the Soviet Union and the negative impact of Soviet authoritarian politics, command economics and Russification policies, has focused Latvian policy-makers on a concerted pro-western policy since the early 1990s. Second, Bukovskis argues that there is widespread public belief that EU membership has had a positive impact on economic development in Latvia. However, this is largely through the high visibility of EU-funded projects, including the significant investments that have been made in upgrading the social infrastructure—schools, public spaces, cycle paths and so on—that has completely changed the visual style of Latvia’s rural regions. At the same time, however, membership in the EU has seen many Latvians vote with their feet and relocate to wealthier regions—primarily the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany and the Nordic states— leading to a severe demographic crisis. The Latvian economy has grown much slower than that of neighbouring Estonia and Lithuania, the other two Baltic states. For example, in 2007 Latvia’s GDP per capita in PPS was 57% of the EU-28 average while Lithuania’s was 60% and Estonia’s was 69%. By 2018 Latvia’s economy had reached 70% of the EU-28 average, but Lithuania had surged ahead to catch up with Estonia at 81%, leaving Latvia closer to Romania (64%) than its regional neighbours (Eurostat 2019a). Thus, the economic gains from EU membership are not as significant as those in the political and security sphere, which is what truly drives the generally positive attitudes towards EU membership.

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A third argument explaining the dearth of Eurosceptic forces is rooted in the nature of the political party system in Latvia, where the primary cleavage is based on ethnicity—ethnic Latvian interests versus Russian-­ speaking minority interests (Auers 2013). As explained above, for Latvians the EU is instrumental in ensuring integration with the West (and thus ‘escape from the East’). However, for parties representing Russian speakers the EU is seen as an instrument that can be used to introduce more liberal citizenship and language policies in Latvia. Thus, both mainstream ethnic Latvian parties and pro-Russian parties identify the EU as a powerful and important instrument to achieve their core aims, squeezing out Eurosceptic voices. Indeed, European Parliament campaigns have often been dominated by this battle between Latvian and Russian-speaking forces, with the core debate focusing on who will represent Latvia in Brussels, and how. The 2003 referendum on accession to the EU was the first opportunity to test the level of public support for EU membership. The political class had been rather uncertain about the outcome of the vote, channelling public money into a campaign for voting yes at the expense of a more balanced debate on the pros and cons of membership. A turnout of 72% was above that of the previous year’s parliamentary election, and a two-thirds majority (67%) of voters supported accession. However, the lack of balance in the campaigning led the eminent British political scientist Geoffrey Pridham (2007: 563) to state that the referendum meant ‘more formal than substantial legitimacy for the EU’. Moreover, this was the third-­ lowest level of support for EU accession among the ten states holding membership referendums before the 2004 accession. This initial enthusiasm for the EU dimmed briefly during the economic crisis that engulfed the continent between 2008 and 2010, and which hit Latvia particularly hard, with almost a quarter of GDP being shed in just seven quarters. Between 2010 and 2014, the number of Latvians tending to not trust the EU rose above the number that trusted the EU. However, since 2015, with the return of brisk economic growth, Latvians have tended to trust the EU above the EU average (Graph 7.1). Latvians also tend to place greater trust in European institutions than they do in their own national institutions. Graph 7.2 reveals that Latvians have trusted the European legislature and executive more than their own parliament (Saeima) since joining the EU in 2004. And only in 2009,

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70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 EU average Latvia

Graph 7.1  % of Latvians that ‘tend to trust’ the European Union. Latvia and EU average, 2004–2018. (Source: Eurobarometer) 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 European Parliament Latvian Parliament European Commission

Graph 7.2  % of Latvians that ‘tend to trust’ European Parliament and national parliament, 2014–2018. (Source: Eurobarometer)

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2011 and 2014 did the percentage of people tending ‘not to trust’ the European Parliament exceed the number trusting the national legislature. This same trend of higher trust in European institutions is also reflected in Latvian attitudes towards EU executives and other institutions. Thus, Latvians could hardly be described as Eurosceptics. As a result, it is hardly surprising that there have been no major Eurosceptic political parties in Latvia. This is not to say that parties do not occasionally express some criticism of the EU, but this tends to be on a policy-by-policy basis rather than as a holistic approach to Europe and there are few calls for Latvia to exit the EU. The most persistent and consistently unsuccessful advocate of Euroscepticism in Latvia has been Normunds Grostiņ š.1 In 1998 he founded the hard Eurosceptics Party (Eiroskeptiķu Partija, EP), which was subsequently renamed the Action Party (Rı̄cı̄bas Partija, RP) in 2008 and competed in the 2009 European election under this name. By 2014 Grostiņ š no longer controlled a political party, but competed in the elections as an ‘independent candidate’ on the Latvian Socialist Party list (Latvijas Sociālistu Partija, LSP) which, in contrast to RP, is a soft-­ Eurosceptic party that is critical of individual policies but not opposed to the EU as a whole. In 2019 Grostiņ š once again led a political party to defeat, this time the misnamed Centre Party (Centra Partija, CP), which can also be classified as soft-Eurosceptic. Two other Eurosceptic parties have participated in Latvian EP elections. In 2009 the pan-European Libertas fielded a candidate list and the following European Parliament election, in 2014, saw a curious small new party, named Sovereignty (Suverinitāte, S) compete in the poll on a platform of renewing Latvia’s sovereign independence and thus reducing the powers of the EU.  Sovereignty had an extremely concise electoral programme of just 42 words that began by stating that ‘the sovereignty of the republic of Latvia is the only road to welfare’ (S 2014). The party collected just a 0.13% share of the vote (equating to a mere 599 votes!). The lack of institutionalised party Euroscepticism is also reflected in a dearth of grassroots Eurosceptic organisations. The most prominent organisation in recent years has been the Eurosceptic Latvian Anti-globalist Association, which in 2013 organised several demonstrations against Latvia’s imminent accession to the Euro-zone in 2014 and later against 1  Grostiņ š has been equally unsuccessful in his repeated bids to be elected to municipal and national office.

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the EU’s refugee relocation programme. Demonstrations against the Euro, which typically rallied around 100 people, called for a national referendum on the issue and claimed that the introduction of the Euro would mean the end of the Latvian state and bring about even greater poverty (BNS 2014). Demonstrations against the relocation of refugees in 2015 and 2016 attracted smaller numbers of people (30 for a demonstration outside the Cabinet of Ministers in November 2015) (LETA 2015). In summary, the few Eurosceptic parties that have competed in European Parliament elections since 2004 have fared badly while Eurosceptic NGOs have few members and can rally only small groups of people. The following section considers the extent to which European Parliament campaigns meet the criteria of second-order elections (SOE) and the extent of Euroscepticism in these polls.

7.3   Second-Order Elections and Euroscepticism: European Parliament Campaigns from 2004–2014 Turnout is certainly lower in European Parliament elections in Latvia. Turnout has exceeded 50% only once, in 2009, when the EP elections were held together with municipal elections and the number of voters was well above the EU average. The first 2004 EP election saw a turnout of 41.3%, while more recently it has hovered around 30% (30.2% in 2014 and 33.5% in 2019). However, the 2019 vote did see a rise in participation in Latvia, largely because the October 2018 parliamentary election had resulted in a fractured national parliament and it took three months to put together a diverse five-party governing coalition. This inconclusive result, as well as a corruption scandal in the Riga municipality which led to the mayor being forced from office and then choosing to campaign in the EP election, meant that interest in politics was kept relatively high. Moreover, in contrast to other EU states, but in common with neighbouring Estonia and Lithuania, high profile Latvian politicians choose to compete in European elections because it offers far greater financial reward than national office, high prestige (with Latvians trusting the European Parliament more than their national legislature) and there is still an opportunity to return to national office (two of the last four Latvian prime ministers have been plucked from the European rather than national parliament2). Nevertheless, a ‘European gap’ in turnout clearly exists. 2

 Valdis Dombrovskis in 2009 and Krišjānis Kariņ š in 2019.

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However, the small/new party hypothesis is less salient in the case of Latvia. Voters have tended to support large, established parties. The one exception has been the Latvian Russian Union (LKS), which has performed well in European Parliament elections in recent years despite not having any deputies in the Latvian Parliament. The LKS is the more radical of the two major pro-Russian speaker parties in Latvia, and benefits from having a high-profile political leader, Tatjana Ždanoka, who effectively rallies support during EP campaigns. However, she is banned from competing in domestic elections (because she was a member of the Communist Party of Latvia after 1991), which weakens the electoral performance of her party. The success of larger and established parties appears to be rooted in the belief that, with just eight MEPs, Latvia must send effective and influential political operators to Brussels in order to leverage Latvia’s influence as well as battle the ‘misinformation’ about Latvia that the Russian-speaking candidates might disseminate. In the case of Latvia, the campaigns do attract a great deal of media attention (even though political parties tend to spend far less on European campaigns than on national level elections), but much of the debates focus on national issues. However, the longer Latvia is a member of the EU and as the Latvian electorate becomes more informed and sophisticated on European issues, the greater the salience of European issues in campaigning. The first European Parliament campaign in 2004 was significantly more low-key than the October 2002 national parliament election campaign, perhaps because it came just a few weeks after the May accession to the EU.  Domestic ethnic issues dominated this campaign, with the Latvian government having started a transitional school reform that would gradually introduce more Latvian language classes and teaching into state-­ financed Russian-language schools. This led to the growth of a significant protest movement among Russian-speakers in Latvia. Alongside debates about citizenship (roughly 20% of Latvia’s population were non-citizens at that time) and different interpretations of the experience of Soviet occupation, the Latvians versus Russians dimension trumped all other political discourses during the campaign (Pridham 2004). This was also reflected in the results, which saw the most nationalist mainstream ethnic Latvian party at that time—TB/LNNK—take almost 30% of the vote and win four of the nine MEP seats, and the pro-Russian speaker PCTVL win one seat. The 2004 election programme of the hard-Eurosceptic Eurosceptics Party

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argued that several decades of the ‘European experience’ showed that countries with Eurosceptic representatives in the European Parliament fared better in financial (and other) negotiations with the EU.3 In terms of policies in 2004, the Eurosceptics Party promised to hold national referendums on any proposed major European reforms (although this is hardly a European Parliament competence) and to generally defend Latvia’s national interests from the encroachment of Europe and, if necessary, to foster Latvia’s exit from the EU. The party finished fourteenth among the sixteen parties campaigning in the election, winning just 0.95% of the vote (which has proved to be the biggest share of the vote that the party has ever received in any European, national or municipal election). The 2009 campaign was framed by the severe economic depression that had enveloped Latvia in late 2008 and would see the country’s GDP shrink by almost a quarter in less than two years. January 2009 had seen an anti-government rally of 10,000 people spill over into a violent confrontation outside the Latvian Parliament between police and a few hundred radical protesters. The government collapsed in early 2009 and was replaced by an austere new coalition led by ex-MEP (and future European Commissioner) Valdis Dombrovskis. The European Parliament vote took place on the same day as municipal elections. European issues were inevitably crowded out of the urgent domestic economic and welfare discourse (Auers 2010, 2011). This is not to say that there were no discussions of relevant international issues. Televised debates between the leading candidates saw moderators ask ‘European’ questions just as newspaper and radio interviews with candidates tried to pin them down on their European positions. Indeed, a clear divide emerged between the sitting MEPs, who were well-informed on European issues, and non-MEPs who were much vaguer on their ambitions in the EP and their policy positions (Auers 2010). Nevertheless, certain European-level issues found their way onto the agenda—European energy security; the level of financial support for Latvian farmers, which remained well short of levels for farmers in the older EU states (the People’s Party [TP 2009] programme stated that ‘we must end discrimination against Latvian famers!’); and Euro membership. As with the previous European election, the debate often came down to a question of who should be allowed to represent Latvia in Brussels and 3  Political party programmes, as well as election results and other relevant data, can be found at the Latvian Central Election Commission’s web site: www.cvk.lv

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Strasbourg and what sort of narrative they would tell. The ethnic dimension remained salient and three of the eight elected MEPs were from Russian-speaking parties (two from SC, one from PCTVL) while all five MEPs elected from mainstream Latvian parties had ministerial experience. Small parties once again struggled to be heard. In terms of Euroscepticism, Grostiņ š’ Eurosceptics Party was now renamed the Action Party (RP). After five years of Latvia in the EU, the party could now draw on negative examples of the country’s experience of EU membership to construct a Eurosceptic narrative. The party programme made reference to the promises that politicians made in 2003 during the EU membership referendum of sharp economic growth, rising pensions and other economic benefits that membership of the EU would swiftly bring. RP stated that none of this actually happened; instead, the EU had shut down Latvia’s sugar producers, dismantled Latvia’s fishing fleet and ‘strangled’ Latvia’s small and medium-sized enterprises (RP 2009). In 2009 RP won just 0.43% of the vote, finishing thirteenth out of sixteen parties. The year 2009 also saw the pan-European Eurosceptic Libertas party, founded by Declan Ganley, field a party list (Libertas.lv) in the Latvian EP election. The party had recruited Guntars Krasts, a former prime minister and then serving MEP (elected from the nationalist For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement party list in 2004) to lead the party list. The party programme was reflected in other party programmes across Europe. This ideology was, at its core, rejection of the Lisbon Treaty and increased accountability, transparency and democracy in the European institutions (Libertas.lv 2009). Krasts’ high public profile saw the party win 4.3% of the vote in 2009, finishing seventh out of seventeen parties and just failing to win a seat. However, the party disbanded not long after the election. In contrast to 2009, the 2014 European election was framed by a fourth successive year of steady GDP growth. However, there was a very unstable international environment following Russia’s annexation of Crimea earlier in the year. The campaign was somewhat of a proxy conflict, as political parties saved the bulk of their cash for the October elections to the national parliament. The campaign was different to previous elections in that the biggest pro-Russian speaker party, Harmony Social Democracy (SSD), moved beyond its previous ethnically based rhetoric and pushed its social democratic credentials—it’s slogan in the election was that ‘Russians aren’t the enemy. Inequality is the enemy!’ However,

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the strategy of attempting to win over ethnic Latvian voters proved unsuccessful as its number of MEPs halved from two to one and it gained just 13% of the votes, less than the half the number it had recorded in the 2011 early parliamentary election. Indeed, the party’s dithering over how to react to Russia’s annexation of Crimea earlier in the year (which it neither denounced, with one eye on Latvian voters, nor supported, despite the party having a cooperation agreement with Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party) seemed to turn off potential Latvian voters who may have been attracted by SSD’s social democratic message while at the same time also driving some more pro-Russia supporters to the unequivocally pro-Putin LKS. The big winners in the election were the moderate and experienced pro-European Unity Party (V), which won 46.2% of the vote (the highest ever recorded for a party in either European or national parliament elections in Latvia) and four of the eight MEP seats. One other interesting development was the election of a Eurosceptic, Iveta Grigule, on the Green/Farmers Union (ZZS) ticket. Grigule ran an extremely personalised campaign (with heavily photoshopped posters rather confusingly stating that ‘people are the most important thing!’) that focused on her personality rather than the ideology of ZZS, and was critical of the EU and the effectiveness of the European Parliament as an institution. However, this seemed to be opportunism rather than conviction. At the opening plenary session of the European Parliament Grigule did not join other Eurosceptics in turning their back on the European anthem (NRA 2014). Latvia’s most prominent Eurosceptic Grostiņ š competed for the 2014 European Parliament election as an ‘independent’ candidate on the Latvian Socialist Party (LSP) list, which described itself as being ‘pragmatic’ on European integration issues. LSP was clearly less Eurosceptic in outlook than the Eurosceptics Party and RP, and was more of a hard-left socialist party than a purely Eurosceptic force. Its 2014 programme was a long wish list that called for Latvia to use EU resources to fight ‘poverty and social exclusion’, promote wage equality for men and women as well as protect press freedom (LSP 2014). Grostiņ š’ inclusion on the list appears to have been a ploy to attract Eurosceptic voters (few as they were) rather than being a strict ideological fit between politician and party. The party programme may have been soft-Eurosceptic, but Grostiņ š himself remained a fierce opponent of Latvia’s EU membership. Latvia only partly meets the second order elections criteria when it comes to the European Parliament elections. While turnout has been low,

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media interest has been relatively high (not least because the European Parliament office in Latvia does much to promote interest in the elections) and parties have put forth heavyweight politicians. Governing parties have tended to well, as the campaign narrative has had a heavy ethnic dimension with Latvians tending to vote for the experienced politicians and parties that they trust to do an effective job in defending Latvia’s interests. Ethnic Russians vote for either the more moderate SSD or the radical pro-Putin LKS. European issues have featured more and more heavily in each election, with previously elected MEPs being particularly keen on displaying their breadth of knowledge of European affairs. However, domestic concerns have been dominant.

7.4   Key Issues in Latvia’s Political Party Programmes in 2019 Eurobarometer survey 91.1 identified the key issues for European citizens in the 2019 EP election. The top issue in Latvia, as elsewhere in the EU-27, was the ‘economy and growth’ followed by social protection and youth unemployment. Immigration was fourth and security fifth. With the exception of youth unemployment, these did indeed prove to be the key issues in party programmes, campaigns and debates in 2019. As in previous years, Normunds Grostiņ š was the major voice of hard-­ Euroscepticism, campaigning with the Centre Party (CP), which also had a member of the Bundestag, Waldemar Herdt (from the Eurosceptic Alternative for Germany, AfD, party), as the number two on its list, seemingly in an attempt to give the party greater Eurosceptic credibility. However, CP has little support in Latvia and picked up just a 0.49% share of the vote in 2019. Mainstream parties could hardly be described as Eurosceptic in their programmes. While a number of parties adopted positions arguing for reform and adaptation of the EU, as well as stronger external borders and more money for Latvian farmers (typically expressed as a fairer distribution of resources), the aim was to make Europe stronger rather than to halt the process of European integration. AP’s programme began by stating that ‘Europe is tired. Its old leaders lack decisiveness, courage and energy’ (AP 2019). However, this was not followed by a diatribe against the EU but rather a call for a new generation of politicians to reinvigorate and

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continue anew the process of integration. This matched the character of AP’s leadership triumvirate which was made up of people new to politics— Ivars Ijabs, a political science scholar, Baiba Rubesa, a businesswoman, and Ieva Ilves, a cyber-security expert better known for being married to Estonia’s former president. NA’s programme was the most EU-critical of the mainstream governing parties. It began by stating that the EU ‘should do less, but better’ and that the organisation should remain a union of ‘independent states’ based on ‘traditional family’ values (NA 2019). The party opposed more integration in the defence sphere, arguing that NATO should remain the key European defence organisation. However, all this amounted to quite mild criticism of the EU from a party that is a member of the Eurosceptic Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe (ACRE) EP affiliation. At the other end of the scale of attitudes to the EU, SSD made much of the fact that it was a member of the EP Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats and that its programme was built on a common European strategy and values. It called for an end to austerity spending in Europe and argued that conservatism and neo-liberalism should be abandoned as guiding ideologies in the EU. However, there was no criticism of the EU institutions or policies. Instead, playing on the core Russian-speaking electorate of SSD, the programme stated that ‘the European Parliament will not discriminate against our voters because of their language or ethnic identity’ (SSD 2019). The more radical pro-Russian speaking party, LKS, called for ‘a different Europe’, arguing that the EU should move from being a union of states to a ‘union of nations, regions and cultures’ with a federation being the end goal (LKS 2019). Parties typically framed economic and social issues within the ongoing negotiation of the EU’s multi-annual financial framework for 2021–2027. However, there were no dividing lines here, with all parties seeking higher direct payments to Baltic farmers and, at the minimum, maintaining current levels of cohesion funding. The liberal AP even called for raising the EU’s budget by 50%, to an annual 1.5% of EU GDP (AP 2019). Migration and security was another key concern. Latvia has seen hundreds of thousands of mostly young people migrate to wealthier western EU states in search of higher salaries. Small, Eurosceptic parties argued that the EU should compensate the Baltic states for this trend while the mainstream governing parties argued that the opportunities of EU

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membership should be utilised to increase competitiveness and grow the economy, which would then stem the outflow of labour. In terms of Europe’s external borders and migrant inflows from third countries, particularly Islamic migration, most parties agreed that Europe’s external borders should be tightened, more funds spent on a common border guard, and that migration be restricted and largely limited to fit the needs of the domestic labour market. The EU’s refugee relocation plans were described as unworkable and rejected by all the major parties. As this overview of party programmes in the 2019 EP election makes clear, even soft-Euroscepticism was largely absent from the mainstream debate in Latvia. The EU was envisaged as an institution that could deal with the major challenges—economic and welfare reform, security and immigration—rather than repatriating more powers to the national level. Thus, the debate was about how to improve the operation of the EU rather than radical change to the organisation. This was particularly clear in televised debates on the eve of the election, where only the parties polling over 2% were invited, leaving the small Eurosceptic parties unheard.

7.5   Campaign and Results 2019 The generally pro-EU tone of the European campaign in Latvia was partially a result of the positive economic environment in mid-2019. Unemployment was at 7.6% and annual GDP was forecast to grow briskly at a rate of 3.1% following growth of 4.8% in 2018 (Eurostat 2019b; European Commission 2019). This was also reflected in more than 50% of the population agreeing that Latvia’s membership in the EU was a good thing (although this was 7% below the EU-27 average). Almost three-­quarters (72%) of Latvians agreed that Latvia had benefited from EU membership while more than half said they would like to see the European Parliament play an even bigger role in the EU system (see Table 3). Sixteen parties competed in the European election and, as with previous elections, senior political and public figures competed in the poll. As discussed earlier in this chapter, this is partially due to the high prestige and generous salary that the European Parliament provides as well as the nature of the Latvian electoral system. This means that the actual and

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potential influence and efficacy of MEPs are among those issues most discussed during the campaigning. As a result, those parties that already have MEPs emphasise the influence and experience their MEPs possess while opposition parties are forced to field candidates with high national profiles that can realistically claim to effectively wield this sort of influence in the future. This election also saw parties emphasise their European-level party affiliations much more than in previous years, seemingly because of the greater legitimacy that contact with a broader European grouping brings, as well as claims that established membership in a group in the EP translates into greater influence. SSD in particular emphasised its contacts with the Party of European Socialists (PES), even using PES’s Spitzenkandidat Frans Timmermans in its street poster advertising rather than its own party leader and MEP candidate, Nils Ušakovs. This is explained by the fact that Ušakovs and the number two on the list, former vice-mayor of Rı̄ga Andris Ameriks, were connected to a fast-spreading municipal corruption scandal and fears that the posters could be defaced. Ušakovs even avoided participating in the many televised debates in the run-up to the poll. As discussed above, a central feature of the campaign was the importance of experience and influence in the EU. The NA campaign in Latvia made much of MEP Robert Zı̄le’s ranking on the mepranking.eu website as the most active Baltic MEP. JV based its campaign on its high-profile personalities, expertise and political experience and influence in the European Parliament. JV’s list was led by Valdis Dombrovskis (who served as Latvia’s prime minister from 2009–2014 and as a vice president of the European Commission from 2014–2019) and Sandra Kalniete (a former foreign minister and European Commissioner who has been an MEP since 2009) and its slogan for the election was ‘Personalities. Experience. Influence’. The country’s eight MEP seats were allotted across five different party groups in the European Parliament (see the Appendix (Table  7.1)). Latvians voted for experience and influence in JV and NA, which together collected over 40% of the vote and half the available MEP slots. AP represented Latvia in the centrist ALDE/New Europe group. However, the ethnic issue still remained salient, with SSD and LKS winning three seats and ensuring that Latvia’s Russian-speaking minority will continue to be represented in Brussels. This election continued the trends established in

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previous European Parliament polls—the primacy of domestic concerns over European, minimal Euroscepticism in the mainstream debate, and votes for experience over experimentation.

7.6   Conclusion Euroscepticism—both soft and hard—remains on the margins of both society and party politics in Latvia. Movements that espouse Eurosceptic ideas are small, and scarce. Mainstream political parties have their differences over taxation, social policy and other crucial domestic issues but have always been unified over the direction of foreign policy, prioritising integration with the West primarily through membership in the EU and NATO. Once EU membership was achieved, the ambition was to extract funding for farmers and cohesion while attempting to bore into the core of Europe by joining the Eurozone and supporting other integration efforts (except refugee relocation policies). As a result, Latvian mainstream parties, even NA which is a member of the Eurosceptic ECR group, are supportive of the EU. Indeed, a strong EU is an important part of Latvia’s overall security strategy of integration with the West. At the same time, pro-Russian speaker parties see the EU as a bulwark for ensuring human rights in Latvia and are thus also supportive of the EU. This elite cohesion on the issue of Europe leaves both hard- and soft-­ Eurosceptics struggling to be accepted as serious and legitimate political actors. Attempts to denigrate and criticise the EU often fall on deaf ears as Latvians have far more negative opinions about their own domestic political institutions and actors than about EU institutions. This is why two of the last four prime ministers were snatched from the European Parliament and the new president, elected by parliament just a few days after the 2019 EP election, is Egı̄ls Levits who had been Latvia’s judge at the European Union Court of Justice since 2004. There appears to be no space for a major soft- or hard-Eurosceptic party to emerge in the Latvian party system.

29.8

– – – 6.6 19.7 – 4.2

5.4

– – – 16.6 23.9 – 9.4

– – – 6.5

– 10.7

– – – 9.5 + 4.9

AP! JKP KPVLV LPP/LC (PLL) LRA LKS (PCTVL) NA (TB/ LNNK) NSL PS SSD (SC) TP V (JL) ZRP ZZS

– – – 1 2 – 0

4

– 1

– – – 1

EP EP 2004(%) 2004 Seats

– 19.0

LV 2002(%)

Party

– – 14.4 19.6 16.4 – 16.7

6.9

– 6.0

– – – 8.6

– 24.3 19.6 2.8 6.7 – 3.7

7.4

– 9.7

– – – 7.5

– 2 2 0 1 – 0

1

– 1

– – – 1

– – 26.0 – 31.2 – 19.7

7.7

– 1.4

– – – 7.6

– – 28.4 – 18.8 20.8 12.2

13.9

– 0.8

– – – 2.4

– – 13.0 – 46.2 – 8.3

– – 1 – 4 – 1

1

0 1

2.5 6.4 14.2

– – – –

– – – –

11.0 0.8 – 19.8 – 6.7 – 9.9

6.8 – 23.0 – 21.9 – 19.5

3.2

12.0 13.6 14.2 –

16.6

6.7 1.6

– 0.7 – –

– – 2 – 2 – 0

2

0 1

1 0 0 –

(continued)

– – 17.4 – 26.2 – 5.3

16.4

5.0 6.2

12.4 4.3 0.9 –

LV EP EP LV LV EP EP LV LV EP EP 2006(%) 2009(%) 2009 2010(%) 2011(%) 2014(%) 2014 2014(%) 2018(%) 2019(%) 2019 seats seats seats

Table 7.1  Results of parliamentary and European Parliament elections in Latvia

Appendix

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147

Note: LV indicates elections to the Latvian Parliament (Saeima), EP denotes the European Parliament. Only parties achieving at least one mandate in one election are considered Party abbreviations: AP (Attı̄stı̄bai/Par!; Development/For!); JKP (Jaunā Konservatı̄vā Partija, New Conservative Party); KPVLV (Kam pieder Valsts, Who Owns the State); LPP/LC (Latvijas Pirmā Partija /Latvijas Ceļ š, Latvia’s First Party/Latvia’s Way), in 2010 merged with other parties and renamed PLL (Par Labu Latviju, For a Good Latvia); LRA (Latvijas Regionu Apvienı̄ba, Latvia’s Regional Alliance); LKS (Latvijas Krievu Savienı̄ba, Latvia’s Russian Union), known as PCTVL prior to ̧ 2014 (Par Cilvēku Tiesı̄bām Latvijā, For Human Rights in Latvia); NA (Nacionālā Apvienı̄ba, National Alliance), prior to merging with VL! (Visu Latvijai!/All for Latvia) in 2010 was known as TB/LNNK (Tēvzemei un Brı̄vı̄bai/Latvijas Nacionālās Neatkarı̄bas Kustı̄ba, For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvia’s National Independence Movement); NSL (No Sirds Latvijai, From My Heart for Latvia); PS (Pilsoniskā Savienı̄ba, Civic Alliance), merged with V in 2014; SSD (Saskaņ a Sociālā Demokrātija, Harmony Social Democracy), earlier SC (Saskaņ as centrs, Harmony Centre) and prior to 2006 a part of the PCTVL alliance of parties; TP (Tautas Partija, People’s Party); V (Vienotı̄ba, Unity) based on JL (Jaunais Laiks, New Era) merging with PS and SCP (Sabiedrı̄ba Citai Politikai, Society for a Different Politics) in 2011 and renamed as New Unity (JV) in 2017; ZRP (Zatlera Reformu Partija, Zatlers Reform Party); and ZZS (Zaļ o Zemnieku Savienı̄ba, Green Farmers Union)

Source: Latvian Central Election Commission (2019)

Table 7.1  (continued)

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References AP. (2019). 2019 European parliament Election Programme. https://epv2019. cvk.lv/pub/kandidatu-saraksti/attistibai-par. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Auers, D. (2010). Latvia. In J. Lodge (Ed.), The 2009 Elections to the European Parliament (pp. 169–177). Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. Auers, D. (2011). The 2009 European Parliament Election Campaign in Latvia: Europeanizing Domestic Ethnic Discourse. In R. Harmsen & J. Schild (Eds.), Debating Europe. The 2009 European Parliament Elections and Beyond. Baden-­ Baden: Nomos. Auers, D. (2013). Latvia. In S. Berglund et al. (Eds.), The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe (3rd ed., pp. 85–124). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. BNS. (2014). Antiglobālistu protests pret eiro pulcē apmēram 100 cilvēku [antiglobalist protest against the euro rallies around 100 people]. TVNET. https:// www.tvnet.lv/5421592/antiglobalistu-protests-pret-eiro-pulce-apmeram100-cilveku. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Bukovskis, K. (2018). Latvia’s Controlled Discontents. https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_latvias_controlled_discontents. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. European Commission (2019). European Economic Forecast Spring 2019. https:// ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/ip102_en.pdf. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Eurostat. (2019a). GDP per capita in PPS. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/ table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00114&plugin=1. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Eurostat. (2019b, March). Unemployment Rates, Seasonally Adjusted. https:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Latvian Central Election Commission. (2019). https://www.cvk.lv. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Latvijas Sociālistiskā Partija. (2014). 2014 European parliament Election Programme. http://ep2014.cvk.lv/saraksti/c1476f2bcd.html#programma. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. LETA (2015, November 17). Ap 30 cilvēku protestē pret bēgļ u uzņ emšanu. [30 people protest against relocation of refugees]. Delfi. https://www.delfi.lv/ news/national/politics/video-ap-30-cilveku-proteste-pret-begluuznemsanu.d?id=46731065. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Libertas.lv. (2009). 2009 European parliament Election Programme. https:// www.cvk.lv/cgi-bin/wdbcgiw/base/eiro9.EiroKand09.programma?NR1=12 LKS. (2019). 2019 European Parliament Election Programme. https://epv2019. cvk.lv/pub/kandidatu-saraksti/latvijas-krievu-savieniba. Accessed 27 Nov 2019.

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NA. (2019). 2019 European parliament Election Programme. https://epv2019. cvk.lv/pub/kandidatu-saraksti/nacionala-apvieniba-visu-latvijai-tevzemei-unbrivibai-lnnk. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. NRA. (2014). Eiroskeptiķi pagriež muguru ES himnai. Bet Grigule? https://nra. lv/video/2948-eiroskeptiki-pagriez-muguru-es-himnai-bet-grigule.htm. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Pridham, G. (2004, June 12). The European Parliament Election in Latvia. European Parliament Election Briefing, No. 19. Pridham, G. (2007). Legitimating European Union Accession? Political Elites and Public Opinion in Latvia, 2003–2004. Party Politics, 13(5), 563–586. RP. (2009). 2009 European parliament Election Programme. https://www.cvk.lv/ cgi-bin/wdbcgiw/base/eiro9.EiroKand09.sar. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. SKDS. (2019). Vēlētāju Attieksmju Pētı̄jums 2019. https://www.cvk.lv/uploads/ files/P%C4%81rskati/Atskaite_CVK_062019.pdf. Accessed 27 November 2019. SSD. (2019). 2019 European parliament Election Programme. https://epv2019. cvk.lv/pub/kandidatu-saraksti/saskana-socialdemokratiska-partija. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Suverinitāte. (2014). 2014 European Parliament Election Programme. http:// ep2014.cvk.lv/saraksti/ffed2e7f2c.html#programma. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. TP. (2009). 2009 European parliament Election Programme. https://www.cvk.lv/ cgi-bin/wdbcgiw/base/eiro9.EiroKand09.sar. Accessed 27 Nov 2019.

CHAPTER 8

Lithuania Liutauras Gudžinskas and Tomas Bekišas

8.1   European Parliament Electoral System in Lithuania The Law on Elections to the European Parliament (EP), which regulates the elections to the EP in Lithuania, was adopted in 2003. Since then, the law has been modified more than 20 times, but the most significant revision was made in 2013. That year, the Lithuanian Parliament implemented a seminal ruling of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court of 2010. In this decision, the Court found that Article 36 of the Law on Elections to the European Parliament breached the Lithuanian Constitution as it limited the right to be elected to the EP of those candidates who were not included in the candidate lists drawn up by the political parties (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania 2010). In other words, the Court

The research is funded by the European Social Fund under the No 09.3.3-LMT-­ K-712-02-0165 “Development of Competences of Scientists, other Researchers and Students through Practical Research Activities” measure. L. Gudžinskas (*) • T. Bekišas Vilnius University, Vilnius, Lithuania e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 V. Hloušek, P. Kaniok (eds.), The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9_8

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ruled that the then applicable version of the law prevented non-party candidate lists from participating in the EP elections and that such legislation was unconstitutional. Consequently, the Parliament was compelled to revise the law and to allow public election committees to participate in the upcoming EP elections. Overall, the requirements for participation in EP elections are identical1 for both parties and election committees—they need to meet special membership and candidate list requirements and receive the support of at least 10,000 voters. As the elections to the EP in Lithuania are held in one multi-member constituency according to the list proportional system with a preferential voting, a party or an election committee needs to receive at least 5 per cent of the votes to win a seat in the EP. Notably, Lithuania has elected a decreasing number of members of the EP since 2004 (13 in 2004, 12 in 2009 and 11 since 2014), while the elections to the EP coincided with the first round of the Lithuanian presidential elections in 2004 and with the second one in 2014 and 2019.

8.2   General Development of Public and Party Euroscepticism Since 2004 After re-establishing their national independence in 1990, Lithuanians showed a strong support for European integration.2 This positive attitude towards the EU materialised in 2003, when 91 per cent of Lithuanians participating in the national referendum voted to join the bloc (Central Electoral Commission 2019a). Since becoming a full member of the Union, the Lithuanian public has remained highly pro-European. A significant portion of the Lithuanian population has supported further European integration at least since 2008 (see Graph 8.1). Moreover, the share of Lithuanians who trust the EU has never been overtaken by that of those who do not trust the bloc. Likewise, the share of citizens that tend to trust the EU is on average 33 per cent larger than the share of those who tend to trust the national government (European Commission 2019a). Moreover, the share of the Lithuanian 1  This is not the case, however, regarding the operation of the parties and election committees. The rules of financing, for example, are less strict for the election committees, which remains a controversial issue in Lithuania. 2  In a survey carried out in 1992, 64 per cent of Lithuanian respondents were in favour of joining the European Community (INRA 1993).

8 LITHUANIA 

153

60 50 40 30 20 10 0

2008

2012 2014 2017 Unification went too far Unification should remain at the status quo Unification should go further

Graph 8.1  Lithuanians’ view of the state of European unification. (Source: European Social Survey 2019)

public having a fairly negative or very negative view of the EU has remained rather stable since 2004 and has never risen above the European average, as shown in Graph 8.2. The only notable rises in negative opinion were registered just after Lithuania joined the EU (2005) and during the financial (2008–2010), Euro currency (2011–2012) and migration (2015–2016) crises. This dynamic corresponds closely to the changes in public opinion seen in other Member states during European-level crises, while the sudden rise in the negative view of the EU in 2005 could be explained by the end of the accession ‘honeymoon’ period (Unikaitė-­ Jakuntavičienė 2014). Nevertheless, even with these increases of negative views, on average only 7 per cent of the Lithuanian population has had a negative image of the EU during the 15 years of Lithuanian membership in the bloc. This suggests that, in general, the Lithuanian public did not have a significant inclination towards Eurosceptic ideas between 2004 and 2019, though some social movements started to incorporate Eurosceptic ideas in their agendas more prominently (Vitkus 2017). This lack of support for anti-European sentiments among Lithuanians also helps to explain the rather scarce supply of Eurosceptic views in the Lithuanian party system. In general, the Lithuanian case almost perfectly

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35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 2004 2005 2005 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011 2011 2012 2012 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 2016 2017 2017 2018 2018

0%

EU average

Lithuania

Graph 8.2  Share of population having a fairly negative or very negative view of the EU in Lithuania. (Source: European Commission 2019a)

fits ‘the system of constrained contestation’ as defined by Paul Taggart and Alex Szczerbiak (2008), where European issues are less likely to directly affect domestic party competition as they are framed within a constraining context of the inevitability of involvement in the European integration process. Indeed, previous studies reveal that parties openly expressing Eurosceptic ideas are mostly political outsiders and are not widely supported by Lithuanian voters (Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė 2014; Vitkus 2017). This does not mean, however, that party-based Eurosceptic voices are completely non-existent (see the Appendix (Table 8.1) for Lithuanian parties’ performance in national and EP elections). The Lithuanian Nationalist and Republican Union3 (Lietuvių tautininkų ir respublikonų sa ̨junga, LTRS) can be considered the most consistent Eurosceptic party in Lithuania. The party presents itself as the direct successor to the Lithuanian Nationalist Union, which operated until the 1940s, and thus bases its ideology on its predecessor’s nationalist views 3  Formerly called the Nationalist Union (Tautininkų sa ̨junga). In its current form the party was established in 2017, when the Republican Party, another Eurosceptic party, joined the Nationalist Union.

8 LITHUANIA 

155

(Lietuvių tautininkų ir respublikonų sa ̨junga 2019a). This is apparent when reviewing the party’s position on the EU—it rejects European federalisation, supports unanimous voting on all EU legislation and proposes that any new limits on Lithuanian sovereignty be approved by national referenda (Lietuvių tautininkų ir respublikonų sa ̨junga 2019b). In its 2014 electoral manifesto, the party also called for a repeal of the Lisbon Treaty and abolition of the positions of ‘the EU President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ (Central Electoral Commission 2019b). This reveals that the LTRS is opposed in principle to the current European integration path and, thus, following the criteria set by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008), we consider this party to be hard Eurosceptic. These views, however, have not helped the party to become a considerable political player in Lithuania—its best electoral result was in the 2014 EP elections when it received 1.9 per cent of the total votes. LTRS did not participate in the 2019 EP elections but its leaders assisted a presidential candidate, Arvydas Juozaitis, in the registration of an election committee under his name. Later, however, Juozaitis annulled the committee in support for Vytautas Radžvilas’ election committee (see below). The Lithuanian Centre Party4 (Lietuvos centro partija, LCP) was once considered to be Eurosceptic (Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė 2014). Its current manifesto, however, lacks any direct criticism of the EU (Lietuvos centro partija 2019). Previously, and especially under the leadership of Romualdas Ozolas,5 however, the party openly argued against any ‘further limitation of Lithuanian sovereignty’ and called for a wider freedom of action for EU Member states, especially in the field of foreign policy (Central Electoral Commission 2019c, d). The party’s best electoral performance (though in an electoral alliance with a prominent TV personality) was recorded in the 2016 parliamentary election when it received 6.1 per cent of the vote and won 1 seat out of 141. The party’s electoral manifesto, however, lacked any references to the EU and was more concentrated on anti-corruption rhetoric (Central Electoral Commission 2019e).

 Previously known as the National Centre Party (Nacionalinė centro partija).  Ozolas was an important player in the Lithuanian independence movement (1988–1990) and later became better known for his openly anti-EU rhetoric. Just before the referendum on Lithuanian membership in the EU, Ozolas argued against joining the EU, describing membership in the EU as a loss of Lithuanian independence (Ozolas 2005). 4 5

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The Order and Justice Party6 (Tvarka ir Teisingumas, TT) is also sometimes labelled as Eurosceptic (Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė 2014; Vitkus 2017). The party leadership, especially during the tenure of Rolandas Paksas, has always expressed the importance of the preservation of national Lithuanian identity, voiced its opposition to the adoption of the Euro currency in 2015, and joined Eurosceptic political groups in the EP (namely the Union for Europe of the Nations until 2009 and Europe of Freedom and Democracy later). However, its EP electoral manifestos since 2004 have lacked any direct criticism of European integration, made no objections to the adoption of the Euro and even supported some pro-­integration initiatives (e.g., in social and energy policy areas). Therefore, the party is situated in the grey area between soft-Eurosceptic and pro-European parties. Nevertheless, this party is inclined to employ Eurosceptic rhetoric in a strategic fashion (Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė 2014). Before winning the 2016 national parliamentary election with a pro-­ European manifesto, the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union7 (Lietuvos valstiečių ir žaliųjų sąjunga, LVŽS) tended to politicise certain aspects of European integration. The most prominent example of this was its support for continuing prohibition of selling land to foreigners in a 2014 referendum (Lietuvos valstiečių ir žaliųjų sąjunga 2013). Even though the party criticised some other EU policies as well (e.g., unequal farmer subsidies across the EU), in neither of its EP electoral manifestos did it argue against Lithuanian membership in the EU or further integration. What is more, after winning the national legislative elections in 2016, neither the party nor the government it formed appear to show any signs of opposition to the EU. Some other Lithuanian parties, for example the Labour Party (Darbo partija, DP) in 2016 and Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija, LLRA8) in 2014, also tried to exploit EU-related issues (e.g., refugee relocation and Euro adoption) (Vitkus 2017) but these attempts were rather limited and did not translate into a significant shift in those parties’ European policies.  Previously, the Liberal Democratic Party (Liberalų demokratų partija).  Previously known as the Lithuanian Peasants Party (Lietuvos valstiečių partija), the Peasants and New Democratic Party Union (Valstiečių ir Naujosios demokratijos partijų sa ̨junga), the Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union (Lietuvos valstečių liaudininkų sa ̨junga) and the Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union (Lietuvos valstiečių ir žalių jų sa ̨junga). 8  Since 2016, its official name has been the Lithuanian Polish Electoral Action – Christian Families’ Union (Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija – Krikščioniškų šeimų sa ̨junga, LLRA-KŠS). In EP elections in 2004, it also ran a joint list with the Lithuanian Russian Union (Lietuvos rusų sa ̨junga), and since 2014 with the Russian Alliance (Rusų aljansas). 6 7

8 LITHUANIA 

157

8.3   Second-Order Euroscepticism: The EP Campaigns 2004–2014 On average, the voter turnout in the European elections in Lithuania during 2004–2014 was one of the highest (38.9 per cent) among the post-­ communist EU member states.9 In two elections (47.4 per cent in 2004 and 48.4 per cent in 2014), it also exceeded the EU average by 2.9 and 4.7 percentage points, respectively, and almost matched the turnout in the national elections. However, concurrent presidential elections in 2004 and 2014 significantly inflated the relatively high participation rates. The EP elections in 2009, after Dalia Grybauskaitė convincingly won the presidential race in the first round, was a more precise indicator of Lithuanians’ interest in EP elections. In that year, the turnout (21 per cent) was the second lowest in the EU. Certain political personalities and the inclination of voters to punish incumbent parties have both played crucial roles in determining the outcomes of European elections in Lithuania. In the first EP elections in 2004, a left-leaning populist DP, founded at the end of 2003 by the Russian-born tycoon and MP Viktor Uspaskich, scored a decisive victory taking five of thirteen Member of European Parliament (MEP) seats. Other opposition parties shared six seats, while the incumbent Social Democrats (LSDP) got only two mandates. In later EP elections, governing parties performed somewhat better. In 2009, the then ruling Homeland Union—Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD) and Liberal Movement of the Republic of Lithuania (LRLS) took respectively three and two out of twelve seats, while other coalition partners—the National Resurrection Party (TPrP) and Liberal and Centre Union (LiCS)—did not meet the threshold. The EP elections in 2014 have so far proved to be the best for incumbents. An oversized centre-left governing coalition of four parliamentary parties (winning 86 out of 141 seats in the Seimas elections in 2012) took six out of 11 EP mandates allocated to Lithuania.10 The leading government party (LSDP), however, suffered a somewhat unexpected loss. Contrary to opinion polls that predicted three 9  Only in Latvia was the average voter turnout in elections to the EP from 2004 to 2014 a bit higher (41.8 per cent). 10  However, just months after the EP elections, the Lithuanian Polish Electoral Action (LPEA), represented in the EP by its chair Valdemar Tomaševski, announced that they were leaving the government headed by Algirdas Butkevičius (LSDP).

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or even four MEP mandates for them, LSDP received slightly fewer votes than the main opposition TS-LKD and won only two seats. In general, the European elections in Lithuania (if they coincide with the presidential elections boosting turnout) closely resemble the elections in the Seimas’ multi-mandate district in which 70 of 141 MP seats are allocated under the proportional system.11 Therefore, for political parties, analysing the results of EP elections allows them to strategically evaluate their chances in forthcoming legislative elections at the national level. Lithuania’s party system is one of the least stable in Central and Eastern Europe (Lewis 2006; Rose Munro 2009; Cabada et al. 2014). Nevertheless, two parties (the centre-left LSDP and the centre-right TS-LKD) consistently prevailed in national politics until parliamentary elections in 2016. One of key factors that allowed these parties to be so resilient was their ability to secure seats from 71 of the Seimas’ single-mandate districts, which helped to amortise occasional setbacks in the multi-mandate district. Without the single-mandate districts’ leverage, the competition for the two major parties to compete in EP elections, however, is more challenging. As an only exception, one could refer to the EP elections in 2009. Because of a much lower voter turnout, the duo jointly managed to get a record seven seats out of 12 (58 per cent). Meanwhile, in both 2004 and 2014 they collectively got four mandates or only about one-third of all MEP seats allocated to the country. This collective proportion of received mandates was significantly lower than in the Seimas elections (until 2016) where on average these two forces shared with some fluctuations around a half the house. However, if we compare the results of EP elections only with the outcome of voting in the multi-member district in the national parliamentary elections, we observe very similar trends. In EP elections 2004–2014, LSDP and TS-LKD on average received together 35.7 per cent of votes, while in the Seimas elections 2004–2016 this proportion was 34.1 per cent. The outcomes of the EP elections were slightly better than for the Seimas’ multi-member district only for LRLS and LLRA. In terms of content and media attention, national elections overshadow European elections. While political parties in Lithuania broadly cover European issues in their official manifestos, such Europeanisation is shallow. In practice, national concerns prevailed in EP electoral campaigns and public debates during 2004–2014. The contenders emphasised social  The rest of the MPs are elected in 71 single-mandate districts.

11

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exclusion, unemployment, emigration, taxation, agricultural subsidies, the pace of economic reforms and other pressing socio-economic issues (Krupavičius 2005, 2010; Mayer 2005; Aleknonis 2014; Braghiroli 2010; Talving and Pukelis 2014; Jastramskis and Ramonaitė 2015). In addition, following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, national security was one of the key topics during the simultaneous presidential and EP campaigns (Aleknonis 2014; Jastramskis and Ramonaitė 2015). For LLRA, defence of national minorities’ rights at the European level was a high priority. Other matters (such as protection of family values and national traditions or environmental concerns) were raised by political actors from different ideological backgrounds, but, in general, they were of secondary importance. Primarily European topics rarely come out on top. In addition to some references to EU institutional reforms as well as vows to effectively use EU structural funds, there have been some debates on implementation of certain EU membership obligations. During the EP election campaign in 2009, TT was the only relevant party openly demanding postponement of the decommissioning of the Ignalina nuclear power plant, which, according to the EU accession treaty had to be closed by the end of that year. In response to such demands, the incumbent TS-LKD as well as other relevant forces emphasised the role of the EU and its various instruments to strengthen the energy security of the country (Braghiroli 2010: 183; Krupavičius 2010: 1063–1064). In 2014, TT proposed a referendum on the introduction of the Euro— another commitment stemming from the EU accession treaty, which was eventually realised on January 1, 2015. Nevertheless, the party did not actively campaign against the adoption of the currency, as it was part of the governing coalition (Jastramskis and Ramonaitė 2015: 193). Also, in June 2014, after the EP elections had taken place, a referendum was held on banning the sale of land to foreign nationals and foreign legal entities, together with several other constitutional amendments, after the constitutionally required 300,000 citizens’ signatures were collected. The referendum was initiated by the Farmers and Greens, the Nationalist Union and several civic groups (Jastramskis and Ramonaitė 2015: 193–194). The leaders of TT also supported the referendum. If the voters agreed to such a proposal, Lithuania would violate the EU accession treaty. However, the turnout was only 15 per cent (far below the required 50 per cent), and the referendum thus failed. The choice of its date was a key issue. The initiators wanted to organise the referendum together with the presidential and

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the EP elections, but the mainstream parties deliberately decided to postpone it in order to significantly reduce the probability of its success (Aleknonis 2014: 41). Despite the overall dullness of EP election campaigns, the EP is an attractive place for many career politicians due to its prestige and notable financial rewards. During 2014–2019, at some point of time, six Lithuanian MEPs (out of eleven in the initial composition) were leaders of five parliamentary parties, the TS-LKD, DP, LRLS, TT and LLRA. LSDP was also represented by key party politicians, including Zigmantas Balčytis who stood against Grybauskaitė in the second round of the presidential elections in 2014. For some of these leaders, a MEP mandate provided a platform to solidify their political positions. For example, the impeached president and the long-time leader of the TT, Paksas, has been barred from participating in any national elections where the oath to the Republic of Lithuania is required. Consequently, standing in EP elections has been the only way he can participate in politics since his removal from the Lithuanian presidency in 2004. Likewise, MEP status provided opportunities for Uspaskich to seek shelter from legal prosecution in Lithuania at certain points of time. While seasoned politicians generally dominate EP electoral lists, parties also tend to recruit certain celebrities before the elections. One of the drawbacks of such tactics, however, is that these celebrities, if elected, might not follow the official party line and be rather undisciplined. To sum up, EP elections in Lithuania exhibit clear traits of second-­ order elections (SOE). They are overshadowed by other elections in media coverage and voters’ interest. European issues also rarely serve as a focal point for party competition. Nevertheless, political parties tend to use them strategically to solidify their positions. Because EP election participation almost matches that of national elections, EP elections serve as a bellwether for political actors to realistically evaluate their capacities and future prospects. Furthermore, they provide an opportunity for non-mainstream parties to increase their visibility and political status. While the overall Europeanisation of EP electoral campaigns has been rather superficial, certain relevant political forces in Lithuania, such as TT and LVŽS, have attempted to politicise certain aspects of the Lithuania’s EU commitments. So far, however, such efforts in Lithuania in general have failed.

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8.4   Euroscepticism in the Lithuanian Electoral Manifestos of 2019 In the EP elections in 2019, most contenders in Lithuania were decidedly pro-European. Even if they recognised that the EU faced numerous challenges and required reforms, they tended to agree that, precisely because of these existential threats for the EU, Lithuania needed more Europe, not less. In fact, the electoral manifestos of the major parties were even more favourable concerning further European integration than in previous EP elections. While a number of Eurosceptic contestants showed up, they limited themselves to a rather abstract critique of the EU and stopped short of proposing more concrete steps like leaving the Eurozone, not to speak of exiting the EU. The electoral manifesto of the incumbent Farmers and Greens (LVŽS) expressed clear Euro-optimistic tones. They declared that Lithuania’s entry to the EU was a success and it provided numerous opportunities for the future. While acknowledging ‘the emerging challenges for the EU’ and that ‘the world was always changing’, they nevertheless conveyed confidence that working together with their European counterparts they could create a better Europe (Central Electoral Commission 2019f: 12). Differently from previous electoral campaigns, they exclusively focused on proposals to deepen European integration in order to foster sustainable development both in Europe and Lithuania. The programme of their minor coalition partners—the Lithuanian Social Democratic Labour Party (LSDDP)12—also strongly supported Lithuanian membership in the EU, while expressing the need to increase member states’ influence in EU institutions (Central Electoral Commission 2019f: 30–31). One can also register a shift in favour of further European integration in the most recent programmatic documents of the main opposition party—the centre-right TS-LKD. While this political movement has always been pro-European, it contains an influential Christian Democrats faction that is more socially conservative and Eurosceptic than the party’s front leaders. Under the influence of these more conservative ranks, the party manifesto in the EP elections in 2014 in an Orbánesque manner denounced EU-wide efforts to replace Christian cultural heritage and traditions with 12  This party was formed in mid-2018, when a group of LSDP MPs, including their two former leaders and Prime Ministers Kirkilas and Butkevičius, left the party after they rejected the decision by an internal party referendum to withdraw from the governing coalition.

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an ‘artificial’ European identity. It also asserted that the nation state is a ‘natural community’ and the main actor in building a strong future for Europe, and strongly criticised intensifying incitements to recognise same-­ sex couples as ‘alternative families’ in the EU.  It concluded that social policy must firmly remain the exclusive competence of individual member states (TS-LKD 2014). However, in 2015, after the election of a new TS-LKD leader, 33-year-­ old MEP Gabrielius Landsbergis, grandson of the independence movement leader Vytautas Landsbergis, the party started a renewal process, including its eventual programmatic upgrade. In 2018, the party congress adopted the declaration ‘We Believe in Europe’ with official translations into English and German. It aimed to solve the identity dilemma of reconciling culturally conservative concerns with the geopolitical obligations of European integration for the benefit of the latter. The declaration argued that in the wake of the Kremlin’s aggressive actions in Ukraine and elsewhere, as well as due to numerous challenges that Europe faced, Lithuania needed to be at the forefront of ‘natural consolidation in the EU along with its leaders Germany and France, because this guarantees the country’s geopolitical safety’. It also explicitly called the German Christian Democrats their ‘closest ideological allies’ and renounced any attempts to contrast ethnic nationality against European identity, which ‘turns us into narrow-minded provincials’. Moreover, it refrained from any references to ‘traditional family values’ while calling the respect for human dignity, democracy and free society as the core values of Judeo-Christian civilisation that unite Europe. Ultimately, it also asserted that Lithuania ‘should not fear the power of EU policy to expand into new areas such as social policy, healthcare, and education, which is where the state still experiences many issues’ (TS-LKD 2018). This declaration was a key source for the TS-LKD platform in the EP elections in 2019. It also validated the decision of TS-LKD as the sole major centre-right party in Central and Eastern Europe to join its Western counterparts in demanding the expulsion of the Hungarian Fidesz party from the European People’s Party in March 2019 (Baltic Times 2019). A major opposition force—the centre-left Social Democrats (LSDP)— has also gone through a renewal process since 2017, after a new party leader, 37-year-old Gintautas Paluckas, was chosen in direct elections. The new leader promised to restore Social Democratic credibility after the humiliating loss in the Seimas elections in 2016. Against this background,

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in the EP elections in 2019, LSDP re-confirmed its pro-EU orientation with an ambitious platform almost exclusively focused on EU-level goals and respective measures. While the party openly admitted the existence of political, economic and social problems in the EU, they blamed not European institutions but national governments for their inability to fully implement the integration goals established by the Lisbon Treaty (LSDP 2019). The other centre-right parliamentary party in the opposition—the Liberal Movement of the Republic of Lithuania (LRLS)—presented itself as ‘the most European party in Lithuania’. Its electoral manifesto, apart from few general critical remarks about lack of transparency and overregulation in the EU, presented 15 proposals to support further European integration as well as to solidify Lithuania’s position in the ever-closer union (LRLS 2019). One of two Liberal MEPs in 2014–2019, Antanas Guoga, left the party before the elections and joined the electoral list of the originally soft Eurosceptic and populist Lithuanian Centre Party (LCP). However, the campaign was heavily based on Guoga’s personality and any critical remark concerning the EU was removed from the party platform. Likewise, the campaign of the populist Labour Party (which like LRLS belongs to the ALDE group) was largely centred around its leader and MEP Uspaskich. Its official manifesto was non-controversial and entirely pro-European, reflecting general ALDE political values. After withdrawing from the presidential elections in early 2019, the independent MP Aušra Maldeikienė assembled an electoral committee called ‘The Train of Aušra Maldeikienė’ (Aušros Maldeikienės traukinys, AMT) with yet another pro-EU programme for the 2019 EP elections. The AMT manifesto not only expressed strong support for Lithuanian membership in the EU but also openly argued for ‘more Europe in Lithuania’ and even framed the EU as an essential factor ensuring Lithuanian independence (Central Electoral Commission 2019f: 34–35). In this regard, during the campaign TV debates AMT regularly warned about the threats to Lithuania if the EU disintegrated and frequently attacked the Lithuanian government’s lack of solidarity with other member states in such areas as migration and social policy. Given the highly securitised public discourse, which tightly connected EU membership with the country’s chances of survival in a volatile geopolitical environment, the Eurosceptic forces in Lithuania were largely marginalised. Nevertheless, somewhat emboldened by Donald Trump and

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Brexit, as well as by the victories of populist and nativist forces in various EU countries, Eurosceptics attempted to provide an alternative vision of Europe. All of them emphasised the idea of a ‘Europe of nations’ as a way of reforming the EU and thus thwarting the alleged federalisation of Europe. However, they avoided any proposals that Lithuania should radically break with the EU, and in some cases even included some pro-­ integrationist ideas to win over the voters. Among such forces, LLRA-KŠS stands out as the most solid organisation enjoying some of the most stable electoral support in the Lithuanian party system. While affiliating with the Eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists political group (Central Electoral Commission 2019g), LLRA-KŠS has tried to find a delicate balance between soft Eurosceptic and moderately pro-EU views. The electoral manifesto of LLRA-KSˇS expressed the need to reform the EU but it also argued for the creation of a common EU social policy as well as for the equalisation of farmer subsidies across the EU (Central Electoral Commission 2019f: 24–25) and even the strengthening of EP powers (LRT 2019a). Moreover, its electoral manifesto could be considered one of the most Europeanised in the 2019 campaign. In fact, most of its points were dedicated to pan-EU issues, such as immigration, GMO governance, the Services Directive and the new Copyright Directive, and largely omitted Lithuania-only issues. At the EU level, the same concerns were also often raised by the ruling Law and Justice Party in Poland, with whom LLRA-KŠS has fostered a long-standing cooperation and which belongs to the same political group in the EP. The Order and Justice Party’s (TT) approach to the EU during the 2019 EP electoral campaign was similar to that of LLRA-KŠS. Under the leadership of Remigijus Žemaitaitis, who forced the former chairman Paksas out of the party in mid-2018, TT also mixed soft Eurosceptic and moderately pro-EU messages during the campaign. Even though its view of the EU as a ‘Europe of nations’ was identical to the LLRA-KŠS, TT’s angle was a bit different as it framed its messages in the context of the need to safeguard Lithuanian interests within the EU and protect the country from the ‘unfavourable’ initiatives of the big member states, for example, the Mobility Package (Tvarka ir Teisingumas 2019). This focus allowed the party to counterbalance its soft Eurosceptic views with some pro-EU proposals, such as strengthening the EP and even the creation of EU-wide minimum personal income rules (Central Electoral Commission 2019f: 40–41).

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After leaving TT in mid-2018, former president and two-term MEP Paksas assembled an election committee called ‘The Movement of President Rolandas Paksas’ (‘Prezidento Rolando Pakso judėjimas’, PRPJ) in early 2019. His election committee may be considered one of the few undoubtedly, albeit soft, Eurosceptic forces that competed in the 2019 EP electoral campaign. Even though PRPJ did not back a Lithuanian exit from the EU, it based its EU policy on a ‘Lithuania first’ principle, by rejecting any possibility of ‘the federalisation of the EU’ (Central Electoral Commission 2019f: 10–11). PRPJ also raised some unique points by blaming Germany and France for forcing their proposals on other member states (e.g., the Mobility Package) and by criticising the EU for disregarding the interests of its eastern member states, for example, by ‘forcing’ migrant quotas (LRT 2019b). Ultimately, a soft Eurosceptic election committee called ‘Let Us Recover the State!’, headed by Radžvilas, a professor of political philosophy at Vilnius University, delivered arguably the most theoretically articulated critique of the EU (see Radžvilas 2017). While emphasising ‘an unalterable Lithuania’s interest to be in the EU’, it deplored ‘the liberal-­ communist ideology’ of contemporary EU leaders who strived for EU federalisation at any cost. According to the manifesto’s authors, such actions will inadvertently lead to EU disintegration, which puts Lithuania’s existence at risk. Therefore, the manifesto called for an urgent and fundamental EU reform, which would protect the sovereignty of European nations and curb the influence of ‘globalist’ elites and NGOs (VRSV 2019). While its rhetoric might have sounded radical, the manifesto provided only few concrete ideas detailing what the reformed EU would look like. Even concerning Lithuania’s membership in the Eurozone, it mainly called for a cost-benefit analysis to make further decisions.

8.5   The Campaign and Results of 2019 In general, the EP elections in 2019 epitomised the SOE trends that had been observed in Lithuania since its entry to the EU in 2004. Although the voter turnout reached a record 53.5 per cent, the EP 2019 electoral campaign was largely overshadowed by the simultaneous Lithuanian presidential election. As the incumbent Grybauskaitė could not run for a third term in office, the Lithuanian public was far more interested in the personalities competing for the office of the head of state than the EP.

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This interest was well reflected by the media. For example, the Lithuanian national broadcaster organised eight live primetime TV debates for the presidential candidates, while the parties and election committees competing in the EP elections were offered only four live pre-peak TV debates in the same period (Central Electoral Commission 2019h). Unsurprisingly, Lithuanian political actors were also more invested in the presidential election. During the electoral campaign, the presidential candidates spent seven times more money on political advertising than all the candidate lists for the EP combined, despite there being only seven presidential candidates and 301 candidates for the EP (Central Electoral Commission 2019i). Because the bulk of attention was paid to the presidential campaign, the 2019 EP electoral campaign was uneventful and rather dull. Even though a record high of 16 candidate lists participated in the contest, most of them focused on a short list of similar issues and failed to produce more than a very limited number of new or unique proposals. One of the most frequently touched upon issues was the expected reduction in EU financial support to Lithuania after 2021. Each year, Lithuania receives around €1.5bn in EU funding (European Commission 2019b), which significantly reduces pressures on the national budget. However, as Lithuanian GDP per capita has substantially increased since 2004, the EU financial support may be considerably reduced for the period of 2021–2027, thus bringing into the question the sustainability of the Lithuanian budget. During the campaign only LSDDP argued to seek to maintain the current level of EU funding, though it also agreed with most other parties and election committees that Lithuania had failed to invest the EU financial support strategically—for example by spending money on ‘asphalt’ rather than on projects to transform the country’s economy or improve peoples’ skills. Most of the parties and election committees also argued for the equalisation of farmer subsidies across the EU.  As Lithuanian farmers receive around 45 per cent lower subsidies than the EU average, this provided the candidates an opportunity to promise ‘fairer’ financial arrangements, if elected. The parties and election committees also often discussed the proposed Mobility Package and the idea of an EU-wide minimum wage or universal basic income scheme. The Mobility Package became a household name in Lithuania in early 2019, when the biggest Lithuanian transport companies, generating up to 12 per cent of Lithuanian GDP, threatened to leave

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country if the legislation was adopted. They argued that the proposal would make their business model untenable due to new EU-wide social standards for truck drivers. In this regard, LLS, PRPJ and TT openly criticised the proposed Mobility Package as being unfair to Lithuanian companies and pledged to stop it. Only AMT unequivocally supported the proposal by stressing its benefits for workers. At the same time, a number of parties and election committees (DP, LCP, LLS, LSDDP, LSDP, SLVE and TT) supported the introduction of a minimum wage across the EU. Other common campaign issues were related to the climate and environmental protection, migration and border protection, EU Eastern policy, equalisation of farmer subsidies and the protection of ‘traditional values’. Most noticeably, none of the candidate lists proposed to leave the EU and, more interestingly, no one argued for the reintroduction of the national currency, the Litas. The common EU currency is rather unpopular13 among Lithuanians due to its perceived effect on prices since 2015. Even though PRPJ raised the idea of a return to the Litas in mid-2018 (Paksas 2018), the committee did not include this proposal in its EP electoral manifesto and did not mention it in any of the TV debates, thus making the question of Lithuanian membership in the Eurozone an issue outside political discourse. Overall, the 2019 EP elections were not particularly successful for Lithuanian Eurosceptics. If only ‘openly’ Eurosceptic political forces (PRPJ and VRSV) are considered, their performance was in line with the previous elections as they did not win any seats in the EP and received the support of only 7 per cent of the electorate.14 These numbers increases to 14.8 per cent and one seat in the EP, if LLRA-KŠS and TT are counted as soft Eurosceptics. To counter the long-standing pro-EU trends in Lithuanian politics, there were some efforts of coordination between the nationalist candidates in the simultaneous EP and presidential elections. As mentioned above, Juozaitis, a nationalist and soft Eurosceptic candidate in the 13  According to the Flash Eurobarometer survey published in November 2018, only 42 per cent of Lithuanians thought that having the Euro was a good thing for Lithuania—the lowest share across the Eurozone. 14  This number closely corresponds to the actual share of Eurosceptics in Lithuania. According to the 2019 Spring Eurobarometer, Lithuanian withdrawal from the EU was supported by around 9 per cent of Lithuanian voters (European Parliament 2019).

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presidential elections, recalled his EP electoral committee to support Radžvilas’ committee. However, later Juozaitis, disappointed by the lack of cooperation from Radžvilas in the first round of the presidential elections, withdrew his support for Radžvilas a few days before the EP elections took place. The incumbent LVŽS did not receive as much electoral support as it had hoped but it managed to increase its number of seats from one to two. LVŽS framed both the presidential and EP elections as a national referendum on its work in the government since 2016. After its presidential candidate and incumbent PM Saulius Skvernelis failed to reach the second round in the presidential election, LVŽS suggested that it would leave its own governing coalition if it did not win the 2019 EP election. The party eventually retracted its original promises, although it started negotiations on enlarging the governing coalition to secure a minimal winning parliamentary majority. To attract more votes, the LVŽS also recruited the legendary basketball player and businessperson Šarūnas Marčiulionis. After he was elected to the EP, the political novice decided not to take the office and amid the public criticism for cheating the voters relinquished his mandate to Stasys Jakeliūnas, an influential MP from the LVŽS. The Farmers and Greens, however, were not the only party that included celebrities at the top of their electoral list. Another notable example was the TS-LKD candidate Liudas Mažylis, professor of political science at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas. Although he had previously belonged to the party, Mažylis was largely a political enigma until recently when he hit the headlines for discovering Lithuania’s independence act of 1918 with original signatures in German archives. The 2019 EP election results also revealed the limited success of the election committees. Overall, five election committees received the support of just 15.6 per cent of the electorate, while only one committee (AMT) managed to win a seat. Nevertheless, the committees further fragmented Lithuania’s political scene, though they mainly affected the results of the smaller parties. In fact, the vote share of both the LSDP and the TS-LKD dropped by only one percentage point when compared to the 2014 EP elections. Meanwhile, both the LLRA-KŠS and the LRLS, the parties that usually enjoyed better results in European rather than in national elections, experienced a setback. Electoral support for the Liberals

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fell by 9.4 percentage points, and the party lost one of its two MEP seats. Its performance was affected by the departure of MEP Guoga, who decided instead to run a personality-based campaign as the first number in the list of the populist LCP. The biggest loser among the parliamentary parties was Order and Justice, which got only 2.6 per cent and lost both its MEP seats. The main factor in its fiasco was the exodus of Paksas. The former president created his own committee but could not meet the threshold himself.

8.6   Conclusion In the EP elections of 2019, the major political actors in Lithuania retained their overly pro-European tone and effectively managed to restrict the spread of Eurosceptic ideas. As with the ‘fight or flight’ response in stressful situations, the apparent fragmentation of the EU as well as increasingly aggressive actions by the Kremlin motivated the mainstream parties in Lithuania not to drop but instead to further reinforce their pro-­integration stance. Eventually, the EP 2019 election campaign in Lithuania and clear defeat of its marginalised Eurosceptic forces re-confirmed the highly securitised character of the country’s party system. Nevertheless, beyond the inherent geopolitical structuration of political competition in Lithuania, one may also observe the essential role of relevant parties’ organisational development and their tactical choices. The generational change of the mainstream parties TS-LKD and LSDP and their leadership coincided with the confirmation of their pro-Western orientation and democratic credentials. Since the Seimas elections in 2016, the incumbent Farmers and Greens also experienced a transformation from a mainly extra-parliamentary organisation towards an established political force that must consider the international obligations of the country. For their part, the Eurosceptic and populist forces were more original and vocal than in previous EP elections in Lithuania. However, the split in Paksas’ Order and Justice party and the overall failure of the rising right-­ wing Eurosceptic movements to better coordinate their national and European electoral campaigns produced an ultimately miserable outcome. At least this time.

5 2 0 2 2 1

1 0

0 0 0 0 – – – – – – – –

28.4 13.6 4.6 11.8 10.7 7

6.4 5.4

2.6 2.4 1.1 0.3 – – – – – – – –

DP LSDP NS TS/TS-LKD LiCS/LLS VND/LVLS/ LVŽS LDP/TT LLRA/ LLRA-KŠS LKD KKSS TPP NCP/LCP TaS/LTRS LRLS FP PDP ŽP TPrP TPLK LŽP

EP 2004 seats

EP 2004%

Party

1.3 1.9 – 0.5 0.2 – – – – – 0.2 –

11.1 3.7

14.4 8.9 6.4

27.7 20.1

LT 2004%

– – – 0.7 – 5.4 3.1 1.1 – 14.3 – –

12 4.5

8.5 11.1 3.5 18.6 5 3.5

LT 2008%

1

3

0.3 –

– 7.2 2.4 1.3 1.2

– 2.9 –

11.9 8.2

8.6 18.1 – 26.2 3.4 1.8

EP 2009%

– 0 – 0 – 1 0 0 0 0 0 –

2 1

1 3 – 4 0 0

EP 2009 seats

0.9 8.6 1.2 – – – – –

– – –

7.3 5.8

19.8 18.4 – 15.1 2.1 3.9

LT 2012%

Table 8.1  Results of the parliamentary and EP elections in Lithuania

Appendix

– – – – 1.9 15.6 – – – – – 3.3

15.5 7.6

12.1 16.3 – 16.5 1.5 6.2

EP 2014%

– – – – 0 2 – – – – – 0

2 1

1 2 – 2 0 1

EP 2014 seats

– – – 6.1 0.5 9.1 – – – – – 1.9

5.3 5.5

4.7 14.4 – 21.7 2.1 21.5

LT 2016%

– – – 4.9 – 6.2 – – – – – 2.1

2.6 5.2

8.5 15 – 18.7 1.8 11.9

EP 2019%

– – – 0 – 1 – – – – – 0

0 1

1 2 – 3 0 2

EP 2019 Seats

170  L. GUDŽINSKAS AND T. BEKIŠAS

– – – – – –

EP 2004%

– – – – – –

EP 2004 seats – – – – – –

LT 2004% – – – – – –

LT 2008% – – – – – –

EP 2009% – – – – – –

EP 2009 seats – – – – – –

LT 2012% – – – – – –

EP 2014% – – – – – –

EP 2014 seats – – – – – –

LT 2016% 6.2 3.8 3.2 2.2 1.3 1.1

EP 2019% 1 0 0 0 0 0

EP 2019 Seats

Note: LT indicates elections to the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania (multi-mandate district), and EP denotes the European Parliament. Only parties and election committees that participated in the EP elections are considered. Results in italics indicate a soft Eurosceptic party, while bold italics indicate a hard Eurosceptic party DP = Labour Party; LSDP = Lithuanian Social Democratic Party; NS = New Union; TS/TS-LKD = Homeland Union/Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats; LiCS/LLS = Liberal and Centre Union/Lithuanian Freedom Union (Liberals); VND/LVLS/LVŽS = Union of Peasants and New Democratic Parties/Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union/Lithuanian Farmers and Green Union; LDP/TT = Liberal Democratic Party/Order and Justice; LLRA/LLRA-KŠS = Lithuanian Polish Electoral Action/Lithuanian Polish Electoral Action  – Christian Families’ Union; LKD = Lithuanian Christian Democrats; KKSS = Christian Conservative Social Union; TPP = National Progress Party; NCP/LCP = National Centre Party/Lithuanian Centre Party; LRLS = Liberal Movement of the Republic of Lithuania; FP = Front Party; PDP = Civic Democratic Party; ŽP = Samogitian Party; TPrP = Party of National Renaissance; TPLK = National Party ‘Lithuanian Way’; LŽP = Lithuanian Green Party; TaS/LTRS = Lithuanian Nationalist Union/Lithuanian Nationalist and Republican Union; LS = Political party ‘List of Lithuania’; LLP = Lithuanian People’s Party; AMT = Public election committee ‘Aušra Maldeikienė’s Train’; PRPJ = Public election committee ‘President Rolandas Paksas’s Movement’; VRSV = Public election committee ‘Vytautas Radžvilas: Let Us Recover the State’!; LSDDP = Lithuanian Social Democratic Labour Party; SLVE = Public election committee ‘Strong Lithuania in United Europe’; LŠ = Public election committee ‘The Decisive Leap’

Source: Central Electoral Commission

AMT PRPJ VRSV LSDDP SLVE LŠ

Party

8 LITHUANIA 

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References Aleknonis, G. (2014). European Parliament Elections in Lithuania: Populist Competition in the Shadow of the Presidential Vote. Political Preferences, 9, 37–56. Baltic Times. (2019). Orban Asks Lithuanian Conservatives Leader to Leave Fidesz in EU Center-Right Group. https://www.baltictimes.com/orban_asks_lithuanian_conservatives_leader_to_leave_fidesz_in_eu_center-right_group/. Accessed 7 July 2019 Braghiroli, S. (2010). Lithuania. In J.  Lodge (Ed.), The 2009 Elections to the European Parliament (pp. 178–187). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Cabada, L., Hloušek, V., & Jurek, P. (2014). Party Systems in East Central Europe. Plymouth: Lexington Books. Central Electoral Commission. (2019a). Referendum on Lithuania’s Membership of the European Union, 10–11 May 2003. http://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/rinkimai/2003/referendumas/rezultatai/rez_e_16.htm. Accessed 6 July 2019. Central Electoral Commission. (2019b). Tautininkų sa ̨jungos programa. https:// www.vrk.lt/Tautininku-programa/. Accessed 6 July 2019. Central Electoral Commission. (2019c). Nacionalinė centro partija. https:// www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/rinkimai/2004/euro/programos/index.html. Accessed 6 July 2019. Central Electoral Commission. (2019d). Nr. 6 Lietuvos centro partija. https:// www.vrk.lt/nr.-6-lietuvos-centro-partija/. Accessed 6 July 2019. Central Electoral Commission. (2019e). Partijų rinkimų programų leidinys. https://www.vrk.lt/documents/10180/606155/Daugiamandates+inf.+leidi nys_2016.pdf/5a06d1e3-7fd5-4192-b397-a0531bdd5971. Accessed 6 July 2019. Central Electoral Commission. (2019f). Rinkimai i ̨ Europos Parlamenta ̨ 2019  m. gegužės 26 d. https://www.vrk.lt/documents/10180/676652/ EP+bendras+leidinys++A5+2019.pdf/36efb36d-7f88-479e-855a-66 6c4060b322. Accessed 6 July 2019. Central Electoral Commission. (2019g). Anketos dėl rinkėjų informavimo apie ryšius tarp nacionalinių partijų ir Europos politinių partijų . https://www.vrk. lt/anketos-del-rinkeju-informavimo-apie-rysius-tarp-nacionaliniu-partiju-ireuropos-politiniu-partiju-2019-ep. Accessed 6 July 2019. Central Electoral Commission. (2019h). Kviečiame stebėti 2019  m. rinkimų diskusijų laidas per LRT ir „Lietuvos ryto” televizija ̨. https://www.vrk.lt/naujienos/-/content/10180/9/kvieciame-stebeti-2019-m-rinkimu-diskusiju-laidas-per-lrt-ir-lietuvos-ryto-televizija. Accessed 6 July 2019. Central Electoral Commission. (2019i). Rinkimai ir referendumai. https://www. vrk.lt/rinkimai. Accessed 6 July 2019.

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Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. (2010). On Elections to the European Parliament. https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ ta1215/content. Accessed 6 July 2019. European Commission. (2019a). Eurobarometer Interactive. https://ec.europa. eu/commfrontof fice/publicopinionmobile/index.cfm/Chart/index. Accessed 6 July 2019. European Commission (2019b). EU Expenditure and Revenue 2014–2020. http://ec.europa.eu/budget/graphs/revenue_expediture.html. Accessed 6 July 2019. European Social Survey (2019). Cumulative File, ESS 1–8. http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/. Accessed 6 July 2019. INRA (1993): European Integration Survey 1992. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. https://doi.org/10.4232/1.2345. Accessed 6 July 2019. Jastramskis, M., & Ramonaitė, A. (2015). Lithuania. European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook, 54, 190–198. https://doi. org/10.1111/2047-8852.12097. Krupavičius, A. (2005). Lithuania. European Journal of Political Research, 44, 1086–1101. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00273.x. Krupavičius, A. (2010). Lithuania. European Journal of Political Research, 49, 1058–1075. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01962.x. Lewis, P. (2006). Party Systems in Post-Communist Central Europe: Patterns of Stability and Consolidation. Democratization, 13(4), 562–583. https://doi. org/10.1080/13510340600791863. Lietuvių tautininkų ir respublikonų sa ̨junga. (2019a). Istorija. https://tautininkai. lt/istorija/. Accessed 6 July 2019. Lietuvių tautininkų ir respublikonų sa ̨junga. (2019b). Bendroji programa. https:// tautininkai.lt/bendroji-programa/. Accessed 6 July 2019. Lietuvos centro partija. (2019). Programa. https://www.centropartija.lt/programa. Accessed 6 July 2019. Lietuvos valstiečių ir žalių jų sa ̨junga. (2013). LVŽS: Referendumas dėl žemės pardavimo – ne emocija, o stiprėjanti Lietuvos pozicija ES. https://www.lvzs.lt/lt/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1421:lvs-referendumas-dlems-pardavimo-ne-emocija-o-stiprjanti-lietuvos-pozicija-es&catid=2:pagrindin is&Itemid=1. Accessed 6 July 2019. LRLS. (2019). Europos Parlamento 2019 metų rinkimų programa. https://www. liberalai.lt/content/uploads/2018/10/EP-PROGRAMA_PatvirtintaTarybos-2019.02.28.pdf. Accessed 7 July 2019. LRT. (2019a). Rinkimai 2019: Kandidatų i ̨ Europos Parlamenta ̨ debatai I. https://www.lrt.lt/mediateka/irasas/2000067371/kandidatu-i-europosparlamenta-debatai. Accessed 6 July 2019. LRT. (2019b). Rinkimai 2019: Kandidatų i ̨ Europos Parlamenta ̨ debatai II. https://www.lrt.lt/mediateka/irasas/2000068300/rinkimai-2019-kandidatu-i-europos-parlamenta-debatai. Accessed 6 July 2019.

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LSDP. (2019). LSDP rinkimų i ̨ 2019–2024 metų Europos parlamenta ̨ programa. https://www.lsdp.lt/europosprograma/. Accessed 7 July 2019 Mayer, T. (2005). Lithuania. In J. Lodge (Ed.), The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament (pp. 173–179). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ozolas, R. (2005). 2004-ieji: Lietuva: antrosios Respublikos pabaiga. Vilnius: Mintis. Paksas, R. (2018). Kviečiu i ̨ Tautos referenduma ̨ dėl lito sugra ̨žinimo. http:// www.respublika.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuva/lietuvos_politika/rolandas_paksas_ kvieciu_i_tautos_referenduma_del_lito_sugrazinimo/. Accessed 6 July 2019. Radžvilas, V. (2017). European Union at a Crossroad: Reform or Failure? In A. Austers & K. Bukovskis (Eds.), Euroscepticism in the Baltic States: Uncovering Issues, People and Stereotypes (pp. 38–50). Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Rose, R., & Munro, N. (2009). Parties and Elections in New European Democracies. Colchester: ECPR Press. Szczerbiak, A., & Taggart, P. (2008). Theorizing Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement, and Causality. In A.  Szczerbiak & P.  Taggart (Eds.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Volume 2 (pp. 238–262). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2008). Conclusion: Opposing Europe? Three Patterns of Party Competition over Europe. In A.  Szczerbiak & P.  Taggart (Eds.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Volume 1 (pp. 348–363). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Talving, L., & Pukelis, L. (2014). The Baltic States: Mixed Results for Incumbents. In L. De Sio, V. Emanuele, & N. Maggini (Eds.), The European Parliament Elections of 2014 (pp. 133–140). Rome: Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali. TS-LKD. (2014). 2014  m. Europos parlamento rinkimų programa. https:// elections-europeennes.robert-schuman.eu/wp-content/themes/electionseuropeennes/pdf/1_Homeland_Union_Lithuanian_Christian_Democrats_program.pdf. Accessed 7 July 2019. TS-LKD. (2018). Declaration: We Believe in Europe. https://tsajunga.lt/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/TS-LKD-European-Declaration_2018-05-12-EN. pdf. Accessed 7 July 2019. Tvarka ir teisingumas. (2019). Lietuvos vieta  – Tautų Europoje. http://www. tvarka.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuvos-seime/vytautas-kamblevicius-lietuvos-vietatautu-europoje. Accessed 6 July 2019. Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė, I. (2014). Eurosceptics in Lithuania: On the Margins of Politics? European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities, 3(4), 1–21. Vitkus, G. (2017). Small Is Small: Euroscepticism in Lithuanian Politics. In A. Austers & K. Bukovskis (Eds.), Euroscepticism in the Baltic States: Uncovering Issues, People and Stereotypes (pp. 38–50). Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. VRSV. (2019). 2019  m. Europos parlamento rinkimų programa. http://www. radzvilas2019.lt/p/priedas-nr.html. Accessed 7 July 2019.

CHAPTER 9

Poland Aleks Szczerbiak

This chapter examines the May 2019 European Parliament (EP) election in Poland in the context of the three previous campaigns. It focuses particularly on the role of Euroscepticism and uses the second-order election (SOE) hypothesis (Reif and Schmitt 1980) as an analytical framework. It begins by examining the basic characteristics of the electoral system for EP elections in Poland. It moves on to discuss the general patterns of public and party Euroscepticism since Polish EU accession in 2004, identifying the Hard and Soft Eurosceptic parties and their performances in both first-order and EP elections. The next section analyses the first three Polish EP election campaigns held in 2004, 2009 and 2014 from the perspective of SOE assumptions, including the level of Euroscepticism and the salience of EU-related issues. It then examines the role of Euroscepticism (or rather lack of it) in the 2019 election, and concludes by analysing the election results and campaign, again from a SOE perspective and with particular focus on the performance of Eurosceptic parties. The chapter argues that although Poland appeared to be one of most overwhelmingly Europhile countries in terms of public attitudes, Poles had become increasingly instrumental in their approach towards EU A. Szczerbiak (*) University of Sussex, Brighton, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 V. Hloušek, P. Kaniok (eds.), The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9_9

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membership as the idea of accession as a natural and obvious civilisational choice came under question. It shows that the first three Polish EP elections did not conform to the SOE thesis entirely; the 2004 poll did so the most, and the one in 2014 the least. The 2019 election was seen as the first stage of the country’s autumn first-order parliamentary campaign and there was a high turnout, the main governing party won a stunning victory, fringe parties did not perform especially well and there was a great deal of media interest in the campaign. Moreover, in spite of the fact that the Soft Eurosceptic government had been in an ongoing conflict with the EU political establishment since 2015, Euroscepticism actually featured very little in the 2019 campaign.

9.1   The Electoral System The Polish law on European Parliament (EP) elections (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza 2019) remained largely unchanged since it was first approved in 2004. Poland’s MEPs1 were elected from 13 electoral districts that corresponded roughly to Poland’s 16 regional provinces, except that two South-Western provinces, two Southern provinces, two North-­ Western provinces and two North-Eastern provinces were merged to form single districts. At the same time, the province centred on Warsaw was divided into two districts: one comprising the city itself, the other its outer suburbs. The election was contested by ‘election committees’ (komitety wyborcze) that comprised either parties, coalitions of parties, or those non-­ partisan independent civic ‘committees of voters’ registered by groups of at least 1000 voters. In order to register a candidates’ list in an electoral district, an election committee had to collect 10,000 signatures from voters residing in that district. If an election committee collected the requisite number of signatures in at least seven districts then it was automatically registered across the whole country. In order to secure a share in the division of mandates, individual parties and civic committees needed to secure at least 5% of the vote nationally (electoral coalitions 8%) so, in reality, the only election committees with a serious chance of winning representation were those that managed to register candidates’ lists across the whole country. In a provision designed to 1  A total of 54 were elected in 2004, 50 in 2009, 51 in 2014 and 52 in 2019, although in the case of the last election the fifty-second would only take their seat after the UK left the EU. See: TVN 24 (2019, May 24).

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encourage electoral participation, there was no fixed number of seats allocated to each electoral district. This was determined after the election on the basis of turnout in that district. First, the overall allocation of seats between the electoral committees was determined nationally using the D’Hondt counting method (which favoured larger parties). Then, seats were divided among electoral districts according to turnout using the (more proportional) Hare-Niemayer method.

9.2   The General Context of Public and Party-­Based Euroscepticism in Poland Poland joined the EU along with seven other post-communist East European states in May 2004. The first decade-and-a-half of post-­ communist politics in Poland was characterised by very high levels of agreement among the main political actors over the broad direction and main objectives of foreign policy. Along with NATO accession, EU membership was one of the major foreign policy goals, if not the top goal, of all the post-1989 Polish governments of every political persuasion, and Poland was in the vanguard of the post-communist states wanting to integrate into Western international structures. Consequently there was, initially at least, a very high degree of public and elite consensus around the goal of EU membership for Poland, reflected in the fact that Poles voted overwhelmingly by a three-to-one margin to join the EU in a June 2003 accession referendum in which most of the main parties and political groupings called for a Yes vote (Szczerbiak 2004). Subsequently, support for Polish EU membership actually increased and Poland appeared to be one of the most overwhelmingly Europhile countries in terms of public attitudes (Szczerbiak 2011). For example, a March 2019 poll conducted by the Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (CBOS) agency, which tracked Polish public attitudes towards European integration since the country submitted its EU membership application in 1994, found that 91% of respondents supported Poland’s membership and only 5% were against. For most of the post-accession period, 80–90% were in favour with only 5–10% opposed (CBOS 2019: 2). One of the main reasons why levels of popular support for the country’s EU membership remained so high was that many Poles, especially among the older generations, saw the European integration process as part of a symbolic re-uniting of Poland with a Western international

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community of shared values that they had always considered themselves to be part of culturally and spiritually. Popular support for EU membership was, thus, originally rooted in the idea of accession to the Union as representing the culmination of the post-communist democratisation process, a factor that was evident, to a greater or lesser extent, in most of the postcommunist states that joined the EU at this time and captured in the slogan ‘returning to Europe’. This casting of EU accession as an historical and ‘civilisational’ choice made it difficult for Polish Eurosceptics to construct a convincing alternative narrative because European integration appeared to go with the grain, and be an inescapable part of the logic, of the country’s recent history. However, although Poles continued to favour their country’s EU membership overwhelmingly, this support often appeared to be very broad but rather shallow. Many had concerns about the trajectory of the European project and were much more divided over attempts to deepen integration and extend EU competencies in a number of areas. For example, a March–April 2017 CBOS survey found that 43% of Poles felt that defending the independence of member states should be given priority compared with 31% who favoured limiting national sovereignty to ensure the EU’s effectiveness (CBOS 2017: 17). Most Poles also opposed their country joining the Eurozone single currency area: a November 2018 CBOS survey, for example, found that 71% of respondents were against Euro adoption and only 22% were in favour (CBOS 2018a: 6). Poles also appeared to be increasingly instrumental in their approach towards EU membership, with support driven by the tangible material benefits that the Union was felt to deliver. An ominous sign for Polish EU enthusiasts was the fact that the younger, post-accession generation of Poles were the most anti-EU demographic: the March 2019 CBOS survey cited above, for example, found that 11% of 18–24-year-olds opposed EU membership compared with an average of 5% among all respondents (CBOS 2019). At the same time, the idea of EU membership as a natural and obvious civilisational choice came under strain due to an increasing sense of cultural distinctiveness that many Poles felt towards Western Europe. This was particularly evident in the sphere of moral-cultural values where Polish attachment to traditional morality and national identity stood in stark contrast to the socially liberal, cosmopolitan consensus that predominated among West European cultural and political elites. This issue surfaced in the contrasting reactions of Poles (and other Central Europeans) to the EU’s compulsory quota scheme developed as a response to the 2015

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European migration crisis. Poles were keen to avoid the kind of cultural and security problems that many of them felt West European countries had experienced through admitting large numbers of Muslim migrants who were seen as difficult to assimilate and embedding violent extremists within their communities. A June 2018 CBOS survey, for example, found that 72% of Poles were against accepting refugees (never mind economic migrants!) from the Middle East and North Africa and only 22% in favour (CBOS 2018b: 4). The same survey also found 75% of respondents opposed taking refugees from Muslim countries even if Poland was threatened with financial penalties, with only 16% in favour (CBOS 2018b: 5). Interestingly, a June 2017 poll conducted by the IBRiS agency for the Polityka journal found that 51% of respondents actually supported Poland leaving the EU if this was the only way to prevent the country being forced to admit Muslim migrants (TVP Info 2017). The only two main political groupings that opposed Poland joining the EU in the 2003 accession referendum were the clerical-nationalist League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR) and the radical agrarian Self-Defence (Samoobrona) party led by the controversial farmers’ protest movement leader Andrzej Lepper. The League spearheaded the most high-profile ‘no’ campaign during the referendum and its young and articulate deputy leader (and later leader) Roman Giertych emerged as the main spokesman and figurehead for the Hard Eurosceptic cause. Its anti­EU stance was underpinned by fundamental objections to European integration based on an ideological critique of the Union as a threat to Poland’s continued sovereign statehood and Catholic Christian traditions. After Poland’s accession to the EU, although some party leaders appeared (albeit reluctantly) to cease (or, at least de-prioritise) explicitly advocating the country’s withdrawal, the League remained deeply Eurosceptic and continued to stress the need to retain Warsaw’s sovereignty and distinctiveness within the Union, and oppose ‘deeper’ integration. Self-Defence ran a much less high profile and more instrumental campaign in the 2003 referendum and, in spite of its often-bitter anti-EU invective, argued that it was not opposed to Polish membership in principle, simply against the allegedly unsatisfactory ‘deal’ and unfavourable accession terms negotiated by the then-Polish government. During the referendum Self-Defence campaigned on the rather enigmatic slogan ‘The Choice is Yours’, although it was fairly clear from the party’s strong criticisms of the EU and vision of the dangers that would arise from Polish accession, particularly to its core electorate of farmers and those living in

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rural areas, what ‘choice’ it thought that Polish voters should make. After accession, Self-Defence’s criticisms of the EU became more low key and muted; indeed, although the party was always widely perceived to be strongly Eurosceptic, it was essentially a protest party and its approach to European issues instrumental and contingent on the current political situation. The party’s often very strong attacks on the EU were generally linked to its broader critique of the (pro-EU) political establishment. Self-Defence and the League both entered parliament in 2001, winning 10.1% and 7.9% of the votes, respectively, and secured re-election in 2005 with 11.4% and 8%. Mr Lepper also won 15.1% of the vote in the 2005 presidential election. In May 2006, the two parties joined the government as junior partners in a coalition led by the right-wing Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) but were excluded from any influence over the government’s foreign and European policy. Although Self-Defence had in any case almost completely withdrawn from discussions about the EU, the League’s period of silence on European policy ended abruptly when, at the beginning of 2007, it strongly opposed attempts by the Union to revise the constitutional treaty (what was to become the Lisbon Treaty). However, the two parties faded into obscurity after they both fell well short of the 5% parliamentary representation threshold in the 2007 parliamentary election. In fact, the most significant Polish party to have been labelled (Soft) Eurosceptic (including by this author) was Law and Justice, although its attitude towards European integration was not always easy to pin down. Law and Justice always supported EU membership, which it campaigned for in the 2003 referendum, as the only realistic foreign policy alternative for Poland. The dominant view within the party was that it was in the county’s interests to join and then remain a member of the Union and reform the organisation from within. Certainly, when it was in office in 2005–2007, Law and Justice significantly re-oriented Polish foreign and European policy, ‘re-claiming’ it from a post-1989 establishment that it argued had been overly conciliatory and insufficiently robust in defending the country’s interests within the EU. However, it was possible to exaggerate the extent to which there was a radical discontinuity between the European policies pursued by this government and those of its predecessors. This could be seen in the examples of the continuation, or even strengthening, of Polish support for European integration in some policy areas, such as common energy and defence policies. Law and Justice’s support for ‘solidarity’ through a large and expanding EU budget, and the

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continuation of EU regional and agricultural policies, also meant that, in practice, its approach often implied deeper European integration and the strengthening of the supranational institutions that were the main promoters of these policies. On the other hand, Law and Justice was, in abstract philosophical terms at least, clearly an anti-federalist grouping extremely critical of proposals to ‘deepen’ European integration and weaken the role of nation-states. The party was committed to defending Polish sovereignty and interests robustly within the Union, especially in the moral-cultural sphere where it rejected what it saw as a hegemonic EU liberal-left consensus that it believed undermined the country’s traditional values and national identity. Indeed, after Polish accession the party articulated an increasingly fundamental and principled critique of federalism and deeper European integration, highlighting the many economic and cultural risks that it felt were embodied in the EU project. This could be seen in Law and Justice’s attitude towards Polish adoption of the Euro single currency. The party always argued that Poland should not adopt the Euro until the country’s economy was more closely aligned with the rest of the EU, and that any final decision should be approved by a referendum. However, following the onset of the Eurozone crisis in 2010, Law and Justice increasingly gave the impression that, given the single currency’s huge internal problems, it could not envisage any point in the foreseeable future when it would be advantageous for Poland to adopt the Euro. Similarly, following the June 2016 UK referendum vote to withdraw from the EU, Law and Justice called for a fundamental re-think of the trajectory of the European project, highlighting the necessity for the EU to undertake deep reforms if it was to survive. The party called for a new European treaty that returned the EU to its original role as a strong but loose international ‘confederation’ of economically co-operating sovereign nation-states based on a more consensual decision-making process and clearly defined division of rights between the Union and its members. This involved: weakening the European Commission bureaucracy, whose role would be restricted to regulating the single market; shifting more EU decision-making power to the European Council and national governments who would be freer to pursue their own policies; and reducing the dominant role of the Franco-German axis. Moreover, after returning to office in autumn 2015, the new Law and Justice government found itself in conflict with the EU institutions and

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major European powers on several fronts. Firstly, along with other Central European states it refused to implement a plan agreed at a September 2015 EU summit involving the compulsory relocation of Middle Eastern and North African migrants located in Greece and Italy. This proposal was accepted by Law and Justice’s predecessor—the liberal-centrist Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), which was Poland’s ruling party between 2007 and 2015 and subsequently became the main opposition grouping. Although Law and Justice criticised the EU plan in opposition, it initially agreed to implement it—but then suspended the process, arguing that procedures for vetting migrants were insufficient to guarantee Polish security. Then, from January 2016 the Law and Justice government found itself in a protracted stand-off with the European Commission over ‘rule of law’ issues. Initially, the dispute was over the membership and functioning of Poland’s constitutional tribunal but in July 2017 escalated to include Law and Justice’s fiercely contested judicial reform programme. The Commission took the unprecedented step of initiating an action against Poland under Article 7 of the European treaties, which it could invoke against any EU member state where it felt there was a ‘systemic threat’ to democracy and the rule of law, threatening Warsaw with sanctions including the suspension of its European Council voting rights. The Commission also initiated infringements procedures in the Court of Justice of the EU against the Law and Justice government on both its judicial reforms and refusal to implement the migrant quotas scheme. Law and Justice, on the other hand, argued that its judicial reforms were needed because Polish courts were seriously inefficient and tolerated frequent irregularities. The party said that, following the country’s flawed transition to democracy in 1989, the judiciary, like many key Polish institutions, was expropriated by an extremely well-entrenched, and often deeply corrupt, post-communist elite, which then co-opted the new legal establishment that perpetuated its legacy. It accused the Commission of bias and double standards, arguing that the reforms were in line with practices that existed in other established Western democracies. The Commission was, they argued, motivated by the fact that Warsaw had been robust in promoting Polish interests and values, and in opposing the socially liberal and multicultural policies supported by the EU political establishment.

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The Law and Justice government’s clashes with the EU institutions were one of the factors contributing to a worsening of the country’s already strained bi-lateral relations with the main European powers. Indeed, the government’s opponents argued that Law and Justice had so marginalised Poland within the EU’s decision-making structures that the Union would be much less engaged in the country’s future development. In response, Law and Justice argued that it found itself in conflict with the EU political establishment because it was robust and assertive in defending and advancing Poland’s national interests within the Union. Law and Justice shifted away from its Civic Platform-led predecessor’s strategy of trying to locate Poland within the so-called European ‘mainstream’ and prioritising the development of close relations with the main EU powers, especially Germany. Rather, the party argued that Warsaw needed to form its ‘own stream’ within the EU by, for example, building alternative alliances with CEE post-communist states to counter-balance the influence of the Franco-German axis. The other Soft Eurosceptic grouping elected to parliament in October 2015 was the right-wing anti-establishment ‘Kukiz’15′. After its leader, rock star Paweł Kukiz, caused a political sensation in the May 2015 presidential election—when he finished third, picking up more than one-fifth of the vote—his newly formed grouping emerged as the third largest in parliament, securing 9% of the votes. It enjoyed particularly strong support among younger voters, many of whom saw Mr Kukiz as the most credible opponent of the political establishment. Kukiz’15 supported a ‘Europe of sovereign states’, which involved limiting the role of the European Commission and EU institutions and opposing the Franco-­ German alliance’s ‘imperialist’ tendency to dominate the Union’s politics, as a way of defending national democracy and the rights of member states. Mr Kukiz’s grouping strongly criticised the migrant relocation scheme, organising a petition against the EU’s plans as an important element of its 2015 parliamentary election campaign. Subsequently, it criticised the Commission’s ‘rule of law’ action against the Law and Justice government and other attempts by EU institutions to become involved in Polish debates on judicial reform as undermining national sovereignty (even though the grouping also had misgivings about some of Law and Justice’s proposals). Kukiz’15 also strongly opposed Polish adoption of the Euro and called for the single currency area to be dismantled.

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9.3   Second-Order Euroscepticism: The EP Campaigns 2004–2014 As second-order elections, EP polls in Poland might have been expected to be characterised by a number of typical features. Firstly, a much lower level of electoral turnout than first-order parliamentary elections. Secondly, with voters treating the elections as referendums on the performance of the government, they might have been expected to use them as an opportunity to cast a cost-free mid-term protest vote, leading to losses for governing parties. Thirdly, given the disproportionately large role played by such protest voting one might also have expected concomitantly higher levels of support for new or fringe parties and groupings, particularly those offering radical alternatives to the political establishment. Fourthly, the election campaigns would be contested primarily on domestic policy issues, with less focus on EU-related matters. Fifthly, there would be less intensive media coverage and interest in the election campaign than in first-order elections. Voter turnout in the 2004 EP election was only 20.9%, the second lowest among EU countries and lowest ever recorded in any post-1989 national poll in Poland.2 Although turnout increased slightly to 24.5% in 2009, this was still the third lowest in the EU and, at the time, the second lowest in any Polish election.3 In 2014, turnout fell back again slightly to 23.8%, this time the fourth lowest in the EU. These levels compared with the 47.4% average voter turnout in post-1989 Polish parliamentary elections, which was in any case one of the lowest electoral participation rates in Europe.4 As far as voters using the EP election as an opportunity to punish the incumbent government and cast a protest vote, in 2004 the governing communist successor Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) saw a huge slump in its support from 41% in the 2001 parliamentary election to only 9.4%, while the election was a triumph for the centre-right opposition parties with Civic Platform topping the poll at 24.1%. However, in 2009 Civic Platform, by then the main governing party, won a clear and overwhelming victory and actually increased its share of the vote slightly from 41.5% in the 2007  For more on the 2004 EP election in Poland, see Szczerbiak (2005).  For more on the 2009 EP election in Poland, see Szczerbiak (2010). 4  For more on the 2014 EP election in Poland, see Cześnik and Kotnarowski (2014). 2 3

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parliamentary election to 44.4%. Similarly, although its vote share was down from 39.2% in the 2011 parliamentary election, in 2014 Civic Platform won an unexpected victory securing 32.1% of the votes, with Law and Justice, the main opposition grouping, close behind with 31.8% (although, with only 24,000 votes out of more than seven million cast separating them, and both parties winning 19 MEPs, the result was effectively a tie). In the 2004 EP election, non-mainstream parties performed well, although this was very much in line with opinion polls and arguably their strong performance was due to the fact that they were (or appeared to be) genuinely popular at the time and not necessarily because voters used the poll as a cost-free opportunity to desert mainstream parties that they would have otherwise supported in order to register a one-off protest. Radical parties opposed to or extremely critical of the EU performed particularly strongly with the main beneficiary being the League of Polish Families, which secured the second largest share of the vote with 15.9%, while Self-Defence scored 10.8%. However, smaller pro-EU parties also performed well enough to cross the 5% threshold, including the liberal Freedom Union (Unia Wolności, UW), a one-time governing party in the 1990s, which scored 7.3%, and Polish Social Democracy (Socjaldemokracja Polska, SDPL), a Democratic Left Alliance breakaway, with 5.3% (although neither of these parties crossed the 5% representation threshold in the subsequent 2005 parliamentary election). However, in stark contrast to Poland’s first EP election, none of the minor radical and fringe parties made any impact in 2009 and all of them fell well short of the 5% threshold. This included the Polish branch of Libertas, the trans-national Eurosceptic grouping set up by the millionaire Declan Ganley, who played a key role in the successful No campaign against the Lisbon Treaty in the 2008 Irish referendum. Libertas ran an electoral list comprising representatives from a number of small Eurosceptic parties on the radical right including the League of Polish Families. (Indeed, Libertas actually attracted considerable attention during the campaign when, in a major public relations coup, former President and historic leader of the anti-communist Solidarity movement Lech Wałęsa gave a speech at an international convention in Rome to officially launch its EP campaign.) Similarly, the only smaller party to perform strongly in the 2014 EP election was the economic libertarian-social conservative and radically Eurosceptic Congress of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy, KNP),

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which came from nowhere to finish fourth by securing 7.2% of the votes. The Congress was the latest political project of veteran eccentric Janusz Korwin-Mikke, one of the most controversial figures in Polish politics who contested every national election since 1989. However, it proved to be yet another one of the fleetingly successful but relatively short-lived anti-establishment protest parties that were a recurring feature of the Polish political scene. Although elected as one of the Congress’ four MEPs, Mr Korwin left the party in 2014. He then secured 3.3% of the vote in the May 2015 presidential election and his new Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic Freedom and Hope (Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja, KORWiN) party won 4.8% (just short of the representation threshold) in the parliamentary poll held later that year. European issues played very much a secondary role in the 2004 election. Certainly, the League of Polish Families revived its old referendum slogan of ‘Yesterday Moscow, today Brussels’ and, describing its approach as ‘Euro-realist’, Self-Defence called for a complete re-negotiation of the accession terms and withdrawal from the EU if this could not be achieved. However, most parties made very little attempt to present voters with clear choices about the Union’s future trajectory and EU issues were almost completely over-shadowed by domestic and other non-European foreign policy themes, such as Poland’s involvement in the Iraq conflict. The main exception to this was probably Law and Justice, which produced a fairly detailed policy statement setting out a vision of an EU that was strongly intergovernmental but also based on high levels of fiscal transfers from richer to poorer nations. Similarly in 2009, although Polish-EU relations were a fairly prominent issue in the lead up to the election due to the salience of debates surrounding the Lisbon Treaty, the main party campaigns once again focused primarily on domestic issues. European themes were not completely absent from the election and Polish-EU relations were given a somewhat higher profile as a sub-theme than in the 2004 campaign. However, this was not in the sense that the main parties competed over different visions of the EU’s future trajectory and the nature of Poland’s participation in the European project. Rather, they treated ‘Europe’ primarily as a so-called ‘valence issue’ and competed over which of them could represent Polish national interests most effectively within the EU institutions, and divisions over this issue were largely assimilated into domestic party politics. One aspect of this was the way that the major parties used their European

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trans-national party links, both positively to stress that they would help them to promote Poland’s interests effectively and negatively by using statements made by their opponents’ European partners against them. Only the smaller, radical right-wing Eurosceptic parties—such as the Right-wing of the Republic (Prawica Rzeczypospolitej, PR), a conservative-­ Catholic breakaway from Law and Justice led by former party deputy chairman Marek Jurek, the Libertas grouping, and Mr Korwin-Mikke’s radical conservative-libertarian Union of Real Politics (Unia Polityki Realnej, UPR)—gave a high profile to offering differing visions of the EU’s future trajectory. All three of them opposed both the Lisbon Treaty and Polish accession to the Eurozone. Nonetheless, as noted above, in contrast with the previous EP election, radical Eurosceptic parties (and, indeed, other fringe groupings) in 2009 failed to make any real impact and obtained minimal support. Most commentators assumed that the 2014 EP election would also be fought primarily over domestic policy issues. However, in February the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine—which, for geopolitical reasons, has always been a central topic in Polish politics—into the most serious international crisis in Europe since the end of the Cold War altered the dynamics of the campaign and meant that the election was dominated by security issues, which included an EU dimension. Civic Platform Prime Minister Donald Tusk seized upon the Ukrainian issue, portraying his government as a key player in determining the international response to the crisis. He also tried to link the issue to the future of European integration, claiming that Eurosceptic parties like the then-opposition Law and Justice played into Russia’s hands by encouraging the major European powers to develop bi-lateral relations with Moscow based on their own narrow, short-term national interests that often conflicted with Poland’s interests, rather than adopt a common EU stance. Mr Tusk also tried to open up another dimension of the ‘security agenda’ by launching a diplomatic offensive calling for a so-called EU ‘energy union’. Law and Justice tried to steer the EP campaign towards domestic issues by linking national security with socio-economic policy, arguing that only it could reform and re-build the country to ensure the prosperity and good governance that were necessary to guarantee security. However, this effort was not entirely successful and international issues remained the dominant campaign theme, so Law and Justice also tried to undermine Civic Platform’s credibility as a guarantor of security by claiming that Mr Tusk’s administration was itself partly responsible for the Ukrainian crisis.

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European issues also featured in the 2014 campaign due to the fact that media commentary in the later stages focused on the Congress of the New Right’s strong showing, not least because of Mr Korwin-Mikke’s controversial statements. He appeared, for example, to agree with Russian President Vladimir Putin that Poland had trained ‘Ukrainian terrorists’ who took part in the demonstrations that led to the downfall of the country’s previous pro-Moscow government. Moreover, although the core of the party’s programme, and main driver of its support, was its radical economic liberalism, the Congress was also, as noted above, a radical Eurosceptic party. For example, during the campaign Mr Korwin-Mikke argued that half of the then-members of the EU Commission should be arrested, and promised to ‘blow up the EU from within’ and turn its institutions into a brothel! Finally, although all of these elections were generally characterised by lower levels of media coverage, interest did increase over time. The 2004 campaign was, for example, extremely low key and failed to capture the public’s imagination. This was partly because at the time Poland was embroiled in a government formation crisis and speculation about the possibility of an early parliamentary election, as a consequence of which the main parties wanted to conserve their energies and gave the campaign a very low priority. For example, Civic Platform actually formally wound up its campaign a week before the election was due to take place! On the other hand, the 2014 election was much more keenly watched and analysed by politicians and pundits as the first test of national party strength since the 2011 parliamentary poll and kicking off an electoral marathon that would encompass autumn 2014 local elections, a summer 2015 presidential contest and culminate in the autumn 2015 national parliamentary election.

9.4   Euroscepticism (or Lack of It) in the 2019 EP Election In spite of the fact that the Law and Justice government had been in an ongoing conflict with EU political establishment on a number of issues, Euroscepticism actually featured very little in the 2019 EP campaign. Indeed, the party tried to tone down its disagreements with the EU institutions and went overboard to stress its strong commitment to continued membership of the Union as a core element of Polish foreign policy. While the party remained Eurosceptic in the sense of being anti-federalist and wary of further centralisation and extensions of EU competencies at the

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expense of member states—and, for example, argued that the Union needed to pay greater attention to the role of national parliaments—Law and Justice also tried to position itself as the promoter of a positive agenda of EU reforms. These included initiatives to strengthen the single market, bolster border controls, reduce tax evasion, introduce a new tax on digital technology companies, promote infrastructure investment in innovation and advanced technologies, and establish a new EU anti-monopoly body (Morawiecki 2019, 2 May). This attempt by Law and Justice to avoid overtly Eurosceptic rhetoric was driven by a concern that the liberal-centrist opposition would try and turn the EP election into a de facto referendum on continued Polish EU membership, by claiming that the ruling party’s frequent clashes with the EU institutions could lead to Poland leaving the Union. Given Poles’ overwhelming support for EU membership, so-called ‘Polexit’ was potentially a toxic slogan for any mainstream politician to be associated with. In the event, virtually all the main opposition parties united in the so-called ‘European Coalition’ (Koalicja Europejska, KE), an electoral alliance formed specially to contest the EP election led by Civic Platform and including the Democratic Left Alliance, the agrarian Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) and the liberal ‘Modern’ (Nowoczesna) grouping. Given its ideological eclecticism, the Coalition struggled to develop a clear and distinctive programmatic message, so its EP campaign strategy was based on rallying government opponents by framing the election as a ‘great choice’ (‘wielki wybór’) between returning Poland to European mainstream politics and a Law and Justice government which, it said, had undermined the country’s international standing and thereby threatened its access to EU funds, and ultimately membership of the Union (Wroński 2019, 4 April). In so doing, the opposition was trying to replay its successful tactic from the autumn 2018 local elections when, in the week leading up to polling day, it emerged that Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro had asked the country’s constitutional tribunal whether Polish judges had the right to refer queries on EU law to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The opposition interpreted this as a pretext for Poland to ignore the Court’s verdict if the constitutional tribunal questioned the primacy of EU law in Polish affairs, arguing that undermining the EU treaties in this way could be a precursor to Poland leaving the Union. Drawing analogies between the situation that led the UK to vote to leave the EU, opposition leaders warned that frequent clashes between Warsaw and the EU political

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establishment could accidentally trigger a slow motion ‘Polexit’ in the same way that Britain stumbled out of the EU. The debate was further inflamed when, on the final day of local election campaigning, the EU Court issued a preliminary injunction calling for a key element of the government’s judicial reforms, relating to lowering the retirement age for Polish Supreme Court judges, to be suspended. However, the European Coalition’s attempt to turn the 2019 EP election into plebiscite on ‘Polexit’ did not work out so well. Its case was fatally undermined when, in a May interview with the ‘Rzeczpospolita’ newspaper, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker denied that Poland would leave the EU even if Law and Justice secured re-­election in the autumn 2019 parliamentary election (Bielecki 2019, 29 April). At the same time, Law and Justice’s efforts to re-assure Poles of its commitment to continued Polish EU membership also appeared to work. For example, a May 2019 survey conducted by the Kantar polling agency found that only 38% of respondents felt that Law and Justice’s policies could lead to Poland leaving the EU, while 58% disagreed (Fidziński 2019, 23 May). The only Eurosceptic theme that Law and Justice raised during the campaign was its opposition to Polish accession to the Eurozone single currency area. The party re-iterated its argument that Poland should not adopt the Euro until the country’s economy and living standards were more closely aligned with the rest of the EU and Polish salaries comparable with those of the EU’s most developed member states (especially Germany), saying that otherwise it risked driving up prices and leaving Poles worse off (Kolanko 2019a, 15 April). In addition to tapping into the fact that, as noted above, the Polish public was strongly opposed to their country adopting the Euro, the main objective of this was to exploit divisions within the liberal-centrist opposition. Law and Justice supporters repeatedly tried to present the European Coalition as a strong advocate of Euro adoption, citing a commitment given by Civic Platform leader Grzegorz Schetyna at a conference of the European People’s Party trans-­ national federation to offer Poles a plan for joining the single currency. In the past, Civic Platform had taken a more positive stance than Law and Justice on this issue and proposed initiating a national debate aimed at securing broad social consensus around a decision to adopt the Euro so that Poland would at the heart of an EU which, it argued, would inevitably integrate more closely around its Eurozone core (Fijołek 2018, 9 November). Moreover, some of the Coalition’s members, notably the ‘Modern’ grouping, were strong advocates of more rapid Polish adoption

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of the single currency. However, on other occasions Civic Platform, and other Coalition members such as the Peasant Party, adopted a more sceptical tone and the opposition alliance did not publicly express a joint position on the single currency during the EP campaign. One political grouping that might have been expected to convey a clear and strong Hard Eurosceptic message was the ‘Confederation’ (Konfederacja), an electoral alliance comprising an eclectic mix of radical nationalists, free marketeers, Eurosceptics and social conservatives. As one of its leaders put it summing up the grouping’s policy platform, ‘we don’t want Jews, homosexuals, abortion, taxes and the EU’ (Kolanko 2019c, 21 May). As the Confederation’s appeal was targeted at mobilising the relatively narrow segment of public opinion opposed to Poland’s EU membership, it was less constrained than Law and Justice by the overwhelming pro-EU sentiment among the Polish public. Its leadership certainly included radical Eurosceptics such as Mr Korwin-Mikke and Robert Winnicki, leader of the radical nationalist National Movement (Ruch Narodowy, RN). However, the Confederation also encompassed Softer Eurosceptics including Kukiz’15 defectors who favoured EU reform rather than ‘Polexit’. In order to paper over internal divisions, its overall position was actually much vaguer and the group talked about the need to ‘regain national sovereignty’—which, it claimed, was lost when Poland signed up to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (not with accession to the EU, as such)—and to challenge German hegemony, but left open the question whether this would be best achieved by working to reform the EU, or leaving it (Konfederacja KORWiN Braun Liroy Narodowcy 2019). Indeed, it can be said the Confederation’s signature issue was its criticism of Law and Justice’s alleged failure to stand up to the United States and Israel over the question of Jewish wartime reparations as emblematic of the ruling party’s inability to defend Polish interests effectively. In this election Kukiz’15, the other (Soft) Eurosceptic grouping, linked up with a number of other anti-establishment parties, notably Italy’s governing ‘Five Star Movement’, to form a trans-European electoral alliance (Kukiz’15 2019). Campaigning on the slogan ‘Poland in Europe, Europe for Poland’ (‘Polska w Europie, Europa dla Polski’), and in line with both the prevailing mood of hostility towards ‘Polexit’ and its own previously stated ideological preferences, Kukiz’15 made it clear that it supported continued Polish EU membership and favoured reforming the Union from within. Describing the Commission as ‘contemporary aristocrats’ who served the interests of the ‘Franco-German duopoly’, Mr Kukiz’s

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grouping called for a return to the intergovernmental model of a ‘Europe of nations’ in which all EU members had equal status, although (curiously) this was to be achieved through strengthening the (supranational) EP.  In line with its broader critique of the political establishment, and what it had previously termed the ‘partocracy’, Kukiz’15 also called for more use of direct democracy mechanisms in the EU such as Internet voting and binding referendums (Kukiz 2019, 1–7 April).

9.5   The 2019 EP Campaign and Results The May 2019 EP election in Poland was held in the run-up to the country’s autumn parliamentary election, which many commentators felt would be the most important and consequential since the collapse of communism in 1989. Knowing that a good performance would provide the winner with a major psychological and strategic boost, the main parties viewed the EP election as a precursor to the parliamentary poll. As a consequence, the 2019 election did not resemble a typical second-order poll in virtually any respect, not least because the extremely high level of media coverage more closely resembled that of a first-order campaign. Moreover, as Table 9.1 shows, at 45.7%, turnout was significantly higher than in any previous Polish EP election, and much closer to the average in parliamentary polls. Similarly, in spite of being the governing party, Law and Justice performed exceptionally well, securing 45.4% of the votes, ahead of the European Coalition at 38.5%. Indeed, the Law and Justice result was not only 7.8% higher than the party achieved in the 2015 national parliamentary election, it was the largest share of the vote achieved by any party or political grouping in any post-1989 Polish national-level election. It was a particularly impressive result because virtually all of the main opposition parties had united in a single electoral bloc, and participation in EP elections was traditionally very low overall but higher among better-off, urban voters who tended to support liberal and left-wing political groupings. At the same time, with the two main groupings in combination securing 83.9% of the votes, there was not a notably higher vote for smaller parties. The most significant opposition grouping not to join the European Coalition was the new liberal-left ‘Spring’ (Wiosna) party, formed in February 2019 by the former mayor of the Northern provincial town of Słupsk and veteran sexual minorities campaigner Robert Biedroń. However, although ‘Spring’ crossed the 5% representation threshold, its 6.1% share was disappointing and very much at the lower end of its expectations. At the same time, both of the right-wing anti-system groupings,

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the Confederation and Kukiz’15, failed to cross the 5% threshold, securing only 4.6% and 3.7% of the votes, respectively. The only respect in which the May 2019 EP election conformed to the SOE model was the fact that it was dominated by national political issues rather than European ones (with, as noted above, a notable lack of party Euroscepticism). However, this was a function of the fact that it was effectively the first stage of a (first-order) national parliamentary election campaign, and these also tend to be dominated by domestic rather than international politics. In fact, the election campaign was fast-moving, with the dominant issue appearing to change almost every week. In a bid to rally its supporters, Law and Justice made the centrepiece of its campaign a substantial package of new social welfare spending promises and tax cuts unveiled at a February party congress, which it hoped would burnish its image as the first government that tried to ensure all Poles shared fully in the country’s post-communist economic transformation. Given the traditionally low levels of turnout in previous EP elections, Law and Justice’s campaign was focused primarily on mobilising its core electorate in smaller towns and rural areas. The aim was to raise the electoral stakes for these core voters who, as noted above, would not normally vote in an EP poll but may have feared that the liberal-centrist opposition would abandon these carefully targeted programmes if they were to win office. In order to signal to its supporters just how important this election was, Law and Justice also stood some of its best-known ministers as leading candidates. The downside for Law and Justice was that these hefty increases in social spending also generated an appetite among public sector workers for similar largesse; particularly teachers who had complained for years about their low salaries. In April, two of the three largest teaching unions began a strike following their failure to secure a 30% pay increase. Law and Justice suggested that this was orchestrated in collusion with the opposition to undercut support for the ruling party. As well as overshadowing other campaign issues, the strike made it difficult for a time for Law and Justice to promote its new spending programmes by raising questions as to why, if the state of the public finances was so healthy, the government could not afford more substantial pay increases for groups such as teachers? However, after three weeks the strike was suspended without further government concessions after Law and Justice neutralised its impact by ensuring that end-of year exams (which the strike was timed to coincide with) proceeded without serious disruption, and the initially strong public support for the teachers declined.

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The European Coalition’s ideological eclecticism made it difficult for the grouping to develop a clear and distinctive programmatic message, but it hoped that opposition to Law and Justice would, on its own, be a powerful enough mobilising appeal to win what would normally be a SOE where voters were not choosing a government. However, as noted above, the Coalition’s attempt to turn the election into a de facto referendum on continued Polish EU membership did not work. It therefore tried to shift the focus of its campaign to domestic issues and counter Law and Justice’s social benefit expansion by arguing, for example, that it could secure more EU funds to improve Poland’s dysfunctional health service (Kolanko 2019b, 13 May). However, while the quality of health care was a high priority issue for many Polish voters, the Coalition’s efforts failed to get any traction, partly because Law and Justice had much greater credibility on these social policy issues, having implemented most of the spending promises on which it was elected in 2015. Moral-cultural issues were also a major theme at both the beginning and end of the campaign. In February, Civic Platform Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski published a 12-point charter pledging support for the city’s LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) community. The charter was one of Mr Trzaskowski’s campaign pledges in the 2018 local elections but commentators suggested that the decision to prioritise it as one of his first high profile policy initiatives was a manoeuvre to counter the electoral challenge from ‘Spring’ which made moral-cultural issues a centrepiece of its political appeal. However, Law and Justice zeroed in on the Warsaw charter as an opportunity to make the sexual minorities issue one of the key divisions in the EP campaign, putting itself at the head of a moral crusade to promote traditional values and defend Polish families and children against what it argued were threats to the country’s culture and national identity from the LGBT lobby and left-wing enemies of Western civilisation. As a polarising issue that struck an emotional chord with many Poles, because it involved a clash of basic moral-cultural values and thus mapped on to some of the deepest divisions in Polish society, pressing Law and Justice’s message on the LGBT question strengthened its hold over conservative voters. It thereby neutralised the electoral challenge on the radical right from the ‘Confederation’ as well as helping to mobilise the party’s supporters in smaller towns and rural areas where conservative cultural values still held considerable sway. The prominence of the LGBT issue in the EP campaign was also very problematic for the European Coalition. As well as alienating more traditionalist Civic Platform voters, it raised serious doubts among the Peasant Party’s socially

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conservative small-town and rural electoral base as to whether they really wanted to support such an apparently overtly socially liberal electoral alliance. Moral-cultural issues re-emerged as salient at the end of the campaign following the release on YouTube of ‘Just Don’t Tell Anyone’ (‘Tylko nie mów nikomu’), a harrowing film documenting several alleged instances of child sex abuse by Polish Catholic priests and accusations of subsequent cover-ups and neglect of victims by the Church hierarchy, which gained massive popularity online. The documentary’s release in the final days of the campaign posed a significant challenge for Law and Justice by turning the role of the Church in Polish politics and society into a major issue. The Church was an important civil society actor in Poland, particularly in Law and Justice’s electoral heartlands where levels of religiosity were still high. While the ruling party had not always enjoyed the closest of relationships with the Church hierarchy in recent years, in public consciousness the two organisations were still very closely aligned. At the same time, the European Coalition was very quick off the mark in calling for an independent inquiry to investigate how the Church had handled clerical sexual abuse. However, Law and Justice managed to get ahead of the issue by arguing that any inquiry should not single out the clergy but investigate paedophiles in all milieux, and introducing new legislation to increase penalties for sex offenders.

9.6   Conclusions The goal of EU membership was subject to a very high degree of public and elite consensus in post-communist Poland, reflected in the fact that Poles voted overwhelmingly join the Union in a 2003 accession referendum. Since accession in 2004, support for Polish EU membership actually increased and Poland appeared to be one of most Europhile countries in terms of public attitudes. The two main political groupings that opposed Polish accession, the League of Polish Families and Self-Defence, faded into obscurity after they failed to secure re-election in the 2007 parliamentary election. One of the main reasons why levels of popular support for the country’s EU membership remained so high was that many Poles, especially among the older generations, saw the European integration process as part of a symbolic re-uniting of Poland with a Western international community of shared values that they had always considered themselves to be part of culturally and spiritually. However, although Poles continued to favour their country’s EU membership overwhelmingly, this support often appeared to be rather shallow. Poles seemed to become increasingly instrumental in their

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approach to the EU and the idea that membership represented a natural and obvious civilisational choice came under strain due to an increasing sense of cultural distinctiveness that many felt towards Western Europe. The first three Polish EP elections did not conform to the SOE thesis completely. They fitted with the hypothesised pattern only in the sense that they were characterised by extremely low levels of turnout, even by Polish standards. The main governing Democratic Left Alliance party’s vote share fell and it lost badly in 2004, but the ruling Civic Platform actually increased its vote in 2009 and also won the 2014 election (albeit narrowly and with a lower share of the vote than in the previous national parliamentary poll). Fringe parties performed well in 2004 (although they were doing well in the polls anyway) but not in 2009 nor in 2014 (with one notable exception). In spite of the strong performance by Eurosceptic parties, EU issues did not feature prominently in either 2004 or 2009 except as valence issues. But they did receive more attention in 2014 given the peculiar circumstance that the campaign was dominated by an international security crisis in the Ukraine with a strong European dimension. The level of media interest varied from extremely low in 2009 to much greater in 2014. Although the Soft Eurosceptic Law and Justice government was in an ongoing conflict with the EU political establishment, Euroscepticism actually featured very little in the 2019 campaign. Driven by a concern that the liberal-centrist opposition would try and turn the election into a de facto referendum on continued Polish EU membership by claiming that Law and Justice’s frequent clashes with the EU institutions could lead to Poland leaving the Union, Law and Justice bent over backwards to stress its strong commitment to continued membership as a core element of Polish foreign policy. Moreover, not only was there a notable lack of party Euroscepticism in the 2019 poll, the only respect in which the election conformed to the SOE model was the fact that it was dominated by national rather than European issues. In addition to the fact that turnout was extraordinarily high, the main governing party won a stunning victory, fringe parties did not perform well and there was a great deal of media interest in the campaign. This was due of the fact that it was held in the run-up to the country’s autumn parliamentary election, which many felt would be the most important and consequential since the collapse of communism in 1989.

12.7 24.1 9.4 6.3 – – – – – 15.9 10.8 7.3 5.3

9.5 12.7 41.0 9.0 – – – – – 7.9 10.2 3.1 –

PiS PO SLD PSL Konfederacja W Kukiz 15 Nowoczesna PR LPR S UW SDPl

7 15 5 4 – – – – – 10 6 4 3

EP 2004 seats 27.0 24.1 11.3 7.0 – – – – – 8.0 11.4 – 3.9

PL 2005 (%) 32.1 41.5 13.2 8.9 – – – – – 1.3 1.5 –

PL 2007 (%) 27.4 44.4 12.4 7.0 – – – – – – 1.5 – 2.4

EP 2009 (%) 15 25 7 3 – – – – – – 0 – 0

EP 2009 seats 29.9 39.2 8.2 8.4 – – – – 10.0 – 0.1 –

PL 2011 (%) 31.8 32.1 9.4 6.8 7.2 – – – 3.6 – 0.0 –

EP 2014 (%)

–

–

– – –

0

0

19 19 5 4 4

EP 2014 seats

– – –

37.6 24.1 7.6 5.1 4.8 – 8.8 7.6

PL 2015 (%)

– – – –

0 3 0

3.7 6.1 4.6 – – – –

27 22

EP 2019 seats

45.4 38.5

EP 2019 (%)

– – – –

43.6 27.4 12.6 8.6 6.8

PL 2019 (%)

Party abbreviations: Konfederacja = Confederation Freedom and Independence (in EP2014, we present the result of the party New Right); LPR = League of Polish Families; Nowoczesna = Modern Party of Ryszard Petru (part of European Coalitionin EP2019, and Civic Coalition with PO in PL2019); PiS = Law and Justice; PO = Civic Platform (part of Civic Coalition in PL2019, part of European Coalition in EP2019); PR = Palikot’s Movement (later on renamed to Your Movement, coalition with SLD in 2015); PSL = Polish Peasant Party (part of European Coalition in EP2019); S = Self-Defence; SDPl = Polish Social Democracy (coalition with SLD in PL2007, later on various party lists); SLD = Democratic Left Alliance (part of European Coalition in EP2019); UW = Freedom Union W = Spring of Robert Biedroń (coalition with SLD in PL2019)

Note: PL indicates elections to the Sejm, the lower Chamber of Deputies of the Polish Parliament, EP denotes the European Parliament. Only parties achieving at least one mandate in one election are considered. Deputies representing the German minority are not included. Results in italics are denoting a Soft Eurosceptic party, bold italics stay for Hard Eurosceptic party

Source: Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza (https://pkw.gov.pl/), Serwisy informacyjne wyborów i referendów ogólnokrajowych (https://wybory.gov.pl/)

EP 2004 (%)

PL 2001 (%)

Party

Table 9.1  Results of the parliamentary and the EP elections in Poland

Appendix

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References Bielecki, J. (2019, April 29). Kaczyński nie chciał się ze mna ̨ spotkać. Rzeczpospolita. CBOS. (2017). Jakiej Unii chca ̨ Polacy. Warsaw: CBOS. CBOS. (2018a). Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Warsaw: CBOS. CBOS. (2018b). Stosunki Polaków i Czechów do przymowania uchodźców. Warsaw: CBOS. CBOS. (2019). 15 lat członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej. Warsaw: CBOS. Cześnik, M., & Kotnarowski, M. (2014). Poland: Old Turnout and New Right. In L.  De Sio, V.  Emanuele, & N.  Maggini (Eds.), The European Parliament Elections of 2014 (pp. 223–228). Rome: CISE. Fidziński, M. (2019, May 23). Sondaż: Większość Polaków nie wierzy w polexit. Polityka PiS nie doprowadzi do wyjścia Polski z UE. Gazeta.pl. http://next. gazeta.pl/next/7,151003,24808450,sondaz-wiekszosc-polakow-nie-wierzyw-polexit-polityka-pis.html. Accessed 10 Sept 2019. Fijołek, M. (2018, November 9). Co oznaczaja ̨ deklaracje Schetyny ze szczytu EPP w Helsinkach? Lider Platformy odkrył kilka kart. wPolityce. https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/420378-co-oznaczaja-deklaracje-schetyny-ze-szczytu-epp-whelsinkach. Accessed 9 Nov 2018. Kolanko, M. (2019a, April 15). Kampania wielkanocna. Rzeczpospolita. Kolanko, M. (2019b, May 13). Kampania na ostatniej prostej. Rzeczpospolita. Kolanko, M. (2019c, May 21). Skrajności Konfederacji. Rzeczpospolita. Konfederacja KORWiN Braun Liroy Narodowcy. (2019). Konfederacja KORWiN Braun Liroy Narodowcy przywróci Polsce Suwerenność! Spot wyborczy nr 5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYJcw-g47Kk&list=PL7t5uZKNNe_ Ganvgc3oj9n_AKxQtw1Zeg&index=6&t=0s. Accessed 10 Sept 2019. Kukiz, P. (2019, April 1–7). Gdybym zostal prezydentem, rzucilbym sie do Wisly. Sieci. Kukiz’15. (2019). Program Kukiz/15: Strategia zmiany dla Europy. http:// kukiz15.org/program/europejski. Accessed 23 July 2019. Morawiecki, M. (2019, May 2). Pia ̨tka dla Europy. Rzeczpospolita. Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza. (2019). Ustawa z dnia 5 stycznia 2011r: Kodeks Wyborczy (stan prawny na dzień 10 sierpnia 2019 r.). Warsaw: PKW. Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-Order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research., 8(1), 3–44. Szczerbiak, A. (2004). History Trumps Government Unpopularity: The June 2003 Polish EU Accession Referendum. West European Politics, 27(4), 671–690. Szczerbiak, A. (2005). Poland. In J.  Lodge (Ed.), The 2004 Elections to the European Parliament (pp. 201–209). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Szczerbiak, A. (2010). Poland. In J.  Lodge (Ed.), The 2009 Elections to the European Parliament (pp. 213–223). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Szczerbiak, A. (2011). Poland Within the European Union: New Awkward Partner or New Heart of Europe? Oxford: Routledge. TVN 24. (2019, May 24). Okręgi wyborcze, zasady głosowania, podział mandatów. Eurowybory w pigułce. http://www.tvn24.pl. Accessed 10 Sept 2019. TVP Info (2017, July 5). Polacy wola ̨ wyjść z UE, niż przyja ̨ć islamskich uchodźców. Najnowszy sondaż IBRiS. https://www.tvp.info/33102359/ polacy-wola-wyjsc-z-ue-niz-przyjac-islamskich-uchodzcow-najnowszy-sondazibris. Accessed 10 Sept 2019. Wroński, P. (2019, April 4). Koalicja Europejska przedstawiła plan na wybory. Kosiniak-Kamysz: “Wybierzcie fajterów, nie hucpiarzy”. Gazeta Wyborcza. http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24616303,koalicja-europejska-przedstawiaplan-na-wybory-kosiniak-kamysz.html. Accessed 10 Sept 2019.

CHAPTER 10

Romania Sorina Soare and Claudiu D. Tufiș

10.1   The Electoral System The electoral system used for European Parliament (EP) elections in Romania was established in 2007 and it has remained the same until the present day.1 The elections are based on a single constituency, covering the entire country. The members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are elected every five years using a closed list system and proportional representation. The first EP elections in Romania were held in 2007, when the country joined the EU. Political parties and alliances need to pass the 5% electoral threshold in order to win any seats. Independent candidates need to receive more votes than the national electoral coefficient in order to win a seat. The seats are allocated according to the D’Hondt method. During 1  For more details, see Law 33/2007 ‘Regarding the Organisation and Carrying of the European Parliament Elections’ (in its current form).

S. Soare (*) Department of Political Science, University of Florence, Florence, Italy e-mail: [email protected] C. D. Tufiș Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest, București, Romania e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 V. Hloušek, P. Kaniok (eds.), The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9_10

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the electoral campaign a political party can spend up to 67 million lei (about 14.2 million euros). Parties obtaining at least 3% of the votes are reimbursed their electoral campaign costs, up to the limit indicated above. The distribution of seats in the EP was amended as a result of Brexit. Romania had 34 MEPs in 2007 and 32 since 2009. After the UK’s withdrawal from the EU comes into force, the number of Romanian MEPs will increase to 33. The elections are managed by two administrative structures: the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) and the Central Election Bureau (BEC). Candidate registration procedures are managed by BEC and require different numbers of supporting signatures for parties, electoral and political alliances and organisations representing ethnic minorities (at least 200,000 voters) and independent candidates (at least 100,000 voters). Moreover, according to the legal framework, a person can sign only a single supporting list. Together, the high thresholds and the restriction on endorsement are considered to be an implicit obstacle for new parties and grassroots candidates. In the 2019 EP elections, twenty-three parties/alliances and seven independent candidates registered to be on the ballot. After eligibility controls by BEC, only thirteen parties/alliances and three independent candidates fulfilled all the criteria to stand for election.2 Note that the initial increase in the number of parties is connected to the 2015 amendments of the party regulation and, more specifically, to the drastic reduction in the minimum number of members required for the registration of a party, from 25,000 to three members, without any territorial diffusion criteria (Popescu and Soare 2017). Considering the final number of competitors, there were no major changes compared to the 2014 competition. Note also that in line with the Constitution’s restrictions on party membership, EP membership is not compatible with certain professional occupations (e.g. Constitutional Court judges, ombudsman, active members in the army, policemen), and with being a member of the Romanian Parliament or of the Government of Romania. The administrative procedures for candidate registration were open until March 28. Thirty litigious cases were discussed by the Electoral Office, the final list of candidatures 2  It should be noted that some parties and candidates filed in their candidature strategically, using BEC’s decision to reject them from the competition to attack the electoral legislation in the courts (see Demos 2019).

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being finalised on April 16. According to the law, the electoral campaign starts thirty days before the date of the elections and ends on the Saturday preceding election day (i.e. in 2019 it started on April 26 and ended on May 25). In Romania, voting takes place on Sundays, from 7:00 am to 9:00 pm, with the 2019 elections for the European Parliament being held on May 26.

10.2   Public- and Party-Based Euroscepticism in Romania It is widely acknowledged that Romanian politics and society have been traditionally Europhile and uncritical towards the process of European integration (Grabbe 2006; Noutcheva and Bechev 2008; Gherghina and Soare 2016). Surveys conducted during the 1990s showed over 90% of Romanians endorsed European integration, the highest percentage in Eastern Europe (Roper 2002: 118). At the same time, in public debates and media, EU integration was highly consensual, although with little emphasis on technical issues. The EU was equated to a symbolic ‘return to Europe’, a normalcy that had been abruptly interrupted by the communist regime, and to a necessary investment in a secure future, away from communism and its partners (i.e. especially the USSR). Despite this consensus, different Eurosceptical platforms won electoral support in the first decade after communism. The main representative of this group of parties was the National Salvation Front (FSN). While not voicing total hostility to European integration, the FSN emphasised the need to defend national interests, adopting a ‘wait and see’ position (Georgescu 2004). Delayed economic reforms, radical nationalism and violent management of voices of opposition in Parliament or in the streets, all made Romania a pariah for the main projects of Western integration, in primis the CEE/EU and NATO (Roper 2002; Vachudova and Hooghe 2009). By the mid-1990s, Romania’s foreign policy was clearly Western-­ oriented (Georgescu 2004) and FSN started to express a positive evaluation of European integration. While the literature argues that the prospect of government participation induces parties to modify their Eurosceptical platform (Sitter 2001), in the case of FSN this change was related to the prospect of governing without international credibility, a sensitive topic for the party for a long period of time.3 3

 The current Social Democratic Party (PSD).

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In addition to FSN, two radical right populist parties (the Romanian National Unity Party—PUNR and the Greater Romania Party—PRM) echoed a diffused Euroscepticism motivated primarily by anti-Hungarian sentiments. For instance, PUNR organised a funeral march and walked a coffin through the centre of Cluj Napoca in protest against the signing of the neighbourhood treaty with Hungary, required by the agenda for EU integration (Soare 2004). Similarly, the central points of PRM’s message concentrated on the need to defend Romania’s national sovereignty against Hungarian irredentism and international institutions conspiring against Romania. To this, PRM added an appeal to Romanian values and Christian Orthodox traditionalism (Cinpoeș 2015). These hard Eurosceptic views were based on the idea that EU integration was an economically and politically motivated process of destroying Romania’s state borders, limiting Romania’s sovereignty and endangering national traditions and identities. Within this context, from 1990 onwards, the anti-Communist parties represented a stable pro-European pole. These parties framed EU integration primarily as a domestic-focused process (Roper 2002: 112). More specifically, EU integration was equated to a rapid convergence between democratic norms and Romanian politics. They considered allegiance to Europe compatible with the ‘national interest’ since it provided the principle of motion governing the political, economic and social reforms required by the transition to a functional democracy. Starting with the so-called Snagov Pact (1995),4 all political parties with ambitions to govern converged on consensual pro-European stances, forcing, eventually, the radical right populist parties to tone down their messages (Pytlas and Kossack 2015). Since then, no relevant party has built its agenda around a critical assessment of the EU. From 1992 until today, the symbolic and pragmatic costs of EU integration have been regularly justified by the reward: EU membership (Grabbe 2006; Vachudova and Hooghe 2009). Moreover, over time, political parties have used the EU as a legitimising tool, exhibiting European commitment to reinforce their democratic credibility at the domestic level (Gherghina and Soare 2016). Euro-scepticism remained isolated within the extra-­parliamentary arena.

4  An agreement between the parties then in parliament in favour of joint support for Romania’s EU integration.

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Thus, for almost three decades, being against the EU in Romania has been perceived both as an act of disloyalty to the national interest, and an attempt to dismantle democracy. To this point, the most salient examples are the 2007 and 2012 institutional crises in Romania (Sedelmeier 2014; Gherghina and Soare 2016). Despite differences related to the content and the partisan players taking part in the two processes, the parties involved used the EU as a blame-shifting strategy and attributed responsibility for undemocratic behaviour to their opponents. In parallel, they deployed their European allegiance to empower themselves with regard to EU institutions, in line with a standard credit-claiming strategy (Gherghina and Soare 2016). Similarly, parties and their leaders proved to be highly sensitive to public shaming following criticism from the EU of democratically unfit behaviour. As in the early 1990s, the quest for international credibility induced parties to desist from openly challenging the European project. But this self-control is also connected to the diffusion of Europhile sentiments among the citizenry and the perception of the EU as a guarantor of democracy. The position adopted by the parliamentary parties on the topic of membership in the EU mirrored the position of the Romanian citizenry (see Graph 10.1). 100 80 60 40 20

October 2004 May 2005 October 2005 March 2006 September 2006 April 2007 September 2007 March 2008 October 2008 June 2009 October 2009 May 2010 November 2010 May 2011 November 2011 May 2012 November 2012 May 2013 November 2013 May 2014 November 2014 May 2015 November 2015 May 2016 November 2016 May 2017 November 2017 March 2018 November 2018

0

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DK

Graph 10.1  The image of the EU among Romanians. (Source: Eurobarometer)

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In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Romanians continued exhibiting the highest level of trust in the EU. Data from Eurobarometer polls show that about two-thirds of Romanians had a positive image of the EU prior to Romania joining the EU.  After accession, the proportion declined and starting in 2010 seems to have stabilised at around half the population. It should be mentioned that the group of people that has a negative image of the EU is still small in comparison to the number of EU supporters, at only about 10–15%. The largest difference between supporters and opponents of 24% was in 2013: in May, 41% of respondents had a positive image of the EU while 17% had a negative image. For the last decade, the most significant changes have occurred between the ‘positive’ and ‘neutral’ groups, with the ‘negative’ group showing only a small increase. The literature agrees that the Great Recession and the austerity measures that followed induced a cycle of blame and anger, damaging the trust of the people in national and EU institutions (Drakos et al. 2019). Despite negative economic conditions, Romanians continue to express a positive vision on the future of EU (România  – 10 ani în Uniunea Europeană 2017: 13–14). Bârgăoanu and Durach (2013) report that although Romanians did not directly blame the EU for the crisis, the volatile economic conditions eroded the level of trust in the European project, bringing it to the low levels of 2012 and 2013. However, Romanians continue identifying a mixture of pragmatic and symbolic benefits associated with EU membership (Bârgăoanu and Durach 2013). At a symbolic level, EU membership is associated with ‘being part of the civilised world’, ‘being proud of being European’, and a guarantee of ‘peace and security’, while from a utilitarian perspective, it is equated with the benefits connected to ‘freedom of movement’, access to ‘European funds’, and more ‘financial advantages’. After the 2007 enlargement, the level of satisfaction with EU membership decreased and cracks in the trans-partisan European consensus multiplied. An eloquent example is provided by the Coalition for Family (Coaliţia pentru familie, CpF), promoter of a referendum to change the Constitution to define the family as a couple composed of members of the opposite sexes. Although the referendum failed to meet the required majority, it provided an ample space for debating the link between Orthodox Christianity and Romanianism, and became an opportunity to criticise the negative effects of secularisation and EU integration on the national identity. A few parties, such as the Save Romania Union (USR), the Green Party, ProRomania, the Party for Democracy and Solidarity

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(Demos), and the Freedom, Unity and Solidarity Party (PLUS), most of them without parliamentary representation, openly opposed the referendum backed by the Social Democrats (PSD) with wide support from most parliamentary parties and, most notably, from the Orthodox Church. Beyond the strictly technical aspect of modifying the Constitution, which currently defines the family as being founded by ‘the free will marriage between spouses’, and the adoption of a stricter definition that redefines the family as a ‘union between a man and a woman’, the referendum created spaces for the expression of different breeds of soft Euroscepticism. Despite the lack of principled objection to EU membership, the opposition targeted aspects of the EU’s values. The referendum campaign allowed different actors to argue that at stake was the definition of the organic community of the Romanians against the EU, international lobbying and various conspiracies. Similarly, over the last decade, the topic of maintaining the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) has galvanised a growing chorus of criticisms among parties in government and within an increasingly polarised network of civil society organisations (CSOs) and NGOs. Most recently, the PSD-led reform of the laws of the judiciary was harshly criticised by the European Commission on the ground that they have negative effects on judicial independence in general and on the National Anti-­ Corruption Directorate in particular. The members of the government reacted defensively and accused EU institutions of transforming Romania into a ‘second-hand member state’ (Neagu 2019). Argumentation based on soft Euroscepticism allowed the PSD-led government to express opposition to the EU institutions in the name of national sovereignty: ‘I am curious what would the European Court of Justice say about the violation of Romania’s sovereign right to legislate domestically, considering the (European) Commission’s summons in the latest CVM report’ (Ioan Mircea Pascu, PSD MEP, quoted in Neagu 2019). All in all, despite widespread endorsement of Romanian membership in the EU among the citizenry there seems to be increased room for challenging the legitimacy of the EU socio-economic and cultural project. Critiques of the EU have multiplied over the last decade, but the data presented in Graphs 10.1 and 10.2 show that support for the EU is still strong in Romania. If we take into account the indicator of trust in the European Commission (EC), we see some evidence of the ‘post-accession blues’, similar to Eichenberg and Dalton’s (2007) post-Maastricht blues. The data show not necessarily a decline in support but rather a

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100 80 60 40

0

October 2004 May 2005 October 2005 March 2006 September 2006 April 2007 September 2007 March 2008 October 2008 June 2009 October 2009 May 2010 November 2010 May 2011 November 2011 May 2012 November 2012 May 2013 November 2013 May 2014 November 2014 May 2015 November 2015 May 2016 November 2016 May 2017 November 2017 March 2018 November 2018

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Don't trust

DK

Graph 10.2  Trust in the European Commission in Romania. (Source: Eurobarometer)

crystallisation of people’s opinions on the EC: as people learned more about the EU and its institutions, the proportion of those without a clear opinion on these issues declined from about 35% to 10–13%, while the proportion of those with a negative opinion has increased correspondingly. Overall, however, since 2013 we see stability: about half of the population trusts in the EC, about a third does not trust the Commission, with the rest not having a formed opinion.

10.3   Lost in Domestic Politics with Limited Space for Euroscepticism: 2004–2014 Elections From 2007 onwards, EU elections in Romania have been regularly overshadowed by national party politics. The 2007 elections were organised in the wake of a failed referendum for the impeachment of President Băsescu, which triggered a constitutional crisis and monitoring by EU institutions. The main parties quickly self-regulated to avoid the pragmatic and symbolic costs of facing criticism from Brussels (Gherghina and Soare 2016) and maintained a strict pro-European position in the autumn campaign

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for the European Parliament. Note that the space for debating the EU was reduced by the fact that a referendum on a new voting system was scheduled for the same day. Based on van der Eijk and Franklin’s (1996) work, we can argue that this made the 2007 elections less salient in the eyes of many voters. Despite the enthusiasm that accompanied the celebrations of Romanian EU membership on January 1, 2007, the main characteristic of a second-order election (SOE) became visible rather rapidly: turnout was extremely low—29.5% (half the turnout of the previous legislative elections)—and proved that even if Romanians were extremely positive with regard to EU, the EP contest was seen as less salient than national elections. The main party in government, PNL, lost the election. However, contrary to the expectations of Reif and Schmitt’s (1980) SOE theory, small parties did not perform very well. The case of the PRM is indicative: after its outstanding success in the 2000 legislative elections, PRM underwent a gradual electoral decline. Attempts to integrate with the mainstream parties, normalise its image and, eventually, integrate into the EPP increased tensions within the party (Soare 2005). At its core, PRM maintained its illiberal vision and its rejection of individualist and secular European values. The party’s original hard Euroscepticism was abandoned in favour of a softer opposition to the EU, which was portrayed as weakening national sovereignty and promoting foreign interests. However, EU membership was acknowledged as consistent with the national interest. After a sequence of intense electoral activities (2008 local and parliamentary elections), in June 2009 Romanians took part in the first Europe-­ wide EP elections. The assumptions of SOE theory were only partially confirmed. The turnout remained low: 27.7% (−1.8% compared to the 2007 EP elections and −11.5% compared to the 2008 parliamentary elections). Meanwhile, the Social Democrats, minor partner in the coalition government with the PD-L, won the EP election. Compared to the 2007 elections, the main difference was the electoral success of PRM: 8.65% of votes (+ 4.5% compared to 2007). In coalition with Gigi Becali, a well-­ known Romanian businessman, PRM’s campaign was focused on a mixture of anticorruption stances, the need for morality and spirituality in politics, and a nationalist position. The party’s opposition to the EU was filtered by cultural concerns. PRM claimed that Romanian national interests were at odds with the trajectory of a secularised EU and acknowledged the priority to build a stronger Romania in a united Europe. Similarly, a couple of years before his candidacy to the EP, Gigi Becali declared: ‘Now that Europe has been reunited, I also want to see a

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spiritual reunification of Europe, I want Western Christian-Democracy to be enriched by Eastern Orthodoxy. If we don’t counter sin with faith, then the end of the world is nigh’ (Lungescu 2007). With these exceptions, the main competitors produced Europhile programmes and expressed strong support for EU values and norms. The 2014 elections remained focused on domestic issues. To wit, one of the hottest topics of debate was the diffusion of controversial photos of President Băsescu wearing a T-shirt with the People’s Movement Party (PMP) logo, one of the parties registered in the campaign. The pictures were posted by the PMP leader, Elena Udrea, on her Facebook account under a symbolic headline: ‘Traian Băsescu with the young men and women of PMP’. According to the Romanian Constitution, the president is defined as ‘a mediator between the powers in the State, as well as between the State and society’, and ‘during his term of office, the President of Romania may not be a member of any political party, nor may he perform any other public or private office’. Following the publication of the photos, Victor Ponta, the PSD Prime Minister, grabbed the opportunity and asked the Constitutional Court to clarify if the president overstepped his prerogatives. No party openly challenged the EU and declared the outright rejection of the European political and economic programme. At the fringe of the competition, soft forms of Euroscepticism were present. The PRM and People’s Party Dan Diaconescu (PPDD) shared a platform based on anti-corruption and morality in politics, without managing to mobilise enough support for parliamentary representation. With regard to SOE assumptions, the 2014 elections saw an increased participation, 32.4% (+4.8% compared to the 2009 elections). The party in government, the Social Democrats, mobilised its habitual voters and largely won the elections. Two smaller parties, the UDMR (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania) and the newly created People’s Movement Party (PMP), won parliamentary representation on mainstream European platforms. Summarising the trends from 2007 to 2014, EP elections are generally perceived as of lesser importance than those for national offices. In each round of elections, the participation rate is lower than in the previous legislative elections. For this period, the average turnout for EP elections was 9.7% lower than the average turnout for national elections and almost 24% lower than turnout for presidential races. A caveat has to be mentioned: since the early 1990s, Romanian elections have been characterised by an abrupt decline in turnout from initial rates of around 80% (in the 1992 elections) to the 37.79% turnout in the 2016 legislative elections. As such,

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low EP election turnout has to be interpreted in the context of this more general declining trend, despite the efforts of civil society organisations (e.g. campaigns in 2014 to encourage citizens to make use of their European rights within the framework of the ‘European Year of the Citizens 2013’) or publicly funded awareness-raising projects (e.g. the AEP ‘Ambassador of a European Romania’). Similarly, the topics of debate have remained national. Different explanations have been provided for this strong national twist. First, there is the role of the parties in shaping the discourses and choosing the candidates. Beyond the references to EU topics in the official programmes and/or during official meetings with the Spitzenkandidat in 2014, parties’ campaigns have dealt with national issues only because they are most important to voters (Bârgăoanu et al. 2015). Although high-level key politicians have been occasionally included on candidate lists, there is a prevalence of lower-level political profiles among the EP candidates across the party spectrum. Moreover, the media regularly draws attention to the high numbers of first-level politicians’ relatives among the EP candidates. An additional explanation is connected to the timing of each election. The 2007 EP elections were organised in the aftermath of a failed impeachment. The 2009 and 2014 EP elections took place in the shadow of forthcoming presidential elections. With regard to the results, there is no clear evidence of preference for parties in government or for protest votes. The 2007 elections were organised by the second Tăriceanu cabinet (a coalition government of PNL and UDMR). However, PD (the party of the president then in office, Traian Băsescu) came in first with 28.1% (13 seats), followed by the Social Democrats (10 seats), the Liberals (6 seats) and their splinter, PLD (3 seats), and finally UDMR (2 seats). In 2009, Emil Boc’s first cabinet (a coalition government of PDL and PSD) coordinated the organisation of the elections. Plagued with tensions since February 2009, the parties in government won the first two positions (i.e. the PSD and PC alliance obtained 31.07% of the vote, followed by the PDL with 29.71%, 11 and 10 seats, respectively). While the parties in government obtained two-­ thirds of the seats, there was also a pool of protest votes as illustrated by the success of the Greater Romanian Party (PRM) (8.65% of the vote and 3 seats). The seat of the independent candidate Elena Băsescu, daughter of President Băsescu, is a different story; less than a protest vote, it chronicles a strategic attempt to avoid accusations of nepotism. Indeed, President Băsescu’s younger daughter was a member of the PDL; her intention to

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run on her father’s party list triggered numerous criticisms and, eventually, she ran as an independent. From the very beginning, the ‘independence’ of her candidature was doubted: PDL provided informal support for the collection of the needed signatures and, more generally, during the campaign (Ghinea 2009). In 2014, the third Ponta cabinet formed by PSD-UNPR-PC, with the support of a splinter from PNL, organised the elections and obtained a renewed confirmation of authority with 37.06% of the votes (16 seats). Following the dissolution of the previous governing coalition, PNL ran independently and obtained 6 seats, followed by PDL with 5 seats and its splinter, PMP, with 2 seats. UDMR maintained EP representation with 3 seats. Once again, an independent candidate obtained representation: the well-known Romanian actor, Mircea Diaconu, who built his campaign on his celebrity status with a strong anti-establishment twist. There is mixed evidence with regard to the standard expectations of second-order elections in terms of the so-called honeymoon effect. The EP elections were held close to general elections only in 2009 (five months after). In 2007 the Euro-elections were held more than three years after general elections, while in 2014, they were held almost two years after the general elections. Similarly, a relevant outsider won representation only in 2009 (the PRM in a sui generis alliance with the New Generation Party, led by Gigi Becali, a controversial businessman). Summarising the trends, the Romanian EP elections provide mixed evidence with regard to the assumptions of SOE theory. There is indeed low turnout, although the difference from national elections has decreased over time. There is also low media coverage and an almost exclusive focus on national issues. The performance of the mainstream parties remains solid, while Eurosceptic positions remain isolated in the extra-parliamentary arena. Last but not least, in a political culture that remains generally committed to the EU project with regard to both the demand side and the supply side, the space for manoeuvring for Eurosceptical parties remains low. Although a critical assessment of EU membership was reinforced in the aftermath of the Great Recession, hard Euroscepticism advocating Romanian withdrawal from the EU cannot be identified in the main political arena. This is because of the widespread belief that EU membership is consistent with the national interest both symbolically and pragmatically, as illustrated by Bârgăoanu and Durach (2013). Despite a diminished appeal, the EU remained the embodiment of positive values. Softer forms of Euroscepticism were granted Parliamentary representation but on limited occasions.

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10.4   Any Space for Euroscepticism in the Romanian Electoral Manifestos in 2019? The 2019 EP elections brought important changes, starting with an exceptionally high turnout (51.2%). The supply of parties in competition changed in an important manner. The main traditional parties took part in the competition independently. This was the case for the Social Democrats (PSD), their liberal governing partner (ALDE), former president Băsescu’s party (PMP), the historical liberals (PNL) and the Hungarian party (UDMR). Among the new competitors given enough votes to obtain representation in the European Parliament, there was the post-2016 parliamentary party, the Save Romania Union (USR). Born in 2015 with a strong Europhile and anticorruption platform, the USR formed an alliance with a recently created party, the Party for Freedom, Unity and Solidarity (+PLUS). Founded by the former European commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development and also former Prime Minister Dacian Cioloş, +PLUS shared the USR pro-European stances and campaigned for increased transparency in public administration, as well as for maintained commitments to Romania’s international partners. Two new parties had their origins in the Social Democratic Party: the ProRomania Party, recently created by former Prime Minister Victor Ponta, and Prodemo, founded by a former Social Democratic MEP, Catalin Ivan. If Prodemo’s programme was explicitly focused on defending national values, ProRomania’s programme officially promoted a modern and pro-­ European version of social democracy. Only ProRomania obtained seats. Among the main parties registered in the competition, three parties (Prodemo, Romania United Party and the National Union for the Progress of Romania) promoted a Eurosceptical platform, although none of them openly militated for Romania to leave the EU in line with a total opposition to the project of European integration. Their founding leaders/leading groups included former members of the PSD, although not exclusively. Their platforms emphasised national dignity and traditions with explicit references to the defence of the natural family. However, their message failed to mobilise a consistent number of voters. National values have been high on Romanian parties’ political agenda ever since the early 1990s. The nationalist rhetoric, with a Eurosceptic twist, survived within mainstream parties through the incorporation of former members of the radical parties (Cinpoeş 2015; Soare and Tufiș 2019). Particular events (e.g. the campaign for the 2018 referendum on

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changing the definition of family in Romania’s Constitution) provided additional windows of opportunity for party representatives, intellectuals and CSOs to claim the need for a resurgence of Romanian culture and the repudiation of imported (Western) values. As such, ethnocentric discourses multiplied and support for cosmopolitan and liberal principles became increasingly associated to a betrayal of the Romanian nation, a discrimination against the ‘natives’ in favour of ethnic minorities, sexual minorities or even the Muslim invasion (Cinpoeş 2015; Soare and Tufiș 2019). If we refer to the 2019 party programmes, we can observe that none openly challenged the EU project. No scenarios of Ro-exit were present in official documents or even in declarations of high-ranked representatives of the mainstream parties (see Table  10.1). As in the previous EP elections, the national agenda was particularly visible, obscuring the European-­ focused debates. This is obvious not only for the parties in government, which strategically emphasised their achievements in national politics, but also for opposition parties, whose programmes dealt extensively with national topics (e.g. the fight against corruption, the reform of the

Table 10.1  EU vision in Romanian parties’ manifestos (2019) Party

Main topics

PSD

Auto-proclaimed pro-EU stances/nationalist slogan of the campaign Elements of soft Euroscepticism (e.g. criticism of EU practices and policies; fight against double standards; MEPs patriotic behaviour) Pro-EU stances/nationalist slogan of the campaign Central argument: The fight against double standards Nationalist slogan of the campaign Pro-European stances (further integration at EU level; willingness for increased cooperation at EU level) Full integration in a federal EU Reinforcement of economic and security structures of the EU Union with the Republic of Moldova Europhile stances on the principles, policies and future of the EU Strong emphasis on the fight against corruption at the national level and increased mechanisms of coordination on the EU level Official pro-EU stances/nationalist slogan of the campaign Pro-EU stances with a regionalist twist; full support for the two national priorities (Schengen and Eurozone)

ALDE PNL PMP Alliance 2020 USR PLUS Pro-Romania UDMR

Source: Authors based on party manifestos

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judiciary, the absorption rate of structural funds and the unionist project with the Republic of Moldova). Several cracks in the pro-European consensus among the main parliamentary parties gained increased visibility. Patriotic-centred slogans characterised the campaigns of the three main parliamentary parties—PSD, ALDE and PNL—although with different intensities and styles. PSD launched its campaign under the slogan ‘Patriots in Europe. Romania deserves more’. Although PSD had no explicit party manifesto available on their website during the campaign, the core of the party’s programme was synthesised in an eight-page electoral flyer distributed by the state-­ owned Romanian Post to pensioners in March 2019. The first page of the flyer exhibited part of the 2019 electoral slogan, ‘Romania deserves more’ written on the Romanian flag. The narrative was built around the topic of fighting for the dignity of Romanians and the dismantling of the double standard and discrimination they face at the EU level. Accordingly, on the first page of the flyer, there was harsh criticism of the differences in ingredients in food products sold under the same brand and packaging in different EU countries, which had made headlines across the post-communist region. Similarly, the document criticised double standards in the quality of medicines. PSD also adopted a critical position with respect to criticisms from EU institutions and other member states on the justice reform and the state of corruption in Romania. Prime Minister Dăncilă framed the issue in terms of unfairness between eastern and western member states: ‘I’ve seen very big acts of corruption also in Holland, I saw them in France, I saw them in Germany. No one ever asked for the introduction of such a mechanism’ (Fiorentino 2019). Similarly, she attacked the consensus of member states supporting France on the issue of police clashes with the gilets jaunes protesters (Gurzu 2019). More generally, she attacked the patronising behaviour of the EU institutions with regard to Romania: ‘To solve certain issues, I don’t think you need to put someone in a corner or point the finger at them, the others need to come to support you to solve these issues’ (Fiorentino 2019). All in all, PSD’s message was summarised in an electoral advertisement on the last day of the campaign in a national newspaper: ‘We fight for dignity, for respect in Europe! We no longer accept double standards and discrimination. We firmly support that what is valid in the EU also applies to us. Romanians are not and do not deserve to be treated as second-class Europeans’ (www.cotidianul.ro 2019). Although the party programme dedicates ample space to EU-connected achievements under the PSD government and the main representatives of

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PSD regularly describe themselves as pro-European, during electoral rallies and on the individual party members’ social network profiles, the nationalist tone prevailed. A soft form of Euroscepticism permeated the PSD platform: there was no principled objection to European integration but the party voiced concerns about several policy areas (e.g. food, justice) that put Romanian interests at odds with the EU. Such was the case during the launching of the PSD 2019 campaign in Craiova when Liviu Dragnea (president of the PSD at the time) openly targeted foreign companies and EU institutions. He accused foreign companies of selling to Romanians fruits and vegetables contaminated with chemicals, of humiliating Romanian farmers, of opposing the adoption of the minimal wage and so on. He denounced EU officials’ criticism of the justice system as incorrect and their disregard of the achievements of his party for the people (www.hotnews.ro 2019). Consequently, the PSD criterion for selecting their EP candidates was the degree of commitment to the defence of national interests: ‘none came to this list unless she/he was a pure-blooded patriot’ (www.hotnews.ro 2019). PSD’s coalition partner, ALDE, synchronised its manifesto with the PSD campaign, although in a moderate tone. The slogan of the ALDE campaign laid emphasis on the need to defend the dignity of Romanians in Europe: ‘In Europe with dignity. # I respect Romania’. Renate Weber, one of the leading ALDE MEPs, provided a pro-European explanation for this slogan: ‘In Europe with dignity is a liberal creed. The essence of liberalism consists in respecting human rights and freedoms, supporting private initiative, independent judiciary, civilian control of the army and services, and the EU is based on these values’ (www.stiridecluj.ro 2019). However, her colleague, Norica Nicolai, also a MEP, voiced a different interpretation by harshly targeting ‘the double standards’ of the EU in judging Romania, and the old member states with regard to the specific topic of the justice system reform (Radio Europa Libera Romania 2019). In this case too, Eurosceptical inputs were used in order to frame a focused opposition to those EU policies and EU politicians seen to hamper or even clash with Romania’s interest. Note, however, that the synthetic programme ALDE presented for the 2019 EP elections5 remained focused on technical issues and that the party webpage dedicated to the EP elections started with an explicit pro-European slogan: ‘Your Europe, my Europe, our Europe!’ 5

 See the webpage of the campaign at https://2019.alde.ro/mesaje

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The main slogan of the Liberals (PNL) was fine-tuned to the nationalist dimension described above. Their slogan, ‘Romania above all’, openly recalled the slogan of Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. Moreover, PNL placed at the top of its candidate list a famous journalist, Rareş Bogdan, known for his provocative style and nationalist themes. However, the programme echoed a highly technical and pro-European dimension (PNL 2019). Significantly, the PNL manifesto was entitled ‘Professionals in Europe’ and structured on 20 topics ranging from general issues, such as the future of the EU, to more sectoral topics, such as security, internal affairs and EU foreign policy. As with the other parties, the topic of double standards was also present, although in a more technical dimension: ‘Some European companies selling goods or services on the Romanian market offer these products at a lower quality than in other Member states. This is about double standards within the Internal Market (…). The EU legislation has been amended, however there are concerns that it is not strict enough. (…) For Romanian consumers, the MEPs of the National Liberal Party will monitor the implementation of European legislation and will propose its stricter application. Also, if it is found that current regulations do not stop this type of practices, we will propose changing existing legislation and tightening sanctions and controls. We have to say stop standards doubles in the EU, Romanians are not second-­ class citizens!’ (PNL 2019). PMP’s slogan, ‘United in Europe’, made an allusion to the pro-­ European identity of the party, the need to reinforce linkages with the Romanian diaspora, and the main objective in terms of domestic politics, union with the Republic of Moldova.6 Former president Traian Băsescu, the leading candidate of the PMP list for the 2019 EP elections and the main promoter of unification with Moldova, officially launched the programme in Chişinău. Although not very technical, their programme was among the very few that openly discussed the topic of migration, an important topic at the EU level in 2019, insisting on the need to guarantee the protection of the frontiers and joint European action in this area.7 Among the new parties, the Alliance 2020 USR PLUS innovated less in terms of Europhile values, which it shared with the other parties, and 6  See the explicit position on the occasion of the launching of the campaign in Chisinau, (PMP 2019). 7  The same topic of migration was discussed at length by Traian Băsescu in a meeting with political science students at the University of Bucharest during the electoral campaign.

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more in terms of style. In line with its status as an EU member state, Romania has implemented the arrangements specified in Council Directive 93/109/EC on the voting rights of non-national EU citizens for EP elections ever since the 2007 elections. However, the mobilisation of non-­ national EU citizens has been low, and parties have shown limited interest on this topic (Vintilă and Soare 2018). The Alliance not only ran a French-­ born citizen on its list but also presented its programme and objectives in multiple languages: Romanian, English and Hungarian. The Alliance’s programme emphasised the pro-European dimension of its objectives, although the party slogan echoed the core-positioning of others in national politics, the fight against corruption: ‘We want a Romania without criminality and without thievery’. ProRomania distanced itself from the nationalist campaign promoted by the PSD. The slogan chosen for the 2019 EP campaign strategically reconnected the party with the 2014 PSD EP campaign led by then party-­ leader Victor Ponta: ‘Proud to be Romanians’. In 2019, ProRomania added a second sentence: ‘Proud to be Europeans’ (ProRomania 2019). During the official launching of the campaign, the continuity with the European PSD was openly assumed and demonstrated in the names of the party’s candidates, among which was the European commissioner Corina Creţu. Mirela Huncă, MP, openly stressed the difference between PSD and ProRomania’s offer: ‘Corina Creţu argued that Europe has money for roads, highways, and other major projects, but no one in the PSD government asked for the money. We will stay with the progressive parties in Europe’ (ProRomania 2019). To our knowledge, the party did not prepare a detailed manifesto for the 2019 EP elections, but we can infer the main issues of concern from the party’s vision statement on its official website (ProRomania undated). Two chapters refer explicitly to the EU: EU institutions and funds. With regard to the latter, ProRomania’s position stands in line with all the other parties, converging on the need to increase the absorption rate of EU funds. With regard to the former, ProRomania stated that the EU was the only political and geopolitical solution that could preserve peace and development on the continent and unambiguously referred to the need for all political forces, academia, and civil society to develop a national platform on the European project and the role of Romania in this project. The national dimension of the topic ‘EU institutions’ was further detailed with references to a pan-partisan consensus within the Romanian delegation in the EP to defend national interests. This agreement was supposed to be endorsed by the Supreme Council for National Defence (CSAT). Not surprisingly, the coordinator

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of this topic within the party was Laurenţiu Rebegea, a former MEP elected on the joint list of the PSD-PC-UNPR (on behalf of the Conservative Party) in 2014. In 2015, Rebegea left the S&D group at the EP and joined the Europe of Nations and Freedom. By 2018, he had become a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group. The case of the UDMR is particularly interesting considering the fact that the European political space offered an additional window of opportunity for the Hungarian minority to defend its rights and distinctiveness, benefitting from the collaboration with its kin-state representative in the People’s Party group, FIDESZ (Waterbury 2017). UDMR’s 2019 programme confirmed the strong allegiance of the alliance to the European project, although expressed with regard to the regional dimension of its constituency (UDMR 2019). The slogan of the alliance, ‘A prosperous Transylvania, a strong Europe’ was significant on this point. The programme pinpointed to not only the long-term commitment of the UDMR to Romania’s accession to the EU but also sources of disappointment.8 Despite different levels of intensity with regard to their endorsement of the EU project, the manifestos presented by the Romanian parties on the occasion of the 2019 EP elections confirm a weakened but enduring consensus on the country’s EU membership. However, the EU was increasingly identified as the institutional arena where national interests have to be presented and defended, even beyond traditional ideological distinctions. Explicit soft forms of Euroscepticism were present at the fringe of the competition advocating for a sectoral opposition to EU values and policies seen as contrasting to traditional Romanian values. But almost all the parties in the competition adopted pieces of Eurosceptical platforms with regard to the need to curb ‘double-standards’. The practice of dual-­ quality foods packaged as identically branded products has been openly targeted. Many parties have pointed out the need to guarantee a one-­ speed European union and avoid hierarchical practices.

10.5   Campaign and Results 2019 The 2019 campaign for the EP in Romania was marked from the very beginning by the decision of the Romanian president, Klaus Iohannis (PNL), to organise a referendum on judiciary on the same day as the EP 8  The programme openly quoted rejected Minority SafePack Citizens’ Initiative, endorsed by the UDMR, the Federal Union of European Minorities and the South Tyrol People’s Party. For details, see Waterbury (2017: 235–236).

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elections, justifying his decision by an increasing interest of Romanian society in the issues of pervasive corruption and unstable legislation. The two main themes of the referendum were the ban on amnesty and pardoning for people convicted on corruption charges and the ban on the government changing sensitive legislation in the area of criminality and justice legislation via emergency ordinances. Although technically criticised by specialists, the referendum was seen from the very beginning as an obstacle for PSD, disadvantaged by the increased participation of voters from urban areas and abroad who were particularly sensitive to topics such as corruption and justice reform. Indeed, the EP elections took place after two and a half years characterised by pressures from PSD to modify the Criminal Code, coupled with significant street protests organised by the civil society. The 2019 EP elections overlapped with Romania holding the six-­ month rotating Presidency of the EU.  This Presidency was marked by harsh EU criticisms of the continuous attempts to modify the justice system. In this context, the two parties in government, PSD and ALDE, were openly isolated by their parliamentary groups of reference in Strasburg. Both the European Socialist Party (EPS) and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) expressed deep concerns on the matter of the justice system reforms in Romania and threatened the two parties with exclusion (PES 2019; Digi24 2019). The boycott by the EU party family was such that the leader of the European Liberals, Guy Verhofstadt, announced his participation in the closing meeting of another party, the 2020 USR PLUS Alliance, avoiding any contact with ALDE. The turnout for the EP elections in 2019 was 51.2%, a significant increase from the turnout in the previous round of elections in 2014 (32.4%). As in the 2014 presidential and 2016 legislative elections, significant problems were reported in the organisation of the polling stations for the non-resident Romanian citizens (Vintilă and Soare 2018). According to the final results, ALDE failed to reach the threshold and lost its EP representation. Although PSD received a similar number of votes as in 2014, the increased turnout reduced the relative share of PSD to only 22.5%, sending the party into second place. PNL became the winner, with 27% of votes, and 10 MEPs (+4). The second winner was the newly created alliance between the USR and +Plus with eight MEPs. Once again, the 2019 elections only partially confirm the regularities of second-order elections. The convergence concerns the governing parties’ losses. The two governing partners (PSD and ALDE) were, indeed, the

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losers in the elections. ALDE failed to achieve the 5% threshold, while PSD, losing around 50,000 votes from the 2014 elections, came in second behind the opposition PNL. There were no gains for small or radical parties. Significantly, the three parties with an explicit Eurosceptical message obtained electoral results below 1%, their aggregate vote being 1.77%. The explanation for their limited success is, at least partially, connected to the fact that mainstream parties touched upon these issues. Note the major increase in participation (+18.8% compared to the previous EP election, +13.4% compared to the 2016 legislative election), which was also observed on a wider EU scale (21 MSs). In Romania, the high participation rate of 2019 was consistent with that part of the SOE thesis with regard to EP elections that EU elections fail to mobilise non-habitual voters, as demonstrated by Franklin and Hobolt (2011). In 2019, non-­ habitual voters among residents and non-residents increased the participation rate and voted against the parties in government. The referendum on justice reform acted as a trigger for this mobilisation. In the aftermath of the elections, the rate of participation remained a hot topic of debate considering that many non-resident Romanian citizens did not get the chance to vote at the 441 polling stations (+251 compared to 2014 elections) due to the long queues and the refusal of electoral authorities to extend the voting hours. The representatives of the opposition strongly criticised the government for voluntarily hampering the voting abroad and, two months after the elections, Parliament adopted a major change in the diaspora vote, by introducing multi-day voting and by extending the possibility to vote by mail.

10.6   Conclusions Since the very first Romanian EP election in 2007, the campaigns have had very little focus on European matters, privileging national political issues instead. Starting in 2009 the EP elections schedule has overlapped with the presidential election schedule, so that EP elections are seen as an antechamber for the presidential elections. The 2019 EP elections did not change the previous dynamics: the competition maintained a strong focus on national politics, as a direct consequence of the forthcoming presidential elections, and also as a by-product of the organisation of a consultative referendum held at the same time on the topic of justice. This national focus fits well within the traditional theoretical model of second-order elections. According to this interpretation, the electoral results can be viewed as a protest against the ruling PSD-led government, particularly in

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the arena of justice reform. Overall, the results can be summarised as a re-­ composition of the supply of Romanian MEPs, none of whom exhibited open Eurosceptic formulas. Overall, the May 2019 electoral moment in Romania was only marginally about the elections for the European Parliament. The main topics of discussion were related to the referendum on justice, to the voting process for Romanians living abroad (an issue that had been on the public agenda ever since Romania joined the EU and the number of Romanians living in the EU has increased), and to punishing PSD’s governing performance since 2016. The elections were also used as a check on the parties’ relative standing six months ahead of the presidential elections and one year ahead of local elections in 2020. Political parties were expected to use the results to decide on their internal strategies for the next elections, to decide on the candidates to run, and to negotiate possible alliances and coalitions. As for the activities of the Romanian MEPs in the new European Parliament, we expect the 2020 USR-PLUS Alliance to use the same approach to politics as they did in their first mandate in the Romanian Parliament and inform their voters about their actions in the EP, putting thus pressure for increased transparency on all MEPs. With regard to the topic of this volume, Euroscepticism is a relatively new phenomenon for Romania. There were mobilisations on this platform in the early 1990s, but since 1995 no major party has openly invested in attitudes that oppose the European project. Objections to the European project have remained peripheral, as in the case of the PRM, PUR and UNPR in 2019. Symbolically there are no relevant calls in Romania for Ro-exit, and European integration has always been seen as a benefit. On the demand side, over the last decade since the Great Recession disagreements on the positive value of EU have multiplied but attitudes towards the EU and integration remain generally favourable. Meanwhile, on the supply side critical stances have become more vocal. Although there are no diverging visions of the European project, the 2019 campaign marks a change of tone. The consensus on the EU was shattered but not by a critical assessment of the economic and political benefits of integration. Instead, Euroscepticism is projected onto domestic contests on highly polarising issues: the fight against corruption and the independence of the judiciary (Table 10.1).

14.09 24.22 – – – 5.79 – 30.20 – – 8.15 – – 3.61 13.94 – 29.46

6 10 – – – 2 – 13 – – 3 – – 1 0 – –

18.57 33.09 – – – 6.32 – 32.36 – – – – – – 6.21 3.45 39.20

65 114 – – – 22 – 115 – – – – – – – 18 –

EP2009

RO2012

EP2014

RO2016

EP2019

14.52 31.08 – – – 8.92 – 29.71 – 8.66 – – 4.22 – 2.89 – 27.67

5 11 – – – 3 – 10 – 3 – – 1 – 0 – –

273 – – – 18 – 56 47 – – – – – 0 18 –

58.63 – – – 5.14 – 16.51 13.99 – – – – – 3.00 2.73 41.76

15.00 37.60 – – 6.21 6.29 – 12.23 – – – 6.81 – – 15.86 – 32.44

6 16 – – 1 2 – 5 – – – 1 – – 0 – –

20.04 45.48 8.87 – 5.35 6.19 5.62 – – – – – – – 7.10 1.35 39.46

69 154 30 – 18 21 20 – – – – – – – 0 17 –

10 9 8 2 2 2 – – – – – – – 0 – –

27.00 22.50 22.36 6.44 5.76 5.26 – – – – – – – 10.68 – 51.20

a

In the post-2014 period only

Note: Italics indicate a soft Eurosceptic party. EP denotes European Parliament, RO denotes Chamber of Deputies of Romanian Parliament Party abbreviations: 2020 USR-PLUS Alliance (Alianţa 2020 USR-PLUS), Conservative Party (PC—Partidul Conservator), Democratic Party (PD—Partidul Democrat), Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR—Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din Romania), European Liberal and Democrats Alliance (ALDE—Partidul Aliant ̦a Liberalilor și Democrat ̦ilor), Greater Romania Party (PRM—Partidul Romania Mare), Liberal Democratic Party (PLD—Partidul Liberal Democrat), National Liberal Party (PNL—Partidul Naţional Liberal), National Union for the Progress of Romania (UNPR—Uniunea Nat ̦ională pentru Progresul României), People’s Movement Party (PMP—Partidul Mişcarea Populară), People’s Party—Dan Diaconescu (PPDD—Partidul Poporului—Dan Diaconescu), ProRomania, Social Democratic Party (PSD—Partidul Social-Democrat), Save Romania Union (USR—Uniunea Salvat ̦i România

Source: Romanian Permanent Electoral Authority (www.roaep.ro)

PNL PSDa USR/A2020 ProRomania PMP UDMR ALDE PD PPDD PRM PLD Mircea Diaconu (ind.) Elena Băsescu (ind.) László Tőkés (ind.) Others Minority seats Turnout

RO2008

Votes (%) Seats Votes (%) Seats Votes (%) Seats Votes (%) Seats Votes (%) Seats Votes (%) Seats Votes (%) Seats

EP2007

Table 10.2  Results of parliamentary and EP elections in Romania (2007–2019)

Appendix

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Reif, K., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-Order National Elections  – A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research, 8(1), 3–44. România  – 10 ani în Uniunea Europeană. (2017). Bucharest: Institul European din Romănia. http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/publicatii/RaportRomania-10-ani-in-UE-online_0.pdf. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Roper, S. D. (2002). Romania: The Unfinished Revolution. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. Sedelmeier, U. (2014). Anchoring Democracy from Above? The European Union and Democratic Backsliding in Hungary and Romania After Accession. Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(1), 105–121. Sitter, N. (2001). The Politics of Opposition and European Integration in Scandinavia: Is Euroscepticism a Government-opposition Dynamic? West European Politics, 24(4), 22–39. Soare, S. (2004). Les partis politiques roumains après 1989. Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles. Soare, S. (2005). Le nationalisme-populisme roumain aux portes de Bruxelles. Amnis, 5, 145–162. Soare, S., & Tufiș, C. D. (2019). Phoenix Populism. Problems of Post-Communism, 66(1), 8–20. UDMR. (2019). Programul UDMR pentru alegerile Europarlamentare. http:// ep19.udmr.ro/info_item/programul-udmr-pentru-alegerile-europarlamentare/. Accessed 29 Nov 2019. Vachudova, M. A., & Hooghe, L. (2009). Postcommunist Politics in a Magnetic Field: How Transition and EU Accession Structure Party Competition on European Integration. Comparative European Politics, 7(2), 179–212. van der Eijk, C., & Franklin, M. (Eds.). (1996). Choosing Europe. The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Vintilă, D. C., & Soare, S. (2018). Report on the Political Participation of Mobile EU Citizens: Romania, Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/59406. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Waterbury, M.  A. (2017). National Minorities in an Era of Externalization. Problems of Post-Communism, 64(5), 228–241. www.cotidianul.ro. (2019, May 24). Votat ̦i pentru patriot ̦i în Europa, stabilitatea t ̦ării și dezvoltare. https://www.cotidianul.ro/votati-pentru-patrioti-ineuropa-stabilitatea-tarii-si-dezvoltare/. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. www.hotnews.ro. (2019, April 12). Mitingul PSD de la Craiova. Liviu Dragnea: „Cineva mi-a zis: chiar dacă te arestează, venim și te scoatem de acolo” / O nouă serie de atacuri la oficialii UE și companiile străine. Hotnews. https://

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www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-23084844-livevideo-mitingul-psd-craiova-liviu-dragnea-iubita-lui-irina-facut-baie-multime.htm. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. www.stiridecluj.ro. (2019, May 14). Renate Weber, candidatul ALDE la europarlamentare: În Europa, cu demnitate! Stiri de Cluj. https://www.stiridecluj.ro/ politic/renate-weber-candidatul-alde-la-europarlamentare-in-europa-cu-demnitate. Accessed 27 Nov 2019.

CHAPTER 11

Slovakia Marek Rybář

11.1   The Electoral System The electoral system used for the European parliament elections essentially mirrors the one used for the national parliamentary elections. It is a list-based proportional representation system held in a single nationwide constituency with a 5% threshold. The only major difference is that in national elections, formal electoral alliances of two or three parties need to cross the increased 7% threshold, and a coalition of four or more parties faces a challenge of a 10% threshold, while a 5% threshold applies to both single parties and party alliances in the EP elections. The largest remainder Hagenbach-Bischoff method is used to allocate seats to the successful parties. Since 150 seats are at stake in the national elections, while only 141 MEPs are elected in the country, the natural threshold is technically higher in the EP elections. In practice, however, the higher natural threshold

1  Due to the changing size of the European Parliament, the share of MEPs elected in Slovakia has changed. It amounted to 14 in 2004, 13 in 2009 and 2014, and 14 in 2019. Due to the delayed Brexit, however, only 13 Slovak MEPs now sit in the EP; the 14th MEP will gain her seat only after UK’s withdrawal from the European Union.

M. Rybář (*) Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic © The Author(s) 2020 V. Hloušek, P. Kaniok (eds.), The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9_11

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never affected the distribution of MEPs: It has never happened that a party would cross the 5% threshold and received no parliamentary seats. Because of the delayed Brexit, originally expected to be completed before the 2019 EP elections, the Slovak Parliament passed a last-minute change to the electoral system to the EP in March 2019. The amendment was to determine which of the 14 MEPs will assume the seat only after the completion of the British withdrawal from the EU. It was decided that the fourteenth parliamentary seat will be allocated to the party with the lowest remainder (Kerekes 2019). Consequently, a party that received 9.62% received two seats, while the party with 9.69% of votes got only one seat, and its second elected MEP will have to wait until departure of British MEPs. Party lists are not fully closed, since voters can cast up to four preferential votes in the national elections and up to two preferential votes in the EP elections to candidates from their preferred party list. This provides some room for individual campaigns of the candidates, who can gain seat at the expense of their fellow party candidates.

11.2   Public Opinion and European Integration As in most EU member states, public opinion towards the EU membership has undergone dramatic changes. In the pre-accession phase, Slovaks overwhelmingly supported their country’s accession to the European Union. The EU accession referendum in 2003 resulted in a highest support ever for EU membership in any European country (Henderson 2004). The enthusiasm was driven by a desire to ‘return to Europe’ following the breakdown of the communist regime in late 1989. Moreover, due to the country’s exclusion from the first group of strong candidates for EU enlargement (back in 1997), the support for EU membership was boosted by a desire ‘to catch up’ with neighbours (the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary), who were given a green light. The effects of ‘returning’ and ‘catching up’ lasted throughout the first years after EU accession in 2004 (Malová et al. 2005). In addition, the widespread support left a legacy in the form of complex and somewhat paradoxical stances of some of those institutional players who would, under different circumstances, probably adopt clearer (Eurosceptic) positions. The most prominent of them was the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), a senior governing party during most of the 1992–1998 period, when Slovakia was originally excluded from the group of most promising

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candidates for EU membership. Nominally, HZDS, led by Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar, supported Slovakia’s early accession and wrote the goal into all its party documents and even in the official government programme. However, the party consistently undermined the institutional foundations of the liberal democratic regime and, consequently, faced the prospect of the country being excluded from receiving an invitation to start accession negotiations in 1997. Mečiar himself toyed with the idea of abandoning the EU integration effort and repeatedly accused EU officials for applying double (i.e. more critical) standards to Slovakia. These circumstances led one observer to label the HZDS as a ‘phony Europhile’ (Henderson 2008). Nevertheless, after the HZDS was voted out of power and remained in the opposition for eight years (1998–2006), the party pledged support for EU membership and nominally even supported federalist tendencies in the EU (Mesežnikov 2009: 25–26). Another case in point was the Communist Party of Slovakia, briefly represented in the Slovak Parliament in 2002–2006. In its manifestos, the party emphasised the need for international cooperation in Europe and even supported the idea of European cooperation. However, as an orthodox communist party, it rejected the idea of an EU-wide single market, a cornerstone of EU integration. In fact, its core policy goals were clearly inconsistent with the economic and political foundations of the European Union. Hence, despite being nominally supportive of EU integration, the Slovak Communists were a de facto hard Eurosceptic party (Haughton and Rybář 2004). In addition to being overwhelmingly supportive of EU membership, Slovaks also enthusiastically supported early accession to the Schengen zone and adoption of the common European currency, the Euro. Nevertheless, over time their opinions about the benefits of EU membership have undergone significant changes as the country assumed full membership in the European Union. A majority of the population has consistently held the opinion that, overall, Slovakia’s EU membership is beneficial. The share of those who appreciate the benefits of EU membership has dropped since 2009 (see Graph 11.1), however. Between 2005 and 2010, the share of those who both appreciated the benefits and acknowledged the drawbacks of being in the EU dropped and recently returned to the level of about 40%. The share of those who did not see EU membership as beneficial revolved around 10%. Another way to look at the levels of diffuse Euroscepticism (and, conversely, at support for EU membership) is to examine the evolution of

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Membership in the EU is...

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Bad Good Niether good nor bad

Graph 11.1  Benefits of EU membership in Slovakia. (Source: Standard Eurobarometer)

trust in the European Union. Before 2011, there had been an overall trend of a growing trust in the EU, peaking with 71% of Slovaks expressing trust in 2009 and 2010 (see Graph 11.2). Ten years after joining the EU, nearly three in five (57%) Slovaks did not trust the EU.  Between 2011 and 2018, the share of those who trusted and those who distrusted the EU were roughly equivalent. It is also possible that the potential for Euroscepticism is more obvious when we look at the levels of popular trust in specific EU institution, for example, the European Commission. As Graph 11.3 indicates, there is a striking similarity between the levels of trust in the Commission and in the entire EU. There is, however, one important difference: A two-year time-­ lag in the drop of trust in the Commission compared to trust in the EU. One can only speculate that growing distrust in specific EU institutions (like the Commission) is a consequence of a general lack of trust in the European Union. In other words, distrust in the Commission may not be primarily driven by its (in)actions but by a general feeling of distrust towards the way the entire EU functions. The potential for popular support for (hard) Eurosceptic political parties can be assessed by examining a question included in the Standard

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Trust in the European Union

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 2010 2010 2011 2011 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 2016 2016 2017 2017 2018 2018

0 Trust

Distrust

Don't know

Graph 11.2  Trust in the European Union in Slovakia. (Source: Standard Eurobarometer)

70

Trust in the Commission

60 50 40 30 20

0

2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 2010 2010 2011 2011 2011 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 2016 2016 2017 2017 2018 2018

10

trust

distrust

don't know

Graph 11.3  Trust in the European Commission in Slovakia. (Source: Standard Eurobarometer)

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Eurobarometer since 2012. Respondents are asked whether they agree with the statement that their country would more easily face the future outside the European Union (see Graph 11.4). Since 2012, a clear majority of respondents (some 60%) do not agree that leaving the EU would be beneficial to their country. Some 30% think leaving the EU would improve Slovakia’s future prospects. All in all, there has been a shift in the overall levels of support for Slovakia’s EU membership and its perceived benefits among the voters. A growing distrust of the EU can be dated back to the outbreak of economic, geopolitical and immigration crises that brought EU-wide trends and policies into the heart of Slovak politics. The second half of Slovakia’s fifteen-year EU membership has been marked by growing distrust of the EU and its institutions. Nevertheless, the perceived benefits of EU membership outweigh the costs, and the level of support for leaving the EU is only about half that of support for remaining in the EU. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that there has been a stable pool of potential supporters of (hard and soft) Eurosceptic parties.

70

Easier to Face the Future Outside the EU

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 2016 2016 2017 2017 2018 2018 Don't know Agree Disagree

Graph 11.4  Slovakia would easier face the future outside the EU (Source: Standard Eurobarometer)

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11.3   Party-Based Euroscepticism and Second-­Order Elections Framework 2004–2019 A major theoretical explanation of EP election results in general has evolved under the rubric of the second-order election (SOE) framework. Briefly, EP elections are essentially national contests that tend to be characterised by lower turnout and electoral defeats of governing and major parties. The results are also influenced by the timing of EP elections within the domestic electoral cycle. A cursory overview of our case reveals that SOE theory is not fully satisfactory in explaining the EP election results in Slovakia before 2019. Turnout in Slovak EP elections is considerably lower than in the national parliamentary elections. In fact, Slovakia recorded the lowest turnout in the entire European Union in every EP election between 2004 and 2019. Participation plunged to 13.05% in 2014, while it reached just 22.47% in 2019, the highest level in Slovakia nonetheless. The other components of the second-order election framework, however, are absent. To start with, the EP elections have not seen losses by governing parties. In 2004, three governing parties—SDKÚ, KDH and SMK—gained three, three and two parliamentary seats, respectively. The opposition Smer and HZDS parties each gained three seats. SDKÚ, the senior governing party, gained a symbolic if narrow victory, defeating the opposition HZDS by a small margin. At the time, all five parties were the major players in the domestic party-political scene. Five years later, the governing parties also performed well: Smer gained five seats, while its junior coalition partners HZDS and SNS each managed to elect one MEP. The opposition SDKÚ, SMK and KDH each gained two seats. Clearly, voters did not punish the sitting governments, nor did they reward new and smaller opposition parties. In 2014, the single-party majority government of Smer also performed well: Smer gained four seats in the EP, twice as many as the best-performing opposition KDH and SDKÚ. This time, five additional parties each gained a seat in the EP, resulting in a fragmented party representation of Slovak MEPs. However, it is difficult to argue that the fragmentation was caused by the peculiarities of EP elections. In fact, the electoral success of minor parties was not confined to the EP elections: Two years later, national parliamentary elections produced the most fractionalised National Council, as eight parties (party lists) managed to cross the 5% electoral threshold.

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High fragmentation, low organisational continuity of political parties, and their relatively short life-span have all characterised the party-political scene in post-Communist Slovakia. With respect to EP elections between 2004 and 2019, just two parties consistently managed to gain seats in all four EP elections: Smer and the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). It is also telling that the latter failed to cross the threshold of parliamentary representation in the 2016 national elections (for the first time since 1990) and was, at the time of the 2019 EP elections, an extra-parliamentary party. Two other parties (SMK and SDKÚ) managed to gain EP seats three times, while three parties (HZDS, SaS and OĽ aNO) gained EP representation twice. Five formations (Ľ SNS, SNS, PS/Spolu, Most-Híd and NOVA) only succeeded once. To some extent, clarity of stance on EU-related issues is linked to the longevity of party representation in the EP: one can expect more elaborated positions from parties that voters returned to the EP on several occasions. However, other factors do play a role, especially patterns of domestic party opposition and government-­opposition dynamics.

11.4   Euroscepticism: Hard or Soft? To understand the differentiation of party positions with respect to EU integration, a simple distinction can be made on the basis of the character of their opposition to EU integration (qualified and principled) between hard- and soft-Euroscepticism. With some simplification, the remaining parties may be grouped into a residual category of Europhile parties. Despite some limitations, this taxonomy provides a useful starting point for discussing the stances of Slovak political parties. Starting in the pre-accession period, all major parties nominally supported membership in the European Union. As noted above, opposing EU integration was at odds with the dominant attitude of Slovak citizens. Consequently, European integration had not been a contentious issue in Slovak politics. It is true that the issue of EU accession played a crucial role in 1997–2004. Slovakia had been excluded from the original small group of EU membership frontrunner candidates in 1997. However, that decision reflected a deteriorating state of democratic practice in the country, not the programmatic goals of the main Slovak parties. Furthermore, Slovakia may have provided a rare example of a country where the issue of EU integration contributed to a transformation of party competition: as a reaction to the 1997 exclusion from early EU accession, the then-fragmented opposition parties coordinated their electoral efforts, culminating

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in a merger of five into a single party (SDK) that emerged victorious in the 1998 national parliamentary elections. Furthermore, the ensuing fourparty coalition government, with the goal of catching up in EU accession, consisted of parties from across the left-right spectrum. They downplayed considerable political differences to keep the semi-­authoritarian parties out of power and thus secure the country’s chances to enter the EU. Furthermore, one of the parties was determined to leave the coalition government but both domestic and foreign actors (the EU) persuaded its representatives to remain in the cabinet so as not to endanger a smooth EU accession (Rybář 2005a: 187). Consequently, European integration was present in national politics as an important issue, albeit one that did not produce differentiation in policy platforms and stances. In fact, the shock of the initial exclusion from the accession process, and the subsequent effort to catch up, resulted in a politics of technocratic implementation of EU acquis and depoliticisation of EU integration. That being said, it is important to acknowledge the somewhat complex positions of HZDS and the unreformed Communist Party (see above). Both parties nominally supported Slovakia’s EU membership but their practical steps in government (by HZDS) and radical ideological stance expressed in various party documents (by the KSS) conflicted with the goals of EU accession and integration. To simplify somewhat, HZDS’s position vis-à-vis the EU may be described as inconsistent, while that of the KSS was of a de facto hard Eurosceptic party, rejecting the main economic and political principles of EU integration (Henderson 2008). The Christian Democrats have long been the clearest example of a soft-­ Eurosceptic political party in Slovakia and their attitudes towards the integration project have long represented one of the pillars of their identity (Rybář 2005b). KDH’s Euroscepticism has been based on its opposition to integration in cultural affairs and on value issues. In the past, the party unsuccessfully initiated a parliamentary declaration asserting an opt-out if questions of bioethics and family law were to be regulated by EU legislation, and repeatedly expressed its reservations about the transfer of foreign and defence policies to the EU level. As it failed to enter the Slovak Parliament in 2016, the new party leadership concentrated on more pressing issues of organisational and personal consolidation and paid less attention to EU issues. KDH’s soft-Eurosceptic positions contrasted clearly with, and were in part prompted by, competition with the SDKÚ, its liberal-­conservative competitor and senior coalition partner (1998–2006). The SDKÚ projected itself as the champion of modernisation and

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Europeanisation of Slovakia and, until its demise in 2016, was a leading representative of Europhile forces in the country. After the initial period of EU integration as a depoliticised issue, European issues returned to Slovak politics vigorously in 2011. This year also marked the ascendance of a new relevant soft-Eurosceptic party, Freedom and Solidarity (SaS). The centre-right coalition government of Iveta Radičová, implementing several austerity measures, faced the difficult decision of approving the European bailout fund intended to help crisis-hit Eurozone member states. Unable to persuade a coalition partner to support the ratification, Prime Minister Radičová called for a vote on the issue that she linked to a vote of confidence in her government. Nevertheless, the SaS coalition party did not succumb to the pressure, a decision that led to the fall of the government and early elections (Halas 2018). The incident damaged the relations between parties of the centre-­right for years but it also represented a break with the tacit Slovak consensus on European politics. From then on, political parties would not shy away from using European themes for domestic political purposes. Nevertheless, they still rarely elaborated their own positions and internalised European political issues; rather, more often than before, they cherry-picked issues related to EU and turned them into issues they deemed worth politicising in their national election campaigns. Interestingly, most parties weaponised integration-related issues more in national elections than in EP elections. SaS’s first MEP, Richard Sulík, elected in 2009, who also served as party leader, regularly criticised the integration project from an economically liberal position. The party leader expressed his sympathy for Brexiteers, repeatedly criticised German Chancellor Angela Merkel for her handling of the immigration crisis in Germany and beyond, and argued in favour of restrictive policies on immigration to the EU, especially for people from predominantly Muslim countries. Nevertheless, SaS continued to support Slovakia’s EU membership and recommended the integration project be refocused on further liberalisation of the single market. His party’s support for the core principles of market integration in the EU would make the case for classifying SaS as a soft-Eurosceptic party. For both KDH and SaS, soft-Euroscepticism represented an important building block of their party identity that differentiated them from their potential centre-right rivals. The period between 2009 and 2014 was marked by economic and immigration crisis in Europe. In Slovak domestic politics, it was also a period of in which some of the established parties (e.g. SDKÚ, HZDS and SMK) started losing political relevance, while

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new players entered the national political arena. In addition, Smer-Social Democracy, a left-leaning party, assumed control of the executive (2006–2010 and 2012–2016). Smer initially started as a party with an ambivalent and rather ambiguous stance towards Slovak EU membership. While in opposition (1999–2006), the party had questioned whether the level of socioeconomic development in Slovakia was sufficient to withstand the competitive pressures of EU membership. Smer also questioned Slovakia’s readiness to join the EU (and the Eurozone). Later, in the position of senior governing party, Smer oversaw Slovakia’s completion of Schengen and Eurozone accession. In fact, European integration came to play the role of a valence issue—parties competed on who was the most competent to complete the accession and thus to deliver the fruits of membership. Thus, Schengen area entry and adoption of the Euro were used by Smer to demonstrate their competence and adherence to the principles of ‘ever closer union’. This came in quite handy especially as both domestic and international observers expressed their concerns about Smer’s entry into government with HZDS and the Slovak National Party, parties with dubious democratic credentials. The Party of European Socialists even temporarily suspended Smer’s membership among its ranks (Nicholson 2006). Similar concerns emerged in 2015 and 2016, in the course of the national electoral campaign: Smer’s leaders based the party’s message on ‘protecting Slovakia’ against a non-existent wave of immigrants. Party leader Robert Fico pledged to prevent the formation of ‘concentrated Muslim communities’ in Slovakia and the party vigorously opposed any Europe-wide measures that would lead to reallocation of immigrants and asylum seekers to the country. To offset criticism from their European partners and improve their party’s international position, Smer leaders justified their entry into a left-­ right coalition government in 2016 by the need to keep the extremists out of power and to remain at the centre of the EU integration process. In 2017, following Slovakia’s first presidency to the European Council, Prime Minister Fico of Smer vigorously advocated the need for his country to be at the core of further EU cooperation (TASR 2017a). He argued in favour of a closer cooperation of the Eurozone countries, leading to further communitarisation of social policy and taxation (TASR 2017b). It is notable, however, that Fico as prime minister was a considerably more enthusiastic supporter of EU integration than Fico as party leader. Only rarely did his party openly support or argue in favour of common European

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policies. For instance, Smer’s leading representatives, including Fico himself, repeatedly questioned the rationale for EU sanctions against Russia. They also showed little sympathy for those EU countries that demanded joint measures to tackle the immigration crisis. After his resignation as prime minister in March 2018 (while retaining his post as Smer leader), Fico and his party essentially stopped talking about the EU, limiting themselves to neutral statements. Smer’s metamorphoses nicely illustrate how government-opposition dynamics can influence party stances towards the EU. Smer, when in opposition or in campaign mode, would tap into Eurosceptic and not-so-­ liberal-democratic sentiments. However, when in government, the burden of responsibility to both domestic constituencies and international partners had a moderating impact on its EU-related agenda. With the departure of the Christian Democrats (KDH) and SDKÚ from parliament in 2016, the diversity of centre-right party stances towards the EU increased. Besides soft-Eurosceptic SaS, three other formations— OĽ aNO, Most-Híd and most recently PS/Spolu—all qualified as Europhiles. Nevertheless, their stances varied, as did the extent to which they paid attention to EU integration themes. For Most-Híd and OĽ aNO, European integration never represented a theme on which they would sharpen their policy profile. The former prioritised the interests of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, and the need for inter-ethnic Slovak-Hungarian cooperation, while the latter has been an unorthodox anti-corruption formation of individual parliamentarians with diverse political persuasions. Their enthusiasm for EU integration emerged almost by default, from a stance of not being overtly critical of EU affairs. Both gained national parliamentary seats and also managed to gain EP seats (Most-Híd in 2014 and OĽ aNO in 2014 and 2019). In its stance towards the EU, Most-Híd resembles the Hungarian Community Party (SMK), which was represented in the EP in 2004–2014. For the SMK, European integration represented additional guarantees of the rights of ethnic minorities and the EP embodied a symbolic forum in which Slovakia’s Hungarians could sit together with MEPs elected in Hungary. Two other new parties, Progressive Slovakia (PS) and Together-Civic Democracy (Spolu) need to be examined, despite their newness. Both were established in late 2017: PS as a brand-new initiative of various leftliberal activists, while Spolu emerged on the remnants of the Network (Siet)̌ party’s parliamentarian factions opposing the post-2016 Smer-led government. One of the central components of their identities has been a

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positive view and active promotion of European integration, a stance without an unequivocal partisan anchor in the post-2016 national parliament. Although developing independently of each other, their leaders have actively communicated together and eventually decided to form an electoral alliance for the 2019 European Parliament elections. They have prepared probably the most elaborate EU-related policy manifesto of all Europhile parties, being broadly supportive of various federalist solutions (see below). Interestingly, despite growing dissatisfaction with the way EU works (see above), there was no breakthrough of radical parties to the EP until 2019. The unreformed far left Communist Party (KSS) was represented in the national parliament only briefly (2002–2006), and failed to gain representation in the European Parliament. The Slovak National Party (SNS) comes closest to a radical right party gaining EP seats. Once a champion of xenophobic nationalism and a supporter of national sovereignty taking precedence over commitment to the EU, the party toned down its extremist rhetoric, changed its leadership, and shifted away from issues of identity and ethnicity. Like most Slovak political parties, it opposed the compulsory relocation scheme of immigrants within the EU but other than that it made few explicitly critical EU-related statements. Its only MEP (elected in 2009) represented a moderate national-conservative tendency in the party. In fact, SNS has been considerably more successful domestically than in the EP elections. SNS has become a well-entrenched player in the political scene, having participated in several national governments. Its recent moderation is also attested to by the fact that it entered a coalition government in 2016 together with Most-Híd, symbolically crossing an ethnic cooperation red line that would have been unacceptable to the ‘old’ SNS. Two other parties should be mentioned. The Peoples’ Party Our Slovakia (Ľ SNS) is an extreme-right party that first recorded a political breakthrough in 2013, when its leader Marian Kotleba was surprisingly elected regional governor of the Banská Bystrica region (Kluknavská and Smolík 2016). While in office, among other measures he rejected co-­ financing of regional cultural and development projects from EU funds. His party gained parliamentary representation for the first time in 2016 on an anti-immigration, anti-Roma and anti-EU electoral platform. It has long argued for Slovakia’s withdrawal from the EU. In fact, it is the clearest example of a Slovak hard-Eurosceptic party. It portrays the EU as a sophisticated project intended to destroy the nations of Europe, as a conspiracy of liberal elites to uproot the traditional Christian values and way

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of life. The party has unsuccessfully attempted to initiate a plebiscite on Slovakia’s exit from the EU. Finally, Sme rodina, another new parliamentary party since 2016, is a radical right party that campaigned on a mix of welfare state extension policies and anti-Muslim/anti-immigration rhetoric. Its European platform remains underdeveloped but it is telling that in the run-up to the 2019 EP elections it forged an alliance with Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders and Matteo Salvini (see below), who come close to hard-Eurosceptic positions. To summarise, three Slovak political parties can unequivocally be considered Eurosceptic. KDH and SaS have taken a soft-Eurosceptic standpoint, albeit from different positions: protection of the traditional Christian conservative values of Slovak society in the former case, and a desire to focus on developing an economically liberal market economy in the latter. Neither of them calls for abandoning the EU; their criticism of European integration is clearly qualified. Ľ SNS, on the other hand, is a hard-­ Eurosceptic party, rejecting the EU as a conspiracy aimed at destroying the Slovak nation, its state and traditional way of life. A few other parties relevant in 2019 at times toyed with Eurosceptic stances, notably SNS and Sme rodina. However, their positions have either moderated over time (SNS) or remained sufficiently fuzzy and underdeveloped (both the ‘old’ SNS and Sme rodina) not to qualify as Eurosceptic.

11.5   The 2019 EP Election Campaign As explained above, the second-order elections framework does not seem to explain the results of European elections in Slovakia before 2019. In this respect, the European Parliament elections in 2019 were different, since the results were more in line with the framework than ever before. It is essential, however, to provide a broader political context to understand the EP contest. Since Slovakia’s accession to the EU in 2004, EP elections have always been preceded by direct presidential elections, held just weeks earlier. Executive power in the country rests primarily with the prime ministers and his or her government, who need parliamentary support throughout their term in office. The presidency is largely a ceremonial office with some important formal powers but it also carries important symbolic value. The presidential elections in 2019 were special, because outgoing President Andrej Kiska decided not to run for re-election. The decision left the race without an obvious frontrunner. Some scholars argue there is an indirect link between presidential and EP elections, as their temporal

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proximity may negatively affect the turnout in European elections (Gyárfášová and Henderson 2018). Furthermore, the near overlap of the two elections puts additional pressures on the coordination efforts of parties and candidates, who must remain in a campaign mode for an extended period of time. That also brings an extra financial burden, as neither parties nor candidates receive public funding for presidential and EP elections. Finally, success or failure in presidential elections may create momentum for parties in the EP elections. The 2019 presidential election resulted in the unexpected victory of the political newcomer Zuzana Č aputová, a deputy chairwoman of Progressive Slovakia. She defeated Maroš Šefčovič, a Smer nominee and Vice President of the European Commission, in a run-off. Č aputová benefited from electoral coordination with SaS nominee Robert Mistrík, who quit the race after Č aputová consistently registered higher approval ratings in the run­up to the election. Although the bulk of the campaign focused on domestic issues, Č aputová also promoted clearly pro-integration attitudes, arguing in favour of further European cooperation. Her victory also increased the visibility of the Progressive Slovakia/Spolu alliance that attempted to capitalise on her victory in the subsequent EP elections.

11.6   Party Lists and Manifestos Eight parliamentary parties plus an additional twenty-three formations participated in the 2019 EP elections. Few relevant political parties prepared a full-fledged election manifesto. Some, including the governing SNS and the opposition Ľ SNS and Sme rodina, did not prepare any official document stating their policy preferences regarding the EU. Of the three, Ľ SNS presented the least ambivalent stances towards the EU in its various press statements. It has regularly portrayed the EU as a threat to Europe and Slovakia, referred to EU policies as ‘dictate from Brussels’ (Ľ SNS 2016) and lamented the supremacy of EU norms over national laws (Ľ SNS 2019). In several televised debates of party leaders in the campaign, the Ľ SNS leader claimed the money Slovakia contributed to the EU budget could be better spent domestically. Ľ SNS did not openly advocate withdrawal from the EU but its proposals were clearly in conflict with the existing norms and with the course of EU integration. Ľ SNS featured on their website and Facebook profiles videos from the streets of Brussels aimed at documenting how EU integration causes the influx of migration to Europe that threatens the traditional way of life. The party candidates pledged to fight the trend as future members of the European Parliament.

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Two other rightwing parties, SNS and Sme rodina, presented a gentler picture of the EU. They did not advocate leaving the EU but pledged a vague protection of vital national interests and European culture and traditions. SNS criticised the EU for its sanctions against Russia that it deemed unjust and ineffective. Beyond that, however, few specific proposals and elaborated stances were put forward by the party. Sme rodina also did not publish any policy document specifying its stance on EU integration. Its main campaign message emphasised the need for ‘nationally oriented’ parties to cooperate in the EU. The party organised a meeting in the Slovak capital Bratislava of Le Pen’s Front National, Salvinis Lega, and other parties. The party also published campaign videos in which its European partners appealed to the Slovak voters to support Sme rodina in the EP elections. Despite their apparent affiliation with hard-Eurosceptic parties from Western Europe, few official proclamations and public stances of Sme rodina politicians characterised the party as Eurosceptic. Its positions vis-à-vis the European integration project remained unclear. The SaS and KDH, two soft-Eurosceptic parties, made their positions much clearer. SaS presented probably the most elaborate programme of all parliamentary parties: it pledged respect for, and deepening of, the original four freedoms, aimed at strengthening economic aspects of European integration. SaS de facto supported a multi-speed integration, security and defence cooperation with the primacy of NATO, and defended the national veto in the area of immigration and taxation (SaS 2019). Christian Democrats continued to emphasise their traditional themes of national autonomy in cultural and ethical issues, the need to tackle excessive bureaucratisation in the EU, and the need for Slovakia to attain food self-­ sufficiency (KDH 2019). Their seven-point manifesto was clearly less elaborated compared to their policy platforms from earlier EP elections. The governing Smer-SD only published a brief leaflet with three main points, in which it pledged equal pay for men and women across the EU, claimed that Russia is a partner and not an enemy, and demanded that cultural and ethical issues, including family law and the definition of marriage, remain exclusively under the authority of member states (Smer 2019). Opposition OĽ aNO and governing Most-Híd each prepared relatively elaborate policy documents. The former pledged respect for existing EU rules (e.g. concerning immigration control, tax evasion, EU funds), supported further EU enlargement in the Balkans, and called for reinforced cooperation in security and internal matters (OĽ aNO 2019). Most-­ Híd emphasised the need to protect ethnic minorities by establishing

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EU-wide standards, and supported increased levels of environmental protection and enhanced cooperation among EU countries in security and defence policies (Most-Híd 2019). Finally, the coalition of PS and Spolu presented a detailed manifesto covering all major areas of cooperation in the EU. The alliance portrayed Slovakia’s EU membership as a missed opportunity for accelerated modernisation of the country, and pledged enhanced European cooperation in the areas of internal and external security, environmental protection, and the new digital economy. PS/Spolu also endorsed the introduction of EU-wide welfare and social protection (PS/Spolu 2019).

11.7   Electoral Campaign and Election Results Mobilisation without contestation is probably the best way to describe the 2019 campaign. Political parties and their candidates rarely addressed each other’s statements, positions and policy goals. Instead, they each attempted to mobilise their core electorate, occasionally attacking the integrity of the other parties’ candidates. European issues did play some role but domestic concerns prevailed. In addition, several parties waged their ‘micro wars’, fighting for similar voters or on similar policy issues. The election resulted in a surprising victory of the PS/Spolu. The alliance gained over 20% of the vote and four seats in the European Parliament. With just over 15%, Smer-SD ended up second, for the first time in nationwide elections since 2006. Decline in the support for the party was clear but Smer-SD gained three seats in the EP, a result that it considered a success. The third place went to the extreme right Ľ SNS. The party gained two seats in the EP and confirmed its viability as a relevant political party. The Christian Democrats surpassed SaS by a razor-thin margin, each gaining over 9% of the vote and two seats in the parliament. OĽ aNO crossed the 5% threshold narrowly, gaining a single seat. No other party managed to secure parliamentary representation, even though the Party of Hungarian Community came very close, gaining 4.96 per cent. Smer-SD’s main goal was to minimise expected losses. The party had suffered a constant decline in popular support since it peaked in 2012, when it won over 40 per cent of the votes in the national elections. The resignation of its leader from the position of prime minister in March 2018, followed by his unsuccessful candidacy for the Constitutional Court in early 2019, followed by the defeat of its presidential candidate in the run-off all revealed stagnation and uncertainty. The veteran MEP Monika Beň ová led the party list but no other candidate could be considered a

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political heavyweight. The party emphasised its traditional themes: social protection and welfare provisions, and national sovereignty in immigration control. Its coalition partners SNS and Most-Híd led only a low-­profile campaign, focused around the profiles and experience of their MEPs. Most-Híd’s main concern was to recover after the humiliating result of its presidential candidate. At the same time, the party clashed with the Party of Hungarian Community over who was the true representative of the country’s largest ethnic minority. SNS also faced a tough challenge from the opposition extreme right Ľ SNS. The radicals accused SNS of selling out the national interest, allowing Brussels to control the fate of the Slovak nation. The EP elections confirmed the political relevance of the extreme right hard Eurosceptic party. Having secured its national parliamentary presence for the first time in 2016, the party managed to attract solid electoral support and gained two seats in the European Parliament. For the Christian Democrats, the EP election provided a test case of their effort to return to political relevance. They faced challenges from several small Christian-conservative groupings vying to be the standard-­bearer of voters concerned with Christian cultural and ethical norms and principles. The largest parliamentary opposition parties SaS and OĽ aNO each fought on different ground. SaS leader and outgoing MEP Richard Sulík decided not to run, claiming that it was not possible to lead the party from Brussels, but he wanted to prepare his party for taking over government responsibility in 2020. SaS emphasised its competence in economic policy, its consistent and predictable positions in many areas of EU policy, its preference for relatively limited and effective European cooperation, defence of the national veto over migration, and its opposition to the federalisation of the debt of Eurozone member states. OĽ aNO, on the other hand, ran a rather confusing and disorganised campaign. The party leader Igor Matovič originally decided to lead the party list, even though he claimed he had no intention to sit in the EP.  During the campaign, he withdrew from the list and instead recommended to his voters to support no. 3 on the party list, Peter Pollák (TASR 2019). He argued that Pollák, as an ethnic Romani politician, would nicely contrast the expected success of the (anti-Roma) extreme right Ľ SNS in the elections. Green issues entered the campaign for the first time primarily thanks to the alliance of PS/Spolu, which nominated two well-known environmental activists. The alliance was the most openly Euro-enthusiastic political force in the campaign. It advocated a more coordinated EU common defence and foreign policy, the need for investments in new technologies, and minimal EU-standards of social welfare.

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11.8   How to Interpret the Election Results? The elections clearly resulted in defeat for the governing parties: two of the three coalition partners (SNS and Most-Híd) did not even manage to cross the 5% threshold of EP representation. Smer-SD, the senior coalition partner, lost votes and seats compared to 2014, and ended up second with just 15.7%. The parliamentary opposition centre-right SaS and OĽ aNO gained two and one EP seats, respectively, and the extreme right Ľ SNS managed to gain two MEPs. The true winners of the elections were the extra-parliamentary PS/Spolu and Christian Democrats, with four and two seats, respectively. To summarise, the governing parties clearly lost, while the opposition, both in and out of national parliament, dominated. Interestingly, a similar pattern can be observed in the 2017 regional elections, a point to which we will return below. Compared to the 2016 national elections, the two largest parties (Smer-SD and SaS) both lost. In contrast, new and minor parties (PS/Spolu, Ľ SNS and KDH) gained, which is in line with the second-­ order elections framework. In addition, the turnout was well below levels recorded in the national parliamentary (i.e. first-order) elections. The 2019 EP elections were different because, to a larger extent than ever before (Gyarfášová 2017), European and EU-related issues were presented and contested in the campaign. Most notably, environmental issues, and their ‘European context’ seemed to matter to many voters of the victorious PS/Spolu alliance, as two environmental activists on the party list profited from preferential votes and clung to seats in the European Parliament. In addition, the extreme right managed to gain seats for the first time ever, running on a clearly anti-EU ticket. For PS/Spolu and Ľ SNS, Europe mattered in the elections, and their voters probably rewarded them electorally because of their EU-related platforms. This is in line with some accounts of EP elections that emphasise the importance of issues directly influenced by EU policies (Hix and Marsh 2011). However, there are good reasons to interpret these findings with caution. Most importantly, Slovak EP election results, both in 2019 and earlier, seem to reflect the long-term trends of (changing) support for political parties. To illustrate the point, the results of the four most successful parties can be considered. The poor results of Smer are consistent with a long-­ term electoral decline of the party: it lost the 2019 EP elections and was also defeated in the 2019 presidential contest, the 2017 regional elections,

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and the 2018 local elections. It emerged as the largest party in 2016 but lost a third of its support compared to 2012. Similarly, the extreme right Ľ SNS came in a strong third in the EP elections. Its result was consistent with the levels of support for its presidential candidate in 2019 and with opinion polls since mid-2018. Furthermore, the electoral alliance of PS and Spolu won not just in the EP elections but its candidate had also convincingly gained the Slovak presidency a few weeks earlier. Finally, the result of KDH is again in line with the support for the party in the 2018 local elections and the 2017 regional contests. The party has been out of national parliament since 2016 but its wide organisational network and relatively extensive membership provide it with important resources deployable in electoral campaigns.

11.9   Conclusion Both the status of European integration and Slovakia’s role in the EU have changed over the last fifteen years. As a consequence of the country’s ‘return to Europe’ after the end of Communism, and of the ‘catching up with neighbours’ after the initial exclusion from the integration processes, Slovak voters had been very supportive of EU integration. Political parties followed suit: EU integration became depoliticised, parties presented rather underdeveloped positions concerning the EU, and competed with each other on who was best qualified to lead the country towards full membership. Soft-Eurosceptic party positions did exist, but openly hard-­ Eurosceptic stances were politically irrelevant. The situation changed with the coming of the economic and migration crises in Europe in the late 2000s. As documented by the shifts in public opinion, room for criticism of the EU emerged, with about 30% of voters openly acknowledging that leaving the EU would be beneficial for the country. It took until 2019, however, for hard-Eurosceptic Ľ SNS to capitalise on these sentiments and gain seats in the European Parliament. Soft-­Eurosceptic positions, such as criticism of the EU from Christian conservative and market liberalisation perspectives, continue to inform the profiles of two relevant political parties. There are also other parties that at times express critical or even anti-EU statements but their stances seem to depend on their position within the government-opposition dynamics (Table 11.1).

– 17.1 13.2 17.0 4.7 4.5

– 15.1 11.2 19.5 8.0 6.3

– 3 2 3 0 0

– 3 – 3 – – 0 –

EP 2004 seats

– 18.4 11.7 8.8 1.4 3.9

– 29.1 – 8.3 – – 11.7 –

NR 2006 (%)

– 17.0 11.3 9.0 – 1.7

– 32.0 – 10.9 4.7 – 5.6 –

EP 2009 (%)

– 2 2 1 – 0

– 5 – 2 0 – 1 –

EP 2009 seats

8.1 15.4 4.3 4.3 – 0.8

– 34.8 1.3 8.5 12.1 – 5.1 –

NR 2010 (%)

6.9 6.1 4.3 0.9 – 0.7

– 44.4 1.6 8.8 5.9 8.6 4.6 –

NR 2012 (%)

5.8 7.8 6.5 – – 1.5

– 24.1 1.7 13.2 6.7 7.5 3.6 –

EP 2014 (%)

1 2 1 – – 0

– 4 0 2 1 1 0 –

EP 2014 seats

6.5 0.3 4 – – 0.6

– 28.3 8.0 4.9 12.1 11.0 8.6 6.6

NR 2016 (%)

2.6 – 5.0 – – 0.6

20.1 15.7 12.1 9.7 9.6 5.3 4.1 3.2

EP 2019 (%)

0 – 0 – – 0

4 3 2 2 2 1 0 0

EP 2019 seats

Note: ‘NR’ indicates elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic, ‘EP’ denotes the European Parliament. Only parties that crossed the 5% threshold in at least one election are considered. Results in italics denote a soft-Eurosceptic party; bold italics indicate a hard-Eurosceptic party Party abbreviations: PS/Spolu = Progressive Slovakia/Together; Smer-SD = Direction-Social Democracy; Ľ SNS = Peoples’ Party Our Slovakia; KDH = Christian Democratic Movement; SaS = Freedom and Solidarity; OĽ aNO = Ordinary People and Independent Personalities; SNS = Slovak National Party; Sme rodina = We Are Family—Boris Kollár; Most-Híd = Bridge; SDKÚ-DS = Slovak Democratic and Christian Union-Democratic Party; SMK = Hungarian Community Party (previously the Hungarian Coalition Party); HZDS = Movement for a Democratic Slovakia; ANO = Alliance of a New Citizen; KSS = Communist Party of Slovakia

Source: Slovak Statistics Office

– 16.9 – 16.2 – – 2.0 –

– 13.5 – 8.3 – – 3.3 –

PS/Spolu Smer-SD LSNS KDH SaS OĽ aNO SNS Sme rodina Most-Híd SDKÚ-DS SMK HZDS ANO KSS

EP 2004 (%)

NR 2002 (%)

Party

Table 11.1  Results of the parliamentary and the EP elections in Slovakia

Appendix

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References Gyarfášová, O. (2017). The EU Agenda as an Emerging Cleavage of Political Competition? Parties and their Voters in Slovakia. In R. Boicu, S. Branea, & A.  Stefanel (Eds.), Political Communication and European Parliamentary Elections in Times of Crisis: Perspectives from Central and South-Eastern Europe (pp. 151–165). Houndmills: Palgrave. Gyárfášová, O., & Henderson, K. (2018). Slovakia and the Turnout Conundrum. East European Politics, 34(1), 77–96. Halas, M. (2018). A Model Disagreement: The Fall of the Slovak Government during the Eurozone Crisis in 2011. Europe-Asia Studies, 70(9), 1472–1495. Haughton, T., & Rybář, M. (2004). The Communist Party of Slovakia: Electoral Performance, Parliamentary Experience and Policy Choice. Sociológia, 36(6), 545–559. Henderson, K. (2004). EU Accession and the New Slovak Consensus. West European Politics, 27(4), 652–670. Henderson, K. (2008). Slovak Republic: Eurosceptics and Phoney Europhiles. In A. Szczerbiak & P. Taggart (Eds.), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism (pp. 277–294). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hix, S., & Marsh, M. (2011). Second-Order Effects Plus Pan-European Political Wings: An Analysis of European Parliament Elections across Time. Electoral Studies, 30(1), 4–15. KDH. (2019). Silné Slovensko v Európe. http://kdh.sk/eurovolby-program/. Accessed 1 Oct 2019. Kerekes, D. (2019). Mostu-Híd nemusí stačit ̌ 5%, aby mal europoslanca; ak nebude brexit, problém má aj KDH a SaS. https://dennikn.sk/blog/1398008/ mostu-hid-nemusi-stacit-5-aby-mal-europoslanca-ak-nebude-brexit-problemma-aj-kdh-a-sas/?ref=in. Accessed 1 Oct 2019. Kluknavská, A., & Smolík, J. (2016). We Hate Them All? Issue Adaptation of Extreme Right Parties in Slovakia 1993–2016. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 49(4), 335–344. Ľ SNS (2016). Program  – Desatoro Ľ SNS. http://www.naseslovensko.net/wpcontentuploads201501volebny-program-2016-pdf/. Accessed 1 Oct 2019. Malová, D., Láštic, E., & Rybář, M. (2005). Slovensko ako nový členský štát: Výzva z periférie? Bratislava: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. ̌ Mesežnikov, G. (2009). Politické strany na Slovensku vo volbách do Európskeho parlamentu 2009. In G.  Mesežnikov, O.  Gyarfášová, & M.  Kollár (Eds.), ̌ 2009 (pp. 9–39). Bratislava: Inštitút Slovensko volí: európske a prezidentské volby pre verejené otázky. Most-Híd. (2019). 15 bodov pre lepšiu Európu. https://most-hid.sk/sk/volby-doeuropskeho-parlamentu-2019. Accessed 1 Oct 2019.

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Nicholson, T. (2006). Euro-Socialists Suspend Fico’s Smer Party. The Slovak Spectator. https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20003547/euro-socialists-suspendficos-smer-party.html. Accessed 1 Oct 2019. OĽ aNO (2019). Slovensko v bezpečnej a prosperujúcej Európe. http://www.obycajniludia.sk/volby-do-ep-2019/program/. Accessed 1 Oct 2019. ̌ do Európskeho Progresívne Slovensko/Spolu. (2019). Program PS/Spolu pre volby parlamentu. https://progresivnespolu.sk/program/. Accessed 1 Oct 2019. Rybář, M. (2005a). From Isolation to Integration: Internal and External Factors of Democratic Change in Slovakia. In T. Flockhart (Ed.), Socializing Democratic Norms: The Role of International Organizations for the Construction of Europe (pp. 169–189). Houndmills: Palgrave. Rybář, M. (2005b). The 2004 EP Elections in Slovakia: Euro-Apathy in a Euro-­ Optimistic Country? In R. Hrbek (Ed.), European Parliament Elections 2004 in Ten New EU Member States: Towards the Future European Party System (pp. 201–228). Baden-Baden: Nomos. SaS. (2019). Náš hodnotový kompas do Európskeho parlamentu. https://eurovolby2019.sk/sas-hodnotovy-kompas-do-europskeho-parlamentu/. Accessed 1 Oct 2019. Smer. (2019). Na čo sa chceme v Európe sústredit.̌ https://www.facebook.com/ smersd/photos/a.321767734529889/2904661079573862/?type=1&the ater. Accessed 1 Oct 2019. TASR. (2017a). R. Fico: Pre Slovensko neexistuje iná alternatíva ako byt ̌ súčastǒ u jadra EÚ. https://www.vlada.gov.sk//r-fico-pre-slovensko-neexistuje-inaalternativa-ako-byt-sucastou-jadra-eu/. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. TASR. (2017b). Fico očakáva hlbšiu integráciu eurozóny. V daňových aj sociálnych veciach. https://euractiv.sk/section/buducnost-eu/news/fico-ocakava-hlbsiuintegraciu-eurozony-v-danovych-aj-socialnych-veciach/. Accessed 1 Oct 2019. ̌ TASR. (2019). Matovič odstúpil z kandidátky do eurovolieb. Vyzval ludí, aby podporili Petra Polláka. https://hnonline.sk/eurovolby-2019/clanky/1944039matovic-odstupil-z-kandidatky-do-eurovolieb-vyzval-ludi-aby-podporili-petrapollaka. Accessed 1 Oct 2019.

CHAPTER 12

Slovenia Alenka Krašovec and Damjan Lajh

12.1   The Electoral System Since 2002, Slovenian legislation on European Parliament (EP) elections has stayed rather stable; the most important change was passed in 2004 with the introduction of the gender quota.1 Changes to the Law on Election and Referendum Campaign influenced EP election campaigns in terms of funding. While for the 2004 EP elections, each candidate list could spend no more than €0.25 per voter, by the 2009 EP elections, the spending cap had increased to €0.40 per voter, which for the 2014 EP elections equated to €686,549.20. Candidate lists that enter the EP are entitled to reimbursement of their election campaign expenditures. The actual amount of the reimbursement depends on the number of votes received, but it is limited to €0.33 per vote. However, candidate lists that managed to receive a certain amount of support but failed to gain seats are also entitled to a reimbursement of €0.17 per vote received. In either case,  The law states that a list of candidates must comprise at least 40% of representatives of each gender. In addition, at least one representative of each gender must be placed in the top half of the list. If this is not respected, a candidate list is not allowed to run in the elections. 1

A. Krašovec (*) • D. Lajh Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 V. Hloušek, P. Kaniok (eds.), The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9_12

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the total reimbursement cannot exceed a list’s expenditure on an election campaign. Changes to the Law on Political Parties, adopted in 2013, also influenced the funding of campaigns for EP elections. Respective changes banned donations from companies to parties; thus, only membership fees, donations by individuals, public subsidies and property revenues are permissible sources of income for political parties. Transfers from ‘ordinary’ party accounts to special campaign accounts are also allowed. The election campaign officially starts 30 days before the date of the election, and the polling day is Sunday or some other day of rest. The law establishes a proportional electoral system (using the D’Hondt method) with a single constituency and the possibility of a preference vote, which, however, does not have an absolute influence. A parliamentary threshold is not formally set, but based on the results of the 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019 EP elections, it has been de facto at least 8%. After adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, Slovenia was granted one more MEP to the initially assigned seven MEPs. The law also establishes incompatibility of the MEP post with holding the positions of national MP (both houses), serving in local representative bodies, or being a member of the government. In addition, all rules of incompatibility for an MP also apply to an MEP.

12.2   Public and Party-Based Euroscepticism in Slovenia Slovenia became a European Union (EU) member on 1 May 2004, and for years, it has mostly been listed among the countries where it is difficult to talk about important Eurosceptic sentiments, both in public and among the political elite (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008). Nonetheless, some events have occasionally led to raising these sentiments. Broadly speaking, it is possible to detect two particular periods when public Euroscepticism was on the rise in Slovenia and had the potential to become a line of party competition: (a) during the EU accession process in the late 1990s, and (b) more recently, with the peak of the great economic crisis followed by the migration/refugee wave into Europe and the de facto decay of EU migration policy. It is necessary to highlight that Slovenian EU membership was defined as a national project even before Slovenia’s formal independence. Euroscepticism, in general, first emerged with the public, but until the

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mid-1990s, the public remained strongly in favour of EU membership. However, during the long process of negotiations, this support tended to decrease somewhat, and public Euroscepticism began to emerge slowly. In particular, some issues triggered a decrease in public support, with one of the most important being the so-called Spanish Compromise, which dealt with issues of foreign ownership rights,2 closing duty-free shops on road crossings,3 and transition periods for the free movement of labour (see Krašovec and Kustec Lipicer 2008). Due to the decrease in pro-European enthusiasm, the government before the referendum on Slovenian membership4 started to carry out a carefully designed campaign under the slogan ‘Slovenia at home in Europe’ (Fink-Hafner and Deželan 2016: 476). After some turbulence in the accession period, public opinion polls eventually stabilised and today continue to indicate favourable stances of Slovenes towards the EU (see Graph 12.1). Looking at public opinion, only some Euroscepticism can be identified among Slovenian citizens, though in various waves over time. In the eyes of Slovenes, the EU still has a relatively positive image, while the percentage of Slovenes who have a very negative image of the EU is consistently below 5%. Since accession, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the EU dropped drastically (see Graph 12.2). At the beginning of EU membership, approximately 60% of citizens were fairly satisfied with democracy at the EU level and only 20% were not very satisfied. Today, approximately 40% of Slovenes are fairly satisfied and not very satisfied with how democracy works in the EU. Euroscepticism can be measured by the level of trust in EU institutions, particularly using the European Commission and the EP as the most suitable proxies. It is interesting that since membership and up until 2018, Slovenes had a practically identical level of trust in the European Commission and the EP (Graph 12.3). This might be linked to citizens’ weak knowledge about the European institutions and, thus, they were unable to adequately draw distinctions between them.

2  The Compromise was agreed at the insistence of Italy when Slovenia was forced to change the so-called real estate clause in its Constitution as a (pre)condition for signing the European Agreement. 3  Austria insisted on this, and duty-free shops on road crossings were eventually closed in 2000. 4  The referendum was held on 23 March 2003 and 89.6% of voters supported Slovenian membership (the turnout was 60.4%).

60 50 40 30 20 10 10/1/2004 4/1/2005 10/1/2005 4/1/2006 10/1/2006 4/1/2007 10/1/2007 4/1/2008 10/1/2008 4/1/2009 10/1/2009 4/1/2010 10/1/2010 4/1/2011 10/1/2011 4/1/2012 10/1/2012 4/1/2013 10/1/2013 4/1/2014 10/1/2014 4/1/2015 10/1/2015 4/1/2016 10/1/2016 4/1/2017 10/1/2017 4/1/2018 10/1/2018 4/1/2019

0

Fairly positive(4.0)

Very positive (5.0)

Fairly negative(2.0)

Very negative (1.0)

DK - Don't know

Neutral

(3.0)

Graph 12.1  Image of the European Union in Slovenia. Question: ‘In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?’ (Source: Eurobarometer) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 10/1/2004 4/1/2005 10/1/2005 4/1/2006 10/1/2006 4/1/2007 10/1/2007 4/1/2008 10/1/2008 4/1/2009 10/1/2009 4/1/2010 10/1/2010 4/1/2011 10/1/2011 4/1/2012 10/1/2012 4/1/2013 10/1/2013 4/1/2014 10/1/2014 4/1/2015 10/1/2015 4/1/2016 10/1/2016 4/1/2017 10/1/2017 4/1/2018 10/1/2018 4/1/2019

0

very satisfied

fairly satisfied

not at all satisfied

DK

not very satisfied

Graph 12.2  Satisfaction about the way democracy works in the European Union in Slovenia. Question: ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU?’ (Source: Eurobarometer)

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80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 10/1/2004 4/1/2005 10/1/2005 4/1/2006 10/1/2006 4/1/2007 10/1/2007 4/1/2008 10/1/2008 4/1/2009 10/1/2009 4/1/2010 10/1/2010 4/1/2011 10/1/2011 4/1/2012 10/1/2012 4/1/2013 10/1/2013 4/1/2014 10/1/2014 4/1/2015 10/1/2015 4/1/2016 10/1/2016 4/1/2017 10/1/2017 4/1/2018 10/1/2018 4/1/2019

0

Tend to trust

Tend not to trust

DK - Don't know

Graph 12.3  Trust in the European Commission in Slovenia. Question: ‘Trust in European institutions. And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? The European Commission.’ (Source: Eurobarometer)

According to the Eurobarometer survey, trust in both institutions has changed significantly in the course of Slovenian EU membership. Whereas the first years after accession were characterised by a high level of support, peaking at over 60%, the crises (economic, financial, but most prominently, the Eurozone) starting at the end of 2008 began to reverse this trend. As a result, since the beginning of 2013—which coincides with the Commission’s ‘recommendations’ for the consolidation of public finances—more Slovenes have tended not to trust the Commission and the EP than to trust them. When speaking about party-based Euroscepticism, it should be noted that, in general, the entire EU accession period was marked by a rather broad consensus within the political elite on the process of joining the EU (Fink-Hafner and Lajh 2003). Moreover, the reformed former Slovenian League of Communists used the slogan ‘Europe Now!’ for the first multi-­ party and democratic elections, held in spring 1990 (Balažic 2002). Besides this party, a majority of other political parties competing in the first multi-party and democratic elections explicitly included ‘integration or co-operation with the EU, approaching European standards as well as the EU as a reference point in several policy fields’ in their electoral

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programmes (Krašovec and Lajh 2009: 12). A broad informal consensus among Slovenian parties on EU membership was also seen in the 1992 and 1996 parliamentary elections. However, in the context of the growth of public Euroscepticism since the mid-1990s, parliamentary parties in 1997 under the leadership of Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS), the leading governmental party, decided to deal with the emerging public Euroscepticism, overcome their other differences and conflicts, and sign an Agreement on Co-operation in the EU Accession Process. Only the Slovenian National Party (SNS), whose leader revealed that the party had become aware of the true nature of the EU (Jelinčič 2002) during the negotiation process, did not sign it. Following the logic of inter-party competition, it was expected that some parties would soon try to take advantage of the gap between the politics of the parties’ elite and public opinion when Slovenia’s accession to the EU was in question. As Robertson (1976) found, inter-party competition can also occur between new or mainstream parties over neglected issues, and several empirical studies (e.g. Caul and Gray 2000; Lucardie 2000; De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Meyer and Wagner 2013; Zons 2015) have found that new, challenger and/or marginal parties, in particular, are more inclined to adopt such issues for inter-party competition. This indeed happened in Slovenia, and in the 2000 parliamentary elections, Euroscepticism was evident among some parties for the first time. In 2000, the SNS displayed its opposition to the EU accession process on their billboard posters, which showed the party president holding a plucked chicken (the geographic shape of Slovenia resembles a running chicken) surrounded by EU stars. The image emphasised the party’s view that it would be better for Slovenia to enter the EU later (or not at all) rather than sooner, based on the conditions demanded by the EU.  In addition, from its very establishment, the non-parliamentary New Party, which was formed in 1996, emphasised the importance of Slovenian restraint in regards to EU accession. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, the party stressed that the EU is based on a discriminatory principle; that is, some countries are invited to the feast and others have to feverishly and recklessly prepare themselves in a side room to meet the demands, while a third group of countries can only watch this situation from a distance. The party proclaimed its disagreement with the basic principles of how the EU functions. Frequently, it stressed that it was Eurosceptical, but even more precisely, EU-critical (Krašovec and Kustec Lipicer 2008), which enables

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us to classify this party as hard Eurosceptic. Since SNS hardly passed the parliamentary threshold of 4% and the New Party only received 0.6% of votes, this inter-party competition strategy cannot be described as successful. Public Euroscepticism was generally absent from the post-accession period and the parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2008. This is likely because public opinion polls continued to indicate Slovenes’ favourable stances towards the EU.  Therefore, it is not surprising that only some small and marginal parties, and occasionally the parliamentary SNS, tried to play the soft Eurosceptic card to a limited extent. However, this tactic proved not to be a trump card in the electoral competition (Krašovec and Lajh 2009). Some might say that the 2011 parliamentary elections present a similar picture. At that time, selective politicisation of EU issues had already emerged, but in general, this was not because new political parties5 were trying to enter the parliament by politicising EU issues. Against the backdrop of the great crisis, which hit Slovenia severely with some delay, ‘Europe’ was mentioned as a kind of a threat during the electoral campaign. Some politicians from new and mainstream parties warned that if Slovenia did not sort out its fiscal problems itself, ‘Europe’ (in the form of EU technocrats) would lay down the necessary measures (Krašovec and Haughton 2011). Interestingly, in such circumstances, even the SNS, which had not passed the parliamentary threshold for the first time since the 1992 elections, did not play the Eurosceptic card more actively. After some turbulence in the accession period, the next and more important window of opportunity for Eurosceptic parties came with the Eurozone crises, particularly in 2012 and 2013, which brought greater public Euroscepticism. The 2014 parliamentary elections brought with them novelty,6 and were dominated by debates about anti-corruption, recovery of the rule of law and the question of how the different parties would further tackle the country’s economic difficulties (Krašovec and Haughton 2014). However, in 2014 the debate over the latter theme was  Two new parties recorded very good electoral results; the List of Zoran Janković— Positive Slovenia (LZJ-PS) with 28.5% became the biggest party, while the Civic List of Gregor Virant received 8.3% of the votes. 6  The Party of Miro Cerar (SMC) received 34.5% of the votes, but two more newcomers also entered the parliament: the United Left ID=”ITerm12”Coalition with 6% and the Party of Alenka Bratušek (SAB), a splinter party of the PS. 5

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more intensive than in 2011, as it was linked to EU politics, particularly the European Commission’s ‘recommendations’ for Slovenia (together with deadlines to achieve them) to tackle the country’s debt and economic woes. Prior to the election, the Commission had recommended the consolidation of public finances, further privatisation and a fight against corruption. These developments indeed triggered some politicians from the centre-left Social Democrats (SD) and the less moderate United Left Coalition (ZL), which for the first time also entered parliament, to criticise some developments in the EU, but their fire was directed more at the policies of austerity than the EU as such (Haughton and Krašovec 2014). Even the leader of the SNS did not confront the EU, but rather castigated Slovene representatives in Brussels for not doing anything for their country. Although some stronger reservations by the public about the EU and its institutions were already seen in the crisis period (see Graphs 12.1, 12.2 and 12.3), it was only in the 2018 parliamentary elections that a battle on one EU issue, namely the migration/refugee policy, was clearly on the agenda, accompanied by several Eurosceptic voices. The Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), a party that received the most support (24.9%) and a member of the European People’s Party (EPP), employed anti-­ migration/anti-refugee rhetoric, criticising the EU policy of quotas and liberal migration/refugee policies for their impact on the security and culture of Slovenia and its citizens. This party was taking a cue from the Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán in this regard, but anti-migration/anti-­ refugee rhetoric and the increased salience of identity politics also served the SNS and its leader well and allowed them to secure more than 4% of the votes, thus returning them to parliament after a seven-year absence (Haughton et al. 2018). Nevertheless, similar rhetoric did not bring success to the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS), also an EPP member, which had dropped out of parliament in 2014. In the 2018 parliamentary elections, it was therefore possible to speak about influential soft Euroscepticism, since all three of the abovementioned parties criticised the EU migration/refugee policy. However, all of these parties also occasionally made calls that would require Slovenia (and other EU countries) to respond to other ineffective and inappropriate EU policies by taking powers from the EU back to the individual countries—such elements occasionally seen in campaigns could be treated as a sign of hard Euroscepticism. Critical stances on the EU migration/refugee policy were also evident among some parties from

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the (centre-)left spectrum, most clearly in the case of the Left. Although these calls were also critical of the present EU migration/refugee policy, they were very different from the views of the SDS, SLS and SNS.

12.3   EP Elections and Campaigns In general, EP elections have been frequently described as elections where European issues are overshadowed by national concerns and issues (Seoane Perez and Lodge 2010). Likewise, in Slovenia in 2004, EU-related topics were generally neglected or remained marginal and narrow in scope; therefore, campaigns were also marked by a lack of ‘real’ Eurosceptic parties (Krašovec and Lajh 2010). In 2004, only two small parties, the parliamentary SNS and the non-parliamentary Democratic Party of Slovenia, proclaimed themselves to be Eurorealist parties on some occasions. Given the fact that EP elections were held just several months prior to parliamentary elections (later-term), the EP elections were mostly seen as preparation for ‘the most important national elections’ with politicisation of the national issues and topics. This was especially evident in the case of non-­ parliamentary parties; to a limited extent, parliamentary parties in their programmes or other printed materials discussed EU topics/issues, such as the EU Constitution, human rights, distribution of funds, cooperation with neighbours and relations between Slovenia and the EU (Krašovec et al. 2006). At the time of the 2009 EP elections, rather high pro-European public sentiments were evident in Slovenia, diminishing the prospect of playing the ‘Eurosceptic party’ card. Contrary to the 2004 EP elections, many parties did not even prepare ‘real’ party manifestos, and in written form they simply presented brief opinions on some topics (Krašovec and Lajh 2010). On the basis of these rather short manifestos and the characteristics of the campaigns using electronic media, it can also be said that the degree of ‘Europeanisation’ in the campaigns was, in general, rather low during the 2009 EP elections (Krašovec and Lajh 2010). In general, some of the most discussed topics at the EU level, such as the European Constitution Treaty/Lisbon Treaty, attitudes towards further EU enlargement etc., were not debated at all (Fink-Hafner and Deželan 2016), even though the EP elections were being held at this time during the ‘honeymoon period’ of the national electoral cycle. Still, some ambivalent stances towards the EU were evident, for example as expressed by the parliamentary SLS and

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the Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia (DeSUS), while SNS’s ‘Eurorealistic’ position was actually far from being Eurosceptic (Fink-Hafner and Deželan 2016: 481). The criticisms from some parties were, in general, infused with concerns related to the global economic and financial crisis and calls for a more responsible and socially oriented market economy in the EU (Krašovec and Deželan 2014). In 2014, the EP elections were again held (two months) prior to the parliamentary elections (later-term). In addition, some other events at the time (see Krašovec and Deželan 2014) contributed to the fact that the campaigns in Slovenia, in contrast to many other countries where European issues seemed to have been much more prominent than in previous EP elections, did not address European issues in an important manner. Šabič et  al. (2014) even claimed that the importance of European issues in Slovenia decreased in comparison to the 2009 EP elections. However, Krašovec and Deželan (2014) believed that the EP elections in 2014 brought some new developments and EU-related momentum. Given the fact that Slovenia seemed to be on the brink of needing a Eurozone bailout on several occasions in the 2012–2013 period, and that the EU continued to issue ‘recommendations’ on how to handle the crisis, some critical stances towards the EU and/or its policies could be expected, especially if we also consider public sentiment (see the above graphs). Again, only a small number of parties prepared documents that could be regarded as party manifestos, while others prepared short written statements mostly due to the so-called bandwagon effect, that is, when parties produce statements simply for the sake of having one and to avoid being the only one without a manifesto (Krašovec and Deželan 2014). Consistent with theories of inter-party competition, again, especially new and/or non-parliamentary parties allowed themselves to be more critical of the EU. Still, only more radical left parties managed to base their criticism on a systematic set of ideological positions and arguments, for example, the Solidarity and United Left Coalition, but their fire was directed more at the policies of austerity than the EU as such (Haughton and Krašovec 2014). However, the novelty was also that, for the first time, Euroscepticism could be observed in some mainstream parties. Among them, the most vigorously Eurosceptic at the time of the EP elections was the biggest governmental party, PS, established in 2011, whose candidate list leader Jože Mencinger, a prominent retired economist with some political experience during the first democratic government in Slovenia, expressed, as

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he had already done in the past, many Eurosceptic stances on EU economic policies. Among others, he criticised the Euro as being a political project without a solid economic basis, a prevailing neoliberal economic doctrine in the EU. Yet, at the same time, he stressed that he believed in the EU.  Here, it is necessary to mention a schism forming in the PS, which put the candidate list leader in a strange position, while giving him a freer hand in the formation of the list’s statements of opinion. Just several weeks before the EP elections, a battle over the leadership position in the PS between the party founding father Zoran Janković and Alenka Bratušek, who had served as prime minister since 2013, led to a split in the party (and the fall of the government). Mencinger had to fight the campaign literally by himself because seven other candidates found themselves in different political groups after the party’s split (some supported Janković, others Bratušek), while the candidate list had already been approved by the State Electoral Commission and could not be withdrawn. Other major parties, members of the main EU parties (EPP, S&D, ALDE), remained within the framework of voicing occasional ‘constructive criticism’ and mainly discussed the need for different EU reforms (Krašovec and Deželan 2014), but it is difficult to evaluate their stances as even soft Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, mainly due to the more radical left parties, it is possible to say that in 2014, Slovenia faced soft Euroscepticism, based exclusively on economic arguments.

12.4   Euroscepticism in Slovenian Manifestos 2019 In the 2019 EP elections, 14 candidate lists competed, but only a handful of them approached the drafting of manifestos seriously. Among them, the more radical left party Levica (The Left) prepared a document in excess of 50 pages, while the centre-left SD and the centre-right NSi each prepared manifestos approximately 14 pages in length. In contrast, some candidate lists only prepared short written statements, including the biggest coalition party, LMŠ. However, following past experiences, the majority of Slovenian parties that are members of the EU parties adopted the manifestos of their EU-level counterparts. The majority of the Slovenian parties’ manifestos only addressed more general perspectives on the EU or its policies, while more detailed stances were mostly absent. Nonetheless, in several parties’ written documents, it was possible to detect some brief discussions of more prominent topics.

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Although many documents demanded reforming the EU political system and/or its policies, Eurosceptic stances were expressed to a very limited extent, most of which reflected a soft Eurosceptic stance, that is, criticism of certain EU policies. The exception is found in documents by two small non-parliamentary and marginal parties—United Slovenia and DOM— where hard Eurosceptic stances were visible. Unlike the 2014 EP elections, in 2019 the mainstream SDS could also be classified as a soft Eurosceptic party, particularly due to its stances on migration policy and southern border security issues. Contrary to the 2014 EP elections when economic policy took a central place in pre-election documents, in 2019, identity politics entered the foreground of discussion as well. Still, in their documents, mainstream parties in general avoided getting into too much detail about identity politics. Nonetheless, some lines of division among mainstream (centre-)left and (centre-)right parties could be detected; while the latter (SDS and SLS, NSi) openly politicised identity politics, especially in relation to migration and asylum policies, security issues and ‘“our”/European way of life’, the former (Levica, SD, SMC) tried to deal with identity issues indirectly, mostly in the framework of solidarity. An analysis of the written documents reveals the diverse topics emphasised by the parties (see Table 12.1). Table 12.1  Prominent topics discussed in the written documents of Slovenian parties (only topics mentioned by at least two parties are included) Topic

Reflected by

Migration, refugees, asylum policy Security Welfare model of the EU, solidarity Environmental protection EU democracy Economic policy Agriculture policy Digital policy Science, innovations Equality Human rights and freedoms Trade policy Corruption

NSi, SDS, DD, DOM SD, NSi, SDS, DOM Levica, SD, SMC, Let’s Connect! Levica, SD, NSi, SDS, SMC, Let’s Connect!, DD Levica, SD, NSi Levica, NSi, SDS, DOM Levica, NSi, SDS, Let’s Connect! Levica, NSi, Let’s Connect! Levica, NSi Levica, SD Levica, SD, SMC Levica, NSi SDS, DD

Sources: Party manifestos and written documents

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At the same time, the content of the written documents can reveal the ideological positions and the extent of Euroscepticism of individual parties. Levica (a European Left member) addressed the electorate with the slogan, ‘For a Europe of People, not Capital’. In this manner, the party’s leitmotif was criticism of the EU’s neoliberal economic model, rule of the EU technocracy, and shortage of democracy at the EU level. The party continuously stressed that the EU was at a crossroads, faced with the dilemma of whether it would be able to introduce more solidarity, common social standards and ensure its democratisation, or if ‘dark forces’ were going to prevail. Although Levica was clearly very critical of several aspects of the functioning of the EU and its policies, it is also obvious that the party still trusts in the EU and supports its existence, while simultaneously advocating the need for numerous serious reforms. Still, the party has directed many criticisms towards the EU’s policies and, therefore, can be labelled as a soft Eurosceptic party. Similarly, SD as a member of S&D called for several reforms aimed at Europe becoming more progressive, introducing solidarity, justice and sustainability. These goals were reflected in their slogan, which called for a social democratic Europe. At the same time, SD stressed that Europe must return to the roots from which it originated, while like Levica, the party called for a ‘Europe of People’. However, contrary to Levica and despite its calls for reforms, SD could hardly be classified as a (soft) Eurosceptic party. The NSi (an EPP member) addressed similar topics. At the beginning of its manifesto, the party highlighted that Europe was facing a division between support for continuing the successful European project and support for its radical reformation or even its destruction. The party clearly expressed strong support for the first alternative. The SDS prepared a joint candidate list with the non-parliamentary SLS, both being EPP members. In their manifesto, they clearly highlighted Slovenia, which was put in the European context in different ways, such as Slovenia in Europe with a dynamic economy or Slovenia in Europe without corruption. Obviously, ‘Slovenia in Europe that preserves “our way of life”’ holds the most prominent place in the manifesto, advocating the importance of such topics as the European way of life, migration and security issues. Considering its use of the slogan,

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‘Strong Members for a Strong EU’, it seems that the party has not been inclined towards deepening integration further. Given the party’s close relationship with and regular support for the Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party, mostly in terms of stances towards migration policy, it can be argued that the party expressed significant soft Eurosceptic views. Each of the three ALDE/Renew Europe members from Slovenia presented manifestos that were at best only short written documents. The leading governmental party LMŠ, which entered the national electoral arena with the 2018 parliamentary elections, did not even prepare short written documents or standpoints. Rather, it only chose the slogan, ‘We Manage at Home, We Manage in the EU’. A similar approach was taken by SAB, which highlighted the necessity of safeguarding the integration of European countries, as Europe and the world are facing challenges that countries are unable to cope with individually. In a twopage written document, the SMC called for taking a stand against international, cultural and other conflicts, as well as against authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The party also clearly rejected both right and left extremism. Besides calling for solidarity, no concrete or particular party stance, neither critical nor positive of the EU or its policies, could be detected. Two other parliamentary parties, DeSUS and SNS, did not prepare written statements that could be treated as surrogate manifestos. Five non-parliamentary parties also competed in the 2019 EP elections. Anti-system United Slovenia prepared five points on a half-page, revealing some hard-Eurosceptic stances. For example, the party called for a modern Europe, consisting of independent, free and sovereign nations in which all countries from the Urals to the Atlantic would be equal; claiming Slovenia is bound to the Slovenian Constitution and its Article3a, which obliges it to leave the EU due to anticipated violations of human rights and freedom (the case of Catalonia). Likewise, the moderate Good Country (DD) prepared ten short points on one page, which can be summarised as a fight against Eurocracy and corruption and for the rule of law and equal treatment of all EU members, and for a migration policy that considers the capacities of EU members as well as human values. Also, DOM (the Homeland League) followed DD in terms of the length of its written statement, but addressed very different values and aims. DOM clearly criticised EU migration policy (it

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demanded that Slovenia join the Visegrad countries in this regard) and multiculturalism, but also globalisation and the economic policies of the European Central Bank and the European Commission. In addition, DOM called for a new approach to political and economic challenges as well as issues in society. Its slogan, ‘For Slovenia in a Europe of Homelands and Freedom’, clearly corresponds to its self-identification with the MENL.  Let’s Connect! (Povežimo se!) list, which was openly supported by the European Greens, in its nine-­pages long manifesto predominantly exposed diverse environmental topics or general green topics. Although this list made several calls to reform the EU and/or its policies, it cannot be classified as a Eurosceptic party. Also, the Greens of Slovenia declared itself a European environmental-oriented party, but it did not prepare any written standpoints.

12.5   Campaign and Results 2019 Several important developments occurred before the official start of the election season. The most important question was the issue of the joint candidate lists of several parliamentary parties. This controversy got a lot of media and public attention. Although the SDS called for a joint list of all three parties that are members of the EPP, the NSi decided to enter the elections independently. This decision was partly related to the rivalry in the NSi on who should be the leader of the list (between a long-term MEP and a former leader of the party, who had taken critical stances on the SDS’ politics under its long-time leader Janez Janša), and partly to the split between these parties regarding stances taken on politics in Hungary and its PM Viktor Orbán, and on the fate of Fidesz’s within the EPP. The NSi is a member of the EPP wing which has been rather critical of Orbán and is closer to the German CDU, while the SDS and the SLS have clearly supported the Hungarian leader. In the end, the SDS formed a joint list only with the non-parliamentary SLS, which from 2014–2019 had one MEP, elected on the joint candidate list of the NSi and the SLS. A similar question, as already before the 2014 EP elections, emerged in the case of ALDE members. As in 2014, also in 2019, liberal parties (LMŠ, SMC, SAB) were unable to reach a consensus on a joint candidate list and ran in the elections individually. DeSUS, however, decided to link with Igor Šoltes, an MEP member of the European Greens, and make him the

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leader of the candidate list, despite Šoltes in 2014 having won a mandate with his independent list. In Slovenia, several MEPs were nominated as candidate list leaders, and a possible explanation for the low level of Euroscepticism in Slovenia could be the fact that in the mainstream parties, namely the SD, SDS, DeSUS and SAB, the leaders of the lists were (more) moderately oriented MEPs, while the NSi had a former MEP. Meanwhile, Violeta Tomič from Levica was even nominated as one of the Spietzenkandidat from the European Left. Before the official start of the campaigns, significant media attention was also paid to the question of traditionally low voter turnout; in Slovenia, the turnout for the EP elections was 28.5% in 2004 and 2009, and 24.5% in 2014. Especially the public broadcaster and several nongovernmental organisations were heavily involved in different public awareness initiatives, as well as mobilisation activities regarding the EP elections as part of the wider EP campaign. Contrary to the previous EP elections, alongside traditional debates and confrontations among candidates organised by the public broadcaster, in 2019 the biggest commercial television station also devoted more time to several such debates and confrontations. In the absence of substantive party manifestos, these debates and confrontations might have helped reveal more about candidates’ stances. However, the campaigns were generally described as boring and without clear opinions by the majority of the (mainstream) parties. Indeed, the media heavily determined the discussions during the electoral campaign by choosing the topics. In public broadcasts, the main topics of the TV debates and confrontations included: migration, what can we learn from Brexit, the arbitration agreement between Slovenia and Croatia, and the rule of law, environmental protection, food safety, political corruption, the economy, and Euroscepticism and populism in Europe. Before the elections, it was generally expected but also warned (as in the wider EU context) that during the campaign, the issue of migration would dominate other topics and greatly polarise the electoral competition. Although the topic was indeed more heavily addressed in these debates than in the parties’ written documents, it was not emphasised as much as predicted, despite the strong and constantly reinforced traditional-­libertarian cleavage in Slovenia (Fink-Hafner 2012). This was the case even though just before the official start of the EP electoral

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campaign, a group of four illegal migrants kidnapped a 79-year-old native in Bela Krajina (in southern Slovenia) who was working in a vineyard, tied him up with a rope, forced him into the trunk of his car and fled towards Italy, and just before the border, released him. Even this incident, which offered room for certain right-wing parties to manoeuvre for further politicisation of migration policy, did not radically increase the topic’s salience. Drawing attention to this issue in another context also failed on even a larger scale. Backed by the SDS, a civil movement in Bela Krajina organised a protest to demand better security and to stop illegal crossings at the border. The protest did not attract a large number of participants; nonetheless, some politicians, including candidates from the SDS, SLS and DOM, attended it. Meanwhile, the government immediately took several steps to calm down the potential conflict, such as visits to municipalities by the Minister of Internal Affairs along the (Schengen) border with Croatia, an increase in the number of police and army forces along the border, and statements to the effect that some politicians were trying to politicise crime for electoral reasons. During the campaign, it was apparent that the parties could still be clearly divided into two camps: those that saw migration as a kind of threat (all three members of the EPP as well as the SNS, DOM and United Slovenia), and those that stressed a need for solidarity on this issue and to assume a more libertarian posture (all ALDE members, including DeSUS, which became an EDP member in February 2019, (centre) left SD and Levica). In the debates and confrontations in the media, some evident Eurosceptic stances, arguing the harmful aspects of EU membership, were evident. The standpoints of Andrej Šiško and Zmago Jelinčič especially reflect this. Šiško, the leader of United Slovenia, argued that membership in the EU is actually harmful in all areas. In one debate, he clearly made the assessment that the current developments in the EU represent a path leading to creation of a United States of Europe, where there will be no nations and no national cultures, representing ‘genocide as the greatest crime against humanity’. In doing so, Šiško pointed out that he is in favour of leaving the EU (RTVSLO 2019a). Meanwhile, Jelinčič and the SNS (SNS is a member of the Alliance of European National Movements  – AEMN) opposed multiculturalism and supported a proud national consciousness. According to Jelinčič, the EU as it is today has no future, since it is run by only three countries. In his view, Europe should be a Europe

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of nation states and freedoms. In this regard, Jelinčič indeed called more for major reforms than to exit the EU, although he claimed he is in favour of leaving the EU (RTVSLO 2019a). Due to such statements, both parties can be described as hard Eurosceptics, and similarly, this can also be true for the DOM. The DOM was established in spring 2019, and during the campaign, its leader exposed the party as populist but also a party with several hard Eurosceptic stances; for example, stating that European civilisation has been under attack, and that the EU cannot be tolerated, since it is a project that has to be taken away from the globalists (RTVSLO 2019b). The majority of the other parties in the debates and confrontations made many calls for different kinds of reforms of the EU and/or its policies. When it comes to hard Eurosceptics and their performance in the 2019 elections, no such party managed to make a breakthrough and gain seats in the Brussels/Strasbourg assembly (SNS received 4%, DOM 1.7% and United Slovenia 0.7% of the votes). The soft Eurosceptics had the better outcome in the elections; among them were the winning SDS, SLS with 26.2% and Levica with 6.4% of the votes. Five years earlier, 24.5% of voters came to the polls in Slovenia, which means that the turnout of 28.9% in 2019 was higher. However, considering average voter participation at the EU level, which was more than 50%, the turnout in Slovenia was still extremely low. From this point of view, Slovenia achieved the second worst result among all member states (following Slovakia), and this low voter turnout could maybe also be interpreted as an indicator of public Euroscepticism. Voting abstinence is probably also indicative of citizens’ dissatisfaction with the choice of candidates and Slovenian politics in general, as well as with EU politics.

12.6   Conclusion In trying to summarise the main results of the 2019 EP elections and evidence of Euroscepticism in Slovenia, we can conclude that all of the political parties made different calls for some reforms of the EU and/or its policies. If we were to characterise this as Euroscepticism, indeed all parties would have to be categorised as at least somewhat soft Eurosceptic.

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However, since we believe that just a call for reforms cannot be automatically treated as Euroscepticism, only some parties exhibited genuinely soft or hard stances. In comparison with previous EP elections, in general, more parties took Eurosceptic stances in 2019. If in the past Slovenia only faced some soft Euroscepticism, mostly by non-parliamentary or new parties, in 2019, soft Euroscepticism was apparent in the campaigns of even mainstream parties, most prominently in the winning SDS, SLS, which particularly voiced disagreement with the EU’s migration policy and concerns about security questions, and in this regard, was closely aligned with Hungarian politics as led by PM Orbán. Meanwhile, Levica mostly highlighted economic and welfare policies. In contrast, two nonparliamentary or new parties (United Slovenia and DOM) expressed hard Eurosceptic views, while over almost two decades, the parliamentary SNS evolved from soft to hard Euroscepticism. It seems that such a change in party-­based politics can be attributed to ‘the second window of opportunity’, which occurred due to disappointments with the EU and its politics/policies, made more visible since the Eurozone crisis. However, it is interesting that the parties which made calls for reforms—and also soft Eurosceptic parties—in the 2019 EP elections clearly gave voice to proEU rhetoric. Slovenia has been facing instability in the party system and has seen the electoral success of new parties (Fink-Hafner and Krašovec 2013; Krašovec 2017) since the 2008 elections, reaching its peak in the 2011 and 2014 national parliamentary elections with the electoral victory of new parties, and this trend of electoral success by new parties continued in 2018. Interestingly, none of these very successful newcomers played the Eurosceptic card. However, several marginal parties tried to get an electoral advantage by playing this card, especially when EU-sceptical public sentiment was on the increase, but without much success. These findings enable us to conclude that public Euroscepticism appears to be a necessary, yet simultaneously insufficient condition for fruitful electoral inter-­ party competition and successful party-based Euroscepticism in Slovenia. In addition, it is obvious that the wider EU context has been needed to ‘help’ Slovenian parties change their long-term course of de-politicising EU issues (Table 12.2).

Levica VerjamemList of dr. Igor Šoltes

LDS SDS SD SLS NSi DeSUS SNS SMS Zares LZJ-PS DLGV SMC ZL ZaAB LMŠ

– –

36.3 15.8 12.1 9.5 8.7 5.2 4.4 4.3 – – – – – – –

DZ 2000 (%)

– –

21.9a 17.6 14.1 8.4 23.7 – 5.0 2.3b – – – – – – –

EP 2004 (%)

– –

2 2 1 0 2 – 0 0 – – – – – – –

EP 2004 seats

– –

22.8 29.1 10.2 6.8 9.1 4.1 6.3 2.1 – – – – – – –

DZ 2004 (%)

– –

5.2 29.3 30.4 5.2c 3.4 7.4 5.4 – 9.4 – – – – – –

DZ 2008 (%)

– –

11.5 26.7 18.4 3.6 16.6 7.2 2.8 1.9 9.7 – – – – – –

EP 2009 (%)

– –

1 (2+1)f 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 – – – – – –

EP 2009 seats

– –

1.5 26.2 10.5 6.8 4.9 7.0 1.8 0.9 0.6 28.5 8.4 – – – –

DZ 2011 (%)

– 10.3

– 24.8 8.1 – 16.6d 8.1 4.0 – 0.9 6.6 1.1 – 5.5 – –

EP 2014 (%)

– 1

– 3 1 – 2 1 0 – 0 0 0 – 0 – –

EP 2014 seats

– 0.8

– 20.7 6.0 3.9 5.6 10.2 2.2 – – 3.0 0.6 34.5 6.0 4.4 –

DZ 2014 (%)

9.3 –

– 24.9 9.9 2.6 7.2 4.9 4.2 – – – – 9.2 – 5.1 12.9

DZ 2018 (%)

6.4 –

– 26.2e 18.7 – 11.1 5.7 4.0 – – – – 1.6 – 4.0 15.4

EP 2019 (%)

(continued)

– 3 (EPP) 2 (S&D) – 1 (EPP) 0 0 – – – – 0 – 0 2 (ALDE/ Renew) 0 –

EP 2019 seats

Table 12.2  Electoral results to the National Assembly and the European Parliament in Slovenia in the period 2000–2019

Appendix

272  A. KRAŠOVEC AND D. LAJH

b

a

LDS and DeSUS had a joint list SMS and the Greens had a joint list c SLS and SMS had a joint list d NSi and SLS had a joint list e SDS and SLS had a joint list f According to Lisbon Treaty Slovenia got another MEP

Source: Državna volilna komisija DZ indicates elections to the national parliament (National Assembly); EP indicates elections to the European Parliament In the table only parties achieving at least one mandate are shown Italic = soft Eurosceptic party. Bold = hard Eurosceptic Party LDS = Liberal Democracy of Slovenia; SDS = Slovenian Democratic Party; SD = Social Democrats; SLS = Slovenian People’s Party; NSi = New Slovenia; DeSUS = Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia; SNS = Slovenian National Party; SMS = Party of Youth; Zares = For Real; LZJ-PS = List of Zoran Janković-Positive Slovenia; DLGV = Citizen List of Gregor Virant; SMC = Party of Miro Cerar/Party of Modern Centre; ZL = United Left Coalition; ZaAB = Alliance of Alenka Bratušek; LMŠ = List of Marjan Šarec; Levica = Left; Verjamem-Lista dr. Igorja Šoltesa = I Believe-List of dr. Igor Šoltes

Table 12.2  (continued)

12 SLOVENIA 

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References Balažic, M. (2002). Evropa zdaj. Teorija in praksa, 39(4), 559–578. Caul, L. M., & Gray, M. M. (2000). From Platform Declaration to Policy Outcomes: Changing Party Profiles and Partisan Influence over Policy. In R. J. Dalton & M. P. Wattenberg (Eds.), Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (pp. 208–237). Oxford: Oxford University Press. De Vries, E. C., & Hobolt, S. B. (2012). When Dimensions Collide: The Electoral Success of Issue Entrepreneurs. European Union Politics, 13(2), 246–268. Fink-Hafner, D. (2012). Značilnosti razvoja strankarskega sistema v Sloveniji. In J.  Prunk & T.  Deželan (Eds.), Dvajset let slovenske države (pp.  193–213). Maribor: Aristej. Fink-Hafner, D., & Deželan, T. (2016). Slovenia. In D. Viola (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of European Elections (pp. 471–490). London/New York: Routledge. Fink-Hafner, D., & Krašovec, A. (2013). Factors Affecting the Long-Term Success of New Parliamentary Parties: Findings in a Post-Communist Context. Romanian Journal of Political Science, 13(2), 40–68. Fink-Hafner, D., & Lajh, D. (2003). Managing Europe from Home: The Europeanisation of the Slovenian Core Executive. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede. Haughton, T., & Krašovec, A. (2014, May 23). Are European Elections Ever about Europe? The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/23/european-parliamentary-electionsslovenia/. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Haughton, T., Krašovec, A., & Deegan Krause, K. (2018, June 5). Slovenia Voted on Sunday: Is an Anti-Immigrant Government on the Way? The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/05/ slovenian-voted-on-sunday-is-an-anti-immigrant-government-on-theway/?utm_term=.901e196c1521. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Jelinčič, Z. (2002). Poslanska skupina Slovenske nacionalne stranke: Ob 10. obletnici Državnega zbora Republike Slovenije. In Državni zbor Republike Slovenije 1992–2002 (pp. 74–77). Ljubljana: Državni zbor Republike Slovenije. Krašovec, A. (2017). A Hint at Entrepreneurial Parties? The Case of Four New Successful Parties in Slovenia. Czech Journal of Political Science, 24(2), 158–178. Krašovec, A., & Deželan, T. (2014). The 2014 European Parliamentary Elections in Slovenia: Hardly and Novelty. Political Preferences, 9, 77–96. Krašovec, A. & Haughton, T. (2011). Europe and the Parliamentary Elections in Slovenia. Election Briefing, No. 69. Krašovec, A., & Haughton, T. (2014). Privlačnost novog: nove stranke i promjena stranačkog sustava u Sloveniji. Političke analize, 5(19), 48–53.

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Krašovec, A., & Kustec Lipicer, S. (2008). Euroscepticism and Slovenian Political Parties: A Case of Weak Party-Based Euroscepticism. In A.  Szczerbiak & P.  Taggart (Eds.), Opposing Europe: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism (pp. 314–327). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Krašovec, A., & Lajh, D. (2009). The European Union: A Joker or Just an Ordinary Playing Card for Slovenian Political Parties? Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 25(4), 491–512. Krašovec, A., & Lajh, D. (2010). Slovenia. In J. Lodge (Ed.), The 2009 Elections to the European Parliament (pp. 252–258). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Krašovec, A., Lajh, D., & Kustec Lipicer, S. (2006). The European Union and Party Politics in Slovenia: An Apparent or Real Impact? In P.  G. Lewis & Z. Mansfeldova (Eds.), The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe (pp. 169–189). Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Lucardie, P. (2000). Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocutors: Towards a Theory on the Emergence of New Parties. Party Politics, 6(2), 175–185. Meyer, M.  T., & Wagner, M. (2013). Mainstream or Niche? Vote-Seeking Incentives and the Programmatic Strategies of Political Parties. Comparative Political Studies, 46(10), 1246–1272. Party Manifestos for EP Elections 2019. (2019). EU volitve/26. maj 2019/programi strank na spletu. https://www.had.si/blog/2019/05/08/eu-volitve-26-maj2019-programi-strank-na-spletu-tokratgremvolit/. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Robertson, D. (1976). A Theory of Party Competition. London/New York: Wiley. RTVSLO. (2019a). Pogovor mladih s kandidati za evropske poslance. https://www. rtvslo.si/slovenija/evropske-volitve-2019/grem-volit-2019/pogovor-mladihs-kandidati-za-evropske-poslance/488585. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. RTVSLO. (2019b). Soočenje zunajparlamentarcev o korupciji in evroskepticizmu. https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/evropske-volitve-2019/soocenje-zunajparlamentarcev-o-korupciji-in-evroskepticizmu/489000. Accessed 27 Nov 2019. Šabič, Z. et  al. (2014, June). Slovenia: TEPSA Report on the 2014 EP Election Campaign in the Member States: National Debates, European Elections, Brussels. Seoane Perez, F., & Lodge, J. (2010). Framing and Salience of Issues in 2009 European Elections. In J.  Lodge (Ed.), The 2009 Elections to the European Parliament (pp. 293–303). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2008). Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe. In A.  Szczerbiak & P.  Taggart (Eds.), Opposing Europe: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism (pp. 1–15). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zons, G. (2015). The Influence of Programmatic Diversity on the Formation of New Political Parties. Party Politics, 21(6), 919–929.

CHAPTER 13

Euroscepticism, Parties, Voters and Politicisation in the 2019 Campaigns for the European Parliament Elections in Central and Eastern Europe Vít Hloušek and Petr Kaniok

This chapter summarises the findings of the country chapters. First, we discuss to what extent the concept of Second-Order Elections (SOE) applies to the contests in Central and Eastern European (CEE) elections to the European Parliament 2019. In the following sections, we assess the validity of the five hypotheses introduced in the first chapter, which are related to the impact of soft- and hard-Eurosceptic parties, public opinion and campaigning. The final section considers the conceptual takeaways of the presence, manifestations and impacts of soft- and hard-Euroscepticism in East-Central Europe in the EP elections of 2019 that can offer material for further research and scholarly discussion.

V. Hloušek (*) • P. Kaniok Department of International Relations and European Studies, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 V. Hloušek, P. Kaniok (eds.), The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9_13

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13.1   European Parliament Elections 2019 in Central and Eastern Europe: Second-Order Contest of a Kind As explained in the introductory chapter, the SOE concept conceives elections to the European Parliament as a kind of second-ordered version of national (parliamentary) elections. This means that, typically, voters participate to a lesser extent; the campaigns deal predominantly with issues of national politics (at least more than with genuine ‘European’ issues); the media do not cover the campaigns with the same intensity as first order elections; the position of incumbent parties is tested by shifts in voters’ preferences in favour of opposition groups (which, of course, depends on the phase of the national parliamentary election cycle); and voters feel freer to experiment, which opens the way for representation of smaller and fringe parties. Looking at the evidence from the EP 2019 elections in Central and Eastern Europe, we can clearly confirm only the assumptions related to lower turnout and reduced media coverage. Let us start with the turnout data on which are summarised in Table 13.1. Among the eleven countries under our scrutiny, only in Romania and Lithuania was there a higher turnout in the EP election than in the preceding parliamentary elections. The margin was, however, small (2.5 percentage points) in the Lithuanian case, where the more important motivation for voter participation was the presidential election held simultaneously. In the case of Romania, the EP election was held at the same time as a referendum on the judiciary, which ‘crowned’ almost three years of much-disputed reforms of judicial power (Selejan-Gut̗an 2018) deemed undemocratic by the opposition and many of the voters. This domestic concern was the real trigger for electoral participation. Romania and Lithuania were at the same time the only CEE countries where turnout reached at least the EU28 average. Poland ranked third in participation with 46% and Hungary fourth with 43%. Here as well, the level of polarisation of domestic politics and the relation of the campaigns to domestic electoral cycles is the clue explaining such levels of turnout. All other countries had turnout between 23% and 38%. Media coverage was typically limited as well. Only in the cases mentioned above, where the EP elections matched up with other important elements of direct or electoral democracy, was the coverage higher. Another example of high media coverage was the case of Poland, where

54 51

+3

51 40

+11

55 −21

−16

34

62

46

−21

54

33

−23

52

29

−24

54

30

−26

64

38

−29

72

43

−32

61

29

−37

60

23

Romania Lithuania Poland Latvia Bulgaria Slovenia Croatia Estonia Hungary Czechia Slovakia

Source: Compiled by the authors from https://election-results.eu/turnout/ and http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/

EP 2019 turnout in per cent Previous parliamentary elections turnout in per cent Difference in percentage points

Country

Table 13.1  Turnout in the 2019 EP elections in Central and Eastern European EU member states

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the EP elections were treated by parties, voters and the media as a kind of prequel to very important parliamentary elections scheduled for autumn 2019 to test the dominant position of the incumbent Law and Justice party. The 2019, evidence from the CEE countries does not reveal a clear trend in terms of other tested SOE assumptions. In some countries, the incumbent ruling parties were punished but to a very different extent. Sometimes only a small decline occurred, such as in Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechia where the EP elections took place roughly in the middle of the national electoral cycle. The same tendency to punish the parties in power can be observed in Estonia, Lithuania, and especially Romania and Slovakia in a clearer way. We can interpret cum grano salis both the Romanian and Slovak EP elections as a kind of referendum condemning the ruling parties. The sharp decline of the ruling Croatian HDZ can be explained less by the EP 2019 elections than by the general trend of reconstruction of the Croatian party scene. Evidence from Latvia is mixed, since some governmental parties weakened but others got stronger. Here again, the high volatility of the party system was induced by the 2018 parliamentary elections, so there is still no clear trend in electoral behaviour patterns. In the case of Slovenia, the opposition strengthened but some governmental parties were reinforced at the cost of other incumbents. Poland demonstrates a specific pattern of both governing and major opposition parties getting stronger. The last assumption we tested was the more ‘experimental’ nature of SOE, wherein smaller, fringe or marginal parties are theorised to have a better chance of making an electoral breakthrough. Here, the evidence is even more mixed. No newcomers experienced any expansion in Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (where, however, one independent candidate was elected) and Slovenia. In Slovakia, a coalition of two brand new parties, Progressive Slovakia/ Together, won the race. In Croatia, both small Eurosceptic parties and independent Eurosceptic candidates gained. In the case of Hungary, the 2019 EP elections served as a kind of springboard for the Momentum party, which failed to win seats in the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary elections. In Poland, the same happened to the Spring party of Robert Biedroń, which was founded in 2018. In Romania, the new Euro-­ enthusiast party ProRomania entered the EP in 2019, a formal newcomer only in the sense that the party was founded in 2017 by former Prime Minister Victor Ponta as a split from the Social Democratic Party.

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To sum up, the observed lower turnout and much lower interest from the media in the 2019 EP elections correspond very well with the assumptions of the SOE theory. The rest of theory’s predictions, however, were not well supported empirically and there are many national idiosyncrasies in terms of government-versus-opposition dynamics and the EP elections functioning as a window of opportunity for minor and fringe parties.

13.2   Are the Moderate Parties ‘Tempted’ by Soft-Euroscepticism? When it comes to party-based Euroscepticism, we proposed five hypotheses to test its significance in the 2019 EP elections. Our major goal was to assess the robustness of both the soft- and hard-Eurosceptic categories, their relevance in the elections for particular actors and their mutual exclusiveness. We were also interested in how both categories fit into the second-­order nature of the EP elections. Our first hypothesis assumed a relation between moderate opposition parties and soft-Euroscepticism. We expected that centre-left and centre-­ right opposition parties would use soft-Eurosceptic arguments during the 2019 elections in order to challenge governmental parties. This hypothesis draws on research arguing that party-based Euroscepticism is especially a product of government-opposition dynamics where governmental parties support the EU and the opposition adopts a mild critique of the EU in order to be perceived as different—and thus more visible—from the government. When looking at the findings from our case studies, this hypothesis can hardly be sustained both in terms of regional coherence and in terms of the existence of a link between opposition and soft-Euroscepticism. The picture that can be constructed on the basis of our country analyses is more blurred and challenges conceptualisation of Euroscepticism as a stance of opposition. For the first, when looking at the manifestos and electoral campaigns— and compared to previous elections—we have found an obvious reduction in unconditional party-based support for the EU.  What was a kind of norm for the political mainstream in the CEE region during the first decade after the Big Bang enlargement in 2004 became almost invisible during the 2019 elections. Even parties identifying themselves as pro-EU raised serious concerns, for example, about the treatment of ‘new’

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member states. The metaphor of double standards—whether applied to how the European Commission has evaluated political events in CEE countries or used to describe particular policies or events—resonated across the region quite well. The same applies to pro-EU parties’ critique of particular EU policies as well as their calls for EU reform. As a consequence, terms such as ‘national interests’ or ‘protection’ were no longer taboo for pro-EU parties. This shift in mainstream discourse had obvious implications for soft-­ Euroscepticism as a minority approach emphasised by the opposition. We have identified widespread soft-Euroscepticism (at least) across the region—affecting governing parties in particular. Poland and Hungary are perhaps typical examples as both of these countries are governed by explicitly Eurosceptic cabinets. Even though Polish Law and Justice tried to tone down its disagreements with EU institutions during the campaign and went overboard to stress its strong commitment to membership in the Union, it remained Eurosceptic in the sense of being anti-federalist and wary of further centralisation. Hungarian FIDESZ went even further and moved closer to hard-Euroscepticism, but again not questioning Hungarian EU membership. As governmental parties in both countries dominantly owned the EU-critical discourse, the opposition was forced to adopt rather pro-EU stances—quite surprisingly including even the previously hard-line Hungarian party Jobbik. A bit in the shadow of Poland and Hungary stands Bulgaria. Since 2017 its government has consisted of the pro-EU party GERB and three openly hard-Eurosceptic parties—ATAKA, NFSB and VMRO-BND, acting as the United Patriots coalition. Surprisingly, opposition parties such as ABV and BSP adopted a rather more friendly EU approach, as both parties can be classified as soft-Eurosceptic. Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria are not the only countries in the region where expressing soft- or even hard-Eurosceptic arguments became normal for governments. For example, in Czechia we could identify very little difference in this sense between the parties in power and the majority of opposition parties. Campaign slogans included the phrases ‘reform’ and ‘Czech interests’. A similar pattern can also be found in Slovenia where soft-Euroscepticism was observed in the rhetoric of mainstream parties. Estonia further demonstrated that important changes are happening in the CEE region: whereas the major coalition party KESK remained pro­EU, minor partners Isaama and EKRE in particular took rather critical approaches towards the EU.

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Apart from countries where soft- and even hard-Euroscepticism have entered mainstream rhetoric, several countries still kept their ‘virginity’ in this regard, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania in particular. In these three countries we can hardly speak about any real influence of Euroscepticism at all. An exception is Slovakia, where we observe a link between soft-­ Euroscepticism and the opposition (SaS and KDH in particular), while all governmental parties were pro-EU during the campaign. But in general throughout the CEE region, soft-Euroscepticism had similar links to the opposition as well as to governmental parties in the 2019 elections.

13.3   The Role of Public Euroscepticism Our second hypothesis assumed that in countries which are affected by high levels of public Euroscepticism—and here we highlighted Czechia as a typical example of this in the region—even moderate governmental parties will tend to use Eurosceptic arguments in order to harvest votes. In this regard, the remarkable increase of party-based Euroscepticism does not seem to be echoed at the level of the public, but is espoused mainly be political elites. If we measure public Euroscepticism by trust in the European Commission as a proxy, the average value EU-wide of distrust of the EU was 39.44% in November 2018. In the CEE region, apart from Slovenia where the level of distrust in the Commission was highest (54.87%), the level of distrust was higher than the EU-wide average in only two other countries—Croatia (42.53%) and Czechia (53.45%). This makes the CEE region less Eurosceptic than many western EU member states—for example, in France the level of distrust in the Commission was 44.61%, in Spain 50.21% and in Greece almost two-thirds of the respondents (65.94%). Among three CEE cases, only in Czechia is there some evidence supporting a link between the high level of public Euroscepticism and soft-Euroscepticism expressed by governmental parties. In Czechia, the campaigns by both ANO and the Social Democrats appeared Eurosceptic only in comparison with previous elections when the same parties declared almost unconditional support for EU. When it comes to the two Balkan countries, the evidence from neither Slovenia nor Croatia supports the claim that high levels of public Euroscepticism is reflected in governmental parties—in Slovenia, only ‘Levica’ (which supports the minority government indirectly) could be classified as a soft-Eurosceptic party on the basis of its electoral campaign and manifesto, whereas all the other parties forming the cabinet remain pro-EU. Croatia is a similar case,

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as none of its governmental parties even flirted with critique of the EU before or during the elections. Even if we include countries where public distrust of the Commission is remarkably high (and just a few percentage points below the EU average), such as Slovakia (39.49%) and Hungary (38.03%), the picture would not change. Whereas Hungary represents a country whose cabinet is openly fighting with the Commission and using broadly Eurosceptic rhetoric, the Slovak government has a totally different policy. To sum up, the relationship between public Euroscepticism and the 2019 EP electoral style or campaigns run by the governmental parties in the CEE region is problematic at best and almost non-existent.

13.4   Trends in Support for Hard-Eurosceptic Parties Our third hypothesis targeted the performance of hard-Euroscepticism in the EP elections. We were interested in the relationship between the importance of hard-Euroscepticism for particular types of elections, assuming that support for hard-Eurosceptic parties using Euroscepticism as a part of their ideology and political identity will score better in the EP elections than in the first-order elections. Hard-Eurosceptics in the CEE region can be divided into two groups. The first consists of parties, which were represented, in the government at the time of the elections. For them, the EP elections were quite a disaster in 2019. In Bulgaria, only VMRO-BND passed the 5% threshold, while ATAKA and NFSB remained far below it. The same applies to EKRE in Estonia, which lost more than five percentage points compared to its performance in the 2019 national elections. Only Hungarian FIDESZ—if treated as a hard-Eurosceptic party—slightly increased its support from 49.27% to 52.56%. The results of opposition hard-Eurosceptics were mixed in the same regard. Whereas in Slovakia LSNS strengthened its support by about four percentage points, the Czech SPD lost 1.5 points compared to the 2017 national election. In addition, both Polish parties which can be classified as hard-Eurosceptic—Konfederacja and Kukiz’15—lost and did not even pass the 5% threshold. Hence, CEE hard-liners, despite EU-wide expectations forecasting substantial gains for hard-Eurosceptics across the EU, did not score particularly well if compared with their performance in most recent national elections.

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13.5   Is Soft-Euroscepticism an ‘Open Sesame’ of Electoral Victory? The fourth hypothesis we developed assumed that the parties strongly espousing soft-Euroscepticism in the campaign would score better in the EP elections than in the first order elections (FOE). The hypothesis is based on the assumption of increasing politicisation of EU issues as well as on expectations that voters, shaken by multiple crises but still willing to sustain the EU and the membership status of their country, will prefer reform-minded voices but not incline to support hard-Eurosceptic ‘exiteers’. This hypothesis was confirmed in the cases of Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Lithuania (where, however, Euroscepticism as an issue remained marginal and the voters were more motivated by the parties’ stances on the candidates in the simultaneous presidential elections). The hypothesis was discarded in the cases of Bulgaria, Czechia (among soft-Eurosceptics, only the Civic Democrats did better in the SOE than in FOE, but the general tenor of most of the parties in the campaign was in fact a sort of soft-Euroscepticism), Estonia (where the Eurosceptic parties were not punished by the voters for their unsatisfactory governmental performance), Latvia (where there were no relevant Eurosceptic parties campaigning for the votes at all), Poland (where in fact the race had not the features of SOE but of a sort of prequel to the autumn parliamentary elections, which included a remarkable decline of Eurosceptic issues in the campaigns of even the most important soft-Eurosceptic party, Law and Justice), Romania (where criticism of as well as support for the EU was overshadowed by domestic concerns on judicial reform), and Slovakia (where Euroscepticism was overshadowed by domestic concerns and the EP elections were treated as a sort of sequel to the recent presidential elections). Before we simply say that the hypothesis was ultimately rejected because it was confirmed only in 4 cases of 11, we have to reconsider the context. There was no viable Euroscepticism at all in Latvia and domestic issues completely dominated in Poland, Romania and Slovakia, preventing the soft-Eurosceptic parties from criticising the EU for strategic reasons. Therefore, we might conclude that soft-Euroscepticism worked well in those countries where there was a real Europeanisation of the campaign. If the EU issues gained prominence compared to the 2004–2014 period, it can be said that the soft-Eurosceptic criticism worked reasonably well. Therefore, we claim this hypothesis was partially confirmed.

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13.6   Eurosceptic Narratives as a Prominent Form of Europeanisation? The final hypothesis postulated that the significant presence of hard- and soft-Eurosceptic parties would lead to increased ‘Europeanisation’ of the EP electoral campaign in general. To assess the validity of the fifth hypothesis, we will first summarise the major topics and levels of Europeanisation in each of the 2019 campaigns in the CEE member states. After that, we will investigate in more detail the types of hard- and soft-Eurosceptic narratives employed by political parties in order to unravel the existing softand hard-Eurosceptic discourses among the ‘new’ members of the EU. In some of the CEE countries, the 2019 campaign was plagued by domestic topics because of simultaneous FOE elections or because of domestic political crisis overlapping the period of the EP elections. This was the case in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. In Bulgaria, popular dissatisfaction with the performance of the ruling party, GERB, surrounded by corruption scandals, was connected with the fact that in a way, the EP election was a kind of prequel to local elections. The two biggest parties tried to engage with ‘genuine’ EU-related topics, GERB in a pro-integration way and BSP in a soft-Eurosceptic tone, yet the topics of domestic politics dominated. In the case of Hungary, the polarisation of FIDESZ against the rest was a crucial issue of the campaign, downgrading EU-related topics to a purely instrumental role. The Lithuanian EP campaign was almost completely overshadowed by the simultaneous presidential elections. Some EU-related issues (cohesion funds, migration, climate protection and social policies at the EU level), however, penetrated the debate to some extent. The Polish 2019 EP election was a prequel to the autumn parliamentary elections. For tactical reasons, therefore, even the most important soft-Eurosceptic party, PiS, dramatically reduced its critique of the EU. The source and trend of politicisation was thus driven almost purely by domestic concerns. In Romania, a parallel referendum on the judiciary turned the EP elections to a forum for a profound critique of the government in particular and domestic issues in general. The reason why the Czech campaign was not very Europeanised is specific. The Czech campaign actually contradicted SOE assumptions because the European topics were overshadowed by domestic issues. The point was that all the relevant parties employed soft-Eurosceptic narratives, the very fact of which prevented politicisation of the debate around EU-related issues and reinforced the exposition of domestic issues.

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Slovakia offers a kind of contradictory picture. Here, the EP election was preceded by a highly polarised presidential election. The victory of pro-integration Zuzana Čaputová was capitalised on by the Progressive Slovakia/Together coalition, which contributed to a higher level of politicisation of EU-related topics in the campaign in comparison to the 2004–2014 EP elections. On the other hand, even in Slovakia, national issues prevailed. In other cases, the campaign was fairly Europeanised, especially in comparison with previous EP elections in the 2004–2014 period. This was the case of Croatia, where the incumbents faced Eurosceptic criticism amid a profound debate on the economic advantages of EU membership. We observed a fairly high level of Europeanisation of the campaign in Estonia, too. One of the main reasons for this was the focus of the highly personalised campaign on individual candidates who were typically experts in the EU and foreign policy. We made a similar observation in the case of Latvia: domestic issues prevailed but compared to past EP campaigns and many other countries, the Latvian EP elections in 2019 were relatively Europeanised because the candidates were capable of debating EU issues. The EP 2019 campaign was fairly Europeanised in Slovenia, too. Slovenia was a country suffering from all the aspects of the recent multiple EU crises, which contributed to discussions on migration, economic development, social policies and migration, all this with a clear EU ‘flavour’. In the Slovenian case, the soft-Eurosceptic discourses contributed the most to this EU-based politicisation of the debate. When we take a closer look at the Eurosceptic narratives, we can see many similarities across the CEE countries. There is actually nothing we can label as a unique CEE Eurosceptic narrative since the motives we observed could be found in western and southern European countries, too. The most generally applied message was the concept of a ‘reform’ of the EU, which can hardly serve as an element distinguishing between soft-­ Eurosceptic and lukewarmly pro-integration parties. For some traditionally Euro-enthusiast parties (such as the Czech Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, and the Estonian Centre Party, or Isamaa), the dominant tone of the 2019 EP campaign was a shift to a softer version of soft-Euroscepticism. On the far right, we observed a typical narrative of nationalism combined very often with cultural conservatism. This narrative stressed a sovereigntist discourse and anti-liberal cultural claims, such as critique of sexual minorities, a liberal concept of human rights, or invoked a radical

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vision of the Christian tradition. Such narratives were delivered by the small hard-Eurosceptic nationalist parties on the fringes of the party spectrum in the countries of Visegrad Group (Konfederacja, Czech SPD, Slovak ĽSNS) and in the former members of Yugoslavia. Similar narratives, however, were utilised by some mainstream parties including ruling Estonian EKRE.1 The label of ‘Eurorealism’ seems to be very popular. The trouble is with getting a clearer definition of what it means exactly. The Eurorealist tag covers diverse forms of soft-Eurosceptic stances ranging from the nationalistic and Catholic claims of the Croatian Sovereigntists, through the ECR-like rhetoric of flexible integration and ‘common sense’ simplistic solutions employed by the Czech Civic Democratic Party, to the ‘Eurorealism’ of FIDESZ, which took positions much closer to the anti-­ liberal and anti-EU claims of the far right. There is a soft-Eurosceptic leftwing critique present too. For example, the Bulgarian Socialist Party accused the EU institutions of being remote to the citizens and over-bureaucratic at the cost of solidarity and welfare redistribution. A similar critique was shared to a lesser extent by some other social democratic parties, such as the Czech ČSSD and the Romanian PSD. Some far-left parties, such as the Czech Communists, expressed similar complaints, but their ambition is to transform the EU to some sort of ‘democratic socialism’, whatever that means. The Croatian populist party Živi zid employed the anti-capitalist narrative of the Italian Movimento 5 Stelle. There is actually one country that is a showcase of all the types of the above-described discourses, Slovakia. We can find far-right narrative of Kotleba’s ĽSNS (in fact almost the only real fascists among the CEE countries), the conservative cultural soft-Euroscepticism of the Christian Democratic Movement, the libertarian economic critique of the EU boosted by the sovereignist discourse of Freedom and Solidarity, and the leftwing soft-Euroscepticism flavoured with cultural critique of Fico’s liberal Smer. When we return to our fifth hypothesis, we have to admit that the evidence is mixed at best and we cannot deem the hypothesis on soft- and 1  Some moderate Christian Democratic or conservative parties in Central Europe, such as Lithuanian TS-LKD, stressed the Christian or Judeo-Christian roots of Europe without connecting this appeal with any real Euroscepticism.

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hard-Euroscepticism as confirmed. The power of Eurosceptic narratives to politicise the electoral campaign was confirmed in some cases where the entire context already put the EU-related issues to the forefront, such as in the case of Slovenia. In Latvia, on the contrary, we saw a fairly highly Europeanised campaign without any significant Eurosceptic voice. In the Czech Republic, where soft-Euroscepticism worked as a new kind of political consensus across the party spectrum, EU issues were downplayed completely. We can therefore carefully interpret the presence of strong Eurosceptic party narratives as an almost necessary, but surely not a sufficient, condition for politicisation of the EU campaign around integration themes.

13.7   Discussion The EU, dealing for at least a decade with a phenomenon called ‘multiple crises’ (Schweiger 2016), has in recent years been a target for various forms of intense critique. This could easily lead to a conclusion that Euroscepticism is everywhere and that it has become a prevailing framing device for political parties on European integration. As the EP elections— as the best known embodiment of the SOE model—offer an unique opportunity to voice such positions and to harvest electoral support on their basis, the 2019 EP elections were predicted by many politicians, commentators and scholars to deliver an earthquake shaking previous patterns and rewriting the political map of EU politics. At the EU level, this appeared not to be the case. As our chapters revealed, neither did the Eurosceptic narrative dominate in the CEE countries, which are often portrayed as sceptical troublemakers. Euroscepticism followed a different path than expected. Here we are going to discuss our findings within the broader theoretical context of research on Euroscepticism. The impact or consequences of our findings on party-based Euroscepticism can be interpreted from two perspectives. First, our research sheds some new light on the dynamics between softand hard-Euroscepticism that calls into question their treatment as two versions of the same position. In many CEE countries, soft-­Euroscepticism has become the norm. This means that it is no longer a politics of opposition or just a strategic choice. Soft Eurosceptics can be found both in the corridors of government buildings as well as on the opposition benches. For the former, soft-Euroscepticism can be interpreted as a divergence from the EU core—but particularly in terms of the content of various EU

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policies, not in terms of key EU principles. The fact that many of the parties in the CEE that previously unconditionally supported the EU have adopted a more critical approach can be also interpreted as a sort of membership ‘hangover’. EU membership has delivered not only milk and honey but also pressure to comply with social values and norms such as multiculturalism and forms of solidarity that are either different or unknown in CEE. As well, CEE parties and politicians have in recent years experienced feelings of their nations being second-rate EU members, which could also have weakened their support. Nevertheless, the performance of hard-Euroscepticism was much poorer than expected. CEE voters do not want to exit the EU as much as they are reluctant to Europeanise further. Building on Hooghe and Marks’ (2009) metaphor, we might say that the ‘median voters’ demonstrate a kind of ‘permissive dissensus’ restraining pro-integration positions but punishing exiteers as well. In many CEE countries, soft- and even hard-Eurosceptics are represented in government. The voters therefore do not need to punish governments-in-­ office as they already reflect critical public voices. This has had a very important impact particularly on hard-Euroscepticism: the soft-­Eurosceptic critique of the EU is well promoted and not marginalised. Consequently, radical stances demanding, for example, exit of particular country from the EU have become less attractive and less articulated. What we also found is that hard-Eurosceptics have started to abandon their rhetoric demanding exit from or dismantling of the EU. Instead, the CEE hard-­ Eurosceptic parties refocused on the radical reconstruction of the EU and defence against the EU’s allegedly decadent values. The second perspective suggested by our research is more critical and targets the very logic of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ categories. In the period of a widespread permissive consensus and pro-integration stances taken by mainstream political parties around the EC/EU, soft- and hard-­ Euroscepticism worked as moderate and radical versions of the same opposition, respectively. Are they still two kinds of the same opinion in the period of ‘multiple crises’? Does not the spread of soft-Euroscepticism in particular tell us something more important? We believe it does. What we have learnt on the basis of our analysis of not only the 2019 EP elections in CEE, but also on the basis of the development of election outcomes in CEE since 2004, is that soft- and hard-Euroscepticism represent two distinct positions rather than two versions of one attitude. Soft– Euroscepticism, as we have argued elsewhere (Kaniok 2012; Kaniok and Hloušek 2018, 2019), stands for a position that criticises from within the

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system, whereas hard-Euroscepticism fires at the EU as such. This means that these two positions are fundamentally different not only in their content but also in their origin. Whereas the former is a part of a generally pro-EU approach—but defined more broadly than has been claimed up to now—the latter rejects fundamental principles of European integration or the very idea of it. This means that the former is based on disagreement with a particular policy or decision—and thus can change in the course of time—but the latter is usually firmly embodied in an underlying anti-­ system approach. It is also quite symptomatic that—if we look at the development of party-based soft- and hard-Euroscepticism in the CEE region since the 2004 EU enlargement—we find only a very limited number of cases where initially soft-Eurosceptics have evolved into hard-liners, and vice versa. On the other hand, the number of parties whose position towards the EU has changed from soft-Euroscepticism to a pro-EU stance (and vice versa) is remarkably higher. This again suggests that the approach which is known as soft-Euroscepticism is indeed closer to the pro-EU stance than to the hard-Eurosceptic position. We are aware that our suggestion to redefine the categories of party-­ based Euroscepticism—particularly the ‘soft’ version—can be challenged based on the specific context of the 2019 EP elections. One can argue that party systems in CEE are now in a time of remarkable instability and constant change. Voters’ strategies for participation in SOE have changed, too. Increased volatility in FOE context suggests that voters in CEE countries tend to experiment more in general, not just in SOE. Additionally, higher turnout in the 2019 elections affected the results. From the perspective of political empirics, voters (not only) in CEE countries could have been influenced by Brexit negotiations. The long and as-yet unfinished process of dealing with Brexit, causing turbulent chaos in British politics, most likely discouraged not only voters, but also many CEE hard-­ Eurosceptics from dreaming about following the UK path. As we have demonstrated, in the majority of CEE countries the general public is still strongly pro-EU, which limits possibilities for the hardliners. Overall, even if we take into account all the reservations mentioned in the previous paragraph, this again points out the conceptual weakness of the soft-Euroscepticism category. This category worked very well when fair weather drove the propeller of European integration and the mainstream did not contest deepening of the EU. In recent years of crises, however, the concept suffers from three major shortcomings. First, as our chapters revealed, it is very dependent on the existing political situation, thus

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changing often and being too vague. Second, it implicitly assumes that the only ‘appropriate’ pro-EU approach is that which advocates speed and a never-ending power transfer from member states to the EU.  Third, and probably most importantly, the ‘soft’ conceptualisation of party-based Euroscepticism lacks a clear and convincing definition of the pro-EU stance or stances. Whereas in the late 1990s and in the first years of the new millennium, when the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ categories emerged, this did not necessarily cause many analytical problems—the vast majority of parties were pro-EU, the overall atmosphere within the EU was optimistic, and the project as such was considered a success story—in recent years examples of outright disapproval of particular EU policies have increased. Does this mean that the EU has become a less and less desirable project at the party level? No, it could instead mean that the EU has become a ‘normal polity’ where policies are the subject of daily competition for approval or criticism. Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2004) category of ‘soft-­Euroscepticism’ is therefore both the ideal point of departure for further conceptual endeavours and an object to be challenged by redefinitions considering changes in public moods, party positions and strategies, as well as the EU itself.

References Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. British Journal of Political Science, 39(1), 1–23. Kaniok, P. (2012). Eurosceptics  – Enemies or a Necessary Part of European Integration? Romanian Journal of Political Science, 12(2), 29–52. Kaniok, P., & Hloušek, V. (2018). Brexit Outside of UK Politics: The Case of Czech Eurosceptics. European Politics and Society, 19(5), 507–525. Kaniok, P., & Hloušek, V. (2019). Slow and Big or Say No to the Devil: Party-­ Based Euroscepticism and the Future of EU Enlargement. In M.  Góra, N.  Styczynska, & M.  Zubek (Eds.), Contestation of EU Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy. Actors, Arenas, Arguments (pp.  133–158). Copenhagen: DJOF Publishing. Schweiger, C. (2016). Exploring the EU’s Legitimacy Crisis: The Dark Heart of Europe. Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar. Selejan-Gut̗an, B. (2018). Romania: Perils of a “Perfect Euro-Model” of Judicial Council. German Law Journal, 19(7), 1707–1740. Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2004). Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Party Systems of the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 43(1), 1–27.

Index1

A Action Party (Rı̄cı̄bas Partija, RP), 136, 140, 141 Alliance of a New Citizen (ANO), 69, 70n4, 73, 75–78, 283 Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe (ACRE), 143 Alliance of European National Movements (AEMN), 269 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE), see European Liberal and Democrats Alliance, 220 Alternative for Bulgarian Revival (ABV), 20, 21, 23, 282 Alternative for Germany (AfD), 142 Anti-establishment, 45, 48, 52, 54–56, 191, 212 Asylum policy, 96, 132, 264 ATAKA, 21, 23–27, 31, 32, 35, 282, 284

B Babiš, Andrej, 2, 70n4, 73, 75, 76 Băsescu, Traian, 210, 211, 217, 217n7 Brexit, 13, 50, 64, 75, 78, 83, 164, 202, 229n1, 230, 268, 291 Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), 19–21, 23, 28–31, 282, 286, 288 C Centre Party (CP), 89–95, 95n3, 97–99, 136, 142 Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), 235–238, 240, 242, 244, 247, 248, 283, 288 Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), 108, 109, 115–117, 119, 121, 122, 126 Christian values, 99, 241

 Note: page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2020 V. Hloušek, P. Kaniok (eds.), The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40858-9

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294 

INDEX

Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), 27, 28, 30–32, 34, 282, 286 Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), 182, 184, 185, 187–191, 194, 196 Common Agricultural Policy, 88, 96 Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), 231, 237, 241 Congress of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy, KNP), 185, 188 Corruption, 27, 29–31, 34, 48, 54, 122, 137, 145, 214, 215, 218, 220, 222, 260, 265, 266, 268, 286 Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ), 42, 44–47, 49–54, 56, 57, 280 Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska stranka prava, HSP), 43, 57 D Democratic backsliding, 2 Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD), 184, 185, 189, 196 Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia (DeSUS), 262, 266–269 D’Hondt method, 40, 62, 85, 107, 201 E Economic crisis, 69, 78, 85, 90, 91, 111, 112, 116, 134, 254 Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija, LLRA), 156, 156n8, 158–160 Electoral system, 5, 17–18, 39–40, 61–62, 83–85, 94, 107–108, 112,

117, 131–132, 151–152, 175–177, 201–203, 229–230, 253–254 Estonian Centre Party (KE), 89, 287 Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE), 88, 93–101, 93n2, 282, 284, 288 EU Constitution, 261 EU Court of Justice, 146, 182, 189, 207 EU funds, 2, 28, 50, 189, 194, 218, 241, 244 Euro, 2, 3, 50, 62, 72–75, 86, 91, 133, 137, 139, 153, 156, 159, 167n13, 178, 181, 183, 190, 231, 239, 263 European Coalition (Koalicja Europejska, KE), 93, 94, 99, 189, 190, 192, 194, 195 European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), 26, 33, 47, 65, 69, 146, 164, 219 Europeanisation, 2, 5, 6, 8, 11–13, 55, 69, 74, 116, 118, 158, 160, 238, 261, 285–289 European Liberal and Democrats Alliance, 76, 93, 119, 145, 163, 213, 215, 216, 220, 221, 263, 266, 267, 269 European People’s Party (EPP), 47, 95, 112, 121, 122, 162, 190, 209, 260, 263, 265, 267, 269 Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD), 156 Eurorealism, 288 Eurosceptics Party (EP), 136, 138, 141 Eurozone, 2–4, 8, 12, 13, 28, 29, 63, 64, 72, 75, 78, 88, 112, 119, 146, 161, 165, 167, 167n13, 178, 181, 187, 190, 238, 239, 246, 257, 259, 262, 271

 INDEX 

F Federalisation, 89, 101, 155, 164, 165, 246 Fico, Robert, 239 Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance (FIDESZ), 108, 109, 111–118, 120–124, 126, 219, 286, 288 For fatherland and Freedom/Latvia’s National Independence Movement (TB/LNNK), 138, 140 France, 98, 162, 165, 215, 283 Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), 236, 238, 240, 242–247, 283, 288 Freedom Union (Unia Wolności, UW), 185 G Germany, 74, 133, 162, 165, 183, 190, 215, 238 Greater Romania Party (Partidul Romania Mare, PRM), 204, 209–212, 222 Green/Farmers Union (ZZS), 141 H Hard Euroscepticism, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 54, 65, 96, 101, 109, 111, 113–115, 117, 118, 123, 124, 142, 209, 212, 260, 271, 277, 282–284, 289–291 Hare-Niemayer method, 177 Homeland Union–Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD), 157–162, 168, 169, 288n1 Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), 108, 111, 114–119, 123, 126

295

I Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty Group (ITS), 21 Illiberalism, 3 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Bulgarian National Movement (VMRO-BND), 21, 25–27, 29, 31–33, 35, 282, 284 Iohannis, Klaus, 219 Isamaa (Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, IRL), 89, 91–98, 287 Istanbul Convention, 28 J Jobbik, 108, 109, 111, 113–124, 126, 282 Juncker, Jean-Claude, 113, 121, 190 K Kaczyński, Jaroslaw, 2 Korwin-Mikke, Janusz, 186–188, 191 Kotleba, Marián, 241 Kukiz’15, 53, 183, 191–193, 284 L Labour Party (DP), 156, 157, 160, 163, 167 Latvian Russian Union (LKS), 138, 141–143, 145 Latvian Socialist Party (LSP), 136, 141 Law and Justice (PiS), 23, 164, 180–183, 185–196, 280, 282, 285, 286 League of Polish Families (LPR), 179, 185, 186, 195 Le Pen, Marine, 97, 100, 242

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Levica (The Left), 263–265, 268–271, 283 LGTB, 26, 31–33, 194 Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS), 258 Liberal Movement of the Republic of Lithuania (LRLS), 157, 158, 160, 163, 168 Libertas, 136, 185, 187 Lisbon Treaty, 67, 69, 73, 74, 95, 140, 155, 163, 180, 185–187, 191, 254, 261 Lithuanian Centre Party (LCP), 155, 163, 167, 169 Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (LVŽS), 156, 160, 161, 168 Lithuanian Nationalist and Republican Union (LTRS), 154, 155 Lithuanian Social Democratic Labour Party (LSDDP), 161, 166, 167

National Liberal Party (PNL), 209, 211–213, 215, 217, 219–221 National Movement (RN), 191 National Movement Simeon II, 18, 23 National Salvation Front (FSN), 203, 204 NATO, 24, 27, 28, 68, 74, 88, 92, 96, 97, 133, 143 Neo-liberalism, 143 NGOs, 24, 33, 137, 165, 207

M Mečiar, Vladimír, 231 Merkel, Angela, 238 Migration crisis, 3, 63, 75, 87, 101, 112, 179 Momentum, 119, 121–123, 126, 280 Most, 34, 45, 46, 51–54, 52n5, 54n6, 75, 122, 166, 167, 178, 187, 207, 247 Most-Híd, 236, 240, 241, 244–247 Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), 230, 231, 235–239

P Party of European Left (European Left), 265 Party of European Socialists (PES), 145, 220, 239 People’s Movement Party (PMP), 210, 212, 213, 217 People’s Party (TT), 114, 139, 219 Peoples’ Party Our Slovakia (Ľ SNS), 236, 241–243, 245–248, 284 Polish Peasant Party (PSL), 189 Ponta, Victor, 210, 212, 213, 218, 280 Populism, 3, 25–27, 109, 268 Progressive Slovakia (PS), 236, 240, 243, 245–248, 259n6, 262, 263, 280, 287 Putin, Vladimir, 92, 100, 141, 188

N National Front for Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB), 21, 23–27, 31, 32, 35, 282, 284

O Orbán, Viktor, 2, 108, 109, 116, 117, 119–122, 260, 266, 267, 271 Order and Justice Party (TT), 156, 159, 160, 164, 165, 167, 169 Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽ aNO), 236, 240, 244–247

 INDEX 

297

R Reform Party (RE), 89–95, 95n3, 97–99 Roma minority, 25, 26, 31 Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR), 204 Russia, 19, 20, 24, 27–29, 31, 87, 91

Soft Euroscepticism, 6–8, 10, 13, 48, 49, 51, 54, 71, 73, 77, 78, 89, 92, 144, 207, 236, 238, 263, 271, 283, 285, 287–292 Soros, George, 24, 113, 120, 121 Spitzenkandidat, 145, 211

S Salvini, Matteo, 98, 100, 242 Schengen area, 3, 28, 29, 133, 239 Second order elections (SOE), 4–8, 10, 11, 34, 35, 43, 44, 51, 52, 55, 67–70, 74–76, 78, 97, 115, 116, 118, 120, 122–124, 137–142, 160, 165, 175, 176, 184, 193, 194, 196, 209, 210, 212, 220, 221, 235–236, 242, 247, 277, 278, 280, 281, 285, 286, 289, 291 Self-Defence, 179, 180, 185, 186, 195 Slovak National Party (SNS), 235, 236, 239, 241–244, 246, 247, 258–262, 266, 269–271 Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), 260, 261, 264, 265, 267–271 Slovenian People’s Party (SLS), 260, 261, 264, 265, 267, 269–271 Sme rodina, 242–244 Smer-Social Democracy (Smer), 235, 236, 239, 240, 243, 244, 247 Social Democratic Party (SDP), 42, 44, 46, 49, 50, 57, 89, 91–94, 99, 207, 210, 211, 213, 215, 216, 218, 220, 221, 280 Social Democrats (SD), 62, 68, 69, 71, 73, 76, 77, 91, 94, 98, 157, 207, 209–211, 213, 260, 263–265, 268, 269, 283, 287

T Together-Civic Democracy (Spolu), 236, 240, 243, 245–248 Trump, Donald, 163, 217 U Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN), 156 Union of Democratic Forces, 18 United Left Coalition (ZL), 259n6, 260, 262 United Patriots (UP), 23, 31, 282 United States (USA), 27, 73, 108, 191 United States of Europe, 48, 118, 119, 122, 269 Unity Party (V), 141 V Visegrad Four (V4), 115 W Wilders, Geert, 242 Z Živi žid, 45, 46, 49, 51–54, 54n6, 56, 57, 288