The Ethics Of Joy: Spinoza On The Empowered Life 0190086025, 9780190086022, 019008605X, 9780190086053, 0190086033, 9780190086039

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The Ethics of Joy Spinoza on the Empowered Life A N D R EW   YOU PA

1

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective ofexcellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Ox.ford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2020 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress ISBN 978- 0-19- 008602- 2

I 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed by Integrated Books International. Inc., United States of America

Contents Acknowledgments List ofAbbreviations

Introduction

ix xi

1

1. Spinoza's Symptomatic Theory of Emotions

10

2. Emotions as Axiological Information

28

3. Spinoza's Moral Realism

40

4. Spinoza and Moral Anti-Realism

61

5. Underivative Goodness and Underivative Badness

82

6. Derivative Goodness and Derivative Badness

100

7. Summum Mentis Bonum

113

8. The Empowered Life: Freedom

126

9. The Empowered Life: Tenacity

142

10. The Empowered Life: Nobility

160

Conclusion: Ethics and the Project of Empowerment Bibliography Index

180

185 189

Acknowledgments I am fortunate to work in a field that brings me into contact with many wonderful and talented people, and I am indebted to a number of such people for their help with this project, including Lilli Alanen, Douglas Anderson, Anne Margaret Baxley, Eric Brown, Torrie Hester, Susan James, Olli Koistinen, Ian Leask, Alissa MacMillan, Patricia Marino, Jon Miller, Steven A. Miller, Peter Myrdal, Christopher Paone, Daniel Selcer, Yasuko Taoka, and Valtteri Viljanen. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Bartholomew Begley for inviting and hosting me for the 2015 Spinoza Symposium at University College Cork; for helping to organize talks for me at Maynooth University and Dublin City College; and for many stimulating scholarly discussions. I am grateful to Karolina Hübner for her generosity in organizing and hosting a workshop for my manuscript at the University of Toronto in 2018. Meeting with scholars to discuss my manuscript was a fantastic learning experience for me and a highlight of my journey in writing this book. I am also grateful to Karolina for her insightful comments on a draft of the full manuscript. John Carriero, Matthew Kisner, Sanem Soyarslan, and Justin Steinberg read and commented on my manuscript for the Toronto workshop. I thank them for the thoughtfulness with which they handled the task, and for the many excellent questions and difficulties that they raised for the views I defend. Their engagement with my manuscript in writing and discussions was a model of Spinozistic friendship. Over the years Matthew Kisner also read drafts of my chapters and partook in numerous philosophical and scholarly discussions with me. Mike LeBuffe, too, commented on early drafts of chapters as well as the full manuscript. His feedback was an enormous help, and his encouragement despite some differences in our views is a model of professionalism. I also wish to thank my friend and colleague Ryan Netzley for his support, for his help at every stage of this project, and for providing me invaluable feedback on my manuscript. I am fortunate to have been able to rely on Ryan’s vast expertise. I have benefited from the comments and questions of those in attendance at the 2012 Judgment Conference at the University of Turku, the

x Acknowledgments 2012 Human Nature and Agency in Early Modern Philosophy Workshop at Uppsala University, the Second Annual Seminar on Moral and Political Contractualism at the Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro, the 2013 Joint Meeting of the Indiana Philosophical Association and the Midwest Study Group of the North American Kant Society at Indiana University, the 2014 Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, the 2015 Spinoza Symposium at University College Cork, a colloquium with the Department of Philosophy at Maynooth University, a colloquium at the Mater Dei Institute of Education at Dublin City University, the 2017 South Central Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy at Hendrix College, the manuscript workshop at the University of Toronto, and all the students who have been in my Spinoza seminars over the years. I am fortunate for the support of my colleagues in the Department of Philosophy at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, and I thank Southern Illinois University Carbondale for granting me sabbatical leave for the Spring 2016 semester, giving me much needed time to work on this project. I would not have gotten far in this endeavor without Steven Nadler’s generosity, encouragement, and his feedback on early drafts of chapters and on a draft of the full manuscript. My gratitude to my adviser, Alan Nelson, is not easy to convey in a few words. I thank Alan for everything he has done for me, for his instruction and guidance at every step. My heartfelt thanks to my family and friends, especially my parents, Don and Carolyn Youpa, to whom I dedicate this book, with love and joy.

Abbreviations Translations of Spinoza’s works are from Edwin Curley’s The Collected Works of Spinoza, Volumes I  and II, unless I  indicate otherwise. References to passages in Spinoza’s Ethics cite the part by Arabic numeral, and then I use the following abbreviations: a axiom App appendix c corollary d demonstration l lemma D definition DA Part 3 Definitions of the Affects G Gebhardt edition’s pagination GDA Part 3 General Definition of the Affects exp explication p proposition post postulate Pref Preface s scholium

For example, 4p28d refers to Ethics, Part 4, proposition 28, demonstration.

Introduction This book offers a reading of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Specifically, it is a philosophical exposition of his masterpiece, the Ethics, that focuses on his moral philosophy. Central to the reading I defend is the view that there is a way of life that is best for human beings, and what makes it best is that it is the way of life that is in agreement with human nature. I begin this study with Spinoza’s theory of emotions, and I do so because it is one of two doctrines that fundamentally shape the structure and content of his vision of the way of life that is best. The other is his view that striving to persevere in being is the actual essence of a finite thing (3p7). Together these make up the foundation of Spinoza’s moral philosophy, and it is from these two doctrines that his moral philosophy emerges. In saying this I am not denying that his substance monism, the doctrines of mind-​body parallelism and identity, the tripartite theory of knowledge, and his denial of libertarian free will, among others, also belong to the foundation of his moral philosophy. Each of these contributes in its way to the portrait of the best way of life, and they play important roles in the chapters that follow. But it is his theory of emotions and the theory of human nature on which it rests that are chiefly responsible for the structure and content of his moral philosophy. The reading I offer in this book is the result of my interest in what Spinoza’s ideas contribute to our understanding of human life and how it should be lived. It is this interest that informs the approach I take to the Ethics. In taking this approach I have helped myself at times to philosophical concepts and terminology from contemporary philosophy that shed light on his views. Although the language I use is in some cases drawn from contemporary philosophy, the underlying concepts are of much older origin and are at home in the philosophical tradition. To take one example from the following chapters, ­chapter 3 is about what I call Spinoza’s “moral realism.” I believe that Spinoza is a moral realist in an important and illuminating sense of the term “moral realist.” I do not think we can claim to understand his moral philosophy unless we understand the type of realism on which it rests. Still, talk of Spinoza’s moral realism may strike some readers as out of place and The Ethics of Joy. Andrew Youpa, Oxford University Press (2020) © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190086022.001.0001

2  The Ethics of Joy might raise concerns about anachronism. My goal is to get Spinoza right. I do not wish to place his views in a framework for which they are ill suited, even if that framework might make his thought appear more fashionable (or less unfashionable) than it is. While I have sought to avoid the pitfall of anachronism, I have also sought to avoid treating Spinoza’s moral philosophy merely as a chapter in the history of ethics. I apply contemporary terms to Spinoza, but I do so only when they best enable me to explain his views and demonstrate their enduring relevance. Throughout this book I use the phrase “moral philosophy” to refer to the practical project that is contained in the Ethics. Here, at the outset, I wish to clarify how I use this phrase and to explain how I use the word “moral” in reference to Spinoza’s practical doctrines. It is important to see that Spinoza’s moral philosophy does not fit within a framework that takes accountability as an essential function of morality. An ethics of accountability is about what a person deserves. It is a system for taking account of an individual’s moral worth, and its currency is praise and blame, and reward and punishment. An ethics of accountability nicely fits an economic model of morality. On this model an essential feature of morality is that it assigns credit and debt to individuals for their contributions in the economy of good and evil. If a requirement for being a moral philosophy is acceptance of the view that accountability is an essential function of morality, Spinoza’s Ethics does not contain a moral philosophy. The ethics of the Ethics is not about what a person deserves. Its focus is not what makes a person praiseworthy and blameworthy, morally or otherwise. Rather, it is about how to live joyously and lovingly, not sadly and hatefully. But I am not convinced that accountability is an essential function of morality, and I see no good reason to restrict our conception of moral philosophy to the accountability project. On the contrary, moral thinking is assisted by encountering perspectives that challenge us and help us overcome the moral blindness that accompanies dogmatism and complacency. A broader conception of moral philosophy assists moral thinking more effectively than a conception restricted exclusively to the accountability project. In this book I use “moral philosophy” in a broad sense that includes the accountability project and the type of project of which Spinoza’s is an instance, and I use the word “moral” to refer to doctrines that compose such projects. Instead of an ethics of accountability, Spinoza’s is an ethics of joy. By this I mean that it is centered on what, with respect to mental and physical wellness, deserves our attention and what, with respect to mental and physical

Introduction  3 wellness, does not deserve our attention. Spinoza’s ethics of joy reminds us that every way of life enacts and embodies a system of triage in its allocation of care to ourselves, care to others, and care to things in the world around us. Not every system of triage—​not every way of life—​is arranged such that it expresses mental and physical wellness and such that it promotes mental and physical wellness in oneself and others and at the same time alleviates mental and physical illness in oneself and others. Some ways of life do the opposite: they impair and degrade us mentally and physically and they impair and degrade our loved ones mentally and physically. Spinoza’s moral philosophy is a framework for a system of triage that promotes mental and physical wellness and that alleviates mental and physical illness. Spinoza’s ethics of joy belongs to a philosophical tradition that follows a medical model of morality.1 Accordingly, the purpose of morality is not to assign credit and debt in the economy of good and evil. Its purpose is to heal the sick and empower the vulnerable, which is to say it is for each and every one of us. The overriding concerns for Spinoza’s project are one’s way of life and how one allocates one’s attention. In contrast, an ethics of accountability is concerned with choices and actions, and less so with one’s way of life. An ethics of accountability gravitates toward a decision procedure that we can use in every circumstance to give us the single right choice and right action, and there can, it seems, be only one correct decision procedure owing to the demands of accounting. Multiple procedures that issue in sometimes conflicting decisions and actions would create a problem for calculating a person’s moral worth. Unlike an ethics of accountability, Spinoza does not offer a decision procedure. Furthermore, Spinoza’s moral philosophy is pluralistic in that there are as many good ways of life as there are ways of living joyously and lovingly. There is a variety of empowered ways of life and there is a variety of disempowered ways of life. It is not that Spinoza has nothing to say about and nothing to contribute to an ethics of accountability. However, the accountability project is, in Spinoza’s view, the primary function of the state. The rules and standards that set out what a person deserves is a function of the state and the common agreements that constitute the basis of the state. Spinoza’s view is that the norms by which 1 In this regard Spinoza’s moral philosophy can be seen as a descendant of the Hellenistic philosophical tradition. In ­chapter 5, I maintain that Spinoza’s moral philosophy can also be seen as a naturalistic ancestor of our contemporary fields of biology, psychology, and medicine. Regarding the centrality of the medical model of moral philosophy in the Hellenistic philosophical tradition, see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton University Press, 1994).

4  The Ethics of Joy we judge what an individual deserves are artificial.2 They are created by a social contract and enforced by the state apparatus by means of a system of rewards and punishments. For Spinoza, a theory of the accountability project belongs to a treatise on political philosophy. His Theological-​Political Treatise and the unfinished Political Treatise contain his thoughts on the foundation of the accountability project, the form it should take in the constitution of the state, and its limits. An important feature that accountability projects and way of life projects have in common is that they are normative, although normativity takes different shapes in these distinct projects. Normativity for the accountability project standardly takes the form of claims about what a person morally ought to do and morally ought not to do. In a way of life project, normativity standardly takes the form of claims about what virtue calls for and what a model human being would do. While normativity takes different shapes in these types of projects, both are normative in the sense that their doctrines constitute standards of success and failure. Just as it is possible to fail to do what one morally ought to do, it is possible to fail to do what virtue calls for and what the model person would do. Neither the accountability project nor the way of life project takes an exclusively descriptive, anthropological approach to human life. They are action-​guiding. They are intended to guide the actions and lives of rational agents insofar as we are rational. A key doctrine in the foundation of Spinoza’s moral philosophy is the conatus doctrine (i.e., 3p6). This much is uncontroversial. While scholars agree that the conatus doctrine is pivotal, scholars have not always agreed on how to understand it, and divergent understandings of the conatus doctrine lead to diverse readings of his moral philosophy. An important passage for my understanding of the conatus doctrine is 4D8: “By virtue and power 2 For Spinoza, the central notions of the accountability project are disobedience (inobedientia), obedience (obedientia), sin (peccatum), and merit (meritum), and he holds that these notions have content only in the civil state where “it is decided by common agreement what is good or what is evil” (4p37s2). Such notions are empty where is there no common agreement about what is good and what is evil, such as in the state of nature. This is also true of the notions of just and unjust as these relate to property norms. Although the accountability project’s norms—​the norms by which an individual is judged deserving (undeserving) or worthy (unworthy) of praise, blame, rewards, and punishments—​ are established by common agreement and enforced by the state, it does not follow that an ethics of joy and its notions of good, evil, joy, sadness, freedom, and bondage are artificial. For a reading congenial to the view I am putting forward here about Spinoza’s theory of the accountability project, see Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of His Reasoning, volume II (Harvard University Press, 1962[1934]), pp. 246‒249; David Bidney, The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza: A Study in the History and Logic of Ideas (Yale University Press, 1940), pp. 327‒330; John Carriero, “The Ethics in Spinoza’s Ethics,” in Essays in Spinoza’s Ethical Theory, ed. Mathew J. Kisner and Andrew Youpa (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 20‒40.

Introduction  5 I understand the same thing, i.e. (by IIIP7), virtue, insofar as it is related to man, is the very essence, or nature, of man, insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone.” The reading I offer in this book is largely a matter of taking up and running with Spinoza’s identification of an individual’s conatus with adequate causal power. A finite existent is a finite system of adequate causal power. Our lives are shaped in part by expressing God’s power directly—​that is, through the actual essence that is our adequate causal power. Our lives are also shaped by expressing God’s power indirectly through the causal influence of finite things whose natures do not entirely agree with human nature. The best way of life is that which follows from our actual essence. It is the way of life that follows from God’s power directly. In ­chapters  1 and 2, I  argue that Spinoza believes that emotions qua mental items are symptomatic representations of changes in the power of the subject’s body and as such constitute what I call “axiological information.” An episode of joy is axiological information in the sense that the qualitative character of an episode of joy informs the subject that his body’s power is increasing. The qualitative character of an episode of sadness informs the subject that his body’s power is decreasing. In maintaining that emotions as mental items are symptomatic representations of changes in the power of the subject’s body, I am not denying that emotions are at the same time increases and decreases in the mind’s power. There is no question that they are increases and decreases in the mind’s power. My characterization of emotions as symptomatic representations is intended to capture Spinoza’s talk in the “General Definition of the Affects” about how an emotion “affirms of its Body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before.” It is also meant to capture his claim in the Explication of the “General Definition of the Affects” that an emotion must “indicate or express a constitution of the Body (or some part of it).” He also uses the word “sign” (4p47s) to describe this aspect of emotions. Spinoza’s theory of emotions is relatively foreign to the mainstream of contemporary philosophical psychology, but it may be closer to the truth than the mainstream view. The latter is a descendant of Hume’s theory of emotion, and Spinoza’s theory stands in sharp contrast to Hume’s view that a passion is an “original existence.”3 According to Hume, a passion “contains not any 3 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford University Press, 2000), 2.3.3, p. 266.

6  The Ethics of Joy representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high.”4 Whereas Hume denies that an emotion has a representative quality, Spinoza maintains that an emotion, as it exists in the mind, represents a change in the power of the subject’s body. Because emotions in Spinoza’s view are representational in the sense that they inform us about enhancements and impairments to our nature, his theory of emotions is a bridge to the conception of human nature on which his moral philosophy is founded. In c­ hapter 3, I argue that Spinoza subscribes to a type of moral realism, and I show that the source of his moral realism is the realism in his conception of human nature. Although I borrow the language “moral realism” from contemporary philosophy, I  do not borrow a specific conception of moral realism from contemporary philosophy and impose it on Spinoza. I stipulate that “moral realism” is a theory of the way of life that is best for us as human beings, a theory based on a view on which goodness and badness are objective properties. This conception of moral realism is recognizably moral in that it is about an account of the way of life that is best for human beings. It is recognizably realist in that it holds that goodness and badness are objective properties. The main purpose of my discussion of his moral realism is not to bring Spinoza into dialogue with contemporary moral philosophers. My goal, as I said, is to get Spinoza right, and I do not think we get him right unless we understand the foundation of his moral philosophy. On the reading I defend, it is a finite thing’s actual essence—​its adequate causal power—​that serves as the foundation of his moral philosophy. In his From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence, Michael LeBuffe defends a reading according to which Spinoza is a type of moral anti-​realist. I examine LeBuffe’s anti-​realist reading in c­ hapter 4, and I also examine three passages from the Ethics that appear to conflict with the realist reading I favor. Any broad reading of the Ethics will have its share of strengths and weaknesses. Any such reading will nicely fit and illuminate some passages and will be an awkward fit with and obscure other passages. This is as true for a reading that focuses on his metaphysics as it is for a reading that focuses on his moral philosophy. Because no reading can avoid running up against passages that challenge it and raise difficult questions for it, arriving at the most reasonable view is in part a matter of assessing the 4 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2.3.3, p. 266.

Introduction  7 challenges that it faces. In this chapter I argue that the challenges that my reading faces are less severe than the ones that LeBuffe’s powerful and sophisticated alternative faces. In ­chapters 5, 6, and 7, I provide a reading of Spinoza’s various statements about goodness and badness, including his view of the highest good. At the center of the reading I defend in these chapters is the pair of doctrines I refer to as the Wellness as Underivative Goodness Doctrine and the Illness as Underivative Badness Doctrine: Wellness as Underivative Goodness Doctrine:  The goodness of wellness is underivative—​that is, enhancements in power are good in and of themselves. Illness as Underivative Badness Doctrine:  The badness of illness is underivative—​that is, impairments of power are bad in and of themselves.

These doctrines make up the normative core of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. What makes our lives good is that we are mentally and physically well; what makes our lives bad is that we are mentally and physically ill. Further, Spinoza’s view is that mental and physical wellness is the source of the goodness of our good deeds; mental and physical illness is the source of the badness of our bad deeds. Good deeds follow from mental and physical wellness (i.e., joy and love). Bad deeds follow from mental and physical illness (i.e., sadness and hate). With respect to external objects, it is their causal contribution to human wellness and illness that makes them good and bad. Spinoza subscribes to a relational theory of value with respect to external objects. It is relational, but not relativistic, in the anthropologist’s sense of “relativistic.” External objects are good insofar as they contribute to increases in human wellness, and they are bad insofar as they cause increases in human illness. The underivative goodness of human wellness and the underivative badness of human illness are the sources of the goodness and badness of human deeds and of external objects. Chapter 7 addresses the question whether Spinoza shares Hume’s view that reason is a slave of the passions. According to Hume, knowledge is not an independent source of emotions and desires.5 It is not a source of 5 Hume writes, “Since reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition, I infer, that the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion. . . . Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2.3.3, p. 266).

8  The Ethics of Joy emotions and desires independent of preexisting emotions and desires. If Hume is right, knowledge is motivationally inert. Does Spinoza share this position? Is it the case that, for Spinoza, knowledge is motivationally inert? It can seem as if he agrees, for he writes, “From all this, then, it is clear that we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it” (3p9s). This seems to suggest that judgments of good and evil are not an independent source of emotions and desires. Judgments of good and evil arise from emotions and desires. They do not give rise to emotions and desires. Now, it seems reasonable to think that if any knowledge is an independent source of emotions and desires, knowledge of good and evil is such a source. Therefore, if knowledge of good and evil is not a source of motivation, knowledge generally, it seems, is not a source of motivation. In ­chapter 7, I show that this line of reasoning does not hold up as an understanding of Spinoza’s view. Knowledge, for Spinoza, is an independent source of emotions and desires. Metaphysical knowledge is identical to an enhancement of our power and as such is, or is accompanied by, joy. There is considerable debate among early modern scholars about Spinoza’s view of the type of freedom that human beings can achieve. There is also debate about whether the free human that appears in propositions 4p67, 4p68, 4p69, 4p70, 4p71, and 4p72 is the model of human nature that Spinoza mentions in the Preface to Part 4 of the Ethics. In ­chapter 8, I argue for a specific conception of Spinozistic freedom that I call the “Causal Adequacy reading,” and I make a case for the view that the free human is, according to Spinoza, the model of human nature and that actual human beings can achieve the freedom that the model illustrates. A life of genuine freedom is not inaccessible to us, contrary to the view of some scholars. Chapters  9 and 10 take up Spinoza’s theory of virtue and his concrete doctrines about the best way of life. In these chapters I focus primarily on Spinoza’s conclusions about living well and less on the arguments by which he reaches his conclusions. I have two reasons for this approach. First, I am not convinced that Kantians in ethics are Kantians because of an argument that Kant or Korsgaard makes. Nor am I  convinced that utilitarians are utilitarians because of an argument that Bentham or Mill or Singer makes. This is not how moral thinking works, and we miss something important when we imagine otherwise when engaging with Spinoza’s views. What we miss is an alternative way of thinking about our lives—​an alternative that is

Introduction  9 illuminating and insightful. As far as moral thinking is concerned, the presentation of an illuminating alternative is arguably the best that a philosopher can do. Second, and relatedly, in c­ hapters 9 and 10, I set aside the geometric apparatus in an effort to get to the heart of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Careful attention to his demonstrations can be useful for this, but the demonstrations can also be a hindrance. The geometric method can be a distraction. It can distract us from Spinoza’s vision of the best way of life. No doubt Spinoza attempts to establish his vision of the good life through the apparatus of definitions, axioms, and theorems. But whether we are or are not Spinozists in ethics has little, if anything, to do with the apparatus by which he attempts to establish his account of the best way of life. Insofar as we are not Spinozists in ethics, it is because his ethical doctrines leave us cold and do not ring true from the standpoint of our moral expertise. Insofar as we are Spinozists, it is because his ethical doctrines resonate with us and do ring true from the standpoint of our moral expertise. My examination of his theory of virtue discloses the importance Spinoza assigns to friendship and education in the best of way of life. First and foremost we need to be friends to ourselves and friends to others. The virtue of tenacity calls for taking intelligent care of oneself, and the virtue of nobility calls for taking intelligent care of others. While there is much in the world that is useful for taking care of ourselves and others, such as nourishing things to eat, the universe is indifferent to our happiness and misery, and the number of things that are detrimental to our nature is endless. Our finitude makes us vulnerable to overwhelmingly powerful causal factors, and it is impossible for us to overcome our vulnerability and make ourselves impervious to external things. Nor is it possible to eliminate every source of human suffering. But despite our limitations and despite the factors that cause suffering, we can achieve blessedness, the greatest happiness. To achieve blessedness, it is necessary to intelligently care for ourselves and others no matter what challenges and hardships we encounter. Intelligently caring for ourselves and others involves, above all, education. Education is the greatest source of empowerment and thus the greatest source of joy. The best way of life, in Spinoza’s view, is a life of learning.

1 Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions Introduction My thesis in this chapter is that Spinoza believes that an emotion—​an episode of joy, for instance—​represents a change in the power of the subject’s body in the way that a symptom represents that of which it is symptomatic.1 On the reading I defend, some emotions symptomatically represent increases in the power of the subject’s body. Others symptomatically represent decreases in power. Regardless of whether it is symptomatic of an increase or a decrease, an episode of an emotion qua mental item is symptomatic of the state of the power of acting of the subject’s body, and an emotion serves as a symptom, I argue, in virtue of its qualitative character. It represents a change in power by virtue of the way it feels to experience an emotion. While an episode of the qualitative character of joy signals an increase in the body’s power, an episode of the qualitative character of sadness signals a decrease in its power.

1.  Emotions as Symptomatic Representations According to Spinoza, an emotion is a change in a finite thing’s power (3D3, 3p11s). Here and throughout this book I use the term “emotion” in place of 1 There is, comparatively speaking, considerable agreement among scholars that emotions track increases in power and decreases in power, although among those who accept this view, not much discussion is devoted to the way that emotions track changes in power. For instance, see C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethics Theory (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1930), pp. 51‒52; William K. Frankena, “Spinoza on the Knowledge of Good and Evil,” Philosophia 7, no. 1 (March 1977): 23; Steven Nadler, Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 200‒208; Michael LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 140‒142; Matthew J. Kisner, “Spinoza’s Virtuous Passions,” Review of Metaphysics 61, no. 4 (June 2008): 778; and Kisner’s Spinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy and the Good life (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 192‒195; Valtteri Viljanen, Spinoza’s Geometry of Power (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 137. The Ethics of Joy. Andrew Youpa, Oxford University Press (2020) © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190086022.001.0001

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  11 Spinoza’s term affect (affectus), which he uses broadly to refer to emotions, desires, and what we call a mood (e.g., cheerfulness, melancholy). I use the word “emotion” in an equally broad sense. Spinoza believes that all such states are changes in an individual’s power. They are either increases in power or decreases in power. An increase is either an increase in a part of an individual or it is an increase in the individual’s power as a whole. Likewise, a decrease is either a decrease in a part or it is a decrease in an individual’s power as a whole. The power that an emotion is a change in is the power to causally produce effects such that the effects can be understood through the individual’s power alone. An emotion, in other words, is a change in a thing’s power of acting, which I will refer to as its adequate causal power.2 God causally produces infinitely many effects that can be understood through God’s power alone because God’s adequate causal power is infinite (1p16, 1p16d). A finite thing causally produces a finite number of effects that can be understood through its power because it is a finite expression of adequate causal power (1p36, 1p36d, 3p6, 3p6d).3 A  finite thing is a limited system of adequate causal power. Not every effect to which a finite thing causally contributes can be understood through its power alone. As a result, a finite thing is not the adequate cause of every effect to which it causally contributes (3D1). In such instances a finite thing is an inadequate, or partial, cause (3D1). When an emotion cannot be understood through an individual’s adequate causal power alone, it is a passive emotion—​that is, a passion (3D1, 3D3). In contrast, an emotion that can be understood through a finite individual’s adequate causal power alone is an active emotion (3D1, 3D3). Whether an emotion is passive or active hinges on whether the causal history of the occurrence of an emotion includes something other than a finite thing’s adequate causal power. If the causal history of a particular occurrence of an emotion includes a factor other than the subject’s adequate causal power, it is a passion. If not, it is an active emotion.4 2 Each and every finite thing is, at its core, a system of adequate causal power (3p7). Such power is said to be a finite thing’s “actual essence” (actualem essentiam) (3p7). It is also referred as a thing’s “given essence” (datâ essentiâ) (3p7d). On the reading I favor, what Spinoza means in part by “actual essence” and “given essence” is a property that a thing possesses in virtue of expressing God’s essence. A finite thing’s actual/​given essence is identical to a finite configuration of God’s essence. Because power is God’s essence (1p34), a finite thing’s actual/​given essence is a finite configuration of God’s power. 3 I  argue for this view in Andrew Youpa, “Spinoza on the Very Nature of Existence,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 35 (2011): 310‒334. For further discussion see ­chapter 8, this volume. 4 As I understand Spinoza’s view, passivity and activity are relative to an individual’s mind and body in the sense that the mind and the body are sources of causal power. What makes a finite mind

12  The Ethics of Joy The “General Definition of the Affects” gives the following definition of a passion: “[1]‌An Affect that is called a Passion of the mind is a confused idea, [2] by which the Mind affirms [affirmat] of its Body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before, which, [3] when it is given, determines the Mind to think of this rather than that.” According to the first clause of this definition, a passion is a confused idea. The fact that passions are said to be ideas supports the view that passions are representational in some sense, and this holds for active emotions too, even though the “General Definition” is about passions. As manifested in the mind all emotions are ideas and are, as a result, representational states. For Spinoza, an emotion is representational in the sense that, according to the “General Definition,” it is a confused idea “[2]‌by which the Mind affirms of its Body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before” (GDA, emphasis added). What does this mean? Specifically, what does it mean to say that an emotion is an idea that “affirms” something of the body? Some light is cast on the way that an emotion affirms something of the body in the “Explication” of the “General Definition” where Spinoza writes, For all the ideas we have of bodies indicate [indicant] the actual constitution of our own body (by IIP16C2) more than the nature of the external body. But this [idea], which constitutes the form of the affect, must indicate [indicare] or express [exprimere] a constitution of the body (or some part of it), which the body (or some part of it) has because its power of acting, or force of existing, is increased or diminished, aided or restrained. (GDA exp)

Here the words “indicate” (indicare) and “express” (exprimere) are used to clarify the way an episode of joy or sadness affirms the body’s power.5 An passive is not that its ideas result from causes external to the mind where the mind is regarded as a storehouse of ideas, some of whose ideas are adequate and some inadequate. Rather, it is passive in virtue of the fact that its ideas result from causes external to the mind where the mind is a system of adequate causal power. Similarly, what makes a finite body passive is not that its states and constitution result from causes that are spatially external to it. It is passive in virtue of the fact that its states and constitution result from causes that are external to it as a system of adequate causal power. 5 Absent from this explication is 2p49: “In the Mind there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea” (emphasis in original). Rather than invoking 2p49, Spinoza invokes 2p16c2: “It follows, second, that the ideas which we have of external bodies indicate the condition of our own body more than the nature of the external bodies.” It is important to note that the demonstration of 2p49 does not rely on 2p16c2. I discuss and respond to the potential difficulty that 2p49 presents for the emotion as symptomatic representation reading in the present chapter.

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  13 emotion affirms an increase in the body’s power or an increase in some part of the body by indicating and expressing such an increase. But, now, what does it mean for an emotion to indicate and express an increase or decrease in power? This is best understood on the model of a symptom and the way that a symptom indicates and expresses a condition.6 An emotion indicates and expresses an increase in the body’s power similar to the way that a symptom indicates and expresses a condition of the individual who exhibits the symptom. A  particular episode of joy, for example, indicates and expresses an increase in the body’s power in that it is symptomatic of an increase in the individual’s power. That is to say, an episode of the qualitative feeling of joy is symptomatic of an increase in the power of the joyous subject’s body like an episode of the qualitative feeling of an abnormally high body temperature is, in some cases, symptomatic of an infection. Unlike the qualitative feeling of an abnormally high body temperature, an episode of joy, in Spinoza’s view, infallibly signals an increase in part of the body’s power or in the body’s power as a whole. 6 C. D. Broad writes, There remains one other point of general ethical interest to be mentioned before we leave Spinoza and pass to Butler. This is the position of pleasure and pain in Spinoza’s ethical system. He is not a Hedonist, in the strict sense. States of mind and actions are not good because they are pleasant or conducive to pleasure, nor are they bad because they are painful or conducive to pain. But pleasure and pain, though they are thus not the ratio essendi of good and evil, are the ratio cognoscendi thereof. Pleasure is the infallible sign of heightened vitality, pain is the infallible sign of lowered vitality, and these are the only ultimate good and evil. (Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, pp. 51‒52) “Pleasure” and “pain” are Broad’s terms for what I, following Curley’s translation, refer to as joy and sadness, and “vitality” is Broad’s term for the conatus. The reading I am defending is a version of Broad’s view that joy (pleasure) is a sign of increased vitality and that sadness (pain) is a sign of decreased vitality. In this chapter I show that episodes of joy (pleasure) and episodes of sadness (pain) are, in Spinoza’s view, signs in the way that a symptom is a sign. The reading I  defend can be contrasted with the interpretation maintained by commentators who hold that emotions are propositionally structured ideas. According to this reading, emotions are propositionally structured judgments about states of the body. There is an extreme version of this propositionalist reading and a moderate version. According to the extreme propositionalist reading, emotions are nothing but propositionally structured judgments; they have no phenomenologically qualitative features. According to the moderate reading, emotions are propositionally structured judgments, but it is not the case that they are nothing but propositionally structured judgments. For a defense of the extreme view, see Gideon Segal’s “Beyond Subjectivity: Spinoza’s Cognitivism of the Emotions,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8, no. 1 (2000): 1‒19. See also Michael Della Rocca’s “The Power of an Idea: Spinoza’s Critique of Pure Will,” Noûs 37, no. 2 (June 2003): 200‒231; Della Rocca, “Rationalism Run Amok,” in Interpreting Spinoza: Critical Essays, ed. Charlie Huenemann (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 26‒52; and Della Rocca, Spinoza (Routledge, 2008), ch. 4. For defenses of the moderate propositionalist reading, see Eugene Marshall’s “Spinoza’s Cognitive Affects and Their Feel,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16, no. 1 (2008): 1‒23; Justin Steinberg, “Affect, Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza’s Account of Motivation,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24, no. 1 (2016): 67‒87; Lilli Alanen, “The Metaphysics of Affects or the Unbearable Reality of Confusion,” in The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza, ed. Michael Della Rocca (Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 314‒342.

14  The Ethics of Joy Spinoza’s discussion of shame and pity strongly supports this reading: “The things which must be noted about Shame are easily inferred from what we said about Compassion and Repentance. I add only this, that like Pity, Shame, though not a virtue, is still good insofar as it indicates [indicat], in the man who blushes with Shame, a desire to live honorably. In the same way pain [dolor] is said to be good insofar as it indicates [indicat] that the injured part is not yet decayed” (4p58s, emphasis added). This makes clear that these emotions—​shame and pity—​indicate a condition similar to the way that a symptom indicates a condition. Just as pain indicates that the damaged part of the body is not yet completely decayed (putrefactam), an episode of shame indicates that an individual still has a desire, however feeble, to live honorably. Further support for this reading is found in the scholium to 4p57 where he says, “For as I said in the Preface of Part III, I consider men’s affects and properties just like other natural things. And of course human affects, if they do not indicate [indicant] man’s power, at least indicate [indicant] the power and skill of nature, no less than many other things we wonder at and take pleasure in contemplating” (4p57s). It is evident that Spinoza is talking about passive emotions and active emotions alike: active emotions are included in the reference to affects that “indicate man’s power” while passive emotions are those that “indicate the power and skill of nature.” Emotions disclose the status of the power of the subject’s body. Regarding hope and fear Spinoza writes, “We may add to this that these affects show [indicant] a defect of knowledge and a lack of power in the Mind. For this reason also Confidence and Despair, Gladness and Remorse are signs [signa] of a mind lacking in power” (4p47s, emphasis added). The word “sign” (signa) is used in this passage to make the very same point as he makes using “indicate” (indicant), and so it stands to reason that the terms have the same meaning in this context. An episode of any particular one of these emotions indicates a condition of the body, that is, it signals the status of the power of the subject’s body. Just as episodes of hope and fear indicate a lack of power, confidence, despair, gladness, and remorse indicate a lack of power also. Emotions are not cognitively empty. They carry information. They carry information about the status of the power of the subject’s body. An episode of joy, for example, carries information about the status of the subject’s power:  it signals that the subject’s power is increasing.7 An

7 As William K. Frankena puts it, “It [a joy or pleasure] is or involves a cognition, however confused, of a certain fact, and is not simply a blind feeling, as emotivists and hedonists usually conceive it to be.” See Frankena, “Spinoza on the Knowledge of Good and Evil,” p. 24.

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  15 episode of sadness carries information: it signals that the subject’s power is decreasing. As we have seen, Spinoza uses variants of the terms “affirm,” “indicate,” “express,” and “signal.” These do not refer to four distinct and independent aspects of an emotion. Nor are they four oblique ways of talking about judgment. Rather, they are four essentially equivalent descriptions of the way an emotion carries information. An emotion affirms (indicates, expresses, signals) changes in the body’s power similar to the way that a symptom carries information about the condition of the subject who exhibits the symptom. It is important to see that the reading I am defending is about the representational character of emotions. My characterization of an emotion as a symptomatic representation of an increase or decrease in the body’s power is intended as a way of understanding the claim in the “General Definition of the Affects” that an emotion “affirms of it Body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before” and the claim in the “Explication” that an emotion must “indicate or express a constitution of the Body.” No doubt an emotion in the mind is a change in the mind’s power (3D3, 3p11s, DA II, DA III, DA III exp). Yet there is also a way an emotion represents greater or lesser power in the body. For the purpose of investigating Spinoza’s moral philosophy, in this chapter and the next I am foremost concerned with the way emotions are representational and with their specific type of representational content, not with the metaphysical structure of emotions. It is their representational character that illuminates the structure of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Emotions are changes in the mind’s power and they represent the status of the body’s power, but it is not simply as increases and decreases in power that emotions represent the body’s power. Increases and decreases in power have distinctive phenomenological qualities, and it is an emotion’s phenomenologically qualitative character—​what it is like to experience an emotion—​that indicates the status of the body’s power. The distinctive way it feels to experience joy is an aspect of an increase in power. When someone’s body undergoes an increase in power and thereby experiences the buoyant feeling that is joy, this buoyant feeling indicates that the power of the subject’s body is increasing. It is an indicator that is accessible to the subject. The same holds for sadness. The way a decrease in power first-​personally feels is an aspect of a decrease in power. When someone undergoes a decrease in power and thereby experiences the oppressive feeling of sadness, the oppressive feeling indicates that the power of the

16  The Ethics of Joy subject’s body is decreasing.8 Increases and decreases in the power of the subject’s body are revealed to a subject through the phenomenologically qualitative character of his emotions. A human mind, according to Spinoza, is the idea of the human body (2p13). A  human body is a system of interacting bodies of various sizes, shapes, motions, and various degrees of hardness and softness (2p13cs post 1, post 2). The composite system of bodies that constitutes an individual’s body is mirrored in the composite system of ideas that constitutes the mind (2p15). The ideas that compose the mind are ideas of the individual’s body, of its parts, and of changes in the power of the parts and changes in the power of the individual’s body as a whole (2p14, 2p15d). Ideas that constitute emotions “indicate or express a constitution [constitutionem] of the Body (or of some part of it)” (GDA exp). The constitution of a human body varies due to varying increases and decreases in the power of the parts of the body and in the body’s power as a whole. As the idea of the body, the mind has ideas of the varying increases and decreases in the power of the parts of a body and in the body’s power as a whole. At the same time, the mind’s ideas of increases and decreases in the body’s power are themselves increases and decreases in the mind’s power. An emotion as a mental item is an idea of a change in the power of a part of the subject’s body or in the body’s power as a whole, and it is a change in the mind’s power, a change that is the mind’s counterpart to the body’s change in power. An emotion’s phenomenal feel is the idea of the change in the body’s power. In the case of emotions for which a subject is an inadequate cause, an emotion’s distinctive phenomenal feel is a confused idea of an increase or decrease in the body’s power. It is an idea whose causal history includes a factor or set of factors other than the individual’s adequate causal power. In the “Definitions of the Affects” joy is said to be an individual’s “passage from a lesser to a greater perfection” and that sadness is a “passage from a greater to a lesser perfection” (DA II and III), and this might be interpreted 8 In “The Metaphysics of Affects or the Unbearable Reality of Confusion,” Lilli Alanen opposes a reading of Spinoza according to which emotions are nothing but propositionally structured ideas and have no qualitative features. Alanen argues that, as transitions from one grade of power of acting to another, emotions “must be something more than mere representations” (p. 323). The reading I defend in this chapter is in agreement with Alanen’s view that emotions are something more than mere representations when “representation” is understood as propositional representation. I believe that my view differs from Alanen’s concerning what the something more is that constitutes an emotion. Whereas I maintain that the qualitative character of an emotion is the something more, Alanen holds that the transition between grades of power is that something more. See Alanen, “The Metaphysics of Affects or the Unbearable Reality of Confusion.”

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  17 as suggesting that the qualitative character of emotions is eliminated from the mind. It might be understood as supporting that joy and sadness are nothing but propositional representations.9 However, when Spinoza says that joy and sadness are passages to greater and lesser states of perfection, his point is not that emotions are nothing but passages between propositionally structured ideas and have no qualitative character. On the contrary, every change in an individual’s power has a qualitative character. There is a way that it feels to experience an emotion. This is strongly supported by 4p14 and its demonstration: P14: No affect can be restrained by the true knowledge [cognitio] of good and evil insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect. Dem.: An affect is an idea by which the Mind affirms of its Body a greater or lesser force of existing than before (by the general Definition of the Affects). So (by P1), it has nothing positive which could be removed by the presence of the true. Consequently the true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain any affect. But insofar as it is an affect (see P8), it can restrain the affect, if it is stronger than it (by P7), q.e.d. (emphasis in original)

In the proposition itself (i.e., 4p14) an emotion considered as an emotion is contrasted with true knowledge (cognitio) of good and evil, and an emotion considered as an emotion is an “idea by which the Mind affirms of its Body a greater or less force of existing than before” and, as a consequence, “it has nothing positive which could be removed by the presence of the true.” From this it is evident that an emotion qua affirmation of the body’s greater or lesser power cannot be restrained or removed by knowledge considered as

9 Michael Della Rocca argues for a reading of Spinoza according to which emotions are propositional representations and nothing but propositional representations. On this reading, an emotion can be true or false, justified or unjustified, and, as Della Rocca puts it, “there is nothing in affects that cannot be evaluated for truth or falsity, nothing that is not subject to justification or lack of justification” (Della Rocca, “Rationalism Run Amok,” p. 31). Emotions, according to Della Rocca’s reading, are propositional representations and have no qualitative features. They do not have any qualitative features because they do not have any non-​representational features. I agree that emotions have no non-​representational features, but I disagree with the view that an emotion’s qualitative character is non-​representational. For Spinoza, emotions are representations in virtue of their qualitative features. In countenancing the qualitative character of emotions Spinoza does not violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason, as Della Rocca argues would be the case if the mind contained non-​representational features. In virtue of what is an emotion’s qualitative character a feature of the mind? It is in virtue of being representational or, as I think best captures Spinoza’s view, it is in virtue of being informative. Also see Della Rocca’s “The Power of an Idea.”

18  The Ethics of Joy knowledge. Knowledge as such does not have the qualitative character of an affirmation of a change in the body’s power. Unlike an episode of joy, knowledge as knowledge has no qualitative character. Knowledge can restrain an emotion only if it has strength, and it has strength only when it is considered as an emotion. This strongly supports that, for Spinoza, emotional strength belongs to the qualitative character of an emotion, not to the logical or epistemological character of a belief or judgment. An increase in the body’s power is signaled in the mind by the specific qualitative character of an emotion, and its qualitative character differs from the qualitative character that signals a decrease in power. Love, for example, is an increase in the body’s power, and the qualitative feeling of love symptomatically represents an increase in the body’s power. Hate is a decrease in power, and its qualitative character signals a decrease in the body’s power. The qualitative character of different types of emotion varies, and the distinctive qualitative character of a type of emotion is that which signals an increase or decrease in the body’s power. On the basis of the confused idea clause of the “General Definition,” there is reason to think that emotions are representational, but it does not follow that an emotion is nothing but a propositional representation. In addition to the “Explication” of the “General Definition of the Affects,” there is evidence against an extreme propositionalist reading following the discussion of the sensory idea of the sun in the scholium to 4p1:10 And so it is with the other imaginations by which the Mind is deceived, whether they indicate [indicant] the natural constitution of the Body, or that its power of acting is increased or diminished: they are not contrary to the true, and do not disappear on its presence. It happens, of course, when we wrongly fear some evil, that the fear disappears on our hearing news of the truth. But on the other hand, it also happens, when we fear an evil that is certain to come, that the fear vanishes on our hearing false news. So imaginations do not disappear through the presence of the true insofar as it is true, but because there occur others, stronger than them, which exclude the present existence of the things we imagine, as we showed in IIP17. (4p1s)

10 For a defense of the extreme propositionalist view, see Segal’s “Beyond Subjectivity.” See also Della Rocca’s “The Power of an Idea,” “Rationalism Run Amok,” and his Spinoza, ch. 4.

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  19 The view that sensory ideas and emotions are “not contrary to the true, and do not disappear on its presence” strongly supports that sensory ideas and emotions are not simply propositional representations. This is because sensory ideas and emotions do not conflict with ideas that are true insofar as they are true. According to Spinoza, this is the reason that our sensory idea of the sun does not change or disappear after we learn the truth about the sun’s distance from us. If our sensory idea of the sun were nothing more than a propositional representation, it presumably would, or at least could, disappear after we learn the truth about the sun’s distance from us. But it does not disappear and cannot disappear because the sensory idea indicates the constitution of the body in the way that a symptom represents that of which it is symptomatic.11 Like our sensory idea of the sun, an episode of fear is not contrary to the true and does not disappear in its presence. This is because fear—​that is, an episode of the qualitative feeling of fear—​indicates a decrease in the body’s power of activity, and as an indication of a state of our power it is as impossible for fear to be contrary to the true as it is, say, for a body temperature of 104˚F (40˚C) to be contrary to the true. The qualitative feel of an abnormally high body temperature is not a propositional representation of a state of affairs. It therefore cannot be contrary to the true and it does not disappear in its presence. But this does not mean that the qualitative mental correlates of body temperatures and emotions are “mute pictures on a panel” (2p49cd, II/​132 10; cf. 2p43s). They are not mute because they are not non-​ representational states. Like all ideas, emotions are representations. An episode of joy represents an increase in the body’s power. An episode of sadness represents a decrease in power. Nevertheless, emotions, like sensory ideas, in and of themselves “involve no error” (2p49cd, II/​134 30) and are “not contrary to the true.” How can something be representational, involve no error, and not be contrary to the true? Something can be such when it represents in the way that the qualitative feel of an abnormally high body temperature represents an infection and in the way that pain represents that the damaged part of the body is not completely decayed.

11 Although sensory ideas and emotions cannot be contrary to the true, as indications of the constitution of the body they can mislead us into forming propositional representations that are contrary to the true. For example, someone who, ignorant of the sciences of optics and astronomy, uncritically accepts his sensory idea of the sun will, as a result, believe that the sun’s distance from him is approximately two hundred feet (2p35s, 4p1s). This is a case where the sensory idea causally contributes to the formation of a propositional representation, a representation that turns out to be false.

20  The Ethics of Joy So far I have been defending a reading of Spinoza’s claim that an emotion “affirms [affirmat] of its Body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before” (GDA). According to this reading, what Spinoza means by “affirms” in this context is that the qualitative character of an emotion symptomatically represents a change in the body’s power. Symptomatic representation is not a propositionally structured representation. When someone deepens his knowledge and understanding of God, for example, there is a joy that accompanies this acquisition of knowledge that is not merely a propositional representation of an increase in power. However, this is not to say that an episode of an emotion’s qualitative character does not have a propositional representation as a necessary consequence. A  propositional representation necessarily follows from an emotion’s qualitative character.12 By “propositional representation” I mean a belief or judgment, and when talking about a propositional representation following from an emotion’s qualitative character I mean an evaluative belief or evaluative judgment, such as, for example, the judgment, “The warmth of this fire in the fireplace is good.” Spinoza’s view is that a change in the power of a subject’s body and the idea in the mind that is the way this change qualitatively feels is accompanied by an evaluative judgment. He writes, P8: The knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an affect of joy or sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it. Dem.: We call good, or evil, what is useful to, or harmful to, preserving our being (by D1 and D2), that is (by IIIP7), what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting. Therefore (by the definitions of joy and sadness in IIIP11S), insofar as we perceive that a thing affects us with joy or sadness, we call it good or evil. And so knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an idea of joy or sadness which follows necessarily from the affect of joy or sadness itself (by IIP22). (4p8, 4p8d, emphasis in original)

In isolation from the demonstration, this proposition might seem to say that knowledge (cognitio) of good and evil is one and the same thing as an 12 As I stated earlier, I am bracketing issues concerning an emotion’s metaphysical structure. My main concern in this chapter and the next is with an emotion’s representational character. I believe that, for Spinoza, in the case of the emotions of adult humans a propositional representation follows from an episode of an emotion’s qualitative character and can therefore be said to be a component of an emotion, but I am not convinced that Spinoza holds that the same is true of the emotions of animals and infants. Nevertheless, a defense of a reading of Spinoza’s metaphysics of emotions is tangential to my main purpose.

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  21 emotion of joy or sadness, but this reading does not stand up under close inspection; for a premise of the demonstration states that “knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an idea of joy or sadness which follows necessarily from the affect of joy or sadness itself (by IIP22)” (4p8d, emphasis added). If such knowledge were strictly identical to an emotion, it would make no sense to claim, as Spinoza does, that knowledge of good and evil follows necessarily from joy or sadness. Thus he is best understood as maintaining that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary consequence of an emotion’s qualitative character and that it therefore necessarily accompanies an emotion. An increase in the body’s power is symptomatically represented in the mind by the qualitative character of joy, and an episode of the qualitative character of joy necessarily gives rise to knowledge of goodness in the sense that someone who experiences joy judges that the apparent source of his joy is good. For example, someone whose body’s power of acting increases as a result of eating an orange will have in his mind a feeling of joy (i.e., the symptomatic representation of this particular increase in his body’s power), and the judgment “This orange is good” follows necessarily from the feeling of joy. An instance of an evaluative judgment of this type illustrates at least in part what Spinoza has in mind when he refers to the knowledge (cognitio) that follows from an emotion. Furthermore, when he says that “knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an idea of joy or sadness which follows necessarily from the affect of Joy or Sadness itself ” (4p8d), his point, I believe, is that an occurrent evaluative judgment follows necessarily from an occurrent episode of joy. An individual X occurrently judges “This orange is good” as a result of an occurrent episode of the qualitative joy that the orange causes when it increases X’s power. But it is not the case that an occurrent emotion is the immediate cause of every evaluative judgment that an individual might make. For example, superstitious people believe that “the good is what brings Sadness, and the evil, what brings Joy” (4App XXXI). It would be a mistake to conclude from this that superstitious people are an exception to the view that a judgment about what is good follows from an episode of joy and that a judgment about what is bad follows from an episode of sadness. Under normal circumstances, the superstitious, like everyone else, obtain joy from eating an orange. An orange causes an increase in power and thereby joy even in an individual who is superstitious and believes that goodness is what brings sadness. In such a case the superstitious person has two conflicting evaluative judgments: one that results from the joy that the orange causes (i.e., “This orange is good”) and a

22  The Ethics of Joy second that results from his superstitious beliefs about goodness and badness (i.e., “This orange is evil”). A case of this type falls under what Spinoza calls “vacillation of mind” (3p17s), although in the case at hand the second evaluative judgment, the one that results from superstition, does not necessarily directly follow from an emotion that is a decrease in the individual’s power. Superstitious evaluative judgments are not grounded in an individual’s nature as a system of adequate causal power and, as a consequence, do not necessarily result from increases and decreases in an individual’s power. Superstitious evaluative judgments are not the only evaluative judgments that are not a direct consequence of emotions. Consider an evaluative judgment about hatred. Suppose Peter believes that hatred is bad, and suppose that in a conversation Peter says to Paul, “Hatred is bad.” When Peter expresses this evaluative judgment it is not necessarily the case that the judgment results from an occurrent decrease in Peter’s power. When Peter expresses the judgment about hatred it is not necessarily the case that he is undergoing any decrease in power at all. There is no reason to think that Spinoza is committed to the view that a true belief, such as “Hatred is bad” (true, that is, in Spinoza’s view; cf. 4p45, 4p45c1, 4p46d), is invariably a necessary consequence of an occurrent emotion. No doubt Spinoza holds that hatred is a decrease in power. And no doubt the fact that hatred is a decrease in power is the basis for the truth of the judgment that hatred is bad. What makes the evaluative judgment about hatred true, in other words, is that an episode of hatred is a decrease in power.13 But from this it does not follow that an individual’s judgment that hatred is bad is, in every case, a direct consequence of an occurrent decrease in power. For Spinoza, it is not necessary presently to undergo an episode of joy or sadness to make an evaluative judgment, although all evaluative judgments and thus all knowledge of good and evil presuppose prior changes in power (4p68, 4p68d).

13 What makes an evaluative judgment true is that it accurately corresponds to increases or decreases in power that we have undergone, are undergoing, or will undergo. If, contrary to the usual state of affairs, oranges were poisonous to humans and caused severe decreases in our power, someone who ate an orange would judge that the orange is bad, and in fact it would be bad. It would be bad because it caused a decrease in the orange eater’s power, not simply because the orange eater judged it so. Likewise, if contrary to Spinozistic fact hatred were an increase in our power, someone who experienced hatred would judge that it is good and, indeed, hatred would be good, not because the hater judged it so, but because it is (in this fictional universe) an increase in the hater’s power. In dealing with the representational character of emotions I cannot avoid touching on issues that I cannot adequately clarify and defend in the present chapter. I discuss Spinoza’s moral realism in ­chapter 3, this volume, and I discuss the goodness and badness of emotions in ­chapter 5, this volume.

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  23 It is therefore useful to make a distinction, one that Spinoza does not make explicit, between evaluative judgments that directly result from episodes of joy and sadness, on the one hand, and evaluative judgments that do not necessarily directly result from episodes of joy and sadness, on the other. The former I will refer to as “basic evaluative judgments.” The latter I call “non-​ basic evaluative judgments.” Every episode of joy and its variants and every episode of sadness and its variants is accompanied by an evaluative judgment. Such judgments are basic in the sense that they are direct and immediate consequences of episodes of the qualitative character of emotions. In contrast, a non-​basic evaluative judgment is not the direct and immediate effect of an increase or decrease in power. As I have discussed, in some cases superstitious evaluative judgments fall into this category, such as when the superstitious judgment is rooted in metaphysical fictions and is not directly grounded in a change in human power. Also, evaluative judgments that are universal in scope are not necessarily basic, such as the judgment “Hatred is bad.” While unconfused evaluative judgments are based on changes in human power that we experience as emotions, it is not the case that every unconfused evaluative judgment must be the direct and immediate result of such a change. For instance, an unconfused evaluative judgment can follow from the premises of a demonstration. On this reading the qualitative characters of emotions are in effect barometers for changes in the body’s power: joy and species of joy symptomatically represent increases in the body’s power while sadness and species of sadness symptomatically represent decreases in power.14 Moreover, judgments of good and evil (i.e., basic evaluative judgments) necessarily follow from and accompany episodes of the qualitative character of emotions. “Love,” Spinoza says, “is nothing but Joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause” (3p13cs, emphasis in original). Love is an episode of the qualitative character of joy that is accompanied by the idea of someone who, or something that, is regarded as the cause of love. Similarly, the emotion that Spinoza calls “self-​ esteem” (acquiescentia in se ipso) is a “species of Love” and a state of joy that is “accompanied by the idea of an internal cause” (3p30s; cf. DA XXV). Self-​ esteem is a type of joy and it has oneself as its object. Love and self-​esteem, as 14 In his “Spinoza’s Virtuous Passions,” Kisner writes, “Since the passions serve as a barometer of our power, they would help us to increase our power by indicating whether an activity increases our power” (p. 778). I agree with Kisner and would add that active emotions are also barometers of the subject’s power. In c­ hapter 2, I argue that passive emotions and active emotions not only carry information, they carry axiological information. The information they carry is about enhancements and impairments to a subject’s power.

24  The Ethics of Joy types of joy, share the buoyant qualitative character that all joys have in virtue of representing an increase in the body’s power as a whole or in part. Moreover, love and self-​esteem are accompanied by propositionally structured ideas about the objects and apparent causes of the particular episodes of the feeling of joy. It is the buoyant feeling that produces the evaluative judgment about the object and apparent cause of the emotion. Spinoza writes, “Therefore (by the Definitions of Joy and Sadness in IIIP11S), insofar as we perceive that a thing affects us with Joy or Sadness, we call it good or evil” (4p8d). Suppose someone X experiences the joy that is love, and suppose X’s love is for someone Y. From X’s love will follow the judgment that Y is good and at the same time X “necessarily strives to have present and preserve the thing he loves” (3p30s). Similarly, someone who experiences the joy that is self-​esteem will, as a result of this joy, judge that he himself is good and seek to preserve himself with greater power than he would if he lacked self-​esteem or had less self-​esteem. To take another example, “pity” is defined as a type of sadness that is “accompanied by the idea of an evil that has happened to another whom we imagine to be like us” (DA XVIII). As a type of sadness pity has an oppressive qualitative character that symptomatically represents a decrease in the body’s power. An instance of pity’s oppressive qualitative character necessarily gives rise to, and is thereby accompanied by, the idea of someone or something who is regarded as the cause of the oppressive feeling, an idea that is a judgment that this particular someone or something is the victim of something terrible. In addition to making sense of the fact that knowledge of good and evil follows necessarily from episodes of joy and sadness, this reading squares with other claims Spinoza makes about emotions and judgments. For instance, in the scholium to 3p39 he writes, For we have shown above (in P9S) that we desire nothing because we judge it to be good, but on the contrary, we call it good because we desire it. Consequently, what we are averse to we call evil. So each one, from his own affect, judges, or evaluates, what is good and what is bad, what is better and what is worse, and finally, what is best and what is worst. So the Greedy man judges an abundance of money best, and poverty worst. The Ambitious man desires nothing so much as Esteem and dreads nothing so much as Shame. To the Envious nothing is more agreeable than another’s unhappiness, and nothing more burdensome than another’s happiness. And so, each one, from his own affect, judges a thing good or bad, useful or useless.

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  25 A basic evaluative judgment is parasitic on an emotion’s qualitative character and it is not the case that an emotion’s qualitative character is parasitic on a judgment of goodness and badness. From this it follows that an emotion’s qualitative character and the evaluative judgment that follows from it are not one and the same thing. The relation of dependence of basic evaluative judgments on an emotion presupposes that one thing depends on the other. There are two distinct items. There is the causally dependent thing (i.e., a basic evaluative judgment) and there is the cause (i.e., an episode of the qualitative character of an emotion) on which the effect depends. A potential difficulty for the symptomatic representation reading is that in the “General Definition of the Affects” Spinoza’s talk of an emotion affirming increases and decreases in power might seem to be about a propositionally structured mental state. What is affirming if not ascribing a property to something and accepting something as true? Furthermore, such a notion of affirmation plays a role in the theory of ideas that is presented at the end of Part 2 of the Ethics: 2p48s, 2p49, 2p49d, and 2p49cs. 2p49 reads: “In the Mind there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea,” and the sample idea that Spinoza uses in the demonstration is one in which the mind “affirms [affirmat] that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.” On the basis of the discussion at the end of Part 2, to affirm something is to make a judgment. Affirmation, it seems, is nothing apart from making a judgment or forming a belief, such as the judgment that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. The mind performs no separate act of affirmation or assent independent of the affirmation inherent in the idea itself. Spinoza maintains that to have an idea is to accept it as true, unless another idea calls it into question. This creates an apparent problem for the reading that I am defending because I am arguing that the qualitative character of an emotion affirms and represents a change in the body’s power similar to the way that a symptom affirms and represents that of which it is symptomatic, not the way a belief or judgment affirms and represents a state of affairs. Therefore, if all affirmation is affirmation in the 2p49 sense of “affirmation,” the emotion as symptom reading is in trouble.15

15 Proposition 49 of Part 2 is one basis for reading Spinoza as holding that the type of affirmation involved in emotions reduces emotions to propositionally structured ideas. But, as I argue, it is a mistake to think that the type of affirmation Spinoza is talking about in 2p49 is identical to the type of affirmation that he is talking about in the “General Definition” and in the “Explication” of the “General Definition.” For defenses of a propositionalist reading that make use of 2p49, see Della Rocca’s “The Power of an Idea”; and see Marshall’s “Spinoza’s Cognitive Affects and Their Feel.”

26  The Ethics of Joy The evidence strongly supports that Spinoza does not use “affirm” with the same meaning in the “General Definition of the Affects” as he does in 2p49. First, in 2p49 Spinoza is talking about affirmation and negation, not affirmation alone. And there is no evidence in the “General Definition of the Affects” that emotions negate changes in the body’s power. It is not clear what it would even mean for an emotion to negate a change in the body’s power except in the sense that one emotion overpowers another emotion, and emotional conflict is not what Spinoza is talking about when he talks about emotions affirming changes in the body’s power. This is a reason to suspect that the type of affirmation that features in 2p49 is not identical to the type that features in the “General Definition of the Affects.” Second, when in the Explication of the “General Definition of the Affects” Spinoza seeks to clarify what he means by an emotion affirming a change in the body’s power he cites 2p16c2, not 2p49. And 2p49 is not derived from 2p16c2. That 2p49 is not derived from 2p16c2 makes sense because 2p16c2 is about how the ideas we have of external bodies “indicate [indicant] the condition of our own body more than the nature of the external bodies” (2p16c2), whereas 2p49 is about the affirmation and negation inherent in propositionally structured ideas, such as the idea that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles (2p49d). For Spinoza, there is an important way in which emotions are akin to sensory ideas. They indicate states of the body. It might be the case that a propositional representation such as the idea that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles indicates something about the body, but if it does, it is not in virtue of the type of affirmation that is essential to the idea as a propositional representation. The affirmation involved in the idea that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles has to do with the belief-​like character of the idea, not what the idea itself indicates about a state of the body. Third, as discussed earlier, in the scholium to 4p1 Spinoza again cites 2p16c2 and offers the sun example and the example of fear to illustrate the way in which sensory ideas and emotions are representative—​ the way that they indicate the present constitution of the body—​while not being contrary to the true. Spinoza concludes, “And so it is with the other imaginations by which the Mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural constitution of the Body, or that its power of acting is increased or diminished: they are not contrary to the true, and do not disappear on its presence” (4p1s). Like sensory ideas, there is a way that emotions indicate states of the body. As indicators emotions, like sensory ideas, cannot be contrary to the true. It follows that emotions are not simply propositionally

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  27 structured representations. If they were nothing but propositionally structured representations, they could be contrary to the true. Therefore, the way that emotions affirm (indicate, express, signal) changes in the body’s power should not be confused with the way that affirmation belongs to the idea that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.16

Conclusion Spinoza believes that an emotion as it exists in the human mind involves two distinct representational states. There is an emotion’s qualitative character, on the one hand, and there is the evaluative judgment that follows from an episode of an emotion’s qualitative character, on the other. An emotion’s qualitative character “affirms of its Body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before” (GDA; cf. 4p14d). I have argued that this is best understood on the model of a symptom and the way that a symptom represents that of which it is symptomatic. An episode of an emotion’s qualitative character symptomatically represents an increase or a decrease in the body’s power. Furthermore, a symptomatic representation “determines the Mind to think of this rather than that” (GDA, cf. 4p8d). A symptomatic representation “determines the Mind to think of this rather than that” in the sense that an evaluative judgment necessarily follows from a symptomatic representation. An episode of the buoyant qualitative character of love, for example, gives rise to the judgment that the object of one’s love is good.

16 Possibly Spinoza has a unified account of affirmation, an account that brings together the affirming/​indicating/​expressing/​signaling of emotions with the affirming and negating inherent in a propositionally structured idea. But I do not believe that a unified account is necessarily called for.

1 Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions Introduction My thesis in this chapter is that Spinoza believes that an emotion—​an episode of joy, for instance—​represents a change in the power of the subject’s body in the way that a symptom represents that of which it is symptomatic.1 On the reading I defend, some emotions symptomatically represent increases in the power of the subject’s body. Others symptomatically represent decreases in power. Regardless of whether it is symptomatic of an increase or a decrease, an episode of an emotion qua mental item is symptomatic of the state of the power of acting of the subject’s body, and an emotion serves as a symptom, I argue, in virtue of its qualitative character. It represents a change in power by virtue of the way it feels to experience an emotion. While an episode of the qualitative character of joy signals an increase in the body’s power, an episode of the qualitative character of sadness signals a decrease in its power.

1.  Emotions as Symptomatic Representations According to Spinoza, an emotion is a change in a finite thing’s power (3D3, 3p11s). Here and throughout this book I use the term “emotion” in place of 1 There is, comparatively speaking, considerable agreement among scholars that emotions track increases in power and decreases in power, although among those who accept this view, not much discussion is devoted to the way that emotions track changes in power. For instance, see C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethics Theory (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1930), pp. 51‒52; William K. Frankena, “Spinoza on the Knowledge of Good and Evil,” Philosophia 7, no. 1 (March 1977): 23; Steven Nadler, Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 200‒208; Michael LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 140‒142; Matthew J. Kisner, “Spinoza’s Virtuous Passions,” Review of Metaphysics 61, no. 4 (June 2008): 778; and Kisner’s Spinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy and the Good life (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 192‒195; Valtteri Viljanen, Spinoza’s Geometry of Power (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 137. The Ethics of Joy. Andrew Youpa, Oxford University Press (2020) © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190086022.001.0001

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  11 Spinoza’s term affect (affectus), which he uses broadly to refer to emotions, desires, and what we call a mood (e.g., cheerfulness, melancholy). I use the word “emotion” in an equally broad sense. Spinoza believes that all such states are changes in an individual’s power. They are either increases in power or decreases in power. An increase is either an increase in a part of an individual or it is an increase in the individual’s power as a whole. Likewise, a decrease is either a decrease in a part or it is a decrease in an individual’s power as a whole. The power that an emotion is a change in is the power to causally produce effects such that the effects can be understood through the individual’s power alone. An emotion, in other words, is a change in a thing’s power of acting, which I will refer to as its adequate causal power.2 God causally produces infinitely many effects that can be understood through God’s power alone because God’s adequate causal power is infinite (1p16, 1p16d). A finite thing causally produces a finite number of effects that can be understood through its power because it is a finite expression of adequate causal power (1p36, 1p36d, 3p6, 3p6d).3 A  finite thing is a limited system of adequate causal power. Not every effect to which a finite thing causally contributes can be understood through its power alone. As a result, a finite thing is not the adequate cause of every effect to which it causally contributes (3D1). In such instances a finite thing is an inadequate, or partial, cause (3D1). When an emotion cannot be understood through an individual’s adequate causal power alone, it is a passive emotion—​that is, a passion (3D1, 3D3). In contrast, an emotion that can be understood through a finite individual’s adequate causal power alone is an active emotion (3D1, 3D3). Whether an emotion is passive or active hinges on whether the causal history of the occurrence of an emotion includes something other than a finite thing’s adequate causal power. If the causal history of a particular occurrence of an emotion includes a factor other than the subject’s adequate causal power, it is a passion. If not, it is an active emotion.4 2 Each and every finite thing is, at its core, a system of adequate causal power (3p7). Such power is said to be a finite thing’s “actual essence” (actualem essentiam) (3p7). It is also referred as a thing’s “given essence” (datâ essentiâ) (3p7d). On the reading I favor, what Spinoza means in part by “actual essence” and “given essence” is a property that a thing possesses in virtue of expressing God’s essence. A finite thing’s actual/​given essence is identical to a finite configuration of God’s essence. Because power is God’s essence (1p34), a finite thing’s actual/​given essence is a finite configuration of God’s power. 3 I  argue for this view in Andrew Youpa, “Spinoza on the Very Nature of Existence,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 35 (2011): 310‒334. For further discussion see ­chapter 8, this volume. 4 As I understand Spinoza’s view, passivity and activity are relative to an individual’s mind and body in the sense that the mind and the body are sources of causal power. What makes a finite mind

12  The Ethics of Joy The “General Definition of the Affects” gives the following definition of a passion: “[1]‌An Affect that is called a Passion of the mind is a confused idea, [2] by which the Mind affirms [affirmat] of its Body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before, which, [3] when it is given, determines the Mind to think of this rather than that.” According to the first clause of this definition, a passion is a confused idea. The fact that passions are said to be ideas supports the view that passions are representational in some sense, and this holds for active emotions too, even though the “General Definition” is about passions. As manifested in the mind all emotions are ideas and are, as a result, representational states. For Spinoza, an emotion is representational in the sense that, according to the “General Definition,” it is a confused idea “[2]‌by which the Mind affirms of its Body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before” (GDA, emphasis added). What does this mean? Specifically, what does it mean to say that an emotion is an idea that “affirms” something of the body? Some light is cast on the way that an emotion affirms something of the body in the “Explication” of the “General Definition” where Spinoza writes, For all the ideas we have of bodies indicate [indicant] the actual constitution of our own body (by IIP16C2) more than the nature of the external body. But this [idea], which constitutes the form of the affect, must indicate [indicare] or express [exprimere] a constitution of the body (or some part of it), which the body (or some part of it) has because its power of acting, or force of existing, is increased or diminished, aided or restrained. (GDA exp)

Here the words “indicate” (indicare) and “express” (exprimere) are used to clarify the way an episode of joy or sadness affirms the body’s power.5 An passive is not that its ideas result from causes external to the mind where the mind is regarded as a storehouse of ideas, some of whose ideas are adequate and some inadequate. Rather, it is passive in virtue of the fact that its ideas result from causes external to the mind where the mind is a system of adequate causal power. Similarly, what makes a finite body passive is not that its states and constitution result from causes that are spatially external to it. It is passive in virtue of the fact that its states and constitution result from causes that are external to it as a system of adequate causal power. 5 Absent from this explication is 2p49: “In the Mind there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea” (emphasis in original). Rather than invoking 2p49, Spinoza invokes 2p16c2: “It follows, second, that the ideas which we have of external bodies indicate the condition of our own body more than the nature of the external bodies.” It is important to note that the demonstration of 2p49 does not rely on 2p16c2. I discuss and respond to the potential difficulty that 2p49 presents for the emotion as symptomatic representation reading in the present chapter.

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  13 emotion affirms an increase in the body’s power or an increase in some part of the body by indicating and expressing such an increase. But, now, what does it mean for an emotion to indicate and express an increase or decrease in power? This is best understood on the model of a symptom and the way that a symptom indicates and expresses a condition.6 An emotion indicates and expresses an increase in the body’s power similar to the way that a symptom indicates and expresses a condition of the individual who exhibits the symptom. A  particular episode of joy, for example, indicates and expresses an increase in the body’s power in that it is symptomatic of an increase in the individual’s power. That is to say, an episode of the qualitative feeling of joy is symptomatic of an increase in the power of the joyous subject’s body like an episode of the qualitative feeling of an abnormally high body temperature is, in some cases, symptomatic of an infection. Unlike the qualitative feeling of an abnormally high body temperature, an episode of joy, in Spinoza’s view, infallibly signals an increase in part of the body’s power or in the body’s power as a whole. 6 C. D. Broad writes, There remains one other point of general ethical interest to be mentioned before we leave Spinoza and pass to Butler. This is the position of pleasure and pain in Spinoza’s ethical system. He is not a Hedonist, in the strict sense. States of mind and actions are not good because they are pleasant or conducive to pleasure, nor are they bad because they are painful or conducive to pain. But pleasure and pain, though they are thus not the ratio essendi of good and evil, are the ratio cognoscendi thereof. Pleasure is the infallible sign of heightened vitality, pain is the infallible sign of lowered vitality, and these are the only ultimate good and evil. (Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, pp. 51‒52) “Pleasure” and “pain” are Broad’s terms for what I, following Curley’s translation, refer to as joy and sadness, and “vitality” is Broad’s term for the conatus. The reading I am defending is a version of Broad’s view that joy (pleasure) is a sign of increased vitality and that sadness (pain) is a sign of decreased vitality. In this chapter I show that episodes of joy (pleasure) and episodes of sadness (pain) are, in Spinoza’s view, signs in the way that a symptom is a sign. The reading I  defend can be contrasted with the interpretation maintained by commentators who hold that emotions are propositionally structured ideas. According to this reading, emotions are propositionally structured judgments about states of the body. There is an extreme version of this propositionalist reading and a moderate version. According to the extreme propositionalist reading, emotions are nothing but propositionally structured judgments; they have no phenomenologically qualitative features. According to the moderate reading, emotions are propositionally structured judgments, but it is not the case that they are nothing but propositionally structured judgments. For a defense of the extreme view, see Gideon Segal’s “Beyond Subjectivity: Spinoza’s Cognitivism of the Emotions,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8, no. 1 (2000): 1‒19. See also Michael Della Rocca’s “The Power of an Idea: Spinoza’s Critique of Pure Will,” Noûs 37, no. 2 (June 2003): 200‒231; Della Rocca, “Rationalism Run Amok,” in Interpreting Spinoza: Critical Essays, ed. Charlie Huenemann (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 26‒52; and Della Rocca, Spinoza (Routledge, 2008), ch. 4. For defenses of the moderate propositionalist reading, see Eugene Marshall’s “Spinoza’s Cognitive Affects and Their Feel,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16, no. 1 (2008): 1‒23; Justin Steinberg, “Affect, Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza’s Account of Motivation,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24, no. 1 (2016): 67‒87; Lilli Alanen, “The Metaphysics of Affects or the Unbearable Reality of Confusion,” in The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza, ed. Michael Della Rocca (Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 314‒342.

14  The Ethics of Joy Spinoza’s discussion of shame and pity strongly supports this reading: “The things which must be noted about Shame are easily inferred from what we said about Compassion and Repentance. I add only this, that like Pity, Shame, though not a virtue, is still good insofar as it indicates [indicat], in the man who blushes with Shame, a desire to live honorably. In the same way pain [dolor] is said to be good insofar as it indicates [indicat] that the injured part is not yet decayed” (4p58s, emphasis added). This makes clear that these emotions—​shame and pity—​indicate a condition similar to the way that a symptom indicates a condition. Just as pain indicates that the damaged part of the body is not yet completely decayed (putrefactam), an episode of shame indicates that an individual still has a desire, however feeble, to live honorably. Further support for this reading is found in the scholium to 4p57 where he says, “For as I said in the Preface of Part III, I consider men’s affects and properties just like other natural things. And of course human affects, if they do not indicate [indicant] man’s power, at least indicate [indicant] the power and skill of nature, no less than many other things we wonder at and take pleasure in contemplating” (4p57s). It is evident that Spinoza is talking about passive emotions and active emotions alike: active emotions are included in the reference to affects that “indicate man’s power” while passive emotions are those that “indicate the power and skill of nature.” Emotions disclose the status of the power of the subject’s body. Regarding hope and fear Spinoza writes, “We may add to this that these affects show [indicant] a defect of knowledge and a lack of power in the Mind. For this reason also Confidence and Despair, Gladness and Remorse are signs [signa] of a mind lacking in power” (4p47s, emphasis added). The word “sign” (signa) is used in this passage to make the very same point as he makes using “indicate” (indicant), and so it stands to reason that the terms have the same meaning in this context. An episode of any particular one of these emotions indicates a condition of the body, that is, it signals the status of the power of the subject’s body. Just as episodes of hope and fear indicate a lack of power, confidence, despair, gladness, and remorse indicate a lack of power also. Emotions are not cognitively empty. They carry information. They carry information about the status of the power of the subject’s body. An episode of joy, for example, carries information about the status of the subject’s power:  it signals that the subject’s power is increasing.7 An

7 As William K. Frankena puts it, “It [a joy or pleasure] is or involves a cognition, however confused, of a certain fact, and is not simply a blind feeling, as emotivists and hedonists usually conceive it to be.” See Frankena, “Spinoza on the Knowledge of Good and Evil,” p. 24.

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  15 episode of sadness carries information: it signals that the subject’s power is decreasing. As we have seen, Spinoza uses variants of the terms “affirm,” “indicate,” “express,” and “signal.” These do not refer to four distinct and independent aspects of an emotion. Nor are they four oblique ways of talking about judgment. Rather, they are four essentially equivalent descriptions of the way an emotion carries information. An emotion affirms (indicates, expresses, signals) changes in the body’s power similar to the way that a symptom carries information about the condition of the subject who exhibits the symptom. It is important to see that the reading I am defending is about the representational character of emotions. My characterization of an emotion as a symptomatic representation of an increase or decrease in the body’s power is intended as a way of understanding the claim in the “General Definition of the Affects” that an emotion “affirms of it Body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before” and the claim in the “Explication” that an emotion must “indicate or express a constitution of the Body.” No doubt an emotion in the mind is a change in the mind’s power (3D3, 3p11s, DA II, DA III, DA III exp). Yet there is also a way an emotion represents greater or lesser power in the body. For the purpose of investigating Spinoza’s moral philosophy, in this chapter and the next I am foremost concerned with the way emotions are representational and with their specific type of representational content, not with the metaphysical structure of emotions. It is their representational character that illuminates the structure of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Emotions are changes in the mind’s power and they represent the status of the body’s power, but it is not simply as increases and decreases in power that emotions represent the body’s power. Increases and decreases in power have distinctive phenomenological qualities, and it is an emotion’s phenomenologically qualitative character—​what it is like to experience an emotion—​that indicates the status of the body’s power. The distinctive way it feels to experience joy is an aspect of an increase in power. When someone’s body undergoes an increase in power and thereby experiences the buoyant feeling that is joy, this buoyant feeling indicates that the power of the subject’s body is increasing. It is an indicator that is accessible to the subject. The same holds for sadness. The way a decrease in power first-​personally feels is an aspect of a decrease in power. When someone undergoes a decrease in power and thereby experiences the oppressive feeling of sadness, the oppressive feeling indicates that the power of the

16  The Ethics of Joy subject’s body is decreasing.8 Increases and decreases in the power of the subject’s body are revealed to a subject through the phenomenologically qualitative character of his emotions. A human mind, according to Spinoza, is the idea of the human body (2p13). A  human body is a system of interacting bodies of various sizes, shapes, motions, and various degrees of hardness and softness (2p13cs post 1, post 2). The composite system of bodies that constitutes an individual’s body is mirrored in the composite system of ideas that constitutes the mind (2p15). The ideas that compose the mind are ideas of the individual’s body, of its parts, and of changes in the power of the parts and changes in the power of the individual’s body as a whole (2p14, 2p15d). Ideas that constitute emotions “indicate or express a constitution [constitutionem] of the Body (or of some part of it)” (GDA exp). The constitution of a human body varies due to varying increases and decreases in the power of the parts of the body and in the body’s power as a whole. As the idea of the body, the mind has ideas of the varying increases and decreases in the power of the parts of a body and in the body’s power as a whole. At the same time, the mind’s ideas of increases and decreases in the body’s power are themselves increases and decreases in the mind’s power. An emotion as a mental item is an idea of a change in the power of a part of the subject’s body or in the body’s power as a whole, and it is a change in the mind’s power, a change that is the mind’s counterpart to the body’s change in power. An emotion’s phenomenal feel is the idea of the change in the body’s power. In the case of emotions for which a subject is an inadequate cause, an emotion’s distinctive phenomenal feel is a confused idea of an increase or decrease in the body’s power. It is an idea whose causal history includes a factor or set of factors other than the individual’s adequate causal power. In the “Definitions of the Affects” joy is said to be an individual’s “passage from a lesser to a greater perfection” and that sadness is a “passage from a greater to a lesser perfection” (DA II and III), and this might be interpreted 8 In “The Metaphysics of Affects or the Unbearable Reality of Confusion,” Lilli Alanen opposes a reading of Spinoza according to which emotions are nothing but propositionally structured ideas and have no qualitative features. Alanen argues that, as transitions from one grade of power of acting to another, emotions “must be something more than mere representations” (p. 323). The reading I defend in this chapter is in agreement with Alanen’s view that emotions are something more than mere representations when “representation” is understood as propositional representation. I believe that my view differs from Alanen’s concerning what the something more is that constitutes an emotion. Whereas I maintain that the qualitative character of an emotion is the something more, Alanen holds that the transition between grades of power is that something more. See Alanen, “The Metaphysics of Affects or the Unbearable Reality of Confusion.”

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  17 as suggesting that the qualitative character of emotions is eliminated from the mind. It might be understood as supporting that joy and sadness are nothing but propositional representations.9 However, when Spinoza says that joy and sadness are passages to greater and lesser states of perfection, his point is not that emotions are nothing but passages between propositionally structured ideas and have no qualitative character. On the contrary, every change in an individual’s power has a qualitative character. There is a way that it feels to experience an emotion. This is strongly supported by 4p14 and its demonstration: P14: No affect can be restrained by the true knowledge [cognitio] of good and evil insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect. Dem.: An affect is an idea by which the Mind affirms of its Body a greater or lesser force of existing than before (by the general Definition of the Affects). So (by P1), it has nothing positive which could be removed by the presence of the true. Consequently the true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain any affect. But insofar as it is an affect (see P8), it can restrain the affect, if it is stronger than it (by P7), q.e.d. (emphasis in original)

In the proposition itself (i.e., 4p14) an emotion considered as an emotion is contrasted with true knowledge (cognitio) of good and evil, and an emotion considered as an emotion is an “idea by which the Mind affirms of its Body a greater or less force of existing than before” and, as a consequence, “it has nothing positive which could be removed by the presence of the true.” From this it is evident that an emotion qua affirmation of the body’s greater or lesser power cannot be restrained or removed by knowledge considered as

9 Michael Della Rocca argues for a reading of Spinoza according to which emotions are propositional representations and nothing but propositional representations. On this reading, an emotion can be true or false, justified or unjustified, and, as Della Rocca puts it, “there is nothing in affects that cannot be evaluated for truth or falsity, nothing that is not subject to justification or lack of justification” (Della Rocca, “Rationalism Run Amok,” p. 31). Emotions, according to Della Rocca’s reading, are propositional representations and have no qualitative features. They do not have any qualitative features because they do not have any non-​representational features. I agree that emotions have no non-​representational features, but I disagree with the view that an emotion’s qualitative character is non-​representational. For Spinoza, emotions are representations in virtue of their qualitative features. In countenancing the qualitative character of emotions Spinoza does not violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason, as Della Rocca argues would be the case if the mind contained non-​representational features. In virtue of what is an emotion’s qualitative character a feature of the mind? It is in virtue of being representational or, as I think best captures Spinoza’s view, it is in virtue of being informative. Also see Della Rocca’s “The Power of an Idea.”

18  The Ethics of Joy knowledge. Knowledge as such does not have the qualitative character of an affirmation of a change in the body’s power. Unlike an episode of joy, knowledge as knowledge has no qualitative character. Knowledge can restrain an emotion only if it has strength, and it has strength only when it is considered as an emotion. This strongly supports that, for Spinoza, emotional strength belongs to the qualitative character of an emotion, not to the logical or epistemological character of a belief or judgment. An increase in the body’s power is signaled in the mind by the specific qualitative character of an emotion, and its qualitative character differs from the qualitative character that signals a decrease in power. Love, for example, is an increase in the body’s power, and the qualitative feeling of love symptomatically represents an increase in the body’s power. Hate is a decrease in power, and its qualitative character signals a decrease in the body’s power. The qualitative character of different types of emotion varies, and the distinctive qualitative character of a type of emotion is that which signals an increase or decrease in the body’s power. On the basis of the confused idea clause of the “General Definition,” there is reason to think that emotions are representational, but it does not follow that an emotion is nothing but a propositional representation. In addition to the “Explication” of the “General Definition of the Affects,” there is evidence against an extreme propositionalist reading following the discussion of the sensory idea of the sun in the scholium to 4p1:10 And so it is with the other imaginations by which the Mind is deceived, whether they indicate [indicant] the natural constitution of the Body, or that its power of acting is increased or diminished: they are not contrary to the true, and do not disappear on its presence. It happens, of course, when we wrongly fear some evil, that the fear disappears on our hearing news of the truth. But on the other hand, it also happens, when we fear an evil that is certain to come, that the fear vanishes on our hearing false news. So imaginations do not disappear through the presence of the true insofar as it is true, but because there occur others, stronger than them, which exclude the present existence of the things we imagine, as we showed in IIP17. (4p1s)

10 For a defense of the extreme propositionalist view, see Segal’s “Beyond Subjectivity.” See also Della Rocca’s “The Power of an Idea,” “Rationalism Run Amok,” and his Spinoza, ch. 4.

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  19 The view that sensory ideas and emotions are “not contrary to the true, and do not disappear on its presence” strongly supports that sensory ideas and emotions are not simply propositional representations. This is because sensory ideas and emotions do not conflict with ideas that are true insofar as they are true. According to Spinoza, this is the reason that our sensory idea of the sun does not change or disappear after we learn the truth about the sun’s distance from us. If our sensory idea of the sun were nothing more than a propositional representation, it presumably would, or at least could, disappear after we learn the truth about the sun’s distance from us. But it does not disappear and cannot disappear because the sensory idea indicates the constitution of the body in the way that a symptom represents that of which it is symptomatic.11 Like our sensory idea of the sun, an episode of fear is not contrary to the true and does not disappear in its presence. This is because fear—​that is, an episode of the qualitative feeling of fear—​indicates a decrease in the body’s power of activity, and as an indication of a state of our power it is as impossible for fear to be contrary to the true as it is, say, for a body temperature of 104˚F (40˚C) to be contrary to the true. The qualitative feel of an abnormally high body temperature is not a propositional representation of a state of affairs. It therefore cannot be contrary to the true and it does not disappear in its presence. But this does not mean that the qualitative mental correlates of body temperatures and emotions are “mute pictures on a panel” (2p49cd, II/​132 10; cf. 2p43s). They are not mute because they are not non-​ representational states. Like all ideas, emotions are representations. An episode of joy represents an increase in the body’s power. An episode of sadness represents a decrease in power. Nevertheless, emotions, like sensory ideas, in and of themselves “involve no error” (2p49cd, II/​134 30) and are “not contrary to the true.” How can something be representational, involve no error, and not be contrary to the true? Something can be such when it represents in the way that the qualitative feel of an abnormally high body temperature represents an infection and in the way that pain represents that the damaged part of the body is not completely decayed.

11 Although sensory ideas and emotions cannot be contrary to the true, as indications of the constitution of the body they can mislead us into forming propositional representations that are contrary to the true. For example, someone who, ignorant of the sciences of optics and astronomy, uncritically accepts his sensory idea of the sun will, as a result, believe that the sun’s distance from him is approximately two hundred feet (2p35s, 4p1s). This is a case where the sensory idea causally contributes to the formation of a propositional representation, a representation that turns out to be false.

20  The Ethics of Joy So far I have been defending a reading of Spinoza’s claim that an emotion “affirms [affirmat] of its Body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before” (GDA). According to this reading, what Spinoza means by “affirms” in this context is that the qualitative character of an emotion symptomatically represents a change in the body’s power. Symptomatic representation is not a propositionally structured representation. When someone deepens his knowledge and understanding of God, for example, there is a joy that accompanies this acquisition of knowledge that is not merely a propositional representation of an increase in power. However, this is not to say that an episode of an emotion’s qualitative character does not have a propositional representation as a necessary consequence. A  propositional representation necessarily follows from an emotion’s qualitative character.12 By “propositional representation” I mean a belief or judgment, and when talking about a propositional representation following from an emotion’s qualitative character I mean an evaluative belief or evaluative judgment, such as, for example, the judgment, “The warmth of this fire in the fireplace is good.” Spinoza’s view is that a change in the power of a subject’s body and the idea in the mind that is the way this change qualitatively feels is accompanied by an evaluative judgment. He writes, P8: The knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an affect of joy or sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it. Dem.: We call good, or evil, what is useful to, or harmful to, preserving our being (by D1 and D2), that is (by IIIP7), what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting. Therefore (by the definitions of joy and sadness in IIIP11S), insofar as we perceive that a thing affects us with joy or sadness, we call it good or evil. And so knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an idea of joy or sadness which follows necessarily from the affect of joy or sadness itself (by IIP22). (4p8, 4p8d, emphasis in original)

In isolation from the demonstration, this proposition might seem to say that knowledge (cognitio) of good and evil is one and the same thing as an 12 As I stated earlier, I am bracketing issues concerning an emotion’s metaphysical structure. My main concern in this chapter and the next is with an emotion’s representational character. I believe that, for Spinoza, in the case of the emotions of adult humans a propositional representation follows from an episode of an emotion’s qualitative character and can therefore be said to be a component of an emotion, but I am not convinced that Spinoza holds that the same is true of the emotions of animals and infants. Nevertheless, a defense of a reading of Spinoza’s metaphysics of emotions is tangential to my main purpose.

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  21 emotion of joy or sadness, but this reading does not stand up under close inspection; for a premise of the demonstration states that “knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an idea of joy or sadness which follows necessarily from the affect of joy or sadness itself (by IIP22)” (4p8d, emphasis added). If such knowledge were strictly identical to an emotion, it would make no sense to claim, as Spinoza does, that knowledge of good and evil follows necessarily from joy or sadness. Thus he is best understood as maintaining that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary consequence of an emotion’s qualitative character and that it therefore necessarily accompanies an emotion. An increase in the body’s power is symptomatically represented in the mind by the qualitative character of joy, and an episode of the qualitative character of joy necessarily gives rise to knowledge of goodness in the sense that someone who experiences joy judges that the apparent source of his joy is good. For example, someone whose body’s power of acting increases as a result of eating an orange will have in his mind a feeling of joy (i.e., the symptomatic representation of this particular increase in his body’s power), and the judgment “This orange is good” follows necessarily from the feeling of joy. An instance of an evaluative judgment of this type illustrates at least in part what Spinoza has in mind when he refers to the knowledge (cognitio) that follows from an emotion. Furthermore, when he says that “knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an idea of joy or sadness which follows necessarily from the affect of Joy or Sadness itself ” (4p8d), his point, I believe, is that an occurrent evaluative judgment follows necessarily from an occurrent episode of joy. An individual X occurrently judges “This orange is good” as a result of an occurrent episode of the qualitative joy that the orange causes when it increases X’s power. But it is not the case that an occurrent emotion is the immediate cause of every evaluative judgment that an individual might make. For example, superstitious people believe that “the good is what brings Sadness, and the evil, what brings Joy” (4App XXXI). It would be a mistake to conclude from this that superstitious people are an exception to the view that a judgment about what is good follows from an episode of joy and that a judgment about what is bad follows from an episode of sadness. Under normal circumstances, the superstitious, like everyone else, obtain joy from eating an orange. An orange causes an increase in power and thereby joy even in an individual who is superstitious and believes that goodness is what brings sadness. In such a case the superstitious person has two conflicting evaluative judgments: one that results from the joy that the orange causes (i.e., “This orange is good”) and a

22  The Ethics of Joy second that results from his superstitious beliefs about goodness and badness (i.e., “This orange is evil”). A case of this type falls under what Spinoza calls “vacillation of mind” (3p17s), although in the case at hand the second evaluative judgment, the one that results from superstition, does not necessarily directly follow from an emotion that is a decrease in the individual’s power. Superstitious evaluative judgments are not grounded in an individual’s nature as a system of adequate causal power and, as a consequence, do not necessarily result from increases and decreases in an individual’s power. Superstitious evaluative judgments are not the only evaluative judgments that are not a direct consequence of emotions. Consider an evaluative judgment about hatred. Suppose Peter believes that hatred is bad, and suppose that in a conversation Peter says to Paul, “Hatred is bad.” When Peter expresses this evaluative judgment it is not necessarily the case that the judgment results from an occurrent decrease in Peter’s power. When Peter expresses the judgment about hatred it is not necessarily the case that he is undergoing any decrease in power at all. There is no reason to think that Spinoza is committed to the view that a true belief, such as “Hatred is bad” (true, that is, in Spinoza’s view; cf. 4p45, 4p45c1, 4p46d), is invariably a necessary consequence of an occurrent emotion. No doubt Spinoza holds that hatred is a decrease in power. And no doubt the fact that hatred is a decrease in power is the basis for the truth of the judgment that hatred is bad. What makes the evaluative judgment about hatred true, in other words, is that an episode of hatred is a decrease in power.13 But from this it does not follow that an individual’s judgment that hatred is bad is, in every case, a direct consequence of an occurrent decrease in power. For Spinoza, it is not necessary presently to undergo an episode of joy or sadness to make an evaluative judgment, although all evaluative judgments and thus all knowledge of good and evil presuppose prior changes in power (4p68, 4p68d).

13 What makes an evaluative judgment true is that it accurately corresponds to increases or decreases in power that we have undergone, are undergoing, or will undergo. If, contrary to the usual state of affairs, oranges were poisonous to humans and caused severe decreases in our power, someone who ate an orange would judge that the orange is bad, and in fact it would be bad. It would be bad because it caused a decrease in the orange eater’s power, not simply because the orange eater judged it so. Likewise, if contrary to Spinozistic fact hatred were an increase in our power, someone who experienced hatred would judge that it is good and, indeed, hatred would be good, not because the hater judged it so, but because it is (in this fictional universe) an increase in the hater’s power. In dealing with the representational character of emotions I cannot avoid touching on issues that I cannot adequately clarify and defend in the present chapter. I discuss Spinoza’s moral realism in ­chapter 3, this volume, and I discuss the goodness and badness of emotions in ­chapter 5, this volume.

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  23 It is therefore useful to make a distinction, one that Spinoza does not make explicit, between evaluative judgments that directly result from episodes of joy and sadness, on the one hand, and evaluative judgments that do not necessarily directly result from episodes of joy and sadness, on the other. The former I will refer to as “basic evaluative judgments.” The latter I call “non-​ basic evaluative judgments.” Every episode of joy and its variants and every episode of sadness and its variants is accompanied by an evaluative judgment. Such judgments are basic in the sense that they are direct and immediate consequences of episodes of the qualitative character of emotions. In contrast, a non-​basic evaluative judgment is not the direct and immediate effect of an increase or decrease in power. As I have discussed, in some cases superstitious evaluative judgments fall into this category, such as when the superstitious judgment is rooted in metaphysical fictions and is not directly grounded in a change in human power. Also, evaluative judgments that are universal in scope are not necessarily basic, such as the judgment “Hatred is bad.” While unconfused evaluative judgments are based on changes in human power that we experience as emotions, it is not the case that every unconfused evaluative judgment must be the direct and immediate result of such a change. For instance, an unconfused evaluative judgment can follow from the premises of a demonstration. On this reading the qualitative characters of emotions are in effect barometers for changes in the body’s power: joy and species of joy symptomatically represent increases in the body’s power while sadness and species of sadness symptomatically represent decreases in power.14 Moreover, judgments of good and evil (i.e., basic evaluative judgments) necessarily follow from and accompany episodes of the qualitative character of emotions. “Love,” Spinoza says, “is nothing but Joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause” (3p13cs, emphasis in original). Love is an episode of the qualitative character of joy that is accompanied by the idea of someone who, or something that, is regarded as the cause of love. Similarly, the emotion that Spinoza calls “self-​ esteem” (acquiescentia in se ipso) is a “species of Love” and a state of joy that is “accompanied by the idea of an internal cause” (3p30s; cf. DA XXV). Self-​ esteem is a type of joy and it has oneself as its object. Love and self-​esteem, as 14 In his “Spinoza’s Virtuous Passions,” Kisner writes, “Since the passions serve as a barometer of our power, they would help us to increase our power by indicating whether an activity increases our power” (p. 778). I agree with Kisner and would add that active emotions are also barometers of the subject’s power. In c­ hapter 2, I argue that passive emotions and active emotions not only carry information, they carry axiological information. The information they carry is about enhancements and impairments to a subject’s power.

24  The Ethics of Joy types of joy, share the buoyant qualitative character that all joys have in virtue of representing an increase in the body’s power as a whole or in part. Moreover, love and self-​esteem are accompanied by propositionally structured ideas about the objects and apparent causes of the particular episodes of the feeling of joy. It is the buoyant feeling that produces the evaluative judgment about the object and apparent cause of the emotion. Spinoza writes, “Therefore (by the Definitions of Joy and Sadness in IIIP11S), insofar as we perceive that a thing affects us with Joy or Sadness, we call it good or evil” (4p8d). Suppose someone X experiences the joy that is love, and suppose X’s love is for someone Y. From X’s love will follow the judgment that Y is good and at the same time X “necessarily strives to have present and preserve the thing he loves” (3p30s). Similarly, someone who experiences the joy that is self-​esteem will, as a result of this joy, judge that he himself is good and seek to preserve himself with greater power than he would if he lacked self-​esteem or had less self-​esteem. To take another example, “pity” is defined as a type of sadness that is “accompanied by the idea of an evil that has happened to another whom we imagine to be like us” (DA XVIII). As a type of sadness pity has an oppressive qualitative character that symptomatically represents a decrease in the body’s power. An instance of pity’s oppressive qualitative character necessarily gives rise to, and is thereby accompanied by, the idea of someone or something who is regarded as the cause of the oppressive feeling, an idea that is a judgment that this particular someone or something is the victim of something terrible. In addition to making sense of the fact that knowledge of good and evil follows necessarily from episodes of joy and sadness, this reading squares with other claims Spinoza makes about emotions and judgments. For instance, in the scholium to 3p39 he writes, For we have shown above (in P9S) that we desire nothing because we judge it to be good, but on the contrary, we call it good because we desire it. Consequently, what we are averse to we call evil. So each one, from his own affect, judges, or evaluates, what is good and what is bad, what is better and what is worse, and finally, what is best and what is worst. So the Greedy man judges an abundance of money best, and poverty worst. The Ambitious man desires nothing so much as Esteem and dreads nothing so much as Shame. To the Envious nothing is more agreeable than another’s unhappiness, and nothing more burdensome than another’s happiness. And so, each one, from his own affect, judges a thing good or bad, useful or useless.

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  25 A basic evaluative judgment is parasitic on an emotion’s qualitative character and it is not the case that an emotion’s qualitative character is parasitic on a judgment of goodness and badness. From this it follows that an emotion’s qualitative character and the evaluative judgment that follows from it are not one and the same thing. The relation of dependence of basic evaluative judgments on an emotion presupposes that one thing depends on the other. There are two distinct items. There is the causally dependent thing (i.e., a basic evaluative judgment) and there is the cause (i.e., an episode of the qualitative character of an emotion) on which the effect depends. A potential difficulty for the symptomatic representation reading is that in the “General Definition of the Affects” Spinoza’s talk of an emotion affirming increases and decreases in power might seem to be about a propositionally structured mental state. What is affirming if not ascribing a property to something and accepting something as true? Furthermore, such a notion of affirmation plays a role in the theory of ideas that is presented at the end of Part 2 of the Ethics: 2p48s, 2p49, 2p49d, and 2p49cs. 2p49 reads: “In the Mind there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea,” and the sample idea that Spinoza uses in the demonstration is one in which the mind “affirms [affirmat] that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.” On the basis of the discussion at the end of Part 2, to affirm something is to make a judgment. Affirmation, it seems, is nothing apart from making a judgment or forming a belief, such as the judgment that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. The mind performs no separate act of affirmation or assent independent of the affirmation inherent in the idea itself. Spinoza maintains that to have an idea is to accept it as true, unless another idea calls it into question. This creates an apparent problem for the reading that I am defending because I am arguing that the qualitative character of an emotion affirms and represents a change in the body’s power similar to the way that a symptom affirms and represents that of which it is symptomatic, not the way a belief or judgment affirms and represents a state of affairs. Therefore, if all affirmation is affirmation in the 2p49 sense of “affirmation,” the emotion as symptom reading is in trouble.15

15 Proposition 49 of Part 2 is one basis for reading Spinoza as holding that the type of affirmation involved in emotions reduces emotions to propositionally structured ideas. But, as I argue, it is a mistake to think that the type of affirmation Spinoza is talking about in 2p49 is identical to the type of affirmation that he is talking about in the “General Definition” and in the “Explication” of the “General Definition.” For defenses of a propositionalist reading that make use of 2p49, see Della Rocca’s “The Power of an Idea”; and see Marshall’s “Spinoza’s Cognitive Affects and Their Feel.”

26  The Ethics of Joy The evidence strongly supports that Spinoza does not use “affirm” with the same meaning in the “General Definition of the Affects” as he does in 2p49. First, in 2p49 Spinoza is talking about affirmation and negation, not affirmation alone. And there is no evidence in the “General Definition of the Affects” that emotions negate changes in the body’s power. It is not clear what it would even mean for an emotion to negate a change in the body’s power except in the sense that one emotion overpowers another emotion, and emotional conflict is not what Spinoza is talking about when he talks about emotions affirming changes in the body’s power. This is a reason to suspect that the type of affirmation that features in 2p49 is not identical to the type that features in the “General Definition of the Affects.” Second, when in the Explication of the “General Definition of the Affects” Spinoza seeks to clarify what he means by an emotion affirming a change in the body’s power he cites 2p16c2, not 2p49. And 2p49 is not derived from 2p16c2. That 2p49 is not derived from 2p16c2 makes sense because 2p16c2 is about how the ideas we have of external bodies “indicate [indicant] the condition of our own body more than the nature of the external bodies” (2p16c2), whereas 2p49 is about the affirmation and negation inherent in propositionally structured ideas, such as the idea that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles (2p49d). For Spinoza, there is an important way in which emotions are akin to sensory ideas. They indicate states of the body. It might be the case that a propositional representation such as the idea that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles indicates something about the body, but if it does, it is not in virtue of the type of affirmation that is essential to the idea as a propositional representation. The affirmation involved in the idea that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles has to do with the belief-​like character of the idea, not what the idea itself indicates about a state of the body. Third, as discussed earlier, in the scholium to 4p1 Spinoza again cites 2p16c2 and offers the sun example and the example of fear to illustrate the way in which sensory ideas and emotions are representative—​ the way that they indicate the present constitution of the body—​while not being contrary to the true. Spinoza concludes, “And so it is with the other imaginations by which the Mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural constitution of the Body, or that its power of acting is increased or diminished: they are not contrary to the true, and do not disappear on its presence” (4p1s). Like sensory ideas, there is a way that emotions indicate states of the body. As indicators emotions, like sensory ideas, cannot be contrary to the true. It follows that emotions are not simply propositionally

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions  27 structured representations. If they were nothing but propositionally structured representations, they could be contrary to the true. Therefore, the way that emotions affirm (indicate, express, signal) changes in the body’s power should not be confused with the way that affirmation belongs to the idea that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.16

Conclusion Spinoza believes that an emotion as it exists in the human mind involves two distinct representational states. There is an emotion’s qualitative character, on the one hand, and there is the evaluative judgment that follows from an episode of an emotion’s qualitative character, on the other. An emotion’s qualitative character “affirms of its Body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before” (GDA; cf. 4p14d). I have argued that this is best understood on the model of a symptom and the way that a symptom represents that of which it is symptomatic. An episode of an emotion’s qualitative character symptomatically represents an increase or a decrease in the body’s power. Furthermore, a symptomatic representation “determines the Mind to think of this rather than that” (GDA, cf. 4p8d). A symptomatic representation “determines the Mind to think of this rather than that” in the sense that an evaluative judgment necessarily follows from a symptomatic representation. An episode of the buoyant qualitative character of love, for example, gives rise to the judgment that the object of one’s love is good.

16 Possibly Spinoza has a unified account of affirmation, an account that brings together the affirming/​indicating/​expressing/​signaling of emotions with the affirming and negating inherent in a propositionally structured idea. But I do not believe that a unified account is necessarily called for.

2 Emotions as Axiological Information Introduction In ­chapter  1, I  argued that emotions track increases and decreases in the way that a symptom represents that of which it is symptomatic, and it is an emotion’s qualitative character that symptomatically represents a change in the body’s power of acting. In this chapter I argue that because they symptomatically represent changes in power, emotions carry information about the status of an individual’s power. Emotions carry axiological information. Emotive information is “axiological” in the sense that it is information about the goodness and badness of the state of an individual’s power of acting. Increases in power and decreases in power are not psychologically and ethically equal. It is not the case that an increase in an individual’s power is psychologically and ethically no better and no worse than a decrease in power. On the contrary, an increase in power in part of an individual is, other things equal, better than a decrease in power, and an increase in power as a whole is invariably better than a decrease in power. I also argue that increases and decreases in power are not psychologically and ethically neutral or indifferent. An increase in an individual’s power as a whole is a genuine enhancement of his nature, whereas a decrease in power as a whole is a genuine impairment of his nature. While it is true that Spinoza believes that God-​or-​ Nature is indifferent to human interests, he does not accept that we have no interests whose fulfillment constitutes our greatest happiness.

1.  Neither Neutral nor Equal Even if the emotion as symptomatic representation reading is correct, for all that I argued in ­chapter 1 it remains an open possibility for Spinoza to hold that there is nothing good about increases in power and there is nothing bad about decreases in power. Although I will argue that such a reading is incorrect, it is compatible with the symptomatic representation reading that The Ethics of Joy. Andrew Youpa, Oxford University Press (2020) © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190086022.001.0001

Emotions as Axiological Information  29 changes in an individual’s power are, in Spinoza’s view, axiologically neutral or indifferent. According to this (inaccurate) reading, increases are neither better nor worse than decreases in power. One person’s love and enjoyment of whiskey is neither better nor worse than another’s love and enjoyment of wisdom. From the standpoint of metaphysics, as well as the nature of human beings, the lover of wisdom has no advantage over the lover of whiskey in any psychologically and ethically relevant sense. They simply have desires for different things. This is not to deny that the philosopher judges that wisdom is good and judges that whiskey, insofar as it prevents one from obtaining wisdom, is bad. The lover of wisdom judges so. At the same time the lover of whiskey judges that whiskey is good and judges that wisdom, insofar as it prevents one from enjoying whiskey, is bad. Continuing with this possible (but wrongheaded) line of interpretation, there is nothing that ultimately makes the philosopher’s judgment correct while making the whiskey lover’s incorrect; nor is there anything that settles it the other way around, with the whiskey lover’s judgment as correct and the philosopher’s incorrect. Even if it turns out to be true that a desire for whiskey is a decrease in power and that the consumption of whiskey further decreases an individual’s power, there is nothing in the nature of things that makes a decrease in power less desirable than or worse than an increase in power. Changes in a body’s power are no different from other changes that a body undergoes, such as the bodily changes that have sensory ideas in the mind as their counterparts. Just as a sensory idea of the sun is neither better nor worse than a sensory idea of a tree as far as our perfection and happiness are concerned, an increase in power is neither better nor worse than a decrease in power as far as our perfection and happiness are concerned. Indeed, an increase in power is neither better nor worse than a sensory idea of the sun. Metaphysically, psychologically, and ethically speaking, it is all the same. Let’s call this the unqualified anti-​realist reading.1 As a reading of the Ethics, the unqualified anti-​realist reading is wrong. It is not the case that, for Spinoza, an increase in an individual’s power is neither 1 Versions of this anti-​realist interpretation have been defended by Yitzhak Y. Melamed, “Spinoza’s Metaphysics of Substance: The Substance-​Mode Relation as a Relation of Inherence and Predication,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78, no. 1 (January 2009): esp. pp. 51‒53 and note 108; and Melamed, “Spinoza’s Anti-​Humanism: An Outline,” in The Rationalists: Between Tradition and Innovation, ed. Carlos Fraenkel, Dario Perinetti, and Justin E. H. Smith (Kluwer, 2011), pp. 147‒166; Jeffrey K. McDonough, “The Heyday of Teleology and Early Modern Philosophy,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 35 (2011): 179‒204; Charles Jarrett, “Spinozistic Constructivism,” in Essays on Spinoza’s Ethical Theory, ed. Matthew J. Kisner and Andrew Youpa (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 57‒84.

30  The Ethics of Joy better nor worse than a decrease in his power. Unlike sensory ideas, increases and decreases in power are neither psychologically and ethically neutral nor psychologically and ethically equal. I will turn to the question of their metaphysical status in the next chapter on Spinoza’s moral realism. My present aim is to show that, contrary to the unqualified anti-​realist reading, Spinoza believes that increases in power and decreases in power are not devoid of axiological significance. By “axiological significance” I mean that increases in an individual’s power are enhancements to the individual and as such are good. Decreases are impairments to the individual and as such are bad. Therefore, if the desire for whiskey is a decrease in power, it is psychologically and ethically worse than a desire for wisdom, assuming that a desire for wisdom is an increase in power. That Spinoza holds that increases and decreases in power are not psychologically and ethically equal is evident from 4p41 and its demonstration as well as 4p42 and its demonstration: 4p41 and 4p41d: Joy is not directly [directè] evil, but good; Sadness, on the other hand, is directly [directè] evil. Dem.: Joy (by IIIP11 and P11S) is an affect by which the body’s power of acting is increased or aided. Sadness, on the other hand, is an affect by which the body’s power of acting is diminished or restrained. And so (by P38) joy is directly good, etc., q.e.d. (emphasis in original) 4p42 and 4p42d: Cheerfulness cannot be excessive, but is always [semper] good; Melancholy, on the other hand, is always [semper] evil. Dem.: Cheerfulness (see its Def. in IIIP11S) is a Joy which, insofar as it is related to the Body, consists in this, that all parts of the Body are equally affected. I.e. (by IIIP11), the Body’s power of acting is increased or aided, so that all of its parts maintain the same proportion of motion and rest to one another. And so (by P39), cheerfulness is always good, and cannot be excessive. But melancholy (see its Def., also in IIIP11S) is a sadness, which, insofar as it is related to the Body, consists in this, that the Body’s power of acting is absolutely diminished or restrained. And so (by P38) it is always evil, q.e.d. (emphasis in original)

In the demonstration of 4p41 Spinoza argues that because joy is an increase in the body’s power of acting and because increases in the body’s power are

Emotions as Axiological Information  31 good, joy is directly good. The same holds for the joy that is an increase in the mind’s power of acting. Because sadness is a decrease in the body’s power of acting and because decreases are bad, sadness is directly evil. The same holds for the sadness that is the mind’s decrease in power of acting. Similarly, in the demonstration of 4p42 he argues that because cheerfulness, as a state of the body, is an increase in the body’s power as a whole and because such increases are good, cheerfulness is always good. Melancholy, as a state of the body, is always bad because it is a decrease in the body’s power as a whole and such decreases are always bad. An emotion’s goodness or badness importantly has to do with whether it is an increase or a decrease in power of acting. Joy and cheerfulness are good in virtue of being increases in power. Sadness and melancholy are bad in virtue of being decreases in power.2 There is something about an increase in power that enables it to make joy and cheerfulness good, something that a decrease in power is lacking. It follows that increases are not on an equal footing with decreases in power. Increases in power are psychologically and ethically superior to decreases in power. Increases in power are psychologically superior to decreases because being an increase in power is the basis for the goodness of good psychological states (e.g., joy and cheerfulness), whereas being a decrease is the basis for the badness of bad psychological states (e.g., sadness and melancholy) (4p41d, 4p42d). Increases are ethically superior because increases constitute good psychological states and good psychological states are the source of good deeds and, ultimately, good ways of life, whereas decreases constitute bad psychological states, and bad psychological states are the source of bad deeds and, ultimately, bad ways of life (4p59ad, 4p63cs).3 Furthermore, because increases and decreases are not equal in value, increases and decreases in power are not neutral. They are not axiologically indifferent. To see this, recall that the unqualified anti-​realist reading maintains that even if a desire for whiskey is a decrease in power and even if consuming whiskey further decreases an individual’s power, there is nothing in the nature of things that makes a decrease in power worse than an increase

2 How, in Spinoza’s view, do increases and decreases pull this off? What is it about an increase in power that enables it to make joy and cheerfulness good? What is it about a decrease in power that enables it to make sadness and melancholy bad? These questions take us to the metaphysical heart of Spinoza’s theory of goodness and badness, which I examine in c­ hapter 3, this volume. 3 For further discussion of the goodness and badness of emotions and deeds, see ­chapters 5 and 6, this volume.

32  The Ethics of Joy in power. A change in bodily power whose mental counterpart is an emotion, according to the unqualified anti-​realist reading, does not psychologically and ethically differ from a bodily change whose mental counterpart is a sensory idea. Just as a sensory idea of the sun is a value neutral state, so too is an increase in power.4 However, I have shown that this is not a plausible reading because increases in power are superior to decreases in power (4p41d, 4p42d). The fact that they are superior implies that they are not neutral. That increases in power are psychologically and ethically superior to decreases implies that if, for example, a desire for whiskey is a decrease in power and if consuming whiskey further decreases an individual’s power, there is something that makes the desire for and consumption of whiskey, as a decrease in power, worse than a desire that is an increase in power, such as the desire for wisdom. Therefore, increases and decreases are not psychologically and ethically neutral or indifferent. For Spinoza, it is not all the same whether someone’s power is increasing or decreasing. As far as the perfection and happiness of a human being are concerned, nothing is more important than whether an individual’s power is increasing or decreasing. This is because an increase in an individual’s power as a whole is an increase in the individual’s perfection and happiness, whereas a decrease in an individual’s power as a whole is a decrease in his perfection and happiness. That this is correct is confirmed by the fact that Spinoza holds that joy is “a man’s passage from a lesser to a greater perfection” while sadness is “a man’s passage from a greater to a lesser perfection” (DA II and III). Joy is an increase in power (3p11s), and as an increase in power joy is an increase in perfection. Sadness, as a decrease in power (3p11s), is a decrease in perfection. Regarding sadness as an individual’s passage from greater to lesser perfection, Spinoza writes, “For a privation is nothing, whereas the affect of sadness is an act, which can therefore be no other act than that of passing to a lesser perfection, that is, an act by which man’s power of acting is diminished or restrained (see P11S)” (DA III exp, emphasis added). Sadness is a 4 Much has been written on Spinoza’s theory of representation. A  few illuminating treatments of his theory includes:  Margaret D. Wilson, “Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge,” in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don Garrett (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 89‒141; Michael Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-​Body Problem in Spinoza (Oxford University Press, 1996); Don Garrett, “Representation and Consciousness in Spinoza’s Naturalistic Theory of the Imagination,” in Interpreting Spinoza: Critical Essays, ed. Charlie Huenemann (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 4‒25; Michael LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence (Oxford University Press, 2010), esp. chs. 3 and 4; Justin Steinberg, “Imitation, Representation, and Humanity in Spinoza’s Ethics,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 51, no. 3 (July 2013): 383‒406.

Emotions as Axiological Information  33 transition from greater to lesser perfection because it is a transition from greater to lesser power. A change in perfection is a change in power, and vice versa. When a change is an increase in power as a whole, it is a change to greater perfection and can therefore be said to be an enhancement to the individual whose power increases. When it is a decrease in power as a whole, it is a change to lesser perfection and can be said to be an impairment to the individual whose power decreases. Spinoza writes, Superstition, on the other hand, seems to maintain that the good is what brings sadness, and the evil, what brings joy. But as we have already said (P45S), no one, unless he is envious, takes pleasure in my lack of power and misfortune. For as we are affected with a greater joy, we pass to a greater perfection, and consequently participate more in the divine nature. (4App XXXI)

Joy is an increase in power and as such is a passage to greater perfection and thus greater participation in the divine nature. To increase power is to participate to a greater degree in the divine nature because power is God’s essence (1p34).5 Lack of power and decreases in power are a misfortune and a failure to participate in the divine nature. Increases in power are increases in perfection and happiness, whereas decreases in power are decreases in perfection and increases in sadness. In ­chapter 1, I argued that in Spinoza’s view the qualitative character of an emotion represents a change in the body’s power. When someone experiences joy, for example, the qualitative character of the subject’s joy symptomatically represents an increase in his body’s power. But it symptomatically represents more than a mere increase in power. An increase in power is an enhancement to the individual whose power increases. Thus an episode of joy in individual X indicates an enhancement of X’s nature. The qualitative character of joy and the qualitative character of species of joy track and reveal enhancements

5 This is a point that Spinoza also makes in Letter 19 to Blyenbergh: As to the second difficulty, it is indeed true that the wicked express God’s will in their own way, but they are not for that reason at all comparable with the good; for the more perfection a thing has, the more it participates in Deity, and the more it expresses God’s perfection. Since, then, the good have incomparably more perfection than the wicked, their virtue cannot be compared with the virtue of the wicked, because the wicked lack the love of God that flows from the knowledge of God, and by which alone, within the limits of our human intellect, we are said to be servants of God. (Letter 19, in Spinoza: The Letters, trans. Samuel Shirley, introduction and notes by Steven Barbone, Lee Rice, and Jacob Adler [Hackett, 1995])

34  The Ethics of Joy to our nature while the qualitative character of sadness and species of sadness track and reveal impairments. Emotions are therefore axiological information in the sense that their qualitative character informs us that our power and perfection are increasing in case they are increasing, and their qualitative character informs us that our power and perfection are decreasing in case they are decreasing.6 Just as pain is informative in virtue of indicating “that the injured part is not yet decayed” (4p58s), sadness is informative in virtue of indicating that the subject’s perfection is decreasing, that is, that the subject’s nature is impaired. I am not suggesting that Spinoza believes that an emotion’s axiological information is propositionally structured information. As I  showed in ­chapter 1, an emotion’s qualitative character is a symptomatic representation where by “symptomatic representation” I mean that an emotion as it exists in the mind represents a condition in the body similar to the way that a symptom represents that of which it is symptomatic. A symptom, such as the phenomenologically qualitative character of a body temperature of 104˚F (40˚C), is not a propositionally structured representation of a state of affairs, and yet the qualitative character of an abnormally high body temperature is representational: in many cases it represents the condition that is an infection. As such, a subject’s experience of an abnormally high body temperature is informative, and this information is not axiologically neutral or indifferent. It is information about the status—​very poor status in this case—​of an individual’s nature.7 For Spinoza, the phenomenal feel of an episode of an emotion is representational like the way that the phenomenal feel of an abnormally high body temperature is representational and thus can be said to be informative. Moreover, emotive information is axiological in virtue of representing enhancements and impairments to an individual’s nature. Because increases and decreases in power have

6 Matthew Kisner arrives at a similar conclusion about passive emotions and how in Spinoza’s view passions track the status of an individual’s power. Because Spinozistic passions track the status of an individual’s power Kisner describes them as a “kind of intelligence.” I agree that passive emotions are a type of intelligence. Active emotions are a type of intelligence also. They are axiological information. See Matthew J. Kisner, “Spinoza’s Virtuous Passions,” Review of Metaphysics 61, no. 4 (June 2008): 778. 7 To say that the qualitative character of a subject’s body temperature is information about the status of the subject’s physical condition is not to say that the universe has any special concern for the individual’s physical condition. Likewise, to say that emotions are information about the status of the subject’s power of acting is not to say that the universe has any concern for the individual’s power of acting. Spinoza believes that the universe is indifferent to human beings. It is indifferent to human happiness and human misery.

Emotions as Axiological Information  35 axiological significance, the qualitative character of an emotion has axiological significance. If increases and decreases in power were value neutral states, an emotion’s symptomatic representation of an increase in power would be informative but it would have no axiological significance. Therefore, if increases and decreases in power were neutral, an emotion’s symptomatic representation of an increase in power would be on a par with a sensory idea’s symptomatic representation of a state of the body. Just as a sensory idea of the sun, for example, is a purely value neutral representation of a value neutral state of the body, as well as this state’s causal history, an episode of joy would be a purely value neutral representation of a purely value neutral state of the body’s power, as well as its causal history. But this is not Spinoza’s view. Emotions importantly differ from sensory ideas. Emotions are increases and decreases in power (3D3). This is the basis for an emotion’s axiological significance. There is no reason to think that Spinoza believes that sensory ideas are increases and decreases in power, and this accounts for their lack of axiological significance. Enhancements and impairments of an individual’s power and perfection are not mysterious events that take place beyond the threshold of experience. Anyone who is familiar with joy is familiar with an enhancement of his nature. Anyone familiar with sadness is familiar with an impairment of his nature. When Spinoza writes, “The knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an affect of Joy or Sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it” (4p8, emphasis in original), it is easy for us post-​Humeans and post-​Stevensonians to imagine that he is expressing a familiar view about the non-​cognitive basis of ethical belief and ethical language. But this is a mistake that rests on a relatively commonplace contemporary commitment. Spinoza is not a non-​cognitivist about the basis of ethical belief and ethical language because he is not a non-​cognitivist about emotion.8 Emotions are information. An emotion’s qualitative character discloses that we are undergoing an enhancement to our nature when our power is increasing and discloses that we are undergoing an impairment to our nature when our power is decreasing. So to experience joy (i.e., to experience an enhancement of one’s nature) is to know 8 William K. Frankena makes a similar point about 4p8 where he writes, “As for the first problem—​ we have seen that P8, IV, does not commit Spinoza to emotivism. For him P8 is just a derivative equation that looks like something an emotivist would say but is not, for behind it is the view that an affect is a kind of cognition, confused or not, of a state of the body.” See William K. Frankena, “Spinoza on the Knowledge of Good and Evil,” Philosophia 7, no. 1 (March 1977): 42.

36  The Ethics of Joy goodness (4p8). To experience sadness (i.e., to experience an impairment to one’s nature) is to know badness (4p8). An episode of an emotion is cognition of good or, as the case may be, cognition of evil.

2. Axiological Ambiguity Unlike cheerfulness (hilaritas) and melancholy (melancholia), not all emotive information is axiologically unambiguous. Some emotions are, other things equal, good. Some are, other things equal, bad. Pain (dolor) is a type of sadness and, as with all types of sadness, it is a decrease in power. Because it is a decrease in power, pain is bad, but unlike melancholy, pain is not invariably bad (4p43). In contrast with emotions that are always good and others that are always bad, pain is, other things equal, bad. For example, a painful medical procedure that results in the improved health of the patient is a case in which other things are not equal and, as a result, an episode of such pain is good, or at least it is not irredeemably bad. Spinoza writes, Pain [Dolor], on the other hand, which is a sadness, cannot be good, considered in itself alone (by P41). But because its force and growth are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our power (by P5), we can conceive infinite degrees and modes of the powers of this affect (by P3). And so we can conceive it to be such that it can restrain pleasure, so that it is not excessive. (4p43d)

Pain, though it can never be good in and of itself, is good when it serves as a check against excessive pleasure. Thus there are cases in which the decrease in power that is pain is good for the person who suffers the pain. In such cases pain helps the subject avoid a greater decrease in power that would occur from a debilitating pleasure, such as the sort of pleasure that we obtain from consuming alcohol. Spinoza says, “Finally, from P57 it follows that there is no small difference between the gladness [gaudium] by which a drunk [ebrius] is led and the gladness [gaudium] a philosopher possesses” (3p57s). Other things equal, pleasure is good. But other things are not equal when the pleasure is the pleasure that a drunkard enjoys while consuming alcohol. The pleasure in such cases is bad. Similarly, other things equal, pain is bad. But other things are not equal when the pain is the pain that a drunkard suffers

Emotions as Axiological Information  37 when he is not able to satisfy his desire for alcohol. In such cases the pain is good or, at least, it is not irredeemably bad.9 It is important to see that only passive emotions can be qualified as, other things equal, good, and only passive emotions can be qualified as, other things equal, bad (4App III).10 This is because a passive emotion’s occurrence and intensity do not necessarily indicate increases and decreases that contribute to what is truly good for the subject (4p5). It is in this sense that passive emotions and the desires that issue from them are blind (4p58s, 4p59s). Passive emotions and passive desires are blind in that they do not necessarily track what is truly good for a subject. They track increases and decreases in the body’s power, but passive emotions do not necessarily track what is truly good and truly bad for human nature. They do not necessarily do so because, unlike active emotions, passive emotions have a causal history that includes factors other than an individual’s adequate causal power. Their causal history includes, for instance, natural objects (4p4, 4p4c). There are natural objects that causally contribute to decreases in an individual’s power, and there are natural objects that contribute to increases in power. But no natural object affects us the way it does by virtue of being inherently regulated to affect us the way it does: “things do not act in order to affect us with Joy, and their power of acting is not regulated by our advantage” (4App XXX). Objects causally impinge on us and thereby bring about increases and decreases in our power, but the increases and decreases that they cause are not necessarily in agreement with human nature.11 It is not the purpose of natural objects to contribute positively or negatively to human nature (1App, 4Pref). The mushroom Amanita phalloides, also known as the “death cap,” can, when eaten, destroy a human. But the death cap does not destroy a human with the

9 From a desire for alcohol an alcoholic will judge that consuming alcohol is good and that the absence of, and the lack of access to, alcohol is bad (3p39s). But this does not mean that the alcoholic’s judgments are correct. An alcoholic’s judgments about the goodness of alcohol and the badness of teetotalism result from impairments in the alcoholic’s mind and body. For discussion of what serves as the foundation of the correctness of evaluative judgments, see c­ hapters 3 and 5, this volume. 10 It is also the case that only passive emotions can be designated always bad, as is the case with melancholy, for instance (4p42). An active emotion, such as cheerfulness, is always good (4p42, 4App III, 4App VI). 11 A decrease in power that is, other things equal, bad can in some cases be good in the sense that it is better than its alternatives. As I have discussed, Spinoza believes that pain is, other things equal, bad (4p43d). In some cases pain serves as a check against excessive pleasure and in this way is good, or at least it is less bad than the alternatives. Thus it is not the case that a decrease in power necessarily disagrees with an individual’s true advantage.

38  The Ethics of Joy purpose of destroying a human. The belief that it destroys people with the purpose of doing so is a falsehood derived from the prejudice that Spinoza exposes in the Appendix to Part 1: “All the prejudices I here undertake to expose depend on this one:  that men commonly suppose that all natural things act, as men do, on account of an end; indeed, they maintain as certain that God himself directs all things to some certain end, for they say that God has made all things for man, and man that he might worship God” (1App G II/78 33–36). Natural objects do not act on account of an end. A fortiori they do not act on account of human advantage and are not inherently regulated by our advantage. The passive joy that a natural object causes a subject can be contrary to what is best for the subject, as can be the case, for example, with the causal power of Papaver somniferum, the opium poppy. An opium poppy can cause an individual to experience a type of passive joy, but the joy that it causes is not inherently regulated by the individual’s advantage. Because factors external to an individual’s adequate causal power cause passive emotions, passive emotions do not necessarily indicate contributions to the subject’s overall adequate causal power. The joy they cause is, other things equal, good, and the sadness they cause is, other things equal, bad.12 Going forward, when I  talk about emotions as enhancements and impairments of power I refer inclusively to emotions that are always good and always bad and those that are other-​things-​equal good and other-​things-​ equal bad, unless I indicate otherwise. In addition to the axiological ambiguity of many emotions, people are susceptible to misreading and misunderstanding their emotive information, as is the case with the superstitious, thinking as some do that joy is bad and that sadness is good (4App XXX). As I discussed in c­ hapter 1, when someone who believes that joy is bad experiences joy, he has, as a result, conflicting evaluative judgments. On the one hand, he judges that the apparent source of joy is good. The judgment, “X is good,” where the referent of “X” is the apparent source of joy, necessarily follows from an episode of joy (4p8d). On the other hand, he judges that joy is bad and that the apparent source of joy is bad. The judgment, “X is bad,” where the referent of “X” is the apparent source of joy, follows from his superstitious set of beliefs. On the basis of his superstitious beliefs, he misreads the information that his emotions carry. Emotions are not “mute pictures on a panel” (1App II/​132 10). They are information in virtue of symptomatically representing the status of an

12 For further discussion of the goodness and badness of objects, see c ­ hapter 6, this volume.

Emotions as Axiological Information  39 individual’s perfection. They are informative in the way a symptom is informative, and just as medical experts can and sometimes do misread an individual’s symptoms, people can and sometimes do misread their own emotions. It is not that there is no joy and no goodness to be obtained from whiskey, opium, and the like. It is that the joy that we obtain from them is not as empowering and not as lacking in disempowering side effects as other sources of joy, such as knowledge and friendship.

Conclusion Spinoza believes that we have a nature and that our nature can undergo enhancements as well as impairments. Power is our nature. Increases in power are enhancements of our nature. Decreases are impairments. Emotions in Spinoza’s view are increases and decreases in an individual’s power, and it is by means of the qualitative character of increases and decreases in our power that we cognize enhancements and impairments to our nature. An episode of joy is an indication that one’s nature is improving. An episode of the feeling of sadness is an indication that it is impaired. Because the qualitative characters of emotions are symptomatic of enhancements and impairments to our nature, emotions are axiological information. A  clearheaded grasp of an episode of joy as a symptom of enhancement and a clearheaded grasp of an episode of sadness as a symptom of impairment constitute axiological knowledge. It is knowledge of good and evil.

3 Spinoza’s Moral Realism Introduction In this chapter I show that Spinoza is committed to a type of moral realism.1 By “moral realism” I mean a theory of the way of life that is best for us as human beings, a theory based on a view on which good and bad are objective properties.2 By “objective property” I mean a property whose instance(s) 1 In the secondary literature an anti-​realist reading of Spinoza’s theory of goodness and badness is maintained by Donald Rutherford, “Spinoza and the Dictates of Reason,” Inquiry 51, no. 5 (October 2008): 508; Yitzhak Y. Melamed, “Spinoza’s Metaphysics of Substance: The Substance-​Mode Relation as a Relation of Inherence and Predication,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68, no. 1 (January 2009):  51‒53; Michael LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 153‒154, here p. 161; Jeffrey K. McDonough, “The Heyday of Teleology and Early Modern Philosophy,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 35 (2011):  192; Matthew Kisner, Spinoza on Human Freedom (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 94‒96 and note 21, pp. 102‒106; Charles Jarrett, “Spinozistic Constructivism,” in Essays on Spinoza’s Ethical Theory, ed. Matthew J. Kisner and Andrew Youpa (Oxford University Press, 2014); Michael A. Rosenthal, “Politics and Ethics in Spinoza: The Problem of Normativity,” in Essays on Spinoza’s Ethical Theory, ed. Matthew J. Kisner and Andrew Youpa (Oxford University Press, 2014); Samuel Newlands, “Spinoza and the Metaphysics of Perfection,” in Spinoza’s Ethics: A Critical Guide, ed. Yitzhak Y. Melamed (Cambridge University Press, 2017). Interpretations with a realist character include William Frankena, “Spinoza on the Knowledge of Good and Evil,” Philosophia 7, no. 1 (March 1977): 24‒29; Ruth Mattern, “Spinoza and Ethical Subjectivism,” in New Essays on Rationalism and Empiricism, ed. Charles E. Jarrett, John King-​ Farlow, and F. J. Pelletier (Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1978), pp. 59‒82; E. M. Curley, “Spinoza’s Moral Philosophy,” in Spinoza:  A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Marjorie Grene (University of Notre Dame Press, 1979[1973]), pp. 354‒376; R. J. Delahunty, Spinoza:  The Arguments of the Philosophers (Routledge, 1985), pp. 229‒231; Alan Donagan, Spinoza (University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 162‒163; Don Garrett, “‘A Free Man Always Acts Honestly, Not Deceptively’:  Freedom and the Good in Spinoza’s Ethics,” in Spinoza:  Issues and Directions:  The Proceedings of the Chicago Spinoza Conference, ed. Edwin Curley and Françios Moreau (E. J. Brill, 1990), p.  229; Jon Miller, “Spinoza’s Axiology,” in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, volume 2, ed. Daniel Garber and Steven Nadler (Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 160‒166 and 169‒170; Steven Nadler, Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 218‒220; Andrew Youpa, “Spinoza’s Theories of Value,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19, no. 2 (2010): 209‒229; Colin Marshall, “Moral Realism in Spinoza’s Ethics,” in Spinoza’s Ethics: A Critical Guide, ed. Yitzhak Y. Melamed (Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 248‒265. 2 In seeking to demonstrate a theory of the way of life that is best, Spinoza seeks to demonstrate a normative ethical theory. A normative ethical theory, as I understand it here, is a set of doctrines concerning how we ought to live and how we ought not to live, and in Spinoza’s case this set of doctrines is anchored in a model of human excellence. This model, the free human, is a conception of how a human life ought to be. It consists of a set of doctrines concerning how we ought and ought not to live, although the doctrines are not explicitly formulated in terms of how we ought and ought not to live. The absence of ought statements and ought-​not statements in the Ethics might seem to suggest The Ethics of Joy. Andrew Youpa, Oxford University Press (2020) © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190086022.001.0001

Spinoza’s Moral Realism  41 does (do) not directly depend on anyone’s desires, emotions, or beliefs about its existence and nature. For example, in accordance with this definition, diabetic is an objective property because an instance of diabetes does not directly depend on anyone’s desires, emotions, and beliefs about the existence and nature of diabetes. To use an example Spinoza would have been familiar with, dropsy is an objective property.3 Dropsy is objective in the sense that instances of dropsy do not directly depend on anyone’s desires, emotions, or beliefs about the existence and nature of dropsy. In contrast, being the most well-​liked ice cream flavor does not count as an objective property because an instance of the most well-​liked ice cream flavor directly depends on someone’s desires, emotions, and beliefs about a flavor of ice cream. Whereas instances of dropsy would have existed even if people had remained completely ignorant of such instances and, moreover, dropsy would have existed even if no one had ever had an unfavorable attitude toward it, being the most well-​liked ice cream flavor is a property an instance of which cannot exist without the existence of a favorable attitude toward a flavor of ice cream. Because instances of the property of being the most well-​liked ice cream flavor directly depend for their existence on desires, it is what I will call a “subjective property.” In this chapter I argue that, for Spinoza, the properties of goodness and badness are objective properties in the sense that diabetes and dropsy are objective properties. Instances of goodness do not directly depend on someone’s desires, emotions, and beliefs about the existence and nature of goodness. The same holds for badness. My argument for this reading hinges on the conception of human nature that Spinoza appeals to in his definition of “virtue” (4D8). This conception of human nature, I argue, serves as the

that his ethical project is not normative, and that he is instead merely describing and predicting how things turn out in the lives of differently constituted individuals. But with respect to the question whether it is a normative project, it makes a difference how the individuals are differently constituted. Spinoza describes how things go for differently constituted individuals, and he describes how things go for ignorant, powerless, and unhappy individuals, on the one hand, and knowledgeable, powerful, and happy individuals, on the other. Thus Spinoza’s moral philosophy is normative because the categories fundamental to his theory are normative. He gives us a science of happiness. The fact that it is a science, or that it is presented as such, is compatible with it also being a normative project. No doubt the word “normative” has a variety of meanings, and I am not suggesting that Spinoza’s moral philosophy is normative in every way that the word “normative” is used in philosophical discourse. For a reading according to which Spinoza does not offer a normative moral philosophy in a Kantian sense of “normative,” see Rutherford, “Spinoza and the Dictates of Reason.” 3 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, CSM II 58–​59, AT VII 84–​85.

42  The Ethics of Joy foundation for the objectivity of the properties of goodness and badness, and I contend that it is this that makes Spinoza a type of moral realist.4

1.  A Theory of Axiological Experience In ­chapter 2, I argued for the view that Spinoza believes that emotions are axiological information. My argument for this reading rests in part on his view that increases in an individual’s power are enhancements to an individual’s nature while decreases in power are impairments to his nature. Some increases are always good (e.g., cheerfulness) while others are, other things equal, good (e.g., pleasure). Some decreases in power are always bad (e.g., melancholy), and other decreases are, other things equal, bad (e.g., pain). An important piece of evidence for this reading is Spinoza’s appeal in the demonstrations of 4p41 and 4p42 to his view that emotions are increases and decreases in power. Joy, as an increase in power, is good. Sadness, as a decrease in power, is bad. Every emotion, not including desires, is either a species of joy or a species of sadness (3p11s). So the goodness and badness of every emotion depends on whether it is an increase or a decrease in power. Moreover, Spinoza writes, “As far as desires are concerned, they, of course, are good or evil insofar as they arise from good or evil affects” (4p58s; cf. 4p45c2). Good desires follow from good emotions. Bad desires follow from bad emotions. Thus the goodness of an emotion is the source of the goodness of the desire that arises from it, and the badness of an emotion is the source of the badness of a desire that issues from it. Because emotions are good and bad in virtue of being increases and decreases in power and because desires are good and bad in virtue of issuing from good and bad emotions, increases and decreases in power do not derive their goodness and badness from emotions and desires. In other words, emotions and desires are not the source of the enhancing property of increases in power; nor are they the source of the impairing property of decreases in power. 4 Colin Marshall argues that Spinoza is a moral realist, and his argument rests in part on Spinoza’s definition of “virtue” in Ethics 4D8. I agree with Marshall that Spinoza is a moral realist and I agree with his view that 4D8 is crucial for understanding the realist foundation of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. What makes it crucial is not only that, as Marshall suggests, it reveals that there is an important sense in which virtue is real, but it also reveals the conception of human nature that serves as Spinoza’s model of human nature and that serves as the foundation of the objectivity of the properties of goodness and badness. 4D8 discloses the realist foundation of Spinoza’s moral philosophy, and it is part of my aim in this chapter to set out this foundation. See Marshall, “Moral Realism in Spinoza’s Ethics.”

Spinoza’s Moral Realism  43 Although this does not disclose the basis of the goodness and badness of increases and decreases in power, it rules out one alternative: the remarks about goodness and badness in the scholium to 3p39s. There Spinoza writes, By good here I understand every kind of joy, and whatever leads to it, and especially what satisfies any kind of longing, whatever that may be. And by evil [I understand here] every kind of sadness, and especially what frustrates longing.

Independent of Part 4 of the Ethics, this might appear to be a theory of what makes good things good and bad things bad. But, as we have seen, Spinoza holds that joy, sadness, and desires are themselves good and bad and, as we have also seen, he does not leave us guessing as to the source of their goodness and badness (i.e., 4p41d, 4p42d, 4p43d). Pleasure, a species of joy, is bad when it is the pleasure that the envious take in other people’s misfortune, and this is because envy is a species of hatred (4p45c1) and as such is a decrease in the power of the envious individual’s body.5 If Spinoza’s remarks about goodness and badness in 3p39s really did amount to a theory of value, it would certainly be possible to contrive a basis for the badness of the envious person’s pleasure, but it would not be the power-​impairment basis that Spinoza accepts. Given that the remarks about goodness and badness in 3p39s do not qualify as a theory of value, what is he up to there? In the same scholium he provides examples to illustrate what he thinks follows from his remarks about goodness and badness: So each one, from his own affect, judges, or evaluates, what is good and what is bad, what is better and what is worse, and finally, what is best and what is worst. So the greedy man judges an abundance of money best, and poverty worst. The ambitious man desires nothing so much as esteem and dreads nothing so much as shame. To the envious nothing is more agreeable than another’s unhappiness, and nothing more burdensome than another’s happiness. And so, each one, from his own affect, judges a thing good or bad, useful or useless. (3p39s) 5 Strictly speaking, pleasure (titillatio) is, other things equal, good (4p43, 4p43d). But other things are not equal when it comes to the pleasure that the envious person takes in another’s unhappiness. As a result, the envious person’s pleasure is bad. I wish to thank Steven Nadler for pressing me to clarify this point.

44  The Ethics of Joy I discussed this passage in c­ hapter 1 in the context of Spinoza’s view that basic evaluative judgments are parasitic on emotions. Basic evaluative judgments are parasitic on emotions in that an episode of the qualitative character of an emotion gives rise to an evaluative judgment. A greedy man’s desire for wealth gives rise to his judgment that wealth is good. An ambitious man’s desire for esteem (gloriam) leads him to judge that esteem is good. From envy the envious judge that others’ unhappiness is good. And so on and so forth. People judge that joy is good. We also judge things that lead to the satisfaction of desire are good. People judge that sadness is bad. We also judge things that fail to satisfy desire are bad. According to 3p39s, people judge as good any joy and anything that they desire. But the fact that people evaluate things in this way does not entail that their joys really are good and that their evaluations are correct. Surely the greedy, the envious, and the ambitious are, in Spinoza’s view, mistaken about what is truly good and truly bad. After all, they fail to grasp that knowledge of God is the mind’s greatest good (4p28). Because they are mistaken about what is truly good and truly bad, it would be more than a little odd if in the scholium to 3p39 Spinoza were offering his official theory of what makes things good and bad. The greedy, the envious, the ambitious, the drunkard, etc., judge that their joys are good and judge that the objects of their desires are good. Likewise, the noble and the free judge that their joys are good and judge that the objects of their desires are good. Nothing follows from this about what is good and what is bad. What follows is that our joys and the objects of our desires appear to us as good and are judged as good by us. Our sadness and the objects that fail to satisfy our desires appear to us to be bad and are judged as bad by us. This is a matter of descriptive psychology. From this descriptive psychological thesis it is a mistake to conclude anything about what really makes things good and really makes things bad. Such a mistake is tantamount to holding that Spinoza believes that we should consult the greedy, the envious, and the ambitious for advice and wisdom about what we should and should not pursue in life. I can think of no reason, Spinozistic or otherwise, to take such a reading seriously. It is inaccurate then to call the 3p39s discussion of goodness and badness a theory of value, as I previously have.6 It is not a theory of value, if by “theory

6 Youpa, “Spinoza’s Theories of Value.”

Spinoza’s Moral Realism  45 of value” one means an account of what makes things good and bad.7 Instead, the remarks about goodness and badness in 3p39s are best described as a theory of axiological experience—​that is, a theory of how people experience things as having value and disvalue and come to make evaluative judgments. Regardless of whether it is an increase in power as a whole or an increase in only one part, every first-​personal instance of an increase in power is an episode of joy, and every first-​personal episode of joy is judged good by the person who experiences the joy. Furthermore, any object of our desire will appear to us as good and be judged good. For example, an object of individual X’s desire will appear to X to be good and will be judged as such by X. So “good” in the context of this descriptive psychology means joy and anything that leads to the joy that comes from the satisfaction of desire. Similarly, “bad” in this context means sadness and anything that fails to lead to the satisfaction of desire. This explains and illuminates what people mean when they use the words “good” and “bad” in ordinary usage. It does not explain what makes things good and bad. An additional reason for thinking that this reading is correct—​that is, that in 3p39s Spinoza is not offering his official theory of value but, rather, a theory of axiological experience—​is that there is no mention of 3p39s in 4 Preface and in 4D1 and 4D2 where “good” and “bad” are defined. Again, it would be odd if 3p39s were the official theory of value and yet he neglects to cite his official theory when spelling out what he means by “good” and “bad” at the beginning of Ethics Part 4. On the other hand, it makes perfect sense that it would not be mentioned in 4 Preface and in 4D1 and 4D2 if and because it is not his official theory of value. On the reading I am defending, it is not a theory of value at all and therefore has no place in 4 Preface and in 4D1 and 4D2. This is the reason that it makes no appearance in the opening pages of Part 4. If emotions and desires are not the source of the goodness of increases in power and the badness of decreases in power, what then is (are) the source(s)? What in Spinoza’s view is the basis for his view that increases in power are enhancements while decreases are impairments? Answering 7 By an “account of what makes things good and bad” I mean a theory of what makes something good according to which it is possible for someone to be mistaken about the goodness of something that he believes is good. Similarly for “bad.” Of course, it could have been the case, and, according to the anti-​realist reading that I discussed in ­chapter 2, it is the case, that Spinoza does not present a theory of value in this sense. But such a reading need not detain us here; it is, as I argued in ­chapter 2, an implausible reading of Spinoza.

46  The Ethics of Joy these questions will enable us to see whether Spinoza subscribes to a type of moral realism. So far I have argued that two alternatives are unsatisfactory. In ­chapter 2, I examined the unqualified anti-​realist reading. Recall that the unqualified anti-​realist maintains that, for Spinoza, increases in power are neither better nor worse than decreases in power and, according to this reading, Spinoza is committed to the view that there is no source of the goodness and badness of increases and decreases in power because at bottom they are neither good nor bad. This, however, conflicts with Spinoza’s view that joy and cheerfulness, as increases in power, are good, and that sadness and melancholy, as decreases in power, are bad (4p41d, 4p42d). In addition to the unqualified anti-​realist reading, so far in the present chapter I looked at whether Spinoza’s 3p39s remarks concerning goodness and badness disclose the basis of the goodness and badness of increases and decreases in power. I will call this the qualified anti-​realist reading. A problem for this reading is that emotions and desires are themselves good and bad, and they are good and bad in virtue of being increases and decreases in power. Moreover, the 3p39s remarks are, I have argued, best understood as a theory of how we experience things as having value and disvalue and come to make basic evaluative judgments. This is supported by the particular examples Spinoza uses to illustrate the view that he presents in 3p39s (i.e., greed, ambition, and envy), examples of individuals who are mistaken about what is truly good and truly bad, and it also explains the conspicuous absence of 3p39s in Spinoza’s 4 Preface and 4D1 and 4D2 treatment of goodness and badness.

2.  An Argument for a Moral Realist Reading of Spinoza Although it may appear incomplete as it stands, what Spinoza regards as the source of the goodness of increases in power and the badness of decreases in power is disclosed in 4 Preface and in 4D1 and 4D2: In what follows, therefore, I shall understand by good what we know certainly is a means by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature that we set before ourselves. By evil, what we certainly know prevents us from becoming like that model. Next, we shall say that men are more perfect or imperfect, insofar as they approach more or less near to this model. (4Pref)

Spinoza’s Moral Realism  47 By good I shall understand what we certainly know to be useful to us. (4D1) By evil, however, I shall understand what we certainly know prevents us from being masters of some good. Exp.: On these definitions, see the preceding preface. (4D2)

In the Explication to 4D2 Spinoza refers the reader to his discussion of goodness and badness in 4 Preface, and so I will treat these remarks as a unit and therefore as a single theory. In contrast with the 3p39s desire-​satisfaction theory, in 4Pref-​ 4D1-​4D2 Spinoza defines “goodness” in terms of what is useful for approaching a model of human nature and defines “badness” in terms of what prevents us from approaching such a model. This is a perfectionist theory of value. For it grounds the nature of goodness and badness in an exemplar of human nature. What makes this account seemingly incomplete is that it appears not to specify the conception of human nature that serves as the model. At least, in 4 Preface, 4D1, and 4D2, there is no specification of the conception of human nature that serves as the model. But this does not mean that there is no conception of human nature that serves as the one true model of human nature. Nor does it mean that Spinoza does not specify the conception in the definitions that open Ethics Part 4. Notwithstanding the truckload of scholarly ink that has been spilled on this issue, and in full acknowledgment that I have contributed to it,8 4D8 can hardly be more unambiguous about the conception of human nature that serves as the model: By virtue and power I understand the same thing, that is (by IIIP7), virtue, insofar as it is related to man, is the very essence, or nature, of man, insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone. (4D8)

“Virtue” and “power” have the same meaning. The virtuous person is therefore the powerful person, and the powerful person is the virtuous person. I will not argue that it is not possible that the person of virtue-​power is not the conception of human nature that serves as Spinoza’s model of human nature. Such a reading is conceivable. However, unless and until there is a good reason to think

8 Andrew Youpa, “Spinoza’s Model of Human Nature,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 48, no. 1 (January 2010): 61‒76.

48  The Ethics of Joy otherwise, there can be no serious doubt that the person of virtue-​power is Spinoza’s model of human nature. In the concluding lines of the Ethics he writes, With this I  have finished all the things I  wished to show concerning the mind’s power over the affects and its freedom. From what has been shown, it is clear how much the wise man is capable of, and how much more powerful he is than one who is ignorant and is driven only by lust. (5p42s, emphasis added)

What makes Spinoza’s wise person superior to the ignorant man is the wise person’s superior power by comparison to the ignorant person. The ignorant person lacks power and is therefore weak, and because virtue and power are the same thing, the ignorant person lacks virtue and fails to act from virtue. “Therefore, he who is ignorant of himself, and consequently (as we have just now shown) of all the virtues, does not act from virtue at all, that is (as is evident from D8), is extremely weak-​minded [maximè animo impotens]” (4p56d). Virtue is identical to power, and lack of virtue is identical to weakness. To lack virtue is to be disempowered. The good life is a virtuous life. It is the empowered life. Because the specific type of power is the “power of bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone” (4D8), and because a thing is said to be free in case it exists “from the necessity of its nature alone” and is “determined to act by itself alone” (1D7), the model of virtue-​power is identical to the model of freedom. Spinoza’s conception of the free human is the model of human nature because it is the model of optimal human power (4p67, 4p69, 4p70, 4p71, 4p72). What is more, 4D8 makes clear the foundation for this model. By citing 3p7 in his definition of “virtue” (4D8), Spinoza discloses the metaphysical and psychological foundation for his model of human nature. Its foundation is the conatus doctrine. 3p7 reads, “The striving [Conatus] by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing” (emphasis in original). An individual’s striving to persevere in being is identical to his “power of bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone” (4D8). If the appeal to 3p7 in 4D8 leaves any doubt about this, there are additional passages where the same identity is expressed, such as the following: 3P37d: Sadness diminishes or restrains a man’s power of acting (by P11S), i.e. (by P7), diminishes or restrains the striving by which a man strives to persevere in his being.

Spinoza’s Moral Realism  49 4p4d: The power by which singular things (and consequently, [any] man) preserve their being is the power itself of God, or Nature (by IP24C), not insofar as it is infinite, but insofar as it can be explained through the man’s actual essence (by IIIP7). The man’s power, therefore, insofar as it is explained through his actual essence, is part of God or Nature’s infinite power, that is (by IP34), of its essence. 4p20d: Virtue is human power itself, which is defined by man’s essence alone (by D8), that is (by IIIP7), solely by the striving by which man strives to persevere in his being. So the more each strives, and is able, to preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue. And consequently (by IIIP4 and P6), insofar as someone neglects to preserve his being, he lacks power, q.e.d.

These passages confirm that power of acting and striving to persevere in being, in Spinoza’s view, are identical. They are one and the same thing. Not only is the virtuous person identical to the powerful person, the virtuous-​ powerful person is identical to the person who most effectively strives to persevere in being. Spinoza’s conception of the conatus is the conception of human nature that serves as his model of human nature.9 In 4 Preface Spinoza introduces the idea of a model of human nature on the heels of his attack on ideas that are used as models of man-​made things and natural things. On the one hand, he is critical of the use of models of natural things as evaluative standards for such things. On the other hand, he uses the idea of a model of human nature in his definitions of “goodness” and “badness,” as well as his definitions of “perfect” and “imperfect.” This naturally raises questions about his use of a model of human nature. Does Spinoza believe that his model has credentials that other models lack? If so, what are its credentials? Alternatively, if not, what is the point of introducing a model at all if all such ideas are hopelessly confused? If models are hopelessly confused, why engage in a bizarre game of pretending to demonstrate hopelessly confused propositions? In light of his appeal to 3p7 in his definition of “virtue” (4D8), his attack on ideas that serve as models is, I believe, best understood as an attack on a specific type of model—​namely the type that has no basis in anything but human imagination and passive emotion, which is to say that he is critical of ignorant conceptions of natural things. He concludes his attack on models of natural things stating, “We see, therefore, that men are accustomed 9 Youpa, “Spinoza’s Model of Human Nature,” pp. 61‒76.

50  The Ethics of Joy to call natural things perfect or imperfect more from prejudice than from true knowledge of those things” (4Pref). Needless to say, Spinoza believes that his conception of the conatus neither is a prejudice nor is it based on prejudice(s). In the demonstration of 3p7 he appeals to 1p29, 1p36, and 3p6, and there is no reason to believe that Spinoza regards these propositions as prejudices. So the conception of human nature that serves as Spinoza’s model of human nature possesses credentials that other models lack.10 Its credentials are the axioms, definitions, and theorems from which 3p7 is derived. Because the conatus is the conception of human nature that serves as the model, the concept of the conatus describes what a thing at the core really is and, at the same time, it serves as a standard for what a thing should be. Each and every finite thing is an expression of God’s adequate causal power and as such is a (finite) system of adequate causal power. Moreover, each and every finite thing should be the most powerful system of adequate causal power that it can be. It is evident from the demonstration of 4p4, for instance, that a finite thing is a system of God’s adequate causal power and that a finite thing can reach varying levels of success in expressing God’s adequate causal power. In 4p4d Spinoza states, “Next, if it were possible that a man could undergo no changes except those which can be understood through the man’s nature alone, it would follow (by IIIP4 and P6) that he could not perish, but that necessarily he would always exist” (4p4d). If a person could undergo no changes except those that follow from his nature, then he, like God, would always exist. But it is not the case that all the changes that a person undergoes follow from his nature alone. Only some of the changes follow from his nature alone. At least some, if not most, of the changes do not follow from a person’s nature alone, and this is unavoidably the case (4p4c). Although we are systems of adequate causal power, our nature is fragile. An individual’s nature can be impaired. Many things are capable of impairing an individual’s power (4p3). We are inescapably vulnerable to external causal factors, and insofar as external factors impair our power, we have less success as systems of adequate causal power than we do insofar as our power is unimpaired. 10 This is in line with Henry Allison’s view that “the most reasonable reading is that [Spinoza] is suggesting that the problem with traditional morality is not that it appeals to a model of human nature, but that it appeals to a bad model, one based on inadequate ideas. Presumably Spinoza’s alternative model will be based on an adequate idea of human nature” (Henry E. Alison, Benedict de Spinoza: An Introduction, rev. ed. [Yale University Press, 1987], pp. 142‒143). Steven Nadler reaches a similar conclusion: “Thus, Spinoza can say that while good and evil will remain relative to some standard, the standard itself is not relative to just anyone’s conception of what the good life is but is in conformity with human nature itself ” (Nadler, Spinoza’s Ethics, p. 220). Also see Curley, “Spinoza’s Moral Philosophy,” p. 364.

Spinoza’s Moral Realism  51 When we have little success at fulfilling our nature as systems of adequate causal power, we are passive and weak. Passivity and weakness do not bring true happiness and the highest blessedness. On the contrary, they are sources of misery and a life without true peace of mind. To return to the concluding lines of the Ethics, From what has been shown, it is clear how much the wise man is capable of, and how much more powerful he is than one who is ignorant and is driven only by lust. For not only is the ignorant man troubled in many ways by external causes, and unable ever to possess true peace of mind, but he also lives as if he knew neither himself, nor God, nor things; and as soon as he ceases to be acted on, he ceases to be. On the other hand, the wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, is hardly troubled in spirit, but being, by a certain eternal necessity, conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, he never ceases to be, but always possesses true peace of mind. (5p42s)

We should seek to increase activity and power and seek to avoid passivity and weakness. This is because power is our actual essence. Power makes us what we really are: “things that express, in a certain and determinate way, God’s power, by which God is and acts” (3p6d). Insofar as we lead lives in agreement with our actual essence, we achieve true happiness. Insofar as we do not, we are miserable. Because 3p7 discloses what an individual really is and what he should be, 3p7 is a central principle of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Furthermore, because power is the property that is singled out as our nature, Spinoza subscribes to the Goodness as Power Enhancement and the Badness as Power Impairment Doctrines: Goodness as Power Enhancement Doctrine: Goodness is identical to power enhancement. Badness as Power Impairment Doctrine:  Badness is identical to power impairment.11 11 These doctrines are in agreement with a strand of interpretation in Michael LeBuffe’s From Bondage to Freedom (cf. pp. 142, 144, 170) and in Matthew J. Kisner’s Spinoza on Human Freedom (cf. pp. 76, 88, 110). But while LeBuffe and Kisner maintain that, for Spinoza, goodness is in some sense an increase in power and badness is in some sense a decrease in power, they treat the foundational conceptions of goodness and badness on a desire-​satisfaction model. They read Spinoza as holding that what fundamentally makes something good is that it is an object of someone’s desire or satisfies someone’s desire. Bad things are bad in virtue of being the object of someone’s aversion or something that frustrates someone’s desire. In contrast, goodness, on my reading, is power enhancement,

52  The Ethics of Joy Apart from particular enhancements to a singular thing’s power, there is no distinct property of goodness. There is no unique and irreducible property of goodness apart from the increases in power that singular things undergo. Likewise, apart from particular impairments, there is no unique and irreducible property of badness. For Spinoza, some ethical properties are identical to metaphysical properties.12 Thus the question of the objective or subjective status of the properties of goodness and badness boils down to the question whether the properties of power enhancement and power impairment are objective or, alternatively, subjective. As I stated at the outset, by “objective property” I mean a property whose instance(s) does (do) not directly depend on anyone’s desires, emotions, or beliefs about the existence and nature of the property. Dropsy, for example, is an objective property because instances of dropsy do not directly depend on anyone’s desires, emotions, and beliefs about the existence and nature of dropsy. Even if no one had any knowledge of dropsy and even if no one had an unfavorable attitude toward it, dropsy could and would afflict and impair people. Do instances of power enhancement and instances of power impairment directly depend on anyone’s desires, emotions, and beliefs about the existence and nature of power enhancement and the existence and nature of power impairment? I do not think that there can be any doubt that they do not directly depend on anyone’s desires, emotions, and beliefs. Regardless and desires themselves are good or bad depending on whether they follow from emotions that are enhancements or impairments of an individual’s power. For more on the goodness and badness of desires, see c­ hapter 5, this volume. Although there are important differences between their views, in the end LeBuffe and Kisner steer clear of a moral realist reading. LeBuffe’s is a projectivist and pragmatist reading (From Bondage to Freedom, pp. 154, 169) and Kisner’s is subjectivist (Spinoza on Human Freedom, pp. 94‒97). 12 This reading agrees with G. E. Moore’s view that Spinoza identifies the property of goodness with a metaphysical property. In his Principia Ethica Moore identifies two types of ethical theory that he charges with committing his naturalistic fallacy. One type Moore calls “naturalistic ethics” and the other “metaphysical ethics” (pp. 91‒94 and pp. 161‒164). According to Moore, a naturalistic ethics holds that ethics is an “empirical or positive science: its conclusions could be all established by means of empirical observation and induction” (p. 91), and such theories treat goodness as identical to a natural property (i.e., an empirically observable property). A metaphysical ethics, on the other hand, holds that ethics is not an empirical science and such theories treat goodness as identical to a metaphysical property (i.e., a supersensible property). Moore includes Spinoza with the Stoics, Kant, and some Hegelian philosophers in the latter category, as progenitors of a metaphysical ethics (p. 161). I am not convinced that Moore’s naturalistic fallacy is a genuine fallacy, but this is not the place to dispute the issue. Moore classifies Spinoza’s ethical theory as a metaphysical ethics on the basis “that we are more or less perfect, in proportion as we are more or less closely united with Absolute Substance by the ‘intellectual love’ of God” (p. 164). See G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, rev. ed., edited and with an introduction by Thomas Baldwin (Cambridge University Press, 1993[1903]).

Spinoza’s Moral Realism  53 of the beliefs and desires people happen to have and regardless of the beliefs and desires they happen not to have about increases in their own and others’ power of acting, an individual’s power is either increasing or it is not. Even if an individual accepts that goodness is what brings sadness, as the superstitious believe (4App XXXI), such an individual’s power may nevertheless undergo an increase, and the increase would be good for him despite his superstitious beliefs. Like increases and decreases in blood glucose levels in the case of diabetes and like increases and decreases in interstitial fluid in the case of dropsy, increases and decreases in power of acting, in Spinoza’s view, are part of the fabric of the universe. Its increase in a particular case or lack thereof is an objective matter of fact. Like diabetes and dropsy, then, instances of goodness and instances of badness do not directly depend on anyone’s desires, emotions, and beliefs about the existence and nature of goodness. This is because goodness in Spinoza’s view is identical to power enhancement and instances of power enhancement do not directly depend on anyone’s desires, emotions, or beliefs about the existence and nature of power enhancement. Similarly, badness is identical to power impairment and instances of power impairment do not directly depend on anyone’s desires, emotions, and beliefs about the existence and nature of power impairment. It follows that goodness and badness are objective properties. Ultimately the 3p7 and 4D8 conception of power serves as the source of the goodness of increases in power and the badness of decreases in power. The reason that increases in power are enhancements to our nature and that decreases in power are impairments is that power is our actual essence, and there is no reason to believe that Spinoza regards this view of our actual essence as a mere subjective expression of his favorable attitude toward power. There is no reason to believe that he thinks that this account of our actual essence is inadequate and confused. It is not based on the mutilated contents of the imagination, and it is not derived from hearsay. The conatus doctrine is not, in Spinoza’s view, an anthropocentric prejudice; nor does it depend on an anthropocentric prejudice. As far as Spinoza is concerned, it is not a mere reflection of the disposition of his own brain; nor is it an expression of non-​cognitive mental states. He is not a skeptic about the model of human nature that he attempts to provide a demonstration for in 3p7d. On the contrary, he regards this conception of our actual essence as the basis for the one true model of our nature. As Spinoza sees it, it is demonstrably certain that adequate causal power is our actual essence and, due to the nature of the power that constitutes our actual essence, it is

54  The Ethics of Joy demonstrably certain that the life of the wise person is superior to the life of the ignorant. Because the foundation for its superiority is that power is our actual essence, the life of the wise person is objectively superior to the life of the ignorant. Spinoza is therefore committed to a type of moral realism. For he attempts to establish a theory of the way of life that is best for human beings, a theory based on a view on which goodness and badness are objective properties.

3.  An Objection and a Reply My argument for the view that Spinoza subscribes to moral realism rests on his theory of human nature. Spinoza is a moral realist, I argue, because he derives a theory of the way of life that is best for human beings from a conception of human nature. On this reading, realism enters Spinoza’s moral philosophy via the realism in his account of human nature. If this reading is correct, Spinoza belongs to the tradition of moral perfectionists, a tradition that includes Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, Hegel, and Green, among others. One difficulty for this reading, as we have seen, is posed by Spinoza’s remarks about conceptions of models in the Preface to Part 4. I attempted to deal with this difficulty earlier. A second difficulty is posed by remarks that Spinoza makes about our essence. In his essay “Spinozistic Constructivism” Charles Jarrett nicely formulates this difficulty for the type of perfectionist reading that I am defending: An alternative attempt to justify Spinoza’s model would be to try to derive it from the concept of the nature or essence of human beings. . . . Although it is not at all evident why our highest ideal must consist in fully or maximally actualizing our essence, there is a more important problem in ascribing this view to Spinoza. For our whole essence does not consist solely in reason or (clear and distinct) understanding. This is not merely the actual essence of a person, because the actual essence of a person includes inadequate ideas.13

Jarrett goes on to cite the following two passages to illustrate his point: The first thing that constitutes the essence of the Mind is nothing but the idea of an actually existing Body (by IIP11 and P13); this idea (by IIP15)

13 Jarrett, “Spinozistic Constructivism,” p. 67.

Spinoza’s Moral Realism  55 is composed of many others, of which some are adequate (IIP38C), and others inadequate (by IIP29C). (3p3d) The essence of the Mind is constituted by adequate and by inadequate ideas (as we have shown in P3). (3p9d)

The mind’s essence includes adequate ideas and inadequate ideas. It might seem then that our essence cannot serve as the source of an account of the way of life that is best for human beings because our essence includes inadequate ideas, and inadequate ideas presumably are antithetical to living well, or at least do not contribute to living well. Jarrett concludes, “Thus Spinoza seems to make it quite clear that reason is only part of the essence, not the whole essence, of human beings. His conception of our highest good, then, is not derivable merely from the concept of our essence, although it is or may be derivable from a concept of a part of our essence.”14 To derive an account of the best way of life from human nature, it seems that it is necessary to ignore that part of our essence that includes inadequate ideas. For if the inadequate ideas that constitute human nature are not set aside, an account of a way of life that could be derived from our essence as a whole would not be an exclusively rational life. Therefore, with respect to living well, there would be no non-​arbitrary basis for favoring the intellect’s adequate ideas over the imagination’s inadequate ideas. However, Spinoza appears to do just this: the intellect’s adequate ideas are favored over the imagination’s inadequate ideas in his theory of the best way of life. A free person is guided by reason alone (4p67d, 4p68d; cf. 4p36s). It appears then that Spinoza’s theory of human nature is not the basis, or not the exclusive basis, for his theory of the way of life that is best for human beings. I believe that this difficulty for a perfectionist reading of Spinoza is merely apparent and that it rests on two errors. First, although tangential to the main thrust of the difficulty, Spinoza’s view is that every finite existent naturally seeks to preserve and increase its power. For a human being, an increase in power is experienced as an episode of joy. A decrease in power is experienced as an episode of sadness. According to Spinoza, “We strive to further the occurrence of whatever we imagine will lead to Joy, and to avert or destroy what we imagine is contrary to it, or will lead to Sadness” (3p28, emphasis in original). We naturally seek joy and naturally seek to avoid sadness. Whether

14 Jarrett, “Spinozistic Constructivism,” p. 68.

56  The Ethics of Joy a person knows it or not, he always seeks to increase his power of acting and seeks to avoid decreases in his power. Our highest ideal consists in maximally actualizing our essence because maximal actualization is what our power does so long as it is unimpeded. It is in the nature of power, “power” as Spinoza understands it, to maximize itself. Second, while it is true that a human mind contains adequate ideas and inadequate ideas, it is not the case that inadequate ideas have no cognitive value. Their cognitive value is not optimal, but it is not that there is nothing cognitively to be said for such ideas. Note that this is true, I believe, of sensory ideas and emotions. It may or may not be true of every idea, or every idea-​type, that Spinoza regards as inadequate.15 So my point here is restricted to the cognitive status of sensory ideas and emotions, and my claim is that the fact that they are inadequate does not disqualify them as knowledge. They constitute what Spinoza calls “knowledge of the first kind” (2p40s2, 2p41). This is the lowest grade of knowledge, but it is knowledge. It is a grade of cognitio. This means in part that the ideas that constitute the first kind of knowledge are informative. They are not non-​cognitive. As I argued in ­chapters 1 and 2, Spinoza believes that emotions carry information about the status of a subject’s power. Sensory ideas carry information, too. The information that sensory ideas carry is first and foremost about a state of the subject’s body, a state of the body other than its power. According to Spinoza, “For an imagination is an idea which indicates the present constitution of the human Body more than the nature of an external body—​not distinctly, of course, but confusedly” (4p1s, emphasis added). The imagination’s inadequate ideas represent states of the body. Sensory ideas and emotions are confused ideas, but their confusion does not entail that they have no cognitive value relative to a human mind. If inadequate ideas had no cognitive value in a human mind, it would be unclear how they could be true and adequate in God’s mind, as all ideas are (2p32, 2p35d). In other words, if inadequate ideas 15 I have in mind ideas that fall into the category of prejudice and superstition. For example, while a sensory idea of the sun and an episode of joy are items of information about the subject’s body and the power of the subject’s body respectively, it is not clear that a prejudice, such as that “all natural things act . . . on account of an end” (1App) is information about an aspect of the subject’s body. Spinoza’s discussions of error in 2p17cds and 4p1 suggest that only sensory ideas and emotions do not err and are not contrary to the true. The prejudice “all natural things act on account of an end” is, it seems, a paradigm case of error and an item that is contrary to the true. However, it does not follow from this that a prejudice is not information about an aspect of the subject who believes such a thing. I am inclined to think that, for Spinoza, a false belief is confused information about the (impaired) status of a subject’s power. If it did not constitute such information about the subject’s power, someone who has only false ideas would not necessarily be psychologically and ethically worse off than someone who has true ideas.

Spinoza’s Moral Realism  57 were non-​cognitive relative to a human mind while they had full or absolute cognitive value relative to God’s mind, there would, it seems, be an unbridgeable gap between the human mind and God’s mind. For the human mind would contain items that were non-​cognitive and uninformative, but the numerically identical items in God’s mind would be adequate and true. It is not the case that inadequate ideas are cognitively empty relative to a human mind but are adequate and true relative to God’s mind. Rather, inadequate ideas are suboptimal cognitions relative to a human mind and are, at the same time, optimal cognitions relative to God’s mind. From this alone it does not follow that the perfectionist reading avoids or resolves the difficulty that inadequate ideas pose. But to avoid the difficulty that they pose it is important that the inadequacy of inadequate ideas—​the inadequacy of sensory ideas and emotions—​is not overstated. This is because if such ideas markedly differ from adequate ideas, the task of showing that there is a non-​arbitrary basis for privileging a type of cognition (i.e., the intellect and its adequate ideas) as our essence is, it seems, insurmountable. It is difficult to see how it would not be arbitrary to privilege mental items of one kind (e.g., cognitions) over mental items of another kind (e.g., non-​ cognitions). However, on the reading I  favor sensory ideas and emotions do not differ in kind from adequate ideas. Sensory ideas and emotions are suboptimal cognitions relative to a human mind that reduce to optimal cognitions in God’s mind. Although it does not on its own solve the problem, this account of inadequate ideas provides the basis for a solution to the difficulty that inadequate ideas pose for a perfectionist reading. Inadequate cognitions are inadequate only in relation to the human mind (2p36d).16 They are not intrinsically and irreducibly inadequate.17 Ultimately there are no inadequate ideas as such (2p32; cf. 5p17, 5p17d). At the level of the fundamental structure and content of reality, inadequate cognitions drop out of the landscape, leaving only the adequate cognitions that make up God’s infinite intellect. The human mind’s essence includes adequate ideas and inadequate ideas, but inadequate ideas are not on an equal metaphysical footing with adequate ideas. “Now 16 Michael Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-​Body Problem in Spinoza (Oxford University Press, 1996), ch. 3. 17 According to Michael Della Rocca, “By this I mean that a particular idea may be inadequate insofar as it is in the human mind (since that idea is caused from outside the human mind), but adequate insofar as it is in God’s mind (since that idea is not caused from outside God’s mind). An idea cannot be adequate or inadequate intrinsically, but only relative to a particular mind of which it is a part” (Representation and the Mind-​Body Problem in Spinoza, p. 56).

58  The Ethics of Joy the essence of the Mind,” Spinoza writes, “consists in knowledge [cognitione] (by IIP11), which involves knowledge of God” (4p37d; cf. 5p36s, 5p38d). Spinoza’s view is that the essence of the mind is cognition, and he is best understood as maintaining that this does not include suboptimal cognitions as suboptimal.18 A human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God (2p11c; cf. 2p43s). A human mind is not part of the infinite imagination of God. God has no imagination. Because human minds are part of the infinite intellect, and because adequate cognition is metaphysically prior to inadequate cognition in the sense that inadequate cognition reduces to adequate cognition, a human being qua thinking thing essentially and fundamentally is an adequate cognizer.19 Inadequate ideas are cognitively suboptimal and ontologically suboptimal relative to a human mind. They are not real in the fullest sense. Cognitively and ontologically suboptimal cognitions do not contribute to the perfection of our nature as modes of God’s infinite intellect. They do not necessarily hinder our perfection, either. The confused information that inadequate ideas carry can be unraveled to some extent with the help of adequate ideas. We can come to know that our sensory idea of the sun, for example, is the idea that it is due to the nature of our sensory apparatus, the nature of the sun, and the nature of the medium intervening between our sensory apparatus and the sun. Arriving at such knowledge in clearheaded detail requires adequate ideas and the elimination of prejudices and other errors. For a finite mode of God’s infinite intellect, then, adequate ideas are best. Adequate ideas make us the cognizers that we fundamentally are, and they contribute to the perfection of our cognition. They contribute to our perfection because they make us what we fundamentally are. Spinoza concludes, “In life, therefore, it is especially useful to perfect, as far as we can, our intellect, or reason. In this one thing consists man’s highest happiness, or blessedness” (4App IV). This is true of every human being. It is true of the greedy person, the ambitious person, the envious, the drunkard, etc. It is true of every human because, strictly speaking, every human being is a mode of the infinite intellect. For 18 For an alternative reading of Spinoza’s account of a finite thing’s essence, see Samuel Newlands, Reconceiving Spinoza (Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 129‒135. 19 In the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect Spinoza writes, “But if it is—​as it seems at first—​ of the nature of a thinking being to form true, or adequate, thoughts, it is certain inadequate ideas arise in us only from the fact that we are a part of a thinking being, of which some thoughts wholly constitute our mind, while others do so only in part” (Benedict Spinoza, The Collected Works, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley [Princeton University Press, 1985], vol. 1, p. 33). On the reading I favor, in the Emendation and in the Ethics Spinoza accepts that it is the nature of a thinking thing to form adequate thoughts.

Spinoza’s Moral Realism  59 a mode of the infinite intellect to achieve true happiness, perfection of one’s intellect is not optional. On the contrary, it is necessary and, in conjunction with cooperative circumstances, sufficient for happiness.20 Briefly, one difficulty for a perfectionist reading of Spinoza is that it can seem as if there is no non-​arbitrary account of human nature to serve as the foundation of his theory of the best way of life. On the one hand, Spinoza holds that the mind’s essence includes adequate ideas and inadequate ideas. On the other hand, he holds that the best way of life is a life of freedom, and to be free is to be guided by adequate ideas alone. What, if anything, justifies the move from the former to the latter view? Does Spinoza arbitrarily privilege the intellect and its adequate ideas in his account of the good life? I have argued that his move from the account of human nature to an account of the life that is best for human beings is justified within Spinoza’s system and that, from a standpoint internal to his system, he does not arbitrarily privilege the intellect and its adequate ideas. Moreover, I believe that, at the very least, Spinoza accepts that there is justification for the move from his account of human nature to his ethical theory proper. There is no compelling reason to believe that he thinks that his metaphysics, epistemology, and psychological theory underdetermine his ethical theory.

Conclusion Spinoza subscribes to a type of moral realism. He attempts to demonstrate a theory of the kind of life that is best for human beings, and his theory rests on a view on which goodness and badness are objective properties. Goodness is identical to the enhancement of an individual’s power. Badness is identical to the impairment of an individual’s power. Thus goodness and badness are objective properties because they are identical to properties that are themselves objective. What Spinoza calls our “actual essence” is the foundation of the objectivity of the enhancing property of increases in power and the impairing property of decreases in power. A finite thing’s actual essence, and 20 Delahunty writes, “From postulating an instinct for self-​preservation, he has derived an ideal of truthfulness, disinterested inquiry, and self-​sacrifice. The result can only be explained, I think, on the assumption that Spinoza implicitly identified human beings with their minds, or more precisely with part of their minds, the intellect” (Spinoza: The Arguments of the Philosophers, p. 270). I agree with Delahunty that Spinoza identifies human nature with the intellect, but I do not accept that the identification is implicit (cf. 2p11c, 4p27, 5Pref, 5p9d, 5p36cs, 5p38d). Nor do I think that the identification is arbitrary. It has solid and explicit Spinozistic credentials.

60  The Ethics of Joy thus the actual essence of a human being, is the power to strive to persevere in being. Such power is our actual essence because, as modes of God, we are what we essentially are in virtue of expressing God’s power. In the final analysis, it is God’s power that serves as the foundation of Spinoza’s account of the way of life that is best for us.

4 Spinoza and Moral Anti-​Realism Introduction It is undeniable that the Ethics contains seemingly incompatible claims about the nature of goodness and badness. The text presents its share of challenges to anyone who sets out to construct a coherent interpretation of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. It is not a surprise that these difficulties have led scholars to interpretations that do not agree on every detail. In this chapter I focus on what in my judgment is a major difficulty for a charitable interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of goodness and badness and then I examine Michael LeBuffe’s way of meeting this challenge, a way that constitutes an alternative to the reading I defend in c­ hapter 3. The particular difficulty at issue is that the Ethics appears to contain two sets of definitions of goodness and badness and they appear to be in tension with one another. In 3p39s Spinoza offers what appears to be a desire-​satisfaction theory: By good here I understand every kind of joy, and whatever leads to it, and especially what satisfies any kind of longing, whatever that may be. And by evil [I understand here] every kind of sadness, and especially what frustrates longing. For we have shown above (in P9S) that we desire nothing because we judge it to be good, but on the contrary, we call it good because we desire it. Consequently, what we are averse to we call evil. (3p39s)

In contrast, in 4 Preface, 4D1, and 4D2, Spinoza offers what appears to be a perfectionist theory: In what follows, therefore, I shall understand by good what we know certainly is a means by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature that we set before ourselves. By evil, what we certainly know prevents us from becoming like that model. Next, we shall say that men are more perfect or imperfect, insofar as they approach more or less near to this model. (4Pref) The Ethics of Joy. Andrew Youpa, Oxford University Press (2020) © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190086022.001.0001

62  The Ethics of Joy By good I shall understand what we certainly know to be useful to us. (4D1) By evil, however, I shall understand what we certainly know prevents us from beings masters of some good. Exp.: On these definitions, see the preceding preface. (4D2)

Is goodness joy and the satisfaction of desire, as 3p39s says, or is goodness what helps us be more like the model of human nature, as 4Pref-​4D1-​4D2 says? Or, is there a reading on which these definitions are in harmony? Furthermore, depending on which of the two definitions is official and foundational, a subjectivist or an objectivist reading can seem more plausible than the alternative. The 3p39s desire-​satisfaction theory lends support to a subjectivist interpretation because it defines goodness and badness in terms of an individual’s psychological states. On this view, an instance of the property of goodness directly depends on an individual’s desire or joy.1 Alternatively, the perfectionist theory lends support to an objectivist interpretation because it defines goodness and badness in terms of what brings an individual nearer to a model of human nature. On this view, an instance of the property of goodness depends first and foremost on a thing’s effectiveness in contributing to an individual’s approximation to the model of human nature.

1.  LeBuffe’s Subjectivist Interpretation In his From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence, Michael LeBuffe treats the 3p39s desire-​satisfaction theory as the official definition and defends a subjectivist interpretation.2 According to LeBuffe’s interpretation, goodness is that which is the object of desire or serves as a

1 I am not suggesting that there can be no objective basis for the truth of an ethical judgment if the subjectivist interpretation is accepted. If desire X is singled out as the most fundamental or most important or most essential desire, it will be true that the things that contribute to the satisfaction of desire X are good, and in a sense objectively so. But I have a reservation about classifying such a view as this as a desire-​satisfaction theory when the singled out desire is singled out as an individual’s essence. The reason is that the view that a specific characteristic is elevated above others as our essential characteristic seems best categorized as a perfectionist doctrine, not a desire-​satisfaction one. The fact that the characteristic in question is a desire does not change the perfectionist structure of the view. 2 Michael LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 152‒159, 160, 165.

Spinoza and Moral Anti-Realism  63 means to the satisfaction of desire, or that which is associated with joy, especially the joy that accompanies the satisfaction of desire. Badness is that which someone is averse to or which frustrates desire, or that which is associated with sadness, especially the sadness that accompanies the frustration of desire.3 On this reading, goodness is a subjective property because instances of goodness directly depend on an individual’s desires, emotions, and beliefs. The same is true of badness. Regarding Spinoza’s remark in the preface to Part 4 that good and evil “indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves” (G II/​208), LeBuffe writes, “As in 1 Appendix, he implies that we ordinarily understand the judgments to apply to things themselves—​we take them to be ‘positive’ properties of things, a tendency that needs to be corrected—​whereas really they are products of our own psychological tendencies.”4 In part on the basis of 3p39s LeBuffe interprets Spinoza as holding that the properties of goodness and badness are subjective properties. How then are we to understand the perfectionism of 4Pref-​4D1-​4D2? LeBuffe argues that the 4Pref-​4D1-​4D2 theory should be understood as a “pragmatic effort” to help us attain what we value.5 LeBuffe maintains that the purpose of the 4Pref-​4D1-​4D2 theory is not to inform us about the nature of goodness and badness. This is supposedly carried out by 3p39s alone. In 4Pref-​4D1-​4D2, by contrast, Spinoza’s purpose is to provide us with a way of thinking about goodness and badness that will most effectively help us obtain what we value. LeBuffe writes, Some understandings of the good are better than others in the sense that they are more productive of the things that we find valuable. Because we are flexible in the ways in which we understand value, Spinoza is free to offer us that account of value which is the most productive of those things. He does not pretend, in offering his formal definitions [i.e., 4D1 and 4D2], to explain what value consists in but instead is interested only in providing the most useful account of value.6

LeBuffe’s point, if I understand him correctly, is that the purpose of Spinoza’s 4Pref-​4D1-​4D2 theory is purely instrumental. Its purpose is instrumental

3 LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom, pp. 153‒155. 4 LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom, p. 158. 5 LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom, p. 160. 6 LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom, p. 167.

64  The Ethics of Joy in the sense that someone who actually accepts such an understanding will pursue what he desires and avoid what he is averse to more effectively than he otherwise would. Its purpose is not to reveal the nature of goodness and badness. The strongest piece of textual evidence for the pragmatist reading of 4Pref-​ 4D1-​4D2 is, it seems, the subjectivist interpretation of 3p39s. If the 3p39s theory is Spinoza’s official account and if it is a subjectivist account, there appears to be no theoretical work for the 4Pref-​4D1-​4D2 to perform. What then is it doing? According to LeBuffe, its job is practical, not theoretical. This is one way of bringing Spinoza’s apparently incongruent claims into harmony. However, a price that it pays is, as LeBuffe notes, that it leaves us without an explanation of why things have the value they have and of what value is. LeBuffe says, “His formal definition [i.e., 4D1 and 4D2] of the good does no more than his projectivism [i.e., 3p39s] to explain why there is value in the world or what it is. This concern, I think, is well-​founded. The project of the Ethics does indeed stop short of this inquiry and leaves it, for all the reader can tell, an unexplained fact about experience that, when we desire things or associate them with laetitia, we also find value in them.”7 If the project of the Ethics stops short of this inquiry, it follows that the metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology stops short of explaining why there is value in the world and what it is. And if the metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology stop short of providing such an explanation, the ethical theory, and the theory of goodness and badness in particular, are not substantively rooted in the metaphysics (etc.). There is an explanatory gap between the metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology, on the one hand, and the ethical theory, on the other. This is a consequence of a pragmatist reading of 4Pref-​4D1-​4D2. It is, in my opinion, a high price to pay for rendering the text consistent. It agrees with an ethical non-​naturalist perspective, but it does not fit nicely with Spinoza’s geometrical method and his seemingly unwavering naturalism. Nor is it consistent with passages where Spinoza connects his theory of goodness and badness to his metaphysics and psychology, such as in the demonstration of 4p8: “We call good, or evil, what is useful to, or harmful to, preserving our being (by IVD1 and IVD2), that is (by IIIP7), what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting” (4p8d, emphasis added). This demonstration looks back to 3p7 to explain goodness and badness, and 7 LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom, p. 166.

Spinoza and Moral Anti-Realism  65 this move is not unusual in the Ethics. For instance, in the demonstration of 4p30, he writes, “We call evil what is the cause of sadness (by IVP8), that is (by the definition of sadness, see IIIP11S), what diminishes or restrains our power of acting. So if a thing were evil for us through what it has in common with us, then the thing could diminish or restrain what it has in common with us. But (by IIIP4) this is absurd” (4p30d). This is part of Spinoza’s explanation of what makes something bad, and his explanation relies on the metaphysical-​psychological doctrine that “No thing can be destroyed except through an external cause” (3p4). It is difficult to see how a pragmatist reading of 4Pref-​4D1-​4D2 can accommodate these explanations of why there is goodness and badness and what they are. For Spinoza, goodness is identical to power enhancement. Badness is identical to power impairment.8 On the reading I  favor, emotions are increases and decreases in power and are, as a consequence, enhancements and impairments to our nature. Although it is true that basic evaluative judgments result from each person’s own emotions, it is not necessarily the case that each person’s basic evaluative judgments correspond to what really is good and what really is bad. For example, a greedy person judges an abundance of wealth best, and he judges so from his own desire for an abundance of wealth. But greed, like ambition, envy, hatred, pride, fear, lust, etc., is a decrease in power. As a decrease in power, greed is an impaired mental-​physical condition. Thus the greedy person’s judgment results from a mental-​physical impairment and is itself impaired and inadequate. The greedy person’s judgment about wealth is false. It is false that an abundance of wealth is the supreme good. Wealth is not the summum bonum. In contrast, someone who judges from an emotion that is an increase in his power as a whole makes a judgment that is correct. This is because his judgment results from a mental-​physical enhancement—​an increase in power as a whole—​rather than from a mental-​physical impairment. And the judgment of someone who judges from his own mental-​physical enhancement 8 Here I am echoing a point Jon Miller makes where he writes, “However, the basic metaphysical and ethical justification for the acquisition of knowledge or understanding must be, for Spinoza, that it will increase our power of action” (Jon Miller, “Spinoza’s Axiology,” in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Daniel Garber and Steven Nadler [Clarendon, 2005], p.  158). As Miller notes (p. 166, note 9), there is strong theoretical pressure stemming from the parallelism doctrine (2p7, 2p7s) for Spinoza to hold that, just as knowledge of God is the greatest good of the mind, there must be something that serves as the greatest good of the body. Spinoza, however, never speaks of the body’s greatest good as such. For an insightful account of Spinoza’s theory of the body’s good, see Susan James’s “Spinoza, the Body, and the Good Life,” in Essays on Spinoza’s Ethical Theory, ed. Matthew J. Kisner and Andrew Youpa (Oxford University Press, 2014).

66  The Ethics of Joy (e.g., cheerfulness) corresponds to what really is good and what really is bad. He judges, for instance, that knowledge of God is best. And it is true—​it is demonstrably certain—​that knowledge of God is the summum bonum. Spinoza’s remarks in 3p39s are therefore best understood within the framework of his perfectionist psychological theory, a key doctrine of which is that an emotion is and registers an increase, decrease, or a mixed increase-​ decrease in power and perfection. So when Spinoza says, “By good here I understand every kind of joy and whatever leads to it, and especially what satisfies any kind of longing” (3p39s), it is incorrect to read this as saying that goodness is nothing but an emotion of joy that comes from the satisfaction of a desire. What makes it incorrect is that it neglects the fact that an emotion is an impairment of an individual’s power or an enhancement of an individual’s power, and judgments that arise only from enhancements are in agreement with the real nature of goodness, that is, in agreement with increases in our power.

2.  Is Spinoza a Moral Anti-​Realist? In the remainder of this chapter I examine three passages from the Ethics that make trouble for a moral realist reading. I argue that none of these passages are serious trouble for the reading I defend. None of them are best understood as committing Spinoza to a version of moral anti-​realism. By “moral anti-​ realism” here I mean any single or any combination of the following views: (a) Moral (or ethical) ideas, such as the ideas of goodness, badness, perfection, and imperfection, are invariably confused and inadequate ideas. (b) Instances of moral (or ethical) properties such as goodness, badness, perfection, and imperfection directly depend on an individual’s non-​ cognitive motivational states. (c) There is no single correct account of the kind of life that is best for human beings. (d) All models of human nature lack epistemic and rational credentials that would otherwise make one or more epistemically and rationally superior to other models. I argue that Spinoza does not subscribe to any single nor any combination of (a), (b), (c), and (d). Although my examination sheds further light on

Spinoza and Moral Anti-Realism  67 the type of moral realism to which Spinoza subscribes, my aim in the remainder of this chapter is to address passages that can seem to support an anti-​realist reading. In section 2.1, I examine Spinoza’s remarks in the Appendix to Part  1 concerning the notions of good and evil. In section 2.2, I look at the scholium to Proposition 9 of Part 3 where Spinoza claims that we do not desire something because we judge it to be good but, rather, judge something good because we desire it. Section 2.3 is about the analysis of perfection and imperfection as well as the analysis of good and evil in the Preface to Part 4.

2.1.  Ethics, Part 1, Appendix: “Hence, they had to form these notions . . .” In the Appendix to Part 1 of the Ethics Spinoza seeks to disprove the anthropocentric, teleological view that God and nature act for the sake of an end. In addition, he seeks to expose the falsity of views that spring from an anthropocentric view of God and nature. Anthropocentrism and the falsehoods that spring from it are obstacles that prevent people from grasping the demonstrations and accepting the theorems in Part 1. Thus in 1 Appendix Spinoza engages in a demolition project. His aim is to demolish the common but false beliefs that serve as stumbling blocks to a clearheaded understanding of the demonstrations of the thirty-​six theorems that make up Part 1. Among the derivative falsehoods that Spinoza singles out is the view that whatever “conduces to health and the worship of God” is good and “what is contrary to these” is evil (1App G II/​81 34–​35). This conception of good and evil is rooted in an anthropocentric conception of God and nature. Spinoza writes, After men persuaded themselves that everything that happens, happens on their account, they had to judge that what is most important in each thing is what is most useful to them, and to rate as most excellent all those things by which they were most pleased. Hence, they had to form these notions, by which they explained natural things: good, evil, order, confusion, warm, cold, beauty, and ugliness. And because they think themselves free, those notions have arisen: praise and blame, sin and merit. (1App G II/​81  25–​33)

68  The Ethics of Joy Because people became convinced that God and nature act for an end and that that end is to “bind men to them” and to be held “in the highest honor,” they invented notions tailored to explaining God and nature in accordance with their wrongheaded metaphysics. This includes the invention of the anthropocentric notions of good and evil. From this account of their origin, it might seem that Spinoza is committed to the view that the ideas of good and evil are invariably confused and inadequate. Anthropocentric conceptions of good and evil are confusions that stem from a false view of God and nature. Moreover, the ignorant who accept these confusions “affirm nothing concerning things” (1App G II/​81 36) and yet “consider them the chief attributes of things” (1App G II/​82 19), which suggests that the ignorant erroneously believe that their confused ideas of good and evil pick out real properties of natural things. However, there are three reasons that make an anti-​realist interpretation of 1 Appendix implausible. First, a target of Spinoza’s 1 Appendix criticism is an anthropocentric conception of good and evil, not any and all conceptions of good and evil. An anthropocentric conception of God and nature leads us to mistake the imagination for the intellect (1App G II/​82 1). It encourages us to treat sensory appearances—​affections of the imagination—​as touchstones of reality. Spinoza writes, “All of these things show sufficiently that each one has judged things according to the disposition of his brain; or rather, has accepted affections of the imagination as things” (1App G II82 17–​22 and 32–​ 34). Notions formed from the confused deliverances of the imagination fail to unconfusedly reveal anything about the nature of things in imagination-​ independent reality. Thus Spinoza’s 1 Appendix criticism does not necessarily apply to a conception of good and evil that is not tied to an anthropocentric view of God and nature and to the imagination’s confused ideas. In particular it does not necessarily apply to a conception that is based on a correct understanding of God and nature and on the intellect’s clear and distinct ideas. Second, an anti-​realist interpretation of 1 Appendix is inconsistent with Spinoza’s remarks there about skepticism. In addition to failing to reveal anything about natural things, what is objectionable about an anthropocentric conception of good and evil is that it leads to moral skepticism. Spinoza writes, “So it is no wonder (to note this, too, in passing) that we find so many controversies to have arisen among men, and that they have finally given rise to Skepticism” (1App G II/​82 34–​36). Spinoza is not touting skepticism as a virtue of anthropocentricism. On the contrary, he believes that the fact that it leads to skepticism is part of what makes it objectionable. If Spinoza were

Spinoza and Moral Anti-Realism  69 a moral anti-​realist, it would be odd, if not inconsistent, for him to criticize anthropocentrism as a source of moral skepticism. Third, after highlighting the skeptical consequences of the anthropocentric framework, Spinoza reveals his solution to the controversies and their subsequent skepticism: “For the perfection of things is to be judged solely from their nature and power; things are not more or less perfect because they please or offend men’s senses, or because they are of use to, or are incompatible with, human nature” (1App G II/​83 23–​26, emphasis added). Anthropocentricism seeks to measure the perfection of things either on the basis of whether they please men’s senses or on whether they are of use to a confused conception of human nature. Such views erroneously treat the imagination as the intellect, inadvertently generate controversies, and in the end result in widespread skepticism. Fortunately there is an alternative that does not have these consequences. Controversy and skepticism can be avoided when the imagination is recognized as such and the intellect is relied on to measure the perfection of things based on their nature and power. It might be objected at this point that even though Spinoza is offering an alternative basis for measuring the perfection of things, the basis he offers—​ their nature and power—​is devoid of normative significance. The objection goes:  granted that Spinoza rejects the anthropocentric view of good and evil (etc.), what he seeks to put in its place is a purely descriptive account of the perfection-​making characteristics of natural things.9 On this reading, “nature” and “power” are non-​normative, purely descriptive notions. Even the idea of perfection is non-​normative, seeing how it is identical to reality (2D6). Ultimately Spinoza rids ethics of normativity. He rids it of any and all talk about goodness and badness and about how things should and should not be. There is nothing for ethical theorizing to do but to describe things from the perspective of a value-​free observer. There is, I believe, a decisive reason for rejecting this non-​normative interpretation. The reason is that Spinoza believes that a human being can fail to be an adequate cause of his emotions, desires, and deeds, and a person can succeed in being an adequate cause of his emotions, desires, and deeds. Failure and success with respect to adequate causal power is inevitably a matter of degree for finite modes. But failure to a degree is possible and success to a

9 For a defense of a non-​normative reading of Spinoza’s account of perfection, see Samuel Newlands’s “Spinoza and the Metaphysics of Perfection,” in Spinoza’s Ethics: A Critical Guide, ed. Yitzhak Y. Melamed (Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 269‒272.

70  The Ethics of Joy degree is possible. Someone who is wise succeeds in being an adequate cause of his emotions, desires, and deeds to a much greater extent than someone who is ignorant.10 Although it is a matter of indifference to God-​or-​Nature whether human beings have success in being adequate causes, it is not a matter of indifference to human nature. It is not a matter of indifference to human nature because true happiness comes from having some success in being adequate causes, whereas unhappiness comes from failing to be adequate causes, that is, from being inadequate causes. Furthermore, the notion of perfection is a purely non-​normative notion only if the notion of reality is non-​normative. Whether the notion of reality is non-​normative or not cannot be settled on the basis of 2D6 alone.11 In the philosophical tradition a purely non-​normative notion of reality has not always enjoyed the popularity that it enjoys today. It cannot be presumed without argument that Spinoza’s notion of reality is in agreement with a contemporary, purely descriptive notion.

2.2.  Ethics, 3p9s: “From all this, then, it is clear . . .” In the scholium to proposition 9 of Ethics Part 3 Spinoza appears to put forward a type of subjectivist view wherein instances of moral properties such as goodness and badness directly depend on an individual’s non-​cognitive motivational states. He writes, “From all this, then, it is clear that we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it” (3p9s). An evaluative judgment is not independent of and prior to a motivational state. On the contrary, an evaluative judgment depends on a motivational state. An individual’s judgment that something is good is dependent on a preexisting motivational state, such

10 Spinoza writes, “In life, therefore, it is especially useful to perfect, as far as we can, our intellect, or reason. In this one thing consists man’s highest happiness, or blessedness” (4App IV). It is especially useful to perfect our intellects. It is the source of our greatest happiness. Summarizing at the end of the Ethics he adds, “From what has been shown, it is clear how much the Wise man is capable of, and how much more powerful he is than one who is ignorant and is driven only by lust. For not only is the ignorant man troubled in many ways by external causes, and unable ever to possess true peace of mind, but he also lives as if he knew neither himself, nor God, nor things” (5p42s). Whatever else this is, it is not the perspective of value-​free observer. Wisdom is superior to ignorance. 11 For an illuminating comparison of Spinoza’s notion of reality with Leibniz’s notion of goodness, see John Carriero, “The Highest Good and Perfection in Spinoza,” in The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza, ed. Michael Della Rocca (Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 263‒265.

Spinoza and Moral Anti-Realism  71 as the individual’s striving, or volition, want, or desire. When it comes to our judgments about good and bad, motivational states are, it seems, in the driver’s seat. Further along in Part 3 he explains, So each one, from his own affect, judges, or evaluates, what is good and what is bad, what is better and what is worse, and finally, what is best and what is worst. So the Greedy man judges an abundance of money best, and poverty worst. The Ambitious man desires nothing so much as Esteem and dreads nothing so much as Shame. . . . And so, each one, from his own affect, judges a thing good or bad, useful or useless. (3p39s)

It is “from his own affect” (ex suo affectu judicat) that each judges what is good and what is bad. What makes a greedy person judge an abundance of wealth best is the greedy person’s desire for an abundance of wealth. What makes the ambitious person judge esteem best is the ambitious person’s desire for esteem. Judgments of good and bad arise from emotions and desires. Different emotions and desires give rise to corresponding judgments of what is good and what is bad. Given the views expressed in 3p9s and 3p39s it would be difficult to argue that Spinoza does not subscribe to a type of moral anti-​realism if it were not for the fact that he holds that an emotion’s qualitative character signals an increase or decrease in the power of acting of the subject’s body. Because the qualitative character of emotions symptomatically represents increases and decreases in the body’s power, emotions are not non-​cognitive states. They are not uninformative and therefore are not cognitively empty. As I showed in ­chapter 1, emotions are informative in virtue of symptomatically representing a change in the power of the subject’s body. Some emotions symptomatically represent that the subject’s power is increasing when it is increasing while others represent that it is decreasing when it is decreasing. An emotion’s qualitative character indicates an increase or decrease in our power. Joy and species of joy indicate increases in power. Sadness and species of sadness indicate decreases in power. When in 3p39s Spinoza says that it is “from his own affect” that each “judges, or evaluates, what is good and what is bad,” he is not saying that it is from each person’s own non-​cognitive state that each judges what is good and what is bad. If Spinoza were a proto-​Humean, it would be correct to interpret him as saying that it is from his own cognitively empty motivational state that each judges what is good and what is bad. But in Spinoza’s

72  The Ethics of Joy psychological theory there is no equivalent of Hume’s “original existence.”12 Emotions, for Spinoza, are not Humean original existences. Spinoza believes that passions contain a “representative quality.”13 Active emotions also contain such a quality. Passions and active emotions are representations in virtue of representing changes in the body’s power of acting. An emotion’s qualitative character is representational in the way that a symptom represents that of which it is symptomatic. How does this rule out the view that Spinoza subscribes to a type of moral anti-​realism? It rules out anti-​realism because emotions disclose a metaphysical-​natural norm that gauges our perfection, namely, our adequate causal power and its increases and decreases. As I showed in c­ hapter 2, changes in our adequate causal power, from the standpoint of human nature, are not axiologically neutral. An increase in power as a whole is always good (4p42d). A decrease as a whole is always bad (4p42d). Because the emotion Spinoza calls cheerfulness is an increase as a whole (4p42), it is an enhancement of our nature and, as a consequence, it discloses that an individual is in a good psychophysical condition. It discloses that the subject is well. Because the emotion he calls melancholy is a decrease in power as a whole, it is an impairment of our nature and, as a consequence, it discloses that an individual is in an impaired psychophysical condition. It discloses that the subject is unwell. For Spinoza, it is an objective matter of fact that an emotion is an enhancement or, as the case may be, an impairment of our nature. The reason is that increases and decreases themselves belong to the objective order of nature. That melancholy is a decrease in power as a whole is not, from Spinoza’s point of view, merely an expression of his attitude about melancholy. Regardless of an individual’s beliefs and attitudes about it, melancholy is an impairment of human nature.

2.3.  Ethics, 4 Preface: “As far as good and evil are concerned . . .” The Preface to Part 4 of the Ethics, like the Appendix to Part 1, can appear to be a moral anti-​realist diatribe. However, as with 1 Appendix, an anti-​realist interpretation of 4 Preface is, I believe, inaccurate. In 4 Preface the target of 12 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford University Press, 2000), 2.3.3.5, p. 266. 13 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 266.

Spinoza and Moral Anti-Realism  73 Spinoza’s criticisms are, as in 1 Appendix, evaluative notions that are based on an anthropocentric, teleological conception of God-​or-​Nature. Thus the 4 Preface discussion is in part a continuation of the 1 Appendix discussion. Just as the latter sets out to demolish anthropocentric prejudices that arise from an anthropocentric, teleological conception of God and nature, so too does 4 Preface. Regarding the formation of our ordinary conceptions of perfection and imperfection Spinoza writes, They regard these universal ideas as models of things, and believe that nature (which they think does nothing except for the sake of some end) looks to them, and sets them before itself as models. . . . We see, therefore, that men are accustomed to call natural things perfect or imperfect more from prejudice than from true knowledge of those things. For we have shown in the Appendix of Part I, that Nature does nothing on account of an end. That eternal and infinite being we call God, or Nature, acts from the same necessity from which he exists. (4Pref G II/​206 13–​26)

The source of our wrongheaded notions of good and bad—​namely, an anthropocentric conception of nature—​is also responsible for our wrongheaded notions of perfection and imperfection. This strongly supports that his discussion of ordinary wrongheaded notions of perfection and imperfection is of a piece with his 1 Appendix discussion of ordinary wrongheaded notions of good and bad. An anthropocentric, teleological conception of God and nature leads people to form wrongheaded notions of good and bad as well as wrongheaded notions of perfection and imperfection. Moreover, in saying that people call “natural things perfect or imperfect more from prejudice than from true knowledge of those things,” he leaves open the possibility that natural things can be called perfect or imperfect from true knowledge of things. Wrongheaded notions of perfection and imperfection are not inevitable. They are not inevitable because reliance on an anthropocentric conception of God and nature is not inevitable. Such a conception of God and nature is not inevitable because we are capable of recognizing the imagination for what it is and how the imagination compares unfavorably to the intellect as a source of clear and distinct ideas. Thus the 4 Preface remark that people call “natural things perfect or imperfect more from prejudice than from true knowledge of those things” echoes the 1 Appendix claim that people who do not understand the nature of things “take the imagination for the intellect” (G II/​81).

74  The Ethics of Joy In 1 Appendix and in 4 Preface Spinoza targets imagination-​based notions, not any and all evaluative notions. Notions that originate in the intellect are not under attack. Because only imagination-​based notions are under attack, an anti-​realist interpretation is implausible. It might seem that this reading falters when it reaches Spinoza’s claims in the second half of 4 Preface regarding how the notions of perfection and imperfection and the notions of good and bad are only “modes of thinking” (modi cogitandi) (G II/​207; G II/​208). These claims do not appear to contain any qualifications. For instance, he refers to the notions as “modes of thinking,” not specifically as “modes of imagination” as would be expected if 4 Preface continues and adheres to the discussion in 1 Appendix. It can therefore seem as if he is saying that all such notions, even the notions as Spinoza himself employs them and that are therefore based on a non-​ anthropocentric and non-​teleological conception of God, are nothing but “modes of thinking” and, as a result, do not pick out real properties of natural things. I believe that when Spinoza claims that the notions of perfection and imperfection are “only modes of thinking” his point is in agreement with his point in the first half of 4 Preface and in 1 Appendix, which is that ordinary notions of perfection and imperfection are modes of imagining. However, when he claims that the notions of good and evil are “modes of thinking” he is not making a claim about ordinary notions of good and evil but, rather, his own metaphysically and epistemologically unobjectionable notions of good and evil, and his point is that goodness and badness in such things as music are relational properties, not that they are inevitably modes of imagining. Thus, in the second half of 4 Preface Spinoza makes two claims: (1) one is about the imagination-​based status of ordinary notions of perfection and imperfection and (2) the other is about the relational status of his own metaphysically and epistemologically sound notions of good and evil as applied to artifacts and natural objects. In defending this interpretation of the modes of thinking passages in 4 Preface, I begin with the reading on which the notions of perfection and imperfection are modes of imagining and afterwards defend the reading on which the notions of good and evil are relational properties. In calling the notions of perfection and imperfection “modes of thinking” in 4 Preface my contention is that this is equivalent to saying that ordinary notions of perfection and imperfection are “modes of imagining.” Thus the notions of perfection and imperfection that are under scrutiny are on a par with the

Spinoza and Moral Anti-Realism  75 notions that are under scrutiny in 1 Appendix. What they have in common is that they are formed from the deliverances of the imagination and the anthropocentric, teleological conception of God and nature and are, as a consequence, wrongheaded. Spinoza’s reference in 4 Preface (G II/​206) to the conclusions that he reaches in 1 Appendix—​quoted in the opening paragraph of this section—​ supports this reading. Further support comes from the claim that we ascribe imperfection to certain things “because they do not affect our mind as much as those we call perfect” (4Pref G II/​208). Because it is by and through the imagination that things affect our mind (2p17cs), this is a reference to the role of the imagination as the source of our wrongheaded ascriptions of imperfection. People customarily ascribe imperfection to things on the basis that something does not make as powerful an impression on their imagination as something else. But the imagination does not disclose the nature and power of things and is therefore not a legitimate basis for the notions of perfection and imperfection. On this reading, Spinoza’s 4 Preface analysis applies only to imagination-​ based notions of perfection and imperfection. Because all ordinary notions are derived from the imagination, the analysis applies to all and only ordinary notions of perfection and imperfection. It does not apply to Spinoza’s notions. If it did, it would be disastrous for many doctrines in the Ethics, and the fact that it would be disastrous strongly supports that Spinoza’s analysis applies to only ordinary, imagination-​based notions. Among the doctrines for which it would be disastrous is the following: “The more perfection each thing has, the more it acts and the less it is acted on; and conversely, the more it acts, the more perfect it is” (5p40, emphasis in original). This is a theorem, and its demonstration appeals to 2D6, 3p3, and 3p3s. This theorem also has a corollary: “From this it follows that the part of the mind that remains, however great it is, is more perfect than the rest” (5p40c). If Spinoza’s notions of perfection and imperfection are, like ordinary notions, wrongheaded, the theorem, its demonstration, and its corollary are also wrongheaded. And if the demonstration is wrongheaded, one or more of the premises that make up the demonstration is (are) wrongheaded. Perhaps the least damaging option would be to pin the wrongheadedness on the definition, 2D6, because pinning responsibility on it would at least prevent the wrongheadedness from spreading to Part 1 of the Ethics. But even if it can be prevented from spreading to Part 1, the wrongheadedness could not be kept out of Parts 3 and 4. In Part 3 Spinoza defines joy and sadness, two of the three “primary affects,” in terms of perfection. “By joy,” he says, “I shall understand in what follows that passion by which the mind passes to a greater

76  The Ethics of Joy perfection. And by sadness, that passion by which it passes to a less perfection” (3p11s, emphasis in original). If Spinoza’s own notion is as wrongheaded as ordinary notions of perfection, his psychological theory is a train wreck. Philosophers and psychologists might, for independent reasons, believe that it is a train wreck, but the suggestion that Spinoza knowingly used wrongheaded notions to define two of the three central terms of his psychological theory would, if taken seriously, be tantamount to claiming that the text is incomprehensible by design. It might be incomprehensible, but not by design. In addition to the centrality of the notion of perfection to the psychological theory, in 4 Preface Spinoza ties the notions of perfection and imperfection to the model of human nature. So if the notions of perfection and imperfection are wrongheaded, so too are the notion of a model of human nature and the notion that serves as Spinoza’s model of human nature: the free human. There would be nothing about the notion of the free human, from the standpoint of theoretical rationality and practical rationality, that sets it apart from other models of human nature. All models would lack theoretic and practical credentials that would otherwise make one or more rationally superior to other models. All models would be equally wrongheaded. This would mean that the free human theorems (4p67, 4p69, 4p70, 4p71, 4p72), their demonstrations, corollaries, and at least some of the propositions, corollaries, and scholia that appear in the demonstrations are also wrongheaded. The wrongheadedness would not be confined to the free human however. Spinoza’s claim in 4 Appendix that “it is especially useful to perfect, as far as we can, our intellect, or reason” (4App IV) would also be wrongheaded. As would his view that “perfecting the intellect is nothing but understanding God, his attributes, and his actions” (4App IV). The same holds for the view that “as we are affected with a greater joy, we pass to a greater perfection, and consequently participate more in the divine nature” (4App XXXI). These are a few of the notable consequences that follow from the view that Spinoza’s 4 Preface analysis of the notions of perfection and imperfection applies to his own notions. In light of these consequences and in light of the aforementioned clues within 4 Preface, the most plausible reading is that the analysis of the notions of perfection and imperfection does not apply to Spinoza’s notions. His own notions are metaphysically and epistemologically unobjectionable, from Spinoza’s point of view.14 This is the reason that he 14 Samuel Newlands defends a similar conclusion about Spinoza’s notion of perfection in Reconceiving Spinoza (Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 38‒39. I agree with John Carriero’s view that “Spinoza regards perfection as an absolute notion” (“The Highest Good and Perfection in Spinoza,” p. 250).

Spinoza and Moral Anti-Realism  77 has no qualms with making such claims as the following: “On the contrary, the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass, that is, the more we must participate in the divine nature” (4p45c2s, emphasis added). That we have perfection and that our perfection increases and decreases depending on the adequacy or inadequacy of our ideas are doctrines that are central to Spinoza’s psychological theory and ethical theory. If Spinoza does not believe that his notions are exempt from his 1 Appendix and 4 Preface analysis, it is difficult to see what reason(s) he could have for writing Parts 3, 4, and 5 of the Ethics. Turning now to the 4 Preface claim that the notions of good and evil are “modes of thinking,” my claim is, first, that this is about his metaphysically and epistemologically unobjectionable notions, not imagination-​ based notions; and second, that his point is that, with respect to spatially external objects, good and evil are relational properties. That Spinoza is talking about his own notions of good and evil is strongly supported by the fact that in the alternate demonstration of 4p59 he cites his 4 Preface remarks about good and evil: “But no action, considered in itself, is good or evil (as we have shown in the Preface of this Part); instead, one and the same action is now good, now evil” (4p59 alternate demonstration, emphasis added). Because Spinoza appeals to his 4 Preface claim that good and evil are modes of thinking in support of his claim that “no action, considered in itself, is good or evil” (4p59), it is evident that his 4 Preface claim about good and evil applies to his own notions of good and evil. What is more, it is implausible that he is also talking about ordinary, imagination-​based notions of good and evil because earlier Spinoza attributes a non-​relational account of good and evil to the ignorant: “The other notions are also nothing but modes of imagining, by which the imagination is variously affected; and yet the ignorant consider them the chief attributes of things, because, as we have already said, they believe all things have been made for their sake, and call the nature of a thing good or evil, sound or rotten and corrupt, as they are affected by it” (1App G II/​82 17–​22, emphasis added). The ignorant fail to understand that the deliverances of the imagination do not reveal the nature of things in imagination-​independent reality and, as a result, they believe that by means of the imagination they grasp the chief attributes of things. Just as the ignorant take their imagination-​based notion of order and believe that “there is an order in things” (1App G II/​82 1), they also take their imagination-​based notion of goodness and believe that there is goodness in things. Ordinary ascriptions of good and evil, according to

78  The Ethics of Joy Spinoza’s 1 Appendix analysis, rest on a non-​relational theory of good and evil. It would therefore be inconsistent for him to attribute to the ignorant a relational theory of good and evil. This last conclusion depends in part on the supposition that when in 4 Preface he describes good and evil as modes of thinking what he means, in part, is that good and evil in spatially external things are relational properties. Is there reason to think that this is correct? The passage in question goes as follows: As far as good and evil are concerned, they also indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves, nor are they anything other than modes of thinking, or notions we form because we compare things to one another. For one and the same thing can, at the same time, be good, and bad, and also indifferent. For example, music is good for one who is melancholy, bad for one who is mourning, and neither good nor bad to one who is deaf. (4Pref G II/​208)

The goodness and badness of something such as music is a relation that obtains between the nature of the object (e.g., music) and the nature of an individual (e.g., someone who is melancholy). Music can be good for X and bad for someone Y, but independent of someone who is exposed to music there is nothing good or bad about music. This is because in some cases, such as in the case of someone who is melancholy, music causes an increase in power. In other cases, such as in the case of someone who is mourning, music causes a decrease in power. Music’s effect on human beings varies according to variations in our nature (e.g., melancholy, mourning, etc.). As a consequence, the goodness and badness of music and other spatially external things is in an important sense relational. This relational interpretation of the music example is confirmed in 4 Appendix where he writes, The principal advantage we derive from things outside us—​apart from the experience and knowledge we acquire from observing them and changing them from one form into another—​lies in the preservation of our body. That is why those things are most useful to us which can feed and maintain it, so that all its parts can perform their function properly. (4App XXVII)

Recall that in his definition of “good” Spinoza defines it as “what we certainly know to be useful to us” (4D1; cf. 3p39s, 4Pref). Things that can feed and

Spinoza and Moral Anti-Realism  79 maintain the body enable the parts of the body to perform their function properly. Such things are useful and therefore good. He says, Since those things are good which assist the parts of the body to perform their function, and joy consists in the fact that man’s power, insofar as he consists of mind and body, is aided or increased, all things which bring joy are good. (4App XXX)

Because joy is an increase in an individual’s power, things that cause joy are good. Music causes joy in some people but not others. Similarly, there are things that feed and maintain some people’s bodies but not others. Peanuts, for example, feed and maintain some people, but they destroy people who are allergic to them. Regarding things that effectively feed and maintain us, he writes, But there seem to be very few things of this kind in Nature. So to nourish the body in the way required, it is necessary to use many different kinds of food. Indeed, the human body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which require continuous and varied food so that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything which can follow from its nature. (4App XXVII)

Not all parts of the human body require the same type of nourishment. Because the body is composed of parts that vary in nature, the body needs to be fed and maintained with a variety of foods. It follows that some foods are good for body-​part A, others are good for body-​part B, and still others are good for body-​part C (etc.). This is a relational theory of the goodness and badness of foods, and the presence of this view in 4 Appendix strongly supports a relational interpretation of the music example in 4 Preface.15 In this section I have shown that 4 Preface is not a moral anti-​realist diatribe. To support this I have argued that Spinoza’s discussion of the notions of perfection and imperfection in 4 Preface is about anthropocentric conceptions and it is a continuation of his 1 Appendix attack on notions 15 Spinoza’s relational account of goodness and badness applies to the goodness and badness of things other than increases and decreases in our power. It applies to music, food, whiskey, plants, and an agent’s deeds. But it does not apply to increases and decreases in an individual’s power. The goodness of an increase in an individual’s power is not relational. For further discussion of these issues and my defense of these claims, see c­ hapters 5 and 6, this volume.

80  The Ethics of Joy that are informed by an anthropocentric conception of God-​or-​Nature. I have also argued that his remarks about the notions of good and evil diverge from his polemic against anthropocentrism and are best understood as an outline of his relational theory of goodness and badness in such things as music, food, and spatially external objects generally. As I spell out in detail in ­chapter 6, on this account what makes an external object good is that it causally contributes to an increase in an individual’s power. What makes an external object bad is that it causally contributes to a decrease in power. So the notions of good and evil as applied to external objects are “modes of thinking” in virtue of picking out relations between objects and changes in human power.

Conclusion In ­chapters 1 through 4, I set forth a reading of the doctrines that make up the metaphysical and psychological foundation of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. In the next three chapters I set out a reading of the doctrines that make up the normative core of his moral philosophy. Before turning to this task, I want to conclude by giving a brief summary of the reading that I have defended so far. According to this reading, increases in power are enhancements to our nature while decreases in power are impairments because, as a matter of demonstrably certain fact (in Spinoza’s view), power is our actual essence. There is no such thing as goodness apart from enhancements to power, and there is no such thing as badness apart from impairments of power. Goodness, in other words, is nothing but an enhancement of power. Badness is nothing but an impairment of power. Furthermore, an episode of joy as it exists in the mind is symptomatic of an enhancement of the power of the subject’s body. An episode of sadness symptomatically represents an impairment of the power of the subject’s body. Some enhancements to an individual’s power are increases to the individual’s power as a whole. Others are increases in power to a part of the individual, not to the individual as a whole. Likewise, some impairments are decreases to the individual as a whole, and some are decreases in a part of the individual. Because the qualitative character of an emotion symptomatically represents an enhancement or an impairment of a subject’s nature, an emotion carries axiological information. Episodes of joy inform us that our power and perfection is increasing in case it is increasing.

Spinoza and Moral Anti-Realism  81 Episodes of sadness inform us that our power and perfection is decreasing in case it is decreasing. If this reading is correct, Spinoza’s moral philosophy is a paradigmatic version of moral realism. It is centered on an essentialist view of human beings. It takes a specific notion of power as our essence, namely, adequate causal power, and from this conception of power it derives an account of the best way of life. The best way of life is the way that perfects human nature. The good life is the empowered life. This is true for all human beings. It is true of the wise, as well as the ignorant. It is true of the free, as well as the slavish; the joyful, as well as the hateful. Adequate causal power is what makes us what we essentially are. Empowerment is therefore the answer to how to live well. It is the single correct answer to the question. With respect to the truth of the theorems, it makes no difference that the disempowered (i.e., the greedy, the ambitious, the envious, the hateful, etc.) disagree with the ethical theorems that Spinoza demonstrates on the basis of his theory of human nature, just as it makes no difference that the superstitious disagree with the metaphysical theorems that he demonstrates on the basis of his theory of substance and mode. Human nature is human nature, and the best way of life is what it is because human nature is what it is. The disempowered lack knowledge. They lack knowledge of themselves, and as a result they lack knowledge of how to live well. “For not only is the ignorant man troubled in many ways by external causes, and unable ever to possess true peace of mind, but he also lives as if he knew neither himself, nor God, nor things; and as soon as he ceases to be acted on, he ceases to be” (5p42s). The ignorant fail to recognize that they are disempowered. They fail to understand that they lack agency and are not the authors of their unhappy lives. Their life stories are written by the haphazard play of external causes that impinge on their bodies. As soon as the causes stop, so too does the story. This is not true of the empowered. The empowered exercise agency. They are the authors of their lives. Guided by knowledge and motivated by joy and love, the empowered take intelligent care of themselves and others despite the hardships and misfortunes they encounter. They pursue what is truly good for themselves and others, and they avoid what is truly bad. As a result, they enjoy true happiness and empower others to enjoy it with them, or so I argue in the remainder of this volume.

5 Underivative Goodness and Underivative Badness Introduction Having investigated the foundation of his moral philosophy in the previous chapters, in this chapter I begin to flesh out Spinoza’s moral philosophy. In section 1, I argue that Spinoza is committed to the underivative goodness of human wellness and the underivative badness of human illness. In section 2, I argue that such goodness is naturalistic in a sense that makes it a precursor to contemporary sciences that deal with physical and mental health. In section 3, I elaborate the specific type of axiological ambiguity and complexity to which Spinoza’s naturalism leads by outlining his hierarchical system of classification of emotions, a hierarchy based on whether a type of emotion is indefeasibly good, defeasibly good, indefeasibly bad, or defeasibly bad. This system of classification, in turn, undergirds the classification of desires as indefeasibly good, defeasibly good, indefeasibly bad, or defeasibly bad. The next chapter deals with the derivative goodness and derivative badness of human deeds and of natural objects.

1.  Underivative Goodness and Underivative Badness At this moment your Spinozistic power is either increasing or it is not. If it is increasing, you are in a good way. You are well. If it is decreasing, you are unwell. Most of us for most of our lives are well in some respects and in some degree and unwell in other respects and in some degree (4p4d, 4p4c, 4App XXVII, 4App XXX). Spinoza’s view is that there is a notion of happiness that is identical to wellness where “wellness” refers to the fact that a subject’s power is increasing, and there is a notion of unhappiness that is identical to “illness”

The Ethics of Joy. Andrew Youpa, Oxford University Press (2020) © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190086022.001.0001

Underivative Goodness and Underivative Badness  83 where “illness” refers to the fact that a subject’s power is not increasing or is decreasing.1 He writes, But for a clearer understanding of these things, we must note here that we live in continuous change, and that as we change for the better or worse, we are called happy [felices] or unhappy [infelices]. For he who has passed from being an infant or child to being a corpse is called unhappy [infelix]. On the other hand, if we pass the whole length of our life with a sound Mind in a sound Body [mente sanâ in corpore sano], that is considered happiness [felicitati]. (5p39s)

There are two pairs of notions of happiness and unhappiness at work in this passage, and they are related in an important way. The first pair involves happiness as an episodic increase in power and unhappiness as an episodic decrease in power, and the second pair is about happiness and unhappiness from the synoptic perspective of an individual’s life as a whole. The former pair is connected to the point that our minds and bodies undergo continuous change. Some changes that we undergo are increases in power and as such are enhancements of our nature. They are changes for the better, and these are changes that we experience as episodes of joy or one of its variants. In such cases we are happy in the sense that we are well. Some changes that we undergo are changes for the worse, changes that we experience as episodes of sadness or one of its variants. In such cases we are unhappy in the sense that we suffer from an illness. Now, someone whose life as a whole is replete with episodes of joy is happy in the second sense of “happiness.” He has a happy life. Someone whose life as a whole is marred with episodes of sadness is unhappy in the second sense of “unhappiness.” He has an unhappy life.2 Thus increases in power—​episodes of joy—​are the basic constituents of

1 I use “unwell” and “ill” interchangeably throughout what follows. I use both to refer to a subject whose condition is such that his power is not increasing and (or) that his power is decreasing. Thus a subject S is unwell (i.e., ill) insofar as his power is stagnant or impaired. Instead of talking about the property of “unwellness,” I have opted to refer to it as “illness.” 2 What one thinks about one’s own happiness or unhappiness does not change the fact that one is happy or unhappy. This is true of wellness and illness, as well as of synoptic happiness and synoptic unhappiness. An individual is well (in some respects and in some degree) or unwell (in other respects and in some degree), and an individual’s life as a whole is characterized for the most part by wellness or it is characterized by illness. Whether one is well (or ill) does not directly depend on one’s desires, emotions, and beliefs. Wellness is not in the eye of the beholder, as it were. The greedy, ambitious, envious, hateful, ignorant, etc., are unwell and lead unhappy lives regardless of what they may think and say about themselves and their lives.

84  The Ethics of Joy synoptic happiness. Decreases in power—​episodes of sadness—​are the basic constituents of synoptic unhappiness. Synoptic happiness depends on wellness happiness. It depends on the wellness that is an increase in an individual’s power as a whole (i.e., cheerfulness) and on the wellness that is an increase in an individual’s power in part (i.e., pleasure). Wellness constitutes synoptic happiness. A happy life is a life in which one’s mind and body are optimally developed and optimally functioning at every stage. The good life is the empowered life. Because the qualitative character of the emotion of joy symptomatically represents an enhancement of the power of the subject’s body, happiness can also be said to consist in joy. The good life is a joyful life. This is not to suggest that power enhancements are good because and insofar as they lead to synoptic happiness. Nor am I claiming that, for Spinoza, impairments are bad because and insofar as they bring synoptic unhappiness. On the contrary, because enhancements in an individual’s power constitute synoptic happiness, their goodness is not the goodness of instrumental value. As is the case with synoptic happiness itself, an enhancement in power is good apart from its usefulness for an end. Similarly, power impairments constitute synoptic unhappiness, and a power impairment, as is the case with synoptic unhappiness, is bad independent of its disadvantageousness towards an end. “Joy is not directly [directè] evil, but good; sadness, on the other hand, is directly [directè] evil” (4p41, emphasis in original). Spinoza thus subscribes to the Wellness as Underivative Goodness Doctrine and its correlate the Illness as Underivative Badness Doctrine: Wellness as Underivative Goodness Doctrine: The goodness of wellness is underivative, that is, enhancements in power are good in and of themselves. Illness as Underivative Badness Doctrine:  The badness of illness is underivative, that is, impairments of power are bad in and of themselves.

By “underivative” I  mean that the goodness or badness of a subject’s condition is not derived from the value or disvalue of anything except the state of the subject’s power itself.3 Whether someone X is in a good way or in a 3 The interpretation I am defending here is compatible with the interpretation Jon Miller defends in his “Spinoza’s Axiology.” My earlier Goodness as Power Enhancement Doctrine and the Badness as Power Impairment Doctrine express a point that Miller makes in passing in his article. Miller writes, “However, the basic metaphysical and ethical justification for the acquisition of knowledge or understanding must be, for Spinoza, that it will increase our power of action” (p. 158). This, in my judgment, is the core tenet of Spinoza’s moral philosophy, and it is what I try to capture in the

Underivative Goodness and Underivative Badness  85 bad way—​whether he is well or ill—​is about whether X’s power of acting is increasing or decreasing. What makes wellness underivatively good is that it is axiologically fundamental. Illness is also fundamental in this sense: there is nothing over and above illness that is the source of the badness of being ill or unwell. The Wellness as Underivative Goodness Doctrine does not imply that there are no factors on which an individual’s wellness depends. There are factors on which it depends, such as nourishing food (4p45c2s, 4App XXVII; cf. 4p63cs). But even though an individual’s wellness depends to some extent on factors external to it in that an individual’s wellness can be enhanced or impaired by, for instance, healthy and unhealthy foods, the goodness of wellness is not something whose value is derived from the value of anything other than being well. To clarify, the Wellness as Underivative Goodness Doctrine and the Illness as Underivative Badness Doctrine are about what Spinoza is committed to given his stated views, and while these doctrines are compatible with the definitions of “good” and “bad” at the beginning of Ethics Part 4 (i.e., 4D1 and 4D2), they are not a gloss on those definitions in abstraction from their context and apart from other claims Spinoza makes about goodness and badness. There is more going on in Spinoza’s theory of value than what is expressed in 4D1 and 4D2 alone. Spinoza admits as much when he adds an explication to 4D1 and 4D2 that refers the reader to 4 Preface. 4D1 defines “good” simply as what is “useful to us.” 4D2 defines “bad” in terms of what “prevents us from being masters of some good.” Regarding these definitions Jon Miller writes, It is evident that Spinoza determines value in terms of use. However, a theory of value which defines value in terms of use can be satisfactory only if an account is provided of the agent using the good in question. The reason is simple: it is impossible to say whether a thing is useful and therefore valuable for an agent unless it is known what sort of being that agent is.4

Goodness as Power Enhancement Doctrine and the Badness as Power Impairment Doctrine. In his article Miller does not give an extensive treatment of this idea, and so it is not clear whether in his view increases in power of action are, in his terms (p. 160), non-​circumstantially relatively valuable, circumstantially relatively valuable, valuable in some other sense, or indifferent. On the interpretation I am defending, an increase in power of action is neither non-​circumstantially relatively valuable nor circumstantially relatively valuable, and yet it is valuable. Because the value of an increase in power is not derivative from something else that has value, I have opted to describe it as “underivative goodness.” See Jon Miller, “Spinoza’s Axiology,” in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, vol. II, ed. Daniel Garber and Steven Nadler (Clarendon, 2005), pp. 149‒172. 4 Miller, “Spinoza’s Axiology,” p. 152.

86  The Ethics of Joy Any reading of Spinoza’s theory of value that neglects his account of human nature fails to be a fully accurate reading of his theory of value. This is because he has an account of the human agent for whom things are useful and for whom things prevent the agent from making use of some good. This is, I believe, captured in part by the Wellness as Underivative Goodness Doctrine and the Illness as Underivative Badness Doctrine. In the next chapter I discuss in detail Spinoza’s view of the goodness and badness of human deeds and of natural objects. Things such as food, shelter, music, gardening, theater, sporting activities, alcohol, and wealth are good and bad because and insofar as they are useful or disadvantageous (4D1, 4D2). What are they useful for? Insofar as such things are useful, they are useful for being well and living well and, ultimately, for being well and living well over the course of one’s life as a whole. Is wellness, like food (etc.), good because and insofar as it is useful as a means to an end? To be well is to undergo enhancements of power without suffering impairments, and a happy life is one that is shaped by power enhancements and not marred by impairments.5 It is not the case that enhancements of an individual’s power are useful for something beyond the enhancements themselves and the synoptic happiness that they constitute. Wellness is a final end. As such, it is not the sort of thing that can be said to be useful in the same way that food, shelter, etc., are useful. Wellness happiness is underivatively good. Likewise, synoptic happiness, and the wellness that composes it, is not good because it is useful as a means to an end. Its goodness is underivative.

2.  Naturalism and Non-​Naturalism If this reading is correct, wellness and illness are natural properties because enhancements and impairments of power are natural, and they are natural in at least two senses of “natural.” First, they are natural in the sense that is announced in the Preface to Part 3: The Affects, therefore, of hate, anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and force of nature as the other singular things. And therefore they acknowledge certain causes, through which they are understood, and have certain properties, as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing, by the mere contemplation of which we 5 What makes this conception of happiness the correct conception? It is our actual essence as power of acting that makes it correct and therefore makes it the conception of true happiness.

Underivative Goodness and Underivative Badness  87 are pleased. Therefore, I shall treat the nature and powers of the Affects, and the power of the Mind over them, by the same Method by which, in the preceding parts, I treated God and the Mind, and I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a Question of lines, planes, and bodies. (3Pref)

Knowledge of enhancements and impairments of power is as amenable to the geometric method as is knowledge of God, mind, and as knowledge of geometric objects and properties themselves. An enhancement of an individual’s power belongs to the same order of existence as such natural properties as the particular size and shape of the desk at which I sit and the current level of sugar in my bloodstream. Wellness and illness are thus natural in the sense that they are properties that can and should be studied in the most scientifically rigorous manner available, and, in Spinoza’s view, this means the geometric method. Second, wellness and illness are natural in a sense familiar to us from the standpoint of contemporary biology, psychology, and medicine.6 They are Spinoza’s conceptions of the natural properties of physical and mental health and physical and mental illness. Spinoza’s notion of wellness is a precursor of our contemporary notions of physical and mental health and should be understood as being on a naturalistic par with our contemporary notions. As Don Garrett writes, “A Spinozist approach is also echoed in the work of another astute psychologist, Sigmund Freud. For Spinoza’s is fundamentally an ethics of mental health, in which one achieves a healthy power to control the direction of one’s affects through knowledge of their causes.”7 From our present vantage point, we may have misgivings about the view that 6 Regarding Spinoza’s claim in 4p18s that the foundation of virtue is the striving to preserve one’s own being, Antonio Damasio writes, “So here is the beauty behind the cherished quote, seen from today’s perspective: It contains the foundation for a system of ethical behaviors and that foundation is neurobiological” (Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain [Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2003], p. 171; cf. p. 174). 7 Don Garrett, “Spinoza’s Ethical Theory,” in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don Garrett (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 308. Delahunty also endorses this type of naturalist reading where he writes, “But more importantly of all, his aim in writing the Ethics is, in large part, to provide a remedy for the passions which afflict us, by describing how they damage us, how they arise and can be removed, and what a sane and healthy life would consist in” (R. J. Delahunty, Spinoza: The Arguments of the Philosophers [Routledge, 1985], p. 229, emphasis added). Spinoza’s moral philosophy is an ethics of mental health and healthy living, but I am not suggesting that Spinozistic wellness and illness are identical to contemporary notions of health and illness. As I discuss in ­chapter 8, enhancements to adequate causal power do not necessarily contribute to a person’s longevity. For Spinoza, the quality of a person’s life is not based on the quantity of time that a person lives, although a person cannot realize a high level of perfection and achieve a high level of synoptic happiness without existing for a minimum quantity of time. But while a minimum is necessary, the quality of a person’s life is measured by the extent to which a person is an adequate cause of effects, as this is understood through human nature. For further discussion see Andrew Youpa, “Spinozistic Self-​Preservation,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 41, no. 3 (2003): 477‒490.

88  The Ethics of Joy enhancements to our power of activity constitute physical and mental health, but it is not clear that we should have misgivings about the idea that natural facts about physical and mental health serve as the central components of human happiness and thereby serve as the foundation of ethics. On the contrary, on this point Spinoza is, I believe, correct.8 This second sense of naturalism is evident in the following remarks from the Ethics: Generally, then, the affects are excessive, and occupy the Mind in the consideration of only one object so much that it cannot think of others. . . . When this happens to a man who is not asleep, we say that he is mad or insane. Nor are they thought to be less mad who burn with Love, and dream, both night and day, only of a lover or a courtesan. For they usually provoke laughter. But when a greedy man thinks of nothing else but profit, or money, and an ambitious man of esteem, they are not thought to be mad, because they are usually troublesome and are considered worthy of Hate. But Greed, Ambition, and Lust really are species of madness, even though they are not numbered among the diseases [morbos]. (4p44s, emphasis added) Nothing forbids our pleasure except a savage and sad superstition. For why is it more proper to relieve our hunger and thirst than to rid ourselves of melancholy? (4p45c2s) It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself in moderation with pleasant food and drink, with scents, with the beauty of green plants, with decoration, music, sports, the theater, and other things of this kind, which anyone can use without injury to another. For the human Body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which constantly require new and varied nourishment, so that the whole Body may be equally capable of all the things which can follow from its nature, and hence, so that the Mind also may be equally capable of understanding many things. (4p45c2s, emphasis added) 8 Philosophers and nonphilosophers today do not, generally speaking, identify themselves as Spinozists in ethics, but every day many of us affirm our commitment to such a naturalistic ethics in such things as our child-​rearing practices and our views about what qualifies as good parenting and good teaching, in our interest in the nutritional content of our own and our children’s diets, and in the use of medications to ward off depression and other forms of psychological illness. We engage in such practices and hold such beliefs because we rightly believe, as Spinoza does, that our good is fixed, at least in part, by objective natural facts about our wellness and objective natural facts about the sorts of things that contribute to our wellness and the sorts of things that diminish and destroy it.

Underivative Goodness and Underivative Badness  89 The principal advantage which we derive from things outside us—​apart from the experience and knowledge we acquire from observing them and changing them from one form into another—​lies in the preservation of our body. That is why those things are most useful to us which can feed and maintain it, so that all its parts can perform their function properly. . . . So to nourish the body in the way required, it is necessary to use many different kinds of food. Indeed, the human Body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which require continuous and varied food so that the whole Body may be equally capable of doing everything which can follow from its nature, and consequently, so that the Mind may also be equally capable of conceiving many things. (4App XXVII)

Greed, ambition, and lust are mental illnesses on a par with other types of mental illness, such as a lover’s obsession with the object of his obsession.9 Melancholy is an impairment like other impairments of our power such as hunger and thirst, and we ought to be as prepared to extinguish melancholy as we are prepared to extinguish hunger and thirst. Proper food and nourishment are the key to enhancing the body’s power, as well as the mind’s power. Spinoza’s theory of goodness and badness rests on a naturalistic conception of power, and his conception of power is a conception of health, including mental health.10 In contrast with a theory of moral goodness and

9 The following passages are additional evidence of Spinoza’s commitment to naturalism in the health-​related  sense: For example, if someone sees that he pursues esteem too much, he should think of its correct use, the end for which it ought be pursued, and the means by which it can be acquired, not of its misuse and emptiness, and men’s inconstancy, or other things of this kind, which only someone sick of mind thinks of. (5p10s, emphasis added) Next, it should be noted that sickness of the mind and misfortunes take their origin especially from too much Love toward a thing which is liable to many variations and which we can never fully possess. (5p20s, emphasis added) For Spinoza, ethics is in part about what enhances and fulfills our nature and about the proper therapy for the disorders that we suffer. Regarding the former, he says, “But perfecting the intellect is nothing but understanding God, his attributes, and his actions, which follow from the necessity of his nature” (4App IV). Under the attribute of thought, knowledge is our nature, and so knowledge is what enhances and fulfills our nature. Ignorance and superstition, among other things, are disorders. 10 My argument is not that goodness is an objective property because health is an objective property, and that goodness is health (wellness). In the previous chapter I completed my argument for the view that, for Spinoza, goodness and badness are objective properties. My claim here is that his conception of objective goodness is a conception of natural goodness because it is a conception of physical and mental health. His conception of objective badness is a conception of natural badness because it is a conception of physical and mental illness.

90  The Ethics of Joy moral evil designed to serve as a standard for what an agent retributively deserves in terms of praise, blame, reward, and punishment, Spinoza’s is a theory of natural goodness and natural badness.11 Wellness and illness—​ that is, physical and mental health, as well as physical and mental illness—​ are the central notions, and these serve as the standards for a good human life and as the standards for what constitutes effective therapy.12 “Therefore, since Joy is generally (by P44S) related to one part of the body, for the most part we desire to preserve our being without regard to our health as a whole [integrae nostrae valetudinis]” (4p60s). Although the power of our bodies often undergoes increases, when such increases are increases to a single part of the body or a particular subset of parts, such an increase in power is inferior to an increase in the body’s power as a whole. The highest state of joy is an increase in an individual’s wellness as a whole. We can also inquire whether Spinoza subscribes to moral naturalism in a sense of “moral naturalism” that gained philosophical attention in the twentieth century. Much of course depends on how this view is formulated. If “moral naturalism” is understood as the view that moral properties can be defined in terms of and thereby reduced to non-​moral properties, no doubt Spinoza subscribes to this type of moral naturalism. He seeks to derive ethical theorems in part from metaphysical axioms, definitions, and theorems. For instance, he defines “virtue” in terms of power (4D8), and power in Spinoza’s view is a metaphysical notion (1p16d, 1p34). In ­chapter 3, I argued that Spinoza is committed to the Goodness as Power Enhancement and the Badness as Power Impairment Doctrines, which also supports that Spinoza is a naturalist in the specific sense under consideration. He is a naturalist in the sense under consideration because he is a metaphysicalist: the non-​moral notions in terms of which he defines and reduces ethical notions are metaphysical notions. On the other hand, if “moral naturalism” is understood as the view that moral properties can be defined in and thereby reduced to empirically 11 Spinoza believes that the retributivist notion of desert (i.e., moral responsibility) and the conception of free will that it requires are fictions (see Chapter 8 of Part 2 of the Appendix to Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, Letter 58, and Letter 78). 12 As Herman De Dijn writes, “Spinoza’s ethics, properly speaking, turns out to be more related to the issues of self-​loss and self-​realization—​issues intrinsically linked to the search for a meaningful life—​than to what today is usually understood by ethics or morals. In the contemporary context, this issue and this search have become closely associated with therapeutic theories and activities, and various methods of self-​realization” (Herman De Dijn, “The Ladder, Not the Top: The Provisional Morals of the Philosopher,” in Ethica IV: Spinoza on Reason and the “Free Man,” ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel and Gideon Segal [Little Room Press, 2004], p. 39).

Underivative Goodness and Underivative Badness  91 observable properties, I do not believe that Spinoza is a moral naturalist. By “power” Spinoza means the “power of bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone” (4D8; cf. 3p7d, 4p4d). Spinozistic power is the power to be the adequate cause of an effect or effects. While the consequences of a thing’s adequate causal power are empirically observable, power itself is not, strictly speaking, an empirically observable property. No amount of empirical observation would determine whether, for example, Peter is the adequate cause of the deed(s) he performs when he comes to the aid of someone in distress. There is, it seems, no direct empirical access to the nature of the sort of power that, in Spinoza’s view, constitutes the actual essence of an existing thing. There is at least one further way of formulating the doctrine of moral naturalism worth considering, and this third formulation strikes at something deeper and more interesting in Spinoza’s philosophy than the previous two formulations. According to this third formulation, moral naturalism is the view that moral properties can be defined in and thereby reduced to non-​ evaluative and non-​normative properties. By a “non-​evaluative” property I mean one that neither grades something as good and bad nor as better and worse than something else. In Spinoza’s metaphysics, the notion of extension is non-​evaluative in this sense. One extended thing, A, can be neither better nor worse than another extended thing, B, in virtue of being extended alone. Something is either extended or it is not. There is no basis for evaluating extended things as good and bad on the basis of their extension alone. By a “non-​normative” property I mean a property that is not about how things should be or should not be. In Spinoza’s moral philosophy, the notion of model (exemplar) in the phrase “model of human nature” (4Pref) appears not to fall into this category. To claim that something X is a model of human nature is to claim that humans should be X or should resemble X as far as possible. Is Spinoza a moral naturalist in this non-​evaluative and non-​normative sense? It might seem that this question was addressed with my first formulation of moral naturalism and the view I maintained there that Spinoza, as a moral metaphysicalist, is a moral naturalist. However, it is important not to conflate moral metaphysicalism with non-​evaluative and non-​normative naturalism. It is relatively uncontroversial that Spinoza is a metaphysical naturalist: he attempts to derive ethical theorems in part from his metaphysical definitions, axioms, and theorems. The more controversial and, in my judgment, more interesting question is whether the metaphysical terms that

92  The Ethics of Joy serve as the reductive base are purely non-​evaluative and non-​normative terms. For instance, are Spinoza’s notions of power and perfection purely non-​evaluative and non-​normative? Or, are they descriptive and evaluative/​ normative? In other words, are Spinoza’s notions of power and perfection on a par with his notion of extension or, alternatively, with his notion of model? It can appear that Spinoza is a moral naturalist in this non-​evaluative and non-​normative sense of “naturalism.” Why else would he seek to define moral notions in metaphysical terms if it were not for the purpose of reducing moral notions to non-​evaluative and non-​normative notions? I do not find this convincing, however. The attractiveness of this non-​evaluative and non-​normative reading stems in part from a contemporary point of view that has been shaped by twentieth-​century debates between moral non-​naturalists and moral naturalists, beginning with G. E. Moore’s charge that moral naturalism commits what he calls the naturalistic fallacy.13 It is difficult to overestimate the influence that this debate exerts on our contemporary philosophical outlook. There is no question that Spinoza subscribes to moral naturalism in some senses of the highly ambiguous word “naturalism.” But the question is whether there is any good reason to think that he subscribes to moral naturalism in the non-​evaluative and non-​normative sense of “naturalism.” It will not do to take a position on this question without supporting textual evidence, and it is question-​begging to claim that his moral metaphysicalism commits him to non-​evaluative and non-​ normative naturalism. After all, one reason he might have for defining moral terms in metaphysical terms is that this is simply the correct method of philosophizing; non-​foundational notions must be built up from foundational notions in the way that Euclidean geometry, the paradigm of science and of scientific rigor, proceeds from a foundational set of definitions, axioms, and postulates to non-​foundational notions and propositions. This is not to be confused with our contemporary social scientist’s superstition about a theoretical apparatus that is supposedly devoid of evaluative and normative notions. There is nothing inherent in the geometric method that rules out the deployment of notions and axioms that contain evaluative and normative notions. Of course, it does not follow from this that Spinoza does not subscribe to non-​evaluative and non-​normative naturalism. What it shows

13 As I note in c­ hapter 3, G. E. Moore includes Spinoza among those whom he charges with having committed his naturalistic fallacy (G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, rev. ed., ed. and with introduction by Thomas Baldwin (Cambridge University Press, 1993[1903]), pp. 161‒164.

Underivative Goodness and Underivative Badness  93 is that his commitment to moral metaphysicalism is not a good reason to think that he is also committed to non-​evaluative and non-​normative naturalism. My view is that Spinoza is not a non-​evaluative and non-​normative naturalist.14 His moral philosophy is a version of non-​naturalism in this sense of the word “non-​naturalism.” My full argument for thinking so is the argument that runs through the entire course of this book. Still, with regard to whether Spinoza is a non-​evaluative and non-​normative naturalist, a key question is whether increases and decreases in a human’s power have axiological significance.15 Is an increase in an individual’s power an enhancement of the individual’s nature? Is a decrease an impairment? If the correct answer to these questions is no, Spinoza arguably is committed to a version of non-​ evaluative/​non-​normative naturalism. Alternatively, if the correct answer is yes, he arguably does not subscribe to a version of non-​evaluative/​non-​ normative naturalism. In other words, if an increase in an individual’s power is an enhancement and a decrease is an impairment, Spinoza subscribes to a type of moral non-​naturalism. For even though ethical properties are identical to metaphysical properties, central metaphysical properties are irreducibly axiological; the enhancing aspect of an increase in power and the impairing aspect of a decrease in power do not disappear at the level of fundamental metaphysics. For my argument in favor of reading Spinoza as holding that increases in power really are enhancements and that decreases really are impairments, see c­ hapter 2.

3.  Natural Axiological Complexity Naturalism in the sense of psychophysical wellness and psychophysical illness is the source of an important level of complexity in Spinoza’s account of underivative goodness and underivative badness. Recall that cheerfulness

14 Contrary to the type of non-​naturalist reading that I favor, Don Garrett maintains a naturalist reading in his “Spinoza’s Ethical Theory,” pp. 286‒287. Regarding Spinoza’s use of the terms “good,” “virtue,” “guided by reason,” and “free man,” Garrett says, “As Spinoza uses these terms, each is, or can be, defined naturalistically—​that is, in natural, descriptive, nonethical terms” (p. 286). I do not agree with the view that Spinoza uses these terms in a way that can be defined purely descriptively. They are, I believe, descriptive and irreducibly normative/​evaluative. 15 This question can also be formulated as the question whether, for Spinoza, the notions of increases in power and decreases in power are purely descriptive notions or, alternatively, descriptive and evaluative/​normative. My view is that they are descriptive and evaluative/​normative.

94  The Ethics of Joy cannot be “excessive” and is “always good” while melancholy is “always evil” (4p42). The reason that cheerfulness is always good is that it symptomatically represents an increase in an individual’s power as a whole (4p42d). Similarly, melancholy is always bad because it symptomatically represents a decrease in an individual’s power as a whole (4p42d). But, as I discussed in ­chapter 2, not all emotional states are axiologically unambiguous in the way that cheerfulness and melancholy are unambiguous. Not all are always good or always bad. Some emotional states are, other things equal, good. Others are, other things equal, bad. This is because not all emotional states symptomatically represent increases and decreases to an individual’s power as a whole. Many register increases in power in one part of oneself or they register decreases in power in one part of oneself (4p44s). An emotion that registers an increase in power in one part of oneself can be bad, and an emotion that registers a decrease in power in one part of oneself can be good. Pleasure and pain, for example, are psychophysical states of this sort: “Pleasure [Titillatio] can be excessive and evil, whereas Pain [dolor] can be good insofar as the Pleasure, or Joy, is evil” (4p43). Pleasure registers an increase in power in one part of oneself, not an increase in one’s power as a whole. Pain registers a decrease in power in one part of oneself, not a decrease in one’s power as a whole. This means that pleasure is, other things equal, good. Pleasure is good insofar as it registers an increase in power, but an increase in power in one part of an individual (e.g., drunkenness) can impair an individual’s power as a whole, and pleasure is bad when it impairs an individual’s power as a whole. A similar point holds true of pain. In spite of being a decrease in power in one part of an individual, pain can be good or, at least, less bad than the relevant alternatives. Pain, as a decrease in power, is bad. But, as a check against a harmful pleasure, pain is good. Similarly, humility, as a decrease in power, is bad (4p53), but by comparison with and as an alternative to pride, it is good or, at least, less bad (4p54s). This gives the basis for the following fourfold hierarchical classification of emotions: 1.  Indefeasibly good emotions 4p42: cheerfulness (hilaritas) 4p52: rational self-​esteem (acquiescentia in se ipso) 5p32c: intellectual love of God (amor Dei intellectualis)

Underivative Goodness and Underivative Badness  95 2.  Defeasibly good emotions 4p43: pleasure (titillatio) 4p44: love of a person (amor) 4p58: love of esteem (gloria) 3.  Defeasibly bad emotions 4p43: pain (dolor) 4p47: hope (spes) 4p47: fear (metus) 4p50: pity (commiseratio) 4p53: humility (humilitas) 4p54: repentance (poenitentia) 4.  Indefeasibly bad emotions 4p42: melancholy (melancholia) 4p45: hate (odium) 4p48: overestimation (existimationis) 4p48: scorn (despectus) 4p55: pride (superbia) It is not my intention for this list to be exhaustive. My intention here is to place in each category types of emotions that clearly belong in it. By “indefeasibly good” I mean good under any and all circumstances. For instance, an indefeasibly good emotion cannot be excessive. No level of intensity can diminish or nullify the goodness of an indefeasibly good emotion, such as cheerfulness (hilaritas), and make it bad, not good, or less good.16 Furthermore, there

16 It is important to keep in mind that what Spinoza means by “cheerfulness” (hilaritas) is not identical to what we today mean by “cheerfulness” in ordinary usage. Spinozistic cheerfulness is a “Joy which, insofar as it is related to the Body, consists in this, that all parts of the Body are equally affected” (4p42d), and he notes, “Cheerfulness, which I have said is good, is more easily conceived than observed. For the affects by which we are daily torn are generally related to a part of the Body which is affected more than the others” (4p44s). The kind of cheerfulness that Spinoza has in mind is not the kind of cheerfulness that one experiences, say, when one plays a winning poker hand or when one receives an upgrade from coach to first-​class. Spinozistic cheerfulness is an increase in one’s power as a whole, not the satisfaction of a desire for wealth or luxury.

96  The Ethics of Joy are no consequences that follow from an indefeasibly good emotion that can undermine and tarnish its goodness. In contrast, defeasibly good emotions, such as pleasure (titillatio) and love (amor), are, other things equal, good. Pleasure and love can be excessive and can have consequences that undermine and nullify their goodness. This is the case with the drunkard’s pleasure in drinking and also in the case of an individual’s obsessive love of his beloved (3p57s, 4p44s). While pleasure and love, as enhancements to a part of an individual’s power, are good, they can reach levels of intensity and have consequences for the subject and others that undermine their goodness and make them bad. They are therefore defeasibly good. As with the notion of indefeasible goodness, by “indefeasibly bad” I mean bad under any and all circumstances. Nothing about indefeasibly bad emotions, such as melancholy and hatred, can compensate for their badness and make them good, not bad, or less bad. Furthermore, unlike defeasibly bad emotions, there are no circumstances in which the badness of melancholy and hatred is offset by comparison with worse alternatives. Spinoza writes, “Because men rarely live from the dictate of reason, these two affects, Humility and Repentance, and in addition, Hope and Fear, bring more advantage than disadvantage. So since men must sin, they ought rather to sin in that direction” (4p54s). Unlike humility, repentance, hope, and fear, under no circumstances should we err in the direction of melancholy and hatred. This is because there is never any compensatory advantage to be gained from melancholy and hatred. They are indefeasibly bad. With respect to humility and its ilk, the advantage that Spinoza has in mind is a comparative advantage. Humility, repentance, hope, and fear have a comparative advantage over pride, shamelessness, and fearlessness in that the former are more conducive, or less unconducive, to social bonds than the latter. “If weak-​minded men were equally proud, ashamed of nothing, and afraid of nothing, how could they be united or restrained by any bonds?” (4p54s). Compared to pride (etc.), humility (etc.) is also less unconducive to learning how to live by the guidance of reason (4p54s). Humility is bad, but it is less bad than many other emotions. It is therefore better to err on the side of humility than to be the subject of pride. Humility is defeasibly bad.17 17 This distinction among indefeasible goodness, indefeasible badness, defeasible goodness, and defeasible badness should not be confused with Jon Miller’s distinction between non-​circumstantially relative value and circumstantially relative value (“Spinoza’s Axiology,” p. 160). This is because the indefeasible/​defeasible distinction is about whether a thing’s value can or cannot be overridden in a context composed of other valuable things, and not about what makes something valuable. In other words, the indefeasible/​defeasible distinction is not intended to explain the source of a thing’s value, whereas Miller’s non-​circumstantial/​circumstantial distinction, as I understand it, is primarily about

Underivative Goodness and Underivative Badness  97 Desires fall under this same fourfold classification because desires are “good or evil insofar as they arise from good or evil affects” (4p58s; cf. 3p56d, 5p4cs). A desire that arises from an indefeasibly good emotion is itself indefeasibly good (4p63cd). Defeasibly good emotions give rise to defeasibly good desires and defeasibly bad emotions give rise to defeasibly bad desires (4p60). Finally, indefeasibly bad emotions produce indefeasibly bad desires (4p45c2).18 As discussed in ­chapter 1, an emotion is either active or passive. An emotion is active if it follows from an individual’s adequate causal power alone (3D1, 3D3). If the causal history of a particular episode of an emotion includes a factor besides an individual’s adequate causal power, it is a passive emotion (3D1, 3D3). Spinoza writes, “Our actions—​that is, those desires which are defined by man’s power, or reason—​are always good; but the other [desires] can be both good and evil” (4App III). All active desires are indefeasibly good, and no passive desire type is indefeasibly good. So only active desires are indefeasibly good. Furthermore, only passive desires are defeasibly good, defeasibly bad, and indefeasibly bad. The reason that no active desires are defeasibly good is that active desires result from emotions that are increases to an individual’s power as a whole and therefore cannot be excessive (4p61; cf. 4App VI). Because passive emotions that are increases in power are increases only to a part of an individual and not to the individual as a whole, they can be excessive and harmful and can give rise to desires that are excessive and harmful. For this reason ordinary love and the desire that issues from it, unlike the intellectual love of God, falls short of being indefeasibly good (4p44; cf. 5p20s). the source of a thing’s value. Or, perhaps Miller intends that it perform double-​duty: serving as an account of the source of a thing’s value and as an account of how a thing’s value can or cannot be overridden in a context with other valuable things. Regarding the source of a thing’s value, I take Spinoza to be committed to the Wellness as Underivative Goodness Doctrine and the Illness as Underivative Badness Doctrine (see section 1 of the present chapter), on the one hand, and the derivative goodness and derivative badness of deeds and objects (see ­chapter 6), on the other. 18 The view I am defending here is contrary to the reading maintained by Ursula Goldenbaum, “The Affects as a Condition of Human Freedom in Spinoza’s Ethics,” in Ethica IV: Spinoza on Reason and the “Free Man,” ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel and Gideon Segal (Little Room Press, 2004), pp. 149‒165. Goldenbaum suggests that “all affects of desire and joy are good in principle because they are expressions of an increased power of acting and of increased perfection” (p. 152). On the reading I favor, some desires are expressions of an increase in power and perfection, some are expressions of decreases in power and perfection, and some are expressions of mixed increases and decreases in power and perfection. Desires that express only a decrease in power and perfection (e.g., desires that arise from hate) are indefeasibly bad and, as a consequence, are not good even in principle; nor are they good in a particular instance when special circumstances obtain. There are no special circumstances that would make a desire produced by hatred good. This is ultimately because hatred itself is indefeasibly bad.

98  The Ethics of Joy Spinoza’s brand of naturalism is responsible for this axiological complexity. A human being is a complex system operating in a complex environment, an environment that is cooperative to some extent and in some ways but is often uncooperative with an individual’s functioning as a whole (4App XXXII). Moreover, not all elements of the complex system that is a human organism respond to the same environmental factors in the very same way (3p17s, 3p59s). Some elements respond favorably to large quantities of bacon and whiskey. Others do not. Some respond favorably to exercise and sporting activities, but not all do. For some elements music and theater are empowering. But not always. We are complex organisms who inhabit a complex environment. At the same time there is a state of happiness—​our wellness as a whole—​that is our true happiness. It is the fact that we are complex organisms who inhabit a complex environment that is responsible for the complexity of Spinoza’s theory of underivative goodness and underivative badness.19

Conclusion For Spinoza, it is not the case that wellness happiness and synoptic happiness are instrumentally valuable. They do not have the value that they have because they are useful as means to an end independent of wellness and synoptic happiness. Wellness and the synoptic happiness that it constitutes are underivatively good. There is no end apart from wellness and synoptic happiness that make them good. Similarly, illness and the synoptic unhappiness 19 My argument for reading Spinoza’s moral philosophy as a type of naturalistic realism does not hinge on whether human nature is, in his view, an objective property. Even if it turns out to be true that Spinoza believes that there are no species essences existing in nature, my arguments that goodness and badness are objective, natural properties still stand. It is not necessary to accept that human nature is a property existing in nature to accept that enhancements and impairments of power exist in nature. But because Spinoza makes frequent reference to human nature in the context of the psychological and ethical theory, especially in Part IV of the Ethics (e.g., 3p57s, 4Pref, 4p35d, 4p61d, 4App IX), I am convinced that human nature, in Spinoza’s view, is an objective property. However, because this issue is not central to the argument of this chapter and to address it adequately would take me far afield, I will not elaborate and defend my position here. For a discussion of Spinoza’s theory of human nature, see Diane Steinberg, “Spinoza’s Ethical Doctrine and the Unity of Human Nature,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 22, no. 3 (July 1984): 303‒324; Karolina Hübner, “Spinoza on Being Human and Human Perfection,” in Essays on Spinoza’s Ethical Theory, ed. Matthew J. Kisner and Andrew Youpa (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 124‒142; and Hübner, “Spinoza on Essences, Universals, and Beings of Reason,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97, no. 1 (March 2016): 58‒88. For a reading similar to the one I favor regarding Spinoza’s view of human nature and its role in his ethical theory, see Steven Nadler, “Act and Moral Motivation in Spinoza’s Ethics,” in Moral Motivation: A History, ed. Iakovos Vasiliou (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 122‒145.

Underivative Goodness and Underivative Badness  99 that it constitutes are underivatively bad. Furthermore, because episodes of wellness and illness are, respectively, enhancements and impairments to power, and because enhancements and impairments to power are natural phenomena, wellness and illness are natural in the sense that they can and should be investigated with full scientific rigor and thus in accord with the geometric method. As ancestors of recent and contemporary notions of physical and mental health, as well as physical and mental illness, wellness and illness are also natural in a way recognized by the contemporary fields of biology, psychology, and medicine. An ethics of psychophysical wellness is at home in a world where scientific rigor is welcome in moral philosophy. It is at home in a world where the overriding project is not to assign credit and debt in the economy of good and evil, but where the overriding project is to empower people to live joyously and lovingly, as is Spinoza’s world. Although he is committed to moral naturalism in important senses of the word “naturalism,” I  have argued that Spinoza is not a naturalist in the sense that analyzes evaluative notions and normative notions in terms of purely non-​ evaluative and non-​normative notions. On this issue, he is, I believe, committed to a form of non-​naturalism. There is no reason to think that Spinoza has reservations about the encroachment of scientific rigor in to moral philosophy, as many of our naturalistically oriented contemporaries do.

6 Derivative Goodness and Derivative Badness Introduction In ­chapter 5, I examined the goodness and badness of wellness and illness and showed that they are underivatively good and underivatively bad, respectively, and that, as power enhancements and power impairments, they are natural properties in important senses of the word “natural,” though certainly not in all senses of the word. Spinoza also has things to say about the goodness and badness of types of actions and about such things as food, music, sporting activities, and knowledge of God. In this chapter I  continue to flesh out his moral philosophy. To avoid confusion with “action” in Spinoza’s technical sense of the word (3D2), I will use the word “deed” when speaking of actions in our ordinary sense. By “deed” I mean an individual’s voluntary behavior—​ that is, behavior that results from an individual’s desires, emotions, and beliefs regardless of whether the desires and emotions are active or passive and regardless of whether the beliefs are adequate or inadequate. In contrast with the underivative goodness of wellness and the underivative badness of illness, in this chapter I show that Spinoza is committed to the derivative goodness and derivative badness of deeds and of spatially external objects.

1.  The Derivative Goodness and Derivative Badness of Deeds According to Spinoza, an individual’s deed, independent of the cause that produces it, is neither good nor bad. No outward behavior, independent of its causal history, is good or bad. This is because goodness and badness do not inhere in deeds as unique and irreducible properties. A deed does not contain goodness as if its goodness were a distinct feature of an agent’s behavior The Ethics of Joy. Andrew Youpa, Oxford University Press (2020) © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190086022.001.0001

Derivative Goodness and Derivative Badness  101 alongside of and on a par with, say, the specific size, shape, and motion of an agent’s limbs. Spinoza says, Any action is called evil insofar as it arises from the fact that we have been affected with Hate or with some evil affect (see P45C1). But no action, considered in itself, is good or evil (as we have shown in the Preface of this Part); instead, one and the same action is now good, now evil. Therefore, to the same action which is now evil, or which arises from some evil affect, we can (by P19) be led by reason, q.e.d. (4p59 Alternate Demonstration, emphasis added)

The italicized remark in parentheses refers back to the music example and the lines leading up to it in the Preface to Part 4. So the point that he makes in this passage is, as Spinoza sees it, directly related to the one that he makes with the well-​known music example.1 Here in 4p59’s Alternate Demonstration, he is saying that what makes a deed bad is that it is brought about by a bad emotion or bad desire. Independent of the emotion or desire that produces it, someone’s outward behavior—​a particular deed—​is neither good nor bad. One and the same type of outward behavior, such as the type in which someone uses his fists to beat someone else, is bad in case it is motivated by hatred, whereas it is good in case it is motivated by reason (4p59s; cf. 4p63cs). This is not the ridiculous claim that physically assaulting an innocent person is bad when it is motivated by hatred but good when it is motivated by reason. Spinoza’s view is that the deed of an agent who is motivated by reason to use his fists to defend himself against attack is a good deed, whereas the deed of the attacker, motivated as he is, say, by hatred, is a bad deed. A deed derives its goodness or badness from the motivation that produces it, and this is because motivation is invariably either an instance of power enhancement or an instance of power impairment.2 A particular motivation is good or bad, 1 I discuss the music passage in section 2 of the present chapter. 2 Steven Nadler arrives at the same conclusion I defend here. According to Nadler, “the moral character of an action is a function of the motive behind it” (Steven Nadler, “Act and Moral Motivation in Spinoza’s Ethics,” in Moral Motivation: A History, ed. Iakovos Vasilou [Oxford University Press, 2016], p. 141). Also, Matthew Kisner writes, “The virtuous character is particularly important to Spinoza’s ethics because, unlike the now dominant ethical theories, utilitarianism and deontology, Spinoza’s ethics is not act-​focused, ultimately concerned with determining the rightness or wrongness of acts, but rather, character-​focused” (Matthew J. Kisner, Spinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy and the Good Life [Cambridge University Press, 2011], p. 198). I agree with Kisner that Spinoza’s ethics is character-​centered if by “character” is meant the motivation that causes a deed. For Spinoza, the goodness or badness of the motivation that causes a deed is the source of the deed’s goodness or badness; cf. Michael LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 19.

102  The Ethics of Joy or it is better or worse than an alternative, and a deed derives its goodness or badness from the motivation that causes it. When an emotion that is an enhancement to an individual’s power as a whole gives rise to a deed, the deed must be good. He writes, But because all those things of which man is the efficient cause must be good [necessariò bona], nothing evil can happen to a man except by external causes, viz. insofar as he is a part of the whole of nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to which it is forced to accommodate itself in ways nearly infinite. (4App VI)

I take it that “efficient cause” in this passage has the same meaning as “adequate cause.” Someone is the efficient cause of an effect E if and only if he is the adequate cause of E. Insofar as an individual is a cause but not the sole efficient cause of E, he is, with respect to E, an inadequate cause. Now, when an individual is the sole efficient cause of a deed, the deed follows from his power as a whole and, as a result, it is necessarily good. It is good for the agent and it is good for human nature generally. According to Spinoza, [M]‌oreover, because what we judge to be good or evil when we follow the dictate of reason must be good or evil (IIP41), it follows that insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, they must do only those things that are good for human nature, and hence, for each man, i.e. (by P31C), those things that agree with the nature of each man. (4p35d)

An agent is an adequate cause if he is guided by knowledge. When an individual is guided by knowledge, his deeds are good. Only good effects follow from an enhancement to an individual’s power as a whole. In contrast, when an individual is an inadequate cause, his deeds do not follow from his power as a whole, he is not guided by knowledge, and his deeds, as a result, can be good in some cases and bad in others. Their goodness or badness depends on the goodness and badness of the enhancements or impairments of power that give rise to the deeds. When a partial enhancement, such as pleasure, is responsible for a deed, the deed may be good. But a partial enhancement of power is defeasibly good, which means that it is not invariably good. Deeds that follow from partial enhancements can be bad, such as when a partial enhancement is excessive and it causes behavior that exhibits the emotion’s excess (4p44s). Similarly, when a partial

Derivative Goodness and Derivative Badness  103 impairment, such as pity, is the cause, the deed may be bad, but in some cases can be good, or less bad, depending on the subject’s constitution and the relevant alternatives (4p50cs; cf. 4p54s). When an impairment to an individual’s power as a whole is the cause (e.g., hate), the resulting deed is bad. Only bad things follow from an impairment of an individual’s power as a whole. Because the good-​making characteristic of a good deed and the bad-​ making characteristic of a bad one is, respectively, the goodness and badness of the motivation that produces it, Spinoza is committed to the Derivative Goodness of Good Deeds and the Derivative Badness of Bad Deeds Doctrines: Derivative Goodness of Good Deeds Doctrine: A deed’s goodness is derivative from the goodness of the motivation (i.e., enhancement in power) that causes it. Derivative Badness of Bad Deeds Doctrine:  A deed’s badness is derivative from the badness of the motivation (i.e., impairment of power) that causes it.

By “derivative” in “derivative goodness” I mean that the source of the goodness of a good deed is not the deed itself. A bad deed is not the source of its own badness. A deed derives its goodness and badness from its causal history. It is the goodness of the motivation that produces a deed that is the source of a deed’s goodness. Emotions that are power enhancements produce empowering deeds. The badness of the motivation is the source of a deed’s badness. Emotions that are power impairments produce disempowering deeds.3 3 Given the centrality of motivation in this account, it might seem that Spinoza is an early proponent of a type of sentimentalist theory. His view that motivation is the source of the goodness and badness of deeds bears some resemblance to the sentimentalist views of Shaftesbury (1671–​ 1713) and Hutcheson (1694–​1746). For instance, in his “An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit,” Shaftesbury writes, Whatsoever is done through any unequal affection is iniquitous, wicked, and wrong. If the affection be equal, sound, and good, and the subject of the affection such as may with advantage to society be ever in the same manner prosecuted or affected, this must necessarily constitute what we call equity and right in any action. For wrong is not such action as is barely the cause of harm (since at this rate a dutiful son aiming at an enemy, but by mistake or ill chance happening to kill his father, would do a wrong), but when anything is done through insufficient or unequal affection (as when a son shows no concern for the safety of a father; or where there is need of succour, prefers an indifferent person to him) this is of the nature of wrong. (Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, ed. J. B. Schneewind [Cambridge University Press, 2003], p. 491) Shaftesbury believes that motivation—​unequal affection or equal affection—​is responsible for the wrongness and for the rightness of our deeds. Similarly, in his “An Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil,” Hutcheson writes,

104  The Ethics of Joy It is not the case that, for Spinoza, a deed is bad if and because someone has an unfavorable attitude toward it or disapproves of it. Nor is it the case that a deed is good if and because someone has a favorable attitude toward it or approves of it. Someone who is greedy, for example, is averse to and disapproves of providing relief to someone who is poor, but the greedy person’s aversion to and disapproval of providing relief to a person in need does not make providing relief bad. It means that providing such relief appears bad to a greedy person. It appears bad to the greedy and a greedy person judges that it is bad. But a greedy person’s judgment that providing relief is bad is false. Virtue calls for coming to the aid of others (3p59s, 4App XXV; cf. 4App XVII).4 A  greedy person’s emotions and desires are impairments of his adequate causal power. The evaluative judgments that result from a greedy person’s emotions and desires are therefore false. A deed derives its goodness or badness from its causal history. Whether a deed is good or bad then is an objective matter. A deed is caused by an enhancement in power as a whole or it is not. If it is, it is good, and objectively so. If a deed is caused by a partial enhancement or partial impairment of power, it can be good, bad, better than an alternative, or worse than an alternative, and in any particular case it is objectively the case that it is one or the other of these alternatives. Furthermore, when a total impairment of power is the cause of a deed, the deed is bad, and objectively so. Instances of power enhancements and power impairments are elements of the natural world. Whether a deed is caused by an enhancement or an impairment, and whether the enhancement or impairment is good or bad, are matters of objective fact. If we examine all the actions which are counted amiable anywhere, and inquire into the grounds upon which they are approved, we shall find that in the opinion of the person who approves them, they generally appear as BENEVOLENT, or flowing from good-​will to others, and a study of their happiness, whether the approver be one of the persons beloved, or profited, or not; so that all those kind affections which incline us to make others happy, and all actions supposed to flow from such affections, appear morally good, if, while they are benevolent towards some persons, they be not pernicious to others. (British Moralists 1650–​1800, ed. D. D. Raphael [Hackett, 1991], p. 280) According to Hutcheson, the basis for our approval of a deed is that the deed appears to flow from a good motivation. Deeds are disapproved of and regarded as evil in case they appear to flow from a bad motivation, such as the “desire of the misery of others.” For Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, the motivation that gives rise to a deed is the source of the rightness or wrongness and the goodness or badness of the deed. I do not think the comparison with Spinoza can be pressed very far, however. Spinoza’s view that emotions are symptomatic representations of increases and decreases in power (­chapter  1, this volume) and his view that metaphysical knowledge is motivationally efficacious (­chapter 7, this volume) do not, as far as I know, have counterparts in Shaftesbury’s and Hutcheson’s sentimentalist theories. 4 I discuss Spinoza’s view of coming to the aid of others in c­ hapter 10, this volume.

Derivative Goodness and Derivative Badness  105

2.  The Derivative Goodness and Derivative Badness of Spatially External Objects The good-​making characteristic of good deeds and good lives is that they result from good emotions and good desires, and the bad-​making characteristic of bad deeds and bad lives is that they result from bad emotions and bad desires. However, the same is not true of food, music, and other spatially external objects. Unlike deeds, the good-​making characteristic of external objects is that they contribute to enhancements of our power. An external object’s bad-​making characteristic is that it contributes to impairments of our power. What makes nourishing food good, for example, is that it enhances our power. What makes unhealthy food bad is that it impairs our power. Likewise, what makes music good is that it enhances our power. It is bad insofar as it impairs our power. Whether a type of natural object or a type of artifact has power-​enhancing effects or power-​impairing effects (or both) is therefore an objective matter. For example, the power-​ impairing effects of the mushroom Amanita phalloides (the “death cap”) do not depend on our desires, emotions, and beliefs about the power-​impairing effects of this species of mushroom. It is an objective matter of fact.5 According to one relatively popular reading of the music example in the Preface to Part 4, Spinoza’s point is that goodness and badness are not objective properties.6 But this, I believe, misses the point of the passage. With the music example Spinoza is not denying that good and bad are real properties. On the contrary, the music example illustrates the sense in which good and bad are real. This is the passage in question: As far as good and evil are concerned, they also indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves, nor are they anything other than modes 5 This is a view I share with Delahunty. According to Delahunty, “The goodness of things, being determined by their usefulness to us (E IV, Definition, I), is thus in a manner objective, and independent of our desires; and the life of the man who obeys the ‘dictates of reason’ provides an external standard against which to measure ourselves. Such judgments of value do of course depend on the fact that we are creatures with a special type of nature, needs and goals, but that does not imperil their objectivity” (R. J. Delahunty, Spinoza: The Arguments of the Philosophers [Routledge, 1985], p. 229). 6 For instances of this reading, see Herman De Dijn, “The Ladder, Not the Top: The Provisional Morals of the Philosopher,” in Ethica IV: Spinoza on Reason and the “Free Man,” ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel and Gideon Segal (Little Room Press, 2004), pp. 44‒46; Jeffery K. McDonough’s “The Heyday of Teleology and Early Modern Philosophy,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 35 (2011): 191‒192; Charles Jarrett, “Spinozistic Constructivism,” in Essays on Spinoza’s Ethical Theory, ed. Matthew J. Kisner and Andrew Youpa (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 58‒60.

106  The Ethics of Joy of thinking, or notions we form because we compare things to one another. For one and the same thing can, at the same time, be good, and bad, and also indifferent. For example, Music is good for one who is Melancholy, bad for one who is mourning, and neither good nor bad to one who is deaf. (4Pref II/​208  8–​14)

The claim that good and bad are “nothing positive” is best understood as the claim that good and bad are not irreducible properties. A good thing’s goodness is nothing but its enhancing effect on our power. A bad thing’s badness is nothing but its impairing effect on our power. There is nothing good or bad in external objects independent of their enhancing and impairing effects on our power. A good object does not contain goodness as if goodness were a unique and irreducible property that a good object transmitted to whomever and whatever is exposed to it. If a good object, contrary to fact, causally transmitted irreducible goodness, it stands to reason that the transmitted goodness would produce the same effect in every case: in every case the object would be good. But this is not how things work. Water is good for someone who is thirsty and bad for someone who has dropsy. Strawberries are good for someone who is hungry and bad for someone who is allergic to them. Moderate amounts of pleasant food and drink are good for us while large amounts are bad (4p45s). Music is good for someone who is melancholy, and it is bad for someone who is mourning (4Pref). The effects that things have on our power vary in accordance with variations in our power. A person who is allergic to strawberries may love strawberries, but her love for strawberries does not change the fact that strawberries impair her power and are therefore bad for her. A person may love whiskey, but his love of whiskey does not change the fact that a large quantity of whiskey is bad for the whiskey lover. Whether something enhances or impairs our power is not up to us in a wishy-​washy subjectivist sense. For Spinoza, our tastes and preferences, our likes and dislikes, are not necessarily accurate indicators of what is truly good and what is truly bad for us. They do not necessarily accurately track what is empowering for us and what is disempowering for us. With regard to spatially external objects, Spinoza is committed to the following two doctrines: Derivative Goodness of Good Objects Doctrine: A spatially external object’s goodness is derivative from its causal contribution to an increase in an individual’s power.

Derivative Goodness and Derivative Badness  107 Derivative Badness of Bad Objects Doctrine:  A spatially external object’s badness is derivative from its causal contribution to a decrease in an individual’s power.

By “derivative” in “derivative goodness” and “derivative badness” I mean that the goodness and badness of an external object is not an intrinsic property of the object. A derivatively good object is not the source of its own goodness. The same is true of the badness of bad objects. For example, the badness of the mushroom known as the “death cap” does not belong to the mushroom independent of the effect that it has on human power. Independent of how it affects human power, the “death cap” is not bad, although it may be bad for animals other than humans. Spatially external objects derive their goodness and badness from the effect that they have on human power. Insofar as they cause power enhancements, they are good. Insofar as they cause power impairments, they are bad. Because a spatially external object’s enhancing or impairing effects on our power is a relational property, it is impossible to read off a thing’s goodness or badness independent of observations of its effect on human power. It is also true that in isolation from observations of their effect on human power it is impossible to read off the superiority of an instance of one type of thing (e.g., a glass of water) over an instance of another type (e.g., a glass of gasoline). Hence good and bad are “modes of thinking, or notions we form because we compare things to one another” (4Pref). With respect to spatially external objects, we form our notions of good and bad on the basis of comparisons among the effects that things have on our power. For example, by comparing the effect of music on us when we are melancholy versus its effect on us when we are mourning, we form the notions of good and bad, better and worse, and recognize that instances of one type of thing can have power-​enhancing effects on some occasions and power-​impairing effects on other occasions depending on, among other things, the specific constitution of our power. Someone who is under the spell of a “savage and sad superstition” (4p45c2s) may be convinced that the power-​enhancing effect of music is a bad thing and that the power-​impairing effect of, say, wearing a hair shirt is good. Indeed, people who are under the spell of a savage and sad superstition believe that badness is identical to power-​enhancement and that goodness is identical to power-​impairment (4App XXXI). Nevertheless, Spinoza says, “Superstition, on the other hand, seems to maintain that the good is what brings Sadness, and the evil, what brings Joy. But as we have already

108  The Ethics of Joy said (see P45S), no one, unless he is envious, takes pleasure in my lack of power and misfortune. For as we are affected with a greater Joy, we pass to a greater perfection, and consequently participate more in the divine nature” (4App XXXI). The superstitious are mistaken about the properties of derivative goodness and derivative badness. It is not just that their desires and preferences may differ from Spinoza’s. They are also plainly wrong about an objective matter of fact: the fact that external objects are derivatively good because and insofar as they enhance human power and that they are derivatively bad because and insofar as they impair our power. As we have seen, Spinoza also maintains that to “nourish the body in the way required, it is necessary to use many different kinds of food” (4App XXVII). By making comparisons of the nourishing effects of different foods, we arrive at knowledge that some edible things are better for us than others and that some quantities of food are better for us than other quantities.7 Nature did not provide us with a menu listing the nutritional data of its contents. It is only by observing and comparing the power-​enhancing and the power-​impairing effects of different things and different quantities of things that we come to have nutritional data—​that is, knowledge of good and bad foods.8 “Knowledge of evil,” Spinoza writes, “is an inadequate knowledge” (4p64). The demonstration of this proposition does not include a premise stating or implying that impairments of power are not, as a matter of fact, bad for us. 7 A necessary condition for making such objective evaluative comparisons is that our power can and does undergo impairments. If we never suffered an impairment of our power, we would form no notion of badness and, as a consequence, would have no notion of goodness. “If men were born free,” Spinoza says, “they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free” (4p68). A finite thing can pass to greater and lesser perfection, and it is in a finite thing’s nature to seek increases in its power and perfection. An individual strives to enhance its power. As a result, an absolutely stagnant power in a finite individual (i.e., someone whose power is neither increasing nor decreasing) is not an ethically neutral state. Stagnation is an impairment of power. So someone who is born free and remains free not only has never suffered a decrease in power but also has never undergone a state in which his power was not increasing. Spinoza’s claim in 4p68 is that a person who knows nothing but uninterrupted growth in power would form no concept of badness and therefore have no concept of goodness, and this is so because formation of the concept of goodness as power enhancement presupposes, at a minimum, a state of affairs in which no enhancement of power takes place. 8 This sheds some light on Spinoza’s claim that “From the guidance of reason, we shall follow the greater of two goods or the less of two evils” (4p65). In the demonstration of this proposition, he says that a “good that prevents us from enjoying a greater good is really an evil. For good and evil (as we have shown in the Preface of this Part) are said of things insofar as we compare them to one another” (4p65d). Given that a thing’s goodness is its capacity to enhance human power, it is possible to comparatively rank good things in terms of their capacity to enhance human power. Therefore, Spinoza’s claim at 4p65 is best understood as the sensible view that something X with a smaller capacity to enhance human power than something else Y should not, other things equal, be pursued at the expense of Y.

Derivative Goodness and Derivative Badness  109 Knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge because a particular impairment of power is an effect whose causal history includes causes other than our adequate causal power, and any effect that has such a causal history is an effect about which we have, at least initially, inadequate knowledge. I say “at least initially” to leave open the possibility that we are able to acquire adequate knowledge of an impairment of our power, and insofar as we do so the impairment will cease to be an impairment or, at a minimum, it will become a less severe impairment (5p3, 5p3c, 5p4). This does not imply that the badness of an impairment to one’s power directly depends on one’s beliefs about the badness of it in the way that the property of being the most well-​liked ice cream flavor directly depends on people’s preferences. What it means is that there is an effective form of therapy for treating impairments to our power (5p20s). We should undertake therapeutic treatment because impairments to our power really are bad for us.

3.  A Unified Theory of Derivative Goodness and Derivative Badness So far in this chapter I have argued that, for Spinoza, a deed derives its goodness or badness from the motivation that causes it, whereas a spatially external object (e.g., whiskey, mushrooms, music, etc.) derives its goodness or badness from its causal contribution to human power. Thus the basis of the goodness and badness of deeds is not identical to the basis of the goodness and badness of objects. A deed derives its goodness or badness from its causal history. An external object derives its goodness or badness from its causal consequences. Although these views might seem to be in tension, there is, I believe, a basis that underlies and unifies them. Power is central to both pairs of doctrines. It features as a cause in the Derivative Goodness of Good Deeds and the Derivative Badness of Bad Deeds Doctrines, while power features as an effect in the Derivative Goodness of Good Objects and the Derivative Badness of Bad Objects Doctrines. Insofar as a deed is caused by an increase in power, it is a good deed. Insofar as an external object is the cause of an increase in power, it is a good object. It is also important to note that motivation is power. Emotions are increases and decreases in power. Therefore, when an external object contributes to an increase or a decrease in an individual’s power, it contributes to the individual’s motivation. Motivation, in turn, produces deeds. When the

110  The Ethics of Joy motivation is good, a good deed follows. When motivation is bad, a bad deed follows. By giving rise to increases and decreases in an individual’s power, external objects causally influence an individual’s motivation (4App XXX). And by producing changes in motivation, external objects causally influence an individual’s behavior. Thus the consequences that result from external objects that make external objects good and bad can belong to the causal history of an individual’s deeds. Not all deeds result from changes in power that have objects as their cause. In some cases a deed results from the individual’s essence alone (4App VI). In such cases the individual is an adequate cause of his deed, and his deed is an action and in no way a passive reaction to a spatially external object. But when an individual is an inadequate cause of his deed, the deed results from a change in motivation that is produced in part by an external stimulus. In such cases the deed is a passive reaction to a spatially external thing, and the spatially external thing belongs to the causal history of the deed. Deeds that result from adequate causes have causal histories that trace to the individual’s essence alone. Such deeds can be said to have an adequate causal history. Deeds that result from inadequate causes have causal histories that trace back to the individual’s essence in part and to a spatially external object in part. Such deeds can be said to have an inadequate causal history. Spinoza’s account of the goodness and badness of deeds is not identical to his account of the goodness and badness of spatially external objects because deeds are effects of changes in human power while spatially external objects are causes of changes in human power.9 The Derivative Goodness of Good Deeds and the Derivative Badness of Bad Deeds Doctrines are about the post-​ motivation segment of the causal history of a deed. The Derivative Goodness of Good Objects and the Derivative Badness of Bad Objects Doctrines are about the pre-​motivation segment of the causal history of a deed. To put it another way, the Deeds doctrines are about the causal output of changes in human power, whereas the Objects doctrines are about the causal input of 9 There is a deeper issue here, and it concerns Spinoza’s view of nonhuman animals and his view that human beings cannot form associations and friendships with any beings other than human beings (4p37s1, 4App XXVI). Spinoza accepts that nonhuman animals have emotions, but in his view their emotions differ from human emotions “as much as their nature differs from human nature. Both the horse and the man are driven by a Lust to procreate; but the one is driven by an equine Lust, the other by a human Lust” (3p57s). This view is, it seems, behind Spinoza’s silence about the psychology and motivation that is the source of the deeds nonhuman animals perform that contribute to enhancements and impairments in human power. For further discussion of Spinoza’s view of nonhuman animals, see John Grey, “ ‘Use Them At Our Pleasure’: Spinoza on Animal Ethics,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 30, no. 4 (October 2013): 367‒388.

Derivative Goodness and Derivative Badness  111 changes in human power. Either way, causal history in relation to changes in human power serves as the underlying and unifying basis of Spinoza’s theory of the goodness and badness of deeds with his theory of the goodness and badness of objects. Everything other than changes in human power derives its goodness and badness from its connection to changes in human power as either cause or effect. Causes of changes in power are good or bad in virtue of causing either increases or decreases in power, respectively. Effects resulting from changes in power are good or bad in virtue of resulting from either increases or decreases in power, respectively.

Conclusion Changes in power are central to Spinoza’s theory of the goodness and badness of deeds and objects. When an enhancement to an individual’s power as a whole is a cause of an individual’s deed, the resulting deed is good. When an impairment as a whole is the cause of an individual’s deed, the resulting deed is bad. Similarly, insofar as an object causes an enhancement of an individual’s power as a whole, the object is good. Insofar as it impairs an individual’s power as a whole, the object is bad. Deeds that result from enhancements in a part of an individual or from impairments in a part are good in some cases and bad in other cases. Objects that cause enhancements in a part of an individual or cause impairments in a part are good in some cases and bad in other cases. Power enhancements and power impairments are the basis of a human being’s goodness and badness. They determine whether a human being is well and lives well or is unwell and lives unwell. Someone is well insofar he lives joyously and lovingly (4p45c2s, 4p46, 4p46s, 4App XXV). He leads an empowered life. Someone who lives joyously and lovingly performs deeds that empower himself and empower others (4p37), and he pursues things that empower himself while he avoids disempowering objects (4p63c, 4p63cs, 4p65, 4p66, 4p66c). Moreover, because emotions are contagious, a person’s joy and love often spread to other people independent of his desire to empower others (3p27, 4App XI, 4App XXV, 5p10s). Such people are useful (4p35c1, 4p35c2, 4App IX). They are sources of empowerment. In contrast, someone is ill or unwell because and insofar as he lives sadly and hatefully. He has a disempowered life. People who live sadly and hatefully disempower themselves and disempower others (4App XIII). They are

112  The Ethics of Joy therefore dangerous (4p69cs, 4p70, 4p70d). They are a danger to themselves and to others. They are a danger to themselves ultimately because they do not know what is good for themselves (4p24, 4p35c2, 4p56d). They foolishly pursue things that disempower themselves and foolishly avoid things that are sources of empowerment (4p44s, 4p66s, 4App XXX). They are a danger to others because they seek to have others live in the same disempowered way as they themselves live (3p31c, 3p31cs, 4p69, 4p69s, 4p70; cf. 4p54s). Again, because emotions are contagious, an individual’s disempowering emotions have a tendency to spread to other people independent of the person’s desire to have others live in the same sad and hateful way as he himself lives (3p27, 4App XIII). Such people are sources of disempowerment. Good and bad objects, good and bad deeds, good and bad lives, and good and bad people are a function of power enhancements and power impairments, that is, human wellness and human illness. Not all people and not all lives are good. Spinoza believes that many people, if not the vast majority, suffer from mental illness. Mental illnesses such as hate, greed, envy, pride, and melancholy shape our wretched lives and, via the mechanism by which mental illnesses are contagious, shape the lives of our loved ones. I discuss Spinoza’s view of how we should treat others in ­chapter 10 when I examine his account of the virtue of nobility. But it is important to see that although his perfectionist moral philosophy evaluates people in terms of how empowered or disempowered we are, he does not subscribe to the repugnant view that the empowered are permitted to do as they please with the disempowered. Empowerment does not give the empowered a right over the disempowered. No doubt his moral philosophy is in a way inegalitarian in that it differentiates and grades people and lives. It is also inegalitarian in that the standard for empowerment is exceptionally high. Most of us do not have a genuine opportunity to live well, by Spinoza’s standard of living well. These ideas do not sit comfortably with today’s popular piety that every way of life is good and as good as every other way of life. Still, as I discuss in ­chapter 10, the empowered person seeks to come to the aid of other people and to empower others. Spinoza holds that to be empowered is in part to recognize the importance of spreading empowerment. It is to recognize the importance of spreading knowledge, joy, and love, and the importance of reducing ignorance, sadness, and hate.

7 Summum Mentis Bonum Introduction “Knowledge of God,” Spinoza writes, “is the mind’s greatest good [summum mentis bonum]; its greatest virtue [summa mentis virtus] is to know God” (4p28). In this chapter I  address two questions about this account of the summum mentis bonum. First, in what way is knowledge of God related to emotions and desires and to the evaluative judgments that result from emotions and desires? In c­hapter  1, I  showed that Spinoza believes that emotions are representational in two ways: (1) the qualitative character of an emotion is a symptomatic representation of a change in the power of the subject’s body, and (2) an evaluative judgment necessarily follows from an instance of the qualitative character of an emotion. For example, an instance of joy indicates that the power of the subject’s body is increasing and, moreover, it gives rise to a positive evaluative judgment about the object of this instance of joy. On the basis of this account it might seem that Spinoza is committed to a version of Hume’s doctrine that reason (knowledge) is motivationally inert: “Since reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition, I infer, that the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion. . . . Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”1 Hume’s view is that knowledge is not an independent source of emotions and desires, independent, that is, of preexisting emotions and desires. If Hume is right, knowledge is motivationally inert. It can seem as if Spinoza agrees with this since in his view emotions and desires give rise to evaluative judgments, but evaluative judgments are not a source of emotions and desires. If evaluative judgments cannot causally produce emotions and desires independent of preexisting emotions and desires, knowledge of good and bad cannot be a cause of emotions and 1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Norton and Mary Norton (Oxford University Press, 1739–​1740), 2.3.3, p. 266. The Ethics of Joy. Andrew Youpa, Oxford University Press (2020) © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190086022.001.0001

114  The Ethics of Joy desires independent of preexisting emotions and desires. Thus it can seem that, for Spinoza, knowledge in general cannot give rise to emotions and desires. Contrary to this appearance, in this chapter I argue that knowledge is, or is invariably accompanied by, an enhancement of power, and that as an enhancement of power knowledge is a type of joy. It is not the case that knowledge, in Spinoza’s view, is motivationally inert. The second question I address in this chapter is: Is the goodness of knowledge of God on a par with the goodness of such things as food, shelter, sporting activities, and theater while differing from these sorts of things only in degree? Alternatively, does the goodness of knowledge of God qualitatively differ from the goodness of such things as food, shelter (etc.)? I argue that the goodness of knowledge of God qualitatively differs from the goodness of food, shelter (etc.). Unlike the derivative goodness of human deeds and of spatially external objects, the goodness of knowledge of God is underivative.2

1.  Knowledge and Joy In ­chapter 1, I defend a reading of Spinoza’s moral psychology according to which an evaluative judgment necessarily follows from an instance of the qualitative character of an emotion or desire. Joys and desires give rise to positive evaluative judgments (e.g., “X is good”). Sadness, species of sadness, and aversions produce negative evaluative judgments (e.g., “Y is bad”).3 Spinoza writes, “From all this, then, it is clear that we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it” (3p9s; cf. 3p39s). This might appear to be an unequivocal endorsement of the view that knowledge is not a source of motivation: evaluative 2 A question regarding Spinoza’s theory of the summum bonum that I do not address in detail in this book concerns the nature of the body’s summum bonum. For an excellent discussion of Spinoza’s theory of the body’s summum bonum, see Susan James, “Spinoza, the Body, and the Good Life,” in Essays on Spinoza’s Ethical Theory, ed. Matthew J. Kisner and Andrew Youpa (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 143‒159. 3 As I discuss in c­ hapter 1, Spinoza is not committed to the view that all evaluative judgments result from occurrent emotions and desires. However, he is committed to the view that emotions and desires, as increases and decreases in power, are the foundation for evaluative judgments: emotions and desires serve as the basis for the truth and falsity of evaluative judgments. For example, the judgment “Hatred is good” is false, in Spinoza’s view, and what makes it false, is that hatred is a decrease in power and as such is bad. Nevertheless, the true judgment, “Hatred is bad,” is not invariably the causal outcome of an occurrent decrease in power. An individual need not be undergoing a decrease in power to form and express the judgment that hatred is bad.

Summum Mentis Bonum  115 judgments do not give rise to emotions and desires but, rather, they invariably result from emotions and desires. Independent of preexisting emotions and desires, evaluative judgments are, it might seem, motivationally inert. Because some evaluative judgments constitute knowledge (4p14, 4p15, 4p16), such knowledge cannot, independent of preexisting emotions and desires, give rise to emotions and desires. From this it might seem natural to conclude that knowledge, in Spinoza’s view, is motivationally inert. But this last step is fallacious. From the claim that knowledge of good and bad, independent of preexisting emotions and desires, cannot produce emotions and desires, it does not follow that all varieties of knowledge, independent of preexisting emotions and desires, cannot produce emotions and desires. It is possible that some varieties of knowledge are motivationally efficacious, even though judgments of good and bad, including judgments of good and bad that constitute knowledge, are motivationally inert independent of preexisting emotions and desires. Even though it can seem natural to conclude from 3p9s (cf. 3p39s) that no judgments and thus no varieties of knowledge are a source of emotions and desires, Spinoza’s view is, I believe, the exact opposite: except for judgments of good and bad (including the knowledge that such judgments constitute when they are true), knowledge is a source of emotions and desires. So, with the exception of knowledge of good and bad, knowledge is inherently affective or, equivalently, motivationally efficacious. For the sake of brevity I will refer to knowledge of good and bad as “moral knowledge.” The theorems and corollaries in Part 1 of the Ethics are examples of what I will call “metaphysical knowledge.” My claim is that metaphysical knowledge, unlike moral knowledge, is a source of emotions and desires in virtue of being inherently affective. This reading calls for two lines of defense. First, I need to give a reason to think that moral knowledge is an exception among the varieties of knowledge in that it is not inherently affective. Second, I need to offer evidence for my claim that the metaphysical knowledge that belongs to the second kind of knowledge and the third kind of knowledge is, unlike moral knowledge, inherently affective. I turn first to what makes moral knowledge the non-​ affective exception among varieties of knowledge. Spinoza has a reason specific to judgments of good and bad for why they, unlike judgments that constitute metaphysical knowledge, are not affective independent of preexisting emotions and desires. The reason is that cognitive apprehension of goodness and badness is not possible without a

116  The Ethics of Joy change in power. To apprehend something as good or to apprehend it as bad presupposes an increase or a decrease in power. This is because the notions of goodness and badness are empty apart from enhancements and impairments of power. In c­ hapter 3, I showed that Spinoza is committed to the following doctrines: Goodness as Power Enhancement Doctrine: Goodness is identical to power enhancement. Badness as Power Impairment Doctrine:  Badness is identical to power impairment.

There are no unique and irreducible properties of goodness and badness apart from the enhancements and impairments in power that singular things undergo. Thus the notions of goodness and badness are empty independent of enhancements and impairments in power.4 Because emotions and desires are enhancements and impairments in power, the notions of goodness and badness are empty independent of emotions and desires. Evaluative judgments derive their content and their motivational strength from emotions and desires. In addition to being caused by emotions and desires, evaluative judgments are informed by emotions and desires. And emotions and desires are suited for this because, as I showed in ­chapter 2, they are, in Spinoza’s view, axiological information. An emotion’s qualitative character informs us that our power and perfection is increasing in case it is increasing and it informs us that our power and perfection is decreasing in case it is decreasing. Evaluative judgments are not an independent source of emotions and desires because there are no properties of goodness and badness apart from enhancements and impairments in power—​that is, apart from emotions and desires. Judgments of good and bad that are not based on enhancements and impairments, such as those based exclusively on superstition, are confused. They are not informed by the one and only source of axiological information: the qualitative character of emotions and desires. 4 According to John Carriero, “Although Spinoza’s readers, going back to Leibniz, sometimes lump his views on good and perfection together, good is a secondary and derivative notion for Spinoza, whereas perfection is basic” (John Carriero, “The Highest Good and Perfection,” in The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza, ed. Michael Della Rocca [Oxford University Press, 2018], p. 255). I agree with Carriero that, for Spinoza, good is a secondary and derivative notion, but my view is that power is basic, although this is, I believe, a mere difference in emphasis since power and perfection (and reality) are in Spinoza’s view equivalent notions.

Summum Mentis Bonum  117 On this reading, enhancements and impairments in power are causally and conceptually prior to judgments of good and bad in that they are causally and conceptually prior to the notions of goodness and badness. But even if this is correct, it does not establish that evaluative judgments are, as I am claiming, exceptions among judgments with respect to motivation. Given that, as Spinoza clearly appears to be saying in 3p9s (cf. 3p39s), evaluative judgments are not inherently affective, what reason can he have for thinking that some non-​evaluative judgments are inherently affective? It may seem that if any judgments are affective, surely it must be evaluative judgments and moral knowledge. If the latter are not affective independent of preexisting emotions and desires, it seems as if no judgments are affective. However, the idea of a judgment that is not causally and conceptually dependent on enhancements and impairments in power and is, at the same time, inherently affective is not conceptually problematic within the framework of Spinoza’s metaphysics and psychology. Because metaphysical judgments need not presuppose enhancements and impairments in power in the way that evaluative judgments do, there is nothing in principle that rules out the existence of inherently affective metaphysical judgments and thereby inherently affective metaphysical knowledge. Is there evidence that Spinoza accepts that metaphysical knowledge is inherently affective? The view that metaphysical knowledge is inherently affective follows from the view that metaphysical knowledge is power, and the latter is central to Spinoza’s system. In the demonstration of 4p28 Spinoza says, “The absolute virtue of the mind, then, is understanding [intelligere].” Because “virtue” and “power” have the same meaning (4D8), it follows that the absolute power of the mind is understanding. He writes, “But the power of the mind is defined by knowledge [cognitione] alone, whereas lack of power, or passion, is judged solely by the privation of knowledge [cognitionis], that is, by that through which ideas are called inadequate” (5p20s). A  mind has power insofar as and only insofar as it has knowledge. When someone adds to his knowledge he adds to his power, and when his power increases, the individual is affected with joy because joy is an increase in power. Regarding the third kind of knowledge Spinoza says, So he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the greatest human perfection, and consequently (by Def. Aff. II), is affected with the greatest joy, accompanied (by IIP43) by the idea of himself and his virtue.

118  The Ethics of Joy Therefore (by Def. Aff. XXV), the greatest satisfaction there can be arises from this kind of knowledge, q.e.d. (5p27d)

This is about the third kind of knowledge, which in the demonstration of 5p27 Spinoza regards as identical to knowledge of God (5p27d). This kind of metaphysical knowledge is a source of emotion independent of preexisting emotions; for it gives rise to, or is accompanied by, joy. It gives rise to, or is accompanied by, joy because to acquire such knowledge is to increase one’s power and perfection, and joy is the passage from lesser to greater power and perfection (3p11s, DA II). Thus the third kind of knowledge is inherently affective. Unlike knowledge that results from enhancements and impairments of power, the third kind of knowledge is a source of joy in virtue of giving rise to an enhancement of power and perfection. The second kind of knowledge is not mentioned in the demonstration of 5p27 where Spinoza talks about how the third kind of knowledge is the source of the greatest joy and the greatest satisfaction, but evidence supports that the second kind of knowledge is also a source of joy, albeit not the greatest joy. Like the third kind of knowledge, the second is necessarily true (2p41), enables us to distinguish between the true and the false (2p42), and is a conception of things under a species of eternity (2p44c2). Like the third kind of knowledge, the second is knowledge of God (2p47, 2p47d, 2p47s), although it is not the same depth of understanding as the third kind because it does not consist of knowledge of singular things as they follow from God’s attributes. Rather, it consists of adequate ideas of what is common to all things. Moreover, unlike the first kind of knowledge, the second kind can give rise to the desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge (5p28). This is because the second kind, like the third and unlike the first, consists of adequate ideas (2p40s2, 5p28d). Furthermore, because the second kind consists of adequate ideas, to act from the guidance of reason is to act from virtue (4p23, 4p24), to be free (4p66cs), and to achieve the highest happiness (4App IV). For these reasons it is evident that the second kind of knowledge, like the third, is an enhancement of power and perfection and is therefore a source of joy. It is not motivationally inert. As with any and all instances of joy, a positive evaluative judgment follows from the joy that metaphysical knowledge produces. An instance of the qualitative character of joy invariably results in a judgment that the object of joy is good. This holds true for the joy that an individual experiences when he eats an orange, as well as the joy that an individual experiences when he acquires

Summum Mentis Bonum  119 knowledge. Just as a judgment about the goodness of an orange results from the joy that an orange causes, a judgment about the goodness of knowledge results from the joy that knowledge produces. According to Spinoza, “What we strive for from reason is nothing but understanding; nor does the Mind, insofar as it uses reason, judge anything else useful to itself except what leads to understanding” (4p26). To increase one’s knowledge is to increase one’s power. When an individual increases his metaphysical knowledge, he experiences joy and as a result judges that knowledge is good, and from this he will strive for nothing other than knowledge and what facilitates the acquisition of knowledge. Moral judgments and hence moral knowledge result from and are informed by increases and decreases in power. Such judgments and knowledge do not give rise to increases and decreases in power independent of preexisting emotions and desires. This is, I believe, the point Spinoza is making in the scholium to 3p9: “From all this, then, it is clear that we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it” (3p9s; cf. 3p39s). Although moral knowledge is not a source of motivation independent of preexisting emotions and desires, the same is not true for metaphysical knowledge, such as the theorems, corollaries, and demonstrations that compose Part 1 of the Ethics. Metaphysical knowledge is identical to increases in power. Because joy is an increase in power, all metaphysical knowledge is, or is accompanied by, joy.5 This joy in turn is the foundation of the moral knowledge that knowledge is good and that knowledge of God is the greatest good. A difficulty for this reading is that, in addition to suggesting that the third kind of knowledge is, or is accompanied by, the greatest joy (5p27), Spinoza maintains that the joy that comes from the third kind of knowledge—​ intellectual love of God—​is not a passage from lesser to greater perfection, but is “perfection itself ” (5p33s), which he also refers to as blessedness (5p33s). If the third kind of knowledge is not, or does not result in, a passage from lesser to greater perfection, it seems that it cannot be accompanied by the joy that is an increase in an individual’s power (3p11s). And if intellectual love is not a species of ordinary joy, does it give rise to a judgment about the goodness 5 It might seem counterintuitive that metaphysical knowledge, not moral knowledge, is inherently affective. But this counterintuitive appearance is mitigated to some extent so long as we can keep in view that knowledge is the essence of the mind (5p36cs, 5p38d). Because knowledge is the essence of the mind, acquisition of knowledge is an increase in the perfection of the mind’s essence.

120  The Ethics of Joy of the object of this intellectual emotion? I believe that insofar as intellectual love is not a passage from lesser to greater perfection, it does not give rise to a moral judgment. The Goodness as Power Enhancement Doctrine states that goodness is identical to power enhancement. Independent of enhancements of power, the concept of goodness is empty. Spinoza writes, “If men were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free” (4p68). To conceive humans as having been born free is to conceive humans as having perfection itself and therefore as neither increasing nor decreasing in power, and independent of increases and decreases in power, we would form no concepts of good and bad. The concepts would be empty. So insofar as it is not an enhancement of power but is perfection itself, intellectual love, unlike non-​intellectual love, does not and cannot give rise to a positive evaluative judgment about the object of intellectual love. On the one hand, insofar as the third kind of knowledge is an increase in power and therefore a type of ordinary joy, such joy gives rise to the judgment that knowledge is good. On the other hand, insofar as the third kind of knowledge is perfection itself and is therefore intellectual love, such love does not give rise to a judgment about the goodness of the object of love, regardless of whether the object is knowledge, God, or knowledge of God. How can the third kind of knowledge produce a joy that both does and does not result in moral knowledge? I think that the least unsatisfactory approach to this apparent paradox is to read Spinoza as holding that in relation to human beings the third kind of knowledge produces two distinct types of joy, one of which leads to moral knowledge (e.g., that knowledge is good) and one that does not. For a human being qua finite mode acquisition of the third kind of knowledge is invariably an increase in an individual’s power, and this increase in power is the sort of ordinary joy that produces a positive evaluative judgment. But for a human being qua element of God’s infinite intellect, it makes no sense to speak of the acquisition of the third kind of knowledge because the infinite intellect possesses all knowledge. The infinite intellect is complete. It does not increase in perfection as if it were in the process of development and learning new things. It has perfection itself. A finite mind, as an element of the infinite intellect, has perfection itself and therefore it does not have ordinary joy but, rather, the joy that is intellectual love (blessedness). As an element of God’s infinite intellect a finite mind does not increase its perfection by means of the acquisition of knowledge. Among the most reasonable options available, this is, as I said, what I believe is the least unsatisfactory way of handling the apparent paradox. It does

Summum Mentis Bonum  121 not remove much of the air of paradox, leaving things pretty much as we found them apart from the fact that for finite minds there are two distinct types of joy, not one. Indeed, this reading of the third kind of knowledge and its accompanying intellectual love of God pushes the paradox back to the two ways that a finite mind can be conceived—​namely as a finite mode who increases and decreases in power and perfection and, alternatively, as an element of the infinite intellect who enjoys perfection itself. But while this is not very satisfying as an effort to reach a coherent understanding of Spinoza’s view, this paradox is a challenge for any reading of the Ethics. This is a challenge that any broad interpretation runs up against because it largely structures the system as laid out in the Ethics. Without any hint of awareness of how paradoxical it might seem to the reader, Spinoza states, We conceive things as actual in two ways:  either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. But the things we conceive in this second way as true, or real, we conceive under a species of eternity, and to that extent they involve the eternal and infinite essence of God (as we have shown in IIP45 and P45S). (5p29s)

Things can be conceived in two ways. They can be conceived in relation to a time and place, and they can be conceived as contained in God. This raises a number of questions, but it is beyond the scope of the present discussion to attempt to shed light on this puzzling set of doctrines.6 Still I want to highlight that in this passage from the scholium to 5p29 Spinoza cites 2p45 and 2p45s, and in 2p45s in particular Spinoza distinguishes between durational existence, on the one hand, and eternal existence, on the other. The latter he describes as the “very nature of existence” and cites 1p16 and 1p24c as the basis for this account of existence. So these seemingly paradoxical doctrines are not isolated to the scholium to 5p29. This division is part of the

6 A few of the questions it raises are these: When things are conceived in relation to a time and place, are they not conceived in God? If so, how, given 1p15, can anything be conceived independent of God? Furthermore, are these equally adequate ways of conceiving things? Or, is there something about conceiving things in relation to a time and place that makes such a conception less clear and distinct or less adequate than conceiving things as contained in God? Also, how do these two ways of conceiving things line up with the three kinds of knowledge? These are a few of the questions that 5p29s raises. For further discussion of Spinoza’s two notions of existence, see section 1 of c­ hapter 8, this volume.

122  The Ethics of Joy fundamental framework of Spinoza’s system. The two joys that emanate from the third kind of knowledge are merely one of the ways that this seemingly paradoxical division manifests itself in the Ethics. It also appears to be at work in the contrast between the notions of the common order of nature versus the order of the intellect, passion versus action, slavery versus freedom, as well as duration versus eternity. Unlike moral knowledge, metaphysical knowledge is identical to an enhancement of power. As an enhancement of power metaphysical knowledge is, or is accompanied by, joy. So metaphysical knowledge, in Spinoza’s view, is a source of motivation independent of preexisting emotions and desires. While all metaphysical knowledge is a source of motivation, knowledge of God is accompanied by the greatest joy because it is the greatest enhancement of power.

2.  Knowledge and Goodness The goodness of knowledge of God qualitatively differs from the goodness of other goods for the same reason that knowledge of God, like metaphysical knowledge generally, is inherently affective: it is an enhancement of power. Unlike spatially external objects such as food and shelter, knowledge of God does not merely causally contribute to enhancements of power. Knowledge of God is an enhancement of power. Such things as food and shelter contribute to enhancements of power, but they themselves are not identical to enhancements of power. As I showed in c­ hapter 6, Spinoza is committed to the view that the goodness of spatially external objects is derivative: Derivative Goodness of Good Objects Doctrine: A spatially external object’s goodness is derivative from its causal contribution to an increase in an individual’s power.

Spatially external objects derive their goodness (and badness) from how they affect human power. An orange when eaten causally contributes to an individual’s power, and insofar as an orange enhances an individual’s power, it is good. Insofar as it impairs an individual’s power, it is bad. With respect to spatially external objects, goodness and badness are relational properties. An object’s goodness or badness wholly depends on how it affects human power. Things that enhance human power are good. Things that impair

Summum Mentis Bonum  123 human power are bad. Although relational, derivative goodness and derivative badness are nonetheless objective properties. No matter how convinced a drunkard is that whiskey is good and no matter how strongly the drunkard desires whiskey, it is bad because and insofar as it contributes to impairments of the drunkard’s adequate causal power. Unlike the derivative goodness of spatially external objects, the goodness of metaphysical knowledge is underivative. What makes it underivative is that metaphysical knowledge is itself an enhancement of power, and, by the Wellness as Underivative Goodness Doctrine, enhancements of power are underivatively good. Metaphysical knowledge is an enhancement of power because it constitutes the essence of the mind.7 According to Spinoza, “The Mind’s essence consists in knowledge [cognitione] (by IIP11)” (5p38d; cf. 4p37d). He also writes, “Again, because the essence of our Mind consists only in knowledge [cognitione], of which God is the beginning and foundation (by IP15 and IIP47S), it is clear how our Mind, with respect both to essence and existence, follows from the divine nature, and continually depends on God” (5P36cs). Knowledge is the mind’s essence, and this knowledge first and foremost consists of the metaphysical knowledge that is knowledge of God. When someone adds to his metaphysical knowledge he perfects his nature. Knowledge does not merely contribute to the perfection of the mind. It is the perfection of the mind and as such is identical to an enhancement of power. Spinoza says, “But the power of the Mind is defined by knowledge [cognitione] alone, whereas lack of power, or passion, is judged solely by the privation of knowledge, i.e., by that through which ideas are called inadequate” (5p20s). Knowledge is not extrinsically related to the mind’s power. Knowledge is the mind’s power. Every increase in knowledge is an increase in the mind’s power, and because knowledge alone is the essence of the mind, every increase in the mind’s knowledge is an enhancement of the mind’s power as a whole. Knowledge of God, like all metaphysical knowledge, is therefore underivatively good.8

7 Jon Miller highlights the point that, for Spinoza, knowledge is the mind’s essence, and this serves as a premise in Miller’s argument for the conclusion that knowledge of God is non-​circumstantially relatively valuable. See Jon Miller, “Spinoza’s Axiology,” in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy (Clarendon, 2005), pp. 163‒164; and Jon Miller, Spinoza and the Stoics (Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 159‒160. 8 With respect to Spinoza’s view of knowledge of God, here I side with Jon Miller’s view that “knowledge or understanding of God is a good that has value not for prudential or instrumental reasons. Rather, it is of direct value, in itself ” (Miller, Spinoza and the Stoics, p. 154).

124  The Ethics of Joy Over the course of this book I have said of more than one thing—​wellness, enhancements of power, and metaphysical knowledge—​that in Spinoza’s view it is underivatively good. It is therefore worth emphasizing that there is nothing apart from metaphysical knowledge that is the source of the goodness of metaphysical knowledge, and this is due to a chain of identities that starts with goodness itself and includes wellness, enhancements of power, and metaphysical knowledge. As I  argued in c­ hapter  3, Spinoza is committed to the view that goodness is identical to power enhancement. In ­chapter 5, I argued that wellness is identical to enhancements of power. So goodness, wellness, and enhancements of power are one and the same thing. Furthermore, as I have shown in the present chapter, metaphysical knowledge is identical to enhancements of power. Owing to this chain of identities, nothing remains from among these items that can stand in a relation to the others such that it serves as the source of the goodness of the others. For instance, there is no irreducible property of goodness that is the source of the goodness of wellness, enhancements of power, and knowledge. Goodness is identical to wellness. It is also identical to enhancements of power and to knowledge. Alternatively, enhancements of power and knowledge do not derive their goodness from wellness, as if enhancements of power and knowledge were instrumental to wellness. Enhancements of power and knowledge are identical to wellness. Therefore they cannot be valuable as means to wellness since it would imply that they are valuable as means to themselves. Unlike spatially external objects, metaphysical knowledge is identical to an enhancement of power, and as an enhancement of power metaphysical knowledge is underivatively good. Knowledge of God, as a subset of metaphysical knowledge, is underivatively good. Although all metaphysical knowledge is underivatively good, knowledge of God is best because it is the greatest enhancement of power.

Conclusion Metaphysical knowledge is, in contrast with moral knowledge, inherently affective—​that is, its motivational efficacy does not depend on preexisting emotions and desires. Such knowledge is an independent source of joy. Indeed, as an increase in power and perfection, knowledge of metaphysics is joy. This is a view that is foreign to contemporary philosophy. How can a purely descriptive account of the fundamental structure and content of

Summum Mentis Bonum  125 reality be non-​accidently connected to human happiness? How can Spinoza, the model metaphysician, paradigmatic rationalist, and proponent of the geometric method, accept that knowledge of metaphysics is the greatest enhancement to our power and thus the greatest happiness in life? It may be difficult to take such a view seriously today. But be that as it may, it is the view Spinoza holds. Whereas knowledge of good and bad is not a source of emotion independent of preexisting emotions and can therefore be said to be motivationally inert, knowledge of metaphysics is motivationally efficacious. It is the greatest joy. What makes it the greatest joy is that it is underivatively good. Unlike things that derive their goodness from their effect on human power, knowledge of metaphysics is power itself. It is the power that makes us what we essentially are, and as we come to apprehend such knowledge our nature is enhanced directly. Increases in such knowledge increases the extent to which we participate in the divine nature.

126  The Ethics of Joy

8 The Empowered Life Freedom

Introduction There is a debate among scholars about whether human beings in Spinoza’s view can be free and about the precise conception of freedom that is relevant to human agents, finite modes of God-​or-​Nature that we are.1 The disagreement stems in part from Spinoza’s definition of “freedom”: That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone. But a thing is called necessary, or rather compelled, which is determined by another to exist and to produce an effect in a certain and determinate manner. (1D7)

A thing is free if it is self-​caused in its existence and operations. To be compelled is to exist and operate such that a factor (factors) other than a thing’s own nature is (are) causally responsible for its existence and operations. Whereas to be free is to be self-​caused, to be compelled is to be non–​self-​ caused. This account of freedom and compulsion can be transposed in terms of adequate cause and inadequate cause (3D1). An adequate cause is the total

1 Don Garrett, “‘A Free Man Always Acts Honestly, Not Deceptively’: Freedom and the Good in Spinoza’s Ethics,” in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, ed. Edwin Curley and Pierre-​Francois Moreau (Brill, 1990), pp.  221‒238; Andrew Youpa, “Spinozistic Self-​Preservation,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 41, no. 3 (2003):  477‒490; and Andrew Youpa, “Spinoza’s Model of Human Nature,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 48, no. 1 (2010):  61‒76; Daniel Garber, “Dr.  Fischelson’s Dilemma: Spinoza on Freedom and Sociability,” in Ethica IV: Spinoza on Reason and the “Free Man,” ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel and Gideon Segal (Little Room Press, 2004), pp. 183‒207; Matthew J. Kisner, Spinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy, and the Good Life (Cambridge University Press, 2011), ch. 1; Eugene Marshall, “Man Is a God to Man: How Human Beings Can Be Adequate Causes,” in Essays on Spinoza’s Ethical Theory, ed. Matthew J. Kisner and Andrew Youpa (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 160‒177; Matthew Homan, “Rehumanizing Spinoza’s Free Man,” in Doing Without Free Will:  Spinoza and Contemporary Moral Problems, ed. Ursula Goldenbaum and Christopher Kluz (Lexington Books, 2015), pp. 75‒96; Steven Nadler, “On Spinoza’s ‘Free Man,’” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1, no. 1 (2015): 103‒120.

Summum Mentis Bonum  127 cause of an effect. An effect that follows from an adequate cause follows from the nature of the cause alone. An adequate cause, in other words, is a self-​ caused cause. In contrast, an inadequate cause contributes to bringing about an effect but it is not the total cause of the effect. It is one contributing factor among others. An inadequate cause is a non–​self-​caused cause. For Spinoza, something can be said to be free insofar as it is an adequate cause of its existence and operations. A thing is compelled (i.e., unfree) insofar as it is an inadequate cause of its existence and operations. Furthermore, Spinoza says, “God is the efficient cause, not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence” (1p25, emphasis in original). Human beings are among the things whose existence and essence have God as their efficient cause. It is also the case that any effect that a thing causes has been determined to do so by God, and no thing can produce an effect unless God determines it to do so (1p26). The question is, is it possible for human beings to be adequate causes of any effects whatsoever? If freedom is understood as causal adequacy, it can seem as if it is impossible for human beings to be free. Given our total dependence on God’s causal power, it seems as if it is impossible for human beings to be anything other than inadequate causes. However, Spinoza’s entire ethical project rests on the possibility that humans are able to be adequate causes and thus act in the strict sense and be free, virtuous, and blessed (3D2, 3p1, 3p3, 3p58, 3p59, 4D8, 4p23, 4p66cs, 4App II, 4App III, 4App VI, 5p42). If it turns out to be impossible for humans to be adequate causes of any effects whatsoever, for Spinoza’s moral philosophy this result would be, as Eugene Marshall aptly puts it, “devastating.”2 Needless to say, strong arguments have been made on both sides of this debate. It may be that Spinoza’s metaphysics is at odds with his moral philosophy. I have not been able to rule this out for my own view of things, but I am not prepared to accept it, either. Until recently Spinoza’s moral philosophy had long been peripheral to early modern scholarship. This has begun to change, and my hope is that further discussion concerning questions of interpretation pertaining to Spinoza’s moral philosophy will help illuminate a way of reading the text that harmonizes the core doctrines of his metaphysics with the core doctrines of his moral philosophy. In this spirit I  wish to contribute to the 2 Marshall, “Man Is a God to Man,” p. 160. Also, as Valtteri Viljanen puts it, “All finite things, in turn, are effects of God’s essence, expressing his power, and therefore ontologically speaking not substances but modifications or properties of substance. The real challenge is to provide a convincing account of finite things’ power of acting, for it, not God’s power of acting, is of crucial importance for Spinoza’s ethical theory” (Valterri Viljanen, Spinoza’s Geometry of Power [Cambridge University Press, 2011], p. 80).

128  The Ethics of Joy ongoing discussion by setting out a reading according to which existing human beings can attain freedom. According to the reading I favor, human beings can be free because we follow from God’s power and are therefore expressions of God’s adequate causal power.3 This reading is, I believe, the one that the central doctrines of Spinoza’s moral philosophy call for and that the weight of the textual evidence supports. But it does not come without its share of difficulties, as is the case with the competing lines of interpretation. In addition to my discussion of freedom in section 1, in section 2 of this chapter I argue, following the work of two recent scholars, that the free human, the model of human nature, is not an impossibly distant ideal but, rather, a better version of actual human beings that we can attain. It is possible for actual human beings to achieve the freedom that Spinoza’s model of human nature illustrates.

1.  The Causal Adequacy Reading The reading I favor takes 4D8 as its starting point: “By virtue and power I understand the same thing, i.e. (by IIIP7), virtue, insofar as it is related to man, is the very essence, or nature, of man, insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone” (4D8). This invokes 3p7. It invokes 3p7 in its analysis of virtue as the “power of bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone.” 3p7 is the claim that striving to persevere in being is a thing’s “actual essence” (actualem essentiam), and the demonstration of 3p7 refers to a thing’s striving to persevere in being as its power (potentia). Spinoza believes that the striving to persevere in being that is a thing’s actual essence is identical to the power that constitutes virtue, namely, the power to bring

3 The reading I  favor is in important ways in agreement with Don Garrett, “Spinoza’s Conatus Argument,” in Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes, ed. Olli Koistinen and John Biro (Oxford University Press, 2002), cf. pp. 139‒141; Eugene Marshall, “Adequacy and Innateness in Spinoza,” in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, volume IV, ed. Daniel Garber and Steven Nadler (Oxford University Press, 2008), cf. pp. 73‒80; Marshall, “Man Is a God to Man,” pp. 176‒177; Valtteri Viljanen, “On the Derivation and Meaning of Spinoza’s Conatus Doctrine,” in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, volume IV, ed. Daniel Garber and Steven Nadler (Clarendon, 2008), cf. pp. 106‒109; and Viljanen, Spinoza’s Geometry of Power, pp. 65‒76, 125‒132. I agree with much in Garrett’s, Marshall’s, and Viljanen’s reading, but a key difference between theirs and mine is that I maintain that a finite mode can be and is a cause of its existence in the 2p45s sense of “existence.” I agree with Garrett, Marshall, and Viljanen that a finite mode is not the cause of the beginning of its durational existence, but my view is that, for Spinoza, a finite mode is a cause of its existence in the strict sense of “existence.” For further discussion of the reading I defend in section 1 of the present chapter, see Andrew Youpa, “Spinoza on the Very Nature of Existence,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 35 (2011): 310‒334.

Summum Mentis Bonum  129 about effects that can be understood through the laws of an individual’s nature alone (4p20d, 4p35c2). To bring about effects that can be understood through the laws of an individual’s nature alone is to be an adequate cause (3D1). It is adequate causal power. A thing’s actual essence is adequate causal power. Each and every existing thing is therefore a self-​caused cause of some effects where by “self-​caused cause” I  mean an actual-​essence–​caused cause.4 How can this be? How can a finite existent be a self-​caused cause of anything? A finite existent is a self-​caused cause of some effects because a finite existent is an expression of God’s self-​caused nature (1p36d, 3p6d, 3p7d). The first line of the demonstration of 3p7 reads, “From the given essence of each thing some things necessarily follow (by IP36)” (3p7d), and here Spinoza appeals to 1p36 for support: “Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow” (emphasis in original). An effect follows from the “given essence” of every existent, or effects follow from the “given essence” of every existent.5 This is because every existent is an effect of God’s power, and effects are known through their causes (1a4).6 An effect, in Spinoza’s view, expresses the nature of its cause(s). Existing things express the nature of God such that knowledge of existing things is knowledge of God (5p24). Thus every existing thing is a self-​caused cause of effects by and through its “actual essence” or, equivalently, its “given essence.”7 4 Spinoza uses the phrase “actual essence” interchangeably with “given essence” in the demonstration of 3p7. Thus a finite existent can also be said to be a “self-​caused cause” in the sense that it is a given-​essence–​caused  cause. 5 This is in agreement with the conclusion Valtteri Viljanen reaches: “So, things are essential causers and effects follow from finite essences, because essences individuate things by indicating how God-​or-​ Nature’s power is modified” (Viljanen, Spinoza’s Geometry of Power, p. 75, italics in the original). 6 As Don Garrett notes, “There is no incompatibility in saying both that God freely causes human behavior and that human beings sometimes freely cause their own behavior, for human beings are modes of God. Insofar as they act freely, God produces effects by constituting their own natures; insofar as they do not act freely, God produces effects through other means” (Don Garrett, “Spinoza’s Ethical Theory,” in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don Garrett [Cambridge University Press, 1996], p. 299). 7 This reading is corroborated by Spinoza’s reply to Tschirnhaus’s query about the possibility of deducing more than one property from a thing’s definition. In his reply Spinoza writes, As to what you add, that from the definition of any thing, considered in itself, we can deduce only one property, this may hold good in the case of the most simple things, or in the case of mental constructs (entia rationis), in which I include figures, but not in the case of real things. Simply from the fact that I define God as an Entity to whose essence existence belongs, I infer several properties of him, such as that he necessarily exists, that he is one alone, immutable, infinite, etc. I could adduce several examples of this kind, which I omit for the present. (Letter 83) According to the reading I am defending, a real thing, such as an existing human being, has an actual essence from which effects (properties) follow. A thing’s actual essence and the effects that follow from its actual essence, as I go on to argue in what follows, constitutes its existence, that is, its existence in the strict sense (2p45s). For further discussion of a finite thing’s adequate causal power, see Viljanen, Spinoza’s Geometry of Power, pp. 125‒132.

130  The Ethics of Joy This reading, like its competitors, faces difficulties. I will limit myself to considering and addressing one objection to the view. For the sake of clarity, I will call the reading set out here the “Causal Adequacy reading.” The Causal Adequacy reading naturally invites a question regarding, and a potential objection to, its scope. Even if it is supposed that, according to Spinoza, finite existents can be self-​caused causes (i.e., actual-​essence–​ caused causes) of some effects, is it an implication of the Causal Adequacy reading that finite existents are self-​caused causes of their own existence? If so, how is this not a reductio ad absurdum of the reading? We do not cause ourselves to exist (1p24c, 1p25, 1p25c). So, even assuming that a finite existent is, as the Causal Adequacy reading claims, a self-​caused cause of some effects, it would be ridiculous to maintain that a finite existent is a self-​caused cause of its existence. The strength of this objection crucially depends on the notion of existence. According to the version of the Causal Adequacy reading that I favor, finite existents are self-​caused causes of their existence in accordance with Spinoza’s technical notion of existence. In the scholium to 2p45 Spinoza cautions that existence “as it is conceived abstractly, and as a certain species of quantity” should not be confused with the “very nature of existence” (2p45s). To conceive existence abstractly and as a species of quantity is to conceive it confusedly through the imagination, not clearly and distinctly through the intellect.8 Spinoza writes, For I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is attributed to singular things because infinitely many things follow from the eternal necessity of God’s nature in infinitely many modes (see IP16). I am speaking, I say, of the very existence of singular things insofar as they are in God. For even if each one is determined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the force by which each one perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God’s nature. Concerning this, see IP24C. (2p45s)

I attempt to shed some light on this passage elsewhere.9 Here I wish to make two points. First, on the basis of 2p45s, it is evident that what Spinoza means by “existence” is not a finite thing’s existence as it is determined by another

8 Spinoza makes a similar point about a common misconception of extension (1p15s). To conceive something abstractly is a failure to conceive it properly. That is, it is a failure to conceive it. 9 Youpa, “Spinoza on the Very Nature of Existence,” pp. 310‒334.

Summum Mentis Bonum  131 finite thing. To be determined by another finite thing is to be in another finite thing, and to be in another finite thing is not to participate in the very nature of existence. It is not to follow from the eternal necessity of God’s nature. Second, it is evident that what Spinoza means by “existence” is the force by which a thing perseveres in existing. A thing’s force to persevere in existing—​ its striving to persevere in being, or its power (3p6, 3p7d)—​follows from the eternal necessity of God’s nature and is, as a result, in God. To participate in the nature of existence is to be in God, and to be in God is to express God’s causal power. God’s causal power is adequate causal power. So to exist is to be an adequate cause, that is, a self-​caused cause. A finite thing is a self-​caused cause of its existence—​its existence in the strict sense—​insofar as it is a self-​ caused cause of any effects whatsoever.10 It exists if, and insofar as, it is an adequate cause. “To be able not to exist is to lack power, and conversely, to be able to exist is to have power (as is known through itself)” (1p11d). Existence, strictly speaking, is not a matter of something either being or not being. Rather, there are degrees of existence. A thing’s degree of existence is in proportion to the quantity of effects of which it is an adequate cause through its actual essence.11 Something whose actual essence is the adequate cause of a great many effects exists to a greater degree than something whose actual essence is the adequate cause of very few effects. In accordance with Spinoza’s technical notion of existence, a finite thing is a self-​caused cause of its existence where “existence” is understood as a thing’s adequate causal power and its effects. However, a finite thing is not a self-​caused cause of its existence if by “existence” one has in mind the notion of existence that is framed by the imagination. The latter imaginative existence does not partake in the nature



10 Michael LeBuffe maintains a similar reading:

God is self-​caused and self-​explanatory, and the thought that grasps the reason for God’s existence is the idea of God. Similarly for each finite thing, it is, albeit in a finite way, self-​ caused and self-​explanatory, and the grasping of the reason for that thing is the idea of it. Of course all things are in God, and God is all of being and all of causation and explanation. So a finite thing is just an expression of a kind of God. It should not be surprising, then, that its causal activity is like God’s: it is God’s. (Michael LeBuffe, Spinoza on Reason [Oxford University Press, 2018], p. 40) What the Causal Adequacy reading adds to this view is that insofar as a finite thing is an adequate cause of effects it has an existence that is of the same kind as God’s existence, and this type of existence is not measured in terms of duration. 11 Spinoza’s point about how the nature of existence is not a species of quantity (2p45s) is, I take it, about how existence is not a durational quantity. It does not follow that no notion of quantity pertains to the nature of existence.

132  The Ethics of Joy of existence. To follow from the eternal necessity of God’s nature is to participate in the very nature of existence. This reading of the scholium to 2p45 is corroborated by the end of 4 Preface: “Finally, by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, understand reality, that is, the essence of each thing insofar as it exists and produces an effect [existit, & operatur], having no regard to its duration. For no singular thing can be called more perfect for having persevered in existing for a longer time” (4Pref). A thing’s perfection is identical to its reality, and a thing’s reality is its essence insofar as it exists and operates regardless of the length of the duration of its existence. What is existence independent of a thing’s duration? To exist is to be an adequate cause of effects, and being an adequate cause of effects is not about the cause’s duration. Something X that is the adequate cause of a great many effects exists to a greater degree, has more reality than, and is more perfect than something Z that is the adequate cause of fewer effects but has a longer durational existence than X.12 There are two notions of existence at work in the Ethics, and they are not on an equal footing. There is the very nature of existence, on the one hand, and there is existence as it appears to the imagination, on the other. Whereas the former is a matter of being the adequate cause of effects without regard to duration, the latter is a matter of being under the causal sway of other finite things for a quantity of duration. According to Spinoza, a thing exists, is perfect, and has reality insofar as it is the adequate cause of effects (2p45s, 4Pref, 5p40). It is also the case that a thing is active, virtuous, and free insofar as it is the adequate cause of effects (1D7, 3D2, 4D8, 5p40). A human being experiences cheerfulness (hilaritas) and achieves blessedness (beatitudo) if, and insofar as, he is an adequate cause of effects (4p42, 5p42). The greater a human being increases his adequate causal power, the greater is his joy and perfection and, as a consequence, the more he participates in the divine nature (4p45s, 4App XXXI). Only good things follow from an individual’s adequate causal power (4App VI). If it were true that Spinoza maintained that it is impossible for finite existents to be adequate causes of any effects 12 When, for example, someone who is greedy has a long durational existence—​a durational existence that is longer than that of someone who is free—​it is not the case that the former is more perfect than the latter. With respect to an existing thing’s perfection, a minimum quantity of duration is necessary to achieve a high level of perfection, but it is not what makes a thing more or less perfect. There are people who live a hundred years and achieve very little genuine freedom and perfection. There are others who, like Spinoza, live fewer than fifty years and achieve a considerable amount of freedom and perfection. Living well, in Spinoza’s view, is a matter of perfection-​preservation and perfection-​ enhancement, where perfection is measured by adequate causal power, not quantity of duration. For further discussion, see my “Spinozistic Self-​Preservation,” pp. 477‒490.

Summum Mentis Bonum  133 whatsoever, the Ethics would be incoherent. The Causal Adequacy reading avoids this otherwise devastating result for Spinoza’s project.

2.  The Free Human In addition to disagreement concerning whether human beings can be free to any degree whatsoever, there is debate among commentators over how to understand the role that homo liber, the free human, plays in Spinoza’s moral philosophy.13 Among the issues over which there is disagreement is a question concerning how far removed from the freedom on display in the free human are actual human beings. Some commentators maintain that the freedom on display in the free human is far removed from actual human beings. It is so far removed, in fact, that it is a mistake to think that the free human is intended to serve as a model of human nature.14 Others maintain that the free human’s freedom is not far removed at all; it is within reach of actual human beings, if not already in the possession of an exceptional few.15 I believe that a reading resembling the latter view is correct but, like most issues over which scholars disagree, there are strong arguments on both sides. I think that some light can be shed on this issue and to the current state of the debate if we divide the question and deal with each part separately. I will offer a defense of the reading I favor, but my goal in part is to shed some light on the issue in the hope that this will contribute to the advancement of the discussion. The question as originally formulated can be divided into two subquestions. First, how ideal and perfect is the free human? Second, how non-​ideal and imperfect are actually existing human beings? The distance between homo liber, on the one hand, and existing human beings, on the other, varies in accordance with the answers given to these two questions. For example, if the freedom on display in the free human is the freedom of complete (i.e., infinite) adequate causality and if existing human beings, as finite modes, are invariably the playthings of external causal forces, the 13 Garrett, “ ‘A Free Man Always Acts Honestly, Not Deceptively’ ”; Garber, “Dr.  Fischelson’s Dilemma”; Youpa, “Spinoza’s Model of Human Nature”; Matthew J. Kisner, “Spinoza’s Model of Human Nature: Rethinking the Free Man,” in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Daniel Garber and Steven Nadler (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 91‒114; and Kisner’s Spinoza on Human Freedom, ch. 8; Homan, “Rehumanizing Spinoza’s Free Man”; Nadler, “On Spinoza’s ‘Free Man.’ ” 14 Kisner, “Spinoza’s Model of Human Nature”; and Kisner’s Spinoza on Human Freedom, ch. 8. 15 Homan, “Rehumanizing Spinoza’s Free Man”; Nadler, “On Spinoza’s ‘Free Man.’ ”

134  The Ethics of Joy free human will then be an impossibly distant ideal. Alternatively, if the free human is a finite expression of God-​or-​Nature’s infinite causal power and if existing human beings, while always subject to external causal forces, can be adequate causes of some effects, the free human will not be an impossibly distant ideal but, rather, a better version of ourselves that we can look to for guidance. These two sets of answers and their corresponding readings are not the only available options, but they roughly represent two major lines of interpretation and, more important for my present purpose, they illustrate how specific ways of answering the questions can make the conception of the free human more remote from us and less remote from us. I now want to discuss each subquestion in more detail, starting with the ideality of the free human. I argue in favor of a reading according to which the free human is a better version of ourselves, not an impossibly distant ideal.16 How ideal and perfect is the free human? According to one line of interpretation, the free human is an idealization that represents a condition without passive emotions and inadequate ideas. The free human, according to this view, has only active emotions and adequate ideas, and he is causally self-​sufficient such that he does not need “external supports for his continued existence, needing neither food nor water nor air.”17 This is to view the free human as invulnerable. The free human is incapable of being harmed by anything in his environment. Likewise, he is incapable of being benefited by anything outside himself. In this way the free human, according to this reading, is in a sense supernatural in that he acts on the natural world while remaining invulnerable to the natural world. If this were the correct way to understand Spinoza’s idea of the free human, it would not be difficult to show that the free human is not intended to serve as a model of human nature. Because human beings bear no resemblance to this supernatural being in any relevant practical sense, it would be foolish to look to the free person as a source of practical guidance. But the textual support for this reading is less than compelling. The free human “lives according to the dictate of reason alone” (4p67d) and is “led by reason alone” (4p68d; cf. 4p66cs). From the claim that the free human is led by reason alone, it does not follow that he has no passions and no inadequate ideas. Being led by reason alone does not rule out the possibility of being the subject of passions,

16 My argument is indebted to Matthew Homan’s and Steven Nadler’s contributions to this issue. See Homan’s “Rehumanizing Spinoza’s Free Man” and Nadler’s “On Spinoza’s ‘Free Man.’ ” 17 Garber, “Dr. Fischelson’s Dilemma,” p. 186.

Summum Mentis Bonum  135 sensory ideas, and relying on such things as food, water, and air. It is possible that the free person is such that he has passions and inadequate ideas but he does act on them or does not act on them blindly. What is more, there is strong textual support for the view that the free human is not invulnerable. For example, Spinoza writes, “The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in avoiding dangers as in overcoming them” (4p69, emphasis in original). The free human, like all human beings, encounters dangers. If the free human were invulnerable, there would be no reason for him to avoid and overcome anything because nothing would be dangerous to him. “In a free man, a timely flight is considered to show as much Tenacity as fighting; or a free man chooses flight with the same Tenacity, or presence of mind, as he chooses contest” (4p69c). Spinoza’s free human at times flees what poses a danger to him. At other times the free person chooses to fight and overcome danger. The free person therefore is not invulnerable. He can be harmed. This is confirmed by 4p70: “A free man who lives among the ignorant strives, as far as he can, to avoid their favors” (emphasis in original). A free human avoids as far as possible favors from the ignorant because the ignorant do not correctly value the favors they confer, and when an ignorant person does not see his favor valued as he himself values it, he will feel hatred toward the recipient of his favor. Ultimately it is an ignorant person’s hatred that the free human seeks to avoid as far as possible, and it is good for the free person to avoid being the object of a person’s hatred because we “strive to destroy the man we hate” (4p45d). The free human seeks to avoid favors from the ignorant because he is not invulnerable to hatred and to the destructive deeds that hatred causes. Furthermore, in the scholium to 4p70 Spinoza adds, “I say as far as he can. For though men may be ignorant, they are still men, who in situations of need can bring human aid. And there is no better aid than that. So it often happens that it is necessary to accept favors from them, and hence to return thanks to them according to their temperament [i.e., in a way they will appreciate]” (emphasis in original). The free human avoids favors from the ignorant as far as possible. Yet he will often need help from others and will therefore often need to call upon others, including the ignorant, for help. Spinoza’s free human thus can be harmed by things in his surroundings and can also be benefited by things in his surroundings. Among the things that are especially useful to the free person are other free people (4p71d). Spinoza holds that the free human is united with other free people by the “greatest necessity of friendship,” and the free seek to “benefit one another with equal eagerness for love” (4p71d). One important way

136  The Ethics of Joy the free benefit one another is by their shared love of knowledge. In seeing that others love and pursue the same thing as he does a free person, like all people, is encouraged and strengthened in the pursuit of what he loves (3p31). A free human will love knowledge more steadfastly when he is in the company of others who love knowledge (4p37ad). Having friendships with other free people increases a free human’s motivation to pursue knowledge. Far from being invulnerable and in no need of external supports, the free person has ordinary human vulnerabilities and needs. What sets the free apart from the unfree person, in part, is that the former has knowledge of his limitations and has knowledge of how best to live given his limitations (4p17s). Knowledge of human weaknesses and vulnerabilities belongs to the knowledge that guides a free person, just as such knowledge belongs to the body of knowledge contained in the Ethics.18 Still, there is a passage that appears to go against this reading and that seems to support the view that the free human is an ideal of invulnerability. It is 4p68 and its demonstration: If men were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free. Dem.: I call him free who is led by reason alone. Therefore, he who is born free, and remains free, has only adequate ideas, and so has no concept of evil (by P64C). And since good and evil are correlates, he also has no concept of good, q.e.d. (emphasis in original)

This appears to support the view that the free human is invulnerable. An individual who is born free and remains free would, according to the demonstration, have only adequate ideas. So, someone who is born free would have no passive emotions and no sensory ideas and, as a result, would presumably have no need for external supports such as food, water, air, and friendship. In the scholium to 4p68, Spinoza points out that the hypothesis is false and is in a way inconceivable. What makes it false is that it is impossible for a human to be independent of nature such that he undergoes “no changes except those which can be understood through his own nature alone, and of 18 I agree with Sanem Soyarslan’s view that for Spinoza, “reason enables us to not only understand our essence, which only affirms what we are and can do, but also compare ourselves with other finite things (and vice versa) in an adequate way, a process that inevitably involves an understanding of the fact that our power is limited by them” (p. 354); see Sanem Soyarslan, “Spinoza’s Critique of Humility in the Ethics,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 56, no. 3 (September 2018): 342‒364.

Summum Mentis Bonum  137 which he is the adequate cause” (4p4). It is impossible for human beings to be invulnerable to factors external to our nature. We are inescapably subject to passions (4p4c). To form a conception of a being who is born free is to conceive of someone who is not subject to passions and is invariably an adequate cause. The idea of such a being is conceivable only if what is conceived is God “insofar only as he is the cause of man’s existence” (4p68s). The only way to conceive of someone who is born free is to conceive of him as a system of adequate causal power who is invulnerable to factors external to his nature. Is the free human of 4p67, 4p69, 4p70, 4p71, and 4p72, a system of adequate causal power who is invulnerable to external causal factors? The evidence, as we have seen, strongly supports that he is not independent in this way. The free human faces dangers (4p69). The free human avoids as far as possible favors from the ignorant (4p70). The free human often calls upon others for help (4p70s). The free human is joined to other free individuals in bonds of friendship (4p71). Moreover, the free human acts honestly even if dishonesty could save him from imminent danger (4p72s), and a free human enjoys greater freedom in a state than he would in solitude (4p73). In contrast with an individual who is born free, the free human is not invulnerable. Spinoza’s model of human nature has ordinary human weaknesses and vulnerabilities.19 The free human and the person who is born free are not identical. The free human, while guided by reason alone, is vulnerable to existing things in the natural world. The person who is born free is in possession of only adequate ideas and is invulnerable to the natural world. There is no compelling textual support for the view that the free human, in Spinoza’s view, is born free, and there is no compelling textual basis for thinking that someone who is born free is the model of human nature. What is 4p68 about if it is not about the free human? This much is clear:  4p68 is not a first-​order moral claim about what someone who is born free would or would not do. It is a metaethical claim about the basis of the notions of good and evil. By way of 4p64c and 4p64, 4p68 traces its ancestry back to 4p8: “The knowledge [Cognitio] of good and evil is nothing 19 As Steven Nadler puts it, “The point I wish to make is that acting under the guidance of reason to the extent of being a free man does not mean having only adequate ideas. What it does mean is that the nature of such a person, through his adequate ideas, is the sufficient cause of all of his actions, even if he is also subject to changes brought about by other things and thus susceptible to passive affects. In other words, the free man is the man who, while experiencing passions, never lets those passions determine his actions; he always does what reason dictates” (Nadler, “On Spinoza’s ‘Free Man,’ ” p. 114).

138  The Ethics of Joy but an affect of joy or sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it” (emphasis in original). As I argued in c­ hapter 1, cognition of good and evil is a necessary consequence of an emotion’s qualitative character and such cognition necessarily accompanies an emotion. Emotions are increases and decreases in power. Someone who is born free would be invulnerable to the natural world and therefore would not experience passive increases and passive decreases in power. Someone who is born free would not have passive emotions. Therefore the person who is born free would have no cognition of evil. Because, according to Spinoza, the notions of good and evil are correlates (4p68d), someone who is born free would have no cognition of goodness. To cognize good and evil is to experience the qualitative character of increases and decreases in power. If an individual were to lack the latter, he would also lack the former. What does this have to do with how we should live? It has nothing to do with how we should live. It tells us nothing about what a free person does or does not do. Although the free human is like us in that he is vulnerable to the external world, it may still be the case that human beings are so profoundly weak and vulnerable that the free human cannot be a model of human nature. It may not be invulnerability that opens up a gulf between the free human and existing human beings. It may be actual human beings’ bondage that opens up a gulf. Even though the free human is vulnerable to the external world and even though existing human beings have a modicum of adequate causal power, it may be that existing human beings are too weak and vulnerable to be free. If the bondage of existing human beings is insurmountable, a model of freedom, even one that is not an ideal of invulnerability, is an impossibly distant ideal. Is our bondage insurmountable? How non-​ideal and imperfect are existing human beings? According to the Causal Adequacy reading, human bondage is not insurmountable. We are not so weak and vulnerable that it is impossible for us to be free, although weakness and vulnerability are part of the human condition (4p3, 4p4, 4p4c). We inhabit a world with things whose power infinitely surpasses our power (4p3). Undergoing changes that other existing things cause is unavoidable. But undergoing no changes except ones of which we are the inadequate cause is avoidable. A human being, like every existing thing, is an adequate cause of at least some effects (1p36, 3p7d), and an individual is free in proportion to the quantity of effects of which he is the adequate cause. It is in this sense that human freedom is a matter of degree and not absolute. A human being can be the adequate cause of greater or fewer effects, but

Summum Mentis Bonum  139 no person can be an infinitely powerful cause (4p4d). As a result, no human being can be free in the absolute sense that God-​or-​Nature is free. Yet every human being can be genuinely free. Indeed, every existing thing is genuinely free in virtue of being an adequate cause of an effect or an adequate cause of multiple effects. An alternative reading construes Spinoza’s notion of adequate cause such that a human being can be an adequate cause of an effect to some degree where “to some degree” means that a person can approximate being an adequate cause of an effect (effects) but cannot be the total cause of an effect (effects). According to this reading, a person cannot be a total cause of even a single effect, but he can come close to being a total cause of an effect. Furthermore, because to be free is to be an adequate cause of an effect and because, according to this view, a human being can at best approximate being an adequate cause, it follows that a human being can never be free, although an individual can be further away from or approach more closely to being free.20 An individual X can be said to be free to a greater degree than individual Y in the sense that X approaches freedom more closely than Y. This way of construing Spinoza’s notions of adequate cause and freedom is, I believe, an error. What makes it an error is that an adequate cause is the total cause of an effect. Something either is the total cause of an effect or it is not, and when a cause is not the total cause of an effect, it is an inadequate cause. Someone who approximates being an adequate cause is an inadequate 20 The contrast I am highlighting between the two ways of reading Spinoza discussed in this paragraph and the previous one ultimately rests on a difference in view about how finite modes express and possess certain of God’s characteristics. For instance, according to the Causal Adequacy reading, a finite mode expresses certain characteristics of God just as they are in God, although it expresses God’s characteristics in a limited way. For example, by expressing God’s eternity a finite mode possesses the very same kind of eternity as God’s eternity. A finite mode possesses genuine eternity, not a qualified and inferior version of God’s eternity. Moreover, it expresses genuine eternity in a “certain and determinate way” in the sense that only part of a finite mode—​the intellect—​is eternal, and its intellect is limited. A finite mode is a mode of the infinite intellect and does not itself have an infinite intellect. Also, a finite mode’s imagination is not eternal. According to the Causal Adequacy reading, a finite mode can be said to be a “quasi-​substance” in that it expresses and has certain characteristics of God (e.g., adequate causal power, activity, freedom, eternity) as those characteristics are in God, albeit in a limited way. In contrast with the Causal Adequacy reading, the alternative under consideration here maintains that a finite mode possesses qualified and inferior versions of certain characteristics of God. A finite mode does not express and possess God’s characteristics as they are in God. For instance, a finite mode possesses a qualified and inferior version of eternity, not eternity as it is in God. Likewise, a finite mode possesses a qualified and inferior version of freedom, not freedom as it is in God. Contrary to the Causal Adequacy reading, it is not the case that a finite mode has less of essentially the same type of freedom as God’s. A finite mode’s freedom is not of the same kind as God’s freedom. According to this reading, finite modes can have only inferior imitations of God’s characteristics: quasi-​adequacy, quasi-​activity, quasi-​freedom, and quasi-​eternity. I borrow the phrase “quasi-​substance” from Garrett, “Spinoza’s Conatus Argument,” p. 140.

140  The Ethics of Joy cause. An adequate cause with respect to a particular effect or set of effects is not of the type that admits degrees. A person is either the total cause of a particular episode of joy of which he is the subject or he is an inadequate cause of a particular episode of joy of which he is the subject. Insofar as a person falls short of being the total cause of a particular episode of joy, he is not an adequate cause of the episode in any degree whatsoever. He is an inadequate cause without qualification. To ascribe to Spinoza the view that a human being can at best approximate being an adequate cause of an effect is to accept that he believes that it is impossible for human beings to be an adequate cause. If it is impossible for a human being to be an adequate cause of any effects whatsoever, it is impossible for us to be free and virtuous. And if we cannot be virtuous, we cannot be blessed (5p42). This result, as I pointed out earlier quoting Marshall, would be devastating for Spinoza’s moral philosophy. It would mean that the ethics of the Ethics is intentionally for and about nonexistent individuals. Instead of leading us “by the hand, as it were, to the knowledge of the human Mind and its highest blessedness” (2Pref), Spinoza would have deliberately changed course after the Preface to Part 2 and led us to a fantasy about the minds of fictional creatures and their fictional blessedness.21 Such a reading is indefensible. At this point I would like to return to the passage that I take as the starting point for the Causal Adequacy reading: “By virtue and power I understand the same thing, i.e. (by IIIP7), virtue, insofar as it is related to man, is the very essence, or nature, of man, insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone” (4D8; cf. 4p20d). This is not conclusive evidence for the Causal Adequacy reading. Conclusive evidence is, it seems, rarely if ever available in matters of interpretation. However, by identifying virtue, power, and striving to persevere in being with the power to bring about things that can be understood through the laws of an individual’s nature alone, it strongly supports that Spinoza does not accept the view that it is impossible for human beings to be adequate causes of any effects whatsoever. On the contrary, such power makes us the type of thing that we are. For Spinoza, power is existence itself.

21 What he wrote might nevertheless be a fantasy, but no doubt Spinoza does not see it this way. As he writes to a correspondent, “For I do not presume that I have found the best philosophy, but I know that what I understand is the true one” (Letter 76, to Alfred Burgh). As I suggest in ­chapter 10, Spinoza would have been right to presume that he had found the best philosophy, but the important point here is that it would be a mistake to think that he is anything other than enviably confident in the truth of his views.

Summum Mentis Bonum  141

Conclusion If there is one thing about Spinoza’s account of freedom that scholars seem to agree on it is that freedom, with respect to human agents, is a “matter of degree” and not “absolute.”22 A human being can be “free to some degree,” but no human can be “absolutely free.” This is accepted by a number of commentators, and my view is no exception. However, as the scare quotes are intended to suggest, there is an ambiguity lurking behind the phrases “free to some degree” and “absolutely free.” There are two distinct ways of construing “to some degree” and “absolutely” in the phrases free to some degree and absolutely free, and only one is correct. According to what I have argued is the incorrect reading, to say that a human being can be “free to some degree” is to say that a human being can approximate being an adequate cause of an effect but can never be an adequate cause of an effect. Accordingly, a human being can never be “absolutely free” because he can never be the total cause of an effect. Alternatively, according to what I have argued is the correct reading (the Causal Adequacy reading), to say that a human being can be “free to some degree” is to say that a human being can be an adequate cause of one or more effects but can never be an adequate cause of infinitely many effects. Accordingly, a human being cannot be “absolutely free” because it is impossible for a human being to be the total cause of infinitely many effects. Moreover, I have argued that Spinoza’s model of human nature, the free human, is not an impossibly distant ideal. Spinoza’s model human being has ordinary vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and actual human beings are not merely the playthings of our circumstances. We can be free, and we can always be more free than we are at present. Spinoza’s free human is an ideal, and it is an ideal that is accessible to actual human beings.

22 Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (Hackett, 1984), p. 317; Garrett, “Spinoza’s Ethical Theory,” p. 279; Kisner, Spinoza on Human Freedom, pp. 32‒34.

9 The Empowered Life Tenacity

Introduction The terms “virtue” and “power” are, for Spinoza, interchangeable. An individual is virtuous and powerful “insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone” (4D8; cf. 4p20d). Real power is adequate causal power (3D1, 4D8).1 Moreover, a human being is free if, and insofar as, he is an adequate cause. Because knowledge is adequate causal power in the attribute of thought, to be free is to be guided by knowledge. Spinoza writes, If these things are compared with those we have shown in this Part up to P18, concerning the powers of the affects, we shall easily see what the difference is between a man who is led only by an affect, or by opinion, and one who is led by reason. For the former, whether he will or no, does those things he is most ignorant of, whereas the latter complies with no one’s wishes but his own, and does only those things he knows to be the most important in life, and therefore desires very greatly. Hence, I call the former a slave, but the latter, a free man. (4p66cs)

1 A drunkard, for example, does not have real power by virtue of his ability to drink an unusually large amount of whiskey while not losing self-​control. Drinking an unusually large amount of whiskey without losing self-​control does not follow from a human being’s adequate causal power. It is incompatible with living intelligently. A drunkard is an inadequate cause of his drunkenness and drunkard way of life. Because alcohol is primarily responsible for the way he lives, a drunkard’s agency is impaired. In ordinary usage there is a meaning of the word “power” according to which a drunkard has the power to drink an unusually large amount of whiskey without losing self-​control. In this ordinary sense of the word “power” an individual has the power to do anything that he can do. But this is not the meaning of “power” that Spinoza has in mind when speaking of our actual essence (3p7). Real power makes us free. Indeed, real power is freedom. The Ethics of Joy. Andrew Youpa, Oxford University Press (2020) © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190086022.001.0001

The Empowered Life: Tenacity  143 A free person is someone who is guided by knowledge, not by passive emotion and opinion. Someone who is guided by passive emotion and opinion performs deeds out of ignorance. First and foremost he is ignorant of himself, and someone who is ignorant of himself is “ignorant of the foundation of all the virtues, and consequently, of all the virtues. . . . Therefore, he who is ignorant of himself, and consequently (as we have just now shown) of all the virtues, does not act from virtue at all, i.e. (as is evident from D8), is extremely weak-​minded [animo impotens]” (4p56d). Unfreedom is the result of ignorance. A slave is ignorant of himself and is ignorant of all the virtues, and owing to a slave’s ignorance, he fails to be free and fails to live virtuously. While to live well is to live intelligently, to live badly is to live ignorantly. In addition to using the word “virtue” to mean adequate causal power (4D8), Spinoza at times uses the word “virtue” to refer to specific ways that adequate causal power can be harnessed and directed. These two meanings of “virtue” appear side by side in the demonstration of 4p56 where he claims that the ignorant person is ignorant of “all the virtues” and “does not act from virtue at all, i.e. (as is evident from D8), is extremely weak-​minded” (4p56d). In speaking of “all the virtues” Spinoza is talking about virtues as specific ways that adequate causal power can be harnessed and directed. In contrast, when he claims that the ignorant person “does not act from virtue” he is talking about virtue simply as adequate causal power. The latter meaning of “virtue” features in the official definition of “virtue” (4D8), and virtue in this sense constitutes what Spinoza calls “strength of character” (fortitudo): “All actions that follow from affects related to the Mind insofar as it understands [intelligit] I relate to Strength of character [Fortitudinem]” (3p59s, emphasis in original). Someone who performs deeds on the basis of understanding has the virtue of strength of character. Furthermore, strength of character is a genus that contains two primary species of virtue. First, there is the virtue of tenacity (animositas), which is defined as the “Desire by which each one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to preserve his being” (3p59s, emphasis in original). Tenacity is the virtue of taking intelligent care of oneself. It is empowered self-​love. Second, there is the virtue of nobility (generositas), which is defined as the “Desire by which each one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to aid other men and join them to him in friendship” (3p59s, emphasis in original). Nobility is the virtue of taking intelligent care of others. It is empowered love. Other than tenacity and nobility, there are no primary virtues, but there are virtues that are subspecies of tenacity, and there are also virtues that are subspecies of

144  The Ethics of Joy nobility.2 Moderation, sobriety, presence of mind in danger, and chastity, for example, are virtues that are subspecies of tenacity (3p56s, 3p59s, DA XLVIII exp). Courtesy and mercy are subspecies of nobility (3p59s). Accordingly, there is a single overarching virtue (i.e., strength of character), two primary species of strength of character (i.e., tenacity, nobility), and multiple subspecies of tenacity (i.e., moderation, sobriety, presence of mind in danger, chastity, etc.) and multiple subspecies of nobility (i.e., courtesy, mercy, etc.). Regarding the subspecies of tenacity and nobility, Spinoza does not intend for the account presented in the Ethics to be exhaustive. Near the end of Ethics Part 4 he writes, These and similar things which we have shown concerning the true freedom of man are related to Strength of Character, i.e. (by IIIP59S), to Tenacity and Nobility. I do not consider it worthwhile to demonstrate separately here all the properties of Strength of Character, much less that a man strong in character hates no one, is angry with no one, envies no one, is indignant with no one, scorns no one, and is not at all proud. For these and all things which relate to true life and Religion are easily proven from P37 and P46, viz. that Hate is to be conquered by returning Love, and that everyone who is led by reason desires for others also the good he wants for himself. (4p73s)

There are species of tenacity and species of nobility that Spinoza does not discuss because he does not consider it worthwhile to examine all the virtues that follow from strength of character. He nevertheless points out 2 What is the significance of making tenacity primary among the self-​regarding virtues and making nobility primary among the other-​regarding virtues? Each is, it seems, set up in opposition to what Spinoza regards as a major source of human foolishness and unhappiness—​namely fear and hatred. Fear and hatred are not the only troublemakers in our lives. But in Spinoza’s view they are responsible for a considerable amount of trouble. Fear is responsible for trouble that we cause ourselves. Hatred is responsible for trouble that we cause others. Tenacity owes its status among the self-​ regarding virtues to the fact that it counteracts and helps us overcome fear. Nobility is primary among the other-​regarding virtues because it counteracts and helps us overcome hatred and its variants, such as envy, disdain, anger, and vengeance. A potential worry about this rationale is that tenacity and nobility may not seem as suitably contrary to fear and hatred as other alternatives; it may seem that if Spinoza were really setting things up with fear and hatred in mind, he would have given primacy to presence of mind in danger and love because these most clearly and directly oppose fear and hatred. However, I do not think that this worry is as serious as it might seem at first glance. Spinoza does not draw a sharp distinction between the notions that make up each pair: at times he equates tenacity and presence of mind (e.g., 4p69c) and at times equates nobility and love (e.g., 4p46d).

The Empowered Life: Tenacity  145 that someone who has strength of character is not hateful toward others, not angry with others, not indignant, not scornful, not proud, and, on the affirmative side, returns love for hatred, and wants for others what he wants for himself. With the possible exception of not being prideful, each of these properties of strength of character concerns how we should regard and treat others, and thus each appears to be a species of nobility. In the next chapter I examine Spinoza’s view of nobility and the way of life that nobility calls for. In the remainder of this chapter I examine tenacity and its subspecies with the aim of outlining the way of life that tenacity calls for.

1.  Intelligent Care of Oneself: Moderation Spinozistic tenacity calls for moderation (temperantia) with respect to eating, sobriety (sobrietas) with respect to drinking, and chastity (castitas) with respect to sex. It is a mistake to conclude from this that tenacity requires teetotalism and celibacy. As with the virtue of moderation (temperantia) in eating, sobriety calls for moderating, not total abstention from, drinking alcohol. Chastity calls for moderating, not total abstention from, sex. “For by Gluttony, Drunkenness, Lust, Greed, and Ambition we understand nothing but an immoderate Love or Desire [immoderatum Amorem vel Cupiditatem] for eating, drinking, sexual union, wealth, and esteem” (3p56s). Like the immoderate desire for eating that is gluttony, drunkenness is an immoderate desire for alcohol. Lust is an immoderate desire for sex. Spinoza continues, “For Moderation [Temperantia], which we usually oppose to Gluttony, Sobriety which we usually oppose to Drunkenness, and Chastity, which we usually oppose to Lust, are not affects or passions, but indicate the power of the mind, a power that moderates [moderatur] these affects” (3p56s, emphasis added). Sobriety and chastity are virtues, powers of the mind, that moderate but neither eliminate nor totally abstain from the desires for drinking alcohol and for sex, respectively.3 Spinoza’s conception of the virtue of sobriety is thus best understood as the virtue of intelligently moderating the desire for drinking alcohol. Similarly, the virtue of chastity is best understood as intelligently moderating the desire for sex. 3 This reading is corroborated by Spinoza’s view that it is the “part of a wise man . . . to refresh and restore himself in moderation with pleasant food and drink [suavi cibo, et potu]” (4p45c2s). Moderation and sobriety do not prohibit the enjoyment of food and alcohol.

146  The Ethics of Joy In someone who lacks the virtue of moderation (temperantia), the desire for food dictates what, when, and how much he eats. Someone who lacks the virtue of sobriety is a slave of his desire for alcohol. In the absence of chastity the desire for sex determines with whom and how often one has sex. In such cases the desire is immoderate. It is immoderate in two senses of “immoderate.” First, a desire can be immoderate in the sense that it is not regulated in accordance with what is truly good for oneself. It is in this sense that passive emotions and passive desires are blind (4p58s). Their occurrence and intensity are not necessarily in line with what is truly good for the individual who is the subject of them. Spinoza says, Since those things are good which assist the parts of the Body to perform their function, and Joy consists in the fact that man’s power, insofar as he consists of Mind and Body, is aided or increased, all things that bring Joy are good. Nevertheless, since things do not act in order to affect us with Joy, and their power of acting is not regulated by our advantage, and finally, since Joy is generally related particularly to one part of the body, most affects of Joy are excessive (unless reason and alertness are present). (4App XXX, emphasis added)

A spatially external object is good insofar as it contributes to an increase in an individual’s power. An object is bad insofar as it gives rise to a decrease in power. But things do not affect us the way they do with the purpose of affecting us the way they do. Objects do not cause increases in our power with the purpose of contributing to increases in our power. Nor do they cause decreases with the purpose of diminishing our power. The mushroom known as the “death cap,” when eaten by a human, destroys the individual’s power, but the mushroom does not cause a life-​threatening decrease in power with the purpose of decreasing the individual’s power. The effects that mushrooms have on our power, like all natural objects other than humans, are not regulated by what is useful and harmful to us. Only human intelligence regulates things in accordance with human advantage. Everything else is indifferent to our happiness. Although objects are indifferent to our happiness, they can cause changes in our power, changes that are enhancements of our nature, as well as changes that are impairments of our nature. The second way that a passive emotion can be immoderate has to do with its power. Because a passive emotion is not inherently regulated in accordance with what is good for human nature, it can be excessively powerful.

The Empowered Life: Tenacity  147 “Generally, then,” Spinoza says, “the affects are excessive, and occupy the Mind in the consideration of only one object so much that it cannot think of others” (4p44s). An unregulated passive desire can be so powerful that it dominates the subject’s thinking and leads to behavior that is self-​destructive and (or) destructive of others. When this is so, the subject does not have a sound mind and the emotion is a type of mental illness. “But when a greedy man thinks of nothing else but profit, or money, and an ambitious man of esteem, they are not thought to be mad, because they are usually troublesome and are considered worthy of Hate. But Greed, Ambition, and Lust really are species of madness [delirii], even though they are not numbered among the diseases [morbos]” (4p44s; cf. 3p26s, 5p10s, 5p20s). An excessively powerful passive emotion is a mental illness. By pointing out that greed, ambition, and lust are “not numbered among the diseases” Spinoza is acknowledging the unorthodox character of his view. Greed is not typically thought of as a mental illness. But it is a mental illness, as is the case with every emotion that is excessively powerful, keeping in mind that only passive emotions can be excessive because passive emotions, unlike active emotions, are not naturally regulated in accordance with what is truly good for a human being. Without virtue, passive emotions lead and shape our way of life. With virtue, knowledge leads and regulates our responses to our passive emotions. Knowledge does not give us absolute control over passive emotions and passive desires because we do not have absolute control over how things causally impinge on us. Because we have no absolute control over how things causally impinge on our power of acting, we have no absolute control over when we have a passive emotion and no absolute control over its level of intensity. What we do have some control over is how we respond to increases and decreases in our power. No one can prevent himself from experiencing a desire to eat, but in the virtuous person knowledge dictates when, what foods, and how much to eat. No one is immune to experiencing a desire to drink alcohol, but in the virtuous person knowledge dictates when to drink, what to drink, how often, and how much to drink. Likewise, no one is exempt from having a desire for sex, but in the virtuous person knowledge dictates with whom to have sex and when to have sex. It is not quite right to think that virtues directly regulate passive emotions and passive desires. Spinoza’s view is that the knowledge that constitutes a virtue regulates how we respond to our passive emotions and passive desires. A virtue is the power to govern our lives in ways that promote our true happiness and minimize our unhappiness without being slaves to our passions.

148  The Ethics of Joy As in the case of the desires for food, alcohol, and sex, moderation is called for with respect to the desire for wealth (divitia) and the desire for esteem (gloria). Greed (avaritia) is an immoderate desire for wealth (3p39s, 3p56s, 3App XLVII). Ambition (ambitio) is an immoderate desire for esteem (3p39s, 3p56s, 3App XLIV). Money and esteem are not incompatible with living well. Regarding the desire for money, Spinoza writes, “But this is a vice [vitium] only in those who seek money [nummos] neither from need nor on account of necessities, but because they have learned the art of making money and pride themselves on it very much” (4App XXIX). A desire for money is not necessarily a vice. It is a vice when money is not pursued as it should be pursued, and it should be pursued only to meet necessities. “Those, however, who know the true use of money, and set bounds to their wealth according to need, live contentedly with little” (4App XXIX). With respect to the desire for wealth, taking care of oneself is about pursuing wealth within the limits of one’s needs. Spinoza does not provide specifics about what qualifies as a genuine need and what does not, but living contentedly with little presumably includes the enjoyment in moderation of the sorts of things listed in the scholium to 4p45s: “pleasant food and drink,” “scents,” “the beauty of green plants,” “decoration,” “music,” “sports,” and “the theater” (4p45s). These of course are not the only things that can be enjoyed as part of living contentedly with little. They are presented as examples of things that can be enjoyed “without injury to another” (4p45s). So long as activities are enjoyed without injury to oneself (i.e., in moderation) and without injury to others they can be included in a good life. On the other hand, his point about those who have learned the “art of making money and pride themselves on it very much” implies that living contentedly with little excludes the pursuit of wealth for the sake of inflating one’s ego. It excludes pursuing anything in such a way that knowingly results in injury to oneself or others, such as excessively pursuing wealth, food, or alcohol. Living contentedly with little also excludes harmful and destructive ends, which I discuss in some detail shortly. Like the desire for wealth, the desire for esteem (i.e., fame, glory) is not necessarily a vice: “Love of esteem [Gloria] is not contrary to reason, but can arise from it” (4p58). When the desire for esteem arises from reason it is a strength and a virtue, not a weakness and a vice. Recall that courtesy (modestia) is among the virtues that are species of nobility. Regarding this virtue he says, “Courtesy, i.e., the Desire to please men which is determined by reason, is related to Morality [Pietatem] (as we said in P37S1). But if it arises from an affect, it is Ambition, or a Desire by which men generally arouse discord and

The Empowered Life: Tenacity  149 seditions, from a false appearance of morality [falsâ Pietatis]” (4App XXV; cf. 5p4cs). Whereas ambition is an immoderate desire for esteem and as such is a vice, the virtue of courtesy is the intelligent moderation of the desire for esteem. In these cases and others like them a desire for an object or end is a vice when the desire is not intelligently moderated, but when a desire for the same object or end is intelligently moderated it is a virtue.

2.  Intelligent Care of Oneself: Overcoming Intelligently moderating our emotions and desires is the key to giving the ends that they present as good or bad an appropriate amount of our attention so we do not waste our lives pursuing things that do not merit it (e.g., an abundance of wealth) and we do not neglect to pursue things that should be pursued (e.g., knowledge). But in many cases intelligent regulation is about overcoming the emotion or desire and not acting on it. There are ends that one should not pursue regardless of how strongly one desires them. Unlike the desire for food, there is no such thing as a proper amount of attention devoted to killing oneself, for instance (4p20s). This is not to say that a desire to kill oneself cannot be comparatively less intense in one instance than in another instance. But regardless of how strongly one desires it, suicide should never be pursued. With respect to the desire to commit suicide, intelligent regulation is ultimately about overcoming the desire, which, at a minimum, is about regulating it to the point that one never acts on it. Similarly, there are no good desires that issue from hatred (4p45, 4p45d, 4p45c1, 4p45c2). Hatred in any form and at any level of intensity ought to be resisted and overcome. “All affects of Hate are evil (by P45C1)” (4p46d). Hatred is invariably accompanied by a desire to destroy the object of hatred (3p13cs), and there is no such thing as a good desire to destroy a person. There is no good desire to destroy a human being so long as the end is understood and undertaken as the destruction of a human being. From this it does not follow that killing a human being is necessarily dishonorable and bad. “Similarly, a judge who condemns a guilty man to death—​not from Hate or Anger, etc., but only from Love of the general welfare—​is guided only by reason” (4p63cs). Condemning a guilty person to death is not a weakness and therefore not dishonorable only if the condemnation issues from love of the general welfare and the desire to protect and promote the general welfare. In such a case the guilty person’s death is not understood and undertaken for the sake of

150  The Ethics of Joy the person’s destruction, as it would be in the case of a judge who condemns a guilty person to death from indignation. “Indignation” is defined as a type of hatred directed at someone who has inflicted evil on another (3App XX). He says, Indignation as we define it (See Def. Aff. XX), is necessarily evil (by P45). But it should be noted that when the supreme power, bound by its desire to preserve peace, punishes a citizen who has wronged another, I do not say that it is indignant toward the citizen. For it punished him, not because it has been aroused by Hate to destroy him, but because it is moved by duty [pietate]. (4p51ads)

Hatred of other people in any form (e.g., indignation, envy, mockery, disdain, etc.) and its accompanying desire to destroy the individual(s) who is (are) the object(s) of hate are invariably evil and dishonorable (4p45, 4p45d, 4p45c1, 4p45c2).4 It is always an impairment of power that, if unchecked, results in impairments of power. Therefore, intelligently regulating hatred is about overcoming it, and overcoming it at the very least involves mitigating hatred’s influence and its consequences as far as possible. I discuss hatred in more detail in my discussion of the virtue of nobility in the following chapter. My main point here is that hatred and the desires that issue from it should never be acted on, unlike, for example, the desire for food. Unlike the latter, there is no hatred in moderation that is an element of living well. Fear belongs in the same category as hatred. Like hatred, fear is a type of sadness (3p18s2, DA XIII). It is an inconstant sadness “born of the idea of a future or past thing whose outcome we to some extent doubt” (DA XIII). As a type of sadness, fear is a decrease in the subject’s power. It is a decrease in power that comes from imagining something that we hate and are unsure that the hated thing happened or unsure it will happen (DA XIII exp). Because it is about something whose occurrence we are unsure about, doubts make fear inconstant. Doubts cause fear to ebb, and as fear ebbs it gives way to hope, hope that the hated thing did not or will not occur. Hope too presupposes a level of uncertainty, and due to its underlying uncertainty it too is easily 4 Anger (ira) is a desire that follows from hate, and it is a desire to “do evil to him we hate” (3App XXXVI). As with indignation and other forms of hatred, there is no virtuous pursuit of inflicting evil on someone one hates. Even if the desire to do evil to someone is relatively mild it is, in Spinoza’s view, a weakness and a vice.

The Empowered Life: Tenacity  151 overtaken by doubts. Then, as hope ebbs it gives way to fear, and so on and so forth. Back and forth we go. This state of vacillation between hope and fear features in the opening lines of the Theological-​Political Treatise (TTP): “If men could manage all their affairs by a definite plan, or if fortune were always favorable to them, no one would be in the grip of superstition. But often they are in such a tight spot that they cannot decide on any plan. Then they usually vacillate wretchedly between hope and fear, desiring immoderately the uncertain goods of fortune, and ready to believe anything whatever” (TTP, pp. 65–​66). Vacillation between hope and fear is very common, according to Spinoza. It is, it seems, our default psychological state. Such vacillation leads us to spend our lives in a restless pursuit of things that cannot bring genuine happiness.5 Neither hope nor fear is good in itself (4p47), but fear is more dangerous than hope since, as he goes on in the Preface to the TTP to suggest, fear is responsible for the persistence and prevalence of superstition (TTP, p. 67). The prejudices that make up superstition “turn men from rational beings into beasts, since they completely prevent everyone from freely using his judgment and from distinguishing the true from the false, and seem deliberately designed to put out the light of the intellect entirely” (TTP, p. 70). Fear leads to credulity, and credulity leads us to embrace childish garbage. Childish garbage prizes anti-​intellectualism and fosters hatred of those who disagree with the currently fashionable brand of garbage (TTP, pp. 70–​71). In the Ethics and in the TTP, Spinoza makes the point that our minds are often caught in a state of vacillation between hope and fear, but no less important to his ethical project and his political project is that fear, in his view, leads to hate via credulity and superstition. Thus not only does fear play a role in the wretched state of vacillation that many lives are trapped in, it is also a cause of hatred. Hatred, in turn, is a cause of wretchedness that we inflict on others. Fear and hatred, while not the only sources of wretchedness, are responsible for a significant amount of the wretchedness that we, as instruments of our passive emotions, play a part in producing.6

5 Steven Nadler writes, “The importance of hope and fear derives from the fact that they are the foundation of the kind of life for which the Ethics is supposed to provide the antidote. To live a life according to hope and fear is to be governed by an anxious state of expectation or dread that has deleterious consequences for our well-​being” (Steven Nadler, Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction [Cambridge University Press, 2006], p. 205). 6 Pride (4p57s) and ambition (4App XXV), according to Spinoza, are also responsible for their fair share of the horrors we produce.

152  The Ethics of Joy With respect to the importance of the role that fear plays as a cause of wretchedness, it is no coincidence that strength of character—​fortitudo—​is the genus from which all other species of virtue are derived. In the philosophical tradition fortitudo is one of the four cardinal virtues and is commonly translated into English as “courage.” Fortitudo itself translates the Greek andreia, which in Plato’s Republic is the key excellence of the guardians. It is the virtue of soldiers. Spinoza’s view is that all virtues are versions of the soldier’s virtue. The importance he assigns to courage is also reflected in the virtue of tenacity. The Latin animositas, which Curley translates as “tenacity,” can be translated into English as “courage,” as Elwes and Shirley do in their translations of the Ethics. Furthermore, the virtue of presence of mind in danger (animi in periculis praesentia) is a species of animositas, and clearly this too is a version of courage. In Spinoza’s taxonomy of the virtues, courage is the highest genus (strength of character), and alongside nobility it is one of the two primary species (tenacity) of strength of character. A variant of courage (i.e., presence of mind in danger) is also a subspecies of tenacity. I believe that the rationale for this emphasis on courage is, in part, that fear and its consequences, such as vacillation and hatred, account for much of the wretchedness in the world for which we are conduits. Spinoza’s view is that fear is at the root of much of the misery that we bring on ourselves and on others. Of course, we would not be conduits of wretchedness if we were not subject to passive emotions (4App VI). Our inescapable vulnerability makes us a danger to ourselves and to others. But the answer to our vulnerability is not invulnerability. Invulnerability is not an option (4p3, 4p4, 4p4c, 4App XXXII). The answer is the strength, the tenacity, the presence of mind—​the courage—​to persist in taking care of ourselves and in taking care of others no matter what misfortunes we suffer, and to resist contributing further to the wretchedness and horror. To have the specific virtue of presence of mind in danger is to have the strength not to succumb to fear when confronted with danger (4p69c, 5p10s). It is the strength to keep one’s cool when trouble strikes. When exposed to danger, someone with presence of mind is equipped to make decisions that best prevents harm or that minimizes harm. This means that when confronted with instances of some types of danger the virtuous person chooses flight. When confronted with other types the virtuous person chooses contest (4p69c). He meets it head on. It depends on the danger and the circumstances. Knowledge is needed to assess a danger and to assess the most effective way to deal with it. The important thing is that when

The Empowered Life: Tenacity  153 confronted with danger we have the presence of mind that allows knowledge to govern our choices and behavior and that prevents blind fear and other passive emotions from usurping control and leading us into harm. The knowledge that constitutes presence of mind in danger, like the knowledge that constitutes the virtues generally, cannot guarantee that we do not suffer. We are finite modes and as such will always be vulnerable to the power of external factors. As a result, suffering is an inevitable part of life (4p4c, 4App XXXII). Nevertheless, knowledge provides the strength to respond to our suffering and the suffering of others. Knowledge empowers us to respond in ways that are good for ourselves and good for others. While everyone is equally vulnerable because we are equally finite, not everyone is equally helpless. Vice first and foremost is helplessness, where “helpless” is understood as the inability to persevere in one’s being and help others according to the dictates of reason. Someone who lacks the strength to intelligently regulate and withstand his passive emotions is unable to help himself and unable to help others. An individual is also helpless insofar as he lacks the strength to endure misfortune with equanimity. In our helplessness we are governed by whatever happens to be our most intensely felt emotion at present, not by knowledge of what is truly good for ourselves. “For most people,” Spinoza writes, “apparently believe that they are free to the extent that they are permitted to yield to their lust, and that they give up their right to the extent that they are bound to live according to the rule of the divine law” (5p41s; cf. 4App XXX). By “divine law” in this context Spinoza means the way of life that is required to achieve the supreme good: the knowledge and love of God (TTP, p. 128).7 This is a life that is governed by tenacity and nobility (5p41d), which is identical to the life of freedom (4p73s). What the virtues call for is not the same thing as what our unregulated passive emotions call for. Presence of mind in danger calls for avoiding some dangers and for confronting others in accordance with what is in our best interest regardless of the intensity of one’s fear or, alternatively, regardless of the intensity of one’s daring (4p69d). Moderation calls for regulating how much one eats and what one eats in accordance with what is in one’s best interest regardless of the intensity of one’s desire for food and regardless of one’s craving for a particular type of food. The same holds for sobriety with respect to alcohol and

7 Here I am agreement in with Justin Steinberg, “Following a Recta Ratio Vivendi: The Practical Utility of Spinoza’s Dictates of Reason,” in Essays on Spinoza’s Ethical Theory, ed. Matthew J. Kisner and Andrew Youpa (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 188).

154  The Ethics of Joy for chastity with respect to sex. Fear, on the other hand, gives rise to a desire to flee danger regardless of whether flight is in one’s best interest and the interest of others. A passive desire for food simply calls for eating regardless of whether doing so is in one’s best interest. One’s passive emotions and passive desires do not take one’s best interest into account. Spinoza’s point in the passage from 5p41s is that the average person seems to think that to be free is to be governed by whatever emotion is currently experienced as most intense (cf. 4App XXX).8 The average person is helpless in the way that a toddler is helpless. He lacks the knowledge and strength to resist passive emotions and, as a result, is unable to take care of himself. According to Spinoza, there is such a thing as true happiness, and perfecting the intellect—​learning—​is the key to it. To increase knowledge is to increase happiness (4p26, 4p27, 4p28, 4App IV). In one sense then the way to happiness is quite simple. Despite the uninviting, complex, and burdensome geometric apparatus of the Ethics, its ultimate ethical message is that learning about oneself and the world is the key to the highest happiness. In another sense, however, the way to happiness is anything but simple. We are fragile and the world is a dangerous place. When we are not preoccupied with fear of dangers (in some cases real dangers and in some cases merely imagined dangers), we are easily seduced away from doing what we know to be good for ourselves and good for others, including learning about what is good for ourselves and others. “To this we may add that when we follow our affects, we value most the pleasures of the moment, and cannot appraise future things with an equal affect of mind” (4App XXX). Passive emotions foster short-​sightedness, making it difficult to evaluate the pursuit of future goods and avoidance of future evils against present goods and evils. Passive emotions make it difficult to learn the importance of exerting the self-​discipline required to learn anything, including learning that unrestricted self-​indulgence is not the way of life that brings real happiness. Thus ignorance and passive emotions make us dangerous to ourselves. We can be, and often are, our own worst enemies (4p17s). But this too is self-​knowledge, and its importance cannot be overstated. There is empowerment in knowing that power is our essence (4p24, 4p55, 4p56d, 5p42s), and there is empowerment in knowing the limitations of our power (4p17s, 4App XXXII). From 8 In this regard not much has changed from Spinoza’s time to the present day. Consumer capitalism thrives on the belief that one’s every passive emotion is a sacred oracle that must be honored and obeyed. If Spinoza is right, the dominant way of life under consumer capitalism is a life of crippled agency and pervasive mental illness.

The Empowered Life: Tenacity  155 the knowledge that even the most empowered are subject to powerful passive emotions, it is clear that all of us have reason to be vigilant (cf. 4App XXX). We need to know our weaknesses and be vigilant not to permit our weaknesses to lead us to perform self-​destructive deeds and to become inured to a self-​destructive way of life.

3.  Weakness of Will It might seem that in regarding knowledge as the key to living well Spinoza is committed to denying that there is such a thing as the psychological phenomenon that has come to be called “weakness of will.” But this is not true. Spinoza does not deny that people can and often do suffer from the type of lapse that nowadays is referred to as weakness of will. He in fact offers an explanation of it (4p15, 4p16, 4p17, 4p17s), an explanation that makes no reference to a faculty of will because, in his view, there is no faculty of will (2p49). Because there is no faculty of will, the psychological phenomenon that is commonly called “weakness of will” is not weakness of the will. According to Spinoza, what happens when someone suffers from this type of lapse is that passive desires conflict with knowledge-​based desires, and the passive desires overpower the knowledge-​based desires, causing an individual to pursue an option that is worse than an available alternative while the individual knows that it is worse than an available alternative. So the kind of weakness involved has to do with the comparative weakness of the motivational strength of knowledge-​based desires, on the one hand, versus the motivational strength of passive desires, on the other. Passive desires can and often do have greater motivational strength than knowledge-​based desires. In remarks about his account of weakness of will Spinoza says, I do not say these things in order to infer that it is better to be ignorant than to know, or that there is no difference between the fool [stulto] and the man who understands [intelligens] when it comes to moderating the affects. My reason, rather, is that it is necessary to come to know both our nature’s power and its lack of power, so that we can determine what reason can do in moderating the affects, and what it cannot do. (4p17s)

This reveals Spinoza’s concern about an anticipated objection that the phenomenon of weakness of will raises against the centrality of knowledge in

156  The Ethics of Joy his account of living well. The objection goes roughly as follows: if an intelligent person’s knowledge does not guarantee that he will pursue the option that he knows is best among the available alternatives, an intelligent person is as much at the mercy of passive emotions and passive desires as an ignorant person. So, an intelligent person’s knowledge, the objection goes, is no better than a fool’s ignorance for the purpose of living well. In fact, knowledge makes us worse off than ignorance because, as Spinoza himself admits, an intelligent person suffers internal conflicts, “disturbances of the mind” (4p17s), between his knowledge-​based desires and passive emotions, whereas a fool’s ignorance allows him to avoid such disturbances. Therefore, for an individual’s happiness, the objection concludes, ignorance is better than intelligence. Spinoza disagrees. In his view, it is false that for happiness ignorance is superior to intelligence. He concludes, “In life, therefore, it is especially useful to perfect, as far as we can, our intellect, or reason. In this one thing consists man’s highest happiness, or blessedness” (4App IV). It is also false that an intelligent person is as much at the mercy of passive emotions and passive desires as a fool, and it is false that an intelligent person is more vulnerable to internal conflicts in comparison with a fool (4p33, 4App XXXII, 5p10s, 5p20s, 5p42s). However it is true that despite the fact that knowledge is adequate causal power, knowledge does not guarantee lasting happiness. It cannot guarantee lasting happiness because passive emotions and passive desires often have greater motivational strength than knowledge-​based desires, and for finite modes such as ourselves there is ultimately nothing we can do to makes ourselves invulnerable to overwhelmingly intense passive emotions and passive desires (4p3, 4p4, 4p4c). Indeed, there is nothing we can do to guarantee that external causal factors—​factors such as mental disease, physical disease, natural catastrophes, and human foolishness—​will not impair or destroy us. “But human power is very limited and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. So we do not have an absolute power to adapt things outside us to our use” (4App XXXII). Spinoza adds that although human power is limited, when misfortune occurs we can obtain some satisfaction from knowing that we have “done our duty” and that the “power we have could not have extended itself to the point where we could have avoided those things” and that “we are part of the whole of nature, whose order we follow” (4App XXXII). Knowledge of these things cannot prevent us from suffering misfortune, but it can help us obtain satisfaction when misfortune strikes. But just because knowledge cannot guarantee our

The Empowered Life: Tenacity  157 happiness and invulnerability, it does not follow that knowledge is not genuine happiness, regarding ourselves as modes of the attribute of thought. Nor does it follow that knowledge does not make us less vulnerable to external causal factors that can impair and destroy us (5p10s, 5p42s). Knowledge is power and happiness, but it cannot make us, finite modes of an infinite and impersonal natural world that we are, invincible. This is the reason that “it is necessary to come to know both our nature’s power and its lack of power” (4p17s). It is not enough to know our power. We also need to know its limitations. While the free human is the model of human nature and a slave is the free human’s opposite, the fundamental opposition in Spinoza’s perfectionist moral philosophy is between intelligence, on the one hand, and ignorance, on the other, with due allowance for a parallel opposition in the attribute of extension, as well as in any and all other attributes. Every human, as a finite mode, falls on a point located on a spectrum that runs from absolute knowledge at one end to absolute ignorance at the other. No finite individual can achieve absolute knowledge; for no human possesses God’s infinite intellect. Nor can anyone succumb to absolute ignorance. For no existent can fail to be a mode of God’s infinite intellect and express God’s adequate causal power to some degree. Thus every finite individual has some measure of intelligence and some measure of ignorance; some measure of freedom and some measure of enslavement; some measure of power and some measure of weakness. The goal above all is to increase intelligence (4p26, 4p27). This is what increases our power, virtue, freedom, and happiness. Ignorance, on the other hand, increases our weakness, viciousness, slavishness, and unhappiness (4p56d, 4p66s, 5p42s). Among the things that we should increase our knowledge about, the goal, above all, is to increase our knowledge of God (4p28). This does not mean that the goal is an exclusively contemplative one, however. For Spinoza, knowledge of God is not a purely theoretical endeavor. Knowledge of God is the foundation of knowledge of our essence (3p6d), and it is this self-​ knowledge that separates a free person from a fool (4p56d).9 A free person’s intelligence essentially consists in the self-​knowledge that adequate causal power is his essence. It is this knowledge that a fool lacks and that accounts for a fool’s weakness (4p56d). A free person, by contrast, has knowledge of 9 Cf. Michael LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 203‒206.

158  The Ethics of Joy human nature. He understands that he, like all existing things, is essentially a system of adequate causal power. He understands that adequate causal power is the “first and only foundation of virtue” (4p22c). Unlike a fool, a free person also understands that knowledge is adequate causal power, and that knowledge, and self-​knowledge in particular, is the foundation of all the virtues (4p56d).

Conclusion Everyone at times experiences intense passive emotions and, specifically, experiences intense types of sadness. This is unavoidable. Spinoza’s view is that we need not and should not surrender to a life of passivity and unhappiness. Although invulnerability is impossible, we can achieve a robust level of self-​determination and happiness. We can take care of ourselves and have good lives. But taking care of oneself is something to be achieved. First and foremost, it requires learning. It also requires effort and practice in the form of mental exercises (5p10s). Yet we will always be vulnerable to people and things that have the power to cause us psychological impairments. In some cases the impairments are short-​lived, such as a bout of envy regarding a colleague’s recent success. In other cases they are permanent and chronic, such as the grief from the loss of a loved one. No one is impervious to impairments, and the goal as Spinoza sees it is not to render oneself impervious. Nor is it an unqualified acceptance of whatever comes one’s way. The answer, according to Spinoza, is empowerment. What is necessary to live well is to be empowered such that we persist in taking intelligent care of ourselves despite everything that the universe throws at us (4p69, 4p69c, 5p10s). We need tenacity (animositas) to care for ourselves even in times of distress. We need it especially for such times. Spinozistic tenacity is the intelligent care of oneself through hardship, setbacks, and misfortune. It is empowered self-​love. It is empowered self-​love because, as a species of strength of character, it is both a type of intelligence and a form of strength and resilience. Spinoza’s view is that the virtue of tenacity is about intelligently moderating emotions, which involves regulating some and overcoming others as far as possible. In the case of a desire for food, for example, intelligent moderation is about regulating when, what, and how

The Empowered Life: Tenacity  159 much one eats. In the case of a desire for vengeance, intelligent moderation is about overcoming the desire by not acting on it. Intelligent moderation of passive emotions and passive desires is half of the story about what is required to have an empowered life. The other half of the story, which is the focus of the following chapter, is the virtue of nobility.

10 The Empowered Life Nobility

For my part, of all things that are not under my control, what I most value is to enter into a bond of friendship with sincere lovers of truth. For I believe that such a loving relationship affords us a serenity surpassing any other boon in the whole wide world. —​Spinoza, Letter 19

Introduction The person of Spinozistic fortitudo takes intelligent care of himself, which is to possess the virtue of tenacity (animositas), and he takes intelligent care of others, which is to possess the virtue of nobility (generositas). The person of fortitudo is a friend to himself and he is a friend to others. In the previous chapter I examined what, in Spinoza’s view, is entailed by friendship to oneself. In this chapter I examine his theory of the virtue of nobility and the central role of friendship in Spinoza’s conception of the empowered life. In section 1, I argue that nobility is a distinct type of love. It is distinct from the passion of love that is introduced in 3p13s, and it is distinct from the intellectual love of God that is introduced in 5p32c. Nobility is empowered love. Essential to empowered love is the desire to help and befriend others. In section 2, I show that helping others is about empowering others to live joyously and lovingly, and the most important way to help others live in this way is through education. Education is the most powerful aid. Moreover, education, in Spinoza’s view, is a social project, and I highlight three ways that it is social. Finally, in section 3, I show how Spinozistic friendship and the virtue of courtesy (modestia) prepare us for a life of learning. To live well is to live joyously and lovingly, and to live joyously and lovingly is first and foremost about loving oneself and loving others. This doctrine, The Ethics of Joy. Andrew Youpa, Oxford University Press (2020) © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190086022.001.0001

The Empowered Life: Nobility  161 arrived at by unaided intelligence following the geometrical method, is the principal moral teaching of the Ethics, and it is the philosophical sibling of Spinoza’s view that religious scripture’s principal moral teaching is to love one’s neighbor as oneself. As I discuss in section 2 of this chapter, Spinoza’s political philosophy dovetails with his moral philosophy. Political philosophy and moral philosophy have the same end, namely, to empower people to be free and to live in harmony with each other. It is thus fitting that a catalyst of the European Enlightenment is, above all, a philosopher of friendship.1 I can think of no better measure of a person, community, and of a nation. In his letter to Alfred Burgh Spinoza remarks that he does not “presume” to have discovered the best philosophy though he knows that he discovered the true one (Letter 76, 1675). He would not have been mistaken in presuming to have discovered the best philosophy.

1. Empowered Love Nobility, like tenacity, is a species of strength of character (fortitudo). Spinoza defines “nobility” (generositas) as the “[d]‌esire by which each one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to aid other men and join them to him in friendship [amicitiâ]” (3p59s). As in the case of tenacity, knowledge is essential to nobility since knowledge is essential to strength of character. Practical activity is also essential to nobility. It is the desire by which we strive to aid others and befriend them, and it includes deeds that “aim at another’s advantage” (3p59s). Nobility is knowledge put into action with the aim of helping and befriending others. It is the activity of helping and befriending others, an activity informed and guided by knowledge. Furthermore, nobility is identical to a type of love. Spinoza writes, He who lives according to the guidance of reason strives, as far as he can, to repay the other’s Hate, Anger, and Disdain toward him, with Love, or Nobility. (4p46)

1 Sibyl A.  Schwarzenbach suggests that no major thinker of the modern period addresses the issue of social and political unity with a theory of friendship. There are, as far as I know, very few major thinkers in the Western tradition who make love and friendship as central to their theorizing about living well and social harmony as Spinoza does. See Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, On Civic Friendship: Including Women in the State (Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. xii‒xiii, 59.

162  The Ethics of Joy Therefore, one who lives according to the guidance of reason will strive to repay the other’s Hate, etc., with Love, i.e., with Nobility (see its Def. in IIIP59S), q.e.d. (4p46d) For example, we have laid it down as a maxim of life (see IVP46 and P46S) that Hate is to be conquered by Love, or Nobility, not by repaying it with Hate in return. (5p10s)

It is important to see that the type of love that is identical to the virtue of nobility is not identical to the passion of love introduced in 3p13s.2 There are three reasons for thinking that they are not identical. First, the type of love introduced in 3p13s is defined as “Joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause.” This type of love is a species of joy, and joy makes no appearance in the definition of nobility (3p59s). This does not exclude joy as an effect of noble love, but the latter does not involve joy in its definition. Noble love is by definition a desire, not by definition a joy. Second, the 3p13s type of love has as its object an apparent external cause. Such love has the beloved as its apparent cause. In contrast, someone who is noble desires to help and befriend others “solely from the dictate of reason” (3p59s). It is from reason, and not from an externally caused species of joy, that the noble desire to help and befriend others. Third, because the 3p13s love is about its apparent external cause, someone who is subject to this type of love cannot exercise control over it in such a way that he makes it about a specific individual and not another, whereas the noble are able to exercise at least some minimal amount of control over whom serves as the object of the noble’s desire and activity. For instance, the noble can desire to come to the aid of someone who is hateful, and this is so despite the fact that a person’s hate causes hatred in the person who is the object of hate. “He who imagines he is hated by someone, and believes he has given the other no cause for hate, will hate the other in return” (3p40). Hate is an impaired psychological state that can cause hate in others. But the noble nevertheless desire to help and befriend the hateful. It is 2 Jeanette Bicknell arrives at the same conclusion I defend here: that in the Ethics what Spinoza calls nobility is a distinct type of love, a type of love that is distinct from the passion of love introduced in 3p13s, as well as distinct from the intellectual love of God introduced in 5p32c. Bicknell refers to this love as “self-​determined love” (p. 49), and she explains, “In calling this type of love self-​determined, I mean to stress that it follows from the individual’s conatus and is based on adequate ideas, and, like any of the active emotions, it is a form of pleasure” (p. 49). I agree with Bicknell’s account of this type of love and believe that the label “self-​determined love” is apt, but in keeping with the central idea of the reading I am defending in this book I have chosen the label “empowered love.” See Jeanette Bicknell, “An Overlooked Aspect of Love in Spinoza’s Ethics,” iyyun 47 (January 1998): 41‒55.

The Empowered Life: Nobility  163 therefore implausible that the love that is nobility is identical to the love that is an externally-​caused joy. Spinoza accepts that we can feel love toward someone who hates us (3p40c1). In such cases we are torn by love and hate toward the hateful. However, this frame of mind does not characterize the noble qua nobility. Nobility is the knowledge-​based and knowledge-​guided desire and activity to help others and establish a bond of friendship with others. There is nothing in Spinoza’s account of nobility to suggest that exercising the virtue of nobility is the same thing as, nor that it requires, an increase in power that has an individual(s) as its cause, the same individual(s) who is (are) the object of noble desire and activity. Therefore, when Spinoza claims at 4p46 that the individual guided by reason strives to repay others’ hate with nobility-​or-​love, he is not claiming that the repayment is with a love that has the hateful individual as the cause of love. Rather, he is claiming that an individual guided by reason repays others’ hate by coming to their aid and attempting to establish a bond of friendship with the other person(s). Nobility does not exclude externally caused joy as an indirect consequence. In fact, Spinoza is committed to the view that, when the noble seek to aid others and establish a bond of friendship with them, the noble come to have externally caused joy for those who are hateful as their hate ebbs and gives way to love. But noble love is not identical to this externally caused joy. In 4p46 Spinoza thus introduces a notion of love distinct from the notion introduced in 3p13s. In contrast with the latter, noble love desires and engages in activities aimed at another’s good, but it does not have the other whose good one aims at as the cause of the desire and activities. It is a desire that arises from reason. As such, it cannot be excessive (4p61). The fact that noble love is about helping, befriending, and contributing to another’s good is, it seems, the reason that it merits the name “love.” That it is identical to nobility makes it a virtue and a species of strength of character. Like all virtues, it is a type of intelligence. Nobility is virtuous love or, equivalently, empowered love.

2. Empowering Others Nobility is about helping others. What in Spinoza’s view does it mean to help others? Fundamentally the same things and the same way of life are good for everyone alike (4p45c2s). The types of factors that make Peter’s way of life

164  The Ethics of Joy good for Peter are the same types that make Paul’s way of life good for Paul. Likewise, the factors that make Peter’s way of life bad for Peter are the same types that make Paul’s way of life bad for Paul. Just as melancholy and hatred are impairments in Peter, they are also impairments in Paul. What makes something a mental disease is not relative to each individual. Greed, for example, is a mental disease when Peter suffers from it, and it is a mental disease when Paul suffers from it. Because such impairments, like all emotions, are contagious, they pose a danger to those who currently do not suffer from them (4App XIII; cf. 3p27). Just as power impairments are not relative to each individual, power enhancements are not relative either. Knowledge, for instance, is empowering for everyone. The supreme good—​knowledge of God—​is the supreme good for all human beings alike. It is not the case that Peter has a supreme good for him that differs from Paul’s supreme good, and it is not the case that each of their supreme goods differ from each other’s, as well as differ from a third individual’s and a fourth’s and a fifth’s. All humans have the same fundamental nature. There is therefore a single supreme good. Just as an empowered life is best for Peter, so it is for Paul. None of this is to suggest that there is not an endless variety of empowered ways of life. Peter may prefer to refresh and restore himself with gardening and the theater while Paul prefers music and sports. Peter may enjoy sleeping until noon, whereas Paul enjoys waking before sunrise. From the standpoint of how best to live, there is nothing objectionable about the fact that Peter loves Italian cuisine and Paul prefers Mexican cuisine. It is unnecessary to pile up examples of this sort to illustrate the pluralism that Spinoza’s moral philosophy is compatible with. There are a countless number of activities and ways of life that do not involve injury to the agent and do not involve injury to others, all of which and any combination of which are compatible with living well. Even the supreme good, as Spinoza understands it, is in an important sense pluralistic because all knowledge is knowledge of God (5p24). To study any facet of the natural world, including human nature, is to study God. There are thus infinitely many routes to knowledge of God-​or-​Nature. Spinoza is neither a pluralist about conceptions of empowerment and disempowerment nor a pluralist about the conception of the supreme good. Nevertheless, Spinoza’s moral philosophy accommodates as much pluralism as there are ways of living joyously and lovingly. To help others is to contribute to the removal of obstacles that prevent people from living joyously and lovingly, and it is also to contribute directly

The Empowered Life: Nobility  165 to empowering others to live joyously and lovingly. “The good which everyone who seeks virtue wants for himself, he also desires for other men; and this Desire is greater as his knowledge of God is greater” (4p37; 4p51ad). Because the factors that make Peter’s way of life good for Peter are the same types of factors that make Paul’s way of life good for Paul, insofar as Peter seeks the empowerment that is virtue he wants Paul to enjoy the same power-​enhancing things that make his own life good. Because learning is the greatest power enhancement and thus the greatest joy, helping others first and foremost is about helping others learn and about removing obstacles to learning. What helps others is that which contributes to the improvement of their thinking; what hinders others is that which worsens their thinking or prevents them from improving their thinking.3 This is a way of saying that the most important way to help others is by education and by removing obstacles to education. Spinoza writes, “Again, because, among singular things, we know nothing more excellent than a man who is guided by reason, we can show best how much our skill and understanding are worth by educating men so that at last they live according to the command of their own reason” (4App IX). Education empowers the student. It also empowers the educator. Learning, in Spinoza’s view, is a social process (4p35c1, 4p35c2s, 4p37s1, 4p71d).4 It is social in three ways. First, even the most knowledgeable know no more than a fraction of the infinite extent of what there is to know. The amount of knowledge that any individual is capable of acquiring is therefore a matter of degree and inevitably incomplete. This is a corollary of the view that an individual’s freedom is a matter of degree and inevitably incomplete. Every individual’s education is a work in progress, from the most ignorant to the most learned. So the greater the number of knowledgeable people there are, the greater the number of educators there are, that is, the greater the number of people who can contribute to the perfection of people’s intellects.5

3 No doubt there is also a good of the body. What helps others is what contributes to the functioning of their bodies and what hinders others is what impairs the functioning of their bodies (4App XXX). For a discussion of Spinoza’s account of the good of the body, see Susan James, “Spinoza, the Body, and the Good Life,” in Essays on Spinoza’s Ethical Theory, ed. Matthew J. Kisner and Andrew Youpa (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 143‒159. 4 Here I follow John Carriero, “The Ethics in Spinoza’s Ethics,” in Essays in Spinoza’s Ethical Theory, ed. Matthew J. Kisner and Andrew Youpa (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 37. 5 Spinoza writes, “Moreover, if we consider our Mind, our intellect would of course be more imperfect if the Mind were alone and did not understand anything except itself ” (4p18s; cf. 4p35c1, 4p35c2s, 4p73).

166  The Ethics of Joy Everyone needs help from others in the project of improving his thinking. Improvement cannot happen in isolation from a community of learners, a community of people who value knowledge and prioritize learning. It requires a truly philosophical community. As the formerly ignorant and superstitious acquire knowledge and come to live according to the command of their own reason they, in turn, contribute to others’ education, including those who originally helped them learn to value knowledge and prioritize learning. A second way learning is social has to do with Spinoza’s view that emotions are contagious (3p27). Hate, for example, is an obstacle to learning (4p73s). Love, on the other hand, can facilitate learning (4App XXV). Because emotions are contagious, learning disorders are contagious. Learning virtues are contagious, too. Peter’s progress in improving his thinking will, all things equal, be more difficult in a community with a greater number and greater intensity of debilitating emotions than in a community with fewer and less intense debilitating emotions. This is because Peter will contend with more learning disorders and thus more setbacks in the former than in the latter community. A few of the most prevalent learning disorders are fear, hate, anger, melancholy, gluttony, ambition, greed, envy, and pride. Each of these is an impairment of power and is, as a result, incompatible with an empowered way of life. They are incompatible with a life of learning. One way to help others is by helping them overcome these obstacles. “For one who desires to aid others by advice or by action, so that they may enjoy the highest good together, will aim chiefly at arousing their Love for him, but not at leading them into admiration so that his teaching will be called after his name. Nor will he give any cause for Envy” (4App XXV). Superstition is also an obstacle to learning. Thus a way to help others is to expose superstition for the garbage that it is. The Appendix to Part 1 of the Ethics is a model of exposing superstition for the garbage that it is. Among the falsehoods that popular superstitions perpetuate is the falsehood that the “good is what brings Sadness, and the evil, what brings Joy” (4App XXXI). With respect to religious misconceptions of how best to live, Susan James writes, A related misconception about the best way to live flows from a failure to appreciate that sadness and its concomitant disempowerment cannot qualify as good. When, for example, Catholic or Protestant churches advocate bodily mortification or persistent fear, they reveal a profoundly

The Empowered Life: Nobility  167 inadequate understanding of human nature and encourage a way of life that is at odds with laws to which human beings conform. Individuals who believe that a virtuous life should be infused with the shadow of physical pain take themselves to understand what is best for them, but are in truth in the grip of a mutilated, imaginative idea of the good.6

Religions are a common source of erroneous and disempowering accounts of the best way of life. Disabusing people of such views helps prepare them for learning that “no deity, nor anyone else, unless he is envious, takes pleasure in my lack of power and my misfortune; nor does he ascribe to virtue our tears, sighs, fear, and other things of that kind, which are signs of a weak mind. On the contrary, the greater the Joy with which we are affected, the greater the perfection to which we pass, i.e., the more we must participate in the divine nature” (4p45c2s; cf. 4App XXXI). To increase joy is to increase power, and to increase power is to increase perfection. Therefore to increase joy is to increase perfection (DA II). To live virtuously is to live joyously, and vice versa. Contrary to gloomy superstition, gloominess, like sadness and its variants generally, is a mental impairment and, when excessive, a mental disease. A  sound mind is a joyful mind. Helping people therefore includes helping others find enjoyment in activities and things that cause no injury to themselves and no injury to others (4p45c2s). There are many ways of refreshing and restoring ourselves that neither causes injury to oneself nor to others, and there is no shortage of activities that clearly do cause injury to oneself and to others. There is also no shortage of people who need to learn the difference between these and learn how to steadfastly enjoy the former while steadfastly avoiding the latter. Superstition feeds on fear (TTP, p. 67). Thus helping others overcome or resist their fears is an important way to help others become less susceptible to superstition and prepare them for acquiring knowledge. Regarding someone who aids others Spinoza writes, “Again, in common conversations he will beware of relating men’s vices, and will take care to speak only sparingly of a man’s lack of power, but generously of the man’s virtue, or power, and how it can be perfected, so that men, moved not by Fear or aversion, but only by an affect of Joy, may strive to live as far as they can according to the rule of reason” (4App XXV; cf. 4App XIII). The best approach is to inspire others 6 James, “Spinoza, the Body, and the Good Life,” p. 149.

168  The Ethics of Joy with joy by speaking to them about human empowerment and what people are capable of achieving. It is best to highlight examples of human goodness and to lead “others by the free judgment of reason” (4p70). Superstition, on the other hand, exploits human weakness and failure. It seeks to manipulate people by exacerbating their fears and suppressing the free judgment of reason. “The superstitious know how to reproach people for their vices better than they know how to teach them virtues, and they strive, not to guide men by reason, but to restrain them by Fear, so that they flee the evil rather than love virtues. Such people aim only to make others as wretched as they themselves are, so it is no wonder that they are generally burdensome and hateful to men” (4p63s; 4App XIII). People who use fear to influence others are ignorant or weak or both. They may be ignorant of human nature and ignorant of what is best for human nature. Alternatively, they may have knowledge of human nature but their minds are too weak to resist the influence of the passive emotions that lead them to do what they know they should not do. Regardless of whether it is through ignorance or weakness or both, to influence others by inspiring and exacerbating fear is to spread disempowerment and misery. Coming to others’ aid includes ensuring that others have knowledge of nutrition and access to nutritious foods. Spinoza believes that a diet consisting of a wide variety of foods is best (4App XXVII, 4App XXX). To live joyously and lovingly we need to feed and maintain our bodies properly. Empowering the body is as important as empowering the mind, although Spinoza mainly focuses (and I have followed accordingly) on the mind’s empowerment. The body is an equal partner with the mind in the best way of life (4p38, 4p39, 4App XXVII, 4App XXX). A third way learning is social has to do with our social milieu and the political organization of society. A population can be more or less supportive or opposed to education and the empowered way of life. Government officials and the political order can also be more or can be less supportive of or opposed to education and the empowered way of life. An in-​depth discussion of the foundational principles of a political order supportive of education and empowerment belongs to an exposition of Spinoza’s political writings, which is beyond the scope of the present work. Nonetheless, it is important to see that Spinoza’s political views are continuous with his ethical views in that empowerment is the overarching aim and concern of both. While the Ethics is about the way of life that most effectively empowers people, the Theological-​ Political Treatise and the Political Treatise are about the political order that

The Empowered Life: Nobility  169 most effectively empowers people.7 To be empowered is to be free. It can therefore be said that freedom is the thread that ties Spinoza’s ethical views to his political views. In the TTP he writes, “The end of the Republic, I say, is not to change men from rational beings into beasts or automata, but to enable their minds and bodies to perform their functions safely, to enable them to use their reason freely, and not to clash with one another in hatred, anger or deception, or deal inequitably with one another. So the end of the Republic is really freedom” (TTP, p. 346). The ultimate purpose of the republic is the same as the ultimate purpose of moral philosophy: to empower people to be free.8 There are ways of life that are empowering and there are ways of life that are disempowering. Likewise, there are systems of political organization that are empowering and there are systems that are disempowering. In the Ethics Spinoza argues that tenacity and nobility are essential elements of an empowered way of life. In the TTP he argues that the freedom to philosophize and the freedom to communicate with others are essential elements of a political system that empowers people. In reality there is not a sharp divide between existing political systems that are disempowering, on the one hand, and existing systems that are empowering, on the other. Like his naturalistic views on disempowerment and empowerment with respect to individuals, disempowerment and empowerment with respect to existing political systems is a matter of degree. Empowerment is never perfect and complete, and there can be a degree of empowerment in a severely disempowering political system. Also, what is an empowering system during one period of its history can become disempowering at a later time, as Spinoza well knew. Regardless of the extent to which one’s political system is disempowering or empowering, one can contribute to mitigating socially and politically disempowering influences and can contribute to the promotion of empowering social and political conditions. In this regard the single most important thing an individual can do for himself and for others is to join with others in friendship. Friendship, in Spinoza’s view, is a type of social activism. It is political activism also. It is political activism because it is social activism. “Minds, however, are conquered not by arms, but by Love and Nobility” 7 Susan James, Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics:  The Theological-​Political Treatise (Oxford University Press, 2012), ch. 1. 8 I am in agreement with Matthew Kisner on this point. See his discussion in Matthew Kisner, Spinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy, and the Good Life (Cambridge University Press, 2011), ch. 11.

170  The Ethics of Joy (4App XI; 4p46s). Disempowering political systems thrive on fear, ignorance, and hatred. A disempowering political system’s main interest is to “keep men deceived, and to cloak in the specious name of Religion the fear by which they must be checked, so that they will fight for slavery as they would for their survival, and will think it not shameful, but a most honorable achievement, to give their life and blood that one man may have a ground for boasting” (TTP, p. 69). A disempowering system seeks to keep its people in ignorance and maintain order by means of fear. Although very few individuals are ever in a position to contribute to the improvement of a political system at the level of the structure of leadership and the rights of the people, every individual is in a position to contribute to the improvement of a political system by bringing “people together in love” (4App XV). Nobility and love conquer minds. They do so by destroying ignorance and fear, two things that disempowering political systems rely on to preserve their governing power.

3.  Modestia Nobility is about helping others and, according to Spinoza, education is the best way to help. It is best because perfecting the intellect as far as possible is the key to happiness. Yet, to be prepared for education we need to be receptive to knowledge. This requires overcoming learning disorders, such as hate, anger, envy, pride, and so on. Thus contributing to others’ empowerment begins with friendship. In the absence of friendship, education is nothing more than an attempt to win followers (4p37s1, 4p58s, 4App XXV, 5p4s). The difference between the desire to help others and the desire to win followers boils down to the difference between the virtue of courtesy (modestia), which is a species of nobility, and the vice of ambition (ambitio). Courtesy is the desire “to please men which is determined by reason” and “is related to Morality [Pietatem]” (4App XXV), and morality is the desire “to do good generated in us by our living according to the guidance of reason” (4p37s1). It is noteworthy that courtesy (modestia) is equated with the virtue of human kindness (humanitas) (DA XLIV). Its relation to morality (pietas) and its equivalence to kindness (humanitas) make clear that courtesy is more than a desire to please others. It is a desire to please others in a way that is not self-​aggrandizing. While the English “courtesy” comes close to capturing this aspect of Spinoza’s modestia, it does not quite do the notion full justice. The individual of modestia aims to arouse others’ love “but

The Empowered Life: Nobility  171 not at leading them into admiration so that his teaching will be called after his name. Nor will he give any cause for Envy” (4App XXV). Modestia is the desire to inspire love in others, and this desire comes without any mixture of the desire for fawning acolytes nor the desire for envious admirers. As a species of nobility, it is a desire informed by knowledge of what is truly good for human beings.9 Moreover, like nobility, it is a type of love. For Spinoza, modestia is humble devotion to others with their true well-​being in mind. By “humble devotion” I mean non–​self-​aggrandizing concern for and treatment of others. Someone who possesses the virtue of modestia cares about and for others without seeking to use others as a means to inflating his importance in his own and others’ eyes. The virtue of modestia is, I believe, the core of Spinozistic friendship. In contrast, ambition is an “excessive desire for esteem [gloriae]” (DA XLIV). Ambition in Spinoza’s view does not differ much from pride (5p4cs). The latter is a joy “born of the fact that a man thinks more highly of himself than is just” (3p26s, emphasis in original). Pride is an exaggerated view of one’s own importance and, like ambition, is a type of mental illness (3p26s; cf. 4p44s). What unites ambition with pride, apart from being types of mental illness, is the desire for followers. “The proud man loves the presence of parasites, or flatterers, but hates the presence of the noble” (4p57, emphasis in original). Someone who believes that he himself is more important than others wants to be surrounded by people who share the fantasy that he is more important than others. Similarly, someone who is ambitious seeks to inflate his importance and to do so in such a way that is “encouraged only by the opinion of the multitude” (4p58s). Like the proud, someone who is ambitious seeks to use others as a means to inflating his importance in his own and others’ eyes. In fact, the ambitious, like the proud, seek self-​importance in their own and others’ eyes as the highest good. This is the basis for Spinoza’s claim that, in contrast with modestia, ambition is a desire “by which men generally arouse discord and seditions, from a false appearance of morality” (4App XXV). Whereas modestia creates friendship and harmony, ambitio creates discord and disorder. Someone who is humbly devoted to others seeks to inspire 9 Regarding Spinoza’s notion of modestia, Kisner writes, “According to this reading, modestia is best understood as a desire to please others only in ways that truly benefit them” (Spinoza on Human Freedom, p. 209). Kisner also notes that modestia importantly differs from ambition in that the person of modestia recognizes that “the good of others consists in their rationality and, thus, freedom, which inclines us to promote and respect the freedom of others, thereby opposing the dominating tendencies of ambition” (p. 209). This aspect of modestia I describe as non–​self-​aggrandizing concern for and treatment of others.

172  The Ethics of Joy love in others and seeks to enjoy with others the love of learning, whereas someone who is ambitious seeks to persuade others that he is more important than others. The goal to have others accept that you are more important than them naturally leads to discord because acceptance of this view conflicts with the view that others often have of themselves on the basis of their own ambition. Equally naturally, empowering others through education cannot succeed unless the educator is dedicated to others’ happiness, and not to self-​aggrandizement. As discussed earlier, empowering oneself also requires assistance in the form of education and emotional support from others. No human can come to know more than a small fraction of what there is to know, and we will be more steadfast in our pursuit of knowledge as more people come to love learning. Friendship is therefore necessary for self-​empowerment, as well as the empowerment of others. At this point it might be thought that I  am overstating the importance of friendship in Spinoza’s moral philosophy. In Anglophone scholarship Spinoza’s view of friendship has not received much attention, and one might think that this is because it is peripheral to the moral philosophy presented in the Ethics. But it is, I believe, difficult to overstate the importance of friendship in Spinoza’s thinking about how we should live. He defines “living honorably” (honestatem) in terms of the desire to join others in friendship (4p37s1). “Dishonorable” (turpe) is defined in terms of that which conflicts with the formation of friendship (4p37s1). Thus an upright life is governed by the desire to build and strengthen friendships. A disgraceful life destroys friendships. Further, he writes, “Whatever we want because we have been affected with hate is dishonorable [turpe]; and [if we live] in a State, it is unjust [injustum]. This too is evident from IIIP39, and from the Definitions of dishonorable [turpis] and unjust [injusti] (see P37S)” (4p45c2). This has three important implications. First, 4p37s is cited in support of the claim in this corollary about the dishonorable and unjust, which strongly supports that behavior motivated by hate is at least a subset of that which conflicts with the formation of friendship. To be dishonorable is to destroy bonds of friendship or, equivalently, to be hateful. Second, from the clause “and [if we live] in a State” the implication is that the notion of living dishonorably can apply to an individual when not living in a state. It can apply, in other words, to human life in the state of nature. There is therefore a moral standard independent of a common agreement. It is a standard for evaluating the goodness and badness of an individual, and it does not rest on a common agreement

The Empowered Life: Nobility  173 or social contract, thus corroborating the moral realist reading that I defend in ­chapter 3. Third, 4p45c2 reveals that to be unjust is to undermine bonds of friendship with one’s fellow citizens. In the state of nature undermining bonds of friendship is dishonorable. In a civil state it is unjust. While 4p37s1 and 4p45c2 make clear the centrality of friendship to Spinoza’s moral philosophy, the implications of 4p45c2 naturally raise questions about the views presented in 4p37s2 about the state of nature and the civil state. Specifically, they raise questions about the meaning of the conclusions of the following two passages: From this we easily understand that there is nothing in the state of nature which, by the agreement of all, is good or evil; for everyone who is in the state of nature considers only his own advantage, and decides what is good and what is evil from his own temperament, and only insofar as he takes account of his own advantage. (4p37s2, emphasis added) Again, in the state of nature there is no one who by common consent is Master of anything, nor is there anything in Nature which can be said to be this man’s and not that man’s. Instead, all things belong to all. So in the state of nature, there cannot be conceived any will to give to each his own, or to take away from someone what is his. I.e., in the state of nature nothing is done which can be called just or unjust. But in the civil state, of course, where it is decided by common consent what belongs to this man, and what to that [, things are done which can be called just or unjust]. From this it is clear that just and unjust, sin and merit, are extrinsic notions, not attributes that explain the nature of the Mind. But enough of this. (4p37s2, emphasis added)

In the first passage Spinoza seems to say that there is nothing in the state of nature that is good or evil. In the second he seems to conclude that there is no standard of justice and injustice independent of a common agreement. But Spinoza is not saying either one of these things. Regarding his point about the absence of good and evil in the state of nature, his claim includes the qualification “which, by the agreement of all, is good or evil.” He is not claiming that there is nothing good or evil in the state of nature. Rather, his claim is that in the state of nature there is no standard of good or evil that everyone agrees on. This is not identical to the claim that there is no such thing as good or evil in the state of nature. Spinoza’s claim is also a quite tame doctrine by

174  The Ethics of Joy comparison. The view that in the state of nature there is no common agreement on a standard of good or evil is compatible with the view that in the state of nature there is good and evil. According to the moral realist reading that I defend in ­chapter 3, Spinoza accepts that in the state of nature there is good and evil. In the state of nature there are people who live honorably and there are also people who live dishonorably; in the state of nature there are people who are guided by the desire to join others in friendship, and there are also people who are guided by hatred. In the state of nature, as is in the civil state, the former are good and the latter are bad. Now, what about his claim that in the state of nature nothing can be done that is just or unjust and his claim that justice and injustice are “extrinsic notions”? It is important to be clear about the source of puzzlement here. In 4p45c2 Spinoza basically says that whatever we desire on the basis of hatred is dishonorable when we are in the state of nature and it is unjust when we are in a civil state. This view of hatred does not, it seems, rest on a common agreement. In 4p45c2 Spinoza does not appeal to his society’s nor any other society’s common agreement about the notions of dishonor and unjust. Rather, he appeals to 3p39 and the definitions of “dishonorable” and “unjust” in 4p37s. Desires that issue from hatred are dishonorable when we are in the state of nature and they can be said to be unjust when we are in a civil state, regardless of what people may think and say about dishonor and injustice. On the other hand, he claims that in the state of nature there is no justice and injustice and he claims that the notions of justice and injustice are extrinsic, that is, they are not “attributes that explain the nature of the Mind” (4p37s2). Spinoza’s point, it seems, is that the notions of justice and injustice rest on a common agreement and are therefore artificial. They do not pick out natural properties of human nature. Thus Spinoza appears to hold that injustice does and does not depend on a common agreement. This apparent inconsistency is, I believe, merely apparent. It arises from the fact that Spinoza equivocates on the notion of injustice or, less uncharitably, it arises from the fact that he does not adequately signal to the reader that he discusses two types of injustice. One type is natural. It does not rest on a common agreement. The other is artificial and depends on a common agreement. According to Spinoza, in a civil state whatever someone desires out of hatred is unjust. This is true, in Spinoza’s view, regardless of whether there is a common agreement about it (4p37s1, 4p40, 4p45, 4p45c1). To be unjust in this sense of “unjust” is to be anti-​friendship or, equivalently, antisocial. I will refer to this as “anti-​friendship injustice.”

The Empowered Life: Nobility  175 In contrast with anti-​friendship injustice, he also discusses justice and injustice in relation to property norms. According to Spinoza, in the state of nature nothing “can be said to be this man’s and not that man’s” (4p37s2). In the state of nature everything belongs to everyone: “all things belong to all” (4p37s2). Because in the state of nature everything belongs to everyone, there is no basis for maintaining that something belongs to Peter that does not at the same time belong to Paul. In the state of nature whatever belongs to Peter also belongs to Paul. From this Spinoza draws the conclusion that in the state of nature “there cannot be conceived any will to give to each his own, or to take away from someone what is his” (4p37s2). There cannot be conceived any will to give to each his own because in the state of nature no one has an exclusive right to anything. In the state of nature Peter does not even have an exclusive right to Peter’s “own” body. Where no one has an exclusive right to anything, nothing can be done that is just or unjust. Nothing can be done that is just where “just” means to give to each his own, and nothing can be done that is unjust where “unjust” means to deprive someone of what is his own. This is because in the state of nature there is no such thing as one’s own. Property norms are artificial. A society’s property norms rest on a common agreement that a particular society reaches about such norms. Where there is no common agreement about such norms, such as in the state of nature, there is no justice and injustice with respect to property. Still, in a civil state to be motivated by hatred is to be unjust. To be anti-​ friendship is unjust in a civil state regardless of whether a civil state has reached a common agreement about whether being an enemy of friendship is a form of injustice. This norm is natural and universal, unlike property norms.10 Does Spinoza hold the correlative view that being pro-​friendship is a type of justice? I believe that Spinoza is committed to the view that in a civil state to be pro-​friendship—​that is, to be noble—​is to be just, but I am not aware 10 If I  understand his view correctly, David Bidney defends a reading similar to the one I  am defending here. Bidney notes that, for Spinoza, in one sense “justice is primarily an economic notion dependent upon the possession of private property and is not therefore to be considered as an inherent quality of reason and order, as Plato taught” (p. 328). Bidney also notes that in another sense justice “is in accord with the dictates of reason which teach us that ‘the highest good [summum bonum] of those who follow after virtue is common to all’ (4–​36). That is to say, justice is based on the realization of the essential community of human interests (4–​36 schol.) and not at all on the exclusive possession of property” (p. 330, emphasis in the original). I agree that Spinoza employs two notions of justice and that one is an economic notion and the other is a community-​of-​interests, or friendship, notion. I also agree that in Spinoza’s view the former varies according to social convention whereas the latter does not. See David Bidney, The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza: A Study in the History and Logic of Ideas (Yale University Press, 1940), pp. 327‒330.

176  The Ethics of Joy of any place in his writings where he makes this specific claim.11 Clearly he holds that being guided by the desire to join others in friendship is the essence of living honorably (4p37s1). This is true independent of a common agreement that people have or have not made regarding what it means to be honorable. It is therefore true in the state of nature, and it also holds true in a civil state, although in a civil state desiring to join others in friendship can be said to be just. Presumably the difference is that in a civil state, unlike the state of nature, the desire to join others in friendship calls for abiding by a civil state’s particular set of property norms and other norms that hold by common agreement. This is presumably also the basis for Spinoza’s view that being anti-​friendship is dishonorable in a state of nature while it is unjust in a civil state. There are norms that obtain in a civil state that do not obtain in the state of nature. These additional norms (e.g., norms of property, norms of etiquette, norms of family relationships, etc.) constitute a civil state, and they are what make being anti-​friendship unjust, in contrast with being dishonorable; they are also what make being pro-​friendship just, in contrast with being honorable. Unfortunately Spinoza does not strictly adhere to these terminological distinctions. When discussing issues related to the desire to joins with others in friendship, he typically opts for the language of honor and dishonor regardless of whether the context suggests that the notions of just and unjust are appropriate. The following passage is a case in point: The things that beget harmony are those which are related to justice [justitiam], fairness [aequitatem], and being honorable [honestatem]. For men find it difficult to bear, not only what is unjust [injustum] and unfair [iniquum], but also what is thought dishonorable [turpe], or that someone rejects the accepted practices of the state. But especially necessary to bring people together in love, are the things which concern Religion and Morality. (4App XV)

11 This agrees with Wolfson’s reading that friendship in Spinoza’s view is the foundation of the state: “Finally, the principle advanced by Spinoza that likeness of kind is the basis of social coherence reflects Aristotle’s discussion as to the nature of friendship whether it is based on likeness or on unlikeness, and his conclusion that the perfect form of friendship is that which is based upon a likeness in virtue, and which exists between good men. Such a kind of friendship, as we have seen, is called by Spinoza a friendship (amicitia, Aristotle’s ϕιλία) based on honor (honestas, Aristotle’s τò καλόν), which he considers the foundation of the state (civitas, Aristotle’s πόλις)” (Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processses of His Reasoning, vol. II [Harvard University Press, 1962 (1934)], p. 246).

The Empowered Life: Nobility  177 In the second line of this passage he contrasts what is unjust and unfair, on the one hand, with what is thought dishonorable (turpe), on the other. But the context suggests that the relevant contrast is between what is unjust and unfair versus what is thought unjust and unfair. This contrast is especially appropriate since he expands on his point by adding the clause “or that someone rejects the accepted practices of the state.” Someone who rejects the accepted practices of the state is, according to 4p45c2, unjust. Nevertheless, the fact that Spinoza shifts from speaking of being unjust and unfair to speaking of being dishonorable supports that he does not recognize a substantive difference between these notions, which supports the reading I am defending. To be unjust in one important sense of the word “unjust” and to be dishonorable amount to the same thing, namely, being an enemy of friendship. Although the desire to join others in friendship is central to his theory of how to live well, Spinoza also warns about the potential dangers of friendship. We should seek to join others in friendship (4App XII), but we should do so cautiously (4App XIII). A danger inherent to building friendships is the danger of being exposed to and infected with others’ emotional disorders. We are fragile and the world is a dangerous place. Among the most imminent of the many dangers that we face is the danger of contracting other people’s mental diseases. We are especially vulnerable to others’ emotions. No doubt this is a positive vulnerability when the person with whom we are building a friendship is filled with joy and love. In such a case our friend’s joy and love empowers us, as real friends do. However, generally people do not live joyously and lovingly. “For men vary—​there being few who live according to the rule of reason—​and yet generally they are envious [invidi], and more inclined to vengeance [vindictam] than to Compassion [Misericordiam]. So it requires a singular power of mind to bear with each one according to his understanding, and to restrain oneself from imitating their affects” (4App XIII). Vengeance is a desire that stems from hate (4p45c1), and Spinoza believes that people generally are envious and hateful. “It is clear, therefore, that men are naturally inclined to Hate [Odium] and Envy [Invidiam]” (3p55c1s). Seeking to join others in friendship comes with a risk. If the person or persons with whom we seek friendship are, like people generally, envious and hateful, we expose ourselves to the danger of becoming envious and hateful. What we risk, then, is true happiness. This is the reason Spinoza says that skill [ars] and alertness [vigilantia] are required for forming associations and building friendships (4App XIII). It takes skill and alertness to prevent our desire for friendship from turning us into someone who spends his life sick

178  The Ethics of Joy with envy and hate. We need skill and alertness to avoid ruining our lives in disempowering relationships. The risk of ruin does not mean that we should avoid friendship. Nor does it mean that we should avoid friendships with envious and hateful people. Despite the fact that people generally suffer from mentally illness, there are greater risks on the side of avoiding friendship (4p35c2s, 4p70s, 4p73, 4App XIV). Although our ruin can be brought about by other people’s wretchedness, our happiness is intertwined with the happiness of others. Solitude is not a viable path to happiness. In fact, in solitude failure is assured. “So it is better to bear men’s wrongs calmly, and apply one’s zeal to those things that help to bring men together in harmony and friendship” (4App XIV). The best way of life is to seek friendship with others, and to do so carefully and intelligently, taking care not to allow envy, hatred, and other mental diseases to infect one’s thinking.

Conclusion According to Spinoza, there are two cardinal virtues: tenacity and nobility. Whereas tenacity is the virtue of empowered self-​love, nobility is the virtue of empowered love. Spinoza’s moral philosophy does not give primacy to one of these virtues over the other. They are on an equal footing and are equally important in living well. To obtain happiness it is as important that we are friends to ourselves as that we are friends to others. What it means to be a friend to others does not significantly differ from what it means to be a friend to oneself. All humans have the same fundamental nature. So the ways in which we empower ourselves are ways to empower others. Moreover, insofar as we empower ourselves, we will seek to empower others. Empowering others begins with love, the type of love that Spinoza refers to as the virtue of modestia: humble devotion to others with their true well-​being in mind. It begins with devotion to their true well-​being because such devotion helps prepare people for a life of learning, and it does so by inspiring love in them. Love in turn remedies learning disorders such as hate, envy, and pride. Ultimately the most important way to help others is to contribute to the improvement of their thinking and to the functioning of their bodies. Spinoza focuses on the improvement of thinking, but not because bodily functioning is less important than mental functioning. Both are essential to living well. With respect to the mind’s functioning, education is the most

The Empowered Life: Nobility  179 important assistance we can provide others, apart from inspiring love in them. Although people are naturally inclined to hatred and envy, love and education help us overcome the wretchedness that we are naturally inclined toward. Love and education empower people to live joyously and lovingly. They empower us to live in friendship.

Conclusion Ethics and the Project of Empowerment

Everyone is free to define “ethics” (“morality”) as he pleases. Throughout history ethics (morality), like philosophy, has been conceived in a variety of ways. According to one conception, ethics is about moral obligation, moral responsibility, and moral oughts. In the introduction I refer to this way of conceiving ethics as the accountability project.1 Spinoza’s moral philosophy does not belong to the accountability tradition. His moral philosophy is about living well in this life, and not about one’s status in a system of moral credit and moral debt. There are ways we should care for ourselves and ways we should care for others. There is nothing in Spinoza’s moral philosophy to suggest that we must make ourselves worthy or deserving of care. Nor does it suggest that we should make ourselves worthy or deserving of praise and rewards—​praise and rewards that would serve as compensation for our hardships, suffering, and bad luck. There is no compensation for a life of sadness, hatred, and disempowerment. Spinoza does not ascribe a compensatory value to a person. A life marred with sadness and hatred is a life marred with sadness and hatred. It is as unfortunate as it is commonplace. There is no compensation for such a life. There are mentally and physically empowered people and empowered ways of life, and there are mentally and physically disempowered people and disempowered ways of life. There are ways of empowering ourselves and empowering others such that we contribute to making ourselves and others more joyous and loving and less vulnerable to sadness, hatred, and misfortune. Empowerment is not

1 The two conceptions of ethics I discuss here and in the introduction should not be confused with G. E. M. Anscombe’s distinction between a law conception of ethics and Aristotelian virtue ethics; see G. E.  M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33, no. 124 (January 1958): 5. Anscombe’s is, I believe, a distinction within what I am calling the accountability project; it differentiates two versions of the accountability project. What I am calling an ethics of accountability is basically what Bernard Williams refers to as the “morality system” (Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [Harvard University Press, 1985], p. 174). The Ethics of Joy. Andrew Youpa, Oxford University Press (2020) © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190086022.001.0001

Conclusion  181 invincibility. But it is not a pious illusion, either. Education and proper nutrition are sources of empowerment. Joy and love are healthy psychological conditions. What is important is empowerment in this lifetime.2 There are no scores and there is no scorekeeper. There is no alternative social status masquerading as moral worth. Either one is well and lives well or one is unwell and lives unwell. If we do not take care of ourselves and others, no one cares. The universe is perfectly indifferent to our happiness and unhappiness. The model of human nature is the free person. Not the dutiful person. Not the pious person. Not the morally good person. Not the utility maximizer. It is not that the free person is not dutiful (4p72, 4p72d), and it is not that the free person is not pious (4p37s1). It is not even that the free person is not in an important sense a source of utility (4p35c1, 4p35c2, 4p71d). But it is not these things that Spinoza singles out as the primary characteristic of the model of human nature. The model is an exemplar of freedom, and the person is free because he is empowered, and he is empowered because he lives intelligently. The foundation of Spinoza’s model of human nature, as is the foundation of his first-​order views about living joyously and lovingly, is our actual essence. Our actual essence is an ethically loaded conception of the self. It is not an amoral and pre-​ethical conception of the self. Spinoza does not try to show that a life of tenacity and nobility follows from and serves an amoral self and its pre-​ethical desires. A life of tenacity and nobility serves the self because the self is, at its core, a finite system of adequate causal power. It is the power to act. Spinoza starts from an ethically loaded conception of the self and arrives at the way of life that best serves such a self. This is not egoism in a non-​normative and degenerate sense of “egoism.” It is not degenerate egoism because the Spinozistic ego is not a degenerate. Spinoza’s moral philosophy can be said to be egoistic in the sense that Bernard Williams attributes to Plato and Aristotle: Their outlook is formally egoistic, in the sense that they suppose that they have to show to each person that he has good reason to live ethically; and the reason has to appeal to that person in terms of something about himself,

2 As Pierre Hadot puts it, “One could say that Spinoza’s discourse, nourished on ancient philosophy, teaches man how to transform, radically and concretely, his own being, and how to accede to beatitude” (Pierre Hadot, “Philosophy as a Way of Life,” in Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. and with introduction by Arnold I. Davidson [Blackwell, 1995], p. 271). It teaches how to transform oneself from disempowered to empowered.

182  The Ethics of Joy how and what he will be if he is a person with that sort of character. . . . Their aim is not, given an account of the self and its satisfactions, to show how the ethical life (luckily) fits them. It is to give an account of the self into which that life fits.3

In the early propositions and demonstrations of Ethics Part  3 Spinoza presents a specific conception of the self. This is the true self of every human being. It is from this conception of the self that the ethical life follows, and it is this self that the ethical life fulfills. Although the universe does not provide a set of instructions for how to lead an ethical life, emotions, in Spinoza’s view, help guide us in the ethical way of life. They perform this function in virtue of their qualitative character. Emotions are enhancements and impairments to a subject’s actual essence. They are increases or decreases in power. An emotion’s qualitative character informs the subject that his power is increasing in case it is increasing or, alternatively, it informs the subject that his power is decreasing in case it is decreasing. Emotions thus guide us in the right way of life, not like signs or markers set up on the side of a road but like the gauges of an automobile’s dashboard. Like the gauges on a dashboard, emotions are feedback on how well or poorly the subject’s systems are functioning and how well or poorly the subject’s system as a whole is functioning. Sadness and its subspecies indicate that the subject’s systems are functioning poorly. Joy and its subspecies indicate that the subject’s systems are functioning well. But things are complicated by the fact that some species of sadness are, other things equal, bad, and some species of joy are, other things equal, good. As a result, it is not necessarily the case that an episode of a type of sadness indicates that the subject’s system as a whole is functioning poorly; an episode of joy does not necessarily indicate that the subject’s system as a whole is functioning well. There are times when an episode of a species of sadness does not signal that the subject as a whole is functioning poorly (e.g., a painful medical procedure). There are times when an episode of a species of joy does not signal that the subject as a whole is functioning well (e.g., drunkenness). Still, emotions are feedback about the status of the subject’s nature. They are axiological information.

3 Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 32.

Conclusion  183 The ethical life is identical to the empowered life, and it is the best way of life for every human being. Empowerment is good for the greedy, the envious, and the seeker of fame, as well as for the noble and free. It is good for the benighted, as well as the enlightened.4 Everyone should be empowered and lead an empowered way of life. This is not the “should” of moral obligation. It is the “should” of living well. To live well one should be empowered. There is a single standard for everyone alike. In this regard Spinoza’s moral philosophy is egalitarian. It is not the case that there is a standard for a certain type of person, a standard that does not hold for the rest of us. The freedom as empowerment model applies to all human beings equally. Nevertheless, the empowered life is not accessible to everyone equally. The universe is indifferent to human empowerment. Many people, if not the vast majority, are ignorant of or mistaken about the empowerment project and what empowerment consists in. Mental illness and physical illness are widespread and difficult to cure. Cultures and traditions can be debilitating, and some more debilitating than others, and many are more debilitating to some people than to others. Thus the empowered life is a standard that many in their lifetimes failed to meet and that many in our lifetimes are failing to meet. But it would be incorrect to construe this as elitist; doing so would be on a par with thinking that a standard for a nutritious diet is elitist because there are people who, without access to adequate quantities of nutritious food, suffer and die from malnutrition and from malnutrition-​related diseases. The standard is a basis of evaluation. It is the basis for protesting the fact that people do not have access to what our nature requires. It is a basis for evaluation and for action, and there is no expectation that everyone lives up to it or even approaches it. It would be elitist to think that those who fail to meet this standard are unworthy of the empowered life. But talk of being worthy (unworthy) and deserving (undeserving) does not belong to Spinoza’s moral philosophy, just as it does not belong to talk of mental health and illness and physical health and illness. No one deserves cancer. Nor does anyone not deserve cancer. It is not a matter of desert. Rather, it is a matter of misfortune for those who are stricken with it and a matter of fortune for those who are not and whose 4 I am not suggesting that, for Spinoza, empowerment is good for the greedy (etc.) qua greedy. It is not that empowerment benefits the greedy by making the greedy more greedy; nor does it benefit the greedy by making them more wealthy. Empowerment benefits the greedy by curing them of their greed and empowering them to take intelligent care of themselves and others. The same holds for the envious and the seeker of fame. Empowerment cures the envious of their envy and it cures the seeker of fame of their desire for fame. Empowerment thus benefits us qua human.

184  The Ethics of Joy loved ones are not. This is not to say that there is nothing that can and should be done to avoid misfortune and nothing that can and should be done to obtain good fortune. There are things that we can and should do. There are things we can do to take intelligent care of ourselves and take intelligent care of others. Spinoza’s view of how to take care of ourselves and others is not very different from how many today think we should care for ourselves and others—​ that is, his view is not very different from how many today think when we are not under the spell of a savage and sad superstition. We should feed our minds with quality information and feed our bodies with quality food and drink, including quality whiskey. We should enjoy non-​injurious activities, such as theater, sports, and gardening. We should do what we can to avoid fear and hate and their antisocial variants. And we should help others do the same. Instead of focusing on elevating our social status by making ourselves deserving of praise and rewards, and instead of obsessing over the status of others and how they make themselves worthy of blame, we should focus on empowering ourselves by empowering others. The empowerment of others is our own empowerment because their example helps motivate us to adhere to the empowered way of life and their intelligence can teach us things about the world and ourselves. When in 1673 he was offered the position of professor of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, Spinoza declined.5 But his moral philosophy presents a conception of social life that can be viewed as an ideal university where everyone is dedicated to learning and the advancement of knowledge. Everyone is both student and professor, and everyone is motivated by joy and love and seeks to empower themselves and others. Obviously social life falls far short of such an ideal. Obviously, too, academic life falls far short of this ideal. Still, it is an ideal worth striving for. It is a project for our times.

5 Spinoza, Letter 48.

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