The Enemy Beyond: External Threat Perceptions in the ASEAN Region 9789814376099

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE CONTOURS OF ASEAN FOREIGN POLICIES
III. EXTERNAL THREATS: THE FORCES SHAPING ASEAN PERCEPTIONS
IV. THE ENEMY BEYOND AND THE ENEMY WITHIN: ASEAN THREAT PERCEPTION IN PERSPECTIVE

Citation preview

I5EA5 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interest is focused on the many-faceted problems of development and modernization, and political and social change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees on which are representatives from the National University of Singapore, appointees from the government, as well as representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

THE ENEMY BEYOND External Threat Perceptions in the ASEAN Region

by

Robert 0. Tilman

Research Notes and Discussions Paper No. 42 INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES 1984

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 0511 AI I rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. ©

1984 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

ISSN 0129-8828 ISBN 9971-902-70-2

CONTENTS

Page LIST OF TABLES

II

y

INTRODUCTION

1

Projections and Perceptions

2

The Structural Dimension

3

The Geopolitical Dimension

3

The Historical Dimension

4

The Socio-Cultural Dimension

4

The Economic Dimension

4

THE CONTOURS OF ASEAN FOREIGN POLICIES

8

Indonesia

8

Malaysia

10

Philippines

12

Singapore

14

Thailand

17

iii

Page III

IV

EXTERNAL THREATS: PERCEPTIONS

THE FORCES SHAPING ASEAN 24

The Structural Dimension of Policy-making

24

The Geopolitical Dimension of ASEAN Policy-making

27

The Historical Dimension

29

The Socio-Cultural Dimension

34

The Economic Dimension

37

THE ENEMY BEYOND AND THE ENEMY WITHIN: ASEAN THREAT PERCEPTION IN PERSPECTIVE

48

ASEAN Perceptions of the Enemy Beyond

48

External Threats in Perspective:

50

iv

The Enemy Within

LIST OF TABLES

Page 1 Exports of the ASEAN States, 1981 {Expressed as percentages of each ASEAN state's world total)

38

2

Imports of the ASEAN States, 1981 (Expressed as percentages of each ASEAN state's world total)

39

3 ASEAN Trade Balances, 1981 (Imports expressed as a percentage of total trade with each partner)

40

4 American and Japanese Investment in ASEAN Countries (Expressed as percentages of total foreign investment in each ASEAN country)

41

v

INTRODUCTION

Growing Soviet, and later Chinese, influence in the region must be balanced by that of the US and Japan. Japan may have to take a more active role in helping to maintain stability of areas vital to Japan. (Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, 19811) I am distrustful of the Japanese. is my bias. (President Ferdinand Philippines, 19822)

I am sorry. It Marcos of the

For years, governments and people in this region have been brainwashed into believing that the main source of threat lies with the People's Republic of China That shallow and easy deduction flowed from certain facts •••• These facts blinded people to the reality that a victorious North Vietnam supported by a powerful protector and sponsor could combine to become a more menacing threat than a populous but underdeveloped colossus. (Deputy Prime Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand, 19823) We see China as a bigger danger regionally than the Soviet Union because the Chinese have links with the CPM [Communist Party of Malaya] while the Soviets have none •••• (Foreign Minister Ghazali bin Shafie of Malaysia, 19814) The perceptive visitor who jets hurriedly through the capitals of the five ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines) may leave with the impression that there is little agreement on the identity of the threats lying beyond the borders of each of the countries. The press has certainly pointed out these differences on numerous occasions, and, as even a few sample quotes amply demonstrate, the leaders 1

of these countries seem to interpret the world around them in somewhat different ways. To what extent do these interpretations differ? And why do these interpretations differ? These are the fundamental questions addressed in this paper.5

* * * * *

The literature on "threat perceptions" as approached in this study is not voluminous. Numerous studies deal with threat "realities" by third-party observers, and writings on the perceptions of nuclear threats are common. However, studies of reality usually substitute the subjective perceptions of the writer for those of the actors, a difficulty that the author will attempt to avoid here, and there is little concern about nuclear warfare in Southeast Asia.6 Another genre of threat-perception studies with fewer contributions deals with empirically describable perceptions and misperceptions in foreign policy-making and international relations.? These studies depend on the historical record and refer to manifest threats and the perceptions and misperceptions of them ("misperceptions" because it is possible to document a historically specific outcome and thereby determine the accuracy of any given perception). However, our concern here is with something much more ambiguous -- ASEAN leaders' perceptions of future developments that will threaten their countries if they occur and the perceived probabilities that these events might come about.8

Projections and Perceptions Individuals perceive phenomena with varying degrees of fidelity and distortion. The transformation process takes place in the collective mind of society and the individual mind of the actor. Both are influenced by culture, history, and the environment. "Reality" may exist, but a person reacts, behaves, and plans his actions according to his perceptions of reality, and two persons may perceive two considerably divergent "realities". The factors affecting perceptions may be considered to fall into several "dimensions", the term employed here to describe a c 1 uster of related influences. In crude terms the following diagram illustrates this conceptualization.

2

PROJECTION

-------~

TRANSFORMATION PROCESS

-------~

PERCEPTION

Dimensions:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Structural Geopolitical Historical Socio-cultural Economic

The remainder of this introductory section wi 11 examine the five dimensions affecting the transformation process.

The Structural Dimension The structural dimension involves a consideration of the political and bureaucratic machinery through which foreign policy is formulated and executed. Central to this is the question "Who makes po 1 icy?" but there are other cons ide rations as we 11. Bureaucracies are rarely neutral because bureaucrats, and through them their bureaucracies, develop vested interests that seem conducive to nurturing or sustaining the bureaucrats and their bureaucracies. Thus, with intent or as a conditioned reflex, the foreign affairs bureaucracy may se 1ect i ve ly gather, filter, or subtly alter the messages it transmits to the policy-makers on top. There a 1 so will be persons who influence the po 1 icy-makers in one, several, or all areas, and these persons may be inside or outside the government.

The Geopolitical Dimension This is probably the most readily apparent cluster of influences. An enemy that is far away, all other things being equal, certainly seems much less threatening than one that shares a common 1 and border. If the USSR occupied the terri tory that is now Canada, it seems unlikely that the "Cold War" could have remained a struggle of words rather than actions. Cuba, sma 11 and re 1 at i ve ly powerless, took on much greater proportions as an external threat because of its proximity to the United States. The threat of Russian missiles in Cuba probably would not have greatly affected American policy-makers if Cuba had been at the tip of Africa rather than Florida. The Chinese are perceived as a threat to the Russians, and vice-versa, in part because they 3

share a long and poorly demarcated land border. For centuries Europe was a steaming cauldron of latent and manifest hostility because many nations and claimants to nationhood were packed into a limited geographic area. Geography has influenced political perception throughout history.

The Historical Dimension This cluster of influences is more complex and more difficult to deal with, for history must be considered at the personal, institutional, and national levels. Policy-makers have had unique historical experiences that affect their perceptions, and in countries with strong oral traditions these personal historical experiences may continue through several or many generations. In addition, in many of these same countries political leaders enjoy fewer popular constraints in the formulation of foreign policy and thus a leader's perception is more likely to be translated into official policy. At the institutional level account must be taken of the treatment of other countries in school textbooks and the popular wisdom about other countries heard in offices and coffee-shops. Of course, history reports that some countries have been friends and some have been enemies, and past relations obviously affect perceptions of the future.

The Socio-Cultural Dimension The ethnic, cultural, and religious make-up of a country, and its policy-makers, can be expected to influence foreign-policy formulation. In the United States it is generally accepted that the presence of a significant Jewish minority, as well as the common origins of Judaism and Christianity, serve to explain much of the tilt in American policy towards Israel in conflicts with her Muslim neighbours. The "Atlantic Alliance" is built on common cultural origins, religious affinities, and a common language, as well as economic, philosophical, and historical ties. For the same reasons the "longest unfortified border in the world", which separates Canada and the United States, is a political possibility.

The Economic Dimension The economic dimension may encompass several aspects. foreign investment creates reciprocal obligations

4

Firstly, between

1nvestor and the host country, and these obligations may affect the formulation and implementation of relevant foreign policies. Secondly, disproportionate foreign trade exchanges, one-way, may do the same. But, thirdly, either of the above may generate or serve as a catalyst to generate, feelings of resentment against the partner perceived to be getting the better of the arrangement. And, finally, there is the issue of corruption fuelled by the availability of extensive foreign resources. In most Western writings on the formulation of foreign policy there is the assumption often unspoken that those officials responsible for foreign policy regard themselves as the stewards of the national good as they perceive it. This may not De true anywhere in the world, but certainly in Southeast Asia there are many examples of personal, or peer-group, foreign pol icy-making and execution for the sake of personal or family gain. Although the state may not suffer seriously, or it may even benefit, some policies are devised and carried out with more concern for the individual or the group than for the state. However, as is common when dealing with the issue of corruption, it is difficult to gather reliable information on leaders of a regime that remains in power. Thus one is left to speculate on the international political effects of corruption rather than reaching definitive conclusions about its impact. For this reason the question will only be mentioned and not pursued intently in this study. These then are the dimensions on which the foreign policies of the ASEAN states will be examined. Before proceeding, however, it will be useful to summarize the major features of each country's policies.

NOTES Interview with Asahl Shl~n, 5 January 1981, Singapore (Singapore Government Press Release, 02-1/81/01/07>. 2

Straits Tl.as (Singapore), 20 September 1982.

3

Address before the Pacific Symposium. See n. 8 below for full citation and comments about the Symposium. Quotation from pp. 2, 3.

4

Sunday Star (Malaysia), 16 August 1981. ThIs study had Its orIgIns In a fIve-week Iecture trIp through f l ve ASEAN countries In 1980. In the course of my visits to ten cities It became

5

apparent that wh i I e the rea I i ty of the wor I d surrounding ASEAN had changed very I ittle in this brief period the interpretation of this reality seemed to vary considerably as one crossed the several international borders. This visit to the area, one of many since 1959, was supported by the United States International Communications Agency (USICA), The impressions gained from my many conversations and observations on this trip led to a successful app I i cat I on for a Senior Fu I bright Research Fellowship to the InstItute of Southeast Asian Studies (I SEAS) in Singapore during the period January-March 1983. Two months were spent in Singapore and one month was devoted to visits to the other four ASEAN capita Is. In the course of these three months I was able to interview and talk informally with some of the most senior leaders of the five countries, staff of the five foreign ministries, senior military officers, businessmen, and religious leaders. For obvious reasons, and because it was often their wish, most of these persons wi II remain nameless and faceless, unless they are quoted from the pub! ic record, but I have genuine I y tried to ref I ect their vIews as I understood them accurate I y and within context, I am greatly indebted to USICA, the Fulbright program, I SEAS, the Centre for Strategic and I nternat ion a I StudIes (Jakarta), and my many nameless friends, colleagues, and interviewees. The strengths of this study may be attributed to them; the weaknesses, to the author. 6

Except in the Phi I i pp i nes (which a recent Brookings study had II sted as a target for Russ I an mIss I I es because of the presence of AmerIcan bases l the nuclear threat was never mentioned In any discussion, either In 1980 or 1983. Even in the Phi llpplnes it was rarely brought up and when suggested it was usually disposed of quickly, Later In 1983, as the date for signing the new bases agreement drew c I oser, the opposition attempted to make the 11 nuc lear I I ghtn I ng rod" argument a major Issue. However, the unexpected haste with which agreement was reached effectively terminated most of the discussion.

7

Three such studies, which proved very useful, even though they are addressing different problems, are Raymond Cohen, Threa-t Percep-tions In ln"terna"tlonal

O"lsls (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979); Klaus Knorr, "Threat Perception", In Hls"torlcal Dl-slons of Na-tional Securi-ty Probl-, ed, Klaus Knorr (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), pp. 78-119; and Robert Jervis, Percep-tions and Mlspercep"tlons In ln"terna"tlonal Poll-tics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). The basic "dimensions" framework emp I oyed In thIs study was suggested in the Cohen book, though he might not recognize the kinship. Jervis, a psychologist by training, offers many Insights that aid In understanding the contributions of the ASEAN framework to mean i ngfu I intra-region a I communicatIons, though hIs work was less directly related to the subject of this study. 8

When my research plans were formulated In 1980-81, few scholars were concerned with those aspects of the subject that attracted me. By the time my research began In I ate 1982 the situatIon had changed somewhat. Bernard K. Gordon of New Hampshire UnIversity and Rear Adml ra Executive Director of the Pacific Forum, conducted a with high government officials through much of Asia in was I ater to write, "it became c I ear • • • that there

6

I (Ret. l L.R. Vasey, series of interviews mld-1981. As Gordon are indeed important

cross-nat I on a I Paper,

In

d i fterences

PacIfIc

Asia/Pacific", SymposIum,

In perceptIons of securIty threats",

Forum

Honolulu,

February

SymposIum, 6-8

1982,) grew

February The

out

1982

Hono I u I u of

--

Threat

hereafter

conference

these

visits,

(Background

PerceptIons on

and

cited threat

at

the

In

as

East

Pacific

perceptIons

(referred

to

I nd I vI dua I

papers on every ASEAN state, and others as we I I, were presented,

As

above)

"Nat I on a I

conference

va I uab I e as thIs set of papers proved to be to my research, most of the

partIcIpants were not addressIng themse I ves to the quest Ions that Interested me most, historical,

The

threats

which

w lth

was my

comparisons (except by to

account

strong

for

policy

the

whIch

focus,

perceptions,

content to

concerned

the

Moreover,

and the authors of

tended to take the opportunIty to on

were

were

Inference on the part of the readers)

differing

orientations,

the Americans --

they

but there were no attempted

nature of

the several

I ecture the major the

world

I et others dIscover the poI Icy

the

and

not

cross-national and no attempt conference national

had

papers

powers -- part I cuI ar I y

political

environment,

Imp I I catIons of my study,

and I am attempting only to report the perceptions of others,

7

I atent

I

am

If any,

II

THE CONTOURS OF ASEAN FOREIGN POLICIES

Indonesia

Following the slow but incessant eclipse of Sukarno after the GESTAPU Affair in 19651 Indonesian foreign policy took a marked turn from the socialist camp (in this case the People's Republic of China) and veered lurchingly towards the foreign policy course of the West. Yet, throughout this period of change Indonesian foreign pol icy retained some distinctive continuities, and after an informal rapprochement with the PRC, examples of Indonesian autonomy could be even more easily identified. Post-Sukarno Indonesia regained its lost friendship with the United States as America resumed arms shipments, joined in the rescheduling of the crushing Indonesian debt, and generally treated the country as a strayed ally returning to the fold. The United States seemed to feel comfortable doing business with General Suharto and the technocrats he gathered around him, many of whom were American educated. By 1968, even though Sukarno was formally still in power, Americans walking the streets in Jakarta were again getting friendly greetings from Indonesians, something that had been rare in the years preceding GESTAPU. Today the United States may be regarded by some (particularly in the military) as being somewhat immature or naive in foreign policy, or of having (some in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have said) a healthy non-policy of following the ASEAN lead, but generally the criticism heard of the United States tends to be benign and friendly. The reverse is true in the case of the PRC. Sukarno developed close relations with the PRC, which at that time was st i 11 viewed by the United States and some of its a 11 i es as a major world threat. By the early 1970s Indonesia and the United States had each reversed its position. PRC-U.S. relations thawed following the death of Mao, the emergence of Deng, and the Nixon 8

visit to China in 1972. On the other hand, Indonesian-PRe relations took a decided turn for the worse following the GESTAPU affair, and eventually Indonesia and Singapore agreed to be the last of the ASEAN states to resume official ties with the PRC. 2 While Indonesia's civilian leaders have always seemed more willing than the military to re-establish formal ties with the PRC, it is apparent that the military view has prevailed. For the past several years it has been common for Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials and other ranking civilian leaders to observe that "normalization" with the PRC will occur before much longer, only to have a major military figure (and sometimes the President himself) silence the speculation with a stern statement about the subversive nature of PRC intentions.3 Indonesian views of the USSR are not consistent throughout the government and throughout time. A Radio Moscow broadcast regarding the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) provoked outbursts by students and in Parliament;4 the Jakarta manager of Aeroflot was arrested as a spy after a fist fight at Halim Airport;5 and several days later the government expelled a second Soviet diplomat for spying.6 Nevertheless, at present formal relations are on a much more even keel. Officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tend to be much more charitable in interpreting Soviet intentions and actions in Southeast Asia. The view that the USSR either wants or will get permanent naval base facilities in Vietnam is not widely held in the Ministry, and Ministry officials share little of the Philippine concern about Russian submarines roaming the waters of the South China Sea. The military, on the other hand, tends to subscribe more to the American line (though it sometimes seems that the rhetoric lacks great conviction), and again it is the military that has generally dominated policy in this area.7 Elsewhere in ASEAN, Indonesia is sometimes criticized for being insensitive to Vietnam's aggressive ambitions, and j ou rna lists have sometimes pointed to this sympathy for Vietnam, believed also to be shared by Malaysia to a lesser extent, as an important chink in the ASEAN armour.B Certainly the sympathetic expressions for Vietnam's current problems heard in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are rarely repeated elsewhere in ASEAN, but the Ministry does not speak with a single voice on this issue. Moreover, the military, although much less strident than the generals in Thailand, tend to parallel official policy which is supportive of the ASEAN hard line against Vietnam. One can hear from various important officials that Vietnam has been "duped" by the USSR, that it had no choice but to turn to Russia after it had been rebuffed by America and the West, and that it has strayed from the correct path -- temporarily, many will add. Most holding these views will go on to argue that sooner or later Vietnam will reassert its historic independence. Ultimately, so

9

this argument goes, Vietnam will play the role of friendly buffer against a hostile and threatening China, but in the mean time their potential friend is travelling the wrong path and cannot be supported. Some important Indonesian policy-makers tend to be very susp1c1ous of Japanese intentions, and in past years it became apparent that these suspicions were shared by many others in Indonesian society as amorphous resentments crystallized into concrete anti-Japanese demonstrations.9 Japan is a major trading partner and a major investor in Indonesia, but relations between the two countries have been more correct than cordial. It is not uncommon in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to hear concerns expressed about probable Japanese behaviour once they again command dominant political positions internationally, and the military has expressed concern about the nature of hardware Japan may acquire to carry out its new defence responsibilities.10 In Indonesia, as in some other ASEAN countries, the official policy is friendly and correct, while the policy-makers are troubled by ambivalence and doubts.

Malaysia Almost two decades ago this author subtitled a studY. of Malayan foreign policy "the dilemmas oJ a committed neutral",ll and today many similar dilemmas are still in evidence. Malaysia still aspires to steer a foreign policy course equidistant from that of the major and middle powers, but today, as in the early 1960s, some powers are kept at a greater distance than others. An American over-the-horizon presence is just as welcome in Malaysia as it is elsewhere in ASEAN. Yet Malaysia, the architect of the concept of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality, remains ZOPFAN's strongest supporter. As far as bilateral relations are concerned, the American proclivity to dispose of rubber and tin from its strategic reserves, sometimes when prices are already depressed, provides a constant irritant in U.S.-Malaysia relations, but at the same time America has replaced Britain as the major source of training for Malaysian students on government scholarships. And, to compound the ambivalence, the United States is often verbally treated similar to the USSR and the PRC -- that is, it is one of the major powers intent on interfering in Malaysian domestic affairs. At the same time the newly found cordiality between the People's Republic of China and the United States is a cause of some concern. To add to the ambivalence and frustration, policy-makers often express the view that Malaysia is too small and too insignificant to 10

influence American policy in any significant manner. Although official attitudes towards the People's Republic of China have softened greatly since independence in 1957, and Ma 1ays i a was the first ASEAN state to estab 1ish forma 1 ties with the PRC (in 1974), suspicions about China linger to the present time. The media event staged in Kuala Lumpur on the occasion of the return of the Chairman of the Communist Party of Malaya, Musa bin Ahmad, demonstrated that Ma 1ays i a was not re 1uctant to seize the opportunity to reassert its conviction that the PRC constitutes a long-term threat to Malaysia.12 The Kuala Lumpur visit of Premier Zhao Ziyang in August 1981 ended with both sides making reference to continuing historic problems that had not yet been resolved.l3 Despite the rhetoric of ZOPFAN and "equi distance", it is apparent that Malaysia does not intend to place itself politically too close to the USSR. Prime Minister Mahathir had been embarrassed by the discovery that his political secretary, Siddiq Mohamed Ghouse, was a Soviet mole, just as two aides of a former Prime Minister, the late Tun Razak, had confessed to communist connections earlier.14 As a result of the Siddiq revelations, three Soviet diplomats were expelled, the first such expulsions for Malaysia, though not uncommon elsewhere in ASEAN. The current Prime Minister, Mahathir bin Mohamad, has also expressed his concern about Soviet support for Vietnamese adventures in Indochina and a particular concern about the probable consequences of a Soviet naval presence at Cam Ranh Bay.l5 Although the Prime Minister regards Soviet behaviour as typical of that of any major foreign power, it is clear that he views the projection of Russian power into the region as a greater threat to Malaysia than the American presence. Malaysia's views of Vietnam are usually considered to be close to those of Indonesia, and there is cons i derab 1e evidence to support such a contention. The former Malaysian Foreign Minister, Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, apparently made every effort to carry on a meaningful dialogue with his Vietnamese counterpart, Ngyuen Co Thach, and Ngyuen has often met with less hostility in Kuala Lumpur (and Jakarta) than in the other ASEAN capitals. It is often heard in Kuala Lumpur (but said with less evidence of conviction than in Jakarta) that Vietnam ultimately will reassert its historic autonomy and divest itself of its Soviet albatross. However, Malaysia, more than Indonesia, is committed to support for the Thai pas it ion in the Kampuchean dispute, which Malaysia feels is dangerously close to its own borders. a

Prime Minister Mahathir's "Look East Policy" is principally "look-towards-Japan" policy, although on occasion he has 11

included Korea. Malaysia has looked towards Japan for many years as a source of investment, assistance, and technological imports and as a market tor Malaysian raw materials. "Looking east" theret·ore must involve more than this. The Prirne Minister has frequently described it as a long-overdue counterweight to previously unquestioned policies of "looking west" and as an attempt to import from Japan and East Asia some of the cultural values and practices that have contributed significantly to Japanese successes in the areas of applied technology and marketing. What differences "looking east" ultimately wi 11 bring to Malaysian foreign policy, if any, remain uncertain, but the Prime Minister's pronouncements have improved the climate for Malaysian-Japanese relations. However, as was evident when the Prime Minister was led to believe (incorrectly, he was later con vi need by Japanese Premier Nakasone) that the Japanese defence of its vital sea lanes might include the Straits of Malacca, Malaysia has a latent concern about Japan that cannot be blunted by the "Look East Policy".l6 Prime Minister Mahathir, with characteristic bluntness, has enumerated his foreign policy priorities. His first priority is ASEAN; second, the Islamic world; and third, the rest of the world.l7 He has also become the first Malaysian Prime Minister publicly to disparage the continuing significance of Malaysia's British colonial heritage and Commonwealth ties.l8 Relations between Malaysia and Britain improved following Mahathir's visit to the United Kingdom in 150.0 represent deficit balances of trade; percentages . 2

On

Thai

political

factional ism,

see

Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polley

Fred w. Riggs, Thailand: The (Honolulu: East-West Center Press,

1966), chap. 8. 3

Asadakorn Eksaengsri, Foreign Polley·Maklng In Thailand: ASEAN Polley. 1967-72 (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1980), pp. 116 tt., 144-50.

41

4

A detailed

examination

ot

relevant to this study. the

manoeuvrlngs

ot

constitutional

February-April

Involved two reforms Constitution.

the

Needless to say,

scheduled

crisis

like all

were

complex

temporarily

1983.

Intense.

Is

not

politics

Briefly

arrangements

In

It the

struggle,

the constitutional

placated

amendment that would have

arrangements on more permanent tooting.

constitutional

application of genera I

1983

early

These provisions would have served to reduce the power of the

placed the transitional the

and

to replace transitional

mil ttary, and the military backed a constitutional lost

ot

aspects of Thai

but

a

last-minute

The military

compromise

on

the

provisions by the Prime Minister at

the military and possibly averted another coup.

least For a

Far Eas"tern Econanlc Review, 31 March A good review ot the election results appeared In the Bangkok Pos"t, 19 summary

ot

the

Issues,

see

and 20 April 1983.

5 6

Eksaengsrl, op. cit., pp. 128-29. In February 1983 the Ministry ot Foreign Affairs uncharacteristically opened Its doors to a one-day forum tor Ministry ottlclals, academl cs tor unusua II y candId exchanges on ThaI tore I gn these

pol lcles

are made.

The

forum was

reported

In

journal lsts, po II c1 es and

data I I

and how

the Na"tlon

In

Review, 16 and 17 February 1983. 7

On the cement agreement, seen. 20 of Chapter I 1.

8

Sarasln Vlrapol,

"Domestic Considerations of Thailand's Policies Toward

IndochIna

States",

Indochina,

London,

paper

prepared

tor

15-17 July 1982,

p.

the

SOAS/FCO

Seminar

8.

The author

on

Is Chief

ASEAN of

the and

Polley

Planning of the Ministry ot Foreign Affairs. 9

This point Is made several times In several contexts In Charles E. Morrison, "Southeast Asia In a Changing International Environment: A Comparative Foreign Polley Analysts of Four ASEAN Member Countries", Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1976.

10

The

"Jogja Syndrome"

g I or I ous the

epIsode

revolutionary

Republic with

to the

refers

In the

to the effects of memories of

IndonesIan Revo I utI on when Dutch

army

In

Jogjakarta

limits

of

this

little contact

with

the

a

one-day

blitz

that

virtually

outside world,

reI y on Its own wIts to survIve. after

and

single city.

a

low point but

forces batt I ed up

confined

the

fledgling

Without outside support, the revolutionary

army

and

had to

Dutch troops eventua I I y captured the cIty

signalled

the

beginning

of

the

second

"pollee

action" on 19 December 1948. It Is useful to note that the Central Java regiment based In Jogja was commanded by Lt.-Col. Suharto. Suharto led his regiment

out

ot

Jogja

on

19

December

and

took

up

positions

In

the

countrysIde. Pres I dent Sukarno, VIce-Pres I dent Hatta, and other members ot the Cabinet decided to remain In Jogja because they felt there was no other place to go and were arrested on the second day of the blitz. from President Suharto's perspective,

For the story

see O.G. Roeder, The S.lllng General:

Preslden"t Soeharto of Indonesia (Jakarta: Gunung Agung Ltd., 1980), chaps. 14-16.

42

11

Harry J. history.

Benda first used this term in his period i zat ion of Southeast Asian Benda's thesis argued that the colonial period and the Japanese

interregnum Southeast

constituted

Asian

temporary

hi story.

See

deviations

Harry

J.

from

Benda,

the

"The

main

course

Structure of

of

Southeast

Asian History: Some Pre\ iminary Observations", Journal of Southeas-t Asian A considerably abridged version with the His-tory Ill (March 1962): 103-38. same title appeared in Robert o. Ti I man, ed., Man, S-ta-te, and Socie-ty In Con-temporary Southeas-t Asia (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 23-54. 12

In

February

proposal the

1983,

during

the

height

of

Phi I ippine reaction

to 1he American

of a 1,000 nautical mile surveil lance perimeter tor Japanese forces,

Jefferson

exhibition

Cultural

on

photographs,

the

Center

in

I i berat ion

memorabi I ia,

models

Makati

(adjacent

of

Man i I a.

of

weapons,

to

Mani Ia)

Inc I uded and

a

were

opened

an

contemporary

videotape

--

with

contemporary f i I m c I ips -- deta i I i ng the operation from beginning to end.

many On

two occasions when this author visited the display the small exhibit hall was fi lied with

Fi I ipinos of all

ages, and both times younger attendees probably

outnumbered older by a large margin. 13

c I osed

the

magazine We For. . and

senior editors to court

for

I i be I.

President of

the

Marcos

President

questions

about

decorations

he

in

the

how

guerr iII a

deserving

had received.

produced American

the

In

ex-servicemen

in

January

1983 took

its

The magazine had questioned the bravery warfare against President

the ensuing

the

Japanese

might

tria I

be

of

and

some

raised of

the

the President 1 s attorney

who testified to his bravery

in fighting the

Japanese. 14

Free Philippines, 22 February 1945, p. 2.

15

Initial

confusion

1,000-mi le

tip of Japan? (when

aI I

stemmed

from

uncertainty

I imit was to be measured.

Was

about

the

point

from which

the

it to be Tokyo Bay or the southern

American oft i cia Is te It that this had been c I eared up ear I i er

parties agreed

it was to be Tokyo Bay)

and that President Marcos

was in agreement. 16

There

are

four

understanding

historical

of

and

Indonesian

"five principles"),

National

ideological

foreign

elements

pol icy:

the

that

are

Revolution,

Resi I ience, and GESTAPU.

key

to

Pancasi Ia

an (the

Of these four elements

the Revolution dominates thinking in most foreign-pol icy areas. 17

On

the opposition

1982.

The

Foreign

of

some DPR members,

Minister,

The

Prime

Minister

that "there bu i I d

if

they

reported

weapons, After

"rolling-stone" that

is

to

Is no fear of a revival

nuc I ear

umbre I I a".

but,

prodding

effect

meant

see New S-trai-ts Tl~,

Mochtar Kusumaatmadja,

has

30

November

pub\ icly

stated

See S-trai-ts Times, 23 March 1981.

his opposition as well. 18

Dr

of

have

instead, from

told

the

continues newsmen

a decision to rearm,

rearmament

wou I d

43

visiting

Japanese

journalists

of Japanese mi I itarism if Japan does not

eventua I I y

under about

the the

US

nuc I ear possible

the Prime Minister responded I ead

Japan

to "go nuc I ear",

then "it's better not to start the rebuilding of adequate armed forces". Interview cited on pp. 19-20 In no. I of Chapter 1. 19 20

See

Aslaweek, 11 February 1983, p. 49. An exception Is Tan Sri Muhammad Ghazall bin Shafle, now Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Ghazall

published

speeches,

136.

Shafle,

according

served

SeeM. Ghazall Shafle,

as

an

to the autobiographical

Malaysia:

Creative Enterprise Sendlrlan Berhad, frequently heard

preface

In his

Intelligence officer connected with Force ln~erna~lonal

Rela~lons

1982), pp. 1-4.

(Kuala Lumpur:

However, It Is a view

In Kuala Lumpur that Ghazall does not have great Influence

on the making of foreign policy. 21

A good and

lengthy biographical

account of Mahathlr and the Mahathlr family

appeared on consecutive Sundays In the Sunday and 9 April 1972. According to this account,

Mall (Malaysian edition) on 2 written by Leung Thong Ping,

"for Mahathlr the Occupation years were profitable. Japanese he jointly ran a banana them fresh and

served them

stall

Refusing to work for the

In Alor Star's Pekan Rabu,

In the coffee shop he had nearby.

promise he had made himself, Mahathlr, better off than any of his friends".

who

was

then

In

He sold

True to hIs

his twenties,

was

22

"Nanyang" literally means "southern ocean" and Implies that the sea Is within a Chinese sphere of Influence.

23

The only exception encountered In the course of my Interviews occurred when a high-ranking military officer placed China second and the Soviet Union first In his hierarchy of external threats, but as our discussions proceeded he made a very sIgnIfIcant d I st I net I on between the two.

The USSR constItuted a

temporary threat that wou I d eventua I I y recede; ChIna constItuted a permanent threat that would not disappear. 24

See the comments made by Prime Minister Lee to the effect that Belj lng Is "keeping a foot In the door" by maintaining friendly relations with Indigenous communist reI at I onsh I p because

parties whl le exercising restraint In exploiting the PRC needs "A SEAN support • • • In keepIng out

Soviet Influence In the area". See on pp. 7-8 Inn. 25 of Chapter II. 25

See the candid

the •••

US News and World Repor1" Interview cited

Interview of Foreign Minister Ghazall

with

u.s.

Senator S.Y.

Hayakawa reported In detail In Sunday S~r, 16 August 1981 and cited Inn. 4 of Chapter 1. At the United Nations Ghazall later compared the conduct of the PRC with "sweet and sour rotten fish" CSrral~s Mahathlr,

shortly

after

assuming

Zhao Z I yang at a state dInner In support for the CPM, whether moral remain

an

Srral~s

Tl.as, 10 August 1981>.

obstacle

to

the

the

Tl-, 25 September 1981 >.

post of Prime Minister,

told Premier

hIs honour In Kua I a Lumpur that ChIna 1 s (as Zhao had claimed) or military, would

Improvement of

44

Malayslan-Chinese relations

(......,

26

eI i te

In a major study of the perceptions of the Thai the Institute of Strategic and International

conducted in 1982 by Studies at Chulalongkorn

University on a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation (but as yet unpublished and not ava II ab I e In Eng I Ish) China was perceived as a threat on an abstract question,

but

in

a

concrete

hypothet i ca I

situation

the

PRC

emerged

as

an

ally. 27

Eksaengsri, op. cit., p. 32.

28

Ibid., pp. 34, 35.

29

Ibid., pp. 43-44.

30

Ibid.,

p.

media

in

73.

Newspapers Keemthong

For a critical

Thailand, In

see

Slam",

Wor I d

on

Books,

Sl-

In

Crisis

Sivaraksa,

1980),

pp.

impact on the printed

Influence 280-331.

For

a

Magazines, (Bangkok:

tactual

and Komol

chronological

foreign pol icy with a heavy emphasis on Thai-U.S. relations,

see Xlang Chai Shad, S i nee

s.

In

Foundation,

account of Thai

review of the American

"American

War

"Thai land's Foreign Polley: An Analysis of Its Evolution

II",

In

Nanyang

University,

InstItute

of

Humanities

and

Social Sciences, Occasional Papers Series, no. 73 (July 1977>. 31

Leo Suryadlnata, Prlbu•l Indonesians, ~he Chinese Minority, and China (Kuala Lumpur: HeInemann As I a, 1978).

32

Bangkok

33

Neither match, however, pitted a Chinese team against a Malaysian team, which would

Pos~,

27 February 1983.

undoubtedly

coach of

have

been

a M i dd I e Eastern

a

According to my

better test.

team was quoted

as

saying

he

had

informant the not been aware

that his team would have to play the match In Beijing! 34

The turning point in the mind of Mr Lee seems to have come about as a result of

his

first

visit

to the PRC

In May

subsequent visit almost four years he

seemed

doubtfu I

that

the

1976 and

later.

process of

was

fully

confirmed

transformIng SIngapore-chInese

Singaporeans had progressed far enough to cross a point of no return. course of hIs second vIsit Singapore

journalists

in November 1980 he reI a ted

accompanying

his

In

a

Only briefly before his 1976 visit

party

how

into

In the

in an IntervIew wIth

"Singaporean"

he

felt

in

China In 1976 and how "our life experience, our perception of the world, and our nat I on a I Chinese"

interests make us thInk, fee I and act d i tterent I y from the Ch 1na

China, 23 November 1980, Speeches 4, no. 6 !December 19801: 13-14).

35

(Xiamen,

in

Government

of

Singapore,

A government sponsored movement to return to the principles of Confucianism began

in

1980 but has received only lukewarm support from most Singaporeans,

part I cuI ar I y

the

motor-bikes,

video games,

ConfucIan campaign

ethics. with

younger The

banners

SIngaporeans, government

in

most of

and MacDonald's shopping

has

a I so

centres

45

whom show

hamburgers and

than

I aunched stickers

a In

more In

interest the

In

study of

"Speak

MandarIn"

taxis

Imploring

SIngaporeans persona I

to

speak MandarIn

experIences

campaIgn,

It

suggest

neverthe I ess

rather

only

seems

than

II ml ted

to

have

theIr

home d I a I acts.

success tared

In

the

better

A I though

"Speak MandarIn"

than

the

attempt

to

revive Confucianism. Some well-Informed Singaporeans will argue that both efforts were launched to placate that segment ot the Singapore electorate -and

theIr

I eaders

In the PAP -- who te It that SIngapore was movl ng too tar

and too rapidly towards becoming a Western, English-speaking country. Others have poInted out that a return to the Contucl an va I ue ot respect tor one's elders

and

responslbl llty

tor

economic

Implications

the PAP

I eadersh I p have rea I

Impact ot

technology

one's

tor Singapore.

parents

concerns

transfer

have

Finally, about

It the

Important

pol ltlcal

and

Is apparent that some ot unIntended

from the West to Singapore,

(and

unwanted)

and a return to

basic Confucian values Is probably seen as an effective counterweight. The Singapore Government In 1978 had assembled a task force to examine the "moral education published

programme" In 1979.

In Singapore schools, See Moral Education

and Its recommendations were Committee (Ong Tang Cheong,

Chairman), Report on Moral Educa~lon 1979 (Singapore: Singapore National PrInters, 1979). A I though not spec It I ca I I y concerned wIth Contuc I an Ism the

Report presaged the emphasIs that was I ater to to I I ow.

For a treatment ot the attempted return to Confucianism that stresses the politically authoritarian nature ot the doctrine and Its Implications tor Singapore, see

Rodney Tasker,

"Searching

tor a Better Tomorrow", 36

tor a Soul",

and Patrick Smith,

11

An Ancient Code

Far Eastern Ec:ono.lc Review, 7 May 1982, pp. 19-23.

A I though not yet as tota I I y encompassIng as wou I d be the case In an Is I ami c state, Islamic prohibitions and laws In Malaysia are not confined exclusively to members of the Muslim community. For a highly critical view of Malaysia's applIcations

of

unusually candid

Islamic

law,

practice,

custom,

Interview with the Rev. Paul

Catho If c Research Centre In Kua I a Lumpur,

In

and

constraints,

see

the

Tan Che lng, Director of the

Far

Eas~n

Ec:ono.lc Review, 3

March 1983, pp. 27, 28. Tan Sri Sufflan, former Lord President of the Federal Court (now retired) had ruled In 1979 that shari's law should be applied only to limited personal law