The end of communist rule in Albania : political change and the role of the student movement 9780367193607, 0367193604

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The End of Communist Rule in Albania

This book provides a comprehensive examination of the Albanian Student Movement of 1990–1991. To date, there are no thorough studies of the first year of the post-Communist transition in Albania, which constitutes the most critical period of transition. The lessons to be learned are vast and of great importance to the debates on social movements, mobilization, and transition. Renowned scholars of modern Albanian history, led by the former leader of the Albanian Student Movement, Shinasi A. Rama, provide a study of the critical role played by this movement in the political transformation of Albania from a totalitarian cult-state to a multiparty political system during 1990–1991. Their informed analyses combined with first-hand knowledge of the events during a key period of Albanian history shed light on the Student Movement, its ideology, values, contributions, and its relationship to the system and to the ruling caste. The authors come to the core conclusion that the Student Movement remained an independent player that achieved change in the political system at a crucial juncture. The End of Communist Rule in Albania is a much-needed contribution in the fields of social movements, democratization studies, Communist and Post-Communist politics, and Albanian Studies. Shinasi A. Rama is a Clinical Professor of Politics with the International Relations Program at New York University. He was a co-founder of the Democratic Party of Albania, served as the Spokesman of the Provisional Government of Kosova in the USA, and was the Political Advisor of the Kosovo Liberation Army. After the war, Prof. Rama served as a Senior Political Advisor to the Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Kosova and an Adviser to the Commandant of the Kosovo Protection Corps. He served as the Editor-in-Chief of The International Journal of Albanian Studies.

Conceptualising Comparative Politics: Polities, Peoples, and Markets Edited by Anthony Spanakos (Montclair State University) and Francisco Panizza (London School of Economics) Conceptualising Comparative Politics seeks to bring a distinctive approach to comparative politics by rediscovering the discipline’s rich conceptual tradition and inter-disciplinary foundations. It aims to fill out the conceptual framework on which the rest of the subfield draws but to which books only sporadically contribute, and to complement theoretical and conceptual analysis by applying it to deeply explored case studies. The series publishes books that make serious inquiry into fundamental concepts in comparative politics (crisis, legitimacy, credibility, representation, institutions, civil society, reconciliation) through theoretically engaging and empirically deep analysis. 5. Migration Governance across Regions State-Diaspora Relations in the Latin American-Southern Europe Corridor Ana Margheritis 6. What Kind of Democracy? Participation, Inclusiveness and Contestation Kateřina Vráblíková 7. Trust and Terror Social Capital and the Use of Terrorism as a Tool of Resistance Ammar Shamaileh 8. Manipulating Political Decentralisation Africa’s Inclusive Autocrats Lovise Aalen and Ragnhild L. Muriaas 9. Shaping Citizenship A Political Concept in Theory, Debate and Practice Edited by Claudia Wiesner, Anna Björk, Hanna-Mari Kivistö and Katja Mäkinen 10. The End of Communist Rule in Albania Political Change and The Role of The Student Movement Edited by Shinasi A. Rama

The End of Communist Rule in Albania Political Change and the Role of the Student Movement

Edited by Shinasi A. Rama

First published 2020 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Taylor & Francis The right of Shinasi A. Rama to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Rama, Shinasi A., 1959- editor. Title: The end of communist rule in Albania : political change and the role of the student movement / edited by Shinasi A. Rama. Description: New York : Routledge, 2020.. | Series: Conceptualising comparative politics : polities, peoples, and markets 10 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019018428 (print) | LCCN 2019980685 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367193607 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429519574 (mobi) | ISBN 9780429512711 (pdf) | ISBN 9780429516146 (epub) | ISBN 9780429242991 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Student movements--Albania--History--20th century. | College students--Political activity--Albania--History--20th century. | Youth--Political activity--Albania--History--20th century. | Post-communism--Albania. | Albania--Politics and government--1990Classification: LCC LA1040.A4 E64 2019 (print) |LCC LA1040.A4 (ebook) |DDC 371.8/1094965--dc23LC record available at https://lccn. loc.gov/2019018428 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019980685 ISBN: 978-0-367-19360-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-24299-1 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Taylor & Francis Books

For Aidan R. and Ashtin B.: “Start children off on the way they should go, and even when they are old they will not turn from it.”

Contents

List of tables List of contributors Acknowledgments Series Editor Preface 1 Who Slew The Dragon?! The Collapse Of Communism, Political Change, And The Student Movement In Albania—A Review Of The Literature

ix x xiii xiv

1

SHINASI A. RAMA

PART I

The Regime In A Deep Crisis: The Albanian Case 2 Coming To An End: The Fall Of Communist Rule In Albania

33 35

FATOS TARIFA

3 Contributing Actors To The Regime Change In Albania: The First Phase Of Transition And The Role Of The Student Movement

55

MIRELA BOGDANI

4 The Youth As Social Actor In The Albanian Regime Change

69

LUISA CHIODI

PART II

The Evolution Of The Student Movement And Its Role In The Dynamics Of Political Change 5 The Rise Of The Student Movement And Its Role In The Collapse Of The Communist Regime LLUKMAN HALILI

93 95

viii

Contents

6 The Idea Of The Nation-State And The Albanian Student Movement

147

GRID RROJI

7 Considerations On The Leadership Dynamics In The First Stage Of The Transition In Albania

167

VALBONA KARANXHA

8 Competing Visions: Albanian Youth And Students In The Late-Communist Period And The Political Elite

195

JAMES PETTIFER

9 What Kind Of Democracy? Which Kind Of Pluralism? Comparing President Ramiz Alia’s Meetings With The Intellectuals And With The Student Representation

208

AFRIM KRASNIQI

PART III

Political Change And The Student Movement In Albania: Three Perspectives

227

10 Making Sense Of Albanian Events: International Interpretations And Responses

229

MIRANDA VICKERS

11 Heroes And Myths

235

FRED ABRAHAMS

12 The Student Movement Changed Albania Forever: A Reflection On Its Contribution To Modern Albanian History

240

LLUKMAN HALILI

Conclusion 13 The Dragon Did Not Commit Suicide: The Collapse Of The Totalitarian Cult-State And The Role Of The Student Movement In Albania

254

SHINASI A. RAMA

Index

286

Tables

5.1

Overview of the number of students at the University “Enver Hoxha”, and their distribution by department in 1989/1990.

100

Contributors

Fred Abrahams is a special advisor at Human Rights Watch. Among other publications, Abrahams has co-authored A Village Destroyed: War Crimes in Kosovo (2002). He is the author of Modern Albania: From Dictatorship to Democracy (2015). Mirela Bogdani holds a doctorate and currently is an Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Tirana. Among her books are Albania and the EU: The Tumultuous Journey towards Integration and Accession (2007) and Turkey and the Dilemma of EU Accession: When Religion Meets Politics (2010). Luisa Chiodi holds a Ph.D. from the European University Institute of Florence and is the Director of the Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso. Among her contributions are the edited volume (with Francesco Priviterra) Guida ai paesi ell Europa Centrale e Balcanica (Bologna, 2006); Transnational Policies of Emancipation or Colonization: Civil Society Promotion in Post-Communist Albania (Florence, 2007); her edited volume The Borders of the Polity: Migrations and Security across the EU and the Balkans (Ravenna, 2005); and “Mass Migration, Student Protests and the Intelligentsia Popullore in the Albanian Transition to Democracy,” Working Paper Series/Report, 2012/02. Llukman Halili holds the degree of Doctor of Social Sciences from the University of Zadar, Croatia and is affiliated with The Helvetian Institute of South Eastern European Studies. With Blerim Shala, in 1992 he published a long interview with the former President of Albania Ramiz Alia, Une Ramiz Alia, dëshmoj pėr historinë (1992). His book The Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of Poland from 1945 to 1980 was published in 2012 in Zagreb, Croatia. His doctoral dissertation was published as a book, Student Movement and Change in Albania, in 2015. Valbona Karanxha holds an Ed.D. in Leadership and Policy Studies and teaches at Western State Connecticut University. Her book Politika dhe

List of contributors

xi

Strukturat e Rrethit te Ferrit was published by Instituti I Studimeve Kombetare Shqiptare, Shkoder dhe (2015). Afrim Krasniqi holds a doctorate from the University of Tirana and currently is an Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Tirana. Among his books are: Rënia e demokracisë (1998); Renia e Siberise Shqiptare (The Fall of the Albanian Siberia, 1999), Shoqëria Civile në Shqipëri (Tiranë, 2004); Partitë Politike në Shqipëri (2006); Partitë Politike dhe Sistemet Politike (2008); (Mbi)pushteti i Partive Politikë në Shqipëri (2008); Sistemet politike në Shqipëri, 1912–2008 (2009); Zgjedhjet në Shqipëri, 1990–2009 (2009); and Sistemet zgjedhore dhe administrimi zgjedhor në Shqipëri, 1990–2010 (2011). James Pettifer is a Professor of History at Oxford University where he teaches Balkan history at St. Cross College. Prof. Pettifer is the author of a number of standard works on the region such as The Greeks: The Land and People since the War (London: Penguin, 1993); The Turkish Labyrinth (1997); and Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity (with Miranda Vickers, 1997). He has edited Blue Guide: Albania and Kosovo (New York: Norton, 2001); The New Macedonian Question (2001); Kosovo Express (2005); and The Making of the Greek Crisis (2012); and has authored the most extensive study on the KLA, The Kosova Liberation Army: From Underground War to Balkan Insurgency 1948–2001 (2012). Shinasi A. Rama is a Clinical Professor of Politics with the International Relations Program at NYU. He is the author of several books in Albanian such as Probleme Politike Shqiptare (Shkoder, 2006); Perrallat e Tranzicionit Shqiptar (Tirane: Princi, 2012); Per Levizjen Studentore (Tirane: Princi, 2015); and Rrethi i Ferrit (Shkoder and New York: Instituti i Studimeve Kombetare Shqiptare, 2015), as well as Nation Failure: Ethnic Elites, Balance of Power and the International Administration of Kosova (2019). Grid Rroji is a Ph.D. Candidate at the City University of New York. His most recent book is Paria e Rrethit te Ferrit (2015). Fatos Tarifa holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a doctorate in Political Science from the University of Tirana. Currently he is Professor of Sociology and International Relations, and Director of the Institute for Studies on Democracy and Development, at the University of New York Tirana. Tarifa has authored, co-authored, and edited numerous books. Among then stand out The Quest for Legitimacy and the Withering Away of Utopia (2001), The Breakdown of State Socialism and the Emerging Post-Socialist Order (2001), and Vengeance is Mine: Justice Albanian Style (2008).

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List of contributors

Miranda Vickers studied at London University. She is the author of Albania: a Modern History (London, 1994) and Between Serbs and Albanians: A History of Kosovo (London, 1998). With Prof. James Pettifer as a coauthor, she wrote Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity (New York, 1997) and The Albanians: Reshaping the Balkans (2006). Currently she is an analyst with the International Crisis Group.

Acknowledgments

This book is the outcome of a conference held in Albania in December 2015, as part of the activities commemorating the 25th anniversary of the beginning of the student protests. The commemoration, a series of meetings, conferences, and other activities spread across three days, was organized and funded by the former leaders of the “Fan S. Noli” Student Association, with the support of the “Student Movement, 90–91” Association in Tirana. The 25th Anniversary Commemoration activities included the awarding of the “National Flag Medal,” the highest National Honor, to the Student Movement 1990–1991 by the President of Albania at the time, Bujar Nishani. My heartfelt thanks go to the Organizing Committee for the Commemoration of the Student Movement 1990–1991, and especially to Prof. Akli Fundo, Edvin Shvarc, Arben Sulo, and Myftar Gjanaj for their outstanding job in managing the events. This book would not have been possible without the steady support provided through the years by the NYU, its Department of Politics, The Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy, and the Program in International Relations. My heartfelt thanks go to the late George Downs, and to Michael J. Laver, Alastair Smith, Neal Beck, Rebecca Morton, and Bertell Ollman as well. I am especially obliged to the unfailing gentleman and the superb scholar Bruce James Bueno de Mesquita and other friends that have supported me through the years. I am grateful to my colleagues Tony Spanakos, Asli Peker, and Mehmet Tabak of the NYU Program in International Relations for their extremely useful comments and friendship. A book is only a token payback for the sublime willingness of my friends to sacrifice everything. At the least this volume can serve as a reminder for others that the reckless courage and the hopes of the youth, beyond reason, could change a nation. Humbly, therefore, I would like to dedicate this book to the memory of my student friends of the Student Movement and in particular to the fellows of the “Fan. S. Noli” Student Association. They all did so much for the betterment of the lives of the Albanian people, expecting so little in return. I am very proud to have been one of them and with them during those critical times, when, as the Japanese say, “the good name of a thousand years is won in a single moment.” They did the very best one could do. It was unexpected of them but so indispensable for the future of their own people.

Series Editor Preface

plus ça change…?

1

Former New York Governor Mario Cuomo is famous for saying that politicians campaign in poetry and govern in prose (Barnes, 1985). If campaigns are poetic because they contain that remarkable mix of hope and change (for the better, hence the hope), then what literary form would be appropriate for epoch-changing moments like those of 1989? There was something lyrically operatic—an analogue to student references to General Lamarque’s funeral in Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables and the use of Hu Yaobang’s funeral by young Chinese citizens as an opportunity to protest. The visit of Communist reformer Mikhail Gorbachev further motivated the latter and, perhaps, temporarily stayed the coercion that eventually broke up the manifestations. There was a sense of inevitability to not only the success of anti-totalitarian movements but also their replacement with liberal democracy as a utopian eschatological moment.2 Looking back three decades later there is reason for guarded optimism if not a more deep-throated cynicism. The very same scholars (and journal) who had devoted themselves to and succeeded in turning comparative politics into the study of democratization were now creating neologisms for political systems that failed to democratize and new methods for explaining why authoritarian systems withstood the allegedly inevitable pressures to democratize. There are many differences between the processes of democratic transition of the countries of the former Soviet Bloc and indeed with regard to their current democratic status but they all seem to push toward necessitating scholarly reevaluation of transitions including the watershed moment of 1989. If the overarching narrative of democratization was that of hope that a transition to liberal, capitalist, democracy was forthcoming and would be an unadulterated and welcomed good, more recent considerations require a bit more prose and being with wondering what went wrong. Albania does not get terribly much attention though it is a collection of puzzles that would trouble even veteran social scientists. Its democratization is highly peculiar, perhaps not surprising given the cult-state that emerged around Enver Hoxha in a way that was fairly unique in the Communist (and more

Series Editor Preface xv broadly authoritarian) world. There are a number of reasons the Albanian case should be investigated thoroughly. First, unlike other cases of a collapse of a regime and its legitimacy, the Albanian Communist regime had virtually no real opposition, not even in the form of a dissident intelligentsia (at home or abroad), revolved around a cultlike figure, and was so sufficiently isolated from the liberal, capitalist, democratic world (as well as most of the Communist world) that its access to materials that proved inspirational and spaces that were necessary for organization were almost wholly absent (there was neither a Havel nor a Charter 77, nor even a Charter 08). The writing was not quite “on [a crumbling] wall” and there was no obvious group of internal or external challengers to the regime, nor was there a break within the ruling elite, all key elements in most studies of transitions (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, Anderson, 1999). A second reason to give this case greater attention is similarly unique. A non-elite, non-partisan student movement emerged, remained independent of pro- and nominally critical regime intellectuals, and was a decisive actor in pushing the leadership of the regime towards transition. Its leaders were largely not from Tirana, nor were they elites, nor were they absorbed or coopted by elites who began to slowly become critical of a government that they claimed to want to reform. This was a clear case of a movement from below that was decisive and not coopted (Disi Pavlic, 2018). Thirdly, the Albanian Student Movement and the transition it facilitated become even more interesting in that it disappeared as quickly and suddenly as it emerged. In its absence, its ideas and banner were raised by various leaders (all connected to the Hoxha regime) who now positioned themselves as reformers, democrats, and capitalists. It has become commemorated by the national elites as part of a national liberation by elites who were, properly speaking, part of the system that the students challenged. The contestation over memory and the shifting positions of past partisan adversaries made possible by time, reflection, and political gain is, perhaps inevitable (Dobos and Stan, 2010, Bernhard and Kubik, 2014). Finally, the Albanian Student Movement should be of interest for scholars of transitions because the success of the students at challenging the regime was matched by the ability of the regime’s leadership to largely preserve its positions, prerogatives, and ruling apparatus under a regime with a new nomenclature: liberal, capitalist, European democracy. The current book opens an investigation into the Student Movement that begs the question of whether a transition truly took place and, if it did, how it can best be characterized. In some ways, the persistence (or, in some cases, return) of the usual suspects (pre-transition elites) is all-too-common in narratives of post-transition politics (Krastev, 2016). Authoritarian-era elites are often rehabilitated or find some current crisis that justifies their return (and that “at least you could walk the streets” under the old regime). This is not necessarily out of ethical bounds and democracies must always be careful about potentially issuing a de facto (or de jure)

xvi

Series Editor Preface

permanent sanction on current and future political activities because of activities of the past. But what is striking about the Albanian case—and the disappearance of the students, the most proximate cause of the transition, as an agent in the political transition—is that this might be the most striking case of changing the names of ministries without changing very much at all. Rama’s contributions to this book suggest that contemporary analysts misread the movements and events of 1989 and thereafter. For him, however revolutionary the changes of 1989 throughout Europe were, they were not primarily about order—not democracy or open markets. These changes saw the ruling classes adjusted to new tactics and roles but, they, largely, remained in control. This position boldly challenges much of the literature of transitions, particularly from Communist rule, and it is worth taking seriously particularly as an alternative to the widespread discussions of populist and authoritarian challenges to liberal democracy. Such readings assume that the normal trajectory was for transitions to liberal democracy and capitalism to at least have begun in earnest before they were hijacked at some point. But, perhaps they never did. In 2015, Shinasi Rama, one of the leaders of the Student Movement, convened a conference on the 25th anniversary of the Student Movement in Albania. The conference was attended by leading scholars on the Albanian transition from Communism to whatever it is today. After various rounds of feedback and reflection, the participants produced the current volume which we are pleased to include in our series as it offers considerable evidence to rethink so much of what has become conventional wisdom through deep case study analysis.

Notes 1 We thank Ben Nienass and Mishella Romo for their very useful suggestions. 2 Hence Francis Fukuyama’s famous proclamation of history’s end (Fukuyama, 1992).

References Anderson, Lisa, ed. 1999. Transitions to Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press. Barnes, Fred. 1985. “Meet Mario the Moderate: Is He the Last Liberal or a Lost Liberal?” The New Republic 192(14), April 8th: 17–20 (at 18). Bernhard, Michael and Jan Kubik, eds. 2014. Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration. New York: Oxford University Press. Disi Pavlic, Rodolfo. 2018. “Sentenced to Debt: Explaining Student Mobilization in Chile.” Latin American Research Review 53(3): 448–465. Dobos, Corina and Marius Stan, eds. 2010. Politics of Memory in Post-Communist Europe, vol. 1. Bucharest: Zeta Books. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.

Series Editor Preface xvii Krastev, Ivan. 2016. “The Specter Haunting Europe: The Unraveling of the Post1989 Order.” Journal of Democracy 27(4): 88–98. O’Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

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Who Slew The Dragon?! The Collapse Of Communism, Political Change, And The Student Movement In Albania—A Review Of The Literature Shinasi A. Rama

Three Symbolic Representations of the Change of Order and the Struggle for Legitimacy Most people would instantly recognize the story of the dragon and tell you how it ends with the salvation of the people from its enslaving evil. There is a striking parallel between the ubiquitous dragon tale and the process of radical political change, i.e., the sweeping replacement of the fundamental principles of social order. At a deeper level, the virgin-eating or the childeating dragon is a symbolic representation for the existing destructive social order and the dehumanizing rules in a society resigned to its dreadful circumstance. The dragon, therefore, is the darker force that imposes itself on the whole society albeit its presence is perceived differently by different strata that, under its rule, had adjusted their lives to its exigencies. The dragon is the antithesis of the desirable Leviathan, although we should not forget that the Leviathan is also much like a dragon, but “good to the end of days.” The slaying of the dragon, then, is simultaneously the liberating act from the old order and the fresh beginning for any society. Every society goes periodically through the symbolic process of dragonslaying and a fundamental change of the political order, replacing a dragon with a “benign” Leviathan, i.e., with a new social order. In this process, an important part is the cathartic end of separating with the past. Another important part tied to the outcome is the obvious slaying of the dragon, for the details of the slaying matter immensely to the future social order. The reason for the obsession with the act of dragon-slaying is understandable. Routinely, the act of slaying the dragon bestows an irreplaceable hero/savior status and it becomes the fountain of honor, both indispensable marks as the source of lasting legitimacy for the future rulers. Hence, an important part of the story of understanding how the political change occurred is to learn how the dragon-slaying happened and who does it. For the dragon-slaying moment is the beginning of the new social order, free of the oppressive old, i.e., the dragon itself. The “how it

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Shinasi A. Rama

happened” and “who did it” become inseparable from “what happened,” and, in due time, as important as well. What is the rationale for the need to focus on the unfolding of the act of dragon-slaying and the role of different individuals and strata in such events? Again, the rationale and the answer are revealed in the myths of dragon-slaying. In classical mythology, popular legends, and folk-tales, there are at least three versions of the dragon-slaying. All three versions may agree on the fact that the dragon was killed but they would differ radically on all of the other aspects of how the process unfolded. In each respective version, the different strata seek to appropriate the version of the slaying of the dragon. Their vital existential interests define their interpretation and they choose to believe what serves them. The different strata would stick to it even when, faced with incontestable facts, their version no longer makes sense. So what are these three versions? There is a version of the ruling caste/stratum that, with the slaying of the dragon, justifies the continuation of their rule albeit under a new religion, under new rules, or through the incorporation of the heroes in the existing ruling caste/stratum. This allows for the continuity of the ruling stratum under a freshly grown snakeskin of legitimacy; for the hero is one of them and hence, all of them partake in his heroism. This first version goes pretty much like this. A kingdom is held hostage by a dragon that demands to be fed everyday one of the children, conspicuously virgins or the nobility’s daughters. A hero, let’s say, a prince like Jason in the story of the Argonauts or Saint George in Christian mythology, appears. Invariably, in the dragon-slaying stories, the hero is a semblance of either Jason or St. George. Obviously this is a self-serving version to the ruling strata, to the aristocracy, and to the clergy, a synonym for the intellectuals of any society for the hero always needs either God or, when he cannot have heavenly guidance, in their view, a Merlin suffices. He mortally wounds the dragon and then, in the case of Saint George, brings it to Silene where it is killed. Liberated, the king and the people decide to change their religion and their life returns to the normality of the new social order. Then, there is a second version of the dragon-slaying told by the peasants as well. In this second version, a kid hero, courageous and smart, but always represented as a peasant orphan, or, very significantly, as a rejected bastard, mortally wounds the dragon and saves the daughter of the king. Yet, the ungrateful king and his advisers deny that he is the hero until a miracle happens. Only then does the bastard dragon-slayer become one of the ruling caste, let’s say Baron Linton in England. He then marries the king’s daughter and is incorporated into the ruling stratum. While peasants remain peasants, he does a lot of good things for them such as offering tax relief, punishing unjust nobles, and defending them in the king’s court. However, the hero becomes integrated into the old ruling stratum that is further entrenched and, as a stratum, thanks to him, it gets even more power.

Who Slew the Dragon? A Literature Review

3

Finally, there is a third version told by the clergy of the particular entity. In this version, to save his own skin, the shaman, the priest, the magician, or the intellectual in our own modern era, and, again, Merlin is the best illustration, tells the king where to find the dragon. Even if he can’t do much, the intellectual foretells to the king and to the people their future and the coming of the savior. Never mind that the future never materializes exactly in the same way he predicted it. What matters is that act of clairvoyance of knowing where the dragon is and how to go about killing it. No matter whether the dragon may have been his own creation, the act of foreseeing the future makes him central to the entity and to the changing order as well. The act of partaking in the act of saving the entity makes the intellectual a hero. The intellectual that shows even the way of how to slay the dragon, therefore, is transformed into a demigod, a saint, a magus, a noble, ultimately fit to rule as the legitimate ruler in the new post-dragon social order that is the new normal order. What does the myth of the dragon-slaying have to do with the specific case of political change in Albania? Why do we have to elaborate on a myth in a book on a specific case of political change and the change of social order? Well, there is a two-dimensional eerie parallel to the tales of the dragonslaying legend in the political change that took place with the collapse of Communism in Albania. One dimension concerns the act of slaying, what happened, i.e., the collapse of the system and of the old order. The second dimension is the extraordinary controversy regarding the incompatible versions of who did it and why they engaged in the dragon-slaying. Firstly, there is the dramatic parallel between how the dragon dies and how the totalitarian cult-state system and the social order that it sustained collapsed. Albania was the last domino in East Central Europe to fall. One moment the Communist rule was firmly in control. The very next moment, a democratic system was decreed and a few hours later the opposition parties were formed and established. In a sense, the dragon was alive at one moment and dead upon the next. It is either sudden death or assassination; the dragon does not commit suicide. This dramatic and sudden change of the political system in Albania is a puzzle that is not fully understood or explained in the literature. Yet, this is the perpetual subject of vehement discord in Albania and in Albanian studies. Each and every one of the main actors has their own version of the truth which is not compatible with the others. Secondly, in the process of the appropriation of the truth of dragonslaying, there are three central actors that lay claim to the collapse of the old order and to the establishment of a new social and political order in Albania. The three players, much like in the dragon-slaying myths, are the ruling caste, the intellectuals, and at the earlier stages, and in lieu of the orphan/peasant boy, the Student Movement. Significantly, while all parties recognize the important role played by the students, they persistently claim

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that either there was no movement or that the Student Movement was under their control or inspired by them. Why is this problematic? The problem is that much like in the first version of the dragon-slaying, the ruling caste has no explanation for how the system collapsed and how the political process got totally out of its control. The intellectuals were not even present at the crucial events when the change of the fundamental rules was requested and agreed upon, such as in the meeting of Student Representatives with the President Ramiz Alia that led to that collapse of order. Some of the leaders of the Student Movement claim that they acted on their own and that they knew what they were doing. As a result, even after so many years, the question remains unanswered: who slew the dragon of the totalitarian cult-state and why did they do it?!

Remembering the Slaying of the Dragon: The Student Movement as the Horse of Saint George At this point a digression is necessary. Every second week of December, the Albanian ruling caste, the media, academia, and the most important institutions and personalities of the Albanian state engage in a very interesting ritual. December 8th is a national holiday, the National Youth Day. In those few days revolving around December 8th, the establishment focuses on the commemoration of events that took place during a few days in December 1990. The overwhelming presence of politicians, of the innumerable protagonists, the wannabe heroes, and omniscient analysts, who always find something new and sensational to say about that period all the time, is rather impressive. All of them recognize that those days were extremely critical to the political and regime change that took place in Albania. The dragon, so to speak, was mortally wounded right then and there. In one event he was killed. In the other his ghost left his soul. After that period, politics was politics as usual. All claim to have done that heroic act and each one corroborates or contradicts the other’s story. Firstly, and differently from the ancient tales, this contradicts any common sense. The event of dragon-slaying is recorded in a video and, by now, is available for all to see what happened in that meeting. It was kept as a close state secret and never ever transmitted on TV except as a figure recording, set in mute, for 20 years. But, by now, it is readily available. Why is this important? In that meeting with the Student Representation, the omnipotent dictator of the state, the First Secretary of the Party and the President of Albania, agreed on the establishment of a democratic system. To be clear, the students demanded the establishment of a multiparty system and the president agreed to the establishment of a multiparty system. That was the moment of the slaying of the dragon, and the moment of death of the old order. Albeit conditioned by the influential twin factors of enormous external pressure and boiling popular discontent, the establishment of a new order and of the new system to implement it was recognized and accepted by the

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dictator himself. You may claim it was a suicide, but if somebody demands that you die, and you consent, it no longer is just a suicide. Any court would say that this is murder. The second event is also remembered with the same veneration although there is intense disagreement on the utility of the path taken afterwards. The same ritual of commemoration is repeated on February 20th, the anniversary of the toppling of the statue of Enver Hoxha. This is the moment when the source of legitimacy of the system was openly challenged. The people of the capital, supposedly the firm bastion of support for the regime, toppled the statue of Enver Hoxha in the main Skanderbeg Square of the capital. Again, faced with huge resistance from inside and outside, the regime chose to do nothing and thereby lost the source of its legitimacy. These are two essential and momentous events in the process of radical political change in Albania. The Communist system collapsed in December 1990 for the social order and the rules of the political game were irreversibly changed in a few minutes. Going from a totalitarian cult-state to a multiparty system is as real a change as it can get. Then, with the popular rejection of the idol of the cult-state, a new age was made possible upon the ruins of the old order in February 1991. The cult of the infallible and omniscient prophet was substituted with the fiat voluntas populi. First the dragon lost his body and then he lost his soul. The totalitarian anti-Leviathan cult-state was dead. After these critical events, through craft, politics, and legal means, the emerging politicians were to build the new normal society and state based on a new order. The events were connected to one another, for the main actors in both of them were the students. These few months from December 1990– February 1991, culminating in these two events, were, so to speak, the heroic times of the Albanian transition. Yet, as with all watershed and heroic events, there is more to it than meets the eye. This powerful and seemingly nostalgic commemoration, routinely organized by some of the leading figures of the ruling caste of contemporary Albania, backed by their powerful propaganda and media apparatus, is not simple nostalgia. If you follow their speeches attentively, sooner rather than later, you are confronted by a very puzzling paradox. On the one hand, the attention is focused on the Student Movement of 1990–1991. The Student Movement and its achievements are glorified. Participants are routinely and repeatedly decorated and honored. The Student Movement itself has been decorated multiple times by all the presidents of the state. In the talk shows, there are endless discussions about the Student Movement, its leaders, its contribution, and its role in history. However, as one could surmise, there is a twist. In their pronunciations, interviews, and speeches, the Student Movement becomes the horse of Saint George. In the media, in their speeches and eulogies, these personalities, clearly outsiders to the Student Movement, act as if they were its soul, its ideologues, its minders and controllers. Horses can’t be heroes but individuals can become heroes and Saint Georges as well. Not surprisingly, innumerable personalities

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and politicians reminisce about their own heroic times and the focus is on their own heroic role. The focus of any discussion rapidly shifts onto the very important role that the current leading figures of the ruling caste claim to have played in its contribution and historic achievements. It is all about these politicians and how they killed the dragon. The only problem is that there is no shred of evidence to support what they claim. They were not there. Simply put, the emerging documents, recordings, testimonies, and reports show and definitively prove that they were not there. They had no role in these events and actually were fiercely opposed to the students and to their agenda. Therefore, the annual commemoration of these events by the ruling stratum is quite perplexing. All the leading politicians of this generation, including the President Ilir Meta, the Prime Minister Edi Rama, and in particular Sali Berisha, the long-time former Prime Minister and President, as well as a substantial part of the ruling caste, claim to have played a role in these events as leaders, inspirers, participants, influencers, or enablers. On the surface, it seems that these politicians are paying due respects to a set of events that are truly momentous in contemporary Albanian history. Indeed, the shift from the totalitarian, one-party cultstate to a multiparty system is an incomparable event in the history of every state, worthy of utmost respect and remembrance. Obviously, there is a reason why this media show, based on a purely imaginary role of the intellectuals and of the leading elements of the ruling class, is a ritualized yearly event. Essentially, the concerted effort of the ruling class is focused on protecting their vital interests in a fierce battle for legitimacy. The paradox is that their battle for legitimacy is with the Student Movement itself. For there is always one last mortal blow given to the dragon, so to speak, and in that stroke is where the real source of heroism and future legitimacy lies. The heroes of the past, all killed by the dragon, did not solve the problem. For they were all killed or failed. The problem was solved by whoever killed the dragon itself, the usurper anti-Leviathan. Here, then, is their conundrum. If these politicians recognize and accept the fact that the Student Movement was the decisive factor in the collapse of the Communist system, and that the Student Movement gave that deadly blow to the system, then they would appear to be nothing more than opportunists that took advantage of the Student Movement. For the regime in Albania did not change gradually and over several years. The regime was gradually weakened, wounded, but it collapsed almost instantly. The rules of the political system were changed in a matter of hours. The system changed with an exchange of words in a meeting after the students, on their own, demanded the establishment of political pluralism. This was the moment when the system collapsed. The paradox is made even more perplexing because before that collapse, the intellectuals and these elements of the ruling class were all, unfortunately all of them, on the record, for the gradual reformation and the improvement of the then-existing totalitarian cult-state. In short, after the collapse of the

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system and the changing of the rules, they were left like fish out of the water. Speaking publicly about reforming a system that, minutes after the meeting of December 11th, 1990, was already dead was a ridiculous political position. Hence, unless these currently powerful politicians claim that they were somehow central to that particularly important event, their legitimacy as independent and influential political factors that affected the political change, and that deserve to shape it in the future, leading the state and rule in the new social order, amounts to nothing. They have to show that they did something that made them central to that act of dragon-slaying. Furthermore, it is not merely the matter of the slaying of the dragon. Equally important was the choice about the future order. What kind of state and society was going to be constructed in the post-cult-state Albania? The events that took place during those few months separate two very distinct epochs and two entirely incompatible social orders. The Albanians knew what system they were leaving behind but they did not know which system would be beneficial to them in the future. A truly incomparable predicament: Albania had to make a choice about what kind of order was to be established and the state was to embark on an experiment that was unique. Political change in Albania was not a reversal, like in the case of Czechoslovakia, who could claim to go back to the democracy of the interwar period. In Albania, the real totalitarian cult-state of the Cold War, this was a new beginning and an experiment that set it apart from all East Central Europe. Given the specificities of the Albanian case, the magnitude and the gravity of what happened and of the choices that were made must not be underestimated. In those four days in December 1990, the socialist Albania, the twin brother ideological totalitarian cult-state to North Korea, collapsed and politically broke down. More significantly, the totalitarian cult-state system collapsed in a single meeting. The dragon is not killed only by the sword; this time around, the dragon died in a meeting. This time, in many ways, for the Albanians, history is and will remain tied to this single event. This was, indeed, history; for the entire edifice of the future social order was conditioned by the outcome of this historical moment that made the totalitarian cult-state past history and that offered an unexpected new opportunity. What was impossible to contemplate even a day before became legally permissible in a few minutes. If you were one of the people that helped bring about this change, then you certainly enjoy real legitimacy as a political actor for you risked everything to make it happen. If you joined any political processes after that event, you are only a mere opportunist. After that meeting of December 11th, 1990, you would not have risked everything for making a political choice. In February 1991, the status of Enver Hoxha was toppled and, with that event, the regime lost its legitimacy and the state was separated from the cult of the leader. Afterwards, the politics in Albania was politics as usual. To sum up the point, the cult-state dragon was alive at one moment and breathless the very next second. So, who dealt that deadly blow? In a thousand sophisticated ways, most of the leaders of the current ruling

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caste claim to have killed the dragon or, at least, to have taught others how to kill the dragon. When they have no other choice, they simply claim that they had the back of the students while they killed the dragon. Each cluster of people that are currently striving for legitimacy, in this yearly repeated battle, sticks to its own version of events. Often they are claiming the impossible and the unreal. It is not surprising that by acting in concert, and by being relatively supportive of each other, they create a very disorienting, absurd, and surreal drama. They claim that they killed the hideous dragon that was the totalitarian cultstate. To convincingly tell the people how they killed it, they have to stick to the same story that has already been thoroughly debunked. In this effort by many Albanian politicians to find their own centrality and agency in those events, by hook or by crook, the truth is the perpetual victim. Obviously, there is the other side that is ubiquitously present. Documents, materials, and recordings as well as personal testimonies show that processes had evolved in a thoroughly different manner from that claimed by the narratives that pervade the official media. The narratives that are presented are essentially mutually exclusive. As a matter of fact, there is not one truth but there are several different entrenched truths about the collapse of the totalitarian cult-state that are presented every year.

On the Handling of the Albanian Case in the Literature There is a vast literature on this period of Albanian history in the Albanian language. Within that literature, here are several important studies that focus specifically or extensively on the Student Movement. The most comprehensive contributions are the studies, memoirs, or the analyses by Ramiz Alia (Halili and Shala, 1992), Blendi Fevziu (Fevziu, 1993), Afrim Krasniqi (Krasniqi, 1998), Prec Zogaj (Zogaj, 2014), Shinasi Rama (Rama, 2015), Luljeta Progni (Progni, 2013), Servet Pellumbi, Izet Haxhia, and, in particular, the two books by Llukman Halili (Halili, 2015a, 2015b). I will briefly review some of these studies and essays. Then I will discuss other important sources. In his long essay Pedestals without Statues, Blendi Fevziu does not pretend to offer a professional analysis of the period or an in-depth examination of the Student Movement.1 Blendi Fevziu was not at the center of events, and he did not have the inside knowledge of how the decisions were made. This outsider position is clearly reflected in the book-length essay. Yet, the book was published almost immediately after the events took place. Given the detailed description of the events, his book is immensely important. It is very rich in evidence and quite objective. In many substantial ways, it is a personal testimony that markedly went astray of the mainstream interpretations at the time. Given the notoriously difficult evaluations of the social and student movements in general, this first serious effort helps highlight some of the critical moments in the evolution of the Student Movement. It is a very important dissenting view

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that showed many of the cracks in the official versions of events even if that may have not been the intention of the author. Afrim Krasniqi’s book The Fall of Albanian Siberia: The Student Movement, December 1990- February 1991 is the earliest serious systematic attempt to examine the Student Movement and its role during the transition.2 One of the active participants in the Student Movement, Krasniqi went to great lengths to get his hands on the primary documents and sources rather than relying on the individual testimonies of the intellectuals and of other prominent politicians of the time. Krasniqi has done an invaluable service in reconstructing some of the key events, especially some of the events of the earlier days of the student activities in which he himself was an active participant. Regrettably, given his affiliation with the Democratic Party (at the time, he was an MP and the President of the Youth Forum of the Democratic Party), Krasniqi was quite biased. This bias shows strongly in the manner in which he handles key events and people or in the selectivity of the evidence. In spite of its professional shortcomings, and, at certain points, the marked lack of objectivity in the presentation and the analysis of several critical moments, this study is an extremely valuable reference to any professional analysis of the period and of the Student Movement. A journalist and, at the time, a doctoral student studying the early phase of the transition, Luljeta Progni has done an outstanding job in problematizing the treatment of the Student Movement in the literature in her study The White Gabardines – The Secrets of Those that Dismantled the Dictatorship (Progni, 2013). Interestingly, Progni started by assuming that the intellectuals had been the main factor in the process of the collapse of the totalitarian cultstate. Initially, the focus of her book was on the evolution of the Democratic Party and the factional fighting within it during the earlier stages of the transition. Initially, considering the Student Movement only as a transitional phase that preceded the Democratic Party and that then naturally fused into the opposition, her intention was to focus more on the role of intellectuals and the various Democratic Party leadership crises during 1991. In the research process, however, she realized that although her focus was on the intellectuals and the Democratic Party, the book inevitably had to deal with the Student Movement as a separate and distinct entity from the intellectuals. Aware of the gap in the existing studies, Progni meticulously identified some of the key people, events, contributions, and structures that ultimately led her to consider the Student Movement as an important factor in the earliest phase of transition. Subsequently, given the in-depth knowledge that she accumulated as a researcher, Progni posed highly specific questions to many of the activists and protagonists so that they had to provide her with specific answers. This approach did not leave much room for evasion or speculation on their side. The selection of the personalities that were interviewed makes this substantial compendium all the more valuable. In the end, Progni was unable to make up her mind about what happened. When it comes to the Student Movement,

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she leaves us with many more questions than answers. This is, indeed, one of the strengths of the book. In any event, most of the people who were interviewed clearly show that they were only marginal to the decision-making process or, at best, played only a secondary role in the Student Movement. No matter how important and famous they became afterwards, at the time, they did not have a significant leadership role to play. One of the books that purportedly seeks to give an objective view of December 1990, this time through documents and seemingly a very professional presentation, is the collection of documents prepared by Alexander Meksi, December '90: Documents and Materials. 3 A long-time Prime Minister (1992–1997), through what appears to be an objective presentation of the existing documents and materials, Meksi seeks to establish his own place in history. Yet, this comes at the expense of the Student Movement, in particular. On the one hand, Alexander Meksi has never been part of the Student Movement, neither in December 1990 nor later. In fact, during the Hunger Strike of February 1991, Meksi was on the opposite side. On the other hand, there is only one key document related to the Student Movement in this collection. Given the plethora of documents and materials related to the Student Movement and to its activities in the various archives, one would expect a long-time serving Prime Minister to systematically collect and present them. For example, although he had full access to the documents and reports, Alexander Meksi did not even search the State Archives, the Central Committee Archive, or the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs where the most important materials for the Student Movement were and remain stored. Among the most interesting and eye-catching materials is the inadequate transcript of the meeting between Ramiz Alia and the Student Representation. The transcript of the meeting is not done with the proper professionalism. Specifically, important exchanges and passages that are essential to the establishment of a multiparty system in Albania are left out, presumably because the conversation is not heard very well. Since this is the only material related to the Student Movement included in this book, the impression one gets is that there was no Student Movement at all. A conversation is not a movement. This intentional misrepresentation raises the red flag about the objectivity and the intentions of the author. In short, by downplaying the role of the Student Movement, and by withholding the available documents, Meksi attempts to show that he himself, the intellectuals, and the Democratic Party played the central role in the process. Among the recent books that deal at length with the Student Movement is Preç Zogaj’s The Beginnings. 4 Off the bat, Zogaj argues that there was no single movement of students. There was, according to him, a movement of students and intellectuals, in which the intellectuals played the central and most important role. However, as he admits in one of his other interviews, regardless of the role he was assigned, it was me who invited him to be a part of the opposition. Unbeknownst to us, though, Zogaj, who at the time was a prominent poet, was also an active informant of the secret political police, the

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State Security. Having said that, he was very close to other intellectuals that were heavily promoted by the regime such as Besnik Mustafaj. Zogaj’s book is very ambitious for it seeks to reconstruct the process of the collapse of the totalitarian cult-state and extends the process of collapse and transition through the three critical years of 1989–1992. As such, his book goes far beyond an individual testimony. However, given the lack of professionalism, the extensive speculation, and the untamed literary imagination, his book also suffers from many debilitating shortcomings. Paramount among them are its lack of objectivity, especially in the case of the Student Movement, and the excessive lyrical and poetical descriptions of events and people, which make this book a novel rather than a serious study. Based on his own doctoral dissertation, and subsequently building on one another, the two books by Llukman Halili remain the indispensable reference point for any scholar of the period. Halili’s book The Albanian Student Movement, 1990–1991: Its Historical Origins and Its Contribution during the Phase of Political Transformation is a must for any serious researcher on the Student Movement.5 During the first year of transition, 1990–1991, Halili was among the handful of accredited foreigners that were ubiquitously present in Tirana, and that were allowed relative freedom of movement and contacts. Hence, he writes as a scholar, as a witness, but also as an extremely well-informed and very skilled professional in informational and political affairs. In his writings, Halili argues that the Albanian transition was unique. One of the main reasons for this uniqueness is that during the early stages of this process, the Student Movement played the central role. In his view, the Student Movement was not taken over by the regime. More importantly, it operated in a distinct path from the intelligentsia in Tirana. He notes that the Albanian Student Movement managed to wrest important concessions by the regime that led to the establishment of a multiparty system on December 11th, 1990. Halili shows how the Student Movement forced President Ramiz Alia to accept political pluralism and a multiparty system. He goes on to show how the students organized and led the Hunger Strike of February 1991, which led to the overthrow of the statue of Enver Hoxha and the delegitimization of the regime. Halili contends that the Student Movement became a part of the opposition, mainly of the Democratic Party, in which many important student leaders played a first-hand role such as its first Chairman, Azem Hajdari, but also other student leaders. Significantly, Halili claims that the Student Movement was not a mere historical accident but the expression of the opposition to the Stalinist regime, which evolved into a proper social and ideological movement based on nationalism and the Albanian Renaissance. He claims that the Student Movement in Albania and the student movement in Kosova share ideological similarities that should not be underestimated and underappreciated. In his view, a better understanding of the Student Movement is “the crucial starting point of any scientific approach that purports to examine the

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subsequent developments and the transformation of the Albanian society in the post-Cold War period and of its system as a whole.”6 In my own book, On the Student Movement, 1990–1991, I draw heavily on my own intimate knowledge of the events and processes as one of the organizers and the leaders of the Student Movement.7 After all, I myself made many of the key decisions and I knew the reasons why I made those decisions better than anybody else. The format of my book was such that it allows for a mixture of personal testimony and of an objective analysis of the events from a social sciences perspective. My book echoes and supports many of the claims made by Halili, Krasniqi, Haxhia, and others that consider the Student Movement as a very important agent of change that acted independently of the intellectuals, the regime, and other emerging civil society and political structures. The book filled many gaps that were noticeable in the literature. Besides these studies, there is a substantial body of literature that is made up of memoirs or analyses of the events of the period that aim to go far beyond the personal testimonies and, in many important respects, become valuable reflections on the period. In this category, among others, stand out the books by Ramiz Alia (Halili and Shala, 1992; Alia, 2010), Robert Goro (Goro, 2004), Izet Haxhia (Haxhia, 2016), and Besnik Mustafaj (Mustafaj, 1999). Their arguments deserve closer scrutiny for some of these people either played very important roles in the processes or were close to key players. The hand-picked successor of Enver Hoxha, Ramiz Alia was the most important political figure in Albania. His books, interviews, and memoirs stand out and are an indispensable point of reference for any scholar and researcher. To the end, Ramiz Alia, a consummate politician and formally the First Secretary of the Albanian Labor Party and the President of Albania at the time, defended his political choices and his actions. He does this in his books as well. Ramiz Alia was at the center of the decision-making and, luckily, he was a politician like no other in Albania. In more than one sense, Alia was central to the transformation of the system and to the establishment of the new social order. Yet, when it comes to the Student Movement and the transition, there are many discrepancies in his arguments. Video recordings, documents, meeting protocols, and reports of 1990–1991 show that Alia was not always truthful in what he later on wrote in his books. In those documents, recordings, and registrations, you find a very different Alia from the one he presents in his subsequent writings. A tenacious, wily, and shrewd politician that never gave up unless he was forced to, Alia is revealed to have fought for the party and the ruling caste to which he belonged and for the interests of the structures which he led to the bitter end. However, he did not go to extremes and Alia managed to avoid a civil war and bloodshed. His duplicity takes away much of the strengths of his arguments and claims, but nonetheless his memoirs, interviews, and books are an essential reference point for the study of this period.

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In his recent book, Përballë Sali Berishës (Haxhia, 2016), Izet Haxhia, another of the active participants in the Student Movement, and later on the Head of Security for the President of Albania, has offered a most valuable and thoughtful analysis of the period and of the Student Movement. As the personal bodyguard of Sali Berisha at the time, Haxhia had the opportunity to know in depth many of the key players and have a sophisticated understanding of the processes. Haxhia argues that the Student Movement was genuine but there was a cabal of people from Tropoja, such as Azem Hajdari, Besnik Mustafaj, and Sali Berisha, that plotted to take over the fledging opposition and that were systematically opposed to the Student Movement and its other leaders. In Dosja 1990–1991, Dëshmia e Kico Mustaqit, Robert Goro (Goro, 2004), at the time a journalist with the Albanian News Agency, offers a book-long interview with Kico Mustaqi, then a Politburo member and the Minister of Defense. The book is a mixture of Mustaqi’s personal testimony of what happened within the leadership and of Goro’s own analysis as an informed outsider. The book provides valuable insights on how the system was reacting and how the Student Movement was perceived by the society, the intellectuals, the loyalists, and the powers that be at the time. There is a vast literature made up of memoirs, individual recollections, and reflections of the participants and student leaders. In this body of literature two edited volumes stand out. One is the second part of Luljeta Progni’s book The White Gabardines: The Secrets of Those Who Dismantled the Dictatorship (Progni, 2013) which includes the interviews of 21 individuals that claimed to have played a significant role in the process.8 The other volume, December ’90: A Compendium of Recollections and Reflections (Grup Autorësh, 2011), includes the recollections of 47 student activists and intellectuals. As a part of this body of literature, the extensive interviews, reflections, and the analyses of the participants in the Student Movement are immensely valuable both as personal testimonies but as reflections as well. There are priceless gems of evidence that one finds in the interviews, articles, or the analyses of Edvin Shvarc, Azem Hajdari, Arben Lika, Pandeli Majko, Akli Fundo, Mimoza Ferraj, Arben Sulo, Myftar Gjanaj, Arian Manahasa, Blendi Gonxhe, Ilir Dizdari, Ilir Meta, Blendi Fevziu, Arben Kushta, Mark Marku, Artan Tahiraj, Alban Pici, Ndue Lugja, Afrim Krasniqi, Bardhyl Ukcamaj, Spiro Curraj, Ardi Stefa, Mesila Doda, Ilir Tole, Arben Ahmetaj, Neritan Sejamini, Alban Tërshana, and many others. Numerous other participants have periodically offered testimonies and evidence that, when it is properly evaluated, carries immense weight in any such analysis. Many of the interviews of the protagonists are to be found in the two edited volumes of Progni (Progni, 2013) and the Group of Authors Collection (Grup Autorësh, 2011). However, there is a vast number of additional interviews that are published in the Albanian media almost every year. One could safely assume that since these were the last and the most complete interviews, these participants and activists practically said there all that they had to say.

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These two edited volumes, then, are immensely important to any study of the Student Movement. The most striking aspect of these interviews and recollections is the clear lack of information about the key major decisions that defined the Student Movement and the political change in Albania. In their recollections, almost none of the contributors can convincingly explain how these decisions were made and how they themselves were related to the decision-making process. This is perplexing because for many years, several of these people have claimed to be the protagonists and the leaders of the Student Movement. In these recollections, they show that they were not part of the leadership group that made those key decisions. Having said that, the two volumes remains a valuable contribution to properly considering the Student Movement from the perspective of witnesses and participants. If properly evaluated and interpreted, these books contain some really important pieces of information and testimonies that deserve attention. Many of the leading political actors, from all sides, have given long interviews that offer a rich view of the period and of the events. Among them, one would single out the books or the long interviews by leading politicians and key figures such as Xhelil Gjoni, Sali Berisha, Gramoz Pashko, Skender Gjinushi, Lisien Bashkurti, Prec Zogaj, Hekuran Isai, Robert Koli, Muho Asllani, Aleksander Meksi, Mehmet Elezi, Besnik Mustafaj, and others. As part of this body of literature, one cannot fail to mention other important personalities of the time that published their recollections in the form of either books, interviews, or book chapters, such as Edi Rama, Abdi Baleta, Guro Zeneli, Muharrem Xhafa, Ardian Klosi, Mitro Cela, Arben Imami, Edmond Budina, Edmond Trako, Mimoza Pashko, Frrok Cupi, Blerim Cela, or Eduard Zaloshnja. Either published as books, as interviews in the newspapers, or as book chapters or in the shape of interviews given in highly rated hour-long TV talk shows, these contributions deal extensively with the Movement and the context in which it evolved. Their arguments should be seriously considered and weighted in any analysis of the period and of the Student Movement as well. From a scholarly standpoint, there is an influential body of literature made up of general analyses of the transition in which the Student Movement is analyzed but not in depth and mainly as part of the broader transformation of the Albanian society and state. In this ever-growing literature stand out the books and studies of Elez Biberaj (Biberaj, 1998), Fatos Tarifa (Tarifa, 1997, 1998), Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997), and Fred Abrahams (Abrahams, 2015). Among the influential analyses one has to single out Albania: The Rocky Road to Democracy by Elez Biberaj.9 In this book it is clearly seen that beneath the apparent layer of objectivity, especially when it comes to the Student Movement, Biberaj wholeheartedly and unquestionably embraces the version of the intellectuals of Tirana and the cabal of Tropoja led by Sali Berisha and Besnik Mustafaj. This is quite obvious, in particular, when it comes to the change in the rules of the political system. Biberaj accepts as

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factual the version offered at the time by Sali Berisha and Besnik Mustafaj. This is quite puzzling for, even at the time, there were numerous articles and interviews that had convincingly challenged that version and that Biberaj had access to but which he did not consider. This shortcoming greatly weakens his claims of objectivity and impartiality. The same shortcomings, but this time around, reflecting the views of another group of intellectuals connected with the previously ruling caste, are found in one of the most serious books about the Albanian transition, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity by Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer.10 In their book, Vickers and Pettifer bypass the Student Movement and focus on the evolving dynamics of the political transition considering the intellectuals as the main players. Among the most valuable recent studies one has to single out Fred Abrahams’s Modern Albania. 11 This is a remarkable effort in dissecting the complexities of the earlier stage of the transition. Abrahams has interviewed numerous participants and many of the major actors of the Albanian transition. The book is very ambitious and informative. His book, however, has several major shortcomings. Abrahams tries to build his narrative mainly based on the testimonies of the participants and on the documents available outside Albania. Heavily influenced by his background as a researcher and as a journalist, Abrahams needs, and thereafter creates, a dramatic narrative. In addition, he relies heavily on the CIA and other sources from outside Albania. As a professional, I know for a fact that the information provided to foreigners at the time was very scarce, spoon-fed, and, more often than not, was utterly inaccurate and purposefully misleading. The shortcomings of the book become enhanced because of the journalistic approach that conditions the narrative. The lack of the proper theoretical perspective, the selectivity of the sources on which he relied, the political preferences of the researchers with whom he collaborated, and his attempt to explain the failed transition as tied to the choices made mainly by personalities and the ruling caste and ignoring the pressure from below, as in the case of the Student Movement, greatly weaken the book. The Student Movement has gradually drawn the attention of the younger generation of academic researchers as well. This body of literature is made up of numerous theses and dissertations that focus on this critical period and the transition. Among these research projects stand out the dissertations and theses by Luisa Chiodi, Johana Shahini, Eduart Kaca, Elda Gjergji, Alma Bocaj, Dorian Koci, Sonila Boçi, Albana Agolli, and Doriana Pano but also others that had to deal with the Student Movement as a political factor. The examination of the Student Movement in these studies may be somewhat limited and contextual. Their focus is on the broader political processes of transition. Still, they had to examine it as a distinct factor in the processes of transition. Another set of literature is made up of the documents and materials that are related to the period and that have uncovered a great deal of truths that were refused to this point. Here one cannot fail to mention the systematic and diligent work of Blendi Fevziu, the best-known talk-show

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host in Albania, that has done much to publish some of the significant documents and materials related to the period on his own TV show Opinion. Robert Papa, an investigative journalist, has brought forth substantial evidence by digging in the Archive of the Albanian Labor Party and the State TV and presenting and replaying the recordings on his own TV show Focus. Video recordings of the events by Agim Buxheli, Mikel Pendavinji, Roland Tasho, and others remain an essential part of the evidence that has been brought forth recently and that has helped change the understanding of the events and of the Student Movement itself. Finally, a very valuable primary source remains the daily reports from Tirana of the foreign journalists. Among them stand out the reports by Fahri Musliu and especially by Llukman Halili that are included as an appendix in his book in Croatian but that could, very easily, stand as a book by themselves.12 Kastriot Dervishi, the former Director of the Archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but also journalists such as Dashnor Kaloci, Ferdinand Dervishi, and Gilmana Bushati have published numerous key documents and archival materials that help create a much clearer view of the time, of the people, and of the context. In short, it is safe to say that the literature on the Student Movement and the period is really burgeoning. The interest in the period is unabated. Yet, in spite of all the new evidence coming out, all the time, the debates are the same. The leading actors, the participants in the Movement, and the analysts all seem to have made up their mind on what happened and this is the opposite of what the others argue. The slaying of the dragon appears to have been like a ritual murder when everybody at the same time thrust their knives and killed the beast. To better understand what happened, we have to turn to the interpretations of the events.

Rashomon Albanian Style: Three Interpretations of the Student Movement in the Literature One might expect that the Albanian scholars would have reached a consensus about all the questions that were listed above. Indeed, in contemporary Albanian studies, there is wide agreement on what happened in December 1990 in terms of the process of the collapse of the totalitarian cult-state. However, there is wide disagreement in terms of who did what, how did these processes evolve, and why certain key decisions were taken. Surprisingly, the Student Movement remains one of the most contested, questioned, examined, and disputed social movements in modern Albanian history. On the long road of Albanian transition, which is still going to nowhere, the Student Movement is simply a fulminous flash, for it lasted only a few months. Yet, the Student Movement seems to be a very important part of the explanation for the outcome of these processes at this early stage. No wonder, then, that all the main aspects of the activity of the Student Movement are disputed with an unusual bias and acrimony.

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The Student Movement is recognized as a central factor, but its existence is questioned. The politicians purposefully downplay its contributions to the processes of political and regime change. It would be safe to say that we have three competing, and mutually exclusive, narratives of the early processes of political change in Albania. All of them build upon the respective interpretation of the events. One interpretation is the interpretation of the former ruling class that claims that they were in control of the processes. The second interpretation is the interpretation of the events offered by an important faction of the current ruling elite that represents itself as the heroic agents of change. A subset of this interpretation is the argument that what happened was like a bolt of lightning in a clear sky. Singlehandedly, Azem Hajdari managed to do everything in only four days. Then, the “Movement of December” as they call it evolved naturally in the Democratic Party. The third interpretation argues that the process was much more complex. The regime had designs of its own and wanted a reformation of the system. They argue that the Student Movement radically changed the rules of the game and helped bring about unexpected change in the form of political demands and, later on, the mobilization of the masses and the toppling of the statue of Enver Hoxha. Hence, to go back to the metaphor of the beginning, the Student Movement mortally wounded the dragon and then killed it. All of these three narratives offer a distinct interpretation that is entirely incompatible with the others. This warrants careful examination of their claims and counter-claims. We also have to look carefully at the gaps in their arguments and discrepancies that, often, help not just raise questions but unravel the respective version of the events. The First Interpretation: The Students Were Used by the Intellectuals… For the past 27 years, one of the most powerful factions of the Albanian ruling class, in power for most of this time, repeatedly and aggressively has claimed that their legitimacy to lead the transition is based on the role that, presumably, they played at this early stage. At the time, the majority of the people advocating for this interpretation were part of the intelligentsia of Tirana. They were professionals, artists, physicians, writers, poets, actors, lecturers, and researchers. Among them one would mention Aleksander Meksi, Sali Berisha, Gramoz Pashko, Besnik Mustafaj, Arben Imami, Prec Zogaj, and several others. Their narrative of the events is quite simple. It is based on two parallel narratives that, if believed as presented, would make them the dragon-slayers of the Communist system. On the one hand, they try to represent themselves as “the intellectual circle of Tirana.” Supposedly, they were an organized dissident group that was opposed to the regime. This myth of presumed dissidence on their side is easily debunked. Many of them were on the payroll of the State Security as informants recruited at a very young age and had done much harm to many people in their past lives. Some of them, like Gramoz Pashko, even had foreigners assigned to

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live in their homes for a whole year, which means that their abodes practically served as residencies of the State Security. Others, like Sali Berisha, were serving as secretaries of party organizations in their workplace, had a reputation as hard-liners, and were routinely used by the State Security. Some of them were serving as advisers to Ramiz Alia or even were trusted subordinates of Nexhmije Hoxha. For example, Besnik Mustafaj was a trusted employee of the Central Committee of the Party and, at the same time, a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth Organization. Even in late 1990, Mustafaj went to France to sell and distribute the Collected Works of Enver Hoxha to the French people. In the best-case scenario, this so-called “intellectual circle of Tirana” were a handful of people who were entirely isolated from the people, tolerated by the regime, and who regularly congratulated themselves on their own achievements over imported cognac and whisky. According to their narrative, in the Student City, there were several spontaneous protests and shoutings demanding electricity, better living conditions, hot water, and better food. These spontaneous expressions of student dissatisfaction with the living conditions, initially encouraged and tolerated by the regime, were an amorphous protest that was channeled into a political protest on December 8th, 1990, by a group of students. At the helm of the protests, they argue, emerged a single student, Azem Hajdari. According to their narrative, Hajdari was the one and only leader and the mythical hero of these protests. Their insistence is that Azem Hajdari represented the will of the student mass and, in fact, they claim that he controlled the student mass. However, because neither Hajdari nor other students knew what they had to do, they decided to follow the leadership of the intellectuals. Thus, they present themselves as the Merlins of the transition. This is the point when the two narratives become the rails that support their argument. They argue that the situation changed and it became really politicized only when these members of the intelligentsia, i.e., “the intellectual circle of Tirana,” went to the Student City and took over the leadership of the protests. In short, they claim that they were behind every decision that was made by the students. As their argument goes, students, including Azem Hajdari himself, agreed to follow the leadership of the prominent members of the intelligentsia like Sali Berisha, Gramoz Pashko, and others. In a few hours, according to this narrative, Azem Hajdari and other students were transformed just into an instrument of their will. These members of the intelligentsia told the students what to do, how to think, what decisions to take, and in more than one sense, they became the mind controllers of the protests. The Student Movement was basically transformed into the horse of Saint George. Hence, for everything that happened, there was an explanation that ascribed to them agency, sometimes as actors, sometimes as decisive influencers, and, in the case of Hajdari and others, as minders. For example, they agree that the students demanded the establishment of a multiparty system, but they insist that they told the students to do so beforehand. When it comes to the founding of the first opposition party, they claim that they founded the

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party and the students were just part of the cheering crowd that only supported that party which they claim to have founded. When it comes to the Student Movement, they insisted that there was no student movement but only four days of protests in December, so it had to be called “the December Movement” (much like in the Russian version of Decabristi). Hence, we had not a student movement as its participants and leaders consciously insisted on defining it, very significantly, at the time. According to them, the students were just a disgruntled mass guided and used intelligently and skillfully by the determined and courageous supposedly dissident members of the intelligentsia, i.e., by themselves. It was, their narrative proclaims, these dissidents that were far-sighted, democratically minded, pro-Western, liberal, and the real promoters of change. One cannot help but notice how they appropriated the narrative of the Czech, Hungarian, and Bulgarian opposition to the system and adjusted it to the Albanian case. The foreigners bought into this narrative for it made perfect sense to them. Yet, there are so many holes in their arguments that make their claims appear a pure figment of their wildest fantasy on a par with Baron Munchhausen’s imagination. To begin with, one cannot reconcile their claims and arguments with the testimonies of the leading personalities of the time. At various times, but always relatively consistently, Ramiz Alia, Xhelil Gjoni, Robert Koli, Skender Gjinushi, Lisien Bashkurti, Ismail Ahmeti, and many other leading personalities such as Sabit Brokaj have said, quite openly, that these individuals were not acting outside of the control of the system.13 The clearest testimony of them all has come from Xhelil Gjoni, then the number two man of the regime. Gjoni, as a matter of fact, was in charge of the intelligentsia. It was Xhelil Gjoni himself who hand-picked Sali Berisha and Besnik Mustafaj and then sent them to do what they did.14 Xhelil Gjoni has debunked many of their claims by showing how and why he himself, following the instructions of Ramiz Alia, decided to use these intellectuals to achieve a smooth transition. Secondly, there was a marked discrepancy between their own testimonies offered at various times. Depending on their interests at a given time, they would offer a version of the story that was a substantial modification of what they had insisted on before. The best example of this gyration and shapeshifting is the description by Sali Berisha of the evolution of his involvement. In numerous interviews, and throughout the years, Berisha has presented completely incompatible versions of his activity. One could easily establish a pattern of adjustment in these interpretations of Berisha based on the publications, interviews, and documents that emerged and forced him to revise his story. It shows clearly that Berisha kept adjusting his story to the circumstances, losing every shred of credibility in the process. Thirdly, there are the testimonies of other participants that have been able to locate these individuals at critical junctures, clarify their actions, and provide a better rationale for what happened and that, very significantly, are supported by documents, recordings, and reports of the time. These

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testimonies offer a completely different picture. There is a puzzling paradox for, in the past, while these people were in power, there were many former participants who had supported, confirmed, or gone along with this version of the events. However, by now, a lot of them have come out and are offering a different narrative from what was the official version.15 Fourthly, there are numerous documents, recordings, and archival materials that are gradually being made available to the public. These materials clearly and convincingly show that the version of history promoted by these people for two decades was simply a huge lie. The best juxtaposition is that of the behavior of these leading figures of the opposition party during the Hunger Strike. The testimony of some of the student leaders, supported with these recently uncovered and published documents, materials, and recordings, leads to a different picture. The finding that the intellectuals did not play any role and that the students acted independently of them is corroborated by the recent documents unearthed from the state archives as well. This completely undermines their narrative. Fifthly, and more importantly, recent serious studies and analyses have tried to systematically offer a better picture and chronology of what happened. These studies have failed to identify these people as having played any key role. Their arguments, then, appear to be wishful thinking. The point is that there are many holes in their argument. There were many facts that they had to explain away and that they could not, no matter how much they have tried to. One of these facts was the looming presence and the central role played by the Student Movement. For their narrative to be credible, the imperative was that there should not exist a distinct Student Movement with its own structures, common values, a coherent ideology, and its own recognized leadership. In the absence of the Student Movement, the fundamental and central role was presumably played by these members of the intelligentsia who brought democracy with courage, foresight, and by fighting the system. Let us focus on one of the core claims of this group. One of the most potent versions tied to this interpretation is the version that claims that, indeed, there were four days of student protests but there was no Student Movement. Students protested for their living conditions. Later on, under the leadership of Azem Hajdari, the students connected with the intellectuals that were found close to the Student City such as Sali Berisha, Kujtim Cashku, and Besnik Mustafaj. Once this happened, the intellectuals claim that they were able to influence Hajdari and the students. They claim that they were able to mobilize the people, to bring in the intellectuals, and to form the first opposition party and that is the whole story one needs to know. Because of their skillful handling of the circumstances, they claim, Azem Hajdari was temporarily elected as the chairman of the nascent Democratic Party and the student protesters were naturally fused into this party. In this manner, the intellectuals claim that they became the real force that shaped the student protests, and subsequently, propelled the opposition to become a real party. The student protests lasted only four days. What is important, according to this narrative, is the emergence of

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the opposition. The Student Movement, then, was just a blip and the amorphous initial stage of the emergence of the opposition. It was not a social movement. It did not have any organization. It was basically an appendix of their political agenda and subject to their will. Indeed, there were a substantial number of students who followed this path. They participated in the events of the four days in December 1990 and then became followers of Hajdari and fierce militants of the Democratic Party. Many of them were among the very first students to rise in protest. As such, some of them enjoyed substantial legitimacy. And yet, they were not the Student Movement. They were not the only group that emerged and was organized among the students. A substantial part of the leadership and of the student mass were organized in distinct associations. These associations, such as the Student Association “Fan S. Noli,” were openly opposed to Hajdari, to the Democratic Party, and to their agenda. In this sense, and seen from this perspective, some students became members and militants of the Democratic Party. But the Student Movement continued and one could see its evolution very differently. One can easily say that Azem Hajdari and his followers moved away from the Student Movement. The Student Movement continued and existed without them. The core group of the leaders of the Student Movement such as Arben Lika, Mimoza Zhamo, and Shinasi Rama were part of this structure that guaranteed the continuity of the Student Movement independently of Azem Hajdari and of the Democratic Party. Still, beyond this obvious continuity, the proponents of this view have a hard time explaining numerous discrepancies and events. To begin with, there is the issue of students continuing their own activities and organization separately from the Democratic Party. On December 21st, 1990, some of the aforementioned student leaders called and organized a separate demonstration in the Student City listing specific demands that were in contradiction to what the Democratic Party was planning to do.16 Several student leaders broke up with the Democratic Party and continued to organize or reorganize the Student Movement as a distinct organization. It is important to note that in the next few weeks, several student organizations emerged that reorganized the Student Movement or aligned particular clusters of students with the emerging political parties. One crucial piece of evidence is that the Hunger Strike was organized explicitly against the will of the Democratic Party by these organizations that were not part of the opposition parties. Much of their claim rests on the central leadership role of Azem Hajdari. The intellectuals claim that Hajdari was the unique and the undisputed leader of the students. At no point was Azem Hajdari the unique leader of the Student Movement. Many of the student leaders, in particular Arben Lika, Shinasi Rama, and to some extent Tefalin Malshyti, were consistently operating independently of Hajdari and routinely vetoing him. They led organizations that were distinct parts of the Student Movement and that clashed with Hajdari before and after the foundation of the Democratic Party. The regime and the intellectuals propped him up, for he was allied with

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them, but his influence on these student leaders was non-existent. Even then, there were open confrontations regarding his affiliations with the State Security. Hajdari was openly called an agent provocateur, as he indeed was revealed to have been by his erstwhile ally, Sali Berisha, in 1994 and 1995. There are many issues regarding Hajdari’s leadership that the proponents of this view just cannot explain away. One of the most sensitive issues is the organization of the demonstration of December 9th, 1990, in Skanderbeg Square. This demonstration is one of the most important events in recent Albanian history. It was the very first political demonstration in 45 years of Communist rule in the main square of the capital. This demonstration was organized against Azem Hajdari’s strenuous opposition. At the least, one can say that the people that organized it did not recognize Azem Hajdari as their leader. Long story short, Azem Hajdari did not control the other student leaders. Knowing that he was a patsy, others put him up in the front but made the key decisions behind his back or routinely vetoed him openly and without much hesitation. The other flagrant issue is the open siding of Azem Hajdari with Alia in the meeting with the Student Representation, when Hajdari betrayed the promises he had made to his fellows. He explicitly said that, “Comrade Ramiz, we are here to help you and the Party…. Those who raise the two fingers are our enemies.”17 First, when he mentioned those “two raised fingers” the V sign, he was talking about other student leaders present in that meeting. This is not the behavior of a leader but of a sellout and of a traitor. Second, the obvious question is, who rises in protests against a system to support its dictator?! This statement needs no explanation and it did not go unnoticed by other student leaders. Most of them treated Hajdari as a patsy. Indeed, Hajdari was an informant of the Secret Police and his nickname was “the Buffalo.”18 From the very beginning, however, and for many years afterwards, in spite of being privately humiliated, Azem Hajdari was presented as being the leader of the Student Movement. In more than one sense, in the version of the intellectuals, the Student Movement became Azem Hajdari and Azem Hajdari was represented as the willpower behind the Student Movement. He became a national mythic figure. Even at the time, some of us in the leadership of the Student Movement suspected that he was an agent provocateur and later we obtained confirmation of this via other sources. I confronted him publicly in a rally about this matter on February 15th, 1991.19 Sali Berisha knew about this but wanted to use Hajdari for his own purposes. Whenever Berisha wanted to use or restrain Azem Hajdari he would mention publicly that Hajdari was an informant and acted on orders from the State Security.20 Another important matter is the presence of six students in the Founding Committee of the Democratic Party. Initially, the intellectuals had hoped that by incorporating just Hajdari and another student in their Founding Committee, they would solve the problem of the support from the students. Yet, the student leaders were prepared to kick them out of the Student City. The intense negotiations that ensued between the intellectuals and other student

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leaders led to a completely different composition of the founding Committee of the opposition party. Instead of just six intellectuals and Azem Hajdari as the token student leader, the Founding Committee was to have six students, four lecturers, and four intellectuals. When others veto your decisions, you certainly are not their leader. In short, there are so many holes in this argument that this interpretation is not sustainable. Having said that, many participants in the Student Movement, much like the mass society theory would predict, in a few days came to identify with Hajdari and the Democratic Party. It clearly shows that many students did not know what they were doing. Even 25 years later, as in the volumes by Progni and Ahmetaj, their recollections clearly show that they did not know what they were doing then and why. But, again, they were not the Student Movement, which was weakened for a while but gradually gained strength and numbers and continued to play an important role in the coming months. With regard to the role of the intellectuals as influencers and minders it suffices to note that the student leadership distrusted almost all intellectuals. Their influence on other student leaders was zero. For example, Sali Berisha came to negotiate on behalf of Ramiz Alia. In the eyes of the student leaders, with whom he was negotiating, he was unquestionably representing the opposite side. As Gjinushi, the Minister of Education of the time, notes, Berisha was treated very harshly and actually abused by the student leaders.21 Yet, always Berisha claims that he was telling students what to do. So do other intellectuals like Zogaj, Mustafaj, Imami, or Pashko. Why, then, were the intellectuals able to sell these arguments for so long? To begin with, the foreign analysts and scholars used the templates borrowed from East Central Europe and applied them to the Albanian case. It made sense to them that there was to be a rift in the elite, the model of ruptura pactada was so inculcated in them, and that the change was to go along with the models provided by other cases and theorists of transition. Secondly, these individuals were in power and, for decades, this power was unchallenged. As such, they were able to sell their version on TV, in the media, press, textbooks, and the like. Many of the analysts and scholars went along with it for a lot of them were making a good living and incurring favor from the powers that be by selling this story. Thirdly, many of the participants, who in many cases knew nothing about what happened, and were just part of the crowd, went along with the official version and adjusted their narrative accordingly. Also, it is important to note that the former members of the ruling caste and the State Security went along with this version, at least for a while, simply because it served their interests as well. None of them were touched, arrested, or sent to trial. As most of the new leadership that claimed to have been the agents of change were, in fact, their informers, it made perfect sense to the State Security nomenklatura to continue protecting their interests under the new circumstances. It was vital to them for the

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system to appear democratic, and outside their own control. In addition, a lot of participants were opportunistic and stood to benefit a great deal from the new rulers in exchange for parroting the version of the intellectuals. Finally, a lot of the protagonists were in exile, isolated, and without any presence in Albanian politics. Their words were lost or simply ignored. For two decades, the version of the intellectuals was sold to the Albanians as the truth of the dragon-slaying of Communism, with the intellectuals posing as Merlins and the mythical heroes as well. The Second Interpretation: The Students Were Used by the Regime… For the second group of scholars and analysts, the student protests were simply staged by the regime. This narrative is also widespread and received as an indisputable truth by a substantial number of people. Fatos Lubonja neatly summarizes this viewpoint: People need their myths, but the facts look different. The regime change in Albania was not a new beginning, there was no revolution. There were also no violent revolts, which would have led to an exchange of the elite. This regime change was organized, arranged, commanded from above—simply staged by the ruling elite. (quoted in Dalipaj and Pistrick, 2010) The more elaborate argument goes like this. Ramiz Alia and the state leadership had promised to the foreigners that he would change Albania like other countries in East Central Europe were changing. The leadership of the regime had failed to find appropriate ways to change the system on its own. The resistance from the conservatives within the structures was intense. The intelligentsia refused to rise to the challenge and one of their last hopes, the famous writer Ismail Kadare, refused to wear the mantle of Havel and requested political asylum in France. There were no known and trusted dissidents within the country. There was another way to change the system, which was corrupt, bankrupt, and under intense international pressure. As the system failed to find the right people to take this responsibility and become a façade of dissidents that would lead the opposition, it had no choice but to use the students. The model became Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Students, incited by the network of informants of the State Security, would begin protesting over the bad food and bad living conditions. Then, “the prominent people and intellectuals” would take over and the regime would accept some kind of pluralism, albeit this would not be the multiparty system. Their argument is that the regime structures used the students and pushed them to demonstrate and protest to show that there was some popular revolt. Subsequently, several fourth- and fifth-year students, most of them officer cadets of the military academy that were studying engineering and electronics, as well as some informants or students with ties to

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the State Security, began the protests. On the path to go to the city center, they selected as their leader one student, who, standing and waiting for them at the entrance of a dormitory (Hajdari did not even live on campus), offered to become the leader of the protests. Incidentally, later it was revealed that this student, Azem Hajdari, had just applied for party membership a few months earlier, was an informant of the State Security, and his nickname was Bualli (the Buffalo), wrote Andrea Dimushi, formerly one of the highest officials of the National Informative Service.22 This version, then, continues in this line of tying everything to the State Security. The leadership of the party and the state saw to it that all the intellectuals that were selected and carefully promoted during 1990 as “distinguished intellectuals” and as “dissidents,” such as Gramoz Pashko or Sali Berisha, worked together. I must say that Pashko and Berisha did not know each other. Apropos of this, I myself introduced them to one another on December 10th, 1990. They and other intellectuals, such as Mustafaj, were connected to Azem Hajdari, who suddenly became their lieutenant in charge of the students. In this way, the intellectuals gained the valuable credentials as influencers over the students that the system so badly needed. In their own turn, all these were connected with other people, actors like Arben Imami, writers such as Prec Zogaj and Besnik Mustafaj, lecturers like Eduard Selami, and researchers and scholars such as Aleksander Meksi or Neritan Ceka. This is how, according to this view, the opposition was formed. Several of these people, later on, were uncovered as informants, most conspicuously among them Azem Hajdari and Prec Zogaj. Others were outright tools of the clans in power like the powerful Hoxha or Kapo clans or those of the reemerging Orthodox bloc. Many analysts and scholars such as Artan Fuga, Xhemil Frasheri, Servet Pellumbi, Kico Mustaqi, and Robert Goro are convinced that this is what happened. They disagree on whether or not Ramiz Alia himself was a traitor to the regime (worse than Gorbachev) or whether he did this maneuver to maintain control over the emerging opposition. Yet, most of them concur that the students were used ruthlessly by the regime and that they were just pawns to be sacrificed in a bigger game. According to them, there was no Student Movement, nor there were people outside of the control of the regime. In short, this was simply a smart and highly successful game and a false flag operation prepared by the State Security under the leadership of the top leaders of the party. The state structures were and remained in full control throughout the process. Why would the political change happen in this way? Their answer is that the regime was so strong, and so much was at stake, that it would not allow for any disruption of its plans. Dangerous people could be killed and eliminated easily. Moreover, there were no people who possibly would know what to do. The stakes were extremely high for this was the game that would solve all the problems of the regime. Crucially, it would satisfy the foreigners because the country would appear democratic while the ruling caste would

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remain in charge. The transition, the opposition parties, and the processes, however, would be thoroughly controlled by the party and the State Security. There would be a transfer of power without giving up power. Even in this version, there are some nagging issues that cannot be explained away. The first and the most crucial issue is the matter of the establishment of pluralism. We now know from the secret documents published recently that Ramiz Alia and the leadership of the party were prepared to offer only a pluralism of thought, i.e., a form of electoral pluralism in which different electoral subjects would compete for seats in the parliament. This would seem democratic but it was not a normal democratic practice. These electoral subjects were not political subjects in the sense that they were not supposed to subscribe to a different ideology from that of the party. The kind of pluralism that was demanded by one of the students at the meeting between Ramiz Alia and the Student Representation was based on this marked distinction between an elective democracy and a democratic multiparty system. Ramiz Alia had come prepared to offer a democratic system understood as a choice within a menu of parties and organizations that were all of the same political persuasion. The student representative asked for a democratic system that would be based on an understanding of democracy as a competition between different political parties that subscribed to different ideologies. Faced with the persistence of the student representative, Alia gave up. Where is the regime control here?! If you have control over somebody, that person should do your bidding. The students did not do that and in fact they became independent agents of change. Furthermore, the last thing the leaders of the regime wanted to see was the overthrow of Enver Hoxha’s cult. Enver Hoxha was the soul of the totalitarian cult-state. Yet, the Student Movement, in particular a faction of it gathered in the Student Association “Fan. S. Noli,” was able to design and execute the plan to overthrow the myth of Enver Hoxha. The popular mobilization that ensued was so intense that the regime shook to its core. This is when the dragon of the totalitarian cult-state died. This happened in open opposition to the ruling party and to the opposition parties, which had signed a social pact to stop all political activity till after the elections. The system was unable to control them, yet again. Finally, after the Hunger Strike, the state decided to close the State University of Tirana and to send all students home. If they were in control, why would they close the university? If the students were controlled by the regime, why would the regime destroy the lives of thousands of students by forcing 6000 students to go into exile in just three days? The answer is simple. The Student Movement was out of control, it acted on its own, and the regime did everything within its power to destroy it. There was no question that Ramiz Alia was in control. The conservatives and the structures were not willing to accept these changes. But the Student Movement radically changed the rules of the game. The

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radical changing of the political rules meant that the fundamental principles of social order changed as well. With the change of the fundamental rules of the political game, the behaviour of the totalitarian cult-state institutions and that of Ramiz Alia himself changed substantially. The change of the rules of the game conditioned their behaviour and their subsequent choices. Again, the dragon did not commit suicide on its own. The Third Interpretation: The Students Were Used Neither by the Intellectuals Nor by the Regime… The third interpretation is fundamentally more complex and very much more nuanced than the two previous interpretations. This version recognizes and accepts that the regime was able to mobilize the people and to incite protests that would serve its interests. It accepts the fact that the regime did all that it could to incite the protests and subsequently strove to control the student protests. Hence, there was no doubt that at the beginning, at the head of the protests one would find informers like Azem Hajdari or individuals of dubious connections to the state, the party, or the State Security. Several scholars and former participants subscribe to this view. One would single out Llukman Halili, Izet Haxhia, and Edvin Shvarc, but there are also others who maintain this view. This group contends that while it believed its structures to be in control of the events, the regime was not able to control the Student Movement as a whole. At the very critical moments, some of the student leaders and, through them, the whole Student Movement were able to push the political processes in directions that were the opposite of what the leadership of the party and of the state wanted. Such student leaders prevailed over the stooges, the patsies, the provocateurs, and the informants. These actions and policy choices ran against the interests of the emerging opposition leaders and of the parties that were formed. Moreover, they argue, the Student Movement was not a purely amorphous mass of students. The Student Movement lasted for several months, parallel to the opposition parties and very distinct from them. It had distinct leaders that acted independently of the political parties and that pursued distinctive agendas. Crucially, the Student Movement had well-organized structures and associations that were extremely well structured and effective such as the “Fan S. Noli” Student Association, The Albanian Student Association, but also the Branch of the Democratic Party at the university and the cluster of students that were later affiliated with the ruling party. There are two key and conspicuous moments in which the Student Movement prevailed and managed to determine the future of Albania. According to this group, these two critical moments are the establishment of a multiparty system and the organization of the Hunger Strike that led to the toppling of the statue of Enver Hoxha, which effectively blew up the central myth of the system. It took people, knowledge, structures, and leadership to make these events happen. There are few student movements

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in the world that could claim to have played a similar crucial role in changing the social order. Let’s focus on these two events. With regard to the establishment of a multiparty system, Ramiz Alia and the leadership were prepared to establish pluralism of thought, but the Student Movement fought and managed to win the right to establish a multiparty political system, i.e., political pluralism. The ideological difference cannot be underestimated. A pluralism of organizations controlled by the party is not the same as the pluralism of political parties based on different ideologies. This means that the regime was prepared to allow the electoral competition of the existing mass organizations that were controlled by the party, such as the Youth Organization, the Women Organization, the Veterans Organization, and the League of Writers and Artists, via their own candidates. The students forced the regime to concede to the establishment of a political multiparty system in which would compete political parties that subscribed to different ideologies, much like in Western Europe. The distinction is fundamental and it required a great deal of knowledge about the political systems that the students were not supposed to have. More importantly, this was what the great powers were demanding, and what Ramiz Alia and others were trying to avoid at any cost. The toppling of the statue of Enver Hoxha came at a time when the political parties, all of them, had signed a political pact to guarantee social peace and order. There is no doubt that by organizing the Hunger Strike, the Student Movement went against this pact. It hit the hornet’s nest with a huge stick. The central myth of the totalitarian cult-state was instantly delegitimized. The state was separated from the ruling party, which in turn, by default was transformed into a sect. No one is to deny the important role of other organizations and structures, such as the emerging trade unions, but it all started as a plan of the Student Movement. Others joined in quite later on but they did not design it. These and many other actions of the Student Movement were entirely against what the ruling caste and the emerging opposition leadership hoped to achieve. Realizing that the Student Movement was uncontrollable by them, and that the situation had gotten out of hand precisely because of the activity of the Student Movement, the state structures in full cooperation with the opposition parties ended up adopting extreme measures. The university was closed. A Presidential Council, essentially a Junta, was declared, and all the students were sent home. The closing of the Student City was a well-calculated move and a deadly blow to the Student Movement. Since the heart of the Student Movement had been the Student City, and many of the students had no other place to stay in Tirana, the majority of them left. More than 6000 students left the country within a month. With the departure of some of its leaders abroad, the Student Movement was rapidly dissolved.

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In Lieu of a Conclusion These are the three perspectives that prevail in the treatment of the Student Movement and the three perspectives on the collapse of Communist rule and the political change in Albania. Obviously, and given the rapid unfolding of the events, there are many questions that are left unanswered by all three perspectives. Social movements, and student movements in particular, are difficult to reconstruct and properly evaluate. The Albanian case is no exception. However, as this survey of the literature shows, this particular student movement is way too important to the changing order in Albania to be ignored or left aside. By ignoring it, one would be remiss, and, indeed, create the wrong impression of the process of political change in Albania. I would venture to say that in light of the developments elsewhere it is legitimate to raise questions and reexamine the processes of political change in the formerly Soviet-dominated East Central Europe. Therefore, we ought to get a better picture, something that only a combination of the insights from the three perspectives would provide. By raising, and seeking answers to, several important questions we will get a better view of the events and processes. Some of the questions one should address are the following: Was the Student Movement a social movement or not? Were there informants and tools of the State Security at the head of this movement? Was it a consolidated structure or just a student crowd protesting for food and better living conditions? Was there a clear leadership? Was there a clear ideology or was it a mess for light, water, and the best food rations? Was there a program and political purpose? Was it just a movement used by the system and its structures? What did the Student Movement achieve? What was its contribution to the change of the previous system? How long did it last; for four days or four months? Last but not least, how different was this movement from other student movements in other Eastern European countries and beyond? In short, we need to start by raising questions. These questions, most of which inevitably will draw controversial answers, are necessary. As one could easily observe, particularly in the tertiary literature, scholars do not know much about it. There is a distinct gap when it comes to handling the Student Movement with the professionalism expected and the objectivity desired. All three views provide answers incompatible with one another. All three perspectives capture and clarify some part of the truth. Yet, the task of any researcher or research scientist is to clarify things, systematize information, and provide a clearer picture based on the facts, the documentation, the materials, and the evidence known about the Student Movement. However, in spite of the massive propaganda, one can safely say that the arguments that the intellectuals killed the dragon, or that the dragon committed suicide, do not stand up to scrutiny. The substantial evidence that is coming out from the documents and the archival materials, the testimonies of the participants and the careful reconstruction of the events, points to the Student Movement as the major force at the early stage of transition. In

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short, the dragon of the totalitarian cult-state did not die on its own. The Student Movement did not change the political system in Albania on its own. However, the evidence shows that it was a powerful social movement that acted independently of the intellectuals and the ruling elite. It had a clear political agenda and it was a potent revolutionary force that seemingly came out of nowhere but it changed Albania forever.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

(Fevziu, 1993). (Krasniqi, 1998). (Meksi, 2010). (Zogaj, 2014). (Halili, 2015a, 2015b). (Halili, 2015b). (Rama, 2015). (Progni, 2013: 195–407). (Biberaj, 1998). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997). (Abrahams, 2015). (Halili, 2015a). (Gjoni, 2015; Brokaj, 2009). (Gjoni, 2015). (Haxhia, 2016; Halili, 2015b). (Rama, 2015). (Rama, 2015). (Dimushi, 2015). (Shvarc, 2002). (Dimushi, 2015). (Gjinushi, 2012). (Dimushi, 2015).

Bibliography Abrahams, Fred C. 2015. Modern Albania – from Dictatorship to Democracy in Europe. New York and London: New York University Press. Alia, Ramiz. 1988. Our Enver. Tiranë: 8 Nëntori. Alia, Ramiz. 2010. Kujtime-Jeta ime. Tiranë: Toena. Asllani, Muho. 2015. “Katovicë në Shqipëri nuk ka pasur. Ato që thuhen e shkruhen nëpër gazeta, nuk janë të vërteta.” Gazeta SOT, November 22nd. Baleta, Abdi. 2005. Kundërshpifografi. Tiranë: Rimëkëmbja. Biberaj, Elez. 1998. Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Brokaj, Sabit. 2009. “Lëvizja Studentore e Dhjetorit Të ‘90 Ishte Me Regji Nga Ramiz Alia.” Transcript of the interview with Mustafa Nano in “Déjà Vu”. Panorama, November 8th. Available at: http://www.arkivalajmeve.com/Sabit-Brokaj-Levizja-stu dentore-e-Dhjetorit-te-90-ishte-me-regji-nga-Ramiz-Alia.345231/. Dalipaj, Gerda and Eckehard Pistrick. 2010. “Die verordnete Wende: Der albanische Schriftsteller und Dissident Fatos Lubonja über den Mythos vom

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Neuanfang.” Ostpol, January 1st. Available at: http://www.ostpol.de/articles/ view/40. Dimushi, Andrea. 2015. “Replika II me Bujar Ramën/ Pseudonimi i Azem Hajdarit dhe 33 spiunët e parlamentit.” Interview with Xhevdet Shehu. Gazeta Dita, July 24th. Elezi, Mehmet. 2011. Nuk isha student i dhjetorit. Tiranë: Enti botues Gjergj Fishta. Fevziu, Blendi. 1993. Piedestale pa statuja: 8 dhjetor 1990–31 Mars 1991. Tiranë: Brezi 22. Gjinushi, Skënder. 2012. “Porositë që Ramiz Alia dha për Sali Berishën.” Interview with Jakin Marena. Shqiptarja.com, December 14th. Gjoni, Xhelil. 2015. “Ramiz Alia Më Kërkoi Që Ta Largonte Nexhmijen Jashtë Shtetit.” Panorama, January 12th. Available at: http://www.panorama.com.al/ 2015/01/12/. Goro, Robert. 2004. Dosja 1990–1991, Dëshmia e Kico Mustaqit. Athinë: Privat Edition. Grup Autorësh. 2011. Dhjetori’ 90, Mbaj Mend: Kujtime dhe Refleksione. Durrës: Mileniumi i Ri. Halili, Llukman. 2015a. Studentski pokret i tranzicija Albanije 1990.-1992. Rijeka: ZAPGŽ. Halili, Llukman. 2015b. Lëvizja Studentore dhe Tranzicioni i Shqipërisë, 19901992. Tiranë: Shtëpia Botuese Princi. Halili, Llukman and Blerim Shala. 1992. Unë, Ramiz Alia Dëshmoj Për Historinë. Prishtinë: Zëri. Haxhia, Izet. 2016. Përballë Sali Berishës. Tiranë: Gazeta Dita. Kadare, Ismail. 1991. Nga Një Dhjetor Në Tjetrin. Paris: Fayard. Kasoruho, Amik. 2012. Shqipëria, Ankthi dhe Ëndrra. Tiranë: UET Press. Krasniqi, Afrim. 1998. Fundi I Siberisë Shqiptare: Lëvizja Studentore, Dhjetor 1990– Shkurt 1991. Tiranë: Shtëpia Botuese Albin. Meksi, Aleksandër. 2010. Dhjetor` 90 - Dokumente Dhe Materiale. Tiranë: UET Press. Mustafaj, Besnik. 1999. Midis Krimeve dhe Mirazheve. Tiranë: Toena. Ngjela, Spartak. 2011. Përkulja Dhe Rënia E Tiranisë Shqiptare 1957–2010. Tiranë: UET Press. Pëllumbi, Servet. 2015. Përmbysja e Komunizmit. Tiranë: UET Press. Progni, Luljeta. 2009. Trashëgimtarët (Partia Socialiste Midis Transformimeve Dhe Vazhdimësisë). Tiranë: Ideart. Progni, Luljeta. 2013. Pardesytë E Bardha: Të Fshehtat E Atyre Që Çmontuan Diktaturën. Tiranë: Gent-Grafik. Rama, Shinasi. 2006. Probleme Politike Shqiptare. Shkodër: Instituti i Studimeve Kombëtare Shqiptare. Rama, Shinasi. 2012. Përrallat E Tranzicionit Shqiptar. Tiranë: Shtëpia Botuese Princi. Rama, Shinasi. 2015. Për Lëvizjen Studentore. Tiranë: Shtëpia Botuese Princi. Shvarc, Edvin. 2002. “Greva e Urisë - 1991 - Shembja e Komunizmit.” Accessed July 24th, 2019. Available at: https://www.forumishqiptar.com/threads/ 35983-Greva-e-urise-1991-Shembja-e-komunizmit Tarifa, Fatos. 1997. “The Quest for Legitimacy and the Withering Away of Utopia.” Social Forces 76(2): 437–474.

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Tarifa, Fatos. 1998. “East European Puzzles: Old and New.” Sociological Analysis 1(2): 61–76. Vickers, Miranda and James Pettifer. 1997. Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity. New York: NYU Press. Zogaj, Preç. 2014. Fillimet - Ngjarje, Dëshmi, Kronikë, Refleksione Nga Vitet 90.92. Tiranë: UET Press.

Part I

The Regime In A Deep Crisis: The Albanian Case

2

Coming To An End The Fall Of Communist Rule In Albania Fatos Tarifa

Eastern Europe has always been the poorest part of the continent; yet, until the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries the Balkans were even more backward and cut off from the West, not so much by distance as by time.1 The Albanian lands in particular, which had been ravaged and partitioned by covetous foreign powers, were also oppressed by a legacy of backwardness—pervasive poverty, disease, illiteracy, superstition, vendetta—suffering immensely from social and political disunity, regionalism, and, in northern Albania, from semi-feudal tribalism.2 The end of World War II found this country a semi-feudal society, with an extremely primitive and predominantly agrarian economy and virtually no industrial base. By 1944 Albania was the only sizeable country in Europe without a national railway system and with no paved roads. Until the end of the 1940s, 85 percent of Albania’s population was illiterate (among women the figure was well over 90 percent), and archaic social relations and norms prevailed, particularly in the northern part of the country. Albania differed in many ways from the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Unlike Czechoslovakia, where a democracy existed even before the Communist takeover, Albania’s only experience with democracy was a short-lived government of Fan S. Noli, which lasted for only six months in 1924. The democratic experiment under Noli (June–December 1924) failed mainly because of a lack of popular support for radical reforms, and because of the military intervention by the future King Zog who was assisted by White Russian troops exiled in Yugoslavia. Ahmet Zogu was a clan chieftain and landowner who overthrew Noli’s democratic government and became Albania’s prime minister in 1924. In 1928 he proclaimed himself King Zog I of the Albanians and ruled the country as an autocrat within the frame of a “constitutional monarchy” until the Italian fascist invasion of Albania in April 1939. Therefore, during its independent political life Albania was subject either to monarchic rule, under King Zog, or to the most extreme form of Communist totalitarian rule, under Enver Hoxha. Similarly, whilst in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, for example, the political parties of the pre-war era remained in the political arena even after the Communist takeover, the two political organizations of Albania, the nationalist Balli Kombëtar (National Front) and

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Legaliteti (the royalists) that were created during the war to oppose the Communists, were defeated along with the Italian fascists and the Nazis with whom they had collaborated, and quickly disappeared to operate in exile. Misha Glenny remarks that the collaboration of the Balli Kombetar with the Nazi occupiers against the Partisans in a civil war paralleled the struggle between the Chetniks and the Partisans in Serbia, Montenegro, and other parts of Yugoslavia.3 In the political vacuum prevailing in the aftermath of World War II, the Communists immediately seized full power by their own exertions throughout a long partisan war in which they faced virtually no political rivals. This circumstance was of great importance both in establishing the authority of Hoxha’s Communist rule, as well as in determining his iconoclastic independent path in the decades to come.4 The success of the Communists was all the more remarkable given that Albania was the only country in Eastern Europe in which not a single Soviet soldier fought during the National Liberation War. This was of exceptional importance in determining the curious independent path that Albanian foreign policy would take in the decades to come.5 Of all Eastern European Communist countries, it was only in Albania and Yugoslavia that the Communists’ acquisition of power was accomplished by a more or less truly revolutionary process.

Albania’s Go-It-Alone Policy Immediately after the Communist takeover, Albania followed the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe in adopting the Soviet pattern and was subject to the Soviet sphere of influence until 1960. The Labor Party remained the sole political force in the country for 46 years. It controlled all aspects of society and of people’s lives: the state, the economy, the army, culture, and education. The citizens of Albania were not able to take part in democratic elections, nor could they voice their opinions freely. The economic system evolved strictly along the lines of the orthodox model provided by early Soviet socialism.6 It was based on two principles: complete reliance on central planning and the rejection of private ownership of the means of production. The enforcement of these principles was carried out to an extreme unknown in any other socialist country, resulting in the elimination of almost all forms of private property. Virtually no modification was made to this system until the late 1980s. It is well established that among the Communist-ruled states of Eastern Europe, significant differences existed with regard to the degree of political repression. Communism atomized society, destroying virtually all institutions of autonomous collective action, which we usually refer to as civil society, and leaving very little space for any form of private or group initiative based on free association to succeed. This said, however, not all Eastern European societies were equally regimented by Communist totalitarianism, nor was civil society demolished everywhere to the same

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degree. There was significant variation by country—with Poland and Hungary representing one end of the civil society continuum and Albania and Romania the other. In Poland, for instance, formal structures of selfdefense—the Catholic Church, underground social organizations, semiautonomous associations, active workers’ groups, etc.—had existed for a long time during the socialist period. Their activities played an important role in the self-liberation of civil society, which, in turn, became a crucial agent for change. Hungary was also a country in which an organized opposition, albeit not as effectual as its Polish counterpart, played an important role in buffering the fray between state and society and aiding the reemergence of civil society. Poland and Hungary enjoyed a measure of freedom unequalled in the socialist bloc. Many segments of social life in these two countries were relatively free from the pressure for uniformity.7 Both countries opened up their societies to a considerable extent and, indeed, the totalitarian system there never came fully into existence. As Adam Michnik phrased it, Polish socialism was indeed “totalitarianism with the teeth knocked out.”8 Poland and Hungary enjoyed a fairly lively press, albeit subjected to censorship, but nonetheless not as thoroughly controlled as in the other socialist countries. Instead of repression and economic Stalinism, Hungary, particularly under Kádárist rule, aimed for consumer satisfaction and controlled relaxation of political pressure. The general easing of controls encouraged Polish and Hungarian intellectuals to begin open criticism of their regimes’ shortcomings much earlier than this happened in other countries. The straitjacket of “Socialist Realism”—insistence by the Soviet overlords upon the grandiose pictorialization of Communist heroes and achievements—was cast off.9 There was, in these two countries, considerable artistic freedom: painters explored cubism, surrealism, and abstractionism, and the works of modern composers were played in the academies. Western newspapers were available to intellectuals and the risk of speaking your mind in public became gradually more calculable and less extreme.10 Polish professors were allowed to visit the West, distinguished self-exiles could return home, and many political prisoners were released. For most of the 1960s–1980s, life in these two socialist countries was relatively relaxed. Of all formerly Communist states, Albania and Romania had the most oppressive regimes. No other countries in Eastern Europe experienced such an uninterrupted exercise of Stalinist repression, so closely foreshadowing the tyrannical and stifling society imagined by George Orwell in his novel 1984. Yet, whereas in Romania, even under the utterly unfavorable circumstances of the Ceausescu regime, the germs of civil society managed to survive (Tismaneanu, 1993), in Albania virtually no civil society in the sense of “a network of underground organizations outside of communist control” (Osiatynski, 1991: 830) ever emerged. The last token of civil society here was demolished in 1967 with the total abolition of religion.11

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The Albanians suffered longer and more silently under Communism than any other nation in Eastern Europe, and the Communist experiment in Albania was carried out to its fullest and nothing changed in its body politic until the death of its dictator in 1985. Few people knew, or cared, about the brutality of its leaders or the persecution of its people. Although other Central and Eastern European countries experienced similar forms of authoritarianism, Albania, the most backward country in the region, was uniquely isolated from the rest of the world and deprived of any foundation for democratic participation. Indeed, it was isolated even from the former Communist Bloc. Other policies, too, had set Albania apart from the other Communist-ruled countries of Eastern Europe, such as restriction of foreign tourism to Albania in order to minimize the penetration of “alien influences,” a ban on travel abroad for Albanian citizens, the absence of private cars—a policy designed to curb “consumerism”— and a constitutional ban on obtaining foreign credits and on granting concessions to foreign companies to prevent “economic exploitation by bourgeois and revisionist states” (Tarifa, 1998). Albania did not undergo any period of liberalization such as that experienced by other Eastern European countries in the post-Stalinist era, where a cultural form developed opposing totalitarian terror, and encouraging criticism and a more open interpretation of the official ideology. Although this was a short-lived phenomenon and varied in intensity between the socialist countries, it played an important role in the destruction of Communist ideology (Kolakowski, 1992). Indeed, of all Eastern European countries Albania was the only one which avoided all revisionist thinking and withstood the pressures to change that periodically affected the other countries. Communist Albania never had a dissident movement. The complete lack of an organized opposition was one of Albania’s main features under Communism.12 After assuming power in 1944, the Communist party maintained control over the country through the politics of permanent purge, the brutal use of violence by the Sigurimi (Security police), and a vast network of informers. During Hoxha’s reign, all his political or ideological opponents were either assassinated or given severe prison sentences on the pretext of being agents of imperialism and revisionism. Out of a population of about three million, thousands of Albanians were imprisoned on political grounds, for voicing thoughts which differed from the official clichés, or for making statements which expressed disappointment or dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs. These were considered crimes of “agitation and propaganda against the state” (Tarifa, 1998). Many families also suffered internal exile in remote areas when someone in the household was imprisoned. Communism not only survived longer in Albania than in the rest of Eastern Europe, it also survived with most of its Stalinist trappings in place. It is therefore no surprise that the breakdown of Communism found this country with no democratic traditions or institutions. Under Hoxha’s dictatorship, every spark of democracy had been extinguished.

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Being aware of the major role that communication plays in the formation of public opinion, Hoxha severely restricted the flow of information into and within Albania following Stalin’s dictum: “No information, no problem.” Albania, more than any other Communist country, was subject to extraordinary censorship and isolation. Until Hoxha’s death, people in Albania were not allowed to watch foreign television programs, in case they should learn that the West was not the “dark devil” described in Communist propaganda. Similarly, Albanians were denied access to Western books and magazines, especially those dealing with philosophy, the arts, and fiction, for fear that they would make the people more difficult to control. Moreover, there was no chance for people to leave their “socialist island of happiness”; many were killed in their efforts to escape Albania. Throughout the period of Communist rule, Albanians were told that their government was right and the rest of the world was wrong. In 1973, replying to the complaint by the youth organization that Albania was, after all, a European country and therefore “should follow … the course of European developments,” Hoxha said: “No, we cannot and should not follow ‘the European road,’ on the contrary it is Europe which should follow our road, because from the political standpoint, it is far behind us … far from that for which Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin fought.”13 A tedious refrain of Enver Hoxha’s propaganda machine was that the entire capitalist world, and the American and the Soviet superpowers above all, considered socialist Albania “a thorn in their flesh.” Propaganda claimed that the outside world wanted to isolate Albania and make her give up her socialist ways. After a long quarrel with Khrushchev, in 1961, Enver Hoxha, who was a Stalinist fundamentalist, abandoned the Soviet line and diplomatic and trade relations between the two countries were broken. Relations between Albania and all the other countries of the former Soviet bloc immediately chilled as well. Although since 1961 Albania had been a sleeping partner in the Warsaw Pact, in August 1968, using the excuse of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Hoxha withdrew Albania from that military alliance. The divorce from Moscow opened a window of opportunity for Albania to tie itself to the West and also join NATO. This, however, was not Hoxha’s intention. He chose Communist China and her Asian satellites as his political and ideological allies during the 1960s and in the first half of the 1970s, embracing with great enthusiasm Mao’s revolutionary doctrine and setting about adopting it for use in Albania’s peculiar conditions. In 1966–1967 Hoxha even launched a Chinese-type “cultural and ideological revolution” in Albania, aimed at strengthening the control of the party over all aspects of society. After Mao’s death in 1976, economic and political relations with China practically came to an end. With his paranoid policy that strictly adhered to Marxist ideology and Stalinist practices, Hoxha attempted to carry out one of the most far-reaching experiments in socialist orthodoxy. He chose isolationism as Albania’s only policy during the 1970s and through the mid-1980s, thus leaving Albania with no international support. The dire

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consequences of this policy were felt in all aspects of life. The Albanian economy had been heavily dependent on external sources of technology and development assistance, first from the USSR and later from China. The level of industrial development in Albania had therefore been closely related to the scale of foreign assistance she obtained (Alia, 1992: 65; Blejer et al., 1992: 18; Schnytzer, 1982: 101; Sjöberg, 1991). Consequently the break with the Soviet Union in 1961 and with China in 1978 hit Albania’s economy hard. The isolation that had been a constant element of Hoxha’s reign became virtually complete after the break with China. Albania was deliberately cut off from the outside world and remained, until the death of its Communist dictator, as remote to its European neighbors as “a mountaintop Himalayan kingdom.”14 With Mao gone, Hoxha claimed that Albania was the only country in the world that was building a genuine socialist society. Splitting with China, Hoxha tried hard, and with some success, to make little Albania the center of the world Communist movement, denouncing both the Soviet and the Chinese revisionism. Albania, the smallest and the poorest of all Communist countries, subsidized a couple of dozen Communist (MarxistLeninist) parties throughout the world. Hoxha believed that Albania could serve as a “lighthouse” for the world Communist revolution and he believed himself to have been the sole and undisputed theorist of latter-day Marxism-Leninism. In his last years Enver Hoxha wrote a series of volumes aimed at scrubbing the Marxist-Leninist doctrine clean of all the filth attached to it by renegades and revisionists of all colors: Trotskyists, Titoists, Khrushchevites, Maoists, Euro-communists, etc. The 1970s and the first half of the 1980s were characterized by a virtually autarkic policy of economic development. The 1976 Constitution formulated as one of the main postulates of “socialist construction” in Albania the principle of “self-reliance.” This go-it-alone economic policy prohibited any foreign credit, aid, or investment. From that time until 1990, Albania received virtually no financial assistance from international organizations or foreign countries. This period, therefore, witnessed a severe slowdown in economic performance. In the late 1960s and early 1970s Albania’s real net material production (NMP) had grown by nearly 44 percent and during the second half of the 1970s by about 20 percent. Between 1980 and 1989, however, NMP rose by an average of less than 1 percent a year. It dropped from an average of 1.6 percent in the period 1980–1985 to zero growth in the years 1985–1990.15 Critical areas of economic activity such as agriculture and extractive industries declined, causing drastic shortages in consumer goods and foodstuffs. Albania’s isolation was reflected domestically in extremely rigid policies that violated several basic human rights including the freedoms of belief, conscience, expression, and peaceful assembly. Many rights that existed in theory were ignored in practice; even on paper, many rights were limited and incomplete. Religion was banned in 1967, and all houses of worship were either closed or demolished at once. With the 1976 Constitution

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Albania became the first self-proclaimed atheist state in the world, recognizing “no religion whatever” (Article 37). Philosophies other than Marxism-Leninism were also prohibited, making atheism and Marxism legal obligations for all Albanian citizens.16 Indeed, Hoxha’s fanatical ideas became the mainsprings of Albanian politics and legislation, as well as part and parcel of people’s daily lives. His works were the Albanian bible—sacred in every way—without, which, he claimed, life would make no sense. The case of Albania confirms Kolakowski’s argument that totalitarian regimes need an ideological foundation in the form of an obligatory doctrine with all-embracing pretensions.17 The strong repression and the isolation of Albania from world events explain why the Communist rule in this country, although it had begun to show signs of serious erosion, was the last to come under attack.

Lost Opportunities Enver Hoxha died in 1985. His handpicked successor was Ramiz Alia. Alia had been appointed by Hoxha as President of the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania in 1982 and to a large extent owed his political career and his popularity to Hoxha. He was not as strictly orthodox as Hoxha, but neither did he possess the strong authority of his predecessor. Therefore, in order to ensure full support from the population and to prove to the party his loyalty to Hoxha’s political line, he had no choice but to follow closely in the footsteps of his mentor. Glenny (1990: 156) points out that Alia was faced with the same dilemma that Khrushchev encountered when he decided to confront the criminal legacy of Stalin. During his first years in power, Alia made virtually no change to Hoxha’s policies. In the 9th Congress of the Labor Party (November 1986) Alia vowed to follow Hoxha’s path. He again professed his fidelity to Hoxha’s political line in his book Our Enver, published in 1988. Alia wrote: “Enver Hoxha has shown us the road we must follow …. Continuity on the road of socialism and continuity on the road of Enver are one and the same thing.”18 Alia’s loyalty to Hoxha’s policies and approach made many people believe that Hoxha was still ruling the country from the grave. By the end of the 1980s, however, with the extreme brutality of Hoxha’s regime very gradually easing, Alia began to relax the rigid isolationism of his predecessor and to make some minor adjustments to the previous system. Many people started to believe that he would be the “Albanian Gorbachev.” The economy had become a major problem, and political solutions were needed. First of all the 1976 Constitution, with its ban on foreign credits and investments, had to be revoked. This was clearly no easy task for Alia, given the ideological fanaticism prevailing among the hardliners who still dominated the party leadership and the strong government bureaucracy, and Alia’s own pledge to continue Hoxha’s line.

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Alia himself had neither a clear vision for future changes nor the courage to bear the responsibility for his country’s destiny. However, he realized that there were only two choices to make: to try to save socialism in Albania at any cost, as Hoxha had done for many decades, or initiate and promote changes in both domestic and foreign policies. To his credit, he understood that isolation and “self-reliance” were leading the economy “to the edge of the abyss, which, in fact, was a threat for the country’s freedom and independence.”19 If Albania was to be less poor, it had to open up and become more democratic. Although Alia remained loyal to Hoxha until the end, he was more of a pragmatist than his mentor. After decades of centralist rule Alia started— albeit slowly and gingerly—to move away from the principle of self-reliance. He tried to reconcile Albania’s ideological rigidity with the pragmatism required to manage a modern economy, feed the people, and broaden ties with the West. Gradually he adopted a perestroika-style “new economic mechanism,” introducing a raft of limited reforms designed to make life a little easier for his long-suffering compatriots. Some modifications implying a more decentralized management of the economy were put on the agenda in 1986. In the years that followed, greater autonomy was accorded to enterprise managers about what to produce and how; the number of plan indicators was reduced; and enterprises and farms were granted more discretion in planning, finance, and pricing.20 People were now given more opportunities to build their own houses, helping to ease the housing shortage. Workers were able to earn extra bonuses for extra work. In the spring and summer of 1990, a wide range of new policies were promulgated, aimed at introducing a larger measure of market-conformity;21 they included new laws on enterprises, banks, and prices, and they condoned private economic activities. These reforms were, in fact, a desperate move aimed at integrating Albania into the world economy and at promoting a gradual transition from central planning to a market-oriented system.22 Despite the introduction of the new mechanisms, however, all economic indicators continued to decline. Ramiz Alia appeared to be more successful in foreign affairs than on the domestic front. In 1986 he began to show serious interest in emerging from isolation and gravitating toward the West in search of new political and economic ties. Diplomatic relations were established with several countries, including the German Federal Republic, Canada, and Spain. At the same time, Albania’s diplomatic missions with the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were upgraded to the ambassadorial level. In the 10th Central Committee Plenum of the Labor Party (April 1990), to the surprise of many, Alia declared that Albania was now ready to resume diplomatic relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. Both superpowers were seen as incarnations of ideological evil during Hoxha’s rule, and the mere suggestion of talks with Washington and Moscow would have been dismissed as a perfidious plot at that time. In May 1990, Albanian Prime Minister Adil Çarcani announced to parliament the leadership’s

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decision to abandon its boycott of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and sign the previously scorned Helsinki Final Act. In a matter of months the USSR and the USA opened diplomatic offices in Tirana, while negotiations were going on to exchange ambassadors with Israel, Great Britain, and the Vatican. In September 1990, for the first time, Alia addressed the United Nations, where he was spotted shaking hands with Britain’s former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.23 In October 1990 Albania, having participated in the first Conference of Balkan Foreign Ministers held in Belgrade in 1988, played host to the second Balkan Conference. Joining the CSCE and reopening relations would give Albania a chance to make the new ties to the outside world—both political and commercial—which were so badly needed after the long years of isolation. On the other hand, participating in the Helsinki process would necessarily impose obligations on the Albanian government to abolish a number of repressive and discriminatory laws, and to fundamentally improve its human rights record. Indeed, the move to sign the Helsinki Final Act was accompanied by a series of laws and governmental decisions restricting the death penalty, giving those on trial the right to a legal defense and the right to appeal, allowing the distribution of religious material and the performance of religious activities, as well as allowing Albanian citizens to apply for passports and to travel abroad into the previously prohibited world. All these changes were enthusiastically received by the majority of citizens, but while conservative forces were concerned that too many changes were being made, other people seemed to be dissatisfied with the scope and the speed of change. Even two years earlier, these reforms might have seemed adequate, and Alia would have gained tremendous political credit; but the time for half-measures had passed. Alia’s mild relaxations merely made people more restless. Far from thanking him, they felt frustrated that the changes were being carried out too slowly and that more time was being lost. Once minor changes were put on the agenda, the people, headed by the intellectuals, demanded total change, as they did all over Eastern Europe. We must assume that Alia did not realize that Albania had embarked upon the spiral which had become familiar in Eastern Europe: pressure for change brings minor concessions, which in turn create pressure for greater change, which elicits fresh concessions, and so on until the old system cracks. By the end of 1989 and during 1990, Alia was recognized as a reformer. Many, however, began to wonder whether he was a real reformer, seriously committed to substantial changes, or a time-server, merely interested in making minor cosmetic adjustments. An increasing number of people put little faith in what Alia said. Indeed, although not opposed to moderate economic reform, Alia wanted a minimum of political change and certainly no reform of the political system, having every intention that the Labor Party should remain in power. This was spelt out quite clearly by Foto Çami, Alia’s ideology chief, in a speech to the Academy of Sciences in March 1987, in which he indicated that changes could be made, as long

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as the country’s freedom and independence were protected and the social order was preserved. Although this pragmatic approach left the door open to a number of possibilities, Alia remained fearful of radical change. He ignored the persistent demands being made in many quarters, especially by the intellectuals, who were establishing a reformist wing within the Party, and by the urban youth, for the abrogation of the 1976 Constitution, which was the greatest hindrance to the democratization of Albanian society. Revoking the Constitution would imply consenting to a multiparty system—replacing a police-state with the rule of law; removing the barriers built into the Communist legal system by restoring freedom of conscience and belief; permitting people to freely express their opinions, to organize societies and hold meetings without fear of punishment. Abandoning the old Constitution would not simply mean rectifying the many human rights violations and social injustices of Hoxha’s dictatorship; it would mean creating a new legal framework, essential for democracy and for economic and social progress, and a new set of democratic institutions. But these demands were rejected by Alia and the ruling elite, who believed them to be the demands of exclusive intellectual circles, lacking in popular support. Alia sincerely believed that the Albanian people had bound their life to socialism. Although Alia made a remarkable move forward, he underestimated the iron rule of reform—that one change leads to another. Furthermore, having seen every other Eastern European Communist leader fall, Alia did not know what lessons to draw and what mistakes to avoid. The official line adopted by Alia vis-à-vis events in Eastern Europe was simple and self-serving: it was not Socialism that had failed, but revisionism. In September 1989 Alia denounced the Soviet and Eastern European models as bourgeois perversions and irrelevant to Albania’s approach toward a socialist society: “We are a small country, but the sole country that is building socialism and developing without looking to anybody else for help.”24 Two months later, Alia told the Communist-controlled Trade Unions Council: “There are people abroad who ask: ‘Will the processes like those taking place in Eastern Europe also occur in Albania?’ We answer firmly and categorically: ‘No, they will not occur in Albania.’”25 This position was repeated in Alia’s year-end address to the nation, in which he underlined that what happened in Romania could not happen in Albania because the “party had served the people well” and, therefore, it need not fear a popular uprising. Yet he admitted that events in Eastern Europe “have inspired certain known anti-Albanian forces to resume the campaign of slanders against the country.”26 Even when the Berlin Wall crumbled and the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed, Alia made no effort to alter his orientation. His interlude in power was a period of lost opportunities. In the weeks after Ceausescu was toppled, Alia showed his political myopia by believing that Albania could remain unaffected by the tremors shaking Eastern Europe. It was at this time that Alia formulated the political slogan: “Albania is neither West nor East.” However, nothing proved

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to be further from the truth. Although the Communist system in Albania had not yet come under the same degree of attack as the other regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, it was not going to be exceptional. There were, certainly, differences between these countries with regard to historical traditions and political and economic development, but the political system in Albania was of the same basic type as that prevailing throughout Eastern Europe. Moreover, Albania’s was the drabbest and most repressive regime among the Communist countries, and a growing number of people had, by this time, no illusions left about it. In many ways, therefore, the need for change was even more pressing in Albania.

The Last Domino: What Was Next? In 1989, all the Eastern European countries—Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania—moved away from Communism. The one exception was Albania, which survived the 1989 revolution more or less intact. But how long would it last? The collapse of the Communist system in Central and Eastern Europe had been assisted by what Laqueur has called the echo effect: “once the onslaught against the old establishment had been successful in one country, revolutionary uprisings tended to be infectious.”27 The term more frequently used in the literature on post-Communist transition is the “domino effect,” which is perhaps a better description of the crumbling process that took place in the former socialist countries. Osiatynski (1991: 834) describes this process most eloquently: “As with waves at sea, each revolution picked up some energy from the preceding one and could not avoid building its own momentum.” This irreversible process made it inevitable that, after Romania, Albania would be the last domino to fall. Being the last could have been an advantage for Albania; at least the country’s leaders would have the chance to learn from the mistakes of their neighbors—for example, from the reform Communists in Bulgaria and Romania who miscalculated that, because the opposition was too weak and divided to govern, it could safely be ignored. At this point, the Albanians were fairly well aware of what was happening elsewhere in the world; it was now possible to watch foreign television programs, mainly Italian and Yugoslav ones, almost all over the country. The “Romanian story” that had dominated world radio and television had a particularly profound effect on the Albanian people. Besides showing the dramatic effects of the ending of Communism, this story carried the message that even brutal regimes, such as the one under which the Albanians were living, could be toppled. Though the situation in Albania appeared calm, the first signs of accumulated tension soon began to show. In spring 1990, the first strikes were recorded, and in Shkoder, the northernmost city of the country, the monument of Stalin disappeared. For many people, it gradually became evident that radical change was inescapable. The outside pressure on Alia’s

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regime was also increasing. The CSCE refused to admit Albania because of its poor human rights record and its opposition to a multiparty system. The West made it clear that Albania should expect nothing until essential changes were made and free elections were held. Yet, there was no organized force to take the initiative for change. The first half of 1990 passed without major incident, even though it was evident to many that the system had started to crumble. Finally, on 2nd July 1990, tens of thousands of mostly young people took to the streets of Tirana. After anti-regime demonstrations, which the police tried hard to put down by force, more than 6000 of them invaded 14 foreign embassies, asking for asylum. The West German embassy was the most popular refuge, with some 3200 asylum-seekers. Many Albanians had watched on TV as thousands of East Germans had flooded the West German embassy in Prague the year before. The Italian and French embassies were the second and third choices. Most of the asylum-seekers, according to Western diplomats, were not political dissidents but economic refugees, in search of the better life seen on foreign television.28 In Tirana, where almost every family at that time had a black-and-white TV set, the joke circulated that people had stormed the foreign embassies to make sure of seeing the football World Cup Final in color! With the advice and the assistance of the United Nations’ representatives, and after some initial hesitation, Alia agreed to let these people leave for the West. This flood of asylum-seekers (which had, in fact, begun as a trickle three months earlier) dealt a decisive blow against the Communist establishment. It wrong-footed Alia and signaled to both the people and the ruling elite that things could not continue as they were. The rules of 45 years of Communism had now been brought into question and it seemed that the country would have no rest in the days to come. The embassies event was a turning point in Albania’s political life; it effectively announced the end of the old regime. After the refugees’ departure, tension appeared to die down and the explosive atmosphere which had built up in the early days of July relaxed. In fact, however, the people were in shock. Uncertainty prevailed both in the cities and in the countryside. Later that same month, workers staged a sit-in at the big “Stalin” leather-processing factory in Tirana. Rumors spread that the borders would open for three or four days so that anyone who wanted could leave. There were further signs of upheaval, particularly in the main towns of Tirana, Shkodër, and Durrës. However, Alia appeared not to have learnt any lessons from earlier events. Again he reacted rather than taking the initiative, and again his reaction was inadequate, consisting only of minor changes in the Politburo and in the government. Some members were removed but those who took their place were no better. Instead of gaining the support of the people, Alia’s measure merely irritated them even more. Fearing turmoil in the capital city when the Tirana University students returned from their summer holidays, the party elite tried to play another card, appealing to the patriotic spirit of the Albanians. On September 1st,

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1990, tens of thousands of people were brought to Scanderbeg Square, in the heart of Tirana, to demonstrate their support for Alia and to denounce the thousands of “hooligans” who had left Albania. As clever as it seemed, the idea of holding such a large rally was also perilous: the story of Ceausescu’s last rally in Bucharest was still very fresh in people’s memories. Alia did not appear in public that day and, indeed, the events of Bucharest were not repeated in Tirana; party propaganda claimed this “ecstatic” rally as proof of the unity between the Party and the people. The deterioration of the economic situation during the summer and autumn unquestionably added to the unsettled public mood. Given the country’s long isolationist policy and the state of its economy, the collapse of COMECON plunged Albania into a more savage recession than any other Central or Eastern European country. In addition, the dry summer of 1990 parched Albania’s rivers, halting hydroelectric plants, which make most of the country’s electricity. Chrome production, Albania’s industrial staple, slowed. Antiquated factories in other industries were shutting down as they ran out of raw materials and spare parts for their outdated machinery. Irreparable Soviet and Chinese tractors rusted in fields, and private gardens went dry. As a result of all these things, food shortages were more severe than ever, and thousands of jobless workers would flow into the streets of Tirana and other towns, just waiting for something to happen. The defection of leading Albanian novelist, Ismail Kadare, in October 1990, who was given asylum in France, was the final proof that Alia no longer had the trust or support of the Albanian intellectuals: there had already been evidence of this, for example in the August 1990 meeting between Alia and some leading intellectuals. Kadare’s reputation and prestige among Albanian intellectuals and youth, however, made his defection a major factor in accelerating the process of change and in establishing a multiparty system. It was no accident that Kadare’s portrait was found in the hands of Tirana University students during their demonstrations in December 1990. In the other Central and Eastern European countries, youth—and students in particular—played a major role. Glenny (1990: 155) likened them to “the engine of rebellion that generated such powerful change in the whole region while the intellectuals provided the fuel.” Albania was no exception. A three-day demonstration of the Tirana University students (December 8–11th, 1990) gave the signal for a nationwide democratic movement. The students’ initial demands were of an economic character, but within a few days a group of intellectuals had joined their movement, and their goal was clearly pronounced to be the transformation of the political system. The Student Movement, which was also joined by many workers, provided the greatest momentum for change. The students refused to talk to Prime Minister Adil Çarcani or any leader other than Ramiz Alia. When the two sides did finally meet, the students made their uncompromising demand: freedom for other political parties.

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There was no way to ignore the students’ position if a confrontation was to be avoided. Thus, bowing to demands for more democracy, Alia announced on December 11th that “independent political organizations”— i.e., political parties other than the Labor Party—were to be allowed “in accordance with the laws in force.” Given that the 1976 Constitution, which banned the creation of political parties, was still in force, this last qualification was meant to ensure that any “independent” parties would be acceptable to the Labor Party. For several days after this, an expectant atmosphere prevailed across the country. A new political system had been launched within the framework of the old one and a period of transition would now begin. The mood and perception of the people were different in various parts of the country and between different social and age groups. An increasing number of questions, dilemmas, and uncertainties were pressing, but there seemed to be no one who could offer the people a clear picture of what was going to happen in the coming weeks or months, let alone further into the future. What political parties would emerge? Was Albania’s social soil fertile enough to nurture independent political organizations? What programs would they have? Was there going to be a coherent and cohesive apposition? What would happen to the Labor Party? What were Ramiz Alia’s plans? Would there be free elections soon, as in all the other Eastern European countries? What about the economy: would there be foreign credits or investments? There were, as yet, no answers to these questions. The “domino game” was over, but if a new game had begun, no one seemed to be sure of the rules.

A Dramatic Split with Communism Only three days after Alia’s decree on political pluralism, besides the Party of Labor, Albania had a newly formed second political party, the Democratic Party (DP); other parties were subsequently formed as well. Their numbers would later increase with each passing month, but the first opposition party, which emerged in the euphoria after the triumph of the Tirana University Student Movement, was the DP. In fact, the DP grew out of the students’ protests. Its founders were a group of university students, professors, writers, journalists, and actors. From among them, Sali Berisha, a cardiologist, and Gramoz Pashko, a Tirana University reader in economics, emerged as party leaders. Subsequent developments in Albania followed a similar pattern to those of other Central and Eastern European countries, particularly Bulgaria and Romania. The DP was more of an anti-Communist movement, or an umbrella organization, than a political party. Its militant members were a mixed lot: many reformed Communists, as well as anti-Communists, intellectuals, students, workers, former political prisoners and members of their families, and even people who had never before shown any interest in

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politics. Within a few months, their ways would again part, yet for the moment, as Laqueur noted for other Eastern European countries, these people were united in the belief that “there would be no future for any of them unless the old order was defeated.”29 More than anything else, the opposition movement was helped by the DP’s newspaper Rilindja Demokratike (Democratic Renaissance), in the pages of which dozens of talented young writers and journalists waged a pugnacious campaign against totalitarianism and the legacy of Hoxha’s Communist regime. Of course, one of the first demands of the opposition movement was the holding of free elections. The DP immediately organized a Western-type electoral campaign and, in fact, managed it quite well. The DP widely publicized its plans for ridding Albanian society of Hoxha’s legacy, and mobilized large segments of the urban population, including many young and unemployed people. The Labor Party, paralyzed by the sudden changes, did almost no campaigning on its own behalf. All the same, many people were clearly not convinced that the election, first called for February 1991 and later, at the demand of the DP, postponed until the end of March, would change anything. Unlike some of the other Central and Eastern European countries, such as East Germany, Poland, and Hungary, where the post-Communist transition was negotiated through round-table talks between the Communists and reasonably well-structured opposition, Albania’s first free elections were organized by the Labor Party without any prior negotiations with the newly founded opposition parties. The electoral system—adopted by the Communists before the introduction of a multiparty system—was a variant of majority voting with run-offs. In this, Albania was in line with other Eastern European countries where the Communists advocated majority vote in single-member districts, because their candidates were believed to have higher recognition, whilst the opposition advocated proportional voting.30 The DP originally fought for proportional representation, but later, as they gained in confidence, accepted the majority system. The road toward the first multiparty elections was hazardous. There was an atmosphere of uncertainty throughout the country. Many people believed, quite correctly, that life in Albania would get worse before it could get better, even if pluralism prevailed. Toward the end of the year, rumors swept through the towns and villages that the Greek authorities would close the borders on December 31st. During the last days of December, the regular trickle of fugitives swelled to a flood of some 16,000 people. On the night of December 31st, 1990 alone, more than 5000 people, the bulk of them young people from the Greek-minority villages of southern Albania, escaped across the snow-bound mountain frontier into Greece.31 In February 1991, thousands of people flocked to Durrës, the country’s main port, in response to a rumor that a visiting Italian ship would pick up passengers without passports or visas. This time, however, there was to be no repetition of July’s mass exodus. The crowd found the harbor gates locked and turned violent, while the army was called in.

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De-Hoxhaization became the main focus of the opposition’s propaganda crusade and quickly brought Albania to the brink of civil war. Although the opposition leaders played successfully on the accumulated anger of the population, once the crowds took to the streets, the DP leaders seemed unable to control their destructive instincts. Consequently, throughout the winter, the electoral campaign of the opposition was compromised by anachronistic forms of political protest akin to those of the Luddites in early-nineteenth-century England. Events were running out of control and Albanian society was sliding closer and closer to total chaos. Law and order broke down; unemployment was rampant; anarchy, crime, and violence in the streets reached frightening proportions. Free from the constraints of the past, more and more of the country’s youth, and especially the least educated, equated democracy with anarchy. Hundreds of schools, hospitals, health and day-care centers, shops, post offices, collective farms, and industrial plants were either looted or destroyed, causing further damage to an economy which was already in virtual ruin. The public transportation system broke down and disorder prevailed. Abhorrence at Hoxha’s dictatorship and socialism led to the destruction of everything that had been state- or collectively owned, and the rule of the day became “everyone for himself.” This is how a BBC TV news correspondent described the situation during those days: The country was in economic chaos, its people queuing some times for hours just to get bread. To watch the excitement of children walking home with a loaf under each arm, you would have thought they were carrying bars of gold …. Firewood was fast running out. Along some country roads there was hardly a tree left standing, such was the desperation. The shops were empty—no meat, no fish, no coffee. At one stage the railway network had to be closed down completely …. Railway sleepers had been removed to be used as a source of fuel, and signaling wire was torn down by those who had thought of an innovative way of connecting electrical supplies from street lights into their homes. Nearly 70 percent of the adult population was out of work. There were no raw materials for the factories …. Machines stood idle and resilience was wearing thin …. Lethargy had set in with Albanians losing the desire to work and becoming almost totally dependent on Western aid. (Hamilton, 1992: 18) The situation reached its climax in February 1991, when 100 students of Enver Hoxha Tirana University staged a hunger strike, demanding the removal of Hoxha’s name from their university. Although their demand was hardly a surprise, it placed Alia in an embarrassing position. On one side, there were the students’ demands and strong pressure from the opposition to get rid of Communist symbols and Hoxha’s legacy; on the other side, there were tens of thousands of Labor Party members and large

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sections of the population, especially in the rural areas, reminding him of his oath to follow Hoxha’s path. Negotiations between Alia’s emissaries and the students failed to reach a compromise. Finally, on February 20th, the government announced the decision to reorganize Tirana University into two separate universities: it was left unsaid that neither of the two would bear the name of the late dictator. Although the students were barely satisfied, this was another triumph for the opposition movement and another step back for the ruling elite. On the same day, many citizens of Tirana, mostly young people, streamed through the streets chanting “Enver-Hitler” and trying to topple the nine-meter gilded statue of Enver Hoxha that towered over Scanderbeg Square. The police and special troops—the Sampists—were sent to stop them, but with tens of thousands of protesters in the main square, the police were helpless. The conflict had reached its zenith, and a civil war seemed to be only a hair’s breadth away. Alia, again, had two choices: to order the demonstrators to be shot, and turn Scanderbeg Square into a Tiananmen, or to let them accomplish their aim. Later Alia would describe the country’s situation in February 1991 as closer to bloodshed than any other moment during the transitory period.32 Alia did not imitate Honecker’s actions in East Germany, and he is widely credited as having avoided a civil war in Albania. By the evening of February 20th, Enver Hoxha’s statue was no longer standing in the capital city. Reacting to this latest burst of popular anger, Alia declared that evening on national television: “Busts may be removed, but the figure of Enver Hoxha cannot be toppled.” However, everybody knew that the real target of the demonstrators was not Hoxha’s good name but his appalling system. Later that evening, Alia also announced that he was setting up a Presidential Council to help the nation through its emergency. He sacked Prime Minister Adil Çarcani and named what was meant to be a government of talents. On closer inspection, however, the Presidential Council and the new government led by Fatos Nano, a thirty-nine-year-old Western-style economist, turned out to be filled mainly by younger or less tired Communists. In the following days, all the other monuments of the late dictator were dismantled. The “Pyramid of the Pharaoh,” the name Albanian students gave to the multimillion-dollar museum built to hold everything Hoxha ever possessed, was closed. In the meantime, several pro-Hoxha rallies were organized, and a movement comprising tens of thousands of mainly rural people, called “Volunteers for the Defense of the Memory of Enver Hoxha,” unsettled the political atmosphere even more. The situation became extremely tense and remained that way throughout the spring. The election campaign was short and bitter. In fact, the programs of the Communists and the Democrats were not very different. Both concentrated on economic reform, advocating a market economy system, but whereas the Socialists were in favor of a gradual approach, the Democrats

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supported radical measures. The Democrats waged a Western-style campaign, holding outdoor rallies with dramatic posters and the two-fingered V-for-victory sign, while Alia and his Labor Party conducted the more traditional, unimaginative, heavy-handed campaign that Eastern European Communists had waged for years.33 The campaign became more intense in March when, on the eve of the first free elections, more than 25,000 people vowed to get out of Albania at all costs, invaded the boats at Durres harbor, and escaped to Brindisi in Italy. Prime Minister Nano claimed that the government had had no choice but to let the people go: the alternative would have been ordering soldiers to shoot them. Opposition politicians countered that the Communist government was only too happy to wave farewell to thousands of prospective anti-Communist voters three weeks before the general elections, speaking of the exodus as “a safety valve.”

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

(Kenan, 1993). (Tarifa, 2007). (Glenny, 1990: 145). (Glenny, 1990; Latey, 1989; Tarifa, 1997). (Tarifa, 1997). (Sjöberg, 1991). (Reykowski, 1994). (Quoted in Ash, 1989). (Tarifa, 1998). (Ash, 1989: 266). (Tarifa, 1992). (Glenny, 1990: 160). (Hoxha, 1973: 240). (Laber, 1993). (Blejer et al., 1992: 10–11). (Tarifa, 1992). (Kolakowski, 1992). (Alia, 1988: 479, 481). (Alia, 1992: 134). (Sjöberg, 1991; World Bank, 1993). (Sandstrom and Sjöberg, 1991); (See Blejer et al., 1992: 55). (See The Economist, December 15th, 1990). (Zëri i popullit, September 17th, 1989). (Quoted in Biberaj, 1992: 188). (Quoted in Stavrou, 1990). (Laqueur, 1992: 551). (The Economist, July 14th, 1990). (Laqueur, 1992: 551) (Elster, 1991). (The Economist, January 12th, 1993). (Alia, 1992: 193). (Lucas, 1991).

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References Alia, Ramiz. 1988. Our Enver. Tirana: 8 Nëntori. Alia, Ramiz. 1992. Unë, Ramiz Alia dëshmoj për historinë. Prishtinë: Zëri. Ash, Timothy Garton. 1989. The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe. New York: Random House. Biberaj, Elez. 1992. “Albania: The Last Domino.” In Eastern Europe in Revolution, edited by Ivo Banac. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 188–206. Blejer, Mario I., Mauro Mecagni, Ratna Sahay, Richard Hides, Barry Johnston, Piroska Nagy, and Roy Pepper. 1992. Albania: From Isolation toward Reform. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Elster, Jon. 1991. “Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction.” The University of Chicago Law Review 58(2): 447–482. Glenny, Misha. 1990. The Rebirth of History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy. London: Penguin Books. Hamilton, Bill. 1992. Albania: Who Cares?Alma Park, Grantham, UK: Autumn House. Hoxha, Enver. 1973. Raporte e fjalime, 1971–1973. Tirana: 8 Nëntori. Kenan, George F. 1993. “The Balkan Crisis: 1913 and 1993.” The New York Review of Books 40(13): 3–7. Kolakowski, Leszek. 1992. “Mind and Body: Ideology and Economy in the Collapse of Communism.” In Constructing Capitalism: The Reemergence of Civil Society and Liberal Economy in the Post-Communist World, edited by Kazimierz Z. Poznanski. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 9–23. Laber, Jeri. 1993. “Slouching toward Democracy.” The New York Review of Books 40(1–2): 24–27. Laqueur, Walter. 1992. Europe in Our Time: A History, 1945–1992. New York: Viking. Latey, Maurice. 1989. “The General Crisis of Socialism.” The World Today 45(8– 9): 131–134. Lucas, Peter. 1991. “A Western-Style Campaign in Eastern Europe.” The Boston Globe, April 22nd. Osiatynski, Viktor. 1991. “Revolutions in Eastern Europe.” The University of Chicago Law Review 58(2): 823–858. Reykowski, Janusz. 1994. “Why did the Collectivist State Fail?” Theory and Society 23(2): 233–252. Sandstrom, Per and Orjan Sjöberg. 1991. “Albanian Economic Performance: Stagnation in the 1980s.” Soviet Studies 43(5): 931–947. Schnytzer, Adi. 1982. Stalinist Economic Strategy in Practice: The Case of Albania. New York: Oxford University Press. Sjöberg, Orjan. 1991. “The Albanian Economy in the 1980s: Coping with a Centralized System.” In Economic Change in the Balkan States: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, edited by Orjan Sjöberg and Michael L. Wyzan. London: Pinter Publishers, 115–127. Stavrou, Nikolas A. 1990. “Albania.” In Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1990, edited by Richard F. Staar. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 296–308. Tarifa, Fatos. 1992. “Freedom of Conscience in Albania: The End to an Experiment.” Conscience and Liberty 2(8): 51–57. Tarifa, Fatos. 1997. “The Quest for Legitimacy and the Withering Away of Utopia.” Social Forces 76(2): 437–474.

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Tarifa, Fatos. 1998. “East European Puzzles: Old and New.” Sociological Analysis 1(2): 61–76. Tarifa, Fatos. 2007. To Albania, with Love. Lanham, MD: Hamilton Books. Tismaneanu, Vladimir. 1993. “The Quasi-Revolution and Its Discontents: Emerging Political Pluralism in Post-Ceausescu Romania.” East European Politics and Societies 7(2): 309–348. World Bank. 1993. “Strategy Note: Albania Educational System.” Unpublished document. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

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Contributing Actors To The Regime Change In Albania The First Phase Of Transition And The Role Of The Student Movement Mirela Bogdani

Samuel Huntington classified three waves of democratization in the modern world.1 The third wave, which began in Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) and then moved to Latin America, includes the period from 1974 until 1991. At the end of this period the great historic event, the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, opened the way to a long process of transformation and democratization of the countries that once belonged to the Communist bloc. McFaul argues that decommunistization triggered a “fourth wave” of regime change.2 The 28 countries, which for almost 50 years belonged to the same camp, embarked on a transition process from Communism to democracy. However, even within the countries of the former Communist camp, we can distinguish differences in their transitions between the Central and Eastern Europeans (CEE) and Baltics on one hand, and the Balkans and postSoviet republics on the other. But even among the latter we can still notice differences, between the western former Soviet states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova), the Caucasian states (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan), and Central Asian countries and Russia itself. What explains these differences and the widening gap between East-Central Europe on one hand, and the Balkans and post-Soviet republics on the other? There are two dimensions of transition. The first is the “temporal dimension”: which period are we talking about? There are at least three main periods: system change, transition (early phase and late phase), and consolidation. The second dimension is the “outcome dimension.” This dimension has to do with the trajectories of transition and with what regime type is installed. In the case of democratic transition of Eastern European countries we notice four main regimes established after the collapse of Communism: (a) dictatorship or autocracy rule; (b) semi-democracy—partial-democracy, proto-democracy, hybrid regime, democratura, or façade democracy; (c) democracy; and (d) consolidated democracy. Hence the question is: why these diverging transition trends? Why did CEE countries progress more than former Soviet Union countries, or the Balkans? Why do we find these different paths of transition? Why smooth

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democratization and transition (linear path) in some, and troubles and setbacks (sequencing, halted, reversed) in others? In my view this can be explained by the interaction of three groups of factors, which I have presented in a multidimensional comprehensive approach. It identifies the initial domestic ingredients that can explain the substantially different paths of regime change and different regime outcomes. The set of these three groups of factors are the contextual factors, domestic actors, and exogenous factors. The first group of factors, contextual factors, have to do with legacies. These include historical, political, economic, social, and cultural legacies. The second group include elites, masses, youth, civil society, media, all those actors who were involved and influenced the breakdown of the regime and after. The third group include the outside factors that directly or indirectly influenced the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. The Gorbachev reforms (Perestroika and Glasnost), besides being an essential link in the chain of destabilization, delegitimization, and disintegration that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union superpower, served as an exogenous factor for satellite countries of Eastern Europe, which all led to the symbolic and historic moment of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Western European countries and the USA are thought to have had more of an indirect effect, while physical contacts of people from the Communist camp with the Western world, as well as the technology (radio and TV), had a more direct impact on the destabilization of Communism. During the first phases of transition, the exogenous factors that had a great impact on the evolutionary transition of each of the post-Communist countries were mainly the EU membership prospects for CEE countries and the Baltics; and the role of international organizations such as the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Obviously one should never downplay the crucial role played by the Western democracies and especially by the United States. However, I will not analyze their role, as that is not the focus of this book.

Role of Legacies Pridham rightly says that “democracy is not born of an immaculate conception, but inherits a variety of past legacies that may complicate the regime change.”3 I believe that legacies play a significant role, in both the transition and consolidation of new democracies. In the case of transition of Eastern European countries I classify them into two groups: long-term and short-term legacies. Long-term legacies have to do mainly with the historical context before Communism. All the European post-Communist countries used to be part of one of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, or Russian empires. Therefore, one of the variables is their period under the respective empire. Countries which have been under Ottoman rule (such as the Balkans) and under the Russian Empire (like Central Asian states) were more backward and were

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likely to have a more difficult transition, compared to those under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It also depends for how long they have been under them: for example, Albania was under the Ottomans for 500 years, compared to 400 years for Greece. Another significant historical and cultural variable is the division between the so-called Visegrád states and those that had been under the Russian or Ottoman empires. Visegrád countries share some of the history of Western Europe and went through experiences such as the Reformation, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, nineteenth-century urbanization, and nationalism and may even have had some limited experiences of democracy. They therefore promptly evolved into successful Western democracies. The transition for these countries, as Kaplan argues, “was relatively easy because the countries boasted high literacy rates, exposure to the Enlightenment under Prussian and Hapsburg emperors and strong industrial bases and middle classes prior to WWII and the Cold War.”4 The other group of countries (where Albania is included) had not had this experience, having been part of the Russian or the Ottoman Empire before being ruled by extreme-right regimes in the period between the two world wars, or being annexed by the Soviet Empire. Therefore, the idea that Western-style democracy could be developed further south in the Balkans has proved more challenging and problematic. It is the first group of countries that have been able to draw on these historical affinities to adapt themselves to the political, economic, and social conditions necessary for joining the European Union. Albania was first part of the Byzantine Empire and then part of the Ottoman Empire, with its sultanate imperial system and legacy of patrimonial and personalistic rule. From this it inherited underdeveloped state–society relationships, weak institutional capacity and structures and civil society, and an agrarian, largely feudal country with a great mass of peasantry. Albania then became an authoritarian monarchy until the outbreak of the Second World War (under King Zog’s rule, however, Albania was a much freer society compared to the Communist period). Even in terms of Marxist ideology, these conditions were unpropitious for the development of a modern socialist society and economy, which presupposes an already developed urban and industrial system, with bourgeois elites capable of carrying through the revolutionary transformation.5 Short-term legacies are related to the shared 50 years of Communism. However, even under the same regime, great variations existed between countries of the Communist bloc with regard to the level of dictatorship (Albania and Romania having very harsh ones), the level of isolation (prohibition of movement of people and information), political freedom and liberalization, political and civic pluralism, the existence of opposition parties and organizations, allowance of religion, economic liberalization (existence of private property and a private sector), and the existence of political, economic, and cultural links with the Western world, organizations, etc. In some of these countries private property had not been totally abolished (Hungary,

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for example, initiated economic reforms already during the Communist period), religion was not completely forbidden (in Poland, for example, the Catholic Church provided a strong counter-culture to the ruling Communist Party), and political and social pluralism were tolerated to some extent, even if under more restricted conditions than in the West. They even had ties with, and membership in, a number of international organizations. In this way they never entirely broke their ties with the West. Instead, in Albania during four decades of Communist rule, mostly under the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha, a grotesque and paranoid regime was established, which created political, economic, and social asymmetries between Albania and the rest of Europe. Political Legacy Albania was to be considered Europe’s most Stalinist country. There was an extreme degree of totalitarianism which attempted to control every aspect of life. Albania was considered a “special case” or truly an “exception,” even within the Communist bloc. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the country had suffered under one of the toughest dictatorship regimes within the entire Communist bloc. As one author puts it, “Albania’s dictator, Enver Hoxha, was a fan of the more extreme forms of Communism, first embracing Soviet Stalinism until Khrushchev started introducing reforms, and then Maoism, until China began liberalizing its economy.”6 Albania described itself as “the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat,” and was one of the most repressive Communist regimes the world has ever seen. Like other Stalinist countries, it was a one-party state run by the Party of Labor of Albania (PLA) as the Communist party was known. Elections to the parliament were purely cosmetic and the parliament met just twice a year to approve decisions already made by the party leadership. In fact, it was the Politburo of the PLA which was the real decisionmaking body of the state. It is sometimes argued that there is no such thing as a “totalitarian” regime, in the sense that it is not possible for a state to control every single aspect of the lives of individuals and society. Albania, however, came close to such a state with the widespread and brutal repression and violation of basic human and political rights. Freedom of expression and independence of thought were completely crushed, and “class struggle” was invoked in a paranoid manner to justify the merciless political persecution of “people and class enemies” and their families (thousands of people vanished in prisons and internal exile, or were executed). Political and civic pluralism and democratic institutions were forbidden. Albania went even further than China in abolishing all forms of private sector activity and private property, and forbade all religious institutions or even beliefs. The Albanian version of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and subsequently other bizarre Chinese-inspired policies brought more repression, devastation, and poverty to the country.7

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The second reason had to do with its self-imposed international isolation. “Fortress Albania” with its “sealed” borders was one of the most isolated countries in the world, never mind Europe. Isolation was the keynote of Albania’s foreign policy during the Communist period. This meant that for decades Albania was cut off from any kind of economic, political, and cultural links with the outside world, being turned into a “gigantic prison,” with its people “locked” inside barbed-wire fences.8 Anyone caught trying to escape from this “prison” was considered guilty of “high treason of the homeland” and severely punished by long terms of imprisonment, executed, or shot by border guards. This pathological isolation imposed by a xenophobic Communist dictatorship prohibited the free movement of people and information (media, literature, and art) and did not allow the existence of any international organizations in the country until 1991. What was striking was the fact that Albania isolated itself not only from the Western world, but equally from the Communist camp as well. Because of this bizarre isolation, most Westerners viewed Albania with mystery and curiosity. The paranoia of being surrounded by “external enemies” was used to justify isolation and hardships and to litter the country with tens of thousands of concrete bunkers (around 400,000), in an imaginary war and defense, mainly against “Soviet revisionism and American imperialism.” The bunkers, cement-domed structures built into the earth and resembling heads of R2D2 from “Star Wars,” were grey eyesores planted into the country’s fields, beaches, and mountains, creating a siege mentality in an imaginary “Don Quixote” war of defense. Albania was thus something like a surreal maverick country. When the curtains fell, however, the self-proclaimed “light-house of Europe” was revealed as nothing more than a dark hell.9 This self-imposed international isolation left a legacy of political passivity and backwardness. Albanians had no points of reference apart from those given by the regime. It is true that during the Cold War all Communist countries operated in isolation, with the exception of Yugoslavia. However, the lonely “fortress Albania” was even more isolated than its Communist sister-states. Albania was forced to cut links with Yugoslavia in the late 1940s, with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, and with China in the 1970s “on the grounds that these countries were not truly communist” and then claimed it was the world’s only true Communist country. As a matter of fact, at some point these countries cut ties with Albania, which found itself a pawn in these powers’ rivalries. Yugoslavia severed relations with Albania following the Tito–Stalin split and Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in June 1948. After Stalin died in 1953, Enver Hoxha lost his protector, as Khrushchev began a rapprochement with Tito. This forced Hoxha into the arms of China in 1960, but when the Chinese began their rapprochement with the United States, Hoxha was forced reluctantly to choose a path of isolationism after 1978. After each breakup with its close allies, observers hoped Albania would move toward a rapprochement with the West. But instead of opening the country in this direction and outwards, Enver Hoxha moved it further

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inwards and, at the end, after 1978, cut it off almost entirely from the rest of the world, maintaining semi-formal relationships only with some hopeless Latin-American and African Marxist-Leninist countries like itself.10 For their part, the Western governments totally ignored this strange country and the foreign intelligence agencies “wiped” Albania from their plans of cold war, maintaining a total indifference towards it, as if the country did not exist at all. Ordinary Europeans, if they noticed Albania at all, viewed “the country of eagles” as one of mystery and curiosity. For them, Albania was one of the most unfamiliar parts of Europe, a blind hole in the knowledge of the average educated Westerner, a bizarre country of some 3.5 million people who even spoke a language unrelated to any other European tongue (Bogdani and Loughlin, 2007). It is obvious that such a society is not a fertile breeding ground for political democracy and the creation of a vigorous civil society. However, even before the Communist period, Albania had never developed a genuine democracy or experienced political pluralism in any significant way. After the First World War, a rudimentary pluralistic party system appeared, composed of three parties: the conservative Progressive Party led by Ahmet Zogu (which attracted the support of some northern clan chiefs and some Muslim tribal leaders from the south), the Popular Party led by Xhafer Ypi, and the People’s Party led by Fan S. Noli, who had been educated at Harvard and wished to develop Western ideas. There were, however, high levels of governmental instability during this time, illustrated by the fact that, between July and December 1921, the government changed hands no fewer than five times. Both Ypi and Noli served as Prime Ministers of governments led by the Popular Party, but it must be said the experiment of multiparty democracy was not a great success and it soon degenerated into armed struggle between the different factions for control of the state. By 1924, Ahmed Zogu finally defeated his enemies (including the more progressive elements, such as Fan Noli) and smothered the fledgling democracy. Zogu came to power mainly with the support of Yugoslavia. However, after his victory, he in turn began making claims on territory settled by Albanians in Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, Benito Mussolini had come to power in Italy in 1922 and the Italian state had its eyes on Albania as a foothold for the creation of a new Italian empire in the region. Zogu turned to the Italians for support against Yugoslavia and, in 1925, the Italian-backed “Society for the Economic Development of Albania” was created. Italy and Albania also signed a mutual defense agreement. In 1928, Zogu convinced the Albanian parliament to agree its own dissolution and to proclaim him as “King Zog.” By this point, Albania and King Zog were, in effect, puppets of the Italian Fascist State and Albania was turned into a semi-protectorate of Italy.11 The friendly relationship ended in 1939 when Italian forces invaded Albania and Zog fled with his family to Greece. The Italians controlled Albania during most of the Second World War until November 1944, when the Communist partisans led by Enver Hoxha took over the country.

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Economic Legacy Albania had a very low socioeconomic starting point in the 1990s, with a background as the poorest country in Europe, and was considered by some as the “Somalia of Europe.” Albania came out from Communism as a very backward country, where feudal-medieval features were combined with those of a paranoid Communist regime. Its extreme poverty was a consequence of the Communist regime’s centrally planned and collectivist economy, the full collectivization of agriculture, state ownership over everything and regulation of business, and the abolishment of private property, all of which were a recipe for economic failure by their stifling of private initiative and an independent economic sector. This was the case with most of the other countries of the Communist bloc and was one of the principal reasons for the collapse of the Communist system in the 1990s. However, these problems associated with Soviet-style economic approaches were compounded in the Albanian case by Enver Hoxha’s paranoid adoption of the principle of national selfreliance. This principle became the main element of the country’s economic policy, especially after the split with China in 1978. Before that, Albania had achieved relative economic success, receiving substantial assistance from its “big brothers”: first from Yugoslavia (1945–1948), then from the Soviet Union (1948–1960) and later from China (1961–1978), with whom it developed a series of client relationships. But after the split from China, until 1990, Albania refused all foreign aid or investment. The strict implementation of the self-reliance policy was clearly demonstrated in the crazy and egotistical slogan “we Albanians would prefer to eat grass, than to sell our principles” (Bogdani and Loughlin, 2004). The economy was characterized by fixed prices and salaries, low rates of trade, and a very low standard of living. The economy and society in general depended on a Spartan egalitarianism (emphasized especially after the Albanian version of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the 1960s), in which the majority of the population lived, in stark contrast with the “royal” nomenklatura class, who used to enjoy enormous privileges and live a good life in a special guarded area in Tirana, known as the infamous “Blloku” (the block). Sociocultural Legacy The establishment of Communism found Albania a very backward country, largely agrarian with a great mass of peasantry, and a Muslim and semi-feudal society, which was very traditional, conservative, and patriarchal. At the very onset of the Communist system, in an attempt to overcome the backwardness of this society, Marxism-Leninism was declared to be the official and sole ideology. Everything was to be in conformity with this dogmatic ideology, which internationally preached “the triumph of the proletarian revolution,” and domestically had to protect the people from “dangerous, alien, bourgeoisie-revisionist” influences from abroad. The determination to continue “our

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own way” was expressed in the saying of that time, “Let the dogs [enemies of Albania] bark as much as they can, while the Albanian caravan will always march forward.” Even some achievements of Communism had unfortunate social consequences: illiteracy was eradicated, but literacy and education became tools to brainwash the masses; a wide network of professional and vocational schools was created, but education was strongly centralized and ideologically driven; the Communist regime succeeded in the electrification of the whole country, but this became a means to broadcast Communist propaganda; the economy was industrialized, but this process was a way of creating the “new socialist man,” indoctrinated with the Communist mentality. “The new socialist man” was considered the “highest social achievement” of Communism. This “creature” was expected to acquire appropriate Communist traits, morality, and atheistic ideas, as well as to be free of any remnants of the past and “bourgeois culture.” As a result of this, the amorphous mass of peasantry was “promoted” to the level of the “working class” and pseudo-intelligentsia, who all were obedient creatures of the Communist leadership. The Albanian Communist “revolution” resembled the Russian and Chinese Revolutions in so far as it attempted to “skip” a stage of Marx’s model of historical dialectic in which feudalism gave way to bourgeois industrial capitalism (including liberal democracy), which would be in turn replaced by Communist socialism. Albania, like Russia and China, attempted to pass from a rural peasant society to a socialist industrialized one without passing through the intermediate stage of bourgeois capitalism. It therefore lacked a well-developed middle class imbued with democratic ideas and principles.12 The Communist regime aimed to create a national community and construct a socialist society “blessed with social and economic equality.” And by not allowing tolerance for diverse viewpoints (critics and alternative ideas were a total heresy), and by long and brutal repression, Communism managed to develop mass brainwashing, conformism, and apathy. In the end, Albania retained some of the worst aspects of the traditional and peasant tribal society of the past without developing the positive features of industrialization. Albanian society also retained many of the features of what may be described as the Balkan-Mediterranean culture and mentality. This culture is marked by hostility between individuals and the state and urban/rural conflicts. Society is dominated by “clan” interests, that is, the interests of patriarchal extended families who operate a system of informal networking and clientelism. “Gifts” and bribes are exchanged as a way of attenuating the excesses of exploitation and repression. In the same way as in Mediterranean societies such as Sicily, southern Italy, Greece, and Corsica, Albanian society is based on the notion of the “honor” of the family, which leads to the violence of the vendetta if this “honor” is violated.13 This means that there is a subculture of violence subverting any attempt to create a civil society based on the rule of law, which is one of the prerequisites of a democratic system. Furthermore, again like in other societies of this region, this

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culture perverts formal political and administrative institutions by transforming them into instruments of cronyism, nepotism, and clientelism. To conclude about the impact of legacies on transition, the Communist countries entered transition with different traditions of democracy and capitalism. There were different starting points and many political, economic, and social asymmetries were observed between them. The further east one goes, the stronger the differences and the weaker the degree of democratization. Albania, therefore, did not have traditions of capitalism and democracy, unlike some of the other transition countries that embarked on the “era of changes” with varying potential levels of these traditions. Albania was experiencing democracy for the first time in its history and was clearly the country with the longest journey to travel from a rigid Stalinism to democracy. “Of all the former Communist countries, Albania appeared least prepared for the painful transition from dictatorship to a pluralist democracy and a market economy,” argues Biberaj, “the historical legacies of centralized, authoritarian rule and economic underdevelopment placed serious impediments in the way of rapid and smooth democratization of the Albanian polity.”14 Albania’s task of overcoming this legacy and “catching up” with the West was therefore immense, even compared to other former Communist states. These legacies were responsible for a faulty transition, which has been long, challenging, painful, and problematic and has not finished yet. Albania’s historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, as well as Communism, have been important factors in hindering its successful transition to a modern liberal democracy.15

Actors In this category I include the opposition, elites (old and new), masses, Communist leaders, and civil society, hence all those actors who were involved in and influenced the breakdown of the regime. The collapse of Communism established a New World Order and dramatically changed the geopolitical landscape of Europe and more specifically that of Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasian region, and the Balkans. By the end of the 1980s, unlike other countries of the eastern Communist bloc where the “velvet revolutions” had started their irreversible way towards democracy, Albania seemed to slumber in a long lethargic sleep, not even awakened by the events sparked off by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. This slumber was, in part, a result of the determination of the old Albanian Communist caste to prolong the regime as long as they could. They sought to prevent Albania from following the path towards democratic reforms adopted by the CEE countries. It was also because of Albania’s terrible isolation, which meant an almost complete lack of information about what was going on in the rest of Europe. At the time, most Albanians did not even know that the Berlin Wall had fallen.16 The first signs of Albanians wakening from their slumber were the antiCommunist demonstrations, the first in 50 years, in Kavaja and Shkodra in

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spring 1990. These reflected the widespread discontent of people with the regime, which had been present beneath the surface. Eventually, the existing regime introduced some liberalization, including measures for freedom to travel abroad and efforts to improve ties with the outside world. In the summer of that year, thousands of people invaded the foreign embassies in Tirana, asking for political asylum. However, the development that really shattered the Communist regime was what became known as “the Students’ Movement,” which lasted from December 1990 until April 1991, as one of the most prominent students of this movement, Shinasi Rama, recalls.17 This started with protests in Student City on December 8th, 1990, focused at first on better living conditions. However, it later developed a political nature, pressing the government to agree to a multiparty system. Four days of protests culminated in the legalization of political pluralism on December 11th, 1990. The dynamics of those four historic days were very rapid and involved three group of actors: the students, top party officials, and the intellectuals. The students were those who initiated the whole process, with a great courage and determination, despite the risks of persecution from the harsh Communist regime. They also asked for mediations with Communist leaders. It is interesting to analyze the role of the President, Ramiz Alia, in this process. He and the other top leaders found themselves under two pressures. On one side, the outside events: the fall of the Berlin Wall, the toppling in a domino effect of all Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, and moreover the execution of the Romanian leader Ceausescu with his wife. On the other side, the pressure from inside: the Students’ Movement and widespread discontent of people with the regime. The intellectuals took advantage of the situation (one should note the controversial role played by Sali Berisha in this process). They used the Students’ Movement, stepped in at the right time, and took over. They had connections, knowledge, and finance in their favor, so they used all of them to create the first democratic party, after almost 50 years of a monist system. The Students’ Movement culminated with the historic hunger strike in February 1991. Thereafter, the crowd of students and masses threw down Enver Hoxha’s statue in the main square of Tirana. Following the Students’ Movement were mass street demonstrations and protests in Tirana and other cities and, in 1991, a nationwide strike of workers. These demonstrations and protests occurred with little violence and the transition in Albania, like in most of the other countries of the Eastern Communist bloc, came as a result of a “velvet revolution,” avoiding bloodshed such as occurred in Tiananmen Square in China or in Romania. Therefore, those who initiated the overthrow of Communism in Albania were not established and well-known intellectuals as in the other CEE countries, but students and the young, who were the first to ask for political pluralism and the removal of Communist symbols, and later on workers and the trade unions, all of whom appeared brave enough for an open confrontation

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with the government. The intellectuals, however, were reluctant to challenge the system and unwilling to openly confront the regime. But why not the intellectuals? Unlike the Visegrád countries, which were part of the Habsburg Empire, developed an efficient administration and taxation system, and where the conditions were created for the formation of a middle class, Albania came out of the Communist period without this key group. An embryonic middle class appeared in Albania after independence in 1912, but this was crushed during Communism. The first period after the Communists came to power (1945–1948) witnessed an attack on the political and intellectual elites formed before the war and on the bourgeoisie, by confiscating all their properties. The previous ruling elite was almost entirely educated in the West. By 1945 and afterwards, it was gradually replaced by a new intellectual elite, prepared uniformly in the Communist camp according to the Soviet model. During the second phase (1949–1961), the attack continued on the fragile stratum of the bourgeoisie (composed mainly of small entrepreneurs), which was considered by the Communists to be a reactionary social class. The destruction of this class and continuous persecution of their family members was accompanied by the complete abolition of private property. In this way, the pre-Communist upper and middle classes and elites were eliminated. During 1962–1973, at the time of the “cultural revolution” and under Chinese influence, the Communists started the experiment of the creation of a new species, known as “the new socialist man.” As in China, this social experiment led only to the destruction of the social basis of a healthy society and in fact led to the degradation of the human person and a deep cynicism on the part of the political class.19 This would have grave consequences for the transition from Communism, as some of the essential elements of a democratic society—what Robert Putnam calls “social capital”—were missing.20 This intellectually stifling environment and the consequent series of “witchhunts” of intellectuals resulted in the end in the prevalence of an “intelligentsia” which was, to a large extent, brainwashed, mediocre, and passive (intellectuals and academics used to assume a low profile in order to survive the Communist regime), but also blindly loyal to, and closely integrated into, the PLA. As Vickers and Pettifer describe it, “the political culture of the Tirana elite under Communism was of a peculiar narrowness, extremely provincial, often extraordinarily self-satisfied in view of how modest Albania’s achievements were in many fields, and full of internal contradictions.”21 The artistic elite was conformist and ideologically indoctrinated and forced to produce the so-called “art of socialist realism,” while every other form of art was condemned and punished as “foreign bourgeois-revisionist ideology.”22 The leaders of the intelligentsia were almost entirely located in Tirana. Because intellectuals enjoyed a privileged social position compared to the other two strata of society (the working class and the so-called “cooperativist peasantry”), their attitude was extremely elitist (especially among Tirana intellectuals who had an almost “aristocratic” mentality), and in reality the differentiation among (the new) social classes was very evident, despite the

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Communist propaganda about the superiority of the “working class,” which denied that such social discrepancies existed. As a result of these purges and the mediocrity of Communist intellectuals, therefore, Albania did not have a long-established culture of dissident intellectuals and there was no equivalent of the liberal political elites and dissident groups which emerged in Central European Communist countries in the late 1970s or early 1980s. It was these groups who made the biggest contribution to overthrowing Communism in Hungary, Poland, and other CEE countries. On the contrary, the early 1990s found Albania without a democratic liberal elite to lead the transition process. The people who filled the gap and who formed the new political class in the 1990s, were, ironically, mostly individuals who had been members of the PLA, or had links with the former Communist establishment. Some of them, overnight and without a real metamorphosis, “rediscovered” themselves as democrats or opponents of Communism. Few of the post-Communist political elites can claim to have had a “dissident” status under Communism. The development of an independent and efficient elite (in particular a political elite) in postCommunist Albania was, therefore, a real challenge.23 The lack of a democratic liberal elite and dissident intellectual groups as initiators and leaders of the democratic movement is one of the features distinguishing Albania from other CEE countries. However, in most European Communist countries the elite was not that important in this period. Even though some scholars, such as Rustow (1970) and Di Palma (1990), speak of a “genetic approach” (a transition theory which highlights the importance of elites and elites’ pacts), the new regime came through confrontation. Only in two countries did the transition have clear elements of an elite pact. In Poland, because the organized opposition was better than in other countries, the change came through old and new elite cooperative pacts. Also, to a lesser extent, it happened in Hungary. In both of them, pacts and roundtable discussions in government offices took place between Communists and the opposition (hence the old and new political elite). In others, such as East Germany, Czechoslovakia, the Baltics, and the Balkans, the challengers to regimes were mass-based groups that had limited experience in public politics before 1989, therefore the mode of transition was openly confrontational. Mass actors and confrontational tactics produced street demonstrations, strikes, and violent clashes, not discussions with the authorities. In these countries an organized opposition did not exist prior to 1989, but grew during the demonstrations. However, there were also reformed Communists who cooperated with the opposition (as in the Baltics and Slovenia). Popular mobilization and cooperation proceeded quickly, breaking authoritarian rule and building democratic institutions.

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Conclusions The Students’ Movement in December 1990 marked the fall of Communism in Albania. Even though the first signs of the widespread discontent of the Albanian people with the Communist regime were seen throughout the year of 1990, such as the anti-Communist demonstrations that occurred in Kavaja and Shkodra in spring of that year, and the thousands of people that invaded the foreign embassies in summer, it was the student protests in Student City that helped topple the harshest Communist regime in Eastern Europe. The main importance of the Students’ Movement was that it was the first to demand political pluralism and helped greatly in the acceleration of democratic reforms. Hence, revolutionary movements from below, mainly by students and masses, not elites from above, toppled the Communist regime in Albania and opened the way for democratic processes. The process of regime change, as McFaul points out, was revolutionary, not evolutionary.24

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

(Huntington, 1993). (McFaul, 2002). (Pridham, 2000: 30). (Kaplan, 2004). (Bogdani and Loughlin, 2007). (Hollingham, 2005). (Bogdani and Loughlin, 2007). (Bogdani and Loughlin, 2007). (Bogdani and Loughlin, 2007). (Bogdani and Loughlin, 2007). (Bogdani and Loughlin, 2007). (Bogdani and Loughlin, 2007). (Loughlin, 1992). (Biberaj, 1998: 149). (Bogdani, 2010). (Bogdani and Loughlin, 2007). (Rama, 2005). (Bogdani and Loughlin, 2004). (Bogdani and Loughlin, 2007). (Putnam, 1993). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1998: 39). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1998: 39). (Bogdani and Loughlin, 2007). (McFaul, 2002).

Bibliography Biberaj, Elez. 1998. Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy. Boulder, CO: The Westview Press. Bogdani, Mirela. 2010. “Is Transition in Albania over? The Indicators of a Consolidated Democracy.” Gjeopolitika5, September. Tirana.

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Bogdani, Mirela and John Loughlin. 2004. Albania and the EU: European Integration and the Prospect of Accession. Tirana: Dajti. Bogdani, Mirela and John Loughlin. 2007. Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey towards Integration and Accession. London: I.B. Tauris. Di Palma, Giuseppe. 1990. To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Hollingham, R. 2005. “Albania’s Struggle with Privatization.” BBC News, May 19th. Huntington, Samuel. 1993. The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Kaplan, Robert. 2004. “Barren Ground for Democracy.” The New York Times, November 15th. Loughlin, John. 1992. “Les Iles de la Méditerranée.” La Revue d’Economie Régionale et Urbaine4, December: 619–628. McFaul, Michael. 2002. “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Non-Cooperative Transitions in the Post-Communist World.” World Politics 54(2): 212–244. Pridham, Geoffrey. 2000. The Dynamics of Democratisation: A Comparative Approach. London: Continuum. Putnam, Robert. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rama, Shinasi. 2005. “Pjesemarresit ne Levizjen Studentore jane te gjithe fitimtare.” Gazeta Politika, Tirana, December 8th. Rustow, Dankwart A. 1970. “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” Comparative Politics 2(3): 337–363. Vickers, Miranda and James Pettifer. 1998. Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity. London: Hurst and Co.

4

The Youth As Social Actor In The Albanian Regime Change Luisa Chiodi

The youth played a fundamental role in the mobilization of Albanian society that led to the collapse of the Communist system. It did so in the form of massive flights from the country, as the Student Movement, and in the worker movement that followed suit. This youth participation took place in the absence of a meaningful civil society and other supportive structures. Albania remained a Stalinist country almost until the last days of the life of its Communist regime and experienced many of the features of the “people’s democracy” to the extreme. The repression by the regime had been one of the worst in the Communist bloc, with the Party State colonizing all public space (and part of the private sphere too) for almost half a century. Predictably, it was difficult for the country’s civil society to reemerge after the regime had successfully eliminated every alternative source of social power through the considerable use of coercion and had achieved total control of the population through the cult-state organization. Only in 1990 did some spaces for anti-Communist protests grow with the weakening of the state apparatus, the worsening economic conditions, and the rising expectations of the population aware of the velvet revolutions that had taken place in Central Europe the year before. At that point, young Albanians played the central role in the regime change and they did it as protagonists of the massive flights from the country, with a student movement, and as workers taking part in months of strikes.

The Democratic Contagion The collapse of the Communist regime in Albania was deeply influenced by the 1989 democratization wave in the USSR and Eastern Central Europe. Tiredness and disaffection towards the regime became unmanageable during the 1980s when it was increasingly difficult for the regime to maintain the country in isolation. At the time, a small piece of metal would serve as an antenna to receive foreign radio and TV transmissions that could no longer be encrypted or jammed. Thus, when the 1989 velvet revolutions took place, the news on the Italian, Greek, and Yugoslav television concerning the extraordinary political events in Eastern and Central

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Europe circulated in Albania regardless of the tight regime control. At the time, the experience of oppression at home discredited the regime’s propaganda on the danger constituted by Albania’s neighbors and “the capitalist enemies” transfigured into people’s aspirations. The political and cultural proximity to the rest of the Communist bloc from which Albania had isolated itself with the autarchic choice was fundamental to explaining the regime change. Already from 1988, articles attacking Perestroika appeared in the Albanian press, highlighting the regime’s growing awareness of the changing international context. Yet until the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, changes in the Albanian system were very marginal.1 For the nomenclatura, the death of Ceausescu had a particular relevance and was a wake-up call. By the beginning of 1990 the frightened Party leaders initiated a few limited reforms with the conviction that they could control from above what they seemed to consider as an inevitable liberalization.2 The first timid signs of a small student protest took place in a student house in the northern town of Shkodër at the beginning of December 1989.3 The first attempts at organizing a public protest against food shortages and in favor of democratic reforms on the streets of Shkodër started on January 11th, 1990. In this traditionally anti-Communist center, troops were brought from Tirana to immediately silence discontent.4 All other small attempts at organizing protests in the first half of 1990 were crushed by the regime that responded with hundreds of arrests in Shkodër, Kavajë, and the capital Tirana. After more than four decades of totalitarian rule, fear continued to dominate the country for a month but anti-government feelings spread in a political atmosphere of growing tension.

The Embassy Crisis The first consistent outbreak of discontent occurred in the summer of 1990 when about 400 people—growing to 5000 in a few days—sought refuge in foreign embassies, endeavoring to flee the country. The government declared a partial state of emergency but the police fired on the people only occasionally. Even though the Albanian authorities denied requests for food and tents and cut off the embassies’ water, in the end they broke the deadlock by allowing the first group of asylum seekers to leave the country on July 10th, 1990. Two days later all the people that had sought refuge in the embassies had left Albania.5 Although the regime explained the episode as the work of thugs, this massive flight marks the beginning of the Albanian transition. Echoing the regime’s view of these events, many accounts described the protagonists of the exodus as emerging from semi-criminal and alienated subcultures.6 Among others, the future Democratic Party (DP) exponent Besnik Mustafaj stressed the fact that only a few dozen of the 5000 people who

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succeeded in entering the Western embassies had a university diploma, and no political slogans were heard from them at the time.7 Indeed, what then took the name of the “embassy crisis” was not the outcome of political organization among the protagonists but the result of deep and long-standing discontent. As described by Abrahams, just as in the failed protests and riots in early 1990 in Shkodër, Kavajë, and Tirana, those who took part in the embassy crisis were deeply dissatisfied people, and often, unemployed young men that saw no future in Albania and were drawn by strong myths of the West. They did not have a clear political orientation apart from their dissatisfaction with the regime.8 Yet their mass migration was a fundamental chapter of the struggle against the regime. By showing that the state security apparatus was no longer invincible, their act had a tremendous impact on a population that had not been allowed to exit the country for decades. The embassy crisis entailed a situation similar to the German context of the previous year when thousands of citizens showed their opposition to the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR) regime by “voting with their feet.”9 Here as well one finds a positive relationship between exit and voice, as Hirschman labeled the actions of people dissatisfied with the situation in an organization. As in Honecker’s East Germany during the summer of 1989, in Albania too the “exit” of thousands of young people, rather than diffusing the tension, encouraged others to “voice” their protest and bring down the regime. In particular, such a large-scale exodus of hundreds of young people stimulated the mobilization of university students six months later. There were a few other important similar episodes of massive flights during the Albanian transition, leading up to July 1992 when a new wave of 6000 people reached Italy.10 All such cases were relevant in the internal political struggle in various ways, including the fact that, when later on the Italian and Greek authorities deported people back to Albania and put pressure on the authorities to police their border posts, ports, and harbors, they contributed to the escalation of disorder and chaos in the country.11

The Student Movement Up to December 1990, the Albanian regime managed to avoid significant street protests. But from July 1990 onwards, disorder spread in the country, becoming endemic in many provincial towns. In the country, the living conditions were harsh and, as the winter began, food and power shortages became the rule. Troops were moved to the cities to guard public buildings and frequently engaged in small clashes with isolated protesters. Their intimidating power was still considerable and the secret police was greatly feared. Decades of repression and the political control of all institutions had reduced the population to silence and boycott was the only way to express profound and widespread discontent.

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However, by July 1990, Albania was the only remaining Communist state in Europe. The university students had rising expectations as to the democratization of the country and were growing impatient with worsening living conditions.12 Finally, in December 1990, a student movement emerged and became the first collective actor that openly challenged the regime. The students started with economic requests, as the protest originated in frustration against another power-cut in the Student City, but they quickly put forward political demands to the Communist regime. In the Student City’s open space, later on renamed The Democracy Square, the student leaders elaborated the first list of nine points on December 10th, 1990, outlining both economic and political demands. These demands included the acceleration of democratic reforms, political pluralism, the punishment of police officers who had beaten students in previous days, and the legalization of the Organization of Students and Young Intellectuals created during the protest and soon to become the first opposition party.13 The organizing committee held a first meeting with two of the regime’s officials, the Minister of Education and the Head of the Communist Youth. Four leading Albanian intellectuals participated in the discussions: one of them was the cardiologist Sali Berisha, a trusted member of the Communist Party who soon became the leader of the opposition and remained for the following 20 years the unchallenged leader of the DP. He was among those that insisted on interrupting the protests in order to hold a meeting with the Secretary General of the Albanian Party of Labor (PLA), Ramiz Alia. Tensions were high at the meeting. The students vehemently refused the idea of moderation, fearing that the protests would lose momentum. Contrary to expectations, Ramiz Alia acceded to meeting the students at the presidential palace the next evening, even with the protests ongoing. On the fourth day of protests, the students were joined by professors, workers, and common citizens demanding political and economic reforms. By the afternoon of December 11th, 1990, about 80,000 people gathered in the Student City square. The delegates to meet with Alia were chosen from the various faculties in the first democratic consultation ever held in the country. They accepted Alia as interlocutor in his role of President of the Republic but not as the Secretary General of the Communist Party. At the meeting, Alia announced the decision by the Central Committee to introduce political pluralism.14 The students had in fact brought up the issue of political pluralism themselves but Alia wanted to take credit for it. The mass protests quickly spread from the capital to the main cities, including Shkodër in the north, the port of Durrës, and the industrial center of Elbasan. Everywhere the demonstrators demanded an end to one-party rule, multiparty elections, and major changes in the country’s economic structure.15 In the following days riots exploded in cities like Shkodër, Kavaja, Durres, and Elbasan. Young men expressed their rage by destroying signs, busts, and books by Hoxha, looting shops, and clashing with police. As stressed by Vickers and Pettifer, the opposition had “a random and anarchic

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character […] attacks on a public building at night by a few people who would then rapidly disappear into the darkness was a much more typical expression of the public mood than the kind of large-scale organized meeting and street demonstration that had developed elsewhere in Eastern Europe.”16 Regardless of the disorders, one cannot fail to notice that, from December 1990 onwards, once fear from the police faded away, the Student Movement became a catalyst for other civil society initiatives. Later, on February 5th, 1991, a new wave of protest started among students at the Higher Institute of Agriculture on the outskirts of Tirana. They were soon joined by their colleagues from the Student City in the city center. They were requesting the resignation of the dean and improvements in their living standards. In two days, the Student City mobilized not only around economic issues but also on political issues such as the compulsory study of Marxist-Leninist theory and the mandatory class on the History of the Ruling Party, and the removal of the name of Enver Hoxha from the state university of Tirana. Ramiz Alia predictably rejected these requests, suggesting the issues would be solved after the political election by the new parliament or with a national referendum. The students pushed the newly formed DP towards a confrontational approach to the regime. They criticized the conciliatory and obedient approach that the new DP leadership had chosen. The latter, in fact, was focused on organizing the first free elections which were initially scheduled to be held later that month. The DP was afraid of giving an excuse to the conservative members of the Party to interrupt the democratization process. It was thanks to the students’ uncompromising approach that things started to move faster. As their protests continued and grew, a referendum was held among students and professors concerning the university name change. In just a few hours around 8000 signatures from a total of 11,000 students and professors at the university were collected to support the request. The consultation was held under the supervision of the official commission of students, but was considered illegal by the authorities.17 As a consequence, on February 18th the students announced the beginning of a Hunger Strike. Seven hundred and twenty-three people placed their names on the strikers’ list, including a handful of professors.18 The Hunger Strike continued for the next three days. Other people joined and gave speeches to the crowd. These were ordinary citizens from all over the capital and workers from the Kombinat “Stalin” in the outskirts of Tirana and from the mines in Valias, which were in the mountains near the capital city. By February 20th, 1991, about 20,000 people had rallied at the university campus to support the students. To disperse the demonstrators, the police fired warning shots. This further angered the protesters who started to march towards the city’s main Skanderbeg Square. Hardly able to contain the people, the police could not prevent Hoxha’s statue being pulled down amid chants of “Enver-Hitler.” Twenty people were injured in the

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clashes but eyewitness accounts stressed that members of the security forces sympathized with the protesters.19 Once again hoping to keep control of the reforms, Alia announced that the university’s name would be changed in line with its reorganization into four parts a few hours later. That night the government resigned and an eightmember Presidential Council was formed. The next day, more monuments were toppled in various towns including Gjirokaster, Hoxha’s birthplace. On February 22nd, 1991, rumors spread that the Army was conspiring to restore Hoxha’s monument in Tirana. Barricades were built and bullets flew in the air around the Military Academy. During the confrontation with the special police forces sent to disperse the protest four people were killed, including one member of the police.20 The regime’s idea of controlling the liberalization process from above worked in controlling the two protest waves. However, the victories were illusory. The Communist electoral victory at the first pluralist elections in March 1991 turned out to be a Pyrrhic one. In the weeks following the elections, workers and students participated in a series of scattered protests asking for badly needed economic reforms. On April 1st, 1991, the police killed a 14-year-old boy in Tirana. On the same day, the town of Shkodër became the epicenter of the protests. High school students organized a sitin in front of the PLA Regional Committee.21 On the next day, April 2nd, 1991, in Shkodër, four more people were killed by unidentified shots and 60 people injured during a protest denouncing electoral fraud. The crowd then stormed the PLA premises and set the building on fire.22

The Workers The workers movement that followed the Student Movement was constituted in great part by youth. As in any Stalinist country, for decades, the Albanian trade unions had served as transmission belts for political power in workplaces. They controlled workers in terms of maintaining productivity and political behavior rather than protecting their rights or working to improve their conditions. The trade unions in Albania had their “golden age” in 1991–1992 after the first independent Trade Union was legalized. Thereafter, they faced a sharp decline due to the economic catastrophe of the following years, suffering under the new authoritarian turn and marginalized by the new emerging private sector.23 Accounts describing workers’ participation in the democratization movements in Albania are rare. One of the few foreign witnesses, MEP Alexander Langer, who took part in a diplomatic mission to Tirana during the crucial weeks of December 1990, gave a sympathetic and emotionally strong account of the events in his travel notebook: “One hears talks about a number of factories in which workers would have sympathized with the students, the printers were on strike and even sent their representatives to join them, as well as in other factories there would be support for the students’ cause.”24

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The first independent trade union, the Free and Independent Syndicate of Miners, was established in February 1991. The creation of the Union of Independent Trade Unions of Albania (BSPSH) followed the days of mobilization in Tirana. Its foundation entailed a dramatic membership loss for the Communist-led United Trade Unions of Albania (BPSH), which had a hard time freeing itself from the reputation of being a tool in the hands of the ruling party even after reorganizing as the Confederation of Independent Workers Unions of Albania (KSSH) in April 1991. The BSPSH was the protagonist of the May 16th, 1991 general strike. As the economic situation deteriorated in the country, the strike saw the participation of 250,000 workers in particular from the industry and transportation sectors, paralyzing a country where almost no cars circulated as their private ownership had been prohibited until very recently.25 The BSPSH presented a list of 17 economic demands, asking for a 50% wage increase for all workers, better working conditions, as well as for investigations into police violence during the Shkodër protests on April 2nd. In Lawrence’s account: “The BSPSH’s strike committee instructed essential service workers in the water, electrical, medical and food production industries to keep working while expressing solidarity with their fellow workers. This accommodation allowed an ample supply of bread to be available throughout the strike.”26 This, as well as previous strikes, aimed at not only securing better economic conditions, but also demanding further political liberalization. The demands of 50% pay rises and six-hour working days were probably unrealistic requests with the country facing economic disintegration. A further step was taken on May 25th, 1991 when 200 miners from the coal mines in Valias began a hunger strike deep in the pit. In solidarity with the Valias miners, hundreds more workers across the country began their own hunger strikes and protests in cities including Durrës, Shkodër, Vlora, Korcë, and Tirana.27 The workers movement paralyzed the country and led to the resignation of the Communist-led government. On June 4th, 1991, a Stability Government was formed to lead the country to a new election which was set for March 1992. When the miners joined the protests with their hunger strike it was clear that the Communists, despite retaining the majority in parliament and changing their name to Socialists, had lost the country.28 This first large-scale mobilization showed growing intransigence at street level. Even though the economic situation worsened, becoming downright dramatic, the protest waves continued during the months following the general strike. The major opposition party stood back, but it was as well gradually losing its influence over the social movement.29 The winter of 1991–1992 was characterized by a situation of breakdown in the labor force organization and the discipline in the factories. Many state enterprises never again resumed production.30

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The Youth as Social Force From December 1990 to March 1991, the Albanian sociopolitical scene was dominated by the two aforementioned short waves of street protest. Thanks to this youth mobilization, the country saw the formation of the first non-Communist political parties and the organization of the first pluralist elections. As already noted, the Albanian transition is deeply entrenched in the 1989 wave of democratic contagion. But the transition to democracy was not simply the outcome of a palace intrigue that the Communist elite could not control. Forty-five years of totalitarian rule had profoundly transformed Albanian society through industrialization, collectivization, mass literacy, and the struggle against religious institutions and faiths as well as deeply rooted customs. The Albanian Communist regime, just like any other Communist system, was based on a modernizing ideology. The ideology aimed at profound changes in a very short period of time in an attempt to challenge Western capitalist modernization by imposing a radically new project of economy and society. Among the products of such radical changes was a young population, as high birth rates had almost tripled the population since 1945. One of the PLA’s main concerns in the late 1980s was how to deal with a youth that, as stressed by Vickers and Pettifer, was seen as “apathetic, unruly and undisciplined […] increasingly exposed to foreign influences.”31 The culprit for the regime was their widespread access to foreign TV programs. Retrospectively, the only predictable force that could push for political change lay with the young Albanians, that is with the Student Movement as well as with the massive exodus from the isolated country. It was certainly very difficult for social movements to emerge in the country, as the totalitarian regime had eliminated or controlled all potential mobilizing structures, strove to manipulate the liberalization process, and continued to dominate the population through the secret services. Once the Student Movement emerged in December 1990 it became a catalyst for other civil society initiatives: the birth of the first independent trade union organization, journalists’ struggles for editorial freedom, the establishment of the first human rights group, etc. These experiences were nevertheless short-lived and many of the leaders soon joined the political parties that were reemerging in the same period. Many of the participants in the protests and the Student Movement emigrated with the hundreds of thousands of people that left the country in the following years. Indeed, right after the social movements erupted, from April 1991 to February 1992, Albania lived through a very difficult period of instability characterized by scattered and widespread protests but also of state disintegration. If the youth was then “naturally” central to the Albanian regime change process, it is worth exploring more in-depth the reason for the absence of the other social forces in the country.

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The Missing Social Actors Looking at the Albanian transition it becomes obvious that because of the totalitarian nature of the previous Communist system, the social and political actors that played an important role elsewhere, are missing. One cannot fail to notice how harsh the Albanian Communist regime was in term of maintaining social control. All mass organizations set up by the Communist party-state, such as trade unions, youth organizations, women’s unions, artists’ associations, and the like, constituted instruments for mass mobilization, control, and the preservation of the power of the party.32 As Baruti observes, the Albanian Communist regime imposed a ban on all independent organizations from 1956 onwards. At the time, a law passed that restricted the activities of all associations created in the country since the beginning of the century, effectively closing them down. As Baruti notes, “the only organization that survived was the Red Cross that existed until 1964. From 1964 to 1990 the only non-governmental organization working in Albania was the Association of Hunters.”33 The Inteligjenca Popullore In Albania, the long experience of repression of dissent did not allow intellectuals to play the same kind of role that the intellectuals played in Eastern Central Europe. In addition, the isolation of the country was such that the European dissident debates could not include the Albanian cultural elite in any form. In the years before the regime collapsed, the intellectual debates were not even framed in the language of civil society used by central European intellectuals. The very concept of civil society was unknown until that point. The term “civil society” does not appear in the Albanian dictionary published in 1980.34 Right up until its final days, the regime’s apparatus of repression was very successful in preventing the emergence of open criticism. Even those few people who could, under the strict control of the secret services, travel abroad did not dare to openly challenge even the discourse of the system. Therefore, debates were shaped by the mummified language of the Communist apparatus. This extended to the matter of political change, with the party leader Ramiz Alia arguing in favor of “pluralism of ideas” but against real political pluralism. Many intellectuals later observed that in the 1990s citizens could speak only of the construction of civil society, not of a reconstruction of civil society. The argument was that the Party and the society were indistinguishable under the old regime. The choice of autarchy and the complete isolation of the country was a strategy to maintain political power. Yet, the isolation from the external world had a profound impact on Albanian society and on the country’s transition to democracy. In a country where 80% of the population was illiterate in 1945, and that had no universities until 1957, the whole society was shaped according to the regime’s ideology.

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Most of the pre-Communist intellectual elites were killed during the first few years of Communism. A second dramatic period of repression of the intellectuals followed with the Maoist anti-intellectual propaganda of the 1970s. Fortunately, the Albanian cultural revolution was less violent than the Chinese Cultural Revolution, but still effectively discouraged any public intellectual resistance.35 This notwithstanding, inteligjenca popullore (the intellectuals of the people) emerged as a specific social category during Communist rule. The socialist rhetoric described a society based around the revolutionary class, the working class, with peasants holding revolutionary potential, and its inteligjenca popullore in charge of educating the workers, engaged in the edification of socialism.36 The Communist regime did not tolerate any form of intellectual freedom and the choice for the inteligjenca was either to remain silent or to coexist with the system in some form. When the grip of repression finally loosened, some intellectuals “organic” to the system worked for its democratization. The first timid requests for intellectual freedom emerged in the beginning of 1988, but the kind of intellectual liberalization that took place in the literary field was the official approval of a few novels written by the internationally renowned Ismail Kadare in an non-realist socialist style. In 1989, at a literary conference, Kadare criticized political interference in the artistic realm, saying it limited creativity. In September 1989 a novel entitled Knives by Neshat Tozaj, which attacked the dreaded Albanian security forces, the Sigurimi, was published. The author was an employee of the Interior Ministry. Even though the plot referred to an officially disgraced period a couple of decades before, the denunciation of police abuses of power was unprecedented.37 The publication of Tozaj’s novel marked the timid beginning of intellectual dissent and the possibility of mentioning human rights violations. From the spring of 1990 onwards, encouraged by the regime, the press started to explore taboo topics, and a wave of public discussions swept through the major towns and the University of Tirana.38 By 1990, Alia’s strategy was to allow trusted public figures to emerge so that he would prepare the ground for his limited reforms. Many writers, scholars, and journalists then started to organize. Among these were a group of journalists who gathered around the periodical Bashkimi, requesting independent editorial choices, while the first organization for human rights was formed around the historian Arben Puto. Every public figure who expressed critical stances of any kind was under terrible pressure, receiving menacing phone calls or other intimidation, and the course of political transformation was slow and unpredictable. Indeed, Ramiz Alia looked for the intellectuals’ support to balance out the hardliners in the Party. On a few occasions during those months, he invited some intellectuals to privately debate the reforms he envisaged. In August 1990, the Secretary General discussed the possibility of introducing political

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pluralism in the country with a number of leading intellectuals. The information we have about these meetings shows the complex relationship intellectuals entertained with the state only a few months before its collapse. Ismail Kadare was one of these public figures, members of the Communist party who were designed to be co-opted by the regime to ensure a process of limited opening up in the country. But he was also the protagonist of one event considered important by most literature on the Albanian transition that gives a sense of the central role that intellectuals used to occupy in the country. In October 1990, the renowned writer decided to seek political asylum in France. His flight was particularly traumatic for the nascent Albanian public sphere, which interpreted it as a sign that the reform process had reached a dead end.39 Kadare’s words could not be found in the Albanian press but they reached the population through the Voice of America radio program and were widely discussed. Many considered his decision as a betrayal at the moment of utmost need, others in retrospect stressed how his move encouraged students to protest. The literature on transition considers this episode central to the further stirring up of the situation, and to pushing thousands of university students onto the streets of Tirana to ask for the dictatorship to end. Later on, during the political upheaval against the regime in December 1990, some professors supported the mobilized university students against the old guard of party militants. Among the public figures that played a role during those days, the most important was the already mentioned Sali Berisha, who at the time was a respected cardiologist and Tirana Hospital’s Communist Party chief who later became the leader of the opposition. From May 1990 onwards, a few of his articles had appeared in the press asking for democratization, the end of international isolation, and for support for Albanians in Kosovo. He was among the group of intellectuals selected to meet Alia in August 1990. But above all, Alia chose Berisha to become his mediator with the students during the protests in December 1990 and he turned into an opposition leader within a few days afterwards. However, he did not hand in his Communist Party membership card until February 1991. His cautious attitude was abandoned once and for all after the first multiparty elections and his rise to power culminated a year later in December 1991, at which point he ousted all possible competitors from his own party to become the President of Albania in March 1992. However, the influence from the rest of the collapsing Communist bloc in Albania arrived only at a late stage and was not long lasting. The postCommunist transition in Albania was especially turbulent. Once the regime change occurred there was not enough time or space to debate what kind of social, political, and economic institutions would be preferable for post-Communist Albania. In addition, the depth of the economic crisis wiped out state funds for any kind of intellectual production or expression for the whole decade. The problem of having missed the opportunity to imagine the country’s future was repeatedly stressed by

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Fatos Lubonja, who had been imprisoned for 17 years and who became one of the leading public intellectuals after 1991.40 Later, the situation gradually improved, but many of the fundamental choices had already been made during the dramatic first few years of the transition. The Former Political Prisoners What is certain is that the intellectuals that became the DP founders were not dissidents who had struggled for years against the regime. They did not emerge from the traditional sources of Albanian anti-Communist movements, that is, the nationalists and monarchists, two groups that paid a very high price after the end of World War II and that were harshly persecuted during the regime. This is highly significant for, in 1990, Albania still had the highest number of political prisoners in Europe. Quoting the data of the Association of Former Political Prisoners, Abrahams stresses that, “34,135 people were imprisoned for political reasons during the four decades of communist rule, and 59,009 internally exiled. 5,487 people were executed after bogus courts.”41 It was only in late 1990 that a significant number of political prisoners were released. A university professor, the historian Arben Puto, became the leader of the first Forum for the Defence of Human Rights (Forumi për Mbrojtjen e të Drejtave te Njeriut), which was established to monitor their release.42 The release of the political prisoners came in waves. During the spring of 1990, the release was announced of political prisoners who had spent more than 25 years in prison. A Human Rights Watch report from the time describes the situation well: According to the government, 191 political prisoners were released in 1990, another 202 in January 1991, and 126 on March 17. On July 2nd, President Alia signed a decree granting amnesty to all prisoners convicted of espionage, sabotage, diversion and terrorist acts, as well as those convicted of slandering high state organs; approximately ninety prisoners were released following the decree.43 As highlighted by Abrahams, the Communists and the democrats agreed to release the most sensitive political prisoners less than two weeks before the first free elections in March 1991.44 This meant that these former political prisoners were ineligible to run for parliamentary seats. In August 1991, the released prisoners set up The Association Of Former Political Prisoners to help their own reintegration into society. Many could not find a job. The majority had neither housing nor documents and continued to suffer the consequences of their years in detention. On September 21st, 1991, a group of former political prisoners went on hunger strike in Tirana, asking for rehabilitation, the restitution of confiscated properties, economic support and housing assistance, the identification of the graves of

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prisoners who died in detention, and the return of their bodies to their families. By September 30th, an Amnesty Law was approved for political prisoners and compensation foreseen for all those who had been convicted, deported, or sent into internal exile for crimes of conscience.45 The association continued its activities but the political prisoners never really achieved any political relevance in the country. Fatos Lubonja stresses that the DP leadership considered them a potential menace. However, it was able to exhibit them during public events. Therefore, it turned the former political prisoners into a tool of political propaganda.46 As these people had spent many years in prison it was generally difficult for them to start a new life, while it was easy for the new party leadership, by now in charge of the state as well, to marginalize them. The New Social Movements With the exception of initiatives around fundamental human rights issues, in Albania there were few social movements. What are generally known as “new social movements” such as the organizations focusing on women’s issues or gender issues did not emerge in a context characterized by the lack of basic individual freedoms and widespread economic deprivation. Moreover, a closer look at the distinct characteristics of the previous Albanian regime shows why the women’s organizations could not emerge as protagonists during the regime change. Like other Communist systems, the Albanian Communist regime promoted women’s education and participation in its labor-intensive modernization process and organized women in mass organizations. Contrary to other countries in the bloc, however, female participation coexisted with the prohibition of abortion and the discouragement of divorce. This was a policy that Albania, due to its Stalinist course, maintained until the regime’s end. In the account of a march held on February 20th, 1991, Abrahams recalls an episode involving the actress Rajmonda Bulku, who incited women in the rally to lead the march in support of the student strike, and how it was a group of women that set forth while men followed suit.47 But besides this occurrence, no other major female mobilization was evident in the Albanian transition. Many women’s NGOs formed later on and often with a clear party affiliation, such as the Democratic League of Albanian Women, linked to the DP, or the Forum of Republican Women, linked to the Republican Party. As stressed by Young, such women’s groups aimed fundamentally at mobilizing women to vote for their political party of choice.48 As for environmental issues, the first party was established in 1991 but with its small constituencies it never achieved any real political relevance in the country.49 Nothing resembling a gay, lesbian, or queer movement played any role in the Albanian transition. Twenty-some years after the collapse of the regime, homosexuality is still taboo and hardly any organization is visible in the Albanian public sphere, although the first association named “the Gay

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Club” announced its existence in 1994.50 At that time the Communist law on homosexuality was still in force. The members of the group were beaten heavily by police in October 1994.51 Decriminalization was obtained only in 1995 thanks to substantial international pressure. The novelty that followed the collapse of the system was the arrival of foreign funds to establish NGOs. Independent social organizations in Albania did not exist before the coming of these donors. In the Communist system, the party controlled all civic organizations. Western donors invested resources in the establishment and the formation of the new civil society organizations that would contribute to the democratization of the country. In a situation of profound uncertainty and extreme economic impoverishment, NGOs become a fundamental safety net and later a job market for elites, especially intellectuals. In the Tirana area, particularly, hundreds of think-tanks, women’s and youth associations, human rights groups, and environmental organizations were established.52 A few such NGOs gradually structured their goals and strategies, developed some experience in the field, and carried out a significant number of projects. Yet they did not achieve much reputation in the Albanian public opinion, nor did they ever become civil society actors in the full meaning of the term.53 The relationship between Albanian NGOs and the population remained weak, with low public awareness and trust in their activities.54 The lack of previous experience of independent civil society organizations made the Albanian NGOs’ relationships with donors very close, and the struggle to gain social legitimacy particularly difficult. The Religious Institutions Traditionally the Albanians belong to four major religious traditions: the Sunni majority, the Bektashi Muslim minority, and the Orthodox and the Catholic Christians. Under Communist rule, all religious institutions were annihilated following the decision to make Albania the first atheist country in the world. This policy was established in 1967 following years of anti-religious campaigns that had already led to the closure of churches and mosques and the killing or imprisonment of members of all clergies. It was only in May 1990 that the offence of religious propaganda was removed from criminal law and churches and mosques were gradually permitted to reopen. It is not surprising therefore that the religious institutions were not available to support or to stimulate protests. Only a few individuals emerged as significant public figures in the last stage of the regime’s crisis. Although no religious movement was central to the regime change in Albania, some kind of religious cleavage came to be relevant in 1990. The northern city of Shkodër, where the largest Albanian Catholic community was based, became one of the strongholds of the opposition movement. The secret police viewed the Catholic community in Shkodër as the fifth column of the Vatican. It was here that a small group of people had

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attempted a first failed protest on January 11 , 1990. They decided to organize another demonstration on January 14th, asking a Catholic priest, Simon Jubani, released from prison just a year earlier after 26 years behind bars, to lead the protest following the Romanian example. At the time Jubani cordially refused but later, on November 4th, when a few thousand people gathered at the city’s Catholic cemetery, they finally convinced him to hold a public mass in open violation of the atheist prescriptions of the Albanian Communist state. A few days later, on November 11th, tens of thousands gathered to celebrate a mass at the cathedral that under the Communist rule had been converted into a Palace of Sports. Among the participants were not only Catholics but also Muslims and Orthodox Christians.55 Later, the Catholics supported the mufti as they reopened the main city mosques. These episodes in Shkodër were limited but they were powerful signs of the rebirth of civil society. On March 20th, 1991, a delegation from the Vatican visited Albania. Right before the first multiparty elections, on the occasion of the Easter festivities, the Tirana cathedral, once transformed into a cinema, was reopened. Mother Teresa of Calcutta, an ethnic Albanian from Macedonia, participated in the Holy Saturday Mass. In the same period, the Orthodox Church also reopened and the Tirana mosque posted the dates for Ramadan.56 However, soon the dependence on foreign aid in the post-Communist years provoked tensions among the Albanian religious communities: the Sunni Muslims were targeted by competing foreign influences, especially from Saudi Arabia and Turkey; and many evangelical Christian groups were struggling with all the traditional groups to convert Albanians. Finally, the Orthodox Christians remained trapped within Greek–Albanian tensions as Greek nationalists tend to consider all Albanian Orthodox to be Greek.57 th

The Ethnic Cleavages At the turn of the 1980s, ethnic Albanians made up around 95% of the population in Albania. The law used to divide ethnic minorities into three national minorities: Greeks, Macedonians, and Montenegrins; and two linguistic minorities: Roma and Vlachs/Aromanians. Of these small ethnic groups, the Greek minority constituted the biggest, numbering 59,000 citizens, according to the 1989 Census, and growing political relevance due to the role of neighboring Greece. The ethnic Greeks emerged as a relevant political social and actor only once the transition had started and despite the ban on forming ethnic parties. They established the organization Omonia to represent the minority and created the (predominantly Greek) Union for the Defence of Human Rights political party that gained five representatives in the 1991 electoral competition and two at the second general elections in 1992. However, the situation began to deteriorate soon after the democratization process started, due on one hand to the newly elected President Berisha’s

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authoritarian turn and on the other to strong political interference from Athens, reaching the lowest levels in 1994 with the arrests of five Omonia political activists. Besides national minorities and the religious cleavages, of considerable political relevance during the regime change was the identification of Albanians with their territorial belonging and language, which varies between the Northern Gheg and the Southern Tosk dialects. Even though the last Communist leader, Ramiz Alia, was a Northerner, the Communist regime was shaped and dominated by the Southern elites. Enver Hoxha himself originally came from the Southern town of Gjirokaster. Apart from when it came to elite selection, the North perceived itself as discriminated against in many ways, including the linguistic choice made in the 1970s of standardizing the official language around the Southern dialect. The organizing committee of the 1990 Student Movement was constituted by a majority of students of Northern origin. Alia’s delegation to mediate with them was made up of Northerners like Berisha and Mustafaj. In post-Communist Albania, the new leadership selected a consistent number of government employees from among fellow Northerners, especially in the police and secret services. Finally, the Catholic community, predominantly based in the North, also turned out to be a relevant antiCommunist actor, as discussed. One cannot speak of social movements here, but social cleavages that mattered in the regime change dynamics. The Army To understand the level of power concentration in the Albanian Stalinist system it is worth considering one of the common actors in political changes: the Army. In Albania, even the Army had been reduced to complete silence after the far-reaching purges of the 1970s. By 1975, Enver Hoxha had eliminated all potential rival centers of power from the public administration as a whole.58 Until the final crisis of the system, the army was an important tool to enforce ideological conformity, but totally subordinated to the Party’s Secretary General. The result of Hoxha’s policy of total party dominance over the security apparatus was that neither the Army nor the Ministry of Defense could really challenge Alia’s power during the regime crisis.59 The Army was the protagonist during a critical moment on February 22nd, 1991. A group of military students and officers at the Academy and the Military School expressed their concern over the toppling of Hoxha’s statue in the main square of the capital. They threatened that, if no explanation for the lack of defense of public order were provided by the authorities, then they would attack the state television center. They wanted to take the statue of Hoxha in the Military Academy and put it in the main square of the capital. Outside the Military Academy, ordinary citizens built improvised barricades to prevent the replacement of the statue. As the special police forces tried to disperse the crowds four people died, including one member of the

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police. The day after, the Military Academy was attacked with Molotov cocktails, stones, and metal rods. The water and electricity supplies to the building were cut. A tank full of military students was blocked outside the Academy while someone blew up the building walls using dynamite.60 Once again a crucial role was played by a DP delegation who mediated between the Academy students, the defenders of the regime symbols, and the infuriated protesters. It was evident then that the Army could not threaten Alia’s role in the transition nor the liberalization process itself. Rather, the Army’s weakness was among the reasons behind the state’s collapse and the situation of chaos that reigned in 1991–1992. In August 1991, President Alia held a meeting with the Minister of Defense to request that the Army restore its internal order after episodes of discipline breaking down and looting in Kukes took place.61 By the end of 1991, the coalition government reformed the military. A more radical transformation of the military was carried out by the new DP government, which rapidly reduced its size and sought foreign assistance for its modernization. The Economic Collapse Since the economy had reached such a level of paralysis by the turn of the 1990s, not even the managers of the state factories or collective farms emerged as potentially relevant social actors in the regime change, either then or later. Highlighting the worsening of the economic situation in the country, in August 1991 for the third time a wave of people left the country, reaching the Italian ports of Bari, Brindisi, and Otranto on board the tugboat Vlora and other fishing boats, floating craft, and barges while violent clashes took place around the port of Durres when the police tried to prevent the seizing of ships.62 The autumn of 1991 was characterized by a new wave of strikes but the country collapsed into a spiral of lawlessness. By November 29th, 1991, the DP withdrew from the stability government. Dozens of people died during street riots in the following months as private violence also spread. During this dramatic winter of 1991–1992, the first foreign military intervention took place in Albania. Named Operazione Pellicano, it consisted of 1000 unarmed Italian soldiers distributing humanitarian aid to placate food riots and lawlessness that had spread in various parts of the country, especially in the remote mountain areas where the situation was especially harsh. The catastrophic economic conditions that characterized the Albanian transition were entrenched in the experience of isolation that the country lived out from the 1970s onwards. The self-reliant economy had a very negative impact on its post-Communist transition. De facto the industrial base of the Albanian economy started to break down before the collapse of the regime when foreign support and technology were withdrawn.63 Already in the last few years of Communist rule, the shortage of spare

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parts and fuel, as well as absenteeism at work, had reduced production to half its capacity, and once factories and mines were abandoned, the economy was barely functioning. The first sign of the regime’s intentions to abandon autarchy had arrived only in 1987, but the effective return to the international political arena took place in February 1988 with the country’s participation in a Balkan conference in Belgrade.64 While the regime procrastinated over the need for economic reforms, by late 1990 the people started to de-collectivize the land spontaneously, abandon factories, and destroy state properties. When the anti-Communist mobilization increased from early 1991 onwards, the economy was basically paralyzed. On the one hand, the economic crisis during the transition was so severe that almost everything came to be seen as a possible source of income, pieces of public buildings included. Literally anything was seized for this purpose: windows, chairs, tables, manhole covers from the streets. Everything that could be taken from public properties was dismantled and taken home. The economic breakdown was certainly a fundamental structural condition enabling regime change in Albania, as it helps explain the profound disaffection with the regime in the country, the mass emigration that contributed to its fall, and the months of anarchy that accompanied the transition. Once the reforms began in 1992, people from every social group, including the most skilled and professional strata of the population, saw their social statuses change dramatically. The majority were obliged to reinvent their lives to cope with the drastic fall in living standards and thus they could not actively contribute to the political transformation.65 The Post-Communist State–Society Relation Due to previous political experience and the concomitant developments in the former Yugoslavia, the fear of a civil war was strong both in Albania and abroad. Therefore, most of the literature sees the Albanian regime change as relatively peaceful and non-bloody. However, Albania lived through a difficult post-Communist transition characterized by serious problems with public order due to violent strikes, looting, and food riots connected with the economic collapse. The breakdown in state authority also resulted in a crime wave between 1991 and 1992. The government reacted by channeling resources to improve policing and by frequently applying the death penalty. The turbulence experienced during the early stage of the regime change lowered after March 1992 when the first non-Communist government was elected, the political democratization and the economic liberalization started, and a degree of political stabilization was achieved. In the first few months after the 1992 elections, the first non-Communist government inherited the problems of public order and for a while had to confront the new independent trade unions and unpredictable labor protests.

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From April 1992 the resumption of widespread strike activities saw the BSPSH under pressure to continue to represent the radical demands of the workers while the new government expected it to stabilize the political and economic situation. As stressed by Vickers and Pettifer, the conflict showed “the unpredictability of outbreaks of violence in urban centers, and the fact that trade unions were still an independent force.”66 On August 26th, 1992, the workers at the Polican munitions complex surrounded the town of Berat, took two public officers hostage, and set fire to the factory’s office building. Violence spread in the streets and six people were injured. The government was forced to accept economic concessions to calm the situation. As the protests continued, the reaction of the new government was to violently crack down on trade unions shortly after. In December, the government reacted to a prolonged hunger strike and occupation at the Bulqize chromium mine by sending in paramilitary units that intimidated workers by placing dynamite around the top of the mine shaft.67 Similarly, a few weeks later, paramilitary units were sent to Kukes to face workers asking for the land compensation they had been promised.68 The new DP government continued the old practice of controlling the media. As Vickers and Pettifer observed: “In a nation plagued with strikes the media only transmitted news of workers agreeing to go back to work.” In fact, the many social and economic conflicts taking place at the time were seldom reported, and people learned about important protests such as a two-week strike in the railway sector only when they found the stations closed in May 1992.69 In the following years the two main trade unions identified themselves with one of the main political parties, that is, the Socialist or Democratic parties, and remained trapped within the harsh political battle between them. They thus lost the autonomy and credibility they had achieved in the eyes of the public during the transition. The DP leadership continued the Communist practice of the political appropriation of state institutions and established a new one-man rule, limiting democratic participation and mismanaging the economic transition.70 Internally, very few voices were able to speak out against the authoritarian practices of the new democratically elected government. The Socialist Party was heavily hit by various measures, from the incarceration of its leaders to the firing of thousands of public employees that refused to change their political affiliation. However, these practices were not used in a context of totalitarian control and therefore the formation of public opinion did gradually occur, despite the poor quality of democracy. For instance, the severe public order problems that troubled the country once the regime had collapsed provoked a number of citizen protests focusing on security issues. Of the few records available on these movements, Vickers recalls how teachers and pupils organized around the Independent Educational Union of the Shkodër district, boycotted lessons, and organized a rally

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calling for order against vandalism and violence at school in February 1992.71 However, the combination of local media manipulation and foreign media neglect explains the limited availability of analyses of social movements in the first few years of the Albanian transition.

Concluding Remarks: A Turbulent Transition, Not a Velvet Revolution In Albania the collapse of the party state did not give the lead to a velvet transformation, nor was it characterized by bloodbaths. In Albania, the transition was rather characterized by a steady stream of violence, street violence and institutional violence, provoked by the economic and institutional breakdown. It entailed the diffusion of anarchy, looting, and other forms of violence on state property connected with the economic breakdown. Obviously, after the long years of the Stalinist regime no one expected a smooth regime change. The Communist elite endeavored to use its power to limit the breadth of the political transformation, but only managed to postpone the regime’s collapse for a few months. However, when it realized it was impossible to control change from above it renounced state violence. The difference between Albania and the other post-Communist countries, in great part, was a matter of degree. In Albania, the conflict was mostly experienced in an extreme form at the societal level due to the worse economic situation and state and civil society weakness. The 1989 democratic contagion was fundamental for the political change of the whole region. Yet, Albania was a latecomer. In addition, Albania represents an interesting case of shifts from exit and voice as identified by Hirschman in the case of the DDR.72 Starting from July 1990, the repeated episodes of massive flights abroad of people “voting with their feet” showed the deep legitimization crisis of the system and encouraged popular revolts. The central social actor for the regime change in Albania was the youth. Its contribution came in the three forms described here: as mass emigration, as a student movement, and in the workers movements. While the decades of totalitarian regime had disarticulated other social and political actors, the youth emerged as an agent of change. As the mobilization of the rest of Albanian society turned out to be ephemeral, the relevance of these events has been played down by the academic literature that has focused instead on the political elite or, if looking at grassroots, on the large-scale exodus and the cultural origins of the myth of the West that spread in Albania before the collapse of the regime. However, the turbulent transition showed the extent to which the Communist regime had transformed the country. Retrospectively, the centrality of youth in the Albanian regime change was predictable for a country whose population had tripled in just a few decades under a modernizing system. Similarly, one could expect the intelligentsia to have played a role, given the centrality attributed to it by a Communist regime that had managed to

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annihilate all other sources of social power. Finally, once the fear of protesting faded, the intransigence of the workers’ protests mirrored as much as they worsened the economic deadlock already reached in the country. The peculiarity and the paradox of the Albanian transition was that its late-in-coming protest waves occurred in a situation of state disintegration. The totalitarian state that had profoundly transformed Albanian society for 45 years experienced large-scale exoduses, spontaneous de-collectivization of the land, the abandonment of factories, and the widespread destruction of public property. This situation of state collapse, unprecedented for a European state, constituted a considerable encumbrance for the reemerging Albanian civil society. The new post-Communist political elites that emerged from the intellectual milieus once “organic” to the Communist system absorbed the short-lived social movements that emerged in the struggle against the regime, in particular the Student Movement, and soon marginalized its members. Moreover, the emerging ruling elite soon showed authoritarian inclinations and used the old cult-state tools to repress discontent. In 1992, the new government used secret police and paramilitary forces to demobilize workers and crack down on union independence. Finally, few of the protagonists of the struggles that took place between December 1990 and March 1991 remained politically active; the great majority of people simply demobilized or emigrated, seeking new opportunities abroad after being hit by the harsh economic situation in the country. The regime change in Albania was completed when, for the first time since 1945, a non-Communist political party won the elections on March 22nd, 1992. Whether these were the first free elections is a matter of debate. After all, this was the second time that multiparty elections had taken place. Indeed, they were among the few elections whose results were not contested in Albania’s post-Communist history. Since that point Albania has performed poorly in terms of the quality of its democracy. As Elbasani notes, the new democratic institutions “failed to achieve either a degree of stability or a sufficient level of legitimacy” in the years that followed.73

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

(Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 14–17). (See Langer, 1996: 231; Kola, 2003: 1994; Mustafaj, 1993: 27–30). (Champseix, 1990: 310). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 20). (Abrahams, 2015: 44). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 34). (Mustafaj, 1993: 31). (Abrahams, 2015: 48). (Hirschman, 1993). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 84). (Elbasani, 2008). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 33).

90 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

Luisa Chiodi (Abrahams, 2015: 59). (Abrahams, 2015: 63). (Keesing’s Record of World Events, 1990). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 34). (Mustafaj, 1993: 124). (Abrahams, 2015: 79). (Abrahams, 2015: 82). (Human Rights Watch, 1991: 4). (Champseix, 1992: 184). (Lawrence, 2011). (Vaughan-Whitehead, 1999). (Langer, 1996: 227). (Champseix, 1992: 186). (Lawrence, 2011). (Mustafaj, 1993: 109). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 65). (Abrahams, 2015). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 66). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 120). (Biberaj, 1998). (Baruti, 1996). (Krasniqi, 2004: 19). (Blumi, 1997). (Chiodi, 2007). (Champseix, 1990: 310). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 23). (Champseix 1992: 215). (Bazzocchi, 2004). (Abrahams, 2015: 12). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 38). (Human Rights Watch, 1992). (Abrahams, 2015: 72). (Human Rights Watch, 1992). (Cited in Bazzocchi, 2004: 99–101). (Abrahams, 2015: 81). (Young, 2000: 150). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 56). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 139). (Human Rights Watch, 1996). (Vaso, 1998; Sampson, 1996). (Chiodi, 2008). (ICG, 1999). (Human Rights Watch, 1991). (Champseix, 1992: 186). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 96–117). (Biberaj, 1998). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 212). (Human Rights Watch, 1991). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 71). (See Abrahams, 2015: 86; Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 70). (Lohmel, 1996). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 8). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 86).

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(Schmidt-Neke, 1992: 6). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 86). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 90). (Elbasani, 2008). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1997: 129). (Hirschman, 1993). (Elbasani, 2008: 5).

Bibliography Abrahams, Fred. 2015. Modern Albania. New York: New York University Press. Baruti, Vasfi. 1996. “A General Outlook on Albanian NGOs ’96.” NGO Bulletin, Special Issue 12, December. Bazzocchi, Claudio. 2004. Fatos Lubonja. Intervista sull’Albania. Dalle carceri di Enver Hoxha al liberismo selvaggio. Bologna: Il Ponte. Biberaj, Elez. 1998. “Albania.” In Eastern Europe. Politics, Culture and Society since 1939, edited by Sabrina P. Ramet. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 251–283. Blumi, Isa. 1997. “The Politics of Culture and Power: The Roots of Hoxha’s Postwar State.” East European Quarterly XXXI(3): 379–398. Champseix, Elisabeth and Jean-Paul Champseix. 1990. 57, Boulevard Stalin. Paris: Editions La Découverte. Champseix, Elisabeth and Jean-Paul Champseix. 1992. L’Albanie ou la logique du désespoir. Paris: Édition la Découvert. Chiodi, Luisa. 2007. Transnational Policies of Emancipation or Colonization? Civil Society Promotion in Post-Communist Albania (Ph.D. Dissertation). Florence: European University Institute. Chiodi, Luisa. 2008. “The Profession of Civil Society in Post-Communist Albania.” Albanian Journal of Politics IV(I): 1–32. Chiodi, Luisa. 2012. “Mass Migration, Student Protests and the Intelligentsia Popullore in the Albanian Transition to Democracy.” Cosmos Workings Papers. Firenze: European University Institute. Elbasani, Arolda. 2008. “Political Transformation and Implementation of the EU’s Democratic Requirements in Albania.” In Integration Perspectives and Synergic Effects of European Transformation, by Arolda Elbasani, Anuela Ristani, and Gjergji Vurmo. Budapest: Centre for EU Enlargement Studies. Hirschman, Albert. 1993. “Exit, Voice and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic. An Essay in Conceptual History.” World Politics 45(2): 203–241. Human Rights Watch. 1991. News from Helsinki Watch – Albania, April 19th. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ALBANIA.pdf. Human Rights Watch. 1992. Human Rights Watch World Report 1992 – Albania, January 1st. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca541e.html. Human Rights Watch. 1996. Human Rights in Post-Communist Albania, March 1st. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a7f30.html. ICG. 1999. Report 54: The State of Albania, January 6th. Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group. Keesing’s Record of World Events. 1990. Unrest—Foundation of Opposition Party Government and Party—Changes, Volume 36, December. London: Keesing’s Worldwide, LLC. Kola, Paulin. 2003. The Search for Greater Albania. London: Hurst & Co.

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Krasniqi, Afrim. 2004. Shoqeria Civile Ne Shqiperi. Historia è Lindjes,Shivillimit Dhe Sfidat e Saj. Tirana: Shtyp. Geer. Langer, Alexander. 1996. Il Viaggiatore Leggero. Scritti 1961–1995. Palermo: Sellerio editore. Lawrence, William. 2011. “Albanian Workers Force Shift toward Democracy, 1991.” Global Non Violent Action Database. Available at: http://nvdatabase.swa rthmore.edu/content/albanians-force-out-communist-government-1991. Lohmel, Edith. 1996. “Le Défis De L’Autarchie Économique.” In Albanie Utopie. Huis Clos Dan Les Balkans, edited by Sonia Combe and Ivaylo Ditchev. Paris: Edition Autrement, 68–79. Mustafaj, Besnik. 1993. Albania. Tra crimini e miraggi. Milano: Garzanti. Qesari, Eldon. 2011. “La storiografia contemporanea albanese e lo studio della storia recente. Gli anni del ‘passaggio epocale’ (1985–1992).” In Dopo la pioggia. Gli stati della exJugoslavia e l’Albania (1991–2011), edited by Antonio D’Alessandi and Armando Pitassio. Lecce: Argo, 51–64. Sampson, Steven. 1996. “The Social Life of Projects: Importing Civil Society to Albania.” In Civil Society: Challenging Western Models, edited by Chris Hann. London: Routledge, 121–142. Schmidt-Neke, Michael. 1992. “Albania.” In European Labor Unions, edited by Joan Campbell. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group. Vaso, Adrian. 1998. Assessment of NGOs Situation in Albania. Aquarius for the World Bank. Tirana: World Bank. Vaughan-Whitehead, Daniel. 1999. Albania in Crisis: The Predictable Fall of the Shining Star. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Vickers, Miranda and James Pettifer. 1997. Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity. London: Hurst & Company. Young, Antonia. 2000. Women Who Become Men. Oxford: Berg.

Part II

The Evolution Of The Student Movement And Its Role In The Dynamics Of Political Change

5

The Rise Of The Student Movement And Its Role In The Collapse Of The Communist Regime Llukman Halili

The Albanian Student Movement seemingly came out of nowhere, lasted only a few months, and then it disappeared. It was a unique movement in many respects. In this essay I will trace the process of its evolution from protests to a student movement, its contribution, and the role it played in the collapse of the regime in Albania. Although it lasted for only a few months, it played an extremely important role during the first phase of transition in Albania. The Student Movement was the decisive factor in the change of the political system from a single-party to a democratic multiparty system. It was the leading catalyst in the founding of the first party of the opposition. It was the force that galvanized the Albanian masses. Finally, it was the force that designed, led, and achieved the overthrowing of the myth of Enver Hoxha, on whom the whole legitimacy of the previous system was centered. The essay is organized in two parts. In the first part I examine the rise of the Student Movement to the point of the establishment of political pluralism. In the second part I examine the role of the Student Movement in the struggle for legitimacy and the toppling of the myth of Enver Hoxha.

“Albania is Changing”: The Albanian Student Movement and the Establishment of Political Pluralism The Albanian students of the University “Enver Hoxha” in Tirana, but also students in other institutions of higher education such as in Korca or Shkodra, knew very little or next to nothing about the organizations and the actions of student movements in Europe and the world. Due to the known censorship on information, and prohibitions on foreign literature and contact with foreigners, Albanian students did not even have the opportunity to learn about these examples. The creation, development, and action of the Albanian Student Movement would probably be best described by Mark Kurlansky’s statement on the student movement of 1968: Protesters-rebels rejected most of the institutions, political leaders, and political parties. Protests and rebellion have not been planned and have not been organized. The uprisings have been shaped or directed by the

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Llukman Halili participants of the urgent meeting. Part of the most important decisions are taken instinctively, often being made possible by human desires. Movements have been directed against all forms of authoritarianism, so they have not had leaders, or have had leaders who have denied being leaders. The ideology has largely been unclear, while broad consensus has existed for a very small number of issues. (Kurlansky, 2007: 4)

One of the leaders of the Student Movement notes that the student protests in Tirana gradually, but with safe steps, were transformed into a social movement. Rama notes that, “Until the afternoon of December 9th, was this mass of students unhappy with the living conditions without consolidated structures and without clearly defined targets. There was no objection and opposition to the regime, there was not even any particular leadership structure.”1 However, the situation changed. In a matter of hours and days, after it acquired the following attributes, the Student Movement became a social movement. Those characteristics are that (a) there was a substantial group of different individuals (b) who shared the same common political goals, (c) who acted in solidarity with one another in the open social context, and (d) their actions were undertaken in a systematic adversarial or supportive relationship with the elites, the regime opponents, and other state organs.2 Ideology is the essential glue that holds a movement together. According to Rama, the core ideological values were manifest in the main purpose of the Student Movement, which was, “protecting and preserving the national state and putting this state in the service of all Albanians.”3 Its ideology was nationalism. At first, the Student Movement did not have all the attributes of a social movement. The Student Movement in Albania came to an end with the great exodus of March 1991 and the closure of the university by the government. Practically, it lasted effectively from December 4th, 1990 until February 20th, 1991. However, although it did not last long, it left its mark and was a force for a better tomorrow and for a better future. The Albanian students had selected and focused on a few goals that they were able to achieve after the structuration of the Movement. These twin goals were the establishment of political pluralism and the overthrowing of Enver Hoxha’s cult. With the establishment of pluralism and the removal of Enver Hoxha, the 45-year history of post-WWII Albania dominated by a party system ended. How did they manage to do this? The students of the University of Tirana in December 1990 did not have any knowledge of the existence of European leftist movements and the role these student movements played in changing the social order in their own countries. On the other hand, they were informed about the events in Southeastern Europe, the impact of Glasnost and Perestrojka, and the collapse of the Berlin Wall mainly through Italian TV stations. Judith Hoffman thinks that, “the collapse of the regime in Romania and the end of Nicolae Ceausescu has been a decisive factor in accelerating the reform process [in Albania].”4 Indeed, photos from Bucharest and Timisoara

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left an important impression on the Albanian students of Tirana, Shkodra, and Kamza. But there were other factors at play as well. Blerim Çela argues that among other factors that have forced the hand of the regime and that eventually influenced the democratization of Albania, “besides the Fall of the Berlin Wall, there were the changes in Poland led by Solidarnosc with a particular emphasis placed on the execution of the couple Ceausescu in Romania.”5 According to the Albanian historian Pjetër Pepa, the crucial event that led to the rise of the Student Movement was the fall of the Berlin Wall: “Our salvation from the regime was long due coming. However it was the day when the Berlin Wall fell, a glorious and blessed day that led to the rise of [students] December 1990 in Albania.”6 The Movement’s contribution to the country’s transition is undoubtedly crucial because it laid the foundations of the new social order in Albania. Did the Student Movement have clear political objectives? There is no doubt that the students were ideologically molded in a certain way. They also possessed a system of ideological values, clear values for anyone but much less valuable for others. The Student Movement’s main purpose was to transform the Albanian state to be like the states in Western Europe. The Student Movement viewed this transformation as the new beginning for all Albanians. It was to be a transformation that would lead to the establishment of a new system fit for modernity. The main purpose was to build and establish a new national state for the benefit of all Albanians. The Albanian Student Movement and the ruling elite had competing visions. The ruling elite during the transition, which was essentially the same ruling elite as that of the past regime, consistently puts the Student Movement in a bad light and tries to minimize its vision and achievements. However, despite all its efforts, the Student Movement was and it remains the fundamental factor that pushed for real political change during the first stage of the transition. Paradoxically, the transition still continues and there is no end in sight. Yet, for the Albanians, the Student Movement was a trusted political factor and an ideological guide to a better future. Influences on the Rise of the Student Movement There are debates regarding the extent to which the events in Eastern Central Europe and in Romania played an influential role in the process of transition and in the facilitation of the actions by the Student Movement. Gjergj Zheji argues that the killing of the Ceausescu couple was a key and crucial factor that served “to inform the communist political nomenclature of Albania that this was their death knell.”7 One of the founders of the Democratic Party of Albania (DPA), Alexander Meksi, points out that the Student Movement was not the only factor in the establishment of the multiparty system in Albania in December 1990. According to Meksi, the Student Movement was the main force led by the student visionaries who best understood and knew what modern Albania needed. However, in his

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view, there were also other factors that influenced the establishment of the multiparty system. First of all, it was the execution of the Ceausescu couple. This event was an unmistakable message to the members of the Politburo. If the ruling caste did not do the right thing, they knew that they would suffer the same fate. Then, argues Meksi, it was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany. Finally, Meksi remarks that the failure of the model of democratization that Ramiz Alia wished to implement left no other choices to the regime.8 The killing of the Ceausescu couple was labeled in Albania as the “Çaushesku syndrome.” According to Elida Buçpapaj, this fear of being judged and executed by their enemies was the decisive factor that forced Ramiz Alia to approve the demands of the students for the establishment of the multiparty system in Albania. Buçpapaj notes that: the December 8th, 1990 [the day when students rose in demonstrations] in Albania is, first and foremost, the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the events in Southeastern Europe. When they saw the end of the Ceausescu couple on TV screens, Ramiz Alia and the regime were scared to death. The first signs of the opening of the system on the side of Ramiz Alia were not because of the convictions of the communist regime in Tirana—that was convinced that it would survive as the last bastion of communism in Europe—but with the pressure of the international community. The Embassy Crisis of July, 1990 had signaled to the Albanians that the West was on their side.9 From his own perspective, Ramiz Alia pointed to the “Embassy crisis” as one of the leading causes. He also accused the foreign media that, according to him, “inspired the young people to leave Albania.”10 Among thousands of refugees that left Albania through embassies were hundreds of students of the University of Tirana as well. The current President of Albania, and one of the participants in the student protests in December 1990, Ilir Meta, in his memoirs remarks that events in Romania served as a warning sign, indeed. The regime was frightened that something similar could happen in Albania. Therefore, change was required and expected. What was to be changed, argues Meta, was the structure of the political system. As Meta puts it, “The student protests took place one year after the events in Romania. It was an irreversible process. Although the news media were totally silent, we learned much about the events through the Italian TV stations. The assassination of the Ceausescu couple convinced us that the change was unavoidable.”11 Each of these analyses captures part of the truth. When it comes to the analysis of the Student Movement of 1990–1991, I have identified the following external and internal factors that influenced its rise and formation. Among the external factors I would note the following three: Glasnost and Perestroika; the demolition of the Berlin Wall; and the events in Romania, i.e., the killing of the Ceausescu couple. Among the internal factors, I

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would highlight the following four: the Embassy crisis in July 1990 and the flight of thousands of Albanians mainly to the West; the escape of the writer Ismail Kadare to France; the unsuccessful talks of the group of 50 intellectuals with Ramiz Alia during August 1990; and the role of Ramiz Alia. Alia was torn and vacillated between support for reforms, clearly noticeable in his rhetoric, and the determination of the Party’s conservative wing to maintain the existing Stalinist order only with some system corrections. One should not underestimate the role of the economy. In spite of Alia’s efforts to improve the economy, at the end of 1990, Albania was the poorest “communist state in Europe, completely isolated, autarchic and extremist in its Stalinism.”12 The economy was stalled and in deep crisis. What stands out, though, is the failure of the intellectuals to act. While Tirana’s intellectuals might appear to have been against the regime in their actions, this is deceptive. Even by mid-December 1990, the intellectuals were under the complete control of the Albanian Party of Labor. It became clear even from early on that the intellectuals, who formally and very carefully were declared for the continuation of the reforms initiated by Alia, did not stand for radical change. The intellectuals wanted the reformation of the existing system. In this sense, they were not supporting the demands for the overthrow of the Communist system.13 Elez Biberaj, the director of the most well-known radio station in Albania in 1990, “Voice of America,” and one of the best-informed analysts of the conditions within Albania, forcefully argues that the merit for the change belongs exclusively to the student youth of Albania: “Only student youth were determined in their demands for radical reform in Albania.”14 The reason is that, at the time, Albania had a very substantial student body. After the death of Enver Hoxha, on the proposal of the Political Bureau of the Party and with the decision of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, on April 14th on the State University of Tirana was bestowed the name “Enver Hoxha.” By the end of 1990, the University had a total of 25,964 students, out of which 13,310 were women, and the Higher Institute of Agriculture in Kamza had a total of 5065 students, out of which 2668 were females.15 Table 5.1 gives an overview of the number of students at the University “Enver Hoxha” of Tirana, and their distribution by department in the academic year 1989/1990.16 It is clear that the State University of Tirana had substantial enrollments. Its campus was a separate campus known as Student City. This is where the Student Movement evolved and where most of the students from other regions resided and lived in dormitories. On the Beginning of the Student Protests: The Eruption of December 8th, 1990 By the beginning of December 1990, the Student City of Tirana, the university campus where the students’ dormitories were located, was in a

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Table 5.1 Overview of the number of students at the University “Enver Hoxha”, and their distribution by department in 1989/1990. State University of Tirana

Total

Female

All students Full-time students Part-time (correspondence) students Department of Economics Department of Geology Department of History and Philology Department of Engineering Department of Medical Studies Department of Law and Politics Department of Natural Sciences

25,964 20,608 5356 2832 926 1539 2613 1983 591 1929

13,310 10,617 2693 1894 99 983 1198 970 240 1102

Source: Grothusen (1993: 563).

different state of mind from the past. Among other things, students were debating and exchanging ideas on the unusual content of some articles published in the party press that were not in conformity with the party line of the immediate past. Also, by December 1st, 1990, living conditions were worsening. Complaints about the quality of the food were routine but by now, in the dormitories that housed students of engineering, art, and language-literature majors, haphazard and frequent reduction and termination of the electricity supply was happening. This was the month of the final exams so it is understandable that the students were very upset and worried. They started to react in various ways. On December 4th, in the evening, when the lights went off, students reacted loudly by screaming, singing songs, and reciting poems by poets forbidden by the regime like Gjergj Fishta. Other students from the nearby dormitories joined in, for all were unhappy with the living conditions, with the lack of electricity in the first place, with the lack of heating in the buildings, and with the inadequate food.17 The situation became problematic for the authorities as well. The Rector of the University of Tirana undertook measures aimed at the normalization of the situation. He also warned them to adhere to the rules of the university, threatening them with various administrative sanctions and penalties that ranged from a warning to expulsion from the Student City and expulsion from the university altogether. On December 6th, the students of Mechanical Engineering posted a Flete-rrufe, a poster of public criticism, at the door of the Director of the Student City. For the first time, the students publicly reprimanded the Government of Prime Minister Adil Çarçani for failing to fulfill their obligations and the promises they had publicly given to students through Albanian television. The emphasis of that public criticism was the message that “one cannot make a new jacket just by turning out a

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worn-out cloth.” This poster alarmed the government and Prime Minister Adil Çarçani himself was notified. The poster was written by a student majoring in Mechanical Engineering, Pandeli Majko, with the help of students Petrit Zeqiri and Arben Tahiri.18 This poster was the first sign of trouble in the Student City that was seriously examined by the regime. On the evening of December 6th, students began to shout from their balconies slogans hostile to the regime such as, “Long live Helmut Kohl! Long live Bush! Down with Hysni Kapo! Down with Stalin!”19 Reacting rapidly, the very next day the Minister of Education, Skender Gjinushi, issued an order that all the protagonists of the “Balcony of the Revolution” were to be expelled from the school. But the dissent escalated. On December 8th, 1990, the students of the Higher Institute of Arts (ILA) organized a concert to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the murder of John Lennon, a former member of the rock band The Beatles,20 hugely popular among the Albanian youth at the time. The expression of opposition to the system by the young people through music, and The Beatles who were banned in Albania, was happening for the first time in the history of Communist Albania. It triggered a reaction on the side of the authorities that through their party newspaper The Voice of the People drew attention to the negative influences of music and fashion in the education of the new generations.21 However, the newspapers and the press continued their routine and ignored the events in the Student City. For example, The Voice of the People on December 7th, 1990 published the news of the visit of the Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Reis Malile to Cuba and the meeting with Fidel Castro, as well as the “triumphant” news of the publication of the complete 71 volumes of the Selected Works of Enver Hoxha. Formally, the political position of the press and the media remained unchanged, with the articles and op-eds written by the people that continued expressing their sentiments of “loyalty to Communism.” However, students were not towing the party line. Since early December, students had publicly expressed their opinions on the draft law of the electoral law on general elections announced by the Party, under which other political organizations that were serving as levers of the Party could independently participate in those elections as electoral subjects. Such organizations were The Youth Organization, the Association of Writers and Artists, the People’s Front, the Veterans Organizations, and other loyal organizations firmly under the control of the ALP. Thus, the newspaper of The Popular Front of Albania, Bashkimi, on December 1990 conducted a survey with the students. It found that 86% of the students at the University of Tirana were familiar with the draft law for general elections but that only 20% of them thought that this law was appropriate.22 The government reacted differently from what was the routine, though. On December 8th, 1990, Adil Çarçani, the Prime Minister of the country, suddenly paid a visit to the Student City. An improvised meeting with a group of students selected by the Communist Youth Organization was

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organized impromptu. However, during this conversation with the Prime Minister, the students present publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the conditions in which they were living. They also expressed their disagreement with other policies. Among other things, for the first time, they sought substantial changes in the curricula and in the university program. Prime Minister Çarçani accused the students of being indoctrinated by the enemy and having been inspired by foreign propaganda. He left while the students were reacting loudly, jeering and whistling.23 Subsequently, that same day, the alarmed Prime Minister notified the leadership of the Party and the state about the demands of the students. According to him, the student demands were not related to the social and living conditions. To him, the student demands were clearly formulated as political demands. Prime Minister Çarçani’s visit in the Student City increased the tensions, but it also increased the determination and the resolve of the students to demolish the regime.24 In an attempt to persuade the students to stop the protests and to return to their classrooms, Ramiz Alia sent a delegation led by the Secretary of the Labor Party Committee for Tirana Pirro Kondi and the Minister of Education Skender Gjinushi. Students refused to talk to this second delegation.25 On the evening of December 8th, 1990, the electric grid of Building 20 of the Student City exploded. On that evening, protesting over the lack of electricity around the clock, a group of students from Buildings 20 and 21 started singing patriotic songs such as “Enough in captivity, o poor Albania” and slogans such as “Down with Communism!” were heard.26 After these first signs of open opposition to the system, on that night began the gathering of various groups of students who would massively stand in front of their student dormitories and sing another patriotic song, “Come here, gather here, here, here!” Students were throwing around slogans such as “We want electricity!” and “We want better living conditions!” By this time, there was already a group of about 200 students protesting together. Very soon, this group swelled to about 1500 students.27 At this time, an older student, Azem Hajdari,28 a third-year student majoring in Philosophy and Justice, asked the rally to trust him to become the leader of the protest. He told the students: “My friends, I am Azem Hajdari. I will guide you. I know the law. I am married and I have two children. If they kill me, my children will live, but under no circumstances will I betray you.”29 The students were determined that their protests should continue no matter what happened and no matter what the cost would be. According to the testimonies of students present at the dormitories 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, about 1800 students were determined to face the repercussions of the regime. They decided to stay firm and defend their demands.30 Their march, under the leadership of Azem Hajdari, continued on the street “Budi,” a narrow lane that was used by the students to go to the center of Tirana, without being able to reach the Street of Elbasani, a main thoroughfare of the capital. At that juncture, the students found

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themselves surrounded by the police and, more notably, by the so-called Department 326, the Rapid Intervention Task Police Force. Otherwise known as “the Sampists,” because many of them were sportsmen and practiced in wrestling, judo, and sambo, this time Department 326 was there under the direct command of Hekuran Isai,31 the Minister of the Interior. The police asked them to stop the march. They requested that the students return to their student dormitories and stop the protests, under threats that the students would be punished for counter-revolutionary activities. If one was to be accused of counter-revolutionary activities, one could expect to be sentenced with severe and long jail terms. The threats did not break down the student resolve. They asked the Minister of the Interior Isai to intermediate so that they would be able to meet with President Ramiz Alia himself. Remarkably, the students specifically demanded to meet with the President of the state, and not with the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the ALP. Alia held both positions but the students were sending a clear signal that they did not want to deal with the Party, which, later on, they would accuse as responsible for the bad situation of themselves and of their families.32 After initially refusing to meet them, Ramiz Alia told the Minister of the Interior that he was willing to meet with a selected group of students to get acquainted with their demands. Under heavy escort by the police, this meeting was held at one o’ clock after midnight. The student group was led by Azem Hajdari. Before they left, Azem Hajdari warned other students that, “if they do not return within half an hour, it means that they will never return and so, they should continue the protests even if they had to give their lives.”33 The agreement of President Alia to begin the dialogue with the students was definitely one of the most important defeats of the Albanian Party of Labor, but also of President Ramiz Alia himself. In fact, this was a move conditioned by the circumstances. Ramiz Alia had no other option except to agree to meet with the students without any conditions.34 That dialogue, which started on December 8th, 1990, was the beginning of the end of the rule by the Albanian Party of Labor. By the same token, it was the beginning of the end for a peculiar mindset and the totalitarian system that had shaped Albania and its people for 50 years. Whether or not the students acted on their own and without being controlled by the Albanian Party of Labor is a matter of debate. As the first American ambassador in Albania, William Rayerson, observed, at the time Albania was “in unprecedented poverty, unprecedented misery and complete isolation from the world.”35 Because of this isolation, the emergence of the Student Movement is inexplicable to many experts. In this context, not only several Albanian analysts, but also foreigners, such as several German experts of Albanian affairs, including here Hans Joachim Hoppe, claim that at the beginning, the Student Movement was staged by the Albanian Party of Labor and Ramiz Alia himself. To them,

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this was a “Leise Revolution” (peaceful revolution) directed from above in order to maintain the existing system.36 Among the Albanian scholars, Kristo Frashëri thinks that the students were not the only ones who contributed to the collapse of the Communist regime. According to Frashëri, there were a number of factors that forced the regime’s hand, first of all the events in Southeastern Europe. There was also the regime’s fear that the use of force would cause the Ceausescu effect, i.e., turning all the people against the regime leadership. Frashëri says that, “It was not only the students and their professors that had changed. The Communist regime also had changed. That change was announced five months earlier, at the time when the regime allowed the unhindered access of the Albanian citizens to the accredited foreign embassies in Albania.”37 However, even for him, the December 8th protests were a catalyst for the decisive mobilization of the students and for the subsequent “social mobilization of all social strata. With regard to political objectives, it is noted that ‘the poor living conditions’ were just an excuse to start the protests. On December 9th, the students would articulate clearly the political platform of their movement for ‘a free Albania that would be like all Europe.’”38 The Student Movement—on the Establishment of Political Pluralism The student delegation met with the President on the night between December 8th and December 9th at 01:10 past midnight. The delegation requested another follow-up meeting, which would be attended by more students, representing their departments, to present their demands to President Alia. To President Alia’s assertion that “if you have come to address the severe conditions at the student campus, we will soon meet your requirements,” Azem Hajdari, the informal student leader, replied that: “We have not come here because of the lack of beans or sugar, for these items are not available to my children in Tropoja either. We have other requests.”39 President Ramiz Alia, in his memoirs, recalls that during his first meeting and conversation with the students it was immediately clear to him that in this case, the regime was no longer dealing with mere economic demands. Students were prepared to present political demands. For Alia, the student demands to improve the conditions in the Student City were essentially intended to attract a greater number of students so that they would join the Student Movement.40 In short, Alia’s meeting with the envoys of students lasted nearly 20 minutes. It ended with an agreement that there would be a subsequent second meeting in which the students would submit their better-defined requests. After the return of the delegation, on the morning of December 9th, at around 02:00 am, Azem Hajdari described to the protesting students the conversation with President Ramiz Alia. Then, a police officer screamed that, “Somebody stole my gun!” This served as a signal for the police forces and for the Minister of the Interior, Hekuran Isai, to give the order to use force to solve the student problem. The student representatives that had met Alia, as

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well as other student groups were ruthlessly attacked with rubber clubs by the police forces.41 The dispersed students returned to the Student City. After the police intervention and the attack on the students’ “representation” that had met with Ramiz Alia, they were determined to continue the protests. Hence they gathered in the Student City, hoping and expecting that the citizens of Tirana would join their protests. Yet, this happened only by late December 10th. Even on the early hours of December 9th, students such as Alban Tërshana and others took on the role of messengers and began spreading the word. Their message was simple. The entire Student City should mobilize and gather in the morning in the main square. The goal was to continue even tougher protests against the “Ramizian dictatorship,”42 i.e., against the system. In the words of one of the renowned activists of the ASM, “The blessed night of December 8th and the few next days, wrote one of the brightest and most inspiring pages in the history of the Albanians. Those days mark the end of the red epoch of the Communist rule on the continent of Europe.” The use of force on the student envoys and on the student protesters on the night of December 8th served as a catalyst for student mobilization. Their determination to keep their protests going to the end was intensified. Afterwards, the student envoys decided to boycott the classrooms and the school until the students’ requirements were met. The essential demand was the demand for the establishment of political pluralism. One student notes that, “We, the students, started the protests. Then we decided to continue our protests and hence, respect the decision we took on the midnight of December 8th that if our demands were not met, we would not stop our protests.”43 However, President Alia did not address their demands. The next day, December 9th, at around 10 am, a crowd of students gathered in the Student City protesting against the violent beating of the student envoys. Nearly 1000 students, led by Azem Hajdari, tried to go to the center of Tirana. The police were determined not to let them get there. For the first time, the slogans “Enver was Dictator!” and “Down with Nexhmija”44 were heard. The first political figure who sought to enter into a dialogue with the students was the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Albanian Youth, Lisien Bashkurti. Bashkurti told them that, “Your protest based on demands regarding living and the economic conditions is being misused by elements hostile to the system.” Azem Hajdari answered, “We are past the time when the Albanian youth were led by the shepherds. Now the situation is in the hands of the students.”45 Finding themselves faced with a very strong police presence that had surrounded the Student City, blocking all the exits, the students strengthened their resolve and became even more determined to continue the protests at any cost and price. At exactly noon of that day, for the first time were thrown slogans that were unmistakably political. Students began shouting, “We want Albania to be a democracy!”, “We too should be like Europe!”, “Freedom and Democracy!”, “Join us, do not be spectators,” “Do not shoot at the students!”,46 and

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the like. Students then rallied and attempted to go and protest in the center of Tirana. They headed in the direction of the Boulevard “Martyrs of the Nation,” shouting slogans and inviting the citizens of Tirana to join them. Around 13:30, the police brutally confronted the protesters at the Rruga e Elbasanit close to the Lyceum. Several shots were fired, students were badly beaten, and the police threw them back to the Student City. Dozens of students were injured and arrested. At the forefront of the December 9th protests were students who later would become well-known in Albania: Azem Hajdari, Shinasi Rama, Alban Tershana, Bardhyl Ukcamaj, Tefalin Malshyti, Mimoza Zhamo, Arben Lika, Akli Fundo, and many others.47 Even at this point, in the opinion of one of the main actors of the 1990 Student Movement, the students presented a mass of dissatisfied students with no consolidated leadership structures, no clear political goals and demands. In all these protests, albeit there was voiced a need for change, there was no unequivocal opposition to the regime and there were no structures of leadership. The process of transformation from a mass of students dissatisfied with the conditions to a meaningful social movement opposed to the system and that had clear political goals and a coherent leadership happened afterwards. The students who met President Ramiz Alia on December 8th and that protested on December 9th were clearly dissatisfied and opposed to the regime. But, actually, they were not very clear about their political goals. All these elements were crystallized on the very next day when a coherent leadership emerged. With the leadership, a set of clear political goals was defined, the organizational structures and the channels of communication were established, and the protests became revolutionary. This is the crucial moment when the student protests acquire the characteristics of a social movement. As one of the students notes, the leadership was made up of a Committee made up of Arben Lika, Mimoza Zhamo, Tefalin Malshyti, Azem Hajdari, and Shinasi Rama.48 The political objective was the transformation of the political system from a single-party system to a multiparty democratic system. The lines of structural organization were based on the departmental majors and the regional and personal ties of the students. A relatively solid structure emerged that was to prove crucial during the next few days. The Intellectuals Establish Contacts with the Student Movement This was the time when the intellectuals started to establish contact with the students. One of the witnesses of the violent police intervention was Dr. Sali Berisha. Once he was told that the police had used force against the student messengers who participated in the meeting with Ramiz Alia on the night of December 8th, he went to the Student City. On the occasion of the demonstration of December 9th, 1990, Berisha told the unnamed local police commander: “Your intervention was a barbarous intervention. I will denounce it. I will let know the whole world about the barbarous act. The students were doing nothing but throwing slogans.”49

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For the first time, Sali Berisha established contact with the students on December 9th. He did so as the formal messenger and the mediator of President Alia. His objective was to calm the situation in the Student City. As a mediator between the regime and the students, Sali Berisha managed to gain the release of the group of arrested students.50 In his collaboration with the students, of utmost importance was his provenance from the anti-Communist northern Albania. This was extremely important for the leaders of the Student Movement, Azem Hajdari and Shinasi Rama, both were from northern Albania. Hajdari was from Tropoja and Shinasi Rama was from Shkodra. It should be noted that, with the intermediation of one of the members of the Political Bureau, Xhelil Gjoni, Ramiz Alia personally invited Berisha to his home with a plea to mediate with the students. Berisha could play this role because on the one hand he had been a member of the Albanian Party of Labor for many years and had served as Secretary of the Party Organization in the Department of Medical Studies. On the other hand, he and the rebelling students were all from northern Albania.51 Yet, Berisha was not trusted and was viewed as the instrument of Alia. In his book Kurbani, Edi Rama sums up the ambivalence of the character of Berisha in this manner: Alia’s greatest gift to the students was Sali Berisha, the unshakeable loyalist of Enver Hoxha, the faithful secretary of the ALP, and the tireless servant of the Political Bureau. It was the same Sali Berisha that had glorified Ramiz Alia in his efforts for the democratization of the state and that had called the people of Shkodra “hooligans.” It was the same Sali Berisha, that is, Enver’s admirer, who (even after the change of the political system) did not allow the publication in the Democratic Party’s newspaper Rilindja Demokratike of the petition to revise and reevaluate the contribution of Enver Hoxha. This petition was signed by three hundred students, professors and citizens. It demanded from Ramiz Alia to immediately start reviewing the role of Enver Hoxha in the Albanian post-WW II history. It also demanded that Alia order immediately the release of all political prisoners.52 In short, Sali Berisha’s mission as an intermediary was unsuccessful. The angry students believed that they were dealing with the personal emissary of Ramiz Alia and with a faithful member of the Albanian Party of Labor. Berisha himself claims that, with Azem Hajdari’s intervention, he started a dialogue with the students: I asked the Movement leaders what their true purpose was in their confrontation with the dictatorship. They had many demands, some of them of an economic nature. They demanded the resignation of the members of the Politburo, the permission to create a Party of Young Intellectuals and of the Young Lecturers of the University and, their fourth point was the demand for political pluralism. I said, “Forget all

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Later that night, at midnight, Ramiz Alia insists that Sali Berisha reported to him that, “I cannot agree with the students. They have some reasonable economic demands. However, their other requests are not clear. Dialogue with them is impossible.”54 However, Sali Berisha categorically dismisses President Alia’s assertions. He denies that he met with Ramiz Alia on that night. He says that he met with Alia on the following day: I have never told the President that the students have no clearly articulated objectives. I told him about what they were insisting on, that is, the establishment of political pluralism, that they were intent on continuing the dialogue and that they requested the punishment of those who ordered the police and the Guard to brutally massacre the students who were peacefully protesting on the streets of Tirana.55 Again, according to Sali Berisha, he was convinced that on December 9th, Albania was changing. It was clear to him, he says, that the Student Movement, which was born on that very day, would be the only social organization that could force Ramiz Alia’s regime to surrender and accept the much-needed political change. December 9th, 1990—the Birth of the Student Movement After 45 years of Communist dictatorship and isolation it can be safely said that with the student demonstrations of December 8th and 9th in Albania begins the era of democratic development. In spite of this sense of inevitability of political change, a desperate Ramiz Alia tried to manage the events and keep the processes of political change under the control of the regime. Such an effort backfired, deepening the instability, economic collapse, and anarchy which were looming on the horizon and that materialized in the coming year.56 Part of his immediate effort was to control the students. Among his actions was the intervention by the police. The violent intervention of police forces against students in the afternoon of December 8th, 1990 and on December 9th, 1990 was highly counterproductive. Thousands of angry students, after returning to the Student City, in addition to slogans against the violence would also begin chanting slogans that were clearly hostile to the regime such as “Enver—Hitler,” “Ramiz—Traitor,” “The party of work—party of violence.”57 December 9th will undoubtedly be remembered as the date of the real birth of the Student Movement. The Movement began as a movement about the economic and living conditions in the Student City. However,

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these protests turned into open opposition against the regime of dictatorship. The rising of more than 3000 students on December 9th sent a clear message to the regime. The end of dictatorship was near and 45 years of Communist rule would have to come to an end. But at the same time, the students were organizing rapidly and on their own. Here emerges as salient the nagging issue of the role of the intellectuals and that of Sali Berisha in particular. Azem Hajdari, one of the main leaders of the Student Movement, claims in his reminiscences that on the afternoon of December 9th he had a long discussion with Dr. Sali Berisha and Besnik Mustafaj, at the corner of 3rd and 7th Student City Halls. Hajdari recalls that, “During the meeting, Berisha advised us to continue the protests and to try to avoid provocations by all means. He said that the dialogue was the best way to realize the goals of the Movement. After the conversation, we decided to cancel the planned protest rally in Skanderbeg Square on that night.”58 Besides this important point, Besnik Mustafaj, in his testimony about Berisha’s meeting with students, supports the claim of Berisha that during his talks with Azem Hajdari, Berisha had suggested that the students demand the establishment of political pluralism. Mustafaj says that, “I am sure that Berisha was not Ramiz Alia’s envoy. I am sure about this and I declare under my full responsibility that it is this way. I was with him all the time, especially on the day of December 9th 1990.”59 On her part, Luljeta Progni, one of the scholars of the early phase of transition, thinks that the attachment of Sali Berisha to the Student Movement and then his involvement in Albanian national politics should not be analyzed through conspiracy theories. However, Progni insists that we have to examine the facts. According to her: Sali Berisha was one of the most renowned intellectuals in Albania in 1990. He was one of the most gifted medical doctors and an intellectual who stood out with his opinion editorials in some of the media outlets of the time. The moment that requires clarification in my opinion is the day of December 9th, the day when Sali Berisha appeared for the first time at the events in Student City. We have to chronologically organize the events as they unfolded. Otherwise, any misplaced facts would completely change the story of how Sali Berisha got closer to the students, but of how he met with Ramiz Alia as well.60 The first moment that Berisha appears to be present is the student protest at the Artistic Liceum on December 9th. Together with Besnik Mustafaj, a well-known young writer in the intellectual circles of the time, Berisha was located near the venue where the protest was taking place. According to his own recollection, but also to Besnik Mustafaj’s memoirs, Berisha saw how the students were beaten and then he intervened and told the police officers to stop the violence. He then joined the students in the Student City where he contacted the organizers of the protest. Based on the

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evidence I have, it turns out that the students sought protection from the regime by Berisha, as he was known as an influential intellectual. Berisha took on this role and then contacted his acquaintances at the Party Committee for Tirana, one of whom was his patient, Robert Koli, the Second Secretary of the Party Committee for Tirana. After conversing with him, and he had gone to Koli’s office to ask for protection for the students, Berisha met also with Xhelil Gjoni, who was then a member of the Political Bureau and the First Secretary of the Party Committee for Tirana. Always based on the testimonies of the protagonists of this event, with the recommendation of Xhelil Gjoni, Ramiz Alia contacted Berisha by telephone. Then Sali Berisha went to Ramiz Alia’s house to talk in person to Alia. The meeting was a tête-a-tête meeting with no other witnesses present. This confidential meeting between Alia and Berisha could be interpreted in a variety of ways. One of these manners in which to interpret the meeting is that he was charged to be an intermediary of Alia. I, myself, do not think that the activization of Berisha should be interpreted through a conspiracy theory, i.e., that Berisha was just a Trojan Horse. I think that Berisha was also genuinely interested in democratic change. The truth is that Sali Berisha had long been a member of the Albanian Party of Labor. At the beginning of the Movement, however, he assumed the role of a leader although often contested by the students themselves. If Sali Berisha had not taken this role, another person similar to him would have taken that role. Today we would be having the same discussion. The mass media from which the public received the information, which were under the firm control of the regime, continued the old practices, and thereby they were casting the students as “hooligans, who mostly have intentions that are inimical to the party and the state.”61 In this context, the official press reports portrayed the violent police intervention against the students as “an indispensable and necessary measure to protect the socialist order in Albania.”62 On Monday, December 10th, 1990, elections were held in the former Yugoslavia, in the republics of Serbia and Montenegro in which the Serbian Communists led by Miloshevic won convincingly. On that same day, the Albanian students pass the line of no return, overcome the insecurity and the fear from the regime, and their demands become exclusively political.63 On this day, Gramoz Pashko, one of the intellectuals who had the reputation of being in opposition to the regime, joins the students. Gramoz Pashko, a professor of economics, together with Sali Berisha will be the duo who lead the transition and become the core leadership of the DPA, the first opposition party. On the other hand, at this time, the mass of students gathered in the Student City after many discussions and consultations forms the organizational committee which was made up of Azem Hajdari, Arben Lika, Tefalin Malshyti, Mimoza Zhamo, and Shinasi Rama.64 The protests are spreading. At the same time, on December 9th, 1990, the protests take on a national character, with organized protests by

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students and professors of the High Institute of Agriculture (ILB), based in the small town of Kamza near Tirana. After the diversion to a power supply booth that took place on December 9th, 1990 comes the protest of nearly 400 students. The Institute is surrounded by large police forces. Kamza’s student protests are very structurally organized with only one requirement—the end of the governing of the Albanian Party of Labor and the introduction of a multiparty system in the country. This request formulated during the protests will be submitted to the Rectorate of the Institute. The student protest of Kamza, headed by Ahmetaj, joins the Student Movement of the Tirana Student City on December 10th. There are indications that on this day, the students in the Shkodra and Korca institutes of higher learning start to organize on their own as well.65

The Political Demonstration of December 9th in Skanderbeg Square One of the most important and most critical moments of the entire Student Movement from the first period to the Hunger Strike remains the first national political demonstration of the students or, as it is also known, the “triumphant descent” fraught with many dangers, in Skanderbeg Square on December 9th. As Ukcamaj remembers: An important moment of the Albanian Student Movement, for which there is not much writing, is the descending of the students at Skanderbeg Square, on the evening of 9 December, led by Shinasi Rama. After calling on students, spreading in small groups, we managed to challenge the dictatorship by gathering in Skanderbeg Square.66 There was a deep division among the student leaders and the students in general. One group led by Azem Hajdari wanted to remain in the Student City. The other group insisted on transforming the protest from a student protest to a national protest. This group aimed at involving the people of the capital in their protests. Their argument was that the students could not win the establishment of pluralism for the people if the people themselves were not involved and remained as bystanders waiting for others to solve the problem. With unparalleled courage, for the regime had stationed numerous police and special forces surrounding the Square, these students “relocated” the student protest into Skanderbeg Square. The people of Tirana remained as bystanders and nobody joined their protest or demonstration. In a sense, the demonstrating students were isolated but the people applauded their demonstration. The police intervened rapidly. The demonstration was dispersed by the rapid intervention forces and the police. The demonstration did not achieve its goal of mobilizing the people of Tirana. Yet it became a very important catalyst that convinced the people of Tirana that these students were serious. Furthermore, the demonstration of December 9th convincingly shows that the group of students that

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later would go on to found the “Fan S. Noli” Student Association was acting independently of other students who had remained in the Student City. According to one of the leaders of the demonstration, among the key features of this demonstration was its inspiration from nationalist ideology. Very important was also its clearly political objective of transforming it from a student protest into a wider social movement with a national basis. According to Rama: The main characteristic of this demonstration was that it carried a clear national message based on the ideology of the National Renaissance. The message, the songs and the slogans were all taken from the arsenal of the National Renaissance. The students did not ask just “let us make Albania like Europe” but they demanded “freedom and democracy for the Albanian nation.” Second, the organization of the demonstration in the main Square of the capital and the clear political signal it sent constitute a radical break-up and a qualitative shift from the demands of student protesters of the previous night, but more importantly from the students who were still asking for better conditions, hot water and electricity a few days later. Third, the demonstration was organized in clear rejection of the recommendations of some individuals sent by President Alia or the other student leaders. This clearly showed that there was no single individual or any group that could control the whole mass of the students. To say it explicitly, even at this early stage of organization, the regime could no longer control the student movement through the “student leaders” that it preferred to work with. Fourth, this demonstration shows that within the Student City had emerged competing authoritative centers and structures that collided with one another and that were struggling for the hearts and mind of students. Fifth, we should highlight the fact that the demonstration of December 9th, was not a “spontaneous” explosion, but a very well-organized demonstration, which had the clear political purpose of involving the people in the struggle to establish genuine democracy in Albania. Sixth, the demonstration had thrown the gauntlet to the regime and it had transferred the confrontation at the heart of the capital. This was a huge step forward towards the involvement of the people, precisely the opposite of what the regime aimed for, i.e., to keep the people out of the game. After the demonstration of December 9th, the political game could not be played as before for by now the people knew what was happening.67 In short, with the December 9th demonstration, these students wanted to send a clear message to the citizens of Tirana: “We are the conscience of the nation.” The effort of the students to revive the “conscience of the people” through the December 9th protest did not succeed. It failed to give the Student Movement the “parameters” of a national social movement.

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However, it strengthened the Student Movement and its role in the processes that were unfolding. It legitimized it as the single and the main force for the change that was to happen. Perhaps, the December 9th demonstration also achieved a more important and essential objective. It served as a catalyst for even greater mobilization and better organization of the students. It also became a catalyst for the mobilization of the other social strata. Late in the evening of December 9th, the Student Movement clearly articulated its political platform “for a free Albania with a European image.” There were meetings and discussions and by the next day an authoritative leadership emerged. December 10th and the Presentation of Student Demands By December 10th, there were intense negotiations ongoing with Berisha and others as representatives of Ramiz Alia. In the afternoon of December 10th, at an improvised podium, 80 different speakers of various profiles expressed their views. Many of them were young intellectuals. A consensus was reached and one of the leaders of the Student Movement, Azem Hajdari, presented the student demands. These were addressed to President Ramiz Alia. It is worth reproducing here the document: We support the democratic reforms initiated by President Alia and we are committed to accelerating them. This was also the purpose of our protests. We seek the identification of the perpetrators who ordered the use of force against the students. We ask them to be tried before the Student City. We ask for the establishment of a joint student-medical commission that would determine the health status of the injured students. We seek the introduction of political pluralism as the highest degree of today’s democracy. In addition, we request in conformity with laws to establish “The Organization of Students and the Young Intellectuals” whose statute, for legalization purposes, will be submitted to the Ministry of Justice. We want this organization to have its deputies in the Albanian Parliament. We require publication in all means of information of the Charter of the UN, the Helsinki Declaration and the Charter of Paris. We demand freedom of the press, the free speech, and the cessation of any censorship. We demand that public opinion be informed of the reality of the student movement. We seek solving the problems accumulated due to the expansion of the economic crisis in which the state is located. We demand a meeting with Ramiz Alia. We require that students not be subjected to any criminal offense and strictly exclude the use of force and any other sanctions against them.

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Llukman Halili We invite all intellectuals, well-known public figures and all those who love Albania to join us and support our demands.68

To the people of Tirana, the authorities described the situation at the university on December 10th, 1990 as “unclear” and as an inexplicable boycott. This is how Mustafaj presents the situation: Ramiz Alia’s envoy, Comrade Skënder Gjinushi, the Minister of Education, conveyed to the students the President’s message. The president is willing to meet with the student envoys, but on the condition that students return to lectures. The meeting with the president and the students did not happen even as the students were unable to appoint their representatives who would talk with the first Secretary of the Albanian Party of Labor, Ramiz Alia.69 The massive meeting of the evening at the Student City, due to heavy rain, was transferred to the campus cafeteria. Nearly 1500 students on December 10th, 1990, all the time chanting anti-Communist slogans, demanded the continuation of the protest. In complete confusion Arben Imami proposed to continue the protest on the next day on December 11th, but as he put it, “We must show readiness for dialogue with the country’s President.” The next round of talks of the students and young intellectuals with Ramiz Alia would be held on December 11th, 1990.

The XIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor—the Approval of Electoral Pluralism It was understandable that the regime would react vigorously. The regime was in full control. By the late 1980s, there were individual efforts and attempts to oppose the regime but there was no organized open opposition or resistance of any kind. From this aspect, the Albanian regime was highly consolidated and a special case in the pattern of “revolutionary” change that swept the states of Southeastern Europe.70 When the students rose, the situation immediately changed. Ramiz Alia was aware that student protests could turn into a general “uprising” of citizens throughout Albania against the regime. Hence, according to him and also other members of the Politburo, Ramiz Alia took the “painful but the inevitable decision”—to allow some form of political pluralism. On the one hand, this meant that the 45-year-old hegemonic role of the Party in society had to come to an end. On the other hand, Ramiz Alia realized very clearly that, according to him, the time had come to deal with the unavoidable and harsh reality. He had lost much valuable time seeking a compromise between conservatives that controlled the Party-State and the demands to change and democratize that were coming from outside. Alia knew that he had to act fast to avoid the fate of Ceausescu in Romania.

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The emergence of the Student Movement and its organized protests, that rapidly acquired political goals, practically forced Ramiz Alia to call an urgent session of the Politburo even after the XIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor in the afternoon of December 10th. As a matter of fact, Alia was not entirely unprepared. A month earlier, Sigurimi, the secret political police, relying on a “CIA-issued” document, presumably intercepted by them, had alerted President Alia and other members of the Politburo to the potential student protests. But the situation had changed and there was a new reality that had to be properly addressed.71 In his opening speech to the Plenum, Alia warned the Politburo that the student protests were of a political nature and that they were: hostile to the Party, to the state and to socialism. On the other hand, we lack the arguments to defend ourselves for the situation is desperate. Even if this is not acceptable to us, I think that we should continue the dialogue with the students, for the other way is open confrontation. We could act but then we have to wait for the reaction. Maybe we will be able to bring to an end the demonstrations of ten thousand students, but tomorrow we will have a doubled number of disgruntled high-school students and workers demonstrating against us. Also, could we use weapons? And against whom? Against our children?! If the people go to the street by the thousands, it means that we have lost their trust.72 After Ramiz Alia’s speech, all the members of the Plenum understood clearly that they should support the granting of some form of political pluralism. This is best demonstrated by the speech of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Hekuran Isai, to the Politburo: If Azemi forms a political party, so let it be. If we are not able to beat that party in elections, then we do not deserve to lead this people. We have identified as the leader of the protests Azem Hajdari, but not Sali Berisha. He was not subject to the surveillance operation of Sigurimi. We cannot arrest the organizers because we cannot foresee the consequences of the reaction. I think that we should allow the registration and the functioning of other political subjects. We have no other choice …73 Almost all members of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, who participated in the workings of the Plenum, agreed on the party’s responsibility for the current state of affairs. After the prolonged “debate” the Political Bureau decided by a majority of votes (only Spiro Koleka and Rita Marko were against) that in June 1991, the Albanian Party of Labor was to hold its Tenth Regular Congress. The Plenum released from the function of member of the Political Bureau Muho Asllani, Simon Stefani, Lenka Çuko, Foto Çami, and Hajredin Çeliku. Also,

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Pirro Kondi and Qirjako Mihali were no longer Alternate Members of the Politburo. However, the Plenum added: It is recommended to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, in accordance with the established situation, to propose to the People’s Assembly obligatory changes to the Council of Ministers. The plenum considers it to be of the benefit of democracy in life in the country and pluralism, the establishment of independent political organizations in harmony with the existing law in force …74 In short, there would be some form of electoral pluralism. This historic decision of the Plenum of the Albanian Party of Labor to relax the rules of the political system was in fact the victory of the “Student Movement,” which with its determination and uncompromising struggle forced the Communist leadership to surrender.75 Having said that, this was not a real multiparty system by any means. The Albanian Party of Labor retained its hegemonic role in the society. Eduart Kaca thinks that in addition to the Student Movement, Ramiz Alia’s decision to allow pluralism in the country was influenced by the appeal of some European capitals. The demands from Washington also had an important impact. This, argues Kaca, pushed Alia to make changes immediately, before it was too late.76 In almost all of his subsequent appearances, Ramiz Alia would award to himself and to the Albanian Party of Labor the merit of allowing a multiparty and pluralistic system. This was an attempt by Alia, “in his famous Bolshevik way, to rob students of the victory of democracy.”77 Alia himself admitted that allowing the multiparty system was a change dictated by the events. As he put it: The Albanian Party of Labor was not established for the purpose of establishing a system of competing ideas. It was a Party-State, so the Labor Party did not like political pluralism at all. I personally was for plurality of ideas, but the events developed so fast that we were forced to cross over to multiparty.78 Yet, the reason must be sought elsewhere. After the student protests the pressure was very great and the situation became quite unstable. Fearing possible widespread confusion as well as that their lives were in danger, Ramiz Alia and the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor decided to make some cosmetic changes to the Albanian political system. Just as in the case of Ion Iliescu79 in Romania, Ramiz Alia was deeply convinced that with his “elastic” strategy he would succeed in preserving and strengthening the monopoly of the Albanian Party of Labor in society. He thought that most of the groups in the society that might become the opposition, such as

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the students and the young intellectuals, could not consolidate any serious force that would harm the party’s and socialist interests. The Meeting of the Student Representation with Ramiz Alia On December 11th, student protests continued unabated. They were concentrated mainly on the Student City. A large number of intellectuals joined the students during the day. Most of them were readers and lecturers at Tirana University such as Gramoz Pashko, Eduard Selami, Arben Imami, and Arben Demeti. The influential intellectuals were deeply divided. For example, Hamit Beqja, one of the respected intellectuals and professors, in his speech emphasized that, “I support the reforms, but I remain a communist!” In addition to the students and the faculty, there were many others that came to support the students, such as a large number of citizens of Tirana, groups of workers, and substantial numbers of high school students. Even on December 11th, 1990 they went on with the speeches, throwing slogans that had become popular against the regime and the party. However, the common agreement among the students was that a student representation was to meet with Alia on that day. They were discussing the venue where the meeting was to take place: the Presidency, the Palace of the Congresses (with 3000 students), or have Alia come to the Student City. After much discussion, President Ramiz Alia decided to meet with a group of 30 students and professors at the Palace of Brigades, the Presidential Residence. The choice of the student representatives was democratic, for they were chosen by acclamation in impromptu meetings held by their respective departments. However, the representation that was elected to meet with Ramiz Alia was made up not just by the students that had distinguished themselves during the protests. Its composition was extremely problematic. According to Rama, the election of the representatives was democratic but extremely unjust: The paradox was that among those who were elected to that Representation, there were more students who did not live on the Student City but in Tirana. There were several students who had done nothing during the protests and that had come to the Student City only on December 10th. Even more problematic was the fact that the vast majority of the representatives who came to the meeting with Ramiz Alia were renowned youth secretaries, some of them were fourth year students, several of them were sons and grandchildren of the Members of the Central Committee of the Labor Party. There were several lecturers, and some of them were members or candidates for membership in the Labor Party as well. Most of these people had found the courage to join student protests only on the morning of December 10th only after the word had spread that the Labor Party and Ramiz Alia would allow for a

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On his part, Ramiz Alia aimed at using the meeting with the students to achieve his own important objective of legitimizing the “prominent intellectuals” and presenting them as leaders of the opposition. This was not a new policy. Throughout 1990, Ramiz Alia had been working very hard to promote many of these leading figures of the intelligentsia as political figures, going as far as presenting them as dissidents. He had done the same with the group of the “young intellectuals,” some of whom would play a prominent role during the transition. The Delegation, who met in the evening with President Alia, was led by Shinasi Rama, Azem Hajdari, Arben Imami, Tefalin Malshyti, and Arben Lika. Also present were Zef Brozi, Adrian Petrollari, Albert Kushta, Arben Broci, Arben Demeti, Edmond Budina, Mimoza Ferraj, Pandeli Majko, Skender Minxhozi, Alfred Gemi, Ilir Meta, Dritan Shakohoxha, and Mimoza Zhamo.81 As expected, Alia had invited some of the leading figures of the Communist Youth Organization to be in the meeting. Significantly, he was flanked by the Minister of Education, Skender Gjinushi, and the first Secretary of the Communist Youth, Lisien Bashkurti. At the onset of the meeting, Ramiz Alia announced to the students and professors the decisions of the XIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, adding that: there are only two ways to solve the accumulated problems, only two ways in which Albania can go. Those paths are the path of dialogue and the path of conflict. We chose the first one. You may have different opinions, but in one thing we have to be united and this unity should always be shown when it comes to defend Albania’s sovereignty and independence. Albania is still surrounded by enemies today. I am convinced that the path of democratization, which our Party has chosen together with the working class and the people of the country, is the right path for Albania’s development. Remember that we will develop in accordance with our traditions and we will not be a bad copy of anyone. Democracy does not agree with enforced acts and acts, we need tolerance and patience. The party made the decision to meet student requirements in accordance with its principles and allowed the registration of other independent political organizations …82 Azem Hajdari began by saying that, “Speaking on behalf of the Student Organization and Young Intellectuals, we support the reforms and we demand that our organization be legalized and participate in the parliamentary elections, which will be held in February 1991” (Halili, 2015a). However, the disagreements surfaced immediately. Alia was prepared to allow a pluralism of electoral subjects, a measure that according to the laws and to the existing Constitution preserved the hegemony of the party.

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The students insisted on the establishment of a multiparty system, which would be composed of parties that held different ideological viewpoints. The Albanian Party of Labor would no longer be the sole political party. The Constitution, therefore, had to be fundamentally changed as well. The meeting of President Alia with the university’s students and professors lasted for more than two hours. In this long discussion, Alia, among other things, presented to the students an overview of the difficult economic situation of the country. On the other hand, the students firmly demanded from Alia the dismissal of the Minister of the Interior, Hekuran Isai. They demanded that he should be sent to court, a demand that Alia refused. Alia argued that the Minister of Interior had not ordered the use of force on December 8th and 9th but that he had only implemented the existing laws. President Alia on that occasion begged the students to return to the classrooms, to stop the protests, and thus to stop the descent into full anarchy. Alia insisted that, “all those who come to Albania to invest, will first of all be interested in the stability and security. This is a precondition for the arrival of investors. The path of our democratization is the path of the interests of the homeland and socialism.”83 The students were quite clear that they were insistent on their political demands. Hence, Arber Ahmetaj, who was majoring in Pharmacy, interrupted Alia’s speech by firmly demanding that the whole process of democratization should be based on the respect for human rights. The whole Albanian society should have access to personal and institutional responsibilities. Ahmetaj recalls saying to Alia, “Honorable President, you have to order the publication of human rights documents without hesitation! Without respect for human rights, we cannot continue with the reform process” (Ahmetaj, 1999). There were many other moments when the students clearly and unequivocally opposed the President of the country, showing a high degree of maturity. The harshest of them all was one of the leaders of the students who accused the President and his clique of all the misfortunes, the misery, and the oppression that had befallen the Albanian people. Verbally, Shinasi Rama for a moment also clashed with one of the student representatives, Arben Imami, who called Ramiz Alia a “pioneer of democracy.”84 The transcripts of the student talks with Ramiz Alia prove that the students were quite clear and they even openly opposed President Alia when he said that there had been no tradition of pluralism. One of the students offered an exemplary lecture on the history of political pluralism among the Albanians from the times of Skanderbeg until 1990. According to the students, the tradition of pluralism in Albania had had a historical continuity of development, which had lasted until 1946, been interrupted, and now was merely being restored. Describing the course of the talks in his memoirs, Shinasi Rama states:

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Llukman Halili We did not go to talks to lobby for Alia because he had no merit for the establishment of pluralism in the country. Rather, he was the biggest inhibitor of all processes, which sought some reform and finally declared for a kind of unparalleled pluralism that implied the further continuation of hegemony over the system of the Albanian Party of Labor.85

The student envoys who met with President Alia on December 11th were the real leadership of the Student Movement at the time. They achieved the objective that they set for themselves. Pluralism was not a gift. Shinasi Rama has stated that: We went there to seek the establishment of the real political pluralism; to us it was not important that the Party had issued a decision on permitting the electoral pluralism. We brought Alia to a very unfavorable situation by pointing out that we and only us, students and no one else, our movement, the Student Movement, would give Albania the greatest gift at the time – the establishment of political pluralism. We achieved the objective.86 With the push to change the decision of the XIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor, the “Student Movement” practically realized its purpose. The establishment of political pluralism became a political reality. In spite of all its problems, Albania is a democracy and the Albanians cast their free and unconditional vote. Upon returning from the meeting with Ramiz Alia, the student envoys were welcomed with excitement by tens of thousands of students, workers, citizens, and others present. After their arrival, the recording of the meeting was publicly broadcast. Every appeal, remarks, irony, and word coming out of Alia’s lips against the student envoys was followed with whistles, cheers, and shouts against the dictatorship and against Ramiz Alia himself!87 As Blendi Fevziu noted, “Exactly, at 22.15, Arben Imami, then a Drama Lecturer in the Institute of the Arts addressed to those attending by announcing tomorrow the formation of the first opposition party in Albania: ‘It is decided to form the second political party in Albania.’ The date was December 11th 1990 and the time was 22:15.”88 The Student Movement in Albania on December 11th, 1990 realized its most important political goal: political pluralism was established in Albania. The plaudits for pluralism in Albania are exclusively for the students who, over three days, December 8th–11th, 1990, won the great victory that resulted in the fall of Communism in Albania.89 After the meeting of Alia with the student representatives, the political system in Albania was no longer the same. The fundamental principles of the political system had changed. From a totalitarian system dominated by a single party, now Albania had, thanks to the Student Movement, a multiparty system.

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The Student Movement after the Establishment of Pluralism: The Founding of the DPA, The Hunger Strike, and the Collapse of Enver Hoxha’s Myth The establishment of a multiparty system required the establishment of new political parties. This was a critical moment for the regime and for Ramiz Alia, who, aware of what was going to happen, sought to control the political process. It was a critical moment for the intellectuals, who had to make decisions and take sides. This was a very critical moment for the Student Movement as well. Once this core objective goal of political pluralism was achieved, they were no longer essential players in the political scene. Yet, the students managed to play a hugely important role then and afterwards. At this particular moment, the students and the intellectuals founded the first opposition party. The students played a very important role in the process of the foundation of the first opposition party. After the return of the student representation to the Student City, there was a rally in which about 100,000 people participated. On the side, however, took place a very important meeting in which were present a group of students and some university lecturers, among whom the best known were Arben Imami, Azem Hajdari, Sali Berisha, Gramoz Pashko, Shinasi Rama, Preç Zogaj, Besnik Mustafaj, and Edmond Budina. It is this group and others that went to Building 18 in the Student City to discuss the further steps to be taken.90 The objective was the transformation of the Movement into a political structure, The Organization of the Students and the Young Intellectuals, which they had demanded to become legalized in their meeting with Ramiz Alia. However, starting on December 10th and 11th, two days after the protests had started, a number of intellectuals, part of the Tirana intelligentsia elite, came to the Student City, to the various departments where they were also teaching, and became a significant presence in the process. Sokol Necaj, then a diplomat with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one of the people who wrote the program of the DPA, notes that in the early days of the protests, the students did not have the support of intellectual circles and they did not have any other kind of support from abroad. As Necaj said, “the intellectuals in those days were very undecided and they lacked the courage to support the students.” The meeting was adjourned for it was very late. The very next day, however, on December 12th, a selected group of intellectuals tried to sideline and eliminate the Student Movement as a political factor. They met at Gramoz Pashko’s house along with two students, Mimoza Ferraj and Azem Hajdari. Other intellectuals joined in like Sokol Necaj, Aleksander Meksi, Eduard Selami, and Genc Ruli. This was the meeting when the intellectuals insisted that they should be the main force of the opposition and take a central role in the politics of transition.91 After some discussion, it was decided that intellectuals would take a leading role in the shaping of the DPA. The argument, presented from Aleksander Meksi, was that, “Nowhere in the world we find students founding political parties. Let us decide on this matter.” All the participants,

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some of whom would later become the leading actors in Albanian politics, supported this option of the intellectuals taking charge. The core political objective of this formula, however, was the elimination of the Student Movement as a radical political factor and the reduction of their influence on future political processes. On their side, the students were aware that their vocation was not the foundation of political parties. However, they were fully aware that their role was to be a factor that would steer political and social processes in the desired direction, much like their counterparts in the European student movements that influenced the path of fragile and newly established democratic systems. The new party was baptized as “the Democratic Party of Albania.” As Tarifa observes, the new political party was “the outcome of the essential effort, courage and of the victory of the Student Movement.”92 The important element to note is that this was not the party of intellectuals but of the students as well. The students made up the overwhelming majority of the people that signed the documents for the legalization of the party. The intellectuals, who relied on Azem Hajdari, thinking that they would rally the students behind him, were forced to yield to other student leaders, who were deeply distrustful of them and of Hajdari’s intentions as well. On December 12th, the same day, at around 16:00, there was a meeting in which the foundation of the DPA and of its Founding Committee was presented at the theater of the Student City. Due to the ongoing negotiations between Sali Berisha and another student, a compromise was reached and in the Founding Committee, out of 14 members, 6 of them were to be students. This was a sign that the students were not accepting the leadership of the intellectuals and that they had their own agenda. The next day, in the afternoon of December 13th, a massive rally was held in the main square of the Student City. In front of 100,000 people, Azem Hajdari, the best-known student leader, and the Chairman of the Founding Committee, declared the founding of the DPA. In the meeting spoke Arben Imami, who presented the initial program of the party, and Dr. Sali Berisha as well. It is highly significant that Berisha, who was destined to become the most important politician of the transition, was booed and his speech was accompanied by whistling from the people. The reason was that Berisha thanked President Ramiz Alia “for the democratization of the country.” Not only that, but Berisha said that Alia: with the wisdom and the great courage had commanded our partisan units during the National Liberation War, and with the same wisdom and courage steered the country in the path of democratization. We are grateful to the President that accepted the demands by the students to allow political pluralism. Long live President Alia!93 At the end of the rally, Berisha invited the people present to support the demands of the Albanians in Kosova for the upgrading of its status to a Republic. Afterwards, in a discussion with me, Berisha argued that “his call”

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for the glorification of the figure of Ramiz Alia was a tactic that served the consolidation of the opposition. However, one of the student leaders, and practically “the soul and the brain” of the Student Movement, argues that Berisha’s speech was the continuation of his role as intermediary and the representative of Alia in the previous days, when he had faithfully discharged the duties assigned by Ramiz Alia. Shinasi Rama says that: There is no doubt that Sali Berisha was the intermediary sent by Ramiz Alia and Xhelil Gjoni’s man, who was the leading figure of the conservatives in the Political Bureau of the ALP. In 1990, following the direction of the ALP, a member of which he was, Berisha published two articles in the party newspapers. One was on “the state of law” and the other was on the “freedom of expression.” One was published in the weekly “Drita”, the newspaper of the League of Writers and Artists of Albania and the other was published in the party newspaper “Zëri i Popullit” in May of 1990 as well as with another article in “Bashkimi,” the newspaper of the Popular Front of Albania.94 There is no doubt that, these justifications on Berisha’s side notwithstanding, Ramiz Alia showed that he was a politician of the highest caliber, but also a very shrewd individual who was not to be trusted. Conscious about the necessity of change, Alia decided that the change was to be led by his own people and one of them, certainly and without any doubt, was Sali Berisha himself. In a country so thirsty to have a political opposition, although he never deserved this label, for he never was a dissident just by writing those articles, Sali Berisha instantly earned the label of “dissident.”95 Therefore, Ramiz Alia played a central role in this process. He was guided by his superb survival instinct that throughout his life had allowed him to survive politically and even physically the purges of Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu. The Hoxha family protected him. As Amik Kasaruho says, “Ramiz Alia did build his career under the shadow of his predecessor, who in turn, before he died had taken all the measures to crown him as the next leader.”96 Ramiz Alia survived the processes of the democratic transformation and was able to play a very important role in determining the path of the Albanian transition, primarily through control over the make-up of the leadership of the Albanian political parties even at this early stage.97 The Strife within the Student Movement The Hunger Strike is the other high point of the activity of the Student Movement. According to one of the active participants, Bislim Ahmetaj: without the victory of February 20th 1991, the Student Movement would resemble an epileptic child. The political system would be a

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Indeed, the situation was complex. Aiming at countering the wave of attacks targeting WWII and partisan memorials and clearly seeking to protect the monuments of Enver Hoxha, on January 22nd, 1991, Ramiz Alia issued a decree. Better known as decree Number 7459, its objective was the “preservation and the cultivation of traditions and national historical treasures.”99 With regard to the personalities, statues, and monuments of leading figures of Albanian history, such as Skanderbeg, Naim Frashëri, and Enver Hoxha, the decree sanctioned that any attack on them would be punished by imprisonment of up to three years.100 In explaining his decision to issue this decree, which clearly was aimed at the protection of the image and the work of Enver Hoxha, Ramiz Alia said that: we issued this decree because of the growing attacks on the image and work of Enver Hoxha and the calls for the demolition of his statues and memorials by the Democratic Party. We issued the decree not only for the protection of the statues of Enver Hoxha, but also of Skanderbeg and of the important personalities of our history.101 To Alia this was a normal step, and he tried to justify the decree by referring to historical sources and to the examples of other countries: This decree is not our original invention. Similar actions by the opposition there, have also led Gorbachev to protect Lenin and his statues. We even have such laws in Turkey, where offences against Attaturk are punishable by law and even the Bulgarian law that protects the figure of Gjergj Dimitrov. There are also those who attacked me, claiming that I deliberately initiated the passing of this decree simply to remind students that they had forgotten the monument of Enver Hoxha and it would be nice to take it down.102 According to Alia, just the opposite was true. The names, the work, and the statues of these leaders had to be protected by an institutional decree, simply because the students of “Enver Hoxha” University in Tirana, after they had won the first battle for the establishment of political pluralism, were about to start their campaign to depoliticize the university. The campaign to depoliticize the university inevitably led to the request for the removal of the name of Enver Hoxha from the University of Tirana. This objective was expressed in several meetings and enjoyed wide support among the students. This very paradoxical predicament defined the second phase of the Student Movement, which begins on February 6th, 1991. The spark for the explosion of the student protests, which were fueled by the growing dissatisfaction with

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the situation, was the expression of solidarity with the demands of the students of the High Institute of Agriculture in Kamza who had demanded changes in the curriculum.103 As in the previous cases of protests, students gathered in the main square of the Student City. Initially, they expressed solidarity with the students of the Agricultural Institute of Kamza and their demands. However, their own demands rapidly escalated. They decided to boycott their studies until the state completely depoliticized the university and removed the names of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin from the university books as well as the ubiquitous quotations of Enver Hoxha from the textbooks. This was very threatening to the system and to the legitimacy of the Albanian Party of Labor.104 This was a genuine demand of the Student Movement that led to the Hunger Strike of February 18th–20th, 1991, which in turn became the catalyst for the mass popular protests that led to the toppling of the statue of Enver Hoxha in Skanderbeg Square. Later on, Sali Berisha, the leader of the DPA, would claim “that the Democratic Party was the one that practically led the Student Strike.”105 This contention, however, has never been supported with evidence by him or proven by the available documentation. The Hunger Strike of 723 students of the University of Tirana was organized on the initiative of the students themselves. It was the Student Association “Fan S. Noli” that organized this hunger strike and carried it successfully to the end. At that time, Donika Gërvalla, the daughter of Jusuf Gërvalla, one of the best-known Albanian nationalists from Kosova, killed in Germany by the Yugoslav Secret Service (UDB), was a student at the High Institute of Arts. She testifies that the spark for the protests that subsequently led to the Hunger Strike came from the protest of the students of the High Agricultural Institute of Kamza. Gërvalla says: The students of the Agricultural Institute of Kamza protested because they were not happy with the status quo. We, the students of the High Institute of Arts, supported them and every day in February, we joined them in solidarity. Then, the student protests of Kamza were transferred to the Student City. When it comes to our demands, we sought the de-politicization of the University, the de-politicization of university textbooks and finally the removal of the name of Enver Hoxha from our University. No one supported us. Even the Democratic Party of Albania [DPA], which emerged from the Student Movement, was not supportive. As a matter of fact, the DPA opposed to our demands, arguing that such demands damaged its own political agenda.106 The split within the Student Movement was noticeable. Some supported the agenda of the DPA and some demanded the radicalization of the protests. In this context, Azem Hajdari was the best-known student leader, but he, by now, had assumed the Chairmanship of the Founding Committee of the DPA. When it came to the protests, Azem Hajdari’s behavior

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was quite strange. As the students analyzed the situation, the real political dilemma was how to go to the multiparty elections amidst the overwhelming presence of Enver Hoxha’s figure and statues. It was impossible to have meaningful pluralism within a system that was entirely based on Enver Hoxha. On his part, Hajdari insisted on the preservation of the status quo. He argued that Hoxha’s myth would fall by itself, sometime in the future. This pitted him against the other student leaders who insisted on radicalization. In the end, there was no alternative left for the students except to organize the Hunger Strike independently of the DPA. In their view, this was the only way to force the hand of the regime and to challenge the source of its legitimacy. In this enterprise, the intellectuals and the opposition were opposed to the students. As Gërvalla observes: The Hunger Strike definitively buried the communist regime. It made it clear to Ramiz Alia and to the Albanian political class that there was no force that could stop the march of Albania in its path towards freedom and democracy. In the end, it can be said that the Student Movement was the only factor that unreservedly pushed for Albania’s democratization. The so-called “intellectual” elite, that to a large extent was a part of the communist regime, had neither the intellectual nor the organizational capacity to initiate or guide the necessary reforms. This could only be done by the Albanian students.107 The split among the students was reflected in the process through which they ended up focusing on one single demand, that of the removal of the name of Enver Hoxha from the university. It was also reflected in the conflict between various factions within the Movement. In particular one faction was tied to the DPA. This faction was organized in the Student Association led by Blendi Gonxhe, Tefalin Malshyti, Ridvan Peshkepia, Blendi Fevziu, Myftar Gjanaj, and others. The other faction which eventually would determine the direction of the protests was led by the “Fan S. Noli” Student Association, which was founded on the initiative of Shinasi Rama, who was also its chairman, while the deputy chairman was Arben Lika and in the leadership were some of the most prominent student leaders such as Arben Sulo, Edvin Shvarc, Alban Pici, or Edmond Bushati. All of them were among the pioneers of organizing and then leading the Hunger Strike. The gradual move from the multiple demands to concentrating on a single one is an interesting process. On February 7th, at a mass rally, many students signed a petition addressed to the Prime Minister, Adil Çarçani. The petition contained the following demands: 

The Improvement of food and living conditions in the student dormitories of Tirana and of the High Agricultural Institute of Kamza.

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The suspension of all court cases against students as well as the deletion of their records from the police investigations.  The professors and lecturers living in the Building Number 18, should be given apartments in Tirana.  The starting of the procedures for the complete de-politicization of the University.  On the basis of this petition we request that the name of Enver Hoxha immediately be removed from the University and the university should be renamed the University of Tirana.  We demand the removal from the curricula of all subjects that are strictly Marxist and ideological.  We demand the resignation of the Director General of the State Television.  We demand the resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Albania, Reiz Malile.  We demand the abolishment of the decree for the protection of “prominent figures and their inheritance”. Please let us know about our requests by February 9th, 1991. In the meantime, we will continue with our protest!108 There are some strange demands in this petition. However, there is a rationale for explaining their inclusion. The petition was formulated by the leaders of the Student Association, which was connected to the DPA as well. As one of the leaders of the Student Association, Blendi Fevziu, notes: the students underlined the urgency of Malile’s resignation with the argument that the visit of Reiz Malile to the Tien An Men Square, after the massacre of students there by the Chinese government, during his visit to Beijing on January 28th 1989, was unnecessary and provocative. The hypocrisy reached a low point, when despite the dissatisfaction expressed by the Europeans and the United States, Minister Malile invited the Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister, Li Peng, to visit Tirana.109 Prime Minister Adil Çarçani and President Ramiz Alia firmly refused any further talks with the students. In a demonstrative manner, Çarçani and Alia would support a campaign of demonstrations and public manifestations initiated by the conservative wing of the Albanian Party of Labor, represented by Xhelil Gjoni. Through a so-called “Letter to the People” the conservatives tried to mobilize the people from all over Albania to express their support in defense of the socialist system and its heritage, in particular in defense of the name, figure, and work of Enver Hoxha. In this context, the Albanian people were divided in their perception of the Student Movement. Ramiz Alia considered the student protests and organizations as the continuation of the Student Movement albeit, this time around, in collusion with the DPA. According to Alia, “Students in February protested

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with the support of the Democratic Party of Albania. Their demands were entirely political and they received support from some of the academic institutions and the newly established independent trade unions.”110 Nonetheless, these protests were going against the pact between the DPA and the ALP to preserve the status quo and the “social peace” until the elections. Therefore, in order to “soften” the radical demands of the students, the Executive Committee of the city of Tirana decided that the central city square of the Student City on September 9th, 1991 should change its name and be called “The Democracy Square.” Ramiz Alia tried to personally influence the course of the protests by promising to fulfill all the demands of the students, except for the demand which called for “the elimination of the symbolic and central role of Enver Hoxha.” When it comes to Enver Hoxha, Ramiz Alia said: we cannot and will not negotiate with anyone. It [i.e., the removal of the name of Enver Hoxha from the university] can be solved only by a general referendum of all students or by a popular referendum. The change of the name of the university could not be done in the middle of the school year.111 The boycott of the university by the students continued even after the student delegation talks with the representative of the government, the Secretary General of the Council of Ministers, Aleks Luarasi, which were held on February 9th, 1991. Once again, the students expressed their determination not to yield until their demand for the removal of the dictator’s name from the university was accepted. After an unsuccessful series of negotiations between the students and the Minister of Education, Skender Gjinushi, and the Head of the Youth Organization of the regime, Lisien Bashkurti, the students decided on the formation of a “student protest committee” which would have representatives from all organizations, i.e., the Student Association, the “Fan S. Noli” Student Association, and the branch of the DPA in the university. This committee, composed by the representatives of these organizations, served as the body that coordinated the actions of the Student Movement. The members of the Committee were Blendi Gonxhe, a student in the High Institute of Arts (Chair); Ridvan Peshkėpia, a student majoring in Architecture; Arben Lika, majoring in Electronical Engineering; Mesila Doda, majoring in Economics; Ndue Lugja, majoring in Geology and Mining; Arian Manahasa, majoring in Architecture; and Ilir Dizdari, majoring in Electrical Engineering. The records were kept by Ardi Stefa, majoring in Albanian Language and Literature. The debate on what to do next was taken to the students and gradually the list was reduced to one single demand: “To remove the name of Enver Hoxha from University!”112 The decisive factor persuading the students to enter into a Hunger Strike was undoubtedly the speech of one of the leaders of the Student Movement and the representative of the “Fan S. Noli” Student

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th

Association on February 15 , 1991, who in his speech stressed that there could be no compromise with the regime. The burden of Enver Hoxha’s name and heritage was to be removed once and for all not only at the University of Tirana, but throughout Albania as well. There could be no democratic Albania with Hoxha’s statues and monuments everywhere.113 Once this matter was settled, then the lists were prepared, a date was set, and the decision was made to hold the Hunger Strike at the Student City Theater. After the preliminary preparations, and the voluntary enrollment of students willing to join the strike, the strike began on February 18th, 1991. According to the testimony of two of the most active students, Edvin Shvarc and Afrim Krasniqi, there were 723 students that participated in this Hunger Strike. The list with the names of striking students was never released, even though it was delivered to the students Ridvan Peshkėpia and Ardi Stefa. The reason for not submitting the lists was that the people who had the lists and that were close to the DPA subsequently distributed a huge number of false certificates of participation. Before starting the Hunger Strike, the strike committee published a letter through which students apologized to their parents by saying, “We know that our decision will create problems for you. However, history threw on us this heavy burden. We will not give up until we reach our objective.”114 The Hunger Strike was drawing heavily on nationalist ideology. At the entrance, there was a national Albanian flag and one of the student leaders said that, “You are in front of this flag which has been guarded for 70 years (without a star) and whomever enters in this Hunger Strike should bow, honor and kiss the flag and then they may enter in.”115 It is worthwhile to cite here how the students saw this Hunger Strike. I am going to quote here, at length, one of the most active students, Edvin Schvarc, because he offers the most detailed and competent description of the process of the organization of the Hunger Strike. Shvarc believes that: the status quo was untenable and the Hunger Strike was inevitable. You could not simply reform the system with Enver Hoxha being omnipresent. It was not possible to organize multiparty elections with the ubiquitous presence of Enver Hoxha, a person that had caused so much damage and harm to the people. The collapse of the myth of Enver Hoxha was to begin then and there. The students who participated in this Hunger Strike undertook this step fully aware that they were making a great service to the Homeland, to the Albanian nation, and to the Student Movement itself. The Hunger Strike was the hour of truth for them all. On February 20th, 1991, the striking students killed the soul of dictatorship. Thus, February 20th, 1991, enters the Albanian history as the day when the false myth of the dictator Enver Hoxha was destroyed. This is the day when the majority of the honorable Albanians breathed freely, for they were now freed from a fifty years nightmare. This was the day when a minority experienced the

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Llukman Halili humiliation of their “spiritual father,” whom they had exalted and under whose service they had enjoyed their undeserved privileges. February 20th was the hour of truth, the point of separation of the two epochs, the moment when the vast majority of the Albanian people celebrated the collapse of the dictator’s monuments from the pedestals where they had been unjustly erected, and at the same time, the ruling class gnashed their teeth deafened by the bells that rang strongly warning the end of their bloody rule. From that day on, there would be no more dictatorship of the proletariat, the class struggle would no longer be legitimate, and there would be no fratricide in the name of communist ideals …. But most importantly, this meant that the Albanians would go to the first democratic elections after 46 years completely liberated from the heavy shadow of Enver Hoxha. They would decide themselves for their future, without going through the trauma of a possible civil war which was looming at the time, in which they would take sides defending the merits or opposing the crimes of Hoxha’s regime. These important achievements came as a direct consequence of the Hunger Strike organized by the students of the State University of Tirana.116

The regime was perfectly aware of the political ramifications of this Hunger Strike. Understanding the risks and the importance of the request of the striking students to remove the name of Enver Hoxha from the University of Tirana, Alia tried by all means to avoid it. Through his emissaries, the Minister of Education, Skender Gjinushi and the First Secretary of the Youth Organization, Lisien Bashkurti, Alia sought to persuade the students to abandon this request. This mission also failed and the negotiations were discontinued because they were unsuccessful. On the other hand, the regime responded to the demands of students with an intensifying media campaign aimed at the exaltation of “the greatest, the Comrade Enver Hoxha.”117 Given the influence of the Northerners and of the students known as nationalists, the pressure that came from leading Albanians in Yugoslavia was enormous. As Biberaj notes, the pressure on students came also from the Albanians in the former Yugoslavia. Calls for a peaceful solution to the problem of political heritage and the image of Enver Hoxha were conveyed to the students by leading personalities in Kosova. Among them, the President of the Christian-Democratic Party of Kosova, Mark Krasniqi, as well as the former communist leader of Kosovo, Mahmut Bakalli, appealed to them to solve this problem by peaceful means. The students, however, categorically rejected these demands as publicity manipulations of the Albanian officials and media. On the other hand, the demands of Albanian striking students were supported by some of Kosovo’s influential Albanians, such as Rexhep Qosja, who in an interview with Voice of America appealed to President Ramiz Alia to meet the student demand: “One cannot live any longer

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under the authority of a dead person who actually had died twice, once as a man and then as a symbol. It is not worth pouring even a drop of blood for a dead man in Skanderbeg Square.”118 Students were aware that the Hunger Strike was certainly the most important achievement of the Student Movement. The leadership of the Movement, which at that point would be guided firmly by the “Fan S. Noli” Student Association, was strongly convinced that the Hunger Strike was the only way possible to eliminate Enver Hoxha’s myth once and forever. The leaders of the Movement made it clear that Albania’s democratization could only take place if everything that was related to the name and the myth of Enver Hoxha was removed from public life. As Shinasi Rama notes: His name and work were closely related to the structure of this scary entity that was the Party-State. Enver Hoxha was the soul and the brain of dictatorship, which kept that dictatorship alive. The state had to be separated from the party, and this could be done by removing and toppling the myth of Enver Hoxha. There could be no democracy in Albania with the face and the photos of a criminal like Enver Hoxha that were so ubiquitous in every town, every village, school, square and institution of Albania. By destroying Enver Hoxha’s myth, we (students) were fully aware that we were opening the doors of the democratic reformation of the Albanian society. We were aware that with Hoxha’s myth removed, the country would finally breathe freely. We were also fully aware, that by undertaking this action we would create problems in the society, but we also knew that Albania would not slide into a civil war. That is why before we organized the Hunger Strike we took into account all the consequences that could be rather unpredictable for our lives, but that would be better for the future of Albania, which was the most important matter, that stood above all else, for all of us.119 This uncompromising position was not acceptable to any of the political parties. The Student Movement did not have the support of the new democratic forces, not even of the DPA. This was the party that had emerged from the Student Movement itself in December 1990. The new opposition would try to justify this unwillingness to support the Student Movement as based on the “need to maintain peace and to avoid domestic chaos and civil war.” However, one of the most active participants and the initiator of the Hunger Strike accuses the DPA and its leaders of collaborating with Alia to strangle this effort. Shinasi Rama states that, “Sali Berisha and Azem Hajdari tried, in cooperation with President Alia, to prevent the Hunger Strike from happening by stating that they were for the reconciliation and for the temporary closure of University of Tirana.”120 He publicly accused Azem Hajdari of being an informant. On his part, Azem Hajdari answered all accusations that he was an instrument of the regime or of somebody else by saying that he was a staunch

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anti-Communist. Consequently, later on, Hajdari demanded the opening of the files of Sigurimi, the secret police: Nobody brought me to politics. I came to politics through the December Movement and through my struggle against Communism, a struggle in which I have been and am firm and consistent. That is why I am determined to go to the end of this path. We are sworn in to open the files and to make them open to the public so we would have a clean politics tomorrow. And the people expect this much from us. (Hajdari, 1993). Yet the clash between Hajdari and Rama was significant for another reason. It showed that the disagreements between the Student Movement and the DPA leadership were irreconcilable. The resistance of the conservatives within the Political Bureau was so strong that nobody dared to put the matter of the removal of the name Enver Hoxha from the University of Tirana into the agenda. However, the Politburo had already taken the decision that the name of Enver Hoxha should in no way be removed from the university. In his memoirs, the former member of the Political Bureau of the ALP, Muho Asllani, writes that, “I went to my office, I called Ramiz Alia and I told him that we decided not to remove the name of Enver Hoxha from the University.”121 The students had the exact opposite position. For the striking students the name of Enver Hoxha was to be removed from the university. The only future acceptable to them was the new Albania without Enver Hoxha. The students remained firm in their demands by sending this message: “We will not make any compromises in this regard.” As Muho Asllani, the Politburo member, says, “They had already decided. The name ‘Enver Hoxha’ had to disappear from the face of the earth.”122 On February 18th and 19th, 1991, the days when students were on the Hunger Strike, through a variety of tactical moves, Ramiz Alia would try to convince the students to abandon the strike. Thus, he would send emissaries that in exchange for ending the Hunger Strike promised to organize a nationwide and all-university referendum for changing the name of the university.123 The other proposal of President Alia was that the Albanian Parliament would decide on the name of Enver Hoxha. The student leaders of the Hunger Strike firmly refused these proposals.124 Meanwhile, the student strikes took on a nationwide character. In 10 provinces of Albania, in 12 cities, from Shkodra to Gjirokastra, students in the institutes of higher learning and high school students would go on strike in solidarity with the students of Tirana. For example, in front of the strike council of Gjirokastra we find student Roland Bejko and professor Syrja Barçi. On February 19th, 1991, Ramiz Alia’s negotiating trio, comprised of Minister of Education Skender Gjinushi, Lisien Bashkurti, and Minister of Construction Ismail Ahmeti, almost managed to persuade the students to abandon the Hunger Strike. As Vickers notes:

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The strike committee accepted the proposal that the University of Tirana was to be divided into three new universities. One of these universities, that of humanities and social sciences would be named after Enver Hoxha. But after the determined intervention by Shinasi Rama, Omer Stringa and Perparim Dervishi, the strike commission retracted and fell back to the initial demand of removing the Dictator’s name from the University, adding at the same time the demand for the abolition of compulsory education of Marxism and Leninism by all school programs.125 The failure of negotiations led to popular mobilization. On February 20th, the Student City turned into a meeting point of people who came from all over Albania. More than 100,000 people solidarized with the Hunger Strike. The removal or the transferring away of the weakened students who could no longer resist in the Hunger Strike by ambulances electrified the crowd even more. Those present began to shout against Ramiz Alia, Nexhmije Hoxha, and the dictatorship. The strike committee was incessantly receiving telegrams of support from all regions of Albania. However, the telegram coming from the miners of Valias, who on the next day, February 21st, would start their own Hunger Strike in the galleries of the mines in solidarity with the student demands, was received with much enthusiasm. The telegram said that, “We will always be with you. Long live the students!” The huge crowd, which repeatedly cheered the slogans in support of the students and against Ramiz Alia and the dictatorship, was suddenly addressed by the actress Rajmonda Bulku. She practically demanded that the crowd be directed to Skanderbeg Square, where the great statue of Enver Hoxha stood erect. Several thousand citizens managed to break up the police cordon that protected the monument, and at 14:05, the bronze monument of the former dictator, weighing eight tons, was overthrown to the ground. With the help of a vehicle, they would bring it to the Student City like a trophy gift for the striking students. Thus, the Hunger Strike had a huge effect. In his memoirs, Ramiz Alia would attribute to himself the merit of avoiding bloodshed at the critical moment when the monument of his beloved leader was overthrown by the crowd. Later on, Alia said that: I recommended to the Minister of Internal Affairs, Hekuran Isai, to do everything to prevent the overthrow of the monument, but I also demanded that no matter what, we should not use force. We do not need bloodshed—so be restrained. My secretary brought me a piece of paper in which were written only these words: “The monument has fallen.” I informed the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party. Nexhmije Hoxha, Enver Hoxha’s widow left the plenum weeping.126

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The former Political Bureau member Muho Asllani considers Ramiz Alia’s reaction, and the decision not to defend Enver Hoxha’s bronze statue at all costs, as very reasonable and just. However, Muho Asllani says that: Nexhmije Hoxha and others were angered by the overthrow of Enver Hoxha’s monument. Because then the question was asked: How could they not defend the monument of Enver Hoxha when they had control over the state power, state security and the army?! Ramiz Alia, at the Central Committee meeting, said: “The monument fell, but we will not kill the people! We can raise the monument again, the people themselves have put it there, the people themselves may remove it.”127 It was extremely difficult for the “faithful” party cadres to understand that the matter was not just simply about the statue taken down by the people but about the collapse of a whole era. In the next part of the meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor it was decided that the university should be simply called the University of Tirana and was to be split into four universities. Indirectly, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor made the decision to remove the name of Enver Hoxha.128 Xhelil Gjoni, one of Ramiz Alia’s closest associates, has another explanation of the events. To put it succinctly, Gjoni says that Ramiz Alia told the Plenum that the Minister of the Interior betrayed him: by not complying with the order given by him that the monument of the beloved leader was to be “protected at all costs, even with the use of weapons.” I think that there was no such order and that all this was just a game between Alia and Isai. Neither had Alia given any such orders nor could Isai implement them.129 The former Defense Minister Kiço Mustaqi, also a member of the Political Bureau, in his memoirs claims that the collapse of the eight-ton memorial was in fact the work of Ramiz Alia himself. Mustaqi says that: During one of the sessions of the People’s Assembly, I told to Arben Imami: “If you had not overthrown Enver Hoxha’s memorial, you would have won the elections!” But Imami stoically replied to him that Ramiz Alia himself had overthrown the statue. Our goal (the goal of the Democratic Party) was to take over the State Radio-Television, the Central Committee building and the Bloc (where the leadership lived).130 The news of the decision to remove the dictator Enver Hoxha’s name from the university was brought to the students by the Minister of Education, Skender Gjinushi. The students, however, demanded that the decision be brought in writing and by decree. After the television announced the news

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about the abolition of the name of the university, the strike Committee, to which in the past days had been added Shinasi Rama and a professor as well, announced the end of the Hunger Strike.131 The Hunger Strike finalized the end of the cruel dictatorship of Enver Hoxha. The very next day, on February 21st 1991, all over Albania, statues and monuments of Hoxha were overthrown or destroyed and tons of books by Enver Hoxha were publicly burned. Also on February 21st, 1991, all over Albania, volunteer formations were organized and reorganized and rallies were held in support of the dictator. The country seemed on the brink of civil war. In the city of Berat, the National Association “The Volunteers of Enver” was founded by the militants of Enver Hoxha. Its sole purpose was to defend the regime and to incite civil war.132 In just two weeks it claimed to have a million members. However, all this support was contained by Alia and the function of that organization was reduced to the expression of nostalgia for the memory of the dictator. The judgment of the Student Movement that democracy could not coexist with the dictator’s memorials had long-term effects. It eroded the core source of the legitimacy of the regime and was the death blow to the dictatorship. However, several Military and Security Units emerged openly on the side of the Association of “the Volunteers of Enver.” There was a quasicoup at the Military Academy. Its officers and students wanted to take the statue of Hoxha from the Military Academy and put it in Skanderbeg Square. There were other clusters and groups that wanted the return of the statues of Enver Hoxha and, more importantly, the return of the dictatorship as well. However, these efforts were marginal and peripheral, and were ably contained and controlled by Ramiz Alia and the regime. Throughout the week of February 21st–28th, 1991, the daily party newspaper Zëri i Popullit opened a rubric, “Today we know who loves Albania.” Almost every day on this page were published extensive reports about the activities of the association of “The Volunteers of Enver.” It is important to note that important political figures were featured in this rubric including Nexhmije Hoxha, Ramiz Alia, Haxhi Lleshi, and Namik Dokle. As Afrim Krasniqi emphasizes, Dokle, with a hysterical and medieval tone, wrote, “Even if he is dead, Enver Hoxha, still unites us. Who wants to vote for Enver Hoxha, let him know that he should give the vote to the Party of Labor and vice versa.”133 The DPA was forced by the overwhelming pressure and the fear of its leaders to cancel some rallies in the districts outside Tirana in order to avoid provocations and the intense climate of Communist reaction. The intensity of the outbursts was such that according to one of the leaders of this party, Besnik Mustafaj, they “could lead the country to civil war.”134 The Albanian Party of Labor organization at the university sent a circular note which contained open threats to the students and the lecturers. In that circular note, the powerful Albanian Party of Labor organization demanded the banning of the DPA, the return of Enver Hoxha’s memorials, the trial

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and the sentencing of students who had incited the protests, and of their parents, the trial of all professors who supported the students, the replacement of Ramiz Alia with Hysni Milloshi, the head of the million-strong Association of the “Volunteers of Enver,” and even the removal of the capital from Tirana as a city that did not love Enver Hoxha. The parents of the students participating in the Student Movement, it was said in the circular note, were to be charged with all damages caused by their children.135 The Closing of the University and Exodus of the “Albanian Student Movement” Once Gramoz Pashko said, “the Student Movement brought pluralism to Albania.”136 After the student decision to initiate the Hunger Strike, on February 18th, 1991, by a special decree, the Ministry of Education suspended all work, teaching, and study at the university for a period of three weeks. Through this suspension of activity, the regime intended to send students away from the capital and to reduce their influence in the preelection campaign. The regime knew quite well that the students would be “the electoral army of the Democratic Party.”137 The Minister of Education in the government headed by Fatos Nano was Kastriot Islami, who was educated in France. He promised to offer the final solution to the university’s problem. Intensive talks were held between the officials, deans, and elected representatives of the Student Movement, as well as representatives of several European delegations who had recently started to visit Tirana. The capital was transformed into a diplomatic center of reflection about the future, a place to measure the pulse of the country, and a center in which multiple interests were converging, coalescing, and clashing as well.138 The DPA and the Albanian Party of Labor were shifting the political debate to the upcoming general elections. Yet, in these days, the Student Movement was hit hard in many ways. On the one hand, several leading students started leaving the country. For example, the news that Blendi Gonxhe, a highly respected student leader, had left the country for Greece caused much displeasure among the students. Later on, almost all the influential leaders of the Student Movement, refusing to become a part of the deal that was forged between the ALP and DPA, would either leave or go into exile. With them was exiled also the spiritual ideal of an Albanian nation-state based on the advanced models of the European nation-states.139 On the other hand, the state institutions took care to destroy the Student Movement. The Ministry of Education took the decision to close the university. On March 2nd, 1991, the Ministry of Education decided that “due to multiple problems with supply, heating and other factors, the regular schedule of teaching at the University is suspended. From the regular studies, the schedule now is changed to the model of the studying with correspondence” (Halili, 2015b). This meant that students had to come to

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Tirana only at exam time. The exams were scheduled for June 1991, four months later. It was clear that behind the decision to cancel the classes and lectures stood Ramiz Alia. By sending students home and by closing the university, he practically destroyed the epicenter of the Student Movement, the Student City. He also eliminated the Student Movement as a political factor by setting up the DPA as the only interlocutor of the Albanian Party of Labor. In this context, Dritëro Agolli is fully convinced that Ramiz Alia not only “led the process of the establishment of pluralism, but also had the power to create the opposition parties and that he was able to appoint the leaders of these parties, including Sali Berisha himself.”140 For Agolli, Alia was in complete control of the process. The decision to close the university was an act of revenge on the Student Movement that had won the political pluralism and that overthrew the central myth of the state of the red terror in Albania. It is important to note that the decision to suspend the teaching and close the university was quietly approved by the DPA as well. Understandably, the DPA had other reasons, not least of which was the elimination of the Student Movement as a potent competitor for legitimacy. The leadership of the Student Movement considered that the closing of the university was part of a “secret pact” between Ramiz Alia and Sali Berisha. The article “Learning is Our Future” published in Rilindja Demokratike on March 6th, 1991 launched fierce criticism of alleged non-constructiveness by students on the eve of the election. Student leaders such as Shinasi Rama and Arben Lika, distrustful of the DPA’s attitude towards them, went to the Chairman of the Republican Party, Sabri Godo, who promised them moral support, as much as he had political power. However, soon they learnt that Sabri Godo was working in collaboration with Ramiz Alia and Sali Berisha as well. The leadership of the Student Movement, particularly the “Fan S. Noli” Association, would try everything they could to reopen the university but to no avail. Ridvan Peshkėpia would write to the Embassy of Italy and the Council of Europe. Arben Lika, Shinasi Rama, Edvin Shvarc, Edmond Bushati, Arben Sulo, Alban Pici, and others took the decision to gather students on the first day of consultations on March 10th, 1991, at 10:00 am in the University Square, now known as Mother Teresa Square. Later, Arben Lika, Shinasi Rama, and several others would sign a proclamation by which students from the districts were invited, as well as those students from Tirana, to return to the university and to protest against the regime’s criminal plot. The students would unequivocally lay the blame for the political act of the closing of the university on Ramiz Alia and Sali Berisha. As Rama said to Berisha, “You sentenced the University with the death penalty because you no longer had any control over the students. By depriving them of the University, you [i.e., Sali Berisha] let no other choice to more than 6,000 students who were part of the Student Movement but to emigrate from Albania.”141 Zef Brozi, a lecturer during the events of December 1990, and a member of the student representation who met with Ramiz Alia, blames the regime but

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also the DPA for the closure of the university and for creating a climate of terror and fear that openly threatened the real protagonists of the Student Movement. Brozi says that: In December 1990, neither the students who participated in the Student Movement, nor myself or many other intellectuals, were so clear about how we would go about building a democracy. We had a great desire to contribute, we had the pure ideals that inspired us, we had the will and the passion, but we did not have the necessary experience in politics. Under these conditions, after the political pluralism was won, the fruits of the Student Movement were reaped more by those who had experience in politics, even though they came from the party against which the students arose. The Student Movement became an all-inclusive movement. Unfortunately, the tendency to eliminate former student leaders from the leading positions in the Democratic Party and other opposition parties in Parliament, governments, or other institutions was noticeable even at the very early phases of transition, such as the first pluralistic elections of March 31, 1991. Worse than that, politicians from all political parties intentionally pursued the method of intimidation and the exiling of the students, so they would leave Albania. Consequently, hundreds of students from the Student Movement began to leave their country.142 After the closure of the university, the majority of the students who consistently formed the nucleus of the Student Movement were left defenseless, and without any support from the society or the opposition. By March 6th and 7th they would be a sizeable part of the people that took over the ships in the ports of Durres and Vlora seeking to leave Albania and migrate elsewhere. Afrim Krasniqi estimates that with the exodus of March 1991, nearly 5000 students left Albania, while the Ministry of Education reported that about 6000 students left.143 For Albanians, the most popular slogan at the time was that “the state does not exist any more!”144 Among those who emigrated or went into exile were some of the student leaders of the Hunger Strike Committee: Ilir Dizdari, Mesila Dode, Blendi Gonxhe, Arjan Manhasa, Ndue Lugja, and the deputy chairman of the DPA, also a renowned student leader, Tefalin Malshyti.145 Azem Hajdari described the students’ mass exodus as scripted by Ramiz Alia and the Albanian Party of Labor. Hajdari said that, “With the student exodus, our chances of winning are minimal.”146 Yet it was clear that to the regime and to the DPA leadership this was a huge relief, for it eliminated one of the most important factors in the political game. In a later, much more sober assessment, Marjan Gryka notes that: The exodus of the protagonists from Albania, the ease with which they were provided with the passports and the silence that followed their

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departure from the homeland, and then their “indifference” with regard to the democratic processes, which culminated with the targeting and the killing of Arben Broci (one of the student leaders), though it cannot be proven, sheds light on the existence of a scheme that is not difficult to label as “the scheme of the elimination of the true protagonists of December 1990.”147 It must be noted that all this was taking place while Albania was plunged into a deep institutional crisis. On February 21st, 1991, Ramiz Alia and the Albanian Party of Labor concluded that with the collapse of Enver Hoxha’s memorials, the students also had knocked down their own Albania, which they ruled despotically. In an effort to overcome the crisis, the chaos, and the very difficult situation, Ramiz Alia, just two days after the end of the Student Strike and the overthrow of the statue of Enver Hoxha, decided, based on Article 78 of the Constitution, to establish the Presidential Council with the Chairman of the Presidium of the People’s Assembly of the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania as its head. This was practically a coup d’état and the establishment of a Junta. The government was changed as well. The Presidential Council was made up of several “staunch party loyalists.” Among them were some of the leading politicians of the future: Fatos Nano, Kleanthi Koçi, Kiço Blushi, Haxhi Lleshi, Lufter Xhuveli, Rexhep Meidani, Minella Dalani, and Xhenet Muco.148 The reaction from the conservatives and the Enverist loyalists, who thoroughly controlled the army, security, and police structures, was extremely intense. Even more than that, the core institutions of the state were demanding the declaration of martial law. Ramiz Alia resisted this and argued that the formation of the Presidential Council was a sufficient measure. Later on he would say that he resisted the demands to declare martial law in this manner: “I delayed the signing of the decree that would have established the martial law because I concluded that that decision would harm the process of democratization both domestically and our relations with other states.”149 The General Investigations Office in a report to the Minister of Interior, Gramoz Ruçi, concluded that there had been armed clashes between the army and the “other side” which they defined as the enemy. About 32 people were arrested for disruptions of the social order. Ramiz Alia argues that Albania was in grave danger: “During the month of February 1991, the country was closer to civil war and bloodshed than at any other point during the transition.”150 The students had dealt a deadly blow to Enver Hoxha’s legacy and yet Ramiz Alia and the state never gave up the practice of defending and honoring Enver Hoxha. For example, during his visit to Albania, Ibrahim Rugova refused to lay flowers at the grave of Enver Hoxha, expressing in this manner his own opposition to the anti-Albanian and anti-nationalist policy of Enver

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Hoxha. Ramiz Alia threatened to interrupt his visit and declare Rugova persona non grata. It was under these conditions that the exodus of all Albanians continued unabated. During the year 1991, over 100,000 Albanians would leave the country. More than 20,000 of the people who emigrated would be young people and among them 5000–6000 students of the University of Tirana. It was clear that without the base that was the Student City, without its activists, and without its leaders, the Student Movement ceased to exist. Gradually, a part of the students were absorbed into political parties of all stripes but the page that they had written in the history of modern Albania and their contribution would be remembered forever.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

(Rama, 2006). (Rama, 2015). (Rama, 2012: 129). (Hoffman, 2008: 122). (Çela, 2010). (Pepa, 1995). (Fevziu, 2009b). (Meksi, 2010a: 17). (Buçpapaj, 2011). (Halili, 1992: 152). (Fevziu, 2011: 392); (Elsie, 2004: 287–288). (Ross and Sudar, 1998: 1). (Biberaj, 2011: 101). (Biberaj, 2011: 109). (Grothusen, 1993: 563). (Grothusen, 1993: 563). (Krasniqi, 1998: 39–40). (Demeti, 2011: 82–83). (Krasniqi, 1998: 37). (Krasniqi, 1998: 38). (Krasniqi, 1998: 38). (Bashkimi, 1990: 1). (Grup Autorësh, 2011: 74). (Grup Autorësh, 2011: 73–74). (Biberaj, 1998). (Grup Autorësh, 2011: 74). (Abrahams, 2010). (Elsie, 2004: 176). (Krasniqi, 1998). (Krasniqi, 1998: 42). (Elsie, 2004: 194). (Fevziu, 2011: 19). (Fevziu, 2011: 20). (Kaca, 2004: 74). (Rayerson, 2013). (Hoppe, 1994: 105). (Frashëri, 2012). (Chiodi, 2012).

The Rise of the Student Movement 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

(Fevziu, 2011: 21). (Halili, 1992: 188). (Fevziu, 2011: 22). (Tërshana, 2011). (Tërshana, 2011). (Krasniqi, 1998). (Krasniqi, 1998). (Fevziu, 2011: 28). (Dervishi, 2009). (Gazeta Shqiptare, 2006: 18–19). (Fevziu, 2011: 31). (Ukcamaj, 2011: 140). (Fevziu, 2011: 95). (Rama, 2011: 335–336). (Papa, 1995). (Alia, 2010: 361). (Berisha, 2012). (Biberaj, 1998: 82). (Krasniqi, 1998: 60). (Hajdari, 1993: 2). (Mustafaj, 2009). (Progni, 2015). (ATSH, 1990). (ATSH, 1990). (Kasoruho, 2012: 216). (Abrahams, 2010). (Ahmetaj, 2001: 8). (Ukcamaj, 2011). (Rama, 2015). (Meksi, 2010a). (Mustafaj, 1997: 70). (Glenny, 1990: 160). (Dervishi, 2009). (Fevziu, 2011: 48). (Fevziu, 2011: 49). (CC of PLA, 1990). (Kaltsounis, 2010: 152). (Kaca, 2004: 74). (Krasniqi, 1998: 72). (De Matteis, 1992: 43); (Krasniqi, 1998: 72). (Kerscher, 2009: 166). (Rama, 2015). (Demeti, 2011: 88). (Meksi, 2010a: 29). (Meksi, 2010a: 29). (Rama, 2015). (Rama, 2015: 185). (Rama, 2015: 185). (Sharxhi, 2011). (Fevziu, 2011: 65). ( Pano, 1992: 59). (Fevziu, 2011). (Meksi, 2014). (Tarifa, 1995: 146).

141

142 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146

Llukman Halili (Berisha, 2012). (Rama, 2006: 42–43). (Rama, 2006: 43). (Kasoruho, 2012). (Kasoruho, 2012). (Ahmetaj, 2012). (Shvarc, 2002). (Mustafaj, 1997: 115). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1998: 45). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1998: 45). (Biberaj, 2011: 98). (Krasniqi, 1998: 97). (Berisha, 2012). (Gërvalla, 2012). (Gërvalla, 2012). (Krasniqi, 1998: 98). (Fevziu, 2011: 126). (Krasniqi, 1998: 195). (Halili, 1992). (Krasniqi, 2008a); (Aliu, 2008); (Fevziu, 2009a). (Fevziu, 2009a). (Fevziu, 2011: 154). (Fevziu, 2009a; 2010: 154). (Shvarc, 2002). (Krasniqi, 2008a). (Biberaj, 1998: 146). (Rama, 2015). (Rama, 2006: 190); (Biberaj, 2011: 117). (Asllani, 2016) (Asllani, 2016). (Krasniqi, 1998: 106). (Krasniqi, 1998: 106). (Vickers, 2008: 342). (Halili, 1992). (Zeneli, 2015). (Halili, 1992: 198). (Progni, 2012). (Zholi, 2011: 138). (Hoppe, 1994: 106). (Vickers and Pettifer, 1998: 48). (Zëri i Popullit, 1991). (Mustafaj, 1997: 90). (Cited in Krasniqi, 1998: 124). (Pashko, 1991). (Ukcamaj, 2011). (Fevziu, 2011: 202). (Gonxhe, 2013). (Progni, 2012). (Rama, 2006: 190). (Brozi, 2011). (Krasniqi, 1998). (Schubert, 1997: 52). (Fevziu, 2011: 215). (Halili, 2015a).

The Rise of the Student Movement 147 148 149 150

143

(Gryka, 2005). (Zholi, 2011: 141). (Halili, 1992: 199). (Halili, 1992: 193).

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Elsie, Robert. 2004. Historical Dictionary of Albania. Oxford: The Scarecrow Press. Fevziu, Blendi. 2009a. “Greva e urisë së studentëve, 18 vjet pas: with Mesila Doda, Blendi Gonxhe, Emin Barçi, Edi Paloka.” Opinion, TV Klan, February 18th. Fevziu, Blendi. 2009b. “1989–1990 Shansi i humbur – Me Gjergj Zheji, Skender Gjinushi, Dashamir Shehi, Diana Çuli, Sokol Nako, dhe Genc Ruli.” Opinion, TV Klan, December 11th. Fevziu, Blendi. 2011. Piedestale pa statuja: 8 dhjetor 1990–31 Mars 1991. Tiranë: UET Press. Fevziu, Blendi. 2014. “Interviste me Ismail Kadare.” In Jeta Ime. Tiranë: UET. Frashëri, Kristo. 2012. “Kush e permbysi regjimin Komunist ne Shqiperi?” Gazeta TemA, September 19th. Available at: http://www.gazetatema.net/web/2012/09/ 19/kush-e-permbysi-regjimin-komunist-ne-shqiperi/. Gazeta Shqiptare. 2006. Speciale, November 5th: 18–19. Tiranë. Gërvalla, Donika. 2012. “Refleksion për Lëvizjen e Dhjetorit.” Personal Analysis prepared for Llukman HaliliFebruary. Glenny, Misha. 1990. The Rebirth of History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy. London: Penguin Books. Gonxhe, Blendi. 2013. “Lëvizja e dhjetorit, Gonxhe: Ishte një dashuri me kushte.” Interview with Entela Resuli. Dita, December 13th. Grothusen, Klaus Detlev. 1993. Albanien, Südosteuropa-Handbuch, Band 7. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Grothusen, Klaus Detlev. 2006. Bericht über die Tage der Trauer um Genossen Enver, 2. Magdeburg: Sozialistische albanische hefte, July. Grup Autorësh. 2011. Dhjetor 90: Mbaj Mend. Tiranë: Grupimi “Dhjetori 90”. Gryka, Marjan. 2005. “Ideali i bjerrun i dhjetoristëve.” Telegraf, 10, December: 16. Hajdari, Azem. 1993. “Intervistë.” Studenti, January 1st: 2. Halili, Llukman. 2015a. Studentski pokret i tranzicija Albanije 1990.-1992. Rijeka: ZAPGŽ. Halili, Llukman. 2015b. Lëvizja Studentore dhe Tranzicioni i Shqipërisë, 19901992. Tiranë: Shtëpia Botuese Princi. Halili, Llukman and Blerim Shala. 1992. Unë, Ramiz Alia Dëshmoj Për Historinë. Zëri: Prishtinë. Hoffman, Judith. 2008. Die Integration Südosteuropas-Die Demokratisierungspolitik europäischer Organisationen in Albanien. Baden-Baden: Verlag Nomos. Hoppe, Hans-Joachim. 1994. “Albanien-Mühsame Demokratisierung im Land der Skipetaren.” In Reformen und Refomer in Osteuropa, edited by Franz-Lothar Altmann and Edgar Hösch. Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet. Kaca, Eduart. 2004. Shqipëria nga Diktatura në Demokraci - teoria dhe praktika. Tiranë: Kristalina-KH. Kaltsounis, Theodore. 2010. The Democratization of Albania: Democracy from within. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kasoruho, Amik. 2012. Shqipëria, Ankthi dhe Ëndrra. Tiranë: UET Press. Kerscher, Daniel. 2009. Demokratisierung in Südosteuropa un den Andenländern. Hamburg: Verlag dr. Kovacˇ . Krasniqi, Afrim. 1998. Fundi I Siberisë Shqiptare: Lëvizja Studentore, Dhjetor 1990– Shkurt 1991. Tiranë: Shtëpia Botuese Albin. Krasniqi, Afrim. 2008a. “Greva e urisë, si kapërcyen studentët manovrat e Ramizit.” Shqiperia.com, February 22nd. Available at: http://lajme.shqiperia.com/la

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jme/artikull/iden/15167/titulli/Greva-e-urise-si-kapercyen-studentet-manovra t-e-Ramizit. Krasniqi, Afrim. 2008b. “Shkurt ’91, greva që shembi themelin real të diktaturës.” Shqiperia.com, August 21st. Available at: http://lajme.shqiperia.com/lajme/arti kull/iden/14859/titulli/Shkurt-91-greva-qe-shembi-themelin-real-te-diktatures. Kurlansky, Mark. 2007. Godina koja je uzdrmala svijet. Biblioteka Kultura i Civilizacija. Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak. Meksi, Aleksandër. 2010a. “Komunizmi edhe ra vetë, edhe e rrëzuam.” Interview with Skënder Minxhozi. Revista Mapo, 208, December 12th: 17. Meksi, Aleksandër. 2010b. Dhjetor` 90 - Dokumente Dhe Materiale. Tiranë: UET Press. Meksi, Aleksander. 2014. “Si e themeluam PD në shtëpinë e Pashkos, pati dhe të infiltruar.” Panorama, December 14th. Available at: http://www.panorama.com. al/meksi-si-e-themeluam-pd-ne-shtepine-e-pashkos-pati-dhe-te-infiltruar/ Mustafaj, Besnik. 1997. Albanien Zwischen Verbrechen und Schein. Frankfurt: Frankfurter Verlagsanstalt. Mustafaj, Besnik. 2009. “Interview with Blendi Fevziu.” Opinion, TV Klan, December 21st. Pano, Nicholas C. 1992. History Of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century: Albania. New York: Columbia University Press. Papa, Robert. 1995. “Intervistë me Sali Berisha.” Emisoni Fokus, RTSH, December 11th. Pashko, Gramoz. 1991. “Shqipëria dhe Kamya: Intervistë me Gramoz Pashkon.” Epoka, Prishtinë, May. Pepa, Pjetër. 1995. Dosja e Diktaturës. Tiranë: Private Publication. Progni, Luljeta. 2012. “Rrëzimi i busteve të Enver Hoxhës dhe ringritja nga ‘vullnetarët e Enverit’.” Studimepolitike.com, May 8th. Progni, Luljeta. 2013. “Dritëro Agolli: Të gjithë kryetarët e partive në 1991 i caktoi Ramiz Alia.” Available at: http://www.arkivalajmeve.com/Driter o-Agolli-Te-gjithe-kryetaret-e-partive-ne-1991-i-caktoi-Ramiz-Alia.363402/ Progni, Luljeta. 2015. “Interview with Llukman Halili.” Private Communication. Rama, Edi. 2011. Kurban. Tiranë: Dudaj. Rama, Shinasi. 2006. Probleme politike shqiptare I. Shkodër: Instituti i Studimeve Kombëtare Shqiptare. Rama, Shinasi. 2012. Përrallat e tranzicionit shqiptar. Tiranë: Princi. Rama, Shinasi. 2015. Për Lëvizjen Studentore Shqiptare, 1990–1991: Analiza, Rrëfime dhe Argumente. Tiranë: Princi. Rayerson, William. 2013. “Mbresa ime nga Shqipëria, dashuria e jashtëzakonshme për Shtetet e Bashkuara.” Interview with Voice of America, January 13th. Available at: http://www.zeriamerikes.com/content/amb-rayerson-albania-dem ocracy-12-07-2010-111441604/455992.html. Ross, Anthony Clunies and Petar Sudar. 1998. Albania’s Economy in Transition and Turmoil 1990–97. Aldershot: Ashgate. Schubert, Peter. 1997. Zündstoff im Konfliktfeld des Balkan: Die albanische Frage. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Sharxhi, Mirel. 2011. “Dhjetori 90: pa zbukurime, pa retushime.” In Grup Autorësh, Dhjetor 90: Mbaj Mend. Tiranë: Grupimi “Dhjetori 90”. Shvarc, Edvin. 2002. “Greva e Urisë - 1991 - Shembja e Komunizmit.” Forumi Shqiptar, February 19th. Available at: http://www.forumishqiptar.com/threads/ 35983-Greva-e-urise-1991-Shembja-e-komunizmit.

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Tarifa, Fatos. 1995. “Albania’s Road from Communism: Political and Social Change, 1990–1993.” Development and Change 26(1): 133–162. Tërshana, Alban. 2011. “Dëshmia e Alban Tërshanës.” Gazeta Shqiptare, December 12th. Ukcamaj, Bardhyl. 2011. “Lëvizja studentore e Dhjetorit, si e kam jetuar unë.” In Grup Autorësh, Dhjetor 90: Mbaj Mend. Tiranë: Grupimi “Dhjetori 90”. Vickers, Miranda. 2008. Shqiptarët një histori moderne. Tiranë: “Bota Shqiptare”. Vickers, Miranda and James Pettifer. 1998. Shqipëria nga Anarkia te një identitet ballkanik. Tiranë: Toena. Zeneli, Guro. 2015. “Nexhmija i kërkoi llogari Ramizit pse nuk u vranë njerëz kur ra busti, Saliu dhe Mehmet Elezi ishin kundër pluralizmit në mbledhjen me intelektualët.” Sot, January 17th. Zholi, Albert. 2011. Kiço Mustaqi, Ministri I Mbrojtjes Midis Dy Sistemeve. Tirane: Toena.

6

The Idea Of The Nation-State And The Albanian Student Movement Grid Rroji

Introduction The Student Movement is considered by historians as one of the most important events that occurred in the modern history of the Albanian state.1 While it remains largely one of the least understood and most contested social movements in Europe, from a sociopolitical perspective it represents a crucial point of change for Albania and Albanians in the region.2 In this chapter I argue that Albanian nationalism rooted in the Albanian Renaissance movement of the late nineteenth century was an ideological guideline for the Movement. The Movement was inspired by, and was viewed by the leadership as a continuation of, nationalistinspired student movements in Kosova in 1968, 1981, and 1989. Moreover, the Movement would not have taken place were it not for the historical continuum, shared values and objectives, and learned lessons of its predecessors. Hence, its objectives qua movement were presented by the leadership as, and perceived in an important sense to be like, the continuation of the national struggle that began in 1870 with the League of Prizren. Furthermore, the Student Movement adopted, and in some cases improved, some of the successful political contention techniques of its predecessors, including hunger strikes and student demonstrations and boycott. This repertoire was also adopted with some degree of success by previous movements inspired by the nationalist idea, such as the Trepca miners’ strike in Kosova in 1989. The direct personal contacts of some of the leadership of the Student Movement with the miner and student organizations in Kosova further cemented the linkages between them. For instance, much like previous student movements, the Student Movement used symbols of national unity such as the starless flag which was banned by the Communist state, adopted the verses of patriotic songs from the first Albanian nationalist movement, the League of Prizren, and some of the leaders openly called for a national reawakening in their rhetoric.3 In this sense, the Movement built on the extant political discourse and action

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of the Albanian National Renaissance, particularly with respect to the idea of constructing a modern, democratic state that was legitimized by the nation as a unitary community, avoiding civil war, avoiding any bloodshed, etc. These are clear examples of a nationalist political discourse used by a social movement that seeks to transform the polity. One of the main objectives the Student Movement achieved was breaking the ideological dependency on Hoxhaism—a Marxist-Leninist version of Communism spattered with Maoist and isolationist precepts—and shattering the cult of Enver Hoxha as a father to the nation. This objective was viewed by the leadership as a necessary and crucial step to free many strata of society, such as mid- and low-level members of the Communist party, the army, and administration officials that had been trained and educated to worship the leader and the regime, from the expectation to defend the status quo. In addition, as Halili documents, the nationalist discourse and action were anathema to the Communist regime, and it served as a rallying cry for the students against the political status quo.4 Hence, the principal objectives of the leadership of the Student Movement were inspired by the nationalist framework of the Albanian Renaissance and were expressed through nationalist political discourse. This chapter begins by defining the concepts that are used to explain and analyze the Movement, and sets out the scope of my argument. The second part of the chapter is devoted to a theoretical discussion of ideology in social movements, framing as an explanatory model for social movements, and the linkages between the expression of nationalist goals and the ideological frames used by student leadership. The third part deals with examining the evidence that is available so far, in the form of books, articles, and first-person accounts in the media, and analyzing what the goals of the Student Movement were and how the idea of nation-state shaped its political action. I find that there are several events within the timeframe of the Movement’s activity that have been overlooked or ignored by current literature on the Student Movement and that provide crucial details that contribute to the explanation of the goals and objectives of the Movement. For instance, several actions were undertaken by the “Group of Shkodra” named after the provenience of most of its members from the region of Shkodra. These actions that defined some of the crucial moments during the protests, and the continuity of leadership and organization throughout the hunger strike have not received due attention and require deeper analysis. Finally, I conclude that the leadership of the Student Movement had political goals that were consonant with the nationalistic platform of the Albanian National Renaissance, acted in an organized fashion to achieve that platform, and succeeded in several crucial aspects. In addition, I find that ultimately the Student Movement failed to fully enact its political project because of the alliance between segments of the Communist elites and the Democratic Party, which both viewed its ideological goals as life threatening for their agendas.

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The Student Movement: A Social Movement or Political Upheaval? The difficulty in assessing the Student Movement within the continuum of social movements lies in the contested nature of the facts about it. An added difficulty is that most of the facts that are known derive from personal accounts of protagonists and very few official documents have become available to this day. There is a collection of the existing documentation published in 2015 by former Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi, which includes notes and speeches from the protagonists and several official documents.5 However, despite being the most serious attempt at documentation of the Movement to date, it is missing very important items from the Ministry of Interior and other related state apparatus institutions in charge of state security and party ideology, which are to this day classified. In the absence of credible documentation, scholars must rely on the imperfect evidence provided by protagonists on either side, and book accounts from members and leaders of the Movement. There are various explanations and interpretations that exist in the literature and in the media about what happened, who was in charge, how long did the Movement last, and what were its achievements. The central contested fact is whether a movement occurred at all. Other questions revolve around the timeline of events and whether the Movement was independent or under the umbrella of the nascent political opposition. Finally, many have questioned whether the Student Movement was an instrument of the Communist regime that was used to achieve a soft landing for the Communist elite. Thus, it is prudent to begin by clarifying the facts, offering some simple definitions of the concepts used, and applying them to the version of the facts most supported by the available evidence. The literature notes that social movements are defined by structure, leadership, clear ideological values, and a non-dependent relationship with existing elites. Thus, parsing the evidence to clarify if these conditions apply is perforce the starting point. The clearest conceptual explanation of the various schools of thought about the Student Movement is provided by the editor of this volume, Shinasi A. Rama.6 According to his examination, there are three schools of thought about the Student Movement. The first group of scholars, associated with the newly formed Democratic Party (DP) of Albania, emphasize the role of the intellectuals that joined the Movement and contributed to creating opposition parties.7 Their argument relies loosely on a traditional explanation of social movements that focuses on the moderate actors within the opposition and the ruling elite.8 This view portrays the moderate intellectuals coming from the regime as the driving force behind the Movement who led and cooperated with the moderate liberal group of student leadership on the road to political pluralism.9 Moreover, this group of scholars paints the Student Movement leadership as homogeneous and lends legitimacy to the view that the only student leader with decision-making capabilities was the now-deceased Azem Hajdari. According to this account the Movement lasted several days, it ended with the creation of the DP as the

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first legal opposition party since 1946, and its ideological foundation was anti-Communist liberalism that was expounded by DP leaders Sali Berisha, Gramoz Pashko, and other intellectuals. The second group focuses on the role of the Communist regime during the student protests, the infiltration of regime intellectuals among the student leadership, and the consequent détente that formed between Communist leader Ramiz Alia and DP leader Sali Berisha. Among this school of thought the most relevant accounts are the memoirs published by former Communist Party Central Committee members Servet Pellumbi and Sabit Brokaj, who reveal that Alia acted according to a Soviet plan concocted by Gorbachev and explained in detail to all leaders of the Communist bloc in an alleged meeting in Katowice, Poland.10 Whether the meeting occurred or not, the contention is that change was the result of a ruptura pactada between moderate segments of the Communist elites and the intellectuals that led the Student Movement. Similarly, Fred Abrahams of Human Rights Watch concurs with this version and asserts that the Student Movement falls short of being a real transformational movement. Rather, Abrahams contends it was a slow evolutionary set of events that was tolerated by the Communist Party and allowed political entrepreneurs such as Sali Berisha to profit politically.11 However, in a departure from the official hagiography Abrahams acknowledges the important role some of the leaders of the Group of Shkodra played in making decisions at crucial points. The crux of this argument is that the Communist state realized that the status quo was unsustainable and it engineered a soft evolution, relying on its strong grip on the state and complete control over the intellectuals. Moreover, the Communist Party, of whom Sali Berisha was a devout member, did not view him as an agent of change, but as a guarantee of continuity under slightly different rules. The acknowledgment here is that the Communist elites viewed the Student Movement as an opportunity to reframe but not transform the system. That Berisha later deviated from that commitment and sought complete control of the state over his former masters, was in these authors’ view due to his own political calculations rather than the effects of the Student Movement.12 In short, this school of thought believes that without the prodding of the Communist Party there would have been no organization or leadership, the tolerated protests lasted a few days, and the students had no clear ideology nor transformational objectives. The third group of scholars that have studied this period is composed of some of the leadership of the Group of Shkodra, foreign correspondents for international news agencies, and some Balkan specialists. The main thrust of their argument is that the Student Movement was a structured, organized, and ideological social movement that was at crucial points the agent of change that brought about regime change in Albania. Rama notes that from a theoretical standpoint it was a social movement because it had clear leadership, organization, a clear ideology, and was independent from the extant elite structures. As such, “the Student Movement could very well stand the comparison with

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Student Movements in France in 1968 and elsewhere.” Halili argues that there was not only ideological continuity between Albanian social movements in Kosova in 1968 and 1981 and the Student Movement, but also a learning process of the repertoire of contentious politics used by it.14 Other accounts, despite arriving at different analytical conclusions, corroborate the existence of an independent student leadership that had clear ideological goals and was not a part of a negotiated transition with the regime.15 In this chapter, I argue that the Student Movement was a full-fledged social movement that lasted several months despite the leadership fracture that occurred after the birth of the DP. In addition, I concur with Rama and Halili that it had a clear organizational structure and clear ideological objectives. The organizational structure and leadership are evident in the internal electoral process that defined the delegation to Communist President Alia asking for political pluralism, and the ability to organize sustained protests and a hunger strike against the wishes of all political actors including the new opposition. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the core Student Movement leadership did not cease its actions even when presented with political benefits and carrots both by the regime and by the opposition, demonstrating a strong ideological conviction to separate the state and elites from the former dictator Hoxha and to build the foundation for a nationstate. In addition, the Student Movement leadership demonstrated a clear knowledge of events, methods, and tactical skills that were necessary to contest a closed, violence-prone state apparatus without causing massive bloodshed. As such, the Student Movement was the main factor that caused regime change. There are several evidentiary indicators that point me in that direction. As Della Porta notes, disruptive social movements with a broad civic and national self-definition play a dynamic role in eventful democratizations. These events, including student protests and hunger strikes, not only serve to mobilize opponents of the autocratic regime in a closed political opportunity environment, but also cause elite realignment, changing their rationale and calculation through the events.16 The Student Movement’s actions were instrumental to (1) mobilize large strata of society against an economically failing but politically strong state, thus creating political opportunities where there appeared to be none, and (2) change the loyalties of crucial segments of the elites by shattering the myth of Enver Hoxha, hence creating a new calculus among the elites. In addition, Schmitter and O’Donnell underscore the importance of tactical moderation from the change agents, in order to allow the elites room to maneuver while preserving the vital interests of the nation and the state.17 The Student Movement leadership demonstrated the necessary restraint by calling for all citizens to join in the Movement as members of the nation, thus insulating students from repressive retribution, as well as largely avoiding bloodshed.

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Ideology, Definitions, and Applicability In the previous section I argued that the Student Movement was a social movement that took an ideological approach to regime change. Thus, it is of crucial importance to begin this section by coming to a clear definition of the concept of ideology, in order to thoroughly parse its weight within the Movement’s actions. First, ideology is a central component to any social movement because it provides an explanation of not only causality but also motivation for the future, hope, aspiring to a better state of things, and so on. As Jon Elster puts it, “ruling ideologies can actively shape the wants and desires of those subjected to them,”18 but they must also address what already is within people, thus fulfilling practical needs and what they perceive as their social reality.19 In this sense, ideology is both constitutive of our identities and a sort of anonymous universal truth that we all regard as given. Hence, successful ideologies must be compatible with what the social strata that embrace them view not only as achievable but as desirable in a social sense. It follows that for our purposes it is necessary to not only unpack the various uses of the concept and the term, but also apply different definitional levels of analysis. On the one hand, ideology as a wide concept is useful in terms of defining whether something is of ideological origin or not. For instance, Eagleton’s definition that describes ideology as “the general material process of production of ideas, beliefs and values in social life”20 is useful because it defines the wide scope within which ideology can be produced in society. Social movements arise within societies and aim at changing both reality and its perception. On the other hand, in the context of a social movement in which political activities depend on the common understanding of objectives and political goals, the Althusserian notion is very useful. For Althusser, ideology represents a set of conscious and unconscious ideas which make up one’s goals, expectations, and motivations.21 In this context, ideology represents a pragmatic tool to transmit to subjects the necessary orientation to function properly within society. Moreover, the ideological goals of the state are filtered down through ideological institutions which Althusser defines as Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs). One of the most important ISAs is the political system. No ruling class can remain in power for long if it does not have ideological hegemony. It follows that to change society, i.e., transform the social mechanisms of power and identity that legitimate power, and more importantly to change through social movements, it is necessary to contest not only the government but also its ISAs through ideological means. Furthermore, the only way to really achieve the desired change comes through controlling not only state mechanisms of power, but just as importantly its ISAs. This perspective is very useful to our analysis of social movements and of the Student Movement because it underlines the inherent ideological character of all successful social movements. Moreover, by marrying ideological frames to pragmatic social objectives and aspirations it allows us to

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analyze the specific mechanisms used by the Student Movement to achieve its goals through an ideological lens. A third level of analysis that is useful in the context of social movements deals with the promotion and legitimation of the interests of social groups in the face of opposing interests. Ideology in this sense is viewed as a discursive field where social group interests collide and are resolved through an ideological contest.22 In particular, there are two questions that bear asking: (1) was the fall of the Communist regime the result of an ideological struggle for legitimacy among opposing groups? and (2) which ideology defined the Student Movement in this struggle? Ideology here is understood as both a general set of beliefs that inform social action and expectations, as well as a discursive field where social groups’ interests are contested or resolved. This is fundamental for analyzing the Student Movement because it reveals the linkages between the systemic change through contentious politics and the mechanisms of breaking institutional state apparatuses that kept important strata of society linked to the previous regime. In other words, to clarify the effects of a social movement on the political system, it is crucial to examine how and when state ISAs lose legitimacy and how different social strata react to this loss. In addition, it is necessary to define the scope of the relationship between social movements and nationalism that I adhere to in this chapter. This is relevant because, as Della Porta reminds us, “democratization struggles often develop an appeal to the nation.”23 Rokkan and Urwin note that intellectuals play a crucial role in creating an “imagined community,”24 whereas Snyder provides a typology of four different types of nationalism, as they relate to democratization movements: civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counter-revolutionary nationalisms.25 Civic and ethnic nationalism are defined as they relate to the degree of inclusiveness of the dominant ethnic groups, whereas revolutionary and counter-revolutionary typologies are defined by the type of agency involved. Fearon and Laitin contend that there is a correlation between political violence based on ethnicity and the weakness of the state: the weaker the state the more violence is produced.26 Thus, with respect to the Student Movement, the following sections will examine whether and how nationalist ideology influenced the Movement, what type of nationalism was embraced by student leadership, what role intellectuals played during and after the period of political contention, and what explains the low level of violence and bloodshed.

Framing the Nation-State: The Student Movement vs. Communist Elites This section will examine nationalist framing and social movements. This theoretical discussion covers the role nationalist ideologies play in shaping social movements as well as how nationalist leaders within the Student Movement framed their discourse and objectives to define the identity of the

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Movement. Several studies have explored how political actors and entrepreneurs frame their actions to achieve nationalist goals. Della Porta reminds us that the first distinction to be made is the one between inclusive and exclusive framing of political goals.27 According to this school of thought, the more inclusive the movement the more democratic the system coming out of it will be. Johnson and Melucci note that inclusive framing of nationalist goals marks a shift from pure ethnic identity to a more cultural and inclusive identity based on the cohabitation of diverse cultural groups.28 On the other hand, Giddens contends that as globalization expands, local resistance to foreign intrusions grows and gives rise to more exclusive frames of nationalism.29 The Student Movement leadership clearly adopted an ethnic version of nationalism. At the same time, the Student Movement was just as clearly a democratization movement, and at various points it was successful at balancing these goals. For instance, the hunger strike was organized to remove the name of Enver Hoxha from the university and to shatter his myth, but also to allow an important part of the elites to free themselves from his political legacy. Even with the students’ successful effort, because of the strong legitimacy Communist ISAs still enjoyed particularly in the rural areas, the Albanian Labor Party won the first democratic elections in a landslide. Benford and Snow define frames as the “constructive and elaborate scheme that simplifies the world out there.”30 They point out that social movements do not grow out of extant structures but actors are viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, opponents, and bystanders or observers.31 Hall adds that they (the contesting actors) are deeply embroiled, along with the media, local actors, and the state, in the “politics of signification”, or the construction of meaning.32 Tarrow argues that there are three ways in which framing is central: (1) as a simplified version of the common beliefs; (2) to define, crystallize, and construct collective identities; and (3) in fomenting and sustaining emotional connection for all.33 The objective of the leaders is to build solidarity among the participants and strengthen their resolve, but also to construct common grievances. Tarrow emphasizes the role of “performances” which are defined as both substantial and ideological.34 In other words, constructing the meaning of collective grievances and solutions through framing is of central importance to the success of a social movement, because of the building of solidarity especially from a nationalist standpoint. Similarly, Johnston and Oliver (2000) and Benford and Snow (2000) note that there is a clear distinction between ideology and the framing of social movements in contentious politics. They talk about collective action frames that help interpret the world for the masses not only to explain what the world is about, but also to help mobilize support for the objectives and the outcomes of the movement through what Gamson et al. (1992: 11) have called “negotiation of shared meaning.”35

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Thus, if we adopt an Althusserian viewpoint of ideology, the group of ideas that form the ideology of social movements are constantly being reinforced and made meaningful by entrepreneurial leaders to represent the participants’ conscious and unconscious social goals, aspirations, and grievances. The appeal to the achievement of national goals thus becomes the unifying factor for the movement and it ensures homogeneity of action and of purpose. Because, as we described in the previous section, there are three distinct interpretations of the Movement, each giving a different ideological explanation, the framing of the shared meaning of the political objectives becomes an important aspect of study in order to define the identity of the Movement. It is important to note here that the Student Movement leaders used a nationalist repertoire of mobilization techniques such as calling on the citizens to rise in the name of the nation,36 for workers and peasants to join them in a common national cause, and used national symbols devoid of Communist insignia.37 Moreover, as Halili and Rama document, there was clear ideological continuity between Albanian student movements in Kosova in 1968, 1981, and 1989, and the Student Movement improved on its predecessors’ repertoire. As Tarrow reminds us, frames should not be viewed as “text” but within their proper political, structural, and economic contexts.38 In other words, the Student Movement’s case demonstrates that when the framing mechanism fails to function in its entirety, i.e., to not only build and sustain solidarity and create a collective identity through framing but also penetrate into the ISAs, the social movement fails at least in part to achieve its objectives. Despite framing its action through nationalist goals that were shared by a majority of the people, building solidarity for a hunger strike, and despite its success at undermining the legitimacy of Communist ISAs, it failed to gain full control of ideological institutions. In time, its adversaries coopted and deviated its message until the Movement withered away and leadership were forced to leave.39 The Student Movement did not result in widespread repression or revolution. It did reform the system, although many observers including Abrahams, Rama, and others have argued, correctly in my view, that the transformation occurred under the approving gaze of the Communist authorities which had realized that the Communist system could not survive. However, as Rama and Halili remind us, the Communist elites and the Student Movement leadership had different ideas about what was to follow.40 The elites wanted a soft transformation without structural change, whereas student leadership aimed at building a nation-state. Grievances and Cohesive Action of the Student Movement Another aspect that provides crucial insights into the factors that help to explain the ideological direction and nationalist framing used by the Student Movement in Albania is the expression of grievances. Tilly distinguishes

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between three sorts of claims advanced by social movements: identity, standing, and program claims.41 Identity claims declare that “we”—the claimants—constitute a unified force to be reckoned with. The identity claims of the Student Movement were evident in all the phases of the Movement, from the early phase of protest seeking political pluralism in the democratic framework to the later stages of demystification of the Communist dictator Enver Hoxha and the removal of his name from state institutions including the university.42 The students forcefully safeguarded their independence and unity of purpose and action through democratically electing representatives to conduct negotiations with the Communist President Ramiz Alia over political pluralism.43 Moreover, despite disagreements among various factions and attempts at cooptation by the newly born DP, the students remained united in their nationalist objectives before, and more importantly during, the crucial period of the hunger strike.44 Because of this level of ideological and organizational cohesion and coherence, various tricks employed by the regime through its envoys failed. In addition, the Student Movement became the representation for all different strata of society who did not have the organization nor the clear ideological purposes the student leadership demonstrated. Standing claims assert ties and similarities to other political actors, for example as excluded minorities, established traders, properly constituted citizens’ groups, or loyal supporters of the regime.45 Although Albania was a strong and violently repressive Communist state, the Student Movement sought to coopt and attract parts of the elites including state officials and the army. For example, former DP leader and creator Sali Berisha notes that during the most volatile part of the protests in the early stages, the Communist regime’s reactionary instincts were limited at least in part by the fact that most of the protesters were the sons and daughters of medium- to high-level Nomenclatura officials.46 Thus, the collective identity that the Student Movement leadership promoted and sustained was the nationalist one and the political outcome that was sought was a nation-state. Furthermore, many extant organizations, the most prominent among them the National Union Syndicate, but also the Student Association of Kosova, joined or supported the Student Movement’s cause and became crucial allies during the period of the hunger strike increasing.47 In the case of the Student Movement, in time the frames that defined the ideological direction of the Movement were inspired by the values and notions of the Albanian National Renaissance which resonated widely among the students. For instance, as Abrahams, Krasniqi, and others have noted, when students at Student City started protesting, their demands and their objectives were neither coherent nor particularly political. The leadership that emerged directed the processes and built a collective identity through nationalistic frames such as replacing the authoritarian Communist regime with a democratic modern nation-state. With respect to program frames, defined by Tilly as stated support for or opposition to actual or

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proposed actions by the objects of movement claims, the relation between nationalistic and democratic goals within the Student Movement bears exploring. According to our current knowledge of events, there was no apparent tension between those who advocated for democracy first and those who came from a nationalist viewpoint. Rather, the tension appeared among those who accepted cooptation from renegade elites and the ideological purists. Despite some of the achievements of the Movement, and the resistance of some of the leadership, ultimately most students chose cooptation and accommodation rather than to continue the ideological fight.

Albanian Nationalism and the Student Movement This section examines the evidence and analyzes the action of the leadership of the Student Movement as it relates to the outcomes the Movement achieved. The main question this part seeks to answer is whether there were any manifestations of a clear nationalist ideology that underlay the Student Movement, and if there were, what does the evidence demonstrate? It bears repeating here that there is not much available written material, and there are not many studies based on archival sources. Hence, we have to fill the gap by referring to the studies of participants such as Llukman Halili, Afrim Krasniqi, Blendi Fevziu, Aleksander Meksi, and Luljeta Progni, and written or oral testimonies by leading participants such as Shinasi A. Rama, Edvin Shvarc, Mimoza Ferraj, Izet Haxhiaj, Sali Berisha, Eduard Selami, and Arben Imami. There are several interesting findings that emerge. There are three distinct events where the nationalist platform emerges within the framework of action of the leadership of the Student Movement: (1) the student platform of reform of the state, (2) the political platform of the DP, and (3) the shattering of the myth of Enver Hoxha. In the first phase, students were mobilized under the slogans “Come gather here for the nation,” and “Either Death or Freedom” which were slogans of the Albanian Renaissance and the League of Prizren. Despite tremendous pressure by the state to accommodate a China-like transition to a state-controlled nominal pluralism, some student leaders insisted on real political pluralism. According to Halili, student leader Azem Hajdari declared to Alia during the meeting on December 11th that “he supported the party’s reforms and wanted to subscribe the Young Student and Intellectual organization to the February elections.”48 However, one of the leaders of the Group of Shkodra, Shinasi Rama, made the forceful argument that political pluralism has run through Albania and has been the practice among Albanians since the time of our national hero Gjergj Kastrioti in the 1400s, and the only interruption was during the Communist regime.49 Rama also verbally sparred with some of the intellectuals that were present who attempted to maintain Alia’s line.50 In the second phase, the platform of the DP was important because the first opposition party in decades placed the focus on the solution of the National Question, which included Kosova and other Albanian lands outside

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the borders. In addition, Sali Berisha, who emerged as the leader of the regime intellectuals who took the reins of the DP with the quiet consensus of the existing elites, has declared that, “as I declared in my first speech to the party, the National Question is my star, and my reason for entering the DP was the issue of Kosova.”51 However, in that speech he also praised the Communist leader Alia, declared that he was “an ally of the students and not a leader of the party,” and was booed vociferously off the stage.52 According to some accounts, Berisha was the envoy of Alia and other regime leaders to lead the students away from their original objectives.53 Similarly, despite later compromises, Azem Hajdari gained his legitimacy among the students by declaring himself a supporter of Kosova but during crucial moments acted in accordance with Alia’s wishes. So, the nationalist framing did not come from those who coopted the Movement or were coopted by the regime intellectuals. It came as a result of the reaffirmed nationalist collective frame that the Student Movement leadership had been sustaining for weeks. Interestingly, after the constitution of the DP and the cooptation of some of the leaders including Hajdari, the DP’s stance changed. Before and during the hunger strike to remove Hoxha’s name, the DP’s official stance was not to support the strike. Moreover, as Rama notes, Hajdari attempted to get the students out of the strike by a rudimentary ruse, which was promptly sniffed out by the strike’s leaders.54 Finally, the third phase was conceived by the Student Movement leadership as the only way to avoid bloodshed and civil war, which became part of the reached objectives of the Movement.55 What is striking here is that the idea of nationalism was a source of mobilization not only for the genuinely nationalist leadership of the Movement (The Group of Shkodra) but also for some student leaders such as Azem Hajdari who became the provisional leader of the DP. Hajdari had been one of the most accommodating actors during the meeting with Alia in the President’s Palace. According to Meksi’s transcription of the meeting, Hajdari had told Alia, “those who make the victory sign, do not work for the good of the country, comrade Ramiz.”56 Politically shrewd, Hajdari had realized that he needed to legitimize his leadership through adopting the nationalistic rhetoric of his fellow Student Movement leaders. Both Sali Berisha and Azem Hajdari used nationalist rhetoric to gain the trust of the mass of students and to legitimize themselves at various points. For instance, in his speech on December 13th, Berisha appealed to the students to honor President Alia who “led our people in the national antifascist struggle and demonstrated the same leadership during these difficult times for the Albanian nation.” Moreover, according to Arben Imami, the reason Berisha gave for staying at Student City after he was rejected by the Student Movement leadership was “to contribute for my nation.”57 Thus, it seems clear that the Student Movement had been crystalized as a Student Movement inspired by nationalistic political goals, that aimed at transforming the system without destroying the state and above all avoiding any bloodshed.

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One of the ideological phenomena that has been overlooked in the evidence is the strong influence on the northern students (the Shkodra Group but also others) from Kosova protests in 1981 in Prishtine and in 1990 in the case of the hunger strike of the miners of Trepca.58 Despite the isolation of Albania vis-à-vis the outside world, some student leaders had indepth knowledge of the processes and the actors in those movements. Particularly the influence of Rexhep Qosja was felt at a personal level for some of the leaders, as there were direct contacts with other leaders of the national movement in Kosova and in the protest movements as well. This proximity of goals and objectives was reflected in the contentious repertoire that the Student Movement adopted. The attempt to bring the protest from the isolated venue of Student City to the heart of the capital on December 9th was a clear sign that the student leadership wanted to mobilize the nation against the regime and had clear goals.59 Another overlooked part of the evidence demonstrates the clarity of the Student Movement leadership on the national agenda. An example of the ideology sustaining the Movement came on December 20th at the Dinner at Hotel Dajti in Tirana. In a meeting with Zekeria Cana, an academic from Kosova who had been sent to talk to student leadership, the Student Movement representatives insisted that the national anthem be sung despite the fact that Cana was at the time a citizen of Yugoslavia and was not keen to be seen as a supporter of nationalistic goals in Kosova.60 The Student Movement used nationalist slogans and mobilization techniques throughout its existence. From its inception it sought to create a national platform based on a national renaissance and eschewing cleavages based on class, regional, cultural, and political distinctions. For instance, during the incident at the Military Academy when students and demonstrators came dangerously close to starting a civil conflict, the DP, which at the time included six leaders of the Student Movement in its leading committee, called on: all the sons and daughters of the Albanian people serving in the military, to refrain from rising against your brothers and sisters … and not use the weapons that were given to you by the Albanian people to defend the Albanian nation in order to suit the appetites of a minority who want to shoot over innocent Albanians.61 Moreover, during the days leading to the hunger strike, the Student Movement leadership struck a crucial strategic alliance with the General Union in order to unify the people against the myth of Enver Hoxha. It was that national solidarity that made it impossible for the regime to defend the statue by force and preserve an immense ideological obstacle to the transformation of the regime and the state. Regardless of the path that Albania took afterwards, all leading personalities of the Movement were inspired by nationalist ideology. In interviews and

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memoirs, all recount that the primary reason for joining the Movement was at least in part the National Question. Thus, if we examine carefully the totality of the available evidence, there are ten specific events that demonstrate the nationalistic affinities of the Student Movement: (1) the call to arms was an old nationalist song of the Renaissance; (2) very early in the protests the appearance of the starless flag as a symbol of Albanian unity; (3) the Movement’s platform for political pluralism within the context of a nation-state, a pre-taste of which was offered by the organization of the first free elections among the student body; (4) the constant engagement of student leadership to avoid a civil war and bloodshed; (5) the call for workers and intellectuals to join the Movement as a symbol of national unity vis-à-vis the regime (the December 9th failed demonstration); (6) the adoption of the nationalist contentious repertoire used by student movements in Kosova, in 1968, 1981, and in Trepca 1989, as well as starting the hunger strike on a corresponding date with those movements as a symbol of unity of purpose; (7) the establishment of contacts with former student leaders and ideological leaders of the nationalist movement in Kosova and exchange of experiences; (8) influencing the platform of the DP to reflect national goals and objectives—importantly this fact is confirmed by Arben Imami’s interview in 2012 stating that “the major goal of the intellectuals was to achieve a bloodless transformation of the political system” and that “this fact explained why in the first program of the DP the national question was central”;62 (9) the fight to shatter the myth and the personal cult of Enver Hoxha; and (10) the failure of the intellectuals to become part of their mission, which ultimately caused the dissolution of the leading structures and the Movement. After assuming the leadership, the intellectuals deviated the Student Movement leadership’s project and either coopted or eliminated leading student figures from the party, causing the DP to veer away from the ideological framework of the Movement. As a result, the Movement withered, most of its nationalist leaders went into exile, and the DP continued its incompatible path with student aspirations.

Conclusion The evidence presented in this chapter and all the facts that are available to date demonstrate that the Albanian Student Movement was a social movement with a clear organizational structure, an ideological platform based on the Albanian National Renaissance, clear leadership lines, and was independent from the regime. It adopted a nationalist program and framed its action on these nationalistic goals throughout its two and a half months of existence. The other two hypotheses that were presented at the beginning of the chapter are not supported by the available evidence. While there is some evidence that the Communist regime attempted to coopt, infiltrate, and deviate the Student Movement, none of it indicates that the Movement (1) was created by the regime, and (2) served as a puppet to the regime’s goals.

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Moreover, there are at least two crucial moments when the Movement’s framing of grievances pushed the regime to relent: (1) the adoption of a real multiparty democratic system with guarantees for individual and human rights, instead of the China-style pluralistic organizations system they had envisioned and sought to install; and (2) the shattering of Enver Hoxha’s myth which destroyed the Communist regime’s legitimacy and forced the regime to relinquish power in 1992. So, the idea that the Student Movement was a tool of the regime for a soft landing is not supported by the overwhelming majority of the available evidence. Similarly, the notion that the ideological background of the Student Movement was liberal democracy is undermined by the contradictory statements of some of its supporters. There are several published versions, and some are missing crucial facts completely, such as the failed demonstration of December 9th, while others are obvious attempts at politicking. Sali Berisha’s own version has changed accordingly. In 2004, his statements seemed to indicate that the students were rudderless and had no idea what they sought, and only the intervention of the intellectuals saved the day and brought along democracy.63 However, later on he seems to have changed his version, stating in a 2016 interview that “democracy is the product of only one factor, the students and only the students.”64 On the other hand, the role of Hajdari as the leader of the liberal democratic wing among students is undermined by the accounts of some of the participants who credit the intellectuals with leading the way, as well as by the Meksi transcripts of the Alia conversation discussed in this chapter. More documentary evidence is necessary to assess Hajdari’s role in the Movement post-December; however, it is clear from what we know so far that there are blatant contradictions among those who ascribe a liberal democratic ideological direction to the Student Movement. Considering the emerging evidence of a historical continuum with other nationalist movements, as well as the existing evidence of a nationalist ideological direction of the Movement, especially during crucial moments, a strong case can be made that the Student Movement is the first nationalist social movement in Albania after World War II. The most salient evidence based on the ideological affinity with other national movements is from Llukman Halili, but it is also confirmed by snippets of evidence coming from Meksi, Progni, Krasniqi, and some of the participants’ memoirs. That contemporaneous accounts seem to confirm this hypothesis only lends more credence to the assertion. More primary documentary sources will become available in the years to come, and they will allow for a more thorough analysis of the ideological phenomena that characterized the Student Movement. It will be interesting to examine the documentation that the Ministry of Interior has about internal communications among state institutions during the time, which remain classified. Considering how the Communist state was security strong, and had an extended network of informers, this information could shed some important

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light on these events. However, even with the evidence we have, it seems clear that nationalist ideology inspired and guided the Student Movement. Another decisive factor that informs my conviction that the Student Movement in Albania was guided by nationalist ideology is the framing that the Student Movement leadership used to express its goals. The list of requests the students presented to Ramiz Alia on December 11th was not simply a political one, but aimed at transforming the state into a nationstate. The slogans that were used to mobilize the students and the other strata of society, the platform of the DP, the request to remove Hoxha’s name, etc., were not liberal grievances but nationalistic ones. They were made not in the name of capitalism but of free Albania. Furthermore, the inclusion of the “unresolved issue of Kosova” in the speeches and ultimately in the DP platform indicates that student leadership intended to continue framing their political action by sustaining the nationalistic collective identity they had created during the protests. It was only with the advent of an intellectual-led DP that these goals were abandoned. The main slogan the students used, which lived on as a DP rallying cry, was “let’s make Albania like the rest of Europe.” Some observers have interpreted that as an unconscious desire, expressed ideologically, to be a member of the European Community (EC; now European Union). However, in 1991 there was no realistic chance that Albania would join the EC, and that assertion begs the question by assuming that students had no idea what they were asking for. The evidence points to exactly the contrary. Student leadership, especially the nationalistic group, were clear about asking for real democracy and not China-style state-controlled elections, like some of the intellectuals eagerly seemed to accept. Student leadership did not stop protesting the name of the university, even though the newly born DP did not support them openly because it had made a deal with the Communist Party. Student leadership did not accept the ruse of dividing the university without formally renouncing Enver Hoxha’s name, correctly predicting that such a change would not destroy the myth and free several strata among the elites to abandon the regime. Thus, it does not seem that student leadership were either naïve, or unlearned about political contention or pluralistic systems. Thus, it seems more plausible that “making Albania like the rest of Europe” meant that their aim was to create an Albanian nation-state, like the rest of the European nations that were members of the EC. In conclusion, nationalistic ideology was a fundamental element of the Movement, and therefore we need to reevaluate the Movement from this optic through the evidence that was ignored prior to now. The Student Movement did not achieve its objective of creating a consolidated nationstate in Albania. However, it did achieve many of its objectives including political transformation without any bloodshed. Tarrow notes that even defeated or suppressed movements leave some kind of residue behind them, and that the effect of social movements, successful or failed, is cumulative in

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the long term, leading to new protest cycles. This is visible especially when those cycles are analyzed in the historical frame. As Tilly reminds us, prior to the eighteenth century, rebellions were usually aimed at local targets in response to local grievances, usually without many preparations and without allies in different social or ethnic groups. This however changed in the eighteenth century, when social movements evolved in West Europe and North America.66 The Student Movement leadership was very aware of that and sought to overcome that challenge. As one of the student leaders, Shinasi Rama, declared in an interview with Radio Radicale in Italy in 1991, “We the leadership, did not want to repeat Europe’s mistakes.”67 It is my conclusion that the student leadership sought to create a democratic nation-state that protected the interests of, and represented, all Albanians. They framed their political action through nationalistic symbols reminiscent of the National Renaissance, they used nationalistic mobilization techniques used by their brethren in Kosova, and they adopted nationalistic language to maintain cohesion within the Movement. The Student Movement failed at this objective because their cause was not shared by the intellectuals who assumed control of the DP and led it in a completely different ideological direction.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

(Rakipi, 2011). (Rama, 2015: 4). (Rama, 2015: 7). (Halili, 2015: 33–35). (Meksi, 2015). (Rama, 2015: 7–8). (Rama, 2015: 7–8). (Huntington, 1991: 588). (Progni, 2015). (Pëllumbi, 2015). (Abrahams, 2015). (Pëllumbi, 2015; Rroji, 2013). (Rama, 2015: 9–11). (Halili, 2015: 203). (Fevziu, 2012; Zogaj, 2014). (Della Porta, 2015: 213). (O’Donnell et al., 1986: 14). (Elster, 1982: 123–148). (Eagleton, 1991: 14). (Eagleton, 1991: 28). (Althusser, 1971). (Eagleton, 1991: 30). (Della Porta, 2015: 272). (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983: 269). (Snyder, 2000). (Fearon and Latin, 2000). (Della Porta, 2015: 276). (Cited in Della Porta, 2015: 276).

164 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

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(Cited in Della Porta, 2015: 276). (Benford and Snow, 2000: 611–639). (Benford and Snow, 2000: 611–639). (Hall, 1980: 57–72). (Tarrow, 2011: 140). (Tarrow, 2011: 142). (Benford and Snow, 2000: 613). (Rama, 2015; Halili, 2015; Fevziu, 2012). (Fevziu, 2012). (Tarrow, 2011: 156). (Halili, 2015). (Halili, 2015). (Tilly, 2004). (Rama, 2015: 93). (Fevziu, 2012). (Fevziu, 2012; Halili, 2015). (Tilly, 2004: 34). (Berisha, 2016a). (Fevziu, 2012). (Halili, 2015: 121). (Halili, 2015: 121–122). (Halili, 2015: 121–122). (Berisha, 2016a). (Halili, 2015: 126). (Halili, 2015: 127). (Rama, 2015: 113). (Rama, 2015: 137). (Meksi, 2015: 29). (Progni, 2015). (Rama, 2015; Halili, 2015). (Rama, 2015: 130). (Rama, 2015). (Halili, 2015). (Progni, 2015). (Rama, 2015: 61). (Berisha, 2016a). (Tarrow, 2011: 8). (Tilly, 2004). Shinasi Rama, Interview with Radio Radicale, http://www.radioradicale.it/sog getti/33132/shinasi-rama (accessed January 24th, 2017).

Bibliography Abrahams, Fred. 2015. Modern Albania: From Dictatorship to Democracy. New York: The NYU Press. Althusser, Louis. 1971. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an Investigation.” In Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. New York: Monthly Review Press. Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. 2000. “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment.” Annual Review of Sociology 26: 611–639. Berisha, Sali. 2016a. “Kosova është e lirë falë luftës së Ibrahim Rugovës (Video).” Gazeta Express, February 3rd. Available at: https://www.gazetaexpress.com/

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intervista/sali-berisha-kosova-eshte-e-lire-fale-luftes-se-ibrahim -rugoves-video-165025/ Berisha, Sali. 2016b. “21 Janari, Berisha në Top Story: Rama s’do ishte gjallë.”Top Story, Top Channel TV, December 12th. Available at: http://top-channel.tv/2016/ 12/12/21-janari-berisha-ne-top-story-rama-sdo-ishte-gjalle/ Brokaj, Sabit. 2016. “Dokumenti Nga Moska Për Enverin Për Dështimin E Komunizmit.” Interview with Aristir Lumezi. Gazeta Shqiptare, August 29th. Available at: https://www.balkanweb.com/brokaj-dokumenti-nga-moska-perenverin-mbi-deshtimin-e-komunizmit/ Della Porta, Gabriella. 2015. Mobilizing for Democracy: Comparing 1989 and 2011. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eagleton, Terry. 1991. Ideology: An Introduction. London: Verso, 14. Elster, Jon. 1982. “Belief, Bias and Ideology.” In Rationality and Relativism, edited by Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 123–148. Fearon, James D. and David D. Latin. 2000. “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Conflict.” International Organization 54(4): 845–877. Fevziu, Blendi. 2012. Piedestale pa Statuja. Tiranë: UET Press. Gamson, William A., David Croteau, William Hoynes, and Theodore Sasson. 1992. “Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality.” Annual Review of Sociology 18: 373–393. Halili, Llukman. 2015. Lëvizja studentore dhe tranzicioni i Shqipërisë, 1990–1992. Tiranë: Botimet Princi. Hall, Stuart. 1980. “Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms.” Media, Culture & Society 2 (1): 57–72. Huntington, Samuel. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Johnston, Hank and Pamela Oliver. 2000. “Mobilization Forum: Reply to Snow and Benford.” Mobilization 5(1): 61–64. Meksi, Aleksandër. 2015. Dhjetori 90’, Dokumente & Materiale. Tiranë: Botimet MAPO. O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Pëllumbi, Servet. 2015. Përmbysja e Komunizmit. Tiranë: UET Press. Progni, Luljeta. 2015. Pardesytë e Bardha, Dhjetori 90. Tiranë: Botimet MAPO. Rakipi, Albert. 2011. “Elez Biberaj, Një Histori Politike E Tranzicionit.” MAPO, October 7th: 19. Available at: http://lajme.shqiperia.com/lajme/artikull/iden/ 1047114534/titulli/Elez-Biberaj-nje-histori-politike-e-tranzicionit. Rama, Shinasi A. 1991. “Elezioni in Albania: la vincita del Partito Comunista.” Interview, Radio Radicale, April 24th. Available at: http://www.radioradicale.it/ soggetti/33132/shinasi-rama. Rama, Shinasi A. 2015. Për Lëvizjen Studentore Shqiptare. Tiranë: Botimet Princi. Rokkan, Stein and Derek W. Urwin. 1983. The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism. London: Sage Publications. Rroji, Grid. 2013. “Replikë mbi Parinë e Katovicës.” Rrethi I Ferrit, October 19th. Available at: https://shinasi.wordpress.com/2013/10/19/grid-rroji-replike-mbi-pa rine-e-katovices-2/ Snyder, Jack. 2000. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York: Norton.

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Tarrow, Sydney. 2011. Power in Movements, 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, Charles. 2004. Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zogaj, Prec. 2014. Fillimet, 2nd ed. Tiranë: UET Press.

7

Considerations On The Leadership Dynamics In The First Stage Of The Transition In Albania Valbona Karanxha

In this chapter I review the process of change during the very first stage of the transition in Albania. By applying the theory of change by Kurt Lewin, the chapter examines the leadership interactions and dynamics during this period and the implications for change. My core argument is that the Student Movement assumed the transitional leadership and became the primary force for the innovation of the system. I show that the intellectuals were not even early adapters. They refused to rise to the occasion when they met with Ramiz Alia only a few weeks earlier, but very opportunistically became his instrument to take over the newly emerging opposition and take control of it after the students demanded and won the establishment of pluralism. I show how the intellectuals and Ramiz Alia joined forces and marginalized the Student Movement’s transformational leadership to the point that they closed the university and eliminated it entirely as a relevant actor in the political process.

Unfreezing the System: The Overarching Destabilizing Factors Changes, whether small- or large-scale, go through stages. Theories attempt to define these steps and make them well distinct from one another. However, in practice, the cusps between the stages can hold traits and characteristics from the bordering phases of change. The key points between organizational change and the evolution of political movements are at cross-purposes frequently, especially when changes are revolutionary and the events are radical. Most organizational change scholars agree that the first phase of change is the realization by the stakeholders that the status quo must come to an end. Many also agree that the first stage encompasses a diagnosis of the problem, such as becoming aware of what it is that makes the existing system problematic and dysfunctional. They differ in their interpretations on how change takes place. One of the earliest models of organizational change is the model introduced by Kurt Lewin.1 This theory has been criticized, complemented, and improved but it still is considered one of the best explanations of change in leadership studies and organizational and group behavior. Lewin argued that, in any given system, the set of the determinant behaviors is the outcome of

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the interaction between two groups: those striving to maintain the status quo and those pushing for change. The group that seeks to preserve the status quo is defined as the restraining force. The group that seeks to change the order is called progressive forces. The leadership that under the given circumstances seeks to change the system is defined as agents of change. The dynamic of interaction is a major point of difference among theories. In his theory, for change to happen, Lewin maintained that the restraining forces must decrease and the moving forces must increase.2 Yet, the dynamic is different in political systems and business organizations and in social and political movements. In a political movement, the complexity of the occurring events can drift the change away in many directions because the resistance produced constantly by the restraining forces can modify the results of the model itself. Nevertheless, if the right strategies of diffusing the message are used in the beginning stages, Lewin argued that the results can be more or less predictable. Lewin defined the earliest stage for both planned and linear change as the unfreezing stage. Lewin focused on organizational theories. His model, however, can apply to the evolution of social movements as well. During this stage, he argued, there is a conscious awakening within the organization that change is needed or beneficial to the organization itself. In a political context, the interest groups identified as the moving forces start to realize that the quasi-stationary equilibrium between the forces must unfreeze.3 The balance between restraining and moving forces starts to rattle. The breakup of the adapting curve includes from left to right, in a spectrum, groups that accept or seek change to various degrees. Rogers introduced another theory that complements Lewin’s and that essentially argues that ideas about change are spread in what is known as diffusion of innovation. The argument is that there is the new idea, the channels through which it is communicated, time, and the social or political system. While all recognize the need for change, the adapters see different ways of applying it. The categories of adapters are groups that seek different kinds and degrees of change. The innovators are those who seek a radical overhaul of the system. Generally speaking, early adopters and the forces demanding reforms or change embrace the rhetoric of transformation early on.4 They identify the need for a new model or a new system, whether on a large organizational scale, or via small, systematic increments of success. Albania was a closed system. The ruling ideology did not accept change. The system was under outside pressure to rapidly change. The leadership of the state/system was unwilling to move on because of the immense strength of the restraining forces. This makes for a perfect case study. It is important to break up the sequences of change. In Albania, the beginning of this stage exhibited a set of behaviors initially thought to be isolated occurrences. In retrospect, it is clear that these occurrences were consistent and intensified rapidly in a period of six months, from July to December of 1990. Uncoordinated protests had preceded these events. For

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example, on January 14 , 1990 there was a demonstration that sought the removal of a statue of Joseph Stalin in Shkodra. Similarly, the people protested their living conditions in Kavaja in July 1990.5 These were among the clear first signs of popular discontent and disagreement with the system. External factors also influenced the speeding up of events. As Prec Zogaj notes, the January events in Shkodra were inspired by a meeting between diplomats and people who had family relatives outside Albania. The embassy crisis of July 1990 was inspired by other mass walk-ins, of East German tourists, inside the West German Embassy in Budapest and other Eastern European countries. In the meeting with the intellectuals, in August 1990, Ramiz Alia states that The Voice of America and Belgrade Radio had announced the opening of the embassies in Tirana on June 26th. 6 This had given the people the idea that they could walk into the embassies in Tirana. Over 5000 people did just that in a matter of days. The regime claimed that during the summer of 1990, diplomats and foreigners in Albania had been meddling in internal affairs, seeking to incite discontent. Alia claimed that these actions were coordinated by outside intelligence agencies with help from their supporters inside the country. Since these incidents involved diplomatic entities, Alia did not respond other than following diplomatic protocols and procedures. There were no indications yet of any organized movement. The incident in the German Embassy prior to the embassy crisis was a clear message that Alia was under pressure to speed up the democratic reforms. This became a debatable matter in the meeting of Ramiz Alia with the intellectuals. In the meeting of Alia with the intellectuals, one of the doctors reported that the German Embassy had brought to the hospital a very sick individual shot by the Albanian Police. Ramiz Alia responded that: the individual drove and crashed his truck into the German Embassy and the Albanian Police shot him. The German security knocked the Albanian Police officer out and took his gun stating that he had entered their territory. [Alia stated that] a disciplinary action is on the way on behalf of the police officer and that he had been suspended. Along with him, a few high-ranking officials in the Ministry of the Interior have been suspended, among others the Vice-Minister of the Interior. Alia also mentioned that the person who broke into the embassy was in the custody of the German authorities. The person who drove the truck into the embassy died later as a result of their wounds.7 As the Socialist Bloc in Eastern Europe was falling apart, the breaking up of the Soviet Union and the turmoil in Rumania reminded the rest of the leaderships in the Soviet camp that intense social unrest was ahead.8 Economic hardship spread quickly, revealing the rotten shape of the centralized economy, the only source of food and provisions in many countries of

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Eastern Europe. A failed statist economy and the social and political unrest infuriated the masses, especially when food became scarce.9 The rapid change of mindset is especially striking in the case of Albania. The most significant change in the mindset of the people was accepting the reality as it was and not blindly believing the propaganda of the regime. The same people cheering with flowers and holding Hoxha’s portraits in the manifestations of May 1988 would topple his statue two years after. More than a change in ideology, it was a great awakening in the sense that the old system had failed. According to Rogers, we have to look for the signs of the failure of the system. The summer of 1990 found the majority of the Albanians living in extreme poverty. As Zichel and Iwaskiw note, “Hoxha’s decision to keep Albania isolated retarded the country’s technological growth to such an extent that it became economically inferior to all of its neighbors.”10 The population had little self-confidence and practically no confidence in the system’s ability to overcome the long isolation, or reform the economic system. This awareness was widespread among the intellectuals and the leadership as well. Communication, as Rogers notes, is important. The daily propaganda of the regime, spread through the State TV and the newspapers, spoon-fed the population unbelievable lies.11 The State TV, RTSH (Albanian Radio Television), remained the strongest diffusion mechanism, although it had long lost its credibility. The Albanians turned elsewhere for news. Ramiz Alia had a hard time—at least publicly—to rid the country of Enver Hoxha’s cult and to separate the cult from the state. Time is also important. In May 1990, Perez de Cuellar, the UN General Secretary, visited Albania and met with Alia. de Cuellar’s visit had many interpretations and it was seen as a green light given by the international community for the country to implement the reforms albeit at its own pace. Yet, they would not yield in expressing their concerns about the violation of human rights, which continued to worry the international community.12 After the visit of Perez de Cuellar, Alia had the chance to reflect about the predicament, but, given the strength of the restraining forces, he was discreet about his plans and his actions. Every move demanded extreme caution. The resistance from the Politburo was strong. The resistance from the political structures and the deep state, extremely loyal to Enver Hoxha, was formidable.13 The restraining forces thoroughly controlled the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Given the predicament, Alia refused to unfreeze the deadlock. Meanwhile, ignoring these pressures, the international community was pushing for the radical change of the system, i.e., democratic changes, including constitutional revisions, an end to human right violations, and an end to political imprisonment and persecution.14 The members of the Politburo, government officials, and the administration sought to protect the system at any cost. The Labor Party had solid roots in the capital city of Tirana and enjoyed substantial support in the south of the country. Their reluctance to change was also the result of

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fear of possible mass retaliation for the crimes committed during the regime. Politics and the economy were the two areas in which the longawaited changes were expected to happen. After Ramiz Alia failed to speed up the liberalization of the economy, or reform the economic system, the masses grew weary and expressed their anger at the regime, the growing poverty, the lack of basic needs, and the low living standards.15 To return to the events of unfreezing, on July 2nd, 1990, the embassies opened their gates. Approximately 4500 people flooded the German Embassy. Many others entered the Italian Embassy, the French, Greek, and even the Czech or the Turkish embassies. Others were seeking ways to leave the country by land.16 The frenzy to flee continued with a series of exoduses, mainly at the Greek border. A key important event in the process of unfreezing, that helps us see clearly where the innovators, adapters, and the restraining forces stood, was the meeting of Alia with a selected group of renowned and distinguished intellectuals of the capital. On August 10th, 1990, Ramiz Alia met with the leading intellectuals to discuss the situation in the aftermath of the embassy crises. Given the pressure from outside, Alia had in his mind the issue of the establishment of political pluralism. He wanted to test the waters and see whether or not the intellectuals would rise to the occasion and give even a single timid spark of demanding political pluralism. He was sorely disappointed. There were no innovators, or early adapters, in that meeting. The intellectuals, among others Sali Berisha, Luan Omari, Dritero Agolli, Ismail Kadare, Fahrudin Hoxha, Skender Gjinushi, Besnik Mustafaj, and Mumtaz Dhrami, voiced their concerns openly. Yet, they were talking only about cosmetic changes. In the aftershock of the embassy crisis, it was undeniable that the system was rattled. Despite Alia acknowledging that the system needed drastic changes, the intellectuals focused mainly on secondary concerns and issues. The “ghost” of Enver Hoxha was present in all of the party decisions and every decision made at state level and lower levels continued to reflect his ideology. The meeting is exceedingly important for another reason. It shows us how the intellectuals perceived the situation and how far they were willing to go. The concerns the intellectuals brought up had to do with gross propaganda lies, lack of information, police brutality, violation of human rights, the lack of professionalism from the secret services, the degradation of the press, the lack of freedom of information, corruption of government employees, use of public funds for personal services, and similar issues. Differently from others, and after talking about the extreme brutality of the secret service and state police, Sali Berisha suggested that, at that stage, the establishment of “pluralism of thought” was necessary for the country. This is significant for Berisha was not talking about the establishment of political pluralism or a multiparty system. When asked by Alia what were his thoughts about political pluralism, Berisha stated that, “We are not ready” for political pluralism. Clarifying further his point, he

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added that, “we can definitely implement the pluralism of thought and permit various organizations or associations mainly in the respective professional fields, but independent of the Labor Party [to be a part of the process].”17 Berisha was very convinced about his idea that pluralism of thought was what was needed. He suggested that the Voice of People (Albania’s Labor Party newspaper) should be a place where people could voice different opinions, not necessarily in agreement with the party line. At this point, Berisha was leaning more towards opening the door for civil liberties rather than implementing innovative political changes. Alia recognized immediately what Berisha was implying with this step. At the end of the meeting, Alia criticized the Albanian intelligence services as one of the most incompetent, de-institutionalized, and weakest of all state structures. By that, Alia meant that the Albanian intelligence services—those departments in charge of foreign relations—were accountable for the lack of information relating to the embassy crisis. He believed that interference from outside and other intelligence services had played a part in the crisis. In the final remarks, Alia reminded the intellectuals that their support for the Albanian Labor Party was crucial for survival against the attacks from the West.18 For the argument presented here, this event is crucial in identifying where the parties and interest groups stood. An important part of the change process is the people. Prior to the democratic changes, the isolationist policies had left the population in total darkness. The Albanian people felt isolated from the outside world and helpless; the events followed a pattern seen before in Eastern Europe. However, Albania was a very distinct case of totalitarianism. Mass mobilization in the summer of 1990 seemed far-fetched. The embassy crisis showed that people were pushed to act in isolation, individually and out of desperation. No organized group operated to coordinate the events and lead the masses. No one assumed a leadership role. Despite the growing discontent, the masses did not flood the streets yet, but the rhetoric had already started.19 In late September 1990, a very influential figure, the most renowned Albanian writer, Ismail Kadare, defected and petitioned for political asylum in France. From there he issued statements in favor of democratization and against the regime. Rexhep Qosja states that Ismail Kadare’s motivation might have been the result of the Albanian Government’s reluctance to speed up the democratization of the country. He condemned Kadare’s defection, emphasizing that the presence of Ismail Kadare in Albania at that time was vital for Albania and Kosovo, which was suffering under the tyranny of Serbia. In fact, Ismail Kadare’s defection could well have been related to the restrictions on his creativity as a writer under the dictatorship. Probably, and genuinely, he believed that freedom elsewhere would give him the opportunity to express himself and get recognition for his talent. Many of his prior novels were laudatory of the system. Kadare idolized Enver Hoxha in his work, contributing to the building of the cult-state. His defection sent shock waves around the country.

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th

About ten weeks later, on December 8 , 1990, the students arose in protests at the Student City. Students demanded better living conditions, but the issues that had brought the situation to that point were deeper. The altercation incident on the same night worried the government officials. The signs warned of a possible wider turmoil. The students’ riots were the embryo of an organized political movement that took over the challenge to confront the old system, its practices, the ideology, the policies, citizens’ participation in the decision-making process, and representation. In his own words, Sali Berisha states: The December movement was a hurricane of ideals. If you ask me to describe it … it was a hurricane of the purest human ideals. The December movement achieved—in the most extreme conditions, the avoidance of bloodshed which was of a high value. Do not forget, a week after the founding of the Democratic Party, Ramiz Alia declared us as the party of the enemy. Let’s talk about the secret service known as Sigurimi. Someone may think that Enver Hoxha’s secret service wanted to self-destroy itself. This would be the most ridiculous pretention. They were already in power. However, to pretend that they did not infiltrate their own people in the movement, it is ridiculous. Every secret service—unquestionably—tries to infiltrate their own people in a political movement to obtain information. The files are there, who was under their surveillance and what they did. But did they dictate the path of the events? Absolutely not! And there is the history of the Democratic Party. Thinking that the students were infiltrated by the secret service, it is the lowest of the calumnies.20 The confrontation of December 8th at the Student City was followed immediately by the student protesting on December 9th in downtown Tirana. The uproar revealed the struggle between the students, the secret services, and the police, in order to save a lingering system from collapsing. It was the genesis of a power struggle, a face-off between the state and the students.21 The students became the innovators of change that had not been present to that point.

What Was to Be Changed? The Student Movement and the Albanian State The idea of the state changes from system to system. To better understand the concept of a totalitarian system, one has to consider the relationship between the state and the people it governs or rules. The power of the state is in the hands of those who use it as an instrument to fulfill a role and duties based on pre-recognized, well-established principles and structures. The state is an organization and a bureaucratic entity. It is important to remember Aristotle’s postulate that despotic power allows the government to treat its citizens as slaves. Here, the state does not acknowledge any of

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the citizens’ rights. This relationship is, of course, a one-way relationship and benefits the state only. In the Albanian context, until 1985 the unquestionable authority was vested in the Albanian Labor Party. As its spiritual leader, the real authority was vested in Enver Hoxha. To the Albanians, Hoxha was an omnipotent figure and the foundation of the system. Hoxha placed himself above ideology, yet used the ideology as an instrument to rule and punish. He ruled in his interest and in the interest of those people who believed in his ideology. He used physical and psychological violence on any individuals and groups who opposed or contradicted him and did not share his views or his preconceived values. The Albanian state was accountable for the execution—with or without a trial—of over 5000 political opponents in the period of 50 years that Hoxha was in power. Hundreds of thousands lived without parole in internment camps or deeply rural areas in punishment for years and generations.22 The stigmatizing, disenfranchising, and marginalizing of approximately 100,000 Albanians, that even in 1990 were living in internment camps, is a testimony of the cruelty that the state used to control the rest of the population. Many died of diseases caused by the harsh living conditions. In 1985 after Hoxha’s death, the power shifted from Enver Hoxha to the party. The party, then, provided the ideological guidance and inspiration to the state structures. Ideology, presented in his numerous works, was central to the functioning of the regime. Ramiz Alia—the leader handpicked to continue Hoxha’s legacy—used the state structure to rule but leaned heavily on the ideology and on the party as a guardian of Hoxha’s thought.23 When Alia took power, many thought that the direction of the country would change. This was not the case. First, Alia was always a Communist and a believer in the socialist system, but more lenient and shrewd than Hoxha. Understanding the power of ideology over the people and the rigidity it imposed on the system, Alia realized that the system would collapse once people stopped believing in the ideology itself. So he used everything in the ideological arsenal to justify the worsening conditions, for example, blaming the foreign blockade. However, after the poverty reached new levels, and as people were noticing the rising corruption and inefficiencies, he was not able to sell it anymore. He was aware of the deep crisis. Alia inherited a system that he thought he could improve just by recognizing the failures, but he failed to recognize that the system had crumbled down and reforming it from within would be just as good as treating cancer with aspirin. Alia continued the hardline policies up to the late 1980s, but forced by international factors sought to reform the country economically to avoid falling into utter collapse.24 Having said that, even in 1990, the Albanian state continued to have strong bureaucratic structures, secret services, and layers of administrative systems that were very effective, loyal, and functional. The administrative state was functioning extremely well. Strategically, it had

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the means to crush every upheaval through the use of force, the military, and the police. The state as a bureaucratic entity determines the adequate response in a crisis.25 Due to its impeccable structures, the Albanian state had all the capacities and resources to exert coercion upon social or political movements. Ramiz Alia had verbally stated that the use of violence on the citizens was prohibited, and he was against the use of police force on citizens.26

From Unfreezing to Reform: Alia and the Problem of the Student Movement Lewin argues that the final point of unfreezing is the moment when all the agents of change reveal their strategies. The reform or change becomes unavoidable. The factor that precipitated the shift from unfreezing to reform was neither the intellectuals, nor Alia or other interest groups but the Student Movement. Alia had enormous power and he had to handle this problem to implement the reforms that were needed. Many have argued that the Student Movement, far from being a political movement, was a short-lived series of student riots in search of better living conditions.27 By December 11th, 1990, during the student meeting, Alia had granted political pluralism as the students had asked. That night, students walked out of the meeting with political pluralism in their hands and headed to the Student City to plan the founding of the newest political structure. This is a very sketchy description of its role and the momentum that it generated particularly for the reforms that Alia subsequently was to implement. A major problem for Alia was the students and their Movement. I deal with this issue later on. Another much more pressing problem for Alia was the handling of the dynamic that was generated by the class warfare. If the system collapsed or changed faster than it should, or if it were not managed properly, then the clash of political groups and classes was unavoidable. The class warfare had divided the Albanian people into seemingly irreconcilable groups defined by reciprocal hate and prejudice. Thus, the mutual hatred along with the collapse of the structures would launch an open civil war. For this and for other reasons, Alia believed that the Student Movement must be controlled and contained in the Student City to avoid spreading in the capital city of Tirana. As the student leadership, as I show later, split into three groups, the disruption and the fragmentation of the Student Movement became a reality. Alia managed to fracture the Movement from the inside. Targeting the consistency factor and the lack of a unified leadership, Alia decided to suspend the academic year 1990–1991, closed the Student City center, and dispersed all the students by sending them to their hometowns.28 This solved the problem of the Student Movement but it was too late. By then, clearly, the Movement had successfully challenged the system at least at two critical points. The students were on the opposite side from the state when it came to law-and-order agency. The Movement forced the state to

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show its power and use it ruthlessly.29 The Albanian state, especially the secret services, worked behind the scenes and served as the main structure to minimize the impact and prohibit a greater outbreak of the social conflict. They infiltrated their own agents among the students to break them apart. It seems that they were very successful. The state did not use excessive violence or deepen the conflict. It limited its actions in trying to prevent the spread of the social upheaval. Avoiding a civil war and the eruption of an armed conflict were the paramount objectives of Alia. This required that even after the formation of the opposition, the state would use all means to keep the situation at Student City isolated from other parts of the capital. The government focus on the Student City continued until late February 1991.

Agents of Change Transformational leadership emerges from necessity at critical times and after the realization that changes are necessary and that the status quo is no longer tolerable. Transformational leadership identifies with the social class or the interest group that seeks changes on many levels and to many structures, whether political, economy, judicial, or constitutional.30 In this case it was the students. There is a duality in the relationship between transformational leadership and the masses. This duality is seen clearly in their distinct perceptions of the future. The relationship between the transformational leaders and the masses is established based on a common cause and shared values. This relationship between the transformational leadership and the people can be quite risky, especially when the goal is to get people in the community to address a deeply felt issue.31 The more delicate the issue is, the higher are the chances that the people will silence the transformational leadership when pushed to face the problem. The role of the transformational leaders is to reach an understanding of various perspectives among parties and improvise whenever needed.32 In this context, as of December 1990, no transformational leadership had emerged on the Albanian political scene. The intellectual elites were wrapped up in the system’s structures. Previous protesting in Shkodra (January 1990) and Kavaja (July 1990) was crushed brutally by the police and Special Forces, and no one assumed a transformational leading role. The Student Movement, however, allowed the emergence of a new kind of transformational leadership. It was authentic, and as a force, it solidified its position in a matter of weeks. Students in the Student City presented a series of requests, among others the introduction of a new political force, and the demand for the establishment of political pluralism. The political conjectures amplified and the insecurity of Alia and the partystate increased. A possible upheaval in the heart of the Student City as of September 1990 was very worrisome for the regime, for a lot of understandable

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reasons. Students were a new political force that had just emerged on the political scene. Although many believed the students were a disorderly and uninformed group of youngsters in the Student City, surprisingly their requests were taken seriously by Ramiz Alia himself. One of the aspects that converted the students into a political force was the essentially political nature of their claims. Paramount among other issues was the introduction of political pluralism that had been outlawed after WWII. Ramiz Alia showed high interest in negotiating directly with the students. He sought to figure out ways to get the situation back under his control.33 Outside the Student City, there was no clarity about the Student Movement and its political agenda. The campaign of disinformation misrepresented its intentions and the wide web of informers, secret services, police, and provocateurs created a lot of misperceptions. The situation was very dangerous for the students. The students were not under the protection of any organization or agency inside or outside of the country. All the structures were under the control of the Albanian Labor Party. For the first few days, the students did not seek any other support except for that of other students within the university. Hence, no one backed or had the courage to back them if a possible arrest and mass prosecution would have taken place. One can say that at this point the state structures were the restraining forces. The intellectuals were nowhere to be seen and part of the state. Alia was the reformer that wanted to avoid the bloodshed and civil war and lead the country. The students were the innovators that, by operating outside the control of the structures, sought to change the system and assumed the role of the transformational leadership. This is exactly what the intellectuals refused to do.

Participants and Adopters’ Dynamics The ideas that the Student Movement supported were entirely political and well defined. These were the establishment of a multiparty system, the introduction of competing new political platforms with nationalist or social-democratic values, the idea of the nation-state, the demand for the removal of Enver Hoxha’s name from the public institutions, and the ending of the myth of Communism. The ideas were utterly new and hard to digest given the context in the Albania of the time. These are the hallmarks of an innovator in the process of change. The success of their political campaign depended entirely on the diffusion of ideas and the message. The participants in the Movement, as agents of a social-political change, went through the stages of the diffusion theory.34 It is necessary to mention all the layers of the strata that made up the participants. Here, the protagonists who organized the hunger strike such as the Student Association “Fan S. Noli” played a major role. Much support also came from the University of Tirana campuses and other institutions of higher education like the Agricultural Institute in Kamza. In addition, the February

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hunger strike had the support of all the students who participated in the riots or boycotted school to support their friends in the hunger strike. They did so regardless of their ideological platforms or political affiliations. Student solidarity was quite strong. As the theory suggests, organizations undergoing changes must embrace the innovative ideas and experience a cultural shift. But, the Albanian Student Movement is quite different from what the diffusion theory postulates and there are limitations in defining the process and its magnitude. First, it is a political movement that sought major changes in the system, a shift in ideology, and therefore it proposed a culture shift that was unacceptable to the masses and the regime. Second, the change had already happened and the Student Movement was shaped after political pluralism was established. Third, the social settings are non-traditional as to what the theory postulates in that the students did not have prior structures and an organization that was functional and well-established. Lastly, the variables (students, lecturers, intellectuals, politburo, Ramiz Alia, etc.) had an established political agenda with very complex characteristics and implications. Scholars who have tried to apply the theory in developing countries have questioned the validity of the diffusion model as to whether it changes the social or political structure of a society. Could it ever produce a social revolution? Their argument is valid in the Albanian case as well, mainly due to the complexity that arises from the volatile political and economic settings. Primarily, the diffusion model was conceived in conditions very different from those in countries of Africa or Latin America (similar in terms of political structures and transparency level with Albania). As the Albanian case shows, the theory has its limitations if it is used as a rigid model in all cases. However, it might serve as an analytic tool for ex post facto research, such as in the Albanian case. At another level, the organization versus the political movement, the model has some applicability. In the case of political or social movements, the adoption of the new ideas is a more complex process due to the presence of palpable and underlying factors. These factors are highly dependent on the environment and include the overall readiness of people to partake in a collective action, finding a common cause worth fighting for, facing the opposing forces, diffusion of the new ideas through means of communication, and their availability. When social or political movements arise, a certain level of risk taking is involved. The constituencies are seeking change, and change generates resistance as well. The risk-taking is greater for the visionaries and those who are on the frontlines and perhaps lesser for those who embrace the movement in the latter stages. In non-democratic states, the degree of risk is higher and the diffusion of ideas is done in unconventional ways. In a sequential order, in non-democratic environments, exercising extreme caution, targeting a specific population, then reaching out to the masses are alternative strategies as opposed to disseminating the message in a democratic setting. The means of communication are very limited, thus the role of media in the case of the

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Student Movement was non-existent. The media was government owned and controlled.35 As a matter of fact, it was openly used as a weapon against the students for it spread disinformation and put a wedge between them and the masses. This accounted for one of the major obstacles which were to the students’ disadvantage, but nonetheless, networking and peer work achieved the goal. The mechanisms of organization and communication were based on existing networks and personal trust. The diffusion and adopters theory has its boundaries. It postulates that innovators may not be necessarily transformational leaders. In such cases, they question the whole system and its existence based upon their own values.36 Yet, innovators operate within a social system in which they have found flaws and seek changes as a critical mass or group that brings in the masses or the constituency. The success of a political or social movement depends on the entire participation process but first and foremost, on how well, how soon, or how early on a substantial mass of people would embrace the new common cause. Articulation of the ideas plays a fundamental role in the process. Innovators must be great communicators and the grassroots work depends on their ability to transfer the ideas in a way that will find support among the masses.37 Participants in a political movement must not only adopt the new ideas, but they also must take into consideration the risks associated with the political movement. These risks that the innovators face magnify in non-democratic and dictatorial states. In the Albanian context, the adopters’ curve starts with the innovators’ quest to introduce the new ideas and then it moves on to the expansion and the diffusion of innovation.38 In the process of the diffusion of ideas, they faced, as I noted, the enormous power of the state. A largescale and very sophisticated propaganda campaign by the regime served as a major instrument to achieve and maintain control over the processes. In the Student Movement of 1990–1991, the early student body and the political activists were the innovators. Not only did this group disseminate the new ideas for the change of the system, but they also took on a transformational leadership role. The student leadership unveiled outstanding abilities to propagate the ideas with limited means of communication in a non-traditional setting. Those who demanded political pluralism were the core nucleus of innovators and the transformational leadership. In this cluster were identified a closed group of students from different departments of the University of Tirana.39 Most of these students were residents in the dorms and they were the first ones to be targeted by the secret services and the police. A few months later, on April 2nd, 1991, Arben Broci, one of the students, was shot dead in Shkodra while at a political gathering. He was a mechanical engineering student who participated in the meeting with Ramiz Alia on December 11th, 1990. In the case of the Student Movement, the regime waged a psychological war on a personal and a group level, aiming at isolating the students and blocking any channels of communication between them and the masses.

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The systematic propaganda campaign, coupled with the campaign of the services to smear and discredit the Student Movement and its leaders, was sophisticated and intense at multiple levels including the political, psychological, physical, and emotional levels. There is no question that the students were isolated and this made it much easier for Alia to support the takeover of the opposition by the intellectuals.

Leadership Dynamics and the Change Process By December 1990, after 45 years of Communism, Albania was on the verge of political and economic collapse. From the “Velvet Revolution” in Czechoslovakia to Tiananmen Square, the insecurity over the course the country would take became daunting. What sort of transition to democracy would Albania experience? Albania was the last domino, but it had more time to weigh its options: “The sweeping crackdown in the Chinese capital offered mixed lessons for Communist Party leaders in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.”40 Unless the transformation was carried out carefully, Albania could face the same circumstances. The country was heading towards total collapse, and there was no turning back once it entered inside the ripple currents of the opening of the political, economic, and social systems. Among other predicaments, people questioned the existence of democracy. Paramount was the issue of leadership. The setting was much the same as in other Eastern European countries: a statist economy, violation of human rights, a one-party-state constitution, a deep institutional crisis, political imprisonment and persecution of opponents, low standards of living, and, lastly, intentional isolation from the West. Yet, given the rigid nature of the system, the expectations were that the transition would be traumatic and a prolonged process. Finally, on December 8th, 1990, the protests erupted among the resident students in the Student City in Tirana, warning of troubled times ahead. Unquestionably, the events in Eastern Europe affected Albania as one of the last links of the former socialist bloc. A set of dilemmas emerged from the country’s trajectory during the transformation period. The late 1980s found most of Eastern Europe at the lowest point it had ever been, politically and economically. The international community, including liberal institutions, had long awaited democratic change taking place. The chain of events warned of the collapse of the East, the end of the Cold War. It was apparently a victory for the Allies and the West. The disarray in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was no longer a security dilemma—at least for the moment. The states had to face their internal problems, and the magnitude was immense. Embracing Western democratic values reasserting economic and political boundaries remained one of the leading issues in many of the new democracies. Albania was worse than any other state.

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From a human rights perspective, reevaluating the pain and suffering caused to millions of people under the totalitarian system became an existential question. Albania was a unique case of totalitarianism. The world almost forgot that people lived there. The Albanian state implemented a policy of self-reliance to prove to the world that it was able to sustain growth and progress by limiting foreign trade, and carry out a unique version of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. All Western hallmarks of behavior and culture including clothing and haircuts, let alone music and songs, were considered “foreign influences” in a pejorative way. To achieve success in creating a hybrid system, a mix of Communism and a despotic form of government, it was necessary to block all interferences from the outside, including the West. This ideological war went as far as blocking transmissions on the foreign radio frequencies. The isolation became necessary to minimize the effects of the West on Albania. Hence, the population was an indoctrinated mass with strong convictions that the West was a deadly danger to the country. After breaking up with the Soviet Union, and later with China, the state felt that its sovereignty was threatened by all sides and kept and intensified the self-reliance policy as the only option. Enver Hoxha’s famous quote, “We will eat grass, but we will never violate our principles,” meant that the Albanians were to live in poverty and to self-sacrifice for a greater cause. Enver Hoxha saw the West as his sworn enemy. In fact, it was a clash of two fundamentally different systems, and the Western form of democracy was a direct threat to Communism as it was applied in Albania. After the student uprising in China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe scrambled to keep the population under control through peaceful means. The internal pressure, along with uncertainties in the international system, fostered chaos and fear in the people and the leadership.41 After his visit to China in the spring of 1989, Gorbachev came to the conclusion that the Chinese experience was exactly what they had to avoid in the Soviet Union.42 After the unpleasant events unfolded in Romania, the states had no other choice but to succumb to reforming and transformations and avoid revolution at any cost. Afterwards and looking back, the peaceful collapse of Eastern European Communism in 1989 was due as much to the fundamental reorientation of Soviet foreign policy under Mikhail Gorbachev as to the courage and restraint of protesters in Eastern Europe.43 Albania also was not immune to the transformations even though it was a tough case of an authoritarian regime. The student protests proved this point.

The Student Movement: Leadership Issues Student protests in Albania erupted on December 8th, 1990. Initially, the protesters sought improvement of the living conditions in the dormitories of the campus known as the Student City, in Tirana.44 Later on, the protests transformed into a political movement seeking the transformation of the political.

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The protests evolved into a Student Movement that through a series of political actions expedited the collapse of the system. The Movement helped establish political pluralism, mobilized the masses, and defeated the myth of Communism by delegitimizing the figure of Enver Hoxha, and his legacy. As Halili notes, “The merits for pluralism in Albania are exclusively for students who, for three days, from 8 to 11 December 1990, won the great victory that resulted in the fall of communism in Albania.”45 Here, the leadership is important. Of all the components of organizational evolution or transformation, leadership and change must be interpreted with cohesiveness and keeping in mind the changing agenda of the key players. In a much broader sense, change and leadership are interdependent and leadership does not function in a political vacuum. For the old leadership to react and for the new leadership to emerge, it is necessary that the old organization’s shape and structures become ineffective and dysfunctional. For the leadership to act as an agent of change, the fundamental precondition is organizational ineffectiveness and the need to resolve problems emerging in the newly created circumstances. Political change and leadership dynamics during the period the Student Movement was active are closely intertwined with one another. As a matter of fact, this influenced all the emerging leadership of the country. The issue of the leadership’s emergence and transformation in the Albanian case is understudied. Undoubtedly, the extraordinary course of events leading to the democratic changes in Albania has generated interest among scholars. In the last 25 years, a substantial number of interpretations and frameworks have emerged. However, many of these studies are broad and superficial comparative or social science descriptions of the events. The leadership and organizational change approaches are used rather seldom. Yet, organizational theories offer deep insights into the interaction of the structural layers of the state, focusing on the leadership as a primary and decisive factor. On the other hand, given their focus on structures and the process, the organizational theorists show little interest in analyzing political and social movements in terms of events, ideology, and implications on the system. Therefore, assuming that they could complement each other, both approaches have much to offer. An adequate method requires grasping the concept of transformation in the parameters of the correlation, change and leadership, and to what degree the two concepts, i.e., change and the change agents, “tolerate” one another based on the organization’s pre-change conditions. In a political or a social movement, if the leadership emerges from the old organizational structures that object to transformation, the tolerance will be low and the resistance to change will be stubborn. In other words, leadership in this case is transactional.

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The Specificities of the Albanian Case of Leadership Applying this approach to the Albanian context, one notices a few other factors that influenced this interaction. The complexity of the events was increased by the uneven impact of the intellectuals. Given their upbringing and willingness to serve under the existing system, that is, serving faithfully the Albanian Government and the party, until December 1990, the intellectuals were not agents of change. Their refusal to act set the direction of the transformational process and facilitated the emergence of other factors. As Halili notes, Daniel Usprung believes that, “in the case of Berisha, Kadare and other Albanian activists, founders of the new opposition, we are actually dealing with the ‘strong continuity of the elites, which are the result and product of the communist regime.’ Albania’s problem was that its elite were exclusively the product of Enver Hoxha’s time.”46 Change required a shift in mentality and culture. Culture influences change before the change happens and in the process of transformation as well. A culture shift as the precursor to change questions values and puts them to the test. Linear changes regarding reforming are less complicated than the longterm processes of transformation. The underlying assumption is that the established organization’s dynamics allow the leadership to emerge, and the leadership is the primary change agent. Political movements are entirely different from traditional organizational changes due to the presence of a series of latent factors, variables, and political actors. Many of these variables grow in relevance and become political actors involved in the movement. In leadership studies this mutation falls into the adopters’ curve paradigm.47 The input in a political movement does not always produce the desired output; the events might become “fluid.” The multifaceted nature of the movement undermines a linear traditional change and the resistance to change is more defined. In this context, the leadership that emerged in the Student Movement was made up of a group of students residing in the dormitories of the University of Tirana student campus. This emerging leadership, independent of the old leadership and the intellectuals, managed to contribute to change but was elbowed out by the Albanian Government that pursued their own idea of change and political transition. Again, Albania became the last of the former socialist bloc to seek democratic changes. It did so in very specific political conditions.48 The lack of adherence to international or liberal institutions and treaties had left a gap in the country’s political culture. The country had no allies in the West. It withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in August 1968 so its relations with the Soviet bloc were icy. Many people in the leadership structures did not clearly grasp or accept the idea of democracy and what that meant for the country and the future.49 This is explained also by the rigidity of the Albanian ruling party. The Communist parties in Eastern Europe dominated the political scene for almost half of the twentieth century. Yet, understanding the

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new perspectives and agreeing to share political power proved to be quite a challenge for them. Whether by reforming or by changing the name, the Communist parties in Eastern and Central Europe legitimized their presence in the newly converted systems. At the dawn of the democratic changes, the Communist parties of Eastern Europe suddenly emerged as reformed structures in the new realities and embraced, at face value, the Western European values of social democracy.50 Albania was different. During the totalitarian rule, the politics of representation were farcical. The Albanian Labor Party had modeled the government after the Soviet Union. A paradigm shift in Albania in the late eighties required the emergence of a new ideological consciousness, and that was unacceptable to the leadership. The totalitarian ideology had transformed the country into an obsolete Stalinist extension of the Eastern Bloc’s political system, which functioned in a vacuum. Before December 1990 a reformist strategy seemed totally unacceptable.51 Despite the awareness regarding Glasnost and Perestroyka in the USSR, economic and social reforming in Albania were out of the question. The situation did not change until Ramiz Alia recognized the need to move in the path of reforms. Even then, the change was not radical. Alia mainly changed the rhetoric from self-reliance socialism, to speaking about economic reforms which included practices drawn from failed experiences like the Yugoslav self-management.

Paradigm Shift and the Politically Unfit Leadership For these and other reasons, in the Albanian case, before December 1990, the triangle—organization, change, and change agent—lacked cohesiveness, purpose, and concrete action. The state as an organization was a very rigid structure. Systemic change depended heavily on the culture shifting. Embracing new behaviors was more than just embracing new political ideologies. This was not only a leadership problem. To accept the political diversity necessary for democracy, the masses needed behavioral and ideological “reprogramming.” Certainly, the old structures were not the agents of change which people and the West were seeking to work with in Albania. The Albanian Government was keenly aware of the lack of a pluralist culture.52 The absence of the proper cultural values on the side of the leadership and the people put the emerging political forces that sought change at a huge disadvantage. Ramiz Alia insisted that the intellectuals and many of the student leaders did not have a clear ideology, a platform, or a program. On its part, the Albanian Labor Party did not make any effort at seriously reforming itself or its own party structures. Yet, in spite of its ideological shortcomings, it recognized the presence of other political groups as a political threat.53 The problem was that embracing new beliefs, especially democratic values, required delegitimizing the entire ideology on the basis of which the state functioned. This required, as a precondition, the delegitimization of

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the cult of Enver Hoxha. Neither Ramiz Alia, nor the party, nor the intellectuals were prepared to solve this problem.

Guiding the Transformation: Manipulating the Emerging Leadership This brings us to the various change agents. The entities designated as political actors by the regime—the renowned Intellectuals, the Youth Organization, the Women’s Organization, the Trade Unions—were all part of the old structure. Actually, all were considered as levers of the party.54 A new group that emerged were the students that did not belong to any of the old structures. It is this group that, whenever it played a leadership role in the process and acted as an agent of change, was faced with old leadership entities and culture resistance. As the primary change agent, the students faced the task of transforming the rules of the system but also the culture based on “preconceived cultural schemes.”55 The student leadership emerged out of a social movement. This makes it very different from the kind of leadership that emerges in traditional organizations. Organizations have their own distinct culture and prescribed behavior that are entirely inherent in their specific dynamics. In this case, the student leadership faced intense opposition and resistance from the leadership of the party and the state. The restraining forces had solid support and used the state and its institutions as a means of coercion and violence to crush the students and halt the change or make it amenable to their own agenda. In the Albanian case, the initial phase of change aimed at very specific areas. Such change targeted the political system, the economy, and the ideology; it was a transformational change with a transactional base between actors.56 Central to this was the role of the state. The focus on the political system meant that the administrative state was not a target of the Student Movement. The impact that the Student Movement had on the administrative state and the Albanian Labor Party was vicarious and indirect. The state and the party were two structures that were very strong, compact, and solidified ideologically. The idea of pluralism promulgated by the students meant creating democratic changes and opportunities, instead of revamping the structures of the deep and the administrative state.57 The preconceived cultural shift wobbled before it found its stable path. Yet, it proved much different to what the students had in mind. Such an upheaval of the system from an outside political movement required adjustment and adaptability, well-thought strategies and ideological approaches that would be taking into account the interests of other actors. The leadership of the party-state was more worried about social upheaval than the establishment of democracy. The most significant threat the Albanian Government dreaded was the uprising of the masses in the capital city of Tirana, and the snowball effect it might have in the periphery. A crackdown using force had proved devastating in other countries, and even within Albania itself, like in Kavaja. The Albanian people were little prepared for radical changes.

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Faced with the choice of repression and cooptation, Alia chose a different path. For Ramiz Alia, a more acceptable path to transition was to destabilize the Movement by changing its leadership dynamics and to take control over its agenda. Strategically, it meant creating factions within the Student Movement and its leadership to empower those groups that had ties to the government and to avoid a broader social conflict. The fear of retaliation from inside and the interference from outside, that was using propaganda to incite the opposition, forced the Albanian Government to encourage the emergence in leadership positions of “controlled” factions and other interest groups. In a matter of months from December 1990 until March 1991, many new political and other entities that were formally representing a non-existent civil society were cautiously introduced into the political scene. Llukman Halili writes: Just as it happened in Ion Iliescu’s Romania, Ramiz Alia was deeply convinced that his “elastic hide” strategy would succeed in preserving and strengthening the monopoly of the Albanian Party of Labor in society, thinking that most groups, small opposition groups, such as the student group and young intellectuals, could not consolidate any serious force that would harm the party’s and socialist interests.58 Yet even this was done with a twist. Political dissidents, formerly persecuted people, victims of the class struggle, and other groups known to be dissatisfied with the system were still out of the loop and purposefully excluded. These groups had neither a political platform nor a clear political program. Their impact was minimal, and the systematic persecution they had experienced had left them apprehensive of any change and afraid. The most prominent interest group, clearly backed by the Government, emerged on the political scene as the “Intellectuals.” They were part of the old structures and held high-profile positions in their respective professional fields and political structures as well. After the intellectuals entered the political scene, the dynamic of the Student Movement changed and took a different course. The intellectuals were acceptable for the society. The student leadership and agenda were not.

Implications for the Student Leadership The leadership conflict was not just between the intellectuals and the students. There were deep divisions among the student leaders themselves due to their different ideological beliefs. More importantly, the differences on the strategy and actions to be undertaken became a cause of friction. The student leadership gradually evolved into three different factions.59 The disagreements later became bitter, especially between the students and the intellectuals. The ideological and strategic battles turned into divergences and resulted in conflicts that in time would surface and become public.

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What were these groups with different agendas and ideologies? Collectively identified, the first group included students with a solid nationalist platform and a clear Albanian nation-state ideology.60 Apart from the primary role of the state as a democratic instrument, the platform strove to build in Albania proper, the Albanian nation-state. Up to that point, Albania was dominated by a formally Marxist ideology and for many intellectuals, the time had come for liberalism and the establishment of capitalism. Their program relied on the assumption that the Albanian national unity based on the principles of the Albanian National Awakening of the 1870s, rather than the contemporary dominant ideologies, was the solution. These views were broadly shared by many students like Arben Likaj, Arben Sulo, Edvin Shvarc, Shinasi Rama, Mimoza Zhamo, and many others. In January 1991, after the course of events and the founding of the Democratic Party by the intellectuals, some of these students founded the Student Association “Fan S. Noli” and continued their political activism along these ideological lines.61 The second faction consisted of a group of students and philosophy professors, among others Pandeli Majko, Blendi Gonxhe, Ilir Zela, and Ilir Meta. Many of them came from families connected to the system, and broadly shared a belief that socialist ideology provided the much-needed solution. They supported a perestroika platform following the late eighties Soviet model. The leading figures of this group thought that by opening up the system and liberalizing the economy through a well-thought restructuring, and even by democratizing, they would save socialism. Many of these students, who a few months later founded The Forum of the Euro-Socialist Youth of Albania, now hold leading positions in the government and represent the left-wing parties. During the Student Movement, they proposed evolution within the system. Reforming the Albanian economic system where the production had declined systematically was the recipe for another failed experiment. They feared the outcome of the transformational processes and believed Ramiz Alia had the ability and perhaps the willingness to save the country.62 Ideologically, this group supported Ramiz Alia’s conception of a pluralist system with a socialist base. The course of events showed that Ramiz Alia ignored this path. He chose to rely on the “intellectuals” to fulfill the swapping process from the statist economic system to a market form of economy. The third faction was the game changer for it opened the door to the intellectuals. Led by Azem Hajdari, this group played an important role in the Movement in its early stages. Hajdari rapidly became known as one of the most influential leaders and he enjoyed a lot of support among the students and the people. However, in the meeting with Ramiz Alia, Hajdari stated that the students agreed with Alia and the party, and his plans for the democratization of the country. Hajdari became the bridge through which the intellectuals infiltrated the Movement. Along with Arben Imami (acting professor at the Institute of Arts) and other intellectuals, Hajdari emerged on the political scene as one of the founders of the Democratic Party of Albania. Regardless of the split and his betrayal—as many of his fellow students called

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his actions—Azem Hajdari gave a significant contribution in this earlier stage. Other students from this group, some very influential, joined the intellectuals and became the nucleus of the Democratic Party in its earlier stages and the Branch of the Democratic Party at the University, which was the largest branch in the country; later they founded the Albanian Student Association. Tefalin Malshyti, Bardhyl Ukcamaj, and others of the same group were among those who had exhibited courage and stood up to the injustices in the most unpredictable circumstances. By now, they were just followers of the intellectuals that had taken the lead.

The Intellectuals: Playing it Safe The “Intellectuals” had power in the state, influence on the people, and connections to the ruling elite. After the establishment of political pluralism, the intellectuals worked feverishly to retain control and institutionalize the political force that would make pluralism viable. In this sense, they helped found the Democratic Party and, more importantly, formulated and presented a minimal political program for the newly founded party.63 Historians and researchers have long debated their contribution to democracy. One has to have reservations regarding their courage but also accept that at this critical moment they were able to seize the opportunity. Once the door opened and pluralism was established, they were determined to bypass the Student Movement and attain the leadership of the processes. Their assignment—as Alia had stated—was to keep the students under control, and to convince them to return to the lectures and the classrooms. It is very important to figure out whether they acted on their own or whether they acted on behalf of Ramiz Alia. Many are silent on whether or not the intellectuals had clear directions from Ramiz Alia to form a party. However, contradicting messages came from many sources; Gramoz Pashko, a co-founder of the Democratic Party, explains, “We just founded the Democratic Party with instructions from Ramiz Alia.” On his own side, Sali Berisha denies that he acted on any orders from Alia. Berisha idealizes his role and the role of Azem Hajdari as “the shining knights” of democracy. Despite their lack of any democratic experience or any in-depth knowledge of the democratic ideology, this group of intellectuals wrote a minimal program. According to Gramoz Pashko the program was modeled on the documents available to them such as the Copenhagen Charter and the Helsinki Charter. As Pashko notes, “That summer I was in Copenhagen and I received the documentation of Copenhagen Charter, as you might see the whole (the Minimal Program of the Democratic Party) is an adaptation of the Copenhagen Charter; the three pillars of democracy …”64 The program was based on formally recognized principles of respect for human rights, political pluralism, and a market economy.65 It is worth mentioning that Berisha and Pashko as well were members of the Albanian Labor Party till

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January 1991. Berisha was a professor of Medical Studies and Pashko was a professor of Economics in the University of Tirana.66 Many are baffled, even 25 years after, why did the intellectual group overshadow the student leadership? Many answers to this question were part of the Politburo scenario and the plans Ramiz Alia had already made with the Albanian intellectuals. Fred Abrahams writes: At 7:30 the next morning, the student Azem Hajdari and drama professor Arben Imami left Student City, stopped for a breakfast of kebabs, and arrived at Pashko’s home. Other men soon arrived, many of them meeting for the first time. Pashko’s brother-in-law Genc Ruli came, as did the philosophy professor Eduard Selami, the drama professor Edmond Budina, and Dr. Sali Berisha. An acquaintance of Pashko’s unknown to the others also joined, the mild-mannered archeologist Aleksandër Meksi, who would become Albania’s first post-communist prime minister. Around 10:30, Pashko called Reuters in Vienna to announce that a group of students, intellectuals, and workers would present Albania’s first opposition party later that day … He praised Ramiz Alia’s decision to allow pluralism as a victory over party conservatives. “We are for Alia,” he said.67 The founding of the Albanian Democratic Party was a simple transaction accomplished with the permission of Ramiz Alia. It was an alternative party, a fictitious balance of political powers to appease the international and domestic pressure. Regardless, the founding of the Democratic Party opened the doors for the democratic changes in Albania. The Albanian Democratic Party was able to attract a vital electorate due to the anti-Communist rhetoric. Once the intellectuals tried to join them, the students became anxious and unruly. They worried that Communists and former members of the old structures were taking over the Movement. They kicked the intellectuals out of the meetings and kept them away from the decision process. It seems that the students had every reason to worry. On the morning of December 12th, 1990, Gramoz Pashko, Sali Berisha, Genc Ruli, Aleksander Meksi, Sokol Necaj, Eduard Selami, and Azem Hajdari, against the expressed will of other students, and without notifying the Student Committee, met in Gramoz Pashko’s house. In this meeting they attempted to legitimize the founding of their own version of the Democratic Party that would have as its leadership only one student and several of these intellectuals. This was the first open blow from the intellectuals to the student leadership and to their cause. The student leadership refused this plan and ultimately the Democratic Party was founded on a transactional base that included six students, four intellectuals, and four university lecturers. The university lecturers had remained in their own residence and did not join the students for the first two days. Afterwards, with the authority of the professor and using personal relationships and their power over the students, a number of them

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became critically important players. For the purposes of this chapter, given that most of them were just followers of the more distinguished intellectual figures, the lecturers still were part of the group of the intellectuals. What proves that the intellectuals were not acting on the basis of their convictions but taking advantage of the opportunity? In the years that followed, when they had ample time to revise their transitional plan, these intellectuals proposed a new political and economic system without offering a coherent platform or strategy. They recognized the need to reform the economy from a centralized to a market economy. Yet, they chose to rely on an extreme laissez-faire system, a self-regulating market, which excluded the state and that had no regulatory agencies to prevent speculation.68 As Gramoz Pashko himself stated, the intellectuals had very little idea about how the system of planned economy would transition to a market economy, what would remain state assets, and who would privatize the industry that they deemed to be non-profitable. The privatization of the undervalued state-owned property was also a hallmark of this irresponsibility. They undervalued state property simply to make it easier for individuals involved in politics to attain ownership, rather than reforming these enterprises and giving them to the former employees. This brings us to the culture shifting. Given that the people were steeped in the class struggle mindset, Berisha and Hajdari rekindled the class warfare rhetoric of the past system. The “new class warfare,” so to speak, against the Communists, was accepted by the masses in the subsequent years as fair. This artificial division of the people helped the intellectuals secure a political victory in the elections of 1992. In the following years, the intellectuals declared themselves the new face of the Albanian democracy and received a great deal of support from the international community.69 More importantly, they claimed that they were the force that spearheaded the transition and brought about change. The momentum generated by their affiliation with the Student Movement helped the intellectuals reach out to the right-wing strata, including the politically persecuted families, former political prisoners, survivors of the National Front, and other political groups previously eliminated by the Communists. Claiming that they were the real force of opposition and the agents of change allowed them to foster a broad-based coalition that kept them in power for many years. In the case of the Student Movement, the emerging leadership of the intellectuals marginalized the students. The intellectuals took over as leaders but they were not the real agents of change and, in this case, leadership and change were loosely coupled. Subsequently, the intellectuals who took over the implementation of the democratic changes kept close ties with the old system and plunged the country into one of the most dysfunctional transitional periods.70

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Summary of the Argument To sum up the argument one can say the following. The leadership dynamics in the Student Movement are multifaceted. There is a plethora of underlying factors and agents that impacted the democratic changes significantly. However, one of the factors is information, knowledge, and its application. The student leadership recruited primarily participants who identified with the injustices, but on a smaller scale, such as in the case of the December 8th riot over the poor living conditions. Consequently, it escalated with the demands for a pluralistic system, and finally with the hunger strike. By February 1991, the students finalized the delegitimization of the Communist system with the fostering of mass protests. The achievement became successful due to the sensitivity of the collective action campaign and the new set of values that resonated with most—but not all—of the population. The agency factor as an awareness of political efficacy to bring about change occurred at a poignant stage. Precisely speaking, it was the moment when 753 students of the University of Tirana entered the hunger strike in the Student Center. The student leadership was able to mobilize the students and demanded political action without any expectancy of success. Moreover, the mass mobilization was fired up by the collective action and the common shared interest to end the era of the regime and strip the government of ideological legitimacy. Regardless of the fact that the political efficacy (trust of the people in the government) was at its lowest and meeting the students’ demands was far-fetched, the student leadership emerged not as a contingency, but rather as an insurgency, a determined group of students whose beliefs and confidence transcended what was thought to be unthinkable. It is important to remember the paths undertaken by the three factions of the student leadership. All three groups played important roles in Albanian politics and influenced the democratic processes during this first stage of the transition. However, the implications for practice are important. The factions engaged in a struggle for the soul of the Student Movement and the struggle for power intensified. One faction withdrew and began supporting the Socialist Party by forming the FRESH (Forumi Rinor Eurocialist Shqiptar). Given the support of the Hajdari faction, the intellectuals elbowed the other students out of the leadership. They embarked on the road of the systemic change from totalitarianism to democracy by recycling the same powerstructure and by implementing the same class warfare ideology.71 The intellectuals—by now in leadership positions—came from the old structures. As I have shown, they were not prepared to become agents of change; in short, they were unwilling to design and implement the necessary reforms. The organizational pre-change conditions transferred from one system to the other and were carried out in a more sophisticated way, but the substance remained the same. The structure and the ideological war did not change, nor did the culture. Only the roles and groups experiencing them changed. On December

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th

12 , 1990, the intellectuals founded the Albanian Democratic Party with clear instructions from Ramiz Alia. In conclusion, this chapter sheds light on one of the most controversial political movements in Albanian modern history. It was the first organized political movement the country had seen since WWII. Albania had—in theory—established a Communist economic and political system based on equality, but in practice, it was a dictatorship. In 1990, this hopeless dystopian state, the poorest country in Europe, was in the middle of the crossroads—either to continue on the same path in isolation, or to break the chains of totalitarianism and join the rest of the world. As I have shown here, there was no one to lead, no one to take on the challenge of becoming the innovators. The Student Movement came at a time where it was needed the most and it took over a task that transformed Albania forever. Regardless of the students’ subtle political position, they brought about transformational changes in the Albanian society and became the transformational leadership of change that the country needed the most at that time.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

(Cummings and Worley, 2008: 24). (Cummings and Worley, 2008). (Cummings and Worley, 2008). (Rogers, 1983). (Abrahams, 2015). (Shqiptarja.com TV, 2015a). (Shqiptarja.com TV, 2015a). (Stokes, 1993). (King, 2008: 44). (Zichel and Iwaskiw, 1994: 173). (Shqiptarja.com TV, 2015a). (Weiner, 1994: 147). (Zichel and Iwaskiw, 1994). (Ramet, 1998). (Shqiptarja.com TV, 2015a). (King and Mai, 2008). (Shqiptarja.com TV, 2015a). (Ramet, 1998). (Abrahams, 2015). (Berisha, 2015). (Rama, 2015). (Knowlton, 2005). (Zichel and Iwaskiw, 1994: 171). (Zichel and Iwaskiw, 1994: 171). (Knowlton, 2005). (Shqiptarja.com TV, 2015a, at 05:00). (Rama, 2015). (Vizion Plus TV, 2016). (Vizion Plus TV, 2016). (Heifetz and Linsky, 2002: 13–26). (Heifetz and Linsky, 2002).

Considerations on the Leadership Dynamics 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71

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(Heifetz and Linsky, 2002: 63). (Rama, 2015). (Rogers, 1983). (Zichel and Iwaskiw, 1994: 182). (Rogers, 1983). (Rogers, 1983). (Rogers, 1983). (Rama, 2015). (Kramer, 2011). (Kramer, 2011). (Kramer, 2011). (Kramer, 2011). (Rama, 2015: 75). (Halili, 2015). (Halili, 2015: 96). (Rogers, 1983). (Zichel and Iwaskiw, 1994). (Pa Rrotlla Official, 2015). (Stokes, 1993: 134). (Gallagher, 2012). (Pa Rrotlla Official, 2015). (Pa Rrotlla Official, 2015). (Rama, 2015: 74). (Bass, 1992). (Bass, 1992). (Rama, 2015: 74). (Halili, 2015). (Rama, 2015). (Rama, 2015). (Rama, 2015). (Rama, 2015). (Vizion Plus TV, 2012, at 35:38). (Vizion Plus TV, 2012). (Vizion Plus TV, 2012, at 36:34). (Vizion Plus TV, 2012, at 38:36). (Abrahams, 2015: 66). (Pashko, 2015). (Abrahams, 2015). (Rama, 2015). (Vizion Plus TV, 2013).

Bibliography Abrahams, Fred. 2015. Modern Albania: From Dictatorship to Democracy in Europe. New York: The NYU Press. Bass, Bernard M., and Bruce J. Avolio. 1992. “Organizational Description Questionnaire.” PsycTESTS Dataset. doi:10.1037/t06481-000 Berisha, Sali. 2015. “Cili ka qënë roli i sigurimit në lëvizjen e dhjetorit. Ja përgjigja e Berishës.” Syri.net, December 11th. Accessed March 21st, 2018. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DA_y08PUuqUS Cummings, Thomas G., and Christopher G. Worley. 2008. Organization Development and Change, 9th ed. Macon, OH: Cengage Learning.

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Gallagher, Deborah. 2012. Environmental Leadership: A Reference Handbook. London: Sage Publications. Halili, Llukman. 2015. Lëvizja Studentore Shqiptare 1990–1991: Origjinat Historike Dhe Kontributi I Saj Gjatë Transformimeve Politike. Tiranë: Princi. Heifetz, Ronald A., and Martin Linsky. 2002. Leadership on the Line: Staying Alive through the Dangers of Leading. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Kamrava, Mehran. 1996. Understanding Comparative Politics: A Framework for Analysis. London: Routledge. King, Russell, and Nicola Mai. 2008. Out of Albania: From Crisis Migration to Social Inclusion in Italy. New York: Berghahn Books. Knowlton, Mary Lee. 2005. Albania. New York: Benchmark Books. Kramer, Mark. 2011. “The Demise of the Soviet Bloc.” The Journal of Modern History 83(4): 788–854. Pa Rrotlla Official. 2015. “Ramiz Alia dhe Kuvendi Popullor.” YouTube, November 26th. Accessed March 16th, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= ywZ4T9W3KgM. Pashko, Gramoz. 2015. “Interview with Gramoz Pashko.” ABC News, February 11th. Accessed May 19th, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGskOfA4mUQ. Rama, Shinasi A. 2015. Për Lëvizjen Studentore Shqiptare 1990–1991. Analiza, Rrëfime, Dhe Argumente. Tirana: Princi. Ramet, Sabrina P. 1998. Eastern Europe: Politics, Culture, and Society since 1939. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Roberts, Adam. 1993. Civil Resistance in the East European and Soviet Revolutions. Cambridge, MA: Albert Einstein Institution. Rogers, Everett M. 1983. Diffusion of Innovations. New York: Free Press. Shqiptarja.com TV. 2015a. “Ramiz Alia’s Meeting with the Intellectuals.” AI Report, YouTube, August 12th. Accessed March 21st, 2018. Available at: https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=e1j2fVkmh3U&t=859s Shqiptarja.com TV. 2015b. “Biseda mes Ramizit, Kadaresë dhe Berishës në 1990 Pjesa e 1.” AI Report, YouTube, August 12th. Accessed May 19th, 2017. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e1j2fVkmh3U Stokes, Gale. 1993. The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. New York: Oxford University Press. Tarrow, Sidney G. 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vizion Plus TV. 2012. “Gramoz Pashko.” Zonë e Ndaluar, Vizion Plus TV, December 11th. Accessed March 21st, 2018. Available at: https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=f6YeDSP_FMA&t=986s Vizion Plus TV. 2013. “Portreti i paautorizuar i Sali Berishes - Pjesa e trete.” Zone e Ndaluar, Vizion Plus TV, June 17th. Accessed May 19th, 2017. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gY2FhYTJ63I. Vizion Plus TV. 2016. “8 dhjetori 1990, si lindi lëvizja që shembi diktaturën.” Lajme Vizion Plus, December 8th. Accessed May 19th, 2017. Available at: http s://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jn-NkAJP1gA Weiner, Robert. 1994. Change in Eastern Europe. Westport, CT: Praeger. Zichel, Raymond E. and Walter R. Iwaskiw. 1994. Albania: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Department of the Army.

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Competing Visions: Albanian Youth And Students In The Late-Communist Period And The Political Elite James Pettifer

The Albanian Communists always took the question of the loyalty, ideology, and organization of the young seriously, as the following quotation from the official history of the Party of Labor (PLA) shows: The PLA and the Albanian working class have always had youth on their side. They have educated it with revolutionary ideas, fulfilled its natural political, material, cultural and spiritual dreams and demands of the present and of the future, thrown it into revolutionary action and made it a gigantic revolutionary force. They never forget that the class which has youth on its side will triumph.1 It was a serious, perhaps devastating, blow to the PLA when in 1990–1991 the young, the students in particular, were at the forefront of the opposition to the one-party state in the transition from the dictatorship to a capitalist and ostensibly liberal democratic order. The history of the Student Movement in the period of the end of the one-party state in Albania, principally between 1989 and 1992, has not received the attention it deserves from historians, it is generally agreed. This is also true of the wider cultural history in Albania in the period after the establishment and consolidation of communism. The academic tradition in the West usually focused on the security and international relations issues, and on Albania’s place in the Cold War and the development of the international Communist movement. The image was of a nation gripped by a rigid and unchanging Marxist-Leninist system, and where, unlike Yugoslavia and other nations in the Warsaw Pact countries, mass media and radical cultural influences coming from the West had little influence. For many years—perhaps, for the sake of analysis, up to about 1960— this was a generally correct and realistic picture. But Albania was not an unchanging world, and gradually outside contacts and influences began to play a greater and greater role. The dramatic events in the Albanian Student Movement against the one-party state in 1990–1991 were, at one level, clearly a product of the end of the Cold War, but they also had deep roots in the recent past, particularly the years after PLA leader Enver

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Hoxha died in 1985. But even then, youth rebellion was not entirely new in Albanian society, even if it took different forms from that in the West or elsewhere in the socialist countries. It is important to focus on the cultural background of young people in the latter stages of the one-party state and the effect this cultural formation had on the Student Movement. The key period of change was the mid-1960s, when Albania was closely linked to China in the international Communist movement, and when all over the world, in societies both capitalist and Communist, young people were rebelling openly against the social norms of those societies. The events of the Sixties fundamentally changed the relationship between the inherited mostly Tirana-based elite of the one-party state, and the young, the educated young in particular, and these developments helped prepare the ground for disintegration of the old elite in the very last years of communism, between about 1987 and 1991. The atheism campaigns of this period were seminal in setting free the rebellious instincts of the young and it was this generation that were in positions of power, in many cases, in middle age in the 1990 period. The young were at the centre of the PLA plan for the destruction of religion in Albania that was initiated by Enver Hoxha’s speech on February 6th, 1967, after the 5th Congress of the Party. The young people were mobilized for a variety of direct actions against churches, mosques, and other religious buildings, and against what the Party saw as the ‘petit-bourgeois’ survivals in the ideology of their elders, particularly in the countryside; in other words, they were encouraged to rebel, and to undertake often destructive and nihilistic vandalism not only against social property owned by religious organizations, but as part of a wider and deeper campaign to try to use the war on religion also as a war on old patriarchal and socially conservative ideas, many embodied in the traditions of the Albanian rural family. The determinant background factor was the split in the international Communist movement and Albanian adherence to Communist China. It is sometimes forgotten nowadays how strong this link was, or the length of time Chinese advisers were a normal fixture in Albanian life. A British tourist, the prominent art critic Brian Sewell, notes in his account of his holiday visit to Albania as late as 1976, the ‘blue clad Chinese under every Judas tree’, a ubiquitous cultural influence for many years.2 The Chinese project for Albania was one of forced modernisation, under Chinese guidance, from the centre, authoritarian, illiberal, and undemocratic but it appealed to the new educated technocrats around Enver Hoxha, many of whom, like future leader Sali Beriisha, had been educated in Western universities and knew how far behind Albania was in terms of progress towards a modern society in these years. Some, as later Prime Minister Berisha has observed frequently over the years, were willing to join the PLA because they felt modernisation was so urgent to save the country that the human rights violations and other disadvantages of Enverism were a price worth paying.

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According to the semi-official history of Albania by Arben Puto and Stefanaq Pollo that was the only Albanian-authored book of its kind available to non-Albanian readers in the Cold War years, Albanian students had played a positive role in the struggle against the Zogist regime’s move towards dictatorship in the 1920s but there is little or no mention of youth or student political intervention in any other period of Albanian history.3 Student movements in terms of self-conscious organizations campaigning for basic political change are of course not new. In general terms student movements and independent youth cultures are seen as products of an emerging middle class.4 Many nineteenth-century revolutions, particularly the 1848 generation, had substantial input from young people and students. In this Romantic model of revolution, the world of the impoverished and radical student increasingly overlapped with the world of the impoverished political activist and the bohemian world in general. The city of Paris has perhaps the most continuous history of this kind of movement, the city that Walter Benjamin the German Jewish author called ‘The Capital of the Nineteenth Century’5. But youth movements were also very important elsewhere, far from Europe, as in China for instance. The historical slowness of Albania to achieve independence and the lack of higher education until after 1945 obviously limited any possible development in this direction in Albania, or indeed, in most Balkan countries. But this situation began to change with the onset of the twentieth century. Young nationalist activists were important in the League of Prizren and other nationalist organisations before 1900, but it was the importance of mobilising those of their generation to follow older leaders, such as Ismail Quemal Bey. And during the difficult Zogist years, the government concentrated on the provisions of basic schooling rather than higher education. Higher education was something—for a tiny minority of the young—that took place abroad, and some of this tradition continued, with a different emphasis, in the post1945 Communist period. The Communists wished to develop a cadre of educated people with roots in the values of the new society. Higher education was seen as a matter of ‘specialisation’, as the vocabulary used to describe it showed, and the term continues to be used in popular parlance for higher education up to the present day. The establishment of Tirana University which was originally guided by Soviet advisers, in its modern form, was a landmark. Young people had played a critical part in the Partisan military detachments fighting the Axis occupation that had won power for Enver Hoxha. The Communist leader had himself been involved in politics as a Communist student at Montpellier in France before 1939 and he knew full well the potential value of the young people’s energy and commitment. Considerable attention was given to youth organizations and the Youth League of the Party of Labor as soon as it triumphed in 1944–1945. Heroes of the war against the Axis occupation were often young men and women, like Tirana Partisan leader Qemal Stafa and top female

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Communist Lili Belishova and their lives and sometimes their heroic deaths provided iconic examples of the new Communist man or woman to the new generation of youth. The figure of Stafa was very important to Hoxha and the PLA as he had had a Jesuit education in Shkodra, which, according to his biographer Nasho Jorgaqi, ‘paralyzed the spirits of the young’. His death at the hands of the Italian fascists when he was fighting for the freedom of Albania was used by the PLA to show the inherently anti-Albanian nature of pro-fascist Vatican policies in the Adriatic region, as the party saw it.6 In the early years of communism, with the extreme militarisation of society, this idealism and energy was channelled by the Party of Labor into the PLA youth movement, but always with a very heavy emphasis on voluntary labour under the command of older party members. Enver Hoxha himself saw ‘youth’ as a social category that was inextricably linked with the need for self-sacrifice and hard work to rebuild the country after the ravages of the war years, as he writes in The Khrushchevites, where the energy and purpose of the Albanian youth are contrasted to the poor outlook of the revisionist countries.7 In this culture there was obviously no room for independent student or youth cultural organisation outside the Marxist-Leninist state structures. Yet Albania was not hermetically sealed, either. Even in the early years of communism, external cultural influences were beginning to enter the country. Clever students coming out of the new university in Tirana were sent to Eastern Europe, usually Moscow University, for specialised post-graduate training in disciplines such as engineering and military science where the PLA was anxious to build up available expertise in Albania and had no indigenous intellectual resources. Here the Albanian students met young people from different political cultures, and also often had the opportunity to see clandestinely imported Western films and books. The ethics of personal life and the birth of modern sexual politics were important. Although close relationships between exiled Albanian students and their counterparts in Moscow State University were discouraged by the party, in practice they were impossible to prevent either, although in most cases the PLA was able to stop marriage resulting. Hard information about some aspects of life in the West was available to these young people in the Moscow student world that was not available in Albania, except for the tiny number of senior figures who had to travel abroad in connection with foreign trade and diplomacy, and, in the early Communist years, the military. In some institutes in Moscow Western magazines and newspapers were available, even if only those published by foreign Communist parties, or other Communist material, which was not generally available anywhere in Tirana. Clandestine contacts with Kosova Albanians also existed with the possibility of somewhat freer information interchange than that they had known at home. The Diaspora was also important. Although the PLA attempted to stop inter-family contacts where part of the family lived outside Albania, not all Diaspora experience was the same. Contact with

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American family members was dangerous and difficult, particularly after 1948, but neighbouring countries with porous borders like Greece and Yugoslavia made it much harder for the Enverists to control informal contacts. Also these countries had substantial Communist parties with long-standing local links to Albanian Communists going back to the conflicts of the World War II period. Although the subject has yet to be professionally researched, it seems the Arberesh-Albanian Diaspora in southern Italy and in Sicily managed continual cultural interchange throughout the Communist years in Albania. The Albanian Orthodox church with its roots in the New England states in the USA also was a conduit for information and news until the violent clampdown on all religion in the later stages of the Hoxhaist regime. In different periods, different cultural influences predominated among the young. In the early years of communism, Russian influences were obviously predominant, but as Albanian industry and agriculture developed, some traditional trade links with neighbouring Balkan socialist countries began to develop, particularly with Hungary and Bulgaria. In the period of Albanian predominance in the League of Communists in Yugoslavia in the 1980s and much-improved relations with Yugoslavia, cultural and ideological material found its way to Albania via this route. So when was the critical period when the PLA began to lose its hold over the young? This was the late 1960s, for two main reasons. The first is that worldwide this was a period of rebellious and disaffected youth; the fixed parameters of Cold War politics were breaking down with the long crisis over the US war in Vietnam and the onset of a new youth culture. Albania was very much closed but it was not sealed and immune to these factors. Enver Hoxha in a speech once condemned what he saw as the bizarre dances and aggression of Western rock music, compared to the ‘graceful traditional dances of our people’. The importance of rock music in defining a new rebellious youth identity everywhere in Eastern Europe has been shown by Sabrina P. Ramet and other scholars.8 Technology was helping the rebels. The arrival of the easily copied cassette tape meant that it was de facto impossible for the PLA to control the music the young people heard, although there were still penalties for involvement with rock music under the legal catch-all of anti-social behaviour. The PLA took time to come to terms with television, but ultimately even the most hardened conservative had to accept mass TV ownership was inevitable and in the 1980s receivers were imported in large numbers from Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic, although for a long time these were only available to urban residents in Tirana and only the lowland cities could obtain reception. These were all external influences, of course, from external Western sources. But an important internal factor was related to the split in the international Communist period, the period of Albanian involvement on the Chinese side in it, and the arrival of Maoist Red Guards in Albania. This affected the ideological authority of the ruling elite and also its internal

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cohesion. The PLA had to face the issue of widespread de facto unemployment and under-employment of the many new graduates emerging from Tirana University, caused by the failure of the development of the productive forces in the late-PLA period. The mid-Sixties saw the reorganisation of the Young Communists into shock ideological and Labor battalions, as the party sought to harness the energies and idealism of youth for its own ends. This set an important precedent, of the leadership mobilising the young, that had implications throughout the period of late-communism and helps explain the way in which the first post-Communist leadership emerged from the Student Movement in 1990. Young people had already been central to the anti-religion campaigns and the closure and vandalism and even full destruction of churches and mosques throughout the country. In undertaking this work, the young were encouraged by the current party line to rebel against conventions and their elders, in a way that soon produced a delight in the physical destruction of traditional religious images; in essence a PLA-sponsored period of barely controlled anarchism/vandalism. This set an unfortunate precedent for the future, a cultural norm that remained in the popular mind and reappeared in the attacks on public property after 1990. The students in Tirana University were of course fully mobilised in this ‘Red Guard modelled’ movement, and many soon also found themselves conscripted into labour gangs to work on particular rural projects. Chinese advisers were still in Albania and promoted the Maoist doctrines of everintensifying ideological struggle against revisionism and bourgeois ideology. This was linked to the creeping bourgeois ideology among the urban elite, and the new technocrats that Tirana University was producing. A particular keynote policy was imitation of the ‘turn to the rural proletariat’, on the same model as had taken place in China. My research interviews on this topic some years ago concentrated on the ‘Terraces of Lukova’ projects to develop fruit growing in the extreme southwest of the country, along the coast north of Saranda, although similar work to construct new terraced agricultural projects took place everywhere. The young pioneers were away from home for quite long periods in the summer months and of course away from their parents and teachers. It was not long in the peer group before new values began to assert themselves, based on hedonistic Western and external influences, of subjectivity, personal hedonism, and a degree of feminism, of which the discovery of sex was often the most dramatic and important. Early relationships flourished under the olive trees in the summer sun, in rejection of the strict puritanical ethos of the early Communist years, and away from the often cramped conditions of urban family life under the gaze of parents and grandparents in small apartments with little or no privacy. What else did the young students and workers discover, apart from more about each other? The answer to this question was of course that the authority of the PLA was a good deal less overwhelming and effective than it used to be, and as well that many of the labouring projects were voluntaristic

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in the extreme, some completely pointless, and never likely to amount to anything much in terms of boosting agricultural production and ending food shortages. Party policy in mobilising the young in this way was not only highly authoritarian but also produced little or nothing of lasting social or economic value. There was also the issue of the emergence of the new human subject, particularly for young women. As the novelist Ismail Kadare shows in what is perhaps one of his masterpieces, The Successor, telling the story of the time around the murder (in all probability) by Enver Hoxha of his appointed successor and long-time confidant Mehmet Shehu, the affair of a young girl with her much-loved first boyfriend and embarking on pre-marital sex with him told as much about the mood of the times as the bloody scandal of the assassination.9 The emerging youth subject did not empathise well with forced labour. Lukova was actually an exception to the rule—some useful and productive olive and fruit plantations were developed in that generation, and grow along the coast north of Saranda today—but most of the youth work involved endless digging and other hard manual labour to only result in nil returns when it was done on unsuitable land for fruit growing. But as China had terraces dominating its agricultural landscape, so Albania had to have terraces, too, the argument ran; all in all, the authority of the Enverist authoritarian bureaucracy was considerably diminished in these years. The young were able to learn from bitter experience in the countryside that the state planning system in this period was deeply irrational and had turned its back on science. It is worth remembering how important agriculture was in Albania in this period. The overwhelming majority of the population, perhaps 85%, lived in the countryside, and many urban dwellers retained small rural plots, if only vegetable gardens and tiny vineyards, in defiance of party policy on agricultural collectivisation. Foreign influence in the countryside was still very limited. Movement controls on the population, particularly rigorously enforced in the north, meant that often the only time the peasants visited the capital Tirana was to go on officially sponsored mass demonstrations. The Chinese agricultural advisers were often the only foreigners they had ever seen. They were seen as bizarre, and often Albanians noted their poor personal hygiene and the unpleasant habits of the Chinese, like picking their noses in public and so on. Guided tourism through ‘Albturist’ had hardly started, industrial production was at a low level, and what had developed as sensible mutually beneficial trade patterns in Comecon and old Soviet-period trade links across the Balkans were abandoned for political reasons. The vast majority of the population worked in agriculture and within the framework of collectivisation, however incomplete and imperfect it was, particularly in the north. For the sons and daughters of the urban party elite, with their very different ethos, forced into arduous manual labour in the countryside for no discernible end result, young people who made up the vast majority of Tirana University students, this was a key period in developing a critical (if only privately critical) view of the PLA leadership. The French political philosopher Louis Althusser

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has shown how in Communist transition societies much ideology is actually unconscious and it was at this time that intelligent Albanians, whether in the PLA or outside it, began to develop an alternative internal ideological sphere with significantly different values from those promoted by the ruling state ideological apparatus. The university was turning out far more students than there were suitable jobs available, and the specialisations learned in China had to be undertaken extremely slowly because of the time and energy necessary to learn Chinese. For an interesting picture of the world of the ‘Maoist’ generation of the educated young who were sent to China for ‘specialization’, serve the memories of one of the students sent to China, Agron Fico. Fico’s time in China was in and after 1964, when relationships between the Chinese Communist leadership and the Albanians were relatively calm, before the Cultural Revolution really got underway.10 The PLA had led the young to believe that it was right and politically correct to rebel and confront old authorities in religion in the pro-atheism campaigns, but it did not realise that the rebellious spirit of the young, once aroused, would be hard for the older generation to control for many years ahead. In Marxist terms, there was a crisis in the whole country caused by the voluntarism affecting every aspect of party policy. In the pro-China period, the emphasis on ‘putting politics in charge’ led to a neglect of the most basic economic analysis of what the country needed, and technocrats of the older generation who had been specialised in Russia were often sacked on political grounds, or their views neglected, even if they were loyal Albanian citizens with a major contribution to make to the development of the country. Would it be true to say that the PLA never recovered its authority fully after the Red Guard period? The most pro-Chinese period in Albania also paralleled the Cultural Revolution in China itself. Given the international position of China nowadays, it may seem hard to imagine, but then Maoism was seen as a very positive international movement by many young leftists in the West and it was very influential indeed in major events like the May–June 1968 ‘evenments’ in Paris and elsewhere in France. Kosova had a ‘1968’ in a way Albania did not, but it was ruthlessly repressed by the Titoist petitbourgeois revisionist apparatus and did not come to very much. Many of the issues were worked out within the League of Communists itself as various recent authors have shown. One gets a grasp of how little real autonomy the revisionist leaders of the Yugoslav League of Communists in Kosova had visà-vis Belgrade in Et’hem Ceku’s book on the student rebellion of 1968 in Kosova.11 Taking part in this was a way for the PLA leadership to control the young and prevent them from moving into anti-Communist positions vis-àvis internal Albanian politics. How important did the Communist leaders think this movement was? Obviously their public pronouncements may not be a very reliable guide, but a common thread in speeches of Hoxha, Alia, Carcani, and others was the potential they saw for the privileged student young in Tirana to improve their political consciousness by ‘going to the workers in the countryside’, in Maoist style. But what the leadership did not

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seem to realise was what they would actually learn there. Instead of renewing their faith in the one-party state, the students saw it as failing to organise the country’s most important industry properly, and opening the way to often absurd and wasteful projects. They saw the poverty and hardship in many rural workers’ lives, and desperate shortages of foods and basic requirements in health and education. Thus the elite became destabilised in the pro-China period, to a greater degree than many outside observers of the Albanian political scene realised. Hoxha’s iron control of political and intellectual life was not the same or equally effective in all periods. The brutal and violent mass repression of all opposition between 1945 and 1950 was not possible later in the twentieth century, at least not on the same scale, although draconian measures were taken against individual ‘enemy within’ cadres from within the system, as in the ‘smashing of the enemy group of former Defence Minister Beqir Balluku’ in 1974. And the young, particularly the students, began to form critical views of their often privileged parents immersed in the Hoxhaist system. Enver Hoxha himself had of course a vision of society where internal upheaval through youth revolt was not only conceptually difficult but also irrelevant. His enemies were so often elite figures like Liri Gega, Todi Lubonja, and many other leaders and often prominent ex-Partisans who were the ‘enemy within’ and conspiring with the Soviet revisionists or Yugoslavs. In all his lengthy denunciations of his enemies in a work like The Khrushchevites there is no mention at all of the dissidents attempting to stir internal revolution against the PLA, only foreign destabilisation and intervention causing it. The culmination of this process was the murder of Mehmet Shehu in 1981, set out very perceptively in fictional form by novelist Ismail Kadare in his story The Successor. I have discussed the wider politics of Mehmet Shehu’s death and the structural weaknesses of the Enverist state in another paper.12 There was a long-running crisis in the military leadership as well which is analysed by Leci.13 The year 1981 was a seminal year for the development of youth movements in the wider Albanian world, with the student uprising in Kosova. This movement, with its violent repression by the Yugoslav security apparatus, the secret police, and the military, was under essentially Marxist-Leninist leadership, as shown by Prishtina historian Mehmet Hajrizi in his authoritative work Histori e një organizate politike dhe demonstratat e vitit 1981. 14 The Albania–China link in the background with the cultural model of youth-led revolution on the Maoist model was clearly important to the leadership, although probably not to the mass of student participants. The student leaders involved such as Hydajet Hyseni and Bajram Kosumi received very long gaol sentences, as did over a thousand student participants, and their time in prison became one of the main seed corn experiences for the later genesis of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA). This influence is noticed in numerous personal

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memoirs, but also in Bujar Dugolli’s account of the influence of the demonstrations of 1981 on the subsequent student protests of 1997.15 I have examined the general context of the events of 1981 in my own book on the rise of the KLA.16 The significance of this background to the fate of the 1990–1991 Student Movement lies in the fact that it set clear precedents of the Tirana elite believing it could manage political change through manipulation of youth revolt in a way the Yugoslav apparatus had failed to do. A key figure is obviously Ramiz Alia, Hoxha’s successor as leader. All the evidence suggests that the PLA under his leadership between 1985, the year of Hoxha’s death, and about 1988 did not envisage the end of the Cold War or the end of communism in Eastern Europe, but when the mass revolt started in Albania with ship seizures, the most obvious symbol visible in the West, Alia sought to manage to control the students and the unemployed and rebellious youth. The fate of the Ceausescu regime in Romania in late 1989 alerted the leadership nomenclature to their probable fate if reforms and the dismantling of the one-party state were not put in motion. Alia’s policies in placing himself in a Gorbachev-type transition role were widely, if not openly, supported or at least tolerated in the international community, who were well aware of the potential for very serious violence, even a north–south civil war, as communism collapsed. An important sign of the imminent collapse of the one-party state was the demise of the Democratic Front, the mass organization which almost all Albanians were expected to adhere to, and which in the past had been an important way for the regime to try to channel the energy of the young in positive directions. As long ago as 1979, with the 5th Congress of the Democratic Front that was held in the port city of Vlore that year, Enver Hoxha in his speech to the Congress called for the reinvigoration of the Front, and a renewal of mass youth participation in it, a sign of the damage that had been done to the image of the official organisations by the excesses of the Maoist years.17 The voluntaristic invocations of the PLA leadership had often only brought disillusion and apathy amongst the young. As the one-party state declined in authority, to many young Albanians the social conservatism and authoritarianism of the Party seemed only a reproduction of the most conservative structures of the traditional Albanian family. In the same period, the problems of the PLA in securing the active adherence of women to PLA policy also intensified and to some extent overlapped with the issue of the apathetic and privately critical youth. At the 8th Congress of the Women’s Union of Albania in Durres in 1978, in a an open and quite candid report to the leadership, Kadri Hazbiu, a member of the Political Bureau of the PLA, described the failures of social policy at the time which involved, on occasion, ‘damage to socialist property’, with ‘shortcomings in the behaviour of children, nepotism, waste and favouritism’, and so on.18 It was only a short step form this world of stagnation and economic and social stasis to the beginning of more direct oppositional activity in the following years. An interesting account of these years and the efforts of

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the broadcasters to focus on the disaffected young, is offered by Xhevdet Shehu.19 Young people were the great majority among those seeking to escape from Albania by swimming across to Corfu or through remote mountain areas, and some of the most important leaders of the next generation of the Albanian Diaspora organizations in the United States and elsewhere were escapees of this and earlier generations. It was also increasingly impossible for the government to monopolize control of the media. By the end of the Communists’ power, in 1990, there were networks of television satellite dishes all over the country, mostly focused on Italian television. It was no longer possible for the available technology to block the radio broadcasts of Radio Free Europe and, increasingly important, the Voice of America.20 A valuable view of the PLA leadership on the subject in the years before the end of the one-party state, is offered by Ramiz Alia in one of his speeches after the death of Enver Hoxha. Alia’s text is of considerably wider interest than its subject matter might ostensibly suggest. The latter part can only be read as permeated by fear of widespread disorder after Hoxha’s death, with calls for vigilance and strict discipline. It is perhaps significant that much of it relates to the city of Vlora, later to become the heart of street politics and violent oppositional activity, both in 1990–1992 and also as a centre of the armed uprising in 1997.21 When the direct oppositional process started, the students from Tirana University were the central catalyst on the streets of the city in the struggle to remove the hated symbols of the one-party state and in particular, Enver Hoxha himself. The world of private and often semi-unconscious ideological opposition and internal criticism that had developed after the ‘Red Guards’ years and gradually built up after Enver Hoxha’s death in 1985 had become angry, open, and confrontational. The atmosphere of the time is sometimes forgotten nowadays, a generation after the end of the Cold War, and with the transformation of Tirana from a very Communist capital to a modern commercial capital city. In 1991, the population of Tirana also merged with the students and the young. The latter had raised a banner of revolt with the embassy sieges and ship seizures of the summer of 1990, but as the Reuters report of February 21st, 1991 shows, by the following winter the movement against Enverism crossed all lines in society. The correspondent reports, ‘the crowd tore down a huge statue of Enver Hoxha, a hated symbol of the country’s Stalinist past and then marched to Skanderbeg Square where they burned books and shredded pictures of the former leader.’ It was all, at one level, a triumph of the anti-Communist youth. But students of journalism and the media cannot help but notice that much of the eyewitness ‘colour’ of the report was actually dictated on a telephone from Tirana to Reuters’ Vienna office by the old historian and sometime Hoxha associate Arben Puto, co-author of the ‘official’ history of the country in the Communist period.22 Although the revolutionary young who controlled the streets in 1991 were unaware of it at the time, the old elite with its traditional vision of Albanian

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life and society was going to coexist with the radical perspectives of the Albanian unemployed young and students for much longer than anyone could have anticipated in those dramatic days. Many in the old elite were adaptable, much more than their critics in the West believed. They had changed their coats from adherence to Russia and then China and then isolation. Adherence to the Grand Strategy of the United States as the next superpower patron would not be difficult for them given the seminal role of the USA in creating and protecting the modern Albanian state after Independence before the First World War. Albania had not had a ‘1968’ event and when the educated and also uneducated young began to enter the political arena as active subjects, their agenda was not, by 1991, based on the personal and subjective issues of the 1970s and afterwards, but on democratising Albania and then on the transference of the national question agenda from Kosova and then from the western part of the Republic of North Macedonia. The elite had and have little interest in these new perspectives, with a few notable exceptions, but wish for comfortable petit-bourgeois bureaucratic lives with opportunities for minor and sometimes major personal enrichment under the umbrella of the European Union finance plans. The vision of the young may be quite different, as in 1981, 1990, 1997, and afterwards. As Mark Kurlansky has written on the early youth revolts in 1968 and their aftermath, ‘the changes in the world have been very far from what the people who were out to change the world have wanted.’23 But change has nevertheless taken place, in Albania, as everywhere else. Yet the old elite has hung on: most of the current Tirana political leadership are people who emerged in the 1990–1991 period and have hung onto power ever since, although many of the student leaders from the past in Kosova now occupy prominent positions in the newly independent state.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

(Instituti I Studimeve Marksiste-Leniniste, 1982: 471). (Sewell, 2014: 97). (Puto and Pollo, 1981). (Fowler, 2008). (Benjamin, 1979). (Jorgaqi, 1975). (Hoxha, 1980: 64). (See Ramet, 1994). (See Kadare, 2003). (Fico, 2004). (See Ceku, 2009). (Pettifer, 2014: 242; Shehu, 2015). (Leci, 2002). (Hajrizi, 2008). (Hajrizi, 2008; Dugolli, 1999). (Pettifer, 2012). (Fronti Demokratik i Shqipërisë, 1979: 47). (Kapo, 1978: 58).

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(Shehu, 2002). (Shehu, 2002). (Alia, 1985: 322). (Beattie, 1991). (Kurlansky, 2005).

Bibliography Alia, Ramiz. 1985. Te Populli – Forca Jonë. Tiranë: 8 Nëntori. Beattie, Muriel. 1991. ‘More Shots in Tirana as Protestors Burn Hoxha Books.’ Reuters, February 21st. Benjamin, Walter. 1979. Paris: Capital of the Nineteenth Century. London: New Left Books. Ceku, Et’hem. 2009. Demonstratat e Vitit 1968 në Arkivin e Kosovës. Prishtinë: BREZI 81. Dugolli, Bujar. 1999. I Tetori i Kthesës Lëvizja Studentore 1997–1999. Prishtinë: Rrota. Fico, Agron. 2004. Profesor Në Tre Kontinente. New York: Albanian Publishing Co. Fowler, David. 2008. Youth Culture in Modern Britain. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Fronti Demokratik i Shqipërisë. 1979. The 5th Congress of the Democratic Front of Albania. Tiranë: ‘8 Nëntori’. Hajrizi, Mehmet. 2008. Histori e një organizate politike dhe demonstratat e vitit 1981. Tiranë: Toena. Hoxha, Enver. 1980. The Khrushchevites – Memoirs. Tiranë: ‘8 Nentori’. Instituti I Studimeve Marksiste-Leniniste. 1982. The History of the Albanian Labor Party. Tiranë: ‘8 Nëntori’. Jorgaqi, Nasho. 1975. Qemal Stafa. Tiranë: ‘Naim Frashëri’. Kadare, Ismail. 2003. The Successor. New York: Arcade. Kapo, Vito. 1978. Report to the 8th Congress of the Women’s Union of Albania. Tiranë: ‘8 Nëntori’. Kurlansky, Mark. 2005. 1968: The Year that Rocked the World. London: Vintage. Leci, Elmas. 2002. Eleminimi i Lidershipit Ushtarak. Tiranë: IS and M. Pettifer, James. 2012. The Kosova Liberation Army, 1948–2001. London: C. Hurst and Co. Pettifer, James. 2014. ‘Albanian Communist State Formation after 1945.’ In 100 Years of Independence: Speeches of the International Scientific Conference, 26– 27 November 2012, edited by Beqir Meta. Tiranë: Institute of History. Puto, Arben and Stefanaq Pollo. 1981. The History of Albania from Its Origins to the Present Day. London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul. Ramet, Sabrina P., ed. 1994. Rocking the State: Rock Music and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia. Boulder, CO: Westview. Sewell, Brian. 2014. Outsider II: Always Almost: Never Quite. London: Faber. Shehu, Xhevdet. 2002. Ambasadori VOA. Tiranë: Ombra. Shehu, Xhevdet. 2015. Prapaskena. Tiranë: Cadprint.

9

What Kind Of Democracy? Which Kind Of Pluralism? Comparing President Ramiz Alia’s Meetings With The Intellectuals And With The Student Representation Afrim Krasniqi

Introduction Some of the most influential and critical events of the past half-century of Albanian history took place during the period of 1990–1991. During this brief period of intense political change, events, unimaginable until then, such as the first public anti-Communist demonstrations, the storming of Western embassies in Tirana by over 5000 Albanian citizens, the rise of the Albanian Student Movement, the fall of the one-party system, and the laying of the foundations of the new democratic system took place. Due to their intensity, the lasting effects that these events had on the political change, the large number of people involved, their complexity, and the bearing that they had on the subsequent political processes, these events have remained a ubiquitous part of the political discourse in Albania. And yet, notwithstanding their historical importance, scholars have not seriously examined such events. During the past 25 years, the numerous studies on the Albanian transition were conditioned by two important factors. On the one hand, there was the legal obstacle that did not allow for the use of the state archives and hence, they lacked the necessary evidence and data. On the other hand, there were the subjective interests of the leading political figures during the transition that had been key actors in these events of the past. The transition in Albania was a very political environment, in which the political discourse was highly charged with ideologically informed and, often, with very subjective interpretations. Instead of describing the real historical events as they unfolded, the modus operandi of these scholars was to launch and propagate new myths and unfounded interpretations. Numerous scholars sustained and reinforced these false interpretations with publications that periodically rehashed the speculative claims and interpretations of the interested politicians who claimed to have been the agents of change. On the other hand, mainly because they were threatened or afraid of the consequences for their academic careers, many professional historians avoided dealing with the period. This lack of objectivity is reflected in the high

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school and college-level textbooks in circulation in Albania. In these textbooks, the events of 1990–1991, and, in particular, those events that were of utmost importance for the change in the political system, are sketchily represented and described mainly through the enumeration of the important dates and chronology and the use of clichés. Such descriptions do not offer a qualitative, in-depth, and professional examination of these historical events, the factors that influenced them, the possible trajectories and scenarios that could have unfolded, and, no less important, their influence on the subsequent evolution of the Albanian society and state. Twenty-five years after the events of 1990–1991 unfolded, one can say that these two fundamental obstacles to an objective interpretation have been removed. One factor is the access to the heretofore-inaccessible state archives. According to the current legislation, official documents extending to the end of the year 1990 are available to the scholars and to the public on request. The other obstacle that was removed is that the majority of the political actors that were central to that period, by now, are no longer politically active. Hence, one could approach the analysis of the critical period of political change very objectively through the data, the documentation, and the available evidence. Scholars can approach and study the Albanian case in the same objective manner as other cases of transition in the former socialist countries of Eastern Central Europe. Increased access to the archival information is the key to explaining why there is so much interest in the political change in Albania and an important reason to explain why, recently, there have been a number of qualitative publications from foreign and Albanian scholars on the subject of transition. An important aspect of the analysis of these events is the focus on the political thought of the time. How did the various actors really think about politics, of the time and of the future? What did they say, propose, recommend, or insist on in their exchanges with the political leadership of the time? By now, we have sufficient evidence to point to marked differences and competing interpretations of the leading actors at the time. Not surprisingly, then, an important part of the analysis relying on the current evidence should focus on the differences in the visions about the future of the important players. A central point on which these differences stand out clearly is their understanding of the competitive democratic system. Among the vast number of events, when it comes to the contrasting of the views about democracy and the democratic system, two such events that took place within a few months are particularly important and interesting to compare. One could hardly miss their symbolism and significance, because these events involve the most advanced and the most influential competing visions of the future of Albania at that time. The central figure in both events is the then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania (PLA) and Chairman of the Presidium of the Popular Assembly, the equivalent of the President, Ramiz Alia. The other sides that interact with President Alia, however, are the two other key groups of players in the transition. In the first meeting are

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the leading members of the Albanian intelligentsia. In the second meeting the key group are the representatives of the students. The first event, Alia’s meeting with the representatives of the intelligentsia, took place on August 12th, 1990.1 The second event, Alia’s meeting with the Student Representation, took place on December 11th, 1990.2 In this chapter I show how the representatives of the intelligentsia in the one instance, and those of the students in the other, represented two different and incompatible interpretations of the past. More importantly, the intellectuals and students offered two competing visions of the future for Albania. Through extensive examination in the background of the data, the important elements and issues that were discussed, the arguments used, and the level of understanding of political thought manifested by the representatives of the intelligentsia, I show that the representatives of the intelligentsia failed to rise to the occasion; they did not demand political pluralism but advocated cautious and gradual change. On the other hand, the students were able to convincingly show that they understood the need for political change. More importantly, the students insisted on the transformation of the political system, the establishment of the pluralistic democratic system, and defended these objectives, forcing President Ramiz Alia to accept the change from a one-party system to a multiparty system.

Ramiz Alia’s Meeting with the Intellectuals: Objectives, Participants, and the Outcome Between July 2nd and 12th, 1990, about 5235 Albanian citizens forcefully entered into the Western and other embassies in Tirana, protesting against the regime but also requesting political asylum. This event was the first massive protest in the capital after the end of WWII. The political crisis was resolved through the intermediation of the UN. The Albanian citizens were sent from Albania to the other countries. At the same time, the Communist regime began a very harsh and intense campaign seeking to denigrate them and devaluate the political significance of their action. One month after the “Event of the Embassies” the Communist leader, Ramiz Alia, organized a consultative meeting with 50–60 selected well-known representatives of the intelligentsia, writers and professors of Tirana. The meeting, subsequently known as the “Conversation with the Intellectuals,” was a first during the long period of Communist rule. The selection of the participants, according to the official sources, and confirmed by the participants themselves, was conducted by the highest party authorities. Among them there were no known dissidents. There was not a single former political prisoner present. There were no politically persecuted people. There was not a single recognized critic of the regime, nor any person that had expressed disagreement with the system publicly. In short, there was not a single individual who was known to have a political agenda that was different from or against the PLA and the regime.

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According to the archival sources regarding this meeting, about 90% of the participants were members of the PLA. Several of them were members of the Central Committee of the PLA and secretaries of the party organizations at various levels as well. Ten participants were members of the Popular Assembly, i.e., members of the Parliament of the time. Of all participants, only one person had not been outside Albania. In fact, 98% of the participants had travelled to study, participating in different scientific activities, specializations, or formal engagements out of state, mainly in Western countries. Thanks to these experiences, they had a first-hand knowledge of the reality in the outside world, “the capitalist world” as it was called by the regime. They also had a good understanding of how democratic Western societies functioned at different levels. Furthermore, the manner in which the meeting was organized, and its agenda were highly indicative of the overwhelming degree of control by the regime. A meeting with the intelligentsia was not a new development in Eastern Central Europe. Such meetings, defined as roundtables, had previously been organized in Poland and in Hungary. The outcome was a very intense exchange of ideas that clearly positioned the dissident or activist intellectuals as the opponents of the regime. Yet, in the Albanian case there were no two opposing sides. In this case, there were two parts of the same political system that were discussing the specific problematiques of the system and the ways in which the functionality of the existing system could be improved. This was an essential specificity of the meeting of Ramiz Alia with the intellectuals that conditioned the discussion. Numerous authoritative sources confirm that this meeting was, indeed, designed as an exchange between the leadership and the “loyal” intelligentsia. In his memoirs, Ramiz Alia himself stated that “dangerous” intellectuals were not invited to the meeting. As Ramiz Alia said, “in this meeting we did not invite the dissidents, for there was no dissidence as such, but we invited distinguished intellectuals of all fields of life” (Halili and Shala, 1993: 161). Alia is trying to shed a positive light on the meeting, its participants, and the outcome. On the other hand, the then Minister of Culture, Alfred Uçi, a critic of Ramiz Alia’s meeting with the intellectuals, said that the meeting was actually disappointing. According to Uçi, the intellectuals were abused by the regime. Uçi confirmed that “attendees were assigned according to the official and permanent protocol list of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Party, individuals who were not known ‘dangerous’ and ‘brave’ to stand up against the general line of the party.”3 Some of the participants at the meeting, including the famous writer Ismail Kadare or the future opposition leader Sali Berisha, at different times, have confirmed the fact that the announcement came from the high structures of the PLA in Tirana and that the majority of the participants were handpicked by them. Also, the purpose of the meeting was debated for a long time among the participants themselves. Ismail Kadare and Sali Berisha, but also other intellectuals that later became active in the processes of democratic

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change, offered very critical evaluations of the meeting as well. For the most famous Albanian writer, Ismail Kadare, Ramiz Alia’s meeting with the intellectuals: was all just a farce … It was just a farce. It was all built as a bad scenography designed to create the impression in Tirana the very next day that “Ramiz Alia wanted to liberalize the state, to democratize Albania, but, alas, it was the intellectuals, and above all the writers, that did not allow him to do this.”4 For Sali Berisha, Ramiz Alia’s invitation to participate in the meeting was a “trap to suffocate freedom of speech.” According to Berisha, the meeting was convened for “mischievous purposes,” because “the sole purpose of this meeting was to break up those [who opposed the regime] and who were left behind after the protestors left the country” after the crisis of July 2nd. 5 In his memoirs, Ramiz Alia himself writes that, “I convened the meeting to discuss with them [i.e., the intellectuals] about the events that were taking place at that time, focusing on the democratization processes that were being implemented in the country, and to discuss the situation in general.”6 Ramiz Alia also noted that to avoid the appearance of a formal political meeting, the event did not take place in any of the halls of the Central Committee but at the Palace of Congresses. According to Alia, it was an informal roundtable, without a podium and without written reports. In fact, the careful selection of the participants and the meeting itself were a carefully choreographed opportunity to test the level of control the regime had over Albanian society. The objective was to test the extent to which some of the most influential representatives of the intelligentsia would go in opposing the regime. From the very start of the meeting, Ramiz Alia gave a long political speech which was rather aggressive and emphasized that the ALP would not yield to the external pressure for change. The entire meeting was recorded, and, subsequently, its minutes then were distributed to the party structures of the ALP throughout the country as “material for internal use.” In this meeting, Ramiz Alia accepted light criticism of the existing system of socialism. However, he did not show any signs of being open to liberalization on any of the pressing matters of the time, such as the implementation of economic reforms, the establishment of political pluralism, and openness to the West. In his speech, Alia equalized the demand for pluralism with the demand for breaking down national unity and with the ending of the sovereignty and the independence of the country. His rhetoric was obviously threatening such as when he said that, “there is no turning back by auctioning the freedom and the independence gained by us, the power of the people and the socialist way … Never, ever, will we stray from this path.”7 After leaving politics, in his memoirs published much later on, Alia claimed that he had said the opposite. Furthermore, when evaluating the

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meeting with the intellectuals in his memoirs, Alia observed that, “the main idea that dominated this meeting was that the democratization measures implemented were moving forward without any hindrance. Intellectuals supported my efforts, but they were worried that these measures were not being applied everywhere with the same pace.”8 In fact, he said that he was so pleased with the meeting and its outcome that he came to the conclusion that, “in the future, the Party’s work with intelligence and its contacts had to be intensified. If we fail to engage, to involve and to listen to this great social force which was, surely, connected with the party, the processes of democratization … would not be effectively implemented.”9 Alia’s thesis on the establishment of pluralism of thought, i.e., limiting discussions only within the framework of “encouraging debates to improve the socialist system,” found the support of the intellectuals. There were some intellectuals who emphasized that the ALP had always encouraged the exchange of diverse opinions. There were no demands whatsoever on their side about the establishment of a multiparty political system. A diametrically opposed evaluation is offered by several of the participants in the meeting. This is particularly noticeable among those intellectuals who later on engaged in politics and became critics of the Communist regime and of Ramiz Alia himself. Ismail Kadare says that Ramiz Alia “gave me a very ominous threatening warning.”10 In his speech at the meeting, Ramiz Alia said that, “based on the information that the Albanian state has, you should know that through this slogan (i.e., the democratization is the solution), the international bourgeoisie with its agents in Albania wants to overthrow the power.”11 The implication, according to Kadare, was that if one defended the idea of political pluralism, the regime would label you as an agent and the consequences of being labeled as an agent of imperialism in a dictatorial regime are well known. In his evaluation, 20 years after the event, Sali Berisha says that Ramiz Alia came out of the debate as a loser. According to Berisha, “None of the participating intellectuals, some of whom were a part of the Central Committee, attacked their colleagues. All of them, in one way or another, distanced themselves from Alia either by launching criticisms, making puns, or just by defending each other.”12 Judging from the transcript and the registration, it appears that this was not the case. An important political figure of the Socialist Party, subsequently critical of Ramiz Alia, who also had insisted that Marx be mentioned in the program of the Socialist Party, was Servet Pëllumbi. A former professor at the Party High School, Pëllumbi was very critical of the manner in which the meeting was convened and of its outcome. Pëllumbi said that, “in essence, the meeting was a failure. The intellectuals, who were called the ‘leading intellectuals of the country’ did not have the courage to offer their opinion on political pluralism!”13 Pëllumbi went on to note that at the meeting, the intellectuals did not give the appearance of “people satisfied with the situation,” but there was no “harsh criticism” coming from them either. None of them even dared mention

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words such as “freedom” or “democracy.” His conclusion is that the neutralization of the intellectual elite was a good move by the regime.14 It should be noted that an important part of Albanian society disagreed with the outcome of this meeting and likewise concluded that the regime had neutralized the intellectuals.15 Critical assessments for the two opposing interpretations of the meeting and its outcome, such as these evaluations offered by Servet Pëllumbi, are much more in line with the perceptions of the general public itself than the positive interpretations offered by the participants. It is worth noting that, a few days after this meeting, Alia hosted a second and a third meeting. The second meeting was held with a number of experts and managers of the economic sector. Referring to the archival documents regarding this particular meeting, one can say that it was mainly on economic and technical issues. There are two very important and striking points that stand out in this second conversation. The first point is the total lack of economic knowledge by the regime’s chief (during this meeting, Alia himself points out several times this weak point). The second important point is that Alia admits that the economy is in a very difficult place. The third meeting was organized mainly with representatives of the ALP in the state police and security structures. The records for this third meeting have not become fully accessible to the public. However, it is clear that in all these meetings Alia stuck to the line of the party and there were no demands whatsoever for the change of the political system.

What Stands Out? The Missing Concept of Real Pluralist Democracy in August 1990 The meeting of Ramiz Alia with the intellectuals takes place in the context of three important circumstances. These circumstances were more favorable to the intellectuals that participated than to Alia and to the regime itself. First, in the majority of the former Communist countries, political change had already taken place. Essentially, continuing to oppose political pluralism appeared to go against the spirit of the time. Second, the embassy events and the expulsion of over 5000 citizens from Tirana were crucial. On the one hand, Albania had attracted the attention of the international media. On the other hand, a large part of the citizens in the country, especially the young people, were disappointed with the regime and very unhappy. Third, the confrontations in Shkodra, Kavaja, Tirana, etc. had broken the myth of the regime being in total control and of the people’s acceptance of the regime. The people were giving clear signs of dissatisfaction with the regime. All these factors should have been helpful and encouraging for the invited intellectuals to stand up to Alia and to demand further and deeper political change of the system. Such a thing did not happen and the intellectuals did not rise to the occasion. The meeting with the intellectuals, as Elez Biberaj points out, “gave a huge blow to the credibility of the intellectuals who were supportive of further reforms.”16

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What are the main reasons for their failure to rise to the occasion? The answers are found in the transcript of the meeting and in their pronunciations there. A structural analysis of the power structure and the analysis of the discourse of the meeting with intellectuals lead to a single main conclusion. The perception of the intellectual elite of the time was that what was needed was a minimalist democracy within the socialist system. In their view, at that point in time, Albania could not advance toward competitive democracy and toward the establishment of a new political system. In terms of power relations, all intellectuals referred to Alia as the First Secretary of the ALP. No one addresses him as the President of Albania. For all matters and purposes, this implies that the meeting with the intellectuals was a routine PLA party activity. The main demands of the intellectuals consist in the following requests. For example, they argue on the need to open the Voice of the People newspaper, the leading newspaper of the party itself, to the membership of the party. They recommend the official media provide more information on the activity of the government. They suggest that the government should offer more information on those incidents that are commented on by the public. They want more debates within the party cells, within the mass organizations of the ALP, and so on. None of the discussants deals with critical economic issues. None of them talks about fundamental topics such as openness towards the West or how to deal with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. They never mention, let alone criticize, the Central Committee and the Politburo. There is no mentioning of the politically persecuted or of the dissidents that are still in jails. There are no suggestions on how to rehabilitate people and no positive references for the people expelled in July. The most advanced arguments put forth by the intellectuals in the meeting were the request for removal from the Constitution of Article 3 related to the leading role of the ALP in the state and society. Another argument was focused on the criticisms addressed to the selective and violent behavior of the State Security. The third set of discussions focused on the abusive behavior of the bureaucratic and party structures at a local level. The first and the third point were points upon which both the intellectuals and Alia agreed. The criticisms on the behavior of the State Security caused more debate but even then the discussion remained within constructive suggestions. The most pressing issue, though, was the change in the political system. When it came to the establishment of political pluralism, none of the intellectuals managed to even articulate it or mention it as a fact, as a need, or as a challenge. On the contrary, there was a full consensus between them and Ramiz Alia that Albania has no democratic traditions and that the country was not prepared for political pluralism. The most advanced ideas at this point concerned the demand for pluralism of thought within a one-party political system—a minimalistic, even speculative, idea of political pluralism.

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The justifications of the intellectuals for failing to refer openly and unequivocally to the need for political pluralism are very diverse but mainly based on speculative or nonsensical arguments. For example, Sali Berisha insisted that he was unable to demand political pluralism because this was not allowed under the terms of the constitutional article on the leading role of the ALP. In fact, just a few months later, in December 1990, when students demanded the establishment of political pluralism, Article 3 of the Constitution was still in force. This article played no role in the progress of the protest, the talks between Alia and the students, or the processes that led to the fundamental change of the political system. The transcript of the conversations that took place, in which participated personalities that in less than one year became the political leaders of Albania, i.e., President, Prime Ministers, Chairman of the Academy of Science, ministers and members of the Parliament, shows a remarkable discrepancy. What was said in that meeting does not reflect the state of real Albanian society in August 1990. The transcripts show a virtual Albania as seen from the different levels of the structures within the system. Much like on July 14th, 1990, when it participated and spoke at the rally in Tirana against the expelled people who left the embassies, a month later, the intellectual elite of the time in Albania did not find the courage to stand for the public interest and to become the voice of the concerns of the citizens. Elez Biberaj confirms the fact that many of those who emigrated in July expressed “their deep disappointment with the inability of intellectuals to make clear political demands” and that they considered the intellectuals as the collaborators of Ramiz Alia.17 In short, the intellectuals did not even think about radical and rapid change. They did not expect the radical change to happen. They did not see themselves as freethinkers and outside the orbit of the ALP. They failed to articulate any arguments that would become a matter of public debate or that would inspire students in their protests a few months later. Symbolically, the Communist Albania was the same as it was on August 11th, 1990, a day before the meeting, as it was on August 12th, 1990 during the meeting. It remained the same Communist Albania on August 13th, 1990, a day after Alia’s meeting with the intellectuals.

Ramiz Alia’s Meeting with Students in December 1990: The Purpose of the Meeting, Composition, and Outcome The Student Movement in the university campus otherwise known as “Student City” formally began on December 8th, 1990. Initially, the protests started with slogans and political and economic demands. However, within a day, the protest became massive with thousands of students participating. By December 10th, 1990, the protesters began to organize and the protest became an insurmountable problem for the regime, and hence an important factor in the political scene. In these circumstances, the regime had to solve the problem it

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presented. On their own side, the students demanded to meet with the leader of the regime. The meeting of the student representation with the head of the Communist system Ramiz Alia was held on December 11th, 1990. The meeting between Ramiz Alia and the student representation was attended by about 30 people. The student representation was composed mainly of students but there were a few lecturers as well. The student representation was elected without a technical vote, but with consultation, acclamation, and nominal consensus among protesting students. It is worth mentioning that this student representation was the first legitimate representative group democratically elected outside the structures controlled by the system in the period after World War II. Among the students were also four representatives of the Youth Union of the ALP, a compromise understandable given the circumstances of the time. From the elected students, none of them was a member of the ALP. However, two of them were candidates for ALP membership. Two members of the Youth Union were secretaries of their respective youth organization. From the lecturers, some of them were members of the ALP. None of the students came directly from a persecuted political family. Some of them, however, before coming to university had worked for many years (clearly a discriminatory sign that they were not liked by the regime). The majority of them came from peripheral districts. None of the students participating in the meeting had studied or lived outside of Albania, so their knowledge of Western reality, unlike the intellectuals of August 1990, was based mainly on indirect knowledge acquired through reading or otherwise. A group of students had first met Alia at midnight on December 8th. Alia agreed to further talk to them in the coming days. And yet, between December 8th and December 10th, the emergence of the Student Movement had changed the political equation and the political situation in the country. The Student Movement had already become a well-known social fact. The international media had reported on it. The families of the students were aware that their relatives were involved or present in these protests, and they supported them. A large number of Tirana citizens and districts solidarized with students, including four or five intellectuals who had participated in Ramiz Alia’s meeting with intellectuals in August 1990. Earlier, in October, the most famous Albanian writer Ismail Kadare had fled and sought political refuge in France, accusing the regime and Alia himself of being unreformable. In contrast to the meeting of Alia with the intellectuals, the meeting with the student representation took place in different circumstances. Given that the students were presenting demands, there was no place for conversation but Alia and the student representation had to conduct political negotiations. It follows that there was no place for consultations but for the presentation of demands for concrete pressure and change. More importantly, Alia himself was not seen as a symbol of change, but as a problematic factor that did not allow change. Unlike the case with the intellectuals, no student had a prior acquaintance with Alia. He did not

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know their names or families, did not know their fields of study, and could not create personal referrals, as happened most of the time at the meeting with intellectuals. The meeting with the students focused precisely and exclusively on the topic that was not even mentioned in the meeting with the intellectuals, and that was rejected by all the intellectuals: the establishment of political pluralism. In the meeting, Ramiz Alia announced the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the ALP to allow electoral pluralism. However, the decision of the ALP was considered insufficient by the student representation, and rightly so. The student representation demanded political pluralism. It sought further clarification, it requested legal guarantees for a fair competition. Throughout the meeting, the student representation did not make any positive remarks regarding the ALP and the manner in which it had led the Albanian state and its society. On the contrary, the students were very critical of the ALP and its leadership.

The Concept of Democracy in December 1990 The analysis of the discussions and the discourse of the meeting of Ramiz Alia with the student representation shows that the understanding of political processes of the youth elite of the time was much more advanced than the vision of the intellectual elite of the regime and in line with the contemporary understanding of democracy. Even the relatively incomplete transcript published by Meksi shows that their understanding of democracy was very close to the contemporary conceptualization of democratic and pluralistic societies in advanced democratic societies.18 From the outset, students referred to Alia not as First Secretary of the ALP but as President (Chairman of the Presidium), separating his state position from his party post. One should remember that according to the Constitution of the Albanian People’s Socialist Republic of 1976, the ALP was the only leading political force in the state and the society. This was a significant warning signal to the regime that the status quo was not acceptable to the students. Furthermore, students refused to be involved with or be represented by the youth organization of the ALP, The Youth Union. They considered this organization as part of the system, which they were rejecting, and as their opponent. They noted that political pluralism was “the highest degree of democracy.” In this meeting, the student representation expressed the intention to fight for electoral representation and parliamentary representation. They demanded the resignation of officials and requested investigations of the Interior Ministry officials for their acts of violence and the violations of rights. Going a step further, they requested the publication of the prohibited international documents in the field of human rights. In broadening their democratic concept, they sought legal guarantees for the freedom of religion, the freedom of speech, and the freedom of the press without censorship. They also demanded concrete economic measures aimed at getting the country out

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of the deep economic crisis. In the end, but with an understandable youthful enthusiasm, the students sought to end their political and class persecution, to inform the public of their movement, and appealed to “all those who love Albania” to join them. In political terms, the students’ concept of democracy in December 1990 was much more in line with contemporary concepts of democracy than that of any other public personae, group, or official in Albania. During his speech with the students, Alia himself, forced to make concessions, consistently placed signs of reconciliation between political pluralism and possible consequences on unity, sovereignty, and national interests—an open threat that he successfully had used in August in the meeting with the intellectuals. On his side, Alia avoided any questions related to the realistic implementation of pluralism and the rule of law. He did so by using arguments related to the legal structure (referring to the constitution, which was based on one-party rule) or to the problematic situation of the country, or by claiming that the students should seek more information. The implication of Alia’s behavior was clear. Formally, the ALP would agree with pluralism, but without affecting stability, which implied the stability of the regime and of the system dominated by the ALP. Alia was refusing to accept the establishment of a multiparty political system. This approach that was intended to undermine the establishment and the functioning of a pluralistic democratic system does not come out clearly and convincingly from the discussion with students. However, the intention to undermine the pluralist system is clearly present in the transcripts of the meetings of the Political Bureau of the ALP and of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the ALP that took place on the same day. On the basis of the materials, particularly of the late-evening film footage of the meeting of the Political Bureau of the ALP, recently made available, it is clear that the Student Movement was not seen as peaceful and apparently was not even acceptable to the leadership of the party and the state. At the Political Bureau’s meeting, some Politburo members wanted to use force against the students. Alia agrees with them that they could use the army and the security services against students. However, he is afraid that this would be more damaging. He asks: Do we gain anything? Only the burial of those whom you would massacre will turn into another great manifestation that we cannot afford in any way … one person is killed at the border and there is so much concern all over Albania. Let alone to do such a thing [to massacre students].19 Several important members of the Political Bureau and the ALP call the students “hooligans” and “hippies” and openly refuse to accept their request for real political pluralism.20 At a maximum they would tolerate a new student organization as an electoral subject, but they would go no further than that. One of these Political Bureau members, Foto Çami, who was

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in charge of ideological issues, culture, and education, clearly shows the gap between the real Albania (represented by the students) and the surreal Albania (represented by the Political Bureau). He tells his colleagues that: if we do not accept the pluralistic party system today, it will be forced on us tomorrow. There is huge pressure from the whole reactionaries and the international bourgeoisie, so this issue cannot be avoided. It is one of the fundamental issues for the enemy to force us to change.21 Furthermore, Alia noted that he would be ready to offer and accept the establishment of “pluralism of thought,” that is, electoral pluralism. The consensus of the Politburo was that if the student representatives demanded political pluralism, then Alia should oppose them. Thus, even on December 11th, 1990, for the ALP, pluralism was the enemy’s demand and the students were their spokespersons. Yet, the students persistently demanded the establishment of a multiparty political system, which caught Alia and the Politburo unprepared. This was the crux of the matter and the critical moment of the radical change of the political system. In his extraordinary message that Ramiz Alia directed to citizens through RTSH, the state television, on December 12th, 1990, noticeably, he speaks from the position of the leader of the ALP and not that of the President of a state that just has already allowed the establishment of political pluralism. Among other things, Alia says, “I call upon the Albanian communists … to stand in the forefront of the struggle for the realization of the program of the democratization of the society undertaken by their party.”22 Only a day later, he held meetings with the Youth Union representatives and especially with the party members in the state security, secret police, and military intelligence, using harsh rhetoric against students and the new nascent political forces. After the meeting with Alia in the night of December 11th, 1990, the student representation rejoiced with all other students because they had fulfilled their most important demand: the establishment of political pluralism. Despite the details of their conversation with Ramiz Alia, which were indications of lack of experience or little preliminary acquaintance among students themselves, success was achieved at the second that Alia acquiesced to their demand about the establishment of political pluralism. Everything else serves to assess their understanding of democracy, pluralism, and other technical aspects of how the pluralistic system was supposed to function. The difference between the students and the lecturers in their understanding of the democratic processes and in their understanding of what was going to happen is striking. The latter, although they afterwards became important political figures of the new opposition, were significantly more reverential to Alia and pragmatic, accepting his political arguments to the point of praising his individual role with the highest marks. This overly respectful behavior is not noticed among the student speakers, quite the contrary. They reject many

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of Alia’s arguments, are determined to establish a democratic pluralistic system, do not display any signs of positive evaluation for the ALP, and have no doubts that Ramiz Alia himself was the leader of a system that should be changed as soon as possible. In the political discourse during the time of the Student Movement days, new arguments and competing visions for the future of Albania are introduced and debated. Among such arguments and topics are the need for a process of integration of Albania into the EU and for openness to the West, the need for free and competitive elections, the need for the establishment of a state of law, and the recognition of international practices regarding various freedoms and rights such as the need for free press and free thought. Very importantly, part of the debates and the arguments is a sense of urgency that there is the need for the reassessment of historical figures which had been denigrated by the regime, as well as the considerations of the efforts of the Albanians in Kosova from a national perspective. Much has been made of the argument that the Student Movement was a movement about economic demands and for the improvement of living conditions. This claim does not stand up to scrutiny. The events of December 1990 took their impetus from the economic conditions and the squalid living conditions in the Student City, but this was only for a very brief moment. From the very first moments of confrontation the protests were transformed as they were, into clear political acts. The official statement of the Student Commission, their speeches, the public calls, and everything else had a clearly and unmistakable political nature. The inalienable political nature of the student protests is also confirmed by the head of the regime in the newly uncovered speeches and videos of the time. Referring to the negotiations on December 10th, 1990, just a day before the meeting with the student representation, Ramiz Alia writes that: the student movement was organized and aimed at something else. Specifically, they were requesting the legalization of their organization as an alternative political force, hence, in concrete terms, they were demanded to solve the problem of the political pluralism. Students, or other forces that sought to use the student movement were no longer talking about any student organization within the Youth Union or that would exist in parallel with it. Now the question was whether or not to allow the creation of other parties, alongside the Albanian Labor Party.23 Based on the analysis of the materials, events, statements, and memories that are available, the Student Movement has a unique and special place in Albanian modern history. In fact, it becomes the most important factor and catalyst in changing the political system. In the hierarchy of the events of significance, the meeting of Alia with the intellectuals remains a minor event. The crisis of the embassies is a much more influential event. However, the Student Movement remains unique in its

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form, in its organization, in the concepts that it embraced, and in the change that it was able to bring in Albania. The Albania of December 11th, 1990, the day when the meeting took place, and the Albania of December 12th, when the first opposition political party was announced, would not be the same. Everything had changed, and this change was mainly thanks to the students and their Movement.

Conclusion In conclusion, the comparative analysis of the two respective meetings of Ramiz Alia, first with the intellectuals and then with the students, shows clearly that both groups played different roles in the political processes. This analysis shows that the students were able to bring about the desired political change and that the intellectuals failed. In the analysis of the two events, we should keep in mind the circumstances in which both these factors found themselves, the influence that they had on the political processes, and the consequences of their action and inaction. However, the contrast could not be clearer. The meeting of Alia with the intellectuals showed that the intellectual elite was very pragmatic and was working with the regime. The intellectuals held a minimalist vision of democracy and their conceptualization of pluralist politics was very narrow. In contrast with them, the students showed political maturity and a better understanding of democracy and pluralist politics. It is obvious that political change in Albania in December 1990 was not the product of intellectual elites and, certainly, if the protests and Student Movement had not happened, the process of change would have happened much later and it would have been far more controlled by elite groups of different levels within the existing regime. This conclusion is intended to shed light on the truth of what happened. It is intended neither to serve to blame the intellectuals nor to misinterpret the role of the political and public elites of that period. Intellectual elites of the time were the product of a society, a reality, a formation, and a unique governing experiment—from which there could be no other angle of evaluating the situation and acting politically. The responsibility for the situation was with the regime that had shaped and deformed them in this way. In general, the Communist regime left Albania without Western-educated elites, without any liberal thinkers, without free citizens able to think and act on their own, and without meaningful social mechanisms that promote change. People were fighting to survive the difficult economic circumstances. As a result, Albania was the last country in Eastern Central Europe to change its political system and embrace democracy. It did so after 100 years of existence under various dictatorships and lacking democratic experiences and the democratic tradition. The Albanian authoritarian regimes did not allow political elites and competitive elections. They did not allow dissent, and Western cultural influences were

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viewed as detrimental. Furthermore, they did not allow the Diaspora’s involvement in domestic problems. When it came to foreign influences, the Albanian authoritarian elites did not allow the introduction of the concepts of freedoms and rights, enshrined in various charters and the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In short, they did not allow for some form of liberalization as it had happened in Eastern Central Europe. In short, the regime did not permit the development of civic and political institutions that would be based on trust, or a professional promotion system on non-ideological grounds that would have preserved the rule of law and state. Many of the intellectuals were a by-product of the system. The students were shaped by their aspirations and ideals. The differences between the intellectuals, who rapidly came to dominate the opposition parties, and the students that were subsequently marginalized, were easily noticeable in their political activity after the events of December 1990. After the establishment of pluralism, the opposition led by the intellectuals addressed the ALP for technical assistance to establish offices, and it requested funding and support. Many of the opposition parties led by the intellectuals lost much of their oppositional credentials when, only several days before the March 31st, 1991 elections, they appealed to the people to vote for and support Ramiz Alia, the leader of the ALP and the former dictator. Furthermore, the opposition promised free and independent media. However, very symbolically, the first and second newspapers that were published as independent press were, in fact, party journals. Contrary to pressure by the students and others for change, in January 1991, the opposition agreed to a political pact with the ALP, which stopped all strikes and protests. Finally, all political parties agreed in March 1991 to compete with seven fictitious entities, satellite organizations of the ALP, and that the elections would be run by the Central Electoral Commission, the chairman and members of which were also competing for the ALP as candidates in the elections. To the students, and particularly to the participants in the Student Movement, this state of affairs was perplexing. By January 16th, 1991, a law was passed which protected the statue of Enver Hoxha and other statues from desecration. This unnatural coexistence between a democratic system, a pluralistic multiparty system, and the ubiquitous presence of the dictator and his name, statues, and portraits was unacceptable. It is not surprising that the students acted. The student initiative in February 1991 for the removal of the dictator’s name led to the hunger strike, but students were faced with hostility from the regime and from the opposition as well. Events and actions like the Hunger Strike, which led to the removal of the name of Enver Hoxha from the university and the overthrow of his statue in Skënderbej Square, highlight the marked difference between the students’ concept of democracy and the new party system

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that was evolving. This conflict included the new political parties which students had helped found, but in which they no longer had an influential role.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

(Shqiptarja.com TV, 2015a). (Krasniqi, 1998). (Uçi, 2012). (Kadare, 2010). (Berisha, 2010). (Halili and Shala, 1993: 160). (Shqiptarja.com TV, 2015a). (Halili and Shala, 1993: 162). (Shqiptarja.com TV, 2015a). (Kadare, 2010). (Shqiptarja.com TV, 2015a). (Berisha, 2010). (Pëllumbi, 2015). (Pëllumbi, 2015). (Progni, 2013: 35). (Biberaj, 2011: 95). (Biberaj, 2011: 87). (Meksi, 2010). (Meksi, 2010: 14). (Meksi, 2010: 25). (Meksi, 2010: 15). (Meksi, 2010: 77). (Halili and Shala, 1993: 190).

Bibliography Documents, materials, and reports from the State Archives and the Archive of the Albanian Party of Labor. Abrahams, Fred. 2015. Shqipëria e re. Tiranë: Dudaj. Alia, Ramiz. 2010. Jeta Ime. Tiranë: Toena. Berisha, Sali. 2010. “Intervistë.” Opinion, TV Klan, December 11th. Biberaj, Elez. 2011. Shqipëria në tranzicion. Rruga e vështirë drejt demokracisë 1990–2010. Tiranë: AIIS. Bufi, Ylli. 2016. Në fillimet e tranzicionit. Tiranë: UET Press. Fevziu, Blendi. 2012. Piedestale pa statuja. Tiranë: UET Press. Grup Autorësh. 2011. Dhjetor '90, mbaj mend: kujtime e refleksione. Durrës: Mileniumi i Ri. Halili, Llukman. 2016. Lëvizja Studentore shqiptare 1990–91. Tiranë: Princi. Halili, Llukman and Blerim Shala. 1993. Unë Ramiz Alia, dëshmoj për historinë. Tiranë: Dituria. Hana, Lulzim and Ilia Telo. 2005. Tranzicioni në Shqipëri: arritje dhe sfida. Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave. Kadare, Ismail. 2010. “Intervistë.” Opinion TV Klan, October 30th. Kadare, Ismail. 2015. Nga një dhjetor në tjetrin. Tiranë: Onufri.

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Krasniqi, Afrim. 1998. Fundi I Siberisë Shqiptare: Lëvizja Studentore, Dhjetor 1990– Shkurt 1991. Tiranë:Shtëpia Botuese Albin. Krasniqi, Afrim. 2006. Partitë Politike në Shqipëri 1920–2006. Tiranë: Edlor. Krasniqi, Afrim. 2009. Sistemet politike në Shqipëri 1912–2008. Tiranë: UFO Press. Meksi, Aleksander. 2010. Dhjetor ‘90, Dokumente & Materiale. Tiranë: UET Press. Ngjela, Spartak. 2013. Përkulja dhe rënia e Tiranës shqiptare, 1991–1996. Tiranë: UET Press. Pëllumbi, Servet. 2006. Pluralizmi politik: përvojë dhe sfidë. Tiranë: Rinia. Pëllumbi, Servet. 2015. Përmbysja e “komunizmit”. Tiranë: UET Press. Progni, Luljeta. 2013. Pardesytë e bardha. Tiranë: Gent Grafik. Rama, Shinasi. 2012. Përrallat e tranzicionit shqiptar. Tiranë: Princi. Rama, Shinasi. 2015. Për lëvizjen Studentore shqiptare 1990–1991. Tiranë: Princi. Shqiptarja.com TV. 2015a. “Ramiz Alia’s Meeting with the Intellectuals.” YouTube, August 12th. Accessed March 21st, 2018. Available at: https://www.you tube.com/watch?v=e1j2fVkmh3U&t=859s Shqiptarja.com TV. 2015b. “Biseda mes Ramizit, Kadaresë dhe Berishës në 1990 Pjesa e 1.” AI Report, YouTube, August 12th. Accessed May 19th, 2017. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e1j2fVkmh3U Uçi, Alfred. 2012. “Si u manipulua takimi I intelektualëve me Ramiz Alinë.” Gazeta “Telegraf”, February 16th.

Part III

Political Change And The Student Movement In Albania: Three Perspectives

10 Making Sense Of Albanian Events International Interpretations And Responses Miranda Vickers

Towards the end of 1989 world attention had been focused on the momentous events in Eastern Europe that transformed the region’s political landscape. In the southeastern corner of Europe, however, Albania remained hermetically sealed off from the outside world, frozen in time, stranded in a different epoch from the rest of the continent. All that was generally known of the country was that it had a hardline Communist regime and that it had once had a king called Zog. It was not until the summer of 1990 that international attention began to look at developments in Albania when the European media ran the dramatic headlines: “Eastern Europe’s last domino set to fall”; “Albania on the brink”; “The last bastion of Stalinism about to collapse.” These headlines were in response to the disturbing scenes which saw thousands of Albanians scrambling to get into foreign embassies in Tirana. Apart from small snippets in the specialist media, this was the first time most Europeans would have heard of Albania. The international press were predicting widespread violence and the bloody overthrow of Ramiz Alia’s regime within weeks. The American magazine Newsweek held that Albania was “at the edge of revolution” but as we know, this revolution never happened. Why did the Western media get it so wrong? Firstly, Albania was an unknown entity unlike the other Communist bloc countries, and secondly, aside from the various Albanian diaspora groups, there were virtually no informed Western experts able to comment or accurately analyse the fast-moving situation. This led to confusion and misinterpretation of what was actually happening in Albania. The rapidity of the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe culminating in the execution of President Ceausescu had obviously sent shock waves throughout the Albanian ruling elite. Surely Albania was next? Albanians had watched the Eastern European revolutions on their television screens and many Western journalists believed the country’s youth would surely not miss this opportunity to take to the streets and topple the regime that was imprisoning them in such a harsh time-warp. Charles Maynell, an Eastern European analyst, wrote in The Times, “Ramiz Alia, the hapless president, will be lucky to hang on for six weeks.”1

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Throughout January 1990, there had been small outbreaks of unrest in Tirana, Kavaje, and Berat but the most serious had been in Shkoder, when around 4000 mostly students tried to topple a bust of Stalin. By the standards of other Eastern European states, however, these protests were insignificant and apparently leaderless and without clear objectives. Nevertheless, for Albania they were remarkable. Despite Ramiz Alia’s denunciation of events in Eastern Europe as “the ruling class having deviated from true Marxist-Leninism,” the Albanian regime was quick to realize that the winds of change were inevitably blowing southwards. As a result, at the beginning of May Alia launched a cautious programme of political and economic reforms which went virtually unnoticed outside Albania. They were prefaced by a series of events that were often unconnected, but whose timing was not coincidental. Together these spelt out the absolute necessity of changes in Albania. As well as student unrest, the intelligentsia had been attacking Stalinism in their books and the media. The economists had been warning that as Albania’s most important commercial partners, all members of Comecon, began trading in hard currencies, the Albanian lek would become a useless anachronism. Ramiz Alia’s reforms broke almost every seminal tenet of his late master Enver Hoxha, as he began to reduce the number of references to Hoxha in his Central Committee speeches. But the destruction of the Hoxha myth was difficult because sections in the party were still being controlled by Hoxha’s widow, Nexhmije, who had her own hardline group on the Politburo—the “Group of the Widow”—which acted as the guardian of tradition and Enverist orthodoxy. This confirmed what many Western analysts believed, that Enver Hoxha was still ruling Albania from the grave. With the outside world still coming to terms with the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, it was the unrest in July 1990, when security forces violently dispersed anti-government demonstrators in Tirana, that first made the international community sit up and take notice of Albania. Immediately following the violence four Albanians sought asylum in the embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany and over the next few days, several thousand others followed their example and sought refuge in other foreign embassies. The dramatic scenes were reminiscent of the previous summer’s rush by East German families into the West German Embassy in Prague that sparked the fall of Communist rule throughout the Eastern bloc. For the first time ever, Albania dominated European news as the story of “Albanians’ scramble for freedom from Europe’s last bastion of Stalinism” was headlined across Europe. This was the worst crisis Alia had had to face and it reflected the Party of Labor’s (PLA’s) declining control over the domestic political scene. Some Western diplomats believed that the whole embassy issue was orchestrated by the Sigurimi itself in order to create a crisis to justify their opposition to the reforms. In a burst of crisis management, the beleaguered Albanian regime announced more cabinet changes, suggesting that Ramiz Alia could be

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exploiting the embassy crisis to step up the process of reform. In what, to outsiders, looked like an attempt to fend off the prospect of yet more Albanians flooding into the embassies by improving the dire routine of food and consumer goods shortages, Alia reshuffled the cabinet, removing the ministers in charge of the food and consumer goods industries. Anticipating strong resistance to his reforms, Alia rationed the ammunition available to the Sigurimi, capitalized on the Kosovo issue to deploy a sizable section of the army on the Yugoslav border, and planned a series of changes in the political hierarchy. At this stage Western observers began to look more closely at Albania, but it was still generally considered that Alia still had a number of factors working in his favour. There were no organized dissidents, no clear demands from the protestors, and no Vaclav Havel or Lech Walesa waiting in the wings. Alia had met resistance from radicals and diehards alike. The radicals— mainly young intellectuals—felt that his reforms were too little too late and feared that as in the past, practice would again fall short of the promise, hence their “invasion” of the embassies in Tirana. The hardliners, on the other hand, blamed Alia for the turmoil and unleashing a flood of rising expectations and could not stop the flow. In fact, as we know, the flow was stemmed. Although there was discontent in various pockets around the country, none of this was visible to foreign visitors, of which I was one. I entered Albania from Hani Hot in July 1990 in a small tour group that included a German, two Frenchmen, an Italian, and eight British nationals. Initially most of the group appeared to be either archaeologists, naturalists, or plain tourists. By the end of the week it turned out that at least five were journalists and several others were intelligence gatherers. To our surprise, the country appeared more or less calm. There seemed to be no nationwide revolution, Polish-style, in the offing and any imitation of it could doubtless have been met by sealing off each of the country’s 26 administrative districts and cutting communications. Nevertheless, the regime went to great lengths to ensure that foreign groups had no contact with each other. At the time of my visit, there were three other foreign tour groups visiting the country and the regime made sure we did not meet by staggering the timetables so that one group left a town as another arrived. Sigurimi secret police were stationed both inside and in the surrounding streets of each tourist hotel, making it impossible to meet and talk with ordinary Albanians. Many of the embassy refugees were critical of the country’s intellectuals for failing to articulate clear political demands as Vaclav Havel and Alexander Solzhenitsyn had done for Czechoslovakia and Russia. Albania’s foremost intellectual and the only one known outside Albania, Ismail Kadare, eventually fled the country for Paris in October 1990, where he declared, “the promises of democracy are dead.” Predictably, the Party newspaper Zeri-i-Popullit gave the briefest of cover to Kadare’s “treacherous act”. The day after the news, a university student met a Western journalist by chance, who asked her what she thought of Kadare’s

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departure: “There was a pause,” he wrote, “and then a hand touched a black pullover. She was in mourning, she said. Tears seemed about to flow.”2 Young people, especially students, felt betrayed by Kadare’s departure. Although they realized the intellectuals were too divided to confront Alia with a common stand, they did look to Kadare as their symbol. His departure had emphasized a sense of isolation and despair. In October 1990 a meeting was hastily convened in London’s Chatham House—the world’s most influential non-US political think tank—to try to analyse the deteriorating situation in Albania. Around the table sat British government officials together with the small handful of academics and journalists who knew anything about Albania. After a heated debate the meeting concluded that for the present time Communist rule in Albania was probably relatively secure and that a controlled revolution from the top was more likely than a nationwide revolution from below. It was generally agreed that the embassies in Tirana had served as a kind of safety valve for the discontented, and Ramiz Alia appeared to be trying to provide alternative avenues for the mitigation of grievances. Despite the eagerness of young Albanians to emigrate, many of the older generation remained as suspicious of the West’s commitments to Albania’s “freedom” as many Czechs and Slovaks in the years after Munich. Memories die hard, and in the years before Hoxha’s dictatorship, the West did little or nothing to preserve Albania’s national integrity or ensure its democratic development. Two years after its independence in 1912, the country became a “Western” battleground and ceased to exist and after its re-emergence in the Twenties, Italy enforced a virtual protectorate. A few weeks after the embassy sieges, one of Europe’s longest-running diplomatic disputes—a Balkan tale of sunken British warships and confiscated Albanian gold—came to an end when the British Foreign Office announced that talks would begin to discuss the reopening of diplomatic links with Albania. This followed on from the meeting between Margaret Thatcher and Ramiz Alia in New York the previous month and was seen by Britain as Alia’s wish to encourage desperately needed foreign investment and to demonstrate his country’s newfound liberal commitment. The main reason that outside observers believed there was no imminent threat to the Albanian regime was because there was no organized opposition. Rather there was a mass of angry, frustrated young people who were longing for basic freedoms. The students were poorly organized and initially did not appear to have demands beyond improving their own living conditions. However, that all changed following the large student demonstrations which began in Tirana on December 8th, 1990. Two days later the student protestors issued a list of demands, which for the first time included the introduction of a full multiparty system for the forthcoming elections to the People’s Assembly scheduled for February 1991. As support for the student demonstrations grew amongst the wider public, people flocked to join the students from across Tirana.

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Alia only had two choices, either to use armed force to suppress the demonstrators or to accept their demands and allow political pluralism. After emergency discussions with the Central Committee, the use of force was ruled out because it would have inevitably resulted in massive bloodshed. In Britain The Times newspaper ran the headline: “Albania Braces for a Revolution Waiting to Happen” and concluded in its main editorial that, “Albania’s days are numbered and we must draw the ominous comparisons between Ceausescu’s Romania and the problems of President Alia.” Fearful of the growing unrest, Alia forced through a new package of reforms—the most radical so far undertaken—allowing opposition parties to form, ordering a government reshuffle, and sacking almost half the ruling Politburo. As a result, on December 11th, the Central Committee of the PLA finally agreed to legalize independent political parties. The formation of the Democratic Party was announced the next day. Only a few weeks previously, the idea of a multiparty system had seemed unthinkable, yet despite all the resentment amongst the youth and the unemployed, the opposition still appeared to be unsure that the dislike of the regime would alone be enough to unseat the party that had held power for the past 46 years. The unexpected reforms brought mixed reactions from Albania watchers in the West. One sceptical analyst described the watershed changes as only, “window dressing and due to power struggles inside the party leadership. It looks good and costs nothing. If any independent parties emerge they will not have time to organize ahead of the proposed first multi-party elections.”3 Another analyst described the changes as “early Gorbachev”, but was cautious about what political pluralism might mean for Albania. “There is absolutely no democratic tradition there, and the communists can rightly claim, unlike most in Eastern Europe, that the system was not imposed from outside.”4 Albania’s uncertain fate was ominously reflected in mid-December when disturbances throughout the country exposed the dangers facing the regime as it tried to liberalize without losing control. This was particularly evident following violence in Shkoder and Elbasan, where the opposition, i.e., the Democratic Party, joined the Communist government in blaming “Dark Forces” trying to block moves towards democracy. The Democrats were worried that hopes for a peaceful transition to democracy would be derailed by the violence. Some Western analysts argued that Belgrade had an obvious vested interest in destabilizing Albania, whilst others blamed Athens for stirring up dissent in the south of the country. But as 1991 dawned, international attention became focused away from Eastern Europe and towards the prospect of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. The Balkans suddenly became the new news story and because of Yugoslavia’s large ethnic Albanian population, Albania now became geopolitically important. Consequently, numerous diplomatic missions quickly opened, whilst journalists, missionaries, aid agencies, and do-gooders of all persuasions flooded the country. However, the capacity of Western

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governments and international agencies to influence events during this period was limited. Meanwhile, Albanians had begun to flee the country on remote mountain tracks and even across water. On January 6th, around 70 Albanians fled during the night to the Montenegrin town of Ulcinj, using the inner tubes of tyres and makeshift rafts to cross the Bojana River which marks the frontier. At the same time, far to the south, small groups trekked through the treacherous frozen mountain passes into Greece. Albania’s border controls had collapsed and the country’s physical isolation had ended. Despite this inevitable process, the predicted bloody revolution never happened and Ramiz Alia survived to win the first multiparty elections. Had he opted for a tough approach, the country would very likely have witnessed much bloodshed. Alia had successfully prevented this by repeatedly making concessions. Nevertheless, Albania’s remarkable journey from the most repressive Communist regime in Europe to the “relatively” calm democracy we see today is tainted with serious irony. Unlike the rest of Eastern Europe, Albania was able to pass from a hardline one-party state to political pluralism without any kind of revolution and bloodshed. Yet, just five years into “democracy”, the country was brought to the virtual brink of outright civil war which caused the deaths of more than 4000 people.

Notes 1 Maynell, Charles. 1990. “Albania Braces for a Revolution Waiting to Happen,” The Times, July 14th. 2 Petar Hadji-Ristic. 1991. “Shaking Albania’s Torpor.” Index on Censorship 1: 10. 3 The Guardian, December 12th, 1990. 4 The Guardian, December 12th, 1990.

11 Heroes And Myths Fred Abrahams

Twenty-five years since the fall of Communism in Albania, the myth of a popular revolution largely prevails. The narrative is compelling: long isolated and repressed, a courageous people arose to overthrow their oppressors and to rejoin the world. But what type of a revolution did Albania experience? And what social forces drove the change? The first step toward an answer is to understand the context of the time. In the week when mass protest erupted in Albania, in July 1990, when about 7000 people stormed the foreign embassies in Tirana, the Berlin Wall had already been opened and destroyed. Nicolae Ceaus¸escu was dead and the Cold War was getting its first mentions in the history books. Albania stood as Europe’s last Communist state, and it was a matter of time before the regime succumbed. Ramiz Alia and most of the party leadership understood this very well. They had already introduced timid reforms, especially as glasnost and perestroika grew in the Soviet Union, and this intensified after the killing of Ceaus¸escu and his wife. The motivation for change, these ex-leaders say, was to promote Albania’s democratic development. The more pressing reason, in all likelihood, was their desire to preserve power and, most importantly, to protect their lives. As then deputy foreign minister Muhamet Kapllani explained, “They were thinking: this could happen to us.” 1 In May 1990, the party legalized the private practice of law and reopened the Ministry of Justice. It removed internment and expulsion as punishments, and reduced the illegal crossing of Albania’s borders from a counter-revolutionary act to a criminal offense. In June, parliament legalized the issuance of passports. The so-called “Spring of the Albanian media” followed, with bold proclamations in newspapers about freedom of religion and speech—all with Ramiz Alia’s direct or implicit consent. This is not to say that all changes came from above, and to claim this would ignore the courage and determination of Albanians who had long suffered under Europe’s most totalitarian regime. If the changes in Albania were largely introduced with reform from above, they were driven by revolt from below.

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The first example of this is the January 1990 protest in Shkoder, when a few hundred people tried to topple the bust of Stalin in the center of town. Next came protests in Kavaja, the so-called “silent protest” in Tirana, and, most significantly, the July 1990 storming of the diplomatic quarter in Tirana. These set the stage for the largest popular protest and the death blow to the regime: the Student Movement of December 1990. Already prior to December, the students were cause for concern. The Tirana elite that was peddling Alia’s reform could be managed but the Stalinhaters in Shkoder, the rebel-rousers in Kavaja, and the restive students in Tirana could not be controlled. The government postponed the start of classes for two weeks, claiming that university buildings needed repair. The students knew of Communism’s fate in Eastern Europe from Italian and Yugoslav television. Many of them came from other cities, including Shkoder and Kavaja. They had hoped Alia would follow through on his promises of change. Instead, every move was mixed. The government issued passports, but soldiers shot those attempting to flee. Taboo topics appeared in the media, but Alia slandered those who wanted to leave. As winter neared, the students’ anger grew. The university and Student City had broken windows, no heat, sporadic water, and electricity cuts, made worse that year by a drought. When the lights went out at night, voices sprang from the dormitories: “Freedom!” “We want democracy!” Students banged on the heating pipes. Music students answered with a chorus of horns. On the evening of December 8th, the lights went out—again. A small group of students gathered in Student City to protest. They rumbled into town and were blocked by police. But it sparked a fire that the party could not contain, spreading across Student City, and then Tirana and beyond. Some members of Tirana’s political elite mobilized right away. They understood that the students represented a powerful force, a rising wave. They gathered their surfboards and offered support. At the same time, they maintained close ties with Alia, even serving as messengers and negotiators between the two sides. When Alia finally met a large student delegation at the presidential palace on December 11th and announced the legalization of pluralism he had played a cunning trick. He had snatched victory from the students’ hands. They had started the protest, but he would take credit for allowing reform; he would dictate the pace of change. The first opposition party, the Democratic Party (DP), was formed the next day, and Alia responded well. He was relieved that trusted individuals, many of them still party members, had taken the lead. They were not the traditional anti-Communist forces he feared, the nationalists or monarchists, nor wild protesters from the street. On the contrary, the DP was led by intellectuals with ties to the regime. From the start, some students and the key non-student DP leaders clashed. Younger and more radical, the students wanted proper change. At that point, the institution where they studied was still called Enver Hoxha

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University. Hundreds of political prisoners remained behind bars. The DP leaders, such as Gramoz Pashko and Sali Berisha, argued for a more moderate approach. They considered it irresponsible and dangerous to challenge Alia directly. The Party of Labor had deep roots, especially in rural areas, and rapid change could provoke loyal supporters to react, they said. The DP leaders were also nervous about being labeled troublemakers and saboteurs, which they feared Alia could use to undermine reform. The different views did not split the DP at first because party members wanted to maintain a common front, and the party still needed the students for the first democratic elections scheduled for March 1991. But the debate over radical action versus conciliation grew sharper by the day. The tension played out in the formation of the party leadership. The DP at first established a “Founding Commission” with 15 members from three groups: 6 students, 5 intellectuals, and 4 workers. Each group chose its own representatives in an open vote by consensus. The student Azem Hajdari was elected provisional chair, but that did not last long. An unruly character, Hajdari was quickly removed and, after complicated machinations, the former cardiologist and party member Sali Berisha took his place. The DP’s drift from the students continued apace. The younger party members wanted to confront the regime, but the DP was cautious, and frequently met with Ramiz Alia to consult. “We did not attack communists, even Hoxha,” explained Frrok Çupi, first chief editor of the DP’s newspaper, Rilindje Demokratike. “He was an Albanian god and, if we messed that up, we could have lost everything.”2 In February 1991, another electricity cut pushed the students to act, this time at the Institute of Agriculture on the edge of Tirana. A group of students protested on February 5th and demanded that the dean resign. The dean refused and the students declared a strike until living conditions improved. Students at Enver Hoxha University joined the following day, and the protests quickly spread. As speakers in Student City took the mike, the list of demands grew: if living conditions for students did not improve, the government must resign. This expanded to “freeing the school from ideology.” Then came the most delicate ask: remove the name Enver Hoxha from the school and call it the University of Tirana. The call to remove Hoxha’s name was strategic and charged. The students meant to strike at the symbolic heart of the regime. They wanted to convey a message, especially to the rural areas, that Communism had died. The government predictably rejected the students’ demands. Removing the name would insult Albania’s past and its citizens, Alia said. To the students’ surprise and dismay, the DP leaders agreed. They feared provoking the regime and its conservative wing. The party had promised Alia that it would participate in the first elections peacefully and with respect for the law. They also thought a strike would take crucial time away from the electoral campaign. In the end, the DP could neither stop nor oppose the students, so it walked a middle line by proposing a referendum to remove Hoxha’s name.

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“The Democratic Party believes that stability cannot be attained by closing our ears, objecting to or denying the request of the students to remove the name of Enver Hoxha from the University of Tirana,” a carefully worded statement said. “Fulfillment of the students’ request through a referendum of the students and staff of the university does not affect the figure of Enver Hoxha as the leader of the Party of Labor of Albania.”3 The theater in Student City grew by the day. The newly established Independent Trade Union announced a general strike if the students’ demands went unmet. A spokesman from Enver Hoxha Factory showed a petition with 2000 names calling for the workplace to be renamed the Tractor Factory. On the other side, word spread of a nebulous organization called the “Volunteers of Enver,” ready to defend the system. Unbowed, the students declared a hunger strike on February 18th. Seven hundred and twenty-three people kissed the Albanian flag (without communist star) and entered the cultural center in Student City, among them a handful of professors. Guards turned away many more due to lack of space. “Parents, brothers and sisters,” a defiant declaration from the students’ organizing committee said. “With determination and without pain we tell you that we won’t return as before to our family homes. We won’t even return in the evening. Maybe you will miss us for days and we are confident that this absence will make you proud.”4 That night, the DP sent a delegation to speak with Ramiz Alia. He urged the opposition party to use its influence with the students to get them out of the strike and to have them drop their demand for a change of the university name. The students and professors should hold a referendum, as the DP had proposed, and parliament would approve the change, Alia said. The DP members said a referendum did not meet the students’ demands, and that they could not convince the students to stop the strike. As a compromise, Education Minister Skender Gjinushi proposed that the government “reorganize” the university into four parts and, as part of that reorganization, officially change the name. The DP members agreed to present the students with his idea but, when they explained it to the protesters in Student City, they were roundly dismissed and rebuked. “Don’t use the students to make any compromise that will help you win the election,” a student said as the DP leaders left the strike.5 On February 20th, the tension at Student City span out of control, and a crowd began marching into the center of town. Green police trucks with hoses and water tanks blasted the marchers with water, forcing them past the state radio and television building, behind the Hoxha museum in the pyramid, and onto the boulevard. Riot police and water cannons waited there to defend the sacred Block where the political leadership lived and to divert the crowd down the boulevard to Skanderbeg Square. The police action was a physical manifestation of Alia’s political strategy since 1989. Albanians’ desire for change had swelled like a wave, and

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no wall could withstand that force. Rather than build a useless defense, Alia channeled the flow into areas that could be managed and controlled. Security forces waited in the square. Thousands of protesters milled about, some throwing rocks, thinking of Tiananmen Square, while looking at the 30-foot-high bronze statue of Enver Hoxha, taller still atop his granite pedestal, standing like a lightning rod in a storm. A crowd surged, was repelled by the police, and surged again. A boy climbed Hoxha’s coat and hooked a metal cable around the dictator’s thumb. Men pulled from the left, while others pushed from the right, and the Leader’s body began to tilt from side to side. Just after 2:00 pm, it separated from its base and came crashing down, predictably, to Hoxha’s left. That night, Alia gave a speech on television saying the university had been divided into four parts, and the name “Enver Hoxha” had been removed. The DP welcomed the change but its relationship with the core of the Student Movement had been damaged beyond repair. Over time, more students left the party or became inactive, replaced by a new wave of party faithful who sensed the inevitability of change. The DP lost the parliamentary elections the following month but the new government soon collapsed, and the DP joined the Communists in a coalition “Stability Government,” which also had a brief life. By that point, the transfer of power could not be stopped, and the DP convincingly won the second democratic elections in March 1992. As a political force, the students were done, and they have never regained a fraction of the power they held in December 1990. They served as a potent and useful force, skillfully managed by Tirana’s elites, both those from the old guard and those from the new. In the end, a managed transition may have been Albania’s best route. Given the extent of repression and cruelty under Communism for decades, a radical break and a true revolution could have caused a lot of bloodshed. As stymied as Albania’s transition has been due to the lack of rotation among elites, a popular uprising and full break might have led Albania to a darker place.

Notes 1 2 3 4

Author interview with Muhamet Kapllani. Author interview with Frrok Çupi. “First meeting of the Democratic Party.” Rilindja Demokratike, February 16th, 1991. “Declaration of the Organizing Committee of the Student Movement.” February 18th, 1991. 5 Mitro Çela. “Political Diary: Three Days to Overthrow Three Statues.” Rilindja Demokratike, February 23rd, 1991.

12 The Student Movement Changed Albania Forever A Reflection On Its Contribution To Modern Albanian History Llukman Halili To appreciate the Student Movement and its role in the changing of the political system we need to briefly review the nature of the regime in Albania. After the death of Enver Hoxha, and under the rule of Ramiz Alia, the Albanian political system continued to rely on the paranoia and xenophobia that were essential to the regime’s indoctrination propaganda. The ruling ideology was based on the assumption that the country was engaged in a continuous and uninterrupted struggle with deadly enemies. These enemies, as the argument went, were domestic and foreign. Their only objective was “to destroy and enslave Albania.” The propaganda war reached a point where the rulers believed that they were engaged in a “life or death” battle with these enemies, often a figment of their imagination, much like the quixotic imaginary windmills. Because of the focus on this relentless struggle, these rulers did not know their own people and did not care about it. On its part, the Albanian people, “isolated and indoctrinated,” was convinced that Albania was the vanguard of the cause of world Communism. The Albanians were told, and many believed it, that after Stalin’s death and Albania’s detachment from China, Albania was the only country in the world that was loyally and faithfully defending Marxism-Leninism. In spite of all the ideological craziness and multiple social problems, there was a bright side. The regime took pride in, and was praised for, several social achievements that were recognized also by foreigners. As Robert Seitz and Bernhard Műller point out, among the indisputable achievements of Enver Hoxha’s regime are the full eradication of illiteracy and the struggle to emancipate women, who traditionally were discriminated against, oppressed, and mistreated.1 Yet, the Hoxhaist dictatorship was undoubtedly characterized by despotic rule. It relied on excessive violence and repression, which was a mixture of terror, cruelty, and craziness. In many ways, the Stalinist, totalitarian, authoritarian, and despotic system of Enver Hoxha’s rule was much more repressive than the Stalin-installed system in the Soviet Union itself. As Arshi Pipa says: “Albanian Stalinism was more fierce than the original Stalinism itself.”2 This cruelty and the abuse of power were manifested in massive campaigns leading to arrests and internments as well as in staged processes against the “enemies.” These campaigns took place in the name of

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the so-called “class struggle” aimed at eradicating and eliminating the enemies. During these campaigns, as the evidence emerged later on, over 10,000 Albanians have disappeared, and over 700,000 others have undergone various forms of repression and persecution. Persecution was an existential circumstance, experienced in the everyday life of Albanians, and integrated in the strategy and the ideology of the regime itself. The preponderance of Enver Hoxha’s hardened conviction that Albania was surrounded by “imperialist” enemies in the West, “the revisionists” in the East, Yugoslav “Titoists” in the North, and Greek “monarcho-faschists” in the South, as well as festering with internal enemies, Trotskyites, and opportunists of all convictions and persuasions, was transformed into a system in which the life was lifeless. As a logical step in this craziness, Enver Hoxha decided to “defend the country’s independence” by realizing, in economically poor Albania, a crazy project. This was the largest and most creative military construction project in Europe’s post-war history. The state planned for and built exclusively for “defense purposes about 350,000 bunkers. This was an enormous enterprise with huge costs for the economy.”3 The craziness extended to the ideological level as well. After the destruction of the religious objects and sites in 1967, Albania was declared the only atheistic state in the world. Religion and religious structures were replaced by the cult of Enver Hoxha. Repression became the main instrument of preserving the dictator’s power. Marxism as applied in Albania was defined by many scholars as “Orthodox—Dogmatic Marxism.” This and etatist nationalism were the two key ideological pillars that characterized the despotic rule of Enver Hoxha and then of his successor Ramiz Alia. As Oliver Jens Schmitt propitiously observes, the 45-year-long Communist rule in Albania can be defined as “the rule of the totalitarian national Stalinism.”4 This helps us understand better why the widely used approaches that see the transformation of the USSR and Eastern Central Europe as a total break with the past, or as the moment of the historical “revenge” over the end of Communist monism, are not applicable to the Albanian transformation. Any effort to interpret the transformation that took place in Albania through their lenses would obfuscate key aspects of the process and render the meaning of the Albanian transition exceedingly difficult to grasp. The Albanians themselves were a different people. From the end of 1990, as Jens-Schmidt notes, in Albania “lived a people that was deeply traumatized under the unheard of ultranationalist propaganda of the regime, deeply traumatized under the influence of totalitarianism and isolation, a people that from a social aspect, was thoroughly crushed.” There was a set of severe political, economic, and social crises at the end of 1990, which manifested itself in the unbearable misery and poverty of every Albanian. Yet, while there were protests and discontent, there was no meaningful political opposition organized by the society.5 This specific situation explains also why the most vocal and intense opposition and resistance to the policies of the regime and to the situation are found predominantly among the students of the University of Tirana

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and then in the Student Movement itself. Many students were socially conscious and fully aware of the deteriorating situation in the country, under the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha, and then under Ramiz Alia as well. On its part, even the Party-State was fully aware of the danger that the students represented. This is one of the reasons why the Party-State began a propagandistic “operation” to improve the living conditions in the Student City. However, all the measures undertaken by the state had no impact on the students of the University of Tirana and did not sway them. On their part, neither Ramiz Alia himself, nor the whole apparatus of the Party-State cared much about the low living standards of the students. They were mainly disturbed by the student behavior during lectures and the opposition to their prescriptions and requirements. Yet, the students were unyielding. This stark opposition was manifest even during the earliest stages of the Student Movement. For even then, we see that the Student Movement in any of its segments was not amenable to the regime and its objectives were non-negotiable. It was not an evolution as some “scholars” claim, but it was a revolution. Slowly, but confidently, the students questioned and critically analyzed the Party’s flawed policy in the areas of the fight against religion, violent forms of centralization, total collectivization, and the complete isolation of Albania from the outside world. The students, courageously and resolutely, would tell the faculty that the historical dialectical method, central to any subject in the university studies, was unhelpful. The students openly and firmly rejected the mandatory Marxist interpretations of history. The students did not act in a vacuum and many processes influenced their thinking. Political change and transformation in Eastern and Southeastern Europe provided an impetus to their organization and resistance. On the other hand, the crazy dictatorship rule associated with unprecedented measures of class struggle and repression, the cultural alienation from the world, the thorough isolation of the country, and the extreme poverty in which they were living gave students the impetus and determination to resist and fight the dictatorship and oppose the supremacy of the Party-State. The organization of the Movement itself was evolutionary and a learning process. The protests took concrete form and began articulating with the student demands in November 1990 to improve the living conditions in the Student City. The government aimed at fulfilling the promises it made to improve the low living standard of university students. This meant rapid improvement in three essential services: heating, food, and electricity. The demands posed by the students at the Engineering Department took the regime by surprise. Immediately, the government began a thorough investigation in order to discover the students’ intentions. This constant exchange and the pressure by the governmental apparatus on the students helped foster a sense of community that manifested itself during the latter days. This sentiment of solidarity was

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manifest in the subsequent protests. During those decisive days of December, the students became even more convinced that only by sticking together would they give greater weight and legitimacy to their demands.6 In terms of the political change in Albania and the importance of the Student Movement, we notice that, initially, the forces opposed to the regime were based on specific networks and clusters of relations that were fundamentally regionally based. In the first stage of the transformation, however, the Student Movement played the central role in providing the center for subsequent organization. Its contribution is seen in the changing structure of the political forces that led the transformation processes. Subsequently, the political forces that guided and implemented the entire process of transformation in Albania were the political parties that traditionally had been active before the establishment of the Communist dictatorship (such as the Balli Kombëtar and the Movement of Legality), and the transformed Party of Labor that became the Socialist Party of Albania. However, the founding of the newly formed political party that led the processes, the Democratic Party of Albania, was an exclusive merit of the Student Movement. The Student Movement, with its courageous and organized opposition to the system, established political pluralism in Albania and it gave rise to a new political party. Its contribution was the emergence of a multiparty system that marks the end of Communism in Albania, the last standing fortress of Communism in Eastern Europe. In short, the Student Movement is the foundation of the later democratic institutional development in Albania. Did the Student Movement rise spontaneously or was it a continuation of the Albanian student movements during the twentieth century? Rama argues that student protests in Tirana, Shkodra, and Kamza and the Student Movement itself are informed by, and in their ideological lines are a continuation of, the former Albanian student movements of the twentieth century.7 In my view, however, this continuity should by no means be taken for granted. The Student Movement arose spontaneously and only later took on the contours of an organized structure and embraced the nationalist ideology.8 Having said that, in terms of its composition, the Student Movement was an all-Albanian movement. After December 8th, 1990, it spread throughout Albania, first through the universities and institutes and then into a mass movement. It was transformed from a student movement into a general social movement, including itself, in addition to thousands of students and professors as well as people from all the different strata of the population. Although at the beginning the Student Movement was focused mainly in Tirana, soon with it solidarized the students of Elbasan, Shkodra, and Korca. The solidarity they expressed in support of their fellow students in Tirana was remarkable and this led to the collapse of the Stalinist regime. By December 1990, that solidarity would strengthen the development of cooperation among the students from different universities

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and institutes. Their main objective was the complete de-politicization of the university. The new Albania that was emerging was deeply influenced by the values of the Student Movement. The Student Movement was essential in the establishment of pluralism and of a democratic system in Albania. The Student Movement took over historical responsibility in the struggle for the dismantling of the party-state and the transformation of the country into a democracy. In this context, I would like to note that Ramiz Alia insisted on his effort to manipulate the Student Movement. He tried to do so through his personal emissaries as well as through a considerable number of intellectuals. It is worth noting that almost all these intellectuals were members of the Albanian Party of Labor, who would return their party membership cards shortly after December 12th, 1990 and the creation of the Democratic Party of Albania. Regardless of the regime efforts to manipulate the Student Movement, and leaving aside various versions and conspirative theories regarding its foundation that are irrelevant to this study, the origin of the Student Movement was within the Student Movement itself; the nucleus of the students that organized and led it remained in the Student Movement, the greatest achievement of which was the organization of the decisive Hunger Strike of February 1991 to remove the name of Enver Hoxha from the university. To better understand this great achievement that was the toppling of the statue of Hoxha from the main square of the capital and the removal of the name of Enver Hoxha from the State University, one should be reminded of the situation in Albania. Ramiz Alia’s refusal to get rid of the ideological and institutional legacy of the dictator Enver Hoxha was known. It was obvious that Alia did not want to solve this problem for Enver Hoxha was the foundation of the whole system itself. Besides the transformation of the system into a multiparty system, which was the achievement of the Student Movement, there were other factors. Among these domestic factors one could mention the dire economic situation, the embassy crisis of July 2nd, 1990, the riots in Shkodër and Kavaja, and the fleeing from the country of the writer Ismail Kadare who sought political asylum in France.9 On the other hand, the decisive foreign factor that caused “the nightmare” for the Political Bureau of the Albanian Party of Labor was not the fall of the Berlin Wall, the events in Czechoslovakia, the fall of the GDR (Democratic Republic of Germany), or events in Hungary. As Ramiz Alia himself observed, what became a nightmare for the leadership was the violent execution of the Ceausescu couple in Romania on December 25th, 1989. The developments in Romania, according to Ramiz Alia, had a major, if not the decisive, impact on the acceleration of the process of reforms and on the making of the decision to legalize political pluralism. The final straw which gave the ultimate blow to the hope of the Albanian Communists to preserve the system, notes Luljeta Progni, was precisely the execution of Ceausescu: “Ramiz Alia and the Politburo were terrified of the possible Romanian scenario in Albania as well, therefore, by

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some cautious movements they created more room for movement towards democracy”10 The conviction that there was a real threat to life and possibility that they would end up as had the Romanian “leader” was stronger than all other convictions. This proved to be even stronger than the desire to defend the socialist legacy of “the beloved leader” Enver Hoxha at any price. Furthermore, the transformation process towards becoming a liberal democracy in Albania was influenced by the international community. In addition to the internal dynamics and structures of local interests, the transformation was conditioned by the international factor that played a decisive role especially for the necessary 1991–1992 reforms. During that period, the international community, Western Europe, and the United States in particular would provide the necessary economic assistance. They also would become very influential on the decision-makers influencing the country’s democratization process. One major issue regards the establishment of political pluralism. Alia declared a form of pluralism, that is, the pluralism of “political subjects” within the existing constitutional framework of the one-party system. The decision of Plenum XIII of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania on the legalization of political pluralism on December 11th, 1990 was taken with the knowledge that students were determined to demand political pluralism. This effort to offer a pluralism of political subjects, not a meaningful multiparty system, was only a desperate attempt at self-defense by the Political Bureau and Ramiz Alia. The Student Movement demanded and obtained the legalization of Albania’s multiparty system by itself. No one else could claim this achievement. No one could take this victory from the students. On his part, Ramiz Alia tried to represent himself as the nation’s savior. After 1992, Alia publicly reflected on this period. He justified his actions during the 1990s in Albania with the “Anti-Chaos Reflex” theory, i.e., that his main objective was to prevent the country from sliding into chaos. Yet, at the time, his ultimate goal and the whole strategy was to establish firm control over the Student Movement and, subsequently, over the entire process of transition. This did not work. The Hunger Strike, and its organizers and leaders, which were the students themselves, forced the regime to kneel and eventually to raise the white flag and surrender. Clearly, Alia had no control over the Student Movement. Undoubtedly, Ramiz Alia remains a central figure and the main player in these critical “moments” of political change in Albania in the 1990s.11 No one can claim this other major achievement and take it away from the students. Based on the research of the archived materials and documents, as well as on my own personal impressions, for as a journalist I was present during the unfolding of all these processes, I firmly conclude that the creation of the Democratic Party of Albania was the result and the merit of the Student Movement.

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This raises the issue of the role of the intellectuals. The short of it is that the intellectuals had failed to rise to the occasion. On August 12th, 1990, Ramiz Alia connived, with a very devious and treacherous move, a meeting of the Communist elite structure in Tirana. The formal subject was the supposed reform process, but the meeting was primarily concerned with the possible avoidance of the Romanian scenario. All the leading intellectuals were there. However, the message that came from the meeting, and that was the thread of that conversation between Alia and the intellectuals, was clearly not the establishment of political pluralism. The intellectuals did not ask for the establishment of such a system and the Party and Alia expressed readiness to apply diverse thinking to the problems, but not to establish a multiparty political system. At first (like on December 8th, 1990), the students did not clearly articulate their demands. But later on, a day or two later, the students came up with radical political demands. This qualitative change did not suit the regime which sought only the reformation of the system and not its radical change. These demands were too advanced even for the intellectuals that had expressed their readiness to be involved in this process. This brings us to the personae of Sali Berisha, the main political figure among the intellectuals of Tirana. One of the top leaders of the Student Movement, Shinasi Rama, publicly wrote that the intellectuals were sent to the students. More specifically, he claimed that Sali Berisha was the emissary of Ramiz Alia and Xhelil Gjoni to negotiate with the students. President Alia himself forcefully denied that he sent these emissaries. However, subsequent developments confirm Rama’s thesis that at Alia’s request, Sali Berisha was the intermediary between Alia and the students. Alia himself said that he sent Berisha because of the regional affiliation he had with some students (Berisha came from the same region as the so-called Student Movement leader in 1990, Azem Hajdari). According to Alia, “he was sent to calm the spirits,” a goal which he obviously failed to achieve.12 On the other hand, one has to give Berisha his due. When faced with the students’ determination not to give up to anyone and to stick to their demands at any cost, Sali Berisha switched sides. Conscious of the political situation, later on Sali Berisha abandoned the role of intermediary and joined the Movement in order to take its lead. The fact is that Sali Berisha joined the Student Movement whose objective was the establishment of the multiparty system. Afterwards, he was “installed” as opposition leader and became the leader of the main party of the opposition, the Democratic Party. On his part, Ramiz Alia himself has consistently denied that he sent Berisha to infiltrate the Student Movement and take over the Democratic Party of Albania. In my later conversation with him, President Alia would repeat several times: “He went with my order to convince the students to return to the lectures and the classrooms, but he certainly saw his political chance and stayed there, joining the students and their movement.” This view is supported by Ramiz Alia’s secretary,

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Guro Zeneli, as well: “Ramiz Alia doubted all the time in Berisha’s honesty, he was convinced Berisha would turn the new situation into its own benefit.” On his part, Sali Berisha claimed that he went to the students because of his love for democratic ideals and freedom: I went to the students because I had a platform, which is well known by everyone. Then came Gramoz Pashko, and then came a group of university lecturers and we all shared the same ideals. We had no intention to form a political party. We were passionate about establishing freedom, but the freedoms were prohibited and there was a capital punishment in the constitution for asking for freedom, and in this context, I can say that it was the movement of the purest ideals. On the other hand, as I noted, Ramiz Alia remains a central figure and the main player in these critical “moments” of political change in Albania in the 1990s. Afrim Krasniqi points out that Ramiz Alia had no influence on the Student Movement. Despite Alia’s intense efforts to manipulate the Movement, not least by using his reputation as a reformer (albeit his reforms were just cosmetic), Alia was forced, within two days, to accept the establishment of pluralism. Political pluralism was the beginning of the end for the ideological system that he represented and which he led. As Krasniqi notes: Ramiz Alia was the leader of a communist regime, he had been a lifetime on its helm and as its dictator, and his actions and decisions, in each and every case, including those taken in the years 1989–1990, concerned the preservation of this non-negotiable, existential position for him and for his collaborators. After a while, and based on facts and their analysis, history and the scholars will judge Alia. However, we can say that Ramiz Alia was a politician of the highest order.13 The Student Movement demonstrated a high level of political maturity. The maturity of the Movement is best illustrated by the “preliminary elections” that students themselves prepared, managed, and realized within the university. The outcome of these elections, the first democratic elections in Albania, was the selection of the student representation that met with Ramiz Alia and that demanded the establishment of a multiparty system. This is very important for, in a country isolated for nearly 50 years, in a country divided and closed by dictatorship, a group of students showed unprecedented political maturity in demanding political pluralism. In that meeting on December 11th, 1990, in fact, the representation of the Student Movement told Ramiz Alia that there was no other alternative but for the system to collapse and for him to leave. Students were not always in agreement on what to do and why. In the Student City, the epicenter of the Student Movement, as of December 12th, 1990 we notice the emergence of three distinct views regarding the

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direction of the development of Albania in the future. The ideological differences and arguments led to a relatively moderate polarization within it. The ideological differences heavily influenced the unity of the Movement but did not lead to its unraveling. Students active in the Movement shared three opposing platforms— basically the first expression of political pluralism—that they did not yet fully understand. It is worthwhile to examine the three ideological lines that emerged and their supporters The first political platform was in line with the political platform of the regime. According to this platform, the president Alia was “the reformer” and “the great Gorbachev” of Albania. According to this platform, the demands of the students were socialdemocratic. Therefore, change would occur within the existing value system which should not fundamentally change. The second political platform was nationalistic. According to this political platform, students and their movement should seek the establishment of the national Albanian state. The representatives of the third platform essentially aspired to Albania’s integration in the free European Market and a shift based on the values of Western civilization. According to them, Albania and the Albanians were a natural part of Europe. Looking at the course of the evolution of the Student Movement, one can clearly see how these belief systems were informing the students’ actions. For example, various student groups and individuals undertook steps to create student organizations such as the Fan S. Noli Association of Shinasi Rama and the Albanian Student Association led by Blendi Gonxhe. Their differences notwithstanding, both these two organizations would be the leadership of the historic Hunger Strike which forced the regime to surrender by removing the name of Enver Hoxha from the university and ultimately enabled the collapse of the dictator’s myth.14 Agreeing that the good of the country came first, students successfully completed their mission by bringing political, economic, and spiritual freedom to the country, the precondition for any future reform. The Student Movement in its activities aimed primarily at solving what was the key issue of the utmost national interest for the Albanians, i.e., the legalization of the multiparty system and the canalization of conflict through political means. By giving support to the emergence of new political parties, the students were aware of the possibility of their instrumentalization by the intellectuals and the regime. Yet, as one of the students pointed out, they were ready to step aside for the ultimate benefit of Albania and, “The Student Movement would become a sacrifice on the altar of freedom of Albania.”15 Some scholars like Eduard Zaloshnja argue that the Student Movement was not founded by a well-organized dissidence and, hence, it could not have a political platform for the future. Many scholars of the Student Movement, however, describe it as a civic movement based on European values that had a vision for the future. They also would note that based on this vision, one of the paramount objectives of the Student Movement was to avoid a civil war. From

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its inception, the Student Movement decidedly insisted that there should not be any kind of retaliation and revenge against their erstwhile political opponents. The future belonged to all Albanians. On the other hand, the Movement established the first opposition political party, the Democratic Party of Albania. Yet, the Student Movement quickly distanced itself from this party as well. It remained a very distinct social and political entity that had united all the Albanians with the single objectives of overthrowing the Communist system and the establishment of a multiparty political system with a historic motto: “Even we should become like all Europe.” Furthermore, the Movement had defended and supported the new parties. Thus, it had fostered the conditions for possible democratic confrontation but always in favor of the country’s future. Finally, and most importantly, the Movement implemented and successfully implemented the project of demystifying the role and cult of the dictator Enver Hoxha. By removing Enver Hoxha, the Student Movement opened up the path of meaningful confrontation and of the plurality of ideas and values. By organizing and concluding the Hunger Strike with the single request of the removal of Enver Hoxha’s name from the university, the Student Movement galvanized the people of Tirana, which in turn toppled the statue of the dictator. To persist in the achievement of your goals, even when you are faced with the threat of the use of force, is surely the best example of sacrifice in the name of the general welfare of the people. Enver Hoxha for the Movement and the students in general was “the personification of all the bad things” of the past and the dictatorship. The position of the students was very clear: with the Enverist figure and his heritage ever present, there could be neither liberalization nor democratization of life in Albania. Hoxha was not compatible with democracy and the future. Hence, the destruction of his cult was both for students and for most citizens the fundamental condition of freedom and democracy, and the premise for the further development of Albania. By destroying the myth and monument of Enver Hoxha in February 1990, the Movement forced his successor Ramiz Alia to sign Enver Hoxha’s political death warrant. The fact is that, because of the brutal nature and the repressive measures of a totalitarian regime until 1990, Albania was not able to reorganize as did Poland or Czechoslovakia, who went back to their models of the interwar period. Accordingly, the change was not cosmetic. The change was radical and thorough. Walther Buhle claims that Albania had no other option but a mutually agreed transition or what Juan Linz calls ruptura pactada. 16 There was no old elite to negotiate with. The old elite had been completely destroyed by the Stalinist regime. The intellectuals that emerged were a part of the ruling elite. Hence, the Communist government’s continuance after the first multiparty elections was understandable considering the strength of the repressive apparatus. In the sense of repression, Albania was similar to the Soviet Union and Romania. It was not like Poland or Czechoslovakia, where state power was much more

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limited by a vibrant domestic opposition which was also relatively wellorganized. The Student Movement changed the rules and this led to a non-violent transition and transformation of the same ruling elite and of the intellectuals as well. The Student Movement is important for it is similar to previous student movements in Albania’s history. The Movement was undoubtedly the most influential and the most powerful factor in the early stage of transition. Students managed to break down the party-state. Given the massive support and all over the country, for students from all over the country joined it, the Student Movement represented the most popular movement in the modern history of Albania. The Movement agreed to a certain extent, and it certainly supported the so-called intellectual elite. They did so knowing that these were also part of the existing system. Yet, in consideration of the benefit and the welfare of the Albanian people they supported them until they took over completely the Democratic Party of Albania. All the prejudices to the abuse of the Student Movement were best answered by one of the leaders of the Movement, who noted that, “Our paths crossed. However, we were on their path, as long as they were in our path.” In short, relying on an objective analysis of the facts, and also as a person who was present there during the time, I would not hesitate to call this early stage of the transition the “Albanian Democratic Student Revolution.” The conclusion that the Student Movement was the decisive factor in changing the political rule of the party-state is very strongly supported by the evidence. There is much said about the similarity of the Student Movement with other Albanian student movements. Using the comparative method, Arber Ahmetaj attempted to prove that the Student Movement in Tirana in 1990 and the Kosovo Albanian student demonstrations at the University of Prishtina in 1981 were identical in many key respects.17 Taking into account the specific historical circumstances of the Student Movement in Albania, one can say that there are some similarities. The Student Movement was the third movement in modern Albanian history, specifically after that of Albanian students in Zagreb in Croatia in 1971, and in Prishtina in the spring of 1981. All three of these movements were inspired by a nationalist ideology. The Zagreb Albanian Student Movement in 1971 (which was held under the auspices of the Student Club “Shkëndija”) and the student protests in Prishtina in 1981 shared the same purpose as the Student Movement in Tirana: freedom, national unification, and national progress. The difference is that the student movements in Zagreb and Pristina were “eliminated” by the repression of the Serbian police apparatus, while the Student Movement in Tirana reached its goal, given the historical circumstances that permitted it to achieve its goals. The spontaneous emergence and the subsequent development of the three movements do not testify to a lack of responsibility or political consciousness. The opposite is true, for the participants in all three movements sought to

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avoid “pre-political action” and their demands were clearly political. All three movements had a common denominator and will be marked in the history of world student movements as the only unique student movements led and organized by students who lived in dormitories. In Zagreb as well as in Prishtina and Tirana, the dormitories were the “hotbeds” of the protests. In the case of Tirana, they were also the source of the student leadership, and of the strike which led to the final overthrow of the dictatorship. Another fundamental difference is that, first in Zagreb and then in Prishtina, student movements produced, so to speak, many political prisoners, mainly leftists, who later on left Kosova and went into exile. On the other hand, the Student Movement, with its massive participation, recruited and legitimized the future ruling class. Regardless of the party affiliation, many of these people governed Albania and continue to do so to this day. Regardless of the claims of the various conspiracy theories and arguments to the opposite, the Student Movement in Albania reached its ultimate goal: the establishment of political pluralism. The reason for the rise of the Albanian students in Prishtina was exclusively the repressive politics against Kosovo Albanians and the suppression of national feelings by the Serbian oligarchy in power. Hence their political demand for the establishment of the Republic of Kosovo. In Tirana, the issue was the extreme repression of spiritual, political, and economic freedoms, and denial of freedom. Hence, the demand for political pluralism. All these three movements are of historical importance. All three represent the stages of the beginning of true national revival for the Albanians. The common denominator is the national character of the movements regardless of the specific ideological aspects that become secondary, for the question is always: “qui bono?” The Albanian students in Zagreb, in the framework of the “Croatian Spring” in 1971, sought a separate Kosova from Serbia, and the Albanian students in Prishtina in 1981 sought the establishment of the Republic of Kosova, equal to the other six republics within Yugoslavia. The students in Tirana wanted an Albania like the rest of Europe. According to Stephan Hensell, during the Hoxhaist dictatorship period, Albania was not just a dictatorship of the party-state which relied on terror, on institutional repression in all spheres of societal life. It was a state that relied on systematic and purposeful persecution, abuse of power, extreme self-isolation, induced poverty, and denial of fundamental human rights, Its core ideology was the pursuit of the imaginary threats and it found enemies everywhere. More than that, Hensell argues that Albania was also largely a Familienstaat, i. e., “family-state.” Albania was ruled by a family dynasty and the collapse of this regime was the exclusive merit of the Albanian Student Movement. Furthermore, Hensell states that the support for the Communist Party regime, from the beginning, and its base of steady political support and power consisted mainly of the people from Southern Albania (Machtbasis des Regimes). This can undoubtedly be confirmed, given the composition of the key institutions of the political system such as the Central

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Committee and the Politburo. During Communist rule Northern Albania was very much excluded from the center of power.18 However, keeping in mind that all of Albania was oppressed by the regime, this nuancing fact becomes almost insignificant even, thanks to the Student Movement. Downplaying and overcoming these divisions, the Student Movement embraced the nationalist Albanian ideology. Its vision was allinclusive and overcame these deep cleavages by forcefully supporting a project that asked for the establishment of a modern, European-like national state of all Albanians. The Student Movement as a movement had many participants but it did not have a single leader. Its leaders were the mass of students who achieved an incomparable political objective that was the establishment of democracy by strengthening the foundations of the Albanian nation-state. It is the only student movement in the world that achieved this objective by itself. The Student Movement brought about political change in Albania. Albanian intellectuals did not have either the intellectual or the organizational capacity to promote political processes. After the proclamation of the 1912 Act of Independence, the Student Movement was the second most important event, being of a comparable historical weight that marks the change of epochs. As Zef Brozi wrote: I say with conviction that the 1990 student revolution is the most massive, the purest, the least flawed, the most sincere, and the most successful movement in all the history of Albania. The biggest mistake of students in December 1990 is that after the creation of the Democratic Party, usurped by the Ramiz Alia envoys, after the toppling of Enver Hoxha’s monument in February 1991, and after the Democratic Party’s victory in the March 22, 1992 parliamentary elections, the students thought their mission ended. Almost all the initiators of the Student Movement at that time are now found in the world as immigrants. They were expelled from their homeland with threats, by force and by the ploy of those who robbed the fruits of the movement and abused Albania in the name of democracy, and then also by those who came to power after the bloody collapse of Albania in 1997.19

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

(Seitz and Müller, 1994: 26). (Pipa, 1990: 295). (Grothe, 2012). (Schmitt, 2012: 171–172). (Schmitt, 2012: 171–172). (Demeti, 2011: 82–83). (Rama, 2006: 308). (Rama, 2006: 308).

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(Kadare, 1991: 103–105). (Progni, 2013). (Halili, 1992: 187). (Halili, 1992: 189–192). (Krasniqi, 1998: 14). (Krasniqi, 1998; Fevziu, 2009). (Shvarc, 2002). (Linz, 1990). (Ahmetaj, 1999). (Hensell, 2004). (Brozi, 2011).

Bibliography Ahmetaj, Arbër. 1999. Shqipëria Trishtimi im. Tiranë: Koha. Brozi, Zef. 2011. “Idealet e nëpërkëmbura dhe ëndrrat e parealizuara të Lëvizjes Studentore të Dhjetorit 1990: me rastin e 21-vjetorit të Lëvizjes Studentore.” Gazeta Shqip, December 7th: 8–9. Demeti, Arben. 2011. In Grup Autorësh, Dhjetor 90: Mbaj Mend. Tiranë: Grupimi “Dhjetori 90”. Fevziu, Blendi. 2009. “Greva e urisë së studentëve, 18 vjet pas, Mesila Doda, Blendi Gonxhe, Emin Barçi, Edi Paloka.” Opinion, TV Klan, February 18th. Grothe, Solveig. 2012. “Bunkerland Albanien, Alle in Deckung.” Der Spiegel, August 6th. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/einestages/bunker-in-albanie n-ein-volk-unter-beton-a-947666.html Halili, Llukman and Blerim Shala. 1992. Unë, Ramiz Alia Dëshmoj Për Historinë. Prishtinë: Zëri. Hensell, Stephan. 2004. “Regieren in Albanien. Herrschaftslogik und Zerfall eines Familienstaates.” WeltTrends - Zeitschrift für Internationale Politik45: 71–83. Kadare, Ismail. 1991. Nga një dhjetor në tjetrin. Paris: Fayard. Krasniqi, Afrim. 1998. Fundi I Siberisë Shqiptare: Lëvizja Studentore, Dhjetor 1990– Shkurt 1991. Tiranë: Shtëpia Botuese Albin. Linz, Juan J. 1990. “Transiciones a la Democracia.” Reis, 51, July–September: 7–33. Pipa, Arshi. 1990. Albanian Stalinism: Ideo-Political Aspects. New York: East European Monographs. Progni, Luljeta. 2013. Pardesytë e Bardha. Tirana: Gent-Grafik. Rama, Shinasi A. 2006. Probleme politike shqiptare I. Shkodër: Instituti i Studimeve Kombëtare Shqiptare. Schmitt, Oliver Jens. 2012. Die Albaner, Eine Geschichte zwischen Orient und Okzident. München: Verlag “C. H. Beck”. Seitz, Robert and Bernhard Müller. 1994. Albanien, Land im Aufbruch. Ulm: Gerhard Hess Verlag. Shvarc, Edvin. 2002. “Greva e Urisë - 1991 - Shembja e Komunizmit.” Accessed July 24th, 2019. Available at: https://www.forumishqiptar.com/threads/ 35983-Greva-e-urise-1991-Shembja-e-komunizmit

13 The Dragon Did Not Commit Suicide The Collapse Of The Totalitarian CultState And The Role Of The Student Movement In Albania Shinasi A. Rama The contributions included in this volume support a very nuanced view of the dynamics of the collapse of the totalitarian cult-state and of the nature of the radical political change in Albania. The outstanding contributions by Fatos Tarifa, Mirela Bogdani, and Luisa Chiodi provide a much-needed and sober background and overview on the complex international situation and of the social, institutional, and political context of Albania at the time. Building on this necessary background, Afrim Krasniqi, Llukman Halili, Valbona Karanxha, James Pettifer, and Grid Rroji provide an in-depth analysis of various aspects of the emergence, the organization, core values, and the contribution of the Student Movement. Through their superb and systematic examination of its evolution, structures, leadership, ideology, and the interaction with the authorities and the intellectuals, we are able to create a much better view of the Student Movement and of its role at this early stage of the transition. In the final part, Miranda Vickers persuasively argues that the international perceptions were conditioned by the rapidity with which the events unfolded and the information, often distorted, that was spread by the ruling caste and the intellectuals. Llukman Halili offers an evaluation of the Student Movement and its contribution from a historical perspective and, in his view, the Student Movement played the most important role in the process. Fred Abrahams argues the exact opposite. In his view, there were no heroes and the ruling elite was able to remain in charge of the transformation process. Again, albeit this is the conclusion, a much more nuanced analysis of the institutions, elites, and the Student Movement itself is needed here to complement the outstanding contributions of this volume. In one way or another, this was the perfect storm and the Albanian totalitarian cult-state had to cave in and collapse. After the end of the Cold War, Albania could not continue to be a totalitarian cult-state on the side of Europe, occupying a strategic position but without any allies or protectors. The state and the economy were utterly bankrupt. Popular discontent was palpable and extremely intense. Yet, against reason, the ruling caste of the cult-state was open only to moderate and cosmetic changes. The intellectuals were also aware that the system was totally dysfunctional. Most of them were aware that it was not possible to continue on this path. However, they refused to

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rise to the occasion and to help their own people find the right path. By adopting a “wait and see” attitude, and by refusing to lead, instead of being trailblazers, they became an enormous obstacle in the process of transformation of the state. Given the fierce resistance of the ruling caste to change and the utter paralysis of the intellectuals, as well as the general apathy of the society, the Student Movement took the political initiative. The outcome was that the Student Movement was the single factor that was responsible for the slaying of the dragon that was the totalitarian cult-state. The Student Movement rose to the occasion and took over a historical responsibility that was fraught with dangers but that, given the circumstances, was the right thing to do. It demanded the radical changing of the principles of the social order. This was tantamount to the killing of the dragon. Then it designed and single-handedly spearheaded the process of the delegitimization of the totalitarian cult-state by directly attacking the figure of Enver Hoxha. This is how the totalitarian cultstate gave up its ghost. This is how the path to the processes of normal politics, and to the establishment of the new social order, was cleared. The merit for this rests squarely with the Student Movement. Much more than the intellectuals that refused to act and, for a time, acting as the only meaningful opposition in Albania, the Student Movement played a very important and decisive role in the changing of the social order. This makes the Albanian Student Movement unique and one of the most successful student movements ever in history. This is the most important finding of the book. What about other players? This does not mean that Ramiz Alia was just an idle player on the receiving end of whatever the Student Movement was doing. This means that the logic of political interaction between Alia and the Student Movement leadership was conditioned by the ubiquitous and immensely important influence of two factors that provide the context of their interaction. One such factor was the pervasive attention of the victorious powers of the Cold War that demanded the change of the system in Albania at any cost. The other factor was the rising popular discontent. Having said that, the influence of these factors in the process of the dragon-slaying, i.e., the collapse of the totalitarian cult-state, must be placed in the proper perspective. Therefore, going one step beyond the analyses of Tarifa, Bogdani, and Chiodi we should expand on four important additional elements that would help back up and provide the necessary background to better evaluate the strong claims and findings of other authors. First, we have to focus on the under-analyzed legal-constitutional structure of the Albanian totalitarian cult-state. Once we become aware of the political opportunities and the legal context, we will get a much better and clearer picture of this first phase of the process change. Second, we should parse through the set of choices that the leadership had and focus on what it was planning to undertake. Then we have to compare those outlined options with the choices that it was forced to make to induce the expected change, albeit

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going only to the limits of what change was acceptable. Third, we have to uncover the reasons why the students became an important and influential autonomous force in these processes and, crucially, try to trace the path of how they became a social movement. Here we should consider the extent to which the political game got out of the hand of the ruling caste and why the Student Movement became an independent factor that played such a disproportionate role in the process of change. The diverging explanations of how it happened and who were the real actors become rather clear and are presented in this section. Finally, we have to contextualize the case and offer some insights on the relevance of the Student Movement for the debates on student movements and on social movements in collective action.

Four Influential Factors in the Process of Political Change in Albania What are the most important factors in this process? There are four such factors that, quite often, are either downplayed or ignored in the literature. To begin with, one should remember that the totalitarian cult-state enjoyed substantial legitimacy. Regardless of their miserable economic conditions and the very low standard of living, and the craziness of the system, from the standpoint of the regime, the majority of the people were reliable. Indeed, the majority of the people viewed the totalitarian cult-state as legitimate and the reservoir of support for the cult-state was remarkably strong. There was open popular discontent but the state was able to localize and contain it. When it could not contain it, it opened the foreign embassies and let people escape by crossing the border to Greece or to Yugoslavia. Furthermore, beyond the unexpected behavior of the people, the most important element in any such radical change of the social order is the deep state. At this time and afterwards, the loyalty of the structures of the party, the army, and the services was and remained unquestionable. Indeed, the most conservative structures were the institutional structures of the deep state. Ramiz Alia was in total control and the structures of the deep state behaved with utmost loyalty to him personally and to Enver Hoxha. Yet, the behavior of the deep state was not uniform. At this early stage of the transition, they were simply followers of Ramiz Alia. They were intensely loyal to the party and to Ramiz Alia for he was the dictator. Throughout the process the structures of the deep state played according to the playbook and followed the requirements set up by Alia and the leadership of the party. It is only later on, after the toppling of the statue of Enver Hoxha, that the structures of the deep state express their qualms and begin opposing the radical change of the totalitarian state, demonstrating a willingness to instigate a coup d’état, but by then, it was way too late.

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At this time, there were very dense social relations, networks and clusters of people based on multiple ties, but there was no meaningful civil society. A totalitarian cult-state does not allow for any such structures outside of its ideological framework. The real deep bonds that hold a society and a community together were carefully cultivated but, so to speak, they were underground ties. Family, regional, cultural, and even religious ties held the opposed Albanian society together. Later on, these ties became essential to the newly emerging social and political structures. Beyond these givens that should be further emphasized, so to speak, all contributors highlight the decisive role of the international system and the unyielding pressure of the Great Powers on the Albanian ruling caste. It was exceedingly difficult for the totalitarian cult-state in Albania to continue as if it were uninfluenced by the changes in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Central Europe, and in the Balkans. Albania had no allies. After the break-up with China in 1978, the ruling caste had gradually shifted towards the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc but these were almost exclusively economic ties. This was understandable for the dependency on the Soviet-dominated bloc was noticeable. Furthermore, almost all the leadership of the time, including Ramiz Alia, Xhelil Gjoni, and Hekuran Isai, were a product of the educational system of the Soviet Union and the Orthodox members of the leadership had a natural inclination and gravitation towards the USSR. The state naturally gravitated in that direction as well. Tied to the shift in international alignments and politics is the Zeitgeist of the time, neatly condensed in the quasi-imposed agenda of democratization, free markets, and liberalism. This set of expectations seemingly left the leaders of the Albanian state with few available choices. Ultimately, and because of the unyielding pressure from outside, the Albanian ruling caste had to choose between continuity (which was what the ruling caste insisted on) and radical political change (which the Great Powers demanded). Both were extremely risky paths to the ruling caste. On its part, then, the Albanian ruling caste was faced with a conundrum. On the one hand, the continuity of the totalitarian cult-state was not possible. On the other hand, the new order that was being imposed from outside was completely unacceptable to the ruling caste. Ramiz Alia and the leadership opted for a policy of “plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose,” i.e., the more it changes the more it remains true to itself. It was a shrewd policy but it came way too late in the process. What would change would be the appearance of the social order and the number of political actors, but there would be no overhaul of the political rules of the system. What would remain the same was that the party would continue to control the state, the economy, and the society. This was a gimmick that clearly was not acceptable to the foreign powers. Any effort to sustain the rule of the caste as a caste after the collapse of the cult-state would have had unforeseen consequences for Albania. The victorious powers of the Cold

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War were determined not to let Albania get out of their newly expanded sphere of influence. For a choice to be made, there must be at least two options. On the one hand, there was the option of the ruling caste, supported by the intellectuals. This meant that the system would change by taking some baby steps and in outer appearances only. The other option at this time was the option presented by the Student Movement: the deep reformation of the nationstate, democratization, and a model of social political and economic development based on the European experiences of the social state. A small group of Albanian leaders, and in particular Ramiz Alia, have the merit that they refused to yield to the conservatives and to the structures of the totalitarian cult-state, that were ready to suppress violently the students. Alia behaved with a high degree of pragmatism and tolerance, accepting the changes demanded by the students and expected by the Great Powers. What about the intellectuals? The intellectuals had a very important role to play. Yet, they refused to play the role that prominent intellectuals had played elsewhere in Eastern Central Europe. They behaved, in the words of Xhelil Gjoni, “like jelly,” i.e., spinelessly (Gjoni, 2015). As Krasniqi and Karanxha show in their essays, the intellectuals refused to rise to the occasion. They behaved as if they lacked a social consciousness and failed to show the minimum degree of civic responsibility expected of them. In their meeting with Ramiz Alia, only three months before the student protests began, the intellectuals insisted that the people were not prepared for the establishment of a multiparty system and recommended only cosmetic reforms. Only when the Student Movement demanded the establishment of a multiparty system and obtained the right to form an opposition party, did the intellectuals join in and try to take over the opposition. Yet, by then, this was not very risky. While the intellectuals continued to collaborate unconditionally with the ruling caste, the real agenda for change was embraced and pushed forward by the students. Only a few months later, the intellectuals and the opposition parties engaged in serious dissenting interactions with the ruling caste. At this earlier stage, particularly at these critical junctures, as several of the authors argue, the initiative was at the hands of the Student Movement. More importantly, the Student Movement was outside of the control of the ruling caste and of the intellectuals. Authors included in this volume bring ample evidence that the processes of political change, at these critical moments, went in ways that were undesirable, unforeseen, and quite often, uncontrollable by the regime. The merit for setting up the direction, albeit not the pace, of the change of social order, at several critical moments belongs to the Student Movement. Hence, if anything else, this volume establishes that the political change in Albania was a complex set of processes in which the Student Movement played a very important, and at several critical times the central, role. They recognize that the Student Movement was quite independent of the

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ruling caste and the intelligentsia. They identify the ideological underpinnings of the Student Movement as strongly based on the ideology of Albanian nationalism. The role of the intellectuals and of the intelligentsia is re-dimensioned and properly contextualized. The process of political change and the role of key players such as Ramiz Alia are well-explained. The interdisciplinary take helps highlight many aspects and key events that otherwise would have been lost by the paradigmatic blinders of specific theories and subfields. Overall, one gets a much clearer and healthier view of the unfolding of the processes of the political change in Albania. This volume makes a truly substantial contribution to the understanding of a delicate, tumultuous, and difficult period in modern Albanian history.

The Context: The Paradox of the Legal-Constitutional Democratic Elements in a Totalitarian Cult-State The concern of clarifying and understanding what happened in Albania in December 1990 and what was the role of the Student Movement becomes all the more important if the events of 1989–1991 are placed in due international and national context. The external pressure to change was ever present and intensifying daily. The change, though, had to happen from within, and indeed it happened from within the state. The commonalty with the former Soviet Bloc was that Albania was the last standing, formally Communist state in Eastern Central Europe. The peculiarity was that Albania went beyond the Stalinist despotic model and essentially was an ideal-type totalitarian cult-state. There was broad awareness of changes happening in the former Soviet camp but the system was politically solid and functional albeit it was economically bankrupt. We all know how important the economy is. However, regimes do not fall simply because the economy does not work. There are always ways to alleviate the economic pressures on the state. One could always put the blame on the others, the enemy, sabotage, or the activity of hostile states. The valve of mass expulsion is always available. And, of course, intense repression and terror would be the final solution. Yet the collapse of the system seems way too easy. Why? Part of the explanation for the easiness of the transformation must be sought in the peculiar nature of the legal and the electoral structures of the Albanian state. There is a duality one has to grasp well for the easiness of the collapse to make sense. With regard to the state and to its ideological underpinnings, Albania was a cult-state that had its prophet in Enver Hoxha. It was a state that resembled the contemporary North Korea in many central aspects of the state and societal organization. The parallels between the two countries are eerily striking: etatism and self-reliance to the point of autarchy, forced collectivization of people and livestock, ideological rigidity to absurdity, extreme class struggle, extermination and purges of the opposing political clans, stateenforced atheism, persecution of opponents, a suffocating cult of the leader, a

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military-first policy, and the like. The myth of Enver Hoxha was central to the Albanian cult-state and the whole legitimacy of the system was pinned upon this figure. The destruction of Hoxha’s myth would pulverize the system. Afterwards, the structures of the ruling caste would continue to function quite effectively. However, they were no longer tied to the state. These structures would be family, professional, and clannish, but no longer ideologically bounded and tied to the state. Yet, the focus on the excesses and the unique attributes of the Albanian state, such as the cult-state nature of the political system, which made it appear unique and to some outlandish, hides some very strong and vital similarities between it and other states in the Soviet-dominated camp. There are four core elements that Albania shared with the rest of Eastern Central Europe and the USSR in this process. First, it was on the losing side of the Cold War and it faced immense and equal pressure from outside to change. Second, it was a state essentially relying on the trio of Security Services–Party–Army, in that order. Third, pro forma, the legal edifice and the institutional structure of the state were almost identical to the Brezhnevian structure implemented with the Constitution of 1976 in the USSR. Fourth, the dominant ideology was fundamentally the same. Hence, in spite of the aberrations, these common core elements of the superstructure and institutional structures bring Albania much closer to the cluster of socialist states and the USSR. Therefore, the significance of the Albanian case cannot be reduced to mere claims of exceptionalism. There is no question that East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Poland were controlled with an iron hand by the police and their secret services. The Albanian case is specific but not entirely outside the model of a socialist Stalinist state. Essential here is to understand that while the Constitution sanctioned the dominance of the party and of the one-party system, the system was a system of laws. More importantly, the system was formally declared to be democratic, albeit defined as “people’s democracy.” The elements of the democratic system were atrophied and manipulated at every level. Yet, the state went a long way to preserve the appearance of being a democracy: elections were held regularly, the electoral commissions were appointed and met regularly, candidates were nominated, the electoral campaigns were extensive and well-covered. The whole set of rules and paraphernalia that are attributed to a meaningful democracy were, on paper, present. There is no question that this was a sham, but it is important to note that underneath the voluntaristic and prevalent hegemonic aspects of the rule in a cult-state, for the majority of the people, a legal state was in place and functional, no matter how twisted or crazy its laws and rules seem to be to outsiders. Ultimately, the party leadership, the Politburo and the Plenum of the Central Committee, made the final and important decisions. At its center was the First Secretary of the Party of Labor who was the Chairman of the Presidium of the Popular Assembly as well.

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Democratization, in this context, meant three distinct choices. One choice was the continuing sham “people’s democracy” and, under its veneer, the continuation of the totalitarian cult-state. This was no longer acceptable to the victorious powers. The second choice was the gradual empowering of the legal political structures, and then of the various organizations that would compete in elections, within the existing rules and laws that did not challenge the hegemony of the party. This was relatively unacceptable to the victorious powers and to the masses that were extremely agitated. In the medium-term future, this choice was going to lead to social clashes with unforeseen consequences. However, for a time, if the ruling caste were able to convince the interested parties that it had no other path, they would acquiesce to this choice as a temporary solution. The third path was the empowering of these laws as a transitional phase towards what the victorious powers expected, and what some of the people believed would serve them well: the empowering of the atrophied democratic legal rules and structures and the replacement of the hegemony of the party by the popular will and nationalism. The natural outcome would be the separation of the state from the party and its empowerment. Whether the people would choose the party over the state was a matter to be decided by the leadership and how much it wished to prioritize the state over the party.

Choosing to Do Nothing or Moving in Circles: How the Totalitarian Cult-State Refused to Change on Time Until it was way too late, the leadership did nothing. The regime chose to do nothing but to attempt to reform and fix the existing system. The leadership doggedly hoped to reform a system that was beyond any doubt non-reformable and that had gone bankrupt economically, politically, and morally a long time ago. While changes in the economy were contemplated, the overhaul or radical political change of the totalitarian cult-state was unthinkable. As Ylli Bufi, then a Deputy Minister and later the Prime Minister of the Stability Government in 1991, states, “Until 1990, none of the leaders, including Ramiz Alia himself, had thought about the solutions that would lead to political and regime change.”1 In Albania, the state and the leadership behaved as if nothing was happening in the outside world. It also functioned as if the economy was performing well. This was the real Albanian dystopia. Appearances, however, were deceiving. After the murder of Ceausescu, and given the mounting external pressure, the Albanian leadership was frantically searching for ways to change the system. Under intense pressure from the victorious powers in the Cold War to relinquish power and to democratize, the Hoxhaist regime in Albania was faced with an impossible dilemma. On the one hand, the regime leaders and the deep state were strenuously opposed to any return to power of their exiled enemies. After all, they had come to power after a fierce civil war in 1944. The civil war had continued, in the form of class struggle, for the next 45 years. The

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mutual hatred and the fear of revenge excluded this option. Any efforts by the USA and the Europeans to insert the émigrés as a significant factor in the process were rebuffed and rejected. On the other hand, while Ramiz Alia was the handpicked successor of Enver Hoxha, and he had enormous power, he was not omnipotent and his hands were tied behind his back. To begin with, Enver Hoxha’s ideology had taken on a life of its own and there were many incurable fanatical believers in it. And, at the time, there were too many of them. In addition, after the death of Enver Hoxha, the power structure had shifted and changed. Several organized societal structures, that until then had been relevant but very subdued, emerged and began reasserting themselves. A strong current of Orthodox clans had asserted itself and began competing for the leadership of the party, solidly backing Simon Stefani. The very powerful Kapo clan, that was spared the purge suffered by the Shehu clan, simply because Hysni Kapo had died in Paris with pancreatic cancer, held several key seats in the Politburo and many key positions in the Government, Party, security services, and Army. For many years, particularly after one of the leading exponents of the clan, Kadri Hazbiu, was shot, the clan had been under enormous pressure and the constant threat had increased their internal solidarity. In spite of all the utter failures in its economic and social policies, the regime enjoyed very strong legitimacy. The indoctrinated and loyal Army Officer Corps, State Security, and other services were squarely behind the leadership, as long as the ideology of Hoxha, enshrined in the 71 thick volumes of his Complete Works and other innumerable publications, was not challenged. Out of loyalty, fear, or arrivism, the majority of the influential professionals and intelligentsia were not only pro forma loyal to the party as well. Fully aware of the failure of the system, all of them were supportive of some sort of reformation of the system but the overwhelming majority of them were not for fundamental political change. By 1987, Ramiz Alia, a graduate of the Moscow Party School, was semi-privately informed by Gorbachev, one of his old party school colleagues in Moscow, that change was inevitable and Albania had to join the wave of transformation that was about to sweep the former Communist camp. Faced with the complex individual and political situation, Ramiz Alia opted for the path of gradual reformism. The process is well described by some of the contributors to this volume and in other studies as well. Yet, it all failed. Half-hearted economic measures only aggravated the situation. There was no venturing into a perestroika or glasnost for the party, the Army, and above all the services and the fanatics were totally against it. Intellectuals refused to join associations that were not sanctioned by the regime. By August 1990, the regime had tried everything under its power to reform and it had failed in everything. All those who had enough courage had entered the foreign embassies. The politically persecuted people, the clergy that were released from jails, and the censured intellectuals had all refused to venture in this effort of opposing the

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regime. In a case so well described by Krasniqi, even when Alia begged them to become at least the protected “loyal opposition,” the intellectuals refused to cooperate. In the words of Xhelil Gjoni, the intellectuals proved themselves to be characterless and spineless, “like jelly.”2 The pressure had intensified after Ramiz Alia’s visit to New York in September 1990. In a series of meetings, most importantly with Edward Shevardnaze, a former Lieutenant-General of the KGB and then the Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Alia was convinced that some political change was more than necessary. In fact, this was required by the Great Powers. Given the geopolitical relevance of Albania and its proximity to the ready-to-explode Yugoslavia, political change was unavoidable. It is at this point that failing to jumpstart a fictitious opposition, Ramiz Alia decided to focus on the students as the chosen partner in this process of political change. The objective was to be achieved by his loyalist Hekuran Isai, the Minister of Internal Affairs, who organized the protests in cooperation also with Xhelil Gjoni, the number two of the regime and a very powerful figure in the Kapo clan who mobilized the intellectuals. After a careful evaluation, after all the measures introduced failed miserably, Alia had to make a decision. Several visits to Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, by trusted individuals and delegations sent by him, convinced Alia and the leadership to follow the Czechoslovak model of “the velvet revolution.” The plan foresaw that students would be induced to protest and, then, the intellectuals would join in. In their view, the intellectuals would find the necessary courage to act, only if they saw that there were no threats whatsoever to their lives. As they all were vetted and believed to be relatively trustworthy and controlled by the party, the transformation would be in the interest of the party as well. The condition set by the Great Powers, in the form of an ultimatum with a specific deadline, was the full economic, political, and social opening of the country, and this obviously entailed the thorough opening under this agenda of the democratization of the political system. In a few meetings with incoming foreign representatives, Alia had pleaded his case. He argued and explained that, given the internal resistance by the conservatives, security services, and the fanatics, this radical change was impossible for him to undertake. Instead, he advocated for a very gradual change of the system. So what was Alia’s plan? First, there would be student protests, induced and controlled by the regime. Second, these protests would attract some intellectuals, some on their own and some encouraged to participate, which would lead to greater or closer cooperation among the students and the intellectuals. In turn, many of these intellectuals were allowed to publish articles or even give interviews to foreign media outlets. Third, this cooperation would lead to the emergence of an Association of the Students and of the Young Intellectuals centered on the Student Campus. Much like in the fashion of WWII organization of youth in Albania (there were then two structures that organized the youth: one was the

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Communist Youth Organization and the other was the Antifascist Youth Organization), this new organization would be a parallel organization to the Communist Youth Organization and independent of it much like the Antifascist Youth Organization. Afterwards, this Association of the Students and the Young Intellectuals would participate in elections on a par with and competing with all other organizations and the Party itself. Alia’s hope was that, given the failure of other forces to emerge or to properly organize in the state, his solution of “pluralism of political subjects” rather than the “pluralism of political parties” that the outsider powers expected would be accepted as the only possible solution. In spite of numerous intense efforts by the leadership of the party and of the structures of the deep state, the regime was unable to find reliable and committed individuals and groups from the intelligentsia who could take over the task of opposing the system itself. The extent of the fear and of the indoctrination among them was such that some of the leading intellectuals, that also enjoyed the protection of foreign powers, such as France or Italy, would publicly refuse to become “the most loyal opposition.” The influential intellectuals or the better-known representatives of the intelligentsia were either staunch loyalists or were simply frightened by the consequences of their likely actions. Their stasis reached the point that they would refuse to publicly move a finger, even when they were strongly prodded and encouraged by the regime to do so. The opponents of the regime inside the state were so beaten up, and so thoroughly terrorized, systematically persecuted, heavily controlled, and carefully broken down that they distrusted all the overtures of the regime. All that they wanted to do was to leave the state and emigrate. The instances of opposition or rebellion from below, mainly in the industrial centers and towns like Shkodra, Kavaja, and Elbasan, were isolated, controlled, or repressed ruthlessly. The regime was shaken, it was in a deep economic crisis, but it enjoyed enormous legitimacy and it was still extremely effective. Furthermore, at the moment that the regime sensed that the external pressure to change would become insurmountable, it decided to follow the Cuban Mariel example. It decided to conduct a social purge, i.e., to let go all the people who wished to leave the country that included the presumed discontented people and the enemies of the status quo. This action of opening the door to the dissatisfied and the disgruntled people meant also that the likely future opposition would evaporate with it. The assumption was that the majority of people who were opposed to the state would leave at the first opportunity given to them. Indeed, for three days, whoever wanted to leave Albania could enter or walk straight into one of the foreign embassies in Tirana, in the presence of the Albanian police who stood there doing nothing for they were ordered to do nothing. Over 5000 people swarmed the foreign embassies. Significantly though, the rest of the Albanians, out of fear or out of loyalty, did not enter the embassies. By the fall of 1990, several thousand more Albanians had escaped to Greece and

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to Yugoslavia by a riskier route. In more than one sense, in this way, Albania was purged of elements that could become the foot soldiers of any future opposition to the regime. Many more dissatisfied and discontented people had left the country by December 1990 and the majority of them, about 150,000 people, had gone to Greece through the southern border that, suddenly, had become very porous. Within Albania itself, there was an intense effort to find a solution that would be satisfactory to the victorious side in the Cold War and that would protect the interests of the ruling caste. Yet, no one within the state dared to move without the approval of the leadership, and of Alia himself, for the consequences of any such action were obvious. The people, and with them the majority of the intelligentsia, were not clear about what was going to happen in the future. Steeped for decades in a crazy version of extreme Marxist-Leninist ideology, the leaders, the intelligentsia, and the masses had a twisted understanding of democracy, of capitalism, and of the modern nation-state above all. To them this meant handing the state to the international bourgeoisie and to the Black International. More importantly, it meant the return of their deadly enemies, whose families they had persecuted for half a century. Would this be a reversal in persecution? They did not know how to act properly for, if not them personally, their relatives had been a part of the system. The ideology becomes important here. Thoughtful action is not just aimed at destroying the old order but also consists in being fully aware of what should be construed in its place. For the overwhelming majority of the people, there was no clear political and ideological alternative to the hodgepodge of twisted Marxism that was the Hoxhaist ideology. This totalitarian cult-state was built around the idolization of Enver Hoxha. For 45 years, i. e., for two generations, the organized political opposition had been nonexistent. Given that four in five living Albanian citizens were born, educated, and raised under the long Communist rule, it appeared that no serious opposition would ever be able to emerge in Albania. There was no meaningful civil society. Religion had been abolished more than two decades earlier and the efforts to reestablish organized religion showed that religion and the remaining clergymen that were released from jail would be a poor guidance to the Albanians. Any group of people that coalesced outside the approved structures and that discussed any of the disapproved topics was considered hostile to the regime. In this highly effective police state, the consequences of opposing the system were dreadful. Until December 11th, 1990, unlike the former Soviet Union and Eastern European states, that enjoyed a relative measure of free speech, Albania was the extreme case of a totalitarian cult-state. The whole state was formally a sect and a cult that had its infallible prophet in Enver Hoxha. The party, the state, and the whole edifice of the society were designed and imbued with the single purpose of serving his ideas, collected in 71 volumes and innumerable other publications. Even casual utterances of

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Hoxha were considered the equivalent of prophetic revelations and were received as a sacrosanct dogma. The institutions, the party, the people, the history, and the future as well were there to serve the cult of the late idolized leader. Enver Hoxha was presented as the fifth leading Marxist thinker in the history of humanity and the pinnacle of Marxist thinking for the ages to come. It was idiocy on an unparalleled scale. On its part, the state continued to pursue failed economic policies. Grave policy mistakes such as the forcible livestock collectivization had led to malnourishment and famine in the countryside for over a decade. Even then, the craziness of the forced collectivization continued unabated. The rationale and the justification for this craziness, that in some slightly modified form continued to the end of the regime, was that Enver Hoxha had sanctioned and recommended it before he died. Hence, even when its failure was glaringly obvious, the forced livestock collectivization that had led to destitution, extreme poverty, and outright slavery was still considered the right policy, only badly implemented. In many instances, because of the thorough indoctrination, the resistance to change on the side of the substantial loyalists and believers was genuine. The country was living in a state of induced paranoia, and to the last minute, radical change appeared unlikely. At most, intellectuals were cautiously recommending reforms. Even then, the leading personalities of the intelligentsia did so only after strong assurances from the leadership of the party and the state. It was the leadership of the party and the state that literally requested, reviewed, and then permitted their shallow articles meekly advocating for change, to be published in the leading party newspaper. The reformation of the system was desirable but the radical change of the system was inconceivable and unacceptable. This was where the buck stopped. Demanding political pluralism, the fundamental change that would undo everything that Enver Hoxha had constructed for so long, to many was an unthinkable proposition. After the refusal of Ismail Kadare to play the role of Vaclav Havel, some say out of his own fear whereas others insist that it was mere paranoia, the situation for Alia became very difficult. There was no other intellectual figure of that stature to replace him. Both to gain time and to show progress, Alia allowed the holding of religious rites and ceremonies all over the country. Yet, people participating in these rites refused to become politically active. Again, the only hope left seemed the activation of students. By the end of the second week of November, rumors were spreading all over the country that the students were ready to rebel. The rumors spread all over the country to the point that even in his own jail, a political prisoner, Fatos Lubonja, learned that the students were to rise soon.3 Others knew the precise date; the rebellion and protests were to start after the National Holidays, i.e., in the first week of December. The expectation was that by implementing this plan, the pressure from the victorious powers of the Cold War would relax. Although a form of fictitious

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pluralism would be established, in the form of multiple organizations competing in the elections, this would still be within the one-party system. Formally and practically, the hegemonic control of the party would not be challenged. The system then would be essentially preserved as it was. Foreign powers had to accept this as the maximum that was to be achieved then and there. However, should somebody dare ask for pluralism, then the game would radically change. At that point, given the repressive nature of the regime and the secure verdict of death sentence by the deep state for anyone who would dare ask for a multiparty system, with the single exception of Ramiz Alia, the rest of the leadership of the totalitarian cult-state were convinced that they would remain in power, at least for a while. To them this meant that they would continue “the struggle against imperialism” without any regard whatsoever for the vital interests of their own people and seemingly unaware that their state, Albania, was handed on a plate to the victorious powers by its former allies. The first thing that comes to mind when we think of political change are various models of change and transition presented by Huntington, Linz, and others. But at the outset it must be said that given the efficiency of the state structures no one expected any radical revolution to happen. Indeed, no revolution, understood as the violent replacement of governing structures based on different political principles, took place in Albania. There was no ruptura pactada either, for there was no opposition to negotiate with. The intellectuals were creatures of the regime and loyal to the leadership of the state. Their role was limited to the firefighters role, i.e., to contain and manage the popular discontent and to control the opposition when the leadership demanded this service from them. It seemed that Ramiz Alia and the leadership had everything under their firm control. Yet, the processes of change did not go according to the plan of the ruling caste. The totalitarian cult-state utterly collapsed and so rapidly that none believed it. A new order was established against their own preferences. Indeed, this was a revolutio of the order, but without the bloodshed and without the intense fighting among classes and groups that a classical revolution entails. Why and how did this happen?! Among such critical moments are the unexpected demands for the establishment of a multiparty political system, the galvanization of the masses and their inclusion in the political process, and the overthrow of the totalitarian cult-state of Enver Hoxha. At all these critical moments, neither the ruling caste nor the intellectuals were leading the process. They were reacting and responding to situations that essentially were outside of their control. Obviously, they controlled a very effective and loyal state structure, the party and the specialized agencies, so the ruling caste had ample means and ways to adjust to the new circumstances. Yet, the fundamental change of the rules of the political game and of the social order put them in a very difficult position. By the same token, the display of the loss of legitimacy with the toppling of

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Enver Hoxha’s statue completely undermined their legitimacy, ultimately transforming them from a cult-state into a sect within the state. An important challenge that they had to contend with was the unexpected rise of nationalism and its strength as an ideology. How they handled these issues later on could very well be the topic for another book.

The Background to the Student Protests It is imperative for a better understanding of the process to explain why and how the students ended up becoming major players in this delicate game. The beginning of the academic year saw an unusual concern for the students on the side of the state. Before the students were set to go to the university for the beginning of the academic year in September, in all towns and cities meetings were held in which the leading party and youth politicians lectured them on what counted as proper behavior. When they went to the university campus, the Student City, they found a doubled and even tripled surveillance: an increased uniformed police presence, undercover State Security, and, more strikingly, numerous former instructors of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth Organization permanently assigned to their buildings. The regime was determined not to cooperate with the émigrés. It was also determined not to cave in to the pressure from the urban proletariat masses, or to the pressure coming from individuals and strata with a religious orientation. It certainly did not accept the ultimatum of the victorious powers and had decided to make a firm stand. It is precisely at this time, i.e., on November 13th, 1990, that the Director of State Security sent a letter to the party leadership informing them that foreign intelligence agencies had been very active in inciting the students to rebel. The students would rebel, he specifically noted, incited by the foreign agents of the CIA, who obviously were nowhere to be seen or found, around the National Holidays and, at the latest, by the end of the first week of December. For any professional, this letter suffices to consider this rising of the students as an unmistakable false flag operation. The Director of State Security was informing the leadership that students would rise and that the protest would be under their control. So, there would be no worries on their side. Through this letter, the other institutions of the state were put on notice that this affair/operation was handled by them so they had to act carefully and not intervene in this operation. Otherwise, the job of State Security was not to inform the leadership but to decisively identify/uncover, follow, penetrate, and arrest the likely troublemakers before they were to act. There is no mystery in explaining why the State Security, the police, and the deep state did not act. By claiming that a CIA “cadre,” i.e., a resident or someone close to that level, had informed them of this operation, the State Security was basically informing the party that all was under their control. Backhandedly, this meant that should things get out of hand or should the need to use force emerge,

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then the victims that were to be arrested were already designated as foreign agents and would be dealt with accordingly. The State Security was ready but the students were not and without mass cooperation from the students, the operation would fail. To incite them to act, a lot of small but significant steps were taken. A group of students, led by the Youth Secretary of the Department of Engineering, Pandeli Majko, a staunch loyalist of the regime, posted a letter criticizing the university administration. With much publicity, Adil Carcani, the Prime Minister of the government, went to an open meeting with the students to discuss these “concerns.” This willingness to talk and the lack of punishing measures helped convince some students that bolder actions would be permissible. Then, by institutional fiat, the situation in the Student Campus got worse and worse by the day. Electricity was cut frequently. There was no hot water for showers. There were problems with the heat. The food got worse and worse. Immediately after the National Holidays of November 28–29th, 1990, the lessons ended. The session of semestral exams started. This meant that the number of students was about 35 percent of those that normally lived on campus. Whenever there were electrical energy interruptions and the lights went off, students rose and shouted, initially timidly and then progressively more boldly, against the regime, against Alia, the Hoxha family, Communism, etc. Initially there was a fearful expectation of arrests but nothing happened. Nobody was touched, questioned, or arrested. Students were encouraged and the situation was getting more and more heated. There was an effort, outside this plan, specifically in Building 6 to incite the students to rise up on December 6th and 7th and that failed miserably. Students did not join the group that demanded that they come out to protest. On December 8th, a Saturday, the Prime Minister came again to meet with the students. His later explanation for that unheard-of and strange action was that Ramiz Alia told him to do so. The act of the Prime Minister coming to the Student City was interpreted to mean that the regime would be open to discussing matters with the students, that there would be no punishments, and that students would be free to say to him what they had said/shouted in the darkness when the lights went off. The impression was that if trouble-making persisted, Ramiz Alia himself would come. On that night, there were two events, another sign of careful preparation and control by the regime. One was the commemoration of the anniversary of John Lennon in the Institute of Arts. This event did not escalate into clashes with the police, and understandably so, for many of the participants were sons and daughters of the ruling caste. They were tolerating them. The other event is that the students, mostly from provincial towns and rural areas, rose in protests in the Student Campus. These were to be the scapegoats and ultimately pay the price should the leadership of the party decide otherwise and declare them enemies of the people and the agents of the CIA. Afrim Krasniqi has examined the events of the first two

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days in much detail in his book. The protesters were stopped at the entrance of the Student City and by then, the group of agents provocateurs led by Azem Hajdari had taken control of the protests. The Ministers of the Interior and of Education happened to be there waiting for them. A representation of the students led by Hajdari met with Ramiz Alia and the leadership of the state that was awake, just after midnight … waiting to meet Hajdari and the other protesting students. To their disappointment, there were no political demands whatsoever presented in that meeting. Once the student representatives went back to where the protesters were stopped, there was an incident and the police started beating the students who ran back to the Student Campus. There was no police intervention, no arrests, and no interference in the Student City. For a regime that prided itself on the efficient use of violence, this was strange. In fact, a lot of students who claimed to be protesting against the regime openly met with their own relatives in the Rapid Intervention Forces on the other side, smoked cigarettes together, and … nothing happened. Obviously, the CIA had not instructed them well, for they said that they supported the party, Comrade Ramiz, and only wanted better living conditions. The only explanation, then and now, is that Alia decided to rough them up so that they would decide to protest again and have clearer demands that would be even faintly political. Then, the intellectuals would join them and the Association of the Students and the Young Intellectuals would be formed as it suited the regime. Indeed, there was another demonstration on the morning of December 9th, when, in a panic attack, a lot of students rushed to get out of the Student City and Azem Hajdari lost control. The students clashed with RENEA (Rapid Intervention Force), which had formed a cordon all over the Student City. While returning to the Student City, the beaten and angry met some of the intellectuals that were expecting them there surrounded by plainclothes operatives of the State Security. The plan of the regime did not go as expected. The plan failed for a number of reasons. Several of the student leaders, later identified as informants of the State Security, such as Azem Hajdari, but also other student leaders such as Arben Lika and Tefalin Malshyti, failed to convince the students to follow the agenda, i.e., to remain in the Student City and to become the soldiers that had the backing of the intellectuals that were coming to join them. Second, a substantial number of students had returned to the Student City and began organizing on their own. In particular, a group of students that had attempted to initiate political protests just a few days before became a distinct fulcrum of organization acting independently of others. Third, even the students that initially were timid and had no political demands, after the roughing-up by the police, became galvanized, very distrustful of the regime, and by now were asking for political change. The regime lost its control over the mass of students. The students were on the path towards becoming a student movement with

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clear political objectives. Thus, the initial plan of the regime failed and it took a very dangerous turn for the cult-state. By the afternoon of December 9th, this was no longer a plan to be implemented. It was a game to be played and it became a clash with distinct players and opposing agendas. The protests turned political. Students were outside their control and different people, several of the key students, were totally outside of their control and had emerged as leaders. By now, the regime had to improvise. Although they were unaware of the danger they were faced with, many of the students involved already had slipped into the category of enemies and foreign agents. Many assumed that much and behaved as if they had nothing to lose. The real mark of this extraordinarily rapid transformation of the student protests was the organization of the demonstration of December 9th in Skanderbeg Square, the main square of the capital. This was the first political demonstration during the 45 years of Communist rule. By now, the divide among the students was starkly clear. While Azem Hajdari and others insisted on keeping students in the Student City, the other group of students decided to go to the center of the capital and demonstrate there. The plan was to demonstrate before the Historical Museum. This site was changed once it became obvious that in the Square were hundreds of plainclothes and uniformed police and several trucks filled with the Rapid Intervention Forces. Several hundred students were instructed to leave individually and congregate in front of the Museum. Given the overwhelming presence of the police, the organizers moved to the other corner of the square. About 50–60 students demonstrated close to the statue of Skanderbeg for several minutes before being dispersed by the police. Students sung patriotic songs, threw slogans, and called on the people that had swarmed the square but they were left on their own. The demonstration was set to begin exactly when the Sunday soccer match ended and about 20,000 people would come from the soccer stadium through the square. Yet, the citizens of the capital that knew of the protests, and had just come from a soccer game, all rapidly moved to the other side of the street. Some applauded, but no one joined the students, who were left to face the police alone. This is the time when the student mass began organizing as a separate movement. Until then, they had followed the individual leaders, older peers, or people they trusted because they were from their own hometown or their classmates or relatives. Yet, that night several meetings were organized between Hajdari, me, and others. The agreement was to create a Committee that would lead the protests. As Halili explains in his chapter, the Committee was made up of Arben Lika, Tefalin Malshyti, Mimoza Zhamo, Azem Hajdari, and Shinasi Rama. This was indeed a very authoritative and respected structure that guided the Student Movement for several days. These individuals were also the leaders of the student

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organizations and associations that subsequently emerged as important components of the Student Movement. What did this Committee do? It agreed on the agenda. It conducted the negotiations with the representatives of Alia, such as Sali Berisha and others. It organized the democratic elections for the student representation, the very first elections in 45 years in Albania. It formulated, with the help of other important student leaders such as Akli Fundo, the demands that were to be presented to Ramiz Alia. Yet, through the further coordination and the cooperation of the students, and the growing popular attention and support, during the subsequent days the Student Movement played a much larger role at the national level. It helped organize the students in other universities and colleges. It helped galvanize the masses all over Albania. It became the real force that sustained the opposition at the most critical moments to the point that it appeared to many that the opposition and the Student Movement were one and the same. However, this was not the reality. The Student Movement continued to organize and reorganize. Differently from the opposition, it proposed a path that would lead to the building of the nation-state as the only right solution. And, above all, it managed to preserve its independence from the intellectuals and others that were seeking influence. These are all the hallmarks of a strong ideologically based social movement.

The Student Movement as a Social Movement Much of the debate regarding the role of the Student Movement is tied to its own nature. Were these just student protests that lasted a few days and then were absorbed into the emerging opposition? Was the Student Movement acting autonomously or as an appendix of the intellectuals and of the opposition? Did it have organizational structures and a solid leadership? What were the principles of organization? How important was the ideology? How did they interact with the authorities? What kinds of campaigns and actions did the Student Movement undertake? There are numerous such questions that warrant a further and more theoretical examination of the Student Movement. All these questions are essentially tied to the criteria used to evaluate a social movement. Social movements are notoriously elusive. To begin with, there are all kinds of movements that emerge under a repressive state and they do not leave tracks for a long time until they act politically. Moreover, in such repressive circumstances, the people involved have every reason to remain as influential as they can but from the shadows. These movements lack the proper organizational quasi-military structure of the party, or the common material interest that unifies people in trade unions. There are few records left for much of their activity is based on personal networks, interpersonal relationship, and influence rather than on prescribed adherence to a rigid organizational hierarchy and prescribed

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institutional rules. As a matter of fact, social movements, especially at the early stages, operate outside of the institutions and against them. Quite often, the trail of the emergence of the movement and its operation are unknown until people in the know connect all the existing dots and try to make a case for the unseen and the undocumented behavior. As in the case of myths of dragon-slaying, quite often, on its own part, the ruling caste will do everything in its power to eliminate the inconvenient truth and to self-ascribe centrality to its own agency. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Student Movement in Albania was misrepresented, misunderstood, and some politicians even openly aimed at negating its existence. There is a lack of data, missing supporting materials, and immense difficulty to evaluate the Student Movement and its role. There is no question that, at the earliest stage, let us say at the very first day, the student protesters were not a social movement. These were protests, unorganized and confused. The student mass was more of a crowd than a mob, but nonetheless it did not have the necessary leadership and structure. There was no massive and organized, open and uncompromising opposition to the regime, there were no consolidated structures or shared, clear political objectives. The effort on the side of the intellectuals to misrepresent it as continuing to be a mass even afterwards is just not true. The point is that this amorphous state of the student organization was just the very beginning. For during the next three months, the Student City was the epicenter of the opposition and the students were a uniquely organized force that autonomously and decisively influenced processes of political change in Albania. The obvious question is how to consider it? Were the student activities mere demonstrations, protests, or was this a student movement that, in the conditions of a small country like Albania, was transformed into a social movement? The proper qualification and identification of this form of collective action are important for theoretical discussions as well. Therefore, to properly evaluate the character of the Student Movement we ought to start with the dominant frameworks and theories of social movements. The reason why we cannot consider this as a student movement is quite obvious. Albanian students were not dealing with their own immediate or professional concerns as students but with the specific political problematique of their own society under the conditions of a totalitarian cult-state. The moment that students were involved in the politics of the state and went beyond student activism, they became a political and social movement that was made up of students. There is a substantial and qualitative difference that puts the Albanian Student Movement in a different category from the traditional student movements elsewhere. That is not to deny its qualification as a student movement. The vast literature on student movements and activism is replete with cases of student movements impacting the political environment and the society. Having said that, the Albanian Student Movement is a very interesting case. On the

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one hand, it is recognized as having played a very important role in the process of political change. On the other hand, the ruling elite and the emerging opposition led by the intellectuals have sought by any means to transform it into the horse of Saint George. As the chapters in this book show, the Student Movement in Albania was far more than a traditional student movement. Its political objectives, its role, and its contribution do not fit well with the traditional student movements, which may have political objectives but that essentially remain confined to the university. In many important ways the Student Movement became a social movement. To have a better appreciation of the Student Movement, one has to consider it through the optic of the various theories of social movements and collective action. Among the theories that would help us properly evaluate the Student Movement are the mass society theory, the deprivation theory, the resource mobilization theory, and the political contention approach. There are many people who quickly would point out that there was no clear organization of the students during the first few days. Mass society approaches seem to be the ideal approaches to analyze the behavior of people engaging in a spontaneous rebellion in a closed totalitarian cultstate as Albania was. By definition, mass society theory approaches would seem ideal in any analysis of the Student Movement. To attain the idealtype anomie and atomization you need either extreme technological control and isolation or a totalitarian idol-state that relies strictly on terror. The mass society assumes that there is no social fabric to hold the society together and to facilitate the collective action. The mass society assumes that the people, either as a mass, as a mob, or as a crowd, would follow the leading individuals, sometimes blindly, hence the psychology of the crowds. This assumes that the leader becomes the great unifier of a very diverse group of people. Therefore, given the specific nature of the Albanian totalitarian idol-state and its rigidity, in many important ways, the Student Movement would be the closest thing to a social experiment. Indeed, during the first day of the student protests, one could say that a substantial mass of individuals that seemed not to know each other well, or not even know each other at all, coalesced around a group of individuals that assumed the role of leaders and the responsibility for the actions of the mass of students. The authorities had counted on this assumption of suggestiveness to provide the necessary support to their own intellectuals. This argument goes a long way towards explaining why Azem Hajdari emerged as the leader of a group of students and, to some extent, why these students continued to remain loyal to him for a long time afterwards. The mass, let’s call it a crowd, followed him and he became the embodiment of their will. After that moment, as an individual leader, Azem Hajdari could count on the support of a substantial group of followers. There is no question that a part of the students followed the student leaders be it Hajdari or somebody else. Yet, they did not do so blindly. For

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example, on December 9 , 1990 when he sought to bring the intellectuals onboard, the students called Azem Hajdari a traitor and kicked out the intellectuals. Hajdari had to change his position quickly to retain his leadership position.4 To reiterate the point, this simple explanation of the students remaining a crowd is very deceiving and not very appropriate. Indeed, there were moments of panic when the students were a crowd and acted as a crowd, like in the morning of December 9th when panic prevailed and they rushed to get out of the Student City. However, these moments were noticeable only during the first day of protests. After the very first day, organizational and leadership elements emerged that rapidly structured the mass into a movement. Upon closer examination, it appears clearly that the structures were not atomized and there were several elements that facilitated the rapid mutation into a movement. Five things stand out that make the mass society approach quite problematic. First, students, most of them from remote small towns and clustered regions, had very strong interpersonal ties. They lived in the same dormitories and went to the same classes; many had gone to high school together. So they knew each other well. The students had multiple connections to one another. Second, there were very strong regional and family ties. Students from the same region and town knew each other and their families going back generations. They could trust each other almost blindly or at least could count on the others. Third, the ideology became a great unifier of interests and objectives. Nationalism in the form of ideas, concepts, symbols, and slogans became the great unifying force. Fourth, at critical points, several student leaders emerged who assumed responsibility, provided the agenda, and became natural leaders. Most of these students were older, had previous life experiences, enjoyed charisma, or were trusted. Finally, a much stronger sentiment of solidarity vis-à-vis the authorities and the intellectuals, who were perceived as the other, served to cement their ties and led to trust and the willingness to continue independent collective action. Sidney Tarrow offers a very constructive and useful take on social movements which would help us to properly evaluate the Student Movement as a social movement and as distinct from the political parties and the interest groups such as the emerging trade unions. According to Tarrow, social movements are as collective challenges, by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and authorities. There is no question that the Student Movement was a collective challenge, that had the common purpose of the changing of the political system, with a high degree of solidarity and in a severalmonths-long interaction as a distinct force with the authorities, the opposition, and the intellectuals. Charles Tilly’s definition of social movements is quite useful here. In his final take on social movements, Charles Tilly argued that modern social movements have three fundamental characteristics.5 This makes our task

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relatively easy. We just have to consider whether the Student Movement in Albania satisfies the definitional criteria set up by Tilly with regard to campaigns, repertoire, and WUNC (explained in what follows). This should settle the matter of whether the Student Movement was a social movement or not. To begin with, Tilly argues that social movements are a sustained public effort making collective claims on target authorities. The Student Movement was a sustained effort for it formally lasted for about four months, i. e., between December 1990 and April 1991. It made repeated and sustained collective claims on the authorities. It did so in two important ways. On the one hand, it behaved as a collectivity for it had commonly agreed demands supported by the students. On the other hand, the demands it made were on behalf of all the citizenry and polity. Such demands were the demand for the establishment of political pluralism, the demand for the removal of the name of Enver Hoxha from the State University, the depoliticization of the university, the release of political prisoners, and the like. Its independence from the government and the opposition reinforces the claim that it was a distinct social movement that actively sought to change the political system. Second, Tilly argues that social movements employ a distinct repertoire of forms of political action. Indeed, the Student Movement was initially based on a coalition of student clusters but then these were formalized into special purpose associations such as the Student Association “Fan S. Noli” and the Albanian Student Association. By December 10th the Student Movement had a leading committee made up of the most prominent leaders. In many important ways these individuals continued to be central to the Student Movement in the future months. I was the President of the “Fan S. Noli” Student Association and Arben Lika was Vice President while Tefalin Malshyti was the founder of the Albanian Student Association. It is worth mentioning that the Student Movement held the first democratic elections in Albania. The student representation that went to meet with President Alia was elected and each department sent three students. The Student Movement organized the very first political demonstration in the main square of the capital on December 9th, 1991 and the last demonstration was formally organized on March 10th, 1991 in front of the Main University Square. In between there were almost daily protests, demonstrations, and the like. The Student Movement issued numerous leaflets, proclamations, and widely distributed materials and documents that helped galvanize the people. If nothing else, by organizing a Hunger Strike in which 753 students participated, the Student Movement showed that it was a very creative and formidable force. The Student Movement acted independently of the political parties and the trade unions, adopting a very distinct repertoire. Third, when it comes to the WUNC displays, i.e., worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitments on the part of themselves and the citizenry, there

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is no question that the Student Movement fulfills these criteria as well. In terms of worthiness, the Student Movement was extremely civilized, wellmannered, accepted the requests for dialogue, invited and properly received state representatives, trade union representatives, citizens, and even high school students, and it showed itself to be a very responsible and civic-minded entity. In terms of unity, the display of the unity was formidable. Students used the Albanian national flag, sang patriotic songs, used the slogans of the Albanian National Renaissance, and kept a remarkable organizational discipline. In terms of numbers, the Student Movement was represented not only in the University of Tirana but in other institutions of higher learning as well. Several times, hundreds of thousands of people would be present supporting the Student Movement at the Student City. Petitions were filled out and presented to the authorities. The final point that Tilly mentions in the WUNC is commitment. There is no question that the students showed extraordinary courage. They faced the police and the government of a totalitarian idol-state. At some point, they locked themselves up in a Hunger Strike seeking the removal of the name of the former dictator from the university. At that point the leadership of the state had made it clear that it was willing to use force and sent tanks to the capital. Yet the students did not yield. They stood there, even if they were not sure of the outcome. In short, the Student Movement fulfills all the criteria to define it as a social movement set by Charles Tilly. Having said that, we are immediately faced with a paradox. There are three additional elements that end up being of the essence here. One is the political environment. Tilly is assuming that social movements are a characteristic of modernity and of specific forms of government. Yet, Albania was and continued to be a totalitarian idol-state and by definition a social movement cannot emerge under such repressive conditions. Second, the Movement was virulently political. It maintained its political character to the end. The third problem has to do with the specific ideology adopted by the Student Movement that was essentially nationalism. Tilly offers a very generic definition that does not allow us to properly evaluate the Student Movement and its role. The explanation is complex. In many important ways, the Student Movement was an informal structure. It did not have a rigid hierarchy. It witnessed intense fighting among the individuals that were recognized as its leaders. As a matter of fact, there were several structures within it that acted highly autonomously, sometimes adversely towards one another. One example is the complex relationship between Azem Hajdari and other leaders that very often would explode in public. Another example is the competition and conflict between the “Fan S. Noli” Student Association and the Albanian Student Association. The Albanian Student Association was organized as a counterweight to the “Fan S. Noli” Student Association, and even copied its statute and program. Yet, competition and frictions notwithstanding, both organizations cooperated in the organization

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of the Hunger Strike. As various documents show, the cooperation was explicitly arranged to preserve the Student Movement. The common cause of the Student Movement brought different organizations together. Both organizations had the capacity to mobilize the students and, as the various activities, strikes, and demonstrations show, to sustain them. The Student Movement used all the arsenal of a non-institutional agent that seeks to protest: sit-ins, boycott, demonstrations, strikes, and the like. It is essential to discuss the issue of deprivation as well. The assumption behind deprivation being the cause of the rising of the people is that people would rise because they became aware that they did not have certain goods. Almost as one, all the Albanians were deprived of material things. All of them had sufficient access to Italian TV. They went to school with the members of the ruling caste. As such they were aware of their relative deprivation. Yet, not everybody rebelled. A substantial number, particularly students who were connected to the regime, stood apart. The students who started and sustained this Movement were, as Llukman Halili, Grid Rroji, and James Pettifer argue, of the nationalist ideology. One of the theories that helps us better examine the Student Movement is the resource mobilization theory. The resource mobilization theory goes a long way towards explaining the Student Movement. There was no question that there were strong grounds to protest. Moreover, the students acted rationally. Once the actions of their fellows went unpunished by the regime, they became bolder. When they were beaten up and pushed back to their Student Campus, they again acted rationally and began organizing. Furthermore, a lot of students, particularly those who emerged as leaders, were well-experienced people. A lot of them came from a military background, either as military cadets or as former soldiers. The ability to use the existent structure of departments and regional affinities went a long way towards the building of the organization and the structuring of the Student Movement. As Halili notes, the fact that the majority of the student leaders were from the North, and many were from the same town of Shkodra, as well as the strong cluster of students coming from Tropoja was a huge resource. The pragmatism and the high level of tolerance, as well as the organizational skills of some organizers allowed for the synergy of different groups and the emergence of a legitimate leadership. Yet, this approach does not explain adequately why several students would join, even when it appeared that the regime was going to punish the students. Again, three elements stand out that make the nexus between financial resources and the social movement problematic. First, there was no immediate benefit to the students, for the objectives of the Student Movement were and remained essentially political and quite removed from their own immediate interests. Second, there was a high degree of solidarity that preceded the Student Movement. Third, the mobilization was sustained over several months and this was done in opposition to the ruling caste and to the intellectuals.

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Finally, tied to the previous point and very importantly, without factoring in the ideology it would be quite difficult to explain the actions of the students. An important aspect that has to do with framing is the set of competing ideologies that informed the behavior of students. There were three groups and all of them subscribed to different ideologies. There were the followers of the intellectuals that believed that capitalism was to be established in Albania. There were the loyalists that believed in a form of socialism. Then there were the nationalists. All three groups disagreed on which path was best to be followed, but they continued to work together. The chapters by Halili, Rroji, and Karanxha go a long way in providing a very dense and rich analysis of the Student Movement as a social movement.

What Did the Student Movement Achieve? Suffice to say that during those four days of December 1990, thanks to protests organized and led in the Student City, the university campus by students, mainly coming from outside the capital, i.e., mostly from the rural areas and small towns, the situation in Albania radically changed, and it changed overnight. The fundamental principles of the political organization of the state were changed in that single meeting of Ramiz Alia, then President of the country and the First Secretary of the Albanian Labor Party (ALP), the handpicked successor of the late dictator, with the student representatives. In that meeting, Alia conceded that people were allowed to form a second party, which could be ideologically different from the ALP. Although the Constitution did not formally change, Alia was forced to give up and concede to the student demand for the establishment of a political multiparty system. With over 100,000 people supporting the students in the Student City, and the foreign representatives carefully watching and following the developments, Ramiz Alia chose not to use force. It was a huge gamble he took on behalf of the system and he lost. It is important to highlight here the following points that make this event so important. For the establishment of political pluralism was not a gift by the dictator of the totalitarian cult-state. The student representatives demanded and wrestled away the change of the fundamental principle of the social order. They did so at immense risk to their lives and to their families. For even if Alia agreed to it, nobody knew how far the structures of the deep state, filled up with bigots and fanatics, were willing to go. In the meeting of the Politburo just the night before, Ramiz Alia had laid out the following plan. The students and the young intellectuals (poets, writers, lecturers) would form an organization that would exist parallel to the Youth Organization, the mass lever of the party. The model was the youth organization during World War II and afterwards when two youth organizations coexisted: the Communist Youth Organization and the Antifascist Youth Organization. By building this new organization Alia and the other members of the Politburo hoped that a fake and

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fictitious form of democracy would be established. New evidence from the archives shows that the Politburo discussed the risk of the establishment of multiparty pluralism. Ramiz Alia himself left open the possibility that the students might ask for substantive political pluralism but the Politburo members believed that they were in control of the situation. Hekuran Isai, the Minister of the Interior, assured them as well. In the meeting with the student representatives, Alia was very threatening, intimidating, and arrogant. Yet, while many of the students present demonstrated utmost loyalty to him and to the ALP, which raised very grave doubts about the likelihood of the protests being a false flag operation and of them being patsies, at least one of the students openly insisted on demanding the establishment of a multiparty system. Very reluctantly, and only after his direct threats did not break this student, Alia agreed to that demand. After all, the meeting was recorded and the representatives of the foreign powers were following its development closely. Up to that point, nobody had asked for the establishment of a multiparty system in Albania. Some students had the courage to ask the right question and they did so on behalf of the whole Student Movement. This is how the dragon was killed and how the political system was changed. Albania was ushered into the era of the multiparty political system and, albeit without immediate constitutional reform, de facto became a democratic state. The party, through its leader, had formally renounced its leading role in the society. To properly understand what happened, one should go one step back and recall the peculiar electoral laws under the totalitarian cultstate. The key to understanding the political change in Albania and elsewhere as well is tied to the fact that all these countries were formal democracies. De jure, all socialist states were “people’s democracies,” i.e., they held elections and had all the structures needed for the functioning of the democratic system. And yet, all these institutional structures and laws were the façade. The system was a cult-state of a single party. Now, these rules became very important and new life was breathed into them. From now on, the laws, the rules, and the political institutions were to be taken seriously and were to be central to the political process. The barrier was broken and no one understood this better than the ruling class and the intellectuals. Overnight, the intellectuals present in the Student Campus and some of the student leaders formed the new party, the first opposition party in 45 years. But they did so after the fact that a multiparty system was permitted by the system, i.e., with no risk to themselves. The walls came tumbling down and Albania was thrust into a new brave world in which the people were galvanized and empowered rapidly. Subsequent to that meeting, the intellectuals rode the wave of change with the support of the ruling caste. Even then, the actions of the Student Movement seemed to be out of step with the actions of the people and the intelligentsia. Student activists went all over Albania to spread the word and to help organize the opposition. In a few days, they returned very

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discouraged and unhappy. Everywhere they went, they were met with intense resistance, threatened, abused, and harassed. The disappointment with the opposition was also intense. Most of the people who emerged as leaders were known to be staunch loyalists and party members. Gradually, within the next few days, the students began organizing autonomously from the political parties. Given that Azem Hajdari, Arben Likaj, Tefalin Malshyti, Arben Sulo, Shinasi Rama, and Alma Bendo were part of the Founding Committee of the Democratic Party, it seemed that the Student Movement was naturally fused with it. Yet, nothing could be farther from the truth. Given the Winter Break it seemed that the Student City was controlled by the Democratic Party. Yet, the students organized separate meetings, activities, and even a demonstration on December 21st, 1990, separately from the opposition. This period is well-examined in the essays by Llukman Halili, Grid Rroji, and Valbona Karanxha. It is important to note that activists from the budding civil society, the student organizations, and in particular the “Fan S. Noli” Student Association zeroed in on the cult of Enver Hoxha. Throughout the early weeks of the process of the political transformation, the cult of Enver Hoxha, the soul of the cult-state, was not touched. To put this in a better context, Albania was covered with statues of Enver Hoxha, from the main town squares to the classrooms, that no one dared to touch. However, a few months later, in February 1991, the Student Movement organized a Hunger Strike. Their single demand was the removal of the name of Enver Hoxha from the university. The outcome of that strike was that the idol itself, the statue of Enver Hoxha that was still the soul of the party and the state, was toppled by the people, albeit with the consent of the regime, and with it went the source of legitimacy of the system as well. The road was opened wide to democratization and to the transformation of the country. To some, Albania simply became the last domino to fall in the formerly Soviet-dominated Communist camp. To others, the Albanian state became democratic by mere institutional fiat, i.e., it was just a political decision by Ramiz Alia, the president of the state, to transform the political system from a totalitarian cult-state into a democracy. This had happened in Eastern Central Europe and the former USSR where the leadership of the cult-state had steered the processes of democratization on the right path. Hence, most analysts assumed that the student protests and their political demands were just used as a pretext to justify these inevitable changes that the victors of the Cold War were demanding of the Albanian leadership. To them, the intellectuals behaved as had the Czech and the Hungarian intellectuals. Analyzed from this viewpoint, all made perfect sense. And yet, this picture-perfect interpretation of transition is wrong. There was no question that the legal and the political foundations of the state were changed during that meeting in which the intellectuals played no role whatsoever. Indeed, President Alia consented to change but two things stand out that tied his hands. First, the foreign presence made impossible

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the use of force. Simply put, the USA and its allies would not allow a Tien An Men-type massacre in Albania. Second, the students knew what to demand. Without the right question, there was no right answer. The political system changed because the students insisted on political pluralism. President Alia and the leadership of the country did not expect this. As a matter of fact, as he explained to the party leadership the very next day after the meeting, Alia himself was perfectly aware of the role of the students and the changing situation. There are no fixed plans after the first day of war, and in such a case, no one was able to foresee the cascade of events that were to unfold from that very night forward. After those four days of protests, and especially after that meeting of December 11th, 1990, institutionally speaking, the state was no longer the same. The totalitarian cult-state had collapsed. The state was effective and the institutions, agencies, and structures of the state were fully functional. However, the ruling caste was in disarray and on the defensive for the rules of the game had radically changed. The most significant factor in this process was the rising opposition of the intelligentsia, a mass of educated people that up to that point had played the role of the “most loyal” lever of the party. The intellectuals were quick to grasp the opportunity. Students and the leading intellectuals founded the first opposition political party that very night. In a few days, joyous and hopeful popular masses were galvanized in support of the supposedly emerging fledgling opposition. Because of the notoriety gained through some interviews, visits, and meager support by foreign journalists and the small group of Western diplomats accredited in Tirana, this small group of selected handpicked members of the intelligentsia was perceived by the population to have the backing of the outside powers. Secondary and tertiary echelons of the intelligentsia rapidly gravitated in their direction. The regime suddenly was faced with the rapid and extraordinary drain of legitimacy that usually leads to utter collapse. Spreading itself in all the opposition parties that emerged, the ruling caste sensed that with its knowledge, connections, and its professional capabilities it could become the new bourgeoisie, all the while retaining the political power as well. The politically persecuted people were sensing that they had an opportunity to organize politically and they were timidly probing their opportunities. The intellectuals realized that they had a chance to become political players and also compete with or replace the ruling caste. Above all, the workers and the peasants suddenly realized the possibility of change in their own favor. Against all odds, they hoped that the system would change to their own benefit. The majority of the people were irrationally assuming that their lives would be the same as the lives of actors that they saw in the Hollywood movies or the Italian TV soap operas. In more than one sense, the situation was imbued with an unjustifiable romanticism that usually comes from unfounded hopes and from ignorance about the future. While the structures of the state were loyal to

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the late leader, now all state servants had to make an individual choice. The cult-state had collapsed but, strangely, buoyed by an unjustifiable sense of optimism, everybody agreed that this collapse of the totalitarian cult-state was also a new opportunity for them all. The Student Movement emerges as a central factor at a second point as well. The Hunger Strike removed a very important psychological obstacle for the ruling caste, the state servants, the professionals, and the intellectuals. Figuratively, the church had crumbled. By now, even some of the erstwhile fanatical believers renounced their prophet. This created the opportunity not of the reformation as desired by the ruling caste, but of the thorough reconstruction of the state and of the reorganization of the society on a completely different ideological platform. Albania had a unique chance to build a state based on completely different principles and on a different ideology. It is safe to say that all parties agree that the system was changed in those moments and that these two events are connected. Nobody contests the claim that during that time, students requested the political change of the system. Disagreements on details notwithstanding, all pretty much agree that the new opposition party was formed, that the students had protested, that the multiparty system was established, and that the intellectuals played a critical role afterwards. Most people want to believe that the people of the capital overwhelmingly supported the students, and that the regime had managed to change the fundamental structures of the political system, miraculously without any bloodshed, according to the requirements imposed by the powers that won the Cold War. None of these are true. When the students were protesting at the Student City and in Skanderbeg Square, 20,000 people from the capital went to watch a soccer match and none of them joined the students. The soccer stadium was less than a mile from the Student City. Afterwards, a day later, some of them did join the students but, very significantly, not at the very crucial and critical time of the first few days. To sum up the core claim of this book, the Student Movement clearly was a social movement and very successful for the duration of the period that it was active. It fulfills all the parameters of the definition of a social movement. It had a stable structure and student support, an identifiable leadership, clear ideological values, and it was not subject to the control of political elite structures. The Student Movement acted independently of the political elite and the intellectuals. In this sense, one could compare the Student Movement in Albania to the student movement of 1968 in France, Germany, and the former socialist states. There are fundamental differences between the Albanian Student Movement and other movements but these are in terms of the vision and the project for the future. This brings us to the ideology, for the Movement, or better to say those who inspired that Movement, were “armed” with the values of an ideological system based on nationalism and the Albanian National Renaissance. The Student Movement had a base of support but that was not so consolidated. Thus, when the regime turned fullforce against it, the Movement collapsed. In many ways, regardless of the fact

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that they belonged to other parties and structures, many students continued to self-identify as part of the Student Movement. The fairy tale that is presented in the scholarly research outside Albania is simple but also quite deceiving. In a blip, much like in the story of the sleeping beauty, Albania went to sleep as a totalitarian ideological cult-state and woke up as a democracy. Yet, what happened to the dragon of the cultstate?! Inside Albania, the situation is the opposite: for everybody in Albania claims that they slew the dragon. This list of dragon-slayers includes the leadership of the party, the secret police, the intellectuals, and individuals from all strata of the society. As this book convincingly shows, the Student Movement killed the dragon of the totalitarian state. It did so by changing the fundamental principles of social order and by delegitimizing the totalitarian cult-state. Its significance, though, goes far beyond the single Albanian case. For this was one of the most successful student movements that not only achieved its political goals but it became the beacon of hope and reason for an entire people forced to live in the institutionally induced absurd existence of a cult-state. If one is to take a single finding from this book, that would be that the Student Movement achieved its main goals. The Student Movement did succeed in establishing political pluralism, in demolishing Enver Hoxha’s myth, in liberating the masses and empowering the society from party-state shackles, and in giving the opposition strength and support—and, to the people, a vision for the future.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5

(Bufi, 2016: 10). (Gjoni, 2015). (Lubonja, 1994). (Mustafaj, 1999). (Tilly, 2004: 3–4).

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Gamson, William A. 1990 [1975]. The Strategy of Social Protest, 2nd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Gjoni, Xhelil. 2015. “Ramiz Alia Më Kërkoi Që Ta Largonte Nexhmijen Jashtë Shtetit.” Panorama, January 12th. Available at: http://www.pa norama.com.al/2015/01/12/ Goldstone, Jack A., ed. 2003. States, Parties, and Social Movements. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Goodwin, Jeff and James M. Jasper, eds. 2004. Rethinking Social Movements. Structure, Meaning, and Emotion. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kornhauser, William. 1959. The Politics of Mass Society. New York: Free Press. LeBon, Gustave. 2002 [1896]. The Crowd. London: Dover Publishing. Lubonja, Fatos. 1994. Ne vitin e shtatembedhjete: ditar burgu 1990–1991. Tirane: Marin Barleti. Marx, Gary T. and Douglas McAdam. 1994. Collective Behavior and Social Movements: Process and Structure. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. 1988. “Social Movements.” In Handbook of Sociology, edited by Neil J. Smelser. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 695–737. McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds. 1996. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Melucci, Alberto. 1980. “The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach.” Social Science Information 19(2): 199–226. Mustafaj, Besnik. 1999. Midis Krimeve dhe Mirazheve. Tiranë: Toena. Obershall, Anthony. 1992. Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests, Identities. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Press. Smelser, Neil J. 1963. Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: Free Press. Staggenborg, Suzanne. 2008. Social Movements. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Tarrow, Sidney G. 2011. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Revised and Updated Third Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: AddisonWesley. Tilly, Charles. 2004. Social Movements, 1768–2004. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. Tilly, Charles and Sidney Tarrow. 2007. Contentious Politics. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. Zald, Mayer and John D. McCarthy, eds. 1987. Social Movements in Organizational Society. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Index

Abrahams, F. 15, 80, 150 Agolli, A. 15 Agolli, D. 137, 171 Ahmetaj, A. 13, 119, 250 Ahmetaj, B. 23, 111,123 Albanian Student Association 27, 126–8, 188, 248, 276 Alia, R. 4, 12, 48, 84, 99, 105, 113, 120, 140, 167, 169, 216, 232, 234, 240–2, 258–9, 262, 267, 269 and “Ceausescu Syndrome”, 64, 98 and the deep state, 135, 256 and Enver Hoxha, 41–42, 174, 204–5, 241 and external pressure, 24, 64 116, 184, 210, 229, 235, 261, 263 and the formation of the opposition, 19, 118, 120–21, 188–189, 192, 252 and Ismail Kadare, 213 and the meeting with intellectuals, 78, 171, 208–12, 214–15, 217, 222, 246 and the meeting with the student representation, 47, 72, 103, 106, 117–119, 162, 216, 221–22, 279–80 and the overthrow of Hoxha’s statue, 73, 124, 126, 128, 132, 134, 139, 170, 238, 249 and political pluralism, 11, 26, 28, 47–8, 114, 119, 137, 156, 186–7, 210, 218, 220–21, 245, 257, 261 and pressure to reform, 150, 171 and Sali Berisha, 107–10, 122–23, 131, 137, 158, 247 and the Student Movement, 270, 104, 115, 127, 133, 177, 244, 272 and ‘the Volunteers of Enver’, 136 Albanian Army, 84–85, 255 Asllani, M. 14, 132, 134

Baleta, A. 14 Bashkurti, L. 14, 19, 105, 115, 118, 128, 130, 132 Berisha, S. 6, 13–15, 18, 20, 22, 25, 48, 64, 72, 137, 150, 157–58, 169, 171–172, 190, 212–13, 216, 221, 247 and the founding of Democratic Party, 121–22, 156, 189, 237 and the Student Movement, 19, 23, 79, 106–110, 108–110, 123, 125, 131, 161, 173, 188, 246 Biberaj, E. 14–5, 63, 99, 130, 214, 216 Bocaj, A. 15 Boci, S. 15 Bogdani, M. 60, 254–255 Brokaj, S. 19, 150 Brozi, Z. 118, 137–38, 252 Buçpapaj, E. 98 Budina, E. 14, 118, 189, 121 Bushati, E. 126, 137 Bushati, G. 16 Buxheli, A. 16 Cashku, K. 20 Ceausescu, N. 37, 44, 47, 64, 70, 96–98, 104, 114, 204, 229, 233, 244, 261 Cela, B. 14 Cela, M. 14 Ceka, N. 25 Chiodi, L. 15, 254 The Communist regime, 36–48, 70, 195–203 in crisis, 41–48, 70, 168–171 economic collapse 46–48, 85–86, 99 establishment of, 36–41 57–62, Cupi, F. 14, 237 Curraj, S. 13

Index Dizdari, I. 13, 128, 138 Demeti, A. 117–118 Dervishi, F. 16 Dervishi, K. 16 Dervishi, P. 133 Dimushi, A. 25 Doda, M. 13, 128, 138 Dokle, N. 135 Elezi, M. 14 Embassy Crisis, 98–99 “Fan S. Noli” Student Association 21, 27, 112, 128, 137, 187, 248, 276–77 and the organization of the Hunger Strike, 26, 125–128, 131, 177, 281 Ferraj, M. 13, 118, 121, 157 Fevziu, B. 8, 13, 15, 120, 126–27, 157 Frasheri, K. 104 Frasheri X, 25 Fuga, A. 25 Fundo. A. 13, 106, 272 Gemi, A. 118 Gervalla, D. 125–126 Godo, S. 137 Gjanaj, M. 13, 126 Gjinushi, S. 14, 19, 23, 114, 101–2, 128, 130, 132, 134, 171, 238 Gjoni, X. 14, 19, 127, 134, 257–58 and the intellectuals, 258, 263 and Sali Berisha, 107, 110, 123, 246 Gonxhe, B. 13, 126, 128, 136, 138, 187, 248 Gorbachev, M. 41, 56, 63, 124, 150, 181, 204, 233, 248, 262 Goro, R. 12–13, 25 Halili L. 8, 11–12, 16, 27, 148, 151, 155, 157, 161, 254, 182–83, 186, 271, 278–79, 281 Hajdari, A. 11, 13, 17–18, 20–23, 25, 27, 102–6, 107, 109–111, 113, 115, 118, 121–22, 125–126, 131–2, 138, 143, 149, 157–8, 161, 187–191, 237, 246, 270–71, 274–75, 277, 281 Haxhia, I. 8, 12–13, 27, 157 Hoxha, E. 5, 84 and Hoxhaism, 36–42, 50–51, 59, 61, 148, 174, 181, 196, 199–201, 203, 205, 240–241 and Ramiz Alia, 40–42, 50–51, 123, 128, 204, 230, 262

287

and the specific nature of the regime, 240–241, 251 toppling of statue, 51, 124–25, 129, 130–35, 139, 237, 239, 244 and the totalitarian cult-state, 170, 249, 255, 259–60, 265–268, 281 Hoxha, N. 133–35, 230 the Hunger Strike, 121–136 background, 121–129 political effects, 135–136 popular support, 133–134 significance, 130–131 Imami, A. 14, 17, 23, 25, 114, 117–22, 134, 157–58, 160, 187, 189 Isai, H. 14, 103–4, 115, 119, 133–34, 257, 263, 280 Intellectuals, 7–24, 66, 77–80 failure to act, 18–24, 77–80, 99–100, 214–216 meeting with Ramiz Alia, 172, 188–191, 210–214 Kaca, E. 15, 116 Kadare, I. 24, 47, 78–79, 99, 171–72, 183, 201, 203, 211–13, 217, 231–232, 244, 266 Kaloci, D. 16 Karanxha, V. 258, 279, 281 Krasniqi, A. 8–9, 12–13, 129, 135, 138, 156, 161, 247, 254, 258, 263, 269 Koli, R. 14, 19, 110 Klosi, A. 14 Kushta, A. 13, 118 Lika, A. 13, 21, 106, 110, 118, 126, 128, 137, 187, 270–71, 276, 281 Lubonja, F. 24, 80–81, 203, 266 Lugja, N. 13, 128, 138 Malshyti, T. 21, 106, 110, 118, 126, 138, 188, 270–71, 276, 281 Majko, P. 13, 101, 118, 187, 269 Manahasa, A. 13, 128 Marku, M. 13 Meksi, A. 10, 14, 17, 25, 97–98, 121, 149, 157–158, 161, 189, 218 Meta, I. 6, 13, 98, 118, 187 Musliu, F. 16 Mustafaj, B. 11–15, 17–20, 23, 25, 109, 114, 121, 135 Mustaqi, K. 13, 25, 134

288

Index

Necaj, S. 189 Noli, F. 35. 60 Pano, D. 15 Papa, R. 16 Pashko, G. 14, 17–18, 23, 25, 48, 110, 117, 121, 136, 150, 188–90, 237, 247 Pashko, M. 14 Pellumbi, S. 8, 25, 150, 213 Pendavinji, M. 16 Peshkepia, R. 128 Petrollari, A. 118 Pettifer, J. 14–15, 65, 72, 76, 87, 254, 278 Pici, A. 13, 126, 137 Political change, 1–4, 7–8, 48–52 agents of change, 64–66, 176–177 and ethnic cleavages, 83–84 and former political prisoners, 80–81 and the intellectuals, 77–80, 89 international interpretations, 229–234 and international situation, 45–48, 56, 69–70, 97–98, 169 and lack of organized opposition, 241 and leadership, 169–70, 182–185, 205 and legal structure 259–261 and religious institutions, 82–83 and the state, 185, 268–269 and women, 81–82 and the workers 74 and the youth, 76, 88–89, 204–207 Progni, L. 8–10, 13, 23, 109, 157, 161, 244 Rama, E. 6, 14, 107 Rama, S. 8, 21, 64, 96, 106–7, 110–12, 117–121, 123, 126, 131–133, 135, 137, 149, 155, 157–158, 187, 246, 248, 271, 281 Rayerson, W. 103 Rroji, G. 254, 278, 281 Ruli, G. 121, 189 Sejamini, N. 13 Selami, E. 117, 121, 157, 189 Shahini, J. 15 Shakohoxha, D. 118 Shvarc, E. 13, 27, 126, 129, 137, 157, 187 Stefa, A. 13, 128–29 Stringa, O. 133 Student Movement, 64–67, 71, 100 and commemorations, 4–6

and contribution, 97, 239, 241–253, 279–280 and democracy, 218–222 and the demonstration in Skanderbeg Square, 111–113 and the establishment of political pluralism, 114–120, 216–218, 222, 236 factions within the Student Movement, 124–128, 181–182 and the Hunger Strike, 121–136 as an independent factor, 27–29 and the intellectuals 17–24, 106–109, 149–150 and leadership, 110–112, 157–159, 182–187 and literature on transition, 8–16 and nationalism, 112–113, 130–131, 148, 153–156 and political demands, 113–114, 156–157 and the regime, 24–27 and Sali Berisha, 107–110 as a social movement, 89, 96–97, 108, 149–151, 177–179, 272–278 and the state, 173–176 Sulo, A. 13, 126, 137, 187, 281 Symbolic representations of the change of order, 1–3, 6–8 Tahiraj, A. 13 Tasho, R. 16 Tarifa, F. 14, 122, 254–55 Tershana, A. 13, 105–6 Tole, I. 13 Trako, E. 14 Ukcamaj, B. 13, 106, 111, 188 Vickers, M. 14–15, 65, 72, 76, 87, 132, 254 Xhafa, M. 14 Zaloshnja, E. 14, 248 Zela, I. 187 Zeneli, G. 14, 247 Zhamo, M. 21, 106, 110, 118, 187, 271 Zogaj, P. 8, 10–11, 14, 17, 23, 25, 121, 169 Zogu, A. 35–36, 57, 60, 197, 229