The emperor's adviser - Saionji Kinmochi and pre-war Japanese politics 0203841654, 9780415564984, 9780203843178, 9780415594745, 9780203841655, 0709934491

Table of contents :
COVER
TITLE01
COPYRIGHT01
TITLE02
COPYRIGHT02
CONTENTS
GENERAL EDITOR’S PREFACE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER ONE: SAIONJI’S EMERGENCE AS GENRO THE SAIONJI-KATSURA COMPROMISE
CHAPTER TWO: THE GENRO
CHAPTER THREE: SAIONJI’S PARTICIPATION IN THE GENRO GROUP 1913–1919
CHAPTER FOUR: THE TURNING POINT: SAIONJI’S DOMINATION OF THE GENRO GROUP
CHAPTER FIVE: SAIONJI THE LAST GENRO PARTY GOVERNMENTS AND SAIONJI DIPLOMACY
CHAPTER SIX: THE SAIONJI GROUP UNDER ATTACK
CHAPTER SEVEN: FROM POLITICAL ACTOR TO POLITICAL COMMENTATOR SAIONJI’S LAST YEARS 1937–1940
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
NOTES
A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX

Citation preview

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS: JAPAN

THE EMPEROR’S ADVISER

THE EMPEROR’S ADVISER Saionji Kinmochi and pre-war Japanese politics

LESLEY CONNORS

Volume 66

  LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published in 1987 This edition first published in 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 1987 Lesley Connors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 0-203-84165-4 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 13:978-0-415-56498-4 (Set) eISBN 13:978-0-203-84317-8 (Set) ISBN 13:978-0-415-59474-5 (Volume 66) eISBN 13:978-0-203-84165-5 (Volume 66) Publisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and would welcome correspondence from those they have been unable to trace.

THE EMPEROR’S ADVISER SAIONJI KINMOCHI and pre-war Japanese politics LESLEY CONNORS

CROOM HELM

London • Sydney • Wolfeboro, New Hampshire and

NISSAN INSTITUTE FOR JAPANESE STUDIES University of Oxford

© 1987 Lesley Connors Croom Helm Ltd, Provident House, Burrell Row, Beckenham, Kent, BR3 1AT Croom Helm Australia, 44–50 Waterloo Road, North Ryde, 2113, New South Wales Croom Helm, 27 South Main Street, Wolfeboro, New Hampshire 03894–2069, USA British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Connors, Lesley The Emperor’s adviser: Saionji Kinmochi and pre-war Japanese politics. 1. Saionji, Kinmochi, Prince 2. Statesmen—Japan—Biography I.Title 952.03’092’4   DS884.S3 ISBN 0–7099–3449–1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Connors, Lesley. The emperor’s adviser. (The Nissan Institute/Croom Helm Japanese studies series) 1. Japan—Politics and government—1912–1945. 2. Saionji, Kinmochi, 1849–1940.  I. Title.  II. Series. DS885.C66  1987   952.03   86–29325 ISBN 0-7099-3449-1

CONTENTS

GENERAL EDITOR’S PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS INTRODUCTION CHAPTER ONE:  SAIONJI’S EMERGENCE AS GENRO; THE SAIONJI-KATSURA COMPROMISE * A biographical sketch; the early years. * Saionji’s appointment to the Presidency of the Seiyukai and the origins of the Saionji-Katsura compromise 1903–1906. * Compromise in action; its decline and fall. CHAPTER TWO:  THE GENRO * The emergence of the Genro group. * The Genro as Cabinet makers. CHAPTER THREE:  SAIONJI’S PARTICIPATION IN THE GENRO GROUP 1913–1919 * The Genro and Cabinet succession. * Saionji and the Paris Peace Conference. CHAPTER FOUR:  THE TURNING POINT; SAIONJI’S DOMINATION OF THE GENRO GROUP * Court issues. * Cabinet succession. CHAPTER FIVE:  SAIONJI THE LAST GENRO; PARTY GOVERNMENTS AND SAIONJI DIPLOMACY * The normal course of constitutional government. * Saionji diplomacy; the changing role of the Genro in Japanese foreign policy 1928–1932. CHAPTER SIX:  THE SAIONJI GROUP UNDER ATTACK * The return to transcendental cabinets. * Clarification of the national polity: the Minobe affair. * Crisis year 1936: the February Incident.

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43

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77

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135

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vi  Contents

CHAPTER SEVEN: FROM POLITICAL ACTOR TO POLITICAL COMMENTATOR; SAIONJI’S LAST YEARS 1937–1940 * The end of an era. * The reorientation of Japanese foreign policy. * The last bastion; Saionji, Konoe and the Court.

181

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

211

NOTES

225

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

247

INDEX

249

GENERAL EDITOR’S PREFACE

Few countries in the world today can be unaware of the increasing international impact of Japan. From the ashes of defeat in 1945, Japan has risen to become one of the most dynamic and successful economic powers in the world today. The broad outlines of how this has been achieved are reasonably well known. There are, however, many little-documented aspects of contemporary Japan, and many thinly understood facets to the Japanese experience of modern development. Japan is neither unique (as sometimes asserted), nor merely a copy of the outside world, but rather a fascinating source of human experience which deserves to be tapped and disseminated far more widely than it now is. The Nissan Institute of Japanese studies at the University of Oxford, in conjunction with Messrs Croom Helm, has decided to launch a series of books designed to make the Japanese experience more accessible. Some of the books will be relatively specialised, scholarly monographs. Others will be of a more general kind, with the aim of introducing the reader to some broader aspect of Japan. We are very happy to publish as the second in the series Lesley Connors’ work on the prewar statesman Saionji, the last surviving Genro or elder statesman, who played a key role in advising the Emperor and appointing prime ministers until his death in 1940 on the eve of the Pacific War. Dr. Connors presents a fresh interpretation of Saionji’s role and achievements, assessing these in a more favourable light than some previous historians. In writing the biography of Saionji, she also relates what happened at the centre of Japanese government over a period of great drama and far-reaching change. J.A.A.Stockwin, Director, Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, University of Oxford. January 1986   vii

For My Father

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all the scholars, friends and family members who gave their help and encouragement during the preparation of this book and the doctoral thesis from which it grew. Many institutions and their staff gave unstintingly of their help. I would particularly like to thank the staff of Hosei University, Tokyo University and the National Diet Library in Japan, and of the Centre for Japanese Studies at the University of Sheffield and St. Antony’s College, Oxford. Mr. Saionji Kinkazu, Mr. Kido Takasumi and Mr. Harada Kei shared their memories of the men with whom they grew up. Prof. Akio Yasuoka of Hosei University spent long hours teaching me to read Saionji’s attractive but illegible writing whilst Prof. Yamamoto Shiro inspired me with the belief that such struggles were worthwhile. Prof. Banno Junji, Dr. Gordon Berger, Dr. Thomas Burkman, Prof. Alvin Coox, Dr. Gordon Daniels, Dr. Ian Gow, Prof. Hata Ikuhiko, Mr. Graham Healey, Dr. Janet Hunter, the late Prof. Richard Storry and Prof. David Anson Titus generously read and criticised sections of the manuscript. Prof. Arthur Stockwin was the impetus behind the present work and contributed greatly to its completion. I would finally like to thank my mother who gave me the time to write, my husband whose humour sustained me and Jessica, Eleanor, Hannah and Jojo who distracted me.

  ix

INTRODUCTION

It is rare to find a man of such significance in the political development of a country so neglected by its historians as Saionji Kinmochi. There are, even in the National Diet Library in Tokyo, no collected papers of the man whose political activities began before the opening of Japan to the West and ended only months before her momentous attack on Pearl Harbor. Much of this neglect has been the result of the nature of his involvement in politics. As adviser to three Emperors, his influence, though at the highest levels, was un-publicised and largely unchronicled. Some of the blame however must fall on the urbane public image cultivated by Saionji himself and passed into history by his protege Hara Kei, whose acid descriptions of Saionji’s ineffectuality have distorted descriptions of Japan’s last Genro. This biography is an attempt to substitute for the bland and passive public persona attributed to Saionji a picture of a determined political leader with clearly defined objectives, a coherent political philosophy and the political sense to know when both needed to be abandoned. Saionji’s Genro years, from 1913 to his death in November 1940, were a period of rapid political development for Japan both domestically and in terms of international standing and outlook. Saionji’s biography during these years shows the massive extent of his own contribution to Japanese politics, but also illustrates with great clarity both the rise of the liberals and the total erosion of their power in the period leading to the Pacific War. From it emerge answers to a number of questions about modern Japanese politics and Saionji’s role in it: 1. Saionji’s political philosophy; its consistency and importance in his practical politics. 2. Saionji’s function in Japanese politics; why he was sought after politically at the different stages of his career. 3. The changing role of the court and nobility in modern Japanese politics.   1

2  The Emperor’s Adviser

4. How, when and why fluctuations occurred in the balance of elite power. 5. The changing role of the Genro, the small group of imperial advisers, and its importance for constitutional government. Some answers confirm the general picture of Saionji and the Saionji group which can be found in general histories of the period. Some indicate that, in the conventional view, the emphasis has been misplaced or placed with too heavy or too light a hand. In a number of important areas it is necessary to revise the traditional picture. There is, surprisingly, a lack of specific information on Saionji’s involvement in certain issues which with hindsight appear important. The Washington Conference of 1921 is one such case. Equally surprising were the other issues which forced themselves into the biography because of the interest they aroused at the time. Thus, at the time of the Washington Conference, the chief preoccupations of the Emperor’s advisers Saionji, Yamagata Aritomo and Matsukata Masayoshi, as they emerge from the Hara Diaries and all other sources available, were the issues of the Crown Prince’s betrothal, his trip abroad and the Regency. The most fruitful sources of information on Saionji vary with the period. The Hara Diaries, Kobayashi Yugo’s history of the Seiyukai, biographies of major contemporary politicians such as Ito Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Inoue Kaoru and Katsura Taro, and a large number of letters written by Saionji himself make up the core of the ‘primary’ materials on Saionji during the early 1900s. For Saionji’s Genro period, the same role is played by the diaries of the next generation of political leaders, Matsumoto Gokichi, Kido Koichi, Honjo Shigeru and Ugaki Kazushige and by the Harada memoirs and biographies of Tanaka Giichi, Saito Makoto, Chinda Sutemi and Konoe Fumimaro and reminiscences of Saito, Okada Keisuke and Wakatsuki Reijiro. Given the factionalised, privatised nature of the decision-making process in Japanese politics, those who were privy to Saionji’s thoughts were, almost without exception, sympathetic to his views and in order to examine Saionji’s participation in the political process, his assessment of it, his attempts to change it and the effects it had on him and his group, these sources have been used centrally. Most of the detailed first-hand records of his involvement in politics, at least in the Genro period, were written by members of the Saionji group. The Hara diaries provide a flavour to the description of Saionji’s pre-and early Genro career which

Introduction  3

is lacking in the later chapters. Even Hara, however, was for most of the time, at least ostensibly, on the ‘same side’. Perhaps it would be appropriate here to acknowledge a particular debt to the Harada memoirs and to defend the use which has been made of them. The memoirs, written by Saionji’s secretary as a record of the political activities of the Saionji group, have been criticised as gossipy, ambiguous and inaccurate. Some of this criticism is justified; events are dramatised and dates and times sometimes do not correspond with other reports of the same incident. Harada also assumes knowledge which the modern reader may not possess. However, the use to which the memoirs have been put here makes much of the criticism irrelevant. The memoirs were written by Harada and read, corrected and annotated by Saionji himself before finally being redrafted. As a record of what Saionji was told by his chief political liaison man and of Saionji’s reactions to this information it is therefore both sound and useful. Finally, there is much anecdotal material about Saionji’s private life, the breadth of his interests, his non-political friendships, habits and lifestyle. Many biographies agree in their descriptions and judgements. Some are probably true, others are less believable. There are vivid descriptions of Saionji’s childhood. Brought up by a housekeeper from the age of nine, after the death of his adoptive parents, he was an active and involved young man who, despite Bakufu injunctions against the practice of martial arts, learnt riding and swordsmanship. He had a reputation as a brilliant, if arrogant, youth who read widely and enjoyed political debate. The overall picture of Saionji in these accounts is of a highly cultivated, educated man with a fondness for both Western culture and Chinese classics. He was a man of habit but was not given to placing great store by precedent. He provoked love and admiration but also exasperation and scorn. Ito Hirobumi’s description of Saionji, as Japan’s Lord Rosebery, an enlightened liberal, with a loathing for politics, was apt enough to stick. He was renowned for his wit and sarcasm, for being a good listener and for his unruffled calm. There are details of his dress, aggressively Western in his youth, always elegant and with a lingering foreignness even in his old age, his taste in food, very particular—he found it difficult to keep his cooks—and the architecture of his houses, designed by himself and financed by his younger brother. There are reports of the women in his life, the mistress he shared with his political rival, Katsura, and the exgeisha who accompanied him to Versailles, and of his love for literature and support of literary groups. There is reference to, but very little detail on, Saionji’s relationship with his two natural brothers, the Grand

4  The Emperor’s Adviser

Chamberlain, Tokudaiji Sanenori, and adopted heir to the Sumitomo family, Sumitomo Kichizaemon. Saionji liked Bonsai and hated playing the biwa—a family instrument. He disliked the Nanga school of painting of the early 19th century and generally preferred Chinese to Japanese art, his avowed ideal being understated elegance. He liked emotional Edo music more than songs accompanied on the shamisen. Perhaps more than anything else, he enjoyed reading, often Chinese classics and, in his later years, as his eyesight deteriorated to the extent that he found it difficult to read Kanji, mostly Western books, and he himself composed haiku and practised calligraphy. There is much which could be said about this side of Saionji’s life but, interesting as it is, it has little bearing on his role as a politician. Saionji himself acknowledged that descriptions of his private life would be acceptable, but asked to be spared a political biography. For a man in Saionji’s position this was a pious request and it is Saionji as a public figure and his political role with which this biography is concerned.

CHAPTER ONE SAIONJI’S EMERGENCE AS GENRO THE SAIONJI-KATSURA COMPROMISE

A Biographical Sketch: The Early Years Saionji Kinmochi was born in Kyoto on October 23rd, 1849. He was born Tokudaiji Yoshimaro, the second son of Tokudaiji Kinzumi and younger brother of Tokudaiji Sanenori who was later to become Grand Chamberlain. The Tokudaiji family was one of nine noble families (kuge) who provided middle ranking advisors to the Court. In 1853, as was common practice among Japan’s elites where a family lacked an heir, Yoshimaro was adopted into the family of Saionji Morosue. Both the Tokudaiji and Saionji families were branch lines of the Fujiwaras who had intermarried extensively with the Imperial family and had effectively ruled Japan for three hundred years during the Heian period (794–1185). Saionji’s familiarity with the Court and his exposure to politics began during his childhood. At the age of four he was appointed Chamberlain and elevated to the rank of senior official (Kampaku Shogun), at the age of thirteen. It was as a child and then as a young man that his connections with the kuge leaders of the early Meiji period were established and his relationship with the boy who in 1866 was to become the Meiji Emperor, was cemented. Since Saionji was two years older than the young heir to the throne, they did not attend school together, but played together as children and formed a sufficiently close relationship for the Meiji Emperor to send enquiries after Saionji’s health when he was ill in Europe. From the age of eleven to the age of eighteen, Saionji was educated at the Gakushujo. This school for the sons of the Court nobles (kuge), now famous as the Gakushuin, became a notable centre of the anti-Bakufu, ‘Revere the Emperor, expel the barbarians’, sonnojoi movement. Records   5

6  The Emperor’s Adviser

show that in 1867 Saionji was active in pressing the Court to become involved in the armed struggles between the Tokugawa Shogunate and Satsuma and Choshu clan forces and to treat the Tokugawa as rebel forces. It was in this same year that Saionji conceived an unseasonable admiration for the West after reading Fukuzawa Yukichi’s Seiyo Jijo, an admiration which grew into an ambition to study abroad.1 In the spring of 1868, at the age of nineteen, Saionji was appointed to the developing government structure as one of the hundred-odd new councillors (sanyo), deputies in the new administrative departments. Fighting continued in the North, however, and for a time he was seconded to military service in charge of Satcho troops and acting as liaison between Satsuma and Choshu forces attempting to pacify the Hokuriku region, before being recalled to local government service as Governor of Echigo. These appointments extended and developed his contacts with a wide variety of people inside and outside the government. These included Iwakura Tomomi, with Sanjo Sanetomi the most influential of the Court nobles in the new regime, and, like Sanjo, a man familiar with Saionji from weekly meetings at the Court. They embraced also Omura Masujiro, Vice-Minister of Military Affairs and proponent of such radical reforms as the abolition of the fiefs and the introduction of universal military conscription, who advised Saionji against a career in the military, and Kido Koin, the chief voice of the Choshu clan in central politics, who subsequently sponsored Saionji with other members of the Goverment. Before his departure for Echigo, Saionji shocked the public and attracted much criticism by being the first kuge to appear at Court in Western dress and with cropped hair. It was not until several years later that Western dress became a reasonably common sight and the traditional hairstyle was abolished. On his return from the North, Saionji took lodgings in a geisha district of Tokyo where he indulged a taste for ballads and popular songs and translations of Western books. For a six month period in 1869, Saionji studied French at the newly opened predecessor of Tokyo University, the Kaiseijo. That same summer he was put under a week’s house arrest for travelling without government permission to Kyoto and for his involvement there in the establishment of the Ritsumeikan School, a literary discussion group for the education of loyalists.2 With the help of Kido Koin and Omura Masujiro, Saionji received government permission and an unusually generous scholarship to study law in France. He left Japan in December 1870.3 For ten years, from 1871 to 1880, Saionji, with great enthusiasm, lived and studied in France, acquiring fluent French, the sing-song tones of a Marseilles accent and an

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  7

enduring passion for Vichy water From the autumn of 1872 he attended classes with the radical legal theorist Emile Acollas. He also enrolled in classes at the Sorbonne from where he graduated with a degree in law. Through his connection with Acollas, Saionji became acquainted with other French friends, many of whom, such as Clemenceau and Floquet, came to hold positions of political prominence. He was intimate too with literary figures such as the Goncourt brothers, the Gautiers and Liszt. It was Edmond Goncourt who wrote of Saionji at this time that he had the face of a Chinese, with upturned eyes and thick lips that laughed like a child and hair parted in the middle like a stylish Parisian, When he talked in his sleep he spoke both French and Japanese. When he discussed the law and artificial, as opposed to natural, subjects, he formulated his thoughts in French, but when the topic was concerned with natural objects or emotions his thoughts came naturally in Japanese.4 His Japanese friends from this period included men like Nakae Chomin and Matsuda Masahisa, who became active in radical or party politics after their return to Japan. After ten years of happy exposure to French culture and liberal philosophy, Saionji returned to Japan. It was October 1880 and he was thirty-two. The following spring, 1881, Saionji became editor of the Toyo Jiyu Shinbun, a newspaper set up as an organ of the burgeoning popular rights movement. He resigned this position the same year in a somewhat delayed response to orders from the Emperor. Saionji’s separation from the cause championed by Okuma Shigenobu, the young Hizen aspirant to the inner circle of Meiji oligarchs, and by Itagaki Taisuke, one of the Tosa liberals, put him firmly in the Government camp when the split came later that year. This was emphasised by his appointment in November that year as a Vice-Councillor in the Sangiin, a body set up to continue the drafting of the constitution begun by Iwakura and Ito Hirobumi that summer. Ito, born the son of a Choshu peasant and adopted into the family of a low ranking samurai where he had worked as a servant was to become Japan’s first prime minister. By 1881 Ito had won the support of Iwakura and the Emperor and had established himself as one of the major forces for modernisation. In March 1882, Saionji set off with Ito on an eighteen-month journey around the European capitals to observe the constitutions in operation in other countries. On these long train rides through Europe they discovered a basic sympathy of opinion and, to Iwakura’s satisfaction, Saionji’s most important political relationship was cemented. Saionji’s relationship with the Satsuma leader Matsukata Masayoshi, who also rose to prominence as Finance Minister in 1881,

8  The Emperor’s Adviser

and who was to outlive all the other Genro with the exception of Saionji himself, was less satisfactory. In July 1884, with the promulgation of the laws rationalising rank, many of the new Meiji leaders were elevated to the peerage. Saionji was awarded the rank of Marquis, below Iwakura who had died the previous year, but above Ito and Yamagata Aritomo who were made Counts. Yamagata, who by the turn of the century was the most famous of the Meiji oligarchs and known as the ‘father of the army’, had begun the new era as a soldier in the Choshu forces under the command of Saionji. By 1884 however, despite his lower rank, Yamagata, like Ito, held incomparably greater sway in the new regime than Saionji who, almost ten years their junior, had spent the politically most important years of the Meiji Restoration away from Japan. Saionji’s years abroad however qualified him for a job in Japan’s now burgeoning Foreign Office. His diplomatic career began in Austria in 1885 and for six years kept him away from Japan in Germany and in Belgium, broadening both his knowledge of Europe and his circle of intimates. His closeness with Mutsu Munemitsu, a career diplomat who subsequently served in both the Yamagata and Ito Cabinets began abroad. In 1891, Saionji returned to Tokyo as Director of the Bureau of Decorations, and for three years lived uneventfully in Omori in a house provided for him by his younger brother, Sumitomo, developing the personal connections among the domestic political elites which his years in Europe had weakened. His first cabinet appointment, as Minister of Education in the Second Ito Cabinet from September 1894 to September 1896, coincided with a surge in enthusiastic nationalism. These feelings had been intensified by the diplomatic struggles to revise Japan’s ‘unequal’ treaties with the West and by Japan’s success in the Sino-Japanese war, and brought to fresh heights by the humiliating necessity to bow to the demands of Russia, France and Germany to cede the Liaotung Peninsula won in the war. An integral part of this new Japanism, the Imperial Rescript on Education promulgated in 1890 under the Yamagata Cabinet, had condemned the pursuit of Western knowledge and advocated ‘the inculcation of a specific ideological code’. Ito’s appointment of Saionji as Education Minister was significant in the ongoing struggle over constitutional interpretation. On the one side were ranged Yamagata Aritomo and the Kumamoto educationalist and economic historian, Motoda Eifu, committed to personal Imperial rule and the direct involvement of the Court in politics,

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  9

and on the other Ito and Saionji with their belief in limited constitutional monarchy and the separation of Court and politics. Seen against this backdrop, Saionji’s public arguments in favour of the liberalisation of education, are particularly notable. Saionji was in several noteworthy ways heir to Ito’s first Education Minister, Mori Arinori. Both strongly opposed the teaching of classical texts and religion in schools as unproductive, and advocated replacing these classes with the teaching of English.5 Both saw in education Japan’s path to independence and international standing. Saionji told a press conference in 1895: If we want to stand effectively as one of the great powers and to defend our honour, we must seek first of all to cultivate and nourish firm roots which can produce fine fruit. How can we implant these roots? The way to do it is to promote and expand education, and to make progressive application of the power of science.6

Saionji’s vision of an internationally oriented Japan took on a more concrete form towards the end of his first period as Education Minister. At this time, he collaborated with Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu and a young man introduced to him by Mutsu, Takekoshi Yosaburo, who was to become one of his earliest and most admiring biographers, to produce a magazine which he named Sekai no Nihon (The Japan of the World).7 When Mutsu fell ill in the spring of 1895, Saionji was appointed acting Foreign Minister, and began what was to become a lifelong proccupation with Japan’s relations with the Western powers. As Foreign Minister for the last fifteen months of the Ito Cabinet, Saionji was involved in the negotiations surrounding the return of the Liaotung Peninsula and China’s payment of reparations, and in the settlement of the conflict between proJapanese and pro-Russian factions in Seoul which came to a head in the involvement of Japanese nationals in the assassination of the Korean Queen Min. Saionji had written to Inoue in Seoul in February, only weeks before the coup d’etat, voicing deep anxiety about the future of Japan: There is great insistence on ‘Japanism’ and ‘an aggressive fighting spirit’, but behind these are lies and greed. There will be no end to the misery which arose without warning from victory in the war, unless we develop adequate countermeasures.8

This anxiety was to re-emerge greatly strengthened forty years later. In 1897 following the resignation of the Second Ito Cabinet, Saionji travelled to France. In a number of letters to Ito throughout the previous

10  The Emperor’s Adviser

year, Saionji had complained of illness and during his trip abroad, he suffered from acute appendicitis. It was a recurrence of this illness which brought to a premature end his next brief tenure as Education Minister in the Third Ito Cabinet. His legacy, an attempt to liberalise education policy through a second Imperial Rescript on Education, failed when the Cabinet fell. Saionji remained close to Ito during the following years and took an active role in the planning of Ito’s new political party, the Seiyukai, and in negotiations with leaders of the existing political party, the Kenseito. In September 1900 he wrote to a friend: You will have read about the establishment of the Seiyukai in the newspapers. There are many people who slander us and there are many erroneous ideas about…. I would like to tell you in detail of my aspirations for the Seiyukai…but, to put it very briefly, they are (that it should become) ‘the salvation of the times’.9

When the Fourth Ito Cabinet was established just one month later, in October 1900, Saionji was not given a cabinet post, but was appointed President of the Privy Council, thereby ensuring Ito’s control of the Privy Council, whilst at the same time allowing Saionji, as Council President, to attend cabinet meetings. It was in his capacity as President of the Privy Council that Saionji was appointed temporary Prime Minister from October to December during Ito’s illness, and again when the Cabinet fell because of budget problems in May 1901. It was popularly believed that Saionji would be confirmed in this appointment. The diaries of Hara Kei, ambitious, politically machiavellian and soon to become one of the significant influences in Saionji’s political career, suggest that Saionji was offered the post but turned it down in the belief that there would be unacceptable restrictions on his freedom to organise his cabinet. However, an Imperial message relayed to Saionji by the Grand Chamberlain, his elder brother Tokudaiji, suggests that the post had always been intended to be purely transitional: Saionji too is of a weak constitution and ought not to work for long periods. The Genro should, with some urgency, make strenuous efforts to find a solution.10

When Katsura Taro, Yamagata’s protege and like his patron a Choshu military figure, became Prime Minister in June 1901, Saionji remained in his post as President of the Privy Council, retaining the right to attend

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  11

cabinet meetings and continuing to act as a conduit between Ito, Hara and other party leaders.11

Saionji’s appointment to the Presidency of the Seiyukai and the Origins of the Saionji-Katsura Compromise 1903–190612 The political relationship between Saionji and Katsura began in June 1903 with Saionji’s assumption of the leadership of the Seiyukai during the third year of the First Katsura Cabinet. It stumbled along through various shifts in the balance of power until the fall of the Second Saionji Cabinet in December 1912 and the subsequent major upheaval in Japanese politics, the Taisho Crisis. During these ten years of relative political stability, known as the ‘Keien’ period of Japanese politics from a combination of the Chinese readings of the names of Katsura and Saionji, Saionji’s relationships with the political elites matured and crystallised, and his influence both in and out of office developed accordingly until in 1913 he emerged as the last appointed member of the select group of imperial advisers, the Genro. At the start of this period in 1903, Saionji was fifty-four, and brought to the office of party president a variety of experience ranging from diplomatic postings in Europe, to ministerial office in the Ito cabinets and presidency of the Privy Council. He also brought to the job an extensive and impressive range of personal contacts. Saionji’s appointment as President of the Seiyukai, and the withdrawal of Ito Hirobumi to the Privy Council, were precipitated by a combination of pressures. There was growing dissatisfaction within the Seiyukai with Ito’s handling of the party’s relations with the Government which had led to a number of withdrawals of Seiyukai Diet members. Though this in itself was not a serious threat to Ito’s position as President of the party, the general mood of political instability caused by the commotion in the Seiyukai was brought to new heights by the resignation of the Prime Minister, Katsura Taro. The manner of Saionji’s selection was as autocratic as were Ito’s usual dealings with the Seiyukai. Party leaders Hara Kei and Matsuda Masahisa were instructed by Ito that he wished to be succeeded by Saionji, and the process was effected within a few days. Saionji remarked of his appointment: ‘Ito told me to take it and it was more or less a case of my giving it a try to see if I could be of any use.’13 Saionji was known personally to only a handful of leaders in the Seiyukai at the time of his

12  The Emperor’s Adviser

appointment. His contacts with Hara Kei were regular if not particularly close and the party executive, through Hara, had for some time used Saionji to facilitate negotiations with Ito.14 Saionji’s role within the Seiyukai before he became president of the party was thus not related to party management as such, but was that of a conduit between the party leadership and Ito. It was essentially an expanded version of this role which he continued to play after 1903. Although Ito’s resignation was followed by a second wave of withdrawals and the Seiyukai lost its majority strength in the Diet when its numbers were reduced by almost a third, the party ultimately benefited from the change in leadership. As an aristocrat and a non-clan politician, Saionji brought prestige to the Seiyukai. He also brought with him strongly held liberal beliefs and broad political experience. His relationship with Seiyukai was different from Ito’s, and the active role which the party was able to play under Saionji gave it an internal cohesion which had been impossible under Ito’s autocratic management of the party’s relations with the other elites. Saionji was generally a popular public figure and his appointment was for the most part treated favourably in the press where he was described as having Ito’s fullest confidence and as having always been regarded as his rightful successor. He was characterised ‘as a man of brilliant parts’ whose weak point was his delicate health.15 Saionji’s ill health has more often than not been interpreted as diplomatic illness. His correspondence with Katsura undermines this theory. Saionji’s illnesses, whether physical or psychological in origin, were frequent and debilitating and explain at least in part his reputation as lazy and lethargic.16 In this connection, it has been remarked that shortly after his appointment, Saionji moved permanently from Tokyo to his summer house in the coastal resort of Oiso, and his letters to Katsura indicate that his visits to Tokyo after 1906 were indeed limited. However, Oiso at this time was a noted political centre where the homes of Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo were to be found, and it is reasonable to suppose that Saionji’s chief contributions to the party were made more in the villas of Oiso than in the conference halls of the Seiyukai’s Tokyo headquarters. Saionji, like Ito, stood apart from the affairs of party organisation, a job which fell increasingly to Matsuda and the eager hands of Hara. His value to the Seiyukai lay elsewhere, in his relationships with Ito and the Genro and in his connections with the Court. The role of the nobility in Japanese politics was historically of great importance, an importance which was reaffirmed when the kuge councils of the early Meiji period brought the Court into direct participation in politics. As the new political order was

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  13

developed in the years up to 1889, both the reality and the trappings of power passed to the clan (han) bureaucrats. Nevertheless, the decision to make the Imperial institution the focal point of the new state ensured that the old aristocracy retained at least some of its former significance. Saionji, who had long-standing family and personal connections with the Court as well as an intimate relationship with the new beneficiaries of power in the Meiji state, was in an unparalleled position to benefit the cause of party politics. The emergence of Saionji as Genro in 1913 was a direct result of the effectiveness of the working relationship between Saionji and Katsura from 1903 to 1912, which permitted the controlled transition and growth of Japanese politics towards institutional diversity. Saionji’s role in achieving this transition was central. The compromise relationship allowed the Seiyukai to develop its political role and expand its influence whilst ensuring that certain areas of decision making remained under the control of the Government and the Genro. At the time of Saionji’s appointment to the presidency of the Seiyukai, anti-party feeling amongst government leaders was growing, the fortunes of both the Seiyukai and the Kenseihonto (the party resulting from the reorganisation of the Kenseito and the Rikken Kaishinto following the formation of Ito’s party) were at a low ebb and there was considerable dissatisfaction amongst rank and file party members with the agreements reached between party leaders and the Government. One of the main areas of conflict was the Government’s conduct of foreign policy and Saionji was instrumental in preventing party interference in diplomacy. Negotiations for a Russo Japanese agreement recognising Japan’s special interest in Korea, and Russia’s special position in Manchuria, had begun at the end of July 1903. By October, when talks were still inconclusive, general opinion had become militant and a large number of societies had been formed, the most effective and well known of these organisations being the so-called Tairodoshikai (Anti-Russian Association). Concerned at the impact which the Tairodoshikai was making on Seiyukai party membership, the Standing Committee sought to mitigate the effect by obtaining a directive from Saionji, the text of which was distributed to party members. The notes read: The cultivation of national strength, that is the promotion of culture within Japan and the expansion of national interest and wealth in external relations, have been national policy since the Meiji Restoration…. The Seiyukai has no intention of doing anything other than support the

14  The Emperor’s Adviser

national policy laid down in the Meiji era, thereby promoting national strength and increasing national prestige. This has already been set out clearly in the general manifesto and there should be no misconceptions amongst members at this late stage. Consequently, despite the controversy over this diplomatic problem, there is no necessity for us to dwell on this afresh in the Seiyukai. There are those who argue in simplistic terms that if there is not peace there is war and if we are not rigid, then we are weak, but diplomacy does not consist simply of war or peace, rigidity or weakness. We must therefore allow the government as much freedom of action as possible if it is to achieve success in foreign relations in accordance with the national policy already laid down. Even so, if the Government goes against the desires of this party, that is to say against the desires of the people, then they will have misunderstood Meiji national policy, and our responsibility will be clear.17

Despite this directive, Seiyukai rank and file opposition to the leadership policy of co-operation with the Government on this issue continued to strengthen so that three weeks later, at the beginning of November 1903, Saionji made a speech which further clarified his views on party involvement in foreign policy and on Japan’s role in international politics: The Meiji Constitution was intended to eliminate the stratum between the Emperor and the People to enable all men to go where they would and to do the things for which they were most suited. Political parties are a means of achieving this…. It is obvious from history that countries whose politics develop in accordance with these principles prosper whilst those which do not, decay. Parties were born of the need to abolish hierarchical divisions in society and to put people in a direct relationship with one ruler …There are cliques which are afraid of the very word ‘party’… similarly, the appearance of the word ‘imperialism’ has been seen as heralding the imminent decline of parliamentary politics… this shows a lack of knowledge and expertise which is laughable, but which would be deplorable if it were allowed adversely to affect national development. This problem is not the sole preserve of Japan. All the civilised nations have followed the same difficult path, whilst countries which have not yet undergone this process suffer from considerable disorder. I am sure that Japan as a nation possesses characteristics to enable her to pass successfully through this period to which we have only recently come. The general world trend is one of continuing progress and there is no reason why Japan should be an exception.

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  15

What should the attitude of the Seiyukai be during this transitional period? In a word, we must take the popular will, that is good, enlightened popular will, and make it our own. What I am saying is commonplace in the West but completely new to Japan and China…. Unless we follow the popular will we will not progress…. If we promote industry necessary to the country and advance in a way which is straightforward and honest, people will naturally be won over to the Party. If there is conflict and dispute over strategy, we might make temporary gains, but we shall soon be defeated. Party men who would lead the nation must look overseas and must resolve to make Japan the best in the world. Several friends have written from Europe that party discretion and military discipline in the face of the current controversy over diplomacy, are seen as tremendous advances and have enhanced Japan’s reputation there. Be that as it may, to reach the ranks of the advanced nations, the people too must be composed and discreet. We will not win the respect and sympathy of other nations if we are hot headed and discourteous—a source of weakness even in times of peace, but especially in times of trouble. This is not something that the authorities alone can work for. In the present diplomatic troubles you are naturally uneasy at entrusting things to the authorities and your worries are compounded by a lack of information. You should nevertheless remain calm. There is absoutely no value to the nation to be found in shackling the authorities with conflicting theories and differing demands. If we do so and government negotiations are unsuccessful, it will be too late to be regretful. This troubles me greatly. I am not worried about any general lack of patriotism, but afraid of where an abundance of patriotism might lead us. We must avoid infantile demonstrations which will weaken the country. Our people have a big fight coming. Whether we like it or not, there will have to be a big war, and that war will be a desperate war, a war in which the whole nation will be involved; a war where we are pitted against the whole world. To fight this war we must have absolute trust. The people must be bold, knowledgeable, quick and diligent, but most importantly they must have trust. Hitherto, Japan has lagged behind, and the voice of the parties has been hushed. The politicians of the civilised nations have brought all their efforts to bear on this war. This war is a total war, but it is also a peaceful war where guns are not heard, a war of civilisation, an economic war. If we win this war, it would be very easy to acquire guns and warships and to win what might be called a true war. If we intend to engage in this war, urgent preparation is needed now. Financial readjustment and administrative reform are the first

16  The Emperor’s Adviser

steps. Material reform is necessary, but in a time of transition, must be accompanied by reform of ideas… Japan has clung to outmoded schools of thought and is not taking advantage of opportunities to rise to power. There is much that is resentful, indignant and scornful in the public attitude; generosity and magnaminity, gravity and elegance are lacking… This is distressing and frightening for the future of Japan. It is of course related to education…. I hope that you will think hard and long before committing yourselves to anything …The Seiyukai is unconnected with the Government or any other party. In the past, the Government’s actions have not been completely satisfactory, and it is difficult to know what attitude it will adopt in the coming session. However, if the Government abides by its duty, and acts in the interests of the people and for the benefit of the nation, we should not hesitate to support it fully. Nevertheless, the Diet has a duty to fulfil the functions of the Diet, and will of course ask of the Government the things it must and assume responsibility for those things it should… I hope that the Seiyukai will endeavour to carry out its functions and support the national administration in an open and above-board manner.18

These two statements, made in 1903 when he was fifty-four, throw light on the nature of Saionji’s relationship with the ruling elites and the parties, which was the key to his growth as a politician. They also give a clear picture of the main elements of his political philosophy, a philosophy which, as we will see when we consider his later career, did not change significantly thereafter. Saionji was a nationalist and a constitutional monarchist, and it was the protection and promotion of the interests of a monarchical Japan which dominated his practical politics. There are however many ways of defending a nation, and the split between those who defined defence and expansion primarily in economic terms, and those who saw territorial expansion, and military rather than economic imperialism, as the key to Japan’s development, was deep and lasting. Ultimately, it was this difference of philosophy which resulted in the downfall of the Second Saionji Cabinet, and brought the period of political compromise to an end. Saionji did not reject Japan’s going to war if it were defensible in terms of national interest and if it were sensible. He was not, that is to say, a philosophical pacifist. It was rather that he saw inter-nation competition in economic and cultural terms regulated by international agreements. It is clear that Saionji did not, at this stage of party development, envisage any role for the parties in the definition and negotiation of Japan’s diplomacy.

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  17

Saionji is justly recognised as an internationalist and to draw attention to his nationalism is not to underestimate or devalue this judgement. At the time of the negotiations with Russia in 1903, national consciousness in Japan had reached a high point. Saionji’s internationalism, muted as it was at this juncture, is perhaps even more notable than that he displayed sixteen years later at Versailles, when the mood of international politics had swung nearer to his own and his position had significant support in the Japanese Government, and in particular in the Foreign Ministry. Saionji’s internationalism was both ideological and pragmatic. In the true Wilsonian sense, Saionji was an ideological internationalist. He had a liberal’s belief in the inevitability of progress and in the efficacy of a rational, scientific approach to international politics. He was able to envisage a stable, peaceful international order in which Japan played an important role. But the wellspring of his internationalism was the betterment of Japan. The maximisation of Japan’s role in Asia was to Saionji’s mind a limited ideal and his aim was to put Japan amongst the major powers. The methods he followed in pursuing this aim were twofold. First, Japan’s diplomacy must be in accord with current international thought and morality. She must correctly identify the important world powers and cultivate their friendship. Second, domestic social and political stability must be encouraged and political consciousness and the conduct of political affairs improved. Saionji understood the functionality of political parties in the pursuit of this aim. They were of direct importance in maintaining internal cohesion and of indirect importance in their impact on Japan’s image abroad, an image of which Saionji was acutely conscious and which he believed to be vitally important to Japan’s acceptance as an equal with the Western nations. In setting up the Seiyukai, Ito had aimed to build a so-called ‘Imperial Rule Assistance Association’ and Saionji’s views on the role of the party as described in these speeches, were in accordance with these aims. It is clear that Saionji held a low opinion of the level of development in Japan, but that he believed that government should be responsive to enlightened and educated public opinion as expressed through the parties. The area in which this held least true was, in Saionji’s view, that of foreign policy, which was to be entrusted to the government insofar as it acted in accordance with established national aims. If we compare Saionji’s political philosophy, as applied to domestic and to international affairs, we see a difference of extent rather than of nature. Domestically, his appreciation that the realities of the political situation determined what was possible was mitigated by a liberal belief in the importance

18  The Emperor’s Adviser

of constitutional politics. Internationally he had an ideological view of relations between states tempered by a recognition of the exigencies of national requirements. The strength of Saionji’s internationalism was compounded by his identification of Japan’s co-operation with the current international order, with what was good for Japan. Thus with the retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula, and the Portsmouth Settlement, as with the demands made on Japan at Versailles, Saionji did not subordinate nationalism to internationalism, but so defined Japan’s national requirements as to make the two compatible. We thus see in Saionji’s statements to the Seiyukai in 1903 the main strands of a philosophy which was evident throughout his political career. A commitment to: 1. constitutional government under a constitutional monarchy. 2. a strong party system responsive to popular educated opinion. 3. the cultivation of good international relations and, to this end, the education of a politically and culturally sophisticated population willing to entrust diplomacy to the government of the day. 4. the economic and cultural development of Japan to enable her to compete on terms of equality with the West.

The Hara diaries enhance this picture of Saionji’s relationship with the Party and indirectly with Katsura and Ito.19 As President of the Seiyukai, Saionji rarely attended the Standing Committee meetings of the party, and Hara and Matsuda reported on the discussions of that body and relayed Saionji’s views to the party leadership. He continued to act as a conduit between Ito and the party leadership, and Hara used his meetings with Saionji to check on what he himself had been told by Ito. It does not appear from the diaries as if Hara was taken into Saionji’s confidence during these early months and it is clear that Saionji’s predominant relationships remained within the established elites, whilst his primary commitment was to national development, the goal of these elites. For Saionji, rational party development was a step toward this goal rather than an end in itself. In accordance with Saionji’s efforts to promote party development, for almost a year, from December 1903 to December 1904, one of the basic tenets of Seiyukai Diet policy was to co-operate as fully as possible with the other major party in the Diet, the Kenseihonto, in opposing the Government. Earlier attempts to build an alliance between the Seiyukai and Kenseihonto had ultimately failed because of Ito’s private

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  19

agreements with Katsura. This time, the policy was not without success. By mid-March, signs of a change in government tactics were noticeable and in March and again in June, joint meetings of party and Government representatives were held to discuss war and post-war management, unification of the country, the management of Korea, the problems of the Peace Treaty and plans for a joint enquiry board. This policy of interparty co-operation in dealings with the Government came to a sudden end in December 1904, when Katsura and Saionji agreed the terms of a more exclusive compromise relationship. Although by this time Katsura’s meetings with Hara had become more frequent, his initial move toward establishing a longer term arrangement with the Seiyukai was made directly to Saionji. Katsura offered Saionji a long term alliance excluding the Kenseihonto. He undertook that the Government would not take advantage of a split between the two parties, and agreed to recommend Saionji as the next Prime Minister when he resigned. These arrangements were made known only to the Foreign Minister, Sone and the Navy Minister, Yamamoto, on the Government side, and to Matsuda and Hara from the Seiyukai. It is impossible to measure the impact of this agreement on Government policy in the following year. At a time when party activity was prolonging Diet discussions of military expenditure and tax increase bills, Saionji addressed the Seiyukai to emphasise the necessity for national unity in pursuing war, and define his view of party responsibility during the state of emergency: I do not intend to theorise. I am weighed down by the gravity of the situation and will put my true feelings before you. At a time of national emergency such as this, the Seiyukai must put aside conflicting feelings and become the cornerstone of the nation …this is the right course of action for a national party… My usual way is to take life easy, but now I am extremely worried. I hope that discussions will be concluded quickly and that now you understand my feelings you will make great efforts to redeem the situation.20

Hara’s opinion of Saionji did not improve as a result of the negotiations, and the tone of his comments on Saionji’s attitude toward the Government was disparaging. His belief that Saionji was easily taken in by Katsura persisted throughout the whole of the Saionji-Katsura (Keien) period. It was a belief echoed by others who described him variously as having no fighting spirit or determination to have his own way, as being continually caught by Katsura’s ‘smile and tap on the shoulder’ technique, and as

20  The Emperor’s Adviser

being no match for Katsura in politics.21 Such characterisations are misleading. They underestimate Saionji’s basic identification and community of interest with the governing elites and they overestimate his commitment to the cause of party expansion for its own sake. It is evident from the speeches which remain that national expansion took precedence over party expansion in Saionji’s political philosophy. Party development was rather to be a tool in national development. This belief obviously limited Saionji’s manoeuvrability in his dealings with Katsura as compared with Hara. Saionji, unlike Hara, had participated in the founding of the Meiji state. Similarly, Saionji did not have Hara’s personal stake in the growth of the Party which Hara’s biographer Najita Tetsuo, so clearly describes. For Hara, party aggrandisement and personal aggrandisement became increasingly the same, and party expansion was paramount. Thus, at a meeting with Katsura in April 1905, Hara told the Prime Minister that although he personally could see no value for the nation in the continuation of the war, the position of the Seiyukai had to be considered separately, and he threatened Seiyukai participation in the demonstrations of public dissatisfacton with the Peace Treaty unless a prior agreement with the Government were reached. Najita has deduced from Hara’s account of this meeting with Katsura that Saionji was passive in the negotiations for Seiyukai support of the Portsmouth Treaty in exchange for a Saionji Cabinet. However, negotiations were carried out at two levels; strategically with Ito and Saionji and tactically with Hara. Before meeting with Hara, Katsura had already held discussions with Ito Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru and with his Foreign and Navy Ministers concerning the nature and structure of the proposed Saionji cabinet. Katsura’s discussions with Hara were nevertheless a recognition of the fact that Hara was, by the end of 1904, the key to control of the Seiyukai membership. It is idle to speculate on what would have been the outcome of an open clash between Saionji and Hara over the Treaty issue. Hara, though able, was unpopular in the party whilst in Hara’s own words, there was extremely warm feeling for Saionji amongst party members.22 The Treaty issue however was one on which regional party feeling was particularly hostile. The problem of conflict between Saionji and Hara over the orchestration of Seiyukai response to the Treaty never arose. Suspicious, but tempted by the prize of a Saionji Cabinet, Hara promised his cooperation. The nature of the co-operation of the two men in the event,

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  21

illustrates the differences in their basic positions. Whilst Hara left Tokyo on the day the Treaty was signed, thereby disrupting the organisation of an anti-government Seiyukai movement, Saionji spoke strongly and publicly in support of the Government. It is difficult, reading Saionji’s speeches to the Seiyukai, to imagine that he would have countenanced Hara’s threats to mobilise the Party in the riots which accompanied the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty. His speech on June 28th, 1905, occasioned by Russia’s reply to the American peace proposals, suggests that he would have opposed Seiyukai participation in mass demonstrations. In it, Saionji praised the caution of the Seiyukai in the face of public criticism during the period of negotiations which led up to the war, and advised that the same prudent attitude would improve Japan’s reputation amongst the allies. On September 2nd, 1905, three days before the signing of the Treaty, Saionji delivered this speech to a meeting of Seiyukai Diet Members: The Peace Treaty has not been published, and details are as yet unknown, but it is obvious from the information we can piece together from newspaper reports that plans have already been laid for the restoration of peace. My own position, which at this junture is admittedly based on incomplete knowledge, is one of jubilation at the return to peace…. However, we should also appreciate the peculiar character of this Peace Conference which, called on the advice of the President of the United States of America, is an attempt to secure negotiations for peace between Japan and Russia as equal states. This is very different from the situation where a defeated nation sues for peace from a victor …and we must recognise the dangers inherent in ignoring the wishes of the powers…. The allies are undoubtedly determined in their search for peace and we should recognise the American proposal as representative of the wishes of the other powers, and the recommendations of France and Germany to Russia that she should seek peace, as an expression of similar sentiments to ourselves. We must take great care not to disregard the wishes of the powers by breaking off discussions because we are unable to obtain certain provisions…. The popular view favours a continuation of the war, but the American suggestion…is not empty rhetoric…. If we emulate the obstinacy of Russia and call for a continuation of the war, what impression will we make? …. Even in terms of self interest, it is obvious that now is the time to make peace…. Now is the time, in the wake of a successful war to strengthen the basis of the Empire through political and economic development. There is much to be done and the slightest error of direction could bring Japan to the verge of diplomatic

22  The Emperor’s Adviser

and economic crisis. This must be the most decisive period in the destiny of Japan, notwithstanding the gravity of the pre-war situation.23

At Saionji’s initiative, and against the advice of members of the Seiyukai management who were fearful of popular repercussions, this address was published in the newspaper the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shinbun. Takekoshi Yosaburo reports Saionji’s reply to the fears of the Seiyukai leadership that Party popularity would be adversly affected: Even though one or two such parties as the Seiyukai were destroyed, if it were for the sake of the country, their loss would not be worth notice. The address should be published promptly to disillusion and pacify the minds of the populace.24

Notwithstanding the secret agreement with Katsura, these speeches show Saionji’s consistent concern for nation over party. It is perhaps worthwhile to remember that the difference between Saionji’s views on the role of the parties and that for example of such anti-party men as Yamagata, was one of degree rather than of kind. Just as Yamagata opposed the parties chiefly because he was convinced that they would always subordinate national interest to the pursuit of power, so Saionji, whilst giving basic support to the function of the parties in the political system, was critical when he considered their narrowness of vision to be obstructive to national goals. Thirty years later when, ironically, the parties had so far drifted from the pursuit of Saionji’s concept of the national interest that they vied in their efforts to identify themselves with army policies (a development Yamagata would no doubt have applauded), Saionji withdrew his support. Although trouble had been expected, the ferocity of the Hibiya riots was a great shock to the political leadership. Katsura in a letter to Yamagata on September 18th described the riots as beyond all expectation. Yamagata wrote to Oyama Iwao, hero of both the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, warning against the spread of the movement to the army, and Katsura unofficially offered his resignation.25 Saionji’s support of the Treaty attracted strong opposition within the party and telegrams were sent from regional branches attacking him for his weakness and the Seiyukai leaders for following him blindly. By the time of the Portsmouth Treaty, negotiations for the transfer of power to a Saionji Cabinet were well advanced. It was agreed that the new Cabinet would not call itself a ‘party cabinet’, and that it would co-operate with the Kenseihonto but

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  23

would not form an alliance. Katsura undertook to mediate fully with the Peers and the Genro, and to guarantee that there would be no opposition from Yamagata (who had not been informed of the arrangements), no requirement to include representatives of the Genro in the cabinet and no manipulation. The timing and method of this change were novel. The Katsura Cabinet had been known as ‘the little Yamagata Cabinet’.26 By 1905 however, Katsura was beginning to act independently of Yamagata. Not only Yamagata, but also Ito, who was in principle in favour of Saionji forming a cabinet, had objections to Katsura appearing to determine the choice of his successor as prime minister.27 Nevertheless, Yamagata was not approached directly by Katsura until October. Moreover, following Katsura’s advice, and against Ito’s opposition, Saionji consulted individually with the Genro and the precedent was set of a cabinet change being made without a meeting of the Genro Council.28 The time of the change was arranged in detail six weeks before the event and was a smooth, pre-planned transfer of power, the prime movers behind which had been not the Genro, the self appointed and firmly established group of Imperial advisors, but Katsura, Saionji and Hara.

Compromise in Action; its decline and fall The First Saionji Cabinet, thus appointed, governed Japan for two and a half years from January 7th, 1906 to July 14th, 1908. The selection of personnel showed that little heed needed yet to be paid to the desires of such party notables as Hara in the setting up of a cabinet. Even Hara, never reticent about his own role, fails to claim any serious involvement in the proceedings by himself or other members of the Seiyukai executive. Cabinet appointments were made on the basis of discussions between Saionji and Katsura and the individual Genro. Saionji’s letters to Katsura hint at the important role Katsura played in setting up the First Sajonji Cabinet. On January 1st, Saionji wrote: My apologies for keeping you talking until midnight last night. Your tremendous efforts and the extent of your kindness at this time have made a deep impression on me.29

The appointments show the need for the new cabinet to accommodate the desires of a number of elites. The bargain struck with Katsura had provided that the cabinet should not be advertised as a party cabinet, but

24  The Emperor’s Adviser

need not include representatives of the Genro as ministers. Nevertheless, the appointments made within the spheres of competence of each of the Genro were negotiated with those Genro, and apparently made subject to their approval. Thus the appointment of Sakatani Yoshiro as Minister of Finance was made by Inoue Kaoru. Terauchi Masatake, Army Minister in the previous cabinet, was appointed by Yamagata. Yamamoto Gombei refused to continue in office as Navy Minister but recommended and negotiated with Saito Makoto who had been Vice-Minister under him. Ito Hirobumi, as Saionji’s patron, was consulted generally. The Peers were not consulted directly, but Katsura, acting in liaison with the Upper House, negotiated the appointment of one of their number. Matsuoka Masatake, as Minister of Agriculture and Commerce.30 The leadership of the Seiyukai, although not taking part in the decisions on those posts traditionally subject to Genro control, nevertheless made an important advance by their assumption of the posts of Home Minister and Justice Minister in the persons of Hara and Matsuda Masahisa. Capture of the Home Ministry which brought the means to expand party power within the bureaucracy, was an undoubted prize for Hara.31 Makino Nobuaki as Minister of Education was a Satsuma representative, but also a personal friend of Saionji, whilst Kato Komei’s appointment as Foreign Minister pleased none of the Genro and is something of an enigma. The necessity to make certain cabinet appointments in accordance with the wishes of certain elites was a reflection of their influence in these policy areas. Inoue’s connection in the business world were legendary. Yamagata, as the leading Choshu general and architect of the reforms which gave Japan its modern army, had unparalleled influence within its leadership. The Peers, with less political clout, but functioning largely as an extension of the Yamagata faction, also needed to be placated. The Satsuma group (in the person of Matsukata in the Genro and represented extensively in the higher echelons of the navy) traditionally controlled the post of Navy Minister and this appointment was therefore necessarily with Satsuma approval although not on this occasion from amongst their number. The new Cabinet nevertheless showed significant changes in the balance of elite representatives. More importantly, the Saionji Cabinet had a basic sympathy with the Seiyukai which gave scope for a gradual expansion of party power throughout the political structure. Although the number of party appointees in the cabinet was severely limited, it had, as Makino wrote, a strong Seiyukai tint:

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  25

The establishment of the Saionji Cabinet is a further step toward the realisation of party government, and the public has welcomed Saionji as an open politician untrammelled by han (clan) or bureaucracy…. Saionji pays great attention to Hara and Matsuda. This is only natural in a cabinet backed by the Seiyukai, and the cabinet strongly resembles a Seiyukai cabinet.32

The policies of the Saionji Cabinet had their origins in a number of sources. Some, like the first budget, were inherited from the previous administration, whilst others were party policies or were a reflection of the particular commitments of the Prime Minister. The newly relaxed attitude toward socialist activity in Japan and the cabinet’s efforts to render its Manchurian and Korean foreign policies more acceptable to international opinion fall into the latter category. At the start of the new cabinet, evidence was mounting that the continuation of Japanese army administration in Manchuria was alienating Japan’s Western allies.33 After meeting with the Genro, Saionji made an unprecedented, incognito, four week visit to Manchuria to investigate at first hand the possibility of withdrawing Japanese troops.34 The Genro conference which followed Saionji’s return and his private discussions with Katsura, agreed to his basic proposals; that the Kwantung Governorship should revert to a peacetime structure, with the immediate withdrawal of military Governors from areas with Japanese Consuls, and their gradual withdrawal from other areas.35 By October, the American Consul in Peking, Lockehill, was writing to his government describing the steady shift of power from the Japanese military to civilian officials and the opening up of Southern Manchuria to economic development. Cabinet policy brought an appreciable amelioration of Japan’s relations with the West, but at some cost to inter-elite relations in Japan. This conflict between civil and military policy demands was also apparent in Korea. There, however, the position of the Japanese civil authorities had been strengthened by Ito’s insistence when he was appointed Resident General of Korea in 1905, that the Resident General should have military powers over Japanese troops in Korea. At the same time, the Saionji government came under little pressure from the West in its relations with Korea. The Taft-Katsura agreement of July 1905 and the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in August, gave American and British sanction to Japanese interference in Korean affairs. Explicit recognition of Japan’s paramount interest in Korea by the Portsmouth Treaty ending the Russo-Japanese war the following month, provoked no

26  The Emperor’s Adviser

adverse response from the West. The Japan-Korea Agreement, concluded shortly before the Saionji Cabinet was established, had pushed Korea still further along the road to becoming a Japanese protectorate. The First Saionji Cabinet thus had an almost free hand in its dealings with Korea. Nevertheless, for the first eighteen months of its life, the cabinet followed what was described in the newspapers of the time as a ‘mild policy’ toward Korea. In July 1907, however, in response to a lack of progress in the modernisation and reconstruction of Korea deemed necessary to Japan’s security, the Saionji Cabinet authorised the despatch of troops to Seoul and forced the Korean Emperor to abdicate and the Korean Cabinet to accept a Japan-Korea Agreement which gave the Resident General wide-ranging powers over the Korean Government, the judiciary and the Imperial house. The Saionji Cabinet took these measures in some trepidation about international opinion, but reaction abroad was sympathetic and both the American and British press praised Japan’s contributions to stability in Korea. Saionji was clearly not averse to ensuring Japanese security by force of arms provided that by doing so Japan did not alienate the Western powers. However, both Saionji and Ito were opposed to the outright annexation of Korea, a central policy of the Katsura Cabinet which followed. The Saionji Cabinet’s revised policy vis-a-vis the control of socialist thought owed much to Saionji’s own introduction to socialism under the tutelage of Emile Acollas in France twenty years earlier. A statement was made to the press at the inauguration of the Cabinet, that the growth of interest in socialism was a world trend which would not be subjected to indiscriminate police repression, Although controls were tightened during the second year, this remained largely true throughout the life of the Cabinet. Within a few months of the announcement, the newly legalised Japan Socialist Party (JSP) had increased its membership ten-fold from an original core of two hundred members and had set up regional branches around the country. In February 1907, the first annual convention of the JSP voted to strike out the phrase ‘within the limits of the law’ from the party platform and to give its backing to strikes, labour violence and the world revolutionary movement.36 The Saionji Cabinet’s policy on socialism was a bone of contention between Saionji and the Genro Yamagata and Matsukata, one or both of whom made complaints to the Emperor about the inadequacy of Cabinet controls.37 The growing militancy of the socialists and mounting pressure from the Genro resulted in the banning of the JSP as a threat

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  27

to public peace and order. Nevertheless, government policy toward the dissemination of socialist thought remained sympathetic, even in the wake of an incident of major proportions involving a scathing attack on the Emperor system. This attack and calculated insults of the Emperor in an open letter addressed to ‘Mutsuhito’, were published in a San Franciscan newspaper financed by the JSP, Kakumei (Revolution), and translated in newspapers across the world.38 Despite the banning of the JSP and the suspension of its newspaper, the socialist movement began to grow again in this essentially unantagonistic domestic atmosphere, and split into two factions, the Katayama faction which supported parliamentary tactics and the Mori-Kotoku faction which favoured direct action. Opposition between the two factions became acrimonious and direct confrontation between the groups in the Red Flag Incident in June 1908, resulted in a large scale disturbance with thirteen arrests being made. It has been suggested that this incident helped to bring down the Saionji Government. The decision to resign, however, had been taken some time previously and was due, not to the Red Flag Incident and the Genro’s subsequent protests to the throne, but to the failure of the relationship with Katsura and of the financial policies of the Cabinet. Hara’s attempts as Home Minister to take advantage of the opportunities offered by a Saionji/Seiyukai Cabinet, and, by administrative reforms, to extend the power of the party into the strongholds of the bureaucracy were, in a sense, the most notable feature of the First Saionji Cabinet. Hara succeeded in putting the Police Department under the direct control of the Home Minister and in making Governorships into political appointments. Hara’s Gun (district) Abolition Bill although unsuccessful was perhaps the most damaging to the Cabinet’s relations with the Yamagata faction. The Bill was intended, on the prextext of rationalisation of local government structure, to undermine the position of the Yamagata faction, which was strongly represented in the Gun leadership. Katsura refused a request from Saionji to mediate with the Genro and the House of Peers, and the Bill was defeated. Katsura’s personal relationship with Saionji and with the Saionji Cabinet deteriorated abruptly and the alliance between the Seiyukai and Katsura’s Daido Club in the Diet, broke down. It was Hara’s measures to bolster the power of the party at the expense of the bureaucracy which rendered the compromise relationship with Katsura temporarily unworkable, and it was this breakdown in relations, exemplified by the failure of the government to gain support for its financial policies, which resulted in the fall of the Cabinet.

28  The Emperor’s Adviser

Saionji had undertaken, as part of the conditions for the transfer of power, to implement the budget drawn up by the previous Katsura administration. By the time of the First Saionji Cabinet, the ‘rich country, strong military’ (Fukoku Kyohei) debate, which had divided the country during the early Meiji period, had lost much of its divisiveness. The severity of the argument from the mid-1870s to the mid-1890s, was a reflection of the difficulties faced by the new government in financing a modern state. In 1895, the payment of massive indemnities by China following the Sino-Japanese War had, for a brief period, allowed both policies to be pursued in parallel. This respite had ended in 1897 and the argument between guns and butter had again grown intemperate.39 Throughout the whole of this early period, government finances had derived almost exclusively from land taxes with little indirect taxation and no foreign borrowing. The financial basis of the Keien period however, was characterised by two main developments, both stemming from the Russo-Japanese War; a shift from dependence on land taxes to indirect taxation and foreign borrowing, and increased expenditure and defence commitments with a corresponding increase in the size of the national debt. During the Keien period successive governments sought to achieve both domestic development and a strengthening of military defence and at the same time to avoid increases in taxation by floating large scale foreign loans. The first budget of the Saionji Cabinet was an expansionist budget which provided exceptional funds for post-war troop establishments in Manchuria and Korea and also allowed extensive sums for the development of heavy industry and communications. In an expanding economy backed heavily by domestic and foreign borrowing, the positive policy to which the Seiyukai and the Saionji Cabinet were committed, was not a source of conflict between the Cabinet and the Genro. Ghosts of the old debate still walked however and divided both the Cabinet and the Genro. In 1906, Yamagata had recommended to the Throne an expansion of the number of Army Divisions, from the seventeen it possessed at the end of the Russo-Japanese war to twenty-five. The army budget for fiscal year 1907 therefore claimed funds for the continuation into peacetime of the four divisions established during the war and approved by the Emperor. The situation was further complicated by the fact that, in accordance with the stated aims of the Cabinet, and in anticipation of an expansionary budget, all departments had prepared inflated demands and were engaged in interdepartmental struggles to obtain maximum concessions.

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  29

Throughout the negotiations which resolved this issue, Katsura acted on the Cabinet’s behalf in dealings with Yamagata, and an agreement was reached on a two division expansion with a steady increase in the army budget over a ten-year period starting in 1907.40 The draft budget for 1907 was subsequently passed almost without change. By the following year’s budget however, not only had the positive policy become a major source of dispute in the economic depression which had hit Japanese industry and forced the price of rice to rise by twenty percent over the previous year, but the breakdown in relations between the Saionji Cabinet and Katsura ensured that these disputes would not be resolved. The Cabinet’s draft budget, and with it the ‘positive policy’, was rejected by the Genro. Huge cuts were made in public works and taxation was increased and extended resulting in a cabinet crisis and an active campaign by Katsura to bring down the government. When on July 4th, 1908, after two and a half years in office, Saionji presented his resignation to the Throne, he recommended Katsura to succeed him. He wrote to Katsura that day: I have informed his Majesty that it would be suitable for him to question Prince Yamagata and Marquis Inoue…and I think that Inoue will have a good idea of Ito’s feelings. The above is of course between ourselves.41

Hara, who had only learned of Saionji’s intention to resign one week earlier, had strongly opposed the decision. If he knew of Saionji’s message to Katsura he made no mention of it in his diary. The Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was sent to Korea, where Ito had recently become Governor General, to consult with Ito directly. When the courier returned, the remaining Genro were consulted and Katsura was approved as Prime Minister for the second time. Katsura’s Second Cabinet survived for three years. When the Second Saionji Cabinet was inaugurated on August 30th, 1911, there was no meeting of the Genro Council. Saionji was chosen on Katsura’s recommendation. Yamagata had approved the transfer of power and Katsura gave assurances that there would be no opposition from the bureaucracy.42 The timing of the transfer was once again a long—planned, controlled event and part of a ‘mutual understanding’ between Katsura and the Seiyukai. During the early part of his second cabinet, Katsura had not only attempted to proceed without an understanding with the Seiyukai, but had also made two abortive efforts to unite the anti-Seiyukai parties and amalgamate them with the pro-government Daido Club to form an

30  The Emperor’s Adviser

anti-Seiyukai alliance. Increased activism on the part of the Seiyukai was a spur to these efforts. The relationship between Katsura and Saionji, however, had become closer and the two held regular discussions on financial policy and diplomacy.43 Both the improvement in Saionji-Katsura relations and the increased militancy of party members at the start of the Katsura Cabinet were directly connected with the prolonged absence of Hara abroad. Despite Saionji’s active support for Katsura’s policies, without Hara’s presence, party hardliners became increasingly difficult to restrain. Katsura wrote to the Genro Inoue a propos the Government’s draft budget: ‘At any rate, Saionji’s intentions are clear, but the intentions of the others are not, so I am concerned for the future.’44 Despite Katsura’s worries, the Seiyukai, at Saionji’s insistence, co-operated with the Government. With Hara absent, this co-operation was apparently given freely by Saionji with no bargaining and no attempts to use the situation as a means of extending party power. After Hara’s return in February 1909, Saionji continued to facilitate the process of compromise by his close relationship with Katsura. The Katsura papers make it clear that throughout the period of the Second Katsura Cabinet, Saionji and Katsura corresponded regularly and met frequently, both socially and to discuss political affairs. The conventional view has it that Saionji did not become involved in detailed bargaining, but would “cast the net” and then leave Hara and Matsuda in charge and that if the Government were planning legislation not supported by the Seiyukai, Katsura would send for Hara and Matsuda and agreement by these two ensured party co-operation.45 It is obvious from the Hara Diaries that the situation was not so simple. Hara was unhappy about the relationship between Katsura and Saionji and worried about secret agreements between the two such as that over land taxes and official salaries in the 1910 budget. In April 1910, there were rumours that Katsura would retire in the autumn and would hand over to Terauchi. Hara found it difficult to judge the authenticity of the rumours and to know whether Saionji had come to any secret agreement over the exchange of power. Saionji did indeed intend to decline the premiership, but under pressure from Hara to accept or to propose a coalition cabinet, agreed to take the post for a limited period. Whilst talks on the transfer of power were in progress at least from May 1910, unrest grew among party members and negotiations began between the dissenting factions of the Seiyukai and the newly established Rikken Kokuminto to combine in opposition to the Government. In December,

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  31

Hara had a long meeting with Katsura. Agreement was reached on the transfer of power to the Seiyukai, but the issue of the Broad Gauge Bill, which would divert funds from Seiyukai expansion of local railways and undermine the regional bases of Seiyukai Diet Members, remained a major stumbling block to Seiyukai support of the Government. The deadlock was broken when Katsura met with Saionji, Hara and Matsuda in January 1911. Saionji and Katsura were agreed that the advisory role of the Genro must continue to decline as it had since Ito’s death. Katsura, a shrewd judge of Saionji’s political character, couched his offer as an appeal to his sense of responsibility to the nation and to the cause of constitutional development. The mutual understanding reached at this meeting postponed implementation of the change to broad gauge and, in return, obtained a guarantee of Seiyukai support for Government policies across the board for the remainder of the Katsura Cabinet. Saionji described the arrangement as the beginning of a new era in constitutional politics in which the voice of the House of Peers would be muted.46 Hara echoed these sentiments. Throughout the spring and early summer of 1911, the Seiyukai, in accordance with the mutual understanding, supported the Government in the Diet and Hara negotiated with Katsura the timing of the handover of power for the end of the summer. Saionji accepted the premiership as much to maintain political stability as to promote party expansion. The terms of the mutual understanding had provided for a Seiyukai Cabinet, and for Saionji to have refused the post would have thrown the country into political turmoil. He had nevertheless agreed to form a second cabinet with some reluctance, and on the understanding that he would not hold office for long. In December 1910, Saionji would agree to take office for only six to ten months. At this stage, Hara accepted Saionji’s stipulation, but by June the following year, was insisting that when Saionji resigned, he must do so on the pretext of illness and that plans must be laid for a successor cabinet and for succession of the presidency, The selection of cabinet ministers for the Second Saionji Cabinet which took office on August 30th, 1911, showed a significant break with precedent. Saionji and Hara were in agreement that they must avoid bringing in outsiders if they were to be able to form a unified cabinet capable of withstanding external pressure. Moreover, the mutual understanding which had supported the Katsura Government during its last months had been arranged by the top level management of the Seiyukai in the face of opposition from the middle levels, and since the strength of this group had increased at the expense of presidential control,

32  The Emperor’s Adviser

it was considered to be a tactically sound move to placate middle-and lower-strata party members. Thus the decision was taken to select cabinet members entirely from within the Seiyukai. In contrast with the setting up of the First Saionji Cabinet, Hara’s role in the selection of ministers for this cabinet was very important. During negotiations for the transfer of power Katsura had made a number of suggestions which had become more insistent as time went on but which nevertheless were given little weight. Hara wrote: This time, from the beginning we adopted a policy of not discussing the formation of the Cabinet with Katsura…. This is partly because Saionji was not consulted on the line-up for the Katsura Cabinet and partly because if there had been any discussion with Katsura, he would have had various commissions.47

It was not only Katsura who might have expected to be consulted. Although Katsura had been the chief influence in the selection of the First Saionji Cabinet, the Genro had also been extensively consulted. Now, Saionji’s patron, the Genro Ito Hirobumi, was dead, assassinated in Harbin two years earlier by a Korean nationalist. Yamagata was excluded from discussions, and although Inoue discussed the choice of Finance and Foreign Ministers with Hara, he had no say in the final selection. The tensions created by Saionji’s decision to select the cabinet without outside interference became clear even before the cabinet was inaugurated. Saionji avoided meeting with Katsura to inform him of the cabinet line-up before the inauguration ceremony, apparently from fear of Katsura’s reaction to the appointment of Yamamoto Tatsuo, Governor of the Hypothec Bank, as Finance Minister, a post which had always been held by a member of the Genro or a bureaucrat. The appointment of Yamamoto, non-bureaucracy but close to Inoue, non-party but relatively sympathetic to the Seiyukai, was a mistake. Neither the new Cabinet nor the Seiyukai was strong enough to act without the support of the other elites, and the relationship between Saionji and Katsura was the key to this support. Katsura was outraged first by the appointment of Yamamoto (his own appointee to the Hypothec Bank), and secondly because Saionji had deliberately kept it from him. He sent messages to Inoue and Yamagata condemning the new Finance Minister as unreliable. Yamagata was also displeased with a number of the appointments and wrote an angry reply to Katsura. Relations with the major Genro and with the party’s old mediator were thus soured in the first hours of the Cabinet’s existence.

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  33

The appointment of the Foreign Minister had been another source of conflict. One week before the transfer of power Katsura had sent a message advising Saionji that the Emperor wished the current Foreign Minister, Komura Jutaro, to remain in office, and suggesting that there would shortly be an Imperial message to that effect. Saionji’s reply to Katsura was unambiguous; the principle of cabinet responsibility made it unacceptable to make cabinet appointments by Imperial recommendation, and he declined to create that precedent.48 The facts of the Komura affair are unclear. Although there was apparently no discussion of the question of Komura’s continuation in office in terms of his foreign policy commitments, it seems probable that this was indeed a significant factor. Komura/Katsura foreign policy diverged widely from that of Saionji and his Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu in the First Saionji Cabinet, particularly vis-a-vis Manchuria and Korea and with implications for Japan’s relations with the West. Katsura’s attempt to maintain Komura in the Saionji Cabinet was thus an attempt to perpetuate the foreign policies of the Second Katsura Cabinet. Saionji chose to avoid open confrontation, and made no reference to foreign policy differences or to Imperial interference in his rejection of Komura, but presented his objections to Komura on medical grounds. Public reception of the new Cabinet was mixed. Bureaucratic opposition was strong and immediate. Party members were generally disappointed by the Cabinet line-up. The new Cabinet contained only three party men in addition to Saionji, only one more than in the first cabinet. Other appointees however were close to the Seiyukai and this and the manner of their selection showed a slight but noticeable move in the direction of ‘constitutional’ government. The Kobe Chronicle voiced the concern of the less hopeful public when it identified financial policy as the major issue facing the new cabinet, and judged that since the biggest consumers of money were the army and navy, and the Cabinet had little control over them, its chances of success and the possibility of any real development in constitutional politics were slight. Government policies were also seen to be subject to restrictions imposed by the bureaucracy and the banks.49 The significance of Saionji’s role in the compromise between the bureaucracy and the parties was complicated by a shifting balance of power. The navy had increased its public popularity at the expense of the army. There was also growing public antipathy towards han bureaucracy and Choshu/army interference in politics which was manifested in the difference in public attitudes toward army and navy expansion

34  The Emperor’s Adviser

programmes. In factional terms, the changes in political balance had been a distancing between Katsura and the Yamagata faction and the expansion of Katsura’s personal power base in the form of a new bureaucratic faction in the Peers which soon gained substantial control over the Upper House. The influence of the Seiyukai had been extended vis-a-vis all other groups and the importance of Saionji’s role somewhat decreased. With Ito Hirobumi’s death, Yamagata’s grasp on power tightened and Saionji and the Seiyukai lost a valuable spokesman. Following the assassination of Ito in October 1909, Yamagata had assumed the presidency of the Privy Council and the Council had taken on a strong Yamagata-faction colouring. The loss of Ito became most apparent not immediately during the Katsura Cabinet, but in 1911–1912 when the Second Saionji Cabinet faced pressure from the Genro, the Privy Council and the Upper House. Ito’s death not only robbed the Seiyukai of their link with those institutions, but also allowed Yamagata to consolidate his hold within a number of the elites. Ito’s death therefore affected Saionji in a number of ways. It encouraged Katsura’s bid for independence and therefore increased the conflict between Katsura and Yamagata, thus contributing to his attempts to expand his power base by forming an anti-Seiyukai party. It also strengthened Yamagata’s position as the major Genro. The loss of Ito undermined Saionji’s position vis-a-vis all the elites and left him without a sponsor in the Genro councils. In the longer term, Ito’s death almost certainly contributed to the failure of the Yamagata-army faction to compromise with the Second Saionji Cabinet and to the downfall of the Cabinet in the Taisho Crisis. Paradoxically however, had Ito lived, there is reason to doubt that Saionji would have been invited into the ranks of the Genro in 1913. During the early months of the Second Saionji Cabinet the relationship between Saionji and Hara became increasingly strained as Hara became more and more disillusioned with Saionji’s political stance and especially with what he saw as Saionji’s lack of commitment to party politics. Saionji still had much to offer to the cause of party expansion. Hara was not yet at the stage where he could manage without Saionji’s services, and yet his ambitions had advanced beyond what Saionji was able or willing to give. That winter, relations between the two men slumped further. Hara accused Saionji of siding with his opponents whilst agreeing with him in private and, specifically, of agreeing that the positive policy on harbours should not be abandoned and then opposing him in cabinet. He had over-ridden Hara and approved the Naval expansion programme and

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  35

had allowed the Government to adopt the ‘negative policy’ supported by the bureaucracy and industrialists. The basis for Hara’s attack on Saionji is clear. He believed that Saionji had overestimated the endurance of the support from these two groups and he feared that the Seiyukai would be disadvantaged in the following year’s election by the negative policy in general and by its extension to railway finance in particular. Despite Hara’s vitriolic accusations of duplicity, Saionji’s position over the past few years had changed little. Neither bureaucrat nor party man, he continued to act as a regulator between the forces at work in Japanese politics. The strength of the forces had changed however. The power of the Seiyukai and of Hara personally had grown over the period of Saionji’s presidency to the point where Hara was less inclined to accept Saionji’s ‘equivocal’ role. Hara’s diary entries for the 23rd and 24th of December give a vivid illustration of the egotism which colours the whole of the diary. They also show how keenly Hara felt his inability to control Saionji, despite the fact that he saw himself as the power behind the throne. Hara wrote: I have helped Saionji for a number of years, and most of the successes attributed to him are the implementation of my plans. Even the establishment of his two cabinets was the result of my efforts. He never gives any thought to me…and I have not advanced a step through Saionji’s mediation. …I have helped him both publicly and privately and yet he has never concerned himself with my problems.50

The shifting balance of power received another impetus when the Meiji Emperor died in July 1912 after a reign of forty-five years. The death of the Emperor was a great blow to the bureaucratic faction whose longstanding ties with the Emperor and manipulation of the Imperial institution were central to bureaucratic dominance. The death came at a time when relations between the elites had become very unstable, partly because of social changes taking place in Japan and partly because of the growth in the political power of the parties. The disruptive potential of the situation was increased dramatically by the fact that the new Taisho Emperor was not healthy. The Meiji political system had been designed ostensibly to maximise but effectively to minimise, the personal role of the Emperor. Nevertheless the Meiji Emperor, whilst never a great leader in the Western sense, was indisputably of great importance in the workings of Japanese consensus politics. His importance lay in his ability to orchestrate the views of his advisers. His long and central involvement

36  The Emperor’s Adviser

in politics since the Restoration had produced a perceptive and skilled negotiator of political consensus.51 The transition from an Emperor of long political experience and the contemporary of many of the ruling group, to an inexperienced man of thirty-three, would in any case have placed a considerable strain on an already unstable political situation. The fact that the new Emperor was also suffering from the after effects of childhood meningitis increased both these strains and the possibilities for factional intrigue. The need to keep the knowledge of the illness secret and to guard the Imperial institution and the political structure from the effects of the Emperor’s debility, brought a subtle change in relationships amongst Saionji, Hara, Katsura and the Genro. Saionji, the only one amongst the now active Meiji leaders who had been a longstanding intimate of the Meiji Emperor and his Court, persuaded Yamagata to accompany him to the palace on the evening of Mutsuhito’s death. There, they talked to the new Emperor and began the task of devising ways of coping with the unprecedented situation. Letters in Yamagata Monjo provide evidence of the concern of the elder statesmen in the next few months and indicate that it was the Empress Dowager who was consulted on political matters and that Katsura, who had been hurriedly appointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, saw the Emperor only to explain decisions when they had been taken. Three months into the new Taisho era, Katsura wrote to Yamagata: Do not worry. The Court is working day and night, singlemindedly and unerringly to overcome the problems. However, there are many extremely unexpected concerns and it is not easy.52

Katsura’s hasty recall from Europe and his move into the palace following the Emperor’s death make sense when interpreted in this light. The office of Privy Seal, the chief link between the Government and the Court, was of considerable political importance.53 The duties of the office were flexible and ranged widely from taking charge of the Imperial Seal and the Seal of State, to responsibility for Imperial Rescripts, Imperial Edicts and palace documents. His overall responsibility was to be in attendance on the Emperor and to advise him on both national and Court affairs. Katsura was appointed not only to the office of Privy Seal, but also as Grand Chamberlain. Officially, the Grand Chamberlain assisted the Emperor and supervised the Chamberlains and Stewards. However the scope of the office was defined chiefly by the exigencies of the time and the personality of the incumbent, and Katsura’s responsibilities

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  37

included not a few which were created by the special needs of the new Emperor. The appointment of Katsura to these powerful Court posts provoked considerable adverse public reaction and suspicions of a plot to expand the influence of the bureaucracy in the palace. Hara subscribed to this theory.54 There is a strong case, however, for arguing that Katsura’s entry into the palace was agreed by the Genro to be a necessary response to the special problems created by the accession of the Taisho Emperor, and indeed, Yamagata was prepared to consent to Katsura’s return to politics if he would accept the Court posts at this juncture. The extent of Saionji’s involvement is not clear but the fact that he was consulted about and agreed to the decision is indisputable. Saionji did not discuss either the appointment or the Court problem with other leaders of the Seiyukai. Many years later he denied any involvement in the plan which he said was devised by Yamagata.55 It is equally clear, however, that Katsura’s appointment was not intended simply to minimise the effect of the change in Emperor, but was also an attempt by the Yamagata faction to manipulate an essentially problematical situation to its own advantage. Any understanding of these events is further complicated by the nature of the relationships within the factions and specifically the nature of ‘protege’ politics which was far from the simple mechanism it has often been portrayed. Katsura, for example, spent considerable energy building up his own power base, distinct from Yamagata’s, in the various elites, first in the House of Peers and subsequently among the parties. The relationship between Ito and Saionji and Saionji and Hara showed similar signs of independent thought and action on the part of the proteges toward their sponsors. The difficulty of analysing events in terms of protege politics is nowhere more fraught with pitfalls than in the case of the Court where, despite subsequent competition to declare the ‘Imperial will’, there was, at least in 1912, a common desire among the advisers to the throne, both the Genro and their second generation followers, to act in the best interest of the Imperial institution. At the same time as Katsura was appointed to the Court, an Imperial Rescript calling upon the advisers of the Meiji Emperor to continue to advise and support the throne in the new reign, was granted to the Genro, which since the resignation of his second cabinet included Katsura. The Rescript, and a similar message to Saionji instructing him to assist the throne with affairs of state was intended to strengthen the position of the Genro group and the bureaucracy against their competitors for power.

38  The Emperor’s Adviser

The major area of competition for power throughout the Second Saionji Cabinet was that of fiscal policy. Whilst Hara and the Seiyukai sought to divert the savings from administrative economies to the expansion of vote catching public works as part of a general campaign to expand party influence, the Genro and bureaucracy pushed for a retrenchment policy and, variously for funds for navy or army expansion. The issue of financing a two division expansion of the army went back to 1906 when the formation of eight new divisions was approved as national policy. Full implementation of this policy had been postponed because of financial restraints but the question had been given a new impetus by the army’s desire, thwarted by the Saionji Cabinet, to exploit the situation created by the revolution in China. In December 1912, the Second Saionji Cabinet fell as a result of the Government’s refusal to agree to the Yamagata-backed demands of the army. The fact that Saionji’s opposition was not on purely economic grounds, but reflected fears that the divisions would be used against China and would adversly affect Japan’s international relations, made the issue more explosive.56 It seems too that Saionji meant to use the opportunity to challenge the influence of the Genro.57 Confident that Katsura would supply an Imperial Rescript to resolve the issue, Saionji stood firm. The Government’s earlier acceptance of a naval expansion programme undoubtedly complicated the situation, but Saionji’s stance does not completely defy explanation. Naval expansion was more acceptable to the public than was army expansion. It also had the support of the Seiyukai. Furthermore, expansion of the navy did not constitute a threat to China and was less likely to excite international suspicion.58 But the problem was not simply one of army expansion or even of army/navy competition, The army was using and being used by the bureaucratic faction in the struggle to regain ground lost to the parties. A document emanating from the bureaucratic faction and showing its fears about the Government and the shift toward party and democratic politics, was circulated by the Army Minister, Uehara Yusaku.59 Saionji’s acceptance of naval demands must be understood in the light of this struggle. Opposed by the army and the bureaucracy, Saionji, through his partiality to the navy, was widening his camp and building the foundations of a relationship which was to come to fruition in the 1920s and early 1930s. But now it was of no avail. Yamagata later claimed to have advised Katsura to obtain an Imperial Rescript to settle the issue. Saionji and Hara hoped for one, but none was forthcoming. Saionji blamed Katsura’s

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  39

ambiguity. The compromise relationship which had been the defining characteristic of nine years of rapidly changing politics had failed. When Saionji resigned on December 5th, 1912, both he and Hara believed that he would be offered and should accept reappointment.60 They were to be quickly disillusioned. On the day following the Cabinet’s resignation, Yamagata met with Katsura in the palace before the opening of the Genro Council and insisted that Saionji should meet him privately and should not be called to the meeting.61 Yamagata asked Saionji to remain as Prime Minister but stipulated that the army’s demands would have to go before the Diet that year. Saionji wrote to Hara that there was thus no way out.62 After twelve days and eleven meetings, the Genro Council agreed to recommend Katsura and an Imperial Rescript was issued granting him leave to return to politics. Katsura’s re-entry into politics and the widespread opposition to his appointment, which brought down the Cabinet seven weeks later, are at the heart of what has become known as the Taisho crisis.63 The crisis centered on two grievances; Army Minister Uehara’s presentation of his resignation direct to the throne, which had brought down the Saionji Cabinet and Katsura’s interference in politics from within the palace. Saionji’s role in this affair left a number of questions unanswered. Having approved Katsura’s appointment as Prime Minister, why did he only weeks later support the movement to bring the Government down, and what was the significance of his failure to obey an Imperial command ordering him to quell the disturbance in the Lower House? Saionji, with the approval of Hara and Matsuda Masahisa, supported Katsura’s appointment in the belief that the mutual understanding would be rejuvenated. On Katsura’s side too, it seemed as if there was a real desire to reach an accommodation with the Seiyukai. At the time of Katsura’s appointment, the Seiyukai had an absolute majority in the Lower House. It was necessary therefore for any government to take one of two paths; either to arrange for support from the Seiyukai through some degree of mutual understanding, or to build an alternative body of support for the government within the Diet. All the indications were that Katsura meant to return to a Keien form of compromise. Katsura’s supporters let it be known that he wanted an alliance with the Seiyukai and that he intended to cut his ties with the Genro and to work closely with Saionji. There were even rumours that Katsura was himself prepared to become President of the Seiyukai. Saionji had met privately several times with Katsura during the last few days of his cabinet. From his subsequent complaints about

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the lack of consultation and mutual understanding it is clear that these meetings had encouraged Saionji to envisage a significant role for the Seiyukai during Katsura’s tenure of office. When the miscalculation was laid bare in the first meeting between Katsura and Saionji following Katsura’s nomination, Saionji and the party leadership swung the body of the Seiyukai behind the burgeoning popular movement to protect the constitution which had begun even before the inauguration of the Katsura Cabinet. This shift in policy was subsequently encouraged by fears that the Seiyukai’s newly enhanced popularity could be jeopardised by too close an association with a prime minister who was rapidly becoming a public pariah.64 Saionji’s refusal to bow to pressure from Katsura’s lieutenant, Goto Shimpei, and to prevent the Seiyukai’s presentation of a vote of noconfidence in the Government, precipitated the announcement of the formation of a new party to be led by Katsura and the prorogation of the Diet immediately after its opening on January 21st. When the Diet reconvened on February 5th with a massive police presence around the building, a joint Seiyukai-Kokuminto question condemned Katsura’s misuse of Imperial Rescripts, his failure to separate Court and political functions, his abuse of power and his usurpation of constitutional government.65 Katsura immediately obtained an Imperial order suspending the Diet and preventing the motion being put to the vote. His new party, the Doshikai, was inaugurated two days later with ninety-seven members; insufficient to provide a lever for controlling the Diet. Abandoned to his fate by his disgruntled sponsor, Yamagata, and much to the dismay of Hara, who opposed the meeting, Katsura negotiated directly and alone with Saionji. Saionji’s formal reply stated his inability to secure the withdrawal of the no-confidence motion and strongly opposed any attempt to reach a settlement by means of an Imperial order. Katsura ignored the warning and Saionji was summoned to the palace and instructed by the Emperor to find a solution to the impasse. It was only after consulting with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal about the meaning of these instructions that Saionji met secretly with Katsura and promised his co-operation. The extent of Katsura’s miscalculation soon became apparent. His error lay not in any misjudgement of Saionji’s attitude but in a misreading of the broader political situation. Politically and emotionally it was necessary for Saionji to appear to have tried and himself to believe he had tried to comply with the Imperial message. The Seiyukai, still less the other actors in the movement to protect the constitution, were under no such restraints.

Saionji’s Emergence as Genro  41

Imperial requests had failed before,66 and the lineage of this particular command was too clear to produce anything but scorn among the general public, the press and the parties. The significant factor overlooked by Katsura was that it was precisely this group which would determine the response to the message. The Seiyukai itself saw the message as one more example of bureaucratic misuse of the constitution to protect the bureaucratic position against the parties and they were not insensitive to the fact that any opposition to Katsura would at this point win widespread support, whilst any compromise would win only opprobrium. What is surprising is that Katsura’s miscalculation should have apparently been mirrored by the leadership of the Seiyukai who, with the exception of Ozaki Yukio, agreed to support Saionji in seeking the withdrawal of the no-confidence motion. This decision however was not a miscalculation of the extent of anti-government feeling. It was rather, an indication that the Seiyukai leadership recognised that the preservation of Saionji’s power and therefore his usefulness to the Party, lay in his ability to deliver party support. His relationship with the Seiyukai had earned him a place among the Genro only weeks before, when his second cabinet had fallen. If the Party were now to repudiate his leadership, his position would be untenable. The Hara diaries provide no explanation of the decision, but Hara’s machiavellian grasp of the niceties of the power struggle must surely have led him to this conclusion. The mood of the Party in the country was not swayed by such considerations and the clamour from the regional groups grew.67 This split in the party was reflected in the meeting of Seiyukai Diet members addressed by Saionji on the morning of February 10th, Unbeknown to the Party, Saionji had already informed the Court of his intention to resign as President of the Seiyukai. His speech was short and he did not stay to answer questions. He told the meeting that as a loyal minister he must act in accordance with the Emperor’s message, that they as representatives of the people would want to reflect the people’s wishes but that modification of their stand at this point would not preclude their success in the future. Notwithstanding Saionji’s aversion to exerting himself in support of lost causes, the message and the nature of its delivery appear remarkably urbane. At no time did Saionji, as President of the Party, demand its conformity to the Imperial message and indeed it is unsurprising that the tenor of his remarks drew accusations from the Katsura camp that he had been deliberately derelict in his duty. Any emotional pressure felt by Saionji was undoubtedly diluted by the recognition that the Imperial command emanated from Katsura.68 There was little doubt which way the

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vote would go. In the middle of the meeting there was a telephone call from Kato Komei, now a leading member of Katsura’s Doshikai, asking for their decision and requesting a meeting with Saionji. Hara refused both requests. When Katsura learned this he once again suspended the Diet, unleashing mass riots which resulted in widespread damage to property and a number of deaths. The following day the Cabinet resigned. The compromise was at an end.

CHAPTER TWO THE GENRO

The Emergence of the Genro Group Saionji Kinmochi was the last appointed and longest surviving member of the Genro and it is in this, his best remembered, role that he made his greatest contribution to the political development of Japan. He was a Genro for half a lifetime and yet when he received the Imperial message of appointment in 1912, the Genro period of Japanese politics was almost finished. ‘Genro’, ‘Genro period’, ‘Genro politics’ are words which have meant different things at different stages in Japanese political history. The role and influence of the Genro changed, sometimes slowly and subtly, sometimes suddenly and dramatically. It changed as Japanese politics developed through the various stages of modernisation, spawning elites which then competed in the balance of power. It changed also as the members of the group itself changed. The Genro as an institution was more affected by the personalities which constituted it than any other institution in modern Japanese politics. The nature of the office was not defined either in law or in the constitution and the criteria by which individuals were chosen to serve as Genro can be given only ex post facto definition. Essentially, they were a self-generated and self-limiting body of elder statesmen who chose to justify their power from their position vis-a-vis the Court. The group was not created at one time. In a sense it was not created at all, but evolved gradually, gathering members which it was necessary or useful to include and jealously excluding all others. It is difficult to point to any particular stage at which the evolution was complete. When the group had reached completion in terms of members, that is to say, the time after which no new Genro were created, the group in terms of function had already moved through a number of phases, none of which was to be its final stage of development. Despite these   43

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ambiguities, within a year or so of the Sino-Japanese War, the group had become recognised as a body with certain members and certain functions. By 1898, the term ‘Genro’ had passed into common usage and there was public recognition of their involvement in politics if no clear definition of the scope of their powers.1 Who exactly constituted the Genro was also a question which produced conflicting answers. Since membership of the group was determined initially by practice and not by appointment, certain figures who were later recognised as members played restricted roles and others, who at times seemed to function as Genro, did not in fact become recognised as members of the group. The main body of the group had a number of characteristics in common. The first and most widely used as a definition of a Genro was the fact that all received, on one or more occasions, Imperial commands that they should receive the honours due to elder statesmen (Genkun). This was to form the legal basis of their claim to advise on matters of national importance. Secondly, they had served in the Sangi, the body of predominantly Satsuma and Choshu councillors, which gradually consolidated its hold on power after its reorganisation in 1873 following the Korean Expedition controversy.2 That is to say, they had been leaders in the Meiji Restoration and were from the two foremost han, Satsuma and Choshu. The nine men who have in retrospect been recognised unequivocally as Genro were Kuroda Kiyotaka, Ito Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Matsukata Masayoshi, Inoue Kaoru, Saigo Tsugumichi, Oyama Iwao, Katsura Taro and Saionji Kinmochi.3 All received an Imperial command, the texts of which varied, requesting them to advise on important matters and to co-operate in government. Katsura and Saionji, who first received the command in August 1911 and December 1912 respectively, were the only Genro appointed after the original group of seven, so-called Meiji Genro, had been recognised. They did not participate as Genro in the years which have come to be known as the period of Genro politics. In other respects too, Saionji differed from the personality profile which can be drawn of the earlier Genro. He did not come from either of the major clans, but from Kyoto. As a pre-Restoration aristocrat (kuge), his background and status at the start of the Meiji period were totally unlike that of Ito and Yamagata who began the Restoration as low ranking samurai. He was ten years younger than the average age of the other seven. Like the others he had participated in the anti-Tokugawa campaigns but he had spent the early Meiji years not in the government but rather as a student in France. In this sense, Saionji’s definition of himself as

The Genro  45

a quasi-Genro was appropriate. Okuma Shigenobu, who is included in some lists of Genro, did not receive the command, and his participation in what were essentially Genro functions was limited and sporadic and was permitted for particular pragmatic reasons. When in 1916 Yamagata gave his backing to Oyama Iwao’s suggestion that Okuma should receive recognition as a Genro, both Saionji and Matsukata Masayoshi, the other two remaining Genro, were strongly opposed and Okuma was never admitted to their ranks. The definition of a Genro as an elder statesman who had received an Imperial command to assist the throne, was one which gained currency at about this time. The Genro had previously felt little necessity to define their position. However, the threat to Genro power at the start of the Taisho period, and the public criticism of their role spurred on by the Movement to Protect the Constitution, led them to legitimise and justify their position in terms of their direct appointment by the Court and their special position as Meiji elders. If we accept the Genro’s own definition of the group, we should bear in mind that the group came before the definition and that, as with the late additions like Katsura and Saionji, or those like Okuma who were rejected, the deed was made to fit the reality and the need. It was the Genro themselves who decided whether or not an Imperial command would be given and who thereby controlled the membership of that body. The Genro are also frequently defined by their functions. This definition too is useful if it is remembered that these functions changed, and that they changed with the membership as well as in response to larger changes in the political arena. The group from which the small body of Genro emerged was the Genkun, predominantly Satsuma and Choshu politicians who at the start of the Meiji period occupied the second rung in Japanese politics. The new Government formed after the Meiji Restoration was a kuge government, dominated by former Court nobles such as Iwakura, Sanjo and Tokudaiji. The executive branch of the major office of government, the Dajokan (cabinet), consisted of six departments, with each department split into upper and lower echelons within which the most important positions were open only to princes, kuge and daimyo (the old feudal lords). Sanjo Sanetomi as Dajodaijin (prime minister), had, in theory, absolute control over the ministries; the ministers had no autonomy and no responsibility and only the Dajodaijin and the Ministers of the Right and Left had the authority to present reports to the throne.4 Nevertheless, it was in fact in the ministries that the real power lay and over a number of years, through

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various council systems, Satsuma and Choshu leaders in the ministries gradually eroded the hold of the kuge. When the new cabinet system was introduced in 1885, the positions of Dajodaijin and Ministers of the Right and Left were abolished. In the first Cabinet, led by Ito Hirobumi, there was not one kuge. All cabinet members were from Satsuma and Choshu. The remnants of kuge influence were to be found amongst the newly expanded Peers and in the office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, a new office created as resting place for the erstwhile Dajodaijin. The first cabinet included all seven of the subsequent Meiji Genro and the second all but Ito, who had just resigned as Prime Minister. Of the first nine cabinets formed in the period 1885– 1901, all but one was headed by a member of the Genro group.5 At this time, there was no ‘normal’ mechanism for selecting prime ministers. The First Ito Cabinet was recommended by the Dajodaijin Sanjo, with the agreement of the Genkun. The next two cabinets were recommended by the outgoing Prime Minister with the agreement of the cabinet members and non-cabinet members of the Genkun. From the establishment of the First Matsukata Cabinet in 1891, the Genkun no longer provided the cabinet members, but their co-operation was necessary to the functioning of the cabinet and they were actively involved in decision making. From 1892, Genkun conferences were called whenever an issue of national importance was under discussion. When Matsukata resigned in July that year, the Genkun Ito Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo and Kuroda Kiyotaka were called by the throne to advise on the next cabinet. This marked a shift from recommendation by the outgoing Prime Minister, to an Imperial question to the Genkun. The Genkun who participated in this advisory function varied, but never included anyone who did not subsequently become one of the Genro group.6 This group of Genkun, by their regular participation in the selection of the prime minister, were identified by the public as a special group for which the name ‘Genro’ was coined. With this public recognition in one sphere, their activities in other spheres were also identified as Genro involvement. From 1898, the precedent was established whereby the Foreign Office would send copies of all its documents to the Genro. Such were the seeds from which the two major functions of the Genro, those of recommending cabinets and overseeing foreign policy, grew. The Genro intervened vigorously in the formulation of foreign policy during the period of Genro cabinets and again from 1901 to 1913 when the premiership passed between Saionji and Katsura Taro. They also acted individually, as consuls and plenipotentiaries and both individually and as

The Genro  47

a council they advised the government of the day. Their activities during the Russo-Japanese War provide a clear example of their involvement in policy making. Yamagata, as Chief of Staff, held military responsibility. Ito, as President of the Privy Council, advised the Emperor, and Inoue and Matsukata acted alongside the Minister of Finance to direct wartime finances. There was no serious opposition to their involvement in foreign policy decision making until Kato Komei, as Foreign Minister in the Second Okuma Cabinet, 1914–1916, made a concerted effort to curb their influence.7 In 1918, when the Gaiko Chosakai (Advisory Council on Foreign Relations) was set up to deal with the problem of the Siberian Expedition, the Genro found themselves facing an institutional rival for control of foreign policy. Their control was further weakened in the Taisho period by the growth of a strong, professional foreign office staffed by Seiyukai party men. When Saionji attended the Versailles Conference as chief plenipotentiary for Japan, he did so partly in the role of Genro, but his participation was largely a reflection of his identification with the emerging forces in Japanese politics, the liberals, the internationalists and the pro-party men. By the time of the Washington Conference in 1921, the direct role of the Genro qua Genro in Japanese foreign policy was even further limited. There are strong indications that the Cabinet made all policy decisions regarding the Conference, including the selection of delegates, without consultation with the Genro and that these decisions were approved without change by the Gaiko Chosakai.8 After the death of the other Genro, Saionji continued to participate in foreign policy on two levels; first as leader of the liberal group and secondly as Genro, As Genro, he advised the Court directly on foreign policy matters at times of crisis, However Saionji’s major contribution as Genro to Japan’s politics, both foreign and domestic, was in his role as advisor at times of Cabinet change and maker of prime ministers. This function of the Genro developed during the latter half of the Meiji period.

The Genro as Cabinet Makers The right to recommend the prime minister did not fall immediately or without question to the Genro and for some time it was considered more appropriate that the Imperial question should go to the Privy Council which was, unlike the Genro, a legally constituted body. Ito Hirobumi favoured putting the question of succession to a reformed and strengthened Privy Council when his second Cabinet fell in 1896. Nevertheless, from

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1892, the Genro invariably answered the throne at times of cabinet change and it was this function which gave them their greatest and most enduring influence in Japanese politics. The fact that the question did, after 1892, go regularly to the Genro group, did much to give that group stability. In 1898 three cabinets fell. On each occasion, the President of the Privy Council was called and advised the Emperor to consult with the group of seven Genkun now identified as Genro; Ito Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Kuroda Kiyotaka, Matsukata Masayoshi, Inoue Kaoru, Saigo Tsugumichi and Oyama Iwao. With the appointment of the Yamagata Cabinet in November that year, the term ‘Genro Conference’ passed into official usage. The absence of one of the Genro from this first Genro Conference was noteworthy. Shortly after the fall of his third Cabinet in June that year, Ito had begun a series of trips to lay the foundations of a new political party. Ito’s new party, the Seiyukai, was established on September 15th, 1900. One month later, Yamagata resigned with the recommendation that Ito be asked to form a government. It is possible to see in Yamagata’s nomination of Ito a hint of the splits and manoeuvrings which characterised the efforts of the Genro group to maintain its internal balance, whilst at the same time protecting its position against the other elites. Ito’s new power base in the political parties was a threat to Yamagata’s position within the Genro group. By insisting that Ito form a cabinet at a time when the Seiyukai was still weak and its internal politics in disarray, Yamagata was protecting his own position within the Genro and the power of the House of Peers vis-a-vis the House of Representatives. It is important to remember that at no time in its development was the Genro a monolithic body. The dual functions of the Genro group as political arbiter and as final voice in who would form the government, along with the private nature of policy resolution in Japan, have tended to obscure the fact that the Genro were split into several factions. In the Keien period, the true period of Genro politics, the two major factions, those of Ito and Yamagata, fought their battles in the cabinets of their proteges, Katsura and Saionji. The First Katsura Cabinet was appointed in June 1901 on the recommendation of Yamagata, Matsukata, Inoue, Saigo and, for the first time, Saionji, in his capacity as President of the Privy Council and acting Prime Minister. In 1903, Katsura backed by Yamagata, succeeded in forcing Ito to withdraw from the presidency of the Seiyukai. As both Genro and President of the only political party of any significance in the Diet, Ito presented a potent threat to the policies of Katsura and therefore of Yamagata. Ito’s identification with the liberal opposition to the

The Genro  49

bureaucracy not only gave legitimacy and succour to that group but also strengthened Ito’s position vis-a-vis the other Genro in a way which was particularly threatening. Katsura, supported by Yamagata and Matsukata, pressed Ito to renounce either his position as Genro or his presidency of the Seiyukai.9 Since the position of Genro was, as Ito argued, without substance or constituted authority, but was simply a recognition of past services, it was not possible to resign from it. There was indeed no precedent for such a step, nor did anyone subsequently resign as Genro although Saionji twice in later years attempted to do so. Precedent or not, it was unlikely that Ito would play into Yamagata’s hands in this way. Ito’s disassociation from the presidency of the Seiyukai was not simply a means of rendering his opposition to the Katsura Government less effective, but was also a means of regulating the relations among the Genro themselves. The Genro agreed that Ito would abandon his formal ties with the parties and would take over the presidency of the Privy Council, where he would be joined by Yamagata and Matsukata as Privy Councillors. Many political observers both at the time and since have believed that the appointment of Yamagata and Matsukata to the Privy Council, was the result of retaliation by Ito and that ‘Ito was indeed such an old hand that when he jumped into the den, it was with Yamagata and Matsukata under his arms’.10 The decision for Ito to assume the presidency of the Privy Council was however not necessarily a part of Katsura’s plans. The Genro’s decision to move en masse into the Privy Council suggests that this element of the incident was less a plot against Ito—a division along the Ito/Saionji, Yamagata/ Katsura lines—than a move to strengthen the position of the Genro against the second generation ‘cabinet’ politicians. The suggestion that the three Genro should all enter the Privy Council in fact appears to have come from Yamagata.11 The role and significance of the Privy Council during the Meiji period varied. Ito had described its functions in a letter to Inoue shortly before the announcement of its establishment in April 1888: This (the Privy Council) is my own invention…Ultimate decision making authority has been conferred on the Emperor through a specific clause in the constitution. In any situation in which the Cabinet and the Diet reach an impasse, there are two alternatives open to the Emperor. One is to receive the resignation of the Cabinet, the other is to dissolve the Diet. In such a case there is a need for an advisory organ which can give adequate advice to the Emperor after considering the total national picture and the feelings of the public. We must create the Privy Council

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to perform this function for there is no other adequate institution. This is what I have decided.12

Ito became the first President of the Privy Council, a body which initially seemed destined to play a significant political role. The development of the Genro group and the succession of Genro Cabinets, however, eclipsed the new advisory council which fell into decline. The inclusion of the three Genro amongst its numbers in 1903 invested it with an increased importance and gave the Genro, whose supervision of government was now more indirect, a further lever for controlling its sometimes recalcitrant proteges. The politics of the Keien period were not simply those of party versus han, nor of Saionji plus the Seiyukai versus Katsura and the bureaucracy. This was also the period in which the proteges of the Genro began to form their own alliances and power bases, separate and different from those of their sponsors. When these groups began to jostle for power within the factions bringing intra-factional, inter-elite struggles, the balance of power within the Genro and between the Genro and the other elites shifted dramatically. The nascent struggle is obvious in this letter written by a member of the Ito Hirobumi faction, the Privy Councillor, Ito Miyoji, to Katsura, a few days before Katsura formed his first Cabinet in May 1901: We must be aware that the days left in the political life of the Genro are numbered. Whenever they find themselves in trouble they seek our assistance but when things go well, they are arrogant and think nothing of those at the second level and below…. Even when they realised that today’s situation indeed demands some determined efforts on the part of the second level leadership, they first recommended that the senile Count Inoue form a cabinet: and when he failed they then, for the first time, turned their attention to the leaders at the second level…. Avoid revealing your sharp edge to the Genro now. Continue upholding the Genro and let them first exhaust every means they have. After they have revealed their incompetence to the nation and when the populace, having completely deserted the Genro, come round to demand the determined efforts of the second level political leaders, only then should you give serious consideration to forming a cabinet.13

Through the nine years and four cabinets of the Keien period, the Genro sat in conference on decisions regarding treaties, war, finance and foreign policy. They also mediated between the Katsura Government

The Genro  51

and the Seiyukai and Kenseihonto and the Saionji Government and the bureaucracy. Though their influence was at its height at the start of the First Katsura Cabinet and declined thereafter, they remained, despite the prophesies of the second generation hopefuls, an extremely potent force in politics. However, after the First Katsura Cabinet was set up, the Genro did not again, during the Keien period, take the lead in recommending the cabinet. The outgoing prime minister recommended his successor and the Genro gave their assent. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that the Genro supported this pattern of exchange of power and that had they not done so, that pattern would not have continued. They supported the regular peaceful exchange as a means of regulating the balance of power within the Genro group itself. The Genro, balanced internally in this way, were able to act as mediators in the political process and this for a time was their major function. The splits within the Genro grew however as Yamagata came to act increasingly as leader of the military and bureaucracy whilst Ito, without the broad power base enjoyed by Yamagata or his commitment to specific interest groups, remained broadly neutral but well disposed to the parties. When Ito moved to Korea and away from central politics, Yamagata’s position among the Genro became more dominant. When Ito was assassinated in 1909, Yamagata’s control of the Genro became almost absolute and the balance of the Keien period lurched perceptibly. Saionji had lost his main support in the Genro camp and the Seiyukai had lost a source of information on government dealings and a route to the Court. The Genro, never close to the Second Saionji Cabinet, finally brought it down. The Second Saionji Cabinet resigned on December 5th, 1912 when Yamagata failed to persuade the army to supply an Army Minister and to break the deadlock over army expansion. For twelve days the Genro met repeatedly, choosing first one and then another candidate who could not or would not form a cabinet.14 The first recommendation of the Genro Council was that Saionji should remain as Prime Minister. When Saionji refused, the Council suggested a Genro Cabinet led by Matsukata and then on Matsukata’s advice made unsuccessful approaches to Yamamoto Gombei and to Hirata Tosuke. Finally Yamagata told the Council to choose between himself and Katsura.15 It is clear that Saionji recommended Katsura to succeed him, and urged him to take office. But it was not Saionji’s recommendation which secured Katsura’s nomination. The easy exchange of power which had characterised the Keien period,

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whereby the outgoing prime. minister had recommended his successor who had then been approved by the Genro, had ended. When the Genro, after eleven meetings, reluctantly recommended the Third Katsura Cabinet, they precipitated a political upheaval which swept away Genro politics in the form in which it had existed in the Keien period. Genro influence was in fact rejuvenated, not destroyed, in the political crisis which marked the beginning of the Taisho era. However, the stable political arena in which the Genro had been able to exert their influence covertly, rather than in the full view of the public eye, was replaced by one in constant flux and one moreover which was under closer public scrutiny than ever before. Politics had become more complicated and less stable. The Genro’s grip on power remained firm, but as the political elements with which they had to deal grew stronger and more varied as the Taisho period progressed, the scope of Genro activities was progressively narrowed. The Imperial command making Saionji a member of the Genro, which was delivered on the day of Katsura’s appointment as Prime Minister, had surely been intended to forestall the Taisho Crisis. Saionji’s appointment as Genro came about primarily because of his ability to influence the party elite. Saionji, as heir to many of Ito’s connections and with many of his own forged through his presidency of the Seiyukai, filled a void in the Genro group left by the assassination of Ito. Yamagata’s domination of the Genro at the time of Saionji’s appointment was complete and he had little to fear and much to gain by the inclusion of a ‘party’ Genro in their ranks. The process by which Saionji had come to fill the requirements for his emergence as the last appointed Genro, was through the compromise of the Keien period.

CHAPTER THREE SAIONJI’S PARTICIPATION IN THE GENRO GROUP 1913–1919

The Genro and Cabinet Succession The Taisho Crisis began a slow shift in the balance of power among the Genro in favour of Saionji. The shift was to be intensified over the following years by the consolidation of Saionji’s power base and the increasingly violent splits amongst the elites which constituted the Yamagata faction. The extent of Saionji’s influence within the Genro group in the subsequent cabinet changes is significant of the splits in the balance of power within and between the elites which were precipitated by the breakdown of the Keien compromise.

The First Yamamoto Cabinet: February 1913 With the Keien compromise and with it the simple exchange of power between Saionji and Katsura at an end, the Genro Council was once again called upon to select a prime minister to succeed Katsura. Saionji participated in this Genro Council; the first time he had done so in the capacity of Genro. He was summoned to the meeting in the palace after Yamagata questioned why he had not been called to attend when: ‘He was favoured with a gracious message (appointing him) Genro shortly after the Emperor had acceded to the throne.’1 The revised Council consisted of Saionji, Yamagata, and Oyama.2 The Yamamoto Cabinet recommended by the Genro Council was Saionji’s creation, as he himself acknowledged: ‘I exerted enormous efforts in the establishment of the Yamamoto Cabinet after Katsura fell.’3 Saionji secured the support of the Genro and also organised Seiyukai   53

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backing without which Yamamoto would not accept the post. The new Cabinet, midwifed by Saionji, was made up of Seiyukai, Satsuma and navy men and had strong backing in financial circles. The formation of this Cabinet was not so much indicative of a loss of Choshu power to Satsuma, as of a shift of allegiance by the Seiyukai.4 From 1903 to 1912, the Seiyukai under Saionji had supported Katsura’s Choshu Cabinets as the prime ministership alternated between Katsura and Saionji. Now, under Saionji’s guidance it shifted its backing to Yamamoto Gombei and the Satsuma-navy group. The formation of the Yamamoto Cabinet was of great significance in Saionji’s political career. Yamagata had hoped to preserve the proChoshu balance of power through a third Saionji Cabinet. Instead, by recommending Yamamoto and procuring Seiyukai support for his cabinet, Saionji helped to shift the balance of power away from the Choshu faction. By recommending, instead of acting as prime minister, he began the consolidation of his position as a member of the Genro group. This was by no means a steady process. At the time of the Taisho Crisis, Seiyukai popularity was at a highpoint from which it rapidly fell. The Yamamoto Cabinet too, hailed at its inception as a victory over han bureaucracy quickly began to lose popular support. Positive economic policies lost the Cabinet the support of financial circles whilst a moratorium on army but not navy expansion had the military looking for an opportunity to bring the Cabinet down. After the formation of the cabinet, Saionji retired to Kyoto, in touch with Hara and Yamagata but functioning overtly neither as Genro nor as party leader. He refused entreaties from Yamamoto to take a more active role in regulating the Seiyukai to make it more supportive of the Government and in June 1914, shortly after the formation of the Okuma Cabinet, Saionji retired as party president. It was widely conjectured that he had withdrawn from politics because of his failure to comply with the Imperial Rescript, and though Saionji himself denied this, his move to Kyoto was almost certainly meant to take him out of the spotlight of criticism which was now directed at him. The failure of the Imperial Rescript weapon in Katsura’s hands brought to fruition the navy, Satsuma, Seiyukai alliance actively cultivated by Saionji and Hara throughout the period of compromise. It removed from the active political-arena the two men who, standing between the Genro and the party and bureaucratic forces, had acted out the institutional struggles of the last ten years of the Meiji era. It also changed the course of Saionji’s career. Saionji’s value to the Genro group lay in his influence

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within the parties. His failure to control the Seiyukai seemed as if it might have isolated him from political power. Instead, the dramatic exhibition of the power of the parties and the strengthened alliance with the navySatsuma group, provided an expanded power base from which Saionji in future years was to challenge Yamagata’s stranglehold on Genro power.

The Second Okuma Cabinet: April 1914 The Yamamoto Cabinet survived barely one year. Saionji refused the demands of both Yamamoto and Hara that he should attend the Genro Conference and, though he had given his blessing to Yamamoto’s plans to nominate Hara as his successor, he must have appreciated the impossibility of persuading Yamagata to agree.5 The time was scarcely appropriate for Saionji to hazard his position. His influence was at a low ebb. The Yamamoto Cabinet, which stood in the same relationship to Saionji as did the Saionji and Katsura Cabinets to the early Genro, had lost the support necessary to keep it in office. Moreover, his position within the Genro rested ultimately on his relationship with the Seiyukai, whose popular fortunes were in decline. Only days before the Yamamoto Cabinet fell, demonstrators lay in wait for Seiyukai members outside of the Diet, allowing only those members bearing placards identifying themselves as non-Seiyukai men to pass.6 Without Saionji’s voice in the Genro Council there was no possibility that Hara would be recommended to form a government. Yamamoto therefore attempted to by-pass the Genro. When Yamamoto presented his resignation to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Prince Fushimi, he stressed the important place which the parties had come to hold in Japanese politics and the role of the Seiyukai during his cabinet. He explained that Saionji himself was ill and unable to accept the post but that Hara had Saionji’s support. The Prime Minister then asked the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to recommend Hara without recourse to a Genro Council whose members were twenty years away from direct power and out of touch with political reality.7 Yamamoto’s attempt to by-pass the Genro failed. The Genro Council, now without Katsura who had died the previous year, was dominated by Yamagata who deplored the estrangement of Choshu and Satsuma, the institutionalisation of conflict between them as army-navy rivalry, and the introduction of politics into national defence.8 Yamagata’s plaints were disingenuous. Political rivalry and military

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rivalry had long been interconnected. The history of the Meiji period up to this point was the history of army precedence over the navy as the army’s Choshu backers maintained their pre-eminence in government councils. What was novel was the boost received by the navy through the Yamamoto Cabinet and the alliance with the Seiyukai. Yamagata and Matsukata each made the ritual suggestion that the other should lead the next cabinet. On Matsukata’s suggestion, the Council then approached Prince Tokugawa, a ‘neutral’ candidate, acceptable to Yamagata and supported by the Peers but unfortunately unwilling to take on the job. Privy Councillor and would—be Genro, Kiyoura Keigo, accepted the mandate but was unable to secure the support of either the Seiyukai or the navy, who refused to supply a Navy Minister without a guarantee of appropriation of naval funds by special Diet session. Saionji’s name was put forward by Matsukata but rejected by Yamagata on the grounds of his failure to obey an Imperial command, his failure to honour his promise to resign as President of the Seiyukai, and the fact that the appointment would be opposed by the Peers. The real basis for Yamagata’s opposition to Saionji lay elsewhere. Saionji had in fact received a message from the Emperor asking that his failure to comply with what was only a spoken request should not cause him to withdraw from politics. Yamagata himself had pressed Saionji to form a government when the Katsura Cabinet fell and had insisted on his participation in the Genro Council. Then, however, it had been in Yamagata’s interest to have Saionji take responsibility for the situation. This was no longer the case. Nor, with public support for the Seiyukai at a low ebb, was it necessary to court Saionji or his party. Saionji, who had been summoned to Tokyo by the Genro, sent a message that he was too ill to travel. The four remaining members of the Genro Council agreed unanimously to recommend Okuma Shigenobu, former leader of the Kenseihonto, as Prime Minister.9 The Genro Council made its recommendation of Okuma not without some misgivings. Okuma was well known as an opponent of the Genro and the Genro institution. His appointment owed much to the fact that he presented an opportunity to curb the influence of the Seiyukai and to his support for army expansion.10 The Cabinet fulfilled their worst fears. The Genro were greatly dissatisfied with foreign policy and resentful of Foreign Minister Kato Komei’s disregard of their prerogative of consultation. Kato failed either to discuss the issues or to circulate foreign policy related documents. In an attempt to regain their hold on foreign policy, the Genro

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presented Okuma with a document which demanded that the Foreign Minister should implement agreements reached between the Genro and the prime minister and, in addition, that originals and translations of all important documents should be circulated to the Genro who, in the interests of national unity, would be consulted before any important decisions were reached. The document also laid down broad guidelines for the direction of foreign policy. Kato’s subsequent presentation of the Twenty-one Demands to China, without Genro knowledge or approval, set them howling unsuccessfully for his dismissal.

The Terauchi Cabinet: October 1916 In February 1916, Yamagata used his influence to suppress a Peer’s attack on the Government in exchange for Okuma’s promise to resign.11 It was Okuma’s intention to win the nomination for Kato Komei, or if this proved impossible, to secure a coalition cabinet led by Kato and Yamagata’s nominee for the post, Governor General of Korea, Terauchi Masatake. For several months, Okuma clung to his post in the hope that a new party, the Kenseikai, to be led by Kato, would achieve a majority in the Lower House and force the Genro’s hand. It is noteworthy that Yamagata was not unsympathetic to Okuma’s suggestions for changes in the membership of the Genro, his chief concern being to effect a peaceful transfer of the premiership from Okuma to Terauchi with Kato’s support. Underlying this was a change of strategy by Yamagata and his desire to have two ‘party’ Genro under his sway. It was Okuma’s decison to pre-empt the issue by having the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Oyama, recommend Kato without reference to a Genro Council, which caused the Genro to close ranks and act.12 Saionji described the gist of a meeting with Yamagata to Hara Kei: It is very alarming, Okuma intends to have Kato receive the command directly, without reference to the Genro. We cannot allow Kato to succeed him.13

Yamagata had called immediately on Saionji in Kyoto before leaving for the capital and when the Genro Council met before the Emperor he reminded them that Saionji was entitled to be treated as a Genro and asked that he be summoned. Saionji participated in the Genro Council

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which overruled Okuma’s recommendation and put forward Terauchi’s name. He took part too in conferences on Cabinet composition and in conferences which discussed the advisability of appointing Okuma as a Genro. It is easy to speculate why Saionji began to act publicly as a Genro at this time. First, there was pressure from Yamagata for him openly to align himself with the dwindling group of Imperial advisers, now reduced to four with the death of Inoue in 1915. The prerogatives of the Genro had been under constant attack by the Okuma Cabinet both in the arena of foreign policy and in the matter of cabinet succession. The power to select the prime minister was of enormous significance. Within the constraints of political realities such as the existence of the parties and the ability of the military to refuse to supply service ministers, the Genro could select the prime minister whose political policies accorded most closely with their own and who would allow them to maximise their own role in the political process. They could, by drawing the prime minister from one elite, or one faction rather than another, alter the balance of power between the elites, or reduce the hold of a party on the Lower House. Okuma’s attempt to wrest this power from the Genro was a challenge to the Genro system itself and therefore provoked a strong reaction. Yamagata orchestrated the Genro response. At this critical moment Yamagata met with the Emperor to obtain his support. His second measure was to have Saionji at his side. A few days after Okuma informed the Court of his intentions, Saionji arrived in Tokyo. With elaborate secrecy, he visited Yamagata at his home outside the capital in Oiso, and agreed to meet with the Seiyukai leaders to secure their support for Terauchi as the next prime minister.14 Yamagata assured Terauchi that, with Saionji’s support, there would be no obstacle to his appointment. Theoretically, the Terauchi Cabinet was to be a national unity cabinet, drawing its support from all the parties and dependent on none. Yamagata’s desire to involve Saionji fulfilled two functions: it ensured Genro solidarity against Okuma and against any popular dissatisfaction with the selection. It was also the means to securing broad political support for Yamagata’s candidate. For his own part, Saionji was probably as much motivated by his support of the Seiyukai against the Kenseikai and his opposition to Kato’s aggressive China policies, as by the attack on Genro privileges. Nevertheless, his belief that the Genro system ultimately had no place in Japanese politics did not mean that he countenanced attempts to strip the Genro of their powers. He was not averse to using the essentially undemocratic Genro institution to guide Japanese politics toward

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democracy and was prepared to defend the system until such times as he considered it could be allowed to atrophy. It was this belief which also underlay Saionji’s successful opposition to the appointment of any new Genro such as Okuma, an idea embraced by Yamagata in an attempt to buy Kenseikai support.15

The Hara Cabinet: September 1918 The next cabinet change produced no direct threat to the Genro’s prerogative of selecting the prime minister. There were however restrictions of a different nature on the Genro’s freedom of choice. During his two years in office, Terauchi had failed to achieve any agreement with Kato Komei and the Kenseikai. The Seiyukai, whilst officially uncommitted, had drawn close to the cabinet, and in the process had regained much of the strength it had lost during the Okuma Cabinet. An attempt to create a third, neutral party had failed and in the election of 1917, the Seiyukai once more became the largest party in the Lower House, able to dictate which of the government legislation would pass unscathed. For several months after the election Yamagata persuaded Terauchi to remain, but the rice riots which began in August 1918 made a change of government inevitable. The riots were symptomatic of growing social unrest and increased politicisation of the general populace. The natural beneficiaries of the increased political activism were the parties and the Genro were restricted in their choice of prime minister to someone acceptable to the parties. Hara Kei, now President of the Seiyukai, was confident enough in April 1918 to claim: ‘Yamagata and I are the makers of the cabinet.’16 Yamagata’s first choice was Saionji. In the midst of a budget crisis less than two months after he had formed his cabinet, Terauchi was informed by Yamagata that he wanted Saionji to head the next cabinet. The Terauchi Cabinet had survived these early difficulties, but by July 1918, Yamagata was again pressing Saionji to form a national unity cabinet.17 As exPresident of the Seiyukai and mentor of Hara, Saionji would command the support of the largest party in the Diet, but he was also a Genro and any cabinet he formed would be a transcendental cabinet. Hara declared his support for a Saionji Cabinet if Saionji could be persuaded. He was firmly convinced however that Saionji would never consent.18 The rice riots brought the question to a head, but Saionji remained adamant. On September 23rd, Saionji informed Yamagata of his intention

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to refuse the mandate later that day and recommended that Hara be asked to form a government.19 He assured the old Genro that Hara would welcome his advice and argued that if the cabinet were set up quickly it would not be necessary for the leader of the Seiyukai to compromise with the Kenseikai. He also argued that to allow Hara to form a party government at this juncture would be to give it the chance to fail and permit the return of transcendental cabinets. Saionji’s recommendation of Hara was decisive but Yamagata in fact needed little persuasion. To the weight of Saionji’s arguments were added certain practical realities. The Seiyukai had proved co-operative during the period of the Terauchi Cabinet but was unlikely to continue to be so if its efforts were overlooked. The social upheaval of the late summer and the resulting strength of the parties had created expectations both within and without the party which, if disregarded, were likely to prove extremely disruptive. Hara in fact was preparing to launch a joint Seiyukai-Kenseikai attack in the event that a transcendental cabinet were recommended. When Saionji persisted in refusing to accept the mandate, Yamagata was left with little alternative but to recommend Hara. By refusing to serve himself and acting as Hara’s advocate within the Genro Council, Saionji not only smoothed the way for Hara’s appointment, but also enhanced his own position within the Genro. Yamagata undertook to get Matsukata’s support for Hara but insisted that Saionji make the recommendation to the throne himself. Yamagata’s waiving of his rights and responsibilities in Saionji’s favour did not stop with the recommendation to the throne, and Saionji found himself as sole Genro advisor to Hara in the selection of cabinet ministers and the devising of cabinet policy.20 He was acting not, however, in his capacity as Genro but as an ally of Hara, the Seiyukai and party government.

Saionji and the Paris Peace Conference Saionji’s appointment as Chief Plenipotentiary In December 1918, Saionji was named as Japan’s Chief Plenipotentiary to the peace conference to be held in Paris the following year. The selection of the new Genro to fill this post tells much about the domestic balance of power between the elites at the end of the First World War. The diaries of the Prime Minister, Hara Kei, and Privy Councillors Ito Miyoji and Makino Nobuaki indicate that although the choice was made by Hara and

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Yamagata and not by the Gaiko Chosakai or the cabinet as a whole, it was nevertheless based primarily on domestic considerations.21 Not the least of these considerations was the need to rally popular support for the delegation and its work at the conference, the more so since the election of 1917 had failed to give the Seiyukai an absolute majority. The riots which had followed the Portsmouth Conference in 1905 when public expectations of the peace were not realised, remained vivid in official memory. It was therefore thought advisable to have as Chief Plenipotentiary someone whose public popularity would protect the Government from the expected backlash when peace terms were concluded. Consensus politics also made it advisable that there should be agreement amongst the various political elites on who should present Japan’s conference aims. The requirements were therefore for an uncontroversial figure of some standing. The selection of Saionji as Chief Plenipotentiary to the Paris Peace Conference was based on his fulfillment of these requirements. It was, wrote the journalist Nakano Seigo, an attempt by the cabinet to patch up domestic affairs.22 By 1918, Saionji had ostensibly retired from active politics. His withdrawal had begun in 1912 with the fall of his second Cabinet and had been followed by his official resignation in 1914 as President of the Seiyukai. At the same time, Saionji had begun to participate in the Genro group and had been influential in the establishment of the Yamamoto, Terauchi and Hara Cabinets. He regarded himself however as only ‘half-Genro’, and it is indeed necessary to distinguish between Saionji and the first generation leaders.23 Saionji’s age, social position and career set him apart in conviction and approach and made him, in many respects, despite his elevation as Genro, one of the ‘second generation’ politicians who had come to fill public offices since the turn of the century. This, combined with the lack of such a wide, strong base of support as that provided by the army and the Choshu faction for Yamagata, left Saionji in a junior position among the three Genro still alive in 1918. The key to Saionji’s position at this time was his ability to mediate between the Genro and the growing political force of the parties. The strenuous efforts made from the summer of 1918 to persuade Saionji to form a national unity cabinet when Terauchi should resign, attest to his continued importance in domestic politics in the Taisho period. Saionji’s return to Tokyo from his self imposed exile in Kyoto encouraged Yamagata to press him further. Throughout the summer Saionji pleaded illness, whilst Yamagata reminded him of his own continuation in office despite his more advanced age and his own lowly status compared with

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that of Saionji, whose family he described as bulwarks of the Imperial line.24 Saionji’s still active role in politics, despite his protestations of illness, is evidenced by his successful efforts to achieve the selection of Hara as Prime Minister and by his frequent meetings with Hara during this period and the period of the Hara Cabinet. When, in February 1919, Yamagata fell seriously ill, Saionji was commonly recognised as the man who would inherit his mantle. Contingency plans for recalling Saionji from the Peace Conference were agreed with the Government and relayed to the Emperor.25 It was Saionji’s importance in domestic politics which, when combined with his position as elder statesman and his impeccable lineage and family connections, qualified him to play the role of figurehead so necessary to the Japanese delegation at the Paris Conference. The role of figurehead, the chief role he played in Paris, was not new to Saionji. Indeed, it was the most important aspect of the many roles he played during his career. His position as a Court aristocrat (kuge), and his unquestionable devotion to the Imperial institution, enabled him to promote his ‘liberal’ and ‘internationalist’ convictions in a way which no one else could have emulated. His stress on ‘non-restrain’,26 of riding the waves of social and political development, often made him appear vacillating and his views lightly held, but did not make his role as figurehead—that is, as unifier and justifier—any less effective. The main function he fulfilled at Paris he had already fulfilled as a flag bearer in the wars of the Restoration, as editor of the newspaper, the Toyo Jiyu Shinbun, as Party President of the Seiyukai and indeed to a large extent as Prime Minister of two cabinets. The role of figurehead in modern Japanese politics has attracted notable attention. Maruyama Masao’s analysis of political types defines the role of Omikoshi or ‘Portable Shrine’ as the-overt embodiment of authority ‘held aloft’ by the real force which resides below with the Official. In this system, the Shrine is seen as little more than a robot manipulated from below and used to justify the exercise of power.27 Professor Maruyama specifically describes the role of party president in the pre-war period as that of the Shrine. Saionji typifies the kind of political actor which in this analysis would be described as a Shrine. David Titus has examined the validity and usefulness of this system of typology as it applied to a number of pre-war political figures, and has found several difficulties;28 first, the dif ficulty of separating position from personality and of considering an actor’s position within a number of political organisations and at the same time within the overall national polity, and second, difficulties in

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explaining and accounting for relations between Maruyama’s three types of order; Shrine, Official and Bandit. Many of the questions which Titus raises in respect of the Emperor’s position as the ultimate Shrine, can also be put in relation to Saionji. Did he ratify decisions automatically, regardless of his own views on the subject? Was he a passive seal, taking no initiative either to influence the Officials below or to select the decisions he would then choose to ratify? The answer for Saionji, as well as for the Emperor, is a strong no. Titus’s alternative classification in fact dubs Saionji as a ‘negotiator’ rather than a ‘ratifier’. The negotiator, by this definition, had real but restricted latitude in policy initiative and selection. The negotiator, ‘…was responsible for evaluating the ‘trends of the times’ and forging the consensus on which policy and personnel decisions were based…the ratifier…put the final seal of approval on political decisions’.29 The description of Saionji as a negotiator rather than a Shrine is a big step in the direction of recognising and appreciating his role as a figurehead; not a mere ‘figurehead’ as the term is normally used but a figure of critical importance in politics. Saionji’s role as a figurehead embraced the functions of both negotiator and ratifier, and that role is seen with great clarity at the time of the Paris Peace Conference. As a figurehead, he could co-ordinate and mediate differences within the delegation and sway or strengthen the opinion of the group. At the same time, he provided an overall directional stability to the negotiations of the Japanese delegation which were at times at variance with Japanese Governrnent policy. His participation also served to defend the decisions of the delegation against outside criticism from all levels. As a Genro, Saionji was fully informed of the positions taken by the various elites on conference issues and of the state of Japan’s international relations. This knowledge, with his prestige as elder statesman, allowed him to provide some measure of on-the-spot decision-taking ability. Japanese delegates were traditionally allowed little latitude in their negotiations, and were required to refer all revisions of proposals to the home government. The roots of this lack of discretionary power are clear. The multi-layered consultations necessary for the maintenance of consensus politics made decision making a cumbersome procedure and ensured that decisions so laboriously reached were not readily changed. A further manifestation of consensus decision making was that policies arrived at after long consultation were delicate plants which could be destroyed by the slightest change. Consensus politics as it

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referred to diplomacy too often meant consensus on form rather than in essence. In this situation, Saionji’s standing as one of the three men in Japan specifically charged with mediating a consensus, made his role in the Paris delegation one of paramount importance. His philosophical and pragmatic commitment to a successful outcome for the conference, and the strength of his backing within the governmental structure, reinforced his discretionary powers. As Hara had predicted when confronted by criticism of the delegation under Makino for its failure to seize opportunities and its demands for quick and detailed instructions, things were to change after Saionji’s arrival.30 The popular misconceptions about Saionji’s role in Paris are put forward in one modern analysis of Japanese negotiating style which describes him as a ‘classic example of the figurehead Japanese negotiator’: The noble Prince, sick and seventy, added little to the Japanese effort at Paris, except his retinue of followers (including his mistress) and his prestige. He arrived late, when the conference was almost over, left the work to his subordinates and attended but few sessions.31

The description is misleading on two counts. As reports by participants at the conference clearly show, Saionji was an active and significant participant in the internal workings of the Japanese delegation. Moreover, it reveals a basic misconception of the processes of negotiation and ratification in modern Japanese politics. In a situation where Japanese diplomacy was greatly influenced by domestic politics and strongly reflective of inter-elite competition and the requirements of consensus politics, Saionji’s role at Paris was of profound significance. International considerations had also favoured the selection of Saionji as chief delegate, and Saionji himself was aware of the expediency of his acceptance of the post for both domestic and international relations.32 The significance of the Paris Peace Conference, it seems, did not immediately become apparent to the Japanese Government, whose original intention had been to head their delegation with someone of the level of ambassador. This plan was abandoned on the advice of the Ambassador to Britain, Chinda Sutemi, who notified his Government that the composition of the other delegations necessitated that Japan send her Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs or, failing this, a non-cabinet politician, ‘a statesman of first rank’.33

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It was not simply that the high rank of the chief delegates of the other allied powers required a Japanese statesmen of equivalent standing. It was, more pertinently, that Japan’s status at the conference was in question. Japan and Belgium were the first of the ‘lesser allies’ to request and be granted permission to send delegates to the armistice discussions, and the decision to admit Japan to a position of ‘theoretical equality’ with the United States and the major European allies was taken at the London Conference which met on December 2nd and 3rd, 1918. However, it was not until January 12th that the Supreme Council of the conference, ‘the direct heir of the various political conferences of the allies during the war years and at the time of the armistice’, finally decided to allow Japanese participation in the Council of Ten.34 The Council of Ten determined the structure and procedure of the preliminary conference and defined the functions of the full inter-allied conference, that is the plenary sessions. Since the Council of Ten allowed only an extremely restricted role to the plenary sessions, Japan’s participation as a full member of the conference was of great importance to the outcome of her demands. In this situation where her status as a great power was so delicately balanced, it was all the more important that the Japanese delegation be led by a prominant statesman known in the West. Nevertheless, the imminent opening of the Diet, the need to devise the budget for the coming year and pressing problems with education, the rice supply and labour militancy made the position of the new party cabinet difficult and precluded long absences by either Hara or his Foreign Minister. Saionji, despite his lack of official Government position, was known and respected in the West as a ‘veteran statesman and quasi Genro’ and a ‘patrician liberal’ with liberal and even socialistic sympathies, a man whose political ideas had been much influenced by his long residence in France. Sir Arthur Connyngham Green, reporting on Saionji’s appointment, wrote that it was not necessary to furnish details of Saionji’s distinguished career as these were on record in previous dispatches of the Tokyo Embassy. In France, Clemenceau let it be known before Saionji’s arrival that the chief Japanese delegate was an old friend and immediately after the conference, Saionji travelled to London where he had private discussions with the King directed at facilitating the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.35 Nevertheless, the appointment had come as something of a surprise.36 A confidential dispatch from the British Ambassador in December remarked on the unexpected nature of the choice. It was the opinion of the British

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Embassy that Kato Komei had been the first choice to head the delegation and that public opinion had been in favour of his appointment. It was believed that Saionji had been appointed only because Kato himself was averse to heading the delegation because of his opposition to the Hara Ministry and his disagreements with the Gaiko Chosakai. Kato was also, it was thought, afraid of jeopardising his political future by disappointing what he considered to be the exaggerated hopes of the Japanese public. In fact, as both the Hara and the Harada Diaries show, both Yamagata and Saionji were strongly opposed to any approach being made to Kato. Saionji noted: ‘It was apparently Yamagata’s plan to recommend myself since he was averse to sending Kato Komei.’37 It was a measure of Saionji’s own opposition to entrusting Kato with what he believed to be a major event in Japan’s international development that, despite his advanced age and ill health, he accepted the position of chief delegate. It was to be the only public office he held between 1914 and his death in 1940. Saionji had opposed a number of other would—be candidates including Okuma, ‘a public buffoon’, and though he approved of Makino, had considered him to be inadequate by himself.38 Makino, who believed that Japan would ultimately withdraw from the conference when her demands proved unobtainable, made his participation conditional upon Saionji leading the delegation.39 Hara, convinced that Saionji’s appointment was the only answer to the various requirements of the national and international situations, was prepared to have him stay at the conference only briefly and to play a passive role.40 Finally in December, Saionji, still weak from a bout of pneumonia, agreed to depart for the conference in mid-January.

Saionji Diplomacy By the end of the war, the international environment had changed considerably from that encountered by Japan when she had made her first forays into modern international politics in the Meiji period. Alliances had been redrawn, the balance of power had begun to swing from the old world to the new, and a new language of diplomacy had become current. In 1919, there was a particular need for Japan to consolidate her position with the allies. The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in doubt. America, with whom Japan was on less than the best of terms, was emerging as a dominant power in international affairs and Japan’s nearest neighbours were in a state of flux.

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The way in which Japan was to respond to the demands of this new environment was determined by the relative domestic strengths of the ‘internationalists’ and the proponents of pan-Asianism within the elites. The internationalists, the non-interventionist camp in the argument over Japanese participation in the Siberian Expedition, included Makino Nobuaki in the House of Peers, the Genro, Matsukata Masayoshi, the Shidehara Kijuro clique in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Admiral Kato Tomosaburo and Hara, as well as Saionji. Opposition to this group’s ‘low posture’ approach to foreign policy was centred in the Gaiko Chosakai (Advisory Council for Foreign Affairs) around Ito Miyoji, Inukai Tsuyoshi and ex-Prime Minister General Terauchi Masatake. The Gaiko Chosakai, set up at the instigation of the Choshu/Yamagata faction in 1917 to debate ‘important matters relating to the general situation’, comprised representatives of various groups on which the cabinet depended for support. It was the function of the Council to act as the main policy-making body with regard to preparation for the peace conference, and as such, to vet Foreign Ministry proposals and oversee the activities of the Japanese delegation. Throughout the conference, members of the Gaiko Chosakai, which had not been consulted about the appointments of either Saionji or Makino, grew increasingly critical of the ‘internationalist approach’ and the efforts of the Japanese delegates at Versailles.41 The appointment of Saionji as chief delegate and, on Saionji’s recommendation, of Makino, was indicative of the growing strength of the so-called ‘new diplomacy’ and of Saionji’s power base, a trend which had been given considerable impetus by the appointment of Hara as Prime Minister. The Saionji group, identifiable in terms of domestic politics as liberals and constitutional monarchists, shared in addition a pro AngloAmerican outlook, and a commitment to co-operative diplomacy which nevertheless encompassed a range of views on the value of the Wilson peace proposals which became central to the Paris Conference. Many of the group had direct experience of the West and many spoke English or French. Makino was one of these. Makino, like Saionji, was convinced that Japan would of necessity be profoundly and permanently affected by the post-war developments in Europe and in particular by the changes in the structure of international diplomacy precipitated by the emergence of America with her ideological commitment to non-intervention.42 He argued before the Gaiko Chosakai that Japan’s failure to adapt to the new trends, as exemplified by the proposal to establish the League of Nations, would result in her economic

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and political isolation, and he made his participation as a delegate contingent upon Japanese support of the League.43 The arguments which Makino marshalled in favour of Japan’s support of the principles underlying the League, were those of pragmatic national self-interest and not those of an ideological commitment to the concept of an international peacekeeping body.44 Shidehara Kijuro, a favourite of Saionji and the man who, as Foreign Minister in five cabinets between 1924 and 1931 came to personify the Saionji group’s approach to foreign policy, was in contrast openly fearful of the potential repercussions of the League on Japan. Centrally involved in Japan’s preparations for peace as Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Committee for Preparation for Peace with Germany, Shidehara nevertheless gave the League proposals his support with reluctance and only in order that Japan should be seen to conform to world trends.45 Saionji’s understanding of the Paris Peace Conference and the question of the League of Nations which came to dominate it differed in one major respect from the majority of his supporters. Like these men, Saionji appreciated the benefits to be found for Japan, as a country of limited resources with aspirations to rank among the leading nations, in promoting the trend toward pacifism and economic liberalism. Japan’s doubtful status at the conference, the nature of the Government’s instructions to the delegates and the ultimate outcome of Japanese conference demands, were all symptomatic of the country’s precarious position on the fringes of international politics. Japan’s chief delegate believed that the conference would be crucial in effecting Japan’s transition from this unhappy limbo to recognised world power status and expanded international responsibilities. His views on the need to incorporate Japan into the Anglo-American definition of the international structure was a pragmatic response to a changed political situation. Whether the relationships in the new order were defined in terms of military and economic strength or in terms of international brotherhood, the realities of inter-nation relations remained largely unchanged. Saionji, an admirer of Bismarck as ‘an acute statesman and realistic diplomatist,’46 saw in the conference and, in particular in the League, Japan’s best opportunities for expansion. As the British Foreign Office remarked, however, eighteenth-century French liberalism had made a lasting impact on Saionji’s thought. His commitment to a successful outcome to the conference and the League was not only pragmatic but was a natural consequence of an ideological

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internationalist outlook learned in France a half century earlier. Saionji was an idealist in his approach to international politics. He believed wholeheartedly in the idea of the League, in disarmament, in the possibility of world peace through cultural advance and in the value of co-operative diplomacy in conjunction with America and her European allies.47 In 1919, at the height of ‘Wilsonian idealism’, ideological internationalism was a strong element in Saionji’s thought. Like the many other Wilsonian idealists, Saionji believed in the capacity of the League as a civilising peacekeeping force. He also saw membership of the League as a practical means of assuring Japan’s position in the new world order. There was thus no conflict in Saionji’s mind between the idealistic and the pragmatic elements of his thought vis-a-vis the League of Nations and in sharp contrast with the instructions from the Japanese Government that delegates should prevaricate as long as possible on the issue of the League, Saionji made it the central focus of his concern at Versailles. On his arrival in Marseilles Saionji made a statement to the press explicitly supporting the League and implicitly recognising the need to submit Sino-Japanese relations to solution within that framework. He told Le Petit Marseillais: …je n’hésite aucunement à vous dire que le Japon désire voir s’organiser au plus tôt une Ligue des Nations, de facon à assurer au monde entier une civilisation ‘plus libre, plus effective, surtout plus féconde en résultats’. Au siècle de progrès vertigineux dans lequel nous vivons, il est du devoir des hommes de toutes classes et de toutes races d’apporter leurs concours à la destruction de tous les éléments -tel le militarisme Prussienqui sont susceptibles d’arrêter ou seulement de suspendre le progres de la civilization …ce language…ne prête à aucune équivoque…La paix qui doit surgir de la Conference ne doit être pas seulement une paix Européene, mais bien la paix du monde entier et assurer pour toujours. L’humanité doit savoir tirer parti des fautes du passé, si elle veut vivre heureuse dans une paix eternelle et féconde.

It was a source of conflict between Saionji and Konoe Fumimaro, the young Prince destined to evoke so many hopes and dash so many dreams in the party Genro, that Konoe throughout the conference condemned the whole idea of the League as the creature of Britain and America and a tool for shoring up their position by holding back the ‘have not’ countries like Japan. Participation in the conference confirmed Saionji’s belief in the usefulness of the League and his speeches following his return

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reiterated that the League was the salient feature of the Treaty, that Japan was committed to making peace and that through her participation in the League, Japan must endeavour to revise her aggressive, militaristic image abroad.48 His plenipotentiary report read: Amongst those provisions which should form the basis of a lasting peace, the most notable are the League of Nations and the Labour Convention. The League Covenant, which forms the core of the Peace Treaty, aims to avoid war through the power of co-operation between all nations and will deal with all international problems.

He summed up his report to the throne thus; The results of the recent conference will have a profound effect on the position of Japan in international politics. Japan has joined the ranks of the five great powers and this is the beginning of our participation in European politics. Furthermore, since we occupy an important place in the League of Nations, we have acquired the right to participate generally in future in all East-West matters.49

Saionji’s attitude to the League contrasts strongly with the official government stance. The written instructions of the Japanese Government to its delegates stated ultimate agreement with the aims of the League but noted that it was likely to create significant disadvantages for Japan, and therefore advised postponement of agreement on definite plans for as long as possible.50 The commitment to the League, in both theory and practice, of Japan’s Chief Plenipotentiary and her chief active delegate in Paris, had important implications for Japan’s participation at the conference. The Japanese delegation was in the unhappy position of drawing the fire of both its home government and the allied delegations over each of the issues with which Japanese demands were particularly concerned. The delegates were subject to constant pressure and supervision from Tokyo and it was only those particular attributes brought to the job by Saionji which enabled the Japanese delegation to modify its conference demands to the extent to which it did. Under Saionji’s guidance, the Japanese delegation compromised on two of the three Japanese basic conference demands, accepting that the German Pacific islands, the Carolines, Marshalls and Marianas be entrusted to Japan as a mandatory power rather than annexed by her, and agreeing to League consideration of the question of racial authority

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being deferred. Government instructions to the delegation had in fact made Japan’s participation in the League dependent upon the inclusion of a racial equality clause in either the body or the preface of the League Covenant.51 They had also tied Japan’s entry into the League to the successful outcome of her claims to the transfer from Germany of all rights of possession relating to Shantung, and although ultimately this claim was upheld, Saionji had in fact made clear to the rest of the delegation that he was prepared to subordinate even this, the most important of Japan’s conference demands, to Japan’s participation in the League. His stress on the primacy of the League thus diverged considerably from that of the Gaiko Chosakai. By appointing Saionji to head the delegation, the ‘internationalists’ in the government structure had gained an effective check and balance to the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations.

The Conference Although the Paris Peace Conference is thoroughly documented, the role of the Japanese delegation is less well covered and Saionji’s activities have received little attention. Saionji attended a number of the Preliminary Peace Conference meetings and was present at all except one of the March meetings of the Council of Ten but made no contribution to the discussions. When the Council of Ten was abandoned, Japan was not invited to participate in the Council of Heads of State. The Council of Heads of State, or Council of Four, which met over two hundred times between March 20th and June 21st, had no written rules and for the first three weeks of its life had no formal minutes. It became the most important decision making body in the conference. The barring of Japan from this inner Council was based technically on the fact that her Chief Plenipotentiary was not a Head of State. Saionji’s appointment as Japan’s chief delegate and the failure to send Prime Minister Hara thus resulted in the exclusion of Japan from the major policy-making body during the most important weeks of its work. Woodrow Wilson’s biographer, Russell Fifield, concluded that Japan’s case would have been helped by the attendance of her Prime Minister and that the Japanese Government had underestimated the opposition which Japanese demands would meet when it made its selection of the chief delegate.52 This is an error of judgement by Fifield which Wilson himself and the other Western leaders who were well apprised of Saionji’s

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political career, were unlikely to make. In contrast with the Western nations, maximum prestige and value as a figurehead lay not with the Prime Minister but with the most popular of the Genro and it was in anticipation of a difficult reception of Japan’s claims that the decision to appoint Saionji had been made. Despite urgent messages from the Japanese Ambassador to France that the French leaders, Clemenceau and Pichon, were enquiring after Saionji and strong suggestions that the Genro should join the conference as soon as possible in view of the strength of the other delegations, Saionji did not set sail for Marseilles until mid-January and did not arrive, with his large personal retinue, until March 2nd. Saionji’s late arrival and subsequent failure to appear in public provoked rumours that he was not in Paris at all.53 Stephen Bonsal, a member of the American delegation and an old friend of Makino known to Saionji, was asked by Colonel House to ascertain if the Genro were really there. At the meeting which was subsequently set up, Saionji made the case that promises made to the Tsar during the war, of a base which would provide free access to the Mediterranean should be kept, despite the change in government, not simply in recognition of a pledge made, but in the interests of Europe. He told the American: I am of the opinion that Russia’s agricultural produce and her increasing industrial output will revive the devastated economy of Europe as nothing else can, and it is to the advantage of all of us to facilitate in all possible ways and by all legitimate means, this revival.54

Bonsal’s interview with Saionji persuaded House that ‘the Prince is in Paris and from behind the curtain is pulling the wires that control the dance of his puppets’ and that the Genro was ‘a wise old boy’ whose attempts to place Russia in charge of Constantinople and the Dardanelles were intended to give Japan a free hand for a general advance across the Asian continent. Whatever else these efforts to interfere in European politics were, they were certainly an attempt by the chief Japanese delegate to establish the precedent of Japan’s involvement in international political decision making outside of the Asian arena. Saionji’s agreement to the trial of the Kaiser, despite the doubts of other members of the delegation, was prompted by similar aims. At a private dinner at Buckingham Palace, Saionji explained to the King, who was sympathetic to the Kaiser and disparaging about the American President, that although deeply rooted historical sentiment

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made it difficult for him as a Japanese plenipotentiary to agree to bringing an Emperor to trial, it was imperative that the allied powers should keep in step and that his decision had therefore been inevitable.55 Records of such direct meetings between Saionji and the allied leaders are few, but one at least was significant to the outcome of the conference. The Shantung issue was potentially the most dangerous threat to Japan’s successful participation in the conference. The general mood of the Council of Ten was unsympathetic to Japan’s claims to the transfer to her of all German rights of possession relating to Shantung. The American delegation with the exception of Colonel House favoured the Chinese who were disputing this claim. Clemenceau took little interest in nonEuropean matters but was inclined, like the British delegation, toward the Chinese, despite their earlier agreements with Japan.56 The question came to a head at the end of April when the Japanese delegation was instructed to abstain from signature of the Covenant if the conference would not consent to the unconditional surrender of Tsingtao to Japan. The enormous strain which the Japanese delegates were placed under by these instructions became apparent to allied observers. At the heart of the Japanese demands on Shantung stood the whole vexed question of whether relations between China and Japan should be subject to outside scrutiny and interference. The Japanese Government was insistent that the problem of retrocession be settled solely between Japan and China and the delegation consistently maintained this stance. Ambassador Chinda Sutemi told the American Secretary of State Lansing: Regarding the good or bad (sic), or the validity of the JapaneseChinese agreement, our government will not permit the meddling of another country…this conference of the Allied nations. each having equal qualifications as a nation, is organised chiefly for the purpose of discussing peace conditions with reference to the enemy; and it is against the objectives of the Peace Conference to try to criticise the agreements existing between friendly nations.57

The question of whether Japan would in fact have left the conference had her Shantung claims been rejected is one to which there can be no definite answer. The consensus among the major allied delegates was that Japan would withdraw if her demands were not met. President Wilson, with whom in effect the final decision lay, remarked for posterity: They are not bluffers, and they will go home unless we give them what they should not have.’58 Documentary evidence indicates the consistency of

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Japanese Government thought on the Shantung issue and reveals that they would indeed have instructed the delegation to withdraw without becoming a signatory to the Peace Treaty or the League Covenant.59 The question remains however of whether Saionji would have agreed to lead the delegation from the conference. In Saionji’s own words, the answer was no. The chief delegate saw Sino-Japanese relations as an integral part of the peace and therefore, given his convictions, subject to the authority of the League. More pertinently, he put the question of the retrocession of Shantung second to the formation of the League and Japan’s participation in it, and he specifically stated that he would dismiss any member of the delegation who opposed him on the question of withdrawal.60 In fact, Japanese claims on Shantung were met, at least in part, because of the relationship which existed between Saionji and Georges Clemenceau. Shaken by the uncompromising instructions from Japan, Saionji sought a meeting with Clemenceau to explain Japan’s position on Shantung. He convinced the French Premier that despite her present repudiation, China had in fact entered into voluntary agreements with Japan with regard to Shantung in 1917. At the next meeting of Foreign Ministers, Clemenceau interrupted Lansing’s denunciation of Japan to describe his discussions with Saionji. He told the assembled delegates that he and Saionji had been friends since they were young men and that they trusted each other. Saionji had assured him that Japan intended to return Shantung to China, and he accepted Saionji’s assurances.61 Clemenceau lent his weight to persuade President Wilson of the rectitude of Japan’s claims and this, with the Japanese delegation’s agreement to submit only a token protest on the racial equality question, swung the issue in Japan’s favour. Saionji believed that his early friendship with Clemenceau had been advantageous in a number of ways, and certainly, the French reception of the old left wing, left bank student was very sympathetic.62 Clemenceau and Saionji had exchanged telegrams whilst Saionji was en route to the conference and the two had met on the second day after Saionji’s arrival in Paris.63 French newspapers described Saionji in these terms: Aussi lorsque, en 1880 il retouma au Japon, ses amis le considéraient aussi bien comme Francais que comme Japonais. Pendant ces dernieres années, le marquis Saionji à joué un role politique prépondérant qui, outre ses sentiments d’attachement à la cause des Alliés, justifie son choix comme délégué à la Conference de la Paix…

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Cet Homme; aux larges idées liberales, peut être considéré — parmi les grands hommes d’Etat du Japon—comme celui qui comprend le mieux l’esprit de Europe occidentale; c’est à dire qu’il ne pouvait être fait un meilleur choix qu’en sa personne…64

Clemenceau himself summed up his impressions of Saionji on meeting him again after almost forty years: ‘L’aimable Prince Saionji, jadis impétueux, aujourd’hui doucement ironique.’65 Although Saionji’s activities in Paris are badly documented, it is possible to form a fairly clear picture of his days there from a diary kept by Konoe Fumimaro.66 Mornings were given over to meetings with members of the delegation and staff of the Japanese Embassy. Occasionally, he would give a press conference or meet individual members of the press, often through the offices of Koyama Kango, a long standing friend and employee of the Tokyo Jiji Shinpo newspaper. At mid-day he would go regularly to the office of the Japanese delegation where he remained until early evening. Evenings were spent receiving visitors including members of the allied delegations and evaluating the reports of Japan’s conference team. For three days in April, Saionji’s health caused concern but, except for this brief period, he followed the regular schedule of work described by Konoe, occasionally varying the routine by going for a drive with various members of the delegation, or with his daughter and son-in-law Saionji Hachiro. With his eye for the cut of a French suit, his one weakness appears to have been rather notably frequent visits to his tailor. There is no support for the suggestion that he abandoned the work of the conference to others whilst he took the opportunity to visit old haunts.67 The evidence on the contrary supports the view that he played a major role within his own delegation but not in the negotiations, either direct or indirect, which constituted the main work of the conference. The structural organisation of the Japanese delegation was weak, primarily because of its limited numbers of delegates and the bulk of official conference work was carried out by Makino Nobuaki and Chinda Sutemi. Negotiations concerning finance, trade, labour and territorial problems as well as those relating to Japan’s main conference demands were undertaken by these two delegates under Saionji’s supervision and subject to his approval. Saionji’s role as final arbiter was made all the more important by the distance of the Japanese delegates from their home government, the slow process of government decision making and the fact

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that conference issues were broader and more complicated than had been expected. Despite strong pressures exerted by the bureaucratic elements within the government structure, the delegation, safe in the knowledge that they worked under the protection of the second most powerful man in Japan, made considerable departures from their initial brief to ensure that Japan would become a signatory to the new world order.

CHAPTER FOUR THE TURNING POINT: SAIONJI’S DOMINATION OF THE GENRO GROUP

Court Issues Saionji was not long returned from Paris before domestic and essentially Court issues began to claim his attention. The position of the Genro group had been eroded over the years. Foreign policy decision making, once the major function of the Genro, had become increasingly the preserve of the Government and the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations, and whilst (as the preparations for the Washington Conference showed) the Genro were still consulted on such issues, the consultation appears to have been largely a matter of courtesy. The Prime Minister made explicit reference to the limitations on the role of the Genro in December 1920. Hara, who was trying to dissuade Yamagata and Matsukata from resigning their posts as President of the Privy Council and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal respectively, told Tanaka Giichi; There are a great many problems concerning the Court and there have been great fluctuations in popular sentiment. The Genro must realise that it would be inadvisable to cause waves now. I have already told Yamagata that politics must be my responsibility …Court affairs are the preserve of the Genro.1

Hara’s comments of course reflected as much what he thought the situation should be as what it actually was. Nevertheless, the appointment of Hara as Prime Minister following the rice riots had been indicative of a change in the political climate. The Genro’s choice of prime minister, hitherto based almost exclusively on the need to preserve the balance of power amongst the Genro group, was now forced to take into account the strength of the emergent party elite and the fluctuations in popular   77

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sentiment referred to by Hara. In such circumstances Saionji’s capture of the Court as a power base was to reverse the relative position of influence amongst the Genro in his favour. Whilst the role and influence of the Genro had become narrower, Saionji’s standing within the group had been enhanced. This resulted from several factors. First, Saionji’s participation as Chief Plenipotentiary at the Paris Conference had given him a public prestige which the Genro as a whole had been losing. His contributions were given recognition by the Court in 1920 with the award of the title of Prince.2 This award followed closely on the presentation to Saionji of the highest decoration in Japan, The Grand Order of the Chrysanthemum, granted to him shortly before he left for the peace conference, in recognition of his speech to subdue popular feeling against the Portsmouth Treaty fourteen years earlier. Secondly, what can be loosely identified as the Saionji group, had achieved a position of power within the government structure. If Yamagata was the “army Genro”, then the description of Saionji as the “party Genro” is apt. With Saionji’s nominee as prime minister and the cabinet supported by a strong government party in the Lower House, Saionji’s value as a mediator was considerably enhanced. In addition, with the dominant section of the Foreign Office and a significant faction in the Navy Ministry identified with his internationalist approach, Saionji’s views undoubtedly carried more weight within the Genro Council than hitherto. The Hara Cabinet itself enhanced Saionji’s standing amongst the Genro. Hara forged alliances with a number of Yamagata’s factional leaders in the various elites; with Hirata Tosuke and the Sawakai in the Peers, with Tanaka Giichi in the military and with Den Kenjiro in the bureaucracy. These links not only reinforced the influence of Hara and the Seiyukai, but also strengthened Saionji’s position vis-a-vis Yamagata. Furthermore, both Yamagata and Matsukata were in physical decline. Yamagata died in February 1922 after several months of severe illness and Matsukata in June 1924, leaving Saionji as the last surviving member of the Genro. Saionji, despite his recurrent illnesses and the decline into which the institution appeared to have fallen, continued as sole Genro to exert his influence on Japanese politics until his death in 1940. The Court issues with which the Genro were involved at this time had important implications for domestic political stability. Hara refers many times in his diaries to the instability of public sentiment and to the need, in dealing with Court issues, to avoid provoking adverse public response. As those standing in opposition to the ultra-nationalists of the 1930s were

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to discover, the Imperial myth could be a double-edged weapon. The issues in which Saionji was primarily involved during the final years of Hara’s premiership were those concerned with the Court; the illness of the Taisho Emperor and the Regency, the colour blindness and marriage questions, and the matter of the Crown Prince’s trip abroad. These issues were of course interconnected substantively as well as in historical time and formed part of the larger issue of the role of the Court and the Genro in politics. The Emperor’s illness, thought to be the result of childhood meningitis, grew increasingly serious following a period of apparent recovery between 1914 and 1915. By 1919 the Emperor’s behaviour had become noticeably temperamental and eccentric and discussions began between the Prime Minister and the Genro on the need to involve the Crown Prince in political matters.3 By January 1920, the Emperor’s condition had deteriorated to the point where it was necessary to inform the Cabinet, in the strictest confidence, of the nature of the illness and from the end of March, Imperial audiences for cabinet members were restricted to the Prime Minister and the Army, Navy and Foreign Ministers. As news of the illness was leaked in the American press, enquiries began to come in from Japanese Embassies.4 Despite the rapid deterioration in the health of the Emperor and the embarrassment which this was causing the Government, the possibility of establishing a Regency, put forward by Matsukata in mid-June 1920, received little support from either Hara or Yamagata. Yamagata, worried by the scale of the operations involved—the need to win over the Empress and the Imperial Family and the inevitability of opposition, not least from Okuma and the Kenseikai —was against the plan.5 Hara too, though appreciating the benefits of a Regency, seemed overwhelmed at the enormity of the task. The principle of a Regency had been established in pre-Restoration Japan and Article 17 of the Meiji Constitution provided for the creation of a Regency in the event that the Emperor was incapacitated and unable to participate in the political process. Despite these constitutional provisions and the obvious inability of the Taisho Emperor to continue to fulfil the necessary political functions, the Regency question remained a politically dangerous issue. The Imperial Household Law, which regulated succession to the Throne and which was subject to neither discussion nor amendment by the national legislature, did not provide for Diet participation in the establishment of a Regency.6 Nevertheless, Hara insisted that the Regency question was a political matter, responsibility for which rested with the prime minister alone and

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not with the Genro.7 Whilst Hara claimed theoretical responsibility, and everyone was convinced that things could not continue as they were, no one was ready to initiate the steps to change them. At about this time, the Regency question was complicated by the sudden eruption of an equally divisive issue, the colour blindness question. In January 1917, Kuninomiya Nagako, daughter of Prince Kuni Kuniyoshi, had been selected by the Crown Prince, with the approval of the Empress, as his future consort. The engagement was formalised in September 1918. The revelation of colour blindness in the family of Nagako’s mother, the Shimazu’s, a Satsuma family, and the subsequent attempts to cancel the engagement, rocked Court circles and caused tremors which spread through the political world. The debate grew in strength through 1920 and 1921 and was to place great strain on the Hara Government and on the domestic balance of power. The Genro insisted throughout on the maintenance of secrecy, and public understanding of what became known at the time as the ‘serious Court incident’, was therefore based largely on information leaked by those in opposition to the Genro position. The incident became a weapon to be used against the Genro and against Yamagata in particular and the view has persisted that the issue was manufactured by Yamagata, as leader of the Choshu faction, in a bid to avoid a strengthening of the relationship between the Imperial line and the Satsuma clan. The monolithic stance of the Genro on the issue has been given little attention and in particular, no attempt has been made to describe or explain Saionji’s role in this quarrel. Examination of Saionji’s position on this issue in fact supports the conclusions of Yamagata’s biographer that there was no conspiracy.8 A report on the presence of colour blindness in the Shimazu and Kuni families and the danger of colour blindness in Nagako’s progeny was given by Yamagata to Saionji and Matsukata at a meeting of the Imperial Estate Committee in the summer of 1920. Since both Saionji and Matsukata agreed that it was unjustifiable to bring an hereditary illness into the Imperial line, the Imperial Household Minister responsible for the selection was informed and medical reports and academic research into the nature of colour blindness were ordered. The Imperial Household Minister Hatano Takanao resigned and the report prepared by Imperial Household doctors and officials was presented to the new Imperial Household Minister Nakamura Yujiro, in October.9 The report set out the laws of heredity relating to colour blindness and predicted that half the male offspring of the proposed union would be victims of the affliction. In addition to any ‘pure blood’ argument, this posed practical problems since

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Imperial Household Laws required that all male members of the Imperial family undertake military service and according to current conscription laws, anyone suffering from colour blindness was ineligible for service in the armed forces. The report was discussed by the three Genro, the Imperial Household Minister and Hirata Tosuke. It was unanimously agreed that the introduction of colour blindness into the Imperial family would cause great problems and that the matter must be reported directly to the throne, despite the Emperor’s condition, in order to ascertain the Imperial will. It was nevertheless assumed, without any prior consultation with the Imperial family, that the marriage would not proceed. The Imperial Household Minister was asked to see Prince Fushimi, head of the House of Fushimi to which Prince Kuni belonged, and to report the matter to Prince Kuni. Prince Fushimi, who was sympathetic to the Genro’s concern agreed to deliver the medical report to the Kuni family himself. Hara’s first record of the growing controversy is his diary entry for December 7th, 1920, more than five months after the issue was first raised.10 It was from Saionji that Hara apparently learned of the betrothal problem. The delicacy of the problem and the nature of the relationship between the Court, the Genro and the Government, is vividly revealed in this surprising lacuna in government knowledge. The question of the Crown Prince’s marriage was of course a political question in the sense that it involved the balance of power within the Court and therefore the relationship of the Court to the other branches of government. Nevertheless, the matter was not referred to the Prime Minister until the situation had become critical. Even Saionji, whose relationship with Hara was somewhat more than that between Genro and prime minister, failed for more than four months to pass on information on this issue. Saionji, informing Hara of the problem, stressed that he could not countenance the marriage and that changes would have to be made. Hara learned that Saionji had contacted Prince Kuni in Kyoto to persuade him to withdraw his daughter, but that Prince Kuni had argued that the diagnosis was of ‘colour weakness’ and not colour blindness and had taken his case to the Empress.11 Nagoko’s father had also tried unsuccessfully to win support from the Genro Matsukata, but Matsukata, despite his Satsuma lineage and links with the Shimazu family, remained convinced that the engagement should be nullified.12 Hara supported the unanimous decision of the Genro and made his own attempt to persuade the Prince to withdraw his daughter.

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In order to resolve the differences in the medical reports prepared by the doctors to the Kuni family and by the Court physicians, a third report was prepared by five members of Tokyo University and circulated by the Genro to Prince Kuni and the throne. Saionji again journeyed to Kyoto to bring pressure on the Kuni family to accept the new report13. Despite the fact that all three Genro and the Prime Minister were in agreement that the engagement must be called off, it was Yamagata who attracted the brunt of the opposition attack. Yamagata was an easy target. Ulterior motives could with credibility be imputed to him and it was easy to arouse animosity toward the autocratic old clan leader. Saionji, having no apparent ulterior motive and known for his closeness to the Imperial family, was still basking in the popularity he had won the previous year and drew little criticism. The opposition mounted steadily throughout December 1920. There were threats on Yamagata’s life and anonymous letters were sent to Hara and Upper House members attacking Yamagata for his disloyalty over the colour blindness issue. Copies of these letters were distributed to the press in an effort to make the affair public. Public opinion, insofar as it had any knowledge of the matter, was inflamed against the Genro and their attempts to cancel the marriage plans. Support for Prince Kuni was strong within the palace, amongst both the Imperial family members themselves and amongst the Court ladies and Satsuma clan members. By the beginning of 1921 the Government’s position had become very difficult. On January 26th, Hara told a Privy Council meeting that the issue must be settled quickly since it was causing political problems and he began to press Imperial Household Minister Nakamura for a decision. The Prime Minister arranged with members of the Seiyukai and the opposition parties to keep the matter out of the Diet.14 It was clear that he had no intention of involving the Government in such a potentially disruptive Court issue and that he was relying on the Genro and other Court advisors to resolve the question. Greatly afraid that Yamagata might resign leaving the issue unresolved, Hara sought reassurance from various members of the Yamagata faction. On February 4th, Hara visited Saionji, who was in Tokyo to advise, with the other Genro, on the timing of the Crown Prince’s trip to Europe. Under pressure from Hara to precipitate a decision on the bethrothal, the Imperial Household Minister, Nakamura, had informed Saionji of his intention to have the arrangement stand and to take responsibility for this decision by resigning. Although the Privy Council had advised Nakamura to ascertain the Emperor’s views on the question and proceed accordingly, neither Hara nor the Imperial

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Household Minister approved of the authorities abdicating responsibility to an already assertive Court. Saionji, still implacably opposed to the continuation of the marriage plans, had tried unsuceessfully to dissuade Nakamura and had refused to give his agreement to a course of action which he believed might contaminate the Imperial line. His inability to influence Nakamura led Saionji to the conclusion that the Imperial Household Minister had not come to the decision on his own.15 What little evidence there is of the divisions created amongst the political elites over this issue suggests a far more complicated network of relationships than is often thought. Amidst growing institutional and ideological diversity the old factional lines were begining to blur. It was in fact Hirata Tosuke, a prominent protege of Yamagata, who had reversed his earlier opposition to the continuation of the engagement and had encouraged the Imperial Household Minister to allow the marriage plans to stand. Hirata was also instrumental in securing the appointment of Makino, a Satsuma man and member of the Saionji group, to succeed Nakamura as Imperial Household Minister. Makino also appears to have favoured a continuation of the engagement and the Hara diaries show a divergence, not between Satsuma and Choshu, or between Saionji/Hara and Yamagata/ Hirata, but rather between the Genro/Hara and Makino/ Hirata. Hara seems to have had no doubts that the marriage plans should be cancelled. On the other hand, defence of his party and his government was as ever uppermost in Hara’s mind and he steadfastly avoided overt involvement in this explosive issue. To align the government with the Yamagata faction in the public mind was unthinkable and the more so as criticism of Yamagata’s part in the affair mounted. It was not only Hara who sought to limit the impact of this controversy on his own power base. Kiyoura, the Vice President of the Privy Council, was anxious to avoid a split in the Council and was reluctant to agree to suggestions from Yamagata and Nakamura, that an Imperial question should be put to the Privy Council.16 Thus, Yamagata was not even assured of the support of the body of which he was President, and which was so widely seen as dominated by his faction. On February 10th, in a vain attempt to forestall riots at the opening of an annual mass political rally to celebrate the founding of Japan at the Meiji Shrine the following day, the Imperial Household Ministry made a public statement of the continuation of the marriage plans. Hara had refused to make the announcement himself.17 Despite the announcement, Meiji Jingu became the scene of violent protest against Yamagata. The accusations of a Yamagata conspiracy ring hollow, but various factions

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stood to gain from any diminution of Yamagata’s powers which could be achieved by exploiting the situation. As Hara wrote, it was Yamagata’s long monopoly of power which had been one of the major causes of the whole problem. The repercussions of the colour blindness question were significant, The incident, which had brought all three Genro into conflict with the Court and had resulted in the rejection of their unanimous recommendation, could easily have spawned a general attack on the prerogatives of the Genro and their role at the interface of Court and government politics. Instead, the attack was directed at Yamagata and had the effect of increasing Saionji’s prominence within the Genro group. On February 21st, Yamagata presented his resignation as President of the Privy Council and expressed the desire to return all his titles and decorations. In the preceding week, Matsukata, on Hirata’s advice, had proposed Makino as Imperial Household Minister, a position filled hitherto by a member of the Yamagata faction.18 It was therefore to Makino, as Imperial Household Minister, that the resignation was addressed. Yamagata had refused to advise on the appointment and it is possible that his resignation was not unconnected with Makino’s selection. Saionji set out the reasons why Yamagata’s resignation must be rejected in a letter to Hara; there had been no disloyalty on Yamagata’s part, the Crown Prince was abroad and when he returned the problem of the Regency had to be resolved, moreover since the resignation was a matter of importance to public affairs, it was proper that it be settled in accordance with the Government’s wishes. The Prime Minister made recommendations to the throne that Yamagata’s resignation be rejected. Nevertheless the affair dragged on and Makino, who insisted on meeting with Saionji before coming to a decision, continued to procrastinate. The Emperor himself understood little of the struggles taking place about him.19 Faced with this impasse, Saionji travelled up to Tokyo to meet with Makino. Saionji’s chief worry was that Yamagata’s withdrawal from Court affairs would complicate the Regency debate and he hoped for a speedy rejection of the resignation in order to minimise public agitation. He was adamant that neither Yamagata nor Matsukata could be allowed to leave the palace. On May 8th, Saionji saw Makino and met with unexpected opposition. The new Imperial Household Minister was prepared to have the matter decided in accordance with Saionji’s wishes but was himself in favour of accepting the resignation. Saionji warned Hara that the political implications of the issue were vast and that the Prime Minister must impress on Makino that the matter must be decided in accordance with

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the Government’s wishes. At the same time Saionji moved to by-pass the Imperial Household Minister, and on his advice, Kiyoura Keigo, Vice President of the Privy Council, met with the Emperor and obtained his rejection of Yamagata’s resignation.20 Yamagata ostensibly relinquished his active political role from the time of his attempted resignation and though his withdrawal from politics was neither comprehensive nor entirely real, his voice was henceforth undoubtedly muted.21 Fears about the impact of the marriage on the Imperial institution are comprehensible in the light of the incomplete understanding of colour blindness at that time, the politically disruptive sickness of the Emperor and the obvious dangers of inbreeding. It is clear from the Hara diaries that neither the Prime Minister, nor Saionji, nor indeed Yamagata regarded the colour blindness issue as settled despite the announcement of the continuation of the engagement. Throughout July and August they continued to discuss ways in which the marriage might be stopped. Yamagata refused to become involved but made no objection to Saionji’s plan to take the question up again with the Crown Prince and the Empress after the Regency had been established. However, on November 4th, 1921, two weeks after the Crown Prince was appointed Regent, Prime Minister Hara was stabbed to death. Hara’s last diary entries refer to the marriage question. Saionji had reacted to their first setback in this issue by backing away from the confrontation and continuing to work behind the scenes. Faced now with the death of Hara and the reluctance of Yamagata openly to intervene, and opposed by Makino and Hirata, it would have been understandable had Saionji let the matter rest. In fact, the quiet struggle continued, and it was not until June 20th, 1922, several months after Yamagata’s death, that the engagement received Imperial sanction.22 Interconnected with the two issues of the Regency and the engagement was the matter of the Crown Prince’s European tour. The question of a foreign trip was initiated in mid-1917 by Saionji’s adopted son and sonin-law, Saionji Hachiro. Yamagata had opposed the trip on the grounds that the Crown Prince’s ordinary education was not yet complete and the idea was shelved for the next two years.23 In November 1919, Hara reopened the discussions on the possibility of a trip abroad for the Crown Prince before his marriage.24 Though the idea was well received by the Genro, little progress was made with the plans until the summer of the following year when the impact of the colour blindness question and the Regency had helped to polarise opinions on the suitability of the

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proposed trip. Saionji was in favour of the trip for a number of reasons. He considered that an extended stay in the West would contribute to the Crown Prince’s preparation to act as Regent and he believed that a trip of this nature would improve Japan’s relations with her Versailles allies. The Empress and certain other Court members were opposed both to the trip per se and because of the implications of the trip for the power struggle now gripping the Court. At Hara’s behest, Saionji undertook protracted negotiations to obtain the Empress’s approval of the plans, without which nothing could be done. The negotiations dragged on through the autumn and winter. Supported by an anti-Yamagata medley of individuals and groups led by the right-wing political agitator, Toyama Mitsuru, the Empress maintained a strong stand against the trip and only appears to have backed down when charged by Saionji with political interference. The Empress argued that should the condition of the Emperor deteriorate during the Crown Prince’s absence, then the Crown Prince would be open to charges of lacking filial piety. Saionji countered that the trip was in the interests of the nation and therefore was itself a manifestation of filial piety. Though still not giving her assent, the Empress told Saionji that she would not interfere if the trip were considered a political necessity.25 It was not until January 1921 that Imperial permission was finally obtained. Arrangements for the trip, which was fixed for March 3rd, were delegated to Saionji by the other Genro. The difficulties which the Genro experienced with the Court over the question of the Crown Prince’s engagement and his trip abroad, fuelled their efforts to establish a Regency. It was to Saionji, who by the summer of 1921 had assumed the dominant public role amongst the Genro, that Yamagata turned to persuade the Empress that a Regency was now unavoidable. The Prime Minister, though convinced of the importance of the problem, was nevertheless opposed to Yamagata’s attempts to expose his most valuable link in the political world in this way. Hara therefore asked Saionji to have the Genro come to a unanimous decision and to advise the Imperial Household Ministry of their conclusions. The issue was manifestly not primarily a Court issue. It was a major event in national politics which promised to upset the precarious balance of power inside and outside the Court. Saionji and Hara discussed the possibility of postponing the Regency question in favour of a temporary system of attorneyship outlined by Yamagata, but dismissed this alternative approach as likely to cause problems if it became the subject of public discussion. They were in agreement that the Emperor and

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Empress should remain in the palace after the Regency was established and that for the immediate future no changes would be made in the existing Court set up or its personnel. Hara undertook to discuss these apparently unanimous decisions with the Imperial Household Minister, Makino. When Hara saw Makino to report this consensus however there appeared to be some lack of unity among the Genro with Matsukata now expressing doubts about the necessity for a full Regency. Matsukata’s about-turn came as a shock to the Prime Minister and the other Genro whose chief concern was to avoid a split in public opinion26. The problem was resolved privately between Saionji and Matsukata and Matsukata agreed to report the unanimous view of the Genro to the Empress. The final weeks of decision making and the mechanics whereby the Regency was established are shrouded in secrecy. Before the final step could be taken it was necessary to make a public announcement of the Emperor’s illness, a necessity which caused the government grave misgivings. A government announcement was made on October 4th.27 As Yamagata sought to keep a low profile following his defeat in the colour blindness issue, affairs of the Court devolved more and more into Saionji’s hands. The assassination of Hara exacerbated this trend. When the decision to approve the Regency was taken at a meeting of the Privy Council, Yamagata was too ill to attend. Too ill even to write, he appended his signature to letters of thanks written by his secretary to Saionji and Matsukata.28 The Crown Prince, who had returned to Japan on September 3rd, was appointed Regent on November 25th. Alongside the founding of the Regency ran the question of who would act as advisor to the new Regent. Saionji was the preferred choice of both Yamagata and Makino, as the Hara diaries show.29 Makino was, alternatively, in favour of the appointment of Prince Kanin as advisor to the Crown Prince and the appointment of Saionji to the post of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, but this was adamantly opposed by Saionji himself. Yamagata was insistent that Saionji must be made to accept. Hara wrote: It is probably true, as Yamagata says, that Saionji, whose family has had an unbroken relationship with the Crown for several hundred years, is different from ourselves.30

It is equally true, as Hara also wrote, that Yamagata thought it a good plan to keep himself in the background and to put Saionji in the limelight for a time.

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The implications of the Regency for the role of the Court itself were far reaching. The Empress had come to hold unprecedented influence in the Court and on quasi-political matters, a development which drew criticism from both Saionji and Yamagata. The change to a Regency restricted the role of the Empress and her advisors and extended the influence of the advisors to the new Regent. As chief advisor to the Crown Prince, Saionji’s personal influence and the opportunities for expansion of the Saionji group within the Court, grew. Court appointments after the death of the Meiji Emperor had been more frequent and less predictable than in the pre-1912 period and there was a wide spectrum of elites represented within the Court, with the balance of power leaning toward the Yamagata faction. Nakamura’s appointment as Imperial Household Minister in 1920 had been a further move in this direction. Makino’s appointment in 1921 was a significant shift away from this position. The Saionji group of constitutional monarchists began to assume the major positions of power within the palace and dominated the Court from this point until 1936.31 Saionji was thus able not only to consolidate his hold on the palace but also, through such appointments, to ensure that his constitutional and diplomatic views were shared by the palace so that there would be no conflict between the two. The Regency was also a means of protecting the political role of the Court and Japan’s polity as a constitutional monarchy. The growing inability of the Taisho Emperor to fulfil the role of Emperorin-state (ratification of government policy) and even, to a growing extent the public aspects of the role of Emperor-in-Court (providing a focal point for popular loyalty and identification)32 was a real threat to the nature of Japan’s polity. The role of the Genro at this stage of Japan’s political development is shown very clearly in these three Court issues. Court affairs and politics could not be divorced despite the aspirations of Hara to separate the two and to limit Genro interference to the former. It was the Genro (Matsukata) who initiated discussion of the possibility of establishing a Regency. It was of course politically inadvisable, not to mention constitutionally impossible, for the Cabinet or the Diet to take such a step. It was the Genro (Saionji) who undertook the delicate negotiations with the Empress for the implementation of the Regency, again a role which the Government was unable to perform, and Saionji who brought pressure to bear on the Empress for approval of the Crown Prince’s trip. The possibility of a split within the ranks of the Genro over any of the issues was of paramount importance to the Government in a situation where any lack of unity amongst the Genro would have provided a focal point for

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the concentration of dissenting voices. The fact that all three Genro— major advisors to the Court and forgers of consensus—stood together, gave a ‘legality’ and ‘validity’ to procedures which would otherwise have been lacking and deprived any opposition of its potentially most effective figurehead. Saionji’s appointment as Genro in 1913, shortly after the death of the Meiji Emperor, was, like Katsura’s appointment to the posts of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Grand Chamberlain, indicative of the difficulties faced by the Meiji leaders with the loss of Meiji and the accession of Taisho. Within the Court, the years from 1912 to 1920 saw much manoeuvring to grasp the opportunities for influence which this situation created. The role of the Empress was revolutionised. The major Court appointments changed hands frequently, the incumbents were drawn from an increasingly wide spectrum and the structure of Court politics, as it was reflected in the division of influential posts within the Court amongst the elites, came closely to reflect the balance of power outside the Court. Saionji’s influence as Genro at the start of 1919 was incomparably greater than it had been six years earlier. He had played an influential role in the selection of the Yamamoto Cabinet, the Terauchi Cabinet and the Hara Cabinet. He had been courted by Yamagata to form a third cabinet himself in 1918. His nominee held the Premiership and the Foreign office was in the hands of men like Shidehara, whose view on Japan’s international relations closely ressembled Saionji’s own. Despite this growth in influence of Saionji and the group of internationalist and constitutional monarchists and new bureaucrats which loosely speaking formed his power base, the Yamagata faction still, in 1919, had significantly more influence in both Court affairs and politics. The years 1919 to 1921 were a turning point. The Court problems of these years accelerated the growth of Saionji’s influence by bringing Yamagata into disrepute and opening the way for an influx of members of the Saionji group—Makino Nobuaki, Ichiki Kitokuro, Suzuki Kantaro and Chinda Sutemi—into important Court positions. Saionji was forced to act as mediator between the Court and Yamagata and to assume responsibility for advising the new Regent. The assassination of Hara in November 1921 made Saionji’s role even more pre-eminent. The potential and actual impact of the Court issues, all of which were directly related to the incapacity of the Taisho Emperor and the opportunities for shifts in the balance of power which it created, was

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far greater than was immediately obvious. The power of the Genro institution had declined but, as these issues showed, the role of the Genro was still crucial in the functioning of Japanese politics. Despite the unanimity of the Genro on the colour blindness, the foreign trip and the Regency questions, the outcome was greatly different for Saionji and for Yamagata and the strengthening of Saionji’s power base and his position within the Genro group was given a further impetus by these issues. The uncertainty created by the shifts in power resulting from the Court problems had implications for both domestic and foreign policy so that not only the Genro but also the Government were centrally concerned. The Court issues also had far-reaching implications for the privatisation of conflict which was perhaps the major function of the Court in politics. If the role of the Palace was to provide ‘an inviolable sanctuary for the resolution of political conflict’, then conflict within Court circles was potentially the most damaging to this role and to the theory of Imperial prerogative which underlay the Meiji Constitution. This thought too may have been in Saionji’s mind when he finally bowed to the continuation of the engagement; if it was necessary to protect the physical state of the Imperial House, it was even more necessary to preserve the role of the Court in Japanese political life. All three issues held the seeds of open conflict surrounding the Court and its place in Japanese politics. The struggle over the betrothal dragged on for two years. The establishment of a Regency ultimately brought no clash of interests but the potential for conflict delayed the decision by some months. The Crown Prince’s trip abroad, bringing to the fore as it did Saionji’s two guiding political principles—the importance of Japan’s Western alliance and the maintenance of her constitutional monarchy—is of particular interest. Saionji is said to have told the Empress that the Cabinet had decided that the trip was necessary and that it was not a private Court matter to be decided by herself, but a matter of state which required that the Crown Prince make the visits for the sake of Japan and regardless of any risk to his personal wellbeing.33 What was good for Japan was by definition good for her Imperial line and equable relations between Japan and the West was, for Saionji, of paramount importance in the development of the nation. The personal safety of the particular Imperial incumbent was of secondary importance to the dual goals of constitutional and international stability.

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Cabinet Succession The Takahashi Cabinet: November 1921 When Hara was assassinated on November 4th, 1921, Saionji played the most influential role in the selection of his successor. Of the Meiji Genro, only three, Yamagata, Matsukata and Saionji, remained. Yamagata’s influence had been undermined by the splits in his multi-constituency faction, by the overall shift in the balance of power toward the parties and by his loss of control in the Court. When the Imperial question came from the Crown Prince on Hara’s death, Yamagata declined to participate.34 Despite his official non-participation, Yamagata was in fact active in trying to secure the appointment of Hirata Tosuke.35 As a prelude to this, it was necessary first for Yamagata to press Saionji to accept the premiership. But there were other more sincere efforts to persuade Saionji to come forward. Matsukata, recognising Saionji’s acceptability among the parties,36 pressed for a return to a Genro cabinet under the ‘party Genro’. The Seiyukai leadership, which considered that Saionji would be more of a channel for party influence at a high level than a means of Genro interference in government, pressed him to accept the presidency of the party once more.37 Saionji refused. The youngest of the Genro at seventy-two years old, he was the natural successor to Yamagata’s role as chief advisor to the Court when the older Genro should die, and on these grounds he declined to accept the premiership.38 Saionji’s own recommendation was Takahashi Korekiyo, Finance Minister in the Hara Cabinet and close to the Seiyukai although not a member of the party. Takahashi had a number of points in his favour. Since the ex-Finance Minister could count on the support of the Seiyukai, there would be no shift in power as a consequence of the assassination. Moreover, Saionji himself was very firmly allied with the YokotaOkazaki-Yoda faction of the Seiyukai; the pro-Takahashi group in the reconstruction debate which had exercised the party since the beginning of the Hara Cabinet. Takahashi’s election as Premier and his assumption of the Presidency of the Seiyukai was calculated to precipitate a favourable realignment of factions in the struggle for party control. Saionji’s failure to support a Seiyukai Prime Minister to succeed Hara reflected his belief that there was no one within the party of sufficient stature, nor anyone who could command complete party support. In addition, it would seem that Saionji was in agreement with a prevailing view that the absolute majority of the Seiyukai in the Lower House was potentially disruptive39.

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With Saionji’s encouragement, the Seiyukai made Takahashi President of the Party and the composition of the cabinet remained as it had been under Hara.

The Kato Tomosaburo Cabinet: June 1922 When, in the spring of 1922, Takahashi attempted with Saionji’s support to reconstruct this inherited cabinet, a cabinet crisis occurred. Saionji’s desire to break the absolute majority of the Seiyukai did not go so far as to make him sympathetic towards a Kenseikai Cabinet led by Kato Komei and he made it clear that the cabinet would not go to Kato if the Takahashi Cabinet fell: People talk of constitutional rationalism or the normal course of constitutional government and say that when the Seiyukai cabinet goes, the prime minister must come from the Kenseikai or, if the Kenseikai is no good, the Kokuminto, but to my mind the Seiyukai Cabinet is not, for all its name, a Seiyukai cabinet, but the Emperor’s cabinet.40

This rather cryptic comment does not so much indicate that Saionji believed party cabinets to be unneccessary or meaningless as it shows his partisan affiliation to the Seiyukai, which he described as a national party of government, concerned with broad issues and in that respect essentially different from the Kenseikai and the Kokuminto. Nevertheless, Saionji had no intention of appointing a prime minister from among the Seiyukai leaders. In May, when word came from Takahashi that he might be forced to resign and that he favoured party leaders Yamamoto Tatsuo or Yoda Utaro, Saionji summoned the Prime Minister to his house in Okitsu and rejected the one as useless and the other as in no better position to unite the Seiyukai than Takahashi himself. He also dismissed Goto Shimpei, Saito Makoto and Kato Komei as possible candidates and worried lest Takahashi should, like Okuma, recommend Kato directly to the throne.41 It is clear from Saionji’s comments at this time as well as from his choice of prime minister on this and subsequent occasions up to 1925 that his recommendations were based less on considerations of principle than on his judgement of the abilities of the various candidates and of their policies, The importance of his relationship with Hara Kei cannot therefore be overestimated. For Saionji, the Seiyukai under Hara was a different animal from the Seiyukai after Hara’s death. Hara had been

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the force which held the party together and gave it direction. Without Hara, the latent divisions within the party erupted into open conflict for control of the leadership. In the spring of 1922 as the Takahashi Cabinet trembled, Saionji was sufficiently unhappy with the leaders of both major parties to embrace the idea of a transcendental cabinet led by Den Kenjiro. Den Kenjiro had enjoyed the support of both Hara and Yamagata and after Hara’s assassination and Yamagata’s death, had been taken up by Saionji, Den was backed also by Hirata and the Sawakai in the Peers and it seemed for a time as if the only obstacle to his recommendation was the disarray of the Seiyukai and a general antipathy towards the return to transcendental cabinets. The cabinet change was complicated however by the factional realignments and struggle for power between the remaining Genro, Matsukata and Saionji. Despite the steady shift in power within the Genro in favour of Saionji, Yamagata had retained the upper hand. During the years of Yamagata’s dominance, Saionji had been for most purposes on the Matsukata-Satsuma side of the Yamagata-Choshu versus Matsukata-Satsuma struggle. Saionji’s Second Cabinet had forged an alliance with the Satsuma group which had been upheld by the Seiyukai and perpetuated through the Yamamoto Cabinet. The alliance was not without its difficulties however and Hara during his cabinet had worried about Satsuma intentions. Matsukata and the Satsuma group had begun their bid for the mantle of power immediately after the death of Yamagata in February 1922. Without any discussion with Saionji, Matsukata and the Imperial Household Minister, Makino, had negotiated with Tokugawa Yorimichi to accept the Presidency of the Sochitsuryo, a section of the Imperial Household Ministry dealing with former daimyo and kuge.42 Tokugawa had accepted the post without consulting Saionji. Now, on the first cabinet change after the death of Yamagata, the Satsuma group set itself to capture the cabinet. Saionji, angered by the Tokugawa incident, deputised Yamagata’s former protege, Hirata, to negotiate on his behalf with Makino and Matsukata and when the Takahashi Cabinet presented its resignation, Saionji took to his bed. He refused to travel to Tokyo, or to take responsibility for answering the Imperial question. Matsukata responded by seeking permission to discuss the question with the President of the Privy Council, Kiyoura Keigo, and former Prime Minister Yamamoto Gombei.43 This gave rise to speculation that Kiyoura and Yamamoto had become accepted as quasiGenro and that the ranks of the Genro would ultimately be extended to include them. It is apparent from Saionji’s later reaction to the suggestion, that he would not have given his approval to any extension of the Genro

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group. But there were other reasons why Saionji must have opposed this departure from precedent. The move to include Yamamoto in the consultations, like the earlier attempt, vetoed by Saionji, to appoint him to the Presidency of the Privy Council and the successful efforts to win the Premiership for Admiral Kato Tomasaburo, was a part of Matsukata’s bid for power. It is tempting to see Saionji’s hand behind Yamamoto’s refusal to participate in the consultation process. If such was the case, then Yamamoto’s restraint was amply rewarded one year later when Saionji went to great pains to ensure that he received the mandate to form his second cabinet. Matsukata recommended Kato Tomosaburo as the next Prime Minister and over Saionji’s objections gave President of the Kenseikai, Kato Komei, as his second choice.44 Faced with such a choice, the Seiyukai volunteered its unconditional support to Kato Tomosaburo and the Kato Cabinet was set up on June 11th.

The Second Yamamoto Cabinet: September 1923 The next cabinet change was brought about by Kato Tomosaburo’s death from tuberculosis on August 24th 1923 and set a new precedent in the form of consultation. When the Cabinet, under the temporary leadership of Uchida Ryohei, resigned on August 26th, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Hirata, was called and asked to give careful consideration to what should be done. Hirata then recommended that Matsukata and Saionji be called. This pattern of a formal question to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal followed by his recommendation that the Genro be called, continued through thirteen cabinet changes until the establishment of the Hayashi Cabinet in 1937. During this time, the Genro retained sole responsibility for answering the Imperial question. This change in form had come about due to the retirement of Matsukata as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in September 1922, a post he had held since 1917. From the time of Katsura’s appointment as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in 1912, that post had been held, except for one short period, by a member of the Genro. When Kato had fallen ill in August 1923, the Seiyukai was confident that Takahashi Korekiyo would be asked to form the next cabinet. Saionji, whose relationship with Hirata had developed over the previous year to the point where it was felt prudent to try to dispel the impression that Hirata was a ‘Saionji man’, was aware of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal’s view that the Seiyukai was if anything in worse condition that the

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previous year and that there should be another transcendental cabinet. He warned the leadership of the Seiyukai that no one amongst the Genro or the Jushin (non-Genro elder statesmen) was prepared to recommend a Takahashi Cabinet and that there was strong Satsuma pressure to have Yamamoto Gombei appointed.45 That this was only partially true is clear from Matsukata’s refusal to become a party to the recommendation of Yamamoto. When the Cabinet resigned the two Vice-Chamberlains, Tokugawa and Irie were sent, in accordance with Hirata’s instructions, to deliver the Imperial question to Saionji and Matsukata. Saionji who, with uncharacteristic impatience, declared his mind already made up, was barely restrained from leaving for Tokyo before the arrival of the Imperial messenger. Saionji’s selection of Yamamoto to lead a national unity cabinet was made on his sole responsibility and in spite of Matsukata’s refusal to support the recommendation. Saionji’s reasons for rejecting a party cabinet at this time are aired at length in the Matsumoto diaries; he hoped thereby to ensure that the coming elections were kept free from interference. Moreover, both major parties were split and both lacked acceptable leaders.46 His reasons for recommending a Satsuma man were less clear. It is true however that the previous year Yamamoto had refused to become embroiled in the struggle between Matsukata and Saionji and that Matsukata complained that Yamamoto would not listen to him. Saionji had a longstanding personal relationship with Yamamoto and expected, and got, a voice in deciding the composition of the cabinet. He might also have reasonably expected that the relationship established ten years earlier between Yamamoto and the Seiyukai would result in an accord between the government and the party and a corresponding boost to their fortunes. Despite his rejection of a Seiyukai Cabinet, Saionji continued to meet with Seiyukai leaders and to concern himself with the future of the party, urging that it heal its rifts and unite behind an acceptable leader.47 Saionji’s attitude was clearly partisan. He had no overwhelming commitment to party cabinets. Insofar as he recognised that a government with Diet support was a stronger, more stable government than one without such backing, he preferred that support to come from the Seiyukai. If the Seiyukai was unable for internal reasons to provide such support, then he had no compunction about recommending a nonparty cabinet, providing that the prevailing balance of power would allow it stability.

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The Kiyoura Cabinet: January 1924 In December 1923 the Yamamoto Cabinet resigned when an attempt was made on the life of the Crown Prince at the opening of the Diet. Despite Saionji’s hopes that the Seiyukai would develop into the government party under the Yamamoto Cabinet, Yamamoto had failed to build up any rapport with the party which had then reorganised internally and had begun to collaborate with the Kenseikai to oppose the government. Saionji’s disillusionment with Yamamoto had been swift and total. The man whom he condemned as inept and stupid found himself under no pressure to continue in office. The nature of the demise of the Yamamoto Cabinet precluded the appointment of one of its members, Saionji’s favourite for the post of prime minister, Den Kenjiro, and Saionji recommended in his stead the President of the Privy Council, Kiyoura Keigo. Saionji hoped to see the Seiyukai consulted by the government on policy formation and expected the position of the party in the Lower House to be reinforced by the coming elections under a non-partisan cabinet. Again, he was to be dissappointed and even before the cabinet was complete, was bemoaning his decision to negotiate the recommendation through Hirata Tosuke rather than directly himself.48 Kiyoura failed to reach an accommodation with the Seiyukai over the composition of the cabinet and formed a transcendental cabinet composed of members of the Upper House. To Saionji’s further regret, when the Seiyukai split into two factions in the ‘movement to protect the constitution’ which followed, its election chances were shattered and in the spring elections the Kenseikai became the majority party. Questions were raised in the Lower House about the procedures which had been adopted at this cabinet change. Strong rumours circulated that a quasi-Genro conference consisting of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Hirata, the Imperial Household Minister, Makino, and President of the Privy Council, Kiyoura, had been held in the Akasaka Detached Palace and that the Imperial question had gone to this conference. Saionji’s later lamentations about his failure to negotiate directly, and the fact that Hirata, Makino and Kiyoura were indeed together when Hirata as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was asked to give counsel, suggest that the rumours were not without some foundation.49 Had the Kiyoura Cabinet proved successful, then the three would-be Genro might have been less reticent about their roles. As it was, Kiyoura’s dismal performance left no one eager to claim responsibility for the recommendation. Even as the cabinet was being set up, Saionji was predicting its downfall and observing that

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he had not insisted on the selection of Kiyoura but that neither Matsukata nor Hirata had offered any alternative suggestions.

The First Kato Komei Cabinet: June 1924 The appointment of Kato Komei in 1924 is of particular interest in the saga of Genro involvement in cabinet succession. Although two Genro remained, Matsukata was on the verge of death, a situation which led to increased activity by the Satsuma group to have Yamamoto recognised as a quasi-Genro and to have him included with Saionji and Matsukata in receiving the Imperial question.50 The notion of expanding the Genro group, which was mooted at the end of February and grew in intensity over the following months, was emphatically rejected by Saionji.51 Despite opposition from Makino, Saionji resolved to avoid all further petitions by answering the Imperial question without travelling to Tokyo, on the grounds that the cabinet change was straight forward and did not require his presence in the capital. He also requested that, since Matsukata was too ill to participate, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal be included in the question. If the change of cabinet was straightforward, it was so only because at the last minute, Saionji swallowed serious doubts about Kato’s suitability as prime minister. It is widely believed that Saionji’s recommendation of Kato was automatic in view of the victory of the Kenseikai in the election of May 10th, and yet, on May 11th when the election results were not yet confirmed but the Kenseikai appeared certain to become the first party in the Lower House, Saionji had refused to discuss the suggestion that it would be necessary for Kato to receive the mandate in order for political stability to be pre-served.52 Saionji had for many years been unequivocally opposed to the emergence of Kato as prime minister. From January 1924, he found himself unable to discount the possibility of a Kenseikai Cabinet and the thought filled him with dread. What caused him most concern was Kato’s foreign policy. Only slightly less worrying to Saionji had been the fear that, by combining with the Kenseikai to fight the election, the Seiyukai might make it necessary to recommend a coalition cabinet. It seems likely that it was Hirata’s support of a Kenseikai Cabinet and his suggestions that the temporary banishment of the Seiyukai from political prominence would lead to a rejuvenation of the party, which persuaded Saionji.53 On May 15th, Saionji informed the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal of his intention to recommend Kato and entrusted him with the

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negotiations for the resignation of the Kiyoura Cabinet. It is a revealing comment on Saionji’s evaluation of Japanese politics that he told an intimate: ‘In present circumstances the Imperial Household Minister is more important than the Prime Minister.’54 Political battles could be fought tactically by prime ministers; strategically, they were won or lost at Court. Saionji’s chief political efforts during the 1920s were therefore aimed at consolidating the position of the constitutional monarchists at Court. Careful selection of senior Court officials made it possible not only to imbue the Court with ‘liberal’ political theory, but also, by swinging the weight of the Court behind these elements in other areas of government, to ensure their supremacy outside the Court. The appointment of the Kato Cabinet was the last in which the Imperial question went to two Genro. Following the death of Yamagata in 1922, each cabinet crisis had provided an arena for further jostling for influence between the Satsuma group, represented in the Genro by Matsukata, and an uneasy combination of liberal groups and individuals represented by Saionji. This struggle was carried on also in the Court. The limitations on Saionji’s power during this period are evidenced by the appointments which were made. Saionji was hampered not only by the disarray in the Seiyukai after Hara’s death, but by the flexing of the Satsuma group’s muscles following the blow to Choshu power resulting from Yamagata’s death. Both Matsukata and Saionji courted different elements of the erstwhile Yamagata faction. Saionji cultivated a close relationship with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Hirata, and Matsukata wooed Kiyoura with hopes of his appointment as Genro. Of three out of four cabinet changes during the Matsukata-Saionji period of Genro politics, it was Saionji’s choice for prime minister who received the mandate. Saionji’s recommendations during these years were nevertheless as much a reflection of weakness as of strength.

CHAPTER FIVE SAIONJI THE LAST GENRO PARTY GOVERNMENTS AND SAIONJI DIPLOMACY

The Normal Course of Constitutional Government When Matsukata’s death in June 1924 left Saionji as the last of the Genro, the question of whether to appoint one or more new Genro or to extend the Imperial question at times of cabinet change to others outside the Genro group (a topic which had been under discussion since before Yamagata’s death) acquired new urgency. In particular, sporadic efforts had been made by and on behalf of the President of the Privy Council, Kiyoura Keigo, and Admiral Yamamoto Gombei but these had been consistently opposed by Saionji and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Both Saionji and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal were against the creation of any new Genro and it was agreed between the two senior advisors to the throne that Saionji would henceforth take sole responsibility for recommending the prime minister. Such a move blocked one avenue of political control to wider factional influence, but did not resolve the problem of how the cabinet would be recommended after the last Genro had died. The picture at the Court was further complicated at this time by Hirata’s ill health and his desire to retire from the post of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. The problem of finding a suitable successor, without allowing the Satsuma faction to extend its influence into the heart of the Court, was one which troubled both men. In 1926, the system of recommending the prime minister came under wider scrutiny when the magazine Chuo Koron published an article entitled ‘Saionji’s argument against the need for a Genro institution’.1 The article was a synopsis of Saionji’s views as expressed in his meetings in   99

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April that year with Makino Nobuaki, now Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and with the Imperial Household Minister Ichiki Kitokuro. Saionji argued that although hitherto the Genro had received the Imperial question, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had originally been intended to perform this function. He believed moreover that party development had rendered further transcendental cabinets unnecessary and the recommendation of the cabinet largely one of form which could in the future be achieved by the Privy Seal without assistance. He had therefore asked at the previous three cabinet changes—the First and Second Kato Cabinets and the Wakatsuki Cabinet—that the Imperial question be extended also to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. He was firmly opposed to the appointment of either Kiyoura or of Yamamoto as quasi Genro, or to their taking responsibility for recommending the prime minister. He was also opposed to suggestions that he should himself have formal consultations with a group of eminent politicians consisting of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Imperial Household Minister, the President of the Privy Council and the Presidents of the Upper and Lower Houses. Saionji’s position as stated in this article seems clear enough. He was against a continuation of the Genro system and he believed that the parties had progressed to a state where party cabinets would be the norm. This also appears to have been borne out by the six appointments he made in the so-called ‘period of party government’ between 1924 and 1932. And yet the picture of normal constitutional government with which this period has been labelled becomes less substantial as Saionji’s views over these years are plotted. Despite the mounting pressures to appoint party cabinets, Saionji was at every juncture stricken with doubts about the suitability of this course. This becomes clear when we look at the events leading up to each of the cabinet changes in this period.

The Second Kato Komei Cabinet: July 1925 At the end of July 1925, the newly appointed leader of the Seiyukai, General Tanaka Giichi, ignored veiled warnings from Saionji and forced the Kenseikai Government to resign. The Imperial question was taken to Saionji in Gotemba by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal himself, and the Genro made his recommendation with no further consultation. Saionji’s decision to recommend a further party cabinet, again under Kato, had been made several months earlier in March, but followed a long period at the start of the First Kato Cabinet when the general impoverishment of party

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leadership and the internal divisions and struggles within the Seiyukai, had caused the Genro consistently to declare his intention to recommend a neutral cabinet when the next government was formed.2

The First Wakatsuki Cabinet: January 1926 Throughout the Second Kato Cabinet, Saionji took an active interest in the efforts of the Seiyukai to split the Seiyuhonto and to persuade the Motoda and Nakahashi factions to return to the Seiyukai fold. Matsumoto Gokichi, on Saionji’s behalf, monitored the situation closely and made efforts to facilitate the proceedings. The split in the Seiyuhonto finally came about at the end of December 1925, but when Kato Komei died suddenly in office in January 1926, the reunification with the Seiyukai had not yet occurred. Kato’s death came at an opportune time for the Kenseikai. On February 11th, with the merger of the Nakahashi faction, the Seiyukai controlled 161 votes in the Lower House and the remainder of the Seiyuhonto 87, but by then it was too late. It seems that Saionji was disappointed.3 He had small regard for the Vice-President of the Kenseikai, Wakatsuki Reijiro, whom he considered to be not of prime ministerial calibre.4 Nevertheless, the path was clear. The Diet was still in session and the Kato Cabinet had not lost popular support. The financial policies of the cabinet were still widely approved and industry and the financial world were against a dissolution of the House. Finally, the precedent had been set on Hara’s death. The decision to recommend Vice-President Wakatsuki was therefore straightforward. The procedure followed reflected Saionji’s belief that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal should henceforth take the primary, if largely formal, role, of answering the Imperial question. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal departed from all past precedent by sending a message to Saionji, through his secretary, Nakagawa Kojuro, informing the Genro that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the High Steward, Count Chinda Sutemi, were in agreement that the mandate should go to Wakatsuki, and that only if Saionji should disagree, would Makino travel down to consult with Saionji in his house outside of Tokyo in Okitsu. Yet despite his statements concerning the maturity of the parties, Saionji, only weeks later, in the spring of 1926, was again only a step away from a return to neutral cabinets. His predictions in February and March, echoed many times throughout the year, were that the Wakatsuki Cabinet would be shortlived and that in the absence of a united Seiyukai, he would be forced

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to select the prime minister from within the House of Peers.5 During Wakatsuki’s tenure of office the Genro continued to concern himself actively with the fortunes of the Seiyukai and was undoubtedly relieved when the Kenseikai Prime Minister, ignoring his advice that the period of national mourning for the Emperor Taisho did not preclude his going to the country, chose not to call an election—an election which would undoubtedly have failed to bring the Seiyukai to power.6

The Tanaka Cabinet: April 1927 On April 17th, 1927, a financial scandal brought down the Wakatsuki Cabinet.7 Only weeks before, Saionji had made it clear that he would not appoint a party cabinet, but would favour a neutral cabinet under Den Kenjiro. However, when the time came to make the choice, the Genro once again swallowed his doubts about the calibre of the party leadership and gave his support to the ‘normal course of constitutional government’ by recommending Tanaka Giichi, now leader of the largest party in the Lower House, as prime minister. He did so on the advice of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Makino. The shift of responsibility to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, discussed by Saionji and Makino the previous year, was beginning to form a pattern. When the Cabinet fell, the Emperor called the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and asked him to recommend a successor. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal then advised that the Grand Chamberlain be sent to ask the opinion of the Genro. At the same time, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal advised the Genro of his own choice. Thus, although he retained ultimate responsibility, the Genro’s role was in fact being phased out. Such expansion of the role of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was a half—way house to his assuming full responsibility after Saionji’s death. The premise on which this shift of power was based, was that the parties were maturing to a stage where the mandate could be allowed to pass automatically from one political party to another, with the advisory role of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal becoming ultimately purely formal. By fully incorporating the parties into politics in this way, the Genro felt that the process of their maturation would be encouraged. Saionji’s commitment in the long term to political stability deriving from a system of party government, was unequivocal. It was a combination of this commitment and of external pressures which overcame Saionji’s

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disillusionment with the individuals concerned and persuaded him to promote the cause of party government during these years. Up until the time of the Tanaka Cabinet, Saionji’s belief in party government was essentially a belief in Seiyukai party government. Perhaps Saionji’s main concern at the start of the Tanaka Cabinet, was the question of foreign policy and, in particular, the Manchurian-Mongolian problem. The ability of the Genro group to interfere in the selection of cabinet personnel had become increasingly circumscribed throughout the Taisho period. Insofar as the Genro’s views remained significant in the selection of ministers, then Yamagata’s opinions had been sought regarding the Army Minister and Inoue’s and Matsukata’s regarding the Finance Minister. Saionji had always taken the greatest interest in the appointment of the Foreign Minister. Thus, when the Tanaka Cabinet was formed in April 1927, Saionji made strong representations about the qualities he required in the man who was to fill that post.8 When the Cabinet fell, it was over Tanaka’s failure to put foreign relations above domestic politics and Saionji’s foreign policy above the army’s.

The Hamaguchi Cabinet: July 1929 When the Tanaka Cabinet was forced to resign in July 1929 over the Chang Tso-Lin affair, Hamaguchi Osachi, leader of the Rikken Minseito Party, was appointed Prime Minister. The new party, formed in June 1927 from the body of the Kenseikai plus factions of the Seiyuhonto and other small groups, had held an absolute majority of seats in the Lower House for much of the first year of the Tanaka Government until the elections of February 1928. These elections, the first to be held after the passage of the Universal Suffrage Law, had deprived the Minseito of its majority and given the government an equal number of votes with the combined opposition parties when all alliances were taken into account. When Tanaka was forced out of office therefore, a bid was made by Tanaka and other Seiyukai party leaders to secure another Seiyukai Cabinet under Tokonami Takejiro. These efforts came to nothing. Moreover, although there was some diversity of views as to the meaning of Saionji’s replies to questioning by a number of Seiyukai members, the general belief was that the Seiyukai would not be called on to form a government while ever Tanaka remained as President of the party. Pressed for an answer as to how he could reconcile this with the ‘normal course of constitutional government’, Saionji agreed that the recommendation of the leader of the

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majority party in the Lower House, if that man were suitable, constituted the smooth working of the constitution and advised his questioner that if his failure to recommend Tanaka would be to flout the will of the people and misuse the constitution, then the Seiyukai had better not win the next election.9 The appointment of the Hamaguchi Cabinet appears to have followed an identical pattern to the recommendation of the Tanaka Cabinet. It seemed at last as if a precedent had been established and that following the collapse of the government, the leader of the foremost opposition party would be appointed prime minister.

The Second Wakatsuki Cabinet: April 1931 In November 1930, Hamaguchi was shot and wounded. Saionji was concerned to avoid a political change resulting from a physical attack on the government10 and for five months as Hamaguchi moved in and out of hospital and the Minseito engaged in intra-factional manoeuvring, government was carried on under the temporary leadership of Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro. On April 11th, 1931, under pressure from the Cabinet, Hamaguchi resigned as party president and Wakatsuki Reijiro became leader of the Minseito. The following day the Cabinet presented its resignation. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino was called to receive the Imperial question and Grand Chamberlain, Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, was sent to ask the Genro’s opinion. Once more a neutral cabinet was considered and rejected, partly because of Saionji’s view that there was no suitable candidate, but primarily because of his conviction that such a move was likely to cause political disruption in a period now recognised as one of party government. Since the cause of the Cabinet’s resignation was not political but medical and, perhaps more to the point, because Saionji was at odds with the Seiyukai over a number of issues, including their economic policies, the Genro advised that it was correct that the mandate should go to the new Minseito President, Wakatsuki.

The Inukai Cabinet: December 1931 Less than eight months later, the Wakatsuki Cabinet, rocked by the Manchurian Incident and the October Incident and with its economic policies in difficulty, was finally brought down by internal power struggles. Saionji supported the Government to the last, travelling up to Tokyo to

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meet with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Shidehara and Home Minister Adachi, and discussing the possibility of a coalition cabinet.11 The Genro was in basic accord with the Cabinet’s foreign and economic policies, despite its difficulties of the moment. Two years earlier, in 1929, when the Tanaka Cabinet had fallen, the question had arisen within the Seiyukai as to whether Saionji would recommend Tanaka Giichi to form a government if the Seiyukai should win a majority in the spring election. Saionji’s reply had fuelled the factional struggles over party leadership which had resulted, following Tanaka’s death, in the appointment of Inukai Tsuyoshi as President of the Seiyukai. Worried by Inukai’s hard line on China and the party’s intention to abandon the gold standard and reimpose the gold embargo, Saionji shrank from recommending a Seiyukai Cabinet.12 When the Wakatsuki Cabinet resigned, the Genro considered having only the Home Minister’s resignation accepted and having the remainder of the Cabinet continue in office. He seems to have been dissuaded from this course by the plots and propaganda emanating from the military and bureaucracy and directed against the advisors to the throne. Afraid that if the Seiyukai were passed over it would make common cause with these elements to attack not only the advisors to the throne, but the Court itself, Saionji made an apparent sacrifice of shortterm economic and foreign policy in the broader interests of the Court.13 A number of changes in procedure at this cabinet change are evidence of the growing tension in Japanese politics in both the domestic and international arenas. First of all, after the call to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and subsequent message from the Emperor carried to Kyoto by the Grand Chamberlain, Saionji was pressed to travel to Tokyo himself. There had been a gradual trend toward dispensing with the Genro’s presence, but this was now reversed. Secondly, although Saionji met with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Imperial Household Minister and the Grand Chamberlain, he had previously informed all three through Harada that he intended to recommend Inukai unless they were prepared to oppose him. He did so despite Makino’s preference for a national unity cabinet. Before Saionji made his recommendation in person to the Emperor, he took the unprecedented step of calling Inukai and cautioning him about the lack of discipline in the army and its unwarranted intrusion into national politics.14 Of the elites competing for control of the cabinet in the 1920s, the Peers were factionalised and impotent and the army lacked the leadership or the impetus to make a serious bid for political power. Other factors also favoured the parties. The post-Versailles ‘New World Order’ had resulted

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in a relatively stable, uneventful international political environment for Japan, which encouraged the public, the Genro and the other elites to allow the luxury of party political control. Equally significant was the fact that the support of the parties in the Lower House was necessary for the passage of government legislation. Had Saionji not had a fundamental sympathy for party government however, it is unlikely that the eight years of normal constitutional government would have occurred when they did despite the coincidence of circumstances which pushed the Genro in this direction.15 For much of the period of ‘normal constitutional government’, Saionji was torn between his desire to encourage party development and his feelings of uncertainty about the stage of development they had already reached. He looked forward to the day when the parties would be mature enough to assume the co-ordinating influence in Japanese politics once wielded by the Genro group and now by himself alone, but was not convinced that they were yet sufficiently mature to perform that function adequately. Nevertheless, the lack of co-ordinated elite competition for control of the cabinet, the comparatively high standing of the parties in the public mind and the lack of anything approaching a national emergency during the 1920s caused the Genro to bury his doubts and to allow the premiership to shift back and forth between the major parties.

Saionji Diplomacy; the Changing Role of the Genro in Japanese Foreign Policy 1928–1932 The 1920s were the highpoint of Saionji’s political career. From the time of his appointment as Genro in 1912, his standing amongst the advisors to the throne grew steadily, a consequence of and a contributory factor in the expansion of party power. By 1924, Yamagata and Matsukata were dead and Saionji remained alone as Genro. Saionji’s appointees were introduced into the Court and the Court itself became a stronghold of the liberals and constitutional monarchists who constituted the so-called Saionji group. Saionji’s pre-eminence amongst Japanese statesmen was not the only important factor in making the period of the mid-Twenties his own. It is in the field of diplomacy that the idea of a ‘Saionji period’ holds most true and the roots of this are to be found not simply in Saionji’s personal power in these days. The Saionji period was based equally in the shifts in overt perceptions of international politics among the Western nations and the underlying political and economic causes of these shifts,

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and on similar changes in Japan’s diplomatic perceptions and goals in the postwar era. By the end of the First World War, Meiji Japan’s diplomatic goals of security and equality were largely achieved. Her new diplomacy was therefore less a response to crisis situations than a search for a new and more acceptable national identity within the new world order. Under Saionji’s guidance, the resulting Western-oriented foreign policy of the Hara Cabinet, was given concrete form in the Treaty of Versailles and in Japan’s participation in the League of Nations. This commitment to Anglo-American-centred co-operative diplomacy was re-expressed throughout the mid 1920s in a series of treaties with the Western powers. This diplomatic stance had its roots in domestic prosperity and in rapid industrialisation and modernisation which drew heavily, in terms of both technology and culture, from the West. History had moved around Saionji. For many years a man before his time in his political ideologies and in particular in his perceptions of the diplomatic road Japan should follow, Saionji’s ideals had now come into their own. Educated in France and posted to Europe as a young diplomat, Saionji had spent half of the first forty years of his life out of Japan. If the guiding principles of national diplomacy are indeed a product of cultural tradition,16 then it is unsurprising that Saionji’s singularly unorthodox cultural tradition should have inclined him toward diplomatic policies which did not gain ready acceptance in Japan and which after a few years of public support, were repudiated by the mass of the population and its elected government, For these few years however, the internationalist pro-Western tenor of Japan’s foreign policy was succoured by and itself gave support to the dominance of the Saionji group. Saionji’s approval of the direction of Japan’s foreign policy in this period is well documented and there is ample evidence of the continuity in Saionji’s foreign policy commitments from the time of his own cabinets. Through three cabinets, from 1918 to 1923, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in the hands of the former Foreign Minister in the Second Saionji cabinet, Uchida Yasuya. From 1924 to 1927, through the First and Second Kato Cabinets and the Wakatsuki Cabinet, the position of Foreign Minister was held by a man who remained throughout Saionji’s lifetime a favourite of the old Genro, Shidehara Kijuro. But by 1928, conditions within Japan and in China, the area of Japan’s most intractable foreign policy difficulties, had combined to produce a vocal alternative foreign policy. The assassination of the Manchurian leader, General Chang Tsolin, by the Kwantung Army in 1928, was a major watershed in Japanese politics after which Japanese foreign policy underwent a steady and

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comprehensive reorientation from co-operative to autonomous diplomacy and withdrawal from the League of Nations. Such being the case, how far did Saionji and the Saionji group retain their influence over diplomacy in the following years and how and where did they actually exert that influence? To answer this, it is necessary to look back at the way in which the elements of Saionji diplomacy evolved. Saionji’s approach to modern diplomacy derived in large part from his extensive, first hand experience of the West during his twenties and thirties. First as a student and then as a member of Japan’s overseas missions, he had lived in Europe for almost twenty years. The ‘modernist’ inclination he had evidenced as a young man in Japan, flourished in this exposure to Western thought and Western diplomatic practice. Away from Japan in the period of ‘bunmei kaika’, Saionji nevertheless personified the ideals of this cult with its search for civilisation and enlightenment through the acquisition of knowledge throughout the world. The boy who had devoured Fukuzawa Yukichi’s writings on the West had been tempered by first hand exposure to the sources of European liberalism and had moved beyond the ‘modernist’ position in the modernist-traditionalist split, to an ‘internationalist’ stance which far exceeded the Meiji commitment to ‘abandon the evil customs of the past’ and to ‘strengthen the Imperial polity through knowledge of the West’.17 The internationalist position in diplomacy implied in, but not necessarily contingent upon, the modernist position, he expanded into a doctrine of ‘Japan in the World’. This ideal, which Saionji disseminated in a publication by that name, implied co-operative diplomacy and the expansion of Japan’s diplomatic horizons beyond the boundaries of Asia. An autonomous role for Japan as ‘Japan in Asia’, was an idea which was anathema to Saionji as early as 1895, when he wrote to the Genro Inoue Kaoru, decrying the vogue of Japanism which was beginning to sweep the country.18 In 1904, he drew attention to the changing international perceptions of Japan following her victory in the Sino-Japanese War and to the necessity for countering the fears of the West, not by an expansion of military strength, but by a growth in the dissemination of modern education. Saionji’s concern with Japan’s image abroad and with the necessity for co-operative diplomacy are amongst the most important elements in his political thought. These concerns were clearly expressed in the period immediately prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War and in the turbulent days following the return to peace. Throughout the whole of Japan’s pre—war modern period, the area of foreign policy potentially most disruptive to her relations with the Western

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powers, was that of China. The significance of Japan’s China policy for her relationship with the West, varied with the importance placed on the China arena by the Western powers at any given time. The First Saionji Cabinet, in contrast with the First and Second Katsura Cabinets which preceded and succeeded it, showed a notable tendency to minimise military involvement in Japan’s relations with Korea and Manchuria. The differences in policy were on two levels. First, although the Saionji Cabinet, no less than the Katsura Cabinet, took an interventionist stance vis-a-vis Korea, the Saionji-Ito group was less inclined in principle to extend Japanese control to actual annexation. Second, they were notably more sensitive to the repercussions of their management of these countries on their relations with the West. Given that the control of foreign policy during the early years of the Keien period lay almost exclusively with the Genro as a group, changes in the cabinet could produce only minor changes in the direction of diplomacy. Nevertheless, while Ito’s protege controlled the cabinet and Ito remained Resident General in Korea, Japanese control, although strengthened, was not made absolute, despite agreements with the West which gave Japan an almost free hand in that country. In Manchuria, as in Korea, the First Saionji Cabinet had endeavoured to maximise the role of the civilian government and to quiet the fears of the American and European powers by the withdrawal of military governors and the return of the Kwantung Governorship to a peacetime structure. The China policy of the Second Saionji Cabinet bore the marks of conflicting pressures. Ultimately, the Saionji Government cooperated with Great Britain in her refusal to participate in a Four Power Loan to the Chinese Government and gave tacit support to the revolutionary party by undertaking not to interfere in the event that a republic was established in China. Domestically, Saionji refused to sanction army demands for the creation of two new divisions and rejected proposals to send Japanese forces to Manchuria. Publicly, Saionji refused the expansion on economic grounds. Privately, he told Yamagata that the expansion would create suspicion in the West and would cause diplomatic problems for Japan. Saionji’s stress on the importance of Japan’s good relations with the West did not indicate any divergence on his part from Katsura’s assertion in 1911, that ‘Japan possesses in the region of Southern Manchuria, special rights and interests’.19 However, the nature and scope of these interests and the lengths to which Japan was prepared to go to defend them, were questions of real substance which were to divide Japanese diplomacy for the rest of Saionji’s life and beyond.

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As a Genro from the fall of his Second Cabinet in 1912, Saionji maintained this commitment to minimal interference in China and to co-operation with the West. His split with Kato Komei after the latter’s presentation of the punitive Twenty-One Demands to China, was never fully healed, and in 1916, he emerged from semi-retirement in Kyoto to oppose an attempt by Okuma to have Kato appointed Prime Minister. Eight years later when he himself was forced into the position of putting forward Kato’s name as Premier, he was still plagued by serious doubts about Kato’s foreign policy.20 Saionji’s participation in the Versailles Conference as Japan’s Chief Plenipotentiary in 1919 suggests the personal nature of his involvement with the West, as well as the depth of his belief in Western-oriented diplomacy. The creation of the Washington System at the beginning of the 1920s, codified and extended the policy of co-operation with the West into the Far Eastern arena. Through the Washington Conference and the Nine Power Pact, Japan agreed to abjure unilateral action in her dealings with China and to curtail her military involvement in that country. The Nine Power Pact condemned the recognition of spheres of influence in China and upheld the principles of Chinese sovereignty and the ‘open door’. These agreements superseded all previous unilateral agreements with China and implied a basic redefinition of Japan’s foreign policy. The personification of this shift in diplomacy in the mid-Twenties was Japan’s chief delegate to the Washington Conference, Shidehara Kijuro. Both Shidehara personally and Shidehara diplomacy were openly and volubly held in high regard by Saionji. With Saionji’s support, Shidehara responded to the May incident and the rising anti-foreign feeling in China in 1925 by opposing force on the part of the foreign powers and recommending that the situation be defused by the withdrawal of Japanese nationals from dangerous areas.21 With Saionji’s approval, the Foreign Minister also refused to act unilaterally to improve Sino-Japanese relations at the expense of co-operation with the West. Later that same year, in an apparent departure from this policy of co-operation with the West which might have been expected to draw opposition from Saionji, Shidehara had Japan take the initiative in recognising Chinese tariff autonomy. Shidehara defended his position in a note to Minister Yoshizawa in Peking: Japan must make considerable efforts to maintain the co-operation of (the United States and Great Britain). However, she must refuse strictly any measures involving intervention in Chinese domestic affairs (that

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Great Britain might propose in the conference) and at the same time must endeavour to harmonize the ideal and the pragmatic to bring about some kind of compromise to the extent that the result would not be too out of step with the real situation in China.22

Saionji, who received copies of all major Ministry of Foreign Affairs correspondence, had approved Shidehara’s proposals for the Tariff Conference and concerning this issue had concluded that Shidehara was the best Foreign Minister Japan had had for some considerable time.23 Saionji’s views on China policy grew from two sources. The first, was a belief that diplomacy vis-a-vis China must be conducted within the restrictions set by the larger arena of Japan’s relations with the West. This limitation naturally curtailed autonomous action on the part of Japan in China. It also, given the Washington System ideology, tended to reduce interference overall and to encourage a positive policy of co-operation with Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government. The second was a sympathetic attitude towards the growth of Chinese nationalism and specifically towards Chiang Kai-shek. During the early years of the Washington System, these two strands in the China policy of the Foreign Minister and the Genro were entirely compatible. However, as China began to seethe with both nationalism and communism, and as anti-foreign feeling became increasingly violently manifested, the West, and particularly Great Britain, began to demand a firmer line against the nationalist regime. Commitment to co-operative diplomacy and the support of the Chiang regime could therefore be in conflict. The failure of the Tariff Conference to reach a common policy vis-a-vis China marked the first open rift amongst the Washington signatories. Japan nevertheless maintained its hybrid policy and by the following year, Saionji was noting with satisfaction a turn-around in JapaneseAmerican relations and openly praising the foreign policy of the Kato Government and castigating the vocal Tanaka led, anti-Shidehara faction of the Seiyukai, as ignorant of China issues. But if Saionji could find no fault with Shidehara’s conduct of diplomacy, the same was not true for an increasingly vocal number of Japanese, both private and official. Newspapers orchestrated a widespread public attack on Shidehara in the spring of 1927, which reached a crescendo during the Nanking and Hankow anti-foreign riots. Seiyukai criticism of Shidehara’s ‘weakness’ had also been growing in intensity, despite the Genro’s scathing remarks, and had attracted the support of the House of Peers and the Privy Council.

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The Nanking and Hankow incidents again forced the Genro and the Foreign Minister to choose between the two elements of their China policy and once more they chose to intervene with the powers on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek and to refuse to dispatch Japanese troops. Shidehara echoed Saionji’s sentiments of sixteen years earlier; that Japan’s relations with China did not depend on the maintenance of a monarchical system there, but would continue were a republic, or in this case, a communist state, to be established. Saionji continued to defend Shidehara and the Kato Cabinet against the mounting attacks on the Government’s foreign policy, a policy he described as ‘truly strong diplomacy’ and as ‘one whose success he prayed for’.24 Nevertheless despite the Genro’s continued support, the Cabinet was brought down by the Privy Council in April 1927 and Saionji, in accordance with the advice of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Makino, recommended Tanaka Giichi, leader of the Seiyukai, to form the next cabinet. Much has been written about the continuity of Japanese foreign policy before and after the appointment of the Tanaka Cabinet in 1927. It has been argued that there was little fundamental difference between Shidehara and Tanaka diplomacy and that such differences as there were, were largely a matter of style, or were reflections of a changing situation.25 Such arguments serve to highlight one of the major common denominators of Japanese policy goals, that of the economic and military security of Japan through the successful manipulation of her relations with China. The thesis is a blunt instrument however for analysing the relationship between the domestic distribution of elite power and Japanese foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s. Throughout the modern period in Japan, there had been agreement at all levels and amongst all political colourations that Japan had special interests in Manchuria. To acknowledge this however is not to deny the diversity and range of opinion as to what these special interests consisted of and to what extent they justified military interference. Nor did the agreement preclude differing assessments of how these interests were best served and to what extent it was necessary to see them in the context of Japan’s relations with the other powers. The morality of economic imperialism may be questionable but the implications and physical realities of such imperialism are different in kind from those of military imperialism. The one may and often does, lead to the other, but in Japan, the main advocates of the two approaches were clearly identifiable.

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Of course, one cannot discount the extent to which the changing situation in China and amongst the Washington powers moulded the foreign policies of the various administrations. Domestically too, there were pressures toward autonomous diplomacy, pressures which themselves were a factor in the change of administration in 1927. Nevertheless, the traditionalist, pro-autonomous diplomacy group was clearly identifiable, and when, in April 1927, Saionji, in line with the ‘normal course of constitutional government’, recommended Tanaka Giichi to form the next cabinet, he did so with grave misgivings about the future course of foreign policy. These misgivings had not been alleviated by Tanaka’s denunications, only days before his appointment, of the ‘non-resistance’ principles of the previous cabinet, and his demands for a ‘positive policy’ to solve Japan’s problems in China. Both Saionji and the Emperor cautioned Tanaka about the necessity to exercise care in the formulation of foreign policy and in the selection of the new Foreign Minister.26 Tanaka’s reply was to assume the post of Foreign Minister himself. The change in Japan’s foreign policy following the appointment of the Tanaka Cabinet was swift and dramatic. Shidehara’s commitment to the removal of Japanese nationals from threatened areas was abandoned and a unilateral decision was taken to send Japanese troops into Manchuria. The Far Eastern Conference, called by Tanaka in June that year, defined Japan’s policy vis-a-vis China as the protection, by force where necessary, of Japan’s special position in Manchuria and Mongolia, and the promise of support to any Manchurian leader who was in a position to stabilise these areas. There was in fact a real and significant shift from a China first to a Manchuria first policy.27 Tanaka’s China policy did not initially meet with significant opposition from the West. Indeed, the first Shantung expedition in May 1927, had considerable support, particularly from England. By 1928 however, Japan’s autonomous China policy had soured relations with both England and the United States and had redirected China’s anti-foreign activities away from Great Britain and toward Japan. Japan’s second Shantung expedition and Tanaka’s memorandum claiming Japan’s right to defend Manchuria against threat from China, brought an international storm of protest and an intensification of the violent antiJapanese demonstrations in China.28 Japan’s relations with both China and the West had sunk to a low point when, in June 1928, Japanese soldiers assassinated the Manchurian war-lord, Chang Tso-lin.

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The Assassination of Chang Tso-lin It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of this event for Japan’s political history. Neither the Prime Minister nor the Army Minister planned or approved of the assassination. Both Tanaka and the Army Minister had supported Chang against the China-first policies of the Kato and Wakatsuki Cabinets.29 With the appointment of the Tanaka Cabinet, the pro-Chang policies of the Government and the Army Ministry were, for the first time since the beginning of the Washington era, in accord, and were given practical expression in the Shantung expedition undertaken shortly after the formation of the Tanaka Cabinet. There was however an alternative China policy within both the Army Ministry and the General Staff at field officer level, which, at the start of 1928, found expression in the statements of an extremist group, the Mokuyokai. The Mokuyokai, which included amongst its members Nagata Tetsuzan, Ishiwara Kanji and Suzuki Teiichi, called for the seizure of Manchuria and Mongolia and the consolidation of absolute Japanese authority in these areas, preparation for war with China, and the domination of China by Japan. The shift of a significant section of the army away from support of Chang Tso-lin, returned Japan to the dual government/military diplomacy which had existed under the Kato and Wakatsuki Cabinets and intensified the trend towards autonomous diplomacy implicit in the appointment of the Tanaka Cabinet.30 The assassination of Chang Tso-lin by the Kwantung Army, at a time when Tanaka, through private negotiations with Chang, had achieved considerable advantages for Japan, was a serious blow to Japanese power in the Northeastern provinces. Had the assassination been followed by the dispatch of Japanese troops to secure Manchuria, as the Kwantung Army had hoped, this would not have been the case.31 Instead, the incident was contained. Chang Tso-lin was replaced by his son, Chang Hsueh-liang, and a steady rapprochement of Manchuria with the nationalist government and a corresponding worsening of relations with Japan, followed. The response of Saionji, and the Court under Saionji’s orchestration, was immediate and unambiguous. The Genro, who from the first reports had harboured suspicions about the origins of the assassination, intended to use the incident to purge the Kwantung Army of its anti-Shidehara, anti-Genro factions, thereby also refurbishing Japan’s tarnished image in the West and improving her relations with China. He also held out to

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Tanaka the prospects of increased domestic popularity for his cabinet and for the Seiyukai. He told the Prime Minister: If it becomes evident that the Japanese Army was responsible, then discipline must be enforced through strict punishment. Even if public feeling toward China should suffer for a time, proper retribution would enhance our national credibility and the honour of both the Japanese Army and the nation. It would also restore the trust in the Japanese Army which we have seen lacking in the past. In the long run, when it is known that those who suborn discipline will be subject to severe punishment, and that, even though the Japanese Army has in the past evidenced a lack of faith in its dealings with China and Manchuria, the situation has changed and that strict military discipline has ensured that such things are no longer possible, such knowledge will produce enormous goodwill towards Japan on the part of China… Domestically too, both Tanaka personally and the party would reap enormous benefits from strictly enforcing military discipline since (it would be recognised) that the Prime Minister had been able to control the military by virtue of his own connection with the army and because he was backed by a powerful political party like the Seiyukai.32

At the same time, Saionji took the decision to involve the Court in enforcing this line by instructing Tanaka to report the matter immediately to the Emperor and to no one else. The Cabinet disagreed strongly with Saionji’s assessment of the potential international repercussions of admission of Japanese military involvement and Tanaka, torn between the two, failed to respond to Saionji’s instructions and report these suspicions to the Court. It was only under considerable pressure from Saionji that the Prime Minister finally reported to the Emperor the possibility of Japanese military involvement in the assassination and the fact that the Army Minister was conducting an investigation into the matter. Saionji’s insistence that the Emperor be informed of the suspicions was an insurance against the issue being shelved. The question of Imperial involvement in politics was not, in 1928, a matter of acute importance. Theoretically, Saionji favoured a constitutional monarchy with a politically informed monarch standing outside the practical workings of politics. In 1928 however, the protection of the Court did not seem to necessitate its absolute non-involvement in the political process. Despite a certain amount of domestic unrest, a worsening economic climate and an emergent nationalist backlash against Saionji-Shidehara diplomacy, Saionji remained confident of his ability to direct Japanese politics. He

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thus had no compunctions against involving the Emperor in his efforts to enforce Tanaka’s cooperation in the purge of the Kwantung Army. When the Army Minister had an audience with the Emperor, he was warned that he should ‘strictly enforce military discipline’.33 Saionji was vehement in his determination that the issue should not be pigeonholed whilst, as he put it, he had breath left to fight.34 But the Genro had underestimated the strength of the opposition ranked against him and had overestimated Tanaka. The lobby in favour of the publication of the Army Minister’s report into the incident included, in addition to Saionji and the Emperor, Privy Councillor Ito Miyoji, and Yamamoto Jotaro, President of the South Manchurian Railway Company. Those against publication included the General Staff, the majority of the Cabinet (including the Army Minister) and a large number of Seiyukai officials. It was this group which prevailed. Tanaka reported to the Emperor in December 1928 that there were indications that the initial suspicions had been true and that, if they were proven, the members of the Kwantung Army who had been involved would be subject to strict military discipline.35 Nevertheless, although the report implicating the Kwantung Army was completed shortly after, the Prime Minister failed to take any punitive action despite pressure from Saionji on both himself and the Army Minister and despite repeated questions from the Emperor. Finally, in June, after months of vacillation, Tanaka accepted military demands to suppress the findings and reported to the throne the Cabinet’s intention to ask for administrative measures to be taken against certain members of the Kwantung Army found guilty of negligence. Unable to prevail against the combined pressure of the army, the Cabinet and the Seiyukai, Saionji brought the Cabinet down. The Emperor expressed his displeasure with Tanaka’s report and the Grand Chamberlain, a major figure in the Saionji group, discouraged the Prime Minister passively if not actively, from attempting to reinstate himself in the Emperor’s favour.36 Rebuffed by the Emperor, Tanaka left the palace and reported his intention to resign to the Genro37. Saionji ignored efforts by cabinet members to have Tanaka reinstated and within days, a Minseito Cabinet under Hamaguchi Yuko was established and the Foreign Office was back in the hands of Shidehara in a determined attempt by the Genro to restore Japan’s China policy to its former direction. Saionji and the Court had failed in their attempts to discipline the army, but they had nevertheless played a most active and conspicuous role in attempting to cut off the new dual diplomacy at its source. However the Tanaka

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Cabinet’s decision not to purge the Kwantung Army of the proponents of an autonomous Manchuria encouraged the growth of unauthorised army action in the Northeastern provinces and was to prove a serious blow to the ability of the Foreign Office to formulate and execute foreign policy vis-a-vis China.

The London Naval Treaty The next major conflict to involve the Genro in open interference in foreign policy was the London Naval Conference. The issue provoked massive interference by Saionji and the Court in a struggle against the Naval General Staff, the Seiyukai and the Privy Council, and was a loud assertion of the strength of the pro-Western, liberal Court group.38 The conflict over the London Naval Treaty, and the nature of its resolution, was pregnant with significance for the future of Japan’s elite conflict. One of the most outstanding features of the struggle was the extent to which the Genro and the Court were involved both overtly and covertly in the conflict and the fact that it was the last time that such involvement occurred on such a massive and open scale. Genro interference began with the selection of the delegates to the conference. It is possible to make a case for it beginning before this, in the appointment of the Hamaguchi Cabinet to succeed Tanaka in 1929. Before Tanaka resigned, his cabinet had approved participation in a naval disarmament conference to extend and expand the agreements on capital shipbuilding laid down at the Washington Conference in 1921–1922. Thus when Saionji recommended Hamaguchi to the Throne, he did so in the knowledge that whoever formed the new government would be responsible for the composition and conduct of Japan’s delegation to the London Conference. In recommending Hamaguchi, Saionji was ensuring a return to Shidehara diplomacy and the continuation of military retrenchment which was a corollary both of this internationalist approach to foreign policy and of the economic policies of the Minseito. Acceptance by the Hamaguchi Cabinet of the formal invitation to the conference was followed almost immediately by a public statement by the Prime Minister (the result of meetings between the Cabinet, leaders of the Seiyukai, the Privy Council and senior military personnel) setting out Japan’s conference requirements as a 70 per cent ratio vis-a-vis the United States in heavy cruisers, 70 per cent overall and no scrapping of

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her submarines.39 Wakatsuki Reijiro and Navy Minister Takarabe, Japan’s delegates to the conference, meeting with Saionji, found the Genro’s chief concern to be that the conference should not fail because of Japanese insistence on certain minimum demands. This fear and the reasons for the Genro’s strong commitment to the London Naval Conference, are clearly expressed in the following statement. After complaining about unsympathetic press reports, Saionji went on: For Navy partisans to insist on a 70 per cent ratio and to clamor that our delegates should kick over their seats, leave the conference and come home if there is the slightest diminution of the 70 per cent ratio; this would be a most serious mistake. The Navy must, naturally, stand on its own ground; but when the matter is judged from the wider viewpoints of politics and diplomacy, it cannot hope for complete victory no matter how loud the clamor…and this, of course, makes it even harder for them to talk of national strength. After all, a nation’s military preparedness, its ability to maintain its strength in time, depends first of all upon its financial policies. The strength that derives from reckless plans and emergency ad hoc preparations is virtually no strength at all. Especially now, in order to produce a successful result at the conference, Japan should lead other nations to recognise her earnest promotion of international peace by voluntarily accepting 60 per cent. Japan will greatly increase her future international role if she takes a leading part in bringing this conference to a successful conclusion. I am convinced that it would be extremely impolitic for the future of our country if we were to forego the privileges Japan has enjoyed, up to the present, of close ties with Britain and America.40

Saionji’s views were shared by Japan’s chief delegate, Wakatsuki. Takarabe, the Navy Minister, was under considerable pressure from all sides and there was great tension within the delegation. The navy itself was divided. A section of the Naval General Staff led by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Kato Kanji and Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Suetsugu, and supported by the Hiranuma group, the Seiyukai and a variety of right-wing groups, made increasingly vocal demands for Japan’s withdrawl from the conference if her three demands were not met. The struggle between the pro-treaty Saionji/Court/liberal group and the anti-treaty Hiranuma/Kato/Suetsugu group was continuous from March 13th, 1930, when the delegation announced that Japan must

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choose between withdrawal from the conference and a modification of her demands, through to October 1st of that year, when the Privy Council gave its formal approval of the treaty. The Genro and often the Court, played an active and sometimes belligerent role in overcoming the opposition at each stage of the conflict. The liberal group won each of the battles; that it had lost the war became evident very soon after. The decision to compromise on Japan’s initial conference demands was orchestrated by Saionji. In early March, following the general election, and as the opening of the Diet drew near, the Hiranuma/Seiyukai-backed Kato/Suetsugu group attempted to have official announcements made in both houses of the Diet, establishing a 70 per cent ratio as national policy. Saionji persuaded Konoe Fumimaro, who through his organisation of the Kayokai was now a leading figure in the House of Peers, to prevent this happening. On March 13th, the Japanese delegates notified Foreign Minister Shidehara that the Reed-Matsudaira compromise, which fell below the 70 per cent ratio, was a final position beyond which a rupture in the conference would occur, and they recommended acceptance of the compromise plan. The Navy Minister, Takarabe, under pressure from both sides did not join in this recommendation to the government. His silence was liberally interpreted by the pro-treaty faction as signifying his tacit acceptance. Saionji immediately began to co-ordinate the protreaty forces. He sent a message to the Prime Minister urging him to take a positive stand and to separate what were essentially domestic issues from the international question at hand. He also had his secretary and political liaison man, Harada Kumao meet with Admiral Okada Keisuke, Secretary of the Supreme War Council, and the three leading Court officials to ensure their understanding that: Even if it should be France or Italy which might bring about a rupture in negotiations, it is Japan’s shilly-shallying about this reply which may make it possible and Japan will have to bear responsibility for such a rupture…. This London Conference is one of the most grave and serious issues before the world today. It is entirely different from such issues in former years as the racial equality question and the Shantung question. I take a most serious view of it. Therefore, if it is our principle to conclude the treaty, the reply should be sent as soon as possible to speed the settlement. Why not treat the domestic issues and the Navy reform matter as separate questions? As

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for breaking off discussions and leaving the conference, this would be quite disastrous…. Furthermore, at a time like this, it is important to see that the Imperial Household Minister and the Grand Chamberlain, as well as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, have a clear understanding of the problem.41

Saionji had reason for concern about the Grand Chamberlain, Suzuki, who had earlier supported the proposal for an Imperial Conference to determine Japan’s position and unite opinion before the delegates left for the conference. Saionji had been sharp in his opposition. That Saionji’s role among the Court officials was something more than primus inter pares was evident at other times during the treaty conflict. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Makino, found himself called to heel for interfering between a prime minister and a cabinet member and the court officials collectively found themselves overruled in their desire to delay the Supreme War Council Conference which preceded submission of the treaty to the Privy Council. Backed by the Genro himself and, with the Genro’s help, assured of support from the Court, both Prime Minister Hamaguchi and Admiral Okada took a firm line. Okada had been sounded out by both Saionji and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal earlier in the year and had promised his support to the conference.42 When the delegate’s request for instructions arrived from London, Okada renewed his commitment. He told the Foreign Minister: By all means come to an agreement, even if it is 60 per cent or 55 per cent…. I will not be able to check the Chief of the Naval General Staff by myself but I will do what I can, together with Governor General Saito.43

True to his word, Okada, supported by Grand Chamberlain, Admiral Suzuki, brought pressure on two of the anti-treaty faction Supreme War Councillors, Fleet Admiral Togo and Prince Fushimi, to identify themselves less closely with the Chief and Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff. When the Supreme War Council met on March 24th, it agreed to support the Government’s new instructions to the delegation. Prime Minister Hamaguchi turned down a request from the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Kato, that he be allowed to attend the cabinet meeting to ratify these new instructions and the following day, April

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1st, they received Imperial sanction and the Japanese delegation was empowered to accept the compromise plan. Dissatisfied with the Cabinet’s decision, Kato had tried unsuccessfully to pre-empt Imperial sanction by attempting to report directly to the Emperor that the General Staff could not guarantee national defence under the new terms. He was prevented from doing so until the following day when sanction had already been given. The Saionji group were extrememly coy about their role in delaying Kato’s appeal to the throne and in the face of their denials there is only circumstantial evidence to suggest that it was their determined action which prevented an open confrontation between the Foreign and Navy Ministries, and the General Staff, which at the very least would have seriously delayed Japan’s agreement to the compromise terms. Admiral Suzuki, who, in his role as Grand Chamberlain, was in charge of appointments at the Court, claimed he had done no more than criticise Kato’s proposed report as an encroachment on the prerogatives of the Navy Minister, and his biographers conclude that in the light of this criticism, Kato voluntarily withdrew his request for an audience.44 Okada’s memoirs confirm that the Grand Chamberlain was critical of Kato’s intention to make an unfavourable report to the throne and that after consulting with Okada, he informed Kato that the Emperor’s schedule for the day was already full. Both Suzuki and Okada denied that the Grand Chamberlain had been a party to any intrigue. The Harada diaries neither admit nor deny the essential points of the rumours which soon became current; that the chief Aide-de-Camp had reported to the Grand Chamberlain Kato’s desire to petition the throne, that the Grand Chamberlain had informed the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal who had then asked Harada to discuss the matter with the Genro and that, in the meantime, the appeal had been postponed at the request of the Prime Minister.45 Nevertheless, the diaries record a flurry of activity between Saionji’s residence in Okitsu, the Prime Minister and the Court in the four days preceding the abortive appeal. By March 27th when Kato and Okada visited the Prime Minister together and Kato warned Hamaguchi, not for the first time, of the General Staff view that without the fulfillment of the ‘minimum demands’, security could not be maintained, the suspicion had been sown that Kato, denied any further meetings of the Supreme War Council, or formal access to the Cabinet, might exercise his legal right to report directly to the throne (Iaku Joso). Harada, who had already met with the Prime Minister, on Saionji’s behalf, on the morning of the 27th, returned later in the day after Kato

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and Okada had left. From this meeting with the Prime Minister, he went directly to the palace where he met with the Imperial Household Minister and the Grand Chamberlain. That evening he consulted with the Foreign Minister, it being his intention to travel down to Okitsu to report back to Saionji that night. A sudden crisis in Saionji’s health caused Harada to delay his visit until the morning of the 30th when, in a brief bedside meeting, he assured the Genro that ‘The Grand Chamberlain has an astute awareness of the whole situation’,46 Suzuki had in fact told Harada: Somehow this must be settled. I am very much of the same mind as Prince Saionji on this. If I did not occupy this post as Grand Chamberlain, I should certainly go to explain and clarify matters to Kato and his group, but in my present position I can do nothing. He who is Chief of the Naval General Staf f must be able to utilise whatever strength is alloted to him; whether it is to be 60, or even 50 per cent, that may be decided upon.47

Harada returned to Tokyo following this meeting with Saionji and again visited the Grand Chamberlain. The following day, March 31st, he met with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and explained ‘the points on which Prince Saionji had been particularly apprehensive. The Lord Keeper too held quite the same views’.48 It requires but little imagination to conclude that the possibility of a direct report to the throne, which Kato had already hinted that he would be prepared to make, was one of Saionji’s particular concerns and that the Court officials had been primed to meet just such an emergency. It was again largely due to pressure from the Genro which prevented Ugaki from resigning as Army Minister, that the army failed to become embroiled in the controversy over whether the Cabinet, by recommending the Treaty despite Naval General Staff opposition, had violated the rights of the Supreme Command. The matter had become public when the Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Suetsugu, had supplied the Rengo News Agency with copies of Kato’s report to the throne. The report argued that the Reed-Matsudaira Plan was detrimental to national security and thereby came under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Command as exercised by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and that the Cabinet, by ignoring the advice of the General Staff, had violated its rights. The question was taken up in the Diet by the Seiyukai and, on Saionji’s advice, the Government sought the advice of the Tokyo University constitutional theorist, Dr. Minobe, in drawing up arguments to defend its constitutional

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position. The matter was eventually resolved internally between the Navy Ministry and the Navy Staff with a ruling that the views of the Navy Ministry were to be recognised as the views of the navy and that since the treaty had the support of the Navy Minister, the question of violation of the Supreme Command did not arise.49 The next hurdle for the pro-treaty faction was to secure the approval of the Supreme War Council for the treaty, without which it could not proceed to the Privy Council. The task was daunting. Although the six—member Supreme War Council was evenly divided between the pro-and anti-treaty supporters, the anti-treaty chairman, Fleet Admiral Togo, was in a position to use his casting vote as chairman to cause the Council to reject the treaty. The pressures brought against the Council by the Saionji group were twofold. First they tried to woo Togo away from the Kato group and, when this failed, to prevent him from using his casting vote. The other pressure point open to the Court group was Prince Fushimi. Fushimi had, the previous month, been snubbed by the Emperor for attempting to explain Kato’s views during a private audience. The question now arose whether the authority of the Emperor should be used to prevent the Prince from casting his vote. The three senior Court officials were unsympathetic to the efforts of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister to invoke Imperial authority in this way. Nor were they in favour of having the Emperor order the Privy Council to by-pass the normal procedure and consider the treaty without first submitting it to the Supreme War Council. Saionji however took the view that Imperial interference, however undesirable, was preferable to losing the vote.50 On July 21st, backed by a message from Saionji that it was time to take decisive action and by the knowledge that Prince Fushimi had been persuaded to reverse his position, the three pro-treaty members decided to force the issue and to proceed with an unofficial meeting of the Council. Two days later, with Kato and Togo now in a minority, the full Supreme War Council noted the faults of the treaty and recommended that these faults be temporarily offset by an increase in the strength of the navy, and rectified at the next naval conference in 1936.51 With their approval, the treaty passed into the hands of the Privy Council. The Saionji’s group’s struggle with the Privy Council was not a simple effort to have the London Naval Treaty ratified, but developed also into an attempt to limit the powers of that body. The Prime Minister, backed by the Court group, prevailed by refusing to discuss questions which he deemed to be outside the competence of the Council, by threatening to

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change the membership of the Council and ultimately by promising to appeal to the Emperor. An active section of the Privy Council led by Hiranuma Kiichiro and Ito Miyoji had given consistent support and advice to the Kato group in its struggle against the Cabinet. The sub-committee which met to discuss the treaty one month after its submission to the Council was led by Ito Miyoji and packed with anti-government councillors. Saionji, anticipating trouble with the Privy Council, had pondered the idea of reform and had warned the Government to take the advice of constitutional scholars in case the Council tried to attack the treaty on constitutional grounds.52 He proposed to Prime Minister Hamaguchi that the President and Vice President of the Privy Council should be removed before the Privy Council decision on the treaty was taken. As Harada remarked, reform of the Privy Council at this stage would kill two birds with one stone.53 The sub-committee, meeting over a period of four weeks from midAugust to mid-September, dwelt on two issues; first, the right of Supreme Command and secondly, the Government’s plans to strengthen the navy to offset any threat posed by the treaty to national security. The committee’s efforts to prove that there had been disagreement between the Naval General Staff and the Navy Minister were blocked by the combined efforts of the Prime Minister, the Navy Minister and the new Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Taniguchi, who refused to supply the Privy Council with copies of the relevant report of the Supreme War Council meeting. Behind the firmness of the Cabinet was Saionji’s unwavering and often insistent support of strong measures. Behind Saionji’s commitment to strong measures were his belief in the financial and diplomatic necessity of the treaty and his long-standing dislike of the Privy Council and its Vice President, Hiranuma. When the subcommittee restricted the attendence of Ministers of State he fumed: …when Ministers of State…may seek an audience with the Emperor, even his Majesty may not refuse them a hearing… This disturbs me very much, for it is only the latest in a long series of flaws in the Council through the years.54

Denied access to the report of the Supreme War Council meeting, the Privy Council attempted to resuscitate the Supreme Command issue by calling the ex-Chief of the Naval General Staff, Kato, to testify. Hamaguchi, having refused this request, sought the support of the Genro for a confrontation with the Privy Council. Saionji, who was still at his

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summer residence, away from the heat of Tokyo in the mountains near Hakone, sent back an immediate message of support for whatever strong action the Prime Minister saw fit to take: Thank the Prime Minister for his message. I understand and agree with him completely. If it is necessary and reasonable to do so, I would have him take drastic measures today. Provided the action is clearly within the Constitution, I see no reason to be bound by precedent.55

The Genro sent messages alerting the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Grand Chamberlain and the Imperial Household Minister. Press reports intimated that the Cabinet had the support of the Genro for a direct appeal to the throne if the Privy Council should refuse to ratify the treaty or try to make amendments.56 Faced with the Government’s refusal to be drawn into a debate on the constitutional issue, the committee shifted its attack to the Cabinet’s supplementary naval spending programme. Saionji once again pressed the Prime Minister to take drastic measures against the Privy Council.57 Confronted by a solid phalanx of opposition which included the Cabinet, the Navy Ministry, the Army Ministry, the Genro and the Court officials and threatened with a reform of the Council, Ito, the chairman of the sub-committee backed down and on September 17th, advised that the treaty be presented to the whole Council with a recommendation for ratification. At each of the stages toward acceptance of the London Naval Treaty, the Saionji group had faced and overcome the opposition of one or more of the political elites. They had, as Saionji had advised, fought each stage step by step, and had mobilised every weapon at their command, including the authority of the Emperor. Although wary of overtly unconstitutional interference, Saionji was prepared to use the Court officials and, if necessary, the Emperor, to support the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. The use of this power, whilst it won the battle of the London Naval Treaty, as it had succeeded in bringing down the Tanaka Cabinet two years earlier, provoked a reaction which was to make any further use of it politically dangerous. Such monopolisation of the right to speak on behalf of the Emperor as was evidenced in these incidents combined with the social and economic disturbances of these years to produce a realignment of forces in Japan. The new configuration tended towards isolation of the constitutional monarchist, liberal group and toward a new closeness between the right-wing groups, the Hiranuma group and the Kodo faction in both military services and the Seiyukai. The co-operation

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which was born of this new closeness encouraged the trend toward violent action to wrest the symbols of Imperial sanction from the liberal group.

The Manchurian Incident and its Aftermath The problems posed by the Mukden Incident and its aftermath— the establishment of an independent Manchukuo and Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations—were of a different nature from those presented to the Saionji group by the London Naval Treaty question. The domestic background against which these problems were resolved had also changed considerably. After the assassination of Chang Tso-lin, Japan’s relations with Manchuria had worsened steadily and as Chang Hsueh-liang drew closer to the nationalist government, anti-Japanese sentiment had mounted. The antagonism which this provoked both in Japan and amongst the Kwantung Army, was intensified by the return to Shidehara-Saionji foreign policy following the fall of the Tanaka Cabinet. At the same time, there had been an expansion of the radical reform movement and a trend toward unification of the various nationalist societies and an increase in the level of general social unrest in Japan. The combination of these developments had encouraged active cooperation between civilian and military groups at lower and middle grade officer level. By the beginning of 1931, it had led to the formation of young officer clubs such as the Sakurakai, which were actively involved in attempts to achieve domestic political and social reform and an expansionist foreign policy.58 All these trends were exacerbated by the show of strength f rom the liberal group in forcing through the ratification of the London Naval Treaty. A concrete manifestation of the new combination of forces and the level of their determination to secure domestic reform came in March 1931 when, in the March Incident, senior army officers joined with members of the Sakurakai and civilian nationalists in a coup aimed at bringing down the Wakatsuki Government and replacing it with a military government under General Ugaki. The philosophical basis for the unsuccessful coup was the plans of the civilian nationalist, Kita Ikki, for the reconstrucion of Japan. The March Incident, although not perhaps, as Harada believed, a direct cause of the Mukden Incident, was undoubtedly one of the considerations in the minds of the Saionji group when they took the decision of how far to resist the fait accompli of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria later that year.

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The wider context of government-military relations also bore signs of the increased politicisation of the military and the growing intrusion of the army into political affairs. There was widespread dissatisfaction with the Governrnent’s disarmament programme (a programme which was soon to be reaffirmed in the Geneva Conference) as well as with the deterioration of the situation in Manchuria and Mongolia. In 1931, both the Chief of the General Staff, General Kanaya Hanzo, and the Army Minister, Minami Jiro, made openly political speeches attacking government policy in these two areas.59 These criticisms of ShideharaSaionji diplomacy were not without support amongst the public and among civilian officials. In parallel with these public statements by senior representatives of the army, the military were also taking active steps vis-a-vis the disarmament and Manchurian issues. Japanese policy at the Geneva Conference was made subject to approval by the Army Minister and, taking an obvious lesson from the discomfiture of the Kato group at the time of the London Naval Treaty, this policy, once agreed, was ruled not to be open to further negotiation when the Conference opened.60 By 1931, the Manchurian policies of the Army Minister and the General Staff had achieved a closeness which was expressed, in the summer of that year, in new operational plans drawn up by Colonels Ishiwara and Itagaki for Japanese control throughout the whole of Manchuria. Whereas over the London Naval Treaty issue, the liberal group had enjoyed popular support for its efforts to limit armaments and thereby reduce taxes, it now faced an increasingly hostile press and unsympathetic public opinion.61 Where the group had had to deal with the navy, an elite in which the influence of the Genro was greater than in any institution other than the Court (with the possible exception of the Foreign Ministry), it was now facing the army, into which the fingers of the Saionji group barely reached. The Genro’s lack of influence within army circles became even more acute when General Ugaki, who had proved reasonably susceptible to the blandishments of the elder statesman, retired as Army Minister. The group had been further weakened by the loss of Prime Minister Hamaguchi who had been shot barely a month after the ratification of the London Treaty. Finally, the negotiation and ratification of the Naval Treaty had required initiative on the part of the liberal/ Court group followed by defence of its position. The group had effected its fait accompli against the Supreme Command and had then held firm. This time, the positions were reversed and the liberals were to find how much more difficult it was to reverse an action once taken, particularly one which enjoyed public support.

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Though the Kwantung army presented the Government with a fait accompli in the attack on the Manchurian capital of Mukden on September 18th, 1931, there had been intimations of trouble. Skirmishes had occurred along the Manchurian-Korean border and reports from the Consul General, Hayashi, had alerted the Saionji group that an incident seemed to be imminent. The group had indeed taken steps to prevent any unauthorised action. Army Minister Minami had been summoned by the Emperor and warned about deficiencies in army discipline, specifically the formation of politically motivated groups amongst the young officers, political speeches by soldiers and by civilian employees of the military and army interference in foreign relations.62 Saionji, who was asked by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Prime Minister to remind Minami about military discipline, was more specific in his warnings against insurrection in Manchuria. He told Minami: It is extremely bad to be sending villains and roughnecks and members of right wing terrorist groups to Manchuria. That the army should make use of such people is bad for national and army prestige alike. If the army incites these people then the reputation of the Japanese military abroad will be no better than theirs. Our military, in their country, must be as His Majesty’s troops… Manchuria and Mongolia are Chinese terrritory and anything to do with diplomacy must be left to the Foreign Ministry. It is outrageous that the army should push itself forward. As head of the army and with responsibilities as a Minister of State, you must be discrete and control this kind of thing.63

Alerted to the need for rapid action before specific instructions should arrive from Tokyo, the Kwantung Army provoked a skirmish with Chinese troops on the outskirts of Mukden at the site of an explosion of small magnitude and doubtful origin. This action was immediately used by Colonel Itagaki as an excuse for attacking the Chinese barracks to the north of the city and for capturing Mukden. The efforts which the Government and the Saionji group made to contain this incident were directed primarily at preventing the movement of the Korean Army to supplement the Kwantung Army troops. The Korean Army had mobilised without Imperial authorisation on the morning following the incident, but had halted at the Korean-Manchurian border awaiting Imperial sanction to cross the River Yalu. The Prime Minister sent a worried message to Saionji that the Army Minister was defending the unauthorised mobilisation which had taken the troops as far as the Manchurian border and that he was at a loss how to control the Army without help.

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Saionji’s secretary, Harada, was dispatched on a round of meetings. The Imperial Household Minister, the Grand Chamberlain and the Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Kido, summoned together by the Genro, were loath to involve the Court. Harada’s next series of calls was therefore with senior cabinet members to encourage them to try to resolve the incident without recourse to help from the Court officials.64 On the evening of the mobilisation Harada had seen the Chief of the General Staff, General Kanaya, and had warned him against any unauthorised action on the part of the army. Saionji had also sent instructions to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal that: 1. The Government should under no circumstances be allowed to resign before the affair was settled. 2. If the Army Minister or the Chief of the General Staff reported on the unauthorised troop movements to the Emperor, the Emperor should on no account acknowledge the troop movements, nor should he remain silent, but should indicate that he would consider the matter. The Cabinet’s attempts to impose a policy of non-aggravation of the incident by denying the Korean Army Imperial authorisation to cross an international boundary and engage with the Chinese, failed. On September 21st, in response to the ‘emergency’ created by Kwantung Army troops leaving Mukden to advance on Kirin, and in accordance with army instructions from Tokyo, the commander of the Korean troops took ‘appropriate measures’ to deal with the situation and ordered his troops across the Manchurian border. The issue which faced the liberal group was no longer how to prevent the Korean Army from becoming involved in the conflict; the Government and Court group had lost this struggle. Much has been made of the subsequent decision by the Wakatsuki Cabinet to agree to provide the funds for the Korean Army mobilisation. In crossing an international boundary, the army had compromised the ‘Supreme Command prerogative’ on which it had based continued expansion of hostilities. Had the Government successfully challenged the army over the Supreme Command issue, the Korean Army troops would ultimately have been forced to withdraw for lack of funds. Given the prevailing sentiment, however, the political furore which would have ensued would have brought down the Government. Wakatsuki therefore agreed to give cabinet support to the Korean Army moves and to negotiate a new treaty guaranteeing Japan’s interests in Manchuria in exchange for an undertaking by the Army Ministry to prevent any expansion of hostilities prior to the report of the upcoming League of Nations Council session. Wakatsuki’s hopes of containing the fighting long enough

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to reach an agreement with China, acknowledging Japan’s special position in Manchuria, which would be recognised by the League were dashed when that body supported China’s demand that Japanese troops should withdraw from the newly occupied areas before negotiations could commence. Meanwhile, although in accordance with the Army Minister’s undertaking, the Kwantung Army remained relatively quiet, domestic opposition to the Government’s China policies grew. Plans were uncovered in October for a coup d’état which would replace the Wakatsuki Cabinet with a military cabinet led by General Araki and would give the Kwantung army freedom of action in Manchuria. The Seiyukai, the Hiranuma group in the Privy Council and the Adachi f action in the government party denounced Foreign Minister Shidehara’s ‘weak diplomacy’ and called for the setting up of an independent government in Manchuria. As the Cabinet struggled to maintain its pro-League, pro-America policies during these weeks of mounting criticism, Saionji defended the Foreign Minister and his policies from attack. One course of action considered by the Genro to strengthen Shidehara’s position was to have him replace Wakatsuki as Pime Minister.65 Within the liberal group responses to the deteriorating situation varied. Shidehara and the Finance Minister had been opposed to giving Cabinet support to the unauthorised troop movements and had voted to confront the military over the issue of Supreme Command. The Emperor, concerned about the League and the possibility of an economic blockade, was eager to use the throne to reach a settlement and discussed with the Court officials the possibility of calling the Prime Minister and the Army Minister together. Warned of the Emperor’s suggestions by a worried Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Saionji went immediately to Tokyo. There he warned the Emperor against calling officials whose opinions differed and took steps to reduce the possibility that the Emperor might disregard his advice and act alone. Having advised the Emperor to call the Foreign Minister, Saionji sent a message to Shidehara asking him to ‘talk to the Emperor at length and in such a way as to avoid worrying him’. The Genro summed up the reasons for his decision in these words: ‘My duty to the Emperor today is twofold, to avoid damaging the spirit of the Constitution granted by the Meiji Emperor and to observe international treaties.’67 By refusing to allow the use of the Imperial institution in a divisive issue, in a manner for which, in terms of constitutional legality and historical precedent there was no justification, Saionji was preserving the role of the constitutional monarch in Japan and fulfilling his duty

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to preserve the spirit of the Constitution. It is clear from Saionji’s use of the Court in Tanaka’s resignation as Prime Minister, that there were circumstances under which he was prepared to use the Emperor politically. The criteria for such use were twofold. First, he would only do so when such use was safe. Secondly, he would only allow the Emperor to be used to sanction and strengthen policies of which he approved. To say that Saionji’s objections to using the Emperor were based on ‘principle’ would not be entirely true. Nor is it the case that he did not really believe in ‘principle’ when the Emperor was useful to his purposes. His attitude was nevertheless ambivalent. Thus there was a third criterion to be taken into consideration when invoking Imperial interference. Not only must such use be safe and conducive to the policies which Saionji supported; its use should also be limited to those occasions when failure to invoke Imperial sanction would pose a greater threat to the general principle of a limited constitutional monarchy than would the isolated violation of one of the tenets of this philosophy. It has often been thought that Saionji’s feelings of duty toward the constitution stood in the way of his commitment to the observation of international treaties and that it was to the protection of the throne that he gave precedence. Given the realities of the political situation in Japan in 1931, this interpretation of his actions is by no means necessarily valid. The defeat of constitutional monarchy which Saionji believed would follow any overt interference by the Emperor in the Manchurian issue, would have undoubtedly resulted in the strengthening of the army and its role in China. By maintaining the constitutional monarchy and its trappings of parliamentary government and cabinet responsibility, the Genro was also reaffirming his commitment to co-operative diplomacy in the form of the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Briand Pact. Although unwilling to hazard the Imperial institution directly, Saionji himself opposed the calls for an independent Manchukuo and was critical of the Government for allowing itself to be dragged along by the army. On many occasions during the following months, he reaffirmed his belief in cooperation with the West. When the possibility of Japan’s withdrawal from the League first became an issue, Saionji restated the need to maintain Shidehara diplomacy: What advantages can we obtain by withdrawing from the League? I cannot agree with the theory that by withdrawing from the League and dealing directly with England, America and France and taking an independent position for Japan on the basis of understandings with

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these countries, that we would be able to achieve our aims without interference from the League…. No, at this time, it is imperative that we stand with England and America in our capacity as a member of the League and work for the advantage of Japan by bolstering her position whilst extending the greatest co-operation.68

Again when Manchukuo was recognised by the Saito Cabinet in September 1932, the Genro grumbled: As I said at the time of the London Naval Treaty, the reason that Japan maintains her world power status is that she holds the baton of command with England and America. If Japan loses her grip like France and Italy, how will she develop as a world power? In the past, when Ito and myself and others thought about Japan’s future path, we never thought in terms of anything so narrow as ‘Japan; leader of the East’ or an ‘Asian Monroe Doctrine’. What we aimed at was ‘Japan in the World’. The problems of the Far East can be better resolved through co-operation with England and America than through the mouthing of ‘Asianism’ or the Asian Monroe Doctrine.69

Nevertheless, when the League’s report on the Manchurian Incident was made public on February 15th, 1933, Saionji cancelled a conference of elder statesmen which had been summoned to discuss the Kwantung Army’s extension of its activities to Jehol and resigned himself to Japan’s withdrawal from the League. This decision could and did appear to many observers to indicate an essential contradiction and incompatibility between Saionji’s constitutional monarchism and his internationalist beliefs. This judgement is based on the assumption that, had Saionji used the power of the throne to oppose withdrawal from the League, the result would have been compliance with the Court’s wishes. Saionji’s assessment, shared by the majority of the liberal group, was that this would not be the case and that the resultant damage to the prestige of the throne and thus to constitutional monarchy, would result in an even greater shift of power toward the anti Western-alliance forces. If Saionji was correct in his assessment of the strength of the forces ranged against him, then any move to use the throne to tip the balance would have been not merely an empty gesture, but a positive disservice to the long-term international orientation of Japan. As one looks back over the years from 1921 to 1928, it is clear that Saionji, both as Genro and as leader of the liberal group, played an active role in supporting the ‘Shidehara’ policy of co-operation with the West

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which he had advocated since the days of his own cabinet and which he had brought to fruition at the Versailles Conference. Forced to replace the liberal cabinet in 1927, Saionji harboured grave doubts about the suitability of the incoming Seiyukai Cabinet’s foreign policy. When this cabinet proved itself incapable of establishing its dominance over the army in the question of diplomacy, the Genro, in concert with the Court, brought the Government down, Once again Japan returned to Shidehara/ Saionji diplomacy and in 1930, despite heavy opposition from a number of directions, the policy of co-operation with the West was strongly reaffirmed by the signing of the London Naval Treaty. However, in September 1931, when the Manchurian Incident occurred, both the protagonists and the domestic situation were changed. The structure of the army and the situation in which it operated were not responsive to the kind of pressure which had been exerted on the navy at the time of the London Naval Treaty. This was compounded by the nature of the issues; the one requiring acquiescence to a government decision by a very small number of senior naval officers; the other requiring that a much larger and more disparate group of army officers at various levels refrain from taking action in a volatile and tempting situation, The Saionji group was also hindered by its lack of leverage among senior army officers. Saionji’s relationship with the navy, sustained since his second cabinet, had strengthened over the years, whilst his connections with the army, initially turbulent, had suffered further from the Genro’s commitment to disarmament and his general anti-army feelings. Finally, the domestic background against which the struggles took place, was of primary significance. By 1931, the army’s plans for Manchuria had widespread and vocal sympathy at all levels in Japan and, as the incident spread, so the support for it grew. The Genro, in this situation, avoided pitting the Court group against the massed enthusiasm of the army, the Reserve Association, the Privy Council, the Seiyukai and certain factions of the Minseito and tried instead to use his prerogative of recommending the Prime Minister to maintain the foreign policy of the liberal group. Foreign policy and control of the army were the most important issues in the appointment of both the Inukai and Saito Cabinets in 1931 and 1932, and both men were warned at their appointment of the great significance which the Court attached to a co-operative foreign policy free from military interference. It was in such less obtrusive ways that the Genro used his prerogatives to influence the course of Japanese diplomacy after 1930. The almost

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certain repercussions of open Court involvement in more partisan activities threatened to damage the very constitutional structure of Japan and was thereafter abjured by the liberal group. Saionji remained convinced that Japan was passing through a developmental phase and that, if the basic structure of the country’s constitutional monarchy could be preserved during this period, it would be possible ultimately for the liberal group to regain its hold on foreign policy.

CHAPTER SIX THE SAIONJI GROUP UNDER ATTACK

The Return to Transcendental Cabinets The termination of party government after the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai by a group of civilian nationalists led by a mixed group of young military officers on May 15th, 1932, was unsurprising. Perhaps more surprising was that only six months earlier Saionji had felt compelled to turn to the Seiyukai to form a government. The domestic and international considerations which had brought the parties to power had all but disappeared by the end of the Wakatsuki Cabinet in December 1931. The Minseito-backed Shidehara China policy had provoked the Kwantung Army into independent action. The domestic repercussions had been an increased politicisation of the army and a proliferation of nationalist groups willing to engage in direct action against the Government. With the signing of the London Naval Treaty in 1930, the Privy Council had emerged from a period of dormancy and had begun to challenge party control of Government. Furthermore, the Genro’s honeymoon with the Seiyukai was over. The relationship had come under severe strain during Tanaka Giichi’s tenure as prime minister. The burgeoning ties of the Seiyukai leadership with the military, their support of a positive China policy and their opposition to the London Naval Treaty, had brought it almost to breaking point. It was the emergence of Suzuki Kisaburo as heir apparent to the Seiyukai Presidency which snapped the fragile link between Saionji and the party which he had led and cultivated. Suzuki was a political and personal friend of Hiranuma Kiichiro, a vocal advocate of emperorcentered politics and a rabid opponent of parliamentary government.1 Suzuki was held responsible by the Genro for the Seiyukai’s opposition to the London Naval Treaty.2 Thus, despite the Seiyukai’s absolute majority in the Lower House, his personal antipathy for the new leader of the   135

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Seiyukai pushed him toward a national unity cabinet. This decision was encouraged by a number of other factors. First, the army informed Saionji of its opposition to a party cabinet and laid down conditions for providing an Army Minister for the next cabinet.3 The Minseito, reduced in the previous election to 147 seats and weakened even further by the internal splits, had little hope of being called on to form a government for the foreseeable future. The President of the Minseito himself therefore was in favour of a non-party cabinet under Admiral Yamamoto Gombei or Admiral Saito Makoto. In the Court too, opinion was against appointing another party cabinet. On the morning after Prime Minister Inukai’s assassination, Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Kido, in a written analysis of the situation for the use of Privy Seal, Makino, proposed a national unity cabinet with party support in the Lower House, to be led by someone like Saito. He also urged that the Genro should come immediately to Tokyo and reach an understanding with the Army and Navy Ministers and that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal should meet with the party leaders.4 For three days following the assassination, Saionji waited in Okitsu and listened to reports from the capital. Some weeks earlier, in March, he had appeared to be considering General Ugaki Kazushige as a possible successor to Inukai and had vehemently opposed suggestions from Konoe that Hiranuma Kiichiro might be called upon to form the next government. Doubts about the ability of any prime minister to effect significant changes were already assailing the Genro.5 Saionji’s aversion to Suzuki, the rapidly deteriorating position of the parties in the political order and the almost unanimous reports from Tokyo that a party cabinet would merely exacerbate the tension in domestic politics, suggest that the Genro’s mind was already made up when he left Okitsu for consultations in Tokyo. His meetings there with the elder statesmen and Army and Navy Ministers did nothing to dissuade him and on May 22nd, after a final meeting with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Makino, Saionji recommended Admiral Saito to the throne. The simple pattern whereby the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal would receive the Imperial question and make his recommendation in accordance with normal constitutional government and toward which Saionji had been steering the political process, had suffered a reverse. The Genro’s extensive consultations with the elder statesmen and senior military leaders, extending as they did over a period of days after the assassination, were a direct response to the unstable political climate.6 The Emperor’s memorandum detailing the points which Saionji should bear

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in mind in his selection of the prime minister (that the cabinet should not be tinged with fascism but should respect the Constitution and put strong emphasis on Japan’s international relations) was a further reflection of this instability. The process of consultation undertaken at this cabinet change was codified later that year, at Saionji’s request, into a formal proposal for a new procedure to be followed in selecting Japan’s Prime Minister, In February 1932, shortly after the formation of the Inukai Cabinet, Saionji had advised Konoe Fumimaro of his desire to resign as Genro. He wished to withdraw from the selection procedure, he told Konoe, because changes in the direction of Japanese politics and developments within the army made him believe it would be necessary to recommend a military man to form the next cabinet. Saionji was dissuaded from this intention as being an ineffective gesture and the idea was dropped.7 Nevertheless, on the Genro’s insistence, shortly after the recommendation of Admiral Saito as Prime Minister, a proposition for selection of the prime minister by a council of elder statesmen was drafted. Saionji’s proposal was that a council of elders (Jushin) should deliberate and, having secured the agreement of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, should make a joint recommendation to the throne.8 The institution of Genro would end with his death, and in the interim would be relieved of the responsibility of answering the throne. A counter plan, put forward by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, provided for the question to go to the Genro who would then consult at the palace with a council consisting of the President of the Privy Council and ex-Prime Ministers awarded the honours of their previous office. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal would be consulted and the Genro would make the resulting recommendation to the throne; this procedure to be waived at the discretion of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.9 The recommendation of the Okada Cabinet in July 1934 followed a procedure which was a compromise between the two proposals. That the Council included representatives of the parties was due entirely to Saionji’s efforts. His struggle against Makino and the Imperial Household Minister to secure the inclusion of ex-prime ministers who had also been leaders of political parties, had begun six months earlier in January 1934 when he had informed Kido that there was no valid reason why the participation of party presidents should be inadmissible.10 When it became clear in May that the Saito Cabinet would not survive for long, Saionji informed Makino of his desire to follow the procedures he had suggested in recommending the new cabinet. Makino, supported by the

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Imperial Household Minister, was still strongly opposed to the inclusion of ex-party Prime Ministers Saito, Takahashi and Wakatsuki and proposed that the conference be limited to the Genro, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the President of the Privy Council and Kiyoura Keigo, with Kiyoura acting in the capacity of quasi-Genro. Saionji was particularly opposed to Makino’s proposed elevation of Kiyoura and rejected both this proposal and Kido’s compromise suggestion that only Saionji, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the President of the Privy Council should confer. It was Saionji’s contention that in a time of political flux, the broader experience of a Council which included ex-prime ministers and party leaders, would produce a more balanced decision; further, that a properly defined and constituted forum for consultation was intrinsically better than individual, behind the scenes, negotiation and that to limit that forum to a group of three was absolutist and potentially dangerous.11 Although the procedure for recommending the prime minister became a matter of contention between the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Genro, there was, for at least two months before the Saito Cabinet fell, a consensus amongst the Court officials, the Prime Minister and the Genro, that the man to lead the next cabinet was Admiral Okada Keisuke. When the Saito Cabinet resigned, Saionji travelled up to the palace and conferred with the three senior Court officials, afterwards meeting with what the press described as a Jushin conference, consisting of ex-Prime Ministers Saito, Takahashi, Wakatsuki and Kiyoura and the President of the Privy Council, Ichiki Kitokuro. This change in procedure encouraged a fresh spate of speculation and debate over what would happen after the death of the last Genro. The Jushin conference had no constitutional validity. On this occasion the Genro had received the Imperial question, consulted with the Jushin and advised the throne on his own responsibility. Had the procedure had time to establish itself, there might eventually have been a return to recommendation of the cabinet by a group of elders patterned after the Genkun and Genro conferences of the Meiji period. The erosion of the influence of Saionji and the Court advisors during the Okada Cabinet and the abrupt and bloody end of the administration put an end to this possibility.

Clarification of the National Polity: the Minobe Affair The nature of the national polity (Kokutai) was the subject of academic debate in Japan from as early as the Tokugawa period but, understandably,

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it was first during the political flux of the early years of the Meiji period and again, during the turbulent period of the Taisho crisis, that the debate gained strength. It was then, in 1912, that the Education Ministry of Saionji’s Second Government was accused of trying, through Dr. Minobe Tatsukichi, to promote ‘a construction of the constitution favourable to anti-bureaucratic forces’.12 The attacks, in both academic journals and popular magazines, accused Minobe, a member of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, of being a partisan of Saionji against Katsura and of improper intervention in the then current constitutional controversy. Minobe’s followers were accused of ulterior motives in their attempts to acquire legislative and administrative powers for a Lower House which would be under the control of the political parties. Saionji and Minobe were thus aligned in the minds of intellectuals and officials alike from the early stages of the struggle between the bureaucracy and the parties. The early 1930s brought another period of domestic political upheaval and fresh attempts to use the issue of clarification of the national polity to shift the balance of power. The important difference between what became known as the organ theory controversy at the time of the Taisho Crisis and again in 1935, lay in the balance of power between the constitutional monarchists and their protagonists. Persecution of those professing ‘anti-Kokutai’ views was a feature of this debate from its inception but it was not until 1925 that a law was passed specifically concerned with eradicating organisations considered subversive of the national polity. The Peace Preservation Law of 1925 was used widely against the universities and it was Minobe Tatsukichi, by then a professor of Tokyo Imperial University, who wrote of it in 1926 that it was a law ‘under which the beliefs of the class currently holding power are viewed as correct and the opposing views are deemed heretical and are suppressed by force’.13 The provisions of the Peace Preservation Law, strengthened in 1928, became increasingly widely interpreted and the area of permissible thought and belief became ever more restricted until men who had once enjoyed government support and public prestige found themselves beyond the pale. In 1935, when the attack on the constitutional theories of Minobe began, the Saionji group still occupied the majority of higher governmental and palace positions which they had dominated since the beginning of the regency. Makino Nobuaki, the leading constitutional monarchist of the Saionji group, who at the time of the Taisho organ theory controversy had voiced his support of the organ theory in Privy Council discussions of the

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question, had, as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, held the key position of liaison between palace and government for the past nine years. Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, another member of the Saionji group, was appointed Grand Chamberlain in 1929 on the advice of Makino and the then Imperial Household Minister, Ichiki Kitokuro, largely because of his support of Minobe’s theories of constitutional monarchy.14 Like the Privy Seal, the Grand Chamberlain, by the late 1920s, played an important role in regulating relations between the Court and the Government. Ichiki Kitokuro, himself a staunch member of the group, had been, as Imperial Household Minister from 1925 to 1933, concerned with the general supervision of Imperial Household affairs, that is, with the management of the public role of the Emperor in Court.15 In respect of this function, the Imperial Household Minister had close contact with the Home Ministry and specifically with the Chief of the Metropolitan Police, over whom he held limited authority. Ichiki’s credentials as a constitutional monarchist were irreproachable. As a professor at Tokyo Imperial University and in fact one of Minobe’s teachers, he had taught that the ‘supreme right of rule’ was lodged in the state and exercised by the Emperor as the highest organ; that the power of the Emperor was not bound by that of any other of the organs of state but that the Emperor did act in co-operation with them and was therefore a constitutional monarch and Japan, a constitutional monarchy. Similarly, the leadership of the government, though no longer with the political parties after the assassination of Inukai in 1932, was still closely allied with Saionji. Both Admiral Saito Makoto, Prime Minister from 1932 to 1934, and Admiral Okada Keisuke, were strongly identified with the policies of the Saionji group and had been instrumental in pushing through the London Naval Treaty. In 1934, at his own request, the Genro was assisted in the selection of a successor to Prime Minister Saito by the Jushin, a council of senior statesmen consisting of the leading constitutional monarchists of the Saionji group. The resulting Okada Cabinet was, like the Saito Cabinet which preceded it, notably sensitive to the advice of the Genro. The appointment of Okada Keisuke had been a special blow to a man who had earned the Genro’s particularly intense dislike and who himself had harboured hopes of becoming prime minister, Vice President of the Privy Council, Hiranuma Kiichiro. Thus, when the Minobe affair began, Saionji’s appointees were still firmly entrenched in all civilian posts responsible for regulating access to the throne and for presenting the public face of the throne to the

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government and the people. Given the structure and practice of Japanese politics at that time, they thus had a near monopoly on the use of the ultimate sanction for or against any political policy. They also had control of the cabinet. The weakness of the constitutional monarchists lay in the fact that, as an elite group, the base of their support within the country was disappearing and the political theories to which they subscribed were being repudiated on a steadily increasing scale. The Minobe affair was a manifestation of the continuing growth in right-wing activity provoked in part by this monopolisation of the important structural positions in the upper hierarchy by a small, elite group with declining support. The clarification issue which it spawned was a tool, contrived and used by a variety of individuals and groups to enhance their own positions, an issue which grew beyond all expectation. That it did so was almost certainly as Matsuoka Yosuke, the diplomat who had led Japan out of the League two years earlier, claimed: there had been a general reawakening of militant nationalism, of what he labelled ‘the Japanese spirit’.16 The Manchurian Incident, the withdrawal from the League of Nations and the abrogation of the Washington Treaty all commanded popular support. There was widespread disaffection with the political parties and a resurgence of support for the ideals embodied by the military. In the wake of the London Naval Conference, the membership and activity of the right-wing groups had entered a phase of accelerated growth. Although ideologically the nationalist groups ranged all the way from ‘restorationist’ to ‘radical reformist’, they were united in their opposition to the ‘progressives’ and ‘gradualists’ whose liberal, pro-Western philosophies had dominated Japan since the time of the Hara Cabinet.17 The years between the London Naval Conference and the attempted Showa restoration in February 1936, saw continuous, if unsystematic, attempts to erode the influence of the liberal group headed by Saionji. Many violent attacks were planned, and a large number actually executed, against the prime ministers and cabinets of these years and against the Genro, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Presidents of the Seiyukai and the Minseito, Inukai Tsuyoshi and Wakatsuki Reijiro and prominent leaders of the zaibatsu. Like the London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, the Minobe affair enhanced the trend towards co-operation and union already apparent among the right-wing groups, especially between military and civilian rightists. At the same time the rivalry between the two broad camps within the radical reformist group of the army was exacerbated and ultimately came to a head in the February

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Incident. This division, though most intense within the army, was also reflected within the naval and civilian radical groups. The interpretation of the Minobe affair as a right-wing attack on liberalism and specifically on the liberal influences close to the throne (Saionji, Ichiki and Makino) was put forward by the Genro at the very beginning of the affair in February 1935 and was generally accepted by the government and the police department.18 The significance of the resulting defeat of Minobe’s theories was not so much that it destroyed the intellectual basis for resistance to fascism as that it illustrated the extent to which Saionji and his group of liberal internationalists were already out of tune with the views now popularly held throughout the country. The prime movers in the attack on Minobe—the leader of the Kokuhonsha, Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro, the right-wing civilians, the Reservist Association, the military and the Seiyukai—represented the opinions of sizable sections of the community in their opposition to one or more aspects of Jushin politics and its constitutional, internationalist ideologies. The fact that the press, firmly in the intellectual camp, university educated and unsympathetic to the spiritual elements of nationalism espoused by large sections of the population, was in general pro-Minobe, somewhat obscured the extent to which the Minobe camp found itself isolated. Articles supportive of Minobe were, in any case, extremely prudent in tone. As Professor Maruyama argues, the incident was significant for the development of Japanese fascism because of its relationship to the opinions of the pseudo-intellectual section of the middle class.19 Its real significance however was not that it affected the opinion of that section, so much as that it gave expression to an already existing popular feeling and turned that feeling into political action. Though few of the protagonists in the affair could claim a real understanding of Minobe’s constitutional theories, three main elements provided the focus for attack.20 First there was the theory of state sovereignty and the Emperor-as-organ theory which followed from this. The theory of state sovereignty defined the state as possessing personality and rights, including the right of government. The idea that the Emperor was the supreme organ of expression of the will of the state followed naturally from this in the light of the Meiji Constitution. Minobe wrote that among the organs of state there were ‘direct organs’, whose creation was effected by a change in the organic law of the state and not by a delegation of powers by another organ. He argued futhermore that the Diet was such a direct organ, the establishment of which was

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not dependent on the Imperial will. It was nevertheless, in Minobe’s definition, a ‘participating organ’ and not a ‘ruling organ’, and therefore had a restricted and subordinate role. The existence of direct organs other than the monarchy made Japan a limited, or constitutional, monarchy. Secondly, Minobe attacked the use of the word kokutai (national polity) to define the form of government. He argued that the organisation of the direct organs of state, which constituted the form of government, was not kokutai, but seitai, that seitai was to do with law and not power and that matters of state form should not be confused with matters of national polity. Minobe’s interpretation of the ‘national polity’ articles of the constitution—Article 1: The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal’, and Article 5; The Emperor is head of the Empire, combining in himself the rights of sovereignty and exercising them according to the provisions of the constitution’ —was also controversial. He interpreted them as prescribing a monarchic form of government though not implying a monopoly of power in the hands of the Emperor, and as defining the position of the Emperor as an organ of the state. The third major element of Minobe’s constitutional theories to invite attack, was his interpretation of the Imperial prerogative; in particular the question of independent ordinance power and the Supreme Command prerogative. Here Minobe argued that since all exercise of prerogative was made on the advice and responsibility of ministers of state, it was, even in the extreme case of an Imperial Command, open to public debate and criticism. He wrote in his commentaries on the constitution: There is an idea current that the Imperial prerogative is sacred and inviolable—that because it is executed by Imperial will there can be no discussion of it nor can anyone debate its merits in any particular instance of its exercise…this is a gross error contrary to the spirit of our constitution.21

Minobe interpreted the power of independent ordinance very narrowly. He defined its scope as limited to ‘those matters only which are permitted by the constitution’,22 and was concerned that even this restricted interpretation was a threat to the legislative competence of the Diet. More pertinent to the attack on Minobe however were his views on the Emperor’s Supreme Command prerogative. Over the years, this prerogative had come to consist of two elements; that of Gunri or military command

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(strategy, discipline, training and disposition of troops) and that of Gunsei or military administration (number of divisions, armament supplies and such matters as conscription). Minobe argued that both elements should be subject to parliamentary responsibility and influence through cabinet responsibility to the Diet and that the practice of making them subject to disposition by ordinance was simply a long-term military usurpation of parliamentary power which was constitutionally unjustifiable. It was Minobe’s position on this issue which brought him into conflict with the military in 1930 and again in 1935. In 1930, Minobe had supported the Saionji group with a number of magazine articles defending the constitutionality of the Government’s decision to conclude the London Naval Treaty in the face of opposition from the Naval General Staff, wherein he had argued that the determination of the size of the armed forces was intrinsically linked with foreign and economic policies and therefore subject to cabinet responsibility. He had advised Harada, who at Saionji’s behest was seeking a constitutional line of defence for the government against attacks in the Diet for violation of the prerogative of Supreme Command: The Naval General Staff, as one of the Headquarter’s agencies, participates in planning under the sovereign authority of the Emperor. The staff’s views, as a matter of reference, should be given every serious consideration by the government; yet it does not have the right of decision.23

It was specifically Minobe’s untiring academic support of the liberal group’s efforts to restrict the role of the military in politics by means of constitutional interpretation, which ensured military support for any move to undermine his position. The major criticisms directed against Minobe’s work in 1935 were that it insulted the Imperial institution by defining the Emperor as an organ of the state and that it was subversive of the national polity. Yet these constitutional theories were neither new nor uncommonly held. The basis of much of Minobe’s thought was to be found in the teachings of his early mentor, Ichiki Kitokuro, and both Ichiki’s theories and Minobe’s extended, liberalised version of these theories, were accepted widely and uncritically by intellectuals within the universities, the Government and the Court itself. Saionji, who was himself involved at all stages of the preparation of the Meiji Constitution, subscribed to the organ theory and accepted

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Lorenz Von Stein’s description of the state as similar to a physical constitution of which, ‘the Emperor is the head, that is the chief.24 He was dismissive of those who believed the Japanese polity to be unique and of those who claimed that the Meiji Constitution was developed from some earlier, centuries-old, indigenous, unwritten constitution. ‘Special characteristics’, Saionji wrote, ‘be they of countries or people, are nearly always points of weakness or error. The way educationalists in particular prattle about the special characteristics of Japan, causes raised eyebrows amongst anybody of any intelligence.’25 Like Minobe, Saionji recognised no autonomous role for the Emperor and believed that constitutionally the Emperor could act only on the advice of his ministers and further that the quality of this advice should be subject to criticism. He advised the Emperor that ‘Emperorship under constitutional government, ought to consist of the sovereign’s acting solely on the advice of responsible officials’.26 The Emperor took the same view and had made complaints to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal about attempts by Prince Fushimi, then Chief of the Naval General Staff, to claim Imperial family privileges to present, without cabinet approval, a navy document concerning the London Naval Treaty. He told the Privy Seal: Perhaps this kind of thing was acceptable at the time of the Meiji Restoration, but since the establishment of the constitution, politics is carried on properly when those in positions of responsibility take responsibility.27

Saionji was also anxious to avoid any situation where the Emperor might be forced to choose between conflicting pieces of advice as is indicated by his attitude toward the use of Imperial Conferences, of which he argued: In short, they fundamentally violate the spirit of the constitution. If a conference were held which got out of hand, the Emperor would be put in a very difficult position. As I have said before, Imperial Conferences are not things to be held indiscriminately. The Imperial Conferences of the Meiji period and what we call Imperial Conferences today, are not the same thing. During the days of Meiji, the Emperor attended cabinet meetings. It was probably necessary for the Emperor to familiarize himself with politics and the constitution was not enforced so thoroughly as it is now.28

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He also believed the Emperor to be bound by the limits of the Constitution: There seem to be many people who argue that properly speaking, the Emperor unquestionably transcends the constitution, but the Emperor in fact has no existence outside the constitution. The Emperor’s position is clearly defined in the articles of the constitution as: ‘The Emperor is the head of the state’. The Emperor himself has made this point abundantly clear.29

On the position of the Diet, Saionji’s political philosophy and his practical politics diverged somewhat. He attempted throughout his early career to develop the activities of the Lower House so that it should occupy a meaningful position in decision making and he made great efforts to encourage the growth of normal constitutional procedure. However, his belief in representative government did not imply a belief in cabinet responsibility to the Diet. Theoretically he believed in the supremacy of party cabinets over transcendental cabinets but this was tempered by a further belief that politics was, without qualification, the art of the possible and that the conditions necessary for party government had not so far been achieved in Japan. His evaluation of the general level of political consciousness and the quality of the political parties was low and he recommended party cabinets on only a minority of occasions. Indeed by 1938, he seemed to be losing faith in the possibility of achieving constitutional government in Japan. Despite his equivocation on party cabinets, he placed strong and unchanging emphasis on the pre-eminence of the cabinet in government. He opposed the practice of allowing the President of the Privy Council to appeal directly to the throne as an infringement of the prerogative of the prime minister and he lost no chance to question the limits of Privy Council competence which, established alongside the cabinet and with real powers, was able to interfere with the cabinet from a position of unaceountability. Saionji also argued against the convention of an observer, in the person of the Grand Chamberlain, being present during reports by cabinet members irrespective of their personal ability or the severity of the political situation, on the grounds that it was the responsibility of the state minister to advise and assist the Emperor. On the position of the military in politics, just as Minobe argued the constitutional case for keeping active service military men out of the cabinet and replacing them with civilian ministers, so Saionji had

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strongly approved of Hara Kei’s plan to stand in for the Navy Minister, Kato Tomosaburo, whilst Kato attended the Washington Conference. He did so on the grounds that it would set a new precedent for a civilian to fill what was traditionally regarded as a service post.30 Saionji, like Minobe, believed that the Supreme Command prerogative was and should be constitutionally limited: At the same time as he is the Emperor, his Majesty is also Commander in Chief. ‘Commander in Chief’ and ‘Emperor’ are often thought of as equivalent but this is only one of the Emperor’s functions. ‘Commander in Chief’ is not the same thing as ‘Emperor’.31

As Prime Minister in 1911, Saionji had put his views on the restricted prerogative of the military into practice by turning down his Army Minister’s demands for a two division expansion on the grounds that the current cabinet should decide the level of military strength necessary for defence. Whether or not the views which Saionji and Minobe held in common could in fact be seen as a justifiable interpretation of the Meiji Constitution is another question. This aside, the charge made by the rightwing, that Saionji’s limited monarchy theories were essentially the same as Minobe’s constitutional theories, was substantially true. The implied threat to Saionji in the attack on Minobe was thus potentially of extreme importance both to Saionji and to the wider group of Saionji sympathisers of whom the Emperor was one. The reaction of the throne to the affair attracted attention at the time, when there were persistent rumours of its support for Minobe and later, after the publication of diaries which gave direct evidence of the Emperor’s views.33 The sharpness of the conflict between the Emperor and his Chief Aide de Camp Honjo, recorded in Honjo’s diaries, indeed clearly illustrates just how partisan the Emperor’s stance had become.34 Like the assassination of Chang Tso-lin and the Manchurian Incident, the Minobe affair showed the Emperor to be firmly allied to the Saionji camp. This was unsurprising. Over the years, Saionji’s opportunites for educating the Emperor in his own brand of political philosophy had been extensive. As chief advisor to the Crown Prince during his regency, he had selected the young heir’s advisors carefully and Minobe himself had lectured at the Court. The Emperor opposed the anti organ-theory movement in all the stages of its development and tried, albeit with little success, to bring pressure to

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bear on the Army Minister through the Chief Aide de Camp with whom, against all precedent, he discussed at length what was ostensibly a nonmilitary matter.35 Honjo listened repeatedly to the Emperor’s defence of Minobe and Ichiki and to suggestions that the Chief Aide de Camp should use his influence to halt the Army’s attacks on the two men. The Emperor spoke against non-scientific beliefs which slowed down progress and expressed his support of the organ theory in general terms, if not actually by name, arguing that to call the Emperor an organ of state was not in opposition to the national polity and that theories of Imperial rather than state sovereignty were open to charges of absolutism and were likely to cause difficulties with international treaties and international credit.36 The Emperor however disagreed with Minobe’s claim that Imperial proclamations were open to criticism and were not binding on the Diet. In this he was at at odds with Saionji, certainly in terms of Saionji’s own behaviour. The initial attack in the Diet on Minobe’s organ theory was launched in February 1934 by a retired Major General, Baron Kikuchi Takeo, a senior member of many of the leading nationalist societies, and took the form of criticism of the Government’s failure to suppress certain named texts used at Tokyo University. Minobe’s name was not mentioned directly and the question died without any apparent repercussions. Then, in January 1935, an article was published in the name of the Kokutai Yogo Rengokai, an alliance of right-wing groups founded in 1932. The article, ‘The philosophies of Dr. Minobe Tatsukichi and Dr. Suehiro Iwataro; their deleterious effects on national polity’, took the form of a series of questions.37 The question directed at Saionji and the Jushin was, ‘How can you fulfil your heavy responsibilities…whilst academics such as Dr. Minobe and Dr. Suehiro, who infringe sovereignty and bring disorder to the constitution, are allowed to remain in their posts?’38 Within a few weeks, the attack was taken up in both houses of the Diet. In the Lower House, Eto Genkuro criticised the Home Minister for allowing the publication of books by Minobe which posited an independent position for the Diet and which were an encouragement to communism. The issue was taken up again in the Upper House by Kikuchi as part of a general attempt to promote the ideals of nationalism and militarism. Kikuchi’s attack criticised by name both Minobe and Ichiki Kitokuro. The Government at first paid little attention to these rumblings. Prime Minister Okada praised Minobe’s reply to Kikuchi’s interpellations and assured the Genro that there was no cause for alarm. Nevertheless,

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immediately following these exchanges in the Diet, Eto filed an indictment with the Public Procurator’s Office charging Minobe with lèse majesté. Saionji was considerably less sanguine than the Prime Minister and from the first was inclined to view the gathering storm as essentially an attempt to oust the President of the Privy Council, Ichiki, and to see Minobe and the Emperor organ theory as simple scapegoats.39 The importance to the Saionji group of Ichiki’s position as President of the Privy Coucil, is suggested by the lengths to which Saionji went initially to keep the post out of the grasp of the Vice President, Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro, and by the efforts of the group to maintain Ichiki in his position throughout the crisis. The Privy Council had, for many years, been a thorn in the side of the Saionji group. In 1926, on the death of the President, Saionji had been unwilling to move Ichiki, who had only shortly before been appointed as Imperial Household Minister, and the Vice President of the Council, Baron Kuratomi Yusaburo, had instead been elevated. Kuratomi had proved to be very much under the sway of Hiranuma and Count Ito Miyoji, and Saionji and the Government had consequently experienced great difficulties with the Privy Council at the time of the ratification of the London Naval Treaty. It was these difficulties which convinced the Genro of the need for a lever within the Privy Council, an important but hostile group, to counterbalance the influence of Hiranuma, Ito and Viscount Kaneko Kentaro. In April 1934, Kuratomi died, and Ichiki, at Saionji’s insistence, was appointed President of the Privy Council in order to prevent Hiranuma, eight years Vice President of the Council, from attaining the Presidency. The move to block the promotion of the Vice President was unprecedented and was due directly to the Genro’s determination to keep Hiranuma out of the palace. If Hiranuma became President, Saionji argued: It would please a certain section of the military but there would be little good come of it and much evil. Of the three, Ichiki, Kiyoura and Hiranuma, Ichiki is the most familiar with the constitution and I would recommend him with confidence.40

At the time of the Minobe affair, Ichiki’s importance to the group was twofold; as President of the Privy Council he was a powerful lever in the manipulation of that body, he was also a physical bar to the advancement of Hiranuma. His desire to resign in 1935, whilst under attack in connection

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with Minobe and the organ theory, constituted a threat at a number of levels. First in that it would undermine the strength of the Saionji faction by giving Hiranuma and Ito a freer hand within the Council. If, as Saionji feared, Hiranuma were promoted to the presidency, or the appointment were made after the collapse of the Okada Government and under a Seiyukai administration, then the balance of power would shift even further against the Saionji group. Finally, Ichiki’s resignation would be an extreme embarrassment to the Government and could even precipitate its collapse. Both Okada and Saito were anxious for Saionji to dissuade Ichiki from his intention.41 It is clear that the driving force behind the decision to keep Hiranuma from the presidency was the Genro. The attack had barely begun before Ichiki himself and indeed the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain were agreeing that ‘If by any chance President Ichiki did resign it would be safer to promote Hiranuma’.42 Harada was dispatched hastily with a message for the Privy Seal: I thought that those close to the Throne and President Ichiki himself, all understood the Prince’s feelings on the troubles… and it is a cause for real unease that they can, out of the blue, so readily suggest the promotion of Vice President Hiranuma.43

It seems probable that, like Saionji, Makino and Suzuki saw the attack on Minobe as an Hiranuma-sponsored thrust at Ichiki but that unlike the Genro they hoped by placating Hiranuma with advancement to the Presidency of the Privy Council, to defuse the situation. Should Hiranuma again be thwarted by Saionji in his bid for the Presidency, it may have seemed to the Court officials that his ire would fall not only on Ichiki but also on the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Makino himself, who had many years before declared his support for the organ theory before the Privy Council. Such a policy of containment of radical pressure by piecemeal concessions came to be regularly followed by the Genro. However, his fear and dislike of Hiranuma precluded any such moves at this stage. It was not until the Saionji group was reeling from the bloody attacks of February 1936 that Saionji could be persuaded to acquiesce in Hiranuma’s promotion. Despite Saionji’s later insistence that he had not been directly concerned in co-ordinating resistance to the attack on Minobe, it is evident that the Genro was deeply involved, first in supporting the Government and

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subsequently, when Okada’s efforts on Minobe’s behalf began to flag, in attempting to prevent any concessions by the Government which might damage the position of the liberal group. During the first weeks of the affair, Saionji’s secretary, Harada, met on at least six occasions with Kido, the Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, to discuss the organ theory question. Harada discussed the issue with the SuperintendentGeneral of the Metropolitan Police, Oguri, Baron Iwakura Michitomo of the Koseikai, the Prime Minister, Okada, the Minister of Home Affairs, Goto Fumio, Colonel Suzuki Teiichi, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, Major-General Nagata Tetsuzan, Railway Minister, Uchida Shinya, the Chief Secretary of the Privy Council, Murakami Yukikazu and the Minister of Justice, Ohara Tadasu. He met also with Terauchi Hisaichi, commanding officer of the Formosan Army, whom he warned against any military incitement or of involvement in the controversy.44 As the affair dragged on into the early summer of 1935, both Saionji and the Emperor became critical of government laxity in enforcing censorship of rightist propaganda pertinent to the Minobe affair. Suggestions were made to the Prime Minister and to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal that measures might be taken to make press censorship more effective. The hand of Saionji could be seen too in press reports denouncing the affair as ‘a terrible plot by a faction centring on Hiranuma’; this despite the Prime Minister’s rejection of the Genro’s suggestions that a counter attack be mounted against the Vice President of the Privy Council and his supporters.45 The need for more effective censorship of the press, especially of its coverage of affairs of international significance, is a recurring theme in the Harada diaries. Indeed, Saionji’s robust attitude toward manipulation of the press tends to refute claims that his idealism made him unrealistic as a politician. He himself summed up his philosophy succinctly: ‘In politics, the first and foremost thing is to tackle the problems which one faces on the basis of actual conditions; ideals and imagination are not the stuff of politics.’46 This attitude of realism could be seen too in Saionji’s views on electoral malpractice during the elections held that summer: The regulation of elections is an extremely laudable idea. However we must remember that it is people we are dealing with. Therefore although it would not do for us to acknowledge bribery, it is doubtful, if we abjure the use of money completely, whether the elections will result in success. It would be ludicrous if the government were to become the

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minority party and would cause considerable difficulties. I do not doubt but that Prime Minister Okada is well aware of this but it will be most peculiar if the Home Minister does not make sure that he doesn’t get too far away from reality.47

Although, as these comments make clear, the Genro continued to support the Government, the evidence of the Harada diaries suggests that Saionji’s position gradually came to diverge from that of the Government as Okada, his cabinet threatened, moved to conciliate Minobe’s attackers. It was undoubtedly Saionji’s rigid stance against sacrificing Minobe which determined the Government’s initial firm response but Okada’s public statements show a steady move away from the resolute position he took at the start of the attack and as the Prime Minister manoeuvred to protect the Cabinet, the distance between his own and Saionji’s position grew. After their initial open, if qualified, support for Minobe, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice, made piecemeal concessions to prevent the escalation of the issue into a wide ranging threat to the balance of power. Okada’s first unavailing hope was that Minobe could be persuaded to clarify his position without recourse to judicial action.48 By late June, despite Saionji’s fears that any punishment of Minobe would play into the hands of a section of the public prosecutor’s office anti-pathetic to the liberal group, the Prime Minister was not prepared to battle for Minobe any further. It was Saionji’s opinion that, ‘You could argue that the loss of one castle is the loss of one castle, but in the end it will probably reach as far as Makino and Ichiki’.49 Okada nevertheless let the Genro know that unless Minobe resigned from his official positions, the public prosecutor’s office would institute proceedings against him. The attack on Minobe, begun by Eto and Kikuchi in the Diet, was embraced by different groups for different ends. For the army, it became a weapon for both sides of the factional struggle between the Mazaki/Araki, Kodo group and the Nagata/Hayashi, Tosei group. There were of course ideological as well as purely self-interested reasons for the attack by the military on Minobe but primarily the Mazaki group hoped, by discrediting Saionji and the Jushin, to undermine the pre-eminent position of the Tosei faction with which the Saionji group had a working relationship. The Tosei faction, on their part, sought to increase the reliance of the Saionji group on their co-operation. The Minobe affair thus came to have significance for a number of apparently unrelated issues. The expansion of hostilities by Japanese troops in North China during 1935 was closely related to the struggle for pre-eminence between the

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two main army factions, the Tosei and Kodo groups and to the fight for survival of the Saionji group, The Kodo faction analysed Japan’s defence requirements primarily in terms of the threat from the Soviet Union, Domestically, they supported a policy of radical reform which included the eradication of the Genro and other members of the liberal, constitutional monarchist group, the zaibatsu and the political parties. Their political contacts included men like Baron Hiranuma and, to a lesser but still significant extent, Prince Konoe, who though he disagreed with calls for the eradication of the Genro and Jushin, nevertheless believed their ideas to be out of date and their existence to be an obstacle to progress.50 Domestically the Tosei faction was prepared to use the constitutional system and its contacts within the liberal group, the zaibatsu and the parties in order to maximise its own control, first within the military organisation itself and then within the political structure as a whole. The Tosei group, otherwise known as the ‘Strike South’ faction, was committed to the consolidation of Japan’s position in China and more specifically, in 1935, to the creation of an autonomous region under Japanese control in North China. The terms ‘Nanshinron’ and ‘Hokmhinron’, although used popularly from the Meiji period to mean ‘Strike South’ and ‘Strike North’, were of dubious validity as a simple description of the policies the two factions favoured. Hokushinron in fact indicated a continental policy rather than referring solely to a policy directed against the Soviet Union, whilst the meaning of Nanshinron was more vague and referred more properly to the economic penetration of South East Asia. Nevertheless, the domestic struggle between the triangle of forces—the Kodo, Tosei and Saionji groups—which centered in 1935 on the attack on Minobe and calls for clarification of the national polity, had far reaching implications for military developments in North China; developments which resulted in May 1935 in an attack on Tientsin. The Tientsin Incident was known popularly as a second Manchurian Incident. As with the Minobe affair, there was some divergence of opinion between Okada and the Cabinet on the one side and Saionji on the other. The Genro pressed the Government for firm action against unauthorised army activity but was told by the Foreign Minister that the matter concerned the powers of the Supreme Command and was outside his jurisdiction. With the Army Minister and the Chief of the General Staff, Prince Kanin, absent from Tokyo, Harada dicussed the problem with the Grand Chamberlain. The Grand Chamberlain then suggested to the Prime

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Minister that he should consult with the Foreign Minister and appeal to the Emperor who had already indicated his concern and had tried, through his Chief Aide de Camp, to get news of the situation in Tientsin. Saionji continued through Harada to push Okada to take action. On May 25th and 31st, June 4th, 7th, 10th, 11th and 13th, Harada discussed the Genro’s concerns with the Prime Minister, who throughout continued to argue that the incident would be settled locally under the control of the Chief of the General Staff. Saionji was of a different mind: Really, the military’s way of going about things is outrageous. If we just look on silently for any length of time, it will end in disloyalty and that would make things very difficult.51

Finally, on June 13th, Okada asked Saionji and the Court officials to stop interfering in the North China issue. Saionji’s response was predictable: At the moment, what could we do even if we were to make a hue and cry? In any case, since the Prime Minister has made his point so clearly, I can’t see that there is anything to be done but to keep quiet and watch what he does.52

The reason for Okada’s reluctance to press the army over the North China incident at this juncture is clear. The group which stood to gain by an expansion of influence in China was the Tosei faction, the faction with which Okada had to reach an accommodation if the Minobe affair were to be defused and his Cabinet to retain its position. There is a strong case for arguing that the Prime Minister gave a free hand in North China to the Tosei group, against the wishes of Saionji, as a direct result of the need to retain the support of that group, or at least to stop its participation in the struggle to remove Minobe and ultimately the Genro, the senior statesmen and the Government. In this, Okada was fairly successful. The Army Minister utilised this hold on the government to make demands in the domestic field but the Tosei group did not actively participate in the efforts to bring down the government. The threat of domestic upheaval as the price of suppressing army activity in China was a well-used cudgel for beating successive governments in the 1930s. In 1935, the domestic upheaval threatened was the overthrow of Minobe and the constitutional monarchists by a movement to clarify the national polity. North China was the price paid for stopping this movement. The links between the Saionji group and the

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Tosei faction were further strengthened during 1935 by the continuing transfer of officers of the Kodo faction culminating in July in the transfer of Mazaki from his influential post as Inspector General of Education to that of Supreme War Counsellor. Saionji monitored this purging of the army closely and interfered actively to maintain Tosei faction leader General Hayashi, as Army Minister throughout this period.53 When Mazaki was finally removed, Saionji sent a message of congratulations to the Army Minister and wrote to the Prime Minister: The resolution shown by the Army Minister is certainly due in part to the Prime Minister’s strong determination. This has been a good thing, not simply in domestic terms but also internationally, where it will result in greater trust. I am extremely well satisfied.54

The selection of Watanabe Jotaro (one of the few army leaders known to be in sympathy with the organ theory) as the replacement for Mazaki, suggests that the transfer had two functions. First, the removal of Mazaki profoundly undermined the position of the Kodo faction vis-a-vis the Tosei faction. It was also intended to hasten the supression of the organ theory controversy.55 It is tempting to condemn Saionji’s co-operation with the Tosei group as a gross misreading of the situation; an overestimation of his own ability to manipulate this faction in order to eradicate the influence of the Kodo group. It has even been suggested that were it not for the loss of power by the Kodo group as a result of this co-operation between 1934 and 1937, the China war would have been prevented. And yet, Saionji had no illusions about the character of the men with whom he was dealing. He was to say of the Hayashi Cabinet two years later: ‘They don’t understand anything. Really, the military don’t understand things like “for the sake of the nation” or “for the sake of the people”.’56 What guided the Genro’s judgement on this occasion, as it had throughout his political career, was his belief in the necessity to avoid violent change which would imperil the Imperial institution and undermine progress toward a system of constitutional goverment. It was this which determined Saionji’s decision to continue to cooperate with and thereby to bolster, the power of the Tosei faction. If it was a misreading of the situation, it was rather an overestimation of the power of the military in 1935 and an underestimation of the strength of the liberal group. But public feeling was indeed drifting rapidly away

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from the liberal group as Saionji recognised when he complained some months later: Ultimately, if there is a clash, the constitution will go by the board, already it is half abandoned. Thus, whatever may be said, there is no alternative to proceeding slowly and gradually.57

Despite the accommodation with the Tosei faction, the clarification debate continued. In June the Government came under pressure from both the army and the Seiyukai to clarify the definition of the national polity. The Seiyukai pressed for the elimination of the organ theory and the removal of its supporters from all public posts. These attacks resulted in a formal statement by the Government on August 3rd, clarifying the definition of Japan’s national polity. At the same time, the Government publicly defended Ichiki and the latest target of attack, Cabinet Secretary Kanamori Tokujiro. It was at this stage, five months after the first broadside against Minobe had been fired, that the attack turned openly on the Saionji group. The assassination, only days after the Government’s statement, of Major General Nagata Tetsuzan, Harada’s confidante and the primary force behind the transfer of Mazaki, was widely interpreted as an indirect attack on Saionji and the Saionji group for their involvement in Mazaki’s removal. A document circulated condemning The treason of the Genro and Jushin who, by putting the Emperor organ theory into practice, destroying the national polity and throwing the army into confusion, strive to prevent the Showa Restoration’.58 When the Army Minister, Hayashi, assaulted on all sides for his failure to demand further government action on the clarification issue and criticised for his failure to accept responsibility for Nagata’s assassination, indicated that he wished to resign, Saionji warned the army against putting forward ridiculous conditions concerning the appointment of a new Army Minister and against plotting to overthrow the Cabinet. And yet, it seemed that the appointment of General Kawashima as Hayashi’s successor marked another step backward by the Prime Minister who, despite earlier refusals to acknowledge that personnel matters could be affected by the attack on Minobe, allowed proceedings to be initiated against Kanamori in response to the army’s demands.59 The next blow to the Saionji group came from Minobe himself. On September 18th, Minobe resigned from the Upper House and was granted

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a reprieve from prosecution. Harada wrote that the Minobe affair had been settled. The Emperor expressed his pleasure to Okada and the Army Minister expressed the opinion that there was nothing more to be done and the matter should be dropped. But Minobe’s statement to the press the following day that his beliefs had changed not an iota, shattered the brief peace. Harada wrote that the rightists and ‘a certain section of the army’ had been provided with extremely valuable material with which to bring down the Cabinet.60 A letter from Minobe to the Minister of Justice three days later, retracting some of his earlier statements to the press, was seen as a conspiracy by the groups it was intended to placate. Most worrying of all to the Saionji group was the effect this might have on Ichiki and Kanamori. Pressure mounted on the Government to make a second statement clarifying its position on the national polity. At the same time, the voices attacking the Jushin bloc, which had gradually strengthened over the summer, took on renewed vigour. It was against the Genro and the Saionji group that the clarification movement now directed its energies. Articles appeared in newspapers and magazines identifying individual members of the Jushin and condemning them as ‘germ carriers of the Minobe sickness’.61 The attacks on Saionji were now more direct and linked the Genro with Minobe’s ‘anti-kokutai’ constitutional theories. The Seiyukai had first turned their sights on the Jushin and demanded the impeachment of the elder statesmen in June. Under the direction of Suzuki Kisaburo and Kuhara Fusanosuke, the party leadership had discussed means of resistance to the ‘bloc behind the Throne’. Suzuki told a meeting of the Seiyukai leaders that, ‘as the retrogressive and negative spirit which guides the bloc runs counter to the positive policy of the Seiyukai, this group of big men or elder statesmen must be attacked’.62 Both the Seiyukai and the military authorities believed that Okada had brought pressure to bear on the judiciary to dismiss Minobe’s case in order to protect Ichiki and Kanamori. The Miyako reported Seiyukai opinion that: ‘In this, he (Okada) has been showing consideration for the desires of important statesmen near the Throne, against whom the party has been campaigning for several months.’63 A number of articles appeared calling for the resignations of Ichiki, Kanamori and Makino and those adherents of the organ theory like Okada who put the theory into practical effect.64 The Okada Cabinet was condemned as a Jushin Cabinet and Okada as a Jushin robot.65 And yet, as one newspaper wrote, the most extraordinary thing was that Saionji himself was treated as if he were outside the bloc.66 This initial failure to take issue directly with Saionji seriously undermined

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Suzuki’s attack, and the constitutional issues raised by the existence of Jushin politics remained untouched. Superficially, it did indeed seem then as if Saionji had ‘reached a position…almost above criticism’.67 By October this began to alter. Two of the more virulent attacks on Saionji himself were written and distributed by Eto Genkuro, the initiator of the attack on Minobe. The first was entitled: The existence of the Genro and Jushin has become detrimental to the advance of the nation and to the clarification of National Polity’, the second: ‘Concerning Prince Saionji, self styled disciple of that commander of the communist party, Acollas’. In the first tract, copies of which still exist, Justice Minister Ohara and the Prime Minister were attacked for defending Ichiki and Kanamori, at the instigation of the Genro, despite their known organ theory allegiancies. The article went on to describe Saionji’s ten years in revolutionary France, his association with the Toyo Jiyu Shinbun, his friendship with the radical Nakae Chomin, and his failure to obey an Imperial decree at the time of the Taisho crisis. Eto accused the First Saionji Cabinet of allowing the formation of the socialist party and identified what it called Saionji’s democratic socialism as the organ theory by a different name. Ichiki was recognised as a favourite of Saionji and under his protection. The Saionji group of appointees were identified as the Privy Seal, Makino, the Grand Chamberlain, Suzuki, the President of the Privy Council, Ichiki, Saito Makoto, Wakatsuki Reijiro, Shidehara Kijuro, Ugaki Kazushige and Izawa Takio. They were further identified as supporters of Shidehara diplomacy who eulogised parliamentarianism, spread democracy, favoured the Minseito and poisoned the national polity. It was this group which violated the rights of the Supreme Command. It was they who opposed the Manchurian Incident, the attack on Jehol and Kum Island and they who fought against withdrawal from the League and the abrogation of the Washington Treaty. Now they were impeding the advance of the nation and hindering the clarification of the national polity. The article concluded that no matter how many cabinet changes were made, there would be no real change without the removal of Saionji: ‘Saionji is their sectarian headquarters. If the Genro falls, his friends the Jushin will fall too.’ This then was ultimately the aim of the clarification movement. From its beginnings as, perhaps, a personal attack on Minobe, the affair grew rapidly into a powerful political movement to restructure the power groupings of Japanese politics. It became a part not only of internal army

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struggles but also of inter-party and intra-bureaucracy politics. For the Seiyukai it presented an opportunity to attack the Minseito-supported Cabinet; but more importantly it offered the possibility of silencing Minobe, a Minseito partisan, and of removing Saionji, the chief block to the formation of a Seiyukai Cabinet. For Hiranuma, the Minobe affair held promise of immediate personal advancement and a significant shift in the balance of power away from Saionji and the constitutional monarchists and to the Hiranuma faction and an emergent alienated and impatient generation of so-called ‘new bureaucrats’. For the military, the affair was an opportunity to effect a shift in the balance of power from civilian government to military government by undermining the position of the dominant liberal group. It also set the stage for an intensification of the factional struggles for power within the army. Used as a tool in both factional and personal struggles, the movement to clarify the national polity lacked unity. Although this diminished its effectiveness, the threat to the Saionji group and the government was real and the affair undoubtedly undermined the power basis of the liberal group. It did this in several ways: first it silenced Minobe and ultimately resulted in the resignation of Ichiki, Makino and Kanamori; second it gave voice to the nationalist, pro-military, anti-Jushin feelings which had been growing in strength since the beginning of the decade; finally it resulted in steps being taken by Prime Minister Okada to protect himself and the Genro, steps which allowed the Tosei faction to consolidate its position so that after the February Incident its voice became increasingly heard in the formulation of both domestic and foreign policies.

Crisis Year 1936: the February Incident At the beginning of 1936, the Saionji group, despite the struggles of the previous year, still ostensibly retained its prominent position in Japanese politics. Saionji’s absolute opposition to any new appointment as Genro ensured that he would remain as sole holder of that position and that the institution of Genro would end with his death. Although Minobe had retired from public life and the Okada Cabinet had been forced to issue a second declaration of clarification of the national polity in October the previous year, the group maintained its hold on the Court and Saionji his power to recommend the prime minister. Saionji refused Ichiki’s repeated requests to be allowed to resign and at the start of the year, Ichiki was still

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in his post as President of the Privy Council and still blocking the path to advancement for Hiranuma. Some weeks earlier Saionji had sent Harada with a message to Okada: When Kido came earlier (December 4th), he thought that this would be a good time, but I think it would be an extremely bad time for the resignations (of Ichiki and Makino). Makino keeps on about the state of his health but advising the Throne is a question of spirit; it does not involve physical service. That being the case, he can stay in bed and it will not affect his position as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. If he resigned now it would be assumed that he had done so because of the attack on Minobe …. But it depends which way you look at it; perhaps it would be better to change both now and be done with it. I will leave that decision to the Prime Minister. Please tell him that if and when he comes to a firm decision, I will give him my fullest support. However, when he does finally come to a decision, I would like to have him discuss it with me beforehand.68

When possible successors to the two were under consideration, Makino, Kido and the Prime Minister were initially in favour of Konoe to succeed Makino as Privy Seal. Saionji however was opposed to appointing Konoe to such a sensitive position but was willing to consider him as President of the Privy Council. The Emperor, the Imperial Household Minister and the Grand Chamberlain also wished to pass over Konoe in favour of Admiral Saito as Privy Seal. Harada discussed the question with Kido in terms of the candidate’s relationship with Hiranuma.69 On December 21st, Makino’s resignation was accepted by the Prime Minister and the Imperial Household Minister but Ichiki was pressed to remain. The Genro was particularly concerned to avoid making any change in the post of Privy Seal under a Seiyukai Government.70 He wrote: Theoretically, the question of the Privy Seal is under the jurisdiction of the Imperial Household Minister, but in fact, the relationship (between the posts of Privy Seal and prime minister), is of such importance that the opinions of the Prime Minister must be given the greatest weight. Therefore I want you to talk to the Prime Minister at length, have him consider the matter again and if he is happy with Saito telephone me.71

Saito was appointed to the post on December 26th.

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Saionji’s efforts illustrate with great clarity the political importance of this post and thus of the Court in the political process. The relationship between the Privy Seal and the prime minister was a two-way affair and when the two officials were in basic agreement on domestic and diplomatic policy, the role of both the cabinet and the Court was enhanced, When, on the other hand, the Genro was forced to recommend as prime minister someone with whose political philosophy he was not in agreement, the Saionji appointee to the post of Privy Seal could serve as a barrier between the Court and the cabinet. Since the relationship between the Privy Seal and the prime minister was of such importance that Saionji felt it necessary to take into consideration the views of the prime minister in making the appointment, it was imperative that the appointment be made before a cabinet essentially hostile to the Saionji group was formed. The anti-Seiyukai, pro-Minseito bias of the Saionji group suggested by these manoeuvres is noteworthy. Nor was this all. In addition to his manipulation of personnel changes at the Court, Saionji also, through his younger brother, the head of the Sumitomo family, provided considerable financial support for Okada and the Minseito in the 1936 elections. Given the general shift by the zaibatsu away from financial support of the parties, the large sums of money provided by Sumitomo for the Minseito suggest the strength of both the Saionji-Sumitomo and the SaionjiMinseito relationship. Other important Court posts remained in the hands of the Saionji group. Yuasa Kurahei who had replaced Chinda Sutemi as Grand Chamberlain in 1929, was, in 1936, still active in that role as a prominant member of the Saionji group. Yuasa, a personal friend of Ichiki Kitokuro and Saito Makoto, had been recommended by these men to Saionji and accepted by him as Imperial Household Minister as a way of ‘broadening the base’ of those who served at Court.72 The presence of the Saionji group in all the important civilian posts in the Court and, in the shape of Okada, in the government, was to receive a shattering blow in the crisis which broke in domestic politics at the end of February 1936. It was a blow from which the group never recovered. Not only did the balance of power undergo a fundamental shift, but Saionji himself in the following months seemed to recognise the extent to which the liberal values he represented had been rejected. The events of 1935 had increased the isolation of the liberal group and had advanced the fortunes of the Tosei faction and the ‘new bureaucrats’. Nevertheless, until the February (2.26) Incident, members of the Saionji group retained their hold on key positions of authority, even though the exercise of their power was

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circumscribed. The February Incident was of enormous significance both for the Saionji group and for Japanese politics. 1936 brought the demise of Saionji’s power. It was the point of no return for the constitutional monarchists in general and Saionji in particular. The men who instigated and executed the February Incident, like the senior officers who stood to benefit from the uprising, were, with very few exceptions, Kodo faction sympathisers. The assassinations on February 26th, 1936 of Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, the newly appointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Viscount Saito Makoto, and the Inspector General of Military Education General, Watanabe Jotaro, and the unsuccessful assassination attempts on Grand Chamberlain Suzuki Kantaro, Prime Minister Okada Keisuke and Count Makino, were essentially a continuation in violent form of the Minobe affair and the ‘clarification of Kokutai’ movement of the previous year. These movements had aimed to destroy the influence of the Genro and the liberal bloc and thereby improve the lot of the Kodo faction. Instead, the affair had tipped the balance of power towards the Tosei faction and away from both the liberals and the Kodo faction. This shift of power to the Tosei group was carried to a dramatic conclusion by the events of February 1936. Plans for a massive attack against the Saionji group had been under consideration for some time. Indeed, throughout the early thirties, such plans were being hatched intermittently. The original planning of the February Incident can be traced back to August 1935 when, following the assassination of Nagata Tetsuzan, the principal leaders of what was to become the February uprising, resolved to kill Saionji, Privy Seal Makino and Mazaki’s replacement as Inspector General of Military Education, General Watanabe.73 These plans were shelved in December 1935 in favour of an attempt inspired by the founder of Hitachi, the Seiyukai supporter Kuhara Fusanosuke, to overthrow the Okada Government. The plans were revived again in a more ambitious form when this venture failed. A meeting at the end of December of thirty junior officers (attended also by civilian rightists Kita Ikki and Nishida Zei) to protest against the appointment of Admiral Saito as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, was, in all probability, where these plans were reshaped.74 Both the August and December conspiracies were known at the time to the Prime Minister and to the Army Minister but no steps were taken to apprehend the conspirators. In January and early February concrete plans took shape to add to the original list of targets the new Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Grand Chamberlain and Prime Minister Okada. As

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the plans progressed, the scale of the proposed action grew rapidly until the insurgent forces numbered approximately 1,400 officers and men drawn from the First and Third Regiments, the Third Imperial Guards Regiment and the Seventh Regiment of Field Operations. The junior officers discussed their plans in general terms with senior army officers and obtained (or believed they had obtained) their support.75 The final timing of the uprising was settled by the decision to transfer the First Division for a period of combat duty in Manchuria in the spring. The First Division contained a sizable proportion of the ‘Young Officers’, the radical junior officers whose earlier tenuous relationship with the Kodo generals had been strengthened by their co-operation in the attack on Minobe and by the clarification movement. For these young officers time was short if they were to act to destroy the liberal group and pave the way for a Showa Restoration. The role of the navy in the planning of the conspiracy is far from clear. Factional groupings within the navy (Treaty Faction and Fleet Faction) corresponded to the pro-and anti-Shidehara diplomacy factions. Within and in addition to these two major groupings were a number of other groups aligned on the basis of both policy and personality. The FleetTreaty faction split was mirrored closely in the divisions between the General Staff and the Navy Ministry and also between the Administrative and Command factions. There is no concrete evidence of any involvement of high level naval personnel in the conspiracy, nor any suggestion which can be substantiated, that Fleet faction senior officers were implicated in the planning. Nevertheless, it was evident that the cause of the Fleet faction would be served by the assassination of members of the Saionji group, especially by that of the Treaty faction Admirals. The Young Officers in the army were not without contacts at high levels in the navy. One avenue of liaison with the navy throughout the planning stage was Nishida Zei.76 There were also ties between the Kodo faction and the Fleet faction stemming from Mazaki Jinzaburo’s close personal relationship with Kato Kanji and Admiral Yamamoto Eisuke. Mazaki’s relationship with Yamamoto Eisuke, the nephew of Yamamoto Gombei, had developed whilst both were studying in Germany.77 The relationship between Kato Kanji and Mazaki had begun around 1928 and had become very close. Kato and Mazaki met frequently to discuss military questions and national affairs and shared many common views on these subjects. Mazaki aligned himself squarely with Kato during interrogations which followed the incident, acknowledging him as ‘a friend for whom I have the utmost trust and respect’.78 Under Kato’s guidance, the Fleet faction

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had acted in concert with the Kodo faction during the clarification issue and had pressured the Navy Minister Osumi, to take a strong anti-Minobe line in cabinet meetings. There was a second string too to the Kato-Mazaki link. Mazaki’s younger brother Rear Admiral Mazaki Katsuji (transferred to the reserve following the February Incident), was a member of the Fleet faction with a close relationship himself to Kato and to Kato’s son, for whom he had acted as an intermediary in marriage. The plans of the insurgents suggest that they intended to rely heavily on the help of the Fleet faction, and in particular on the help of Kato (who had already used his family relationship with Prince Fushimi to bring Fushimi and Mazaki together), in securing Mazaki’s nomination as prime minister.79 It is noteworthy that shortly after the uprising started, Kato Kanji met with Mazaki by prior arrangement at the residence of Prince Fushimi and that together they urged the Chief of Staff to bring the situation under control by proposing a strong cabinet and the promulgation of an Imperial Rescript. The attacks on the senior statesmen on the morning of February 26th were not unexpected. The activities of the junior officers had been under surveillance since the previous August. The extent to which the details of the plot were known and by whom, is still the subject of heated debate. The military police, hampered by army factionalism and by the antagonism between themselves and the Regimental Commanding Officers, failed to produce any concrete information from their investigations of the First and Third Regiments. The military authorities were not alone in being guilty of indifference and negligence. The continuous rumours of impending attack numbed the responses and reduced the credibility of the threat in the minds of many. This general mood of resignation was almost certainly accompanied in certain quarters by the idea that there was factional benefit to be had if an uprising were to occur. Thus for a variety of reasons, despite strong warnings from a number of sources that detailed plans for an uprising were underway, the response from the military police, the army and the government authorities was half hearted. At Okitsu, Saionji’s home in a coastal village outside the bustle of Tokyo, the police guard had indeed been increased late in 1935 at the request of Saionji’s secretary, Nakamura Kojuro, whose contacts with the rightwing, the army and the police, had made him fearful of an attack on the Genro. There were also long-standing contingency plans for removing Saionji by boat from the coast behind the Okitsu house, Zagyoso, to Izu. Had an attack been mounted on Saionji, however, there is little doubt that it would have been successful.80

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The uprising finally came in the early morning of February 26th, 1936 against a background of deep new snow. There is now a mass of literature dealing with the horrific events of these few hours and the days of confusion which followed. The descriptions of the nature and scope of the attacks are extensive and colourful.81 During the early hours of the incident however the extent of the insurgency was unclear even to those in authority in Tokyo. In Okitsu, and even more so in the provinces and in Manchuria, it was difficult to assess the situation in Tokyo. Communication from the capital was disrupted and although telephones had been functioning until about 7.30 on the morning of the 26th, continued snowfall and strong winds severed lines between Tokyo and Okitsu at about this time. Two Shizuoka policemen were sent to Tokyo to gather information and these men telephoned their reports on the railway telephone.82 The first report received in Okitsu was from Kido, secretary to the assassinated Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, who telephoned the Genro from the palace at 6.40 a.m. to inform him of the fatal attack on Saito. As news from the capital gradually extended the picture of the situation it became clear that rebel soldiers had seized a sizable section of central Tokyo. The occupied areas included the private residence of the Army Minister, the Army Ministry, General Staff Headquarters, Defence Headquarters, the Metropolitan Police Headquarters, the Prime Minister’s residence and the Miyakezaka approach to the palace. The Finance Minister, Takahashi Korekiyo, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Admiral Saito Makoto, and the Inspector General of Military Education, General Watanabe Jotaro, were dead. Grand Chamberlain Admiral Suzuki Kantaro had been seriously wounded. Okada, hidden by maids in his own house, was presumed dead. His escape was reported to the palace by the afternoon but it was not until the following day that the Prime Minister was able to flee from the rebel-occupied house. Makino had been attacked at his hotel in Yugawara and it was not clear whether or not he had survived. The offices of the Asahi Shinbun had been attacked and the presses destroyed.83 Saionji was initially reluctant to leave his house and impair communication with the palace: It is likely that there will be a message from His Majesty, then I shall go directly to Tokyo. It is absolutely out of the question to seek refuge in a place where we are not in touch.84

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It may well have been the arguments of the Shizuoka Chief of Police, Hashimoto Seikichi, which persuaded Saionji of his own value to the rebel troops as a lever on the throne and secured his agreement to leaving the villa. The Chief of Police, an intimate of one of the rebels, warned Saionji that his information suggested that the Genro would be taken alive to advance the rebels’ demands.85 Saionji left in one of a convoy of cars down the Tokaido road, first to the house of the Chief of Police and later to the home of the prefectural Governor where massive security arrangements were mounted. Contingency plans for an escape by sea had been abandoned, in part because of the bad weather and in part because of the Genro’s insistence that he must remain accessible in case the Emperor should need him. Saionji’s whereabouts were immediately reported to the palace and regular telephone contact was maintained with the palace and in particular with Kido, throughout the day.86 In the meantime, sixty-five police and five military police were posted at Saionji’s house in preparation for his return. One of the more interesting questions concerning the role of the Genro and the Emperor during the incident is why Saionji’s journey to Tokyo was delayed for five days until March 2nd. As cabinet ministers and senior advisors, both civilian and military, hurried to the palace, Saionji remained away from the capital. It was not in fact until the afternoon of February 29th that Vice Chamberlain Hirohata telephoned Okitsu to ask the Genro to travel to Tokyo as soon as possible to advise on the formation of a new cabinet. Saionji was of course physically weak. He suffered from lumbago. Unaccustomed to exertion, he had been moved around Shizuoka on the 26th and 27th in an attempt to preserve the secrecy of his whereabouts. In 1936 Saionji was eighty-seven years old. Yet it seems unlikely that his physical condition was a significant factor in the decision to delay the call for him to travel to Tokyo. With the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal dead, it was the Imperial Household Minister, Yuasa, backed by Kido, who undertook to devise countermeasures against the political ambitions of both the insurgents and those who, although not personally involved in the uprising, sought to utilise it to achieve their own political ends. The main fears at the Court were two-fold. First that the situation would be manipulated to establish a military cabinet and second, that the position of the Emperor himself might be endangered. It was primarily the fear of a military cabinet emerging which resulted in Saionji’s continued absence from Tokyo throughout the

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incident. For three days the Emperor insisted that the rebels be forcibly suppressed. For three days the military authorities failed to move.87 It was not until the afternoon of the 29th that the occupied areas were finally cleared. While ever this situation obtained, Saionji’s presence in Tokyo would have brought the risk of his person and his name being used as authority for the formation of a military cabinet and would, by signalling that a cabinet change was underway, have enhanced the position of those who hoped to see a new cabinet installed prior to the termination of the incident. He therefore remained in Okitsu, in touch by telephone with the palace whilst the Emperor, advised by the Genro and the Court officials refused either to appoint an interim cabinet as the insurgents had demanded and the Army and Navy Ministers had recommended, or to accept the resignation of the Cabinet, until the affair was settled.88 The Emperor needed little persuasion. His immediate response to news of the rebellion had been violent and his opposition to any negotiations with the rebels unbending. His views had been made plain to the Chief Aide de Camp. Before he had received advice from either Saionji’s appointees at the Court or from Saionji himself in Okitsu, he had instructed Honjo that the ‘insurgents’ must be put down quickly and a bad situation used to best advantage.89 Indeed, so outspoken was the Emperor in his instructions to the Chief A.D.C. (that he did not want any change in the cabinet until the incident was settled and that he would not have a transcendental cabinet), that this openly political message was abridged before being passed on to the Army Minister.90 The Emperor was supported in his stance by the Imperial Household Minister, Yuasa, the Vice Grand Chamberlain, Hirohata, the President of the Privy Council, Ichiki, and Kido. As Imperial Household Minister, Yuasa would not under normal circumstances have met with the Emperor as he did during the crisis, nor have proffered advice on political issues. However, with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal dead, Yuasa abandoned his non-political role and with the support and advice of Kido, became the Emperor’s closest advisor. Yuasa, a career bureaucrat from the Home Ministry, was highly regarded by the Genro. Outspoken against both fascism and the political activities of the army, his political worth to the liberal group was recognised when he was subsequently appointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Saionji’s decision to recommend Yuasa in preference to Konoe, despite the general consensus in Konoe’s favour, was taken, he said, because they could not afford to have a

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robot in the position of Privy Seal.91 The other major source of support for the Emperor’s stand was the Treaty faction of the navy. Opposition to the coup was led by Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa, Commander of the Yokosuka Naval Station, who had made extensive preparations for an armed naval response against any army uprising. The Navy Ministry was heavily defended and gunboats, their guns trained on the centre of Tokyo, stood ready to evacuate the Emperor. This physical support from the navy undoubtedly helped to strengthen the stance of the Emperor and the Saionji group. The Emperor’s conduct during the incident was remarkable. He refused to let the cabinet resign or to accept a provisional prime minister. He condemned the officers as ‘insurgents’ and would offer no word of conciliation. He insisted on the quick suppression of the incident and repeatedly summoned both Honjo and Army Minister Kawashima to question them as to how preparations for the active suppression of the rebels were proceeding. Honjo, throughout, defended the rebels for the purity of their intentions: Their action was a selfish utilisation of the Emperor’s troops and, as a violation of Supreme Command, was a serious matter and something which of course cannot be permitted. But the spirit in which it was done was one of esteem for Emperor and country and we should not blame them.92

The Emperor’s reply to this not uncommon defence of the motives of the rebels summed up his attitude: Why should we forgive them when these brutal officers kill our right hand advisors?…. All my most trusted retainers are dead and their actions are aimed directly at me…. We ourselves will lead the Imperial Guards and suppress them.93

Only once before, in the aftermath of the assassination of Chang Tso-lin, had the Emperor interfered so overtly in political affairs and following the London Naval Conference, Saionji had attempted to avoid too overt an identification of the Emperor with the liberal group. This time, however, the Genro at least tacitly supported the Emperor’s active role. Both the Harada diaries and the Kido diaries confirm that close communication was maintained between Okitsu and the palace throughout the incident. They also document in detail the Emperor’s consistently strong stance

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and the fact of his active involvement in decision making. The necessity for the Emperor to take an open and active role in the resolution of a political power struggle was a great blow to Saionji and in the decisions taken during the days following the suppression of the incident, his determination that this necessity should never arise again, is very evident. The second major concern of the Court was whether support for the rebels would be forthcoming from within the Imperial family. The main cause of concern was the eldest of the Emperor’s younger brothers, Prince Chichibu. The Emperor had for several years exercised considerable vigilance regarding the connection between Prince Chichibu and the Young Officers and General Mazaki, whose part the Prince had taken against the Emperor on a number of occasions. In 1933, it became clear that the Prince had been meeting secretly with the right-wing activist, Kita Ikki.94 Prince Chichibu had therefore, against all precedent, been assigned a regional posting as Commander of the Battalion 8th Regiment at Hirosaki where access to the Young Officers and the civilian right wing was difficult. When the February Mutiny occurred there was an overwhelming fear at the Court that were any sympathy to be shown by Prince Chichibu for the cause of the Showa Restoration demanded by the Young Officers, then the fence sitters would fall like an avalance into the Kodo camp.95 On February 27th, against the advice of the Imperial Household Minister, Prince Chichibu returned to the capital. Measures were immediately taken to prevent the insurgents meeting with the Prince. On the Emperor’s orders he was met outside the capital and taken directly to the palace avoiding the Akasaka area where rebel troops were making statements of their aims.96 The Prince remained in the palace and was not allowed to move to his own residence in Aoyama. The reason for such circumspection was obvious. Irrespective of his personal inclinations, which were in any case of grave concern to the Emperor and to Saionji, Prince Chichibu, to an even greater extent than the Genro, would have proved a tremendously effective political lever had he fallen into the hands of the insurgents. Saionji had also been concerned for some years by Prince Chichibu’s relationship with members of the Kodo faction and by his suspected involvement in their plots and intrigues. The fears entertained by the Genro were voiced baldly on a later occasion in relation to the so-called Higashikuni affair, which occurred a few weeks after the February

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Mutiny, when a priest with connections with certain members of the Imperial family was arrested for predicting the death of the Emperor: I don’t know, it may well be because I am old that I say this and in any case, it will probably be after I’ve gone, but I cannot see what the devil is going to happen if the present mood continues for very long. There are some truly scandalous facts in Japanese history. Emperor Suizei for example, who succeeded Emperor Jimmu, in fact killed his older brother in order to ascend to the Throne and that is only one example. There are many more occurrences like that in the history of both Japan and China. Of course, such things could not happen now as a result of his own (the Emperor’s younger brother’s) initiative, but if by force of circumstances it came to such a pass, I really do not know what would happen then. Of course, it is not at all likely that such matters are under discussion by the Imperial family today, but one must bear this point firmly in mind.97

A few days later, he expanded on this: It is probably not something which will happen in my lifetime, but I want to warn both Kido and Konoe that the matter of the Imperial family is of the utmost moment. Japanese history has sometimes repeated itself and one can find a considerable number of examples where, urged on by hangers-on, a younger brother has killed an older brother in order to ascend to the Throne. Of course the Emperor’s younger brothers are not discussing anything of the sort and I do not believe that there is anything so ominous, or that there is such talk between Prince Chichibu and Prince Takamatsu and so on. However, if they were to be led astray by odd characters within the Court and were elements to emerge which got up to I don’t know what, then if we were not constantly on our guard…. The matter is of the utmost importance.98

It is easy, from such statements, to imagine the fears of the Saionji group when the Young Officers made their bloody presentation of the manifesto for a Showa Restoration. It is easy also to understand the unprecedentedly strong stance of the Emperor. In the event, their fears were not realised, It would seem that the final hope of the military advisors had been that Prince Chichibu would effect a change of heart in the Emperor and it was not until Princes Chichibu and Takamatsu had had audiences with the Emperor that the military advisers informed the rebel troops of the Emperor’s implacable opposition.99 In fact, Prince Chichibu had opposed

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the appointment of Mazaki as Prime Minister and had proposed a thorough purge of the army. The Prince’s concept of Imperial rule called for more rather than less interference by the Emperor and the prospect of himself as regent, controlled by threat of assassination, may well have passed through his mind as he decided his course of action. Similar reasoning may also have caused other members of the Imperial family, such as Prince Higashikuni and Prince Fushimi, to hesitate. It was the firm stand taken by the Emperor and the remaining advisers which took advantage of this hesitation and defeated the uprising. An Imperial Command ordering the suppression of the rebels and signed by the Emperor on the morning of the 27th was ignored. Preparations to evict them forcibly did not begin until the evening of February 28th and were not completed until the morning of the 29th. At the same time, final efforts were made to persuade the rebels to surrender. The rebel officers sought to reach an agreement whereby they would disband their troops and themselves commit suicide if the Emperor would consent to sending an Imperial messenger. The Emperor, determined to offer no recognition to the insurgents, refused. Finally in response to radio broadcasts and the air drop of thousands of leaflets urging the soldiers to return to their barracks, the incident was disposed of without any clash between the insurgents and regular troops. The rebel officers hoped for a public trial but in this too they were to be sorely disappointed. In the following months Saionji opposed all calls for clemency and all attempts to protect senior officers such as Mazaki who were suspected of complicity in the plot.100 In this he had the support of the Tosei faction which exploited the incident to the full. The assassinations and attempted assassinations of prominent members of the Saionji group were of immense significance, implying as they did an attack on the palace itself. Nevertheless, the positions held by the victims of the attacks; Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Grand Chamberlain, remained firmly in the hands of Saionji appointees. Nor was any overt consideration given to accommodating the desires of any of the other elites in making the new appointments. Konoe’s name had been put to the Emperor as a possible successor to Saito and had been rejected because of the Emperor’s fears about Konoe’s right-wing leanings.101 The Emperor stipulated that the appointee be someone well versed in international relations and suggested Ambassador Matsudaira Tsuneo as someone known for his anti-fascist views.102 Prince Chichibu’s objections that this was an unnecessary provocation of right-wing forces which would lead to

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further attacks on senior statesmen close to the throne, were given little consideration. Kido wrote: Unlike other cabinet members, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal must above all enjoy the confidence of the Emperor. What is more, the way things are now, it would be exceedingly difficult for anyone who fulfilled the hopes of that group which is writing all manner of things, also to win the confidence of the Emperor. There is no other way even though it might provoke attacks.103

Matsudaira however was disinclined to take the post which went instead to the Genro’s choice, Yuasa. Matsudaira was instead appointed Imperial Household Minister where, Harada wrote, he would still be able to contribute his knowledge of international relations to the Court. These manoeuvres suggest a remarkable flexibility in the system of Court advisers and a considerable consensus of opinion. Thus, in the short term, the Saionji group maintained its position within the Court itself. However, the apparent tenacity of the group was deceptive. First, even within the Court, the new appointees were less partisan than their predecessors and the posts changed hands at a rapidly increasing rate during the remaining years of the decade.104 Second, as a result of the incident, the Tosei group consolidated its pre-eminence over the Kodo faction within the military and extended its influence dramatically vis-avis the other elites. Finally, despite the Genro’s determination to purge the army, the Saionji group, and not least Saionji himself, had lost faith in their ability to manipulate politics in the direction they wished and at the same time maintain the integrity and guarantee the safety of the Imperial institution. The negotiations with the army prior to the setting up of the Hirota Cabinet and the measures taken by the Hirota Cabinet during the first few weeks of its life, give a striking indication of the shift in the balance of power. When Saionji travelled to Tokyo on March 2nd to answer the Imperial question, the Jushin group he had latterly hoped would take up this role, was shattered. Saionji rejected suggestions that the remaining Jushin be called for consultations and made his recommendation to the throne on the basis of his own discussions with the President of the Privy Council, Ichiki, and the Imperial Household Minister, Yuasa, and of reports from Kido and Harada. In the selection of the prime minister

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greater heed was paid to the views of the military than ever before in Japan’s modern history. The Emperor voiced his concerns to Honjo: When Saionji comes to Tokyo shortly to deliberate on the question of a new cabinet, it seems that the army’s demands in this regard will be as strong as ever and that they will become politically active. Since we fear a repetition of this kind of incident if we do not accede, we want to take their views into consideration.105

Kido, who had cultivated a variety of contacts with the army, contacts which were later to cause Saionji concern, kept the Genro informed of army views of the various possible candidates for the premiership.106 What emerged from these consultations was the conviction that only two candidates could gather sufficient support to form a cabinet; Hiranuma Kiichiro and Konoe Fumimaro. Unable to bring himself to recognise that the tenets of the liberal group had been so far rejected that he must recommend a man he so strongly opposed, Saionji determined to recommend Konoe. He explained his decision: I have just talked to Konoe. Konoe says this and that about his physical condition but I cannot recommend Hiranuma. I shall recommend Konoe. Whether he accepts or not is a different matter.107

Before making his recommendation to the Emperor, Saionji asked Kido to ascertain whether or not Konoe would accept the command. Konoe indicated that he would not. It was thus in the full knowledge that Konoe intended to refuse the command that Saionji made his recommendation. When the Emperor, aware of Konoe’s intentions, questioned Konoe’s health, Saionji defended his choice, ‘At this time, it seems to me there is no alternative to Konoe’.108 He afterwards explained to Vice Chamberlain Hirohata: I feared from the first that Konoe would probably refuse…but not to recommend him to the Throne on the off chance that he might decline, when I believed him to be the most suitable man to take charge in the circumstances, would be to sway the exercise of Imperial authority selfishly.109

The Genro’s deliberate recommendation of a candidate who had already made clear his intention to decline was unprecedented and it was only

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when he had confirmed that Saionji had made the recommendation after informing Ichiki and Yuasa, that the Emperor summoned Konoe and ordered him to form a cabinet. What had Saionji hoped to achieve? Undoubtedly, he harboured the hope that Konoe would succumb to pressure to accede. It would seem that in his earlier discussions with Kido and Harada, Konoe had not specifically withdrawn himself from the running. It also seems likely that in his first interview with Saionji, at which Saionji explained his intention to recommend him, Konoe failed to explain the real reasons for his determination not to accept the post. After his audience with the Emperor, Konoe again saw Saionji. This time he explained more fully the reasons for his decision to refuse. It is not difficult to speculate what these reasons might have been. Saionji had for many years seen in Konoe a successor in fact, if not in name, to himself as Genro. Although on many occasions he had been disappointed, the Genro still maintained his faith in Konoe’s return to the fold. With Mazaki and Araki, the leaders of the Kodo faction, discredited, the positive aspects of Konoe’s close relationship with the military and the right-wing were attractive. It may even have been that Saionji recognised the value of Konoe’s Kodo faction inclinations as a balance to the Tosei faction. In addition, Konoe was on friendly terms with both the House of Peers and the political parties. The reasons for Saionji’s insistence on putting forward an unwilling Konoe have been succinctly put by Gordon Berger. Despite his increasingly right-wing tendencies, ‘…thanks to his noble birth …Konoe maintained a position of importance at Court, whilst also enjoying the respect of radical right-wing and young officer groups who vilified and now murdered Court politicians as well as evil advisors to the Throne. In recommending him as Premier, Saionji hoped desperately that Konoe would be able to absorb and control the radical calls for direct Imperial rule in the Imperial system without shattering it. At the same time he counted on Konoe’s Court heritage to incline the young Prince towards fulfilling in the Premiership the mediatory and insulatory roles Saionji had earlier envisaged for the parties in the Cabinet’.110 But Konoe had for a good many years been increasingly dissatisfied with liberal policy. He was in sympathy with many of the domestic reforms proposed by the Young Officers and considered the suppression of their ideas to be nationally damaging. He was opposed specifically to Saionji’s foreign policy. Nor did he wish to preside over the dismemberment of the Kodo faction. Saionji’s preoccupation throughout the 1930s had been

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to preserve the status quo in the face of social movements which were finding increasingly violent expression. Konoe, who believed that these social movements should be directed and used, and not suppressed, was unable to fill the role Saionji had cast him for. The suggestion that the Foreign Minister, Hirota Koki, might be suitable as a candidate came from Ichiki Kitokuro and was passed via the Imperial Household Minister and Kido to Saionji.111 Saionji discussed the proposal individually with the Navy Minister, Osumi, and the Army Minister, Kawashima, before making his recommendation. Before Hirota was called to the palace, Yuasa was appointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Matsudaira took over Yuasa’s position as Imperial Household Minister. The need to select a prime minister who could elicit general support and whose appointment would prevent further outbreaks of violence against Court advisers and obviate the need for further direct involvement of the Court in politics had resulted first in the recommendation of Konoe and then of Hirota. Hirota, unlike Konoe, was closer to the Tosei faction than to the Kodo faction but was not himself a military man. Within the Foreign Office he was identified as a ‘Japanist’ type and did not participate in the activities of the ‘Western’ set. Nevertheless, the appointment was well received in the West. American Ambassador, Joseph Grew, described Hirota’s selection in a cable to his government: I am very much pleased because I believe that Hirota is a strong, safe man and that while he will have to play ball with the army to a certain extent, I think that he will handle foreign affairs as wisely as they can be handled given the domestic elements which he will have to conciliate. I think too that he wants good relations with the U.S. and will do what he can in that direction…. If I had to pick myself, I know of nobody whom I would have more gladly chosen to head the government, with American interests in view. To have chosen an out and out liberal would have been fatal because any Prime Minister at this juncture must absolutely possess the confidence of the Army and Navy if he is not to be hamstrung at the start.112

The appointment was a compromise between the desires of the liberal group and those of the emergent military clique and showed clearly the impossibility of maintaining the post of prime minister as a prerogative of the constitutional monarchists. The selection of cabinet ministers soon showed how tenuous was the liberals’ hold on even such compromised

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power. On receiving the command to form a cabinet Hirota met with Saionji before returning to the Foreign Ministry where, with Konoe and Yoshida, he began to draw up cabinet lists. A suggestion that Hirota work from the Imperial Household Agency was rejected for fear that it would provoke accusations of a palace plot.113 The ink was barely dry on the list of prospective cabinet ministers before the army presented its commissions. Terauchi first let it be known that he would refuse the Army Ministry unless upwards of half the list were dropped. When these men had been dropped, or moved to less strategically important positions, the army added further stipulations on the diplomatic and domestic policies of the cabinet to which Hirota also agreed.114 The demand which caused an impasse and threatened to prevent the cabinet from being established was that for the restriction of party members in the cabinet to one from each of the two major parties when the parties had already been informed that four places would be retained for them. The Emperor questioned Honjo about the army’s intentions and whether it meant to reject the Hirota Cabinet.115 Having won most of the concessions it had demanded, the army held its fire. On March 7th, eleven days after the biggest military attack on civilian government in the modern history of Japan, the Hirota Cabinet was established. The Emperor warned the new Prime Minister to pursue politics in accordance with the constitution, to take international friendship as his keynote, in particular to be reasonable in diplomacy and to avoid precipitate changes in financal policy and domestic politics. The choice of prime minister and the selection of cabinet personnel and basic cabinet policies had been influenced to an unprecedented degree by the desires of the military. In the ensuing weeks the policies pursued by the cabinet continued to reflect this trend toward greater military and rightwing involvement in decision making. The ‘clarification of the national polity’ continued to be a political issue and the Seiyukai demanded a special Diet session to deal with it. Hirota, in accordance with his agreement with the army, announced that his cabinet intended to clarify the national polity and ban the organ theory. The Education Minister stated the position more explicitly. Henceforth, lectures which offended the principles of Kokutai would be prohibited in all schools and offenders would be punished.116 Saionji made no move to interfere when the government continued its clarification of the polity by changing the title of the Emperor in official documents from Nihon Koku Kotei to Dai Nihon Koku Tenno, on the grounds that the word ‘Kotei’ was derived from foreign ideas. When in May, the Education

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Ministry published its definitive version of the national polity, Kokutai no Hongi, the Genro was quietly dismissive of what he disparagingly referred to as an unintelligible mix of mythology and history, religion and philosophy.117 That same month, a new Imperial Defence Policy was presented for the Emperor’s approval. Despite initial opposition from the Emperor, the final draft included Britain in the revised list of foremost enemies of the nation. The document also called for a massive increase in the number of army divisions and air squadrons and new battleships for the navy. The increase in defence spending necessitated a vast increase in the size of the budget which was modelled extensively on the ‘Five Year Plan for the Empire’s Income and Expenditure from 1937’, drawn up by the Kwantung Army and middle echelon army officers for Ishiwara Kanji. The new planned economy provided for greater government controls alongside enormous increases in government spending. The institutionalisation of military interference in civilian government proceded across the board. In the first days of the new cabinet the active service requirement for military ministers was re-introduced with little dissent from either the cabinet or the Diet. In practical terms, the revision had little effect but was yet another psychological blow to the liberal group. Saionji’s message to the Prime Minister was brief and typical of his philosophy, ‘If you have no alternative but to heed what the Army Minister says then listen with good grace’.118 The reorientation of foreign policy manifested in the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact by the Hirota Cabinet in November, was something, however, which the old Genro was unable to accept with good grace. His opposition however was in vain. One further blow to the Saionji group, most painfully felt by Saionji himself, came within days of the February Incident. For years, Saionji had contrived to keep Hiranuma, Vice President of the Privy Council, from any higher position of responsibility. When the question of Ichiki’s resignation as President of the Privy Council was raised again on March 3rd, the Genro was still opposed to elevating the Vice President. Ichiki had let it be known that he believed that Hiranuma would have to succeed him, but Saionji told Kido: ‘It won’t do, I would not be happy with Hiranuma.’ Despite Saionji’s strong opposition at this point and his advice to Kido a week later, Hiranuma was appointed President of the Privy Council on March 17th. The only requirement had been that he sever his relations with the Kokuhonsha and other similar organisations.119 The Harada diaries make no mention of the discussions or of Hiranuma’s promotion.

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For Saionji it was perhaps the bitterest pill of all and something which underlined the bankruptcy of the liberal group. By the end of 1936, the Saionji group was inestimably weaker than the previous year and the Tosei faction was even more firmly entrenched. The army had made inroads into both domestic and foreign policy making. The complexion of the cabinet and the prime minister had moved significantly to the right, and neither was as responsive as their predecessors to the advice of the Genro. Even within the Court itself, still largely the domain of the Saionji group, the liberal grip had been weakened. From now, until his death four years later, Saionji saw the power of the liberal group systematically eroded by the domestic and foreign policy decisions of successive cabinets. Saionji’s initial failure to appoint as prime minister the candidate of his choice in February 1936, following the decimation of the liberal group, was illustrative of the dramatic decline in his power. From 1936 onwards, the Genro’s powers of appointment became increasingly circumscribed. The Genro’s decision to recommend Konoe throws light on both his relationship with Konoe and his assessment of the political situation in Japan in 1936. It seems clear that Saionji was closing his eyes not only to the near certainty that Konoe would refuse to serve as prime minister, but also to the very real differences in political beliefs which the two of them held. Saionji’s overriding concern then, as hitherto, was the preservation of Japan’s polity as a constitutional monarchy and the preservation of the position of the Emperor as a constitutional monarch. With the February Incident, Saionji came to the end of the road of compromise in the pursuit of these aims. He had for years made a virtue out of ‘riding the waves’, of not opposing the ‘trend of the times’. Yet for at least five years, he and the liberal group had been increasingly out of step with public opinion and with the opinions of the new bureaucracy and the military. Saionji, the enduring bastion of the theories of civilisation and enlightenment, had changed little from the days when he had edited the Toyo Jiyu Shinbun, or led the Seiyukai, or acted as Japan’s Chief Plenipotentiary at Versailles. Saionji still believed that civilisation was a natural development consisting of the gradual education and liberalisation of society, and a similar process for all nations. He believed too that progress for Japan necessitated accepting the West on its own terms and he still believed that the conflicts in Japanese society could be resolved within the framework of parliamentary democracy and pro-Anglo/American co-operation that he had espoused fifty years before.

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Saionji had stood still and history had moved around him. If Saionji had personified bunmei kaika (civilisation through enlightenment), then the new bureaucrats and the military were the heirs to the philosophy of fukoku kyohei (rich country, strong military). These men sought to relieve the social and economic troubles of Japan by radical reform at home linked with economically rewarding expansion abroad. For nearly forty years, Saionji had been able to move with the trend of the times without, in any profound way, compromising his basic beliefs in Japan as a limited monarchy and Japan as a leading nation alongside the West. He had been able to do so because his direction had been the direction in which Japan had been moving since the first compromise of the Keien period. From the beginning of the 1930s, this had become less and less true until the trend of the times was no longer compatible with Saionji’s deepest political convictions. Never a man to take a stand on matters which were anything less than vital, and not given to holding many beliefs so dear, Saionji was nevertheless driven into a corner where to compromise any further would be to expose to attack the beliefs which were at the core of his political philosophy. The nature of the February Incident, directed for the most part against the Court itself and demanding radical changes in the Court’s composition and functioning, unnerved the liberal group and Saionji far more than any of the previous attacks. Saionji believed that Konoe’s appointment as prime minister would provide the only possibility that the Constitution and the Court be enabled to function as they had hitherto, as a limited monarchy. If this last chance for retrieving the situation were not available to him, then he would not participate in the political process. The Genro’s recommendation of Konoe was in part intended to pressure him into acceptance but was, more than this, the abdication of his own role in politics.

CHAPTER SEVEN FROM POLITICAL ACTOR TO POLITICAL COMMENTATOR SAIONJI’S LAST YEARS 1937–1940

Saionji’s active role in politics did not end in 1936. As Genro, he continued to receive Foreign Office communications and to advise the Emperor at times of cabinet change. As leader of the liberal constitutionalmonarchist group, he continued to exercise influence in the Court and, through the Jushin, in the Privy Council, the House of Peers and the Navy Ministry. After 1936, however, his voice as Genro in the selection of prime ministers became progressively weaker until candidates who did not have his support were appointed and ultimately, the procedure of recommendation was revised to reflect the political realities of the situation. As the balance of power shifted away from those groups in which Saionji as leader of the liberal group exercised some control, both the group as a whole and Saionji personally, suffered a loss of prestige and influence. Saionji himself, almost ninety years of age and active for seventy years in affairs of state, had acquired a degree of immunity from popular attack. In the popular mind, Saionji, like the Emperor, was above factional politics. Nevertheless, the institution of Genro was seen as anachronistic not only by those active in politics, who sought to usurp its power, but also, increasingly, by the mass of the population. Unlike Saionji himself, the liberal group as a whole enjoyed no immunity from popular attack and as the group’s influence on policy making declined, so did its reputation suffer. Finally, Saionji’s health continued to worsen and his meetings with political figures became less frequent and shorter in duration. Over the years from 1937 to his death in November 1940 therefore, the scope of Saionji’s participation in politics, both as Genro and as leader   181

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of the liberal group, progressively narrowed. In many ways his position became that of a figurehead in the ordinary sense of the term.1 Now, moreover, he was the figurehead of a contracting power base. At the same time, Harada began to assume a greater autonomy in his dealings as Saionji’s secretary and to fulfil, to a certain extent, Saionji’s role as arbiter, especially within the liberal group itself. Harada’s powers were of course tenuously held. Not only were they circumscribed by the shrinking influence of the liberal group, but they were ultimately dependent on Saionji. When Saionji died, Harada no longer played any effective political role.2 Despite his increasing displacement from decision taking, Saionji retained a clarity of vision as a political commentator which testifies to the extent and quality of the information he received. It was this role of political commentator, rather than the role of political actor which Saionji played during the last three years of his life. As the number of Saionji’s political meetings steadily declined, the bulk of his information was supplied by Harada. Harada’s contacts were many and varied. He met regularly with Kido and Konoe, with Arita Hachiro, Foreign Minister in the Hirota Cabinet, the First Konoe Cabinet and the Hiranuma Cabinet, and with General Ugaki Kazushige and the financier Ikeda Seihin. He also had regular discussions with the Imperial Household Minister and the Grand Chamberlain. In the navy, Harada’s main contacts were Yonai Mitsumasa, Navy Minister and later Prime Minister, and Vice Navy Minister Yamamoto Isoroku. As Saionji’s secretary, Harada met freely with senior Court officials, members of the House of Peers, members of the Imperial family, party leaders, bureaucrats and military figures. It is notable that after the assassination of Nagata Tetsuzan in 1935, Harada did not meet regularly with any senior member of the Army Ministry as he did with the Navy Minister and Vice Minister. At intervals of a week to ten days, Harada reported the details of these meetings to Saionji, sometimes supplementing them with written reports. The fruits of this information gathering, checked and annotated by the Genro, became the drafts for the Harada diaries. Whatever their factual shortcomings, the memoirs are a remarkable indication of how much Saionji actually knew of what was going on in the political world, from whom he received his information, how he evaluated this information and whether and how he attempted to intervene. Saionji often complained of being unable to understand the way things were and the policy decisions which were being taken. This was less a complaint against the quality of the information he was receiving than a cri de coeur at his own

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diminishing ability to influence events, for if his health deteriorated, his critical faculties remained finely honed.

The End of an Era The formation of the Hayashi Cabinet in January 1937, was the last time that the Genro took responsibility for answering the throne on a cabinet change. When the Hirota Cabinet fell on January 23rd, 1937, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Yuasa, travelled to Okitsu to receive the Genro’s reply to the throne. Before he did so, Yuasa consulted with the President of the Privy Council, Hiranuma. Saionji had been opposed to any official approach to Hiranuma on his behalf, but had agreed to let Yuasa solicit Hiranuma’s opinion unofficially and on his own account.3 The Genro’s first choice, General Ugaki Kazushige, had considerable support amongst the Saionji group and amongst the general public and financial circles, but was blocked when the Army and Navy Ministries refused to supply service ministers for an Ugaki-led cabinet.4 When the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal returned from a second visit to Okitsu, he first asked Hiranuma if he would accept the premiership and, when Hiranuma refused, recommended General Hayashi Senjuro to the throne. The reasons behind the decision to have two tentative candidates and the way this decision was reached are but sketchily documented. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Genro met alone and neither Kido nor Harada record what occurred. It seems clear from subsequent events and from remarks by the Privy Seal that Saionji did not approve of the approach to Hiranuma. Four days after the inauguration of the cabinet, Saionji informed the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal that he was old, ill and out of touch with the personnel of politics and that he wished to resign as Genro and withdraw from the procedure of recommending the prime minister.5 The Genro’s request caused great consternation within Court circles. For some time the relationship between the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Imperial Household Minister had been strained. Moreover, the position of the Court advisors was under attack from a number of quarters. Yuasa and Kido argued that the existence of the Genro ameliorated these dif ficulties and that his resignation could only make the position of the Court more dangerous. Saionji was persuaded to retain the title of Genro but insisted that a new procedure be drawn up transferring to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal the responsibility for recommending cabinets hitherto held by the Genro.

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The new system, finalised in May 1937, allowed greater discretion in procedure than had the earlier abortive attempt to introduce a Jushin council. Henceforth the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal would carry the responsibility for advising the throne and would consult with others as necessary. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had thus become heir to the Genro’s power as maker of prime ministers. Like the Genro before him, he was free to consult others and to accept or ignore their advice. After more than half a century, the official role of the Genro in Japanese politics, was finished. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal continued to consult Saionji when cabinet changes occurred and his influence persisted for a time but the Genro no longer retained any responsibility. The formation of the Hayashi Cabinet was the end of an era. The remaining cabinet changes until Saionji’s death in November 1940, show a steady decline in his ability to influence the selection process. When, in 1937, Konoe was appointed Prime Minister, Saionji’s agreement was considered necessary even though the range of possibilities presented to him precluded any real participation in the process. Moreover, Saionji participated actively in the selection of cabinet ministers, specifically in the selection of the Foreign Minister. When Yuasa made the journey down to Okitsu to obtain Saionji’s approval of Konoe, he took with him the cabinet list, drawn up by Konoe and Kido, for Saionji to add his written comments. Saionji disapproved of Konoe’s choice of Foreign Minister, Nagai Ryutaro of the Seiyukai, and wanted Hirota appointed to the post. Harada was instructed to discuss the appointment with Konoe by telephone from Okitsu and acted as go-between, securing Hirota’s acceptance and clearing the appointment with Army Minister, Sugiyama.6 The First Konoe Cabinet had Saionji’s support; the Hiranuma Cabinet which followed it in 1939, did not. Matsudaira, Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal apologised: The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal understands the Prince’s views on Hiranuma from the last time and himself feels very bad at agreeing to Hiranuma’s emergence (as Prime Minister).7

Saionji’s response was a mixture of resignation and despondency: It comes as no surprise…. That is the trend of the times and there is nothing to be done…. It is a great pity for the Emperor’s sake …and for the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I feel sorry for Konoe too since it is the trend of the times and ultimately, because it is the trend of the times, it can’t be helped.8

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The Genro’s voice was now only one of many in the selection of the prime minister. The cabinet, for a brief period the preserve of the parties and the liberal monarchists, had been thrown open to competition from the other elites. When the Hiranuma Cabinet fell in August 1939, Saionji hoped for the appointment of Ikeda Seihin but would not recommend him without Konoe’s backing. Konoe refused his support and General Abe Nobuyuki was appointed as Prime Minister. Saionji told Harada: I cannot begin to think about the question of the next cabinet. If I felt that one would be better than another, I would say…. On three occasions I have received a message from the Emperor saying ‘Please assist me in affairs of state’. If I had something to say which I considered necessary I would say it even if the Emperor told me not to speak. But at present I have nothing to say.9

In the struggle to gain control of the cabinet, the army’s voice was the most insistent and had prevailed in all the cabinet changes since the February Incident four years earlier. When the Abe Cabinet fell under attack from the parties in 1940, the army gave its support to Konoe as the next prime minister.10 The Genro, whose power within the liberal group remained unparalleled, overruled Yuasa’s request to officially extend the consultations to include ex-Privy Seal Makino.11 In accordance with the guidelines introduced in May 1937, ex-Prime Ministers Okada, Hiranuma, Konoe and Kiyoura were summoned by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal before he replied to the throne. When Konoe refused to have his name put forward, the Privy Seal recommended Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa. Although Yonai’s appointment was undoubtedly a reprieve for the liberal group, there is no evidence to suggest that Saionji played anything but a minor part in his selection, and in fact, Harada had been actively restraining the movement to have Yonai made prime minister in order to keep him as a member of the Naval General Staff.12 Further changes were made in the selection procedure as the elites jostled to acquire the powerful right of recommendation which had lain so long out of reach. The Genro overrode an attempt by Konoe to put the selection procedure followed on Yonai’s appointment on a legal, systematised basis by transferring to the Privy Council, of which Konoe was now President, the responsibility for replying to the Imperial question.13 In June 1940, Kido was appointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and a new procedure for recommending the prime minister was

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drawn up. Konoe’s proposals had urged the emasculation of the role of the Privy Seal in cabinet changes and the transfer of the powers which had once lodged with the Genro, to the President of the Privy Council. Kido’s counter proposal was for informal group consultation with the President of the Privy Council and former prime ministers and a conference with the Genro, after which the Privy Seal would take sole responsibility for answering the throne, making the decision himself if a consensus could not be reached. ‘They make me responsible’, the Genro complained/only when it suits their purposes.’14 Four days later, a meeting of the President of the Privy Council and former prime ministers, agreed unanimously to recommend Konoe as the next prime minister.15 The Genro refused to answer: I am an old man and ill and have no clear understanding of how things are. If I were to agree (to Konoe) as if I did understand when I do not, or if I were to provide answers to the Imperial question, I would be guilty of disloyalty.16

The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal recommended Konoe to the throne and advised that no further attempt be made to seek the Genro’s opinion, The Genro function in politics had effectively ended.

The Reorientation of Japanese Foreign Policy Historically, it was Saionji’s prerogative as Genro to receive and comment on all substantive Foreign Office communications. In fact, for some years, his greatest influence on foreign policy as Genro had been exercised not in this way, but at times of cabinet change, when he would make his recommendation largely on the basis of the nature of the prospective prime minister’s foreign policy commitments. Thus any diminution of the Genro’s prerogative in the appointment of the prime minister, also impaired his ability to direct Japan’s foreign policy. Over the years, the arbitration functions of the Genro had been gradually eroded and, except at times of cabinet change, it was primarily not as Genro, but in a partisan role, as leader of the liberal, constitutional-monarchist group, that Saionji had been able to influence diplomacy. Saionji’s roles as Genro and as partisan liberal leader, overlapped and the loss of power by the Genro in the selection of prime ministers and the shift in the balance of power away from the liberal group and towards the military, went hand in hand.

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The years 1937–1940 saw the culmination of a fundamental reorientation of Japanese foreign policy which had begun at the start of the decade and it was with the diplomatic developments of this period that Saionji was almost exclusively preoccupied. The appointments of prime ministers and cabinet members, he evaluated largely in terms of their likely impact on foreign policy and he evinced a consuming interest in the appointments of overseas personnel which he was convinced held more potential for change in diplomacy than did shifts in government policy and instructions. The foremost issues in Japanese foreign policy between 1937 and 1940 were the China Incident and the tightening of the ties with the Axis countries through the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact to form the Axis Alliance. Saionji deplored the continuing realignment of diplomacy, fought against its execution and remained bitterly critical of Japan’s pro-Axis orientation. Saionji attacked the Anti-Comintern Pact signed by the Hirota Cabinet in 1936, as German exploitation and of no conceivable value to Japan. He opposed all overt acts of friendship toward Germany, such as the visit planned by Prince Chichibu, of which political capital could be made. He told Harada: The Japan-German pact is 100% to Germany’s benefit and can be nothing but a loss to Japan. So far, pro-German feelings have been confined to the habatsu and the feelings of the mass of the people are pro-Anglo-American rather than pro-German… Geographically, we are much better off keeping close relations with England and America. If Japan were in the position of Turkey, or of one of the Balkan states, then the current methods might be valid but in terms of geography, we are very different …Whichever way one looks at it, the Japan-German pact has diminished Japan.17

Whilst Saionji feared the damage the pact would have on relations with England, the army and the Hirota Cabinet saw in it the potential for Japan to enhance her position in China. Saionji had this to say: What do they really intend with China? They know nothing, any of them. Manchuria is a land with a long history and she has suffered considerably in her relations with Japan. Well there is no good crying over that now; but does the future hold any happiness for the children of Manchuria or will it bring only continued despair. I am consumed with worry at the various things which are being done in North China.18

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The China Incident which Saionji so feared began on July 7th, 1937 with an attack on the Marco Polo Bridge and came to dominate the foreign policy of the First Konoe Cabinet and to overshadow much of the domestic politics of Konoe’s period of office. Konoe, with the support of the Home, Navy and Foreign Ministers, refused the army’s request for the dispatch of troops from Japan on the grounds that mobilisation would be opposed by the Japanese public and would create friction between public and army. Saionji, worried by the prospect of endangering relations with England and America, congratulated Konoe: The road which Japan must take henceforth, is to advance her national interest by preserving a sufficient closeness to Great Britain and America in order that this kind of trouble may be avoided and Japan kept from falling into error in terms of the wider situation. I am afraid ultimately for Japan’s interests with such skirmishes constantly occurring on the Manchurian-Russian border and in North China.19

Despite his relief at Konoe’s initial handling of the situation, the Genro was less than sanguine about the Imperial Army’s attitude to the North China situation and was fearful of the repercussions of continued army action. It was not long in fact before Konoe reversed his decision to refuse reinforcements and approved them for the purpose of protecting Japanese lives and ensuring the safety of the North China forces. Nor was Saionji happy about reports that Ishiwara Kanji had discussed the incident with the Emperor and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was instructed to make the Genro’s dissapproval of Ishiwara known.20 It could, in fact, scarcely have escaped the notice of the Court that Ishiwara, architect of the Manchurian Incident, apologist for the comprehensive reorganisation of Japan on a war-time footing and proponent of a Japanese—led Asian bloc against the Western nations, was anathema to the Genro. Saionji had hopes of Konoe visiting South China personally to find a solution to the situation and was opposed to sending Foreign Minister Hirota, whom the Chinese mistrusted. It is clear that, even at this stage of the incident, he saw the problem largely in terms of the impact it would have on Japan’s international standing: There are Chinese who are wiser than are the Japanese and there will be not only Chinese, but also other foreigners who will see through Japan’s intentions and will tell the Chinese. If Japan does not act with great rectitude, she will be despised.21

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His fears that the situation would not be contained, were soon realised. By the end of July, more than five thousand Chinese had died and several hundred Japanese soldiers and civilians had been killed. Three extra Japanese divisions had been mobilised and the Diet had approved, without debate, a massive appropriation of funds for the army in North China.22 The Genro favoured a policy of accommodation with the nationalist regime and he, at least, had taken to heart Chiang Kai-shek’s call for peace moves to be backed by China’s readiness ‘to throw the last ounce of her energy into a struggle for national survival, regardless of the sacrifices’.23 He remarked: It was a good policy for Japan to cultivate Chiang Kai-shek and to deal with him throughout. Why does the army hate him? Now it is no good. Things have reached such a pass that Chiang Kai-shek will probably refuse to have any dealings with us and then who will we deal with…?24

Given the mounting national awareness in China and growing opposition to Japan’s special rights, Saionji’s favoured policy necessitated a reversal of the recent trend toward increased autonomy for Japan in China and was therefore a reactionary position. By September, Saionji was openly despairing of the army’s plans to divide and rule North China through puppet regimes and, though the Army Minister assured the Emperor that the army had no territorial ambitions in China and would respond to diplomatic efforts to end the war, Saionji was sceptical of the Army Ministry’s ability to control the soldiers in the field: Although they say of the soldiers who have already gone, ‘They will return immediately’, still they do not return.25

As Japanese troops drove almost unhindered down into China, Saionji sent messages to Konoe seeking to clarify the Prime Minister’s intentions and repeatedly signalled to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and to the Foreign Minister, his concern and his desire to end hostilities. His opinion of the press, never high, declined still further as enthusiastic reports of the numbers of Chinese killed stoked popular feeling for the war.26 Japan’s draft terms for peace, presented to the Chinese leader by German Ambassador, Oscar Trautman, on November 5th, were immediately rejected. The decision to present the terms to China via the German Ambassador had been taken at the urging of the General

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Staff. The peace terms, vague and general and open to a variety of interpretations, had been sent to Saionji several days before their dispatch but there is no record of his reaction to the draft. However, the Genro was strongly opposed to any strengthening of Japan’s ties with Germany such as the acceptance of German mediation entailed: What can we do tied to Italy and Germany; it is ridiculous and I am deeply suspicious. To think of Japan with America to the East and Britain to the West, is meaningful. But an alliance with Germany and Italy—what possible meaning could that have?27

Chiang’s rejection of the peace terms brought an immediate escalation of hostilities. Within a few days, Japanese troops attacked and captured the British gunboat Ladybird and sank the American gunboat Panay. On December 14th, Nanking fell under Japanese attack. By December 1937, the Prime Minister’s views on the settlement of the China Incident diverged widely from those of the Genro. Whilst Saionji fulminated against the attack on the Ladybird and argued that strong disciplinary measures against those responsible would facilitate diplomacy, Konoe and Kido stressed the need to appear strong and to show no signs of weakness toward the Chinese and foreign observers. On January 16th, Konoe formally declared his government’s refusal henceforth to recognise or deal with Chiang Kai-shek, and pledged himself to work for the establishment of a new regime in China. A written report of the Imperial Conference which produced this policy of aite ni sezu (non-recognition) was taken to a worried and exasperated Saionji two days later. It is clear that the Genro’s own commitment to Chiang had not weakened. His faith in Konoe, however, had. In May he said of the Prime Minister: It would probably be better to have Konoe resign at some suitable time and for him to look forward to another day. But it really was very instructive. When one looks at the China problem, it really does seem very strange to talk of abandoning Chiang Kai-shek.28

Konoe, by this time, was himself discouraged by the protracted war and the failure to crush Chiang and was ready to reverse the non-recognition policy. To facilitate this change in direction, Konoe planned to reshuffle his cabinet to include General Ugaki Kazushige, a prominent opponent of the aite ni sezu policy, as Foreign Minister. But Saionji had other plans

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for Ugaki. The Genro had failed in his bid to have Ugaki appointed Prime Minister in 1937, but the Konoe Cabinet was shaky and he was prepared to try again. Saionji, apparently ready to give the last push to the unsteady structure of the Konoe Cabinet, refused to co-operate. He declined to advise Ikeda to join the cabinet as Finance Minister and was vehemently opposed to the appointment of Ugaki: I also think it would be extremely dangerous to have Ugaki as Foreign Minister because if the cabinet should resign it seems to me that Ugaki, as a politician who has real ability and who will stand up under pressure, is the best qualified to succeed. It would be very unfortunate if someone I had carefully set aside should be damaged; and the post of Foreign Minister is the place where such damage is most likely to occur.29

Saionji’s answer was conveyed to Konoe and to Kido. When, two days later, both Ugaki and Ikeda began to demur, Kido complained angrily to Harada of the Genro’s interference and warned him that the cabinet would fall. Harada therefore advised Ugaki to accept the post since the Genro wanted nothing to mar the General’s reputation and that were the Cabinet to fall on Ugaki’s responsibility, he would be damaged. Ugaki therefore joined the cabinet and negotiations were once again opened with the nationalist Government. In early September 1938, the British Ambassador in China offered to mediate between Japan and China and suggested that he should fly to Hankow to deliver Japanese terms and to propose peace moves. A sudden rash of entries in the Harada diaries dwells on the moves by the General Staff to use this opportunity to secure a quick peace.30 Saionji was critical of Konoe’s lack of enthusiasm for the venture: If by any chance anti-Japanese activities begin straight away, we should let the British Government shoulder the responsibility… maybe the Prime Minister is incapable of consistency and of being governed by logic. Perhaps it is a matter of temperament that he vacillates between this and that. If he could be more consistent he might become a very good prime minister but…31

When, in early September, Konoe rejected Ugaki’s recommendation for direct negotiations with Chiang, the Foreign Minister presented a memorandum drawn up by the Foreign Ministry which criticised Konoe and his aite ni sezu policy and called for his resignation. Konoe retaliated by having the China issue removed from the jurisdiction of the Foreign

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Ministry and placed under the guidance of the China Board, and Ugaki resigned. Saionji was greatly concerned about Konoe’s intentions and worried that Konoe might appoint Matsuoka Yosuke to the post of Foreign Minister.32 The appointment of Arita Hachiro at the end of October after an interregnum of one month when Konoe acted as his own Foreign Minister, came as a great relief to the Genro but did nothing to reconcile him to Konoe’s China policy. In December, a plot to seduce Chiang’s ally, Wang Ching Wei, away from the nationalist leader, fell through just as it had seemed about to come to fruition. The negotiations with Wang had been initiated by Konoe during Ugaki’s term of office and pursued without the knowledge of either the Foreign Minister or the Genro. When the plot, having failed, was brought to Saionji’s attention, it drew the full force of his criticism: What in heavens name will they do next. How low Japanese politics and diplomacy are…Plotting is not appropriate to civilised diplomacy, well that is how low Japanese diplomacy is …Where the devil are they taking the country, what are they doing, I don’t understand…?33

Konoe stepped down and in January the Hiranuma Cabinet was formed. Konoe replaced Hiranuma as President of the Privy Council and, against Saionji wishes, became Minister without Portfolio in Hiranuma’s Government, attending cabinet meetings in this role. The war in China dragged on and, as it did so, the China problem became increasingly tied in with the whole question of Japan’s relations with the Western nations and specifically with the problem of strengthening the Tripartite Pact. Whilst Konoe had been Prime Minister, talks between Oshima, Japan’s Ambassador to Germany, and German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, had produced a German proposal for a pact which would commit Japan to declare war immediately against any third party which became involved in hostilities against Germany. The Japanese reply had stated that war could not be declared automatically, but only after careful deliberation by the Japanese Government, and had added a codicil that the pact should specifically exclude America. Saionji had cautioned that great care was necessary with regard to diplomacy vis-a-vis Germany and that it would be to Japan’s great disadvantage to make feelings toward England and America worse.34 As the negotiations for a strengthened pact between Japan and Germany had progressed during the winter of 1938, Saionji’s worries had taken on a more concrete form. He agreed with the Finance Minister, Ikeda Seihin,

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that stronger ties with Germany were alienating America and England and endangering the supply of important imports and that if London’s financial facilities were to be denied to Japan, or if anti-Japanese feeling in America were to result in a trade embargo, the effects on the Japanese economy would be devastating. He added: However you look at it, in terms of Japan’s future development or expansion of real power, or even in terms of production, there is no alternative to basing our foreign policy on our relations with England and America. It is quite clear that unless we cooperate with England and America, we shall have no diplomacy. Why can’t the military understand?35

When Hiranuma was appointed Prime Minister, the greatest concern of both the Court and the Genro was the question of his foreign policy and it was thought necessary to try to impose some guidance on him. Accordingly, Arita had joined the government as Foreign Minister on the understanding that the Anti-Comintern Pact would not be strengthened. Arita however found himself opposed by the Army and Navy Ministers and the Prime Minister himself and within three weeks of the inauguration of the cabinet it had been agreed that the scope of the pact would be extended to include nations other than the Soviet Union, as the circumstances required. The problem which faced Arita and the Saionji group was not simply the pro-German disposition of the military, but lay much deeper, in the isolation of their position from the popular mood of the country. As the Foreign Minister complained to Saionji, it was the domestic balancing act and not real diplomacy which held his attention. Saionji understood and acknowledged the distance at which the mass of the Japanese population stood from his policies when he admitted: It is not just the military…the attitude of the Japanese generally toward China is wrong.36

Anti-British feeling was strong both amongst the men at the front and in Japan itself. In March, Harada reported to Saionji that anti-British fever was spreading in all directions though they still retained the support of the financial and academic circles. Economic competition, British and French aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and a general antipathy toward the policies supported by the anachronistic institutions of Genro and Jushin, all contributed to a general mood of friendliness towards Germany. As

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Germany began to make political and military capital in Europe, the number of her friends in Japan increased. The ground was being cut from under the feet of the pro-Anglo— American group from yet another direction. Japan’s Ambassadors in Germany and Italy, Oshima and Shiratori, withheld or revised decisions reached by the Japanese Government with which they were not in agreement. Thus, a decision which committed Japan only to non-military support in case of war, was ignored by the ambassadors who promised Japan’s active participation. There is little doubt that they did so with the support of the army. The navy, which for budgetary reasons had supported the expanded scope of the pact, was nevertheless strongly opposed to active participation by Japan at the side of Germany in case of war. Great efforts were therefore made by the army and the Prime Minister to provide ample opportunity for liaison between the services which would enable the army to press its views on the navy. The disparity in the quality of the Genro’s relationships with the army and the navy is clear in comments he made with regard to these efforts: Whether or not co-ordination between the army and the navy is good or bad is surely not the question. It cannot be to the national benefit to have all the evil together. It would be senseless to join the good with the bad. No, with the army lawless and the navy maintaining a correct posture, we strike a balance.37

He urged caution in the face of the advice of the Ambassadors and their military supporters: Japan’s Ambassadors to Europe approve of the military alliance because they are steeped in that atmosphere. However, it is no good looking at things from the centre of the vortex if one wishes to approach diplomatic moves in terms of the overall situation. Decisions must be taken coolly at a distance.38

And when the question arose of whether the Ambassadors should be recalled for overstepping their instructions, Saionji was eager to have them withdrawn. The Genro’s own view of the value of an expanded pact was concise; that it made sense neither politically nor diplomatically.39 As the impasse within the government continued and Germany rejected each of Japan’s compromise proposals, calls for a return of Konoe were heard. The Genro was drawn to remark that asking Konoe to head another goverment would

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be like asking a thief to come back on the assumption that he would not steal a second time. As Germany pressured the Japanese Government with its own formulations of the new pact and steadfastly rejected each change made at such effort in Japan, the splits within the government grew deeper. The army was supported by the Prime Minister in its demands that the German plan be adopted but there was strong opposition from the Navy Ministry and the Foreign Minister. Right-wing activity became frenzied and antiBritish demonstrations swept Tokyo. Led by the Kempeitai and financed by the army as they were, there was little that Saionji could do to deter them. In the wake of the Tientsin Incident, Foreign Minister Arita began negotiations with the British Ambassador, Craigie, but these meetings served only to inflame the anti-British movement further. This movement was not solely, nor even primarily, a foreign policy issue. Like the Minobe Affair and the February Incident before it, it was in fact an attack on the advisors around the throne and an attempt to force the Saionji group to abandon some of its more cherished positions of power, notably that of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, at that time still held by Yuasa. The attacks were not all verbal and several well advanced plots to assassinate members of the pro-British group were uncovered. Targets of attack included the Imperial Household Minister Matsudaira, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Yuasa, Ikeda Seihin, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, Admiral Okada, Makino Nobuaki and even Saionji’s secretary, Harada. Saionji’s opposition to the German pact continued unabated. He remained hopeful that changes of personnel both at home and in the embassies might yet redeem the situation. He told Harada in August 1939: I think it would be best if Hiranuma resigned as soon as possible. I suppose Araki would do if there were no other way.40

Konoe at least was not under consideration by Saionji. Harada told Konoe that many people were putting forward his name but: It would not be to your benefit and we do not think it would be a good idea for you to come forward.41

The signing of the non-aggression pact between Russia and Germany only days later brought down the Hiranuma Government and seemed as if

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it might provide the Saionji group with a last chance to redefine Japan’s diplomatic position. The fortunes of the German lobby slumped and it seemed that if Saionji could engineer the appointment of one of the proBritish group as prime minister, then the balance might still be tipped away from the army and its pro-German inclinations. Saionji hjimself apparently retained this hope. Questioned about Hiranuma’s successor, he said: This time, I want the Prime Minister to ensure that the wishes of the Emperor are made clear. Our foreign policy is the biggest failure since the beginning of our history. The power of the army is very worrying. It will be exceedingly difficult, no matter who takes office. Japan must at all costs align herself with Great Britain, the United States and France.42

The Genro indicated that he would like to recommend Ikeda Seihin but that Konoe must take the initiative in putting forward his name; that is, he must be assured of Konoe’s backing. Konoe refused and at the end of August, General Abe was appointed Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister. The Foreign Office was deeply divided internally with one faction, under the leadership of the Chief of the Asian Bureau, working closely with the army. The Emperor warned the new Prime Minister of the importance of America and Britain to Japan’s foreign policy and, in an unprecedented attempt at interference, he advised the replacement of the head of the Asian Bureau and demanded a say in the selection of the Army Minister. The position of Foreign Minister was won for the pro-Anglo-American camp by the appointment of Admiral Nomura who enjoyed the support of the Emperor, the Genro and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Saionji interested himself in the subsequent internal reorganisation of the Foreign Office as the pro-German and pro-AngloAmerican factions manoeuvered to strengthen their respective positions. The Genro continued to press for the early recall of Ambassador Oshima and for the appointment of a man of high calibre, capable of inspiring confidence, as Ambassador to the United States.43 Saionji’s attachment to the British cause was only partly emotional. He had always been convinced of the importance of British finance and American trade in the economic and social development of Japan. Now to this was added an unshakeable belief that the federated nature of the German state would prove to be a fatal weakness, that the Hitler cult

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would not last and that Germany would lose its war with Britain. His strong pro-British feelings were underwritten by a dislike of Hitler and a belief that Germany, if victorious, would exploit and suppress Japan. The fear of the Balkanisation of Japan haunted Saionji and was a vision he conjured up often. The decision to explain the recall of Oshima and Shiratori to Hitler and Mussolini through their Ambassadors in Tokyo enraged him as being further evidence of the realisation of this fear. With encouragement from the Genro, the new Foreign Minister attempted to orchestrate a pro-British backlash across the country. His efforts drew the criticism of Konoe and Harada warned Nomura: There are people who go to see Prince Konoe and threaten him, so you must listen to what he says with some care. Konoe has a weak character and is easily pushed around, so you should be particularly cautious.44

Konoe had warned the Prime Minister that the attempt was ill-timed; that anti-British feeling was widespread in the rural areas of Japan and that pro-Soviet, pro-German feelings were prevalent among younger members of the Foreign Office. Harada had dismissed Konoe’s claims as exaggerated, but ultimately it was the pro-British group which was deluding itself. In an effort to win Konoe’s support, Saionji asked him to visit the United States and to look at the international situation and at Japan’s image abroad. It was nine months earlier that Saionji had first put forward the idea that Konoe should travel to Europe and the United States in order to ‘broaden his vision’ and make some close friends among the leading American statesmen. Saionji’s plan called for Konoe to resign from the Presidency of the Privy Council and to travel, not as part of a delegation, but in an unofficial capacity as a private citizen. With a liberal’s belief in education, Saionji seems to have convinced himself that his own perceptions of the realities of the European situation would make themselves apparent to Konoe, if only he saw them for himself. He rapidly withdrew his support for the project when it became clear that Konoe planned to visit Russia, Germany and Italy, but not Britain or the United States and moreover that he intended to have ex-Ambassador Shiratori accompany him to Europe and Hiranuma take his place as President of the Privy Council. The Abe Cabinet and the Yonai Cabinet which followed it in January 1940, were in retrospect simply a hiccup in the continued pro-German reorientation of Japanese foreign policy. Personnel had been changed

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at home and abroad, but cabinet changes and changes of ambassador did nothing to alter the discord between America and the Japanese Army in China which was at the root of Japan’s diplomatic problems with both America and Britain. When Konoe, against Saionji’s wishes, was appointed to head his second cabinet in July 1940, the diplomatic initiatives which the incoming government intended to pursue, were clearly defined. The Axis pact was to be strengthened to facilitate the establishment of a ‘New Order in East Asia’. Relations with Russia were to be rationalised by a non-agression pact. Positive steps were to be taken to incorporate British, French and Dutch possessions in the Far East into the New Order. Unneccessary conflict with the United States was to be avoided as far as possible but any interference was to be eliminated by force. When, against this backdrop, in September 1940, Yoshida Shigeru wrote to Saionji urging him to take some action himself to redress the balance of Japan’s foreign policy, the Genro declined. Yoshida had worked assiduously, if ineffectively, since 1936, to improve relations between Japan and England. One of the mainsprings of his political theory was that Japanese politics worked like a pendulum and that the moderate anglophile group led by Saionji was poised for an upturn. Saionji did not agree. Two weeks later, and less than three months into the Second Konoe Cabinet, the long-debated Axis Pact was agreed. Harada commented laconically that the Genro was naturally not in favour. In fact, Saionji had been kept unenlightened about the progress of the talks, and Harada himself had failed to discern that the negotiations had come to a head. It was not until the pact had been signed that Saionji was informed. Harada told Prince Takamatsu: The Genro was not informed that the Tripartite Pact had been settled. I myself heard from navy sources that there was an Imperial Headquarters Liaison Conference on the day it was held …and I telephoned Konoe from Osaka…Konoe said ‘I have just returned home after concluding the Liaison Conference. The navy has finally agreed and we can go ahead’.

He complained to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal that Saionji had been kept in ignorance: If the Genro were slow-witted, or hampered by illness or lack of understanding, then there would be no need to tell him anything.

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As things are, to leave him in ignorance of an issue of such national significance, is completely deplorable.45

Kido’s answer to this charge was that he had felt too sorry for Saionji to report the matter to him. In foreign policy, as in cabinet succession, Saionji’s voice was no longer heard. Saionji was deeply suspicious of the means whereby the Emperor’s approval had been won by Konoe. Until his final capitulation, the Emperor had consistently stressed that he would not permit the pact to be signed. Yet there was little to justify suspicion or surprise. The cabinet, including the Navy and Foreign Ministers, were in agreement and Saionji had refused to involve himself. He still muttered about the glaring diplomatic blunder Japan had made in setting Great Britain and the United States against her. He still sent messages to Konoe asking the Prime Minister to clarify where he set his political goals, whether he intended to settle the China Incident and whether he was satisfied with current Japanese diplomacy, but such questions were no longer within his sphere of competence.

The Last Bastion: Saionji, Konoe and the Court As his power to influence the broader issues of Japanese politics waned, Saionji directed his efforts toward maintaining the liberal complexion of the Court. In doing so, the Genro finally broke with Konoe, in many ways the man he had regarded as his rightful successor. Although by 1936 Saionji’s relationship with Konoe had cooled considerably, it was Konoe’s efforts as Prime Minister from 1937 to 1938 to realign the Court, which brought the final rift. Saionji observed the First Konoe Cabinet very closely and offered a great deal of advice on day-to-day domestic issues and on foreign policy. Negotiations, advice or criticism were relayed both ways through Harada or, less frequently, Kido and, since messages from Saionji were widely interpreted as Genro interference and were apt to produce attacks on the Genro and Jushin, and often, rumours of imminent political change, Harada would go to great lengths to avoid the press.46 Only on very rare occasions during these years did Saionji and Konoe meet face to face. When the two men met in the autumn of 1937 for the first time in twelve months, Konoe was struck by the deterioration in Saionji’s physical

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condition but even more surprised to find him intellectually as sharp as ever. The struggle for the Court began in June, in the first weeks of the new cabinet, when Konoe began to press for an Imperial Amnesty for the insurgents in the February Incident, and the release of General Mazaki, who was in detention pending trial for complicity in the affair. Through Kido, Konoe informed Saionji that people were contrasting Mazaki’s situation with that of General Ugaki who had been widely regarded as implicated in the 5:15 Incident and the treatment meted out to the defendents in the 2:26 Affair with that in the May incident four years earlier,. He warned the Genro that the continued detention of Mazaki was creating an impression of bias in the palace and that, like the London Naval Treaty, it was provoking criticism of the advisors to the throne and encouraging political instability.47 In August, to Saionji’s great satisfaction, Kita Ikki and Nishida Zei were sentenced to death for their part in the February Incident. For the first time in a year, Konoe by-passed both Kido and Harada to petition Saionji directly and was firmly rebuffed. The agreement of both the Emperor and the Genro was necessary to secure an Imperial Rescript granting amnesty, and both were implacably opposed. Saionji, dismissing Konoe’s warnings, remarked on the basic lack of understanding between them and hinted that he would oppose an amnesty. To Harada, he was more specific: If he can’t do things as they should be done, he had better resign. Konoe isn’t the only possible prime minister.48

This issue undoubtedly damaged Saionji’s relationship with Konoe and enhanced his opinion of Kido who had joined with him in opposing the amnesty. It was an issue which both Saionji and Konoe took to heart. Saionji had lost long standing friends and allies in the uprising and had himself been under threat of assassination. He had also seen the attack on the politics he embodied brought into the Court itself. The political repercussions on the liberal group had been catastrophic. He had opposed all efforts to secure leniency for the defendents and was unalterably opposed to the granting of an Imperial Rescript. Konoe, on the other hand, had close personal relationships with many of the Kodo faction generals, including Mazaki, and was sympathetic to the grievances articulated by the insurgents. Mazaki had a staunch ally in the Prime Minister who defended the intentions of the perpetrators of both the May and February

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Incidents and complained there would be no justice if the Emperor did not sympathise with their motives.49 Despite Saionji’s rebuff, Konoe refused to be daunted and though the trials continued, at the end of September, Mazaki was acquitted on the grounds of insufficient evidence. Saionji voiced his dissatisfaction with the verdict and his fears that the acquittal might be the forerunner to an Imperial Proclamation of amnesty: If that happens, if the constitution becomes superfluous, then the regulation of the nation and the governing of society will come to nothing. It is most grievous.50

Saionji clearly articulated the damage this issue was causing to his relationship with Konoe although he had evidently not yet abandoned the hope that Konoe would return to the fold. He told Harada: I want a stop put to this Imperial Proclamation somehow. It is very disappointing, things being what they are, that Konoe’s future prospects should be narrowed in this way and that it should end once more with him the puppet of the right-wing. Konoe must be stretched and become the flag bearer of civilised politics.51

Saionji’s worries were revived in December when Konoe appointed Admiral Suetsugu, a friend of Hiranuma and a fervent advocate of an amnesty, to the post of Home Minister. The appointment was made without prior warning or discussion with the Genro and despite the Emperor’s strongly voiced misgivings.52 Saionji had favoured the appointment of Kido as Home Minister and Harada had passed on this message to Konoe, but to no avail.53 Despite renewed efforts to secure an amnesty however, the Emperor, supported by Saionji, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Navy Ministry, would offer only a general Imperial Proclamation similar to that given on the birth of the Crown Prince. The growing rift between Saionji and Konoe centred on the dif fering perceptions each had of the role of the Court in the political process. These differences encompassed matters both of principle and policy. Konoe, who himself shared many of the sentiments of the young officers and the right-wing, believed that the Court should be sympathetic to rightist efforts to restructure society and to redefine Japan’s international position. He complained long and bitterly about the political complexion of the Court and about Yuasa Kurahei, Saionji’s appointee as Lord

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Keeper of the Privy Seal and he manoeuvred to win the post of Privy Seal for himself. He also made a number of attempts to promote the active participation of the Emperor in the political process. Nor did Saionji want the Emperor to be neutral and above politics; indeed, he wanted the Court to continue to reflect the liberal, constitutional-monarchist complexion it had shown since the early 1920s. Thus as the political mood of the country changed and as the balance of power between the elites shifted in favour of the opponents of his political philosophy, he was in effect advocating an increasingly radical role for the Imperial Institution. However, unlike Konoe, who was in favour of a politically active monarchy in principle, Saionji, even at the expense of further tipping the balance of power toward the rightists, was generally opposed to allowing the Emperor anything but formal participation in overt politics. Specifically in the 1930s, he would not allow the power of the Emperor to be used to arbitrate between conflicting views. This description of Saionji’s perceptions of the role of the Court requires some modification. As a matter of principle, Saionji advocated a limited role for the monarchy and a system of cabinet responsibility. He was not however totally averse to making use of the Imperial sanction to further a policy he considered necessary, in a situation in which he judged it would be safe and where to do so would promote rather than undermine the general principles of an intemationally-oriented, constitutional-monarchic political structure for Japan. The issue of direct Imperial participation in politics arose in June, within weeks of Konoe’s appointment as Prime Minister, when Konoe made the revolutionary suggestion to the Emperor that his Majesty should attend cabinet meetings. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, consulted by the Emperor, was deeply suspicious and believed that the suggestion was intended to produce something like the Imperial Conferences (Gozen Kaigi) advocated by the Hiranuma faction. Saionji too was outraged by the idea: The Emperor attends Privy Council meetings when the Emperor has a question and a written enquiry is prepared. It is unthinkable that the prime minister should ask questions of the Emperor in a cabinet meeting.54

One month later however, as the situation in China worsened, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal came to favour Konoe’s scheme and told Harada that it was likely to be put into practice. Saionji was adamant;

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It is acceptable for the Emperor to attend in the same capacity as he attends the Privy Council, but it is absolutely not acceptable for him to participate in decision-taking, or for the Emperor’s opinions to be advanced as if they were Imperial decisions. The most earnest attention must be paid to this point.55

A similar controversy surrounded the question of whether Imperial Conferences might be called on the authority of the Emperor. The Emperor himself provoked the issue by a request in early November 1937 that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal should discuss with Konoe the possibility of calling an Imperial Conference to plan the Japanese reply should Chiang’s response to the November 5th peace proposals be positive. On the advice of the Privy Seal, the question was referred to Saionji before it was put to Konoe. The Genro’s views on the paramountcy of protecting the inviolability of the Court are clear in his answer; In any event, the first thing is to solicit the Prime Minister’s opinion…. The army says it will set its course in accordance with the Emperor’s wishes, but if it can’t, what then? The Emperor’s words, once spoken, cannot be retracted…. If my opinion is being asked, it is that the Prime Minister’s views should first be solicited and that in all the government’s plans, it is the government itself which must make all the petitions. It would be very embarrassing to have an Imperial Conference called on the instructions of the Emperor. It will not do for there to be any possibility that things should happen because of an Imperial Command. If it came to such a pass and then such Imperial wishes were ignored, what would happen then? In a word, the authority of the Emperor would be damaged and that would be inexcusable. It is imperative that our attitude should be one of extreme caution. If they meant to proceed by Imperial decision then there would have to be a great deal of preparation beforehand and that would be quite another question. But that is not possible, there would be countless dangers, so that even if this Imperial Conference is convened, it will have to be done in such a way that there is no Imperial decision; where it is an Imperial Conference in the same sense as the Emperor attends the Privy Council.56

It is evident that the Genro’s opposition to interference by the Emperor in politics, although often expressed as a question of principle, was more than this. It was, especially in the mid-Thirties, a result of his belief that the views of the Emperor were not in accord with those of the army and were likely to be disregarded. Moreover, it was not only with the views of

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the military that the Court was out of step. In the question of diplomacy and specifically of China policy, there was considerable public support for the strong autonomous policies of the army. Saionji’s decision to keep the Court aloof from political decision making in this troubled period, his refusal to play what has been seen as his ace to force a shift in Japan’s diplomacy, has been sharply criticised by Japanese and Western scholars alike. Had this decision been based on a simple ideological commitment to non-participation by the throne, such criticism would be justified. But this was not the case. As late as the assassination of Chang Tso-lin in 1928 and the signing of the London Naval Treaty in 1930, Saionji had used the power of the Court in order to impose the policies of the liberal group against the opposition of the military, the Privy Council and the Seiyukai. It was only when, to Saionji’s mind, the point had been reached at which the Emperor’s intervention would have failed to be effective and would instead have undermined Japan’s system of constitutional monarchy and thus, given the nature of the Court at that time, Japan’s diplomatic orientation, that he refused to allow any involvement of the Court in the resolution of politically sensitive issues. It was not indecision or indifference or even ideological commitment which stayed Saionji’s hand from using the Court overtly to pursue the goals of the liberal camp in the 1930s. It was rather the realisation that the group he led, of which the Emperor was one member, was totally out of tune with the prevailing political mood of the country and that any attempt to exert their influence at this stage could only have long-term detrimental effects and might in fact result in the destruction of constitutional monarchy in Japan. When as a result of these exchanges an Imperial Conference was convened on January 11th, 1938, to discuss China policy, the Genro refused a request from the Chief of the General Staff that the Emperor should put a question to the Conference. Ultimately, Konoe joined Saionji in enjoining the Emperor not to speak. His concern however, was less with the integrity or protection of the Imperial institution than with the desire to achieve a hardening of Japanese policy toward China which had the appearance of Imperial approval. Questioned by Konoe about the nature of Imperial Conferences in the Meiji era, Saionji was unsupportive of the Prime Minister’s efforts to bring them into the mainstream of political decision making: Of course (the Emperor) spoke and asked questions about all kinds of things and gave his opinions. But responsible Ministers of State and the

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Prime Minister shouldered the responsibility and such discussions were never disclosed.57

Saionji was philosophically opposed to overt political participation by the throne but was strongly in favour of any Court activity which would serve to enhance the public standing of the Imperial institution. The distinction between the Imperial institution and any particular incumbent was particularly clear in the Genro’s mind and he was scathing about the precautions which were considered necessary to protect the Emperor from the people: Wherever the Emperor goes, the guards…make a big thing out of every little excursion. They are as vigilant as if he were walking round in a foreign country…. If we boast to the rest of the world of the reverence of the Japanese people for the Imperial Family and their absolute loyalty to the Emperor, then even though there might sometimes be Koreans, or malcontents among the foreigners, the Emperor must go out a little more openly. If this does not happen, the people will become distant from the Throne. If the worst came to the worst, there might be harm done to the Emperor’s person, or some unlucky incident occur, but to be devoted solely to weighing the safety of the Emperor’s person is to create a distance between the Throne and the people.58

Konoe’s attempts to suborn the Court, compounded by their differences over foreign policy issues, steadily undermined the relationship between the Prime Minister and the Genro. Saionji’s refusal to reply to Konoe’s repeated requests to be allowed to resign, was a measure not of his regard for the Prime Minister but of his fear of what the next change of cabinet would bring. Indeed, as the weeks passed, his evaluation of the First Konoe Cabinet grew increasingly critical and he was disparaging of Konoe’s weakness and his domination by Hiranuma and the right-wing, even whilst he was sympathetic to the problems Konoe faced. He opposed Konoe’s National Mobilisation Bill as unconstitutional and his Five Year Economic Plan as politically naive:59 Controls are all right, but not when they are aimed solely at the economy. One must think also in terms of politics…. Somehow the actions of the present government are a medley of contradictions. They seem to be at a loss what to do. But I feel sorry for Konoe. Whatever one says, it is a difficult period.60

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It was during the First Konoe Cabinet that serious movements got underway to amalgamate the parties into one new body led by Konoe.61 In March 1938, Konoe himself broached the idea of a mass party to the Genro. Saionji was contemptuous. He ridiculed Konoe for even bringing the idea to him and warned that it was out of the question that he would give his blessing to the creation of a body so potentially unstable and troublesome.62 In the autumn of 1938, when the issue became active again and posters were printed bearing Konoe’s name and announcing the inauguration of a new party, the Prime Minister studiously avoided discussing the question with Saionji. The Genro’s views were, in any case, rigid: The talk of a whole nation party is ridiculous. This is no real party …. It is a real puzzle to me why Konoe wants to lead such an amalgamation. The more I hear, the more I come to feel that Japan is politically underdeveloped. There are no fights between gentlemen, just the petty quarrels of political pygmies and there is no trace of understanding of what national politics is…. Our education policy was, after all, misguided.63

Concerned lest the Court become identified in any way with the new party, Saionji sent Harada to warn the Emperor’s younger brother, Prince Chichibu, against showing any approval of a one party system. In the last week of October, the press was enthusiastically forecasting the imminent emergence of Konoe as leader of the new party. The Prime Minister, however, his eyes set on higher goals, suggested to Harada that instead of his resigning and perhaps leading the new party, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal might resign and he, Konoe, be appointed in his stead with Admiral Yonai succeeding him as prime minister. With Konoe, as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, controlling the relations of the Court with the government, Saionji’s last bastion of liberalism would have been breached and the battle to politically realign the Imperial institution won. The Genro dug in his feet: This is not to go any further, but just think in practical terms. It has been hard for Konoe to keep going for as long as he has and I sympathise with the magnitude of his task, but in fact, the reason why he has been able to continue so far is that he has the support of the army. If we were to put Konoe close to the Emperor as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the influence of the army would inevitably spread into the Court. This would be very bad. It has come to the stage where politics has all but

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been taken over by the military but I want to keep the Court, at least, free from this. This must go no further than the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I am unequivocably opposed to the appointment of Konoe to the post of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at this time.64

Saionji had not always been so critical of the suitability of Konoe for high Court office and indeed over a number of years had groomed him for the position he now sought in vain. Even as late as 1933, although harbouring doubts as to whether Konoe might harbour sympathies for military government, the Genro still did not dismiss the possibility that the most suitable place to utilise Konoe’s talents, given the growing weakness of the position of prime minister, might be in the role of Privy Seal. By the late Autumn of 1938 however, the battle for the Court and Saionji’s disaffection with the Cabinet’s foreign policy, ensured that Konoe would not only fail to win the position to which he aspired, but also that his resignation, when offered, would be accepted without argument. When Hiranuma Kiichiro succeeded to the Premiership on January 4th, 1939 following Konoe’s resignation, Saionji’s cup of bitterness ran over and his gloom-filled view of his own circumscribed powers and of the political backwardness of the country, seemed to him to be vindicated. He had told Konoe shortly before: I have no connection with actual politics these days and so do not fully understand and although I have my hopes and opinions, it would only trouble you if, without any power to effect them, I set them out now. The things one would like to achieve cannot be achieved in present conditions, so ultimately, there is nothing to be done but to hold one’s tongue and watch. For myself, there is nothing for it; I am old and do not have the energy. …If I were a little better physically and I had a little more energy, I would like to see the Emperor and talk to him about a number of issues but the way things are, that too is unthinkable. There is nothing for it but to stay quiet and take stock of the situation.65

He later expanded on this: It is evident when one looks at politics in Japan today that they are being dragged along by the right-wing. To me this seems a retrograde step and shows no hint of progress. It is a great pity, but even if I were to speak out now, it would come to nothing and it would not do to give forth vainly on this and that, without even limited power. There is nothing to do but to hold one’s tongue and to watch the lay of the land. Within

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ten or twenty years, the atmosphere may change and more progressive politics appear, but at present, there is absolutely no alternative but to endure it in silence.66

That Saionji’s assessment of his own restricted role was very close to the truth was illustrated by the appointment of his adversary, Hiranuma, as Prime Minister, and by Konoe’s decision, when he resigned, to attend cabinet meetings in his capacity as President of the Privy Council. Saionji, who had never favoured the idea in theory, was now strongly opposed in practice and made his opposition loudly known, but to no avail.67 By the time of the demise of the First Konoe Cabinet in January 1939, the ‘father-son’ relationship between Saionji and Konoe, for so many years reported fondly by the press, lay shattered. Shaky as their relationship had been throughout the early—thirties, Saionji had continued to cling to the idea that Konoe was not only the man Japan needed, but that he would steer the country in a direction which Saionji himself could find acceptable. The abyss which opened between the two men during the months of Konoe’s First Cabinet never closed and when Konoe again became Prime Minister in 1940, it was against the wishes of the Genro. In contrast, there was a growing warmth between Saionji and Kido and, although Saionji never harboured the same high hopes of Kido as he had of Konoe, he nevertheless came to rely on him a good deal. From 1930 to 1936, Kido had served as Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and during that time, he and Harada had met regularly at intervals of two or three days, acting as mutual information brokers. Their relationship was more than purely professional and embraced their families. Less frequently, Kido met with Saionji himself during this period and was well known to him personally. Kido’s firmness during the 2.26 Incident enhanced his standing with the Genro and in May 1940, when the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal fell ill, Saionji once again refused his consent to the appointment of Konoe, and Kido was given the post which Konoe had coveted. Saionji approved the appointment but took no overt part in effecting it and it was Harada who drew together the support of palace officials and senior statesmen to secure the nomination. The Genro, despite his private approval of Kido, refused to participate in the political process.68 From the wealth of detail and colour of that section of the Harada diaries relating to Saionji’s declining years, several facts emerge clearly.

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First, Saionji continued to take an active interest in political developments although both as Genro and as head of the liberal group, he had negligible power. Second, although he retained an interest in all aspects of Japanese politics, his overwhelming concerns were with Japan’s relations with Britain and America and with keeping the Imperial institution out of the increasingly bitter maelstrom of elite conflict, whilst at the same time preserving the liberal complexion of the Court. Saionji wanted in fact, to have his cake and eat it. Third, Saionji firmly believed that the liberals’ day would come again but that Japan was passing through an unavoidable phase of her political development. Disappointed as he was with Konoe, he could excuse him a great deal because ‘the trend of the times’ made certain things inevitable. It was a combination of his desire to maintain Japan as a constitutional monarchy and his belief that Japan would emerge from this phase of militaristic expansionism and domestic anti-liberalism which, compounded by the real loss of power by the liberal group and by Saionji as Genro, encouraged him to preserve an almost complete aloofness from practical politics during the last three years of his life. The loss of power by the Saionji-liberal group in foreign policy went hand in hand with the loss of Saionji’s powers as Genro. The role of the Genro in Japanese politics had suffered drastic restrictions from the beginning of the 1930s. From 1937, although consulted at times of cabinet change, Saionji as Genro no longer bore any responsibility for answering the throne. There were similar restrictions on the role of Saionji as Genro in foreign policy. Although as Genro Saionji was entitled to receive all important foreign policy documents, and though he apparently continued to do so, much of Japan’s real foreign policy decision making had passed outside the Foreign Office. The failure to inform Saionji of the Tripartite Pact was symbolic of his total loss of power both as Genro and as leader of the liberals. The Genro institution had been slowly stripped of its powers, or rather the functions filled by the Genro had been slowly but systematically eaten away until nothing but the name remained. So, for the final years of his life, Saionji watched and commented and worried. To the end he remained the figurehead of the liberal constitutionalmonarchist group, but a role which had once been heavy with significance was now empty. Covert and limited as they were, Saionji’s last efforts at political brokerage were exercised, naturally enough, in the Court. Greatly worried that after his death the general current of politics would affect the high Court officials, he urged that the posts of Grand Chamberlain, Imperial

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Household Minister and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, be consolidated as soon as possible, with suitable people. Harada commented: Now, when the Prince can do nothing to affect the larger picture, I thought that he might at least do something about the Court officials next to the Throne.69

Two weeks later, on November 24th, 1940, Saionji died, leaving the government in the hands of a man he had refused to sanction as Prime Minister and the Court in the hands of a Grand Chamberlain whom he held in contempt, an Imperial Household Minister whose political acumen he doubted and a Privy Seal who he had come to believe leaned dangerously to the right.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Saionji’s political philosophy is widely and properly acclaimed as ‘liberalist’ and ‘internationalist’, but we would do well to clarify this description. It is clear that Saionji’s political beliefs were formed early in his career and changed very little during his middle and later years. What did change however was his assessment of how far his political predilections were realisable. His practical politics, a reflection of his political philosophy and his pragmatic assessment of its chances of success, therefore varied over time. The internationalist element of his philosophy was the strongest in the sense of being the area in which he was least willing to compromise his basic commitments to practical necessity. When Saionji returned after ten years in France, his commitment to incorporating Japan into the Western Community was fully formed and did not change in any significant way thereafter. Saionji had also during these years acquired a personal fondness for the West and for Western manners and culture. The speeches he made as President of the Seiyukai and the foreign policies adopted by his two cabinets bore unmistakable signs of his Western orientation and his minimisation of Japan’s purely regional role. As Genro, Saionji exercised his power of selecting Japan’s prime minister according to two principles: first, in accordance with his belief that the most appropriate form of polity for Japan was a constitutional monarchy governed by a cabinet responsible to educated public opinion; second, in accordance with his commitment to westernise Japan culturally and in terms of foreign policy orientation. This second consideration weighed at least as heavily as the first in his selection of cabinets. Thus, he would judge cabinet appointments on the basis of his international ideals and domestic practicality. If a party president with a majority in the Diet were a ‘Japanist’ bigot, Saionji either opposed his appointment as prime minister, as with Suzuki Kisaburo, attempted to contain it by warnings and advice, as with Tanaka Giichi, or sought to mitigate the effect of the original appointment by influencing other key cabinet posts,   211

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as with the appointment of Shidehara to the position of Foreign Minister under Kato Komei. The close relationship between ‘Saionji diplomacy’ and ‘Shidehara diplomacy’ in the 1920s has been explored above. It is in the 1920s that Saionji diplomacy in its clearest form can be seen. The reasons for this were to be found as much in the new post-war international environment and in domestic prosperity and confidence, as in the increased power of the Saionji group, itself in part a reflection of the new ‘acceptability’ of Saionji diplomacy. In the 1930s, both the domestic and international environments changed once more and Saionji diplomacy again became unacceptable. This unacceptability was of only minor importance while ever the opposition to it remained fragmented and essentially powerless. From 1930, however, the general dissatisfaction with Japan’s international role, as interpreted by Saionji and his group, began to coalesce into a recognisable anti-Genro, anti-Jushin movement. This movement gradually expanded to include a section whose opposition was directed as much at the domestic distribution of power per se, as at the foreign policy which this led to. It is at this point that critics of Saionji have accused him of abandoning his internationalist ideals. Some have suggested that Saionji’s failure to control the military was a deliberate sacrifice of the principles of cooperation with the West on the altar of his special relationship with the Court and his determination to protect the throne at whatever cost. Others have interpreted his actions even less favourably as either reflecting a sense of self preservation or as the vacillations of a weak character. Even those, or perhaps mainly those, in sympathy with his ‘liberal internationalism’ have seen in Saionji’s decisions in the 1930s, grave errors of judgement and have suggested that, had he taken a firmer stand either over the Manchurian Incident, or the withdrawal from the League of Nations, or even after the February Incident, the burgeoning role of the military in Japanese politics could have been contained and war have been avoided. It is impossible to test the validity of this argument but it has been possible to show that Saionji’s decision to refrain from involving the Imperial institution in the elite power struggle after 1930 was a reasoned decision, consistent not only with his belief in constitutional monarchy, but also with his internationalism. The other major element of Saionji’s philosophy, his liberalism, is far more nebulous. ‘Liberal’, as applied to the Saionji group, implied first and most importantly a commitment to constitutional monarchy; that is to

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a monarch who reigned but did not rule and whose powers were limited by the provisions of the Constitution, the exercise of which powers was subject to the scrutiny of popularly elected representatives of the people in their capacity as law makers. The premise on which Saionji’s constitutional monarchic theory was based was the existence of an educated, politically mature electorate. Other elements of Saionji’s liberalism, his views on the importance of education and the necessity for practical scientific education to supersede the teachings of moral codes and religion and for the teaching of modern languages to replace the Chinese classics, were most obvious in his younger days when, as Education Minister, he tried to put some of his ideas into practice. Similarly, his stress on the rights of the individual found its most clear expression shortly after his return from his ten year stay in France when for a brief time, he supplied articles to the Toyo Jiyu Shinbun. Later in his life, he was to blame Japan’s failure to produce a politically mature, ‘liberal’ electorate on the misguided education policy introduced in the Meiji period. Saionji was a liberal in the sense summarised above. He was however, as is apparent from his views on party government and foreign policy, an elitist liberal. His power base was the palace and his own position transcendental. He was not, unlike Konoe, accessible to everyone who wished to see him, but he combined his transcendental elitist position with clear liberal policy views. From this sometimes uneasy combination derived his ambiguous feelings toward the parties and their leaders. Saionji’s views on constitutional monarchy can be seen most clearly at the time of the Minobe Affair. His belief in the supremacy of a responsible cabinet, limited monarchy and a restricted role for the military, are nowhere set out as a philosophical treatise, but find expression in his practical response to actual political situations. Neither Saionji nor his early biographers ever wrote any systematic exposition of his political philosophy and the picture of his political ideals is derived largely from a study of his actions; of what he did, rather than what he said. This in itself suggests the answer to the question of how far his political philosophy was reflected in his practical politics. Saionji was a practical politician with a belief, if not in marxist determinism, then in the intractability of the ‘trends of the times’. Saionji was a pragmatist, a believer in ‘politics as the art of the possible’ and one of his major functions in Japanese politics at each stage of his career was to facilitate compromise whilst at the same time working toward clearly defined domestic and international goals.

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Saionji’s function in Japanese politics and the reasons why he was sought after politically, are clear. To simplify them to their most basic: Saionji was a conduit between a variety of elites in all of which he had acceptability and credibility. He was also the figurehead for a variety of ‘causes’. The role of the conduit in Japan is a well known phenomenon. The need for introductions and connections and the difficulties of the direct approach, are cultural marks of long history. Saionji, like most politicians, acted as the intermediary for people and elites between whom a direct relationship would have been limited or difficult. What was particular about Saionji’s role as conduit was the way in which he chose to use it and the levels at which he operated. Saionji was a young aristocrat with a position at the Court and a relationship with the young Meiji Emperor which had begun when they were children. He was familiar with the paths of power in the Court and had both personal and family connections with the first generation of Meiji leaders, Tokudaiji, Iwakura, Okubo and Sanjo. It was initially these ties which allowed him to serve as a path between the first and second generation Meiji leaders and the second generation—Ito, Yamagata, Inoue and Matsukata—and the Court. The role of the Court and the nobility at the end of the Tokugawa period and the start of the Meiji period is a fascinating and important one as the appointment of Saionji, a kuge, as commander of troops and governor of a province, indicates. The Saionji-Ito tie, in a sense the relationship through which Saionji became a significant politician, was a manifestation of Saionji’s conduit role. Ito was a low ranking samurai without the links with the Court which his faction building required. The means to develop these ties was provided by Saionji. Saionji’s efforts to facilitate communication and compromise between different elites were most marked in his role as President of Ito’s party, the Seiyukai. His relationship with Ito and the other Genro, with Katsura and with Hara, enabled him to act as an intermediary between the groups they represented. This arrangement, though it ultimately pleased no one, was the key to the development of the Seiyukai as an independent political party. The Taisho Crisis was partly a result of the failure of the network of connections and conduits between the various elites. It brought an end to the particular set of relationships which had allowed the continuation of bureaucratic control whilst at the same time allowing the development of an autonomous party. The breakdown of the Hara-Saionji-Katsura link led to the end of compromise between the party and the bureaucracy. Saionji’s subsequent failure to act as a reliable conduit for pressure

Summary and Conclusion  215

from the bureaucracy and Court on the Seiyukai, brought a dramatic realignment of forces and a new conduit role for Saionji. In 1918, when the Seiyukai emerged from a period of relative obscurity, Saionji’s role as a link between the party and the Genro once again became significant. By virtue of Saionji’s own elevation to the rank of Genro, the nature of the role was necessarily somewhat different and the opportunity for acting as the spokesman for one elite or the other, increased. After Hara’s death, the Seiyukai and Saionji’s relationship with it began to change until finally, Saionji no longer performed his earlier function. The development of the Saionji group in some ways externalised and rationalised the conduit role which Saionji played. The group embraced a number of elites tied by shared beliefs but with differing institutional commitments and requirements: sections of the Minseito, Satsuma, the navy, the Foreign Office and the Court. This group dominated Japan in the 1920s and the need for Saionji’s role as link between essentially hostile forces, was no longer felt. Now, that role was played by others on behalf of different elites who were in conflict with Saionji and the Saionji group. The figurehead role, whilst in some ways connected with the role of conduit, was essentially different and was not one which became less important as Saionji’s position within the political community was enhanced. The figurehead role has been badly misunderstood and underrated and particularly so in the case of Saionji. During his career, Saionji actively lent his considerable rank and prestige to causes which would otherwise have won little acceptance. By doing so, he succeeded in promoting ideas and beliefs which went against the common opinion and in giving credibility to groups and to institutions which would otherwise have met with opposition or indifference. Saionji was a truly powerful figure and he brought this power to bear in his ‘figurehead’ role, to promote the liberal policies he espoused. Hara Kei’s diary has done much to create an image of an effete and weak Saionji. Saionji’s biography shows this description to be unjustified, Saionji and Hara moved in different circles and had differing ideals and differing policy views. Hara judged Saionji’s actions in terms of their contribution to the power of the Seiyukai as he himself defined it. He misunderstood Saionji’s role in the political process and tried to make of it something it was not. When Saionji failed to live up to Hara’s expectations, a tension was created which in turn coloured the descriptions of the Hara diaries and the subsequent evaluation of the first half of Saionji’s political career.

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Saionji’s role as ‘leader’ of the constitutional monarchist group during the second half of his career, allowed the influence of that group to persist beyond the time when it would have otherwise succumbed to oppositional forces. Within the Saionji group itself, the sanction of the Genro remained, until his death, of absolute importance. By the late 1930s, when the Saionji group had been almost totally deprived of its political clout, groups essentially hostile to the Jushin still sought to use his name to justify political decisions. Although after 1937, Saionji had no real influence on the selection of Japan’s prime ministers, the myth of Genro sanction was perpetuated. The question of continuity and change in the status of the Court runs both explicitly and implicitly through Saionji’s biography. First, at a very basic level, the appointment of Saionji, as a four-year-old in 1853, to the position of Chamberlain, contrasts sharply with the appointment of Tokudaiji in 1885 and bespeaks a radical change in the importance of the Court in politics between 1850 and 1900. The appointment of Saionji, as a result of his membership of the kuge, as a commander of troops in the Restoration is also suggestive both of the belief that ostensible Imperial sanction was useful, if not necessary, and of the determination of the Court to secure its position in the new era. The fact that when, after the Restoration, Saionji went to France, it was a matter of state requiring the permission of the Court and the Government, also suggests the importance of the nobility in 19th century politics and the way in which the nobility was perceived in relation to the state. The arguments used against Saionji’s involvement with the newspaper of the liberal opposition to the government in 1882, revolved around the unsuitability of the participation of the nobility in such causes. The events of Saionji’s Second Cabinet testify to the importance of the character and qualities of the Emperor at this stage in Japan’s political development and at the possibilities for manipulation of the Court presented by a change in Emperors. The death of the Meiji Emperor resulted in a closer identification of Saionji’s interests with the interests of the Genro and the bureaucracy; that is, the question of national interest, which for Saionji had always taken preference over party interest, was for a time more clearly and narrowly defined as the preservation of the Imperial institution in the face of internal stress. The loss of the Meiji Emperor and the illness of the Taisho Emperor removed one element of the consensus-making machinery which had developed since the Restoration and for a time, contributed to the strengthening of Yamagata’s control. It

Summary and Conclusion  217

also underlined the symbolic nature—‘figurehead’ in the usual sense of the word—of Imperial power. The decision to establish a Regency and the issue of the Crown Prince’s travel abroad were symptomatic of the changing social and political balance and of the consensus amongst the government and the Genro, of which Saionji was now one, that the inability of the current Emperor to fulfil even the limited political functions which fell to him, was a threat to the Imperial institution and its role in Japanese politics. The resolution of these two questions and the interconnected issue of the Crown Prince’s betrothal, resulted in a shift in factional strength within the Court and the beginning of a Saionji group based on the three major civilian Court posts and on the throne itself. It was Saionji’s capture of this stronghold and the use which was made of it by the Saionji group in the 1920s and early 1930s which ensured the strength of the constitutional monarchist group and ultimately its collapse. The domination of the Imperial symbol in all its manifestations by the Saionji group was its strength and ultimately the source of its weakness when it finally provoked the opposition forces to combine. Saionji’s domination of the Court was complete. The views of the group found expression in the Personal Will and the Imperial Will of the Emperor as Emperor-in-Court and in the management of the Emperor-in-State. The post of Chief Aide-de-Camp, the only Court post which remained outside Saionji’s control, remained a channel between the Court and opposition forces and one which was used most openly during the Minobe Affair and the February Incident. After the February Incident, Saionji’s grip on the Court was weakened qualitatively if not quantitatively. While ever the Saionji group had maintained its preeminent political position, Saionji had not taken any firm stand against the involvement of the Emperor and the Court in politics. Indeed in the Chang Tso-lin Incident and during the controversy over the London Naval Treaty, he specifically sanctioned Imperial interference. This was not due to any belief in the validity of direct Imperial rule, as his earlier comments show. When the group became isolated from both other political elites and domestic opinion, and the invocation of such direct interference brought hitherto unforecast dangers, Saionji refrained from using his remaining power over the Court. Saionji’s career after 1903 is a window on the changing balance of elite power in modern Japan. From 1903 to 1914, his efforts were directed with varying success on two fronts: first at the development of

218  Summary and Conclusion

Japan as a civilised international power and second at the education of a politically sensitive electorate and the development of an independent party structure which would assume the functions of government. After 1914, the presidency of the Seiyukai passed to Hara and for a time, Saionji’s career, like the fortunes of the party he had headed, remained in limbo. The re-emergence of the Seiyukai through its rapprochement with Terauchi in 1916, revitalised Saionji’s role as ‘party Genro’. When social changes combined with splits within the Yamagata group to make a Hara Cabinet possible, Saionji’s position among the Genro was enhanced. The policies followed by the Hara Cabinet, in particular its diplomatic policies, reflected the views of its patron very closely. Support for these diplomatic policies was also found in increasing numbers within the Foreign Office. Saionji’s participation in the Paris Peace Conference during Hara’s term of office was influential in the outcome of Japan’s conference demands and in her decision to participate in the League system. Under Saionji’s guidance, the policy of co-operation with the West was extended and deepened throughout the rest of the decade. From 1928 however, and with increasing tenacity and co-operation after 1930, the elites which did not enjoy the support and patronage of the Saionji group began to attack the basis of the group’s power and its policy manifestations. In a series of steps—some legitimate, some violent—the opposing elites undermined both the domestic and diplomatic policies of the Saionji appointed governments. Diplomatically, opposition took the form of attacks on the disarmament conferences and on the treaties which limited Japan’s capacity for independent action. This was effected on the one hand by the organisation of legitimate protest by the military and its civilian supporters and by violent, non-legitimate, autonomous measures by members of the Kwantung Army and later by members of the Imperial Guard. Domestically, the Seiyukai, having lost the patronage of Saionji, joined with right-wing dominated institutions such as the Privy Council and the Hiranuma group to loosen the stranglehold of the Saionji group on the major positions of power. This opposition also proceeded by both violent and non-violent means. By 1937, a significant number of the Saionji group had been assassinated in a variety of plots and coups. The Genro himself had lost the power to recommend the prime minister in name as well as in fact. Hiranuma, the major figure of the right-wing opposition to Saionji, had finally succeeded in ousting Ichiki from the Presidency of the Privy Council and in assuming that position for himself. The result was a

Summary and Conclusion  219

dramatic shift in Japan’s foreign policy orientation which led directly to the Pacific War. The role of the Genro in politics, specifically in cabinet formation, is central to Saionji’s biography. The functions of the Genro group and the extent of their powers developed ad hoc. Of all their powers, that of recommending the prime minister was the most important and the most enduring. This power was used by the original Genro as a method of balancing power within the Genro body itself. From 1914 to 1918, it was used as a means of undermining the power of the Seiyukai and its Satsuma associates. Saionji’s own participation in the Genro Conferences began in 1913 with the fall of the Third Katsura Cabinet and resulted in the formation of a quasi-Saionji Cabinet being set up under Yamamoto Gombei. The next cabinet, led by Okuma Shigenobu, was recommended by a Genro Council in which Saionji did not participate and was an attempt by the Genro to undermine the predominant position of the Seiyukai among the party forces. Despite the Genro’s efforts to contain and direct the growth of the parties, the appointment of the next cabinet, led by Terauchi, was only possible with the co-operation of the Seiyukai. Saionji, as party Genro, was the link which Yamagata used to secure this co-operation. The subsequent two cabinets, led by Hara Kei and Takahashi Korekiyo, were selected by Saionji with only reluctant agreement from Yamagata. The appointments were evidence of the burgeoning power of the parties at a time of great social upheaval. Their championship by Saionji reflected his belief in the capacity of the parties to utilise their popular support to develop into a significant and enlightened force in Japanese politics. The Saionji-Matsukata period of Genro politics which followed Yamagata’s death and which lasted from 1921 to 1924 was characterised by attempts by the two remaining Genro to use the power of appointing prime ministers as a method of developing their own factional strength. Matsukata’s death in 1924 gave Saionji a free hand in the selection of Japan’s prime ministers. At the same time, for the next eight years, pressures in favour of ‘the normal course of constitutional government’ were sufficiently strong to persuade the last of the Genro to recommend party cabinets even where he had doubts about the suitability of the candidate in question. Saionji himself argued the case for phasing out the role of the Genro in cabinet change and absolutely opposed the creation of any new Genro charged with this function. The return to transcendental

220  Summary and Conclusion

cabinets in 1932 with the formation of the Saito and Okada Cabinets, was a deliberate move away from this trend toward rationalisation. The shift in policy by Saionji away from the appointment of party prime ministers to the selection of members of the Saionji group to head the government was a move calculated to safeguard the domestic positions and the diplomatic policies of the group at a time when it was coming under increasingly co-ordinated and violent attack. This decision was encouraged by the reduction of the party favoured by Saionji, the Minseito, to the position of a small minority in the Lower House and by Saionji’s antipathy toward the Japanist, Emperor-centred politics of the leader of the majority Seiyukai, Suzuki Kisaburo. The freedom exercised by the Genro in the choice of prime minister came to an abrupt end in 1936. The Hirota and Hayashi Cabinets, appointed by Saionji in 1936 and 1937, were the result of the vastly expanded political role of the military in cabinet succession. From May 1937 the procedure for recommending the prime minister was revised to give responsibility to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Saionji maintained, for a brief period, a degree of unofficial influence but this too gradually dissappeared. The nature of Saionji’s political philosophy, specifically his ultimate commitment to party government, allowed the role of Genro to continue into the mid-1930s. Saionji used his power as Genro in the interests of his political beliefs and, by extension, in the interests of the Saionji group and it is often difficult to judge where Saionji as Genro ended and Saionji as leader of the liberal group began. From 1936, the decline of the liberal group and of the Genro institution, went hand in hand. At the nub of any biography of Saionji must stand an assessment of the effect of the Genro system on the development of constitutional government during the Taisho and Showa periods. At the beginning of the Taisho period, the Genro body was extended to include Katsura and Saionji. Though there is no documentary evidence of how the decision was reached, it is clear that there were both long term and short term considerations. In the short term, the loss of the Meiji Emperor was an immediate threat to Genro dominance, the more so since the weakness of the new Emperor provided increased opportunities for the development of an anti-Yamagata, anti-Genro faction, at Court. By bringing the two foremost leaders of the next political generation into the dominant Genro body, the ability of those leaders and of their support groups to take advantage of the situation was decreased, while at the same time, the Genro group itself was strengthened against attack from other quarters.

Summary and Conclusion  221

The Taisho Crisis was a severe test of the strength of the newly expanded Genro body. Saionji’s inclusion in the Genro was in large part the product of his party connections and his ability to manipulate that elite. The Taisho Crisis showed that the Genro body, even when reformed to include the ‘party Genro’, was unable to manipulate political affairs in quite the way it had before. The party elite had become a significant if unsteady force. The efforts of the Genro over the next five years were directed toward containing this force by encouraging the development of a second party. In a curious way then, the Genro group in the Taisho period, by contributing to the creation of an anti-Seiyukai party force facilitated the formation of a strong two-party system. In 1916, when power had swung away from the Seiyukai, the Genro interfered to restore the balance by avoiding the leader of the Kenseikai and appointing a transcendental cabinet under a member of the Yamagata faction. Thus although the Genro were a significant force in establishing a two—party system in the early Tasiho period, they were also a brake on their full integration into responsible politics. The shift to party government under Hara in 1918 was a result of the immense social and political pressures which faced the Genro group and of Saionji’s refusal to defuse these pressures by himself forming a cabinet. The existence of the Genro group made it unnecessary to hold a general election following the assassination of Hara three years later. On Saionji’s recommendation, the government passed to Takahashi Korekiyo, thereby determining not only the nature of the next cabinet but also the outcome of Seiyukai internal factional struggles for succession. The Genro thus, by their power of appointing the prime minister, regulated both inter-elite and intra-elite balance. Immense as the power of prime ministerial appointment was, the role and influence of the Genro during the Taisho period extended still further. Whilst the Genro no longer formed cabinets themselves, they retained a voice in the selection of cabinet ministers and were able to exert considerable control over policy formation even when, as in the case of the Okuma Cabinet, the administration was basically antipathetic towards Genro interference. The Genro received and considered all important diplomatic dispatches and Genro councils were held regarding important foreign policy issues. This had the result of leavening the effects of any change in government and of ensuring continuity in terms of foreign policy. The significance of this became even more apparent after Saionji came to be the leading figure in the Genro and finally the sole survivor

222  Summary and Conclusion

of the group. Since foreign affairs were, by the terms of the constitution, outside the jurisdiction of the Diet, the only other bodies which rivalled the Genro group in its efforts to direct the Foreign Ministry, were the Privy Council and the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations. The continuation of the Genro group in the person of Saionji was to prove the most effective balance against the anti-Shidehara efforts of the Privy Council in the 1920s and early 1930s. From 1924, the history of the Genro institution is the history of one man, Saionji Kinmochi. As the Ito-Yamagata struggle had defined the character of the early Genro group and its impact on politics, so after the death of Ito, the institution, first under Yamagata, and then Saionji, reflected the political values of its dominant member. The power exerted by Saionji derived from the juxtaposition of his position as Genro and his position as leader of the liberal consitutional-monarchist group. In selecting prime ministers, Saionji as Genro gave the utmost weight to the foreign policy commitments of the various candidates and interfered most actively in the choice of Foreign Minister. In addition, he advised the government directly and indirectly on the direction of foreign policy and defended the so-called Shidehara diplomacy and the governments which promoted it, against attack. When a cabinet proved recalcitrant in its diplomacy, as did the Tanaka Cabinet, Saionji brought it down. Saionji brought to bear his power as Genro and his power as leader of the liberals in the maintenance of Japan’s co-operative diplomacy with the West. The significance of the Genro influence on foreign policy was enormous and increased as the general mood turned away from support of SaionjiShidehara diplomacy towards an autonomous, pro-Axis position. From 1924 to 1931, the Genro recommended party leaders to the post of prime minister. Saionji was basically sympathetic to the development of the parties and of party government despite the fact that he was often unhappy with the rate and the nature of this development. Had Saionji been opposed to party government in this form there would have been a clash between the Genro and the parties and, although the parties had the support of public opinion behind them, it is unlikely that the governments which ran Japan from 1924 to 1931 and under which Japan aligned herself with the Western nations, would have been formed. The fact that the Genro favoured and supported, rather than tolerated, these cabinets, strengthened them against encroachment by other elites. The Genro institution in the Regency period and the early Showa period thus created and maintained the system of party government.

Summary and Conclusion  223

The perpetuation of the Genro institution under Saionji was also the key to the pre-eminence of constitutional-monarchy theories over absolutist theories. It was Saionji’s prerogative as Genro to select the chief civilian advisors to the throne and from 1921 onwards, by the appointment of constitutional monarchists to all major civilian Court positions, he ensured the dominance of this theory within the Court and gave impetus to its acceptance outside. With constitutional monarchists controlling the Court and like thinkers in the academic world lecturing to the Imperial family, the Emperor Organ theorists became dominant in the universities. The underlying force behind this trend was identified by one of the principal actors in the Minobe Affair, who wrote: ‘Saionji is their sectarian headquarters. If the Genro falls, his friends the Jushin will fall too.’ Had the Genro and his group of constitutional monarchists and western-oriented liberals been able to retain their power, it is reasonable to suppose that politically, pre-war Japan would have made the transition to post-war Japan without the impetus of the war and the occupation. The commitment for this existed and was developed and defended by Saionji while ever he retained his influence. The two elements of constitutional monarchy and internationalism went hand in hand, both in Saionji’s political philosophy and his practical politics. The defenders of both elements were one and the same group. It was not possible to sacrifice the one (constitutional monarchy) for the sake of the other (co-operative Western-oriented diplomacy) and it is this point which has given rise to the greatest misunderstanding of Saionji’s position. It has been argued that Saionji failed his internationalism by refusing to put at risk Japan’s constitutional monarchy. This argument is fallacious. The two were a unit, mutually supportive and mutually dependent. The pamphleteer who predicted that the demise of the Genro would mean the end of the influence of the liberal Jushin, was correct. After the assassinations of 1936, Saionji’s power suffered a dramatic decline. In 1937, the Genro lost the right to recommend the prime minister and his control over foreign policy became negligible. At the same time, the influence of the liberal group shrank into insignificance. Saionji had twice argued that the Genro institution was no longer necessary; once when it appeared that the normal course of constitutional government was established and that Japan was irretrievably set on the road that Saionji had envisaged, and again when the fortunes of the liberal group began to fail. When Saionji finally succeeded in ending Genro sanction of

224  Summary and Conclusion

prime ministerial candidates he was simply giving concrete recognition to an established fact. The Genro no longer had any responsibility for Japanese politics and the liberal group through which he had exercised and extended his powers as Genro, was dead. Saionji himself died after a brief illness at 9.45 p.m. on November 24th, 1940.

NOTES CHAPTER ONE SAIONJI’S EMERGENCE AS GENRO; THE SAIONJI-KATSURA COMPROMISE

1. Seiyo Jijo (The Western Situation), was published in 1866 after Fukuzawa’s return from Europe. Fukuzawa’s philosophy embraced beliefs in scientific method, in the essential goodness of man and in the importance of spiritual independence. 2. Many years later, an attempt was made to blackmail Saionji with the papers relating to this affair. See Koizumi Sakutaro, Zuishitsu Saionji Ko (Tokyo 1939), p.422. 3. Saionji kept a diary of his trip via America and England, Saionji Kinmochi Yoko Yochuki, now in Kyoto University Library. The text is printed almost complete as Koizumi (ed.) ‘Yoroppa Ki Yu Nukigaki’, in Bungei Shunju, October 1932. 4. Ando Tokki, Toan Ko Eifu (Tokyo, 1937), p.33. 5. Kokumin no Tomo No.252, 1895, p.208. Saionji was also interested in the possibilities of bringing Japan closer to the West by romanising Japanese writing to make it more easily intelligible to foreigners. Tanakadate Aikitsu, ‘Romaji Kaki Nihon Bungaku no Teishosha Saionji Ko’ (Meiji Bunka, 10.7.1937), and ‘Saionji Ko to Romaji’ (Gakushikai Geppo, 1940). 6. Kobayashi Yugo (ed.), Rikken Seiyukai Shi (Tokyo, 1924–1943). 7. Takekoshi Yosaburo Monjo, Reel 2. The magazine was published fortnightly from July 1896 to January 1897 and also as a daily paper thereafter. The newspaper closed in October as a result of Mutsu’s death in August. The magazine became a weekly publication and continued in this form until March 1900. 8. Letter from Saionji to Inoue Kaoru in Inoue Kaoru Monjo (669.2), February 1895. 9. Letter to Sakai Yosaburo in Paris for the exhibition, September 24th, 1900, appearing in its original form in Ando Tokki (ed.), Toan Ko Eifu (Tokyo, 1937). 10. Inoue Kaoru Monjo (669.3), May 1901. 11. Hara Kei, Hara Kei Nikki (Tokyo, 1967), vol. 1, p.330. Hereafter, Hara Nikki. 12. Of more than one hundred letters from Saionji to Ito now extant (see Ito Hirobumi Kankei Monjo vol. 5, pp.44–79), there are almost none for the period   225

226  Notes

February 1901 to August 1905. Letters to Mutsu end in 1895. Letters to Katsura and to Yamagata cover the years 1906–1912. Hara Nikki and Kobayashi Yugo’s Rikken Seiyukai Shi, are the main sources of information on the two and a half years from Saionji’s assumption of the Presidency to the establishment of the First Saionji Cabinet. 13. Kimura Ki (ed.), Saionji Kinmochi Jiden (Tokyo, 1949), p.139. 14. Hara Nikki, vol. 2, pp.2–71. 15. Japan Times Weekly, July 16th, 1903, p.427. 16. Katsura Monjo, 33 letters, 1905–1912. 17. Kobayashi, op. cit., vol.2, pp.11–12. 18. Ibid., pp.16–24. 19. Except where otherwise stated, information in this section is taken from Hara Nikki, vol. 2, pp.72–63. 20. Kobayashi, op. cit., pp.185–186. 21. Ozaki Yukio, Ozaki Yukio Zenshu (Tokyo, 1955–1956), vol.11, p.443. 22. Masumi Junnosuke, Nihon Seito Shiron (Tokyo, 1965–1980), vol.3, pp.7–8. Hara Nikki, vol.2, p.84. 23. Kobayashi, op.cit., pp.243–246. 24. Takekoshi Yosaburo, Prince Saionji (Tokyo, 1933), p.218. 25. Yamamoto Shiro, ‘Keien Jidai no Kaimaku’ (Kyoto Joshidaigaku Shigakkai, March 1977), p.45. As Yamamoto comments, the offer of the resignation is not mentioned in Katsura Den. 26. Ishii Kinichiro, Kensei Shijo ni okeru Keien Jidai, p.65. 27. Hara Nikki, vol.2, pp.145–146. 28. Inoue Kaoru Ko Denki Hensankai (ed.), Segai Inoue Ko Den 1835–1915 (Tokyo, 1934), vol.5, p.155. Hereafter, Inoue Den. 29. Katsura Monjo (2). 30. Katsura Monjo (1). Inoue Den, p.155. Hara Nikki, vol.2, pp. 160–164. Saito Makoto Monjo (297.4). 31. For a comprehensive discussion of Hara’s use of the post of Home Minister, see Najita Tetsuo, Hara Kei in the Politics of Compromise 1905–1915 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp.33–38. Najita does not discuss the method whereby Hara was selected. 32. Makino Nobuaki, Makino Nobuaki Kaikoroku (Tokyo, 1977), pp.195–197. 33. Hara Nikki, vol.2, p.174. 34. Kobayashi, op.cit., p.324. The Mission was referred to throughout as ‘Vice Minister Wakatsuki’s party’. Nakayama Jiichi, ‘Saionji Shusho no Manshu Ryoko ni tsuite’ (Jinbun, Kenkyu, 13.7.1962, p.15.) 35. Katsura Monjo (8). Hiratsuka Atsushi (ed.), Ito Hakubun Hiroku (Tokyo, 1929), pp.392–409. 36. See F.G.Notehelfer, Kotoku Shusui: Portrait of a Japanese Radical (Cambridge 1971).

Notes  227

37. Hara Nikki, vol.2, p.308, June 23rd and 25th, describes Hara’s summons to the palace to report on controls against the Socialist Party. See also ibid., vol.3, p.36. 38. At least thirty-five copies of the text reached Japan and severe sentences were meted out to those found in possession of them. Itoya Toshio, Taigyaku Jiken (Tokyo 1960), pp.56–58. 39. Banno Junji, Meiji Kempo Taisei no Kakuritsu (Tokyo 1971), p.119 ff. 40. Yamamoto Shiro, ‘1907 -nendo Yosanhensei Keiri’ (Osaka Rekishi Gakkai: Historia, (78), March 1978). 41. Katsura Monjo (21). 42. Tokutomi Iichiro, Koshaku Katsura Taro Den (Tokyo 1933), vol. 2, p.552. Hara Nikki, vol.3, p.156. 43. Saionji’s letters to Katsura show the improvement in their relationship. In October, for example, Saionji wrote congratulating him on the Government’s finance diplomacy, Katsura Monjo (23),’ and in February, Saionji’s adopted son, Saionji Hachiro, was appointed private secretary to Katsura, ibid (25). 44. Extract from a letter from Katsura to Inoue in the Inoue Papers, reprinted in Yamamoto Shiro, ‘Keien Jidai no Kanryo to Seito’ p.21 (Kacho Tanki Daigaku Kenkyu Kiyo, 1962, (7)). 45. Masumi, op.cit., p.16. Wakatsuki Reijiro, Kofuan Kaikoroku (Tokyo, 1950), pp.136–138. 46. Katsura Monjo (30). Makino Monjo (447.15). 47. Hara Nikki, vol.3, p.162. 48. Ibid., p.152. 49. Kobe Chronicle, quoted in Yamamoto Shiro, Taisho Seihen no Kiteki Kenkyu (Tokyo, 1970). 50. Hara Nikki, vol.3, pp.200–204. 51. For discussions on the parameters of the role of the Emperor in modern politics see, for example, Inoue Kiyoshi, Tennosei (Tokyo, 1953); Yamazaki Tansho, Tennosei no Kenkyu (Tokyo, 1959); Toshitani Nobuyoshi, ‘The Meiji Constitution System and the Emperor at the time of the Meiji Political Crisis’, Annals of the Institute of Social Science (19) (University of Tokyo, 1978). 52. Letter from Katsura to Yamagata in Yamagata Papers, reprinted in Yamamoto Shiro, Taisho Seihen no Kisoteki Kenkyu (Tokyo, 1970), p 85. 53. David Anson Titus, Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan (New York and London, 1974), pp.171–182. 54. Hara wrote on August 13th that he had not attached any special significance to Katsura’s remarks the previous day on the need for co-operation between the Court and the Government, but that now he understood. ‘It is clear that this is a plot by the Yamagata faction to gain absolute control of the Privy Council and the Court’. Hara Nikki, vol.3, p.245. However, recent historians such as Najita Tetsuo, op. cit., p.85, see it as an attempt by Yamagata to prevent Katsura

228  Notes

forming a party. Yamamoto Shiro, op. cit., also sees it as a response by the Yamagata faction to Katsura’s bragging, whilst Titus, op. cit., p.137, describes an agreement between Saionji and Yamagata; Saionji because he wanted to be rid of his and Hara’s political rival and Yamagata because he feared independent action on the part of Katsura and specifically the establishment of a third party. 55. Koizumi, op. cit., p.440. Saionji told Koizumi that although he had met with Yamagata during this period, he did not venture an opinion on the subject. He believed that it was because it was generally felt that Yamagata had grown so he did not know what to do with Katsura that Katsura’s appointment was interpreted as his having been ‘kicked upstairs’. 56. Ito Takashi (ed.), Taisho Shoki Yamagata Aritomo Danwa Hikki —Seihen Omoide gusa (Tokyo, 1981). Hereafter, Danwa Hikki (1). ‘Taisho Seihen to Yamagata Aritomo’ (Shigaku Zasshi 75.10, October 1966). 57. Hara Nikki, vol.3, p.257. 58. Najita, op. cit., p.96, writes, This was contrary to the cabinet’s retrenchment programme and it defied explanation. It could have been retracted with proper mediation as in the past; instead it caused unnecessary rivalry between the services’. 59. Yamamoto, op.cit., pp. 172–174. 60. Hara Nikki, vol.3, p.271. 61. Danwa Hikki, pp.72–73. 62. Letter from Saionji to Hara. Hara Nikki, vol.6, p.209. 63. There is one study in English which deals with Saionji’s role in the affair; Jackson Holbrook Bailey, ‘Prince Saionji and the Taisho Political Crisis’ (Studies on Asia 1962), pp.39–57. 64. Hara Nikki, vol.3, p.273. 65. Yamamoto, op.cit., p.544. 66. Yamagata himself had failed to secure the Peer’s support for an Ito Government budget in 1901, despite a similar message from the Emperor. Sato Tsutomu, ‘Iwayuru Taisho no Seihen ni tsuite’ (Seiji Keizai Ronso (1.1)), p. 88. 67. Yamamoto, op.cit., pp.574–576. 68. Ibid., p.563.

CHAPTER TWO THE GENRO

1. The term ‘Genro’ appears in diaries of the period, such as Hara Nikki, and regularly in newspapers, from around 1898. The first well defined press usage of the term was in August 1892. Jackson Holbrook Bailey, ‘The Origin and Nature of the Genro’ (Studies on Asia, 1965), p.729 ff. 2. The Sangi, originally formed as a body of councillors, was revised in 1873 to form a ‘cabinet’ which took all major policy decisions. See Ishii Ryosuke, A History of Political Institutions in Japan (Tokyo, 1980). 3. Katsura Taro is usually recognised as a Genro, although some scholars have argued that he should not be included. 4. See Yamazaki Tansho, Naikaku ron (Tokyo, 1953). 5. 1st Ito Cabinet December 1885—April 1888 Kuroda Cabinet April 1888— December 1889 1st Yamagata Cabinet December 1889—May 1891 1st Matsukata Cabinet May 1891—August 1892 2nd Ito Cabinet August 1892—August 1896 2nd Matsukata Cabinet September 1896—January 1898 3rd Ito Cabinet January 1898—June 1898 1st Okuma Cabinet June 1898—November 1898 2nd Yamagata Cabinet November 1898—October 1900 4th Ito Cabinet October 1900—May 1901. 6. By 1898, Ito, Kuroda, Yamagata and Matsukata had already received Imperial commands. 7. Ito Masanori, Kato Komei Den (Tokyo, 1929), vol.2, p.49. 8. Hara Nikki, vol.5, p.426. 9. For details see Yamamoto Shiro, Shoki Seiyukai no Kenkyu and ‘Keien Jidai no Kaimaku’ (Kyoto Joshidaigaku Shigakai, March 1977). 10. Takekoshi, op. cit., p.205. 11. Tokutomi Iichiro, Koshaku Yamagata Aritomo Den (Tokyo, 1933), pp.555–557. Yet another thesis was current at the time: that Ito’s shift from the Presidency of the Seiyukai to the Presidency of the Privy Council was a move to allow the party more scope for development including the chance of forming a cabinet. Toriyabe Harue, ‘Seiyukai no Shinsosai’ (Jinbutsu Gettan, 9.9. 1903), pp.43–46. This article also described Saionji as the real heir to Ito’s political philosophy.   229

230  Notes

12. Translated from Shumpo-Ko Tsuishokai (ed.), Ito Hirobumi Den, vol. 2, pp.585– 586 and quoted in Jackson Holbrook Bailey, Prince Saionji: A Study in Modern Japanese Political Leadership (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1959), p.139. 13. Translated from Kurihara Hirota, Hakushaku Ito Miyoji, vol.1, pp.354–355 and quoted in Okamoto Shumpei, The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War, pp.237–238. 14. The Genro Council again consisted of five members due to the appointment of Katsura the previous year. 15. Ito Takashi, op.cit. Masumi, op.cit., vol.5, p.7.

CHAPTER THREE SAIONJI’S PARTICIPATION IN THE GENRO GROUP 1913–1919

1. Tokutomi, op.cit., pp.870–875, quoted in Masumi op.cit., p.7. Saionji received two such messages; one at the death of the Meiji Emperor and one at the fall of his cabinet six months later. 2. Inoue was ill and did not attend. Matsukata was called but did not attend. Katsura left the meeting shortly after Saionji arrived. 3. Koizumi op. cit., p.460. The index to Ito (ed.), Danwa Hikki, lists in section 1 ‘The Situation at the Time of the Establishment of the Yamamoto Cabinet, February 1913.’ Unfortunately, the piece is one of several missing from the actual documents. See also Hara Nikki, vol.3, pp.289–293. 4. Ito Takashi (ed.), ‘Taisho Seihen to Yamagata Aritomo’ (Shigaku Zasshi 75.10. October 1966). 5. Hara Nikki, vol.3, pp.404–408. 6. Den Kenjiro, Nikki (unpublished), Kensei Shiryoshitsu, National Diet Library. 7. Hara Nikki, vol.3, p.409, vol.4, p.5. 8. Details of the council meetings can be found in Ito, op. cit., pp.68–79 and Yamamoto Shiro, Dainiji Okuma Naikaku Kankei Shiryo. 9. Katsura had died in October 1913. The council which recommended Okuma consisted of Yamagata, Matsukata, Inoue and Oyama. 10. Joyce Lebra, Okuma Shigenobu: Statesman of Meiji Japan (Canberra, 1973), p.119. Masumi, op. cit., vol.3, p.265. Ito Yukio, ‘Genro no Keisei to Hensen ni Kansuru Jakkan no Kosatsu’. 11. Masumi, op.cit., vol.3, p.282. 12. Oka Yoshitake, Hayashi Shigeru (eds.), Taisho Demokurashi Ki no Seiji: Matsumoto Gokichi Seiji Nisshi (rev. ed., Tokyo, 1977), p.16. Hereafter, Matsumoto. 13. Hara Nikki, vol.4, p.212. 14. Matsumoto, op.cit., pp.11–12, describes how Saionji met Yamagata disguised, following backwoods and contriving to look as if he had been visiting General Oshima. The Ito edited Yamagata notes do not mention their meetings. Saionji’s meeting with the Seiyukai took place on July 18th, ibid., p.13 and Hara Nikki, vol.4, p.194. Suprisingly, the Hara diaries contain no details of this important meeting of Saionji with the Seiyukai. 15. Ibid., p.218.   231

232  Notes

16. Ibid., p.385. 17. Ibid., p.424. 18. Ibid., vol.5, p.11. 19. See ibid., pp.12–13 for Saionji’s description of his meeting with Yamagata. 20. Ibid., p.16. 21. The Gaiko Chosakai was informed of the selection of Saionji and Makino at its meeting on December 2nd, by which time the information had already been published in the press. Kobayashi Tatsuo (ed.), Suiuso Nikki (Tokyo, 1966), pp.315–322. 22. Despite the general popularity of the choice, which is recorded by Hara (vol.5, p.59), there were criticisms from a number of sources and even threats against Saionji’s life. Such criticisms came from Nakano Seigo, Kowa Kaigi o Mokugeki Shite (Tokyo, 1919), p. 166. who condemned Saionji’s lack of enthusiasm for the post of chief delegate and his lack of inner conviction: ‘He spoke French well but he had nothing to say.’ They came also from Ozaki Yukio who said of the Chief Delegate: ‘…He might be an authority on cooking but he seemed to have no definite ideas with regard to the welfare of his country’. (Foreign Office, hereafter F.O., 608 642/2/5). 23. Stephen Bonsal, Suitors and Supplicants (London, 1944), p.232. Saionji remarked: ‘You do me too much honour, classing me with the founders of modern Japan. Even my most indulgent friends speak of me as only half-Genro.’ 24. Matsumoto op. cit., pp. 23–24. 25. Hara Nikki, vol.5, p.69. 26. Oka Yoshitake, Kindai Nihon no Seijika (Tokyo, 1960), p. 203. 27. Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics (London, 1963), pp.128–130. 28. Titus, op. cit., pp.275–309. 29. Ibid., p.9. 30. Hara Nikki, vol.5, p.70. 31. Michael Blaker, Japanese International Negotiating Style (New York, 1977), pp.71–72. 32. Hara Nikki, vol.5, p.40. 33. Kikuchi Takenori (ed.), Hakushaku Chinda Sutemi Den (Tokyo, 1938), pp.216–220. F.O. 608 vol.211 648/2/2. Shidehara’s biographer claims that the appointment of the ambassadors had been intended only as a temporary measure. Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan (ed.), Shidehara Kijuro (Tokyo, 1950), p.128. 34. F.S.Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919 (London, 1944), pp.19 and 45. 35. F.O. 608 vol.211 648/2/2. F.O. 371 5350 F9/9/23 and following documents. Hara Nikki, vol.5, p.133. 36. Kimura Ki, Saionji Kinmochi (Tokyo, 1948), pp.264–266. F.O. 608 vol.211 648/2/2.

Notes  233

37. Harada Kumao, Saionji Ko to Seikyoku (Tokyo, 1950–1956), vol.4, p.375. Hereafter, Harada. 38. Hara Nikki, vol.5, p.40. 39. Makino Nobuaki, Makino Nobuaki Kaikoroku (Tokyo, 1977), vol.3, pp. 165–168. 40. Hara Nikki, op. cit., p.40. Saionji, weak from a bout of pneumonia, accepted on the condition that his health did not deteriorate. In December, Saionji did indeed suffer a relapse and in a letter to Hara on December 16th, he asked to be allowed to withdraw. Hara dissuaded him, and on December 20th, Saionji wrote fixing his date of departure as January 14th, 1919. 41. For an excellent assessment of the attitudes of the various elites towards conference issues, see Thomas W.Burkman, Japan, the League of Nations and the New World Order (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1975), Chapters 3 and 5. 42. Makino’s views are set out in Makino Nobuaki Kaikoroku, op. cit., in Kobayashi (ed.), Suiuso Nikki, in the minutes of the Conference itself and in his reports following his return from France. 43. Kobayashi (ed.), op.cit., pp.326–347. 44. Burkman, op. cit., p.104. 45. Shidehara, op. cit., pp. 136 -237. 46. Harada Kumao (translated by Thomas Mayer Oakes), Saionji-Harada Memoirs: Fragile Victory, Prince Saionji and the 1930 London Treaty Issue (Detroit 1968). Hereafter, Mayer Oakes, p.85. 47. Saionji Kinmochi, Plenipotentiary Report, August 27th, 1919. 48. F.O. 371 3816 15 1270. Speech, September 7th, 1919. 49. Plenipotentiary Report. 50. Nihon Gaiko Shi, vol.12, Pari Kowa Kaigi (Tokyo, 1971). 51. Instructions from the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations, March 30th, endorsed by the Cabinet April 1st. See Kobayashi Yukio, ‘Pari Heiwa Kaigi to Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai Mondai’ (Nihon Gaikoshi Kenkyu). See also Kobayashi (ed.), op. cit., pp.315–322, for Ito Miyoji’s explanation of the report on Japanese Conference demands. 52. Russell H.Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East (New York, 1952), pp. 114–115. 53. Diplomatic Records Office (D.R.O.) P.C. 2–3-1–10 telegram no. 16824. 54. Bonsal, op. cit., pp.229–234. 55. F.O. 371.5350 F9/9/23 and following documents. The account of the interview with the King, which was telegraphed by Saionji to the Prime Minister and subsequently leaked in the Gaiho Iho, was quickly suppressed in Japan and denied by both governments. 56. Fifield, op. cit., pp.226 and 241. Chapters 3 and 5, provide a detailed breakdown of the negotiations relating to Japan’s various conference claims. 57. Fifield, ‘Japanese Policy Relating to the Shantung Question’ (Journal of Modern

234  Notes

History), XXII, September 1951. pp.267–268. Telegram fom Ambassasor Matsui to Foreign Minister Uchida, April 28th, 1919. 58. From Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, quoted in Fifield, op.cit., p.265. 59. Ibid., passim. 60. Harada, vol.1, pp. 20–22. Saionji told Harada: ‘During the Paris Peace conference, when the Shantung issue became the subject of heated discussion, I determined to send back all the other delegates, since they were too troublesome, and to remain alone to settle the matter.’ Other independent reports recall how Saionji told the delegates that there were international problems more important than Shantung and that if they intended to let this issue stand in the way of the League they should leave the Conference. 61. Makino, op. cit., pp.201 -202. Kimura Ki, Saionji Kinmochi, op. cit., p.269. 62. Hara Nikki, vol.5, p.133. 63. Konoe Fumimaro, ‘Saionji Ko Pari Kaigi Nikki’ (Sekai Orai 8.1. January 1937), pp. 123–125. 64. Extract from Le Petit Marseillais, February 27th and 28th, in D.R.O.P.C.2.3.1.10. 65. Georges Clemenceau, Grandeurs et Misères d’une Victoire (Paris, 1930), p.126. 66. Konoe, op. cit.. Kikuchi, op. cit., p.213–221. 67. Mayer Oakes, op. cit., p.30.

CHAPTER FOUR THE TURNING POINT; SAIONJI’S DOMINATION OF THE GENRO GROUP 1. Hara Nikki, vol.5, p.321. 2. Ibid., p.45. 3. Ibid., pp. 147, 166, September 1919, are the earliest discussions of the issue recorded by Hara. 4. Ibid., pp.207, 226, 249. 5. Ibid., pp.246–248. 6. Takeuchi Tatsuji, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York, 1967), p.10. 7. Matsumoto, op. cit., p.110. 8. Roger F.Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo (Cambridge, Mass. 1971), gives the best analysis of the question in English. Other English language works which deal with this topic include: Leonard Mosley, Hirohito, Emperor of Japan (New Jersey, 1966) and Koyama Itoko, Nagako, Empress of Japan (New York, 1958). In Japanese, after Hara Nikki, Misuzu Shobo (ed.), Gendaishi Shiryo (Tokyo 1964), and Takakura Tetsuichi, Tanaka Giichi Denki, (Tokyo, 1958–1960), (hereafter, Tanaka Den) are the most detailed. Other Japanese works provide little more than a passing reference. 9. Tanaka Den, p.226. 10. Hara Nikki, vol.5, p. 318. 11. Ibid., p.319. Tanaka Den, p.239. 12. Hara Nikki, p.325. 13. Ibid., p.345. 14. Ibid., pp.345, 351. 15. Ibid., pp.345–346. 16. Ibid., pp.341, 344. 17. Ibid., pp.347. Both Mosley and Bergamini mistakenly attribute the decision to make the announcement to the riots attacking Yamagata at the Meiji Shrine on February 11th. 18. Ibid., p.352. 19. There appears to have been Court activity on the issue unknown to Makino. On April 23rd, Tanaka reported to Yamagata that Okuma had been told in an audience with the Emperor that Yamagata’s resignation would not be accepted. Yamagata had also been informed of this by Ichiki Kitokuro. On May 4th, Makino knew nothing of this. Ibid., p.378.   235

236  Notes

20. Makino wanted to go through Hirata, but Hirata was away from Tokyo, and Saionji, who above all wanted a quick settlement of the matter, was not prepared to await his return. 21. Hackett, op.cit.. 22. Koyama, op. cit., p. 38. 23. Gendaishi Shiryo, vol.4 (1), pp.476–477. 24. Hara Nikki, vol.5, p.166. 25. Ibid., p.300. 26. Ibid., pp.420–421. 27. Nezu Masashi, Dai Nihon Teikoku no Hokai (Tokyo, 1961), p.36. 28. Tokutomi, Yamagata Den. p.1022. 29. Hara Nikki, vol.5. p.441. 30. Ibid., p.445. 31. Titus, op. cit., pp.108–112. 32. Ibid. 33. Nezu, op.cit., p.131. 34. Okuma was also invited to answer but refused on the grounds of ill health. 35. Matsumoto, op. cit., pp.121, 124. 36. Tokutomi Iichiro, Koshaku Matsukata Masayoshi Den (Tokyo, 1935), p.948. 37. Masumi, op. cit., vol.5, p.30. Matsumoto, op. cit., p.120. 38. Ibid., p.125. 39. Ibid., pp. 126,149,168. Harada, vol.1, p.220. 40. Matsumoto, op. cit., p.142. 41. Ibid., pp.147, 151, 157, 158. 42. Ibid., pp. 172–173. 43. Ibid., p.178. Ito Takashi (ed.), Danwa Hikki, p.180. 44. Matsumoto, op. cit., p.197. 45. Masumi, op. cit., vol.5, p.49. Danwa Hikki, p.118. 46. Matsumoto, op. cit., pp.253–256. 47. Ibid., p.252. 48. Ibid., pp.286–287. 49. Hirata’s biography, Hirota Koki Denki Kankokai (ed.), Hirota Koki (Tokyo, 1966), does not throw any light on this issue. 50. Matsumoto, op. cit., p.309. Matsumoto was perhaps the most important channel of information in the period between the election and the formation of the Kato Cabinet. In these four weeks, he met with Saionji seven times, Hirata eighteen times, Kato twice, Takahashi frequently and Yokota of the Seiyukai almost daily. 51. Ibid., pp.298–299. 52. Ibid., pp.299, 315. 53. Ibid., pp.300–301, 315. 54. Ibid., p.296.

CHAPTER FIVE SAIONJI THE LAST GENRO; PARTY GOVERNMENTS AND SAIONJI DIPLOMACY

1. Yoshino Sakuzo, ‘Saionji ko no Genro Muyoron’ (Chuo Koron, September 1926. p.167). 2. Matsumoto, op. cit., pp.330, 377, 392. 3. Ibid., pp.476–477. 4. Oka, op.cit., p.222. 5. Matsumoto, op. cit., pp.482, 485. 6. Ibid., p.554. Masumi, op. cit., p.118. 7. The Taiwan Bank relief question which brought the Cabinet down, is described in detail in Matsumoto, op. cit., pp.555–556. 8. Ibid., p.571. 9. Masumi, op. cit., pp.173–176. 10. Harada, vol.1, p.220. 11. Ibid., vol.2, pp.115–116. 12. Ibid., p.154. 13. Ibid., p.168. 14. Ibid., p.160. 15. See Peter Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp.243–246, for an extensive discussion of why the parties came to power when they did. 16. Nobuya Bamba, Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma (Vancouver, 1972), p.28. 17. The Charter Oath of March 1868, which Saionji helped to draft, called for the abandonment of the evil customs of the past and the seeking of knowledge throughout the world in conjunction with the strengthening of the Imperial Polity. 18. Inoue Kaoru Monjo (669.2). 19. Verbal note from the Japanese Government to the French Government, June 25th, 1911, quoted in C.Walter Young, Japan’s Jurisdiction in the South Manchurian Railway Areas (John Hopkins Press, 1931), p.175. 20. Matsumoto, op. cit., p.295. 21. Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–31 (Cambridge, 1965), p.67. 22. Bamba, op. cit., p.251. 23. Matusmoto, op. cit., p. 447.   237

238  Notes

24. Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan (ed.), Shidehara Kijuro, p.376. 25. See, for example, Iriye, op.cit.. Imai Seiichi, ‘Seito Seiji to Shidehara Gaiko’ (Rekishigaku Kenkyu 219, May 1958). Gavan McCormack, Chang Tso-lin in North-east China 1911–1928 (California, 1977). 26. Matsumoto, op. cit., pp. 569–572. Bamba, op. cit., pp.283–285. 27. Tanaka Den, pp.655–657. 28. Bamba, op. cit., p.331. 29. Ugaki Kazushige, Ugaki Nikki (Tokyo, 1971), pp. 560–561. William F.Morton, Tanaka Giichi and Japan’s China Policy (Kent, 1980), pp.131–132. 30. See Banno Junji, ‘Shidehara Gaiko no Hakkai to Nihon Rikugun’ pp. 115–142 (Tokyo University Institute of Social Science (ed.)), Gundo to Teiko, vol. 6 of Fuashizumu Ki no Kokka to Shakkai. 31. Komoto Daisaku, ‘Watakushi ga Chang Tso-lin o Koroshita’ (Bungei Shunju, December 1954, pp.194–201). 32. Harada, vol.1, pp.3–4. 33. Ibid., p.5. 34. Ibid., p.10. 35. Tanaka Den, vol.2. p.1030. 36. Titus, op. cit., pp.145–148. 37. Morton, op. cit., p.160. 38. Thomas Mayer Oakes, Fragile Victory, op. cit., is a fine translation of the whole of volume 1 of Harada Kumao (ed.), Saionji ko to Seikyoku, excluding the first short section which concerns the assassination of Chang Tso-lin. This volume documents the activities of the Saionji group throughout the struggle to ratify the London Naval Treaty. 39. James B.Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy (Princeton, 1966), p.43. Ito Takashi ‘Coalition and Conflicts in Japan 1930; Political Groups and the London Naval Conference’ in Groennings, Kelly and Leiserson (eds.), The Study of Coalition Behaviour (New York, 1970), p.169. 40. Mayer Oakes, op. cit., p.85. 41. Ibid., pp.98–99. 42. Okada Keisuke Taisho Kiroku Hensankai (ed.), Okada Keisuke (Tokyo, 1958), p.44. (Hereafter, Okada Keisuke.) These meetings had taken place in January. Okada also visited Saionji early in March, at Hamaguchi’s request. Mayer Oakes, op. cit., p.94. 43. Ibid., p.96. 44. Suzuki Hajime (ed.), Suzuki Kantaro Jiden (Tokyo, 1949), pp.256–257. Suzuki Kantaro Denki Hensankai Iinkai (ed.), Suzuki Kantaro Den (Tokyo, 1960), pp.112–113. 45. Mayer Oakes, op. cit., p.137. 46. Saionji was suffering from pneumonia. Ibid., pp.103–104. 47. Ibid., p.103. 48. Ibid., p.105.

Notes  239

49. Ito Takashi, op. cit., p.171. Crowley, op. cit., pp.72–73. 50. Mayer Oakes, op. cit., p.188. 51. Ito, op. cit., p.172. Crowley, op. cit., p.77. 52. Mayer Oakes, op. cit., p.125. 53. Ibid., p.211. 54. Ibid., p.219. 55. Ibid., p. 224. 56. Takeuchi, op. cit., p.330. 57. Mayer Oakes, op. cit., p.229. 58. For analysis of the changing domestic scene, see, for example, Richard Storry, The Double Patriots: a Study of Japanese Nationalism (Boston, 1957); Ogata Sadako, Defiance in Manchuria (Berkley 1964); Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, op. cit.; Delmer M.Brown, Nationalism in Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1955); Kinoshita Hanji, Nihon no Fuashizumushi (Tokyo, 1950); Hata Ikuhiko, ‘Sakurakai Shuisho’ (Rekishi Kyoiku, 6.2.1958), pp.81–89; Gendashi Shiryo, op. cit., vol.10 (3). 59. Takeuchi, op. cit., p.345. 60. Crowley, op. cit., p.106. 61. See Kakegawa Tomiko, ‘The Press and Public Opinion, 1931 -1941’ in Dorothy Borg and Okamoto Shumpei (ed.), Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese and American Relations 1931 -1941 (New York and London, 1973). 62. Harada, vol.2, pp.52–53. 63. Ibid., p.54. 64. Ibid., pp.64–66. 65. Ibid., pp.99, 112. 66. Crowley, op. cit., p.125. 67. Harada, vol.2, pp.108, 115. 68. Ibid., pp.275–276. 69. Ibid., p.377.

CHAPTER SIX THE SAIONJI GROUP UNDER ATTACK

1. Gordon M.Berger, Parties out of Power in Japan, 1931–1941 (Princeton, 1977), pp.47, 49. 2. Harada, vol.1, p.177. 3. Ibid, vol.2, p.286. Kido Koichi, Kido Koichi Nikki (Tokyo, l966), pp. 166–167. (Hereafter, Kido Nikki.)s Gendaishi Shiryo, 4 (1), p.114. Yamamoto Shiro, ‘Saito Naikaku no Seiritsu o Megutte’ (Shirin 59.5, September 1976) p.50. 4. Kido, op.cit., vol.1, pp. 163-165. This was not simply a reaction to the assassination of Inukai. In April, Kido had written that even a Seiyukai Cabinet with 300 Diet seats, would not be secure and that Saito or, if necessary, Hiranuma, might be the best choice to lead a national unity cabinet. Ibid., p.153. 5. Harada, vol.2, p.154. 6. Saionji had met on May 19th with the Grand Chamberlain, Suzuki. On the following day, he had received ex-Prime Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, the President of the Privy Council, Kuratomi Yuzaburo, and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Makino. On May 21st, Saionji met with ex-Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro, Konoe Fumimaro, Yamanouchi Ichiji and Army Minister Araki Sadao and on the 22nd, with Navy Minister Osumi, Admiral Togo Heihachiro and again with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Ibid., pp.288–289. 7. Kido, vol.1, pp.143, 191. 8. Ibid., pp. 190, 207. 9. Ibid., pp. 194, 206–207. 10. Ibid., pp.303, 331. Harada, vol.3., pp.317, 323. 11. Ibid., pp.325-326. 12. Frank O.Miller, Minobe Tatsukichi: Interpreter of Constitutionanalism in Japan (Berkeley, 1965), p.32. 13. Ibid., p.153. 14. Titus, op. cit., p.143. 15. Ibid., p.120. 16. Matsuoka Yosuke, Showa Ishin (Tokyo, 1938), pp.200–201. 17. The analysis of Japanese politics along the axes ‘progressive’ (western) — ‘reactionary’ (Restorationist), and ‘radical reformist’ —‘gradualist’, is put forward by Ito Takashi in Showa Shoki Seijishi Kenkyu. 18. Harada, vol.4, pp.204–209. 19. Maruyama, op. cit., p.61. 240 

Notes  241

20. Miller, op. cit., Chapter 3, deals with Minobe’s methodology and his ideas on the nature of the law, the state and constitutionalism. Chapter 4 deals with the application of these ideas in interpreting the Japanese constitutional system. 21. Ibid., p.89. 22. Ibid., p.90. 23. Mayer Oakes, op.cit., p.114. 24. Stein was one of the legal theorists with whom Saionji discussed plans for the Meiji Constitution in 1882. Harada, vol.4, p.224. 25. Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, Nihon Kenpo shi no Kenkyu (Tokyo, 1968), p.135, from a critique by Mori Junji of Saionji’s annotations of Inoue’s papers. 26. Showa no Doran, vol.1, p.148, quoted in Imai Seiichi, ‘Cabinet Emperor and Senior Statesmen’ in Borg and Okamoto (ed.), op.cit., p.55. 27. Harada, vol.4, p.18. 28. Ibid., p.1. 29. Ibid., vol.2, p.189. 30. Hara Nikki, vol.5, p.451. 31. Harada, vol.7, p.296. Saionji subsequently deleted these lines from his corrected text of the diary. 32. Inoue Den, p.278. 33. Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, Tenno Kikan Setsu Jiken (Tokyo, 1970), p.502. This work is a collection of extracts from contemporary and post-war materials and of interviews with people involved, like Miyazawa himself, in the incident. Miyazawa’s commentary on the texts is very useful. 34. Titus, op. cit., p.168. 35. Honjo Shigeru, Honjo Nikki (Tokyo, 1967), pp.230, 232. (Hereafter, Honjo Nikki.) 36. Ibid., pp.203-209. 37. ‘Minobe Tatsukichi Hakushi, Suehiro Iwataro Hakushi nado no Kokutai Bunran Shiso ni tsuite.’ 38. Gendaishi Shiryo, vol.4 (1), pp.358–360. 39. Okada Keisuke, p.82. Harada, vol.4, pp.204, 207. 40. Harada, vol.3, p.294. 41. Harada, vol.4, p.233. 42. Ibid., p.230. 43. Ibid., p.230. 44. Ibid., p.227-228. 45. Ibid., pp.265-266. 46. Ibid., vol.8, p.115. 47. Ibid., vol.4, p.285. 48. Ibid., p.228. 49. Ibid., p.277–278. 50. Ibid., vol.5, p.128. 51. Ibid., p.269.

242  Notes

52. Ibid., p.277. 53. Ibid., p.292. 54. Ibid., p.296. 55. Three months after his appointment, Watanabe, addressing a meeting of commanding officers, defended the use of the term ‘organ’, to refer to the Emperor and criticised the anti-organ movement as too strenuous. Four months later, in the February Incident, Watanabe was killed by Kodo faction officers. 56. Harada, vol.5, p.264. 57. Ibid., pp.156–157. 58. Ibid., vol.4. p.309. 59. Kanamori, who had offered his resignation to Okada in the spring of 1935 at the start of the attack on the organ theory, finally resigned in January 1936. Kanamori, for many years a lecturer in constitutional law at various private universities in Tokyo, became Director General of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau in 1934. His public statement that academic theory should not be debated on the political stage ranged him alongside Ichiki and Minobe and brought him under similar attack. Kanamori interpreted this attack on himself as a method of undermining the positions of the President of the Privy Council and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Kanamori Tokujiro, Watakushi no Rirekisho (Tokyo, 1959), pp.70–75. 60. Harada, vol.4, p.336. 61. Nihon Oyobi Nihonjin, No.330, ‘Kokuun Shinten to Kokutai Mondai no Suii’ in Gendaishi Shiryo, vol.4 (2), p.429. 62. The Japan Chronicle, June 23rd, 1935; reported in ibid. 63. Ibid., September 23rd, 1935. 64. ‘Kokumin Tomen no Yobo’ in ibid., p.432. 65. ‘Jushin Seifu no Botsuraku’ (Bungei Shunju, December 1935). 66. The Miyako, ibid. 67. Ibid., June 26th, 1935. 68. Harada, vol.4, p.387. 69. Kido Nikki, vol.1, pp.426, 444–448. 70. Ibid., pp.444–445. 71. Harada, vol.4, p.440. 72. Ibid., vol.2, p.397. 73. Ben-Ami Shillony, Revolt in Japan (Princeton, 1973), pp.110–111. See also Hata Ikuhiko, Gun Fuashizumu Undo Shi (Tokyo, 1962). Hata describes this as the first of three preparatory stages. 74. Storry, op. cit., pp.180-181. 75. Otani Keijiro, Showa Kenpei Shi (Tokyo, 1966), p.733. Shillony, op. cit., p.117. 76. Yukawa Kohei, ‘Ni Ni Roku Jiken to Saionji Ko’ (Bungei Shunju 45-6, p.327). 77. Hata Ikuhiko, ‘Mazaki Jinzaburo’ (Keizai Orai, November 1979, p.222). 78. Sakai Kageyoshi, Eiketsu Kato Kanji, p.57. 79. Hata, op.cit., p.222 and passim.

Notes  243

80. Hashimoto Seikichi, ‘Shugeki no hi no Saionji Kinmochi’ (Bungei Shunju 33– 12 1955, p.75). At the time of the February mutiny, Hashimoto was Chief of Police in Shizuoka. 81. See, for example, Hata, Gun Fuashizumu Undo Shi, op. cit., Matsumoto Seicho, Ni Ni Roku Jiken Kenkyu Shiryo, vol.4 (1), Otani Keijiro, op. cit., Shillony, op. cit. 82. Masuda Shohei, Zagyoso Hiroku (Shizuoka Shinbunsha, 1976), pp.83, 87. 83. The apparent victimisation of the Asahi Shinbun—the Mainichi Shinbun offices were also visited by a group of soldiers who merely gave them a printed manifesto of their aims—may well have been retribution for its vocal support of Mazaki’s transfer the previous year. 84. Masuda, op. cit., p.43. 85. Hashimoto, op. cit., pp.74-75. 86. Ibid., pp.75–76. Masuda, op. cit., pp.81–82. Harada, vol.5, p.4. 87. Ibid., pp.5–6. Kido Nikki, vol.1, pp.464–469. Honjo Nikki, pp.271–281. 88. Kido Nikki, vol.1, p.465. Kido Nikki Kenkyu Kai (ed.), Kido Koichi Kankei Monjo (Tokyo, 1966), p.273. (Hereafter, Kido Kankei Monjo.) Harada, vol.5, p.5. Goto was appointed temporary, acting Prime Minister. 89. Nezu, op. cit., p.152. Honjo Nikki, p.272. 90. Kido Kankei Monjo, p.273. 91. Kido Nikki, vol.1, p.467. Telephone call from Harada to Kido. 92. Honjo Nikki, p.275. 93. Ibid., pp.275–276. 94. Harada, vol.2, pp.24, 39, 43. Kido Nikki, vol.1, p.176. Hata, ‘Mazaki Jinzaburo’, op. cit., p.1225. Honjo Nikki, p.163. 95. Kojima Noburu, Tenno (Tokyo, 1974), vol.2, pp.228–229. 96. Honjo Nikki, p.275. Kido Nikki, vol.1, p.466. 97. Harada, vol.6, p.265. 98. Ibid., p.297. 99. Nezu, op. cit., p.161. 100. Harada, vol.5, pp.134–135, 177. 101. Ibid., p.15. 102. Kido Nikki, vol.1, p.472. 103. Ibid., p.473. 104. Titus, op. cit., pp. 112, 142, 330–331. 105. Honjo Nikki, pp.237–238. 106. Kido Nikki, vol. 1, p.472. 107. Harada, vol.5, p.13. 108. Ibid., p.14. 109. Kido Kankei Monjo, p.280. 110. Berger, op. cit., pp.78–79. 111. Kido Nikki, vol.1, p.474. 112. Joseph C.Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York, 1944), p. 178.

244  Notes

113. Harada, vol.5, p.17. 114. Kido Nikki, vol.1, pp 475–476. 115. Nezu, op. cit., p.169. 116. Miyazawa, op. cit., vol.2, pp.440, 443. 117. Harada, vol.5, p.51, 301. 118. Ibid., p.55. 119. Kido Nikki, vol.1, pp.447, 427, 477, 479.

CHAPTER SEVEN FROM POLITICAL ACTOR TO POLITICAL COMMENTATOR; SAIONJI’S LAST YEARS, 1937–1940

1. See above, Chapter Three, for a discussion of the term ‘figurehead’. 2. See Titus, op. cit., pp.237–246, for an examination of Harada’s assumption of Saionji’s arbitrating function in the appointment of Kido as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in June 1940. 3. Kido Nikki, vol.2, pp.538–539. 4. Harada, vol.6, p.231. 5. Kido Nikki, pp.542, 544. 6. Harada, vol.6, pp.4–5. 7. Ibid., vol.7, p.250. 8. Ibid., p.252. 9. Ibid., vol.8, p.57. 10. Berger, op. cit., pp.243–244. 11. Harada, vol.8, p.163. 12. Ibid., pp.160–161. 13. Ibid., p.239. 14. Ibid., p.268. 15. Konoe had resigned as President of the Privy Council and Vice President Hara had been elevated to fill his position despite Konoe’s recommendation that Hiranuma be appointed. 16. Harada, vol.8, p.291. 17. Ibid., vol.5, pp.193–194, 198–199. 18. Ibid., pp.170–171. 19. Ibid., vol.6, p.32. 20. Ibid., vol.6, p.71. 21. Ibid., pp.48–49. 22. David J.Lu, From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor (Washington, 1961), p. 17. 23. John Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at War, 1937-1945, p.51. 24. Harada, vol.6, p.93. 25. Ibid., p.140. 26. Ibid., pp.93, 100, 114, 119, 124, 135. 27. Ibid., p. l39. 28. Ibid., p.321.   245

246  Notes

29. Ibid., pp.329–337. 30. Ibid., vol.7, pp.96–103. 31. Ibid., p.104. 32. Ibid., p.139. 33. Ibid., pp.232–234. 34. Ibid., p.93. 35. Ibid., p.240. 36. Ibid., p.293. 37. Ibid., p.341. 38. Ibid., p.351. 39. Ibid., p.363. 40. Ibid., vol.8, p.41. 41. Ibid., p.29. 42. Ibid., p.57. 43. Ibid., pp.88, 96. 44. Ibid., p.103. 45. Ibid., pp.373–374. 46. Ibid., vol.6, pp.8, 13. 47. Kido Nikki, vol.1, p.575. 48. Harada, vol.6, p.81. 49. Ibid., p.83. 50. Ibid., pp.107, 113. 51. Ibid., p.114. 52. Ibid., p.185. 53. Ibid., pp. 187–188. 54. Ibid., p.49. 55. Ibid., p.71. 56. Ibid., pp. 140–141. 57. Ibid., p.213. 58. Ibid., p.314. 59. Ibid., p.249. 60. Ibid., vol.7, p.45. 61. Berger, op cit., Chapter 4. 62. Harada, vol.6, p.255. 62. 63. Ibid., vol.7, p.121. 64. Ibid., pp. 171–172. 65. Ibid., p.121. 66. Ibid., pp. 132–133. 67. Ibid., p.256 ff. 68. Titus, op. cit., pp.237–246. 69. Harada, vol.8, p.387.

A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

The history of Saionji is, in a sense, the history of modern Japanese politics. The bibliography cited below is therefore, of necessity, highly selective. In addition to those works mentioned below, a number of unpublished letters written by Saionji, are of some interest. Saionji’s letters are not collected together, but are to be found in the papers of the recipients. The bulk of the letters are in the form of microfilmed copies of the original handwritten manuscripts. Letters to Goto Shimpei, Hara Kei, Inoue Kaoru, Ito Hirobumi, Ito Miyoji, Katsura Taro, Makino Nobuaki, Mutsu Munemutsu, Saito Makoto, Sakatani Yoshiro, Tanaka Giichi, Terauchi Masatake and Yamagata Aritomo, are available in the Constitutional Materials Reading Room of the National Diet Library in Tokyo. Letters to Takekoshi Yosaburo are held by Meiji Bunko at Tokyo University. Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto has, in addition to a number of volumes on the early history of the Saionji family, 37 letters received or written by Saionji from and to a variety of people over the years 1868–1915. Primary Sources Hara Kei, Hara Kei Nikki (6 vols., Tokyo, 1967). Harada Kumao, Saionji Ko to Seikyoku (9 vols., Tokyo, 1950–1956). Honjo Shigeru, Honjo Nikki (Tokyo, 1967). Kido Koichi, Kido Koichi Nikki (2 vols., Tokyo, 1966). Kobayashi Tatsuo (ed.), Ito Miyoji: Suiuso Nikki (Tokyo, 1966). Kobayashi Yugo (ed.), Rikken Seiyukai Shi, vols. 1–4 (Tokyo, 1924– 1943). Makino Nobuaki, Makino Nobuaki Kaikoroku (Tokyo, 1977). Oka Yoshitake, Hayashi Shigeru (eds.), Taisho Demokurashi Ki no Seiji: Matsumoto Gokichi Seiji Nisshi (rev. ed., Tokyo, 1977). Okada Keisuke Taisho Kiroku Hensankai (ed.), Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku (Tokyo, 1977). Takakura Tetsuichi, Tanaka Giichi Denki (2 vols., Tokyo, 1958–1960). Ugaki Kazushige, Ugaki Nikki (3 vols., Tokyo, 1971).

  247

248  A Select Bibliography

Secondary Sources in English Jackson Holbrook Bailey, Prince Saionji: A Study in Modern Japanese Political Leadership (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1959). Gordon M.Berger, Parties out of Power in Japan, 1931–1941 (Princeton, 1977). Dorothy Borg and Okamoto Shumpei (ed.), Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese and American Relations 1931–1941 (New York and London, 1973). Thomas W.Burkman, Japan, the League of Nations and the New World Order (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1975). Harada Kumao (translated by Thomas Mayer Oakes), Saionji-Harada Memoirs: Fragile Victory, Prince Saionji and the 1930 London Treaty Issue (Detroit 1968). Frank W.Ikle, German-Japanese Relations, 1936– 1940 (New York, 1956). Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–31 (Cambridge, 1965). Ito Takashi ‘Coalition and Conflicts in Japan 1930; Political groups and the London Naval Conference’ in Groennings, Kelly and Leiserson (eds.), The Study of Coalition Behaviour (New York, 1970). Marius B.Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Stanford, 1970). Frank O.Miller, Minobe Tatsukichi: Interpreter of Constitutionalism in Japan (Berkeley, 1965). Najita Tetsuo, Hara Kei in the Politics of Compromise 1905–1915 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967). Ben-Ami Shillony, Revolt in Japan (Princeton, 1973). Takekoshi Yosaburo, Prince Saionji (Kyoto, 1933). David Anson Titus, Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan (New York and London, 1974). Secondary Sources in Japanese Ando Tokki, Toan Ko Eifu (Tokyo, 1937). Banno Junji, ‘Shidehara Gaiko no Hokai to Nihon Rikugun’, in Tokyo Daigaku Shakaikagaku Kenkyujo (ed.), Gundo to Teiko. Kikuchi Takenori (ed.), Hakushaku Chinda Sutemi Den (Tokyo, 1938). Koizumi Sakutaro, Zuishitsu Saionji Ko (Tokyo, 1939). Inoue Kiyoshi, Taisho Ki no Seiji to Shakai (Tokyo, 1970). Inoue Kiyoshi and Watanabe Toru (eds.), Taisho Ki no Kyushinteki Jiyushugi (Tokyo, 1972). Ito Takashi, Showa Shoki Seiji Shi Kenkyu (Tokyo, 1969). Ito Takashi (ed.), Taisho Shoki Yamagata Aritomo Danwa Hikki— Seihen Omoide gusa (Tokyo, 1981). Masuda Masahira, Zagyoso Hiroku (Shizuoka, 1976). Masumi Junnosuke, Nihon Seito Shiron (5 vols., Tokyo, 1965 -1980). Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, Tenno Kikansetsu Jiken (2 vols., Tokyo, 1970). Oka Yoshitake, Kindai Nihon no Seijika (Tokyo, 1970). Yamamoto Shiro, Taisho Seihen no Kisoteki Kenkyu (Tokyo, 1970).

INDEX NOTE: Sub-entries are in chronological order

Abe Nobuyuki, General: cabinet of (1939–40) 185, 196–8 Acollas, Emile 6, 27 Adachi 104 Advisory Council on Foreign Relations 47, 65, 67, 71 ‘aite ni sezu’ (non-recognition) 190 Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1905) Britain 26, 65 see also Portsmouth Anti-Comintern Pact 177, 187, 193 Araki, General 130, 174 Arita Hachiro 182, 192, 193, 195 army in Meiji period 8, 24–5, 29, 34–5 in Taisho period 38–40, 51, 55–6 problems with 114–17, 129–31 and cabinets (1932–40) 135–6, 185 and Minobe affair 148, 152–7 uprising (1936) 159–80 passim and Saionji’s last years 183, 185, 187–8, 193, 195, 204 see also February Incident; Minobe Asahi Shinbun 166 Axis Alliance 185 Belgium 64 Berger, Gordon 174 betrothal issue see colour blindness Bismarck, Otto von 68 Bonsal, Stephen 72 borrowing, foreign 28–9 Britain 26, 67

Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1905) 26, 65 Saionji visits 65, 72 relations with (1925–32) 107, 111, 113, 132 relations with (1937–40) 187, 188, 190–1, 193–9, 209 see also London; Portsmouth Broad Gauge Bill 31 bunmei kaika (civilisation through enlightenment) 179 bureaucracy 34, 38–40, 50, 54 cabinets early (1885–1901) 8, 9–10, 45–8 First Katsura (1901–06) 10–23, 48–51, 56 First Saionji (1906–08) 11, 20, 23–9, 32–3, 109, 158 Second Katsura (1908–11) 26, 29–32, 34, 109 Second Saionji (1911–12) 17, 30, 32–9, 51, 61, 107, 110, 147, 216 Third Katsura (1912–13) 40–2, 52, 109, 219 First Yamamoto (1913–14) 55, 61, 89, 219 Second Okuma (1914–16) 47, 54–6, 57, 58, 59, 110, 219, 221 Terauchi (1916–18) 57–8, 59, 60, 61, 67, 89, 219 Hara (1918–21) 58–60, 61, 63,   249

250  Index

78–90, 92, 107, 141, 214, 216, 218, 219, 221 Takahashi (1921) 91–2, 93, 219, 221 Kato Tomosaburo (1922) 92–4 Second Yamamoto (1923) 94–5, 96 Kiyoura (1924) 96–7, 98 First Kato Komei (1924) 97–8, 99, 100, 107 Second Kato Komei (1925) 99, 100, 107, 111, 114 First Wakatsuki (1926–27) 100–2, 107, 114 Tanaka (1927–29) 102–3, 104, 112–17, 126, 131, 135, 222 Hamaguchi (1929) 103–4, 116–25 Second Wakatsuki (1931) 104, 127–31, 135 Inukai (1931–32) 104–6, 134, 137–8 Saito (1932–34) 132, 134, 136–7, 219 Okada (1934–36) 137–66 passim, 219 Hirota (1936–37) 172, 175–7, 182–3, 187, 220 Hayashi (1937) 94, 155, 182–4, 220 First Konoe (1937–38) 182, 184, 188–92, 199–208 Hiranuma (1939) 182, 184, 192–6 Abe (1939–40) 185, 196–8 Yonai (1940) 185, 198, 206 Second Konoe (1940) 185–6, 198–9, 208, 210 Chamberlain see Grand Chamberlain Change Hsueh-liang 114, 126 Chang Tso-Lin, assassination of 103, 107, 113–17, 126, 147, 168, 204, 217 Chiang Kai-shek 111–12, 189–90, 191–2, 194, 203 Chichibu, Prince 169–71, 187, 206 Chief Plenipotentiary, Saionji as see Paris Peace Conference China 39

war with (1894–95) 8, 9, 13, 18, 28, 43, 108 Shantung issue 73–4, 113–14 Incident (1937) 187–92, 198, 199 relations with (1925–32) 109–17, 130, 132, 135 Twenty-One Demands to 56, 58, 110 see also Manchuria; Mongolia Chinda Sutemi 2, 64, 73, 75, 89, 101, 161 Choshu group 5–6, 10, 25, 34 in Genro 44–5 loss of power 53, 55, 67, 80, 98 Clemenceau, Georges 6, 65, 72–5 colour blindness issue and betrothal of Crown Prince 78, 80–5, 90, 217 communications development 29, 31 conduit, Saionji as 214–15 Connyngham Green, Sir Arthur 65 consensus politics 61, 63 Constitution 7, 14, 79 Council of Ten 65, 71, 73 Court issues 77–90 see also emperor; Imperial Craigie, Sir Alexander (British Ambassador) 195 Crown Prince (Hirohito): problems of betrothal, trip abroad and regency 2, 79–88, 90, 217 see also Hirohito Daido Club 28, 30 Dajodaijin (prime ministers) see cabinets Dajokan see cabinets Den Kenjiro 78, 93, 96, 102 depression, economic (1907–08) 29 diplomacy see foreign policy Doshikai (political party) 41, 42 education 8–10, 24, 138–9, 213 Elder statesmen see Genro; Jushin emperor constitutional 212–17, 223

Index  251

see also Hirohito; Meiji emperor; Taisho emperor Eto Genkuro 148–9, 152, 158 Europe Saionji visits 6–7, 9, 44, 107–8 see also Paris Peace Conference see also individual countries Far Eastern Conference 113 fascism, development of 142 see also right wing February Incident (1936) 141, 159–80 passim, 200–1 Fifield, Russell 71 figurehead, Saionji as 62–4, 215, 216 Finance Ministry 24, 33, 46, 130, 162 fiscal policy 28–9, 31, 38 Five Year Economic Plan 206 foreign policy and Foreign Ministry 215, 218, 221–2 in Meiji period 8, 9, 17–18, 24, 33 and Genro 46–7, 56; Paris Peace Conference 60–76, 218; diplomacy (1928–32) 106–34 reorientation (1937–40) 186–99 see also individual countries, in particular Britain; China; Germany; Manchuria; Mongolia; United States France 8, 22 Saionji in 6–7, 9, 44, 68, 72, 107, 213; see also Paris Peace Conference relations with (1937–40) 194, 198 fukoku kyohei (rich country, string military) 179 Fukuzawa Yukichi 5, 108 Fushimi, Prince 55, 81, 120, 123, 145, 164, 171 Gaiko Chosakai (Advisory Council on Foreign Relations) 47, 65, 67, 71 Geneva Conference 127 Genkun (elder statesmen) see Genro Genro Group people in see Inoue; Ito; Katsura; Kuroda; Matsukata;

Oyama; Saigo; Saionji Kinmochi; Yamagata emergence of 43–7 as cabinet makers 24, 34, 47–52 Saionji’s participation in (1913–19) 13, 42, 43, 211, 219–20, 222; Cabinet succession 53–60; Paris Peace Conference (1919) 60–76 Saionji’s domination of 77–98; court issues 77–90; cabinet succession 91–8 Saionji as last of 99–106 Saionji diplomacy and changing role in foreign policy (1928–32) 106–34 see also Saionji Group George V, King of Britain 65, 72 Germany 8, 22 Pacific Islands 70 relations with (1937–40) 187, 190, 192–8 non-aggression pact with USSR 196 Goncourt, Edmond and brothers 6–7 Goto Fumio 151 Goto Shimpei 41, 92 Gozen Kaigi Imperial Conferences 202–5 Grand Chamberlain 216 Tokudaiji Sanenori as 10 Katsura Taro as 37–8, 89 and cabinets (1925–32) 102, 105, 140, 150 and foreign policy (1928–35) 116, 120, 121, 122, 125, 129, 154 Suzuki Kantaro as 121, 140 and Minobe affair 146, 158 and February Incident 160–1, 165 and Saionji’s last years 182, 210 Grand Order of Chrysanthemum 78 Grew, Joseph 175 Gun (district) Abolition Bill 28 Gunri (military command) 143–4 Gunsei (military administration) 144 Hagaki, Colonel 129

252  Index

Hamaguchi Osachi (Yuko) cabinet of (1929) 103–4, 117–25 killed 128 han see Choshu; Satsuma Hara Kei 2, 10, 147 and Saionji-Katsura compromise 11–12, 18–21, 24, 28–42 passim and cabinets (1913–18) 54–5, 57 cabinet of (1918–21) 58–60, 61, 63, 78–90, 92, 107, 141, 214, 218, 219, 221 and Paris Peace Conference 60, 66–7 assassinated (1921) 85, 87, 89, 91, 93, 215 Harada Kumao 2–3, 119, 124, 129 and Minobe affair 144, 151, 154, 156–7 and Crisis Year (1936) 160, 169, 173, 178 and cabinets (1932–40) 181–2, 199–201, 203, 206, 208–9 and foreign policy (1937–40) 187, 191, 193, 195, 197, 198 Hashimoto Seikichi 166 Hatano Takanao 80 Hayashi 183 Hayashi Senjuro, General 128, 156 cabinet of (1937) 94, 155, 182–4 Hayashi, Tadasu 33 Hibiya riots 23 Higashikuni, Prince 170–1 Hiranuma Kichiro, Baron 124, 126, 130, 218 and cabinets (1932–40) 135, 136 and Minobe affair 140, 142, 149–51, 153, 159 and cabinets (1932–40) 183, 185, 198, 202, 205 and Crisis Year (1936) 160, 173, 177–8 cabinet of (1939) 182, 184, 92–6, 207–8 Hirata Tosuke 51, 78, 81, 83, 85, 91, 94–6, 98–100 Hirohata 166, 167, 173

Hirohito, emperor and cabinets (1925–32) 101–2, 105 and foreign policy (1928–32) 121–2, 126, 131–2 as organ, theory of see Minobe and cabinets (1932–40) 136–7 Supreme Command Prerogative 143–4, 147 and February Incident (1936) 168–71, 177 and foreign policy (1937–40) 196 and Saionji’s last years 201–8 see also Crown Prince Hirota Koki, cabinet of (1936–37) 172, 175–7, 182–3, 187–8, 220 Hitler, A. 197 ‘Hokushinron’ (‘Strike North’) 153 Honjo Shigeru 2, 147–8, 167–8, 173, 176 House, Colonel 72–3 Household Minister see Imperial Household Minister Ichiki Kitokuro 89, 99 and Minobe affair 138, 140, 142, 144, 148–50, 157–9 and Crisis Year (1936) 160, 161, 167, 173–5, 178 Ikeda Seihin 182, 185, 191, 193, 195–6 Imperial Command to assist Throne, Genro as recipient of 44–6 Imperial Conferences (Gozen Kaigi) 145–6, 202–5 Imperial Household Law 79 Imperial Household Minister and court issues 80, 82–3, 93 and cabinets (1925–32) 99–100, 140 and foreign policy (1928–32) 120, 122, 125, 129 and February Incident 160–1, 166–7, 169, 171, 172, 175 and Saionji’s last years 182 Imperial Proclamation of Amnesty 200, 201

Index  253

Imperial Rescripts 8, 10, 37–40, 54, 200 ‘Imperial Rule Assistance Association’ 17 see also Seiyukai Inoue Kaoru, Marquis 2, 30, 103, 108, 214 and Saionji cabinets 20, 24, 25, 33 in Meiji Genro 44, 46, 48 death 57 international relations see foreign policy internationalist, Saionji as 17–18, 62, 68–9, 78, 107–8, 211–12 see also foreign policy Inukai Tsuyoshi 67, 141 cabinet of (1931) 104–6, 134, 137–8 assassinated 135–6, 140 Irie (Vice Chamberlain) 95 Ishiwara Kanji, Colonel 114, 127, 177, 188 Itagaki Taisuke, Colonel 7, 127 Italy, relations with (1937–40) 190, 194, 197 Ito Hirobumi, Count 2, 3, 7 cabinets of 8, 9–10, 45–7, 214 and party 11–12, 17, 18, 48–9 and Katsura 18–20, 23 and Saionji’s cabinets 23, 24, 26, 30, 38, 109 in Meiji Genro 44–6, 48, 50 assassinated 33, 34–5, 51 Ito Miyoji 60, 67, 116, 124, 149–50 Iwakura Michimoto, Baron 151 Iwakura Tomomi 6, 7, 45, 214 Isawa Takio 158 Japan Socialist Party (JSP) 27 Jushin (non-Genro elder statesmen) 95, 194 and cabinets (1932–40) 137–8 and Minobe affair 140, 142, 148, 152–3, 157–9 and Crisis Year (1936) 172–3 Justice Ministry 24, 157

Kaishinto (political party) 13 Kakumei (newspaper) 27 Kanamori Tokujiro 156–7, 159 Kanaya Hanzo, General 127, 129 Kaneko Kentaro, Viscount 149 Kanin, Prince 153 Kato Kanji, Admiral 118–19, 121–5, 163–4 Kato Komei 4, 46, 57, 59, 92 211 in Doshikei 42 Chinese policy 56, 58, 110 and Paris Peace Conference 65–6 first cabinet of (1924) 97–8, 99, 100, 107 second cabinet of (1925) 99, 100, 107, 111, 114 death 101 Kato Tomasaburo, Admiral 67, 94, 147 cabinet of (1922) 92–4 Katsura Taro, Viscount 2, 3, 94, 139, 214, 220 first cabinet of (1901–06) 10–23, 48–51; and compromise with Saionji (1903–6) 11–23, decline of 23–42 second cabinet of (1908–11) 26, 29–32, 34, 109 and Saionji’s cabinet 33–9 as Grand Chamberlain 37–8, 89 as Lord Keeper of Privy Seal 37–8, 41, 89 third cabinet of (1912–13) 40–2, 62–4, 109, 219 in Genro 44, 45–6, 48 death 55 Kawashima, General 156, 168, 175 Kayokai group 119 ‘Keien’ period (1903–12) 11, 20, 28–9, 40, 48, 50–2, 53, 109, 179 Kellogg Briand Pact 132 Kempeitai 195 Kenseihonto (political party) 13, 19, 50, 56 Kenseikai (political party) 57, 59, 92, 96–7, 100–1, 103

254  Index

Kenseito (political party) 10, 13 Kido Koichi 2, 129, 136, 138 and cabinets (1932–40) 182, 183–5, 200, 201, 208–9 and Crisis Year (1936) 160, 165–73 passim, 175, 178 and foreign policy (1937–40) 190–1, 199 Kido Koin 6 Kikuchi Takeo, Baron 148, 152 Kita Ikki 127, 163, 169, 200 Kiyoura Keigo, Viscount 56, 83, 85, 98–100, 185 cabinet of (1924) 96–8 as quasi-Genro 93–4, 100, 137–8 Kobayashi Yugo 2 Kobe Chronicle (newspaper) 34 Kodo faction 126, 200 and Minobe affair 153, 155 and Crisis Year (1936) 162, 163, 170, 172, 174–5 Kokuhonsha group 142, 178 Kokuminto (political party) 31, 92 Kokutai (national polity) 138–9, 143, 157, 162, 177 Kokutai Yogo Rengokai (alliance of right wing groups) 148 Komura Jutaro 33–4 Konoe Fumimaro 2, 69, 75, 119, 137, 153 and cabinets (1932–40) 185, 195–7 and Crisis Year (1936) 160, 170, 172–6, 179 first cabinet of (1937–8) 182, 184, 188–92, 199–208 second cabinet of (1940) 185–6, 198–9; and rift with Saionji 199–210 Korea 109, 129–30 Expedition controversy (1873) 44 war over see China, war with policy towards 25–6, 29, 33 Kotoku Shusui 27 Koyama Kango 75 Kuge see nobles Kuhara Fusanosuke 157, 162

Kuni Kuniyoshi, Prince and family 79–80, 81–2 Kuninomiya Nagako 79–80, 81 Kuratomi Yusaburo, Baron 149 Kuroda Kiyotaka 44, 46, 48 Kwantung Army 177 problems with 126, 128–9, 135; see also Chang Tso-Lin Labour Convention 70 Lansing (American Secretary of State) 73–4 League of Nations 67–71, 74, 107, 130–1 withdrawal from 108, 132–3, 141, 158 Liaotung Peninsula ceded 8, 9, 18 liberalist, Saionji as 211, 212–13, 215 Lockehill (Admiral Consul) 26 London Naval Conference and Treaty (1930) 64, 117–26, 127–8, 132, 133, 135, 140, 141, 144, 145, 204, 217 Lord Keeper of Privy Seal see Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki 24–5 as internationalist 60, 63, 66–7, 75 as Imperial Household Minister 84, 85, 87–9, 93, 96 and cabinets (1925–32) 99, 104, 105 as Lord Keeper of Privy Seal 99–102, 104–5, 112, 120–2, 125, 136, 141, 160 and foreign policy (1928–32) 112, 120 and cabinets (1932–40) 136–8 and Minobe affair 139–40, 142, 150, 158, 159 and Crisis Year (1936) 160, 162, 165–6 plot to kill 195 Manchukuo, independent (1932) 126 Manchuria 102, 109, 112–17, 187 policy towards 13, 25–6, 29, 33

Index  255

Incident (1931) 104, 126–34, 141 Incident (1935) 153–4 see also China marriage issue see colour blindness Maruyama Masao 62, 142 Matsuda Masahisa 7, 11–12, 18–19, 24, 31, 40 Matsudaira Tsuneo 119, 172, 175, 195 Matsukata Masayoshi, Count 2, 25, 26 and socialism 27 in Meiji Genro 44, 46, 48–9 cabinets of 46, 214 and cabinets (1913–18) 55–6, 60 and court issues 79, 80, 81, 84, 87, 88 and cabinets (1921–24) 91, 93–5, 98, 103 illness and death (1924) 78, 97, 99, 106, 219 Matsumoto Gokichi 2 Matsuoka Masatake 24 Matsuoka Yosuke 141, 192 Mazaki Jinzaburo, General 155, 156, 163–4, 169, 171, 174, 200–1 Mazaki Katsuji, Rear Admiral 164 Meiji emperor (1867–1912) 36–7, 88, 89, 214, 216, 220 Meiji Period (1868–1912) 11–36 see also cabinets (until 1912); Genro Group, emergence and cabinet makers; Saionji, as president of Seiyukai military power of emperor see Minobe see also army; navy Min, Queen of Korea 9 Minami Jiro 127, 128 Minobe Tatsukichi, Dr and theory of national polity 123, 138–60 passim, 213, 223 Minseito (political party) 103–4, 116–17, 134–5, 141, 158–9, 161, 215, 220 Miyako 157 Mokuyokai group 114

monarchy see emperor Mongolia 103, 113–14, 127, 128 Mori Arinori 8, 27 Motoda Eifu 8, 101 Movement to Protect Constitution 45 Mukden Incident see Manchuria, Incident (1931) Murakami Yukikazu 151 Mussolini, B. 197 Mutsuhito see Meiji emperor Mutsu Munemitsu 8, 9 Nagai Ryutaro 184 Nagata Tetsuzan, Major-General 114, 151, 156 assassinated 162, 182 Najita Tetsuo 20 Nakae Chomin 7, 158 Nakagawa Kojuro 101 Nakahashi 101 Nakamura Yujiro 80, 82–3, 88 Nakano Seigo 61 ‘Nanshiron’ (‘Strike South’) 153 National Mobilisation Bill (1938) 206 national polity (Kokutai) 138–9, 143, 157, 162, 177 navy 215 in Meiji period 24–5, 34, 35 Taisho period 38–9, 53, 55–6, 78 and cabinets (1932–40) 136, 185 and Minobe affair 140, 144, 145 and February Incident 163–4, 168 and Saionji’s last years 182–3, 185, 188, 193, 195, 199, 201 see also London Naval Treaty; Minobe negotiator, Saionji as 62–4 Netherlands 198 Nine Power Pact 1910, 132 Nishida Zei 163, 200 nobles in Meiji period 5–8, 12–13, 25, 28, 31, 34 in Taisho period 38, 105, 112, 119 Minobe affair and 148 Nomura, Admiral 196–7

256  Index

October Incident (1931) 104 Oguri 151 Ohara Tadasu 151, 158 Okada Keisuke, Admiral 2, 119, 120–2, 162, 195 cabinet of (1934–36) 137–66 passim, 219 Okubo Toshimichi 214 Okuma Shigenobu, Count 7, 44, 66 second cabinet of (1914–16) 47, 54–6, 57, 58, 59, 110, 219, 221 Omikoshi (‘Portable Shrine’ concept) 62–3 Omura Masujiro 6 organ theory see Minobe Oshima 192, 194, 197 Osumi 164, 175 Oyama Iwao 23, 44, 48, 53, 57 Ozaki Yukio 42 Pacific Islands, German 70 Paris Peace Conference (1919) 18, 60–76, 107, 110, 133 Saionji as Chief Plenipotentiary 47, 60–6, 77, 218 Saionji’s diplomacy 66–71 party politics see political parties Peace Preservation Law (1925) 139 peers see nobles philosophy, political, Saionji’s 14–18 Pichon (French leader) 72 political parties 10, 13–15, 17–19 and bureaucracy 34 socialist 27, 158 ‘period of party government’ (1924–32) 100–34 see also cabinets; Doshikai; Kenseihonto; Kenseikai; Kokuminto; Minseito; Seiyukai political philosophy, Saionji’s 14–18 Portsmouth Treaty of Peace (1905) 18, 20–3, 26, 60, 78 prime ministers (Dajodaijin) see cabinets

selection of see Genro Privy Council 218, 222 Saionji in 10 Ito in 11, 46, 49–50 Yamagata in 34, 49, 84 Genro and 47–9 Matsukata in 49 court issues in 82–5 Kiyoura in 99 and cabinets (1925–32) 99–100, 135, 149 and foreign policy (1928–32) 112, 117, 123–5, 130, 134 and cabinets (1932–40) 137–8, 150, 183, 185–6 and Minobe affair 146, 151, 158 and February Incident (1936) 160, 177–8 and foreign policy (1937–40) 192 and Saionji’s last years 202–4, 208 Privy Seal, Lord Keeper of 30, 45, 220 Katsura as 37–8, 41, 89 Fushimi as 55 Oyama as 57 Matsukata as 94 Hirata as 94–5, 96, 98, 99–100 Makino as 99–102, 104–5, 112, 120–2, 125, 136, 141, 160 and cabinets (1925–32) 99–102, 104–5 and foreign policy (1928–32) 112, 120–2, 125, 128–9, 131 and cabinets (1932–40) 136–8, 141, 183–4, 185 and Minobe affair 139, 145, 151, 158 Saito as 160, 162–3, 165–7 and February Incident 161–3, 165, 166–8, 171–2, 175 Yuasa as 168, 172, 175, 195 and foreign policy (1937–40) 188, 195, 196, 198 and Saionji’s last years 201–3, 206, 208–10 public expenditure 28–9, 38

Index  257

quasi-Genro Kiyoura as 93–4, 100, 137–8 Saionji as 44, 61, 65 Yamamoto as 93–4, 100, 137 railways 31 Red Flag Incident (1908) 27 Reed-Matsudaira compromise 119 Regency issue 78–9, 84–5, 86–8, 90, 217 Ribbentrop, J. von 192 right wing alliance 148 and February Incident (1936) 163 increase in power 142 see also Kokutai Rikken see Kaishinto; Kokuminto; Minseito riots 23, 59, 111–12 Ritsumeikan School 6 Roosevelt, T. 21 Russia negotiations with 8, 9, 13–14, 17 war with (1904–05) 19–21, 108; anticipated 15–16; Peace Treaty 18, 20–3, 26 see also Soviet Union Saigo Tsugumichi 44, 48 Saionji Group 78, 89, 106, 121, 134, 216, 217 under attack 135–80; return to transcendental cabinets 135–8; Minobe affair; clarification of national polity 138–59; Crisis Year (1936): February Incident 159–80 see also Saionji Saionji Hachiro 75, 85 Saionji Kinmochi, Marquis later Prince (1849–1940) early years 5–10 private life and illnesses 3–4, 12, 61, 78

as president of Seiyukai and compromise with Katsura (1903–06) 11–42, 62, 211; decline and fall of compromise (1907–13) 23–42 first cabinet of (1906–08) 11, 20, 23–9. 32–3, 109, 158 second cabinet of (1911–12) 17, 30, 32–9, 51, 61, 107, 110, 147, 216 last years (1937–40) 181–210; foreign policy reorientation 186–99; Konoe and court 199–210 see also Genro Group; Saionji Group Saionji Morosue 5 Saito Makoto, Admiral 2, 24, 92, 161 cabinet of (1932) 132, 134, 136, 137, 219 and cabinets (1932–40) 136–8 and Minobe affair 140, 150, 158 as Lord Keeper of Privy Seal 160, 162–3, 165–7 assassinated 162, 165 Sakatani Yoshiro 24 Sakurakai (young officers’ club) 126–7 Sangi 44 Sangiin 7 Sanjo Sanetomi 6, 45, 214 sanyo (councillor), Saionji as 5–6 Satsuma group 5–6, 25, 215, 219 in Genro 44–5 and cabinets (1915–18) 53–5, 80, 98 Sawaki 78, 93 seitai 143 Seiyukai (political party) 28, 41, 49–50 planned 10 established (1900) 48 Saionji as president of 11–42, 62, 211; retirement and estrangement from 54, 61, 135 and cabinets (1913–18) 53–62

258  Index

and court issues 78, 82 and cabinets (1921–4) 91–7 and cabinets (1925–32) 100–5 and foreign policy (1928–32) 111–12, 115–19, 123, 126, 130, 133–4 and cabinets (1932–40) 135, 204 and Minobe affair 141–2, 156, 157, 159 and Crisis Year (1936) 160, 161, 162, 176, 179 Sekai no Nihon (magazine) 9 Shantung expeditions (1927) 73–4, 113–14 Shidehara Kijuro, Baron 110–13 Shimazu family 80, 81 shipbuilding see London Naval Treaty Shiratori 194, 197–8 Showa emperor see Hirohito Showa Period (from 1926) 106–210 see also cabinets (1920–40); Genro Group, Saionji diplomacy; Saionji, last years Shrine concept 62–3 Siberian Expedition 47, 66 Sino-Japanese war see China, war with socialism 25 27, 158 sovereignty, state see Minobe Soviet Union relations with (1937–40) 196, 197–8 non-aggression pact with Germany 196 see also Russia Suehiro Iwatoro, Dr 148 Suetsugu, Admiral 118–19, 122, 201 Sumitomo Kichizaemon 3, 8 Supreme War Council 120–1, 123–5 Suzuki Kantaro, Admiral 89, 104, 120–2, 139–40, 162, 165 Suzuki Kisaburo 135, 136, 157–8, 211, 220 Suzuki Teiichi, Colonel 114, 150, 151 Taft, William H. 26

Tairodoshikai (Anti-Russian Association) 13 Taisho emperor (r. 1912–26) 37–8 accession 36, 89 and cabinets (1913–19) 58, 60 problems with 36, 77–90 passim, 101, 216 Taisho empress 86, 87, 88 Taisho Period (1912–26) 36–101, 103 Crisis 11, 35, 40, 53, 54, 139, 214, 220–1 see also cabinets (1912–26); Genro Group, Saionji’s participation and domination Takahashi Korekiyo, Viscount 94–5, 137–8 cabinet of (1921) 91–2, 93, 219, 221 assassination (1936) 162, 165 Takamatsu, Prince 170–1, 198 Takarabe 118, 199 Takekoshi Yosaburo 8, 22 Tanaka Giichi 2, 77, 78, 100, 112, 211 cabinet of (1927–29) 102–3, 104, 112–17, 126, 131, 135, 222 death 105 Taniguchi, Admiral 124 taxation 28–9, 31, 38 Terauchi Hisaichi 151, 176 Terauchi Masatake 24, 218 cabinet of (1916) 57–8, 59, 60, 61, 67, 89, 219 Tientsin Incident (1935) 153–4, 195 Titus, David 62–3 Togo, Fleet Admiral 120, 123 Tokonami Takejiro 103 Tokudaiji Kinzumi 5 Tokudaiji Sanenori 3, 5, 10, 45, 214, 216 Tokudaiji Yoshimaro see Saionji Kinmochi Tokugawa, Prince 55 Tokugawa Shogunate 5, 44 Tokugawa Yorimichi 93, 95 Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shiribun (newspaper) 22

Index  259

Tosei faction and Minobe affair 152–3, 154–6, 159 and Crisis Year (1936) 162, 172, 178 Toyama Mitsuru 86 Toyo Jiyu Shinbun (newspaper) 7, 62, 158, 179, 213 transport 29, 31 Trautman, Oscar 189 travel abroad by Crown prince 78, 84–6, 88, 90, 217 by Saionji see under Europe; France Tripartite Pact 210 Tsingtao, surrender of 73–4 Twenty-One Demands to China 56 Uchida Ryohei 94 Uchida Shinya 151 Uchida Yasuya 107 Uehara Yusaku 39–40 Ugaki Kazushige, General 2, 127, 128, 136, 158, 182–3, 190–2, 200 United States Portsmouth Treaty and 21–2 and Korea 26 Paris Peace Conference and 64, 67, 72–3 relations with (1925–32) 107, 111, 113, 130, 132 relations with (1937–40) 188, 190, 193, 196–9, 209 see also Washington Universal Suffrage Law (1925) 103 USSR see Russia; Soviet Union Versailles see Paris Von Stein, Lorenz 145 Wakatsuki Reijiro 2 first cabinet of (1926) 100–2, 107, 114 second cabinet of (1931) 104, 127–31, 135

and foreign policy (1928–32) 118 and cabinets (1932–40) 137–8 and Minobe affair 141, 158 Wang Ching Wei 192 Washington Conference and System, (1921–22) 47, 110, 113, 117–18, 141, 147, 158 Watanabe Jiro, General 155, 162, 165 Wilhelm II, Kaiser of Germany 72 Wilson, T.Woodrow 67, 68–9, 71, 72, 73, 74 Yamagata Aritomo, Count 2, 12, 22, 27, 216, 221 and army 7–8, 29, 39 and Katsura 10, 23, 29–30, 34–5, 39, 41, 51 and Saionji’s cabinets 24–5, 27, 29, 33–5, 37–9, 109 in Meijo Group 44, 46, 48–9, 51–2 and cabinets (1913–18) 53–60, 214 and Paris Peace Conference 60, 61, 66, 67 and court issues 79, 80, 82, 83–90 and cabinets (1921–32) 91, 93, 103, 219 death (1922) 78, 93, 98, 106 Yamagata Monjo 37 Yamamoto Eisuke 164 Yamamoto Gombei, Admiral 19, 24–5, 33, 51, 164 first cabinet of (1913–14) 53–4, 55, 61, 89, 219 and cabinets (1921–24) 93–4, 95 as quasi-Genro 93–4, 100, 137 second cabinet of (1923) 94–5, 96 and cabinets (1925–32) 99–100 and cabinets (1932–40) 136 Yamamoto Isoroku 182 Yamamoto Jotaro 116 Yamamoto Tatsuo 92 Yoda Utaro 92 Yonai Mitsumasa, Admiral 168, 182

260  Index

cabinet of (1940) 185, 198, 206 Yoshida Shigeru 176, 198 Yoshihito see Taisho Emperor Yoshizawa 110 Young Officers 126–7, 169–70 Yuasa Kurahei and Crisis Year (1936) 161, 166–8, 173–5

as Lord Keeper of Privy Seal 168, 172, 175, 195 and cabinets (1932–40) 183–5, 195, 201–2 zaibatsu group 141, 153, 161