The Embattled General: Sir Richard Turner and the First World War 9780773598003

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
Figures and Tables
Acknowledgments
Foreword
Nomenclature
Abbreviations
Introduction
1 Boer War Hero: Turner to 1914
2 “An awful war”: Turner as Brigade Commander
3 “We are in desolate places”: Battle of St Eloi Craters
4 “Won by my infantry”: Turner’s Somme Campaign
5 Chaos in England: Unwise Management
6 “A wise choice”: Transformation
7 Fighting the Authorities: The Turner–Currie Dynamic
8 Fade Away: Turner 1918–1961
Conclusion
Appendix One: Awards
Appendix Two: Historiography
Notes
Bibliography
Index
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
K
L
M
O
P
Q
R
S
T
V
W
Y

Citation preview

The Embattled General

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The

Embattled General Sir Richard Turner and the First World War

w i l l i a m f. s t e wa r t

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston

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London

•

Chicago

© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2015 isbn 978-0-7735-4625-7 (cloth) isbn 978-0-7735-9800-3 (epdf) isbn 978-0-7735-9801-0 (epub) Legal deposit fourth quarter 2015 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund for our publishing activities.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Stewart, William Frederick, 1958–, author The embattled general : Sir Richard Turner and the First World War / William F. Stewart. Includes bibliographical references and index. Issued in print and electronic formats. isbn 978-0-7735-4625-7 (bound).–isbn 978-0-7735-9800-3 (epdf).– isbn 978-0-7735-9801-0 (epub) 1. Turner, Richard E.W. (Richard Ernest William), 1871–1961. 2. Generals–Canada–Biography. 3. Canada. Canadian Armed Forces–Biography. 4. World War, 1914–1918–Canada. I. Title. u55.t87S74 2015

355.0092

c2015-904274-7 c2015-904275-5

To my wife, Anita, for her ever-constant love and support in times of trials and tribulation as well as joys and jubilation

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Contents

Figures and Tables • ix Acknowledgments • xi Foreword • xiii Nomenclature • xv Abbreviations • xvii Introduction • 3 1 Boer War Hero: Turner to 1914 • 11 2 “An awful war”: Turner as Brigade Commander • 39 3 “We are in desolate places”: Battle of St Eloi Craters • 72 4 “Won by my infantry”: Turner’s Somme Campaign • 114 5 Chaos in England: Unwise Management • 149 6 “A wise choice”: Transformation • 171 7 Fighting the Authorities: The Turner–Currie Dynamic • 207 8 Fade Away: Turner 1918–1961 • 239 Conclusion • 262 Appendix One: Awards • 275 Appendix Two: Historiography • 276 Notes • 281 Bibliography • 339 Index • 369

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Figures and Tables

1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.1 4.2 4.3

4.4 4.5 5.1 6.1 6.2

figures Lieutenant Richard Turner, 1900 • 18 Turner’s Boer War Campaign • 23 Lieutenant-Colonel R.E.W. Turner in 1906 • 37 3rd Brigade Order of Battle, 22 April 1915 • 045 Second Battle of Ypres – situation 6:30 p.m., 22 April 1915 • 50 Second Battle of Ypres, 24 April 1915 • 56 Battle of Festubert, 18–20 May 1915 • 68 2nd Division organization chart – St Eloi Craters, 6 April 1916 • 73 St Eloi panorama, 14 March 1915 • 83 St Eloi aerial photograph, 31 March 1916 • 86 Battle of St Eloi Craters, 6–16 April 1916 • 88 St Eloi Craters aerial photograph, 16 April 1916 • 97 2nd Division organization chart – Courcelette, 15 September 1916 • 123 Battle of Courcelette, 15 September 1916 • 129 2nd Division losses, reinforcements, and cumulative deficiency for weeks ending 15 September to 13 October 1916 • 137 Battle of Thiepval Ridge, 26 September 1916 • 138 Battle of Ancre Heights, 1 October 1916 • 141 Canadian Forces in England 1916 simplified organization chart • 151 Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Turner, goc Canadian Forces in the British Isles • 173 Canadian Forces in England 1917 simplified organization chart • 175

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fig ures and ta bles 6.3 Drafts received and dispatched • 177 8.1 Overseas Military Council organization chart 8.2 omfc 1918 organization chart • 246

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tables 2.1 British to Canadian force ratios in France 1918 • 42 4.1 2nd Division command changes September 1915/November 1916 • 117 6.1 Reduction in staff December 1916 to September 1917 • 187 C.1 Promotion comparison – Turner/Currie • 266

Acknowledgments

This was not the book I intended to write. When I started, knowing Richard Turner’s bleak reputation, I anticipated producing a work that would explore the reasons for his failings. But, I encountered evidence that persuaded me that much of what I knew about Turner was erroneous and in need of a re-evaluation. In developing this new perspective, I was assisted by the support of many, both scholarly and personal. First, I want to acknowledge the generosity in time, insights, and encouragement of Dr Tim Cook of the Canadian War Museum. His detailed comments materially improved the book. Another key contributor was Gary Sheffield, now at the University of Wolverhampton, who went far beyond the call of duty in directing me on the right path. It was an invigorating experience to work with a scholar of such deep and encyclopaedic knowledge of the First World War. I also want to thank Turner’s granddaughter, Mrs Diana Bouchard, for her generous hospitality, for giving me access to documents, and for sharing her insights into Turner’s personality. Dr Andrew Iarocci reviewed all the chapters in draft, and his comments were most helpful. He too was generous with his time and willingness to discuss the intricacies of the Canadian administration in England. Dr David Campbell helpfully provided scans of Douglas Haig’s diaries and discussed obscure aspects of the Battles of St Eloi and Courcelette. Dr Stephen Harris at the Directorate of History and Heritage at the Department of National Defence answered numerous questions and was most accommodating in my visit to the Directorate. Dr Richard Holt generously provided a copy of his excellent dissertation at the last minute. I owe a great debt to Roger Deeks for his incisive and probing comments on the chapters he reviewed and

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his tremendous assistance when I visited England. Roger is a staunch friend and wise counsellor. Finally, I want to thank the reviewers for their feedback and suggestions that materially improved the work. My family was surpassingly supportive as I pursued this strange interest in a “long-dead white guy.” My sons, Eric and Kirk, goodnaturedly endured long tales of major-generals behaving badly and my absences as I tracked down that last footnote. I must especially acknowledge my mother, sadly no longer with us, whose unwavering support and assistance was vital to the project. Finally, this project would not have happened without my wife’s unstinting enthusiasm, encouragement, and support. I hope they will all find the resulting work worthy of their commitment. All errors, omissions, and infelicities are my responsibility.

Foreword

I was delighted to be asked to contribute a foreword to Bill Stewart’s study of General Sir Richard Turner. This study not only affords the opportunity to examine his military biography, which encompassed pivotal combat and administrative roles, but also provides a lens through which to view developments in tactics, operations, administration, training, and civil–military and Imperial relations. This is more than of just parochial Canadian interest. As much work on Dominion forces of the First World War over the last couple of decades has made clear, Canadian (and Australian, New Zealand, and South African) formations were both proto-national armies and components of the British Expeditionary Force (bef). They should be treated as such by historians. Thus, Bill Stewart’s work is not simply a contribution (and a very significant one at that) to Canadian historiography, it is also a piece in the mosaic of scholarship on the war effort of the British Empire as a whole. What makes the project of additional interest is that Turner was much criticized in the historiography, and this work offers an opportunity to test the validity of this negative picture. The result is a balanced re-evaluation of this controversial Canadian general that makes the case that Turner’s role and contribution have been misunderstood or understated. Backed by exhaustive research in Canadian and British archives and on the battlefields, Bill Stewart paints a portrait much at variance with what is commonly believed. It certainly isn’t a hagiography. On the contrary, Stewart critically assesses and describes Turner’s merits, faults, successes, and failures and places them in the context of the period. He also examines Turner’s relationships with the key British and Canadian military and civilian authorities, with a special focus on the commander of the Canadian

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Corps, Arthur Currie. Stewart demonstrates that Turner’s interactions with Currie need to be re-appraised. This revisionist account may ruffle some nationalistic feathers in Canada, but Bill’s arguments are well-balanced, moderate, firmly based on careful evaluation of primary sources, and, above all, convincing. Stewart narrates Turner’s military career from his service as a subaltern in the Boer War, to the hard fighting at Second Ypres, St Eloi Craters, and on the Somme, to his administrative role in England. The book integrates the latest research on tactics, weapons, operations, and organization from Canada, Britain, and Australia. It also explores the reorganization and reform of Canadian military administration in England in the second half of the war, a critical topic that has received only cursory attention in Canadian historiography. But as Stewart argues persuasively, these reforms were a critical step in sustaining the Canadian Corps’s effectiveness in 1917 and 1918. Bill Stewart has written an important contribution to the study of Canada’s participation in the 1914–18 conflict and, by extension, to our understanding of the wider Imperial war. It deserves to be read by anyone with an interest in that dreadful, but all too frequently mythologized, war. Gary Sheffield Chair of War Studies Centre for Historical Research, First World War Research Group University of Wolverhampton

Nomenclature

The book uses a twelve-hour clock for presenting time, following contemporary practice. The British Army did not shift to a twenty-fourhour clock until late in the war. Metric units, with yards equal to metres, are used for distances. This avoids the inelegant appearance of a 914-metre for a 1,000-yard advance without unduly distorting the narrative. To reduce repetition, references to France, England, and Canada allude to Canadian forces in those locations, unless explicitly indicated otherwise. Canadian units are described without a national modifier, hence the 2nd Division for the Canadian 2nd Division. British, Australian, and French units include a national designation, such as the British 3rd Division. Following contemporary practice, battalions, brigades, and divisions are presented as Arabic numerals, corps as Roman numerals, and armies spelled out – so the 14th Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, V Corps, and Reserve Army. Italics designate enemy unit: for example, the 45th Reserve Division. Infantry battalions consisted of four companies plus ancillary units for a total paper strength of 1,000 men, although the fighting strength of a battalion in the field was closer to 700 to 800 men. Four battalions made up a brigade, with a machine gun company and a trench mortar battery added by 1916. Three infantry brigades made up a division that also included, depending on the period, two to four field artillery brigades, a pioneer battalion, three engineer field companies, and a variety of support units. The engineer companies expanded to battalion-size in 1918.

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Abbreviations

aif ams bef bggs casc cef cetd cfa cgs cigs cmgc cmr cra cre crt dso foo fsr ghq goc gocra gso gwva kro mg mgc mggs

Australian Imperial Force Assistant Military Secretary British Expeditionary Force Brigadier-General, General Staff Canadian Army Service Corps Canadian Expeditionary Force Canadian Engineers Training Depot Canadian Field Artillery Chief of the General Staff Chief of the Imperial General Staff Canadian Machine Gun Corps Canadian Mounted Rifles Commander, Royal Artillery Commander, Royal Engineers Canadian Railway Troops Distinguished Service Order Forward Observation Officer Field Service Regulations General Headquarters General Officer Commanding General Officer Commanding Royal Artillery General Staff Officer Great War Veterans’ Association King’s Regulations and Orders machine gun Machine Gun Corps Major-General, General Staff

xviii nco omc omfc pf ppcli qoch raf rca rcd rcr rmc ro smle vc

a b br eviations Non-commissioned Officers Overseas Military Council Overseas Military Forces of Canada Permanent Force Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Queen’s Own Canadian Hussars Royal Air Force Royal Canadian Artillery Royal Canadian Dragoons Royal Canadian Regiment Royal Military College (Kingston) Routine Orders Short Magazine Lee-Enfield Victoria Cross

The Embattled General

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Introduction Gen Turner the great Canadian General, was here today. He is very popular as [he] is every inch a fighting man. Cadet Cecil Frost, 1 February 19171

Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Ernest William Turner, vc, kcb, kcmg, dso was a capable, controversial, and unconventional Canadian general. Unlike many of his Canadian confrères in the Boer, First, and Second World Wars, he was also engaging, courageous, and, despite his unprepossessing appearance, charismatic, and he was a more successful military leader than is commonly believed. He was also greatly respected by his officers, staff, and other ranks. The dominant narrative in Canadian history, described later, however, portrays Turner as a political appointee and a repeated failure in combat. It also claims that he was exiled to England and obscurity. The only time he emerges in this standard interpretation is when he clashes with Sir Arthur Currie, the commander of the Canadian Corps. The single biographical study on Turner belittlingly refers to him in its title as a “dashing subaltern.”2 This portrayal is badly skewed. It ignores, minimizes, or ascribes to others Turner’s successes as a combat commander and head of Canadian forces in England. Turner played a critical part in every stage of the development of the Canadian Corps for the first half of the war and contributed significantly to its success thereafter. His experience was unique in the Canadian Expeditionary Force (cef) in that it included senior command in both the combat arms and administration. His competition and conflicts with Currie highlight how a one-sided perspective shapes and distorts the historical discourse. Examining Turner’s career also

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allows an important window into the wider issues of tactical, operational, and administrative matters of the First World War. The tactical and operational topics include the debates on command centralization versus decentralization, the increasing combat capability of British and Canadian forces (described as a “learning curve”), the role of pre-war British tactical and operational preparation, and responses to the challenges presented by trench warfare. The administrative issues include the appropriate organization for overseas forces in a hybrid-control environment, and the impact of a mixed managerial/professional approach to administration and training. Turner was at the nexus of the evolution of the Canadian military in the First World War but is a peripheral caricature of an officer in current Canadian historiography. Turner was the senior Canadian officer in the cef throughout the war, despite the belief that Currie was his superior in rank.3 Turner commanded the 3rd Brigade in the 1st Canadian Division at the Second Battle of Ypres and the Battle of Festubert in 1915. In August 1915, Turner received command of the newly formed 2nd Division while Currie took over the 1st Division in September 1915. Turner commanded the 2nd Division at the Battles of St Eloi Craters and the Somme. Appointed commander of Canadian forces in England in November 1916 after Currie refused it, Turner was the chief military advisor to the newly formed Ministry of Overseas Military Forces of Canada (omfc). His mandate was to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Canadian forces in England. In June 1917, the rivalry between Turner and Currie culminated in a struggle over who would command the Canadian Corps after Sir Julian Byng’s promotion to command the Third Army. Currie received the corps, while Turner’s consolation prize was promotion to lieutenant-general in advance of Currie to maintain his seniority. For the rest of the war, Turner and Currie had an uneasy relationship marked by periods of cooperation but also of tension and conflict. Turner returned to Canada in the summer of 1919 and held no further formal military office but played an instrumental role in the formation of the Canadian Legion. While there are multiple biographies of Sam Hughes, the minister of Militia and Defence, and Currie, there is no full study of Turner. Neither has much attention been paid to the significant Canadian

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presence in England and to the effect of Turner’s improvement in the administration of Canadian forces in England on the Canadian Corps’s effectiveness in 1917/18. Most popular and scholarly works have focused on the active front to the neglect of the essential role of training and administration in England, as well as support units in France and Belgium. On 11 November 1918, there were 130,000 troops in England and 152,000 in France. Of the troops in France, approximately 108,000 were serving with the corps and the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, the remainder being service units, replacements, and railway and forestry troops.4 This book will address this lacuna in our understanding by delineating the full scope of Turner’s military career.

sour ce mater ial Both the primary and secondary source materials for the book were extensive and in some instances unexploited. The paramount sources were the archival records of the Canadian National Archives, the Canadian War Museum, and the Department of National Defence, Directorate of History and Heritage. Walking the battlefields at Second Ypres, Festubert, St Eloi, and the Somme gave me an appreciation of the terrain features and their salient effects on the battles. Another important source was the material held by the Turner family and not previously consulted, as well as an interview with Turner’s granddaughter, Mrs Diana Bouchard. The archival sources were supplemented with evidence found at the McGill University archives in Montreal, Queen’s University archives in Kingston, the National Archives, the Imperial War Museum, and the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives in London, England. Over 1,200 volumes of archival material were consulted. The Canadian National Archives’ materials consist of official documents, personal papers, and service documents, as well as records of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the Royal Canadian Legion. Three groups of volumes have been hitherto virtually untouched – the correspondence files of John Wallace Carson, the omfc’s ministerial personnel correspondence, and the rg9 III-B series of

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volumes on administration in England. There are 127 volumes of individuals’ correspondence sent and received by Major-General John Wallace Carson, Sam Hughes’s “Special Representative” in England. Unlike their practice regarding other volumes in the rg9 III-A series, historians have not thoroughly examined Carson’s correspondence, except the most senior officers’ files. There is much useful information scattered throughout the volumes that help explicate events, characters, motivations, and major-generals behaving badly. This information ceases with Carson’s unseating in December 1916. The second group includes the 105 volumes of personnel correspondence of the ministers of the omfc. Similar in purpose to Carson’s files, these volumes provide useful background information on motivations and relationships. The other major unexplored group is comprised of the series B volumes on Turner’s command and his immediate staff in England, including Turner’s office and the AdjutantGeneral, Quartermaster-General, General Staff, and Assistant Military Secretary branches. For the most part, historians have not reviewed these files. A query to the lac regarding the number of demands since 1993 for a selection of five Series A and five Series B volumes that would likely be of interest to historians found that the Series A volumes were requested fourteen times since 1993, while only volume 806 in Series B was viewed and that just six times.5 These volumes reveal the management style of Turner and the contribution he and his staff made in reforming the administration in England. These materials were the by-product of the administrative process and were not created to inform later historians. Like all such materials, they must be evaluated in terms of their purpose and context. The pertinent rg24 files relate to the writing of the Canadian Official History and officers’ comments on the British and Canadian Official Histories. While the first Canadian official historian, A.F. Duguid, completed only one volume, his researchers did extensive work on the second and expended some preliminary effort on the third. Duguid, for all his failings, was a careful researcher, and he and his staff, through their painstaking amassing of material, greatly facilitated later historians. The comments made by officers on both official histories can be rewarding, as they often provide information that is unavailable elsewhere and makes explicit how the officers in

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question wanted their story presented. These comments, however, have to be rigorously evaluated, as they are subject to both unintentional and deliberate errors. Another critical category of source material includes the personal papers of men and officers in the cef, historians, and politicians. Currie’s personal papers are an especially valuable source. Sir Edward Kemp’s papers, the second minister of the omfc, are well organized and cover his time as the minister in depth and thus are a rich information source. Researchers have selectively consulted them before, but this book is the first to use his ministerial files in almost their entirety. Sir George Perley’s papers are less abundant but provide useful information. Prime Minister Robert Borden’s and Lord Beaverbrook’s (Max Aitken) papers are extensive and have been thoroughly investigated by historians. Aitken was raised to the peerage as Lord Beaverbrook in 1917, but here he will be referred to as Aitken for clarity. Turner left a limited collection of personal papers and letters to show the interior man. His available papers amount to just twelve volumes in the National Archives – consisting primarily of official documents – and letters, clippings, and certificates at the Canadian War Museum. His diaries are compilations and extracts of letters to his wife that stopped when he moved to England. Therefore, there is little evidence of his innermost feelings and thoughts. His actions have to be traced through the paper trail left behind in the archives and the Canadian War Museum, and his motivations inferred in most cases. The files still held by the Turner family relate primarily to his family life and business interests.

key questions This book explores five key questions the answers to which will determine the nature of Turner’s contribution and assess him as a general in his combat and administrative roles. The US Army’s leadership manual FM 6-22 provides the framework for the assessment, but it is modified to account for the different expectations and context of the First World War.6 The Canadian equivalent is overly complicated for the purposes of assessing generalship in the First World War.7 This

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framework provides a set of criteria that is used to evaluate Turner. The first question revolves around the extent to which Turner’s selection, appointments, and retention were the consequence of his purported Conservative Party affiliation, so important in the patronage-driven Canadian Militia. The book explores the underlying reasons for the political support received by Turner. The second question relates to Turner’s combat generalship. The conventional interpretation portrays him as, at best, a mediocre battle leader. The book examines Turner’s competence as a combat commander by analysing his two major engagements as a brigade and divisional commander. The analysis is based on the information available to Turner and the conditions he faced – circumstances that are often overlooked or underrated in castigating Turner’s leadership. The book also investigates whether Turner demonstrated a learning process as a divisional commander. The third major question concerns the reasons for Turner’s selection to command the omfc in England. The penultimate question assesses how competent Turner was as a military administrator. The book examines the changes in the efficiency and effectiveness of the administration in England, focusing especially on the first seven months of Turner’s command. It also evaluates Turner’s responsibility for these improvements. The final question involves Turner’s relationship with Currie while Currie commanded the Canadian Corps: the extent to which the two contended, the factors contributing to this tension, and the consequences of the conflict. This work, unlike any other, integrates both Currie’s and Turner’s perspective. To provide context, the book also evaluates Turner’s Boer War experiences, his relationships with his political masters, his role in demobilization, the abortive formation of the Canadian air force, the election of 1917, and the establishment of the Canadian Legion. Most Canadian First World War studies, unlike many Australian works, have a limited awareness of the equivalent Australian, New Zealand, and British experiences.8 These other perspectives provide a useful comparison with the Canadian approach, helping us to understand how other organizations in analogous conditions solved the challenges and, in turn, how well Turner performed. The biographer faces the formidable challenge of steering between Scylla and Charybdis – of advocating or loathing the subject.9 It is

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the biographer’s duty to present the facts and analyses reflecting the context of the period and what the subject could or should have known and done, but not to act as a prosecutor or advocate. The biographer should also separate the personal aspects from the professional. Turner presents an attractive personality to a twenty-first-century audience, and it is understandable why his subordinates respected him. He had great physical and moral courage, the common touch, and charisma. Loyal to his friends and family and willing to challenge orders that would unnecessarily cost lives, he had an appealing character. It is in his role as a military commander with responsibility for thousands of men and by his works, however, that Turner will be evaluated. The objective of this book, therefore, is to assess Turner’s personality as it relates to his military role and to provide a considered analysis of his achievements and failures as an officer. The overarching goal is to present Turner in all the relevant military dimensions; insufficient space and lack of evidence prevent an examination of his private life.

or ga niz ation To answer the key questions referred to above, chapters 1–4 focus on Turner’s combat role, while chapters 5–8 examine his administrative career. Chapter 1 briefly explores Turner’s early life, his service in the Canadian Militia, and his exploits in the Boer War. It also describes the relevant aspects of the pre-war Canadian military. The second chapter provides an overview of Turner’s command of the 3rd Brigade and his conduct of the Battles of Second of Ypres and Festubert. Chapter 3 analyses Turner’s command of the 2nd Division, especially his prosecution of the Battle of St Eloi Craters; it also deals with the post-battle attempts to oust Turner. The fourth chapter examines Turner’s victory at the Battle of Courcelette and the two subsequent less-successful engagements on the Somme. The examination of Turner’s administrative role begins with chapter 5’s discussion of the disastrous state of Canadian administration and training in England and Turner’s appointment to reform this flawed organization. Chapter 6 is concerned with Turner’s actions in the first seven months of his command in England and his responsibility for the

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resulting transformation. Chapter 7 reviews Turner’s often-fractious relationship with Currie in the period from June 1917 to August 1919. Chapter 8 begins with the federal election of December 1917, then focuses on Turner’s challenging experience with a new minister and his life after the war, including his successful endeavour to unify the fractured Canadian veterans’ movement. The conclusion brings together the answers to the key questions and assesses Turner as a military leader. A brief essay on historiography is included in Appendix 2.

c onclusion Using new primary research and interpretations, this study revises the prevalent view of a prominent Canadian officer, Sir Richard Turner. The five key questions at the heart of the book relate to Turner’s appointments, his competence and evolution as a combat commander, his transfer to England, his role in the acknowledged transformation of the administration in England, and his relationship with Currie. The study also weaves into the narrative comparisons, where appropriate, with the British and Anzac experiences and solutions. The book presents Turner in all his facets as a commander. In its evaluation of his contributions, his rivalry with Currie, his failures, his flaws, and his virtues, it provides a more balanced and accurate assessment of Turner, and in so doing helps him emerge as more than a peripheral figure.

1 Boer War Hero: Turner to 1914 Never let it be said the Canadians had let their guns be taken. R.E.W. Turner, 7 November 19001

Richard Turner’s Boer War service, his experience as an officer in the Canadian Militia, and the nature of the pre-war Canadian military all helped condition his First World War career. This chapter concisely reviews Turner’s early life, his Militia and Boer War experience, and his service in the inter-war period. It also analyses the structure and state of the Canadian military, as it played a critical role in shaping Turner for the demands of active service. Richard Ernest William Turner, the future lieutenant-general, was born into affluent circumstances on 27 July 1871 in Quebec City. He was the fourth born and the first of four sons of Richard and Emily Turner – they had five daughters, as well.2 Turner’s father was born in 1843 in Quebec City and was of English/Irish origin. He entered the work force at age fifteen and formed a partnership with Joseph Whitehead in 1870 in a wholesale grocery firm called Whitehead and Turner – he took over the business in 1885. He married Emily Ellis in 1865, and his business success translated into a family home on the Rue d’Auteuil, among the better addresses in Quebec City. Active in social, business, and local and provincial political affairs, Turner was also the honorary president of the provincial Liberal Party for a term, indicating his prominence in Quebec Liberal politics.3 Turner’s father was an accomplished businessman and an astute entrepreneur, with a powerful personality and a “Midas touch.”4 He would have had a powerful influence on his oldest son, whom he groomed to take over his business ventures. Richard senior’s wideranging activities included exports, timber, a fish processing plant

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on Bonaventure Island (later donated by the family to become part of a provincial park), and liquor distribution for the provincial government. Turner’s main business, however, was his wholesale grocery concern, which provided credit and supplies to grocers up and down the St Lawrence River and into the Gaspé Peninsula. Illustrating his prominence in business circles, Turner was also the president of the Dominion Wholesale Grocers Association.5 He travelled to the West Indies to contract directly with sugar providers, as sugar accounted for 40 per cent of wholesalers’ business. 6 He later travelled to China, Japan, Ceylon, and Mauritius to source tea, another important staple.7 Turner was a perspicacious art collector, purchasing paintings by Horatio Walker and Cornelius Krieghoff, which the family later donated to the Musée de la Province de Québec.8 All this privileged experience was valuable in exposing the future general to the wider world and the types of challenges he would face in England. R.E.W. Turner was born at an inflection point in Quebec City’s anglophone population and economy. From 1829 to 1853, 750,000 immigrants, primarily anglophones, passed through Quebec City, and some remained there, including Turner’s grandfather, who arrived in 1840.9 By 1871, the anglophone population of Quebec City was 29 per cent of the population of 78,379, but by 1901, it declined to just 15 per cent.10 The faltering of Quebec City’s economic mainstays of timber and shipbuilding was an important factor in the population decline.11 With the economy floundering, anglophones who could easily move within North America left, while the francophone population and the Turner family remained.12 Turner attended private schools and graduated from Quebec City High School in 1889.13 He received what was, for the time, a first-class education that equipped him socially and intellectually for a career in business and the military. The bias in commercial circles was against a liberal education. The focus was on practical training, and there was no perceived need for more advanced managerial education. As Michael Bliss phrased it, “Educational attainment beyond basic literacy was not particularly important, for most businesses were mastered on the job.”14 Turner grew up in the late Victorian era, and this shaped his views on imperialism, honour, and duty.15 He had the conventional views of his time and his social position, and he em-

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bodied the “traditional traits of manliness – self-control, self-reliance, and aggression.”16 Unlike many other anglophones in Quebec City, he did learn to speak French, as it was necessary for the client base outside of Quebec City.17 He was an Anglican, but religion did not play a central role in his life, as evidenced from the lack of references to it in his letters. Turner joined his father’s company as an office boy in 1891 as was the common practice of successful businessmen determined to “toughen their sons.”18 Turner’s father groomed him to take over the business, and he steadily received more responsibility in his father’s wide-ranging business interests.19 Turner was affluent, as by 1901, his annual income was $2,000, while the average factory worker’s yearly pay was $364 and a manager’s $1,069.20 Turner’s business experience in dealing with the uncertainties and constantly changing circumstances of an export and distribution business prepared him well for the challenges he later faced in England. Dealing with transportation interruptions while supply and demand fluctuated resembled problems he would face as the commander of Canadian forces in England in supplying trained manpower. It is highly unlikely that Turner received any business training; rather, he learned on the job as was the practice and natively developed his skills as an administrator.

ea rly military experienc e Turner’s military career commenced with an appointment to the Queen’s Own Canadian Hussars (qoch), on 22 April 1892, as a second lieutenant. The Canadian military, at this point, comprised a tiny Permanent Force (pf) of Regulars and a nominally 40,000-man NonPermanent Active Militia – hereafter referred to as the Militia. The pf was responsible for training the Militia, but there was considerable friction between the two forces because of competition over limited funding.21 High personnel turnover and limited opportunities for its own training hampered the pf.22 The Militia consisted of scattered, inadequately manned, equipped, and trained infantry battalions, cavalry regiments, and artillery batteries, all lacking support services.23 As a result, the Canadian military in 1892 was in “bad shape.”24

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The General Officer Commanding the Militia of Canada, always a British Regular Army officer, was in charge of the Canadian military.25 The post of General Officer Commanding (goc) was a graveyard of careers – all except one of the gocs left before their term expired.26 Their attempts to reform the Canadian military consistently ran afoul of Canadian financial and political realities. Canadians shared a strong belief in the “Militia Myth” of the effectiveness of the citizen soldier, based on a misreading of past wars, such as the War of 1812.27 This myth, one shared by Australia and New Zealand, put faith in the innate superiority of the “hard riding and straight shooting” citizen soldier over the professional.28 The difficulties the British experienced in defeating the Boers in the Boer War and the success of the Canadian contingents reinforced this myth. As a result, there was limited interest in a more professional army. The military was inextricably linked to the politics of the era, and patronage was an accepted fact.29 It was beneficial, if not essential, for an officer to belong to the right party if he wanted promotions beyond the junior ranks.30 One goc, Lord Douglas Dundonald, claimed that his career effectively ended with his attempt to stop patronage in the Militia.31 Owing to the lack of direct evidence, the factors that led Turner to join the Militia have to be inferred, but they were probably, like those of most who joined, an amalgam of fulfilling the late Victorian ideals of “manliness,” vigour, and service, allied with more commercial considerations.32 Young men joined city units because, as Carman Miller has put it, they “offered a wide range of educational, social and recreational services, apart from martial skills.”33 They also offered social respectability and the opportunity to gain business and social contacts.34 The camaraderie of the regiment, outdoor pursuits, and military training also appealed to the adventurous. Turner, throughout his life, regularly went hunting and fishing and listed riding as a hobby.35 In 1892, Turner was of a generation that understood war as “more a manly triumph over the obstacles of nature than massive and indiscriminate slaughter.”36 Wars were frontier adventures – short, sharp, and glorious, with the British triumphant.37 Canadians of Turner’s

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class strongly identified themselves both as members of the British Empire and as Canadians; as the noted Canadian historian Desmond Morton states, “We misunderstand our history if we forget the tremendous appeal of citizenship in the greatest empire the world had ever seen.”38 They would view the conflicts and victories of the British Empire as their own.39 The Boer War, while neither short nor particularly glorious, reinforced this view of war – Turner’s regiment, for example, suffered only 7 per cent of its losses as a result of enemy fire.40 The qoch was a city unit, with training on weeknights in armouries.41 Commissioning was expensive, as it cost $300 to $500 for uniforms and officers usually stood a round of drinks at the end of a parade night, which restricted commissioning primarily to the wealthy.42 City units, too, expended considerable effort on parades and other ceremonies to retain personnel and gain recruits.43 As a result, training tended to be a secondary activity.44 Founded in 1856 and based in Quebec City, the qoch was a long-standing cavalry regiment.45 Canadian cavalry trained as mounted rifles and were not the equivalent of British or Continental cavalry units.46 Turner was fortunate that, for the first year of his service, the Cavalry School of Instruction was stationed at Quebec City and would have provided more advanced and professional training than would normally have been the case for a Militia cavalry unit.47 Before the Boer War, Turner conscientiously worked to raise his qualifications through training and testing. He scored well in his cavalry test in 1892 and on the Maxim gun in 1899 but earned a disappointing mark in his infantry exam in 1896. He attended the cavalry school in 1896, as well. 48 This training and testing projects the image of an officer committed to investing the time and effort necessary to improve his qualifications and to show that his strengths lay in the cavalry and not the infantry. Turner’s troop demonstrated their respect for him by presenting him with a $175 gift on his twenty-fifth birthday in 1896. A newspaper article reported that “the troop has never had a more faithful and painstaking officer and that the unit’s effectiveness was due to him.”49 This was a recurring theme in the way Turner was perceived by his troop; his positive image was probably an outcome of his strong-man management skills.

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Given his relative diligence in upgrading his military education and strong leadership skills, it should not be surprising that Turner rose rapidly through the ranks, receiving a promotion to captain in 1895 and to major in 1900.50 An assertion that Turner’s promotions were more the result of Tory political influence and nepotism than a consequence of his own merits is highly doubtful.51 Turner was not politically active and was not likely a member of the Conservative Party – he was not a “Tory hack.” There is little evidence of Turner’s political leanings before the First World War and no indications of political activity, although there is a paucity of records for the Quebec Conservative Party from this period.52 Turner’s father was a prominent figure in the Quebec provincial Liberal Party, and while this does not rule out Turner adopting a contrary political stance, it is suggestive. The family tradition is decidedly Liberal and in this period Liberals did not oppose war once it was started.53 Turner ran for no political office either before or after the First World War, other than an appointment as a trustee to the Quebec City Protestant School Board after the war.54 Given that he was from a prominent, wealthy family, had earned a Victoria Cross (vc), and that his wartime career indicates he was an excellent public speaker, he could have had a political career had he wanted one. Yet for Turner there was no party affiliation listed in any of the pre-war Who’s Who or Canadian Men and Women of the Time.55 Also, searches of pre-war Quebec City newspapers reveal no indications of political activity by Turner. Finally, Sir George Perley, when evaluating whether to select Turner or Currie to command the forces in England, suggested that Turner was a neutral Liberal.56 Given that Perley was at one point the Conservative Party whip, he would have been familiar with important party supporters, which strongly suggests Turner was not active in the Conservative Party.57 Furthermore, a comparison with the 1914 Quarterly Militia List indicates that Turner’s promotions were slightly faster than those of contemporary pf officers, but not markedly so, as he reached the rank of major after eight years of service while pf officers of his approximate age averaged nine years.58 All of which indicates that there is no evidence of untoward political influence – Liberal or Conservative – in his promotions before the war.

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turner ’s boer war c ampaign In 1899, Turner was a respected field grade cavalry officer from a wealthy and influential family, but then so were many other officers in the Canadian Militia; many had greater personal accomplishments, were wealthier, and had more powerful political influence at their disposal.59 Moreover, photographs of Turner of the time reveal an unprepossessing war leader. They show a slim twenty-nine-year-old man of slightly over average height at 5⬘ 9½⬙ with a weak chin and owlish glasses who resembles a mild wholesale grocery clerk. Despite his appearance, he would demonstrate that he was an effective subaltern who through personal example repeatedly convinced men to follow him on the battlefield. In 1901, Turner returned to Quebec City to a tumultuous welcome, as a lieutenant-colonel with two wounds, a vc, a Distinguished Service Order (dso), and an enviable war record.60 In 1914, when it was time to appoint senior commanders of the first Canadian contingent, there were pf officers with more experience and staff training than Turner and who possessed strong war records. Sam Hughes, minister of Militia and Defence, however, wanted Militia officers to command, and there were none with Turner’s record of active service, seniority, proven capability, and reputation for valour.61 Turner’s Boer War participation was critical for his military career in three respects. It had served to develop his reputation and profile so as to legitimately differentiate him from other Militia officers of the same age and class. It had moulded his character as a leader. It had also raised his confidence through successful military service, the kudos of his men, his peers, and his superiors, and the award of prestigious decorations. Turner served in the second Canadian contingent sent to South Africa to support the British Empire in its conflict with the Boers. The “imagined community of British people” culturally conditioned Turner, like many of those who volunteered, to regard Britain’s call to duty as their own call.62 The British authorities accepted the offer of the contingent on 16 December 1899. Within a month, the Canadian authorities assembled, equipped, and readied for transport a regiment

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of Canadian Mounted Rifles, formed into two battalions, along with three batteries of field artillery. This was a creditable performance considering the state of the Canadian Militia.63 Each battalion of the Canadian Mounted Rifles (cmr) consisted of two squadrons of four troops, each of forty men commanded by a lieutenant.64 On 28 December, Turner received command of the 3rd Troop, from Quebec City, of “B” Squadron, 1st cmr. Turner was a captain, and like many other officers, he reverted to a lower rank to participate in the campaign. He was eager to go and had worried that he would have to remain behind when he was not selected for the First Contingent.65 The squadron commander was Major Victor Williams, a thirty-three-year-old pf officer and a member of the Royal Canadian Dragoons (rcd). Turner thought Williams excitable in battle and preferred the “A” Squadron commander Major William Forester.66 Ironically, owing to Sam Hughes dislike of the pf, Turner would leap over Williams in rank in the First World War. Each man rode a Canadian horse, although the rigours of the trip to South Africa, combined with harsh conditions on the veldt (prairies), quickly killed most horses. The campaign was hard on the horses, and only 18 of the original 375 from Canada survived the campaign.67 By July, Turner recorded he was on his ninth horse.68 The long hours in the saddle, inadequate rations, and less robust Argentinean ponies meant a high horse-loss rate – two-thirds of all horses serving in the British Army perished during the war.69 The cavalry received all the available large horses, so it was difficult to get suitable mounts. The cmr, initially, wore Canadian clothing, but once in the field the men received British uniforms. Later in the campaign after hard wear, their clothing was more of a collection of patches and whatever they could steal.70 The one piece of distinctive Canadian gear retained was their Stetson hats, which lent a unique look.71 Edward Morrison, the officer commanding one of the Canadian Field Artillery (cfa) sections, described the unit much later in Figure 1.1 Opposite Lieutenant Richard Turner in 1900 before receiving his dso and vc . Source: 20020045-2947, George Metcalf Archival Collection, Canadian War Museum.

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the campaign: “You would not wonder at the good opinion entertained of Canadian troops out here if you saw the splendid work of the Royal Canadian Dragoons. On parade they look like a regiment of cowboys, with their shaggy little ponies, prairie hats and roughand-ready uniform – for their original kit is worn out and they wear any sort of clothes they can pick up.”72 Leading the 1st Battalion cmr was Lieutenant-Colonel Francois Lessard, the commander of the pf rcd. Lessard was a rarity in the pre-war pf; he was a senior French-Canadian officer in a pronouncedly British-oriented service.73 Owing to his pf background and strong innate abilities, Lessard knew both how to work the system and how to prepare and lead his men into battle. Carman Miller characterizes him as “superb, courageous, decisive, cool and insistent.”74 The British authorities, however, did not view Lessard as positively and thought he lacked confidence.75 The core of the 1st Battalion cmr was a pf cadre from the rcd amounting to one-quarter of its strength, and they gave the battalion a strong foundation to build an effective mounted rifle unit. Lessard convinced the authorities to change the unit’s name to the Royal Canadian Dragoons in August, and this is the name used here to describe the unit. Turner was not enamoured with the name change, recording in his diary on 5 September that he thought the change absurd, and he told Lessard so.76 This was an early example of Turner’s willingness to confront authority. Before leaving for the war, in what the newspapers chronicled as one of the most romantic moments in the departure of the Second Contingent, Turner married his fiancée, Harriet Augusta Godday, on 8 January 1900. She was vacationing in England with her parents when Turner cabled her that they could marry if she could return before the unit departed in a week. She was clearly resourceful and decisive, and within two hours of getting the cable, she had packed and was on her way to catch the next steamer to North America. She arrived the day before the wedding. They married in the Quebec City Anglican Cathedral in appropriate pomp and circumstance, with a thirty-man guard of honour from the Canadian Mounted Rifles and a large crowd in attendance. Turner and his new bride had a oneday honeymoon in Montreal highlighted, in Turner’s diary, with the

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purchase of a kit for his departure.77 Turner and his wife would have a successful marriage, with one son and two daughters.78 His son, Harold Richard Turner, continuing a family tradition, would earn a dso in the Second World War, serving as a major in the 6th Antitank Regiment. Shortly thereafter, the unit departed for Halifax with Turner and his bride after a torch-lit guard of honour to the train station. Turner wrote in his diary “Happy Man.”79 The troop arrived in Halifax on 12 January expecting shortly to ship out to South Africa, but the Canadian authorities had condemned the transport they were supposed to take. As a result, the unit spent six weeks in Halifax, which probably was not a hardship for the newly married couple. It also enabled Major Williams to train his raw troops in horsemanship, drill, and military deportment. The rcd foes were the Boers, a militia force who were excellent shots, superb horsemen, and resourceful, and who were organized into units of varying size called a “commando.” Mounted on native ponies, the Boers had greater mobility than the British and would choose when to fight and retreat, so it was difficult for the ponderous British columns to engage them.80 The Boers did not have the training or will to fight it out with the British and could not endure the heavy losses that the British routinely suffered. If the battle went against them, they would run pell-mell back to their horses and disappear into the veldt. They fought for their homeland, their farms, their families, and their way of life, and so were motivated and formidable opponents.81 The rcd were mounted rifles who fought in a single line, unlike the British regular cavalry who fought in a double rank because of better training.82 The rcd trained and were equipped to fight both mounted and dismounted but always as infantry. Mounted rifles were an intermediate type between cavalry, fully trained in horsemanship and mounted infantry who had less training in equitation.83 Not for the Canadians the glorious cascade of horses, lances, and swords in a cavalry charge that could result in empty saddles, dead horses, and little damage to the enemy. Theirs was the far more demanding drudgery of twenty hours in the saddle in searing hot days and freezing cold nights, constant vigilance, thorough care of their horses, poor rations,

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bereft of creature comforts, all interspersed with the fear and intensity of battle with an often unseen foe. They were usually the first to fight and the last off the battlefield. The mounted rifles had to be consummate horsemen, physically tough, masters of field craft, and possessed of endurance and stamina. Successful leaders had to have quick intelligence, coup d’oeil, decisiveness, and the ability to motivate exhausted, thirsty, and scared men.

first honour s: crossing the vet river The rcd finally departed Halifax on the newly converted SS Milwaukee on 21 February and arrived in Cape Town on 21 March. Turner’s first duty was to escort a column of infantry and mules to the forward position of the British Army at Bloemfontein, the capital of the southern Boer republic. Turner writes that he was detached with two troops to deliver a hundred mules and that during a storm at night the mules stampeded into another column of mules escorted by a British unit. After considerable confusion, Turner reorganized the column and marched on, reinforced by mules from the British.84 At Bloemfontein, the squadron was attached to Colonel Edwin Alderson’s 1st Mounted Infantry Corps, a brigade-strength unit. Alderson, because of his successful experience in commanding Canadians, including the rcd, would lead the 1st Canadian Division and the Canadian Corps in the First World War. Alderson would later develop an exceedingly negative view of Turner’s ability during that war. As Turner was three levels removed from Alderson, it is unlikely Alderson would have had much opportunity to judge his capabilities. Turner does not comment on Alderson in his letters. Alderson’s command was dispatched on 22 April, as part of a larger operation, to capture a Boer leader. “B” Squadron had their first action, and showed they had much to learn. Turner’s mature assessment of the unit’s performance was “we were too green to be of much use – but did not run away.”85 The column returned to Bloemfontein and “B” Squadron reunited with the remainder of the rcd. They then prepared to take part in the capture of Pretoria – the capital of the

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Figure 1.2 Turner’s Boer War Campaign Pursuit of De Wet First honours on the Vet River Capture of the Boer commanders Operations around Belfast Ultimate honour at Leliefontein

All figures copyright of the author unless otherwise stated.

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Transvaal Republic, the northern Boer state. In response to the British advance, the Boers withdrew to defend the Vet River line. The Vet was a substantial military obstacle. It was forty metres wide, deep with steep brush-filled banks and only a few fords. On the morning of 6 May, Major-General Sir John French, the commander of the cavalry, decided to try to force the river at multiple locations, with “B” Squadron of the rcd in the lead of one of the prongs of the offensive. As per standard procedure, “B” Squadron approached within 500 metres of the river and pushed out about a dozen dismounted scouts led by Turner to determine the Boer position. The Boers responded by opening fire on the scouts, who promptly scuttled back.86 Now, Turner and Lieutenant Harold Borden, the son of the minister of Militia and Defence, Frederick Borden, worked their way to the edge of the river down a dry ravine that screened them from the Boers. Turner, showing considerable initiative, decided to cross the river and called for volunteers to follow him. Reportedly, all there volunteered. This part of the river was steep, deep, and had a swift current, so the Boers did not station troops to cover it. Turner and six volunteers then crossed the river, holding their rifles over their heads as the water rose to their chins. Turner later lamented that the water soaked his haversack and ruined his wife’s letters. Borden and another volunteer crossed separately. Turner’s group, joined by Borden, then advanced about 200 metres and encountered a force of Boers in a farm. After a short firefight across a field, Turner and his group withdrew back across the river in the face of superior numbers.87 Their probing attack, however, disrupted and distracted the Boers’ defensive arrangements, so that Lessard could lead the remaining rcd across a ford in strength and outflank the Boers’ river position. A newspaper article quoted Private Rae of Montreal: “The men are a unit in ascribing the credit to their dashing young officer” – referring to Turner.88 For his initiative and gallantry, Turner was awarded the dso, which, given that he was a subaltern at the time, indicates his actions were highly regarded. Typically, the authorities bestowed the dso on officers in command at and above the rank of lieutenant-colonel or to more junior officers for actions just short of the Victoria Cross.89

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The next day, Turner was back on piquet duty. He proudly wrote his wife that he had been under fire five times and was “feeling fit and burnt brown.”90 By 12 May, the rcd had reached Kroonstadt for a week’s rest. Disrupting the break, British Intelligence reported that a senior Boer commander was staying at Bothaville seventy kilometres to the northwest. Alderson took a flying column of six troops, with two from the rcd led by Turner, to capture this commander. The column marched through the night and most of the next day to surprise and seize thirty-four important prisoners. It was an exhausting and hard ride with men falling off their horses while asleep, but they accomplished their mission.91 In recognition of his performance at the Vet and the expedition to Bothaville, Turner received a promotion over two other more senior officers to be an acting captain in “A” Squadron. Already, the authorities were recognizing Turner as an effective leader. On 19 May, the advance on Pretoria resumed. There was fighting almost every day, but fortunately for the rcd, there were no casualties other than the inevitable horse losses. Over the course of the campaign, the rcd suffered only fifteen casualties to enemy fire in twenty-nine engagements. If the Boer rifle fire were as effective as claimed, this then was a surprisingly small number.92 Nevertheless, there were dangerous encounters. During the advance to the next line of defences, for example, Turner ran into a Boer ambush that sprang prematurely. He escaped by wheeling and riding through the smoke of a veldt fire that was “almost unbearable.”93 Survival in the advance guard required quick thinking and decisiveness, characteristics Turner displayed in abundance. After repeated outflanking manoeuvres by the British cavalry, including the rcd, the British captured Johannesburg on 31 May and Pretoria on 5 June. With the capture of Pretoria, Turner, like most observers, believed that the Boers were “on the run – the war cannot last long now.” Under normal circumstances, the loss of the richest city and the fall of the capital in the face of overwhelming numbers would make this prediction true, but not with the Boers.94 The nature of the campaign changed as the Boers dispersed into the

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hinterland to fight a guerrilla war. They would quickly gather to strike an unguarded train or unwary column, rather than directly confront the overwhelming British force. After the capture of Pretoria, the rcd garrisoned towns on the outskirts of the capital and defended these against probing Boer attacks through June and July. By now the Canadians had developed into an under-strength but effective mounted rifle force. In a battle near Pretoria, Turner reported a British general saying the “Canadians have shown the regulars how to fight.”95 Turner had a realistic appreciation of the need for training and preparation and was not a proponent of the inherent superiority of straight-shooting, hard-riding, but untrained militia over regulars. He realized from the start that the Canadians had much to learn. As he wrote, “It has taken time to learn and teach – but we certainly have an efficient fighting unit.”96 With the Boers dispersed and supplies available, the British could now finish the last stage of the campaign by marching on Middleburg, Belfast, and further east to close off the Boers’ last link to the outside world through Portuguese East Africa. The rcd and cmr were part of this advance and over the next month would see hard fighting. Lessard injured his thigh when his horse fell on 28 July, so Williams moved up to command the rcd and Turner became acting squadron commander until Lessard returned at the end of August.97 As an indication of the worth of the Canadians, the British authorities offered all rcd officers, including Turner, commissions in the British Regular Army. Turner clearly wrestled with this opportunity. He liked the active aspects of the military life – he had already been in seventeen engagements by his count – but he found camp life dull and the meagre pay of a subaltern an issue. In the end, he decided to stick with his family’s business. Later in September, Turner received another indication of his worth – considering his rank – when he was appointed an intelligence officer.98 After reaching Middleburg to the east of Pretoria on 27 July, the rcd and cmr did outpost duty to protect the fragile line of communications along the railway. This involved more long hours of tedium in hot days and frigid nights on the high veldt. This area of South Africa was much higher than even Calgary at about 2,400 metres.

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The lack of remounts strongly suggested to Turner that the regiment would soon return to Canada. The newlywed officer was clearly pining for home.99 By the end of August, the rcd garrisoned Belfast, which was roughly halfway between Pretoria and the Portuguese border. The rcd’s role was to patrol a thirty-two-kilometre zone around Belfast to keep the Boers off the line of communications. To the north was a 500-man commando, and to the south, the Carolina Commando of about 1,000 men commanded by General J.C. Fourie. These two commandos could initiate actions, while the lack of men and an unaggressive commanding officer at Belfast – Turner called him an “awful, old woman” – hamstrung the rcd’s ability to take the battle to the enemy.100 As a result, a series of encounters initiated by the Boers led to further casualties to men and horses. Boer attacks on trains would require a patrol to burn some unfortunate’s farm and send the family to a camp at Middleburg as an object lesson. Turner did not enjoy this duty. “Have sent a lot of Boers and their families to Middleburg,” Turner wrote: “You cannot help but feel sorry for them leaving their house, belongings and farms.” In another case, Turner led a sweep to burn farms in retaliation for a train attack and characterized it as, “unpleasant work.”101 There were constant engagements, and in a particular case, in October, Turner demonstrated his leadership skills and sangfroid. While returning from a farm-burning expedition, the Boers ambushed Turner’s force. Boer fire badly wounded two men, with one shot off his horse and captured and the other escaping by riding hard through a fusillade of bullets. Turner expertly extracted his force out of the Boers’ trap. As one of his troopers put it, “Lt. Turner certainly showed good judgment in extricating us from a very nasty operation.”102 The Boers, in their characteristic excellent treatment of the captured, dropped the wounded man off at the outskirts of Belfast later that day, as they had no resources to care for a wounded prisoner. Turner dispassionately wrote that he cut a bullet out Carter’s chest with a pocketknife. Surprisingly, given the state of medical care and the rough surgery, Carter survived.103

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ultimate honour: vic toria cr oss at leliefontein To suppress the increasingly belligerent and troublesome Boer commandos, the British high command sent a more aggressive commander, Major-General Horace Smith-Dorrien (he later commanded the Second Army at Second Ypres in 1915), and reinforcements to Belfast. With these additional forces, Smith-Dorrien was to take the battle to the Boers. His first attempt was an abortive two-column operation to drive south and deal with the Carolina Commando.104 The two columns had to trundle through cold rain, mud, and sleet that crippled the men and horses. Morrison, the Canadian commanding a section of “D” Battery, Royal Canadian Artillery, reported that the horses were shivering so hard from the cold and wet that they could barely stand.105 Smith-Dorrien realized his force was in no condition to fight and ordered it back to Belfast. This expedition was so gruelling that Turner did not write until two days later, characterizing it as the worst twentyfour hours he had experienced in South Africa.106 After allowing the men and horses to recover and the ground to dry, Smith-Dorrien attempted another push south. This time it would be a single “flying” column to avoid the coordination challenges of the first attack and make better use of the limited mounted forces.107 The column consisted of the rcd, the cmr, four companies each from the Shropshire Light Infantry and Suffolk regiments, and a squadron of the 5th Lancers, supported by two guns of “D” Battery, a section of pom-poms, and two five-inch guns of the 84th Field Battery, for a total of approximately 1,200 men. A transport train ten kilometres long encumbered the column and according to Morrison was all out of proportion to the size of the force.108 This painfully slow and unwieldy collection of animals and wagons greatly limited the mobility of the column and restricted Smith-Dorrien’s options if he had to retreat. His column would have to face a Boer force that, while outnumbered overall, had a significant mobility advantage in that all of their men were mounted, while Smith-Dorrien’s column had at best 200 to 240 mounted men, consisting of approximately 90 to 95 men each in the rcd and cmr and 50 in the 5th Lancers.

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The terrain the column had to traverse was a series of ridges separated by valleys three to five kilometres wide, ultimately leading to the Komati River, which the column would have to cross before reaching Carolina. These ridges made it possible for the outnumbered Boer outpost line to delay the advance without having to commit to a stand-up fight. It was spring in South Africa, and most of the Boer fighters were at their farms planting their crops, so it would take time to gather their forces. With reveille at 1:00 a.m. and a departure at 3:30 a.m. on 6 November, the misnamed flying column lumbered south again towards Vanwykslei. During the day, the column steadily pushed south against the Boers’ outpost line until they reached the last ridgeline running from Witkloof to Leliefontein overlooking the Komati River, where the Boers intended to make a more concerted effort to stop or at least slow down the advance. An initial infantry attack failed, but with artillery and machine gun fire suppressing the Boers, the rcd outflanked their position and drove them off the ridge.109 During the night, the Ermeleo Commando and a smaller third force reinforced the Carolina Commando. The Boers, expecting a further advance in the morning, decided not to wait passively, but to preempt the British at that time. The intent was to strike in the centre to fix the British position with the Caroline Commando and then outflank the ridgeline on the left with the Ermeleo Commando while the third force distracted the other British flank. It was a bold stroke but was feasible because of the Boers’ mobility advantage.110 Smith-Dorrien determined that he did not have a sufficient force to succeed and decided to withdraw to Belfast.111 Smith-Dorrien assigned the difficult role of the rearguard to the rcd. The Canadians were better suited to rearguard actions because the 5th Lancers were equipped with carbines outranged by the Boers’ Mauser rifles.112 The challenge was to get the ten-kilometre-long transport column safely back to Belfast in the face of a far more mobile Boer force. It would require skilled rearguard work to prevent the Boers from overwhelming a section of the rearguard and getting in among the animals, guns, and wagons. A withdrawal in the face of a more mobile opponent was one of the greatest challenges facing a rearguard.

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It required careful management and skilled direction to ensure no part of the force was overwhelmed. The speed at which the oxen could ponderously haul their heavy loads over the next ridgeline conditioned the retreat’s pace. The rearguard, consisting of the rcd supported by infantry, a machine gun, and Morrison’s two guns of “D” Battery rca, would hold in position until the transport column finished crossing the next ridge. Then would begin the most dangerous part of the task. The guns would withdraw up the ridge to the infantry supports in a leapfrog fashion, with one gun always in a position to fire and the troopers dropping back to keep the pursuers at bay. This challenging choreography would then be repeated for the next ridge. The rearguard commander had to ensure his force did not get so closely engaged that it could not retreat, but it had to slow the enemy down sufficiently to allow the baggage train to escape.113 Lessard had approximately ninety men available in six troops, and he divided the force into three groups spaced over an arc of 2,250 metres, with Sergeant Edward Holland’s Colt machine gun and Morrison’s guns in the centre ready to reinforce any hard-pressed section. The descriptions of how Lessard deployed his troops vary from three units of two troops each to two groups of three troops each. It makes more tactical sense having three detachments of thirty men spread over the ground rather than two groups. Possibly the deployment started as three groups but, through movement of reserves, ended up as two.114 Turner was responsible for the centre. Lieutenant-Colonel T. Evans with his cmr reinforced by the 5th Lancers was on flank guard duty; their role was to protect the flank as the column retreated. The battle commenced at 7:00 a.m., when Smith-Dorrien started the transport column on its way back north to Belfast. The move surprised the Boers, and it took them an hour to realize the British were withdrawing. It did not, however, fundamentally change their plans. Instead of a desperate pre-emptive strike, it was a far more congenial pursuit operation. At approximately 8:00 a.m., the Boers moved out and immediately realized that a key position that overlooked the route of the transport column on the left flank of the British line was unprotected. Always quick to spot the tactical advantage, the Boers raced to take the kopje (hill). Fortunately, Lieutenant-Colonel Evans,

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also recognizing the key terrain, dashed with his cmr for the kopje as well. The Canadians were faster, beating the Boers to the top, and easily repelling their resulting attack.115 Initially, the dragoons in the rearguard were successful in holding off the Boers for several hours. It took some time for the Ermeleo Commando to get into action, so most of the pressure was on Lessard’s left flank. Evans had to move off his kopje position in order to continue to act as a flank guard to the column as it withdrew. This then allowed the Boers to concentrate on Lieutenant Hampden Cockburn’s command on the left wing of the rearguard. Lessard, recognizing the pressure, ordered Morrison to send his #5 gun to support Cockburn. Morrison galloped slightly up hill with his gun, unlimbered, and started to shell the encroaching Boers. The rapid gallop across the battlefield further tired the already fatigued animals. Morrison was contently shelling the Boers and had forced them to dismount when Lessard rode up in a panic shouting, “For God’s sake, Morrison, save your guns!” Boers were curling around Cockburn’s line and threatening to capture the gun. Immediately grasping the seriousness of the situation, Morrison limbered the gun and raced away while Cockburn’s command courageously stood their ground, knowing they would be overwhelmed. Cockburn, who would be awarded a vc for this action, and his men delayed the Boers long enough for Morrison to escape. The Boers killed or captured all of Cockburn’s command. After the war, Cockburn reached the rank of major in the Militia before his accidental death in 1913.116 By about 10:00 a.m., after three hours of fighting and a withdrawal of three miles, the rearguard was in trouble. Their left flank was wiped out, their right was under intense pressure, and the centre was denuded of troops to support the wings. The horses pulling the two guns were faltering and had dropped from a gallop to a trot to a slow walk. It was at this stage the Boers realized they had the glittering prospect of capturing the two 12-pounder guns of “D” Battery. Beyond the obvious propaganda and morale benefits of seizing the two guns, they had already captured ample ammunition for these pieces, so they could significantly supplement their force’s firepower. Seizing the opportunity, the Boers, untypically for this stage of the war, launched a cavalry charge.117

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Morrison kept firing to keep the Boers at bay as he retreated with both guns, but he knew he was not going to get across the ridge before the Boers reached him. He appealed to the British infantry supports for help, but the commander, probably deciding it was a lost cause, turned and retreated. As a last desperate ploy, Morrison sent his final galloper to find Lessard to plead for reinforcements. The rider instead encountered Turner, who took immediate and decisive action that saved the guns and made his career. Turner “picked up” a wound in his left shoulder and used this as an example to rally about twelve men. He shouted, “Never let it be said the Canadians had let their guns be taken.” He positioned the dismounted men in a declivity. The Boers, about 100 to 200 strong, charging and firing like a “wild west show,” with General Fourier and second-incommand Commandant Prinsloo in front, rapidly closed on the guns. Sergeant Edward Holland was effectively supporting the guns, but when the Boers closed to within 200 metres, he valiantly picked the blisteringly hot Colt gun off its carriage and carried it to the limber, then escaped to be awarded the second Canadian Victoria Cross of the day. After returning to Canada, Holland would receive a commission and later commanded a motor machine gun battery on the Somme under Turner.118 With the last obstacle out of the way, the Boers charged on, not registering that they were entering an ambush. When they reached the optimal range, Turner ordered his men to fire, and in the first moments, they shot Fourier off his horse and then killed Prinsloo. The momentum of the charge took the Boers through the Canadian position, where they killed one man and wounded two others. However, the loss of their two leaders disrupted the Boers’ cohesion and gave enough of a respite for Morrison’s guns to escape.119 The surviving Canadians scrambled to safety. One of the 12-pounder guns is now prominently displayed in the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa. Roughly thirty minutes after Turner’s first wound, a bullet struck him in the neck, just missing his spine and carotid artery. His horse suffered two wounds as well and died. Morrison claimed that Turner had only left the field for an ambulance after Lessard ordered a ser-

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geant to take him to the rear.120 As Turner was being evacuated, SmithDorrien rode up to ask about the situation and to congratulate Turner on the performance of the Dragoons. Turner’s actions were sufficient for the third Victoria Cross awarded that day. Ironically, at the beginning of the advance south, Turner had remarked that he hoped the men would not take undue chances, as he wanted to lead them in a promised march through London – the march did not occur.121 Turner’s courageous act, despite his wounds, falls into the classic category – that of an officer winning an award for bravery for saving a combat situation through his manifest courage and leadership.122 The nature of war has changed, as the need for senior commanders to show conspicuous courage in order to be successful has receded. Soldiers continue to respond to officers who share in their danger, but the role of the commander is no longer in the front ranks. In the First World War, however, officers and men still respected courage as an important characteristic of a commander and a signifier of competence. Even Alderson, when he was disparaging Turner, acknowledged his bravery.123 Field-Marshal A.P. Wavell, writing in 1941, declared that courage was one of the three essential characteristics of generals; J.F.C. Fuller said the same in his Generalship, Its Diseases and Their Cure.124 A modern study of the winners of gallantry awards in the Israeli Army during the Yom Kippur War showed no pattern other than the recipients’ youth and their somewhat greater intelligence.125 This latter counters the notion that the brave have to be of limited intellect. During the Boer War, the British high command was sensitive to the loss of artillery and 20 per cent of the vcs won during the war were awarded for saving guns.126 Turner demonstrated courage, skill in setting up the ambush, and steadiness under fire and pain. That Turner rallied the men in such a dire situation is also indicative of his leadership and the high esteem in which he was regarded. Military decorations are arbitrary in that factors beyond the circumstances of the act condition their awarding.127 Despite this caveat, winning the vc said much about Turner’s prowess and bravery as an officer. The action was not decisive in any sense other than with respect to Turner’s

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career, and it would be little remarked upon today had it not been achieved on a day that saw the most vcs won by a single Canadian unit in a single day.128 Turner was evacuated to begin a long recuperation period that would be extended when the wound became infected. While he was in hospital, Smith-Dorrien visited him to congratulate him again on his valiant performance. Later, Smith-Dorrien sent Turner a copy of the dispatch he had written about the engagement, which Turner thought was “most handsome of him.” The dispatch concluded with Smith-Dorrien’s opinion of the rcd – “he would choose no other mounted troops in the World before them if he had his choice.”129 Turner wrote Hettie on 15 November to assure her that his wounds were not serious, and to demonstrate that he was recovering, he mentioned that two of his nurses were quite pretty. Two weeks later, he wrote that he would return via England and that he had heard he was recommended for the vc. He did not expect to get it, but it was still an honour to be considered. A parade of the great and mighty visited him while he recovered, including the formidable Kitchener, the new commander-in-chief of South Africa, who complimented him on his plucky fight.130 Turner contracted a fever that set him back. It was not until February that he could wrangle transportation to England. Understanding how to deal with army red tape, he had taken the sensible precaution of obtaining a note from Kitchener “to expedite the departure of this officer when medically fit.” When a medical officer presented an obstacle to his departure for England, Turner deployed the letter and the situation changed instantly – “The red tape medico got very busy.”131 Turner sailed to England, where he met Hettie. Turner returned to Canada late in the evening of 11 May 1901 to a rapturous welcome by hundreds of citizens. Turner and Hettie then attended an outdoor civic reception with thousands, despite the late hour. Turner received his vc from the visiting Duke of Cornwall (the future King George V) on 17 September 1901 in front of 5,000 troops and thousands of spectators. As further recognition of his accomplishments, he was given command of the right wing of Canada’s contingent at the coronation of Edward VII. On the voyage back to

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Canada, all the ncos and men of the cavalry signed a certificate stating, “Our gratitude for the hearty interest you have taken in our welfare under your command.”132 Turner was a courageous officer and undoubtedly an inspirational leader. He demonstrated sound judgment, sangfroid, and a cool eye in the stress of battle. His men, his peers, and his superiors, as demonstrated by his increasing responsibilities during the war, respected him. He had the physically toughness and indefatigability to survive without any illness through to the final stages of the campaign – he fought in twenty-seven of the rcd’s twenty-nine engagements.133 Despite the physical demands and pressures of battle, he maintained a positive outlook. His letters to his wife are relatively honest about the horrors and strains of war, but his attitude was affirmative with only a handful of negative comments about other officers in contrast to his many positive references to his men, other officers, and other units. His letters also indicate a reflective officer who was much more than just a dashing subaltern.134 However, despite all of his excellent service, it is necessary to point out that he was acting as a junior officer with far fewer responsibilities than he would wield in the First World War. Were Turner’s two actions at the Vet and Leliefontein indicative of an officer reckless with men’s lives in unsound or unnecessary military actions – and one whose ardour for plaudits placed honour above the lives of his troops? In both cases, Turner’s actions achieved the desired goal with only minimal losses, despite the Boers’ significant numerical advantage. These were not the actions of a reckless officer, unlike, for instance, the repeated attempts by the British to retrieve the guns at Colenso, which resulted in four vcs but the retrieval of only two of the twelve stranded guns and the death of Lord Robert’s only son.135 There is no evidence in Turner’s letters home of “medal hunting” beyond the natural desire to do his duty well. There is nothing in his actions or language that was particularly vainglorious in the context of the time and place. Turner was a product of the Victorian era, but then so were his men. He was a morally and physically courageous man who shrewdly used the resources he had available, including his wound, to carry out his duty.

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In a theme repeated throughout his military career, Turner would positively connect with his men and be remembered with real affection long after. An example is a letter from an old comrade, Albert Hilder, who forty-six years later recounted to Turner news of an rcd reunion. The men in the 2nd Troop, he wrote, expressed “their best wishes for your continued good health from men who respect you and know you as a man, and a gentleman and a brave officer.”136 The other key factor arising from Turner’s participation in the Boer War was his strong appreciation for the capabilities of the Canadian soldier once properly trained.137 Combined with his knowledge of what effective leadership could achieve, this undoubtedly contributed to his strong support for Canadian control in the First World War.

period between the wa rs After the Boer War, rising tensions in Europe resulted in increased military spending and a shift in the Canadian force structure to a more balanced organization capable of fielding complete formations. Under the reforming Liberal minister of Militia and Defence, Frederick Borden, a cousin of the later Conservative prime minister Robert Borden, the Canadian military established new support organizations, including supply and transport, ordnance, veterinary, intelligence, engineering, and signals corps.138 Another notable change instituted by Borden in 1904 was the abolition of the post of goc and its replacement with a Militia Council modelled on the British Army Council.139 The British in the restructuring after the Boer War instituted an Army Council, consisting of the Secretary of State for War, senior civilian officials, and military authorities, to make critical policy decisions integrating civilian and military imperatives.140 In part, the goal of the Canadian change was to obviate the problem of strongwilled British Regular Army officers clashing with their Canadian political masters.141 The annual budget of the Ministry of Militia and Defence, hereafter referred to as the Ministry of Militia, increased from $3 million in 1904 to $13 million in 1914, and the size of the Permanent Force grew from 900 to 3,100 in 1914.142 Starting in 1903, Canadian offi-

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Figure 1.3 Lieutenant-Colonel R.E.W. Turner vc, dso with his officers in the 10th Queen’s Own Canadian Hussars in their resplendent uniforms at their yearly training camp in 1906. Turner is in the centre of the middle row. Source: 20100062-002, George Metcalf Archival Collection, Canadian War Museum.

cers were sent to the British staff college at Camberley for staff training, and a Canadian Militia Staff Course was developed, albeit one lasting weeks versus the two years at Camberley. Another major development was the British initiative to standardize organization, staff duties, training, and equipment across the Empire. For the most part, this endeavour was successful, since, except for minor differences, the British and Dominion forces were identical in all respects, other than equipment.143 Canada adopted an independent approach to equipment, and this will be discussed later. Turner’s military career prospered after his return from South Africa. In 1903, he reached the pinnacle of most Militia officers’ career with command of the Queen’s Own Canadian Hussars. While in

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command, Turner and his regiment received high marks in the yearly inspections, winning such praise as “A most efficient and energetic officer. Has brought his regiment to a very efficient state.”144 The 1905 and 1906 inspections recommended him as suitable for command of a brigade.145 After a four-year period in command, Turner transferred to lead the 3rd Cavalry Brigade based in Quebec City on 3 February 1907.146 Without Turner’s presence and probable financial support, the qoch disbanded in 1913 owing to insufficient recruits.147 Turner, the leading cavalry officer in the country, was elected president of the Canadian Cavalry Association in 1910.148 As a further mark of distinction, he was named honorary aide-de-camp to the new governor general, the Duke of Connaught, in 1911. In 1912, his career ostensibly ended with his retirement and transfer to the reserve officer list.149 Sam Hughes, believing war with Germany was imminent, restored Turner to active service on 1 June 1914 with the rank of colonel; he did this, however, without Turner taking the required exam for tactical fitness.150 Other than serving as president of the Cavalry Association, Turner does not appear to have engaged in discussions about the future course of warfare. Nor did he take the Militia Staff Course introduced in 1908, probably because he was at the end of his career.151 Turner’s active service and long duty as a senior regimental officer developed his management skills and facility in motivating and leading officers and men, his understanding of minor tactics, and his experience in administration at the regimental level. His four-year command of a cavalry brigade exposed him to some of the issues of commanding higher formations. What he lacked was staff training – even an appreciation of the necessity for trained staff officers – and a thorough understanding of contemporary infantry tactics. His later performance needs to be considered against this background.

2 “An awful war”: Turner as Brigade Commander Still very tired, and my head and brain seem to act slower than usual. It has been an awful war. R.E.W. Turner, 11 June 19151

The official cable from the British government arrived at 8:45 p.m. on 4 August 1914, notifying Canada it was at war with Germany. Seeing it as his duty, Turner joined the first Canadian contingent.2 This chapter examines Turner’s role as a brigade commander and provides an assessment of his actions. It focuses more on Turner’s three key command incidents during the Battle of Second Ypres, his performance in battle, and his relationship with his divisional commander than on the details of battle. The subsequent battle of Festubert will be briefly examined, as well as the context of Canada’s participation, as it is necessary to understand the factors that contributed to the problems that would plague the Canadian war effort.

context of cana da ’s partic ipation in the f ir st world war The scale, scope, and nature of the First World War were unprecedented challenges for Canada. Like Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, Canada vastly increased its armed forces. In Canada’s case, as with Australia and New Zealand, the factors of distance, lack of experience in raising and maintaining overseas forces, and having to operate in a hybrid control environment in reporting to British and Dominion authorities magnified the war’s complexity. All these elements placed a tremendous strain on Canada’s military, political, and

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societal structures, and were critical in shaping the problems Canada encountered in raising, maintaining, and controlling its forces in the first half of the war. Canada’s army was overwhelmingly an amateur force, as the vast majority of its men and officers were not professional soldiers. In the first two contingents, pf officers held only nine of the fortyfour senior positions.3 At the start of the war, Canada had only twelve Camberley-trained staff officers and so had to rely on British-supplied staff. These were as a rule excellent as indicated by three future chiefs of the Imperial General Staff, Dill, Ironside, and Alanbrooke, all serving in the Canadian Corps.4 This amateur ethos changed as officers at the front increasingly recognized the need for professionalism and trained staff officers. However, as long as Sam Hughes was the minister of Militia, the same drive for professionalism was absent from the Canadian administration. The geographic isolation of Canadian units in the pre-war period was an additional impediment, because Militia officers had little opportunity to work with fellow officers outside their immediate area. There were few if any transfers, so officers had minimal contact beyond their own unit, with the result that they did not know each other, unlike the pre-war British Regular Army. Sam Hughes’s military conferences, held in 1911 and 1913, provided some of the few opportunities to meet other senior officers.5 The scope of the war was staggering. Canada expanded its infantry from one pf regiment to fifty active service battalions by the end of the war – forty-eight in the Canadian Corps and two in the Canadian Expeditionary Force (Siberia).6 Canada’s previous experience in the Boer War of an overseas force had been restricted to raising, equipping, and shipping individual battalion-sized contingents to South Africa, but not maintaining these forces in the field. The scale of the Canadian losses in the First World War was immense, with 60,932 killed and 172,950 injured or wounded out of 425,000 who served in the cef outside Canada.7 This meant the Canadian authorities had to improvise a massive recruiting and training infrastructure in Canada and England.8 Inevitably, given the scale of requirements and their rapid introduction, there was waste, failures, and fiascos, much as the British and Australians had experienced in

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the early days of the war.9 The difference was Canada’s retention of the faulty system and incompetent commanders until late 1916. The nature of the war, with the rapid evolving tactics, technologies, and new weapons, materially added to the complexity of training. Contrast the training needs of an infantry battalion in the First Contingent in 1914 – drill, bayonet, rifle, signals, and machine gun instruction – with the requirements of a battalion in 1917 – all the above plus Lewis gun, anti-gas, trench warfare, grenade, rifle grenade, and new communications technology training. Finally, Canadian forces had to deal with a hybrid and constantly evolving control environment along with a flawed Canadian command structure in England (discussed in chapter 5). On the continent, the Canadian Corps and support forces were under the operational control of the General Headquarters (ghq) of the British Expeditionary Force (bef), which meant that ghq directed Canadian units in battle. In England, Canadian training units were under the operational and, until late 1916, training control by the War Office through the various area commands, such as Aldershot Command. Initially, Canadians had limited authority over promotions, decorations, and other administrative matters, but Canadian authorities wrestled more control over the course of the war. The result was that Canadian forces followed British regulations in most matters, but there were exceptions, and these caused delays as the various headquarters involved in any decision tried to determine which rules applied. Further, as these control responsibilities evolved, the authorities had to relearn the rules. It was confusing for the British and Canadians. As late as February 1918, the Canadian adjutantgeneral in England wrote a sharp letter to the War Office asking it to follow procedure and pass all orders affecting the administration of Canadian units through the Canadian headquarters first. He complained that it was the fifth letter he had written on the subject.10 The cef was dependent on the British for most matériel. Canada provided the men and officers, cap badges, pay, and record keeping, while the British provided the forces in France with clothing, personal equipment, rifles, bayonets, artillery, grenades, machine guns, ammunition, stores, and rations, which the Canadian government paid for on a per capita basis. The distinct difference in ratios of British

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Table 2.1 British to Canadian force ratios in France, 1918 Arm

British to Canadian ratio

Engineers Infantry Army Service Corps Army Ordnance Corps

5.3-1 6.8-1 21-1 62-1

Source: Comparison of effective strengths by arms between British and Canadian forces in France, 3 June 1918, 52839, mg26 H v98, Borden Fonds, lac.

to Canadians in the combat arms (infantry, engineers, field artillery, and machine guns) with the supporting services (Army Service Corps and Army Ordnance Corps) illustrates this dependence.

valca rtier and england Unlike at the outset of the Boer War, there was no debate in Borden’s government over whether Canada would take an active role in the war. The British government accepted the offer of a Canadian expeditionary force on 6 August. Acting on the recommendation of the British Army Council that the Canadian force should be a division, Hughes concentrated close to 35,000 men – far more than needed for a division – at Valcartier just outside Quebec City.11 The forces began to arrive in Valcartier in early August. Constant reorganizations of units, officers, and commands characterized the time in Valcartier. As Tim Cook phrased it, “Hughes cleared up things by embracing chaos.”12 The instability meant minimally effective training during the six weeks the men were in camp. The problems the Canadians encountered, however, were not that different from those experienced by the Australians and British in raising the New Army divisions. The 1st Division had a solid core of non-commissioned officers (ncos) and men with previous British military service, so the division was not entirely raw. In the rush of volunteers, recruiters preferred men

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with previous military experience. A greater challenge was presented by the division’s officers. Most had no previous active service, lacked the power of command, and were learning on the job.13 Onethird of the Canadian officers in the first two contingents did not even have the undemanding Militia qualifications for their post.14 Turner wrote his wife that he was “studying hard as there is a lot to learn.”15 As Morton stated regarding the officer corps, “some of them proved less than brilliant, and a few later broke under the strain, but it is not obvious that better officers were available.”16 A key decision for Hughes involved the selection of the division’s brigade commanders. Hughes’s antipathy to pf officers meant that well-qualified ones, such as Brigadier-General Francois Lessard, commander of the rcd in the Boer War, did not receive appointments.17 In their place, Hughes selected Militia officers Colonel Malcolm Mercer, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Currie, and Colonel Richard Turner as the commanders of the three infantry brigades of the division, while a fourth brigade served to provide replacements. The three officers received promotions to brigadier-general while the division was in England.18 Turner was an obvious choice for Hughes, as he had the experience of successfully commanding a cavalry brigade, was only forty-three years old, was a genuine war hero, with a vc, and had a sterling reputation of active duty in the Boer War and long service in the Militia. Did Turner warrant selection? Turner, in comparison with the other two brigade commanders, had the advantage of having seen active service, with awards for courage. He also represented the important province of Quebec, while Mercer represented Ontario and Currie the West. Turner’s reputation from the Boer War meant that many officers and men would know of him, and as a result, Turner claimed that the 3rd Brigade requested him.19 The history of the 15th Battalion indicated that the unit was elated with Turner’s selection.20 The Duke of Connaught, the Canadian governor general and a field marshal, thought Turner a suitable choice. He informed Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War, that “a Col. Turner, vc, dso, who has been commanding a militia Cavalry Brigade, is I think the best of them. He is quick, hard working and conscientious and will loyally carry out every thing he is told and has

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a certain sense of discipline and duty, both of which characteristics are hard to find in Canada.”21 Hughes appointed Turner on 6 August to brigade command and as an assistant adjutant-general of the camp.22 As Valcartier was near Quebec City, it was likely Turner was one of the first senior officers to arrive.23 According to post-war interviews, the brigade commanders drew lots for their brigades and Turner drew the 4th Brigade, which would supply drafts, but Turner persuaded the minister to make his brigade the third.24 The 3rd Brigade consisted of four Highland battalions: the 13th and 14th from Montreal, the 15th from Toronto, and the 16th a mixed Highland battalion from across the country. Turner’s battalion commanders were a disparate lot, with two destined to higher commands. The best was Frederick Loomis of the 13th Battalion, who would rise to command the 3rd Division. Robert Leckie of the 16th Battalion would later command a brigade and would be the chief of the General Staff in Hughes’s short-lived Acting Sub-Militia Council. Frank Meighen of the 14th was the commander of the prestigious Canadian Grenadier Guards regiment in Montreal, but he would earn the enmity of the British commander of the 1st Division by returning to Canada later in 1915.25 He never reached the front again and had to be satisfied with commanding a training brigade in England. John Currie, mp, commander of the 15th Battalion and friend of Sam Hughes, would perform poorly at Second Ypres amid multiple accusations of cowardice and drunkenness. The authorities hurriedly returned him to Canada, and he had no further role in the cef. Turner selected the staff for his brigade, unlike later in the war when commanders could only choose their aide-de-camps (adc). His most crucial appointment would be his brigade-major, the senior staff officer in the unit. Roger Lee, in his work on the Australian staff, stated, “The ability of the Brigade-Major was a key factor in a brigade’s combat effectiveness.”26 Turner chose Lieutenant-Colonel Garnet Burk Hughes, who unusually served at that rank.27 Hughes’s selection was a logical choice for Turner for professional and political reasons. Professionally, Hughes had graduated from Canada’s Royal Military College (rmc) first in his class of 1901, had passed the Militia Staff Course, had long service in the Militia, and was the junior

Figure 2.1 3rd Brigade Order of Battle, 22 April 1915

major in Currie’s 50th Regiment in Victoria.28 Garnet Hughes knew Turner, was a friend of Currie’s, and, most importantly, was the son of the minister of Militia, Sam Hughes. Turner would write in October that “Garnet Hughes is sound and I am well satisfied to have him as Brigade-Major.”29 However, in the unforgiving combat of Second Ypres, Hughes would prove a most unfortunate choice. Sam Hughes’s final pivotal decision was the choice of divisional commander. British authorities considered that no officer in Canada’s military was sufficiently qualified, and Borden dissuaded Hughes from taking command. Hughes, instead, selected Major-General Edwin Alderson from a list of three senior British generals provided by Kitchener. In a prescient move, the British promoted Alderson to lieutenantgeneral to outrank the recently promoted Major-General Sam Hughes.30 Hughes asked Turner about Alderson, and based on his experience in the Boer War, Turner thought Alderson acceptable.31 The First Contingent reached Plymouth on 14 October, and the Canadians moved to Salisbury Plain for further training. Weather, organizational changes, and an injury to Turner hampered preparation for the front. It rained on 89 out of 123 days, producing double the average rainfall, such that one battalion was only able to train for 40 out of the 140 days it spent on the Plain.32 Switches to the battalion organization cost more time, as the company structure changed repeatedly between eight and four companies until it stabilized at four in January 1915.33 These changes left units in a state of constant flux,

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wasting time and energy. Adding to this, Turner suffered a broken right collarbone when his car overturned on 23 December. He was in considerable pain in hospital for close to a month and did not return to duty until 17 January. He still needed a chair to mount his horse in February because of his injured right arm.34 As a result, Turner lost valuable time for training and evaluating his brigade and staff.35 Turner did see enough, however, to replace two of his staff officers on 2 February.36 As replacements, he selected Paul Villiers, another member of the 50th Regiment, and Lieutenant H.F. McDonald, a captain in the 16th Battalion who would later become Turner’s chief staff officer in England.37 Despite these impediments, the division, by contemporary standards for a war-raised formation, was reasonably well trained and probably as fully prepared as the German units it faced.38 The best evidence of the value of the training was the division’s performance at the tactical level at Second Ypres. These disruptions, however, truncated the higher formation training, and this probably contributed to the problems experienced at the brigade and divisional levels at Second Ypres. In one case, Alderson had to stop a division exercise because poor control by the division resulted in units colliding with one another.39 The division crossed to France on 7 February, making it the first non-regular division to reach the front in the British Army.40 The division served a tour with the British 6th Division, held a portion of the line on its own, and then conducted ten days of intense instruction before moving north to relieve a French division in the ill-omened Ypres salient. This initial period in France allowed the division to acclimatize to the conditions on the Western Front and undertake further training.41

battle of sec ond ypres The Second Battle of Ypres was a grim and hard slog extending for over a month as the Germans attempted to erase the Ypres salient and the Allies launched counterattack after counterattack to stop them. Turner’s role in the battle lasted from 22 to 26 April, and his con-

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duct in it demonstrated his customary courage and energy. Duguid, the British official historian, claimed that Turner moved about the battlefield throughout the engagement.42 The battle also displayed grave lapses in staff work, failures in communications, and a serious error by Turner. Second Ypres is a challenging battle to reconstruct because of the fragmentary, possibly fabricated, missing, and erroneous documentation and memories. Key officers were lost, time pressures meant many phone messages were not properly recorded (as Garnet Hughes later complained), German artillery fire destroyed the headquarters of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, the Germans captured some files, and days of constant action exhausted the staff and commanders, increasing the risk of mistakes and omissions in reports.43 The 1st Division’s staff compiled the divisional war diary weeks after the battle and is of suspect value.44 The British official historian did not respect it and thought that it reflected the extent to which the division was out of touch.45 An extract of messages compiled by the Canadian Historical Section for the British Official History carries a pencil warning from a British historian: “The times etc in this file must be carefully checked. They are sometimes 12 hours & more out!”46 MajorGeneral T. Snow, the irascible commander of the British 27th Division, later wrote, “I saw the Canadian report on this Battle and I know it is quite erroneous and was written by someone far in rear and only said what ought to have been done, not what was done.”47 The Canadians took over, by British standards, poorly prepared defences from the French – the French had a different defensive doctrine and did not depend on strong front-line trench systems. The trenches were unconnected, shallow, poorly constructed, filthy, and overlooked by German artillery observers.48 Turner’s 3rd Brigade held the left sector of the 3,800-metre division front, with Currie’s 2nd Brigade on the right. The 3rd Brigade front covered 1,900 metres, with the 13th Battalion on the left and the 15th on the right; the 14th Battalion was in brigade reserve 5,000 metres in the rear at Wieltje; and the 16th Battalion in divisional reserve was stationed on the far side of the Yser Canal. Approximately 2,500 metres to the rear of the front line was the defended village of St Julien, which would be a focal point of the fighting on 24 April. Fifteen hundred metres further to

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the rear was the ghq 2nd line; as there was no 1st line, it was normally called the ghq line. It was a series of well-built and sited redoubts, 400 to 500 metres apart, with good fields of fire and protected by a six-metre-deep belt of wire.49 Turner’s headquarters was at Château du Nord – a grandiloquent name for a farm complex – in the ghq line.50 It was later called Shell Trap and then Mouse Trap Farm. Alderson’s headquarters was at Château des Trois Tour, which was an actual château, nine kilometres behind the front line and on the other side of the Yser Canal. While the location had good communications with the controlling corps, it was poorly situated to control the division. To the left of the Canadian position were the French 87th Territorial and 45th Algerian Divisions, both of which were low-quality formations.51 On the right were the undistinguished British 28th and 27th Divisions, according to the commander of the Second Army, General Horace Smith-Dorrien. Later in 1915, both divisions ended up at the sideshow of Salonika, despite being Regular Army divisions.52 The 1st Canadian Division, as well as the two British divisions, served in Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Plumer’s V Corps in the Second Army. The genesis of the battle was the German intent to attack – with a secret weapon, chlorine gas – the French portion of the Ypres salient to mask the transfer of forces to the Eastern Front. The objective of the attack was a small hill at the base of the salient called Pilkem, situated at the village of the same name, whose capture the Germans thought would force the Allies to withdraw from the salient. There was no contingency plan to expand the scope of the offensive. The German high command allocated no reserves to the attack, as it was to be a limited offensive, was dependent on wind, and the Germans had little faith in the efficacy of the secret weapon – especially after a month of postponements waiting for the right wind conditions.53 The German attackers were not elite assault forces, but Prussian formations hastily raised at the beginning of the war, with only a small cadre of experienced officers and ncos. They suffered severe losses in the First Battle of Ypres and were likely no better trained than the 1st Division. The tactics adopted by the German attackers were often crude mass formations. The commander of the Fourth Army, Duke

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Albrecht of Württemberg, deployed the XXVI Reserve Corps consisting of the 51st and 52nd Reserve Divisions reinforced by the 2nd Reserve Ersatz and 37th Landwehr Brigades – both of which were lower-quality formations. A Saxon formation, the Brigade Schmieden from the 53rd Reserve Division, reinforced the attack on 24 April.54 Despite a warning from a German deserter, the gas attack was a complete surprise to the Allies, and no protective measures were in place.55 As a result, the German gas attack was devastating to the French defenders. The Germans assaulted the two French divisions on Turner’s left at 5 p.m. on 22 April 1915 and quickly overwhelmed them. The Germans advanced to the Yser Canal and, having reached their objective, stopped and consolidated. The 1st Division and the entire V Corps were in dire circumstances. The Germans had penetrated so deeply into the French rear that they could outflank and roll up the V Corps. The British reacted to this potential catastrophe by hastily committing reserves without maintaining unit integrity and either overloading existing formations or forming ad hoc detachments without adequate staff or communications.56 For instance, Turner at one point commanded nine battalions, while Mercer, goc 1st Brigade, only controlled two. Alderson preferred to use a British battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel A.D. Geddes, to command the brigadestrength Geddes’s Detachment (an improvised force of four reserve battalions of the British 28th Division), rather than assign British Regular Army battalions to Mercer.57 This suggests a lack of confidence in Mercer or an unwillingness to assign British troops to Canadian commanders. The British high command also launched a series of imprudent and poorly prepared counterattacks to restore the situation and support the French that resulted in heavy losses for no appreciable gains. Turner conducted one of these counterattacks on the night of 22 April. How did Turner respond to the German attack on 22 April? The French collapse exposed Turner’s left flank for 7,300 metres, leaving the 3rd Brigade in a catastrophic position.58 Turner’s situation was one that few First World War commanders ever faced, where the enemy advanced as deeply as did the Germans in only ninety minutes.

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Figure 2.2 Second Battle of Ypres – situation 6:30 p.m., 22 April 1915 German infantry supported by gas and artillery overran the French 45th and 87th Divisions, and the Germans advanced to the line shown by 6:30 p.m. on 22 April 1915. German proximity, fire on the headquarters, and information from the front misled Turner’s headquarters to report erroneously that the Canadian line was driven back to the ghq 2nd Line. Garnet Hughes mistakenly reported the Germans massing for an attack from the southwest. Hughes meant from Turco Farm to the northwest. Initial positions of the two reserve battalions that attacked Kitchener Wood. The 10th and 16th Battalions took Kitchener Wood in the only successful British counterattack of the battle.

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At 6:30 p.m., Turner thought “all was lost” as the Germans swept around his flank and all he had were “our servants, the Engineer company and about 50 of my grenade co; all the rest had been sent forward to fill the gap.”59 Characteristically, Turner buckled on his revolver, declaiming he would not surrender but was prepared to die and thus setting a “fine example,” according to an observing staff officer.60 Turner responded quickly to the emergency by hustling his reserves forward.61 Turner’s reputation has suffered because of three messages issued by his headquarters to the division; they reported that Germans had driven the brigade’s left flank back to the ghq line, which caused understandable consternation at corps and army level.62 Garnet Hughes (all three messages are in his handwriting) was reacting to the move of a front-line battalion to refuse its open left flank, German rifle fire on the brigade headquarters, the fog of war, and probably reports of disaster from stragglers.63 At 7:30 p.m., Hughes further confused matters by indicating that an attack was developing southwest of the brigade headquarters (he meant from Turco Farm to the northwest), which, if true, meant the brigade was almost surrounded. The messages were erroneous and in some cases poorly worded, but given the grim situation were straightforward, factual, and certainly did not indicate “panic.”64 One historian, Andrew Iarocci, has even claimed the messages were substantially correct.65 During this period, three senior divisional staff officers, Major Beatty and Lieutenant-Colonels Macdonell and MacBrien, visited Turner’s headquarters, and these officers apparently either did not realize or did not inform the division that the 3rd Brigade lines were intact.66 The valid criticism was that neither Turner nor his staff confirmed this critical information before passing it up. Turner and his staff had a tendency to accept initial reports without ascertaining their veracity, an approach that would be repeated on 24 April. Within two hours of the disaster, the brigade determined that the front line was intact; it reported this to the division and repeated the news again at 9:50 p.m., but as late as 9:00 p.m., the division had either not received the earlier message or did not understand its import.67 The report also indicated that Turner planned to use the 16th

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Battalion, released from division reserve at 6:55 p.m., to fill the 1,500metre gap in the line from the ghq line east to St Julien. Meanwhile, the division and corps exhorted Turner to retain the front line but ensure to “hold on to G.H.Q. 2nd line at all costs.”68 This emphasis on the priority of holding the ghq line would help shape Turner’s decisions on 24 April. It was disappointing that it had taken two hours for the brigade to discern the correct situation, but not surprising given the confusion, fog of war, and difficulty in communications.69 It was not only the brigade, with its Militia staff issuing misleading reports, as, at 7:30 p.m., the 1st Division passed on a message from the V Corps that the French right was “slightly turned” – a gross understatement.70 At 8:52 p.m., Alderson ordered Turner to make a night attack on Kitcheners Wood, roughly 900 metres north of Turner’s headquarters, with two battalions to support a French attack.71 “Kitcheners Wood” was used in place of the French name for the woods. Turner selected his two unengaged battalions – the 10th and 16th – as the division had released both from divisional reserve. As was to be a pattern in the battle, the divisional staff work was slipshod, for the division order did not indicate Alderson’s intent that Turner was to use the 14th and 16th Battalions in the attack.72 The attack started just after midnight and was successful, albeit at the cost of shattering losses. Roughly two-thirds of the attackers were casualties or had gone astray in the chaos.73 The two battalions, notwithstanding their inexperience, losses, and the confusion of a night attack, seized most of the woods, except for a small corner, and captured prisoners from the 234th Reserve Infantry Regiment.74 Owing to casualties, the absence of the French attack, and the exposed position of the woods in the German line, the two battalions had fallen back by about 4:00 a.m. to a German trench line short of the woods. Despite its having been the only successful counterattack launched by the British during the battle, the attack has occasioned considerable criticism regarding the lack of reconnaissance, the formation ordered, its poor coordination, and the absence of consolidation instructions.75 Scholars have even claimed that Turner ordered the attack himself or should have realized the French were in no position to assault and cancelled the operation.76 Both critiques are specious as Alderson ordered the assault, and Turner was in no position to

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evaluate the likelihood of the French attacking. What is more, even after repeated failures by the French to advance as promised, British commanders continued to launch counterattacks. If British Regular Army professionals of much greater seniority and experience refused to cancel attacks based on bitter experience, it is invidious to suggest a colonial Militia brigadier-general should have ignored a direct order. Turner received the attack order at 8:52 and sunset at Ypres on 22 April was 8:54, so there was insufficient time to conduct a proper reconnaissance before darkness fell.77 The attack formation of a twocompany front, with thirty yards between each company and with the 10th Battalion leading, has occasioned strong criticism.78 Turner regretted having to place the 10th Battalion first, but as it was the first to arrive – and the 16th Battalion had not yet reached the 3rd Brigade’s headquarters – it was too late to switch them.79 Currie later felt bitter that his 10th Battalion had led the attack.80 Another criticism was the attack formation was “Napoleonic,” but given the time and training level of the units involved, one of which was not from Turner’s brigade, the formation Turner ordered was best suited to get them across no man’s land in a minimum of time and disorder.81 Furthermore, the 16th Battalion had trained for night attacks using this exact formation in early April, and the division had been aware of the attack formation then and on 22 April and had raised no objections.82 British commanders regarded the night attack of 14 July 1916 at the Somme, with ample time for training and preparation, as hazardous, and despite its success, it was not repeated. Even in 1918, with far better trained officers and staff, Currie refrained from making night attacks.83 Artillery coordination was rudimentary and ineffective, as was the case for all the attacks made by the 1st Division in the battle, but this was not Turner’s responsibility. Witness the flawed artillery support for the attack on Mauser Ridge by the 1st Brigade on 23 April, or the British 27th Division’s complaints that targets given it by the Canadians were 2,500 metres to the rear of the enemy’s position.84 In addition, the division ordered the 3rd Brigade’s supporting field artillery brigade to withdraw at 9:00 p.m. to behind the ghq line, which further complicated arranging artillery support.85

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Amid the chaos and shock of the German assault, Turner and his staff had limited time to prepare. Their inexperience showed in the brevity of the instructions provided, but the same strictures applied to attack orders for other formations during the battle, such as the attack of the British 10th Brigade on 25 April.86 What is surprising is not the loss rate or confusion, but that the units launched the only successful British counterattack of the battle. During the night of 22/23 April, reinforcements rushing to the front began to arrive to plug the gaps. Earlier in the evening, Alderson assigned the 1st Brigade’s 2nd and 3rd Battalions to Turner with the instruction that he was to use them to prolong his line to the left to link with the French.87 Turner ignored these instructions and used the two battalions to fill in gaps in his line and to tie in the positions at Kitcheners Wood. For unknown reasons, the two battalions swapped positions, and when queried by the affected units for what to do, Turner directed the battalion commanders to arrange themselves as the circumstances required – indicating his recognition that he could not remotely control the situation.88 In response to Turner’s earlier pleas for reinforcements, Currie, on his own initiative, released three companies of the 7th Battalion to fill the gap between St Julien and the original front line. In addition, a company of the British 2/East Kent Regiment arrived to bolster the 13th Battalion’s exposed left flank. The Geddes’s Detachment filled the hole from the ghq line to near the Yser Canal. During the day, Alderson allocated three separate British battalions to Turner. Before Turner could deploy any of them, however, Alderson reassigned them to assist in an abortive attack by the British 13th Brigade. Garnet Hughes later claimed that this had the effect of making Turner chary of relying on any British reinforcements the next day.89 Fortunately for the Canadians, on 23 April, Duke Albrecht erred in attempting to expand the scope of the attack by assaulting west across the Yser Canal in the French and Belgium sectors.90 Desperate Belgian and French resistance stymied the attack and gave the Canadians a needed respite. Rather than using the opportunity to reinforce the line and build up the defences, Sir John French, the head of the bef, ordered further counterattacks on 23 April, with the re-

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sult that two more Canadian battalions were destroyed in a fruitless attack on Mauser Ridge to the northwest of Turner’s position. By the evening of 23 April, Turner’s defences consisted of the original front line, except for a section of the far left, called the apex, pulled slightly back to reduce its exposure to German enfilade fire. The line then straggled southwest to St Julien, then to Kitcheners Wood, and finally to the ghq line, where it met the Geddes’s Detachment. The line consisted of hastily improvised shallow trenches overlooked by German observers and manned by a mix of units, with limited unit integrity, and short of rations and ammunition. The desperate urgency to fill the gaps meant that Turner had to break up battalions and shuffle companies where needed. The 15th and 13th Battalions reinforced by the British company defended the original front line and apex. The 7th and 14th Battalions held the zone from the original front line to St Julien. The 2nd, 3rd, 10th, and 16th Battalions defended the sector from St Julien to Kitcheners Wood and to the ghq line. After the failure of the larger operation on 23 April, Albrecht received orders to focus on pinching off the Ypres salient, and so he planned to attack the apex of the Canadian position.91 At 4:00 a.m. on 24 April, the Germans launched a converging attack on the apex, supported by a heavy artillery barrage and a further gas discharge on a 1,200-metre front of Turner’s 15th Battalion and Currie’s 8th Battalion. The German bombardment and enfilade fire on the lines of communication made information exchange exceedingly difficult. As was the case on 22 April, the fundamental problem was that Turner was out of touch with the front line. As a result, his headquarters provided misleading information to the division, and his decisions, while appropriate on the basis of his understanding, were flawed given the actual situation. His control of the battle was intermittent, uncertain, and defective. Within thirty minutes of the German attack, Turner’s headquarters reported a German breakthrough on Currie’s front, where the line was still intact. How Turner determined this is unclear, as no messages survive that explain this erroneous view. In reaction, Turner took immediate steps to pull the 10th and 16th Battalions out of the line and

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Figure 2.3 Second Battle of Ypres, 24 April 1915 The Germans attacked with gas, artillery, and infantry at 4:00 a.m., 24 April 1915. Hatching shows the area affected by the release of gas. In reaction to the German attack and inaccurate reports that the Germans had broken the 2nd Brigade’s line, Turner ordered the 10th Battalion to return to Currie’s command. After desperate resistance, the 15th Battalion was overridden and the Canadian line was unhinged. Lieutenant-Colonel F. Loomis, the garrison commander at St Julien, reported the German breakthrough at 7:00 a.m. Turner ordered an immediate counterattack that Loomis later persuaded him to cancel. Under the relentless pressure of the German attack, the front-line battalion commanders agreed among themselves at 11:00 a.m. to fall back to a line running from Locality “C” to St Julien. Shortly before noon, the 1st Division released two battalions of the British 150th Brigade to Turner’s command for a counterattack, but the head of the column did not reach Wieltje until 1:00 p.m., which meant the counterattack could not commence until later in the afternoon. At 1:00 p.m., the 1st Division cancelled the counterattack. Turner interpreted the order to hold the line to mean the ghq 2nd Line, so ordered the forward battalions to withdraw to the stronger defensive position. This exposed Currie’s 2nd Brigade, but the Germans did not take advantage of the error.

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released the 10th Battalion back to Currie to help bolster his line, which was appropriate given Turner’s understanding of the situation. The breakthrough occurred on the front of Turner’s 15th Battalion. Despite significant advantages in numbers, guns, shells, observation, and the agonizing effects of gas, the Germans were initially bloodily repulsed along the entire attack front. Renewed attacks broke through on the 15th Battalion’s front as it buckled and gave way after suffering the most casualties of a Canadian battalion in a single day – 691 men.92 The 8th Battalion had the advantage of artillery support, enfilade fire from flanking units, a rudimentary respirator, and a far more effective commanding officer.93 The front of the 3rd Brigade was out of range of the Canadian artillery after the division ordered the supporting field artillery brigade to retreat behind the ghq line on 22 April; only two batteries could reach St Julien, and German counter-battery fire suppressed one of them.94 The commander of the 15th Battalion, John Currie, cracked under the pressure and fled, but because he was a member of Parliament and a friend of Sam Hughes, the authorities promptly returned him to Canada without any punishment.95 The only aspect of this situation that Turner controlled was retaining John Currie in command before the battle, and Currie’s incapacity emerged only in the stress of combat. In a repetition of 22 April, Garnet Hughes issued gravely erroneous reports to the division and the Geddes’s Detachment. At the same time, Currie’s brigade was reporting the correct situation. Almost three hours into the battle, Turner’s headquarters was still unaware of the location or extent of the breakthrough and reported to the division that “we are not uneasy.”96 It was not until 7:00 a.m., when the commander of the St Julien garrison, Lieutenant-Colonel Loomis, reported stragglers, indicating a broken line, that Turner’s headquarters finally grasped the situation.97 Hughes commanded the 15th Battalion to hold the line, as there was “a strong impression” that the battalion believed it was to fall back to the ghq line. Turner also ordered Loomis to counterattack with two companies to restore the situation and notified him that a reserve company was advancing to St Julien.98 One historian characterized this order as “nothing short of absurd,” which it was given the wisdom of hindsight.99 The order was reasonable considering Turner’s appreciation of the situation, but it

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further highlighted how out of touch were Turner and his staff regarding the scale of the German attack. To get the order cancelled, Loomis had to make the difficult journey of over an hour to brigade headquarters, where he argued that he had no artillery support and insufficient forces to make a successful counterattack.100 Turner agreed and cancelled the operation until he could gather more forces. Turner, through Hughes, passed a steady flow of messages to division headquarters, reporting the situation, the loss of ground, heavy losses, lack of artillery support, and requests for reinforcements. The division’s reaction was to order the British 150th Brigade to cross the canal and advance to Wieltje. The 150th Brigade was a pre-war territorial unit that had only arrived in France eight days before.101 The V Corps instructed the 1st Division to use it only as a last resort, as the corps did not think the brigade suitable for front-line service, despite being embodied longer than the 1st Division.102 At 10:30, Turner learned he could use one battalion if “absolutely necessary,” but that Alderson wanted to use the British brigade to replace Turner’s brigade that night. This injunction would have had the effect of inhibiting Turner’s employment of a British battalion. The Germans methodically advanced by bombarding the Canadians out of successive positions. Disproving the common perception that the division was poorly trained, its units did not unravel and break despite the crushing German superiority, but doggedly withdrew, obstructing the advance, and inflicting heavy losses – not the actions of a wholly green division. Germans acknowledged that the Canadians fiercely resisted and slowed the advance, especially by machine gun fire. The opposing XXVI Reserve Corps reported losses of 6,239 men from 21 to 30 April – many of whom the 1st Division inflicted.103 The 3rd Brigade’s machine guns played an integral role in the defence, with the result that the brigade lost fifteen of its sixteen guns.104 By 11:00 a.m., the intense German pressure compelled Turner’s front-line commanders to decide jointly – they could not reach Turner – to fall back from their positions to a line running from St Julien to the defended Locality “C” in the rear of Currie’s brigade. At the same time, Currie was importuning Turner to launch a counterattack to restore the situation. The unravelling of the 3rd Brigade’s line imperilled Currie’s brigade, so he was understandably anxious for Turner

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to act to restore the line. Turner – and not Hughes, as was the usual case – responded by blaming a lack of forces for preventing an attack.105 Finally at 11:53, the division, responding to Turner’s requests for reinforcements, released two battalions of the British 150th Brigade to Turner and ordered him to make an “energetically pushed” counterattack.106 Turner, but not the division, passed this information on to Currie, who would spend the day waiting for news of the expected attack. The issue was that the head of the two battalions’ column would not reach Wieltje until after 1:00 p.m., and they would need at least an hour to advance to St Julien. Assuming they counterattacked directly off the march, this meant that the assault could not commence until later in the afternoon. Contrary to the usual notion that Currie was uninformed of what Turner was doing, Currie was already by noon working on the assumption that the 3rd Brigade would fall back to the ghq line, as illustrated in a verbal order to the 8th Battalion.107 Further, Currie sent an impassioned plea to Turner, saying that he knew Turner was resolved to hold the ghq line to the last, but he thought a counterattack could restore the situation.108 It is unlikely Currie would have employed this terminology unless a 3rd Brigade staff officer had informed him of Turner’s intentions stemming from the earlier division and corps demands to hold the ghq line at all costs. By midday on 24 April, Turner’s brigade was staggering as the Germans slowly pushed it back with their overpowering artillery and numerical superiority of twenty-eight medium and heavy batteries compared to the V Corps’s two medium equivalents and twentyfour relatively fresh battalions versus eight exhausted and severely attenuated Canadian battalions.109 The Germans had a five to one artillery advantage in the battle.110 The division received multiple reports that the Germans were massing considerable forces against the 3rd Brigade. Turner reviewed the situation, at 1:00 p.m., with the division’s senior staff officer, General Staff Officer (gso) 1 British Lieutenant-Colonel Cecil Romer, who cancelled the planned counterattack and ordered Turner to strengthen the current line. Turner interpreted Romer’s order to mean the ghq line to the rear of the existing positions, and over the protests of some of his battalion commanders, he ordered the brigade to retreat.111

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Did Turner misunderstand the order, or did he deliberately misinterpret a vague instruction? Historians are divided on whether he misunderstood or deliberately misinterpreted the order, with the majority believing the former.112 Turner, after the war, claimed it was a misunderstanding, but given his memory lapses (discussed later) and obvious desire to avoid blame, this cannot be accepted at face value.113 It was clear even before the retreat that Turner looked to his rear, as demonstrated by a warning message to the 3rd Brigade, cfa, that a retreat to the ghq line might be necessary.114 Given the lack of prepared defences, the absence of artillery support, the immense difficulty in supplying his forward forces, and the crushing German numerical and firepower advantages, there was a real possibility that the Germans were going to destroy Turner’s brigade. There was a strong incentive, therefore, to fall back to a prepared and well-sited position, easily supplied and supported by artillery. Given the situation, it is more likely that Turner would take advantage of any opportunity to fall back, and so he interpreted Romer’s imprecise instructions in a way to save his brigade. Late that night, Turner travelled back to division headquarters to clear up the situation, but he and Alderson talked past each other, failing to reach an understanding.115 This was the beginning of a great rift between the two. The withdrawal to the ghq line was unquestionably a mistake and it was not Romer’s intention. Turner’s withdrawal made sense for saving the 3rd Brigade, but it was a potentially disastrous decision, for it exposed Currie’s left flank. The factors of poor staff work, exhaustion, shock at the losses, non-existent communications, and perceived lack of support from the division all contributed to the decision, but they did not excuse it. Given the nature of the situation, Romer had clearly made a mistake in not issuing a written order to Turner so as to remove any possible ambiguity, as the army’s operations manual, Field Service Regulations (FSR ), required.116 Turner’s headquarters issued the order to retreat at 1:40 p.m., and Turner contacted the 2nd Brigade to inform them of the cancelled counterattack five minutes later. Currie had by this time left his headquarters for the rear to find reinforcements.117 The division did not inform the 2nd Brigade of the attack’s cancellation.

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Most historians have accepted British Lieutenant-Colonel G. Gordon-Hall’s post-war assertion that the ghq line faced the wrong way, thus making Turner’s decision even more inexplicable, and that Turner overcrowded it with troops, which led to excessive losses.118 Both assertions are disputable and probably indicate why Gordon-Hall, a trained staff officer, did not receive any further promotions, unlike most officers in his situation. The Germans attacked the apex from both the east and the north, but their greatest success was the eastern attack, which resulted in the breakthrough of the 15th Battalion line. Given that the main thrust of the German attack was westward, the ghq line was not wholly out of position. While the notion of eight battalions crowded within the narrow confines of the redoubts of the ghq line makes for an arresting image; yet it is misleading, given how weak the units were. Turner reported in the evening that the four battalions of his brigade amounted to 750 men. The 2nd Battalion had fewer than 200 men, and the attached British battalion was not much stronger. Therefore, the total strength of the brigade holding the ghq line was probably less than 1,500 men, a number that would not exceed the capacity of the redoubts.119 During the afternoon of 24 April, Turner also received orders from Snow, goc British 27th Division, to “act with vigour” to drive the enemy back with three assigned battalions.120 Earlier, Plumer gave Snow the understanding that Snow controlled all the reserves in the salient, since his was the only division headquarters in the salient and, given the poor communications, was in the best position for command.121 Turner was certainly unaware of this understanding. Snow expanded this remit to issue orders to other divisions’ brigades, assuming Turner was out of communications with the 1st Division. Turner quite rightly ignored Snow’s orders, other than replying that in effect he was in communications with the 1st Division, but this would have further added to his sense that the high command was working at cross-purposes.122 The remnants of the brigade were relieved on the night of 25/26 April; they moved to the outskirts of Ypres and then crossed the canal to their transport lines. The division was not finished with the brigade, ordering it back across the canal to act as a reserve. Turner protested

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the order, given the exhaustion of the troops, but he obeyed. The poor staff work of the division in not providing better direction further annoyed Turner.123 This probably contributed to his later complaint about the division staff’s neglect of the brigade (discussed later).

assessing turner’ s perf ormanc e A set of factors, some of which were out of his control, conditioned Turner’s performance. The first was fatigue. The prolonged strain of battle, lack of sleep, and constant stress led to exhaustion and contributed to poor decision-making by Hughes and Turner on 24 April. Turner reported to his wife that he had his boots off twice between 20 April and 4 May and had gone for forty hours without sleep.124 A key skill needed by senior commanders was to manage their energy and failure to do so resulted in breakdowns.125 Communications and logistics were a constant problem throughout the battle. Turner’s situation was particularly difficult, as the Germans effectively interdicted his main supply and communications route to the front, because of their flanking position and their observation and artillery dominance. Resupply was only possible at night, and even then it was challenging – a problem even the British 27th Division experienced in the south end of the salient.126 As a result, the Canadians had to fight hungry, thirsty, and lacking ammunition. As Andrew Iarocci argues, ammunition shortages exacerbated the problems reported with the Ross rifle.127 A consistent feature of messages from the front line was a demand for more ammunition. Contributing to Turner’s failure was the almost complete collapse of communications throughout the battle. A staff officer claimed that the lack of information was “stygian” and “our energies were as much used up in groping for intelligence as in directing operations.”128 For example, one message from the 15th Battalion in the front line took eighty-five minutes to reach Turner’s headquarters.129 Unlike the 2nd Brigade’s compact position, Turner’s had a sprawling line, oriented at right angles, with unprepared defences on most of the front, poor to non-existent communications, no artillery support, and the equivalent of two brigades to control. Turner com-

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manded at various times nine battalions across a division-sized front – 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th Battalions of the 3rd Brigade; the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, and 10th Battalions; and the British 1/Royal Irish Regiment.130 Despite improvements in communications, the effective span of command in modern armies is a maximum of four to five subordinate units, so Turner was overloaded.131 Alderson blundered in burdening an inexperienced brigade commander and his staff with too long a front and too many units. He faced similar problems of having to control thirty-three battalions, and this contributed to the poor control exerted by the division.132 The staff work in Turner’s brigade was consistently inferior to its neighbours; it was less effective than Geddes’s Detachment, whose staff consisted of a captain. The information flow to Currie, to Geddes, and back to division was at times inaccurate and intermittent, whereas there were multiple instances of Geddes informing Turner of his situation in the message logs.133 The commander of the 7th Battalion, while assigned to the 3rd Brigade, complained that he had no instructions from or contact with Turner or his staff.134 At a staff conference on the evening of 24 April, Hughes, as a result of exhaustion, could not coherently describe the brigade’s positions.135 Paul Villiers, a 3rd Brigade staff captain, later complained that Hughes had bungled providing rations to the exhausted men.136 Villiers himself stumbled badly on 24 April when he tried to report on the brigade’s positions to Major-General Snow. Snow, reportedly the rudest man in the British Army, was enraged when his rapid-fire questions and constant interruptions flustered Villiers. This was the preamble to Snow’s infamous attack on Currie, who had reached Snow’s headquarters in an attempt to contact the 1st Division on the afternoon of 24 April.137 Another 3rd Brigade staff captain was deranged by the bombardment of the headquarters on 25 April and fled to Geddes’s headquarters claiming the brigade staff was wiped out.138 He had to be restrained and evacuated. The brigade staff and especially the brigade-major were essential to success, but they poorly served Turner. Turner, however, was ultimately responsible for his staff selection and their retention. He made no effort to replace Hughes after the battle, and this highlights one of his flaws – he kept his friends in their positions when they had not

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proven successful. Another factor in Turner’s reluctance was Hughes’s father. Turner was politically sensitive and would be loath to earn the enmity of the minister if he tried to replace Garnet Hughes. Although Turner did not know it, Sam Hughes was receiving exaggerated reports of the work done by Garnet at Second Ypres from Colonel John Wallace Carson in England. Carson wrote that Turner “would have been more or less lost if it had not been for the good quiet work – without fuss or feathers – done by Garnet under most trying circumstances.”139 Alderson rapidly transferred Garnet out of the brigade after the battle – Garnet had one hour’s notice – by having him appointed gso 2 of the 2nd Division in England on 27 May 1915.140 Turner fought Alderson over whom to appoint in his place and prevailed in appointing Villiers as his new brigade-major.141 In addition, divisional staff work was deficient. Division orders were incomplete or imprecise, such as not specifying which two battalions should make the night counterattack on 22 April or being unclear about what line Romer had referred to on the 24th.142 Attack orders set unrealistic movement schedules: for example, the British 10th Brigade was ordered to attack on 25 April with fifteen battalions, but only the brigade’s five battalions reached the start line in time for the assault.143 The timing expected by Alderson and his staff was impractical considering the conditions at the front. The British 13th Brigade explained that it had to delay an attack on 23 April because the time “originally allowed was not sufficient.”144 Neither Alderson nor Romer, his gso 1, understood the conditions, because they remained ensconced at the division headquarters throughout the battle. A detailed enumeration of divisional staff officer visits to the 3rd Brigade does not list either Romer or Alderson.145 Romer, who would later rise to the rank of full general, was notorious for being headquarters-bound when serving as brigadier-general, General Staff (bggs) of the British III Corps.146 British observers felt that Alderson did not properly grip the situation.147 Turner was dissatisfied with the information coming from the division, noting in pencil, on a message claiming that the Germans were running out of ammunition, while German artillery pummelled his troops, that it was an “exam-

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ple of the value of information derived from the rear.”148 Currie also lost confidence in the division and was frustrated with Alderson.149 Turner’s critics have underappreciated the scale of the challenge Turner faced, and thus they judged his performance too harshly. Even Duguid made the invidious comparison that the 2nd Brigade had held and the 3rd had not.150 No British or Canadian commander faced the extreme challenges that Turner confronted. Despite having to defend too long a line running at a right angle, with too many units to control, unprepared defences, lack of artillery support, an inexperienced staff, and constantly interrupted communications and logistics, Turner and his brigade performed surprisingly well for their first battle. Turner’s performance was flawed, but not incompetent. Turner made mistakes in his first battle as a senior commander, as did Currie and Alderson. Currie’s leaving his brigade headquarters to search for reserves on the afternoon of 24 April is one example.151 In another case, according to Tim Cook, Currie lost control of the battle on 24 April and got into a shouting match with his subordinates.152 As Cecil Romer phrased it, “the Currie of April 1915 was not the Currie of August 1918.”153 Historians have assessed Currie’s performance through the lens of his later successes and on the basis of comments made by officers long after the war, whose views were coloured by Currie’s later reputation. All levels of command, from Field Marshal Sir John French through army, corps, division, and brigade levels, conducted the battle poorly. Had Turner been a British officer, the British high command, with its limited tolerance for failure, would probably have removed him and possibly Alderson and likely Currie.154 Turner, however, was a Canadian Militia officer, and given the scale and scope of the challenge he faced, allowances had to be made for his inexperience, the situation, and the political cost of removing a Canadian hero. What is certain is that there was little confidence or trust remaining between Turner and Alderson, and this eroded further in the battle’s aftermath. Turner’s military career up to this point was an unbroken series of triumphs. He had not experienced failure before, so he did not react well by unfairly blaming Alderson for his problems, complaining

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that no divisional staff visited his brigade during the battle.155 Alderson easily refuted this grievance by providing a list of repeated visits by his staff to Turner’s headquarters during the battle. Turner had to apologize abjectly, closing with “I can only explain the strange lapse of memory to the awful pounding we received on the 25th April.”156 Why would Turner make such an obviously fallacious claim? The explanation probably lies with the destruction of Turner’s headquarters by intense German shelling in the afternoon of 25 April.157 It was so severe that the staff had to escape by swimming across a moat that surrounded the farm.158 A 2nd Brigade staff officer later reported seeing Turner with his jaw bandaged up, and Turner’s subsequent behaviour strongly suggests that he suffered a concussion during the bombardment.159 Turner lamented to his wife three times in the next two months that he was feeling thick-headed and was “still very tired, and my head and brain seem to act slower than usual – It has been an awful war.”160 One of the after-effects of a concussion can be memory loss, and this may account for his unsatisfactory later explanations for the decisions he made during the battle.161 Another incident was Sam Hughes’s bitter denunciation of Alderson to the Canadian prime minister. He asserted in an inaccurate, exaggerated, and tendentious letter that Alderson was not competent to command the division and Turner should replace him.162 Hughes’s attack was unjust and deeply wounding, and Alderson responded with a detailed letter refuting the claims.163 While Turner and Garnet Hughes were not directly involved in the exchange, it probably further undermined Alderson’s trust in Turner, and once Turner lost Alderson’s and Currie’s confidence, it was next to impossible to regain it.

b attle of festubert The 1st Division had a brief rest before the British high command committed it to the continuation of the First Army’s attack at Festubert, in support of the larger French offensive at the Second Battle of Artois. Turner’s 3rd Brigade marched to Festubert on 16 May, and the remainder of the division followed. Festubert highlighted an im-

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provement in Turner’s command, further deterioration of his relationship with Alderson, and dismal command and staff preparation by Turner’s superiors. The division’s slipshod staff work still rankled Turner twenty years later. He was incensed that when he was ordered to Festubert, a field ambulance and field engineer company did not accompany the brigade as was standard procedure. Turner later claimed that this negligence “astonished” the British. Furthermore, he and Garnet Hughes had to ride thirty-two kilometres to conduct a reconnaissance of the proposed attack frontage at Festubert, while the division provided the other two brigade commanders and their staffs a car for transportation.164 Turner interpreted this as a direct slight, and even Duguid agreed.165 Launched on 16 May, the initial British attack was partially successful and forced the Germans to pull back on a sector of the front. Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig, goc First Army, as was his wont, interpreted this as signifying an incipient German breakdown, and he was determined to press the advantage. Haig allotted the 3rd Brigade to Major-General Hubert Gough’s British 7th Division, and Gough in turn assigned the brigade to make an attack as part of a larger operation in the afternoon of 18 May. Haig’s plan entailed a deliberate bombardment of German positions for two hours and an attack at 4:30 p.m. by the 4th Guards Brigade of the British 2nd Division on the left and the 3rd Brigade on the right. Poor British staff work resulted in Turner’s brigade attacking off the march, without time to prepare properly. Turner later reported that Gough visited him three times that afternoon to impress upon him the importance of the objective.166 The First Army issued its orders only two and half hours before the attack, and they had to transit through the corps and division levels to reach Turner, which left no time for planning.167 Fortunately, Turner had taken the precaution of preparing a tentative attack plan with his battalion commanders the day before, so a plan was in place.168 Further, Turner’s brigade only reached the assembly trenches for the attack at 5:20 p.m., by which time the supporting bombardment had already ceased for fifty minutes and German fire had terminated the 4th Guards’ attack after an advance of approximately 500 metres. The 3rd Brigade assaulted at 5:25 p.m., and the two battalions attacking suffered heavy losses against

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Figure 2.4 Battle of Festubert, 18–20 May 1915

unsuppressed German machine gun and artillery fire. Despite the obstacles of deep drainage ditches and uncut wire, German resistance, and over-hasty planning, the brigade did advance in line with the 4th Guards Brigade before the assault ground to a stop. In response to the partial success, Haig ordered the fresh 1st Canadian and British 51st Divisions to replace the British 2nd and 7th Divisions. In a repetition of the errors at Second Ypres, Alderson commanded both divisions plus part of the artillery of the British 2nd and 7th Divisions – a formation designated as “Alderson’s Force.” The British 7th Division’s commander, Royal Artillery (cra), and gso 2

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remained behind to assist, and both would be vocal about the “sketchy” work of Alderson’s staff.169 The poor staff work of the British 51st Division probably further stretched Alderson’s officers. At the Givenchy operation in June 1915, the British corps commander was so concerned about the 51st Division’s staff that he sent his chief staff officer to assist them.170 Haig ordered Alderson to make a deliberate attack on 20 May. The 3rd Brigade on the division’s left was to capture the Canadian Orchard, named after the Canadians, and a fortified building designated M.10, while the 2nd Brigade on the right was to capture a position named K.5. The bombardment, as for all attacks conducted by the Canadians at Festubert, ceased once the infantry attacked, leaving the German defenders free to fire on the soldiers struggling to navigate the cut-up terrain. To prepare for the offensive, Alderson met with Currie, Turner, and their brigade-majors in the morning, and the resulting operation order called for an attack by the 3rd Brigade at 9:00 p.m. at dusk, followed by an attack by the 2nd Brigade in the morning.171 Shortly after the division issued the order, Haig rejected the plan and timing, believing Alderson too cautious.172 In response, at 3:00 p.m., Alderson issued a new operation order that required both brigades to attack in full daylight at 7:45 p.m., with the 3rd Brigade to attack with two battalions.173 After learning about the change to attack in daylight and an officer’s reconnaissance finding uncut wire in the tall grass, Turner travelled to division headquarters to argue for a postponement. With Alderson and Romer busy managing Alderson’s Force, the senior officer present, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon-Hall, the gso 2, brushed Turner off and ordered him to make the attack. Turner protested, saying that the attack was “murder.”174 Long afterwards, Turner was still bitter about the treatment he received, but he did not realize that GordonHall had tried to persuade Haig of the futility of daylight attacks, but Haig shouted him down.175 Currie, too, wanted the attack delayed, and according to one of his battalion commanders, he “was somewhat bitter in his criticism of higher authority” over the order.176 Trapped between the protests of Currie and Turner over the timing of the assault and Haig’s intense pressure to attack as scheduled, Alderson managed to satisfy neither party. Haig was angry with what

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he perceived as Alderson’s dilatoriness and the slipping away of an opportunity to break the German line. Alderson weakly tried to persuade Haig to grant more time to prepare, but Haig rejected any delays. As a result of his anemic efforts, Alderson further alienated his brigade commanders and infuriated Haig. With minimal effective artillery support and in the face of heavy machine gun and artillery fire, the 16th Battalion captured the Canadian Orchard, but wire and machine gun fire prevented the seizure of M.10. The 15th Battalion captured only part of its objective.177 The writer of the 3rd Brigade’s war diary baldly described the attack of the 15th Battalion as “unsuccessful largely owing to the fact that it was carried out in daylight.”178 The 2nd Brigade’s attack failed. The 3rd Brigade made no further major attacks and withdrew on the night of 22/23 May. As Duguid phrased it, Festubert was the most “unsatisfactory engagement of the 1st Canadian Division in the War.”179 Festubert yields three conclusions relevant to Turner’s career. First, Turner’s two attacks were partially successful, and while a direct comparison is invidious given the different situations, the 3rd Brigade did achieve more of its objectives than did the 2nd Brigade. Turner’s performance showed he could learn from his experiences, for his conduct of operations at Festubert was more assured than at Ypres. The information his headquarters passed to higher formations was more accurate, and he was better at preparing for the vagaries of active service, as illustrated by his pre-battle planning on 17 May. Second, Turner’s reputation for confronting the authorities over poor plans was by now well-established. Calling the revised second attack “murder,” while accurate, was sure to further alienate Turner from the division. Both Currie and Turner expressed great dissatisfaction with the division. Lieutenant-Colonel F.S. Meighen of the 14th Battalion claimed to Carson that both Currie and Turner went to Alderson to complain about how he was running the division.180 And finally, Alderson was most likely fatally compromised in Haig’s mind, with grave consequences in the aftermath of St Eloi Craters in April 1916. Haig was so furious about Alderson’s performance that he chastised Alderson and Romer about the “sketchy methods of Command” of the division and brigade staffs.181

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conclusion Turner’s first battle was not a success. Poor staff work, inaccurate information transmission, and a dangerous decision indicated he was overstretched. Turner faced an unprecedented challenge in reacting to the effective annihilation of two divisions on his left flank by a new, devastating secret weapon. His initial decisions were appropriate for the situation, but his and his brigade staff’s performance deteriorated over the course of the battle. Alderson erred in tasking Turner with controlling too many troops over too long a front, given the inexperienced state of the brigade. Napoleon famously asked whether an officer proposed for promotion to general was lucky; Turner at Ypres was not. He was dealt an unwinnable hand, but he did not play it as well as he could have. At Festubert, the brigade reached most of its objectives and without much evidence of the previous problems, indicating some degree of improvement in Turner’s performance. Turner proved his willingness to challenge flawed orders, but at the cost of further estrangement from Alderson. How Turner would have progressed as a brigade commander was to be moot, as on 17 August, he took over command of the 2nd Division.182

3 “We are in desolate places”: Battle of St Eloi Craters We grope for the wall like the blind, and we grope as if we had not eyes: we stumble at noon day as in the night, we are in desolate places like dead men. Isaiah 59:10

In thirteen days of unrelenting combat in April 1916, Turner’s 2nd Division struggled and failed to hold and then retake a narrow 600metre salient of craters, mud, and dead at the tiny crossroads of St Eloi, Belgium.1 This chapter investigates Turner’s first eight months in command of the 2nd Division and his performance at St Eloi in the context of the information, resources, and conditions of this ill-conceived and strategically purposeless battle.

f or mation of the 2nd division The 2nd Division’s formation followed a different path than that of the 1st Division. The British accepted the Canadian offer of a second contingent on 31 October 1914.2 Rather than mobilizing centrally, as did the 1st Division, the 2nd Division conformed to the original 1912 mobilization scheme of the military district staff, raising its battalions in the districts and selecting personnel.3 The battalions spent the winter training in the districts under the supervision of the district staffs, as Valcartier could not barrack troops during the winter.4 The division consisted of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Brigades. The 4th Brigade was from Ontario, with the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Battalions. The 5th Brigade was a mix of units from the Maritimes and

Figure 3.1 2nd Division organization chart – St Eloi Craters, 6 April 1916

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Quebec, consisting of the 22nd (French Canadian), 24th, 25th, and 26th Battalions. The 5th Brigade was unique in possessing the only francophone battalion in the Canadian Corps. The 6th Brigade included battalions from all four western provinces – the 27th, 28th, 29th, and 31st. A mix of six commanders of Militia regiments, two commanders of Militia infantry brigades, one retired officer, two majors, and one pf officer led the battalions.5 The training of the 2nd Division in Canada faced the same issues that confronted Territorial and New Army divisions in Britain – inexperienced ncos and officers inculcating outdated concepts. 6 There were the added impediments of being even further removed from the developments at the front than British formations and of the harsh Canadian winter limiting training. A further problem was a dearth of British Regular or Canadian pf officers in battalion command who would have added experienced professional leadership. Unlike the 1st Division, all but one of the battalion commanders in the 2nd Division were Militia officers, as were all the company commanders and the adjutants. The one exception was Lieutenant-Colonel A. Bell of the 31st Battalion who was a captain in the pf at the start of the war. First-wave British New Army divisions, in contrast, had Regulars commanding all battalions and most companies. Even the last wave of New Army divisions consisted of battalions commanded by retired Regulars.7 An instructive comparison is provided by the British 21st and 24th Divisions, which had a calamitous introduction to combat at the Battle of Loos. Both were second-wave New Army formations raised and sent to France at approximately the same time as the 2nd Division. The British Official History ascribed their problems to the relative shortage of trained commanders and staff. At a minimum, each battalion in the two divisions had one Regular or retired Regular officer, with all the battalion commanders in the 21st Division being active or retired Regulars. The staffs of the two divisions had more trained and experienced staff officers than did the 2nd Division.8 As a result, it is not surprising that the 2nd Division was not well prepared for battle when Turner assumed command. Selecting the commander of the division was a tangled process. The British appointment of the former British Secretary of State for

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War, Brigadier-General Jack Seely, to command the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, without any discussion with Canadian authorities, goaded Borden to ensure that a Canadian commanded the 2nd Division.9 Originally, Sam Hughes considered commanding the division, but Borden again dissuaded him, and instead Hughes recommended the pf officer Major-General Sam Steele.10 Steele, a Canadian western icon and legendary mounted police and military leader, also had the merit of satisfying the demands of powerful cabinet minister Robert Rogers for equal representation for western Canada in the command ranks.11 Kitchener, given Steele’s apparent age (sixty-six) and inexperience, rejected him and offered any unemployed major-general on the active list as a commander.12 Any such officer at this stage of the war, however, was unlikely to be a better choice than Steele. The Canadian and British authorities eventually agreed that Steele could bring the division to England, but not take it to France. Kitchener did find Steele a position commensurate with his rank, as commander of the Southeastern Area, which included Shorncliffe, the major Canadian training centre.13 Sir John French preferred that Currie command the 2nd Division, given Alderson’s adverse report on Turner – Alderson thought him unfit for divisional command, other than that he was “physically brave to a fault.”14 Alderson did not show this document to Turner as required by regulations.15 No version of it has been found, so the only reference to it is in Alderson’s later 1916 adverse report. Turner must have learned of the letter somehow, as he did make the cryptic comment of “there appears to be trouble ahead” to his wife when he was in temporary command of the 1st Division while Alderson was on leave.16 As the senior Canadian, Turner commanded the 1st Division and later the Canadian Corps when Alderson was on leave. Canadian authorities, however, were adamant that it was Canada’s right to choose and they wanted Turner, believing him the most qualified Canadian given his pre-war and war records. Kitchener had to accede to Canadian demands and appointed Turner.17 On learning of Turner’s appointment, Alderson was to lament, “Canadian politics have been too strong for all of us.”18 Turner’s appointment was generally popular, for even an anti-government paper, the Manitoba Free Press, approved.19 Turner officially took over command on 17 August.20

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In May, Sam Hughes appointed three pf officers to command the brigades. Colonel Septimus Dennison commanded the 4th Brigade, but at fifty-six, he was too old and his health broke down almost immediately. The British Regular Brigadier-General Lord Brooke replaced him on 25 June.21 Brooke was an example of a curious aspect of Hughes’s character: a partiality for aristocrats. Brooke was well connected and was the son of the Earl of Warwick, who was Hughes’s friend. He commanded a cavalry brigade in Canada in 1913 and led manoeuvres in June 1914. He was also an adc to Sir John French in South Africa and France while French commanded the bef.22 Colonel J.P. Landry, initially, commanded the 5th Brigade, until replaced by Brigadier-General David Watson on 30 August. Steele did not believe Landry was competent, and this was a view shared by other officers in the brigade. In his diary, Andrew Macphail reported that Landry was superseded after manoeuvres “ended disastrously for us, so much so that we described ourselves as dead men.”23 In a manner indicative of his political sensitivity, Turner asked that Landry be promoted to brigadier-general, given that he was a senior FrenchCanadian pf officer.24 Watson, the new commander of the 5th Brigade, was a Militia officer who had commanded the 2nd Battalion with distinction at Second Ypres. Watson was the owner and editor of the Tory Quebec Chronicle newspaper, a staunch conservative, a shrewd intriguer, and a confidant of Hughes.25 The commander of the 6th Brigade, Colonel H.D.B. Ketchen, remained in command of the brigade until 1917. Ketchen was a major in the pf in 1914. Educated at Sandhurst, Ketchen emigrated to Canada in 1894, and served in the North West Mounted Police for five years. He joined Steele’s regiment, Lord Strathcona’s Horse, in the Boer War and transferred to the pf afterwards. In 1914, he was the chief administrative officer in Military District #10 – Steele’s command. Hughes selected Ketchen, in part, because he was a protégé of both Steele and Robert Rogers.26 The gso 1 was Lieutenant-Colonel H.D. De Pree, a British artillery officer who joined from the Indian Lahore Division at the end of May 1915. The gso 2 was Major C.A. Ker, who transferred from the 21st Division.27 Ker, a British artillery officer, was familiar to Cana-

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dians, as he had served at rmc in Kingston at the start of the war.28 Ker replaced De Pree at the end of January 1916.29 The head administrative officer (the assistant adjutant and quartermaster-general) was Colonel P.E. Thacker, a pf and Camberley-trained staff officer (see chapter 6). The division set out for England in late April 1915 in convoys of 5,000 men and completed the crossing in June, moving into a recently constructed base at Shorncliffe near Dover on the English Channel.30 This was the first time the division was concentrated in one place. Assuming command of the division on 17 August, Turner had less than a month to place his mark on it before it crossed to France. According to Steele’s aide, Captain F.F. Montague, the division was loyal to Steele, but Turner quickly won them over.31 Captain Andrew Macphail, a doctor and noted Canadian literary figure, commented that Turner “won instant devotion, even from myself who am not disposed to yield devotion upon first demand.”32 One of the first changes Turner made was to institute more pragmatic and realistic formation training. Under Steele, the brigades carried out tactical exercises as meeting engagements, with columns and advance guards as per the FSR .33 Simkins characterized aspects of New Army formation training as appropriate for the Franco-Prussian War, and this was the training approach adopted by Steele.34 Turner instructed the brigades to conduct trench and open warfare training, and each brigade had to carry out a trench attack.35 Turner initially did not make any changes at the command level, as was often the case with a new divisional commander taking over a recently mobilized formation. Wholesale changes at the staff, brigade, and battalion level often followed the replacement of a divisional commander in the British Territorial and New Army divisions early in the war.36 It was unnecessary in this case, as Steele had already replaced one battalion and two brigade commanders. Steele’s dismissal of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Allan of the 20th Battalion caused a near riot in the battalion.37 The battalion’s discipline obviously worried Turner, as he requested that the pf unit, the Royal Canadian Regiment (rcr), recently arrived from garrison duty in Bermuda, replace the 20th Battalion. Turner subsequently changed his mind, as the rcr was

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not ready for active service, and he thought better leadership could salvage the 20th Battalion, which it did under Lieutenant-Colonel C. Rogers.38

in fr ance The division, on 23 September 1915, took over the Wesoutre sector, south of Ypres and overlooked by the Wytschaete-Messines Ridge. Unlike the 1st Division’s experience, there was no gradual introduction to the front line and mentoring with an experienced division. The arrival of the 2nd Division also meant the formation of the Canadian Corps, with Alderson as corps commander and Currie leading the 1st Division. The defences the 2nd Division took over were in deplorable shape, and the division expended enormous efforts to improve them. Constant rainfall and the water pumped by the Germans from their trenches on the ridge onto the Canadian positions thwarted its efforts.39 The men had to stand up to their waists in water in the front-line trenches, and some communication trenches were impassable because of flooding.40 All this work meant that the reserve battalions were unable to train and instead had to supply work parties for repairs. Because of the need to work on the defences, the Canadian Corps instructed the division not to initiate actions with the Germans in this early period.41 Strong leadership was required to keep the division working in these dispiriting conditions. One of Turner’s great strengths was that he was constantly visiting the front, and he would endeavour to be the first officer to tour a new part of the line. In one eleven-day period, he toured the trenches of the 5th Brigade on five separate days.42 Turner would spend hours investigating the situation, talking to the officers and men, and ensuring they knew their duties. He also tasked his adcs to carry copies of illustrated newspapers to hand out to men on his tours.43 This fitted the contemporary British model of man management.44 Like most new formations that had to endure the terrible weather conditions of the winter of 1915/16, the 2nd Division expe-

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rienced its share of problems. The first was the poor response of the 25th Battalion to the Germans’ firing four mines on 8 October, which caused a partial panic in the company holding the affected sector. Some men fled but most rallied and denied the Germans a foothold in the Canadian line. Mines were a constant dread, a “hovering horror,” and during this period, the Germans had an edge in mine warfare.45 The soldiers’ only true protection was the trench; mines removed this last vestige of control and protection – hence the anxiety.46 That some men panicked indicated problems with the battalion, and therefore Watson promptly replaced the commander and second-incommand.47 The incident would likely have further lowered Alderson’s confidence in Turner, given Alderson’s antipathy towards him. In November, Alderson was angered by the state of the 6th Brigade after inspecting its positions. Men in the 27th Battalion were not wearing the required equipment, their rifles were dirty, and the infantry was not in proper communications with the artillery. Turner assured Alderson that the 6th Brigade was dealing with the problems.48 Alderson, however, undoubtedly took note of the offending officers, including Turner, Ketchen, and the 27th Battalion’s Lieutenant-Colonel I. Snider, as all three would figure prominently at St Eloi Craters. The problem most damaging to Turner’s reputation with his superiors was the prevalence of trench foot in the 2nd Division, in October and November of 1915, when conditions were at their worst. The 2nd Division had one of the highest incidence rates in the Second Army with seventy-seven cases in a two-week period, while the more experienced 1st Division had only seventeen. In contrast, the British Regular 27th Division was losing 300 men a day to trench foot in early 1915.49 ghq used the rate of trench foot as an indication of the discipline and leadership of a formation. Both the Second Army and Alderson pressured Turner to address the problem.50 He responded by issuing a circular that emphasized prevention through supervision by regimental officers, with leave revoked for companies with high rates of trench foot. The officers commanding in the brigade with the highest rate would also lose their leave.51 Turner obtained boots, socks, and undervests for his troops through back channels from England. In one request to Carson, the de facto head of Canadian administration

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in England, Turner asked that the socks be sent in small bales addressed to him to get around War Office regulations. Turner claimed he was following the Militia adage of “the Lord helps those that help themselves,” as the British authorities and the Canadian Corps were not supplying these goods in sufficient quantity.52 The Canadian Corps staff complained about Turner’s actions and attitude in this regard, which would have further embittered relations between the corps and Turner.53 Steps Turner took, improvements to the trenches, and colder temperatures (temperatures just above freezing caused the highest rates) eased the problem, and the incidence of trench foot dropped to a more acceptable level.54 Turner and Alderson clashed over staff and command appointments. Turner quickly determined that Brooke, goc 4th Brigade, had to be relieved, despite his being a Sam Hughes favourite.55 According to Max Aitken, Sam Hughes’s “personal representative” to ghq and consummate fixer, Turner, Currie, and Alderson agreed to transfer Brooke to command the 1st Brigade with Garnet Hughes receiving the 4th Brigade.56 The selection of Garnet Hughes to command a brigade was wholly unjustified by his experience and performance, but was indicative of the influence Sam Hughes had in the promotion process. Successful command of a battalion or a strong performance as a senior staff officer was a prerequisite for brigade commands, and Hughes had no such experience. Alderson subsequently changed his mind and assigned Garnet to command the 1st Brigade, as he believed Currie could keep Garnet out of trouble. Turner protested, as he was “exceedingly anxious” that Garnet stay in the 2nd Division, but he was unsuccessful.57 Turner’s inclination to retain Garnet indicates his political shrewdness in staying in Sam Hughes’s favour combined with his genuine if misguided appreciation of Garnet’s capabilities. Brooke transferred to a training command in England to mollify Hughes. In Brooke’s place, on 17 November, Alderson appointed Robert Rennie, the commander of the 3rd Battalion. Rennie, a Militia officer and owner of a Toronto seed firm, would prove to be a safe pair of hands, as he commanded the brigade to September 1918.58 Turner complained to Aitken about the replacement of a Canadian administrative officer, Major Homer-Dixon, with a British officer. In

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turn, Aitken lodged a complaint with the British authorities, which paid off as Homer-Dixon was reappointed in January 1916.59 Turner also battled Alderson over the appointment of Canadian Major J.L.R. Parsons as his gso 2 for Intelligence, because Alderson, not trusting Turner’s judgment, again wanted to appoint a British officer.60 Turner won out, and Parsons received the appointment. Parsons proved to be successful, because he was appointed the Canadian Corps gso 1 for Intelligence later in 1916.61 Sir George Perley, Canada’s acting high commissioner in London, protested to the colonial secretary about the appointment of British officers when qualified Canadians were available. The colonial secretary passed the protest to Kitchener in December 1915, with the advice to treat the grievance seriously.62 It appears to have had an effect, for fewer British officers were selected over similarly qualified Canadians. As a result of these complaints, Hughes waged a campaign to replace British Regular officers in the Canadian Corps. Alderson fought back by polling his divisional commanders on dispensing with Regulars as brigade-majors. Both Mercer and Currie adamantly opposed the suggestion. Turner’s answer was subtly different, for he wanted to retain the Regulars until Canadian replacements were trained. Neither Mercer nor Currie referred to Canadians filling these positions.63 This was early evidence of Turner’s desire to produce more Canadian staff. Later, when in command in England, Turner fostered an increase in Canadian staff officer training. This illustrates that his strong Canadian nationalism was not a negative reaction to the British, but confidence in what Canadians could accomplish. Only in December could the division shift some of its energies to training and to conducting raids. Turner established a series of schools at the division, brigade, and battalion levels to train troops in trench warfare and the new weapons, such as the Lewis gun and Stokes mortar.64 Even in the worst conditions of October and November, the division pursued an aggressive scheme of patrolling no man’s land at night. It was not until January, however, that the division raided German trenches. The 6th Brigade pulled off an impressive raid at the end of January; it was reportedly the first raid conducted without using artillery to cut enemy wire.65 Turner sent Ketchen’s analysis of

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the raid to Alderson over his signature, but in a dubious move did not credit Ketchen for writing the report.

battle of st eloi craters From 4 April, the 2nd Division fought in the Battle of St Eloi Craters. This engagement was the nadir of Turner’s military career, and his conduct in the battle became the focus of opprobrium by historians. It was also an example of the problems Canadians, like other inexperienced units, encountered when they could not operate within the confines of a structured and well-prepared operational scheme. When Canadian formations had to react to German actions and could not dictate the course of the battle, Canadian command and control floundered.66 The problems encountered at Second Ypres, St Eloi, and the opening days at Mount Sorrel, were all examples of similar breakdowns. These issues were a symptom of inexperienced Canadian commanders and staff. A brief description of the battle is in order here. In the first of five phases, the British 3rd Division attacked on 27 March 1916, with the blowing of six mines dug under the German lines, and then struggled to retain the ground gained. Heavy losses necessitated the early replacement of the British division by the 2nd Division on the evening of 3/4 April. The Canadians, like the British, struggled to consolidate the defences in the face of severe German shelling. Next, the Germans launched a strong counterattack in the early morning hours of 6 April that recaptured four craters in the centre of the line gained in the initial British attack. The 2nd Division’s unsuccessful attempts to retake the lost craters were the fourth phase. The initial Canadian counterattacks on 6 April resulted in erroneous claims that the division had retaken the eastern two craters, Craters 3 and 4. Additional counterattacks on the nights of 7/8 and 8/9 April produced further mistaken claims that the attackers had reached the lips of the two remaining craters, Craters 2 and 3. It was not until the night of 10/11 April that an engineering work party discovered that the Germans still held Craters 2 and 3. In the final phase, the commander of the Second

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Figure 3.2 St Eloi panorama on 14 March 1915 before heavy shelling and mines blasted the ground. Source: wo 153/1268, tna.

Army ordered the 2nd Division to cease attacking and consolidate its existing line. The division was still operating under the misapprehension that it held Craters 4 and 5, supposedly captured in the initial counterattack. Aerial photos on 16 April proved conclusively that the division did not hold them, and this knowledge meant the effective end of the main battle and the beginning of recriminations for the failure. The impetus for the battle stemmed from a desire by the commander of the Second Army, General Sir Herbert Plumer, to salvage his career by recovering a small salient that overlooked British positions in the town of St Eloi, four kilometres south of Ypres – the Germans had seized this height of land in March 1915.67 The new commander of the bef, General Sir Douglas Haig, was already expressing his grave reservations about Plumer to the chief of the Imperial General Staff (cigs), Lieutenant-General Sir William Robertson in January 1916.68 The Second Army’s defensive arrangements dissatisfied Haig, and he believed Plumer was insufficiently firm with his

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corps and divisional commanders, whom he thought were weak.69 Haig was especially concerned with Lieutenant-General Hew Fanshawe, goc V Corps, and Major-General Aylmer Haldane, goc British 3rd Division, who would lead the initial attack at St Eloi.70 After losing and retaking a small position, the Bluff, in February 1916, Plumer was on a short leash with Haig, who decided to give Plumer another opportunity to prove himself.71 The Second Army had initiated plans for an attack at St Eloi in November 1915 by tunnelling mines under the German front line.72 Because of concern that the Germans might discover the mines, the plan called for an attack as soon as possible after 10 March, when the mines were to be ready.73 The British Regular Army 3rd Division was to make the attack and consolidate the position. It would then hand over the sector to Turner’s division on the night of 6/7 April. When Turner learned of the plan, he immediately recommended to Alderson that the 2nd Division make the attack, as he believed a fresh division was more likely to be successful.74 Ker, the 2nd Division’s gso 1, later suggested that the Canadians “would of made a complete success of it.”75 Alderson agreed with Turner, but Plumer rejected his request, not wanting to risk the Germans’ discovering the mines while the Canadians carried out the necessary training. There was probably also a reluctance to place his fate in the hands of an untested colonial division rather than in those of a Regular Army formation. The British 3rd Division was selected because of its experience in crater fighting in 1915. Haldane, the divisional commander, did not welcome the assignment; he was bitter about the small-scale attacks he had had to make in 1915, as they had inevitably led to high casualties for little gain.76 Despite its expertise, the British 3rd Division was a lamentable choice: it was tired, under-strength, and unfit after its operations to retake the Bluff. It was reduced to one effective brigade, the British 9th; this was because the British 76th Brigade had lost 924 men at the Bluff and 600 cases of trench foot crippled the British 8th Brigade, indicating a formation with severe leadership and morale problems.77 Two of the brigade commanders – the commander of the British 9th Brigade, the cra, and the commander, Royal Engineers (cre) – were new, and the gso 1 was sick for most of the bat-

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tle. Clearly, the division’s leadership was in a fragile state. During the battle, Haldane would also sack one battalion commander and a brigade-major.78 The key to the plan was to explode six mines under the German front-line positions. The resulting mine craters would create an obstacle in the centre of the salient, requiring the British to attack from each flank. The gso 2 of the British 3rd Division identified the plan’s flaw, stating that “the attack was fitted to the mines and not the mines to the attack.”79 The British 9th Brigade was to advance with one battalion from each flank to capture and consolidate a line 200 metres south of the craters. Haldane, after his experiences at Hooge in 1915, was adamant that craters were shell traps and should not be defended.80 In the initial phase of the battle, the British 3rd Division attacked on 27 March with partial success. The right battalion quickly reached its objectives, but heavy machine gun and artillery fire stopped the left battalion. The division reported that “great difficulty has been experienced in obtaining knowledge of the exact situation from those on the spot.”81 Heavy losses from artillery fire and exhaustion necessitated battalion reliefs every one to two days. Haldane had to commit first the British 8th Brigade and then the British 76th Brigade in relief. The division did not realize until 30 March that the Germans had infiltrated through a gap in the line and recaptured Crater 5. Once this was discovered, it took another four days before the division retook it.82 It is evident from the responses to post-battle enquiries that the units could not advance in a planned direction or even ascertain what they held.83 Haig grew so concerned, finding that the “actions of the 3rd Division seemed so strange,” that sent his chief staff officer to investigate.84 The British 3rd Division was rapidly becoming debilitated, so Plumer ordered the planned relief to be accelerated by three days to the night of 3/4 April – the battle’s second phase. Haldane and Fanshawe asserted that the British 3rd Division had made every effort to facilitate the handover to the Canadians, including leaving behind Haldane’s gso 1, twenty-four Lewis guns, trench mortars, and three communication trenches complete to the front lines.85 The reality was

Figure 3.3 St Eloi aerial photograph, 31 March 1916, showing four of the craters created by the 27 March attack. Note the enormous number of craters in the vicinity of the four centrally labelled ones. Source: ww1air 00157, McMaster University Library, Canada.

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far different, as only one communication trench existed, and it was one metre deep and filled with water. The 27th Battalion found only four of the twelve expected Lewis guns and these were not fully functional.86 The information handed over was inaccurate, incomplete, or entirely absent because of the state of both the ground and the exhausted British division.87 Haig reported in his diary that a senior Second Army staff officer claimed that the 3rd Division “had been in too great a hurry to get out of St Eloi after the action!”88 What is more, the ground had changed so much that Haldane’s gso 1 twice lost his way in guiding the Canadians into position.89 Turner accused the British 3rd Division of making no effort to consolidate. The British had tried, but the Germans kept destroying the defences.90 The British were so exhausted that the Canadians had to evacuate the British wounded and dead. This was almost unheard of and was an indication of just how shattered and fatigued was the British division. Haldane also left recommendations on how to hold the line, the key notion being to avoid the craters.91 As Leppard states, “Incredibly, Turner had received no orders or instructions from 2nd Army, V Corps, or Canadian Corps.”92 Unfortunately, Turner implemented the flawed advice of Haldane – the “expert” on crater warfare. Plumer’s principles of defence agreed with Haldane’s, so Turner was also executing the army commander’s intent.93 On 3 April, Haig criticized this policy and called for units to hold craters, but this was not communicated to Turner.94 Subsequently, the bef doctrine for consolidating craters changed to a fundamentally different policy than that recommended by Haldane.95 The 2nd Division took over a sector where the terrain powerfully shaped the course of the battle. The battlefield lay on a band of impermeable clay, which meant rain remained where it fell if it was not drained off.96 The mines and shelling had destroyed the complex German drainage system, so the heavy rain during the battle created a virtually impassable sea of mud.97 The men had to move through water and mud up to their waists and even armpits.98 The salient was the scene of incessant mine warfare, with thirty-three mines fired and seventeen large craters produced in the immediate vicinity of Craters

1 2 3

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Figure 3.4 Battle of St Eloi Craters, 6–16 April 1916 The 2nd Division took over the British 3rd Division’s meagre defences south of the craters. The Germans launched an attack in the early hours of 6 April, after a devastating bombardment, and retook Craters 2 to 5. The 6th Brigade counterattacked on 6 April and erroneously reported retaking Craters 4 and 5 but actually occupied Craters 6 and 7. This was not discovered until 16 April. The 4th Brigade attacked Craters 2 and 3 at night on 9 and 10 April. It claimed to have recaptured the two craters but only occupied old craters to the north. On 11 April, engineer work parties discovered that the Germans still held the two craters.

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2 to 5, making orientation and movement difficult.99 The Germans on Wytschaete Ridge, 1500 metres south and southeast of St Eloi and 40 metres higher than St Eloi, dominated the battlefield. The Germans had an observation advantage throughout the battle, especially as overcast skies kept the Royal Flying Corps grounded through most of the engagement. The Germans could fire from an arc of 270˚ into the salient. In addition, the salient was compact, measuring approximately 250 metres deep with a width of 600 metres. As a result, the Germans could concentrate observed and, hence, accurate artillery and mortar fire into the contested zone. The critical factor was the six mines exploded on 27 March, their craters, and the resulting disorientation of the British and Canadians in the battle. The mines fundamentally changed the landscape, such that the British 9th Brigade’s officers, who had occupied the sector for months, could not recognize it.100 The lips of the resulting craters were five to six metres high, which blocked observation of the forward positions from the rear lines. The four mine craters in the centre, Craters 2 to 5, were so close together that they created an impenetrable barrier to movement. Maps of the battlefield are misleading, as it appears there are passages between the craters, but the mud and spoil made them impassable.101 The craters themselves were a formidable obstacle, with a width of forty-five to fifty-five metres and a depth of eighteen metres.102 In addition, the mines badly damaged the initial British front-line trenches, which diverted resources from consolidating the new positions to repairing the damage. Even a month later, the defensive line was not continuous in the St Eloi sector.103 The 6th Brigade officially took over the line at 4:15 a.m. on 4 April, with the 27th Battalion on the right covering the majority of the salient and the 31st on the left from Point 77 to the Yser Canal. The units were using the iconic steel helmets for the first time, with fifty issued per company.104 The 2nd Division report characterized the front as little more than a line on the map.105 The ubiquitous mud and water meant movement was slow, arduous, and exhausting. There was little to no cover available, and rain filled depressions with a muddy sludge. The conditions were so bad that carrying parties had to be roped together to prevent them vanishing into shell holes.106

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Both Turner and a staff officer claimed the British did not allow a daylight reconnaissance of the battlefield, so the troops took over their positions in the desolation without proper preparation.107 There was even confusion about the number of craters in the battle area.108 In addition, the division ordered the two front-line battalions to swap positions at the last minute, thus negating any preparations they had made. There was no explanation in the divisional account as to why they switched. The 6th Brigade’s brigade-major toured the front line and reported that the “line was in very bad condition being waist deep in water and very much choked with both enemy dead and our own.”109 Worried about the dire reports from the 6th Brigade, Turner toured the entire front line. He was probably the only senior officer to do so. During his tour, he encountered a private of the 27th Battalion who later remembered Turner “telling us what good cover we had in comparison to the other boys down further in the trench. He did the front line troops, he did the front line.”110 Turner’s biggest concern was the poor state of communications through the centre of the line, as all movement had to pass through the flanks around the craters. Given enough time, he thought the division could develop a “pretty good line,” but it would require a lot of work and the line was an “ideal target” for German artillery fire.111 Turner was all too accurate in this last assessment. During the daylight hours of 4 and 5 April, the Germans methodically destroyed any progress the Canadians had made in constructing defences. The shelling was so severe that one company of the 27th had to be relieved after suffering 50 per cent losses. In reaction, Snider of the 27th thinned out his front line to minimize losses because of the lack of cover. Rather than remain in his battalion headquarters, Snider moved to the front line to share the misery of his troops.112 Ketchen tried touring his line on 5 April, but German shelling pinned him and his party so that he could not proceed.113 Concerned with the situation, he recommended pulling the line back to the craters in expectation of a German counterattack.114 Turner, however, did not believe it was feasible to shift from the existing plan. The Germans continued to pound the 27th and 31st Battalions on 5 April, and this seriously weakened them. In reaction, Turner ordered small

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parties, as recommended by Haldane, to the four central craters to make obvious efforts to dig trenches to force the Germans to expend shells on the craters. The Germans wiped out these parties in their counterattack.115 The Germans started a drumfire bombardment of Canadian lines between 2:45 and 3:00 a.m. on 6 April, causing heavy losses and damage – the start of the third phase. Two battalions, I/214th Reserve Regiment and I/216th Reserve Regiment of the 46th Reserve Division, attacked at 3:30 a.m.116 The defenders were caught in a vulnerable position. A delayed exchange of two companies of the 29th Battalion for two companies of the 27th Battalion was not progressing well, so the defenders were not set. As a result, only isolated detachments defended the central sector of the salient, and they were not in contact with the 31st Battalion on their left. The defenders had to rely on hand grenades, since mud jammed most of their machine guns and rifles – the Lewis guns did not have protection against the mud for their firing mechanism.117 The Canadians called down a protective artillery (sos) barrage, but it was ragged and the Germans were able to work their way through it to overwhelm the defenders. Resistance by the 31st Battalion slowed down the Germans, but did not stop them from taking Craters 2 to 5. German shells quickly severed the already intermittent communication lines with the front-line battalions, so the situation was obscure. Initial information from the 6th Brigade was misleading such that the 2nd Division optimistically reported conditions to the corps at 6:25 a.m. as “not quite clear at present but is considered quite favourable.” This was another example of Turner’s tendency to accept initial reports uncritically. Ketchen, after communicating with both forward battalions, had to admit that the brigade had lost the craters but added that the battalions were launching counterattacks with bombers – this was the contemporary term for hand grenade specialists – to retake them. Turner had to amend his earlier situation report, which would have further affected his credibility with Alderson.118 Ketchen ordered all four of his battalions to counterattack – this was the beginning of the fourth phase. They made weak attacks that were primarily based on bombers in improvised units. The abundance

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of specialists, such as bombers, scouts, and snipers, broke up the battalion structure such that the platoon was little more than an administrative convenience. During the Somme campaign, 40 per cent of each battalion in the 1st Division were specialists.119 The postbattle accounts are replete with commanders assigning men to ad hoc units to conduct counterattacks, instead of fighting in an established platoon structure. The pernicious effects of specialists withdrawn from the company robbed it of much of its firepower and ability to conduct operations on its own. This was not a problem unique to the 2nd Division, but was one that affected the British army of 1916.120 The 27th and 29th Battalions were to retake Craters 2 and 3, while the 28th and 31st Battalions were to recapture Craters 4 and 5. Heavy German artillery fire stopped the attacks on Craters 2 and 3 before the bombers could close with the enemy. On the left, the 31st Battalion, reinforced with bombers from the 28th Battalion, captured what they thought were Craters 4 and 5, but were actually Craters 6 and 7 – Crater 7 was the result of a previous mine explosion. The British 3rd Division had made the same mistake. The brigade and division accepted this faulty positioning, and it became the baseline for orientation for all subsequent units. It also meant that the Germans consolidated their hold on Craters 4 and 5 without artillery interference. The difficulty of moving in daylight, the unfamiliarity with the size of the craters, their misidentification, destruction of front-line trenches, lack of maps, and the battlefield’s desolation made navigation extremely challenging and errors inevitable.121 Once the scope of the problem emerged, Turner released two reserve battalions to Ketchen at 7:55 a.m. to support his counterattacks. Turner then met with Ketchen at 8:50 a.m., once communications with the two forward battalions were restored and the initial results of the counterattacks known.122 Ketchen and Turner decided to launch a more prepared counterattack, supported by artillery, on Craters 2 and 3 for 1:30 p.m. Turner subsequently postponed the attack to the night in reaction to the losses already suffered from German shelling.123 A front-line report from Major Parsons, the division staff officer responsible for intelligence, of “very heavy casualties and men very much shaken by bombardment,” undoubtedly influenced this decision.124 The postponement did not reach all the attackers in time, and

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more men were lost. Turner learned that it was impossible to attack the craters in daylight because of the German observation and artillery advantage. Criticisms of Turner’s defensive arrangements and response are puzzling.125 The front-line forces did call for an sos barrage, which was fired, and the front-line units made prompt counterattacks. An earlier order had stressed the importance of immediate counterstrikes, commenting that “situations will arise when local counterattacks may have to be organized without waiting for superior orders.”126 In the early stages of the German attack, the information received by Turner was positive but inaccurate, as it did not indicate the need for a major intervention. Once the situation was clarified, Turner took appropriate measures. The primary cause of the failure was the weak state of defences in the salient’s central sector. This was a consequence of too few defenders in position armed with little more than bombs to repel the Germans. Snider’s decision to thin out his lines meant fewer casualties but also fewer defenders. The Germans adopted a better policy, fully manning their positions at night and reducing them during the daylight hours, since attacks in the salient took place at night.127 Reports of survivors indicate that the Germans advanced in a mass, and thus a fully manned defensive line would have forced them to deploy to deal with the defenders and would have allowed more time for the artillery to intervene.128 Snider later paid the price for his decision with his dismissal. Turner decided, and Alderson agreed, that the 6th Brigade was exhausted, and as a result, Rennie’s 4th Brigade replaced it at noon on 7 April. A factor in the accelerated relief was Turner’s dissatisfaction with Ketchen’s “methods,” which Turner confided to Watson.129 Turner was under a great deal of pressure, and he uncharacteristically and inappropriately complained to one officer about another. Turner, realizing the futility of the current operations, proposed two alternatives to Alderson to negate the overwhelming German artillery advantage. The first option was to evacuate the craters and pound the Germans with shells. The second was to double the attack frontage to dilute the German artillery concentration.130 Alderson, in turn, proposed that the Second Army widen the attack frontage

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even more. Plumer favoured Turner’s second option and asked Haig for resources to expand the attack.131 The “bellicose spirit” shown by the Second Army pleased Haig, but he refused to divert additional resources.132 Plumer then visited 2nd Division’s headquarters on 8 April and rejected Tuner’s alternatives, in part believing the Canadians held Craters 4 and 5. While there, he dictated how the battalions in the 4th Brigade were to hold the trenches.133 Plumer’s intervention into details four levels below his own indicates the pressure he was under to succeed, his lack of confidence in the command echelons of the 2nd Division, and his unwarranted interference into Canadian command prerogatives. With the rejection of the alternatives, Turner instructed Rennie to retake Craters 2 and 3. On successive nights, the 4th Brigade launched attacks with small parties that reported reaching the northern lips of Craters 2 and 3. These attacks consisted of fifty or fewer men for each crater, indicating the restricting scope of the terrain and the limited scale of the attacks.134 In the fourth phase, engineering work parties discovered on the night of 10/11 April that the 4th Brigade’s counterattacks had captured two of the ubiquitous pre-existing craters, but not Craters 2 and 3.135 Originally, Watson’s 5th Brigade was to replace the 4th Brigade that evening, but Turner ordered Rennie to capture the two craters. Rennie and his battalion commanders protested that the men were in “no fit state” to attack successfully. Demonstrating moral courage, especially given the pressure he was under, Turner agreed and persuaded Alderson and Plumer to cancel the attack. The relief proceeded as planned.136 Alderson now had to explain the situation to Plumer, and he blamed the 2nd Division for the inaccurate information. Alderson chose to ignore the British 3rd Division’s responsibility for the poor handover of information. Plumer was angry and made his dissatisfaction apparent to Alderson.137 No longer trusting the 2nd Division’s reports, Alderson tasked Lieutenant S.A. Vernon, a Canadian Corps intelligence and British Regular officer, to tour the front. Vernon, making the same orientation mistakes as everyone else had, confirmed the loss of Craters 2 and 3, but reported Craters 4 and 5 held.138 Alderson would later claim that the guides misled Vernon, but as an intelligence officer, Vernon should not have had to rely exclusively on guides to discern the location of forces.

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Otherwise, he would always make the same errors as the guides and would add little of value. Alderson, undoubtedly frustrated with his least-favourite divisional commander, sent his senior staff officer, bggs, Brigadier-General “Tim” Harington, to rectify the situation. Harington met with Turner, his staff, and the brigade commanders. At the conference, Turner again proposed two options: to counterattack with the support of trench mortars or to withdraw and shell the German positions. On-site reports of the abysmal field conditions – such as one from Lieutenant-Colonel E. Hilliam of the 25th Battalion – would make a successful attack “an impossibility.”139 There was also a fear of a German attack to retake the purportedly held Craters 4 and 5. Throughout the battle, the Germans launched small-scale attacks that the 2nd Division invariably repulsed, inflicting heavy losses, so the fear of further German attacks was legitimate. In the final phase, Plumer, visiting the division again, the next day, rejected both alternatives, in part because of shell shortages and the British penchant for holding on to meaningless strips of territory; instead he ordered the consolidation of the existing positions. 140 Alderson visited the divisional headquarters in the afternoon of 12 April to emphasize his vexation. In an order that captured his lack of confidence in Turner and his commanders, Alderson demanded that “all work must be supervised and constantly visited by the Staff Officers of the Division and Brigade, and that reports were to be rendered daily as to the progress made.”141 Alderson’s continued distrust of Turner and his staff was evident with another visit he paid to the trenches on 14 April, without first stopping at the divisional headquarters as was proper protocol.142 During the battle, Turner had Ker issue an order to address the problems encountered during battle. Turner wanted subordinates to be “prepared to act on their own initiative. The one unforgivable sin when in difficulties is to do nothing and wait for orders.”143 Units were not to withdraw from positions without reference to superior authorities; this order was in reaction to the 27th Battalion’s actions before and during the battle. In addition, the order made multiple references to the need to pass information, including negative data, back early and often. Clearly, he wanted to address the problem of poor

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communications to the rear. Interestingly, Turner’s demand for more initiative was at odds with Haig’s requirement that superiors impose tighter control over subordinates because of the untrained nature of the army and officer corps.144 The Royal Flying Corps was finally able to take photographs of the battle area on 16 April, showing the Germans holding Craters 2 to 5 and having done so from 6 April. The discovery that the 2nd Division had not known its own positions for ten days kicked off a bitter battle over responsibility. Both Alderson and Harington wrote notes to Turner on 16 April to commiserate with him and to set his mind at rest. Both notes mentioned that Plumer and his chief staff officer had accepted the news in the “right spirit.”145 Events quickly overtook Alderson and Harington’s letters, however, as Haig ordered Plumer to investigate the reasons for the failure. Haig wrote in his diary, “I fear that Canadian officers are not only indifferent leaders, but many of them have strange ideas of what is honest and straightforward. Turner is not quite fit for his work.”146 Haig was in part reacting to the discovery that a senior Canadian staff officer in the 3rd Division was secretly relaying the division’s positions to his wife.

assessing turner’ s perf ormanc e Owing to the loss of ground and the casualties, Desmond Morton called the Battle of St Eloi Craters the “first and the worst Canadian setback of the war.”147 How valid was that characterization? The division suffered 1,372 casualties versus only 483 for the Germans.148 Over the thirteen days of the battle, from 4 to 16 April, the 2nd Division’s loss rate averaged 106 men per day. By the standards of the First World War, this was low. In April 1916, the 2nd Division suffered 1,953 casualties, and in June, during the Mount Sorrel battle, it suffered almost the same total, 1,949 men.149 As a percentage of forces engaged, the loss rate suffered by the 2nd Division was 8 per cent, markedly lower than even the most successful engagements at Amiens in 1918 at 13 per cent and Vimy in 1917 at 16 per cent.150 If compared to the first major engagements of the 1st and 3rd Canadian Divisions and the Australian 5th Division, the 2nd Divi-

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Figure 3.5 Aerial photograph of St Eloi Craters battle area on 16 April 1916. Note the German trench line at the top of the craters. Source: ww1air0015 8, McMaster University Library, Canada.

sion’s first action, while a failure, was not worse than the others. At Second Ypres, despite the performance of the regimental officers and men, the 1st Division was driven from its positions and suffered 37 per cent casualties, 6,036 men, or roughly 1,200 men per day over the five days the Canadians fought.151 At Mount Sorrel, the 3rd Division was surprised and forced from its positions. In the immediate and unsuccessful counterattack after the Germans captured the frontline positions, the Canadians suffered 1,700 casualties, more than during the entire St Eloi battle.152 The Australian 5th Division, whose commander, Major-General James McCay, followed a similar career trajectory to Turner’s, suffered a severe defeat in its first engagement

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at Fromelles in July 1916.153 It lost 5,500 men in a two-day battle and required nine months to recuperate. Unlike Turner, McCay lost the confidence of his division.154 By these measures, the 2nd Division’s first action was not the unparalleled disaster usually portrayed. In their works on St Eloi, both Tim Cook and Thomas Leppard, among other historians, sharply criticized Turner for failing to determine accurately the position of the 2nd Division, although Cook’s treatment in At the Sharp End is less condemnatory and attaches more importance to the weather and battlefield conditions.155 This has become the dominant complaint regarding Turner’s performance in the battle. These scholars base their critique on contraindications of the division’s claims that should have triggered doubts and further investigation. A close examination of the information available to Turner, however, suggests that the critics are taking advantage of hindsight. As David Campbell phrased it, “A scan of references in the Divisional war diary and daily intelligence summaries turns up over twenty reports between April 7 and 15 that claim Canadian possession of Craters 4 and 5, with no clear reports to the contrary.”156 With the vast preponderance of information supporting the claims that the craters were held, Turner had no valid reason to doubt their veracity. Vernon’s report on the night of 11/12 April would have further reinforced confidence that the division held Craters 4 and 5. The evidence from the engineering parties on 10/11 April, however, was sufficient for Turner to recognize that the division did not hold Craters 2 and 3, which indicates that he did not ignore contrary evidence. Critics refer to three types of information that should have initiated an investigation: Captain D.E. Macintyre’s reports from the field, prisoner statements, and air photographs taken on 8 April. Macintyre, the 6th Brigade’s intelligence officer, stationed in a church steeple overlooking the battlefield, reported Germans capturing and holding Craters 2 to 5 on 6 April. In a post-war statement, Macintyre claimed he informed the division that the Germans still held all four craters after the 6th Brigade supposedly recaptured Craters 4 and 5.157 Macintyre’s 9 April 1916 report, however, does not support this claim, suggesting instead that the 6th Brigade had retaken Craters 4 and 5.158 Statements of prisoners taken on 6 April clearly indicate that the Ger-

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mans held all four craters. The Canadian Corps intelligence summary for 7 April, however, assumed they were referring to the period before the 6th Brigade retook the craters.159 The most powerful complaint used to assail Turner was that the 2nd Division had failed to interpret aerial photographs taken on 8 April properly.160 The photographs show that Craters 2 to 5 were dry, with trenches on the north lip of Craters 2 and 3, while water filled most of the other craters. This was the basis for critics to claim that Turner should have realized that the division did not hold the craters it thought it did. There are three problems with this argument. First, the art of photo interpretation was still evolving, and the division did not have a manual on how to analyse photos – ghq did not issue a complete manual until later in 1916.161 Macintyre himself reported that the division was not skilled with photograph interpretation.162 Secondly, the corps had passed the photographs to the 2nd Division, and it was likely they would have analysed them first. As the corps did not raise any concerns, this probably influenced the division’s view and suggests the corps shared in the culpability.163 Finally and most importantly, the 8 April photographs were not in themselves sufficient evidence to overturn the prevailing view. An officer needed to scout the craters held to see whether they were dry as shown in the photographs. The trenches shown on the north lip of Craters 2 and 3 corresponded to the positions reportedly captured by the 4th Brigade. Even Lieutenant Vernon, who would have undoubtedly seen the photographs, did not recognize the discrepancy. The 16 April photographs were fundamentally different, for they clearly showed that the trenches at the crater edges were German because they led back to German lines. This was not the case for the 8 April photographs. The problems with intelligence at St Eloi are best understood in the context of the concepts of signal to noise ratio, confirmation bias, and irrational primacy effect. Roberta Wohlstetter first introduced the notion of the signal to noise ratio in her book on Pearl Harbor, describing how a signal may hide within the background noise of a system and only be explicable with the wisdom of hindsight.164 At St Eloi, the flow of contradictory, incomplete, and inaccurate information made the true situation far less evident than it was to critics after

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the event. Confirmation bias – the human tendency to interpret ambiguous data to support a previously held belief and to dismiss or discount contradictory information – exacerbated the problem. Further, the irrational primacy effect places greater credence on information received initially. All this reinforced the comfortable illusion that the division was holding more ground than it actually was. It required unambiguous information, such as the reports from the engineering parties or the 16 April photographs, to overcome these biases. Where Turner, his staff, and the Canadian Corps deserve censure was in not making extraordinary efforts to confirm reports from the field in light of the conditions and the earlier difficulties experienced by the British 3rd Division; in this, they demonstrated their lack of training and experience. The staff needed to treat all reports with a degree of skepticism, especially positive ones. The division and corps staff did not realize how perverse and pervasive was the fog of war at St Eloi. The ground conditions, intelligence failures, and consolidation and communication difficulties all played significant roles in the defeat at St Eloi. The principal reason the 2nd Division failed at St Eloi, though, was the Germans. As the Confederate general George Pickett quipped when asked why his eponymous charge at Gettysburg failed, “I’ve always thought the Yankees had something to do with it.”165 The German artillery dominated the battleground. It is instructive to compare St Eloi with the Canadian bombardment in preparation for the successful 13 June 1916 Mount Sorrel counterattack. At Mount Sorrel, the Canadians massed 218 artillery pieces to shatter 10,000 metres of trenches or roughly 45 metres per piece, and post-battle analysis claimed too many shells were fired.166 At St Eloi, the British 3rd Division reported engaging forty German batteries or 160 guns on the first day of the battle, and Haig indicated that the Canadians identified forty-four batteries on 6 April or 176 guns. This was probably a conservative estimate of the pieces available, as it does not include the very effective German Minenwerfers.167 Multiplying the width of the salient of 600 metres by four to account for the German fire on reserve trenches gives the Germans a concentration

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of 15 metres/piece or three times the firepower at Mount Sorrel.168 This, though, did not account for the German observation advantage, for, as Graham and Bidwell phrased it, “effective fire was observed fire.” In addition, there was apparently no shell shortage limiting the German fire. Snider of the 27th Battalion claimed that the Germans pounded an area of 60 metres by 15 metres with 900 highexplosive and 2,000 other shells during the attack on 6 April.169 A British artillery officer claimed he had not seen such heavy artillery fire in a year in the Ypres salient.170 In contrast to the forty-four batteries supporting the Germans, the 2nd Division had twenty-three and half batteries on call, with restrictive daily shell allowances.171 Army commanders needed permission from ghq to fire more than their per diem allotment. Given Plumer’s situation, he would not risk raising Haig’s ire by requesting more shells, and Haig rejected his one request for more resources to widen the attack.172 During the battle, Plumer instructed the corps to curtail shell consumption and only to use one of the most effective pieces, the 6⬙ Howitzer, in special circumstances.173 In contrast, at Mount Sorrel, the Canadians fired ten thousand 6⬙ Howitzer rounds during the five-day counterattack preparation, and the daily average of rounds per gun fired was 170 rounds of 18-pounder shell, 90 rounds of 9.2⬙, and 110 rounds of 4.5⬙.174 Aitken reported to Borden that the Canadian artillery daily allotment at St Eloi was three and half rounds per gun, while the Germans had an unlimited supply.175 The result was that the German artillery advantage was insurmountable. The German artillery destroyed the defences faster than the Canadians could build them. The 2nd Division assigned large work parties of up to 1,000 men to consolidate the defences, but three factors stymied their efforts. First, the universal confusion of location and the impediments of mud and water slowed down the work parties; they had to expend most of their energy and time in just getting to their work location. For instance, an officer claimed that a movement of just 800 metres exhausted his party.176 This problem of transit time was exacerbated by the distance the reserve units were stationed from the front. The corps rebuffed attempts by the division to obtain more

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busses to transport the work parties.177 Finally, Canadian officers and ncos could not get the same amount of work out of their troops as did the Germans. Alderson’s replacement as goc Canadian Corps claimed that Canadians “will fight, and die, if necessary, in the last ditch, but by God, gentlemen, I cannot get them to dig that ditch.”178 Watson, too, complained that the Germans got more work out of their troops.179 The Canadian Corps lamented in July 1916 that the Germans had done more work in their ten-day occupation of Mount Sorrel, despite Canadian artillery fire, than had the Canadians in two months of holding the position.180 The German artillery’s constant interruption of communications contributed to the difficulty in managing the battle. The 6th Brigade signal officer reported, on taking over the line, that only a single line existed to the 27th Battalion. During the German counterattack, these lines were knocked out.181 Effectively, there were no links forward of the battalion headquarters. To provide some semblance of communications, commanders used runners, with many falling victim to German fire. Ketchen reported eighteen runners killed during the German counterattack.182 Battalion scouts provided most of the runners, which prevented them from reconnoitring enemy positions and thus further contributed to the intelligence failure.183 Plumer’s plan was ill-conceived, and this was compounded by mismanagement. The fundamental flaw of the plan was that unless Plumer could commit far more artillery resources than were available to him, the Germans could bombard the attackers out of any position at St Eloi. Previous engagements at St Eloi had already proven the futility of attacking there.184 The German observation, artillery, and shell advantages meant overwhelming firepower superiority. No manner of brilliant leadership on Haldane’s or Turner’s part could overcome such a profound disadvantage. Plumer’s selection of the battered British 3rd Division was only justifiable on the assumption that the Germans would accept the loss of the St Eloi salient and not make strenuous efforts to recover the ground. Launching a division reduced to one effective brigade into a narrow salient, down a slope, exposed to observation and dominating fire from three sides, and in extremely muddy conditions was

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an imprudent decision. In addition, the placement of the mines was an error. All of this suggests that the Second Army leadership had not learned much from their experiences in 1915 and continued to make the same mistakes. Turner was happy to report to his wife after the Somme that the 2nd Division was not returning to the Second Army.185 It is facile for one to suggest that a better general would have found a way to win without presenting a plausible alternative course of action. Turner took all the steps that could reasonably be expected in the situation. He presented, on three separate occasions – before the battle, on 8 April, and on12 April – alternatives that Plumer rejected. Turner was denied necessary additional artillery and shell support. It is instructive to compare St Eloi with the situation at Mount Sorrel only six weeks later, when an unlimited supply of artillery and shells for the battle played a material role in the Canadian success.186 An intriguing question is how committed was Turner to recapturing the strategically unimportant and untenable craters, once lost. From the start of the battle, Turner had serious reservations regarding the plan. The limited scope of the counterattacks and their frequent postponements and cancellations also point to his disinclination to commit fully to the futile recapture of the craters. This, and the relatively low loss rate of the division, suggests that Turner was going through the motions to satisfy Alderson and Plumer while avoiding significant casualties. He might have been carrying out a senior officer version of the system described by Tony Ashworth in Live and Let Live, also termed “consent and evade” by Professor Gary Sheffield.187 This was the type of action that would leave no evidence, and Turner could not admit to it during or after the war, but it is strongly suggestive that Turner was pulling his punches. Two contemporary witnesses support the idea that Turner was not fully dedicated to the craters’ recapture. Lieutenant W. Bradley, a perceptive observer from Aitken’s Canadian War Records Office who interviewed all the participants immediately after the battle, posed the question: “[D]id the Brigade and Divisional Commanders really grip the situation firmly, or were they halfhearted and unwilling to make great sacrifices to hold a line they thought, as Brig-Gen Ketchen did, untenable. I do not profess to answer these questions but I have

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doubts.”188 Alderson in his later adverse report on Turner indicated that Turner did not have “‘the thing had got to be done’ spirit,” which strongly suggests that Alderson considered Turner’s efforts to retake the craters a sham.189

hunt for sc apegoats What was extraordinary about the Battle of St Eloi Craters was that, while a failure, it had no strategic or operational ramifications, but resulted in a remarkable number of officers losing or threatened with losing their positions. In the hunt for scapegoats, two corps commanders, one major-general general staff (mggs), one gso 1, one brigade-major, and five battalion commanders lost their commands. Two division gocs and one brigade goc were at risk. These totals include the battalion commander and brigade-major whom Haldane had removed during the battle.190 Haig was still a relatively recent appointee; he had replaced Sir John French in December 1915 and needed to demonstrate that he was running a tight ship. In addition, he was concerned with the state of the army, as evidenced by his order to strengthen control, and he undoubtedly wanted to send a message that he would not tolerate failure. Haig proved to be ruthless in sacking commanders, reportedly removing a hundred brigadiers during the war.191 Plumer was under even greater pressure, since he had to show Haig that if he could not win a battle, he could demonstrate a strong grip in the aftermath. As a result, there was a strong impetus to find scapegoats.192 Even before the investigation into the failure, the battle claimed its first commander with Ketchen’s relief of Snider. Snider’s error in thinning out the front-line positions, his order to withdraw a post without permission during the battle, and a breakdown in his health led to his relief on 14 April, along with his second-in-command and all the company commanders.193 This indicates considerable dissatisfaction with the battalion and its senior officers. While Snider’s removal was unpopular with his troops, it was nevertheless necessary.194 Major P.J. Daly of the 31st Battalion, who had performed well during the battle, was tasked with rebuilding the battalion.195

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On 18 April, responding to the investigation ordered by Haig, Alderson attributed the failure to the dreadful conditions and explained all the steps he had taken to ensure accurate reporting. He also censured Turner’s method of consolidation, but demonstrating his passivity, he had not intervened during the battle to order a different approach. Alderson deeply regretted the failures and concluded, “I am of the opinion that it should not have taken 10 days for the division concerned to have ascertained the exact situation of its troops.”196 Clearly, Alderson was attempting to avoid blame for the failure. Turner had earlier voiced his dissatisfaction with Ketchen to Alderson and Watson. Alderson met Turner on the morning of 18 April and demanded that he put these doubts into writing, which Alderson claimed he should have done earlier. Turner requested time to consider the matter. In the afternoon, when confronted again by Alderson, Turner admitted that he could not get as much out of the 6th Brigade as other units, but thought that this did not justify Ketchen’s dismissal.197 This took considerable courage on Turner’s part, as he would know that his refusal to make an adverse report on Ketchen would likely lead to his own dismissal. Alderson responded with a letter that day to the Second Army requesting Ketchen’s relief. He claimed he had nothing against Ketchen, but he thought the brigade should have done more and that it had generated the initial mistaken locations.198 Turner, when shown Alderson’s letter, wanted Alderson to rephrase a statement attributed to him. When Alderson refused, Turner responded, “I wish to protest most strongly against misrepresentations of my views in the matter.”199 Alderson also wrote an adverse report on Turner that same day.200 Most historians suggest this was in response to Turner’s reaction to the Ketchen report. From its reference number (G.271), it appears that Alderson sent or at least wrote this letter before Ketchen’s (G.284), indicating he was already planning to remove Turner (reference numbers were typically used in sequential order and not in blocks of numbers). The language Alderson used in Turner’s letter was indirect and the charges vague. He made no specific complaints about Turner’s conduct of the St Eloi battle, claiming, in fact, that it was insufficient grounds for Turner’s dismissal. Alderson based his request on his earlier adverse report on Turner in 1915, which had expressed his reluctance

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to place the 2nd Division in a difficult situation, unlike the confidence he had with the 1st or 3rd Divisions. Plumer agreed and requested Haig dismiss Turner.201 The next day, on learning that Plumer was to meet with him in the morning and knowing it meant his removal, Turner requested permission from the corps to visit Haig before he rendered a decision.202 Alderson refused permission, but moves taken by Aitken derailed Turner’s relief. News of Haig’s investigation into the failure quickly reached Aitken. On 17 April, Aitken’s representative at ghq informed him that blame may fall on “[b]rigadiers or higher.”203 Aitken’s contact at ghq kept him fully informed of developments, and he reported to Hughes that Turner was at risk. He asked for directions from Hughes and Borden so that he could make the appropriate representations to the British authorities.204 Knowing of Hughes’s loathing of Alderson and appreciation of Turner, Aitken, who moved freely in the highest circles of British society, contacted members of the British Army Council to plead Turner’s case on 20 April. Aitken counselled Borden as early as December 1915 that trouble was brewing between Alderson and Turner.205 Hughes and Alderson’s repeated clashes over Alderson’s conduct of Second Ypres, the appointments of British officers to staff positions, and the battle over the Ross rifle convinced Aitken that, as he admitted to a subordinate, “I fear Alderson must lose his command.”206 Aitken suggested to the Army Council members that Turner’s removal was exacerbating tensions between the Canadians and the British, and the Canadian government did not favour the dismissal. He might also have argued that Alderson was prejudiced against Turner. The Army Council passed these concerns to Haig, who, being far more responsive to Dominion sensibilities than is generally credited, decided to retain Turner and reserve his decision on Ketchen. In a diary entry of 21 April, Haig wrote that the two officers were “not very efficient,” and he called them incompetent. His reasoning, nonetheless, was that there was no Canadian officer with sufficient experience and knowledge to replace Turner, and he did not want to upset the Canadians.207 One interesting aspect of this analysis is Haig’s im-

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plicit assumption that only a Canadian officer should command a Canadian division. Both Ketchen and Turner continued to work their contacts to save their careers. Ketchen protested Alderson’s adverse report and refuted its claims to Turner. Alderson’s disparagement of his men particularly incensed Ketchen.208 Ketchen contacted his political protector, Robert Rogers, on 24 April to ask for the just-established 4th Division or the command of the Canadian Training Division at Shorncliffe, England.209 In England, the authorities were making moves in the event of Turner’s relief, including trying to persuade the current commander of the Canadian Training Division at Shorncliffe to move to France. If Haig relieved Turner, Hughes wanted Turner to command in England.210 That same day, Turner wrote Aitken explaining that St Eloi was the result of the “ill advised operation of exploding the mines on a narrow front; pulling out the Vth Corps before the line had been consolidated, and establishing such an acute salient, on which the enemy could concentrate all his artillery fire.”211 He had also passed Alderson’s and Harington’s commiseration letters to Aitken, which angered both, as they regarded the letters as private, likely because they exposed Alderson’s hypocrisy in calling for Turner’s removal.212 Turner pointed out that Alderson had made no direct charges and had not shown him his earlier adverse report as required. He was enraged by Alderson’s attack on his men, which he called a “base charge.” Turner also instigated one and possibly a second action to save his career. In a letter shortly after the armistice, William Hughes, Sam Hughes’s brother and commander of the 21st Battalion at St Eloi, referred to a political mission he had carried out for Turner during the engagement. He claimed that he had “fixed the matter very effectively.” Hughes had been on leave from 3 to 12 April, so he could have carried out the assignment.213 It is possible that Turner had sent Hughes to Aitken to arm him with information on the battle that was needed to defend Turner’s position. The second possibility was that Colonel E.W.B. Morrison, the 2nd Division cra and commander of the artillery at Leliefontein, had sent a trusted staff officer to

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Carson to discuss “current events” that Morrison did not want to put into writing.214 Aitken travelled to Haig’s headquarters on 23 April to save Turner – he was unaware of Haig’s earlier decision.215 Aitken informed Haig that Borden would consider it a personal favour if he were to keep Turner, but Borden would accept Haig’s decision. Haig agreed to retain Turner, but it was apparent that Alderson and Turner could not both remain in the Canadian Corps. Haig demanded that the Canadian authorities find a way of disposing of Alderson that was not demeaning. Haig would not sack Alderson unilaterally, but neither was he willing to employ Alderson elsewhere in France. Haig’s actions demonstrated his lack of confidence in Alderson dating from the clashes at Festubert. If Haig had respected Alderson’s abilities, he would have found him a command. One of Haig’s concerns throughout the war was the supply of competent divisional and corps commanders, and thus bypassing Alderson was clear evidence of Haig’s low opinion of him.216 Aitken’s solution was to appoint Alderson the inspector-general of Canadian forces in England.217 This had the merit of appearing to be a meaningful position and a lateral move. It would also seemingly address problems in the administration and organization of Canadian forces in England.218 Haig recommended that Alderson accept the offer, and Alderson interpreted that as an order.219 LieutenantGeneral Sir Julian Byng, who would have a positive effect on the corps and Turner’s relationship with it, replaced Alderson on 28 May.220 Byng and his impact will be introduced in more detail in chapter 4. Alderson treated his role as inspector-general seriously and diligently identified myriad problems with the Canadian training organization in England – problems Turner had to deal with when he took over command in England. Alderson did not realize that the position was a sinecure and that the Canadian authorities in England who all owed their positions to Sam Hughes were hostile to Alderson’s findings. For instance, Carson wrote in reference to Alderson, “I would like the interference stopped,” and “don’t you think he [Alderson] should be shown where he is?”221 As a result, Alderson transferred back to the British Army in September 1916 and continued to serve in England as an inspector-general.222

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Turner learned from Aitken on 27 April that he was safe.223 He was, however, not fully convinced of this and was still expressing concern in early May that “action is being delayed too long as regard Alderson.”224 Turner unfairly blamed Alderson for a lack of support during the battle.225 Alderson had tried to arrange for extra resources and had presented Turner’s alternatives to the high command, but Alderson’s lack of credibility meant his requests were denied. Turner’s anger was misplaced, and he continued to carry a grudge against Alderson for the rest of his life.226 Regarding Alderson, Turner claimed, “I am not easily made angry, but I am slow to forget.”227 He refused to shake Alderson’s hand in the presence of Perley during a later attempted reconciliation.228 Alderson, on the other hand, remained a gentleman and wrote a note congratulating Turner on receiving his knighthood in 1917.229 Turner did not acknowledge it. Alderson provided useful service in preparing the 1st Division for its initial battle but was miscast in his dual responsibilities as a combat commander and head of a national contingent. Whether because of age or incapacity, Alderson was not a success as a divisional or corps commander as demonstrated by the lack of trust placed in him by his superiors. Unlike his replacement, he lacked the political sense or sagacity to deal with the mercurial Sam Hughes. Alderson faced the challenges of satisfying two different masters – ghq and Sam Hughes – and he failed at both. He was also at times unfair and underhanded in his treatment of Turner, such as by not showing him the first adverse report. If Turner could not be touched, Ker, his gso 1, could, and Lieutenant-Colonel Norman “Ox” Webber replaced Ker on 24 May. Ker ended up as the gso 1of the 63rd Royal Naval Division and later the head of the British Mission with the Portuguese forces.230 Ker said of Turner, “I am more sorry than I can say, to leave the Canadians, and particularly General Turner.”231 Turner, in his typical way of looking out for his subordinates, later asked Carson to help Ker out by having Canada pay to move Ker’s effects to England from Canada. Webber was a thirty-five-year-old British Camberley-trained staff officer who greatly improved the 2nd Division and must share the credit for its increased effectiveness at the Somme. Unlike Ker, who at times micromanaged the brigades, Webber was efficient, organized,

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and struck the right balance between control and initiative.232 He did so well that he became the Canadian Corps bggs in April 1918.233 Turner later claimed that he had replaced the battalion commanders of the 18th, 19th, 26th, and 27th Battalions because of St Eloi.234 This is somewhat disingenuous, as Alderson was responsible for writing the adverse report on Lieutenant-Colonel J. McAvity of the 26th Battalion on 6 May that resulted in McAvity’s return to Canada.235 Lieutenant-Colonel E. Wigle of the 18th Battalion returned to Canada after his wife was diagnosed with cancer, leaving him to care for a young family.236 Hughes recalled Lieutenant-Colonel J. McLaren of the 19th Battalion to Canada for instructional duties, but this was probably a cover for his relief.237 It is likely that Lieutenant-Colonel H.S. Tobin, of the 29th Battalion, was relieved at the same time as McLaren, since Tobin transferred to England and held no important position there.238 The search for scapegoats was not restricted to just Canadians. Already dissatisfied with Fanshawe and Haldane, Haig pressured Fanshawe to dismiss Haldane. Fanshawe refused, and Haig removed him instead.239 Haig explained that as he could not remove Turner, someone else needed to pay the price.240 This speaks to Tim Travers’s notion of the “almost ritualistic quality” of dismissals.241 Haig decided to retain Plumer, but not satisfied with the operations of the Second Army, he removed Plumer’s chief staff officer, MajorGeneral H.B. Williams. A Second Army staff officer had criticized Williams as easily rattled, concerned with trifles, and “bad at his job.”242 Williams’s replacement was Harington, the Canadian Corps’s bggs who “was probably the biggest single factor in creating its [the Second Army’s] particular ethos and widespread reputation for operational efficiency.”243 A combination of Sam Hughes’s faith in Turner, Hughes’s loathing of Alderson, the lack of an obvious replacement, and Turner’s own marshalling of Canadian political support saved Turner’s career. Perley, the acting high commissioner, also intervened, cabling Borden that Turner should be retained, as he was “evidently not specially to blame.”244 Turner demonstrated that he was a shrewd military politician in his campaign to retain his division, and like Haig, he was accomplished at enlisting the mighty to assist him. His actions were

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consistent with the contemporary ethos in the Canadian Militia of leveraging political contacts. Should Turner have been removed? If Turner and Ketchen had been in a British division, Haig would have undoubtedly sacked them both. Their removal, however, would be as scapegoats and not because of their failures. As Alderson put it, the St Eloi operations were not a sufficient reason to remove Turner.245 Turner was responsible for but not culpable of the failure at St Eloi. As the divisional commander, he bore responsibility for the battle, but he took all the reasonable steps available to salvage an unwinnable engagement. The errors in the reported position of the division were unfortunate but explicable given the conditions. It is difficult to argue plausibly that any other divisional commander, given the conditions and the relatively raw state of the 2nd Division, would have done better. The failure lies with Plumer and his staff in launching such an ill-considered action.

ross rifle imbroglio There was one last clash between Alderson and Turner – this one over Turner’s support for the Ross rifle. The fundamental problem of the Ross rifle was that it tended to jam, especially in bad conditions or if fired rapidly. The British standard rifle, the Short Magazine LeeEnfield (smle), was more resistant to jamming in poor conditions or with low-tolerance ammunition than was the Ross.246 Sam Hughes headed the committee that selected the Ross, and he continued to play a central role in its evolution. The goc Canadians at the time, Earl Dundonald, called the selection process a “put-up job.”247 As a result, Hughes believed in the Ross’s superiority, and its success at the Bisley rifle matches further reinforced this belief.248 Turner was a staunch defender of the Ross, unlike the other divisional commanders. He worked hard to convince the division of its efficacy through trials, training by the divisional armourer officer, and the banning of the smle, but his efforts were insufficient to change the prevailing view.249 Turner’s support was a consequence of his reaction to Alderson’s disdain for the weapon, his belief that British officers had a bias against Canadian products, his desire to loyally

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support the government’s policy, and the need to sustain the minister who supported him.250 This last factor became especially important after St Eloi. Sir John French ordered the 1st Division to convert to the smle in June 1915 because of the problems at Second Ypres. The 2nd Division crossed to France with the Ross because the British could not provide sufficient smles without delaying the division’s crossing.251 Alderson wanted the Ross replaced, and he engaged Hughes in a bitter battle over it.252 In the aftermath of St Eloi, Alderson astutely arranged to get the unfettered opinion of commanding officers in the Canadian Corps for indisputable evidence of the dissatisfaction with the Ross.253 The 2nd Division’s response gave at best an equivocal reaction to the questions, with the company commanders more opposed than the senior officers.254 There is, however, strong evidence that Turner, after viewing the initial opinions, pressured his commanders to make the results more favourable.255 Post-war, Turner claimed he was sending a safety deposit box to Duguid with evidence that disproved he had applied pressure. The contents of the box cannot be found.256 With Alderson’s removal, the file passed to Haig, who ordered that the smle replace the Ross, given the troops’ lack of confidence in it.257 Turner was in a difficult situation, caught between the need for Hughes’s unqualified support to retain his position and the evident loss of faith in the Ross rifle. It was, however, at this point that Turner’s actions are no longer defensible in the guise of a defence of the government’s policy. Regardless of the relative merits or demerits of the Ross, the fact that the majority of the men had lost confidence in it meant it had to be replaced. Turner’s continued attempts to skew the results reveal a serious lapse of judgment and a failure of character. This was not the only time that political considerations determined Turner’s support. He had also wanted to know Hughes’s stance before providing his opinion on whether to retain the Colt machine gun, another weapon championed by Hughes – this, after he had repeatedly complained over the previous six months about the shortage of spare parts for the Colt.258 Turner’s career was saved but blighted. Under a far more effective and sympathetic Canadian Corps commander, in Byng, and with

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a superior gso 1, in Ox Webber, Turner would significantly improve the effectiveness of the 2nd Division. This increased efficiency would culminate in Turner’s greatest victory as a commander, the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, on the Somme.

4 “Won by my infantry”: Turner’s Somme Campaign Too much credit must not be placed on to the tanks yet. Courcelette was won by my infantry. R.E.W. Turner, 22 September 19161

Turner and the 2nd Division won the principal Canadian victory in the Somme campaign at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette on 15 September 1916. Showing marked prowess, efficiency, and fieldcraft, the division repelled a German attack, captured all its objectives, and then successfully launched a follow-on assault that same day, capturing the village of Courcelette. All this was accomplished in a campaign in which orders for successful assaults normally required a minimum of twelve to twenty-four hours to pass from the corps headquarters to the front-line forces.2 Courcelette, a “forgotten victory,” demonstrated Turner’s maturation as a combat commander, his ability to prepare his division for the Somme, and his improved battle management.3 Turner’s development of the division is the reason the Germans rated the 2nd Division, along with the 1st Division, prior to the Somme, as one of the top eight divisions in the British Army, while the 3rd ranked in the middle tier.4 So many years after the battle, it is difficult to distinguish between the responsibility between Turner and his staff for success. Staff, in this period, were an extension of the commander and were to remain in the background. Therefore, in most instances in this volume, a reference to Turner should be assumed to encompass his staff, as well.

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comma nd changes In the aftermath of St Eloi, Turner was in a difficult position, as he had little recourse if confronted with a duty to make the right decisions yet also fulfill his obligations to Sam Hughes. There were instances where Turner too readily facilitated Hughes’s interference with the Canadian Corps. The peculiar case of the thwarted promotion of William Hughes, Sam Hughes’s brother and commander of the 21st Battalion, highlights this problem.5 On 19 or 20 April, Turner discovered that Lieutenant-Colonel Hughes had withdrawn the 21st Battalion from Crater 1 and the nearby trenches, believing them indefensible. Turner immediately ordered Hughes to reoccupy the positions, and he wrote an adverse report on Hughes. Turner did not need any further failures to tarnish his reputation, especially after a senior British officer had complained to the corps about the 2nd Division’s discipline and appearance in the camps post-St Eloi and Harington had sent a scathing letter to the 2nd Division about the 6th Brigade’s poor performance in counterattacks on 19 and 20 April.6 Subsequently, Haig rejected Hughes’s June nomination to command the 10th Brigade because of Turner’s adverse report.7 Turner’s volteface incensed Carson, as earlier Turner had confirmed that Hughes was the best battalion commander in the 4th Brigade.8 Carson complained that Turner had “certainly burned his boats behind him with that statement.”9 Carson asked Turner in a veiled threat why he had changed his mind.10 Turner reversed his opinion again, claiming that while Hughes’s action displeased him, his subsequent performance was significantly better and he now deserved the appointment.11 Hughes received the 10th Brigade in July 1916, but Watson, then the 4th Division commander, sacked him shortly after Sam Hughes resigned as the minister of Militia in November 1916.12 William Hughes was bitter about the removal but could not secure another position, and he had to return to Canada.13 The explanation Turner gave for his reversal was somewhat plausible, but more likely Carson’s pressure changed his attitude. It is unlikely that Hughes’s ensuing performance was sufficiently noteworthy to overcome his earlier failure. Here, again, Turner demonstrated his tendency to buckle under political pressure.

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On 17 April, Watson left the division to take command of the 4th Division in England.14 To fill Watson’s place, Alderson selected Archibald Hayes Macdonell, nicknamed “Long Archie” to distinguish him from his cousin, Archibald Cameron Macdonell, later commander of the 1st Division. An intriguing aspect of all of this was that Alderson did not believe any battalion commander in the 2nd Division was suitable for promotion. Subsequently, four 2nd Division battalion commanders at that time – Bell, Embury, Hughes, and Tremblay – commanded brigades in the Canadian Corps. Long Archie was a pf officer with twenty-seven years of experience in the Canadian military. He served in South Africa and later West Africa – earning a dso. He was a Camberley-trained staff officer and the gso 2 in Military District 1 at the start of the war.15 He assumed command of the rcr in England and took them to France as part of the 3rd Division.16 The division went to the Somme with a significantly different command structure than at St Eloi. Half of the twelve battalion commanders were new, as was a brigade commander and the gso 1. The 4th Brigade experienced the greatest turnover, with three of the four battalion commanders replaced after St Eloi, and Turner wanted the one holdover, Lieutenant-Colonel C.H. Rogers of the 20th Battalion, transferred as well. Turner tried having him replaced in April 1916, displeased with Roger’s repeated leaves during operations, including St Eloi.17 In August, Turner again complained to Carson, this time about Rogers’s incessant solicitation for a promotion, and asked whether there was a training brigade in England for Rogers. If Ketchen was sacked, Turner wanted Lieutenant-Colonel J. Embury of the 28th Battalion promoted – and not Rogers.18 Turner was trying to complete the task of cleaning out the deadwood in the division, but there was no position in England for Rogers. The 2nd Division was indirectly involved in the engagement at Mount Sorrel in June 1916 that so battered the 3rd Division. This action could be used to criticize Turner for the loss of more ground. To free up units for a planned counterattack, Byng assigned the 6th Brigade to the 3rd Division, and it replaced the 7th Brigade in line on the night of 5/6 June. The 28th and 31st Battalions replaced four battalions of the 7th Brigade. At 2:00 p.m. on 6 June, the Germans

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Table 4.1 2nd Division command changes, September 1915/November 1916 Position

Officer

Fate

gso 1 gso 1 4th Brigade goc 5th Brigade goc 18th Battalion – 19th Battalion 21st Battalion 22nd Battalion – 24th Battalion 25th Battalion 26th Battalion 27th Battalion 28th Battalion 29th Battalion –

Lieutenant-Colonel H. De Pree Lieutenant-Colonel C. Ker Brigadier-General Lord Brooke Brigadier-General D. Watson Lieutenant-Colonel E. Wigle Lieutenant-Colonel H. Milligan Lieutenant-Colonel J. McLaren Lieutenant-Colonel W. Hughes Colonel F. Gaudet Lieutenant-Colonel T. Tremblay Lieutenant-Colonel J. Gunn Lieutenant-Colonel G. LeCain Lieutenant-Colonel J. McAvity Lieutenant-Colonel J. Snider Lieutenant-Colonel J. Embury Lieutenant-Colonel H. Tobin Lieutenant-Colonel J. Tait

Transferred Transferred* Transferred* Promoted Compassionate Compassionate Removed Promoted Removed Injured Transferred* Removed Removed Removed Wounded† Transferred* Injured§

*Indicates a case where the transfer was a removal but in a politically expedient fashion. †Calder, 28th (Northwest) Battalion, 89 §Clynne, Vancouver’s 29th, 17 Source: rg 150 Officers’ Personnel Files, lac.

fired four mines under the front line of the 28th Battalion, annihilating the defenders.19 The Germans seized 60 metres of the Canadian front line with a mass formation attack supported by a powerful barrage. Rifle and machine gun fire from the few survivors in the front line and from reserve positions stopped the Germans and inflicted heavy casualties. The attack on the 31st Battalion failed entirely, but the two front-line battalions, the 28th and 31st, suffered sizable losses of 10 officers and 307 men.20 More pragmatic and confident of his

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position than Alderson, Byng decided against retaking the position.21 What is sometimes overlooked in descriptions of this engagement is that the 6th Brigade was under the command of the 3rd Division and not of Turner.

prepar ing f or the onslaught Turner and the division spent the summer preparing for the likely commitment of the Canadian Corps to the Somme campaign. He ordered a rigorous training program and instituted an aggressive raiding policy. All units in reserve conducted training, with the 24th Battalion, for instance, spending nine days in July undergoing intense instruction.22 The division ordered each brigade to send 200 men for a Lewis gun course and 8 ncos and 32 other ranks for a trench mortar course. 23 As well, Turner held two conferences with his principal staff officers, advisors, and brigadiers on 2 and 8 August to further preparation and training for the offensive – a new initiative by Turner.24 As always, Turner continued his early morning inspections of the trenches, and he was systematic and organized while doing so. He took down reminders in a notebook during these tours, and he or his staff would follow up on the resulting tasks, orders, and observations.25 The new corps commander, Byng, was an ideal fit for the Canadian Corps and played a critical role in its development. Born the seventh son of the second Earl of Strafford in 1862, Byng joined the Militia in 1879 because a shortage of funds did not allow him to join the Regular Army. His father, while wealthy, did not believe he could support another son in the military.26 An offer from the Prince of Wales resulted in Byng’s transfer to the prestigious 10th Royal Hussars, in 1883. He served in India, the Sudan, and South Africa, where he raised and successfully commanded a regiment of colonial irregulars. He graduated from the staff college in 1894. After the Boer War, he commanded a cavalry regiment, cavalry brigade, and Territorial division. He led the British 3rd Cavalry Division in the opening stages of the war and later the Cavalry Corps, the IX Corps at Gallipoli, and the XVII Corps on the Western Front. He enjoyed considerable suc-

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cess in all his positions, including the casualty-free evacuation from Gallipoli. His experiences with the colonial irregulars, the Territorial division, and command on the Western Front resulted in an officer uniquely qualified to deal with the special circumstances of the Canadian Corps.27 Byng did not fit the stereotype of a conventional blueblood British officer, with his rumpled appearance, hands in his pockets, and a casual demeanour that suited Canadian sensibilities.28 Photographs, however, show the intensity that lay behind the facade of affability. He had an incisive mind, self-confidence, strong political skills, and ruthlessness when necessary. He placed his stamp on the Canadian Corps and worked effectively to rid it of the political influence, divisional cliques, and infighting that Alderson could not correct.29 Byng played a decisive role in the increasing capability and effectiveness of the Canadian Corps.30 Byng was successful in navigating the intricacies of a national contingent and dealing with Sam Hughes and ghq. He was able to exploit Sam Hughes’s soft spot for aristocrats to win him over and thus avoid the conflict with Canadian authorities that characterized Alderson’s regime.31 One of Byng’s first actions was to declare that he would not to respond to any of Carson’s letters unless they came through official channels. Carson wrote the corps commanders repeatedly with demands and requests from Hughes and others.32 Byng also affirmed that he would be responsible for recommendations for appointments and promotions.33 These steps significantly reduced Hughes’s ability to interfere in the corps. In response to Haig’s demands for forces outside the Somme front to maintain pressure on the Germans, Turner ordered each battalion to plan and conduct one raid during each front-line rotation. Each battalion was responsible for developing the plan and presenting it to the brigade for approval.34 This approach is of interest because of its consequences and nature. According to David Campbell, the units of the 2nd Division planned twenty-five raids, with twenty-two attempted and eleven rated as completely or partially successful. The losses suffered were approximately fifty-seven, with only three dead and two missing; hence the loss rate was not prohibitive.35 Raids were controversial as to their utility, for they could be costly and the losses

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disproportionally fell upon the most aggressive elements in a battalion.36 Constant raiding would increase German alertness levels, resulting in higher losses and exhausted units. On the other hand, raids inflicted casualties on the Germans and resulted in prisoners taken. Most importantly, they helped train units in preparing for battle, allarms coordination, and conducting assaults. However, raids did not provide experience in consolidation, which Turner thought the most challenging aspect of an attack.37 In the case of the 2nd Division, these raids were beneficial in developing the combat readiness of the battalions with minimal losses. The other aspect of the raiding policy was Turner’s determination to push planning responsibility down to the battalion level; this ran counter to Haig’s strictures of tighter control over subordinates but was in keeping with the Field Service Regulations. At this point in the war, there was a tension in the British Army between the FSR and the reality of a “top down” prescriptive command policy in some formations.38 The FSR stipulated that superiors were to dictate the objectives but subordinates determined the actions for achieving then. The rapid expansion of the bef and cef resulted in unqualified commanders and staff – a problem especially prevalent in the Canadian Corps. Some superiors were thus loath to give subordinates too much responsibility.39 A number of senior commanders, such as General Sir Hubert Gough, commander of the Reserve Army on the Somme, were prone to dictate and micromanage subordinates because of this lack of confidence.40 The division pulled out of the line starting 24 August and moved to training areas to ready for the Somme offensive. The 2nd Division had the opportunity to prepare thoroughly for its first battle on the Somme, unlike the unfortunate divisions that attacked on 1 July, which had not had sufficient training time.41 Turner assembled notes on preparing for the Somme that Webber, the new gso 1, converted into an eight-page set of instructions for company commanders. These notes were an astute set of steps that Turner took to prepare his division.42 Turner’s handwritten notes were based on a visit to the Somme, after-action reports, and lessons learned from brigades, divisions, and corps engaged on the Somme.43 Turner also visited the Australian Corps on 26 August to learn from their experiences.44 His

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instructions emphasized the need for initiative and bold leadership, since the battle was now a mix of trench and semi-open warfare. The critical factor was getting troops to the enemy lines before the German artillery intervened. Troops were to reach the German lines just as the barrage lifted. Units were to plan for a maximum of three waves in an attack, with the first wave going to the final objective. The instructions reflected Turner’s pragmatic and practical orientation and bias towards decentralization. On 25 August, Webber issued further instructions that training was to build progressively from section to company, with attention to musketry (rifle training), route marching, and training of Lewis gun teams. In recognition of the limits of signalling technology, each battalion was to train additional runners.45 A critical aspect of this training was that it allowed all levels of the organization to train under the officers who would lead them into battle.46 Byng was more involved in lower-level training than was Alderson. He met with all the brigade and battalion commanders on 29 August and manoeuvred “B” Company of the 28th Battalion to demonstrate what he expected.47 The training was advanced in several respects. The exercises simulated losses among officers and ncos to engender initiative and give leadership experience to junior ncos and even privates. The training emphasized troops advancing to their objective and fighting on regardless of officer and nco losses.48 For instance, when Byng directed “B” Company, he simulated the loss of leaders at each stage of the exercise so that by the end a lance-corporal commanded the company.49 One soldier later remembered another noteworthy change: “This was the first time that the rank and file had been fully briefed as to what was expected, so we felt encouraged as senior divisional officers took part in the exercise and gave confidence that the preparations were so thorough that the prospect of the attack a few days hence did not seem at all frightening.”50 Mark Humphries questions the notion of a significant difference in the training for the Somme or Vimy Ridge. He argues that the training prior to the Somme demonstrated many of the characteristics of the instruction for Vimy Ridge, such as progressive training, informing troops of their objectives, and simulating losses of leaders.51 In one

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crucial aspect – platoons – the pre-Somme instruction differed fundamentally from Vimy. On the Somme, the company was the primary fighting formation, while at Vimy it was the all-arms platoon. In 1916, specialists still made up a significant portion of the fighting strength of the battalion and did not slot into the platoon structure. For instance, a sample attack formation for training shows company and battalion bombers as separate from the normal organization.52 The British high command simplified the tactics, reducing them to an advance in waves that followed the creeping barrage as closely as possible. Some senior British commanders, especially in the Reserve Army, thought that “fire and movement” tactics were beyond the capabilities of their new divisions and mandated linear tactics – an approach that would apply to the Canadian divisions, as well.53 The attack was subordinated to the artillery plan, whose primary objective was to destroy the enemy.54 As Bidwell and Graham have put it, fire effect was achieved through “quantity not quality of fire.”55 The creeping barrage regulated the infantry advance, so the infantry could progress only as fast and as far as the barrage could take it. Losing the barrage was usually fatal to an attack. Overall, despite the simple tactics taught, Turner and the division were far better prepared for the challenges on the Somme than they had been for St Eloi, and their performance at Courcelette demonstrated this progress.

a potheosis: cour celette, 15 september The 2nd Division’s attack was part of a much larger assault, known as the Flers-Courcelette offensive, stretching across a 16-kilometre front and involving both the Reserve and Fourth Armies.56 Since the initial attack on 1 July, the British had ground through, at great cost, the German First and Second Positions, with each position a complex of trenches and strongpoints deployed in depth. Haig intended the offensive to be decisive, with General Sir Henry Rawlinson’s Fourth Army breaking through the German Third Position, and Gough’s Reserve Army protecting the Fourth Army’s left flank. Rawlinson had

Figure 4.1 2nd Division organization chart – Courcelette, 15 September 1916

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reservations about the likelihood of a great success, but Haig overruled him.57 Haig was counting in part on a greater concentration of artillery and a secret weapon – tanks.58 The Canadian Corps anchored the juncture of the Reserve and Fourth Armies, where the British line running east bent south. Therefore, the Canadian Corps’s attacks were on diverging lines. The corps was to attack with the 3rd Division on the left and the 2nd Division on the right. The selection of the 2nd Division to make the primary attack at Courcelette signalled Byng’s estimation of the 2nd Division. The 2nd Division had the more difficult task, and Byng could have just as readily chosen the 3rd Division to make the main thrust. His decision to rely on Turner and the 2nd Division thus suggests that he had confidence in the division’s abilities. The battle took place on the reverse slope of the Pozières Ridge, won at high cost by the Australians.59 The ridge ran gently downslope to the village of Courcelette, which in turn overlooked a valley curving around it to the north and east. The battle zone extended across a kilometre and half front and reached a depth of two kilometres to encompass Courcelette. The German defences consisted of a frontline trench, another intermediary trench running diagonally across the left front of the attack, and second-line trenches, named Sugar and Candy. Sugar Trench, on the left, slanted across the front such that the advance on the division’s left was 400 metres, while Candy Trench, on the right, ran parallel with the front line and was approximately 1,000 metres from the Canadian forward position. Located in front of Candy Trench was the strongpoint and battalion headquarters, the Sugar Refinery, sometimes called the Sugar Factory. The refinery, a sugar beet–processing facility built of cement and brick, was critical in three respects.60 The Germans had heavily fortified it, like the village of Courcelette, with deep dugouts impervious to all but the heaviest shells. The refinery commanded the entire attack zone and was the sector’s key defensive position. Finally, the building was a valuable water source. The Somme generally had a shortage of surface water, so it was necessary to rely on water pipes or deep wells – as deep as twenty metres.61 Battle plans and after-battle reviews repeatedly referred to the water supply.62 The refinery was located over

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a deep well with an abundant water supply, as sugar beet processing required copious amounts of water. Local stories suggest that the Germans piped water from the well to as far away as Mouquet Farm, over two kilometres distant.63 As a result, the refinery was critical to the German’s hold on the sector. Its loss would appreciably increase the logistical burden of supplying water, as the nearest water supply was probably Miraumont close to four kilometres north of Courcelette. The 45th Reserve Division, the sister division to the 2nd Division’s nemesis at St Eloi, the 46th Reserve Division, defended the sector. The division, formed in August 1914, was rushed to the front in October to take part in the First Battle of Ypres, where it suffered heavy losses. It remained in the Messines area south of Ypres afterwards, but moved to the Somme in early September, with elements entering the line on 7 September. The 6th Brigade, the left formation of the 2nd Division, attacked the II/210th Reserve Regiment and the 4th Brigade on the right assaulted the II/211th Reserve Regiment, with the III/211th Reserve defending the Sugar Refinery. Garrisoning Courcelette was the remainder of the 210th Reserve Regiment, plus elements of the 133rd Reserve Regiment sent during the day to reinforce the badly battered 45th Reserve Division. Trench strength of the four companies in each battalion was approximately 200 men. A later report rated the division’s morale as indifferent, although later in the war it had improved.64 The 2nd Division’ role was to protect the shoulder of the Fourth Army and gain observation over the German Third Position and German artillery batteries in the valley running south, from behind Courcelette to Martinpuich. The Reserve Army, unlike the Fourth Army, had not reached the German Third Position. Turner’s objectives were to capture the German second-line trenches, Sugar and Candy, and the Sugar Refinery. The Reserve Army also wanted the Canadian Corps to probe Courcelette and capture it if possible.65 Turner ordered his brigadiers to submit plans on 10 September, and suggested that the 6th Brigade attack with two battalions and the 4th Brigade with three because of its greater attack frontage and depth of advance.66 Turner’s initial plan, submitted on 11 September, was noteworthy in three respects.67 First, he planned to dig jump-off trenches

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100 to 200 metres closer to the German front line before the attack so as to reduce the assault distance – this was by now a standard policy in the British Army on the Somme. Second, Turner resisted the corps’s wishes to probe Courcelette. His reluctance stemmed from his concerns about German counterattacks from the village. Probing the village meant stopping the protective barrage, and that meant weakening the defences against a counterattack. Turner preferred to make a prepared assault instead of counting on a German collapse. Finally, Turner’s planned use of tanks differed from that of the Fourth Army. The 2nd Division received all six tanks assigned to the Reserve Army owing to the importance of its attack, and one group of three was assigned to each of the two attacking brigades. The tanks were slower than infantry, vulnerable to shellfire, awkward, and prone to breakdowns and bogging down. The Fourth Army planned to use its tanks in the battle for the front line. To accommodate the tanks’ slow speed, the Fourth Army had them advance before the infantry left their trenches, so the tanks reached the German front line five minutes before the infantry. It had been decided – unwisely – that each tank or group of tanks should be protected by a 100-metre gap in the barrage, with the result that those portions of the German line escaped shelling. This was particularly fatal in the many cases where the tanks were incapacitated. Turner’s plan called for the tanks to assist in the mopping up, so his tanks left at zero hour. This meant they would trail the infantry and could not intervene in the initial stages of the attack, but they would at least not interfere in the infantry advance. There was a gap in the barrage on the front of the 4th Brigade but not the 6th Brigade, possibly because of the shallowness of the advance.68 In reaction to Turner’s proposed plan, the corps’s final operational order explicitly stated that the 2nd Division was to send patrols to Courcelette. Thirty minutes after the division had reached its final objective, the protective barrage before Courcelette was to lift to allow patrols to enter the village.69 As the corps controlled the heavy artillery – critical for success – the corps controlled the battle and the divisions had to accommodate themselves to the corps’s plan. Brigadier-

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General Percy Radcliffe, the corps bggs, explained that the narrow front and interdivisional reliefs meant that the corps was “the fighting unit to a greater extent than has hitherto been the case.”70 The Canadian Corps also issued detailed orders for the tanks that were wildly at variance with their actual capabilities. No one from the Reserve Army, including the Canadian Corps, had attended meetings with tank representatives to become familiar with the tanks’ capabilities, and clearly, the corps’s orders highlighted this lack of experience.71 There had been no possibility for tank training, and only a few select officers even saw the tanks, on 10 September, which a later historian described as a “surreal August Bank Holiday.”72 The final version of the 2nd Division’s operational order on 14 September reflected the corps’s demands. It specified that seventythree minutes after zero hour the barrage in front of Courcelette would lift and three patrols of one officer and thirty men from the 6th Brigade would probe the village’s defences.73 Further, in the final conference at army headquarters, Gough agreed that there was to be no organized attack on Courcelette until the Fourth Army was in position on the right, but he wanted the Canadians to push into Courcelette if they could do so without reinforcement.74 Turner accurately anticipated the battle to be costly, warning the medical staff to plan for 3,000 wounded per day. In fact, the divisional medical units handled 3,250 men in the first thirty hours of the battle.75 Nine field artillery brigades supported the division’s attack, with sixty-four heavy artillery pieces supporting the overall Canadian assault.76 The resulting artillery concentration was double that of the 1 July attack, and once the attack depth is factored in, the concentration was five times and was roughly one-third greater than at Mount Sorrel.77 Further, the artillery was firing on relatively less well developed defences, with limited barbed wire in place and the entire position visible from Pozières Ridge. The artillery pounded German positions for three days before the attack, and the constant pummelling degraded the German defences and weakened the defenders’ morale and strength, as the battle demonstrated.

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A creeping artillery barrage of a zone of artillery fire that advanced at a regulated pace, in jumps, was the crucial component of the artillery support. This was a new tactic for the Canadians, but it was the standard artillery scheme by this stage on the Somme. According to the corps’s plan, the barrage was to lift at a brisk rate of 100 metres every three minutes.78 At Passchendaele, the movement rate was lifts of 50 metres every four minutes.79 The creeping barrage was a response to the German practice of stationing machine guns and snipers in shell holes in the intervals between trenches.80 The previous tactic of standing barrages on trench lines meant that these German forces escaped shelling. As stipulated in Turner’s initial plan, both brigades dug jump-off trenches closer to the German lines. Despite heavy German artillery fire, the brigades completed the trenches in time, albeit with losses. This ensured that the first waves of the attack could reach the German front line in one to three minutes.81 On the left, the 6th Brigade attacked with the 28th and 27th Battalions, the 31st Battalion being responsible for mopping up. On the right, the 4th Brigade attacked with the 21st, 20th, and 18th Battalions, with the 19th Battalion tasked with mopping up. The attack formation was deep, consisting of five or six waves.82 This attack alignment was potentially hazardous. It provided sufficient depth to supply considerable power to the attack, but it risked exposing the attackers to German artillery fire. If German resistance held up the initial waves, the German artillery would inflict heavy losses on the latter waves. Before the Canadian assault, the Germans launched a surprise attack on the front of the 18th and 20th Battalions at 3:00 a.m. and again at 4:00 a.m. The 1st Division had captured sections of the German front line in this sector, and the Germans were determined to retake them.83 The trenches were quite close together, so the Germans could enter at one point and capture a trench section. The two battalions quickly rallied, drove out the Germans, then attacked on schedule and took all their objectives. As the Germans had planned to reinforce a successful attack, they had packed the forward line, and they suffered severely from the Canadian bombardment.84 It was, nevertheless, an impressive performance to recover from the attack and carry out the assault as planned. Turner’s pride in his men shows in his later

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Figure 4.2 Battle of Courcelette, 15 September 1916 In the early morning hours of 15 September, the Germans launched an unsuccessful attack on the 4th Brigade’s lines; nevertheless the 4th Brigade attacked on time. The 4th and 6th Brigades reported their objectives taken by 8:20 a.m. The 4th Brigade launched a follow-on assault that took Gunpit Trench. The 5th Brigade in reserve attacked Courcelette at 6:00 p.m. The 25th and 22nd Battalions captured Courcelette and defended it against repeated German counterattacks.

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comment that the attack “nearly upset the applecart and it was only the men’s determination and high spirits that saved the situation.”85 The fifteenth of September dawned brightly with a light breeze blowing dust and debris in the faces of the Germans.86 Promptly at 6:20 a.m., the barrage commenced, and the infantry advanced at 6:24. Within minutes, the first objectives fell, as the artillery had shattered the German defenders and their morale. The infantry pressed on in the face of heavy machine gun and rifle fire and overwhelmed the defenders.87 Although the German protective artillery barrage came down within three minutes of the attack, the Canadians advanced so quickly they escaped the worst of the shelling.88 By 6:55 a.m., the 4th Brigade reached the Sugar Refinery, and the 21st Battalion skilfully launched an attack from three directions that captured the position, 125 prisoners, and a battalion commander.89 An hour after the start of the attack, the 4th Brigade had captured all its objectives. The 6th Brigade’s 27th Battalion suffered heavily from machine gun fire from a strongpoint outside its sector, but an officer, showing commendable initiative, led an attack from an unengaged side and knocked it out. Another company commander, realizing the advantage of a dominating position beyond his sector, seized it.90 Turner’s insistence on inculcating initiative was paying off. The losses in the attack were primarily from rifle and machine gun fire, as the rapidity of the Canadian advance disrupted the German defensive arrangements. It is possible that the swift Canadian advance forced the German field artillery batteries stationed in the valley running behind Courcelette and Martinpuich to retreat, thus interrupting the German artillery support – German field artillery tended to deploy within 3,000 metres of the front line.91 The situation was so dire that the German Army Group commander, Crown Prince Rupprecht, worried that the whole sector would rupture.92 With the capture of all the objectives, the division needed to consolidate its gains and potentially exploit the weakened German defences. At 8:05 a.m., Turner learned that the British 15th Division had reached the 4th Brigade’s right flank, and at 8:20, the 6th Brigade finally reported all its objectives gained.93 With this information and the knowledge that the Germans were in considerable disarray, Turner made three critical decisions. At 8:35, he ordered the 4th Brigade to

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capture Gunpit Trench, 300 metres further east, with the corps heavy artillery supporting the attack. Simultaneously, he issued a warning order to the 5th Brigade to prepare to capture Courcelette later that day.94 Finally, he refused the 6th Brigade’s request to attack Courcelette. The 31st Battalion had pushed three patrols towards Courcelette, and Ketchen believed he could capture the village. However, the standing barrage that was supposed to have lifted was still blocking the entry into the village. The 31st Battalion wanted the barrage stopped. It is unclear from the evidence whether the barrage was lifted as per the corps’s artillery plan and then resumed or never stopped. Turner refused Ketchen’s request.95 Gaining contact with the front line via visual communications aided the 4th Brigade attack because messages did not have to be sent by runner. The hastily prepared attack with depleted forces was successful because of the indomitable spirit and prowess of the 4th Brigade, the fire of the heavy guns, and the broken state of the defences and defenders. The 2nd Division destroyed the German front line, support, and reserve forces in the sector, and only remnants survived to defend Gunpit Trench.96 In what William Philpott described as “an impressive display of fieldcraft and small unit leadership,” the 5th Brigade seized Courcelette that same day.97 At 11:10 a.m., the Canadian Corps, responding to Gough’s wish to take Courcelette, ordered Turner to capture the village. Gough was so anxious about the attack that he visited the 2nd Division headquarters in the afternoon for assurance that the division would succeed.98 The corps did not confirm the attack and timing until 1:25 p.m., and the 2nd Division only issued its operation order at 2:45. This left the brigade with limited time to conduct reconnaissance, prepare plans, and move into position before the planned attack at 6:00 p.m. The brigade had to start its advance down the Pozières Ridge at 5:00 p.m. to reach the start line in time for the attack, which required a forty-five degree change of front from the division’s earlier line of advance. It was a superb performance to attack on time and take its objectives. The 25th Battalion attacked on the left, the 22nd Battalion on the right, and the 26th Battalion would mop up the village. The two attacking battalions punched through the German defences, advanced

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through the ruins in bitter hand-to-hand fighting, and pushed up to a line on the other side of the village. The 26th Battalion had the difficult task of rooting out the German survivors from their underground defences – a task that took the night and most of the next day to complete.99 Once in position, the 5th Brigade had to repel repeated, fiercely pressed counterattacks over the next three nights. The Germans were determined to retake the village and the Sugar Refinery. Their loss meant they would have to abandon a considerable swath of territory because of the observation advantages that holding the village conveyed. The Germans attacked the 25th Battalion four times on the night of 15/16 September and the 22nd seven times. The 22nd had to face another six counterattacks on the next two nights as well.100 Lieutenant-Colonel T. Tremblay of the 22nd Battalion wrote in his diary, “If hell is as bad as what I have seen at Courcelette, I would not wish my worst enemy to go there.”101 The hard fighting for Courcelette was costly, with the 5th Brigade reporting losses of 57 officers and 1,267 men. In compensation, the Germans’ losses were more severe: 1,055 prisoners were captured, including a battalion and a regimental commander. Essentially, the brigade had destroyed the 210th Reserve Regiment, which had a loss rate of nearly 70 per cent, and punished the 133rd Reserve Regiment.102 The 211th Reserve Regiment, which faced the 4th Brigade, suffered 2,162 casualties, which meant 72 per cent of its strength. The German high command had to pull the 45th Reserve Division out of the line because of these losses.103 Overall, the 2nd Division paid a high price for its success. Casualties reported for the period 10–19 September amounted to 163 officers and 3,790 men.104 The division would only receive a handful of drafts before it was committed to battle again, and they received inadequate training in England for their coming ordeal. While the weather was excellent during the attack on Courcelette, the shelling so smashed the battlefield that pack animals could not traverse the wasteland on the night of 15/16 September. It was not until the corps’s pioneer units built a road the next night that the animals could bring supplies forward of Pozières Ridge. Rations, water, and, most importantly, ammunition had to be brought by carrying parties; the wounded were evacuated by stretcher-bearers; and with

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such a tenuous supply line, there was no opportunity to exploit the gains of 15 September.105 The 2nd Division had a score to settle with the Germans, and it attacked with verve, skill, and a degree of brutality. The Canadians killed prisoners as well as Germans attempting to surrender, contributing further to their reputation for atrocities.106 Turner admitted in a letter home to his wife: “It was bayonet work – and some [battalions] took no prisoners.”107 Even official reports suggested that the division did not take captives. The 4th Brigade reported that “where the occupants promptly surrendered they were allowed to become prisoners.” In an incident on the front of the 4th Brigade, an officer was killed while attempting to accept the surrender of a party of Germans, and in retaliation the entire group was killed.108 Another consideration contributing to these deaths was the worry that surrendered Germans, if unguarded, might pick up discarded weapons and resume fighting. Units typically did not have sufficient men to provide escorts for German prisoners. Lance Cattermole, a private in the 21st Battalion, recounted later that the battalion ordered no prisoners taken until they had consolidated the final objective.109 The main factor was revenge: “In soldiers’ diaries and letters by far the most frequently expressed motivations for perpetrating atrocity were feelings of retaliation and revenge. These powerful feelings seem to have been endemic during the war.”110 The Germans had subjected the division to a year of misery, mining, sniping, and the wretchedness of St Eloi, and now the division had a chance for revenge.111 This attitude, combined with the heavy losses, made the Canadians reluctant to take German captives, and this reluctance made the prisoner totals for the day all the more impressive.112 The Canadians, however, were not the only ones to refuse surrenders. Lieutenant-General Jacob of the II Corps on the left flank of the Canadian Corps ordered no prisoners be taken in August.113 Revenge was an understood and accepted mechanism on the Western Front, and the need to strike back would be that much greater because it was long delayed.114 The division took full advantage of its opportunity, and it appears there was little to no attempt by commanders, including Turner, to restrain the troops. In the minds of the commanders, doing so would have carried the risk of inhibiting their offensive spirit.

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The Battle of Flers-Courcelette is famous for the first use of tanks in battle. Of the six tanks assigned to the 2nd Division, two contributed to the battle, but they only assisted in the later stages of the taking of the Sugar Refinery.115 The division later recommended employing tanks for mopping up in order to free men for other duties, but Turner was cautious about their value. He suggested that a sufficient number of tanks be used to exploit success, for he believed that the division could have captured Courcelette and Gunpit Trench by 10:00 a.m.116 The tanks encouraged the infantry, discouraged the Germans, attracted German fire, and assisted in the later stages of the capture of the Sugar Refinery.117 Of these four roles, the combat one was the least important. Turner’s comments on the tanks were based on the different tactical uses of tanks on the 2nd Division’s front and were more in keeping with the actual capabilities of the tanks on the Somme. Turner was adamant: “Too much credit must not be placed on to the tanks yet. Courcelette was won by my infantry.”118 Turner’s contribution to the attack on Courcelette consisted of pre-battle preparation, the plan, and conduct of the battle. The division’s success illustrated the effectiveness of the training before the assault. A central thread running through all the training was initiative. There were ample examples of initiative and of officers and men demonstrating flexibility and responsiveness to changing conditions. The division could not have achieved its victory without thorough preparation. As well as having had the opportunity to conduct two weeks of intense training before the battle, Turner has to share the credit for the effective preparation with Byng and Webber. The army and corps decided what the principal features of the attack plan would be – timing, objectives, and artillery support – leaving the divisions with limited scope for planning. Turner pushed much of the responsibility for attack planning down to the brigades, including their selection of the assault battalions and the attack formation. Turner’s primary contributions to the plan were ordering the digging of the jump-off trenches, assigning tanks to mopping up, and his thwarted attempt to avoid having to probe Courcelette. The three decisions Turner made on the morning of the battle demonstrated a balance between caution and aggressiveness. He showed wariness in not unleashing the 4th Brigade until he knew that all the

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objectives were taken and the British were up on the right. The attack of the 4th Brigade was aggressive considering its casualties and its disruption after an assault. The attack was only justified if Turner was confident that the Germans were badly disordered – which they were. This is an indication of Turner’s improved battle sense. He was also cautious in refusing the 6th Brigade’s request to capture Courcelette. Both Ketchen and Lieutenant-Colonel A. Bell of the 31st Battalion, who were closest to the situation, believed the village was ripe for seizure.119 The issue, however, was whether the 31st Battalion could have taken the objective and retained it. A German counterattack from Courcelette concerned Turner, so he was loath to risk advancing even further with only minimal artillery support. Courcelette was a difficult objective – heavily fortified, the headquarters of the 210th Reserve Regiment, and garrisoned by at least portions of an unengaged battalion. The 31st Battalion would have attacked with limited artillery support, so the odds were against it. Even if it had managed to take the village, it would have had considerable difficulty consolidating its hold. It took the efforts of three battalions to capture and hold Courcelette later in the day, albeit after the village received reinforcements. The many dugouts and cellars made consolidation a costly and time-consuming challenge. It is unlikely that the 31st Battalion could have held Courcelette, even if reinforced by units from the 6th Brigade. On balance, therefore, Turner’s decision, while cautious, was correct, especially given the later success of the 5th Brigade. Communications improved significantly in the battle, but there were still the same problems with getting accurate and timely information from the forward battalions. The 2nd Division’s “Lessons Learned” document lamented, “Battalion reports seemed to be invariably unreliable.”120 This was a universal problem and not unique to the 2nd Division.121 What was different at Courcelette compared to St Eloi was the additional means of gathering information. Aircraft contact patrols, visual communications, reports from forward observation officers (foo), and messages sent by pigeon all provided useful data to Turner. For instance, a contact patrol dropped a message at the forward division headquarters at 7:30 a.m. regarding positions it had identified at 7:00 to 7:20.122 Turner could then make decisions based on the actual situation at the front and keep the corps

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accurately informed. He was still looking for improvements and ordered a reduction in verbiage, the use of pre-printed sketch maps, and the elimination of “panic” messages that inevitably proved false.123 Turner and his brigadiers were understandably jubilant over the division’s success.124 Turner wrote, “For 12 months I have waited with the Division for this opportunity. God knows they [his men] acted in a magnificent way, nothing losses or anything else could stop them. They were out to even old scores of the Ypres Salient.”125 Congratulations poured in and included a warm letter from the former bggs Harington.126 Gough reported that the 5th Brigade attack “across the open without any jumping-off place in the nature of trenches is without parallel in the history of the present campaign.”127 Haig was pleased as well, writing in his diary, “The two Canadian [brigades] which took the Sugar Factory and joining trenches were those which were to have failed at St Eloi in the spring. Sent a word of thanks and congratulations to them.”128 Rennie, writing to Turner well after the war, noted that the attitude towards the division and its commanders had improved because of the success.129

futility: 26 september and 1 october The division left the line on 18 September to rest and recover. However, it received only 594 drafts up to 22 September, against a total loss in the weeks ending 15 and 22 September of 3,589. These losses differed from those quoted for Courcelette because of the different reporting time frame. The officer situation was particularly dire: only 4 officers were received to replace the 177 lost. This probably understates the problem, as the total losses included only killed and evacuated wounded, not the lightly wounded who might not be ready to return in time for the next engagement or other forms of wastage, such as transfers to other units, injuries, and illness.130 The total wounded in this two-week period was 3,047 versus 2,036 evacuated, and the evacuated figure included those ill or injured in an accident.131 The division received a further 1,174 essentially untrained other ranks the week ending 29 September, and the battalions would have had little opportunity to remedy their training deficiencies before

Figure 4.3 2nd Division losses, reinforcements, and cumulative deficiency for weeks ending 15 September to 13 October 1916

their next battle (see chapter 5 for more on the training deficiencies). Figure 4.3 shows the disastrous state of the 2nd Division in terms of reinforcements. The 6th Brigade returned to the line on 25 September just in time to participate in the Battle of Thiepval Ridge on 26 September. The 2nd Division was to anchor the shoulder of the Reserve Army’s attack to the north. Unlike at Courcelette, there was limited preparation time. The Canadian Corps only issued its operational order on 24 September, giving the division and brigade only two days to make arrangements.132 Time was so short that the division was unable to prepare jump-off trenches in time and reported that it was having problems fitting troops into the forming-up areas.133 The German interdiction fire was also troublesome, with the 31st Battalion suffering twenty-five casualties just moving into line.134 The 6th Brigade would attack, supported by two tanks, with the 29th Battalion to press on a short distance on the right and the 31st Battalion on the left with a longer advance of 400 metres. The objective was to protect the right flank of the 1st Division, which was responsible for the main Canadian attack.135 The attack was launched at 12:35 p.m., but the Canadian barrage did not hit the German front line. German artillery, machine gun, and

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Figure 4.4 Battle of Thiepval Ridge, 26 September 1916 The 29th Battalion captured its objective. The 31st Battalion attacked twice but was only able to take half of its objective. The 6th Brigade’s advance was hampered by the requirement to keep in touch with the British 23rd Division on its right. On 27 September, the 31st Battalion incorrectly claimed to have taken Regina Trench.

rifle fire stopped the 31st Battalion while the 29th captured its objective.136 The German barrage isolated the Canadian front line, indicating the ineffectiveness of counter-battery fire. Staff officer Captain Macintyre’s award of a Military Cross for passing through the German barrage to reach the 31st Battalion headquarters and return indicates the severity of the German artillery fire. The two tanks were singularly ineffective, one being knocked out when it attacked an hour early because the commander forgot about a time change.137

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The 31st Battalion made a second attack at 11:00 p.m., but only took the right half of its objective.138 The situation was so confused that the next day the battalion still did not have a clear idea of what it held.139 This confusion travelled up the chain of command, with the result that commanders had no firm notion of the situation, but the corps insisted that Turner close the gap between the 1st and 2nd Divisions.140 The Canadian artillery, despite repeated barrages, could not suppress the German defences, and the 31st Battalion, even reinforced, was too weak to capture the entire objective. The situation changed when the British II Corps and the 1st Division on the left succeeded in unhinging the German line, compelling the Germans to fall back to the Regina Trench line. The 6th Brigade notified Turner of the withdrawal in the late afternoon of 27 September. Turner ordered Ketchen to push out patrols and requested two reserve battalions from Byng to help add force to the follow-up.141 He was, however, again wary and would not allow the 6th Brigade to advance until the two battalions had reached the front line early the next morning.142 There was considerable uncertainty as to how far the Germans were withdrawing, with some reports suggesting that the German infantry had panicked and abandoned Regina Trench. At one point, the 31st Battalion incorrectly claimed to occupy the position.143 Turner believed, as was likely the case, that the Germans had botched a formation relief and had left the line effectively empty.144 But, by the time the brigade launched a more substantial effort, the Germans had reoccupied the trench. The division received conflicting reports over the next two days about the exact position of the Canadian and German positions. Probably, this period provoked Turner’s later criticism that battalion reports were invariably wrong.145 Complicating Turner’s task was the Reserve Army’s repeated orders to keep in touch with the British 23rd Division on its right flank.146 It was advancing east along the Albert-Bapaume road, which was the boundary between the Reserve Army and the Fourth Army. The 6th Brigade’s main attack axis was to the north, so it had to advance across a front of 120 degrees. This diverging axis of advance meant the brigade had to be vigilant to prevent gaps opening in the line. During this period, Turner continued his practice of visiting the front lines to see the conditions and be seen. Captain Macintyre wrote

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in his diary, “Met Gen’l Turner in sugar trench. One was nearly always sure of seeing him up in the line somewhere.”147 Turner also worked long hours, reporting, for example, that he laboured to 4 a.m. on 28 September and was back at work at 6:30 a.m., which indicated that his stamina and capacity for hard work were undiminished.148 Indolence was not one of Turner’s flaws. The Canadian Corps ordered the 2nd Division to attack again on 1 October at 3:15 p.m., as part of another Reserve Army offensive. The order provoked Turner to make this diary entry: “We have to attack again!!”149 The two exclamation marks suggest his frustration with the continued hasty attacks and ongoing destruction of his division. The probing attacks indicated that it took time for the division to locate the German front line, the result being a decrease in artillery fire accuracy and in the ability to suppress the defences.150 The division was again hurried into an under-prepared assault. The attack was part of a larger engagement, the Battle of Ancre Heights, and was a component of a series of assaults designed to position the Reserve Army for a major offensive by mid-October.151 The 2nd Division had the 4th and 5th Brigades in line, with the 5th Brigade responsible for the primary attack to the north and the 4th Brigade on the right to advance east to keep in touch with the British 23rd Division.152 Regina Trench was a significantly more challenging defensive position than those attacked on 15 September. Hidden on a reverse slope of a small ridge and protected by a three-metre wide belt of wire, Regina Trench was a formidable obstacle. In addition, the Germans deployed troops and machine guns in front and behind the trench, which meant that the artillery had to suppress a much larger area.153 Without direct observation of the trench, the artillery bombardment was far less accurate and thus less effective than at Courcelette. The Marine Division, a higher-quality unit than the 45th Reserve Division, defended Regina Trench.154 Formed from the Naval Corps defending the Belgium coast, the Marine Division had not seen much action, so it had a high percentage of pre-war active troops and ncos who contributed to its spirit of élan.155 The exertions at Courcelette severely weakened the 5th Brigade, and it entered the line with a trench strength of just 1,717 men instead

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Figure 4.5 Battle of Ancre Heights, 1 October 1916 1 The 4th Brigade reached its objectives after hard fighting. 2 Under-strength and with an especially long advance, the 22nd Battalion was repulsed and suffered crippling casualties. 3 The remaining units of the 5th Brigade only reached Regina Trench in isolated parties, which were all overwhelmed by the Germans.

of a nominal trench strength of 3,000.156 The 22nd Battalion was so attenuated that it committed only three weak companies, all of which had to attack.157 As a further burden, the assault distances to the German front line ranged from 300 metres on the left to 800 metres on the brigade’s right. The exhaustion and weakened state of the brigade prompted protests by the battalion and brigade commander on 30 September. Hilliam of the 25th Battalion, in a carefully reasoned complaint, argued that success was “highly problematical.” In language seldom seen in official reports, Hilliam claimed that the “very serious gruelling and ghastly experience of the last two days particularly have

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produced the inevitable reaction of physical and moral lassitude. If ordered out they will of course obey orders but the spirit of the 15th will not be there.”158 Macdonell, the brigade commander, concurred and pointed out that the brigade’s trench strength had dwindled to fewer than 1,200 men.159 Turner agreed and escalated the matter up to Byng on 1 October. Rather than grounding his remonstrance on the brigade’s weakness, he based it on evidence of uncut wire. At 7:50 a.m., Turner, on receipt of air photos taken the previous day, complained to the corps that he “did not consider that artillery preparation on regina trench and kenora trench as shown … is sufficient.”160 Turner then called Brigadier-General H. Burstall, the corps artillery commander, again – shortly after – to emphasize the importance of the artillery preparation. Burstall assured Turner that the preponderance of the artillery fire was to take place that morning. As a result of Turner’s complaints, Byng agreed at 9:10 a.m. to give the artillery more time to cut the wire, but he added the admonition that the division was to remain in the line until it attained all its objectives.161 The Reserve Army was not so understanding and pressured Byng to make the attack, and so at 1:15 p.m., the 5th Brigade received the unwelcome news that it was to attack as planned.162 Once again, Turner demonstrated his moral courage in protesting an attack destined to fail, but the scenario was perplexing in two respects. Turner did not base his concerns on the weak state of the 5th Brigade but on the uncut wire. Possibly, he realized that no objection grounded on numerical weakness would be sustained, as witnessed by the 14th Battalion having to attack when it could only muster seventyfive men.163 Aerial photographs, however, were irrefutable. Byng’s willingness to grant Turner additional time is puzzling, since the 2nd Division’s attack was part of a larger offensive and even a corps commander had limited scope to derail such an operation. Thus, it was not surprising that Gough would impose the original plan. Why did Byng keep the sorely weakened 2nd Division in the line for the 1 October attack? Four factors probably contributed to his decision – the previous success of the 2nd Division, the uncertainty around what positions the Germans were holding, intelligence reports

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suggesting the Germans were faltering, and Gough’s longer-range plans. The 2nd Division had won a signal victory at Courcelette, and Byng likely overestimated its remaining combat power. Haig reported in his diary that Byng was full of confidence before the 26 September attack.164 The several days of confusion after the German 27 September withdrawal meant that it was not until 29 September that the requirement for an all-out attack was apparent. There was likely then insufficient time to replace the 2nd Division and attack on schedule. Reports from Haig’s chief intelligence officer, Brigadier-General John Charteris, showed his belief that the Germans were failing. Charteris, writing to his counterpart at the War Office on 1 October, claimed, “We are getting very optimistic here with regard to the fighting. There is no doubt that the German is a changed man … His tail is down, he surrenders freely, and on several occasions he has thrown down his rifle and ran away, and altogether there is hope that a really bad rot may set in any day.”165 Further, the purported abandonment of Regina Trench suggested a German panic, likely leading Byng to suppose that the Germans were not that formidable. Turner was less sanguine and more accurate in a letter to his wife: “I do not believe the statements current – the bosche is Not [sic] half beaten yet.”166 The final and probably most critical factor was Gough’s next planned series of attacks. The Reserve Army issued an order on 28 September for a set of objective lines for attacks on 1, 4, and 10 October.167 The plan was useful in providing the corps with advance notice of Gough’s intent. What was objectionable was the unrealistic tempo of the attacks expected, given the nexus of ground conditions, unit combat power, German defences, and the time required to prepare the attacks. As Gary Sheffield has argued, “In his eagerness to push forward, Gough forced subordinate commanders to attack before they were ready with little allowance made for preparation time.”168 The aggressive schedule meant that Byng had to use the 2nd Division in the 1 October attack if he was to have sufficient fresh troops to make the later attacks. The two brigades attacked on time, and the 4th Brigade, with the easier mission, reached its objectives after hard fighting.169 The 5th

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Brigade was repulsed and shattered, losing nearly 50 per cent of its men. Hit indiscriminately by both German and Canadian artillery, as well as German machine gun and rifle fire, the brigade’s three attacking battalions only penetrated the uncut German wire and reached Regina Trench in isolated sectors. The Germans promptly ejected or overwhelmed the scattered detachments. Illustrating the degree to which Haig was out of touch with the realities on the ground, he blamed the failure on the Canadians’ using insufficient numbers of troops to spare casualties and “nervousness and low morale.”170 The 22nd Battalion was especially battered, and Macdonell characterized it as destroyed in his report.171 It subsequently suffered serious discipline and morale problems because of the evacuation to England of its inspiring commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel T. Tremblay, because of injuries and the poor quality and training of drafts.172 Only Tremblay’s return and a tightening of control restored the battalion to full discipline – three members of the 22nd Battalion were executed from April to July 1917.173 These executions illustrate that discipline issues signalled one of the major differences between Turner, Currie, and Major-General H. Burstall, Turner’s replacement as goc 2nd Division. Turner did pay attention to discipline, dress, and deportment, as the multiple references in the routine orders attest, but he was not as zealous as Currie. Turner was less likely to take umbrage if a soldier had a button undone at the line than other commanders. In comparison with Currie’s and Burstall’s commands, Turner’s command in the 2nd Division saw fewer men executed. In Currie’s 1st Division during the same period that Turner commanded the 2nd Division, seven men were shot compared to only one in the 2nd. Similarly, under Burstall, seven men were executed in the 2nd Division.174 The 2nd Division was clearly played out, and after the 6th Brigade did another tour of duty, the corps relieved the division on 4 October. It did not have to serve another tour on the Somme and departed for the Vimy sector on 10 October. The division lost another 42 officers and 975 men in the Battle of Thiepval Ridge and 56 officers and 1,368 men in the Battle of Ancre Heights.175 It was a husk of the former division after the loss of 6,817 officers and men between 10 September

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and 10 October, more than four times the losses at St Eloi.176 Turner wrote that it was difficult to prepare recommendations for awards, as all the witnesses had died in the battle.177 Surprisingly, given Webber’s professionalism, the 2nd Division did not produce an operations report for the latter two operations, and the one for Courcelette was perfunctory.178 Turner’s response to the corps’s questionnaire on lessons from the Somme was restricted to conventional matters and was not as searching as Currie’s answer. For instance, in response to a question on troop density, Turner recommended two and half men per yard, as this was the figure at Courcelette and the later failures had a lower concentration. This analysis did not consider the other factors contributing to victory or defeat. Turner’s comments were based on the doctrine practised on the Somme, in part because of the type of the questions posed by Byng.179

why the difference in results? The discrepancy in the division’s performance between Courcelette and the latter two attacks was a function of an under-strength division attacking with exiguous preparation time, over too great a distance, and with inadequate, unobserved, and uncoordinated artillery support. The division had not replaced its losses before its recommitment and thus went into the line in an enfeebled state. What is more, the replacements received were little more than raw levies. For instance, the 4th Battalion in Currie’s division received a draft of 154 men who had no experience with the smle and were unfamiliar with the standard grenade.180 Therefore, the Reserve Army’s inexorable demands forced Turner to task units with missions that exceeded their strength. The Canadian Corps and the 2nd Division performed best in a structured combat environment in which preparation time was crucial. Time to gather intelligence and information, to integrate the findings into plans, to coordinate with the artillery, and to disseminate the results was imperative for success. Gough’s tempo denied this time, and the results were costly failures.181 At Courcelette, the division had seven

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days for this preparation cycle, but it had only two days each for the latter two battles. British commanders were beginning to recognize the necessity of sufficient time for preparation. Haig noted that one of his more successful corps commanders, Lord Cavan, estimated that a pause of at least four days was necessary between each attack.182 A significant factor in the length of the planning cycle was the relative inexperience of the staff and commanders of the 2nd Division.183 At Courcelette, the 6th Brigade’s operational order was five foolscap pages in length.184 Orders to this level of detail took time to create and assimilate, which contributed to the interval needed to ready a successful attack. In his book on the operational role of British corps, Andy Simpson argued that the FSR manual was a useful doctrinal guide throughout the war but was intended for “trained and experienced officers.”185 The manual was of scant value, however, for the Canadians on the Somme, as it did not provide any insight into the practical details of attack frontages, troop density, artillery preparation, and logistics. ghq was producing an increasing number of manuals (the Stationery Services series) that provided more concrete and practical proposals on how to conduct actions, but they were of limited value on the Somme.186 The Australian, but educated at rmc (Kingston, Ontario), Major-General W.T. Bridges captured the utility of the FSR when he described the manual “as useful to most Australian militia officers as cuneiform inscriptions on Babylonian brick.”187 Spencer Jones has highlighted the problem: “The failure to create a doctrinal framework for all arms co-operation was a serious weakness for the British Army. Without systematic guidance, the individual arms tended to learn within their own framework, and developing links took time and effort to bear fruit.”188 What is more, Gough’s command style did not follow the FSR doctrine regarding subordinate authority, but as Gary Sheffield wrote, “He was a practitioner of the opposite: prescriptive, ‘top-down’ command.”189 The distances the troops had to cover to reach the German front line were excessive. Rather than the recommended 200 metres, attacks were to cover 300 to 800 metres to reach that objective. The 2nd Division did not have the spare manpower or time to dig closer jump-off trenches – another negative consequence of Gough’s accel-

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erated attack tempo. Later, during the Passchendaele campaign, Currie would refuse to serve under Gough because of the Canadians’ experiences on the Somme.190 The crucial factor was the artillery failure. In the days following the battle for Thiepval Ridge, Canadian artillery continuously shelled the Regina Trench position and, at times, Canadian positions. The 5th Brigade acidly reported that on the 29 and 30 September its forward positions underwent prolonged shelling by Canadian heavy artillery.191 The heavy artillery needed observation to correct their fire, but Regina Trench was on a reverse slope and thus unobservable from the ground. Poor weather and the loss of air supremacy limited the number and effectiveness of observation flights during this period.192 The German artillery received, at best, only a cursory treatment by the corps artillery. The British V Corps was developing methods of successful counter-battery work, but these had not yet reached the Canadian Corps. The inexperience of its personnel and defective shells further hampered the artillery. The artillery was the most technical of the combat arms, and it took much longer to train than the infantry. It was no accident that the divisional artillery of both the 3rd and 4th Divisions were British formations for a year after the divisions arrived at the front. Up to a quarter of the shells, so laboriously dragged forward, burst either prematurely or not at all. In addition, uneven manufacturing standards led to shells from different lots having varied ballistic qualities.193 There were also serious shortcomings in the cooperation between the infantry and artillery. It appeared the two arms fought two separate battles that coincided in time and place – a problem the British faced, as well.194 At a senior officers’ conference in December 1916, the infantry complained of the lack of the personal touch between the infantry and artillery. The infantry was dissatisfied with the time needed to get heavy artillery support, the poor wire cutting of the field artillery, and artillery inaccuracy. The gunners responded to the infantry complaints by pointing out their own difficulties. There were so few experienced officers available that they could not be spared from the guns, and therefore, new officers had to act as foos or liaison officers.

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Communications were slow and intermittent, so it was not surprising that the heavy artillery could not respond promptly. Burstall commented that the infantry often reported the barbed wire as cut, so the artillery was not at fault. The gunners also explained that the attack tempo did not give them sufficient time to register their guns and this affected accuracy.195 As a result, the artillery was far less effective than at Courcelette.

c onclusion Turner’s division performed admirably at Courcelette and won the most striking Canadian victory on the Somme. It also experienced the same frustrations that afflicted the other Canadian divisions on the Somme. Even Currie’s vaunted 1st Division stumbled to the extent that Gough ordered a court of inquiry into the division’s failure at Regina Trench on 8 October. The unexpurgated version of the inquiry includes a crossed-out statement that one officer had to shoot several men who would not counterattack.196 Turner’s own performance indicated that he developed into a competent and effective divisional commander, and his reputation partially recovered. Nevertheless, his further development as a combat commander ended in late November 1916, when the Canadian authorities selected him to address the administrative and training debacle in England.

5 Chaos in England: Unwise Management For armies can signify but little abroad unless there be counsel and wise management at home. Cicero1

Before delineating the changes Turner implemented as goc Canadian forces in the British Isles, it is essential to understand the chaotic state of the Canadian administration in England prior to Turner’s arrival. Every facet of the Canadian military presence in England was faulty, from the Quartermaster Branch to the chaplain service to, most importantly, the training of the combat arms and officers. The purpose of military administration is to “provide the necessities that allow fighting soldiers to achieve full efficiency. There must be clear jurisdictions, open communications, and willing co-operation between soldiers of the bureaucracy and those of the line.”2 Hughes’s regime represents the antithesis of this definition, for there were no clear lines of authority, only limited communications, and a lack of cooperation between the authorities in Canada, England, and the field. This failure had drastic, deleterious consequences, as it seriously compromised the ability of the Canadian Corps to sustain its combat edge. It cost Canada lives, treasure, and reputation. The next two chapters assess the performance of the administration on two dimensions – effectiveness and efficiency (as defined by the author).3 Effectiveness describes the degree to which replacements met the requirements of the fighting forces in numbers and combat performance. An effective organization produced sufficient numbers of disciplined drafts with high morale who could employ efficaciously the tactics, weapons, and techniques required to complete their mission. Efficiency refers to the extent to which production of trained and

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effective drafts utilized resources of personnel, time, and money. An efficient organization minimized resource usage to achieve the required outcome. Most of the evidence presented in this chapter comes from the Hughes period and includes criticisms from the Canadian Corps, from within the administration in England, from friends and associates of Hughes, and from Canada. Such criticisms clearly indicated profound problems in the administration in England and were not inventions made later. Evidence also comes from reports written under the aegis of the administration that replaced Hughes’s regime. These later reports were unlikely to minimize the extent of the problems, but neither were they likely to completely manufacture them. They provide useful details of the extent and nature of the issues.

str ucture The structure of Canadian forces in England was a confusing mess of feuding officers, civilians, and ministerial representatives. At one point, six separate authorities in England claimed that they spoke for Canada. They included Perley, the acting high commissioner; Max Aitken, Hughes’s personal representative; Lord Brooke and later David Watson, the goc Bramshott Canadian Training Division; Major-General J.C. MacDougall, the original goc Canadians in charge of the Shorncliffe Canadian Training Division; John Wallace Carson, the minister’s “Special Representative”; and Major-General Sam Steele, the goc Southeastern Area, and another goc Canadians. This naturally confused the War Office, which at one point plaintively asked who was in charge.4 The answer, ultimately, was – Sam Hughes. This confusing structure developed rapidly once the 1st Division left for France in February 1915. As new units arrived, the authorities added more training areas that would report to different British commands. By late 1916, the Canadian training system and organization consisted of fifty-seven reserve battalions scattered across six major training centres, split into two training divisions at Shorncliffe and Bramshott, reporting separately to the British Aldershot and Eastern Commands.

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Figure 5.1 Canadian Forces in England 1916 simplified organization chart

John Wallace Carson, a stout mining-stock promoter, adroitly manoeuvred a poorly defined set of responsibilities into a position of being the de facto authority for the feuding Canadian major-generals in the training commands and the British. Connaught, Canada’s governor general, characterized Carson as quite “undependable,” and Macphail thought one of Carson’s pre-war business ventures a “pure swindle.” Carson impressed Borden in his initial foray as a special representative in 1914, and he extended his mandate to be the communications nexus between the British, the Canadian authorities in France and England, and Hughes. Carson was entirely dependent on Hughes’s favour and so was certain to satisfy him even when he disagreed with the minister’s demands.5 Carson told Brigadier-General Meighen that he “was obliged to do things, by order of the Minster, of which he did not approve.”6

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The front complained, the British complained, and even Borden complained about the disorganization and misrule. Fundamentally, the problem was that there was no single authority in charge of Canadian forces. From early on in the conflict, there was constant criticism of the administration in England. An example of a complaint was sent by an officer in the 5th Brigade to Borden: “Canadian soldiering arrangements in England are in a deplorable state … the senior officers … are all working at cross purposes.”7 The criticisms resolved to three core grievances: the effectiveness of the Canadian forces in England; their efficiency; and the always contentious, conspicuous issue of promotions. Effectiveness touched on the poor quality and lack of drafts produced by the Canadian administration in England, while efficiency referred to the excessive resources used to produce the deficient replacements. Promotions, appointments, commissions, decorations, and awards (these terms will be subsumed here under “promotions” for brevity) were always a topic close to the hearts of officers and men and subject to the closest scrutiny. Promotions in the cef generated ill will, complaint, and controversy, as it was apparent that factors other than military competence and service were decisive considerations for promotions.

effec tiveness The Canadian Corps’s 24,000 casualties on the Somme threw an insupportable burden on the Canadian training establishment, and it collapsed. By mid-October, the demand for drafts was 18,000 men, and an estimated 7,000 more were needed by the end of the month to replace losses and replenish the replacement pool in France. However, there were only 13,000 drafts available. Hughes refused to break up surplus battalions in England, cabling, “Stand firm. Let our divisions rest. We will get all six divisions in shape.” And referring to Mount Sorrel, he added, “Surely Byng cannot repeat June 3rd every month.”8 By 8 November, the corps was short 296 officers, with only 65 replacements ready. The infantry needed 9,368 drafts, but only 2,923 were ready, leaving a shortfall of 6,445 men.9

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Not only were there insufficient men, those few arriving were unprepared for battle. The training syllabus was only ten weeks, which was insufficient time to instruct the recruits properly.10 In most instances, recruits did not complete their full training period; 59.2 per cent of all the replacements provided in 1916 were only partially trained, and during the Somme in October 1916, the proportion rose to a shockingly high seven out of ten men partially trained.11 Further, Hughes mandated that training be conducted with the Ross rifle, which meant men using the smle needed conversion training. Currie complained that the failure of the 8 October attack was due to fighting with drafts untrained on the smle rifle and unfamiliar with the standard grenade.12 The staggering losses at the Somme also caused problems for the British and Australians. During the battle, men were reaching British units with only six weeks training, making them a “danger to themselves and others.”13 Three separate reports – an inspection of training facilities in England by Major-General Lessard in May 1916, a June 1916 report of training deficiencies on the Shorncliffe base, and a summary of conditions during the Hughes period written in February 1917 – identify myriad training inadequacies.14 There was little or no coordination with Canada, and as a result, much of the training in Canada was wasted. Training staff assessed that battalions embodied in Canada for six to eighteen months arrived in England credited only with what amounted to the first three weeks of the training syllabus. The training in England was substandard and inefficient. Alderson set an unfortunate precedent by agreeing to accept a portion of the partially trained replacements, and “since that time a very small percentage of fully trained Drafts have been despatched overseas.”15 One report included this damning critique: “The conception and tone of the Canadian Training Division is on a wrong basis from its foundation.”16 Another recurring complaint was that men were proceeding overseas without proper clothing and equipment. Part of the problem stemmed from men arriving in England and training in Canadian Oliver harness equipment, Canadian tunics and boots, and with the Ross rifle. Canadian tunics were too restrictive, Canadian boots dissolved in wet conditions, and the Oliver harness was almost unbearable

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and could carry less equipment and ammunition than the standard British web equivalent. The drafts had to be re-equipped with Imperial pattern equipment, including the smle, before departing for France.17 This added an additional complication to the rush to get drafts to France.18 The abysmal state of the training organization did not escape the notice of the British War Office or Haig. Both tried to influence the Canadians to effect reforms. In June 1916, the cigs requested Aitken approach the Canadian government with an offer to replace MacDougall with a British Regular officer. If the Canadians did so, the War Office would abolish Alderson’s inspector-general position as an incentive, but nothing came of the request.19 Haig, after discussions with Byng, wrote, “His recent drafts have been badly trained, and he told me that the Canadian organisation at Shorncliffe is a disgrace. Apparently political influence is allowed free scope there, and there is a feeling of distrust existing at the Corps at the front and those commanding the Depot in England!”20 In July, Haig wrote King George V, asking whether he could say a word to help the situation – meaning pass on to the Canadian government the concerns with the state of training.21 Again, nothing came of the intervention. The quantity and quality of replacement officers was another problem.22 In early 1916, Shorncliffe had only 7 per cent of its officers immediately available for drafts and another 8 per cent after completing courses.23 The corps complained that officers arriving from England did not have sufficient practical training to be effective – they lacked the “habit of command” and did not understand their responsibilities or the technical aspects of their role.24 Steele had to issue an order that all officers were to know their men – it was extraordinary that officers were unaware of this most basic of responsibilities.25 The officers coming from England were so ineffective that Byng established a corps officer school.26 The technical arms, so essential for combat success, including signals, engineers, artillery, and machine guns, were in especially poor condition. In August 1916, the commander of the 1st Division Signal Company commented “that after two years of war, the drafts we are receiving could not be worse than they are.” A later report indicated that each base had its own syllabus based on an obsolete training

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manual.27 The engineering service faced severe shortages of trained personnel, while demands for them escalated. Like the signal service, the engineers had to depend on obtaining skilled tradesmen already trained for technical roles, as the instruction period would otherwise be too long. The corps complained they could only get reinforcements by transferring infantry to the engineers, which disrupted the infantry units and delayed engineer training. The Canadian Corps cre, BrigadierGeneral Lindsay, protested in May 1916 that of the 700 sappers in training at the Canadian Engineer Training Depot (cetd) he could charitably classify only 60 as partially trained. Lindsay concluded that “there is something radically wrong with the organization and administration, and there must be an entire lack of coordination.”28 The War Office suggested that many of the Canadian sapper drafts “do not appear to have carried out any sapper training at all.”29 The artillery probably underwent the most significant change of all the arms during the war. Wartime experience drove the recognition that artillery had to focus on accurate indirect fire.30 The artillery had to adopt the principles of scientific gunnery of the Royal Garrison Artillery, such as calculating adjustments for barometer, air temperature, wind, shell lots, gun calibration, charge propellant temperature, and muzzle velocity, all of which placed a greater pressure on the training organization to produce more and better-trained gunners.31 Unfortunately, it was apparent early on that the artillery-training establishment was unequal to the challenge. In December 1915, Currie complained that the artillery training was “d-d rotten and the men responsible for the training of these men should be told so in no unmistakable terms.”32 Steele, in response, emphasized to MacDougall the importance of sending only trained men, especially artillery, to France.33 The harshest complaints came from Morrison, the 2nd Division cra. In December 1915, he reported to MacDougall on his inspection of the Canadian Reserve Brigade at Shorncliffe. He found it in poor condition and unable to supply the drafts needed for the 1916 campaign.34 The machine gun (mg) service in England was another branch that failed. The training of mg officers and men in England was the responsibility of the Canadian mg Depot. The depot originated as an mg battalion from Canada that had neither completed infantry training

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nor undertaken machine gun instruction. The depot’s organization as a reserve battalion was unsuitable for supplying the twelve brigade mg companies and other mg units in the corps. Infantry battalions supplied the depot with recruits, and as to be expected, the battalions foisted the unwilling and unfit on the depot. It often had difficulty rejecting even the obviously unsuited. Pressure for infantry drafts also resulted in authorities in England sending trained mg officers and men as infantry, thus wasting their specialized training. Even recovered wounded machine gunners were not immune to this pernicious practice. In addition, the depot lacked the necessary training materials and machine guns types used at the front. The situation was so chaotic that, in November 1916, the commander of the depot could not estimate how many trained men the depot could produce in the next months.35 Byng was especially unhappy with the state of the brigade mg companies, noting that the “supply of personnel, condition of service and promotion is highly unsatisfactory and has resulted in extravagance, inefficiency and discontent.”36

efficiency The efficiency of the forces in England was abysmal. The treatment of casualties was so poorly organized that at one point the administration lost 6,000 men in the system. Contrary to good practice, recoveredwounded personnel did not return to their units.37 A senior officer claimed that the Canadians returned only 6 per cent of their wounded to the front while the British returned 60 per cent. There were also issues with authorities not repatriating permanently unfit men.38 The Medical Service suffered from too few officers to inspect arriving and departing drafts, a lack of medical officers assigned to reserve battalions, poor training, and an absence of coordination between the standards of authorities in England and France. The service roiled with the controversy of the Bruce Report. Colonel H.A. Bruce was appointed by Hughes to investigate the Canadian Medical Service. Bruce, with no military experience but extensive surgical knowledge, made a one-month whirlwind tour of the medical facili-

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ties and delivered a report in September 1916 recommending significant changes. Bruce was essentially a civilian with no experience in military medical matters, and his strident advocacy and underhanded tactics undermined the legitimacy of his findings. The surgeongeneral, G.C. Jones, disagreed with the recommended reorganization and resigned. The fallout from the Bruce Report would bedevil Perley as minister well into 1917.39 Hughes saddled the chaplain service with another of his poor administrative appointments. Borden characterized the director, Colonel Richard Steacy, as a “self-centred, useless, inefficient creature, heedless of duty and bent solely on gaining higher rank and increased pay.”40 A report on the service described a litany of problems, including no discipline for chaplains returned for misconduct, administrative irregularities, important letters unanswered, lack of supervision, no understanding of the needs of the service in France, lack of attention to Roman Catholic complaints, and promotions “left to caprice.”41 The relations between the British and Canadian services deteriorated to the point that the British deputy chaplain-general refused to deal with Steacy.42 The situation in the quartermaster’s department was no better. The department unnecessarily used men in the highest medical category in its Canadian Army Service Corps (casc). Training units had their own ordnance supplies and transportation, which resulted in considerable duplication and waste. The government paid for rented accommodations and hospital stores, although the British were supposed to provide these gratis. Four hundred personnel worked on repairing Ross rifles at a cost of $5 per rifle, a weapon no longer used at the front.43 Another complaint was that Canadian equipment was inadequate for active service and ended up condemned, sold at a loss, or cast off. Hughes saddled Canadians with poorly made, poorly designed, or unsuitable equipment, with no spare parts. These problems stemmed from Hughes’s desire to promote Canadian industry and his firm conviction of the superiority of Canadian material. Unfortunately, while Hughes’s motives were well intended, the results were unsatisfactory.44

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pr omotions An exceedingly sore point with the forces in France was the unshakeable belief that promotions were at the mercy of political influence.45 Perley shared this conviction as well, writing in March 1917 that “a great many of our troubles in the past have been caused by the feeling that promotion and leave could only be obtained through influence of some kind.”46 Hence, there was an apprehension that the staff, sycophants, and the connected received rewards over more deserving recipients – a universal complaint.47 This apprehension was not surprising, given the politicized nature of the pre-war Canadian Militia and the ample evidence of political influence affecting promotions.48 A particularly egregious example of interference was the case of Private Galbraith. Hughes ordered Carson to commission Galbraith, a friend’s son, who turned out to be an incompetent officer. His commanding officer in France, whom Carson did not query about Galbraith’s suitability as required, characterized him in an angry letter to the War Office as “absolutely unsuitable and unfitted to be an Officer. He is not fit to be a Bombardier.”49 What was especially frustrating to the officers at the front was Hughes’s practice of recalling junior captains or majors to Canada and returning them to England as majors and lieutenant-colonels and thus having them leap in rank over officers at the front. For example, Lieutenant-Colonel Rogers complained that two captains sent home because of inefficiency were promoted to major and made second-in-command of new battalions.50 The issue of promotions and awards is one that plagues all institutions, and even if the system is objectively equitable, the perception will remain that it can be unfair.51 As Changboo Kang, in his dissertation on British officers, phrased it, “honours and awards were in fact a highly contentious issue during the Great War that provoked ceaseless suspicion and friction.”52 Early in the war, Aitken arranged for Hughes to be the sole arbiter of all promotions and honours not under Alderson’s control.53 This gave Hughes a powerful tool in his efforts to control the forces in England, as well as a great deal of influence in promotions in the Canadian Corps. As he was the fountainhead for all advancement in England, Hughes was able to satisfy his friends, family, and colleagues. He was especially diligent in advancing fam-

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ily members to positions above their probable merits, including his own brother, William Hughes, his son-in-law Lieutenant C. McAlpine, and of course Garnet Hughes.54 This obvious bias alienated officers in France and exacerbated Hughes’s estrangement from the corps.55 Hughes, contrary to regulations, encouraged officers to contact him directly.56 Hence, it became common practice for officers to work outside the normal and expected communication channels to secure advancement.57 This extended to Hughes visits to England, which saw various commanders anxious to pay court to maintain favour.58 Officer gradation was another cause of endless squabbling, as the Canadian Militia List did not apply to the cef. Deeply anguished disputes over officers’ ranks and seniority were the result. No single source could definitively determine who had seniority, so Hughes had to settle these disputes, which gave him another source of power.59 The promotion system failed. By late 1916, the authorities had not forwarded the more than 2,000 names from Shorncliffe to the War Office for promulgation.60 In addition, the War Office could not follow the changes in Canadian policy. In its response to a 1917 request that the minister of the omfc approve all Canadian promotions in France before gazetting (all promotions had to be published in the London Gazette to be official), the War Office stated that it was following a 1915 Privy Council order. In fact, this order had been superseded, then further amended in 1916. This illustrates both the problem the War Office had in following Canadian rules and the fact that no one on the Canadian side noticed the failure of the War Office to follow the agreed-upon procedure.61 The war placed unprecedented demands on the Canadian military, so it was not surprising that there were failures in the initial stages of the war. These errors were understandable, given the conflict’s scope, scale, duration, and nature. After two years, however, the Canadian system in England was not improving and inexperience was no longer an excuse. The Canadian administration was not addressing the problems of inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and promotion inequities. This was in stark contrast to the increasing professionalism and effectiveness of the Canadian forces in the field. If the field forces could master a steep learning curve, so should have the Canadian administration in England.

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The proximate causes of this chaos were fivefold: Hughes’s need for control; Hughes’s drive to create a six-division army; mediocrities in command and on instruction staff; the government’s dependence on a volunteer recruiting system; and the limited communications between Canadian authorities in France, England, and Canada. As other historians have commented, Hughes was pugnacious, partisan, grandiose, frenetic, and unfettered by self-doubt. He was supremely confident in his judgment of people and situations.62 This attitude contributed to his desire for personal control over “his boys.” To achieve this end, he established a confused and overlapping set of responsibilities for the Canadian authorities in England that reflected his desire to centralize all decision-making under his aegis.63 Hughes represented an older tradition of personal management of a government department.64 Before the First World War, the Canadian federal government was small enough that it was possible for an engaged minister to be personally involved in all major and many minor decisions. In 1915, major departments, such as Justice and Finance, had fewer than a hundred employees.65 The ministries were as much an opportunity to reward the party faithful as they were an apparatus to run government operations. Hughes’s domination resulted in a tragic misalignment of priorities between the dictates coming from Canada and the needs of the front. When presented with a choice between satisfying Hughes or the front, the authorities in England chose expediency and satisfied Hughes, despite the resulting cost in blood and treasure. A particularly egregious example was Carson’s callous response to a request in November 1916 to supply men with the personal equipment used in France: “If the authorities in France choose to change that equipment once our men reach France, that is their own funeral and their own responsibility.”66 Hughes was convinced that if the Australians could raise five divisions for service on the Western Front from a population smaller than Canada’s, Canada should be able to mobilize as many as eight to ten divisions – Hughes was promising the British a 5th and 6th Division in September 1916.67 Hughes’s drive to create a larger army and the dependence on a volunteer force had a deleterious effect on

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the efficiency and effectiveness of the training machine. The fundamental problem was the policy of raising new battalions rather than providing drafts for the front.68 Without a rational manpower policy or even an understanding of the available personnel resources, the government relied on local worthies, using their contacts and influence to raise battalions.69 As a consequence, Canada formed 272 infantry or mounted rifle battalions, almost all of which left for England. This total consisted of 257 numbered infantry battalions, 13 Canadian Mounted Rifle battalions, the rcr, and the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (ppcli). This resulted in an excess of units clogging the administration in England, taking up barrack space, diverting resources from the proper mission of training men, and reducing the flow of replacements, as full battalions had to be recruited before moving to England.70 The excessive number of senior officers and ncos created a serious political issue, as the Canadian Corps would not accept them as replacements at their rank. Consequently, there were 499 surplus senior officers and 6,000 ncos in England in November 1916.71 In a long tradition, units proceeding to the front left behind the halt, the lame, and the inefficient as instructors. These instructors tended to have limited knowledge of modern conditions and equally limited abilities to prepare men for battle. The absence of effective communications between England and France further exacerbated the problem of poor instruction, and thus recruits received outdated training. In one remarkable example of how out of touch the training personnel were, a Canadian staff officer stated in the fall of 1916 that the “Lewis Machine Gun is apparently being used in the Canadian Corps” – this a year after its introduction at the front.72 The mediocrity problem in England started at the top with weak commanders such as Steele, MacDougall, and the first commander of Bramshott, Lord Brooke. Steele was old, tired, unfit, and prone to intrigue.73 A staff position better suited MacDougall than the command of a training division; he lacked the strength of character, health, backbone, and knowledge for such a responsible position. In addition, all pf officers knew they commanded on the sufferance of Hughes, who despised the pf, so they were unlikely to raise objections.74

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Carson viewed his responsibilities as limited to England and took no interest or care in the problems created for the Canadian base depot in France by the defective replacement system in England.75 The training brigade commanders had little to no experience at the front and tended to be former battalion commanders who were skilled politicians. Officers selected for training brigades, such as Colonel C.A. Smart and Lieutenant-Colonel Maynard Rogers, were of concern to Alderson.76 Carson knew there were problems and admitted to Hughes he was not happy with the results from Shorncliffe and thought many of the brigade commanders incapable, but he did not rectify the situation.77 Commanders such as Steele and MacDougall did not react well to the deluge of complaints from the front. They either denied there was a problem or shifted the blame.78 They seldom regarded any criticism as valid or at least deserving of investigation. This attitude was intensely frustrating and led to comments from senior officers like Currie: “I almost feel as if it is no further use making complaints, because the position is almost hopeless.”79 Units languished in Canada, spending months in ineffective training before approaching a full complement.80 Frequently, units enlisted over-age, under-age, and unfit men to fill the ranks but who would be culled in England at considerable cost to the country – an estimated $1,500 per recruit in First World War dollars.81 In late 1916, medical inspections assessed one in six men arriving in England as unfit, with one unit having 45 per cent of its men declared medically unfit.82 Further, Canadian regulations allowed units to enlist men who were either too young or too old to serve in France and thus could not be used as replacements.83 A further issue was that the General Staff, which in theory was responsible for training, was, in one officer’s opinion, subordinated to the administrative side and practically controlled by it.84 The technical reserve units, such as artillery and engineers, were under the authority of local commanders, who in many cases were wholly ignorant of or unsympathetic to their special requirements.

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f or mation of ministry of overseas military for ces of canada Hughes was under pressure from Borden, colleagues, and his minions in England to reorganize the forces overseas.85 For instance, Watson wrote to Carson demanding that “the whole slate must be cleaned from top to bottom. Things are radically wrong there General and you should insist, for the honour of Canada and the vital interests here at the front to have a drastic change effected.”86 In March 1916, Hughes responded by first setting up an informal council with four members, including Carson, Aitken, and Watson, the newly appointed goc 4th Division.87 The council held only two meetings before Aitken undermined it, and Watson, realizing the extent of the disorganization, decided to focus on his division.88 In the fall, Hughes formed the Acting Sub-Militia Overseas Council to act as an advisory body. However, its utility was limited by his having to approve all its decisions, its size (twelve members), and its staffing with his cronies, including Carson, Brooke, Meighen, and another Hughes’s son-in-law, Byron Greene, as secretary. Hughes, in his grandiose style, claimed that the British adjutant-general wished they could model their system on Hughes’s structure.89 The council did not accomplish much in its short existence before Perley disbanded it in November 1916.90 Borden was caught in a terrible dilemma. It was evident that the overseas forces were beset with problems, and Hughes could not remedy them.91 Hughes had, however, a powerful constituency in Canada who believed his claims of prowess and accomplishments.92 Borden was non-confrontational and feared the damage the truculent Hughes could do if ousted. While Hughes was in England establishing his council, Perley was in Canada lobbying Borden for a civilian head of a smaller military council in England. From early in the war, Hughes and his regime troubled Perley. As early as May 1915, Perley was raising warnings that the British did not know who was in charge. He had to deal with the consequences of Hughes’s intemperate outbursts, and he wanted to mitigate or avoid the damage by being more involved in military matters. Perley was convinced that Hughes was a menace and was “damaging Canada’s reputation.”93 Perley was a survivor and was not one to bow to Hughes’s bullying.94

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Borden decided to establish a separate ministry for overseas forces. This approach would solve the problems inherent in Hughes’ control over the cef while keeping him in the government. Recognizing Borden’s manoeuvre would effectively end his power, Hughes reacted strongly. His health was suffering, and Morton suggests that a serious car accident involving Hughes’s family probably further unbalanced his already unsteady personality. In the end, Hughes’s outrageous behaviour forced Borden to ask for his resignation. After much anguish, plotting, and pleas, Hughes resigned.95 What was surprising was the limited reaction from Hughes. It suggested that there was an undocumented quid pro quo of ensuring Garnet Hughes received a division. Certainly, there were instructions to Conservatives not to attack Hughes unless he attacked the government.96 In place of a single Department of Militia, Borden established two separate but equal ministries. Perley who retained his position as acting high commissioner, would head the new Ministry of Overseas Military Forces of Canada. The appointment was well received – it was obvious a change was needed.97 Perley was from a wealthy lumber family from Ottawa, and he was first elected in the Quebec riding of Argenteuil in 1904.98 Two of his properties later became important landmarks in Ottawa, Stornaway and the site of the Canadian Library and Archives building.99 Perley was Borden’s closest confidant while the Conservatives were in opposition, and when elected, Borden tasked Perley with overhauling the government machinery.100 Borden admired successful businessmen in an age when business attracted the best and brightest, and Perley was successful. Perley was an astute politician, an anglophile, a millionaire, and almost wholly ignorant of military matters.101 Borden warned Perley indirectly about his perceived predilection for the British: “a cry may be raised on this side that Canadian rights will not be strongly asserted under your administration and that Canadian direction and control will not be properly maintained.”102 Borden appointed A.E. Kemp minister of Militia in place of Hughes. Kemp was born into humble circumstances in Quebec and had parlayed his acumen and hard work into a successful business career in Toronto. He first entered politics in 1900 and was serving as a minister without portfolio at the start of the war. He acted as Borden’s

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troubleshooter, investigating operations of various departments and then serving as the first chairman of the War Purchasing Committee in 1915. Desmond Morton has described Kemp as “bustling, aggressive, and sometimes pompous.”103 A drawback of there being two ministries was Perley’s inability to defend his ministry in the House, leaving that responsibility to Kemp. As Morton suggests, Perley could remain above politics, leaving Kemp with the dirty work.104 Perley was a member of the cabinet but not really in it, given his remote location in England.

anz ac comparison The new structure was significantly at variance with the approach of New Zealand and Australia. They both appointed British officers as goc of all their overseas forces, and these officers retained this post even after receiving appointments to command other units. MajorGeneral Alexander Godley who commanded the New Zealand Militia from 1910, was the goc, New Zealand Expeditionary Force. Lieutenant-General W. Birdwood took over as goc, Australian Imperial Force (aif) after the first commander, Major-General W.T. Bridges, died at Gallipoli. Godley received the XXIII Corps in 1917 and Birdwood the Fifth Army in 1918. This meant the goc had responsibility for both the combat arms and the administrative forces overseas. The advantages of this approach over the Canadian omfc should have been better coordination with and support for the front. The same officer responsible for both functions should have mitigated the bickering between the front and rear services. In addition, a British goc would minimize the intrusion of political influence.105 These advantages, however, were not always realized, and there were disadvantages. The gocs focused on their combat command, and certainly the Australian goc, Birdwood, spent little time on the forces in England. In one year, he made only two visits to training depots in England.106 There was still bickering and intriguing in the Australian case, especially when Major-General J.W. McCay, who was too politically dangerous to be returned to Australia, took over command of the depots in England. McCay was a former defence

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minister and was responsible for bringing down two separate governments.107 Repeatedly, he lobbied to command all forces in England in a role similar to Turner’s. At other times, he angled for command of the Australian Corps, Birdwood’s position, or command of the 5th Division, again.108 E.M. Andrews contrasts the systems: “[W]hereas the Canadian and New Zealand administrations in London were to be become large and effective with some initiative, the aif Headquarters in London remained purely an administrative body, with all policy decisions referred to Melbourne.”109 One advantage to the Canadian approach was the political heft of a cabinet minister residing in England. This might have been a factor in the lower capitation rates Canada paid for its forces compared to the Australians. The Dominions agreed to pay the British for all supplies, food, and ordnance supplied at the front, and to simplify the accounting, a per capita rate was charged for each soldier at the front.110 This lack of political influence later prompted the Australian government to send a cabinet minister to England during demobilization to assert Australian interests.111 A disadvantage of having a British goc was, in Birdwood’s case, his reluctance to replace British staff officers with Australians. Moreover, Birdwood did not encourage the assignment of Australians as staff learners. This contrasted with the Canadian policy of developing Canadians to replace British staff officers for all but the most senior positions.112 In the Second World War, the Canadians would adopt a different approach, with a headquarters in England responsible for routine matters and for command of the static training and administration units in England. This headquarters was subordinate to the senior combatant officer, Canadian Army Overseas. There was a conscious effort to avoid what the chief of the General Staff considered the ills of the system in the First World War, but while the new system had advantages, there were still tensions between the front and the base.113 It is also questionable whether the system was more efficient than the organization in the First World War, as the Canadian hq in London at the end of the first war consisted of 760 personnel, while the Canadian hq in London at the end of the second war was comprised of 2,073 personnel – albeit it managed two fronts.114 There were also numerous complaints about the quality of the training received de-

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spite the twenty-five to thirty-one weeks between enlistment and reaching the front.115 From the available records, there is no indication that Borden ever considered an overall goc of overseas forces. Hughes would not have tolerated a goc limiting his power, and the goc would undoubtedly have been a British officer, which would have been anathema to Hughes and the Canadian cabinet. In late 1916, when Borden was determining the organization, no Canadian officer, including Currie, had the experience, credibility, or success to be selected goc. When established, Borden’s purpose for the omfc was to retain Hughes while stripping him of his power over the cef.

turner ’s selection Perley, assisted by William White, the minister of Finance, in England on business, had the daunting task of determining the ministry’s structure. Initially, all the parties worked on the assumption that it would mimic the organization in Canada with an Overseas Militia Council. Borden offered to send the able chief of the General Staff, Major-General Willoughby Gwatkin, and Eugene Fiset, the deputy minister of Militia, to help staff the council. Borden offered to send Gwatkin in part because Gwatkin was planning to resign owing to conflict with Hughes.116 Perley was fully aware of the inadequacies of the existing senior commanders in England and knew he needed a stronger team. He realized he needed a respected leader with front experience and the confidence of the corps.117 Parachuting in Gwatkin, an Englishman, would be a serious misstep, would undermine Perley’s credibility with the corps, and would open Perley to further accusations of subordinating Canadian interests to British ones.118 Perley astutely met with Byng and his senior commanders, down to brigade level, to get their advice on the organization and staff. He received universal advice that instead of a council there should be a front-experienced officer as goc, assisted by an adjutant-general, a quartermaster-general, and a director of training, with a deputy minister under Perley for civil affairs. They could act as an informal council if Perley selected the right men.119

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Perley now had his organization, but he needed the front-experienced goc. This officer would have to have the confidence of the corps but also the breadth of experience and expertise required to deal with the multitude of military and civil issues in England. Perley effectively had two choices, Currie or Turner. Of the other two divisional commanders, Lipsett of the 3rd Division was British and thus disqualified, and Watson was too junior and had already passed on the opportunity to be goc in England. Perley interviewed both Currie and Turner without revealing his purpose and sought Byng’s advice. Byng recommended Currie without qualification and offered to release him to England.120 Perley cabled Borden, informing him that “Currie is generally preferred by officers at the front,” but his Liberal affiliations might raise objections, although Currie claimed he no longer took a political interest. Perley described Turner as “much beloved by everyone but perhaps not quite so firm or forceful as others.”121 Both White and Perley found “Currie most capable for position but Turner would probably be more popular with our following.”122 As a result of such consultations, Perley first offered the position to Currie, which Currie rejected. Currie smouldered with resentment over the treatment of the corps by the politicians, and he was convinced that the offer was a manoeuvre to displace him. He let it be known that he would only accept the position if it was free from political interference. This was not an unreasonable demand given the previous history of overt intrusion. Currie’s inference that the new minister was no different from Hughes probably offended Perley. Currie believed that Perley was cool to him afterwards because of this. Also motivating Currie was his wish to remain at the front, as that was where the opportunities and honour lay.123 Perley then offered the position to Turner, on 24 November 1916. Turner first resisted, recognizing the supremacy of the active front. He did not want to leave his division. Perley, however, positioned the appointment as Turner’s duty and presented an excerpt of a cable from Borden that stated that whomever Perley selected “will regard it as his duty in the public interest and for the national welfare to undertake the ever more important duty which you propose to

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entrust to him.”124 Perley had asked Borden to send the telegram as a further inducement to convince Turner. Additional pressure from Byng and Turner’s innate sense of responsibility led him to formally accept the offer on 30 November. He did so with the proviso that his seniority be respected and that he be considered for corps command if the opportunity arose.125 An unsigned and undated note accompanied Perley’s original note, asking Turner to cross over quickly and assuring him that the “post will not foreclude [sic] him from again getting to the fighting line at some future time after he has got everything in shape here and when the suitable opportunity arises.” The note was undoubtedly from Perley.126 Some historians have misrepresented one aspect of this decision process – specifically the notion that Byng was eager to relieve Turner.127 Given the 2nd Division’s considerable success at Courcelette, it is difficult to understand why Byng would want to unstick Turner, and there is no evidence to support this claim. Clearly, Byng regarded Currie as more capable than Turner, but it does not follow that he wanted to remove him. If Byng wanted to replace Turner, why did he not recommend Turner for the post initially? It is more plausible that Byng wanted the desperate situation in England to be resolved and if Currie would not do it, then it had to be Turner. Turner was reluctant to take the position, but writing to Garnet Hughes, he put an interesting but characteristic spin on his situation: “When the two ministers were here no intimation was given that I was likely to be selected, and I honestly say the prospect did not appeal to me. I know there will be a bag of trouble, and that is a feature which rather pleases me.”128 Turner’s appointment was widely regarded as a good choice. Even the Toronto Star and Manitoba Free Press, both Liberal papers, approved, with the Free Press commenting, “Drawing room and political influence and social considerations will have a little weight with this man from the front.”129 Turner was on his way to England with the unwieldy title of General Officer Commanding Canadian Forces in the British Isles. His selection was the result of Perley’s need for a competent and respected senior front-line commander capable of overhauling the

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training and administrative chaos in England. He would, however, be missed, as one battalion history described: “[I]t is certain that the units of the division regretted his departure profoundly.”130 A contemporary perspective was provided by a staff officer, D.E. Macintyre, who believed that Turner “certainly is the right man in the right place. Unfortunately it is a great loss for us, everyone was his friend out here.”131

6 “A wise choice”: Transformation General Turner is a great strength and was a wise choice. Sir George Perley, Minister of omfc 1

Turner and his staff were under severe time constraints to build up a supply of effectively trained replacements before the start of the 1917 spring offensive. It was apparent to Turner that to achieve that challenging goal, virtually every aspect of the Canadian training and administration organization needed rapid reform, revision, replacement, rearrangement, or renewal. Turner implemented wide-sweeping reforms that increased the effectiveness of the organization, improved its efficiency, and refashioned the promotion system. What was remarkable was how swiftly Turner and his staff implemented these changes, with most in place within four months of Turner’s selection. After a short leave and meetings with Perley, Turner first dealt with the old guard, relieving the acting chief of staff, adjutant-general, and quartermaster-general. Turner thanked them for their services and suggested that a position commensurate with their qualifications would be found; no such positions, however, were identified, and all eventually returned to Canada. 2 Initially, Perley considered keeping MacDougall as the adjutant-general and finding a place for Carson, but Turner rejected this plan, as he did not want to be encumbered with those responsible for the chaos.3 Since MacDougall’s appointment was by order-in-council, Perley assumed it was necessary to recall MacDougall to Canada for Turner to replace him.4 Canadian authorities thus summoned MacDougall to Canada, where he resumed revising the King’s Regulations and Orders (kro), a task more in keeping with his capabilities.5

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Turner also relieved the two most influential officers – Steele and Carson. On Perley’s appointment, Steele promptly sent Perley recommendations that Steele become the inspector-general or even the goc.6 As Perley did not, however, see any role for Steele, Steele lost his Canadian command, but he did retain the British Southeastern District until 1918.7 Carson was relieved 7 December, and while Perley briefly considered him for chairman of a demobilization committee, Carson returned to Canada in June 1917.8 Turner’s next challenge was staff selection. Contrary to what some historians have claimed, Turner was responsible for choosing his senior staff officers, whom Perley approved.9 Turner had three critical positions to fill that corresponded to the British staff model. In the British system, there were three supposedly coequal staff branches – General Staff, Adjutant-General, and Quartermaster-General. In reality, the General Staff managed coordination of staff duties, so it was more equal than the others. The primary duties of the General Staff in the omfc were training and counter-intelligence. The AdjutantGeneral Branch was responsible for personnel matters, discipline, as well as draft-finding, medical, and chaplain services. The Quartermaster-General Branch was accountable for supplies, transportation, and accommodations.10 Turner had a predilection for selecting officers he knew, and this applied to two of these three key staff appointments. He also brought over his cre, Colonel H.T. Hughes; the deputy director of Medical Services for the corps, Surgeon-General G. Foster; and the chief ordnance officer from the 2nd Division, as the director, Ordnance Services. For the critical role of his senior General Staff officer, his gso 1, he selected Major H.F. McDonald, a burly thirty-two-year-old Militia officer who had served with Turner as the orderly officer in the 3rd Brigade. McDonald had been seriously wounded in the shelling of Mouse Trap Farm at Second Ypres, and Captain F. Scrimger had earned a vc for heroically saving him.11 McDonald later served in Garnet Hughes’s 1st Brigade as a brigade-major and was wounded at the Somme, losing his left arm while making a dangerous reconnaissance, for which he received a dso.12 No longer fit for active service but with extensive front-line experience, McDonald was an excellent choice for the training role. Byng thought him a good selection, agreeing that “[n]othing could be better from my point of view.”13

Figure 6.1 Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Turner, goc Canadian Forces in the British Isles. Source: 19940003-682, George Metcalf Archival Collection, Canadian War Museum.

For his adjutant-general, Turner selected another familiar face, his chief administrative officer from the 2nd Division, Colonel P.E. Thacker. Thacker was a forty-one-year-old pf officer and rmc graduate. He had also graduated from Camberley Staff College and so was one of the few formally trained staff officers in the Canadian military. In 1912, he had been seconded to the Central Section of the Imperial

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General Staff in London, where he served at the start of the war. This strongly suggests that British and Canadian authorities regarded him highly. Serving in London was an invaluable introduction to many of the British officers he would deal with later. Thacker joined the 2nd Division as its chief administrative officer when the division arrived in England.14 Finding an effective quartermaster-general with the appropriate experience in both the military and civilian spheres was a greater challenge. Initially, Turner asked that A.D. McRae, the forty-three-yearold deputy minister of Hughes’s Acting Sub-Militia Council, be retained as a temporary quartermaster-general until he could find a suitable officer. Perley planned to use McRae as his deputy minister, but Turner finally asked him to make McRae the permanent quartermastergeneral, as he could not find a replacement “with a wide experience of business affairs as well as a knowledge of Military matters.”15 McRae was an interesting choice, being the only senior officer retained from Hughes’s council. He had no pre-war military experience but was able to leverage his considerable business acumen – he was a wealthy real estate developer from Vancouver – and success to bring dramatic improvements to the quartermaster service in England.16 Turner selected him over the objections of influential western politicians who were still angry about McRae’s reformation of the remount service in the West in 1915.17 This was an example of both Perley’s and Turner’s refusal to allow the political interference that had characterized Hughes’s regime. With McRae’s loss, Perley had to find a deputy minister. After discussing the matter with Borden, he selected Walter Gow, a railroad lawyer from the prestigious Toronto law firm of Blake and Cassels. Gow had up to that point an undistinguished military career. His brigade commander in England had recommended he not continue as brigade-major, so it was probably not a difficult decision for Gow to return to a civilian role.18 He worked effectively with Turner and Perley, but in 1918 his relations with Turner would break down (discussed in chapter 8).19 Turner’s policy of choosing officers familiar to him carried the risk that he might select them more for their compatibility than their capability. His selection and retention of Garnet Hughes as his brigade-

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Figure 6.2 Canadian Forces in England 1917 simplified organization chart

major was one such example. Generally, Turner’s choices, however, did work out. Writing to his father, Garnet Hughes defended Turner’s selections: “Thacker is not quite up to his job but they might have done a great deal worse. There is a first class man in McDonald who used to be my Brigade-Major and who is now chief of the general staff … McRae is the best possible.”20 Underlying all the problems with drafts was the inherent inefficiency of the training system. Specifically, the manpower supply and the replacement demands were decoupled from each other and were unpredictable. Monthly draft demands could fluctuate by a factor of four between the months of holding the line and a peak demand resulting from a major offensive. For example, the omfc dispatched 3,241 replacements in January 1917 and 13,710 in May.21 The supply of manpower also varied, because of recruiting issues, although it steadily declined in 1917. Further complicating matters was the threat of U-boats, which forced Canadian authorities to rush drafts to

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England in March and April before the long daylight hours of May, June, and July.22 This variability meant that the new system had to be flexible, capable of handling an influx of men from Canada or of rushing recruits through a compressed training schedule. For instance, in the aftermath of Vimy, the General Staff condensed the newly introduced fourteen-week training course to nine weeks as a short-term emergency measure.23 In addition, the assessed training state of units arriving from Canada ranged from having completed a meagre one to five weeks of the syllabus despite having been established for over a year in some cases.24 The recruiting system in Canada collapsed in 1917. The average number of recruits arriving in England dropped dramatically over the course of the year, from 15,197 in April to the low point of 261 in July.25 Thus, the system had to deal with a fundamental problem outside Turner’s control – an issue the previous regime had not had to deal with for the most part. Figure 6.3 graphically illustrates the catastrophic imbalance between drafts received and those dispatched, and even this chart understates the problem, as it does not account for losses in England owing to illness, age, accidents, debility, and transfers. A further complication was the increasing demand for rail and forestry troops. Turner estimated in July 1917 that the rail and forestry troops would require an additional 12,700 men to expand and replace losses from disease, accident, and enemy fire; some rail troops worked close to the front, building and maintaining light rail links, and were subject to German artillery fire.26 Further, hard experience showed that the rail troops needed to be of a high medical category, given the heavy work of building and maintaining light rail lines.27 Finally, a short-term distortion of the manpower supply occurred as a result of a bizarre error made by Kemp’s Department of Militia staff, who mistakenly decoded a cable requesting 500 artillery drafts as requesting 5,000. To meet the “need,” Canada thus sent far too many artillery personnel, with the result that gunners arriving from Canada had to transfer to the infantry – to the deep frustration of those involved.28

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Figure 6.3 Drafts received and dispatched. Source: Report to Kemp, 18 May 1918, mg 30 E46 v6, Turner Fonds, lac.

eff ec tiveness The first step Turner and his staff took to improve training effectiveness was to publish daily a set of routine orders (standard non-operational orders), commencing 5 December 1916. Previously, there was no central repository or authority for routine orders, and the British equivalent Army Council Instructions applied automatically, regardless of their applicability. Starting 16 January, Headquarters, omfc, determined which British instructions applied.29 McDonald, too, strongly recommended that the General Staff take over full responsibility for training from the British to centralize control. That same day, the War Office announced that Canadians controlled training.30 Turner’s staff also streamlined staff work by getting British approval to communicate directly with the adjutant-general section of the Canadian section at ghq. Previously, all personnel matters such as leave and furlough had first to pass through the War Office and ghq, with the attendant delays.31

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In addition, Turner wanted to reform the way Canada supplied replacements. He urged that depots in Canada provide drafts to affiliated training units in England. Using drafts meant no longer having to wait for battalions to recruit to full strength before they could be sent to England. It would also eliminate the many problems of having to break up units when they arrived with the concomitant evils of unhappy men, surplus senior officers, and the “residue of the regimental organization.” Perley agreed and lobbied Kemp to change the policy.32 Perley and Kemp decided that existing infantry battalions in Canada with over 700 men would move to England as units on the understanding that they would disband on arrival. This understanding was not always communicated or comprehended. All officers above the rank of lieutenant would return to Canada if they could not find a position or were unwilling to revert in rank. Canada would send any battalions under 700 men as drafts. Kemp anticipated sending men in batches of 250.33 The compromise allowed Kemp to avoid facing the consequence of the government having authorized too many battalions. Instead, Perley, Turner, and the omfc had to face the obloquy of breaking up battalions.34 The authorization of additional battalions continued to June 1917.35 On 28 December, Headquarters, omfc, announced a new training organization to improve the draft-finding exercise and to better maintain the territorial affiliation of units.36 Turner’s staff reduced the existing fifty-seven training battalions to twenty-six reserve battalions and the twelve training brigades to six. Each reserve battalion reinforced one or two battalions at the front. Previously, reserve battalions would supply men to as many as eleven line battalions.37 In May, frustrated by the poor results of training in Canada, McDonald recommended limiting instruction in Canada to just inculcating essential discipline before dispatching drafts. This memo became the basis of a letter from Perley to Kemp, who agreed that this would be policy from June 1917.38 The next crucial step was to convert the infantry to a full territorial regimental system to “simplify the system of records and facilitating dealing with casualties.”39 Battalions from the same province or area formed regiments consisting of a regimental depot for han-

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dling convalescents and recruits, one or more battalions in the field, one or more reserve battalions, and a depot in Canada. This organization would help ensure that wounded men would return, if not to their battalion, at least to a battalion from their province, and aid in administering recruits and returning wounded.40 Another important step was the full adoption of the War Office’s fourteen-week training syllabus, modified to suit Canadian needs. One difference was that 50 per cent of all Canadian troops were to receive Lewis gun training, unlike the British, who took this instruction in France.41 The General Staff issued the syllabus as a training pamphlet in January 1917, with a revision issued 1 October. Turner instructed reserve units to focus on training men for the front, which did not always appear to be a priority under Carson. For instance, the General Staff ordered training commands not to assign fatigue duties to instructors or trainees, unlike the earlier practice where this work detracted from training.42 The syllabus placed considerable attention on physical and bayonet training as a way of fostering a fighting spirit.43 Paul Hodges, a modern critic of the bayonet, considers the weapon a “fetish.” Not all historians agree. Paddy Griffith, the noted British historian of tactics, and a recent thesis suggest that the bayonet was useful and so the training was not wasted.44 Physical training, fieldwork, marching, and drill took more than half of the time, which was in reaction to Byng’s preference for men with fundamental military discipline rather than a smattering of higherlevel instruction.45 Turner, as a result of Byng’s demands, wanted attention paid to neatness and smartness in drill, saluting, personal appearance, and care of arms. This approach indicated recognition that the lethality of modern weapons increased the need for attention on drill as the cornerstone for discipline. It was a conceit of the British and Canadian senior commanders that drill was essential to develop discipline, and discipline was foundational for success in the conditions on the Western Front – a belief that had some merit. Joanna Bourke writes, “It was believed to be crucial that battle habits became ‘so deeply ingrained’ that they would ‘persist in the face of the most overwhelming provocations to rage or panic.”46 In addition, as Paul Dickson points out, “Parade Square drill and proficiency levels

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were, at least, measurable standards.”47 The British view of Canadian recruits reinforced the belief that the Canadians needed additional drill. The British inspector of infantry, for example, had this impression: “The Canadian learns bayonet fighting, bombing and wiring quicker than the average Englishman, but he is slower at picking up subjects which necessitate exactness, snap and discipline.”48 Not only was the nature of the instruction changed, but so too were the instructors and their training. Turner made it a priority to replace fully-fit instructors with lower-category combat veterans. Such replacements had the double benefit of releasing ncos to the front and bringing in instructors with front-line experience. However, not all the ncos were interested in leaving the comforts of England for the hardships of the front. In May, Turner demanded that the area commanders be more aggressive in replacing fully-fit instructors.49 Further, Turner wanted all officers in training positions, especially company commanders in reserve units, to be overseas veterans. Ideally, they should be officers fit only for home service, and if not, the area commanders had to get permission to retain them.50 By October 1917, Turner had tightened the requirements so that all the permanent cadre of the training units would be overseas veterans and any that were not would be replaced immediately.51 Turner’s demand for combat veterans had three benefits. First, having combat veterans helped ensure that the training was practical and in line with the needs at the front. Second, combat veterans had more impact on trainees than did those without front-line experience. And finally, having combat veterans helped defuse the constant complaints that Argyll House (the short-hand term used to describe Headquarters, omfc) and the training command had too many nonveteran officers hiding from the front. One of the innovative steps taken was the General Staff’s establishment of a trench warfare school to improve the quality and consistency of training. The school trained instructors in entrenching, bombing, rifle-bombing, anti-gas, and Stokes mortars, and qualified 509 officers and 3,508 other ranks as instructors.52 Canadian authorities also took advantage of courses offered by the British; indeed, the number of Canadian personnel at British courses almost doubled from December 1916 to February 1917.53 Men now trained with the weapons

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and equipment they would use at the front, unlike training under Carson. This had the obvious advantage of making the training more realistic and useful. It also eliminated the trouble caused by having to re-equip men being drafted.54 The General Staff required all recruits to pass standard War Office tests and have their qualifications recorded in their pay books when sent to the front. The men were tested on musketry, bombs, bayonet fighting, anti-gas, rapid wiring, Lewis guns, and drill. This allowed the General Staff to trace any deficiencies and resulted in the training officers’ improved commitment to results.55

c omparisons with other combatants The New Zealand military probably had the most efficient and effective drafting and training system of all the Dominions. New Zealand had a compulsory military training program and thus benefited from a predictable supply of men. Regional units in New Zealand drafted and trained men who reinforced an affiliated unit at the front.56 In addition, New Zealand understood its manpower resources, so did not over-expand its forces to the extent Canada and Australia did.57 The Australians relied more on British instructors and courses for much of their training.58 Ironically, while Canada was adopting a regimental system, the British moved to a more centralized system to make the most efficient use of available personnel. The severe losses at the Somme meant the authorities dispatched drafts to where needed, regardless of regimental distinctions.59 The Germans relied on more training near the front, with eight weeks at a depot in Germany and four more weeks of intense training – manned by combat veterans – at the front.60 At least one British divisional commander believed German training to be “harder and sterner” than British training.61 Addressing the numerous problems with the technical arms was another high priority for Turner. The first step was to have these depots report directly to the General Staff rather than through the local training command.62 The artillery depot was reorganized with a new commander responsible for all the branches of the artillery. At the same time, the artillery service had to deal with a major reorganization at

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the front. Haig wanted a more flexible field artillery structure with more army-level field artillery brigades. To create these additional units, the War Office reduced divisional artillery to two field artillery brigades and increased batteries to six guns. In the process, one corps-level Canadian Army field artillery brigade was formed. This meant a considerable shuffling of Canadian artillery units in France and England, with the 4th Division’s artillery – still training in England – supplying gun sections to increase battery size.63 The General Staff established a new signal school to train signallers in the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, while the engineers continued to be responsible for training signallers for brigade, division, and corps units. Signalling was in a transition period, as new communications technologies, such as Buzzer sets, Fullerphones, and wirelesses, were increasingly used, but responsibility was split between the signalling service and the engineers. The quality and quantity of signal training, especially for the divisional and corps units, were sources of considerable dissatisfaction throughout the war.64 The lack of civilian trained recruits for the most advanced technical positions, together with equipment shortages, handicapped training. Some positions, such as wireless operators, required months of training and practice. As early as May, the commander of the cetd was pointing out that the depot, in the first quarter of 1917, had supplied 2,004 drafts but had received only 997 men from Canada and 620 of these had arrived at the end of April.65 The mg service was in particular need of immediate reform. Typical of Turner, the solution was to follow the British lead and establish a separate Machine Gun Corps (mgc). The British had formed their mgc in October 1915 to more effectively train, administer, and draft these critical personnel.66 Byng, in February 1917, responded to Turner’s initial recommendations for a mgc with a detailed proposal from Lieutenant-Colonel Raymond Brutinel, the Canadian Corps mg officer. To further assist, Byng also sent over an experienced mg officer, Major Balfour. Byng expected Balfour to replace the existing commander of the mg Depot whom Byng thought an egregious failure. When this did not transpire, Byng complained to Turner. Turner responded immediately by writing on Byng’s letter: “Major Balfour is to take command of mg Corps permanently!”67 The Canadian mgc

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(cmgc) came into effect in April with the transfer of all officers and men in mg units to the cmgc.68 From early in the war, the Canadian Corps wanted only subalterns – junior officers – from Canada and England.69 The corps adopted this position in part to prevent Hughes from saddling it with excessive numbers of unqualified but politically connected senior officers. In December 1915, Turner was demanding that subalterns be commissioned from the ranks.70 Once in command in England, Turner instituted this policy over the objections of the authorities in Canada, who had to deal with hundreds of now surplus junior officers in Canada. Turner did bend to allow a small number of officers who were conducting drafts to England to be considered for retention. Other than this exception, only rmc graduates and technical officers, such as doctors, were to come from Canada.71 The British and the Dominions moved to a policy of relying on the commissioning of ncos and men to supply junior officers. The British increasingly adopted this approach after exhausting the traditional supply of junior officers from public schools and universities, so that roughly 80 per cent of officer commissions in 1917–18 were from the ranks.72 However, British policy and Australian policy (the latter until January 1917) were typically to have the newly commissioned officers assigned to a different formation from their original one, whereas Canadian officers returned to their original unit.73 The result was that British commanders were known on occasion to recommend ineffective ncos for commissioning to dispense with them.74 Canadian commanders were more likely than British commanders to recommend superior candidates, knowing they would return. Canadian battalion commanders would complain vociferously if their cadets – their officer candidates – did not return.75 New Zealand adopted a different approach where roughly half of the commissions were from the ranks and half from New Zealand. The New Zealand divisional commander was concerned about depleting the supply of future company and regimental sergeant-majors, the view being that they were of far greater value as sergeant-majors than as mere subalterns.76 The Germans rarely commissioned from the ranks, preferring to maintain the social exclusivity of the officer class.77 In addition, they did not have the same need for junior officers, relying

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far more on their ncos for command. British and Canadian battalions had on average three times the number of officers as did a German battalion.78 The Canadian Corps harshly criticized the previous officer training courses. In one of his best selections, Turner appointed LieutenantColonel A.C. Critchley to command the cadet school, based on Byng’s recommendation. Critchley raised the quality of instruction, improved the syllabus, and made the program far more practical and pragmatic – recognizing the school’s purpose was just to develop effective platoon commanders. The school became a model and so successful that the Royal Air Force (raf) recruited Critchley to command its cadet program.79 Turner, an Anglo-Canadian nationalist (hereafter “nationalist” is used in the Anglo-Canadian sense of the term), wanted to ensure a steady supply of Canadian staff officers to replace British ones. The most senior British-born officer in the omfc was Lieutenant-Colonel Prismall, who was in charge of musketry and a holdover from Carson’s time. Turner believed that only the most senior staff positions of bggs and gso 1 in the corps required British officers.80 From 1917 on, only one British officer received a brigade-major appointment, while previously the policy was to appoint only British officers, except in rare circumstances.81 Acting on this belief, Turner almost immediately instituted a program of “staff learners” in England to develop the supply of Canadian staff officers.82 Staff learners were British and Dominion officers who would understudy existing staff to learn their duties. They might also attend a course to learn the rudiments of staff work. The British and Dominion forces faced severe shortages of staff given the army’s rapid expansion, and traditional staff courses took too long to train the numbers required. The staff learners program was a way to accelerate staff development, albeit producing officers not as well trained or rounded as pre-war staff. Turner also worked with the Canadian Corps and with Haig to assign more Canadian staff learners in France.83 The agreement was to assign Canadian staff learners to British units to expand their experience. Haig preferred that the Canadians not replace the corps’s British staff but rather have Canadians assigned to British units.84 Both Turner

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and Currie agreed that they wanted Canadian staff officers in the corps. Birdwood, the Australian goc, was not as active in promoting Australian officers and had to be forced by the Australian government to do so. Thus, it was not until 1917 that the Australians began replacing British staff in large numbers.85

ef ficiency improvements Under Turner, the adjutant-general and quartermaster-general were responsible for the improved efficiencies in the omfc. The primary focus of the Adjutant-General Branch was to find drafts for the front by ferreting out surpluses in the employment of officers and men in England. One of the most critical steps was to assess the fitness for duty of the men in England using the War Office categorization system first introduced in June 1916.86 Category “A” men were fit for general service; Category “B” for duty abroad but not general service; Category “C” for service in England; Category “D” temporarily unfit but likely to become fit in six months; and Category “E” not likely to be fit in six months. It took considerable time for the medical boards making the assessments to learn to be consistent in their findings.87 Unlike in the Second World War, the categorization system did not make any allowance for the mental or psychological capabilities of the soldier.88 In the cef, it was enough to be able to march, shoot, salute, and wear a gas mask. Once the assessment was complete, the Adjutant-General Branch could determine who was available for the front and who would return to Canada. The intent was to replace Category “A” men wherever possible with Category “B” or “C” men, so that the Category “A” would be available for the front. The results of the combingout process were impressive. In February 1917, there were 6,379 Category “A” men on duties other than training, and by July, the number had dropped to 3,550. This included Service and Ordnance Corps men who were not part of the original total. In their place, the authorities substituted lower-category men. In three months, 2,709 men had been raised from a lower category to Category “A,” making

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them available for the front. The number of men in the command depot for convalescent wounded dropped from 10,000 men in January 1917 to 5,600 in June 1917.89 Another aspect of the categorization was the identification of men to return to Canada. All “Ciii” men – the lowest category of men only able to serve in England –who were not likely to be reclassified to a higher category within six months were to be discharged in Canada, as it was not economical to keep them. This was another slow process. In May, Turner expressed dissatisfaction with the number of men unsuitable for military employment remaining in England. He wanted all “Ciii” men discharged and wanted each area commander to make it a priority to return them. The Adjutant-General Branch made some progress, returning 5,000 men from 1 December 1916 to 20 February 1917.90 The administrative treatment of the wounded was reformed. Under the previous system, men were lost or allowed to languish in depots. The new approach relied on the new regimental system: when wounded arrived in England, they were assigned to a regimental depot for tracking. Once the men were discharged from the convalescent hospital, they were assessed by a medical board and assigned to one of four alternatives, depending on their category.91 An additional step was the official disbanding of ninety-six battalions over the course of the year.92 Each disbanded battalion represented tens, and in some cases, hundreds of hours of effort in auditing regimental books and disposing of regimental funds, equipment, and surplus officers. A constantly recurring complaint about Argyll House was that it had an excess of personnel on staff. Turner was quick to respond and repeatedly provided statistics to show staff reductions. The table below demonstrates a considerable decline in staffing levels. One of the ways this was achieved was a reduction in the number of headquarters. The closing of MacDougall’s headquarters at Brighton, for example, released the equivalent of a divisional staff.93 As there were fewer units to control, these headquarters became superfluous. The chaplain service desperately needed to be reformed, but it had to wait until the resolution of more critical issues. Based on Turner’s strong recommendation, Perley replaced Steacey, the director of the

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Table 6.1 Reduction in staff December 1916 to September 1917 Staff size

Officers

Other ranks

Total

1 December 1916 1 August 1917 15 September 1917

134 139 109

566 486 436

700 625 545

Source: Turner to Perley, 21 September 1917, 10-8-43, rg9 III v77, lac.

chaplain service, with John Almond, the assistant director in France. Almond transferred experienced chaplains from the front to England, replaced the ineffective, sent surplus ones home, and placated aggrieved denominations – especially the Roman Catholics. The British service noticed the difference, and John Simms, the British principal chaplain, commented that “the outlook is much brighter.”94 The Quartermaster-General Branch also underwent significant changes. With Turner’s active support, McRae started implementing much-needed reforms that he had been advocating for months. The objective of these changes was to free up men for the front and to reduce costs, and McRae was successful. Overall, he reduced branch personnel by 15 per cent and replaced Category “A” men such that 85 per cent of the casc personnel were Category “C” men by April 1917, and through the centralization of transport, 500 Category “A” men were released for the front.95 McRae’s cost-savings approach was fourfold. First, the branch found all instances where Canada was paying for services that the British were to supply at no cost. This was not a case of the British reneging on promises, but one of the Canadian authorities not following up. The British had offered to provide accommodations for all offices and billets for officers at no charge. Under the old regime, however, Canada paid for rented office space and hundreds of officers billeted at Canada’s expense. One change instituted was the closing of Carson’s Cleveland House office and the amalgamation of all the staff operations at Argyll House at the upscale address of 245 Regent Street, London.96 By August, McRae had sent one bill to the

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War Office for £98,000 for billeting, with more to come. The British agreed to supply hospital stores, and McRae found further savings of £90,000 per year. He also negotiated a share of the profits from Imperial Canteens for Soldier Relief Funds. These profits would later grow into an amount worth millions of dollars and play a key role in encouraging the feuding post-war veterans’ organizations to merge.97 Further, for a saving of another $466,000 a year, McRae persuaded the British to grant an exception for custom duties.98 McRae’s second initiative was to centralize purchasing, rations, stores, and transport. Under Carson, each unit had had its own transport and stores, and had purchased its own rations. While appropriate for active service units, this approach was grossly inefficient for static units. McRae established a central purchasing organization but could not even estimate the savings because of the wretched state of prior documentation. Food provision was changed to a centralized system. This move saved a further two million dollars a year and delivered better meals once the cooks received training. It also reduced food waste, which was crucial, given the food shortages and complaints from British inspectors. The Quartermaster-General Branch established a school of cookery to address criticisms about meal quality.99 Turner himself was involved in these improvements, attending a meeting of commanders from Bramshott and Shorncliffe to make it clear that the new system was there to stay. His endorsement was an example of his support for his immediate staff.100 McRae centralized quartermaster and ordnance stores to reduce the excess supplies at the unit level. When Borden complained about excessive red tape, McRae responded that there were not enough controls on items, such as quartermaster stores, and as a result, there were serious discrepancies. McRae formed a board that worked for four months to regulate the quartermaster stores of 300 units.101 He also imposed better controls, which resulted in further savings. Purchases in France had to have the corps commander’s approval, and this stipulation resulted in a 90 per cent drop in purchases. Under Carson, no one was responsible for monitoring damage to barracks, with the result that the British wanted to charge six shillings per month per soldier for damages; no one on the Canadian side had any docu-

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mentation to dispute this claim. McRae made the units responsible, and the problem diminished.102 Cost-cutting was the fourth key initiative. McRae slashed the use of stationery and typewriters, closed the Ross rifle facility to save $250,000 per year, and reduced the number of motor vehicles. He was also able to dispose of $7.5 million of surplus, obsolete, redundant, or inadequate goods, such as Canadian greatcoats, “Savage” Lewis guns (American-made guns that were not parts compatible with British-made ones), and Ross rifles at no cost to the government.103 Despite these changes, the pace of dealing with surplus equipment displeased Kemp in Canada. In response to this complaint, McRae patiently explained, “Appreciating that it is quite impossible for the Hon. The Minister to have a true appreciation of the result of two years of bad administration and the problems it has left for us to clear up, the desired results cannot be obtained without much patience.”104

pr omotions The next challenge was to establish a credible promotion and gradation (seniority) system. One of the toxic aspects of the Hughes regime was the bitter suspicion that officer promotions were as much a matter of politics as a matter of capability. In January 1917, Borden informed Perley, “Irrespective of rank promotions of officers serving in France are made by you.” He was responding to Perley’s proposal that Perley should consult Borden on all brigade and divisional command decisions.105 There was, however, no effective mechanism for monitoring and managing officer promotions, even though this would be essential to mitigate perceptions of favouritism. To address this deficiency, Turner established the Assistant Military Secretary (ams) Branch in March 1917, similar in function to the British Military Secretary.106 To head this extremely sensitive branch, Turner selected another familiar officer, Captain F.F. Montague, his former adc from the 2nd Division. While holding a relatively junior rank, the ams was a critical position for changing the perception that political influence dominated promotions. In the British Army, the military secretary

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was usually a lieutenant-general and outranked the quartermastergeneral – there was no equivalent to the ams in the Canadian Militia.107 A case involving the Canadian Railway Troops (crt) illustrates the deleterious effects of a flawed promotion process. The commander of the crt in France was a full colonel, a lieutenant-colonel served as a deputy, and one lieutenant-colonel was assigned to each army. One of these army-level officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, was an excellent officer but one with a difficult personality. Ramsay received a promotion to full colonel, in part because of his previous command of the Canadian Overseas Railway Construction Corps, but he was then unwilling to take direction from the deputy. In addition, Ramsay’s peers, on learning of his promotion, demanded elevation as well. This example shows how a promotion could have implications beyond a specific officer and cause dissension.108 The ams was responsible for dealing with surplus officers; honours and awards; appointments, promotions, resignations, and reversions; commissioning; gradation lists; and promulgation of changes in the London Gazette. Other responsibilities were to track officers, enforce policies, and ensure promotions were merited before submitting them to Turner and Perley for approval. Turner tracked all officers through a ledger system managed by a soldier from the 21st Battalion.109 Promotions in the corps were a sore point with Currie and a source of considerable conflict. Eventually, the policy evolved such that Currie, as Canadian Corps commander, approved all promotions for officers and other ranks in the corps.110 Turner tasked Montague with creating a gradation list to resolve disputes over seniority among officers of the same rank. Unlike the Australian Army, which had created a list at the aif’s inception, the cef had operated without one.111 The challenge was how to determine seniority. Turner persuaded Perley that seniority should be determined by the date officers sailed for England.112 The ams worked on this basis and developed the list, but Byng strenuously objected to the sailing date, arguing it would mean that officers in England, in some cases, would have seniority over those at the front. Turner responded that there was but a single cef. Demonstrating his wider perspective, he also contended that the corps commander was poorly

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positioned to make decisions for the units outside the corps. In this case, Turner won, and the sailing date was the basis for the list.113 Even more contentious was the problem of surplus officers. The breakup of battalions was a painful event for the men and junior officers, much like a “death in the family,” but it was far worse for the senior officers.114 The Canadian Corps would only accept officers above lieutenant who had overseas experience. As a result, senior officers had a stark choice of reverting to lieutenant with the resulting loss of prestige and pay, scrambling for a position in England while staff positions were disappearing, or returning to Canada with the resulting ignominy. This treatment outraged these officers, which was understandable considering the money, energy, and prestige expended in raising units and, especially, given that they were generally Conservative Party stalwarts.115 The surplus officer problem emerged early in the Hughes regime when Carson raised it as an issue to Hughes in March 1915.116 All through 1915 and 1916, Carson made ineffectual efforts to address the problem, including sending senior officers as replacements for subalterns. Haig complained to the War Office that a request for six subalterns for the 25th Battalion was filled with two lieutenants, two captains, and a lieutenant-colonel who was senior to the battalion’s commanding officer – clearly the last three would be difficult to place in a battalion.117 Perley was aware of the problems and the political consequences. He ordered that every surplus officer be told individually that his service was appreciated and that his return was not due to inefficiency on his part, but was on the “grounds of military expediency and economy.”118 Turner’s initial approach was to assess all surplus officers and arrange a two-week instructional tour in France so that they could return to Canada having served at the front.119 Byng, appreciating the pressure Turner was under, allowed these instructional tours even though they were disruptive. The War Office stopped the tours in March but allowed another in June.120 The next plan was to allow select officers to serve as supernumeraries with units in the field, with the opportunity to be taken on strength if the unit commander agreed. This program lasted until after the 1917 federal election.121 Another

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approach was to supply officers for line-of-communications duties in France, such as those of town majors. Initially, the British accepted 150 officers, and 162 were serving in these roles in April 1918.122 Eventually, the problem became too large to manage with tours or other subterfuges, and Turner adopted the more hard-nosed approach of giving surplus officers the stark choice of reverting to lieutenant to serve at the front or returning to Canada.123 The omfc had dispatched 196 officers to Canada, including 3 generals, 1 colonel, 48 lieutenant-colonels, and 107 majors through these means by July 1917. By the end of the year, the omfc had returned 665 surplus officers.124 Some officers were willing to drop in rank to get to the front. In April, one lieutenant-colonel who had reverted to major and four majors and twenty-five captains who had reverted to lieutenant left for the front.125 Despite these results, there were still 416 surplus officers as late as November 1917.126 Presenting surplus officers with the choice of reversion or return required tact and diplomacy, which at times were absent. Turner had to chastise one area commander for the poor treatment of officers from disbanded battalions.127 Thacker informed another commander that senior officers were to be asked to sign reversion letters by that commander or his senior staff and not by a mere lieutenant.128 Later in 1918, Turner personally interviewed most of the returning officers once and all lieutenant-colonels at least three times to try to limit the damage they would do back in Canada. At the peak of sending the aggrieved back home, Turner, as a further step to mollify them, had Montague interview each surplus officer when he received his embarkation orders, and pass on to Turner those cases Montague thought worthy of a further interview. Montague had to see up to forty officers a day on top of all his usual duties. Naturally, when the majority of these officers did not get a chance to see Turner, they turned their ire on Montague. Kemp received numerous complaints about Montague’s brusque treatment of these officers.129 Turner attempted to defend Montague, explaining the process and that two of the cases Kemp highlighted involved an officer who had been dismissed for inefficiency and another who was too old and unqualified for his rank of major but was unwilling to revert. Turner’s view was that “Major Montague has served under my Command for a period

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of thirty months … I have the greatest confidence in this Officer.”130 In the end, however, it appears that Turner had to sacrifice Montague to assuage the anger of the surplus officers. Montague was seconded to the War Office on 1 April 1918 to work with the Ministry of Information under Aitken.131

political inter ferenc e To demonstrate the new regime’s commitment to eliminating political influence, Turner’s headquarters issued two routine orders in December 1916 strictly prohibiting irregular communications about appointments and promotions. Turner’s hq repeated the prohibitions again in January of 1917 and 1918. Perley wrote Borden in January, “A very large part of the letters and cables which come to the Overseas Department are from soldiers or their friends with requests of a personal nature.”132 The Canadian Militia’s habit of political interference was hard to break. Perley’s commitment to driving out both the reality and the appearance of political influence was exemplified by his reaction to Sam Steele’s attempt to send a cable to Canada to lobby for a division for his protégé Brigadier-General Ketchen. Perley wrote Borden, “We are trying to manage the Overseas Department as a military organization, and to make all appointments and promotions entirely on the grounds of efficiency, It would not only be unwise but absolutely inexcusable to have political pressure used in regard to the appointment of a Divisional Commander.”133 Turner made an example of an officer who violated these policies to reinforce the message. LieutenantColonel Preston of the 39th Battalion had lost his position with the reorganization of training units, and had reacted by sending cables to two members of Parliament, who in turn strongly endorsed Preston and requested he be found a position. Turner hustled Preston back to Canada with a recommendation that the authorities there discipline him.134 An early test of the political independence of the omfc was the selection of Turner’s replacement as commander of the 2nd Division. Byng recommended that the gocra, Major-General Henry

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Burstall, a pf officer, take command. Borden was unhappy with the selection and wanted Garnet Hughes appointed to placate Sam Hughes. Perley, impressed with Byng, acceded to Byng’s recommendation and selected Burstall.135 The status of the 5th Division was a further issue fraught with political implications. In September, Sam Hughes promised LieutenantGeneral Sir William Robertson, the cigs, two more divisions, and the British were eager to get these units to the front.136 Haig asked Robertson in January when he could expect the 5th Division.137 Both Perley and Kemp had serious doubts about the feasibility of maintaining a fifth division in action. Perley met Robertson in November to provide evidence that Canada could only keep four divisions at the front. Robertson grudgingly agreed.138 Given Perley and Kemp’s qualms regarding the 5th Division, why was the issue still raised?139 A clue may be the identity of the person who received the divisional command – Garnet Hughes. Borden was most anxious about who was to get the division, cabling Perley, “Please consult me before final decision. This very important.”140 Typically, Borden only intervened in politically sensitive matters – he had earlier explicitly granted Perley complete authority over promotions – so this cable had strong political overtones. On learning of Hughes’s appointment, Borden responded that he “quite approved.” Hughes, furthermore, was junior to the incumbent divisional commander, Brigadier-General R.G.E. Leckie, who had been the chief of the General Staff of Hughes’s Acting Sub-Militia Council. To appease Leckie, Perley had to apply considerable pressure on Kemp to get him a command of a district in Canada and a promotion to majorgeneral.141 All this argues for the government procuring Sam Hughes’s relative silence by giving his son the 5th Division. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Manley Sims, the Canadian representative at ghq, Garnet Hughes accepted the position knowing that the authorities did not intend to send the division to France.142 The British were relentless in their demands for the 5th Division. Turner and Perley met with the Secretary of State for War, the cigs, and deputy cigs to drive the point home yet again that there were insufficient resources to maintain another division.143 The War Office sent three requests alone in February for the 5th Division.144 Robertson raised the topic again at the Imperial War Cabinet in March, but

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Borden evaded the issue.145 In May, Robertson cabled the governor general of Canada: “It is very important that this Division should eventually be sent to France.”146 Gow, Perley’s deputy minister, finally put an end to the British pleas by making it clear that “it is estimated that we shall be able to keep our four Divisions in the Field reinforced until about the end of the year, but in order to do this we shall have to use the 5th Division for the purpose.”147 The 5th Division remained in England for the remainder of 1917 and became a subject of further controversy in early 1918.

evaluating turner as administrator Were Turner’s changes effective? Most of the data in this chapter are derived from internal omfc reports. All the branches, starting in April 1917, rendered monthly reports, and like any reports in a bureaucracy, they tended to trumpet successes and ignore, minimize, or explain away failures. Therefore, to evaluate the effectiveness of the reforms, it is necessary to look at three separate metrics: the objective results described in the reports; contemporary statements by officers in the Canadian Corps and by Byng, Perley, and the British; and historians’ later assessments. By these measures, Turner’s reforms were broadly effective. The omfc was a far more efficient organization than its predecessor. Under Turner’s leadership, it used far fewer personnel, Category “A” men, and resources. The considerable costs savings found by McRae, the combing out process of replacing Category “A” men, and the reduction in staffs are all evidence of this greater efficiency. The best illustration of the increased efficiency is the omfc sending to France 70 per cent more men than it received from Canada in 1917. The omfc received 67,467 men from Canada but dispatched 114,222 to France. The extra men were returned wounded or were combed out of units in England.148 Haig noted in his diary on 4 July 1917 that only the Canadians had a surplus of men, while all the British and other Dominion contingents were under-strength.149 One measure of the increased effectiveness of Turner’s regime was the significant improvement in musketry tests. Every soldier had to complete standard War Office musketry tests before going to the front.

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Over the course of the first eight months of Turner’s command, the percentage of 3rd Class shots, the worst rating, dropped significantly in almost every training area, while the number of Marksman, the highest rating, more than doubled from 2.8 to 6.8 per cent of men. For example, at Bramshott, the percentage of 3rd Class shots fell from 26 to 2 per cent by August.150 Another measure was the reduction in the percentage of partially trained men sent to France, which dropped from 59.2 per cent in 1916, to 19.1 per cent in 1917, to just 4.5 per cent in 1918.151 The contemporary records show a favourable view of the changes. The deputy minister paid a visit to the corps in June and reported: “Speaking generally I found a very much better feeling existing on all hands as to the relations between London and the front than existed when I was in France last year. Every where the statement was ‘Things are so much better than they were. The drafts which come over from England are much better trained and the relations between the field and the forces in England seem to be much closer and better in every way.’ That is I think a fair epitome of the many statements made to me on the subject.”152 Officers at the front also thought there was an improvement. After inspecting the training facilities in England, Brigadier-General W. Griesbach wrote, “I was … impressed with the system of training that prevails and with the willingness of these officers to maintain touch with the Battalions at the front and in all respects to render the greatest possible service to the front line people.”153 The commander of the 25th Battalion wrote to McDonald to express his appreciation for the quality of recruits the battalion received.154 A First Army request for the state of drafts received in October and November 1917, the height of the Canadian attacks at Passchendaele, elicited a broadly favourable response from all the divisions. The 4th Division commented that the replacements “showed a marked improvement in training.”155 Brutinel claimed that the success of the machine guns at Passchendaele was “rendered possible chiefly by the very high standard of training attained in the Canadian Machine Gun Depot in England, and the discipline, and Esprit de Corps with which the fresh drafts are imbued.”156

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Byng’s recommendation that Turner receive the Légion d’honneur illustrated Byng’s attitude to Turner, as Turner had already received the British honours normally reserved for officers of his rank.157 A second indication of Turner’s contribution was his appointment as a Knight Companion to the Order of St Michael and St George on 4 June 1917.158 With this appointment, he became Sir Richard Turner. Perley was appreciative of Turner’s efforts, from the beginning writing positively – in January and April 1917 – to Borden about Turner’s changes.159 Perley, upon relinquishing the ministry, wrote to Turner, “I cannot express to you strongly enough my earnest appreciation of the active and sustained assistance which you and your whole staff have given me in every way.”160 The British thought the reforms were a success. The commanderin-chief of Home Forces, Field Marshal Sir John French, noted the improvements and wrote Perley, “General Turner may look with satisfaction on the results achieved generally.”161 When visiting France, McDonald claimed that British and Canadian officers at the base depots agreed that on average Canadian infantry were better trained than were the British, with the exception of drill.162 Inspectors of infantry for different commands also commented on improvements in training results.163 Scholars almost universally acknowledge that the new regime accomplished much in the reformation of the administration and training.164 Even historians normally hostile to Turner, such as Daniel Dancocks, were impressed: “He did a good job. It took several months to sort out the mess, but there would be no further complaints about the standard of training of the replacement troops reaching the Canadian Corps.”165 The British Official History attributed the success of the Canadian Corps in the Arras campaign to “the high standard of the Canadian infantry reinforcements … The Canadian drafts had not only as a rule undergone more training but were also rather older men and often of better physique. Thus, a Canadian division appeared to deteriorate very little after taking part in several engagements at short intervals of time.”166 Where historians differ is on the degree to which Perley was primarily responsible for the improvement. Most historians will grant that Turner was a “first-class staff officer,” but

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some noted historians, such as Hyatt, Currie’s biographer, consider Perley to be the “architect of the new system.”167 The evidence shown here, however, indicates while Perley was a key figure, Turner and his staff were the real architects of the system and were responsible for most of the changes. Still, not all Turner’s initiatives were successful. The anti-gas, signal, engineer, and artillery branches continued to experience problems, which were due to a set of factors only partly under Turner’s control. For example, shortages in equipment and in the supply of civilian trained men imposed limits on signals training. Neither Turner nor his staff had any experience in the technical branches, and their relative ignorance showed when they replaced their initial choices for command of the various depots. Turner had to rely on the Canadian Corps to send the right man with front-line experience to command the depots. In the case of the artillery, the first officer sent by the corps failed and a second had to be sent.168 One area that Turner’s organization never properly addressed was anti-gas training. The technology and tactics of gas warfare evolved rapidly at the front, and the omfc could not catch up. The authorities were still sending men to France in July 1917 without training them in a gas chamber. There was no proper exchange of information with the front, so the training was inadequate, outmoded, and instructors in England unimpressive. As Tim Cook phrased it, “The problem remained unsolved, and soldiers were required to learn much of their gas training in France for the rest of the war.”169 Currie complained about the high percentage of men received after Vimy classified as partially trained. In May, Byng wrote a mild letter to “My dear Turner,” asking that the 5th Division be used for drafts if there was a shortage of trained men.170 Part of the problem was a matter of terminology in that the replacements had not completed the full fourteen-week syllabus but had finished a compressed program to meet the needs of the corps. For example, the 1st Battalion reported receiving a draft rated as untrained where this was not quite the case. The draft came from a reserve battalion that provided pioneer drafts, and as it was over-strength, the drafts were dispatched to the 1st Battalion having completed their nine weeks of infantry training. How-

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ever, because they had not received pioneer training, they were classified as untrained. The larger question was whether nine weeks was sufficient time to train an infantryman.171 Later in the war, to reduce complaints around this issue, McDonald asked the Adjutant-General Branch not to classify men who had passed through a compressed training cycle as partially trained.172 In periods of intense fighting or in expectation of high losses, Turner would compress the training syllabus to as little as nine weeks to maintain the strength of the corps. The vagaries of manpower supply from Canada handicapped what Turner could provide. Turner informed both Byng and Currie of the decision to condense training, but Currie typically still demanded fully trained men, regardless of the resources available to Turner.173 Another partial failure was the regimental organization. Based on population and available replacements, there was an imbalance in the number of battalions from the different provinces. British Columbia had four more battalions, Quebec two more, and Ontario ten fewer than their populations warranted. The Quebec situation was especially dire, because the French-speaking population of the province – the majority of the province’s inhabitants – volunteered in limited numbers. An early 1917 War Office report indicated that 1.4 per cent of French-Canadian men, 6.7 per cent of men of “foreign extraction,” and 37.5 per cent of men of British extraction had volunteered.174 This meant that the battalions from British Columbia and Quebec lacked replacements and thus required men from other provinces to maintain their strength. Turner reported that, from June 1916, the other provinces had to supply 4,900 men to the Quebec battalions.175 In March, Turner disclosed that the seven British Columbia battalions had requested 1,406 drafts but he had only been able to supply 81 men. A further 1,038 were in training, but this was before the losses of Vimy, so it was clear there was a looming replacement crisis.176 Turner, working closely with Byng, replaced two Montreal battalions with one each from Ontario and Nova Scotia.177 They also decided to disband two pioneer battalions from British Columbia instead of infantry units. Byng was disappointed at having to break up battalions but understood the necessity and was pragmatic about it.178 The breaking up of these combat formations just before Vimy was disruptive and prompted many

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protests from the divisional and battalion commanders, including two who travelled to London to complain to Turner. Interestingly, Turner did not blame the officers for their actions; rather he blamed the authorities who had allowed too many units from British Columbia and Quebec to be sent to the front.179 The replacement situation for British Columbia and Quebec after Vimy continued to deteriorate. Turner warned Sims that when Sims discussed the replacement problems with the corps, it was not “an opportune time to question the soundness of the territorial basis.”180 Turner recommended to Perley in July 1917 that two more British Columbia battalions be disbanded to solve the ongoing crisis. Currie, however, resisted the notion of breaking up two more combatexperienced units. Turner then suggested reinforcing the two battalions with men from Ontario regiments, which would result in their gradual conversion into Ontario units. This was more acceptable, and while it would cause much hand-wringing, it was a far better policy than disbanding units. The approach became the policy thereafter, as multiple battalions needed to change.181 Another problem with the affiliation of battalions in the field with a single reserve battalion was the real or perceived unfairness of personnel distribution. Twice the 38th Battalion, with the support of the brigade, divisional, and corps commanders, claimed that the 7th Reserve Battalion, which supplied the 38th and the ppcli, was sending its highest-quality men to the ppcli because ppcli officers dominated the 7th Reserve. The 7th Reserve Battalion denied any favouritism and explained that the greater number of ppcli officers was a function of the ppcli having been at the front longer than the 38th Battalion.182 However, the fact that the 38th complained twice, with endorsements from the chain of command, suggests there was something to its concerns. Not only Canada had to face the difficult situation of having to disband units because of manpower shortages. The British, too, had to convert to three battalions per brigade, which meant that roughly one-quarter of the infantry battalions at the front had to be disbanded in early 1918.183 And the Australians, in May 1918, had to start disbanding battalions because of a lack of replacements. By September,

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the commander of the Australian Corps reluctantly broke up seven battalions. Six of these refused to disband, and the situation was not resolved when the Australians left the line.184

reasons f or success The reasons for Turner’s success fall into three broad categories: situational factors; support from superiors, peers, and subordinates; and personal attributes. Turner had the advantage of not being beholden to the previous regime, so there was no need to either retain or defend the existing organization, policies, procedures, or personnel. Turner in essence had an unfettered mandate to make reforms. There was broad recognition, not only in France but also in Canada and England, that matters were not as they should be, and thus there was little need to justify the need for changes. Turner and most of his staff also had the advantage of unassailable experience. They knew what had to be done, and they had the credibility to institute changes based on their experience. Finally, Turner and his staff had the luxury of adapting proven British policies, organizations, and structures to Canadian circumstances. These changes were not in themselves revolutionary departures from British Army practices. Turner, at heart, was a conservative and systematic man, and it would have been an obvious step for him to utilize the British model. Given the time constraints and the absolute necessity that the administration work within the strictures of the British system, there was no opportunity or need for him to take radical steps. The second set of advantages was the support Turner received from Perley, Byng, and Turner’s subordinates. Turner enjoyed the benefit of ample political will to support his transformation of the administration. Perley and Borden were aware that there were problems, and Perley admitted, “If I had known how difficult the situation is here I doubt if I should have complied with your request [to be the omfc minister].”185 Both knew the system needed to be rectified and so were committed to reform. Perley had little knowledge of military matters,

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and being fully cognizant of this, he relied on Turner and his staff. As a result, Turner had a free rein as long as he delivered results. Perley was an ideal superior, giving Turner the latitude to make the necessary changes while supplying the necessary political muscle when dealing with British or Canadian authorities.186 Perley’s involvement undoubtedly facilitated rapid decisions, such as receiving training control from the British. Turner was always careful not to transgress on Perley’s prerogatives and overstep boundaries. He kept Perley informed and requested his approval before acting on important matters. Turner and his staff were wholly responsible for analysing, planning, proposing, and executing the changes. Perley provided Turner with the political support he needed in dealing with Borden, the cabinet, the Ministry of Militia in Canada, and the British, and in ensuring he had the resources to carry out his reforms. Perley was also an arbitrator and mediator between Currie and Turner. Turner and Perley worked well together, and their only major disagreement was over a separate Canadian Air Service (see chapter 7). Turner also had a good relationship with Byng. Byng was determined to improve the training system in England and recognized that supporting Turner was the best method to achieve this goal; as a result, Byng was accommodating towards Turner. He reacted pragmatically, for example, on learning that two battalions would disband before Vimy.187 Byng was willing and even eager to send first-class officers like Major Balfour and Lieutenant-Colonel Critchley to command depots and schools in England. He could be frank with Turner when displeased, but there was a mutual respect between the two men and they had a good working relationship.188 The fact Turner was a former subordinate and Byng outranked him ensured a clear demarcation of command and no tussling for control.189 Additionally, Byng’s considerable experience in both command and administrative functions and in cutting the political strings from Canada gave him an appreciation of the challenges facing Turner and of how he could assist. Turner and his staff regularly visited the corps, and there was generally an open and candid line of communication. Having had recent experience at the front meant that they had a shared experience

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with the staff and commanders of the corps. The exchange of officers and the visits helped ensure that training was up to date. Guy Turner (no relation), a chief instructor at the cetd, when asked whether the training was excellent, remarked in a post-war interview, “Yes, I can assure you it was because we were kept in close touch with what was going on. I know that during the time I was the chief instructor in field works at the engineer training centre I made two or three trips back to France to get first-hand information.”190 While Turner endeavoured to provide the Canadian Corps with what it needed, he was no mere “cypher.”191 He had to walk a fine line to ensure he met the corps’s requirements without sacrificing longterm efficiency or effectiveness. He was more than willing to stand up for what he regarded as the correct policy; his defence of the basis for gradation is evidence of this. He also was determined that England not become a dumping ground for failures from the corps.192 He had his staff closely monitor the corps, as illustrated by the query about two battalions reporting strengths well in excess of their establishment – their authorized strength. The explanation was that the two battalions had absorbed men from a disbanded battalion.193 Another overlooked factor in Turner’s success was the role Sims played as a go-between for the Canadian Corps and Argyll House. Sims, an ex–British Army major, replaced Aitken as the Canadian representative at ghq in early 1917. Moreover, Sims was a business associate of J.J. Carrick, an early Hughes representative. One of Sims’s roles was to act as the intermediary between the corps and Argyll House, and according to Perley, Byng, the other commanders, and the authorities at ghq liked Sims.194 Numerous letters from Sims to Turner, staff, and the corps provide insight into the views of the other side that help explain their position. For example, in February 1917, Sims warned Turner about the ill-will felt by the corps towards the commander of the mg Depot.195 Sims provided a useful back channel that allowed both sides to vent about or explain matters that could not be handled through official lines of communication. Other than possibly Montague, all of Turner’s key staff officer selections were successful. McDonald, Thacker, and McRae turned in superlative performances and were crucial to the success of the omfc. Turner well appreciated their contribution and recommended

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Thacker to be the adjutant-general in Canada.196 In a confidential report, Turner wrote that a long list of McDonald’s achievements “bear evidence of his ability in organization and amicable relations between ourselves and the Imperial Authorities at present are largely due to his tactful connections with them.”197 Finally, there were Turner’s own characteristics. He worked hard in making the changes, even holding meetings on New Year’s Day 1917.198 Another hallmark was professionalism; one of the critical differences between the old regime and Turner’s was the focus on follow-through and proper procedures. Under Carson, for instance, every unit interpreted how to fill out returns in its own idiosyncratic fashion, so that some returns were incomplete and inaccurate. It was therefore impossible to gain an accurate notion of strengths and available drafts.199 Turner did not tolerate this. In addition, he was constantly striving for increased efficiency, such as requesting Thacker to report on the number of orders issued, their frequency, and whether all were necessary.200 There was a palpable difference in the paperwork generated under Carson compared to Turner. Far more entertaining and useful to the historian, Carson’s correspondence is chatty, informative, and revelatory. It exposes the dirty deeds, the hypocrisy, the frantic manoeuvring for position and power, the almost abject obeisance to Sam Hughes, and the drive for authority.201 Turner’s correspondence is far more bureaucratic, structured, professional, bloodless, and effective. Turner instilled in his staff a readiness to accept criticism, unlike under Carson. The typical reaction to a complaint was to ask for details, investigate them, and, if justified, make changes. For instance, in response to a biting critique from the British inspector of infantry, Turner instructed McDonald to thank the inspector for bringing these deficiencies to light. There was a short explanation of what went wrong and what was being done to address the problems. The response was to close with a request to call on the inspector to discuss these issues.202 The commander-in-chief of Home Forces commented that he was pleased that Canadian officers now accepted critiques from inspectors and acted upon them.203 A more detailed example of responses to criticism was McDonald’s reaction to complaints about artillery drafts. McDonald asserted

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that the only significant complaint coming from France during his one-week visit to the corps in the summer of 1917 dealt with the state of artillery drafts. When asked about this, the commander of the artillery depot claimed that the drafts did not come from his establishment. However, McDonald investigated further and found that the replacements were the commander’s responsibility. Turner promptly removed the commander.204 Turner delegated much responsibility to his subordinates, a practice that worked well with strong officers. He took a modern approach that entailed appointing the right people for each position and enabling them to do their job. It was easier to use this method at this point in the war than in the earlier stages, since there was now a pool of experienced military personnel familiar with their duties. Turner’s business experience probably influenced his management style. He set policies and then allowed the responsible officer to implement them, but he closely monitored their execution. His pencilled comments can be found on a wide range of documents – probing, requesting information, and making decisions – asking, for example, why a hospital had not been inspected since August or querying about the treatment of French Canadians, cost control, and the proposed establishment of a unit of twenty-one men.205 He also closely monitored the regular reports from his staff, such as when he questioned a quartermaster-general report that, after further investigation and discussions with the War Office, revealed that the Canadians were being double-billed for freight costs for rations.206 He would solicit the opinion of his staff before making a decision. For instance, when Thacker recommended that reserve unit commanders have the discretion to select officer reinforcements, Turner redirected the memo to McDonald for his remarks. McDonald agreed, and Turner approved the policy.207 To an outside observer, this approach could easily have been mistaken for a relegation or abandonment of responsibility. There were complaints later in 1918 that Turner’s staff dominated him; however, these complaints were not particularly unbiased or reliable, being from aggrieved surplus officers returned to Canada or from BrigadierGeneral J.G. Rattray, a Currie protégé stuck in England who manoeuvred behind the scenes to return to the front.208 Those closer to Turner,

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such as Kemp and Currie, never made this complaint, so on balance this criticism can be discounted. A final factor was Turner’s solid reputation for treating officers fairly. Major Bill Hewgill wrote in his diary that Turner “understands conditions and as he is in supreme command of the Canadian Forces I know I shall have fair treatment.”209 Turner’s regard even extended to the newly married; in asking that the Canadian Corps allow a newly married officer an extension for his marriage leave, he wrote in the margin of a note, “Have a Heart.”210 This attitude was sure to foster good will. In the Arras offensive, the Canadian Corps performed superbly and maintained its combat effectiveness from the storming of Vimy Ridge through to the end of the campaign. Owing to these accomplishments, Byng received command of the Third Army. Turner and his staff’s transformation of the Canadian administrative and training organization in England was essential for sustaining the Canadian Corps’s effectiveness.

7 Fighting the Authorities: The Turner–Currie Dynamic General Currie must not try to convince himself that there is anyone here after him with a view of destroying the good reputation which he has built up for himself in military matters. Kemp to Borden, 5 March 19191

On 9 June 1917, Currie replaced his red brassard with a new red, white, and red one, indicating he was now the commander of the Canadian Corps. His selection meant a dramatic change for Turner and his command, as Currie brought a fundamentally different and more adversarial attitude to the corps’s relationship with Argyll House. Currie famously responded when asked whether he had problems with the British, “My fight was not with regular officers at all. It was with Canadian authorities in London.”2 This chapter explores the sometimes contentious relationship between Currie and Turner through the lens of their correspondence and extends from the selection of Currie in June 1917 to their final clashes in the post-armistice period. Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur William Currie was born in 1875 and grew up in rural Ontario. At age eighteen, Currie moved across the continent to Vancouver Island to make his fortune. He was a successful teacher, insurance salesman, and real estate broker. Whether because of over-involvement in his Militia career, bad luck, or just poor judgment, Currie was on the verge of bankruptcy at the start of the war as the result of the collapse of the local real estate market in 1912/13.3 Currie’s pre-war military career was an unbroken success. He first enlisted in the 5th Regiment, an artillery unit based in Victoria, in 1897 and commanded it from 1909 to 1913, when he retired. He was an effective commander, and his unit won numerous awards.4 Senior

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officers of the newly raised 50th Regiment, including the junior major Garnet Hughes, persuaded the then retired Currie to accept command of the 50th when its first commander resigned at the end of 1913. Currie’s pre-war service record was outstanding, but he had gained no administrative experience outside his regiment and he had no active duty. Unlike many other senior officers, such as Turner, A.H. Macdonell, and J.H. Elmsley, Currie did not serve in the Boer War.5 Currie had wanted to enlist, but stomach problems in late 1899 and early 1900 prevented his joining. It is unclear why he did not join a later contingent.6 Physically, Currie was tall and portly, and lacked a strong presence. He stands out in a group photo taken in late 1918 for his height, heavy-set figure, and lack of facial hair.7 Shy and somewhat awkward outside of small groups or his inner circle and with a cold and aloof demeanour, Currie never connected with the rank and file during his tenure as corps commander from 1917 to 1919.8 In part, this was because he was a strict disciplinarian, especially in matters of saluting, dress, and appearance. He was maladroit in interacting with his troops and could not inspire them.9 Currie lacked the man-management skills needed to earn the trust and affection of Canadian soldiers.10 It was, however, quite difficult for a corps commander on the Western Front to make a positive impression given the scale of the unit and the nature of the war. Despite these limitations, Currie was one of the finest corps commanders on the Western Front and arguably the best field commander Canada has produced. Beneath his bulk was a man with an incisive mind – careful, deliberate, and, while perhaps not particularly imaginative, decisive. His considerable strengths aligned well with the circumstances of the Western Front. Currie believed in thorough pre-battle preparation and ample firepower to reduce losses. One of his principal merits was his great willingness to learn and master his trade.11 Currie, furthermore, had an inestimable advantage in possessing the confidence of Haig, who overlooked Currie’s lack of “soldierly deportment” because of Currie’s continued success and willingness to instill firm discipline.12 An important factor in the Canadian Corps’s victories was Currie’s readiness to confront his superiors over poor plans and to demand additional guns, shells, and time when he thought

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it necessary. Currie’s taxing nature would have resulted in his dismissal were he a British corps commander, as an example from the Passchendaele offensive illustrates – Haig agreed to Currie’s demand that the corps serve under Plumer instead of the hated Gough.13 Canadian Corps’s staff officers were initially concerned about Currie’s appointment. As Lieutenant-Colonel A. McNaughton, the Canadian Corps counter-battery staff officer at the time, put it, “We as staff officers, didn’t have too high an opinion of General Currie at that time. As a divisional commander he was a very difficult person to deal with. He was very determined that he was going to get the best – for his particular division.”14 He soon won over the corps staff because of his willingness to listen and learn from his staff and subordinates.15 Currie could be a vexing subordinate and challenging peer, but he was an excellent superior to his immediate subordinates. Garnet Hughes wrote to Currie on 11 May that there were reports circulating in England that a promotion for Byng was imminent.16 Further, Currie had met with Philip Hunloke, an adc of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Horne, goc First Army, who discussed Horne’s and Haig’s views on Turner and the corps, which suggests that manoeuvres by ghq were already taking place to ensure Currie’s promotion.17 Haig was unhappy with the performance of the Third Army in the Arras offensive, and he relieved its commander, General Sir Edmund Allenby; ironically, Allenby went on to greater success in Palestine.18 In his place, Haig appointed Byng, who in turn lobbied Haig that it was time for a Canadian to command the corps and that Currie was ready.19 Haig was surprised and worried about the complications of political influence, but he respected Currie.20 Byng nevertheless succeeded in convincing him, and to forestall any potential interference, Haig, without first gaining Perley’s approval, quickly appointed Currie to command the corps. Later, to mollify the Canadians, the British apologized for the inadvertent omission of the term “temporary” in the announcement.21 It was apparent that Currie was well aware that there would be resistance to his elevation. Urquhart, Currie’s first biographer, made the case that a cabal led by Aitken applied considerable pressure for the appointment of Turner instead.22 This lobbying did not have Turner’s support or encouragement according to the deputy minister of the omf,

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Walter Gow.23 This is telling, for Gow was intimately familiar with the matter and a later disagreement with Turner resulted in his resignation. Turner, because of his seniority and Perley’s pledge, could have caused the government considerable embarrassment by demanding it fulfill Perley’s earlier promise. Turner’s stance, however, was that he would not press for the position but would expect the government to honour its commitments. Turner’s refusal to lobby stemmed from his honourable and dutiful nature, as well as from his probable recognition that Haig would not accept him as the corps commander. Perley reported to Borden that Turner was anxious for command, since “he is by temperament a fighting soldier, but he will acquiesce cheerfully in our decision.” Perley also wanted to retain Turner because “his work invaluable here,” and while Turner was senior, Currie was more acceptable to the British.24 Perley then met with Haig, who made it clear that the only Canadian he would appoint was Currie. Currie’s combat record was stronger than Turner’s, and Turner had been out of the line for six months, so was out of touch. Perley agreed to Currie’s appointment but asked that, as a sop to Turner, both Currie and Turner be promoted to lieutenant-general so that Turner would retain his seniority.25 Perley then met with both Turner and Currie on 15 June to determine their responsibilities and channels of communication.26 Perley reported that there was a “pleasant understanding” with Currie and Turner, but in reality there was considerable conflict between the two before they reached a modus vivendi.27 According to the standard narrative, the underlying cause of the resulting conflict was Perley’s granting Turner additional powers that encroached on Currie’s authority within the corps.28 This belief stems from a Perley memorandum that delineated the relationship of the various Canadian formations and headquarters with one another and with the British. Perley specified that Turner was the minister’s “Chief Military Advisor” and that all policy and administrative matters were to continue to pass through him for his recommendations.29 There was, however, nothing in the memorandum that indicated that Turner would acquire any additional powers over the corps – unlike the situation under Byng.

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Two issues arose in the aftermath of Currie’s selection that affected the Turner–Currie relationship. The first involved Currie’s replacement as goc 1st Division. Borden wanted to ensure that Garnet Hughes received the command.30 Again, the matter of what to do with Hughes loomed large. Sims met Currie on 10 June, and Currie claimed that Sims had tried to negotiate with him regarding corps command. Currie rejected any interference, and Sims’s attempt may have been the genesis of Currie’s dislike of him (to be discussed further in chapter 8).31 While Currie did not rule out giving Hughes a division, he thought the pf officer Brigadier-General A.C. Macdonell, then commanding the 7th Brigade, a better choice.32 It was unlikely, though, that Currie had any intention of giving Hughes a division, as demonstrated later in 1918, when Currie refused Hughes again. Currie claimed he had to resist tremendous pressure from the politicians to select Hughes. Historians Hyatt and Morton both suggest that Currie probably exaggerated the force placed on him. Hyatt argues that Currie had a guilty conscience about his treatment of his former friend Garnet Hughes.33 Currie later had a heated three-hour meeting with Hughes, who pleaded for the division, but Currie adamantly refused. According to Currie, Hughes stormed out, vowing vengeance.34 He believed that Garnet was now an implacable enemy and that he and his father were sure to undermine and attempt to replace him. However, Currie continued to correspond with Garnet and to meet with him in England when on leave, which tends to belie Currie’s claim.35 As Turner was closely associated with Garnet, it was an easy leap to assume that Turner was also an inveterate enemy, especially as Currie had thwarted Turner’s ambition to command the corps. The second issue was a terrible secret that loomed over Currie – he was an embezzler. He had misappropriated $10,000 from the 50th’s regimental funds to stave off bankruptcy.36 Throughout the war, Currie – the strict disciplinarian – had lived with the fear that his peculation would be uncovered and the best he could hope for was to be cashiered. Surprisingly, Sam Hughes knew of this serious breach but never revealed it despite his later conflicts with Currie. In 1915, around the time of Festubert, Hughes sent his aide Harold Daly to

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assure Currie that his financial situation was under control. 37 Shortly after Currie’s appointment to corps command, Perley learned of Currie’s theft through the Militia Council. Initially, Perley proposed that he and Kemp pay off the debt, but two of Currie’s subordinates, David Watson and Victor Odlum (goc 11th Brigade), settled it.38 Saving Currie’s career from his financial turpitude was the correct action, given Currie’s success in commanding the Canadian Corps. However, his lack of effort to repay the debt before its discovery does place him in an unfavourable light. All this transpired at a time when the authorities regularly cashiered junior officers for passing bad cheques for as little as £20. Lieutenant-Colonel Jolly of the 212th Battalion, for example, was dismissed for issuing a fraudulent cheque for $800.39 Moreover, the decision to allow two of Currie’s subordinates to repay the debt was a poor one, since, at a minimum, it raised the issue of a potential conflict of interest.40 This was a similar situation to Haig lending £2,000 to Sir John French in 1899 to stave off bankruptcy, although French never repaid the loan.41 Finally, the embezzlement conditioned the Currie and Turner relationship. There is no evidence that Turner knew of the problem, but Currie had to suspect that Turner was aware of it, and so Currie would be concerned that Turner could use the information against him. Currie as corps commander was in an anomalous position. He owed a duty to two different masters and had to negotiate the nebulous boundaries between responsibilities owed to the British chain of command and to Canadian authorities. Operations and logistics were wholly under the British, but administrative matters, such as promotions and appointments, were under both British and Canadian control. The boundary evolved over the course of the war as the Canadians wrested greater control from the British. The Canadian Corps had a similar organization to a British corps, other than having its divisions effectively permanently attached to the corps; it was not until 1918 that the organization of the Canadian divisions differed substantially from that of the British divisions. The Canadian Corps was fully integrated into the bef’s command, discipline, and logistics infrastructure. In matters of promotion, commissioning, and appointments, however, it also reported to Canadian authorities. In a British corps,

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the commander did not have control over appointments to the senior command, administrative, and staff roles – ghq controlled higher staff positions and the branch or administrative corps selected administrative appointments.42 Even Haig was limited in his ability to appoint his own staff. The War Office, for instance, deemed Haig’s first choice for his chief of General Staff too junior and posted Major-General L. Kiggell instead.43 The commander of the Canadian Corps not only had combat responsibilities, but was also the head of a national contingent, which carried political implications. A British corps commander on the Western Front was far enough down the chain of command that his role was entirely military. The formation of the omfc and Perley’s memorandum regularized responsibilities between the forces in the field and the command structure in England. Currie, however, was vigilant in defending what he regarded as his prerogatives. Many historians view the Turner– Currie relationship through the prism of Currie’s voluminous correspondence and diary. As a result, an image surfaces in some accounts of a jealous and refractory Turner interfering in Currie’s responsibilities. A careful review of the documentation, however, reveals an asymmetric dynamic: Currie viewed the administration as an adversary, but Turner and Perley were not fighting Currie. Two issues, initially, roiled the Turner–Currie relationship. The first was the issue of artillery officer promotions. Currie wrote to Turner on 29 July to complain that the gazetting of officer promotions in the artillery was in chaos, with some promotions not gazetted for over a year. Currie then made an impassioned plea for the promotion of officers who had fought with their batteries on the Somme and at Vimy and died without receiving their due rewards. He closed with, “This you know is not right, and the matter should receive prompt attention.”44 Turner swiftly replied, agreeing that the missed promotions were not right. He followed up to report that there were no outstanding promotions at the War Office or ghq.45 Turner did Sims no favour by stating, “The delay therefore must be at Corps Headquarters and Colonel Sims tells me he has pointed this out to you.”46 Turner then sent his ams Major Montague to help the corps accelerate the transit of the promotions through the War Office

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machinery. Montague reported, “General Currie advised us that he had been under a misapprehension at the time he wrote the letter of July 29th.”47 Currie neglected to ask Brigadier-General G.J. Farmar, his chief administrative officer, before writing in high dudgeon to Turner. According to Farmar, the artillery officers had received acting promotions, which did not require gazetting, and so they had received their due pay and allowances. There is no record of Currie apologizing to Turner after his faux pas. This – Currie automatically assuming that problems or obstacles were Turner’s fault – would become a pattern. In August, Currie wrote a strident letter complaining about Turner’s interference in the appointments in the corps. At issue was the selection of the Canadian Corps’s chief ordnance and veterinary officers without Currie’s approval first being obtained. Currie argued that Turner should have asked him for recommendations or better yet that Currie make the recommendation: “This puts me in a false position and I maintain is most unfair. If I am to command this Corps, surely it is for me to say who should be recommended to fill the appointments.” He then drew a comparison with Sam Hughes’s approach to advancement – slapping someone on the back and promoting them on the spot – which was sure to rankle Perley and Turner.48 Turner took the stance that he was following standard British Army policy – that support organizations, such as the Army Veterinary Corps, made all administrative appointments without reference to the corps commander – so it was within his prerogative to appoint the two officers. In Turner’s view, all combat promotion and appointment recommendations emanated from Currie, but administrative selections were in the purview of the services involved.49 Turner, Currie, and Sims worked out a compromise: Turner would unofficially consult Currie to solicit his views before deciding on appointments. This was not a matter of Turner interfering but one of Currie demanding more authority and Turner retreating from standard British policy. Turner backed down in most cases and granted Currie what he wanted. Another example of the negotiating-boundaries process was the corps’s demand that Lieutenant-Colonel Raymond Brutinel be promoted to a full colonel, with the pay and allowances of a gso 1, and

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be responsible for the cmgc. Turner denied the promotion but did allow Brutinel to receive the pay and allowances of a gso 1, who was typically a lieutenant-colonel but received higher pay and allowances than a line lieutenant-colonel. The argument was that while Brutinel had a strong influence on the mg Depot, he did not command it and was thus not truly the head of the cmgc.50 Currie had to acquiesce.

tur ner and the abortive birth of a c anadia n air f orce One of the paradoxes of Canada’s participation in the First World War was the fact that there was no separate Canadian air service at the front (two squadrons were in the process of forming and training at the armistice), while Canada had asserted the right for Canadians to serve in distinct Canadian units from the war’s beginning.51 The British accepted this claim of sovereignty well before Canadians had demonstrated any martial prowess. The British authorities, furthermore, indicated a willingness to accept separate Canadian squadrons.52 In late 1915, the Army Council suggested that the Dominions raise complete squadrons, an offer the Australians accepted.53 Hughes offered four squadrons in September 1916, and as late as March 1917, the War Office was trying to arrange a meeting with Perley to discuss the proposal – a proposal unknown to Turner, Thacker, and Perley.54 Canada made a major contribution to the British air effort, providing 20,000 aircrew or roughly one-quarter of the total British pilot strength. The nature of the contribution was also notable: four of the top ten British air aces were Canadian – William Bishop, vc, with 72 victories, Raymond Collishaw with 60, Donald MacLaren with 54, and William Barker, vc, with 50. Finally, there was Australia’s success in raising and maintaining four squadrons at the front by late 1917, notwithstanding Canada sending twenty times the number of pilots to the front as Australia.55 Turner had a full appreciation of air power owing to his experiences at Second Ypres, St Eloi, and the Somme. As a result, he was a strong proponent of a separate air service for Canada. As early as

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January 1917, Turner was advocating for a separate service.56 Writing a strong letter to Perley on 13 July 1917, he launched a more concerted campaign to persuade the government to establish a Canadian flying service. He followed up with a second letter on 22 September, stating that it was “humiliating” that Canada had no air service when it was contributing so many men to the British service.57 The second letter was probably the most pointed missive Turner had ever sent to Perley. He recommended that Canada form squadrons “as rapidly as conditions allow” with the objective of establishing a Royal Flying Corps Brigade, consisting of observation and scout squadrons, a balloon park, and an aircraft park. Turner believed that this formation would cover all the branches of the air service. The British would supply the equipment and Canada the flying and ground personnel. His rationale was that a Canadian air force would provide better service, increase Canadian recognition, enable the government to fulfill its responsibilities to its citizens in the British flying services, and afford valuable experience. The majority of Canadians had entered the flying service via direct recruitment or transfer, and Canadian authorities could not trace them.58 The omfc could only track officers seconded to the flying services – Canadian authorities incorrectly believed that Canadians made up 35 per cent of the pilots in the British flying services.59 The rationale was a clear demonstration of Turner’s nationalist orientation and political sensitivity. Perley responded to Borden that while he sympathized with the desire for a Canadian air service, there were practical arguments against it. His most telling point arose from discussions with Commander Redford Mulock, the senior Canadian pilot. The issue was how to ensure that a separate Canadian service would get a fair proportion of modern aircraft. Technological advances quickly rendered aircraft obsolescent, and flying these aircraft was akin to a death sentence, as witnessed by the terrible losses of the Royal Flying Corps in April 1917.60 Perley worried that any real or perceived inequitable aircraft distribution would rebound on the government. There are, however, no reports to suggest that the Australian Flying Corps had any difficulty in this respect. At its heart, Perley’s argument was that the political risks of a separate service far outweighed any potential

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benefits.61 All these points had some validity, but other than the issue of modern equipment, all applied equally to the formation of separate Canadian ground units. Hughes brushed these objections aside and aggressively asserted Canada’s sovereignty – to the benefit of Canada and the overall war effort. In the midst of the Passchendaele offensive, Currie wrote to Turner about his desire for a Canadian squadron to support the Canadian Corps. He revealed he did not know Turner’s stance on a separate air force.62 Currie’s comment suggests a critical error Turner had made in not enlisting Currie and the senior Canadian pilots in lobbying Perley. It highlights the costs of the estrangement between Currie and Turner. A strong position from Currie and the senior Canadian pilots orchestrated by Turner might have been sufficient to change Perley’s mind. With Kemp replacing Perley in January 1918, Turner reopened the file by sending a series of letters in January, February, and April, reiterating the case for a separate service and adding that Currie agreed with him.63 Billy Bishop vc, Canada’s most famous pilot, supplied additional ammunition, claiming that all Canadian officers in the raf (formed from the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service in April 1918) wanted their own service.64 Turner was quick to pass on Bishop’s views to Kemp. The formation of the raf gave Turner another opportunity to push for a separate air force. He wrote a further pointed letter to Kemp at the end of April strongly recommending that Canada secure representation on the Air Board commensurate with Canada’s contribution and begin the formation of a Canadian Air Force. Turner’s strongest point was that Canadians were not proportionally represented in the higher ranks.65 He had considerable grounds for this complaint. Figures gathered on seconded officers by the omfc showed that Canadians made up 9.5 per cent of the pilots but only 2 to 3 per cent of the flight commanders and above.66 Turner’s dogged persistence, with support from Currie and leading Canadian pilots, increased public scrutiny, and a less anglophile minister persuaded the government to change its policy in mid-1918. The result was much less than Turner wanted – just two squadrons.67 Despite the promising start, neither squadron reached the front before the armistice.68

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Throughout the war, Canadian authorities struggled to supply sufficient numbers of competent ncos and junior officers to maintain the combat effectiveness of the Canadian Corps. Yet, Canada allowed approximately 20,000 men who were or could have been ncos and junior officers in the cef to serve in the British flying services, with limited direct benefit to Canada. Given the extent and nature of Canada’s contribution to the air war, why was there no separate service? Important factors were the government’s indifference to and underestimation of air power and fear of the political risks. Finally, while Turner was persistent in his efforts to promote a separate service, his failure to recruit Currie and the most influential Canadian pilots frustrated his objective.

f urther deter ioration Currie and Turner had reached a cool but correct relationship after the initial clashes, but persistent rumours of Currie’s imminent dismissal after the Passchendaele campaign upset the balance.69 The purported reasons for Currie’s dismissal included Passchendaele’s high casualties, his ill health, or a poor working relationship with ghq. Today, it is difficult to imagine how Currie’s tenure was in peril, but the extent of the rumours suggests that Currie had reason for concern, and this situation would have intensified his negative view of the administration in England. Possibly triggering these rumours were two cables Perley sent to Borden when he learned of Borden’s plan to include a senior general in the cabinet for the 1917 federal election. Perley considered Currie the better choice politically, as he was a known Liberal, and with Currie ailing in October, Perley thought he might be willing to accept a cabinet post. Perley would then make the case to Haig that only a Canadian could command the corps, meaning Turner, but it is unlikely that Perley queried Haig. Kemp did visit Haig in January 1918, and in his diary, Haig recorded that Kemp “asked my opinion about General Turner and agreed that he must keep him in charge of the Canadian organization in England and that General Currie (now Commander Canadian Corps) should command in the field.”70 This rather odd entry suggests that Kemp was at least willing to discuss replacing or transferring both officers.71 This was

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consistent with Kemp’s expressed dissatisfaction with both officers when he first took over the omfc (see chapter 8). The heavy losses at Passchendaele in the midst of the 1917 federal election campaign and Currie’s lack of public support for conscription in the election did not endear him to the politicians and probably contributed to the whispering campaign. The rumours were prevalent and credible enough that they reached Canada and caused the Liberal Party to cable a party organizer in England enquiring if Currie had been relieved.72 The final straw was a telegram sent to Currie from a newspaper editor, addressed to “General Sir Arthur Currie, or to the Acting Commander of the Canadian Corps.” Outraged, Currie demanded that Perley issue an official statement to the effect that he was not being replaced, which Perley did not do.73 Currie found the atmosphere in London troubling as well, complaining to Brigadier-General F.O.W. Loomis in January, “I also learned that I had become very unpopular with the Commander-in-Chief and the Army. I was told that the Canadian Corps was not working harmoniously with the higher authorities at all.”74 This complaint stemmed in part from Currie’s resistance to participating in the Passchendaele offensive. It may also relate to the campaign that, according to Urquhart, certain British generals and Lipsett were waging to replace Currie with Lipsett.75 Currie’s reaction to these threats indicates he was not a political naïf. He asked Harold Daly, the politically well-connected former aide of Hughes, to tell select journalists his side of the story if he was relieved. Currie was unhappy with the support he was getting and claimed that “some people are not playing the game as they should.”76 Currie was probably alluding to Perley and Turner. However, his complaints were unfair to Turner, as there is no evidence that Turner played any part in this campaign.

challenges of 1 918 Turner’s training organization faced four principal challenges in 1918: first, in responding to the significant expansion of the Canadian Corps due to a major reorganization: second, in supplying drafts in expectation of the German spring offensive; third, in keeping the corps up to strength because of heavy casualties during the Hundred Days

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campaign; and, finally, in simultaneously coping with effects of the Spanish influenza. The degree to which it responded to these challenges would affect the corps’s combat effectiveness. While the federal election ensured conscription’s implementation, there was a lag before the conscripts arrived. In the interim, the main sources of manpower in December and January were recovered wounded and boys who had reached the age of nineteen (British regulations stipulated that drafts had to be nineteen before going on active duty).77 How to deal with conscripts was a matter of great importance. Turner, because of his strong man-management skills, rejected Thacker’s proposal of a special numbering system for conscripts, as he did not want them to be specially distinguished.78 Turner also ordered area commanders to treat conscripts with the “same goodwill and respect as volunteers.”79 When the conscripts started arriving, McDonald reported, “The men throughout are an excellent type, easy to handle, have nothing to un-learn, and are exceedingly keen in their work.”80 The imposition of the Military Service Act meant that, for the first time, omfc had large numbers of French Canadians to train and send to the corps. In response to Turner’s query on how to distribute the additional men, Currie’s divisional commanders were only willing to receive them in units of platoon size; this was because of the earlier desertion of two men from a French-Canadian company in the 14th Battalion.81 Both Turner and Kemp agreed to this policy. Turner took steps to procure French-Canadian cadets from the corps and directed Thacker to ensure that a French-Canadian officer accompanied drafts of fifty French Canadians dispatched to an English-speaking battalion.82

canadian cor ps reorganization The reorganization of the Canadian Corps in early 1918 was the most notable instance of Turner being misguided in an administrative matter. The British losses of the 1916/17 campaigns and the resulting manpower shortage compelled the War Office to mandate a crucial reorganization.83 The War Office, over Haig’s objections, ordered the disbandment of one battalion per brigade.84 In early 1918, it

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approached Canadian authorities to effect a similar change and use the released battalions to raise a sixth division. The War Office also requested that the Australians follow suit, but they rejected the idea.85 Under this scheme, with the 5th Division brought to France, Canada could form a second corps and possibly a small army. This was an attractive proposition to the government, to Turner, and to the many surplus officers remaining in England. For the government, it meant that the surplus officers would have a position, Garnet Hughes would serve at the front, and Canada would gain more influence from a second corps.86 For Turner, it meant the opportunity to possibly command the second corps and to realize his desire for a combat command. Not surprisingly, both Kemp and Turner endorsed the plan, but without first consulting Currie. They likely assumed that Currie would jump at the opportunity to possibly command a Canadian army, but it was an error not to confer with him. Currie reacted, however, with strong disapprobation when he learned of the plan from Turner.87 He hastened to London and met with Turner and Kemp to express his objections. Contrary to the usual narrative of Currie fighting tooth and nail to derail this plan, his objections were convincing and his view prevailed without much resistance.88 Currie thought that the original proposal was inefficient and ineffective. He argued that circumstances compelled the British to adopt this structure, not that it was inherently superior. Changing the organization would mean breaking up battle-tested formations and replacing them with less-effective ones. It was inefficient in overhead, as the requirements for additional support units would far outweigh the increase in combat power. A particularly compelling argument to Turner and Kemp was that the staff required for a sixth division, a second corps, and potentially an army would not be Canadian, so it meant a retreat from Canadianization, given that there were not enough qualified Canadians to staff the new formations.89 Currie’s objections were convincing, but what made the difference was an alternative plan he advanced to increase combat power. He wanted to expand the engineers in each division to brigade strength to reduce the strain on the infantry by freeing them from having to provide work parties. He considered the increase in engineers so vital that he preferred “to do without infantry than to go without Engineers.”90

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He also wanted to increase the number of machine guns and signallers, expand motor transport capacity, and add one hundred supernumeraries to each battalion. Kemp and Turner accepted Currie’s scheme, and in this instance Currie was correct. Historians have rightly praised him for his principled stance of advocating a plan that meant waiving a chance for promotion. After ghq approved the new establishments, Turner had to deliver the additional personnel for the corps. The infantry were not a serious problem, as Turner disbanded the 5th Division to free enough trained men to provide the supernumeraries required.91 The expansion of the technical arms, however, was a different matter. These troops took the longest time to instruct, required specialized training equipment and supplies, and often depended on civilian trained manpower. Turner’s organization had to immediately supply the equivalent of three battalions of engineers, four companies of machine gunners, additional signallers, and 700 motor transport personnel. Argyll House satisfied these initial demands, except for drivers, but they emptied the replacement pools, which took time to recover.92 Turner wrote Currie in February patiently explaining why it was difficult to supply the needed drafts. The increase in the engineers’ establishment required expanding the depot and procuring additional training supplies – the latter always a challenge. Currie failed to grasp that an expansion in the establishment in France required a similar one in England and that there would necessarily be a lag in the supply of trained men.93 The staggering success of the German March offensive caused Currie to increase the firepower of his divisions by adding a third mg company to each division’s mg battalion on 10 April. To obtain the extra personnel, he drafted fifty men per battalion and gave them a crash course in machine guns. He did not inform Turner of his decision until 16 April, but even so, Turner had the new establishment rapidly approved by 1 May.94 Even before the expansion, Currie complained vociferously about the poor state of mg drafts. He could not understand why, given the lack of combat since Passchendaele, there were so few replacements available. Of course, Currie ignored his demand for an increase in the size of the cmgc, and the mg Depot needed time to expand before it could supply the additional replacements. Moreover, originally Argyll House assumed it could use the

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5th Division’s mg companies as drafts, but these troops instead were used to increase the establishment in France.95 In a typical fashion, Thacker and Turner scrambled to satisfy Currie, rescinding an order to retain recovered machine gunners in England and accelerated machine gunner training. Thacker pointed out that he had met all the demands for drafts, other than twenty-five specialist ncos, contrary to Currie’s claims.96 Currie’s increasing demands placed a tremendous strain on Turner’s ability to respond. Currie requested, for example, that Turner supply engineer replacements at a rate of 10 per cent per month because he expected heavier losses in open warfare conditions. Previously, the monthly wastage rate was 4 per cent per month for engineers and 5 per cent for pioneers. In effect, Currie was insisting that Turner’s organization treble the number of engineer drafts because of the increased wastage factor based on a larger establishment of engineers. Turner agreed to the demand when sufficient replacements arrived from Canada, and the plan was put into effect on 22 August.97 Argyll House also struggled to satisfy the increased establishment for engineer officers. The situation was so dire that Turner requested engineer officers from Canada, contrary to the previous policy of not accepting officers from Canada. As late as 20 July, there was still an outstanding demand for 129 officers from Canada.98 Currie continued to complain about the number of and state of training for signallers. Signal training was an ongoing issue throughout 1918, especially given the increased establishment and use of wireless equipment, which put an even greater strain on the limited training capabilities. McDonald explained that Argyll House was expanding its training establishments, combing out experienced signallers from infantry units, raising instructors’ pay, and attempting to secure the necessary equipment.99 McDonald confessed to the Canadian Corps bggs that it was almost impossible to get wireless equipment for training, because all the sets manufactured were sent to the front.100 In May, Currie claimed that his units were lacking 540 battalion signallers, that only 60 were available, and that men did not train on the equipment used in the corps. This was another instance of Currie seeming oblivious to the situation in England and to the impossibility of his demands being met.101 In a sharply worded rejoinder,

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Turner responded that there were no outstanding demands for signallers and if the deficiency had reached such an alarming total, it was “not due to any lack of provision of this personnel on the part of Reserve Units in England.” He also pushed back Currie about the state of training: “The training of Signal personnel depends entirely upon the quality of the instructional personnel returned from the corps for that purpose.”102 Overall, Turner’s organization struggled to supply the corps’s increased establishments in specialist troops. Shortages in the supply of equipment and training matériel and in the supply of alreadytrained technical personnel from the civilian sector severely limited the training capacity. McDonald reported problems in the provision of training equipment and supplies in almost all his monthly reports in 1918. Turner and his staff, despite their best efforts, failed to source the necessary materials and did not respond aggressively enough to address these problems. Again, the lack of experience of Turner’s staff in these specialist branches showed. The other source of manpower was the 5th Division. After the election, the political necessity of keeping Garnet Hughes employed diminished and keeping 7,256 trained infantry – the division’s battalions were under-strength – tied up in England was indefensible.103 In October 1917, the Canadian War Committee considered breaking up the 5th Division, given the replacement shortages, and asked for Perley and Turner’s opinion. 104 Based on a detailed analysis, Thacker recommended that the 5th Division be broken up; otherwise, there would be no infantry replacements after 1 May 1918.105 Perley responded to a further cable from Borden in which Bordon ordered the disbandment of the 5th Division but recommended that the organization be kept but used for reinforcements.106 This was just before the election, and the implication was that it was not politically expedient to break up the division, yet. The continued presence of the 5th Division in England while wounded men returned to the front was cause for public criticism.107 As part of Currie’s plan, the 5th Division disbanded, and its infantry arrived in France as drafts, the mg companies to supplement the newly formed mg battalions and engineers to reinforce the engineer brigades. The 5th Division artillery had already been serving in France since August 1917.

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The breakup of the 5th created a problem – what should be done with the surplus infantry captains, majors, and lieutenant-colonels; Garnet Hughes; and Sam Hughes’s son-in-law, Byron Green, a battalion commander in the 5th Division? After some initial reluctance and a plea from Kemp, Currie agreed to accept more surplus officers, most of whom would suffer a loss of only a single rank. Any officer with experience overseas could return at their previous rank.108 Currie also agreed to the policy that ncos returning as commissioned officers would be dispatched first and then in equal portions with returning wounded officers and officers without overseas experience, such as those from the 5th Division.109 A further indication of the political significance of Garnet Hughes was Borden’s concern over his return to Canada. Garnet Hughes demanded that the War Office recall the British Regular Major-General L. Lipsett in command of the 3rd Division so Garnet could replace him, but Kemp refused to intervene. Currie did not want Hughes because he had been away from the front for a year, and Hughes rejected Turner’s offer of a training area at Hughes’s current rank.110 Eventually, Hughes accepted an unpaid position in the British Munitions Ministry and Green returned to Canada.111 Contrary to the views of some historians, the breakup of the 5th Division did not solve the manpower crisis but did provide a vital buffer to supply the corps with well-trained reinforcements while the conscripts trained.112 The 7,286 trained infantry in the division were used to provide the 100 supernumeraries per battalion and replacements for the men assigned to the mg companies.

r esponding to the ger man march offensive The German March offensive was the second major challenge. The German attack on 21 March was an immense shock. It was not unexpected, but the extent of its success was. The Germans advanced further in a day than in any previous offensive and severely upset Haig’s defensive arrangements. Currie believed the British were fighting poorly, and he communicated his grave concerns to the omfc, to Borden, and by rumour to the British.113 Turner immediately ordered training compressed to nine weeks and preparations made to

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send men with as little as six weeks training to ensure there were adequate manpower reserves.114 Turner also directed Thacker to provide a list of officers suitable for senior positions, should the corps suffer heavy losses.115 Instead of facing an attack, the corps had to stretch to cover more ground as Haig rushed reinforcements to stem the German advance. On 26 March, Haig ordered three Canadian divisions to move south to Byng’s Third Army, while the Canadian Corps headquarters moved into reserve. Currie immediately protested the breakup of the corps to ghq and to Kemp. Kemp promptly intervened with the Secretary of State for War. All but the 2nd Division was restored to Currie, but this later led Haig to complain to the visiting minister of Militia that “the British Army alone and unaided by Canadian troops withstood the first terrific blow made by 80 German Divisions on March 21st until May 27th.”116 It was during this period of intense stress that Currie’s chauffeur reported, “For the first time in my experience he appeared to be perturbed. He was very excited and seemed to lose control of his temper.”117 The stress also touched Turner, who wrote an unusually brusque letter to Kemp complaining that the War Office was requiring Currie’s concurrence on all changes to establishments for cavalry, railway, and forestry troops. Turner’s reaction was harsh: “This letter is directly contrary to any policy known to me to exist.” Turner wanted to make it clear that Currie did not have any control over forces outside of the corps.118 The Germans never attacked the Canadian Corps’s position, even with the attenuated forces stretched paper-thin. Currie and the corps developed a strong position that may have dissuaded the Germans from attacking. A more likely factor was the Canadian front did not lead to significant operational objectives, unlike the other sectors the Germans did attack.119 The impact of the German attack caused the new cigs, General Sir Henry Wilson, to make a desperate request in June 1918. He asked the Canadians to replace one battalion per brigade with an American battalion, thus freeing up forces to form a fifth division, and to form another division out of the Canadian forestry and railway troops. Turner and Kemp refused to change the organization

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of the corps. Kemp, too, politely pointed out the short-sightedness of Wilson’s forestry and rail request, as it would cripple timber production and throttle essential railway construction.120 In England, the training organization continued to work on producing drafts for the corps in case the Germans did attack the corps’s front. To prevent the spread of influenza, Argyll House in April established a segregation camp to hold 10,000 men in quarantine for a month.121 While in the segregation camp, the men would receive elementary training and basic discipline, but this additional interruption disrupted training.122 As a further economy measure, Turner dissolved the remaining Reserve Brigades. By June, Turner restored the full fourteen-week training syllabus, and by July, the training could be extended as the corps left the line, there being little demand for drafts.123 With the corps in reserve, McDonald could spend a week with the corps to review issues and the corps’s training officers could visit England.124 Commanding on the Western Front was arduous, both physically and psychologically, and Currie, fiercely loyal to his officers, closely monitored them for signs of an incipient breakdown. His view was that an officer who broke down was unfit for further front-line duty. To prevent breakdowns, Currie wanted commanders showing early signs of one to take a rest cure in England before they collapsed.125 Turner and Currie worked out a scheme to transfer brigadier-generals and battalion commanders to lead training units for four to six months. This step provided valuable front-line experience to the training areas and gave these officers a chance to recover from the front’s rigours.126 The corps and Turner had already established an officer exchange program of up to six months for qualified officers. This time limit served to keep officers from falling out of touch with the changing conditions in France.127 Turner was concerned that the corps would use these programs as a mechanism to dump weak officers on England – that is, the corps might send officers who were mediocre but not so poor as to warrant an adverse report. The result would be a form of Gresham’s Law – “bad money drives good money out of circulation” – as no competent officer would want to go to England if it gained a reputation as a holding tank for the weak, incompetent,

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or undesirable.128 One such case involved a four-month delay in the corps sending an adverse report on a captain who was acting as an instructor in England.129 Protecting the integrity of the training system was vital to Turner, and it was the cause of further conflict with Currie. Currie complained when Turner rejected Brigadier-General F. Hill – whom Currie had recommended – for a training command. Turner thought Hill an inebriate, which Currie denied. Currie’s comment was a characteristically petulant: “If my recommendations are not to be accepted what is the good of asking me to make them.” Kemp forced Turner to give Shorncliffe Area Command to Hill, replacing the incumbent Brigadier-General Smart, who had to return to Canada.130 Smart would later fiercely attack the omfc when he returned to Canada in 1919.

the hundr ed days campaign The third challenge Turner’s administration faced in 1918 was responding to the corps’s loss of 45,835 men in the Hundred Days Campaign. 131 Considering that the corps’s total establishment was approximately 105,000 men, it meant replacing a substantial portion of the corps’s combat strength concentrated in the infantry, machine guns, and engineers, and to a lesser degree in the signals and artillery. Turner responded by reducing the period of training to twelve weeks in August, ten weeks in September, and nine weeks in October and increasing the number of cadets under training from an average of 350 per month to 586 in September and 627 in October.132 Because of the high demand for infantry drafts to replace the enormous losses, the training organization had to further reduce the time spent on training. The Canadian Corps complained, but as Richard Holt expressed it, “The fourteen-week syllabus could have been restored in September 1918 but only at the cost of stopping the flow of reinforcements for five weeks, a course of action that would have been completely unacceptable given the continuing advance of the Allied armies.”133 By October, musketry training was running seven days a week, from dawn and dusk, to qualify men for the front, and all advanced instruction other than anti-gas training stopped. The strain was starting to show in October, such that McDonald was warning that the

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system could not long sustain the pace.134 The rate had to be maintained, as it was not certain until close to the armistice that the Germans would acknowledge their defeat. Currie in early October was convinced the Germans were not on the verge of surrender. He characterized the Germans as fighting harder than he had known and he expected they would fight even harder next year.135 At the same time as the replacement demands were escalating, Argyll House had to deal with the worldwide influenza outbreak – its fourth challenge. The cef had 45,960 cases, and the problem was particularly acute in the number and severity of cases aboard troop ships.136 Turner’s organization attempted to limit the spread of the disease by closing wet canteens, theatres, and cinemas, and discontinuing church parades. The medical authorities placed the entire Bramshott Camp under quarantine, with the result that men who had completed their training were not available for drafts.137 The training organization did satisfy the corps’s replacement demands despite these challenges but at the cost of compressing the training period. The main indicator of the success of Turner’s training organization was that the corps’s combat power did not significantly degrade with the provision of a vast number of replacements, unlike the situation at the Somme, where the corps’s combat effectiveness precipitously declined after the first engagements.

na dir : post-a rmistice clashes The end of the war, rather than diminishing the tensions between Currie and Turner, seemed to exacerbate Currie’s distrust of Turner. Convinced that Turner and his staff were conducting a campaign to undermine him, Currie complained to Harold Daly, “I am afraid the old gang is still doing business.”138 He accused Turner and his staff of spending most of their time visiting hospitals where they “intimate that the Canadian Corps has suffered great and unnecessary casualties; going so far as to suggest that the leaders in the field have countenanced the men being sacrificed.”139 Currie carped to a former adc that Turner was spreading these lies.140 In response to Currie’s accusations, Kemp denied there was any substance to them.141 Currie also attacked Turner over manpower policies in the post-armistice period.

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Turner, as was often the case, demonstrated to Kemp that Currie’s complaints were exaggerated and in some cases the result of Currie changing his mind.142 In February 1919, Currie denounced Turner for attempting to turn Canadians in England against him. Currie railed, “I repeat these slanders are being encouraged.”143 He claimed he could provide the name of a British general who had stated that there was “a sustained but veiled attempt” to undermine Currie.144 Currie also accused Turner and his staff of lying to officers that the corps did not want them. In at least one case that Turner investigated, the officer promptly repudiated the claim. Kemp once again tried to calm the increasingly excitable Currie, asserting there was no evidence of senior officers spreading rumours. He did suggest that the problem originated with junior officers and other ranks. Kemp was gently trying to inform Currie that he did have a problem, but it was one of his own making. The rift between Currie and Turner was at risk of becoming public, and to forestall this Kemp held a luncheon with Borden, Currie, and Turner, after which statements were made to the press denying any conflict.145 Currie’s attacks finally raised Turner’s hackles, and he asked Kemp to inform Currie “that we resent criticism when it is unwarranted, and nothing causes greater dissatisfaction than generalities.” He further stated that if Currie complained about officer transfers, he would have to provide details – such as the officer’s name – so Turner could investigate.146 Currie’s letters tended to omit details and thus it was difficult to refute his sometimes exaggerated allegations. Were Currie’s claims legitimate? While the idea that Turner and his staff encouraged the slander cannot be ruled out, it is highly unlikely. Currie was intensely sensitive, quick to take offence, and apt to see enemies everywhere, especially when exhausted, as after the Hundred Days Campaign. It was more likely that Currie, as Kemp maintained, magnified the usual grumbling and dissatisfaction of the other ranks into a grand conspiracy, with his rival Turner at its centre. Certainly, Sam Hughes was still an inveterate enemy, but Turner was not part of any conspiracy.147 Turner’s practice of visiting hospitals two days a month, on average – something Currie did not often do – may have

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contributed to Currie’s suspicions.148 Currie’s claim was entirely at odds with Turner’s character. Another factor that argues against Currie’s complaint was Kemp’s defence of Turner. Turner was no great favourite of Kemp’s, and he was the subject of repeated grievances to Borden. It is therefore difficult to believe that Kemp would defend Turner as stoutly as he did if there had been any substance to Currie’s complaints. Furthermore, two of the leading experts on Currie and the omfc, Hyatt and Morton, attribute Currie’s problems to his unpopularity with the other ranks – not to Turner’s machinations.149

the turner –curr ie relationship The working relationship between Currie and Turner was not wholly dysfunctional, but neither was it fully effective. The dynamic consisted of Currie demanding and Turner complying. Currie often couched his requirements in undiplomatic and at times intemperate language. Currie had the expectation that whatever he required would be fulfilled by Turner, and for the most part, Turner accepted this. It was Turner’s practice to do all in his power to help the front, but he had a larger mandate than just Currie’s command: he was also responsible for 50,000 men outside the corps in Europe and 100,000 in England. Currie did not recognize that the factors of finance, politics, and civilian control that he regularly railed against were the sine qua non of Turner’s command. Currie could not distinguish between the necessary political, financial, and civilian constraints and the blatant political interference of Sam Hughes. Currie’s reflection on there being “no freedom of action: financial considerations, personal considerations and all sorts of other things [are] retarding what one considers progress” was Turner’s reality, but Currie did not appreciate this.150 Five conclusions are evident from the Turner–Currie correspondence, starting with Currie’s assumption of corps command to the end of demobilization. First, Turner worked diligently to satisfy Currie’s requests. In case after case, he endeavoured to meet the demands coming from the corps. In October 1918, for instance, he confirmed the

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promotion of two officers to brigadier-general at Currie’s request at the cost of contributing to a bitter rift with the deputy minister.151 On small issues, such as returning officers to the front or retaining them in England, Turner made every effort to fulfill Currie’s demands.152 More importantly, on larger issues, such as having half of the commanders of mg companies graded as majors or changing the policy to give priority to returning wounded officers when filling officer vacancies, Turner satisfied the corps’s needs and requests.153 Another way Turner satisfied Currie’s wishes was to give him authority to transfer men at the infantry depot in France who had not served overseas between units reinforced by the reserve battalion.154 These examples show Turner’s absolute willingness to accede to Currie’s requests. As Tim Cook puts it, “Although Turner had an uneasy relationship with Currie, he had always done his best to assist the corps commander.”155 Indeed, Currie was getting his way so often that the minister of Militia in Canada, Sydney Mewburn, complained to Borden in April 1918 that Currie was setting policy and forcing Turner and the government to acquiesce. Mewburn wanted the government to perform this function, but Currie was still able to fix the course of action, such as demobilization.156 This was a matter of frustration to Kemp when he was the minister of omfc, and it contributed to his complaints that the military was not sufficiently under civilian control. Second, Turner’s general operating principle was to query the corps before making policy decisions that affected it. This was especially evident after the conflict over the appointments to administrative positions in the corps. Turner recognized that the Canadian Corps was a unique formation, and so it was necessary to modify standard British policies. This was especially the case given Currie’s personality and hair-trigger responsiveness to any perceived threat to his autonomy or authority. Turner, for example, in reaction to Currie’s concerns, proposed a different approach to breaking up battalions at the front because of manpower shortages.157 Third, there is no evidence of the jealousy and obstruction that supposedly characterized Turner’s relationship with Currie. In his standard treatment of Canadian military history, George Stanley makes this claim: “That this appointment should of aroused personal jeal-

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ousies was natural; that the jealousies should of led to personal animosities, bitter recriminations, and political intrigue was indicative of immaturity and a lack of a proper sense of military discipline.”158 Even the accomplished historian Charles Stacey focuses on the unpopularity of Argyll House: “Static headquarters in safe areas always are, but in this instance personalities certainly made things worse, the more so as Turner had hoped to be Corps Commander.”159 However, what is missing is any evidence that the conflict that did exist was the result of Turner’s jealousy. What was evident was Turner’s public appreciation of Currie, albeit it might have been just conventional politeness. For instance, there is his letter of congratulations to Currie for his success at Hill 70: “I congratulate you, with all my heart, on the splendid success achieved with the Corps lately.”160 Turner showed support to Currie in a letter written in early September 1918: “I think one of the gratifying results up to the present has been the success achieved with a comparative small loss.”161 Fourth, constants in Currie’s correspondence with Turner were his often-curt tone and his persistent vigilance for any possible infringement on his perceived prerogatives. A note on officer supply from the period leading up to the German March offensive illustrates both themes. Currie was incensed that a letter referred to Turner as goc Overseas Military Forces of Canada, an unauthorized title, and Currie escalated the issue to the minister. Next, he complained that the 5th Division was dumping officers on the corps, units were not getting their commissioned ncos returned, and he wanted an officer exchange for a hard-hit battalion. Turner’s response illustrates how he dealt with Currie’s sometimes brusque and accusatory letters. He began by apologizing for the typist’s oversight in omitting the term “in the British Isles” in his title. Next, he ordered Thacker to satisfy Currie’s request for an officer exchange. Finally, he asked for more specifics on Currie’s complaints so that he could investigate. This letter captures the dynamic of Turner seeking to satisfy Currie’s relentless requests while trying to manage his suspicions and at times ill-tempered demands.162 Currie would never apologize, even when he was clearly in the wrong; Turner, on the other hand, would be contrite. Another instance of Currie’s sometimes unbridled language

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occurred in October 1918: “The seconding of an Officer of a Trench Mortar Battery in France cannot seriously affect the training of Canadian Troops in England, which it is understood is the sole function of the Chief of the General Staff in England.” Turner responded soothingly to this inflammatory letter, stating that his involvement was only to track establishments. He then offered to accept whatever course Currie thought appropriate.163 Finally, what was striking was the banality of the majority of the letters between Turner and Currie and the lack of meaningful information exchange between the two, although Currie was somewhat more forthcoming during the Hundred Days Campaign. Their letters relate to specific topics and do not deal with higher-level issues. In contrast stands the correspondence between Haig and Robertson, who regularly met and exchanged views via letters.164 Haig and Robertson were engaged in fierce battles with their political masters, the “Frocks,” so whatever centrifugal forces might have separated them were overridden by the central necessity of presenting a unified front, at least until late 1917. In the Canadian situation, Currie believed he was in contention with the administration in England, meaning Perley and Turner. This made it difficult for Turner to develop a common front with Currie. According to Currie’s diary, Currie met Turner in France in May 1917 and visited him in England twice in June and twice in September. It was not until 2 January 1918 that Currie met with Turner again.165 A further obstacle was Currie’s likely assumption that Turner was still a competitor for command of the corps, and this would have contributed to Currie’s wariness with him.166 Given the hostile and suspicious tone in some of Currie’s letters, it is not surprising that Turner would not want to share his views with Currie. Consequently, there was a tendency for England and France to operate in isolation. Two such examples are Turner’s ready acceptance of the reorganized corps without first discussing the matter with Currie and Turner’s failure to enlist Currie in the quest for a separate air force. The nature of the Turner–Currie relationship was a function of fundamentally different personalities, backgrounds, and characters, and of the inevitable tension between the front-line commanders and administrators. Currie and Turner were near contemporaries in age but came from decidedly different backgrounds. Turner was

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wealthy, worked at his family’s business, and lived in the city where he was born. Currie, on the other hand, moved across the country to make a new life for himself. He switched careers twice and had the burden of knowing his business had failed. Because he had none to start with, money was important to Currie. As evidence of this, Currie complained to Perley about not receiving the same pay and allowances as Byng, and he requested an increased separation allowance – a monthly pay supplement for officers’ and soldiers’ families – for his wife. Currie wanted British pay and Canadian allowances. He was not entitled to these allowances, but the government did grant Currie’s and Turner’s wives an increased monthly separation allowance of $60 per month.167 There is no evidence that Turner raised any issues regarding pay or allowances. Related to wealth matters was Currie’s embezzlement secret, one that preyed on his equanimity and would affect his view of Turner, who had no such worries. Finally, Turner had earned a vc and dso and was known for his visits to the frontline trenches, while Currie had adopted a less heroic stance of a few visits to the front and hospitals – Currie moved the corps headquarters closer to the front at Amiens to counter this perception.168 In sum, the decidedly different circumstances and financial conditions of the two men contributed to their poor relationship. Turner and Currie did not share a common educational background by attending the same types of schools or military academies, unlike the majority of senior British officers.169 Turner attended a relatively prestigious urban high school in Quebec City, while Currie attended a more rustic school in his small town. Again, unlike the majority of senior British officers, Turner and Currie did not attend a higher-staff college. Currie did pass the three-month Canadian Militia Staff Course, but it was a pale shadow of the two-year staff course at Camberley. In addition, most of Currie’s pre-war service was in the artillery, while Turner’s was entirely in the mounted rifles and cavalry. As a result, there was not a common professional language, background, and culture to the same extent as senior British officers that would help mediate their interactions. Currie had little to no respect for Turner. Hyatt asserts, “Currie had never been particularly fond of Sir Richard Turner, and he remained unimpressed with Turner’s ability as a commander or as a chief of

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staff.”170 Understandably bitter about Turner’s uncovering his flank at Second Ypres, Currie consistently made disparaging comments about Turner and his performance – comments that indicated a loss of trust and confidence in Turner. At times, Currie’s remarks were unfair or ill-informed and appear to be animated by an animus towards Turner unjustified by the circumstances.171 This attitude permeated and shaped Currie’s correspondence to his friends, associates, and Turner. Further, Currie and Turner were rivals. While Turner was the senior officer, Currie had won the greatest prize with command of the Canadian Corps. Turner’s objections to Currie’s demands stemmed from his perspective being different from Currie’s. In addition, their relationship was particularly challenging because they were of a similar rank, unlike the situation with Byng, who was clearly of a superior rank to Turner. Neither Currie nor Turner had had any military administrative experience before their promotions. Currie’s lack of this kind of experience shaped their relationship. Currie had little appreciation of the challenges facing Turner and could not make allowances for them. Even Currie’s first academic biographer admitted, “His correspondence with Sir George Perley showed little attempt to understand Perley’s problems and often seem ungenerous.”172 An apologist might claim that, as a field commander, it was not Currie’s responsibility to worry about Turner’s constraints. This is a false position, however, as field commanders have to take into account the realities of what the rear can provide. To make plans without accounting for the administration’s ability to support these plans risks failure. An example of Currie’s unrealistic demands was his request for ten supernumerary officers per battalion in October 1917. This was an admirable plan, but it meant Turner’s organization needed to supply 480 infantry officers immediately, or roughly double the monthly infantry officer replacement rate.173 The final and most salient factor was the always-present strain between the front and rear. As E.L.M. Burns, a Second World War Canadian Corps commander, puts it, “In whatever echelon of the military machine the soldier happened to find himself he had a profound conviction that the man in the echelon behind had a pretty easy and safe time of it.”174 The British also experienced this strain, as wit-

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nessed by the struggles that the mgc at ghq had with the training arm in England.175 Currie, for example, commented that Argyll House “did themselves very well indeed” when it came to foreign decorations, while the front-line officers got nothing.176 There is an inescapable tension between organizations with different time horizons, decision criteria, reporting structures, and success metrics. In business, government, and the military, the interfaces between departments will always generate stress and friction. Currie was wholly focused on the functional aspects of commanding a fighting force, while Turner had to bring into account the broader perspective of national goals and aspirations, financial matters, political considerations, and manpower availability, of which Currie was seemingly unaware. Not surprisingly, the two had agendas that did not coincide. For example, Turner claimed in March 1918 that “it is safe to say that at least sixty recommendations in the past ten months have been put forward by the goc Canadian Corps, which are not in accordance with the regulations and which are unsound from a view point of policy.”177 A matter beneficial to the corps might not be ideal for the larger context of the cef. The appointment of Brigadier-General Hill to Shorncliffe was an example of these different perspectives: Currie had legitimate reasons for wanting to give Hill a rest, and Turner equally legitimate reasons for not wanting the encumbrance of an alcoholic. Too often, historians ascribe these tensions to personalities when they are actually innate to the system. As Dominick Graham phrases it, “Friction at overlapping functional points is natural and not simply the result of mismanagement or misbehavior.”178 Personalities cannot eliminate the tensions but can ameliorate or magnify them. Officers with a common background, education, social position, training, and administrative experience are more likely to reduce these stresses. Operating against a common enemy will also minimize the strains – Haig and Robertson’s relationship being a good example. None of these factors, however, applied to the Turner and Currie dynamic. Given all these issues, what was surprising was not that there was tension or that their interactions were not fully functional, but that the system worked as well as it did. In an ideal world, all the senior leaders in an organization would work in perfect harmony, but the reality is usually far different. Yet that does not mean that the

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organization will necessarily fail. The fact that Currie and Turner’s relationship functioned was in large part due to Turner’s broader horizons and commitment to duty. Turner accepted a considerable amount of abuse from Currie and delivered only an occasional outburst in return. He worked diligently and effectively to give Currie all he needed and much of what he wanted. What was remarkable was the degree of forbearance Turner demonstrated in the face of constant provocation. Currie certainly fought the administration, but the administration did not fight Currie. A final factor in Currie and Turner’s relationship was the effort of Perley and later of Kemp to mediate between the two. The tenor of Perley’s and Kemp’s correspondence to Currie in answer to his attacks was usually conciliatory, and they attempted to reason with him. They may have had similar discussions with Turner, but these have left no record. Post-war, Turner continued to reach out to Currie despite Currie’s continued disdain. In 1920, Currie’s anger flared again over a supposed faux pas at a memorial event for Second Ypres in Flanders relating to Currie’s brigade. It was a misunderstanding, and Turner wrote Currie, “During the war period, I often thought there were outside influences that caused friction between you and me: Pray that it is all over.”179 Turner recruited Currie to participate in the creation of the Canadian Legion and sent a note of support prior to Currie’s Coburg libel trial.180 He testified at the trial, and according to a newspaper account, “When quizzed during the Currie trial Turner was enthusiastic in his praise of Currie,” but this did not fundamentally change Currie’s view of Turner.181 The challenges of competing imperatives, personalities, and backgrounds, along with Currie’s mistrust and lack of confidence in Turner, all contributed to a tense and at times not fully functional relationship. Despite these pressures, Turner and his organization were still able to supply the Canadian Corps with sufficient replacements in quantity and quality to maintain the corps’s combat effectiveness, which was Turner’s primary role. That the relationship worked in the face of these multiple obstacles was due in part to Turner’s commitment to duty, his broader horizons, and the efforts of Perley and Kemp to prevent a breach.

8 Fade Away: Turner 1918–1961 It is largely due to his untiring efforts that the Canadian Military Organization in England has reached its present high state of efficiency. Kemp’s press release, 14 January 19181 Besides there was an absolute lack of coordination between different important branches, which led to inefficiency, and perhaps what is of more importance, there was a lack of appreciation of what is understood by constitutional methods as against military control. Kemp to Borden, 1 April 19182

Late in 1917, Sir George Perley stepped down as the omfc minister and Sir Edward Kemp, the minister of Militia in Canada, replaced him. Kemp was a different type of superior, and he made considerable changes to the structure and control mechanisms within the omfc. This restructuring and Turner’s difficult relationship with Kemp meant a challenging period for Turner. Post-war, Turner remained active in veterans’ affairs and his family business but held only ceremonial military roles. He did, however, play an instrumental role in the unification of the divided veterans’ movement. This chapter examines Turner’s role in the 1917 federal election, the reorganization undertaken by Kemp, the flawed Turner–Kemp relationship, Turner’s diminished role and influence, attacks on Turner and Argyll House, and failures in troop repatriation. It will also briefly chronicle Turner’s remaining years, focusing on his contribution to the formation of what became the Royal Canadian Legion. Sir Edward Kemp, the new omfc minister, arrived in England in December 1917 determined to reform the department, and this interventionist minister diminished Turner’s role and influence. Kemp

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became minister because Perley resigned in September 1917 to become the permanent high commissioner and so could no longer sit in the cabinet. Perley held two high-profile positions, and his workload was exhausting. Borden’s refusal to select Perley’s nominee for a vacant Senate seat disappointed Perley. After the sacrifices Perley had made and his contributions through his service in England as the acting high commissioner and minister of the omfc, Borden’s rebuff was a bitter blow. It also contributed to Perley’s concern about his ability to retain his seat in Quebec in the coming federal election. With his apparent lack of political capital and the strong anticonscription views of his riding, Perley had legitimate concerns.3 He subsequently changed his mind and tried to withdraw his resignation, but Borden had already arranged for Kemp to replace Perley after the election. To replace Kemp as the minister of Militia, Borden selected a Liberal Militia colonel, Sydney Mewburn.4

conscription a nd election Borden was well aware of the problems with recruiting but blanched at the prospect of bringing in the draft, especially after the negative results from two Australian referenda on conscription. Gwatkin sent Borden a memo in April 1917 that laid out in detail the seriousness of the shortfall in manpower, and pleaded that the government compel 50,000 men to serve. Gwatkin estimated the cef needed 20,000 to 30,000 men over the summer, but there were only 18,496 in the cef in Canada, and most of these were unsuitable for front service or unavailable. Only 4,000 men were joining per month, and some would be unfit for active service.5 Borden initially wanted to give volunteer recruiting another six months.6 However, it was soon apparent that this option was unrealistic, compelling Borden to impose conscription, given his, his cabinet’s, and many Canadians’ commitment to the war effort.7 With the government’s term about to expire and without an agreement from the opposition to extend it, an election was mandatory.8 After Wilfrid Laurier, the Liberal leader, rejected a coalition offer, Borden adroitly undercut him by inducing pro-

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conscription Liberals to join a Union government.9 Not satisfied with this step, Borden also forced through changes to the Election Act that gave women with family members in the military the vote, disenfranchised recent immigrants, and established conditions where soldiers’ votes could be cast in different constituencies.10 The government expected the senior overseas officers to promote conscription to Canadian voters and to encourage the soldiers to vote for the Union government. Turner fulfilled these expectations by delivering endorsements of conscription; he even published a strident article in Canada in Khaki.11 He also actively worked to get the military to vote for the Unionists. The King’s Regulations and Orders, however, forbade military authorities to participate in active political campaigns and constrained the types of activities that were allowed.12 It is likely that Turner’s subordinates violated these regulations in their efforts to support conscription. Chubby Power, who would later be an influential cabinet minister in Mackenzie King’s Second World War government, claimed that some officers allowed or tolerated violations.13 The primary complainant in this matter, however, was a Liberal organizer and scrutineer, W.T. Preston. (Preston would later gain infamy for being the author of the article that triggered Currie’s libel lawsuit in 1928.) Preston made wild claims that the authorities ordered known Liberals to die in suicidal missions. More plausibly, he accused Major-General Garnet Hughes and Brigadier-General F.S. Meighen, a training brigade commander, of organizing committees of officers to lobby their men to vote Unionist. Preston claimed that Canadian authorities arrested him when he tried to enter a camp, but the records of the 208th Battalion indicate he was detained when he tried to intervene at a polling station, which was illegal.14 He subsequently met Turner to complain about the purported violations, but Turner categorically denied the accusations.15 Ten years later, Turner still complained that Preston had caused him “much annoyance” during the election and that he was a “very slippery individual.”16 Turner was also sensitive to the possible political dimensions of administrative decisions, and thus he ordered Thacker to retain surplus officers in England until after the election. This meant fewer

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disappointed officers in Canada who might undermine the campaign.17 In another instance, Turner refused to transfer French-speaking soldiers out of their present units until after the election.18 Members of Turner’s staff and others in the omfc worked diligently for Borden’s government.19 After the election, Perley praised the election contributions of Aitken, Sims, and Donald Hogarth.20 Turner received a warm letter of gratitude from W.P. Purney, who was responsible for carrying out the voting arrangements overseas.21 It is likely that there were contraventions of the kro, but these would not have been as dire as the mendacious Preston alleged.

kemp arrives Kemp arrived in England in December in poor health and with a strong conviction that the omfc needed significant reform.22 He believed Perley had left a mess that he had to clean up, and this gave him a jaundiced view of the incumbents in command positions. Kemp came to the post confident about the reforms required, but he admitted later that the situation was more complicated than he had realized.23 His mood and his dislike of England did not improve in the pessimistic atmosphere in London about the state of the war.24 Kemp’s primary concern was control, or lack of control, over the military in England and over forces outside the corps. He reported to Borden after consulting with Currie, but not with Turner: “I find the organization here somewhat peculiar in many ways, as it does not follow along the lines, altogether, of any organization of similar character either here or in Canada.”25 He believed the military wielded too much power and were not adequately under civilian control. He felt that Turner and Currie took “little interest in public affairs in Canada” and, after three years overseas, had no appreciation of the importance of public opinion.26 Kemp’s strictures did not consider the “peculiar” position of the cef under the dual control of the Canadian government and the War Office. His reference to organizations of a similar character was misleading, as Canadian forces in Canada and British troops had a single reporting structure, unlike the cef’s convoluted one.

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Kemp’s frustration stemmed in part from the power Currie wielded in setting policy. Mewburn complained about Currie’s establishing the direction, with Turner and the government having to follow.27 Kemp viewed the situation in England from his perspective as the former minister of Militia – having to defend the omfc in the House of Commons but lacking the necessary information to do so effectively. In August 1917, for example, Perley, at Turner’s behest, asked Kemp for relief from frivolous information demands from Canada. This was in response to a request in Question Period for a list of officers working extra-regimentally and their cost. Thacker complained that responding to the question would require much extra work for officers who were trying to win the war. Perley’s closing comment was, “This is the kind of question that might very well be left in abeyance until after the war.”28 For Kemp, who had to face mps in Question Period daily, this request demonstrated the military’s lack of political awareness – these questions had to be answered. Turner and Thacker, however, had a legitimate point; many requests required far too much effort for the benefit provided. This was something Kemp initially did not appreciate. Kemp decided that two structural changes to the omfc were required to address these issues – a military council and a revised organization representing Canadian interests at ghq. Kemp’s first structural change was the creation of the Overseas Military Council (omc), following British and Canadian practice. Kemp was intimately familiar with the council in Canada and viewed the situation in England as an aberration. Further, he thought Turner brought a too overtly military orientation to England when the situation was more akin to that in Canada than in France. Kemp therefore wanted greater civilian control and better coordination. He thought that Turner and his staff made important policy decisions without factoring in civilian considerations and the impacts on various branches of the omfc. He claimed that Turner was averse to discussing policy matters with Currie as though they were Turner’s own views.29 Given Turner and Currie’s contentious relationship, it is understandable that Turner wanted Currie to recognize these issues as emanating from the minister, but this suggests that Turner was not necessarily in agreement with them.

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Kemp’s solution to these problems – an omc – consisted of the minister, a deputy minister, Turner, and the heads of the branches.30 Mewburn, the minister of Militia and Defence, objected to the structure and wanted to make Turner an inspector-general. Mewburn, in effect, wanted Turner to be sidelined in much the way Alderson had been.31 Mewburn’s attitude suggests that there was a strain between the Canadian military in Canada and in England. There is some evidence of tension over such issues as Argyll House being slow in settling estates and the inadequate manner in which the Department of Militia investigated compassionate-leave cases.32 The deputy minister for the department, Eugene Fiset, complained that it was “useless” for him to write Argyll House officially, as he would “not even get an answer.” Fiset’s complaint triggered an investigation at Turner’s headquarters that turned up no instances of unanswered letters. Gow wrote back to Fiset asking for examples, but Fiset never replied.33 The creation of the omfc effectively sidelined the Ministry of Militia, and there was bound to be bitterness over its relegation to little more than a draft-finding organization. Mewburn’s actions might have been an attempt to wrestle some control back from the omfc. Contributing to this tension was the relative isolation of Canada owing to the limited information exchange between the front and England and the military in Canada. A notable flaw in the Canadian war effort was the absence of mechanisms to convey war lessons to Canada. While a steady flow of political figures, such as Hughes, Perley, Kemp, and Borden, crossed from Canada to England and vice versa, no senior officer from Turner’s or Currie’s command visited Canada until almost the end of the war – McDonald, Turner’s chief staff officer, and Billy Bishop left for Canada in October 1918. The only senior officers to visit England and France from Canada were the two inspector-generals for eastern and western Canada who made brief inspection tours in the spring of 1916 and 1917.34 An anecdote told by Turner’s adc illustrates the extent to which Canadian-based officers were out of touch: Lessard, an excellent officer, was apparently unaware that comments about wire at the front referred to barbwire.35 Only seven of the sixty-nine general officers who served in France returned to Canada during the war to take up appointments.36 Generally, returning officers were either wounded or re-

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Figure 8.1 Overseas Military Council organization chart

garded as failures. This lack of officer exchange meant Canada operated in isolation. The omc first met on 14 May 1918, it convened a further twentysix times, and it made 434 decisions.37 The council dealt with a wide variety of topics, including promotions, establishments, compassionate policy, officer exchanges, and cadet uniforms.38 It must have consumed a great deal of busy staff officers’ time, as the records for the omc include hundreds of pages of submissions, which all of the council members had to read and approve. To align the new omc more closely with the structure in Canada, Kemp changed Turner’s title to Chief of the General Staff (cgs) on 18 May.39 Turner supplied Kemp with a letter to explain the new title and role to the War Office.40 Kemp made one crucial addition in explicitly making Turner responsible for the administration of Canadian units in France outside the Canadian Corps; this responsibility had been uncertain before.41 In this reformed role, Turner nominally continued as the chief military advisor, was responsible for the coordination of the General Staff, Adjutant-General, and QuartermasterGeneral Branches, and remained responsible for administration and

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Figure 8.2 omfc 1918 organization chart

training of forces in England, with the added explicit control over non-corps forces at the front. The omc constrained his real authority, however, as the council decided all matters of policy, senior officer promotions, issues concerning multiple branches, large expenditures, and establishments. Since the omc subsumed some of his former authority, the new organization effectively meant a demotion for Turner. Despite this, his reaction in his correspondence with Kemp shows ready acceptance of this new title and role. Kemp’s second structural change involved his attempt to pacify Currie and to improve control over and communications with Canadian forces outside England. Sims continued as the Canadian representative at ghq and was the conduit for information between Canadian formations in France and Belgium, the omfc, and ghq. Kemp, however, was not satisfied that Sims could effectively repre-

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sent Canadian interests to ghq because of his rank and origin as a Hughes’s appointee. Further, as there was no central Canadian authority in France over Canadian units outside the corps, Canadian control over these formations was nominal. Currie, furthermore, disliked Sims, regarding him as a meddler, a bottleneck, and lacking the power to make decisions. Currie wanted Sims removed.42 As an interim step to mollify Currie, Kemp agreed that Turner and Currie could communicate directly on purely Canadian matters without passing through Sims.43 On several occasions, Argyll House routed correspondence on Canadian matters through Sims, which angered Currie.44 After one such incident, Currie attacked Turner, claiming, “In a well disciplined Corps, disciplinary action would be taken for such a violation of instructions.”45 Kemp placated Currie, explaining that there was a difference of opinion over what constituted a Canadian domestic matter. Kemp did not want to upset the understanding that Perley had reached with ghq, so his conception – shared by Turner and Gow – of a Canadian domestic matter was conservative. Kemp assured Currie that he was working on addressing Currie’s larger concerns with representation at ghq.46 Kemp’s solution was a Canadian section at ghq, which was similar to a proposal Thacker made to Turner in November 1917 regarding the administration of forces in France.47 The Canadian section served the primary functions of representing Canadian interests at ghq, acting as the primary conduit for communications between Argyll House, Canadian forces in the field, and administrators of the 47,000 Canadians outside the Canadian Corps in France and Belgium.48 It paralleled most of the organization of the omfc with branches for the adjutant-general, quartermaster-general, assistant military secretary, medical, pay, and chaplain services. Kemp shrewdly appointed Brigadier-General J.F.L. Embury to head the section. Embury had commanded the 28th Battalion in the 2nd Division, served as a brigadier-general in the Canadian Corps and the 5th Division in England, and was sitting as a judge of the Court of King’s Bench in Saskatchewan when selected.49 Embury therefore had the necessary seniority, experience, and gravitas to have influence at ghq and was acceptable to both Currie and Turner. The selection helped allay Currie’s fears that the section would act as a watchdog for Kemp.50

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Turner’s role in establishing the Canadian section was twofold. First, he defeated Currie’s attempt to take over as the personal representative at ghq in place of Sims. In February, Currie claimed that ghq wanted him to act as the personal representative for at least corps matters.51 Turner did not approve, pointing out that, as a subordinate of Haig, the corps commander might be in an invidious position in presenting the Canadian point of view to ghq, possibly without having the full information on issues, such as the availability of reinforcements. Further, Currie’s desire to advance the interests of his officers and men meant that his recommendations could not “always be taken at their face value,” as they at times violated regulations or sound policy.52 Turner wanted a third party at ghq who could represent the views of the entire omfc and not just those of the Canadian Corps. Second, Turner and Kemp negotiated the terms of reference for the new organization with the War Office. The War Office was far more amenable to the changes than ghq, which worried about any infringement on its operational control (and ghq defined operational control broadly).53 This was understandable given Haig’s recent experience with the protests over the breakup of the Canadian Corps during the German March offensive. The negotiations with ghq were a factor in delays in setting up the Canadian section. Argyll House was the subject of attacks from the Canadian Corps and Canada. Morton has claimed that, beyond the complaints about the technical services to the corps, “Argyll House had become a symbol of insensitive, arrogant bureaucracy.”54 This was a common complaint about rear administrations, but there are few substantive and documented examples of grievances. One of the few was Sutherland Brown’s complaint in a confidential letter about the attitude of officers in Turner’s command who were trying to save money at the expense of justice to front-line officers.55 It is likely that after a year or more removed from the front, some officers were more responsive to bureaucratic imperatives they were to the front’s needs. Despite Turner’s oft-repeated statements about serving the needs of the forces at the front, it was probable that the message did not reach everyone. It does not appear, however, that Argyll House was any more susceptible to these problems than other rear organizations.

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Some Canadian newspapers regularly assailed Argyll House for tension with the corps in France, extravagant staff levels, and the cowardice of officers sheltering in England. In part, this was a means of attacking the government. There was tension between Argyll House and France, but the preponderance of the blame for the dysfunctional relationship lay with Currie instead of Argyll House. The complaint about excess staffing levels was first expressed as early as January 1917, when Sam Hughes complained about the number of officers at the headquarters.56 Newspapers, especially the Manitoba Free Press and Toronto Star, attacked Argyll House for employing many more officers on commissions and boards or in command and staff positions than were necessary. Turner repeatedly provided statistics demonstrating the increasing efficiency of staffing levels.57 Turner’s organization was employing more officers than was strictly necessary in 1917 and early 1918 as a consequence of having to find places for politically powerful surplus officers. His further staff reductions in 1918 demonstrated that there was some excess. After the federal election, however, it was no longer necessary to appease these officers, as the political impact of their returning to Canada had diminished. Given the steady decrease in staffing levels overall in the omfc, it was difficult to sustain the charge that Argyll House was grossly overstaffed as claimed. The other major charge hurled at Argyll House was that it was rife with shirkers. As the Manitoba Free Press stated, “the control of the Canadian forces in England is in the hands of a clique whose chief activities are directed toward evading the dangers of the front line trenches and capitalizing for their own benefit to the greatest possible extent the glory earned by the troops in the field.”58 This calumny was a fabrication. Of the 67 officers employed at Argyll House on 11 June 1918, 49 or 73.3 per cent had served overseas, and of those who had not served at the front, 11 were unfit or overage and 7 or only 10.4 per cent were fit for active duty. This last category would include officers with specialized qualifications.59 Another example is the Reserve Artillery Brigade in April 1918, all of whose 67 officers and all but 24 of its 394 other ranks having seen active service. The 24 who had not done so included underage soldiers and specialists with unique skills.60 In July, to ensure there were no grounds for complaints, Turner

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mandated the immediate replacement of all officers fit for general service but who had not seen active duty.61 Typically, disgruntled officers were the sources of these complaints, which anti-government newspapers eagerly exploited to attack Argyll House and by extension the government. One of the strongest cases was that of Brigadier-General C.A. Smart, who made a series of damning charges when he arrived in Canada after losing his command to an officer from the corps. These attacks especially nettled Turner, who wrote Kemp twice in April 1919 to refute the charges and disparage Smart.62 In another case, a draft-conducting officer published a long letter in a newspaper listing a litany of transgressions committed by Argyll House. Unfortunately for the creditability of the officer, Turner discovered that he was a coward, as reported by his battalion commander, and a bigamist.63 Turner asked that the government defend his staff from these unwarranted attacks, but he did not ask for protection for himself. He was always assiduous about safeguarding his people. McDonald earlier, in June 1918, asked that the minister refute the attacks made on the honour and integrity of the officer corps in England.64 Turner agreed and presented a memorandum to Kemp contesting the newspapers’ charges discussed above.65 Kemp did make an effort to defend his officers through newspaper articles, but it was difficult to do so from England.66 His complaints triggered tighter censorship regulations in Canada that Mewburn thought would “cause some consternation with the press.”67 Typically, Turner was not the direct target of the attacks; his prestige and reputation made it difficult to challenge him directly. The approach adopted was to denigrate him by claiming, as did BrigadierGeneral Smart, that he was “weak on administration and discipline and has surrounded himself with a lot of weak officers, and has listened too much to tittle-tattle and intrigue. He is a weak man.”68 It is difficult to accept this charge, since both Kemp and Currie, who were in the best position to judge Turner, did not make claims of this sort when they cavilled about Turner. Aligned with newspaper criticisms of the omfc was an inflammatory memo on a reorganization authored by McRae and sent to Currie and most likely Clifford Sifton, the prominent former Mani-

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toba Liberal and now Unionist politician.69 The memo advocated an organization similar to that of the Australians, with the corps commander responsible for all the forces in England and France and assisted by a chief administrative officer. The memo claimed that such an arrangement would lead to great savings in the elimination of duplicate staffs, better manpower utilization, and elimination of delay.70 Currie worried that Kemp would learn he possessed the memo, so he forwarded it to him.71 Currie was careful to take the position that he had not initiated the memo, but would discuss it if requested. This suggests he might have been in favour of its recommendation.72 Kemp’s reaction to the proposal was not positive. He characterized it as “if it was as easy for Canada to manage the problem of its citizen soldiers … as it is to write anonymous documents, we would all be enjoying the rest and quietness of the most peaceful days in our lives.”73 Kemp also passed the memo to Turner for his comments. Turner argued that the direct access to the Secretary of State for War that the Canadian government enjoyed on matters of policy would be unlikely to continue under the terms of the proposed reorganization. He also indicated that he was already effectively fulfilling the role of chief administrative officer. His strongest argument was that the comparison with Australia was misleading because Australian training was essentially under British control. Also, the Australians had few units in Europe outside the Australian Corps, unlike the Canadians, with tens of thousands of personnel serving with the Canadian railway and forestry troops, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, and medical establishments.74 McRae’s second front was Sifton. McRae had made his first fortune as a land agent, opening up Saskatchewan, while Sifton was the minister of the Interior responsible for promoting western settlement.75 Sifton abandoned the Liberals in 1911 over reciprocity (free trade) with the United States and was instrumental in persuading key western Liberals to join the Union government on conscription. Clearly, he was a figure of considerable influence.76 In April 1918, Sifton visited England, where McRae probably briefed him. As well, Rattray, a Liberal and a confidant of Currie’s in a staff position in England, took the opportunity to complain to Sifton about Argyll House.77 These complaints doubtless persuaded Sifton to act, for his newspaper,

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the Manitoba Free Press, published an article in May 1918 strongly suggesting that a fundamental reorganization of the omfc was imminent. It quoted at length an anonymous senior officer who was familiar with the situation and with the lobbying for an administration with an overall goc in charge.78 In all probability, the officer quoted was McRae. The article disturbed Kemp, as it was closely identified with Sifton, a leading member of the Union government, so had the imprimatur of some authority: John Dafoe, the editor in chief of the Manitoba Free Press, was close to Borden and Sifton, and Sifton was the owner of the Free Press.79 Two cables from Gow in Canada at the time and Mewburn advised Kemp to ignore any reports of the abolition of the omfc.80 The memo angered Kemp, and he attempted to find out who wrote it.81 He was either unsuccessful in identifying McRae or decided that McRae was out of reach, since there were no official sanctions against him. McRae had transferred in February 1918 to Aitken’s new British Ministry of Information as deputy minister, ostensibly because McRae impressed Aitken.82 Turner did not readily replace his staff and especially competent ones, so the move was suspicious. McRae’s memo indicates significant dissatisfaction with the organization of the omfc and suggests a serious disagreement with Turner. Since McRae wrote the memo after his transfer, there is the implication that his move might not have been voluntary. McRae’s replacement was the politically connected LieutenantColonel Donald Hogarth. Hogarth, age thirty-nine, had no pre-war military experience but was a business associate of John Carrick, who was in turn close to Sam Hughes. Hogarth served in the casc in the Canadian Corps but bounced between France and England.83 Hughes paid close attention to Hogarth and issued a number of instructions related to promotions and appointments for him.84 Hogarth was also a Conservative political operative, and Perley praised him for his contribution to the 1917 election campaign.85 Turner brought him back to England, over more senior officers, as the director of supplies and transport – a move that elicited a pointed query from Currie.86 Hogarth’s appointment was a logical step, as he was in essence McRae’s deputy, but it did suggest that political influence played a role.

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A significant clash with the omfc deputy minister in October 1918 contributed to Turner’s reputation for poor civil–military relations. Before 1918, there was no evidence of tension between the two. Gow’s health broke down in late April 1918, and he took sick leave in Canada for an extended period – at least past early August.87 When he returned, he was in a “somewhat petulant” frame of mind.88 In October 1918, Kemp travelled to Canada to deal with political matters, and Gow attempted to persuade Kemp to grant him carte blanche to run the department during Kemp’s absence. Kemp quite rightly refused, pointing out the constitutional irregularity of Gow’s request. While Kemp was out of the country, Gow and Turner clashed over relatively minor matters, but these were indicative of Gow’s attempt to usurp Kemp’s authority and Turner’s resistance to Gow’s manoeuvre. The two men clashed over delays in the promotion of two brigadiergenerals, dinner invitations, assigning cars, kit allowances, and allowing McDonald and Billy Bishop to travel to Canada.89 They exchanged telegraphs with a probably increasingly frustrated Kemp complaining about the other. Gow inflated the grievance into a claim that Turner’s actions were “a case of ‘The King and the Army against Parliament’ over again.”90 In a number of cases, Turner made decisions that would normally require Kemp’s approval, including the promotion of two brigadier-generals that Currie had requested.91 Turner’s response was that his decisions were provisional until Kemp accepted them. Referring to Gow’s last memorandum, Turner stated, “The last paragraph of this memorandum illustrates graphically Colonel Gow’s intent for mischief and endeavour during your absence to arrogate to himself supreme authority.”92 The situation was so rancorous that Gow resigned on 25 October, citing Turner’s “unfair, ungenerous, and unwarranted conduct.”93 Despite Turner’s stated regret over the incident, Gow claimed he only shook Turner’s hand when he left because of the presence of a junior officer; refusing to shake hands would be a terrible affront and considered boorish behaviour.94 This clash influenced Borden’s view of Turner and contributed to the impression that he was difficult.95 It is possible that Gow returned too soon from sick leave and tried to take on responsibilities beyond his authority. While Turner was not

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blameless, he was on stronger constitutional ground than Gow. Edwin Pye, a member of Duguid’s historical staff, claimed that Gow’s behaviour while Kemp was away was the genuine trigger for his resignation: “It seems to me that Sir R. [Robert Borden] had a finger in the pie and in his memoirs, has dragged a red herring across the trail.”96

demobilization woes The Canadian demobilization after the First World War was a partial failure. Thirteen riots tarnished the sterling reputation of the cef and resulted in the death of five Canadians and one British policeman, many injuries, and large property losses.97 The Canadian authorities faced the insuperable challenge of balancing equity with the ability to process and transport 345,000 veterans and dependants, and with the economy’s ability to absorb this multitude. The 345,000 total included 130,000 men in England, 152,000 more in France and Belgium, 38,000 dependants, and 25,000 ex-Imperial troops.98 Shortages in sea transport and the limited rail capacity from Canada’s only two ice-free ports of Halifax and Saint John severely constrained the repatriation rate. Shipping capacity was further restricted by the higher standards imposed after returning soldiers had complained bitterly and publicly about the terrible accommodations on repatriation ships.99 The Canadian Overseas Demobilization Committee recommended following a British repatriation scheme of selectively releasing men on the basis of economic factors – a plan the British had to abandon after protests and riots.100 Canada’s plan was changed to make it more obviously fair – it adopted the principle of “first in first out.” But for disciplinary reasons and to promote recognition of the corps, Currie convinced Kemp and Borden to adopt his plan of returning the men of the Canadian Corps by units.101 The Australians adopted a more successful and equitable plan that shipped men home in 1,000-man batches chosen from units based on length of service.102 There were no Australian repatriation riots, despite Australians’ reputation for poor discipline. Because of the massive losses of the Hundred Days campaign, the Canadian Corps’s units included a large number of

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conscripts. These conscripts were all relatively short service in comparison with many serving in England. Currie’s plan thus resulted in many conscripts returning to Canada before long-service men stationed in England, and this engendered discontent.103 In addition, the Canadians would know that the earlier riots of British troops at Calais, Dover, and Folkestone accelerated British demobilization.104 This inequity set the stage for a calamity. In the febrile environment of British demobilization riots, constant strikes, and the triumph of the Bolsheviks, there was a real fear that control over the troops was slipping. Naturally, the men wanted to go home, and their patience in the face of constant indignities, subordination, and petty annoyances of wartime service was fast disappearing.105 The proximate triggers for the riots were lack of pay, poor food, cold weather, and constant and unexplained sailing postponements – all overlaid by anxiousness to get home and clashes with British civilians.106 Sailings were postponed because labour strikes delayed necessary ship refittings to meet the new and higher Canadian accommodation standards. Moreover, large liners that could have been used were assigned to other countries, since Hogarth’s department mistakenly believed that Canadian ports could not handle them.107 The weak discipline and poor command in the segregation camps exacerbated the situation. Turner and his staff were lamentably poor at communicating why there were delays, with the result that rumours, fears, and frustrations spiralled out of control into rioting.108 This lack of communication was unfortunate, because when Turner spoke at the camps after riots, the men readily returned to discipline upon hearing the explanation for the delays. It took considerable courage for Turner to enter the charged atmosphere of the camps, but he had enough credibility and was accorded enough respect that the men listened, obeyed, and even cheered him.109 After the particularly brutal riot at Epsom Police Station, which resulted in the death of a policeman, Turner issued a stern order of the day to the effect that there would be no tolerance for further problems, and the riots ended.110 Certain segments of the British press covered and exploited the riots extensively, to the point that Turner wrote to King George V to complain about such treatment.111

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Turner’s reputation for running a tight ship in the eyes of his political masters suffered. Kemp warned Turner to strengthen his staff, since it would be “distressing” if anything should mar the good records of his officers because of demobilization problems.112 Shipping shortages, delays, and strikes were out of Turner’s control, but he was not proactive in addressing the many problems in the camps and in communicating with the troops. Turner and his staff were clearly tired, and it showed in their performance. In July 1919, for instance, Kemp reported that Thacker was “now rather broken down.”113

the turner – kemp dynamic Turner’s influence during the Kemp regime was less pervasive than it had been under Perley. Kemp was the primary agent in the major initiatives and relegated Turner to the more passive role of their execution. Kemp was far more of a hands-on manager than Perley. He did not interfere with purely military matters, although he and Turner disagreed about what were purely military issues. Turner worked more effectively under Perley’s hands-off approach and did not mesh well with Kemp. Personalities undoubtedly played a role. Kemp was a selfmade man and confident in his abilities, while Turner, from a wealthy family, was more attuned to working with men of a similar background, such as Perley. A further factor in Turner and Kemp’s poor relationship was Kemp’s experience in dealing with pf officers at Militia headquarters in Canada when he was the minister of Militia. These officers were thoroughly conversant with and subservient to civilian authority, having survived Hughes’s regime and his intense dislike of the pf. They would not push back, unlike Currie and Turner, who were not wholly dependent on the minister for their position. As a result, the more military and self-assured attitudes of Currie and Turner would contribute to Kemp’s diatribes. The available correspondence between Turner and Kemp does not reveal the context of Kemp’s complaints to Borden about Turner. Turner’s communications with Kemp were respectful and gave no indication that he challenged civilian control. Further, there is no ev-

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idence of resistance to Kemp’s changes, and neither was there a tone or subtext to suggest that Turner was anything other than in perfect harmony with Kemp. Turner’s actions during the election, his taking on sons of important politicians as staff officers, and his communications with key figures in Canada indicate a politically aware individual quite at odds with Kemp’s claims that Turner was politically insensitive. At various times, Turner had on his staff the sons of Robert Rogers, Sir Joseph Flavelle (the head of the Imperial Munitions Board), Sir Joseph Pope (the under-secretary of state for External Affairs), and Kingston mp William Nickle. 114 What is also puzzling was that while Kemp was disparaging Turner, he was also vigorously defending Turner and Argyll House to Mewburn, Borden, and Currie. Given Kemp’s many complaints about Turner, it is apparent he believed there were problems. It is likely that the conflicts occurred in meetings from which no documentary evidence survives. These points of conflict probably revolved around such issues as omc curtailing Turner’s authority, the Canadian section at ghq, the relationship between Turner and Currie, and Turner’s repeated attempts to convince the government to support a separate air force. In addition, Kemp might have reacted to the poor advice Turner gave him regarding the reorganization of the Canadian Corps. It is apparent that the rift between Kemp and Turner existed throughout Kemp’s time in England and was an important factor in the government’s decision to make no further use of Turner in a military role after the war.

turner post-war Turner’s post-war military career presented a conundrum to the government because his distinguished service, seniority, and relative youth (age forty-seven in 1919) justified a major role in the post-war army. Currie, however, had an even greater claim, and it was evident that the two men could not work together effectively. In December 1918, the finance minister suggested appointing Turner chairman of the Pension Board in order to sideline him. Borden scuttled the idea because he did not think Turner had the temperament for the position,

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and he referred to Gow’s resignation as an example.115 Ironically, Turner would later serve on the Pension Commission for many years with success.116 Turner, unlike Currie, had a business to return to and was not dependent on government largesse, and so he decided not to seek a military appointment.117 Turner’s father died in 1917, and Turner anticipated taking over the family firm.118 In April 1919, an exhausted Turner asked to be relieved of his responsibilities by July, but he had to wait until August to return to Quebec City with his family.119 He officially demobilized in November.120 His reception in Quebec City was far more muted than his return from the Boer War had been – it was no doubt overshadowed by the royal visit of the Prince of Wales – and like Currie, he did not receive any formal recognition from the government.121 Turner returned to Quebec City and ran his family business until he started sitting full-time on the Pension Commission, but he did not forget his old comrades. For instance, in 1920, he followed up with the adjutant-general regarding a medal he recommended for a soldier who had brought ammunition up to the front under intense fire during Second Ypres.122 Turner was a popular figure with veterans and attended reunions, commemorations, and unveilings across the country, including the tenth anniversary of the 15th Battalion’s formation, the unveiling of a memorial to the 28th Battalion in Regina in 1926, and the Ypres commemorative dinner in 1930.123 He attended the unveiling of the Canadian memorial at St Julien in 1933 and the Vimy Pilgrimage of 1936.124 He represented the Duke of Connaught at the funeral of his former minister Sir George Perley in 1938.125 He also wrote forewords to the regimental histories of the 14th and 15th Battalions.126

last servic e: ca nadia n legion The establishment of what became the Royal Canadian Legion was Turner’s final major service to Canada. He led the unification of all but two of the fragmented veterans’ organizations into the Canadian Legion of the British Empire Service League – as the Royal Canadian

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Legion was first known. By 1925, the veterans’ movement had split into at least fifteen different organizations, ranging from broad-based groups that aspired to universal representation to groups with restrictive membership, such as blinded veterans. The Great War Veterans’ Association (gwva), formed in 1917, had the greatest success in recruiting and, as a result, the greatest influence.127 The result was a disjointed movement with little political power or influence – and habitually strapped for funds – that could not effectively represent veterans’ interests. Despite repeated unification and amalgamation attempts, the Canadian veterans’ movement was on the brink of collapse and irrelevance – a fate not unwelcomed by the government.128 Meanwhile, there was a similar problem in the UK, where four main veterans’ groups competed for the allegiance of the returned soldier. By June 1921, all but the most radical of groups had agreed to amalgamate into the British Legion. Contrary to his modern reputation, a key figure in this successful drive to unification was Field Marshal Haig. Immediately after the war, Haig established considerable credibility with the rank and file by refusing a title until the condition of the returned serviceman was addressed. He first persuaded the officer organizations to merge into a single institution, then built on this success to advocate for unification of all veterans’ groups.129 The promise that the amalgamated organization would be given access to the British portion of the profits of the wartime Army and Navy Canteen Fund contributed to Haig’s success. Canada’s share of the profits amounted to two million dollars, but the Canadian government, while it had distributed a small amount of this total, had withheld most of it instead of dispensing the funds to multiple small and ineffective groups.130 It was clear that unification of the myriad groups was necessary, but it was difficult to find common grounds for unification. All the groups were in favour of merging but only on their terms.131 As early as 1921, the gwva offered Currie its presidency, but he turned it down on the grounds that “the clouds which had enshrouded his name had not cleared away.”132 Haig’s triumphant visit to Canada in 1925 was the catalyst for the push towards amalgamation.133 He provided the needed impetus to drive the unification process to success, as he took a personal interest in fostering unity. Haig first

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approached Currie to lead the process, but Currie knowingly set unacceptable conditions.134 Turning from this rejection, the gwva board, with Haig’s personal representative present, passed a resolution on 22 June 1925 asking Turner to lead the unity drive. In a departure from previous practice, all the Dominion executives signed the telegram sent to Turner, including their wartime ranks. Turner did not share Currie’s qualms and accepted. Haig then appointed Turner as his representative in Canada. Turner’s selection was in part due to his stature with officers and his lack of formal links to the gwva and other veterans’ organizations; hence, he was a neutral force in the negotiations leading up to unification.135 In addition, his evident popularity with the rank and file, especially the veterans who served with the 2nd Division, was advantageous to Turner. Currie, on the other hand, did not have the reputation he was to have later. According to Tim Cook, Currie’s “attitude towards veterans was at time ungenerous, bordering on callous.”136 With his customary energy and dispatch, Turner held the first meeting in Ottawa eight days after the resolution appointing him had passed. He urged conciliation with the other groups and mandated that the attacks in gwva publications on other organizations and Pension Board officials stop immediately.137 Clearly, Turner was in charge and driving the process. He then spent the time between June and the Unity Conference in November arranging, negotiating, and applying pressure to ensure the conference was successful. The National Unity Conference met in Winnipeg on 25 November 1925, with forty-six delegates attending from all the veterans’ organizations. From the minutes, it is apparent that the majority of the delegates intended to accept unification. The first step of the conference was to pass a unanimous resolution of gratitude to Turner for his leadership and painstaking care in assembling the convention. The conference in the main was a success, as all but two organizations agreed to amalgamate into a single organization representing veterans. Turner also suggested that “as they were Canadians it was essential to have the word ‘Canadian’ included in the name.”138 The conference selected Turner and Currie as honorary presidents, Haig as the grand president, and Sir Percy Lake as president. Lake was a Canadian who had served in the British Regular Army, was a former

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goc Canada, and was the commander-in-chief in Mesopotamia before retiring to Canada. Turner and Lake then travelled across the country to convince the membership to join the new legion, and in this they were successful.139 Other than serving two terms on the Quebec City Protestant School Board, Turner held no elected office and did not participate in politics. He, too, held the position of Honorary Colonel of the 13th Canadian Scottish Light Cavalry, 13th Brigade cfa, and the Royal Rifle Regiment of Canada.140 He also served on the Canadian Pension Commission from 1932 to 1941.141 Turner retained his robust constitution until almost the end of his life. He marched, for instance, in the parade of vc winners in London in 1956 at the age of eighty-four.142 His wife of fifty-eight years died in 1958, which accelerated Turner’s decline, and he passed away on 21 June 1961 at age eighty-nine.143 His death elicited a flood of condolences and commemorations, including a tribute from Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, who remembered meeting Turner, as a lieutenant in London, and “his kindness to me on that occasion. He was a great man and will not be forgotten.”144 Yet despite his long life, distinguished deeds, impressive honours, and sterling service to his country, Turner is little known and receives little respect today. His obituary in the Montreal Gazette described him as cheerful and modest and “he always tried to do his part, and for him that was enough.”145

Conclusion The General must know how to get his men their rations and every other kind of stores needed for war. He must have imagination to originate plans, practical sense, and energy to carry them through. He must be observant, untiring, shrewd; lavish and miserly; generous and stingy; rash and conservative. All these and many other qualities, natural and acquired, he must have. He should also, as a matter of course, know his tactics; for a disorderly mob is no more an army than a heap of building materials is a home. Socrates1

Canadian generals of the first half of the twentieth century were competent but dour, cool, remote, and uncharismatic technocrats unable to inspire their troops.2 Turner was atypical – charismatic, courageous, conscientious, capable, engaging, modest, and in the trenches. Modern historiography, however, portrays a Richard Turner much at variance with this characterization. In the absence of comprehensive personal records and influenced by Currie’s papers, Turner was a blank matrix upon which historians have pressed a misleading image. Therefore, to present an accurate assessment of Turner as a military figure, it is necessary to analyse the five issues raised in the introduction in light of the evidence presented.

reputation The popularly held conception of Turner emanates, in part, from historians’ drive to enhance Currie’s reputation. An example of this process can be found in the historiography of Allenby in the Middle East, in which historians have unfairly castigated his predecessor in

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order to enhance Allenby’s standing.3 Currie’s and Turner’s reputations have had dramatically different trajectories from the 1920s, with Turner’s, like Haig’s, falling precipitously. Compelling stories require the protagonist to struggle against a foil. In the first half of the war, Sam Hughes fulfilled this role admirably in Currie’s story, but with Hughes’s removal in late 1916, another antagonist was necessary, and Turner was the best available candidate. The standard narrative on Turner is not wholly fallacious, but at times it is erroneous, exaggerated, or arguable, and it focuses almost exclusively on his failures rather than taking a balanced view. What this narrative misses are his successes, such as Courcelette, his moral courage in standing up to superiors, his troops’ and officers’ affection and respect, his rational Canadian nationalism, his support for an independent Canadian air force, and his significant contributions to the Canadian war effort. On the first issue major question – political connections – we have seen that Turner had no pre-war ties to the Conservative Party. Further, Hughes championed Turner because of his high regard for Turner’s courage and capability, as demonstrated by Turner’s record in the Boer War, by his vc, and by his performance as a regimental and brigade commander after the Boer War. Indeed, Turner was a model Militia officer in Hughes’s eyes. Similar factors induced Hughes to appoint Currie and later protect him from the consequences of his felonious behaviour. Turner’s espousal of Hughes and Hughes’s interests contributed to his support of Turner but were not the primary motivation. Second, an assessment of Turner’s combat record must factor in the limited scope for command in battle afforded to brigade and divisional commanders and the conditions in which Turner fought. Sir Henry Karslake, a gunner and staff officer during the war, captured the reality of intermediary command on the Western Front: “[C]ommanders were cogs in the machine. Whether they got decorated or degummed [sacked] largely depended, not on their plans, but on how the enemy on their sector behaved on a particular occasion.”4 Turner’s performance at Second Ypres was poor but explicable given the front, the forces, and the catastrophic situation he faced. He demonstrated that he had learned from his experiences, and while never as capable as Currie, he was still a far more effective combat commander than

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historians acknowledge. His division’s performance at Courcelette was the outstanding Canadian victory at the Somme and illustrated what Turner could accomplish. He was not in the first rank of Canadian commanders because of his earlier failures and poor reputation with the British, but neither was he in the worst. Third, Perley’s desire to appoint a capable and respected combat general to fix a disastrous situation determined Turner’s transfer to England. The transfer was not a demotion, and there is no evidence that Byng wanted to dismiss Turner. The fact that Byng recommended Currie first should be sufficient proof that Byng just wanted to address the lamentable training situation in England. On the fourth issue, Turner and his staff were instrumental in the transformation of the omfc. It was they who initiated, executed, and supervised the metamorphosis. Perley was an important figure in providing the necessary support for the changes, but the primary credit for the military improvements belongs to Turner. Finally, Turner’s conflict with Currie was the inevitable outcome of institutional imperatives together with Currie’s challenging personality, but not the result of an obstructionist jealousy held by Turner. Turner demonstrated considerable forbearance in the face of Currie’s prickly and unsympathetic behaviour. Currie has to bear the predominant share of the blame for the conflict. Despite Currie’s provocations, Turner conscientiously met most of Currie’s demands.

assessment as a general The assessment of Turner presented here is based in part on a framework from the US Army’s leadership manual FM 6-22 but modified to account for the different expectations and context of the First World War.5 Turner was a strong leader who led by example, but he had limited success at extending his influence beyond his formation, the Hughes’s clique, and Sir George Perley. Turner’s perceived combat failures and clashes with Alderson impaired his image with Haig and eliminated any opportunity for influence. His tendency to protest what he regarded as flawed orders would also have reduced his stature with the British. In this respect, Currie was far more effective. Addition-

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ally, Currie’s lack of trust and confidence in Turner affected the general perception of Turner. In England, Turner had considerable influence in matters under Perley, but Kemp limited his autonomy. Currie’s ability to dictate the demobilization policy was an example of his influence and Turner’s relative impotence under Kemp. Turner was a proficient communicator for his time and place. His written work was not polished but was competent and capable of transmitting his ideas, unlike Alderson’s circumlocutions. Turner was a persuasive speaker judging by his connection with his troops and the rioters’ reaction to his speech during the post-war camp disturbances during repatriation. He would not have achieved his reputation with the troops had he been a poor communicator. Overall, Turner was effective at reaching his men. As John Bourne states, “One of the main duties of a divisional commander was to identify, encourage, and promote able subordinates.”6 Assessing Turner in this respect is challenging, so as a proxy, we can use a comparison between Turner’s and Currie’s promotion records of officers who served under them and reached brigade and divisional command during the war. The comparison is restricted to battalion commanders and staff officers who served under Turner and Currie from September 1914 to November 1916 so as to correspond with Turner’s period of combat command. Currie provides the contrast, as he faced the same circumstances as Turner and historians regard him as an effective developer of subordinates.7 The comparison is imperfect, as multiple considerations must be factored into promotions, but it provides an indication of the relative effectiveness of Turner and Currie. Under Currie, eight officers reached brigade or divisional command – one of whom, Loomis, also served under Turner. Excluding political appointees, eight of Turner’s officers gained brigade or divisional commands. The three political appointees – Lord Brooke, William Hughes, and Garnet Hughes – are excluded, as their selection was a function of political interference from Sam Hughes. Watson had proven himself an excellent battalion commander and would likely have been promoted notwithstanding his political credentials. Even without the political appointees, Turner’s record was comparable to Currie’s. Turner supported and advocated the interests of his staff. He would attempt

Table C.1 Promotion comparison – Turner/Currie Turner Name

Initial position

Appointments

G.B. Hughes§ F.O.W. Loomis*

3rd Brigade Staff 13th Battalion

J.F.L. Embury R.G.E. Leckie L.G.F.M. Lord Brooke§ D. Watson J.M. Ross T.L. Tremblay A.H. Bell A. Ross W.St.P. Hughes§

28th Battalion 16th Battalion 4th Brigade 5th Brigade 29th Battalion 22nd Battalion 31st Battalion 28th Battalion 21st Battalion

1st Brigade, 5th Division† 2nd Brigade, 7th Brigade, 11th Brigade, 3rd Division 2nd Brigade, 13th Brigade† 2nd Brigade 12th Brigade 4th Division 5th Brigade, 10th Brigade 5th Brigade 6th Brigade 6th Brigade 10th Brigade

Name

Initial position

Appointments

G.E. McCuaig L.J. Lipsett F.O.W. Loomis*

13th Battalion 8th Battalion 13th Battalion

G.S. Tuxford H.M. Dyer F.W. Hill D.M. Ormond V.W. Odlum

5th Battalion 5th Battalion 1st Battalion 10th Battalion 7th Battalion

1st Brigade, 4th Brigade 2nd Brigade, 3rd Division 2nd Brigade, 7th Brigade, 11th Brigade, 3rd Division 3rd Brigade 7th Brigade 9th Brigade 9th Brigade 11th Brigade

* Shared appointee § Political appointee † Unit did not reach front Currie

* Shared appointee Source: Nicholson, CEF , 540-3; rg 150 Officers’ Personnel Files, lac.

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to advance his officers, and this brought him into conflict with Alderson, who wanted British officers on Turner’s staff.8 Turner had an inconsistent pattern of gaining results. He was successful during the Boer War in a junior position but faltered in the adverse circumstances of Second Ypres and St Eloi. It was his pattern to have poor results in his initial battle at each senior command level followed by greater success in subsequent engagements, as at Festubert and Courcelette. As goc Canadian forces, Turner achieved significant improvements in the omfc and made a valuable contribution to the fighting power of the Canadian Corps. Furthermore, he was successful in his challenging endeavour to unify the myriad Canadian veterans’ organizations. A leader of character encompasses the intertwined concepts of empathy, army values, and warrior ethos. Turner embodied the warrior ethos more so than did the typical Canadian general. His courage, both moral and physical, was self-evident. It was indicative of his character that his first reaction to the catastrophe at Second Ypres was to strap on his revolver and vow to die rather than surrender. J.F.C. Fuller, in his post-war screed about generalship, criticized British generals for losing touch with the front line. Generals were tied to the telephone in their chateaux, rather than leading.9 The limitations of communications, however, necessitated that generals remain close to their telephones to command, and ghq ordered divisional commanders to position themselves to facilitate intercommunication with neighbouring formations and superiors.10 Turner, however, interpreted this order liberally, and because he could trust his staff, he was a regular sight in the forward trenches. As a result, he could better appreciate what his men were enduring and what the actual conditions were at the front. He was not a château general. His letters to his wife, his interactions with his troops, and his actions clearly demonstrate his empathy. His willingness to bypass army regulations to get his men the clothing they needed in 1915 and his attempts to postpone the 1 October 1916 attack are two examples. He was genuinely appreciative of his men. In one of his letters home after Ypres, he wrote, “[T]hinking of them brings tears to my eyes for my gallant lads, Officers and men.”11 There is a tension between empathy and army values that requires the sacrifice of soldiers in

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pursuit of the mission. Turner’s protests over poor plans and his probable refusal to throw away lives at St Eloi highlight his unwillingness to squander troops on profitless operations. In this, he was at odds with the bef culture, which, as Tim Travers has phrased it, was “always to be enthusiastic about attacking, regardless of drawbacks.”12 Turner probably acquired a reputation as a “bellyacher,” and this blighted his chances at commanding the Canadian Corps. In his approach to the outward displays of discipline, dress, and deportment, Turner was not aligned with Haig’s expectations.13 Turner lacked Currie’s punctiliousness in ensuring all the brass work was polished. He was more willing to make allowances for the realities of the front line and was less harsh in his discipline. This contributed to his positive soldier–commander relationship, but while usually effective, it contributed to the 2nd Division’s problems with trench foot in 1915 and lowered Haig’s opinion of him. Turner believed that duty outweighed his own ambitions. While ambition is a necessary characteristic of anyone holding a senior position in business, government, and the military, Turner sacrificed his aspirations for obedience.14 Both his grudging acceptance of command in England and his refusal to demand that Perley live up to his promise to consider Turner for command of the Canadian Corps point to an officer for whom duty was paramount. To a modern audience, Turner’s enlisting Hughes’s and Aitken’s assistance would seem too closely associated with the malign aspects of Hughes’s interference in the cef to be acceptable. Turner’s actions, however, were well within the bounds of the Canadian Militia’s ethos. Turner, Currie, and numerous other officers benefited from Hughes’s involvement, and many were not reticent in leveraging their political connections, as the many letters to Carson, Hughes, and other politicians attest.15 Only later in the war did this interference diminish, and Turner played a critical role in working to purge it from the system. Another term often associated with Turner was “modesty.” In a letter to his wife, for example, he commented that he hoped his son would grow up to be as good as the men who served with him – not served under him but with him.16 These were not public pronouncements, but his private thoughts shared with his wife. In another letter

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to his wife, Turner wrote that Smith-Dorrien had said that Turner had twice saved him, in South Africa and at Ypres, but Turner added, “This is awfully conceited on my part in writing it, so please keep it very much to yourself.”17 Even his obituary remarked on his modesty.18 Turner was not a physically imposing man, which makes his ability to project a commanding presence all that more impressive. He was slightly over average height, had a slim build, a weak chin, blue eyes, fair complexion, fair hair, and he wore glasses. As he aged, he looked less like a mild clerk and developed more gravitas. In photographs, he was usually smiling, and it appears as if laughter came easily to him. His habit of visiting the front lines, his speaking skills, confident deportment, intrepid nature, vc, and engaging personality all contributed to his success in developing his authority over battlehardened troops. He was personable, even charming, and as a result was well liked and respected by his men, officers, and staff.19 Contributing to this reputation was his habit of visiting the front line, which always endeared senior officers to the troops.20 Turner’s vc also lent him considerable credibility with all ranks. Even Alderson, when disparaging Turner, made reference to his valour as demonstrated by his vc. Turner was fit and vigorous. His diary reports of working twentytwo-hour days at the Somme indicate an officer with an exceptional capacity for hard work and immense stamina. He continued this pace while in command in England, and he does not appear to have experienced any long period of illness or incapacity during the war, other than suffering a broken collarbone and possibly a concussion. He had the advantage of relative youth in comparison with the average British divisional commander, who in 1915 was nine years older than Turner.21 Wavell, in his perceptive description of generalship based on his experiences in the Great War, considered robustness – the ability to survive and thrive in an environment of incessant shocks and surprises – the critical aspect of combat generalship.22 Turner demonstrated resilience during the Boer War but not in the disastrous situation of Second Ypres, as his decision to retreat to the ghq line shows. He displayed a greater equanimity and ability to handle the shocks and strains of battle as a divisional commander. Turner’s quick intelligence

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contributed to a less phlegmatic nature in the heat of battle than Currie had and was probably one of the reasons Alderson considered him less level-headed than Currie.23 Good judgment, developed through experience, enables leaders to assess a situation, arrive at a reasonable opinion, and render a sensible decision. Turner generally satisfied these requirements. In a combat role, he did not just register his disagreement with plans but proposed alternatives, such as at St Eloi and on the Somme. The victory at Courcelette demonstrated sound judgment in preparation and battle leadership. He showed greater discernment than did ghq in his assessment of the staying power of the Germans, repeatedly dismissing claims the Germans were on their last legs.24 His decisions while he was the head of the omfc were appropriate, as the improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization demonstrated. Where he failed was in allowing his political support of Sam Hughes to too often intrude excessively in his decision-making, such as when Turner pressured his officers to change the survey results on the Ross rifle. Turner supported Hughes for a combination of reasons – his respect for Hughes’s “many good qualities,” a reciprocal response to Hughes’s championing him, and a failure of judgment and character.25 Turner possessed the coup d’oeil necessary for a junior cavalry officer during the Boer War but lacked it at the higher levels of command. His greatest failing as a senior combat officer was his inability to filter the welter of information flooding into the headquarters and form it into an approximation of the actual situation at the front. Lacking the rare talent to discern the battle’s pattern from afar, Turner tended to limit his battle decisions by a wariness of what the Germans might do. Given the German penchant for launching stinging counterattacks, this caution was understandable and appropriate. Turner was innovative within the context of the extant paradigm. He did not develop novel solutions, but being pragmatic he looked to proven formulae. His steps to establish the command and organizational structure of the omfc were a clear derivation of the existing War Office model, adjusted for the Canadian situation. The approach was not revolutionary, but it was appropriate and effective,

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especially for an institution tightly integrated with and partially subordinated to the British system. Turner was not innovative in tactics and doctrine. His “lessons learned” arising from St Eloi and the Somme dealt with the symptoms of problems and not the underlying causes – in this respect Currie was clearly Turner’s superior. Turner had an open mind towards new technology, as evidenced by his embrace of air power, his comments on tanks, and his request to Carson in 1915 to obtain a device that would enable them to listen to German communications.26 Related to this affinity for technology, as well as to his political sensitivity, were his attempts to salvage Sam Hughes’s equipment projects, such as the Ross rifle, the Bain wagons, and the MacAdam shovel.27 Turner endeavoured to find ways to make such equipment useful, which was laudable, but he persevered with his support too long. Like many who think and talk fast, Turner, other than with Sam Hughes, was not always the most tactful person.28 The 1904 confidential report on Turner assessed him as excellent on all respects except for temper and tact, which rated him only as good.29 His interactions with Byng, Perley, subordinates, and peers were positive, according to the available evidence. His clashes with Alderson, Currie, and Gow, however, indicate a personality that lacked a necessary element of tact to defuse confrontations. In all three cases, however, the other combatant equally, or in Currie’s case predominantly, shares the blame for the conflict. Kemp’s negative comments about Turner suggest that Turner had lost his temper or reacted in a way that offended Kemp, but no evidence exists other than Kemp’s complaints. Turner lacked the skill of a Marlborough or Eisenhower in dealing with difficult personalities and achieving his goals. Turner, when appointed to command the 3rd Brigade, was as qualified as any Canadian Militia officer, but he lacked some of the necessary domain knowledge. A lack of staff training further handicapped him, which led to an under-appreciation of the vital necessity of qualified staff officers. Leading at the brigade and divisional level, however, was an accelerated course in advanced command training. Turner’s progress as a divisional commander and his improved performance at Courcelette shows a learning curve in a structured combat environment.

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Turner, like most of his class and generation in English Canada and Australia, had a dual identity – as a subject of the British Empire and a resident of Canada.30 Canadians were subjects of the British Empire until 1947, when the Canadian Citizenship Act was passed and created Canadian citizenship.31 He was a strong supporter of Canadian aspirations for more autonomy. In this respect, he was a stronger nationalist than Currie. Over the course of the war, Turner increasingly identified himself as Canadian. His frustration with British attitudes and newspaper coverage in the demobilization period accelerated this identity shift, but not to the point where he abandoned his connections to the Empire. On the negative side, he could hold a strong grudge against those he felt treated him unfairly, such as Alderson. He could be petty and prickly at times, as witnessed by his conflict with Gow. Further, under political pressure, he might change his opinion of an officer; his recanting of a negative assessment of William Hughes was an example of this.32 He was defensive about his reputation and was certain to resent any disparagement of his performance or honour – hence his conflicts with Alderson. He was well aware of Alderson’s enmity and kept the message logs from Second Ypres to defend his actions should that be necessary.33 A further issue was his tendency to retain officers who had not proven competent, such as Garnet Hughes and Ker.

turner and currie Any assessment of Turner is incomplete without a comparison with his rival – Arthur Currie. It is essential to recognize the fundamental difference between the Canadian Corps of 1915–16 and that of 1917– 18. In all the vital dimensions of weaponry, ammunition supply, doctrine, logistics, and command and staff training, the Canadian Corps in the later years of the war was far superior to the corps in the first half, and Currie is rightly credited with contributing to this improvement. In addition, the Germans were comparatively weaker in 1917 and even more so in 1918 than in 1915–16. Consequently, it is misleading to make a direct comparison between Currie’s results

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during the Hundred Days campaign and those of Turner at St Eloi. A better comparison is Currie’s record in 1916, which, like Turner’s, was equivocal. Preceding Currie’s great success at Mount Sorrel on 13 June was the defeat of the initial counterattacks. Currie had his share of failures at the Somme, including the battles of 26 September and 8 October, without the compensation of a signal victory, such as Courcelette.34 Based on the 1916 record, both officers showed strong capabilities as well as failures. Turner, with his experience in England, was a more rounded officer than Currie. He showed he could win victories at the Somme and could handle the multi-faceted challenges of administration. He had a better appreciation of the political dimensions of senior command than Currie. As Gary Sheffield argues, “High-level command is as much about politics as operations.”35 Currie was a gifted combat commander and well suited to his role as commander of the Canadian Corps, but his relative lack of success as the inspector-general after the war illustrates his limitations in dealing with the political aspects of senior command.36 Turner, more than Currie, appreciated that the rough and tumble and necessary compromises of party politics, however distasteful to the military mind, were an inextricable feature of an army subordinated to a civilian government. Could Turner have successfully commanded the Canadian Corps? Turner demonstrated a learning curve and his performance at the Somme proved that he had grown to be an effective divisional commander. On the basis of his record, it appears that Turner would likely have been a capable corps commander as well. Nonetheless, Currie was a better choice for corps command than Turner because he had stronger operational capabilities and Haig’s confidence – a confidence Turner lacked. As a result, superiors acceded to Currie’s demands for improved plans and more guns, shells, and time, and these would be critical to the Canadians’ success. Turner would have been in the position of other disfavoured corps commanders that ghq expected to make do with their allotment of resources, time, and planning – no matter how exiguous the resources, limited the time, or flawed the plan. Turner, however, was a better administrator than Currie. As Riley points out in his biography of Napoleon, “the general may have to

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fill a series of incompatible roles: politician, leader, manager, supply specialist, public relations man – as well as strategist, operational commander and tactician.”37 Currie’s strengths were as an operational commander and tactician, while Turner embodied those qualities to a lesser degree but added the other attributes and so was better suited to his administrative role. Richard Turner served Canada well in two wars and materially assisted veterans in the post-war period. Initially, like all his contemporaries, including Currie, he struggled with the new circumstances of trench warfare on the Western Front, but he showed a propensity to learn from the situation and by 1916 had become an effective divisional commander. He proved to be an excellent administrator, and his contributions played an underestimated part in the Canadian success in the final years of the war. He was also a strong but balanced nationalist and supported the aspirations for increased Canadian control, including the raising of an independent air force. Moreover, he was highly esteemed by the troops, and his leadership qualities were crucial to cef’s success. Many Canadian historians think poorly of Turner today, and that is unfortunate, as he deserves more respect for his accomplishments and contributions.

Appendix One: Awards

lieutenant-gener al sir richard er nest william tur ner, vc , kcb, kc mg, dso Victoria Cross Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of St Michael and St George Distinguished Service Order Queen’s South Africa Medal 1899–1902, with clasps for Johannesburg, Diamond Hill, Belfast, Cape Colony, Orange Free State, South Africa 1914–1915 Star British War Medal Victory Medal Mentioned in Despatches (6 times) Canadian Auxiliary Forces Officers’ Decoration Canadian Forces’ Decoration with Clasp Legion d’Honneur, Croix de Commandeur (France) Croix de Guerre avec Palme (France) Order of White Eagle with Swords (Russia)

*Turner Service Jacket, lac.

Appendix Two: Historiography

Turner’s historiography is sparse. There is no full-length biographical study, other than a perfunctory article in the journal Canadian Military History.1 Providing some limited coverage is a master’s thesis on the Battle of St Eloi, an excellent doctoral dissertation on the 2nd Division, and three articles on St Eloi by Campbell, Cook, and Copp.2 As a comparison, there are three full biographies of Currie, plus one book of his selected papers, three biographies of Sam Hughes, and one shared biography of Currie and Hughes, plus multiple theses, dissertations, and articles. Thomas Leppard is the published authority on Turner, having produced the biographical article and a master’s thesis on Turner and St Eloi. In his article, Leppard makes the case that historians have treated Turner as a “peripheral figure,” but “he deserves better.”3 Leppard’s assessment of Turner’s combat record, however, is bleak. He claims that Turner never learned to command, but he does not discuss Turner’s victory at Courcelette in his article. Nevertheless, Leppard credits Turner with the improvements in England and makes the salient point that Turner in his battles with Currie never allowed “their animosity to interfere with the welfare of the Corps.”4 David Campbell’s thesis on the 2nd Division is a well-researched and argued divisional history. Campbell treats Turner carefully, albeit in the context of the standard narrative. Because Campbell’s thesis focuses on the 2nd Division, Turner disappears from the account when he moves to England. Campbell has also published two articles on the battles of St Eloi and Courcelette that are generally favourable to Turner.5

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The majority of historians writing about Canada’s participation in the First World War follow a standard narrative for Turner. They credit him with physical courage but in a manner that suggests that his bravery diminished his suitability for high command.6 They characterize Turner as a repeated failure as a combat commander at Second Ypres, Festubert, St Eloi, and the Somme.7 They also assert that his promotion to goc 2nd Division and subsequent retention in command were due to unwarranted political interference.8 They also claim that Turner sacrificed his men for political advantage.9 Further, according to their interpretation, the authorities sacked Turner because of the “bloody fiasco” at St Eloi, and Byng, the Canadian Corps commander, actively supported his removal.10 The standard narrative will usually admit that Turner was of some value as the commander of Canadian forces in England, but they will often attribute the success in England to the first minister of the omfc, Sir George Perley.11 A conspicuous exception is Desmond Morton, who accurately observes in When Your Number’s Up that Perley left Turner to make the military decisions.12 Another strand of the standard narrative is that while Turner was in England, he clashed with Currie to the detriment of the Canadian Corps. 13 The more informed historians, however, do not accept Currie’s claims that Turner deliberately subverted him.14 Turner’s subordinates, both officers and men, extolled his competence, approachability, and courage. Memoirs, diaries, and contemporary letters rarely mention senior officers, but a surprising number of Turner’s subordinates refer to him and do so in a positive light. One example is D.E. Macintyre, who wrote about Turner’s transfer to England in his diary: “[He] certainly is the right man in the right place.”15 Another is Private Fraser, who wrote about the contempt the men felt towards their officers but added, “One officer I can single out as a decided exception. He is General Turner, V.C.”16 Another example: “Gen Turner the great Canadian General, was here today. He is very popular as [he] is every inch a fighting man.”17 The regimental histories published before the Second World War are also commendatory, and two contain forewords written by Turner, indicating the esteem in which he was held.18 During the war and immediately afterwards, Turner had a distinguished reputation, much like Douglas Haig’s.19 As to be expected,

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wartime works such as J.A. Currie’s The Red Watch and Max Aitken’s Canada in Flanders praise Turner.20 Immediate post-war accounts were either laudatory, triumphal commentary devoid of significant criticisms of leaders or detailed regimental histories where the battles of reputation were irrelevant. As a result, Turner’s reputation matched and might have even surpassed Currie’s in the immediate post-war period. Certainly in 1921, Currie believed that “the clouds which had enshrouded his name” prevented his selection as president of the largest of the post-war veterans’ groups.21 Turner’s reputation has now declined precipitously, again like Haig’s, while Currie’s has ascended. In the 1920s, without detailed academic or official histories, the rumours of Currie’s poor standing with the men of the Canadian Corps affected the narrative. Currie’s 1928 victory in his libel trial (a Port Hope newspaper had printed accusations that Currie had ordered unnecessary attacks at Mons) lifted the pall over his reputation and encouraged both officers and men to rally around him.22 The publication of the long-delayed first volume of the Canadian Official History in 1938 damaged Turner’s stature, despite the fact that A.F. Duguid, the official historian, buried much of his criticism of Turner.23 Turner feuded repeatedly with Duguid over Duguid’s portrayal of the 3rd Brigade and, by extension, of Turner’s role in its command, especially during the Second Battle of Ypres.24 Turner and his former brigade-major, Garnet Hughes, wrote long memos, met repeatedly with Duguid, and Turner even threatened to escalate the matter to the prime minister.25 In the end, Duguid did obfuscate what he regarded as Turner’s errors, as he did not believe the story could be told while Turner was alive.26 Major-General F.O.W. Loomis, a battalion commander in the 3rd Brigade and later goc 3rd Division, also did not approve of Duguid’s account. He wrote, “[T]he action of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade had not been done justice.”27 The volumes of the British Official History covering Turner’s battles were published before the Canadian Official History and were circumspect in the treatment of all Canadian officers. J.E. Edmonds, the British official historian, was extremely critical of the Canadian documentation – the war diaries – related to Second Ypres and believed them to be concoctions to mask serious errors made by Canadian commanders.28 Edmonds’s bias rankled Duguid and Canadian senior officers and resulted in Edmonds’s producing three drafts before a

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version satisfied the Canadians. In this last draft, criticisms of Canadian officers are almost entirely absent,29 and the coverage of St Eloi and Courcelette short and uncontroversial.30 After a long hiatus owing to the Second World War, the looming fiftieth anniversary of the First World War induced historians to return to the war with a deluge of books. Identifying a hero to rally around, writers elevated Currie to his rightful place as the dominant Canadian military leader in the First World War. In the process, however, it was apparently necessary to undermine Turner’s reputation to build up Currie’s. These histories, such as Swettenham’s To Seize the Victory and Goodspeed’s The Road Past Vimy, focused on the operations of the Canadian Corps with an emphasis on the later part of the war.31 They established the primary contours of the standard narrative, with Currie portrayed as the superlative commander of the Canadian Corps who was at odds with the politicians and with the incompetent political general Richard Turner. In the wake of Duguid’s failure to publish more than a single volume of the projected eight, G.W.L. Nicholson’s one-volume history published in 1962 had to cover the entire Canadian war effort.32 Nicholson thus had to be concise, but despite this, his text is an excellent narrative history, with especially strong battle descriptions. Nicholson tended to avoid most of the controversial topics and his treatment of Turner was neutral while burying criticisms in footnotes. The opening of the British and Canadian archives triggered academic interest in delving deeper into the First World War, and another flood of books emerged, starting in the 1980s, that further solidified the standard narrative. These works concentrated on the combat operations of the Canadian Corps.33 Based on under-utilized primary documentation, works such as Hyatt’s biography of Hughes, Haycock’s on Currie, Desmond Morton’s multiple works, and Harris’s on the Canadian staff provided broad coverage.34 This trend culminated in Tim Cook’s two award-winning books on the Canadian Corps that covered not only the battles but also the experiences of the soldiers at and away from the front.35 Nevertheless, in all these works, aspects of the standard narrative persisted. The three indispensable works on the administrative part of Turner’s career are Desmond Morton’s A Peculiar Kind of Politics, Stephen Harris’s Canadian Brass, and Richard Holt’s “Filling the Ranks.”

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Morton covers the previously ignored history of the omfc. This groundbreaking work is the only substantial narrative that deals with the cef’s administrative structure, governance, and evolution. The only other book that deals with administrative matters is David W. Love’s A Nation in Making, an explanatory work that exhaustively details the organization of the cef, including combat, training, railway, and forestry troops.36 Morton explores the evolution of Canadian administration from the chaos of Sam Hughes tenure to the more structured and bureaucratic experience of the omfc. Morton’s focus is on the political level and not the military, so generals only appear when they affect or interact with the politicians. Morton, more than most historians, appreciates the contribution Turner made to the improvement in the administration. Harris investigates the transformation of the Canadian military from a Militia force to a professional army by 1939 through the lens of the commanders and staff. His study shows the evolution from a Militia dominated by political influence to increasing professionalism during the First World War. The lens of Currie’s papers conditioned Harris’s interpretation, as Harris approached the process primarily from the Canadian Corps’s perspective. Holt’s superbly researched dissertation provides an in-depth examination of the 1914 to 1918 evolution of “recruiting, entry-level training and the provision of reinforcements from Canada to England and England to France.”37 Holt acknowledges the contribution of Turner and the omfc staff to the improved efficiency and effectiveness of the provision of replacements to the Canadian Corps.

Notes

abbreviations boh British Official History cwm Canadian War Museum dhh Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence iwm Imperial War Museum (uk) lac Library and Archives Canada lhcma Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (uk) McGill McGill University Archives nls National Library of Scotland (uk) qua Queen’s University Archives tna The National Archives (uk)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

introduction Frost et al., Wartime Letters, 118. Leppard, “The Dashing Subaltern.” Borys, “Education of a Corps Commander,” 13. Demobilization Factors, 41, 74/672 Box 8, dhh. rg9 III A1 and B1 Circulation Stats, email from lac, 12 February 2011, in author’s possession. FM 6–22. Leadership in the Canadian Forces Doctrine; Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations. An exception is Wood, Militia Myths. Hughes, “General Allenby,” 13. chapter one Note: The “Turner Diary” is a collection of excerpts of Turner’s letters to his wife and is similar to his diary from the First World War. When compared to extant letters, the diary entries are accurate but incomplete, as not everything in a letter is included in the “diary” entry.

282

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1 Comrades All, p. 95, mg30 E339 v1, Hilder Fonds, lac. 2 Maria was born in 1867, Amy in 1869, Effie in 1870, Leila in 1872, Albert in 1873, William in 1875, Erie in 1879, and Evan in 1886. Maria, Amy, and Leila died as infants. Smyth, “Descendants of William Ellis,” email, 6 February 2012; Defence, Quarterly Militia List, 341; 1901 Canadian Census; Turner Diary, 1 November 1900, mg30 E46 M-300, Turner Fonds, lac; Macpherson, A Soldier’s Diary, 156. 3 Morgan, Canadian Men and Women 1898; Morgan, Canadian Men and Women 1912. 4 The Whitehead and Turner Story, Turner, Turner Family Fonds, privately held; Harold Turner to Evie and Tion, 27 September 1987, Turner Family Fonds, privately held. 5 Naylor, History of Canadian Business, 79; Taylor et al., Concise History of Business, 314; Boothman, “A More Definitive System,” 25; Bliss, A Living Profit, 33. 6 Bliss, A Living Profit, 33. 7 The Whitehead and Turner Story, privately held. 8 Thibault, “Triomphe De L’art”; The Whitehead and Turner Story, privately held. 9 Rudin, Forgotten Quebecers, 61. 10 Ibid., 82. 11 Taylor et al., Concise History of Business, 218. 12 Silver, The French-Canadian Idea of Confederation, 140. 13 Leppard, “The Dashing Subaltern,” 21. 14 Bliss, Northern Enterprise, 353; Bliss, A Living Profit, 11. 15 Eksteins, Rites of Spring, 128–32. 16 Humphries, “War’s Long Shadow,” 507; Moss, Manliness, 29. 17 The Whitehead and Turner Story, privately held; Bouchard, “Richard Turner,” interview, 10 April 2012. 18 Bliss, Northern Enterprise, 350. 19 The Whitehead and Turner Story, privately held. 20 1901 Canadian Census; Sagar, “National Sample of the 1901 Census,” 19–20. 21 Wood, Militia Myths, 58. 22 Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 17. 23 Miller, A Knight in Politics, 88. 24 Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense, 183. 25 Miller, A Knight in Politics, 97–9. 26 Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 35; Grey, A Military History of Australia. For more on the troubled history of the ministers and generals, see Morton, Ministers and Generals. 27 Wood, Militia Myths, 11; Beahen, “A Citizen’s Army,” 193. 28 Grey, A Military History of Australia, 77.

notes to pag es 1 4 – 1 7 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

283

Miller, A Knight in Politics, 90. Beahen, “A Citizen’s Army,” 268; Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 3. Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 46; Dundonald, My Army Life, 310. O’Brien, “Manhood and the Militia Myth.” Miller, “Chums in Arms,” 362; Miller, “Montreal Militia,” 57–64. Morton, “Militia Lobby in Parliament,” 80. Turner War Record, G.A.Q. 4-40, rg24 v1815, lac; Parker, Who’s Who and Why; Turner Family Photo Album, Turner Family Fonds, privately held. Berger, The Sense of Power, 236. Maroney, “Peaceable Kingdom,” 35–6. Morton, “Divided Loyalties? Divided Country?,” 55. Brennan, “The Other Battle,” 251; McGowan, “‘Finger in the Fire.’” Department of Militia and Defence, Supplementary Report. Wood, Militia Myths, 35. Eyre, “Staff and Command in the Canadian Corps,” 82; Wood, Militia Myths, 29. Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 42. Wood, Militia Myths, 31. Stewart, Conscise Lineages. Cavalry Training Canada 1904. Greenhous, Dragoon: The Centennial History, 13. Certificate of Military Instruction, 19710147-001/docs manu 58A 1 9.4, Turner Fonds, cwm. “A Popular Officer: Presentation to Captain R.E.W. Turner Yesterday,” unattributed newspaper clipping, 19710147-005/docs manu 58E 5 2.1, Turner Fonds, cwm. Richard Turner Service Jacket, rg150 Acc1992–93/166, Box 9842 – 47, lac. Leppard, “Battle of St. Eloi,” 2. English, “Request for Advice on Pre-Great War Conservative Party,” email, 15 August 2011. Bouchard interview. For more on the Liberal position towards war, see Maroney, “Peaceable Kingdom,” 104. “Turner Appointed to Protestant School Board,” Quebec City Daily Telegraph, 13 June 1923. Parker, Who’s Who and Why; Morgan, Canadian Men and Women 1898; Morgan, Canadian Men and Women 1912. Perley to Borden, 22 November 1916, v7/2, mg27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds, lac. MacLaren, Commissions High, 160. Defence, Quarterly Militia List. For more, see Stewart, “Richard Turner’s South African Campaign.”

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60 61 62 63

See Appendix 1, “Awards,” for Turner’s complete list of decorations. Defence, Quarterly Militia List. Maroney, “Peaceable Kingdom,” 200, 284. Robertson, “Royal Canadian Dragoons,” 13; Miller, Painting the Map Red, 154. Department of Militia and Defence, Supplementary Report, 70. Turner Diary, 1 November 1899, lac. Ibid., 29 May 1900. Lessard’s Report, 2 January 1901, rg9 II v32 T10404, lac. Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry, 112. Ibid., 91. For more, see Jones, From Boer War to World War, 167–8. Pugsley, The Anzac Experience, 47. Turner Diary, 18 July 1900, lac; Miller, Painting the Map Red, 158. Morrison, With the Guns, 216. Macfarlane, “Right Stuff.” Miller, Canada’s Little War, 72. Greenhous, Dragoon: The Centennial History, 175. Robertson, “Royal Canadian Dragoons,” 13; Turner Diary, 5 September 1900, lac. Wedding article, 8 January 1900, 19710147-005/docs manu 58E 5 2.1, Turner Fonds, cwm; Turner Diary, 29 December 1899, mg30 E46 M-300, Turner Fonds, lac. Harold, Kathleen, and Evelyn. Bouchard interview. Turner Diary, January 1900, lac. Jones, “The Influence of the Boer War,” 170. Reid, Our Little Army, 9–14. Ibid., 35; Lessard’s Report, lac. Jones, From Boer War to World War, 170–7. For more, see Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry. 1st cmr Regimental Diary extracts, rg9 II v32 T10404, lac; Comrades All, p. 16, lac 16; Turner Diary, 28 March 1900, lac. Robertson, “Royal Canadian Dragoons,” 85–7; Turner Diary, 30 April 1900, lac; Comrades All, p. 20, lac; Miller, Painting the Map Red, 223. Greenhous, Dragoon: The Centennial History, 97. Miller, Painting the Map Red, 229; Turner Diary, 7 May 1900, lac. Newspaper article of dso action, 19710147-005/docs manu 58E 5 2.1, Turner Fonds, cwm. “Orders and Decorations – Distinguished Service Order (dso)”; Kang, “The British Infantry Officer on the Western Front,” 367. Turner Diary, 7 May 1900, lac. Ibid., 16 May 1900; Robertson, “Royal Canadian Dragoons,” 10; Miller, Painting the Map Red, 234. Turner Diary, 29 May 1900, lac; Miller, Painting the Map Red, 236–7; Robertson, “Royal Canadian Dragoons,” 118.

64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77

78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

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93 Turner Diary, 16 May 1900, lac. 94 This was an assumption even commanders such as Napoleon got wrong. Ibid., 30 May 1900. 95 Ibid., 20 July 1900. 96 Ibid. 97 1st cmr Regimental Diary extracts, lac. 98 Turner Diary, 9 August 1900, lac; ibid., 27 September 1900; Turner War Record, lac. 99 1st cmr Regimental Diary extracts, lac; Turner Diary, 7 August 1900, lac. 100 Turner Diary, 25 October 1900, lac; Miller, Painting the Map Red, 256. 101 Madsen, “Farm Burning”; Turner Diary, 21 August 1900, lac; ibid., 7 October 1900. 102 Comrades All, p. 56, lac; Miller, Painting the Map Red, 257. 103 Turner Diary, 7 October 1900, lac; Miller, Painting the Map Red, 257. 104 Smith-Dorrien, Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service, 252. 105 Morrison, With the Guns, 251; Miller, Painting the Map Red, 263. 106 Turner Diary, 4 November 1900, lac; Robertson, “Royal Canadian Dragoons,” 180–1; Smith-Dorrien, Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service, 253. 107 Reid, “For God’s Sake,” 217. 108 Morrison, With the Guns, 264. 109 Ibid., 259; Miller, Painting the Map Red, 267. 110 Robertson, “Royal Canadian Dragoons,” 181. 111 Smith-Dorrien, Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service, 257. 112 Ibid., 254; Jones, From Boer War to World War, 172. 113 Robertson, “Royal Canadian Dragoons,” 186; Miller, Painting the Map Red, 270. 114 Comrades All, p. 62, lac. 115 Robertson, “Royal Canadian Dragoons,” 188. 116 Ibid., 195; Morrison, With the Guns, 267; “Hampden Zane Churchill Cockburn.” 117 Miller, Painting the Map Red, 273. 118 D Battery, rcfa Report, 9 March 1901, 19870027-001 58C 2.14, Morrison Fonds, cwm; Morrison, With the Guns, 269; Turner Diary, 7 November 1900, lac; Comrades All, p. 64, lac; Reid, Our Little Army, 134; Bishop, “Saving the Guns in South Africa”; “Edward James Gibson Holland.” 119 Robertson, “Royal Canadian Dragoons,” 195. 120 Turner Diary, 22 and 28 November 1900, lac. 121 Comrades All, p. 60, lac. 122 Fowler, Courage Rewarded, 14. 123 Alderson to ams 2 Army, G.271, 18 April 1916, rg9 III v5075, lac. 124 Fuller, Generalship, 28; Wavell, Generals and Generalship, 4–5.

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125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132

Fowler, Courage Rewarded, 14. Reid, “For God’s Sake,” 234. Halliday, Valour Reconsidered, 2. Reid, “For God’s Sake,” 192. Turner Diary, 15 November 1900, lac. Ibid., 15 and 28 November and 13 December 1900. Ibid., 6 February 1901. Newspaper drawing of Turner receiving vc, 19710147-005/docs manu 58E 5 2.1, Turner Fonds, cwm; Gratitude for Interest in Welfare for 1902 Coronation, 19710147-012/docs manu 58A 1 9.12, Turner Fonds, cwm. Department of Militia and Defence, Supplementary Report, 99. Leppard, “The Dashing Subaltern.” Pakenham, The Boer War, 240–6. Hilder to Turner, 14 October 1946, 19730069-001/docs manu 58A 1 9.11, Turner Fonds, cwm. Turner Diary, 20 July 1900, lac. Warren, Wait for the Waggon, 25; Signals, Canadian Signals, 3; Beahen, “A Citizen’s Army,” 205–9. For more on Borden’s accomplishments, see Miller, A Knight in Politics. Messenger, Call to Arms, 15. Miller, A Knight in Politics, 176. Beahen, “A Citizen’s Army,” 29–31. Ibid., 130. Faraday, “Half the Battle,” 16; Robson, First A.I.F., 15. Inspection Report, 10 qoch, 25 June 1904, hq 145, rg24 v6413, lac. Inspection Report, 10 qoch, 26 May 1905, hq 145, rg24 v6413, lac. “Turner Appointed General Officer Commanding,” Montreal Daily Witness, 25 March 1907. Stewart, Conscise Lineages; Inspection Reports, 10 qoch, 1906–1912, hq 145, rg24 v6413, lac. Beahen, “A Citizen’s Army,” 328; Cavalry Association Formed, newspaper clipping, 24 May 1910, 19710147-005/docs manu 58E 5 2.1, Turner Fonds, cwm; “Canadian Cavalry Association,” Canadian Military Gazette, 14 March 1911, 11. Turner Service Jacket, lac. Leppard, “Battle of St. Eloi,” 7–8; Campbell, “The Divisional Experience,” 55. Grodzinski, “We Few, We Happy Few,” 77.

133 134 135 136 137 138

139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148

149 150 151

chapter two 1 Turner Diary, 11 June 1915, 19710147-001/docs manu 58A 1 9.1, Turner Fonds, cwm. 2 Duguid, Canadian Forces, 1:7.

notes to pag es 4 0 – 6

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3 Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 97. 4 Stewart, “Attack Doctrine,” 255–6. For more on British staff officers, see Delaney, “Mentoring the Canadian Corps.” 5 Wood, Militia Myths, 176–86. 6 Nicholson, CEF , 519; Isitt, Canada’s Siberian Expedition. 7 Note these statistics do not include Newfoundland casualties, as it was not part of Canada in the First World War. Cook, Shock Troops, 612–13. 8 For more on the topic, see Holt, “Filling the Ranks.” 9 For more on British mobilization issues, see Simkins, Kitchener’s Army. 10 Thacker to Secretary War Office, A.G. 1-2-36, 4 February 1918, O-2933, rg9 III v2881, lac. 11 Duguid, Canadian Forces, 1:5–23. 12 Cook, At the Sharp End, 31. 13 Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 31. 14 Campbell, “The Divisional Experience,” 60. 15 Turner Diary, 4 October 1914, cwm. 16 Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 15. 17 Cook, At the Sharp End, 41. 18 Alderson to Secretary War Office, 29 January 1915, rg9 III v417, lac; Turner Service Jacket, lac. 19 Tuxford Comments, 193?, 39, mg4027 C3, Urquhart Fonds, McGill. 20 Beattie, 48th Highlanders, 28. 21 Connaught to Kitchener, 19 August 1914, wg/21, pro 30/57/56, Kitchener Papers, tna. 22 Turner War Record, lac. 23 From internal evidence, a misdated entry in Turner’s “diary” suggests he was at Valcartier on 10 August. Turner Diary, 10 August/? September 1915, cwm. 24 Tuxford Comments, 193?, McGill; Comments on Skeleton history by Sutherland Brown, 1922, gaq 2-1 v2, rg24 v1811, lac; Duguid, Canadian Forces, 1:59–61. 25 Alderson to Carson, 23 April 1916, rg9 III v114, lac. 26 Lee, “Australian Staff,” 120. 27 Career Outline for Garnet Hughes, rg24 v1754, lac. 28 Royal Military College Results for 30 June 1899, 14-1, mg27 II D23 v14, Hughes Fonds, lac; Horn and Harris, Warrior Chiefs, 19. 29 Turner Diary, 11 December 1914, cwm. 30 Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 25. 31 Turner Interview, 14 March 1934, 2001/10, Duguid Fonds, dhh. 32 Nicholson, CEF , 35; Urquhart, 16th Battalion, 30. 33 Fetherstonhaugh, 14th Battalion, 21. 34 Turner Diary, December–February 1915, cwm; Turner Service Jacket, lac. 35 Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 51.

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notes to pa ges 4 6 – 5 1

36 Turner Diary, 7 December 1914 and 2 February 1915, cwm. 37 Service Record, mg30 E236 v4, Villiers Fonds, lac; McDonald, Harold French Service Record, rg150 Acc1992–93/166, Box 6726 – 40, lac. 38 Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 10. Holt argues that the division was poorly prepared but does agree that it acquitted itself well. Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 295. 39 Radley, “First Canadian Division,” 63. 40 Cook, At the Sharp End, 97. 41 Duguid, Canadian Forces, 1:143, 193; Nicholson, CEF , 49–53. 42 Ypres Memoirs, 193?, mg30 E236 v4, Villiers Fonds, lac; Duguid to Edmonds, 18 January 1926, dhs 3–17 (vol. 3), rg24 v1739, lac. 43 Grossen Hauptquartiers Communique, 3 June 1915, mg30 E46 v1, Turner Fonds, lac; Hughes to Duguid, 29 March 1934, hq 683-1-30-5, rg24 v1503, lac. 44 Report on the Operations of the 1st Canadian Division, 13 May 1915, 15/1, rg9 III v4011, lac. 45 Travers, “Currie and 1st Canadian Division”; Edmonds to Duguid, 18 March 1925, dhs 3–17 (vol. 1), rg24 v1739, lac. 46 Extracts from Messages, Reports, etc., Second Battle of Ypres, cab 45/154, tna. 47 J.D.A. Snow to Edmonds, 8 June 1921, rg9 III v5075, lac. 48 Kerry and McDill, Canadian Engineers, 89; Turner Diary, 22 April 1915, cwm; Duguid, Canadian Forces – Appendices, vol. 1, Appendix 334. 49 Edmonds, Military Operations, 1915, 1:161; Duguid, Canadian Forces, 1:199; Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 84. 50 Greenfield, Baptism of Fire, 39; Hughes to Duguid, 29 March 1934, lac; Edmonds, Military Operations, 1915, 1:175. 51 Dixon, Magnificent but Not War, 43. 52 Messenger, Call to Arms, 65; Smith-Dorrien Diary entries, 25 and 27 February 1915, cab 45/206, tna. 53 Humphries, Germany’s Western Front, 72, 160; Trumpener, “Road to Ypres,” 475. 54 Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 95–6; General Staff Intelligence Section, Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions, 499; Humphries, Germany’s Western Front, 164; Nicholson, CEF , 58, 71. 55 Dixon, Magnificent but Not War, 41–2. 56 Powell, Plumer: The Soldier’s General, 116; Snow and Pottle, Confusion of Command, 114. 57 Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 121; MacKinnon, “Major-General Mercer.” 58 Nicholson, CEF , 63. 59 Turner to Hetty, 3 May 1915, docs manu 58A 1 9.17, 19710246-011, cwm. 60 Ypres Memoirs, 193?, lac.

notes to pag es 5 1 – 4

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61 3rd Brigade Message Logs, 22 April 1915, mg30 E46 v1, Turner Fonds, lac. 62 3rd Brigade Message Logs, 6:25 p.m., 6:45 p.m., and 7:10 p.m., 22 April 1915, mg30 E46 v1, Turner Fonds, lac. 63 Duguid, Canadian Forces, 1:225, 229. 64 Greenfield, Baptism of Fire, 81; Dixon, Magnificent but Not War, 48; Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 88. 65 Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 106. 66 Staff Visits to 3rd Brigade, 8-1-10, rg9 III v28, lac. 67 3rd Brigade Logs, 8:25 p.m., 22 April 1915, lac; Duguid, Canadian Forces – Appendices, vol. 1, Appendix 377. 68 Duguid, Canadian Forces – Appendices, vol. 1, Appendices 364, 376. 69 Ibid., Appendix 379. 70 Ibid., Appendix 361. 71 3rd Brigade Logs, 8:52 p.m., 22 April 1915, lac. 72 Duguid, Canadian Forces, 1:236–7. 73 Nicholson, CEF , 66. 74 Sheldon, The German Army on the Western Front 1915, Loc. 2441. 75 Cassar, Hell in Flanders, 131,243; McWilliams, Gas!, 66; Greenfield, Baptism of Fire, 90, 99; Dancocks, Welcome to Flanders Fields, 175. 76 Marteinson, Stand on Guard, 108; Greenfield, Baptism of Fire, 90. 77 An illustration of how unbalanced some of the criticisms were is Cassar’s Hell in Flanders, which notes the lack of scouting. Cassar castigates Turner for not conducting reconnaissance for the attack on Kitcheners Wood, but exonerates Brigadier-General C.P.A. Hull for not doing so before his morning attack on 25 April because it was dark when Hull received his orders. Hull received his orders at 8:00 p.m. for an attack originally planned for 3:00 a.m. In other words, Cassar excuses Hull for not conducting a reconnaissance even though he had orders almost an hour before Turner received his. Cassar, Hell in Flanders, 131, 243. 78 3rd Brigade Logs, 9:40 a.m., 22 April 1915, lac. 79 Pencil Comments, Diary of Operations, 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade, 22 April to 5th May 1915, mg30 E46 v1, Turner Fonds, lac. 80 Currie to May, 11 May 1915, 34, mg4027 C3, Urquhart Fonds, McGill. 81 McWilliams, Gas!, 66. 82 16th Battalion War Diary, 4 and 5 April 1915, rg9 III v4925, lac. 83 Cook, Shock Troops, 460. 84 Duguid, Canadian Forces – Appendices, vol. 1, Appendix 426, 535. 85 War Diary, 3rd Brigade Canadian Field Artillery, 22 April 1915, rg9 III v4966, lac. 86 Operational Order #10, 1st Canadian Division, 24 April 1915, rg9 III v4866, lac. 87 3rd Brigade Logs, 11:50 p.m., 22 April 1915, lac.

290

notes to pa ges 5 4 – 6 0

88 Ibid., 3:50 a.m., 23 April 1915. 89 Hughes to Duguid, 29 March 1934, lac. 90 Humphries, Germany’s Western Front, 162–3; Trumpener, “Road to Ypres,” 478. 91 Humphries, Germany’s Western Front, 164. 92 Beattie, 48th Highlanders, 72–9; Dancocks, Welcome to Flanders Fields, 227. 93 Nicholson, CEF , 71. 94 War Diary, 3rd Brigade Canadian Field Artillery, 22 April 1915, lac; Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, 227. 95 Note on back of letter Creelman to Duguid, undated, mg30 E8 v1, Creelman Fonds, lac; “The Day at the Capital,” Manitoba Free Press, 23 February 1916. 96 3rd Brigade Logs, 6:50 a.m., 24 April 1915, lac. 97 Ibid., 7:00 a.m., 24 April 1915. 98 Ibid., 7:05 a.m., 24 April 1915. 99 Greenfield, Baptism of Fire, 197. 100 Duguid to Edmonds, 17 March 1926, dhs 3-17 (vol. 2), rg24 v1739, lac. 101 Edmonds, Military Operations, 1915, 1:184; Middlebrook, Your Country Needs You, 110. 102 Gordon-Hall to Urquhart, 12 February 1939, 1, mg4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds, McGill. 103 German Statements on Second Ypres, 9 May 1925, cab 45/289, tna. 104 Machine Guns Lost at Ypres, rg24 v6930, lac. 105 3rd Brigade Logs, 11:30 a.m., 24 April 1915, lac. 106 Ibid., 11:53 a.m., 24 April 1915. 107 Duguid, Canadian Forces – Appendices, vol. 1, Appendix 565a. 108 3rd Brigade Logs, 12:20 p.m., 24 April 1915, lac. 109 One additional British medium battery was overrun on 22 April. Buffetaut, Ypres April 22nd 1915, 31; Dixon, Magnificent but Not War, 85. 110 Powell, Plumer: The Soldier’s General, 117. 111 Duguid to Edmonds (undated), dhs 3-17 (vol. 1), rg24 v1739, lac. 112 Some examples of scholars who attribute the retreat to a misunderstanding include Cook, At the Sharp End, 152; McWilliams, Gas!, 122; Nicholson, CEF , 76; Swettenham, To Seize the Victory, 82. Two who attribute it to panic or wilful disobedience, include Greenfield, Baptism of Fire, 254; Cassar, Hell in Flanders, 208. 113 Turner Interview, 14 March 1934, dhh. 114 War Diary, 3rd Brigade Canadian Field Artillery, 24 April 1915, rg9 III v4966, lac. 115 Duguid to Edmonds, 18 January 1926, lac; Turner to Duguid, 20 April and 11 May 1926, dhs 3-17 (vol. 3), rg24 v1739, lac.

notes to pag es 6 0 – 4

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116 Duguid, Canadian Forces – Appendices, vol. 1, Appendix 580; Great Britain, Field Service Regulations. Part I. Operations. 1909 with Amendments 1912, 22. 117 3rd Brigade Logs, 1:40 p.m., 24 April 1915, lac. 118 Gordon-Hall to Urquhart, 12 February 1939, McGill. For example, see Greenfield, Baptism of Fire, 195. 119 3rd Brigade Logs, 6:35 p.m., 11:20 p.m., 24 April 1915, lac; Hughes to Duguid, 29 March 1934, lac. 120 Duguid, Canadian Forces – Appendices, vol. 1, Appendix 600. 121 Snow and Pottle, Confusion of Command, 101. 122 Duguid, Canadian Forces – Appendices, vol. 1, Appendix 631; Nicholson, CEF , 80. 123 Turner Interview, 14 March 1934, dhh. 124 Turner to Hetty, 9 May 1915, cwm; Turner Diary, 23 April 1915, cwm. 125 FM 6-22, 11–8. 126 Snow and Pottle, Confusion of Command, 104; Ryan, “Supplying the Material Battle,” 31. 127 Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 10, 140. 128 Gordon-Hall to Urquhart, 27 January 1938, mg4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds, McGill. 129 3rd Brigade Logs, 11:25 p.m., 22 April 1915, lac. 130 Duguid to Edmonds, 18 May 1925, dhs 3-17 (vol. 1), rg24 v1739, lac. 131 Bryson, “The Once and Future Army,” 52. 132 Nicholson, CEF , 63. 133 3rd Brigade Logs, 22 April 1915, lac. 134 Ypres Battle Description, 1923, mg30 E300 v24, Odlum Fonds, lac. 135 Gordon-Hall to Urquhart, 15 November 1934, mg4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds, McGill. 136 Ypres Memoirs, 193?, lac. 137 Statement of Major E.F. Lynn, mc – Canadian Engineers, 193?, mg30 E75 v2, Urquhart Fonds, lac; Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 154. 138 Ypres Memoirs, 193?, lac; Napier Comments, 193?, 50, mg4027 C3, Urquhart Fonds, McGill. 139 Carson to Hughes, 10 May 1915, 6-H-5, rg9 III v154, lac. 140 Turner Diary, 29 May 1915, cwm; 2nd Division gs War Diary, 27 May 1915, rg9 III v4841, lac. 141 Turner Interview, 14 March 1934, dhh. 142 Duguid, Canadian Forces, 1:236–7. 143 Dixon, Magnificent but Not War, 105. 144 Duguid, Canadian Forces – Appendices, vol. 1, Appendix 497. 145 Staff Visits to 3rd Brigade, lac. 146 Radley, We Lead, Others Follow, 241. 147 Edmonds to Duguid, 18 March 1925, lac.

292

notes to pa ges 6 5 – 7 0

148 149 150 151

3rd Brigade Logs, 11:35 a.m., 24 April 1915, lac. Dancocks, Sir Arthur Currie, 50; Borden, Letters to Limbo, 59. Defence of Ypres account, 1936, 73, 2001/10, Duguid Fonds, dhh. For examples on how other scholars view Currie’s actions, see Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 160; Cook, At the Sharp End, 158; Borys, “Education of a Corps Commander,” 43. Cook, At the Sharp End, 158. Romer Comments, 193?, 7j, mg4027, acc. no. 391, ref. 1–2, Urquhart Fonds, McGill. Cook, At the Sharp End, 164. For instance, see Turner to Hetty, 15 May 1915, cwm. Staff Visits to 3rd Brigade, lac. Duguid to Edmonds, 17 March 1926, lac. Turner to Hetty, 9 May 1915, cwm. Napier Comments, 193?, McGill. Turner to Hetty, 3 May 1915, cwm; ibid., 15 May 1915; Turner Diary, 11 June 1915, cwm. Meier, “Concussion Effects,” email, 22 September 2011. Dr Meier was an associate clinical professor of critical care medicine and surgery and director of the E.G. King Critical Care/Trauma Unit, University of Alberta at the time of the email. Hughes to Borden, 28 May 1915, 31777–9, mg26 H v62, Borden Fonds, lac. Alderson to Perley, 7 July 1915, 31780-95, mg26 H v62, Borden Fonds, lac. Turner Interview, 14 March 1934, dhh; Turner Diary, 16, 23 May 1915, cwm. Turner Interview, 14 March 1934, dhh. Turner to Duguid, 5 February 1937, hq 683-1-30-5, rg24 v1504, lac. Edmonds, Military Operations, 1915, 1:71. Duguid, Canadian Forces, 1:443. Haig Diary, 21 May 1915, Part 1, No. 96, Haig’s “Autograph Great War Diary,” Haig Papers, nls. Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, 97; Radley, We Lead, Others Follow, 130. 1st Division oo #15, 20 May 1915, rg9 III v4824, lac. Haig Diary, 20 May 1915, nls. 1st Division oo #16, 20 May 1915, rg9 III v4824, lac. Turner to Duguid, 5 February 1937, lac. Gordon-Hall to Duguid, 20 March 1937, 120, 2001/10, Duguid Fonds, dhh. Odlum to Duguid, 16 February 1937, mg30 E300 v3, Odlum Fonds, lac. Cook, At the Sharp End, 190.

152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161

162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177

notes to pag es 7 0 – 6 178 179 180 181 182

293

3rd Brigade War Diary, 20 May 1915, rg9 III v4875, lac. Duguid, Canadian Forces, 1:475. Meighen to Carson, 25 May 1915, 6-M-10, rg9 III v174, lac. Haig Diary, 25 May 1915, nls. 2nd Division a&q War Diary, 17 August 1915, rg9 III v4848, lac.

chapter three 1 The battle extended beyond 16 April as the Germans retook several more craters, but the primary aspect of the battle ends on that date. 2 Duguid, Canadian Forces, 1:404. 3 Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 125. 4 Campbell, “The Divisional Experience,” 17. 5 Defence, Quarterly Militia List. 6 French, “51st (Highland) Division,” 41; Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, 297. 7 Simpson, “The Officers,” 73; Samuels, Doctrine and Dogma, 151. 8 Edmonds, Military Operations, 1915, 2:293–4. 9 Carson to Hughes, 23 February 1915, 8-5-10, rg9 III v45, lac; Borden to Hughes, 19 February 1915, 31762, mg26 H v62, Borden Fonds, lac. 10 Hughes to Borden, 25 February 1915, 31763, mg26 H v62, Borden Fonds, lac. 11 Granatstein, Two World Wars, 65. For an uncritical biography of Steele, see Stewart, Sam Steele. 12 Steele was actually sixty-four in 1915. Stewart, Sam Steele, 278. 13 Major-General Sir Samuel Steele file, S-9, mg27 II D9 v161, Kemp Fonds, lac; Command of the 2nd Division, wg/3 – wg/17, pro 30/57/56, Kitchener Papers, tna. 14 Alderson to ams 2 Army, G.271, 18 April 1916, lac. 15 KRO , 1917, para. 93. 16 Turner Diary, 13 July 1915, cwm. 17 Haycock, Sam Hughes, 270–3. 18 Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 40. 19 “Generals Steele and Turner Are Promoted,” Manitoba Free Press, 28 July 1915. 20 2nd Division a&q War Diary, 17 August 1915, lac. 21 Cooper, Fourth Canadian Infantry Brigade, 9; Defence, Quarterly Militia List. 22 Haycock, Sam Hughes, 147; Duguid, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 57; Murray to Aitken, 15 May 1916, 41/2, rg9 III v4688, lac. 23 Steele to Carson, 3 November 1915, 6-L-86, rg9 III v170, lac; Macphail Diary, 14 August 1915, mg30 D150 v4, Macphail Fonds, lac. 24 Carson to Hughes, 6 September 1915, 6-L-86, rg9 III v170, lac. 25 Biography David Watson, 144/10, rg9 III v4734, lac; Brennan, “Major-General David Watson,” 112; Cook, At the Sharp End, 39. 26 Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 40; 2nd Canadian Division

294

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

53 54

notes to pa ges 7 6 – 8 0 Mobilization in Canada, interview by Wm. F. Bradley, 2 March 1916, rg24 v6999, lac; Biography H.D.B. Ketchen, 144/10, rg9 III v4734, lac. 2nd Division gs War Diary, 1 May 1915, rg9 III v4841, lac. Ker Correspondence File, rg9 III v167, lac; Brigadier-General Charles Arthur Ker, C.M.G., D.S.O., 6 August 1918, 12/1, rg9 III v4678, lac. C.A. Ker Service Jacket, rg150 Acc1992-93/166, Box 5109 – 28, lac. Beaupré, “En Route to Flanders Fields,” 47. Observations of Montague relating to Turner taking over 2nd Division, undated, 19710147-015/docs manu 58A 1 9.14, Turner Fonds, cwm. Macphail Diary, 17 August 1915, mg30 D150 v4, Macphail Fonds, lac. 2nd Division gs War Diary, Appendix A, June and July 1915, rg9 III v4841, lac. Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, 307. 2nd Division gs War Diary, 7 and 8 September 1915, rg9 III v4844, lac. Perry, “Politics and Command,” 108. Corrigall, Twentieth Canadian Battalion, 18. Turner to Carson, 9 September 1915, 8-5-8a, rg9 III v43, lac. Cooper, Fourth Canadian Infantry Brigade, 9; Snow and Pottle, Confusion of Command, 84. Turner to Carson, 6 November 1915, 4-5-25, rg9 III v13, lac. 2nd C.I.D. Summary of Operations, 21 September–7 October 1915, 42/1, rg9 III v4098, lac. Watson Diary entries, 23 September to 3 October 1915, mg30 E69 M-10, Watson Fonds, lac. F.F. Montague Comments, 193?, 19710147-015/docs manu 58A 1 9.14, Turner Fonds, cwm. Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches. Ashworth, Live and Let Live, 199; Jones, Underground Warfare, 83. Calder, 28th (Northwest) Battalion, 61; Leed, No Man’s Land, 113. Robb to Carson, 21 October 1915, 8-5-8a, rg9 III v43, lac; Watson Diary, 14 October 1915, mg30 E69 M-10, Watson Fonds, lac. Instruction to 2nd Cdn. Division, G.284, 28 November 1915, 42/1, rg9 III v4098, lac. Snow and Pottle, Confusion of Command, 84, 88. Campbell, “The Divisional Experience,” 75–8. 2nd Cdn Div a&q Circular, 12 December 1915, rg24 v6991, lac. Turner to Carson, 6 November 1915, lac; Turner to Carson, 12 November 1915, 4-2-3, rg9 III v8, lac. For more on unit autonomy in the Militia, see Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 25–6. Turner to Carson, 5 December 1915, 4-2-3, rg9 III v8, lac. Haller, “Trench Foot,” 730.

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55 Turner to Carson, 1 December 1915, 8-5-8b, rg9 III v43, lac. 56 Aitken to Hughes, 28 September 1915, A1764, mg27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds, lac. 57 Carson to Hughes, 29 October 1915, 8-5-8a, rg9 III v43, lac. 58 Biography, Robert Rennie, 144/10, rg9 III v4734, lac. 59 Aitken to Hughes, 26 September 1915, A1764, mg27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds, lac; 2nd Division a&q War Diary, 17 January 1916, rg9 III v4848, lac. 60 Turner to Carson, 1 December 1915, lac; Parsons Diary, 24 November 1915, mg30 E117 v3, Parsons Fonds, lac. 61 Canadian Corps War Diary, 25 September 1916, rg9 III v4813, lac. 62 Perley to Bonar Law, 29 December 1915, 7/6/5, Robertson Fonds, lhcma. 63 Alderson extract, 1 March 1916, 39325-33, mg26 H v74/75, Borden Fonds, lac. 64 Campbell, “The Divisional Experience,” 81. 65 Deductions from recent minor operations, gs.349, 3 February 1916, 42/1, rg9 III v4098, lac; Garnett, “Butcher and Bolt,” 46–9. 66 Jenkins, “Winning Trench Warfare,” 168. 67 Edmonds, Military Operations, 1915, 1:31; Snow and Pottle, Confusion of Command, 87. 68 Robertson to Haig, 7 January 1916, 7/6/10, Robertson Fonds, lhcma. 69 Haig to Robertson, 17 February 1916, 7/6/23, Robertson Fonds, lhcma. 70 Haig Diary, 18 February 1916, nls. 71 Simkins, “Plumer’s Second Army,” 145. 72 Cmts, British Official History (boh), Keith, 3 February 1929, cab 45/130, tna. 73 Jones, Underground Warfare, 103. 74 Turner Comments on British Official History, St Eloi, 1926, dhs 3-17 (vol. 4), rg24 v1739 lac. 75 Cmts, boh, Ker, 1925, cab 45/149, tna. 76 Haldane, A Soldier’s Saga, 323. 77 Official History, draft, vol. II, ch. X, para. 13, rg24 v6992, lac. 78 3rd Division Report to V Corps, 7 April 1916, wo 158/96, tna. 79 Cmts, boh, Harfund, 1 February 1929, cab 45/130, tna. 80 Haldane to V Corps, 4 April 1916, 14/1, rg9 III v4679, lac. 81 3rd Division Report to V Corps, S.206, 30 March 1916, wo 158/96, tna. 82 Summary Report of the Operations at St Eloi – March 27th to April 18th, 1916, wo 158/96, tna. 83 St Eloi Enquiry, wo 158/402, tna.

296

notes to pa ges 8 5 – 9 0

84 Haig Diary, 2 April 1916, nls. 85 Haldane, A Soldier’s Saga, 326; V Corps to Second Army, G.X. 5303/22, 19 April 1916, wo 158/96, tna. 86 Bradley Report, 18 May 1916, 14/1, rg9 III v4679, lac. 87 R.O. Alexander Comments on British Official History, St Eloi, 1929, dhs 3-17 (vol. 4), rg24 v1739 lac; Interview, G. Scott, 29th Battalion, 1962, rg41 v12, lac. 88 Haig Diary, 8 April 1916, nls. 89 Macintyre Diary, 4 April 1916, mg30 E241 v1, D.E. Macintyre Fonds, lac. 90 Turner Comments, boh, St Eloi, lac. 91 Haldane to V Corps, 4 April 1916, lac. 92 Leppard, “Battle of St. Eloi,” 38. 93 Army Commander Principles of Defence for Newly Captured Ground, Proceedings of Corps Commanders Conference, 4 April 1916, 6/11, rg9 III v3827, lac. 94 ghq to 2nd Army, 3 April 1916, rg9 III v3842, lac. 95 General Staff, Consolidation of Trenches. 96 Doyle and Bennett, “Military Geography,” 12. 97 3rd Division Report, tna. 98 Rennie to 2nd Division, 23 April 1916, 41/16, rg9 III v4688, lac; Report on 2nd Canadian Division’s Operations at St Eloi, 18 April 1916, 14/1, rg9 III v4679, lac; Notes on a conversation with Major A. Styles, D.S.O., 18 August 1922, gaq 5-76, rg24 v1826, lac; Haldane to V Corps, 4 April 1916, lac. 99 A.H. Bell Comments, 192?, Scanlon 94, rg24 v1862, lac; Nicholson, CEF , 158. 100 Cmts, boh, Buchanan, 18 February 1929, cab 45/130, tna. 101 Points regarding the operations of March 27th 1916, wo 158/96, tna; Haldane, A Soldier’s Saga, 323. 102 The fight for the Craters, D.E. Macintyre, 1936?, gaq 5-67, rg24 v1825, lac. 103 2nd Division gs War Diary, Summary of Operations, May 7th–May 14th 1916, rg9 III v4843, lac. 104 Nicholson, CEF , 140. 105 Report on 2nd Canadian Division’s operations at St Eloi, 18 April 1916, lac. 106 C.A. Ker Comments on British Official History, St Eloi, 192?, dhs 3-17 (vol. 4), rg24 v1739 lac. 107 Macintyre Diary, 4 April 1916, lac. 108 Notes on a Conversation, lac. 109 Report on 2nd Canadian Division’s Operations at St Eloi, 18 April 1916, lac.

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110 Interview J.M. Fryday and G. Gibson, 27th Bn, 1963, rg41 v11, lac. 111 Report on 2nd Canadian Division’s Operations at St Eloi, 3–16 April, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 112 I. Snider Comments on British Official History, St Eloi, 22 May 1929, dhs 3-17 (vol. 4), rg24 v1739, lac. 113 Ketchen to Aitken, 28 July 1916, 42/14, rg9 III v4688, lac. 114 The Actions at St Eloi Craters, extracts from Ketchen Diary, gaq 5-41, rg24 v1823, lac. 115 28 Bn Report St Eloi, April 3rd to night of April 7th/8th, 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 116 Nicholson, CEF , 142. 117 mg at St Eloi Report, Lieut. S. Brown to O.C. 22nd Battalion, 7 April 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac; Plain Narrative of the St Eloi Defence, comments by Lt Bradley, 17 May 1916, cid-11, rg9 III v4770, lac. 118 2nd Division gs War Diary, Messages Received 6 April, Appendix 159, April 1916, rg9 III v4842, lac. 119 Stewart, “Attack Doctrine,” 99. 120 Bryson, “The Once and Future Army,” 49; Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 163; Graham, Against Odds, 29; Pugsley, “Learning from the Canadian Corps,” 14. 121 Singer, Thirty-First Battalion, 84; Jenkins, “Winning Trench Warfare,” 174. 122 6th cib at St Eloi, Appendix No. 1, 12 April 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 123 Report on 2nd Canadian Division’s operations, lac. 124 2nd Division gs War Diary, Messages Received 6 April, Appendix 159, April 1916, lac. 125 Leppard, “Battle of St. Eloi,” 57, 64. 126 Counterattacks, H. De Pree General Staff, undated, 42/1, rg9 III v4098, lac. 127 Proposal for Retaking St Eloi by 6th cib, 25 June 1916, 43/1, rg9 III v4098, lac. 128 mg at St Eloi Report, Lieut. S. Brown to O.C. 22nd Battalion, 7 April 1916, lac. 129 Watson Diary, 7 April 1916, mg30 E69 M-10, Watson Fonds, lac. 130 Report on 2nd Canadian Division’s Operations, lac. 131 Warning Order from Cdn Corps G.37, 7 April 1916, 42/3, rg9 III v4098, lac. 132 Haig Diary, 8 April 1916, nls. 133 2nd Cdn Division to 4th Brigade G.571, 8 April 1916, rg9 III v4843, lac. 134 Attack on Crater #3, 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 9 April 1916,

298

135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155

156 157 158

159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166

notes to pa g es 9 4 – 1 0 0 42/16, rg9 III v4688, lac; Extract from Report by Major Elmitt, 10 April 1916, 42/16, rg9 III v4688, lac. Canadian Corps Operations, 12 April 1916, rg9 III v4676, lac. Ibid. Ibid. Lt S.A Vernon’s Reconnaissance Report, night 11/12th April, rg9 III v4676, lac. Report by Col. Hilliam, 25th Bn, 12 April 1916, rg9 III v4676, lac. Report on 2nd Canadian Division’s Operations, lac; Robbins, British Generalship, 27. Canadian Corps Operations, 12 April 1916, lac. 2nd Division gs War Diary, 14 April 1916, rg9 III v4842, lac. 2nd Cdn Division G.685, 12 April 1916, mg30 E46 v1, Turner Fonds, lac. Campbell, “Leap in the Dark,” 35. Alderson to Turner; Harrington to Turner, 16 April 1916, mg30 E46 v1, Turner Fonds, lac. Haig Diary, 17 April 1916, nls. Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 72. Nicholson, CEF , 144. 2nd Division a&q War Diary, April and June 1916, rg9 III v4848, lac. Chartrand, Canadian Military Heritage, III, 104. Nicholson, CEF , 92. Dancocks, Sir Arthur Currie, 71. For more on McCay, see Wray, James Whiteside McCay. Faraday, “Half the Battle,” 113; Pugsley, The Anzac Experience, 171, 253. Leppard, “Battle of St. Eloi”; Cook, “Blind Leading the Blind,” 30–1; Leppard, “The Dashing Subaltern,” 26; Swettenham, To Seize the Victory, 103; Cook, At the Sharp End, 323–34. Campbell, “The Divisional Experience,” 130. Campbell, “Leap in the Dark,” 40. Report of Capt D.E. Macintyre, Staff Captain, 6 Canadian Infantry Brigade to goc 2nd Canadian Division, 9 April 1916, mg30 E46 v1, Turner Fonds, lac. Jenkins, “Winning Trench Warfare,” 175. Nicholson, CEF , 142. Beach, “British Intelligence,” 76. Campbell, “Leap in the Dark,” 40. Ibid., 38. Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, 398–401. McPherson, “American Victory, American Defeat,” 19. Report on Operations of Artillery of Canadian Corps – June 2nd to June 14th, 1916, War Diary gocra, June 1916, rg9 III v4957, lac.

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167 V Corps Report on the Operations at St Eloi –March 27th, 1916, wo 158/96, tna; 2nd Division gs.721, 7 May 1916, rg9 III v3859, lac; Haig Diary, 6 April 1916, nls. 168 2nd Division gs.721, 7 May 1916, lac. 169 Leppard, “Battle of St. Eloi,” 47. 170 Plain Narrative, lac. 171 Can. Corps Summary of Operations, 1st April–21st April 1916, mg30 E46 v1, Turner Fonds, lac. 172 Brown, British Logistics, 109. 173 Official History, Draft, vol. 2, ch. 7, rg24 v6992, lac. 174 Report on Operations of Artillery of Canadian Corps, lac. 175 Aitken to Borden, 17 April 1916, 112840, mg26 H v202, Borden Fonds, lac. 176 Notes on a Conversation, lac. 177 2nd Division St Eloi Defensive Scheme, G.S. 577, 4 April 1916, 42/3, rg9 III v4098, lac. 178 Fight for the Craters, lac. 179 Report of 5th cib, 11–18 April 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 180 Report on Operations of Canadian Corps, July 1916, 6/1, rg9 III v4677, lac. 181 Report on Signal Service from the Night of April 3rd to the Morning of April 7th, 1916, 5/3, rg9 III v4442, lac. 182 Bradley Report, 18 May 1916, lac. 183 Report on Action of 2nd Canadian Division Scouts for April 6th to April 12th, 1916, mg30 E46 v1, Turner Fonds, lac. 184 Snow and Pottle, Confusion of Command, 87; Jones, Underground Warfare, 80. 185 Turner Diary, 8 October 1916, cwm. 186 Interview with General Burstall, hq 650-52-7 v5 f.133, rg24 v6990, lac. 187 Ashworth, Live and Let Live; Sheffield, “Consent and Evade,” interview, 12 March 2012. 188 Plain Narrative, lac. 189 Alderson to ams 2 Army, G.271, 18 April 1916, lac. 190 See references in the following section. 3rd Division Report S.206, tna; 3rd Division Report, tna. 191 Holmes, Tommy, 218. 192 For one explanation, see Travers, “Hidden Army.” 193 Snider Correspondence File, rg9 III v218, lac; Brennan, “Good Men for a Hard Job,” 7. 194 Interview with Graham Pain and V.C.H. Pinkham, 27th Battalion, rg41 v11, lac. 195 2nd Division a&q War Diary, 15 April 1916, rg9 III v4848, lac.

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196 Report to 2nd Army, Canadian Corps G.265, 18 April 1916, rg9 III v3842, lac. 197 Alderson to Second Army G.284, 18 April 1916, wo 158/296, tna. 198 Ibid. 199 Campbell, “The Divisional Experience,” 132. 200 Alderson to Second Army G.271, 18 April 1916, wo 158/296, tna. 201 Haig Diary, 21 April 1916, nls. 202 Turner to Canadian Corps, 19 April 1916, rg9 III v3842, lac. 203 Unsigned [Sims] to Aitken, 17 April 1916, rg9 III v4676, lac. 204 Aitken to Hughes, 20 April 1916, A1764, mg27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds, lac. 205 Aitken to Borden, 15 December 1916 [misdated, should be 1915], v5/1, mg27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds, lac. 206 Willson, Quebec to Picadilly, 213. 207 Haig Diary, 21 April 1916, nls. 208 Ketchen to 2nd Division, G.284, 22 April 1916, 42/14, rg9 III v4688, lac. 209 Ketchen to Rogers, 24 April 1916, 31815-7, mg26 H v62, Borden Fonds, lac. 210 MacDougall to Aitken, 19 April 1916, 6-Mc-153, rg9 III v184, lac; Hughes to Aitken, 21 April 1916, A1764, mg27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds, lac. 211 Turner to Aitken, 24 April 1916, rg9 III v4676, lac. 212 Unsigned to Aitken, 25 April 1916, A1765, mg27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds, lac. 213 W. Hughes to Turner, 24 January 1919, mg30 E46 v11, Turner Fonds, lac; William Hughes Service Jacket, rg150 Acc92-93 v4601, lac. 214 Morrison to Carson, 25 April 1916, 6-M-181, rg9 III v176, lac. 215 Haig Diary, 23 April 1916, nls; Willson, Quebec to Picadilly, 216. 216 Travers, “Hidden Army,” 533. 217 Cable extract Aitken to Borden, 26 April 1916, 31808, mg26 H v62, Borden Fonds, lac. 218 Haig Diary, 23 April 1916, nls. 219 Alderson to Borden, 12 July 1916, 31825, mg26 H v62, Borden Fonds, lac. 220 2nd Division a&q War Diary, 28 May 1916, rg9 III v4848, lac. 221 Carson to Aitken, 11 July 1916, 8-1-87c, rg9 III v34, lac; Steele to cigs, 4 September 1916, 8-5-10f, rg9 III v45, lac. 222 Alderson to Carson, 21 September 1916, 8-1-122, rg9 III v36, lac. 223 Aitken to Turner, 27 April 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 224 Turner to Carson, 5 May 1916, 4-5-13b, rg9 III v12, lac. 225 Turner Comments on boh St Eloi, lac. 226 Turner to Hetty, 16 September 1916, docs manu 58A 1 9.17, 19710246-011, cwm.

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227 Turner Interview, 14 March 1934, dhh. 228 Ibid. 229 Alderson to Turner, 5 June 1917, docs manu 58A 1 9.6, 19710147007, Turner Fonds, cwm. 230 2nd Division a&q War Diary, 24 May 1916, rg9 III v4848, lac; Brigadier-General Ker, lac. 231 Ker Correspondence File, lac. 232 Harington to 2nd Canadian Division G.650, 2 May 1916, rg9 III v4843, lac. 233 Biography of Norman William Webber, 144/10, rg9 III v4734, lac. 234 Turner Interview, 14 March 1934, dhh. 235 McAvity Correspondence Files, 6-Mc-284, rg9 III v186, lac. 236 Wigle Correspondence File, 6-W-204, rg9 III v234, lac. 237 McLaren Correspondence Files, 6-Mc-169, rg9 III v186, lac. 238 2nd Division a&q War Diary, 17 July 1916, rg9 III v4848, lac. 239 Cmts, boh, Haldane, 28 July 1929, cab 45/130, tna. 240 Travers, Killing Ground, 23. 241 Travers, “Hidden Army,” 528, 535. 242 Headlam et al., Cuthbert Headlam Papers, 116, 117, 121. 243 Simkins, “Plumer’s Second Army,” 146. 244 Perley to Borden, 26 or 27 April 1916, v5/3, mg27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds, lac. 245 Alderson to Second Army G.271, 18 April 1916, tna. 246 Phillips, The Ross Rifle Story, 33; Haycock, “Damned Ross Rifle,” 53–6. 247 Dundonald, My Army Life, 204. 248 Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 41; Haycock, “Damned Ross Rifle,” 49–52. 249 Turner to Carson, 28 March 1916, 6-M-188, rg9 III v176, lac; Turner to Carson, 29 March 1916, 4-5-13b, rg9 III v12, lac; Report on Test of Ross Rifle, 16 October 1915, 2/4, rg9 III v4083, lac; 2nd Canadian Division, ro 1313, 21 October 1915, rg9 III v3789, lac. 250 Campbell, “The Divisional Experience,” 155; Turner to Carson, 5 May 1916, lac. 251 Carson to Hughes, 31 August 1915, 4-5-13b, rg9 III v12, lac. 252 Haycock, Sam Hughes, 250. 253 2nd Division a&q War Diary, May 1916, rg9 III v4848, lac. 254 Campbell, “The Divisional Experience,” 148. 255 Gibsone to Duguid, 22 October 1932, hq 683-1-30-1, rg24 v1502, lac; Sims to Aitken, 9 May 1916, A1765, mg27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds, lac. 256 Turner to Duguid, 9 September 1933, hq 683-1-30-1, rg24 v1502, lac. 257 2nd Division a&q War Diary, 31 July 1916, rg9 III v4848, lac; Haig Diary, 21 June 1916, nls. 258 Turner to Carson, 14 March 1916, 4-5-14b, rg9 III-A-1 v12, lac.

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7 8 9 10 11 12

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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

notes to pa g es 1 1 4 – 1 9 chapter four Turner Diary, 22 September 1916, cwm. Robbins, British Generalship, 25. Campbell, “Forgotten Victory.” Duffy, Through German Eyes, 51. Nichol, Ordinary Heroes, 70. Sims to Aitken, 16 June 1916, A1765, mg27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds, lac; Maj-Gen Chichester da & qmg to Cdn Corps, 28 April 1916, 1/8, rg9 III v4118, lac; Harington to 2nd Canadian Division, G.305, 20 April 1916, rg24 v6992, lac. Francis Davie Military Secretary to Carson, 8 June 1916, 8-5-8F, rg9 III v44, lac. Turner to Carson, 23 March 1916, 8-1-70, rg9 III v31, lac. Carson to Aitken, 9 June 1916, 8-5-8F, rg9 III v44, lac. Carson to Turner, 12 June 1916, 8-5-8F, rg9 III v44, lac. Turner to Carson, 15 June 1916, rg9 III v154, lac. 2nd Division a&q War Diary, 14 July 1916, rg9 III v4848, lac; Watson to Perley, 26 November 1916, v7/3, mg27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds, lac. W. Hughes to Turner, 24 January 1919, lac; Return of officers who have served overseas with no employment available, ag 1a 7-3-18, 0-7633 v1, rg9 III v2885, lac. 2nd Division a&q War Diary, 17 April 1916, rg9 III v4848, lac. Defence, Quarterly Militia List, 11, 413. Biography, A.H. Macdonell, 144/10, rg9 III v4734, lac. Turner to Carson, 15 April 1916, 6-R-13, rg9 III v205, lac. Turner to Carson, 21 August 1916, 6-E-45, rg9 III v142, lac. Calder, 28th (Northwest) Battalion, 68. 6th Brigade War Diary, 6 June 1916, rg9 III v4888, lac; Calder, 28th (Northwest) Battalion, 72. Campbell, “The Divisional Experience,” 158–9. Fetherstonhaugh, 24th Battalion, 70. 2nd Canadian Division, ro 2642, 10 August 1916, rg9 III v3789, lac. 2nd Division gs War Diary, 2 and 8 August 1916, rg9 III v4844, lac. F.F. Montague Comments, 193?, cwm. Williams, Byng of Vimy, 4–6. Ibid.; Oxford, Sir Julian Byng. Cook, At the Sharp End, 345. Radley, We Lead, Others Follow, 160; Haig Diary, 23 June 1916, nls. For more on Byng, see Brennan, “Byng and Leadership in the Canadian Corps.” Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 154. For multiple examples, see rg9 III v109-240, lac.

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33 Sims to Aitken, 8 June 1916, A1765, mg27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds, lac. 34 Raids, gs 1096, 6 August 1916, 43/1, rg9 III v4098, lac. 35 Campbell, “The Divisional Experience,” 168–9. 36 Cook, Shock Troops, 61. For a favourable assessment of raiding, see Garnett, “Butcher and Bolt.” 37 Notes on fighting in Somme, 21 August 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 38 Sheffield, “Army Commander on the Somme,” 84; Beckett, “Command on the Western Front,” 7–8. 39 Robbins, British Generalship, 34. 40 Sheffield, “Army Commander on the Somme,” 82–3. 41 Bryson, “The Once and Future Army,” 48. 42 Notes on fighting in Somme, 21 August 1916, lac. 43 Handwritten notes on lessons from Somme, undated, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 44 Turner Diary, 26 August 1916, cwm. 45 2nd Canadian Division G.930, 25 August 1916, 46/1, rg9 III v4114, lac. 46 Strachan, “Training, Morale and Modern War,” 216. 47 Calder, 28th (Northwest) Battalion, 85. 48 Campbell, “Forgotten Victory,” 28. 49 Men of Valour, Macintyre, p. 77, mg30 E241 v2, Macintyre Fonds, lac. 50 Mcintrye Hood Interview, transcript 76/169/1, iwm, 8. 51 Humphries, “Myth of the Learning Curve.” See also Griffith, Battle Tactics, 26, 62. 52 Notes on fighting in Somme, 21 August 1916, lac. 53 English, “Perspectives on Infantry”; Handwritten notes, lac. 54 Marble, “Place of Artillery in the bef,” 45. 55 Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 114. 56 Nicholson, CEF , 167. 57 Sheffield, The Chief, 189; Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, 217–19. 58 Travers, Killing Ground, 178–84. 59 Millar, “General Sir William Birdwood,” 141. 60 Canadian Corps War Diary, Summary of Intelligence, 13 September 1916, rg9 III v4813, lac. 61 Doyle and Bennett, “Military Geography,” 14. 62 Handwritten notes, lac; A.A.&Q.M.G. Branch – 2nd Canadian Division Report – Operations in the Somme, September 12th to 18th, 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 63 Reed, Courcelette, 130. Paul Reed lived in the village, so was aware of the local stories.

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64 Narrative of the Enemy’s Side I. Battles of the Somme 1916, War Narrative Section cef, July 1920, mg30 E40, Erlebach Fonds, lac; General Staff Intelligence Section, Two Hundred and Fifty-one Divisions, 465. 65 Reserve Army Preliminary Operations Order, 8 September 1916, rg9 III v5069, lac. 66 2nd cid Preliminary Orders gs.1166, 8 September 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 67 2nd cid Orders gs.1174, 11 September 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 68 Childs, “British Tanks 1915–1918,” 147–8; Hart, The Somme, 371; Pidgeon, The Tanks at Flers, 126–8; Hammond, “Tank Cooperation,” 60–8. 69 Canadian Corps Operational Order No. 46, 13 September 1916, 30/1, rg9 III v4093, lac. 70 Canadian Corps Order G.612, 6 September 1916, 43/2, rg9 III v4098, lac; Travers, Killing Ground, 78. 71 Hammond, “Tank Cooperation,” 59. 72 2nd Canadian Division G.345, 19 September 1916, 107/8, rg9 III v3867, lac; Campbell, Band of Brigands, 170. 73 2nd Canadian Division Operation Order No. 78, 14 September 1916, 6/3, rg9 III v4677, lac. 74 Notes for Army Conference, 14 September 1916, 43/13, rg9 III v3842, lac. 75 Macphail and Canada, Medical Services, 89. 76 Edmonds, Military Operations, 1916, 2:294; Campbell, “Forgotten Victory,” 31. 77 Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, 233; Report on Operations of Artillery of Canadian Corps, lac. 78 Griffith, Battle Tactics, 10. 79 Nicholson, CEF , 319. 80 Bailey, “British Artillery,” 25. 81 Untitled (6th Brigade Report on Courcelette), 9 October 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 82 Operations of 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade at the Somme, September 10th to 17th, 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac; 6 cib Report of Operations, September 15th, 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 83 Translation of a German Document, 4th Brigade War Diary, September 1916, rg9 III v4880, lac. 84 4th Canadian Brigade, Somme, lac; Corrigall, Twentieth Canadian Battalion, 80. 85 R.E.W. Turner Comments boh, dhs 3-17 (vol. 5), rg24 v1739, lac. 86 Cook, At the Sharp End, 449.

notes to pag es 1 3 0 – 5 87 88 89 90 91 92 93

94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121

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21st Battalion War Diary, 15 September 1916, rg9 III v4930, lac. 6 cib Report of Operations, lac. 4th Canadian Brigade, Somme, lac. 6 cib Report of Operations, lac. Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, 97. Duffy, Through German Eyes, 218. Summary of Operations of 2nd Canadian Division, September 15th and 16th, 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac; 2nd Division gs War Diary, 15 September 1916, rg9 III v4844, lac. 2nd Division gs War Diary, 15 September 1916, lac. 6th Brigade Report, Courcelette, lac. 4th Canadian Brigade, Somme, lac. Philpott, Bloody Victory, 366. Turner to Hetty, 16 September 1916, cwm. 5th cib Operations Report B.M.L. 216, 20 September 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. Ibid.; Bernier, The Royal 22e Regiment, 48. Nicholson, CEF , 171. Passingham, All the Kaiser’s Men, 123. Narrative of the enemy’s side, lac. A.A.&Q.M.G. Branch, lac. Ibid. Hodges, “British Infantry and Atrocities,” 7. Turner to Hetty, 16 September 1916, cwm. 4th Canadian Brigade, Somme, lac. Attack on the Somme – 15th and 16th September 1916, Cattermole, 92/26/1, iwm. Hodges, “British Infantry and Atrocities,” 6. Hewgill Diary, 16 September 1916, mg30 E16 v1, Hewgill Fonds, lac; A.A.&Q.M.G. Branch, lac; Narrative of the Enemy’s Side, lac. Cook, At the Sharp End, 451. Griffith, Battle Tactics, 72. Cook, “Politics of Surrender,” 652; Hodges, “British Infantry and Atrocities,” 37. Pidgeon, The Tanks at Flers, 128–30. 2nd Canadian Division G.345, 19 September 1916, lac. Calder, 28th (Northwest) Battalion, 94–9; Corrigall, Twentieth Canadian Battalion, 83. Turner Diary, 22 September 1916, cwm. 6th Brigade Report, Courcelette, lac. Lessons from the Somme 2nd cid 2.C.D.-G.S.1254, 25 November 1916, 20/5, rg9 III v4089, lac. Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, 182.

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122 2nd Division gs War Diary, 15 September 1916, lac. 123 Information Improvements Needed, 2nd Canadian Division G.379, 21 September 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 124 Ketchen to Carson, 16 September 1916, 6-K-38, rg9 III v167, lac. 125 Turner Diary, 17 September 1916, cwm. 126 Harington to Turner, 17 September 1916, docs manu 58A 1 9.6, 19710147-007, Turner Fonds, cwm. 127 Campbell, “Forgotten Victory,” 44. 128 Haig Diary, 15 September 1916, nls. 129 Rennie to Turner, 20 August 1938, gaq 5-82, rg24 v1826, lac. 130 For more on wastage, see Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 417–21. 131 Casualties and Reinforcements, Appendix 493, 2nd Division gs War Diary, October 1916, rg9 III v4844, lac. 132 Operation Order No. 55, Canadian Corps War Diary, Appendix II/18, September 1916, rg9 III v4813, lac. 133 Canadian Corps War Diary, 26 September 1916, rg9 III v4813, lac. 134 Hewgill Diary, 25 September 1916, lac. 135 Operational Order No. 83, 2nd Division gs War Diary, Appendix 433, 24 September 1916, rg9 III v4844, lac. 136 Singer, Thirty-First Battalion, 163. 137 H.D.B. Ketchen Comments, boh, 193?, dhs 3-17 (vol. 5), rg24 v1739, lac. 138 6th Brigade Report, C.241, 30 September 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 139 Hewgill Diary, 27 September 1916, lac. 140 Canadian Corps War Diary, 26 September 1916, lac; Canadian Corps War Diary, 27 September 1916, rg9 III v4813, lac. 141 Canadian Corps War Diary, 27 September 1916, lac. 142 H.D.B. Ketchen Comments, boh, 193?, lac. 143 5th cib Operations Report, Night of 26/27 September to Night of 1/2 October, B.M.L. 330, 7 October 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 144 Turner Diary, 27/28 September 1916, cwm. 145 Lessons from the Somme, lac. 146 Canadian Corps War Diary, 28 September 1916, rg9 III v4813, lac. 147 Macintyre Diary, 26 September 1916, mg30 E241 v1, D.E. Macintyre Fonds; lac. On the impact of visits, see Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, 98. 148 Turner Diary, 28 September 1916, cwm. 149 Ibid., 30 September 1916. 150 2nd Division gs War Diary, 28 and 29 September 1916, rg9 III v4844, lac. 151 Reserve Army Order, S.G.21/0/51, 28 September 1916, App. I/1 Canadian Corps War Diary, October 1916 rg9 III v4813, lac.

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152 2nd Division Operational Order No. 84, 30 September 1916, 30/3, rg9 III v4093, lac. 153 Captain Macintyre’s Report, 2 October 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 154 Beach, “British Intelligence,” 176–7. 155 Narrative of the Enemy’s Side, lac. 156 5th cib Operations Report, lac. 157 Report of 22nd (French-Canadian) Battalion, 17 October 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 158 Field Message, Hilliam to 5th Brigade, 12:30 p.m., 30 September 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 159 5th Brigade, B.M. 357, 30 September 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 160 2nd Division gs War Diary, 1 October 1916, rg9 III v4844, lac. 161 Ibid. 162 Macintyre Diary, 1 October 1916, lac. 163 Nicholson, CEF , 178. 164 Haig Diary, 25 September 1916, nls. 165 Beach, “British Intelligence,” 178. 166 Turner Diary, 7 October 1916, cwm. 167 Reserve Army Order, S.G.21/0/51, lac. 168 Simkins, “Plumer’s Second Army,” 85. 169 Operations of 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade at the Somme, September 25th to October 4th, 1916, mg30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds, lac. 170 Haig Diary, 2 October 1916, nls. 171 5th cib Operations Report, lac. 172 Dagenais, “Une Permission!,” 22. 173 Godefroy, For Freedom and Honour?, 41–6. 174 Ibid., 38. 175 Campbell, “The Divisional Experience,” 217. 176 Ibid., 232. 177 Turner Diary, 30 September 1916, cwm. 178 Summary of Operations of 2nd Canadian Division, lac. 179 Lessons from the Somme, lac. 180 Evidence of Court of Inquiry Held at Bouzincourt on 11 October 1916, mg30 E100 v35, Currie Fonds, lac. 181 Griffith, Battle Tactics, 74–5. 182 Haig Diary, 28 October 1916, nls. 183 For more on the experience of Canadian combat commanders on the Somme, see Stewart, “Byng Boys.” 184 6th Brigade Operational Order No. 110, App. 6, 14 September 1916, rg9 III v4888, lac. 185 Simpson, Directing Operations, xvi–xvii.

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186 Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 19. For a different perspective of ethos versus doctrine, see Palazzo, Seeking Victory, 11–17. 187 Mallett, “Interplay between Technology,” 3. 188 Jones, From Boer War to World War, 51. 189 Sheffield, “Army Commander on the Somme,” 84. 190 Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 206–7. 191 5th cib Operations Report, lac; Report on Operations – 24th Canadian Battalion Victoria Rifles of Canada, October 1st 1916, 53/8, rg9 III v4693, lac. 192 Bradbeer, “British Air Campaign,” 243; Wise, Canadian Airmen, 1:386. 193 Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, 90. 194 Griffith, Battle Tactics, 66–7. 195 Reply to Corps Questionnaire – 3rd Division, November 1916, 45/6, rg9 III v3843, lac; Lessons from the Somme, Lahore Artillery, November 1916, 20/5, rg9 III v4089, lac; Senior Officers‘ Conference, 19 December 1916, 1/10, rg9 III v4023, lac. 196 Thanks to Aaron Miedema for identifying this version of the report. Unredacted version, Finding of Court of Inquiry at Bouzincourt, 17/4, rg9 III v4011, lac. chapter five 1 Cicero, De Officiis, B1 xxii 76. 2 Haycock, Sam Hughes, 258. 3 For another perspective, see Millett and Murray, Military Effectiveness, 1:1–27. 4 Haycock, Sam Hughes, 267. 5 Biography, J.W. Carson, rg24 v6930, lac; Connaught to Kitchener, 31 May 1915, wg/41, pro 30/57/56, Kitchener Papers, tna; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 32–3, 71; Macphail Diary, 9 February 1916, mg30 D150 v4, Macphail Fonds, lac. 6 Meighen to Duguid, 23 November 1936, hq 683-1-30-5, rg24 v1503, lac. 7 Borden to Perley, 17 March 1916, mg27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds, lac. 8 Hughes to Carson, 14 October 1916, 8-1-7b, 9/52, rg9 III v52, lac. 9 Maj. Macfarland a/dag to Carson, 17 October 1916, 8-1-7b, 9/52, rg9 III v52, lac; Outstanding Reinforcements, 8 November 1916, 8-1-7b, 9/52, rg9 III v52, lac. 10 Steele to Carson, 4 May 1916, 8-5-10d rg9 III v45, lac; Visit to France of Dep. Min. asmc, 3 November 1916, rg9 III v107, lac; Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 298, 551. 11 Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 500. 12 Inquiry Held at Bouzincourt, lac; Response to Cdn Corps G.837, 12 October 1916, mg30 E100 v35, Currie Fonds, lac.

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13 Pugsley, The Anzac Experience, 171, 253; Holmes, Tommy, 381; Hodges, “British Infantry and Atrocities,” 83. 14 Lessard Report, May 1916, gaq 10-39, rg24 v1840, lac; Notes on Canadian Training Division, Shorncliffe, 6 June 1916, 8-5-10e, rg9 III v45, lac; Summary of General Conditions Which Existed prior to Assumption of Command by Major-General R.E.W. Turner, 23 February 1917, mg30 E46 v6, Turner Fonds, lac. 15 Notes on Canadian Training Division, lac. Holt suggests that the authorities did not act on this proposal, but the referenced report indicates they did. Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 497–8. 16 Lessard Report, lac; Summary of General Conditions, lac. 17 Report on Canadian Clothing, Equipment and Supplies for Canadian Overseas Forces, 20 February 1917, Q-3, mg27 II D9 v157, Kemp Fonds, lac; Appleton to oc 11 Cdn Training Reserve Brigade, 31 December 1915, E-60-1, rg9 III v418, lac. 18 H.N. Anley to Carson, 25 February 1916, rg9 III v622, lac. 19 Whigham to Aitken, 25 June 1916, A1765, mg27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds, lac. 20 Haig Diary, 23 June 1916, nls. 21 Williams, Byng of Vimy, 130. 22 Steele to MacDougall, 30 December 1915, rg9 III v622, lac; Carson to MacDougall, 21 January 1916, 8-5-10c, rg9 III v45, lac. 23 MacDougall to Carson, 21 January 1916, 8-1-87a, rg9 III v34, lac. 24 Alderson to Carson, August 29 1916, 8-5-8H, rg9 III v44, lac; Summary of General Conditions, lac; Canadian Military School, undated, S-7-36 v2, rg9 III v3101, lac. 25 Steele to MacDougall, 4 September 1916, 8-5-10f, rg9 III v45, lac. 26 Campbell, “The Divisional Experience,” 165. 27 Canadian Signalling School, 1 December 1918, 113/5, rg9 III v4718, lac. 28 Major Macfarlane to Sec. Dept Militia and Defence, 24 June 1916, 8-58G, rg9 III v44, lac; Summary of General Conditions, lac; Maunsell to a/cgs, 10 December 1916, M-29-33 v13, rg9 III v3092, lac; Lindsay Report, 16 May 1916, 8-5-8E, rg9 III v44, lac; Steele to Carson, 17 July 1916, 8-5-10e, rg9 III v45, lac. 29 121/Overseas/2047. (S.D.3), dcigs to Carson, 27 May 1916, 11, 74/672 Box 3, dhh. 30 Bailey, “British Artillery,” 26. 31 Evans, “British Artillery Fire Control, World War 1 – 1914–18.” 32 Currie to Carson, December 1915, 8-7-1, rg9 III v52, lac. 33 Steele to MacDougall, 30 December 1915, lac. 34 Report to goc Cdn. Training Division, Shorncliffe, 9 December 1915, mg30 E81 v4, Morrison Fonds, lac.

310

notes to pa ges 1 5 6– 8

35 Report on Canadian Machine Gun Depot, 17 November 1916, 34/2, rg9 III v3937, lac. 36 Grafton, Emma Gees, 73; Summary of General Conditions, lac; McDonald to Turner, 1 January 1917, rg9 III v3109, lac. 37 For more on problems with the management of returned wounded, see Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 485–6. 38 Canadian Casualty Assembly Centre, 20 April 1939, gaq 11-11c, rg24 v1844, lac; Willson, Quebec to Picadilly, 206; Points Which Might Be Improved, undated (A Branch), 103/6, rg9 III v3866, lac; Perley to Borden, 27 November 1916, v7/1, mg27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds, lac. 39 asmc Minutes, 6 Oct 1916, rg9 III v107, lac; Reid to hq ctd Shorncliffe, 6 June 1916, 7-6-16, rg9 III v25, lac; Reid to Carson, 6 March 1916, 7-6-10, rg9 III v25, lac; Report on Canadian Army Medical Training School, 2 January 1917, R-160-2, rg9 III v806, lac; Haycock, Sam Hughes, 313. For a more favourable view, see Gomille, “The Bruce Report.” 40 Borden, Letters to Limbo, 148. 41 Confidential Report on Chaplain Service, 31 March 1917, rg9 III v104, lac; Crerar, Padres in No Man’s Land, 16:50–8. 42 Confidential Report on Chaplain Service, 31 March 1917, lac; John Simms Principal Chaplain to Perley, 30 April 1917, 10, mg27 II D9 v118, Kemp Fonds, lac. The British service had its own problems: see Brown, “Army Chaplains,” 27. 43 First Progress Report Quartermaster-General’s Branch Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 20 February 1917, Q-3, mg27 II D9 v157, Kemp Fonds, lac; McRae qmg to Perley, 12 March 1917, 10-8-20, rg9 III v74, lac; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 64. 44 Report on Canadian Clothing, lac. 45 Steele to Carson, 28 August 1915, 8-5-10a, rg9 III v45, lac; Willson, Quebec to Picadilly, 202. 46 Perley to Kemp, 12 March 1917, 10-M-23, rg9 III v298, lac. 47 Holmes, Tommy, 587. 48 Odlum to Carson, 29 March 1916, 8-1-70, rg9 III v31, lac; Carson to Dodds, 24 August 1915, 8-5-8, rg9 III v44, lac. For more on the impact of political influence on promotions for Canadian combat commanders on the Somme, see Stewart, “Byng Boys.” 49 Galbraith File, 6-G-17, rg9 III v148, lac. 50 Lt-Col. C.H. Rogers to Carson, 16 March 1916, 8-1-71, rg9 III v31, lac. 51 Messenger, Call to Arms, 474. 52 Kang, “The British Infantry Officer on the Western Front,” 353. 53 Aitken to Hughes, 20 September 1915, A1764, mg27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds, lac.

notes to pag es 1 5 9 – 6 2

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54 Carson to Aitken, 9 June 1916, lac; Adj.-General Canadian Militia to Carson, 5 November 1915, 6-Mc-85, rg9 III v183, lac; Aitken to Hughes, 28 September 1915, lac. 55 Urquhart, Arthur Currie, 136. 56 Haycock, Sam Hughes, 155; KRO , 1917, para. 424. 57 Perley to Borden, 2 January 1917, rg9 III v73, lac; dwb Spry to hq ctd, 18 July 1916, 8-5-8G, rg9 III v44, lac. 58 Steele to Carson, 25 July 1916, 8-5-10e, rg9 III v45, lac; Steele to Carson, 21 July 1916, 8-5-10e, rg9 III v45, lac. 59 Perley to gg in Council, 3 January 1917, rg9 III v90, lac. 60 Report on the Work of Assistant Military Secretary’s Branch since Organization, 4 May 1917, mg30 E46 v7, Turner Fonds, lac. 61 Gow to Secretary War Office, Min. 10-12-2, 13 March 1917, 10-8-7 v1, rg9 III v72, lac. 62 Harris, Canadian Brass, 87; Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 39–62. 63 Harris, Canadian Brass, 111; Haycock, Sam Hughes, 188; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 42. 64 English, Decline of Politics, 17–19. 65 Brown, Borden, 2:6. 66 Carson to ctd, Shorncliffe, 23 November 1916, E-4-2 v1A, rg9 III v694, lac. 67 Hughes to Borden, 15 August 1916, 77912, mg26 H1 v146, Borden Fonds, lac; asmc to Minister, 13 October 16, rg9 III v107, lac; Robertson to Haig, 28 September 1916, 7/6/68, Robertson Fonds, lhcma. 68 Paul Maroney argues that a centralized approach was not necessarily superior given the localized nature of Canadian society. Maroney, “The Great Adventure,” 74. 69 For more on the issue of recruiting in Canada, see Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” ch. 3. 70 Ibid., 443. 71 Carson to Steele, 16 October 1916, 8-1-87c, rg9 III v34, lac; White to Borden, 11 November 1916, 39205, mg26 H v74/75, Borden Fonds, lac; Surplus Officers as of 24 November 1916, O-35-33, rg9 III v2882, lac; nco Numbers in Training Units, Minutes asmc, 16 October 1916, rg9 III v107, lac. 72 Staff Captain ctd to dag, 10 October 1916, rg9 III v2938, lac. 73 For the health of Steele and MacDougall, see Macphail and Canada, Medical Services, 46. For examples of Steele’s predilection for intrigue, see Steele to Perley, 18 November 1916, rg9 III v74, lac; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 72. 74 Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 42. 75 Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 489.

312

notes to pa ges 1 6 2– 4

76 Alderson to Carson, 4 December 1915, 8-5-10b, rg9 III v45, lac. 77 Carson to Hughes, 25 January 1916, 8-5-10c, rg9 III v45, lac; Watson to Carson, 16 February 1916, 6-W-4, rg9 III v231, lac. 78 Steele to Carson, 25 July 1916, 8-5-10e, rg9 III v45, lac; Carson to Steele, 17 July 1916, 8-5-10e, rg9 III v45, lac; MacDougall to Carson, 23 June 1916, 8-5-10e, rg9 III v45, lac; Carson to Currie, 14 December 1915, 8-5-10b, rg9 III v45, lac. 79 Currie to Carson, 21 January 1916, 8-5-10c, rg9 III v45, lac. 80 Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 287. 81 Clarke, “Unwanted Warriors,” 139. 82 Inefficient and Medically Unfit Soldiers Arriving from Canada, 3 July 1916, I-24-1, rg9 III v447, lac; Statement of Medical Fitness of Troops Who Arrive in England during October 1916, 10-12-15, rg9 III v90, lac; Minutes asmc, 27 October 1916, rg9 III v107, lac. 83 Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 163. 84 Proposed Training Reorganization, Col. Reid to Carson, 24 July 1916, 8-5-10f, rg9 III v45, lac; Summary of General Conditions, lac. 85 Proposed Training Reorganization, lac; Carson to Hughes, 15 December 1915, rg9 III v30, lac; Gwatkin Notes, 11 March 1916, 31737-8, mg26 H v62, Borden Fonds, lac. 86 Watson to Carson, 16 February 1916, lac. 87 Hughes to Aitken, 31 March 1916, A1764, mg27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds, lac. 88 Minutes of Informal Meeting of Four Members, 5 April 1916, rg9 III v2892, lac; Brennan, “Major-General David Watson,” 114; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 67. 89 Hughes to Borden, 8 September 1916, 35731-2, mg26 H v69, Borden Fonds, lac. 90 asmc Minutes, 16 November 1916, rg9 III v107, lac. 91 Flavelle to Borden, 18 September 1916, 6, Loc. 2127, Box 2, Joseph W. Flavelle Fonds, qua; Ross Diary, 25 November 1916, mg30 E392 v1, Ross Fonds, lac. See also Brown, Borden, 2:15. 92 Haycock, Sam Hughes, 187. 93 Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 66. 94 Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 117. 95 Haycock, Sam Hughes, 302–6; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 84–90; Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 176–8. 96 Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 92. 97 White to Borden, 11 November 1916, lac. 98 Walker, “Political Management of Army Leadership,” 160. 99 Gelber, Canada in London, 28; English, Decline of Politics, 51. 100 MacLaren, Commissions High, 161.

notes to pag es 1 6 4 – 7 0

313

101 Haycock, Sam Hughes, 265. 102 Borden to Perley, 6 November 1916, v7/1, mg27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds, lac. 103 Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 148; Biography of Kemp, G.A.Q. 4-41, rg24 v1816, lac; Haycock, Sam Hughes, 150. 104 Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 112–13. 105 Millar, “General Sir William Birdwood,” 128. 106 Andrews, The Anzac Illusion, 141; Faraday, “Half the Battle,” 70. 107 Wray, James Whiteside McCay. 108 Ibid., 214. 109 Andrews, The Anzac Illusion. 111; Perry, “Manpower and Organisational Problems,” 289. 110 Faraday, “Half the Battle,” 94; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 117. 111 Faraday, “Half the Battle,” 281. 112 Grey, The Australian Army, 57; Andrews, The Anzac Illusion, 113. 113 Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 122, 366, 412; Stacey, Six Years of War, 206; Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 215–27. 114 Stacey, Six Years of War, 215; Canada, Report of the Ministry, 55. 115 Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 325, 364. 116 Borden to Perley, 8 November 1916, v7/1, mg27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds, lac; Acting Sub-Militia Council E.P. 3.7.39, rg24 v6930, lac. 117 Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 96. 118 Perley to Borden, 27 November 1916, lac. 119 Perley to Borden, undated, v7/2, mg27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds, lac. 120 ghp (Perley) Memorandum, 3, mg4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds, McGill. 121 Perley to Borden, 22 November 1916, lac. 122 Ibid. 123 Harris, Canadian Brass, 130; Urquhart, Arthur Currie, 116, 140; Currie to Mother, 24 January 1917, 34, mg4027 C3, Urquhart Fonds, McGill. 124 Perley to Borden, undated, lac. 125 Turner to Perley, 30 November 1916, mg30 E46 v11, Turner Fonds, lac. 126 Perley to Turner, 24 November 1916, v7/2, mg27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds, lac. 127 Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 86; Greenhous, Canada and the Battle of Vimy Ridge, 54. 128 Turner to Hughes, 26 November 1916, 5, mg27 II D23 v14, Hughes Fonds, lac. 129 “Influence Will No Longer Carry Weight,” Manitoba Free Press, 2 December 1916. 130 Fetherstonhaugh, 24th Battalion, 109. 131 Macintyre Diary, 26 November 1916, mg30 E241 v1, D.E. Macintyre Fonds, lac.

314

notes to pa ges 1 7 1– 5

chapter six 1 Perley to Borden, 27 January 1917, 13656, mg26 H v33, Borden Fonds, lac. 2 Turner to Leckie, 4 December 1916, mg30 E46 v11, Turner Fonds, lac. 3 Perley to Borden, 22 November 1916, lac. 4 Perley to Borden, 28 November 1916, v7/2, mg27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds, lac. 5 Ibid.; Biography of J.C. MacDougall during War, G.A.Q. 4-40, rg24 v1815, lac. 6 Steele’s Recommendations for Organization of omfc, rg9 III v74, lac; Steele to Perley, 18 November 1916, lac. 7 Perley to Borden, undated, v7/3, mg27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds, lac. 8 J.W. Carson Service Jacket, rg150 Acc1992-93/166, Box 1534, lac; Perley to Borden, 4 December 1916, 45435, mg26 H v88, lac. 9 Perley to Borden, 5 December 1916, 45449, mg26 H v88, lac; Swettenham, To Seize the Victory, 142; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 99. 10 Messenger, Call to Arms, 17; Canada., Report of the Ministry, 9–97. 11 Scrimger Account, docs manu 58A 1 80.7, 20050021-001, cwm; “Francis Scrimger vc.” 12 2nd Canadian Division, ro 1313, 21 October 1915, lac; 2nd Division a&q War Diary, 19 June 1916, rg9 III v4848, lac; McDonald, Harold French Service Record, lac. 13 Byng to Turner, 17 December 1916, docs manu 58A 1 9.6, 19710147007, Turner Fonds, cwm. 14 Defence, Quarterly Militia List; P.E. Thacker Service Jacket, rg150 Acc1992-93/166, Box 9580 – 41, lac; Biography, P.E. Thacker, 144/10, rg9 III v4734, lac. 15 Perley to Borden, 16 December 1916, 45462, mg26 H v88, lac; Turner to Perley, 27 January 1917, mg30 E46 v7, Turner Fonds, lac. 16 For a laudatory biography, see O’Keefe and Macdonald, Merchant Prince. 17 Borden to Perley, 8 November 1916, lac; O’Keefe and Macdonald, Merchant Prince, 88; Steele to Shaungnessy, 19 November 1916, rg9 III v74, lac. 18 Confidential Report on W. Gow, 27 December 1916, R-161-2, rg9 III v806, lac. 19 Perley to Borden, 16 January 1917, mg27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds, lac; Borden to Perley, 20 January 1917, mg27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds, lac; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 99. 20 Garnet Hughes to Sam Hughes, 25 March 1917, 4, mg27 II D23 v14, Hughes Fonds, lac. 21 Reinforcements Despatched January 1917, 19, mg30 E46 v3, Turner

notes to pag es 1 7 6 – 9

22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

41 42 43 44 45

315

Fonds, lac; Reinforcements Despatched May 1917, 23, mg30 E46 v3, Turner Fonds, lac. Perley to Kemp, 3 March 1917, rg9 III v104, lac. Memo to goc, Lt-Col. McDonald, 19 June 1917, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac; Summary on the Work of the General Staff Branch during the Month, June 1917, mg30 E46 v6, Turner Fonds, lac. State of Training in Canada of Battalions Arriving in England in April/May 1917, mg30 E46 v6, Turner Fonds, lac. Report to Kemp, 18 May 1918, mg30 E46 v6, Turner Fonds, lac. Rail and Forestry Reinforcements Needed, rg9 III v104, lac. Report Captain Ker, Senior Medical Officer, crt, 1 December 1917, rg9 III v2939, lac. Artillery Transfers, 10-8-21 pt 1, rg9 III v74, lac. ro 244, 16 January 1917, rg9 III v3780, lac. Memo McDonald to Turner, 21 December 1916, rg9 III v3098, lac; Order War Office 121/Overseas.3157 (S.D. 2), 21 December 1916, rg9 III v3098, lac. War Office A Matters, 121/Overseas/3289 (D.R.2), 7 February 1917, rg9 III v2738, lac. Memo Turner to Perley, 16 December 1916, rg9 III v90, lac. a/ag Cdn Militia to hq, cef, 19 January 1917, 10-12-11, rg9 III v90, lac. For a particularly vitriolic view of the breakup, see Frost, Fighting Men, 90. Notes and Comments on Article by Major Pope, dhs 10-75, rg24 v1762, lac. ro 95, 28 December 1917, rg9 III v3780, lac. Reinforcement by Arm, dhh, 48/3, 74/672 Box 33, dhh. Memorandum on Training Reinforcements in Canada and England, 23 May 1917, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac. ro 95, 28 December 1917, lac. Thacker to the Secretary Militia Council, 5 March 1917, D-85-33, rg9 III v2754, lac; Proposed System for Dealing with Casualties of the Canadian Forces, undated, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac. bggs, ghq Home Forces to hq Canadians, 12 February 1917, T-12-36 v1, rg9 III v3108, lac. For more on the deleterious effects of fatigues on training, see Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 343–4. Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, 43, 79. Hodges, “British Infantry and Atrocities,” 87; Miedema, “Bayonets and Blobsticks”; Griffith, Battle Tactics, 67–72. Training in Canadian Reserve Battalions, Revised Edition, 1 October 1917, T-25-36 v1, rg9 III v3111, lac.

316

notes to pa g es 1 7 9 – 8 3

46 Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, 60. 47 Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 158. 48 Circular McDonald to hq, 8 January 1917, rg9 III v3098, lac; Summary General Staff, July 1917, lac; Englander, “Discipline and Morale,” 125–6; Inspection Report of Canadian Training Division Bramshott, 11 December 1916, I-8-36 v2, rg9 III v3083, lac. 49 McDonald to Landry, 26 May 1917, T-4-36 v4, rg9 III v3106, lac. 50 Circular Thacker to Training Units, 19 April 1917, 0-75-33 v1, rg9 III v2885, lac. 51 Pope, 22 October 1917, 0-75-33 v1, rg9 III v2885, lac. 52 ro 1335, 3 May 1917, mg30 E46 v7, Turner Fonds, lac; Summary on the Work of the General Staff Branch during the Month of November 1918, mg30 E46 v6, Turner Fonds, lac. 53 Courses of Instruction February 1917, R-2-36 Vol. 2, rg9 III v3098, lac. 54 ro 243, 15 January 1917, rg9 III v3780, lac; ro 370, 1 February 1917, rg9 III v3780, lac. 55 Tests G.S. Canadians, 10 August 1917, T-8-14, mg30 E75 v3, Urquhart Fonds, lac; Report on the Work of the General Staff Branch during the Month, August 1917, mg30 E46 v6, Turner Fonds, lac. 56 Perry, “Manpower and Organisational Problems,” 333; Pugsley and Barber, Kiwis in Conflict, 127; Pugsley, The Anzac Experience, 51–2. 57 Pugsley, The Anzac Experience, 64. 58 Faraday, “Half the Battle,” 139. 59 Messenger, Call to Arms, 153; Baker, “The Training Reserve.” 60 Watson, Enduring the Great War, 162. 61 Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 121. 62 ro 162, 5 January 1917, rg9 III v3780, lac. 63 Marble, “Place of Artillery in the bef,” 145; Report General Staff, May 1917, lac; War Office to Administrative hq, cef, 18 December 1916, O-31-33, rg9 III v2881, lac; Administrative hq, cef to War Office, 3 January 1917, O-31-33, rg9 III v2881, lac. 64 Currie to hq omfc, 1 May 1918, R-3, mg27 II D9 v157, Kemp Fonds, lac; Currie to Cdn Representative, 10 December 1917, mg30 E133 v1, McNaughton Fonds, lac; Signals, Canadian Signals, 6. 65 Canadian Signalling School, 1 December 1918, lac; Bogart to Secretary hq omfc, 11 May 1917, rg9 III v2939, lac. 66 Travers, “Problem of Innovation,” 545. 67 Byng to Turner, 27 February 1917, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac. 68 Grafton, Emma Gees, 73; ro 558 Organisation – Cdn mgc, 20 February 1917, P-81-33, rg9 III v2910, lac; Sims to Montague, 25 February 1917, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac; Byng to Turner, 18 January 1917, 99/10, rg9 III v3864, lac. 69 Carson to Hughes, 13 January 1916, 8-1-87a, rg9 III v34, lac.

notes to pag es 1 8 3 – 7

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70 Turner to Carson, 7 December 1915, 8-1-87, rg9 III v34, lac. 71 Memo Touching the Supply of Officers to the C.E.F. On Service in the United Kingdom, 12 February 1917, rg24 v2543 lac; Decision of the Militia Council, 28 February 1917, H.Q. C. 1591, rg24 v2543 lac; Turner to Gwatkin, 5 March 1917, rg24 v2543 lac; Militia Council Decision, 16 March 1917, H.Q. C.2043, rg24 v2543 lac. 72 Perley to Kemp, 3 February 1917, H.Q. C-2043, rg24 v2543 lac; Kang, “The British Infantry Officer on the Western Front,” 110. 73 Sheffield, “Officer-Man Relations,” 216; Faraday, “Half the Battle,” 158. 74 Nicholson, Behind the Lines, 233. 75 Exchange 46 Bn. Officers, 13 March 1918, R-113-33 v2, rg9 III v2940, lac. 76 Pugsley, The Anzac Experience, 154. 77 Watson, “Junior Officership in the German Army,” 436. 78 Samuels, Command or Control?, 226; Watson, Enduring the Great War, 131. 79 Circular McDonald Undated, S-7-36 v1, rg9 III v3101, lac; Critchley, Critch, 72–5. 80 Turner to Perley, 27 January 1917, mg30 E46 v11, Turner Fonds, lac. 81 Appointments, 38/1, 74/672 Box 30, dhh. 82 Circular, Director Personnel Services, 21-2-34, 13 December 1916, O29-33 vI, rg9 III v2881, lac. 83 Turner to Sims, 25 February 1917, A-8-24 v1, rg9 III v2105, lac; Harris, Canadian Brass, 129. 84 Haig to War Office O.B./742, 17 June 1917, 10-8-18, rg9 III v73, lac. 85 Grey, The Australian Army, 57. 86 Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 264. 87 Major Cassels to Deputy Minister, omfc, 16 July 1917, mg30 E46 v11, Turner Fonds, lac. 88 Crang, “British Army as a Social Institution “ 18–19. 89 Major Cassels to Deputy Minister, omfc, 16 July 1917, lac. 90 To Area Commanders, 15 May 1917, mg30 E46 v12, Turner Fonds, lac; Report Adjutant-General Branch, 27 February 1917, mg30 E46 v3, Turner Fonds, lac. 91 Proposed System for Dealing with Casualties of the Canadian Forces, 3 February 1917, O-52-4, rg9 III v2112, lac. 92 ro 1603, 4 June 1917; ro 2174, 4 August 1917; ro 2750, 27 October 1917; ro 2848, 9 November 1917, rg9 III v3780, lac. 93 Report Adjutant-General Branch, 27 February 1917, lac. 94 Crerar, Padres in No Man’s Land, 16:61–3; Perley to Borden, 12 February 1917, mg27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds, lac; John Simms Principal Chaplain to Perley, 30 April 1917, lac; ro 822, 15 March 1917, rg9 III v3780, lac. 95 First Progress Report, lac.

318

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96 Report Adjutant-General Branch, 27 February 1917, lac. 97 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 179. 98 Memorandum of the Quartermaster General’s Branch at the Request of the Minister, 22 August 1917, mg30 E46 v7, Turner Fonds, lac. 99 Canada., Report of the Ministry, 74. 100 qmg Branch Progress Report September 1917, mg30 E46 v5, Turner Fonds, lac. 101 McRae qmg to Perley, 12 March 1917, lac. 102 Memorandum of qmg, lac. 103 Ibid. 104 McRae qmg to Perley, 12 March 1917, lac. 105 Perley to Borden, 28 December 1916, 31655, mg26 H v62, Borden Fonds, lac; Borden to Perley, 12 January 1917, 31656, mg26 H v62, Borden Fonds, lac. 106 Holmes, Tommy, 192; Messenger, Call to Arms, 17. 107 KRO , 1917; F.F. Montague Service Jacket, rg150 Acc1992-93/166, Box 6297 – 5, lac; ro 306, 25 January 1917, rg9 III v3780, lac. 108 Sims to Turner, 31 July 1917, mg30 E46 v9, Turner Fonds, lac. 109 Interview A.R. Cousins, 21st Battalion, rg41 v10, lac. 110 Report on the work of Assistant Military Secretary’s Branch since Organization, 4 May 1917, lac; Memorandum from ams to Director of Personal Services, 17 August 1917, P-118-33, rg9 III v2913, lac. 111 Grey, The Australian Army, 40; Faraday, “Half the Battle,” 27. 112 Perley to gg in Council, 3 January 1917, lac. 113 Byng to Military Secretary, ghq, 3 May 1917, P-24-24, rg9 III v2128, lac; Memorandum on the Procedure to Be Adopted in Connection with Promotion and Appointments in the Canadian Forces in France, P-2424, rg9 III v2128, lac. 114 Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 77. 115 Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 256; Perley to Borden, 2 April 1917, 39248-51, mg26 H v74/75, Borden Fonds, lac. 116 Carson to Hughes, 26 March 1915, 8-1-87, rg9 III v34, lac. 117 Haig to Secretary War Office, 17 May 1916, rg9 III v2883, lac. 118 Thacker A.G. 8-1-38, 6 January 1917, M-29-36 v3, rg9 III v3091, lac. 119 Telegram dag 553, 9 December 1916, rg9 III v2882, lac; Memorandum Regarding Disposal of Supernumerary Officers, 22 December 1916, rg9 III v2882, lac. 120 Deputy Director Staff Duties to hq omfc, 27 March 1917, T-68-33 v2, rg9 III v3000, lac. 121 Pope for ag to Secretary, War Office, 5 December 1917, rg9 III B1 v2883, lac. 122 Memorandum, Director of Operations, 25 May 1917, 79, mg30 E46 v11, Turner Fonds, lac; Summary of Officers on Loan to Imperial Forces, 17 May 1918, O-259-33, rg9 III v2903, lac.

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123 ro 1535, 26 May 1917, rg9 III v3780, lac; Note Turner to A.M.S., 26 June 1917, O-54-33, rg9 III v2883, lac. 124 Return of Officers Returned to Canada Surplus to Requirements in England, 12 July 1917, O-54-33, rg9 III B1 v2883, lac; Return Showing Number of Surplus Officers Returned to Canada for Disposal by the Adjutant-General Ottawa from Jan 1 to Dec 31st, O-76-33, rg9 III v2885, lac. 125 Memorandum for the Information of the goc, 1 May 1917, mg30 E46 v11, Turner Fonds, lac. 126 A.G. 8-1-128 Thacker to Turner Revised, 21 November 1917, rg9 III v2887, lac. 127 Turner to Matthews, 4 April 1917, mg30 E60 v2, Matthews Fonds, lac. 128 Thacker to oc Cdn Troops Shorncliffe, 30 April 1917, rg9 III v2882, lac. 129 Kemp to Turner, 31 January 1918, H-6, mg27 II D9 v144, Kemp Fonds, lac. 130 Turner to Kemp, 4 February 1918, H-6, mg27 II D9 v144, Kemp Fonds, lac. 131 F.F. Montague Service Jacket, lac. 132 Perley to Borden, 2 January 1917, lac. 133 Perley to Borden, 28 June 1917, rg9 III v107, lac. 134 ag to hq Cdn Troops Shorncliffe, A.G. 2.P.211, 27 January 1917, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac. 135 Perley to Borden, 2 December 1916, 31645, mg26 H v62, Borden Fonds, lac; Borden to Perley, 6 December 1916, 31646, mg26 H v62, Borden Fonds, lac; Perley to Borden, 20 December 1916, 31649, mg26 H v62, Borden Fonds, lac; Borden to Perley, 22 December 1916, 31652, mg26 H v62, Borden Fonds, lac; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 100. 136 Robertson to Haig, 28 September 1916, lhcma. For more on the 5th Division, see Stewart, “Frustrated Belligerence.” 137 Haig to cigs, 24 January 1917, wo 158/22, tna. 138 Perley to Borden, 10 November 1916, 39104, mg26 H1 v74/75, Borden Fonds, lac. 139 Kemp to Borden, 15 January 1917, 39115, mg26 H v74/75, Borden Fonds, lac; Perley to Borden, 20 December 1916, 39110, mg26 H1 v74/75, Borden Fonds, lac. 140 Borden to Perley, 26 January 1917, v8/2, mg27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds, lac. 141 Perley to Turner, 25 April 1917, 10-L-10, rg9 III v293, lac. 142 Sims to Turner, 3 February 1917, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac; Note to Garnet Burke Hughes, undated (c. January 1917), 5, mg27 II D23 v14, Hughes Fonds, lac.

320

notes to pa ges 1 9 4– 9

143 Perley to Kemp, 17 January 1917, 39119-20, mg26 H1 v74/75, Borden Fonds, lac. 144 Gow to Secretary, War Office, 2 March 1917, rg9 III v104, lac. 145 Granatstein, Broken Promises, 30. 146 Robertson to Governor General, 25 May 1917, 39133, mg26 H1 v74/75, Borden Fonds, lac. 147 Gow to mg Callwell W.O., 30 May 1917, rg9 III v104, lac. 148 Memorandum to goc, 7 January 1918, rg9 III v74, lac. 149 Haig Diary, 4 July 1917, nls. 150 Report General Staff, June, August 1917, lac. 151 Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 527. 152 Gow to Perley, 29 June 1917, 10-8-7 v1, rg9 III v72, lac. 153 Griesbach to 1st Canadian Division, 2 October 1917, T-4-37 v7, rg9 III v3107, lac. 154 McDonald to Lt-Col. Bauld, 15 May 1917, M-29-33 v11, rg9 III v3092, lac. 155 State of Training Oct/Nov 1917, G.177/2-10, 8 December 1917, 103/10, rg9 III v3866, lac. 156 Currie to Turner, 10 November 1917, mg30 E100 v2, Currie Fonds, lac; Grafton, Emma Gees, 99. 157 Byng to Turner, 17 December 1916, cwm. 158 Turner War Record, lac. 159 Perley to Borden, 27 January 1917, lac; Perley to Borden, 30 April 1917, mg27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds, lac. 160 Perley to Borden, 27 January 1917, lac. 161 French to Perley, 28 August 1917, 10-8-18, rg9 III v73, lac. 162 McDonald to Morrison, 26 July 1917, T-8-36 v2, rg9 III v3108, lac. 163 Report General Staff, June 1917, lac. 164 Wise, Canadian Airmen, 1:580; Swettenham, To Seize the Victory, 171; Cook, Shock Troops, 260; Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 525–7. 165 Dancocks, Sir Arthur Currie, 81. 166 Falls, Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1917, 451. 167 Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 62; Swettenham, To Seize the Victory, 142; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 100–2; Harris, Canadian Brass, 127–9. 168 McDonald to Morrison, 26 July 1917, lac. 169 Cook, No Place to Run, 115–17. 170 Byng to Turner, 6 May 1917, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac. 171 Memo to goc, Lt-Col. McDonald, 19 June 1917, lac. 172 ag to Training Areas, 30 March 1918, rg9 III v2939, lac. 173 Currie 30 April 1917 (A Branch) 103/13, rg9 III v3866, lac. 174 Millman, Pessimism and British War Policy, 90; Proposal on Reorganizing Battalion Affiliation Undated, Unsigned, rg9 III v104, lac.

notes to pag es 1 9 9 – 2 0 4

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175 Turner to Watson, 22 March 1917, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac; Turner to Perley, 26 February 1917, 39239-44, mg26 H v74/75, Borden Fonds, lac. 176 Turner to Perley, 10 March 1917, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac. 177 Perley to Turner, 26 December 1916, 39226, mg26 H v74/75, Borden Fonds, lac; Turner to Perley, 28 December 1916, 39228-9, mg26 H v74/75, Borden Fonds, lac; Turner to Perley, 26 February 1917, lac. 178 Byng to Perley, 18 December 1916, 39214, mg26 H v74/75, Borden Fonds, lac. 179 Turner to Byng, 19 April 1917, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac. 180 Turner to Sims, 27 June 1917, 7, mg30 E133 v1, McNaughton Fonds, lac. 181 Turner to Perley, 19 July 1917, 7, mg30 E133 v1, McNaughton Fonds, lac; Currie to Sims, 29 July 1917, 7, mg30 E133 v1, McNaughton Fonds, lac. 182 MacBrien to 4th Division, G.15/275, 17 August 1917, mg30 E100 v2, Currie Fonds, lac; Edwards to 12 Canadian Infantry Battalion, G.C. 12-A-5, 17 February 1917, rg9 III v2941, lac. 183 Messenger, Call to Arms, 275. 184 Faraday, “Half the Battle,” 125. 185 Perley to Borden, 27 November 1916, lac. 186 Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 93. 187 Byng to Perley, 18 December 1916, lac. 188 Byng to Turner, 6 May 1917, lac. 189 Harris, Canadian Brass, 132. 190 Interview with General Guy R. Turner, rg41 v21, lac. 191 Harris, “From Subordinate to Ally,” 122. 192 Lt-Col. Harvie to Odlum, 27 August 1917, mg30 E100 v2, Currie Fonds, lac. 193 To Major Hamilton, aag Cdn Section, 3rd Echelon ghq, 31 May 1917, R-97-33 v4, rg9 III v2939, lac. 194 Perley to Borden, 8 December 1916, 31647-8, mg26 H v62, Borden Fonds, lac. 195 Sims to Montague, 25 February 1917, lac. 196 Postscript, 18 October 1917, rg9 III v104, lac. 197 Turner to Mewburn, 23 December 1918, mg30 E46 v11, Turner Fonds, lac. 198 Ross Diary, 1 January 1917, mg30 E392 v1, Ross Fonds, lac. 199 Report, Adjutant-General Branch, 27 February 1917, lac. 200 Montague ams to ag, 26 July 1917, M-29-33 v11, rg9 III v3092, lac. 201 Carson to Hughes, 1 April 1915, 8-5-8, rg9 III v44, lac; Carson to Hughes, 4 December 1915, 6-W-56, rg9 III v232, lac. 202 McDonald to Howard, 5 July 1917, T-4-36 v6, rg9 III v3106, lac.

322

notes to pa ges 2 0 4– 9

203 French to Perley, 28 August 1917, lac. 204 McDonald to Morrison, 26 July 1917, lac. 205 Turner to Surgeon General Foster, 9 November 1917, 15-1-3, v1, rg9 III v3495, lac; Thacker to Turner, 8 August 1918, R-113-33 v2, rg9 III v2940, lac; Hogarth to Turner, 13 December 1917, mg30 E46 v5, Turner Fonds, lac; Turner to ag, 23 October 1918, rg9 III v2790, lac. 206 Hogarth to Turner, 13 December 1917, lac. 207 Memo Thacker to Turner, 3 November 1917, R-113-33 v2, rg9 III v2940, lac. 208 A.T. Hunter to [Kemp], 6 November 1917, H-6, mg27 II D9 v144, Kemp Fonds, lac; Currie to Carson, 8 July 1916, 6-R-122, rg9 III v207, lac; Rattray to Currie, 24 April 1918, mg30 E100 v2, Currie Fonds, lac. 209 Hewgill Diary, 15 January, mg30 E16 v1, Hewgill Fonds, lac. 210 McDonald to Sims, 15 January 1917, E-4-24, rg9 III v2112, lac. chapter seven 1 Kemp to Borden, 5 March 1919, 55844-5, mg26 H v102, Borden Fonds, lac. 2 Hyatt, “Currie and Politicians,” 148. 3 See Urquhart, Arthur Currie, 18; Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 5–7; Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 193–4. 4 Urquhart, Arthur Currie, 24. 5 Dancocks, Sir Arthur Currie, 14. 6 Urquhart, Arthur Currie, 15. 7 Duncan-Clark et al., Pictorial History of the Great War, 322. 8 Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 97; Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 240–1, 267–9. 9 Losinger, “Officer-Man Relations,” 18. 10 Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 240. 11 Burstall Comments, 7j, mg4027, acc. no. 391, ref. 1–2, Urquhart Fonds, McGill. 12 Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 22–3. 13 Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 206–7; Haig Diary, 5 October 1917, nls. 14 Swettenham, McNaughton, 94. 15 Horn et al., Warrior Chiefs, 50–1. 16 Garnet Hughes to Currie, 11 May 1917, 9, mg4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds, McGill. 17 Currie Diary, 3 May 1917, mg30 E100 v43, Currie Fonds, lac. 18 Sheffield, The Chief, 221. 19 Urquhart, Arthur Currie, 160–2.

notes to pag es 2 0 9 – 1 5 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

323

Ibid., 157; Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 191. Perley to Lord Derby, 15 June 1917, rg9 III v107, lac. Urquhart, Arthur Currie, 160. Gow to Urquhart, 15 October 1934, 13, mg4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds, McGill. Perley to Borden, 9 June 1917, v9/1, mg27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds, lac. Perley to Lord Derby, 15 June 1917, lac. ghp Memorandum, McGill. Perley to Borden, 15 June 1917, rg9 III v107, lac. Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 152; Biography of Currie, Swettenham, p. 97, mg31 E42 v5, Swetteham Fonds, lac; Harris, Canadian Brass, 131. Memorandum, 14 June 1917, T-7, mg27 II D9 v161, Kemp Fonds, lac. Borden to Perley, 13 June 1917, v9/1, mg27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds, lac. Currie Diary, 10 June 1917, mg30 E100 v43, Currie Fonds, lac. Perley to Borden, 15 June 1917, lac. Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 71–3; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 121–2. Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 121. Currie Diary entries, 13 September, 26 December 1917, mg30 E100 v43, Currie Fonds, lac. Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 9–13. Harold Daly Comments, mg4027, acc. no. 391, ref. 1-2, Urquhart Fonds, McGill. Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 9–13. Thacker to Deputy Minister, 20 August 1917, 10-J-52, rg9 III v291, lac. Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 194. Holmes, Little Field Marshal, 50–1. Procedure to be Adopted, lac. Sheffield, The Chief, 139. Currie to Turner, 29 July 1917, rg9 III v2910, lac. Turner to Currie, 2 August 1917, rg9 III v2910, lac. Turner to Currie, 9 August 1917, rg9 III v2910, lac. Montague to Turner, 16 August 1917, rg9 III v2910, lac. Currie to Perley, 4 August 1917, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac. Memorandum, 3 September 1917, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac. Turner‘s Handwritten Comments on Cdn Corps, A-29-1-6, 1 June 1917, rg9 III v2910, lac. For more details, see Stewart, “Missed Opportunity.” Wise, Canadian Airmen, 1:49, 74.

324

notes to pa g es 2 1 5 – 2 0

53 Cutlack, Australian Flying Corps, 31. 54 Cubitt to Sam Hughes, 8 September 1916, 10-9-27 v1, rg9 III v80, lac; Fellows to omfc, 6 March 1917; Thacker to Turner, 7 March 1917; Perley to Air Board, 8 March 1917, 10-9-27 v1, rg9 III v80, lac. 55 Molkentin, Fire in the Sky, 179; Cutlack, Australian Flying Corps, 421. 56 Wise, Canadian Airmen, 1:587. 57 Turner to Perley, 22 September 1917, mg30 E46 v9, Turner Fonds, lac. 58 Morley, “Earning Their Wings,” 88. For the Royal Flying Corps in Canada, see Hunt, Dancing in the Sky. 59 Perley to Borden, 10 August 1917, mg30 E46 v9, Turner Fonds, lac; Turner to Perley, 13 July 1917, mg30 E46 v9, Turner Fonds, lac. 60 Morrow, Great War in the Air, 234; Hart, Bloody April. 61 Perley to Borden, 10 August 1917, lac. 62 Currie to Turner, 3 November 1917, mg30 E46 v9, Turner Fonds, lac. 63 Turner to Kemp, 19 January 1918, 10-9-27 v1, rg9 III v80, lac. 64 Bishop to Morrison, 10 April 1918, mg30 E46 v9, Turner Fonds, lac. 65 Turner to Kemp, 30 April 1918, C-18, mg27 II D9 v132, Kemp Fonds, lac. 66 Particulars of Canadians Seconded to Royal Flying Corps, 5 April 1918, 10-9-27 v1, rg9 III v80, lac. 67 omc Submissions, 13 July 1918, O-153-3 v4, rg9 III v2892, lac. 68 Wise, Canadian Airmen, 1:579. 69 Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 93; Currie to Perley, 10 December 1917, mg30 E100 v2, Currie Fonds, lac; Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 235. 70 Perley to Borden, 7 September 1917, v9/3, mg27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds, lac; Perley to Borden, 4 October 1917, v9/3, mg27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds, lac. 71 Haig Diary, 18 January 1918, nls. 72 Goodard to Preston, 3 December 1917, mg30 E46 v12, Turner Fonds, lac. 73 Currie to Perley, 10 December 1917, lac. 74 Currie to Loomis, 27 January 1918, mg30 E100 v1, Currie Fonds, lac. 75 Draft Currie Biography, p. 2, mg4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds, McGill, 13. See also Radley, We Lead, Others Follow, 117. 76 Currie to Daly, 10 December 1917, A/2, mg27 III F9 v1, Daly Fonds, lac. 77 Report General Staff, January 1918, lac. For more on the Young Soldier Battalions and the issues of underage soldiers, see Cook, “Underage Soldiers.” 78 Nicholson, CEF , 351. 79 ag Circular Letter, 22 January 1918, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac. 80 McDonald to Turner, 30 March 1918, T-4-36 v8, rg9 III v3107, lac.

notes to pag es 2 2 0 – 4

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81 Currie to Turner, 14 March 1918, 6, mg30 E75 v3, Urquhart Fonds, lac. 82 Report General Staff, July 1918, lac; Thacker to Turner, 8 August 1918, lac. 83 Perry, “Manpower and Organisational Problems,” 58. 84 Messenger, Call to Arms, 275. 85 Mallett, “Interplay between Technology,” 165. 86 Borden to Kemp, 6 February 1918, 73871, mg26 H v139, Borden Fonds, lac; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 155. 87 Urquhart, Arthur Currie, 198; Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 100. 88 Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 120. 89 Reorganization memo, 11 January 1918, 10-3-8, rg9 III v77, lac. 90 Currie to omfc, 27 February 1918, O-27-3, rg9 III v970, lac; Hertzberg, “The Re-organization of the Engineering Troops of a Canadian Division – Great War 1914–1918,” 39. 91 Replacements for the men drafted to increase the mg establishment mentioned below were not provided until August 1918. Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 99. 92 Each of the four divisions had the equivalent of two engineer battalions in the existing three engineer field companies and one pioneer battalion, and there was the equivalent of another battalion in three Canadian tunnelling companies serving outside the corps – hence the need for three additional engineer battalions. casc mt Replacement Issues, R-93-33, rg9 III v2938, lac. 93 Turner to Currie, 11 February 1918, mg30 E46 v8, Turner Fonds, lac. 94 Grafton, Emma Gees, 110. 95 Progress Report Adjutant General’s Branch, February 1918, rg9 III v4864, lac. 96 Currie to hq omfc, 30 March 1918, U-118-33, rg9 III v3006, lac; Thacker to Turner, 2 April 1918, U-118-33, rg9 III v3006, lac. 97 Currie to hq omfc, 20 May 1918, rg9 III v2939, lac; Thacker to Turner, 22 August 1918, rg9 III v2939, lac. 98 aag to cgs, 20 July 1918, R-93-33, rg9 III v2938, lac. 99 Currie to Cdn Representative, 10 December 1917, lac; McDonald to Cdn Representative, 1 February 1918, mg30 E133 v1, McNaughton Fonds, lac; Report General Staff, December 1917, lac. 100 McDonald to Radcliffe, 15 February 1918, rg9 III v3093, lac. 101 Currie to hq omfc, 1 May 1918, lac. 102 Turner to Currie, 10 May 1918, R-3, mg27 II D9 v157, Kemp Fonds, lac. 103 5th cid Strength Return, 11 February 1918, 14/11, mg27 II D23 v14, Hughes Fonds, lac; Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 96. 104 Borden to Perley, 24 October 1917, 39125A, mg26 H v74/75, Borden Fonds, lac.

326

notes to pa ges 2 2 4– 8

105 Thacker to Turner, ag 21-1-1 (C), 1 November 1917, rg9 III v104, lac. 106 Borden to Perley, 7 November 1917, rg9 III v104, lac; Perley to Borden, 8 November 1917, rg9 III v104, lac. 107 Borden to Perley, 17 January 1918, 39154, mg26 H v74/75, Borden Fonds, lac; Macphail and Canada, Medical Services, 152. 108 Currie to hq omfc, A.29.1.50, 21 January 1918, S-6, mg27 II D9 v161, Kemp Fonds, lac. 109 Memo Thacker to hq Cnd Corps, A.G.1. 21-4-23, 27 March 1918, R-124-33, rg9 III v2941, lac. 110 Kemp to Borden, 26 February 1918, mg26 H v141, Borden Fonds, lac. 111 Currie to Bde-Gen. F.W. Hill, 15 August 1918, mg30 E100 v1, Currie Fonds, lac; Byron Green Service Jacket, rg150 Acc92-93/166 v3770, lac; Garnet Burk Hughes Service Jacket, rg150 Acc92-93/166 v4590, lac. 112 Hyatt, “Currie and Conscription,” 295; Marteinson, Stand on Guard, 182. 113 Nicholson, CEF , 380; Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 243. 114 McDonald to Thacker, 27 March 1918, rg9 III v2939, lac; ag to Training Areas, 30 March 1918, lac. 115 Thacker to hq, Cdn Corps, 6 April 1918, rg9 III v2887, lac. 116 Nicholson, CEF , 380. 117 Dancocks, Sir Arthur Currie, 137. 118 Turner to Kemp, 6 April 1918, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac. 119 Zabecki, German 1918 Offensives. 120 Kemp to Wilson, 21 June 1918, R-3, mg27 II D9 v157, Kemp Fonds, lac; Wilson to Kemp, 14 June 1918; Turner to Kemp, 14 June 1918, M-7-36 v1, rg9 III v3088, lac. 121 Report General Staff, April 1918, lac. 122 Turner to Currie, 3 September 1918, mg30 E46 v8, Turner Fonds, lac. 123 Report General Staff, June 1918, lac. 124 Ibid., July 1918; Currie to Turner, 25 July 1918, mg30 E100 v2, Currie Fonds, lac. 125 Brennan, “Completely Worn Out,” 10–11. 126 omc Submissions, 6 August 1918, O-153-3 v4, rg9 III v2892, lac. 127 Cdn hq Shoreham from O.C. Cdn Engineer Training Depot, 11 September 1917, rg9 III v3083, lac. 128 For an in-depth definition, see Selgin, “Gresham’s Law.” 129 ag to hq Cdn Corps, 31 May 1918, rg9 III v2886, lac. 130 Currie to Kemp, 26 June 1918; Kemp to Currie, 29 June 1918, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac; Brennan, “Completely Worn Out,” 9. 131 Cook, Shock Troops, 579. 132 Summary General Staff, September 1918, lac.

notes to pag es 2 2 8 – 3 2

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133 Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” 301–2. 134 Summary General Staff, October 1918, lac. 135 Currie to Alfred Miller, Managing Editor, London Free Press, 4 October 1918, mg30 E100 v2, Currie Fonds, lac. 136 Macphail and Canada, Medical Services, 266–7. For more on the reaction to and impact of the pandemic, see Humphries, The Last Plague. 137 Summary General Staff, October 1918, lac; Humphries, “Horror at Home,” 256. 138 Currie to Daly, 26 October 1918, mg30 E100 v1, Currie Fonds, lac. 139 Currie to Kemp, 23 November 1918, C-53, mg27 II D9 v135, Kemp Fonds, lac; Currie Diary, 17 November 1918, mg30 E100 v43, Currie Fonds, lac. 140 Currie to Alastair Fraser, 7 December 1918, mg30 E100 v1, Currie Fonds, lac. 141 Kemp to Currie, 30 November 1918, C-53, mg27 II D9 v135, Kemp Fonds, lac. 142 Currie to Kemp, 23 November 1918; Turner to Kemp, 2 December 1918; Kemp to Currie, 6 December 1918, 19801226-277/58A 1 60.6, Currie Fonds, cwm. 143 Currie to Kemp, 27 February 1919, C-20, mg27 II D9 v132, Kemp Fonds, lac. 144 Currie to Kemp, 16 February 1919, C-20, mg27 II D9 v132, Kemp Fonds, lac. 145 Bristol to Macinnes, 8 April 1919, 10-M-490, rg9 III v304, lac; Currie Diary, 5 April 1919, mg30 E100 v43, Currie Fonds, lac. 146 Turner to Kemp, 21 March 1919, mg30 E46 v11, Turner Fonds, lac. 147 Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 272–81. 148 Ibid., 242; Turner Diary, 1918, 19710147-001/docs manu 58A 1 9.1, Turner Fonds, cwm. 149 Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, ix; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 175. 150 Hyatt, “Currie and Politicians,” 159. 151 Turner to Currie, 9 October 1918, mg30 E46 v8, Turner Fonds, lac. 152 Currie to Turner, 12 August 1917, 6, mg30 E75 v3, Urquhart Fonds, lac. 153 Turner to Currie, 24 August 1917, mg30 E46 v8, Turner Fonds, lac; Currie to Turner, 24 August 1917, 6, mg30 E75 v3, Urquhart Fonds, lac. 154 Currie to dag, Base, 21 November 1917, R-98-33 v1, rg9 III v2939, lac. 155 Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 269. 156 Mewburn to Borden, 28 April 1918, 75059-60, mg26 H v141, Borden Fonds, lac.

328

notes to pa ges 2 3 2– 8

157 158 159 160 161 162

Turner to Perley, 19 July 1917, lac; Currie to Sims, 29 July 1917, lac. Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers, 312. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 206. Turner to Currie, 28 August 1917, mg30 E46 v8, Turner Fonds, lac. Turner to Currie, 3 September 1918, lac. Currie to Turner, 1 March 1918, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac; Turner to Currie, 6 March 1918, mg30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds, lac. Currie to Canadian Section, 17 October 1918; Turner to Currie, 26 October 1918, mg30 E46 v8, Turner Fonds, lac. Some examples include Robertson to Haig, 7 January 1916, lhcma; Haig to Robertson, 9 January 1916, 7/6/12, Robertson Fonds, lhcma; Haig to cigs, 24 January 1917, tna. Currie Diary, 1917, 1918, mg30 E100 v43, Currie Fonds, lac. Both Perley and Kemp raised the possibility of moving Currie from command of the corps – Perley with Borden and Kemp with Haig. Given Currie’s complaints of the relationship with the Canadian authorities in late 1917, he would likely have identified Turner as his possible replacement. Perley to Borden, 4 October 1917, lac; Haig Diary, 15, 18 January 1918, nls; Currie to Loomis, 27 January 1918, lac. Kemp to Mewburn, 27 April 1918, mg27 II D9 v161, Kemp Fonds, lac; Currie to Perley, 7 October 1917; Harrington to Perley, 29 October 1917, 10-2-29, rg9 III v67, lac. Demill, “Coburg Libel Trial,” 35. For more on Currie’s unheroic approach, see Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 212; Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 5. Sheffield, “Officer-Man Relations,” 4. Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 130. Morton, “Exerting Control,” 13; Currie to May, 11 May 1915, McGill; Currie to Garnet Hughes, 2 May 1917, 5, mg27 II D23 v14, Hughes Fonds, lac. Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 108. Currie to Adv. First Army, G676/2-12, 11 October 1917, 103/6, rg9 III v3866, lac. Burns, General Mud, 4. French, “51st (Highland) Division,” 120. Currie to Carson, 20 February 1918, mg30 E100 v1, Currie Fonds, lac; Currie to Bristol, Private Secretary to Minister omfc, 16 March 1918, 9, mg4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds, McGill. Turner to Kemp, 12 March 1918, C-41a, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac. Graham, “Stress Areas and Grey Areas,” 156. Turner to Currie, 21 August 1920, mg30 E100 v15, Currie Fonds, lac. Turner to Currie, 31 March 1928, 69, mg30 E100 v19, Currie Fonds, lac.

163 164

165 166

167

168

169 170 171

172 173 174 175 176

177 178 179 180

notes to pag es 2 3 8 – 4 2

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181 Currie to Turner, 8 May 1928, docs manu 58A 1 9.6, 19710147-007, Turner Fonds, cwm; “Currie Trial Evidence Completed,” Border Cities Star, 28 April 1928. chapter eight 1 Press release, 14 January 1918, P-16, mg27 II D9 v155, Kemp Fonds, lac. 2 Kemp to Borden, 1 April 1918, 57572-4, mg26 H v105, Borden Fonds, lac. 3 Perley to Borden, 14 September 1917, v9/3, mg27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds, lac. 4 Biography S.C. Mewburn, 144/10, rg9 III v4734, lac. 5 Memorandum Relating to the Military Situation in Canada on the 1st of May 1917, gaq 10-47c, rg24 v1843, lac. 6 Borden to Perley, 23 June 1917, rg9 III v104, lac. 7 Brown, “Unrequited Faith,” 63. 8 Granatstein, Broken Promises, 67. 9 Hillmer and Granatstein, Empire to Umpire, 62. 10 Granatstein, Broken Promises, 63; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 134. 11 Turner, “We Are Winning.” 12 KRO , 1917, 430. 13 Memoir, chs 1–6, p. 109, Loc. 2150, Box 105, Power Fonds, qua. 14 O.C. 208 Infantry Bn to 13th Cdn Inf. Brigade, 4 December 1917, E-410, rg9 III v1644, lac. 15 Preston, My Generation, 365–70; Preston to Turner, 3 December 1917; Turner to Preston, mg30 E46 v12, Turner Fonds, lac. 16 Turner to Currie, 31 March 1928, lac. 17 ag1 Pope to dag, 23 November 1917, rg9 III B1 v2883, lac. 18 Turner to Thacker, 17 November 1917, R-97-33 v4, rg9 III v2939, lac. 19 Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 141. 20 Perley to Borden, 10 December 1917, v10/3, mg27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds, lac. 21 Purney to Turner, 4 January 1918, mg30 E46 v12, Turner Fonds, lac. 22 Kemp to Borden, 8 January 1918, 57514-5, mg26 H v105, Borden Fonds, lac. 23 Kemp to Borden, 24 February 1918, mg27 II D9 v129, Kemp Fonds, lac. 24 Cook, “Sir Robert Borden, Lloyd George,” 382. For more on this pessimism, see Millman, Pessimism and British War Policy. 25 Kemp to Borden, 4 January 1918, 51130A, mg26 H v96, Borden Fonds, lac. 26 Kemp to Borden, 24 February 1918, lac.

330

notes to pa ges 2 4 3– 7

27 28 29 30

Mewburn to Borden, 28 April 1918, lac. Perley to Kemp, 9 August 1917, O-257-33, rg9 III v2903, lac. Kemp to Borden, 1 April 1918, lac. Kemp to Borden, 23 March 1918, 57542, mg26 H v105, Borden Fonds, lac. Memo Mewburn to Borden, 26 March 1918, 57543, mg26 H v105, Borden Fonds, lac. Bristol to Sherwood, 11 July 1917, 10-C-117, rg9 III v257, lac; Thacker to Secretary, Ministry omfc, 5 July 1918, 10-C-431, rg9 III v261, lac. Fiset to Middlebro, 18 September 1917, 10-G-147, rg9 III v277, lac; Gow to Fiset, 17 November 1917, 10-G-147, rg9 III v277, lac. Lessard Report, lac; Inspector-General, Western Canada to AdjutantGeneral, Canadian Militia, 18 June 1917, 10-H-89, rg9 III v282, lac. The Whitehead and Turner Story, privately held. Hyatt, “Canadian Generals of the First World War,” 425. omc submissions, 14 May 1918, O-153-33 v2, rg9 III v2892, lac; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 160. omc Submissions, 6 August 1918, lac; omc Submissions, 13 July 1918, lac; omc Submissions, November 1918, O-153-3 v4, rg9 III v2892, lac; omc Submissions, 6 August 1918, lac. Turner War Record, lac. Turner to Kemp, 29 April 1918, mg27 II D9 v161, Kemp Fonds, lac. Kemp to Secretary of State for War, 1 May 1918, mg27 II D9 v161, Kemp Fonds, lac. Currie to Kemp, 25 February 1918, C-41a, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac; Currie to Kemp, 6 March 1918, C-41a, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac; Currie to Minister, omfc, 25 February 1918, C-413, rg9 III v910, lac. ag Order A.G. 36-1-14, 11 February 1918, C-41-3, rg9 III v910, lac. Currie to hq, omfc, 11 March 1918, C-41-3, rg9 III v910, lac. Currie to Kemp, 14 March 1918, C-41a, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac. Kemp to Currie, 18 March 1918, C-41a, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac. General Officer Commander, 30 January 1918, C-41a, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac. Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 161; ghq Official Notice O.B./1041/1, 31 August 1918, C-41-3, rg9 III v910, lac; Demoblization Factors, dhh. Kemp to Secretary of State for War, 15 June 1918, C-41a, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac. Harris, “From Subordinate to Ally,” 123.

31 32

33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42

43 44 45 46 47 48

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notes to pag es 2 4 8 – 5 2 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78

331

Currie to Minister, omfc, 25 February 1918, lac. Turner to Kemp, 12 March 1918, lac. Stacey, Age of Conflict, 197. Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 201. Sutherland Brown to Unknown (Currie?), 1 April 1918, M-15-3, rg9 III v965, lac. Notes on Speech to House of Commons, 30 January 1917, 1-18, mg27 II D23 v1, Hughes Fonds, lac. Comparative Statement of Staffs Employed, mg30 E46 v6, Turner Fonds, lac. “IX.—Military Problems Overseas,” Manitoba Free Press, 2 March 1918. Officers Employed at omfc hq, 11 June 1918, mg30 E46 v11, Turner Fonds, lac. Sharman to Turner, 26 April 1918, M-29-36 v1, rg9 III v3090, lac. Policy cgs, 17 July 1918, O-83-33, rg9 III v3101, lac. Turner to Kemp, 5 April 1919, mg27 II D9 v136, Kemp Fonds, lac; Turner to Kemp, 3 April 1919, mg30 E46 v7, Turner Fonds, lac; Brigadier-General Charles Smart File, 10-S-68, rg9 III v331, lac. Turner to Sharman, 28 April 1918, M-29-36 v1, rg9 III v3090, lac; Lieutenant Quinney File, 10-Q-9, rg9 III v324, lac. McDonald to Turner, 18 June 1918, M-29-36, rg9 III v3091, lac. Memorandum to the Hon. Minister, 18 June 1918, C-73, mg27 II D9 v136, Kemp Fonds, lac. Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 170. Mewburn to Bristol, 13 April 1918, 10-C-394, rg9 III v261, lac. For more on censorship, see Keshen, Propaganda and Censorship, 66. Statements Made by General Smart, mg27 II D9 v161, Kemp Fonds, lac. Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 158; McAlpine to Urquhart, 12 November 1934, 12, mg4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds, McGill. Memo Canadian Overseas Military Organization, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac. McAlpine to Urquhart, 12 November 1934, McGill. Currie to Kemp, 16 May 1918, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac. Kemp to Currie, 22 May 1918, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac. Memorandum Canadian Overseas Military Organization, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac. O’Keefe and Macdonald, Merchant Prince, 70. “Sifton, Sir Clifford,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography. Rattray to Currie, 24 April 1918, lac. “The Coming Reorganization of Argyle [sic] House,” Manitoba Free Press, 23 May 1918.

332

notes to pa ges 2 5 2– 4

79 Cook, Politics of John W. Dafoe, 87. 80 Gow to Kemp, 25 May 1918, C-39, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac; Mewburn to Kemp, 29 May 1918, C-39, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac. 81 Kemp to Mewburn, 4 June 1918, C-39, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac; Kemp to Currie, 1 June 1918, mg27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds, lac. 82 Beaverbrook to Kemp, 20 February 1918, mg27 II G1 A1766, Beaverbrook Fonds, lac; O’Keefe and Macdonald, Merchant Prince, 91. 83 Douglas McDonald Hogarth Service Jacket, rg150 Acc1992–93/166, Box 4424 – 13, lac. 84 Captain H. White to Carson, 11 July 1916, 6-H-118, rg9 III v156, lac; Hughes to Carson, 3 May 1916, 6-H-118, rg9 III v156, lac; Hughes to Carson, 14 December 1915, 6-H-118, rg9 III v156, lac. 85 Borden to Perley, 24 November 1915, v4/3, mg27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds, lac; Perley to Borden, 10 December 1917, lac. 86 Turner to Currie, 1 October 1917, mg30 E100 v2, Currie Fonds, lac. 87 Kemp to Borden, 28 April 1918, 51197, mg26 H v96, Borden Fonds, lac; Harrington Letter, 3 August 1918, 10-T-158, rg9 III v339, lac. 88 Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 176. 89 Gow to Kemp, 2 October 1918, G-2, mg27 II D9 v143, Kemp Fonds, lac; Kemp to Turner, 25 October 1918, G-2, mg27 II D9 v143, Kemp Fonds, lac. 90 Gow to Kemp, 26 October 1918, G-2, mg27 II D9 v143, Kemp Fonds, lac. 91 Turner to Currie, 9 October 1918, lac. 92 Turner to Kemp, 4 November 1918, G-2, mg27 II D9 v143, Kemp Fonds, lac. 93 Gow to Kemp, 2 January 1919, G-2, mg27 II D9 v143, Kemp Fonds, lac; omc Submissions, November 1918, lac. 94 Gow to Turner, 2 January 1919, G-2, mg27 II D9 v143, Kemp Fonds, lac; Turner to Kemp, 28 October 1918, G-2, mg27 II D9 v143, Kemp Fonds, lac. 95 Borden and Borden, Borden: His Memoirs, 871. 96 Resignation of Gow, 24 January 1939, Box 2 8, 74/672, Directorate of History and Heritage. 97 Disturbances in Canadian Camps and Areas 1918–1919, gaq 10-39F, rg24 v1841, dhh. 98 Demoblization factors, dhh. 99 Rivard, “Bringing the Boys Home,” 48; White to Borden, 30 December 1918, 136632, mg26 H v241, Borden Fonds, lac. 100 Canadian Overseas Demobilization Committee First (Interim) Report,

notes to pag es 2 5 4 – 8

101 102 103

104 105 106

107 108 109

110 111

112 113 114

115 116 117 118 119 120

333

22 July 1918, O-153-33 v2, rg9 III v2892, lac; Graubard, “Military Demobilistion in Great Britain,” 298–304; Sheffield, The Chief, 341. Rivard, “Bringing the Boys Home,” 27; Meeting Notes with Minister, 6 November 1918, 194, mg30 E100 v43, Currie Fonds, lac. Faraday, “Half the Battle,” 265–77. For instance, see the complaints from representatives of the 44th Battalion: 44 Canadian Infantry, 11 February 1919, mg27 II D9 v166, Kemp Fonds, lac; Putkowski, Kinmel Park Camp Riots. See also Turner to Kemp, 7 March 1919, mg30 E46 v8, Turner Fonds, lac; Morton, “Kicking and Complaining,” 337. Comments on Morton’s “Kicking and Complaining,” 14 May 1980, Putkowski, Misc. 61 Item 900, iwm. Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 267. Court of Enquiry – Disturbances, Kinmel Park Camp, 22 March 1919, mg30 E46 v8, Turner Fonds, lac; Morton, “Kicking and Complaining,” 341–3. Memorandum of Conference Held on Saturday, June 21st 1919, mg30 E46 v8, Turner Fonds, lac. Disturbances in Canadian Camps and Areas 1918–19, dhh. Kemp to Borden, 12 March 1919, 55882-5, mg26 H v102, Borden Fonds, lac; Article, Sketch, 17 March 1919, rg9 III v106, lac; Turner to Kemp, 7 March 1919, lac; Coombs, “Dimensions of Military Leadership,” 421. Special Order of the Day, 20 June 1919, mg30 E46 v8, Turner Fonds, lac. Canadian Troops Overseas and the British Press, 15 July 1919, mg27 II D9 v170, Kemp Fonds, lac. For further complaints about British treatment, see Turner to Kemp, 28 July 1919, 10-R-7, rg9 III v323, lac. Kemp to Turner, 9 April 1918, mg27 II D9 v162, Kemp Fonds, lac. Kemp to Mewburn, 23 July 1919, 10-T-280, rg9 III v341, lac. Perley to Sir Joseph Pope, 7 December 1916, 10-P-52, rg9 III v318, lac; Composition of Overseas Dominion Forces, May 1917, mg30 E46 v1, Turner Fonds, lac. Borden to White, 9 December 1918, 55554, mg26 H v102, Borden Fonds, lac. “Turner Retires from Pension Commission,” Montreal Gazette, 6 September 1941. Turner to Mewburn, 29 May 1919, mg30 E46 v11, Turner Fonds, lac. “Hon. Richard Turner Obituary,” Montreal Gazette, 23 December 1917. Kemp to Borden, 31 July 1919, 51433, mg26 H v96, Borden Fonds, lac. Turner War Record, lac.

334

notes to pa g es 2 5 8 – 6 3

121 Turner Diary, 16 August 1919, 19710147-001/docs manu 58A 1 9.1, Turner Fonds, cwm. 122 Turner to Gimblett, 27 March 1920, 72, 2001/10, Duguid Fonds, dhh. 123 Beattie, 48th Highlanders, 433; “28th Battalion Plaque Unveiling,” Montreal Gazette, 10 August 1926; “Second Ypres Commerative Dinner,” Montreal Gazette, 14 April 1930. 124 Photographs, mg30 E236 v4, Villiers Fonds, lac; Macintyre, Canada at Vimy. 125 “Sir George Perley Funeral,” Montreal Gazette, 8 January 1938. 126 Fetherstonhaugh, 14th Battalion; Beattie, 48th Highlanders. 127 Bowering, Service, 6; Great War Veterans Association Minute Book, 12 April 1917, mg28 I298 v1, lac; ibid., 26 March 1917 and June 1917. 128 Bowering, Service, 3. 129 Barr and Sheffield, “Haig and the British Legion,” 228; Sheffield, The Chief, 353–4. 130 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 188. 131 Minute Book, 5 July 1921, lac; Bowering, Service, 10. 132 R.B. Maxwell to Turner, undated, 1921?, mg28 I298 v73, lac. 133 Scott, “Three Cheers for Earl Haig.” 134 Morton and Wright, Winning the Second Battle, 197. 135 Jarvie and Swift, Royal Canadian Legion, 27. 136 Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 314. 137 Great War Veterans Association Minute Book, 30 June 1925, mg28 I298 v1, lac. 138 Report of Proceedings of the National Unity Conference and Draft Constitution, 44, mg28 I298 v43, lac. 139 “Ontario Veterans to Meet,” Montreal Gazette, 15 April 1926. 140 Turner Service Jacket, lac. 141 “Turner Retires from Pension Commission,” Montreal Gazette, 6 September 1941. 142 “Turner to March,” Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph, 24 May 1956. 143 Bouchard interview. 144 Diefenbaker to Mrs Ross, 21 June 1961, Turner Family Fonds, privately held. 145 “Turner Obituary,” Montreal Gazette, 22 June 1961. conclusion 1 Leadership Statements and Quotes, 18. 2 Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 53; Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 210; Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 38; Delaney, The Soldiers’ General, xi; Graham, General Guy Simonds, 60. 3 Hughes, “General Allenby,” 12. 4 Jeffery, Sir Henry Wilson, 167.

notes to pag es 2 6 4 – 7 2

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5 FM 6-22. 6 Bourne, “Major-General Heneker,” 62. 7 Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 141; Horn et al., Warrior Chiefs, 50-1. 8 Sims to Aitken, 6 June 1916, A1765, mg27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds, lac; Turner to Carson, 7 April 1916, rg9 III v116, lac; Turner to Carson, 24 January 1916, 6-Mc-163, rg9 III v184, lac. 9 Fuller, Generalship, 18, 54. 10 Confidential Order, Chief of General Staff, ghq to Second Army C.B. 888, 3 October 1915, 42/1, rg9 III v4098, lac. 11 Turner to Hetty, 15 May 1915, cwm. 12 Travers, Killing Ground, 13. 13 Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 189; Sheffield, The Chief, 143. 14 Graham and Bidwell, Coalitions, Politicians & Generals, 93. 15 Currie to Carson, 8 July 1916, lac; Gunn File, 6-G-18, rg9 III v148, lac; Major-General Sir Samuel Steele File, lac. 16 Turner to Hetty, 30 September 1916, cwm. 17 Ibid., 25 June 1915. 18 “Turner Obituary.” 19 Cotton to Mother, 19 November 1915, 93/24/1, iwm; Parson Diary, 24 October 1915, mg30 E117 v3, Parson Fonds, lac; Nickle Interview, Tape 5, rg41 v10, lac. 20 McGill and Norris, Medicine and Duty, 23, 192; Interview J.M. Fryday and G. Gibson, 27th Battalion, 1963, lac; Fraser and Roy, Journal of Private Fraser, 75; cbc Interview: Snape, rg41 v6, lac. 21 Robbins, British Generalship, 527; Age of goc in the Canadian Corps, gaq 10-55, rg24 v1843, lac. 22 Wavell, Generals and Generalship, 2. 23 Alderson to Second Army G.271, 18 April 1916, tna. 24 Turner to Hetty, 15 May 1915, cwm; ibid., 12 September 1916; Turner Diary, 7 October 1916, cwm. 25 Turner Diary, 7 December 1914, 2 February 1915, 7 December 1914, 2 February 1915, cwm. 26 Turner to Carson, 3 October 1915, 42/1, rg9 III v4098, lac. 27 Turner to Carson, 11 February 1916, 4-5-13b, rg9 III v12, lac; Carson to Hughes, 15 October 1915, 4-10-52, rg9 III v21, lac; Turner to Carson, 8 December 1915, rg24 v6937, lac. 28 Lt-Col. Harvie to Odlum, 27 August 1917, lac. 29 Report on officers for year ending July 1904, hq 145, rg24 v6413, lac. 30 Brennan, “The Other Battle”; Andrews, The Anzac Illusion, 31. 31 “History of Passports.” 32 Carson to Aitken, 9 June 1916, lac.

336 33 34 35 36 37

notes to pa ges 2 7 2– 8 Turner to Hastings, 13 April 1918, 41/1, rg9 III v4688, lac. Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 157. Sheffield, The Chief, 152. Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 289–91. Riley, Napoleon as a General, 5.

appendix 2 1 Leppard, “The Dashing Subaltern.” 2 Leppard, “Battle of St. Eloi”; Campbell, “The Divisional Experience”; Campbell, “Leap in the Dark”; Copp, “Slaughter at St. Eloi”; Cook, “Blind Leading the Blind.” 3 Leppard, “The Dashing Subaltern,” 21. 4 Ibid. 5 Campbell, “Forgotten Victory”; Campbell, “Leap in the Dark.” 6 Greenhous, Canada and the Battle of Vimy Ridge, 27; Cassar, Hell in Flanders, 61. 7 Greenfield, Baptism of Fire, 197; Gustavson, “Missing the Boat?,” 59; Brown, Borden, 2:63; Dancocks, Gallant Canadians, 81. 8 Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 81; Dancocks, Sir Arthur Currie, 60; Leppard, “Battle of St. Eloi,” 11; Cook, “Documenting War,” 278. 9 Campbell, “The Divisional Experience,” 157. 10 Brennan and Leppard, “How the Lessons Were Learned,” 138; Cassar, Hell in Flanders, 321; Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 86. 11 Brennan, “Byng and Leadership in the Canadian Corps,” 89; Dancocks, Sir Arthur Currie, 81; Morton, “Exerting Control,” 12; Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 62. 12 Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 92. 13 Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers, 312. 14 Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 130; Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 269; Harris, Canadian Brass, 134; Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 118. 15 Macintyre Diary, 26 November 1916, lac. 16 Fraser and Roy, Journal of Private Fraser, 75. 17 Frost et al., Wartime Letters, 118. 18 Fetherstonhaugh, 14th Battalion; Beattie, 48th Highlanders. 19 Sheffield, The Chief, 340. 20 Currie, The Red Watch; Beaverbrook, Canada in Flanders. 21 R.B. Maxwell to Turner, undated, 1921?, lac. 22 Cook, The Madman and the Butcher, 336–59; Demill, “Coburg Libel Trial”; Wilson, “Coburg Court Room.” 23 Duguid, Canadian Forces, 1. 24 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 10; Gustavson, “Missing the Boat?”; Travers, “Allies in Conflict”; Travers, “Currie and 1st Canadian Division.”

notes to pag es 2 7 8 – 8 0

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25 Comments on Official History, 1936, dhs 10-10-E, rg24 v1756, lac; Duguid memorandum, 1934, hq 683-1-30-5 v2, rg24 v1756, lac. 26 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 10, 88. 27 Loomis to Hughes, 20 January 1934, 22, mg27 II D23 v14, Hughes Fonds, lac. 28 Edmonds to Duguid, 18 March 1925, lac. 29 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 10, 88; Travers, “Currie and 1st Canadian Division”; Travers, “Allies in Conflict.” 30 Edmonds, Military Operations, 1916, 2:413. 31 Swettenham, To Seize the Victory; Goodspeed, The Road Past Vimy. 32 Nicholson, CEF . 33 Chartrand, Canadian Military Heritage, vol. 3; Freeman and Nielsen, Far from Home; Granatstein, Canada’s Army; Granatstein, Two World Wars; Hillmer and Granatstein, Empire to Umpire; Marteinson, Stand on Guard; Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers. 34 Haycock, Sam Hughes; Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics; Morton, When Your Number’s Up; Harris, Canadian Brass. 35 Cook, At the Sharp End; Cook, Shock Troops. 36 Love, A Nation in the Making. 37 Holt, “Filling the Ranks,” iii.

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Index

adjutant-general, 172, 185, 199, 204, 245 air force. See Canadian air force, Turner’s support for Aitken, Max (Beaverbrook): as Hughes’s representative, 150, 158, 163, 209; as intermediary with British, 80–1, 106–8, 154 Alderson, Edwin (British), 22, 25, 45; competence, 46, 63–4, 68–9, 94, 119; conflicts over officers, 64, 80– 1; criticism of Turner, 75, 103–6; Haig’s relations with, 69–70, 108; Hughes’s relations with, 66, 81, 106, 112; Turner’s relations with, 60, 65–7, 79, 91, 109 Ancre Heights, Battle of, 140–4 Argyll House (omfc headquarters), 180, 187, 203, 222–3, 227–9; attacks on, 186, 237, 244, 248–51 artillery training, 154–5, 162, 181–2, 198 assistant military secretary, 189–92, 213, 247 atrocities, 27, 133 Australia and New Zealand, 8, 14, 39–42, 96–7, 251, 254; administrative structure, 165–6, 181, 185, 215–16 Bell, A.H., 74, 116, 135, 286 Bishop, William “Billy,” 215, 217, 244, 253 Borden, Sir Robert, 202, 240, 253–4; and Currie, 216, 230; dissatisfaction, 152, 157, 188; 5th Division,

195, 224; and Hughes, Garnet, 194, 211, 225; and Hughes, Sam, 45, 75, 151, 201; omfc formed, 163, 164, 167; omfc staffing, 167, 168–9, 174; political influence, 189, 193, 240–1; St Eloi, 106, 108, 110 Brooke, Lord (British), 76, 80, 150, 161, 163 Brutinel, Raymond, 182, 196, 214– 15 Burstall, Sir H., 142, 144, 148, 194 Byng, Sir Julian, 119; assessment of, 108, 119, 134; battle command, 116, 118, 142, 143; Currie’s selection, 206, 209; dissatisfaction, 154, 156, 190, 196; recommends officers, 172, 182, 184, 193–4; training, 121, 179, 199; and Turner, 124, 191, 197, 202, 236; Turner’s selection, 167, 168, 169, 264 Canadian air force, Turner’s support for, 184, 215–18, 234, 257 Canadian Army Service Corps (casc), 157, 187, 252 Canadian Corps reorganization, 220–2, 234, 257 Canadian Legion, 188, 239, 258–60, 267, 274 Canadian Machine Gun Corps, 41, 182–3, 232; Brutinel, Raymond, 196, 214–15; Currie forms additional company, 222–3, 224, 225; problems, 154–6, 161, 203, 228, 236–7

370 Canadian Section at ghq, 247, 248, 267 Carson, John Wallace, 5–6; Hughes’s minion, 64, 151, 158; organizational flaws, 180, 188, 191, 204; and organization in England, 150, 163, 171, 172; personal flaws, 151, 160, 162, 179; political interference by, 115, 116, 268; requests to, 79, 108, 109, 116 chaplain service, 157, 172, 187–8, 247 conscription and conscripts, 220, 240–1, 254–5 Cook, Tim, 42, 198, 232, 260; battle discussion, 65, 98, 276 counter-battery, 57, 138, 147, 209 Courcelette, Battle of, 114, 122–33, 263–4, 270–1 Critchley, A., 184, 202 Currie, Sir Arthur: and Alderson conflict, 65, 66, 70, 80; British approval of, 75, 208, 225; complaints, 53, 214, 218–19; corps command, 212–13, 221–2; demobilization, 254–5; embezzlement, 211–12, 235; and Kemp, 225, 226, 243, 246–7, 250–1; post-armistice, 229–31; promotions, 190, 213–14; protects officers, 227, 228, 248; relationship with Garnet Hughes, 45, 80, 211, 225; reputation, 65, 213, 262–3; Sims, unfavourable view of, 211, 247; technical arms, 199, 222–4; veterans, 259–60; views on Canadian staff, 81, 184–5; Ypres, Second Battle of, 54, 57, 58, 59, 65. See also Currie and Turner; Currie career outline; Currie personality Currie, Sir Arthur, career outline, 43, 48, 207, 209–10; rejects omfc position, 168 Currie, Sir Arthur, personality: curt tone, 232–3; description, 207–9, 219, 270; disciplinarian, 144, 268; importance of money, 235; sensitivity, 232 Currie, Sir Arthur, and Turner: comparison, 265–7, 272–4; conflict, 66, 231–8, 264; reasons for conflict, 234–8; Turner’s broader view, 237

index Currie mp, John, 44, 57 Daly, Harold, 211, 219, 229 demobilization, 172, 232, 254–6, 265, 272 discipline: during demobilization, 254, 255; external evaluation, 44, 133, 157, 196, 247; responsibility for, 172, 212; 2nd Division, 77–8, 79, 115, 144; training, 149, 178, 179–80, 227; Turner and Currie’s approach to, 144, 208, 250, 268 doctrine, 91–2, 95, 271; tactical, 87, 120–2, 145, 146–7 drafts. See replacements Duguid, A., 8, 112, 254; on Festubert, 67, 70; Second Ypres, 47, 65 effectiveness of administration in England: definition, 149–50; improvements in, 177–81, 184–5, 195–7, 204, 270; problems, 154–6, 162 efficiency of administration in England: definition, 149–50; improvements in, 185–9, 195, 204, 270; problems, 156–7 election, 1917 federal, 219, 220, 224, 240–2, 257 Embury, J., 116, 117, 247, 266 engineers, 42, 51, 67; increase in establishment, 221–3, 224, 228; St Eloi, Battle of, 82, 94, 98, 100; training challenges, 154–5, 162, 182, 198, 203 equipment, faulty Canadian, 112, 153–4, 189, 271. See also Ross rifle Festubert, Battle of, 66–71, 108, 211, 267, 277 Field Service Regulations (fsr), 60, 77, 120, 146 Fiset, Eugene, 167, 224 Forestry Troops, Canadian, 5, 176, 226–7, 251 French, Sir John (British), 24, 75, 112, 197, 212; Ypres, Second Battle of, 54, 65 French Canada, 74, 205, 220; French Canadians, 20, 199; French-speaking, 13, 242

index

371 Second Battle of, 51, 54, 57–9, 62, 63 Hughes, Sir Sam: air force, 215, 217; Alderson relationship with, 66, 81, 106, 109; Borden forces out, 163, 164, 167; Byng handles, 119; Currie, 163, 211, 230; defends Ross rifle, 111–12; dislike of pf officers, 17, 19, 161, 256; explaining Turner’s support for, 263, 268, 270; 1st Division, 42, 45; nepotism, 80, 115, 158–9; officers supported by, 80, 151, 204, 207, 252; problems in uk, 152, 153, 157, 183, 191; problems with, 108, 149, 150, 159, 160–1; resigns, 164; 2nd Division, 75, 76; Turner relationship with, 38, 43, 64, 112, 249 Hughes, William, 107, 115, 159, 265, 272 Hundred Days Campaign, 228–9, 230, 234, 254, 272–3

gas: anti-gas training, 41, 180, 181, 198, 228; Ypres, Second Battle of, 48, 49, 50, 55, 57 Geddes, A.D. (British Army) and Geddes Detachment, 49, 54, 55, 57, 63 General Headquarters (ghq), 146, 237; Canadian Corps relations with, 109, 119, 218, 219; Canadian representative, 80, 203; Canadian Section, 177, 243, 246–8, 257; control, 41, 212–13, 222; St Eloi, 99, 101, 106; Turner relations, 79, 267, 270, 273 George V, King (British), 34, 254, 255 Gordon-Hall, G. (British), 61, 69 Gough, Sir Hubert (British), 67, 148; Canadians dislike of, 147, 209; command style, 120, 142, 143, 145, 146; Courcelette, Battle of, 122, 127, 131, 136 Gow, Walter, 174, 195, 244, 247, 252; conflict with Turner, 210, 253–4, 258, 271–2 Gwatkin, Willoughby (British), 167, 240

influenza, reaction to, 220, 227, 229 intelligence, 81, 172; pre-war, 25, 26, 36; St Eloi, 92, 94, 95, 98–100, 102; Somme, 143, 145

Haig, Sir Douglas (British): Canadian relations, 154, 184, 191, 194–5, 225–6; command, 115, 120, 182, 213, 220; confidence in Currie, 208, 209, 273; Courcelette, 122, 124, 136; Festubert, 67–9, 70; opinion of Turner, 210, 218, 268; post-war reputation, 259–60, 263– 4, 277–8; sacking Turner, 96, 104, 106, 108, 110–11; Somme campaign, 119, 143, 144; St Eloi, 83–4, 85, 87, 94, 101 Haldane, Aylmer (British), 84, 85, 87, 91, 110 Harington, C.H. “Tim” (British), 110, 135; St Eloi, 95, 96, 107, 115 Hilliam, Edward, 95, 141 Hogarth, Donald, 242, 252, 255 Hughes, Garnet Burk, 175; as brigade major, 44–5, 64, 66, 67; as goc 5th Division, 154, 194, 221, 224–5; political influence, 80, 159, 241, 265, 271; relationship with Currie, 208, 209, 211; at Ypres,

Kemp, Sir A.E. (Edward): complaints about Turner, 192, 228, 256, 271; Currie relationship with, 212, 218– 19, 221–2, 226; decisions of, 217, 220, 250; defends Turner, 231, 250; 5th Division, 194, 225, 226– 7; as minister of Militia, 164–5, 176, 178, 189; as minister of omfc, 239–40, 250–2; motivation for reforms, 232, 242; referee, 229– 30, 238, 246, 253–4; reforms, 218– 19, 243–4, 245–6, 246–8; Turner relationship with, 205–6, 256–7, 265 Ker, C. (British), 76–7, 84, 95, 109, 272 Ketchen, H.D.B., 193; Courcelette, Battle of, 131, 135, 139; goc 6th Brigade, 76, 79, 81–2, 116; St Eloi aftermath, 104, 105, 106, 107, 111; St Eloi, Battle of, 90–1, 92, 93, 102, 103 King’s Regulations and Orders, 71, 242

372 Kitchener, Sir Horatio (British), 34, 43, 75, 81 Leckie, Robert, 44, 194 Leliefontein, Battle of, 28–33, 35 Lessard, Francois: in Boer War, 20, 24, 26, 30–3; in First World War, 43, 153, 244 Lipsett, L. (British), 168, 219, 225 logistics, 62, 65, 146, 212 Loomis, Sir F.O.W., 219, 265; as battalion commander, 44, 57, 58 McCay, James (Australian), 97–8, 196 McDonald, H.F., 46, 220, 250; assessments of, 172, 175, 196, 203– 4; as chief of staff, 172, 177, 197, 199, 204–5; training challenges, 223, 224, 228–9; visit to Canada, 244, 253 Macdonell, A.C., 51, 116, 211 Macdonell, Sir A.H., 116, 142, 144, 208 MacDougall, J.C., 150, 161, 162, 171, 186 machine guns, 112; in battles, 58, 70, 85, 91; in Boer War, 29, 30, 32; Somme, Battle of, 117, 128, 130, 140, 144 Macintyre, D.E., 138, 139, 170; St Eloi, 98, 99 Macphail, A., 76, 77, 151 McRae, A.D., 174, 175, 203; omfc reorganization memo, 250–1, 252; reforms, 187–9, 195 manpower categories, 157, 187; and Turner, 158, 185–6, 187, 195 medical branch, 127, 156–7, 162, 186, 229; in Boer War, 27, 34; subordinated to adjutant-general, 172, 247 Meighen, F., 44, 70, 151, 163, 241 Mercer, Malcolm, 43, 49, 81 Mewburn, S.C., 240, 244, 250, 252, 257; Currie setting policy, 131, 243 Militia, Non-Permanent Active: ethos, 80, 268; officers, 40, 43, 52, 65, 74, 76; patronage, 13, 16, 158, 193, 111; pre-war, 13–15, 18–19, 31, 36–7, 190 Montague, F., 77, 203; as assistant

index military secretary, 189–90, 192–3, 213–14 Morrison, Sir E.W.B., 107–8, 155; in Boer War, 19, 28, 30, 31, 32 Morton, Desmond, 15, 43, 164, 165; on Currie, 211, 231; on Turner, 96, 248 officers exchange, 228–9, 233, 244–5 Overseas Military Council (omc), 243–4, 245, 257 Parsons, J.L.R., 81, 92 Perley, Sir George: as acting high commissioner, 61, 110, 150; 5th Division, 194–5, 224; as mediator between Turner and Currie, 213, 234, 236, 238; as minister omfc, 189–90, 191, 193–4; Currie–Perley relationship, 209–10, 212, 218–19; establishing omfc, 163–4, 165, 171, 174; issues, 157, 186–7, 200, 215–17; Kemp takes over, 178, 239–40, 242, 243 Perley and Turner: selected for uk, 16, 167–9, 264; Turner–Perley relationship, 172, 197–8, 201–2; Turner’s influence, 256, 265 Permanent Force (pf), 13, 16, 17, 36, 40; Boer War officers, 19, 20; First World War officers, 77, 116, 173, 194, 211; Hughes’s antipathy to, 43, 161–2, 256; 2nd Division officers, 74, 75, 76 Plumer, Herbert (British): goc Second Army, 79, 87, 93, 103, 105; at Second Battle of Ypres, 48, 61; St Eloi, 83–4, 85, 87, 94, 95; St Eloi aftermath, 96, 104, 106, 110; St Eloi responsibility, 101, 102, 103, 111 press, 76, 250, 251–2, 278; British press views, 255, 272; negative coverage, 219, 230, 249, 250; positive coverage, 15, 24, 75, 169, 261 promotions: Currie’s, 209–10, 221– 2; issues with Currie, 213–14, 214– 15, 230–1, 253, 265–7; patronage, 14, 80, 115, 119, 194, 252; problems with, 152, 156, 157, 158–9, 194; reforms, 171, 189–90; responsibility for, 41, 212–13, 245–6

index Quartermaster-General: improvements in, 185, 187–9; under Kemp, 245, 247; in omfc, 167, 171, 172, 174, 205; problems with, 149, 157 raids, 81–2, 118–20 Railway Troops, Canadian, 176, 190, 226, 227, 251 Rattray, J., 205, 251 regimental reform, 178–9, 181, 186, 199 Rennie, Robert, 80, 93, 94, 136 replacements: background, 149–50, 152, 175–6, 185, 220; 5th Division as a source of, 223, 224; issues on the Somme, 132, 136, 144, 145, 153; issues under Hughes, 153–4, 155, 156, 161, 204; issues under Turner, 182, 198–9, 204–5, 222, 229; praise for, 196, 197, 229, 238; Turner’s actions, 178, 180, 199– 200, 204, 227–8 Robertson, Sir William (British), 83, 193–5, 234, 237 Rogers, C., 78, 116, 158 Rogers, Robert, 75, 76, 108, 257 Romer, Cecil (British), 59–60, 64, 65, 69, 70 Ross rifle, 62, 111–12, 189, 270–1; Hughes’s support of, 106, 111, 153, 157 Royal Military College (Kingston), 44, 77, 146, 173, 183 Sifton, Clifford, 250–1, 252 signals, 36, 41, 154, 198, 228 Sims, Manley: Currie’s dislike of, 211, 213, 246–7, 248; role, 194, 200, 203, 214, 242 Smart, C.A., 162, 228, 250 Smith-Dorrien, Sir Horace (British), 28–30, 33, 34, 48, 269 Snider, I., 79, 104, 117; St Eloi, 90, 93, 101 Snow, Sir Thomas (British), 47, 61, 63 St Eloi Craters, Battle of, 72, 82–96, 96, 115, 215 staff: issues with, 161, 162, 198; officers, 172, 173–4; poor, at Ypres, 52, 63, 67, 70; role of, 114, 172, 213; 2nd Division, 74, 80, 87, 109,

373 110; 3rd Brigade, 40, 46; Turner advocates for Canadians, 81, 166, 184–5, 221; Turner’s training in, 36–8, 235, 271 Steele, Sir Sam: as goc 2nd Division, 75, 76, 77; as goc Southeast District, 150, 155, 156, 161, 162; as intriguer, 172, 193 surplus officers, 178, 190, 205, 221, 225; disposal, 178, 186, 191–3, 249; numbers, 161, 183 tanks, 124, 126, 127, 137–8; Turner’s views, 134, 271 Thacker, P., 192, 205, 215, 223, 224; appointments, 77, 172–5; and Kemp, 243, 247, 256; Turner, 203– 4, 220, 226, 233, 241 Thiepval Heights, Battle of, 137–9, 144, 147 Tobin, H., 110, 117 Tremblay, T., 116, 117, 132, 144, 266 Turner, Sir Richard: awards, 24, 33– 4, 43, 197, 275; Boer War service, 17–36; business career, 11–13, 26, 205, 239, 258; family, 11–13, 16, 17, 20–1, 258, 261; political affiliation, 16, 168, 263; pre-war military career, 13, 14, 15, 16, 34–5, 37–8; and veterans, 258–60 Turner, Sir Richard, administrative career: errors, 198–9, 220–2, 253– 4, 254–6; historical reputation, 169, 172, 197–8, 213, 253–4; policy, 231–2, 232–3; in 1917, 171, 172–4, 176, 180; in 1918, 225–7, 228–9; reasons for success, 201–6; selection, 167–9. See also effectiveness of administration in England; efficiency of administration in England; promotions Turner, Sir Richard, assessment of: as administrator, 195–201, 231–8, 256–7; in Boer War, 33–8; as brigade commander, 60–6, 70–1; as division commander, 93, 96– 104, 120–2, 134–5, 145–8; overall, 264–72 Turner, Sir Richard, characteristics of: communicator, 265, 269; conservative approach, 182, 201,

374 270–1; constitution of, 35, 46, 47, 140, 204, 269–70; courage, 20, 35, 51, 69–70, 79–80, 90, 94, 103, 142, 264, 267; injuries, 32–3, 34, 46, 66; disciplinarian, 144, 268; identity, 14–15, 184, 272; keeps familiar officers, 174–5, 192–3, 252, 272; management style, 187, 188, 203–6, 244, 248; man management, 77, 128–30, 206, 220, 267– 8; modesty, 261, 262, 268, 269; negative features, 51, 57, 91, 272; no cypher, 203, 208; physical description of, 17, 269; respected by men, 15, 35–6, 170, 260, 277; sang froid, 25, 27, 35; tact, lack of, 28, 271; view on duty, 168–9, 210, 268; visits the front, 78, 90, 139– 40, 202, 267 Turner, Sir Richard, and goc 2nd Division: Ancre Heights, Battle of, 140–2; Courcelette, Battle of, 122– 36; pre-Somme, 116–22; selection, 71, 75, 77, 78; St Eloi, Battle of, 82–96, 103–4, 104–11; Thiepval, Battle of, 136–9 Turner, Sir Richard, and goc 3rd Brigade: broken collarbone, 46; in England, 45–6; Festubert, Battle of, 66–70; selection, 42–3; Valcartier, 42–4; Ypres, Second Battle of, 46–62 Turner, Sir Richard, life outline: born, 11; chief of the General Staff, omfc, 245; command, 3rd Cavalry Brigade, 38; command, qoch, 37– 8; death, 261; joined business, 13; joined qoch, 13; married, 21–2; Pension Commission, 258; promotion, brigadier-general, 43; promotion, lieutenant-general, 210; promotion, major, 16; returns to Canada, 258; selected, goc Canadian Forces, 167–9; selected, goc 3rd Brigade, 43; selected, goc 3rd Division, 71; serves in Boer war, 17–36

index Vernon, S. (British), 94, 98–9 veterans’s movement. See Canadian Legion veterinary service, 36, 214 Villiers, Paul, 46, 63–4 War Office, 80, 182, 188, 193; complaints, 150, 154, 156, 159, 191; demands more Canadians, 194, 215, 220–1; meets Canadian demands, 41, 177, 248; standards used, 179, 181, 185, 195, 270 Watson, Sir David, 102, 168, 212, 265; as commander, 76, 79, 115, 116, 163; St Eloi, 83, 94 Webber, Norman (British), 109, 113, 120–1, 134, 145 Wigle, E.S, 110, 117 Williams, Victor, 19, 21, 26 Ypres, Second Battle of, 39, 47–62, 82, 97, 263