The Edwardian army: recruiting, training, and deploying the British Army, 1902-1914 9780191741401, 9780199542789

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
Acknowledgements (page vii)
Introduction (page 1)
1. The Officer Corps (page 7)
2. The Other Ranks (page 41)
3. Training and Doctrine (page 64)
4. The Auxiliary Forces (page 106)
5. The Public Face of the Army (page 147)
6. The British Army and the British Empire (page 183)
Conclusion (page 215)
Bibliography (page 219)
Index of British Army Units and Formations (page 233)
Index (page 236)

Citation preview

THE EDWARDIAN ARMY

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The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training, and Deploying the British

Army 1902-1914 TIMOTHY BOWMAN MARK CONNELLY

OXFORD

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UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Timothy Bowman & Mark Connelly 2012

The moral rights of the author have been asserted First published in 2012 Reprinted 2012 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above

You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 978-0-19-954278-9

Contents

Acknowledgements vii Introduction 1 1. The Officer Corps 7 2. The Other Ranks 4]

3. Training and Doctrine 64 4. The Auxiliary Forces 106

5. The Public Face of the Army 147

Conclusion 215 Bibliography 219 6. The British Army and the British Empire 183

Index 236 Index of British Army Units and Formations 233

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Acknowledgements Any work of modern British military history must rely on the archival holdings at the Imperial War Museum, The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives

at King’s College, London, the National Army Museum, and The National Archives. We would like to thank the archivists at all of these institutions for their help and advice. Our research for this book also relied on two important local institutions which are currently endangered by government cutbacks, the regimental museums and the County Record Offices. With regard to the regimental museums we would particularly like to thank Major Jack Dunlop of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers Museum, Captain Robert Bonner of the Manchester Regiment Museum, Barrie Duncan of the Scottish Rifles Museum, Justine Taylor of the Honourable Artil-

lery Company Archives, and the stafts of the Guards Museum, Royal Scots Museum, Hampshire Regiment Museum, Staffordshire Regiment Museum, Bufts Museum, Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry Museum, Durham Light Infan-

try Museum, Royal Ulster Rifles Museum, and Yorkshire Yeomanry Museum. With regard to the County Record Offices we would like to acknowledge our thanks to The Centre for Kentish Studies, Cumbrian Records Office, Dorset History Centre, Durham Record Office, Luton and Bedfordshire Archives (especially

Nigel Lutt), London Metropolitan Archives, Northamptonshire Record Office, Staffordshire Record Office, and Tameside Record Office. Otherwise we would like to thank the staffs at the National Archives of Scot-

land, National Library of Scotland, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (especially Ian Montgomery), Royal Military Academy Sandhurst archives, Uni-

versity of London Special Collections, University of Durham Archives, and University of Edinburgh Archives for their help and advice. We would also like to thank the librarians in the inter-library loan section of the Templeman Library, University of Kent, and of the British Library for their help.

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Introduction The British army during the Edwardian and early Georgian period is a fascinating subject which has already attracted the attention of scholars for a number of

obvious reasons. During the period 1902 to 1914 the army, like its parent nation, underwent a huge upheaval. Shocked by the nature of combat in the South African War in which modern firepower caused many to question every

aspect of British military thinking, the army commenced a long period of reform under various political masters, culminating in those introduced and overseen by R. B. Haldane between 1906 and 1913. The army was forced to reconsider the way it trained officers and men, its tactics, and its equipment. As the army attempted to make sense of its experiences in South Africa, the Russo-Japanese War broke out, throwing up more intellectual problems regarding the nature of modern warfare and the form any future hostilities might take. Plotting a way through these issues was by no means simple or easily apparent to all. In fact, as will be seen, ambiguity emerged at almost every turn and the distillation of distinct, consistent lessons proved exceptionally difficult from the evidence at hand. The forces of reform unleashed by the South African and Russo-Japanese wars did not take place in a military vacuum detached from wider national and international events. Britain changed rapidly between 1902 and 1914. Internally, a much more vigorous democracy emerged through more and more adult males reaching the franchise qualifications, and organized labour gained its own distinctive political voice in the Labour party. Encouraged by compulsory state education, the British working class became more vocal and articulate in its demands, forcing responses

from the established Liberal and Unionist political parties. As industrial unrest became increasingly bitter and protracted, by the turn of the decade the army was deployed in aid of the civil power with greater frequency. In turn, this sharpened still further the attitude of the British working class towards the army. With the labouring classes providing the vast majority of the other ranks, it was important to maintain an image of the army as a national, rather than partisan, institution. It was a position even more keenly felt in Ireland, with the army’s attitude to home rule and the growth of nationalist feeling providing further schisms between the army and sections of the population. At the same time, the army was keen to encourage a better class of recruit in order to meet the challenges of the modern battlefield, but the ambiguities of its domestic image were to prove a difficult obstacle

to surmount. Reform was therefore undertaken within a society marked by a

2 The Edwardian Army greater class consciousness and deepening political divides which debated the precise role and demographic of the army with great passion.’

At the same time, the international situation was undergoing seismic shifts. Britain's isolation at the start of the South African War left it dangerously exposed

to other enemies and the nation felt ill-disguised hostility aimed its way from a number of nations, major and minor. Within a short space of time Britain signed an alliance with Japan and came to understandings with two long-standing rivals, Prance and Russia.” Much of this diplomatic manoeuvring was designed to achieve two aims, security for Britain’s far-flung empire and stability in continental Europe, which appeared to be threatened by an increasingly strident Germany. ‘These devel-

opments did not simplify matters for the army, for they did not provide much clarification on its future role. The empire’s security was still an important, active matter, but it was now contending with an increasing likelihood of fighting on the continent should hostilities break out between the major powers. Whether all sections of the army fully comprehended this possibility and prepared accordingly is not at all clear. With Germany increasingly antagonistic, the invasion threat was renewed, but the kind of force required to defend the home shores was not a matter of consen-

sus. As the regular army was primarily an imperial defence force with overseas commitments, there was a need to supplement the home-based units with auxiliary forces. ‘The existing auxiliary forces had been pulled into the South African War and, like the regular army, had been left exposed to a good deal of critical scrutiny. In the wake of the war there was, therefore, as much talk about the reform of auxiliary forces as there was of regular. By the middle of the decade a fiercely vocal conscription lobby was emerging, backed by sections of the highbrow and

popular press which then had a considerable impact on the way Haldane’s preferred solution of the Territorial Force was perceived.

Finding a way through these many interlocking issues was never likely to be easy, but it was complicated still further by the army’s lack of profile in the defence

plan for the British Empire. Despite its many and various duties, the army remained very much the junior partner of the Royal Navy. The precedence of the Royal Navy made an enormous impact on the army during a period in which naval

' Dedicated studies of Edwardian and early Georgian Britain remain remarkably thin on the ground in comparison to studies of Britain in the Victorian era or the interwar period. Many treat the thirteen years from Queen Victorias death as some kind of coda to the nineteenth century and they are thus included in so-called ‘long nineteenth century histories. For examples of focused studies on this period see Donald Read, Edwardian England, 1901-1915 (London: Harrap, 1972); George L. Bernstein, Liberalism and Liberal politics in Edwardian England (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986); Frans Coetzee, For Party or Country: nationalism and the dilemmas of popular conservatism in Edwardian England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); David Powell, Edwardian Crisis: Britain, 1901-1914 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996). The most readable study of the Edwardian mentalité remains Samuel Hynes, The Edwardian Turn of Mind (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). * ‘The historiography of Britain’s international realignments in this period is extremely impressive. For good examples see Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1977) and David French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, 1905-1915 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982).

Introduction 3 armaments were revolutionized. With the launch of HMS Dreadnought in 1906, a new era in naval weaponry was instigated. Having made all other ships obsolete, the British started a new and hugely expensive naval arms race. As the Royal Navy

swallowed large sums from the public purse, any reform of the army had to be based on very limited budgets. Indeed, for many Liberals economy was the only measure of the army's efhiciency. The British army was therefore caught in a complex web of issues throughout the period from 1902 to 1914, and all played a part in shaping the nature of the force that went to war in August 1914. Much of the existing historiography leaves the period between the end of the war in South Africa and the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in a vacuum. There is an impressive array of scholarship on the South African War and a vast historiography of the Great War. Much of this work, whether academic or popular, naturally enough treats the period between 1902 and 1914 as either a brief epilogue or prologue. Despite this general trend, some historians have tackled certain aspects of the British army in this period and have produced some extremely interesting and valuable studies. However, there is no complete overview, with the existing work concentrating on a few themes rather than a comprehensive whole. This study aims to provide that overview and will both complement and challenge some of the interpretations in the current historiography. Among those who have looked at the pre-war British army, a major influencing factor has been Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds’s judgement contained in the 1914 volumes of his multi-part official history of British military operations on the Western Front. According to Edmonds, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) dispatched to France in 1914 was ‘in every respect...incomparably the best trained, best organized, and best equipped British Army which ever went forth to war’.° This view was based on the concept that the British had learnt their lessons from the South African War and had moved on decisively and effectively. Popular historians in particular have taken this as a sign that the British army in 1914 was a paragon of military excellence and

virtue. John Terraine encapsulated this approach in his history of the conflict, 7he First World War, 1914-1918: ‘this highly trained body of men was to set a tone in the early days of the war that few could match’.‘ By contrast, many academic historians have taken a more nuanced line. Keith Simpson pointed out the many strengths and equal number of weaknesses in the BEF of 1914. He identified its lack of trained staff, its inability to sustain largescale operations over a prolonged period, and the lack of experience at commanding large numbers of men.’ His approach has been enhanced by historians such as Nikolas Gardner in Trial by Fire: Command and the British Expeditionary Force, 1914.° Most of these studies owe a debt to Tim Travers, who attempted to put the > Sir James Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1914, Vol. 2 (London: HMSO, 1925) pp. 10-11. * John Terraine, The First World War, 1914-1918 (London: Hutchinson, 1965) p. 18. > Keith Simpson, The Old Contemptibles. A photographic history of the British Expeditionary Force, August—December 1914 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981) pp. 27-32. ° Nikolas Gardner, Trial by Fire: Command and the British Expeditionary Force, 1914 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003).

4 The Edwardian Army command failings of the BEF into the context of pre-war military culture in a series of influential monographs and articles.’ Although Travers’s articles are weighted towards the pre-1914 situation, the monographs are very firmly anchored in the Great War and look at the Edwardian and Georgian period from that retro-

spective perspective rather than looking at the pre-war army in its own right. In addition, for all the work on the BEF in the opening stages of the war, there are still significant gaps in our knowledge as to how it actually performed. There is one area where the Edwardian and Georgian army has attracted much attention, and that is strategy. ‘The issues of strategy and the politico-military direction of defence policy at its highest levels have been dealt with very effectively for the years preceding the Great War. The macro background to British defence policy in these years has been excellently covered by John Gooch in his The Plans of War. The General Staff and British Military Strategy, c.1900—1916, and Sir Michael Howard in The Continental Commitment: the dilemma of British defence policy in two world wars; while Brian Bond’s study of the staff college has done much for our understanding of its influence on the army’s perception of its role and how it tried to adapt to the policies agreed by its politico-military masters.* These interpretations have provoked further investigations from historians such as Hew Strachan and David French.’ The viewpoint and work of politicians have also been covered

widely with a number of studies on the role of R. B. Haldane, most notably by Edward Spiers, and a comprehensive insight into the workings of Unionist defence

has been provided by Rhodri Williams.'° The following study attempts to fill in from the ground level up to these heights by examining issues such as the impact the General Staff had on the training of the army, how any agreed strategy was met by an army constantly lacking in numbers and equipment, what the officers and rank and file thought their role was, and why men joined in the first place. Few historians have focused on the pre-Great War army in an attempt to examine it from the perspective of its building blocks of battalion, brigade, and division

” See Tim Travers, “The offensive and the problem of innovation in British military thought, 1870-1915’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1978, pp. 531-53; “Technology, tactics and morale: Jean Bloch, the Boer War, and British military theory, 1900-1914’, Journal of Modern History, Vol. 51, No. 2, 1979, pp. 264-86; “The hidden army: structural problems in the British officer corps, 1900-1918’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1982, pp. 523-44; The Killing Ground. The British army, the Western Front and the emergence of modern warfare, 1900-1918 (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1987); How the war was won: factors that led to victory in World War One (London: Routledge, 1992). 8 John Gooch, The Plans of War. The General Staff and British Military Strategy, c.1900-1916 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974); Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: the dilemma of British defence policy in two world wars (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972); Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and Staff College, 1854-1914 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974). » Hew Strachan, “The British Army, its General Staff and the Continental Commitment, 1904-1914 in French and Bond (eds), The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, 1890-1939 (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 75-94; French, British Economic and Strategic Planning. '° For biographies of Haldane see Edward M. Spiers, Haldane: an army reformer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1980); Stephen Koss, Lord Haldane: scapegoat for Liberalism (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969); Ernest M. Teagarden, Haldane at the War Office (New York: Gordon Press, 1976); Rhodri Williams, Defending the Empire. The Conservative party and British defence policy, 1899-1915 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991).

Introduction 5 rather than from a staff college lecture hall, a room in the War Office, or a Whitehall office. Edward Spiers and Ian Beckett are two of the leading exponents of the histories that seek to determine what went on at a regimental level in this period. As well as his work on the nineteenth-century army, Spiers has produced articles and chapters on the rearming of the artillery, the redefinition of the role of cavalry

and reform of infantry tactics in the twelve years after the end of hostilities in South Africa.'’ Spiers concentrates his vision on the regular army, whereas Ian Beckett has focused on the equally important question of the auxiliary forces, particularly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.'* Beckett has led the way in studies of the various auxiliary forces, which have been complemented by historians such as Peter Dennis and K. W. Mitchinson.'* The works of Spiers and

Beckett are very much an inspiration for this study as it aims to build on their approaches and create an overarching view of the army. The main themes of this study are the officering and manning of the regular and auxiliary forces, the training and preparation for wars, the experience of overseas service, and the public image of the army. Through these themes a detailed social history of the profession of soldiering will be provided. Because the Great War was the ultimate test of this army, the study will extend to the opening rounds of the conflict in order to determine the relevance of its pre-war preparations and how the army coped with the stress of large-scale operations against a first-class enemy. Little detailed work has been carried out on the ofhicering and manning of the army, the regular forces in particular, during this period. Establishing the demographic of the officer corps and the rank and file, and their career and promotion prospects across the width of the army will test the relatively small-scale samples

that have been completed. Moving on, the study will look at the training and preparation for combat undertaken by the army. This is particularly important for determining just how far the British army managed to digest the lessons of the South African and the Russo-Japanese wars and integrate modern firepower into its understanding of battle. Next, the experience of soldiering in the empire and the two most important imperial defence forces dependent on the British army, the King’s African Rifles and West African Frontier Force, will be studied. British

soldiers were rotated among the imperial garrisons continually and this gave the working-class rank and file in particular experiences of travel and other

cultures shared by few of their peers in civilian life. The extent to which these duties and secondments maintained the military efficiency of the units will '! Edward M. Spiers, “The British Cavalry, 1902-1914’, Journal for the Society of Army Historical Research, Vol. LVII, No. 230, Summer 1979, pp. 71-9; ‘Rearming the Edwardian Artillery’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, Vol. LVII, No. 231, Autumn 1979, pp. 167—76; ‘Reforming the Infantry of the Line, 1900-1914’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, Vol. LIX, No. 238, Summer 1981, pp. 82-94. 2 T. EW. Beckett, Riflemen Form: A study of the Rifle Volunteer Movement 1859-1908 (Aldershot: Ogilby Trusts, 1982); The Amateur Military Tradition 1558—1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991). 'S Peter Dennis, The Territorial Army 1907-1940 (Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society and Boydell Press, 5005) grave, 2005).K. W. Mitchinson, Defending Albion: Britain’s home army, 1908-1914 (Basingstoke: Pal-

6 The Edwardian Army be explored, as will its influence on the kind of combat most British soldiers expected. Finally, the study will examine the public image of the army. Although much has been written about the image of war in popular culture in this period, the work of Michael Paris and Glenn Wilkinson being two good examples, very little has been written about the presentation of the army itself.'* In the twelve years from 1902 the British people were exposed to and involved in a continual debate over the role and nature of the army, while the image of soldiers was a ubiquitous part of that society’s landscape through its cults of popular nationalism and imperialism. Although this study is intended to be a social history of the professional and auxiliary British armies, there are a few areas it will not examine in detail. Instead, some themes, which form part of the backdrop, will be sketched in where necessary in the appropriate chapters. These particularly relate to the issue of strategy and politico-military direction at the highest levels. As noted, they will not be ignored, but will be examined in the context of what actually happened within the army in its day-to-day existence and how any reforms, new approaches, ideas, or orders affected the officers and men as they went about their usual business. ‘4 Michael Paris, Warrior Nation. Images of war in British popular culture, 1850-2000 (London: Reaktion, 2000); Glenn Wilkinson, Depictions and images of war in Edwardian newspapers, 1899-1914 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2002).

I The Officer Corps It is difficult to define a uniquely Edwardian officer corps. Senior officers in the

Edwardian period had begun their military careers long before Edward VII ascended to the throne. For example, Sir John French was first commissioned into

the militia in 1872 and Horace Smith-Dorrien had passed out of Sandhurst in 1876. Even most of the lieutenant colonels who commanded battalions in the original British Expeditionary Force in 1914 had received their first commissions in the mid 1880s.' The Edwardian officer corps also had an influence for many years after 1914. It provided the vast bulk of the professional leadership of the British army, at all levels in the First World War and the majority of the senior leader-

ship in the Second World War: Harold Alexander, Claude Auchinleck, Alan Brooke, John Dill, Viscount Gort, Bernard Montgomery, and Richard O’Connor being obvious examples. Field Marshal B. L. Montgomery, first commissioned into

the Royal Warwickshire Regiment in 1908, was probably the longest-serving Edwardian officer; he did not retire from the army until 1958, demonstrating just how long the legacy of the Edwardian officer corps persisted.

The commissioning and promotion system in the Edwardian period was, in essence, identical to the post-purchase system established in 1871 and refined with

the introduction of the new regimental system in 1881.’ This system had fixed retirement ages and periods of command, supposedly to prevent stagnation, but it still meant that most commanding officers were in their early to mid 50s when the Great War broke out. Officers of the Edwardian period tended to be drawn from the same social groups as those in the Victorian period and to enjoy the same pastimes. The limited opportunities for professional development were also broadly similar in the Edwardian period to those in the late Victorian period. Looking ahead, the Edwardian officer corps faced its ultimate test in the Great War, and this poses a number of problems for the historian. The high casualty rates meant that some who were highly regarded in the Edwardian army never had the

opportunity to exercise high command. For example, Lieutenants W. B. GrayBuchanan and W. J. Kerr were viewed by their contemporaries in the 2 Scottish ' Hugh Thomas, The Story of Sandhurst (Hutchinson, London, 1961), pp. 135 and 141, Richard Holmes, The Little Field Marshal: Sir John French Jonathan Cape, London, 1981), pp. 19-21 and Harts Army List, 1914.

* A. P. Bruce, The Purchase System in the British Army, 1660-1871 (Royal Historical Society, London, 1980), pp. 144-66, David French, Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, & the British People c. 1870-2000 (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 145-79 and E. M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, 1868-1902 (Manchester University Press, 1992), pp. 89-117.

8 The Edwardian Army Rifles as equal to Richard O’Connor in promise, but neither survived the war.’ The General Staff carefully built up from 1906 was, with few exceptions, dismembered and its members sent out with the original British Expeditionary Force, meaning that senior officers who should have been available to advise politicians, raise new divisions, and plan operations at the War Office were fulfilling staff or command

roles in the field. It is therefore very difficult to comment on how well the Staff College prepared officers for senior staff posts at the strategic level. The other aspect

to the expansion of the First World War was that a number of Edwardian officers were able to reinvent themselves and gain promotion far beyond what they could ever have expected in peacetime. The best example of this is the 10th Earl of Cavan,

who retired from the army in 1912 as a lieutenant colonel, having served as the commanding officer of the 1 Grenadier Guards and seemingly disillusioned at his

future promotion prospects. He rejoined the army on the outbreak of war as a brigadier general and was ultimately to be Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1922 to 1926 and appointed a field marshal in 1932.‘ Another interesting example is Adrian Carton De Wiart. In early 1914 his father went bankrupt, putting an end to De Wiart’s private income, which was a real necessity in a cavalry regiment, and he failed his promotion examination for major. With few options left if he wanted

to remain in uniform, De Wiart left for East Africa on secondment from the 4 Royal Irish Dragoon Guards to the unfashionable Somaliland Camel Constabulary. In the normal course of events De Wiart would have been expected to retire from the army as a captain after two to four years service in Africa. However, 1918 was to find him as a Brigadier General and winner of the Victoria Cross, serving on the Western Front, and in the Second World War he was to serve as a Lieutenant General.° There were clearly problems with the Edwardian officer corps. ‘The teaching and

training provided at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich (RMA) and Royal

Military College, Sandhurst (RMC) were not of a particularly high standard. Other entrance routes via the militia, Special Reserve, Territorial Force and univer-

sities provided very variable training. The need for officers to possess a private income meant that much of the military talent available in the ranks remained untapped. Opportunities for post-commissioning professional development were very limited. The promotions system was too tied to seniority and, arguably, patronage, with the regimental system creating further problems for the advancement of promising officers. Crucially, the Edwardian officer corps did not serve as an adequate basis for the expansion of the British army in time of war. The Army Council in 1910, with very optimistic calculations of likely casualty rates, recognized that 3,201 officers would be needed for the BEF on mobilization. > John Baynes, Morale: A study of men and courage, the Second Scottish Rifles at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle 1915 (Cassell, London, 1967), p. 27.

* DNB entry for 10th Earl of Cavan, http://www.oxforddnb.com.chain.kent.ac.uk/view/ article/34379?docPos=3. > Adrian Carton De Wiart, Happy Odyssey: The Memoirs of Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Carton De Wiart Jonathan Cape, London, 1950), pp. 32-91 and G. D. Sheffield, “Carton De Wiart and Spears’ in John Keegan (ed.), Churchill’ Generals (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1991).

The Officer Corps 9 They recommended that large numbers of NCOs should be commissioned to make up the shortfall and hoped that, if war was delayed, the Officer Training Corps would help to make up the deficiency.° Regular army officers were drawn from a fairly small section of British society, as officers needed a private income to supplement their meagre pay, which only went part of the way towards defraying the cost of uniforms, mess bills, servants’ wages, horses, and personal weapons. Edward Spiers suggests that amongst senior officers in 1914, 7 per cent were drawn from the peerage and baronetage, 26 per

cent from the gentry, 23 per cent from the armed forces, 12 per cent from the clergy, and 12 per cent from other professions. This saw a slight decline in the numbers from the peerage and baronetage and slight increase in clergy and professionals over 1899.’ Table 1.1, based on a sample of officers drawn from the Sand-

hurst cadet registers, suggests that this picture was not very different for junior officers in the Edwardian period. Therefore the army drew on the ‘leisured class’ who were prepared to commit to the part-time, part-paid nature of peacetime soldiering at least for a few years. Some men certainly became officers to establish their families in polite society, their families having made their fortunes in industry. Family tradition saw many sons of professional soldiers join the army, even when their family finances appear to have been severely stretched. They were often prepared to sweat out their careers in less prestigious regiments or corps in some of the hellholes of Empire, out of a sense of duty. Another group was those sons of solid middle-class families who were deemed to be too dim for any other profession but sufficiently snobbish to disdain going into ‘trade’. Table 1.1. Occupations of the fathers of a sample of RMC cadets, 1910-148

Occupational group Number Army officer (serving, retired or deceased) 155

Royal Naval officer Gentleman 1287

Clergy 21

Legal profession 20 Civilian medical practitioner 14 Indian Civil Service 12

Civil engineer 12 Peer 12 Other 33 Home Civil Service 4

° TNA, WO163/15, ‘Minutes of the Army Council, 1910’, précis number 453 ‘Supply of Officers’,

re, Spiers, Late Victorian Army, pp. 94 and 338-9. ® As discussed elsewhere, cadet registers were not kept consistently in the 1902-14 period. Only the RMAS, WO151/8, Cadet Register, February 1910 to January 1917, provides full details of fathers’ occupations. A random sample of 418 cadets was used, those whose surnames ended in A, B, or C and who left the RMC before, or immediately on, the outbreak of the Great War.

10 The Edwardian Army The ‘other’ group in Table 1.1 is a very diverse one, but it should be stressed that the number of industrialists was very low, with only two brewers, a distiller, and an iron founder coming within this heading. Similarly, the number of what could be termed ‘new professionals’ is low, with one architect, one schoolmaster, and one banker falling within this group. Reinforcing the class consciousness of the Edwardian officer corps was the small number of schools which cadets came from. Bedford Grammar School, Cheltenham College, Clifton, Eton, Harrow, Marlborough, and Wellington provided the majority of cadets to the RMC between 1902 and 1914. The position was broadly similar at the RMA, L. A. Hawes remembered: “When IJ arrived at the Academy, I was the only one from a school which was not a major public school. There were contingents from

Marlborough, Cheltenham, Eton and Harrow and the rest. I was the odd man.’” Many cadets at the RMA and RMC had gained their first taste of soldiering in school

cadet corps and this provided an inbuilt advantage to public school products over those who had been educated elsewhere.'! As an example, M. D. Kennedy noted that at Glenalmond, ‘the whole school prided itself on its OTC’ and while membership was apparently voluntary, all the boys over 13 were members.'? From the establishment of the OTC in 1908 those candidates for RMA or RMC entrance examinations received a bonus of 250 marks if they had qualified for their certificate A.” The decision to become an army officer was generally one made by the potential officer's family, given the financial outlay involved. Few parents can have been as calculating as Christopher Lynch Robinson’s father, who was chairman of the Irish Local Government Board. As Lynch Robinson recalled in his memoirs: I never liked the idea of the Army as a profession. I loathed discipline, and what the French call le panache [sic] did not in the least appeal to me. We had, moreover, absolutely no connection with the Army to speak of... However that may be, my father pleaded that the Army was a first- class preliminary to any career and a great opportunity for a young man to see the world. When he saw, however, that soldiering made no appeal to me, he told me that if I would enter the Army for ten years and if at the end of that time I did not like it, he would give me a post in the Irish Civil Service. We clinched the deal on that.’

There is certainly a perception, which cannot be entirely proven, that many young men went into the army as they were not deemed to be sufficiently intelligent to go into more lucrative and secure professions. Captain M. D. Kennedy reflected, ‘It used to be said, and no doubt some say it still, that the fool of the family goes

into the Army.’ S. C. M. Archibald remembered, ‘My father’s main idea in

° Hugh Thomas, The Story of Sandhurst, p. 141. '0 TWM, 87/41/1, Major General L. A. Hawes, “The Memories and Dreams of an ordinary soldier’ (unpublished manuscript), p. 17. '’ RMAS, WO152/74, box 142, RMC correspondence 1907-1909, Half Yearly Report by Colonel William Capper, 18/12/07. '2 IWM, P. 392, Captain M. D. Kennedy, “Their Mercenary Calling’ (unpublished manuscript), p. 8. 'S IWM, 80/14/1, Lieutenant Colonel C. E. L. Lyne, “My participation in the Two Great Wars’ (unpublished manuscript), p. 3. ‘4 Sir Christopher Lynch Robinson, The Last of the Irish R.M.s (Cassell, London, 1951) pp. 59-60. ' TWM, P. 392, Captain M. D. Kennedy, “Their Mercenary Calling’ (unpublished manuscript), p. 1.

The Officer Corps 11 encouraging me to go into the Army was that, as I should never have much in the way of private means, it was important to go into something which carried a pension, in which he was perfectly right. He had hoped, poor man, that I might be

able to get into the Indian Civil Service which carried vast pay and an almost equally comparable pension, but it was soon painfully obvious that I should never be able to rise to that. The next best thing therefore was the Shop [i.e. RMA] and possibly the Sappers.’'® For many, the decision to become an army officer was a simple one as they were following in an established family tradition. Those going into the army as officers did need a private income, but this could vary enormously and depended on a number of factors. At the entry level, fees at the RMA and RMC were placed on a sliding scale. A gentleman cadet whose father was classed as a ‘private gentleman’ would have to find £150 p.a. in fees. At the

other end of the scale, a cadet whose father had been an army officer, who had died, leaving his family in genteel poverty, could qualify for a special £20 p.a. fee. A King’s cadet or King’s India cadet would be educated free and gratis; these cadets

were drawn from the category who would otherwise have had to pay £20 p.a. on the basis of entrance examination results or school examination grades.'’ Some cadets were lucky enough to benefit from bursaries provided by their old schools. For example, L. A. Hawes received a scholarship worth £40 p.a. from Bedford Modern School."*

Major General H. R. Abadie believed that expenses for cavalry officers were much too high, requiring a private income in excess of £300 p.a.’” S.C. M. Archibald reflected that in 1910 any young Royal Artillery officer who was not guaranteed a private income of at least £100 p.a. would have to enter the despised ranks of the Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA), although even in the RGA an absolute minimum of £12 p.a. was required.”° Indian Army officers could live on their pay and also had much better pension prospects than those going into the British

army proper. M. D. Kennedy failed to get into the Indian Army by a couple of places, instead going to the Scottish Rifles. He was conscious that his father found it difficult to provide him with a suitable allowance.*! The future Field Marshal Montgomery was in a similar position and noted candidly, ‘Army life was expensive and it was not possible to live on one’s pay. It was generally considered that a private income or allowance of at least £100 a year was necessary.”

'© TWM, PP/MCR/11, Memoirs of Major General S. C. M. Archibald, p. 43. '’ Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army (Cd.

982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), pp. 86 and 112. IWM, PP/MCR/136, Memoirs of Brigadier G. S. Brunskill, who was a King’s India cadet, entering RMC in 1911. '8 TWM, 87/41/1, Major General L. A. Hawes, “The Memories and Dreams of an ordinary soldier’ (unpublished manuscript), p. 16. ' Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army (Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), Appendix XLII, pp. 134-5.

°° TWM, PP/MCR/11, Memoirs of Major General S. C. M. Archibald, pp. 43-4 and IWM, 87/41/1, Major General L. A. Hawes, “The Memories and Dreams of an ordinary soldier’ (unpublished manuscript), p. 28. *! TWM, P. 392, Captain M. D. Kennedy, “Their Mercenary Calling’ (unpublished manuscript), . 23. P OB L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery (Collins, London, 1958), p. 23.

12 The Edwardian Army Mess expenses were one major variable. Those going into Guards regiments could expect to pay for elaborate meals and fine wines, and to subsidize the large numbers of guests who would be entertained while their battalion was based in London or Windsor. Conversely, those going to a socially inferior county regiment, as Montgomery purposely did, would pay only for simple meals and could possibly manage not to drink or pay for any alcohol at all. Guest nights at provincial army barracks would be quiet affairs, with few guests. Royal Artillery officers who were lucky enough to find themselves stationed at Woolwich benefited from a large mess, catering for about 100 officers. The economies of scale involved in this mess meant that individual subscriptions were very low.” There was a variety of ways in which men could gain commissions in the British army in the years immediately before the Great War but only the figures for those receiving their commissions in 1913 survive in their entirety. A sample of officers

from one cavalry regiment and eight infantry battalions has also been used to ascertain commissioning routes; this information is summarized in Table 1.2. This is an important corrective to the 1913 figures as before the expansion of Sandhurst in 1911, the militia entry route was more prevalent. The main route to a commission was through the RMC, which prepared cadets for the Guards, cavalry, infantry, and Indian Army, and this accounted for 371 commissions in 1913. The other British cadet college, the RMA, which prepared cadets for the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, accounted for just 130 commissions in the same

year. The Canadian equivalent of Sandhurst, the Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, also provided a small number of commissioned officers to the British army proper—five in 1913—though its main role was to provide officers for the permanently

Table 1.2. Commissioning route for officers serving in a sample of units, 1902-14”

Entry route 4DG 1/Man 1/DCLI 2/DCLI 2/SR_ 1/Buffs 1/ASH 2/RIR_ 1/Lein

RMC 25 33 2014 3121332235 Militia/SR 14 22 29 18 2219 18 35 23

Ranks 36 06 50 60 4| 03 03 01 06 RMA University 325040204 08 12 22 52 Colonial 2 Yeomanry 40 00 01 10 00 00 00 00 0] Volunteers Other 0 0 2 0 0 2 ] 0 2

°> TWM, 87/41/1, Major General L. A. Hawes, “The Memories and Dreams of an ordinary soldier’ (unpublished manuscript), p. 21. *4 ‘This table has been compiled from the ‘Records of Service’ of officers. Surprisingly few of these

survive, in their entirety for the 1902-14 period, which explains the small number of units sampled. TNA, WO76/90, 2 Scottish Rifles, TNA, WO76/24, 1 Leinster Regiment, DCLI Museum, Bodmin, 1 Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, TNA, WO76/483, 2 Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, TNA, WO76/472, 1 Manchester Regiment, TNA, WO76/25, 2 Royal Irish Regiment, TNA, WO76/1, 4 Royal Irish Dragoon Guards, TNA, WO76/460, 1 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and TNA, WO76/468, 1 Bufts (East Kent Regiment).

The Officer Corps 13 embodied elements of the Canadian Militia. What is surprising in the pre-1914 period is the large number of commissions granted to those who had never been cadets at any military college or had any previous military training. In 1913, seventy-nine regular commissions were granted to those who had been officers in Special Reserve or Territorial units. As discussed below, it appears that the vast majority of these men came from Special Reserve rather than Territorial Force units, suggesting that the well worn ‘militia back door’ of the Victorian period survived substantially into the Edwardian period. Beyond this there were university candidates, of whom seventy-four were commissioned in 1913. While post 1908 many of these men may have served as cadets in the Officer Training Corps, there was limited military training available for them before 1908. A handful of colonial candidates also received commissions in regular forces—a

mere three in 1913—and the Guards had their own probationary officer scheme, which provided nine officers in 1913. This was established in 1905 as a reaction to the difficulty Guards regiments had in attracting Sandhurst cadets, due to the high costs involved in serving in the Guards. Probationary officers in the Guards were nominated

by a senior officer of the Guards and then served with one of the Guards regiments. They would sit one intermediate and one final exam, both in military subjects, and then, if reaching the qualifying standard, they would receive a regular commission in the Guards.” A tiny number of men were promoted from the ranks in peacetime, a mere seven (or | per cent of the total commissioned) in 1913, and these presumably were either long-service NCOs who were given the ‘dead-end’ appointment of lieuten-

ant and quartermaster or ‘gentlemen rankers’ who had the private income needed to maintain their commissioned status.”° The figures which survive for 1896-1900 suggest that the Edwardian commis-

sioning system followed the Victorian pattern fairly closely. Between 1896 and 1900, 682 officers were commissioned from the RMA; 1,548 from the RMC, 1,124 from the militia and 192 from universities. The South African War had, of course, disrupted this system and during the war, about 1,400 men were commissioned from the yeomanry, militia, volunteers, universities, and from the ranks, without passing any examinations.” This variety of ways of gaining a commission demonstrated serious confusion amongst senior military officers and politicians regarding the basis on which the army was viewed as a profession. The cadet entry route, through the RMA and RMC and via competitive examination conducted by the Civil Service commissioners, suggested a modern, meritocratic profession. However, as discussed below,

the curriculum at both institutions was far from an academic one and, for much of the period, cadets at Sandhurst graduated from the college in exactly the same positionin which they entered, meaning that such distinctions as the Sword of Honour often went to cadets deemed to be ‘nice chaps’ rather than particularly intelligent. ° "TNA, WO163/10, Army Council minutes, 1905, précis entitled, ‘Supply of Officers for the Footguards’, pp. 174-5. *6 Figures taken from Report of the Committee on the Education and Training of Officers (Cmd. 2031), 1924, p. 30. *” Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army (Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), Appendix XXI, p. 84.

14 The Edwardian Army There was also the point that most cadets attending the RMA and RMC were having fees of up to £150 p.a. paid for their education and at times the government was clearly wary of the outcry which would result if a large number of cadets were failed. The Akers-Douglas committee of 1902 was not wildly enthusiastic about the preservation of the cadet colleges, suggesting that they should be preserved as other sources were unable to produce sufficient numbers of officers and as, in the event of war, they would provide a small reserve of subaltern officers.”* The Special Reserve and Territorial route to commissioned rank suggested that an apprenticeship route, rather than an academic course, was the best way to secure a commission. Once having been accepted as a second lieutenant in an auxiliary unit, which with the appropriate social connections and income was never difhcult, as discussed in Chapter 4, the potential officer had the experience of drilling and training men for a minimum of four months before entering a fairly straight-

forward examination, or at least one much easier than that required for entry to RMC, for a regular commission. The university entrance route suggested that what the army really needed for its officer corps was intelligent young men, who, once commissioned, could be trained by their regiments upon arrival. Entry into the RMA Woolwich or RMC Sandhurst was largely by competitive examination, although in 1913, thirty-four of the 371 commissions granted through the RMC went to men who had received their cadetships through nomination, and in spring 1910 the RMA took the unprecedented step of admitting seventy-four cadets on nomination only without any examination due to the shortage of RFA subalterns required for the new Expeditionary Force establishment. Apparently, in 1911, no entrance examination was held for the RMC as there was a shortage of applicants.” By 1902 many of the major public schools had Army Classes, though in practice the ‘Army Class’ seems in many cases to have been a dumping ground for those whose classical language skills were too poor to give them any chance of entering university. At Wellington the Army Class appears to have been a serious endeay-

our and this also seems to have been true at Dulwich College and Clifton, where army candidates appear, if anything, to have been over-taught.*° Those who had been educated at a school without an Army Class or who had failed to gain a place at RMA or RMC as a result of their attendance at one, could entrust themselves to those curious educational establishments, the army crammers. Dr T. Miller Maguire, a crammer himself, provided a spirited defence of the

profession, stating that English schools spent too much time teaching Classics and that university candidates took up the profession ‘in a sauntering

°8 Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army (Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), p. 10. *? Figures taken from Report of the Committee on the Education and Training of Officers (Cmd. 2031), 1924, p. 30, K. W. Maurice-Jones, The Shop Story 1900-1939 (Royal Artillery Institution,

Woolwich, 1954), p. 16 and IWM, PP/MCR/136, Memoirs of Brigadier G. S. Brunskill, unpaginated. °° Lynch Robinson, Last of the Irish R.M.s, pp. 59-60, IWM, 97/10/1, Memoir of Brigadier James Whitehead, p. 5 and Sir Frederick Morgan, Peace and War: A Soldier’s Life (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1961), p. 21.

The Officer Corps 15 manner... A second-rate ignorant athlete is a poor kind of leader.’ He believed that crammers provided a good military education for those planning to become cadets at Sandhurst and Woolwich and further argued that a group of four crammers provided the only organized military education ‘worthy of the name’ outside the cadet colleges and Staff College.*! However, the future Major General S. C. M. Archibald was under few illusions as to why he had been sent to a crammer, having ‘loathed’ his time at Kings School Canterbury and Felsted. ‘The crammer which he attended was a curious establishment at Malvern, part of which was a standard preparatory school and the other part ‘a crammers, existing for the purpose of getting “backward boys” into Sandhurst’. Archibald also thought little of the teaching provided there

and was convinced that, without the help of an older pupil, he would not have qualified for entry to the RMA.” The time frame for cadet entry normally meant that those keen to gain admission could try up to three times for competitive entrance, which meant that crammers were often resorted to after an initial failure. The RMA, Woolwich was the oldest of the cadet colleges and it had a specialized training role in preparing officers for the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery. With the exceptions of 1910, when a large number of cadets was commissioned after one

year to man the expansion of the regular RFA batteries, and 1913, when eleven cadets received accelerated promotion to officer the newly formed mobile batteries of the RGA, the Woolwich course lasted for two years. Cadets generally then spent two further years at either Chatham, for the Royal Engineers, or Shoeburyness, for

the Royal Artillery, once they had received their commissions. ‘The promotion block caused by the rapid expansion of the Royal Artillery in the South African War meant that the number of cadets admitted was very low at the start of our period, reaching a nadir of just thirty-four entrants in the autumn term of 1906. The small number of cadets at Woolwich, compared to the number at Sandhurst, meant that a Sandhurst company was quartered in the RMA Woolwich from

autumn 1905 until December 1911. From 1909 until 1912, when the junior officer shortage in the RFA, caused by the requirements of the BEF, was taken to have been solved, the number of cadets admitted to the RMA increased consider-

ably, and the spring 1912 intake of 131 was the highest number that had been admitted to that date.* For cadets commissioning from Woolwich, in terms of social prestige, professional opportunities, and economic benefits, the Royal Engineers was the most prized branch of the service (largely due to the higher pay), followed by the Royal Horse Artillery (all the panache and social prestige of the cavalry for those who could afford it), the Royal Field Artillery, and, finally, the Royal Garrison Artillery. The RGA was the least prized as its batteries tended to be concentrated in remote

5! Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army (Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), Appendix XV, pp. 77-9. °° TWM, PP/MCR/11, Memoirs of Major General S. C. M. Archibald, p. 40. °° KK. W. Maurice-Jones, Zhe Shop Story 1900-1939 (Royal Artillery Institution, Woolwich, 1954),

pp. 11-13 and 120 and RMAS, WO152/74, box 142, RMC correspondence 1907-1909, letter Commandant RMC to Commandant RMA, 7/3/07.

16 The Edwardian Army garrisons, frequently in some of the most far-flung parts of the Empire, where there were limited opportunities for social activities, professional advancement, or active service.** This isolated existence meant that the RGA tended to be filled by officers with limited financial resources. Not only were they paid slightly more than their counterparts in the RFA but the officers’ mess would normally be a very modest

affair with very infrequent guests, which was a decided incentive for the impecunious.” The Akers-Douglas committee was generally impressed with the standards of teaching at the RMA and saw the prized Royal Engineer commissions as an incentive for hard work by the gentlemen cadets. ‘The accommodation was heavily criticized as it was thought unacceptable that cadets should be sharing from two to four per room, given the high fees being demanded. Similarly, classroom accommodation was very cramped, with the committee witnessing two classes in different subjects being taught simultaneously in the same room. Surprisingly, the guns provided for demonstration purposes were of obsolete models in 1902. In terms of the teaching syllabus, the committee felt that instruction should be purely technical and theoretical. They felt that instruction in French and German should be discontinued, as cadets had to reach a high standard of proficiency in these lan-

guages to gain admission to the academy in any case. It was also felt that the courses in mathematics and science should be more practical and that courses in tactics and military history should be introduced, especially as the latter was taught at Sandhurst. ‘The practical nature of the course should be developed by sending cadets off to annual camp for four to six weeks each year, with two weeks’ gunnery practice at Shoeburyness. The committee concluded by suggesting that civilian staff should no longer be employed as instructors, as officers who were ‘fully competent’ were available in all areas.*° The RMA was well served by its historian and it is clear from the academy’s his-

tory that aspects of the Akers-Douglas report were acted on. Military history was added to the academic syllabus (although French and German both remained) and from 1904 the RMA did have a camp each May and July and underwent field gun training at Salisbury Plain or Shoeburyness. Rather strangely, though, for an institution which existed solely for the provision of Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer officers, when the RMA first went into camp at Perham Down, Salisbury Plain, it was organized as a Mounted Infantry Company, a Field Battery, and two companies of infantry. Developments in science were also recognized with the introduc-

tion of a course on practical electricity in 1904. The suggestion that civilian instructors be dispensed with was clearly rejected as up until 1914 the RMA had

two professors and seven instructors, the most famous being the professor of

“* TWM, PP/MCR/11, Memoirs of Major General S. C. M. Archibald, pp. 43-4 and Morgan, Peace and War, p. 23. °° TWM, 87/41/1, Major General L. A. Hawes, “The Memories and Dreams of an ordinary soldier’

(unpublished manuscript), p. 20. °° Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army

(Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), pp. 15-19.

The Officer Corps 17 French, Albert Barrére, himself a veteran of the Franco-Prussian War. However, the title ‘Professor’ was abolished for military officers serving as lecturers at the RMA, being replaced by the more militaristic title of “Chief Instructor’ .*”

The RMC Sandhurst effectively trained officers for all branches of the army bar the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery. The most prized commissions which it conferred were those to the Indian Army. The Indian Army offered higher pay,

a much cheaper cost of living, more command responsibility at an earlier age, good promotion prospects, and, for much of the late Victorian and Edwardian period, the prospect of more active service.** In 1907 the Commandant of the RMC noted that forty-four cadets were desirous of joining the Indian Army and

some were prepared to remain for an extra term in an attempt to boost their examination marks to a high enough level to permit entry.*’ However, the allocation of the Indian Army commissions was undertaken in a rather strange manner

for much of the period. Pre 1907 they were generally awarded on the basis of where a gentleman cadet was placed in the entrance examination; post 1907 they

were awarded on the basis of where a cadet was placed in the order of merit, which was not quite the same thing as the amount of marks awarded in his leaving examinations.*’ The exceptions to this rule were those accepted as King’s Indian cadets (whose fathers were or had been Indian Army officers or had other family connections with India), who still went to the Indian Army even if they passed out low in the list. Thus, in the one surviving passing-out list of the RMC for our period, that of December 1909, most of the Indian Army commissions went to those placed in the top thirty-two places, but one cadet who passed out 146th of 158 secured an Indian Army commission.*! The least attractive commissions awarded by the RMC were those for the cavalry, due to its expense, and the Army Service Corps and West Indian Regiment, which both lacked social

prestige and offered very limited promotion prospects.*? The course at the RMC fluctuated between one year and two years between 1902 and 1913, with eighteen months being the normal period. On the outbreak of war in 1914 most cadets of the RMC were immediately commissioned.”

7 Maurice-Jones, Shop Story, pp. 11-15. °8 'T. A. Heathcote, The Military in British India: The development of British land forces in South Asia

1600-1947 (Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 200-23. °° RMAS, WO152/74, box 142, RMC correspondence 1907-1909, Half Yearly Report by Colonel William Capper, 18/12/07. “© ‘There is a strong suspicion that the ‘order of merit’ system was simply a way of giving higher marks to ‘nice chaps’. For example, in Montgomery’s cohort which entered the RMC in January 1907, E. H. M. de Stacpoole passed out 1st in the order of merit, although other cadets had higher examination marks. See RMAS, WO151/7, RMC Cadet Register, January 1907 to September 1909. ‘I RMAS, WO152/74, box 142, RMC correspondence, 1907-1909, ‘List of Gentlemen Cadets who pass out for appointment to Commissions in the Regular Army, December 1909’. © Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army (Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), p. 35.

48 RMAS, WO152/73, box 141, RMC correspondence, 1906, letter Director Staff Duties to Pp Commandant, 10/8/06. Alan Shepperd, Sandhurst: The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and its Predecessors (Country Life Books, London, 1980) pp. 108 and 116.

18 The Edwardian Army RMC Sandhurst had the definite feel of a public school rather than a professional institution and the Akers-Douglas committee was much more critical of it than of its sister institution. There was heavy criticism of the standard of education and it was noted that gentlemen cadets had ‘absolutely no inducement to work’, as those who failed to reach the ‘low qualifying standard demanded’ were commissioned anyway. Ihe committee found the standard of instructors at the RMC to be poor, as few inducements were offered to promising officers, and the pay was inadequate. As a result there were few applicants for posts at Sandhurst and no obvious replacements for officers who were found to be unsuitable. It was also felt that too much of the instruction, especially in drill, riding practice, and gymnastics, was left to staff sergeants.

Incredibly, the almost purely military instruction at Sandhurst was found to be wanting. Cadets, whether destined for the cavalry or other arms, only received thirty-nine hours of riding practice per year, a particular problem given that only 20 per cent had ridden before attending Sandhurst. Indeed, Major General H. R. Abadie was of the opinion that cavalry instruction at the RMC was ‘a waste of time’. He advocated a system of 150 lessons, presumably of an hour each, of riding practice in the first year at Sandhurst, with the second year devoted to training in field and reconnaissance work. He also believed that there should be instruction in the use of sword and lance and in the basic elements of veterinary science and shoeing.

Cadets were also not instructed in revolver shooting or musketry, despite the availability of facilities nearby. Indeed, cadets who wanted to practise their shooting had to join a club that cost £1 per term. This was seen as a particular anomaly, as gentlemen cadets at Woolwich were trained in revolver shooting. Cadets were also not instructed in drilling a squad or company in their time at Sandhurst. ‘The cleaning requirements of ‘bull’ also confused the committee, as while gentlemen

cadets had their rifles (which they never fired) cleaned and maintained by their servants, they had to pipe-clay their own waist belts. “This is remarkable, for while

a cadet might acquire a familiarity with the mechanism of the rifle from being required to clean it, the educational value of pipe-claying a belt is extremely slight.’

As with the RMA, it was felt that cadets should undertake an annual camp and, indeed, it was noted that the vacation period from mid June to mid August meant that no training took place at the most favourable times of the year. Cadets had no experience of digging trenches as the War Department refused permission for this to be carried out in the grounds of Sandhurst.

The academic curriculum was also seen to be deficient at Sandhurst. It was noted that only sixty hours per annum were spent studying tactics and too much time was spent on military topography, which seems to have diminished into an elaborate sketching exercise. The course in military history seems to have been almost purely concerned with the American Civil and South African wars and candidates who could crib Colonel Henderson’s work on the American Civil War and draw a map of the Shenandoah Valley were guaranteed good marks. As was the case with the RMA, there was strong criticism of the continued teaching of French

and German to the same standard as that demanded in the entrance examination.

The Officer Corps 19 It was felt that the staff were overworked and had little time to devote to the devel-

opment of courses due to their heavy teaching commitments. Hindustani was taught to those cadets who were destined for the Indian Army but this also seems to have been at a very low standard as it was admitted that cadets would pass the lower standard examination shortly after their arrival in India ‘with the assistance of a good mooshie [native teacher].’* It is clear that some of the criticisms of the Akers-Douglas committee’s report on the RMC were acted on. From 1904 cadets were sent on an annual musketry course

to Hythe and by 1907 the practice of going into camp in July had been established.” Similarly, on the academic side, the military history papers for 1906—7 suggest that the course had been revised with cadets being examined on the Peninsular War, the 1882 Campaign in Egypt and Napoleon’s Polish Campaign of 1806— 7.“° The accommodation at the college was also expanded and improved, with new buildings being constructed between 1908 and 1912, allowing for accommodation for an additional 424 gentlemen cadets and twelve company officers.*”

The surviving paperwork for the RMA and RMC is inconsistent and frustratingly fails to answer some key questions for the historian. Much of the RMA paperwork seems to have been destroyed in the Second World War and the details noted in the surviving cadet registers are not uniform. For example, the RMC cadet regis-

ter for the September 1903 to January 1907 entrants failed to record their fathers’ occupations.*® Meanwhile, RMA registers recorded the cadets’ previous schools, whereas those for the RMC did not. Details on cadets’ performance in the entrance examination is also not always given and the place of merit for those leaving the cadet colleges was not based solely on their performance in written exams but also, it seems, on reports from their instructors, details of which do not survive.” What the surviving RMA Sandhurst archives and other sources make clear is that the courses at RMA and RMC were not particularly rigorous, with failure uncommon. Of the September 1903 entry to RMC, for example, only one cadet failed all components of the course and failed to receive a commission.” The Commandant

“ Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army

(Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), pp. 19-28 and Appendices XXXIH, XLII and XLIV, pp. 119-23, 134-5 and pp. 144-5. The military history examination papers are reproduced in the latter appendix. * WO152/73, RMC correspondence, 1903-1906, Annual Report by Commandant, 21/12/04 and

WO152/74, box 142, RMC correspondence, 1907-1909, letter, Commandant to BGGS, Southern Command, 8/2/07. “6 RMAS, WO152/73, box 141, Military History syllabus for August 1906 and examination papers for 1906 and 1907. “7 Shepperd, Sandhurst, pp. 107 and 112-13 and Thomas, Story of Sandhurst, p. 166.

“8 RMAS, WO151/6, RMC Cadet Register, September 1903 to January 1907. It is one of the minor mysteries of the preservation of public records in Britain that these registers are held at the RMAS without microfilm copies at TNA. ® RMAS, WO151/5-8, RMC cadet registers, 1897-1917 and WO149/8, RMA cadet register, 1901-16. °° RMAS, WO151/6, RMC cadet register, September 1903 to January 1907. Entry for Hon. I. J. L. Hay.

20 The Edwardian Army of the RMC, Colonel Kitson, stated that he wanted to raise standards in November 1903, noting that, “The difficulties of removing undesirable officers from their regi-

ments are so far greater than those incurred in getting rid of insufficient Cadets here.”' The Commandant returned to the standards expected at the RMC in more detail the following year. With the introduction of new examinations at RMC he was concerned that forty to fifty cadets would fail their examinations that year, fifteen to twenty would previously have failed and would therefore have to leave the

college, as cadets were only given one opportunity to resit an exam. Voicing his concerns to the Army Council, Kitson stated, ‘As such a large number of failures has

never been the custom at Sandhurst, it is probable that parents will be indignant and a considerable storm will be raised, and questions may be asked in the House of Commons... The fault lies in the fact that if so many as 180 Cadets are accepted at any one entrance examination, the standard of intelligence of the last 60 is lamentably low. The Company Officers are constantly complaining to me of the crass stupidity of so many of their Cadets... Further in this same class of 180 Cadets, there are no less than 22, who as King’s Cadets &c., had only to pass a qualifying examination. These Gentlemen are, almost always, of a low standard of intelligence.” The Army Council effectively undermined any attempt by Kitson to raise the standards at the RMC. After much moralizing about the Council having ‘no desire or intention’ to lower standards they then proceeded to do exactly that. Kitson was ordered to add term marks to the examination marks so that average marks would be artificially raised, allowing almost all cadets to pass.”

To his credit, Colonel Kitson did not desist in his attempts to dismiss cadets who he felt were not suitable for commissioned officer rank. In 1906 he asked that

four particularly troublesome cadets should be brought before the Chief of the General Staff at his inspection of the RMC, describing one as ‘a bumptious, troublesome fellow and another as ‘a very troublesome baby, with no sense of respon-

sibility. By August 1914 one of these cadets had become a lieutenant in the 14 King George’s Own Ferozepore Sikhs and another had become a second lieutenant in the 3 Hampshire Regiment; the other two never received commissions.” The cadet colleges also showed a worrying failure to spot and promote military talent. Indeed, a curious aspect of the selection system in the British army of this period was that little attention seems to have been paid to officers’ marks, performance, or discipline at the RMA and RMC when considering later promotions. ‘This

was in sharp contrast to the American army's system where ‘high flyers’ like Macarthur and Patton passed out first in their years at West Point and were therefore identified as future leaders. This is particularly noticeable as most of the senior

>! RMAS, WO152/73, RMC correspondence, 1903-1906, circular from Commandant to Company Officers, 11/11/03. °? WO152/73, RMC correspondence, 1903-1906, letter Colonel G. C. Kitson, to Secretary, Army Council, 3/5/04. > WO152/73, RMC correspondence, 1903-1906, letter Major E. M. Percival, DAAG for D.[irector] S.[taff] D.[uties], War Office to Commandant, 21/5/04. *€ WO152/73, RMC correspondence, 1903-1906, Confidential Reports by Colonel G. C. Kitson, 7/7/06 and letter General Sir H. Prendergast to Military Secretary, 17/7/06.

The Officer Corps 21 British army leaders of the Second World War passed through the RMA or RMC between 1902 and 1914. Most famously perhaps, the future Field Marshal Bernard

Montgomery, entering the RMC in January 1907, was placed a lowly 72 in the entrance examination and passed out only 36th in the order of merit.” The future Field Marshal Harold Alexander entered the RMC in February 1910; as he had passed the London University Leaving Certificate he did not have to sit the RMC entrance examination at all. He served as a colour sergeant at Sandhurst, suggesting that he was seen as a promising cadet by his instructors, but he passed out 85th of 172 cadets in his year.*° The future ‘desert victor’ and Lieutenant General, Rich-

ard O’Connor, entered the RMC in September 1908. He entered 120th in the competitive examination and passed out 38th in the Senior Division.” The pre1907 RMC Cadet Register unfortunately fails to give details of where cadets were ranked on entering and leaving the college, so little definite is known regarding the performance of Claude Auchinleck and J. G. Dill (who both attended the RMC in the late Victorian rather than Edwardian period), Viscount Gort, and A. P. Wavell. Of course, this failure to identify future leaders had also been a marked feature of

the Victorian period RMC. General Sir Charles Monro, who succeeded Haig as commander of 2 Army in 1915 and later became Commander in Chief in India, passed out 120th in the order of merit from Sandhurst in 1879; and the future field marshal and Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, failed the entrance examination for the RMC three times and that for the RMA twice before resorting to the militia ‘back door’ to gain a regular commission.”* It might be thought that many of these future senior officers were merely fortunate in their careers, as the more able and promising officers of their generation were killed in the carnage of the Great War. However, if we take the example of Montgomery's cohort of cadets, who entered the RMC in January 1907, it was E. H. M.

de Stacpoole who passed out first of this group, having been placed sixth in the entrance examination, and received a commission in the Leinster Regiment.’ De Stacpoole can be deemed to have had a ‘good war’, winning the MC, gaining pro-

motion to substantive captain and holding a succession of staff posts. His early promise seemed to continue with his attendance at Staff College between 1922 and 1924. With the disbandment of the Leinster Regiment in 1922, de Stacpoole transferred to the Royal Scots. He held a series of staff posts in India and the UK through-

out the 1920s and 1930s and commanded a battalion of his regiment from 1933 to 1937, having secured promotion to lieutenant colonel. However, de Stacpoole > RMAS, WO151/6, RMC Cadet Register, September 1903 to January 1907, Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Making of a General 1887-1942 (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1981), pp. 45-51 and Montgomery, Memoirs, pp. 23-6. °° RMAS, WO151/8, RMC Cadet Register, February 1910 to January 1917 and Nigel Nicolson, Alex: The Life of Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1973),

Pps? RMAS, WO151/7, RMC Cadet Register, January 1907 to September 1909 and John Baynes, The Forgotten Victor: General Sir Richard O'Connor (Brassey's, London, 1989), pp. 4-5.

8 Keith Jeffery, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 11. 9 REIAS. WO151/6, RMC Cadet Register, September 1903 to January 1907.

22 The Edwardian Army was forced to go on half pay in 1937 on completion of his period of battalion command, having reached the age limit for retirement as a lieutenant colonel. He never held another command, not being recalled during the Second World War, and he was formally retired from the Reserve of Officers, having reached the age limit of 55 in September 1944.°° While the promotion system is discussed in more detail below, it appears that de Stacpoole simply failed to secure an influential patron; his other misfortune was that, having gone into a Southern Irish regiment, on its disbandment in 1922 he lost seniority by joining the Royal Scots as an additional captain. Thus, by the time the ‘Buggin’s turn’ principle brought him to the rank of lieutenant colonel, he was deemed to be too old for further promotion and employment. The picture appears to be a broadly similar one for the RMA. Alan Brooke, the future field marshal, entered the RMA in January 1901, leaving in 1903. He was placed 47th in the entrance examination, having worked hard at a crammers near Roehampton for six months before sitting the examination, and 17th in the order of merit on leaving. The only prize he won was, not surprisingly, that for French, having been born and educated in Pau in Southern France.°! General Sir Frederick Pile, later responsible for the anti-aircraft artillery defence of the United Kingdom

in the Second World War, entered the RMA at the very bottom of his intake. Indeed, his entrance examination results ranked him 76th in a year when seventy places were available, and only the fact that a handful of otherwise successful candidates failed their medical examinations let Pile have a place at all. He proceeded

to pass out 26th in August 1904.° The best performance at ‘the Shop’ for any senior commander of the Second World War was that of the future Lieutenant General Sir Philip Neame, who passed in seventh in 1906 and out sixth in 1908, thereby securing a commission in the Royal Engineers.® As with recruitment to the ranks, medical inspections for potential cadets seem to have been perfunctory. Frederick Morgan, who entered the RMA in 1912, had a history of asthma, pleurisy, and bronchitis, and a Harley Street specialist who exam-

ined him believed that there was no possibility of his passing the army medical examination. However, Morgan was passed ‘fit’ after a fairly farcical exercise which

involved his being measured by Guards NCOs and sitting a basic test for colour blindness.°* In September 1906 the Director of Staff Duties at the War Office noted that fourteen cadets at the RMC did not meet the necessary physical requirements,

being between 2” and 2” below the required chest measurement.” C. E. L. Lyne

°° London Gazette, 18/5/16, p. 4957, 25/6/17, p. 6275, 28/6/19, p. 8186, 3/2/22, p. 1050, 27/7/28, p. 5051, 13/1/33, p. 301, 1/6/37, p. 3512 and Army List. *! RMAS, WO149/8, RMA Cadet Register, 1901-1916 and David Fraser, Alanbrooke (HarperCollins, London, 1997), pp. 12-17. °° Prederick Pile, Ack-Ack: Britain’s Defence against air attack during the Second World War (George

G. Harrap, London, 1949), pp. 12-13. °§ Philip Neame, Playing with Strife: The Autobiography of a Soldier (George G. Harrap, London, 1947) p.22. “ Morgan, Peace and War, p. 22. ® RMAS, WO152/73, box 141, Correspondence of RMC, 1906, letter Director Staff Duties to

Commandant, 19/9/06.

The Officer Corps 23 reflected that he had been accepted as a cadet at the RMA despite having varicose veins, a deformed arm, and a ‘suspect heart’.®° Mental health problems were also not

picked up before entry to the RMC. In 1908 the Commandant of the RMC noted that one cadet ‘is an undersized, undeveloped boy, and I am certain is not master of himself or his actions... It is hardly possible to imagine him trusted with the lives of others or to find him in responsible command. On a field day last summer, I found him in a wood in a state of uncontrollable fury, with his bayonet fixed, trying to run men through, and it was with difficulty that he could be disarmed.’ Other instructors questioned about this cadet stated: “Hopeless, not all there, not safe to put him in charge of others’ and “Below average in work and manners, hardly all there, eccentric.’ It appears that the army drew the line at giving a commission to this cadet.’ In 1910 similar problems emerged with another cadet, who was removed from the RMC, the Commandant noting that he ‘loses his head’. Discipline at the cadet colleges was poor, hampered by the fact that as gentlemen cadets, students were not serving members of the military and so not under military discipline. Indeed the term ‘gentleman cadet’ was almost as heavily lampooned as the First World War’s ‘temporary gentleman’, its subjects being described

as ‘almost an officer and not quite a gentleman’.” Bernard Montgomery’s near expulsion from Sandhurst on the eve of his commissioning in December 1907, for setting fire to a fellow cadet’s shirt tails and causing serious skin burns—itself the

culmination in a series of what appear to have been gang fights—is infamous.” 1902 was also a very bad year for discipline at the RMC. ‘There was a spate of incendiarism which saw the cadets confined to college; and later in the same year, the behaviour of one company of cadets, who broke up the Blackwater Fair, held near the college, by smashing up stalls and assaulting stallholders, led to a number of cadets being ‘rusticated’ (i.e. sent home). 1902 also saw some incredible vandalism at Sandhurst when the cadets ran the old guns that were mounted at the front of the college into the lake; this saw the cancellation of the annual RMA v. RMC cricket match for that year.” In 1904 there were a number of petty thefts at RMC. The Commandant warned cadets that anyone found to be stealing would not only be expelled from the college but

would be handed over to the civil power and could expect to go to prison. He then undermined this dire threat by asking a suspected cadet’s father to remove him from the college.” In 1910 the then Commandant of the RMC wanted to use the RMC

6 TIWM, 80/14/1, Lieutenant Colonel C. E. L. Lyne, ‘My participation in the Two Great Wars’ (unpublished manuscript), p. 4. °” RMAS, WO152/74, box 142, RMC correspondence 1907-1909, Confidential reports on Gentlemen Cadets, 29/7/08 and further report requested by War Office 7/8/08. °° RMAS, WO152/74, box 143, RMC correspondence, 1910, letter Director Military Training to Commandant, 10/8/10 and attached report by Major R. B. Stephens. © John Smyth, Milestones: A Memoir (Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1979), p. 24. 7 Hamilton, Monty, pp. 48-9 and Montgomery, Memoirs, pp. 24-5. 7! TWM, 87/8/1, Memoirs of Brigadier R. Micklen, p. 3, Shepperd, Sandhurst, p. 107 and Thomas, The Story of Sandhurst, pp. 164-5.

2 RMAS, WO152/73, RMC correspondence, 1903-1906, letters Commandant to Secretary, War Office, 29/6/04 and 5/7/04.

24 The Edwardian Army company housed at the RMA, Woolwich as a sort of punishment detail, reflecting that: ‘Woolwich “droppers” are transferred here, and to collect many of their sort here is not

good for the working tone of the place, nor is it fair on the instructional staff.’ This proposal was vetoed by the Director of Military Training at the War Ofhice.”? When, in

1911, a cadet at the RMC was found to be suffering from venereal disease, this was treated as a crime and he was told that he could rejoin the college if he dropped a term, but that he would be ineligible for appointment to the Indian Army.”

As at public schools of the period, a fair amount of bullying still occurred. Any cadet seen to have misbehaved could be ‘court-martialled’ by his peers and sen-

tenced to an ink bath.” At the RMA at least one cadet was stripped naked and brought around the grounds in a handcart as he ‘was not showing sufficient signs of masculinity’.”°

The standard of instructors at the cadet colleges was very variable and probably not helped by the fact that appointments were for a maximum of four years.’” This was long enough for an officer to have been sidelined in his regiment when promo-

tion came up, but not long enough for him to have developed as a professional teacher. Certainly the complaints made by the Akers-Douglas committee were well

founded. In 1903, when Major Bevet wanted to resign his appointment at the RMC to return to his regiment as second in command (his immediate superior in his regiment having unexpectedly failed to pass the necessary promotion examina-

tion), the Commandant of the RMC endorsed his application but went on to state: “Though not very successful in his management of the Cadets, I can see no reason why he should not make a good 2nd in Command.” In 1907, the Director of Staff Duties at the War Office noted that Major R. S. May, DSO, was not con-

sidered a good instructor at the RMC but hoped that, with the Commandant’s advice and guidance, he could become one shortly.” Demonstrating that an instructor's post at the RMA or RMC was not a dead-end appointment, the future General Sir Charles “Tim? Harington was an instructor at the RMC from 1903 to 1907. While Harington is vague about what teaching and instruction he provided at the RMC, beyond organizing games, it is clear that this posting was a formative experience in his career, as the Commandant made it clear to him that he had to work hard to enter the Staff College and seems to have given him some leisure time to do this. The Commandant also used his power of nomination to the Staff College to secure a place for Harington.® Little is known about the quality of teaching

7 RMAS WO152/73, box 143, RMC correspondence 1910, letter Commandant to Secretary, War Office, 30/7/10 and letter, Director Military Training to Commandant, 5/8/10. 7 RMAS, WO152, box 144, RMC correspondence 1910-1911, letter Commandant to C. Nelson (solicitor acting for the cadet), 21/3/11). > ‘Thomas, The Story of Sandhurst, pp. 169-71. 7° TWM, PP/MCR/11, Memoirs of Major General S. C. M. Archibald, p. 47.

7” RMAS, WO152/73, RMC correspondence, 1903-1906, letter Henry Wilson for DSD to Commandant, 21/9/05. 78 RMAS, WO152/73, RMC correspondence, 1903-1906, letter Major H. V. E Bevet to Colonel G. C. Kitson and Kitson’s attached note, 18/2/03. 7 RMAS, WO152/74, box 142, RMC correspondence 1907-1909, letter Director Staff Duties to Commandant, ?/3/07. 8° Charles Harington, Tim Harington Looks Back (John Murray, London, 1940), pp. 28-31.

The Officer Corps 25 provided by civilian instructors at the cadet colleges, but one cadet at the RMA noted that the civilian professors of science were quite incapable of keeping order in class and that the professor of German was open to constant ragging.®*! The quality of Staff Sergeants at the cadet colleges was equally variable. Prior to 1907, these were permanent appointments but after this they were for three years only. The Commandant of the RMC, writing in 1911, advocated the re-establishment of permanent appointments. He noted: The position of Staff Sergeants here is one requiring exceptional qualifications on the part of the individual, seeing that he has to deal with Gentlemen Cadets. ‘Tact, firmness, a thorough knowledge of Drill, combined with a power of imparting instruction,

are all essential; but the present terms of appointment are hardly such as to prove attractive to the class of Non-Commissioned Officer we require. Moreover, if we obtain a Non-Commissioned Officer possessing these qualities, he has to revert to his Regiment with the rank of Sergeant on completing three years’ service.*”

Strangely, given the supposedly formative nature of the time spent at Sandhurst and Woolwich, many officers, at least in their published memoirs, had little to say

of their time there. Christopher Lynch Robinson reflected that he had ‘a most enjoyable time there [Sandhurst] where I greatly appreciated the freedom after public school life’.** General Sir Richard O’Connor’s biographer recounted that ‘he never spoke about his time at Sandhurst in later life’.8* Those who did reflect on their time there were rarely complimentary. G. S. Brunshill, who attended the RMC from 1910 to 1911 reflected: “My recollection is that there was some academic military instruction, chiefly in history, but most of the training was as a young private soldier with no introduction to the duties of an officer.’® Frederick Pile reflected on his time as a cadet at the RMA between 1903 and 1904, noting, “The education at “the Shop”...was a general education with a leaning towards military affairs. The one thing they did not teach you was anything about your job as an officer. One learned quite a lot about field engineering. One great military

campaign was studied, and no doubt the cadet could have won that campaign pretty easily. One learned to dress smartly and to sit a horse with reasonable secu-

rity, but what happened to one when one took a battery on parade was never revealed.’*° The future Lord Ismay, a cadet at Sandhurst from 1904 to 1905, echoed this view: “The year as a gentleman cadet passed pleasantly enough. It toughened me physically, and I learned to drill like a guardsman, shoot with a rifle and revolver, dig trenches, ride, signal, draw maps, do gymnastics and wear my clothes correctly. I also learned a smattering of military tactics, history and engineering.

But so far as I remember, man-management and the art of command found no

81 TWM, PP/MCR/11, Memoirs of Major General S. C. M. Archibald, p. 50. 8 RMAS, WO152, box 144, RMC correspondence 1910-1911, letter Commandant to Secretary, War Office, 13/5/11 and memorandum, CO, 2nd KOSB to Commandant, 22/6/11. 83 Lynch Robinson, Last of the Irish R.M.s, pp. 59-60. 84 Baynes, Forgotten Victor, p. 4.

8° TWM, PP/MCR/136, Memoirs of Brigadier G. S. Brunskill, unpaginated. 86 Prederick Pile, Ack-Ack: Britain's Defence against air attack during the Second World War (George G. Harrap, London, 1949), p. 13.

26 The Edwardian Army place in the syllabus. Sandhurst never meant nearly so much to me as Charterhouse had done.’*” The most damning criticism of either of the cadet colleges came from Frederick Morgan, who attended the RMA from 1912 to 1913; he reflected: ‘[N]othing nowadays can approach the standard of futile absurdity set out for our delectation... The usefulness of much of what we did can never have been thought of.’* Militia officers could be commissioned into the regular forces after passing a special examination. [he Akers-Douglas committee was very critical of this examination, describing it as ‘a hybrid examination in which Military and Literary subjects are strangely blended... from a Military point of view, it is impossible to look with favour on a syllabus from which Tactics, so important a part of Military Science, is entirely omitted.’ They recommended that either a new examination for militia candidates should be introduced, which would be based on purely military topics, or that they should complete the same examinations as gentlemen cadets at the RMA and RMC before receiving their regular commissions. The War Office opted for the first suggestion, introducing a new examination for militia and imperial yeomanry candidates in September 1904 which covered military history and strategy, tactics, military engineering, military topography, military law, and military administration and organization. This, of course, merely served to make the militia ‘back door more attractive, as those who had failed the classical, mathematical, and modern language components of the RMA and RMC entrance examina-

tions could naturally turn to the less rigorous militia route.*” There was also a concern that the ‘back door’ meant that the militia proper was deprived of good junior officers, but it was recognized that few men would seek commissions in the militia if there was no possibility of gaining a regular commission on favourable

terms.”” The Duke of Bedford, a strong advocate of the militia, made a radical proposal by suggesting that all candidates for cavalry and infantry commissions should enter the regular army via the militia.”' Few officers entering the regular army through the militia, or post-1908 Special Reserve route, left memoirs, but one notable exception was Edward Spears. He ended his military career as an honorary major general and fulfilled an important role as a liaison officer with the French army in both world wars. Spears entered the militia in 1903 as his family realized that his eccentric schooling by a succession of

private tutors in France and Ireland meant that he had no real chance of passing

87 Lord Ismay, The Memoirs of General The Lord Ismay (Heinemann, London, 1960), p. 4. 88 Morgan, Peace and War: A Soldier's Life, p. 24. ® Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army

(Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), pp. 7 and 14-15 and RMAS, WO152/73, RMC correspondence, 1903-1906, Memorandum ‘Army Entrance Examinations’ issued by the War Office, OS Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army (Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), p. 13. °! Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army

(Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), appendix X, ‘Memorandum by Lt. Col. The Duke of Bedford’, p. 66.

The Officer Corps 27 the Sandhurst entrance examination. Long-standing family connections with the 3 Royal Dublin Fusiliers meant that he had no difficulty in being accepted into that unit. Spears provides few details of his time with this battalion but suggests that preparing for the regular commission examination was no easy matter, taking him ‘two or three years of cramming, courses of various kinds, attachments, etc. before I finally passed all my Army examinations’. He was eventually commissioned into the 8 Hussars in 1906.°? The role of the universities in providing regular army officers was considerably developed in the 1902-14 period, especially with the expansion of the University Commissions scheme in 1904 and the establishment of the Officer Training Corps in 1908. While cadet training in amateur units under, in most cases, non-professional officers may seem a rather strange premise in retrospect, the fact that the militia (and post-1908 Special Reserve) had for many years trained officers who subsequently qualified for regular commissions set a clear precedent. The Akers-Douglas committee stated: “Though it might be supposed that University candidates, many of whom have received practically no military training before joining their regiments, would not be regarded with approval by the Military authorities, the expression of opinion

in their favour is practically unanimous.” The Akers-Douglas committee was impressed by the universities’ willingness (or at least that of Oxford, Cambridge, the Scottish universities, and Trinity College Dublin) to teach their candidates to whatever syllabus the War Office devised; and, indeed, Cambridge University proposed a course in Military Studies and the conversion of the university's Rifle Volunteer battalion into an ‘instructional battalion’.°* However, H. T. Pelham of Trinity College, Oxford was critical of the system. Noting that most university candidates had only spent one or at most two years at university, he continued: “Such men are in no real

sense University candidates, for they have not had time or opportunity to profit either by the teaching given them or by association with their contemporaries in University life.” This view was echoed by the Inspector General’s report of 1907, where he stated: “The university candidates are by no means the intellectual pick of the universities they come from, though I hope eventually that the very best will be forthcoming under the new arrangements.”° University candidates did, however, suffer from a serious disadvantage, in that when Sandhurst products were being commissioned at age 18, university candidates would be unlikely to receive their commissions before the age of 20, there being no requirement for them to complete their degree before commissioning, thereby losing two years’ seniority.”

°° Sir Edward Spears, The Picnic Basket (Secker and Warburg, London, 1967), p. 65. °° Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army (Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), p. 11. * Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army (Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), p. 11. > Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army (Cd.

982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), Appendix XIV, “Memo. on University Commissions’, p. 76. °° "TNA, WO27/491, ‘Annual Report for 1907 of the Inspector-General of the Forces’, p. 9. *” Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army (Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), pp. 9-12 and Appendices XI and XIV, pp. 67—70 and 76.

28 The Edwardian Army The universities were not always that keen on meeting the requirements laid down by the War Office, to allow for their students to be commissioned through

the university route. In early 1909 the Military Education Committee at the University of Durham discovered from a perusal of the minutes of the university's senate meetings that they had a right to nominate regular army officers as part of a group of universities, namely the Universities of Birmingham and Wales and the

Royal University of Ireland. However, protracted correspondence with the Universities of Birmingham and Wales and the successor institutions to the Royal University of Ireland, which had been abolished in 1908, revealed that no application for a nomination for a commission had ever been received from a student at any of these universities and, as a result, the joint appointments board had never

met. As late as 1911, the War Office finally gave its view that the University of Durham (along with a number of other universities) had no power to nominate candidates for commissions in the regular army as it had no established course of military instruction. Students at these universities could only gain commissions through joining their OTC units and obtaining the A and B certificates.”®

Even the larger and older universities sometimes struggled with the requirements of the university commissioning scheme. The University of London was determined to maintain its right to nominate its students for commissions but for most of the 1907-12 period the university was attempting to rely on a series of ad hoc teaching arrangements to prepare individual students for the necessary exami-

nation, rather than providing the course in Military Instruction which the War Office saw as a prerequisite. This seems to have been a reaction to student demand.

From 1904 to 1907, formal courses in military instruction were offered by the University of London, employing Colonels Maude and Sawyer at a combined sum of £250 p.a.. From 1908 these colonels were paid a retainer, totalling just £50 p.a., and by March 1909 only one student in the whole of the University of London was

planning to enter the examination for a university commission. From 1912, a degree course in military science was offered and this was helped by the fact that OTC candidates completing their certificate B course were covering almost exactly the same material as that needed to pass the university commission examination. As we might expect, given the size of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge and the social status of their students, the bulk of university commissions were granted to products of these universities between 1906 and mid 1912. Of the 284 university commissions granted in this period, 131 went to Oxford students and 112 to Cambridge. Trinity College Dublin made good use of the scheme and provided thirty-four students. This is somewhat surprising given the weak nature of the amateur military tradition in the university and the late development of its OTC, which does not seem to have been operating properly until 1910; but it is clear that the university did have a properly constituted ‘Army School’. More sur-

prising is the fact that, over this period, the Scottish universities (meaning °8 Minutes of the Military Education Committee, University of Durham, 14/10/08, 13/2/09, 20/3/09, 25/11/09 and 23/1/12. Letter from registrar, University of Birmingham, 24/3/09 and letter from registrar, University of Wales, 30/3/09. University of Durham Archives, UND/BC1/1.

The Officer Corps 29 St Andrews and Edinburgh, which were the only two to have developed a scheme of military instruction) provided only five students, and the University of London only one. The one remaining student commissioned came through the “Northern Group’ of universities, which included Manchester, Leeds, and Nottingham. Of these 284 students, sixty-four went to the Indian Army, suggesting that they were seeking to become career professionals.” As discussed further in Chapter 4, the OTC failed to provide anything like the number of officers hoped for, though admittedly it was seen primarily as a feeder to the Special Reserve and Territorial Force rather than the regular army. The numbers provided for the regular army before the Great War were absolutely tiny and often going to medical units where, one suspects, graduates’ medical degrees would

have secured them a commission in any case. In the University of London, for example, in 1912, when the OTC numbered 723 cadets, just six secured commissions in the regular forces and of these three went to the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) and two to the Indian Medical Service. In 1913, when the number of cadets was 734, just three obtained regular commissions, all in the RAMC.'” Those gaining commissions from the ranks were a small group amongst the Edwardian officer corps. Most were in the ‘dead-end’ job of Quartermaster, which tended to be given to long-service NCOs and was largely clerical in nature. Such men were ‘honorary officers only, which presumably meant that special arrangements were made for them in the officers’ mess, meaning that they could afford to maintain themselves on their pay. An example of this group is Honorary Captain and Quartermaster Thomas Finn of the 2 Scottish Rifles. He served fifteen years in the ranks before being commissioned and saw active service in South Africa in 1877-9 and 1899-1902. He was mentioned in dispatches twice in 1901, which must have strengthened his claim for promotion.'*' However, William Kelly, who was commissioned into the 1 Leinster Regiment as a lieutenant and quartermaster in 1909, had seventeen years and three months’ service in the ranks, ultimately as a regimental sergeant major, but had never been on active service, showing that bravery in the field was not an essential requirement for a long-service NCO to be promoted to commissioned rank.!” Some of those promoted from the ranks were given the normal duties of an officer

and the opportunity for further promotion. The best example of this in the British army in the Edwardian period, or, indeed in any other period of its history, is the case of Field Marshal Sir William Robertson. Robertson came from an impoverished

» University of London, Special Collections, ME/1/1/1 and 2, Military Education Committee, minutes and correspondence, 1908-1914, ‘Memorandum on the scheme of granting commissions in the regular army to University Graduates’ by Major Earle, General Staff and MEC minutes 9/3/09,

26/10/11, 21/12/11, 25/1/12 and 30/5/12. Trinity College Dublin Archives, MUN/OTC/1-2, enrollment books for Dublin University OTC, 1910-14. '° University of London, Special Collections, ME/1/1/2, Military Education Committee, minutes and correspondence, 1911-1914, MEC Annual Reports for 1912 and 1913. 101 "TNA, WO76/90, ‘Record of Officers service, 2 Scottish Rifles’. '? "TNA, WO76/24, ‘Record of Officers service, 1 Leinster Regiment’ and Army List.

30 The Edwardian Army background and enlisted as a trooper in the 16 Lancers in 1877, gaining his commission in the 3 Dragoon Guards in 1888. The outbreak of the First World War found him a major general and Director of Military Training at the War Office.'°°

Of course Robertson's case was the exception which proved the rule, as most men promoted from the ranks found themselves rising no further than major before the age limits forced them to retire. This is neatly demonstrated in the case

of Captain J. E. I. Masterson, 2 Devonshire Regiment, who had risen from the ranks after winning a Victoria Cross at Wagon Hill, Ladysmith, during the South African War. In his confidential report for 1911, his CO stated: “Has capacity for command and leadership. Is self reliant and possesses tact. Is a v. g. officer and looks after the welfare of his men. I have not recommended this officer for accelerated promotion yet I think it would be a gracious act to promote him to substantive Major, so as to allow him to draw an increased pension. He will be compulsorily

retired in 14 months’ time, and there does not seem much chance of his getting promotion in his own regiment.’ This statement was fully endorsed by Lieutenant General Sir Ian Hamilton, who noted: ‘a very fine fellow and deserves well of his country. These comments were acted on and Masterson was promoted to major in

the Lancaster Regiment before retirement.’ Those promoted from the ranks appear to have faced financial problems in trying to maintain themselves in their commissioned status, and this probably explains why so many of them served with unfashionable colonial units. For example, Cap-

tain J. E MacKay, who, like Masterson, was awarded a VC for heroism in the South African War and then was commissioned into the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, served in the West African Frontier Force from 1903 to 1908. Even when he returned to Britain, he was seconded from his regiment to serve as the adjutant of the 7 Royal Scots, a Territorial Force battalion. Similarly, Major M. N. Turner, commissioned from the ranks in July 1890, into the 1 Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, spent much more than his fair share of service overseas. Between July 1890 and April 1906, he spent just forty-one months in the United Kingdom and from 1897 to 1902 was the adjutant of the Upper Burma Volunteer Rifles. All of these postings brought special allowances and reduced living costs.'” Financial problems could also be a difficulty for the group known as ‘gentlemen rankers’, men who were from middle-class backgrounds but who enlisted in the ranks for a variety of reasons: failure to pass the entrance examinations to the

cadet colleges or lack of family support, moral or financial, for their choice of career. A good example of this group is C. H. Bacon, who had been educated on the army side of St Paul’s School and then enlisted in the King’s Royal Rifle Corps. After two and a half years’ service he was commissioned as an officer in the '3 D. R. Woodward (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, December 1915—February 1918 (Bodley Head for the Army Records

Society, London, 1989), pp. 1-16.

'€ LHCMA, Hamilton, 5/2/6, Ian Hamilton papers, Confidential report on Captain J. E. I. Masterson, May 1911.

' "TNA, WO76/460, ‘Record of service of officers’, 1 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and DCLI Museum, Bodmin, ‘Record of service of officers’, 1 Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry.

The Officer Corps 31 1 Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry in July 1909. However, in August 1913 it was noted that, ‘After making every effort to live upon his pay and the small allowance which is all that his father can afford to give him, Mr Bacon

feels compelled to give up the struggle to make both ends meet.’ Bacon had applied for secondment to the Canadian Militia, which seems to have brought his case to the attention of the authorities at the War Office and, after personal intervention by J. E. B. Seely, the Secretary of State for War, the solution to his case seems to have been to promote him to the rank of full lieutenant in the less expensive Northamptonshire Regiment.'°° While a snob like General Sir William Nicholson could voice concern about those risen from the ranks, commenting on William Robertson's ‘want of breeding’ when he was being considered for the post of Commandant of the Staff College, other senior officers were concerned at the narrow social basis of the officer corps.'*” Lieutenant General Sir Ian Hamilton raised the possibility of, as he put it, ‘slipping, here and there, a Field Marshal’s baton into the knapsack of Thomas Atkins’ in a memorandum of August 1912 and returned to this theme again in the aftermath of the Curragh Incident, when he felt that public opinion might be

more sympathetic to reform. The Curragh Incident, while not a mutiny in the technical sense of the word, saw a major breakdown in civil—military relations when sixty officers of the 3 Cavalry Brigade based at the Curragh Camp in Ireland made it clear that, if ordered to suppress the Ulster Volunteer Force, they would resign their commissions. As Ian Beckett has shown, these officers received wide-

spread support throughout the officer corps of the British army. In Hamilton's mind and those of many others, this event identified the officers corps with the

Unionist Party.’ Hamilton felt that those opposed to more widespread commissioning from the ranks would base their arguments on four main points: first, that ranker officers had not proved to be a success with officers or men; second, that more ranker officers would destroy ‘the social life of the regiment’; third, that the increase in officers’

pay required to allow rankers to remain in their new posts would make it difficult to get officers to serve in India or Africa as the differentials for overseas service would largely be removed; fourth, that the army needed to tap more educated men for the officer corps than were to be found in the ranks. Hamilton himself was concerned that, if handled badly, more widespread commissioning from the ranks would merely benefit the ‘orderly room clerk class’ and ‘crammers failures’, neither

of which he felt would make effective leaders. Hamilton himself advocated a

'6 LHCMA, Hamilton 5/1/62, Ian Hamilton papers, letter J. S. King, War Office to Hamilton, 5/8/13 and Army List, August 1914, c. 1334. '°” Keith Jeffery, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier (Oxford University Press,

2 ,p. 78.

need i W. Beckett (ed.), Zhe Army and the Curragh Incident, 1914 (The Bodley Head for The Army Records Society, London), 1986, Sir James Fergusson, The Curragh Incident (Faber and Faber, London, 1964), John Gooch, “The War Office and the Curragh Incident’, Bulletin of the Institute for Historical Research, XLVI (1973) and A. P. Ryan, Mutiny at the Curragh (Macmillan, London, 1956).

32 The Edwardian Army scheme, which was implemented in 1914, whereby selected NCOs would be commissioned on the outbreak of war. He also proposed a number of special scholarships aimed at pupils in grammar schools, free education for all cadets at Sandhurst, and the reform of the cavalry to make the cost of living in a cavalry mess much less;

but these plans came to nought.'” Post commissioning there was very limited professional development open to officers. Almost all went through a practical course in musketry at Hythe and there

were also practical courses in machine guns, signalling, and mounted infantry work. Officers did have to pass promotion exams, if they were to advance, but it is unclear what exactly these consisted of. For promotion to full lieutenant, officers had to complete the ‘A and B’ exam (confusingly, this seems to have been the same exam which OTC cadets undertook to gain their first commissions). This covered drill, interior economy, and disciplinary powers. It was a test that was very difficult to fail and the Akers-Douglas committee felt that this was because the examining officers were generally drawn from the candidate’s own battalion and knew him too well. The committee recommended that a commanding officer’s report on fitness for promotion should sufhce for promotion to lieutenant. The next exam was

the “C, D and G’, which was a series of written papers concerning law, tactics, topography, military engineering, organization, and equipment. These papers were

seen to be too theoretical and to encourage cramming.''° Nevertheless, Christopher Lynch Robinson, who seems to have had an easy time passing the Sandhurst entrance exam and to have done well there, found his “‘D’ examination for promo-

tion to captain ‘very hard’.''! By 1910 the promotion examinations to lieutenant and captain included a military history component concerning either the American Civil War or the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8.'? In 1906 the Inspector General of the Forces was critical of the promotion examination from major to lieutenant colonel. He noted that officers had to pass the entrance examination for the Staff

College, that is to say that they had to pass the minimum amount of marks to qualify, not enough to actually secure a place. As noted below, the Inspector Gen-

eral, and others, felt that a distinction should be made between ‘command’ and ‘staff’ posts, the former not requiring the officer to have attended Staff College." Other professional development post commissioning was rare. The Akers-Douglas committee suggested more generous cash bonuses for those who qualified to interpreter standard in foreign languages.''* The only attempt made to work in collaboration with a university was a scheme with the London School of Economics which

' LHCMA, Hamilton 5/1/7, Hamilton papers, letter Hamilton to J. E. B. Seely, 27/8/12 and, Hamilton 5/1/11, letter Hamilton to R. B. Haldane, 6/4/14. "© Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army

(Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), pp. 31-2. "Lynch Robinson, Last of the Irish R.M.s, p. 68. "2 RMAS, WO152/74, box 143, RMC correspondence 1910, letter Director Military Training to Commandant, 15/7/10. "8 "TNA, WO27/491, ‘Annual Report for 1906 of the Inspector-General of the Forces’, p. 13. "4 Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army (Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), p. 35.

The Officer Corps 33 commenced in 1906. This was a course on law, economics, statistics, and geography

which was designed to prepare officers for administrative staff duties. From 1906 until the outbreak of the First World War, 241 officers had qualified in this course. This whole scheme was viewed with suspicion by Henry Wilson, who was concerned that it would develop as a rival to the Staff College.’ Historians writing about the Staff College in the Edwardian period have tended to be rather generous in their assessment of the teaching provided in it and to have overestimated its importance in the army. Certainly the succession of Staff College Commandants was impressive: Brigadier General Henry Rawlinson from 1903 to 1906, Brigadier General Henry Wilson from 1906 to 1910, Major General W. R.

Robertson from 1910 to 1913, and Brigadier General Launcelot Kiggell from October 1913 until the outbreak of war. These men all reached the heights of their profession and were surely able to impart some useful knowledge to the students under their tutelage. Henry Wilson probably did good service with his lectures on likely European warfare and staff rides round the Franco-Prussian battlefields. ‘The creation of a General Staff in 1906 and establishment of the Staff College at Quetta, India in 1911 can also be seen as growing professionalism.''® However, the British General Staff was, in many instances, simply a redefinition of existing administrative posts and the Staff College at Quetta was, not surprisingly, designed to profes-

sionalize the Indian Army, not the British army proper. In both Staff Colleges (at Camberley and Quetta) there was too much emphasis on sport and games and too little emphasis on the basic administrative functions of staff officers.''” The ‘p.s.c.’ (‘passed staff college’) letters after an officer's name in the Army List

did not automatically secure him a staff post, and a number of officers who had never studied at the Staff College held staff posts. Most notably, in 1914, Field Marshal Sir John French, General Sir Charles Douglas, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Lieutenant General Sir H. C. Sclater, the Adjutant General, were not graduates of the Staff College. Also, while most officers who attended Staff College did so due to their success in the competitive entrance examination, a small number of places were ‘by nomination’, i.e. effectively in the gift of certain senior officers and serving to reinforce a patronage network.

One officer who attended Staff College between 1906 and 1907 does little to suggest that the course contained any academic rigour. Charles Harington noted that the officers were expected to cycle up to fifty miles a day, three or four days a week, to see if they could still keep their tempers and write sensible appreciations when tired, and were encouraged to take part in games. He also recounted putting together—very hurriedly, due to sporting commitments—a draft scheme for feeding

' Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (Eyre Methuen, London, 1972), p. 252, Command Papers; 1907 (Cd. 6285), 1908 (Cd.4052), 1909 (Cd. 4610), 1910 (Cd. 5213), 1911 (Cd. 5597), 1912-13 (Cd. 6285) and 1913 (Cd. 669), R. Dahrendorf, A History of the London School of Economics and Political Science 1895 to 1995 (Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 89.

"6 John Gooch, The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c. 1900-1916 (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1974). "7 Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, pp. 181-298, Jeffery, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, pp. 64-84.

34 The Edwardian Army the six divisions of the BEF off the land. Henry Wilson, then Commandant of the Staff College, rated this work very highly and saw it as the best piece of work submitted for the exercise. Perhaps, as Harington himself reflected, ‘the greatest factor of the Staff College was the firm friendships made there’.''® Tom Bridges, a student

at the Staff College at the same time, concluded in a similar fashion by noting: ‘Once used to going back to school the Staff College is a good place and affords about the only chance an officer gets in the Army of working and exchanging ideas with his contemporaries of all arms who take their profession seriously.’'””

Given the small number of officers who attended Staff College and the lack of other systematic professional development post commissioning, the question then arises over how the promotion system worked in the Edwardian army. Unfortu-

nately, it is impossible to reconstruct the decision-making process as it existed between 1902 and 1914, as a number of key War Office records have either been destroyed or withheld and a number of officers, who were either at, or would rise to, the height of their profession either did not keep, or in a surprising number of cases destroyed, their personal papers. Tim Travers has considered the promotion system and has developed the concept of the ‘personalized’ army. In Travers’s view the years

1902 to 1918 saw a conflict between a traditional and a professional promotions system, with patronage remaining important. There are, of course, some examples which Travers can point to, to support this argument. Douglas Haig clearly benefited from being a protégé of John French and in turn acted as a patron for a number of officers, perhaps most notably Hubert Gough. However, Travers failed to appreciate the limits of patronage in the years before the First World War and too much of his evidence is based on the unreliable memoirs of J. E. Edmonds.'”° The simple fact of the matter seems to be that in the long-established tradition of the British

public service, at least since the mid-nineteenth century, promotion was largely governed by seniority: the principle of “‘Buggin’s turn’. Officers might jump the queue a little by passing Staff College, performing an act of bravery, or calling upon

the support of patrons, but in a small army, with few senior vacancies, and in the years 1902-14 very limited opportunities for active service, it was seniority which became the guiding principle. As a result, promotion was glacial before the Great War and, in 1914, to use two random examples, the senior captain in the Grenadier Guards had been promoted to that rank as long ago as 1905 and had sixteen years’ service in total, and his counterpart in the Connaught Rangers had been promoted captain in 1901.'7! One CO giving evidence to the Akers-Douglas Committee concluded, ‘Promotion is practically invariably by seniority.’'” "8 Harington, Zim Harington Looks Back, pp. 32-3. "° Tom Bridges, Alarms and Excursions: Reminisciences of a Soldier (Longman, Green, London,

] ,p. 55.

Ee Oe vers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of

Modern Warfare 1900-1918 (Routledge, London, 1987), pp. 3-36 and T. H. E. Travers, “The hidden army: structural problems in the British officer corps, 1900-1918’, Journal of Contemporary History, 17, 3 (1982). '*! Hart's Army List, 1914, pp. 284 and 499. '2 Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army (Cd. 982), 1902 (Akers-Douglas Report), p. 50 and Appendix XV, p. 79.

The Officer Corps 35 The only significant collection of papers relating to the promotions system of this period are those of General Sir Ian Hamilton. Hamilton, as Inspector of Overseas Forces (1910-14) was responsible for completing confidential reports on

a number of officers of the rank of major and above and commenting on their suitability for promotion. He also, as a senior officer and member of the War Office selection board, received a number of letters asking for his help in securing promotion. These papers suggest that the system of confidential reports was taken

seriously and, despite the fact that officers had to be shown and had the right of appeal to the Army Council over any adverse report, that honest appraisals were made. Thus a patron could do very little to promote the interests of an officer who received an adverse report or who had failed his promotion examination.

The nature of the Edwardian army also set limits. Promotions were to fill set vacancies, so however brilliant an officer was judged to be and however great the patronage behind him, he could not receive significantly accelerated promotion. Thus Hubert Gough, coming from a well-established military family, wealthy, having a ‘good war’ in South Africa, and with the patronage of Douglas Haig behind him, still had to wait until he was 36 years old to become a regimental commanding officer.'”’ Linked to this was the operation of the regimental system. The army was loath to cross-post officers from one regiment to become majors or lieutenant colonels in another. At one level this struck at the whole idea of seniority, at the other it set up a new commanding officer for a distinctly frosty welcome and possibly uncongenial period of command, as his arrival signalled the bitter fact that the War Office felt that the regiment itself contained no major worthy of promotion. When Henry de Beauvoir De Lisle, a future general and corps commander during the First World War, was promoted from the Durham Light Infantry into the 5 Dragoon Guards as a major and brevet lieutenant colonel in 1903, this was done at the express wish of Field Marshal Lord Roberts, then the Commander in Chief. Roberts realized that De Lisle and he had similar views on the future employ-

ment of cavalry as mounted infantry and wanted some support to come from within the ranks of the cavalry. De Lisle’s transfer meant that in 1905 he became the commanding officer of the 5 Dragoon Guards. Having been brought in over other officers and from an infantry regiment, De Lisle reflected that his position was ‘at times a little difficult’.'*4 No such difficulties seem to have been experienced

by Tom Bridges when he was promoted from the Royal Horse Artillery into the 4 Royal Irish Dragoon Guards. However, Bridges seems to have been innocent of any politicking over this transfer and, as he joined the 4 Dragoon Guards as their junior major, he was in a rather different position from that of De Lisle.'” This did, of course, then result in a bizarre situation where some battalions were judged to have a wealth of talent, most of which would not be fully recognized by promotion, whereas others were deemed to have very little. Thus Lieutenant

'3° Gary Sheffield and Helen McCartney, “Hubert Gough’ in I. E W. Beckett and S. J. Corvi, Haigs Generals (Pen and Sword, Barnsley, 2006). '4 Beauvoir De Lisle, Reminiscences of Sport and War (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1939), pp. 121-3. '25 Bridges, Alarms and Excursions, p. 58.

36 The Edwardian Army General Sir J. G. Maxwell, as GOC Egypt, commented on Major W. B. Wallace of

the 1 Suffolk Regiment, ‘It seems a pity that an officer who has specialised in S.[outh] A.[frica] and has the experience of Maj. Wallace cannot be made more use of. I was most favourably impressed with this officer. With so many high qualified officers recommended by their C.O. for accel.[erated] prom.[otion] it is a pity that prom.[otion] should be blocked in this particular battalion.’!”° The time limits set on appointments and compulsory retirement meant that a battalion with a number of talented officers risked their facing compulsory retirement as majors. More common than posting in an officer from another battalion as CO was the decision to promote a junior major over the senior, thus maintaining the principle of the regimental system. This was the process by which Lieutenant Colonel C. H. P. Carter

came to command the 2 Scottish Rifles, passing over the senior major who was deemed to have only ‘passable’ performance in manoeuvres and professional knowledge which was ‘not deep’.'”” Accelerated promotion was, therefore, possible but seems to have happened very

rarely. It says much for the promotions system that an officer of the calibre of H. H. Tudor, later to become a major general and highly effective divisional commander during the Great War and in 1920-1 to take on the politically difficult and militarily impossible post of head of the Royal Irish Constabulary, was not selected for accelerated promotion while a major. Julian Byng, while GOC Egypt, strongly recommended Tudor for accelerated promotion, giving the following reasons: 1. “He has been in command of forces of all arms at manoeuvres and has shown ability in handling mixed forces which renders him more efficient than most of his rank.’ 2. ‘He is a most earnest student of millitar]y subjects and is conversant with the opinion of writers of most nationalities.’ 3. “He is a good linguist.’ 4. ‘A very fine horseman + horsemaster.’

[an Hamilton stated that he shared Byng’s ‘high appreciation’ of Tudor but then went on to state: ‘In spite of all this I prefer a negative attitude as to accelerated promotion.”!”* Hamilton’s papers also show the limits of his own and others’ patronage. Hamilton was very impressed by the performance of Lieutenant Colonel C. H. P. Carter of the 2 Scottish Rifles. Carter himself must have been a remarkably good soldier as he was one of the very few commanding officers who had started his army life in the ranks,

albeit as a ‘gentleman ranker’, having been educated at Cheltenham College and

].

iA LHCMA, 5/1/11, General Sir Ian Hamilton papers, confidential report on Major W. B. Wallace,

‘2 LHCMA, 5/1/11, General Sir Ian Hamilton papers, confidential report on Major C. M. S. Henning, 8/4/12. 14/4) LHICMA, 5/1/11, General Sir Ian Hamilton papers, confidential report on Major H. H. Tudor,

The Officer Corps 37 serving for twelve years in the ranks of the Royal Scots before being specially promoted to captain.’”? Hamilton wrote to Lieutenant General E. C. Bethune, the Director-General of the Territorial Force, in May 1912 supporting Carter’s promotion and stating: he is quite exceptional in his way. I heard from Rundle that he finds it impossible on financial grounds to carry on in command of a battalion out here [Malta], and that one of the things that would suit him is a Territorial Brigade...I cannot imagine in the whole world anyone who, from the point of popularity, power of enforcing disci-

pline and skill in imparting training is better than Carter. His own Scottish Rifles Brigade, with its headquarters in Glasgow, falls vacant on 20th August... [I]t is a rare chance that such a man should, so to say, be suddenly made available for a Territorial Brigade instead of being sent out as Inspector General of West African Frontier Force or something of that sort.'*°

Not only was Hamilton’s specific request rejected but Carter’s next appointment, on 24 October 1913, was to the command of the Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force, which could most charitably be viewed as a sideways move.'°! Similarly, Hamilton’s support for the promotion of Brigadier General E. J. Cooper, who he felt had done a very good job in command of the garrison of Tienstin, to command a Territorial division came to nought. Cooper was placed on half pay in June 1914 when his period of command at Tienstin came to an end.'** Hamilton and also Julian Byng possibly did not do some of their protégés much good by recommending them for the command of Territorial rather than regular brigades, which they saw as a high honour and, in some ways, more demanding and difficult than the command of regulars.'* Hamilton did, of course, have some successes. Following an appeal from Robert Kekewich, to help in finding employment for his brother-in-law, Major General E. S. May, Hamilton seems to have been instrumental in securing the command of the Presidency Brigade in Calcutta for May, in spring 1913. Hamilton did note that May had not helped his cause and indeed acted as ‘an awful duffer’ by turning

down the Mauritius command when it was offered to him.'** Hamilton also secured the adjutancy of the 7 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders for Captain Neal Thomson, having been approached by his relatives.'°? Perhaps Hamilton's most notable protégé was Major General, later Field Marshal, Julian Byng. Hamilton witnessed Byng’s work as GOC Egypt and noted: “Ihe Army Council ought not to

' "TNA, WO76/90, Digest of officers service, 2nd Scottish Rifles, entry for C. H. P. Carter. 0 LHCMA, 5/1/11, General Sir Ian Hamilton papers, letter Hamilton to Bethune, 10/5/12. '! Army List, August 1914, c. 2511. ' LHCMA, 5/1/75, General Sir Ian Hamilton papers, letter Hamilton to Franklyn, 2/12/13 and Army List, August 1914, c. 374. "3 LHCMA, 5/1/11, General Sir Ian Hamilton papers, confidential report on Lieutenant Colonel J. O. Travers, 18/3/14. '54 LHCMA, 5/1/34, General Sir Ian Hamilton papers, letters Robert Kekewich to Hamilton, 24/3/13 and Hamilton to Kekewich, 24/3/13, Army List, August 1914, c. 72. ' LHCMA, 5/1/33, General Sir Ian Hamilton papers, letter Hamilton to Bethune, 7/10/13 and Army List, August 1914, c. 1521.

38 The Edwardian Army lose sight of such a man. He ought, in my humble opinion, to be earmarked for some billet of the very first order.’°° However, it seems highly likely that Byng’s star was in the ascendant long before Hamilton made this report. Whilst it is impossible to work out the promotions system in the pre-war army, it is fair to say that a demotion system effectively did not exist. Ifan officer behaved

badly or, indeed, committed a military offence, then he would generally be allowed to resign his commission. Thus when F. P. Crozier, serving as a captain in

the 2 Manchester Regiment, issued a dishonoured cheque in settlement of his mess bill, he was able to resign, forestalling any possible court martial.'%’ Similarly, the worst thing that a confidential report could do was to end an officer's

chances of promotion, not remove him from the post he held. Indeed Alymer Haldane, when commanding the 10 Infantry Brigade, was frustrated by his inability to sack some of the officers under his command: ‘[T]o get rid of a commanding officer in peacetime was not easy — there was nothing to be done but endeavour to make the best of a bad job.’ He felt that the 1 Royal Irish Fusiliers

were particularly badly trained, with their CO more interested in athletics than military training; two weeks into the Great War, Haldane was able to sack this officer though, perhaps ironically, it was the COs of the 1 Royal Warwickshire Regiment and 2 Royal Dublin Fusiliers, both serving in Haldane’s brigade, who failed the test of war more spectacularly by participating in the infamous ‘Colonels’

surrender at St Quentin.'*®

Those falling foul of senior officers or politicians could find themselves in some trouble but this was unlikely to end their careers. In 1910 Major Berkley Vincent, then an instructor at the Staff College in Quetta, ran into trouble with

Douglas Haig, then Chief of the General Staff, India. Discussing a tactical scheme with Haig, Vincent, an experienced soldier who had served in the South African War and as an observer with the Japanese Army in the Russo-Japanese War, gave his view that cavalry should always seek to outflank a skirmish line of infantry. Haig was appalled at this suggestion and felt that Vincent was not sufficiently conversant with field service regulations. As a result of this, Vincent was removed from his post of instructor in cavalry subjects at Quetta, although

his sideways move to be GSOI in Northern Army, India was certainly not a demotion.’ Similarly, there were fears over the promotion and future employment prospects of Major General J. S. S. Barker when he made a serious mistake

'86 LHCMA, 5/1/22, General Sir Ian Hamilton papers, Hamilton to Sir John French, 12/1/14.

'7 Personal file of Brigadier General FE P. Crozier (TNA, WO374/16997). For Crozier’s own account of this difficult time in his life, see his Impressions and Recollections (TY. Werner Laurie,

London, 1930), pp. 131-58. He was recommissioned in 1914 and went on to be a highly successful Brigadier General.

'88 NLS, Ms 20,253, General Sir Alymer Haldane, unpublished autobiography, pp. 286-303 and P.T. Scott, Dishonoured’: The ‘Colonels’ Surrender’ at St. Quentin, The Retreat from Mons, August 1914

(Tom Donovan, London, 1994). Haldane, understandably, managed to gloss over these problems in his, A Brigade of the old army 1914 (Edward Arnold, London, 1920), p. 8-70. '9 LHCMA, 5/1/10, General Sir Ian Hamilton papers, report by Douglas Haig, 5/1/10, letters E.

W. D. Ward, War Office to Vincent, 9/3/11, Vincent to Hamilton, 16/3/11, Hamilton to Vincent, 23/3/11 and Army List, August 1914, c. 68.

The Officer Corps 39 while talking to Winston Churchill. Barker was in command of the Royal Artillery

units in Malta when Churchill visited the island as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1912. Churchill was discussing with Barker and others the likelihood of warships being able to silence the guns in Malta’s forts. Barker gave his view that ships would have to get in very close to shore and continued: ‘Imagine thirty or forty 150lb high explosive shells striking a ship every minute.’ Churchill corrected him, stating that the guns at Malta were 6” in calibre and therefore fired

a shell weighing 100lbs. Details of this incident became known to Colonel Repington of The Times and, probably from him, to R. B. Haldane and H. H. Asquith. General Sir H. M. L. Rundle, the Governor of Malta, rated Barker highly and was worried that this incident would have an adverse impact on his career. Hamilton was sympathetic but didn’t think that Barker had helped himself by getting involved with Repington and trying to pass off his mistake as a ‘trifling error’. This incident had no short-term impact on Barker’s career, as he remained in command of RA on Malta.'° The life of an Edwardian army officer in peacetime was not strenuous. Officers could receive frequent and lengthy leave from their units and even while serving with them they only had a few hours’ work to complete each day. Some posts could be virtual sinecures with Adrian Carton De Wiart remembering that while he was adjutant of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, Yeomanry he was able to fulfil his limited duties by post and telegram while living on the continent for most of the autumn.'*' Recreation was sometimes of a compulsory nature, however, leading to higher expenses. When S. C. M. Archibald was first posted to a RFA battery, his commanding officer insisted that he hunted, and he often did for four days per week.'*” Similarly, when M. D. Kennedy joined the 2 Scottish Rifles, his company commander made it clear that he was expected to play polo and this put a heavy strain on his limited allowance.'° It is very difficult to agree with Tim Travers’s view that the Edwardian period saw growing professionalism over the late Victorian period. ‘The officer corps contin-

ued to be drawn from a tiny section of society and the requirement that officers had to be able to support themselves financially meant that selection processes were far from rigorous. Training was of a poor standard and one cannot help feeling

that the newly commissioned officer learned more about drill and man management from experienced NCOs and officers when he joined his unit than he ever learned at the RMA or RMC. Professional development was very limited and there was confusion over whether ‘command’ posts could be distinguished from ‘staff’ posts, and the extent to which attendance at the Staff College was required to fill

“4° LHCMA, 5/1/43, General Sir Ian Hamilton papers, letters, Charles a Court Repington to Barker, 22/6/12, Barker to Repington 27/6/12, Rundle to Hamilton, 2/7/12, Hamilton to Rundle 8/7/12 and Army List, August 1914, c. 80. 4) Adrian Carton De Wiart, Happy Odyssey: The Memoirs of Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Carton De Wiart (Jonathan Cape, London, 1950), pp. 43-4. “2 TWM, PP/MCR/11, Memoirs of Major General S. C. M. Archibald, pp. 54-5.

p.y ee2P.,392, Captain M. D. Kennedy, “Their Mercenary Calling’ (unpublished manuscript),

40 The Edwardian Army either. In terms of promotion, there are clear examples of patronage but this should

not be overestimated; most promotion was simply by seniority and patrons had very limited powers to push their protégé’s interests. While the Edwardian ofhcer corps did provide the basis for the massive expansion of 1914-18, much of this

was based on rapidly commissioning groups, principally promising NCOs and OTC cadets, who, with few exceptions, could not be accommodated in the class-conscious and largely self-financing pre-war officer corps.

2 The Other Ranks It is a difficult task for the historian to properly evaluate the other ranks’ experience of the Edwardian army. The poor educational backgrounds of most recruits means that few accounts survive of service at this time and those that do are highly unrepresentative. Three examples will suffice. Frank Richards’s Old Soldier Sahib was written under the guidance of Robert Graves, who knew Richards from their service in the 2 Royal Welsh Fusiliers during the Great War. J. E Lucy, who published his memoirs in 1938,

was commissioned during the First World War and ended his career as a lieutenant colonel. James Hutchinson’s memoirs of service with the 1 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers in China between 1909 and 1912 tell us a great deal about his impressions of China, but very little about his regimential service. In any case, Hutchinson was an oddity in

the ranks of the Edwardian army as he was a self-taught photographer with a real genius for his art, who also mastered the complicated processes required to develop

and colour his photographs in the cramped conditions of an infantry barracks. Wounded at Gallipoli and transferred to training duties in Ireland on his recovery, Hutchinson ended his military service as a company quartermaster sergeant in 1919.' Beyond these accounts, there is a small but valuable collection of oral interviews held with Edwardian soldiers in the Imperial War Museum. However, we must remain aware that these accounts serve to highlight just how few soldiers of the period left any accounts and, not surprisingly, we have pitifully few accounts from short-service sol-

diers who felt no affection for their military service, and no accounts from those enlisted under the special enlistment scheme and who were effectively made redundant when, after three months, they had still failed to meet the less than exacting medical standards required. The horrifically high casualty rate suffered by the regular army during the First World War also meant that many pre-war soldiers never had the opportunity to record their military experiences.

Throughout the Edwardian period, most of the recruiting problems evident in the late Victorian army persisted.” The low rates of pay, poor promotion prospects,

' J. E Lucy, Theres a Devil in the Drum (London: Faber and Faber, 1938) and Frank Richards, Old Soldier Sahib (Faber, London, 1936). Hutchinson’s account and photographs, now held by the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers Museum, Enniskillen, were published as Bill Jackson (ed.), The Corporal and the Celestials: In north China with the 1st Battalion, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 1909-1912 (Ulster Historical Foundation, Belfast, 2008). ° A.R. Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home: The Recruitment and terms and conditions of the British regular, 1859-1899 (Croom Helm, London, 1977), pp. 235-300 and E. M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, 1868-1902 (Manchester University Press, 1992), pp. 118-51.

42 The Edwardian Army harsh discipline, and poor conditions of service meant that recruits were overwhelmingly drawn from the most deprived socio-economic groups in the United Kingdom. Having joined the army, a man was likely to leave it as quickly as he legally—or in a large number of cases, illegally—could, meaning that the army, struggling to obtain recruits in the first place, also had a serious problem with retention, as demonstrated in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Service in the other ranks of the British army remained an unattractive proposition for the vast bulk of British society. Indeed, it is clear, given the poor recruiting statistics for the army, at least from October 1903 when the army returned to normal peacetime conditions, and the low medical standards expected, that many

men did prefer the harsh conditions of the workhouse to service in the ranks. Whilst accommodation, conditions of leave, and provision of food were all improving, albeit slowly, pay remained low, the standards of accommodation available, especially in some of the older barracks, remained of a very poor standard, and the

opportunities for a private soldier to marry ‘on the strength’ remained severely curtailed. Worst of all, it was clear to most men that service in the army did little to improve their future career prospects. Overall, it may appear that recruitment to the army remained fairly constant, and consistently bad, throughout the 1903-13 period, once the enthusiasm of the South

African War had passed. However, at the regimental level there were important changes that are worth noting. In 1907 one of the rather neglected aspects of the Haldane reforms was to disband nine infantry battalions (the 3 Scots Guards and the 3 and 4 Battalions of the Northumberland Fusiliers, Royal Warwickshire Regiment, Lancashire Fusiliers, and Manchester Regiment) and a small number of RFA and RGA companies and depots. This left a number of soldiers in an awkward position in the army, especially as few accepted the bounties offered to transfer to other

units, although 120 men of the 3 Manchester Regiment transferred to the Royal Canadian Regiment, a dominion force with higher rates of pay.*? The Cardwell— Childers linked-battalions system established fully in 1881 meant that battalions on home service were left as little more than feeders to battalions overseas, with a very low establishment and high number of soldiers under 20 years of age. This had two serious problems. First, personnel could become transitory, meaning that while one could argue that a regimential esprit de corps was promoted, identification with a

battalion was often weak. So, for example, when the 2 Dorsetshire Regiment replaced the 1 Dorsetshire Regiment in India in 1906, 700 long-service soldiers of the 1 transferred to the 2 to see out their service in India.* Second, the home-service battalions used up a very large proportion of the army reserve and Special Reserve to meet their war establishments on the outbreak of the First World War, providing pitifully few experienced soldiers as reserves against casualty rates.

> 1908 (Cd. 3798), The general annual report on the British Army for the year ending 30th September

1907, pp. 2-3 and H. C. Wylly, History of the Manchester Regiment (late the 63rd and 96th Foot) (Forster Groom, London, 1925), pp. 63-4. * C.T. Atkinson, The Dorsetshire Regiment: The Thirty-Ninth and Fifty-Fourth Foot and the Dorset Militia and Volunteers (Oxford University Press, 1947), vol. II, pp. 102-3.

The Other Ranks 43 Y DNBNDAMOAYWNAOCA

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aOf SCMRONKRWOMNAYNH BzANRDSANYWANDOXHYO Despite these generally high figures, most commanding officers were quick

to dismiss alcohol abuse and STDs as minor problems, at least in the home-based army, and pointed out the noticeable rate of decline in their own units.” Educating men about drink and sex was regarded as an extremely tricky subject and most commanding officers appear to have delegated this issue to the chaplain

and medical officer. Lieutenant Colonel G. Egerton of 1 Yorkshire Regiment summed up the attitude of many of his peers when he noted: ‘I am convinced that lectures or discussion of the subject by combatant officers are inadvisable.’ Commanding officers were confident that medical officers and chaplains dealt with these sensitive subjects extremely effectively and were having a good influence on the men.” Colonel E. Herbert, the commanding officer of the Rifle Brigade depot, was certainly convinced, and wrote: A wonderful influence is here exercised among the men, especially among the recruits,

who form the bulk of the garrison, by the Reverend E. G. E Macpherson, Church of

© TNA WO 33/2979 Report on Welfare, pp. 31-2. °° "TNA WO 33/2979 Report on Welfare, pp. 177, 206, 243. >! Army Medical Department Report, 1908 Cmd. 4933, pp. 123, 135, 144, 153, 166; Report on the Health for the Army, 1912 Cmd. 7201, pp. 139. > Army Medical Department Report, 1908 Cmd. 4933, pp. vi, xiii, 93-5, 123, 135, 144, 153, 166; Report on the Health for the Army, 1912 Cmd. 7201, pp. 46-7. °> Edmondson, John Bulls army, pp. 131-8. * ‘TNA WO 33/2979 Report on Welfare, pp. 7, 9, 31, 77, 93, 163, 183. ° TNA WO 33/2979 Report on Welfare, p. 15. °° TNA WO 33/2979 Report on Welfare, pp. 15, 31, 138, 223.

56 The Edwardian Army England Chaplain to the Forces. He so gets hold of the lads when they arrive, that there is hardly any intemperance, sexual immorality, or gambling among them during the 3 months they are here.”

A good chaplain was certainly a very useful figure, subtly helping to maintain morale and discipline. Horace Wyndham was fulsome in praise of his regimental chaplain. According to Wyndham, he inspired confidence in the men as he encouraged them to speak freely and often started debates on Sunday afternoons in barrack rooms, giving each man a chance to air his opinion.”* The army was extremely solicitous about religion and tried to ensure that each man had an opportunity to

follow his own particular denomination.” However, there were some glaring anomalies. As the army concentrated more and more attention on the facilities around Salisbury Plain, the lack of places of worship became increasingly apparent.

In 1906 Major General E. O. Hay, on behalf of Southern Command, complained that there were now nearly 6,000 soldiers in and around Salisbury Plain and yet there were no religious spaces reserved for their use.® Sectarianism, particularly in Ireland, also caused friction. Major General L. W. Parsons echoed the sentiments of the Reverend F. B. D. Bickerstaffe-Drew, a senior chaplain to the forces, when he noted that soldiers’ institutes and homes had to be ecumenical if they were to be truly effective.° Soldiers’ institutes and homes tried to offer men a friendly welcome and provided them with games, newspapers, and books. Reading was certainly an extremely

important pastime, and many men were voracious readers. Wyndham stated that the men in his battalion had broad reading tastes, enjoying Conan Doyle, Kipling, romances by Mrs Henry Wood and Miss Braddon, and histories, travel books, and biographies.” Official reports on library usage were equally enthusiastic. “The books are largely read, especially novels, and every encouragement is given for the

men to read as much as possible, was the judgement on the Western Heights, Dover garrison library; while that at Curragh camp was ‘extensively and intelli-

gently used by the troops’, and the library at Cork was ‘very largely used and appreciated by all ranks’.®

Live entertainments were often performed in the institute, while men based in the larger garrison towns and cities had the opportunity of visiting local theatres and cinemas. By far the biggest diversion, regardless of season and weather, was sport. [he army indulged in sport to an almost fanatical degree, buttressed by a passionate belief in its moral and physical benefits. Officers often had the opportunity to pursue sporting interests well beyond the grasp of the men. Cavalry units usually maintained horses for polo and hunting with the express encouragement of *” TNA WO 33/2979 Report on Welfare, p. 205. 8 Wyndham, Following, pp. 58-67. »° TNA WO 33/2979 Report on Welfare, pp. 4-5; Wyndham, Following, p. 67. ° "TNA WO 33/2979 Report on Welfare, pp. 136, 169. °! TNA WO 33/2979 Report on Welfare, pp. 68, 169. ° Wyndham, Following, p. 52. ° "TNA WO 33/2979 Report on Welfare, pp. 11, 63, 75. TNA WO 33/2979 Report on Welfare, pp. 4, 9, 11, 17, 42; Wyndham, p. 121.

The Other Ranks 57 the army’s most senior ranks. Maintaining such a broad range of sporting activities

demanded funds and facilities, and the army often felt the want of both. Most sports were heavily subsidized from regimental subscriptions and were not given much direct government funding. This situation was remarked upon by Colonel W. H. Lindsay of the Royal Artillery, who complained that far too much of the expense fell on officers’ purses.” In addition, playing fields were often at a premium. Most officers noted the desperate lack of quality space for sports. Even at Aldershot, the leading garrison of the British army, facilities were lacking. Lieutenant General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, helped by his ADC, Captain R. J. Kentish, a very keen sportsman, saw the provision of additional sporting facilities as a crucial part of his work in the command. Smith-Dorrien wrote in his memoirs: Every spot of ground large enough for cricket, football, or hockey was taken up, levelled, and grassed—some prodigious work was done, and in two cases the tops of hillocks were cut off and pitched into the adjacent depressions and a level

site obtained. In this way the grounds were increased by 150 per cent before I left.°’

Improving the physical and moral condition of a soldier's mind ran alongside sharpening his mental faculties, as men were encouraged to study for certificates of education. Attaining educational qualifications put a man on the promotion lad-

der and was regarded as a mark of his determination to succeed. Although the opportunities provided were undoubtedly of value to the many soldiers almost destitute of any schooling, for those with some education the thresholds could seem absurdly low and the instruction distinctly unimaginative. Both Horace Wyndham and John Lucy felt restricted by the pedestrian pace of the programmes. Lucy had hoped to study for the first class certificate, having already gained the equivalent of the second and third class qualifications. However, the army system would not allow this and so he had to repeat the two earlier stages first. Attaining

the first class certificate then gave him a special status among his peers, who regarded him as someone of great intellectual distinction.

Schoolmasters were generally NCOs and senior warrant officers coming towards the end of their army careers. NCOs provided the interface between other ranks and the army’s system and mentality. Good NCOs were crucial to the smooth running of battalions as they turned orders and instructions into living realities for the men. Gaining the respect of the men was no easy task and often required a subtle mixture of characteristics and enough man-management skills to know when to switch emphasis and manner. Wyndham noted that his sergeant major was a martinet but ‘a born soldier... The men hated and feared him; but they were proud of him’ because he knew his job, was good at it, and produced results. By contrast, his corporal was a quiet, patient, and friendly man who took ®° TNA WO 33/2979 Report on Welfare, p. 137. °° ‘TNA WO 33/2979 Report on Welfare, pp. 8, 17, 36, 76. °” General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service (London: John Murray, 1925) p. 356. ° Wyndham, Following, p. 43; Lucy, Devil, p. 36.

58 The Edwardian Army time to explain, demonstrate, and encourage. For Wyndham the combination of approaches was ideal.®’ Officers were rather more remote and so it was all the more important that they revealed an instinctive ability to read a situation and cultivate the right atmosphere. Soldiers judged officers very quickly, therefore the ability to inspire confidence and respect quickly was vital.”” Unsurprisingly, given

the continual emphasis on hierarchy and rank, private soldiers were intensely aware of their status and were highly sensitive to the mode in which they were addressed. Wyndham took an almost instant dislike to the adjutant who seemed obsessed with finding fault and made absolutely no concession to the novice status of new recruits. By contrast, he had great respect for the commanding officer who revealed knowledge of each man and was clearly concerned for their welfare and improvement as soldiers. Wyndham judged his battalion to have a typical cross section of officers and men. The other ranks consisted of the good, bad, lazy, hard working, cheerful, miserable, clever, and stupid, but on the whole the quality was of a good, even standard. He went on to add, ‘As with the rank and file, so with the officers. We had all sorts in the Cumberlands [the fictitious name he gave his regiment]. Some were popular, and some were unpopular; some were keen, and some were slack; some knew their work, and did it; and some had thoughts of nothing but polo and leave of absence.’”’ Thus, the battalion was a microcosm

of humanity, but with the balance in favour of hard work, efficiency, and improvement. At the same time, soldiers certainly did not make up a trouble-free community. The rigid and totally encompassing disciplinary system created an environment in which transgression against the rules was far more likely and common than in civilian life. Assessing the degree to which men of the Edwardian army were better or worse in terms of discipline than their immediate predecessors in the Victorian army is a complex task. The workings of military law and discipline were altered

significantly in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with a new Army (Annual) Act passed in 1881, and in 1893 the Army Discipline and Regulation Act. The effect of these two pieces of legislation was to streamline military law, make the division between crimes punishable by detention in military and civilian prisoners sharper, and, perhaps most importantly, the devolution of more powers to battalion commanding officers. The implementation of the latter meant that the

emphasis on punishing transgressors of the army’s all-embracing disciplinary system was transferred from the courts-martial system to the battalion and thus allowed many infringements to be dealt with in house by the man’s immediate superiors.” This trend became even more pronounced in 1910 following an Army Order which refined the position in favour of the CO still further.” In turn, this had the effect of driving down the numbers of courts martial convened and so ° Wyndham, Following, pp. 40-1. ” Wyndham, Following, p. 70. ” Wyndham, Following, pp. 68-9. ” Skelley, The Victorian army, pp. 125-79; Spiers, Late Victorian army, pp. 71-5. > Report on the Discipline and Management of the Military Detention Barracks and Military Prisons,

1910, Cmd. 5596, p. 5 (hereafter known as Report on Discipline).

The Other Ranks 59 makes any unqualified comparison between statistics unhelpful. Under the reformed system, commanding officers had powers to impose fines and short peri-

ods of detention in barracks, but more serious crimes were referred to a court martial at either the regimental, district, or general level; a soldier could also opt to have his case heard by a court martial if he so desired. Across the period 1902 to 1914, the total number of courts-martial cases con-

vened declined year by year, maintaining the late nineteenth-century trend. In 1902, a year which included a period of active operations in the field and thus conditions in which transgressions of discipline were more likely, 15,009 cases were brought before courts martial.” By 1913 the figure had shrunk to 4,854, an average of 2.11 per cent of the army’s strength compared with 4.25 per cent in 1902.” A further continuance of the late nineteenth-century pattern was the much higher instance of courts martial in the UK compared with soldiers stationed in India and the colonies. In 1913, 3,090 men were brought before the courts martial

compared with 1,764 abroad.” As with the Victorian army, the explanation for this phenomenon can most probably be found in the very different complexions of the UK and overseas elements of the army. The UK-based army very largely consisted of young, new recruits who had not yet reached either the age or degree of basic training suitable for deployment abroad. For example, in 1913 just short of half the home-based army consisted of men under the age of 22.”” These young, inexperienced men were far more likely to fall foul of the army’s disciplinary sys-

tem than older men acclimatized to army life. This factor also helps explain the story behind the single biggest problem dealt with by courts martial: desertion. In 1902, 2,830 men were charged with this offence. On the surface this more than halved by 1913, as a glance at the figures reveals 1,325 cases.’* However, these statistics have to be treated carefully and do not perhaps reveal the true underlying

trend, for the army’s figures from 1907 onwards record only those convicted of desertion. Whatever the actual pattern, it is clear from the statistics that many young men must have found their immersion in army life a profoundly shocking experience which drove them to desperate measures. In 1913 the desertion rate was highest among those who had served for between one and two years, closely followed by those with fewer than three months’ service and those with between six months’ and a year’s service. A second major problem was that of violence and disobedience to superiors, which appear to have shown a pronounced increase on

the situation in the late Victorian army.” Simple use and presentation of army statistics gave the impression that the problem was a minor one, especially when combined with the effect of recording convictions only, for the two elements of the

charge, violence and disobedience, were disentangled and treated as separate ™ Report on Discipline, 1902, Cmd. 1775, pp. 1-22. ” Report on Discipline, 1913, Cmd. 7331, pp. 1-7. 7° Report on Discipline, 1913, p. 4. ” Annual General Report on the British Army, 1913, Cmd. 7252, pp. 88-9 (hereafter known as Annual Report). 78 Annual Report, 1911, Cmd. 5481, p. 70; Annual Report, 1913, pp. 74-5. ” Annual Report, 1913, p. 74. See also French, Military Identities, p. 182.

60 The Edwardian Army offences after 1909. When these nuances are taken out, the supposed decline from 1902 onwards appears far less convincing. The reasons behind the rise in violence and disobedience are difficult to fathom, set against the wider context of generally improving discipline. It is made all the harder to explain given the decline of drunkenness as a problem. In 1902, 16,292 men were fined by commanding officers for drunkenness. Many men appeared to learn their lesson, for 9,756 received one fine only; but there were 6,536 men who were fined at least once more (one soldier received no fewer than ten fines).*° By 1913 the numbers had dropped to 9,230 in total, consisting of 6,464 single offenders and 2,766 multiple offenders. (Two men were fined on ten separate occasions. The record in this period was set in 1913 when one man collected thirteen fines.)*' Once again, however, care has to be taken with statistics, for they have to be combined with those brought before courts martial. In 1902 a total of 2,765 were dealt with in this manner, and in 1913 426 men were convicted for the offence. These figures reveal drunkenness to be a continuing issue for the army, but one that was being slowly brought under control. On the whole, fewer soldiers were being fined and court-martialled for drunkenness than in the 1870s and 1880s, thus continuing the trend established in the 1890s. Establishing the attitudes of Edwardian officers and men to military law and the disciplinary system is extremely difficult due to the paucity of individual accounts.

Among the published material two works stand out, Robert Edmondson’s John Bulls Army from Within (1907) and Horace Wyndham’s Following the Drum (1912). Both authors served in the ranks but came from very different backgrounds. Edmondson, a former sergeant in the cavalry, was working class whereas

Wyndham came from a genteel family and had already published a book on his earlier service in the army, Soldiers of the Queen (1899). Believing that he had been badly treated by the army’s disciplinary and legal codes on two separate occasions, Edmondson’s work was a passionate polemic against the army. He condemned the army for its obsessive enforcement of every rule and regulation regardless of con-

text and claimed it demoralized and disillusioned the vast majority of ordinary soldiers. Junior officers were castigated as slavish adherents to the rule book, but were too stupid to understand military law and so ensured that soldiers were punished unfairly and inconsistently.” By contrast, Wyndham described a system which was generally beneficent and wisely enforced, even if it was occasionally exasperating in its reach and coverage. He stated that the vast majority of men brought before the commanding ofhcer knew very well why they were there and accepted his judgement uncomplainingly. “In most cases,’ he noted, ‘the colonel’s

summary award is accepted without demur, for the offender knows very well that by doing so his own interests are best served.’** When a court martial was convened, it caused a good deal of excitement. One of Wyndham’s most vivid 8° Annual Report, 1911, pp. 70, 74. 8! Annual Report, 1913, pp. 74, 78. 8 Edmondson, John Bulls army, pp. 61-87 in particular. 88 Wyndham, Following, p. 132.

The Other Ranks 61 memories was the return of three men following their trial. They were marched onto the barrack square under escort armed with fixed bayonets and paraded before the entire battalion. ‘The results of the courts martial were then read out and the prisoners marched off. The commanding officer then concluded the ceremony by giving the assembled soldiers a stern lecture on discipline. According to Wyndham,

the men accepted this system because ‘despite its somewhat rough and ready method of procedure, a court martial is, on the whole, a very fair tribunal, and cases of injustice seldom occur’.**

Those who were convicted of serious offences by courts martial faced the prospect of military prison. The military prisons system had undergone various changes

in the second half of the nineteenth century, causing it to resemble the civilian prison structure and regime more closely. Gradually, military prisons shifted their emphasis to combine punishment with rehabilitation and education. In 1881 the War Office placed habitual military criminals in civilian prisons prior to ignominious discharge in an attempt to ensure that hardened men did not adversely affect

the younger and more impressionable who could still be reformed. In 1893 the diet was improved, and in 1895 new prison regulations and punishments were introduced, as was formal schooling aimed at providing inmates with army certifi-

cates of education. The final step towards convergence with the civilian system came in 1898 when military prisons adopted the same phased treatment of inmates:

an initial ten-week period of solitary confinement to allow the prisoner time to reflect on what he had done, combined with hard labour and a bland diet, through to a final stage of training and education, visitors, ability to borrow library books, and other privileges.®

During the period 1902 to 1914, the numbers held in military prisons and detention barracks declined noticeably. In 1902 some 15,881 men were committed to some form of military detention, and the average daily number in prison was 1,001 in the UK and 401 abroad (excluding India).*° Two years later the total

number detained had risen to 22,012 and represented some 12 per cent of the army's total strength. However, from this point the numbers went down.*’ By 1910 the figures had stabilized at around 9,000 men in detention barracks and a rapidly declining number in military prisons; the combined figures never made up more than 5.5 per cent of the total strength.** The declining numbers reflected the increasing insistence that prison should be seen as a corrective learning experience rather than an unending punishment. A key step towards treating the prisoner as a man who could once again become an effective soldier was the abolition of corporal punishment in military prisons in 1906.” The change in attitude towards corporal punishment as an effective tool in the prison regime had commenced in the 8 Wyndham, Following, p. 145. ®° See Skelley, Zhe Victorian army, pp. 125-79; Spiers, Late Victorian army, pp. 71-5. 8° Report on Discipline, 1902, pp. 6-11. *” Report on Discipline, 1904, Cmd. 1775, pp. 6-8. 88 Report on Discipline, 1913, pp. 1-4.

® For the deliberations leading up to the change in the Army Act and regulations see TNA WO 32/6872 ‘Abolishment of flogging for prison offences in military prisons, 1905-1906’.

62 The Edwardian Army 1890s, and was used more and more sparingly by the turn of the century. In 1902 eight men received corporal punishment; a year later it was seven; by 1904 only two men were punished in this way; and just before abolition in 1906 the number had fallen to one.”° Reflecting this new relationship between prisoner and keeper was the fall in assaults on prison staff and the lessening of offences committed in prison.”!

Lieutenant Colonel R. A. Henderson, Inspector of Military Prisons and Detention Barracks, believed the army’s increasingly sophisticated rehabilitation pro-

grammes were forcing down the total number of offenders by curtailing the tendency towards habitual poor behaviour. “This reduction is due in my opinion,

he wrote in the 1908 report, ‘to the fact that the number of soldiers who are reconvicted is far smaller than [in] former years.’”’ A significant indicator of the

rehabilitative effect of the regime was the number of educational certificates awarded. In 1906, sixty-four third-class certificates and five second class were gained by inmates, and by 1913 these figures had risen to 104 third class and twenty-eight second class.”? In addition, men were set to work making a wide range of military kit and utensils. Three hours’ daily military training was also introduced in order to focus men on their status as soldiers rather than criminals, and by 1913, rifles, machine guns, and swords were available for weapons training.”* The 1902 report summed up this new approach to the military prisoner: ‘A cardinal principle in the treatment of the military offender under the reformed military prison... [is] the fostering in him of the military spirit and the preservation of self-respect.’” It was a regime which impressed many in the army. When Smith-Dorrien visited the Aldershot military prison in 1908, he was struck by the

degree of organization and strict attention to detail, and noted: ‘I consider the arrangements for educating and elevating the men beyond all praise.’”® The army therefore worked hard to maintain discipline and morale and was remarkably suc-

cessful given the fact that the other ranks often came from highly deprived and dysfunctional backgrounds. In conclusion, then, just as the regular army officer corps was drawn almost exclusively from the upper and upper-middle classes of society, so the other ranks

were drawn disproportionately from the unskilled working class. Changes in terms of enlistment and some improvements in conditions of service did little to make soldiering in the ranks an attractive proposition in Edwardian Britain. The

regimental system, created by the Cardwell—Childers reforms of 1868-81, appears to have been largely failing, with many regiments, particularly in rural areas, having little connection to the local society from which they were meant to draw their recruits. Service in the ranks still carried a stigma in the period °° Report on Discipline, 1902, p. 14; 1904, p. 8; 1906, Cmd. 3368, p. 6. *! See reports for 1902, p. 14; 1903, Cmd. 2256, p. 10; 1904, p. 8; 1906, p. 6. °° Report on Discipline, 1908, Cmd. 4606, p. 5 °° Report on Discipline, 1906, p. 7; 1913, p. 6. 4 Report on Discipline, 1913, p. 6. °° Report on Discipline, 1902, p. 22. °° Report on Discipline, 1908, p. 6.

The Other Ranks 63 before the First World War and this seems to have led men to enlist in regiments

far removed from the localities in which they lived. Without embracing the National Service League’s plans to introduce conscription or offering improved

rates of pay and prospects of promotion, Edwardian governments condemned the regular army to recruit from a small recruiting pool consisting largely of the keen and committed (normally sons of serving soldiers) and destitute. ‘The finan-

cial desire to keep battalions at home on very small establishments served to hinder training and meant that, on the outbreak of war, the Army Reserve was

heavily denuded in providing the personnel to complete the original British Expeditionary Force.

Training and Doctrine The British army was required to perform a range of different tasks by the state. In terms of overt military action, the scope of possibilities stretched from full-blown continental war—a concept which loomed ever larger in the period 1902—14—to

small-scale interventions across the empire either to keep native populations in place or unfriendly external elements out. The breadth of this remit meant that the British army had no way of simplifying its approach to war and express it through training of its officers and men. This situation was made more complex still by the fact that successive British governments had no desire to spend large amounts of

money on the army. Compared with continental armies, the British had a tiny force with very little prospect of a significant increase in its size, equipment levels, or standard of facilities. Further complicating the task of the army was the lack of conclusive insights to be drawn from recent military experiences across the globe,

the most important being the South African War of 1899-1902 and the RussoJapanese War of 1904—5. With military technology also changing rapidly, but in a very uneven manner, the training and preparation of the British army for war for both its generals and most recently recruited artillery gunners, infantry privates, and cavalry troopers were challenging tasks indeed.' Responsibility for the way army training was shaped, implemented, and over-

seen resided in its highest ranks and underwent some important administrative changes after the South African War. With the curtailing of the influence, and subsequent abolition, of the office of Commander-in-Chief and its replacement with an Army Council in 1904, there was the potential to consult a wider range of opinions on issues such as training. Working in consultation with two important military posts within the War Office, the Director of Military Training and the Director of Operations, a forum for discussion between the thinking elements of the army had been created. Drawing together, codifying, and assisting this process was the newly created General Staff, which came into effective existence in 1906, under a Chief of the General Staff (the Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1909). Ensuring a flow of qualified officers for roles on the General

Staff was the role of the Staff College at Camberley, a Victorian institution ' For an alternative interpretation of British army thinking, training, and preparation for combat in this period see Spencer Jones, “The influence of the Boer War (1899-1902) on the tactical develop-

ment of the regular British army, 1902-1914’, University of Wolverhampton, unpublished PhD thesis, 2009. I am grateful to Dr Jones for allowing me access to his thesis. See also Nicholas Evans, “The development of British tactical doctrine in land warfare, 1915-1945’, University of London unpublished PhD thesis, 2007.

Training and Doctrine 65 founded in 1858. Overseeing the impact of regulations regarding training was the Inspector General of the Armed Forces who made annual inspections of troops based in the British Isles, assisted by specialist inspectors general for each branch

of the army; the findings were then published in annual reports to the Army Council.’ On the surface this system was robust and ensured a neat integration of roles designed for maximum efficiency. In reality there were several problems which had a negative impact on training and preparation for wars. Central to the issue was the

precise role of the General Staff. A rigorous definition of the remit of the General Staff was never quite achieved. There were a number of models for the General Staff to follow or intermix. It could have taken the role of a secretariat, a welltrained administrative body capable of efficiently carrying out the instructions of its higher executive officers; alternatively, it might have been formulated as the brain and think tank of the army, whose job it was to help create and influence policy and concepts of war at the very highest strategic and intellectual level and act as a finishing school for higher commanders, giving them overall mastery of their trade; finally, it might have used its brains to work not on the grand strategic direction of war, but on the more prosaic and practical levels of battlefield command and applied tactics. Applying a precise role, even if a combined and broadranging one, was very important because this determined the style and content of the training that officers received at the Staff College. That the army and its overseeing politicians never quite managed to provide this direction is perhaps not surprising, given the significance of two further issues. First, the sheer number of scenarios the British army might face, given the hugely diffuse empire, rather precluded any simple, narrow definition of purpose and aim. In second place was the army’s lack of scale and political visibility, particularly when compared with the

manpower, equipment, and financial demands of the Royal Navy. This made the army particularly susceptible to the interests and beliefs of forceful individuals and so ultimate direction was determined by institutional, collective will tempered continually by the power of individual personality. Such a system often confused those within it. The future Field Marshal Archibald Wavell found, when a student at the Staff College under Sir Henry Wilson, that instruction was based on a very high, theoretical level. He felt this was out of kilter with his own most pressing need, which was clear advice on how to plan and administer operations. By con-

trast, others have argued that the Staff College did little other than to provide instruction in basic administrative procedures and ignored the need to provide potential commanders with vital additional insights into the direction of war. Confusion certainly arose from too much emphasis on the theoretical and strategic side of instruction, particularly when it involved constant reference to the German and French armies. By indulging in comparison, often unqualified by reference to

* For army administrative reform in this period see David French and Brian Bond (eds), The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, 1890-1939 (London: Frank Cass, 2002); John Gooch, The Plans of War. The General Staff and British Military Strategy, c.1900-1916 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974); Edward M. Spiers, Haldane: an army reformer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1980).

66 The Edwardian Army Britain’s sheer lack of military power against these two continental giants, unrealistic expectations of the role of the army in future continental war were created. It meant a disconnection between what the army was actually capable of and what some dreamt it could do. Thought on this level then had the unfortunate effect of undermining consistent application of effort to the crucial tactical issues of fire-

power and movement on the battlefield: an area in which the vast majority of officers and men needed careful and precise advice to inform their training and preparations for future combat.° The training that British soldiers received for war in the period from the end of

the South African War up to 1914 was shaped by a series of manuals. Of most importance were the clutch that were issued following the South African War, which was then amended and revised to incorporate further refinements and observations from wider military developments, particularly the Russo-Japanese War. The list includes Cavalry Training, 1904 and its replacements Cavalry Training, 1907 and 1912; Combined Training, 1905; Infantry Training, 1905 (with amendments in 1908) and 19/4, and the summation of overarching principles contained in the Field Service Regulations Parts I and IT in 1909. Precise authorship of these manuals (the contents of which will be discussed in detail below) can be hard to determine. Cavalry Training, 1904 was commenced by Haig while he was preparing to travel to India to take up the role of Inspector General of Cavalry, and was notoriously altered by Field Marshal Sir Frederick Roberts in order to reflect his own particular views.* From 1905 the various directors of military training, assisted by other specialists, played the leading role in the production of manuals, and in 1909 Haig oversaw the writing of the Field Service Regulations in his role as Direc-

tor of Staff Duties at the War Office. Central to all of these instructions was an acceptance of the great impact of modern firepower in both defence and offence. Contrary to much popular belief about the British army before the Great War, firepower was not ignored but accepted and debated fiercely. The problem, as the British army's training regimes revealed, was determining the best way of dealing with this issue.

The training year was staggered and made up of incremental processes commencing with individual training which then proceeded upwards through company, battalion, and brigade training to culminate in larger-scale exercises and manoeuvres.’ On the surface this was a useful system, building up neatly towards a grand conclusion. In practice the training circuit was shot through with difficulties. The first was the instability of the system at its lowest tactical levels, those of

> For further discussion of these points see the above and also: Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and Staff College, 1854-1914 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974) pp. 212-98; Keith Jeffery, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. A Political Soldier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) pp. 43-99; Hew Strachan, “The British Army, its General Staff and the Continental Commitment, 1904-1914’ in French and Bond (eds), The British General Staff; pp. 75-94. * See Stephen Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry, 1880-1918 (Aldershot: Ashgate,

2008) pp. 175-82. > Officially, exercises were training programmes involving troops moving to a definite plan whereas manoeuvres devolved more authority to the commanders to use the troops as they wished.

Training and Doctrine 67 companies, platoons, and sections. Unlike the continental conscript armies, the British voluntary system took in men throughout the year. These men were then assigned to the companies of their battalions almost completely untrained, meaning that a proportion of the manpower available for training supervision was almost always doing nothing other than inculcating very basic skills. As a consequence, company training was often reduced to a crawling convoy pace. Brigadier General

Ivor Maxse made this point most forcefully in an address to the Royal United Service Institution in 1911. He noted that most company commanders ‘begin to realise that the new comers are raw recruits totally ignorant of field work, and with a large proportion of these [they proceed] to army manoeuvres’. “What company officer in a foreign army, where all recruits join the same day, has such a difficult task?’ he asked his audience.® The need to maintain overseas units at full strength also eroded training efficiency. Major General S. C. M. Archibald recalled his early service in the Royal Artillery and noted that: “Winter always began with the annual nightmare of having to find a draft for India. Most of one’s best NCOs and men seemed to be taken away from one every year and replaced by a lot of untrained recruits from whom one was expected to build the battery again by the Spring into a first class show.” Intimately connected with this problem was the lack of numbers, both officers

and men, available for training duties. Maxse identified fifteen different tasks which often demanded the detachment of officers and men for other duties during

the training season. According to his knowledge, this led to company strengths averaging about forty men.® Sir John French recognized this problem while GOC

in C Aldershot, and urged his battalion commanders to resist the temptation to spread themselves too thinly by continually shuttling between their companies to oversee mundane tasks.” Southern Command reported an extreme shortage of men for exercises in 1905, while the 1908 Inspector General’s report noted the weaknesses in company training due to lack of numbers and subalterns, and urged that no subaltern be allowed to take a course while company training was underway.'° Exercises were undermined in 1907 by lack of numbers, as was made clear at the Staff conference in January 1908 when it was noted that ‘they found hardly any regulars, but a miscellaneous collection of units of the auxiliary forces’."! In 1913 the Inspector General found units where companies had been doubled up but were still conspicuously under strength. In one unit only four officers and ninetyfour OR were available for training, exercises, and manoeuvres. Another battalion ° Brigadier General FE I. Maxse, “Battalion Organization’, Royal United Service Institution Journal, Vol. 56, Part 1, January—June 1912, pp. 52-86, p. 59. ” Imperial War Museum Department of Documents (hereafter known as IWM D) PP/MCR/11 Major General S. C. M. Archibald handwritten memoir. 8 Maxse, ‘Battalion Organization’, p. 59. > TNA WO 27/504 ‘Memorandum on Military Training, 1905’, Aldershot Command.

'0 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Reports by the Inspector General of Forces—submitted to the Army Council’, (1903-1913). (Hereafter known as IG Report); IG Report for 1905, p. 51; IG Report for 1908, pp. 13-14. '! Defence College Library, Shrivenham, ‘Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers at the Staff College, 7 to 10 January 1908’, p. 16.

68 The Edwardian Army could muster only five out of sixteen officers to take on the annual training duties. Battalion strengths averaged seventeen officers and 376 OR.” The Army Exercise

of that year was said to have included four full infantry divisions and a cavalry division, but only 47,000 took part.'* The cavalry was in little better condition. One brigade revealed units only 130 strong, while the number rarely exceeded 300 across the cavalry, which led Southern Command to hold manoeuvres without any cavalry present.'* A year later it was no different, with large numbers of units significantly under strength in terms of both manpower and horses.” ‘The fall-off in cavalry strengths has been attributed to the adverse publicity the army received in the immediate wake of the South African War, which led to a loss of morale and sense of purpose.'° Matters had not improved much by 1911, despite a distinct change in atmosphere, with the Inspector General commenting on the lack of good-quality officers, particularly in the less fashionable cavalry units, which was having a marked effect on training. ‘Scarcity is chronic, he noted bluntly.'” In notable contrast, few comments were made on the state of manpower in the Royal Artillery or other corps.

Given the amount of effort the army put into reforming itself in the wake of the South African War, and its concrete expression through the reshaped training manuals, it was disturbing to the General Staff to note continuing problems with

the quality and approach of officers leading training. Colonel J. T. Johnson, GSO 1 4 Division, told the 1908 Staff conference that: ‘Officers had not always a clear idea of what they wanted to teach, nor, when they wanted to test officers, what was a really sound solution of the problem.’'® The surviving personal papers from battalion officers do not imply a particularly rigorous attitude to training. A young lieutenant’s diary reveals that the battalion training period lasting from 16 July to 1 August 1906 consisted of mornings only.’? Captain J. H. Brockle-

hurst of the Coldstream Guards recorded a similar pattern in his diary, and he was clearly shocked when he was ordered ‘to conduct Company in musketry for five hours’.”” During company training in 1912 one of Brocklehurst’s fellow captains recorded that he went ‘to barracks to look in on company training’, which

implies that he did not rigorously supervise it himself.7! While at Aldershot Command, French attempted to impose more rigour and condemned much training as ‘manifestly wrong’.”” In 1912 the Inspector General complained that TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1913, pp. 61-2. 'S Edward M. Spiers, “Reforming the Infantry of the Line, 1900-1914’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, Vol. LIX, No. 238, Summer 1981, pp. 82-94, p. 87.

4 TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1905, pp. 8, 51. TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1906, p. 7. '© Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, pp. 143-90.

'7 TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1911, p. 9. '8 “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1908’, p. 9. ' National Army Museum (hereafter known as NAM) 9605-11 General Sir Walter Venning diary, 16 July—1 August 1906.

°° Coldstream Guards Archive, Wellington Barracks (hereafter known as CGA), diary of Captain J. H. Brocklehurst, 2 January 1912. *! CGA, Captain C. M. Perreira diary, 9 December 1912. * "TNA WO 27/504 ‘Memorandum on Military Training, 1905’, Aldershot Command.

Training and Doctrine 69 too many schemes were set well beyond the current capabilities of the men dur-

ing individual and company training and sensible calibration needed to take place. A year later the Inspector General stated his belief that there were not enough qualified instructors, that there was a significant number of substandard

battalion commanding officers, and that such inconsistencies had a profound impact on training.** For those leading the army it led to an even greater emphasis on the need for officers to study and reflect continually on their profession. French wanted to ensure that all officers took the right attitude to their studies, which meant banning the crammer mentality. He condemned the propensity of officers to learn material by rote for examinations, thus failing to digest it mentally and apply it in practice.** Following on from exhortations in the Inspector General’s reports of 1904 and 1906 that officers should apply themselves intellectually to their roles, the Training and Manoeuvre Regulations, 1913 reinforced the moral. Officers were advised to study ‘how to improve themselves’ continu-

ally and urged to learn French and German in order ‘to read with facility the many excellent military treatises published in these languages’.” There can be no doubt that the leaders of the army were serious in their desire to transform the

force into an intellectually more robust outfit. The key issue was whether the message trickled down with sufficient vigour to change fundamental approaches to soldiering. It commenced with the inability to impose uniformity of approach

to its training instructions, which was a continual problem in the devolved nature of the British army. The Staff conference in 1908 revealed a broad range

of different training practices and approaches, which was commented upon but by no means criticized as lacking overall uniformity to an agreed set of principles.”° Distinct issues regarding the lack of grip exerted by the Director of Military Training were noted by the Inspector General in 1907: I do not consider that the Director of Military Training is as yet in sufficiently close

touch with the Army and the training of commands, neither does his department control the prevalent ideas regarding training. We are in danger of having a different school of thought in each command, resulting in an absence of uniformity which is much to be regretted.”

Such a judgement was a comment on a significant structural problem in the British army. Much of its direction on training, although seemingly binding, was not rigorously enforced in an institution that worked on laissez-faire lines. It was a problem

caused in part by the multifaceted role and locations of the British army. With home-based battalions often little more than draft-finding units for their sister bat-

talions on imperial garrison duties, the units of the army were never effectively °3 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1912, p. 13; Report for 1913, p. 62.

4 TNA WO 27/504 “The Training of the Aldershot Army Corps during 1905’, Aldershot Command. © TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1904, p. 22; IG Report for 1906, p. 72; Training and Manoeuvre Regulations, 1913 (London: HMSO, 1913), p. 21. 6 “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1908’, pp. 5-16. 7 TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1907, p. 79.

70 The Edwardian Army concentrated on a grand scale for a consistent approach to be both inculcated and assessed for efficiency. The effect was to create a mentality of ‘light touch’ intervention and the primacy of local custom, which subsequently dogged British attempts to disseminate trench-warfare doctrine during much of the Great War.”*

Inability to concentrate troops for training, even when based in Great Britain due to their widespread dispersal across numerous garrison towns, proved a major handicap to efficient training. It was suggested that battalions stationed in remote areas should be rotated in and out of the main garrisons, particularly Aldershot, in order to benefit from cooperative training with other units.*”? Long-term assign-

ment to other duties could also cause problems. Despite their reputation for efficiency, the units of the Household Brigade with their constant round of London-based ceremonial responsibilities often found it difficult to achieve prolonged and even training periods.*° The diaries of Guards officers certainly reveal a rather easy-going life of parties, visits to the theatre, and sports when not on formal

parades.*' Even when troops could be gathered, there was the perennial difficulty with finding suitable training grounds. Although the Military Manoeuvres Act of 1897 had been passed in order to purchase Salisbury Plain and assist with the hiring of land for training purposes, there was usually a reluctance to use it to its full. In 1906 Eastern Command complained that few landowners would rent out land and there was an urgent need to purchase suitable training grounds.** French added his weight to the call for the increased provision of suitable training grounds on taking over the Aldershot Command in 1905.°? Government parsimony often further undermined exercises and manoeuvres by failing to provide enough blank ammunition. This became a major problem in an

era in which military thought was trying to understand the impact of greatly increased firepower on the modern battlefield. The issue was raised during both the 1909 and 1912 Staff conferences. In 1909 Brigadier General Sir Henry Rawlinson noted there was not enough blank ammunition to test the theories on firepower, and was given support by Colonel E S. Inglefield, GSO 1 5 Division, who added

that there was an extreme shortage in the Irish Command. Matters had not improved by 1912 and, in fact, appear almost worse. Colonel J. E. Edmonds, then

on 4 Division staff, told the conference: “The allowance of blank ammunition available at training to stimulate this heavy firing is wholly insufficient.’ He gained

overwhelming support for this statement, and similar complaints were made by

*8 See Mark Connelly, Steady the Buffs! A regiment, a region and the Great War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) pp. 167-8, 230-1. See also Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914-1918. The live and let live system (London: Macmillan, 1980) for a study of the tensions between centralised training and localised practice. ” "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1910, p. 32. °° TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1911, p. 52.

°! See NAM 1989-01-125, Diaries and Papers of Lieutenant H. M. Pryce-Jones, Coldstream Guards; CGA, diaries of Captain J. H. Brocklehurst and Captain C. M. Perreira. °° "TNA WO 279/10 ‘Report on Eastern Command Manoeuvres, 1910’, p. 2. °° TNA WO 27/504 ‘Memorandum on Military Training, 1905’, Aldershot Command. Amateur units were still training on great estates and common land partly as a way of giving local visibility. The efficacy of such training experiences is extremely debatable.

Training and Doctrine 71 the artillerymen present. But, rather than take up this crucial issue with the government and the Army Council, the Director of Military Training, Major General Sir Archibald Murray, lamely remarked, ‘I think it rests with you to try and get all your balance of ammunition and carry it over properly.’** To compound matters, finances and other unforeseen factors could cause the abandonment of schemes,

exercises, and manoeuvres. In 1911 the manoeuvres in England and Scotland aimed to regain the time lost in the previous two years when there had been cancellations due to the coronation of King George V and the use of troops as replacement labour during a wave of strikes. Despite this hope, strikes once again caused the cancellation of many divisional manoeuvres in Britain and Ireland in 1911, and an outbreak of foot and mouth disease saw the abandonment of Irish manoeuvres in 1912. The Home Rule crisis in 1913-14 then caused further disruption to Irish Command training, particularly for the Special Reserve.»

The value of manoeuvres was significantly influenced by the actions of the umpires. Wise rulings and interpretations had the ability to teach many lessons, but the army was remarkably lackadaisical in establishing firm guidelines and

training for umpires. Umpiring does not appear to have been a much soughtafter role. Overstretched divisional staffs passed the demand for candidates downwards, thus putting further pressure on battalions. It is unsurprising that the matter was regarded as a nuisance, and Maxse implied that battalion commanders took a rather random approach, arbitrarily allotting officers when called upon to provide someone.*° Finding officers of sufficient rank to act as senior umpires was equally difficult.*’ Training for the role of umpire was then usually rushed and fragmentary. Despite an overhaul of umpiring rules and regulations in 1909-10, many umpires probably remained confused as two systems were left in operation (area and unit) and practice varied between commands.** Matters

did not improve greatly once on manoeuvres, for umpires had to complete a welter of reports within a very short space of time. The 1912 Inspector General’s

report attempted to defend the umpires, but it lacked conviction. In fact, the report did nothing other than highlight a glaring weakness in the entire training structure by listing the ‘selection of unsuitable officers out of touch with the

training of regular troops as senior umpires, insufficient instruction of the umpires in their duties, [and] inability of the senior umpires to grasp a tactical situation as a whole, and consequently to give broad decisions having sufficiently far-reaching results’.*? This damning assessment effectively undermined the value

of much of the large-scale training exercises of the army, a critical part of its

# ‘Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1909’, p. 10; “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1912’, pp. 58-62. ° TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1911, pp. 41-2; Connelly, Steady the Buffs!, p. 45. °° Maxse, ‘Battalion Organization’, p. 59. °” ‘Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1912’, p. 59. °8 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1910, p. 26; “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1913’, pp. 58-62. »” TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1912, p. 12.

72 The Edwardian Army preparations and readiness for combat. It implied an army without a shared standard of training, nor a widely understood tactical doctrine. Specific complaints against umpires were legion. Most significant were the critical comments, even if occasionally sympathetic, on judgements of firepower. Major

General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, then GOC in C Aldershot Command, condemned the umpires’ lack of grip on artillery action. Judging artillery effect was probably the greatest difficulty faced by umpires, according to Smith-Dorrien, and he added that ‘it is here perhaps more than anywhere that the trained and experienced umpire proves his worth’.*° Colonel J. A. L. Haldane, a staff officer at the War Office, noted the lack of recognition given to machine-gun fire on manoeuvres and believed this was undermining the validity of the exercises.*’ The 1910 Training and Manoeuvre Regulations sympathized with the difficulties umpires had in judging fire effect, but did not do much to clarify the matter.** Similarly, much

time was devoted to the issue of umpiring at the 1913 Staff conference, but the discussion ended on a remarkably inconclusive note. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John French, seemed to miss the point completely and rather than instigate a far-reaching reassessment, he rather weakly concluded that senior umpires needed to provide more effective guidance to their subordinates.** French missed the direction of his own logic here. If officers had a firm grip on the tactical doctrine of the army, then the translation to the status of umpire would have been

much easier. The actual point was that the British did not have an agreed and widely understood doctrine on tactical responses to modern firepower.

Keeping the manoeuvres relevant and interesting to those participating could prove difficult, given the many problems associated with them. French had urged those involved to maintain their concentration, having noticed that officers and men seemed to focus only ‘when “opposing” forces are so close to another that the whole operation becomes unreal, the situation impossible and the time has really arrived to sound “Cease Fire”’.4 However, it was perhaps personal rivalry rather than true professional judgement that infused French’s comments when in 1907 he condemned Smith-Dorrien’s Aldershot Command manoeuvres as lacking reality.* Such a comment does not reflect the vigour of Smith-Dorrien’s rigorous training regime while GOC in C Aldershot.

One of the most important attributes of exercises and manoeuvres was the opportunity for senior British officers to practise higher command skills. The mobilization of the Aldershot Army Corps for manoeuvres in 1904 was deemed to be of great value for the lessons it imparted in terms of command, and was a significant underlying justification for all exercises and manoeuvres.*° However, as has

© "TNA WO 33/3261 ‘Report on Army Manoeuvres, 1910’, p. 125. ‘| ‘Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1909’, p. 68. © Training and Manoeuvre Regulations, 1910 (London: HMSO, 1910), p. 10. “3 “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1913’, p. 62.

“ TNA WO 27/504 “The Training of the Aldershot Army Corps during 1905’, Aldershot Command. ® NA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1907, p. 80. “6 "TNA WO 279/8 ‘Report on Army Manoeuvres, 1904’, p. 65.

Training and Doctrine 73 been noted, many factors contributed to make exercises and manoeuvres less than impressive in terms of total numbers and verisimilitude to actual operations. Lack of scale was particularly significant, for it affected the entire concept of command in the army. It created what Nikolas Gardner has called ‘hybrid officers’.*” This was

an approach to command lacking the detachment and perspective of true high commanders because it was infused with the spirit and vision of the regiment and battalion. Command issues were not placed in their correct element due to the inability to escape the extremely limited size of the British army. Thus, French, a commander who took his work very seriously, studied hard to become a good Inspector General and moved on through a series of influential posts, helping to shape the British Expeditionary Force, had never commanded anything larger than a division himself.** An insight into the limited perspectives of the army was pro-

vided by the report on army manoeuvres for 1909 in which the difficulties of directing an army made up of two divisions were commented upon.” Small numbers and the problems of gathering them together on a regular basis consequently meant almost no opportunity to practise the skills demanded by high command.

Wilson’s lectures to Staff College students on whether the army should adopt French or German approaches to war therefore lacked any sense of reality due to the utter inability (or desire) of the British to put together anything like a continental-scale Army Corps for training manoeuvres. Compounding the issue of numbers was the lack of scale in terms of endurance. Few manoeuvres lasted longer

than three to five days. Smith-Dorrien instigated a radical change when he took over at Aldershot by scrapping the concept of a working day in manoeuvres, and instead adopted the much more realistic principle ‘of continuous operations in the face of an enemy’.”? Time spent at Aldershot could come as a rude shock to some.

Captain J. H. Brocklehurst of the 3 Coldstream Guards kept a diary singularly lacking in comment on training and manoeuvres, but there is a distinct gear change in 1908-9 when his battalion began to spend much more time at Aldershot. Training and exercises became more rigorous and form a much greater portion of his journal, although his comments reveal that the weather could play havoc with the schedule and result in the loss of much time.’! Regardless of the many attempts to make training more realistic, it was still fairly easy for officers to switch off and

escape. Captain C. M. Perreira managed to find time to take tea in Hunstanton during exercises in East Anglia in 1912, and was relieved to find that a fellow officer had access to a car, which meant they could leave camp and have dinner ina local restaurant.”’ In such an atmosphere, achieving lasting benefits from exercises

“7 Nikolas Gardner, Trial by Fire. Command and the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 (Westport,

Connecticut: Praeger, 2003) pp. 26-7. ‘8 Richard Holmes, The Little Field Marshal. A Life of Sir John French (London: Jonathan Cape, 1981). See in particular pp. 118-65. © TNA WO 33/3009 ‘Report on Army Manoeuvres, 1909”, p. 65. °° Quoted in Spiers, “Reforming the Infantry’, p. 88. >! CGA, Brocklehurst diary. See especially entries from September 1908. The regime was clearly continued by Haig when he succeeded Smith-Dorrien in 1912. °° CGA, Perreira diary, 10-17 September 1912.

74 The Edwardian Army and manoeuvres could be difficult. Lieutenant H. M. Pryce-Jones seemed to have no idea what had happened during one action, recording in his diary: “[T]he fight started at 10.30 a.m. lasting till about 6 p.m. when we returned to the same camp.

It turned out that we had won!’ The vital need to gain practical skills in high command was noted by both Prench and his successor, Major General C. W. Douglas, when he became Inspec-

tor General in 1912. He noted in his first report that most of the incorrect decisions made during manoeuvres were the result of ‘lack of experience in the actual handling of large bodies of troops’, and added that ‘this lack of experience in the handling of forces of all arms is general throughout the higher ranks of the Army’. A year later he drew attention to the problem again and stressed that ‘these failings are still far from having been remedied’. On examining the workings of the various regional commands and the divisions earmarked for the BEEF, he revealed the lack of cohesive doctrinal understanding and uniformity of standards and practice. Although pleased to discover clear and methodical approaches to operations in the 2, 3, and 4 divisions, he noted that all three were very different. An overall commander was therefore put at a potential disadvantage if he remained unaware of the differing methods of each division. The Army Council’s response to this issue was sanguine. Referring to Field Service Regulations, Part I (1909), it stated that ‘methods to be employed must be left to the commander on the spot’. However, it then stated that there would very probably be clear direction in any operation: “Single divisions will seldom be in action by themselves and Divisional Commanders will almost invariably be allotted some definite task by higher authority, the nature of which should regulate the method to be adopted.’ Such a response adhered to the concept of flexibility deemed necessary for an army that might have to manage a broad range of combat scenarios. Further hindrances to the successful practising of higher command skills were created by the ironic tendency to divert brigadiers and divisional and corps commanders during exercises and manoeuvres. At the 1913 Staff conference, Brigadier General the Honourable C. G. Fortescue of Southern Command stated that during exercises higher commanders were forced to choose

between direct command and supervising the training programme, with most opting for the latter. He therefore supported proposals to provide higher commanders with more opportunities to exercise their command skills, a move which was also encouraged by both Rawlinson and Smith-Dorrien. Once again, French, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), played safe, stating that he did not believe any great benefit could be gained by disrupting the well-worked progressive

training pattern of company, battalion, brigade, and divisional programmes. This conclusion was all the more remarkable given the fact that as Inspector General and a participant in staff conferences he had noticed the manifest problems with the progressive training programme.”

°> NAM 1989-01-125 Lieutenant H. M. Pryce-Jones diary, 17 September 1903.

* TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1912, pp. 4-5; IG Report for 1913, p. 4. ° TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1912, p. 7. °° “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1913’, pp. 38-9.

Training and Doctrine 75 The final issue complicating the practice of higher command skills was the personalized nature of the Edwardian army. Tim Travers has written extensively on this matter, arguing that the small scale of the army encouraged a system of personal

connections and patronage for advancement. This was not a new phenomenon, but an extension of the so-called ‘ring system’ developed during the late Victorian era in which officers had arranged themselves around the two most influential men in the army, Sir Garnett Wolseley and Sir Frederick Roberts. It created a situation which led not only to intense career rivalries but also to intellectual and spiritual ones, as different groups of officers attempted to impose their own interpretations of warfare and combat on the army.’’ According to Smith-Dorrien’s biographer,

A. J. Smithers, French’s dislike of Smith-Dorrien led him to invent a reason to exclude Smith-Dorrien from command in the 1910 manoeuvres. Smith-Dorrien was instead deputed to oversee the exercise in which Plumer and Douglas led the opposing forces.”* If the element of personal rivalry is dismissed, the decision was not outside the pattern of the army in which senior commanders were left to over-

see rather than participate. Such an atmosphere encouraged a command system known as ‘umpiring’, in which commanders gave their subordinates a good deal of latitude, and intervention was more along the lines of general guidance and param-

eters rather than strict orders.’ For this approach to work as auftragstaktik, or mission rather than restrictive command, the army needed a commonly understood doctrine, particularly on firepower and the functions of command, informing its training and preparation for combat.

The question of doctrine and the British army, particularly in the period 1902-14, has been much debated by military historians. Before exploring the issue

further, it is first necessary to determine the meaning of the problematic term, military doctrine. A recent British army definition is that: Military doctrine is a formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the Army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of current and

future conflicts, the preparation of the Army for such conflicts and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success.”

For some commentators, such as Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, British preparation for combat in the years before 1914 was fundamentally undermined by

*” See Tim Travers, The Killing Ground. The British army, the Western Front and the emergence of modern warfare, 1900-1918 (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1987) pp. 3-36. For an argument against the solidity of the rings see Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) p. 103. 8 A.J. Smithers, Zhe Man Who Disobeyed. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and his enemies (London: Leo

Cooper, 1970) p. 132; TNA WO 33/3261 ‘Report on Army Manoeuvres, 1910’. °° See Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and

German Armies, 1888-1918 (London: Frank Cass, 1995) pp. 34-60; Gardner, Trial by Fire, pp. 39-40 for more details on the ‘umpiring’ system. See also M. A. Ramsay, Command and Cohesion. The Citizen Soldier and Minor Tactics in the British Army, 1870-1918 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger,

2002) p. 45. °° Quoted in Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, p. 3.

76 The Edwardian Army the lack of an embracing doctrine determined by rigorous application of the intellect. Others have argued that the British army arrived at a doctrine of sorts, but it was not

particularly well expressed and was often wrong-headed in its conclusions.°' Tim Travers has been an exponent of this point of view. However, he also makes it clear that the conclusions were not reached lightly and were the result of much careful study and debate. An alternative interpretation has questioned whether it is correct to either condemn or congratulate the British army on its doctrine or lack of it when it was a term not widely used at the time. For this reason Stephen Badsey has argued that a formal doctrine will not be found, but something very close to it will in the drill books and training manuals of the army.®’ Thus, in the British instance, it is important to understand that a Jominist conception of general principles rather than tightly constricting rules was the intellectual atmosphere. It was an approach which suited the empiricist intellectual tradition developed in nineteenth-century Britain, and gave the much-needed flexibility required by a small-scale army with worldwide responsibilities. Matters were probably clouded rather than helped by the slow drift

towards a continental commitment, for it stimulated even greater debate on the firepower issue without the higher commanders of the army or the politicians ever making it clear that the army’s overriding preoccupation should be preparation for

war on the continent against a first-class power. The complex historiographical position on this issue reflects the complexity of the debates at the time and the evidence left to historians. What has been made less clear is the trickle down of army doctrine, however defined, to the battalion and regimental levels, the men who were actually expected to get on and do the job of fighting the enemy. In the immediate wake of the South African War the British army was plunged

into a vigorous examination pushed forward by both itself and the government. This process attempted to impart some lessons as quickly as possible, driven on

by the experiences of combat in South Africa. This led to a rapid rethink of assault and defence, and the attempt to disseminate a new approach across the entire army. Initial results seemed good and encouraged the belief that a new doctrinal uniformity had been created. “The principles of attack and defence appear to have been thoroughly assimilated,’ the umpire of Blue Force stated confidently in his report on the 1904 manoeuvres.® Much less reassuring, given the fact that a slew of training manuals was released over the next few years, was

the increasing sensation that basic doctrine was not well understood and disseminated. The army’s desire to provide flexibility was blurring into a lack of uniformity over principles. In 1907, Major General Sir James Grierson, commander of 1 Division at Aldershot, chaired a debate on the firefight led by Lieutenant Colonel N. R. McMahon of the School of Musketry at Hythe. At the end

°! Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire-Power. British Army Weapons and Theories of War,

1904-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982) pp. 7-60. ° ‘Travers, Killing Ground, pp. 37-84. °° Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, p. 3.

Strachan, ‘Continental Commitment’, pp. 75-94. ® TNA WO 279/8 ‘Report on Army Manoeuvres, 1904’, p. 77.

Training and Doctrine 77 of the lecture Grierson stated his belief that, given the increases in firepower, soldiers required more guidance in order to stop what he called the ‘go as you please’ approach often witnessed in exercises and manoeuvres.” The following year the Inspector General’s report asked whether a sufficient knowledge of the

principles of war and some familiarity with the workings of others arms had permeated the entire army.°’ Matters seemed to improve after these warnings, which may reflect the ever-increasing levels of debate about firepower. Haig attempted to impose a centralized approach on Aldershot Command, and in 1913 he noted the good progress ‘towards establishing a uniform doctrine throughout the staffs of the command’.® The significant points here are the amount of time it had taken to impose uniformity after the creation of a General Staff as a model for the rest of the army’s administration, and the fact that Haig could claim only, and thought it worthy to mention, a common approach in staff

work. The degree to which the brigades and battalions under his command shared this core set of principles and interpreted them in a joint, even manner is

unknown. Douglas believed the army did have an established doctrine given expression in the Field Service Regulations of 1909, but he urged its assimilation

by the entire army in his Inspector General’s report of 1912. A year later he noted some improvement, with greater uniformity of approach shown, but he soberly remarked that ‘noticeable improvement must clearly be a matter of time’.® Regardless of the increasing confidence of Douglas, there appears to have been a major weakness in the dissemination and enforcement of the army’s concept of tactical principles at the regimental and battalion level.

The manifest increase in firepower for both defence and attack was the most important issue facing the British army in this period. At its most generic level it was applicable to both actions within the empire against less well-developed peoples, usually referred to as ‘savage warfare’, and first-class, industrialized nations. In the wake of the South African War the artillery, infantry, and cavalry all attempted

to digest the lessons of the war and revise their training accordingly. At the top of the firepower structure was the artillery, and South Africa had forced the British army through some sobering experiences as it faced modern, breech-loading artillery pieces of both short and long range. Although the Boers did not possess quickfiring pieces, the British took the opportunity provided by the war to examine every aspect of modern artillery. A protracted rearmament process was then carried out between 1902 and 1910 partly because of the degree of debate over precise requirements.”” During this period the British gained a range of quick-firing pieces

°° Lieutenant Colonel N. R. McMahon, Fire Fighting (London: Hugh Rees/Aldershot Military Society, 1907), p. 17. Grierson was considered by many to be one of the ablest generals in the army. He went to France in August 1914 as commander of II Corps, but died of a heart attack before seeing action. °” ‘TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1908, p. 35. ° TNA WO 279/53 ‘Aldershot Command, Comments on the Training Season, 1913’, p. 11. ®° TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1912, p. 6; Report for 1913, p. 6. ”” See Edward M. Spiers, “Rearming the Edwardian Artillery’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, Vol. LVII, No. 231, Autumn 1979, pp. 167-76.

78 The Edwardian Army which were added to the existing arsenal: a 13-pounder gun for the Royal Horse Artillery’s support of cavalry, an 18-pounder gun, which became the mainstay of the Royal Field Artillery, a 4.5-inch howitzer, and the heavy 60-pounder gun. The new artillery pieces were the result of experience and much discussion over the future role of artillery. Between 1902 and 1914 the Royal Artillery engaged in a debate designed to determine the best way to use the range, power, and mobility of field and horse artillery. Contemporary experience was cited constantly, particularly the South African and Russo-Japanese wars. However, neither conflict taught unambiguous, simple lessons and so clouded as well as clarified. A tendency to ransack the conflicts for specific types of evidence to suit specific viewpoints devel-

oped, but this trait was by no means confined to the British.”

The debate on artillery tactics and armament commenced while the South African War was still in progress, and was given a good deal of space in the Proceed-

ings of the Royal Artillery Institution. Major L. H. Ducrot, writing on “Guns in South Africa in late 1901, noted the need for a heavier piece with longer range, advocating an 18-pounder, quick-firing gun. At the same time he emphasized the exceptional nature of the war. Atmosphere, climate, and landscape had combined to create conditions unlikely to occur elsewhere, particularly in Europe. Good visibility, large plains interspersed with hills and mountains highly suited to concealment and observation had created exceptional conditions. He therefore believed there was no pressing need to rearm completely. On the significant issue of attacking entrenched infantry, he took the position that European infantry were unlikely to entrench on such a scale, and therefore the need for howitzers should not dominate the debate: they were ‘a very useful auxiliary, but an auxiliary only, of the Field Artillery’. He continued that high explosive was unlikely to cause much damage to deep entrenchments, but shrapnel would keep the enemy's heads down until the

decisive moment of the infantry assault.” Ducrot’s position was buttressed by Major H. A. Bethell’s “Commended Essay’, “Has the experience of the war in South Africa shown that any change is necessary in the system of Field Artillery fire tactics?’. Like Ducrot, Bethell stressed the exceptional atmospheric and geographical condi-

tions in South Africa, and believed in particular that ranges in any European conflict would be much shorter due to climate and the nature of the landscape.” Initially, and despite the range and power of modern artillery as experienced in South Africa, direct fire was considered to be the more likely use of artillery in

7! See Keith Neilson, “That Dangerous and Difficult Enterprise”: British Military Thinking and the Russo-Japanese War’, War in History, Vol. 9, No. 2, October 1991, pp. 17-37; Jonathan A. Bailey, ‘Military history and the pathology of lessons learned: the Russo-Japanese War, a case study’, Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich (eds), The past as prologue. The importance of history to the military profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) pp. 170-94; Spiers, “Rearming the Edwardian Artillery’, pp. 173-4.

” Major L. H. Ducrot, “Guns in South Africa, Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, Vol. XVIII, Nos 4 and 5, 1901-1902, pp. 203-8. 7 Major H. A. Bethell, “Has the experience of the war in South Africa shown that any change is necessary in the system of Field Artillery fire tactics (in the attack as well as the defence) in European

warfare Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, Vol. XXTX, Nos 2 and 3, 1902-1903, pp. 136-46.

Training and Doctrine 79 European conditions, given its enclosed nature and absence of good sightlines across a widely variegated landscape. Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Du Cane produced a short paper on the artillery in defence and attack in 1905.” At this point he still held to the principle of direct fire, but believed it should be achieved by very careful movement of the guns, probably by night so as to achieve surprise. A similar

point was made at the conclusion of the 1909 manoeuvres, when the use of the cover of the landscape was recommended in order to bring field guns to close range; the same tactic was also advocated for the heavier guns.” French also remained a firm supporter of direct fire, and believed the artillery should take con-

siderable risks to achieve it. In his 1905 memorandum on training he wrote: ‘The artillery must move and become conspicuous [original emphasis].’”° Haig, a later

successor at Aldershot Command, maintained this position, and in 1913 stated that ‘artillery must not hesitate to close in towards the enemy so as to give the infantry the best possible support, moral as well as material’.”” The impact of direct fire on an attacking infantryman’s morale was also Brigadier General L. E. Kiggell’s, Director of Staff Duties at the War Office, main reason for continuing to suppott its tacti-

cal value. While chairing a debate on the infantry view of artillery support, he advanced his belief that infantry would accept friendly-fire casualties from direct firing, but not indirect, because the sight of the guns on the battlefield would boost their self-belief. At the 1911 Staff conference he followed up these points by stating that victory was achieved by fire at short ranges and cited the Franco-Prussian War as the most obvious example. He concluded: ‘My own opinion, from an infantry up-bringing, is that the infantry will look to the artillery then for direct and rapid support, and if they do not get it, they will not be satisfied with the artillery.’” By contrast, most artillerymen were making the shift towards indirect fire by the middle of the decade. An article in the Royal Artillery’s journal in 1904 by Lieutenant R. K. Hezlet marked the changing direction. He argued the case for howitzers, describing their ability to fire until the last moment of the infantry assault due to their high trajectory. “The great moral as well as material effect of this support of the infantry attack by the field howitzer, he wrote, ‘was several times exemplified

in South Africa, and this would seem to be another leading feature of its future employment.” Former defenders of direct fire also began to revise their views. By 1906 Bethell was advocating the use of concealed howitzers in the infantry assault, believing them to be the decisive weapon for keeping enemy troops below the parapets of their trenches.*° Through lectures and journal articles for broader 7 TNA WO 27/504 Brevet Lieutenant Colonel J. P Du Cane, ‘Notes on Artillery in Attack and Defence’ 1905.

> TNA WO 33/3009 ‘Report on Army Manoeuvres, 1909’, p. 53. 7° "TNA WO 27/504 ‘Memorandum on Military Training, 1905’, Aldershot Command. 7” ‘TNA WO 279/53 ‘Aldershot Command, Comments on the Training Season, 1913’, p. 6. 78 Captain the Honourable H. Dawnay, ‘Artillery and Infantry in the Final Stages of the Attack. An Infantry View’, Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, Vol. XXXV, 1908-1909, No. 2, pp. 49-56. Remarks made by the Chair, p. 53; “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1911’, p. 65. ” Lieutenant R. K. Hezlet, “The capabilities and future role of field howitzers’, Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, Vol. XXXI, 1904-1905, No. 2, pp. 54-9, p. 56. 8° Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Bethell, ‘Artillery in the attack and defence of positions’, Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, Vol. XXXIII, 1906-1907, No. 2, pp. 59-68.

80 The Edwardian Army audiences, ideas on artillery fire were given broad circulation and did not remain confined to the scholarly pages and readers of the Royal Artillery’s journal. Colonel E.G. Stone added his voice to the case for howitzers in a lecture on “The Employ-

ment of Heavy Artillery in the Field’ to the Aldershot Military Society in 1907. French was impressed by Stone’s paper and remarked from the chair: ‘Looking

at the subject generally, it seems to me that the permanent adoption of Heavy Artillery with armies in the field is the natural outcome of the enormous developments in the power and range of fire arm, and the greatly increased extent of modern

battlefields.”*' That same year the Royal Artillery Institution’s essay competition was on the question of “Io what extent may guns and howitzers of greater calibre than those of our Field Artillery co-operate usefully in field operations, and what rules should govern their tactical employment?’ The four commended essays all foresaw much greater use of indirect fire and heavier calibres, with Major T. B. Wood stating: “Field operations will in future resemble siege on account of the

increased retaining power of modern weapons.’ In a lecture to the Irish Command in Dublin in 1910, Major C. E. D Budworth told the audience the basic facts of future artillery fire: “Theory or no theory, from compulsion or choice, artillery firing is bound to take place at very distant ranges.’”*? Du Cane and Lieutenant Colonel W. T. Furse made the same point at the 1911 Staff conference.

Alongside the question of ranges and type of fire was that of target selection. Much of the debate concentrated on enemy entrenchments and enemy infantry.

Almost all agreed that high explosive would not have much effect on wellconstructed enemy trenches, especially if the fire was at long range and accuracy was subsequently lessened. Far more reliance was placed on shrapnel as the ultimate suppressant of enemy infantry. Whether or not the shrapnel actually killed

the enemy in the trenches or in the open was immaterial; the important point, according to this article, was the disruptive effect it had on aim and coordination,

thus assisting the attacking infantry forward.** This was a nascent theory of neutralization rather than destruction, which the British would return to on the Western Front in 1917.% Exercises and manoeuvres appear to have used artillery

fire almost solely to aid the assault on the enemy infantry main positions.

8! Colonel E.G. Stone, “The Employment of Heavy Artillery in the Field’ (London: Aldershot Military Society/Hugh Rees, 1907).

8° Major H. S. Jeudwine, Captain W. H. Moore, Major K. K. Knapp, Captain O. L. Price, Major T. B. Wood, “To what extent may guns and howitzers of greater calibre than those of our Field Artillery co-operate usefully in field operations, and what rules should govern their tactical employment’, Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, Vol. XXXIV, 1907-1908, No. 4, pp. 113-44; No. 7, pp. 265—

79, 280-96; No. 9, pp. 393-410. 88 Major C. E. D. Budworth, ‘Artillery in Co-operation with Infantry’, Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, Vol. XXXVII, 1910-1911, No. 1, pp. 1-14, p. 1. 8 See Bethell, “Has the experience of war in South Africa’, p. 4; Budworth, ‘Artillery in Co-operation with Infantry’, pp. 12-13; Ducrot, “Guns in South Africa, p. 205; Hezlet, “The capabilities and future role of field howitzers’, p. 56; TNA WO 33/337 Major J. M. Home, “The Russo-Japanese War up to 15 August 1904’, pp. 12, 20; Moore, “To what extent may guns and howitzers’, p. 144. 8° See Jonathan Bailey, “British Artillery in the Great War’ in Paddy Griffith (ed.), British Fighting Methods in the Great War (London: Frank Cass, 1996) pp. 23-49.

Training and Doctrine 81 In concentrating on this role, the Royal Artillery missed almost entirely the extremely important issue of counter-battery fire. Most seemed to think that counter-battery work was part of the ‘artillery duel’, a tactic many declared redun-

dant due to long-range fire and smokeless ammunition.” Some did, however, recognize the significance of this role. Captain W. H. Moore wrote of the need ‘to engage the enemy's guns when located, or seek them out... [and bring] an eftec-

tive fire on the position.” For Major J. M. Home, an observer with Russian forces in the Russo-Japanese War, the vital preliminary of any infantry assault was counter-battery fire.*® Working along similar lines, Budworth denied the obsolescence of the artillery duel and believed that in future artillery would spend more

time and ammunition trying to neutralize each other.’ Whatever the role and whatever the ranges, most British artillerymen recognized that future war would involve a prodigious expenditure of ammunition, even from a force that prided itself on precise firing and strict ammunition conservancy. Bethell saw it as an obvious point about future operations and stressed the need for an ‘abundance of

ammunition.°’ Stone warned that the complete destruction of entrenchments was in fact a ‘siege operation, requiring an enormous expenditure of heavy ammunition’.”’ It was an issue that had to be taken seriously, especially in the light of the Russo-Japanese War. Colonel FE. D. V. Wing noted, “The power of expenditure [of

the artillery] far exceeds the power of supply, the limit of the latter fixes that of our gun power.” An important corollary of this development was the question

of ammunition supply. Some took a sanguine attitude. Jeudwine argued that heavy artillery would be a vital component in future war and would need a greatly expanded supply. However, he believed the nature of modern combat would actually help the situation. With battles likely to become much longer and the pauses

between them extended, the mobility and provisioning of heavy artillery would become less of a problem. Further, the supply needs of modern armies demanded that operations hug the main railway lines. Thus battles in Europe would never be fought too far from a major railway route, which would then alleviate the supply problem.” Although correct in his assumption that railways would play an important role in future European war, Jeudwine’s assessment did nothing to consider

the precise nature of the supply and replenishment issue. He was not alone, for very few in the army took up this problem with anything like enough seriousness.

For a nation drifting towards a continental commitment, it was unwise to leave

86 Jeudwine, “Io what extent may guns and howitzers’, p. 116; Moore, “To what extent may guns and howitzers’, p. 136; Spiers, “Rearming the Edwardian Artillery’, pp. 172-4. 8” Moore, “To what extent may guns and howitzers’, p. 136 Major C. E. D. Budworth, “Tactical Employment of Artillery as evolved on the Practice Ground’ (London: Hugh Rees/Aldershot Military Society, 1908) p. 8. 88 TNA WO 33/337 Major J. M. Home, “The Russo-Japanese War up to 15 August 1904’, p. 11. 8 Major C.E. D. Budworth, “Tactical Employment of Artillery as evolved on the Practice Ground’ (London: Hugh Rees/Aldershot Military Society, 1908) p. 8. °° Bethell, ‘Artillery in the attack and defence of positions’, p. 64. *! Stone, “Ihe Employment of Heavy Artillery’, p. 3. * Quoted in Bailey, “Military history’, p. 179. °3 Jeudwine, “To what extent may guns and howitzers’, p. 131.

82 The Edwardian Army such an important matter underworked. Du Cane was one of the few to broach the issue at the highest levels. He asked the Staff conference of 1909 whether the General Staff should ‘be placed in a position to study more thoroughly than is possible at present this important aspect of the conduct of warlike operations in a Continental theatre of war’.”* Instead, the army comforted itself with the idea that accuracy would act as a brake on expenditure, and the artillery manuals of 1912 and 1914 rested on the principle of ‘economy of force’.” Despite the intensity of this debate, British artillery methods were not altered greatly. [his was partly because of the confusion caused by the Russo-Japanese War. As has been noted, drawing lessons from the Russo-Japanese War was not an easy task. Captain Berkeley Vincent of the Royal Field Artillery was dispatched as an official British observer of the war and came to no overall conclusion on the ques-

tion of indirect over direct fire. He noted that indirect fire was often wasteful of

ammunition, but was useful in the counter-battery role and against infantry redoubts. On the other hand, he recorded the value Japanese infantry officers placed in direct fire as a crucial boost to the morale of attacking infantry. However, he was under no doubt that ‘the great range and power of modern firearms necessitates greater caution in tactics and a more general use of some form of artificial cover’.”° For Major J. A. Home the lesson was clear: artillery had become the dominant arm, and he expressed it in the strongest of terms: The great impression made on my mind by all I saw is that artillery is now the decisive

arm and that all other arms are auxiliary to it. The importance of artillery cannot be too strongly insisted upon, for other things being equal, that side will always win which has the best artillery. Better artillery tactics may make up for the inferiority in armament as it has very largely done in Manchuria, where the Japanese had a gun decidedly inferior to that of the Russians; I estimate the difference numerically as two to three... So strongly am I convinced of the immense importance of the artillery that it seems almost a question of deliberate consideration whether artillery should not be largely increased even at the expense of the other arms. Infantry can, if necessary, be trained in about 3 months, whereas artillery cannot be so improvized.””

Having accepted the primacy of artillery, the moral he drew from this massive increase in firepower was that both direct and indirect fire were useful tactics, and ammunition profligacy might be tempered by accuracy.

The inconclusive nature of the Russo-Japanese War was reflected in the first Inspector General’s report after the war's end. It noted the confusion caused for both umpires and troops at manoeuvres by indirect fire along the lines of Manchurian experiences. The Inspector General urged the Royal Artillery not to run away

4 “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 19109’, pp. 69-70. °° Spiers, “Rearming the Edwardian Artillery’, p. 176. °° Captain B. Vincent, ‘Artillery in the Manchurian Campaign’, Royal United Service Institution Journal, Vol. 52, Part 1, January—June 1908, pp. 28-52. On this issue, we take a different line to Keith Neilson who argued in his article that Vincent became a firm convert to the value of indirect fire. See Neilson, “That Dangerous and Difficult Enterprise”’, p. 21. ” ‘TNA WO 33/337 Major J. M. Home, “The Russo-Japanese War up to 15 August 1904’, p. 8.

Training and Doctrine 83 with the idea that indirect fire was the answer to everything, and laid out eight different types of direct and indirect fire designed to meet different tactical situations.”® Similar ambiguities arose over the role of howitzers. In 1909 it was noted

that howitzers had been used too freely to support attacks, whereas they should have been deployed ‘for specific purposes and not for general utility’, which was

mainly due to the limited ammunition supply.” However, three years later a different Inspector General noted the ‘tendency to treat howitzers as a “speciality”.

I think this is a mistake.’'’° This reveals a lack of cohesive thought in the army which must have made standard interpretation of the various training manuals and guidelines extremely difficult. The confusion at the heart of British artillery practice was fully revealed in the

1911 Staff conference. Once again it was Du Cane who attempted to get the army to consider the full weight of its drift towards a continental commitment. He reminded the conference of the increased ranges likely to be experienced in European warfare, and asked it to consider which approach the Royal Artillery should adopt. Looking at French practice, he noted the reliance on rapid fire from 75mm guns, usually from medium range, with a directing officer relaying orders to the guns, which were protected by the crest of a ridge. For the French the crucial

element was the deluging of an enemy position with shells within a very short space of time. Was there anything the British should take from French practice? he

asked. In essence, Du Cane was pushing the conference to make a stand on the crucial issues of direct and indirect fire, ammunition supply, and target priorities. The ensuing discussion ebbed and flowed around the lessons to be drawn from the Franco-Prussian, South African, and Russo-Japanese wars, and was certainly well informed and intelligently argued. Where the system failed was in decision making

and determining clear ways forward. As on so many occasions and on so many other issues, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in this case Sir William Nicholson, opted for a solution based on the status quo: That a memorandum be prepared by the Director of Military Training, for issue to commands, pointing out that it is undesirable that excessive importance should be attached during practice-camp training to developing accurate fire at difficult targets at long ranges, and that the primary efforts of such training should be directed towards

making artillery highly efficient in the support of infantry in the decisive phases of action; and further, that for this purpose the artillery should devote their attention largely to developing their powers of accurate observation and effective control of fire, coupled with accurate and rapid shooting.'”!

For an army with a broad range of potential duties it might be read as a sensible, pragmatic solution, but for one moving closer and closer to a continental commitment, it lacked hard reality and urgency. It also led to a distinctly dangerous understanding of the value of artillery in close country. The continued belief was that °*8 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1906’, pp. 31-2. °» TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1909’, p. 8. '00 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1912’, p. 29. '®l “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1911’, pp.52—75, 81-2.

84 The Edwardian Army artillery would not find an obvious role in close-country fighting except at very close ranges, and the collected wisdom of the British army on the eve of war informed the infantry that: “Generally speaking, in close country, owing to limitations of the field of view and of fire, the employment of artillery is limited.’'’ Without a clear steer, and anxious not to seem unwilling to suffer casualties, most artillerymen accepted the need to continue direct fire over open sights in the face of the enemy; the result was Le Cateau, after which ‘no British battery commander would ever willingly put his guns in the open, except briefly and in a special emergency’ .'”

With support for the infantry in its assault on enemy positions a leading task in the artillery’s role, there was a need for a thorough system of intercommunications and liaison. South Africa had shown the importance of coordination between the infantry and artillery, but it took some time for the lack of a formal system binding the arms to be noticed. French established the significance of the problem when he took over at Aldershot. He referred to ‘insufficient understanding’ between infantry and artillery and identified it as an issue for urgent attention.'“ That the army regarded this as a novel problem of sudden emergence is underlined by an article in the Royal Artillery’s journal in 1906: “The need for some system of connection between Infantry and Artillery during the attack of a position has only arisen of late years, and like many other developments it does not appear to have been foreseen or provided for.’'° The editor of the journal felt the need to add a note on this essay remarking that the matter was now very much a live issue in the army, particularly at Aldershot and ‘scarcely a field-day passes

without the question cropping up sufficiently acutely to embitter relations between the CRA and the Infantry Commander at the ensuing conference’. Stressing the need for cooperation became a mantra repeated in all official manuals and communications, and was summed up in the 1905 Infantry Training manual, which told infantry officers that ‘the most intimate co-operation between the artillery and infantry must be aimed at’.'°” Having identified the issue, the army moved on to address the best way to tackle it.

By 1908 nothing had been done and two respected artillerymen, Budworth and Stone, pointed out that there was still no formal system of infantry—artillery intercommunication, and called for a solution to remedy the situation.'®® In the following year’s

'©° Infantry Training, 1914 (London: HMSO, 1914) p. 169. '5 See Du Cane’s comments in the 1911 Staff conference, and Budworth, ‘Artillery in Co-operation with Infantry’; Knapp, “To what extent may guns and howitzers’; Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Gunners at War. A Tactical Study of the Royal Artillery in the Twentieth Century (London: Arms

and Armour Press, 1970) p. 29.

'4 TNA WO 27/504 “The Training of the Aldershot Army Corps during 1905’, Aldershot Command. ' Lieutenant S. Gore-Browne, “The best method to be adopted to secure co-operation between Infantry and Artillery in the attack’, Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, Vol. XXXIII, 1906—

1907, No. 5, pp. 304-12, p. 304. ‘06 Gore-Browne, “The best method’, p. 310. '°” Infantry Training, 1905, p. 135. '°8 Budworth, “Tactical Employment of Artillery’, p. 3; see also comments of Colonel F. G. Stone on Brigadier General R.C. B. Haking, “The Action of the Artillery from an Infantry point of view’, Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, Vol. XXXV, 1908-1909, No. 10, p. 440.

Training and Doctrine 85 Staff conference the matter was addressed, but once again the inability to determine a single way forward prevented the adoption of an effective response. Murray suggested

better communications particularly at brigade level, allowing infantry brigadiers to confer with the artillery in order to achieve rapid responses to a changing or unforeseen battlefield scenario. The system was to be achieved by telephone and the flow of information was to come from artillery officers in the front line. He acknowledged that other forms of communication, particularly visual, needed to be integrated into the system as telephones could not be relied upon in all circumstances.'” While all of the officers who took part in the subsequent debate accepted the importance of this issue, no agreement could be reached, particularly on the issue of the forward observer.

Most seemed to think that the artillery could not afford to spare officers for forward roles; by the same token there was extreme reluctance to devolve the task to an infantryman. There was also the usual fear of an overly prescriptive approach. ‘I have come

to the conclusion, remarked Colonel FE G. Davies of 1 Division staff, ‘that it is extremely dangerous to lay down too hard and fast lines; and that with practice in expedients, if elasticity is allowed, communications are established by means which have not been thought of before.’ The issue was left undecided and Nicholson (CGS) moved on to the next item on the agenda.''? Budworth continued with the instance that it was the artillery’s task to provide observing officers to work with the infantry in his 1910 lecture to the Irish Command, but still no move was taken to formalize such

a system.''! With no solution in sight, the Director of the 1912 manoeuvres made unfavourable comments about artillery—infantry cooperation, and it was noted how this tended to allow engagements to degenerate into penny-packet actions between small numbers of troops.''* In 1913 the Staff conference returned to the issue, and the

debate was dominated by the question of whether it should be a specially trained infantry officer or a detached artillery officer. Once again no decision was reached, and the CIGS concluded by stating that junior staff officers at brigade level might be asked

to take on this duty. He then added: “but we will [have to] discuss the possibility of that. That is as far as we can go at present, I think.’'’? It was a malaise which was encapsulated in the next training manual, Infantry Training, 1914, as it advised that there should be personal liaison between infantry and artillery commanders, but gave no instruction on how it should be achieved or structured.'!* Such advice perpetuated a system in which local solutions to immediate scenarios were usually conjured up, but did nothing to maximize the combined potential of the army. Thus, the British went to war without a formalized method for infantry—artillery cooperation, which had repercussions in the early battles of the war.'!” '9 For the army’s early use of telephones see Brian N. Hall, “The “Life Blood” of Communication? The British army, communications and the telephone, 1877-1914’, War and Society, Vol. 27, No. 2,

October 2008, pp. 43-65. "0 “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1909, pp. 5-9. "4 Budworth, ‘Artillery in Co-operation with Infantry’, pp. 7-8. "2 "TNA WO 279/47 ‘Report on Army Manoeuvres, 1912’, p. 127. 13 “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1913, pp. 62-4. "4 Infantry Training, 1905, p. 137. "5 See Gardner, Trial by Fire, p. 82; Neilson, ““That Dangerous and Difficult Enterprise”’, p. 28; Spiers, ‘Rearming the Edwardian Artillery’, p. 176.

86 The Edwardian Army As with the artillery, the main role allotted to the infantry in any future war was offensive and it dominated all manuals and training memoranda. A further common element was the insistence on rapid manoeuvre and redeployment in order to maximize the fire effect of a small army. The key to British infantry thinking was therefore fire and movement, and this concept was held in common both by those often labelled traditionalists—the believers in what Travers has called the ‘psychological battlefield’-—and modernists—the advocates of ever-increasing firepower.''® Well aware of the dreadful losses caused by the Boers on soldiers that had gone to ground and unsure how to move forward, the army emphasized the need to advance

covered by accurate, steady rifle fire. The report on the 1904 army manoeuvres stressed that rapidly moving soldiers using good musketry provided a much harder target for the enemy.'’” A year later the new infantry training manual made a similar point: battles were won by systematic movements from one firing position to another in order to achieve fire supremacy.''® The vital prerequisites for this system

were an effective rifle and infantrymen highly competent in its use. In 1905 the new short-magazine Lee—Enfield was introduced across the whole army, including the cavalry. It was relatively light, easy to carry, having none of the great length of

the Lee—Metford used in South Africa, was accurate at a number of different ranges, and was also a cheap replacement, an important consideration for govern-

ments obsessed with economy in the military budget.'!? Strict new musketry standards were also introduced. A standard of fifteen aimed rounds a minute at 300 yards was demanded, which was considerably more than the eight set by the Japanese army and the twelve of the French, German, and Russian armies. Enormous

efforts were put into musketry practice, and the infantry soon both met and sustained the new standard.!”°

Problems arose uniting the undoubted skill at musketry with the concept of intelligent movement. Similar to the debates on artillery, the failure to define clear

principles led to confusion. Thus, despite constant emphasis on fire and movement, manoeuvres often exposed insufhicient understanding of the tactic. The Inspector General’s report for 1910 remarked on the conduct of the firefight: ‘there is little that is satisfactory to be said on this point’.'*' In that same year, McMahon, an infantry firepower specialist, stated the army’s complete faith in the concept of fire and movement—‘soldiers... must win their battles by movement —but felt it was something requiring constant repetition as it was not properly understood. Forward movement towards the source of enemy firepower was not as ludicrous as some have suggested in hindsight. McMahon pointed out many instances in the Russo-Japanese War where Japanese troops suffered more casualties by going to ground, thereby forming a passive target, than by moving 46 Spiers, ‘Reforming the Infantry’, p. 93; Travers, The Killing Ground, pp. 37-84; Bidwell and Graham, Fire-power, pp. 7-60. "7 "TNA WO 279/8 ‘Report on Army Manoeuvres, 1904’, p. 35. "8" Infantry Training, 1905, p. 128. "19 Spiers, “Reforming the Infantry’, pp. 90-1. 120 Spiers, “Reforming the Infantry’, p. 89.

1 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1910, p. 25.

Training and Doctrine 87 forward and using their weapons.'”” Du Cane supported him, and claimed somewhat disconcertingly that most regimental officers had not properly understood the principle of fire and movement because it was beyond their intellect. He admitted it was embodied in the Field Service Regulations, but in such a way as to be unintelligible.'*? By 1913 an intellectual dead end was reached, which reveals

an alarming lack of consistent thinking on the infantry’s key battlefield tactical concept. The Staff conference of that year examined a glaringly basic theme: “The principle of fire preceding movement. What it involves and may lead to.’ Consid-

ering that fire and movement had a history stretching beyond the South African War, and had supposedly been revised in the light of it, the fact that it was being re-examined in this fundamental way exposes a distinct weakness in the army’s intellectual development. ‘The discussion centred on whether fire was always the prerequisite of movement, and whether a unified system of infantry battlefield communications was required in order to facilitate both between units. Although

a basic tactical point, it was a vital one because it carried with it the threat of assaults collapsing into stalemate as units looked to each other to provide covering fire.!*4 Following further comments on the matter by the Inspector General in 1913, it was addressed once more by the Staff conference in 1914. The laissezfaire nature of the army was once more revealed, as the conference discovered that some brigades had attempted to create a unified battlefield infantry intercommu-

nications system, but others had not and so battalions had created their own internal methods that were completely alien to other units. Kiggell simplified the

whole matter by insisting that the motivating principle of all units at all times should be forward movement. Sir William Robertson, CIGS, supported this point, concluding the discussion by stating: “We must be on our guard against doing anything which might in any way tend to interfere with the desire of troops to get push into the fight at all costs.”!”° The ability to push on was partly determined by battlefield deployment and this too was debated throughout this period. South Africa had exposed the problem of thickly bunched men in the assault when faced with modern rifles and artillery. The initial response was greater dispersion, creating a less obvious target; however, this militated against weight of fire at the chosen point. /nfantry Training, 1905 stated clearly that at effective-to-decisive ranges (1,400 to 600 yards), infantry would have to advance in dispersed order. French made a similar point on ‘increased dispersion’ to Aldershot Command in the same year.'*° The difficulty arose at the close range level of less than 600 yards when men were to be gathered back into more compact groupings in order to win the firefight, with the immense weight of responsibility it placed on officers in the heat, smoke, and disorientation of battle. The response was

'22° McMahon, Fire Fighting, p. 3. '23 “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1910’, pp. 25-8.

'4 ‘Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1913’, pp. 65-6. '25 “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1914’, pp. 73-7. 6 Infantry Training, 1905, pp. 133-5; TNA WO 27/504 “The Training of the Aldershot Army Corps during 1905’, Aldershot Command.

88 The Edwardian Army to thicken gradually the firing line from the rear, dribbling men in by methodical fire and movement in order to achieve fire supremacy.'’” Retaining control over this tactic was extremely difficult, and was complicated still further by the lessons drawn from the Russo-Japanese War. Many observers of the conflict drew the conclusion

that only a dense formation could provide enough firepower and momentum to break through an enemy in any kind of entrenchment or prepared defensive position. Home wrote on the need ‘to pour the greatest volume of fire into the position, which will be better carried out by a thick line than a thin line’ in his report on the conflict.'’* The senior umpires of Eastern Command manoeuvres in 1906 criticized infantry formations for relying too much on dispersal and not making attacks in ‘close formation’ as the ‘lessons taught by the late war forced one to realize that an attack... [in] extended order would be doomed to failure’.'”? Establishing orthodoxy was clearly difficult, as Aylmer Haldane noted at the 1909 Staff conference. In

contradiction of the attitude of umpires of Eastern Command manoeuvres, he believed most umpires persistently made judgements against thickened firing lines. He saw it as a reflection of thinking at the lowest levels: “Our infantry officers in many battalions still regard a thick firing line as an absurdity.’'*° Haig saw evidence of this at Aldershot Command and his report urged the acceptance of a narrower

front in order to ensure a thickened firing line at the decisive point ‘to provide weight for the decisive attack’.'*! There is a tendency to ascribe the thick firing line tactic to the more traditional type of officer, but even McMahon saw the need for a compact firing line in order to achieve fire supremacy at the chosen spot.’ Codification appeared to have been made absolute in Infantry Training, 1914 in which it was stated that ‘the greater the extension of a line... the less will be its fire effect’.'*°

However, it is doubtful whether uniformity was achieved. Brigadier General F. Lloyd told McMahon that he did not consider anything other than greatly extended lines could prove effective in an assault against modern firepower.'** Confusion must then have been heaped on battalion commanders by the Inspector General’s report of 1913, which condemned the tendency to thicken too soon and thus expose attacking infantry to unnecessary casualties.'* Such judgements on the diversity of practice implied a failure to imprint a common understanding of basic tactical principles on the core operational units of the army.

7 Infantry Training, 1905, pp. 133-5; see also Captain L.H. Tudor, “Collective Fire’, Royal United Service Institution Journal, Vol. 56, Part 2, July-December 1912, pp. 1021-5. It could be argued that this debate owed nothing to the South African War per se, but was the continuance of an issue which predated 1899. See D. M. Leeson, “Playing at war: the British military manoeuvres of 1898’, War in History, Vol. 15, No. 4, November 2008, pp. 432-61.

28 "TNA WO 33/337 Major J. M. Home, “The Russo-Japanese War up to 15 August 1904’, PP TINA WO 279/10 ‘Report on Eastern Command manoeuvres, 1906’, pp. 32-4. '° “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1909’, p. 11. '8! TNA WO 279/53 ‘Aldershot Command, Comments on the Training Season, 1913’, p. 13. '82 McMahon, Fire Fighting, p. 18.

3 Infantry Training, 1914, p. 128. '34 McMahon, Fire Fighting, p. 15. 385. TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1913, p. 14.

Training and Doctrine 89 Battlefield formations were the framework for the correct delivery of firepower, which then led to fire supremacy over the enemy. Some officers understood this concept clearly. Home summed it up neatly in his report on the Russo-Japanese War: ‘the object of all tactics is to establish superiority of fire’.'°° For the British, victims of Boer proficiency with Mausers and keen advocates of ammunition and monetary economy, accuracy was the touchstone, but it sparked discussion on the correct balance between accuracy and sheer volume of fire. The 1905 Infantry Training manual stressed the need ‘to secure superiority of fire by accuracy rather than rapidity’, and gave the ratio of 125 rifles to every 100 yards of front attacked as the correct balance.'*’ Strict fire direction and control from both officers and men was necessary for such a tactic to work and demanded careful observation and judgement on the battlefield in order to direct fire onto the correct point and determine effect. Officers were to provide the guidance and the men were to ensure their own contribution by carrying through their orders with extreme attention to their musketry.'** Although there can be no doubt of British musketry skill, the way it was controlled reveals the laissez-faire element prevalent throughout the training regime. In 1909 the Inspector General noted the excellent standards of fire direction, control, and discipline in the 13 and 14 Infantry Brigades, which was obviously due to the internal workings of the brigades. The Inspector General saw ‘no reason why the standard attained by them should not be reached by all’, but then gave no advice as to how to reach it.'*’ A year later the absence of a uniformly enforced training regime was disconcertingly exhibited by the widespread use of volley fire as the key musketry tactic in many units despite the fact that it was ‘quite contrary to the modern theory of musketry...it might be desirable to take other action to check the advocates of this antiquated method of fire control’.'“° Once again, the ‘other action’ was not sketched out and the Army Council devolved the matter to Hythe. Famously, British training did allow for a significant increase in the volume of fire by ordering rapid fire from the infantry. This tactic was to be used sparingly as it put pressure on ammunition supply, and was even more difficult to control and judge effect.'*' However, the question of volume over accuracy began to be asked more frequently, particularly in the light of the Russo-Japanese War, in which machine guns had been used widely. Significantly, the British took a long time to accept a tactical formation which had the potential to deal with a combination of its tactical issues, namely, thickness of the firing line and concentration and vol-

ume of fire, in the adoption of the four-company system. Based on an eightcompany system until 1914, the British retained a structure at variance to the continental armies. The advantage of the eight-company system was said to be its

'3° "TNA WO 33/337 Major J. M. Home, “The Russo-Japanese War up to 15 August 1904’, p. 17.

'” Infantry Training, 1905, pp. 126, 150. '8 Infantry Training, 1914, pp. 122-7. 89 TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1909, p. 21. 0 ‘TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1910, p. 31. 1 Infantry Training, 1914, p. 125.

90 The Edwardian Army flexibility on the battlefield, but in an era of increasing firepower it was beginning to lack punch. Advocates of a four-, or ‘double-company’, system had been around for a long time, but emerged more strongly after the South African War. The 1905 Inspector General’s report was enthusiastic about the double-company system on trial at Aldershot, but at this stage it was mainly because it allowed a reasonable

number to be gathered for training purposes rather than its firepower potential. The Army Council rejected the suggestion of permanent double companies on the grounds that this would block promotion and command opportunities for a good many subalterns.'*” Regardless of this decision, many battalions used the doublecompany system informally out of sheer necessity due to lack of available numbers. '*°

Inspectors General reports made almost continual reference to the need for double companies, but it was probably the sheer demand for expediency given numbers

which pushed the matter. The formal defence of the tactical utility of the fourcompany system was given by Maxse in a 1911 lecture. Maxse expanded on the unwieldiness of the eight-company system, particularly in fire and movement

terms, and how a four-company structure gave better concentration without greatly increasing the target.'“* Revealing the distinct lack of homogeneity on this point, Maxse’s audience responded without consensus. ‘The retired soldiers in the

audience reacted badly and cited all sorts of examples from the past when the eight-company system had emerged triumphant. Of the seven serving officers who spoke, five were serving in staff posts and two on battalion duties. ‘The staff officers

were split on the issue, and one of the two battalion officers supported the idea. Captain Hereward Wake was one of the few speakers to link the suggestion explicitly to modern firepower and tactics. He believed the time had come to ‘base their organization on their tactics instead of trying to adapt their tactics to an organization which they happened to have inherited’.'*° French, chairing the meeting, was in favour of the move, which was eventually accepted by the Army Council and

introduced in 1914.'*° The inability to adopt a four-company system with its advantages in terms of concentrating firepower while still remaining flexible enough to move across the battlefield is an insight into the army’s lack of cohesion on firepower and tactics. Everyone was discussing the issues, but decision making leading to uniformity was immensely difficult to achieve. The second option for increasing volume of fire was automatic weapons. Volume of fire in order to achieve fire supremacy and pave the way for the final assault was

most thoroughly explored by McMahon and other instructors at Hythe, the specialist centre for the study of new infantry weapons and tactics. Increased volume of fire would be the hallmark of future combat, according to McMahon,

2 TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1905, pp. 48-9. 3 Maxse, ‘Battalion Organization’, pp. 75, 85. 4 Maxse, ‘Battalion Organization’, pp. 55-7. 5 Maxse, “Battalion Organization’, p. 79. 46 Maxse, ‘Battalion Organization’, pp. 85-6; Infantry Training, 1914 was the first to be introduced specifically for the new system. For a further discussion of the four-company debate see Ramsay, Command and Cohesion, pp. 101-7.

Training and Doctrine 91 and he became one of the leading advocates of automatic weapons. However, integral to his concept of volume was the belief that fire and movement tactics had not

been fully understood, and the new weapons offered the logical solution to the problem. He was therefore more than simply a zealot for a technological innovation, but was addressing a fundamental tactical issue through its focus. For McMahon, use of automatic weapons went hand in hand with a better understanding of

ground to provide positions for fire support and greater assessment of why a particular piece of ground needed to be taken at all. Simplification and greater guidance in tactics, what he called ‘tabloid’ tactics, would not only enhance the current power of the army, but also make it easier to reintegrate reservists and freshly joined citizens.'*” Alongside the deployment of machine guns, he also urged

the rapid adoption of automatic rifles. With the use of machine guns in the defensive likely to be much more widespread, attacking infantry needed volume of fire. His logic ground on, explaining that the only way to produce much greater volume of fire without automatic weapons was by extending a front in order to allow more infantrymen to bring their rifles into action. However, this created the circular problem of dissipating fire effect. Automatic weapons altered this equation completely by being able to bring down volume on a narrow front. He carefully took into account the most obvious weakness in his concept, the question of ammunition supply, with two points. First was the accuracy of a sighted gun, particularly a machine gun on its tripod, which was much less likely to deviate than the tired or excited infantryman; second was that any acceleration of the firefight through wellaimed, automatically fired ammunition would bring it to a successful conclusion much more swiftly and so would not axiomatically mean far greater expenditure of ammunition.'“8 The problem with McMahon’s approach was not that he was a relatively junior ranking officer trying to convert superiors, nor even his support of a new weapon still in an early stage of development, but rather the style of his advocacy. McMahon was a specialist and always spoke as if addressing a room of specialists; consequently, following the flow of his logic must have challenged the concentration and comprehension of his audience. Relatively few infantry officers

completed the courses at Hythe—it seems to have averaged about two per battalion—and this must have militated against conversance with its arguments and easy dissemination of its conclusions. Unlike automatic rifles, machine guns were already well established, and official military thinking on the weapons did not alter much across the period. For reasons

of weight, both the Maxim and its replacement Vickers guns were not easily deployed on the battlefield, and this probably had an effect on the slow tactical development. According to Infantry Training, 1905 the machine gun was useful in

providing long-range covering fire and short bursts of concentrated fire on a particular spot. It was also suggested that brigading the two guns held by each '47 McMahon, Fire Fighting, pp. 1-14; ‘Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1910’,

25-7.

PP Mahon. Fire Fighting, pp. 1-14; “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1910’, pp. 25-7.

92 The Edwardian Army battalion might prove useful in certain circumstances. The 1908 amendments refined the position a little more by stating: “Machine guns are essentially weapons

of opportunity. The expenditure of ammunition involved and the nature of the mechanism make long periods of rapid fire unsuitable.’!” A great concern was that if not ranged correctly, a machine gun was liable to waste large quantities of ammunition. It was therefore regarded as a very useful auxiliary to the infantry but was not going to be decisive in itself.'°° Given this rather limited role, it is perhaps no surprise that there is evidence of widespread confusion over its application. When

reflecting on the use of machine guns in his 1908 report, the Inspector General pointed ‘to the necessity for further study of the principles’ on which the weapon was used.'*! Murray openly admitted at the 1909 staff conference, ‘I do not think we have got the best value out of them,’ and asked how they could find a better way forward. He regarded it as a matter of urgency, especially since “Russian and Japa-

nese writers [stated that], no weapon is so formidable, morally and materially, at

distances below 1,600 yards as the machine gun.’'” All of the officers present agreed with Murray, including Rawlinson, Haig, and Smith-Dorrien’s representative, and believed experiments in their brigaded use would be useful.'’? The question of brigading was raised in the 1911 and 1912 Inspector General’s reports, but

there was no resolution of this issue.'!°* With such uncertainty at the top, it is unsurprising that few umpires knew how to assimilate machine guns correctly into their assessments.'”? A significant weakness was the lack of blank adaptors, which meant they were silent in exercises and manoeuvres and therefore often ignored. Colonel W. N. Congreve believed this made attacking infantry oblivious to their threat in manoeuvres. ‘I think if a company officer comes to realise that a machine

gun at a thousand yards can produce an absolutely annihilating effect on a suitable target he will appreciate how greatly his responsibility is increased’, he stated while chairing a lecture given by Captain R. V. K. Applin, an expert in machinegun handling.!°° Applin’s advocacy of machine guns followed much the same logic as McMa-

hon’s. He saw it as the ideal way to produce volume and accuracy in a small army.'*’ But his argument was not as well developed as McMahon's. Congreve, an

enthusiastic supporter of machine guns, noted how little guidance Applin had given on the question of attacking an enemy armed with them. He argued that machine guns would scatter and atomize an assault, thus pushing the attackers into dispersed groups, but he wondered whether this might work to the attackers’

‘8 Infantry Training, 1905, pp. 144-5; 1908 amendments, p. 1. 0 Infantry Training, 1914, pp. 198-213. 51 TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1908, p. 53. '52 “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1909’, pp. 65—7.

'3 “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1909’, pp. 67-9. 4 ‘TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1911, pp. 44-5; IG Report for 1912, p. 69. '§5 “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1909’, p. 68.

6 Captain R.V. K. Applin, “Machine gun tactics in our own and other armies’, Royal United Service Institution Journal, Vol. 54, Part 1, January—June 1910, pp. 34-65. ‘87 Applin, ‘Machine guns’, p. 53.

Training and Doctrine 93 advantage, as the defenders had given themselves away, whereas the assaulting infantry had now become a harder target to hit. Urging a much more vigorous approach to machine-gun tactics, Congreve blamed the obsession with financial economy, but also directed a very firm swipe at the General Staff and higher com-

manders: ‘[T]here is the apathy due to want of appreciation of senior officers, which is very largely to blame for the deplorable results we see at manoeuvres and

field firing.’ He thought it reprehensible that the British had not advanced their thinking on machine guns despite pioneering their use.’** The lack of mobility was probably the single greatest problem in fully integrating the machine gun into assault tactics, and the slow emergence of a robust light automatic rifle meant

no immediate alternative was to hand.'” Fire supremacy was therefore a hazy concept despite the insistence that it was achieved through steady, accurate, well-directed rifle fire. Winning fire supremacy was not an end in itself, but the final preliminary to the decisive assault. As with every other stage of the attack, this too had a surface simplicity and logic, but was hindered by uncertainties. The first was a command decision which ran from the front firing line of a battalion backwards through all subsequent levels of command, namely: how were the officers in the forward firing line to determine that fire supremacy had been achieved and the decisive moment had arrived? The only real guidance was provided in /nfantry Training, 1905, and subsequently repeated, where it stated that the signal was a lessening of the intensity and accuracy of the enemy fire.'°° Making such a fine judgement in the heat of battle was an extremely difficult task. Closing with the enemy then became an issue of will and morale encapsulated in the action of fixing bayonets. Much has been written by military historians on the ‘morale’ versus ‘firepower’ issue, and it has been confused by the fact that certain figures, such as Sir lan Hamilton, an officer associated with firepower theories, also emphasized the psychological element in the attack.'®' The significant issue was not whether one view was old-fashioned and one modern, or even correct and incorrect, for no one doubted that at some point in an action a physical clash between the opponents would occur, which would require great determination. Rather, it was creating the right conditions for launching the decisive assault in which physical shock was the culminating experience. Many infantry officers wanted a firepower solution to cover the physical assault of the enemy position, with artillery fire being the preferred option. Artillerymen

often debated the moment when their fire might cause more disruption than 8 Applin, ‘Machine guns’, pp. 62-5. '° ‘Travers has argued that the case for the adoption of the Lewis gun, accepted for service in the Royal Flying Corps, and made available in 1912 reveals an army unclear on, and perhaps unwilling to accept, automatic fire. However, it is uncertain how robust the Lewis gun was for service in a variety of ground operations and so a harsh judgement on the army should perhaps not be passed too easily. Secondly, it has been impossible to re-examine Travers’s thesis closely for, unfortunately, the relevant National Archive file, WO 32/7071 Committee on Automatic Rifles, is currently missing. See Travers, The Killing Ground, p. 67, and Bidwell and Graham, Fire-power, pp. 54-5. '©9 Infantry Training, 1905, p. 137; Infantry Training, 1914, p. 134. '6! See, for example, Travers, The Killing Ground, pp. 37-82. For a more nuanced approach see Ramsay, Command and Cohesion, pp. 49-143.

94 The Edwardian Army support to attacking infantry.’ But, as noted above, infantry officers were willing to take the risk of friendly-fire casualties. Captain the Honourable H. Dawnay put the view clearly stating the infantry’s demand that ‘the artillery should maintain their fire against the position until it is mmpossible tor them to differentiate between their own and the enemy’s infantry’.' To minimize the risk of friendly-fire casual-

ties, he urged that a formal system of cooperation be determined immediately. Field Service Regulations, 1909 encapsulated some of Dawnay’s logic, stating that ‘artillery fire will be continued until it is impossible for the artillery to distinguish

between its own and the enemy’s infantry’. However, artillery officers were reminded of the need to reduce this danger by keeping ‘themselves informed as to the progress of their infantry, and to discontinue fire against the objective if such fire cannot be readily observed and controlled’.'°* Without establishing a formal method by which artillery could liaise with infantry, this was no solution at all. The bayonet charge as the climax of the assault was outlined in Infantry Training, 1905 and held all the way through to Infantry Training, 1914, with its proponents

emphasizing its modern utility by referring to its use by the Japanese against entrenched Russians.'® Resolute forward movement with the bayonet was believed

to be the final psychological turning point of a battle in which the will of the attacker would fatally demoralize that of the defenders. The simplicity of this concept was a major reason for offering it as a panacea to complicated tactical ques-

tions and conundrums. Kiggell certainly used it to counter the highly technical arguments of McMahon during the 1910 Staff conference.’ Responding to a similar point made by Brigadier General C. J. Mackenzie, McMahon insisted that he was not calling for the abolition of the bayonet, only that it was no longer deci-

sive in itself because it did not force the passage to the enemy position. He thus revealed an equal understanding of the need to be at least prepared for shock action.'®” Reinforcing the moral of the bayonet as the ultimate suppressant of firepower did nothing to improve infantry performance in exercises and manoeuvres.

This was partly because the line infantry revealed a healthy respect for modern weapons, but probably more because of the basic fault lines running through the (mis)understandings of the entire tactical concept. The lack of consistency can be detected in the reports: the director of the 1909 manoeuvres recorded his general satisfaction at the way the final stages of the attack were delivered, but the Inspector General was critical of precisely the same element.'® A similar problem occurred

‘62 See, for example, Major H. S. Jeudwine, “The means to ensure co-operation in action between the Artillery and Infantry of the Field Army. How are these means best organised and maintained?’, Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, 1908-1909, pp. 153-70. ‘63 Dawnay, ‘Artillery and Infantry in the Final Stages of the Attack’, p. 53. '4 Field Service Regulations, 1909, Part I (with 1912 amendments) (HMSO: London, 1912), p. 138.

‘© Infantry Training, 1905, pp. 84-90, p. 137; Infantry Training, 1914, pp. 134, 160, 178; Major General E. A. Altham, The Principles of War Historically Illustrated (Macmillan: London, 1914) p. 205. '°6 “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1910’, p. 28. ‘67 McMahon, Fire Fighting, pp. 15, 17. '68 "TNA WO 33/3009 ‘Report on Army Manoeuvres, 1909’, p. 53; TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1909, p. 20.

Training and Doctrine 95 in 1912. Lieutenant General Sir B. M. Hamilton, chief umpire of Red Force, reported there was no question of a prolonged firefight, ‘and the prevailing idea seems to be to reach close quarters regardless of possibility. However, it is difficult to tell whether Hamilton was judging this a good or bad thing from these comments. Smith-Dorrien, Blue Force chief umpire, felt too little attention was given to the possibility of a prolonged firefight perhaps lasting for hours before a decisive attack could be mounted.'©’ On this issue, the fulcrum of the assault, the lack of cohesive tactical theory can be discerned most clearly. In the search for strategic and tactical flexibility, the

British army created an intellectual fog leading to uncertainty at every level. The problem started at the most basic stage, as there was no satisfactory guiding principle. “The fundamental principles of war are neither very numerous nor in themselves very abstruse,’ said the Field Service Regulations, Part I, 1909, the codi-

fication of British practice largely written by Haig while Director of Staff Duties, but the Regulations then failed to define those principles.'”° On the surface, virtue

could be distilled from this lack of grip. /nfantry Training, 1905 stressed the difficulty of providing hard and fast rules to battles, which made it impossible to dictate precise training regulations: It is therefore strictly forbidden either to formulate or to practise a normal form of either attack or defence. To the training of the troops in movements before the enemy, general principles and broad rules alone are applicable; and the practical knowledge

of these principles and rules can only be instilled by intelligent instruction and constantly diversified exercises on broken ground."!

A similar point was made nearly ten years later in the 1914 Infantry Training manual: In no two military operations is the situation exactly similar... It is impossible, therefore, as well as highly undesirable, to lay down a fixed and unvarying system of battle formations. General principles and broad rules alone are applicable to the tactical handling of

troops in war.'”

In adopting this structure without providing a basic training framework rigorously and uniformly enforced, the British army actually created something akin

to a tactical vacuum which undermined the strengths in its approach. It was therefore a significant irony that some concepts should have been made rigid and precise. By 1914 most of the higher commanders of the British army subscribed to what Travers has called the ‘structured battle’ as laid down in Field Service Regulations. Three simple, and it was implied almost inevitable, phases dominated the structured battle: the preparation of the decisive attack, the decisive attack,

'©9 "TNA WO 279/47 ‘Report on Army Manoeuvres, 1912’, pp. 127, 134. '° Field Service Regulations, Part [, 1909 (with 1912 amendments) p. 13. All page references are from the 1912 edition, which is only very slightly different from the original; see also Spiers, “Reforming the Infantry’, p. 92. '7 Infantry Training, 1905, p. 123. '? Infantry Training, 1914, p. 120.

96 The Edwardian Army followed by the exploitation.'” Establishing such a structure was not in itself a problem; the difficulty arose in the tactical uncertainties underpinning the construction of battle. In turn, a system built upon loose principles was both consciously and unconsciously dependent on the sheer personality of leaders at all levels. Character in the Victorian—Edwardian sense of moral dependability and forcefulness was a crucial factor in military training. The 1913 Training and Manoeuvre Regulations stated that: Officers and non-commissioned officers must bear in mind throughout all their instruction that one of the most important objects of individual training is to foster a spirit of self reliance in the soldier, to increase his esprit de corps and his patriotism, and to develop as highly as possible the mental, moral and physical qualities in each individual. They should study the individual character of each man in their sub-unit and adapt their teaching to his character and intellect.'”

Motivation and self-reliance were the principles on which battle plans depended.

Developing these characteristics was a way of keeping command simple and uncomplicated. Commanders at all levels were told to exercise a loose rein in order

to allow initiative to flourish, and guard against the much feared ‘stereotypical’ assault. Some wisdom can be seen in this system. Battalion commanders were told that in modern battle personal intervention was unlikely to be practical or successful once an action commenced. Instead a commander should attempt to give clear, simple orders and then trust his subordinates to carry them through.'” This otherwise sensible concept was undermined significantly by the lack of firm training and tactical regulation that gave young subalterns in particular almost nothing solid on

which to build their own approach. This fault line led to a distinctly dangerous understanding of planning. The Memorandum on Army Training, 1910 stated that ‘success depends not so much on the inherent soundness of a principle or plan of operations as on the method of application of the principle and the resolution with which the plan is carried out’; it was advice Haig repeated while in command at Aldershot.'”° An empiricist approach such as this was very much in line with the British intellectual mentality, but it contained the potential for disaster, especially when combined with the insistence on morale and psychological factors in war. ‘Success in war depends more on moral than on physical qualities,’ stated Field Service Regulations, 1909, continuing: “[S]kill cannot compensate for want of courage, energy and determination.’'”” Resolution was expected from every commander and all ranks were to be imbued with a spirit ‘to conquer at any cost’.'”* Taking into account the ever-increasing power of modern weapons, the stress on morale was not

'3 Field Service Regulations, pp. 128-9, 133, 137; Travers, The Killing Ground, pp. 86-7. '4 Training and Manoeuvre Regulations, 1913, p. 65. '° Infantry Training, 1914, p. 139.

'° Quoted in Spiers, “Reforming the Infantry’, p. 92; TNA WO 279/53 ‘Aldershot Command, Comments on the Training Season, 1913’, p. 3. 7 Field Service Regulations, Part I, 1909, p. 13. '8 Field Service Regulations, Part I, 1909, p. 126.

Training and Doctrine 97 necessarily disastrous. Battles were increasing in length and firepower was making them even more strenuous on participants; the determination to build up morale was therefore by no means a problem in itself. The weakness became apparent when it was used as the panacea for a tactical and command system found wanting. An

intellectual impasse in the system can be detected in the 1914 Infantry Training manual, which was an attempt to fuse together the various strands on the crucial issue of the decisive infantry assault. Fearing an atrophying diminution in the tempo of assaults, thus undermining the chances of decision, front-line commanders were

told to avoid the temptation to sap forward and creeping man-by-man advances. Instead: The object of infantry in attack is... to get to close quarters as quickly as possible [original emphasis]... The action of infantry in attack must therefore be considered as a constant pressing forward to close with the enemy... [and] movement forward will be chiefly determined by the resolution and determination of the various leaders in

the front line [original emphasis]. It must therefore be the principal aim of every leader in the front line to get his command forward.'””

Forward movement was essential for victory in any battle; forward movement regardless of loss might be regarded as a more problematic concept, but the most important weakness was the insistence on forward movement based on an incomplete and misunderstood guiding tactical framework. All of these tactical concerns were discussed at the time, which is evidence of the army's application to the conditions of modern battle; as ever, the difficulty lay in

the mechanism for address and modification. The Inspector General’s report of 1907 referred to the extreme diversity of approaches in the various command districts, and came to the conclusion that the manuals were basically sound, but the system lacked sufficient rigour to impose uniformity. He did, however, allow for the important proviso, ‘[in certain] cases some authoritative pronouncement from the Chief of the General Staff is needed’.'®° As has been noted, decisive direc-

tion from the Chief of the General Staff was an extreme rarity.'*' A similar complaint was made at the 1911 Staff conference by Captain C. A. L. Yate, an observer of the Russo-Japanese War and General Staff Officer. Having just completed a tour of regimental duty, he noted the great need for a manual on applied tactics, believing it would be an invaluable help in the day-to-day training of battalions. Revealing a disturbing lack of grip among battalion officers, he added that most achieved success in promotion examinations not through genuine understanding of tactical

matters but by a crammer. The idea gained some support most noticeably from Brigadier General R. C. B. Haking of Southern Command. However, several other

high-ranking officers, including Robertson, were against it for fear that it might

'? Infantry Training, 1914, pp. 134-6. '89 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1907, pp. 79-80. '8! Brian Bond has claimed the real issue was not so much the General Staff system as the ineffectual chiefs. Given the degree of interesting and valuable debate most firepower matters provoked in the army, this may have been the real issue. Bond, The Victorian Army, p. 239.

98 The Edwardian Army create stereotyped or inapplicable principles. Although the conference admitted that the ‘want of such work is much felt by officers’, the ultimate decision was not to commission an applied tactics manual.'** Here the supposed need for tactical flexibility given Britain’s worldwide responsibilities was used to squash the argument for greater tactical training and advice, despite the obvious shift towards a continental commitment in British strategy. The firepower issues that caused so much discussion in the artillery and infantry were equally applicable to the cavalry. The South African War had provoked much unfavourable comment about the cavalry, with some seeing its redundancy under modern conditions. Lord Roberts, who had restored British prestige after the early defeats and led the way to the capitals of the Boer republics, certainly felt the cavalry had performed poorly and was not as useful as mounted infantry. Experiences

in South Africa therefore sharpened still further the debate over the efficacy of shock action against the use of the horse purely for the rapid delivery of firepower. Drawing a conclusive thesis on cavalry and the utility of the arme blanche from South Africa was, however, extremely difficult, as no one experience proved definitive.'8? No further refinement was possible in the light of the Russo-Japanese War; as with both the infantry and artillery, the conflict allowed multiple readings and

interpretations according to preconceived concepts.'** With nothing definitely proved either way by recent military experiences, the way was open for an ongoing debate. In these circumstances it was important for a consistent cavalry doctrine to impose itself on the entire force. In the immediate aftermath of the South African War, the first task for the battered cavalry was to restore its image and prestige. Of great concern was the extent to which the costs of service in a cavalry regiment were both deterring good-quality potential officers and ensuring a negative public perception of the force as nothing

more than an upper-class social club.'* In 1905 the Inspector General noted the pressing need to dispel the idea that a cavalry officer required a private income of at least £5,000 per year to feel comfortable in a regiment.'*® Such perceptions added to the recruitment problems of the cavalry, and as had been noted, successive Inspectors General recorded their concerns at manpower (and horse) shortages.'*” It took some time for self-confidence to return, but when it did, the focus remained

very much on a certain section of society and the intrinsic qualities such men brought to the cavalry arm. For Haig the all-important ‘cavalry spirit’, a hugely important but ill-defined concept implying initiative and dash, had its heart in the field pursuits of the British gentry and upper classes: ‘I attribute great importance to young officers being encouraged to hunt and play polo, and would urge they

'8? “Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers, 1911’, pp. 5—9, 28. '83 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, pp. 129-30; Edward M. Spiers, “The British Cavalry, 1902-1914’, Journal for the Society of Army Historical Research, Vol. LVI, No. 230, Summer 1979, pp. 71-9, pp. 76-7. '84 Neilson, “That Dangerous and Difficult Enterprise”’, pp. 23-4; Badsey, Doctrine and Reform,

PP “Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, pp. 158-60. '86 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1905, p. 61. '87 See TNA WO 27/508 IG Reports for 1904, p. 20; 1905, p. 8; 1906, p. 7; 1907, p. 21; 1911, p. 5.

Training and Doctrine 99 should be helped to do so in every possible way. These pursuits have a very real value as training for war.’'®®

A significant step towards combining the supposedly inherent qualities for cavalry work found in fox-hunting men with the actual practice of their duties was the establishment of the Netheravon Cavalry School in 1904. Somewhat ironically, given the insistence on getting men used to life in the field, the South African War had revealed a shocking level of riding and horse-care skills across both cavalry and mounted infantry. An important part of the school’s work was the teaching of two key subjects, horsemanship and horsemastership.'® A year later the Cavalry Journal was launched, providing a focus for intellectual development and discussion within the arm.'”° The real basis of cavalry officers’ education was, however, the training regime outlined in the various cavalry manuals. In this respect cavalrymen perhaps suffered more than any other arm as their doctrinal manuals swung most violently between polemical positions which complicated the chances of ensuring a consistent and uniform approach. In the immediate aftermath of the South African War, those who wanted to see radical changes to the cavalry were in the ascendancy. Roberts as Commander-inChief pushed hard his attempt to transform the cavalry into something more like mounted infantry. He banned the use of the lance and categorically downgraded the role of shock in favour of firepower. The culmination of his views was the controversial Cavalry Training, 1904, which stated ‘that instead of the firearm being the adjunct to the sword, the sword must henceforth be an adjunct to the rifle; and that cavalry soldiers must become expert rifle shots and be constantly trained to act

dismounted’.'?! Whether Roberts ever intended to go much further and make a fundamental alteration to the cavalry’s role by insisting on a complete conversion

to mounted infantry is, however, debatable, as he did not attempt to remove the sword and even allowed the lance to remain for ceremonial duties, ‘recreational purposes’, and in India.'°* Having insisted on greater and more proficient firepower from the cavalry, it was necessary to determine its precise role alongside that

of mounted infantry. Achieving doctrinal consistency on these matters was made unlikely due to the atmosphere of distrust that Roberts’s provocative statements had created in the cavalry. Even had Roberts managed to impose his orthodoxy, his authority was too short-lived for it to prove enduring. As soon as he was safely retired, a revisionist atmosphere set in. The advent of Haldane as Secretary of State

for War brought French and Haig into the ascendant, and the two cavalrymen worked to restore the wounded pride of their arm and validate its insistence on shock action. Although neither man denied the absolute importance of dismounted action and firepower, the revised training manual, Cavalry Training, 1907 served as a further source of contention, as doubters of the cavalry accused it of reactionary '88 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1909, p. 43. '9 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1904, p. 22; Thomas Pakenham, 7he Boer War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979) pp. 327-8; Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, p. 189. '° “TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1905, p. 8; Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, p. 190. "! Cavalry Training, 1904 (London: HMSO, 1904) p. v. '? See Spiers, “The British Cavalry’, p. 74; TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1906, p. 16.

100 The Edwardian Army thinking. Haig, the author of the manual, certainly emphasized the continuing importance of shock: It must be accepted as a principle that the rifle, effective as it is, cannot replace the effect produced by the speed of the horse, the magnetism of the charge, and the terror of cold steel. For when opportunities for mounted action occur, these characteristics combine to produce dash, enthusiasm and moral ascendancy [so] that cavalry is rendered irresistible.'”°

It was possible for the cavalry lobby to retain the insistence on shock action by reference to potential European conflict. In 1906 the Inspector General’s report

drew attention to the fact that as long as European nations retained cavalry trained for shock action, the British would find themselves at a disadvantage if they could not match it. But given this reasoning, surprisingly little thought was

applied to the question of cavalry in close country other than to state its difficulties. !4

The tendency to overstate the value of shock in Cavalry Training, 1907 can be seen as a deliberate psychological ploy designed to restore cavalry morale. Intelligent cavalrymen certainly saw the obverse of the manual, which was to stress the need for expert dismounted action. Further refinement came in the Field Service Regulations, 1909, in which the roles of mounted infantry were finally delineated from that of cavalry.'®? A doctrinal consensus over the mixed economy of cavalry action utilizing firepower and shock can therefore be said to have emerged by the period 1908—9.!"° It was underlined by a new manual, Cavalry Training, 1912,

which attempted to pick a middle way and provide more in the way of practical advice, something sorely needed by most regimental officers.'”” However, as with the artillery and infantry, the difficulty lay in ensuring conformity and understand-

ing at the regimental level, especially when doctrine had swung so violently. Circumstances were made more difficult by the minimal role of cavalry studies at the Staff College, and the incomplete understanding shown by umpires in training manoeuvres.'”® Central direction of the cavalry was consistently weakened by these

problems, and it became obvious in exercises and manoeuvres. The Cavalry Division had no permanent staff, and so it was usually cobbled together for large-

scale training. Unsurprisingly, performance was sometimes erratic under these conditions. In 1908 the poor intercommunication between the division and the brigades was noted, but there was an uneasy tension between the need to control

cavalry and acknowledgement of its supposed initiative, dash, and spirit.'”’ This inconsistency was summed up in the report on the 1909 manoeuvres. A special

'3 Cavalry Training, 1907 (London: HMSO, 1907) p. 187. 4 TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1906, p. 16; Report for 1909, pp. 7-8. ' Field Service Regulations, Part I, 1909, p. 15. '°6 For further details on this argument see Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, pp. 213-17. ‘7 For further details on the 1912 manual see Spiers, “The British Cavalry’, p. 78; Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, pp. 228-30. '98 See Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, pp. 199-200, 206.

99 TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1908, p. 51.

Training and Doctrine 101 form of command for the cavalry was advised, which was the distilled essence of the army’s entire vision: Definite plans of action can seldom, if ever, be laid down beforehand, and combination can best be ensured by a clear understanding of what is essential and what is not. At the same time a general outline of the methods on which the cavalry is to work

should be formed in the mind of the commander and explained to subordinate commanders.*”

Thus, a hazy connection between direction and interpretation was sketched out, with an equally indistinct guide as to the methods by which it could be achieved.

Command difficulties were regularly highlighted by this ill-defined system. Inspection of the 2 and 4 Cavalry Brigade exercises in 1912 brought to light ‘a

distinct failure in the machinery of command’.”' A year later the 1 Cavalry Brigade was reprimanded for its ‘want of system’, particularly in training matters, leaving its units unable to follow instructions efficiently. The subsequent exercise saw the brigade move ‘disjointedly and without definite objectives, and the action resolved itself into a series of disconnected combats’. The report concluded on a

sympathetic note, stating that a new Brigadier General had only just been appointed and was therefore feeling his way into the job. However, the fact that he had inherited such a weak system reveals an incomplete grip on the part of his staff and units.”°* Remedying these problems was made much harder by the sheer lack of large-scale training for the cavalry: full manoeuvres for the arm were held

only twice, in 1910 and 1912. This inability to improve cavalry staff work, cohesion, and direction was felt most strongly in 1914 when the division imploded under the strain of war.?™ Ensuring tactical proficiency in the cavalry’s duties was a challenge without a

command mechanism and in an atmosphere of competing doctrinal emphases. The increasingly important issue of reconnaissance work was inconsistently carried out, resulting in negative comments by the Inspector General in 1909 and 1912.°”

But the greatest diversity was seen in the use of firepower and shock weapons. Despite significant increases in the cavalry’s musketry, the arm’s tactical use of firepower was often found wanting.” French was particularly cautious as commander at Aldershot and Inspector General wishing to see the highest possible standards of

dismounted action from the cavalry. His sensitivity to the accusation of poor dismounted work may have led him to overstate any weaknesses and to disconnect

too sharply the firepower role from the shock element he also advocated. 2 "TNA WO 33/3009 ‘Report on Army Manoeuvres, 1909’, p. 52. °°! "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1912’, p. 97. 2 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1913, pp. 73-5.

° "TNA WO 33/3261 ‘Report on Army Manoeuvres, 1910’; WO 279/47 ‘Report on Army Manoeuvres, 1912’. 24 See Nikolas Gardner, “Command and Control in the “Great Retreat” of 1914: the disintegra-

tion of the British Cavalry Division’, Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, No. 1, January 1999, PP TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1909, p. 39; Report for 1912, p. 92. *06 See Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, pp. 230-1 for the cavalry’s improved musketry.

102 The Edwardian Army Attempting this fine balance occasionally made his reports contradictory. In 1908 he remarked that the men had dismounted too early, ‘were worked too much like infantry’, and were not sufficiently close to their led horses to ensure ‘the mobility which is the essential feature of the dismounted action of the cavalry’.’’’ A year later his criticisms swung the other way: horses were unnecessarily exposed to hostile fire, and the cavalry was reprimanded for not realizing fully ‘the enormous changes in modern firearms [which] have, to a large extent, modified, if not revolutionized, the methods to be adopted by the Cavalry’.”°* Douglas, French's succes-

sor in the post, believed matters were improving, but there were still weaknesses. His report for 1911 praised the cavalry for studying the principles of dismounted action more closely, but then condemned its fire control, covering fire, fire and movement, and advised that ‘the tactical use of the magazine rifle and machine gun yet require more attention.” Judgements such as these make it very difficult to determine whether the cavalry’s doctrinal position was accepted and understood across the board. Similar concerns can be detected in the use of shock weapons and tactics. The first problem was the lack of a suitable sword. Experiences in South Africa had revealed the pressing need for a new cavalry sword. Having accepted the need, there was little that could be done to improve training and performance until a new weapon was approved and widely distributed. The absence of a good-quality sword was noted in the Inspector General’s reports of 1906 and 1907, and it was not until 1908 that a suitable design was agreed and put into production.’'® Supply then proved slow and even as late as 1911 the Inspector General was complaining about a shortfall in supply to regiments.*"! The issue and use of the lance proved even more controversial. Roberts’s banishment of the lance in 1903 as an outmoded weapon was almost immediately circumvented by the cavalry, and the Army Council took a remarkably reticent stance over its gradual reintegration. In 1907 it was noted that the 1 Cavalry Brigade was once again openly using the lance in the field, and a ruling from the Army Council was requested. The response was far from clear: ‘Some drill with the lance is necessary to enable the men to carry the weapons properly on escort duty, at reviews and ceremonial parades. Army Order

39 of 1903 is under consideration.”*’? The Army Council therefore avoided an outright ban on its use while the order was under consideration but still in effect, and said nothing about its use in the field. In reality, the decision allowed lancer units to return to its use, and it was formally reintroduced to peacetime training in

1909.7? In 1911 the Inspector General recommended the appointment of an

°7 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1908, p. 52. 208 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1909, pp. 9, 39. Badsey sees a growing difference in interpretation between Haig and French over this issue. See Doctrine and Reform, p. 203.

2 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1911, pp. 10-11. 210 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1906, p. 16; IG Report for 1907, p. 16. “11 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1911, p. 5. 212 TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1907, p. 16.

23 TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1909, p. 6.

Training and Doctrine 103 instructor in the use of the lance at the Cavalry School despite the fact that the weapon was not regarded as wartime equipment until the following year.“ Having retained shock weapons, the cavalry needed to show it was proficient in their use. The new emphasis on firepower caused some to wonder whether the arm had lost its ability to charge effectively. French commented upon the lack of practice in rapid assembly and manoeuvre ‘by which Cavalry attains its superiority’.””” A lack of discipline in shock tactics became apparent due to weaknesses in the training system. Enthusiastic cavalry units were criticized for charging too soon and waving their swords in the air rather than fixing them in the ‘engage’ positions in the 1911 exercises.*!° A year later the deployment for shock action was subjected

to negative comment, as was the ‘distinct tendency to use shock action on all and every occasion, sometimes in cases in which it was obviously unsuitable’.*'” This evidence implies that the re-establishment of the value of shock was not accompanied by a new understanding of its applicability or disciplined delivery. In this atmosphere the cavalry moved back to devoting the majority of its training time to shock action.*'® By 1910 the cavalry spent 80 per cent of its time on shock tactics, 10 per cent on fire tactics, and 10 per cent on reconnaissance.”"? In contrast, Colonel H. de B. De Lisle, an expert on mounted infantry tactics and infantrymen but who had converted to the cavalry, believed that reconnaissance should take up 40 per cent of the cavalry’s time, 30 per cent should be allocated to shock tactics, and 30 per cent to fire tactics.””? Ensuring acquiescence in a useful training regime combining the weapons and roles of the cavalry was something various figures

attempted during this period, but the inability to impose a consistent doctrine throughout the arm undermined its intelligent thinking. The formal abandonment of Regular mounted infantry in 1912, which had for long been withering on the vine, removed an alternative to conventional cavalry. The move buttressed the cavalry’s self-perception as the only useful mounted arm without clarifying sufhciently its tactical framework.””!

214 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1911, p. 5. For further discussion of the lance see Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, pp. 210-11.

15 TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1909, p. 38. 216 "TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1911, pp. 10-11.

27 TNA WO 27/508 IG Report for 1912, pp. 92, 97. *18 ‘The reminiscences of Ernest George White and Percy Snelling, who enlisted in the cavalry c. 1906, both referred to the emphasis on the use of the sword in their initial training with the rifle being introduced to their schedule only after much practice with their shock weapons. The memoirs can be found in the Imperial War Museum sound archive, 188/7 (White) and 314/12 (Snelling). R. A. Lloyd gives a slightly different view in his autobiography. He states that rifle work played little role in initial training, but dismounted work with the rifle was the usual routine in manoeuvres. See R. A. Lloyd, Trooper in the Tins. Autobiography of a Lifeguardsman (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1938) pp. 21, 47. 219 Spiers, “The British Cavalry’, p. 79. °20 Spiers, “The British Cavalry’, p. 79. *21 J. P. Harris has argued that the cavalry theorists used ‘rather weak arguments’ to justify the emphasis on shock in particular, ‘and that the motive in putting them forward was excessive devotion to the arm of the service from which the author[s] came’. Douglas Haig and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 47.

104 The Edwardian Army Continual reference to the army’s worldwide role was a major hindrance to the

search for uniform doctrine and training. The need for flexibility allowed the army to avoid dealing with the obvious gap in its intellectual underpinning— the failure to define the principles of war; in addition, it provided cover for the decision not to devise directed tactical guidance expressed in the obsession with so-called stereotyped tactics. As British policy moved towards a more formal military alignment with France, this reluctance to provide clear instruction and ensure its dissemination and adherence in practice was a major omission. A 1911 article in the Edinburgh Review, later reprinted in the journal of the Royal United Services

Institution, perceptively picked up on this point. A number of military manuals were examined and it was noted that while the Germans and French had their own internally logical, but different, concepts of war which imbued their entire military culture, the British had a vacuum. To a certain extent the conclusion let the army,

and the General Staff in particular, off the hook by claiming that governmental direction was needed to give the army a firm steer. Once this was forthcoming, it was argued, the General Staff could impose a cohesive doctrine and decide whether to adopt a form of the French or German approaches.*”” However, these unfavourable comparisons probably overstated the clarity of vision, efficiency, and effectiveness of the French and German armies. Neither had a notably greater grip on the nature of future operations and neither had made preparations for a long war. The French and Germans had equal problems defining the roles of cavalry and artillery, and infantry training was still based on the idea of mass assaults regardless of conditions. Although the Germans had an advantage in terms of heavy artillery, their field artillery was still the dominant force and it firmly believed in direct supporting fire. As the opening clashes of the Great War revealed, the great continental armies were by no means better prepared for modern combat.” Among those who foresaw the likelihood of British involvement in continental war there was the hope that the army could make up for its lack of numbers, heavy artillery, and reserves of men, ammunition, and supplies through its mobility and disciplined firepower.?” It was a hope which sat uncomfortably with the shrewd estimations of greatly increased firepower. However, no one can accuse the British army of failing to address the problems caused by modern firepower. The degree of thought and debate is obvious in the impressive list of reports, articles, lectures, and discussions produced across the period. They should also be protected from

°22 “The British Army and Modern Conceptions of Wat’, Royal United Service Institution Journal, Vol. 55, Part 2, July-December 1911, pp. 1181-204. 3 For the preparations of the French and German armies in the decade before 1914 see Eric Dorn Brose, The Kaisers Army. The politics of military technology in Germany during the machine age, 1870-

1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) pp. 69-111, 138-82; Bruce Gudmundsson, On Artillery (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993) pp. 17-42; Douglas Porch, The March to the Marne. The French Army 1871-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) pp. 213-31; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: military decision making and the disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell Univer-

sity Press, 1984) pp. 41-156. 4 "The BEF’s ratio of field to heavier pieces was 1:20, whereas it was 1:2.3 in the French army. Neilson, “That Dangerous and Difficult Enterprise”’, p. 27.

Training and Doctrine 105 ahistorical accusations of not reading the future correctly. Hindsight has been used in popular histories far too often to caricature British officers as blimps unable to determine the patently obvious about modern warfare in the light of technological developments. ‘The lessons of contemporary warfare were not conclusive and could be read in many different ways, and many of the most acute criticisms were made by men of relatively low rank who were allowed to express their ideas freely, but

had no power to follow them through. Where blame can be attributed is not so much in choosing the wrong system as in not really adopting a system at all. Far too often issues were left hanging, and despite many fine-sounding comments in training manuals, clarity, purpose, and uniformity were missing. No one took a grip on the entire army and imposed a rigorous system on it, whether ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. The British army had enormous potential given its small size, but it took

the immensely shocking experiences of 1914 for it to begin a slow process of channelling it in the right direction.*”° 25, See also Strachan, “Continental Commitment’, p. 94.

The Auxiliary Forces The auxiliary forces of the Edwardian army have certainly not been neglected by

historians. For example, Ian Beckett and Hugh Cunningham have provided detailed overviews of the Rifle Volunteer movement and a number of important works have been published concerning the Haldane reforms of 1906-8.’ However,

such works tend to emphasize the lack of scholarly attention devoted to other aspects of the forces, especially the militia, post-1908 Special Reserve, yeomanry and Officer Training Corps (OTC).’

Consideration of the auxiliary forces creates some serious problems for the historian. There has been a tendency to view the force from the perspective of Whitehall or the County Territorial Associations, and redressing this top-down approach is not always easy given the patchy nature of surviving records and regimental histories. Linked to this is the sheer variety of units to be considered. While many units were created afresh by the Haldane reforms—the OTCs and the newly

established Army Service Corps companies being interesting examples—other units could trace their histories back through centuries. The Honourable Artillery

Company could claim its foundation in the reign of Henry VHI and county militias had reasonably authentic claims to an existence going back to Elizabethan

times. The Rifle Volunteer movement and, post 1908, Territorial Force had a number of ‘class corps’, where men were expected to pay membership fees and annual subscriptions. The 5 Scottish Rifles alone could claim that Lord Kelvin, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Andrew Bonar Law, Sir John Reith, and Lord Fleming had all served in their ranks.° This variety of units, not surprisingly, throws

up inconsistencies in the nature of records kept and regimental histories written.

' 1. EW. Beckett, Rifleman Form: A study of the Rifle Volunteer Movement 1859-1908 (Ogilby Trust, Aldershot, 1982), Hugh Cunningham, The Volunteer Force: A Social and Political History 1859-1908 (Archon Books, Hamden, 1975), John Gooch, “Mr Haldane’s Army’ in John Gooch (ed.), The Prospect

of War (Frank Cass, London, 1981), John Gooch, “Haldane and the “National Army” in I. E W. Beckett and John Gooch (eds), Politicians and Defence: Studies in the formulation of British defence

policy 1845-1970 (Manchester University Press, 1981), Michael Howard, ‘Lord Haldane and the Territorial Army’ in Michael Howard (ed.), Studies in War and Peace (Temple Smith, London, 1970), A. J. A. Morris, “Haldane’s Army Reforms, 1906-1908: The Deception of the Radicals’, History, 56, 181, 1971 and E. M. Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer (Edinburgh University Press, 1980). * ‘This neglect will be partly remedied by the completion of G. M. Hay, “The British Yeomanry Cavalry, 1794-1920’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Kent, 2011. > Regimental Publications Committee, The Fifth Battalion, The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) 1914-1919 (Jackson and Son, Glasgow, 1936), pp. XV—XVII and Fifth Battalion, Scottish Rifles Gazette, I, 1, January 1909, p. 31.

The Auxiliary Forces 107 The Honourable Artillery Company, with a permanent headquarters and dedicated archivists, has maintained excellent records. The Northern Cyclist Battalion, formed in 1908 and disbanded in 1919, appears to have left no records. ‘Thus the danger for the historian is that too much attention is paid to the ‘class corps’ who preserved records and commissioned histories and that the more numerous plebeian units are entirely neglected. Trying to assess the efficiency and probable effectiveness of the auxiliary forces

is difficult given the failure to decide what threat they were actually destined to counter pre 1914 and how they were treated during the Great War. At the local level, auxiliary units contented themselves with small-scale exercises, largely due

to the size of the forces available and the experience of the men involved rather than out of concern that this was a miltary scenario they were likely to face. At the higher level, no more considered options had been agreed upon. The Royal Navy felt that a raid involving up to 70,000 enemy troops was just about possible, given freak weather conditions. By contrast the National Service League warned of a possible invasion by 500,000 men. Haldane justified the establishment of the new Territorial Force as a reserve for overseas service but the size of the new force was

related to the maximum numbers which it was thought could be raised, rather than tied to any particular strategic appreciation. Rightly or wrongly, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener did not see the Territorial Force as the basis for the expansion of the British army in the war, instead favouring his New Armies. Allied to this was the tendency to dispatch particularly effective Territorial Force units to

reinforce the heavily pressurized British Expeditionary Force in France in late 1914 and early 1915, thus breaking up the carefully planned system of brigades and divisions created in 1908. Therefore, while many Territorial Force units did ultimately serve overseas during the Great War, their performance was not noticeably better than that of the New Armies. Whether this was due to the Territorial Force being an inefficient force in the Edwardian period or due to the New Armies

receiving more than their fair share of trained instructors and equipment over their rival TF units is a discussion outside the scope of this work, although it is worth emphasizing that a force with no overseas service requirement was of little use in meeting Britain’s military needs as understood in August 1914. The Special Reserve was also ill used during the Great War, acting as a general draft-finding force, with the guarantees made to militia colonels about regimental integrity in 1907 and 1908 simply set aside.‘ Ian Beckett has considered the auxiliary forces within the context of a British ‘amateur military tradition and it is fair to say that a number of competing traditions

* 1. E W. Beckett, “The Territorial Force’ in I. E W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (eds), A nation in arms: A social study of the British army in the First World War (Manchester University Press, 1985), Peter Dennis, The Teritorial Army 1907-1940 (Royal Historical Society and The Boydell Press, Woodbridge,

1987), pp. 30-2, K. W. Mitchinson, Defending Albion: Britains Home Army, 1908-1919 (Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 1-51, Peter Simkins, Kitchener’s Army: The raising of the new armies, 1914-16 (Manchester University Press, 1988), pp. 38-46, Spiers, Haldane, pp. 92-115 and PRONI, D.618/174, “Miscellaneous papers re. 4th Leinsters’, “Statement regarding the 4th Battalion Leinster Regiment as typical of that of the other Irish Extra Reserve Battalions.’ 27/7/15.

108 The Edwardian Army can be distinguished between 1902 and1914, with an attempt made to recast the amateur military tradition as a whole by R. B. Haldane between 1906 and 1908 and, more drastically, by Field Marshal Lord Roberts and his National Service League from 1906 to 1914. ‘The first and oldest tradition to identify is that of the militia. As the old ‘constitutional force’, the militia could claim a lineage back to the Anglo-Saxon fyrd. However, for all practical purposes the militia units of 1902 could claim an unbroken history back only to 1852 in Great Britain and 1854 in Ireland. Most militia units relied on rural recruitment, and men joined them for an initial period of three months followed by annual camps of four weeks. During the South African War most militia units had been embodied and many served overseas. Nevertheless, after 1902, as had been its fate during the Victorian period, the militia was to remain little more than a feeder to the regular army. The militia became a political issue in the Edwardian period. H. O. ArnoldForster, who had decided views on army reform when he was appointed Secretary of State for War, ran up against a sizeable traditionalist lobby when he tried

to reform the force between 1903 and 1905. Arnold-Forster believed that the quality of the militia was very variable: the best units deserving of what was, effectively, regular status and the worst units worthy only of disbandment. R. B. Haldane, who had simply wanted to incorporate the militia into the new Territo-

rial Force, ran up against a similar lobby. Haldane’s compromise, one of the many which was to make his reforms rather less of a watershed than some historians have allowed, was to incorporate the militia into the Special Reserve formed

in 1908. The Special Reserve, unlike the militia, did have an overseas service

commitment for its members and, in wartime, it was seen that the Special Reserve battalions would take on the twin roles of home defence and draft finding for regular units.

The yeomanry was a rather more disparate force than the militia and had a rather more mixed record in South Africa. On the outbreak of the South African War the decision was made by the War Office, and after some lobbying from existing

yeomanry regiments, to form Imperial Yeomanry units for service at the front. However, the relationship between existing yeomanry regiments, some of which could trace their continuous histories back to 1794, and the Imperial Yeomanry which served in South Africa was an inconsistent one. Many famous yeomanry regiments were, in fact, formed during or in the immediate aftermath of the South African War. Thus, in 1903, there was a noted variety of yeomanry units. Some fitted the stereotype of the ‘feudal force’ called out by a great landowner and formed

from his servants and tenants, who brought their own horses to camp; the newly raised Lovat’s Scouts and Scottish Horse seems to have fitted this description. Others were noted county ‘class’ units where members were from solid middleclass backgrounds, proposed and seconded for membership and paying an annual subscription. Others were metropolitan corps where members, while normally middle class in background, had little experience with horses and relied on riding schools organized by their regiments to teach them to ride and horses hired by their regiment to provide them with training during camp. The yeomanry was

probably the force most untouched by the reforms of the Edwardian period.

The Auxiliary Forces 109 Arnold-Forster merely cut the establishment of each regiment, while under the Haldane scheme, regiments were brigaded. The Rifle Volunteers could claim a tradition stretching back to 1859. However, the social composition of the force had changed considerably within a few years of its formation. While originally formed as an upper- and middle-class organization

in 1859, with members paying for their own uniforms and weapons, as early as 1863 the government had taken on much of the expense of the force and its membership was dominated by the skilled working class. ‘This was still the picture in the Edwardian period, though a number of ‘class corps’ still existed, mainly in London

but also in Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Liverpool.’ Like the militia and yeomanry, the Rifle Volunteers had no requirement to engage in overseas service in the event of war, though a large number of Rifle Volunteer companies had served overseas as

part of their parent regular battalions during the South African War. There was also an Irish amateur military tradition evident in the Edwardian

period. The militia, as established in 1854 in Ireland, was disproportionately strong, with Irish regiments each having two or three militia battalions. By contrast the Rifle Volunteer movement of 1859 had not transferred to Ireland. During the South African War, Imperial Yeomanry companies were formed afresh in Ireland, the yeomanry having been disbanded there in 1834. In 1902 the North

and South of Ireland Imperial Yeomanry Regiments were formed. When the Haldane reforms were introduced, this left Ireland as an anomaly as the Territorial Force was not formed on the island. Thus the yeomanry regiments were renamed as the North and South Irish Horse and incorporated into the Special Reserve. ‘The Irish militia was recast, as in Great Britain, into the Special Reserve as well, but

with a disproportionate number of Extra Special Reserve battalions. OTC units were formed at Trinity College Dublin, Queen’s University Belfast, Campbell College Belfast, and Cork Grammar School only.

Irish politics created particular problems for auxiliary forces in Ireland. In 1910 Lieutenant General Sir Neville Lyttleton was of the opinion that all Irish Special Reserve battalions should be used for the defence of Ireland in the event

of war, rather than being sent to Great Britain as his predecessors had recommended. Haldane backed Lyttleton’s assessment of the situation, so that on the outbreak of the First World War, Irish Special Reserve battalions were indeed mobilized for the defence of Irish ports.° During the third Home Rule crisis it was clear that a number of special reservists were involved in training members of the Irish Volunteers and the Ulster Volunteer Force. Indeed, it was believed

that in the event of Ulster Unionists declaring their own provisional government, the North Irish Horse would defect to the UVF en masse. Five battalion commanders in the Special Reserve were commanding UVF units and the > H. B. McCartney, Citizen Soldiers: The Liverpool Territorials in the First World War (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 9-22 and I. S. Wood, “Be Strong and of a Good Courage”: the Royal Scots Territorial Battalions from 1908 to Gallipoli in C. M. M. Macdonald and E. W. McFarland (eds), Scotland and the Great War (Tuckwell Press, East Linton, 1999).

° TNA, WO32/7081, “The allotment of Special Reserve Battns. to Ireland’, letter D. M. T. to CIGS, 27/10/09, memo by CIGS, 24/1/10 and comment by Haldane, 7/2/10.

110 The Edwardian Army Intelligence Section of Irish Command warned of the danger of arms and ammunition going astray during the annual training in 1914.” Nationalist sympathies were definitely evident in some Special Reserve units from Southern Ireland. The 3 Royal Dublin Fusiliers, while passing through Naas on their return from their annual training in July 1914, shouted, “We will have Home Rule at any cost’ and sang ‘A Nation Once Again’.®

The relationship between regular and auxiliary forces was a highly variable one, despite the supposedly uniform system brought in by the Cardwell—Childers

reforms of 1868-81 and the Haldane reforms themselves. The standard county regimental system, as established in 1881, meant that each regiment had two regular battalions, one militia battalion and one or more volunteer battalions. This system was meant to allow for an interchange of personnel and more profes-

sional guidance for the amateur units. However, in reality, the links could be tenuous. It was unusual for regular and amateur units to train together or, indeed, for the different elements of the auxiliary forces to train together. Many Rifle Volun-

teer units wore uniforms of rifle green or grey prior to the Haldane reforms, despite their supposed connection with their local county regiment, which wore

red tunics. Even after 1908 many TF battalions contrived to continue to wear green or grey. [his was certainly the case for the 4 and 5 Royal Scots, 5 Royal West Surrey Regiment, 5 and 6 The King’s (Liverpool) Regiment, and 6 East Surrey Regiment.” As David French has noted, there were a startling number of anomalies in the

British regimental system, as recast in 1881.'? One of the most notable was that some of the most professional units in the British army, the Guards, King’s Royal

Rifle Corps, and Rifle Brigade, had no Rifle Volunteer or Territorial battalions attached to them. Conversely, there were many ‘orphan’ Territorial units after 1908. The most notable was the 26-battalion-strong London Regiment. Four of its battalions were allied to the Royal Fusiliers but the rest had no formal links with regular units until the 1920s. This then meant that some of the most socially exclusive and best recruited elements of the Territorial Force had access to very limited professional guidance. As discussed below, special lobbying by the Honourable

Artillery Company and Inns of Court Regiment also left them outside a wider regimental framework. Whatever the arguments about precedence and lineage, one would have thought that a little more imagination could have brought some of these units together in a mutually beneficial arrangement.

7 TNA, WO141/4, ‘Situation in Ireland’, ‘Memo. on the situation in Ireland on the 31st March 1914 prepared in the Inteligence Section of the General Staff at Head Quarters, Irish Command’; see also Timothy Bowman, Carson’s Army: The Ulster Volunteer Force, 1910-22 (Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 57-60 and 94-7 on this issue. 8 Northern Whig, 20/7/14. > BL, 8825 cc.19, ‘15th County of London Battalion, The London Regiment (c. 1913) and Army Lists, 1902-1914. © David French, Military Identities: The Regimental system, the British army & the British people c. 1870-2000 (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 10-30.

The Auxiliary Forces 111 Many auxiliary units had a definite social side to their existence. This was most obvious in the ‘class corps’, like the 15 London Regiment (Civil Service Rifles) who had a well-equipped headquarters providing ‘all the amenities of a social club’ with regular dances, whist drives, and concerts, and the 5 Scottish Rifles, a socially exclu-

sive unit recruiting in Glasgow, which provided a golf club, rugby football club, whist club, and dramatic society for its members. The Northamptonshire Yeomanry’s annual sports day was a fixture for county society, as was the South Nottinghamshire

Hussars’ annual ball. Some less prestigious units also had a social calendar. For example, H Company of the 8 Durham Light Infantry held an annual ball and the 2 Volunteer Battalion (VB), Manchester Regiment held a “Grand Military Bazaar’ in April 1904, which included a Wagner evening, stalls, a miniature rifle competition, and a ‘negro sketch’, to fund a building programme." Less socially exclusive units also offered some recreational facilities. Members of the 3 VB Bedfordshire Regiment could make use of a club room in Bedford which provided a bagatelle board, skittle tables, and dartboards.'* However, the popularity of these social activ-

ities should not be overestimated. While the 1 Lanarkshire Rifles could claim a strength in excess of 1,000, its “Rank and File’ club had just 269 paid-up members in 1905 and the number was still shrinking in 1907, despite a yearly subscription of only 2s.6d.'° Many auxiliary regiments also had shooting competitions, which were as much social as military events and where men could win sizeable cash prizes. For example, the North of Ireland Imperial Yeomanry held an annual shooting competition with a prize of £5 for the best shot in the regiment.'* Promotion in the auxiliary forces, as in the regular army, was driven largely by

seniority within the regiment, and very few auxiliary officers advanced beyond the rank of lieutenant colonel. Indeed, in this period, non-regulars could not attend the Staff College and opportunities for other professional development were severely limited. By 1912, Yeomanry officers were expected, but not compelled, to attend short courses of between twelve and twenty-four days at the Cavalry School or Mounted Infantry School.” The post of commanding officer was a very time-consuming one and some officers refused promotion on the basis that they could not devote sufficient time to it. This was the case in the

' DRO, D/DLI 2/8/25, “Dance card for 7th Annual Ball of “H” Coy., 8th DLI’ and Tameside Record Office, MR3/17/113/3/6, ‘2nd V.B. The Manchester Regiment Grand Military Bazaar, St James’ Hall, April 12th to 16th 1904. Souvenir and History of the Battalion’.

' Luton and Bedfordshire Record Office, X550/6/38, “The Bedford Detachment. “A” & “B” Companies, General Orders for the year ending 31st October 1906’. 'S Tameside Record Office, MR3/17/113/3/6, ‘2nd V.B. The Manchester Regiment Grand Military Bazaar, St James’ Hall, April 12th to 16th 1904. Souvenir and History of the Battalion’, p. 109, The First

Lanark Rifles Gazette, 11, 7, December 1902, p. 67, II, 8, December 1903, pp. 62-4, II, 1, January 1905, pp. 53-4 and UI, 3, January 1907, p. 183, BL, 8825 cc.19, “15th County of London Battalion, The London Regiment’ (c. 1913) and NRO, NY2/3, newspaper cutting concerning annual sports days of 1909 and 1912, George Fellows and B. E M. Freeman, Historical Records of the South Nottinghamshire Hussars Yeomanry, 1794 to 1924 (Gale & Polden, Aldershot, 1928), p. 194-201 and Northamptonshire Record Office, NY2/3, Northamptonshire Yeomanry, newspaper cuttings, 1902-14. ‘4 Standing Orders of the North of Ireland Imperial Yeomanry, January, 1906, p. 14 and The Mid-Ulster Mail, 417/08. Dorset History Centre, D/DOY/A/1/1/14, Dorset Yeomanry regimental orders, 8/1/12.

112 The Edwardian Army 7 Middlesex Regiment in 1907 when Colonel F. G. Collinson retired. The next two senior officers in the battalion refused to accept promotion, with the result that the senior captain was promoted to lieutenant colonel at the comparatively very young age of 30."° The militia was considerably disrupted by its experiences of the South African War and it took some time to return to its normal recruiting and training patterns. Lieutenant Colonel Sir A. A. Weedon of the 4 Leinster Regiment, noted: On the carrying out of Lord Haldane’s Scheme for the reorganization of the Army in 1908, [these] old County Militia Battalions were invited to transfer to the Special Reserve. Great difficulty was experienced by Officers Commanding in persuading both Officers and men to re-engage under the new conditions. The experience the Militia Reserve had during the South African War, when men were posted to Battalions with which they had no connection, and in which they had no friends... made them very distrustful, and they were unwilling to undergo probably similar treatment in the future.!”

In 1903 many militia battalions were excused training due to their recent return from South Africa, which meant that only their new recruits had to attend camp. This then saw a number of confused ad hoc amalgamations for training purposes.'®

It is noticeable that while the militia and later Special Reserve acted as draftfinding units for the regulars, the relationship between amateur and regular units within a regiment was not close. For example, of thirty-one men of the 3 Durham Light Infantry who transferred into the regulars between January and March 1903 only eleven went to the regular battalions of the Durham Light Infantry.’” The editors of the journal of the 5 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers felt that the territorialization scheme of 1881 was being forgotten by the War Office, noting: It is a curious fact that while everything has been done to foster local interest in the case of the Line, since the introduction of the territorial system, everything has been done to decry and lessen the connection between the Militia and the counties to which it belongs, the old county titles have been lost, battalions are sent to counties other than their own for training, recruits are sent for drill to depots miles from their homes.”°

Militia training was problematic as there was tension over where annual camps should be held and their duration. While from a training point of view, large camps with good facilities and the chance to train as part of a brigade were to be favoured,

'6 E. J. King, The History of the 7th Battalion Middlesex Regiment (Harrison, London, 1927), m 7 PRON, D.618/174, ‘Miscellaneous papers re. 4th Leinsters’, “Statement regarding the 4th Battalion Leinster Regiment as typical of that of the other Irish Extra Reserve Battalions.’ 27/7/15. '8 Staffordshire Regimental Museum, “Digest of service 3rd North Staffordshire Regiment 1853—

] *, p. 47.

*e BRO. D/DLI 2/4/7 ‘Order book for 3/DLI, 1902-03’. °° ‘The “Donegals” Own Journal: A monthly magazine for the 5th Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,

IV, 51, 1904, p.44.

The Auxiliary Forces 113 there was an argument that camping locally led to improved recruitment. Thus the

3 North Staffordshire Regiment camped at Whittington Heath near Lichfield in May 1904 and 1907 despite the ‘insufficient range accommodation’.”' Similarly the 4 Leinster Regiment mobilized local opinion to ensure that it continued to hold its annual camp at the Great Heath, Maryborough, when the military authorities had sought to send it to the Curragh Camp.” There were serious problems in securing officers for militia and Special Reserve

units in many areas. In 1907 the annual report on the 3 Durham Light Infantry found that ‘the Battalion is lamentably short of Subalterns’ and the 1912 annual report on the 4 North Staffordshire Regiment concluded that “The shortage of Officers alone prevents this being an effective Battalion.’’? Of course, many men became officers in the militia as a back door into the regular army and this meant that there was a rapid turnover of subalterns. In the Royal Monmouthshire Militia, for example, no less than nine officers transferred into regular regiments between

1902 and 1908.” Many militia and Special Reserve units were unable to secure their officer corps

from their local area. This was not surprising for those seeking a back door to a regular commission but even long-service militia officers often had tenuous connections with their regimental area. Colonel Bence Lambert of the 3 Connaught Rangers stated that he did not have trouble getting officers per se but that he had, ‘in a great many cases, to go almost into the bye-ways and hedges to get officers who are not local men...the supply of the local county officer is difficult to get now—that is the county gentleman’.” By 1914 the 4 Leinster Regiment, the old Queen’s County Militia, was well below its establishment of officers, and nextof-kin addresses suggest that of the eleven officers in the battalion in July 1914, four lived outside Queen’s County, in other parts of Ireland.*° Similarly the correspondence of Major FE. H. Crawford, with his Commanding Officer in the Donegal Artillery, suggests that this regiment was dependent on Belfast businessmen for a large percentage of its officers.”’ This must have led to some problems on mobilization, as many officers had to travel considerable distances to join their units, and demonstrates the degree to which auxiliary units were reliant on the regular officers, particularly their adjutants and quartermasters, for their day-to-day operation in peace and mobilization on the outbreak of war.

*! Staffordshire Regimental Museum, “Digest of service 3rd North Staffordshire Regiment 1853-1914’,

pp. 49 and 56.

* PRONI, D. 618/178, ‘Manuscript History of the 4th Leinster Regiment (Old Queen's Co. Militia)’, p. 45.

°° DRO, D/DLI/2/4/227, ‘Annual Report’, 28/9/07 and Staffordshire Regimental Museum, ‘Digest of service 4th North Staffordshire Regiment 1853-1914’, p. 10. *4 This figure is calculated from a roll of officers given in, B. E. Sargeaunt, The Royal Monmouthshire Militia: Being a detailed description of the Regiment from the year 1660 to the time of its transfer to the Special Reserve (RUSI, London, 1910), pp. 267-88. °° Militia and Volunteers Royal (Norfolk) Commission, Evidence, Vol. I., 1904, Cd. 2062, p. 163. *° PRONI, D.618/184, “Record of Special Reserve Officers service, 4th Leinster Regiment’.

i3/on D.1700/10/1, E H. Crawford out letter book, letters to Gore, 29/1/08, 22/2/08 and

114 The Edwardian Army There was, as with the regular officer corps, considerable snobbery over those deemed suitable for commissions in the militia and Special Reserve. One solution to the officer problem in the militia, mooted by the Norfolk Commission, was the promotion of regular warrant officers into the militia. This was rejected by Colonel Bence Lambert who stated, “I do not think the men would like it.’** Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Wallace showed not only concerns that his officers in the 5 Royal Irish Rifles would be gentlemen but that they would also be Protestants. Writing to his second in command, he noted of a potential officer, R. J. Adcock, ‘he digs with the right foot [i.e. was a Protestant] and is a very good

chap and is quite sound financially.” This sectarianism was also evident in Major E H. Crawford’s recommendation of a potential officer for the Donegal

RFA, as the first thing he noted in his favour was that he was a Protestant, before going on to note his business interests, passion for hunting, and education at a public school.°*° Rejecting the application of one potential officer, Wallace wrote: When you spoke to me respecting a nomination for a commission in the 5/R.[oya]| Irish Rifles, you told me your father had been Agent to the late Major Maxwell. I am informed that he was employed in the capacity of Land Steward +

not as agent. I think under these circumstances it would be much more advisable for you to join some other corps.’ Crawford, who owned a chemical firm in Belfast, thought that the officer corps of the militia had to undergo significant change in Ireland, as a result of the Land Acts. He wrote: “The Militia from this on will require business men for their officers, because there is not the class

now of landed proprietors there used to be (in Ireland) to draw from + if Irish Militia are to have Irish officers then they will have in most or at least many cases [to] be like myself. Manufacturers or other business men who take their holidays in camp, and are willing to make considerable sacrifices because of their love of military training.’ While, as in the regular army, promotion in the militia was primarily based on seniority, it is clear that some militia officers felt that political patronage could help

their case. In trying, ultimately unsuccessfully, to gain promotion to Lieutenant Colonel and command of the Antrim RGA, Major E H. Crawford sought to use his political connections to mobilize the support of Lord Londonderry, Lord Ranfurly, and Colonel McCalmont, MP, amongst others. Crawford had earlier sought the support of H. O. Arnold-Forster, whom he knew in his capacity as MP for West Belfast, where Crawford’s chemical business was located, to gain his promotion to major. *8- Norfolk Commission, evidence, Vol. I, p. 164.

” PRONI, D.1889/4/1/1, R. H. Wallace papers, out letter book, letter Wallace to T. V. P. Mc Cammon, 27/11/06. 309 PRONI, D.1700/10/1, E H. Crawford out letter book, letter to Colonel S. K. Gore, 19/3/08. °! PRONI, D.1889/4/1/1, R. H. Wallace papers, out letter book, letter Wallace to J. J. Clark, 10/1/07.

ee PRONI, D.1700/10/1, Colonel F H. Crawford out letter book, letter to “My dear Crump’,

me PRONI D.1700/10/1, E H. Crawford out letter book, letters to J. M. Andrews, Sir John Byers, Colonel Ware, and Lord Ranfurly, 14/4/09, 16/4/09, 17/4/09 and 19/4/09 and Colonel S. K. Gore, 7/4/08. Army List and Hart's Army List, 1905-1910.

The Auxiliary Forces 115 Mess bills were a problem in militia and Special Reserve units just as they were in regular regiments, especially if the CO felt that the regiment should entertain fairly lavishly, and meant that officers had to possess an appreciable private income. Some units did make efforts to reduce the cost of messing, with the mess commit-

tee of the Cornwall and Devon Miners Royal Garrison Artillery managing the officers’ mess itself, rather than employing a civilian caterer, and reducing the cost from 7s.6d. to 3s.8d. per day.** In the 3 Durham Light Infantry, the basic mess bill was to be the equivalent of seven days’ pay. From 1905 officers in this unit were

expected to contribute seven days’ pay to the mess and five to the band, which effectively meant that they ended up serving without pay.” In the 5 Royal Irish Rifles, messing charges were placed on a sliding scale, with the lieutenant colonel

expected to pay £7 and a further £5 for the band, down to subalterns who were only expected to pay £3 and £1, respectively. Officers who did not attend the annual training paid half mess and band charges.*° R. M. S. Baynes noted that when he was serving as a second lieutenant in the 3 Bedfordshire Regiment from 1906 to 1908, messing cost an extortionate 12s.6d. a day due to the extravagant tastes of the mess president.’ Some officers did serve for a very long period of time in militia and Special Reserve units. For example, when Colonel R. H. Wallace retired as the CO of the 5 Royal Irish Rifles in 1912 he had completed thirty-three years’ service with the regiment, fifteen in command.** However, this long service by a number of officers

did little to resolve the perennial problem of a lack of officers in the militia. This officer problem meant that, for a brief period, between 1909 and 1911, sizeable numbers of regular officers were posted to Special Reserve battalions. H. B. Holt remembered that when he joined the 2 Royal Munster Fusiliers in 1910 they had four captains and four lieutenants detached for service with their 4 and 5 battalions.*° It is clear that by 1914, some Special Reserve battalions had managed to successfully tap the OTC units to obtain officers. From November 1911 to February 1914 the 3 North Staffordshire Regiment, for example, secured seven officers from the OTC.*! As discussed below, the failure of most senior division OTC products to apply for commissions of any sort meant that this was not a solution for the officer shortage in the auxiliary forces as a whole. 4G. Cavenagh-Mainwaring, The Royal Miners: A History of the Stannaries Regiment of Miners, late Cornwall and Devon Miners Royal Garrison Artillery Militia (Harrison, London, 1913), p. 113. 35 DRO, D/DLI2/4/275, ‘1st Durham Militia Record Book—Mess Minutes’, entries for 2/7/03,

6/7/03, and 6/7/06. 6 Royal Ulster Rifles Museum, “Minute book of Officers Mess, 5th Royal Irish Rifles’, entries for

12/6/11 and 10/6/12. °” John Baynes and Hugh Maclean (ed.), A Tale of Two Captains (Pentland Press, Edinburgh,

1Reval . 17. ‘Ulster Rifles Museum, “Manuscript and cuttings book re. Down Militia’, farewell order by Colonel R. H. Wallace, 6/7/12. *° PRONE, D. 618/178, ‘Manuscript History of the 4th Leinster Regiment (Old Queen's Co. Militia)’,

P NAM, 7603-69-1, Memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Holt, p. 3. ‘| Staffordshire Regimental Museum, ‘Digest of service 3rd North Staffordshire Regiment 1853-1914, pp. 62-5.

116 The Edwardian Army In terms of its other ranks, the militia also struggled to reach its establishment

throughout the Edwardian period. In 1903 the militia was 25,619 short of an establishment of 131,583 and, even at this, 33,111 militia officers and men had not attended their annual camp. In 1907 the figure was little better, with the militia

37,397 short of its establishment of 130,737, albeit with only 9,948 militia all ranks absent from camp. Under the Special Reserve system, this situation deteriorated further. In 1911 the Special Reserve had an establishment of 91,219 but its strength was a mere 60,931.” At the regimental level, these recruitment problems are clear. The 3 North Staffordshire had 662 other ranks present at its annual camp in June 1904, 698 in 1905, 625 in 1906. The position declined with the establishment of the Special Reserve, with just 464 in 1909 and 364 in 1913. The 4 North Staffordshire was in a similarly poor position, with just 478 other ranks, out of an

establishment of 750, at camp in July 1913. One of the worst recruiting militia regiments was the 3 Dorset Regiment, which could claim only 239 other ranks serving in June 1908.4 That the militia faced recruiting problems should not surprise us. In what was then the most heavily urbanized society in the world, recruiting was still based on

rural areas and the training periods meant that only casual labourers could be enlisted, as those in full-time employment would rarely be able to absent themselves for three to four weeks each summer to attend camp. Even at this, the timing of the training season did little to encourage agricultural labourers to enlist, as a recruit'’s initial training period was generally held between March and September,

a time when he could reasonably expect to earn a better wage in agricultural employment. One colonel proposed that this training should take place over the winter and believed that in this circumstance he could reach his full establishment.*° It appears that this suggestion had been accepted, at least for some units, by 1908-9, with beneficial results.*° There were, as with other auxiliary units, some problems with employers over the militia. Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Wallace wrote to one employer: W[illia]m. Roy who was lately in ylou]r. employment tells me he has lost his job through being out with the militia. It is very hard for men to get work at present and I always endeavour to get my men work on their return. Dont you think that, considering the fact that you do all the furnishing for the different Battalions at Ballykinlar, you might be able to reconsider your decision and let © Figures calculated from 1904 (Cd. 1903), Return showing the establishment of each unit of militia in the United Kingdom and the numbers present, absent and wanting to compete at the training of 1906, pp. 14-15, 1908 (Cd. 3932), Return showing the establishment of each unit of militia in the United Kingdom and the numbers present, absent and wanting to compete at the training of 1907,

pp. 13-14 and 1912-13 (Cd. 6065), The General Annual Report on the British Army for the year ending 30th September 1911, with which is incorporated the Annual Report on recruiting, p. 26. 8 Staffordshire Regimental Museum, “Digest of service 3rd North Staffordshire Regiment 1853— 1914’, pp. 50-65 and ‘Digest of service 4th North Staffordshire Regiment 1853-1914’, p. 12. “ C.'T. Atkinson, The Dorsetshire Regiment: The Thirty Ninth and Fifty Fourth Foot and the Dorset Militia and Volunteers (Oxford University Press, 1947), vol. II, p. 112. “© Norfolk Commission, evidence, Vol. I, p. 164.

“6 PRONI, D. 618/178, ‘Manuscript History of the 4th Leinster Regiment (Old Queen's Co. Militia)’, p. 49.

The Auxiliary Forces 117 Roy have his job again. I may say that the employers of labour at Lisburn, Lurgan, Gilforde have been most kind in this respect + by their action I am able to get good men in place of loafers to join the Regiment.*”

To his credit, Wallace worked hard to maintain good relationships with employers,

expressing his concern that four men quit their jobs at the Millamount Bleach Works, without giving notice, to attend the annual training, and also did much to support his men when they were seeking work.*® Some regiments were affected by purely local economic conditions. Recruiting for the 5 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers

was seen to be problematic in the winter of 1902-3 due to the job opportunities at the new shipyard in Londonderry and railway works at Ballyshannon.” Re-engagement was also a serious problem in the militia and Special Reserve battalions. In 1911 the CO of the 4 Durham Light Infantry suggested a return to the 30s. annual training bounty or a straightforward payment of £1 for those re-engaging. While he noted that pay had improved, it was clear that this was more particularly the case for NCOs, who were entitled to separation allowance while they were at camp. The battalion’s disappointing retention rate shows why their CO was so concerned, as during 1911, of eighty men whose period of service had expired, only twenty-five chose to re-engage.””

Just as officers could use the militia back door into the regular army, so other

ranks could transfer to the regular army after serving in the militia for a short period of time; by doing this they managed to secure additional pay. In the 3 and 4 Manchester Regiment this practice seems to have been particularly common, the regimental history noting that ‘In peace time they act as a training ground for the Regular recruits.’ The 3 Royal West Kent Regiment claimed that they supplied about 400 men p.a. to the regular army.” The militia was able to recruit men who were deemed to be too small or too young for the regulars, but still medical rejection rates were appallingly high. In the Cornwall and Devon Miners RGA Militia, thirty-seven of seventy-one recruits were rejected as

medically unfit in 1907 and, in the same year, the 3 Durham Light Infantry had thirty-eight other ranks discharged as totally medically unfit and a further forty ‘dismissed home’ as temporarily unfit.* As Major General Edward Spears remembered of his service in the 3 Royal Dublin Fusiliers, ‘the main purpose of the formation, which

].

«): PRONI, D.1889/4/1/1, R. H. Wallace papers, out letter book, letter Wallace to W. McCarthy,

Hi PRONI D.1889/4/1/1, R. H. Wallace papers, out letter book, letters Wallace to Messrs.

A. Cowdy and Sons, 13/3/12, J. Milne Barbour, 18/7/11 and Alderman G. H. Doran, 25/10/10. © The “Donegals” Own Journal: A monthly magazine for the 5th Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,

III, 42, April 1903, p. 95. °° DRO, D/DLI2/4/245 (4), Durham Light Infantry archive, letter Captain A. K. Robb to H.Q. No. 5 District, 10/10/11 and D/DLI2/4/245 (5) ‘Recruiting Report’. >! GL. Campbell, The Manchesters: A History of the Regular, Militia, Special Reserve, Territorial and New Army Battalions since their formation, with a record of the Officers now serving, and the Honours and

Casualties of the War of 1914-1916 (Picture Advertising, London, 1916), p. 15. *° ‘The Queens Own Gazette, 383, June 1907, p. 284. > Cavenagh-Mainwaring, The Royal Miners, p. 115 and DRO, D/DLI 2/4/8, ‘Order book of 3rd Durham Light Infantry’, entry for 2/7/07.

118 The Edwardian Army included men of all ages including the elderly, seemed to be more social than warlike

and to consist in providing short periods of employment to a not very martial and usually unemployed section of the population.’* These problems were seen to persist into the Special Reserve. H. O. Arnold-Forster, then an opposition MP, deplored the policy which meant that ‘the British Army is to be regarded as an annexe to the workhouse, into which boys of seventeen are to be invited “during the winter months”, on the express assurance of the Army Council that they may “buy themselves out” as soon as trade mends, and they can scrape together sixty shillings’.”

Militia colonels were sometimes concerned about the regular soldiers sent to their units as permanent staff. Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Wallace complained about one of the sergeants sent to him, noting, “He has just 16 years service + has no less

than 20 entries [for bad conduct] which include 6 drunks + several irregular conduct—gross neglect of duty—1 misappropriating money.° Captain J. C. Bowen-Colthurst, a regular officer who was attached to the 5 Royal Irish Rifles, was also problematic. In April 1909 he was involved in an ill-tempered argument with Captain and Quartermaster Henderson, who had been promoted from the ranks, about how frequently militiamen should be paid. Bowen-Colthurst, in a display of

snobbery which even Wallace found unacceptable, told Henderson to ‘keep his place’. Bowen-Colthurst was described by Wallace as a man of ‘peculiar temperament and this instability was a foretaste of horrors to come, as Bowen-Colthurst was the perpetrator of one of the worst atrocities of the Easter Rising in Dublin in 1916.°” When Wallace lobbied for Captain H. R. Charley of the Royal Irish Rifles, a local man, to be sent to him as adjutant in 1909, he was unsuccessful.”® Problems of recruitment, officer supply, and training meant that the militia was

seen to be in need of reform during the 1902-8 period. H. O. Arnold-Forster believed that the solution was, essentially, to abolish the force. He proposed that the sixty most efficient battalions should be converted into short-service regular battalions in his new Home Service army, while the remaining sixty-four battalions should either be disbanded or incorporated into the Volunteers. However, moves by the militia lobby on the Unionist backbenches and, more importantly, Lord Selborne and the Marquess of Salisbury (both militia colonels) in Cabinet meant that Arnold-Forster’s scheme came to nought. This was despite Arnold-Forster’s

attempt to undermine his opponents by describing the militia colonels as ‘old women who look upon their regiments as a sort of honorary addition to their 4 Sir Edward Spears, The Picnic Basket (Secker and Warburg, London, 1967), p. 63.

°° H. O. Arnold-Forster, Military Needs and Military Policy (Smith, Elder & Co., London,

] ,p. 119.

S BEONL D.1889/4/1/1, R. H. Wallace papers, out letter book, letter Wallace to General Cooper,

se RONI D.1889/4/1/1, R. H. Wallace papers, out letter book, letter Wallace to Brigadier General G. A. Mills, 27/4/09, Cd. 8376 (1916), Royal Commission on the Arrest and Subsequent Treatment of Mr Francis Sheehy Skeffington, Mr Thomas Dickson and Mr Patrik James McIntyre, Michael Foy and

Brian Barton, The Easter Rising (Sutton Publishing, Stroud, 1999), pp. 190-2, and Charles Townshend, Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion (Allen Lane, London, 2005), pp. 193-5. *8 PRONI, D.1889/4/1/1, R. H. Wallace papers, out letter book, letter Wallace to Brigadier General G. A. Mills, 21/9/09 and Harts Army List, 1910.

The Auxiliary Forces 119 positions as County Magnates or as leading figures in some dull, ineffective society.’ Selborne and Salisbury used a number of arguments in defence of the militia, a force which, on the face of it, it would seem hard to defend. Tradition was one line of defence, Selborne suggesting that the Hampshire Militia had existed ‘without interruption for five hundred years’. More importantly, the case was con-

vincingly made that the militia could be reformed and that it would be signifcantly cheaper than any short-service regular force which would replace it. Haldane’s conversion of the militia into the new Special Reserve was not quite as simple as some have allowed. Crucially, unlike in the militia, recruits enlisting into the new force would have an obligation to serve overseas in time of war, and Haldane conciliated some senior officers by insisting that regular officers and NCOs would be involved in training these units.°' Attempts to gain militia colonels’ support for the new Special Reserve were not entirely successful. Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Wallace wrote to James Craig, MP, a former militia officer himself, discussing his experience of the Esher Committee, which he had attended: The Army Council are desirous that the Militia men should be liable for service over Seas in case of Emergency. The Militia Commanding Officers who were present were all quite willing that he should be so liable, provided that Militia men should be sent out abroad with their own Regiments, and they expressed the opinion that the men would be quite satisfied to enlist under these conditions. It became quite clear that this was not what the Army Council wanted. Their idea is to render the men liable to be drafted in driblets to re-inforce their Line Battalions on service and to this we all strongly objected.

Wallace noted that of the twelve militia colonels giving evidence to the committee, four supported the idea of drafting militia companies into regular battalions in the event of war, while eight wanted entire regiments or nothing to be sent overseas.

It is noticeable that while Arnold-Forster’s plans to reform the militia came to nought due to the presence of a strong militia lobby, the powers of this lobby had weakened considerably after the 1905 General Election and, rather ironically, the Tory front bench supported Haldane, in a way that they did not back his predecessors plans. Haldane’s scheme was, in any case, less radical than Arnold-Forster’s

with, crucially, no disbandment of inefficient units. While it is evident from Wallace’s comments that the new Special Reserve scheme had little support from militia colonels, there was little parliamentary opposition to it and, as discussed

further below, few militia officers resigned when the Special Reserve was introduced.

»? Tan Beckett, ‘H. O. Arnold-Forster and the Volunteers’ in Ian Beckett and John Gooch, Politicians and Defence: Studies in the formulation of British defence policy 1845-1970 (Manchester University Press, 1981), p. 53. °° On Arnold-Forster’s planned reforms see Rhodri Williams, Defending the Empire; The Conserva-

five party and a defence policy 1899-1915 (Yale University Press, London, 1991), pp. 41-58. 62 PRON, D.1889/4/ 1/1, R. H. Wallace papers, out letter book, letter Wallace to James Craig, 11/7/06. See also Cd. 3513, 1907, ‘Report of the War Office Committee appointed to discuss certain Militia Questions with Representative Officers of Militia’.

120 The Edwardian Army It is, therefore, easy to portray the Special Reserve as little more than the militia under a different name and, indeed, for some units the transition from militia to Special Reserve was an easy one. Some regimental histories suggest that the transfer from one force to another was almost seamless.°? However, some regi-

ments did see considerable disruption. In the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers the under-strength 5 Battalion, the old Donegal Militia, was disbanded, while the old Tyrone and Fermanagh militias swapped numbers. While the Fermanagh Militia was the more senior, it was felt that the draft-finding role of a senior Special Reserve battalion would be better fulfilled by a battalion recruiting in the more populous Tyrone.” The numbers transferring from the militia to the Special Reserve were very vari-

able at the regimental level, although the overall figure for the force was rather bleak as the total other ranks of the militia stood at 82,833 on 1 October 1905, while the Special Reserve could claim a total of just 59,734 on 1 October 1908.° In the 3 Royal Irish Rifles, all the officers transferred but only 394 other ranks, 128 remaining militiamen and 109 accepting a free discharge.® By contrast in the 5

Royal Irish Rifles, apparently 90 per cent of the men transferred to the Special

Reserve. Demonstrating considerable enthusiasm for the new force, the Mid Ulster Royal Garrison Artillery greeted the transfer of the regiment from the militia to the Special Reserve with cheers at midnight on 8 July 1908 during its annual camp. All but six of the existing personnel transferred to the new Royal Field Artillery Special Reserve regiment. Somewhat ironically, such enthusiasm was ill rewarded as, with all the other Royal Field Artillery Special Reserve regiments,

the Mid Ulster Regiment was disbanded in 1909.° The establishment of the new force did lead to the resignation of some officers.

An extreme reaction was that of Captain J. O. Johnson of the 3 Royal Irish Regiment. Writing to his CO, Lieutenant Colonel Viscount Stopford, in January

1908, he stated, ‘I am sorry that we are disbanded without a chance of saying goodbye to one another, as long as we were the Wexford Militia I should have stayed on as long as they would let me, but to tell the truth I am not + never was very proud of the Regiment we were attached to though I would never say a word

to anyone against it, but I would rather not go into their Reserve Battalion if I could help it.’ Two other officers in this battalion also voiced grave reservations

about the Special Reserve scheme, disappointed that their battalion, though the most senior militia battalion associated with the Royal Irish Regiment, would

°° Sargeaunt, The Royal Monmouthshire Militia, pp. 247-8. “ Regimental Historical Records Committee, The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers: Being the history of the Regiment from December 1688 to July 1914 (Constable, London, 1928), p. 548. ® Cd. 4058 (1908), Statement showing the strength of the regular army, special reserve and territorial force, on Ist October 1908, as compared with the strength on Ist October 1905. °° Royal Ulster Rifles Museum, C. J. Robb, “History of the Militia Battalions’, unpublished manuscript, pp. 11-12. °” PRONI, D.1889/4/1/1, R. H. Wallace papers, out letter book, letter Wallace to Lord Londonderry, 13/7/08. 6 The Mid-Ulster Mail, 15/8/08 and 12/9/08.

The Auxiliary Forces 121 be disbanded, while the junior Kilkenny and Tipperary militias would become the new Special Reserve battalions of the regiment.” Some regimental records also voiced concern about what they saw as the aboli-

tion of the militia system. The history of the Cornwall and Devon Miners RGA Militia, converted to RFA Special Reserve in 1908 and unceremoniously abolished in 1909, was understandably bitter about the Haldane reforms, noting: It seems a pity that the old Militia, with its history of over a thousand years, should be done away with. ‘The voluntary Militia attracted types, both of Officers and men, that are unlikely to join the Territorial force, and who could be embodied without

seriously affecting their civil occupations... The Militia system has proved its value in many times of stress, while the Territorial system has yet to be proved under conditions of war.’°

Overall, there were serious problems in getting militiamen to transfer to the new Special Reserve system. A report of 1909 showed that while 1,952 militia officers and 48,746 militia other ranks had transferred to the Special Reserve, 301 officers

resigned and 9,818 militiamen took a free discharge on the enactment of the Haldane legislation, and 138 militia officers and 8,386 militiamen decided to continue as militia, serving out their period of enlistment.” The Special Reserve was artificially boosted in 1911 by allowing the incorporation into its ranks of former regular soldiers, most of whom were under an obligation, as army reservists, to rejoin the army again in the event of national emergency.

Thus, the 4 North Staffordshire gained 200 ex-regulars and was also allowed to reduce its annual camp to fourteen days, which it was felt would aid recruitment.” This reduction in the period of the training camp can have done little to promote military efficiency, as the 3 Bedfordshire Regiment noted that their 1911 training, at twenty-seven as opposed to twenty days, did not have ‘to be carried through with a rush and scramble that hardly made for efficiency’, suggesting that a 14-day camp was much too brief to impart high-quality instruction.” On the outbreak of the Great War, Special Reserve battalions were misused in exactly the way feared by R. H. Wallace and his fellow militia colonels in 1906. They were stripped of large numbers of their best men, who were drafted to a wide variety of units to bring the original battalions of the BEF up to strength and to ° NAM, 6012/258/2, Documents re. to disbandment of 3rd Royal Irish Regiment, letters; J. O. Johnson to Viscount Stopford, 29/1/08, J. O. Panter Foster to Stopford, 18/3/08, and G. S. Palmer to Stopford, 11/4/08. Harts Army List, 1905-1910. ”” Cavenagh-Mainwaring, The Royal Miners, p. 119. 7 1909 [Cd. 4608] Army. (Special reserve.) Statement showing, by units, the number of officers and men of the militia (1) present at training on date of inspection, 1908, absent with leave, and absent without leave; (2) transferred to the special reserve up to Ist October 1908; (3) the number of militia officers who (A) resigned up to Ist October 1908, (B) remained on that date, (C) joined the reserve of officers; (4) the number of militiamen who (A) took a free discharge up to 1st October 1908, (B) remained on that date and 1912-13 (Cd. 6656), The General Annual Report on the British army for the year ending 30th September 1912, p. 105.

” Staffordshire Regimental Museum, “Digest of service 4th North Staffordshire Regiment 1853-—

a nae and Bedfordshire Record Office, X550/15/2, “The Bedfordshire Regiment Association of Old Comrades, 8th Annual Report, 1911’, p. 53.

122 The Edwardian Army provide trained NCOs for the New Armies. Indeed, during the entire conflict, no Special Reserve battalion was to serve overseas as a complete unit, something which had supposedly been guaranteed, at least to Extra Special Reserve battalions, by the Haldane reforms. As an example, by 6 August 1914 the 3 Manchester Regiment had already sent 615 other ranks and two officers to the 2 Manchester Regiment to bring it up to its wartime establishment.” Having discussed the militia and Special Reserve, it is now necessary to consider the Rifle Volunteers and Territorial Force. As discussed below, these were rather different forces in terms of their enlistment, standards of training, and composition, but as Ian Beckett has noted, the problems of poor recruitment, retention, and low attendance at annual camps persisted throughout the 1902-14 period.” Beckett's view is fully confirmed by the figures in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Indeed, even within the reduced establishment of the TF period, recruitment remained unsatisfactory. Also noticeable is the number of passive members in these forces, who did not attend a sufficient number of drills and camp to qualify as ‘efficient’ under the old Volunteer regulations or who failed to attend camp for any length of time in the TE Table 4.1. Rifle Volunteers; Establishment, actual strength, and ‘efficients’, 1903-776

Year Establishment Total all ranks Total ‘efficient’

1903 346,171 253,281 242,104 1904 343,246 253,909 244,537 1905 341,283 249,611 241,549 1906 338,452 255,854 1907 335,849 252,791 246,654 244,212

Table 4.2. Territorial Force; Establishment, actual strength, and numbers attending camp,

1908-13”

Year Establishment Establishment Strength Strength Camp Camp (ORs)

(officers) (ORs) (officers) (ORs) (officers)

1908 11,202 302,473 8,428 188,785 6,942 167,351 1909 11,232 301,580 9,652 260,389 8,181 240,056 1910 11,210 301,262 9,759 257,337 8,306 235,054 1911 11,249 302,039 9,475 254,888 8,049 224,103 1912 11,242 302,056 9,279 252,154 7,920 222,755 1913 11,233 301,167 9,390 236,389 8,082 211,862 ”* ‘Tameside Record Office, MR1/3/1/25, C. M. Thorneycroft, “The 3rd Battalion (Militia) The Manchester Regiments: Its origins and services with special reference to its work during the Great War 1914-18’, unpublished manuscript, p. 29. ” Beckett, Riflemen Form, p. 252. 7° Abstracted from 1907 (Cd. 3367), The annual return of the volunteer corps of Great Britain for the year ear,Ip.0b. 63.p. 63 and 1908 (Cd. 3801), The annual return of the volunteer corps of Great Britain for the

7 Table calculated from Cd. 7254 (1914), The Annual Return of the Territorial Force for the year 1913, p. 124.

The Auxiliary Forces 123 At the regimental level there was some scepticism about the Haldane reforms

and no sense that they were to shape the relationship between the regular and auxiliary forces for many years to come. The 1 VB Hampshire Regiment Gazette carried an editorial which stated: Mtr. Haldane’s great scheme for the reorganisation of the Military Forces of the Crown is now before the country... we can't help saying that the new scheme appears to bear

a suspicious resemblance to the long succession of paper schemes which have succeeded each other with such bewildering frequency in recent years, and have none of them materialized into real life... That the Auxiliary Forces should be organized into mobile divisions of the three arms, complete in all the details required to enable them to take the field, has long been the aim of the leaders of Volunteer thought.”

For some units the Haldane reforms saw relatively little change. The 4 (City of London) Volunteer Battalion, Royal Fusiliers became the 4 (City of London) Battalion, The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers). As the regimental historian noted, “The Battalion was fortunate in keeping its number of “Fourth” and retaining the same Headquarters with its old historic associations.” The 7 Middlesex Regiment saw no real change in name or recruiting area when transferring from the Volunteers to TF but it did see just 415 of its 657 men transfer to the new battalion. It says something for the disruption as a whole in the Middlesex Regiment that the battalion history records: ‘A larger percentage of our men transferred than in any other battalion in Middlesex.’*° However, for other units, the Haldane reforms led to considerable upheaval. ‘The 1 Lanarkshire Rifles, when transferring to the TF as the 5 Scottish Rifles, had to cut its number of companies from sixteen to eight. In all, twelve officers resigned from the unit on its conversion to the TF and only 568 other ranks transferred from the Rifle Volunteers. Despite this upheaval, their CO was enthusiastic about the Haldane reforms, stating, “The Territorial Scheme is a vast improvement on anything we have yet had as a provision for National Defence, and we only require sufficient men to make it a complete success.’*' Similarly, in Northamptonshire, the existing two Rifle Volunteer battalions were called upon to find just one battalion for the new TF, leading to considerable discussion about which companies should be disbanded, and the decision over which officers should be retained was left to Colonel the Earl of Euston. A plea from the local Conservative and Unionist Association ensured that the existing Rushden Company was preserved.** In Dorset, the Rifle Volunteer battalion had to disband two companies and its cyclist section when it converted to the TF as the 4 Dorsetshire Regiment. Of the thirty officers and 984 other ranks of

the 1 VB Dorsetshire Regiment, only twenty-six officers and 582 other ranks transferred to the 4 Dorsetshire Regiment, although by January 1913 it had 8 Ist Volunteer Battalion, Hampshire Regiment Gazette, 1V, 198, April 1907, p. 339. ” Anon., The History of the old 2/4th (City of London) Battalion, The London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers), (Westminster Press, London, 1919), p. 4. ®° King, History of the 7th Battalion Middlesex Regiment, p. 144. 8! ‘The First Lanark Rifles Gazette, Wl, 4, January 1908, pp. 193 and Fifth Battalion, Scottish Rifles Gazette,.1, 1, 1909, pp. 3-6.

°° Northamptonshire Record Office, Northamptonshire Territorial Association Minute Book, entry for 25/2/08.

124 The Edwardian Army regained something of its former strength with eighteen officers and 931 other ranks.*° In Staffordshire, | Company of the old Rifle Volunteer battalion, based in Leek, formed the basis of the new 3 Battery of the Staffordshire RFA Regiment.™ From the start, recruitment for many TF units was difficult and novel solutions

were sought. In July 1909 the East Lancashire Division, by no means the worst recruiting, had 473 officers and 14,160 other ranks, against an establishment of 591 and 16,390. A royal review was held in that month and the organizers stated: ‘It is now confidently hoped that the great honour His Majesty is today extending to the East Lancashire Division will inspire all eligible young men of the district to come forward and join the Territorial Force.’® After some initial hesitation, Edward VII was a keen supporter of Haldane’s reforms and seemed happy to use the position of the monarchy to endorse them.*° Recruitment for the newly formed units seems to have been very mixed. In the East Lancashire Division by July 1909 the Royal Artillery units had recruited very

well, being just ten officers and 282 other ranks short of their establishment of ighty-seven officers and 2,181 other ranks, whereas the Army Service Corps was nine officers and 148 other ranks short of their establishment of twenty and 492 respectively.®” Even in Scotland, where traditionally there had been more enthusi-

asm for the Volunteer movement, all did not go well with the TE The 8 Royal Scots, based in Haddington, was down to just 779 other ranks in early 1914, which the local newspaper felt was ‘anything but creditable to the burgh’.*®

What could be described as the original Rifle Volunteer tradition remained in the TF with the continuance of a number of ‘class corps’. R. W. E Johnston started his military career in the 9 (Highlanders), Royal Scots in March 1910 and remem-

bered: ‘in order to join the Dandy Ninth in those pre-1914 days one had to be nominated by two members of the unit and to pay an annual subscription of 10/-. In addition, when attending the Annual 14 days training in camp one’s Army pay was taken to provide a higher standard of messing and to employ civilian cooks and kitchen staff. It was a real “corps d’elite” in which “H” Company, to which | belonged, consisted of University undergraduates, Insurance and Bank clerks,

apprentice Chartered Accountants, Civil servants like myself.’ The 5 Scottish Rifles maintained a tradition that their officers had to enlist and serve in the ranks

88 Dorset History Centre, LB/6/1, “The Territorial Force of the County of Dorset: Report on the work of 1908’, unpaginated and C. T. Atkinson, The Dorsetshire Regiment: The Thirty Ninth and Fifty Fourth Foot and the Dorset Militia and Volunteers (Oxford University Press, 1947), vol. II, p. 114. 8 J. E. Blane and J. R. Sherratt, “Over There”: A Commemorative History of the Old Leek Battery 1908-1919 (Martin Publicity, Stafford, 1991), pp. 5-6. 8° ‘Tameside Record Office, MR3/17/113/3/7, ‘Official programme of the Royal Review of the East Lancashire Territorial Force at Worsley, 6th July 1909’, pp. 5-7.

86 NLS, Ms 5975, ff. 39-40, letter R. B. Haldane to his mother, 30/1/06 and Ms 5976, ff. 9-10 and 46-7, letters Haldane to his mother, 26/6/06 and 16/7/06. 8” ‘Tameside Record Office, MR3/17/113/3/7, ‘Official programme of the Royal Review of the East Lancashire Territorial Force at Worsley, 6th July 1909’, pp. 17-19 and 34.

88 Haddingtonshire Advertiser, 16/1/14 cited in J. G. M. Cranstown, “The impact of the Great War on a local community: The case of East Lothian’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Open University, 1992, p. 103. TIWM 82/38/1, manuscript memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel R. W. E Johnston, p. 1.

The Auxiliary Forces 125 before promotion, and on the outbreak of war, the battalion was noted as ‘composed mainly of young men in comfortable circumstances’.”° However, even the class corps suffered from serious recruiting problems under

the TF scheme. The 5 Scottish Rifles was experiencing recruiting problems by 1911. Their CO stated: “The past year has been satisfactory in all respects, except as regards the recruiting of the rank and file. Our total strength on Ist January of last year [1910] was 918 and notwithstanding our having enlisted 152 recruits during the year, our strength on 1 January this year [1911] is only 880. If the discharges for the current year approximate the numbers for last year, we shall require at least 250 recruits to have the Battalion at full strength on 1 January 1912.! By 1913 the situation was even worse, with just 751 other ranks and over the course of 1912 six other officers had resigned.” Trying to retrieve the situation, Lieutenant General Sir Bruce Hamilton, speaking at the battalion’s prize night in 1912,

stated: ‘[I]t is not, and never has been, the intention to compel any man to do more than the minimum of eight days.’? Hamilton’s words seem to have been acted on, as in the summer of 1913, 663 men attended camp but of these, only 381 attended for the whole fifteen days.°* Within London there was massive disparity evident amongst infantry battalions. In July 1910 the socially exclusive 14 London Regiment (London Scottish) was faring well, with thirty-three officers and 1,016 other ranks, whereas the more plebeian 20 London Regiment (Blackheath and Woolwich) had just twenty-nine officers and 610 other ranks.” The Haldane reforms did contain some curious anomalies. ‘The constitutional

peculiarities of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man meant that the militia survived in the former and the Rifle Volunteers in the latter. The Territorial Force

was not extended to Ireland, which meant that many units there were formed as units of the Special Reserve, whereas in Great Britain they would have been part of the TE. Two of the oldest and most socially exclusive regiments of the auxiliary forces,

the Honourable Artillery Company and the Inns of Court Regiment, secured special treatment from the War Office. The Honourable Artillery Company could claim its formation back to at least 1537 and had a number of concerns about its inclusion in the new Territorial Force scheme: that its valuable premises would have to be surrendered to the City of London Territorial Association for whatever

purpose they saw fit, that the infantry contingent of the Company would be disbanded as it was not of battalion strength, that members could no longer be elected and asked to pay the membership fees then in force, and that officers could be appointed to the unit from other regiments. Haldane and the War Office gave

guarantees to the Honourable Artillery Company but the Company also felt it °° Regimental Publications Committee, The Fifth Battalion, The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) 1914-1919 (Jackson and Son, Glasgow, 1936), pp. XV—XVIL. *! Fifth Battalion, Scottish Rifles Gazette, U1, 1, January 1911, p. 78. °° Fifth Battalion, Scottish Rifles Gazette,, 1,5, January 1913, pp. 155-7. °° Fifth Battalion, Scottish Rifles Gazette, 1,5, January 1913, p. 177. ” Fifth Battalion, Scottish Rifles Gazette,, Ul, 1, January 1914, p. 6. °° LMA, A/TA/1, Minutes of T. F. Association of the County of London, minutes for 13/7/10.

126 The Edwardian Army necessary to have a special Act of Parliament passed in August 1908 at a cost of almost £500, to protect their property interests. [his was seen as especially important if the Territorial Force scheme failed, something which a few members of the Honourable Artillery Company with conscriptionist leanings confidently predicted. The result of all this was that the Honourable Artillery Company continued with its traditions and premises intact and members were still elected and paid a membership fee of two guineas per annum. The Honourable Artillery Company now formed two artillery batteries and an infantry battalion in the TE, recruiting 553 new members in 1908-9 to reach this establishment.” The Inns of Court Regiment was, with some difficulty, accommodated within the Haldane scheme. Prior to 1908 the Inns of Court Regiment had simply been regarded as a unit of the Volunteer Force and, with the reforms, it was originally envisaged that it would simply become the 27 London Regiment. Given the ‘class’ nature of this unit, its relatively small size, and the fact that it contained cavalry and infantry components, it was seen that it could not be easily accommodated within the London Regiment. It also had considerable professional and political influence, given that most of its membership was drawn from the legal profession. Between July 1908 and April 1909 the fate of the Inns of Court Regiment was hotly debated, with it eventually emerging as an OTC unit. Opinion on the military value of this regiment was divided. One civil servant noted that all members of the unit would have attended a university and could have served in the OTC there, continuing, ‘they would all be more useful as officers of Yeomanry or Infantry in the districts in which they reside’. Senior military officers were concerned about the instructional facilities available and the cost of maintaining the cavalry squadron (estimated at £900 p.a.). Despite these concerns and the support of Haldane, who promoted the interests of the legal profession, and of Major General A. G. Mackinnon, the Director General of the TE, who felt that ‘the disbandment of the corps would do an immensity of harm throughout the Force’, the Inns of

Court Regiment was recognized as an OTC unit. This was with the support of the County of London Territorial Association, though this body also felt that the then 28 (Artists Rifles) London Regiment should be converted to an OTC unit, which did not happen before the First World War.”” Some Volunteer and TF units had close links with businesses, which impacted

on their recruiting base. The 2 VB Manchester Regiment drew its C company from employees of Messrs J. P. and E. Westhead & Company, the Cornwall Fortress

RE unit drew many of its other ranks from Cox & Co. Engineers and Shipbuilders, Falmouth, and the 7 Middlesex Regiment contained a section from the Royal

°° HAC Archive, “HAC Act papers 1907-1908 and Court minutes for 3/2/08 and 4/2/08, G. Goold Walker, The Honourable Artillery Company 1537-1987 (Honourable Artillery Company, London, revised edition, 1986), pp. 262-3, and Justine Taylor, ‘Preserving Property & Privilege: The Formation of the Territorial Army and the HAC Act of 1908’ in Honourable Artillery Company Journa 1, 85, 474, 2008. *” ‘TNA, WO32/18557, ‘Application to form the 27th Bn into a mixed unit or division of Cavy. & Infy. of the Oficers Training Corps’ and LMA, A/TA/1, Minutes of T. FE Association of the County of London, minutes for 28/2/08.

The Auxiliary Forces 127 Small Arms Factory in Enfield.?* One regiment which did maintain close connections with workplaces was, not surprisingly, the 15 London Regiment (Civil

Service Rifles). Their A company was formed from staff at the Exchequer and Audit Department and the Bank of England, B company from the Post Office Savings Bank Department, C company from the GPO, D and E companies from the Inland Revenue, F company from London County Council, G company from Whitehall offices, and H company from the Admiralty.” Elsewhere relations could be more problematic. One volunteer was concerned that the company and professional links of his battalion were not being sufficiently preserved: We have companies which proclaim themselves blatantly by various titles—Bankers, Procurators, Accountants, Shippers, Warehousemen, University, etc., etc. but have the leaders of these companies done anything in recent years to justify their special company titles, save to collect perhaps a subscription or two. How many Accountants, say, are in the Accountants’ Coy? Not many, I dare swear, and the same reply would require to be given all along the line.'°°

These concerns seem to have been justified, as in 1905 it was reported that the compulsory camp was leading to serious recruiting problems for the Bankers Company and the University Company could claim that just fifty-nine of its ninety-nine members were past or present members of the University of Glasgow. Indeed, when this battalion was incorporated into the TF as the 5 Scottish Rifles, these afhliations were disregarded.'°'

Some employers did their best to support the TF scheme but received little thanks. Hull Corporation paid their employees their full wages, for their time at camp, less the amount of TF pay received. While this seemed generous, the CO of the 4 Yorkshire and Durham Brigade ASC noted: “These men seem very much dissatisfied, and consider that they lose materially by being Members of the Territorial

Force, since in spite of the fact that they had to forego their holidays in order to

attend Camp, part of their weekly pay was withheld.’ The most generous employer of all appears to have been the government itself, which granted civil servants who were members of the TF an additional week’s leave with pay, so that

their entire holiday entitlement would not be spent in camp.’ Other employers were not at all supportive of the TF camps. When Private W. E. Rodgers of the Staffordshire Yeomanry joined the Worcestershire Constabulary it became clear

8 ‘Tameside Record Office, MR3/17/113/3/6, ‘2nd V.B. The Manchester Regiment Grand Military Bazaar, St James’ Hall, April 12th to 16th 1904. Souvenir and History of the Battalion’, p. 100, C. J. H. Mead, Cornwall’ Royal Engineers: A History of the Regiment from its formation up to the early part of the Second World War (Undershill, Plymouth, 1946), 147 and King, History of the 7th Battalion Middlesex Regiment, p. 130. ° BL, 8825 cc.19, ‘15th County of London Battalion, The London Regiment’ (c. 1913). '00 The First Lanark Rifles Gazette, U1, 8, December 1903, p. 65. '0\ The First Lanark Rifles Gazette, U1, 1, January 1905, pp. 43 and 48 and Fifth Battalion, Scottish Rifles Gazette, III, 1, 1911, pp. 97-100. '® LMA, ACC/1360/781/122, J. B. Stracey-Clitherow papers, “Reports of Commanding Officers of Units’, c. 1909, East Riding County Association. '3 BL, 8825 cc.19, “15th County of London Battalion, The London Regiment’ (c. 1913).

128 The Edwardian Army that he would receive only ten days’ annual leave and this only when his services could be spared. His commanding officer had no option but to regretfully grant his

discharge.’ The overall figures for the TF make it clear that many men were leaving the force fairly quickly and few engaged for extra terms of service before the outbreak of the

Great War. For the year ending 30 September 1913 within the TF as a whole, 62,978 men left on termination of their recruitment term (for most, three years), 1,320 purchased their discharge, and 8,376 were granted free discharges. To balance

this, there were 67,205 new recruits.'° In the County of London TF between 1 October 1912 and 30 September 1913, 10,767 other ranks became time expired. While 4,239 of these re-engaged, 3,294 re-engaged for just one year.’ The rate of turnover of personnel at the unit level could be very marked. In the summer of 1911, A Company, 5 Bedfordshire Regiment saw twelve of its men leave as their

term of engagement was up, two transferred to other TF units, four were discharged (one due to civil conviction, another on medical grounds), and one joined

the regular army, out of a total of ninety-nine. In the summer of 1913 the same unit saw eighteen men leave as time expired out of a total of 108.'°” Therefore not only was the TF failing to meet its establishment by 1913 but it was increasingly filled with men with very little training or no experience. As in the regulars and militia, Rifle Volunteer and TF officers had to meet heavy out-of-pocket expenses which frequently exceeded their pay, and this may have been a key factor in limiting the number of officers available, despite the introduction of the OTC. Colonel W. A. Lynde of the 4 VB Manchester Regiment, by no means the most socially exclusive battalion in the force, thought that an officer's uniform and equipment should cost him no more than £60. An officer would also

be expected to pay £3 3s.0d. as his band subscription, 10s.6d. to the Gymnastic Club, £1 1s.0d. to the Regimental Rifle Club and £1 1s.0d. towards the annual series of dinners at headquarters.'®® The shortage of TF officers was not helped by the less than enthusiastic support of the National Service League for the new force.

When Field Marshal Lord Roberts, President of the League, addressed the cadets of the University of London OTC, he spoke of his experiences at Lucknow in 1857 and how important it was for civilians to undertake some form of military train-

ing. He then urged the cadets to take up commissions in the Special Reserve, ‘where more prolonged training could be obtained’, failing to make any mention of the TE!”

'* Staffordshire Record Office, D.1300/2/3, Staffordshire Yeomanry, out letter book, letter Lieutenant Colonel H. L. Walker, Chief Constable of Worestershire to O.C., 11/10/09.

' 1914 (Cd. 7254), The annual return of the Territorial Force for the year 1913, p. 125. '06 LMA, A/TA/1, Minutes of T. FE. Association of the County of London, minutes for 4/12/13. '°7 Luton and Bedfordshire Record Office, X550/6/4 and X550/6/7, ‘Pay Lists for Annual Training; 5th Bedfordshire Regiment’, 1911 and 1913. '68 "Tameside Record Office, MR1/12/2/4, ‘Memo. by W. A. Lynde, Col. Commanding 4th V.B. Manchester Regiment’, undated but c. 1905. '° University of London Special Collections, ME1/1/1, “Report of Military Education Committee to the Senate’, 1910.

The Auxiliary Forces 129 While much was made of the TF being organized in brigades and divisions, unlike the old Volunteers, this did little to open up the higher command to part-time officers. Indeed, even the otherwise shattering effects of the Great War did little to remove the ‘glass ceiling’ which prevented all but a handful of TF offic-

ers being promoted above the rank of lieutenant colonel. Noel Lee, a TF officer, wrote expressing his surprise on his promotion to brigadier general, following his effective leadership of the 6 Manchester Regiment, in 1911: I am pardonably proud of it all + the more so, as the old battalion has now earned two brigadiers running...I am also bucked up over it as it was practically laid down that no more territorials were to be given brigades... [here are only four infantry brigades TF commanded by Territorials and only five mounted brigades TF by Yeoman and they are mainly ex-regulars or Earls of This and That out of 68 brigade commands altogether.'’°

As in the militia, there was a conflict over where Rifle Volunteer units should go for their annual camp. Large regular military camps provided excellent training facilities but agreeable holiday resorts helped to boost recruitment and guaranteed a better attendance at camp. Thus the 2 VB Manchester Regiment spent 1902 and 1903 in summer camps on Salisbury Plain but had their 1904 camp at Ramsey, Isle of Man.''! In 1911 the entire East Anglian Division of the TF camped in Thet-

ford in Norfolk, where, surprisingly, it seems that all 617 other ranks of the 5 Bedfordshire Regiment attended camp, albeit 177 for less than the entire fifteen days, suggesting that large-scale manoeuvres did not necessarily result in high absenteeism.'!* By 1913 the rather desperate situation in TF recruitment, retention, and attendance at camp meant that a holiday atmosphere was definitely promoted at some camps. The 5 Scottish Rifles camp near Troon, in 1913 for example, left the men free from about 2 p.m. ‘nearly every day’.''’ As Lieutenant General Sir John Keir reflected, “Everything in reason, and some things out of reason were resorted to to tempt men to enlist and to make the Force popular, even at the expense of discipline, training, and efhciency. The sites for summer camps, for instance, were chosen more with a view to the enjoyment of the men than for the benefit of their training.”!'* Other units adopted a more coercive approach to

attendance at camp. When the 4 East Yorkshire Regiment was found to have a high absentee rate at its camp in summer 1908, the County Territorial Association wanted the CO to proceed against a few ‘flagrant cases’ under the provisions of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act.!” 10 "Tameside Record Office, MR3/17/113/1/1, letter Noel Lee to his wife, 12/8/11 and MR3/17/113/3/4 ‘Command Inspection Report on the 6th Manchester Regt., 1910’. ''! "Tameside Record Office, MR3/17/113/3/6, ‘2nd V.B. The Manchester Regiment Grand Military Bazaar, St James’ Hall, April 12th to 16th 1904. Souvenir and History of the Battalion’, pp. 87-9. '? Luton and Bedfordshire Record Office, X550/15/2, “The Bedfordshire Regiment Association of Old Comrades, 8th Annual Report, 1911’, p. 55. "Fifth Battalion, Scottish Rifles Gazette, I, 1, January 1914, p. 24. 4 John Keir, A Soldier’s Eye-View of our armies John Murray, London, 1919), p. 35.

' LMA, ACC/1360/781/23, J. B. Stracey-Clitherow papers, minutes of East Riding County Territorial Association, 19/8/08.

130 The Edwardian Army The County Territorial Associations, an innovative feature of the Haldane reforms, were designed as a devolved system of military decision making and admin-

istration.''® Initially Haldane planned to have an elective element but this was quickly dispensed with and Associations were set up to include a mixture of military and lay members, so normally included established military figures, local aristocrats,

major employers, and members of the local councils. The disparity between the number of units which County Territorial Associations administered was very marked. ‘The County of London Association covered a wide range of units: three yeomanry regiments, eighteen infantry battalions, eight brigades of artillery and supporting RE, ASC, and RAMC units, from parts of Kent, Middlesex, and Surrey, which were regarded as Greater London, while the Kinross Association administered just one company of the 7 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.'””

The County Territorial Associations were designed to relieve commanding officers of a real burden, that of battalion finance. The extent of this is clear in the case of the 7 Middlesex Regiment. Recruited from the Greater London area, this

battalion had to maintain six different detachments, all with separate drill halls. As a result the battalion was running a ‘floating debt’ of £4,000 by 1901 and Lieutenant Colonel Bowles resigned in August 1903 having failed to resolve this debt

with the War Office. Bowles’s successor, Lieutenant Colonel E G. Collinson, refused to take on any personal liability for this debt and came to an arrangement with the War Office whereby it would be paid off by the deduction of £400 p.a. from the grants made to the battalion. The introduction of the County Territorial Association and the removal of this financial liability were warmly welcomed in this battalion.''® For other COs, however, the associations seemed to generate a great deal of paperwork to cover the cost of trifling sums. Some officers also highlighted the nonsense of centralized repairs of clothing and equipment, which had

been negotiated by the County Associations, supposedly to take advantage of economies of scale. Writing in January 1909, the CO of the Staffordshire Yeomanry asked for permission to have cloaks repaired locally, noting, ‘as in some cases the

carriage of the cloak to and from Messrs. Hammond + Co. would cost practically as much as the repairs to the cloak.’!” Large associations provided considerable help to the units under their command. For example, in the case of the County of London Territorial Association, the association funded ‘paid recruiters’ who obtained 737 recruits from January to July 1914.'”° However, this association was more wary of its role in providing uni-

forms for the units under its administrative control, noting: ‘It is difficult, "6 For a detailed discussion of the County Territorial Associations see K. W. Mitchinson, Englands Last Hope: The Territorrial Force, 1908-14 (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008), pp. 1-158.

"7 Army Lists, 1908-1914 and LMA, A/TA/1, Minutes of T. F. Association of the County of London, minutes for 28/2/08. "8 King, History of the 7th Battalion Middlesex Regiment, pp. 130-3. "19 Staffordshire Record Office, D.1300/2/3, Staffordshire Yeomanry, out letter book, letter CO to Secretary, TF Association, 8/1/09. For similar complaints, see LMA, ACC/1360/781/122, J. B. Stracey-Clitherow papers, ‘Reports of Commanding Officers of Units’, c. 1909, East Riding County Association. '20 LMA, A/TA/2, Minutes of T. FE. Association of the County of London, minutes for 23/7/14.

The Auxiliary Forces 131 at present, by any conditions to prevent a bad kind of “sweating” in the employment of labour; and the drawback may, at any moment, attract sufficient public attention to bring the work of the Association into disrepute.’'*'! Where associations could help units was in rationalizing the use of facilities and enabling units to share drill halls, rifle ranges, etc., though in cases where units had owned their own facilities pre 1908 these negotiations were often difficult.!”” The concept of devolving financial management from the War Office to the County Associations was fraught with difficulty. In May 1908 Lord Amptill, the Chairman of the Bedfordshire Association, could not see how he was expected to certify that the claims made by the Bedfordshire Yeomanry for the conveyance of their horses were ‘just and true in every particular’ as the War Office demanded.'” While meant to relieve COs of financial responsibilities, the endless requests and queries of expenditure seem to have produced an inordinate amount of paperwork which COs and their adjutants had to deal with on an almost daily basis.'* The County Associations were, however, aware of their limitations and did not seek to

unduly extend their powers. When, in January 1910, the War Office issued a circular which sought to make the associations responsible for obtaining horses and vehicles for both the TF and regular army on mobilization, the Bedfordshire association responded with an angry minute, stating that they felt this plan was ‘wrong in principle, unfair to the County Associations, thoroughly impracticable and therefore foredoomed to failure. We feel great resentment at the proposal to shift on to these newly-established, untried and powerless County Associations grave responsibilities which the War Office itself has never been able to discharge.’!””

As a result it seems that, on the outbreak of war, the acquisition of horses was left to many units to organize for themselves.'”°

The County Territorial Associations were not treated as anything like equal partners by the Army Council. This is well illustrated by the fate of the Padding-

ton Rifles. Initially incorporated into the TF as the 10 London Regiment, this unit was facing some recruiting problems, being 1,006 strong, but, more seriously, having very high absenteeism at camp, with only 393 members attending the Summer camp in 1911 and of those just 187 for the full fifteen days. The GOC, London District advised the disbandment of this battalion and the formation of a new battalion in Hackney. The County of London Territorial Association felt

'21 LMA, A/TA/1, Minutes of T. FE. Association of the County of London, minutes for 25/11/08.

7 OOK. ke See examples in Staffordshire Record Office, D.1300/2/3, Staffordshire Yeomanry, out letter 3 Luton and Bedfordshire Record Office, X372/1, Bedfordshire Territorial Association, ‘Miscellaneous file of correspondence between secretary and chairman’, letter Secretary to Chief Accountant, Eastern Command, 27/5/08. 4 Luton and Bedfordshire Record Office, X372/2/1,2 and 3, Bedfordshire Territorial Association, “Transport file’ and files relating to the Yeomanry.

5 Luton and Bedfordshire Record Office, X372/2/4, Bedfordshire Territorial Association, ‘Provision of vehicles and ambulances on mobilization’. '6 George Fellows and B. E M. Freeman, Historical Records of the South Nottinghamshire Hussars Yeomanry, 1794 to 1924 (Gale & Polden, Aldershot, 1928), pp. 214-15 and C. W. Thompson, Records of The Dorset Yeomanry (Queens Own) 1914-1919 (F. Bennet, Sherborne, 1921), p. 2.

132 The Edwardian Army that the battalion was recruiting well and had a very good drill hall, built at a cost of £5,000 and in a ‘conspicuous position’. They felt that some improvements to the office and recreational facilities and some changes to organization and person-

nel, including a new CO, would revive the battalion. They continued: ‘[T]he general effect of the disbandment of this markedly local Battalion upon the whole

Territorial Force in the County of London must be considered.’ However, the Army Council ignored these suggestions and acted on the advice of the GOC, London District.!’’ The Works and Buildings Committee of the County of London Territorial Association resigned en masse in April 1910 over what they saw as War Office interference in their work. This was concerned with the redevelopment of an RE headquarters at Elverton Street, which the War Office had asked to be redesigned as a cost-saving measure. This resignation, somewhat surprisingly, saw a victory for

the association as the War Office relented, approving this and a number of other projects.'”®

In Staffordshire it was also felt that the Army Council had taken a very pennypinching approach to the provision of accommodation, even if units had not done much to help their cause by asking for too much.!”” At the regimental level the introduction of the new County Associations led to

major restructuring in some areas. For example, the demarcation between the Kent and County of London Associations meant that the old 2 Volunteer Battalion of the Royal West Kent regiment was split in two. Part remained under the Kent Association as the new 5 Royal West Kent, the rest became part of the new 20 London Regiment. Colonel E. J. Heward, the CO of the old Volunteer Bat-

talion, noted his distaste at the disbandment of the unit but hoped ‘that every member now on the roll will join for at least 1 or 2 years, so as to give the new Territorial Scheme a fair trial’.’°° Even with the input of the local associations, some of the decisions made on the formation of the Territorial Force displayed little knowledge of, or sensitivity to, local conditions. For example, in Cornwall, the Volunteer Submarine Miners were simply disbanded and a Royal Engineer

company formed afresh, whereas it would have been much easier to have transferred the one into the other.'*! While the Haldane scheme explicitly established the TF as a home-defence force only, whose members could only be sent on overseas service if they volunteered to undertake it, at the regimental level there were fears that this was not being made

27 LMA, A/TA/1, Minutes of T. E Association of the County of London, ‘Report of sub-committee appointed by the General purposes committee to inquire into and consider the proposals contained in

the confidential War Office letter...dated 2nd of October, 1911, regarding the future of the 10th Battalion, The London Regiment (Paddington Rifles), minutes for 13/6/12 and 28/11/12 and HC Debates 4/6/12, 39, cc. 16-17. 28 LMA, A/TA/1, Minutes of T. FE. Association of the County of London, minutes for 7/4/10.

9 Staffordshire RO, D.5528/2, ‘Staffordshire Territorial Force in 1909’, report on meeting of County Territorial Asociation, 31/7/09. 130 The Queens Own Gazette, 392, 1908, p. 2367. '5!' Mead, Cornwall’ Royal Engineers, p. 127.

The Auxiliary Forces 133 sufficiently clear. Captain Frank Hipwell of the 3 VB Bedfordshire Regiment commented on the new TF attestation forms: In the Territorial Oath no mention is made of service to be rendered in Great Britain only as was the case with the Volunteers, and it appears that any man signing this renders himself liable to serve abroad if called upon, or bear the consequences as a deserter. Is this omission intentional or not? I should have very decided qualms as to pledging myself to the extent apparently required, and believe that it will prove a very serious stumbling block in the way of recruiting or getting present members of the Volunteers to re-enlist.'*?

The Imperial Service Obligation was, in fact, taken up by very few TF members before the outbreak of the Great War and by even fewer complete units; indeed, in September 1913, only 1,090 officers and 17,788 other ranks were noted as having undertaken the obligation. When units did sign up to the Imperial Service Obli-

gation it seems to have been entirely on regimental initiative. The CO of the 7 Middlesex Regiment tried to persuade all existing members to sign up for the Imperial Service Obligation and ordered that, from 1910, no officer or man should be accepted as a member of the unit unless he was willing to serve overseas. By the

end of 1910, 90 per cent of the battalion had accepted the Imperial Service Obligation. Only the Northumberland Hussars, 8 Middlesex, and 6 East Surrey followed this example. Interestingly, this additional commitment does not appear to have affected the ability of the 7 Middlesex Regiment to recruit. In 1909 it had

816 men; this increased to 890 in 1910, 892 in 1911, and 902 in 1912, before dipping slightly to 865 in 1913. However, it does not seem to have done much to help its re-engagement rate as, in 1913, 350 men were listed as ‘recruits’.'°° The equipment available to the TF was obsolete on the outbreak of war. The socially exclusive 5 Scottish Rifles, despite being one of the first TF units selected for overseas service in 1914, was still armed with the Lee—Metford rifle in August 1914, a rifle phased out of the regular army in the mid 1890s.'°* Equipment was also very limited. Colonel C. H. Milburn of the 2 Northumbrian Brigade, RPA,

complained that he had only four guns out of an establishment of twelve in 1909.'° Another major problem for the TF was the supply of horses. The County of London Territorial Association realized the problems they faced in 1912 when it became clear that the Associated Omnibus Company, which the association relied on to provide 750 draught horses, was becoming motorized. The London Yeomanry '32 Luton and Bedfordshire Record Office, X550/6/152, letter Captain Frank Hipwell to Bedfordshire TE Association, 2/2/08. '33 1914 (Cd. 7254), The annual return of the Territorial Force for the year 1913, p. 129, King, History of the 7th Battalion Middlesex Regiment, pp. VUI-X and 150-4, Army Lists, 1910-1914 and Howard Pease, The History of the Northumberland (Hussars) Yeomanry 1819-1919 with supplement to 1923

(Constable, London, 1924), p. 64. '34 Regimental Publications Committee, The Fifth Battalion, The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) 1914-1919 (Jackson and Son, Glasgow, 1936), p. 7. '85 LMA, ACC/1360/781/122, J. B. Stracey-Clitherow papers, “Reports of Commanding Officers of Units’, c. 1909, East Riding County Association.

134 The Edwardian Army Regiments also appear to have relied on horses from the omnibus companies on a large scale, though presumably they were too heavy for proper cavalry training.'*°

Indeed, by 1912 it appeared that very few horses could be obtained in London for the London-based yeomanry regiments for their camps or on mobilization. This led Lord Esher to state ‘that the sooner the Military Authorities realized the fact that within a measurable distance of time mounted troops for Home Defence could not be provided with horses, the sooner they might be brought to realize the importance of reconsidering the Strategical and Tactical aspects of Home

Defence’.'*” Elsewhere, the problems of horse supply were equally acute. Orders issued to the Staffordshire TF infantry brigade in 1909 for an exercise noted that they would have no cavalry support, ‘as the Yeomanry horses are required for another regiment .'**

Where the County Association tried to resolve the problem of horse supply by purchasing some for training, this could lead to unforeseen difficulties. Lieutenant Colonel J. B. Stracey-Clitherow of the East Riding of Yorkshire Yeomanry had a

long-running feud with his local TF artillery unit, the 2 Northumbrian Brigade, RFA. This unit was entitled to borrow some of the small number of horses which were permanently attached to Stracey-Clitherow’s regiment but he was concerned that they had used these riding horses in harness and believed that on Boxing Day

1908, artillerymen had tried to take the horses to participate in the local hunt, rather than for any military purposes.'*’

While incorporated into the TF as a whole, in 1908 the yeomanry had a sufficiently separate existence to justify its discussion as a discreet entity. The fortunes of the home-based yeomanry had improved markedly, due to the experiences of the Imperial Yeomanry in the South African War. H. O. Arnold-Foster wrote, in 1906: “Ten years ago the Yeomanry was on the point of perishing: it is now in

a most satisfactory condition.’'“° The number of yeomanry units expanded rapidly in 1901 from thirty-eight to fifty-six regiments, and it is somewhat unclear why the War Office let this permanent expansion occur. At a very practical level, the cost of uniforms for yeomanry units alone was much more expensive than that for other auxiliary units. The County of London Territorial Association found that £2 14s.9d. to £3 3s.9d. was needed to clothe a yeoman in 1908 as opposed to £1 3s.¥2d. to £2 2s.3d. for an infantryman.'*’ When Arnold-Forster did preside over a slight reduction in the yeomanry, he reduced the establishment of all yeomanry regiments to 476 all ranks in March 1904, from a previous 86 A. S. Hamilton, The City of London Yeomanry (Roughriders) (The Hamilton Press, London,

Been A/TA/1, Minutes of T. FE. Association of the County of London, minutes for 24/11/10, 28/11/12 and 22/7/13. '88 Staffs RO, D.5528/2, ‘Staffordshire Territorial Force in 1909’, report on “The Staffordshire Territorial Brigade encampment at Towyn’, 14/8/09.

' LMA, ACC/1360/781/126.2 and 107.2 and 107.3, J. B. Stracey-Clitherow papers, letters J. S. Kennedy Shaw to Stracey-Clitherow, 5/1/09, letter Clive Wilson to Stracey-Clitherow, 8/1/09 and letter W. H. Goldie to Adjutant, East Riding of Yorkshire Yeomanry, 7/1/09. ‘0 Arnold-Forster, The Army in 1906, p. 129. 41 LMA, A/TA/1, Minutes of T. FE. Association of the County of London, minutes for 25/11/08.

The Auxiliary Forces 135 establishment of 596. Not disbanding any yeomanry regiment in its entirety prevented political controversy.'*”

This rather ad hoc expansion, with limited War Office supervision, meant that the yeomanry was not distributed throughout the country evenly, even with the formation of the new regiments in Surrey, Norfolk, Sussex, Glamorganshire, Lincolnshire, City of London (Rough Riders and Westminster Dragoons), County of London (Sharp Shooters and King’s Colonials, later King Edward’s Horse), Bedfordshire, Essex, North of Ireland, South of Ireland, Northamptonshire, the East Riding of Yorkshire, and Scotland (Lovat’s Scouts and the Scottish Horse) in 1901. Cornwall, for example, did not have its own yeomanry regiment, despite possessing a long and vulnerable coastline and the traditional social structure which one associates with the yeomanry, although a squadron of the Devon Hussars was

based in the county.'*? Similarly, the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars recruited a

squadron from Monmouthshire, the Denbighshire Hussars had a squadron in Carnarvonshire and a troop on Anglesey, and the Northumberland Hussars had a

squadron in Durham.“ The Haldane reforms, which did so much to recast the other auxiliary forces, had a very limited impact on the yeomanry. Initially, it appears that Haldane had sought to make the yeomanry liable for service abroad in time of war, making an

announcement to this effect in July 1906. Indeed, one regimental history suggests that a meeting of yeomanry commanding officers offered their regiments for overseas service if they were not put under the newly formed County Territorial Associations and left to deal directly with the War Office.’ When the TF was established, some attempts seem to have been made to rationalize the exist-

ing yeomanry regimental system, presumably out of concerns that County Territorial Associations could not easily supervise the existing inter-county organizations. For example, the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars were initially ordered to disband their Monmouthshire squadron and encourage the personnel to join the newly established Royal Horse Artillery battery in the county—an order quickly revoked due to regimental lobbying.'*® Otherwise, the Haldane reforms brigading of yeomanry regiments seems to have led to few concrete benefits and certainly did little to increase the promotion prospects for yeomanry officers. Only two of the fourteen new TF mounted brigades were commanded by officers who had spent their entire military careers in the yeomanry.

“2 E. S. Parry and B. E M. Freeman, Historical Records of the Denbighshire Hussars Imperial Yeomanry from their formation in 1795 till 1906 (Woodall, Minshall, Thomas, Wrexham, 1909), p. 206 and Frank Fox, The History of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars Yeomanry, 1898-1922 (Phillip Allan, London, 1923), p. 26 and George Fellows and B. E M. Freeman, Historical Records of the South Nottinghamshire Hussars Yeomanry, 1794 to 1924 (Gale & Polden, Aldershot, 1928), p. 196. ‘3 Mead, Cornwall’s Royal Engineers, p. 132. 4 Parry and Freeman, Historical Records of the Denbighshire Hussars, p. 208 and Frank Fox, The History of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars Yeomanry, 1898-1922 (Phillip Allan, London, 1923), p. 36.

45 Arnold-Forster, The Army in 1906, pp. 128-9 and E. S. Parry and B. FE. M. Freeman, Historical Records of the Denbighshire Hussars Imperial Yeomanry from their formation in 1795 till 1906 (Woodall, Minshall, Thomas, Wrexham, 1909), p. 244. 46 Fox, History of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, p. 36.

136 The Edwardian Army Three other yeomanry commanding officers were appointed to command mounted brigades but they all had previous service with the regular army.'*” With regard to the officer corps in the yeomanry, some units retained a definite link to landed society. Indeed, in 1914, fifty-seven members of the peerage

were listed as officers in the yeomanry. Of these, twenty-eight were honorary colonels but this position should not be simply viewed as a meaningless local honour. For example, the Duke of Beaufort, who was Honorary Colonel of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars in 1914, had served as an active officer in the regi-

ment for almost forty years, seventeen as lieutenant colonel before resigning in 1904.'*8 In the Lanarkshire Yeomanry, where unusually the regimental history published in 1911 provides a detailed list of officers and their occupations, seven officers in the 1902-10 period owned large estates in the regimental area.'”° However, even the yeomanry could not rely on traditional landed families for its entire officer corps. The Queen’s Own Oxfordshire Hussars could count amongst their officers on the outbreak of the First World War a cloth manufacturer, two MPs, a stockbroker, a solicitor, a barrister, a civil servant, a banker, and an Oxford don.'”® Otherwise, the yeomanry seems to have attracted a lot of former regular

officers, certainly in comparison with the numbers serving in militia or Rifle Volunteer units; in August 1914, excluding honorary colonels and adjutants, the yeomanry contained fifty-seven former regular officers, forty-two of them from cavalry regiments.'?! In 1906 the CO of the Northamptonshire Yeomanry could boast that all of his squadron commanders were former regular officers.'”* By 1914, a few OTC products were gaining commissions in the force. For example, FE. A. Mitchell of Oxford University OTC received a commission in the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars in February 1913 and he was followed in April 1914 by

Lord Apsley of Eton College OTC. Similarly, the Queen’s Own Dorset Yeomanry received two second lieutenants from the Oxford University OTC in January 1913.'° The yeomanry is often portrayed as some sort of ‘feudal force’, the officers being

landed gentry and the other ranks their tenants and retainers. However, just as the officer corps was more diverse than expected, so were the rank and file. Some units do seem to have managed to maintain a largely rural recruiting base. Lovat’s Scouts

and the Scottish Horse, formed in 1902, seem to have obtained most of their men from the tenants, keepers, stalkers, and other retainers from the highland estates.

7 Fellows and Freeman, Historical Records of the South Nottinghamshire Hussars, p. 202. “8 Fox, The History of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars Yeomanry, p. 26. 9 R. E. Wood, Records of the Lanarkshire Yeomanry with some account of the Officers of the Corps,

1819-1910 (privately published, c. 1911), pp. 85-126. 0 Adrian Keith-Falconer, The Oxfordshire Hussars in the Great War (John Murray, London, 1922), p. 25. \ Army List, August, 1914. '? Northamptonshire Record Office, NY2/1, Northamptonshire Yeomanry, newspaper cuttings book, Northampton Independent, 15/12/06. 3 Fox, History of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, pp. 54-8 and Dorset History Centre, D/ DOY/A/1/1/14, Dorset Yeomanry regimental orders, 13/1/13.

The Auxiliary Forces 137 The adjutant of the North Irish Horse claimed in 1913 that about 90 per cent of the men were farmers or farmers’ sons.'” Elsewhere the social profile of yeomanry regiment was more disparate. Colonel Lord Annaly of the Northamptonshire Yeomanry stated: “We do not take anybody but choose principally farmers’ sons and respectable young men from the towns.

We have found some very fine recruits in the towns.”’” In A Squadron of the Queen’s Own Dorset Yeomanry, where unusually a muster roll providing occupations survives, the numbers of farmers and non-farmers serving in the unit between 1902 and 1914 were almost evenly divided; 135 farmers to 132 in other occupa-

tions. The other occupations included traditional rural trades, such as shoeing smiths, blacksmiths, and grooms but new professions and trades were also represented, there being, for example, an architect, three dental assistants, an electrician, and a telegraphist.!°° Regimental histories did tend to make a point of emphasizing how many members of the regiment owned their own horses, as a guide to the social pedigree of the regiment.'”” Lieutenant General Sir Ian Hamilton, inspecting all thirteen yeomanry regiments in Western Command in May 1906 apparently reported that around half of the other ranks owned their own horses.’ The Wolverhampton Troop of the Staffordshire Yeomanry selected its members in a similar way to some of the other ‘class corps’ in the auxiliary forces, requiring new recruits to be proposed and seconded at a meeting of the troop. However, when ‘several gentlemen’ who were unknown to anyone in the troop applied for membership, it appears that they were enlisted after enquiries to their suitability had been made by the squadron sergeant major. The last example of this happening was in November 1908, suggesting that the transfer of the troop to the TF and its expansion to squadron strength led to a more relaxed approach to recruiting.'” What is noticeable is that the yeomanry, like other elements of the auxiliary forces, had a high turnover of personnel. The Queen’s Own Dorset Yeomanry tried to resolve this problem by introducing a series of graduated fines designed to reimburse regimental funds for the cost of uniforms and equipment, for those

who left before their minimum of three years’ service. This meant that a man leaving within one year of enlistment would have to pay £6; this would fall to £4 within two years and £2 within three years. While this may have prevented men

4 R. M. T. Campbell-Preston, The Scottish Horse 1900-1956 (Newsprint, Fort William, N.D.), p. 15, Lord Lovat, March Past (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1978), pp. 20-2 and E. M. Dorman, “The North Irish Horse’, Army Review, HI, 1913, p. 540. '° Northamptonshire Record Office, NY2/1, Northamptonshire Yeomanry, newspaper cuttings book, Peterborough Advertiser, 23/5/03 Northampton Independent, 15/12/06. '6 Figures calculated from Dorset History Centre, D/DOY/A4/8, Dorset Yeomanry muster rolls,

1868— ;

ee Fox, History of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars Yeomanry, p. 31.

8 Ibid, p. 32 and Dorset History Centre, D/DOY/A/3/11/4, Dorset Yeomanry, Confidential letter book, 1903-1909, letter Adjutant to J. Douglas-Willon, Deputy Assistant Director of Remounts, Southern Command, undated, but November 1906.

'99 Staffordshire Record Office, D.1300/1/13, Bye laws, minutes, etc. for Wolverhampton Troop, Staffordshire Yeomanry, minutes for 1902—1905 and D.5559/1, Minute book for Wolverhampton Troop, 1906-1924.

138 The Edwardian Army exercising the so called “housemaid’s clause’ and leaving with two weeks’ notice,

the numbers re-engaging were not particularly good; in May 1905 there were just four enlistments but fifty-seven discharges and in April 1906 there were ten

enlistments but fifty-four discharges. It seems that the Haldane reforms, with their increased emphasis on attendance at camp, may have partially resolved this

problem, but in 1911 in the Queen’s Own Dorset Yeomanry there were still fifty-four discharges to balance against sixty-nine recruits, which suggests that the personnel remained transitory.’ In peacetime, yeomanry training must have verged on the shambolic on many occasions, due to the limited number of horses available. A full week after mobilization in August 1914, the City of London Yeomanry had only enough horses to mount one of its squadrons. Even in rural Kent, horses were not always available

for training, and in 1908 a weekend camp was held with ‘[o]ver 100 men of the Yeomanry assembled, mostly on bicycles’.'°' Anything above regimental training, often carried out at the stately homes of regimental colonels, seems to have been

unusual. Although with the introduction of the brigade system in 1908 there seems to have been a desire to see yeomanry regiments camping in brigades one year in every three, this seems to have been frustrated on cost grounds and because of the desire of many local yeomanry officers to hold their annual camps locally.

The South Midland Mounted Brigade and 1 South West Mounted Brigade did take part in manoeuvres against each other at Salisbury Plain during their annual trainings of 1909 and 1910, possibly as the local GOC, Lieutenant General Sir Ian Hamilton, was a strong advocate of the yeomanry.'® An attempt to form the four Welsh yeomanry Regiments into a brigade for training purposes in Breconshire in summer 1906 ended in farce, when it was found that the area selected for the camp was a peat bog, necessitating rushed regimental arrangements with local landowners in other parts of Wales.'® The experience of the Westmorland and Cumberland Yeomanry, which met for its annual camp every year between 1904 and 1914 at Lowther Park near Penrith, the home of the regiment’s colonel, the Earl of Lonsdale, seems more typical.'“ Opportunities for yeomanry regiments to engage in training with regular cavalry regiments were even more unlikely. A rare case occurred in September 1903 when the

Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, Royal Wiltshire Hussars, and Queen's Own Dorset Imperial Yeomanry furnished a squadron each to join the 2 Army Corps for the autumn

manoeuvres.’ A ‘blue’ force comprised of the South Nottinghamshire Hussars,

‘© Dorset History Centre, D/DOY/A/1/1/13-14, Dorset Yeomanry regimental orders, entries for January 1904, 5/5/05 and 24/4/06 and all entries for 1911. '6! TWM, 93/31/1, A. S. Hamilton, “Wartime travels, 1914-1919’, unpublished manuscript, p. 3 and J. E. Edmeades, Some Historical Records of the West Kent (Q.O.) Yeomanry 1794-1909 (Andrew Melrose, London, 1909), p. 118. ‘© Fox, The History of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, pp. 41-6. ' Parry and Freeman, Historical Records of the Denbighshire Hussars, p. 241.

; 4 oO D.Sen/11/3/5, Westmorland and Cumberland Yeomanry, Regimental order book, "3 Fox, The History of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, p. 24.

The Auxiliary Forces 139 Sherwood Rangers, and Derbyshire Yeomanry felt that it had performed well against a ‘red’ force, which included the Scots Greys in their annual camp at Salisbury Plain

in 1910.1 The position of the North and South Irish Horse was an unusual one. As the Territorial Force was not extended to Ireland they were formed as Special Reserve units with an obligation to serve overseas in time of war. Indeed, two squadrons drawn from these regiments embarked for France with the original BEF. In peace-

time their training was not of a notably higher standard than that for yeomanry regiments elsewhere. The large regimental areas meant that weekly drills were car-

ried out in a wide range of centres. The North Irish Horse alone had thirty-two drill stations spread over an area consisting of ten counties. While many men were able to provide their own horses, at least for training purposes, many of these were plough horses, too heavy for cavalry work. The fact that the annual camp for the regiments lasted for twenty-four days as opposed to the fifteen for other yeomanry units probably did little to compensate for these shortcomings.'% The place of the yeomanry in the arme blanche controversy is a rather confused

one. When the yeomanry was expanded in 1901, the decision was made not to issue the force with swords, although at least three regiments contrived to continue to carry swords for ceremonial purposes.'® The South Nottinghamshire Hussars, at their annual camp at Aldershot in 1903, made a point of parading in full dress uniform, without rifles, and drilling as cavalry.’ Surprisingly, though, in 1904 in the Mounted Scouts competition organized by the National Rifle Association, the Queen’s Own Dorset Yeomanry team won first prize, with the Westminster Dragoons coming second and the regular 18 Hussars coming third.'”? This suggests that, at least in some yeomanry regiments, the ‘mounted rifle’ training was of a very

high standard. In 1909 the short-magazine Lee—Enfield rifle was issued to the yeomanry, but without bayonets. This meant that the yeomanry had no offensive weapon beyond their rifles and so removed the possibility of shock action from their training.'”' By 1912, the situation was no clearer. The Army Council noted that in the event of war, the yeomanry would be utilized in a home-defence role,

‘in a country the nature of which practically precluded any possibility of the employment of shock tactics’, but then stated that swords would be issued to the force on mobilization.'” Interestingly, the problems seen in camp attendance by the Rifle Volunteers do not seem to have been mirrored by the yeomanry. The attractions of holding camp in local stately homes was a marked one. For example, the local press reported on the experience of the Northamptonshire Yeomanry at Castle Ashby in 1904,

'66 Fellows and Freeman, Historical Records of the South Nottinghamshire Hussars, pp. 208-9. '67 E. M. Dorman, “The North Irish Horse’, Army Review, II, 1913. '68 Parry and Freeman, Historical Records of the Denbighshire Hussars, pp. 207-8 and Stephen Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880-1918 (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2008), p. 162. '© Fellows and Freeman, Historical Records of the South Nottinghamshire Hussars, pp. 193-6. ' Gage, Records of the Dorset Imperial Yeomanry 1894-1905, p. 56. '7) Fellows and Freeman, Historical Records of the South Nottinghamshire Hussars, p. 206.

'2 "TNA, WO163/17, ‘Minutes of the Army Council, 1912’, p. 338.

140 The Edwardian Army remarking that it was ‘as acceptable in a military sense as it is picturesque and pleasant from a social standpoint’.'’? However, the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars had a turnout of 458 men for their training at Salisbury Plain in 1909, as opposed to 449

at Sudeley Castle, Winchcombe in 1908, suggesting that attendance at military camps was still high.'”* The OTC sat rather uncomfortably within the various military traditions existing in Britain in the Edwardian period. The committee which developed the concept of

the OTC was established in 1906 under Sir Edward Ward, the Permanent UnderSecretary at the War Office, to consider the provision of officers for, first, the regular army in wartime and, second, for the auxiliary forces. As it evolved, the OTC was then to provide officers to regular, Special Reserve, and TF forces during the Edward-

ian period and to all elements of the army during the Great War. The OTC contingents were to remain outside the TF scheme as a whole, and were not administered by the County Territorial Associations, being under the control of the Army Council. The War Office provided funding for OTC units based on their ‘efficient numbers; for the Senior Division this was £2 per cadet with an additional 3s. for each attending annual camp and for the Junior Division £1 per efficient cadet—but only if 50 per cent of the contingent attended summer camp. In essence, the concept was that a junior division would be organized at public schools and a senior division at universities; most of these would draw on existing volunteer units and rely on school

and university staff for their officer corps. Cadets at OTC units would have the opportunity to complete certificates A, in the junior division, and B, in the senior division on a part-time basis; the possession of these certificates would entitle them

to a commission in the reserve forces, or, indeed, regular army, with the added bonus of a remission in the period of their probation and no further promotion examinations until they reached the rank of captain. Possession of a certificate A alone would enable a cadet to obtain a Special Reserve commission, with the reduction of probation by four months or a TF commission with no further promotion examinations until he reached the rank of lieutenant. With the public school and university basis, the OTC would then have a class composition not that dissimilar to that of the regular army, an issue which exercised some Labour MPs.'” The junior contingents of OTCs were developed at public and some grammar schools and, in many cases, built on existing cadet units. Interestingly, membership of these does not seem to have been compulsory for all pupils, presumably as higher school fees were involved for pupils who were members, but schools clearly set great store by their possession of a contingent. The Headmaster of Campbell College, Belfast spoke about its OTC contingent at the annual speech day in 1913:

'® Northamptonshire Record Office, NY2/1, newspaper cuttings book for Northamptonshire Yeomanry, cutting from the Peterborough Advertiser, undated but 1904. '4 Fox, History of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, pp. 36-43.

'2 J. K. Dunlop, The development of the British army, 1899-1914 (Methuen, London, 1938), pp. 294-5, E. M. Teagarden, “Lord Haldane and the origins of Officer Training Corps’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, XLV, 182, 1967 and Jan Worthington, ‘Socialization, Militarization and Officer Recruiting: The Development of the Officers Training Corps’, Military Affairs, 43, 2, 1979.

The Auxiliary Forces 141 “To parents whose boys have not joined the corps, I should like to say that the advantages of membership are very great, and that the training makes a boy a better man, a better citizen, and more likely to succeed in his subsequent career.’!”°

For the War Office this was a way to secure a reserve of junior officers very cheaply: university and school staff provided the majority of the officer corps for the units, many schools and universities provided accommodation gratis and, in some units, cadets or their parents made a considerable contribution towards the cost of their own training. The system did have significant disadvantages, though. Most units could call on pitifully little professional military experience, beyond the regular adjutant and small number of regular NCOs, which was surely a major shortcoming in an organization providing future officers. Training facilities were often very poor, with inadequate accommodation and equipment. University OTC units relied largely, and school OTC units solely, on members of teaching staff to provide their officer corps. Not surprisingly, few academics could muster much military experience. Of the initial five academics commissioned into the University of London OTC, only two had any military experience, and that rather slender. Captain A. R. Richardson, an Assistant in the Department of Pure Mathematics at University College London, had served for three years as a private in the 4 West Kent Regiment and in the South African War with the Imperial Yeomanry for two years. Major D. S. Capper, Professor of Engineering at King’s College London, had served for three years as a private in the University Company of the Queen’s Edinburgh Rifle Volunteer Brigade. Interestingly, while Richardson had more military experience, these men’s relative academic positions seem to have decided which was given the higher rank. L. N. G. Filon, Assistant Professor in Pure Mathematics at University College London was commissioned as a captain, despite having no previous military experience.'”” The University of London OTC did, however, have some support from regular officers beyond their regular adjutant. In 1909 six regular officers provided a series of lectures to help cadets prepare for their certificate A and B examinations. ‘The proximity of this contingent to the War Office meant that they were fortunate in securing lectures from senior officers, notably Brigadier Generals H. H. Wilson and J. E. Gough.’ For school OTC contingents, the position seemed even worse. After the initial camps in 1909 the War Office came to the conclusion that many schoolmasters

were not sufficiently qualified to train their units. The response was to set up schools of instruction for these schoolmasters in the Christmas vacation of 190910 and, in Easter 1912, 120 of them were attached to regular battalions to learn company drill.'!”” Whatever the quality of training provided, it must be noted that

'° Belfast Evening Telegraph, 26/7/13. '7 University of London Special Collections, ME1/1/1, Military Education Committee minutes, 8/1/09 and Harts Army List, 1908-1910.

'8 University of London Special Collections, ME1/1/1 and 2, ‘Report of Military Education Committee to the Senate’, 1910 and 1913. '? E.B. Ashmore, The Officers’ Training Corps’, 7he Army Review, I, October 1911, p. 249 cited in E. M. Teagarden, “Lord Haldane and the origins of Officer Training Corps’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, XLV, 182, 1967, p. 95.

142 The Edwardian Army the enthusiasm of cadets was not all that could have been hoped for. In the University of London OTC between 1909 and 1913, a considerable number of cadets, as outlined in Table 4.3, had not attended enough drills to render themselves ‘efficient’ and only 402 cadets attended their annual summer camp for the full two weeks in 1909, out of a total of 596.'%° The contribution of universities to their OTC contingents went far beyond the use of their staff. The University of Durham, for example, offered office accom-

modation to OTC staff and an armoury at a purely nominal rent, along with a grant of £50 towards the purchase of textbooks. The University of London provided free office space and, up to January 1910, free printing and postage.'*' Trinity College Dublin entered into an arrangement with the War Office by which the University funded the cost of the new drill hall with a direct contribution of £500 and short-term loan from the War Office for a further £1,000.'8? However, from quite early on, OTC contingents were breaking even or indeed, returning a profit of sorts. In March 1910 it was decided that the University of London OTC should pay £100 p.a. into the general funds of the university and a further £50 for the use of rooms, heating, lighting, and furniture.'®

The cadet’s own contribution to the cost of an OTC varied enormously. The Military Education Committee of the University of London was adamant from the

outset that cadets who made themselves efficient (i.e. attended the prescribed number of drills, attended camp, and fired their musketry course) should not be involved in any personal expense. By contrast, students joining the Oxford University

OTC had to pay a minimum of £3 for their uniforms if they joined the infantry or medical units and up to £4 for their uniforms if they joined the cavalry or artillery units. Whereas the infantry and medical unit cadets had to make no further payments, those in the cavalry had to pay a terminal subscription of £1 15s. Od. and Table 4.3. Strength of University of London OTC, 1909-13 (as per 1 October each year)'™

Year Efficient Total

1909 542 596 1910 697 827 1911 629 739 1912 1913 634 632 723 734 1914

'80 University of London Special Collections, ME1/1/1, ‘Report of Military Education Committee to the Senate’, 1910.

'8! University of Durham Archives, UND/BC1/1, Military Education Committee, minutes, 14/10/08 and University of London Special Collections, ME1/1/1, Minutes of Military Education Committee, 28/1/10 and “Memorandum on Finance of the contingent’, 21/1/10. '8 ‘Trinity College Dublin Archives, MUN/OTC/20/7/1-4 Sir Robert Tate papers. ; 3) University of London Special Collections, ME1/1/1, Minutes of Military Education Committee, "a University of London Special Collections, ME1/1/2, ‘Report of Military Education Committee to Senate’, 1913.

The Auxiliary Forces 143 those in the artillery £2 to cover the costs of horse hire. Cadets at Oxford would, however, pay £2 less on joining if they already possessed an A certificate or would have £2 refunded upon obtaining this certificate and could gain an additional sum of £2 10s.0d. if they obtained a B certificate.’ Between these two extremes, cadets

of the University of Dublin OTC were required to pay 10s. towards the cost of tailoring their uniform and a 5s. annual subscription.'®° Discipline in the senior division OTC was seen as a problem as, in the vast bulk of contingents, cadets were not treated as serving soldiers whilst on parade or at camp and did not take an oath of allegiance or incur any liability for service on joining the unit. As a result, university disciplinary methods were used to deal with problematic cadets. Most units sought to fine cadets the sum of £2 if they were deemed to be ‘inefficient’, although this was challenged by a cadet at the University of London on the grounds that he had entered into his contract to serve in the OTC while an infant (ie. under 21 years of age).'®” The Military Education Committee of the University of London was sufficiently exercised about this issue to circularize the other senior division OTC units to ascertain how they dealt with disciplinary problems. Some universities, particularly the older collegiate institutions, had experienced and foresaw no difficulties. Colonel H. J. Edwards, who had long experience in the Cambridge University Rifle Volunteers before forming the Cambridge University OTC contingent, noted that he had encountered no difficulties in recovering the £2 fine from inefhicients and continued: ‘[T]he threat of expulsion from the Corps is quite sufficient to bring to his sense any cadet who takes his duties lightly.’ The Provost of Trinity College Dublin, whose OTC was one of the last of the senior division to be formed, in 1910, also felt that the college fines system would be quite sufficient to deal with any problems. Sir William Turner, the Principal of Edinburgh University, noted that Scottish law was different from English law on the issue of ‘infancy’ and all of the cadets in the Edinburgh OTC were considered of age and would be pursued legally if necessary. In the Manchester University OTC the contingent had a close relationship with a TF battalion, sharing their headquarters building and rifle range; as a result their cadets were placed under military discipline when in camp and had to obey the orders of officers of the 6 Manchester Regiment when attending drills.'** However, this use of university regulations had its limitations, especially as a

number of senior division OTC units were prepared to admit men who were not actually university students—most famously in the case of the future Field Marshal

'8 University Of London Special Collections, Me1/1/1, Minutes of Military Education Committee, 16/12/08, Oxford University Handbook (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1912), pp. 233-4. '8° Roger Willoughby, A Military History of the University of Dublin and its Officers Training Corps, 1910-1922 (The Medal Society of Ireland, Dublin, 1989), pp. 3-5. '87 Oxford University Handbook (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1912), p. 232 and University of London Special Collections, ME1/1/1, Minutes of Military Education Committee, 1/12/10. '88 University of London Special Collections, ME1/1/1, letters Colonel H. J. Edwards, Dr Antony Traill, Sir William Turner and Sir Alfred Hopkinson to Secretary, Military Education Committee, 18/7/10, 29/6/10, 7/7/10, 9/11/10 and 30/6/10. On Edwards's long experience with auxiliary units see Hew Strachan, History of The Cambridge University Officers Training Corps (Midas Books, Tunbridge Wells, 1976), pp. 106-49.

144 The Edwardian Army William Slim at the University of Birmingham OTC.'® Captain R. L. Pearson of Reading University College highlighted the unsatisfactory nature of the OTC disciplinary code, stating that ‘it calls upon the College to exact payment of a fine for failure of an individual in a duty to the State’.'”° The accommodation offered for OTC units was not lavish. It took some time for a gun shed to be constructed at University College London for the storage of artillery pieces, and the University of London OTC was reliant on the university's Rifle Club for the use of shooting facilities. The accommodation provided by the University of London for its OTC was initially deemed ‘unsatisfactory’ by the War Office,

a situation only resolved in December 1911 when a new headquarters was completed under the Great Hall of the university building at South Kensington, though even then facilities for indoor drill appear to remained almost non-existent.'” For all its popularity, prestige, and economy to the War Office, the OTC scheme must be judged an abject failure in providing officers to auxiliary units in the Edward-

ian period, as is shown in the case of the University of London in Table 4.4. While in the Great War thousands of OTC cadets received commissions, the number preAugust 1914 was disappointingly low. By January 1912, when the OTC could boast fifty-five senior and 155 junior division contingents and a total strength of 630 officers and 23,701 cadets, it had only provided 264 commissions in the Special Reserve and 566 in the TE'” Lieutenant General Sir Neville Lyttleton, then GOC, Ireland, predicted this low conversion rate when inspecting The Queen's University of Belfast OTC at their annual camp in August 1909. He wrote: ‘[A] very fine lot of young fellows quite up to standard...A very large percentage of them are going to be doctors, in which case this corps will hardly justify its existence.’'”°

Table 4.4. Commissions granted to cadets of University of London OTC, 1909-13

Date Regular SR TF General reserve of officers Total

1909 1] 1911and41910 17 07506 028

1912 14 24 181] 4 42 1913 36 27 65 '8° University of London Special Collections, ME1/1/1, ‘application form for cadets’ and ‘rules’, 1908 specifically stated that the CO could admit ‘gentlemen’ who were not students to the corps and Ronald Lewin, Slim: The Standardbearer (Leo Cooper, London, 1976), p. 10. '°0 University of London Special Collections, ME1/1/1, letters Officers Committee, Oxford Uni-

2.

versity OTC and Captain R. L. Pearson to Secretary, Military Education Committee, ?/10/10 and vst ‘University of London Special Collections, ME1/1/1, Minutes of Military Education Committee, 26/6/10 and ME/1/1/2, ‘Report of Military Education Committee to Senate’, 1911. ' J. K. Dunlop, The development of the British army, 1899-1914 (Methuen, London, 1938), p. 295. '3 LHCMA, NGL/KL/825a, Lyttleton papers, letter, Lyttleton to his wife, 10/8/09.

'4 University of London Special Collections, ME1/1/1 and 2, ‘Report of Military Education Committee to the Senate’, 1910-1913.

The Auxiliary Forces 145 We should also be aware that the OTC scheme did not cast its net very wide in attempting to attract potential officers, especially for amateur units. Comparatively few grammar schools had OTCs and only two schools in the whole of Ireland possessed them. More importantly, the rather inflexible regulations of the Board of Education for the teacher training colleges meant that students studying at them could not participate fully in the OTC. The Board of Education argued that in their twoyear course, students could not possibly find the time to complete their B certificate, though they might find time to complete the A certificate. This came as a shock to the authorities at the University of Durham, who had hoped to enrol a large number of students from St Bede’s Teacher Training College in their contingent.'” Indeed, at one stage the “Pupil Teacher’ companies, which existed in a number of TF units, for example B Company, 4 Hampshire Regiment formed from students

of the Diocesan College, Winchester, were under threat as some of the County Associations were not prepared to pay the increased travel costs associated with

them. The TF company formed from students at Exeter Training College was temporarily disbanded in 1909 as the local Association refused to make a special grant. The War Office agreed to make such grants after a senior civil servant made a compelling case, stating: ‘It would be quite impossible to over rate the importance

both from a national point of view and from the stand point of the future of the Territorial Forces of inoculating these young fellows with the military views.’'”° Another group of students who were specifically barred from membership of the

senior division of the OTC were ‘non-European’ students. This ‘race bar’ was brought in voluntarily by Glasgow University on the formation of its OTC in 1908 but was enforced as War Office policy from January 1909 on all senior

division OTC contingents. Explaining the rationale for this, the Director of Military Training stated: ‘It is economically unsound that coloured students should be allowed to join, since they are ineligible for commissions in the Regular Army, Special Reserve, or Territorial Force...The inclusion of coloured students is also undesirable from the social point of view.’!”’ Some institutions also had little success in forming OTC units. Imperial College wanted its own contingent, separate from the University of London, but does not

seem to have managed this before the outbreak of the First World War, despite War Office approval seeming to have been granted as early as June 1909.'* In 1912

'5 Minutes of the Military Education Committee, University of Durham, 14/10/08. University of Durham Archives, UND/BC1/1 and TNA, WO32/6590, ‘Maintenance of Companies of Territorial Battalions which are composed of students in Training Colleges’, letter R. W. Brade, War Office to Secretary, Board of Education, 21/8/08, letter R. G. Mayer, Board of Education to Brade, 30/10/08 and letter Brade to Mayer, 3/11/08. ' "TNA, WO32/6591, ‘Students in Training Colleges and the Territorial Force’, memo. by H. G. Maurice to Secretary of State, 23/5/10. '7 "TNA, WO32/2734, ‘Officer Training Corps Senior Division. Enrolment of non-Europeans’, memo. D.M.T. to C.G.S., 11/12/08 and circular letter, R. H. Brade to University OTC, 2/1/09. '°8 University of London Special Collections, ME1/1/1, Military Education Committee, minutes, 24/6/09, letter E. W. D. Ward, War Office to Secretary, Military Education Committee, 28/6/09 and House of Commons debates, 21/6/09. No reference to an Imperial College OTC exists in the Army List or Harts Army List, 1909-1914.

146 The Edwardian Army the Principal of Wye College asked for the formation of a mounted section of the University of London OTC, formed from his students. He noted: “The College formerly formed a troop of the West Kent Yeomanry (Territorial) but this has been given up on account of the inconvenient date of camp.’ The Military Education Committee at the University of London seemed supportive but reflected that the War Office would not be keen to take on a mounted unit of only thirty cadets, and this seems to have been the case.'””

In conclusion, the role of the auxiliary forces remained rather unclear by 1914; whether they had been formed primarily for home defence, imperial service, or to

participate in a continental commitment remained unclear to the general public and to the units themselves. The Special Reserve, it is true, had a firm obligation to serve overseas; however, its ranks were quickly denuded in reinforcing the original BEF on mobilization. Beyond that, the TF had less than 20,000 all ranks commit-

ted to embark on overseas service. The problems clear in a failure to recruit to establishment, a fairly rapid turnover in personnel, a lack of officers, and an unwill-

ingness or inability of men to attend annual camps for their full duration meant that the military efficiency of the TF was very limited, certainly compared to the regular army. The endless political lobbying, which Arnold-Forster and Haldane endured, meant that the auxiliary forces which emerged were not as efficient as they

should have been and had an uneven geographical spread. It should also be noted that the Haldane reforms did something to upset the earlier Cardwell—Childers

reforms of 1868-81. While the earlier reforms had reinvented the regimental system, bringing together regular and amateur units, the Haldane reforms seemed to rejoice in establishing a number of ‘orphar’ units, with no, or very loose, connections to regular regiments, the best example being the London Regiment. The OTC, in retrospect a great success in providing a large number of temporary officers in the Great War, did not look like a success to contemporaries, who noted just how few OTC cadets ended up taking commissions in the regular army or auxiliary forces. '9 University of London, Special Collections, ME/1/1/2, Military Education Committee, minutes and correspondence, 1911-1914, letter, Principal of Wye College to Secretary, MEC, 18/3/12 and minutes 28/3/12 and 24/10/12.

The Public Face of the Army The public image of the British army consisted of a combination of positive and negative themes, many of which it had carried over from the nineteenth century. With most soldiers either serving abroad or confined to a small number of garrison towns across the British Isles, the general public’s direct contact with the army was minimal. In turn this made people reliant on the media for their knowledge. The image of the army was therefore largely disseminated by methods of mass

communication pioneered or significantly enhanced during the previous century—newspapers, paintings, especially when converted into cheap reproduction prints and cards, posters and advertisements, and books and pamphlets. The ever-greater spread of literacy and disposable income among Britons stimulated these developments. In turn, much of the material served to enhance the belief

that the nation had a unique imperial mission and worldwide role. In the first decade of the twentieth century a potent new technology added its power to the transmission of images about the army, the cinematograph, and it soon alighted on the army (and navy) as a good source of stories. Significantly, the major source

of image production and projection throughout the period was not the state, but private enterprise. The great daily newspapers, both broadsheet and tabloid, dis-

cussed and debated the merits of the army vigorously and with only marginal direct official aid or comment from the War Office or government. As will be seen, however, successive Secretaries of State for War and many soldiers were keen

to have informal links with the press and often sought to use their connections to influence public opinion on military matters. For the public, the often technical debates about the nature and role of the army were counterbalanced by the more emotional appeal to their sense of patriotism and heritage through events such as parades, tattoos, and tournaments. This was especially important in the garrison and regimental depot towns where the connection between the army and local

and national identity was a key element in recruitment and acceptance of the army as an institution, and had been a lynchpin of British thinking about the army from Cardwell onwards. The reverse side of this positive public relationship was the use of the army as an aid to the civil power. With increasing trade union

militancy in the period from 1902, but especially after 1909, the military was regularly called upon to assist with the enforcement of order and the maintenance of supplies and services. Organized labour, and its formal political expression in the infant Labour party, often professed its disquiet at the use of troops in these roles. With the army reliant on the working class (albeit at its very lowest levels) to provide its rank and file, many soldiers felt a degree of sensitivity over their

148 The Edwardian Army public image when directed to perform such roles. Finally, the role of the army in

the rule of Ireland became a great concern by 1914, and the coverage of the so-called “Curragh Incident’ was highly important to public perceptions of its nature and role. The image of the army during this period was therefore complex and determined by a number of interlocking factors. In the immediate aftermath of the South African War the most pressing matter for the army to face was its rather tattered reputation. During the course of the war, correspondents had often criticized the generals, especially in the earliest stages of the fighting, and praised the troops in equal measure.' The length of the war against a numerically far smaller and less well-equipped foe made it increasingly clear that all was not well in the army, and it resulted in a widespread clamour for army reform. It was a campaign led by politicians and orchestrated by the press and it was an issue given an enormous amount of column space in British newspa-

pers. During the course of the nineteenth century the British had become inveterate newspaper readers; the newspaper market had boomed in the last quarter of the century, encouraged by the growth of literacy, the massive expansion of the middle classes, and the extension of the franchise, which stimulated interest in state affairs. By 1902 the newspaper market was firmly divided into a number of sectors. There were the highbrow broadsheet dailies reflecting a range of political interests, from

the overtly Conservative Morning Post and Observer through to the Liberal Manchester Guardian and Westminster Gazette. Alongside these sat the populist dailies, chief of which was the Daily Mail with its vast daily circulation of 900,000 by 1914.” Somewhere between the popular dailies and the highbrow newspapers were the illustrated papers such as the //ustrated London News and The Graphic. These sought to cover a range of stories in a serious, but not overly reverential, manner and, of course, deployed a large number of illustrations to accompany the text. The final sector was the local press, which came in two forms, influential regional dailies such as the Liverpool Echo and Belfast Telegraph, which covered a broad range of news shadowing the coverage of the nationals, and the less grandiose and more regionally focused weekly papers. All forms of newspaper reading were in boom, and politicians saw the press as significant communicators and shapers of opinion.?

Most of the serious national dailies employed military correspondents who were

' Stephen Badsey, “War correspondents in the Boer War’ in John Gooch (ed.), The Boer War. Direction, experience and image (London: Frank Cass, 2000) pp. 187-202. * Henry Sell (ed.), Se/l’s World Press (London: King, Sell and Olding, 1914) p. 147. ° See Stephen Koss, The rise and fall of the political press in Britain, Vol. 2 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984) pp. 15-237. The daily circulations of some of the major newspapers were: Daily Mirror, 350,000 (1905); The Times, 40,000 (1913); Morning Post, 150,000 (1913); Manchester Guardian, 150,000 (1903);

Pall Mall Gazette, 12,000 (c. 1900); Daily News, 400,000 (1909). Information drawn from Maurice Milne, Newspapers of Northumberland and Durham. A study of their progress in the golden age of the provincial press (Newcastle: Frank Graham, n.d.) p. 190; David Ayerst, The Guardian. Biography of a newspaper (London: Collins, 1971) pp. 285, 305; Maurice Edelman, The Mirror: a political history (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966) p. 10; Oliver Woods and James Bishop, The story of The Times (London: Michael

Joseph, 1983) p. 210; Stephen Koss, Fleet Street radical. A. G. Gardiner and the Daily News (London: Allen Lane, 1973) p. 65. In late 1904 W. T. Stead’s Review of Reviews assessed the standing and weight of the great national dailies. Zhe Times and the Westminster Gazette headed the list as being ‘read by men of

The Public Face of the Army 149 supplemented by war correspondents during times of conflict, and as Glenn Wilkinson has shown, British newspapers and the newspaper reading public had an enormous appetite for war stories.* Following his resignation from the army under a cloud of scandal, Charles a Court Repington was military correspondent for the Morning Post from 1903 to 1904 before switching to The Times, where he

worked alongside another journalist deeply interested in military affairs, Leo Amery.’ Such journalists were supported by editors and leader writers with strong opinions on military and naval matters who regularly gave vent to their concerns

in finely crafted articles. J. L. Garvin, editor of Outlook from 1905 to 1906, the Observer from 1908 to 1942, and the Pall Mall Gazette from 1912 to 1915, was a constant agitator on naval and military affairs. Others shared this concern, includ-

ing H. A. Gwynne, editor of the Standard from 1904 to 1911 and then the Morning Post from 1911 to 1937, where he was supported by the chief leader writer, H. S. Wilkinson. More stridently right wing was L. J. Maxse, owner and editor of the National Review from 1893 to 1932, while the Liberal view was put by J. A. Spender, editor of the Westminster Gazette between 1896 and 1922.° Many politicians and others interested in army reform, such as Lord Esher, saw the press

as an important influence on public opinion through education and debate on military matters.’ Information on army affairs was rarely gained in a straightforward way. The War Office's usual attitude towards journalists was little short of contemptuous, but this did not stop leaks to favoured journalists and attempts to use the press to its advantage when it wished to influence perception, a stance that angered much of the newspaper industry.® Specialist military journalism was matched in the popular press. ‘The illustrated papers provided particularly glamorous images through artists who specialized in interpretations of the military and combat, such as Richard Caton-Woodville and William Barns Wollen. Coverage of military matters was therefore a combination of serious discussion tinged with entertainment and excitement. The rush of official enquiries into the South African War and the nature of the army, that reported between 1903 and 1904, were much commented on in the press,

both parties’. Next came the Standard, Daily News, Morning Post, Daily Chronicle, Morning Leader, St James Gazette, Daily Graphic, Star, Globe, Echo and Pall Mall Gazette. Then came a third division which ‘combine the maximum of advertising and circulation with the minimum of influence’: Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, Daily Express. Then came the last group: Morning Advertiser, Daily Mirror, Sun, Evening News, Evening Standard. By 1910 the Sun, Echo and St James Gazette were all defunct, and in 1912 the Morning Leader merged with the Daily News. Stead’s rankings reveal the prejudices of his time, for in judging the third division as being commercially successful but politically insignificant, he was misunderstanding the ever-increasing franchise and the ability of these papers to confirm the voting habits of significant sections of the population. Stead essay quoted in Koss, Fleet Street radical, p. 65.

* Glenn Wilkinson, Depictions and images of war in Edwardian newspapers, 1899-1914 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2002). > For a broader discussion of Repington’s role as a military correspondent see A. J. A. Morris, The Letters of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles a Court Repington (Thrupp: Sutton/Army Records Society, 1999) pp. 1-46. ° For a full history of the Edwardian press see Koss, Rise and fall of the political press, pp. 15-237. ” Morris, Repington, p. 20. * Morris, Repington, pp. 14-15.

150 The Edwardian Army and often did little for the good reputation of the army, although in many instances the army escaped outright censure and condemnation. Most papers provided regular coverage of the Royal Commission on the South African War (more generally known as the “War Commission’ or ‘Elgin Commission’, the latter after its chair, Lord Elgin),

commenting on the questioning and statements of witnesses. When the Elgin report was published in late August 1903 it concentrated on the shortcomings of the War Office and Secretaries of State for War rather than the military conduct of the war. This shifting of emphasis to the civil administration was followed by much of the press. Zhe Times expressed its views in a leading article but sidestepped the issue of military performance, stating that such things were outside its competence: ‘It is for the military authorities to decide what are the true strategical and tactical lessons of the war, and for military historians to endeavour to arrive at a fair judgment on the conduct of the various commanders.” Instead, the article directed its attention to ‘the question of preparations and of the general organization of our forces’, and in so doing subjected the War Office, and by implication the Secretary of State for War at the start of the conflict, Lord Lansdowne, to fierce criticism.'° Finding the supporting infrastructure wanting on virtually every count reinforced the impression that the army commenced hostilities on the wrong footing, with the result that it took a long time to gain the initiative. A week later a leading article returned to the issue, stressing that the real flaw lay in the War Office: ‘As long as our War Office organization is rotten—and it is rotten—our Army can never be sound.’'' Such judgements helped save the public reputation of the army, as it implied that it was deployed lacking the materials, direction, and support it needed through no fault of its own. Readers of The Times seemed to take a similar view, as letters on the subject generally supported the tone of the report and its main targets of the War Office and successive Secretaries of State for War.”” The Liberal Westminster Gazette adopted a similar stance, referring

to the ‘monstrous’ situation, and the ‘chronic condition of the War Office’, which was a view shared by its fellow Liberal paper, the Daily News.'? Among the popular press most were happy to lay the blame at the door of the War Office and the Secretary of State. Both the Daily Mail and the Daily Express announced amazement at the lethargy and lack of direction present in the War Office during the run-up to the war and the subsequent lack of improvement once hostilities were underway." In focus-

ing on the War Office, both the report and its interpretation by the press were extremely helpful to the army’s public image. In fact, the army’s face was saved continually by the press due to the newspapers’ preoccupation with the shortcomings of

various Secretaries of State for War and its political governance. Few issues were directly connected with the army’s own internal thinking or management.

> The Times, 26 August 1903. '° The Times, 26 August 1903. For a fuller discussion of Unionist defence policy in this period see Rhodri Williams, Defending the Empire. The Conservative party and British defence policy, 1899-1915 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991). "\ The Times, 4 September 1903. '? See correspondence on 29 August, 4 September 1903. ' Westminster Gazette, 26 August 1903; Daily News, 26 August 1903. 4 Daily Mail, 26 August 1903;Daily Express, 27 August, 9 October, 16 October 1908.

The Public Face of the Army 151 Not every newspaper was prepared to exonerate the army from responsibility. The Odserver’s first editorial after the publication of the Elgin report opened with

a condemnation of the War Office and its lack of system, but then regretted the lack of detail on operational matters. Lord Roberts's forthright defence of the qual-

ities of the army were noted, but so were his reservations about the training of officers. This point was taken up by the Observer, for it seemed to reveal the structural fault running through the entire army that explained ‘the unseemly friction

and difference of opinion among certain generals as to what their duties and responsibilities were’. Although it was admitted that there was no lack of courage and endurance, the ‘brains of the British army were found wanting.’ At the other

end of the political spectrum and probably wishing to embarrass the army, the Manchester Guardian decided to provide full coverage of Arthur Balfour's speech to the Union Club in which he used acid humour to mock the attitudes of the army’s

high command. He referred to the fact that the generals took great comfort in finding politicians to blame for everything. He illustrated his point by referring to the complaints levelled against the current cavalry sword. Tartly noting that he had never regarded himself as an expert on cavalry swords, his government had allowed

the soldiers to pick their own design and so did not believe the faults with this particular piece of kit could be attributed to the Secretary of State for War.'® With the position of Secretary of State for War the focus of much press atten-

tion, any attempt at army reform was bound to stir up comment and analysis. St John Brodrick found every aspect of his plan for army and War Office reform debated in the press. His decision to commence a broad package of reorganization

while the war in South Africa was ongoing placed both him and his department under immense pressure while at the same time raising public expectations.'” Rapidly lost in a welter of details and increasingly detached from the high command of the army over the feasibility of his plans, particularly the establishment of six self-contained army corps, Brodrick’s momentum declined and he became subject to increasing attacks in parliament and the press. Early in 1903 a group of disaf-

fected Unionists, including Winston Churchill, launched a series of assaults on

Brodrick. Ernest Beckett, a Unionist MP, raised an amendment on a detail contained in the King’s Speech which was discussed in a full-scale debate in the Commons. Both The Times's and the Manchester Guardian’s parliamentary sketch writers ridiculed Brodrick, noting his eloquent, but largely irrelevant, replies to the

cross-examination. It was also clear to both writers that Brodrick had lost the support of his fellow cabinet members and the party as a whole.’® Ignoring Brodrick’s insistence that a short-term rise in the army estimates would quickly be reduced once the reforms were in place, both the Unionist and Liberal press turned their attack to the cost of his plans. According to the Daily Mail, Brodrick had not

'° Observer, 30 August 1903. ‘6 Manchester Guardian, 28 November 1903. '” For a wider discussion of Brodrick’s role see Lowell J. Satre, ‘St John Brodrick and Army Reform, 1901-1903’, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 1976, pp. 117-39. '8 The Times, 28 February 1903; Manchester Guardian, 24 February 1903.

152 The Edwardian Army properly weighed up the defence needs of the empire and had merely shuffled ‘the same old cards’.!” The Manchester Guardian mocked him ‘as the most extravagant,

if not the most efficient, of War Ministers’, and added further insult by denying that any military sense could be found in his schemes.”° Other sections of the Liberal press were equally unimpressed. Both the Westminster Gazette and the Daily News condemned Brodrick’s schemes as expensive and inoperable without a thorough overhaul of the War Office, which he had singularly failed to achieve.”! Only the high Tory journals, the Pall Mall Gazette and Morning Post, persevered with Brodrick, condemning the British public for its lack of patience and vision.” By the time Balfour moved Brodrick to the India Office in October 1903 as part of a cabinet reshuffle, his stock was so low with the press that his redeployment before his schemes had been seen through was hardly commented upon. Most of the press was simply relieved to see him go. Even the Pall Mall Gazette could pay only a halfhearted compliment, noting ‘that it is satisfactory that he will not have to contend against the many adverse circumstances which have rendered his tenure of the War Secretaryship a post of exceptional difficulty’.”° Brodrick’s successor, Hugh Arnold-Forster, was very keen to take on the post of Secretary of State for War and was as ambitious as his predecessor in his plans for reform and reorganization.** Arnold-Forster’s energy and long-standing interest

in army reform were qualities recognized by the press, and an editorial in The Times welcomed his arrival at the War Office, commenting on his ‘lively interest and intelligence’ and his ‘special capabilities’. The Daily Express, Daily Mail and Daily Mirror were equally enthusiastic, all stressing his vitality and knowledge of military affairs.°° Aimed squarely at the middle to lower end of the middle classes, the Daily Express also warmed to Arnold-Forster’s social credentials. According to an editorial, he had caused envy among well-placed families who were lobbying

for their candidates to get the job and were ‘indignant that so well-connected a person as Mr Brodrick should be ousted by Mr Arnold-Forster’.”” The Daily Mirror

was so impressed by his command of the issue of army reform that it believed a future prime minister had been uncovered.** For Arnold-Forster the problem was one of home defence and effective imperial garrisoning, particularly of India. To this end he informed his cabinet colleagues that he intended to restructure the army into two branches: one a short-service home defence force, and the other a

Daily Mail, 23 February 1903. °° Manchester Guardian, 17 July 1903. *! Westminster Gazette, 23, 24 February, 1 September 1903; Daily News, 24 February 1903. ** Pall Mall Gazette, 25 February, 26 August 1903; Morning Post, 24 February, 29 August 1903. 23 Pall Mall Gazette, 6 October 1903. *4 For an assessment of Arnold-Forster’s time at the War Office see I. E W. Beckett, ‘H. O. ArnoldForster and the Volunteers’ in Ian Beckett and John Gooch (eds), Politicians and defence: studies in the Jormudlation of British defence policy, 1845-1970 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1981) PP, The Times, 13 November 1903. °° Daily Express, 7, 16 October 1903; Daily Mail, 6 October 1903;Daily Mirror, 15 July 1904. *” Daily Express, 25 September 1903. °8 Daily Mirror, 15 July 1904.

The Public Face of the Army 153 longer-service force for imperial defence. The scheme also called for significant restructuring of the militia and Volunteer Force, a plan which called for much diplomacy given the political influence of this bloc. Unfortunately for ArnoldForster, tact and patience were not a part of his character and like Brodrick he rapidly alienated many, including his potential allies. His reform package began to unravel almost as soon as it was launched, with a failure to meet the recruiting targets and to entice men of better quality. The Liberal press was extremely concerned by his plans to reform the auxiliary forces, fearful that they might be a cover for a

further militarization of society.*? The Manchester Guardian noted General Lyttleton’s remark that ‘men were...short in numbers, and short, he added, in stature .*° Surprisingly, the editorial failed to point out the fact that Lyttleton had decided to abandon any sense of loyalty to his political master and was revealing embarrassing facts, which was something the Daily Express leapt on, having lost confidence in Arnold-Forster and his plans.*' By the spring of 1905 it was becoming increasingly difficult to suppress the evidence of poor recruitment, and a letter to The Times used a welter of statistics to expose ‘the fallacies of Arnold-Forster’.*? Repington, an early supporter of Arnold-Forster, added his weight to the criticism in the autumn when he accused him of keeping details obscure and added ‘ArnoldForster studiously avoids all reference to this important subject’.*°

As in their treatment of Brodrick, the press pointed out the irony that expenditure on the army was going up and yet the number of men enlisted was dropping, thus emphasizing a double failure. As might be expected, the Liberal Manchester Guardian was extremely sceptical about Arnold-Forster’s estimates. An editorial in March 1904 roundly lambasted Arnold-Forster’s entire scheme: There are not one but three problems to be solved. The first is, to find the men; the

second, to find the money; and the third, to organise the men and to lay out the money to the best public advantage. Of these three problems the most urgent is that of the money.**

A few months later the Manchester Guardian returned to the question of expenditure, condemning all attempts to improve army pay and conditions as expensive failures which merely added to the tax burden without aiding the military situation.”

Most controversial, however, were Arnold-Forster’s attempts to reform the militia and Volunteer Force. It was a task complicated rather than assisted by the

findings of the Norfolk Commission into the auxiliary forces in May 1904. Although seemingly helpful to Arnold-Forster by exposing a catalogue of shortcomings which had been exposed by the war in South Africa, the ultimate conclusion in favour of some form of national service merely heightened the political

” Westminster Gazette, 5, 11 July 1905; Daily News, 24 February, 13 July 1905. °° Manchester Guardian, 9 July 1904. °! Daily Express, 8 July 1904. °° The Times, 7 April 1905. 33 The Times, 9 November 1905. 34 Manchester Guardian, 9 March 1904. °° Manchester Guardian, 9 July 1904.

154 The Edwardian Army atmosphere and made the advocates of the existing system all the more defensive and intransigent. Arnold-Forster’s position was not helped by the fact that the Daily Express managed to obtain details of his reform scheme before he announced them to the Commons, which also revealed the presence of high-placed officials prepared to leak material to the press, probably as a deliberate attempt to damage his plans.*° Totally unconvinced by his plans to reform the auxiliary forces, the editorial in the Daily Express stated that ‘it would not be easy to imagine more

depressing reading for the British breakfast tables’.°’” Many other sections of the press were equally disillusioned. The //ustrated London News made its disdain for both the Norfolk Commission and Arnold-Forster clear. Sensing a dangerous element of continental militarism in the recommendation of national service, an editorial vehemently defended the status quo as a traditional safeguard against the dangers of an overly militarized state: ‘It is not militarism to line our hedges with amateur rifleman, should an invader dare show his nose. But it is militarism of the most reactionary type to take care that the rifleman shall be trained to arms from youth upwards.”* As with other sections of the press, the Norfolk Commission's

stance was confused with that of Arnold-Forster and a few weeks later the Illustrated London News castigated ‘the horrid ambition of Mr Arnold-Forster’ for daring to interfere with the well-established system of the Volunteer Force.°*’ The

biggest about-turn was that of the Daily Mirror, which went from outlining Arnold-Forster’s credentials for future prime minister to utter contempt in editorials precisely one year apart: “Mr Arnold-Forster’s career shows that he approaches the Army question in an absolutely feeble and short-sighted way and an important

section of the Cabinet is in secret sympathy with the revolt against him.’*° The correspondence pages of Zhe Times became a mouthpiece for Arnold-Forster’s crit-

ics. A stream of letters poured in almost unabated during 1904 and 1905. Lord Haliburton proved one of the most persistent correspondents, maintaining an intransigent opposition. His letters were often extremely long and extremely closely

argued, citing numerous sources to support his position, and he added to it with the publication of a pamphlet, Army Organization: the Arnold-Forster scheme." It was not an entirely one-way process, however; ‘A Reformer’ lent his support to Arnold-Forster in a series of equally well-reasoned letters, as did some army officers in correspondence to the Daily Express.” The position of The Times was not wholly

consistent on the issue, with its editorials occasionally taking a slightly different approach from that of Repington. In a series of articles, “The Army in Parliament’, Repington argued that although Arnold-Forster was right in wishing to improve the militia and the Volunteer Force, his tactics and ultimate goals were unwise and

°° Daily Express, 19 April 1904. *” Daily Express, 15 July 1904. °8 [llustrated London News, Vol. 124, No. 3398, 4 June 1904, p. 632. » Tllustrated London News, Vol. 125, No. 3405, 23 July 1904, p. 116. “© Daily Mirror, 15 July 1905.

“| See, for examples, 7he Times, 8, 10, 31 August, 7 September 1904; Army Organization: the Arnold-Forster scheme (London: Edward Stanford, 1905). © See The Times, 16 July, 30 August, 23 September, 15 October 1904; Daily Express, 20 May 1904.

The Public Face of the Army 155 would prove inefficient.” In contrast, an editorial praised Arnold-Forster’s persistence and failure to be brow-beaten by the parliamentary supporters of the auxiliary forces. Arnold-Forster’s opponents were belittled as: Gentlemen who take an interest in Volunteers, but do not seem to have given much thought to our military requirements as a whole, declaimed with considerable warmth in the manner of people who feel exaggerated alarm when their pet idea is reduced from the unique position it occupies in their own minds and put in its proper place among other ideas of equal or greater importance.“

The Observer was equally willing to give Arnold-Forster support in this battle, albeit of a qualified kind. Declaring itself in favour of the Norfolk Commission's recommendations of national service, it nonetheless believed he was carrying out a task deemed necessary by its doyen of military affairs, Lord Roberts. “The Secretary of State for War may have been unfortunate in his methods and choice of time,’ an editorial declared, ‘yet it is indisputable that upon this question, at any rate, he has the support of men whose experience gives weight to their opinion.” Among the

popular dailies, the Daily Mail retained patience for a long time and hoped he would effect long-term improvements in the auxiliary forces.“° By way of opposi-

tion, and somewhat ironically given its opposition to perceived Unionist vested interests, the Liberal press supported the Volunteer lobby against Arnold-Forster. It urged improvements in the effectiveness of the force, but nothing beyond that, on the overt grounds of economy and military good sense and the implicit grounds of constitutional harmony.” Although many in the press were keen to point out Arnold-Forster’s lack of support within parliament, particularly from his own party, few seemed to have realized that his authority had been largely undermined from the very start due to the establish-

ment of an independent committee to investigate War Office reform under Lord Esher.*® The Times implied that Arnold-Forster and Esher were working in happy cooperation in order to achieve effective army reform, referring to the ‘necessity of entrusting the solution of that problem to men who...are qualified to deal with ir’, and declared that it ‘should not be supposed that the creation of this new committee will be in any sense an imperium in imperio, invidiously circumscribing Mr ArnoldForster’s activities and powers’.”” By the spring of 1904, much of the press had noted Arnold-Forster’s increasing estrangement from his party and front bench. The Man-

chester Guardian commented on the open dissent shown by his two predecessors at the War Office, Lansdowne and Brodrick, when he outlined his ideas to the

“3 See The Times, 1 April, 8 April, 20 July 1904. “4 The Times, 14 July 1905.

Observer, 6 August 1905. “6 Daily Mail, 15 July 1904. “” Manchester Guardian, 9 July 1904; Westminster Gazette, 5, 11 July 1905; Daily News, 24 February, 13 July 1905. ‘8 For a wider discussion of the Esher Committee see Peter Fraser, Lord Esher. A political biography (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1973) pp. 122-47; Hew Strachan, The politics of the British Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) pp. 65-9. 49 The Times, 13 November 1903.

156 The Edwardian Army Commons in March 1904. It highlighted the malaise of Unionist defence policy in which Balfour was portrayed as indecisive and Arnold-Forster as at loggerheads with the former Secretaries of State for War.’ Such was the obvious sense of disagreement that Repington was urging Balfour to become more interventionist by the spring of 1905. For Repington the lack of harmony was leading to drift, indecision, and inac-

tivity. He noted that the country would welcome a clearer indication of Balfour's own thoughts and in the process managed to imply that they were significantly different from those of Arnold-Forster.°! In a moment of rare concord, the editorial lines of the Pall Mall Gazette and Morning Post were in agreement with that of the Westminster Gazette, for all expressed utter exasperation that Arnold-Forster should

stir up a hornets’ nest of anger in the auxiliary forces but then fail utterly to see through any of his plans. Ill feeling and high passions had been provoked, and yet

nothing of any worth or longevity had come from it.” Devoid of support from within parliament and given only the most qualified approval by the press, ArnoldForster had reached the end of the line. His fall was disguised by the resignation of the government in December 1905, but the question of army reform and the role of the Secretary of State for War within that process were issues still very much alive and very much of interest to large sections of the press.

The accession of the Liberal government in 1906 brought R. B. Haldane to the post of Secretary of State for War, and the newspapers greeted his arrival enthusi-

astically.°> Significantly, much of the praise was for his thoughtful and careful nature, which was deemed to be a great improvement on his immediate predecessors. Indeed, much of the comment actually provided the cover for a series of swipes at Brodrick and Arnold-Forster in particular. Unsurprisingly, the warmest reception came from the Liberal press. In the Manchester Guardian an editorial welcomed Haldane to the post, referring to his ‘aptitude for thinking out a problem from first principles’, which was much needed as the chief cause of the difficulties with army reform ‘has been want of clearness’ exacerbated by Arnold-Forster, ‘the least successful Secretary of War that this country has ever had’. At the same time the Westminster Gazette and the Daily News rejoiced that the War Office and army had finally gained a calm, reflective, intelligent and dispassionate political head.” The Odserver took a similar line, condemning the haste with which Brodrick and

Arnold-Forster commenced army reform before stopping to consult and determine just how much was practical. The editorial surveyed the ruins of their schemes and believed that, by contrast, Haldane’s expressed willingness to listen first, think, and then act were admirable qualities.°° The Pall Mall Gazette, [lustrated London News, the Daily Express, and The Times all stated that Haldane’s desire to keep the °° Manchester Guardian, 9 March 1904. >! The Times, 8 April, 20 July 1905. 2 Pall Mall Gazette, 11 July 1905; Morning Post, 5, 15 July 1905; Westminster Gazette, 24 February, 13, 14 July 1905. *3 For a comprehensive study of Haldane’s career see Edward M. Spiers, Haldane: an army reformer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1980). 4 Manchester Guardian, 7 March 1906. °° Westminster Gazette, 17 February 1906; Daily News, 5 January 1906. °° Observer, 11 March 1906.

The Public Face of the Army 157 question of army reform free from political partisanship and in the best interests of the nation was an impressive commitment, and The Times added that his position among his colleagues was much higher than that commanded by Arnold-Forster.”” As with his predecessors, however, it did not take long for critical comment to appear, and once again militia and Volunteer Force reform proved the most divisive issue. It was a subject which polarized the press, but it did not occur instantly, with some papers moving their positions only gradually. The Pall Mall Gazette was one of the few papers unconvinced from the start and referred to Haldane’s Territorial Force scheme as ‘playing at soldiers’.** By contrast the Morning Post remained remarkably even-handed about Haldane and delivered its criticisms without too much vituperation or rancour.” The Times was the main heavyweight paper to shift its position. Initially it was prepared to support Haldane’s scheme, and its editorial line persisted in this after Repington had used his column to declare his scepticism; Geoffrey Buckle, the editor of 7he Times, was prepared to allow this division of

thought as part of the newspaper’s dialogue with its readers.’ An editorial on 22 March 1907 reported on Haldane’s plans to reform the militia and gave him wholehearted support in this endeavour. Repington, however, pursued a different line and while never wishing to undermine Haldane nor his plans for the new Territorial Force, expressed his doubts that it would prove an effective answer to Britain’s military problems.*' A year later the editorial line was still at variance from

Repington’s, with a leading article reporting enthusiastically on the quality of Territorial Force training and preparation.” Gradually, however, the two approaches

came closer together, and by 1912, under the new editor, Geoftrey Robinson, the editorial line switched to an outright support for compulsory service in a home defence force. Throughout this period the correspondence columns of The Times maintained an almost continuous debate on the merits of Haldane’s reorganization and reform of the militia and Volunteer Forces, with certain correspondents writing

repeatedly. A constant contributor was Arnold-Forster with letters that were intense, strident, and usually closely argued, deploying a battery of statistics. He often stressed that Haldane was long on rhetoric and short on delivery. “We have gained nothing, nothing but interminable columns of speeches and endless fine phrases about things which do not exist,’ was a typical turn of phrase, reinforced in a later letter with the comment that the army had gained nothing ‘except a vast collection of speeches’ which served to expose the ‘emperor’s new clothes’.

*” The Times, 5 January 1906; Pall Mall Gazette, 16 June 1906; [ustrated London News, Vol. 130, No. 3541, 2 March 1907, p. 322; Daily Express, 9 March 1906. °8 Pall Mall Gazette, 26 February 1907. »” Morning Post, 24 January 1906, 24 February 1907, 1, 2 April 1908, 13 February 1913. °° See Morris, Repington, pp. 16-17. °! See, for example, Zhe Times, 26 June 1907. See also W. Michael Ryan, “The invasion controversy of 1906-1908: Lieutenant-Colonel Charles a Court Repington and British perceptions of the German menace’, Military Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1, February 1980, pp. 8-12. °° The Times, 4 August 1908. 63 The Times, 10 December 1912. “ See, for example, The Times, 27 May 1907, 4 August 1908, 1 February 1909. °° The Times, 10 June 1908; 1 February 1909.

158 The Edwardian Army In addition to these onslaughts, Arnold-Forster published two pamphlets, 7he Army in 1906: a policy and a vindication and Military Needs and Military Policy. Like his letters, the tone of the pamphlets was self-justificatory and bordered on bad-

tempered petulance. This was commented upon by Repington when reviewing The Army in 1906 tor The Times Literary Supplement, in which he expressed his regret that Arnold-Forster had been unable ‘to clear his mind of the dust and heat of contemporary politics and past controversies’..®’ Another regular contributor of anti-Haldane views was Lonsdale Hale, whose constant refrain was the ineffectiveness of the Territorial Force as a home defence army.® Unsurprisingly, such a stream of criticism, bordering on invective, provoked a response from serving Territorial Force soldiers who defended their comrades and training, even if they occasionally admitted that facilities could be better.” Haldane received rather more support from the Liberal press, but it was not entirely favourable. The Manchester Guardian became increasingly disenchanted over the reform of the auxiliary forces. The main point of contention, argued in a

clutch of leading articles, was that Haldane had failed to determine the role of the new Territorial Force sufficiently. Supporting the idea that Britain needed a home defence force, the Manchester Guardian was suspicious of the Imperial Service Obligation, which it believed revealed that Haldane’s real plan was not to create a home defence but a pool of manpower for the regular army. Such allegations of

militaristic and imperialist ambitions while denuding the homeland of defence levelled against Haldane were not allayed by the creation of the Special Reserve.”°

Much of the Unionist press moved towards opposition and outright hostility. The Daily Express condemned the Territorial Force plan unreservedly, believing it

to be an ill-thought-out solution dictated by Liberal party pressure for a quick, cheap solution. In the local association structure it saw the proliferation of red tape and a lack of uniformly imposed and accepted standards of military effectiveness.”’ Indeed, from this moment the Daily Express never missed an opportunity to slate Haldane’s plans. Similar to Arnold-Forster’s favoured criticism, it often stressed Haldane’s theorizing and plethora of speeches over practical thinking applicable to Britain's real situation.” An interesting class angle was also taken, as an editorial noted the rumour that Territorial Force commissions were to be reserved for the gentry in order to keep expenditure to a minimum. By implying that a well-heeled landed class would dominate the Force, the article accused Haldane and his party

of hypocrisy, as they accommodated their supposed ideological enemies when expedient and then were prejudiced against the less well-connected but motivated

°° H. O. Arnold-Forster, Zhe Army of 1906: a policy and vindication (London: John Murray, 1906); Military Needs and Military Policy (London: Smith, Elder, 1907). °” The Times Literary Supplement, 7 December 1906. °8 See for examples, 7he Times, 3 January 1910, 15 April, 22 April 1911, 18 April 1913. ® See for examples, Zhe Times, 19 April, 23 December 1911, 18 February 1913. 7° Manchester Guardian, 15 September, 26 November 1906, 15 January, 26 February, 10 April, 20 June, 30 November 1907. "| Daily Express, 13 July 1906. ” Daily Express, 26 February 1907.

The Public Face of the Army 159 urban middle classes.’* Among the Unionist heavyweight papers, the Odserver,

under Garvin's firm editorial hand, moved rapidly from an initial welcome to implacable opposition. As soon as Haldane announced his scheme for reform of the auxiliary forces, the Observer vented scepticism. ‘The entire structure was condemned as unworkable, particularly the county associations. Such a system, stated an editorial, appeared to lack a centralizing authority and was therefore liable to create huge variation in the quality of the Territorial Force.’”* The opposition was maintained, with vigorous support for Lord Roberts's calls for conscription, with a particularly strong article published a fortnight before the Territorial Force formally came into existence.” Pressure was maintained with a further editorial three weeks later in which Haldane was roundly condemned for creating a force unable to meet any kind of emergency, establishing an ineffective replacement for the militia in the Special Reserve and reducing the number of regulars. The editorial ended with the final, damning judgement, ‘he has not given us the army of our ideal, he has given us the British army of German dreams’.”° The Odserver maintained that Haldane’s biggest handicap was trying to achieve army reform within a party obsessed with retrenchment and misplaced anti-militarist sentiments, and referred to him as a ‘prisoner of his party’.””

Retrenchment was, indeed, an extremely important consideration for Haldane, and the Manchester Guardian considered this to be a vital aspect of any Liberal governments policy on army reform.” Initially, the Manchester Guardian was extremely pleased by Haldane’s financial prudence and his ability to explain expenditure clearly and sensibly in the Commons.” Gradually this gave way to scepticism. The first doubts on cost effectiveness were reported in 1907 and continued with an editorial on a speech made by Haldane to the Manchester Reform Club, which was praised for its candid nature but raised concerns as it failed to answer the questions of ‘those of us who had hoped for a considerable reduction in our military expenditure’.*° Haldane therefore found himself caught in the unenviable position of failing to

impress both supporters and critics. The press image of both Haldane and the Territorial Force, his most controversial creation, was made all the more difficult to

manage by the sustained campaign of those in favour of national service. The National Service League was founded in 1902 and soon gained the active support of Lord Roberts. It pursued a fervent propaganda campaign through widespread pam-

phleteering and public meetings pushing the cause of compulsion with enormous energy. The League aimed to gain the official support of the Unionist party for its campaign, but Balfour and Bonar Law remained wary of committing the party.

> Daily Express, 1 April 1908. ”* Observer, 15 July 1906. 7> Observer, 15 March 1908. ’° Observer, 5 April 1908. ” Observer, 5 April 1908. See also 22 March 1908. 8 Manchester Guardian, 26 February 1907.

” Manchester Guardian, 7,9 March 1906. 8° Manchester Guardian, 10 April, 30 November 1907.

160 The Edwardian Army Both men retained a suspicion that compulsion was a subject which might prove unpopular with the electorate when it came to the decision in a general election.* When the Liberals came to power, Balfour was not prepared to take a partisan attitude with Haldane and decided to give him the time and freedom to shape a new defence policy. Such an attitude kept some of the Unionist press happy, but much of it was drifting towards the position of the National Service League and was prepared to assist its propaganda campaigns. The Pall Mall Gazette was an early convert

to conscription, as was the Observer, and both maintained a deep scepticism that anything short of conscription would ever solve Britain’s defence needs.** Although Repington was won over to the idea of conscription, he was also prepared to give the

Liberals time and this chimed in with the wider, blue-water editorial line of The Times. However, he gradually came to question the integrity of the Territorial Force

and managed to bring Robinson with him, even though neither was prepared to condemn Haldane’s solutions as utterly misguided or incompetent.*?

As noted above, a major problem for the pro-conscriptionists was the difficulty of attacking the Territorial Force as inadequate without seeming to denigrate the loyalty, effectiveness or enthusiasm of the men who had volunteered to serve in it. For this reason, the National Service League remained relatively restrained on the Territorial Force itself until 1910. The catalyst for its change in tactics was the controversy caused by Lord Esher’s article in the National Review in which he expressed his severe doubts that the Territorial Force would ever succeed in either making its establishment or of becoming a truly effective military force.** Haldane was deeply disappointed, especially as Esher was both the chair of the County of London Territorial Association and a colleague on the Committee for Imperial Defence.® Reacting swiftly, Haldane prevailed upon Sir Ian Hamilton, the former Adjutant General, aided by the resources of the War Office, to produce a forceful

defence of the Territorial Force and the voluntarist principle in a short book, Compulsory Service, which was published by the end of the year.*° The National Service League struck back, swiftly producing Facts and Fallacies, an answer to Compulsory Service in March 1911.°’ Far from providing a decisive victory for either side, The Times Literary Supplement reviewer believed both works were effective statements of their respective views.** However, the most enduring outcome of

the clash was the arousal of deep resentments in both camps, with the National

8! For a full appraisal of the national service issue see R. J. Q. Adams and Philip P. Poiirer, The conscription controversy in Great Britain, 1900-1918 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987) pp. 16-33. For the attitude of the Unionist party to conscription see Williams, Defending the empire, pp. 185-9. 8° See, for example, Pall Mall Gazette, 26 February 1907, 31 March 1908; Odserver, 5 April 1908. 83 See Spiers, Haldane, p. 168; Morris, Repington, pp. 24-5, 158-60, 193-6; The Times, 28 November 1912, 28 February 1913. 84 National Review, Vol. 56, No. 331, September 1910, pp. 81-8. 8° Spiers, Haldane, pp. 174-5. 8¢ Sir Ian Hamilton, Compulsory Service. A study of the question in the light of experience (London: John Murray, 1910). 8” Field Marshal Earl Roberts (ed.), Facts and Fallacies. An answer to Compulsory Service (London: John Murray, 1911). 88 TLS, 1 December 1910, 30 March 1911.

The Public Face of the Army 161 Service League and its supporters relinquishing any sense of restraint in their treatment of the Territorial Force. The Daily Express threw its weight behind a national service campaign, asking readers to complete a coupon expressing their commit-

ment to national service which would be used to lobby the government.”” With Territorial enlistment in clear decline by 1913, the conscriptionist press became

more vociferous still, and prompted the Daily Express, Daily Mail, Pall Mall Gazette, and Observer to declare the Territorial Force a disastrous failure.’ Among the Unionist press only The Times and Morning Post remained relatively sober. ‘The Morning Post even expressed some sympathy with Haldane, with an editorial stat-

ing that the bitter condemnations of the National Service League probably had undermined recruitment to the Territorial Force. Whatever the cause of the problem, the article continued in a reflective and calm manner, the time had come to consider conscription carefully.”* This stance probably reflected H. A. Gwynne’s feeling that many Liberals were coming round to the idea of conscription, and only needed diplomatic wooing to be brought into serious negotiations.” It was a belief encouraged by J. E. B. Seely, Haldane’s successor, who appeared to be much less committed to the idea of the Territorial Force.” By contrast, the Liberal papers rallied to the cry of militarism and retrenchment. The Manchester Guardian, Daily News, and Westminster Gazette all saw frightening continental parallels in the appeals of the National Service League, combined with an equally frightening level of expenditure.” In addition, the inconsistencies of the conscriptionist campaign were highlighted. The seeming lack of uniformity over what a conscript army was supposed to achieve was used to condemn the campaign. The Westminster Gazette drew attention to this malaise, pointing out that conscriptionists fell into three sorts: those who wanted a general-purpose, vast conscript

army with overtones of continental ambitions; those who wanted it for home defence but couldn’ clearly rationalize the precise threat; and those who believed in compulsory training at the school level with short refresher courses in early adulthood.° For the Daily News the continual sniping of the National Service League

had sought to undermine voluntarism with the ultimate intention of creating an army for continental-scale expeditions. However, it also aimed a shot at Haldane by

stating that his refusal to make the County Associations truly democratic and his

surrender to Unionist interest and influence on this issue had undermined the Force’s appeal to the general public.”” Equally condemnatory of Haldane were the Labour papers. As early as 1907 the Labour Leader had sneered at Haldane’s ‘obsession’

® See Spiers, Haldane, p. 176. °° Daily Express, 4 November 1912.

°! Daily Express, 10 February, 18 April 1913; Daily Mail, 11 February 1913; Pall Mall Gazette, 10 February 1913; Observer, 2, 9 February 1913. °° Morning Post, 13 February 1913. °° See Williams, Defending the empire, p. 219. 4 See Morris, Repington, p. 25. > Daily News, 11 February 1913; Westminster Gazette, 25 February 1911, 11 February 1913. °° Westminster Gazette, 11 February 1913. *” Daily News, 11 February 1913.

162 The Edwardian Army with militarizing society and maintained its opposition to any hint of conscription, while also retaining a scepticism about the Territorial Force as a potential stepping stone to compulsory service.”®

Haldane became Lord Chancellor in June 1912, and his successor, Seely, never received the same degree of direct criticism until the Curragh affair (see below). This was largely because Seely maintained Haldane’s programme, which meant that the themes rather than his individual personality were the centre of attention, even though he was not such a fierce advocate of the Territorial Force. Seely’s appointment made very little impact, which was reflected in the decision of most papers to summarize Haldane’s work and pass only the briefest of comments on the qualities of his replacement.” Despite the degree of debate on governmental policy and individual Secretaries of State for War, the army itself did not escape entirely from critical comment. A series of widely reported scandals, many at the regimental level, particularly in the period immediately after the South African War presented the army in a very poor light and added weight to the call for reform. ‘The first great scandal to break came in February 1903 when allegations of misconduct in the Grenadier Guards became public.'®° A young officer had resigned his commission after being subjected

to a mock court martial followed by a beating from fellow officers for allegedly breaking regimental codes of practice. The scandal was compacted by the fact that the commanding officer of the 1 Grenadier Guards, Lieutenant Colonel Kinloch,

had supposedly connived in, and condoned, the acts. The press debated the case heatedly.'"' The social divisions within the army were certainly highlighted in the correspondence over the matter. ‘A Late Commanding Officer’ wrote that the Guards were a law unto themselves due to their elite social status and were therefore beyond the control of the War Office, an allegation strenuously denied by a Guards officer in a later letter.'°* Unfortunately for the army, this was not the end of the matter, for a series of incidents regarding misbehaviour by officers became public over the next few years. Once again the accusations revolved around socially elite officers, this time in the Dragoons, Lancers, Rifle Brigade, and the Grenadier Guards, and most attracted unfavourable press comment.'™ Another major issue arose in the winter of 1913 when various corruption charges

regarding the administration of army canteens came to light. Run on a cooperative, charitable structure, regimental institutes had strict rules governing the placing and tendering of contracts and use of profits. Five quartermasters were placed °8 Labour Leader, 17, 31 May 1907, 8, 15 September 1911. ” Daily Express, 11 June 1912; Westminster Gazette, 25 February 1911; Daily Mail, 11 June 1912. ‘00 For a full examination of the ‘Kinloch Affair’ see Thomas C. Kennedy, ‘Airing the dirty linen of

an unreformed army: the Kinloch Affair, 1902-1903’, Military Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 2, April 1979, PP Sen The Times, 13, 14, 16, 21 February, 5 May 1903; Pall Mall Gazette, 8, 11, 13 February 1903; Daily Mail, 12 February 1903; Observer, 15 February 1903. '2 The Times, 16, 21 February 1903. '03 See The Times, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 23, 30 June, 17 July 1903;Sheldrakes Aldershot Military Gazette, 6, 27 April 1906; The Times, 19 November, 10, 11, 13, 19 December 1907; Manchester Guardian, 20, 22 November, 10, 19 December 1907; Daily Mirror, 19 November 1907.

The Public Face of the Army 163 under investigation in November 1913, accused of taking bribes from a contractor, which was later revealed to be the major provisioning firm of Lipton. The investigations unfolded, dragging in more and more soldiers, both officers and men, and

spreading as far as Malta, with the newspapers following every development. By March one of the accused reached breaking point and committed suicide. Eventually an officer was forced to resign his commission, heavy fines were levied

on certain employees of Lipton, and the firm was reorganized to ensure more transparent contract negotiations with regimental institutes.'* To make matters worse, this came after a 1905 enquiry into war stores had supposedly resulted in

greater regulation of military supplies following the exposure of numerous procurement scandals.'”

Various other stories also tarnished the image of the army and stimulated public attention thanks to their ‘human interest’ element. The suicide of Sir Hector Macdonald in March 1903 certainly aroused public interest, particularly in his native Scotland where he was a national hero.'°° Macdonald had a long and distinguished career as a soldier, but had committed suicide in Paris in order to avoid facing enquiries into allegations that he had been caught in fla-

grante delicto with two boys in Ceylon. Although no hint of the real reason behind the scandal reached the British press, the shock that a public hero should have been the subject of an investigation and then taken his own life did cause curiosity and puzzlement.'”” His widow's decision to opt for a private funeral then caused further disquiet in Scotland, as many felt they were being denied the right to honour his memory. Eventually, a compromise was reached in which a public procession took place after the family funeral.'°* Some, however, were not

content with these arrangements and it provoked an extremely irate pamphlet from “Ex-Councillor Wallace Thom entitled Major-General Sir Hector Macdonald. The idol of the Scottish nation. Thom used it to launch a vicious attack on Macdonald’s widow for her refusal to allow a grand public funeral. Scots were ‘struck dumb by the insult... knowing full well that this indignity to their hero was the work of a revengeful woman’.'” He believed he had identified the reasons behind the refusal:

'04 See for examples of coverage The Times, 29 November, 8, 10 December 1913, 19, 26, 31 January, 2, 14 February, 13 March, 21, 28 May, 15 July 1914; Daily Express, 24 January, 14, 16, 28 February, 14, 16, 28 March, 3 April, 15, 16, 28, 29 May, 30 June, 1, 2, 16 July 1914; Daily Mirror, 6, 31 January, 16 February, 6 April, 22 May 1914.

of coverage see Daily Mail, 20 March, 20 June 1905; Morning Post, 21 June 1an' For .Seeexamples Ian Beckett, 7he Victorians at War (London: Hambledon and London, 2003) pp. 76-9, 82; Edward M. Spiers, The Scottish soldier and empire, 1854-1902 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006) pp. 206-8. '07 The Times, 25, 26 March 1903; Manchester Guardian, 26, 27 March 1903. For other examples of the press coverage see Daily Express, 25, 26, 27 March 1903. 108 Manchester Guardian, 30, 31 March 1903.

1903) p. Thom, Major-General Sir Hector Macdonald. The idol of the Scottish nation (no imprint, 1.

164 The Edwardian Army What was the warrior’s fault? Loving his Governor's daughter, and the bravest soldiers

are only human. The bloated face in woman is as repulsive to man as the angelic features of a loving maiden is enticing... The brave warrior might have erred in his love, but forgiveness was denied him on this side of the grave... The woman who still bears his title, appears to be inexorable in spite to her dead lord.'"°

In response, Lady Macdonald was successful in gaining an injunction which sup-

pressed the distribution and sale of the pamphlet.'"' It did not stop widespread interest in Sir Hector and the public got the opportunity to make a permanent contribution to his memory through donations to a memorial which was unveiled over his grave in July 1905.'? In Scotland, Macdonald’s image managed to overcome the scandal, although it is doubtful whether it would have done so had any hint of a homosexual, rather than heterosexual, affair made the public domain. When Lieutenant Allan Sutor of the Royal Garrison Artillery was forced to resign his commission in the autumn of 1910, the press seemed to enjoy the sheer eccentricity of the tale. Sutor published a pamphlet provocatively titled The Army System: Why Muddle Through Thirty Millions a Year during Peace?''? Unsurprisingly,

this raised much ire in the army and a charge of conduct contrary to good order and discipline was brought against him. The subsequent investigation raised a cata-

logue of increasingly odd stories as Sutor claimed that he had been denied an adjutancy due to widespread corrupt practices.''* Allegations flew from Sutor with rising vehemence as he defended himself as if appearing in a stage melodrama. The press enjoyed the show, and in particular the implications that Sutor was of doubt-

ful sanity, a feeling which grew when he stated his desire to call Haldane as a defence witness.'!’ Eventually, Sutor was found guilty and resigned his commission,

claiming that he was going to maintain his campaign against waste, mismanage-

ment, and corruption in the army as a journalist; but he soon disappeared into obscurity.''®

Maintaining a good image of officers and other ranks was essential in a period in which recruitment was a continual problem for the army. The public perception of officers was not helped by the stories discussed above, which unfurled against

the background of enquiries into the education and expenses of officers. These

enquiries resulted in official reports which were widely discussed on being made public in 1902 and 1903. ‘The damning conclusions of the investigation into

"Thom, Macdonald, p. 2. "' Manchester Guardian, 27 April 1903. "2? Manchester Guardian, 24 July 1905. ' Lieutenant A. J. Sutor, 7he Army System: why muddle through thirty millions a year during peace? (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Andrew Dickson, 1910). '4 The Times, 10 September 1910; Sutor, Army System, pp. 20-7 ' Manchester Guardian, 10 September 1910. 116 The Times, 2 November 1910; Manchester Guardian, 9 December 1910; A. Sutor, Ex-Lieutenant Allan Sutor’s case. An explanation and appeal (Bedford Chambers, Covent Garden, 1912); A cause or purpose; or, the simple illusion (London: Deverell, Sharpe and Gibson, 1913); Manchester Guardian, 9 January, 14 August 1912; 12 April, 23 May 1913. See also Daily Mirror, 28 January, 2 December 1911, 2 January, 20 February, 24 October, 28 December 1912; Daily Express, 1 March, 13 August 1912, 15, 23 May, 28 July, 4 August, 17 September 1913.

The Public Face of the Army 165 the education of officers were reported with deep concern. Horace Wyndham, the

military correspondent of the ///ustrated London News (and former gentleman ranker), noted that it did not ‘reveal very much credit’ on the army and added that the recommendations should “be adopted without delay’.''” The Times was equally

adamant that reform had to be effected on the inefficient methods of entry and promotion ‘which in the case of the Army has hitherto baffled the efforts of all who have attempted to touch it’.''® Significantly, when the report on officers’ expenses was released, its recommendations to lower the costs of living, particularly in cav-

alry regiments, were once again warmly received by the press. Repington had already advocated in The Times a different method of officer selection and placement which made no distinction between infantry and cavalry and was performed at a central rather than regimental level. He argued that such a system would break down the entrenched traditions of expensive messes as they received men from a

variety of financial backgrounds.''? Far from the report being seen as a move designed to open up commissions to a broader range of society, the [/ustrated London News praised it for assisting the army's traditional officer class. Wyndham argued that the cavalry in particular had become the plaything of the parvenu class, which militated against the gentry: “When wealthy tradesmen are enabled—and take advantage of their ability to do so—to send their sons into crack corps, it is practically impossible to keep the expenses within the limits that may be met by men of gentle birth and small bank accounts.’!”? For Wyndham it was vital to curb excesses in order to allow ‘men of brains and energy’ an opportunity, but clearly, for him at least, this was most likely to be found in the gentry class.'*! Having broached the question of officers’ expenses over and above their incomes in public, it was an issue that never quite faded away, with The Times’s correspond-

ence columns often providing the forum for the debate. Almost as soon as the revised scales for a private income were announced, comments were made. A long-

serving officer wrote to state that the minimum recommended private incomes had underestimated considerably the true costs of serving, even in the colonies.’ In 1911 Repington investigated the costs of cavalry officers still further, and was allowed to examine the books of an unnamed regiment. What he found impressed him considerably. The commanding officer was strongly against extravagance of all

kinds, with very little alcohol drunk at the vast majority of meals and gambling frowned upon. However, the sticking point was the issue of polo and hunting, ‘sports which are both of the greatest value in the making of a good Cavalry officer’, which could not be pursued for less than £300 to £400 a year, ‘and so long as they go on we are limited in our choice of officers to men of means’.'”? Thus, Repington

"7 [lustrated London News, Vol. 121, No. 3303, 9 August 1902, p. 216. 8 The Times, 9 June 1902; see also Westminster Gazette, 16 March 1903. "9 The Times, “The Problem of the Army. The Selection and Training of Officers’, 23 February 1903. a Illustrated London News, Vol. 121, No. 3308, 13 September 1902, p. 394. '2! For a Liberal press reaction see Manchester Guardian, 4 April 1903. '22 The Times, 25 August 1903. 23 The Times, 8 June 1911.

166 The Edwardian Army did not turn the argument on its head and demand that the state subsidize these vital additions to an officer’s training. These comments provoked a query from ‘A Father of Sons’ who wished to know whether an Indian cavalry unit would be considerably cheaper.'* With organized labour becoming more influential and the Labour party making its first steps in parliament, the issue of the expense of com-

missions was maintained. In February 1911 Labour members requested precise information from Haldane on the quantity and proportion of men commissioned from the ranks, and pressed him as to whether a man who was interested in applying for a commission could gain the opportunity to do so without his commanding officer’s express agreement. Haldane denied that this was a significant issue by stating it was highly unlikely that enthusiastic soldiers would be denied a recom-

mendation.'” Proving the endurance of the issue, the Manchester Guardian returned to it in 1914 and allowed the Labour MP, John Ward, to write a column outlining his views on the officering of the army. For Ward, the issue required a radical approach and he advocated reserving half of the commissioned posts for men who had good records as NCOs. He was confident that men of good quality could be found, and referred to the number of campaigns in which higher commanders had been successfully promoted from the ranks without difficulty. Appealing to the sensitivities of middle-class taxpayers, he stated that officers’ pay should not be increased to allow poor men to meet additional expenses; instead, he called

for a revolution in regimental culture: ‘we must...democratize the life and social surroundings of the officer class’, creating an army in which merit rather than ‘wealth or social distinction’ determined a man’s career.'”° At the other end of the army’s hierarchy, it was also difficult to maintain a posi-

tive public image of the ordinary soldier. In the light of the South African War many believed that the soldier of the future would have to be a self-reliant, highly motivated skilled technician capable of surviving the rigours of the modern bat-

tlefield. Figures such as Lord Roberts and Sir Ian Hamilton had taken this line within the army, while Repington advocated something similar in The Times.'’ The problem was finding and retaining enough men of this calibre. Successive Secretaries of State for War recognized this difficulty and worked hard to improve pay and conditions. The much-maligned Arnold-Forster was praised by The Times for his commitment to improving the lot of the common soldier, and in particular his post-service employment prospects.'** Indeed, Arnold-Forster stated his belief that it was this aspect more than any other which dissuaded men from enlisting. In a speech at the Mansion House he admitted that more needed to be done to pre-

pare men for trades and occupations in civilian life, and that civilian employers needed to overcome their prejudices about employing ex-servicemen.'’” The very 124 ‘The Times, 23 June 1911.

'29 The Times, 22 February 1911. 26 Manchester Guardian, 23 April 1914. See also Westminster Gazette, 28 February 1905; Pall Mall Gazette, 24 February 1905. '°7 See The Times, 21 February, 31 August, 22 September 1903. 128 The Times, 14 June 1905.

9 ‘The Times, 14 June 1905.

The Public Face of the Army 167 fact that such prejudices existed reveals just how poorly soldiers were regarded by the wider population. Many shared Arnold-Forster’s belief. An article in The Times

described the huge improvement in barracking, food, clothing, equipment, and pay that had occurred by the winter of 1905, and even added that compared with an agricultural labourer’s pay and conditions, a soldier was very well off.'%° This argument was somewhat disingenuous given that the comparison was with a notoriously badly paid, unskilled, and unstable section of the labour market, par-

ticularly when the army was demanding a better, higher-skilled type of recruit. Given the clear and numerous benefits provided by army life, the article asked why there was still such a shortfall in recruits, and could only conclude that the negative

image of the soldier and the belief that military service would adversely affect future employment prospects kept numbers down. Edgar Wallace, the journalist and thriller writer, wrote to express his agreement with this analysis, and as a former

ranker provided a rare, authoritative voice from the other ranks. Wallace recommended the establishment of training programmes and facilities for the men to improve their post-service prospects, and concluded: ‘It seems to me that the only solution to the difficulty is, not so much to find employment for men as to prepare men for a greater range of employment.’'! The army certainly worked hard to improve its image in this regard, producing encouraging books such as The Army Clerk and the Soldier Tradesman. Written by a former army clerk, the short book emphasized the army's desperate need for experienced clerks, particularly in the Army Service Corps. The good pay and conditions were stressed, as were the opportunities for travel and adventure. It was firmly aimed at the lower middle class and stated that they formed exactly the social group the army was most keen to draw in, and also called upon a range of tradesmen to consider plying their crafts in the army. In many ways the book compounded the problems outlined above, for it was a call to those who had already gained training and experience rather than an assurance that those with an interest in such occupations could gain the relevant skills in the army.'*’ Despite these attempts to show an army eager to utilize and hone valuable transferable skills, not much seemed to have changed by 1914, for a battalion commander wrote to The Times to state that far too many ex-servicemen faced prejudice from both employers and trade unions, which then had a depressing effect on enlistment.'°* However,

in the spring of 1914 a War Office subcommittee was formed to investigate the question of post-service employment and the provision of transferable skills. It was a move the Pall Mall Gazette approved, for it believed that this was the most effec-

tive answer to recruitment shortfalls.’ The main obstacle to improving the image of the ordinary soldier was the perception that he frequently degenerated into loutish behaviour when off duty. '°0 The Times, 30 November 1905. '31 The Times, 5 December 1905. '? “Ex-Chief Army Clerk’, Zhe Army Clerk and the Soldier Tradesman (London: Walters and Co,

1he Times, . 19 January 1914.

'34 Pall Mall Gazette, 16 January 1914.

168 The Edwardian Army Arnold-Forster was convinced that the poor state of most barracks and the fact that so few battalions ever served for a considerable period in their home depot town diminished respect for their immediate environment and so affected relations with their host communities.'*’ These incidents were often reported by the local press in garrison and depot towns, and occasionally made it to the national

dailies. In January 1912, troops based at Longmoor barracks, home of the Mounted Infantry school, rioted. The ill discipline was sparked by over-zealous rivalries in the inter-regimental football competition. Men burnt down huts and attacked each other with bayonets.'*° The front-page headline in the Daily Express proclaimed: ‘Mutiny of British Soldiers. Astounding Scene at Longmoor Camp. Shots Fired. Men Wounded in a Bayonet Charge’.'*’ Although it can be seen as a

backhanded tribute to the grip of regimental loyalty, it did nothing to stop the idea that soldiers were a boisterous and loutish lot. However, the perceived image was often a lot worse than the reality. Like all British provincial newspapers of the period, Sheldrake’ Aldershot Military Gazette had a fascination with the proceedings of the local police court and recorded its dealings in great detail. Surveys of its coverage reveal that very few soldiers appeared for drunken or violent behav-

iour and certainly were not more frequent offenders than civilian locals. (However, it has to be stated that much of the drunkenness was probably dealt with at the battalion level and never made it as far as the police court.) A fair amount of petty theft was committed by soldiers, with the stealing of bicycles particularly prevalent, although a measurable proportion of this theft was from other soldiers rather than local residents.'°> Most garrison commanders worked very hard to ensure that soldiers were as unobtrusive as possible. The standing orders for the Colchester garrison instructed men to march in the road so as to avoid inconveniencing local residents walking along the pavements. Soldiers who wished to attend football matches at Colchester United’s Layer Road ground were told to leave the camp by the gates closest to the ground and ‘not proceed further than necessary along the public road’ for much the same reason.'*” Soldiers provided an economic stimulus to a town and also a focus of local pride

and colour. In Colchester, soldiers were very important to the local economy. A tailor in the High Street took orders from thirty-eight officers and NCOs between 1908 and 1910. Unsurprisingly, the town’s brewers were great advocates

of the military presence and ‘the brewing trade valued and nurtured its contacts with the garrison’.'*° The expansion of the garrison then provided significant work

' H.O. Arnold-Forster, Zhe Army in 1906 (London: John Murray, 1906) p. 501. '3¢ The Times, 4 January 1912. '57 Daily Express, 4 January 1912. For other examples, see also Westminster Gazette, 4 January 1912; Daily Mail, 4 January 1912. '88 ‘Three six-month samples were taken from Sheldrakes Aldershot Military Gazette, January—June 1906, July-December 1908, January—June 1912.

' Colchester Garrison Standing Orders (London: HMSO, 1909) p. 29; 1913, p. 10. 40 A. E EH. Robertson, “The army in Colchester and its influence on the social, economic and political development of the town, 1854-1914’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Essex, 1992, pp. 204-6.

The Public Face of the Army 169 for local builders.'*! Winchester was the home of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps and Rifle Brigade and each year the depots ran a highly successful “Green Jacket Week’

celebrating the rifle regiments, involving tattoos, balls, sports, and parades. In 1906 over £850 was raised for Green Jacket charities and ‘excited a very great amount of public interest’, with people descending on the city from across the county.'” The Territorial Force inherited the equally deep bonds of attachment with their parent communities, thus making a double focus for local pride, both regular and auxiliary, that helped promote a positive image of soldiers. The mayor of Winchester told a Territorial recruiting drive that the local “Company was one of the public assets of the town’ revealing the citizens’ local and national patriotism.'*°

The presence of soldiers could also draw prestigious visitors to a town, further increasing local pride and honour.'** Such evidence has led a historian of the Colchester garrison to conclude that ‘the soldier was more highly regarded in Colchester, and possibly other garrison towns where he was better known, than in the country at large’.'* Boosting the prestige and standing of the soldier in the country at large, particularly among his own class, was the increasing deployment of the army in aid of the civil power. From 1910 there was a significant increase in violent industrial unrest, and heightened tensions in Ireland over the Home Rule issue. Both of these trends often placed the army in the front line of law enforcement. Fears over the role of the

Territorial Force in internal disputes were raised by Labour politicians soon after Haldane announced his plans for the new force. Will Thorne, a veteran trade unionist and Labour MP representing West Ham, stated that no employee of West Ham council should join the Territorial Force for fear ‘that in the event of a strike members of the Territorial Force might be called out to shoot their fellow citizens. They would be used against their own class and would be traitors to their own class.’'“° Haldane reacted rapidly to this fear in a speech the following evening, reassuring his audience that ‘it was wholly illegal to embody, or attempt to embody, the Territorial Force to interfere in a labour dispute or strike’.'*” These comments were not enough for the Labour MP Philip Snowden, who insisted on raising the whole issue of the deployment of troops in civil disputes in the Commons.'“* When a wave of strikes broke out in the summer of 1911, violence and the threat of violence hung large in many British cities and troops were deployed extensively. This was particularly true in Liverpool, where infantry and cavalry protected convoys of supplies and rioting

broke out. The press divided along political lines on this issue, with the Unionist papers supportive of such action, the Liberal press uneasy, and the Labour titles outraged. The Labour Leader certainly stressed this line, with one correspondent to

‘4’ Robertson, “The army in Colchester’, p. 204. '2 Hampshire Chronicle, 21 July 1906. ‘8 Hampshire Chronicle, 6 January 1912. '4 Robertson, “The army in Colchester’, p. 199. '® Robertson, “The army in Colchester’, p. 203. 46 Manchester Guardian, 15 July 1908. 47 Manchester Guardian, 16 July 1908. “8 ‘The Times, 23 August 1907.

170 The Edwardian Army the paper noting: ‘the proceedings conclusively prove that the Army is not supported to repel a foreign foe, but to buttress up the enemies of the people within our own gates. The Army is the bulwark of the privileged classes.’!*” The spring of 1914 witnessed the most controversial episode in the pre-war debate over military aid to the civil power, the “Curragh Incident’. The events surrounding the supposed refusal of certain officers to carry out government orders relating to the imposition of Home Rule on Ireland achieved instant notoriety at the time and have been much debated since.'”° In terms of the public image of the army, few events managed to polarize press reportage and comment so violently, as the press divided firmly and at times ferociously along political lines. In addition, few events of the period provide such abundant evidence of the collusion between soldiers, journalists, and certain politicians in order to manipulate the presentation of the issues at stake. The crisis which overtook the British army commenced when General Sir Arthur

Paget, commander of British troops in Ireland, arrived in London to attend a conference in order to discuss security issues in Ireland.’*' The small committee established to examine the threats posed by armed loyalist and nationalist elements met on 18 and 19 March. It was decided to make some alterations to troop dispositions to ensure the safety of government property in the event of trouble. There was also some discussion of the nature of wider military operations should they be

needed, but it was clear to many involved that such an escalation would pose considerable difficulties. Paget telegraphed the instructions regarding troop movements to Dublin, and then set off on his return journey. Arriving back in Dublin

on 20 March, Paget found that his orders had been put into effect. At this point Paget called an extraordinary conference of his officers in which he gave them an ultimatum. Those domiciled in Ireland with objections to Home Rule were given the option of absenting themselves while operations were undertaken. Those who did not meet this residential qualification were told they must either obey or, if in disagreement with the plans, would be dismissed from the service, thus forfeiting their pension entitlements. He compounded matters by giving at least some officers the impression that active operations of a pre-emptive nature were about to commence against loyalists. No conclusive explanation for Paget’s actions has ever been

provided, but he claimed that he made the announcement in order to determine the minds of his subordinates. Brigadier General Gough of 3 Cavalry Brigade, and a man of pronounced loyalist sympathies, immediately circulated his brigade, and news rapidly spread to other units. Paget appeared to realize that he had sparked a

crisis and called another conference on the morning of 21 March. This did not improve matters and General Sir Charles Fergusson of 5 Division worked hard to make his officers aware of the enormous consequences of failing to follow the line of duty. By this stage Gough had persuaded many of his fellow officers to state their willingness to resign, and was communicating with many of his friends and allies

9 Labour Leader, 29 March 1912. '°° For a full history of the incident see lan KF W. Beckett, Zhe Army and the Curragh Incident, 1914

(London: Bodley Head/Army Records Society, 1986); Sir James Fergusson, The Curragh Incident (London: Faber and Faber, 1964); A. P. Ryan, Mutiny at the Curragh (London: Macmillan, 1956). ‘5! "The summary of events that follows is largely drawn from Beckett, Curragh Incident, pp. 1-29.

The Public Face of the Army 171 in London. Gough then set off to London with the intention of extracting a promise from the government not to use the army to enforce Home Rule on Ireland. On

Monday 23 March Gough met Paget, Seely, Sir John French, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Sir John Spencer Ewart, the Adjutant General. After much discussion it was agreed to provide Gough with a written assurance that the army would not be forced into action. An initial draft was accepted by the cabinet, but not by Gough, and so Seely added some clarifying statements without reference to the wider cabinet, which satisfied Gough. Gough returned to Dublin in victorious mood with the signed statement, with fanfares from the Unionist press for supposedly halting a plot against Ulster and howls of outrage from the Liberal and Labour papers for supposedly diverting a lawful government from its course. When what had happened became clear to Asquith, the crisis deepened, for he repudiated the guarantee on 25 March. Seely wanted to resign but this was declined, and a day later French and Ewart offered their resignations, believing that they had acted in accordance with the government only to have

their integrity impugned. The army was then pilloried by the Liberal and Labour press when the text of the guarantee to Gough became public, and the government was forced to face uproar in parliament, which was only partially allayed by the publication of numerous documents relating to the crisis. A new Army Order issued on 27 March designed to clarify the situation was ridiculed by the Unionist papers. Haldane managed to persuade French and Ewart to stay their hands while he worked at a statement designed to explain adequately the confusion and delicacy of the situation. Unconvinced by Haldane’s efforts, Ewart and French resigned along with Seely on 30 March. From this point the press slowly wound down their campaigns of rabid intensity during which the army had been subjected to intense scrutiny, with much of it shaped by the connivance of senior officers with journalists. When the story of resignation threats offered by Brigadier General Hubert Gough and many other officers of the 3 Cavalry Brigade as well as the seeming climb down of the government in the face of such action first reached the press on the morning of 21 March 1914, it was not entirely unprecedented. In July 1913 Geoffrey Robinson, editor of Zhe Times, had asked Repington to investigate the attitude of the army

to Home Rule and the possibility of coercing Unionist Ulsterman into acquiescence.'”’ In reply Repington had warned that Home Rule could spell trouble in the army, with officers and men either refusing to help maintain order or even actively working against it. Repington was anxious to avoid such a state of affairs coming to pass and believed that 7he Times could be influential in maintaining order: We dare not admit politics to the Army, and I think you should make a special appeal to regimental feeling and invite senior officers to set an example and to repress at the first symptom not only any rash disposition on the part of officers, but also any conversations and tendencies which might lead the younger hot heads astray. The firmest discipline that we have is that of the regiment, and if this goes, all else goes with it. We must have no compromise with illegality on the part of the Army. It might be the end of us.'” '? Beckett, Curragh Incident, p. 33. '3 Repington to Robinson, 3 July 1913, quoted in Morris, Repington, pp. 208-9; Beckett, Curragh Incident, p. 34.

172 The Edwardian Army Somewhat ironically, Repington was to add a certain amount of fuel to the fire when the incident became public knowledge, and was far from the dispassionate

voice of reason he urged on Robinson in his letter. However, as will be seen, Repington probably justified his reaction on a strict interpretation of what actually constituted ‘compromise with illegality’. The first hints of trouble in the Army in Ireland were reported in the press on 21 March when it was noted that unconfirmed rumours were circulating in Dublin of large-scale troop movements and the resignations of cavalry officers.'** Some of the material carried in 7he Times and other Unionist papers was probably supplied by Sir Henry Wilson, Director of Military Operations at the War Office at this point, for Robinson's diary states that he had a meeting with Wilson in which ‘he told me

roughly what had happened in Dublin the day before’.'” The biggest difference between the papers was the emphasis placed on the recent troop deployments. ‘The Unionist press hinted at impending catastrophe, while the Liberal press described the movements as measures designed to maintain law and order, and attacked the scaremongering of the Unionist papers.'°° Enough information had been leaked to the Unionist press by the evening of Saturday 21 March for the Odserver to deliver a stinging assault on the government. ‘Save the Army’ ran the headline of the editorial column, and it went on to indulge in a lengthy procession of historical analogies, comparing the situation with Marlborough’s decision in 1688 not to serve a tyrannical king against his conscience. Wishing to ridicule Asquith and the Liberals, it pointed out that the great Whig historian, Trevelyan, had written fulsomely

on the British officers who had refused to make war on American colonists in 1776, being unconvinced of the legality of the cause. It was alleged that Seely intended to ‘purge’ the army of officers who would not do the government's bidding. According to the Observer's understanding of events, Gough and his fellow officers had acted with great honour and moral courage for refusing to participate in an illegal, pre-emptive strike on Ulster loyalists as part of the government's plot.'*’ This line of interpretation then set the tone for much of the Unionist press over the next few days. By Monday 23 March the Unionist press had fixed its line. The revolt of Gough

and his fellow officers had saved the country; the army had acted as the nation’s conscience and champion by refusing to be made a tool in the hands of an unscrupulous government. ‘Liberalism does not yet understand that Englishmen cannot be bullied with impunity, and that even discipline may be destroyed by the usurpations of a dishonest tyranny, exclaimed the editorial in the Daily Express.* The

Morning Post was equally forthright and encapsulated the views of the entire Unionist press:

' For examples see The Times, Pall Mall Gazette, Morning Post, Manchester Guardian, Daily News, Westminster Gazette, 21 March 1914.

' Beckett, Curragh Incident, p. 207. 8° Westminster Gazette, Daily Chronicle, Daily News, 23 March 1914. '57 Observer, 22 March 1914. 8 Daily Express, 24 March 1914.

The Public Face of the Army 173 The British officer, we are glad to say is not a politician; but he is a citizen, and the whole history of his race, of his profession, and the Army to which he belongs prompts

him to sympathize with the people of Ulster in their struggle to remain under the Union Jack...the British people, whose spirit is against the use of the Army to coerce the civil population, will thank these soldiers for the stand they have taken in the true interests of the Empire.'”

The denial that the army had any direct interest or involvement in politics was the

second main plank of the Unionist press’s position throughout the crisis. “The officers of the Army were not prepared to butcher their fellow countrymen in order to serve partisan ends,’ stated another editorial in the Morning Post, while the Daily Express announced that ‘the British officer... has never had any concern with politics’.'°° The claims were remarkably disingenuous given the fact that Gough and

other high-ranking officers maintained a continual dialogue with the Unionist papers and even some Unionist politicians. Gough spoke to H. A. Gwynne of the

Morning Post at Euston station before his return to Dublin on the evening of 23 March and a week later had another meeting with him in order to keep him abreast of the latest developments. Gwynne then appeared to play an important role in French's decision to resign and its formal, written justification. At the same time, Gough and many other officers were supplying Leo Amery and the political

pamphleteer and author E S. Oliver with a constant stream of information.'*! Unsurprisingly, the Liberal and Labour press was outraged and stupefied by the statements of non-partisan action, and stressed its contention that the officer class of the army had unashamedly revealed its political sympathies and beliefs. According to certain sections of the centre-left press, the Unionist logic could be turned on its head: there was indeed a plot, not government inspired, but one planned and executed by certain officers in cahoots with the Unionist party.'® Both the Daily News and Reynoldss Newspaper carried the front-page headline, ‘Premier Smashes Army Plot’. With the Liberal and Labour press accusing Gough and his fellow protesters of seditious, mutinous, and unconstitutional behaviour amounting to a threat of military dictatorship, the problem of the army officer corps’s demographic was reopened. For the Daily News it was time for wholesale reconstruction of the army. In an editorial finely balanced between quivering anger and rueful determination it remarked: Every officer in the Army who disobeys orders or joins in a conspiracy against Parlia-

ment, and every officer not on the active list who incites to such seditious conduct, should be broken without mercy and without hesitation, and should never be allowed to rejoin the service of which he has proved himself unworthy... Not only must the Army be purged of every officer who would make the Army the tool of a political '° Morning Post, 23 March 1914. '©° Morning Post, 25 March 1914; Daily Express, 28 March 1914.

'6! See Beckett, Army and the Curragh Incident, pp. 17, 25, 43, 47, 207, 220-1, 226, 239, 316,

20— .

° ‘a Hoe: Strachan has raised a similar point in his examination of the Ulster ‘plot’ in The politics of the British army, pp. 114-15. '3 Daily News, 26 March 1914; Reynoldss Newspaper, 29 March 1914.

174 The Edwardian Army party, but their places should be filled with men risen from the ranks, and the Army should be drastically reorganized so as to be the faithful democratic instrument of the

democratic people.’

The Labour press was more phlegmatic, believing that the Liberal papers were finally gaining knowledge of something it had warned against for many years: the partisan nature of the army. For the Labour papers the most important point was the officers’ seeming assertion of conditional obedience, which had gained so much

coverage and support from the Unionist press and party. If officers were going to be applauded for using the right of conscience, then the OR should have precisely the same right during labour disputes. “This is palpably a revolutionary new departure, an editorial in the Daily Herald commented archly on the insistence from the Unionist press that officers had acted according to conscience; it continued: ‘that members and parasites of the master-classes have set themselves recklessly to play with and revolutionize that formidable engine, the British Army, is a mighty irony. But it has a thrilling side. Watch and wait, brothers!’'® For the rest of the crisis the sole concern of the Daily Herald was to promote the ‘dont shoot [strikers]’ campaign among the other ranks of the army under the justification that the ruling classes now believed obedience was optional.' The Daily Citizen used it as an opportunity to demand full democratization of the army and mercilessly pilloried the quality of the officers. “Cavalry officers have the distinction of being men of the

lowest mental capacity of all who are granted commissions,’ it told readers.’

Belatedly realizing that it had unleashed a rather potent spirit, the Unionist press changed its line and emphasized the fact that no actual order had been disobeyed, and the government had caused the trouble by demanding that Paget put conditions in front of the officers. On this basis Repington was able to justify

his belief that the army had done no wrong and had not actually mutinied.'® According to the Unionist press, it was the supine and illicit government which undermined military discipline through these moves.'” Yet while the Morning Post was loudly proclaiming the army’s innocence of political manoeuvrings and obedi-

ence to duty, it also noted: “The Army has killed the Home Rule Bill, and the sooner the Government recognize the fact the better for the country.’'”° Among the casualties of the incident were the Secretary of State for War, Seely, the Adjutant General, Sir John Ewart, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John French. Regardless of political persuasion, the press expressed sympathy

'©4 Daily News, 24 March 1914. '© Daily Herald, 23 March 1914. '°6 Daily Herald, 25, 27, 28 March 1914. '°” Daily Citizen, 23 March 1914. 168 The Times, 27 March 1914. '© See The Times, 25,27 March 1914; Pall Mall Gazette, 28, 30 March 1914; Daily Mail, 26 March 1914; Daily Express, 28 March 1914. As Ian Beckett and others have noted, as no orders were actu-

ally given or refused, the popular term “Curragh mutiny’ is incorrect, shown in his adoption of the term ‘incident’, Beckett, Army and the Curragh Incident, p. 1.

' Morning Post, 26 March 1914.

The Public Face of the Army 175 for French and Ewart and regretted the loss of their professional influence on the army. The sole difference in the commentaries was the Unionist press’s insistence that French and Ewart had taught the government a lesson about honour and duty in their actions.'”' The Curragh Incident polarized press and public opinion on the army and its raison d’étre in a highly damaging way, for the crisis had made it extremely difficult to view the army either objectively or as a national, as opposed to a sectional, institution. With so many controversies surrounding the army, and its image among the British lower middle and working classes still so ambiguous, it is not perhaps surprising to find that by 1914 the War Office took promotion of the army seriously and decided to encourage a high-profile charm offensive. Central to this campaign was the production of a film about army life. The British Army Film was released in

January 1914 and revealed the War Office’s embrace of new technologies and means of public communication. Produced by Keith, Prowse and Company and made with the full cooperation of the army, the film was an ambitious production involving some 25,000 officers and men.'” In return for providing such generous cooperation, the Army Council reached agreement with Keith, Prowse that the film would be released only after it had given its final approval. Shot between May

and October 1913 at military installations across Britain, some 60,000 feet of material was collected, which was edited down to 7,000 feet for the public release.'”°

Scenes from army life were shown, with a deliberate emphasis on excitement, colour, and dash, including glimpses of the newly formed Royal Flying Corps’s airship, Beta, and a lengthy section on manoeuvres. The ‘dominant idea of [this scene]... dealing with service under active conditions is “reality”, said the accompanying booklet, and it went on to state that: “Everything possible has been done to convey by means of the cinema, a just appreciation of what soldiering under war conditions really means. From the capture of a scout to the final charge of Cavalry against beat and disorganized Infantry, the idea is to show exactly what takes place when the British Army is manoeuvred under war conditions.’ As Seely told the Commons, the film was designed to stimulate recruitment and was part of a wider campaign administered by a professional advertising agency, including the widespread distribution of posters, a new booklet explaining service in the army’s various corps, and front-page advertisements of terms and conditions in the leading daily papers.'”? Newspapers from both ends of the political spectrum were impressed by this innovative approach. The Daily Mail referred to the fact

that the War Office had emerged from the ‘pre-historic age’ and opted for an

'71 See Daily Express, Daily Mail, The Times, Morning Post, Daily Herald, Pall Mall Gazette, Westminster Gazette, Daily News, Daily Citizen, Daily Chronicle, 27, 28, 30, 31 March 1914. '? The British Army Film. Booklet for the Royal Premiere, Sandringham, 1 December 1913. '73 See N. P. Hiley, ‘The British Army Film, You! and For the Empire: reconstructed propaganda films,

1914-1916’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1985, pp. 165-82, p. 164. See also Pall Mall Gazette, 13 September 1913. '4 ‘The British Army Film. Booklet for the Royal Premiere. '? ‘The Times, 16 January, 11 March 1914; Daily Mail, 15 January 1914; Daily News, 15 January 1914.

176 The Edwardian Army advertising campaign capable of selling the army more effectively than ‘an infinity of recruiting sergeants’; while for the Daily News it was a ‘novel experiment’.'”° The

press gave the film itself much publicity and the first London performance was accompanied by a procession of soldiers, a tactic repeated at other screenings.'”” According to the Daily Express, ‘every boy [in Britain] will want to see it’.'’° This was not the first film dedicated to the army, however, for in 1909 the Hepworth Manufacturing Company had gained War Office help in the making of The Service of the Soldier, a film following the career of an individual soldier.'”? A Hampshirebased film maker, Alfred West, also produced a film, Life in Our Army (1911), depicting various scenes from military life both in Britain and abroad, as well as travelogue shots of famous battlefields.'*° Such was the potency of cinema that the City of London Territorial Association considered screen advertising and renting and exhibiting, in cinemas across the county of London, Soldiers of the King, a film about the Territorial Force made by a private company.'*' Not all found these films acceptable. Keir Hardie demanded to know whether government funds had supported the production and distribution of The British Army Film following a parade accompanying its exhibition in Glasgow, and was once again reassured that it was made entirely at the expense of a commercial company.'® The film also caused a disturbance at a screening in Dublin where nationalist youths occupied the front seats, hissing the British soldiers and cheering a brief mention of German troops.'* The very fact that the film provoked such responses is testimony to the power of the cinema even at this early stage in its development.

An equally spectacular way of advertising the army was through parades and tattoos, with the Royal Naval and Military Tournament in London the most lavish. Held in support of naval and military charities, the tournament was instigated

in 1880 and had become a firm part of the London calendar by the turn of the century, playing to sell-out crowds and raising impressive sums for its charities.'*

Appealing particularly to young boys, the tournament emphasized all that was glamorous and dramatic in military life. Reflecting on contemporary military history, in 1904 a blockhouse scene on the veldt was re-enacted, while in 1911 an

incident built around the theft of rifles on the North-West Frontier was dramatized.'®° New military kit and skills were also shown off: in 1902 the Army Service

'6 Daily Mail, 15 January 1914; Daily News, 15 January 1914. 7 The Times, 15, 17, 20 January 1914; Manchester Guardian, 7 May 1914. '8 Daily Express, 20 January 1914. '® Nicholas Reeves, Official British Film Propaganda during the First World War (London: Croom Helm, 1986) p. 48. '8° Alfred West, Life in Our Navy and Our Army (Portsmouth: Wessex Press, 1912) pp. 29-47. '8! Guildhall Manuscripts Library, City of London Archives, Ms 12613 City of London Territorial Force Association Recruiting Committee minute book, Vol. I, 12 March 1913, 14 January 1914. 182 Manchester Guardian, 9 March 1914. 183, Manchester Guardian, 6 March 1914. '§ For a full history of the Royal Tournament see P. L. Binns, The Story of the Royal Tournament (Aldershot: Gale and Poulden, 1952).

' Binns, Royal Tournament, p. 66.

The Public Face of the Army 177 Corps made its debut with a display of packing its wagons with war supplies, which became an extremely popular regular feature, and in 1914 it showed off its new Hornby tractor.'*® However, much of the tournament was devoted to past glories and the history of the army. In 1906, full-scale jousting was included in the programme, and was sketched in lavish detail by Richard Caton-Woodville for the Illustrated London News.'*’ The tendency towards military history was also reflected

in military art. Although more paintings of military scenes were exhibited at the

Royal Academy between 1901 and 1914 than at any point in the nineteenth century, the trend was away from the contemporary army.'*® Richard CatonWoodville, Stanley Berkeley, and R. B. Wollen all specialized in military art and produced iconic images of the army which were reproduced in postcard and print form and were thus brought into the truly popular sphere, but they seemed to find it increasingly hard to depict the contemporary military and, after an initial rush of subjects, the South African War had provided disappointingly few moments of drama: the depiction of farm burnings was hardly likely to prove popular among the British public used to heroic and chivalric visions of its soldiers.'®” Despite this trend, it did not stop the image of the soldier from being ubiquitous, especially on commercial goods where it was used to support everything from cigarettes to boot

blacking. Somewhat ironically, given the pejorative association of soldiers with hard drinking, was the use of soldiers, particularly kilted Highlanders, in whisky advertisements.'”” Boys were also bombarded with histories of the British army and

military toys as mass production made items such as lead soldiers cheaper and more easily available through department stores.'”! Of course, the South African War had ensured a high profile for the army, both good and bad, and it also resulted in a flood of books about the war. Between 1899

and 1914 over 500 books and pamphlets on the war and collections of official documents were published in the English language.'”* Among the first to get into print were the journalists who had covered the campaign and often did little more than reprint their original despatches with a few additions; but their fast-paced, exciting versions such as With the Flag to Pretoria and Transvaal War Album were successful with the public.'?? Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, who had served as a doctor during the war, produced a full history based upon his own experiences and extensive use of eye-witness testimony; but probably the most important account was that

'8° Binns, Royal Tournament, p. 68. '87 [lustrated London News, Vol. 128, No. 3500, 19 May 1906, p. 705. '88 See J. W. M. Hichberger, Jmages of the army. The military in British art, 1815-1914 (Manchester:

Manchester University Press, 1988) pp. 116-18. '89 See Hichberger, Images of the army, pp. 114-16; see also the annual volumes of the Royal Academy Pictures (London: Cassell, 1902-1914). '99 See Jim Murray, The Art of Whisky, A deluxe blend of historic posters from the Public Record Office

(London: PRO publications, 1988). '9! See Michael Paris, Warrior Nation. Images of war in British popular culture, 1850-2000 (London:

Reaktion, 2000) pp. 83-110. ' Figure compiled from Fred R. Van Hartesveldt, The Boer war: historiography and annotated bibliography (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000). '°3 See Ian Beckett, Victorians at War, pp. 84-91.

178 The Edwardian Army published by 7he Times. The intention of Leo Amery, who coordinated a team of researchers, was to provide a comprehensive history of the conflict in which the recollections of major participants and official documentation would play a major role. However, the six volumes were by no means an objective history. Amery used the project as a platform for his army reform campaign, which was highly sympathetic to Lord Roberts’s views and maintained the support of 7he Times for the press hero of the South African War. At the same time there was also the need to make it a commercial success, which was a major demand of The Times's managing director, Moberly Bell.'°* The official history was determined to be comprehensive, but its volumes appeared in such a staccato fashion and were so dry in style that no

more than 45,000 complete sets were ever sold, making the project a financial failure.!” More profitable were the populist works of Horace Wyndham with his Following the Drum, first published in 1912, and the romantic socialist Robert Blatchford’s My Life in the Army, which was an expanded version of articles originally

published in the Daily Mail and subsequently reprinted in its sixpenny novels series.'°° Both men provided lively accounts which emphasized that although soldiers might occasionally be boisterous, they were decent men at heart. ‘The respectable and appealing side of the army was also seen during parades and ceremonial. As mentioned above, local pride often found a significant outlet in the actions of the local units, both regular and auxiliary. In the wake of the South African War,

Britain saw the erection of numerous memorials to the dead of the conflict in a prefiguring of the memorializing process that would erupt during the Great War. These memorials connected the service of respectable citizens with khaki, and the unveiling ceremonies served to stress the links between the army and its parent communities.'”” Manoeuvres and exercises also gave the army a high profile in certain localities, which were analysed and commented on extensively by the heavyweight papers. According to an editorial in the Morning Post, the people of Stony Stratford in Buckinghamshire, the town at the heart of the 1913 manoeuvres, were extremely interested in each day’s events and were very impressed by the good behaviour and comradeship shown by the men encamped across the local countryside.'”® For the Morning Post it was a great shame that not all areas of the country were suitable for

manoeuvres, for they served as an excellent way to bond people and army together.'”” '4 Beckett, Victorians at War, pp. 85-8. ' Beckett, Victorians at War, pp. 89-91. '6 Horace Wyndham, Following the Drum (London: Andrew Melrose, 1912); Robert Blatchford, My Life in the Army (London: Daily Mail press, 1910). '97 See the impressive guidebook to British South African War memorials produced on behalf of service charities, J. Gildea, For Remembrance and in Honour of Those Who Lost Their Lives in the South African War, 1899-1902 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode Ltd, 1911). See also Mark Connelly and Peter Donaldson, “South African War (1899-1902) memorials in Britain: a case study of memorialization in London and Kent’, War and Society, vol. 29, no. 1, May 2010, pp. 20-46. '°8 Morning Post, 3 October 1913. ‘9 "The Pall Mall Gazette was of the same opinion, see 19 September 1912.

The Public Face of the Army 179 The military correspondents of the various highbrow newspapers discussed the value and lessons learnt in manoeuvres and exercises in robust and rigorous manner. In the immediate aftermath of the South African War they were particularly keen to see improvement at all levels. The Westminster Gazette detected positive signs in the 1903 manoeuvres season, referring to the dismissal and retirement of ‘a great many worthy old cavalry officers whose age and infirmities so often prevented the arm from doing itself justice in the war’.*°° Probably taking a swipe at Brodrick’s army corps scheme, the discussion also praised the institution of reforms

based on hard practical experience in the field rather than continental theorizing about ideal military structures.”' Such conclusions reflected the pragmatic, empirical intellectual mindset of Victorian and Edwardian Britain. Two years later The Times

reported its satisfaction that progress had been achieved, and Repington wrote of the enormous strides made by the whole army in 1910.°° In 1912 the Morning Post drew a comparison between the skills shown in the recent manoeuvres and the state of the army at the end of the South African War: “The British Army has made

a great advance during the last ten years in its conception of training and the advance continues.”°° While praising the improvements made by the army, the military correspondents and editorial lines of the serious press were by no means slavish admirers of

every aspect of the army. Many acute observations and criticisms were made, revealing the dedication and knowledge of the correspondents. Repington, who was always quick to praise when he thought it well earned, was also very much aware of the shortcomings. In 1907 he identified the infantry as the ‘queen of the battlefield’, which had to be made effective, and noted the refining of its training

techniques. But he continued to comment on the highly uneven standards between brigades and divisions as a major problem, and was particularly critical of the lack of supervision and guidance given to company commanders on training and the very low numbers available for training.” Perhaps the most insightful comment on the infantry was made by the Morning Post's H. F. Prevost Battersby

whilst observing the 1913 manoeuvres. He was concerned by the manner in which both defence and attack were conducted and was particularly worried by the fact that the attacking ‘infantry ignore hostile artillery entirely’ and added perceptively, ‘the lesson would be very soon learnt in real war’. When drawing conclusions from across the fortnight of manoeuvres, he returned to this theme and warned that ‘some steps must be taken to make infantry during mimic war-

fare pay decent regard to the existence of hostile artillery’. It would take many bloody experiences in the opening part of the Great War for the British to understand this lesson fully.

° Westminster Gazette, 25 September 1903. °°! Westminster Gazette, 25 September 1903. °? ‘The Times, 16 September 1905, 28 October 1910. °° Morning Post, 21 September 1912. °04 The Times, 29 July 1907, 5 January, 17 September 1910, 9, 18 May 1912. °° Morning Post, 29, 30 September, 3 October 1913.

180 The Edwardian Army Of even greater interest to the press was the reform of the cavalry, and the arm saw a considerable number of column inches dedicated to it, rousing an equally significant postbag from readers. The Times heralded Roberts's new cavalry man-

ual as a ‘revolution’ in cavalry tactics, but then printed responses from former cavalry officers who were not at all convinced.’ Although the military correspondents identified a general improvement in the standard of cavalry officers, doubts remained among them as to the actual roles of cavalry in warfare and its ability to perform them.” All agreed that reconnaissance was a vital task, and would remain so as long as aircraft continued to display significant technical limi-

tations to their performance.*’> However, Repington noticed faults in cavalry reconnaissance in both the 1909 and 1912 manoeuvres, calling the latter ‘inclined to be too hurried’ and thus failing to bring in quality information which could be subjected to useful analysis.*” To many press observers it seemed to be indicative

of a lack of integrated command structures in the cavalry bedevilling brigade and divisional action. While identifying improvements in cavalry staff work and higher command in the 1912 manoeuvres, Repington also highlighted its inability to liaise and cooperate with other arms efhiciently.*’® According to Prevost Battersby in the Morning Post, the 1913 manoeuvres revealed that cavalry attached

to infantry divisions far preferred to act independently, summing up the psychology as not so much divisional cavalry as cavalry division.*'' The value of shock action was also debated widely. Captain H. E. Braine, a former cavalry officer, wrote an essay entitled “The Sword and the Lance versus the Rifle’ for the Liberal journal, Zhe Nineteenth Century. Although ostensibly pursuing a non-partisan role by stressing that debate on the cavalry had become too polarized between diehard supporters of dismounted fire action and proponents of the arme blanche at all costs, he showed his true colours in his final sentence. After advocating a mixed training for cavalry, providing the arm with expertise in both shock and dismounted roles, he concluded: ‘until the fallacies of extremists are ruthlessly exposed the lesser evil is, as these wars teach [American Civil, Franco-Prussian, South African, Russo-Japanese], to be too bold by mounted action rather than too cautious by dismounted tactics’.*’” Braine was reacting to the forceful polemic against shock action contained in Erskine Childers’s book, War and the Arme Blanche, first published in 1910. Childers, a veteran of the Imperial Yeomanry and contributor to The Times history of the South African War, wrote a fierce

206 The Times, 2, 25 June 1904. °07 ‘The Times, 5 June 1905, 29 August 1908, 9 September 1912; Westminster Gazette, 22 September 1903.

on See The Times, 30 August 1909, 18 August 1910, 9 September 1912, 4 October 1913; Westminster Gazette, 20 September 1912; Pall Mall Gazette, 17, 30 September 1912; Morning Post, 2 October 1913. ° The Times, 9 September 1912. See also Morris, Repington, pp. 160-1. 210 The Times, 10 September, 7 October 1912. *!! Morning Post, 1 October 1913. *!2 Captain H. E. Braine, “The Sword and the Lance versus the Rifle’, 7he Nineteenth Century, Vol. 71, January—June 1912, pp. 966-75, p. 975.

The Public Face of the Army 181 denunciation of shock tactics as an anachronism destroyed by the capability of modern firepower.’'’ Reaction was swift. A cavalry officer reviewing the book for the Westminster Gazette condemned its lack of balance in stressing the many atypical aspects of the war in South Africa and avoiding all the many improvements in the cavalry since.’'* But it was Repington’s reaction that most interested Childers, and he challenged him publicly to make his position clear on the role of cavalry, especially the value of shock.*” Repington responded by stating his belief in the mixed role of cavalry which the current training regime was working hard to perfect.*!° Childers was not happy with this reply and accused Repington of hiding

behind current army doctrine and not, in fact, making his own position unambiguously clear, and concluded his letter to 7he Times by throwing down his chal-

lenge once more: ‘A reasoned case for shock at the present day, founded on historical facts, that is what is wanted. I appeal again to your Correspondent to present such a case.’*'” Repington was content to ignore the appeal and made no direct response. In wishing to gain his views, Childers had confirmed Repington’s status as the leading military correspondent and made him the arbiter of public information on the position of the army. Repington was certainly prepared to judge on every aspect of the army, and he included the performance of the army’s higher commanders within that remit. In 1913, and despite his admiration for much of his work, Repington criticized Sir John French’s role in the manoeuvres, condemning as inefficient his decision to act as both army commander and coordinator, which meant too heavy and confusing a workload. He went on to doubt the wisdom of French’s criticisms of his infantry divisions and pointed out examples of inefficient staff work: comments that were supported wholeheartedly in an editorial.*'* Unsurprisingly, French was very much

upset and wrote Repington a stinging letter on the matter.” A year earlier, the military correspondent of the Westminster Gazette had made his feelings on the merits and failures of command equally clear. General Grierson was given high praise for his performance, in which he ‘demonstrated his genius’; by contrast: With regard to General Haig’s strategy, no particular brilliance could be claimed. He worked almost entirely by the training manuals, and his every move could be foreseen and met, once it was ascertained for certain that he was not using his splendid division of cavalry for a coup, as it was imagined by all who followed the operations that he was almost certain of doing.”

“13 Erskine Childers, War and the arme blanche (London: Edward Arnold, 1910). For a wider exploration of Childers’ work see Stephen Badsey, Doctrine and reform in the British cavalry, 1880-1918 (Alder-

shot: Ashgate, 2008) pp. 220-8. *\4 Westminster Gazette, 10, 23 May 1910. 215 The Times, 26 March 1910. 216 The Times, 26 March 1910. °!7 The Times, 17 May 1910. 218 The Times, 10 October, 16 October 1913.

“ See Morris, Repington, p. 212. °° Westminster Gazette, 20 September 1912.

182 The Edwardian Army According to the same correspondent, Haig’s performance at the post-manoeuvres

conference was equally unimpressive, his oral performance being almost completely incomprehensible.**! Clearly, military correspondents provided the public with serious commentary based upon first-hand observation and assessments. The public image of the army was therefore a highly complex one and was cre-

ated not only by its own actions but also by the preconceptions of the British public. The British press, regardless of political persuasion, was certainly greatly interested in the army and discussed its officers, men, and roles at great length and often with great passion. Among Liberals, and their press, the army's desire to reform itself, accept economies, and work closely with Haldane after the election victory of 1906 helped improve its image, but it then created enormous distrust by the tacit support of conscription lent by certain officers and by its behaviour dur-

ing the Curragh Incident. For organized Labour, if not perhaps for the entire working class, the army remained a partisan instrument of class conflict which the Curragh Incident merely confirmed to a wider public, and the overt establishment of ‘army versus people’ lines during March 1914 may have influenced patterns of working-class recruitment once war broke out, although without further detailed

research this must remain speculation.” Many Unionists saw the army as the victim of inefficient political leadership, even when that leadership came from the

Unionist party, and the army often marched through controversies relatively unscathed as the blame was placed elsewhere. At the same time, the army played an extremely important role as a symbol of nation and empire through ceremonial duties, parades, tattoos, and tournaments. This ‘boy’s own’ element of the army was also upheld in its ubiquitous use in advertisements, juvenile literature, and toys and games, and was made more potent still by the army’s embrace of the cinema as a recruiting tool—although the pride that many felt in the army was not enough to make them want to enlist or accept the idea of conscription, a fact recognized by the Unionist front bench. The image was therefore one of great contrasts and shades in which feelings of pride and patriotism were often balanced by those of distrust and disgust. 21 Westminster Gazette, 21 September 1912. Others present at that meeting were also rather stupefied

by Haig’s verbal performance, see J. P. Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p. 52.

°22 ‘There is some evidence to suggest that recruitment went down in the immediate aftermath of the Curragh Incident. See Beckett, Curragh Incident, pp. 26, 338-9, 385.

The British Army and the British Empire Imperial service was a large part of a soldier's life. Defending and garrisoning the British empire were an essential component of the army’s raison d’étre as laid down

in the Stanhope memorandum of 1888, where they came second in the list of duties. The empire was the place where men had the chance to take part in combat, as low-level punitive campaigns were mounted constantly in the African colonies and on the frontiers of India. It also offered officers, and more particularly OR, the chance for travel, to experience completely different cultures, and often to indulge

in behaviour either taboo or utterly beyond their grasp at home. While OR had little choice other than to follow their battalions on imperial duties, officers and some senior NCOs had the opportunity for further adventure by applying for a secondment to one of a number of imperial forces, including the West African Frontier Force, the King’s African Rifles, the Chinese Regiment, and the Egyptian army, which worked in close harmony with British imperial interests.' This chapter will first examine the role of British officers and NCOs in the imperial units, and will then turn to the experience of British battalions on imperial stations. By far the most important imperial units under the direct control of the British state were the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) and the King’s African Rifles (KAR).’ These two forces were at the forefront of British ambitions in the great scramble for Africa, the last continent untouched by large-scale European inter-

vention at the end of the nineteenth century. The WAFF and the KAR evolved from a series of ad hoc units protecting British trading interests in west, central, and east Africa. These units gradually took on a range of roles combining police and military work and grew in piecemeal fashion with British imperial ambitions.

Such haphazard growth meant a lack of system, which created administrative confusion. In West Africa, the Colonial Office stepped in and two reports on security forces in 1897 and 1899 recommended the formation of a reformed military structure distinct from the police. This force came into being as the WAFF in 1901, and consisted of the Gold Coast Regiment, the Sierra Leone battalion and attached Gambia company, and the Northern and Southern Nigeria Regiments. A similar scenario was played out in central and east Africa where the Foreign Office built on the example of the WAFF, and in 1902 the six battalions of the

' Unfortunately, there is almost no official, and very little unofficial, extant material relating to the West Africa Regiment, West India Regiment, and Chinese Regiment (which was disbanded in 1906), for the period 1902-14 and so it is impossible to analyse them effectively in this chapter. > By 1913 the WAFF officer establishment was 231 and the KAR, 75. See Army List, 1913.

184 The Edwardian Army KAR were instituted, replacing the former Central African Rifles, East African Rifles, and Uganda Rifles. The decision to restructure the existing African military forces reveals a reforming

urge that predated the debacles of the South African War, and saw the Colonial, Foreign, and War offices determined to ensure new arrangements built on firm foundations of efficiency and energy. Achieving this was no easy task as there were

many problems which often demanded delicate handling. ‘The first issue was the realm of administrative and managerial responsibility as there were as many as three competing authorities at work through the representatives of the Colonial, Foreign, and War offices. Establishing how much direct influence each department of state

was to exert was the crucial first step towards a reformed structure. At the turn of the century the West African situation was the most advanced in terms of colonial

planning, with the Colonial Office already firmly in control of the expanding British presence in Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria, and so it saw the first evolutions of a new military force.‘

The Colonial and War offices’ work on the reconstruction of the West African security forces recommended that the new military units be overseen by an Inspector General. Colonial Office supremacy was emphasized by the fact that the post was under its control and not that of the War Office. The post holder’s department

was in the Colonial Office building, and he was supported by its expert civil administrators. The first Inspector General of the WAFF was Major G. V. Kemball, who brought with him a great degree of expertise due to his many years’ service in West Africa. As a relatively junior officer, Kemball suddenly gained a good deal of

influence and authority, for the post came with the acting rank of Brigadier. The Foreign Office followed this precedent by creating an Inspector General of the King’s African Rifles, and appointed Lieutenant Colonel W. H. Manning, who,

like Kemball, had long experience of Africa. Administratively things became smoother in 1905 when the Foreign Office relinquished control over British central and east Africa to the Colonial Office. The Colonial Office responded by establishing a new department with responsibility for both the KAR and WAFF under the

direction of R. L. Antrobus, assisted by H. J. Read, W. C. Bottomley, and R. Popham Lobb, all of whom had many years’ experience in the West African Department and had overseen the formation of the WAFF? Although relations

> For the development of these forces see Colonial Office Annual Reports, No 260, Niger. West African Frontier Force. Reports for 1897-8 (London: HMSO, 1899); Lieutenant Colonel H. MoyseBartlett, 7he King’s African Rifles. A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890-1945

Vol I (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1956) pp. 3-131; Colonel A. Haywood and Brigadier F. A. S. Clarke, The History of the Royal West African Frontier Force (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1964) pp. 5-36. The older West African Regiment, raised to defend the Sierra Leone port of Freetown, was excluded from the new WAFF and continued to act as an entirely independent unit. * See Haywood and Clarke, Royal West African Frontier Force, p. 37.

> TNA CO 96/388 File notes 28 September 1901; CO 96/402 Correspondence from War Office 16 October 1902; Haywood and Clarke, Royal West African Frontier Force, pp. 37-8; Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles, pp. 127-9; G. H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966) pp. 136-7.

The British Army and the British Empire 185 between the two offices were generally smooth, there were occasional clashes, usually sparked by Colonial Office attempts to gain more control over officer appointments. It was in this crucial area that the War Office maintained authority, as lists of candidates were created, maintained, and supplied by its Military Secretary. Kemball found this arrangement inefficient and in September 1902 requested

the right to interview officers before they were selected on the grounds that he ‘would be able to say at once that an officer was unsuitable for West Africa, and an interview with him or the staff officers would often prevent officers from accepting an offer without fully understanding what would be required of them’. The War Office refused to make any concessions, citing the procedures agreed in 1900, but added that ‘an application from the Inspector General of the West African Frontier Force for a particular officer would always receive favourable consideration’.® A year later the Foreign Office opened up the question of length of service in the KAR with the War Office. Wishing to create continuity by long service, the War

Office was requested to consider establishing a permanent African staff corps. Exploiting differences of opinion between the Inspector General of the KAR, the civilian administrators of Uganda and the East Africa Protectorate, and the Colonial Office, Sir William Nicholson, the Director of Military Intelligence, sidestepped the issue. It was decided to leave matters as they were on the grounds that it was essential that the forces be officered by men ‘thoroughly understanding their duties... [who] look forward to returning and continuing their career in the Army’.’ Finding the right calibre of officer for the WAFF and KAR was not an easy task.

Conditions in Africa, particularly West Africa, were not appealing. The 1897-8 Colonial Office report on the WAFF referred to the ‘enervating climate which is hardly appreciable in England’, and it was further noted that service in India, which might be thought comparable, did not in fact prepare a man for African conditions, before concluding that ‘in West Africa a considerable portion of the Europeans are always on the sick list’.* Experience showed that very young officers and those approaching their forties were especially susceptible to sickness. For this

reason service was restricted to those aged over 22 and no older than 35.’ Given the tough climatic conditions in which malaria, black water fever, and meningitis were common, the Colonial Office was keen to find enthusiastic, regular officers. This desire was shared by successive Inspectors General who often felt that militia and auxiliary forces officers were a poor substitute. Both Kemball and Manning in their initial inspections recommended the removal of auxiliary officers wherever possible. In 1905 Manning expressed his desire to restrict the number of militia officers in the KAR to seven even though ten were in fact serving at that moment. He noted that he had only accepted militia officers under orders from the Foreign Office, which was itself reacting to pressure from the War Office to find posts for

° TNA CO 96/402 Memos and correspondence October and November 1902. 7 ‘TNA CO 445/16 WAFF Reports, 1903 Vol III, Memos and correspondence September 1903. ® Colonial Office Annual Reports, No 260, pp. 8, 15, 22. 9 WAFEF Conditions of Service, 1907; KAR Conditions of Service, 1906.

186 The Edwardian Army auxiliary officers returning from service in the South African War. He warned that no more militia officers should be accepted for service ‘as once having opened the door would be with difficulty restrained from posting auxiliary officers to the KAR in increasing numbers’.'° A similar situation occurred in the WAFF and included suspicion about the credentials of applicants from the colonial militias. Kemball made it clear that he did not regard service in the South African War as a passport for colonial militia officers. However, this occasionally put the Colonial Office in

a delicate situation as it sought to maintain good relations with the dominions. A Canadian Militia officer was turned down by Kemball, but he noted that ‘if it is considered advisable on other grounds to give a nomination to Canada we can ask the WO to appoint him. We now have 9 Canadian officers serving in the WAFF

so that Lord Minto cannot very well say their claims for employment are not sufficiently considered.’'' The conditions of service for both forces reinforced the obstacles put in the way of auxiliary officers. It was made clear that officers of the militia, Imperial Yeomanry and Reserve of Officers would not be accepted ‘if officers of the Regular Army are available’.

Maintaining such standards often proved difficult as supply did not always match demand. It was a problem noted very early in the life of the WAFE The Colonial Office report for 1897-8 recorded only thirteen officers at duty from an establishment of twenty-eight due to sickness and invaliding. When the reformed WAFF came into existence in 1901, things were no better. The war in South Africa made the problem acute. “The difficulty of getting officers for the WAFF is a very serious one, noted a Colonial Office report in September 1901. As an expedient it was decided to approach the Admiralty to request Royal Marine officers; the second element of the plan was the deployment of Royal Garrison Artillery officers despite their lack of infantry training; the third was to increase the establishment of British NCOs to relieve the existing officers of certain duties. In the event, the Admiralty stated that it could not afford to second any additional Royal Marine officers, and

it was felt that increasing the number of NCOs was not an adequate response. Efforts to improve the number and quality of applicants led the Colonial Office to enquire whether the Army Council could determine precisely how many Regular officers were involved in vital work and whether this would then create a surplus for the WAFF in particular. The response was not encouraging, as it pointed out

that ‘at the present time there are very few Regiments or Battalions in which the establishment of Subalterns is complete’. By way of assistance, all the War Office could recommend was precisely what the Colonial Office wished to avoid,

the selection of ‘Militia and Yeomanry Officers to fill any vacancies for which Regular Officers are not available’.'> Haldane’s army reforms, part of which aimed

to increase the number of officers available, brought no respite to the Colonial Office, for its officials began to suspect that the Army Council wished to use the

'0 "TNA CO 534/2 KAR Annual Reports, 1905 Vol II, Memo 12 July 1905. '! "TNA CO 96/402 Memos 15 August, 4 November 1902. '2 WAFF Conditions of Service, 1907, p. 12; Repeated in KAR Conditions of Service, 1906, p. 12. '3 "TNA CO 445/21 WAFF Reports, 1905, Vol HI, Correspondence 20 April 1905.

The British Army and the British Empire 187 WAFF and KAR as convenient finishing schools for officers of the new Special Reserve. An element of exasperation is apparent in the Colonial Office response to this proposal as it once again reminded the Army Council that the trying local conditions in Africa meant that ‘only those officers whose professional knowledge and mental qualities have been developed by their previous experience and military training in the Regular Forces of the Crown can be employed to the best advantage’. The same reasoning ensured that Territorial Force officers were never proffered as an alternative.'“ Making service in Africa attractive was a major part of the Colonial Office’s strategy to improve the supply of officers. In 1902 the Sirdar of the Egyptian army was consulted and asked whether service in the new WAFF and KAR would prove attractive to his British officers. He replied that the pay currently on offer simply was not good enough to induce his officers to apply, and suggested that £600 per annum for company commanders was the minimum requirement.’” At the same time, a long-running debate about the precise nature of pensions, leave arrangements, and sick pay commenced with the suggestion that time spent in the physically more punishing environs of West Africa should count as double towards pension.'° By 1906-7 the pay and conditions structures for both the WAFF and KAR had been largely established, and both were generous. ‘The post of Inspector General came with a salary of £1,200 per annum in both forces; staff officers,

£650; battalion commanders, £900; second in command, £700; majors, £600; company commanders, £500; and subalterns’ pay ranged from £300 to £500. All salaries were in addition to the normal regimental pay, and so could boost income considerably. As a further inducement to junior officers, subalterns’ pay depended upon length of service at time of application, meaning an experienced junior officer frustrated by lack of opportunity at home could gain much greater reward in colonial service. However, the generosity stopped with regular officers; those from the

auxiliary forces were excluded from this ruling and had to accept the basic minimum.” In addition to pay, officers in the WAFF and KAR were usually given an acting higher rank than that held in their home regiment, and equally generous leave arrangements, including full pay while en route to and from Africa, and other

allowances. By 1912, when it was felt conditions in central and east Africa had eased considerably with the establishment of a colonial infrastructure, there was a slight reduction in pay, whereas the WAFF maintained all its privileges due to the unremitting attrition of its environment.'® The generosity of the pay and allowances was undoubtedly an attractive element for many. Richard Meinertzhagen of the 3 KAR noted in his diary on 25 June 1902:

4 "TNA CO 445/34 WAFF Reports, 1914, Correspondence 2 February 1914. '° "TNA CO 96/402 Correspondence 24 June 1902. '© "TNA CO 96/402 Memoranda on conditions 21 May 1902. '” King’s African Rifles, Conditions of Service, November 1906; West African Frontier Force, Conditions of Service, 1 March 1907. 'S King’s African Rifles, Conditions of Service, 1912; West African Frontier Force, Conditions of Service, 1910.

188 The Edwardian Army My pay in India was exactly £108 a year, and now I find myself with £400 a year under

cheaper conditions, for outside luxuries such as cartridges, alcohol etc, living is absurdly cheap... My daily expenditure on food is only about the equivalent of 2s a

day. So, with the small allowance Father gives me, I am rapidly becoming a capitalist.

The editorial note he added for the published version stated that on joining the KAR his capital value was zero, but on leaving after nearly five years’ service it was £3,000.” And, as will be discussed below, the financial incentive was often a major motivation for impecunious applicants. Life in the WAFF and KAR was extremely varied and certainly offered adventur-

ous men the chance for excitement and action. On the other hand, the small numbers of fellow white men living in close proximity in oppressive climatic conditions tended to exaggerate all of the downsides of British regimental life, with a

tendency to cliques, idleness, rumour, and gossip. E P. Crozier left a colourful account of his time in the West African Frontier Force, and its tongue-in-cheek title of Five Years Hard gives away something of the experience. Crozier was accepted for service in 1902 and after a sea voyage via the Azores found himself being taken up the River Niger in a clunking steamer. His memoir shows that two aspects of life in West Africa impressed themselves on him immediately. ‘The first

was drink and the second the heat, for on board the steamer he took part in a burial service for a dipsomaniac British trader during which the blazing sun turned

the deck into a furnace and burned through the rubber soles of his shoes.*? On joining the Northern Nigeria Regiment, he was approached by a representative of

the Niger Company in order to determine his rationing needs for the next six months, which included a recommendation for ‘a hundred and eighty bottles of whisky... half that amount of gin—a bottle of Angostura, a case of beer—four dozen—a case of champagne’.”' His writings then stress continually the centrality

of drink in the WAFF. According to Crozier, the end of each day heralded an elaborate set of drinking rituals in which officers showed varying tolerances for alcohol, but very few remained completely sober. Far from such antics lowering esteem for white men among the black troops, Crozier noted that the batmen were well aware of their masters’ habits and accepted them because they seldom impaired their readiness for duty the next morning and never interfered with their desire for

adventure, action, clarity of decision on the battlefield, or determination to see justice done. There is no exploration of the reasons behind the drinking culture other than the implication that it was merely part and parcel of the maverick characters of those attracted to such challenging corners of the empire.

Whatever the regimental officers thought, the drinking culture certainly concerned the Inspectors General and Colonial Office. Almost every report of the Inspectors General, particularly for the WAFF in the early years after reformation,

'? Richard Meinertzhagen, Kenya Diary, 1902-1906 (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1957) p. 21. °° FE P. Crozier, Five Years Hard (London: Jonathan Cape, 1932) pp. 23-5. *! Crozier, Five Years Hard, p. 54.

The British Army and the British Empire 189 highlights officers incapacitated by drink. In 1903, Captain J. C. Ralph of the Lagos battalion was ordered back to his British regiment after numerous drinking bouts. It was felt that “he would then come under strict Regimental discipline, in a way that is not possible in a small battalion out here’.”” Such was the alcoholism of Lieutenant F. J. Croly that when he resigned both his position in the Northern Nigeria Regiment and his commission, it was noted ‘that he is not mentally responsible for his actions and it might be well to make some enquiry into his family history before giving him any further employment in public service’.*? Similarly odd behaviour was noted in Captain Willcox, a transport officer in the WAFF On his being taken to hospital complaining of malarial symptoms, the medical staff suspected a drink problem; this was confirmed when he was found hopelessly drunk in the bathroom, having slashed his throat with a razor blade. “His action, the High Commissioner wrote, ‘I understand, was due to the effects of continued drinking to excess.’* When Kemball made his Inspector General’s initial tour

in 1902, he condemned Major Aplin, commander of the Lagos battalion, for showing ‘signs of excessive drinking’, and continued: At times he has been quite muddled and has had a difficulty in taking in and remembering what I have said to him, his nerves appear to me to be shaky and he can seldom answer a question about his battalion without reference to his Adjutant or the native Quartermaster. He has evidently been trying to keep steady during inspection, but he knows little about his work, and the training of the battalion has been much neglected.

The battalion wants pulling together and the officers want looking after and | consider Major Aplin incapable of doing this. I would specially ask that whoever is sent should be a steady fellow who will discourage drinking and will set a good example

and also be capable of instructing his officers.”

Significantly, this officer was from the militia and was perhaps reaping the backlash against auxiliary officers. However, Aplin did have a long history of West African

service behind him, and the High Commissioner intervened in order to argue Aplin’s right to a pension and an honourable retirement, stating that his drinking was a problem, but that ‘he had never ceased to be a gentleman’.”® Officials at the Colonial Office debated whether giving Aplin a full pension would amount to a

‘premium on inefhciency, but he was eventually given a respectable pension entitlement.’ In order to combat such a severe problem, Kemball attempted to clamp down on drinking in the mess, and in 1905 strongly recommended that ‘the custom of standing drinks (especially prevalent in the colonies), which is responsible for

* "TNA CO 445/16 WAFF Reports, 1903, Vol III, Correspondence from CO Lagos battalion, 16 June 1903. °3 "TNA CO 445/15 WAFF Reports, 1903, Vol II, Correspondence from Governor, 2 February 1903. 4 "TNA CO 445/19 WAFF Reports, 1905, Vol I, Correspondence from Governor, 1 March 1905. > "TNA CO 445/14 WAFF Reports, 1903, Vol I, Correspondence from Kemball, 24 December 1902. °° "TNA CO 445/14 WAFF Reports, 1903, Vol I, Correspondence from Governor, 14 January 1903. *” "TNA CO 445/14 WAFF Reports, 1903, Vol I, File notes, 9 February 1903.

190 The Edwardian Army much unnecessary drinking and high mess bills should in my opinion be forbidden in every military mess’.”* As Kemball’s report implied, he was actually fighting a much wider cultural norm in the colonies, where excessive drinking was a regular

part of life. The Colonial Office annual reports for Northern Nigeria for 1906—7 show that the value of imports to the colony amounted to £17,405. Of this, £1,090 was whisky, £405 on sparkling wines, £330 on gin, £166 on claret, and £55 on brandy. Only kola nuts, sugar, and salt exceeded the value of imported whisky.” The CO of the 1 Gold Coast battalion ordered a ‘very high’ cost on spirits in an attempt to rein in drinking, but it was noted that despite high freight costs, messing was much cheaper than in Britain and therefore perhaps encouraged a drinking culture.*°

British NCOs were equally susceptible to excessive drinking, and large numbers were sent home having failed to curtail their habits. In February 1903, a sergeant was dismissed due to his ‘intemperate habits’; a bandmaster was found drunk on duty in November 1906 and sent home, while earlier in the year a colour sergeant was reduced to sergeant for persistent drunkenness. His CO wanted to send him home but accepted appeals to give him another chance.°!

Officers and NCOs were exposed to an ironic twist to their lives in Africa: despite the vast spaces of the colonies, they lived in very close proximity with a

small band of other white men. Such intensity could produce a deep sense of camaraderie and common feeling but could also spark a host of petty arguments. There was also the great contrast between the short bursts of active service and the

long periods of mundane routines in an unforgiving environment. As someone with a strong personality and a good deal of intellectual curiosity, Richard Meinertzhagen found on arriving at his new posting in June 1902 that his comrades in the 3 KAR mess were a deep disappointment. His diary reinforces the notion that the reform of the colonial forces had arrived not a moment too soon: My brother officers are mainly regimental rejects and heavily in debt; one drinks like a fish, one prefers boys to women and is not ashamed. On arrival here I was amazed and shocked to find that they all brought their native women into mess; the talk centres around sex and money and is always connected with some type of pornography. Being very junior I cannot do much about it, but I objected not only to the tone in mess but also to native women being brought into mess; they told me that if I did not like it I could return whence I came, so I wrote out a complaint and read it and said that if they did not reform at once I should send it in officially. They were furious but complied. Row No. 1.°

*8 "TNA CO 445/19 WAFF Reports, 1905, Vol I, Kemball report, 4 January 1905.