The Dragon in the Jungle: the Chinese Army in the Vietnam War 9780190681623, 0190681624, 9780190681630, 0190681632

Table of contents :
Introduction: China's War against America 1. The Dragon's Tale 2. Beijing's Respond to Rolling Thunder 3. Air Defense: Command and Control 4. Bridging the Technology Gap 5. Hanoi's Complaints: Rails and Roads 6. Coast Operation: Combat Engineering and the Navy 7. Aid and Arms: From Honeymoon to Divorce Conclusion: Friend or Foe? Selected Bibliography Index

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THE DRAGON IN THE JUNGLE

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THE DRAGON IN THE JUNGLE The Chinese Army in the Vietnam War

Xiaobing Li

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1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2020 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress ISBN 978–​0–​19–​068161–​6 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America

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For Tran, Kevin, and Christina

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CONTENTS

List of Maps and Charts  ix Acknowledgments  xi List of Abbreviations  xiii Note on Transliteration  xvii Introduction: China’s War against America  1 1. The Dragon’s Tale  23 2. Beijing Responds to Rolling Thunder  63 3. Air Defense: Command and Control  100 4. Bridging the Technology Gap  136 5. Hanoi’s Complaints: Rails and Roads  165 6. Coast Operation: Combat Engineering and the Navy  197 7. Aid and Arms: From Honeymoon to Divorce  225 Conclusion: Friend or Foe?  255 Selected Bibliography  273 Index  299

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MAPS AND CHARTS

Maps

1.1 2.1 2.2 3.1 5.1 5.2 6.1 8.1

China and Southeast Asia  26 Vietnam in 1954–​1975  67 Ho Chi Minh Trail, 1963–​1975  88 Chinese AAA divisions in Vietnam, 1965–​1968  101 Major railroads in North Vietnam, 1965–​1968  168 Major highways in North Vietnam, 1965–​1968  180 Disputed islands in the South China Sea  216 China’s invasion of Vietnam, 1979  261

Charts

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The CVFAV formation and chain of command in Vietnam, 1965–​1973  78 The PLAAF AAA formation in Vietnam, 1965–​1968  115

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people at the University of Central Oklahoma (UCO), where I have been teaching since 1993, have contributed to the book and deserve recognition. First, I thank Provost John F. Barthell, Associate Vice President Gary Steward, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts Catherine S.  Webster, and Chairperson of the Department of History and Geography Katrina Lacher. They have been very supportive of the project over the past years. The UCO faculty merit-​credit program sponsored by the Office of Academic Affairs, as well as travel funds from the College of Liberal Arts, provided funding for my research and trips to conferences. The UCO Research, Creative, and Scholarly Activities (RCSA) grants, sponsored by the Office of High-​impact Practices led by Director Michael Springer, made student research assistants available for the project. I wish to thank my Chinese colleagues and collaborators at the China Academy of Military Science (CAMS), China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Military Archives of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), National Defense University (NDU), Peking (Beijing) University, East China Normal University, Northeast Normal University, Ji’nan University, China Society for Strategy and Management (CSSM), China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies (CFISS), Logistics College of the PLA, Nanjing Political Academy of the PLA, and Shaanxi Normal University. They made the many arrangements necessary for interviewing PLA officers and retired generals in 2000–​2016. I am grateful to Senior Colonel Chen Zhiya (PLA, ret.), Senior Colonel Ke Cunqiao (PLA), Li Danhui, Niu Jun, Shao Xiao, Shen Zhihua, Major General Wang Baocun (PLA, ret.), Lieutenant Colonel Wang Po (PLA, ret.), Senior Colonel Wang Zhongchun (PLA), Major General Xu Changyou (PLAAF, ret.), Yang Kuisong, Yang Dongyu, Yu Qun, Colonel Yang Shaojun (PLA, ret.), Zhang Baijia, and Zhang Pengfei for their help and advice on my research in China. This volume is also supported by the Fundamental

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xii  •  Acknowledgments

Research Funds for the Central Universities (Project #19JNYH03), under Shao Xiao at Ji’nan University in Guangzhou, Guangdong. Thanks also go to Vice Rector Tran Vinh Phuoc of Vietnam National University; Chief Consular Nguyen Kim Bang of Foreign Affairs Department, Dongnai Province People’s Committee; Deputy Director Trinh Hao Tam of the War Remnants Museum, Ho Chi Minh City; and the staff of the Museum of the Revolution, Hanoi. They provided the contacts and sources for my research trips to Vietnam. I am grateful to Captain Ta Duc Hao (NVA, ret.), Lieutenant Nguyen Nhieu (ARVN, ret.), Staff Sergeant Huynh Van No (ARVN, ret.), Sergeant Tran Thanh (NVA, ret.), and Lieutenant General Huynh Thu Truong (PLAF, ret.) for their help and information during my research interviews in Vietnam. Special thanks to Stanley J.  Adamiak who critically reviewed all of the chapters. Chen Jian, Bruce A.  Elleman, David Kaiser, Steven I.  Levine, Robert J.  McMahon, Allan R.  Millett, Hai Nguyen, John Prados, David Shambaugh, Harold M. Tanner, James Willbanks, Peter Worthing, Marilyn B. Young, Qiang Zhai, and Xiaoming Zhang made important comments on earlier versions of some chapters as conference papers. Brad Watkins drew the maps. Michelle Magnusson and Travis Chambers copyedited the chapters. Jesse Miller provided consultance on image reproduction. Heidi Vaugh and her Laboratory of History Museum at UCO provided archival assistance. Annamaria Martucci provided secretarial assistance. Several graduate and undergraduate students at UCO traveled with me to meet the veterans, transcribed the interviews, and read parts of the manuscript. They are Major Phred Evans (US Army, ret.), TSGT Charles D.  Heaverin (US Air Force, ret.), Master Sergeant Michael E. Henderson (US Marine Corp, ret.), Capt. Alex Zheng Xing (PLA, ret.), SrA. Oliver Pettry (US Air Force), and First Lieutenant Xiangyao Xu (PLA, ret.). I also wish to thank Nancy Toff, vice president and executive editor of Oxford University Press, who offered many valuable suggestions in the past three years. The anonymous readers also provided important comments and criticism. Any remaining errors of facts, language usage, and interpretation are my own. During the research and writing period over the past fifteen years, my wife, Tran, and our two children, Kevin and Christina, got used to my working weekends and holidays and shared with me the burden of overseas traveling through China and Vietnam. Their understanding and love made the completion of this history project possible. I dedicate this book to them.

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A B B R E V I AT I O N S

AAA AD-​AFC ARVN CAMS CASS CCP CFISS CHECO

anti-​aircraft artillery Air Defense-​Air Force Command (NVA) Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) China Academy of Military Science China Academy of Social Sciences Chinese Communist Party China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operation (USAF) CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US) CMAG Chinese Military Advisory Group (Vietnam) CMC Central Military Commission (CCP) CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference CPVF Chinese People’s Volunteers Force (the Korean War) CSSM China Society for Strategic and Management CVFAV Chinese Volunteer Forces to Assist Vietnam (PLA) CVFAV-​REC Chinese Volunteer Forces to Assist Vietnam-​Road Engineering Command DGL Department of General Logistics (PLA) DGPT Department of General Political Tasks (PLA) DGS Department of General Staff (PLA) DMZ Demilitarized Zone DOD Department of Defense (US) DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) GMD Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang) HKSAR Hong Kong Special Administrative Region HQ headquarters ICP Indochinese Communist Party

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xiv  •  Abbreviations

IRBM JCS KGB KMT MRBM NCO NDU NLF NPC NSA NSC NVA PAVN PLA PLAAF PLACEC PLAF PLAN PLAREC PLAVN POW PRC RMB ROC ROK RVN SAC SAM SMAG SNIE SRBM SRV STFC UN UNC UNF US

intermediate-​range ballistic missile Joint Chiefs of Staff (US) Security and Intelligence Service (Soviet Union) Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party, or Guomindang) medium-​range ballistic missile non-​commissioned officer National Defense University (PLA) National Liberation Front (also known as the Viet Cong) National People’s Congress (China) National Security Agency (US) National Security Council (US) North Vietnamese Army People’s Army of Vietnam (Communist Vietnam) People’s Liberation Army (China) PLA Air Force PLA Combat Engineering Corps People’s Liberation Armed Force (Southern Vietnamese Communists, or PLAVN) PLA Navy PLA Railroad Engineering Corps People’s Liberation Army of Vietnam (Southern Vietnamese Communists, or PLAF) prisoners of war People’s Republic of China Renminbi (Chinese currency) Republic of China (Taiwan) Republic of Korea (South Korea) Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) Second Artillery Corps (PLA) surface-​to-​air missile Soviet Military Advisory Group (China and North Korea) Special National Intelligence Estimate (US) short-​range ballistic missile Socialist Republic of Vietnam Special Task Force Command (PLAAF) United Nations United Nations Command (the Korean War) United Nations Force (the Korean War) United States

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Abbreviations  •  xv

USAF USMC USN USSR Viet Minh VNAF VNN VWP WOW WWI WWII

United States Air Force United States Marine Corp United States Navy Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Vietnamese Independence League) Vietnam Air Force (South Vietnam) Vietnam Navy (South Vietnam) Vietnam Workers’ Party (Communists) way of war World War I World War II

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N O T E O N   T R A N S L I T E R AT I O N

The Hanyu pinyin Romanization system is applied to Chinese names of persons, places, and terms. The transliteration is also used for the titles of Chinese publications. A person’s name is written in the Chinese way, the surname first, such as Mao Zedong. Some popular names have traditional Wade-​Giles spellings appearing in parentheses after the first use of the Hanyu pinyin, such as Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-​shek), as do popular names of places like the Yangzi (Yangtze) River and Guangzhou (Canton). Exceptions are made for a few figures, whose names are widely known in reverse order like Sun Yat-​sen (Sun Zhongshan); and a few places such as Tibet (Xizang). The Vietnamese names follow the traditional way that the surname is written first, then middle name, and first name, as in Ngo Dinh Diem and Vo Nguyen Giap. Most people in Vietnam are referred to by their given names, therefore President Diem and General Giap. The exceptions are for a very few particularly illustrious persons, such as Ho Chi Minh, who was called President Ho.

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INTRODUCTION

China’s War against America

It became a reunion when the eleven veterans of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army, China’s armed forces) and their families arrived at Captain Zhao Shunfen’s home in Harbin, the provincial capital of Heilongjiang, Northeast China (or Manchuria). Zhao wanted me, also a PLA veteran, to meet his comrades.1 They were all survivors of the Vietnam War, and their friendship seemed to last forever. After the potluck dinner and a few bottles of hard liquor, they began to sing Chinese army songs from the 1960s. They recalled the lyrics word for word. They had sung them before their meals and meetings, before each combat mission, during the drills, seeing comrades off to the hospital or cemetery. Those songs demonstrated their loyalty to and love for their army and country (the People’s Republic of China, PRC). Between 1965 and 1970, China sent 320,000 troops to Vietnam to support North Vietnam’s war against America. Beginning in 1968, China also sent 110,000 troops to Laos to fight the war. Zhao served in Vietnam from 1966 to 1967 as a 37mm machine gunner and a corporal of the Fourth Company, Thirty-​First Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) Division of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF).2 Zhao and his comrades were not happy when they returned home from Vietnam from the late 1960s through the mid-​1970s. They received no homecoming party, awards, or pensions. They were not even allowed to talk about their wartime experiences because it had been a secret mission. Both the Chinese and Vietnamese governments officially denied any foreign intervention on Hanoi’s side in the war. The Vietnam War became a “forgotten war” in China. In the 2010s, many Vietnam veterans signed petitions to the National People’s Congress (NPC), State Council, and the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Chinese Communist

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Party (CCP) asking for recognition, health care, and full refund of the board expenses they had to pay during their service in Vietnam.3 Some of them are unable to afford rent and groceries, and some have become homeless. Other Communist countries, including the former Soviet Union, maintained a similar position. The Russian government concealed the Soviet military participation in the Vietnam War, and Russian official records remain closed.4 Even though a few Western historians have speculated about international Communist involvements in the Vietnam War, no primary source or personal accounts had been available for their research. In retrospect, international Communist support to North Vietnam, including troops, logistics, and technology, proved to be the decisive edge that enabled the North Vietnamese Army (NVA or PAVN, the People’s Army of Vietnam) to survive the American Rolling Thunder bombing campaign, and helped the National Liberation Front (NLF, Communists in South Vietnam, also known as the Viet Cong) prevail in the war of attrition and eventually defeat South Vietnam.5 Chinese and Russian support prolonged the war, making it impossible for the United States to win. As the historians Jung Chang and Jon Halliday point out, “It was having China as a secure rear and supply depot that made it possible for the Vietnamese to fight twenty-​five years and beat first the French and then the Americans.”6 An international perspective may help students and the public in the West to gain a better understanding of America’s longest war. International archival documents released in more recent years indicate the true extent and level of Chinese participation in the conflict in Vietnam. For the first time in the English language, the study offers an overview of the PLA’s involvement in Indochina from 1965 to 1973. It provides a comprehensive coverage of China’s foreign war-​fighting experience, including Beijing’s decision-​ making, mobilization, command and control, cooperation and interactions with the Vietnamese and Russians, reinforcement and rotation, and combat performance assessment. The Chinese Communist story from the “other side of the hill” explores one of the missing pieces to the historiography of the Vietnam War. The volume seeks to answer the following pivotal questions: What were China’s objectives in the late 1960s? How did the Chinese plan their operations, adapt and adjust fighting methods, and utilize technology? Why did China withdraw its forces from Vietnam before the war’s end? What impact did Chinese intervention have on the PLA modernization? As a Communist state bordering North Vietnam, China did not want increased American influence in South Vietnam (the Republic of Vietnam, RVN, 1955–​1975) or a collapse of the North Vietnamese regime (the

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Introduction  •  3

Democratic Republic of Vietnam, DRV, 1945–​1976) when President Lyndon Johnson escalated America’s war effort in Vietnam. From 1965 to 1970, China became directly involved in the war by sending the Chinese troops to Vietnam. On June 9, 1965, the first PLA troops entered North Vietnam.7 By March 1966, China had dispatched 180,000 troops.8 In the words of Mao Zedong, chairman of the CCP, the PLA’s mission was to “assist Vietnam and resist America” between 1965 and 1970. The PLA operated AAA guns; built and repaired highways, railroads, and bridges; maintained the Ho Chi Minh Trail; constructed offshore defense works; and assembled pipelines and factories using twenty-​three divisions and ninety-​five regiments.9 On September 18, 1968, the first PLA units, totaling 26,000 men, entered Laos, including AAA and engineering troops. Over the next five years, the PLA sent five more divisions to Lao to provide air defense, construct and repair highways, and maintain the transportation and communication along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.10 Chinese intervention and assistance secured Ho’s regime in the North from the US Rolling Thunder air campaign and enabled Ho to send more NVA regulars to the South. Although some Vietnam War historians have mentioned Chinese contributions to Vietnam’s air defense, very few have PLA operational details and none have explored contributions made by the Chinese railroad and highway engineers, who served in Vietnam for three to five years, much longer than the one-​year tour by Capt. Zhou and his AAA troops. In 1970, the PLA began withdrawing its troops from Vietnam, and by 1973, all its troops had withdrawn from Indochina. By the time the last Chinese officer left in August 1973, 1,715 Chinese soldiers had been killed and a further 6,400 had been wounded in Vietnam. In the meantime, 269 were killed and 1,200 were wounded in Laos. Soldiers and officers killed in Vietnam and Laos were buried there, a practice that continues to trouble the families of the deceased.11 After 1964, China also increased its financial support and military aid to North Vietnam. From 1964 to 1973 it provided 60 billion yuan Renminbi (RMB, about $20 billion) in military aid to Vietnam, including surface-​to-​ air missiles (SAM), weapons, ammunition, transportation and communication equipment, fuel, and medicine. Until 1967, when the Soviet Union superseded the PRC, China was the largest Communist state supplier of war materials to North Vietnam, providing about 44.8 percent of Hanoi’s total international military aid that year.12 These massive contributions to North Vietnam enabled Ho to build up a strong conventional force and gain popular support through expanding the newly reorganized VWP (Vietnam Workers’

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Party, or Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam). Between 1965 and 1970, China also sent financial aid and war supplies to the NLF in South Vietnam through Ho Chi Minh Trail. China’s relations with Vietnam and the Soviet Union have been documented in the West.13 While historians have spent much time bemoaning the political battle and polemical debate among the leaders in Beijing, Hanoi, and Moscow, the authentic operational story has nearly been lost. Much less is known in the West as to how the Chinese actually fought the US military during the Vietnam War.14 New insights on the PLA operational history add a better understanding of the ground-​level contribution of the Chinese army in the Vietnam War. China’s role in Vietnam, nevertheless, differed from that in Korea, where 3  million Chinese troops engaged a large-​scale ground war against the UN Force (UNF) from 1950 to 1953. In reality the Korean War was a conflict between China and the United States, which provided 90 percent of the UNF troops. The primary objective for the PLA in Korea was to defeat the UN/​US forces and drive them out of the Korean peninsula; Mao championed a “War to Resist America and Aid Korea.”15 In Vietnam, the principal goal for Chinese forces was to assist North Vietnam’s fight with America. Chinese troops did not engage the US forces in ground warfare in the South but provided military assistance to the NVA and NLF in air defense, combat engineering, railroad and highway construction and maintenance, and communication network establishment in the North; and finance and logistics in the South. Chinese intervention and contribution in the larger context of the Vietnamese war efforts became obligated by the needs and requests of NVA and NLF, Beijing-​Hanoi agreements, PLA-​NVA cooperation against the American bombing, and division of labor between the Soviet and Chinese troops. This work provides a new opportunity to view the war through the eyes of Chinese officers and soldiers. As a military history survey, the chronological narrative recounting a communist vantage elucidates unique insights into those who fought against US armed forces. It explores a uniquely Chinese approach to warfighting, demonstrating Chinese methods in conducting a war, some of which were holistic, effective, flexible, and as successful as those in the West. Although the Chinese way of warfare cannot be easily essentialized, the book documents a time when Chinese military culture underwent a complex evolution, and it looks at how these changes had a strong immediate impact and continue to serve the PLA today. The Chinese view of warfare shaped China’s military operations and tactics, especially how the high command made war decisions, finalized various

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Introduction  •  5

objectives, executed battle plans, and evaluated combat effectiveness. As a traditional army in East Asia, the PLA acted in the jungles of Indochina according to its doctrine, strategy, and experience and with a consistent logic. A close look at Chinese military culture, operational behavior, institutional control, tactical conduct, and technological improvement identifies a general pattern and a characteristic learning curve for Chinese generals as they faced the most powerful military in the world for eight tough years. The study of Chinese war-​fighting experience in Vietnam, a story as yet untold, sheds new light on the similarities and differences among the Communist armies of Russia, China, and North Vietnam. The similarities included party control, political propaganda, ideological education, mass mobilization, and military secrecy. It has been a common tendency to view the military aspect as one part of a political movement and social revolution in which the army was a subordinate branch of the whole Communist party. Nevertheless, there were some major differences among the three Communist militaries, including military strategy, war objectives, and doctrine. Among other unique Chinese approaches, active defense was the main separating factor between Chinese and other two Communist militaries. The superiority of the Soviet forces in Vietnam fell into the categories of technology, firepower, and mobility, while the NVA had successfully adapted guerrilla warfare and the people’s war strategy. Thus, with Russian new military technology and massive Chinese defensive assistance, the NVA could function on both conventional and unconventional levels, which the American military, in many ways, was not fully prepared to face. The advantages that the American forces possessed were countered by this resourceful foe. The Maoist politicization of warfare in the 1950s conceptualized a new strategy of active defense. After the founding of the PRC in 1949, the PLA transformed itself from a “liberation army” into a national force with two new components: a defensive force to repel foreign invasions in the global Cold War, and a security force against internal threats to the new regime. In 1950, the Korean War was the largest Chinese security concern. Mao believed the US war plan aimed to destroy the one-​year-​old People’s Republic in its cradle by attacking it from Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. He made it clear at the CCP Politburo meeting on August 4, 1950, that “[We] will take back Taiwan, but now can’t just sit by and watch Vietnam and Korea.”16 A successful defense against international imperialist attacks could be achieved by stopping foreign invading forces outside of China. Mao telegraphed his new strategy to Zhou Enlai on October 14, when the Chinese premier was visiting Moscow. Mao asked him to explain it to Stalin: “We do

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it in such way to advance the national defense line from the Yalu River to the line of the Tokchon-​Nyongwon and areas south of it. This is absolutely possible and beneficial [to us].”17 Mao considered the UNF/​US northward advance in North Korea as an immediate threat to China’s national security, and Chinese intervention was necessary to stop a feared US invasion of China. The new Chinese defense line was more than 100 miles south of the Yalu in North Korea. The new strategy changed China’s approach to warfare from fighting an enemy along the Chinese border to defeating a potential invader in a neighboring country. Mao’s strategy led to the Chinese intervention in the Korean War in 1950 and Vietnam in 1965. Mao’s active defense made sense to the Chinese generals who remembered Japan’s invasion of China and eight bloody years (1937–​1945) of the resistance war against the Japanese army in the country at the cost of 3  million Chinese military dead and 10 to 12  million civilians. China’s intervention in Korea seemed a successful application of the new strategy by stopping the UNF in South Korea, preventing a North Korean collapse, and securing China’s northeastern border. Many PLA officers sent to Vietnam had fought in the Korean War, or in Mao’s words, the war to “resist America, aid Korea, defend the homeland, and safeguard the country.”18 The Chinese generals recalled their fighting in Korea as a heroic defense and a continuity of their own struggle against the world imperialism. Chinese history books portray China as a “beneficent victor” of the Korean War.19 Shaped by a military culture and communist ideology, the new strategy nonetheless suggests a contradictory policy toward war since the proactive defense is certainly offensive and aggressive in nature. It apparently goes beyond a homeland defense, a tendency to avoid war by caution and delay, or winning without fighting, as some historians have described as the Chinese “Way of War” (WOW) when they contrast the Chinese military doctrine with that of the West.20 Comparing Chinese and Western approaches to war is a popular topic of discussion between military experts and the general public.21 Some historians draw a line between the Western WOW and Chinese WOW.22 Scholars in the West have studied 2,500 years of Chinese warfare and military thinking, including Sunzi’s classic The Art of War and Maoist doctrine.23 John Fairbank identified a few points of the Chinese WOW, including a Confucian ruling ideology of not using military force nor glorifying military actions, and a tradition of defensive land warfare, using geography to either wear down or pacify enemies as an alternative to annihilating or attacking the enemy.24

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Introduction  •  7

Although Mao’s military strategies drew heavily on ancient classics, he had adapted to the post-​World War II international environment. Having been actively involved in military actions from the 1950s through the 1970s, Mao developed the new strategy for China’s defense in the global Cold War, when traditional military theories failed to meet the demands of modern warfare. Active defense, or stopping the invader outside the gate, sounded reasonable and achievable for the PLA generals in Vietnam, who constantly recognized the original form or traditional style of Chinese warfare.25 A  PLA general considered Mao’s active defense as a theoretical innovation of Sunzi’s idea as it was “winning a defense war without fighting the enemy in our country.”26 In comparison to the Western experience in the Vietnam War, the Chinese experience offers a mixed picture. Countless parallels can be drawn between the PLA and Western armies in the war. In the ongoing debate, some scholars have questioned the views of the Chinese WOW as more Chinese military writings have become available. Among the dissenters are Peter Lorge, Kenneth Swope, Harold Tanner, William Thompson, and Hans Van de Ven, who state that, while a comprehensive and holistic set of Chinese principles exist to deal with war, they do not describe a separate, distinct, and mutually exclusive WOW.27 These scholars contend that the Chinese invented or adopted many of the supposed Western ways of warfare. David Graff and Robin Higham point out that Chinese military history has been overly typified by the use of the Confucian tradition. This sort of contrast is the result of the WOW historians’ failure to see similarities between the Western army and their Chinese counterparts.28 One may have to wait to draw any broad conclusion concerning a Chinese WOW until all the Chinese documents and archives relating to the Vietnam War become available and historians are able to provide a thorough analysis of Chinese operations in the conflict. The war had both positive and negative impacts on China since the Chinese government had been militarily involved in Vietnam for so long. It helped Mao to achieve his own geo-​strategic aim in Asia by preventing a full-​ scale war with the United States. Chinese involvement also changed the PLA in multitude ways. Not all Chinese officers and soldiers realized how drastically their intervention in the Vietnam War changed their national security concerns, perceptions of military technology, and the future of their army. The 1960s were the most controversial and crucial decade in Chinese military history, because the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–​1976) was viewed as nationwide turmoil through the “wasted ten years” or a “lost decade” in term of PLA modernization.29 The PLA’s experience in the foreign war from 1965 to 1973 is all too commonly dismissed as sterile phase of

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the Communist alliance in the Cold War or as a precursor of the upcoming Sino-​Vietnamese Border War in 1979, both of which have been given more detailed attention in China. It is only with the passing of time that many, including myself, have begun recognizing the Vietnam experience as the defining moment in the history of the PLA modernization. Military modernization, one of the central themes in the work, is examined as part of China’s transition from a traditional to a modern nation. This book fills in the gap by examining the issues the high command faced in Vietnam and changes it had to make to survive the most dangerous years of the Cold War. It describes a time of adaptation and evolution, which have defined the PLA’s characteristics and changed it in certain ways by the 1970s. The PLA has been an “army of learning” since the 1950s.30 In the Vietnam War, the Chinese armed forces paid more attention to the development and improvement of their technology through their engagements with American forces. Having learned differing ways of war, the PLA high command emphasized the role of technology and firepower and respected its technologically superior opponents. Vietnam offered an opportunity for the Chinese to measure their technology gap, learn from both American and Russian armed forces, and test their new weapon systems. To narrow the technology gap, the PLA moved its weapon manufacturing industry from “copying” Soviet-​ made weapons in the 1950s and 1960s to designing and developing its own weapon system from the 1970s on.31 By 1972, for example, in terms of air defense weapons, the PLAAF had four SAM divisions and eighteen AAA divisions with more than 10,000 AAA guns, including newly designed and manufactured 85mm all-​weather, automatic guns with new radar systems. During the Vietnam War, the PLA combined nuclear research and development with missile manufacturing in order to produce strategic weapons.32 In the summer of 1966, the high command organized the “Second Artillery Corps” (SAC, strategic rocket force), including tactical nuclear weapons, SAM missiles, and strategic and tactical missiles. The PLA named 1966 the “missile year,” and started initial plans for nuclear submarines, satellites, and an anti-​missile defense system. In June 1967, China tested its first hydrogen bomb. In 1968, Second Artillery regiments were divided into short, intermediate, long range, and intercontinental units.33 In the 1970s, China began to develop and deploy its short-​range (SRBM), medium-​range (MRBM), and intermediate-​range ballistic missiles (IRBM). By the 1980s, the SAC became a nuclear deterrent force since its nuclear warhead could reach both western Russia and the United States. The prolonged foreign intervention in the Vietnam War convinced the Chinese government that it needed to maintain

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Introduction  •  9

a strong military in the Cold War due to security challenges, foreign threats, and US-​Soviet competition in the Asian-​Pacific region. As a result, the PLA increased to more than 6 million men in 1965–​1973. The work goes beyond the conventional battle accounts and analysis by exploring the interaction between the Vietnam War and Chinese society and looking into the social composition of soldiers and officer corps. It intends to move Chinese military studies toward the wider currents of social history while maintaining equitable scholarship. The men and women in the PLA in Vietnam differed from those who fought in the Korean War, when the PLA was a peasant army utterly lacking in education. This work puts individual soldiers and officers in the context of Chinese society, culture, and politics and views them through their conscription, training and education, and social environments. Responsibility, technology, and training can transform a citizen into a warrior; political education, party propaganda, military culture, and Mao’s personality cult can also turn an ordinary Chinese citizen into a PLA soldier. An examination of veterans’ family backgrounds, village life, and professional careers before and after the war provides a workable approach to understanding the PLA not only as a military, but also a social institution. Some Western historians have overlooked the complex nature of the tremendous changes in PLA personnel from one generation to the next that illuminate PLA evolution in the 1970s. In the meantime, the active military role that China played in Asia turned this main Cold War battlefield into a strange “buffer” between Moscow and Washington. With China and East Asia standing in the middle, it was less likely that the Soviet Union and the United States would become involved in a direct military confrontation.34 Although the global Cold War was characterized by the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the two contending camps headed by the two superpowers, China’s position in the Cold War was not peripheral but, in many key senses, central. After the founding of the PRC in 1949, the political and military alliance between Beijing and Moscow was the cornerstone of the Communist international alliance system of the 1950s.35 Yet, beginning in the late 1950s, because of complicated domestic and international factors, the Sino-​Soviet alliance began to decline. The great Sino-​Soviet polemic debate in the early and mid-​ 1960s further undermined the ideological foundation of the alliance.36 Chinese and Soviet military assistance to North Vietnam between 1965 and 1973 did not improve Sino-​Soviet relations, but rather created new competition as each attempted to gain leadership of the Southeast Asian Communist movements after the Sino-​Soviet split. Each claimed itself a key

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supporter of the Vietnamese Communists’ struggle against an American invasion. The Vietnamese, by bringing both Russian and PLA troops into North Vietnam, increased competition between Chinese and Soviet Communists. Gradually, China shifted its defense focus and national security concerns from the United States to the Soviet Union in 1969–​1971. Chinese high command saw the United States as a declining power because of its failures in Vietnam and serious problems in other parts of the world. As the United States tried to withdraw from Asia, the Soviet Union filled the power vacuum, replacing the United States as the “imperialist” aggressor in the region. The Chinese-​Russian rivalry in Vietnam from 1965 to 1968 worsened the Sino-​Soviet relationship and eventually led to Sino-​Soviet border clashes in 1969–​1972. These conflicts, which had pinned down one million Russian troops along the PRC-​USSR (Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics) borders, continued after US President Richard Nixon visited Beijing in 1972. These events transformed the Cold War from a bipolar stand-​off to multiple-​front confrontations, forcing both the United States and the Soviet Union to use the “China card” and to play a different game in the 1970s. Their strategic needs eventually led to the normalization of Sino-​American relations in 1979. In terms of the impact it had upon East Asian and the global Cold War, the Sino-​American rapprochement dramatically shifted the balance of power between the two superpowers in the Cold War. While policymakers in Washington found it possible to concentrate more of America’s resources and strategic attention on dealing with the Soviet Union, Moscow’s leaders, having to confront the West and China simultaneously, caused the Soviet Union’s strength and power to become seriously overextended, signaling the beginning of the end of the Cold War.37 As a result of Cold War politics, the Sino-​Vietnamese alliance experienced the rise and the fall through Chinese intervention from 1965 to 1973. The Chinese troops brought to Vietnam their successful combat experience as a weak army against powerful foes in the Korean War. The Vietnamese Communist forces employed certain guerrilla tactics, such as engaging the enemy by surprise whenever possible in order to avoid the usually superior enemy firepower, ambush tactics, and underground tunnel network operations. But the North’s high command was not satisfied with the Chinese low-​tech tactics; they wanted to win a victory rather than just survive. Hanoi needed advanced military technology that China did not have. Since 1965, the Soviet Union had provided North Vietnam with advanced military technology and the resultant technology gap handicapped the Chinese in competition against superior Soviet technology in Vietnam. The

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PLA had no match for Russian missiles that had shot down B-​52 bombers. No matter how hard Beijing tried, Hanoi grew closer to Moscow after 1968 to obtain better military technology and more economic aid. The advanced Soviet technology won the North Vietnamese over and the NVA successfully adapted Russian military technology.38 The changing international strategic environment that influenced the Chinese intervention had tested the limit of communist alliance, and it eventually led to the early withdrawal of Chinese troops in 1970. When Soviet threats and conflicts ultimately pushed Chinese leaders into improving relations with the United States, North Vietnam moved closer to the Soviet Union. Beijing’s drastic reduction of its aid to Hanoi after 1970 also forced Moscow to expand resources of its own to aid North Vietnam’s cause. For two years after American withdrawal in 1973, both Russia and China continued their interventions in different ways throughout the civil war between the North and the South. In 1974, the PLA Navy (PLAN) attacked the South Vietnamese Navy (VNN) in the South China Sea. Chinese submarines sank one and damaged two VNN warships in the area of the Paracels and Spratly Islands. Among the reasons given for the confrontations over these islands are the strategic positions of both island groups to nearby rich offshore oil and natural gas deposits. After the Vietnam War ended in April 1975, both China, and now the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV since 1976), claim all the islands. Chinese military intervention and assistance in the Vietnam War failed to forge an effective, long-​term, good neighbor alliance that might have prevented China from invading Vietnam in 1979 and thus avoided the continuous Sino-​Vietnamese border conflict through the 1980s. Due to a lack of readily available sources for Western researchers, few areas in contemporary Chinese history pose more difficulties than a study of PLA history. Nevertheless, the Chinese government no longer denies its intervention in Indochina. In 1979 it published some information about its military aid and engagements in the French-​Indochina War of 1946–​1954 and the Vietnam War of 1965–​1973.39 Beijing employed the history of China’s military assistance and intervention in Vietnam to justify its border attacks as self-​defense and its claimed sovereignty in the South China Sea. Unresolved issues from the Vietnam War led to hostility and crises between China and Vietnam in 1976–​1978, and it was only with time that Beijing considered it necessary to invade Vietnam in 1979. On February 17, the PLA launched a large-​scale invasion, sending more than 220,000 troops into North Vietnam. Some PLA divisions returned to Vietnam, not as allies,

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but as invaders. Captain Zhao became upset by the “Third Indochina War” as some historians called it.40 He did not understand why the best communist friends became the worst enemies in less than ten years. This time, however, more than 23,000 Chinese soldiers and officers did not come home.41 The Chinese withdrawal from Vietnam on March 16 did not end the border war. In May and June of 1981, the PLA again attacked Vietnam, after many small attacks. The largest offensive campaign after 1979 took place in April and May 1984, when the PLA overran PAVN positions in the mountains near Lao Son. During this five-​week offensive campaign, 1,003 Chinese were killed in action. It was not until April 1987 that Beijing reduced the scale of PLA operations along the Sino-​Vietnamese border.42 Eventually, in 1992, all Chinese troops withdrew from the Lao Son and Yen Son areas and returned to China. In order to develop border trade between the two countries in 1993, the PLA troops in Guangxi and Yunnan provinces began large-​scale mine clearing operations along the China-​Vietnam border, where they had laid 4 million land mines.43 In the 1980s, when the Sino-​Vietnamese conflict continued, the Chinese government launched a new propaganda campaign to prove that China had been friendly, generous, and sacrificing in the Cold War, only to be betrayed by an odious, aggressive, and greedy Vietnam. Continuing quarrels between Beijing and Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in South China Sea brought forth a number of Vietnam War memoirs that became available to Chinese readers.44 Some are books; others appeared as journal and magazine articles, or as reference studies for restricted circulation only. Historians and other scholars in China reopened their research and began academic debate in the 2000s concerning China’s intervention in the Vietnam War because of ongoing offshore island disputes between Beijing and Hanoi. Chinese forces have occupied these islands since the Vietnam War.45 The naval confrontation resumed when China began its offshore oil drilling in the area in 2014, and it continues today. For political reasons, however, Chinese military historians have a long road ahead before they will be able to publish an objective account in the PRC of China’s intervention in the Vietnam wars. This volume is supported by Chinese primary and secondary sources that have been made available only in recent years. The opening up of these sources resulted from a more flexible political and academic environment compared to the time of Mao’s reign, leading to a relaxation of rigid criteria for releasing party and military documents.46 Consequently, fresh and meaningful historical materials, including papers of former leaders, party and governmental documents, as well as local archives, are now available. I conducted archival and

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academic research, data collection, and individual interviews while in China and had an opportunity to visit some of the headquarters and museums of the engaged PLA divisions and PLA academies, colleges, and history offices during annual trips to China between 2000 and 2016.47 These sources delve into the Chinese army’s war preparation, battle formation, logistics, and intelligence at the next commanding level in Beijing and analyze Chinese survival skills, problem-​solving, operational flexibility, changes in tactics, and technological improvement during the later years. They also cover PLA naval operations in the Vietnam War, including offshore air defense, mine-​sweeping, and naval attacks of the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. The first collection of sources used in this work is from official Chinese records, including party documents, government archives, and military materials. The CMC documents in the PLA Archives under the General Staff Department (GSD) are still closed to scholars, although in the process of researching this book I was able to collaborate with military historians and archivists of the National Defense University (NDU) and Nanjing Political Academy of the PLA. The primary sources used in this book also include selected and reprinted party documents of the Central Committee, CMC, and CCP regional bureaus.48 Some PRC governmental documents also have been released in recent years.49 The second group of sources consists of the writings, papers, memoirs, and interviews of Chinese Communist leaders. While Mao was the undisputed leader in both theory and strategy throughout most of the PLA’s history, other leaders such as Zhou, Defense Minister Lin Biao, and Marshal Nie Rongzhen worked together and made the majority of important decisions within the CMC. Their papers, fundamental for a thorough study of the PLA, include collected and selected military works, manuscripts, instructions, plans, and telegrams.50 Among the most important sources are the military papers of Mao and Zhou.51 Major General Xu Changyou, former deputy secretary general of the CMC, and Huang Zheng, senior fellow and department head of the CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Research Division, assisted me to a considerable extent in understanding the decision-​making of PLA department and service headquarters. Senior Colonels Wang Zhongchun of NDU and Liu Zhiqing of China Academy of Military Science (CAMS) also helped by sharing their sources and research on the PLA intervention in the Vietnam War. The third group of sources includes interviews, memoirs, and writings by Chinese generals, officials, and field commanders. From 2006 to 2015, I  collected memoirs and interviewed retired PLA officers and generals in

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Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Wuhan, and Hangzhou, including Lieutenant General Qin Chaoying, Senior Colonel Chen Zhiya, and Lieutenant Colonel Wang Bo. The immense detail recorded from their experience made a remarkable contribution to this study by adding another perspective to the subject. No matter how politically indoctrinated they may have become, the officers are culturally bound to cherish the memory of the past. More importantly, they had only recently felt comfortable in talking about their experiences, and in allowing their recollections to be recorded, written, and even published.52 The fourth category of sources consists of recollections and interviews of veterans, including Chinese soldiers and junior officers in Shenyang Military Regional Command, NDU, PLA Logistics Academy, and China’s Academy of Armed Police Force.53 Their reminiscences and interviews offer an important source of information and opinion for those scholars and students of Chinese military history who do not read Chinese. Each of the officers and noncommissioned soldiers provided a special, personal insight into a specific aspect of their experience, including chain of command, combat planning, operations, logistics, political control, and field communication. Each person paints his or her own picture of a specific aspect of military experience. The Chinese historians likely agree that recent oral accounts have become more readily available, not just for filling in factual gaps, but in providing sources for discovering both the themes and significance of this specific topic. Between 2001 and 2014, I was also able to interview Communist veterans in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Vietnam, and the United States.54 Most Russian veterans hesitate to talk about their experience in Vietnam—​it is the war they are not supposed to remember. Those who are willing are difficult to reach.55 These interviews offer an important source of information from the former Soviet Union and differing viewpoints from the Chinese perspective, filling some gaps in Vietnam War historiography. Although the declassification process of the war archives in Vietnam has not yet started, a few publications have become available, including stories from retired generals, officials, and diplomats. After 2010, NVA and NLF veterans began to speak of their personal experiences in the Vietnam War and to publish their memoirs, recollections, and war stories, adding new perspectives on the subject. These veterans were also more willing to share their wartime memories. More importantly, they felt comfortable in talking about their experiences and allowing their recollections to be recorded, written, and published in America.56 Although the Vietnamese government still has a long way to go before free academic inquiry becomes reality, the value of NVA and NLF

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veterans sharing their wartime experiences cannot be underestimated in the research of the Vietnam War.57 The last element of my research is comprised of secondary works in both Chinese and English. The Chinese literature includes military publications, academic textbooks, and educational materials about PLA history. These sources contribute a valuable view of the Chinese perspective, which reinterprets a series of fundamental issues crucial to understanding the Chinese military. Having researched many issues on the Chinese military in published findings in recent years, I believe that these sources provide a useful research bibliography for students interested in the Chinese military and in the history of modern China. Given the overwhelming wealth of current literature on the Vietnam War, this work has filtered through the publications and created a clear and lucid analysis.

Notes 1. I  served in the PLA as a private stationed in Heilongjiang province from 1970 to 1972. 2. Captain Zhao Shunfen (PLAAF, ret.), interview by the author in Harbin, Heilongjiang, in July 2002. Zhao served as a sergeant of the Fourth Company, 319th Regiment, Thirty-​First AAA Division of the PLAAF in Vietnam in 1966–​1967. 3. For instance, in 2011 and 2013, the Vietnam War veterans sent their petitions to the Standing Committee of the NPC. Their seven requests included recognition, better retirement arrangement, health care, and return of the board expenses they had paid during their services in Vietnam. http://​blog.sina.com.cn/​s/​blog_​ 0499c6060100q6jp.html. 4. Major General Robert J. Kodosky (KGB, ret.), interview by the author at Lubbock, TX, on October 21, 2006. Kodosky was one of the keynote speakers at the International Conference on “Intelligence in the Vietnam War” at the Vietnam Center, Texas Tech University, on October 19–​21, 2006. 5. The term “Viet Cong” was used by President Diem to label the NLF, meaning “Vietnamese Communists,” to discredit it. The South Vietnamese Communists and the NLF never used the term “Viet Cong” to describe themselves. The People’s Liberation Army of Vietnam (PLAVN) was the armed force of the NLF. For their publications on NVA and PLAVN in English, see Colonel Dinh Thi Van (NVA, ret.), I Engaged in Intelligence Work (Hanoi: Gioi Publishers, 2006); General Hoang Van Thai (PLAVN, ret.), How South Viet Nam Was Liberated (Hanoi: Gioi Publishers, 2005); General Phung The Tai (NVA, ret.), Remembering Uncle Ho; Memories in War Years (Hanoi: Gioi Publishers, 2005). 6. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao:  The Unknown Story (New  York:  Knopf, 2005), 357.

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7. General Zhang Aiping (PLA, ret.; defense minister, 1982–​1988), Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The Chinese People’s Liberation Army] (Beijing:  Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe [Contemporary China Press], 1994), 1: 274, 276; Lieutenant General Han Huaizhi (PLA, ret.; deputy chief of the PLA General Staff, 1985–​1992), Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe [China Social Sciences Press], 1989), 1:  70, 540, 557; Xiao Shizhong, “An Important Military Operation to Put Out War Flames in Indochina: How China Aids Vietnam and Resists the U.S.,” in Junqi piaopiao; xinzhongguo 50 nian junshi dashi shushi [PLA Flag Fluttering; Facts of China’s Major Military Events in the Past Fifty Years], ed. Military History Research Division, China Academy of Military Science (CAMS) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1999), 2: 451. 8. Major General Qu Aiguo (PLA), Bao Mingrong, and Xiao Zuyue, Introduction to Yuanyue kangmei; zhongguo zhiyuan budui zai yuenan [Aid Vietnam and Resist America; China’s Volunteer Forces in Vietnam], ed. Qu, Bao, and Xiao (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe [Military Science Press], 1995), 12. 9. Among Chinese forces in Vietnam were 150,000 AAA troops of the PLAAF. Their statistics show that Chinese anti-​aircraft units shot down 1,707 planes and damaged 1,608 US airplanes in 1965–​1968. American official sources say that the United States lost approximately 950 aircraft in North Vietnam between 1965 and 1968. Col. Jerry Noel Hoblit (US Air Force, ret.), interviews by the author at Lubbock, TX, in October 2006 and again at Edmond, OK, in April 2009. Captain Hoblit was an American pilot who flew F-​105F in the 357th Technical Fighter Squadron, 355th Tactical Fighter Wing, USAF, during the Rolling Thunder campaign in 1966–​1967. See George Moss, Vietnam:  An American Ordeal, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2010), 187. 10. Han, Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 562–​63. 11. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 1: 276–​77. 12. Prior to 1967, military and economic aid from all Communist states totaled 1.6 billion rubles (Russian currency; about $1.6 billion). Russian aid was 547 million rubles, 36.8 percent of the total, while Chinese aid was 666 million rubles, about 44.8 percent. Ilya Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 58, 264n4. 13. Among the important monographs are Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001) and Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–​1975 (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2000). However, the scale and focus of these works do not allow either author to provide specific details of PLA operations during the intervention in Vietnam. 14. For Beijing’s Cold War diplomacy, see Robert Sutter, Chinese Foreign Policy: Power and Policy since the Cold War, 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016); Dong Wang, The United States and China: A History from the 18th Century to the

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Introduction  •  17

Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013); Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War; Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., Re-​Examining the Cold War: U.S.-​ China Diplomacy, 1954–​1973 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Song Enfan and Li Jiasong, eds., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao dashiji, 1957–​ 1964 [Chronicle of the PRC’s Diplomacy, 1957–​1964], vol. 2 (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Publishing], 2001); Yang Kuisong, Zouxiang polie; Mao Zedong and Moscow de enen yuanyuan [Road to the Split; Mao Zedong’s Complaints and Problems with Moscow] (Hong Kong:  Sanlian shuju [Three Allied Books], 1999); Odd Arne Westad, Brothers in Arms:  The Rise and Fall of the Sino-​Soviet Alliance, 1945–​1963 (Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 1998); Michael Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1997); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1996); Michael Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New  York:  Columbia University Press, 1996); Quansheng Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996); Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (London: Clarendon Press, 1994); John Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993); Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union (Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 1990); Robert Ross, The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975–​1979 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 15. Xiaobing Li, China’s Battle for Korea:  The 1951 Spring Offensive (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 28–​29. 16. Mao’s quote from Military History Division, China Academy of Military Science (CAMS), Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [Combat Experience of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Force (CPVF) in the War to Resist the US and Aid Korea] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe [Military Science Press], 1990), 60. Mao also made the same point in his directive to the East Military Region Command on August 11, 1950. Mao, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao [Mao Zedong’s Military Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 2010), 1: 181–​82 (hereafter cited as Mao’s Military Manuscripts since 1949). 17. Mao’s telegram to Zhou on October 14, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wenji [Collected Military Works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing:  Junshi kexue chubanshe [Military Science Press], 1993), 6:  122–​23 (hereafter cited as Collected Military Works of Mao). The omitted sentences were published for the first time in Dang de wenxian [Party Archives and Documents] 5 (2000): 8. 18. Mao’s quote from the following sources:  Major General Xu Yan (PLA), Mao Zedong yu kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng [Mao Zedong and the War to Resist the America and Aid Korea], 2nd ed. (Beijing:  Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press],

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2006), 3; Chu Yun, Chaoxian zhanzheng neimu quangongkai [Declassifying the Korean War] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe [Current Affairs Press], 2005), 161; Shen Zhihua, “China Sends Troops to Korea: Beijing’s Policy-​Making Process,” in China and the United States; A New Cold War History, ed. Xiaobing Li and Hongshan Li (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998), 13. 19. Bin Yu states that “the Korean War is the only meaningful reference point for sustained PLA contingency operations beyond China’s border. The Korean War is also the only real experience, no matter how outdated, that the PLA has had in operating against the US forces.” Yu, “What China Learned from Its ‘Forgotten War’ in Korea,” in Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, trans. and ed. Xiaobing Li, Allan Millett, and Yu (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 9. 20. John Fairbank, introduction to Chinese Ways of Warfare, ed. Fairbank, Rosemary Foot, and Frank Kierman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 6–​7; John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993), 214, 221, 332–​33. 21. For the major works, see Geoffrey Parker, ed., The Cambridge History of Warfare (New  York:  Cambridge University Press, 2008); John Lynn, Battle:  A History of Combat and Culture (New York: Basic Books, 2008); Victor Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (New York: Anchor Books, 2002); Fairbank, Foot, and Kierman, eds., Chinese Ways in Warfare. 22. Victor Hanson and Geoffrey Parker argue about distinctions in Western WOW—​ particularly in the areas of superior military technology, discipline and training, continuity and flexibility, the goal of total defeat and annihilation of the enemy, and the organization for war. For more details on the Western WOW, see Hanson, Carnage and Culture; Parker, ed., The Cambridge History of Warfare; Keegan, A History of Warfare. 23. For example, Ralph Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (New  York:  Basic, 2007); Jeremy Black, Rethinking Military History (London: Routledge, 2004); Keegan, A History of Warfare. 24. Fairbank, introduction to Chinese Ways of Warfare, ed. Fairbank, Foot, and Kierman,  6–​7. 25. Mao highly praised The Art of War and considered it a scientific truth by citing Sunzi in his military writing, “know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat.” Mao, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” Selected Works of Mao Tse-​tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), 1: 190. 26. Major General Xu Yan (PLA), Junshijia Mao Zedong [Mao Zedong as a Military Leader] (Beijing:  Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 1995), 177. 27. For more details, see William R. Thompson, “The Military Superiority Thesis and the Ascendancy of Western Eurasia,” Journal of World History 10, no.  1 (Spring 1999); Hans van de Ven, introduction to Warfare in Chinese History, ed. van de Ven (Boston: Brill, 2000), 1–​22.

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28. Robin Higham and David Graff, introduction to A Military History of China, ed. Graff and Higham, extended ed. (Lexington:  University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 14. 29. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 1: 225, 249; Han, Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 58. 30. I  have borrowed this term from Professor Harold Tanner, who organized a panel, “Armies of Learning:  Issues of Transformation and Continuity in China’s Military, 1920–​2010,” at the annual conference of the Association for Asian Studies (AAS), San Diego, CA, on March 21–​24, 2013. See also Xiaobing Li, “Armies of Learning: Introduction from the Editor,” in Journal of Chinese Military History 3 (2014): 1–​2. 31. Richard A.  Bitzinger et  al., “Locating China’s Place in the Global Defense Economy,” in Forging China’s Military Might:  A New Framework for Assessing Innovation, ed. Tai Ming Cheung (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 171–​72. 32. Liu Bailuo, “The ‘Special Commission’ of the Central Committee and Nuclear Bombs,” in Liangdan yixing; zhongguo hewuqi daodan weixing yu feichuan quanjishi [Two Bombs and One Star:  A Complete Record of China’s Nuclear Bombs, Missiles, Satellites, and Space Programs], ed. Political Tasks Division, PLA Department of General Armaments (Beijing:  Jiuzhou chubanshe [ Jiuzhou Publishing], 2001), 114. 33. Major General Xu Changyou (PLA, ret.), then Vice Political Commissar of the PLAN East China Fleet, interview by the author in Shanghai in April 2000. Xu served as Defense Minister Zhang Aiping’s secretary in the 1980s. 34. Chen Jian and Xiaobing Li, “China and the End of the Cold War” (conference paper at the Fifth Cold War Conference Series: From Détente to the Soviet Collapse at the First Division Museum at Cantigny, Wheaton, IL, October 12, 2005). 35. For studies on the rise and decline of the Sino-​Soviet  alliance, see Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia, Mao and the Sino-​ Soviet Partnership, 1945–​ 1959 (Lanham, MD:  Lexington Books, 2015); Lorenz Lüthi, The Sino-​Soviet Split:  Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Westad, Brothers in Arms; Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War; Chang, Friends and Enemies. 36. For a chronological development of the Sino-​Soviet split, see Shen and Xia, Mao and the Sino-​Soviet Partnership; Lüthi, The Sino-​Soviet Split; Song and Li, eds., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao dashiji [A Chronicle of the PRC’s Diplomacy]; Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, ­chapter 3; Yang, Zouxiang polie [Road to the Split], ­chapters 13–​14. 37. Chen Jian and Xiaobing Li, “China and the End of the Cold War,” in From Détente to the Soviet Collapse; The Cold War from 1975 to 1991, ed. Malcolm Muir, Jr. (Lexington: Virginia Military Institute, 2006), 126–​27.

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38. For more details of Russian advisory, training, and assistance, see Major T, “Russian Missile Officers in Vietnam,” in Voices from the Vietnam War: Stories from American, Asian, and Russian Veterans, by Xiaobing Li (Lexington:  University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 65–​72. 39. Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], the CCP mouth piece, published several long editorials and commentaries in 1979. For example: “The Truth of the Sino-​Vietnamese Relations,” July 1, 1979; “The Sino-​Vietnamese Relations during Vietnam’s Anti-​ French and Anti-​American Wars,” November 20, 1979. Among the books are Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3  vols. (Beijing:  Foreign Languages Press, 1992); Editorial Committee, Zhongyue bianjing chongtu de zhenxiang [The True Story of the Sino-​Vietnamese Border Conflicts] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe [People’s Press], 1979). 4 0. Among recent publications on the 1979 Sino-​Vietnam War are Xiaoming Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War:  The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979–​1991 (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Edward O’Dowd, Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War (London: Routledge, 2007). 41. For more details on the Sino-​Vietnamese border conflict in 1979, see Xiaobing Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 250–​59. 42. Private Xu Xiangyao (PLA, ret.), interviews by the author at Oklahoma City, OK, in February 2005. Xu served in an infantry company of the Thirteenth Army on the Lao Son front in 1984–​1985. 43. Xiaoming Zhang, “The Impacts and Legacies of China’s Border War with Vietnam” (presentation at the 81st annual conference of the Society for Military History at Kansas City, MO, April 3–​6, 2014). 4 4. Examples:  “The Truth about the Sino-​Vietnamese Relations,” Guoji wenti yanjiu [Studies on International Issues], no. 2 (1981): 2–​33; “The Problems of Vietnamese Aggressive Foreign Policy,” Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], March 2, 1983: 1–​2; “The Naval Conflicts in the South China Sea,” Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], April 1, 1988: 1–​3; “The Vietnamese International Relations,” Xinhua [New China] News Agency, News Release, August 7, 1990. 45. For more information on the disputed islands, see Pham Cao Duong, “Spratly and Paracel Islands” and Xiaoxiao Li, “Xisha Islands Defensive Campaign (1974),” in China at War, ed. Xiaobing Li (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-​CLIO, 2012), 426–​27, 502–​503. 4 6. “The Truth of the Sino-​Vietnamese Relations,” Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], July 1, 1979; “The Sino-​Vietnamese Relations during Vietnam’s Anti-​French and Anti-​ American Wars,” Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], November 20, 1979. 47. I  had some help with my archival studies, academic research, and individual interviews from China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), China Society for Strategy and Management (CSSM), China Foundation for International and

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Introduction  •  21

Strategic Studies (CFISS), Beijing International Research Center, Nanjing Political Academy of the PLA, Logistics College of the PLA, East China Normal University (Shanghai), Northeast Normal University (Changchun, Jilin), and Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social Sciences (Harbin). 48. The documents of the Chinese party include CCP Central Archives, comps., Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, 1921–​1949 [Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee, 1921–​1949] (Beijing:  Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe [CCP Central Party Academy Press], 1989–​1992), vols. 1–​18; CCP Central Archives, Central Archival and Manuscript Research Division, and CCP Organization Department, comps., Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao, 1921–​1997 [Documents of the CCP Organization’s History, 1921–​1997] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe [CCP Central Committee’s Party History Press], 2000), vols. 1–​14; Xinhuashe [New China News Agency], Xinhuashe wenjian ziliao huibian [A Collection of Documentary Materials of the New China News Agency] (Beijing: Xinhuashe [New China News], n.d.). 49. The Archives of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, formerly the Archives Section of the General Office of the Foreign Ministry, have 330,000 volumes of documents, which are mainly in paper form, but with some microfilms, photos, audio, and video tapes, as well as compact discs. They have recorded China’s foreign policy and diplomatic activities since the founding of the PRC in 1949. The Archives declassified about 10,000 volumes of the documents in 2006 and 60,000 in 2008. 50. Chinese leaders’ papers and manuscripts include Mao Zedong junshi wenji [Collected Military Works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing:  Junshi kexue chubanshe [Military Science Press], 1993), vols. 1–​6; Mao Zedong junshi wenxun:  neibuben [Selected Military Papers of Mao Zedong: Internal Edition] (Beijing: Jiefangjun zhanshi chubanshe [PLA Soldiers Press], 1981), vols. 1–​2; Zhu De, Zhu De junshi wenxuan [Selected Military Papers of Zhu De] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1986); Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan [Selected Military Papers of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 1988); Liu Bocheng, Liu Bocheng junshi wenxuan [Selected Military Papers of Liu Bocheng] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1992); Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen junshi wenxuan [Selected Military Papers of Nie Rongzhen] (Beijing:  Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1992); Xu Xiangqian, Xu Xiangqian junshi wenxuan [Selected Military Papers of Xu Xiangqian] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1992); Chen Yi, Chen Yi junshi wenxuan [Selected Military Papers of Chen Yi] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1996). 51. Mao, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 1949–​1976 [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the State, 1949–​1976], vols. 1–​13 (Beijing:  Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 1989–​1993); Zhou, Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan [Selected Military Papers of Zhou Enlai], vols. 1–​4 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe [People’s Press], 1997); Liu Shaoqi, Jianguo yilai

2

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Liu Shaoqi wengao, 1949–​1957 [Liu Shaoqi’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the State, 1949–​1957] (Beijing:  Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 2005–​2013), vols. 1–​6; Deng, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vols. 1–​3. 52. Some of the generals quoted have agreed to their names being mentioned, although for understandable reasons other interviewees’ names are not revealed in this book. 53. Part of the research effort resulted in Li, Voices from the Vietnam War. 54. Colonel Konstantin Preobrazhensky (KGB, ret.), interviews by the author at Silver Spring, Maryland, in September 2007. Preobrazhensky served as KGB agent in North Vietnam, North Korea, and Japan in the late 1960s and 1970s. 55. One noted oral history book, for example, Patriots; the Vietnam War Remembered from All Sides, includes one Russian story (approximately two pages), told by Sergei Khrushchev, son of the Soviet leader Khrushchev, although Sergei lived in Moscow throughout the war. Christian Appy, Patriots (New York: Viking, 2003), 87–​89. 56. Fredrik Logevall, “Bringing in the ‘Other Side’: New Scholarship on the Vietnam War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 77–​93; Mark Bradley and Robert Brigham, “Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship on the Cold War,” in Cold War International History Project, Work Paper 7 (Washington, DC: Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1993). 57. For more details on the Western WOW, see Hanson, Carnage and Culture,  20–​23.

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1

T H E D R A G O N ’ S   TA L E

After the founding of the PRC in 1949, the Chinese government was involved in the First Indochina War of 1946–​1954 and also joined North Vietnam against South Vietnam in their civil struggle from 1955 to 1963. The Chinese military’s involvement in the First Indochina War, known in China as the “Fight to Assist Vietnam and Resist France,” became a historical precursor for Chinese intervention in the Vietnam War (1965–​1973) against the United States. Chinese security considerations and policy decisions to aid Ho Chi Minh’s war against France reflected a new strategic culture that advocated concepts of an active defense to protect the newly established Communist state from both a possible foreign invasion and a potential Western threat. Beijing’s policy to keep Vietnam out of Western control is also traditional. In terms of geopolitical history, China had been heavily involved in Vietnam for two millennia. It is no coincidence that the PRC’s two main interventions took place in the former tributary vassal states of Vietnam and Korea, places where China had established dominant control in the second and third centuries. It seemed a traditional strategy for China to consider Vietnam and Korea within its defense orbit in the twentieth century.

A China-​Centered Geopolitical History The first historical writing on present Vietnam was recorded by the Chinese court of the Qin dynasty (221–​206 BCE) about border trade between China and “Nam Viet” (South Yueh) in 220 BCE. Then, Qin Shi Huangdi (the First Emperor) sent General Zhao Tuo (d. 137 BCE) to the border area in an effort to expand Qin frontiers by establishing a kingdom of Nanyue (Nam Viet), which encompassed both modern-​day Guangdong province in China and a section of what is now the northeastern part of Vietnam. In 111

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BCE, Emperor Wudi (Martial Emperor) of the Han dynasty (207 BCE–​220 CE) attacked Vietnam. The Han army integrated the far northwestern part of Vietnam as well as parts of what are now Guangxi province in China as the province of Jiaozhi (Giao Chi) and established several military outposts, including one near modern-​day Hanoi.1 Over the course of the next thousand years, military leaders from the north intermarried with locals and produced powerful Chinese-​Vietnamese Han-​Viet families near modern-​day Hanoi. Wynn Gadkar-​Wilcox points out that these families adapted cultural and linguistic characteristics from the North, eventually producing the Vietnamese language, which though Mon-​Khmer at its base, is dominated by Sinitic vocabulary.2 When the power of dynasties to the north was expanding, Chinese military officials and the nascent Han-​Viet elite near Hanoi attempted to further codify their frontier administration and more effectively tax areas further south. When this happened, the population further south, who may have been related to the people we call Muong today, resisted this administrative control. Examples of this phenomenon are the rebellion of the Trung Sisters (40–​43 CE) and that of Lady Trieu (248 CE). When the fortunes of Chinese dynasties waned, they found themselves unable to send troops to control this distant southern frontier. When that happened, local rulers, usually military leaders from Chinese dynasties who had previously exerted control over the area, filled the leadership void and established their own independent or quasi-​independent regimes. Eventually, in 939 CE, Vietnamese forces under the leadership of Ng o Quyeen took advantage of a civil war in China, defeated Chinese occupation troops, and established an independent state. Over the next sixty years, several local strongmen vied without success to produce a lasting dynasty. Finally, in 1010, the first Vietnamese dynasty, the Lý Dynasty was established. It ruled the country from 1010 to 1225, followed by Trần dynasty, which ruled between 1225 and 1400. Lý and Trần kings were faced with numerous challenges in establishing consistent governance over what is now the northern part of Vietnam. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese dynasties were always vulnerable to attack from Chinese or Mongol dynasties to the north who attempted to reintegrate Vietnam into a Chinese empire. Such attacks occurred in 1076 under the Song, and in 1258, 1285, and 1287 under the Yuan (Mongols). To maintain its independent status, Vietnam participated in the tribute system under China from the tenth through nineteenth centuries. A tribute system was formed for conducting political and trade relations between the Chinese government and other kingdoms. Foreign rulers

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who sought an advantageous mutual relationship with the Chinese empire, sent their representatives to the Chinese capital to present tributes (exotic luxury goods, local special products, or people) to the Chinese emperor, and in return, they were rewarded with promises and gifts from the Chinese emperor, such as political recognition, non-​aggression agreements, and gifts such as porcelain and silk.3 Under this system, the Chinese emperor recognized the authority and sovereignty of foreign monarchs. This suzerainty over neighboring lands afforded exclusive trading conditions between Asian countries and also implied military protection to the subordinate states on the part of China (see Map 1.1 China and Southeast Asia). Therefore, all diplomatic and trade missions were construed in the context of a tribute relationship. There were many tribute states affiliated with the Chinese-​ established empires throughout Chinese history. During the Han dynasty, the various tribes of Japan had already established the tribute relationships with China. Neighboring steppe kingdoms in the northwest, such as the Xiongnu, also turned to an early variant of the tribute program. Furthermore, the subordinate Xiongnu provided a hostage from its royal family to the Han regime to ensure that the Xiongnu would not attack China. The tribute relationship between Korea and China was established during the age of the Three Kingdoms (340–​668) of Korea. This relationship did not come to an end until the Japanese defeated the Chinese in the first Sino-​Japanese War of 1894–​1895. Slaves from tribute countries were sent to Tang (618–​907) China by various groups, the Cambodians sent albinos, the Uighurs sent Turkic Karluks, the Japanese sent Ainu, and Turkish and Tibetan girls were also sent to China. During the Song dynasty (960–​1279), the Song court received more than 300 tribute missions from other countries. Under the Ming dynasty (1368–​1644), countries that attempted to establish political, economic, and cultural relationships with the powerful Chinese empire had to enter the tribute system. Thus, tribute was often paid for practical objectives, instead of only as a sign of devotion to the Chinese emperor. Many tributes consisted of native products, such as elephants from Siam (Thailand) and eunuchs and virgin girls from Korea, Vietnam, or the Ryukyu Islands. To keep it official, the tribute was actually the only existing element of foreign trade for China. Hongwu (r. 1368–​1398), the first Ming emperor, prohibited any private foreign trade in 1371. To increase the number of tribute states, the Yongle Emperor (r. 1403–​1424) expanded the tribute system by dispatching massive overseas missions to the South Seas in the early fifteenth century. Naval Admiral Zheng He’s (1371–​1435) overseas expeditions carrying goods to build tribute relationships between the Ming and newly

MAP 1.1.  China and Southeast Asia

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discovered kingdoms in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Eastern Africa was one of the successful stories. The Chinese regarded the tribute system as equivalent to the familial relation of sons looking after their parents by devoting part of their wealth, assets, or goods to them, which was an integral part of Confucian philosophy. The symbolism of the tribute system ensured that the Chinese emperor and the Middle Kingdom would be regarded as superior to their trading partners. Under such a system, the asymmetrical power relations between China as the Middle Kingdom and its surrounding subordinate states were clear. In this system, power diminished with the cultural and geographical distance from the Middle Kingdom, so that Vietnam and Korea were placed higher than others, including Japan, the Ryukyus, and other Indochinese kingdoms that also gave tribute. The Chinese tribute system, with its burdensome, ritualistic mannerisms, continued until the Qing dynasty (1644–​1912) when European merchants began arriving. Because the Confucian culture placed a greater reward on non-​economic functions rather than extra profit, the Chinese preferred to continue tribute customs even when the Western merchants began to trade with China. Although the Chinese rulers were willing and able to extend a number of concessions and a certain amount of flexibility in meeting Qing requirements, the Westerners, as “men from afar,” were considered as “uncivilized” because they did not know the classic texts and were treated as other “barbarians” like some ethnic minorities.4 Since Westerners were used to the free market and free trade system, and the Imperial Chinese customs to control trade were not productive and non-​economic, the Europeans complained that they could not trade with Chinese merchants in such a way. The Europeans disliked the tribute system, but the Chinese government refused to compromise with them because the Qing dynasty did not see any clear advantage to establishing special relations with Europeans outside of the tribute system. Thus, Sino-​Western trade was limited in the nineteenth century. Finally, the Europeans used military means to force the Qing government to open China’s door to trade with the West in the First Opium War of 1839–​1842. In the meantime, Vietnam was also subjected to colonization or annexation efforts. In 1857, after an unsuccessful attempt to attack the capital at Hue, a French-​led force began an offensive against the southern part of Vietnam with some success. In 1881, the French gained control of the Tonkin area. In 1881–​1882 Nguyen dynasty Emperor Tu Duc repeatedly sent his envoys to Beijing and appealed to the Qing court for assistance. The Qing emperor

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responded by sending Chinese troops to assist Vietnam because Vietnam was still his tributary state, and the Chinese were concerned about the increasing French presence along their southwestern border. In 1883, the Qing regular troops moved into Vietnam and joined the Chinese pirate force, or the Black Flag army. In November 1884, about 7,000 Chinese troops surrounded the French garrison at Tuyen Quang on the Clear River northwest of Hanoi. The French held out until they were relieved in March 1885. By that time, the French force had grown to 40,000 men in Vietnam. Then, the Chinese went on the offensive again and retook Lang Son. However, an armistice was declared in April 1885 before Chinese forces could capitalize on their success at Lang Son. Spencer Tucker argues that this was largely a consequence of French naval operations against China proper in the Sino-​French War (1884–​ 1885).5 On August 23, 1884, for example, French warships destroyed the Qing’s Fujian Fleet at Fuzhou, sinking or damaging eleven Chinese warships. On June 9, 1885, France and China signed the Treaty of Tianjin (Tientsin). It had tremendous consequences for Vietnam, for under its terms China renounced its suzerainty over Vietnam and recognized the French protectorate. Both Chinese regular troops and Black Flags retired behind the Chinese border. In 1887, Paris formed its conquests into French Indochina, including Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Although the new treaty system, which had replaced the traditional tribute system, created a certain degree of ambiguity about future Chinese assistance to Vietnam, a newly emerged nationalism in East Asia continued to keep Vietnamese anti-​French activists close to Chinese nationalist movement. The emergence of the French and British colonial empires in Asia in the eighteenth century brought the universality of East Asia classical civilization into question. East Asians began to see the French and British as possessing a separate civilization, rather than merely being uncivilized. The urgency of the military and commercial problems wrought by Europeans greatly accelerated East Asian efforts at political, economic, and technological reform. By the mid-​nineteenth century, the educational curriculum of Confucianism, political loyalty to the emperor, and native religions like Buddhism and Daoism (Taoism) came to be understood as part of Eastern tradition, and the alternative to them came to be seen as “Western modernity.” This particularistic world view gave rise to proto-​nationalism throughout East Asia. In the late nineteenth century, many anti-​French families sent their children to study in Japan rather than in France. Hundreds of the Vietnamese students established friendship and association with the Chinese nationalists in Japan. In 1900–​1908, Sun Yat-​sen, leader of the Chinese nationalist

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movement and founder of the Republic of China (ROC), visited Vietnam for five times and lived in Hanoi and other places for more than two years. After the founding of the ROC in 1911, China became the political and military base for the Vietnamese anti-​French movement. In 1924, the Vietnamese Nationalist Party was founded in Guangzhou, Guangdong province, with Phan Boi Chau as the first chairman. It was in China that Ho Chi Minh founded the Vietnamese Communist Party on February 3, 1930. After Japan invaded China in 1937 and Vietnam in 1940, both countries joined the Allied powers against the Japanese aggression in Asia. After his return in 1941, Ho worked with ICP leaders in Indochina and founded a new Communist-​ dominated united front in Vietnam, the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Vietnamese Independence League, or Viet Minh) at the Eighth Plenum of the ICP, to fight the Japanese.6 Toward the end of World War II, Chinese President Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-​shek) and his government of the GMD (Guomindang, or Kuomintang, KMT, the Chinese Nationalist Party) had an opportunity to exert some influence on post-​war Vietnam since the Allied Potsdam agreement of July 1945 had decided to split Indochina into two theaters of war, placing the area north of the 16th parallel under Jiang. In August, Japan suddenly surrendered. Jiang sent 100,000 GMD troops to North Vietnam under the command of General Lu Han.7 Ho’s newly established Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) survived with Chinese Nationalist protection in 1945–​1946. In 1949, Jiang lost mainland China to Mao’s army in the Chinese Civil War (1946–​1949), and removed the seat of his GMD government to Taiwan. The newly established the PRC government in Beijing continued the Communist revolution at home and overseas by joining the Communist camp under the Russian leadership and helping Ho’s war against the French forces. Mao’s intent in Indochina can best be understood by four elements: an overall foreign policy in a global Cold War context formed to a large extent by the United States and the Soviet Union, national security concerns, domestic political stability, and military means and economic resources available at that moment. Through the 1950s when Beijing tried to break a perceived US encirclement of China, the Sino-​Soviet  alliance played an important role in Mao’s decision-​making and continuous effort to aid Vietnam and resist France.

Communist Alliance: Stalin, Mao, and Ho Before the founding of the People’s Republic, Mao had declared the “lean-​to-​ one-​side” policy, according to which the new republic would favor the Soviet

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Union and join the socialist and communist camps in the post-​World War II world.8 After Mao proclaimed the PRC on October 1, 1949, his new government was still confronting more than 1 million GMD fighters in Taiwan and southwest China. Mao’s first priority was to consolidate the new state by eliminating all remnants of Jiang’s Nationalist forces on Taiwan and other offshore islands.9 Since the PLA lacked enough air and naval power, Mao required Soviet aid to cross the Taiwan Strait. Mao paid a state visit to the Soviet Union on December 16, 1949, hoping to get what the new China desperately needed through an alliance treaty between the PRC and the USSR. Stalin, however, was never easy to deal with, not even with his next-​door communist comrade. Mao, frustrated after two fruitless meetings in December, became even more upset when he had not yet had a chance to meet Stalin during three weeks in January 1950.10 Nevertheless, during his long stay in Moscow, a total of sixty-​five days, Mao had a better understanding of Stalin’s objective. Among other things, the Soviet leader hoped to convince Mao that the Soviet Union had its own difficulties, there would be no “free ride” for China, and China should share responsibility for the worldwide communist movement. Stalin made it clear that China should support international communist movements in Asian countries. During their second meeting, on December 24, it is recorded that “Stalin did not mention the treaty at all,” and instead discussed with Mao “the activities of the Communist Parties in Asian countries such as Vietnam, Japan, and India.”11 Stalin, preoccupied with European affairs, needed China to help with ongoing Asian Communist revolutions such as the anti-​French war in Indochina.12 Mao understood Stalin’s demand that China share what Mao called “the international responsibility” of global communist movement by supporting Asian revolutionary wars in general, and Ho’s First Indochina War in particular. From a geopolitical point of view, it seemed to make sense to Chinese leaders that China could secure its southwestern border, earn Soviet aid and technology, and modernize its armed forces by helping the DRV fight the French forces. Having noticed Stalin’s priority and intent, Mao accepted Stalin’s perception of a “worldwide communist revolution,” and was ready to share “the international responsibility.” In Moscow, Mao agreed to support Ho’s war against the French because Mao also considered internationalism as one of the fundamental principles of the CCP.13 In late December 1949, Mao decided to involve China in the French-​ Indochina War. He passed on his new strategic consideration from Moscow to his comrades in Beijing. The Chinese leaders immediately made a policy

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change from declining the earlier Vietnamese request to providing them with military and financial aid. From the Vietnamese perspective, Beijing should have taken responsibility for the revolutionary movement and war effort against the French in North Vietnam. Such revolutionary internationalism was widely expected by all Asian Communist parties after the CCP’s founding of the People’s Republic.14 Ho Chi Minh faced an extremely difficult situation in the fourth year of the French-​Indochina War and desperately needed China’s assistance. In late 1949, Ho sent his representatives to Beijing requesting a large amount of financial aid (about $10 million) as well as weaponry to arm three infantry divisions. The CCP Central Committee found it almost impossible to meet the Vietnamese request because of China’s own financial difficulties. The Chinese leaders explained to the Vietnamese delegation that the eight-​year Sino-​Japanese War had deeply wounded China’s economy. In addition, during the three years of the Civil War, the Chinese had paid another high price. It would take the PRC’s economy years to overcome the severe blows dealt by the two wars. Moreover, in 1949, most of the southern provinces suffered serious floods, producing seven million victims of starvation and disease. It appeared the Central Committee, without financial aid, might disappoint the Vietnamese by meeting only a small part of their weaponry request.15 Mao changed the Central Committee’s policy at Moscow as soon as he received its minimum aid proposal. Replying on December 24, Mao cabled Liu Shaoqi, secretary general and vice chairman of the Central Committee, who was in charge at the Party Center during Mao’s trip, to tell the Vietnamese delegation that China should be able to provide at least half of Hanoi’s request initially now and would send the remainder of the aid later.16 Mao asked Liu to adopt a friendly and cooperative attitude toward their Vietnamese comrades, encouraging their struggle, and to refrain from criticism of them.17 Yang Kuisong states that since Mao was willing to work with Stalin’s world revolution plan, “other CCP leaders also changed their views” on the Franco-​Vietnamese War.18 Following Mao’s instruction, Beijing changed its aid plan and promised to meet all the Vietnamese requests. At the meetings in late December 1949, Liu suggested direct communication between Vietnamese and Chinese top leaders by inviting Ho to a summit in Beijing and by sending a CCP representative to Vietnam.19 The Viet Minh lost their official contact with the CCP in 1948–​1949 during the French Indochina War. On January 17, 1950, Beijing sent its “working team,” headed by Luo Guibo, to Vietnam. As one of the Long March veterans, Luo was then the chief of the General Office

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at the Military Committee of the Central Government. Later, on August 11, 1954, he became the first Chinese ambassador to North Vietnam after Ho won the French Indochina War, and he served as vice minister of China’s Foreign Ministry from 1958 to 1970. In a Central Committee telegram to the Vietnamese Communist Central Committee on January 17, 1950, the Chinese Party Center introduced Luo as the CCP “liaison representative” with an official ranking as “provincial governor” and “political commissar.”20 Luo’s mission was to lay the groundwork for Chinese aid and to establish direct contact with Ho’s high command.21 Ho was no stranger to the Chinese leaders. They had established a long-​ time mutual friendship through their revolutionary careers as members of the Comintern (Communist International Congress) in Moscow, alumni of the Russian Oriental University, and comrades in arms during World War II. After the Soviet Union was founded in October 1917, the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) founded the Comintern in Moscow in 1919 as a political association of communist parties of the world.22 Thereafter, the Comintern created the University of the Toilers of the East (or the Oriental University) to train communist leaders from Asian countries. Many Chinese Communist leaders received their training through the Comintern in the 1920s. In 1921–​1922, Liu Shaoqi, the future president of China, studied at the Oriental University.23 His learning experience in Moscow later contributed to his successful organization of Chinese trade unions, worker strikes, and underground party committees.24 Marshal Zhu De, the future commander in chief of the PLA, Marshal Nie Rongzhen, and Marshal Liu Bocheng enrolled in military training programs and studied Russian military operations, communication, and new technology from 1924 to 1926.25 Ho, then Nguyen Tat Thanh, came to Moscow the summer of 1923 and began his studies at the Oriental University. Fluent in Chinese and having had some Chinese friends in France in 1922–​1923, Nguyen soon developed close relations with the Chinese Communists and changed his name to Ho Chi Minh (which means the “Enlightener”). His first book published during his studies was titled China and the Chinese Youth.26 When Lenin died on January 21, 1924, Ho, together with his Chinese classmates, attended the funeral.27 The communist fraternity, among the Asian communist leaders that had developed in the Soviet Union, continued and flourished when they returned to lead their own revolutions.28 Ho spent many years in China building up his revolutionary career and the Vietnamese Communist Party. He had been sent to China by the Comintern after completion of his training in 1924.29 His assignment was

3

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to assist Soviet representative Mikhail Borodin, the Comintern envoy to the GMD Revolutionary Committee in Guangzhou (Canton), Guangdong province. Ho worked for Borodin as his Chinese interpreter during the day, while jogging around the mansion and practicing with pistols and rifles after work. The southern Chinese city of Guangzhou hosted a large number of Vietnamese refugees and political exiles. Ho organized the Association of Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth, or Thanh Nien, a group “which eventually became the forerunner of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP).”30 In 1925, Ho opened a political training school for young Vietnamese revolutionaries. He invited Liu Shaoqi, then leader of CCP labor movement, to lecture his classes. After his return to China, Liu soon became vice chairman of the China National Trade Union. He trained union leaders and mobilized urban workers for the Communist movement in Guangzhou, where a friendship grew between Liu and Ho.31 Communist connections and personal relations played an important role in shaping Chinese leaders’ attitude toward Ho Chi Minh.32 Ho founded the Vietnamese Communist Party in China on February 3, 1930, and then renamed it the ICP in October to include communists in Cambodia and Laos. After the Sino-​Japanese War broke out, Ho came to Yan’an, wartime capital of the CCP in 1938, serving in the branch office of the CCP’s Eighth Route Army in Guilin and southwestern Guangxi, a province bordering Vietnam. In 1939 he served under the command of Ye Jianying.33 In May 1940, Ho recruited Pham Van Dong, later the prime minister of North Vietnam, and Vo Nguyen Giap, later a general and commander in chief of Vietnamese armed forces, into the ICP at Kunming, provincial capital of Yunnan in southwest China, another border province with Vietnam.34 After his return to Vietnam in 1941, Ho founded a new Communist-​led united front in Vietnam, known as Viet Minh, to fight the Japanese. This united political front included some non-​Communist groups for the common purpose of fighting against Japan’s occupation and for national independence. Throughout World War II, the Viet Minh successfully consolidated its military base in the northern border areas. Giap, Ho’s lieutenant, created the party’s army, Armed Propaganda Team, on December 22, 1944, which became the birthday of the Vietnamese Communist armed forces. With Allied support, Giap’s guerrilla army along the Vietnamese-​Chinese border grew to 5,000 men.35 Since his party-​army was under the Vietnamese Communist leadership, the force is also popularly known as the Viet Minh. The sudden surrender of Japan in August 1945 created a power vacuum in Indochina, and Giap, commander in chief of the Viet Minh army, entered

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Hanoi with 1,000 troops on August 18. On September 2, Ho proclaimed the independence of Vietnam and founded the DRV with himself as president and Hanoi as its capital.36 When France returned to its Indochinese colonies after World War II, war broke out between the Viet Minh and French forces in November 1946 after the withdrawal of the 100,000 Chinese occupation troops. In 1947–​1948, French forces occupied most cities, including Hanoi, along with many other strategic points in North Vietnam. The French also launched a series of offensive campaigns, having driven the Viet Minh into the countryside and northern border areas. In 1949, the Viet Minh was facing its worst time in the war against France. In the meantime, France reinstalled Emperor Bao Dai and established a pro-​French and anti-​communist Vietnamese government with a new army. Then, in December 1949, only two months after the founding of the PRC, Chinese leaders committed the new People’s Republic to the struggle and the final victory of the DRV against the French forces in Indochina. Mao’s Vietnam policy extended an existing political friendship between the two Communist parties, the CCP and Viet Minh in World War II, to a new military alliance between two states, the PRC and DRV in the Cold War. On January 17, 1950, Liu Shaoqi telegraphed the Viet Minh Central Committee that the Chinese government would recognize the DRV. The next day, the PRC made its official announcement and became the first nation to establish diplomatic relations with the DRV. On January 30 the Soviet Union recognized the DRV, and other communist and socialist countries followed suit. At Liu’s suggestion, Ho secretly visited China in January 1950. Two Communist leaders met in Beijing on January 28. It had been twenty-​five years since they worked together in Guangzhou in 1925. Ho told the Chinese vice president that it had been extremely difficult for him to come to China. He had walked for seventeen days, in disguise, from his headquarters to the Vietnamese-​Chinese border. His Viet Minh desperately needed more military aid to survive another French offensive campaign. Liu reassured Ho with Mao’s promise that China would try its best to meet all the Vietnamese needs. Liu hosted Ho for five days in Beijing and reported their meetings by telegrams to Mao in Moscow. On February 3, Ho left Beijing to meet with Stalin and Mao in Moscow.37 On February 6, Ho, hoping for Soviet aid, arrived in Moscow. The Politburo of the Russian Communist Party held a welcome banquet for the Vietnamese Communist leader that evening. Stalin did not attend and did not even meet with Ho for several days.38 However, Stalin did tell Mao in

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his office that “Comrade Ho Chi Minh is here asking the Soviet Union to provide aid to Vietnam, helping them to fight the French. But we have a different consideration in this.” Stalin continued, “The victory of the Chinese revolution proved that China has become the center for the Asian revolution. We believe that it’s better for China to take the major responsibility in supporting and helping the Vietnamese tasks.” Stalin justified his position by saying: “China and Vietnam are sharing the border and related to each other. It’s convenient for China to help [Viet Minh].”39 Mao agreed with Stalin. Mao followed Stalin’s advice and met Ho in Moscow. Ho explained to Mao why the Viet Minh needed international help in their war against the French. Mao made it clear to Ho at their meetings that China would support North Vietnam in order to win the war against the French. Mao also “stressed the importance of reciprocating friendship.”40 Thereafter, China began to engage in the global Cold War by supporting Ho’s war against the French in Indochina.41 On February 14, 1950, the Sino-​Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was signed in Moscow. The Soviet Union committed its nuclear protection and military aid to the new People’s Republic. On February 16, Stalin hosted a banquet to celebrate the signing of the Sino-​Soviet treaty. At the banquet, Ho asked Stalin for a similar treaty between the Soviet Union and the DRV. If it worked for China, it should also work for Vietnam; also, it was convenient, since he was already in Moscow. Stalin rejected Ho’s request by saying that Ho’s visit was secret, but Mao’s was a state visit.42 Mao then signed a huge naval order with Stalin in Moscow. The Soviet Union agreed to arm a new Chinese naval force with warships and equipment worth $150  million, half the total loan package that Stalin granted through the treaty.43 Later that year, Stalin helped Mao establish the Chinese air force with brand-​new Russian-​made jet fighters. The PLAAF had fewer than 100 fighters in 1950, increasing to 3,000 fighters and bombers by 1953, and totaling 5,000 planes by 1955.44 In five years, this made China’s air force the third largest in the world, after the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union also re-​armed sixty PLA infantry divisions between 1951 and 1954, and thereafter Chinese weaponry was standardized.45 Soviet support in military, economy, government, and international affairs was critical for the new regime’s political consolidation and economic reconstruction. If the Soviet model had shaped the revolutionary and communist nature of the new China, Russian aid and military technology helped the Chinese military with its transformation in the early 1950s from a peasant army into a modern professional force.46

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After his return to Beijing in March 1950, Mao began planning a large-​ scale PLA amphibious attack on Taiwan in summer, in order to complete his civil war with Soviet naval technology. He did not realize, and did not expect, that the PLA would never make it to Taiwan to finish Jiang Jieshi, but instead was heading to bloody wars against America, both in Korea and Vietnam.

Military Advisors to Resist France After Beijing established diplomatic relations with Hanoi in January 1950, the focus of the CCP’s policy toward Vietnam shifted from party relations to a state relationship. The Chinese leaders began to focus their main concerns on the national defense and southern border security.47 The newly founded republic sought national unity and domestic tranquility, and to reorganize its armed forces in order to defend against foreign invasion. From this point forward, the PRC adopted a geopolitical strategy stressing defensive military measures to consolidate a new regime and to protect its territorial gains. The concept of national defense against a possible Western invasion developed in early 1950, becoming the cornerstone of China’s strategic thinking and its military modernization through the 1970s. In 1950, according to Mao’s perception of the Cold War, Western imperialist powers threatened China’s national security in three areas: Korea, Vietnam, and the Taiwan Strait.48 What worried Mao most was the ongoing French Indochina War.49 Mao had learned more details about the conflict when he left Moscow with Ho, and they rode together by train from Moscow to Beijing, a trip lasting from February 17 until March 4, 1950. On their trip back to China, they made seven stops in the Soviet Union to visit Russian defense industries, factories, and universities.50 During these two weeks, they discussed the Viet Minh’s party development, united front, and deteriorating military situation. Mao realized how serious the war was in Indochina and why Ho desperately needed China’s assistance. Ho told Mao that “Stalin is not ready to provide any direct aid, and refused to sign a treaty with us. From now on, our anti-​French war totally depends on Chinese assistance.”51 Mao also knew that in February the United States had recognized the Bao Dai government, and had begun supporting French forces in Vietnam.52 Washington considered it as part of a defense of the free world against Soviet-​supported international communist aggression, but it seemed to Mao that it was a foreign threat to China’s national security. He believed China should secure its southwestern border by eliminating any Western power’s presence in Vietnam. Mao again promised Ho that the PRC would be primarily responsible for providing support for the Viet Minh.53

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On February 26, 1950, when their train entered China, Ho asked Mao for possible Chinese military intervention in the French Indochina War. Mao thought for a while and declined Ho’s request for Chinese forces, but agreed to send Chinese military advisors to Vietnam.54 When the two men arrived in Beijing on March 4, Ho appointed Hoang Van Hoan as the Vietnamese representative (and later DRV ambassador) to work with the Chinese government on military aid and on PLA advisors to Vietnam.55 On March 9, Beijing’s representative Luo Guibo arrived at Viet Minh HQ. On March 19 Luo cabled the CCP Central Committee that the Viet Minh high command was planning its next major campaign against French forces, and that the Vietnamese asked for Chinese military advisors that would serve at army, division, regiment, and battalion levels in the Vietnamese forces.56 To help Ho Chi Minh to win his battles in the war against the French forces, the PLA high command decided in late March to organize the “Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) to Vietnam.”57 In April, Liu Shaoqi summoned Wei Guoqing to Beijing and informed him of the CMAG. “Under the request of President Ho,” Liu said, “the CCP Central Committee has decided to send the military advisory group to Vietnam to help their Anti-​French War. You are the head of the military advisory group.”58 As one of the few ethnic minority leaders in the CCP hierarchy, Wei had been the political commissar of the Tenth Army Group of the PLA’s Third Field Army in the Chinese Civil War. After his army group took over Fuzhou, capital city of Fujian province in September 1949, Wei was appointed the head of the city’s Military Administrative Committee.59 In February 1950, the Central Committee ordered him to leave Fuzhou for a new appointment. Between February and April in Beijing, Wei had studied international relations, diplomacy, and the new republic’s foreign policy without knowing anything about his “new appointments.”60 He would have been the first Chinese representative to the United Nations had the UN accepted China as a new member to replace Taiwan, or the first Chinese ambassador to Great Britain, had London not lowered its diplomatic mission from ambassadorial to chargé d’affaires level.61 On April 14, 1950, Liu telegraphed Hanoi and introduced Wei to Ho as an army group commander.62 Shortly after accepting his new appointment, Wei submitted his plan to the high command. On April 17, the CMC ordered the Second, Third, and Fourth Field Armies to select experienced and educated officers with at least nine years of education, or a middle school certificate, in order to qualify for the CMAG.63 In May, 281 officers reported to the CMAG, including 59 commanders and officers at battalion level or higher.64

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On June 27, two days after the Korean War broke out, Mao, Zhu, and Liu met Wei and other high-​ranking advisors at Zhongnanhai. Mao told the military advisors that he had not made the decision to send them to Vietnam. “It is President Ho Chi Minh who has asked me for [your assistance],” the chairman said. “Who would have thought our revolution would succeed first? We should help them. This is called internationalism. You will help them to win the battles after you get to Vietnam.”65 Liu and Zhu also made speeches at the meeting by emphasizing that the CCP had “important reasons” for deciding to assist the Viet Minh. Zhu, commander in chief of the PLA, continued: “As internationalists we should regard assistance to Vietnam as an important international task and should spare no effort to help the Vietnamese achieve victory.”66 In July the CMC established a party committee of the CMAG with Wei as secretary and Deng Yifan as deputy secretary. Deng was director of the Political Department of the PLA Twenty-​First Army and political commissar of East China Military and Political University before his mission to Vietnam. He became lieutenant general in 1955.67 Among the CMAG party committee members were Mei Jiasheng, Ma Xifu, Li Wenyi, and Deng Qinghe. Mei was deputy commander and chief staff of the Twenty-​Third Army in 1947–​1949. He was ranked major general of the air force in 1955.68 Li Wenyi was political commissar of East China Military and Political University and ranked major general in 1964. Deng Qinghe was director of the Political Department of the Twenty-​Seventh Army. Under the CMAG Headquarters, political, operational, technical, and medical advisory teams were organized.69 On July 7, upon Ho’s request, Chen Geng joined the CMAG as the CCP Central Committee’s representative and entered Vietnam. As one of the most experienced and dedicated generals of the PLA, Chen had been commander of the 386th Brigade, 129th Division, Eighth Route Army, in World War II. During the Chinese Civil War, he was appointed as commander and political commissar of the Fourth Army Group. After the founding of the PRC, he became commander of the Yunnan Military District and governor of the Yunnan province. Later, in 1955, Chen became one of the ten grand generals of the PLA, acting chief of the PLA General Staff in 1956, and vice minister of defense in 1959.70 In his telegrams to Chen on June 18 and 30, 1950, Liu Shaoqi authorized Chen as the representative of the CCP Central Committee in charge of military advice in Vietnam.71 On August 11, 1950, Wei led the first group of the CMAG, numbering approximately 250 officers, and accompanied by Hoang Van Hoan, then Vietnamese Ambassador, entered Vietnam from Guangxi province. They

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arrived at Quang Uyen, northern Cao Bang province, on August 12. The next day Viet Minh held a reception and General Giap, commander in chief of the PAVN, made a welcome speech in Chinese. On August 16, Ho held a high command meeting where top Chinese advisors explained their missions and plans.72 After the meeting, Chen Geng and Wei Guoqing began to work at the PAVN General HQs, participating in battle planning, operations, and assessments of campaigns. Luo Guibo attended the Viet Minh Politburo meetings, while Mei Jiasheng and his team advised the PAVN General Staff. Deng Yifan led his team to the PAVN General Bureau of Political Tasks, and Ma Xifu advised the PAVN General Bureau of the Logistics. Among others were Zhu Heyun, advising the command of the 304th Division, and Wang Yanquan, advising the 308th Division and later the 312th. Chinese advisors also worked at the regimental and battalion commands of the 95th, 148th, 174th, and 209th Regiments.73 The Chinese advisors attended command briefings, planned operations with the Vietnamese officers, organized training, exercise, and assessment, and visited the front-​line troops. In most cases, the Chinese advisors cooperated well with the Viet Minh commanders and maintained a close working relationship with the Vietnamese throughout the war. Many of them thought they had built friendships for life. The CMAG reported directly to the Central Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee, and Mao “often directly reviewed battle plans and gave specific directions.”74 The Chinese advisors introduced some of their successful tactics from the Chinese Civil War of 1946–​1949. Among the developed tactics were those designed to outnumber the enemy whenever possible in order to wipe out entire enemy units instead of simply repelling them, engage the enemy in mobile operations, and achieve surprise whenever possible.75 Since the Chinese army had previously fought in wars against the Japanese and Nationalist armies, they knew little about Western forces, such as the French army. Sometimes Chinese advisors and Vietnamese commanders had differing opinions and even disagreements over planning and operations. The Vietnamese troops had experience with traditional guerrilla warfare as well as small-​scale operations, but Chinese advisors believed that the Viet Minh should engage in large-​scale offensive campaigns and seek decisive battles in order to destroy more French troops.76 The differing experience and approaches to the war between the Viet Minh and CMAG was clear from the very beginning, when Chinese military advisors participated in Viet Minh’s planning of its first offensive campaign.

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In August 1950, the Viet Minh high command planned to strike the French along the Sino-​Vietnamese border at Cao Bang, the northernmost French garrison, to squeeze the French out of the border areas and to open transportation lines for Chinese aid. Chen Geng, however, sharply disagreed with the Viet Minh generals by insisting on a surprise attack on Dong Khe, the middle connection point of the French defense line between Cao Bang in the north and That Khe in the south, thus cutting off the garrison from behind and eliminating more French troops. The CMAG engaged in heated debate with the Viet Minh for two weeks, and they could not reach an agreement. Chen called Ho and also Mao in Beijing to explain why his plan was best for the Viet Minh. He even threatened Giap repeatedly that he would resign if the Vietnamese would not accept his plan.77 Giap finally agreed with Chen’s plan to attack Dong Khe first, and then eliminate the expected reinforcement from either Cao Bang or That Khe.78 The Border Offensive Campaign began on September 16, when nearly 10,000 Viet Minh troops attacked 267 French troops at Dong Khe. After fighting for two days, the Viet Minh took over the French post, killing 240 French troops, but suffering more than 500 casualties.79 Many Viet Minh officers considered the Dong Khe attack as a failure because of the heavy casualties, violating their guerrilla tactic taboo. Some even criticized the Chinese advisors and asked for an immediate stop of the campaign and evacuating their troops from Dong Khe.80 But Chen Geng insisted on a plan to wait for French reinforcements.81 On September 30, when French reinforcements, under the command of Lt. Col. Marcel Le Page, marched from That Khe in the south to Dong Khe, the French garrison under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Charton abandoned Cao Bang and began withdrawing toward Dong Khe from the north. The Viet Minh commanders feared becoming trapped and wanted to pull their troops out of Dong Khe. Chen argued against Giap and other Vietnamese commanders, and on October 4 he telegraphed his points to Mao. Mao spoke with Ho, who asked Giap to proceed with Chen’s plan. On October 6, Giap’s 308th Division and 209th Regiment first ambushed the Le Page group in the mountain area south of Dong Khe, and then destroyed the French reinforcement the next day. Giap then shifted his troops overnight and attacked the northern French group on October 10. The French were shocked by such a large-​scale, well-​organized attack with a regimental strength. Without certainty of effective defense, the French command withdrew all the outposts from the northern border areas in October.82

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During the Border Campaign the Viet Minh captured both Le Page and Charton while eliminating eight French and South Vietnamese battalions, totaling 8,000 troops.83 The Border Campaign was the first major victory for the Viet Minh’s offensive in the war against the French. After the Border Campaign, toward the end of 1950, Chen Geng was called back from Vietnam by Beijing, to take part in the Korean War. He was appointed commander of the Third Army Group of the CPVF in March of 1951, as second deputy commander of the CPVF in June, and as acting commander in chief of 1.2 million Chinese forces in the Korean War in March of 1952.84 After China sent its forces to the Korean War in late 1950, Mao paid more attention to the French Indochina War to make sure Beijing would not fight against the Western powers on two fronts. To secure the border, in 1951 Mao instructed the CMAG to exploit the victory of the Border Campaign in the northeast by expanding base areas into the northwest, along the border. However, the Viet Minh high command did not intend to move back to the remote, less populated mountainous region with a backward economy. Instead, they were ready to move into the Central Plains, Vietnam’s rice bowl, with a large population near Hanoi, by launching a “general offensive campaign” for the final victory as Giap had planned in late 1950.85 The CMAG could not convince the Vietnamese otherwise until the Viet Minh suffered heavy casualties during four offensive campaigns in the Central Plains. Edgar O’Ballance concludes that the “Chinese advisers had seen that Giap was too anxious to run before he could walk, and cautioned against impetuous action, but the Viet Minh were rather reluctant to take such advice.”86 The first offensive campaign targeted major French posts along the Red River delta to take over rice-​producing areas, and in order to relieve the Viet Minh’s food shortage. Giap started the campaign by attacking the provincial capital of Vinh Yen, thirty-​seven miles northwest of Hanoi, on December 25, 1950. The French garrison defended the city and received reinforcements by airlift. The Viet Minh attack continued until January 17, 1951, eliminating 1,500 French troops, but Giap lost at least 6,000 men. Wei Guoqing became frustrated, complaining in his telegram to Mao on January 27 about Viet Minh’s strategic mistakes and combat ineffectiveness. He suggested an immediate pause of the central offensives in order to start tactical training, political education, and reorganization in the northern base areas. Although Mao supported Wei’s plan in his reply, the Chinese chairman asked the CMAG chief to be patient with the Vietnamese commanders and to not criticize their urban offensives and tactical shortcomings since the Chinese Red Army made similar mistakes during its early years.87

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General Giap launched his second offensive in the Central Plains by attacking the French garrison near Hai Phong on March 20, 1951. The offensive, also known as Operation Hoang Hoa Tham, lasted until April 7, and 1,175 French troops were wiped out. However, the Viet Minh suffered 1,700 casualties. Giap’s adaptation of Chinese human wave attacking tactics brought heavy casualties to his assaulting troops.88 Chinese forces in Korea took advantage of their superiority in number (over 1 million), and organized massive assaults to attack UNF defensive positions.89 By 1951, however, a Vietnamese large-​scale attack lacked the element of surprise and merely exhausted itself. When the Viet Minh attacked, exposing their troops, the French hit them with heavy artillery and air raids, including napalm bombs. Giap’s three infantry divisions continued to suffer heavy casualties during his third campaign from May 28 to June 20, when the 308th and 304th Divisions attacked the French defense along Route No. 1, and during his last campaign in Central Plains, in which the Viet Minh had total casualties of 9,213 men.90 After these setbacks in 1951, the Viet Minh moved back to the northwestern region, as suggested by Chinese advisors. The Viet Minh high command expanded the bases in the mountainous areas along the border, where they trained and re-​armed more regular troops, and developed more technical units with the assistance of the PLA. In 1951–​1952, China armed the 316th, 320th, 325th Infantry Divisions, and the 351st Artillery and Engineering Divisions for the Viet Minh which increased their forces from three to seven regular divisions. Chinese advisors were sent to those newly established divisions. In these years, the CMAG also provided many training sessions for Viet Minh middle and high ranking commanders, logistics officers, and medical personnel. The Chinese advisors wrote the curriculum, drafted the training manuals, and organized routine drills and joint exercises. The Chinese trained the Vietnamese on mobile tactics, offensive operation, and tactics against defense works.91 During the 1952 rainy season the Chinese assisted the Viet Minh force to launch its first large scale “Political Education and Thought Reform Movement.” The CMAG held a series of political conferences for Viet Minh medics and field hospitals from April 10 to April 30. In August, the CMAG provided another series for recruitment and mobilization. The third training conference series in September focused on psychological warfare, and the fourth conference series provided training for both divisional and regimental commanders during the same month.92 To strengthen their bases in the

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northwest, the CCP Central Committee suggested that the CMAG expand Viet Minh military operations further west into Laos and Cambodia.93 From October 14 to December 10, 1952, the Viet Minh launched the Northwestern Offensive Campaign by employing eight regiments from the 308th, 312th, and 316th Divisions, to attack French defense points and military bases. General Raoul Salan, who had succeeded General Lattre de Tassigny in 1952, organized a counteroffensive, Operation Lorraine, totaling 30,000 troops, “the largest French military operation of the war.” After two months of fierce fighting, the Viet Minh successfully secured the border areas.94 On March 23, 1953, Wei Guoqing, Mei Jiasheng, and various Chinese advisors entered Laos with the main strength of the Vietnamese forces. In mid-​April, Vietnamese forces attacked French troops and expelled enemy forces out of northern Indochina in order to expand the Viet Minh base region by the summer of 1953. By early 1954 the Viet Minh was prepared for its decisive battle at Dien Bien Phu, which, as long as China could meet the huge logistical needs of North Vietnamese’s largest offensive campaign, would effectively win the French Indochina War.95

Aid to the Viet Minh’s War The Chinese also trained the Vietnamese in China, opening an officer academy, communication, technology, and mechanic schools in Guangxi and Yunnan, two Chinese-​Vietnam border provinces.96 The Viet Minh high command sent entire units to China for training and re-​arming. In 1951, the 308th Division and the 174th and 209th Regiments traveled to China for training, and while there received new arms, weapons, and equipment from the PLA. In 1952, 799 Vietnamese army medic personnel and 176 field surgical doctors also received training in China. By 1954 the Chinese had provided, within China, military and technology training for 15,000 Vietnamese officers and soldiers.97 By the end of 1954, China had armed five Vietnamese infantry divisions, one artillery division, one AAA division, and one security regiment.98 According to Chinese government statistics, from 1950 to 1956 China had shipped 155,000 small arms, 58  million rounds of ammunition, 4,630 artillery pieces, 1.08  million artillery shells, 840,000 hand grenades, 1,200 vehicles, 1.4 million uniforms, 14,000 tons of food, and 26,000 tons of fuel to Vietnam.99 From August 1950 to March 1954, the Chinese government

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shipped additional goods, war materials, medicine, and fuel worth $43.2 billion to Vietnam.100 China had provided military and economic aid to the Viet Minh since early 1950. On March 9, 1950, when Luo Guibo arrived in Vietnam, he reported to the CCP Central committee that the Politburo of the Viet Minh faced a disastrous situation due to its currency system and food supply. Luo warned Chinese leaders that the economic disaster could collapse Viet Minh’s war efforts against the French.101 Upon receiving Luo’s report, Chinese leaders decided in late March to immediately send economic and military aid to Vietnam.102 In April, the PLA high command instructed its Southwest Regional Command to supply arms, ammunition, and equipment to Viet Minh troops on a regular basis to fight against the French in Indochina. The regional command assigned a truck regiment to ship war materials over the border.103 From April to September 1950, China shipped 14,000 automatic rifles, 1,700 machine guns, 450 artillery pieces, and food supplies for 40 days, in order to secure the success of the Border Offensive Campaign in September and October. The PLA also received and treated 1,143 wounded Viet Minh soldiers in China during the campaign.104 Duiker points out that “The possibility of an outright military triumph appeared increasingly probable after Mao Zedong’s Communist Party came to power in China in 1949, a stunning shift in the regional balance of power that provided the Vietminh with a powerful new ally.”105 While Giap was grateful for the Chinese effort to supply his troops, he worried about the problems caused by the Viet Minh’s setbacks during the Central Plains offensives in 1951. For instance, when the Viet Minh troops launched one after another offensive in the Central Plains, they faced a serious shortage of grain in the northern base areas. Giap turned to the CMAG for help. In an urgent telegram to the CCP Central Committee, CMAG reported on May 15, 1951 that “[Viet Minh] troops are starving, even though we had transferred three regiments to the central areas and reduced office and logistics personnel daily grain [rations] down to 700 grams.” They asked Beijing to send between 1,500 and 2,000 tons of rice to Vietnam before the end of June. That summer the Chinese government supplied the Viet Minh with more than 1,800 tons of rice.106 To supply the Vietnamese, the PLA Department of General Logistics (DGL) set up an office at Nanning, a border city, to handle military aid, economic assistance, and supply transportations. The findings in French sources, however, suggest that by July 1953, China had increased that number to at

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least 10,000 tons per month.107 After the Korean Armistice was signed in July 1953, China shifted its attention and efforts to Vietnam.108 In late 1953, the French sent more than 10,000 troops into the Dien Bien Phu area in the northwest, threatening Viet Minh bases and connections with Laos. Mao urged the Viet Minh to take back Dien Bien Phu as soon as possible. He also instructed the PLA high command to establish four more artillery regiments and two more combat engineering regiments for the Viet Minh. Mao emphasized that the training officers and advisors for these special regiments must be selected from the returning Chinese troops of the Korean War. Training could be provided in Guangxi province in China.109 In November 1953, the Viet Minh high command and the CMAG planned a response to the French occupation of Dien Bien Phu. The Central Committee of Viet Minh approved the plan on December 6. From December 1953 to early March 1954, the Viet Minh concentrated the 304th, 308th, 312th, 316th Infantry Divisions, and the 351st Artillery Division, a total of more than 40,000 troops, and encircled 15,000 French troops at Dien Bien Phu. In the meantime, the PLA sent to Dien Bien Phu one Vietnamese rocket battalion and one 75mm recoilless gun battalion, which had been equipped and trained in China. To support the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, among other supplies China also shipped into Vietnam 2.4 million rounds of ammo, 60,000 artillery shells, 3,000 machine guns, 100 heavy artillery pieces, 200 trucks, 10,000 barrels of gasoline, and 1.7 million kilograms of grain. The CMAG also helped the Viet Minh prepare for field medical care and for campaign hospital readiness. Most of the 9,124 wounded Viet Minh soldiers received proper care during the offensive campaign.110 On March 13, 1954, the Viet Minh launched attacks to isolate French strong points at Dien Bien Phu. By late April French troops held only three points. On May 6, the Viet Minh launched its final attack. The newly arrived Chinese-​manufactured six-​rocket launchers, heavy artillery pieces, and anti-​ aircraft guns played an important role in the final assaults. The very next day, the French surrendered. After eight years of fighting, Ho and the Viet Minh had finally defeated 120,000 French troops in what was later called the First Indochinese War.111 During the battle of Dien Bien Phu, an international conference on Indochina began at Geneva in April 1954. Delegations from France, North Vietnam, China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and four other countries attended peace talk meetings.112 Since Ho did not attend the Geneva Conference, Zhou met him in Liuzhou, Guangxi province. At their meeting in China, the premier pressured Ho to accept a peace settlement in Indochina.

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Mao instructed Zhou to ask Wei Guoqing, head of CMAG, to “not operate any large-​scale military movement in July. Any decision on when you can have a big battle must depend totally upon the situation at the Geneva Conference.” Clearly, Mao wished to secure the southern borders of China. He tried to avoid international conflicts in Indochina because any external crisis at that time would be a distraction.113 Vietnamese leaders like Le Duan rallied against Mao’s idea and Zhou’s pressure, blaming China for a “lost South Vietnam” in 1954. Le Duan reviewed the Sino-​Vietnamese relations many years later and recalled: “When we had signed the Geneva Accords, it was precisely Zhou Enlai who divided our country into two [parts]. After our country had been divided into northern and southern zones in this way, he once again pressured us into not doing anything in regard to southern Vietnam. They forbade us from rising up [against the US-​backed RVN].”114 Later, Mao admitted his mistake by asking the Vietnamese to replace their military struggle with a political struggle. Mao told Pham Van Dong, who represented the DRV at the Geneva Conference in 1954 and visited Beijing in November 1968: “I did say that we had made a mistake when we went to the Geneva Conference in 1954. At that time, President Ho Chi Minh wasn’t totally satisfied. It was difficult for President Ho to give up the South, and now, when I  think twice, I  see that he was right.”115 In July of 1954, the Indochina Settlement was signed at Geneva by the Viet Minh, French, Chinese, and Soviets. The United States did not sign the Geneva agreements. According to the 1954 Geneva Accord on the restoration of peace in the Indochinese region, as a temporary arrangement the Viet Minh army would withdraw from southern Vietnam to the areas north of the 17th parallel, paving the way for a French departure and a mandatory national election.116 The election was to be held in July 1956 to produce a national government for the entire country. The Viet Minh’s withdrawal began in August. On October 10, 1954, after eight years of fighting in the jungle, the Viet Minh eventually returned to Hanoi, capital of the DRV. The CMAG HQs also moved into Hanoi along with a total of 237 Chinese advisors.117 According to Chinese government statistics, from 1950 to 1956 China had shipped 155,000 small arms, 58  million rounds of ammunition, 4,630 artillery pieces, 1.08  million artillery shells, 840,000 hand grenades, 1,200 vehicles, 1.4 million uniforms, 14,000 tons of food, and 26,000 tons of fuel to Vietnam.118 From August 25, 1950, to March 7, 1954, the Chinese government shipped goods, materials, medicine, and fuel worth $43.2 billion to Vietnam.119 In 1954, Chinese imports increased and included trucks, gasoline,

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generators, and 4 million meters of cotton materials.120 By the end of 1954, China had armed five Vietnamese infantry divisions, one artillery division, one anti-​aircraft artillery division, and one security regiment.121 After the Geneva Conference, China tried to adjust its military involvement in North Vietnam in order to reduce international tension. In 1954, for instance, General Wei Guoqing proposed a plan to continue training Viet Minh artillery troops in China. Mao turned down Wei’s proposal, forwarding Wei’s report to General Huang Kecheng, vice chairman of the CMC in April 1954, and adding: “Expecting a possible cease-​fire in Vietnam . . . training the new [Vietnamese] artillery force is no longer appropriate within the boundaries of our country. It may be better to transfer all the used training artillery batteries and other equipment into Vietnam’s boundaries at an early date. Please ask Wei Guoqing for another plan.”122 By April 1955, the Viet Minh army had developed into a regular army (the NVA, or the PAVN) with a total of 320,000 infantry troops. In mid-​March 1956, the last group of the CMAG left Hanoi and returned to China.123 When the Geneva Conference secured the Vietnamese Communists’ power in North Vietnam, Ho strengthened his efforts in social and political reform movements. In 1959, the DRV government passed its new constitution, stating that the DRV was a people’s state, an alliance between workers and peasants led by the VWP, and resulting from Ho’s reorganization of ICP. According to the constitution, a national congress would take place every five years, although in practice they were convened on an ad hoc basis to approve decisions already passed by the Central Committee and Politburo of the VWP. The Politburo (Bo Chinh Tri), the top decision-​making body, enabled senior party and military leaders to handle day-​to-​day issues between plenary sessions of the Central Committee. The ten members met approximately once a week.124 After the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) was founded in Saigon in 1955, the Communist leadership in Hanoi rejected the government in South Vietnam, calling for a national reunification by its Communist forces. In the South, RVN President Ngo Dinh Diem cooperated with the US government by suppressing a large number of suspected communists. In 1957–​1958, angry Southern rebels launched anti-​government revolts in rural areas. To grasp a leadership opportunity for the Southern mass movement, the Viet Minh organized the National Liberation Front (NLF) in December 1960 as an umbrella organization to mobilize the masses against the Diem government. Diem labeled the NLF the “Viet Cong,” meaning Vietnamese Communists. At that time the Southerners joined the northern Communist revolution

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against the RVN government and US involvement in South Vietnam. In February 1961, the People’s Liberation Armed Force (PLAF) was formed, under a united military command with Tran Luong as the head. He was soon replaced by several northern generals of the NVA, veterans of the war against France.125

Mao’s Cold War and the Sino-​Soviet Split, 1956–​1964 Chinese military involvements in Vietnam and Korea had promoted CCP to international status, projecting a powerful China as the vanguard of the communist countries against the West. After the Korean Armistice was signed in July 1953, China shifted its attention and efforts against “American imperialists” from Korea to Taiwan. When the Korean War was over, Beijing had hoped to see US withdrawal from the Taiwan Strait. But the Korean Armistice did not end the Taiwan problem, nor did it lead to the Seventh Fleet’s withdrawal. Instead, America’s increasing involvement dashed Beijing’s hopes for a possible end to the Chinese Civil War. Chinese leaders suspected that the United States was carrying out a policy of “unleashing Jiang.” Since the establishment of the PRC, the question of how to deal with the United States was not only a foreign policy issue for Beijing; rather, it had been an issue concerning the very essence of the Chinese revolution.126 From the moment the “new China” came into being, Beijing’s leaders regarded the United States as China’s primary enemy while, at the same time, consistently declaring that a fundamental aim of the Chinese revolution was to destroy the “old” world order dominated by American imperialists.127 Through endless propaganda campaigns and constant indoctrination efforts, Beijing portrayed the United States as the bastion of all reactionary forces in the world.128 For almost two decades, the United States had been thoroughly demonized in the Chinese imagination. As a result, in Mao’s efforts to legitimize his “continuous revolution,” the theme of “struggling against U.S.  imperialism” had occupied a central position. Chen explains the Mao revolution’s international aim as supposedly serving as a “constant source of domestic mobilization, helping to legitimatize the revolution at home and to maintain its momentum.”129 According to Mao’s Cold War theory, a clash between China and the United States would inevitably occur sooner or later. The Chinese military should thus have its own initiative, advantage, and alternatives prior to this inevitable conflict. In the 1950s, the United States intruded into, and threatened, China’s security in three areas: Korea, Vietnam, and the Taiwan Strait.

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Concerned with the geopolitics, regional economy, and transportation capacity of these three areas of conflict, the Chinese believed America’s intervention in Korea was the most critical threat to the new regime. Mao described American involvements in those three areas as similar to three knives around China’s body: America in Korea was like a knife over her head; Taiwan was one around her waist, and Vietnam was one on her feet.130 Thus, Korea was considered the most immediate threat. Therefore, Korea was chosen as the first place for China to fight against the United States.131 In the early 1960s, Mao warned CCP leaders of a US military encirclement against China. The party chairman believed that the United States was building military bases and establishing its influence in Asian countries along China’s eastern and southern borders in order to surround the PRC. This military encirclement, starting with South Korea from the north, to Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, Taiwan, and the island of Guam, would conclude with Vietnam in the south. Mao’s concerns seemed a reality to the Chinese when US President Lyndon Johnson escalated America’s war efforts in South Vietnam after President Kennedy’s assassination in 1963. Since the United States was trying to contain China, the Johnson administration launched a war in a small Southeast Asian country. To break a US encirclement of China and to keep America away from its communist neighbor, China increased its material support to North Vietnam and began considering the possibility of sending Chinese troops to the Vietnam War in 1965. To keep the NVA fighting hard on the front and to keep the United States off North Vietnam, the PLA was willing to send engineering troops, and to help the Vietnamese build stronger coastal defense works. In 1963–​1964, the PLA high command suggested repeatedly that the NVA strengthen its coastal and offshore defense work in the northeast. To help the NVA win battles, the PLA was willing to provide more military aid to Vietnam.132 After the 1954 Geneva Conference, China continued to provide weaponry, equipment, and military training to North Vietnam. By the end of 1960, Chinese foreign aid had totaled $6.7 billion. One-​third of China’s total foreign aid of $1.9 billion went to Vietnam, another $133.9 million to Cambodia, and $670,000 to Laos. From 1950 to 1960, each year’s foreign aid consisted of 1.2 percent of total governmental annual expenses.133 In Beijing in the summer of 1962, Mao agreed with Ho that China would provide grain and weapons to Viet Cong in South Vietnam through the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a mountainous transport route between North and South Vietnam that cut through Laos and Cambodia.134 After Ho left Beijing, the Central Committee decided to provide free weaponry and equipment to rearm 230 Vietnamese infantry battalions, over 180,000 men.

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In March 1963, Luo Ruiqing, chief of the PLA Department of General Staff (DGS), led the Chinese military delegation to Hanoi to discuss more details on how to assist the NLF in South Vietnam, and how the PLA could better cooperate with the Vietnamese.135 Between 1955 and 1963, Chinese military aid to North Vietnam totaled $320 million, while its economic aid totaled $1.1 billion from 1955 to 1958 alone. Russian economic aid was 531 million rubles (Russian currency, about $177  million at the time). China’s massive supply and support to North Vietnam in the early 1960s helped Ho intensify guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam.136 Ho supported the southern Communist guerrilla warfare against the Southern government and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) by providing logistical support, experienced officers, and a small number of NVA troops. Between 1959 and 1960, North Vietnam sent 4,500 NVA officers and troops to the South to advise the NLF’s guerrilla force against Diem’s RVN government. By 1961, northern advisors had increased to 6,200 men.137 In the summer of 1962, China began aiding the NLF in the South by providing weapons, ammunition, and supplies through the Ho Chi Minh Trail.138 China obviously had another concern in 1964. Any desperate situation of Hanoi would seem an invitation to Moscow to send Russian troops into Vietnam. As a rivalry in the Communist camp, China did not want an increase of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. What was new to Mao’s Cold War was the Sino-​Soviet split in the early 1960s, another important factor behind Beijing’s decision to send Chinese troops to Vietnam in 1965. In the 1950s the alliance between Beijing and Moscow had been the cornerstone of the Communist international alliance system.139 Yet, beginning in the late 1950s, the Sino-​Soviet alliance began to unravel because of complicated domestic and international factors, most importantly whether Beijing or Moscow should become the center of the international Communist movement. In the late 1950s the international Communist movement had experienced its most serious problem since World War II. The crisis began in 1956 when Hungary and Poland challenged Soviet rule. The Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, ordered Russian troops and tanks to suppress the revolts and to reinstall Communist control in Hungary. Thousands were killed or imprisoned, and hundreds of thousands fled the country. Many Communists throughout Eastern Europe began to lose their confidence in communism as an historical force “representing the future.”140 In East Asia, the Moscow-​ Beijing coalition collapsed in 1958–​1960. Since its beginning in the mid-​and late 1940s, the Cold War was characterized by a fundamental confrontation between two contending

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ideologies—​liberal capitalism versus communism.141 The great Sino-​Soviet split buried the shared consciousness found among Communists and Communist sympathizers all over the world, that communism was a viable solution to problems created by the worldwide process of modernization. In retrospect, few events during the Cold War played so important a role in shaping the orientation and essence of the Cold War as the Sino-​Soviet split when Moscow lost absolute control of the international Communist movement. Conflicts between the two Communist parties extended to their strategic issues. From July 31 to August 3, 1958, Khrushchev visited Beijing and proposed a Russo-​Chinese joint fleet, a permanent naval force including both the PLA and Soviet Navies, and a long-​wave radio system between the two countries. Mao declined the Soviet offer by denouncing it as an attempt to control the Chinese military. In March 1959, supporters of the Dalai Lama launched an armed rebellion in Tibet against the Chinese central government. His independence movement received official support from the Indian government, suddenly raising tensions between India and China. Ignoring information and suggestions from Beijing, Moscow issued an official statement on September 9, condemning the Chinese and defending India’s policy toward Tibet.142 On July 16, 1959, the Soviet government informed the Chinese that it would withdraw all of its nuclear scientists and experts. By August 13, 1960, all 12,000 Soviet experts left China, along with their blueprints and designs. Among them were more than 200 scientists who had been working on nuclear weapon research and development programs. The Soviets also blocked shipments of equipment and materials that the Chinese nuclear program desperately needed.143 Khrushchev’s fading leadership in the early 1960s, however, had little impact on the communist revolutions in the world. Instead, some of the Communist leaders became more radical and eagerly pushed their own agendas to an unprecedented level. The great Sino-​Soviet polemic debate in the early and mid-​1960s further undermined the ideological foundation of the Sino-​Soviet  alliance.144 The 1964 transition in the Soviet leadership from Khrushchev to Leonid Brezhnev did not improve Sino-​Soviet relations. The Soviet Union shifted its Vietnam policy from one of “staying away” until Khrushchev’s fall from power in 1964, and then changed to “lending a hand” after Leonid Brezhnev’s succession. From 1965, the Soviet Union continuously increased aid to Vietnam, in particular intensifying its military assistance. North Vietnam knew that the Soviet Union and China were rivals in the Communist camp and were competing for leadership in the Asian

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Communist movement, including Vietnam. Each claimed itself a key supporter of the Vietnamese Communists’ struggle against the American invasion. So the Vietnamese brought troops from both Communist rivals into North Vietnam, increasing competition between the Chinese and Soviet Communists. For China, the Cold War was not “cold,” but a “hot” war. China’s Cold War was primarily its military history. The PLA’s interventional experience reshaped China’s relations with the Soviet Union and the United States and provided a belligerent direction for the communist state. The historical narrative elucidates that China’s position in the Cold War was not peripheral but, in many key senses, central. After China sent more than 3 million troops to the Korean War in 1950–​1953, East Asia became a focal point of the global Cold War. In the meantime, China was also involved in the French-​Indochina War from 1951 to 1954. Then, in 1965, the Vietnam War also erupted along the Western Pacific rim, which along with the Korean War consisted of the only two “hot wars” that the United States fought during the Cold War. China’s Cold War experience—​as exemplified in China’s participation in the Korean War, First Indochina War, and two Taiwan Straits crises in the 1950s—​not only contributed significantly to shaping the specific course of the Cold War in Asia but also, and more importantly, helped create conditions for the Cold War to remain “cold.”145 The active military role that China played in the 1950s turned East and Southeast Asia into the main Cold War battlefield as an odd “buffer” between Washington and Moscow. With China, along with East and Southeast Asia standing in the middle, it was less likely that the United States and the Soviet Union would become involved in a direct military confrontation or even a nuclear showdown anywhere in the West.146

Notes 1. D. R.  SarDesai, Vietnam:  Past and Present, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO:  Westview, 2005),  11–​12. 2. Wynn Gadkar-​Wilcox, writing sections in “East Asia and the West,” by Xiaobing Li, Yi Sun, and Gadkar-​Wilcox (unpublished manuscript, 2016), ­chapter 2. 3. David C.  Kang, East Asia before the West:  Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), ­chapters 1–​2. 4. James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the McCartney Embassy of 1793 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), introduction. 5. Spencer Tucker, “Sino-​French War,” in China at War, 397.

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6. William J. Duiker, Sacred War; Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam (Boston: McGraw-​Hill, 1995), 39. 7. Peter Worthing argues, the Chinese “made a substantial contribution to the Vietnamese Revolution” because they provided “time and opportunity for the Viet Minh to consolidate and triumph over domestic rivals.” His finding differs from most Western accounts that Lu and his senior officers were warlords and tried to avoid being caught in the middle of a Franco-​Vietnamese conflict, and that the GMD troops were greedy, rapacious racists, who failed to maintain order and peace in post-​ war Vietnam. See Worthing, Occupation and Revolution: China and the Vietnamese August Revolution of 1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 173. 8. Xiaobing Li and Xiansheng Tian, introduction to Evolution of Power:  China’s Struggle, Survival, and Success, ed. Xiaobing Li and Xiansheng Tian (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2014), xxii. 9. Mao’s Telegram to Lin on October 31, 1949, “My Suggestions on Your Troops Disposition and Battle Array,” in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the State] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 1989), 1:  107 (hereafter cited as Mao’s Manuscripts since 1949). Lin was the commander of the PLA Fourth Field Army, totaling 1.2 million troops, in South China in late 1949. 10. For Mao’s “anger” over the “ill-​treatments” and his “half prisoner,” see Lüthi, The Sino-​Soviet Split, 31–​33; Chang and Halliday, Mao, 351–​53; Philip Short, Mao: A Life (New York: Henry Holt, 1999), 424. 11. Pei Jianzhang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1949–​1956 [Diplomatic History of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–​1956] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Press], 1994), 18. 12. Ambassador Luo Guibo, “An Exceptional Model of Proletarian Internationalism; Remember Mao Zedong and the Assistance of Vietnam and Resistance against France,” in Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa shilu: dangshiren de huiyi [The Records of the Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) in Assisting Vietnam and Resisting France: Veterans’ Accounts], ed. CMAG Compilation Team (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe [CCP Party History Press], 2002), 3–​4. 13. Mao’s concluding speech at the CCP Seventh National Congress on May 31, 1945, in CCP Central Archives, comp., Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, 1921–​1949 [Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee, 1921–​1949] (Beijing:  Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe [CCP Central Party Academy Press], 1989–​1992), 15: 98–​106. 14. Nguyen Vu Tung, “Interpreting Beijing and Hanoi:  A View of Sino-​Vietnamese Relations, 1965–​1970,” in “77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–​1977” (Working Paper, No. 22), ed. Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, Cold War International History Project (Washington, DC:  Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1998), 46.

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15. Liu’s telegram to Mao on December 24, 1949, “The Aid to Vietnam and Military Situation in Yunnan,” in Liu, Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao, 1949–​ 1957 [Liu Shaoqi’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the State, 1949–​1957] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 2013), 1: 226–​27 (hereafter cited as Liu’s Manuscripts since 1949). 16. Mao’s telegram to Liu on December 24, 1949, ibid., 1: 228 n11. 17. Mao’s Telegram to Liu on January 27 and 31, 1950, ibid., 2: 165, 186–​88. 18. Yang Kuisong, “Mao Zedong and the Indochina Wars,” in Behind the Bamboo Curtain; China, Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia, ed. Priscilla Roberts (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 57. 19. Guo Ming, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishi nian [Deterioration of the Sino-​Vietnam Relations in the Past Forty Years] (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe [Guangxi People’s Press], 1992), 16–​17. 20. CCP Central Committee’s telegram to ICP Central Committee on January 17, 1950 and Liu’s letter to Mao and other Chinese leaders about Vietnam issues on July 4, 1950, Liu’s Manuscripts since 1949, 1: 356–​57, 2: 266–​68. 21. Luo, “An Exceptional Model of Proletarian Internationalism,” 1–​2. 22. Huang Zheng, Hu zhimin yu zhongguo [Ho Chi Minh and China] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1987), 9. 23. Huang Zheng, Liu Shaoqi yisheng [Life of Liu Shaoqi] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 2003), 20–​21. 24. Jin Chongji, “A Great Strategist and Theorist with His Own Thoughts,” keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the conference on the Liu Shaoqi Studies, Chuzhou, Anhui province, October 29, 1996, in Liu Shaoqi yanjiu pingshu [On the Studies of Liu Shaoqi], ed. Chen Shaotao (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 1997): 3–​6. Jin is deputy director of the Archival and Manuscript Research Division of the CCP Central Committee. 25. For more details of their training in the Soviet Union, see Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army, 48–​49, 121, 158. 26. Ho’s book, China and the Chinese Youth, was first published in French in France in 1925. Then, he translated it into Russian and published it in the Soviet Union in 1926. 27. Wang Yizhi, “Recollections of Zhang Tailei,” in Jindaishi yanjiu [ Journal of the Modern History Studies] 2 (1983): 23–​27. 28. Huang, Hu Zhiming yu zhongguo [Ho Chi Minh and China], 9; Robert Strayer, The Communist Experiment; Revolution, Socialism, and Global Conflict in the Twentieth Century (Boston, MA: McGraw Hill, 2007), 118. 29. For more details about Ho’s training in the Soviet Union, see David Halberstam, Ho (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1987), 41–​4 4. 30. Ibid.,  45–​4 6. 31. Huang, Liu Shaoqi yisheng [Life of Liu Shaoqi], 20–​21. 32. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 5.

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33. Mai Ly Quang, ed., Chuyen ke:  cua nhung nguoi giup viec Bac Ho [Personal Recollections: Years Working and Living with Uncle Ho] (Hanoi: The Goi [World Publishing], 2004), 11, 111–​12. 34. Roger Hilsman, forward to People’s War, People’s Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries, by Vo Nguyen Giap (New  York:  Praeger, 1968),  ix–​xi. 35. George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–​ 1975, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1996), 6. 36. General Vo Nguyen Giap, People’s War, People’s Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Praeger, 1968), 8–​10. 37. Huang, Liu Shaoqi yisheng [Life of Liu Shaoqi], 288. 38. Zhang Guanghua, “The Secret Records of China’s Important Decisions to Assist Vietnam and Resist France,” in CMAG Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa shilu [The Records of the CMAG in Assisting Vietnam and Resisting France], 22. 39. Ibid.,  23–​24. 4 0. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 5. 41. Yang, “Mao Zedong and the Indochina Wars,” 58. 42. Zhang, “The Secret Records of China’s Important Decisions to Assist Vietnam and Resist France,” 25. 43. Xiaobing Li, “Truman and Taiwan:  A U.S. Policy Change from Face to Faith,” in Northeast Asia and the Legacy of Harry S.  Truman:  Japan, China, and the Two Koreas, ed. James I. Matray (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2012): 122–​23. 4 4. Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army, 123, 125. 45. The Soviet Union delivered weapons to China for sixteen infantry divisions in 1951 and for forty-​four divisions in 1952–​1954. Marshal Xu Xiangqian, “The Purchase of Arms from Moscow,” in Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, 53. 4 6. Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army, 127. 47. China had a long border with Vietnam, about 850 miles inland and 600 miles offshore in the Tonkin Gulf. The Chinese-​Vietnamese borders are still controversial between the two governments. The information in this work is based upon the Chinese official documents and literature. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian [Deterioration of the Sino-​Vietnam Relations in the Past 40 Years], 135–​36, 139–​4 0. 48. Mao’s conversations with Wang Jifan and Zhou Shizhao on October 27, 1950, from the recollections of Wang Yuqing, grandson of Wang Jifan, in Junshi lishi [Military History], vol. 88, 93; Guandong zhuojia [Authors from Northeast China] no.  9 (2003); Zhiqingzhe shuo [The Inside Stories] 2 (2005): 3–​4. 49. Moss, Vietnam, 40–​41; Tucker, Vietnam,  47–​48. 50. Ho rode on Mao’s train from Moscow to Beijing with other Chinese leaders including Zhou. See CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Research Division, Zhou

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Enlai nianpu, 1949–​1976 [A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai, 1949–​1976] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 1997), 1: 25–​26; Zhang, “The Secret Records of China’s Important Decisions to Assist Vietnam and Resist France,” 25–​26. 51. Zhang, “The Secret Records of China’s Important Decisions to Assist Vietnam and Resist France,” 26. 52. CMAG History Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Historical Facts of the Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1990), 1–​2. 53. Yang Kuisong, “Mao Zedong and the Indochina War,” in Zhongguo yu yindu zhina zhanzheng [China and the Indochina Wars], ed. Li Danhui (Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu [Heaven and Earth Books], 2000), 13; Wang Xiangen, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US] (Beijing:  Guoji wenhua chubanshe [International Culture Publishing], 1990), 42. 54. He Shaobang, Wei Guoqing shangjiang [General Wei Guoqing] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 2000), 2–​3; Colonel Dou Jinbo (PLA, ret.), “Journal of My Assignments in the CMAG in Vietnam,” in CMAG Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa shilu [The Records of the CMAG in Assisting Vietnam and Resisting France], 187. Dou was the Chinese advisor to the 95th Artillery Regiment of the Viet Minh in 1950–​1954. 55. Huang, Hu Zhiming yu zhongguo [Ho Chi Minh and China], 125–​26. 56. CCP Central Committee’s telegram to CCP South Central and Southwest Bureaus; Provincial Committees of Guangxi and Yunnan; and Luo Guibo on April 7, 1950, drafted by Liu, in Liu’s Manuscript since 1949, 2: 16–​17; Luo, “An Exceptional Model of Proletarian Internationalism,” 4. 57. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 1: 117. 58. Yu Huachen, “Comrade Wei Guoqing in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France,” in CMAG Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa shilu [The Records of the CMAG in Assisting Vietnam and Resisting France],  32–​33. 59. Xinghuo liaoyuan Composition Department, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun jiangshuai minglu [Marshals and Generals of the PLA] (Beijing:  Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1992), 1: 52–​53. 60. Mao told Wei later (on June 27) that the Central Committee first had a job for him to head the Chinese mission to the United Nations. The UN, however, refused to accept the PRC as its member. Then, the committee planned to establish an embassy in England with Wei as China’s first ambassador. The two governments, however, could not reach agreements on many things so the Chinese mission was downgraded to consulate level. Thus, Wei became the head of the CMAG to Vietnam. Mao’s quotes in Yu, “Comrade Wei Guoqing in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France,” 39.

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61. Wei Guoqing became one of the fifty-​seven generals of the PLA in 1955 (PLA officers did not have rankings before 1955). Then, General Wei became governor of Guangxi from 1955 to 1975, and director of the PLA General Political Department (GPD) from 1977 to 1982. 62. CCP Central Committee’s telegram to Luo and Ho on April 14, 1950, drafted by Liu, in Liu’s Manuscripts since 1949, 2: 43–​4 4. 63. Zhang, “The Secret Records of China’s Important Decisions to Assist Vietnam and Resist France,” 29. 6 4. Guo Zhigang, “A Foreign Military Assistance after the Founding of the New Republic,” in Military History Research Division, CAMS, Junqi piaopiao [PLA Flag Fluttering], 1: 146. 65. Mao’s words quoted in Yu, “Comrade Wei Guoqing in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France,” 38. 66. Zhu’s words quoted in CMAG History Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Historical Facts of the CMAG in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France], 5–​6. 67. Xinghuo liaoyuan Composition Department, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun jiangshuai minglu [Marshals and Generals of the PLA], 1: 188–​89. 68. Ibid., 3: 441–​42. 69. CMAG History Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Historical Facts of the CMAG in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France], 3–​4. 70. Chen Geng zhuan Compilation Team, Chen Geng zhuan [Biography of Chen Geng] (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe [Contemporary China Publishing House], 2007), 578–​86; Xinghuo liaoyuan Composition Department, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun jiangshuai minglu [Marshals and Generals of the PLA], 1: 26–​27. 71. CCP Central Committee, “Telegrams to Chen Geng on His Mission in Vietnam, June 18 and 30, 1950,” drafted by Liu, in Liu’s Manuscripts since 1949, 2: 256–​57. 72. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 523. 73. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 1: 118; Wang Yanquan, “The Dien Bien Phu Campaign and Strategic Issues in the Viet Minh’s War to Resist France,” in CMAG Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa shilu [The Records of the CMAG in Assisting Vietnam and Resisting France], 145–​4 6, 148. Wang served as Chinese advisor to the 308th Division of the Viet Minh in 1950–​ 1954 and chief of Chinese Military Missions in North Vietnam in 1955–​1957. He became a major general in 1961. 74. Yang, “Mao Zedong and the Indochina Wars,” 58. 75. Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army,  71–​76. 76. Grand General Chen Geng, Chen Geng riji [Diary of Chen Geng] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 2003), 293, 297–​98, 299, 301, 309–​11.

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77. Yu, “Comrade Wei Guoqing in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France,”  46–​48. 78. CMAG History Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Historical Facts of the CMAG in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France], 16–​18. 79. Chen Geng zhuan Compilation Team, Chen Geng zhuan [Biography of Chen Geng], 385–​86; Chen, Chen Geng riji [Diary of Chen Geng], 306. 80. Chen, Chen Geng riji [Diary of Chen Geng], 308. 81. CMAG History Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Historical Facts of the CMAG in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France], 20. 82. Duiker, Sacred War, 72. 83. Wang Yanquan, “Comrade Chen Geng and the Complete Story of the Border Campaign,” in CMAG Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa shilu [The Records of the CMAG in Assisting Vietnam and Resisting France], 123–​24; Chen Geng zhuan Compilation Team, Chen Geng zhuan [Biography of Chen Geng], 390. 84. Li, China’s Battle for Korea, 84, 105. 85. According to Zhai, Giap was “a major proponent of the shift to the third and final stage of Vietnamese people’s war (the first two stages included strategic defensive and stalemate).” Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 33. 86. Edgar O’Ballance, The Indo-​China War, 1945–​1954: A Study in Guerrilla Warfare (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), 141. 87. The CMC telegram to Wei on January 29, 1951, drafted by Mao, in Mao’s Manuscripts since 1949, 2: 90. 88. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 33. 89. Li, China’s Battle for Korea, 126, 130, 132. 90. CMAG History Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Historical Facts of the CMAG in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France], 33. 91. Ibid.,  34. 92. Ministry of Postal Services, “Minutes of Exchange Mails and Packages between China and Vietnam, October 29 to November 6, 1952,” File # 106-​00074-​01 (1), 2–​6 (15 pages, including 7 pages in Vietnamese), Archives Department, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing (hereafter cited as PRC Foreign Ministry Archives). 93. Zhang Guanghua, “CMAG and the Resisting French War in Vietnam,” in CMAG Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa shilu [The Records of the CMAG in Assisting Vietnam and Resisting France], 257–​58. 94. Tucker, Vietnam,  66–​67. 95. CMAG History Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Historical Facts of the CMAG in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France], 143.

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96. CCP Central Committee’s telegram to Luo Guibo and ICP Central Committee on Establishing Military Academies in Vietnam on April 21, 1950,” drafted by Liu, in Liu’s Manuscripts since 1949, 2: 73–​75. 97. Guo, “A Foreign Military Assistance after the Founding of the New Republic,” 1: 161. 98. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 520; Military History Research Division, China Academy of Military Science (CAMS), Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun de 70 nian, 1927–​1997 [Seventy Years of the PLA, 1927–​1997] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe [Military Science Press], 1997), 403. 99. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1:  576; Guo, “A Foreign Military Assistance after the Founding of the New Republic,” 1: 162. 100. Ministry of Foreign Trade, “1953 Zhongguo yu yuenan maoyi xieding” [Agreement of China’s Trade with Vietnam in 1953], File # 106-​00078-​02 (1), 3 (10 pages), PRC Foreign Ministry Archives. 101. Luo’s telegram in CMAG History Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Historical Facts of the CMAG in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France], 44. 102. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 1: 117. 103. CMAG History Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Historical Facts of the CMAG in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France], 14. 104. Ibid.,  44. 105. William J. Duiker, “Foreword: The History of the People’s Army,” in Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–​1975, Military History Institute of Vietnam, trans. Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), xi. 106. CCP Central Committee, “Telegrams to the CCP Provincial Committees of Guangxi and Yunnan, Luo Guipo, and ICP Central Committee, on June 17, 18, 22, and July 2, 1950,” drafted by Liu, in Liu’s Manuscripts since 1949, 2: 249–​53; CMAG [Vietnam], “Report to the Central Committee:  Request 1,500–​2,000 tons of Rice, May 15, 1951),” File # 106-​00073-​01 (1)  (2 pages), PRC Foreign Ministry Archives. 107. Duiker, Sacred War, 86. 108. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishi nian [Deterioration of the Sino-​Vietnam Relations in the Past Forty Years], 54, 59–​60, 65. 109. Mao’s letter to Peng Dehuai on March 3, 1954, in Mao’s Manuscripts since 1949, 4: 474–​75. 110. CMAG History Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Historical Facts of the CMAG in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France], 114.

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111. Herring, America’s Longest War,  32–​34. 112. For more details on the Chinese intention at the Geneva Conference in May–​July 1954, see “Zhou’s telegrams to Mao, Liu, and other leaders on June 10, 18, and July 20, 1954,” File # 206-​Y0050 (2) and 206-​Y0051 (3), PRC Foreign Ministry Archives. 113. For Mao’s quote and details on the Chinese policy at the Geneva Conference, see ibid. 114. “Document: Comrade B on the Plot of the Reactionary Chinese Clique against Vietnam,” in Roberts, Behind the Bamboo Curtain, 468. 115. Mao’s conversation with Pham Van Dong, Beijing, November 17, 1968, in Roberts, Behind the Bamboo Curtain, 504. 116. “Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, 1954,” in McMahon, Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, 124–​26. 117. CMAG History Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Historical Facts of the CMAG in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France], 141. 118. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1:  576; Guo, “A Foreign Military Assistance after the Founding of the New Republic,” 1: 162. 119. Ministry of Foreign Trade, “Agreement of China’s Trade with Vietnam in 1953,” File # 106-​00078-​02 (1), 3 (10 pages), PRC Foreign Ministry Archives. 120. Ibid. 121. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1:  520; History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun de 70 nian [Seventy Years of the PLA], 403. 122. Mao, “Instruction on the Military Arrangement in Vietnam,” in Mao’s Manuscripts since 1949, 4: 480. 123. CMAG History Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Historical Facts of the CMAG in the Struggle to Assist Vietnam and Resist France], 143. 124. Duiker, Sacred War, 106–​108, 120. 125. Moss, Vietnam, 106. 126. For example, Mao, “Where is the Nanjing Government Going?” and “Address to the Preparatory Meeting of the New Political Consultative Conference,” in Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected Works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing:  Renmin chubanshe [People’s Press], 1991), 4: 1447, 1465–​66. 127. For a more detailed discussion, see Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-​American Confrontation (New  York:  Columbia University Press, 1994), 63–​69; Niu Jun, “The Origins of the Sino-​Soviet Alliance,” in Westad, Brothers in Arms,  47–​89. 128. Mao, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the CCP Seventh Central Committee,” in Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected Works of Mao Zedong], 4: 1425–​26,  1428.

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129. Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War, 8. 130. Mao’s conversations with Wang Jifan and Zhou Shizhao on October 27, 1950, from the recollections of Wang Yuqing, grandson of Wang Jifan, in Guandong zhuojia [Authors from Northeast China] no. 9 (2003): 88–​93; Zhiqingzhe shuo [The Inside Stories] 2 (2005): 3–​4. 131. For more details about Mao’s decision to intervene in the Korean War, see Li, China’s Battle for Korea, ­chapter 1. 132. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 1: 271–​72. 133. The Bureau of Foreign Economy and Liaison, “Report on the Current Foreign Aid and Proposal for the Future Tasks,” September 1, 1961, PRC Foreign Ministry Archives. 134. Mao decided that China must support the “excellent armed struggles” in South Vietnam and Laos unconditionally during a Central Work Conference of the CCP Central Committee at Beidaihe in August 1962. See Yang, “Mao Zedong and the Indochina Wars,” 72–​73. 135. Han Nianlong, Dangdai zhongguo waijiao [Foreign Affairs of Contemporary China] (Beijing:  Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe [China’s Social Science Press], 1990), 159. 136. Zhai, China and the Vietnam War, 115–​16. 137. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 71. 138. William J.  Duiker, Vietnam; Revolution in Transition, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 69. 139. For the Sino-​Soviet  alliance, see Westad, Brothers in Arms; Michael M.  Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism; Chang, Friends and Enemies; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War. For the publications in Vietnamese, see Lam Giang, Chien Cong Cua Nhung Nguoi Ahn Hung [My Story of the War] (Ho Chi Minh City:  Nha Xuat Ban Tre, 2005); Nguyen Phuong Thao, Cho Mot Ngay Hoa Binh [For One Day Peace] (Ho Chi Minh City:  Nha Xuat Ban Tre, 2004); Nhieu Tac Gia [Composition Group], Cuoc Khang Chien Chong My [Fighting the American War] (Ho Chi Minh City: Nha Xuat Ban Tre, 2005); Major General Vo Bam, Viet Nam Di Tien Phong [Struggle for Vietnam] (Ho Chi Minh City: Nha Xuat Ban Tre, 2004). 140. Chen and Li, “China and the End of the Cold War,” 120. 141. Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War, ­chapter 1; Shuguang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture:  Chinese-​ American Confrontations, 1949-​ 1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), ­chapter 1; Richard Peters and Xiaobing Li, eds., Voices of the Korean War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2003), 22–​24; Yang Kuisong, “Origins of the U.S.-​Soviet Cold War and Its Impact on China’s Revolution,” in Lengzhan yu zhongguo [The Cold War and China], eds. Zhang Baijia and Niu Jun (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Press], 2002), 51–​88.

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142. Marshal Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu [Memoir of Nie Rongzhen] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1984), 2: 804; Yang, Zouxiang polie [Toward the Split], 454. 143. Nie, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu [Memoir of Nie Rongzhen], 806; Tang Xiuying, “A Sword Thrusting the Sky,” in Political Tasks Division, DGA, Liangdan yixing [Two Bombs and One Star], 366. 144. The first ideological conflict came in 1956 when new Soviet leader Khrushchev issued the “secret report” to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congress, denouncing Stalin as a dictator. Other conflicts between the two Communist giants emerged on issues of foreign policy. The Chinese openly criticized the Soviets of being anti-​Marxist-​Leninist revisionists in 1960. For a chronological development of the Sino-​Soviet split, see Song and Li, eds., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao dashiji, 1957–​1964 [Chronicle of the PRC’s Diplomacy, 1957–​ 1964], vol. 2; Yang, Zouxiang polie [Toward the Split], ­chapters 13–​14. 145. Among other publications on these events, Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War; Shuguang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism; China and the Korean War, 1950–​ 1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); Li, Millett, and Yu, trans. and eds., Mao’s Generals Remember Korea; Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars. 146. For more detailed discussions, see Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, introduction.

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2

B E I J I N G R E S P O N D S TO  R O L L I N G  T H U N D E R

At 8:30 PM on June 9, 1965, the first Chinese troops entered North Vietnam. As the vanguard of the First Division from the PLA Railway Engineering Corps, they wore NVA gray uniforms with no Chinese badges, insignia, or names; all PLA vehicle license plates were replaced with NVA license plates.1 By July, all of the First Division’s 30,000 troops had entered Vietnam.2 Beijing had decided to save the North Vietnam regime from US Rolling Thunder, an air-​bombing campaign against military bases, transportation systems, and industries in the DRV.3 Through late July, the USAF and USN had flown 6,861 sorties and dropped more than 10,000 tons of bombs, plus 3,940 rockets, 449 air-​to-​ground missiles, and other ordnance against North Vietnamese targets. By the end of the year, the sorties totaled 25,000, dropping 63,000 tons of bombs. The Rolling Thunder air campaign tried, in USAF Chief of Staff General Curtis E.  LeMay’s words, “to bomb them back into the stone age” by increasing the sorties to 79,000 in 1966 and 108,000 in 1967, and bombing tonnage to 136,000 in 1966 and 226,000 in 1967.4 American military leaders believed that bombing would ultimately compel the North Vietnamese to stop fighting.5 One of the American miscalculations of Rolling Thunder is that the gradually increased bombing would delay, if not prevent, any Chinese intervention. The strategic bombing failed to reach the objective. After Rolling Thunder started on March 2, 1965, Chinese leaders made a decision on April 8–​9 to secretly send tens of thousands of PLA troops as “volunteer forces” to Vietnam to secure transportation lines, provide air defense of the key points, build and repair major railways and roads, and construct air fields and coastal defense works. The Chinese Volunteer Forces to Assist Vietnam (CVFAV) were simply regular PLA troops that had been assigned to the Vietnam War. By using the term “volunteers” in the army’s name, Beijing hoped to avoid open war with the

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United States. In that spring, the PLA organized three CVFAV commands in Vietnam: air defense, combat engineering, and railway and road engineering. These Chinese commands cooperated with the NVA through the summer to jointly design battle objectives, make operational plans, and share military intelligence. In the fall of 1968, when the United States launched Operation Commando Hunt to interdict NVA transportation and communication along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, Beijing decided to send Chinese AAA and road engineering divisions to Laos in September to maintain the NVA supplies traveling to the South. While in Vietnam, however, the Chinese troops faced many unexpected problems due to a lack of preparation and training, supply shortages, sour relations with the NVA, and the politicization or “Maoization” of the Chinese military in the early 1960s.6 Domestic politics played a significant role in the PLA’s war preparation and combat performance. As the party’s army, the PLA became more radical as a political institution in the early 1960s when the CCP transformed its leadership from a Leninist mode to a charismatic style of leadership, or the cult of Mao Zedong. Between 1959 and 1971, adulation of the top leader developed, fueled by arbitrary decisions by key military commanders such as Marshal Lin Biao, China’s defense minister since 1959. By the end of 1965, more than 160,000 Chinese soldiers had entered Vietnam. The Chinese involvement successfully deterred any US invasion of North Vietnam because of US fears of provoking China.7 The PLA’s intervention in the Vietnam War secured the NVA rear areas, protected the vital Ho Chi Minh Trail, and guaranteed the delivery of international Communist aid to the front line in South Vietnam through the 1960s. Another American miscalculation of Rolling Thunder is that North Vietnam would slow down, if not totally stop, its support to NLF in the South because of heavy air bombing.8 In retrospect, Hanoi used Rolling Thunder to press Beijing and Moscow for more and direct support, which basically met the Northern demands to win the war in the South.

China’s Strategic Concerns Since 1960, North Vietnam had been supporting anti-​government rebellions in the South against the RVN (Republic of Vietnam). Hanoi organized the NLF in December 1960 as an umbrella organization to mobilize the masses against the Ngo Dinh Diem government. Diem labeled the NLF as the “Viet Cong” (Vietnamese Communists) since they joined the northern Communist revolution against the U.S.-​supported RVN government and

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U.S.  involvement in South Vietnam.9 In 1964, American officials warned North Vietnam of serious consequences for its continuing support of the insurgency in the South. Zhai argues that increasing US pressure in Indochina pushed Hanoi to turn to Beijing and Moscow for more aid and direct intervention.10 From June 21 to 24, 1964, General Van Tian Dung, Chief of Staff of the NVA, met Mao and Zhou Enlai in Beijing. Dung asked for more military aid and proposed a format for joint military operations between the NVA and PLA. Mao promised him that if the United States invaded North Vietnam, China would send ground troops to the DRV. The chairman assured the Vietnamese military delegation that “our two parties and two countries must cooperate and fight the enemy together. Your business is my business and my business is your business. In other words, our two parties must deal with the enemy together without conditions.”11 Premier Zhou also told Dung that if the United States expanded the war into North Vietnam, China would make a powerful response. Whatever China did would depend on the situation in Vietnam.12 The Chinese promise to defend the North against a US invasion made clear that the nature of China’s intervention in the Vietnam War would be to fight invading American forces in China’s neighboring country. After more discussions between Beijing and Hanoi in July 1964, three Communist delegations from China, Vietnam, and Laos met in Hanoi and held what was labeled a “most important meeting” before China’s intervention.13 The CCP delegation headed by Zhou included Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi, and Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff General Yang Chengwu.14 Ho Chi Minh led the Vietnamese Communist Party or Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP, formerly ICP) delegation with Le Duan, First Secretary General of the VWP, Pham Van Dong, Premier of the DRV, General Vo Nguyen Giap, Defense Minister and Vice Premier, and General Dung. At the meeting, the three Communist parties agreed on a military coalition against US aggression in Indochina. China’s policy was, as Zhou stated, that “if the United States makes a move, China will make a move; if the United States sends its troops, China will send its troops.”15 Zhou’s statement at the Hanoi meeting confirmed further Chinese military involvement when the United States sent its troops to Vietnam. In August, the PLA high command held four meetings for mobilization and preparation, for direct involvement in Vietnam. On August 2 and 4, 1964, the events in the Gulf of Tonkin, where North Vietnamese boats supposedly attacked American warships, gave President Lyndon B. Johnson a good opportunity to gain congressional support against

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North Vietnam. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was passed by both houses of Congress on August 7, and it authorized Johnson to escalate intervention in South Vietnam. At the same time it shifted America’s war efforts increasingly toward North Vietnam. On the same day, the Chinese government labeled the US congressional resolution as an aggressive move, pointing out that “this was the first step made by the United States in extending the war in Indochina.”16 The Johnson administration eventually escalated the war in early February 1965 by sending the first US combat troops to South Vietnam and launching Rolling Thunder, a massive bombing campaign against North Vietnam (see Map 2.1 Vietnam in 1954–​1957). Thereby, China had new concerns in 1964–​1965. First, Beijing did not want to see American success or North Vietnamese softness. The Chinese feared the escalation of US bombing might force the North Vietnamese government to give up its cities, even the capital, and move to the countryside and border areas. Mao told Le Duan in August 1964 that China needed to deploy 300,000 to 500,000 troops along its southern borders to face the worst case scenario of a US invasion of North Vietnam. The CCP chairman also told the VWP secretary general that China must construct one or two large airports within its bordering province, Yunnan, in order to handle massive evacuations.17 As Beijing did not want a North Vietnamese withdrawal or collapse, it would best serve China’s interests by backing up North Vietnam. Second, it would be effective in securing China’s objective to restrict the ground war to the South. The Chinese leader worried about a US landing in the North, followed by an invasion of China. A possible amphibious landing of US ground troops along the northern coast, similar to the Inchon Landing in Korea, would soon turn the Chinese offshore islands and coastal areas into a war zone. Beijing considered the Vietnam War as different from the Korean War. China had no intention of fighting another ground war with America in Vietnam, while facing a civil war against Taiwan in the southeast, and a perceived threat of Soviet invasion in the north. In 1964, the PLA high command repeatedly suggested that the NVA strengthen its coastal and offshore defenses in the northeast. To keep the NVA fighting hard on the front and deter a US landing in North Vietnam, China was willing to help with whatever the Vietnamese could not accomplish.18 Third, if Hanoi faltered, it would be an invitation to Moscow to send Russian troops to Vietnam. The Soviet Union shifted its Vietnam policy from one of “staying away” until the end of Nikita Khrushchev’s rule in 1964 toward “lending a hand” after Leonid Brezhnev’s rise to the position of general secretary of the Communist Party. Beginning in 1965, the Soviet Union

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MAP 2.1  Vietnam in 1954–​1975

continuously increased aid to Vietnam, particularly military assistance. In February 1965, Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin visited Hanoi and signed an agreement with the North Vietnamese to increase Russian aid to 148,500 tons of military goods, including 55,000 tons of ammunition, by year’s end. The agreement also requested a Soviet missile combat brigade, totaling 4,000

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Soviet troops, to arrive that spring.19 After 1965, the USSR continuously increased its aid to Vietnam, particularly intensifying its military assistance. The goal of Moscow’s active involvement was to control Vietnam in order to dominate the strategically important Southeast Asian region.20 In 1966 and 1967, Russia increased military aid to Vietnam in an amount more than 500 million rubles (about $550 million), exceeding the amount the Chinese supplied Vietnam.21 Unlike its experience in the Korean War, China now had to battle both superpowers in Vietnam: the United States militarily and the Soviet Union politically. After the Sino-​Soviet split had become public in 1960, China swiftly adjusted its position in international affairs and willingly moved to the center of the Cold War. Vietnam was an opportunity for China to achieve a leadership role in Asia’s Communist movement. Beijing’s increasing political ambition and rising international position demanded new commitment and innovative action. As a rival in the Communist camp, China did not want to see an increase of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. The 1964 transition in the Soviet leadership from Khrushchev to Brezhnev did not improve Sino-​Soviet relations. In 1965, Beijing felt increasing pressure from Moscow, which blamed China for the failure to deliver Russian aid to Vietnam. In February, Kosygin passed through China twice on his way to Vietnam. The Soviet Premier told Chinese Premier Zhou that the United States was bombing North Vietnam, and that the Soviet Union had decided to provide Vietnam free military aid, including artillery pieces, tanks, and surface-​to-​air missiles (SAM). Zhou stated that China would ship the weapons along Chinese railroads.22 Mao, meeting Kosygin on February 11, also promised that China would assist the Soviet Union in transporting Soviet military equipment to Vietnam in a timely manner. Later, on March 30, China and the Soviet Union signed an agreement governing the transit of special military supplies from the Soviet government to the DRV.23 According to that agreement, China would transport all Russian shipments across the country by rail, from the Sino-​Russian borders in the north to the Sino-​Vietnamese border in the south, over 3,500 miles. The Vietnamese would then ship Russian weapons and equipment from the border to the front. The first Russian shipment totaled 403 freight cars, which included the first group of SAM, automatic arms for two infantry battalions, equipment for two engineering battalions, and communication equipment for regiment and battalion commands. Two hundred eighty-​two Russian military experts and technicians also accompanied the first shipment.24

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Because the Soviet Union primarily provided advanced weaponry that China, at that time, was still unable to produce in quantity, the Soviet Union greatly elevated its standing in Vietnam, and the relationship between the two countries was much closer by 1965. Despite entering into an alliance with the Soviets, the North Vietnamese were reluctant to lose the substantial aid they received from China, which generally arrived more directly and promptly than its Soviet counterpart. The Vietnamese attempted to remain superficially neutral in the Sino-​Soviet rivalry, which often involved disputes over interpretations of Marxist ideology and the Communist leadership in Southeast Asia. However, having two Communist parties gave rise to a competition, leading the Soviet Union and China to bid for Vietnam’s favor. Both powers experienced constant friction, and sometimes tense clashes with one another. It was not long until the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party blamed China for the delay of the first shipment of Soviet military aid to Vietnam in April 1965.25 According to the Chinese report, China had transported all Russian shipments to Pingxiang, a border city in Guangxi province, between April 14 and May 20.26 General Li Tianyou, First Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff, supervised transactions between the Chinese and Vietnamese railroad officials. It was the Vietnamese who failed to ship the Russian missiles and weapons into Vietnam on time, since they had very little rail transport available. On July 14, the Chinese Party Center replied to Moscow denying Soviet accusations against China’s war efforts.27 Moscow used Beijing’s response to launch unbridled propaganda attacks against China, alleging it sought to block Soviet aid to Vietnam. And again, the Russians demanded to open an air route over Chinese territorial air space for shipping Soviet airplanes and supplies required by Soviet military personnel in Vietnam.28 Moscow first requested an air route over China and two air bases near Chinese-​Vietnamese borders for Soviet MiG-​21 interceptors on February 25.29 Moscow then asked for permission to fly forty-​five airplanes through China to deliver badly needed anti-​aircraft guns to Vietnam on February 28. In March, the Soviet Union again requested China to allow Soviet transport planes carrying military technology and essential military experts to fly over Chinese airspace.30 Beijing rejected all these Soviet requests, arguing that these actions went beyond the normal scope of military aid, and that large-​scale air shipments were incompatible with the principle of absolute secrecy advocated by the Soviet Union. Beijing insisted that rail shipments be made instead. The Soviet requests aroused numerous misgivings among Chinese leaders who felt that,

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in the current state of Sino-​Soviet relations, such requests constituted an invasion of China’s sovereignty and threatened Chinese national security.31 American intelligence seemed to not fully understand the nature and seriousness of the Sino-​Soviet rivalry. The intelligence chiefs had predicted a possible improvement in the relationship between the two Communist giants in the Vietnam War. A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) argued in September 1965 that with rapidly increasing demands for air defense in North Vietnam, “China will need Soviet support and protection. Greater Soviet involvement might reluctantly be desired to deter the U.S. This is an additional factor likely to promote a constructive resolution of previous Sino-​Soviet frictions over the speed, scope, and method of aiding Hanoi and bolstering South China bases.”32 It was evident that the Chinese and Soviet joint involvement in the air defenses of North Vietnam against the Rolling Thunder did not improve relations between the communist powers.

Mao’s Dilemma As the Vietnamese faced increasing difficulties in the war against American forces in early 1965, Chinese leaders were ready to help the NVA fight American forces both in North and South Vietnam and seemed willing to accept most of the Vietnamese requests for Chinese supplies and troops and to take immediate action in the Vietnam War. On April 10, 1965, Zhou summoned his top military leaders to discuss a drafted party document titled “Directive of the CCP Central Committee on War Preparation Tasks.” On April 12, the Politburo held a meeting and passed the Party’s document. At the meeting, Zhou placed all government agencies and the entire PLA military establishment on high alert, asking all offices to provide a duty officer around the clock. Also on the same day, the CCP Central Committee called for an all-​out effort by the Chinese party to assist the Vietnamese struggle against the United States.33 On April 20, the National People’s Congress (NPC) adopted a resolution supporting the North Vietnamese government, declaring that “China will continue to do everything in its power to give resolute and unreserved support to the Vietnamese people” in their struggle against America.34 Nevertheless, Mao faced a dilemma in 1965. While committed to North Vietnam’s survival, China did not intend to become involved in a major war against the United States, as it had in Korea. China’s clear objective in the Vietnam War was limited to facilitating railway transportation in North Vietnam to guarantee the delivery of Chinese as well as Russian military

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aid to the front lines. Mao did not intend to fight another ground war with America. At the April 12 enlarged Politburo meeting, Zhou cautiously discussed launching a nationwide movement to “Assist Vietnam and Resist America.” The phrase officially used for the Vietnam War was different from that used for the Korean War, “Resist America and Assist Korea,” which emphasized the resistance of America. The premier made it clear that China would help Vietnam fight America, but that it was a Vietnamese war, not Chinese.35 At April meetings with the Vietnamese party delegation, Chinese leaders declined the Vietnamese request, refusing to send PLA fighters, bombers, and pilots to Vietnam. Beijing’s dilemma led to a new effort for Beijing to communicate with Washington about its intentions and security concerns in Southeast Asia. Without formal diplomatic relations, the Chinese leadership made full use of its available channels to signal Washington. Beijing did not conceal its strategic concerns or involvement, and made its intentions known in three break-​throughts.36 The first channel was political propaganda and public rallies. Beijing launched an all-​out political campaign of “Supporting North Vietnam and Opposing US Aggression” throughout the country in the wake of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. During the second week of August 1964, the Chinese government organized 20 million people to have public parades, mass rallies, and public meetings. Beijing invited foreign journalists and diplomats to these mass events, while widely reporting, broadcasting, and televising them in order to send a strong signal to Washington. PRC President Liu Shaoqi (in office from 1959 to 1967) later spoke to the public, expressing China’s firm support to Ho Chi Minh. He declared that the Chinese people were prepared to undertake the greatest national sacrifice in supporting the Vietnamese people in their war of resistance against the United States. “The 700  million Chinese people provide a powerful backing for the Vietnamese people and China’s vast territory is the reliable rear area of the Vietnam. The friendship and unity between the two countries are the most reliable guarantee of defeating the US aggressors,” the statement concluded.37 The second channel consisted of public statements by the Chinese government during and after the Tonkin Gulf Incident. On August 6, 1964, the Chinese government issued a statement that US aggression in Vietnam was a step that had gone over the “brink of war.”38 That fall, the Sixth Session of the Standing Committee of the Third NPC adopted a resolution supporting the appeal of the Vietnamese National Assembly. It declared that China would continue to do everything in its power to give resolute and unreserved

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support to the Vietnamese people.39 On January 13, 1965, the Chinese government condemned an alleged US plot to involve South Korean troops in its “aggressive war” in South Vietnam. The statement pointed out that if the United States continued in its scheme to further internationalize its war in South Vietnam, “the Chinese people would have to give further consideration to the duties incumbent upon them for the defense of peace in this area.”40 Moreover, on February 13, the Chinese government issued another statement strongly condemning the United States for “spreading its war of aggression” for bombing raids against the DRV.41 On March 4, Beijing further condemned the United States for continued and “frenzied bombings” of North Vietnam.42 The third channel included mass media and diplomatic talks. On March 25, 1965, a “four-​point message” was delivered for the first time in an editorial of the official Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily). The main point was that, if necessary, China was ready “to send its personnel to fight together with the Vietnamese people to annihilate the American aggressors.”43 Four days later, on March 29, Premier Zhou made the same open announcement in Albania during an official visit. On April 2, when Zhou visited Pakistan, he asked President Mohammad Ayub Khan to pass a message to Johnson, that “China is prepared. If the United States forces a war on China, it doesn’t matter how many American soldiers were sent over, what kind weapons they have, including the nuclear weapons, it is for sure to say that they can come in, but can’t go back.”44 China would unhesitatingly respond to and support the NLF’s just stand of “calling, when necessary, on the troops of North Vietnam and of friendly countries to volunteer to come to South Vietnam to fight against U.S. aggression.” It maintained that upon receiving the call of the Vietnamese people, “China would promptly send volunteers to Vietnam to fight shoulder to shoulder with Vietnamese people and its armed forces until the US aggressors were driven out of Vietnam.”45 In May and June 1965, Beijing continued to spread its message to the world in general, and to the United States in particular, that China was prepared for active involvement in the Vietnam War and that China would send troops to Vietnam if the US government continued to escalate its war efforts, both in North and/​or South Vietnam.46 China signaled the United States through a variety of channels regarding the military situation in Vietnam and the grave danger involved in the escalation of the war.47 From the beginning Beijing balanced twin goals, “on the one hand, to demonstrate determination and preparedness to support their respective rival Vietnamese allies; and on the other, to make it clear that they hoped to avoid another direct Sino-​American

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military clash.”48 Their research reveals that US officials indeed caught the hardening of tone.49 In retrospect, the employment of armed force had explicitly demonstrated Beijing’s determination as well as triggering and encouraging possible restraint on Washington. The PLA’s intervention in June 1965 possibly deterred any US attempt to send American ground troops to North Vietnam, for fear of provoking China and converting a regional war into a Cold War showdown. The administration ordered renewed attention concerning Beijing’s likely response to alternative scenarios for increasing the American ground presence in Vietnam.50 In the meantime, Beijing made it clear to Hanoi that it was a Vietnamese, not a Chinese war. North Vietnam could win the war with China’s help. To keep the NVA fighting effectively on the front, the PLA was willing to provide more military aid and to send supporting forces to Vietnam. NVA leaders, however, had a different view. They believed that the Chinese would play a key role, thus guaranteeing victory. Although the United States had not yet employed its ground force in the North, they launched Rolling Thunder to stop NVA’s intervention in the South. It was thought the North Vietnamese must defeat Rolling Thunder first, and then win the Vietnam War.

Sending Troops to Secure Supply Lines By April of 1965, Rolling Thunder had virtually cut off North Vietnam’s railways. According to Chinese intelligence, the five main railroads in the north of the 17th parallel, totaling 660 miles, had been paralyzed by US air raids. Rail shipping totaled only 100 tons a day in April, much less than the minimum 3,000 tons a day needed by North Vietnam. USAF CHECO reported the results of the US air strikes between 1965 and 1967, showing 3,655 bridges totally destroyed and 1,700 more damaged, along with 9,064 buildings destroyed and 9,440 more damaged, and 3,502 vehicles totally destroyed and another 3,131 damaged.51 In early April 1965, it was the North Vietnamese who eventually pushed China into action. Ho Chi Minh sent a VWP delegation led by Le Duan and General Giap to Beijing during the first week of April, and Vietnamese leaders formally requested China to send troops to Vietnam. On Ho’s behalf, the Vietnamese delegation explicitly asked China to send anti-​aircraft artillery and combat engineers to Vietnam, rather than the ground troops. The Vietnamese made it clear that they were not interested in ground forces like those who were sent by the United States to South Vietnam.52

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At the meeting with Liu Shaoqi on April 8, Duan told the Chinese president that the commitment of Chinese forces would serve four common objectives for Hanoi and Beijing. The first objective was that the presence of Chinese forces in Vietnam would restrain American bombing to areas south of either the 20th or 19th parallel, as the United States did not want to provoke China. The second objective was to provide an effective air defense around the capital city of Hanoi and areas north. The third objective was to defend North Vietnam’s main railroads and highways to keep supply lines open. The Chinese effort in achieving these objectives should raise the Vietnamese morale.53 Liu replied to the Vietnamese leaders that “it is the obligation of the Chinese people and party” to support the Vietnamese struggle against the United States. “Our principle is,” Liu continued, “that we will do our best to provide you with whatever you need and whatever we have.”54 That evening, Liu reported the meeting to Mao, who agreed with most of the Vietnamese objectives and requests.55 China agreed to send AAA troops to North Vietnam since Beijing’s objective was to back up the North in order to confine the ground war to the South. To supply the NVA and NLF, it was important for China to protect rail lines between China and Vietnam. They also needed to protect Chinese railway engineers that were constructing new lines and rebuilding damaged rails. The Chinese AAA troops, it was thought, should be able to provide an air defense against American bombing along the transportation and communication lines in North Vietnam. Worried about railway problems, Mao called Zhou on April 9, asking him to deal immediately with Vietnamese transportation issues.56 Zhou chaired a series of meetings concerning how to resume rail transportation in North Vietnam. The participants concluded that North Vietnam could not make its railways function again without China’s help. Chinese railway engineering troops would therefore be sent to Vietnam to construct new railroads, repair or rebuild the damaged rails, and protect the delivery of China’s military aid to Vietnam.57 To obtain its own first-​hand information on the railroad situation, the PLA high command sent a survey team to North Vietnam. On April 12, the PLA delegation, headed by Lieutenant General Wei Jie, Deputy Commander of the PLA Railway Engineering Corps, arrived in Hanoi.58 Premier Pham Van Dong and other Vietnamese leaders met the delegation. The following day, the chief of the Vietnamese Railway Bureau and commander of the NVA North Region explained their immediate needs and enormous difficulties in rail transportation due to US air raids. On the 16th, the Chinese survey team divided into several groups and traveled across the north for its own

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assessment, with the help of the DRV Transportation Ministry and the NVA North Region Command.59 In their final report, submitted three weeks later, the survey team suggested building three new east-​west railway lines linking the two major north-​south railroads, moving the train stations out of the cities where they were vulnerable to US air strikes, and replacing all Vietnamese rails (old narrow rails built by the French in 1905–​1906) with new standard rails. Without these urgent improvements, the report warned, the existing Vietnamese railroads would not be able to deliver Chinese and Soviet military aid to the front lines.60 Helping North Vietnam construct and reconstruct the railroads was a necessity for China to deliver military aid. In late April 1965, China signed several agreements with North Vietnam concerning the dispatch of railroad engineers to North Vietnam. On April 27, the Chinese government signed the first agreement regarding the dispatch of Chinese engineering troops to Vietnam to construct and repair railroads north of Hanoi. China would supply transportation equipment and all construction materials. More agreements followed, including a hundred construction projects for new railways, train stations, and distribution centers as well as reconstruction. In sum, the Chinese would maintain 332 miles of 660 miles, one half of all the railways in North Vietnam.61 In the late spring of 1965, Ho Chi Minh suffered persistent insomnia amidst the nerve-​racking war conditions. He accepted Beijing’s invitation for medical treatment in China, including Taiji and traditional herbs for his insomnia. On May 16, Mao visited Ho in Changsha, Hunan province, Mao’s hometown. During the meeting, Ho asked Mao about China’s plan to send Chinese anti-​aircraft artillery and railroad engineering troops to Vietnam. Ho said that the DRV government had decided to send more troops to the front (in the South), and that the transportation, logistics, and security in the North would face a manpower shortage. The Vietnamese leader asked if China could take care of these tasks in the North, so that he could dispatch more regulars to the front. Mao told Ho that the decision had been made and added that the Chinese obey Chairman Ho’s orders, and that China will take care of these issues with no problem. The Chinese leader continued: “You are on the front; we should submit ourselves to you.” Mao continued: “We all follow America; what kind of war it wants to fight, we will go with it.” Ho seemed to appreciate those words, saying: “It is really easy to reach any agreement between us.”62 Ho then attempted to persuade Mao to include highway construction and repairs in China’s mission in North Vietnam. During the conversation, Ho took a hand-​drawn map from his pocket and outlined the urgent need

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of constructing twelve highways in North Vietnam.63 Mao accepted Ho’s requests. After his return, Ho sent a DRV government delegation to Beijing to finalize the road construction and repair projects by Chinese troops. On May 30, 1965, the Chinese government signed an agreement with North Vietnam setting forth details for assistance in road construction and repairs. According to the agreement, the PLA would send its engineering troops to North Vietnam to construct twelve new highways (later adjusted to seven highways), totaling 960 miles (later downgraded to 725 miles). The PLA would also send additional AAA troops to both provide air defense along these highways and protect engineering troops. As for railway construction, the PLA would provide all construction materials, equipment, supplies, and other needs for these projects.64 Thereafter, the Chinese high command added North Vietnam’s road construction and repairs to its own operational plan.65 In the summer of 1965, the Rolling Thunder campaign intensified against North Vietnam’s transportation targets. In June, General Dung again met with Grand General Luo Ruiqing to discuss operations of the Chinese AAA troops in North Vietnam. Dung specifically requested that China send two anti-​aircraft artillery divisions to defend Hanoi and areas north of Hanoi in the event the American air force struck there. Luo agreed.66 On July 24, the Vietnamese General Staff telegraphed the PLA General Staff, formally requesting that China send “the two anti-​aircraft artillery divisions that have long completed their preparations for operations in Vietnam. The earlier the PLA sent its AAA troops, the better for the NVA. If possible, they may enter Vietnam on August 1.”67 The next day, the Chinese cabled Hanoi, stating that China would immediately send two AAA divisions and one regiment to Vietnam. These units would take responsibility for defending the Bac Ninh-​ Lang Son section of the Hanoi-​Youyiguan [Friendship Pass] Railway and the Yen Bay-​Lao Cai section of the Hanoi-​Lao Cai Railway, two main railways linking China and North Vietnam.68

“Volunteer Forces” and the Chain of Command To serve these objectives in the Vietnam War, the Party Center, the government, and the PLA established a centralized high command for China’s “War to Assist Vietnam and Resist America” in the spring of 1965.69 First of all, the Party Center organized a seven-​member lead committee, including Li Xiannian, a Politburo member and vice premier; Bo Yipo, a Politburo member and Vice Premier; and Generals Luo, Yang, and Li. Headed by Luo, this decision-​making body, called the Transportation Leading Group to Assist

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Beijing Responds to Rolling Thunder  •  77

Vietnam, oversaw party leadership for the Chinese transport efforts in the Vietnam War.70 Its authority made China’s involvement in Vietnam a top national priority. It set up a centralized tripod of power—​party, government, and military—​tied together under the CCP leadership. The Party Center was driven not only by its national security concerns, but also ideologically against future Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the government created the “State Council’s Task Team in Charge of Supporting Vietnam” to coordinate three central government commissions, six State Council ministries, four PLA general departments, and four services to mobilize the Chinese armed forces, labor, and materials to supply its troops in Vietnam. Headed by General Yang with General Li as his deputy, the administrative team consisted of directors from the three central government commissions:  the Commissions of Economic Affairs, State Economic Planning, and Foreign Economic Affairs. The six ministries were represented by ministers and vice ministers from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Railway, Transportation, Postal Service, Material Supply, and Foreign Trade. The four PLA general department heads came from PLA DGS, Department of General Political Tasks (DGPT), Department of General Logistics (DGL), and other general departments. The four PLA chiefs included the commanders of the Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF), Combat Engineering Corps (PLACEC), and Railroad Engineering Corps (PLAREC).71 This bureaucratic administration established a civilian-​military coalition under the party and enabled China to concentrate its national resources for a prolonged war effort in Southeast Asia. Then, the CMC met several times to discuss the PLA’s operations to assist Vietnam and to resist America. Mao called Zhou and asked him to act immediately to contain the Soviet influence.72 At the CMC meeting on April 17, 1965, Zhou instructed the PLA to establish the CVFAV. After the meeting, the CMC issued orders to the PLA General HQs and departments to organize the “Chinese Volunteer Force” (see Chart 2.1 The CVFAV formation and chain of command in Vietnam, 1965–​1973). The PLA would establish three volunteer forces for the Vietnam War.73 While in Vietnam, the CVFAV division would be referred to as the “columns” to conceal the Chinese formation and battle orders. The regiment was called a “brigade,” a battalion was a “squadron,” and a company was referred to as a “team.”74 On April 18, the DGS made a plan to establish three front commanding headquarters in Vietnam under the Chinese Volunteer Forces, including combat engineering, rail and road engineering, and anti-​aircraft artillery commands.75 On the same day, the NVA sent the PLA General Staff an

78

CCP Politburo Central Military Commission Mao Zedong State Council Task Team

Seven-Member Committee

Zhou Enlai

CCP Central Committee Liu Shaoqi PLA Chiefs Luo Ruiqing Yang Chengwu

PLAAF

PLA -REC

PLA -CEC

PLAN

DGL

Chinese Volunteer Force to Aid Vietnam (CVFAV) Special Air Defense

Logistics Front

Command

Combat Engineering Command

East Zone

Railroad Engineering Command

Central Zone

Command (REC)

16th Regiment

Seven AAA Divisions

Command

Road Engineering

17th Regiment

Fourth CVFA V

Naval Operation

18th Regiment

Division

Command

Comm: Liu Tongshan

19th Regiment

South China

Pol Com: He Jing

Four AAA

First CVFAV

Divisions

Sea Fleet

20th Regiment

Division

Transport

25th Regiment

West Zone

Comm: Long Guilin

Five AAA

Pol Com: Guo Yenlin

Division 27th Regiment

Divisions

2nd Regiment

SAM

6th Regiment

Fleet

Fifth CVFAV

26th Regiment

Mine-Sweeping

Comm: Xu Chenggong

28th R egiment

Fleet

Pol Com: Peng Zongtao Hainan Naval

29th Regiment

Missile

Base Command

7th Regiment

Training Camp

30th Regiment

9th Regiment

31st Regiment

10th Regiment

Sixth CVFAV

Guangzhou

Division

Front Command

32nd Regiment 58th Regiment 33rd Regiment

Comm: Sun Liquan

34th Regiment

Pol Com: Luo Bin

61st Regiment 63rd Regiment

Kunming

Sihanouk

Front Command

Harbor Office

35th Regiment Second CVFAV

Seventh CVFAV

Communication

Twenty -three

Centers

Warehouses

Division

Third CVFAV

Division

Comm: Zeng Xuqing

Division

Comm: Zhao Dongpo

Eleven Field

Fourteen

Pol Com: Li Lianghan

Airbase Construction

Pol Com: Xu Kelin

Hospitals

Depots

Seven

Eight Truck

Transit Centers

Regiments

8th Regiment

14th Regiment

11th Regiment

12th Regiment

13th Regiment

21st Regiment

CHART 2.1  The CVFAV formation and chain of command in Vietnam, 1965–​1973

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urgent telegram requesting an immediate dispatch of the Chinese combat engineering troops to Vietnam. The Chinese high command cabled the NVA revealing the new Chinese establishment and plan for the Vietnam War. The Chinese further informed the Vietnamese that they would provide all weapons, ammunition, supplies, equipment, and construction materials needed by the volunteer troops for their operations in Vietnam.76 To establish PLA-​NVA cooperation, Generals Giap and Dung visited the PLA high command in Beijing on April 21–​22. Grand General Luo and General Yang met Giap and Dung to discuss more details about the PLA-​NVA cooperation. Both sides agreed that the PLA established its chain of command for the Chinese forces in Vietnam, and that after they entered Vietnam, the Chinese forces would be under a dual command of both the PLA and NVA General HQ.77 The General Staff reported the NVA-​PLA meetings and joint operation plan to Mao and Zhou on April 23. Headed by Chief Luo Ruiqing, the DGS served as the headquarters for the Chinese forces in Vietnam and contained directorates for the other armed services. Grand General Luo was in charge of the PLA operation in Vietnam in 1965–​1966. From April 1965, he briefed Mao, Zhou, Zhu, and other top military leaders in Beijing about the war situation on regular basis. His DGS often drafted PLA operational plans based upon the NVA requests and battlefield situations. After Mao and Zhou’s approval, the DGS implemented these as CMC orders through the PLA hierarchy. The DGS translated the military assistance to Vietnam into specific responsibilities for all the departments and services, including the DGPT, DGL, PLAN, PLAAF, PLACEC, and PLAREC. Through 1965, Luo and the DGS oversaw policy implementation on behalf of the CMC, and directly commanded Chinese military operations in the Vietnam War. The General Staff also performed important functions such as establishing the front command, military intelligence, training, combat assessment, and operational coordination with the NVA high command.78 The DGPT was responsible for the Chinese troops’ ideological indoctrination, political and loyalty education, party membership development, morale, discipline, and military justice. The director of the general department oversaw a system of Chinese political commissars assigned to each unit in the Vietnam War. The Chinese army had a dual system with a chain of command and also a chain of political control. Each regiment, division, and army had a political commissar, who was the secretary of the party committee and shared responsibility with the commanding officers. Each regiment, division, and army also had a political department to implement political tasks

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and education. In addition, each battalion had a political instructor, who was part of the battalion command. As the secretary of the party branch in the company, the company political instructor shared the decision-​making responsibility with the company commander. The political instructor and commissar system were major instruments of party control and political penetration in the PLA.79 Once in Vietnam, each divisional political commissar issued orders to his regimental and battalion commissars and assigned them with political tasks, including propaganda, education, party membership, motivational meetings, and self-​confession activities.80 One of the political commissar’s primary tasks was the supervision of the party organization through party committees at the battalion level and above and through party branches at the company level. In the 1960s, under the guidance of China’s defense minister Lin Biao, the DGPT’s role was strengthened, and it exerted a considerable amount of political influence throughout the armed forces.81 The DGPT set up the political agenda for the PLA and also some specific rules and disciplines for the Chinese troops in Vietnam. All the officers and men had to go through a political screening before they could go to the foreign war.82 To coordinate with the Chinese forces, the NVA HQ would provide intelligence, deployment locations, and local connections to the Chinese divisions. The Vietnamese would also share their information and assessment with the Chinese “columns” (division) command. Each column command would create its own battle plans accordingly, execute operation, and command its own regiments.83 The Chinese troops’ deployment was based upon the NVA requests and DGS operational plans. Both agreed to deploy the Chinese troops in areas north of the 20th parallel, or north of Hanoi.84 China’s increased aid and troop intervention did not go unnoticed by the Americans. Since Rolling Thunder began, American intelligence had been closely watching Beijing’s moves. One of the SNIE predicted in June 1965 that “China would feel a strong need to do something more to help the North Vietnamese.”85 Another SNIE reported on July 23 that the Chinese “are already stepping up their military assistance, including the introduction of some rear service elements into North Vietnam.”86

Division Command and the Battle Orders After Mao and Zhou approved its joint operation plan on April 23, 1965, the General Staff began to organize twenty-​three Chinese divisions under four front commands, air defense, combat engineering, road construction,

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and railway engineering commands, for the Vietnam War in late April and May.87 Among these PLA forces were seventeen AAA divisions transferred from the PLA Air Force, and six railway and road construction divisions from the PLA Railway Engineering Corps (PLAREC) and Combat Engineering Corps (PLACEC) Commands.88 Anti-​Aircraft Artillery Divisions Among the four CVFAV commands, the AAA divisions engaged with American airplanes more often than any other services in the Vietnam War. Since 1957, all the AAA troops had been under the command of the Air Force. In 1965, twelve AAA divisions and twenty-​five radar regiments were stationed at air force bases, airports, and around major cities. At its July meetings, the CMC instructed the Air Force to establish more AAA divisions for the expected increasing combat requirement against Rolling Thunder in Vietnam. Following CMC orders, the Air Force put together a “Special Task Force Command” (STFC) to mobilize and organize more AAA divisions. In August 1966, the PLAAF put more pressure on the STFC to speed up its efforts. From 1966 to 1969, the STFC established nine AAA divisions.89 At the CMC July meetings, the PLA high command decided to send the AAA divisions to Vietnam. Their objectives were to provide air defense for North Vietnam’s transportation, communication, and key strategic points north of Hanoi. The Chinese air defense was to also protect the Chinese engineering and logistics troops operating in North Vietnam, including construction sites, warehouses, and other facilities they had built. At the meetings, all CMC standing members agreed to select premier troops for China’s AAA engagement against American airplanes in Vietnam.90 The CMC divided Chinese air defense into east and west zones in North Vietnam. The eastern zone covered the critical Hanoi-​Youyiguan [Friendship Pass] railway lines, Kep-​Thai Nguyen lines, the Thai Nguyen steel complex, and the Chinese engineering troops, construction sites, and other facilities in the northeastern areas. The Guangzhou Regional Command would provide the AAA divisions with transportation, logistics, and intelligence along the northeastern Vietnamese border. The Guangzhou Command also used the city of Ningming, Guangxi province, about thirty miles from the Chinese-​ Vietnamese border, as the location for AAA troops’ assembly, training, and orientation. The eastern AAA troops would then enter Vietnam from the Youyiguan.91

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In the western zone, AAA troops were to defend the Hanoi-​La Cai railway lines and road construction troops in the northwest.92 The Kunming Regional Command would provide all their needs and supplies along the northwestern Vietnamese border. The Kunming Command chose the city of Wenshan for the northwestern AAA troops’ assembly and training. The northwestern AAA troops would enter Vietnam from Malipo and travel Highway 7 into Vietnam.93 On August 1, the Sixty-​First AAA Division entered North Vietnam from Yunnan in order to defend the Hanoi-​La Cai railway lines in the northwest.94 On August 6, the Sixty-​Third Division entered Vietnam from Guangxi to protect the critical Hanoi-​Youyiguan railway lines and Chinese engineering troops in the northeast.95 To strengthen its air defense, the PLA sent three more AAA divisions to Vietnam during the remainder of 1965. Following their Korean War experience, the Chinese high command began, in December 1965, to rotate their AAA divisions for rest and recuperation. In February 1966, the Chinese artillery divisions began their rotations with each division operating six to eight months in Vietnam. The AAA divisions which engaged in the Vietnam War totaled seventeen divisions, including the Sixth, Nineteenth, Thirty-​First, Thirty-​Second, Thirty-​Third, Thirty-​Fourth, Thirty-​Fifth, Thirty-​Seventh, Sixty-​First, Sixty-​Second, Sixty-​ Third, Sixty-​Fourth, Sixty-​Fifth, Sixty-​Sixth, Sixty-​Seventh, Sixty-​Eighth, and Seventieth Divisions. The Chinese were using Vietnam as a training ground. Among these divisions were eleven engaged in the northeastern region, and six engaged in the northwestern regions96 The Railroad Engineering Division The First Division of the CVFAV was a railroad engineering division, including eight railway engineering regiments, one railway prospecting regiment, and a dozen anti-​aircraft artillery battalions (not the same troops in previous section), totaling 30,000 troops. In early May, the PLAREC Command selected the best troops from the corps, and established the expanded division for Vietnam by reorganizing their railway engineering regiments, appointing new commanding officers, and transporting the rail construction troops to the border areas.97 Established in March 1954, the corps had eleven railway engineering divisions, totaling 400,000 troops in the mid-​1960s with General Li Shouhan as the corps commander and General Lu Zhengcao the political commissar (later the minister of China’s Railway Ministry). By 1973 when PLA operations in Vietnam ended, the Railway Engineering Corps had

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fourteen railway engineering divisions, about 6.6  percent of the Chinese armed forces.98 On June 10, 1965, the PLAREC appointed Senior Colonel Long Guilin as commander of the First Division to Vietnam, Guo Yenlin the political commissar, and Li Qingde the deputy commissar. The First Division’s main tasks were to construct and improve railways, train stations, bridges, and tunnels; to build warehouses, telephone lines, and train repair shops; to protect them from US bombing, and to repair any damage in order to guarantee railway transportation and communication.99 By early June the division had completed its reorganization and formation, and by July the First Division had entered Vietnam.100 Combat Engineering Divisions The Second and Third Divisions of the CVFAV were the PLA combat engineering divisions. The PLACEC were established in March 1951 with General Chen Shiqu as its commander. In the early 1960s, the corps had five combat engineering divisions, plus four independent regiments. By 1965, the PLACEC had increased its force to 21 divisions totaling 490,000 men, and constituting 5.5 percent of the Chinese armed forces.101 On April 24, 1965, Generals Li Tianyou, Deputy Chief of the DGS, and Liang Biye, Deputy Chief of the DGPT, chaired a joint chiefs meeting in Beijing, including chiefs from the combat engineering corps, navy, and artillery force. Li passed on important instructions from Mao, Liu, and Zhou. He pointed out that the coastal defenses of North Vietnam were weak and vulnerable to a US landing. In order to help the Vietnamese strengthen their coastal and offshore defenses in the Tonkin Gulf, after urgent requests by the Vietnamese, the PLA would immediately send its combat engineering troops and transport units to North Vietnam.102 The PLA also had to provide construction materials such as cement, steel girders, reinforcing bars, and others that were not available on these islands. In late April 1965, the PLACEC held several meetings to organize its role in the CPVEF. In May, the corps command selected three of the best engineering regiments from Beijing, Shenyang, and Ji’nan Regional Commands in order to form the Second Combat Engineering Division with Zeng Xuqing as its commander, Li Lianghan as the political commissar, and Wang Hui as the chief of staff.103 On May 1, Wang, leading an engineering survey team of fifteen officers, arrived in Hanoi.104 The vice defense minister of the DRV along with other Vietnamese commanders met the delegation. The

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following day the officers of the Vietnamese artillery, combat engineering, and North Region commands briefed the Second Division officers regarding their immediate needs and enormous difficulties in constructing any major defense works while under constant US air raids. From May 2 to May 9, the Chinese team, along with DRV officials, traveled across to the northeastern coast to conduct their own survey, with plans to build up the defenses in North Vietnam.105 The Second Division consisted of two combat engineering brigades, one maritime transportation brigade, a communication engineering brigade, and four combat engineering regiments, totaling 12,000 troops. The division would work on permanent defense works on eleven offshore islands and coastal areas around Hai Phong. To strengthen its self-​sufficiency and self-​defense, the PLACEC added one truck regiment and several anti-​aircraft artillery and coastal battery battalions to the division. To provide offshore transportation, the PLA Navy organized a transport fleet including more than twenty vessels for the Second Division. In mid-​May, the PLACEC Command issued orders that all selected brigades, regiments, and battalions must report to the Chinese-​Vietnamese borders within fifteen days. In early June, the first wave of the Second Division entered Vietnam.106 Although the Third Division was also a combat engineering division, its 15,000 troops mainly comprised PLA Air Force engineering troops for the proposed construction of two large air bases.107 In November 1965, the Third Division entered Vietnam; its mission was to build the Soc Son and Yen Bai air force bases, including runways, underground shelters, anti-​aircraft artillery positions, training grounds, and other military facilities. In that same year, North Vietnam had asked China to build another air force base at Yen Bai, a strategic point, about 65 miles northwest of Hanoi. Highway Engineering Divisions The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Divisions, totaling 80,000 troops, were highway engineering troops, the largest Chinese force among all the services in Vietnam at any given time. The PLA highway construction force was established under direct instructions of Mao and Zhou to keep the promise made to Ho Chi Minh regarding road construction.108 On May 25, Zhou summoned the PLA transportation delegates headed by Grand General Luo. Zhou explained the serious highway transportation problems facing Vietnam and Ho’s pocket road construction map. The generals proposed to Zhou the dispatching of 80,000 PLA engineering troops to North Vietnam in order

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to reconstruct and repair highways. Zhou approved their plan and asked the delegation to affirm Hanoi that the Chinese military would assist road transportation in North Vietnam.109 General Chen Shiqu, commander of the PLACEC, organized the Chinese road engineering volunteer force for the Vietnam War. In early June 1965, Zhou met Chen and Luo Hongbiao, acting commander for the Chinese road engineering force, in Zhongnanhai. Zhou told the engineering corps generals that, among the three CVFAV commands, the “Road Engineering Command” (REC) was the largest force presented in the war. As other services in Vietnam, the CVFAV-​REC was under the command of the DGS.110 Three days after Zhou’s meeting, Chen held the standing committee meeting of the party committee of the PLACEC and discussed how to implement the plan and form the CVFAV-​REC. The party committee decided that, first of all, the PLACEC would establish the CVFAV-​REC under the command of Luo Hongbiao. Secondly, his regiments would be selected by the PLACEC from its divisions. Thirdly, the CVFAV-​REC officers would be selected by Chen himself.111 On June 20, General Li chaired a DGS meeting and the minister of transportation briefed the PLACEC officers on the May 30 Agreement about constructing seven of the twelve highways. These seven highways, totaling 725 miles of road, were required to be completed and operational within three years.112 The DGS meeting decided that the PLACEC would be in charge of these highway projects in North Vietnam, establishing the CVFAV-​REC and organizing three road engineering divisions. The Fourth Road Engineering Division, organized by the Guangzhou Regional Command included five regiments, totaling 25,000 troops. The Fifth Division was organized by the Shenyang Regional Command, and also included five regiments totaling 25,000 troops. The Sixth Division, organized by the Kunming Regional Command, included six regiments totaling 30,000 troops. The division also had two AAA battalions, one design and planning battalion, one pontoon bridge battalion, one field hospital, one logistics department. The Kunming Regional Command would organize one civilian road construction corps, including two brigades assigned to the Fifth and Sixth Divisions each. The regional commands would also dispatch two AAA battalions to each engineering division and provide logistics for their own divisions respectively. All divisions completed reorganization by the end of August and moved into border areas for further preparations in September. On July 25, 1965, the CVFAV-​REC was established, with Luo Hongbiao as acting commander, Sun Zhang as the political commissar, Wang Chunxun

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as the chief staff, Wang Gengyue as the deputy commander, and Liu Yuesheng as the deputy commissar and the director of the Political Department. On August 15, the command arrived at the border and began political education, troop orientation, logistic preparation, and engineering training. In October, the first wave of road engineering divisions crossed the border. By December, all 80,000 troops had moved into their positions in Vietnam.

Intelligence, Training, and Logistics At its July meetings, the CMC requested that the PLA DGS, DGL, and DGPT work on details of troop reorganization, political mobilization, intelligence, training, and logistics for the PLA divisions’ combat readiness in the Vietnam War. The DGS provided the troops with a good deal of information on the enemy by introducing pertinent facts about the American air force, its aircraft, and its weapon systems. Although the NVA exchanged intelligence with the PLA from 1951 until 1969, the Chinese military had established its own intelligence presence in Vietnam in the 1950s. After the Viet Minh invited Chinese advisors to Vietnam in 1950, the PLA had full access to Vietnamese military intelligence. During the French-​ Indochina War, the Chinese advisors worked at the Defense Intelligence Bureau (DIB, North Vietnam’s DIA, comparable to the US Defense Intelligence Agency) at Xuan Mai, Ha Dong.113 After the Geneva Settlement was signed in July 1954, the Chinese wanted to stay at DIB to observe troop reorganization and truce implementation. Although the DIB chief declined the request, he promised that the Chinese could return as early as August 25, once the French withdrew. Chinese intelligence, however, was not allowed to come back until March 1956, when the last French soldier departed from Saigon.114 In mid-​March 1956, the first group of PLA intelligence officers, about thirty-​six DGS staff members, arrived at the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi.115 By the end of the year, more than eighty intelligence officers worked at the embassy, where they were publicly known as the Eighth Group of the “South China Working Team,” one of the Chinese economic and technology groups helping with post-​war reconstruction and recovery. “We wore civilian clothes and each had a professional job title,” Colonel Yan Guitang recalled.116 “Nobody knew we were PLA staff except the Vietnamese intelligence and PAVN (NVA) officers at the division level or above.” Some of the Chinese, however, met Vietnamese classmates with whom they had trained in the Soviet Union. After arriving on September 12, 1959, Yan, like the others,

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rotated back and forth between Hanoi and Beijing. He completed five tours between 1959 and 1964.117 While in Vietnam, they collected information on NVA reorganization, Chinese aid redistribution, public security, and anything occurring near the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone). “It was easy to enter the DMZ,” Yan said of his three trips to the 17th parallel. “The international inspectors had the same routine every day. We got their schedule and visited the area without any problem.”118 By the mid-​1960s, the officers of the Eighth Group had increased to over one hundred since Beijing needed additional information as it became more involved in Indochina. Beijing was shocked by Cambodian reports of an assassination plot against China’s President Liu Shaoqi during his May 1–​6 visit to that country in 1963.119 China had a growing concern about a rapidly increasing Soviet involvement in Vietnam. The Soviets increased their intelligence activities drastically in the early 1960s. The head officer of the KGB served with the military mission at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi.120 In the meantime, the DGS sent hundreds of agents to South Vietnam.121 They traveled with NVA troops and reported their battles.122 In August 1964, for example, the DGS organized a special group of high profile “reporters” for South Vietnam. Their mission was to observe transportation capability of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, report how the NLF fought the war, and collect information on US deployments, troop morale, and new technologies in the South. They were to also participate in “interrogating American POWs.” The operation was classified as “Ground No. 10 Project.” By September, ten “special reporters” had been selected by the DGS, and the group leader was Wang Jie. On October 19, Marshal Chen Yi met with the group in Beijing and reminded them that each should always leave one bullet in his gun, and that in case of emergency, they must commit suicide instead of being captured by Americans or South Vietnamese.123 The Chinese-​classified “reporters” arrived in North Vietnam in November 1964. They began combat training at the Camp Thanh Hoa, which was specialized in training NVA officers for combat effectiveness against American ground troops before being sent to South Vietnam. They received Vietnamese names and were all ranked as NVA lieutenants. Each day they drilled with NVA officers, and the activities included shooting, hand-​to-​hand combat practice, and physical training. The Vietnamese officers told the Chinese they did not need to commit suicide if they were captured in South Vietnam. They were told that the NLF had connections and would help with their release. But group leader Wang told the Vietnamese that they were prepared, and that no prisoners would be taken.124 During the two months of training, on

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December 28, 1964, Ho Chi Minh and high-​ranking NVA officers met the group in Hanoi. On January 12, 1965, the group left the training camp and began their journey to South Vietnam along the Ho Chi Minh Trail (see Map 2.2 Ho Chi Minh Trail, 1963–​1975). No one realized that it would be two years before their return to the DGS in Beijing.

MAP 2.2  Ho Chi Minh Trail, 1963–​1975

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In the spring of 1965, the DGS also designed an eight-​week training program for the commanding officers and a four-​week orientation program for the troops before entering Vietnam. To prepare the commanders for the war, the DGS first summoned division and regimental commanders at either Ningming or Wenshan for four weeks of border training. The commanders and staff officers learned the new chain of command, cooperation with the NVA, and Vietnamese culture and language. After this home session, the officers crossed the border and studied the actual war situation in Vietnam for another four weeks. They traveled to their would-​be construction site or air defense area. For four weeks in country, they examined their own defense objectives at the site, evaluated the enemy bombing effectiveness day and night, and surveyed the landscape for troop deployment.125 If a Chinese AAA division or regiment was present, the training officers interned with them. They watched their comrades demonstrate how to fight against American aircraft, communicate with the NVA commands and local governments, and deal with the daily problems.126 The programs went well and were an important part of war preparation.127 According to DGS instructions, all divisions would assemble along the border areas. After they were assembled, men would begin pre-​war orientation, lasting from four weeks. Motivating the troops was one of the key points of military readiness. The DGPT issued guidelines and several programs for mental and psychological preparation through political education. To promote troop morale, the DGPT emphasized both the internationalism of the legion as well as individual heroism. Since most of the troops were drawn from the best PLA units for Vietnam, a few morale or psychological problems occurred during the training period: One soldier shot himself in his left foot and a couple of men took rat poison to avoid being deployed to Vietnam.128 The men learned some English words they might need if ever confronted by American pilots. They also learned some Vietnamese words and cultural facts. Each division sent Vietnamese translators to serve at regiment, battalion, and company levels.129 The DGPT also set up eighty disciplinary regulations for the troops. Order and discipline were needed for Chinese operations since they had such large numbers of troops. Among other requirements was to maintain strict secrecy of Chinese intervention in the conflict. No man was allowed to tell anyone, including his wife and family members, about operations in Vietnam before, during, and even after his tour. Any leaking of information would result in court martial.130 Another significant disciplinary regulation was to neither offend the Vietnamese people nor damage their property. Chinese

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troops were to show care and respect for the households, rice paddies, and personal belongings of the Vietnamese.131 The DGL had played a major role in the PLA war preparations in 1965. Its ability to transport large numbers of PLA troops and to provide supplies to the border areas throughout the country was a positive sign that the high command could conduct a limited scale border war to stop an invasion by a major foreign power. After each AAA division’s arrival, for example, the DGL requested that all units inspect their artillery, search radars, vehicles, equipment, and communication systems. It required all divisions to regularly send out their vehicles and communication equipment for maintenance and repairs. During their four-​week border orientation, the DGL also helped all the troops replace their Chinese uniforms with Vietnamese uniforms and gray caps without rank insignia. During interviews, some of the veterans have recalled that the men laughed at each other because they appeared to be Vietnamese soldiers, as long as they did not talk.132 The PLA had to supply all war material and daily needs to its AAA troops in North Vietnam, including fire wood, salt, and sugar, everything except drinking water. The DGL even shipped coffins with each regiment into Vietnam for burial services. All dead soldiers and officers were to be buried in Vietnam, and no bodies would be shipped back to China. The department also packed and shipped elegiac couplets for funeral services.133 Moreover, the DGL provided a searchlight battalion to each AAA division for night operations, and also sent some medics and technicians to each regiment. Most of the AAA divisions were armed with Russian-​style 100mm, 85mm, 76mm, 55mm, and 37mm anti-​aircraft guns. China had been importing Russian-​made 85mm and 37mm anti-​aircraft artillery guns since November of 1949, and more models were purchased during the Korean War.134 After 1955, the PLA successfully imitated the Russian 37mm gun, and they manufactured it as double-​barreled weapon in 1965. In the same year, the Chinese produced copies of Russian 57mm and 100mm anti-​aircraft guns. All were equipped with anti-​aircraft fire control radar. The 100mm, 57mm, and 37mm were the major anti-​aircraft artillery pieces for the Chinese divisions from 1965 to 1970.135 The PLA’s rapid mobilization and preparation for the Vietnam War were a positive sign that the Chinese army could be combat-​ready to stop an invasion by a major foreign power within a short period of time. It could concentrate its resources for a limited scale border war even during major political turmoil and domestic disorder like the Cultural Revolution. The PLA intervention in the Vietnam War greatly influenced its military reforms that had started in the late 1950s.136 It was apparent that the Chinese military became

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regularized, modernized, more professional, and ready to take new challenges like opposing Rolling Thunder during the Vietnam War. Newly available Chinese sources also suggest that the PLA officers in Vietnam were capable of commanding troops skillfully and of accomplishing their missions. Their experience in past wars substantially paid off during operations in Vietnam. Some divisional officers had fought in World War II, and most commanders at the regimental and battalion levels had experienced the Korean War.137 The Chinese commanders, however, also believed that their role in the Vietnam War was different from that in Korea. In Korea, the AAA and engineering divisions were supporting players, while the infantry troops had been the key players.138 However, in Vietnam they became the key players in the Chinese intervention.

Notes 1. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 1: 273, 276; Han, Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 70, 540, 557; Senior Colonel Long Guilin, “Show the Valor and Spirit Again,” in Yuanyue kangmei; zhongguo zhiyuan budui zai yuenan [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US: Recollections of China’s Supporting Forces in Vietnam], ed. Major General Qu Aiguo (PLA), Bao Mingrong, and Xiao Zuyue (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe [Military Science Press], 1995), 71. Long was commander of the First Division of the CVFAV in Vietnam in 1965–​1966. 2. Military History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun de 70 nian [Seventy Years of the PLA], 585–​89. 3. Moss, Vietnam, 142, 182. 4. Gary R. Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 85, 86. 5. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, x. 6. Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army, 193–​95. I borrow the phrase “Maoization” from Fang Zhu’s book, Gun Barrel Politics: Party-​Army Relations in Mao’s China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 128. 7. Zhai, China and the Vietnam War, 155–​56. 8. Hess, Vietnam, 86. 9. Moss, Vietnam, 77; Tucker, Vietnam, 93. 10. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 131. 11. Mao’s quote from Han, Dangdai zhongguo waijiao [Foreign Affairs of Contemporary China], 159. 12. Zhou’s quote from Tong Xiaopeng, Fengyu 40 nian [Forty Years of the Storm] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archives and Manuscript Press], 1996), 2: 219.

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13. Major General Qu Aiguo (PLA), “Military Operations of the Chinese Supporting Forces in the Vietnam War,” in Li, Zhongguo yu yindu zhina zhanzheng [China and the Indochina Wars], 43. 14. Marshal Chen Yi was one of the most brilliant military leaders of the CCP. After the founding of the PRC, he became mayor of Shanghai and commander of the East China Regional Command. In 1954, he was appointed vice premier and vice chairman of the CMC. In 1955, he became one of the ten marshals in China. In 1958, Chen was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Xinghuo liaoyuan Composition Department, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun jiangshuai minglu [Marshals and Generals of the PLA], 1: 8–​9; Liu Shufa, Chen Yi nianpu, 1901–​1972 [A Chronological Record of Chen Yi, 1901–​1972] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe [People’s Press], 1995), 2: 1224–​26. 15. For more details of the meeting, see Tong, Fengyu 40 nian [Forty Years of the Storm], 2: 220–​21. 16. Major General Qu Aiguo (PLA), “China’s Military Operations to Assist Vietnam and Resist America in the Vietnam War,” in Zhang and Niu, Lengzhan yu zhongguo [The Cold War and China], 352. 17. Mao, “Meeting with Le Duan, August 13, 1964,” quoted from Yang, “Mao Zedong and the Indochina Wars,” in Li, Zhongguo yu yindu zhina zhanzheng [China and the Indochina Wars], 23–​24. 18. Xiaoming Zhang, “The Vietnam War, 1964–​1969: A Chinese Perspective,” Journal of Military History 60, no. 4 (October 1996): 732–​33. 19. For the details of the Soviet aid, see Li Danhui, “The Sino-​Soviet Dispute over Assistance for Vietnam’s Anti-​American War, 1965–​1972,” 4–​5. Her source is from Foreign Trade Bureau, “Minutes of Meeting between Chinese and Vietnamese Transportation Delegates,” July 26, 1965, International Liaison Division Records, PRC Ministry of Railway Administration Archives, Beijing. 20. Li, “The Sino-​Soviet Dispute over Assistance for Vietnam’s Anti-​American War, 1965–​1972,”  1–​2. 21. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 59. 22. Zhou met Kosygin four times on February 5–​6, and twice on February 10–​11, 1965. For more details, see CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Research Division, Zhou Enlai Nianpu [A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai], 2: 706, 708. 23. Wang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi [Diplomatic History of the PRC], 2: 265, 267. 24. CCP Central Committee document, “Instructions on the Problems of Assisting Vietnam, June 18, 1965,” file-​6084, vol. 2, no.  1, 263–​65, in Yunnan Provincial Archives, Kunming, Yunnan. 25. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Report of Meeting on ‘China’s Blocking of Soviet Aid to Vietnam,’ April 1, 1965,” file-​77-​11-​7, Jilin Provincial Archives, Changchun, Jilin. 26. Shen Zhihua, “Conflicts between China and the Soviet Union on Assisting Vietnam and Resisting America, 1961–​1973,” 33, http://​www.shenzhihua.net/​ ynzz/​000034.htm.

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27. Wang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi [Diplomatic History of the PRC], 2: 268. 28. Li, “The Sino-​ Soviet Dispute over Assistance for Vietnam’s Anti-​ American War,” 4–​5. 29. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Report of Meeting on ‘China’s Blocking of Soviet Aid to Vietnam,’ April 1, 1965,” file-​77-​11-​7, Jilin Provincial Archives, 38. 30. Shen, “Conflicts between China and the Soviet Union on Assisting Vietnam and Resisting America,” 25–​26. 31. Li, “The Sino-​Soviet Dispute over Assistance for Vietnam’s Anti-​American War,” 5. 32. Director of Central Intelligence, “SNIE 10-​11-​65: Probable Communist Reactions to a US Course of Action, September 22, 1965,” in Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948–​1975, 304. 33. CCP Party History Research Division, Zhongguo gongchandang lishi dashiji, 1919–​ 1987 [Major Historical Events of the CCP, 1919–​1987] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe [People’s Press], 1989), 275–​76. 34. Xinhua News Agency, China’s Foreign Relations:  A Chronology of Events, 1949–​ 1988 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989), 283. 35. CCP Archival and Manuscript Research Division, Zhou Enlai Nianpu [A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai], 2: 724. 36. For more details of Chinese leaders’ intention and approaches, see Major General Chai Chengwen (PLA, ret.), Huang Zhengji, and Zhang Changjin, Sanda tupo; xin Zhongguo zouxiang Shijie de baogao [Three Major Breaking-​through: How China Enters the World] (Beijing:  Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1994), 230–​32. 37. Liu, “Statement of the Chinese Government to Support the Vietnamese People’s War against the United States,” in Xinhua News Agency, China’s Foreign Relations, 285. 38. Qu, “China’s Military Operations to Assist Vietnam and Resist America in the Vietnam War,” 352. 39. Han, Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 540. 4 0. Xinhua News Agency, China’s Foreign Relations, 282. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid.,  283. 43. Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], March 25, 1965. 4 4. Jiang Ying, “Conflicts and Restrains:  the Sino-​American Relations during the Vietnam War,” in Cong duizhi zouxiang huanhe; Lengzhan shiqi zhongmei guanxi zai tantao [From Confrontation to Conciliation:  Revisit the Sino-​American Relations in the Cold War], ed. Jiang Changbin and Robert Ross (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Press], 2000), 269. 45. Xinhua News Agency, China’s Foreign Relations, 283.

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4 6. For more Chinese media and diplomatic statements in May and June 1965, see Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishi nian [Deterioration of the Sino-​Vietnam Relations in the Past Forty Years], 74–​75. 47. James G.  Hershberg and Chen Jian, “Informing the Enemy:  Sino-​ American ‘Signaling’ and the Vietnam War, 1965,” in Roberts, Behind the Bamboo Curtain, 194. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid., 196–​98. 50. Ibid.,  218. 51. CHECO Reports (the Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operation Reports of Southeast Asia, 1961–​ 1975), Melyan and Bonetti, “ROLLING THUNDER—​July-​December 1965—​Continuing Report” ( July 15, 1967), Figures 9 and 20, quoted in Like Rolling Thunder, 35, 54. 52. “Le Duan and the Break with China,” in Roberts, Behind the Bamboo Curtain, 469. 53. Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 218–​19. 54. Liu’s quote from Luo, “An Exceptional Model of Proletarian Internationalism,” 6. 55. Senior Colonel Wang Xiangen (PLA, ret.), Zhongguo mimi dafabing:  yuanyue kangmei shilu [Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces: Records of Assisting Vietnam and Resisting America] ( Ji’nan: Ji’nan chubanshe [ Ji’nan Publishing House], 1992), 40. Wang serves on the staff of the Railway Engineering Corps Office at the PLA Department of the General Staff (DGS). 56. Ibid. 57. CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Research Division, Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 1949–​1976 [A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai, 1949–​1976], 2: 732. 58. Lieutenant General Wei Jie joined the Red Army in 1927 and participated in the Long March of 1934–​1935. He became a commander of regiment, brigade, and division of the Eighth Route Army in 19371945. Wei was appointed as the commander of the Sixty-​First and Sixtieth Armies of the PLA in 1947–​1954. After his return from Korea, Wei was appointed the deputy commander of the Chengdu Regional Command of the PLA. He was ranked lieutenant general in 1955. Xinghuo liaoyuan Composition Department, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun jiangshuai minglu [Marshals and Generals of the PLA], 1: 180–​81. Among the delegates was Long Guilin. See also Long, “Show the Valor and Spirit Again,” 68–​70. 59. The Railroad Bureau was under the DRV Ministry of Transportation. The chief of the Railroad Bureau and the chief staff of the NVA North Regional Command co-​headed a nineteen-​member team to work with the Chinese delegation for forty-​five  days. 60. Colonel Yan Guitang (PLA, ret.), interview by the author in Xi’an, Shaanxi, on July 29–​30, 2006. Yan served as a staff member for the delegation and toured Vietnam for five times between 1959 and 1966. 61. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe [CCP Central Committee’s Party Historical Document Press], 1989), 421.

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62. Mao’s quote from Zhang Baijia, “ ‘Resist America and Aid Korea’ and ‘Aid Vietnam and Resist America’,” in Duikang, boyi, hezuo: zhongmei anquan weiji guanli anli fenxi [Confrontation, Calculation, and Cooperation:  Case Studies of Security Consideration and Crisis Management between China and the United States], eds. Zhang Tuosheng and Shi Wen (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Press], 2000), 86–​89. 63. Qu, “Military Operations of the Chinese Supporting Forces in the Vietnam War,” 47. 6 4. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 1: 274. 65. Zhou, “Strengthen the Organization and Leadership for the Task of Assisting Vietnam,” in Zhou’s Selected Military Papers, 4: 527–​29. 66. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 423. 67. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 550. 68. Ibid. 69. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 46. 70. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 413. 71. Wang, Zhongguo mimi dafabing [Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 42. 72. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 46. 73. Qu, “Military Operations of the Chinese Supporting Forces in the Vietnam War,” 47. 74. Second Lieutenant Chen Bai (PLAAF, ret.), Yuezhan qinliji [My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe [Henan People’s Press], 1997), 11, 16, 37. Chen served as the translator at the divisional HQs of the Thirty-​First and Sixty-​Fourth AAA Divisions in 1966–​1968. 75. Qu, “Military Operations of the Chinese Supporting Forces in the Vietnam War,” 47. 76. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA during the Cultural Revolution], 420; Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 223–​24. 77. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 47. 78. Tan Jingcheng, “The Operation Division of the General Staff Department in the 1950s–​1960s,” in Zongcanmobu:  huiyi shiliao, 1927–​1987 [The Department of General Staff: Memoirs and History Records, 1927–​1987], ed. PLA Compilation Committee of Historical Record Series (Beijing:  Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1995), 426. 79. For more information on the PLA’s political instructor/​commissar system, see Paul H. B. Godwin, “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine: 1949–​1999,”

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and Xiaobing Li, “PLA Attacks and Amphibious Operations during the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954–​1955 and 1958,” in Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, ed. Mark A.  Ryan, David M.  Finkelstein, and Michael A.  McDevitt (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 23–​55, 143–​72. 80. Wu Fang, Conglin yishi:  yuanyue kangmei sanji [Personal Stories in the Jungle:  Journal of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting America] (Guiyang:  Guizhou minzu chubanshe [Guizhou Minorities Publishing], 1993), 89–​91. 81. Lin Biao was one of the most brilliant military leaders of the CCP and the defense minister of the PRC in 1959–​1971. He participated in the CCP-​led Nanchang Uprising in August 1927, and then served as a battalion, regiment, and division commander in the CCP Red Army in 1927–​1931. At the age of twenty-​five, Lin became commander of the Red Fourth Army and then the president of the Red Army University in World War II. In 1948, Lin Biao became the commander of the Fourth Field Army, which totaled 800,000 troops. Lin’s successful campaigns against the GMD forces brought about an early victory for the CCP in the Civil War and made him one of the top CCP leaders. Lin became one of the ten marshals in the PLA in 1955, and defense minister in 1959–​1971. During the Cultural Revolution, Lin became the second most powerful leader in the country, next to Mao, who made Lin his successor in 1969. Two years later, however, Lin was accused of leading a military clique against Mao, and Lin and his family members were killed in a plane crash in Mongolia on September 13, 1971. Xinghuo liaoyuan Composition Department, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun jiangshuai minglu [Marshals and Generals of the PLA], 1: 10–​11. 82. Zhao, interviews by the author in Harbin, Heilongjiang, in July 2002. For more details on the PLA political education, see also Zhao, “The Dragon’s Tale: Chinese Troops in the Jungle,” in Li, Voices of the Vietnam War,  76–​77. 83. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 420; Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 223–​24. 84. Major General Mo Chunhe (PLA, ret.), “Several Events in the Confidential Bureau of the DGS,” in PLA Compilation Committee of Historical Record Series, Zongcanmobu [The Department of General Staff ], 441–​43. Mo served as the Deputy Chief of the Confidential Division in the DGS in 1955–​1969 and the Chief in 1969–​1975. 85. CIA, “SNIE 10-​6-​65: Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions, June 2, 1965,” in Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948–​1975, 247. 86. Director of Central Intelligence, “SNIE 10-​9-​65:  Communist and Free World Reactions to a Possible U.S. Course of Action, July 23, 1965,” Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948–​1975, 272. 87. Qu, “Military Operations of the Chinese Supporting Forces in the Vietnam War,” 47. 88. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 2:  209; Han, Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 2: 57; Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 222–​23.

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89. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 371. 90. Zhou Qing, “Winning the First Battle,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 2. Zhou was Deputy Commander of the Sixty-​ First Division. 91. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 1: 274. 92. All Chinese services were divided into nine regional commands from the 1950s to 1980s. The PLA armies and divisions were under a certain regional command (RC). Each RC was named after the city where its headquarters were. They were PLA Shenyang RC (Northeast China), Beijing RC (North China), Jinan RC (East China), Nanjing RC (Southeast China), Fuzhou RC (Southeast China Coast and the Taiwan Straits), Guangzhou RC (South China), Kunming RC (Southwest China), Wuhan RC (Central China), and Lanzhou RC (Northwest China). See Zhu, Gun Barrel Politics, 86–​108. 93. Zhou, “Winning the First Battle,” 2–​3. 94. Colonel Yan Guitang (PLA, ret.), interviews by the author in Xi’an, Shaanxi, on July 29–​30, 2006. 95. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 370–​71. 96. Xiao, “An Important Military Operation to Put Out War Flames in Indochina,” 2: 451–​52. 97. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 362–​63. 98. Ibid., 358. 99. Yan, interview by the author in Xi’an, Shaanxi, on July 29–​30, 2006. 100. Captain Zhang Jinchun (PLA, ret.) and Major Wu Dazhong (PLA, ret.), Tiejun xiongfeng [Heroic Experience of an Iron Corps] ( Jinzhou, Hubei:  Jinzhou [ Jinzhou Printing Office], 2009), 183. 101. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 357, 359–​60. 102. Wang, Zhongguo mimi dafabing [Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 41–​42. 103. Wang Hui, “How the Northeastern Coast Defense System Took Shape in Vietnam,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 115. Wang was Chief Staff and Deputy Commander of the Second Division of the CPVEF in Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. 104. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 14. 105. Wang, Zhongguo mimi dafabing [Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 5–​6. 106. Wang, “How the Northeastern Coast Defense System Took Shape in Vietnam,” 118. 107. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 1:  274; Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 135.

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108. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 46. 109. CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Research Division, Zhou Enlai Nianpu [A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai], 2: 732. 110. Luo Hongbiao, “Assist Vietnam and Build Friendship Highways,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 216–​17. Luo was the acting commander of the Chinese Volunteer Force to Assist Vietnam-​Road Engineering Command (CVFAV-​REC) in Vietnam from 1965 to 1968. 111. Ibid., 217. 112. Ibid., 220. 113. Colonel Dinh Thi Van (NVA, ret.), I Engaged in Intelligence Work (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 2006), 2, 33. 114. Moss, Vietnam, 86. 115. Appendix: “Chronicle of the CMAG’s Major Events to Assist Vietnam and Resist France,” in CMAG Compilation Team, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa shilu [The Records of the CMAG in the War to Aid Vietnam and Resist France], 318–​19. 116. Yan, interviews by the author in Xi’an, Shaanxi, on July 29–​30, 2006. 117. Yan Guitang’s first tour was two months (September to November); his second was five months (February to July 1960); third was ten months (September 1960 to July 1961); his fourth was ten months (September 1961 to June 1962); and his last tour was ten months (September 1962 to July 1963). For details, see Yan, “My Life-​long Effort for National Defense and Security,” in Liangxiang zhanyou canjun wushi zhounian jinianji [Fiftieth Anniversary for Liangxiang Veterans’ Service; Personal Recollections], ed. Editorial Team (Beijing:  Beijing yinshua [Capital Printing Office], 2001), 304–​21. 118. Yan, interviews by the author in Xi’an, Shaanxi, on July 29–​30, 2006. 119. Zheng Yi, Guogong jiandiezhan 70 nian [Seventy-​Year Spy War between the GMD and CCP] (Hong Kong:  Sifeier chubanshe [Shafer Publishing], 2001), 607–​609. 120. Former KGB agent, interview by the author in Silver Spring, Maryland, in September 2007. For more details, see Mr. B, “Russian Spies in Hanoi,” in Li, Voices from the Vietnam War, 93–​100. 121. Li Min, “In South Vietnam,” in Xuesa yuenan; 60 niandai yuanyue kangmei zhandi caifang jishi [Blood Shed in Vietnam; Our Trips to the Front during the Vietnam War in the 1960s], eds. Shang Like and Xing Zhiyuan (Beijing: Zhongguo renshi chubanshe [China Human Resources Press], 1993), 229–​30. 122. Ma Zhenhua and Li Min, “Force the American Troops to Give Up Their Fork and Knife, But Use the Chopsticks,” Shang and Xing, Xuesa yuenan [Blood Shed in Vietnam], 240–​41. 123. Zhang Shihong, Zhang Yanping, and Wu Di, Hu zhiming xiaodao shang de 701 Tian:  Zhongguo jizhe Yuezhan jianwenlu [701 Days on the Ho Chi Minh

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Trail: The Vietnam War in Our Eyes] (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe [PLA Literature Press], 2007), 6. 124. Ibid.,  16. 125. Yao, “Battles of Bravery and Wisdom,” 14. 126. Zhou, “Winning the First Battle,” 2. 127. Wang Letian, “Recollection of the Development Experience of the PLA Weaponry,” in PLA Compilation Committee of Historical Record Series, Zongcanmobu [The Department of General Staff ], 392–​94. Wang served as the staff of the Weaponry and Equipment Division in the DGS in 1956–​1974 and the division deputy chief in 1975–​1978. 128. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 4. 129. Zhao, interviews by the author in Harbin, Heilongjiang, July 2002. Zhao served as the Captain of the Fourth Company, 3rd Regiment, Thirty-​First AAA Division in Vietnam in 1966–​1967. See also Zhao, “The Dragon’s Tale: Chinese Troops in the Jungle,” in Voices from the Vietnam War, 77. 130. Wang Baokui, “My Combat Experience in the Air Defense at Sao Ha and Lang Son,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 6. Wang was the Political Commissar of the Twenty-​Third Regiment, Sixty-​Third AAA Division. 131. Chen Huocheng, “The Unforgettable Eight Months,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 60. Chen was a captain in the 622nd Regiment, Sixty-​Fourth Division. 132. Lieutenant Wang Xiangcai (PLAAF, ret.), interview by the author in Harbin, Heilongjiang, on August 20–​21, 2003. Wang served in the 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment, Thirty-​First AAA Division. 133. Chen, “The Unforgettable Eight Months,” 60. 134. Xu, “The Purchase of Arms from Moscow,” in Li, Millett, and Yu, Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, 143–​4 6. 135. Wang, interviews by the author in Harbin on August 20–​21, 2003. 136. Spence, The Search for Modern China, 533. 137. Zhou, “Winning the First Battle,” 3. 138. Yao Fuhe, “Battles of Bravery and Wisdom,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 13–​14. Yao was Commander of the Sixty-​ Fourth AAA Division that entered Vietnam in April–​May 1967.

01

3

AIR DEFENSE

Command and Control

On August 1, 1965, the Sixty-​First Zhidui (Column or Division) of the PLAAF entered Vietnam from China’s Yunnan province to provide air defense northwest of Hanoi. On August 9, the Sixty-​ First Division moved into action against Rolling Thunder and shot down an American F-​4 fighter/​bomber near the Yen Bai area. It was the first American plane to be downed by Chinese AAA units.1 In the meantime, the Sixty-​Third Zhidui crossed the border from Guangxi in the northeast to protect the critical Hanoi-​Youyiguan (Friendship Pass) railway between China and North Vietnam. The Sixty-​Third Division engaged in its first battle with the Americans in the Kep area on August 23.2 The two Chinese divisions, totaling 21,000 AAA troops, were part of North Vietnam’s air defense under the NVA Air Defense-​Air Force Command (AD-​AFC), which was established in October 1963 with Senior Colonel Phung The Tai as its commander and Dang Tinh Duc as political commissar. In early 1965, the command had twenty-​one Vietnamese AAA regiments and forty-​one battalions, about 36,000 regular troops.3 The Russian SAM troops became operational in July 1965 under the command of Major General Alexander Stuchilov. Even though the total number of Soviets in Vietnam is still inconclusive, US intelligence believed that 1,500 to 2,500 Soviet missile troops engaged in the air defense of North Vietnam in September 1965.4 Thus, the Chinese consisted of 35 percent of the 59,500 air defense troops in North Vietnam in the fall of 1965. In early 1966, the PLA began rotating its AAA divisions. In the west zone, the Sixty-​First Division was pulled back on February 18 after six months in Vietnam, and replaced by the Sixty-​ Seventh Division. In October, the Sixty-​Seventh was relieved by

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the Sixty-​Fifth Division. The Sixty-​Fifth was replaced by the Sixty-​Fourth Division in June 1967. And the Sixty-​Fourth rotated out on January 20, 1968. Meanwhile, in the east, the Sixty-​Third Division was replaced by Thirty-​First Division in August 1966. The Thirty-​First was out in August 1967. And then the Thirty-​Seventh Division rotated in for a year. From 1965 to 1967, the PLAAF rotated nine AAA divisions, nearly 100,000 Chinese troops, in the Vietnam War (see Map 3.1 Chinese AAA divisions in Vietnam, 1965–​1968).

MAP 3.1.  Chinese AAA divisions in Vietnam, 1965–​1968

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In late 1966, the PLAAF sent an additional AAA division to the central region of North Vietnam. In December 1966, the Sixty-​Second Division was assigned to protect Thai Nguyen, a steel-​manufacturing city in the north central region. After eight months, the Thirty-​Second Division replaced it in August 1967. By that fall, the number of Chinese AAA troops in Vietnam had increased to 32,000 men, more than 44 percent of all 72,500 air defense troops in North Vietnam.5 (The NVA AD-​AFC reorganized its air defense units into five AAA divisions in June 1966, totaling 38,000 Vietnamese regulars.6) Although US intelligence followed Chinese troop involvement closely, it underestimated the scale of the Chinese intervention in 1965–​1967. In his August 4, 1967 special intelligence estimate, the CIA director reported, “For some time Chinese military personnel have been present in North Vietnam; current strength is estimated at 25,000 to 45,000. They include AAA troops, engineers, construction crews, and various other logistical support groups.”7 By August 1967, the PLA had 181,000 men in Vietnam, including 44,000 in air defense, 30,000 in railway construction and repair, 27,000 in combat engineering, and 80,000 in highway construction. In retrospect, from 1965 to 1967, the nine Chinese AAA divisions (Thirty-​ First, Thirty-​Second, Thirty-​Seventh, Sixty-​First, Sixty-​Second, Sixty-​Third, Sixty-​Fourth, Sixty-​Fifth, and Sixty-​Seventh) had provided an effective coverage over their defense areas. Newly available sources illustrate the chain of command at division and regiment levels, their strategy and planning, tactical decisions, combat problem-​solving, political indoctrination, and performance evaluation through the first two years of the Chinese intervention. Their operational experience reveals the challenges the Chinese faced and provides new and penetrating insights into the key differences between the Chinese army and other armed forces in the Vietnam War. Major General Xu Changyou (PLAAF, ret.) pointed out during interviews that there was a huge technological gap between the American and Chinese forces, much larger than in the Korean War.8 The Chinese officers, however, had employed an active defense strategy. Spencer Tucker states, “Despite [Russian] SAMs and MiG interceptors, guns remained the most deadly threat to attacking aircraft. Of 3,000 US aircraft lost during the Vietnam War, some 85 percent were downed by guns. Missiles accounted for only 8 percent, less than 2 percent of some 9,000 SAMs fired at US aircraft reached their targets.”9

Division Command: Objective Change, 1965 The goal of the US air bombing was to destroy North Vietnam’s transportation and communication systems to stop its support of the insurgency in

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the South.10 Therefore, the increasingly intense Rolling Thunder air campaign targeted bridges, railways, and roads in North Vietnam, attempting to interdict transportation from China to the DRV. According to USAF Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operation (CHECO) Reports, between July and December of 1965, the USAF, US Navy (USN) air operations, and Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) launched a total of 54,791 sorties (more than 300 per day), including 23,194 strike sorties against North Vietnam.11 CHECO also reported the results of these air strikes, which showed 656 bridges destroyed and 246 more damaged, 2,516 buildings destroyed and 2,330 more damaged, and 847 road sections and 92 railway sections destroyed during this six-​month period.12 The North Vietnamese definitely needed the Chinese AAA divisions to provide better air defense against Operation Rolling Thunder. After the Sixty-​First arrived in August 1965, the AD-​AFC assigned the Chinese division to protect the railroads and also the road construction troops in the northwest from Hanoi to Lao Cai, about 180 miles.13 The Sixty-​First was founded on January 7, 1951 in Jinzhou, Liaoning province, then totaling 6,430 troops. The division entered the Korean War on March 18 and returned to China in October 1953. Its troops were rearmed with Russian weapons and equipment in April 1955 and remained under the army command. As the first AAA division entered Vietnam, the Sixty-​First commanded its 601st, 602nd, 603rd, and 629th Dadui (Regiments), totaling approximately 11,000 men. The division was equipped with 216 Russian-​made AAA weapons, including 36 85mm cannons, 42 57mm cannons, 90 37mm machine guns, and 48 12.7mm machine guns. Wang Qinghua was division commander, with Xie Teshan as political commissar, Zhou Qing deputy commander, and Tie Ying deputy political commissar. The Sixty-​First entered North Vietnam in five groups August 1–​3, 1965. As one of the best AAA divisions in the PLAAF, most of its officers were Korean War veterans experienced in fighting against American warplanes.14 On August 1, at the border checkpoint, the Sixty-​First Command included military representatives from the NVA HQ, who met with Chinese commanders, then guided the division and its four regiments to their positions in the northwestern air defense zone. The Sixty-​First traveled with more than 400 vehicles, moving south along Highway 2 through Ha Giang to Vi Xuyen, and then to Viet Quang, Ha Giang province. The convoys, concealing their movement by traveling at night and resting in the forest during daylight, arrived at the Hanoi-​La Cai railway line in Yen Bai province on the third day, having traveled 200 miles.15 For the Chinese soldiers, it was the first time they had been in a foreign country. Yen Bai had scores of palm and banana trees planted alongside the

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road and several rubber plantations in the middle of the bamboo forest. Curious and excited, many found Yen Bai to be similar to Wenshan in China. Having been prepared for war since mid-​August 1964, the division assembled in the Wenshan area about thirty to forty miles north of the Chinese-​ Vietnamese border and conducted intensive combat training. Captain Zhang Yongfu (PLAAF, ret.) recalled that the Vietnamese houses, rice paddies, and stubble fields looked like those in Wenshan. Most of the Vietnamese trucks, motorcycles, and tractors were all made in China, but some soldiers noted their bicycles were French style, better looking than the Chinese brands.16 The Vietnamese men, women, and children were very friendly to the Chinese troops, and they stopped what they were doing and waved to the Sixty-​First motorized convoy passing by.17 On August 8 the Sixty-​First Division held a command meeting in the city of Yen Bai. Commander Wang Qinghua believed that he would only be able to protect the railroads by concentrating two of his regiments at the key point at Yen Bai, the middle point of the Hanoi-​Lao Cai line, rather than with a scattered air defense along the lengthy railroad. Wang’s “active air defense,” based on his experience in the Korean War, focused on shooting down more enemy planes to prevent American planes from bombing farther north. At that meeting, Wang also decided to deploy one regiment at the border bridge near Lao Cai, which connected the two countries by railway. The division kept several battalions in reserve.18 After the meeting, the division command deployed its four regiments to their positions during the night of August 8.  The men worked all day and didn’t sleep the first night. They had to position their guns on the hills, and around the bridges, train stations, and warehouses. It was rainy, foggy, and muddy, with numerous insects and thick bushes. They barely finished before dawn. The artillery positions of the Sixty-​First remained undetected by American air reconnaissance for several weeks.19 The next day, on August 9, the Sixty-​First went into action for the first time in Yen Bai against two American warplanes. About 10:00 am, the division received an alert from the AD-​AFC that USN planes were flying in their direction. It was not until 1:30 pm that the Chinese warning radar operators reported the approach of two F-​4C Phantom fighter-​bombers. The division passed on the information to regiment and battalion commanders. At 1:32 pm the outposts spotted the two American airplanes within approximately one mile, and reported:  “1,650 feet  altitude, 600 feet (per second) speed.” When the two F-​4Cs were about 9,000 feet from the AAA positions, the regiment and battalion commands ordered their 85mm and 37mm guns to open

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fire on the first plane. In the forty-​second battle the Sixty-​First shot down one F-​4C.20 Deputy commander Zhou Qing sent the men to look for the crash site. The next morning search troops came back with wreckage from the plane and reported that the American air crew had been killed in the crash.21 This was the first American airplane shot down by Chinese AAA troops. On August 10, DRV Defense Ministry, AD-​AFC, NVA Northern Regional Command, and Yen Bai Provincial Command telegraphed their appreciation to the Sixty-​First Division for its first victory.22 The PLA’s DGS, PLAAF, and the Yunnan Regional Command also sent congratulatory telegrams from China. Grand General Luo Ruiqing wrote on the division’s combat report: “The victory over the first battle is very promising. But [you] need a good assessment to carry forward your achievement and overcome the weakness. It is an old and good tradition of our army to make each battle a learning experience. Must foster and enhance it, can’t lose it.”23 The Sixty-​First seemed successful in its active air defense, by not only protecting assigned railways and facilities, but also by its ability to shoot down American warplanes. The number of downed and damaged American planes was certainly impressive on combat reports to both PLA DGS and NVA HQ. This “body count” became a measurement of success for Chinese AAA troops in the Vietnam War. In late August, Commander Wang Qinghua shifted his focus of air defense from protecting the railroad on the ground to shooting down American airplanes in the air.24 His strategic change made the Chinese air defense more proactive in nature, but additionally it fit the Vietnamese goal of defeating the Rolling Thunder air campaign. That shift reflected the Chinese way of active defense and illustrated its methods for conducting war, which were well-​rounded and flexible, while satisfying the field generals. Beijing also approved Wang’s change in his objective after the PLA high command received his reports. On August 30, 1965, the CMC altered the combat objective for Chinese AAA troops in Vietnam. According to a new CMC instruction, “The victory must be achieved in this way for the AAA force: not to engage unless able to destroy the enemy [airplanes] . . . to show the heroic spirit of Chinese people assisting Vietnam and resisting the U.S. and the combat effectiveness of the People’s Army created by Chairman Mao.”25 Thus, the objective of the Chinese air defense shifted from “protecting Vietnamese railways” to “shooting down American airplanes.” The strategic change toward the Vietnam War revealed that the PLA high command was willing and able to adapt to the war-​fighting situation in Vietnam. Sunzi warned about inflexibility in his classic statement that “an army does not have fixed strategic advantages (shih) or

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an invariable position (hsing). To be able to take the victory by varying ones’ position according to (yin) the enemy’s is called being inscrutable (shen).”26 The NVA was certainly putting additional pressure on the Sixty-​First. On August 20, 1965, AD-​AFC political commissar Dang Tinh Duc visited the Chinese division and its 601st Regiment. Duc talked to the officers and men at their artillery sites with fluent Chinese, since he had studied at Beijing from 1954 to 1959 and graduated from the PLA Political Tasks Academy. On August 29, the Sixty-​First shot down one F-​105 and captured the pilot, a USAF major, who was the first American pilot captured by the Chinese in the Vietnam War. Division deputy political commissar Tie Ying interrogated the pilot for four hours through the night with the help of DGS agent Lin Sheng, who could speak fluent English. Next morning, the Sixty-​First had to turn the American pilot over to the NVA.27 On September 8, the deputy director of the NVA’s Bureau of the Political Tasks visited the division and presented a banner to the division commanders on behalf of Ho Chi Minh. It read: “United to Defeat the American Invaders!”28 On September 18, the Sixty-​First, in two separate engagements, shot down four American planes and damaged another.29 By the end of 1965, Rolling Thunder had lost 171 airplanes to North Vietnam’s air defense, plus 450 damaged.30 By February 1966, the Sixty-​First had fought forty-​nine engagements, shot down thirty American warplanes, damaged thirty-​nine, and captured several American pilots.31 After his return to China, division commander Wang was promoted to deputy artillery commander of the Beijing Regional Command from 1968 to 1981. In retrospect, the Chinese active air defense in 1965–​1966 reduced the impact of Rolling Thunder in North Vietnam. Regiment Command: Combat Tactics, 1965–​1966 The Sixty-​Third Division also adapted the same active air defense strategy as the Sixty-​First with the objective of shooting down more US airplanes.32 The Sixty-​Third received orders on July 26, 1964, and arrived at Ningming, Guangxi, on August 9. The division was founded in Shanghai in January 1951 and entered the Korean War on March 10. It returned to China in September 1955. In the 1960s, the division had four AAA regiments, including the 607th, 627th, and 628th as 85mm cannon regiments, and 609th as a 37mm gun regiment, under the army command. In September 1964, the Sixty-​Third was deployed to the Chinese-​Vietnamese border area in Guangxi. Grand General Luo visited the troops of the Sixty-​Third in May 1965 and called for combat readiness. On June 23, the 628th Regiment entered Vietnam with the First

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Railway Engineering Division and stationed itself at Kep, in order to protect Chinese engineering troops.33 Then, the 23rd Regiment of the air force AAA Eighth Division came under the Sixty-​Third command in July. By August 20, 1965, all the five regiments of the Sixty-​Third Division had crossed the border at Youyiguan [Friendship Pass], which connected the main transportation line between the two countries. Traffic from Ningming to Youyiguan, about thirty miles, was heavy and very slow—​about twenty miles per hour. Supply trucks, artillery pieces, construction equipment, and Chinese troops rolled southward, forming a long column on the road. One after the other, the AAA regiments crossed the border at Youyiguan, and no military vehicles stopped at the pass. The traffic became even slower after the Chinese troops crossed the checkpoint.34 At the border, NVA officers met Fan Zhensheng, division commander, Du Hedi, political commissar, and Zhang Xipu, chief of staff, who led the way to their assigned stations. The AD-​AFC assigned the Sixty-​Third to provide air defense for the critical Lang Son-​Hanoi rail lines, including railroads, bridges, train stations, warehouses, and highways.35 Lang Son, a northern border province in the mountainous area, had only two medium-​size cities. Since the cities were so close to the border (approximately twelve to fourteen miles), American planes never raided them. Americans did not want to risk a conflict with the Chinese air force by flying into Chinese air space.36 In early 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS) reissued restrictions on the Rolling Thunder operations, including the Chinese-​Vietnamese border areas.37 Thus, Commander Fan focused his main efforts on the defense of Lang Son’s transportation network. The Sixty-​Third categorized the US air strikes on Lang Son-​Hanoi lines from August 1965 to February 1966 as “intermittent bombing.” US planes successively bombed each target with a short intermission of seven days. During these six months, the United States launched ninety-​nine air attacks along the 250-​mile Chinese sections of the railways.38 These air strikes were much heavier than the Sixty-​Third had experienced during the Korean War. According to the division’s statistics in those months, US aircraft dropped 2,178 bombs, 327 of which only hit targets in the Chinese defense areas, about 15 percent.39 US statistics show its planes flew 1,300 sorties during this period and destroyed targets such as bridges and rail stations.40 To effectively protect key points along the railways, division commander Fan Zhensheng concentrated his regiments in certain areas further south that he calculated were the best positions to shoot down American planes. One of the Sixty-​Third’s regiments entered the Kep area, about forty miles south of Lang Son, and engaged in its first battle with Americans on August

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23, shooting down one plane, and damaging another.41 On August 30, after receiving the new CMC order, the division command issued combat instructions to all regiments. It was imperative, Wang Baokui, political commissar of the 23rd Regiment of the Sixty-​Third, recalled, that all regiments be “active and creative, flexible and mobile” to “concentrate the firepower and destroy the enemy airplanes in close range.” The divisional instruction expected its troops’ “political morale, fighting skills, and combat style must be really up to the mark.”42 The division deployed its 607th and 609th Regiments around the city of Lang Son, and its 628th and 23rd Regiments at Sao Ha, about twenty miles south of Lang Son. Each regiment command worked out detailed tactical plans with the same objective:  shooting down increasing numbers of American planes. From August to December of 1965, the regimental commands of the Sixty-​Third had developed several new operational tactics so they could shoot down more American aircraft during the period of intermittent bombing. These included troop deployments near bombing targets and deception by changing artillery positions to concentrate fire power. The regimental commanders with experience in the Chinese way of fighting from the Korean War saw the traditional form or style of Chinese warfare—​including close engagement and deceptions—​as models to emulate. As Sunzi says, “Warfare is the art of deceit. . . . Attack where he is not prepared; go by way of places where it would never occur to him you would go.”43 In order to shoot down American airplanes, the 628th Regiment Commander Niu Zhishou positioned his guns near a railway bridge and the train station. He also made a practice of immediately replenishing his companies’ supply of new guns to maintain full combat capacity for each unit.44 On the morning of October 17, the Sixty-​Third alerted all its regiments to an American aircraft carrier in the Tonkin Gulf, and ordered all troops to be combat-​ready. At 10:56 am, the Ninth Xiaodui (Company) of the 628th Regiment reported that two A-​4B airplanes were heading toward their positions. Niu ordered:  “Wait for them to get closer and lower.”45 When the planes came down within 4,500 to 6,000 feet (rather than the typical 9,000 to 10,800 feet) above its position, the company fired in succession, shooting down one of the planes. According to US statistics, the majority of US aircraft loss in 1966 was caused by AAA fire when they flew below 4,500 feet.46 Commander Niu also realized that a close deployment and a hunger for shooting down US warplanes could inflict heavy casualties on its own troops. In order to protect the artillery positions and avoid retaliation, Niu changed his AAA positions after each battle with an emphasis on self-​protection. He

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redeployed the artillery pieces into new positions and camouflaged the anti-​ aircraft guns with branches and tree boughs. The 628th placed dummies and fake guns on its abandoned positions in order to attract enemy planes. At 3:26 pm on December 20, four F-​4Bs entered the air defense positions of the Fifth and Sixth Companies of the 628th. When the incoming American planes reached 5,500 feet altitude, Niu ordered the companies to open fire, and within thirty seconds they fired eighty-​one shells, shooting down two F-​4Bs.47 US pilots that flew A-​4C Skyhawks over Sao Ha worried about the Chinese AAA sites and their firepower. Captain Bill Luplow, a US Marine pilot, recalled, “A lot of the time, we couldn’t even see it when they were shooting at us. Sometimes, we could see muzzle flashes or tracers.”48 According to political commissar Wang Baokui, these tactics also worked for his 23rd Regiment through 1965.49 After an engagement on October 15, for example, the 23rd Regiment Commander Qin Shengyun re-​deployed all troops in their new positions. At 11:23 am on October 17, a group of four A-​4B planes approached Sao Ha. Qin did not order the company to open fire until the airplanes descended to a low altitude of 6,000 feet. Two of them were shot down and one was damaged. After a two-​hour air defense battle, the 23rd reported seven of twenty-​seven American planes shot down, and two more damaged.50 After another battle on November 30, Qin again removed his guns to their new position, and also ordered one platoon to remain at the abandoned positions as a trap. At 2:55 pm on December 1, the outpost reported that four F-​105s were coming to Sao Ha at low altitude. A few minutes later, the decoy platoon lit up the grenades, their explosions creating huge clouds of smoke similar to AAA guns firing. The American airplanes were attracted to the old positions, and in turn would dive in order to bomb the abandoned sites. Qin next ordered his guns to fire on the planes from their new positions. Two planes were shot down. One of the pilots failed to open his parachute and fell to the ground.51 The close engagement, or the delayed fire, however, made Chinese air defense troops vulnerable to American air attacks, causing more casualties to the regiments. On September 20, 1965, for example, the 609th Regiment engaged a group of American bombers over Sao Ha Bridge. Commander Cheng Yushan did not open fire during the bombing of the first two waves. He told his staff “not to fire unless able to shoot down the enemy planes.”52 That gave him the direction of the raid, information on the planes, and the time his troops needed to aim at the planes. Cheng opened fire on the third wave, when his battalions had a better chance to shoot down the planes. While his regiment managed to shoot down one of the American bombers in the

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last wave, the first two bombing waves had seriously damaged the bridge and inflicted heavy casualties on the Fourth and Fifth Companies of the 609th Regiment.53 On October 9, the 609th planned to engage four American fighters flying from the northeast. While Cheng was waiting for these planes, two other bombers approached from the southwest and dropped their bombs over regiment headquarters, killing Cheng, the regimental commander, political commissar Li Wan’an, chief of staff Wang Xisen, and all fourteen officers at the regiment’s headquarters. In addition, forty-​seven officers and soldiers were wounded during the bombing.54 After the October 9 battle, the bodies of the three regimental commanders were shipped back to China for burial, while the soldiers were buried in nearby Vietnamese cemeteries. Thereafter, however, Zhou Enlai instructed the PLA that all commanders and soldiers who were killed in the Vietnam War would be buried in Vietnam.55 On November 16, the AD-​AFC informed the Sixty-​Third Division that US airplanes might soon attack their positions along the Hanoi-​Lang Son lines. At 2:43 pm, the Sixty-​Third alerted the 628th that two groups of American planes were approximately seventy miles away and traveling in their direction. At 2:51 pm, similar reports came in from regimental outposts. At approximately 3:02 pm, twenty-​nine fighter-​bombers, coming from two directions in eight groups, attacked the 628th positions. Four airplanes attacked the Fourth Company, which had delayed its fire, and two heavy bombs hit its positions:  nineteen men were killed and sixty-​ one wounded with two artillery pieces destroyed and four damaged.56 The badly depleted company had to be pulled out of position and transferred to the rear.57 From August 1965 to August 1966, the Sixty-​third Division had fired 6,140 rounds of 85mm guns, 6,323 rounds of 57mm, 15,140 rounds of 37mm, 81,707 rounds of 14.5mm, and 72,485 rounds of 12.7mm in seventy-​one engagements, shooting down fifty-​four planes and damaging seventy-​six.58 The division had 45 officers and soldiers killed and 187 wounded.59 The Chinese air defense in 1965–​1966 consisted of capable troops and experienced commanders. Their Korean War experience paid off during operations in Vietnam. In late 1965, the PLA ordered its troops to intensify training to shoot down more American airplanes and to lower its combat casualties. In early 1966 the Chinese high command sent more AAA divisions to Vietnam. CHECO reports that 171 US airplanes were shot down and 450 damaged in North Vietnam from July to December of 1965.60 US intelligence also gave credit to the two Chinese AAA divisions for their air defense of the

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LOCs in North Vietnam during the second half of 1965. A SNIE reported that with the help of Chinese air defense, “[I]‌n 1965, the DRV received about 1 million tons of imports, two-​thirds by sea and nearly one-​third by rail, the small remainder coming by road, trail, and river. . . . About 100,000 tons of military equipment is estimated to have arrived by rail in 1965, mostly for DRV air defense.”61

High Command: Assessment and Rotation Grand General Luo Ruiqing, chief of the general staff, was in charge of the PLA forces in Vietnam as head of the CCP-​PLA Leading Group for Assisting Vietnam. His Department of General Staff led military operations by carrying out staff and operational functions and implementing battle plans. Within the defense hierarchy, the DGS conveyed policy directives downwards, translated national security and defense policy into specific responsibilities for subordinate departments, oversaw policy implementation on behalf of the CMC, and cooperated with NVA HQs. The DGS also performed other important functions such as procurement, intelligence, troop organization, training, evaluation, and awards and punishment.62 In the fall of 1965, the DGS instructed AAA division commands to make combat reports after each engagement in Vietnam. The high command also asked the Chinese officers to locate downed American planes and to capture any surviving pilots in order to evaluate air defense and help improve performance. The division commands ordered each regiment to rush to the crash site as soon as possible and to guard the “operating area” so neither the Vietnamese nor the Soviets could enter.63 Likewise, if the Soviets arrived on the scene first, the Chinese could not interfere in their “operations.” Since the Chinese were competing against the Soviets, Chinese officers often said that they fought against American imperialists in the sky and against Soviet revisionists on the ground. Thus, each army had its own system of counting American planes. NVA numbers were based on eyewitness reports from local garrisons, militia, or villagers. The crash location also determined a combat success that should belong to the Vietnamese troops at that location.64 The Chinese numbers were based on written reports from division or regimental commanders after each engagement. As is acknowledged, sometimes they could not get to the crash site and collect evidence.65 The Russian numbers were based on their missile firing records and combat photographs. After each SAM launched, radar received a confirmation on the firing result: a hit

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or a miss of the target.66 Not surprisingly, multiple systems produced conflicting information about how many American planes had been shot down in North Vietnam. The AD-​AFC also requested Chinese divisional commands to provide regular briefings and combat reports. Weekly briefings took place between Chinese and Vietnamese officers at the divisional level. Usually a Chinese division deputy commander led several staff members and two translators to meet for several hours with AD-​AFC officers, local garrison commanders, and civilian government representatives.67 If an urgent issue arose, any side could call for an emergency meeting. The combat report was submitted to each Chinese AAA division and to the NVA command within twenty-​four hours after each engagement.68 After each battle, Chinese officers sent their action reports to the Vietnamese, including operational summaries and combat results. AD-​A FC required numbers, if any, of American planes shot down, American pilots captured, Chinese casualties, and civilian casualties, as well as details on bridge and road damage, ammunition used, technical problems, communication failures, or any other problems.69 Beginning in October 1965, the DGS sent nine assessment groups to North Vietnam to deal with increasing casualties and other problems faced by the Chinese AAA troops. The DGS assessment groups evaluated the Sixty-​ First and Sixty-​Third Divisions’ performance, morale, supplies, and communication as well as relations with the NVA and local governments. Based on these assessments, the DGS revealed several problems the Chinese divisions faced in Vietnam.70 In the January 1966 assessment report, the General Staff warned of a gradual decrease in the combat effectiveness of the two AAA divisions in North Vietnam.71 This decrease began in the third month after Chinese troops entered Vietnam, and it became serious by the end of five months. Some of the AAA companies had 60 percent of their men sick, wounded, or hospitalized by their fifth month in Vietnam.72 The Chinese border provinces like Guangxi and Yunnan began to establish additional hospitals to meet PLA demands to treat large numbers of wounded and sick soldiers from Vietnam.73 The assessment reports revealed a large number of non-​combat related casualties due to weather, illness, and accidents on the front.74 Heat and diseases in the jungle were as deadly as the air strikes. According to the field report, in October and November, when Vietnam’s dry season began, Chinese troops often operated in temperatures between 100 and110 degrees Fahrenheit. The

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soldiers were perspiring all day, and some of them became sick from afflictions such as bacterial and fungal infections, jungle rot, malaria, hepatitis, and ringworm (from bad water).75 Exposure to the Vietnamese jungles proved as harsh and deadly as American bombs. When the assessment groups visited the two divisions, they documented a lack of fresh food supplies, with no fresh vegetables for months at a time.76 Later assessments reported that during the following spring, endless monsoon rains arrived, and the average humidity remained at 85 to 90 percent. These monsoons ensured that the men stayed constantly damp and wet, and on a daily basis they dealt with discomfort, pain, and even death, sometimes caused by venomous snakes.77 All the soldiers lost weight, and some lost as much as thirty pounds in two months. When assessment groups visited the field hospital, they were surprised to see the hospital full of sick soldiers. Moreover, the assessments concluded that it was impossible to improve the food supply since any imported fresh food would spoil due to the long distance from China to Vietnam. Some troops even cultivated land around their artillery positions and grew vegetables in their own gardens.78 These non-​ combat activities, which took away training time and manpower, reduced the troops’ combat effectiveness. The assessment reports also warned the high command in Beijing that the sickness and weather-​related casualties would increase later, as more and more AAA troops came from north and northeast China—​men who would be unfamiliar with the weather and living conditions in Vietnam.79 The DGS and PLAAF found it difficult to replenish supplies or repair damaged artillery pieces for each unit in Vietnam. More companies steadily became non-​ operational. Several PLA field medical facilities in North Vietnam could not provide proper care for the hospitalized men due to both combat and non-​combat casualties. Luo suggested to the CMC a regular rotation of AAA divisions following the PLA experience in the Korean War.80 Rotation would relieve the fatigued and exhausted units and send in fresh ones with good health and high morale. This meant that when a division’s combat effectiveness fell, the high command should call it back to China instead of attempting to fix it in Vietnam. When a fresh division replaced the returning division, it would help maintain a high combat effectiveness of Chinese troops in the war.81 The CMC decided in December 1965 to rotate their AAA divisions for rest and recuperation (R&R). Each division operated for at least six months, but no longer than eight months, in Vietnam and was then was replaced by

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another.82 In the west zone, four AAA divisions rotated in 1966–​1967. In the east zone, three divisions rotated in 1966–​1967.83 In the central zone, the PLA high command sent an additional division in December 1966 (see Chart 3.1 The PLAAF AAA formation in Vietnam, 1965–​1968). However, some NVA generals disliked the Chinese rotation policy. Lieutenant General Huynh Thu Truong (NVA, ret.) complained in the interview that it usually took several months for a Chinese division to become accustomed to the weather, the terrain, the American air raids, and combat conditions.84 When it became combat-​effective and was able to shoot down American airplanes in the third or fourth month, it had to begin preparing for departure by the fifth month.85 The new division would again repeat the same cycle and learning curve. As a senior artillery expert, Truong’s war experience, both in the North and in the South, reflected the NVA’s view on Chinese combat effectiveness. In the 1960s Truong served as an artillery officer at the Ninth Quan Khu Phao Binh [Artillery] Training Center, NVA Artillery Academy at Hanoi, and Artillery Training Department at the NVA HQs. He was promoted to the rank of major general in 1964.86 Vietnamese officers complained that the Chinese did not shoot down enough American airplanes to protect North Vietnam; thus the Chinese felt pressure, even the obligation, to shoot down more American planes for the Vietnamese.87

Casualty-​Aversion and Political Control, 1966–​1967 Newly arrived divisions inherited some knowledge of the previous air defense tactics, and they also made some changes in combat plans after officers observed the problems and followed the rotation policy. The rotation policy resulted from a desire to limit Chinese casualties in the air defense. Therefore, the regiment commanders became more patient, looking for an opportunity to shoot down enemy airplanes while protecting defensive positions on the ground as much as possible. There was a shift from an aggressive active defense in 1965–​1966 to a more cautious air defense to reduce casualties in 1966–​1967. The 626th Regiment of the Sixty-​Seventh Zhidui (Division) had learned a bloody lesson in its early battles. On February 18, 1966, the Sixty-​Seventh Division replaced the Sixty-​First at Yen Bai. The Sixty-​Seventh had been founded in Shenyang in June 1957, and later transferred to the Ji’nan Regional Command under the army command in 1958. The newly arrived division included the 608th, 619th, 625th, and 626th Regiments, plus the 607th Regiment, which did not return to China with the Sixty-​Third Division after

15

CVFAV Air Defense

East Zone

Central Zone

23rd Reg. 63rd Division

32nd Division

607th Reg.

Comm: Fan Zhensheng Pol Com: Du Hedi

Command

Comm: Xu Xianzhou

609th Reg.

West Zone

4th Reg. 5th Reg. 6th Reg.

61st Division

601st Reg.

Comm: Wang

602nd Reg.

Qinghua

603rd Reg.

Pol Com: Xie Teshan

627th Reg.

629th Reg.

628th Reg. 602nd Reg.

33rd Division Comm: Jin Feng Pol Com: Li Chaoyu

Comm: Yuan Shaofan

8th Reg.

Pol Com: Zhang Keli

9th Reg.

Comm: Wang Siqian

605th Reg.

Pol Com: Cui Qingfu

70th Division Comm: Zhang Jianzhong

31st Division

1st Reg.

Comm: Yan Fuzeng

16th Reg.

Pol Com:

29th Reg.

625th Reg. 626th Reg.

35th Division Comm:

13th Reg.

Huang Mingpu

14th Reg.

608th Reg.

621st Reg. 640th Reg. 641st Reg.

65th Division

613th Reg.

Comm: Wang Jianshu

614th Reg.

Pol Com: Zhang

Pol Com: Li Jingyan 642nd Reg.

Linjing

68th Division *

3rd Reg. 4th Reg.

*

615th Reg. 616th Reg. 623rd Reg.

2nd Reg.

319th Reg.

1st Reg.

610th Reg. *

64th Division Comm: Yao Fuhe Pol Com: Li Qinfu

611th Reg. 612th Reg. 622nd Reg.

15th Reg. 66th Division

615th Reg.

Comm: Wang Huaiyi

617th Reg.

20th Reg.

Pol Com: Chen

618th Reg.

21st Reg.

Jingxiao

8th Reg.

*

37th Division

24th Reg.

24th Reg. 39th Division

25th Reg.

Comm: Wang Mingjiu

26th Reg.

*

27th Reg. 18th Reg. 30th Reg. 34th Division

619th Reg.

19th Reg.

28th Reg.

Pol Com: Ma Jiaxiang

67th Division 604th Reg.

620th Reg.

22nd Reg.

Zhang Jinfan

608th Reg.

*

62nd Division

7th Reg.

* A regiment served its second tour.

523rd Reg. 525th Reg. 528th Reg.

CHART 3.1  The PLAAF AAA formation in Vietnam, 1965–​1968

624th Reg.

*

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a one-​year tour, but transferred to the Sixty-​Seventh command for eight more months in Vietnam. Division commander Wang Siqian was a Korean War veteran and former chief of staff of the Sixty-​First with Cui Qingfu as the political commissar and Lu Jianming as the chief staff. At the first division meeting, Wang asked all regimental commanders to pay more attention to the troops’ protection and safety. Wang then assigned his 626th to protect the Bao Ha Bridge, a forty-​ meter-​long railway bridge near the Bao Ha train station. In the first month after the 626th arrived, there were sixteen US air raids on the bridge and train station. The 626th had not yet found an opportunity to shoot down a plane, as they did not want to give away artillery positions that would result in troop casualties. It was not until April 15, 1966 that the 626th was put into action. That afternoon, two F-​105 Thunderchief fighter-​bombers approached the Bao Ha Bridge and train station at low altitude, oblivious to AAA troops in the area. The regiment commander saw a good opportunity and ordered his men to open fire. The 626th shot down one and damaged the other F-​105 in its first battle.88 While celebrating their first victory, Zheng Yongle, head of the regimental staff, warned the troops of possible American retaliation against their positions. The regiment command inspected the artillery radar, added more outpost points, and practiced safety drills and rescue procedures. Two days later, at about 5:01 pm on April 17, six F-​105 fighters attacked the 626th positions from behind the Elephant Mountain (from the northeast). The regiment commander ordered the troops to “fire at the first, then the third, and the fifth planes!” All the artillery pieces opened fire when the airplanes approached at an 8,400-​foot altitude. Three bombs dropped by the F-​105s hit the 37mm gun positions of the Second Company, leaving twenty-​four men dead, thirty-​two wounded, and four guns destroyed.89 The 626th Regiment began to adopt more cautious tactics in the spring of 1966 aimed to protect the troops and avoid casualties. These casualty-​averse methods and protective tactics prevented the 626th from losing more men and artillery pieces in the April 18 attack. At 3:45 pm on April 18, four F-​105s attacked the same defensive positions again, and dropped eighteen heavy bombs. But since the regiment had moved its troops out of position, the air raid caused little damage to the 626th. At 4:19 pm, four F-​105s approached Bao Ha from the southwest and began diving toward the bridge and train station. When these F-​105s got to 9,000 feet, the regiment commander without any delay ordered, “Aim at the first and third planes, open fire!” The artillery shells had exploded near these planes before they could drop the bombs on

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the targets. The 626th shot down two planes within one minute and thirty-​ two seconds without any casualties or damage.90 Later that day, the 626th held a meeting to discuss how to better protect their positions. The regiment made three immediate changes in its operation. First of all, the 626th immediately abandoned some positions that were exposed to air attacks and moved troops overnight into new sites on the south bank of the Red River. These new positions, away from the bridge and train station, would not be directly under enemy fire. Secondly, the regiment would open fire earlier, before the enemy planes could drop the bombs. Thirdly, the seriously damaged Second Company would not be put back into action; instead, the company was pulled out that evening to the regiment’s rear area for rest and recovery. By October 1966, the Sixty-​Seventh Division had a total of 223 engagements, shooting down 89 American planes and damaging 112.91 The Vietnamese officers, however, continued to complain that the newly arrived Chinese AAA troops still could not shoot down enough American aircraft to stop the Rolling Thunder attacks. The Official History of the PAVN written by the Military History Institute of Vietnam after the war criticizes the PLA tactics of 1966:  “A number of anti-​aircraft artillery units did not properly resolve the question of the relationship between killing the enemy and protecting the target. They emphasized firing to scare off and drive away enemy aircraft, putting up a ‘curtain of fire.’ This type of tactic . . . was not effective either in shooting down enemy aircraft or in protecting the target.”92 There were at least three other reasons beside the Chinese casualty concerns. One of the reasons behind the poor performance of the second echelon of Chinese AAA divisions was that the previous tactics lost effectiveness in 1966–​1967. The American pilots had become familiar with the air defense tactics of the first group of two Chinese AAA divisions through 1965, and they were not easily surprised or deceived by the same tactics when employed by the later Chinese divisions. Moreover, “As more and more sorties were flown over North Vietnam, the coordination between USAF and USN aircraft became more significant.”93 Another reason for the Chinese struggle to protect Vietnamese transportation was that the JCS increased the number of Rolling Thunder air strikes, including more attacks on the AAA sites. On March 1, 1966, the JCF authorized 8,100 sorties per month.94 Tucker points out that “Washington steadily escalated the bombing of the North from more than 10,000 sorties a month in 1966 to more than 13,000 a month in 1967.”95 From June 1966 to May 1967, the United States increased its air attacks against the North in what was

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categorized as “continuous bombing” by the second group of Chinese AAA forces, the Sixty-​Seventh, Thirty-​First, and Sixty-​Fifth Divisions. The United States bombed nearly every day without a break; there were 323 attacks in eleven months with 2,891 waves, and 9,262 sorties. Moreover, the bombing hit rate also steadily increased. Tucker states, “Bombs struck thousands of fixed targets, many more than once, and thousands more moving targets.”96 US planes dropped 5,992 bombs against 815 targets in the Chinese areas; 960 bombs, or 16  percent, hit their target.97 According to the CHECO Reports, Rolling Thunder caused more damage between July 1965 and December 1966 than ever before, including 2,999 bridges totally destroyed and 1,454 damaged; 6,548 buildings totally destroyed and 7,101 damaged; and 8,114 road sections and 887 railway sections either cut or destroyed.98 An additional reason behind the slow improvement of the Chinese air defense depended on the human, rather than any technological component. In early 1966, the PLA sent one more AAA division to Vietnam. It seemed rational to Chinese commanders, who believed that a larger force should achieve a bigger or better result. The facts of the increasing damages of US air strikes in 1966 were contrary to long-​held Chinese beliefs. Nevertheless, all the nine Chinese AAA divisions were able to maintain good morale through the rotation policy and political control. In the summer of 1966, the First AAA Division in the Shenyang Military Region under the air force command received an order to replace the Sixty-​Third Division in Vietnam. The PLAAF First AAA Division was renamed as the Thirty-​First Zhidui (Division) in a new order of battle for the Vietnam War with Yan Fuzeng as division commander and Zhang Jinfan as political commissar. The division included the 1st, 2nd, 16th, and 319th Regiments, plus two AAA battalions from the navy and three battalions from the army. After the division assembled in August at Ningming, about thirty miles from the border, its HQ sent Vietnamese translators to serve at the regiment, battalion, and company levels. A  searchlight battalion was assigned to the division for night operations and some medics and technicians were also added to each regiment. At Ningming, the AAA troops had a four-​week foreign war orientation, including the study of US fighters and bombers. All Chinese soldiers and officers were required to take off Chinese uniforms and put on Vietnamese light green uniforms and gray caps without ranks. Sergeant Zhao Shunfen (PLAAF, ret.), a squad leader, and Corporal Wang Xiangcai (PLAAF, ret.), one of his men in the squad, laughed at each other

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while putting on Vietnamese uniforms. Zhao and Wang had known one another for a long time, as they were from the same town.99 Sgt. Zhao and Corp. Wang were in the Fourth Company of the 319th Regiment. At the age of nineteen they had both joined the PLA in December 1964 and were assigned to the Shenyang First AAA Division.100 The division had fought in the Korean War and its guns and equipment were old. They had the same weapons that were used in the Korean War, including 100mm, 76mm, and 57mm AAA pieces, and 37mm anti-​aircraft machine guns. The Russian-​made 100mm cannons could launch shells up to an altitude of 30,000 feet. They remembered that the different guns were mixed to arm each regiment. The combination could provide a fire zone from 8,000 to 30,000 feet. Their company had 150 men, operating ten artillery pieces and the same number of machine guns. Wang recalled that “As a new recruit, I didn’t get a big-​ gun post. I became a machine gunner to protect the artillery positions, but I had no complaints. I enjoyed drilling in the morning, riding on the truck, talking to the men across the countryside, and eating in the army mess hall.”101 Generally speaking, the pre-​war training conducted during the month before the Chinese troops’ entrance into Vietnam was politically oriented, with an emphasis on political studies of Mao Zedong’s revolutionary thoughts. Lin Biao, defense minister after the fall of Marshal Peng Dehuai since September 1959, played a crucial role in creating the cult of Mao after he emerged as top military leader. Lin had proved himself a great student and loyal follower of Mao since the early years of the Chinese revolution. He emphasized politics in command, promoted Mao’s personality cult, and carried out a leftist policy for the PLA. In October 1960, for example, Lin launched a mass political campaign in the PLA to study Mao’s thoughts which he called the “peak of modern thought.”102 Reading classes replaced training and drills in all the services. In May 1964, Lin Biao organized the compilation of Quotations from Chairman Mao, known worldwide as the Little Red Book, guiding soldiers and later the Chinese people to participate in the Cultural Revolution. Some historians describe it as the “Maoization of the PLA.”103 After May 1966, both PLA soldiers and officers studied Maoist theories and propaganda materials of the ongoing Cultural Revolution.104 Political education or political studies replaced technology training, field communication studies, and coordinative practice between the different units and the service branches. It was a general reversal of the success of previous foreign wars, namely the Korean War and the Sino-​Indian War. When in Vietnam, the Chinese troops were required to study Mao’s Little Red Book for one hour first thing in the morning, every day, all through the entire period

210

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of 1965–​1971. Every man and officer had to submit a reading report every week.105 The Thirty-​First Division, just like other PLA forces at home, became more politicalized after it entered Vietnam with four regiments in September and October 1966. Following the orders from the divisional and regiments’ commissars, each battalion scheduled “daily reading” of Mao’s Little Red Book and organized relevant discussions, presentations, and group activities after they arrived in Vietnam. The men in the Fourth Company appeared to enjoy these activities as part of their literature learning experience. The favorite part of the daily routine of Sgt. Zhao was the two-​hour of political study or “motivational education.” He called it “reading and writing class.” “I had so much fun picking up the books again after having left school four years previously,” he said. “The company political instructor taught world history and Chinese literature in order to help the soldiers understand the communist theory and the thoughts of Mao Zedong.”106 The political instructor taught Chinese characters and grammar so Zhao and others could write essays expressing their own understanding of the Chinese revolution, to exchange ideas with others, and to build loyalty to the party. Zhao’s first essay, six pages long, was an application for Communist Party membership. During the interview, he told the author sincerely, “I really wanted to join the party at that time. I had no doubt about it. Nobody twisted my arm. I still believe that it was a right decision, and that it is probably one of the most important decisions in my entire life. About six months later, my application was accepted by the CCP party branch in our company.”107 Corp. Wang had learned about the Vietnam War through his political studies. “China and Vietnam are neighboring countries,” the political instructor told the men of the Fourth Company. “We have been good neighbors for the past 1,000 years. Today China is a Communist state and North Vietnam also has a Communist government. We are Communist brothers in addition to our traditional friendship.” He told the men that imperialist America was invading Vietnam, separating the country into North and South Vietnam. America was the common enemy of both China and Vietnam. The Vietnamese people’s future was dependent on international Communist aid and support, he told them. His company political instructor then raised a question: “What should we do when a bad guy breaks into our good neighbor’s home?” “We should help,” the men answered. “That’s right,” continued the instructor. “If we don’t stop the Americans in Vietnam, they will invade Cambodia next, then Laos, Thailand, and eventually China.”108 The instructor told the men that

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assisting Vietnam was defending China. The instructor’s interpretation of the “Domino Theory” in Chinese style made sense to Zhao and Wang, who remembered America’s invasion of Korea and its occupation of Taiwan. Zhao’s strong political spirit and hard work made him a squad leader (equivalent to a sergeant) just before his regiment entered Vietnam. As the vanguard of the division, the 319th Regiment crossed the Youyiguan [Friendship Pass] in September 1966. At the border, a group of NVA officers greeted the regiment commanders with a welcome reception held in the checkpoint office. During their briefing, Vietnamese officers told the Chinese commanders that the United States had been trying to destroy North Vietnam with large-​scale bombing, and that they badly needed the Chinese anti-​aircraft firing power to stop US air attacks.109 Entering North Vietnam, the 319th kept moving south along Highway 1 into the east zone. Under the guidance of an NVA officer, the regiment passed Lang Son (about twelve miles from the border) in the afternoon, exited at the forty-​three-​mile mark on Highway 1, then turned onto a muddy country road. After a six-​hour bumpy ride into the mountains, the troops finally stopped before midnight in a quiet, deep forest about seventy miles from the border. In this dark forest, the men were surprised to see a well-​built field camp waiting for them. It included bamboo shelters, showers, and pinewood beds. The 319th was replacing a regiment from the Beijing Regional Command, which had built everything needed for operations before rotating back to China. The Thirty-​First Division was assigned by AD-​AFC to provide air defense over Lang Son, including its cities, railroads, and highways in the east zone. The division command deployed two regiments along Highway 1, a sixty-​mile section from north to south, through Lang Son province. The 319th Regiment was assigned to protect a local road, as well as a bridge, between Highway 1 and Thai Nguyen along the Lang Son-​Hao Binh provincial border.110 The rest of the troops and division headquarters were stationed three miles off Highway 1, eight miles south of Lang Son City. The division’s supply depot and field hospital were located in the same area. After the 319th arrived at its defense area, the regional command of the NVA sent its officers to welcome the Chinese regiment and to again talk about Vietnamese air defense needs. Sgt. Zhao’s battalion was assigned to protect a bridge on the local road. They worked all night, not sleeping the first night. Zhao had to position his machine gun up the hill on the south side of the bridge. He recalled, “It was rainy, foggy, and muddy, with many insects and thick bushes. My twin-​ barreled machine gun seemed much heavier than it had been. After I’d done

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my job, I helped others push the big guns up the hill as a CCP member should do. We barely made it before dawn.”111 The next morning at about 9:20 am (September 30, 1966), their battalion received a call from the regiment headquarters that six F-​105 fighter-​bombers were coming in their direction. Wang Xiangcai described the first day as being nervous or “a little” scared. However, he believed that his cause was just, and that he had the support of his country. These beliefs were all he needed to go into battle and win the fight. He did not think much about his own survival since he was convinced that he would make it as long as his company and his comrades did well.112 At 9:35 am, the battalion’s first outpost, about thirty miles south, called in and reported that four F-​105s, at middle speed and at an altitude of 18,000 feet, were flying from southeast to northwest. Five minutes later the second outpost, about ten miles south of the bridge, reported: “Four 105s are coming!” The same message was passed on from battalion headquarters to the company commanders. “Ready,” the captain of the Fourth Company yelled over the loudspeakers on the hill.113 Wang recalled that the approaching jet engines sounded like “rolling thunder.” The captain shouted, “100[mm]s, 76[mm]s, fire!” The big guns opened fire before Wang could see the planes. Although Wang had learned a lot about American fighters and bombers, he did not realize that they were so noisy and fast. The hill shook, the sky was smoking, and the air smelled of burning gunpowder. He barely heard the captain’s order, “37[mm]s, fire!” Wang looked intently into the sky and saw that two of the fighters had split off and seemed intent on striking Chinese positions. He aimed at one of them and pulled the trigger. The 37mm anti-​aircraft machine gun roared and sent bullets flying toward the American fighter. The planes did not dive, but just flew over the hill. Wang turned his gun 180 degrees and kept firing until the planes disappeared from sight. “Cease fire,” the captain ordered. Wang, sweating and out of breath, realized that the whole battle took only minutes.114 “Oah, oah, oah!” He and Zhao jumped out of their positions and cheered with an inexplicable joy when they knew the American fighters had gone. Even though the American planes had just passed through the area, it seemed important for the men to taste actual combat. Zhao recalled: “We now felt confident. We knew how combat was, and we knew that we could make it.”115 At lunch that day, the men toasted each other with green tea for their first battle. Zhao was promoted to a platoon leader (or second lieutenant) after a battle in December when he continued firing after a bullet ripped through his left leg. He received his award and promotion for his action in a field hospital

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in North Vietnam. In January 1967, he was transferred back to China for further treatment. Wang remained stationed in Vietnam until later that spring, when the Thirty-​First Division returned to China after a one-​year tour in North Vietnam.

Tactical Changes: Mobility and Flexibility In the summer of 1966, the Chinese Cultural Revolution became a nationwide political struggle with extensive purges. With Lin’s support, Mao used mass organizations such as the Red Guards to publicly attack party and government hierarchy officials and purge his political rivalries. In 1967–​1968, the Chinese military moved to the center of domestic politics, and Lin Biao became the second most powerful leader in the country, next to Mao. Lin brought the people’s army back by emphasizing Mao’s “people’s war” principle and military-​civilian integration. In 1966, Lin published his book, Long Live the Victory of People’s War, which emphasized the PLA’s experience. Chinese AAA operations in Vietnam needed to have better performance to show their military tradition and political loyalty. Since no new technology was available, the divisions had to demonstrate tactical improvement, an emphasis that permeated the Chinese combat experience and operational culture. The use of very traditional strategies from military classics and PLA military history helped in maneuvering the AAA divisions to a point where they could obtain the best advantage in their air defense efforts.116 While it was possible for the Chinese to shoot down American planes, it was their ability to preserve their forces that may have been their greatest success. In May 1967, Major Guo Haiyun (PLAAF, ret.) served as chief of staff of the 2nd Battalion, 626th Regiment, Sixty-​Fourth Division, replacing the Sixty-​Fifth Division in the west zone. Guo joined the PLA in 1948 at the age of sixteen during the last year of the Chinese Civil War. After the war was over, Guo was sent to a PLA artillery school in Shenyang to study artillery technology. After the Korean War broke out in the summer of 1950 and China sent its troops to Korea in the fall, the name of his school was changed to the Shenyang Antiaircraft Artillery Academy in order to establish an air defense both in North Korea and in China against American air power. From 1950 to 1955, Guo studied aviation technology, radar systems, and anti-​aircraft defense, as well as the Russian language. After graduation he was assigned as a platoon leader in an AAA battalion of the PLA Twenty-​Fourth Army. In the summer of 1955, Guo’s battalion left the Twenty-​Fourth Army and was regrouped into the 2nd Battalion, 626th Regiment, Sixty-​Fourth Division.

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Between 1957 and 1965 he was promoted to company commander, battalion staff, and subsequently battalion deputy commander in the Sixty-​Fourth.117 The Sixty-​Fourth Division was founded in December 1950 in Andong (Dandong), a city across the Yalu River from North Korea. The division, including the 610th, 611th, and 612th Regiments, entered the Korean War in February 1951. After its return to China in 1954, the division received several AAA battalions from infantry troops and regrouped them into its own 622nd Regiment in 1955 under the army command. In 1966, the Sixty-​Fourth had Yao Fuhe as division commander, Li Qinfu as political commissar, and Wang Kai as chief of staff. In 1967, the division also included the 626th Regiment, which returned back to Vietnam after it had served its first tour from February to October 1966 under the Sixty-​Seventh Division command. To make the Sixty-​Fourth combat ready, the DGS provided a three-​month training in the fall of 1966 for staff officers at battalion, regiment, and division levels. As a battalion chief of staff, Major Guo Haiyun recalled: “We spent two months in Southwest China, learning new communication technologies, cooperative operations, and, of course, Vietnamese.”118 In early November his training group crossed the border and entered Vietnam for further training. They received live combat situational training through observing the 3rd Regiment of the Sixty-​Fifth Division, which would be replaced by the Sixty-​Fourth. There, Guo learned more about America’s Rolling Thunder air campaign, Vietnam’s landscape, command and control, plans and operations, and cooperation with the NVA AD-​AFC. Guo told the author that he also heard a lot of complaints from the Sixty-​Fifth officers during that month.119 His training group returned to China in late December. In May 1967, the Sixty-​Fourth Division began entering Vietnam to take over the Sixty-​Fifth’s air defense of the railways from Lao Cai to Yen Bai in the west zone. Having learned from early Chinese AAA operations, the division command followed the same tactics—​“actively defend the key point, keep the troops together, and concentrate firepower.”120 Each regiment, however, was equipped with the same kind of AAA guns. The Sixty-​Fourth deployed its 610th Regiment with 85mm guns, 622nd with 57mm guns, and 626th with 37mm guns around its key defense area, Yen Bai. There the division command had a total of 138 anti-​aircraft artillery pieces as well as 99 anti-​aircraft machine guns. The search light battalion was also deployed at Yen Bai. The division assigned its 611th with 37mm guns to Sun Chai, and 612th to Bao He. Each defense area was divided into several defensive positions. Each position was to have at least one battalion in order to have sufficient firepower. On June 12, the 622nd engaged and shot down one RF-​4C reconnaissance

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airplane.121 Colonel Jerry N.  Hoblit, a USAF pilot who flew the F-​105F, recalled during interviews that the Chinese AAA fire zone at Yen Bai was “one of the most sophisticated air defense systems in the world.”122 From June 1967 to March 1968, the US forces intensified their bombing, or the “bombing in waves” phase, described by the Chinese as the heaviest of all the years. The raids averaged twice a day, and in some cases five times a day. The USAF launched 545 air raids with 1,744 waves, totaling 12,000 sorties against 1,369 targets. The planes dropped 18,000 bombs and 2,241 (about 12.4  percent), hit their target. Of the Chinese sections, about 110 miles of 332 miles of railway were destroyed or damaged, more than 30  percent.123 According to the Chinese Railway Engineering Division’s estimates, from June 1965 to October 1968, American planes dropped 288,000 bombs along the railways. In the peak month of June 1967, American bombers released sixteen tons of ordnance per mile on these railways, and 2.5 to 6.3 tons per meter directed at the major railway bridges. Chinese anti-​aircraft defenses and railway repair were inextricably intertwined.124 The CHECO Report from January 1967 to November 1968 showed that “a significant portion of North Vietnam’s war-​making potential had been destroyed.”125 Its Rolling Thunder statistics totaled 5,576 damaged or destroyed transportation motor vehicles, 2,507 damaged or destroyed transportation rail vehicles, 179 railway yards, 1,923 AAA sites, and 1,568 staging and supply areas.126 Frankum, Jr. points out that US General Westmoreland believed that “the air war would eventually bring down the Hanoi government because it would no longer be able to feed its people or provide an economy that would sustain the population.”127 On July 4, 1967, the division commanded its first major engagement. On that afternoon, four F-​105 bombers came to attack the bridge, escorted by four F-​4C fighters. Waiting until they reached about 13,500 feet above the Sixty-​Fourth position, commander Yao Fuhe ordered to open fire. All the warplanes pulled up and fled. The officers and men were relieved and happy that their first engagement concluded without casualties.128 On July 13, another air raid at Yen Bai included thirteen groups, totaling forty fighters and bombers. The first groups made a feint to attract Chinese firepower as twelve attacking bombers flew in three groups at low altitude. Closing in on the target, they suddenly pulled up to a high altitude, and then dived down out of the strong sunshine to bomb the train station and two railway bridges. The Chinese guns did not have sufficient time to turn around from the deceptive first attack of these bombers, which had dropped fifty-​six bombs, destroying the station and damaging the bridges. The Sixty-​Fourth suffered

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some casualties and lost several artillery pieces. “It was not a good battle,” as commander Yao Fuhe described it.129 The Sixty-​Fourth’s next engagement was a large-​scale air battle on the morning of July 20, when nearly one hundred American warplanes approached the Yen Bai area. When the American planes came within thirty to forty miles of the 626th’s positions, the regiment’s search radars detected the targets and sent the data to gun-​laying radars. In the meantime, one of the gun-​laying radars spotted the targets and passed the information to Maj. Guo’s battalion commanding center. Guo and his staff members calculated the data and sent out the artillery fix to each company. Waiting until the planes entered the air defense fire net, the regimental commanders issued fire orders to all 100mm, 85mm, and 37mm guns. From the north side of the bridge, Guo’s Fourth Company opened fire on the fighters and bombers. The American airplanes tried to pull out and escape from the well-​organized and heavy Chinese fire. “We got it! We got it!” yelled the Fourth commander so loudly that Guo could hear him from the radio over the heavy bombing and intensive artillery shelling. Major Guo recalled during interviews: “I looked up in the sky. One of the bombers was flying away with black smoke trailing, the plane swinging like a drunkard. I ordered the search team immediately to look for a crashed plane and American pilots. A dozen soldiers picked up their rifles and rushed into the jungle.”130 Two days later, Guo’s search squad returned without finding the crash site. The battalion did not change its combat report that the Fourth Company had shot down one American airplane on July 20.131 The Sixty-​Fourth’s combat effectiveness was improved after each engagement. The command instructed all regiments to drill their troops according to the war situation. “The battle of September 16 was one of these good fights,” the division commander recalled.132 In that afternoon, twenty American airplanes in five groups were coming toward Sun Chai. When eight of the warplanes, flying in two groups, first feigned an attack on the Chinese artillery positions, the AAA guns opened fire immediately. Then the other twelve bombers headed to the No. 67 Railway Bridge. The Chinese gunners turned around fast enough and were able to fire on the bombers before they reached the target. The American bombers dropped only forty-​five bombs and caused no major damage to the bridge. Their ongoing training paid off as the Sixty-​ Fourth shot down three US warplanes and damaged another two.133 In late 1967, the Sixty-​Fourth Command did not satisfy its combat objectives. The division did not shoot down as many American planes as other divisions did. As a result, the command furthered its operation more flexibly by moving out of its defense perimeter and looking for an engagement near the

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flying routes of the American planes instead of waiting for one at the bombing targets.134 The division command had learned from these operational problems and changed its operation from onsite defense to combat flexibility. The division planned to ambush American planes at their rendezvous points after their raids and on their way back to base. With the planes off guard, with no bombs, low on fuel, and traveling at slow speed, the Chinese guns might have a better chance. Three companies participated in the first ambush battle in July. They had small guns without medium-​range search radar. Their ambush point was crucial for the mobile engagement. The first location chosen was about thirty miles south of the defense area near Bac Ninh, sixty miles north of Hanoi, North Vietnam’s capital city. Their AAA positions were in the middle of almost-​impenetrable jungle. The Chinese had cut through trees and bushes in order to move the big guns into position. Movement through fifteen-​foot high elephant grass and knee-​deep mud not only slowed their position construction, but produced considerable fatigue as well. To better conceal their movement and deployment, no cooking, hot water, or hot food was allowed for these three companies. The men ate powdered rice crackers and canned meat for weeks. And, most frustrating of all, the American planes did not rendezvous there, so the companies waited for a whole week without seeing one target. During the second week the Chinese relocated their positions three miles eastward. Early in the third week, eight American planes came, flying south, at slow speed and low altitude, and in a non-​combat formation. The commander waited until all the planes flew into their ambush zone, and gave the order to fire. All the companies aimed at the targets and fired several rounds. One plane was hit by the intensive explosions of the first shells. Before the American pilots realized they were ambushed, another was hit and on fire. The rest of the airplanes climbed to a high altitude, but they did not leave. Instead, they made a sweeping U-​turn, re-​grouped, and attacked the Chinese AAA positions. They then made a second pass, one after another, and two companies suffered heavy casualties. It was reported that the Chinese troops shot down one warplane and damaged two. Commander Yao recalled: “Our ambush was a big success, and I  believed that Mao’s guerrilla tactics still worked in today’s high-​tech warfare.”135 By January 1968, the Sixty-​fourth had a total of 181 air defense engagements and had shot down 109 American planes, damaged eighty-​five, and collected more than 200 pieces of navigation equipment, control instruments, weapon systems, and air-​to-​surface missiles for PLA air defense research. The division had 40 officers and soldiers killed in action and 246 wounded. On

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January 20, the Sixty-​Fourth left Vietnam and returned to China.136 Yao was promoted to director of the Political Task Department of the Fuzhou Regional Artillery Command in 1969 and served as deputy political commissar of the Fuzhou Regional Artillery Command from 1970 to 1979. Later on, other divisions followed the Sixty-​Fourth’s successful experience with flexibility. According to the PLA official statistics on nine divisions’ combat reports, these divisions shot down 125 American planes by employing mobile defense and ambushing the aircraft, about 20 percent of the total in these two years.137 From 1965 to 1967, the air defense provided by the nine PLA divisions was effective during the first two years of the Chinese intervention. Accounts of the officers reveal that the Chinese AAA commanders were capable of skillfully engaging troops, and accomplishing missions. They adjusted to changing conditions in the jungle and consistently reassessed their own performance. Having realized their technological gaps, they quickly learned how to carry out active defensive strategy by focusing on gaining immense flexibility and increased mobility by shifting their combat goal from protecting a position on the ground to shooting down American warplanes in 1965–​1967. Senior Colonel Wang Zhongchun (PLA) of China’s National Defense University (NDU) believes that the combat experience of field commanders was pivotal for the PLA to shape its strategy and tactics in the Vietnam War. Although there was always a learning curve, they adapted to the foreign war conditions and proved their political morale and combat effectiveness.138 The Chinese anti-​aircraft artillery guns were not superior, but they were effective enough to help the Vietnamese survive Rolling Thunder. Frankum, Jr. concludes, “The influx of Soviet and Chinese technology and technical expertise helped to develop, by the end of 1966, one of the most sophisticated air defense systems in the world.”139

Notes 1. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 1: 275. 2. Wang, Dongdai Zhongguo Kongjun [Contemporary China’s Air Force], 397; Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 551. 3. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 96, 165. 4. Director of Central Intelligence, “SNIE 10-​11-​65: Probable Communist Reactions to a U.S. Course of Action, September 22, 1965,” in NIC, Estimative Products on Vietnam, 294–​96. 5. Qu, “Military Operations of the Chinese Supporting Forces in Vietnam’s Battleground,” 50. Qu began serving as deputy chief of the War Theory and Strategic Research Division of the China Academy of Military Science (CAMS) in 2012.

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6. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 189. 7. CIA, “Current Chinese Communist Intentions in the Vietnam Situation” (SNIE 13-​66), in Tracking the Dragon; National Intelligence Estimates on China during the Era of Mao, 1948–​1976, ed. National Intelligence Council (Pittsburgh, PA: US Government Printing Office, 2004), 411. 8. Maj. Gen. Xu, interview by the author. See also Xu, “The Purchase of Arms from Moscow,” 144–​4 6. 9. Tucker, Vietnam, 120. 10. The other two tactics for the Operation Rolling Thunder air campaign to achieve its objectives were to “destroy the DRV infrastructure that supported the war and interdict the movement of personnel and supplies used to maintain the war.” Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 35. 11. CHECO Report, Wesley R.  C. Melyan and Lee Bonetti, “ROLLING THUNDER—​July-​December 1965—​Continuing Report” ( July 15, 1967), 23, quoted in Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 34. 12. CHECO Report, Melyan and Bonetti, Figure  9, quoted in Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 35. 13. The Sixty-​first Division was stationed at Lushun, under the Shenyang Regional Command, in 1955–​1964. The 629th Regiment was later added to the division. For the AAA divisions in the Korean War, see General Hong Xuezhi, “The CPVF’s Combat and Logistics,” in Li, Millett, and Yu, Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, 131–​32. 14. Li Ruihua, “Secret Foreign Mission:  Assisting Vietnam and Resisting the U.S.—​Combat Observation Reports on the AAA Sixty-​first Division; Report #2, August 10, 1965,” in Shang and Xing, Xuesa yuenan [Blood Shed in Vietnam],  5–​6. 15. Major General Qu Aiguo (PLA), “Hundred Battles with Great Victories:  the Combat Experience of the AAA Sixty-​first Division in the War to Resist the U.S. and Assist Vietnam,” Junshi lishi [Military History] 9 (2005): 12–​14. 16. Captain Zhang Yongfu (PLA, ret.), interview by the author in Changchun, Jilin, July 15–​17, 2006. Zhang was a sergeant in Third Company, 602nd Regiment, Sixty-​first Division when he entered Vietnam in 1965. See also the CCP Central Committee, “The Central Committee’s Approval of Sending Aid to Vietnam on June 18, 1965,” in Yunnan yu yuanyue kangmei (dang’an wenxian) [Yunnan and Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US: Archival Documents], ed. Xiao Zuhou and Li Danhui (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archives and Manuscript Press], 2004), 56–​57. 17. Li Zhensen, “Ten Combat Observation Reports on the Vietnam Front,” in Shang and Xing, Xuesa yuenan [Blood Shed in Vietnam], 24–​25. 18. Zhou Qing, “Winning the First Battle,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist America], 3. Zhou was deputy commander of the Sixty-​ First Division.

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19. CIA, “Current Chinese Communist Intentions in the Vietnam Situation” (SNIE 13-​66),  411. 20. Li, “Secret Foreign Mission: Combat Observation Report on August 10, 1965,” 7–​ 8; Zhou, “Winning the First Battle,” 3. 21. Capt. Zhang, interviews by the author; Zhou, “Winning the First Battle,” 4. 22. Qu, “Military Operations of the Chinese Supporting Forces in the Vietnam’s Battleground,” 48. 23. Quoted in Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 423–​24. 24. Capt. Zhang, interviews by the author; Qu, “Hundred Battles with Great Victories,” 18. 25. The CMC document is quoted in Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 551. 26. Sunzi, The Art of War, trans. and intro. by Roger Ames (New  York:  Ballantine Books, 1993), 127. 27. For more information on the interrogation of the American pilot, see Li, “Secret Foreign Mission: Combat Observation Report on August 31, 1965,” 7–​8. 28. Li’s report on September 9, 1965, “Secret Foreign Mission: Combat Observation Report on August 31, 1965,” 16. 29. Zhou, “Winning the First Battle,” 5. 30. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 34. 31. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 92. 32. The division became known in the PLA AAA Corps when Lieutenant Colonel Zhang Qingrong, Deputy Commander of the Sixty-​Third Division, fled the country on a fishing boat to Taiwan on December 17, 1957. Zhang was granted the rank of colonel in the Nationalist (GMD) Army in Taiwan; however, he was executed by the Taiwanese government in 1958. For the AAA divisions in the Korean War, see Li, China’s Battle for Korea, 388–​90. 33. Fang Hang, “The Red Flag Flew over the Border Pass; the Combat Records of the Sixty-​third Division in the War to Assist Vietnam and Resist the U.S.,” in Shang and Xing, Xuesa yuenan [Blood Shed in Vietnam], 55–​56. 34. Captain Ma Zhenhe (PLA, ret.), interviews by the author in Beijing on August 20–​21, 2008. Ma was a lieutenant in First Company, 609th Regiment, Sixty-​Third Division when he entered Vietnam in 1965. 35. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 424. 36. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 89. 37. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 44. 38. Wang, Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun [Contemporary China’s Air Force], 397. 39. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of the Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 551.

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4 0. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 33. 41. Fang, “The Red Flag Flew over the Border Pass,” 63–​64; Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 551. 42. Wang Baokui, “My Combat Experience in the Air Defense at Sao Ha and Lang Son,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist America], 7.  Wang was the political commissar of the 23rd Regiment, Sixty-​Third AAA Division in 1965–​1966. 43. Sunzi, The Art of War, trans. Ames, 104 and 105. 4 4. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 92. 45. Xiao, “Important Military Operations to Stop the War in Indochina,” 2: 453–​54. 4 6. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 41. 47. Wang, Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun [Contemporary China’s Air Force], 398. 48. Captain Bill Luplow (USAF, ret.), “Skyhawks versus the Viet Cong,” in Marine Air: The History of the Flying Leathernecks in Word and Photos, ed. Robert F. Dorr (New York: Berkley Caliber Books, 2005): 211. 49. Wang, “My Combat Experience in the Air Defense at Sao Ha and Lang Son,” 7. 50. Ibid.,  7–​8. 51. Ibid.,  10–​11. 52. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 90. 53. Ibid.,  86. 54. Fang, “The Red Flag Flew over the Border Pass,” 73–​78. 55. Ibid.,  77. 56. Wang, “My Combat Experience in the Air Defense at Sao Ha and Lang Son,” 9–​10. 57. Ibid.,  11–​12. 58. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 92. 59. Ibid. 60. CHECO Report, Wesley R.  C. Melyan and Lee Bonetti, “ROLLING THUNDER—​July–​December 1965—​Continuing Report” ( July 15, 1967), 23, quoted in Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 34. 61. Director of Central Intelligence, “SNIE 10-​1-​66: Possible Effects of a Proposed US Course of Action on DRV Capability to Support the Insurgency in South Vietnam, February 4, 1966,” in Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948–​1975, 333–​34. 62. For more information on the PLA’s DGS, see David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military:  Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 2002), 127–​31. 63. Chen, Yuezhan qinliji [My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War], 54. 6 4. Shang Like (PLA, ret.), diary entry on May 3, 1965, “The Vanguard for Assisting Vietnam and Resisting the U.S.; the Journal of My trip to Vietnam with the Military Survey Group,” in Shang and Xing, Xuesa yuenan [Blood Shed in Vietnam], 147.

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65. Chen, Yuezhan qinliji [My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War], 59. 6 6. Major T (Soviet Armed Forces, ret.), interviews by the author in Kyiv, Ukraine, in July 2005. Anthony Song was the translator. During the interviews, the major asked me to let him remain anonymous since the Russian government has concealed the participation of the former Soviet Union’s military in the Vietnam War. Most Russian veterans do not want to talk about their experience in Vietnam, and those who are willing to have agreed only on the condition that their names would not be used. See also Maj. T, “Russian Missile Officers in Vietnam,”  66–​68. 67. Chen, Yuezhan qinliji [My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War], 53–​54. 68. Ibid.,  68–​69. 69. Wu, Conglin yishi [Voices from the Jungle], 119–​20. 70. Xiao, “Important Military Operations to Stop the War in Indochina,” 2: 451. 71. The PLA troops in Vietnam had several Chinese field hospitals near each division headquarters, clinics at regimental levels, medical teams at battalion levels, and medics in their companies through 1965–​1969. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 554–​55; Wu, Conglin yishi [Voices from the Jungle], 37, 135–​36. 72. Long, “Show the Valor and Spirit Again,” 67. Long was commander of the CVFAV First Division. 73. Honghe District’s report to the Yunnan Provincial Party Committee and PLA Kunming Regional Command, “Report on the Establishment of Schools and Hospitals in Honghe District,” January 5, 1966, in “Yunnan and Assisting Vietnam and Resisting the U.S.:  The Declassified Archives of the Yunnan Archives,” Guoji lengzhanshi yanjiu [Cold War International History Studies] 1 (2004): 315–​16. 74. Wang, Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun [Contemporary China’s Air Force], 408–​4 09. 75. The Chinese soldiers complained about this all the time. Lieutenant Wang Xiangcai (PLA, ret.), interviews by the author, Harbin, Heilongjiang province, in August 2003. See also Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army, 221; Fang, “The Red Flag Flew over the Border Pass,” 61; Li Ruihua (PLA, ret.), diary entries on November 6, 12, and 28, 1965, “We Are the Just Force: My Journal in Vietnam,” in Shang and Xing, Xuesa yuenan [Blood Shed in Vietnam], 51–​52. 76. The PLA troops in Vietnam had several Chinese field hospitals near each division headquarters, clinics at regimental levels, medical teams at battalion levels, and medics in their companies through 1965–​1969. Li, report on August 7, 1965, “Ten Combat Observation Reports on the Vietnam Front,” 25–​26; Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 554–​55. 77. Li, combat observation report on September 9, 1965, “Secret Foreign Mission,” 16; Chen, Yuezhan qinliji [My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War], 17.

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78. Xun Youming, “The Stories about Firewood and Hot Pepper,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 32. 79. For example, the Sixty-​First Division was from the Beijing Military Region Command, and the Thirty-​First from the Shenyang Military Region Command. Both were from north or northeast China. 80. The CMC met in December 1965 and decided to rotate the PLA AAA divisions in Vietnam. See Zhou Enlai Military Record Compilation Team, Zhou Enlai junshi huodong jishi [Records of Zhou Enlai’s Military Affairs] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 2000), 2: 623. 81. Qu, “Military Operations of the Chinese Supporting Forces in the Vietnam’s Battleground,”  49–​50. 82. Chen, Yuezhan qinliji [My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War], 21. 83. Yao, “Battles of Bravery and Wisdom,” 13. 84. Lieutenant General Huynh Thu Truong (NVA, ret.), interviews by the author at My Thanh, Long Xuyen, An Giang province, Vietnam, in June 2006. 85. Ibid. See also Truong, “No Final Victory, No Family Life,” in Li, Voices from the Vietnam War,  57–​59. 86. In the early 1970s, Lt. Gen. Truong was appointed as NVA artillery training chief to the South and participated in the major offensive campaigns for the final victory of the NVA. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1974. For more information, see Ibid., 60–​62. 87. Chen, Yuezhan qinliji [My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War], 38. 88. Zheng Yongle, “Bloody Battles at Bac Hao,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 20–​21. 89. Ibid.,  24. 90. Ibid.,  24–​25. 91. Military History Research Division, CAMS, Junqi piaopiao [PLA Flag Fluttering], 2: 452. 92. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 187. 93. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 35. 94. Ibid.,  37. 95. Tucker, Vietnam, 120. 96. Ibid. 97. Wang, Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun [Contemporary China’s Air Force], 397; Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 551. 98. CHECO Report, Wesley R.  C. Melyan and Lee Bonetti, “ROLLING THUNDER—​July 1965–​December 1966—​Continuing Report” ( July 15, 1967), Figure 20, quoted in Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 54. 99. Captain Zhou Shunfen (PLAAF, ret.), “The Dragon’s Tale: Chinese Troops in the Jungle,” in Li, Voices from the Vietnam War, 78.

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100. All Chinese services were divided into nine military regional commands from the 1950s to 1980s. The PLA armies and divisions were under a certain regional command. Each command was named after the city where its headquarters were. They were PLA Shenyang Regional Command (Northeast China), Beijing Regional Command (North China), Jinan Regional Command (East China), Nanjing Regional Command (Southeast China), Fuzhou Regional Command (Southeast China Coast and the Taiwan Straits), Guangzhou Regional Command (South China), Kunming Regional Command (Southwest China), Wuhan Regional Command (Central China), and Lanzhou Regional Command (Northwest China). See Zhu, Gun Barrel Politics, 86–​108. 101. Lieutenant Wang Xiangcai (PLAAF, ret.), interviews by the author in Harbin, Heilongjiang, August 2003. Wang was a corporal in the Fourth Company, 319th Regiment, Thirty-​First AAA Division in Vietnam in 1966–​1967. 102. Liu Han, Luo Ronghuan yuanshuai [Marshal Luo Ronghuan] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1987), 911–​13. 103. Zhu, Gun Barrel Politics, 128. 104. Chen, Yuezhan qinliji [My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War], 21. 105. Fang, “The Red Flag Passed the Border,” 59, 66. 106. Capt. Zhao, interviews by the author. Zhao was the captain of the Fourth Company, 319th Regiment, Thirty-​First AAA Division in Vietnam in 1966–​1967. 107. Zhao, “The Dragon’s Tale,” 73–​84. 108. For China’s involvement in the Vietnam War, see Qiang Zhai, “Reassessing China’s Role in the Vietnam War:  Some Mysteries Explored,” in China and the United States:  A New Cold War History, ed. Xiaobing Li and Hongshan Li (New York: University Press of America, 1998), 97–​118. 109. Qiao, “The Prelude of Our Victory,” 49; Chen, Yuezhan qinliji [My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War], 15. 110. Vietnam has fifty provinces, which were divided into the South and North during the war. Hao Binh was a northern province southwest of Hanoi. See Tap Ban Do Hanh Chinh, Viet Nam (Vietnam Administrative Atlas), 14. 111. Zhao, interviews by the author. 112. Wang, interviews by the author. 113. Ibid. 114. Ibid. 115. Zhao, interviews by the author. 116. Sunzi, The Art of War, trans. by Sawyer, 156. 117. Major Guo Haiyun (PLA, ret.), interviews by the author in Chengde, Hebei province, in July 2006. 118. Ibid. 119. Ibid. 120. Yao, “Battles of Bravery and Wisdom,” 14–​15. 121. Ibid., 15.

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122. Colonel Jerry N. Hoblit (USAF, ret.), interviews by the author in Edmond, OK, on July 2–​3, 2009. Capt. Hoblit was an F-​105F Pilot of the 357th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS), 355th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), at the USAF Tuy Hoa Air Base, Vietnam. He and his squadron attacked Yen Bai and Thai Nguyen from November 1966 to October 1967. He received the Air Force Cross, the Legion of Merit, three Silver Stars, and three Distinguished Flying Crosses for his heroism in service during the Vietnam War. Jerry N.  Hoblit retired as a USAF colonel in 1982. 123. Li Qingde, “Unbreakable Railway Lines,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 83–​84. 124. Ibid.,  84–​86. 125. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 59. 126. CHECO Report, James B. Overton, “ROLLING THUNDER—​January 1967–​ November 1968—​Continuing Report” (October 1, 1969), Figure  5, quoted in Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 58. 127. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 59. 128. Wang, Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun [Contemporary China’s Air Force], 406–​4 07. 129. Yao, “Battles of Bravery and Wisdom,” 16. 130. Guo, interviews by the author. 131. Xiao, “Important Military Operations to Stop the War in Indochina,” 2: 454–​55. The statistics of American airplanes lost in North Vietnam in US military archives differ from Communist sources. According to Chinese sources, from 1965 to 1968, the Chinese anti-​aircraft troops engaged in 2,153 battles, shot down 1,707 American airplanes, and damaged 1,608. American official sources say that the United States lost 918 aircraft in 1965–​1968. Moss, Vietnam, 236. 132. Yao, “Battles of Bravery and Wisdom,” 16. 133. Chen, “Unforgettable Eight Months,” 60–​61. Chen was a deputy company commander of the 622nd Regiment, Sixty-​Fourth AAA Division in Vietnam between May 1967 and January 1968. 134. Yao, “Battles of Bravery and Wisdom,” 15. 135. Ibid. 136. Ibid.,  19. 137. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1:  552; Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 424. 138. Senior Colonel Wang Zhongchun (PLA), interviews by the author in Beijing on July 20–​22, 2006. Wang has been deputy director of the College of Defense and Security at China’s National Defense University (NDU) since 2005. 139. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 41.

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BRIDGING THE TECHNOLOGY GAP

China’s increasing political ambitions and its rising international position in the Cold War demanded a stronger military to support its growing status. Beijing’s high command believed the PLA should be capable of defeating the technologically advanced Western forces in its own defense, while keeping neighboring countries like Vietnam free of Western “imperialist” control. In that way, the PLA would help China move to the center of the ideological and military confrontations between the two contending camps headed by the Soviet Union and the United States.1 The Chinese Cold War agenda demanded ambitious objectives in fighting the Vietnam War, putting tremendous pressure on Chinese troops in Vietnam. In 1966–​1968, when the Johnson administration escalated its bombing campaign against North Vietnam, the PLA war objectives soon exhausted Chinese resources, exposing numerous PLA weaknesses, and permitting Rolling Thunder to inflict more casualties and more damage to the transportation and communication lines in North Vietnam. Eventually, in late 1968, China decided to withdraw its AAA troops from the Vietnam War. By April 1969, all Chinese AAA divisions had returned to China. From 1966 to 1968, Chinese field commanders were frustrated by a technological gap, making their operational objectives nearly unachievable. In 1965–​1966, the early success of the first echelon’s engagements was due to traditional Chinese tactics, such as surprise attack, close engagement, and deception. After US pilots became familiar with Chinese air defense, these tactics lost effectiveness. The huge technology gap between the American and Chinese forces had widened during the air war of 1966–​1968 in North Vietnam. Major General Xu Changyou (PLAAF, ret.) pointed out:

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When the Americans developed the post-​World War II jet fighters in 1950, we used Russian made World War II radar and anti-​aircraft artillery pieces. There was a five-​year gap between the Chinese AAA technology and the UNF navigation in the Korean War. Then, when the Americans had the most advantaged aircraft in the world by the mid-​ 1960s, we still used the same air defense weapons. There was a twenty-​ year technology gap between the Chinese AAA force and the U.S. Air Force in the Vietnam War.2 Xu also emphasized, during interviews, that the PLA experienced its worst ups and downs in history throughout the Cultural Revolution, a nationwide political and military struggle with extensive purges, starting from the top, in 1966.3 Nevertheless, the Chinese AAA troops persistently sought technical advantages and tried to improve their weapon systems in order to reach their operational objectives. Even when their weapons were not new, the Chinese troops adapted and built an effective air defense. As an army eager to learn, they quickly recognized the disparity between Russian-​made guns and radar, and the American aviation technology, and began improving their own weapons. In addition to utilizing Russian models from the 1950s, the Chinese also tried improving their own technology and developed their own weapon systems in the 1960s, which included strategic weapons. The PLA’s technological improvements and flexible tactics narrowed the objective gap between Beijing and Hanoi, even though, by the end, the North Vietnamese were still dissatisfied with the outcomes of the Chinese AAA engagements.

Technical Frustrations: Old Radar vs. New Shrike In retrospect, the Chinese air defense system was inadequate in the Vietnam War, which included out-​of-​date AAA pieces and a backward warning system. Most of the antiaircraft cannons and machine guns used in Vietnam were Chinese-​made artillery pieces of their 1955 models. To make matters worse, the Chinese-​made radar system could not coordinate with the Russian and Vietnamese networks.4 The Soviet surface-​to-​air missiles (SAM) and its missile force began entering North Vietnam to fight against Rolling Thunder in March 1965. The SAM sites became operational in April, and had their first engagement on July 24, shooting down one of four US F-​4C Phantoms that day.5 The Russian missile officer who served at the North Vietnamese

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Army’s SAM Training Center with a rank of major recalled that during the summer the Russians began “to train the Vietnamese missile troops, not the Chinese, who could join the Soviet SAM operation and shoot down more American airplanes.”6 In August, the NVA AD-​ARC established the first Vietnamese antiaircraft missile battalion. By the end of 1965, fifteen Russian and Vietnamese SAM battalions effectively operated in the north, using Soviet-​supplied mobile missiles, including SAM-​2, SAM-​3, SAM-​75M, and Fan Song (N-​12) electronic detection systems. By June 1966, the USAF “had identified 135 SAM sites” in North Vietnam.7 Both Russians and the Vietnamese operated the Fan Song search and guiding radar sets, the most advanced Soviet model of the late 1960s, providing radar detection a safe distance away from SAM sites.8 The Chinese AAA warning system was not at all compatible with superior Soviet radar and missile technology. After the second rotation group of the AAA divisions entered the war in 1966, Chinese commanders had to establish multiple sources in North Vietnam for detecting American airplanes. The first source for divisional commands was intelligence information from both Vietnamese and Chinese high commands. The AD-​AFC issued circulars on a daily basis on US aircraft carrier movements, warplane deployment, and information on USAF bases in Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines. The Vietnamese provided the same information for the Russian field commands.9 The Chinese divisions also received military estimates from the PLA mission in the Chinese embassy at Hanoi, collecting information from their field agents in the South, as well as around US air bases in Thailand.10 They analyzed the information and indicated enemy activity, capabilities, daily movements, and possible targets, although they provided only the general time frame and flight path, without a large amount of detail. The Chinese military mission also provided naval intelligence collected from the islands around the Tonkin Gulf, including Hainan Island.11 The PLA Navy (PLAN) set up electronic observation stations to intercept radio transmission of US armed forces from as far away as Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. The Chinese broke US codes and tried to decipher what the Americans were talking about.12 The second source of early warning for the Chinese air defense was radar detection. In the mid-​1960s, the Chinese AAA divisions had twenty-​five radar regiments, which were equipped with 700 radar trailers. About half were Russian-​made N-​3H and N-​3A short-​range radar sets with a capacity of about sixty to eighty miles. The rest were Chinese-​made Model 407 medium-​range warning radar, with a range of about 90 to 140 miles. They had

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fire control and tracking functions with two frequencies, in order to counter jamming.13 The PLA also had twenty-​three N-​20 long-​range radar systems with a range exceeding 200 miles. All the N-​20 long-​range systems, however, were deployed along China’s southeastern coast along the Taiwan Strait, and were not available for air defense operations in Vietnam.14 In 1965–​1967, each AAA division in North Vietnam deployed its radar units within ten to twenty miles of its regiment artillery positions. These radar sets covered a zone of 50 to 125 miles from artillery positions. The Chinese air defense radar surveillance in Vietnam was primitive and small in number, and did not provide enough warning to alert an entire regiment. The third source for air-​raid detection was Chinese unit observers known as “outposts” and “air-​watches” sent out by each regiment and battalion. The outposts were usually on hilltops, miles from the commanding officers. The aircraft spotters reported what they saw and heard from their post. Their calls would give the troops a few minutes warning before an attack. The regiment and battalion commanders could have as many outposts as they needed, and each company had its own air-​watch.15 But naturally, there were many factors in an air defense area affecting human vision, such as distance, mountains, inclement weather, or even sunshine in good weather. The reduced detection abilities of the Chinese AAA divisions restrained their combat effectiveness and caused casualties. For example, the 626th Regiment of the Sixty-​Seventh Division suffered heavy casualties during its early engagements in the west zone. After entered Vietnam in March 1966, the 626th Regiment was assigned to protect the Bac Hao Bridge. About 5:01 pm on April 17, six F-​105s attacked its positions from behind (the northeast). The 626th radar operators did not provide an early enough warning to the regimental command. Within two minutes of bombing, twenty-​four men were killed and thirty-​two wounded. The regiment lost four artillery pieces.16 In the spring of 1966, the F-​105F and F-​105G airplanes employed AGM-​ 45 Shrike anti-​radiation missiles against the Chinese and Russian anti-​aircraft radar stations.17 A Shrike, usually launched from a distance of twelve to sixteen miles, followed radio waves from a search radar or gun-​directing radar, and then destroyed the target within fifty seconds. The first F-​105F, or “Wild Weasel,” arrived in Southeast Asia in May 1966 and flew its first mission, with sensors and electronic jamming equipment as well as Shrike anti-​radiation missiles and conventional bombs (sixteen 750-​lb. bombs), on June 6. More F-​105Fs were assigned to Operation Rolling Thunder during June and July of 1966. As an F-​105F pilot, Colonel Jerry N. Hoblit recalled that his combat missions included bombing northern transportation lines and military

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targets near Hanoi, Thai Nguyen, Vinh, and Viet Tri in late 1966 and early 1967.18 In a typical mission, his F-​105F would accompany two or three F-​ 105D fighters to provide protection from enemy ground AAA fire. While this strategy seemed effective in destroying Chinese AAA troops and reducing F-​105D losses, the Wild Weasels suffered heavy casualties in high-​risk areas such as Hanoi and Thai Nguyen. Hoblit said that Thai Nguyen “was one of the few heavy industrial facilities in the Communist North, and it was heavily defended with the best anti-​aircraft forces they had.” Half of the F-​ 105Fs were shot down in only two months, in June and July 1966.19 In the fall of 1967, the USAF began upgrading the F-​105F to the F-​105G, the Wild Weasel Thunderchief. In the meantime, the AGM-​78 Standard anti-​radiation missiles replaced the AGM-​45. Both AGM-​45 and AGM-​78 Shrike missiles inflicted even greater casualties, not only to the Chinese AAA troops, but also to some of the engineering troops, due to the loss of their warning radar sets. On July 13, 1966, the artillery sites and AAA radar of the Sixty-​Fourth Division were attacked by Shrike radar homing missiles, causing serious damage to Chinese positions, personnel, and Vietnamese transportation lines around Yen Bai.20 After entering Vietnam in October 1966, the Sixty-​Fifth Division replaced the Sixty-​Seventh. During the spring of 1967, the Sixty-​Fifth lost two search radar stations and six gun-​laying radar sets within three weeks. Its regiments had soon suffered more casualties than the Sixty-​Seventh had suffered in the previous year. According to USAF CHECO reports, the bombing over North Vietnam had better results with the introduction of Shrike missiles in 1966. The number of destroyed air defense radar sites had increased from 41 in 1965 to 131 in 1966, and damaged radar sites had increased from 10 in 1965 to 32 in 1966. The reports also showed that the total of destroyed AAA sites had increased from 55 in 1965 to 385 in 1966, and damaged AAA sites had increased from 60 in 1965 to 825 through 1966.21 When the Chinese troops struggled between their outdated AAA pieces and advanced American aviation technology, the Soviet troops in Vietnam took advantage of their missile technology in air defense through the 1960s. In comparing and contrasting with the Russian success, Vietnamese officers complained incessantly about the deficiencies of Chinese radar technology and the out-​of-​date, Chinese-​made 1955 models of 57mm and 100mm anti-​aircraft guns. The Vietnamese believed that the Chinese AAA divisions could not shoot down enough American airplanes to protect the targets.22 As a Russian Vietnam veteran put it, the Vietnamese were “amazed by the

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Soviet missile technology” which shot down more American warplanes, including B-​52s, than “the Chinese had ever dreamed.”23 The Chinese AAA force seemed to be no match for superior Soviet missile technology in North Vietnam’s air defense.

The Army of Learning: Technology and Political Struggle The PLA had to search for new military technology.24 As a relatively young army on the world stage, the PLA had been learning new ways of war both through interaction with and observation of foreign militaries, especially American armed forces in the Korean War during the 1950s, then in Vietnam in the 1960s, and through trial and error on the battlefield. While the PLA continued to conduct warfare in its traditional ways, there was an assimilation of lessons and adaptation of new technology from foreign militaries. The Chinese AAA force, building on the PLA’s own historical legacy, creatively drew on the lessons of experience to learn new approaches to their core mission: defending transportation and communication lines in North Vietnam, shooting down American airplanes, and protecting their own troops. Since the establishment of the Chinese AAA force in 1949, all the PLA’s anti-​aircraft weapons and equipment had been manufactured in the Soviet Union. China began importing Russian-​made 85mm and 37mm anti-​aircraft artillery pieces in November 1949. More models of 100mm, 76mm, 57mm, 37mm, and 12.7mm guns were purchased between 1950 and 1953, during the Korean War.25 The Soviet Union re-​armed sixty Chinese infantry divisions, thirty air force divisions, and eleven artillery divisions during and after the Korean War, which became the jump-​start point of Chinese military modernization. By the end of the war, the PLA emphasized the role of technology, as well as firepower, and respected its technologically superior opponents. Marshal Peng Dehuai, commander in chief of Chinese forces in Korea, and at that time the first defense minister of China, launched a reform movement from 1954 to 1959, which continued the modernization begun during the Korean War. The 1950s reforms aimed to transform the PLA from a peasant army into a modern, professional force with new capabilities. Following the Soviet model, reforms included major technological improvements and reorganization of defense industries. The Soviets shared technology for the production of AAA machine guns and artillery pieces. After 1955, the PLA imitated the Russian 37mm gun and in 1965 made it double-​barreled. In the same year, the Chinese produced copies of Russian 57mm and 100mm anti-​ aircraft cannons, which were all equipped with Russian-​made anti-​aircraft

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fire-​control radar.26 Peng’s reform achieved certain goals and eventually transformed the PLA from a ground force into a modern and professional army in the late 1950s.27 The PLA also began its research and development of missile technology in the late 1950s, with Soviet assistance. Soviet aid and Sino-​Soviet cooperation became substantial enough for China to start its own missile programs. In 1957, China signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for 122 joint and cooperative research projects, including 58 industrial defense enterprises and three strategic weapons research institutes that were nuclear-​and missile-​ technology related.28 After the agreement, the Soviets provided the Chinese with weapon-​testing data, missile designs, samples, and other research information. In December, a Soviet-​made P-​2 surface-​to-​surface short-​range missile arrived in Beijing, joined in early 1958 by Russian missile experts, and the Chinese began copying the Soviet model. As part of the 1950s military reform, from its inception the Soviet Union greatly influenced China’s nuclear and missile weapon programs.29 Chinese missile technology developed two tracks: a strategic surface-​to-​surface missile program and a surface-​to-​air missile program. In 1958, the Army established its first surface-​to-​surface missile battalion as a strategic force. Later that year, the PLAAF established three surface-​to-​air missile battalions as an air defense force. On May 21, 1959, the PLAAF opened its surface-​to-​air missile training center, and in March 1964, it established the first surface-​to-​air missile division.30 Ironically, these reforms caused the PLA to become more regularized and institutionalized, while the party and society, under Mao’s leadership, became more radicalized and ideological in the late 1950s. The party and revolutionary society emphasized ideological factors, the human spirit, irrational decisions, extremist programs, and independence during its development. The PLA high command had been favored with technological improvements, institutional control, regular programs, and dependence on Soviet aid. Marshal Peng utilized Soviet technology, officer training and promotion systems, as well as bureaucratic regulations to train a new “professional generation” of the PLA.31 There was an obvious gap between the military reform programs and Mao’s “continuous revolution,” which included political movements against intellectuals and greater emphasis on “political spirit.” To Mao, the revolution that brought the CCP to power was a key to continued success. Mao imposed unprecedented radical methods to mobilize the Chinese masses in order to forge a new “revolutionary generation.” The young Chinese, those “born in New China and raised under the red flag,” had little experience with class struggle. It was widely believed they should be trained and be ready to

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carry on the revolution. Thus, Mao’s continuous political campaigns and brutal class struggle had become social norms for Chinese society from the late 1950s to the early 1960s. The gap between the army and the party caused a series of political problems, which eventually led to the fall of Defense Minister Peng and the termination of the reform programs. When Peng questioned Mao’s Great Leap Forward movement, the marshal was purged at the Party’s Lushan Conference in the summer of 1959.32 That fall, 1,848 generals and officers were dismissed or jailed either as members of Peng’s “anti-​party clique” or as “rightists.”33It became the most serious leadership struggle since the founding of the People’s Republic.34 Chinese military reform took place only within the greater context of the newly founded republic, constrained by how far the Communist Party was willing to go and what Chinese society at large could support.35 The PLA then lost the only source for their AAA force modernization after the Sino-​Soviet split: By August 13, 1960, all 12,000 Soviet experts had left China with their blueprints and designs. China’s independent path to a nuclear and missile research and development program managed to survive the Soviet withdrawal. On September 9, 1960, the first Chinese missile, modeled on Soviet P-​2, was launched successfully in Inner Mongolia, although it was designed to be short-​ranged and not suitable for carrying a nuclear warhead.36 On November 5, and December 6 and 16, China tested three missiles of its own independent design, C-​1059; two of them were surface-​to-​surface missiles, the other was a surface-​to-​air missile. In June and July 1964, there were three successful medium-​and long-​ range surface-​to-​surface missile tests of China’s own models. On October 16, 1964, China conducted its first nuclear bomb test, and on May 14, 1965, its second nuclear test, this time by dropping the bomb from an airplane. In ten years, China had become a nuclear power. While some Chinese military leaders were disappointed by their incomplete Russianization—​rebuilding the PLA after the Soviet model—​the new high command quickly returned to its revolutionary doctrine and traditional military culture. After Peng’s fall, Marshal Lin Biao became defense minister from September 1959 to September 1971. He selected the politics in command and promoted Mao’s ideology of the “people’s war” as well as traditional guerrilla tactics. According to Lin, the PLA should learn from its own successful experience in the past. In charge of the administration of the CMC, Lin terminated most technology research and many developments that Peng had initiated.37 Thus, the PLA technological improvement and modernization were incomplete. Chinese troops continued to use their Korean War

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vintage AAA pieces, fire-​control radar, and warning radar against advanced American technology in Vietnam. Nevertheless, Chinese involvement in the Vietnam War opened up a new window of opportunity to learn from the USAF, the most advanced in the world. In late August 1965, Grand General Luo Ruiqing, chief of the PLA General Staff, held two DGS conferences in Beijing on how to learn American military technology in Vietnam. In mid-​October, Luo traveled to the Vietnamese border, meeting AAA divisional commanders and discussing technical problems and possible solutions.38 In 1965–​1966, the DGS sent several technology research teams from Beijing to North Vietnam. These teams consisted of defense engineers, aviation experts, weapon designers, staff, and security troops. They traveled to crash sites all over the North to study US aviation technology. The DGS also sent three teams to South Vietnam by following NVA regulars through the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Chinese teams visited key battlegrounds like the Central Plains, and recorded the major NVA battles against the American ground force. Chinese officers also traveled to major USAF bases like those at Da Nang and Hue in South Vietnam, and reported details of American aviation technology.39 Luo Ruiqing’s proactive search for American military technology went along with Lin Biao’s emphasis on troop spirit and human potential. Moreover, some military leaders even supported Luo, arguing that the PLA should keep its attention and its resources focused on professional training and military modernization rather than shifting its focus to politics and political study, which Lin considered as the first priority for the Chinese army. Even though Lin did not seem satisfied with Luo’s efforts in technology improvement, he did not interfere with Luo until Mao questioned his loyalty and political support. On November 30, 1965, Lin wrote a letter to Mao accusing Luo of anti-​Maoist activities.40 On December 2, Mao agreed with Lin by writing an instruction on a report of PLA Fiftieth Division’s experience of “politics in command.” Mao warned the high command, “We must be alerted about those who do not believe in politics in command.”41 From December 8 through 15, 1965, Mao called for an expanded meeting of the Politburo in Shanghai, criticizing Luo’s efforts and accusing him of “conducting anti-​party activities” as well as “planning a plot to take over the power.” These charges were often raised against those who had differing opinions from Mao’s. Luo was placed on house arrest on December 18. On February 22, 1966, Mao dismantled the security force, totaling 500,000 troops that had been under Luo’s command as China’s security minister, and reorganized them into the PLA. On March 18, Luo was dismissed from

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all his positions in the party, army, and government as vice chairman of the CMC, secretary general of the CCP Central Committee Secretariats, vice premier, minister of public security, and chief of the PLA General Staff, who had been in charge of the Chinese military operation in the Vietnam War. In March, Luo tried to commit suicide by jumping from a third-​floor balcony.42 After Luo was purged, General Yang Chengwu became new chief of the PLA General Staff. Most Chinese historians agree that it was Mao’s preparations in late 1965 and early 1966 that fueled his political struggles against other military leaders, known widely as the “Chinese Proletarian Cultural Revolution” in the summer of 1966. Although the high command purge continued in Beijing, the DGS teams in Vietnam carried on their research of American military strategies, both in the North and the South, through 1966–​1968. During field trips, the DGS technology research teams also interrogated American POWs, especially officers and pilots. Most pilot POWs were captured in the North. Each Chinese AAA division had two or three English translators for interrogating American POWs and for political propaganda purposes. Even though it was the local Vietnamese troops or militia that incarcerated most of the Americans, the Chinese acquired fifty-​one American pilots in 1966–​1967. The Chinese-​Vietnamese as well as Russian-​Vietnamese agreements required that all American pilots be turned over to the NVA within two hours after capture.43 However, the Chinese attempted to keep them longer in order to get more information on new American aviation technology, air campaign strategy, and operational tactics. According to recollections, the Chinese believe that they treated American POWs much better than the Vietnamese did, since over one hundred American pilots died in Vietnamese captivity.44 In the fall of 1966, for instance, the Sixty-​First Division captured an American pilot, a USAF major, after his plane was shot down at Yen Bai. The DGS field officers rushed to the Sixty-​First HQ and interrogated Major Smith as soon as the Chinese troops brought him at 2:00 am to division HQ.45 During the six-​hour interrogation, Smith told the DGS agents and Tie Zheng, deputy political commissar of the Sixty-​First, that he took off from Chiang Mai air force base in Thailand, approximately thirty minutes flying time to Yen Bai. He had been stationed at other bases, such as Saigon and Da Nang in South Vietnam during his two months of in-​country service, and he had flown eight or nine bombing missions over North Vietnam. Smith also provided some information on his airplanes and showed the operation map of his last mission, including bombing targets and flying route. But Smith did not talk about other planes, pilots, and details of the air bases. He also showed

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the Chinese a standard rescue letter in thirteen different languages, with the American flag on one side and the other side asking for food, water, medical assistance, safety, humanitarian treatment, and the return of American pilots to the United States. About 9:00 am next morning, the Sixty-​First Command turned him over to the NVA, which sent him to Hanoi on the same day.46 The divisional commands also instructed their troops to search for American pilot logbooks, codes, records, and training manuals after each air defense. In addition they took back control panels, communication devices, radar equipment, electronic systems, weapon controls, missiles, launchers, and cameras from crashed airplanes. Sometimes they dismantled the entire warplane and took the parts back to China. Theoretically, the Chinese-​Vietnamese, as well as Russian-​Vietnamese agreements requested that all American weapons and equipment be turned over to NVA local commands. The Vietnamese commands, however, knew that the Chinese and Russians were researching and pirating the American high-​tech equipment and hardware and shipping it back to their countries. Practically speaking, the Vietnamese were neither allowed to stop the Chinese nor Soviet military vehicles, nor to search Chinese or Russian military personnel, especially these wounded men who were transported back to China for further medical treatment.47 However, the Vietnamese high command stopped the Chinese several times when they tried to ship large parts of American aircraft back to China and even, in 1966, an entire American reconnaissance plane. After Chinese radar detected that one US photo-​reconnaissance drone was shot down, the command of the 2nd Regiment of the First Railroad Engineering Division sent troops to secure the drone at its crash site. The following day, the DGS instructed the division command to ship the American drone to China. But NVA officers from the Northern Vietnamese Command asked the Chinese to turn over the American drone to them. Long Guilin, commander of the First Railroad Division, ignored the Vietnamese request and ordered his troops to load the truck and transport the drone back, under Chinese arms. The Vietnamese reported the Chinese refusal all the way to General Vo Nguyen Giap, defense minister and vice premier. Giap was upset and yelled, “This is in Vietnam! [We] must get it back!”48 The Chinese convoy was stopped at the border by Vietnamese troops, who reclaimed the American drone.49 The Chinese troops were also instructed to collect information on Russian military technology as part of China’s “anti-​Soviet revisionism” efforts. The Fifth Division HQ sent its officers to photograph and record the equipment and activities of a Russian SAM missile battalion when they were

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posted nearby in a northern mountainous area for several weeks. After the American warplanes discovered the new SAM sites and started heavy bombing, the Russian missile battalion moved out.50 The First Division recovered many pieces of Russian SAM missiles after they exploded and fell from the sky. The First HQ shipped the wreckage back to China.51 From time to time, NVA officers came and looked for malfunctioned Russian missiles, and the Chinese always refused to return any Russian missile they had recovered. The Vietnamese command tried to avoid direct contact between the Chinese and Russian militaries in Vietnam.52 After receiving Vietnamese complaints and Chinese AAA casualty reports in the spring of 1966, the PLA General Staff drafted a new research plan stating that the high command would organize more experts to study American air war technology. General Yang Chengwu, who replaced Luo Ruiqing as acting chief of the General Staff, indicated an urgent need for Chinese AAA troops to improve their air defense weaponry and equipment. In June, Mao and Zhou Enlai approved the DGS’s new research plan. In late June, Yang held a conference in Beijing to discuss the urgency of air defense and radar improvement in Vietnam. On July 1, Mao, Zhou, and Marshals Nie Rongzhen, Xu Xiangqian, and Ye Jianying met conference representatives from all AAA divisions in Vietnam. Mao told the conference participants, “[We] have to take resolute measures on our radar, optical instrument, and commanding equipment. Reduce the weight, improve the quality, and increase the quantity.”53 Even though the conference reached several agreements on many new research and development projects to improve radar technology, the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution had made implementation of these R&D projects very difficult, if not impossible, between 1967 and 1969. The PLA’s poor performance in the Vietnam War demonstrated its outdated technology.

High Command in Turmoil The decade of 1966–​1976 was the most controversial as well as the most crucial decade in Chinese military history, due to the Chinese Cultural Revolution that rocked the PLA high command at least four times. The first political earthquake began in July 1966 when Marshal Lin Biao called for a period of “three-​month turmoil” in the PLA high command. In June, the Cultural Revolution became a nationwide political movement. Mao used mass organizations, such as the Red Guard youth, to publicly attack, or “bomb,” the CCP and PRC hierarchy officials. The Red Guards, consisting mostly of college,

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high school, and middle school students, were empowered by Mao and used slogans calling for “bombing the headquarters,” “rebellion is justified,” and “learning revolution by making revolution.” The Cultural Revolution developed from top to bottom. Lin, Jiang Qing (Mao’s wife), and other leftists grabbed the revolutionary enthusiasm and naiveté of the students, inflaming them with a great deal of demagogic fury.54 Encouraged by Mao, the Red Guards were more than 10 million strong by August 1966. Lin used the mass movement to purge military leaders who did not agree with his strategy and policies. He mobilized PLA cadets and young soldiers in Beijing to look for “bourgeoisie agents in the PLA.” Commanders and officers were expelled from their positions, and in the course of cruel questioning sessions, many were tormented or beaten to death. For instance, on July 25, in the Department of General Political Tasks (DGPT), Lin’s followers, along with Leftists, called for “destroying the DGPT hell” and for overthrowing General Xiao Hua, director of the DGPT. Thereafter, forty top officers in the DGPT were purged and most died in prison.55 In the PLA Navy, there was an orchestrated “struggle between the two headquarters,” the “Leftist Headquarters” and “Rightist Headquarters.” Then, the PLAN HQs printed and issued the “little white book,” Chronicle of the Struggles between the Two Headquarters in the PLAN, including a confession of Yuan Yifen, commander of the South Sea Fleet. The document concluded that Yuan “had made serious mistakes and took the wrong side.”56 Admiral Yuan was soon dismissed and jailed. On August 12, at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the CCP Eighth Congress, Lin became vice chairman of the CCP, making him second only to Mao. At the meeting, Mao described the ongoing Cultural Revolution as a political struggle, a class struggle inside the party. By the end of the year, the Red Guards totaled 60 million, and social stability had vanished. Industry, agriculture, and commerce were forcefully disrupted, causing widespread public resentment. Disturbances and conflicts increased. With Mao’s support and encouragement, the Red Guard seemed ready to take over the government. From September through November, the Ministry of Defense, as well as all general departments and services of the HQs, came under attack and soon became paralyzed. Numerous chiefs and generals were purged and jailed. On October 5, the CMC and DGPT issued an urgent instruction that all military academies and institutes should dismiss their classes and allow cadets to become fully involved in the Great Cultural Revolution.57 Encouraged by Mao and Lin, Red Guards began to travel and attack local government

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officials from cities to the countryside. Some traveled to Vietnam, wanting to “fight against the American imperialists” there.58 In the fall of 1966, the Red Guards began crossing the border without any travel documents.59 These young students walked through the mountains and forests, or swam across rivers, looking for Chinese troops in Vietnam. Some were stopped by the NVA border patrols, and some were caught by local villagers and militias and turned over to nearby AAA or engineering troops. In many cases, Chinese officers refused their requests for participating in the combat, and sent them to the Chinese embassy in Hanoi, which then had to put them on trucks and send them back to China. After October, however, more high school students from major cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, began crossing the border. Some joined the Chinese AAA troops in Vietnam and engaged in the air defense against Rolling Thunder. The first Red Guard was killed in battle on January 19, 1967.60 The AAA commanders and Chinese embassy began complaining about the Red Guards who came to Vietnam on their own. Premier Zhou Enlai issued a directive that “the Red Guards are not allowed to cross the border and enter Vietnam. All the Red Guards who were already in Vietnam must be sent back to China immediately.”61 Thereafter, Chinese troops had to arrest those who refused to follow the order and force their return to China. The second political strike on the PLA took place in February 1967 when most of the marshals in Beijing tried to stop Lin’s attempt to involve the PLA in the Cultural Revolution. Their efforts failed, and they were branded the “February Countercurrent” against the Cultural Revolution. Seven of eight marshals were publicly criticized, and four were jailed and later died. In March, Lin mentioned several times the need to identify “a small handful in the army” and burn them to death. Shortly thereafter, the Cultural Revolution Leading Group moved into power, replacing the Politburo. Then, with Mao’s approval, Lin jailed many generals.62 Among the marshals was He Long, Lin’s long-​time rival, who was labeled the “biggest bandit” and died in prison. By the end of 1967, the Red Guards totaled approximately 100 million. The third extreme shake-​up of the high command occurred in March 1968 when several top military leaders were arrested, including General Yang Chengwu, acting chief of the General Staff in charge of PLA operations in the Vietnam War since March 1966. Lin appointed loyal followers to these positions, including General Huang Yongsheng as chief of the General Staff in charge of PLA operations in Vietnam from March 1968 to September 1971, and General Wu Faxian as the chief of the PLAAF. From 1966 to 1968, more than 80,000 officers were accused and purged. Among them, 1,169

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officers died of torture and starvation, or were executed. Many military institutes were shut down, and research programs were canceled. The number of military academies was reduced from 125 to 43. Many defense works were destroyed, and regular training actually stopped. The PLA suffered the “most serious damage since the founding of the PRC.”63 In 1969, Lin Biao became the second most powerful leader in the country, next to Mao Zedong, who made Lin his successor. The last top-​down strike on the high command took place after the relationship between Lin and Mao turned into a political struggle. In an attempt to stop national turmoil, Mao employed the PLA to restore social and political order and to prevent a possible civil war in the country. Moving to center stage, and under Lin’s command, the Chinese military replaced civilian governments at the provincial, district, county, and city levels through its military administration, or the “Military Administrative Committee,” from 1967 to 1972. The PLA used its officers as administrators for schools, factories, companies, villages, and farms.64 More than 2.8  million officers and soldiers participated in the tasks. By February 1967, the military administration took control of nearly 7,000 enterprises of mass media, defense industry, law enforcement, foreign affairs, transportation, finance, and other pivotal activities. The PLA take-​over promoted military-​civilian integration and contributed to another increase in military services. By the mid-​1970s, the PLA numbered more than 6.1 million troops.65 In 1970, however, the Cultural Revolution took a sudden and unexpected turn. A new political struggle between Mao and Lin erupted, a struggle that would rip a great hole in a political arena already gasping for breath from the battering it had endured. Lin and Mao differed in strategy, foreign policy, and domestic politics.66 These contradictions burst forth at the Second Plenum of the Ninth CCP Central Committee in August–​September 1970. Mao summoned an expanded meeting of the Politburo and sternly criticized Lin and the military, thus dooming Lin’s fate. The plenum ended on September 6, when Mao’s concluding speech struck the party leaders like a thunderclap. After the stormy meeting, some of Lin’s lieutenants were criticized, compelled to make self-​criticisms, or removed from office. Zhu considers the conference in 1970 only a prelude of the Mao-​Lin showdown a year later.67 Lin and his family realized that Mao was directing the spearhead of his political struggle against them. Just like Peng, Liu, and Deng Xiaoping, Lin would be the next victim of Mao’s brutal political movement. Lin’s son, Lin Liguo, planned to assassinate Mao on his way back from Shanghai. Mao realized the danger and returned early to Beijing from Hangzhou on September

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12, 1971. Lin Liguo’s plot failed, and Lin had taken a fatal step from which there was no return. On September 13, at the urging of his wife and his son, Lin fled. He commandeered a plane at the Shanhaiguan Airport. It flew north, heading for the Soviet Union, but for unexplained and perhaps unknown reasons, the plane crashed in Mongolia.68 Lin, his family, crew members, and others on board, eight in total, were killed in the crash. The Lin Incident was the most troubling political event since the inception of the Cultural Revolution. Five days after the plane crash, the Central Committee, with the approval of Mao, notified its members of Lin’s treasonous flight. Ten days later, Mao informed military officers and commanders at divisional and higher levels. On September 24, the Central Committee dismissed all key members of Lin’s group from their positions. On October 3, Mao dissolved the Executive Office of CMC, formerly controlled by Lin, and created a new CMC Office under Marshal Ye Jianying, and the following day Mao chaired the first meeting of the new office.69 After Lin’s death, Mao launched a large-​scale purge of Lin’s followers and programs in the PLA. General Huang Yongsheng, chief of the General Staff in charge of PLA operations in the Vietnam War from March 1968 to September 1971, was jailed and died in 1983. Ye took charge of PLA’s daily affairs and its operation in the Vietnam War after September 1971.

New Combat Tactics During the peak of the Cultural Revolution in 1967, the third echelon of the AAA divisions entered Vietnam. With little air defense technology improvement, the newly arrived PLA officers had concluded that they would have to adapt to Shrike missiles and increasing US bombing in North Vietnam. They recognized the disparity between the Russian model guns and radar network and the American aviation technology and changed their tactics for better combat results. They developed some tactics around a weak army’s strategy and experience, and against a much stronger opponent. The men and women in the PLA during the Vietnam War differed from those who had served in the Korean War. During the early 1950s, the PLA was a peasant army that consisted of rural conscripts and volunteers who generally had little education. In 1951, illiteracy among the PLA officer corps was 67.4 percent. Among the rank and file, the percentage who passed a third-​grade reading test was only 16.4 percent.70 By the 1960s, many men had completed at least elementary school (a six-​year) education.71 Technology took a large part of the engineering and AAA corps through the 1960s. While the PLA’s infantry troops

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decreased from 61.1  percent of the army in 1950 to 42.3  percent in 1958, its artillery (including AAA) units increased from 20.4  percent in 1950 to 29.1 percent by the 1960s.72 The Chinese AAA troops in Vietnam persistently sought technical advantage and tactical improvements to provide better air defense and to shoot down more American airplanes. As part of the third echelon, the Sixty-​Fourth Division had entered Vietnam in May 1967 to replace the Sixty-​Fifth in the west zone and to set up its command at Yen Bai, the middle point along the northwestern railway between Hanoi and Lao Cai. Its first engagement was at about 9:12 am on June 12, when its 662nd Regiment shot down one of two RF-​4C reconnaissance planes in its defense area. On July 13, however, the division suffered several dozen casualties when its radar failed to provide an early warning of approaching American planes. Division commander Yao Fuhe worked with his staff to deal with the US Shrike missiles that targeted their radar system.73 First of all, the Sixty-​Fourth command used its search radar coverage (long-​ range) and the gun-​laying radar scanning (short-​range) separately to deal with Shrikes. On the morning of July 20, for example, more than 100 planes flew toward the Sixty-​Fourth defense area at Yen Bai. After the regimental search radar stations detected the targets about twenty-​five to thirty-​five miles away, they passed signals to the gun-​laying radar sets in their battalions. Then, according to Major Guo Haiyun, chief staff of the 2nd Battalion of the 611th Regiment, the regimental commands turned off all radar searches before the F-​105s reached their Shrike missile fire range (about fifteen miles) to avoid any radar homing bombs. The battalions then used on-​and-​off switches and low-​volt waves of their gun-​laying radar sets to deal with Shrikes. After the search radar stations had passed on the data and been shut down, the gun-​laying radar spotted the targets and passed information to the battalion commands. Major Guo recalled that his staff members deciphered the numbers and sent out the artillery fix to the AAA gunners.74 Their gun-​laying radar sets then turned off their long wave of optical band, while the operators shook radar antenna left and right, up and down, making it difficult for Shrike missiles to follow their radio wave. Waiting until the planes entered the air defense fire area, the operators turned the long wave back on in order to direct the fire to the airplanes.75 According to the division report to the AD-​AFC, the US planes launched thirty-​one Shrike missiles on July 20, but none hit the radar vans, except for a few damaged radar dishes, an easy item to replace or repair. Then, according to Guo, the regiment command “issued an order to all 100mm, 85mm, and 37mm guns. From the north side of the bridge, the Fourth Company opened

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fire on the fighters and bombers. The American planes tried to pull out and escape from the well-​organized Chinese fire.”76 During engagements that day, the two regiments of the Sixth-​Fourth shot down five American planes and damaged two. The bombing did not destroy or damage any major targets in the air defense area.77 The NVA high command sent a congratulatory telegram to the Sixty-​Fourth Division Command for its efforts against Shrike missiles.78 Realizing they must adapt to Shrike missiles and increased US bombing, the division command instructed the regiments to rely on their own resources and to utilize their troop’s wisdom and potential with low-​tech tactics. On the morning of July 31, American planes attacked positions of the 611th Regiment, dropping twelve 750-​lb. heavy bombs. The Chinese AAA troops did not have serious casualties once they developed new tactics. The Sixty-​Fourth experienced its most intense battle on October 18, when three groups of F-​105s raided Yen Bai. During the engagement, all search radar stations of the Sixty-​Fourth survived without major damage by Shrikes.79 Maj. Guo recalled, however, that “The AD-​AFC was not satisfied with our low-​ tech war-​fighting, or guerrilla, tactics. They asked the Chinese to shoot down more American planes.”80 In the early winter the Sixty-​Fourth also failed to reach its combat objectives, since it did not shoot down as many American planes as other divisions. The command decided to look for more engagement opportunities and to engage at night. American warplanes had been bombing several important targets in Yen Bai in darkness. The Sixty-​Fourth had disengaged through the night because it did not have combat training or experience in cooperation with its searchlight battalion, which the division received only weeks before it entered Vietnam. The battalion also had no experience in fighting against US airplanes. During the first several months, the searchlights could not illuminate the planes, nor could the artillery guns be aimed accurately at them. Until late fall of 1967, after a dozen night engagements, the division discovered a way to defend the area at night. On December 16, Chinese reconnaissance radar detected fourteen F-​4Cs, in seven groups, located about twenty to thirty miles from Yen Bai, and coming from the southwest. Commander Yao ordered the searchlights to wait until after the planes passed their position. At that time the airplanes made a 180 degree turn, and came back for their targets. They regrouped and attacked the Chinese positions from two directions. Yao ordered his troops to turn on the lights and open fire in one direction each time. It was reported that two F-​4Cs were shot down that night. The Sixty-​Fourth Division returned to China in January 1968, after eight months

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in Vietnam. According to their reports, the division shot down 109 American airplanes and damaged 85, while 40 soldiers and officers were killed and 246 wounded in Vietnam.81 In July 1967, the PLAAF organized the Thirty-​Seventh Division for the Vietnam War, including the air force AAA 20th, 21st, and 24th Regiments, and navy AAA 8th Regiment. The division received training in Ningming, Guangxi through the month. On August 17, the division entered Vietnam by crossing the Youyiguan [Friendship Pass], which was assigned to provide air defense for Thai Nguyen, the capital city of the northern region and the center of the steel and iron industry of North Vietnam. Troop morale was fairly high when they traveled at night and rested in the forest during the day. According to Shi Wenling, commander of the 8th Regiment, after arriving at their defense site his men constructed their works, built their shelters, and moved all the artillery pieces into position overnight. Shi deployed his 37mm guns at the hilltops where the small AAA guns would have a better chance of hitting American warplanes if they dove toward the steel bridge. His regiment engaged on a daily basis and shot down several planes in late 1967.82 The real headache for his troops was changing positions after each engagement to avoid American retaliation. Each company moved its guns and ammunition into new positions before the next morning. After each engagement, the company pulled its guns out of positions on the south side of the bridge, moved them down the hill, across the bridge, and into the forest north of the bridge. On January 5, 1968, the Thirty-​Seventh Command warned the 8th Regiment that several F-​4s were approaching its defense area from two directions. At approximately 11:00 am, the regimental alarms went off, and four F-​4s came from the east. They launched two Shrike missiles against the regimental radar, but both missed the targets. At 11:04 am, the radar operators reported to Shi that they had some electronic jamming when they searched the northwestern direction, and Shi ordered his regiment to pay attention to that direction. At about 11:08 am, eight F-​105s in two groups came in from the northwest and headed to the airport at Kep. The F-​105 was designed for low-​level interdiction and its low-​altitude speed was a major problem for the big AAA guns. Shi ordered the 37mm guns to open fire at the low flying F-​ 105s, and the 55mm to fire at the high-​altitude planes. One of the F-​105s was hit, and it exploded in the sky. The men all cheered and jumped from their positions, and before they realized it, twelve F-​105 airplanes came from the east and headed for their positions. Shi ordered the 1st Battalion to fire on the four F-​105s in the first group, and the other battalion to aim at the rest of the F-​105s. They shot down another F-​105 in this battle.83 At about 4:00 pm

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that day, eight planes again bombed the area. With fire support from other units, Shi’s regiment had few casualties, while at the same time protected the airport and the bridge. The PLA’s intervention in 1965–​ 1968 successfully deterred any US attempt to send American ground troops to North Vietnam due to the US fear of provoking China.84 By 1968, the Johnson administration’s escalation of the war, including Rolling Thunder, had reached its limit. As David Kaiser points out, “The administration tried to sell the idea that a demonstration of American power might lead to early negotiations, rather than acknowledge the true scope of the administration’s plans and the task it had undertaken.”85 The Johnson administration had one major fear:  Chinese intervention that would convert a regional war into a Cold War showdown. By March 1969, the PLA had sent seventeen divisions to North Vietnam, including sixty-​three regiments and 150,000 troops of its AAA force.86 In 1970, US air bombing against the Ho Chi Minh Trail was intensified. The Lao Communist Headquarters requested air defense over the Trail, which ran 150 miles through Laos. The CMC sent more AAA divisions to Laos in order to provide air defense for the Ho Chi Minh Trail.87 Coupled with political campaigns and diplomatic efforts, the military operations in Vietnam were partly initiated to draw attention from Washington. It was the use of armed forces that demonstrated Beijing’s determination and judgment to restrain Washington. The PLA operations in 1965–​1968 drew American attention, as well as its reactions, and Beijing’s signals appeared to have worked. Robert D. Schulzinger concludes, “Tactically, the Johnson administration was successful in limiting the war to avoid direct Chinese intervention, yet these tactical skills did not translate into a successful Vietnam policy. Before 1967, the administration often overestimated the danger China posed to U.S.  interests. These exaggerated fears of the influence of the revolutionary doctrines of Mao Zedong probably encouraged the United States to involve itself more deeply in Vietnam than leaders would otherwise have considered worthwhile.”88 In the spring of 1968, the US government decreased its bombing scale and limited its air raids to south of the 20th parallel in North Vietnam.

New Command and New Missile Technology After September 13, 1971, Mao Zedong blamed Lin Biao for the problems in China during the late 1960s.89 Since Lin promoted the Mao cult and purged those who failed to worship Mao, his death brought great joy to

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China’s millions. But cool scrutiny also revealed that the Cultural Revolution was open to serious question. It raised doubts about the entire course of actions, orientations, and policies followed since the advent of the Cultural Revolution. Mao himself certainly knew better. A person who worked closely beside him later recalled:  “After Lin Biao crashed, the Chairman became very ill. Lin’s betrayal had a serious effect on his health. We heard him quote the old adage:  ‘At 73 or 84, if Death doesn’t invite you, you should go to its door!’ We felt badly. He was very depressed.”90 Then, Marshal Ye Jianying took charge of the PLA daily affairs with the consultation of Premier Zhou Enlai. This Zhou-​Ye system replaced the Lin-​Jiang system of 1966–​1971 and controlled the PLA from 1971 to 1976. A new power struggle began between Zhou-​Ye and Jiang Qing, who continued to dominate the media and to preach class struggle. The Great Cultural Revolution lasted until Mao’s death in September 1976.91 Zhou had been supportive of PLA modernization by protecting its nuclear and missile development through the Cultural Revolution. In the summer of 1965, Zhou visited the nuclear test site at Lop Nur to inspect a missile launch experiment. After his return to Beijing, Zhou held the thirteenth meeting of the “Special Commission” August 9–​11 to discuss the combination of nuclear warheads and missiles in order to produce strategic nuclear weapons.92 A week after the thirteenth meeting, Zhou, Marshal Nie Rongzhen, and others began to organize China’s strategic missile force, the “Second Artillery Corps.”93 After its third nuclear test on May 9, 1966, China began testing rockets carrying warheads. The first carrier rocket (delivery system) was successfully tested on June 29.94 On June 6, General Wu Kehua had been appointed as commander of the Second Artillery Corps (SAC), China’s strategic missile force. From the beginning, the SAC maintained the arsenal for both conventional and nuclear-​armed missiles. On October 25, the first combined test, a missile carrying a nuclear warhead, was conducted at Lop Nur, followed by another test on December 28, which yielded an estimated 3.3 megatons of TNT.95 Nie supervised both tests and remained at the testing range for three months. On June 17, 1967, China tested its first hydrogen bomb.96 In 1968, SAC regiments were divided into short-​, intermediate-​, and long-​range, and intercontinental units.97 The SAC today retains operational control of China’s land, air, and sea-​based nuclear missiles. It comes under the operational control of the military supreme command or DGS.98 On September 23, 1969, China conducted its first underground nuclear test. In that year, the first group of operational nuclear warheads and missiles were delivered to the SAC. Thereafter, the Chinese military possessed both nuclear

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and strategic weapons. By 1972, the PLAAF also had four SAM divisions, including fifty-​five missile battalions.99 In 1972, the CMC instructed the PLAAF to assist the NVA in establishing a SAM missile regiment in North Vietnam. The PLAAF organized a group of fifty-​two experts and instructors to train the Vietnamese during June, and in July they shipped missiles, launchers, radar equipment, and a communication system to Vietnam. After the Chinese officers arrived at the missile training ground in Bac Can on July 20, they were surprised and pleased to know that many Vietnamese officers and missile operators could either speak Chinese or else had received some military training in China. The Chinese trained the Vietnamese for one month, and in September the missile regiment practiced on its own.100 On October 18, when the Vietnamese missile regiment became operational, it was deployed to Ha Bac. The following day, when several American planes flew through Ha Bac toward Kep, the Vietnamese SAM regiment launched two missiles and shot down one American A-​7 warplane. The Chinese training group was satisfied and returned to China on December 23.101 From 1971 to1974, PLA antiaircraft weaponry and equipment were improved radically because of the Chinese combat ineffectiveness during the Vietnam War. For instance, the PLA designed and manufactured its own 85mm all-​weather, automatic anti-​aircraft artillery cannon in 1972. The PLA had a total of 10,000 AAA cannons in 1973, and the PLA began producing an improved model of 37mm double-​barreled guns in 1974. It produced its own command and communication equipment the same year.102 By the mid-​1970s, its AAA troops had new radar systems, such as Models 572 and 589 low-​altitude search radar, Model 586 fire-​g uiding radar, and Model 405 offshore search radar.103 During 1966–​1972, the PLA survived domestic turmoil, international crises, and the Vietnam War by adapting to changing political and strategic environments. Nevertheless, the political struggles within the CCP, along with replacement of top military leadership, and the fluctuation of the PLA role in society all functioned as driving forces for change in the PLA. In the meantime, the PLA’s intervention in the Cultural Revolution also affected China’s political culture and justified the use of force in political struggles such as the 1976 coup.104 The findings in this chapter also suggest changing characteristics of Chinese military culture and indicate that the PLA could effectively engage in a foreign war while it faced a political disaster at home. The field generals who thought eclectically about tactical and technology issues were inspired not only by communist ideology, but also by robust traditions dating

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back many decades earlier. Their solutions grew out of active engagements, often practical and effective, in the Vietnam War. From 1966 to 1968, the Chinese military institution appeared to be flexible and able to adapt to a new foreign war environment as well as to respond to new American military technology. However, field solutions were temporary and limited, and they did not help Chinese AAA divisions shoot down more American planes, reduce Chinese casualties, or improve the relationship between Hanoi and Beijing.

Notes 1. Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 1. 2. Maj. Gen. Xu Changyou (PLAN, ret.), interviews by the author in Shanghai on April 25–​27, 2000. Xu served as the deputy secretary general of the CMC in 1995–​ 1999 and deputy political commissar of the East Sea Fleet Air Force of the PLAN in 2000–​2004. See also Xu, “The Purchase of Arms from Moscow,” 144–​4 6. Xu served as chief of the PLA General Staff and vice chairman of the CMC during the Korean War. Then he became vice premier from 1965 to 1980 and defense minister of China during 1978–​1981. He planned China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979. 3. Xu Changyou (PLAN, ret.), interviews by the author in Shanghai on April 25–​27, 2000. See also Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], ­chapters 2–​8. 4. In July 1965, the Soviet Union began providing North Vietnam with its N-​12 search and guiding radar as part of the CA-​75M surface-​to-​air missile system. By 1972, the Soviet Union had shipped to North Vietnam 95 sets of the CA-​75M system with 7,658 B-​750M (SAM-​2) missiles. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 59. 5. Captain John D. Cummings (USMC Air Force, ret.), “MiG Kill near Haiphong,” in Dorr, Marine Air, 313, 314. 6. Major T, interviews by the author in Kyiv, Ukraine, in July 2005. During the interviews, the major asked me to let him remain anonymous since the Russian government has concealed the participation of the former Soviet Union’s military in the Vietnam War. Most Russian veterans do not want to talk about their experience in Vietnam, and those who are willing to have agreed only on the condition that their names would not be used. 7. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 37. 8. Luplow, “Skyhawks vs. Viet Cong,” 211–​12. 9. Mr. B (Russian KGB Agent, ret.), interviews by the author in Silver Spring, Maryland, September 2007. Mr. B worked in the Soviet embassy at Hanoi in 1966–​ 1968 for KGB (Soviet Security and Intelligence Service, or Soviet Ministry for State

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Security). See also Mr. B, “Russian Spies in Hanoi,” in Li, Voices from the Vietnam War,  93–​98. 10. Colonel Yan Guitang (PLAAF, ret.), interview by the author in Xi’an, Shaanxi, on July 29–​30, 2006. Yan served as a staff member at the PLA Department of General Staff (DGS). 11. Colonel Liu Zhiqing (PLA), interviews by the author in Beijing in July 2006. Liu is professor with a PhD degree who teaches at China Academy of Military Science (CAMS). He also serves as the Director of Chinese Society for Sino-​Russian Relations Studies. 12. Wang, Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun [Contemporary China’s Air Force], 396–​97. 13. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 308. 14. Lieutenant General Lin Hu (PLAAF, ret.), Baowei zuguo lingkong de zhandou [Fight to Protect Motherland’s Airspace] (Beijing: Jiefangjun [PLA Press], 2002), 281–​83. Lin served as the deputy army commander of the PLAAF in the 1960s. 15. Zhong Yongming, “Two Raid Warnings,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 64–​66. Zhong was the staff member of the Intelligence Section, Sixty-​First AAA Division Command. See also Wu Fang, Conglin yishi:  yuanyue kangmei sanji [Personal Stories in the Jungle:  Journal of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting America] (Guiyang:  Guizhou minzu chubanshe [Guizhou Minority Publishing], 1993), 75–​79. 16. Zheng, “Bloody Battles at Bac Hao,” 24. Zheng was the operation staff of the 626th Regiment, Sixty-​Seventh AAA Division Command. 17. Yao, “Battles of Bravery and Wisdom,” 16–​17. Yao was the commander of the Sixty-​ Fourth AAA Division. 18. Colonel Jerry Noel Hoblit (USAF, ret.), interviews by the author in Edmond, Oklahoma, April 2005. Born in 1936, Jerry Hoblit graduated from the US Military Academy, West Point, in 1958. He then chose a commission in the USAF. He was initially trained to fly the F-​100 Super Sabre before switching to the F-​105 and being sent to fly and fight in Vietnam. Captain Hoblit was a USAF F-​105F pilot of 357th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 355th Tactical Fighter Wing, Tuy Hoa Air Base, Vietnam, in 1966–​1967. He received three Silver Stars, three Distinguished Flying Crosses, the Legion of Merit, and the Air Force Cross before he retired from the Air Force as a colonel in 1982. 19. Ibid. 20. Yao, “Battles of Bravery and Wisdom,” 16–​17. 21. CHECO Reports, Wesley R.  C. Melyan and Lee Bonetti, “ROLLING THUNDER—​July 1965–​December 1966—​Continuing Report” ( July 15, 1967), ­figures 9 and 20, quoted in Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 35, 54. 22. Chen, Yuezhan qinliji [My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War], 22. Chen served as Chinese-​Vietnamese translator at the commands of the Thirty-​First Division in 1966–​1967 and at the Sixty-​Fourth Division in 1967–​1968.

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23. Major T, “Russian Missile Officers in Vietnam,” 66–​68. 24. Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army, 223. 25. For more details of China’s arms purchase from the Soviet Union during the Korean War, see Xu, “The Purchase of Arms from Moscow,” 143–​45. 26. Major Guo Haiyun (PLA, ret.), interviews by the author in Chengde, Hebei, in July 2006. Guo served as the chief of staff of the 2nd Battalion, 611th Regiment, Sixty-​ Fourth AAA Division in Vietnam in 1967–​1969. 27. Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao, 2. 28. Nie, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu [Memoir of Nie Rongzhen], 2: 775. 29. Huang Liqun, interview by the author in Beijing, July 2004. Huang was a senior fellow at the Center for Research and Information, Space and Navigation Ministry. See also Military History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun de 70 nian, 1927–​1997 [Seventy Years of the PLA, 1927–​1997], 523. 30. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 2:  76; Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 166. 31. Ellis Joffe used the term “professional generation” to describe the Chinese officers in the 1950s in order to differentiate them from the “guerrilla generation” of the 1930s. See Joffe, Party and Army:  Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1948–​1964 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), x–​xi. 32. Mark A.  Ryan, David M.  Finkelstein, and Michael A.  McDevitt, “Patterns of PLA Warfighting,” introduction to Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting, 15. 33. Military History Research Division, CAMS, Junqi piaopiao [PLA Flag Fluttering], 1: 293. 34. Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao, 16. 35. For more details on the radical political movements in the 1950s, such as the Three Antis movement, Five Antis movement, and Anti-​Rightist movement, see Li, Civil Liberties in China,  5–​6. 36. Zhang Jinfu, “They Made History,” Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], May 6, 1999, 1–​2. Zhang was chairman of the party committee and vice president of the China Academy of Science from 1956 to 1967. 37. Joffe, Chinese Army after Mao, 2. 38. Wang Xiangen, “Amazing Victories:  Combat Experience of the AAA Sixty-​first Division in the War to Resist America and Aid Vietnam,” Junshi lishi [Military History] 9 (1995): 9. 39. Zhang, Zhang, and Wu, Hu zhiming xiaodao shang de 701 Tian [701 Days on the Ho Chi Minh Trail], 4–​6. 4 0. Lin Biao, “Letter to Mao Zedong about the Issues of Luo Ruiqing, November 30, 1965,” quoted in Zhongguo wenge wenku [Data Base of Chinese Cultural Revolution], CD, ed. Song Yongyi (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2002).

16

Bridging the Technology Gap   •  161

41. Mao’s instruction on the report by the CCP Party Committee of PLA Lanzhou Regional Command on December 2, 1965, quoted in Huang Yao, Sanci da’nan busi de Luo Ruiqing dajiang [Grand General Luo Ruiqing Survives Three Deaths] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe [CCP Party History Press], 1994), 283. 42. Archival and Manuscript Office of the CCP Central Committee, ed., Mao Zedong zhuan, 1949–​1976 [Biography of Mao Zedong, 1949–​1976] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Committee Archival and Manuscript Press], 2003), ­chapter 34. 43. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 61. 4 4. Chen, Yuezhan qinliji [My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War], 42. 45. Wang, “Amazing Victories,” 8. 4 6. Ibid.,  9. 47. Chen, Yuezhan qinliji [My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War], 21; Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 59. 48. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the U.S.], 106–​107. 4 9. Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 105. 50. The Russian SAM unit was a mobile missile battalion, and changed its operation site frequently. See Ge Xinqing, Daodan zuozhan yanjiu [Combat Missile Operations] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 2005), 233–​34. 51. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 107. 52. Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 105. 53. Mao’s quote is from Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 291. 54. Mao’s letter is quoted in Deng Rong, Deng Xiaoping and the Cultural Revolution—​ A Daughter Recalls the Critical Years, trans. Sidney Shapiro (Beijing:  Foreign Languages Press, 2002), 17. 55. Military History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun de 70 nian [Seventy Years of the PLA, 1927–​1997], 559. 56. PLAN Lushun Naval Command, “Document Collection on Lin Biao and Li Zuopeng’s Criminal Activities of Attacking the Party and Betraying the PLA, October 1971,” Political Files against the Lin-​Li Group (1971–​72), Lushun Naval Base Archives,  24–​25. 57. Gao Meng and Yan Jiaqi, Wenhua dageming shi nian shi [Ten Years of the Cultural Revolution] (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe [Tianjin People’s Press], 1986), ­chapter 5. 58. For more discussions on the Great Cultural Revolution, see Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution]; Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China: A History of the People’s Republic (New York: The Free Press, 1977), ­chapters 18–​20.

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59. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 113. 60. Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 120. 61. Major General Qin Xiaoying (PLA, ret.), interviews by the author at China Society of Strategy and Management (CSSM) in Beijing, July 2007. As a PLA field reporter in the 1960s, Qin wrote about the Red Guards in the Vietnam War. 62. Mao approved most of Lin’s requests. See Mao’s instructions and approvals in Mao’s Manuscripts since 1949, 12: 201, 209, 218, 226–​68, 380, 383. 63. PLAN Lushun Naval Command, “Document Collections on Lin Biao and Li Zuopeng’s Criminal Activities of Attacking the Party and Betraying the PLA,” Political Files against the Lin-​Li Group (1971–​72), Lushun Naval Base Archives, 56. 6 4. Captain Zhou Baoshan (PLA, ret.), “China’s Crouching Dragon,” in Peters and Li, Voices from the Korean War, 93. Zhou served as the captain of the Fourth Company, 2nd Battalion, 347th Regiment, 116th Division, Thirty-​Ninth Army of the CPVF in the Korean War. 65. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 62; Military History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun de 70 nian [Seventy Years of the PLA], 563–​6 4. 66. Among the publications on Marshal Lin Biao both in Chinese and in English are Huang Yao and Yan Jingtang, Lin Biao yisheng [Lin Biao’s Life] (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe [PLA Literature Press], 2004); Wang Zhaojun, Shui shale Lin Biao [Who Killed Lin Biao] (Taipei, Taiwan: Shijie chubanshe [World Publishing], 1994); Michael Y.  M. Kau, ed., The Lin Biao Affair:  Power Politics and Military Coup (White Plains, NY:  International Arts and Science Press, 1975); Martin Ebon, Lin Piao; The Life and Writings of China’s New Ruler (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1970). 67. Zhu, Gun Barrel Politics, 181. 68. There have been several speculations about the crash of Lin’s plane, including a Chinese missile attack, running out of fuel, or simply an accident. See Gao Wenqian, Wannian Zhou Enlai [Last Years of Zhou Enlai] (Hong Kong:  Mingjing chubanshe [Mirror Publishing, 2003], 350–​55; Huang Yao and Yan Jingtang, Lin Biao yisheng [Lin Biao’s Life], 490–​507; Ye Yonglie, Gaoceng jiaoliang [Struggle at the Top] (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe [Xinjiang People’s Press], 2004), 369–​76. 69. Military History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun de 70 nian [Seventy years of the PLA], 566. 70. Ibid., 395–​96. 71. I was conscripted into the PLA’s Heilongjiang Production and Construction Corp (PLA-​HPCC) and assigned to the First Engineering Company, 11th Regiment, Second Division of the PLA-​HPCC in 1969. Our company was upgraded to an active combat unit in 1970 because of the border conflict along the Heilongjiang (Amur) River between China and the Soviet Union.

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72. Military History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun de qishinian [Seventy Years of the PLA], 457–​58. 73. Chen, “Unforgettable Eight Months,” 58–​59. 74. Major Guo Haiyun (PLAAF ret.), interview by the author in Chengde, Hebei, in July 2006. 75. Major Guo Huiyun, “Chinese Response to the U.S. Rolling Thunder Campaign,” in Li, Voices from the Vietnam War, 89. 76. Ibid.,  90. 77. Yao, “Battles of Bravery and Wisdom,” 16–​18. 78. According to the Chinese statistics, the PLA antiaircraft troops in Vietnam shot down 1,707 American planes, damaged 1,608, and captured 42 American pilots in 3 years and 9 months, from August 1965 to May 1969. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 552. 79. Chen, “Unforgettable Eight Months,” 59–​61. 80. Guo, “Chinese Response to the U.S. Rolling Thunder Campaign,” 91. 81. Yao, “Battles of Bravery and Wisdom,” 19. 82. Shi Wenling, “The Victor of an Annihilative Battle,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 43–​45. 83. Ibid.,  45–​4 6. 84. Roger C.  Thompson, The Pacific Basin since 1945 (New  York:  Longman, 1994), 87. 85. David E.  Kaiser, American Tragedy:  Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 311. 86. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 550. 87. Chen, Yuezhan qinliji [My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War], 22. 88. Robert D.  Schulzinger, “The Johnson Administration, China, and the Vietnam War,” in Re-​examining the Cold War:  U.S.-​China Diplomacy, 1954–​1973, eds. Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 239. 89. June Grasso, Jay Corrin, and Michael Kort, Modernization and Revolution in China; From the Opium Wars to World Power, 3rd ed. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), 234. 90. Mao’s quote in Deng, Deng Xiaoping and the Cultural Revolution, 189. 91. For the last phase of the Cultural Revolution, see Gao and Yan, Wenhua dageming shi nian shi [Ten Years of the Cultural Revolution], ­chapters 6–​7; Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun [The PLA during the Cultural Revolution]; Meisner, Mao’s China, ­chapter 20. 92. Liu, “The ‘Special Commission’ of the Central Committee and Nuclear Bombs,” 114. 93. Ibid.,  100. 94. Hu Shihong, “Space Sonata,” Renwu [Biographies] 5 (1994): 65–​67.

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95. Nie Rongzhen, “About the Nuclear and Missile Tests, November 11, 1966,” in Nie Rongzhen junshi wenxuan [Selected Military Papers of Nie]; Military History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun de 70 nian [Seventy Years of the PLA], 526. 96. Military History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun de 70 nian [Seventy Years of the PLA], 525, 528. 97. Interview with Major General Xu Changyou, then vice political commissar of the PLA East China Sea Fleet, in Shanghai in April 2000. Xu served as Defense Minister Zhang Aiping’s secretary in the 1960s. 98. Chen Chuangang, “Sharpen the Just Sword and Forge Defense Shield,” in Military History Research Division, CAMS, Junqi piaopiao [PLA Flag Fluttering], 2: 685. 99. Guo, “Chinese Response to the U.S. Rolling Thunder Campaign,” 92. 100. Chen Huiting, “Establish a Vietnamese SAM Missile Regiment,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 34–​35. 101. Chen, Yuezhan qinliji [My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War], 36–​38. 102. Guo, “Chinese Response to the U.S. Rolling Thunder Campaign,” 92. 103. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 292–​94. 104. Li and Tian, eds., Evolution of Power.

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5

HANOI’S COMPLAINTS

Rails and Roads

Among the three Chinese commands for the Vietnam War, the ground transportation engineering command had the largest force in Vietnam, including four divisions totaling 117,700 troops.1 The First Division consisted of the railway engineering troops with 32,700 men.2 The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Divisions under the highway construction command were comprised of road construction troops totaling 85,000.3 In December 1966, the four divisions became part of the Chinese Volunteer Force to Aid Vietnam (CVFAV), which included three commands: the air defense, rail and highway construction, and combat engineering forces. The four ground transportation engineering divisions were under tremendous pressure when they entered Vietnam in the summer of 1965. American air strikes had destroyed the five railroads in the north, totaling 660 miles. Rail transportation became paralyzed, having a total of only 100 tons per day in May, much less than the minimum of 3,000 tons daily needed for the North to continue its war against America and the South.4 Moreover, the Soviet Union blamed China for the delays shipping Russian SAM missiles, automatic arms, and communication equipment at the Chinese-​Vietnamese border because there was little transport available into Vietnam. The first shipment of Soviet weapons and equipment, scheduled for a June delivery, did not arrive on time.5 After entering Vietnam in June, the Chinese rail and road engineering forces had a different experience than that of the AAA force, which had enjoyed a rotation system. Each AAA division went to the Vietnam War for a tour of eight or ten months. The First Rail Engineering Division operated in Vietnam for five years from June 1965 to July 1970. The Chinese engineering troops lived in constant fear, due to the harsh environment and their fatigue

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and disappointment for long periods of time. They would build a new railway or highway, watch it be bombed, repair it, and then again saw its destruction due to continuous bombing. Their morale declined after the second year when casualties increased and the troop’s physical condition worsened. The rail and road engineering commands faced serious issues, such as insufficient nutrition, sickness, exhaustion, and depression that led to disobeying orders and desertion. The PLA high command and the CSFV began taking action in political education, mental treatments, improved living conditions, discipline, and system of courts martial. Their efforts seemed effective since the four divisions had survived Rolling Thunder and maintained the transportation and communication routes between China and Vietnam in 1965–​1970. The railway engineering division accomplished its mission by building three new east-​west railway lines to link the two major north-​south railroads, replacing all outdated French-​built rails with new standard rails along the two major railways, and constructing and repairing bridges, tunnels, and train stations through the bombing. The three road engineering divisions constructed six new highways and rebuilt another, while also building bridges, culverts, and roadside warehouses. In 1968–​1970, two of the road engineering divisions were redeployed to Laos to maintain the NVA’s supplies and troops traveling to the South along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In 1971–​1973, Beijing reinforced two more engineering divisions to Laos for highway construction, repair, and maintenance. Meanwhile, the PLA high command also sent two AAA divisions to Laos to protect the Chinese engineering troops’ operation, transportation, and communication.

Building the Railway Network In response to Hanoi’s request for transportation assistance, on April 27, 1965 Beijing signed an agreement with Hanoi that China would reconstruct and repair major railways in North Vietnam.6 In May, the PLA high command reorganized the Second Division of the PLA Railway Engineering Corps (PLAREC) at Changsha, Hunan, into the First Division for the planned Vietnam operation.7 Senior Colonel Long Guilin was division commander (1965–​ 1966); Major General Guo Yanlin, division political commissar (1965–​1968); Senior Colonel Xiao Chunxian, deputy commander (1965–​ 1967; acting commander in 1966–​1968; commander in 1968–​1969); and Zhang Tongda, deputy commander (1965–​1969; commander in 1969–​1970).

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The First Division was under both the PLAREC and Guangzhou Regional Commands. From June 21, the First Division, about 32,700 troops, began entering Vietnam in several groups. The division included the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Rail Engineering Regiments, and the 6th AAA Regiment. The division later added three more engineering regiments, including the 44th Regiment, established in February 1967, and the 58th and 61st Regiments, which transferred into the First Division in August 1968. The division also consisted of one transportation regiment, one railway prospecting team, and one bridge engineering battalion, as well as two field hospitals.8 On June 29, the 2nd Regiment with 4,248 troops and the 4th Regiment with 4,318 troops crossed the border.9 On June 30, the 6th Regiment, including 1,020 AAA troops and the division HQ, entered Vietnam. The First HQ had 2,327 officers, staff, and security troops with 183 vehicles and equipment.10 Commander Long set up his headquarters at Dong Mo, Lang Son province.11 With his experience in railroad construction, at age thirty Long was promoted to be commander of the PLA Fourth Railway Engineering Regiment during the Chinese Civil War, and he became commander of the Third Railway Engineering Division of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Force (CPVF) during the Korean War. He served as president of the PLA Academy of Railway Engineering Corps prior to his assignment to the Vietnam War.12 Long deployed his 2nd and 4th Regiments along the major north-​south railway between China and Hanoi, the Hanoi-​Youyiguan [Friendship Pass], or Ha-​You Line, in the northeast. The two regiments crossed the border from Youyiguan and traveled south along the Ha-​You Line. On the afternoon of July 1, the commanders of the NVA North Region came to visit the Chinese railway engineering commanders.13 Somehow, on the next day, South Vietnamese intelligence had information on the First Division’s movement and its locations. In the south, Radio Saigon broadcast the news regarding the Chinese engineering troops’ units, revealing the commanding officer names, and other details. US planes soon began reconnaissance and raids against the First HQ at Dong Mo. On July 3, the NVA warned Long that his HQ must relocate within five to seven days. After the First removed its HQ to Huu Lung, Bac Giang province, the US warplanes found them again and inflicted some casualties on the HQ staff and security troops.14 Long was later seriously injured and his staff and guards were killed during a bombing. The security and safety of the Chinese HQs and commanders remained a major problem of the First Railway Engineering Division in Vietnam.

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The five railroads in North Vietnam radiated out from Hanoi in all directions (see Map 5.1 Major railroads in North Vietnam). The northern line, or the Hanoi-​Youyiguan (Ha-​You, or He-​You in Chinese) Line, started from Hanoi to Youyiguan, a Chinese border city in Guangxi, a distance of 120 miles. The western line, or the Hanoi-​Lao Cai (Ha-​Lao, or He-​Lao in Chinese) line, was approximately 145 miles, from Hanoi to Lao Cai, a Vietnamese border city in Bao Thang, to Hekou. The central line started from Hanoi to Thai

MAP 5.1.  Major railroads in North Vietnam, 1965–​1968

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Nguyen as the Ha-​Thai Line, a distance of about 78 miles. The eastern line, or the Hanoi-​Hai Phong (Ha-​Hai) Line, was approximately 95 miles; while the southern line, or the Hanoi-​Vinh (Ha-​Vinh) Line, was 220 miles from Hanoi to Vinh. All railroads were severely damaged, and many portions of them were no longer functioning.15 Sr. Col. Long followed the seven Sino-​Vietnamese rail assistant agreements and took on the 107 railway projects in North Vietnam.16 Most Chinese rail engineering assignments centered on four major railway projects in North Vietnam. The first was to build three new east-​west railway lines to link the two major north-​south railroads. The three new railways included the Youyiguan-​Kep (You-​Kep), Kep-​Thai Nguyen (Kep-​Thai), and Kep-​Yen Bai (Kep-​Yen) Lines, totaling 182 miles. The new lines were to integrate the existing lines into a railway network of complete circulation in North Vietnam.17 The second project was to replace all outdated Vietnamese rails with new international standard rails along the two major railways: Ha-​You and Ha-​ Lao Lines, about 265 total miles.18 The existing French-​built meter-​gauge (1,000mm) rails would be replaced with standard track gauge (1,435mm).19 The third project was to construct new bridges, tunnels, train stations, and warehouses along the new and remodeled railroads. The fourth project was to repair damaged railways and facilities after bombings, and to keep the four rail lines north of Hanoi operational most, if not all, of the time. Through the construction of all the new rail lines and repairs of the railways in 1965–​1970, China had to ship all construction and logistical supplies to Vietnam for the five railway engineering regiments. On July 7, 1965, railway construction began with the building of three new east-​west railway lines. The division’s engineers designed the new standard-​ gauge railways at strategic points to link the two major north-​south railroads by establishing a rail network in the north. The division command assigned its 2nd Regiment to the construction of the Kep-​Youyiguan Line. Colonel Hou Zhenlu, deputy commander of the 2nd Regiment, and Ding Tiren, his political commissar, first concentrated their troops on one part of the Kep-​ You Line.20 Thus, their AAA companies could protect the entire construction zone from air raids, and the security troops could guard the operation sites, station areas, and supply lines. After finishing one section, the 2nd Regiment moved on to another. By December 23, 1965, the 2nd Regiment was ahead of schedule and completed construction of the Kep-​You rail line by building more than seventy miles of new rails. This rail connection significantly increased shipping capacity. The construction also improved these railroads by adding dozens of new train stations, bridges, and tunnels.

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The division assigned the construction of the second new rail line, approximately thirty-​four miles between Kep and Thai Nguyen, to its 3rd and 5th Regiments. The new Kep-​Thai Line traversed mountains and forest and served as an east-​west bypass connection between the Hanoi-​Thai Nguyen and Hanoi-​Youyiguan lines. The new line would link the existing north-​south lines into a railway network throughout North Vietnam. In case of any interruption of the two major railroads, the rail transportation would continue between China and Vietnam through these new bypass connecting lines.21 The 5th Regiment entered Vietnam on September 24 with Su Baochen as the commander and Lu Yinglin its political commissar, and included 4,727 troops. The 3rd Regiment, consisting of 4,080 troops, entered Vietnam on September 28.22 The two regiments began construction in November 1965 and completed it on December 2, 1966, with a total of 1.5  million work days.23 The 3rd and 5th Regiments constructed four tunnels, four train stations, and several bridges along the Kep-​Thai Line. The division then began construction of the third new railway, the Kep-​ Yen Bai (Kep-​Yen) Line in the west, assigned to its 1st Regiment. The 1st entered Vietnam on November 30, 1965 and included 6,230 troops.24 The regiment crossed the border from Hekou, a border city of Yunnan, and traveled along the Ha-​Lao (Hanoi-​Lao Cai) railway in the west. To strengthen the command and construction capability, in February 1967, the 1st Regiment was split into two regiments, the 1st and 44th Regiments of the First Division, with new reinforcement and newly arrived equipment. Both regiments worked on the construction of the Kep-​Yen railway. Eventually, the two regiments completed the third new railroad by June 1970. From June 1965 to June 1970, the First Division finished the three new railways of 182 miles. The new lines had expanded the existing lines into a railway network to guarantee the shipment of Soviet and Chinese military and economic aid. The six rail engineering regiments also built twenty new train stations, completed forty-​seven new bridges, and constructed fifty-​five railway tunnels along the three new railways.25 The division command also moved the train stations, control facilities, and repair shops out of the cities where they were vulnerable to air strikes. With the completion of the new rail network, the Hanoi-​Youyiguan Line almost doubled its annual rail transport capacity from 1.46 million tons to 2.8 million tons, a 97-​percent increase between 1967 and 1969.26 In the meantime, the First Division worked on the reconstruction of the older tracks along the two major north-​south railways, including the Ha-​ You and Ha-​Lao Lines. The tracks of the two railways were French-​built

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meter-​gauge (1,000mm) rails. The French completed the Ha-​You Line in 1908, but destroyed much of it before leaving Vietnam in 1954. Both railways were badly damaged through three wars. Since the old tracks were hard to replace, the division command decided that reconstructing the two old railways with standard track gauge (1,435mm) was not viable. However, by adding a third rail to the meter-​gauge tracks, the railways were serviceable. The Chinese called the new railways, which kept the old tracks while adding one more rail next to it, the “three legs tracks.”27 The tracks were reconstructed in such a way that the rail transports continued without interruption during the conversions.28 The division assigned its 4th Regiment to the reconstruction of the old rails of the Ha-​You Line. After its completion of the first new railway, the 2nd Regiment began upgrading the Ha-​Lao Line. The two lines crossed 196 bridges, including 61 large and medium-​size bridges totaling 15,786 feet in length, over many rivers in the north.29 It was necessary for the Chinese to reconstruct these old bridges before they could add the third rail. Colonel Hou Zhenlu told the author during an interview, “The most difficult task was rebuilding the bridges” during the reconstruction of the old railway. His regiment needed to rebuild each bridge before the additional rail could be added.30 The division also built thirty-​nine new rail bridges, twenty-​three new train stations, fourteen new tunnels, and laid eight kilometers of underwater cable. Along the two major north-​south railroads, they constructed sixty-​two miles of detours and bypass links.31 The Chinese rail engineering division also constructed many defense works and underground warehouses along the four major railroads to guarantee safe shipment and communication despite heavy bombing. By June 5, 1970, the First Division completed the reconstruction of two major north-​south railroads, having upgraded 265 miles of railroad tracks and moving 9.6  million square meters of stone and earth. They also established 210 miles of two-​way telecommunication wire lines along Ha-​You and Ha-​Lao Lines.32 The new mixed dual-​track railways could potentially double shipping capacity by allowing use of both Vietnamese and international standard locomotives and cargo cars.

“We Repair, Get Bombed, and Repair Again” According to Sino-​Vietnamese agreements, Chinese railway engineering troops were responsible for repairing all damaged railways north of Hanoi along the four railroads, after each bombing, totaling 347 miles. Rolling Thunder challenged the Chinese commanders since the US air strikes against

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Chinese troops and the railroads in Vietnam were much heavier than those they had experienced during the Korean War. Li Qingde, deputy commander of the First Division, divided bombing against the railways into three different phases. The first phase, from August 1965 to July 1966, was called the “weekly bombing,” during which US airplanes bombed each target with a short intermission of five to seven days. The second phase was “daily bombing” from July 1966 to May 1967, and the third phase was the “bombing in waves” from June 1967 to March 1968.33 The increasingly intensified bombing campaign made the rail repairs very difficult, if not impossible, for the Chinese rail engineering regiments. American strategists and historians divide Operation Rolling Thunder into five phases: phase one from March to June 1965, phase two from July 1965 to June 1966, phase three from July to September 1966, phase four from October 1966 to December 1967, and phase five from January to October 1968. The first phase began in March and ended in June 1965, before Chinese troops entered Vietnam. The second phase lasted about one year from June 1965 to June 1966, which almost matches Li’s first phase. Earl H. Tilford, Jr. points out that the bombing during this phase “focused on roads, bridges, and railroads.” “More than 75 percent of the interdiction effort in 1965 and 1966 concentrated on trucks, railroad rolling stock, locomotives.”34 According to deputy commander Li, during the first phase in 1965–​1966, the air campaign focused on the middle sections of the Ha-​You and Ha-​Lao Lines. American planes bombed the same sections every week to cut western and northern rail transportation between China and Hanoi. On July 9, 1965, for example, US warplanes bombed the western Ha-​Lao Line on the middle section between Yen Bai and Bao Ha, including train stations and bridges. Thereafter, American planes bombed the same section on a weekly basis. On August 23, seven bombers raided the eastern railway at the Kep hub, the middle section of the Ha-​You Line. This was the first time the division engaged US airplanes with its own AAA troops. The division had only one AAA regiment with 85mm and 37mm guns. It also had thirty-​three anti-​ aircraft machine gun companies, but their fire power was very limited since each company was only equipped with nine 12.7mm single-​barreled anti-​ aircraft machine guns. After that, the Kep railway hub became the target for weekly American bombings during the first phase. On October 5, US planes, in several groups, again bombed division HQ at Huu Lung.35 From August 1965 to July 1966, the US launched 99 air raids and over 2,100 sorties against the two railroads. The Americans dropped 2,178 bombs on 355 targets, 327 of which hit their targets, making the hit rate about 15 percent.36 Operation

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Rolling Thunder escalated from 25,000 sorties and 63,000 tons of bombs in 1965, to 79,000 sorties and 136,000 tons of bombs in 1966.37 As a Korean War veteran, Sr. Col. Long realized that his division could not accomplish its rail engineering mission in Vietnam without effectively dealing with the bombing. In early July 1965, the division command had several meetings to plan air defense and to arrange protective measures. Division officers then visited each regiment, battalion, and company, in an effort to carry out plans. They asked troops to build division and regimental headquarters in caves along the mountain ranges. All troop living quarters would be away from worksites, warehouses, and rail lines. Each battalion had its own air defense team with anti-​aircraft artillery and machine guns. Each company had its own outposts and a warning system connected with the division warning network. Chinese anti-​aircraft defenses and their railway repairs were inextricably linked. After their efforts for several months, Long believed that the First Division finally consolidated its positions in Vietnam.38 From July 1965 to March 1968, the division engaged in 668 air defense battles, firing a half-​million shells by its anti-​aircraft guns, shooting down and damaging 119 enemy airplanes, and capturing 12 American pilots.39 After entering Vietnam, the division command assigned repairs of the four major railways, totaling 347 miles, to all of its regiments. While they were working on the construction, or reconstruction, of the rail lines, all were standing by (or on-​call) for nearby repairs. The five regiments applied lessons learned during the Korean War for rapid repairs on the damaged railways, bridges, train stations, and rail facilities after air raids. Captain Wu Zhiming, Seventh Company of the 3rd Regiment, said during an interview, “We repaired, got bombed, and repaired again.”40 The rail bridges had been the target for US bombing throughout Rolling Thunder. Among the 222 bridges over the 4 major railways were 15 large bridges and 207 medium or small bridges. From July 1965 to March 1968, these bridges were bombed 484 times and damaged at 181 places. About 35 percent of them were totally destroyed; 30 percent were heavily damaged; 25 percent were partially damaged; and 10 percent had minor damages.41 On September 20, 1965, for example, bombing destroyed approximately 390 feet of the Songhua Bridge, cutting off all rail transportation of the Ha-​You Line. Commander Long ordered his 2nd Regiment to rush to the bombing site and repair the bridge within twenty-​four hours. Long himself went to the repair site and oversaw the operation in person. The 2nd Regiment completed the repairs in less than twenty hours, and the Songhua Bridge became accessible for travel the next day. The Chinese repaired, and they repaired again,

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75 percent of the bridges along the Ha-​You Line, and they kept the railway in operation through the rest of the year.42 In April 1966, Rolling Thunder extended the bombings into the northeastern suburbs of Hanoi. On April 23, US planes bombed, for the first time, all major bridges around Hanoi. By June, Hanoi’s bridges had been bombed at least four times. On June 28, the Yue Chih Bridge, second largest bridge in North Vietnam, was destroyed by air raids.43 Tilford points out that during this period, as phases three and four of Rolling Thunder, “Targets in and around Hanoi, previously off limits for fear of inflicting collateral damage on nonmilitary structures and causing civilian casualties, were struck.”44 Hess’s statistics table also shows that the bombing intensified during this phase from 79,000 sorties and 136,000 tons of bombs in 1966 to 108,000 sorties and 226,000 tons of bombs in 1967.45 Deputy Commander Li categorized the air campaign in 1966–​1967 as the second phase of the bombing, or “daily bombing,” against the Chinese forces. According to Li, from July 1966 to May 1967, the United States increased air attacks and bombed the northern railways nearly every day without a break. American airplanes launched 323 attacks in 11 months (334 days) with 2,891 groups and 9,262 sorties. US airplanes dropped 5,992 bombs against 815 targets; of these, 960 bombs, about 16 percent, hit their targets.46 During the second phase, the hit rate increased steadily. For two major railways, the Ha-​ You and Ha-​Lao Lines, about 108 out of 332 miles of the rails were destroyed or damaged, more than 30 percent.47 The First Division suffered casualties from continuing air raids. They lost 501 officers and men to the air strikes, with more than 3,000 wounded.48 In addition, during a railway repair job right after an air raid, the 5th Regiment lost more than twenty officers and soldiers, due to an undiscovered time bomb. On August 21, 1966, Commander Long rode in a jeep with his staff, guards, and translator to a construction site at the Ha-​You Line. US aircraft attacked his vehicle while they were on their way from the HQ to a worksite along Highway 1.  His staff and driver were killed, and Long was seriously injured. His guard, also wounded, took him to a nearby NVA field hospital, thus saving his life. On August 24, Long returned to China and was hospitalized for a year.49 Ho Chi Minh visited the First Division in October 1966 and January 1967, when he spent Chinese New Year Day with Chinese soldiers and officers of the 5th Regiment.50 After Long’s injury, Senior Colonel Xiao Chunxian replaced him as acting commander (August 1966–​October 1968) and then commander of the First Division (October 1968–​October 1969).51 As a Long March veteran, Xiao

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served as commander of squad, platoon, company, battalion, and regiment in the Eighth Route Army during the Anti-​Japanese War and in the PLA during the Chinese Civil War. He became deputy commander of the Second Railway Engineering Division of the CPVF in the Korean War. Xiao was promoted to commander of the Second Railway Engineering Division in 1954 and was granted a rank of senior colonel in 1955.52 Heavy bombing forced the new division commander to modify the First Division’s plan to keep all the railroads working. Xiao’s new plan focused on keeping the northern Ha-​You Line open by concentrating all AAA battalions in the north. As the Chinese air defense capability improved during the second year, the bombing percentage of hits was reduced from 16 percent in 1966 to 13.3 percent in 1967, and to 9.5 percent in 1968.53 Xiao concentrated his repair troops on the Ha-​You Line by deploying three regiments along the 110-​mile railway, over half of the total force of the division. At the key sections between Kep and Hanoi, Xiao deployed 150 repairmen per mile and 1,000 men per bridge. His new plan worked, and it kept the Ha-​You Line open for rail transportation through the rest of the Rolling Thunder campaign.54 From June 1967 to March 1968, the United States intensified its bombing, entering the “bombing in waves” phase described by the Chinese as the third phase of the bombing and the heaviest of all. The raids averaged twice a day, and in some cases five times a day. As Frankum, Jr. points out, “With 1967 came a new initiative for Rolling Thunder as more targets were approved for air strikes,” and adds, “Just as Westmoreland had planned to make 1967 a turning point in the ground war, the air war was also at a crossroads, since the United States finally had enough air assets available to make a significant difference.”55 The third phase of the bombing concentrated on the northern railway, or the Ha-​You Line, focusing on bridges and train stations near Hanoi, Kep, and Songhua. There were 545 air raids in nine months (270 days) with 1,744 waves, totaling 12,000 sorties against 1,369 targets, including operation sites, construction equipment, AAA positions, communication centers, and troop station areas. During the third phase, American planes dropped 18,000 bombs, with 2,241 hitting their targets, about a 12.4-​percent hit rate.56 On August 11, 1967, US airplanes heavily bombed the Long Bien (or Paul Dewey) Bridge, one of the most important railway-​highway bridges north of Hanoi. The French-​built, 1,681-​meters-​long bridge was seriously damaged by the bombing. Some Soviet experts estimated a minimum of three months to repair the bridge and reopen it to rail traffic. In September, the NVA requested that the First Division repair the bridge. Xiao and Major General

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Guo Yanlin arrived at the bridge and held an onsite commanders’ meeting on September 7.57 They organized a strong force for the bridge repair, including the bridge battalion, two engineering companies from the newly established 44th Regiment, and one company from the 2nd Regiment, totaling 1,000 troops. The repairs began on September 12 with a set deadline for forty days (by October 22). To improve the machine operation efficiency, Chinese troops increased their working hours from two shifts a day to three shifts a day, beginning on September 22. Despite frequent air raids, the repair troops of the 2nd and 44th Regiments worked day and night, completing their repairs of the Long Bien Bridge within eighteen days. On September 30, both rail and road traffic resumed over the bridge. Within the next five hours, more than 400 vehicles safely crossed over the bridge. In less than 10 hours, 60,000 troops traveled across the bridge in and out of Hanoi, and within 24 hours, 27 cargo trains passed the bridge in both directions.58 The bridge was later bombed again and was out for 186 days. However, since the bridge battalion had built one temporary bridge and two ferries to cross the river, the railway transport was interrupted for only four days.59 US intelligence gave some credit to the Chinese AAA divisions for their air defense of the LOCs in North Vietnam. A SNIE reported that with the help of the Chinese air defense, “in 1965, the DRV received about one million tons of imports, two-​thirds by sea and nearly one-​third by rail, the small remainder coming by road, trail, and river. About 100,000 tons of military equipment is estimated to have arrived by rail in 1965, mostly for DRV air defense.”60 According to the division’s statistics, from July 1965 to March 1968, American aircraft had launched 967 raids in 5,211 groups with 23,517 sorties. These airplanes had dropped 288,000 bombs, 430 rockets, and 1,106 time bombs, an estimated 34,000 tons, against 2,575 targets along the four major railways. In the peak month of June 1967, American planes dropped more than sixteen tons of ordnance per mile of the railways, and 2.5 to 6.3 tons per meter of the bridges. Each of the fifteen major bridges along the Ha-​You Line had been destroyed or damaged at least six times. According to CHECO reports, the US bombing over North Vietnam had intensified through 1968 from 3,228 sorties in February, to 5,039 in March, 7,259 in April, 9,739 in May, 10,375 in June, and 14,339 in July.61 According to the division’s statistics, Rolling Thunder had destroyed or damaged 1,250 bridges and tunnels, and 120 miles of railroads, about 32.6 percent of the four major rail lines. Among the 71 train stations along these railways, 59 of them were bombed with a total of 379 attacks, about 5.3

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attacks per station. The Kep Station was bombed forty-​eight times between January and August of 1967.62 The Chinese division rushed to repair it forty-​ one times and maintained the station, as well as kept it open, throughout the year. CHECO reported the results of the US air strikes between 1965 and 1967, showing 3,655 bridges totally destroyed and 1,700 more damaged, along with 9,064 buildings destroyed and 9,440 more damaged, and 3,502 transportation vehicles totally destroyed and 3,131 more damaged.63 Between August 1965 and February 1969, the First Division accomplished 1,178 repair missions for damaged railways and facilities, disarmed 3,100 time-​delay bombs, rebuilt 98 miles of destroyed railway tracks, built 39 new rail bridges and 14 tunnels, laid 5 miles of underwater cable, and repaired 850 miles of railroad telephone lines. From September 1965 to February 1968, the northern Ha-​You Line was open for transportation for 813 (out of 942) days, about an 86.3 percent operational rate. From December 1965 to June 1968, the western Ha-​Lao Line had operated for 596 (of 849) days with a 70.2 percent operational rate. Among the three newly built railways, the Kep-​Thai Line operated 385 (of 443)  days with an operational rate of 86.9 percent from its completion in January 1967 to the end of the Rolling Thunder attacks in March 1968.64 On the 1968 Chinese New Year Day, Ho Chi Minh visited the Chinese railway engineering troops at the First Division’s 5th Regiment HQ, about two miles north of the railway station at Lynn along the Ha-​You Line. The 5th Regiment had just lost more than twenty men with one time-​delayed bomb during repair of the railroad. About 8:00 am, Ho arrived in a jeep with the VWP’s chief of the Propaganda Department, party secretary of the Ha Bac province, guards, and a translator. Ho, however, talked to the Chinese soldiers and officers in fluent Mandarin Chinese. The Vietnamese leader expressed his appreciation to the men of the First Division.65 For the Chinese soldiers, whether an anti-​aircraft gun or a machine operator, terrain dictated much of their experience. The environment provided the most difficulty for the railway engineering troops in Vietnam. In addition to intense and continuous US bombing, these Chinese soldiers faced an oppressive environment of intense heat and humidity set amid nearly impassable jungle terrain. Letters and diaries abounded with references to the oppressive heat. Colonel Hou Zhenlu recalled during the interviews that his men hated the heat and insects in the jungle as much as they did the air strikes.66 From the summer to the fall, the endless monsoon rains arrived, ensuring the soldiers stayed constantly wet. In the winter months, Vietnam’s dry season, troops often operated in temperatures between 100 and 120 degrees

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Fahrenheit. Hou received battalion reports about large numbers of soldiers being sick. For example, in August 1968, 1,900 men were reported sick with afflictions from bacterial infections to jungle rot. The average sickness rate among soldiers in the companies was about 30 percent the majority of the time, with some companies reaching as high as 60 percent. The Eighth Company of the 6th Regiment had eighty-​one soldiers suffering from malaria that September.67 Unlike the AAA divisions, which had a rotation system and served in the Vietnam War for a tour of eight or ten months, the First Division operated in Vietnam for five years from June 1965 to July 1970. The PLA tried to find solutions for the physical, psychological, and morale problems the engineering troops faced. First, the high command began to retire veterans who had served in the First Division for more than five years. In March 1966, the first group of those veterans returned to China and retired from the PLA. Most of them were enlisted in 1959–​1960. In April 1968, the division retired and sent back the second group, veterans who joined the PLA in 1959–​1963. In April 1969, the third group left Vietnam. Most of the veterans began their service in 1963–​ 1966; and the last group returned to China in April 1970. These veterans had joined the PLA in 1965–​1966.68 By that time, all of the 32,000 troops who entered Vietnam in 1965 had retired. At the same time, the PLA began sending in new recruits from China to replace the veterans leaving Vietnam. Since the newcomers did not have any operational experience, Vietnam became a training ground for the fellow soldiers of the First to show these replacements the ropes.69 It took several months for a new soldier to learn how to survive the Vietnam War, and lack of experience accounted for many of the casualties. Next, to improve the supply of men and to utilize local resources, the high command set up “military banks,” created “PLA currency” equivalent to the Chinese currency Renminbi, and opened convenience stores for the engineering divisions. The military banks had branch offices along the border areas, in major cities, and at division and regimental HQs for Chinese officers and soldiers to exchange currency, deposit money, or send cash home. The military also set up shops and convenience stores at regiment, battalion, and company station areas to provide daily needs, groceries, stationary, and other items. The commercial activities alleviated some of the supply problems the railway engineering regiments faced, such as vegetable shortages, poor meat supplies, and contaminated drinking water.

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Highway Construction and the Bombing Continued heavy bombing had cut off highway transportation between China and Hanoi by the spring of 1965. According to the Sino-​Vietnamese agreement on May 30, the PLA sent its engineering troops to North Vietnam to construct seven new highways within three years. Although Ho Chi Minh had proposed twelve highways to Mao Zedong on May 16, the PLA high command later adjusted downward to seven, totaling 726 miles, including 398 miles of new highway construction and the reconstruction of another 328 miles of existing highways (see Map 5.2 Major highways in North Vietnam). The seven highways to be constructed or reconstructed were Highways 1, 3, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12. Six out of the seven highways were brand-​new roads. Among the seven, Highway 1 started at the Chinese-​Vietnamese border in the north and traveled southward about 100 miles, including a junction with a new 55-​mile feeder (service) road through the Phi Mo (Xiamei in Chinese) Mountains, about 3,600 feet above sea-​level. Highway 3, as the only existing highway, was the most important transport route for Chinese and Russian aid traveling from China’s border city Pingxiang, through Thai Nguyen, to Hanoi, about 145 miles. The reconstruction would upgrade it from a one-​ lane dirt road to a two-​lane, two-​way modern highway, and would double its transportation capacity.70 Highway 7 was a brand-​new road to connect Yunnan and Hanoi, and it would be the second most important main transportation route between China and Vietnam, after Highway 3. No. 8 was also a brand-​new highway, coming from China’s Yunnan province in the north to Ban Phei in the south. Although Highway 10 existed, its new extension, crossing over the Phong Nien (Huanglian in Chinese) Mountains consisted of ninety-​three miles of new highway. As the only east-​west highway in North Vietnam, Highway 10 would, upon completion, connect Highways 7, 8, 11, and 12 along the Chinese-​Vietnamese border. Highways 11 and 12 stretched from Dien Bien Phu to Binh Nguyen, about 138 miles, as the major road connection to Laos. The PLA would also send in additional AAA battalions to provide air defense along these construction areas. The Sino-​Vietnamese agreements made it clear that China would provide all construction materials, equipment, supplies, and other needs when their troops worked on the road projects.71 Thereafter, the Chinese high command added North Vietnam’s road construction and repairs to their own operational plan. On July 25, 1965, the Chinese Volunteer Forces to Assist Vietnam-​Road Engineering Command (CVFAV-​REC) was established, with Major General

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MAP 5.2.  Major highways in North Vietnam, 1965–​1968

Luo Hongbiao as acting commander, Sun Zhang as its political commissar, Wang Chunxun as chief of staff, Wang Gengyue as deputy commander, and Liu Yuesheng as deputy commissar and director of the Political Department.72 On August 15, the Road Engineering Command (REC) HQ arrived at the border and began political education, troop orientation, logistic preparation, and engineering training.73 In September, the first wave of road engineering troops entered North Vietnam.

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The CVFAV-​REC had three divisions:  the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Divisions, totaling 80,000 troops, the largest among all the Chinese forces in Vietnam at any given time. Each division was comprised of several road construction regiments, two to four AAA battalions, two special engineering battalions, one design and planning team, one field hospital, and one civilian worker regiment.74 After August 15, the REC HQ established communication with its three divisions. The Fourth Division totaled 24,000 troops with Liu Tongshan as commander, He Jing as political commissar, and Li Kunshan and Wang Kai as deputy commanders. The Fourth commanded five road construction regiments, including the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th Regiments. Each regiment had 3,800 to 4,200 men in four or five battalions, each with 800 to 1,000 troops in five companies. Each company totaled 150 to 200 men. The Fourth Division was assigned to the construction of Highways 1 and 3.75 In mid-​September, commander Liu led the division HQ into Vietnam. From October, his 16th, 18th, and 19th Regiments moved into their construction areas along Highway 3. In November, the 17th and 20th Regiments arrived at their operational sites along Highway 1. The Fifth Division commanded five road construction regiments, including the 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 31st, 32nd, and 40th Regiments, totaling 28,000 troops, with Xu Chenggong as commander; Peng Zongtao as political commissar; Liu Derun, Li Quan, and Yang Jian as deputy commanders; Chen Biao and Xi Boyan as deputy commissars; and Sun Fengshan as the chief of staff. The Fifth Division was assigned to construction of Highways 7 and 11, and repair and maintenance of Highway 6.76 Of all the existing routes, Highway 6 needed the most extensive repairs and maintenance. On August 16, the divisional command sent its staff team to Vietnam under the command of Li Quan to survey travel conditions, living quarters, and the local environment. Beginning October 19, the Fifth Division began entering Vietnam in two groups. The Sixth Division commanded six road construction regiments, including the 32nd, 33rd, 34th, 35th, 36th, and 37th Regiments, with Sun Linquan as commander and Luo Bin as political commissar. The Sixth Division also had two AAA battalions, one design and planning battalion, one pontoon bridge battalion, one field hospital, one logistics headquarters, and the 40th Yunnan Road Construction Workers Regiment. The Sixth Division was assigned to the construction of Highways 8, 10, and 12.77 On July 18, 1965, Commander Sun led a survey team including all his divisional and regimental officers into Vietnam for site visits and data collection. On July 21, they met

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the REC chief of staff at the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi and discussed their assignments and special needs. During their survey trip, they also discussed construction details with NVA representatives and local Vietnamese government officials. On September 27, the Sixth Division began entering Vietnam. In October 1965, after the CVFAV-​REC entered Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh met all its commanders at the division level and above at the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi.78 Ho knew that the Chinese road engineering force faced tremendous difficulties and hardship. By December 1965, all 80,000 troops had moved into their positions in Vietnam. The most serious problem the REC troops had from the very beginning was Rolling Thunder air raids against their road construction areas. The road engineering divisions suffered high casualties during the first year of their operation in Vietnam, since the Chinese AAA divisions only protected road transportation, rather than road construction. The REC had only six AAA battalions, about two for each division, and they were not enough for any effective air defense for road engineering troops’ deployment and operation. The USAF had very good intelligence on Chinese movements. Cai Ping, chief staff of the REC, recalled that in September–​December 1965 US airplanes attacked the troops by bombing them at the bridges and road conjunctions to slow down, if not stop, Chinese force movements. After the road engineering divisions and regiments began their operations, US planes bombed road construction zones, air defense positions, troop station areas, along with surrounding villages and townships.79 After March 1966, the air bombing intensified by involving B-​52 heavy bombers, and dropping more and more heavy bombs between 500 and 1,000 lbs. and napalm. The B-​52 sorties increased from 378 in January–​March 1966 to 445 in July–​September, and from 761 in January–​March 1967 to 2,537 in July–​September. B-​52s flew 141 missions over the North during this period.80 According to CHECO reports, the bombing over North Vietnam had intensified through 1966, and increased totally destroyed road sections (or “road cuts”) from 847 places in 1965 to 8,114 places in 1966; totally destroyed bridges from 656 in 1965 to 2,999 in 1966; and totally destroyed transportation vehicles from 740 in 1965 to 2,762 in 1966.81 REC casualties also increased. From October 1965 to August 1966, for example, US planes bombed construction sites of the 36th Regiment of the Sixth Division 81 times and dropped 1,839 heavy bombs. Some were timed bombs or magnetic bombs, which the Chinese were not familiar with. The regiment lost five men to its bomb removal effort in one day in September 1966. During October 6–​8,

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1966, approximately 34 American airplanes attacked construction sites and troop station areas of the 37th Regiment of the Sixth Division with more than 400 bombs and rockets. The regiment lost three men on the 7th and eleven on the 8th. In late 1966, US airplanes bombed the construction site of the Fourth Company of the 37th Regiment. More than forty men in the Fourth Company were killed or wounded in the twenty-​two-​minute bombing.82 The 36th and 37th Regiments of the Sixth Division were assigned to rebuild Highway 12 between Dien Bien Phu and Binh Nguyen, a total of approximately 138 miles. Both regiments suffered casualties during the first-​ year operation, due to heavy bombings. Many battalions suspended their daytime road construction and only operated at night when fewer air raids took place.83 The Chinese officers joked about this by saying the roads to Hanoi were always under construction. The heavy bombing and lack of air defense not only impeded any road construction progress, but also undermined troop morale. Liu Yuesheng, deputy political commissar the REC, recalled that among the “three fear factors” (death, hardship, and prolonged service in Vietnam) most Chinese soldiers were afraid of being killed by American air raids.84 According to field statistics of the Sixth Division, from August 1966 to March 1968, US airplanes bombed all of the 638 construction sites, air defense positions, transportation lines, and troop station areas for a total of 15,600 times. Sun Linquan, division commander, reported that some of his soldiers refused to go to work by pretending illness or by injuring themselves. Some of the companies in the Sixth Division had as low as 58 percent of the men reporting to duty on a daily basis. More than 40 percent of the men were malingering or even intentionally injuring themselves.85 Some officers became frightened when the Rolling Thunder campaign was escalated in 1966. They expressed that since they had survived the Korean War, they did not want to die in Vietnam.86 Although the AAA battalions of the Sixth Division fought hard through their 181 engagements, the air defense was inadequate, and within the division 204 men were killed and 228 injured due to air attacks. The heavy bombing and lack of an air defense not only inflicted casualties and damages to the Chinese troops, but also isolated them from the Vietnamese people. The REC received frequent reports from the divisions that local Vietnamese citizens fled from nearby villages after the Chinese engineering troops arrived at construction areas. In the beginning, the REC officers thought that the Vietnamese were afraid of the Chinese as foreign soldiers, and that they did not know of the Chinese mission to assist Vietnam. The REC troops tried to build better public relations by helping local

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Vietnamese with medical services, housing improvements, and transportation assistance.87 However, the officers soon realized that the Chinese presence attracted American air strikes to these areas. As soon as Chinese troops moved into one area, the local roads, bridges, and buildings became the targets. The Vietnamese suffered collateral casualties and damages because of the lack of Chinese air defense. Under political and military pressures, in March 1966, the REC reported the intensified bombing and air defense problems to the DGS. In April, the PLA high command sent an assessment team headed by Tan Shanhe, chief of staff of the Combat Engineering Corps, to the front, in order to assess bombing damages and to evaluate the air defense.88 In May, the REC held its commanders’ meeting to assess the air defense problems and look for possible solutions. The meeting determined that first, the REC battalions and companies should establish their own air raid early warning system, rather than waiting for information to be passed down from divisional and regimental commands. Second, more AAA units should be established at the battalion level to increase air defense effectiveness. Third, the AAA should adopt an active air defense strategy by shooting down more American planes to protect the construction areas more effectively. Fourth, the road construction hours should begin in early morning (between 4:00 and 8:00 am), and restart in early evening (after 5:00 pm), to avoid daytime air raids, which mostly took place at 8:30–​11:00 am and 2:00–​5:00 pm. Last, all the REC units should provide air safety training for their troops, as well as the local Vietnamese people, to reduce casualties.89 After the REC meeting, the divisional commands also held their own air defense meetings to carry out the new strategy to improve their air defense. On June 4, 1966, for example, Li Quan, deputy commander of the Fifth Division, held the divisional command’s air defense meeting. His staff and regimental commanders supported an active defense strategy and discussed in detail how to use their 1930s vintage AAA machine guns to shoot down the advanced American jet fighters. The division air defense meeting decided to concentrate all AAA companies to one construction area at the same time, in order to increase their chance of shooting down US planes. They would then rotate the AAA troops from one area to another. The new strategy seemed to work, since the division was soon able to shoot down and damage more American airplanes.90 Thereafter, the engineering troops’ air defense gradually improved. In June 1966, each REC division established direct communication with the air defense centers in North Vietnam, receiving updates on US airplane

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deployment, movements, and attack routes. At the same time, all regiments and battalions were included in the air defense information network to receive early air raid warnings for its troops. Each company got a receiver to share air warning signals with nearby radar stations. By July 1966, eight more AAA battalions were transferred to the road construction divisions, more than doubling the engineering troops’ air defense capability. In November, the Road Engineering Command held another air defense meeting, chaired by Wang Chunxun, chief of staff and deputy commander of the REC. The AAA officers exchanged experiences, discussed problems, and further improved their air defense effectiveness. The active air defense strategy worked. From November 1966 to August 1968, the CVFAV-​ REC AAA battalions had 1,104 engagements, shooting down or damaging 306 enemy airplanes.91 The US planes began avoiding the better-​defended areas and flew higher (above 9,000 feet) to drop their bombs.92 Chinese casualties and material losses gradually decreased.93

Field Assessment and New Construction Strategy From 1965 to 1966, another problem slowing down Chinese road construction was the lack of resources available locally, along with the long supply line from China. For air defense reasons, all new highways traveled through mountains and forests to avoid air attacks, and most construction sites were in remote areas, far from populated towns. A local Vietnamese community could not provide construction materials or even food. Chinese logistics officers joked about this by saying that there were only two things available in Vietnam:  air and water. Most road engineering regiments did not have enough vehicles, construction equipment, or even basic tools such as shovels and pickaxes.94 The new extension of Highway 10 crossed over Phong Nien (Huanglian) Mountains, and was about ninety-​three miles in length. Because of the difficult positioning of Highway 10 and the lack of a pass in the mountainous region, the 34th Regiment of the Sixth Division had to move thousands of tons of equipment, supplies, and logistics with manpower. Its soldiers pulled and pushed the equipment by hand and carried construction materials on their shoulders. It took the regiment six months to move equipment and supplies from Lao Cai, about 270 feet above sea-​level, to the construction sites at the mountain top, almost 6,000 feet higher.95 The NVA representatives were not happy about delays in the construction of Highway 10, nor of the slow improvement of all road transportation in North Vietnam.

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The ambitious and unrealistic planning of the CVFAV-​REC, which assigned the three Chinese divisions to all the seven highways at once, caused delays. The command dispersed its troops and diffused its equipment and resources. According to operational plans, each division was required to construct two to three highways, in different areas, simultaneously. Each regiment was assigned to an average length of twenty to fifty miles of road construction. Quite often it happened that during the first year, a small group of only ten to twenty soldiers worked on a bridge or a single tunnel for the entire time, while lacking necessary equipment, vehicles, supplies, and air defense.96 In early October 1965, for example, the REC assigned the Sixth Division to rebuild three highways in the northwestern region between Lao Cai and Hanoi. Among its six regiments, the Sixth Division assigned its 33rd Regiment to construct Highway 8 as a brand-​new highway from China’s Yunnan province in the north to Ban Phei in the south. The division assigned its 34th and 35th Regiments and Civilian Brigade to extend Highway 10 as the only east-​west highway connecting Highways 7, 8, 11, and 12 along the Chinese-​Vietnamese border. Its 36th and 37th Regiments were assigned to rebuild Highway 12.97 However, the division’s resources were stretched too thin to effectively utilize its equipment and vehicles. In late October, the REC assigned the Fourth Division to rebuild three highways at once in the northeastern region, including Highway 1, the most vital road between China and Hanoi.98 The Fourth Division held its first commanders’ meeting after entering Vietnam on November 2. Division commander Liu Tongshan and political commissar Li Qingshou had to split their division into three groups by assigning their 17th and 20th Regiments to rebuild Highway 1, the 16th and 18th Regiments to Highway 3, and the 19th Regiment and their Civilian Construction Brigade to Highway 11.99 The rebuilding of Highway 1, of about 100 miles, included construction of a new feeder highway of fifty-​five miles through Phi Mo (Xiamei) Mountain, about 3,600 feet above sea level. The 17th and 20th Regiment evenly split the construction assignment near the middle of Highway 1, about fifty-​one miles. It took more than twenty months for the two regiments to complete reconstruction of Highway 1.  The Vietnamese Transportation Ministry pointed out missing deadlines of Chinese road construction divisions and complained of the slow improvement of transportation into North Vietnam. In July 1966, the REC held its commanders’ meeting at the Sino-​ Vietnamese border to assess problems in their operation and to discuss possible solutions. While REC political commissar Sun Zheng chaired the meeting, General Chen Shiqu, commander of the PLA Combat Engineering

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Corps (PLA-​CEC), General Qin Jiwei, commander of the Kunming Military Region, and other commanders attended the meeting and made important speeches.100 At the meeting, the REC divisions decided to concentrate their troops and equipment on a single highway at first, and then to move on to another after completion. Next, that road designing and construction planning should avoid building in hazardous conditions, difficult environments, and in residential areas. It was also decided that equipment utility, vehicle managements, and delivery of logistic supplies should be improved.101 To carry out these new strategies, the REC concentrated its forces first on two highways, beginning after July 1966. By early 1967, the Chinese had completed construction of Highways 3, 8, and 10. To follow the new strategy, each division changed plans and concentrated troops and equipment during the second year. The Fifth Division, for example, concentrated all its five regiments on Highway 7, which as a new highway to connect Yunnan and Hanoi, would be the second most important main transport route between China and Vietnam. Division commander Xu Chenggong, Korean War veteran, had many years of operational experience in Vietnam as a member of the Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG) during the 1946–​1954 French-​ Indochina War. He had participated in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Commander Xu deployed more than 10,000 troops from the 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, and 32nd Regiments along the road from Lao Cai to Yen Bai. His engineering troops, technicians, equipment operators, and technology teams were working together on land clearing, highway paving, bridge building, opening tunnels, and warehouse construction, all at the same time.102 According to the original road design by the Vietnamese Transportation Ministry, Highway 7 would go through more than 20 villages and would need to remove 12,000 residents from 1,500 homes. Xu and his division political commissar Peng Zongtao traveled with their engineers through the areas and redesigned the highway route, avoiding residential areas and saving a great deal of time that would have been spent on housing demolition and resident relocation. All changes of original designs had to be approved through meetings and negotiations with Vietnamese officials. There were often disagreements and arguments before the Chinese could convince their Vietnamese counterparts of the effectiveness of this new strategy.103 Because of the concentration of troops and resources, the Fifth Division finished the reconstruction of Highway 7 within eighteen months in 1967, about sixteen months ahead of schedule. Highway 7 connected Lao Cai with Hanoi, through Yen Bai. After completion of Highway 7, the Fifth Division moved on to the next project, construction of Highway 11.

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From March 16 to 19, 1967, the REC held another commanders’ meeting to review the operation and identify problems and solutions. The HQ worked out new solutions to deal with Rolling Thunder air raids, construction accidents, health problems, logistics, and psychological issues.104 By April 1967, the Fourth Division completed construction of Highway 3. In November 1967, the division completed construction of Highway 1. The Fourth had built 241.3 miles of highway, 120 road bridges, and 1,385 culverts along the two major highways. It had accomplished moving 827,000 cubic meters of earth and stone during two and a half years, and it lost 120 men through its operation in the Vietnam War. The Fifth Division finished the construction of Highway 7 in 1967 and Highway 11 in 1968, while maintaining Highway 6 for daily road transportation.105 The fifth Division returned to China in July. On August 16, Mao issued the order to send Chinese AAA and road engineering troops to Laos to maintain transportation and communication along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. On September 18, the Fifth Division was redeployed to Laos, including four engineering regiments and totaling 26,000 troops, and operated there until April 1971. The Sixth Division completed construction of Highway 8 in Vietnam by December 1966. The division finished construction of Highway 10 on February 22, 1967. By May 21, 1968, the Sixth completed construction of Highway 12. In three years, the Sixth Division had constructed 260.4 miles of highway, 65 road bridges (averaging 1,709 meters in length), and 1,426 culverts (totaling 15,500 meters in length) along three new highways. The division had also accomplished the moving of 9,969,000 cubic meters of earth and stone. By May 21, 1968, when the Sixth Division completed construction of Highway 12, the CVFAV-​REC had accomplished the mission set out in the Sino-​Vietnamese agreements, by opening seven major cross-​country routes for transport operation.106 The Chinese road engineering force also remodeled and repaired Highways 2 and 6. The total length of these state highways was 722 miles, including 363 miles of new highway construction and 359 miles of reconstruction, with a total of moving more than 30 million cubic meters of earth and stone. The three road engineering divisions also built 305 bridges and 4,441 overpass and underpass structures, totaling 53,754 meters. The Chinese road engineering troops suffered 450 killed and 3,211 injured.107 On June 30, 1968, government delegations met at Hanoi and signed a document for the Vietnamese to accept the completed highway construction projects. On July 15, Ho Chi Minh met the commanders of the REC in Hanoi. On July 25, the

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REC divisions began withdrawing back to China. Nevertheless, the CVFAV-​ REC left two regiments, the 36th and 37th Regiments of the Sixth Division, in Vietnam for highway maintenance until June 1969.108 As the rail engineering division, the Chinese road engineering troops of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Divisions operated in Vietnam for a long period of time on highway construction and repairs, between three and five years. They also had to cope with internal affairs and external relations with local Vietnamese villagers. The internal affairs included disciplinary incidents such as violating rules, disobeying orders, inflicting self-​injuries, and desertion. In December 1967, for example, three engineer soldiers went missing from the First Company, 3rd Battalion, and 36th Regiment of the Sixth Division. Two days later, one of them returned and reported they had decided to leave the company and walk back to China. He, however, became lost and returned to the company. In early 1968, one gunner ran away from the Second Company, 1st Battalion, 307th Regiment of the Fifth Division after leaving a note to his men. The company and battalion sent troops after him, but he was never found.109 Local village officials complained about the Vietnamese teenage girls’ frequent visits to the Chinese camps, and some of the REC officers kept them there for days. Some Vietnamese parents also complained about the Chinese field doctors and military nurses, who gave their young daughters contraceptive measures, abortions, or even sterilization operations without notifying the parents.110 As the local Vietnamese complaints increased, the PLA high command established the CVFAV Court Martial in Vietnam in 1966. It set up one branch court martial and a detaining house at each division HQ. The branch court martial had judicial power to arrest military personnel, accuse suspects, sentence the convicted criminals, and execute prisoners on the spot. In 1967, the CVFAV Court Martial facility in Vietnam had to build three jails in the Chinese border cities of Ningming and Gejiu, because of an increasing number of convicted and sentenced PLA prisoners.111 Nevertheless, Chinese efforts in keeping transportation available in North Vietnam via railroads and highways guaranteed military shipments to the frontlines. From 1965 to 1974, China transported 630,000 tons of military aid into Vietnam from the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. By 1974, China itself had shipped to Vietnam 2.14  million rifles and machine guns, 1.2 billion cartridges, 70,000 artillery pieces, 18.1  million artillery shells, 170 airplanes, 176 gunboats, 552 tanks, 320 armored vehicles, 16,000 trucks, 18,240 tons of dynamite, 11.2 million uniforms, as well as fuel, food, medicine, and many other items.112 Between 1971 and 1972, China also

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shipped into Vietnam 180 Chinese-​made Hongqi-​2 SAMs and all the control equipment, radar, and communication facilities for three missile battalions.113 Chinese support, and particularly Chinese transportation of war materials and Soviet military aid to Vietnam guaranteed the victory of the NVA and the NLF over South Vietnam. From 1971 to 1973, the PLA high command also reinforced two more road engineering divisions and two AAA divisions to Laos to maintain the NVA’s supplies traveling to the South along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. China’s assistance to the railway and highway transportation and defenses in the North had freed up NVA troops to be sent to the South. Most importantly, Beijing’s strong commitment and continuous support, as both Allen Whiting and John Garver point out, played a role in deterring further American expansion of the Vietnam War into the North.114 It is therefore fair to say that, although Beijing’s support may have been short of Hanoi’s expectations, if it had not been provided, the course, and even the outcome, of the Vietnam War might have been different.

Notes 1. Qu, “Military Operations of the Chinese Supporting Forces in the Vietnam War,” 47. Major General Qu Aiguo is deputy chief of the Department of War Theory and Strategy Research of CAMS in Beijing. 2. The Second Division of the CVFAV was comprised of combat engineering troops, which were assigned to the construction of coastal and island defense works. The Third Division was mainly comprised of PLA Air Force engineering troops for the construction of a large air base in North Vietnam. The Seventh Division which was established in 1966 was also comprised of combat engineering troops. For their operational details, see Chapter 6. For more details see Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 540–​41. 3. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 8. Senior Colonel Wang Xiangen serves on the staff of the Railway Engineering Corps Office at the DGS. 4. For more information on the Chinese assessment, see Long, “Show the Valor and Spirit Again,” 68–​70. 5. CCP Central Committee document, “Instructions of the CCP Central Committee on the Problems of Assisting Vietnam,” received by the Party Committee of the Yunnan Province on June 18, 1965, File 6084, Group 2, no. 1, 263–​65, in Yunnan Provincial Archives. 6. Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 97.

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7. Lieutenant Wu Zhiming (PLA, ret.), interviews by the author in Changsha, Hunan province, in July 2008. Wu joined the PLA in December 1957 and served as a private in the Seventh Company, 7th Regiment, Second Division of the PLA Railway Engineering Corps (PLAREC), at Changsha. In 1964, he was promoted to a sergeant of the Seventh Company. In 1965, his division was reorganized into the First Division of the CVFAV and entered Vietnam. His 7th Regiment became the 3rd Regiment of the First Division. He was promoted to lieutenant during the Vietnam War. 8. Qu, “Military Operations of the Chinese Supporting Forces in the Vietnam War,” 50. 9. The 2nd Regiment of the First Division had 4,248 troops with 2,847 pieces of various weapons, 67 pieces of heavy rail construction equipment, 59 trucks, and some motorcycles. The 4th Regiment had 4,318 men with 2,836 weapons, 99 pieces of heavy rail construction equipment, 54 trucks, and several motorcycles. 10. Captain Zhang Jinchun (PLA, ret.) and Major Wu Dazhong (PLA, ret.), Tiejun xiong feng [Heroic Experience of an Iron Corps], 183. Zhang served as a medic of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, First Division, in 1965–​1970. Wu served as the head of the Political Propaganda Office of the First Division in 1965–​1968. 11. Long, “Show the Valor and Spirit Again,” 71. 12. Zhang and Wu, Tiejun xiongfeng [Heroic Action of an Iron Corps], 12; Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 102–​103,  104. 13. Long, “Show the Valor and Spirit Again,” 71. 14. Zhang and Wu, Tiejun xiongfeng [Heroic Action of an Iron Corps], 183. 15. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA during the Cultural Revolution], 421. 16. Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 97–​98. 17. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 100. 18. Colonel Yan Guitang (PLA, ret.), interviews by the author in Xi’an, Shaanxi province, on July 29–​30, 2006. Yan served as a staff member for the railway engineering delegation of the DGS and toured Vietnam five times between 1959 and 1966. 19. Captain Zhang Jinchun (PLA, ret.), interviews by the author in Jinzhou, Hubei province, in August 2008. Zhang served as a surgery assistant in the field hospital of the CPVEF First Division in 1965–​1970. 20. Zhang and Wu, Tiejun xiongfeng [Heroic Action of an Iron Corps], 183–​84. 21. Ibid. 22. The 5th Regiment of the First Division had 4,727 troops with 2,714 weapons, 57 pieces of heavy construction equipment, and 65 trucks. The 3rd Regiment had 4,080 troops with 2,604 weapons, 31 pieces of heavy construction equipment, and 60 trucks. 23. Long, “Show the Valor and Spirit Again,” 75.

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24. The 1st Regiment of the First Division had 6,230 troops with 3,606 weapons, 58 pieces of heavy construction equipment, and 78 trucks. 25. Captain Wu Zhiming (PLA, ret.), interviews with the author in Changsha, Hunan province, in July 2008. Wu served as political instructor of the Seventh Company, 3rd Regiment of the First Division in Vietnam in 1965–​1970. 26. Li Qingde, “Unbreakable Railway Transportation Lines,” 91. Li was the First Division’s vice political commissar in 1965–​1967 and then political commissar in 1968–​1970. 27. Zhang Jinchun, interviews by the author. 28. Long, “Show the Valor and Spirit Again,” 74. 29. Yan Guitang, interviews by the author. 30. Colonel Hou Zhenlu (PLA, ret.), interviews by the author in Changchun, Jilin province, on July 14–​17, 2006. See also Hou, “Chinese Railroad Engineering Operations,” in Li, Voices from the Vietnam War, 220. Hou was deputy commander of the 2nd Regiment of the First Division in 1965–​1970. 31. Qu, Introduction to Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist America], 13. 32. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 111. 33. Li, “Unbreakable Railway Transportation Lines,” 83–​85. 34. Earl H.  Tilford, Jr., “Rolling Thunder, Operation,” in The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War:  A Political, Social, and Military History, ed. Spencer C.  Tucker (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 359. 35. Long, “Show the Valor and Spirit Again,” 74–​75. 36. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 550. 37. Hess, Vietnam,  84–​85. 38. Long, “Show the Valor and Spirit Again,” 73–​74. 39. Zhang and Wu, Tiejun xiongfeng [Heroic Action of an Iron Corps], 187. 4 0. Wu Zhiming, interviews by the author. 41. Zhang Jinchun, interviews by the author. 42. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 101, 105. 43. Li, “Unbreakable Railway Transportation Lines,” 84. 4 4. Tilford, “Rolling Thunder, Operation,” 359. 45. Hess, Vietnam, Table 4.1 “Operation Rolling Thunder,” 85. 4 6. Wang, Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun [Contemporary China’s Air Force], 397; Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 551. 47. Li, “Unbreakable Railway Transportation Lines,” 83–​85. 48. Long, Introduction, ii. 49. Long, “Show the Valor and Spirit Again,” 76–​77; Zhang and Wu, Tiejun xiongfeng [Heroic Experience of an Iron Corps], 13.

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50. Major General Guo Yanlin (PLA ret.), “Celebrating the Lunar New Year with President Ho Chi Minh,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 78. Guo was the political commissar of the First Division in Vietnam in 1965–​1968. 51. Senior Colonel Xiao Chunxian was appointed as deputy commander and commander of the Second Railway Engineering Regiment in the Chinese Civil War. Xiao became the deputy commander of the Second Railway Engineering Division of the CPVF during the Korean War. After his return to China, Xiao was appointed the commander of the Second Railway Engineering Division of the PLA Railway Engineering Corps in 1954. He was granted a rank of senior colonel in 1955. Then, Xiao served as deputy commander of the First Division in Vietnam in 1965–​1966 and the commander in 1968–​1970. After his return to China, Xiao became the deputy commander of the PLA Railway Engineering Corps (PLAREC) in 1969–​1975. He left the commanding position in 1975 and retired from the PLA in 1982. 52. Zhang and Wu, Tiejun xiongfeng [Heroic Experience of an Iron Corps], 20. 53. Li, “Unbreakable Railway Transportation Lines,” 91. 54. Ibid.,  86. 55. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder,  55–​56. 56. Li, “Unbreakable Railway Transportation Lines,” 84–​85. 57. Major General Guo Yanlin was appointed as political commissar of the Fourth Railway Engineering Regiment in the Chinese Civil War. He became the political commissar of the First Railway Engineering Division of the CPVF during the Korean War. After his return to China, Guo was appointed commander of the PLA First Railway Engineering Division, deputy commander of the First Railway Engineering Army, and vice political commissar of the Second Railway Engineering Army. In 1960, he was promoted to political commissar of the Logistics Department of the PLAREC. He was granted a rank of major general in 1961. Guo served as political commissar of the First Division in 1965–​1968. After his return to China, he was promoted to the director of the Political Department of the PLAREC, and then vice political commissar of the Railway Engineering Corps in the 1970s. For more details, see Xinghuo liaoyuan Composition Department, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun jiangshuai minglu [Marshals and Generals of the PLA], 3: 402. 58. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 108–​11. 59. Li, “Unbreakable Railway Transportation Lines,” 87–​88. 60. Director of Central Intelligence, “SNIE 10-​1-​66: Possible Effects of a Proposed US Course of Action on DRV Capability to Support the Insurgency in South Vietnam, February 4, 1966,” in NIC, Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948–​1975, 333–​34. 61. CHECO Report, James B. Overton, “ROLLING THUNDER—​January 1967–​ November 1968—​Continuing Report” (October 1, 1969), Figure  12, quoted in Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 62. 62. Zhang and Wu, Tiejun xiongfeng [Heroic Action of an Iron Corps], 187.

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63. CHECO Reports, Wesley R. C. Melyan and Lee Bonetti, “ROLLING THUNDER—​ July-​December 1965—​Continuing Report” (July 15, 1967), Figures 9 and 20, quoted in Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 35, 54. 6 4. Xiao, “Important Military Operations to Stop the War in Indochina,” 2: 456. 65. Guo, “Celebrating the Lunar New Year with President Ho Chi Minh,” 79–​80. 66. Hou Zhenlu, interviews by the author. 67. Ibid. 68. Zhang and Wu, Tiejun xiongfeng [Heroic Action of an Iron Corps], 184–​87. 69. Zhang Jinchun, interviews by the author. 70. Cui Ping, “Tough Mission for the Road Engineering Force,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 239–​4 0. Cui was deputy chief staff of the CVFAV-​REC in Vietnam from 1965 to 1966, and the chief staff in 1966–​1968. 71. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 1: 274. 72. Major General Luo Hongbiao became political commissar of the Fourth Regiment and later deputy political commissar of the PLA’s 34th Division of the Twelfth Army in the Chinese Civil War. He was the political commissar of the 34th Division, Twelfth Army, CPVF, during the Korean War. After his return, Luo was appointed head of the Equipment Division of the PLA Combat Engineering Corps Command. He was granted a rank of senior colonel in 1955, and promoted to major general in 1961. Luo served as acting commander and then commander of the CVFAV-​REC in Vietnam in 1965–​1968. After his return to China, he served as vice president of the PLA Combat Engineering Academy in Nanjing and deputy chief of staff of the Lanzhou Regional Command. He retired in 1984. For more details, see Xinghuo liaoyuan Composition Department, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun jiangshuai minglu [Marshals and Generals of the PLA], 3: 199. 73. Wu, Conglin yishi [ Journey in the Jangle], 17–​21. 74. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA during the Cultural Revolution], 418. 75. Liu Tongshan, “Memoirs at the Bottom of My Heart,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 257. Liu was the commander of the Fourth Division, CVFAV-​REC, in Vietnam from 1965 to 1968. 76. Li Quan, “My Years of Aiding Vietnam and Building Highways,” in Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist America], 267. Li was the deputy commander of the CVFAV-​REC Fifth Division in Vietnam from 1965 to 1968. Also Captain Xue Faqian (PLA, ret.), interviews by the author in July 2012. Xu served in the Second Company, 1st Battalion, 307th Regiment, Fifth Division in Vietnam in 1965–​1971 and in Laos in 1971–​1972. 77. Sun Linquan, “Tough Engagements in the Mountains of Northwest Vietnam,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 271. Sun was the commander of the Sixth Division, CVFAV-​REC, in Vietnam from 1965 to 1968.

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78. Sun Zheng, “Unforgettable Meeting,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 227. Sun was political commissar of the CVFAV-​ REC in Vietnam from 1965 to 1967. He was replaced by Zi Xuelin in early 1967. 79. Cui, “Tough Mission for the Road Engineering Force,” 241. 80. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 78. 81. CHECO Report, Wesley R.  C. Melyan and Lee Bonetti, “ROLLING THUNDER—​ July-​ December 1965—​ Continuing Report” ( July 15, 1967), Figures 9 and 20, quoted in Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 35, 54. 82. Cui, “Tough Mission for the Road Engineering Force,” 241. 83. Liu Yuesheng, “The Friendship Roads with Deep and Long Lasting Feelings,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 231. Liu was the deputy political commissar of the CVFAV-​REC in Vietnam from 1965 to 1968. 84. Ibid., 232. 85. Sun, “Tough Engagements in the Mountains of Northwest Vietnam,” 264. 86. Li, “My Years of Aiding Vietnam and Building Highways,” 264. 87. Liu, “The Friendship Roads with Deep and Long Lasting Feelings,” 234–​35, 236–​37. 88. Cui, “Tough Mission for the Road Engineering Force,” 241. 89. Wang Guodong, “Air Defense of the Road Engineering Force,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 249, 253. Wang was director of the staff division of the CVFAV-​REC Command in Vietnam from 1965 to 1968. 90. Li, “My Years of Aiding Vietnam and Building Highways,” 269–​70. According to Li, the Fifth Division’s AAA troops shot down ninety-​eight US airplanes and damaged 129 in 1965–​1967. 91. Wang, “Air Defense of the Road Engineering Force,” 249, 253. 92. Ibid., 248–​49. 93. Ibid., 252–​53. 94. Cui, “Tough Mission for the Road Engineering Force,” 241. 95. Zhang and Wu, Tiejun xiongfeng [Heroic Action of an Iron Corps], 37. 96. Liu, “The Friendship Roads with Deep and Long Lasting Feelings,” 232. 97. Zhang and Wu, Tiejun xiongfeng [Heroic Action of an Iron Corps], 41. 98. Luo, “Aid Vietnam and Build Friendship Highways,” 220. Luo was the deputy commander of the Fifth Division of the CVFAV-​REC in Vietnam from 1965 to 1968. 99. Liu, “Memoirs at the Bottom of My Heart,” 257. Liu was the commander of the Fourth Division of the CVFAV-​REC in Vietnam from 1965 to 1968. 100. Luo, “Aid Vietnam and Build Friendship Highways,” 222. 101. Ibid., 222–​23. 102. Li, “My Years of Aiding Vietnam and Building Highways,” 267. 103. Ibid.,  268. 104. Luo, “Aid Vietnam and Build Friendship Highways,” 223.

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105. Li, “My Years of Aiding Vietnam and Building Highways,” 269. 106. Sun, “Tough Engagements in the Mountains of Northwest Vietnam,” 278. 107. Luo, “Aid Vietnam and Build Friendship Highways,” 223–​24. 108. Sun Fuxi, “Overcome the Dangerous Mt. Phong Nien (Huanglian),” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 291. Sun was the commander of the 34th Regiment of the Sixth Division, CVFAV-​REC, in Vietnam from 1965 to 1969. 109. Captain Xue Faqian (PLA, ret.), interviews by the author in July 2012. 110. Hou Zhenlu, interviews by the author. 111. Zhang and Wu, Tiejun xiongfeng [Heroic Action of an Iron Corps], 183. 112. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA during the Cultural Revolution], 409. 113. Chen, “Establish a Vietnamese SAM Missile Regiment,” 34–​35. Chen was the head of PLA SAM Expert Group in Vietnam in 1972. 114. Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 194–​95.

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C O A S T   O P E R AT I O N

Combat Engineering and the Navy

At 8:30 pm on June 9, 1965, the first wave of the Chinese combat engineering force, under the command of Wang Hui, deputy commander and chief of staff of the Second Division, entered North Vietnam. As vanguard troops of the Second Division of the Chinese Volunteer Force to Assist Vietnam-​Combat Engineering Corps (CVFAV-​CEC), they were the first Chinese troops entering the Vietnam War. Engineering troops were also the last PLA units to withdraw from Vietnam in August 1973, having served for eight years in the Vietnam War, longer than any other PLA services.1 From 1965 to 1973, the PLA sent three Chinese combat engineering divisions to Vietnam: the Second, Third, and Seventh Divisions.2 They operated on three different fronts:  coastal and offshore defense works from 1965 to 1966; the Hai Phong-​Hanoi inland defense in 1966–​1968; and air base construction and communications in 1968–​1973. As a coastal country, North Vietnam has 1,062 miles of coast line, while sharing a very short border, less than forty miles, with South Vietnam along the 17th Parallel. The long coastline with its narrow, elongated S-​shaped strip made North Vietnam extremely vulnerable for a US ground invasion to cut off its transportation and communication. American armed forces could easily land anywhere along the northern coast from the Gulf of Tonkin, if Washington wanted to extend the ground war to the North. Ho Chi Minh remembered the Japanese landing in North Vietnam in 1941 when they took over the country through WWII.3 General Giap, on several occasions, warned NVA officers about the French landing at Hai Phong on September 23, 1946, which forced the DRV and Viet Minh to retreat into remote mountainous areas, igniting the French-​Indochina War. The PLA high command believed that

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an American amphibious landing, similar to MacArthur’s Inchon Landing in the Korean War, would cause a rapid collapse of North Vietnam, since Ho’s best troops had been concentrated in the south. If it happened, China would have to send its ground force to Vietnam, as it did in the Korean War.4 To defend the northern coast against a possible US landing had been the first priority for both Beijing and Hanoi. Ho wanted a coast defense, and the Chinese agreed to build one for him. When the NVA delegation visited Beijing in early April 1965, the Vietnamese generals presented the PLA high command with a defense plan and requested that the PLA combat engineering force help them build a coast defense system. According to the Vietnamese plan, the first step was to build early warning stations and a communication network on the islands in the Gulf of Tonkin to monitor US forces’ deployment and maneuvers. Second, the Chinese engineering troops would build artillery and anti-​aircraft positions on the offshore islands as the first defense to slow down, if not stop, any amphibious invasion. Third, more permanent defense works were needed along the shore as a second line of coastal defense. Finally, the Vietnamese needed two additional air force bases for both fighters and bombers for the purpose of northern defense. Zhou Enlai, premier and vice chairman of the CMC, forwarded the Vietnamese requests to Mao. After Mao’s approval, the PLA high command began mobilizing combat engineering troops and the PLA Navy (PLAN) for coastal and offshore operations in the Vietnam War.

Island and Coast Defense Work On April 24, 1965, the Chinese DGS and DGPT jointly held a commanders’ meeting in Beijing, including the chiefs from the navy, artillery force, and engineering corps. The PLA chiefs decided to establish the CVFAV-​CEC for the Vietnam War. Among its divisions, the Second Division was comprised of the PLA combat engineering troops with Major General Zeng Xuqing as its commander, Major General Li Lianghan as the political commissar, and Wang Hui as the chief staff and deputy commander.5 The chiefs also selected three of the PLA’s best engineering regiments from Beijing, Shenyang, and Ji’nan Regional Commands to form the Second Division as its 7th, 8th, and 9th Regiments. To strengthen its self-​sufficiency, the HQ also added one hydrology brigade, one maritime transportation brigade, one communication engineering brigade, one truck transportation regiment, and a few AAA and coastal artillery units to the division, totaling more than 20,000 men. Each regiment had

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three combat engineering battalions and one mechanics battalion, totaling 4,500 troops. To ensure their self-​defense capability on these isolated offshore islands, each regiment was further reinforced with one AAA battalion, two 85mm cannon artillery companies, two 82mm mortar companies, one infantry company, one transport company, and one repair company.6 All units were to report to the Chinese-​Vietnamese borders within fifteen days. On May 1, Wang Hui, chief staff of the Second Division, arrived in Hanoi leading a survey team of fifteen officers.7 The vice defense minister of the DRV and other Vietnamese commanders met the delegation. The following day, officers of the Vietnamese artillery, combat engineering, and North Region commands briefed the Chinese on their immediate needs and the enormous difficulties in constructing any major defense works amidst US air raids. At the meeting, Wang met several former classmates who had also received combat engineering training in the Soviet Union. On May 2–​9, the Chinese team, along with DRV officials, traveled across the northeast coast and visited several islands of the Gulf of Tonkin for their own survey and assessment.8 The Second Division entered Vietnam from Lang Son on June 9–​29, 1965. The division HQ moved into Vietnam on June 23 and arrived at Cam Pha, Quang Ninh province, on the following day. On June 28, the division held its first commander’s meeting and decided to concentrate its efforts on island communication and defense works. Li Lianghan, political commissar, recalled that the division’s first mission was to construct command centers, harbors, communication facilities, underground tunnels, bunkers, and other military facilities on fifteen offshore islands along the eastern coast of North Vietnam.9 The division would transport hundreds of vehicles, equipment, and more than one hundred artillery pieces overland. In the meantime, the division would ship tens of thousands tons of materials and supplies from China to these islands by sea. The completion of these projects would provide the NVA the first line of coastal defense, along with an early warning network against a possible US amphibious landing. All the Chinese deployment and operations had been approved by the NVA high command and DRV defense ministry. Nevertheless, most of the fifteen islands lacked paved roads or developed harbors. Some did not have any fresh water, and a few had no residents at all. These made the large-​scale construction of permanent defense work and communication network very difficult. The 8th Regiment, for example, was assigned to the Co To Islands, a group of small islands between one and three square miles, where there was no harbor or road for the regiment to land and move around their construction equipment and communication instruments.

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Ye Conghua, political commissar of the 8th, later recalled that their landing ships could not reach the beach, stopping about 400 to 800 yards away from the islands. Liu Zhigao, regiment commander, ordered his men to carry the supply and construction materials to the islands. Some heavy construction machines were unloaded first from the landing vessels to small junks, which could move closer to the islands. It took more than two weeks for the 8th Regiment to move into their construction positions on the Co To Islands.10 For three months, the large number of Chinese troops remained undetected on these islands. The regiments had begun their construction of trenches, bunkers, underground tunnels, artillery positions, communication system, and command posts. Later, somehow, the South Vietnamese intelligence gained possession of information on the Chinese troops, and on September 19, 1965 Radio Saigon broadcast the Chinese engineering troops’ units, commanding officer names, and other details. Almost immediately, US airplanes began their reconnaissance and raids. At 11:00 am on May 22, the 8th Regiment was attacked from the air while the regiment was constructing defense works along the Bay of Ha Long, Quang Ninh province. Two of the twelve attacking American planes first destroyed the Ha Long radar system, so that the Chinese commands did not receive any warning. During the bombing, the 8th Regiment suffered heavy casualties. Its Eighth Company, for example, had twenty-​seven officers and men killed, including its captain and deputy political instructor; thirty-​seven were seriously wounded; and fifty-​one more were wounded.11 At about 10:00 am on September 20, seventy-​two US planes raided Chinese construction sites on the Dao Cat Ba Island, the largest offshore island in the North. The 7th Regiment command organized its 85mm and 37mm guns of the AAA battalion to fire on the high-​altitude planes, while the 12.7mm single-​barreled machine guns fired on the diving planes at lower altitude. These machine guns fired more than 13,000 rounds, both in the morning and that afternoon, since the American planes kept returning again and again. Guo Peizhang, deputy political commissar of the 7th Regiment, believed that since the Soviet SAM defense system had never protected any of those islands, the US planes had no fear of being shot down when they bombed the Chinese troops. He recalled that American planes heavily bombed construction sites on the Dao Cat Ba from October 2 to 23.12 Continuous air raids remained a major problem for the Second Division’s operation and safety. On October 5, thirteen planes attacked the division headquarters. The anti-​aircraft machine gun company fired its quadruple guns to protect

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the division officers and staff, but the company lost seven men, including its captain.13 Without effective air defense, the Second Division suffered many casualties:  seventy men were killed in action, and more than one hundred wounded, during the first five months. The division command categorized the air strikes from August 1965 to June 1966 as “intermittent bombing.” US airplanes bombed each target with a short intermission of several hours. At 11:00 am on May 22, 1966, twelve F-​105s raided the 9th Regiment by dropping seven 750-​lb. bombs and firing four rockets to the construction site of its Eighth Company. Approximately two hours later, several of the planes returned and dropped five more 750-​lb. bombs. During the raids, the Eighth Company lost twenty-​seven men who were killed, and thirty-​five seriously wounded, on the same day. Among the three company commanders, two were killed and one seriously wounded.14 After the raid, Han Deren, commander of the 9th Regiment, and Liu Yukun, political commissar, deployed more AAA companies around their construction areas. Chinese anti-​aircraft defenses and their engineering projects were inextricably intertwined. The AAA battalions and companies of the Second Divisions engaged 135 times, claimed to have shot down 39 and damaged 124 American airplanes from 1965 to 1966.15 In the fall of 1965, the division telegraphed the 7th Regiment and warned that they should speed up their construction since the United States seemed to be preparing a ground invasion of the north. Xia Mingxian, commander of the 7th, called a meeting where it was decided to shorten their construction schedule and to complete the defense work on the Dao Cat Ba Island at a much earlier date.16 According to the new plan, the engineering troops began working on two shifts. The night shifts focused on open defense works since there were few air raids throughout the night. The daytime shifts worked on underground tunnels, road construction, and infantry trenches on the islands. By October, when the weather had cooled down, the regiment began working three shifts for twenty-​four hours/​seven days a week, speeding up their construction schedule tremendously. By January 1966, the regiment had completed the central commanding system and main defense positions on the island. Beginning in February, its 1st Battalion worked on connections of these positions by building more communication trenches. The 2nd linked the main positions by tunneling through the hills. The 3rd worked on warehouses, field medic shelters, and infantry staging posts. The 4th worked on the roads around the islands, while the 5th completed the underwater telecommunication cable construction linking several islands to the Dao Cat Ba and Hai Phong command centers on the mainland. By April 1966, the 7th

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Regiment had completed all defense work on the Dao Cat Ba Island, nearly two months ahead of schedule.17 The initial NVA designs for these works made the Chinese engineering and construction very difficult, since the Vietnamese ideas were not always feasible. For example, about 28 percent of the artillery positions were planned on the cliffs. And 60  percent of bunkers were connected through underground or semi-​underground tunnels, while 90 percent of defense positions were connected through underground tunnels or open trenches. Since the engineering troops were not familiar with the soil conditions of these islands, accidents occurred frequently during construction of the defense works.18 In the fall of 1965, the DRV Defense Ministry agreed with the Second Division that the Chinese engineering regiments could modify and change the plans if they found it exceedingly difficult to be constructed.19 Since the Chinese troops were stationed on these isolated islands for a long period of time, logistics became another major problem. The construction supply, daily needs, and even fresh water on some islands depended wholly upon naval shipping. The air raids also targeted transport ships between the Chinese coast and the Vietnamese islands. On October 14, 1965, for example, fifteen American warplanes sunk two PLAN transport ships, killed eight Chinese sailors, and wounded six. On November 20, three F-​105 bombers raided Chinese ships in the harbor and destroyed all unloaded supplies.20 This shipping problem resulted in severe supply shortages, such as a lack of vegetables and meat for more than 10,000 engineering troops on the islands. Ho Chi Minh worried about the Chinese troops after he learned that they had only rice and “xiancai” (Chinese pickles) for every meal for two months. On July 22, Ho told the NVA generals and Chinese Ambassador Zhu Qiwen at Hanoi that the local Vietnamese would help the Chinese engineering troops to improve the food supply by cultivating vegetable gardens, putting together soy bean sprout beds, and building tofu (bean curd) shops.21 The Chinese Ambassador called Major General Li Lianghan, political commissar of the Second Division, and passed on Ho’s instruction. Li chaired several division party committee meetings and discussed how to work with the Vietnamese fishermen and develop vegetable gardens. In August, his regiments began organizing farming teams that planted vegetables, fruits, and trees on the islands, with help from the Vietnamese people.22 The isolated environment and mutual dependency created a close relationship between the Vietnamese islanders and the Chinese troops. The local people began providing farming tools to the Chinese, selling fish and other sea food to the troops, and sharing family recipes with the cooks. Chinese

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engineering troops built schools, improved village roads, and most importantly, made medical assistance available to the Vietnamese families on these islands, who had never before had doctors or medicine. At the Co To Islands, for example, a Vietnamese woman had nonstop bleeding when she delivered a baby in June 1965. Her husband and villagers rushed her to the 8th Regiment clinic for help, but the field doctors did not have medicine to stop her bleeding. Liu Zhigao, commander of the 8th, called the division hospital which that evening sent in the medicine by a naval speed boat. The woman’s life was saved, and the Vietnamese families and islanders greatly appreciated the Chinese help. Nevertheless, when the division’s report reached Mao Zedong, the Chinese chairman wrote down four words next to the life-​saving story of the 8th Regiment: “Don’t Be overly Warmhearted.”23 When Mao’s instructions were passed on to the Second Division, many of its officers and soldiers did not understand why their agreeable leader did not want them to help the Vietnamese people too much.24 Was that not what they were there fighting and dying for? No, they were there to help the North Vietnamese government. Hanoi had issued many strict internal policies to prohibit the Vietnamese people from contacting or approaching the Chinese troops directly. Any request, exchange, and communication between Vietnamese villagers and Chinese troops first had to go through the local Vietnamese government.25 When the local Vietnamese leaders felt their authority, responsibility, and popularity were shaken or undermined by the nearby Chinese military, the local Vietnamese officials complained to Hanoi. In August 1965, the division changed its policy from “assisting the Vietnamese people whoever, whenever, and wherever they need some help” to “assisting the Vietnamese people who need some help with a permission letter signed by the local authorities.”26 By early 1966, the Second Division had completed the construction of all the defense works and communication systems on the fifteen offshore islands. Their construction included 154 trenches, 160 underground tunnels, 112 bunkers, three permanent harbors, and 8 paved roads totaling 76 miles. The offshore islands thereafter served as the first defense line against a possible US landing. The division also established an electronic intelligence network and early warning system along the coast by connecting the offshore islands through underwater cables. They had completed 195 miles of island-​to-​island and island-​to-​coast underwater communication cables, 142 miles of island tele-​communication wire lines, and 15 communication centers on these islands.27 Their efforts had made any surprise amphibious landing almost impossible.

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The next mission of the Second Division was the construction of permanent defense works along the northeastern coast at eight strategic points. From January to September 1966, the division built 42 permanent defensive works and 154 underground tunnels along the coast.28 On October 2, the commanders of the Second Division certified completion of the coast defense work at Hanoi. The DRV officers and NVA generals at the ceremony expressed their satisfaction and deep appreciation of the defense work quality, construction schedule, and Chinese sacrifices. At that moment, the first defense line against a perceived US landing along the coast of North Vietnam had been established. In early October, the Second Division returned to China, except for its 8th Regiment, which was reassigned to the Seventh Division and stayed in Vietnam for further combat engineering engagements until April 1967.29

Fortifying the Hai Phong-​Hanoi Region To build the second defense line inland of North Vietnam, in September–​ October 1966, the PLA Combat Engineering Corps established the Seventh Division for the new combat engineering project. The mission of the Seventh Division was to establish an inland defense between Hai Phong and Hanoi. The Chinese combat officers described it as the “Great Wall” of North Vietnamese Defense. Since Ho had decided not to withdraw from the capital city in case of a US invasion of the North, the NVA requested the Chinese to construct a permanent defense system from Bac Giang in the north to Ninh Binh in the south, about 110 miles long and 28 miles deep, to protect Hanoi. According to Sino-​Vietnamese agreements, the Seventh Division was to work on the construction of 11 command centers with communication facilities; 26 sites for staging artillery groups; 85 defensive works with bunkers, open trenches, firing positions, and underground tunnels; and 121 infantry defense posts along the 110-​mile defense line. These construction sites were all over the Red River Delta and across nine different provinces to establish the inland defense of Hanoi. Most of the construction would take place between the 20th and 21st parallels, but some were further south near the 17th parallel.30 The Seventh Division planned to stay in Vietnam for three years to finish the construction of Vietnam’s “Great Wall.” The command of the PLA Combat Engineering Crops selected three engineering regiments, including the 221st, 312th, and 313th Engineering Regiment, two transport regiments, and three AAA battalions, totaling 20,000 men. Each regiment had different assignments in building ground

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defense works at strategic points. On November 25, Zhao Dongpo, commander of the Seventh, led vanguard troops of the division, and entered Vietnam. Beginning on December 15, the main force of the division entered Vietnam in more than twenty groups (about fifty vehicles per group) under the command of Xu Kelin, political commissar, and Liu Zhigao, deputy commander. After arriving at Dong Dang, the division split into two groups that continued southward towards their designated construction areas. Xu Kelin recalled that transportation was one of the first difficult tasks for the division, since everything from armored vehicles to nails had to be shipped from somewhere in China, approximately a thousand miles away. Among other problems was the cement, of which the division needed more than 23,000 tons every month. Most of the highways were under continuous bombing, and the roads south of the 20th Parallel, especially, were in very poor condition.31 A truck could only travel about 20 to 25 miles per hour, and some of the transport lines were as long as 600 miles one way. The Seventh Division needed logistical supplies and construction materials of more than 30,000 tons each month. Its two transport regiments had to send out 300 trucks each day from 6 supply-​depots along the Chinese border, to division construction areas, for more than two years.32 The worst transportation nightmare for the Seventh Division was that nearly all the bridges had been destroyed between China and the construction sites due to Rolling Thunder.33 When the troops arrived at the bank of the Red River, Xu recalled that all the bridges had been destroyed. Even though the NVA provided four rafts of pontoons for the division, one raft could only carry three to four vehicles each trip. The four rafts could, at best, transport sixty to eighty vehicles each night. The longer it took to cross the river, the more casualties and damages the Chinese suffered, since each division had to cross seven rivers before they got to their construction areas.34 After their arrival, the division command divided the Hanoi defense system into four construction zones for its engineering regiments. From south to north, the first zone was around Ninh Binh, and its 212th Regiment was assigned to construct eight command centers, ten artillery sites, and a couple dozen defense posts in the first zone. The second zone was around Ha Tay, and the 312th Regiment was assigned to build permanent defense works with bunkers, open trenches, firing positions, and underground tunnels, as well as more than forty infantry defense posts, in the second zone. The 313th Regiment was deployed in the Dong Trieu area as the third zone to construct more command centers, infantry staging sites, and other permanent defense works.35 After the 312th Regiment had completed its assignments in the

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second zone, it would be redeployed to the fourth zone, from the Vinh Phuc to Bac Giang areas.36 Continuous air raids remained the major problem for the division’s operation and safety. With limited air defense capability, the division command concentrated its three AAA battalions, trying to shoot down more American airplanes to slow down, if not stop, US bombing of their construction sites. The division had only three AAA battalions. Each included three 37mm AAA companies, and one 12.7mm machine gun company, obviously not enough to protect over one hundred construction sites scattered over the Red River Delta. Mu Zhang, deputy commander of the Seventh, recalled that division command decided, in March 1967, that they should deploy the AAA troops at the “heavy traffic area” south of Ninh Binh, where many American planes passed over. Their AAA battalion, it was believed, could ambush the American planes on their way north.37 The mobile air defense proved a tactical mistake for the Seventh AAA troops, since many US planes flying north through their defense positions did not always head to the Seventh construction areas. After their AAA battalions moved into their positions on April 16–​18, more than 140 airplanes flew over their positions between 2:00 and 6:00 pm on April 19. Mu Zhang, who was in charge of the division’s air defense, ordered the AAA guns to open fire at 4:00 pm at sixty-​four airplanes. During the battle, his 37mm guns fired 1,268 shells and his 12.7mm guns fired 1,659 rounds. By the end of the day, Mu reported to the division command that four American airplanes were shot down or damaged, and that his AAA troops had nine casualties.38 Mu asked the division to withdraw the battalion from their ambush position since there were too many American planes for them to handle. After the division approved his request, the AAA battalions evacuated from their positions overnight. The Seventh Division emphasized the quality of their works. Its commanders knew that the Battle of Hanoi would not be the Vietnamese defense, but China’s battle for North Vietnam. According to the PLA war plan, after the United States landed its ground force (estimated 60,000–​100,000 troops) at the northern coast, the CVFAV’s seven engineering divisions, totaling 150,000 troops, would immediately move into these inland defense positions since the main strength of the NVA forces had been engaged in South Vietnam. General Li Tianyou, deputy chief of the PLA General Staff, told engineering division commanders that their troops should defend North Vietnam by stopping the American landing forces along the line. If the Chinese troops could halt the American invaders at the Red River Delta long enough (at least

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for two weeks), reinforcements of 120,000 PLA infantry from north and 80,000 NVA troops from the south would have a good opportunity to flank, encircle, and eliminate the American landing forces before they could attack Hanoi.39 Therefore, the seven Chinese engineering divisions built the defense work for their own battle. When Major General Xu Haoxiu, commander of the 312th Regiment, discovered part of the underground tunnel without enough back-​fill, he ordered his 1st Battalion to open the tunnel top and to re-​do the job with small rocks, to guarantee shell-​proof strength.40 It took the battalion four days to fix that part of the underground tunnel. By February 1968, the Seventh Division had completed construction of the “Great Wall,” almost two years ahead of schedule. The finished defense network included 85 underground tunnels, 11 defense networks, 26 command centers and observation posts, 334 concrete bunkers, and 138 artillery positions at 121 different locations between the 18th and 20th parallels.41 The large-​scale defense network also provided a ground system for the NVA and the PLA in a defense against any possible ground attack cross the 17th parallel from the South. After accomplishing its mission in the Red River Delta, the Seventh Division sent its 312th Regiment to join the Third Division, which had been working on construction of the air force base, runways, and underground aircraft shelters. The regiment returned to China in November 1969. The Third Division had entered Vietnam as an airport construction engineering division in November 1965. Its first mission was to build the Hoa Lac air force base, including runways, underground shuttles, anti-​aircraft artillery positions, training grounds, and other military facilities. The Hoa Lac Airport, about twenty-​four miles northwest of Hanoi, was the largest airport in the North. It hosted two fighter regiments, one bomber regiment, and other transit aircrafts. It had a runway that was 2,800 meters long and sixty meters wide. The airport began operation in 1966 and all construction was finished by November 1969.42 In 1966, North Vietnam asked China to build another air force base at Yen Bai, a strategic point, about seventy miles northwest of Hanoi. Surrounded by mountains, the construction site along the Red River Valley faced frequent flooding during the rainy season. In August 1965, the Chinese Electronic Engineering Regiment entered North Vietnam. It had one equipment installation battalion and four electronic communication companies, totaling 1,400 men. Its mission was to establish a telephone line connecting the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the NVA communication center in North Vietnam. The telephone line began at Son La, northwest Vietnam, then went southward through the mountainous areas, and entered Laos. The regiment finished this important communication line

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by July 1966. It established 210 miles of telephone poles, 560 miles of telephone wires, and 4 telephone operation centers. When it returned to China in August 1966, the regiment received the DRV National Medal from Ho Chi Minh. As we have seen, direct engagement of the Chinese armed forces in North Vietnam enabled Hanoi to send more troops to South Vietnam. The level of infiltration from the North was significantly increased, and the main force units of the NVA began streaming south. Hanoi’s main risk was that a further deterioration of security in the South would lead to increased US involvement, something not desired by Hanoi or its allies in Moscow and Beijing. By the mid-​1960s, the NVA units conducted guerrilla operations and a “people’s war” to assist the Viet Cong in fighting the ARVN and the US armed forces in South Vietnam. By the 1968 Tet Offensive Campaign, the NVA expanded its operations, and troops in the South reached a total of 400,000 men. The struggle in South Vietnam began taking on signs of an open military confrontation between North Vietnam and the United States.43 In the late 1960s, the NVA extended its operations into Cambodia and Laos. Chinese forces in North Vietnam enabled Ho to send more NVA troops to the South to fight the American ground force. The Tet Offensive in early 1968 was a turning point in America’s domestic politics at home and for public opinion of the war in Vietnam. “The changes the Tet Offensive brought were decisive,” Marilyn Young states. “Because Tet was reported as an American defeat, they claim, politicians lost heart, rejected making an increased effort, and took the first steps on the slippery slope toward withdrawal and admitted defeat.”44 After the Tet, US military escalation, as well as Johnson’s political career, derailed. In the spring of 1968, the US government decreased its bombing efforts and limited its air raids to south of the 20th Parallel in North Vietnam. On May 10, Washington and Hanoi began peace talks in Paris, France. Eventually, on October 31, Johnson announced the suspension of all US air raids, bombing, shelling, and coastal harassment against North Vietnam. Richard Nixon won the presidential election in November 1968 by promising the voters that he would end America’s war in Vietnam. The PLA’s engagement in 1965–​ 1968 successfully deterred any US attempt to send American group troops to North Vietnam due to a US fear of provoking China.45 Coupled with political campaigns and diplomatic efforts, the military operations in Vietnam were partially initiated to draw attention from Washington. It was the Chinese use of armed forces that demonstrated Beijing’s determination and deterrence on Washington. The PLA operations

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in 1965–​1968 drew American attention as well as negative reactions. Most importantly, Beijing’s strong commitment and continuous support, as both Allen Whiting and John Garver point out, played a role in deterring further American expansion of the Vietnam War into the North.46 Robert D. Schulzinger concludes, “Tactically, the Johnson administration was successful in limiting the war to avoid direct Chinese intervention, yet these tactical skills did not translate into a successful Vietnam policy. Before 1967, the administration often overestimated the danger China posed to US interests. These exaggerated fears of the influence of the revolutionary doctrines of Mao Zedong probably encouraged the United States to involve itself more deeply in Vietnam than leaders would otherwise have considered worthwhile.”47 On November 17, 1968, Mao suggested to Premier Pham Van Dong in Beijing that some of the Chinese troops should withdraw to China. The CCP chairman said, “As for some of our personnel who are at present not required in your country, they may withdraw to China. . . . We can send them back to you if the Americans return.”48 After more discussion between the NVA and the PLA, Chinese troops began returning to China in 1969. When Ho died in 1969, Le Duan became secretary general of the North Vietnamese Communist Party until 1986. Ho’s other concurrent position, president of DRV, went to Ton Duc Thang until 1980. Even though President Nixon knew that the voters wanted to see the end of US involvement in Vietnam, they would not accept another communist victory. To end the war without losing it, Nixon employed a few new war strategies after becoming president. Nixon’s new war strategies included the Vietnamization of the war and incursion of Cambodia. The NVA then prepared a general offensive in the early 1970s in an attempt to convince Nixon and the American public that further escalation would lead to a US defeat. In late March 1972, the NVA launched the large-​scale spring offensive against the South, in which the South lost 25,000 men.49 To retaliate against the North, in April the Nixon administration responded to Hanoi’s attack by resuming the extensive bombing via Operation Linebacker I, across North Vietnam and mining harbors along the Vietnamese coast.50 In May 1972, the US Navy (USN) blockaded the major seaports and river outlets of the North by laying mines. Hanoi asked Beijing to ship badly needed fuel. The PLA again sent its engineering troops to Vietnam to construct oil pipelines to transport gasoline, diesel, and other fuel from China to North Vietnam. From May 1972 to August 1973, 8,000 engineering troops of the PLA entered Vietnam and built 5 oil pipelines across the Chinese-​ Vietnamese borders, totaling about 100 miles. In early June, the pipelines

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were finished. On June 15, they began transporting fuel from China to North Vietnam. During this period, China shipped 1.3 million tons of gasoline, diesel, and other fuel to Vietnam. The pipelines operated until June 30, 1976.51 In May 1972, Hanoi also requested immediate assistance from the Chinese navy to clear American mines and keep the sea route open for continuous Russian and Chinese aid.

Keep the Sea Route Open: PLAN Minesweeping The PLA Navy (PLAN) had been involved in China’s intervention in the Vietnam War from the beginning, both in naval transportation and intelligence. When the PLA organized the Chinese Combat Engineering Force in 1965, the high command in Beijing ordered the PLAN to provide offshore transportation as well as sea route air defense.52 In June 1965, the PLAN established a transport fleet, including twenty-​two transport vessels and seven escort gunboats, to transport Chinese troops, war materials, and engineering equipment from China to the Vietnamese coast and islands. Between June 1965 and October 1967, the naval fleet had sailed 211,400 nautical miles, had transported 57,535 Chinese troops to Vietnam, and had shipped war materials, including 214 artillery pieces, 416 AAA guns, 881 vehicles, and 1,149 tons of ammunition. By 1967, the fleet had lost two transport vessels, one gunboat, and seven sailors.53 Chinese naval intelligence in Hanoi’s embassy collected information from field agents in the South and from those near USAF bases in Thailand.54 They analyzed the information, which indicated enemy activities, capability, daily moves, and possible targets, although they provided only a general time frame and flight path, and without a large amount of detail. Naval intelligence also collected human and electronic information from offshore islands near the Tonkin Gulf, including Hainan Island.55 The PLAN set up these electronic observation stations to intercept radio transmission of US armed forces from as far away as the Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. The Chinese broke US codes and tried to determine American objectives.56 The PLAN opened its naval base at Hainan Island in the Tonkin Gulf for the NVA vessels’ rest, repair, refuel, and shipwreck rescue. The Chinese naval base set up a joint command and communication center, where Vietnamese naval representatives, stationed at the Chinese naval base, coordinated the operation and activities. From February 25, 1966 to October 20, 1973, the PLAN Hainan base had received, refueled, and hosted 256 NVA naval vessels

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and 4,977 Vietnamese naval personnel; had repaired 163 ships; and had provided 1,350 tons of supplies to Vietnamese ships.57 The Chinese Navy’s involvement in the Vietnam War opened a new window of opportunity to learn from the USN, the most advanced navy in the world. In 1968, PLAN sent a naval war research team to Vietnam to study American naval operations and Vietnamese naval war experience. From May 9 to November 28, 1968, Chinese naval officers traveled to ARVN naval wreck sites and airplane crash sites to study US aviation technology. They traveled to major seaports such as Da Nang and Hue in South Vietnam, reporting details of American naval technology.58 Among more than thirty officers and analysts of the naval research team were five mine experts from the PLA Naval Research Institute. They were briefed by NVA counterparts and provided three types of American water mines captured by the Vietnamese, including MK-​42, MK-​50, and MK-​52.59 The Chinese conducted mine testing, became familiar with NVA mine-​ clearing equipment and experience, and visited major harbors, sea routes, and NVA naval bases. After returning on June 26, 1969, the Naval Equipment Department of the PLAN Command and Naval Research Institute co-​hosted a conference on naval mine warfare, a new category in Chinese naval history. In addition to aquatic mine research and development, the naval conference decided to develop China’s 311-​and later 312-​model mine dredgers, which would later come in handy.60 On the afternoon of May 8, 1972, President Nixon gave a televised speech announcing that the US armed forces would mine all harbors and sea routes along the coast of North Vietnam. Frankum, Jr. points out, “This step had not been taken during the Johnson administration, which considered the action politically risky because it might serve as a catalyst for Chinese or Soviet overt intervention.”61 After Nixon’s trip to Beijing in February 1972 and the detente with Moscow, the United States was no longer worried about Chinese and Russian reactions. An hour after Nixon’s speech, more than ten US mine-​ layer ships and forty mine-​laying aircraft began the mining operation. “Navy A-​6 and A-​7 bombers dropped 2,000-​pound mines at the entrance to Hai Phong Harbor, beginning the isolation of the DRV from seaborne resupply,” according to Tucker.62 Three days later, the major seaport of Hai Phong and other ports such as Cam Pha, Hon Gai, Vinh, and Thanh Hoa, were totally blocked by mines. Ten days later, the United States had created thirty-​seven mine fields and eleven mine belts along 620 miles of North Vietnam’s coast.63 According to Chinese naval intelligence, the United States laid more than 11,000 mines by December 1972, totally blocking all major harbors,

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river outlets, and the sea routes in and out of DRV, paralyzing the entire sea transportation of North Vietnam.64 As Frankum, Jr. confirmed, “As a result, reconnaissance flights noted that no large transports attempted to enter or leave those harbors. The sea route, one of the two major supply lines into the DRV, was cut off.”65 On the morning of May 9, when the United States began its mining operation in North Vietnam’s harbors, Premier Zhou Enlai received an urgent request from the Vietnamese Ambassador in Beijing that Hanoi needed China’s immediate assistance in minesweeping, since half of Russian and Chinese aid, as well as 85 percent of fuel, came from the sea routes. Hai Phong’s port, for example, had been receiving an average import of 215,000 tons of aid every month. According to the ambassador, on May 9, 1972, twenty-​six foreign ships from eight countries were blocked in the port, and thirty-​four ships on their way to Hai Phong would not be able to reach the harbor. Zhou asked the Vietnamese Ambassador at the meeting whether the Soviet Navy might have advanced technology in minesweeping, and if the DRV government could ask for Soviet assistance.66 The ambassador avoided the question, but repeated his government’s request for Chinese help. Around 9:00 pm on the evening of May 9, Zhou called for an emergency meeting in Zhongnanhai, including state transportation officials and PLAN officers.67 At the meeting that evening, Zhou asked Lai Guangzu, deputy chief of staff of the PLAN, to send a Chinese naval search team to Vietnam to monitor American mining and to make an anti-​mine operation plan.68 That evening, Lai Guangzu discussed the naval survey with General Xiao Jinguang, PLAN commander, and Pan Yan, PLAN chief of staff. Lai then ordered the Naval Research Institute and South Sea Fleet Command to organize the planning team within twenty-​four hours.69 At 9:00 pm on May 10, the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee held a special meeting focusing on minesweeping in Vietnam. Zhou and Marshal Ye Jianying, who was also vice chairman of the CMC, and other members of the Politburo’s Standing Committee attended the meeting.70 Pan, Lai, and other naval officers made a presentation at the meeting with maps, numbers, and some suggestions. Zhou shared the intelligence with the PLAN officers and then instructed the PLAN chiefs on their minesweeping plan in Vietnam. First, according to the premier, the Chinese navy should locate a few American mines for research and find out how to deal with them. Next, the navy must clear the mines by different methods. The third instruction was to find a way to clear the channels and to avoid the mines.71 Marshal Ye then talked to the naval officers at the meeting. The PLAN had to develop a new

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strategy to deal with American mines, and the navy should learn from the mine-​clearing, which would enhance China’s naval combat effectiveness.72 After the Politburo meeting, the PLAN worked out an operation strategy and on May 16 submitted it to Zhou, who forwarded it to Mao the same day.73 After Mao’s approval on May 20, PLAN organized a Naval Mine Countermeasures Investigation Team with Zhang Shouying as commander and Guo Baolan as political commissar. The mine investigation team entered Vietnam on May 27 with three 312-​model and one 311-​model mine dredgers plus two escort warships and four supply vessels.74 From May to July, the mine investigation team searched more than 1.9 million square meters of mine fields and located two MK-​52 mines, one exploded and the other disarmed by search divers.75 On June 21, the PLAN Command and the mine investigation team briefed Marshal Ye in Beijing on their mine search and preparation for mine-​clearing operations in Vietnam. According to the naval briefing, the United States had established forty-​three mine fields along the coast of North Vietnam with a focus on Hai Phong and surrounding ports, which had received 75 percent of the total mines. The United States continued to manage mining effectiveness by replenishing mines to ensure total blockage of the sea routes of North Vietnam. If the United States monitoring aircraft found any clearing operation in the mining areas, they would call in air strikes to bomb Chinese and Vietnamese mine countermeasures ships. The US A-​6A and A-​7E mine-​laying airplanes would then lay more mines in these areas.76 The naval officers asked for more ships and troops for their minesweeping operation in Vietnam. Ye agreed with PLAN’s suggestions. On July 15, 1972, the PLAN Command organized the PLAN Mine-​ Sweeping Fleet HQ, including fleet command, diving and searching, mine technology, fleet logistics, as well as intelligence and communication sections. Zhang Shouying was promoted to fleet commander and Guo Baolan as political commissar. From July 23, the Chinese minesweeping fleet entered Vietnam in five groups, including twelve 312-​model minesweepers, four technology-​support vessels, seven logistics vessels, and three escort warships, totaling 1,380 sailors and soldiers.77 Zhang recalled that Chinese naval officers had worked closely with the Vietnamese, who proposed the priority targets, and it was no surprise to the Chinese that Hai Phong was first on the list.78 The Chinese minesweepers, however, could only operate at night along the waterway of Hai Phong, since US air raids made it very difficult, if not impossible, for Chinese mine-​clearing during daylight hours. Both Chinese-​ made 311 and 312-​model mine dredgers participated in minesweeping. These vessels proved efficient and accurate in mine-​clearing operations.79

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By the end of August, although the Chinese had swept and destroyed eleven mines along the channel of Hai Phong, the port was still blocked.80 Hanoi ran out of patience, and the Vietnamese began complaining to Beijing. Under political and military pressure, commander Zhang decided to change the minesweeping strategy. First, Chinese minesweepers began operating during daylight in order to double their mine-​clearing operating hours. Also, the Chinese would include the Vietnamese navy in their operation to expand minesweeping efforts. In September, the Chinese fleet transferred three of their 311-​model mine dredgers to the Vietnamese Navy, and trained Vietnamese naval officers to operate them. The Chinese fleet continued to operate their twelve 312-​model dredgers. Also, they improved minesweeping tactics by remodeling 312 dredgers to increase operational effectiveness.81 The new strategy improved the Chinese minesweeping operation by doubling the number of mines discovered and destroyed by Chinese mine-​dredgers. For example, on October 10, the 312-​05 mine dredger swept eight mines in one day.82 The Chinese, however, suffered casualties due to the air attacks, which dispersed operations. It took another month for the port of Hai Phong to reopen in October 1972. US replenishment mining, however, reblocked the port in November. The Chinese continued their minesweeping efforts and reopened the port in January of 1973, when the Peace Treaty was signed in Paris between North Vietnam and the United States.83 The PLAN Command eventually announced in August 1973 that the US mining campaign against North Vietnam was over, and that all major sea ports were reopened for shipping. By August 1973, the Chinese mine-​ sweeping fleet had conducted 586 sweeping operations, and had cleared 46 mines, 31 of which were swept by their 312 mine dredgers. The Chinese fleet sailed a total of 27,000 miles along the coast of North Vietnam, clearing a water surface of 210 square miles.84 Chinese naval vessels guided 234 foreign cargo ships in and out of Hai Phong port. The United States joined the Chinese minesweeping operation after the Paris Peace Treaty was signed in January 1973. The USN sent a mine-​clearing fleet, including more than 40 minesweeping vessels, 40 helicopters, and 4,000 troops to North Vietnam in the spring of 1973.85 On August 27, 1973, the Chinese minesweeping fleet left Vietnam and returned to China. Because of PLAN’s successful naval operations in the Vietnam War, in November 1974, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) requested the Chinese Navy to assist its blockage of Phnom Penh, capital of Cambodia, in its war against the Lon Nol government.86 The communist victory would

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certainly provide the CPK, under Pol Pot’s leadership, an opportunity to extend its influence within the resistance movement. The CPK also asked for PLAN assistance in mining the Mekong River to cut off the river route supply line to Phnom Penh. In December, PLAN transported 400 Chinese-​made Chen-​5 river mines to Cambodia through Vietnam. In January 1975, the first group of forty river mines arrived at Prey Veng province, across the Mekong River from Phnom Penh. After CPK guerrillas laid the Chinese mines in the river, eighteen government gunboats and transit ships were sunk in February, and water supply lines to Phnom Penh were completely cut off in March.87 On April 17, Phnom Penh fell and Lon Nol fled to America. In 1976, at the request of the newly established Cambodia Communist government, PLAN sent its minesweeping fleet to Cambodia to reopen the water ways of the Mekong River. The Chinese fleet dropped 610 depth charges to destroy all mines in the river between May 25 and June 14. After the Chinese minesweeping fleet had accomplished its mission, as instructed by the Chinese government, the fleet command left four torpedo boats and 800 depth charges as gifts to the Cambodian government.88

From the Coast to the South China Sea As a relatively young navy in Asia, the PLAN developed rapidly during the Vietnam War, from a coastal fleet in 1965 to a modern ocean-​going naval force in 1975. The PLAN experience in coastal defense, anti-​aircraft, minesweeping, and offshore island operations against American and South Vietnamese forces was necessary and significant for the naval modernization of China. The war had internationalized PLAN operations, improved the Chinese naval combat effectiveness, and offered a training and testing ground for the Chinese navy in the high seas. The victory in a naval battle against the ARVN naval force over the disputed islands in the South China Sea in 1974 proved that the Chinese navy had become a maritime power in Asia by the end of the Vietnam War. Since the founding of the PRC, the Chinese government has disputed islands in the South China Sea with Vietnam. These islands are still disputed with the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The Spratly Islands (Quan Dao Truong Sa in Vietnamese, and Nansha in Chinese), as the largest group in the South China Sea, covers a water area of 61,775 square miles, and includes approximately 100 small islands. The PRC and South Vietnam (RVN) claimed the Spratly Islands during the Vietnam War (see Map 6.1 Disputed islands in the South China Sea).89

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MAP 6.1.  Disputed islands in the South China Sea

After American troops withdrew from Vietnam in the spring of 1973, Beijing saw an opportunity to seize some of the disputed islands in the South China Sea. Tension between China and RVN mounted later that year. In January 1974, the Chinese and Vietnamese navies clashed at the Paracel Islands (Xisha in Chinese and Quan Dao Hoang Sa in Vietnamese). The islands are composed of Xuande, Yongle, and 30 other islands located 330 kilometers southeast of China’s Hainan Island. These islands occupy an ocean surface of 15,000 square kilometers in the South China Sea. Many of these

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islets are sandbanks and reefs. Yongxing Island is the major island of 1.6 square kilometers.90 The RVN government had occupied some of the islands in the 1960s. During the war, the USN provided technical support and trained the ARVN naval officers and sailors for their combat readiness and operational skills. Lieutenant Nguyen Nhieu, chief of the electronic reconnaissance division of the ARVN navy (VNN), recalled that he and many other naval officers received training in the United States from the best instructors with the most up-​to-​date technology.91 In 1970, the USN began its ACTOV (Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese) project as part of the Vietnamization program. In August 1970, Lt. Nhieu came to America and studied at the US Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island. After 1971, the USN transferred 571 naval vessels to the VNN, which began to assume coastal operations from the USN. The United States also transferred to the VNN complete control of the high seas surface patrol operations in the South China Sea.92 By 1973, when the US armed forces withdrew from South Vietnam, the VNN had more than 1,400 ships and gunboats with 42,000 soldiers and sailors, as one of the largest navies in the world. In September 1973, the RVN government declared more islands in the South China Sea, including Nanwei and Taiping, along with ten other islands, to be included in their country’s territory, aiming to secure the abundant oil resources in the area. On January 11, 1974, however, the Foreign Ministry of the PRC announced an official statement claiming China’s sovereignty over Nansha (Spratly), Xisha (Paracel), Zhongsha, and Dongsha Islands with all their natural resources belonging to China.93 On January 15, the VNN sent one of its destroyers to the waters around Xisha’s Yongle Island. On January 16, the Vietnamese destroyer shelled the Ganquan Island, driving Chinese fishing boats out of the Paracel area. On the next day, the Vietnamese sent another destroyer to transport some soldiers to occupy the Ganquan and Jinyin Islands and to remove a Chinese national flag, which was set up by the Chinese a couple of days earlier on the island. The PLA high command decided to occupy the Paracel islands by attacking the VNN vessels in the area. Marshal Ye Jianying, defense minister and vice chairman of the CMC, instructed PLAN to be combat ready for a battle over the Paracel Islands. The Chinese navy deployed two attack submarines, Nos. 271 and 274, to Yongle Island, and two Chinese minesweepers to transport troops, equipment, fresh water, and other supplies to the island. Wei Mingsen, deputy commander of the Yulin PLAN Base, was appointed commander for the Xisha Island campaign.94 On January 17, the two Chinese submarines

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landed four platoons of the troops on Jinqin and Chenhang Islands. After their landing, VNN destroyers Nos. 4 and 16 were firing around the area. On the evening of January 18, the VNN sent reinforcements destroyer No. 5 and frigate No. 10, to the waters of Yongle Island. There were four Vietnamese warships in the conflicted area. Then the Chinese navy also sent two more submarines (Nos. 281 and 282) to Yongxing Island. On January 18, Zhou Enlai called for an emergency meeting of the Politburo to form a five-​person-​group led by Ye, including Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Xilian to deal with the urgent crisis. Su Zhenhua, deputy commander of the PLAN, briefed the meeting and proposed a retaliation plan. The leading group immediately issued the “Guideline to Fight against the South Vietnamese Destroyers” at Yongle Islands. Based on this guideline, the Chinese navy was prepared for the Paracels campaign. At 7:00 am on January 19, VNN destroyers Nos. 4 and 5 landed more than forty Vietnamese soldiers on Chenhang and Guangjin Islands, where more than one hundred Chinese troops were already located. After the landing, the soldiers from both sides began to fire on the other. One Vietnamese soldier was killed and three were wounded. Around 10:22 am, four VNN destroyers shelled the Chinese ships, and the Chinese returned the fire. In the first round, the Chinese destroyed the navigation radar antenna on ship No. 4. VNN No. 16 was also hit by shells from a Chinese minesweeper and quickly fled the area. The Chinese ships then concentrated their fire on destroyer No. 10. After fighting for one hour and thirty-​seven minutes, the VNN ships left behind the heavily damaged No. 10. The destroyer attempted to move to the Lingyang Reef, but failed. Two Chinese subs sank the Vietnamese destroyer. At this time, Ye, Deng, and Su reported to Mao Zedong in Beijing, suggesting that China should gain control of the Paracel islands, and Mao agreed. After the successful naval campaign at sea, the PLA landed more troops on the Ganquan, Shanhu, and Jinyin Islands, occupying them. During the Paracel (Xisha) Island campaign, more than one hundred ARVN officers and soldiers were killed or wounded, including one American naval officer, and forty-​nine captured, while sixty-​seven Chinese soldiers were wounded and eighteen killed. The PLAN operations in the battle of the disputed islands provided China with a powerful position to deploy its warships and submarines into the deep water of the South China Sea. The naval operation had transformed the Chinese navy from a coastal fleet to a sea power in Southeast Asia. It had

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increased its operational capability from resisting seaborne invasion, protecting coastal lines and sovereignty, and safeguarding maritime rights to maritime blockage, anti-​sea lines of communication, maritime-​land attack, anti-​ship operations, maritime transportation protection, and naval base defense. In late January 1974, the RVN denounced the Chinese invasion and occupation of the Vietnamese islands, and organized anti-​China protest rallies at major cities like Saigon and Da Nang. The South Vietnamese government, however, considered it as “an isolated incident” and was not interested in continuing the naval battle against the PRC in the South China Sea since both the ARVN and VNN had been preoccupied in the deadly war against North Vietnam after the US withdrawal in March 1973.95 Hanoi had maintained its silence over the Chinese occupation of the disputed islands in the South China Sea until its final victory of the Vietnam War. Before its takeover of Saigon, the NVA landed its troops on six of the disputed Spratly Islands on April 22–​28, 1975. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRV then made a public announcement on June 3 that “the sufficient evidence has proved that Vietnam also has the sovereign power over the Quan Dao Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands, or the Xisha in Chinese).”96 Thereafter, the disputed islands in the South China Sea became a time-​bomb in the Sino-​Vietnamese relations until today.

Notes 1. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 2: 209; Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 2: 57; Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 222–​23. 2. The First Division, about 32,700 troops, was comprised of railway engineering troops. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Divisions were comprised of highway engineering troops, totaling 80,000 men. For more details on their operation, see the previous chapter. See also Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], ­chapters 3, 7, 8. Major General Qu is deputy chief of the Department of War Theory and Strategy Research of China Military Science Academy (CMSA). 3. Tai, Remembering Uncle Ho, 13, 32–​34. Tai as a three-​star general served as the Deputy General Chief of Staff of the NVA in 1967–​1973. 4. After MacArthur successfully landed at Inchon on September 15, 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) collapsed. Pyongyang, the northern capital, fell in October. Then China sent its army to the Korean War on October 19. For more details of China’s intervention, see Li, China’s Battle for Korea, ­chapters 1 and 2. 5. Major General Zeng Xuqing served as the division commander and political commissar in the PLA during the Chinese Civil War. After China sent its forces to Korea,

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Zeng was the deputy commander of the Twenty-​Third Army of the CPVF. After his return to China, he was appointed as the commander of the Combat Engineering Department of the East China Military Region. Zeng was granted a rank of major general in 1956. From 1958 to 1962, he was assigned to the construction of China’s nuclear testing site in the northwestern desert by commanding 100,000 engineering troops. In 1964, he was promoted to the deputy chief of staff of the PLA Combat Engineering Corps. After his return from Vietnam, Zeng served as the deputy commander of the PLA Combat Engineering Corps in 1974–​1982. He retired from the PLA in 1982. For more details, see Xinghuo liaoyuan Composition Department, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun jiangshuai minglu [Marshals and Generals of the PLA], 3: 572. 6. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 53. Senior Colonel Wang served on the staff of the Railway Engineering Corps Office at the PLA DGS. 7. Wang Hui served as a deputy commander and chief staff in the PLA during the Chinese Civil War. After China sent its forces to Korea, Wang participated in the Korean War. After his return, he became division deputy commander and commander, and chief of the combat engineering department of the Wuhan Military Region. After his return from Vietnam, he served as the deputy chief staff of the Wuhan Military Region. For more details on Wang and his survey trip in Vietnam in May, see Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces],  5–​6. 8. Wang, “How the Northeastern Coast Defense System Took Shape in Vietnam,” 116–​117. Wang Hui was chief of staff and deputy commander of the Second Division in Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. 9. Major General Li Lianghan became the deputy chief of the organization department of PLA Northeast Military and Political University, and then its political commissar during the Chinese Civil War. In 1955, Li was granted a rank of major general. In 1957–​1965, he was appointed as the director of the Political Department of the PLA Combat Engineering Corps. After his return from Vietnam, Li was promoted to the political commissar of the PLA Combat Engineering Corps. For more details, see Xinghuo liaoyuan Composition Department, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun jiangshuai minglu [Marshals and Generals of the PLA], 2: 459. 10. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 53–​55; Ye Conghua, “Engagements on the Co To Islands,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 130. Ye was the political commissar of the 8th Regiment of the Second Division in Vietnam in 1965–​1967. 11. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US],  81–​88. 12. Guo Peizhang, “Construction Records on the Dao Cat Ba Island,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 136. Guo was the deputy

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political commissar of the 7th Regiment of the Second Division in Vietnam in 1965–​1966. 13. Wang, “How the Northeastern Coast Defense System Took Shape in Vietnam,” 124–​25. 14. Chen Biru, “When the Eighth Company Was Bombed,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 153. Chen was the head of the organizational office in the Political Department of the Second Division in Vietnam from June 1965 to October 1966. 15. These are the Chinese statistics which are different from the American statistics. See Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 72–​ 73; Li, “Tough Mission and Great Friendship,” 123. Major General Li Lianghan was the political commissar of the Second Division in Vietnam from June 1965 to April 1966. 16. Guo, “Construction Records on the Dao Cat Ba Island,” 135–​36. 17. Ibid., 137–​38. 18. Ibid., 137; Ye, “Engagements on the Co To Islands,” 130–​31. 19. Wang, “How the Northeastern Coast Defense System Took Shape in Vietnam,” 122. 20. Zhou Fengcheng, “Combat Experience of the Transport Fleet in the Vietnam War,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 151–​52. Chen was the political commissar of the PLAN Transport Fleet in 1965–​1967. 21. Li, “Tough Mission and Great Friendship,” 111–​12. 22. Ibid. 23. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 62–​67,  72–​75. 24. Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 69–​71. 25. Colonel Hou Zhenlu (PLA, ret.), interviews by the author in Changchun, Jilin Province, on July 14–​17, 2006. See also Hou, “Chinese Railroad Engineering Operations,” in Li, Voices from the Vietnam War, 216–​22. Colonel Hou was deputy commander of the 2nd Regiment of the First Division in 1965–​1970. 26. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US],  75–​76. 27. Zhou Chi, “Recollection of Laying under-​ water Communication Cable in Vietnam,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 139–​146. Zhou was head of the engineering design section of the 12th Regiment of the Second Division in Vietnam from June 1965 to May 1966. See also Li, “Tough Mission and Great Friendship,” 125. 28. Qu, “Military Operations of the Chinese Supporting Forces in Vietnam,” 51. 29. Ye, “Engagements on the Co To Islands,” 132. 30. Sun Yulin, “The Monument over the Red River Delta,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 164. Sun was the director of the Political Department of the Seventh Division in Vietnam in 1966–​1968.

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31. Xu Kelin, “The Seventh Division in Vietnam,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 159. Xu was the political commissar of the Seventh Division in Vietnam in 1966–​1968. 32. Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 142–​43. 33. Xu, “The Seventh Division in Vietnam,” 159. 34. Sun, “The Monument over the Red River Delta,” 163–​6 4. 35. Ibid. 36. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 140. 37. Mu Zhang, “The First Mobile Air Defense Battle,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 171. Mu was the deputy commander of the Seventh Division in Vietnam in 1966–​1968. 38. Ibid.,  172. 39. Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 136–​37. 4 0. Major General Xu Haoxiu served as the commander of the 312th Regiment of the Seventh Division in Vietnam in 1966–​1968. After he returned to China, his regiment was assigned to the PLA Second Artillery Corps (SAC), China’s strategic nuclear and missile force. Xu became deputy commander of the SAC testing ground and deputy commander of the training base in the 1970s. He was promoted to the deputy chief of staff of the PLA SAC Command in 1983. He was granted a rank of major general in 1982. See Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 141–​42. 41. Qu, “Military Operations of the Chinese Supporting Forces in Vietnam,” 52. 42. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun (The PLA during the Cultural Revolution), 419–​20. 43. Tucker, Vietnam, 178–​79; Duiker, Sacred War, 230; Halberstam, Ho, 116–​17. 4 4. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 222. 45. Thompson, The Pacific Basin since 1945, 87. 4 6. Whiting, Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, 194–​95. 47. Schulzinger, “The Johnson Administration, China, and the Vietnam War,” 239. 48. Mao, “We Agree with Vietnam’s Policy to both Fight and Negotiate,” in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Party Archives and Manuscript Research Center of the CCP Central Committee, comp., Mao Zedong on Diplomacy (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1998), 442–​43. 49. For more details on the NVA 1972 spring offensive, or the Easter Offensive, see Moss, Vietnam, 314–​20. 50. Ambrose E.  Stephen, “Bombing Hanoi, Mining Haiphong, and the Moscow Summit,” in Light at the End of the Tunnel: A Vietnam War Anthology, ed. Andrew Jon Rotter (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1999), 135–​36. 51. Qu, “Military Operations of the Chinese Supporting Forces in Vietnam,” 53. 52. Zhou, “Combat Experience of the Transport Fleet in the Vietnam War,” 151–​52.

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53. Yang, Dangdai zhongguo haijun [Contemporary Chinese Navy] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe [China’s Social Science Press], 1987), 412–​13. 54. Colonel Yan Guitang (PLAAF, ret.), interview by the author in Xi’an, Shaanxi, on July 29–​30, 2006. Yan served as a staff member at the PLA GSD. 55. Colonel Liu Zhiqing (PLA), interviews by the author in Beijing in July 2006. Liu is professor with a PhD degree teaching at China Academy of Military Science (CAMS). He also serves as the Director of Chinese Society for Sino-​Russian Relations Studies. 56. Senior Colonel Ke Cunqiao (PLA), interview by the author at the annual conference of the Society of Military History (SMH)/​Chinese Military History Society (CMHS) at Ottawa, Canada, on April 14, 2016. Ke is professor and Director of World Military History Division, China Academy of Military Science (CAMS). 57. Yang, Dangdai zhongguo haijun [Contemporary Chinese Navy], 413. 58. Zhang, Zhang, and Wu, Hu zhiming xiaodao shang de 701 Tian [701 Days through the Ho Chi Minh Trail], 2-​4. 59. Li Baoxiang, “Technology Improvement:  Help Vietnam to Clean the Mines,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 301. Li was the senior engineer of the PLA Naval Research Institute in 1965–​1973. 60. Ibid., 301–​302. 61. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 157. 62. For more details on Operation Linebacker I, see Tucker, Vietnam, 170–​71. 63. Military History Research Division, China Academy of Military Science (CAMS), Meiguo qinyue zhanzhengshi [War History of US Invasion of Vietnam] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe [Military Science Press], 2004), 346. 6 4. Zhang Shouying, “Memoir of Mine-​Sweeping Experience in Vietnam,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 305. Zhang was the commander of the PLAN Mine-​Search Team in Vietnam in May–​July 1972 and then commander of the PLAN Mine-​Sweeping Fleet from July 1972 to August 1973. 65. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 157. 66. Yang, Dangdai zhongguo haijun [Contemporary Chinese Navy], 422. 67. Zhou Enlai Military Record Compilation Team, Zhou Enlai junshi huodong jishi [Zhou Enlai Military Affairs Record], 2: 748. 68. Lai Guangzu, “Premier Zhou Organizes the Mine-​Sweeping in Vietnam,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 297–​98. Lai was deputy chief staff of the PLA Navy in 1968–​1973. 69. Yang, Dangdai zhongguo haijun [Contemporary Chinese Navy], 422. 70. CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Research Division, Zhou Enlai nianpu [A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai], 3: 524. 71. Lai Guangzu, “Premier Zhou Organizes the Mine-​Sweeping in Vietnam,” 299. 72. Yang, Dangdai zhongguo haijun [Contemporary Chinese Navy], 422.

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73. Zhou Enlai Military Record Compilation Team, Zhou Enlai junshi huodong jishi [Zhou Enlai Military Affairs Record], 2: 749. 74. Xiao, “Important Military Operations in the Indochina War,” 2: 461. 75. Li, “Technology Improvement: Help Vietnam to Clean the Mines,” 302. 76. Zhang, “Memoir of Mine-​Sweeping Experience in Vietnam,” 306–​307. 77. Yang, Dangdai zhongguo haijun [Contemporary Chinese Navy], 423–​24. 78. Zhang, “Memoir of Mine-​Sweeping Experience in Vietnam,” 307. 79. Li, “Technology Improvement: Help Vietnam to Clean the Mines,” 302–​303. 80. Zhang, “Memoir of Mine-​Sweeping Experience in Vietnam,” 307–​308. 81. Li, “Technology Improvement: Help Vietnam to Clean the Mines,” 303. 82. Tian Ming, “A Hero for the Vietnamese People,” in Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 313. Tian Ming was captain of the PLAN 312-​05 minesweeper in 1972–​1973. 83. Xiao, “Important Military Operations in the Indochina War,” 2: 461. 84. Yang, Dangdai zhongguo haijun [Contemporary Chinese Navy], 429. 85. According to the Paris Accords of January 27, 1973, “America . . . agrees to remove, deactivate, or destroy immediately all of the mines that had been laid in North Vietnamese port, harbors, and waterways.” The quote is from Moss, Vietnam, 332. 86. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 2: 58. 87. Yang, Dangdai zhongguo haijun [Contemporary Chinese Navy], 430. 88. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 58. 89. Pham Cao Duong, “Spratly and Paracel Islands,” in China at War; An Encyclopedia, ed. Xiaobing Li (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-​CLIO, 2012), 426–​27. 90. Xiaoxiao Li, “Xisha Islands Defensive Campaign (1974),” in China at War, 502–​503. 91. Lieutenant Nguyen Nhieu (VNN, ret.), interviews by the author at Garland, Texas, in May 2003. Nhieu served as the chief of the electronic reconnaissance division at Giang Doan and Ham Doi naval bases, VNN, in 1970–​1975. 92. Lieutenant Nguyen Nhieu (VNN, ret.), “Electronic Reconnaissance vs. Guerrillas,” in Li, Voices from the Vietnam War, 234n9. 93. The announcement of the PRC Foreign Ministry is quoted in Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian 40 nian [Deterioration of the Sino-​Vietnam Relations in the Past Forty Years], 151–​52. 94. Li, “Xisha Islands Defensive Campaign (1974),” 503. 95. Chen Jiachang, Yuezhan jimidang [Secret Archives of the Vietnam War] (Beijing:  Zhongguo fazhan chubanshe [China Development Publishing House], 2014), 164. 96. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian 40 nian [Deterioration of the Sino-​Vietnam Relations in the Past Forty Years], 154.

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7

AID AND ARMS

From Honeymoon to Divorce

After the Johnson administration escalated the war in early 1965, Chinese leaders increased military and economic aid to the North Vietnamese. The CCP Party Center was driven not only by its national security concerns, but also ideologically against Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. From 1965, both China and Russia provided North Vietnam with money, equipment, and technology against the United States, making it a long war, one that was impossible for the United States to win.1 Soviet and Chinese support proved to be the decisive edge that enabled the NVA and the NLF to resist American forces and to eventually defeat South Vietnam. However, the Vietnam War seriously tested the limits of the Communist alliance. Rather than improving Sino-​Soviet relations, aid to North Vietnam created a new competition, as each attempted to control Southeast Asian Communist movements. China and the Soviet Union never united to support Hanoi, and Vietnam became yet another front between the two contesting Communist states. Unlike its experience in the Korean War, China now had to fight both superpowers in Vietnam—​fighting the United States militarily and the Soviet Union politically—​at the same time. By 1968 it became evident to the Chinese leaders like Mao Zedong and Marshal Lin Biao that the United States was a declining power because of its failures in Vietnam and serious problems in other parts of the world. As the United States withdrew from Vietnam, the Soviet Union filled in the power vacuum and replaced the United States as a new “imperialist” aggressor. Therefore, China, like other Asian countries, could become a target and victim of the new “Soviet socialist imperialist” aggressive policy.2 Chinese leaders’ strategic conception made sense to PLA

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generals, who witnessed increased Soviet hostility along the Sino-​Russian border and saw a direct threat to their country in 1969. To obtain the maximum material support against America, North Vietnam’s government tried to remain neutral in the Sino-​Soviet rivalry in 1965–​1970. The triangular relationship, however, changed in favor of the Soviet Union after Ho Chi Minh died in 1969. In 1970, Hanoi began moving closer to the Soviet Union, and the traditional alliance between the PRC and DRV, established in 1949, fell apart. Some historians argue that the Vietnamese friendship with the Soviet Union caused this realignment, and that this new alliance was a necessary and sufficient cause to produce hostilities between the former allies.3 China withdrew its troops in 1969 and reduced its aid to Hanoi after 1971. Its early withdrawal in the middle of the war forced Moscow to increase Russian involvement, leading to the serious overextension of the Soviet Union’s power. China’s withdrawal worsened the Sino-​Soviet relationship and eventually led to the Sino-​Soviet border clash in 1969–​1971, which pinned down one million Russian troops along the Sino-​Soviet borders.4 China then turned to the United States in 1972, the year that President Richard Nixon visited China. The United States and Soviet Union began to use the “China card” and played a different game in a new triangular relationship during the late 1970s, the beginning of the end of the Cold War.

Military Aid to the DRV China had continued to provide military aid to North Vietnam since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. During and after the French-​ Indochina War, the PRC’s aid totaled 6.4 billion yuan RMB (about $2.56 billion) from 1950 to 1965, including 3.8 billion yuan RMB (about $1.52 billion) of military aid, 1.4 billion yuan ($560 million) of economic aid, and 1.2 billion yuan ($480  million) of special aid. In addition to material aid, China also provided a total of 1.4 billion yuan ($560  million) of financial aid to North Vietnam. To contain Moscow’s influence in Vietnam, Beijing increased its military aid to Hanoi in 1964–​1965 by mobilizing the entire country for China’s “War to Assist Vietnam and Resist America” (Yuanyue kangmei zhanzheng).5 In the early 1960s, nevertheless, China itself was battling tremendous economic difficulties. From 1959 to 1962, China experienced a serious economic depression known as the “three hard years.” This disaster resulted from the massive failure of Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward movement, an effort

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to industrialize through labor power and collectivization instead of technology and private enterprises.6 In rural areas, most peasants were organized into “People’s Communes” that controlled their productivity and distribution. Private land ownership and independent farming were nonexistent. Every peasant worked with others in a team and through collective production shared the annual yields. In fact, the commune system met with serious difficulties and failed to provide the basic needs for the local peasants. A national peasant average income was about 200 yuan RMB ($60) a year in the 1960s. The total grain production decreased from 200  million tons in 1958 to 144 million tons in 1960. In the urban areas, tens of millions of people were mobilized in a nationwide movement of steel-​making, an extremely costly operation in terms of labor, capital, and raw material. Traditional craftsmen were all forced to participate in collectivized firms. China had become a state based on the complete control of all resources by the party-​run government. The Great Leap Forward movement’s consequences were more disastrous than those of earlier programs. Many people’s communes plunged into agricultural disaster. The grain harvest was dismal, leading to widespread famine in 1960–​1963. Shortages of food, fuel, and other daily needs claimed the lives of millions. In 1960, starvation became a nationwide phenomenon. Some provinces lost five percent of their total population. In some areas, animals disappeared, birds were not to be seen in the sky, and even the grass and leaves were gone. People in the worst affected areas soon turned to cannibalism, which eventually became common in every area decimated by starvation.7 Mao never admitted that his policy led to this massive failure and economic disaster, nor that the movement intended to loss the large rural population, even though he had stepped down as China’s president in 1959. After Mao’s resignation, Liu Shaoqi became the PRC’s second president (1959–​ 1969). Liu had been vice chairman of the Central Government and the CMC, and he later assumed the title of the first vice chair of the NPC from 1954 to 1959. He was publicly acknowledged as Mao’s chosen successor in 1961.8 Meanwhile, the government blamed the economic disaster on bad weather, calling it a natural disaster.9 Later, the Soviet Union became the main culprit, when the ideological split between China and its main ally became public in 1961. The Chinese people were told that the Soviet Union had betrayed them by withdrawing all aid and terminating all contracts between the two countries.10 In 1964–​1965, however, the Central Committee of the CCP reached an agreement that China would continue its military and economic aid to North Vietnam, even though China faced bankruptcy. Premier Zhou Enlai

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explained the foreign aid policy to his ministers at a State Council executive meeting on July 18, 1964: “We must seize the moment and take a firm grasp of the central issue [of our economic foreign policy],” because the current international situation offered “a great opportunity” for the PRC to increase its influence among the Southeast Asian nations.11 Shuguang Zhang states, “In the early 1960s, China joined the big-​power league in the field of economic diplomacy. The use of economic and military aid in pursuit of foreign policy objectives did not seem alien to the CCP leaders.” Also, “China’s aid policy toward the Vietnam conflict happened to become a major part of the CCP’s new diplomatic thrust.” To guarantee foreign aid, Zhou directed that many domestic economic projects must yield priority to overseas assistance efforts.12 To increase military aid to North Vietnam, the Party Center in May 1965 established a seven-​member leading committee, called the “Vietnam Aid Leadership Group.” This top decision-​making body provided the party supervision for the Chinese assistance efforts in the Vietnam War.13 Its political authority made China’s involvement in Vietnam a top national priority. In June, the Vietnam Aid Leadership Group set up a centralized administrative body, which was named the “National Task Team of Supporting Vietnam.” This central government executive team tied together the State Council, PLA, and NPC under the CCP leadership to carry out military aid policy. The National Task Team coordinated three central government commissions, six State Council’s ministries, eight PLA general departments, and four military services to mobilize the nation’s human and material sources to aid Vietnam.14 This bureaucratic administration, headed by General Yang Chengwu, established a civilian-​military coalition under the party and enabled China to concentrate its national resources for a prolonged war effort in Southeast Asia.15 With an all-​out nationwide effort, Beijing increased its military aid to Hanoi. From 1964 to 1966, China shipped to Vietnam 270,000 rifles and machine guns, 540 artillery pieces, 900,000 artillery shells, 200  million rounds of ammunition, and 700 tons of dynamite, along with other military supplies.16 The Chinese doubled or even tripled their annual military aid through the second half of the 1960s. For example, China provided 80,500 automatic rifles in 1964, 141,531 in 1966, 219,899 in 1968, and 233,600 in 1973, almost three times more than the total aid of 1964. The heavy artillery totaled 1,205 pieces in 1964, 3,362 in 1966, 7,087 in 1968, and 9,912 in 1973. Artillery amounts increased by nine times between 1964 and 1973. The PRC provided 335,000 artillery shells in 1964, 1.06  million in 1966, 2.08  million in 1968, and 2.2 million in 1973. The increase in tanks and vehicles was

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dramatic: 41 in 1964, 96 in 1966, 462 in 1968, and 8,978 in 1972. The deliveries of tanks and vehicles increased 200 times from 1964 to 1972.17 By 1974, China had sent Vietnam 2.14  million rifles and automatic guns, 1.2 billion rounds of small arms ammunition, 70,000 artillery pieces, 18.1  million artillery shells, 170 airplanes, 176 gunboats, 552 tanks, 320 armored vehicles, 16,000 trucks, 18,240 tons of dynamite, 11.2 million set of uniforms, as well as other war supplies. Between 1971 and 1972, China also shipped into Vietnam 180 Chinese-​made Hongqi-​02 anti-​aircraft missiles and all the control equipment, radar, and communication facilities for a SAM regiment.18 From 1966 to 1973, China provided military aid totaling 42.6 billion yuan (about $14 billion), including guns, ammunition, tanks, naval vessels, armored vehicles, trucks, airplanes, medicine, medical instruments, and other war materials. Thus, during the Vietnam War, China provided North Vietnam with total aid of $20 billion.19 In 1960–​1977, China also provided large-​scale, free military aid to Laos, including 115,000 automatic rifles, 2,780 artillery pieces, thirty-​four tanks, 170 million rounds of ammunition, 2.7 million artillery shells, 920,000 hand grenades, 254,000 land mines, 2,530 wireless radios, 2,654 telephones, 773 military vehicles, 958 tons of explosives, 2,570,000 uniforms, and 7,710 tons of food. The Chinese military aid helped the Laotian Communist forces to win their war against the pro-​American government.20

Economic Aid to the North Beginning in the spring of 1965, Hanoi drastically increased its economic aid requests. From July 1965 to December 1966, North Vietnam signed three economic aid agreements with China, totaling 1.33 billion yuan ($532 million), almost double the total amount of the previous year. The peak years of Chinese economic aid were from 1968 to 1969, totaling 900 million yuan ($360 million).21 The increase in economic aid continued into the 1970s. For instance, China provided Vietnam with 2.4 million tons of grain from 1965 to 1970, and the total increased to 2.96 million tons in 1970–​1975. About 56,000 tons of cotton and cotton yarns were sent to Vietnam in 1965–​1970, and the total increased to 71,000 tons in 1970–​1975. Other Chinese aid included 1.9 million blankets, 41,000 tons of paper, and 477,000 bicycles during 1965–​1970. The totals increased to 2.15 million blankets, 49,200 tons of paper, and 480,000 bicycles in 1970–​1975.22 The financial total increased to $380 million from 1970 to 1975.23 Between 1965 and 1973, China’s economic aid to Vietnam totaled 4.26 billion yuan (about $1.7 billion).24

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Chinese aid of industrial materials and manufactured products also increased from the mid-​1960s to mid-​1970s. In 1965–​1970, China provided North Vietnam with 70,600 tons of chemicals, 185,100 tons of rolled steel, 100,000 tons of coal, 40,000 tons of asphalt, and 95,500 tons of gasoline. The totals increased to 540,000 tons of chemicals, 416,000 tons of rolled steel, 1,810,000 tons of coal, 144,400 tons of asphalt, and 1,800,000 tons of gasoline in 1970–​1975. China also provided North Vietnam with vessels, vehicles, machinery, and industrial equipment, including 4,200 trucks, 334 vessels, 2,300 tractors, 1,238 pieces of road construction equipment, 20 locomotives, and 1,090 railway cars from 1965 to 1970. The total increased to 30,835 trucks, 352 vessels, 2,430 tractors, 4,135 road construction equipment, 107 locomotives, and 2,200 railway cars in 1970–​1975. In terms of financial aid, from 1965 to 1970 China provided $254.6 million hard currency to North Vietnam. Also, in late 1965, North Vietnam began to request Chinese assistance in construction of factories and utility facilities. On January 9, 1966, for instance, a Vietnamese government delegation signed an economic aid agreement with the PRC State Council’s National Commission of Foreign Economic Affairs in Beijing. Among the eighteen aid programs were the construction of two electric power plants and two auto parts factories. In 1967, Beijing signed another economic aid agreement to provide Hanoi with seventy-​seven industrial mills, including twenty sugar mills, twenty paper manufacturing factories, six automobile tire manufacturing and rebuilding shops, and other industrial factories, totaling 100 million yuan ($40 million).25 In addition, since 1965, Hanoi also requested a complete service line for fuel, including shipment, storage, and protection of petroleum products. In December 1965, for example, Hanoi sent a delegation to Beijing negotiating for more petroleum products, including gasoline, diesel, and kerosene. The Vietnamese also asked China to provide oil tanks, pipelines, and gas stations to transport fuel and to serve their vehicles and machines. In February 1966, the Commission of Foreign Economic Affairs called a meeting, and the Ministry of Petroleum Industry (MPI) was assigned to design and build military oil tanks in North Vietnam.26 In March 1966, the MPI decided on three oil tank construction projects. To begin, Project 204 would construct large oil tanks for strategic storage in natural caves in the northern mountainous areas. Secondly, Project A315 was to build oil tanks in manmade caves along the eastern coast for the NVA to ship the fuel to South Vietnam for their military vehicles. And the third project was to make mobile oil tanks for military movements and operations

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along the Ho Chi Minh Trails and other major roads from the North to the South.27 In the summer of 1966, the third phase of Rolling Thunder was underway, which began targeting the POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) storage facilities.28 On July 8, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara told Admiral U.  S. Grant Sharp, commander-​in-​chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), that President Johnson wanted a complete “strangulation” of the North’s POL system.29 Then, the monthly US sorties increased from 10,375 in June to 14,339 in July. The sorties of B-​52s of the Third Air Division increased from 411 in April–​June to 445 in July–​September, and to 542 in October–​December.30 By that fall, Tilford states that “estimates were that 70 percent of North Vietnam’s POL storage capacity had been destroyed.”31 North Vietnam needed immediate Chinese help to secure a fuel supply. Under the pressure, the Chinese sped up their assistance of oil storage and transportation projects. Chen Zhiguang told the author that in that fall the MPI sent a land survey and tank design team, headed by Chen, to North Vietnam, looking for workable sites in the mountains and on the hills as oil tank locations along the railways. Before the end of the year, his team identified the Mt. Long Son for Project 204 and Hai Phong for Project A315.32 The natural cave for Project 204 in Long Son was located in the middle of the mountain range, and with a small entry, making it an ideal strategic oil storage. Chinese engineering troops began construction in the early spring of 1967 and completed it on May 19, 1969, including nine oil tanks (two 5,000-​ cu.-​meter tanks; two 3,000-​cu.-​meter tanks; one 2,000 cu. meters; and four 1,000 cu. meters), and totaling 16,000 tons of oil product storage capacity.33 It is interesting to note that before China invaded Vietnam in February 1979, Chinese military intelligence and PLAAF visited Chen and discussed how to destroy these oil tanks in the caves of Long Son. Because of its hidden location and small entry, they decided to attack the tanks with air-​to-​surface guided missiles.34 Project A315 was a manmade cave at Hai Phong made to store oil products. Nevertheless, Meng Xianrui told the author that construction was delayed because of repeated Vietnamese demands to increase its storage capacity. Meng served as chief of the Foreign Aid Office, Bureau of Production and Technology, MPI, in 1965–​1972. On August 5, 1967, the Vietnamese delegation signed an agreement with China for seventy-​two economic aid programs, including Project A315 of building fifteen oil tanks in caves near Haiphong, with a total storage capacity of 15,000 cu. meters.35 During Chinese survey and designing, the Vietnamese asked the Chinese government to double capacity from 15,000 to 30,000 cu. meters. On July 13, 1971, the MPI agreed

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to increase storage capacity. Meng recalled that during its construction the Vietnamese again asked the Chinese to increase its capacity from 30,000 to 50,000 cu. meters. A new agreement was signed on December 27, 1972. The MPI sent a construction supervision team of thirty-​nine engineers and experts to Hai Phong, working from September 18, 1973 to March 28, 1978.36 China also provided equipment, construction forces, materials, supplies, and air defense during construction. The Chinese finally completed Project A315 on June 24, and it became operational on June 27.37 The third oil tank project was for China to provide small mobile oil tanks to the NVA in 1965–​1969. The MPI organized a working force of 1,200 men who constructed 4.5-​, 10-​, and 25-​cu.-​meter oil tanks in China, and delivered them to North Vietnam.38 The Chinese shipped 2,087 mobile oil tanks to Vietnam in 1965; approximately 2,900 oil tanks in 1966; more than 3,500 in 1967; 2,600 in 1968; and 453 in 1969. Each oil tank came with accessories including an oil pump, connecting devices, and a short pipe. The NVA logistics filled up these field tanks with gasoline, diesel oil, and kerosene, dropping them along the Ho Chi Minh Trails and other major roads for refueling NVA vehicles. The Vietnamese buried these mobile tanks out of sight from the American air reconnaissance and raids.39 Among other fuel aid programs, in 1970 China also built a refinery with an annual capacity of 600,000 tons near the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Cambodia in 1970. The refinery received crude oil from China and produced gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and other oil products for the Communist regimes in both Vietnam and Cambodia.40

Aid to the South through the Ho Chi Minh Trail Nevertheless, Hanoi began complaining in 1966 when Beijing increased its direct military and economic aid to the NLF in South Vietnam by reducing the aid to the North. In the summer of 1966, Le Duan headed an NLF delegation to visit Beijing. Zhou Enlai met the South Vietnamese Communist leaders and briefed Mao Zedong about their urgent needs from China.41 Mao instructed the premier, “Whatever materials the South request, so long as we are capable of giving these, should be provided by us unconditionally; some materials, including mosquito nets, umbrellas, and raincoats, medicines, first-​ aid dressings and kits, or even ship’s biscuit which the Vietnamese delegation has not requested but we are able to provide should also be offered by us.”42 Mao had earlier directed the high command that the PLA “should send in more supplies . . . in large quantity” to the NLF in the South. Among the

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items on Mao’s trivial list were ship’s biscuits, dried meat, canned pork, salt fish, egg powder, raincoats, and mosquito nets.43 Following Mao’s instructions, Zhou made China’s aid to South Vietnam the first priority of its military and economic aid to the Vietnam War. The premier promised the NLF leaders “an exclusive priority to whatever the South Vietnamese [Communists] need.”44 On July 18–​20, 1966, Zhou chaired an administrative meeting and discussed with officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Transportation, and generals from the PLA’s DGS and DGL how to improve China’s aid to the South. He told them that “[we] must try our best to aid South Vietnamese [Communists]. As long as they are fighting the war, we have to help whatever we can.” At the meeting, Zhou proposed “four conveniences” in preparing and shipping aid to the South. First of all, the containers for the weapons should be designed for long-​distance shipping. Secondly, all the cases of ammunition should be small, light-​weight, and easy to carry, since a large portion of those ammo cases would be hand-​carried by women in South Vietnam. Thereafter, each case of ammunition packed in China weighed less than 25 kg, and each bag of rice weighed no more than 30 kg. Thirdly, food items should be fully cooked and ready to use. And lastly, food supplies should still be consumable after stored underground for a period time.45 Following Zhou’s instruction, the Chinese doubled the food packages with thick plastic sheets so the NLF troops could hide or bury the food in the jungle or underground tunnels for months.46 On June 11, 1967, China signed another military aid agreement with the NLF logistics representatives. Beijing agreed to provide NLF troops with more than 650 categories of weapons, ammunition, and daily needs through the Ho Chi Minh Trail. These daily needed items were intended for China to ensure that every NLF soldier would have three sets of clothes and three pairs of shoes every year, along with a daily ration of 800 grams of rice and 110 grams of meat and fish.47 In August 1968, Li Qiang, vice minister of China’s Foreign Trade Ministry and in charge of China’s aid to Vietnam, reported to Zhou regarding China’s financial aid to the NLF in South Vietnam. Li briefed the premier that China provided the NLF with $49 million of hard currency in 1968, and that the total would increase to $57.5 million in 1969. The NLF used the cash to purchase medicine and other wartime needs in South Vietnam and Cambodia, and also to pay transportation costs through the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Cambodia, according to Li’s report.48 To supply the NLF in the South directly, Beijing maintained and expanded the land and sea transportation routes linked to China. Beginning in early 1966, the Chinese forces participated in operations along the Ho Chi Minh

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Trail. The PLA General Staff sent its officers to the HQ of Group 559 (NVA Military Transportation) under the command of Major General Phan Trong Tue (NVA). The Chinese officers also worked at the key transport depots such as Thanh Hoa, Vinh, Tchepong (Laos), and Lomphat (Cambodia) to supervise PLA transportation and road engineering operations, track Chinese aid to the South, and report troop casualties, vehicle damages, and shipment losses along the Ho Chi Minh Trail during Rolling Thunder.49 The PLA truck regiments were fully loaded with military aid at the Chinese border on a daily basis. They drove heavy trucks (Jiefang CA30, wheel 6x6, cargo 6 tons) southward along Highway 1 from Lang Son to Thanh Hoa. Average travel time was about two to four days. At Thanh Hoa, the Chinese soldiers unloaded about one-​third of the supplies for North Vietnam, in order to reduce truck weights because of the bombing areas.50 The lightly loaded trucks had a better chance to survive the heavy bombing. The trucks then continued their journey south from Thanh Hoa to Vinh below the 20th parallel. It usually took three to six days. At Vinh, the heavy trucks unloaded and returned to China. Then, the PLA light trucks (Jiefang CA10, CA10B, or CA10C, wheel 4x2, cargo 4 tons) would load the supplies and continue the shipment to the depot areas at Nam Nhe, Hu Ong Khe, or Cha Lap, where the NVA Group 559 assigned a local driver to pair with each Chinese soldier. Many of them were Chinese immigrants, who had settled in Laos and joined the Laotian Communist Party, then worked for the NVA during the Vietnam War.51 From the DMZ areas, the PLA and NVA drivers worked together and headed west into Laos. It took another week for them to reach Tchepong, a main transport depot of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. Average travel time from the Chinese border to Tchepong was about 20 to 25 days.52 After they unloaded supplies at Tchepong, the PLA soldiers would drive their trucks back to Vietnam and the NVA trucks would load the supplies and continue to travel south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail by crossing the Truong Son Mountain ranges. Some of the trucks reached the South Vietnamese border at the Thua Thien region. The others traveled farther south into Cambodia and reached South Vietnam around the Plei Mok Den area. The annual ground delivery of the Chinese military aid from the border along the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the NLF in South Vietnam totaled 28,000–​30,000 tons in 1966–​1968.53 Nonetheless, the PLA staff reported to Beijing that about 55–​68 percent of Chinese supplies were destroyed or interdicted along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.54 In 1967, China helped the NVA and NLF improve transportation along the Ho Chi Minh Trail by adding two more truck regiments, the 48th and

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49th Transit Regiments, with 1,000 trucks to speed up direct delivery of military aid from China to South Vietnam. From 1967 to 1969, the two truck regiments delivered 17,500 tons of food, weapons, and ammunition.55 The annual delivery of Chinese military aid to the NLF in South Vietnam increased to 40,000 tons in 1969–​1970, a more than 40-​percent increase over the annual shipment in 1966–​1968. On December 11–​28, 1970, Beijing sent Li Qiang, vice minister of China’s Ministry of Foreign Trade, to visit the Ho Chi Minh Trail and check on supplies and delivery. Li and the Chinese military aid delegation traveled 800 miles along the Ho Chi Minh Trail through the war zones in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.56 To supply some of the NLF battalions deep in the south, Chinese naval transit vessels first shipped weapons, ammunition, and food to the high seas off South Vietnam. There, the Chinese ships unloaded the supplies to the small Vietnamese fishing junks, which could reach the southeastern coast. In some cases, the fishermen threw the supplies packed in inflated waterproof plastic bags into the water, allowing them to float to shore and reach the NLF guerrillas.57 In the meantime, Mao approved the construction of China’s sea route Ho Chi Minh Trail, or a southern counterpart of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, through Cambodia to the southwestern border of South Vietnam. China shipped its military aid south through the South China Sea, first to the Sihanouk Harbor in Cambodia, where Beijing had spent huge amounts of money to build a new port. The Chinese supply then crossed Cambodia northward by road and reached Svay Rieng and Chiphu, two Cambodian border towns close to the Viet Cong bases in southwest Vietnam. The NLF guerrilla troops could easily cross the border and receive Chinese supplies there.58 US Army General Creighton Abrams estimated at the time that, while the majority of supplies entering at the north end of the Ho Chi Minh Trail were destroyed, “virtually all supplies entering through Sihanoukville reached destination until Cambodia incursion of May 1970.”59 Chinese support, and particularly Chinese transportation of war materials directly to the South, largely guaranteed the NLF’s battle initiatives in South Vietnam. Zhang concluded that “Without China’s aid, the Vietnamese could not have sustained the burden of fighting a guerrilla war that was, in some sense, a war of attrition with the United States.”60 All these efforts for the South, however, did not slow or reduce China’s aid to North Vietnam, despite Hanoi’s complaints in 1968–​1970. The NLF in South Vietnam was not satisfied with China’s aid, which seemed to have never met its requests. The NLF, for example, asked Beijing for $67.5 million of hard currency as financial aid in 1969, but China could only provide the Viet Cong with $57.5 million in

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cash that year, about $10 million less than the Vietnamese expected.61 Zhang believes that “While making an all-​out effort to supply both the NLF and North Vietnam, China itself was passing through an immensely difficult time of unprecedented economic and political chaos.”62

Sino-​Soviet Rivalry In the meantime, in addition to Chinese aid, the North Vietnamese also received military and economic aid from the Soviet Union. They knew that the Soviet Union and China were rivals in the Communist camp, competing for leadership in the Asian Communist movement, including Vietnam. Each claimed itself a key supporter of the Vietnamese Communists’ struggle against America’s invasion. Tucker states that the Vietnamese therefore brought both Communist nations’ troops into North Vietnam, increasing the competition between Chinese and Soviet Communists.63 American intelligence seemed to not fully understand the nature and seriousness of the Sino-​Soviet rivalry. The intelligence chiefs had predicted a possible improvement in the relationship between the two Communist giants in the Vietnam War. An SNIE (Special National Intelligence Estimate) report argued in September 1965 that with rapidly increasing demands for air defense in North Vietnam, “China will need Soviet support and protection. Greater Soviet involvement might reluctantly be desired to deter the U.S. This is an additional factor likely to promote a constructive resolution of previous Sino-​ Soviet frictions over the speed, scope, and method of aiding Hanoi and bolstering South China bases.”64 It was evident that Chinese and Soviet aid to North Vietnam against Rolling Thunder did not improve their relations. The Soviet Union felt compelled to use all means possible to win Vietnam over as a political ally. After the Moscow-​Hanoi agreement in February 1965, the Soviet Union began sending forces to Vietnam, including SAM missile regiments, air-​defense radar units, security battalions, technology training instructors, and logistics officers. The first aid agreement requested the Soviets send a brigade of combat troops and other armored vehicle personnel, totaling 4,000 troops, to Vietnam in the spring of 1965.65 In April, the Soviet Union began to deliver economic and military aid to North Vietnam. US intelligence believed that 1,500 to 2,500 Soviet military personnel were in Vietnam in September, including 150 pilots and 300 technicians engaged in communication and other supportive activities.66 During the second half of 1965, the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations shipped a total of 592,000 tons of non-​military and military aid to Vietnam by sea or railroads by the end of the year.67

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When Moscow blamed Beijing for intentionally delaying transportation of Soviet military aid to Vietnam in the summer of 1965, Hanoi complained as well. According to the Moscow-​Hanoi agreement of February 1965, the Soviet Union sent the first shipment of 403 railway cargo cars to Vietnam in May, shipping through China. However, the Russian shipment was halted at the Chinese-​Vietnamese border because there was insufficient transport available into Vietnam.68 The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party wrote a letter to the CCP Central Committee blaming China for the delay of the first shipment of Soviet military aid to Vietnam. On July 14, the Chinese Party Center responded, denying Soviet accusations against China’s war efforts in Vietnam.69 Moscow used Beijing’s response to launch unbridled propaganda attacks against China, alleging it sought to block Soviet aid to Vietnam. Hanoi joined the Soviets and put more pressure on the PLA’s railway construction, highway transportation, and air defense in North Vietnam. At the beginning of 1966, China had to add 1,730 freight cars for transporting Soviet military aid from the Sino-​Russian border in the north to the Sino-​Vietnamese border in the south. With improved railway transportation and air defense in North Vietnam, from 1965 to 1974, China transported 630,000 tons of military aid into Vietnam from the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries.70 The Soviet Union increased military aid to Vietnam in 1966–​1967 and soon exceeded China in terms of military and economic aid to the North. Moscow’s military aid increased to 357 million rubles (about $350 million), 70 percent of its total aid of 500 million rubles (about $500 million) in 1968. Moscow’s aid was more than 50 percent of annual aid from all Communist states, having exceeded Chinese military aid to Vietnam.71 From 1968 to 1972, the Soviet Union provided a total of $3 billion of aid to Vietnam, including $2 billion in military aid.72 A CIA memo on August 26, 1966, pointed out the significance of the increasing Soviet military aid to Vietnam. The “Soviet backing has the effect of buttressing the Vietnamese Communist will to persist in the conflict. The Vietnamese probably judge that they can continue to count indefinitely on Moscow’s assistance along recent lines so long as the war continues in its present context. They probably believe, in fact, that the Soviets now are locked into a struggle in view of Moscow’s desire to retain leadership of the Communist camp.”73 The Soviet Union also increased its intelligence activities drastically in Vietnam. A  former KGB agent recalled that after 1965, the Vietnam War became the KGB’s first priority.74 In 1966, the KGB doubled the number of its agents from five to ten at the embassy and by 1970 the number increased

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to fifteen.75 One of the agents, who was assigned to collect political and military information on China and Beijing-​Hanoi relations, told the author, “At that time, the KGB worked hard against China, an immediate threat to Soviet security and international relations.”76 The agents worked inside of the Chinese news corps, recruited Chinese informants, translated important information from Vietnamese to Russian, and wrote reports. The agent spent a lot of time writing reports, about ten pages each day. These reports were then coded into telegrams and sent to Moscow. The agents did not share any information with each other, and they did not know what other agents were doing, as to communicate such things was prohibited on the grounds of KGB security. Colonel Konstantin Preobrazhensky told the author that it had been part of its culture and tradition that the KGB did not trust its own people. All of the Russian agents in the embassy kept an eye on each other and reported any suspicion of any possible collaboration with foreign intelligence. The KGB headquarters had internal controls to protect itself as an institution at home and abroad. It aimed to discover traitors and potential defectors. The extent of the distrust and peer-​spying “hurt many honest agents and officers.” Preobrazhensky called it “a professional disease inside the KGB. Sometimes it just drove you crazy.”77 According to Russian agents, another factor that made the KGB spying on China a most difficult operation was the similarity of the two Communist intelligence systems. A  replica of the KGB had created the Chinese intelligence program in the early 1950s and trained Chinese officers and agents until the early 1960s. In other words, both intelligence agencies grew from the same root. Up until the early 1960s, the leading posts in China’s intelligence were held by Soviet KGB officers from Lubyanka. After the Sino-​Soviet split, the Soviets returned home. Nevertheless, most of the top Chinese officers and agents from the 1960s to 1970s had received some training in the Soviet Union during their early career in the 1950s. Since they were identical, it was very difficult for KGB operatives to spy on China’s foreign military and economic aid programs and to recruit Chinese informants to spy against Beijing’s counterintelligence.78 In the 1970s, more KGB agents were sent to Hanoi after the Sino-​Soviet border conflict broke out in 1969. Beginning in March 1969, border skirmishes erupted along the Sino-​Soviet borders at the Zhenbao (Damansky) and Bacha Islands in Heilongjiang, Northeast China; and at Taskti and Tieliekti in Xinjiang, Northwest China.79 In the first clash of March, more than forty Chinese soldiers were killed. The Soviets lost eight men and one T-​62 tank that sank in the river when artillery fire shattered the two-​meter thick ice cover.80 For the rest of the year,

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sporadic fighting continued along their borders, and both nations stood on the brink of war, with the Soviets threatening nuclear retaliation. Among the border incidents, on June 10, fifty Soviet soldiers attacked the Chinese in Taskti, Xinjiang. On July 8, the fighting in Heilongjiang extended to the Bacha Island along the Amur River. On August 13, more than three hundred Soviet troops supported by twenty tanks and two helicopters engaged in Tieliekti, Xinjiang, and annihilated all the Chinese troops in the battle, but the border conflicts did not escalate into open warfare between the two Communist countries. Zhou met Soviet President of the Ministers Council Aleksei Kosygin in Beijing on September 11, 1969, though the border clashes continued along the Chinese-​Russian borders until the late 1970s.81 By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union had deployed up to forty-​eight divisions, constituting nearly one million troops along the Russian-​Chinese border. Reportedly, Moscow’s leaders considered using a “preemptive nuclear strike” against China.82 China prepared for total war, including possible Russian nuclear attacks. Beijing demanded a reduction in the number of Soviet troops on the Sino-​Soviet and Sino-​Mongolian borders as one of the three conditions for a normalization of relations with Moscow. As a result of its frequent engagements against the Soviet Red Army, the PLA increased to more than six million men, its highest point in Chinese military history. In the meantime, the PLA high command reinforced more troops from the south to the northern border areas. A  CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) predicted on August 12, 1969 that “[i]‌t is almost certain that there will be no significant easing of tensions [between China and the Soviet Union] during the next two or three years. Conflicting national interests, competition for leadership of the Communist movement, and genuine fear of each other’s intentions will prevent a rapprochement. Even the border problems are not likely to be resolved.”83

Beijing’s Missile Gap To provide an effective air defense in North Vietnam against Rolling Thunder, the Soviet high command established a special Vietnam unit of the Soviet missile troops, or so-​called military detachment #31920, under the command of Major General Alexander Stuchilov. General Stuchilov was also the chief commander of the Soviet anti-​aircraft defense forces in Vietnam in 1967–​ 1969. The unit HQ was in Moscow and it provided missile transportation and training for the missile officers and soldiers before leaving for Vietnam. From 1965 to 1972, the Soviet Union shipped 95 sets of launchers, along

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with control systems, N-​12 radar systems, along with 7,658 SAMs to North Vietnam.84 Among the most effective Soviet SAMs were the CA-​75M (or C-​ 75) high-​altitude guided SAMs, known as the SAM-​2 and their improved SAM-​3 systems. The Soviet SAM air defense system became operational in North Vietnam in April 1965. The Russian missile regiments’ first engagement was on July 25, shooting down three US warplanes that day. The Soviets showed off their technological superiority, which paid off for the air defense of North Vietnam. The NVA and the Soviets claim that their SAMs shot down “1,300 American warplanes,” and that they had the best air defense system for North Vietnam through the war.85 In the spring of 1965, Soviet SAM officers began training Vietnamese missile troops that had joined the Soviet SAM operations in late 1965. One of the former Russian missile instructors told the author that he worked at a training center in a mountain north of Hanoi. Established in the spring of 1965, the center had sophisticated Russian-​made training facilities, including an indoor (actually in-​cave) missile launcher model, operation demo equipment, underground classrooms, and comfortable living quarters. The Russian training program focused on the operation and routine maintenance of the CA-​75M high-​altitude guided SAM-​2 model and later the improved SAM-​3 system. More than forty Russian instructors and officers had been teaching and working at this center for more than a year. They had about three hundred Vietnamese students, including commanding officers, HQ staff, missile operators, radar operators, technicians, and logistics officers. These NVA officers studied missile technology and operation in different programs for a period of between one and six months. Most of them did not speak Russian. The Russian instructors totally depended on the Vietnamese translators. Most of the Russian instructors served in the center for two or three years.86 The Russian instructors followed General Stuchilov’s principle in training, which was, “Do as I am doing.” His principle guided the missile training, and it worked pretty well. The Russian instructors emphasized basic knowledge, practical skills, and hands-​on learning. The Vietnamese officers could understand Russian missile operations quickly by following the moves and memorizing the procedures with little instruction or missile technology background. Following the translated operation manuals, the Russians demonstrated missile operation step by step, and showed the Vietnamese officers how missile operations worked. All the Vietnamese officer students worked hard and learned fast. Their evaluations and assessments showed that they had mastered the Russian missile technology and were capable of operating

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Russian radar and missile systems as the major element of air defense in North Vietnam by 1967. By early 1968, North Vietnam had established the most effective air defense system in the world. Clodfelter concludes that “the Tet Offensive provided the most graphic illustration of Rolling Thunder’s failure to affect the Southern war.”87 The United States tried to develop new technology to improve the bombing results in Vietnam. For example, the USAF employed the new F-​111 fighter/​bomber in Rolling Thunder in early 1968 after the Tet Offensive Campaign. Its cutting-​edge technology included “internal radar and a bombing computer in poor weather conditions to maneuver to their targets, where the ordnance was automatically released.”88 On March 17, six F-​111s arrived at a US air force base in Thailand. A week later, the F-​111s began their bombing missions. The Vietnamese, however, almost immediately learned how to deal with the US high-​tech aircraft. On March 28 and 30, the NVA missile troops shot down two F-​111s in Ha Tinh province.89 By the end of the war, more than thirty Soviets and Vietnamese missile regiments had launched 6,806 missiles, and lost 56 sets of launchers and radar systems in their air defense against American bombing.90 By 1973, the Vietnamese had established a strong air defense missile force, including twelve missile regiments and four radar regiments. Each regiment had four missile battalions and one technical battalion, totaling 1,000 troops. In addition, the NVA had a total of six air-​defense divisions. Each division had four AAA regiments, one SAM regiment, and one radar regiment. There were four air defense schools, including a missile technology academy and an air defense officer academy. After the war, Vietnam had sixteen SAM-​6 regiments and six radar regiments. In addition, it had seven air defense divisions, totaling 50,000 troops.91 In retrospect, the Chinese seemed no match for Soviet superior missile technology in North Vietnam’s air defense. The Chinese air defense was inadequate in 1965–​1968.92 The Vietnamese officers complained about out-​ of-​date Chinese artillery pieces and inferior radar systems. Nevertheless, US intelligence gave some credence to the Chinese AAA divisions for their air defense of the LOCs in North Vietnam.93 Vietnamese officers, however, believed the Chinese did not shoot down enough American airplanes to protect the targets.94 They complained incessantly about the deficiencies of the Chinese radar technology and air defense, while they praised the Soviet-​made SAMs that shot down many American warplanes, including B-​52 bombers. In 1965, the PLA high command ordered its troops to intensify their training in order to shoot down more American airplanes than the Soviets

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could. Lieutenant Chen Pai recalled that the Chinese troops had two rivalries in Vietnam: “the American imperialists in the sky, and the Soviet revisionists on the ground.”95 Chen did two tours as a Chinese-​Vietnamese translator at division headquarters and worked closely with the NVA officers. He knew exactly the problems between the two Communist giants. He recalled that both Communist troops spied on each other and fought over the discovery of American aviation technology. Whenever an American plane was shot down, both raced to reach the crash site first. According to their agreements, neither Soviet nor Vietnamese troops could enter the Chinese “operating areas.” If the Soviets or Vietnamese got there first, they would guard the site, and the Chinese could not interfere in their “operations.”96 The division command instructed Chinese troops to check on crashed planes and to capture any surviving pilots in order to evaluate air defense and to improve Chinese anti-​ aircraft performance. Chen accompanied several groups of Chinese defense engineers, technology experts, and weapons designers from Beijing to the crash sites or to the POW camps to interrogate American pilots. The Sino-​Vietnamese agreements requested that all captured pilots be turned over to the NVA within two hours, and all the weapons and equipment be turned over to the NVA within twenty-​four hours. The Vietnamese command, however, knew that the Chinese and Russians were researching and pirating the American high-​ tech equipment and hardware, and shipping them back to their countries. The Vietnamese were allowed neither to stop Chinese or Soviet military vehicles, nor to search Chinese or Russian military personnel.97 To improve Chinese air defense, the PLA deployed its newly established SAM troops to the Chinese-​Vietnamese border in the summer of 1964. The Chinese anti-​aircraft missile troops were the youngest service in the PLA. After the Korean War, the Chinese and Soviets signed the “New Defense Technical Accord” on October 15, 1957, for Soviet aid in nuclear research, missile development, and aviation technology. Among other deals, the Soviet Union agreed to sell its newly developed SAM-​2 missiles and launching equipment to China.98 The Soviet Union made its first delivery to the PLA by 1958, including five SAM-​2 launchers, commanding and communication equipment, and thirty-​six SAM-​2 missiles.99 Thereafter, in June 1958, the CMC ordered the Air Force to establish the PLA SAM troops, named publicly as Unit 543.100 On October 8, Air Force Chief General Liu Yalou announced in Beijing that the first SAM battalion was established. On November 20, the 2nd Battalion was established in Beijing, and the 3rd Battalion in Xuzhou, Jiangsu province, under the Nanjing Regional Command. In 1959, two more

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missile battalions were established, the 4th Battalion as the testing unit, and 5th Battalion as the capital city defense troops. On May 21, 1959, the Air Force opened its first SAM training center, known as the Third Training Base of the PLAAF.101 In March 1964, the PLA established its first SAM division, the Fourth Independent Division of the PLAAF.102 From June through July, there were three successful medium and long range surface-​to-​surface missile tests of China’s own models. In December, China began manufacturing its SAMs, with Hongqi-​01 (Red Flag-​01).103 By early 1967, all four missile battalions replaced their Russian-​made, outdated equipment and missiles with the Chinese-​made Hongqi-​02 missiles and equipment. In July 1967, the PLAAF ordered the Fourth Division to send its battalions to the Sino-​Vietnamese border areas immediately. The division arrived in the fall and located its HQs at the Ningming airport.104 The missile division command deployed its First Battalion at the suburb of Ningming and waited for American warplanes. The 2nd Battalion was at Chongzuo, a railway hub about forty-​five miles from the Sino-​Vietnamese border, and the 3rd Battalion was stationed at the Suixi airport at the Laizhou Peninsula, on the other side of the Tokin Gulf. On September 17, the 3rd shot down a US H-​21 unmanned aircraft. On January 23, 1968 the Second Battalion relocated to the Ningming airport for a better combat position, and on March 22 it shot down one 147-​H unmanned aircraft.105 In the spring 1972, the Nixon administration resumed the large-​scale air campaign as Operation Linebacker I (from May 10 to October 23) against targets in the North. The CMC decided to help the NVA in establishing a surface-​to-​air missile regiment by providing the weapon system and the training program. In the spring, the PLAAF tested the Chinese-​made Hongqi-​02 missiles and launchers. In May, the weapon system, commanding and communication system, radar, transportation vehicles, and other equipment were shipped to arm one Vietnamese SAM regiment, including four combat battalions.106 In June, the PLAAF organized a missile expert group, including fifty-​two Chinese missile engineers, officers, and instructors, to supervise the installation and to train the Vietnamese missile troops. The group, headed by Major General Chen Huiting, chief of staff of a missile division, was divided into four teams, including technology, operation, maintenance, and training, and prepared a three-​month training curriculum for the Vietnamese.107 The Chinese missile advisory/​instruction group arrived in Hanoi between July 20 and 24. They then traveled to the NVA missile training ground in a remote mountainous area in Dinh Tung County, Bac Giang province, north of Hanoi. At the training ground, the Vietnamese commanders suggested

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to the Chinese group that the NVA trainees should be able to operate the Chinese missile system and be combat ready within one month. Although General Chen and the three deputies found it difficult for the Chinese to train the Vietnamese troops in one month, they agreed to provide an intensive training within five weeks. The Chinese advisors certainly understood that the Vietnamese desperately needed more effective air defense, and that the Chinese anti-​aircraft missiles would definitely increase their firing power against the American bombing. The Chinese instructors adjusted their curriculum and cut the training program short to meet the Vietnamese wartime need.108 In early August, the Chinese missile training program began by offering the missile troops more operational courses and hand-​on opportunities. The Chinese realized that many Vietnamese officers could speak some Chinese, that some of them had previously received certain technical training in China. On August 2, several US warplanes conducted reconnaissance over the missile training ground. Afraid of a possible American air raid, the NVA HQs ordered the Vietnamese missile troops to relocate their training ground from Dinh Tung County to Bac Son County. By the end of September, the Vietnamese missile regiment completed its five-​week intensive training program. After a drill, the regiment was deployed in early October to Lang Son and assigned for air defense operation by the NVA. The Chinese advisors and instructors were stationed with two of the Vietnamese missile battalions.109 The Vietnamese missile regiment was put into action when several groups of American naval A-​7 fighter/​bombers bombed the Kep airport on October 19, 1972. After the American planes entered their fire zone, one of the battalions that employed the Chinese “close-​quick launching” tactics launched two Hongqi-​02 missiles at approximately a twenty-​mile distance. Before the first missile engaged one of the enemy planes, the radar operators discovered that the signal of the A-​7 shook once and that a very small and weak signal appeared and came quickly toward the launcher’s site. The battalion commander believed that it was a US Shrike anti-​radar missile. After the first missile hit the A-​7, the commander gave an order to turn off the radar and to cut down the high voltage, in order to avoid the incoming Shrike.110 The Chinese advisors and instructors were pleased to see that the Chinese-​made Hongqi-​ 02 missile shot down an American warplane while their equipment successfully avoided the Shrike’s attack. On October 23, 1972, two days after Hanoi accepted the American position at the Paris Peace Talks, President Nixon suspended bombing above the 20th parallel in North Vietnam, and ended Operation Linebacker

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I. However, the Paris negotiations broke down again on December 13. After Hanoi rejected Nixon’s ultimatum to return to the conference table, Nixon resumed the bombing campaign as Operation Linebacker II on December 18. Hanoi was not happy when the Chinese missile advisory/​instruction group returned to China on Christmas Day, in the middle of Linebacker II, which lasted until December 29.111

Beijing Lost Hanoi to Moscow No matter how hard the Chinese tried, however, the Vietnamese moved closer to the Soviet Union in 1970–​1972. The economic limits and technology gap handicapped the PLA in a futile competition against the superior Soviet air defense systems in North Vietnam. When Russia became more involved in Indochina, Hanoi moved closer to Moscow for better military technology and more economic aid. The Soviet military technology won the Vietnamese by cutting off the Sino-​Vietnamese alliance and downgrading the ideological factor. As the Sino-​Soviet relationship worsened in 1968 and gradually moved from hostility to outright confrontation, Moscow considered China’s increasing influence in Southeast Asia as a challenge to the Soviet Union in that region.112 As Li Danhui points out, “Faced with the prospect of increasing closeness between Vietnam and the Soviet Union, China became increasingly anxious and wary of Vietnam even as it sent its neighbor massive amount of aid and a rift began to develop between the two countries.”113 The Chinese leaders realized that their experience of the “people’s war” did not help the Vietnamese much in their war against American forces. Mao admitted this difference to the DRV leaders in Beijing, telling them that “you are meeting new situations at present, so a lot of your ways of dealing with them are and ought to be different from ours in the past. We learned how to fight step by step and frequently suffered defeat in the beginning; it was not as smooth as for you.”114 Mao had to accept that China would not win a war of ideology with shells and bodies in the air defense of North Vietnam. Mao developed a fresh idea to reignite China’s cause by “exploring a Soviet conspiracy” in Vietnam.115 Hanoi, however, refused to join Beijing’s propaganda and political campaign against Moscow. Beijing became isolated and upset by Hanoi’s non-​involvement in China’s anti-​Soviet campaign within the Communist and Socialist camp. On March 31, 1968, Johnson announced a halt in US bombings over North Vietnam. The announcement, intended as a new peace gesture, evoked a positive response from Hanoi, which announced on April 3 its readiness

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to negotiate with the Americans. China, however, knew nothing about the United States-​DRV peace talks until much later. In April and May, Beijing began to criticize Hanoi for following the Soviet Union and compromising with the United States. After the Paris negotiations began on May 13, Beijing continued criticism of Hanoi for conducting negotiations with Washington.116 Eventually, on October 31, Johnson suspended all the US air raids, bombing, shelling, and coastal harassment against North Vietnam. Moscow was enthusiastic about the negotiations, while Beijing refrained from intervening and participating in the Paris Peace Talks. Vietnam began to move closer to the Soviet Union. Marshal Lin Biao, China’s defense minister, and his lieutenants considered the Soviet Union as a more immediate threat to China. When the Soviet Red Army invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, its troops broke into the Chinese Embassy and “savagely” beat Chinese diplomats.117 While the tension mounted, the Soviet Union deployed a large number of Red Army troops along the Soviet-​Chinese border.118 Zhou told Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on April 29, “Now the Soviet Union is also encircling China. The circle is getting complete, except [the part of ] Vietnam.”119 By the end of that year, Moscow increased its troops from seventeen divisions to twenty-​seven divisions along the border. In 1968–​1969, the PLA was apparently under tremendous pressure and felt directly threatened by the Soviet Union.120 In October 1968, Lin warned the army and the country that Soviet forces would soon invade China.121 Thereafter, the country became militarized and prepared for an invasion. Nicholas Khoo claims that the increasing Sino-​Soviet conflict had a major impact on Soviet-​Vietnamese relations, “because the new Soviet leadership to take a more nuanced and effective approach to undermining Chinese influence in North Vietnam.”122 As the Vietnamese became more friendly with the Soviet Union, China distanced itself further from Vietnam: “Hanoi continued to send delegations to Beijing, but there was no reciprocity.”123 Niu Jun points out that a major change took place in China’s strategic thinking in 1968. The Soviet Union replaced the United States as Beijing’s leading security concern, promoting China’s withdrawal of its troops from Vietnam.124 The Communist coalition in Southeast Asia collapsed. Beijing began to prepare for an expected war against the Soviet Union and to repel a Soviet invasion in north China. Nicholas Khoo also argues that “the threat represented by the Soviet Union was the central and overriding concern of Chinese foreign policy-​makers, a fact that was strongly reflected in Sino-​ Vietnamese relations. In effect, increasing Sino-​Soviet conflict following the

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Sino-​Soviet split of the early 1960s provided the critical context for increased Soviet cooperation with the Vietnamese communists, and was the fundamental cause of the cracks in the Sino-​Vietnamese alliance that eventually resulted in the Sino-​Vietnamese War of 1979 and the Third Indo-​China War (1979–​1991).”125 As China’s strategic focus shifted from the south to the north and the Soviet Union replaced the United States as its immediate threat, Beijing decided to pull its troops out of Vietnam. On November 17, 1968, Mao suggested to Premier Pham in Beijing that some of the Chinese troops withdraw back to China. The CCP chairman said, “As for some of our personnel who are at present not required in your country, they may withdraw to China. . . . We can send them back to you if the Americans return.”126 In March 1969, Chinese troops began withdrawing from Vietnam and returned to China.127 By July 1970, all the Chinese AAA troops had withdrawn back to China. One of the Vietnamese leaders recalled later, “I know the Party had long ago decided to form an alliance with the Soviet Union. The movement in this direction started way back in 1969, and the passing away of Ho Chi Minh paved the way for officially making the decision. However, there was no open declaration, because Chinese assistance was still needed.”128 Khoo concludes that “the Chinese viewed their relationship with the Vietnamese communists primarily through the prism of a deteriorating Sino-​Soviet relationship. When Hanoi and Moscow consolidated relations after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Sino-​ Vietnamese relations declined. Similarly, when the Vietnamese and Soviets increased cooperation in the Paris peace negotiations and Hanoi accepted increased Soviet military and economic aid after the Sino-​Soviet conflict in 1969, Sino-​Vietnamese conflict increased.”129 After China withdrew its troops and reduced aid to Hanoi, Moscow filled the gap and continued its military and economic assistance. From 1969 to 1971, Moscow signed seven economic and military aid agreements with Hanoi.130 In 1972, the Soviet Union further strengthened its missile defense in North Vietnam. It is interesting to note that, in the meantime, Chinese leaders encouraged the Vietnamese to demand more aid from the Soviets. Marshal Ye Jianying, for example, said to Ly Ban, vice minister of the DRV Foreign Trade, in 1971, “You should ask them [the Soviets] to ship over more weapons, ammunition, food, and supplies, the more, the better.”131 When Truong Chinh, chairman of the Standing Committee of the DRV National Assembly, visited Beijing in 1972, Premier Zhou also suggested that the DRV government ask for more weapons and equipment from the

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Soviet Union. Moscow’s continuing commitment to the war in Indochina had further drained Soviet resources, and Chinese leaders recognized and encouraged this. By 1969, the Soviet Union replaced the United States as Beijing’s leading security concern, prompting changes in China’s strategic thought. Thereafter, the high command prepared for an expected war against the Soviet Union and to repel a Soviet invasion. The Soviet threat and conflicts pushed the Chinese leaders to improve their relations with the United States. Their strategic needs eventually led to normalization of the Sino-​ American relationship in the early 1970s.132 In term of the impact it had on the East Asian and global Cold War, the Sino-​American rapprochement dramatically shifted the balance of power between the two super powers in the Cold War. While policymakers in Washington found it possible to concentrate more of America’s resources and strategic attention on dealing with the Soviet Union, Moscow’s leaders, having to confront the West and China simultaneously, caused the Soviet Union’s strength and power to become seriously overextended.133

Notes 1. Xiaobing Li, “Introduction: The Long War,” in Li, Voices from the Vietnam War, 1–​10. 2. For example, Zhou said on April 29, 1968 that the Soviet Union [like America] was apparently circulating and containing China. Li Danhui, “Conflicts between China and the Soviet Union in Their Efforts to Aid Vietnam and Resist America,” in Zhang and Niu, Lengzhan yu zhongguo [The Cold War and China], 373n1. 3. For example, see Khoo, Collateral Damage, 3. 4. Chen and Li, “China and the End of the Cold War,” 121. 5. CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Research Division, Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 1949–​1976 [A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai, 1949–​1976], 2: 732. 6. For more details on Mao’s Great Leap Forward movement, see Li, Civil Liberties in China,  12–​13. 7. Frank Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine; The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–​1962 (New York: Walker, 2010), 320–​21. 8. For a review of Liu Shaoqi, see Lowell Dittmer, Liu Shao-​ch’i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution:  The Politics of Mass Criticism (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1974). 9. For more details on the 1959–​1962 “natural disaster,” see Fairbank and Goldman, China, 372–​82; Spence, The Search for Modern China, 552–​23. 10. Yi Sun and Xiaobing Li, “Mao Zedong and the CCP: Adaptation, Centralization, and Succession,” in Li and Tian, Evolution of Power, 44, 46.

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11. CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Research Division, Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 1949–​1976 [A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai, 1949–​1976], 2: 657. 12. Shuguang Zhang, “Beijing’s Aid to Hanoi and the United States-​ China Confrontations, 1964–​1968,” in Roberts, Behind the Bamboo Curtain, 280–​81. 13. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 413. 14. Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 42. 15. Zhou, “Strengthen the Leadership and Organization of the Aiding Vietnam Task,” in Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan [Selected Military Papers of Zhou Enlai], 4: 527–​29. 16. Wang Taiping, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1957–​1969 [A Diplomatic History of the PRC, 1957–​ 1969] (Beijing:  Shijie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Press], 1998), 2: 35. 17. Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 228, table 1. 18. Major General Chen Huiting (PLA, ret.), “Establishing A  Vietnamese Surface-​ to-​Air Missile Regiment,” 34. Chen was the head of the Chinese Missile Training Group in Vietnam from 1972 to 1973. 19. Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 137. 20. Military History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun de 70 nian [Seventy Years of the PLA], 593. 21. Major General Yang Shaojun, interview by the author in Beijing in July 2006. Yang was senior researcher fellow at the PLA Logistics Academy in 1985–​2002. 22. Shi Lin, Dangdai zhongguo de duiwai jingji hezuo [International Economic Cooperation of Contemporary China] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe [China Social Sciences Press], 1991), 52, 57–​58. 23. Zhang, “Beijing’s Aid to Hanoi and the United States-​China Confrontations, 1964–​1968,” 272, table 7.1. 24. Zhang, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA], 1: 272–​73. 25. Zi, Li Qiang zhuan [Biography of Li Qiang], 259. 26. Jiao Liren, Dangdai zhongguo de shiyou gongye [Petroleum Industry in Contemporary China] (Beijing: Shehui kexue chubanshe [Social Science Press], 1988), 285. 27. Meng Xianrui, interviews by the author on June 12–​14, 2012, in Beijing. In the 1960s, Meng was the chief of the Foreign Programs Office, Bureau of Production and Technology, Ministry of Petroleum Industry. 28. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power,  92–​93. 29. U. S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (New York: Presidio Press, 1986), 119. 30. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 62, 79. 31. Tilford, Jr., “Rolling Thunder, Operation,” 359. 32. Chen Zhiguang, interviews by the author on June 8–​10, 2012, in Beijing. In 1965–​ 1966, Chen was the deputy director of Beijing Petroleum Planning and Designing Institute. He was promoted to director in 1967. 33. Meng, interviews by the author on June 12–​14, 2012, in Beijing.

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3 4. Chen, interviews by the author on June 8–​10, 2012, in Beijing. 35. Meng, interviews by the author on June 12–​14, 2012, in Beijing. 36. Jiao, Dangdai zhongguo de shiyou gongye [Petroleum Industry in Contemporary China], 285. 37. Meng, interviews by the author on June 12–​14, 2012, in Beijing. 38. Jiao, Dangdai zhongguo de shiyou gongye [Petroleum Industry in Contemporary China], 285. 39. Meng, interviews by the author on June 12–​14, 2012, in Beijing. 4 0. Ibid. 41. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 130–​31. 42. Mao’s instruction is cited in Zhang, “Beijing’s Aid to Hanoi and the United States-​ China Confrontations, 1964–​1968,” 285n41. 43. Mao, “Instruction on the Meeting Minutes of the Southern Vietnamese Leaders’ Conversation with the Chinese News Team,” in Mao’s Manuscripts since 1949, 11: 478–​79. 4 4. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 131. 45. Zhou Military Record Compilation Team, Zhou Enlai junshi huodong jishi [Records of Zhou Enlai’s Military Affairs], 2: 631. 4 6. Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 133. 47. The military supply agreement was signed between the PLA Kunming Regional Command and NLF Logistics Service on June 11, 1967. For more details, see Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 410–​11. 48. Zi, Li Qiang zhuan [Biography of Li Qiang], 262. 49. Zhang, Zhang, and Wu, Hu zhiming xiaodao shang de 701 Tian [701 Days on the Ho Chi Minh Trail], 34–​36. 50. Chen, Yuezhan jimidang [Secret Archives of the Vietnam War], 197. 51. Zhang, Zhang, and Wu, Hu zhiming xiaodao shang de 701 Tian [701 Days on the Ho Chi Minh Trail], 93–​94. 52. Michael Kelley, Where We Were in Vietnam:  A Comprehensive Guide to the Firebases, Military Installations, and Naval Vessels of the Vietnam War (Central Point, OR: Hellgate Press, 2002), F-​33. 53. Zi, Li Qiang zhuan [Biography of Li Qiang], 276. 54. Zhang, Zhang, and Wu, Hu zhiming xiaodao shang de 701 Tian [701 Days on the Ho Chi Minh Trail], 328, 338. 55. Zi, Li Qiang zhuan [Biography of Li Qiang], 274–​75. 56. Ibid., 284–​89. 57. Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces], 129–​30. 58. Zi, Li Qiang zhuan [Biography of Li Qiang], 259–​60. 59. General Creighton Abrams’s quote in Kelley, Where We Were in Vietnam,  F-​33.

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60. Zhang, “Beijing’s Aid to Hanoi and the United States-​China Confrontations, 1964–​1968,”  281. 61. Zi, Li Qiang zhuan [Biography of Li Qiang], 262. 62. Zhang, “Beijing’s Aid to Hanoi and the United States-​China Confrontations, 1964–​1968,”  281. 63. Tucker, Vietnam, 133. 6 4. Director of Central Intelligence, “SNIE 10-​11-​65: Probable Communist Reactions to A US Course of Action, September 22, 1965,” in NIC, Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948–​1975, 304. 65. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 59, 61–​62. 66. SNIE, “Probable Communist Reactions to a U.S. Course of Action, September 22, 1965,” in National Intelligence Council (NIC), Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948–​1975, 294–​96. 67. Among the total were 447,900 tons of aid sent to Vietnam by sea, and the rest was shipped over railroads through China. For details of Soviet aid, see Li Danhui, “The Sino-​Soviet Dispute over Assistance for Vietnam’s Anti-​American War, 1965–​1972,” 4–​5. Her source is from Foreign Trade Bureau, “Minutes of Meeting between Chinese and Vietnamese Transportation Delegates,” July 26, 1965, International Liaison Division Records, PRC Ministry of Railway Administration Archives. 68. CCP Central Committee document, “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu yuanyue wenti de fushi” [Instructions of the CCP Central Committee on the Problems of Assisting Vietnam], received by the Party Committee of the Yunnan Province on June 18, 1965, File 6084, Group 2, no. 1, 263–​65, in Yunnan Provincial Archives. See also Xiao and Li, eds., Yunnan yu yuanyue kangmei [Yunnan and Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US], 56–​57. 69. Wang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi [A Diplomatic History of the PRC], 2: 268. 70. Zi, Li Qiang zhuan [Biography of Li Qiang], 267. 71. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 59. 72. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian 40 nian [Deterioration of the Sino-​Vietnam Relations in the Past Forty Years], 103. 73. CIA Memo, “The Vietnamese Communists’ Will to Persist—​ Summary and Principal Findings Only, 26 August 1966,” in NIC, Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948–​1975, 365. 74. Major General Robert J.  Kodosky (KGB, ret.), interviews by the author at the International Conference on “Intelligence in the Vietnam War” at the Vietnam Center, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, on October 20–​22, 2006. 75. Mr. B (KGB, ret.), interviews by the author at Silver Spring, Maryland, in September 2007. He worked as a KGB agent in the Russian Embassy in Hanoi in 1966–​1968. He wishes to remain anonymous in the publication of his personal story. 76. Mr. B, “Russian Spies in Hanoi,” in Li, Voices of the Vietnam War,  96–​97.

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77. Col. Konstantin Preobrazhensky (KGB, ret.), interviews by the author at the International Conference on “Intelligence in the Vietnam War” at the Vietnam Center, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, on October 20–​22, 2006. Col. Preobrazhensky worked as a KBG agent in the Russian Embassy in Tokyo during the Cold War. 78. Col. Preobrazhensky, interviews by the author at Lubbock, Texas, on October 20–​22, 2006. See also Preobrazhensky, “Russian Espionage on China,” American Review of China Studies 8, no. 1 (spring 2007): 36. 79. Xiaobing Li, “Sino-​Soviet Border Disputes,” in John Powell, ed., MaGill’s Guide to Military History, 4: 1424. 80. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1:  639–​42; Military History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun de 70 nian [Seventy Years of the PLA], 580–​81. 81. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 643–​4 4; Military History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun de 70 nian [Seventy Years of the PLA], 582. 82. Yang Kuisong, “From the Zhenbao Island Incident to Sino-​ American Rapprochement,” Dangshi yanjiu ziliao [Party History Research Materials], no. 12 (1997), 7–​8; Thomas Robinson, “The Sino-​Soviet Border Conflicts of 1969; New Evidence Three Decades Later,” 198–​216. 83. CIA, “National Intelligence Estimate 11/​13-​69, the USSR and China, August 12, 1969,” in Tracking the Dragon, 549. 84. Major T (Strategic Missile Force, Soviet Union, ret.), interviews by the author at Kyiv, Ukraine, in July 2005. Maj. T served as a training instructor at the SAM Training Center of the NVA in North Vietnam from 1966 to 1968. He wishes to remain anonymous in the publication of his personal story. 85. According to the American military reports, the US armed forces lost 950 planes during Rolling Thunder from March 2, 1965 to October 31, 1968. For more details, see Moss, Vietnam, 182, 187. 86. Maj. T, interviews by the author at Kyiv, Ukraine, in July 2005. See also Maj. T, “Russian Missile Officers in Vietnam,” in Li, Voices of the Vietnam War,  65–​68. 87. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 141. 88. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 64. 89. The US Air Force lost another F-​111 on April 22, 1968. 90. Frankum, Jr., Like Rolling Thunder, 30–​32; Zi, Li Qiang zhuan [Biography of Li Qiang], 267. 91. Maj. T, “Russian Missile Officers in Vietnam,” 71. 92. Lieutenant Wang Xiangcai, interviews by the author in Harbin, Heilongjiang, on August 20–​21, 2003. Wang served in the First Battalion, Third Regiment, Sixty-​ First AAA Division. Also see Marshal Xu Xiangqian, “The Purchase of Arms from Moscow,” 143–​4 6.

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93. Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Special National Intelligence Estimate:  Current Chinese Communist Intentions in the Vietnam Situation, August 4, 1966,” in Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948–​1975, 344–​45. 94. Chen, Yuezhan qinliji [My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War], 22. 95. Ibid.,  66–​67. 96. Ibid., 69. 97. Ibid., 21. 98. Chen Geng Zhuan Composition Team, Chen Geng Zhuan, 500–​503. 99. Chen Huiting, Feimingdi; zhongguo dikong daodan budui zuozhan shilu [Whistling Arrows Flying:  The True Story of the Chinese Surface-​to-​Air Missile Troops’ Operation] (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe [PLA Literature Press], 2005), 7. 100. The PLA named its missile units as the following: the surface-​to-​surface missile troops were named as Unit 541, which was equipped with P-​2 Russian-​made missiles; the land-​to-​ship missile troops as Unit 542, armed with Russian C-​2 missiles; the SAM troops as Unit 543, armed with Russian C-​75 missiles; and the air-​to-​air missile troops as Unit 545, armed with Russian K-​5M missiles. Weng Taisheng and Chris Pocock, Heimao zhongdui [Black Cat Brigade], 63–​65. 101. Chen, Feimingdi [Whistling Arrows Flying], 8–​9. 102. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 2: 76; Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 166. 103. Military History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun de 70 nian [Seventy Years of the PLA], 525, 528. 104. Chen, Feimingdi [Whistling Arrows Flying], 567, 573–​74. 105. Ibid., 577, 606–​608. 106. Chen, “Establishing a Vietnamese Surface-​to-​Air Missile Regiment,” 34. 107. Ibid., 35. 108. Ibid.,  35–​36. 109. Chen, Feimingdi [Whistling Arrows Flying], 583. 110. Ibid., 583. 111. Chen, “Establishing Vietnamese Surface-​to-​Air Missile Regiment,” 37–​38. 112. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 16–​18,  34–​37. 113. Li, “The Sino-​Soviet Dispute over Assistance for Vietnam’s Anti-​American War, 1965–​1972,”  1. 114. Mao, “Faith in Victory Is Derived from Struggle,” conversations with a party and government delegation from the DRV on October 20, 1965, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Party Archives and Manuscript Research Center of the CCP Central Committee comps., Mao Zedong on Diplomacy, 435. 115. Mao quoted in “Mao’s Conversation with Pham Van Dong, November 17, 1968,” in Westad, Chen, Tonnesson, Nguyen, and Hershberg, eds., “77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the War in Indochina, 1964–​1977,” 138–​4 6.

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116. Zhai states, “After the opening of the Paris peace talks and the Johnson administration’s suspension of the American bombing of the DRV in November 1968, China began to pull back its support troops from the DRV.” Zhai, China and the Vietnam War, 179. Also see Appy, Patriots, 461–​69; Herring, America’s Longest War, 276–​78. 117. Xinhua News Agency, China’s Foreign Relations, 461–​67. 118. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Moscow reinforced its border forces from seventeen divisions to twenty-​seven divisions in 1969 along the Russo-​Chinese borders. See Li, “Sino-​Soviet Border Disputes,” in MaGill’s Guide to Military History, 4: 1423. 119. Zhou quoted in Westad, Chen, Tonnesson, Nguyen, and Hershberg, eds., “77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the War in Indochina, 1964–​1977,”  130. 120. Among the recent publications on the rise and demise of the Sino-​Soviet alliance in English are Shen and Xia, Mao and the Sino-​Soviet Partnership; Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms; Chang, Friends and Enemies. 121. Li, “Sino-​Soviet Border Disputes,” 4: 1424. 122. Khoo, Collateral Damage, 23. 123. Ibid., 39. 124. Niu Jun, “Historical Change in China’s Policy toward the United States in the late 1960s,” in Li, Zhongguo yu yindu zhina zhanzheng [China and the Indochina Wars], 103. 125. Khoo, Collateral Damage, 3. 126. Mao, “We Agree with Vietnam’s Policy to both Fight and Negotiate,” in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Party Archives and Manuscript Research Center of the CCP Central Committee, comps., Mao Zedong on Diplomacy, 442–​43. 127. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 550. 128. Truong Nhu Tang, minister of justice of the Provisional Republican Revolutionary Government (PRRG) quoted in Tang with David Chanoff and Doan Van Toai, Yu Hanoi fendao yangbiao [Parting Company with Hanoi] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Press], 1989), 229. 129. Khoo, Collateral Damage, 76. 130. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 215, 231. 131. Ye quoted in Li Danhui, “Sino-​Soviet Conflicts over Their Efforts to Aid Vietnam and Resist America,” in Li, Zhongguo yu yindu zhina zhanzheng [China and the Indochina Wars], 80–​81. 132. Chen and Li, “China and the End of the Cold War,” 122–​24. 133. Ibid., 124.

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CONCLUSION: FRIEND OR FOE?

In retrospect, China’s intervention in the Vietnam War had strong impacts on the PLA’s modernization and the Chinese-​Vietnamese relationship. Militarily, the international Cold War role and new foreign war experience transformed the PLA from a traditional army in the 1950s to a more modern armed force by the end of the 1970s with more than 6.2 million men, making it the largest armed force in the world. The Vietnam War accelerated China’s military modernization in terms of technology, organization, and training. While the PLA’s infantry troops decreased from 61.1  percent of total Chinese forces in 1950 to 40.8 percent by 1969, its artillery units increased from 2.4 percent in 1950 to 6.6 percent by 1969. By the 1970s, the PLA had 6,400 tanks, the third largest armored force in the world just after the United States and the Soviet Union.1 Its air force increased from 0.8 percent of total Chinese forces in 1950 to 12.2 percent by 1969; and the navy from 1.5 to 5.8 percent during the same period.2 The Vietnam experience was necessary and significant for the naval development in China. The Chinese Navy expanded from a “coastal navy” in the Taiwan Strait in the 1960s to a “maritime power” over the South China Sea and East China Sea in the 1980s. The navy, building on the PLA’s own historical legacy, creatively drew on the lessons of its Vietnam experience to learn new approaches to its core mission: the defense of transportation and communication lines along China’s coastal line, as well as preparing a cross-​strait campaign against Taiwan during the Cold War. While the navy continued to conduct warfare in traditional ways, there was also assimilation of lessons and adaptation of new technology learned from foreign militaries like the Soviet Union and the United States. By the mid-​1960s, about 66 percent of Chinese warships were Soviet-​ made or imitations of Russian models. Thereafter, China began to design and manufacture its own naval

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vessels according to the PLAN’s third five-​year plan in 1965.3 For example, in 1966, China began to produce its own submarines (Model 31) in Shanghai and Guangzhou, which had proved their (Models 33 and 35) capacities and effectiveness in the battles of the South China Sea in 1974. When the PLAN established its second submarine division in 1976, the Chinese-​made submarines had replaced all the Russian subs. In 1968, China started to manufacture its first nuclear submarine (Model 09-​I), which was finished in 1970.4 The first nuclear submarine division was established in 1975. Before the Vietnam War, the PLAAF relied almost exclusively on Russian-​ made aircraft. Through the 1950s, China purchased 5,000 military aircraft from the Soviet Union. During the Vietnam War, China successfully imitated Russian MiG fighters and began to produce China’s own jet fighters as the “Qian” series. In 1966, for example, the PLAAF tested the Qian-​7 fighter (a Chinese version of the Russian MiG-​21 model) and commissioned new jet fighters to the air force next year. By the late 1960s, the air force had created fifty air divisions in thirteen air force armies.5 In 1972, China began to manufacture the improved Qian-​7I fighters. After the Vietnam War, the Chinese defense industry evolved from being an adapter and modifier to being its own weaponry developer by demonstrating a few capacities for designing and producing relatively advanced aircraft. In 1965, Grand General Luo Ruiqing approved the PLAAF plan to design China’s own fighters. In 1980, China manufactured its first jet fighter, Qian-​8.6 In 1969, China designed and manufactured its own strafing aircraft as the Qiang series. In 1971, Qiang-​5 began to serve in the air force. In January 1972, one of the Qiang-​5 aircraft was used to carry and drop a nuclear bomb in an atomic test. During the Vietnam War, the PLA also acquired more sophisticated military technology, including nuclear weapons. On October 16, 1964, China had its first nuclear bomb test, and on June 17, 1967, China detonated its first hydrogen bomb. In 1968, Second Artillery Corps (SAC) divided its troops into short-​ , intermediate-​, and long-​range, and intercontinental units.7 On September 23, 1969, China conducted its first underground nuclear test. In that year, the first group of operational nuclear warheads and missiles were delivered to the SAC. Thereafter, the Chinese military possessed nuclear and strategic weapons. By the 1970s, China had become an independent nuclear weapons producer and continued to develop and build more advanced strategic weapons. In 1980 it tested its first intercontinental-​range ballistic missile (ICBM) and, two years later, its first submarine-​launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The lessons learned from the Vietnam War had an impact on subsequent national defense planning at the PLA high command, including

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Mao’s decisions during the Sino-​Soviet border conflict and his strategy and tactics of the people’s war against a possible Russian invasion in 1969–​1971. Internationally, the Chinese military intervention in the Vietnam War did not serve Beijing well in the global Cold War. China’s assistance to North Vietnam did not improve the Sino-​Soviet relationship, but rather created competition as each attempted to gain leadership of the Southeast Asian Communist movements. The Sino-​Soviet border conflict that started in March 1969 represented a major turning point in their relationship and instantly transformed the Soviet Union into China’s principal enemy.8 The border war lasted until 1971 when the Soviet Union had deployed up to forty-​ eight infantry and armor divisions, constituting nearly one million troops along the Russian-​Chinese border. China had to prepare for total war, including possible Russian nuclear attacks. The Vietnam War, however, created an opportunity for China and the United States to normalize their diplomatic relationship, which could provide some solutions to their immediate security and political concerns. To curb the rising power of the Soviets in Asia, Mao began to play the “American card” and open a new relationship with the United States, which had never had any diplomatic relation with the PRC since its founding in 1949. The “principal enemy” theory explains that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”9 The Soviet threat and conflicts pushed the Chinese leaders to improve their relations with the United States. Their strategic needs eventually led to the normalization of Sino-​American relations in the 1970s, when President Richard Nixon visited Beijing in February 1972 and the United States established diplomatic relations with China on January 1, 1979. The increasing conflict between Moscow and Beijing had a major impact on Soviet-​Vietnamese relations. Khoo points out that the Sino-​Russian border war “caused the new Soviet leadership to take a more nuanced and effective approach to undermining Chinese influence in North Vietnam.”10 As the Vietnamese continued to increase their cooperation with the Soviets, Beijing distanced itself further and further from Hanoi after 1969. China’s military and material support to Vietnam continued, but the quantity began to drop in 1970 after it peaked in 1969. In Beijing’s and Hanoi’s open propaganda, the assertion that China and Vietnam were “brotherly comrades” could still be heard from time to time, but the enthusiasm disappeared. Chinese influence over North Vietnam diminished as that of the Soviet Union grew.11 Hanoi considered the marked improvement of relations between China and the United States in the wake of Nixon’s visit as tantamount to betrayal on China’s part. Leaders in Beijing, from geopolitical considerations, had

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decided that they could not stand by while Vietnam was engaged in a war that might endanger Chinese security. Chinese-​V ietnamese relations became worse and worse after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, and the two countries immediately fell into a series of disputes after the Vietnamese Communists won their country’s unification in 1975. Among other issues, border disputes caused a rapid deterioration in the Vietnam-​China relationship. In the Chinese view, North Vietnam was an ingrate challenging China under Soviet protection. China lamented the loss of Chinese lives and the expenditure of so many resources for so little in return. For the Vietnamese, the Chinese “Northern threat,” replaced America as the enemy. The Vietnamese charged that Chinese intended to keep Vietnam in the war in order to exhaust the United States by bleeding Vietnam. Since Vietnam aligned with China’s principal enemy, now Hanoi became Beijing’s “secondary enemy.”12 Three years later, when Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia, Beijing responded by using its military to attack Vietnam “to teach Hanoi a lesson.”13 It turned out that after committing much of China’s resources to supporting the Vietnamese Communists, Beijing had created a new enemy; comprehensive confrontation characterized the relationship between Beijing and Hanoi throughout the 1970s. In this sense, the Vietnam War became a “lost war” for China. After Mao’s death in September 1976, the new Chinese leadership’s world view included different concerns about the country’s security. Deng Xiaoping (in power from 1978 to 1989) as the head of the second generation of the CCP leadership intended to stabilize China’s relations in Southeast Asia and create a “peaceful international environment” in order to focus on his economic reform. On February 24, 1977, Li Xiannian, PRC president, declined the Vietnamese request for more Chinese aid when Nguyen Tien, vice foreign minister, visited Beijing. Premier Pham was not happy when Nguyen told him of the Chinese rejection on March 17. References to Chinese aid have disappeared from Vietnamese historic writing, and China is now portrayed as having been an impediment to the reunification of Vietnam. One of the Vietnamese party leaders told a Swedish reporter that “Vietnam borders China in the north, which is a powerful country. This neighboring relationship has both positive and negative impact. By any means, the political and cultural pressures from the north must be eliminated.”14 The deteriorating relationship, along with Vietnam’s persecution of its ethnic Chinese and its invasion of Cambodia, induced China to take military action along the border.

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On December 20, 1977, Vietnam sent 200,000 troops into Cambodia. Joining the international community and the United States, Beijing denounced the invasion and asked for an immediate and full withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops. Since the Vietnam War ended in 1975, the tension over the border had mounted between the countries. At least one hundred border skirmishes occurred in 1976 alone. In 1978, Chinese sources reported 1,100 border incidents, in which about three hundred Chinese troops and civilians were killed or wounded. That same year, the PLA reinforced the border with twenty infantry divisions.15 Both international and internal factors played an important role in the changes of China’s security concerns. When Vietnam sent troops to Cambodia and clashed with the PLA along the Chinese-​Vietnamese borders, Deng decided to punish Vietnam as a warning to some neighboring countries, while pleasing others like Thailand, which was worried about Vietnam’s aggressive foreign policy. China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979 and several major attacks along the Sino-​Vietnamese borders in 1981 and 1984 also expressed Beijing’s concerns on other issues such as Vietnam’s expelling some 200,000 Chinese Vietnamese refugees into China and challenging China’s claims over the South China Sea islands.16 On December 25, 1978, China closed the border. The next day, the PLA began to deploy 220,000 troops along the Vietnamese border. In the east, along the Guangxi-​Guangdong borders, about 110,000 troops, including five armies, moved in their positions under command of General Xu Shiyou. In the west, along the Yunnan borders, more than 100,000 men were deployed under the command of General Yang Dezhi. On July 8, 1978, the PAVN (People’s Army of Vietnam) Political Bureau issued the “Outline of the New Tasks of the PAVN,” which warned of a possible invasion by “a foreign country” while its troops fought in Cambodia. The Vietnamese military intelligence was accurate. By November 20, the Chinese troops from the Guangzhou Regional Command were combat-​ready. On December 8, the CMC issued an order of deployment and re-​formation. On the 13th, the CMC ordered the troops to move into the border areas. By the end of the month, all the Chinese troops had moved into their positions along the borders. On January 8, 1979, the PAVN occupied Phnom Penh, the capital city of Cambodia.17 China saw an opportunity, not only because of Vietnam’s weakened national defense, but also because of a moral justification for invasion. On January 28, Deng paid a state visit to America. He told President Jimmy Carter in Washington that Asia “is very unstable.” At the meeting with the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on January 30, a senator asked if China would attack Vietnam since Beijing-​supported government in Cambodia

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was overthrown and the country was in a serious crisis. Deng answered that “We will not allow Vietnam to make so many troubles [in Asia]. In order to protect our country and world peace, we probably have to do something that we don’t want to.”18 In early February, on his way back to China, Deng told the Japanese prime minister in Tokyo, “To deal with the Vietnamese, it seems no effect by any other means than a necessary lesson.” Deng wanted to teach Vietnam “a lesson.”19 Chen points out that “Beijing’s leaders used force only when they believed that they were in a position to justify it in a ‘moral’ sense.”20 On February 17, 1979, the CMC ordered the attack. Deng set up three principles for the Chinese invasion: a limited attack, quick victory, and avoidance of “mission creep.” The Chinese operation can be divided into three phases. The first phase was an attack on all fronts from February 17 to 26 in two major directions. In the east, the Guangxi troops, five armies, more than 100,000 men, under the command of General Xu crossed the borders in fourteen places. On February 20, his troops encircled Cao Bang, defended by the PAVN 346th Division. The PLA Fifty-​Fifth Army took the city on February 25, but the Vietnamese division HQs had escaped. Serious communication problems arose due to poorly manufactured equipment or untrained operators. Xu’s “attack order” to the Sixty-​Seventh Regiment, for example, somehow changed to a “hold and defend” when it passed through the army and division headquarters. The regiment never joined the general attack against Lang Son.21 In the west, the Yunnan troops, five armies, about 100,000 men, under the command of General Yang Dezhi concentrated on Lao Cai by crossing the Red River in six different places. By February 20, the Yunnan troops took over Lao Cai with strong artillery support. Then, they moved further south toward to Giang Dong, a major mining city in the north. The Vietnamese troops reinforced Giang Dong. On the 25th, the Yunnan troops captured the city and its mines (see Map 8.1 China’s invasion of Vietnam, 1979).22 The second phase, from February 27 to March 5, was a focused attack on Lang Son, one of the major cities in the north. Lang Son, the provincial capital, was well connected by railroads, highways, and rivers and defended by a large number of the Vietnamese troops. On February 27, the Guangxi troops attacked the city. Xu concentrated more than three hundred artillery pieces and issued orders that “No house stands in Lang Son.”23 About 7:50 am, the Chinese bombardment began. Having failed to stop the Chinese attack, the PAVN 308th Division withdrew from Lang Son. By March 2, the Chinese troops occupied the northern part of the city. On March 4, they took over

MAP 8.1.  China’s invasion of Vietnam, 1979

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the city and threatened Hanoi, only eighty miles away. The Vietnamese government gathered troops for the defense of its capital. The Chinese invaders, however, did not press on and stopped at Lang Son.24 The third phase was the Chinese withdrawal from Vietnam on March 6–​ 16, 1979. The CMC ordered all the troops to move out of Vietnam on March 5.  On their way back, Chinese troops looted North Vietnam, removing industrial machinery, equipment, and governmental properties, and destroying the remainders. Many artillery and tank units fired indiscriminately at Vietnamese towns. Some Chinese units who suffered heavy casualties retaliated by burning villages, bridges, and anything they could ignite.25 Some Chinese soldiers called it a “painful, little war.” Vietnamese troops avoided battle and instead harassed PLA forces. Some Chinese officers described it as a “ghost war” since the enemy troops were almost invisible; or a “shadow war,” fighting against your own shadow. The Vietnamese troops employed the same tactics, made the same moves, and used the same weapons as the Chinese. They knew exactly what the Chinese were trying to do. They exploited almost every problem and weakness the Chinese had. The Chinese troops had to fight their own problems first before they could fight the Vietnamese. Deng’s border war taught the PLA a lesson in a hard way.26 During the nineteen days of the first two phases, the PLA suffered 26,000 casualties, about 1,350 per day.27 Gerald Segal points out that “in contrast to Korea, Chinese troops performed poorly. In Korea, they adequately defended North Korea, but in 1979 they failed to punish Vietnam. China’s Cambodian allies were relegated to a sideshow along the Thai frontier, and China was unable to help them break out.”28 During the war, 37,300 Vietnamese troops were killed, and 2,300 were captured. The Soviet Union surprised the Vietnamese with their noninvolvement during the conflict. On February 18, 1979, Moscow denounced China’s aggression and promised that the Soviet Union would keep its commitments according to the Soviet-​Vietnam cooperation and friendship treaties but did not make any major moves. The Russian military intelligence increased its reconnaissance planes and ships in the South China Sea and along the Vietnamese coast after China’s invasion. On February 24, two Russian transport planes landed at Hanoi and unloaded some military equipment. Most countries maintained a neutral position during the Sino-​Vietnamese War in 1979.29 The brief 1979 war was a grievous misfortune for both China and Vietnam, not only because of the material and human losses suffered by both nations, but also because it brought years of earlier cooperation to such a dispiriting conclusion. The war showed that American concerns about the domino

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theory were misplaced, since two Communist countries, one of which had just attained national liberation, were now in conflict with each other. Each valued its own national interests much more than the common communist ideology. On February 27, 1979, Deng told American journalists in Beijing, “Vietnam claims itself as the third military superpower in the world. We are eliminating this myth. That’s all we want, no other purpose. We don’t want their territory. We make them to understand that they can’t do whatever they want to all the times.”30 Hanoi believed that the Vietnamese army taught the Chinese army a lesson. China lost militarily and beat a hasty retreat: “After we defeated them we gave them the red carpet to leave Vietnam.”31 Henry J. Kenny points out that “Most Western writers agree that Vietnam had indeed outperformed the PLA on the battlefield, but say that with the seizure of Lang Son, the PLA was poised to move into the militarily more hospitable terrain of the Red River Delta, and thence to Hanoi.” He, however, further explains that Lang Son is less than twenty kilometers from the Chinese border, but remains twice that distance from the Delta. Moreover, at least five PAVN divisions remained poised for a counterattack in the Delta, and 30,000 additional PAVN troops from Cambodia, along with several regiments from Laos, were moving to their support.32 Thus, the PLA would have taken huge losses in any southward move toward Hanoi. The Chinese withdrawal from Vietnam in March 1979 did not end the border conflict. For the next decade, PAVN units, along with a rearmed and retrained militia, maintained as many as 800,000 troops in northern Vietnam. Across their northern borders, more than 200,000 Chinese troops faced them. In May–​June 1981, the PLA attacked Vietnam again after many small border conflicts. The Chinese troops occupied and defended several hills.33 The largest offensive campaign after 1979 took place in April–​May 1984, when the PLA overran PAVN positions in the Lao Son Mountains. The attack began on April 2 when the Chinese artillery heavily shelled the Vietnamese positions in the area. The bombardment continued until April 27. On April 28, the infantry troops from Yunnan province charged the Vietnamese defense positions at Lao Son, including Hills 395, 423, and 662. The Chinese forces eliminated two Vietnamese companies of the 122nd Regiment, PAVN 313th Division and occupied Hill 662, the highest position on the top of the Lao Son Mountains. Within a few days, the Chinese troops controlled most of the mountain, and had eliminated about 2,000 Vietnamese troops.34 Then, the Chinese forces attacked the Vietnamese positions on Yen Son Mountain

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on April 30. By May 15, the Chinese occupied most of the positions on the two mountains and built defensive works against the PAVN counterattacks. During this five-​week offensive campaign, there were 939 Chinese soldiers killed in action, plus another 64 Chinese laborers.35 From July 12, the Vietnamese launched counterattacks. The Chinese troops held the position for three years until April 1987. They constructed defensive works, launched small-​scale attacks, and defended the positions on these two mountains. The Chinese maintained a large force with two armies, usually including two artillery divisions, four infantry divisions, and several tank regiments in the Lao Son area. The artillery played a major role in the 1984–​1987 defenses. A typical battle at Lao Son began with a small Vietnamese infantry unit (usually a company) charging the Chinese positions. The Chinese defenders called in their artillery support. After the Vietnamese located the Chinese artillery positions (it took only a couple of minutes), the Vietnamese artillery began counter battery fire. Then, the Chinese artillery targeted the Vietnamese artillery positions. During the artillery exchanges, the Vietnamese withdrew. Finally, the shelling stopped and the battle was over. The Chinese artillery divisions were equipped with 130mm guns, 152mm howitzers, and forty-​barrel rocket launchers. The infantry regiments used 85mm guns and 100-​D mortars. Chinese tanks also took part in several battles.36 In April 1987, the CMC reduced the scale of its operations in Vietnam though the Chinese maintained routine patrols at Lao Son and Yen Son. From April 1987 to October 1989, there were only eleven attacks, most of them simply artillery bombardments. In order to gain combat experience, the CMC began to rotate the troops at the Lao Son and Yen Son areas. Many PLA units, including infantry, artillery, anti-​aircraft units, and reconnaissance troops, moved into Vietnam from Guangxi and Yunnan provinces. Deng said once, “Let all of our field armies touch the tiger’s butt.”37 The high command had certainly learned lessons from the 1980s border conflicts. Chinese military leaders gradually changed their perceptions of PAVN tactical capabilities. From the late 1980s, the PLA treated the Vietnamese military as a much more formidable adversary, especially given its ability to adapt its tactics. Despite the improvements in technology and officer training, the PLA morale remained low in the 1980s due to many “material problems” such as “weapons stockpiles were deteriorating”; “military property and facilities were inadequately protected; and military installations had been vandalized.”38 The Chinese military suffered more damage and casualties along the border areas by the end of the decade.

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By the end of the 1980s, China and Vietnam normalized their diplomatic relationship. In 1992, all the Chinese troops withdrew from the Lao Son and Yen Son areas and returned back to China. In order to develop border trade between the two countries, the PLA troops in Guangxi and Yunnan provinces in 1993 began large-​scale mine-​clearing operations along the Chinese-​ Vietnamese borders, where they had laid more than four million land mines against the Vietnamese. Given the swings in the Sino-​Vietnamese relationship, the question now is what new lessons did the PLA learn from its war with Vietnam in 1979–​ 1987? To what extent will the lessons of the wars affect China’s conflict and diplomatic behavior in the future? How have these lessons influenced the PLA’s current modernization and professionalization? Perhaps the most important lesson that China learned from its engagements in the Sino-​Vietnamese conflict of 1979–​1987 was to avoid or prevent such a prolonged war in the future, or both. Beijing paid a tremendous price economically, diplomatically, and strategically. From the mid-​1980s, the PLA reverted in its thinking to a “limited and localized” strategy, as a result of its border wars with Vietnam, which serves as a painful reminder of PLA outdated strategy and tactics. As the head of the second generation of the CCP leadership and PLA high command, Deng explained his new strategic thoughts to the high-​ranking commanders in 1985. First, the Chinese armed forces should expect a “local war” or a “limited war” rather than a “total war” or a “nuclear war” in the future. Second, the next “local war” or “limited war” needed a professional army with modern technology. This was another strategic transition from Mao’s “people’s war” doctrine to a new “people’s war under modern conditions” doctrine.39 The war in Vietnam tested the limits of the Chinese military, especially its technology. Another valuable lesson of the limited war was for the PLA to obtain new military technology. In the mid-​1980s, military reform followed Deng’s new doctrines of fighting “limited, local war” and emphasized the development and employment of new technology and improvement in PLA weaponry. Deng downsized the PLA forces by one million troops over the next two years. Theoretically, the money saved from the troop reduction would be available for upgrading defense technology.40 However, the PLA did not get what it wanted in terms of a bigger budget and new technology. According to Deng, the PLA had to wait for national economic growth as prerequisite for its technology improvement. Deng emphasized, “Only when we have a good economic foundation will it be possible for us to modernize the army’s equipment. So we must wait patiently for a few years.”41 He

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believed that defense-​building must be subordinated to serve national economic development and that the two causes should be promoted in a coordinated manner. You Ji points out, “Many senior officers attribute the PLA’s slow modernization progress to Deng’s decade-​long suppressive policy of ‘jundui yaorennai,’ meaning the armed forces must refrain from demanding too large a budget.”42 After the Tiananmen Square Events in the summer of 1989, Jiang Zemin (1926–​) came to the power as the head of the third generation of the CCP leadership. In November, he became chairman of the CMC at the Fifth Plenary Session of the CCP Thirteenth Central Committee.43 As the PLA’s first civilian commander in chief, Jiang developed an institutionalized authority that enabled him to assume the top post as the CCP and CMC chairman and the country’s president. In the 1990s, Jiang launched another round of military reforms known as the “two transformations.” First, the PLA would be changed from an army prepared for “local wars under ordinary conditions” to an army prepared to fight and win “local wars under modern high-​tech conditions.” Second, the PLA would become an army based on quantity versus an army based on quality.44 Jiang’s doctrine of fighting “local wars under modern high-​tech conditions” became the new guideline for the PLA’s institutional reform under the third-​generation high command.45 The new generation of Chinese military leadership emphasizes the importance of military science and technology. President Jiang stated clearly at the beginning of the twenty-​first century that “we should energetically push forward a Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) with Chinese characteristics, so as to ensure that our armed forces keep up with the current rapid development of science, technology, and RMA.” The president has made the PLA’s information-​based capability the key for China’s military modernization. He also said that promoting RMA with Chinese characteristics would bring about profound changes to every aspect of Chinese army-​building.46 In November 2002, when Jiang retired, Hu Jintao (1942–​) became chairman of the CCP at the Sixteenth CCP National Congress. In March 2003, at the Sixth National People’s Congress, Hu was elected the president of the PRC. In September 2004, Jiang gave up command of the Chinese military at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth CCP National Congress. Hu then became the new civilian commander in chief of the PLA as the head of the fourth generation of the Chinese leadership. He nurtured a relationship with the PLA by supporting the growing military professionalism with an emphasis on technological improvement. Hu stated that the PLA should resort to different warfare means in future conflicts, including a high-​tech

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approach to circumvent enemy strengths and to confront the enemy in ways it would not be able to match. Thus China would “not be intimidated by a military superpower,” and China’s foreign policy would “not be constrained by its military weakness.”47 According to Hu and his new high command, the PLA should make a “leap-​over” transition from an army with mechanical and semi-​mechanical equipment to an army equipped with digital facilities. Ironically, while the PLA became modernized and institutionalized as the result of the reform, the Chinese Communist Party has remained its control of the army. Chinese military reform took place only within the greater context of a newly founded republic and within the constraints of how far the Communist Party was willing to go and what Chinese society at large could support. On the one hand, the military favored technological improvements, institutional control, rational decisions, regular programs, and more professionalism. On the other, the CCP put emphasis on ideological factors, human spirit, political education, and loyalty to the party. Thus, some of the elements in Chinese military culture and Communist ideology survived the Vietnam War and have remained unchanged since 1965. The new leadership in Beijing will not abandon the deliberate approach its previous generations had employed with success for military reforms. To keep the military under control, a continuing coalition between the PLA and the CCP is necessary for Beijing. At the NPC in 2005, Hu’s vision for “harmony and innovation” became government policy for China’s further development. To achieve a harmonious China in a new time, it is important to build on its long and rich traditions and preserve them in innovative ways. The PLA needs to follow the fundamental principle and system of absolute Party leadership over the armed forces. In other words, the PLA should support the Hu administration by showing its loyalty to the Party Center. The rank and file should value social harmony, share ideas, and live with them as social norms. The high command needs to contribute to various forms of rationale to promote social harmony. The PLA still belongs to the Party since the latter controls the resources and personnel management for the military budget and professional careers under the current leadership. The Party Center can channel the military elite interests and individual consciousness, prejudice, and conflict of the rank and file through the existing strong political institution. Since the state has adapted well to economic and social changes and effectively responded to the rising demands and expectations with the PLA, its political institutions may be able to manage some of the discontent or a different opinion of the PLA in the near future.48 These activities are still within the boundaries of the Party Center’s preference and control. In the meantime, the PLA should

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also provide new military capabilities for the policy since there are serious disharmonious factors and unstable elements in China and in the world. As we know, in the past two decades, disparity in wealth, unsettled social and political infrastructure, and international conflicts have resulted in a new set of uncertainties and challenges for China’s sustained development. In November 2012, Xi Jinping (1953–​) became the chairman of the CCP at the Party’s Eighteenth National Congress as the new leadership of the fifth generation. For the new commander in chief of the PLA for 2012–​2022, President Xi faces more opportunities and challenges, and more hopes and difficulties. He has promised the country to maintain a sustainable economic development in order to realize the “China Dream.”49 The new leadership seeks a growing role on the global political stage while assuring the international community that China does not pursue a policy of military and political hegemony in a conventional sense. However, while China is repositioning itself by creating a new center of gravity in the Asia-​Pacific region, its new demands will create potential problems. A  possible source of crisis is the highly sensitive and increasingly disputed islands in the East China Sea and South China Sea, as Japan and Vietnam may make bolder moves toward an armed clash. Xi is developing a new strategy and using tactics of modern warfare to deal with a possible crisis. In the CCP Eighteenth National Congress Report, the Party Center made a new plan of national defense and military modernization for the coming decade. In Section Nine, the report details how to speed up the armed forces’ modernization, and how to deal with the major issues facing the overall defense. It raised a series of new thoughts and concepts that are of critical importance in long-​term strategy.50 In May 2015, China issued its annual Defense White Paper, titled “China’s Military Strategy.” It clearly states that it is a strategic task of China’s modernization drive as well as a strong guarantee for China’s peaceful development to build a strong national defense and powerful armed forces that are commensurate with China’s international standing and that meet the needs of its security and development interests.51 The coming decade is the most important time period for China’s rejuvenation as well as the time when China has to face some of the most serious, unprecedented challenges. There is a three-​step strategic plan. The first step has been completed in 2010, which was to reduce the size of the armed forces, optimize structure, and develop advanced weaponry. The second step is to realize the mobilization of the armed forces, and to achieve great improvement in the information construction by 2020, and finally with an additional thirty years of hard work, to fully modernize Chinese armed forces and national defense.

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There is an increasing need for China to pay attention to the security on the sea, in space, and in cyberspace. Our historical overview shows the changing characteristics of the PLA in recent years. The analysis includes three elements of the process by which the Chinese military moved from a peasant army to a professional one. The first facet includes human resources available for military revolution and reforms. Our stories about peasant soldiers help to better understand how their values, duties, and concerns affected the military as an institution. The organization was firmly entrenched in Chinese tradition and society. The PLA was one of the few entities in the PRC that enjoyed some praise and recognition of the past. It takes time for a major transition and significant changes. The second element indicates the pressure on reform and its limits, including backward technology, poor living standards, a lack of education and professional training, and an authoritarian government. The third is the way the military compromised for difficult changes while shaping both Chinese attitudes and the international view toward the PLA and China. The objective of this analysis is to effectively present national interests, security concerns, perceived threats, and international conditions. All three—​Chinese resources, problems and limits, and military problem-​ solving—​describe unique characteristics of Chinese military culture. The analysis provides a different interpretation in which a balanced examination between the social and military history defines the unique characteristic of Chinese military from its high command to its ordinary soldiers. These are the unique Chinese characteristics between tradition and modernization. Some of them have changed from time to time. In the near future, Chinese generals may tend to act effectively as independent forces, so they can have an impact when their concerns and interests converge with those in the system. Whether or not the military leaders of the new generation are eventually accepted by the Party and government as leading actors, they will shape part of the domestic and foreign policy-​making context.

Notes 1. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 295. 2. Ibid., 363–​6 4. 3. Yang, Dangdai zhongguo haijun [Contemporary China’s Navy], 241. 4. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution], 303–​304.

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5. Military History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun de 70 nian [Seventy Years of the PLA], 462. 6. Wang, Dangdai zhongguo kongjun [Contemporary China’s Air Force], 305. 7. Major General Xu Changyou, interview by the author in Shanghai, April 2000. Xu served as the vice political commissar of the PLA East China Sea Fleet in 1999–​ 2004. He was General Zhang Aiping’s secretary in the 1960s. 8. Khoo, Collateral Damage, 45. 9. For more on the “principal enemy” theory, see Ross, The Indochina Tangle, 12, 254; Eugene Lawson, The Sino-​Vietnamese Conflict (New York: Praeger, 1984), 6; Chang, Friends and Enemies, 240–​4 6. 10. Khoo, Collateral Damage, 23. 11. John L. Gaddis, Forward in China and the Vietnam Wars, x. 12. Khoo, Collateral Damage, 4. 13. Deng’s words are quoted in Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army, 252, 259. 14. Haong Sun’s conversation with Eric Pier, a Sweden reporter, in 1976. Haong was member of the VWP Central Committee and editor of the party newspaper. Tian, Zhongyeu zhanzheng jishilu [Factual Records of the Sino-​Vietnam War], 9–​10. 15. Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 659–​60. 16. Xie Guojun, “Maintain the Peace and Safety along the Sino-​Vietnamese Border,” in Military History Research Division, CAMS, Junqi piaopiao [PLA Flag Fluttering], 2: 624–​25. 17. Military History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun de 70 nian [The Seventy Years of the PLA], 609–​10. 18. Deng’s conversations are quoted from Tian, Zhongyeu zhanzheng jishilu [Factual Records of the Sino-​Vietnam War], 16–​18. 19. Ibid.,  18. 20. Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 14. 21. Tian, Zhongyeu zhanzheng jishilu [Factual Records of the Sino-​Vietnam War], 42. 22. Ibid.,  43. 23. Ibid. 24. Xie, “Maintain the Peace and Safety along the Sino-​Vietnamese Border,” 629–​30. 25. Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War, 191–​93, 244–​47. 26. Tian, Zhongyeu zhanzheng jishilu [Factual Records of the Sino-​Vietnam War], 327–​28. 27. Ibid., 92, 328. 28. Gerald Segal, “Foreign Policy,” in China in the Nineties:  Crisis Management and Beyond, ed. David S.  G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (Oxford, UK:  Oxford University Press, 1991), 173. 29. Tian, Zhongyeu zhanzheng jishilu [Factual Records of the Sino-​Vietnam War], 26–​27,  92. 30. Deng’s conversation was quoted in ibid., 25.

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31. Henry J.  Kenny,“ Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China,” in Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting, 232 (quotes from interviews with Vietnamese colonels and a general). 32. Ibid. 33. For more details of these battles between 1979 and 1984, see Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 679–​82; Xie, “Maintain the Peace and Safety along the Sino-​ Vietnamese Border,” 629–​ 32; Military History Research Division, CAMS, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun de 70 nian [The Seventy Years of the PLA], 613–​14. 34. Tian, Zhongyeu zhanzheng jishilu [Factual Records of the Sino-​ Vietnam War],  72–​73. 35. Ibid.,  403. 36. For more details of these battles between 1984 and 1987, see Han, Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces], 1: 684–​86; Xie, “Maintain the Peace and Safety along the Sino-​ Vietnamese Border,” 634–​35. 37. Deng’s talks at a 1986 CMC meeting in Tian, Zhongyeu zhanzheng jishilu [Factual Records of the Sino-​Vietnam War], 55. 38. CMC, “Investigative Report on the Phenomenon of ‘Localization’ in the Officer Corps, March 18, 1989,” in The Tiananmen Papers; The Chinese Leadership’s Decision to Use Force against Their Own People—​in Their Own Words, ed. Zhang Liang (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 9. 39. Deng, “Streamline the Army and Raise Its Combat Effectiveness,” a speech at an enlarged meeting of CMC Standing Committee on March 12, 1980, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 2: 284–​87. 4 0. Deng, “Speech at an Enlarged Meeting of the CMC, June 4, 1985,” a speech at an enlarged meeting of CMC Standing Committee on March 12, 1980, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3: 131. 41. Ibid., 3: 133. 42. You Ji, “Changing Leadership Consensus; The Domestic Context of War Games,” in Across the Taiwan Strait; Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995–​1996 Crisis, ed. Suisheng Zhao (New York: Routledge, 1999), 87. 43. CCP Central Committee, Selected Documents of the Fifteenth CCP National Congress (Beijing: New Star Publishing House, 1997), 104–​106. 4 4. Jiang’s words are quoted in Information Bureau of the PRC State Council, White Papers of China’s National Defense in 1998 (Beijing:  Foreign Languages, 2000), 2: 645. 45. Lieutenant General Wang Wenrong (PLA), vice president of NDU, “Introduction:  Studying and Carrying Out President Jiang’s Important Strategic Thoughts,” in Sun Kejia, Zhongguo tese de junshi biange [RMA with Chinese Characteristics] (Beijing:  Changzheng chubanshe [Long March Publishing House], 2003), 1.

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4 6. Jiang’s speech to the PLA delegation to the Tenth NPC on March 9, 2003, in Jiefangjun bao [PLA Daily], March 10, 2003. 47. Hu’s speech at the “Four General Departments” [sizongbu] meeting in August 2000 was quoted by Taiyangbao [Sun Daily] on September 5, 2000. Then, Hu was the chairman of the CCP and vice chairman of the CMC. 48. For example, Major General Zhu Chenghu, dean at PLA NDU, told to a group of foreign journalists in July 2005 that China would attack over one hundred American cities with nuclear weapons if the United States interferes in a war between China and Taiwan. The US Congress called for sacking of the Chinese general. The Chinese government, however, did not reject Zhu’s speech, and a spokesperson from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that Zhu’s speech was his own personal opinion. This spokesperson declined to comment on whether or not the speech represented the Chinese government’s view. Jonathan D. Pollack pointed out that while China becomes more involved in “sub-​and pan-​regional security affairs,” it is “acquiring military capabilities that it believes will ultimately enable a short-​ warning, high-​intensity attack against Taiwan. These include a growing inventory of short-​range ballistic missiles, advanced conventionally powered submarines and other naval platforms, longer-​range aircraft, and a host of related capabilities.” See Wang Zheng, “U.S. Congress Calls for Sacking of Chinese General,” The Epoch Times, http://​www.theepochtimes.com/​news/​5-​7-​25/​30545.html; David Shambaugh, “The Rise of China and Asia’s New Dynamics,” in Power Shift; China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 11; Pollack, “The Transformation of the Asian Security Order; Assessing China’s Impact,” in Shambaugh, Power Shift, 339. 49. Xiaoxiao Li, “Unity and Stability: Xi Jinping’s Promise and the CCP’s Future,” in Li and Tian, Evolution of Power, 351. 50. Wang Guanzhong, “Strive to Build a Defense and Military Force That Is Suitable for China International Position and National Security and Core Interest,” Guideline for Understanding Eighteenth National Conference Reports, 326. 51. The full text of “China’s Military Strategy,” China’s Defense White Paper, May 26, 2015, accessible at the PRC Ministry of National Defense, http://​www.eng.mod. gov.cn/​Press/​2015-​05/​26/​content_​4586805.htm.

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Zhang Shihong, Zhang Yanping, and Wu Di. Hu zhiming xiaodao shang de 701 Tian: Zhongguo jizhe Yuezhan jianwenlu [701 Days on the Ho Chi Minh Trail: The Vietnam War in Our Eyes]. Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe [PLA Literature Press], 2007. Zhang Shouying. “Memoir of Mine-​Sweeping Experience in Vietnam.” In Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 305–​10. Zheng Yongle. “Bloody Battles at Bac Hao.” In Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 20–​26. Zhong Yongming. “Two Raid Warnings.” In Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 63–​66. Zhou Chi. “Recollection of Laying Under-​Water Communication Cable in Vietnam.” In Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 139–​4 6. Zhou Enlai Military Record Compilation Team. Zhou Enlai junshi huodong jishi [The Records of Zhou Enlai’s Military Affairs]. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 2000. Zhou Fengcheng. “Combat Experience of the Transport Fleet in the Vietnam War.” In Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 147–​52. Zhou Qing. “Winning the First Battle.” In Qu, Bao, and Xiao, Yuanyue kangmei [Aid Vietnam and Resist the US], 1–​5. Books, Articles, and Other Materials CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Research Division. Mao Zedong zhuan, 1893–​ 1949 [Biography of Mao Zedong, 1893–​1976]. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 1996. CCP Party History Research Division. Zhongguo gongchandang lishi dashiji, 1919–​ 1987 [Major Historical Events of the CCP, 1919–​1987]. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe [People’s Press], 1989. Chai Chengwen, Huang Zhengji, and Zhang Changjin. Sanda tupo; xin Zhongguo zouxiang Shijie de baogao [Three Major Break-​Throughs; How China Enters the World]. Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1994. Chen Chuangang. “Sharpen the Just Sword and Forge Defense Shield.” In Military History Research Division, CAMS, Junqi piaopiao [PLA Flag Fluttering], 2: 684–​700. Chen Geng zhuan Compilation Team. Chen Geng zhuan [Biography of Chen Geng]. Beijing:  Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe [Contemporary China Publishing House], 2007. Chen Shaotao, ed. Liu Shaoqi yanjiu pingshu [On the Studies of Liu Shaoqi]. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 1997. Chu Yun. Chaoxian zhanzheng neimu quangongkai [Declassifying the Korean War]. Beijing: Shishi chubanshe [Current Affairs Press], 2005.

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CMAG History Compilation Team. Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Historical Facts of the CMAG in the War to Aid Vietnam and Resist France]. Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1990. Composition Team. Yidai mingjiang:  huiyi Su Yu tongzhi [A Famous General:  Remember Comrade Su Yu]. Shanghai:  Renmin chubanshe [Shanghai People’s Press], 1986. Dong Fanghe. Zhang Aiping zhuan [Biography of Zhang Aiping]. Beijing:  Renmin chubanshe [People’s Press], 2000. Editorial Committee. Zhongyue bianjing chongtu de zhenxiang [The True Story of the Sino-​Vietnamese Border Conflicts]. Beijing:  Renmin chubanshe [People’s Press], 1979. Fan Shuo. Ye Jianying zhuan [Biography of Ye Jianying]. Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe [Contemporary China Publishing House], 1995. Gao Meng and Yan Jiaqi. Wenhua dageming shi nian shi [Ten Years of the Cultural Revolution]. Tianjin:  Tianjin renmin chubanshe [Tianjin People’s Press], 1986. Gao Wenqian. Wannian Zhou Enlai [Last Years of Zhou Enlai]. Hong Kong: Mingjing chubanshe [Mirror Publishing], 2003. Ge Chumin, ed. Laozhanshi yishi [Personal Stories of the Veterans]. Beijing: Zhongguo duiwai fanyi chuban gongsi [China’s Outreach and Translation Publishing Company], 2000. Ge Xinqing. Daodan zuozhan yanjiu [Combat Missile Operations]. Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 2005. Guo Ming. Zhongyue guanxi yanbian 40 nian [Deterioration of the Sino-​Vietnam Relations in the Past Forty Years]. Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe [Guangxi People’s Press], 1992. Guo Zhigang, “A Foreign Military Assistance after the Founding of the New Republic.” In Military History Research Division, CAMS, Junqi piaopiao [PLA Flag Fluttering], 1: 145–​61. Han Huaizhi. Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [Military Affairs of Contemporary China’s Armed Forces]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe [China Social Science Press], 1989. Han Nianlong. Dangdai zhongguo waijiao [Foreign Affairs of Contemporary China]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe [China’s Social Science Press], 1990. He Shaobang. Wei Guoqing shangjiang [General Wei Guoqing]. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 2000. Hu Yanlin, ed. Renmin haijun zhengzhan jishi [War-​fighting Records of the People’s Navy]. Beijing:  Guofang daxue chubanshe [National Defense University Press], 1996. Huang Yao. Sanci da’nan busi de Luo Ruiqing dajiang [Grand General Luo Ruiqing Survives Three Times of Death]. Beijing:  Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe [CCP Party History Press], 1994.

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Huang Yao and Yan Jingtang. Lin Biao yisheng [The Life of Lin Biao]. Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe [PLA Literature Press], 2004. Huang Zheng. Hu zhimin yu zhong guo [Ho Chi Minh and China]. Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1987. —​—​—​ . Liu Shaoqi yisheng [Life of Liu Shaoqi]. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 2003. Jiang Changbin and Robert Ross, eds. Cong duizhi zouxiang huanhe; Lengzhan shiqi zhongmei guanxi zai tantao [From Confrontation to Conciliation:  Revisit the Sino-​American Relations in the Cold War]. Beijing:  Shijie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Press], 2000. Jiang Ying. “Conflicts and Restrains: the Sino-​American Relations during the Vietnam War.” In Jiang and Ross, Cong duizhi zouxiang huanhe [From Confrontation to Conciliation], 257–​96. Jin Chongji. Zhu De zhuan [Biography of Zhu De]. Beijing: Renmin and Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [People’s Press and CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 1993. —​—​—​ . “A Great Strategist and Theorist with His Own Thoughts.” In Chen, Liu Shaoqi yanjiu pingshu [On the Studies of Liu Shaoqi], 1–​12. Jin Yuguo. Zhongguo zhanshushi [History of Chinese Military Tactics]. Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 2003. Li Bingyan. Da moulue yu Xin junshi biange [Military Stratagem and the New Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)]. Beijing:  Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 2004. Li Danhui. “Conflicts between China and the Soviet Union in Their Efforts to Aid Vietnam and Resist America.” In Zhang and Niu, Lengzhan yu zhongguo [The Cold War and China], 372–​414. —​—​—​ . “Sino-​Soviet Conflicts over Their Efforts to Aid Vietnam and Resist America.” In Li, Zhongguo yu yindu zhina zhanzheng [China and the Indochina Wars], 79–​100. —​—​—​ . “The Sino-​Soviet Dispute over Assistance for Vietnam’s Anti-​American War, 1965–​1972.” http://​www.shenzhihua.net/​ynzz/​000123.htm. —​—​—​, ed. Zhongguo yu yindu zhina zhanzheng [China and the Indochina Wars]. Hong Kong: Tiandi Tushu [Heaven and Earth Books], 2000. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang. Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefang jun [The PLA in the Cultural Revolution]. Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe [CCP Central Committee’s Party Historical Document Press], 1989. Liu Han. Luo Ronghuan yuanshuai [Marshal Luo Ronghuan]. Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1987. Liu Shufa. Chen Yi nianpu, 1901–​1972 [A Chronological Record of Chen Yi, 1901–​ 1972]. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe [People’s Press], 1995. Military History Research Division, China Academy of Military Science (CAMS). Junqi piaopiao; xinzhongguo 50 nian junshi dashi shushi [PLA Flag Fluttering; Facts

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of China’s Major Military Events in the Past Fifty Years]. Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1999. —​—​—​ . Meiguo qinyue zhanzhengshi [War History of U.S. Invasion of Vietnam]. Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe [Military Science Press], 2004. —​—​—​ . Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun de qishinian, 1927–​1997 [Seventy Years of the PLA, 1927–​1997]. Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe [Military Science Press], 1997. —​—​—​ . Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhanshi [War-​fighting History of the PLA]. Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe [Military Science Press], 1987. —​—​—​ . Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [Combat Experience of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Force (CPVF) in the War to Resist the US and Aid Korea]. Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe [Military Science Press], 1990. Niu Jun. “Historical Change in China’s Policy toward the United States in the late 1960s.” In Li, Zhongguo yu yindu zhina zhanzheng [China and the Indochina Wars], 101–​24. Pei Jianzhang. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1949–​1956 [Diplomatic History of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–​1956]. Beijing:  Shijie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Publishing], 1994. Political Tasks Research Division, China Academy of Military Science (CAMS). Zhongguo gongchandang zhengzhi gongzuo 70 nian [The Seventy Years of the CCP Political Tasks in the Chinese Military]. Beijing:  Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1992. Qu Aiguo. “China’s Military Operations to Assist Vietnam and Resist America in the Vietnam War.” In Zhang and Niu, Lengzhan yu zhongguo [The Cold War and China], 341–​71. —​—​—​ . “Hundred Battles with Great Victories: the Combat Experience of the AAA Sixty-​first Division in the War to Resist the U.S. and Assist Vietnam.” In Junshi lishi [Military History] 9 (2005): 10–​17. —​—​—​ . “Military Operations of the Chinese Supporting Forces in the Vietnam War.” In Li, Zhongguo yu yindu zhina zhanzheng [China and the Indochina Wars], 39–​54. Shi Lin. Dangdai zhongguo de duiwai jingji hezuo [International Economic Cooperation of Contemporary China]. Beijing:  Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe [China Academy of Social Sciences Press], 1991. Song Enfan and Li Jiasong, eds. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao dashiji, 1957–​1964 [Chronicle of the PRC’s Diplomacy, 1957–​1964]. Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Press], 2001. Sun Kejia. Zhongguo tese de junshi biange [Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with Chinese Characteristics]. Beijing: Changzheng chubanshe [Long March Publishing House], 2003. Tang Xiuying. “A Sword Thrusting the Sky.” In Political Tasks Division, PLA DGA, Liangdan yixing [Two Bombs and One Star], 361–​72. Tian Fuzi. Zhongyeu zhanzheng jishilu [Factual Records of the Sino-​Vietnam War]. Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe [PLA Literature Press], 2004.

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Tong Xiaopeng. Fengyu 40 nian [Forty Years of the Storm]. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archives and Manuscript Press], 1996. Wang Dinglie. Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun [Contemporary China’s Air Force]. Beijing: Shehui kexue chubanshe [Social Science Press], 1989. Wang Taiping. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1957–​1969 [A Diplomatic History of the People’s Republic of China, 1957–​1969]. Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Press], 1998. Wang Wenrong. “Introduction: Studying and Carrying out President Jiang’s Important Strategic Thoughts.” In Sun, Zhongguo tese de junshi biange [RMA with Chinese Characteristics],  1–​10. Wang Xiangen. “Amazing Victories:  Combat Experience of the AAA Sixty-​first Division in the War to Resist America and Aid Vietnam.” Junshi lishi [Military History] 9 (1995): 7–​15. —​—​—​ . Yuanyue kangmei shilu [True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US]. Beijing: Guoji wenhua chubangongsi [International Culture Publishing Co.], 1990. —​—​—​ . Zhongguo mimi da fabing:  yuanyue kangmei shilu [The Secret Dispatch of Chinese Forces: True Stories of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting the US]. Ji’nan: Ji’nan chubanshe [ Ji’nan Publishing], 1992. Wang Zhaojun. Shui shale Lin Biao [Who Killed Lin Biao]. Taipei, Taiwan: Shijie chubanshe [World Publishing House], 1994. Wu Fang. Conglin yishi: yuanyue kangmei sanji [Personal Stories in the Jungle: Journal of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting America]. Guiyang: Guizhou minzu chubanshe [Guizhou Minority Publishing], 1993. Wu Jiezhang. Zhongguo jindai haijun shi [Modern History of the Chinese Navy]. Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1989. Xiao Shizhong. “An Important Military Operation to Put Out War Flames in Indochina:  How China Aids Vietnam and Resists the U.S.” In Military History Research Division, CAMS, Junqi piaopiao [PLA Flag Fluttering], 2: 445–​62. Xie Guojun. “Maintain the Peace and Safety along the Sino-​Vietnamese Border.” In Military History Research Division, CAMS, Junqi piaopiao [PLA Flag Fluttering], 2: 622–​35. Xie Lifu. Yuenan zhanzheng shilu [Historical Narrative of the Vietnam War]. Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Press], 1993. Xinghuo liaoyuan Composition Department. Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun jiangshuai minglu [Marshals and Generals of the PLA]. Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1987–​1992. Xu Yan. Junshijia Mao Zedong [Mao Zedong as a Military Leader]. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press], 1995. —​—​—​ . Mao Zedong yu kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng [Mao Zedong and the War to Resist America and Aid Korea]. 2nd ed. Beijing:  Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 2006. Yan Xinning. Wei Jie Zhongjiang [Lieutenant General Wei Jie]. Beijing:  Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe [PLA Literature Press], 2005.

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Yang Guoyu. Dangdai zhongguo haijun [Contemporary China’s Navy]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe [China’s Social Science Press], 1987. Yang Kuisong. “Mao Zedong and the Indochina War.” In Li, Zhongguo yu yindu zhina zhanzheng [China and the Indochina Wars], 12–​28. —​—​—​ . “Origins of the U.S.-​Soviet Cold War and Its Impact on China’s Revolution.” In Zhang and Niu, Lengzhan yu zhongguo [The Cold War and China], 51–​88. —​—​—​ . Zouxiang polie:  Mao Zedong yu Moscow de enen yuanyuan [Toward the Split:  Interests and Conflicts between Mao Zedong and Moscow]. Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian [Three Allies Publishing], 1999. Ye Yonglie. Gaoceng jiaoliang [Struggle at the Top]. Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe [Xinjiang People’s Press], 2004. Zhang Aiping. Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun [The PLA]. Beijing:  Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe [Contemporary China Press], 1994. Zhang Baijia. “ ‘Resist America and Aid Korea’ and ‘Aid Vietnam and Resist America’.” In Zhang and Shi, Duikang, boyi, hezuo [Confrontation, Calculation, and Cooperation],  71–​93. Zhang Baijia and Niu Jun, eds. Lengzhan yu zhongguo [The Cold War and China]. Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Press], 2002. Zhang Jinchun and Wu Dazhong. Tiejun xiongfeng [Heroic Experience of an Iron Corps]. Jinzhou, Hubei: Jinzhou yishua [ Jinzhou Printing Office], 2009. Zhang Shihong, Zhang Yanping, and Wu Di. Hu zhiming xiaodao shang de 701 Tian:  Zhongguo jizhe Yuezhan jianwenlu [701 Days through the Ho Chi Minh Trail:  The Vietnam War in My Eyes]. Beijing:  Jiefangjun wenyi [PLA Literature Press], 2007. Zhang Tuosheng and Shi Wen. Duikang, boyi, hezuo:  zhongmei anquan weiji guanli anli fenxi [Confrontation, Calculation, and Cooperation: Case Studies of Security Consideration and Crisis Management between China and the United States]. Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Press], 2000. Zhang Yutian. Zhongguo jindai junshishi [Military History of Modern China]. Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe [Liaoning People’s Press], 1983. Zheng Yi. Guogong jiandiezhan qishinian [Seventy-​Year Spy War between the GMD and CCP]. Hong Kong: Sifeier chubanshe [Shafer Publishing], 2001. Zi Ding. Li Qiang zhuan [Biography of Li Qiang]. Beijing:  Renmin chubanshe [People’s Press], 2004. EN G L I S H-​L A N G UAG E S O U R C ES Documents, Memoirs, and Papers Barrett, David M., ed. Lyndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam Papers: A Documentary Collection. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997. Blackburn, Donald Dunwody. The Donald D.  Blackburn Papers. (Available through Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA: US Army Military History Institute; includes information about his work in the 5th Military Region (Mekong Delta), and also his

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having been director of Special Warfare, ODCSOPS (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations). Bui, Tin. Following Ho Chi Minh:  The Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel. London: Hurst, 1995. CCP Central Committee. Selected Documents of the Fifteenth CCP National Congress. Beijing: New Star Publishing House, 1997. Cheng, J. Chester, ed. The Politics of the Chinese Red Army: A Translation of the Bulletin of Activities of the People’s Liberation Army. Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966. Deng Xiaoping. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. Beijing:  Foreign Languages Press, 1994. “Document:  Comrade B on the Plot of the Reactionary Chinese Clique against Vietnam.” In Robert, Behind the Bamboo Curtain, 467–​86. Dung, Van Tien. Our Great Spring Victory. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977. Guo, Huiyun. “Chinese Response to the U.S. Rolling Thunder Campaign.” In Li, Voices from the Vietnam War,  85–​92. Giap, Vo Nguyen. Banner of People’s War:  The Party’s Military Line. New York: Praeger, 1970. —​—​—​ . Military Art of People’s War. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970. —​—​—​ .People’s War, People’s Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries. New York: Praeger, 1962. Giap, Vo Nguyen, and Van Tien Dung. How We Won the War. Ypsilanti, MI: RECON Publications, 1976. Ho Chi Minh. On Revolution. New York: Praeger, 1967. Hoang, Van Hoan. A Drop in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan’s Revolutionary Reminiscences. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1988. Hong Xuezhi. “The CPVF (Chinese People’s Volunteers Force)’s Combat and Logistics.” In Li, Millett, and Yu, Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, 106–​38. Information Bureau, the PRC State Council. White Papers of China’s National Defense in 1998. Beijing: Foreign Languages, 2000. Kau, Michael Y. M., and John K. Leung, eds. The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949–​1976. 3 vols. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986–​1992. Kesaris, Paul, ed. Documents of the National Security Council. Microfilm ed. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1987. Kick, Russel. Listing of Classified and Restricted Documents at the Air Force Historical Research Agency. Memory Hole. 2002. http://​www.thememoryhole.org. Lester, Robert. Vietnam Documents and Research Notes Series Translation and Analysis of Significant Viet Cong/​ North Vietnamese Documents:  Microfilmed from the Holdings of the Library of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Vietnam War research collections. Bethesda, MD:  University Publications of America, 1991.

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Lofgren, William W., and Richard R. Sexton. Air War in Northern Laos: 1 April–​30 June 1971. Project CHECO Report. Christiansburg, VA: Dalley Book Service, 1993. Luplow, Bill. “Skyhawks versus the Viet Cong.” In Dorr, Marine Air, 204–​20. Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong on Diplomacy. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1998. —​—​—​ . On Protracted War. English trans. Peking (Beijing):  Foreign Languages Press, 1960. —​—​—​ . Selected Works of Mao Tse-​tung. 4 vols. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977. McGarvey, Patrick H., ed. Visions of Victory: Selected Vietnamese Communist Military Writings, 1964–​1968. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1969. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. The Truth about Vietnam-​China Relations over the Last Thirty Years. Hanoi:  Vietnamese Government Publishing, 1979. Ministry of National Defense, PRC. “China’s Military Strategy.” China’s Defense White Paper of 2015. http://​www.eng.mod.gov.cn/​Press/​2015-​05/​26. National Intelligence Council (NIC). Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948–​1975. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005. —​—​—​ . Tracking the Dragon: National Intelligence Estimates on China during the Era of Mao, 1948–​1976. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004. Nixon, Richard M. No More Vietnams. New York: Arbor House, 1985. Preobrazhensky, Konstantin. “Russian Espionage on China.” American Review of China Studies 8, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 31–​4 0. Reedy, George. Lyndon B.  Johnson, A  Memoir. New  York:  Andrews and McMeel, 1982. Special Report. “Status of Soviet and Chinese Military Aid to North Vietnam,” September 3, 1965. Special Intelligence Material, vol. VII, Box 50, National Security File: Vietnam, Johnson Library. T, Major. “Russian Missile Officers in Vietnam.” In Li, Voices from the Vietnam War,  65–​72. Tai, Phung The. Remembering Uncle Ho; Memories in War Years. Hanoi:  Gioi Publishers, 2005. Thai, Hoang Van. How South Viet Nam Was Liberated. Hanoi: Gioi Publishers, 2005. Trà̂n, Văn Nh·ụt, and Christian L. Arevian. The Unfinished War: The Memoirs of Gen. Tran Van Nhut. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2009. Truong, Huynh Thu. “No Final Victory, No Family Life.” In Li, Voices from the Vietnam War,  55–​6 4. Truong, Nhu Tang. Journal of a Vietcong. London: Jonathan Cape, 1985. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions with the Senate Armed Service Committee (Historical Series), 1965, vol. 17. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1992.

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US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States: China, Korea, Vietnam, and Indochina, 1945–​72. 8  vols. Washington, DC:  US Government Printing Office, 1982–​1989. US Military Academy. Maps of the Vietnam War. West Point, NY:  Department of History, United States Military Academy, 1990s. http://​resolver.library.cornell. edu/​misc/​4168649. US Navy. An Analysis of SA-​2 Missile Activity in North Vietnam from July 1965 through March 1968. FPO San Francisco: CINCPACFLT, 1968. —​—​—​ . Air Delivered Weapons: Effectiveness against Waterborne Logistic Craft in North Vietnam. FPO San Francisco: CINCPACFLT, 1968. —​—​—​ . Sea Dragon Ship Engagements with North Vietnamese Coastal Defenses. FPO San Francisco, CA: CINCPACFLT, 1967. Van, Dinh Thi. I Engaged in Intelligence Work. Hanoi: Gioi Publishers, 2006. War Experience Recapitulation Committee of the High-​Level Military Institute. The Anti-​U.S. Resistance War for National Salvation 1954–​75:  Military Events. Hanoi: NVA Publishing House, 1980. Westad, Odd Arne, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tungand, and James G.  Hershberg, eds. “77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–​1977.” In Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 22. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1998. Westmoreland, William C.  Report on the War in Vietnam. Washington, DC:  US Government Printing Office, 1969. —​—​—​ . A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976. Xinhua News Agency. China’s Foreign Relations:  A Chronology of Events, 1949–​88. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989. Xu Xiangqian. “The Purchase of Arms from Moscow.” In Li, Millett, and Yu, Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, 139–​4 6. Zhang, Liang. The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership’s Decision to Use Force against Their Own People—​in Their Own Words. New York: Public Affairs, 2001. Zhou Baoshan. “China’s Crouching Dragon.” In Peters and Li, Voices from the Korean War,  85–​96. Zhou Shunfen. “The Dragon’s Tale: Chinese Troops in the Jungle.” In Li, Voices from the Vietnam War,  73–​84. Books, Articles, and Other Materials Andrew, Christopher M., and Vasili Mitrokhin. The Sword and the Shield:  The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB. New York: Basic Books, 1999. Ang, Cheng Guan. Vietnamese Communists’ Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956–​1962. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1997.

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Chen, Jian, and Xiaobing Li. “China and the End of the Cold War.” In From Détente to the Soviet Collapse; The Cold War from 1975 to 1991, edited by Malcolm Muir, Jr., 120–​33. Lexington: Virginia Military Institute, 2006. Cheung, Tai Ming, ed. Forging China’s Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. Clay, Lucius D. USAF Operations in Laos: 1 January 1970–​30 June 1971. Christianburg, VA: Dalley Book Service, 1994. Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1989. Colvin, John. Giap: Volcano under Snow. New York: Soho Press, 1996. Cowley, Robert, ed. The Cold War:  A Military History. New  York:  Random House, 2005. Currey, Cecil B. Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam’s Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1997. Daddis, Gregory. Westmoreland’s War:  Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Davidson, Phillip B.  Vietnam at War–​The History:  1946–​1975. New  York:  Oxford University Press, 1988. Dikotter, Frank. Mao’s Great Famine:  The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–​1962. New York: Walker, 2010. Dorr, Robert F. Marine Air: The History of the Flying Leathernecks in Words and Photos. New York: Berkley Caliber Books, 2005. Drenkowski, Dana, and Lester W.  Grau. “Patterns and Predictability:  The Soviet Evaluation of Operation Linebacker II.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20 (October–​December, 2007): 559–​607. Duiker, William J. China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict. Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1987. —​—​—​ . The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981. —​—​—​ . Sacred War; Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam. Boston: McGraw-​Hill,  1995. —​—​—​ . U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994. —​—​—​ .Vietnam: Revolution in Transition. Second edition. Boulder, CO: Westview,  1995. Ebon, Martin. Lin Piao: The Life and Writings of China’s New Ruler. New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1970. Elleman, Bruce A. Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–​1989. London: Routledge, 2001. Errington, Elizabeth Jane, and B. J. C. McKercher, eds. The Vietnam War as History. New York: Praeger, 1990. Fairbank, John K., Rosemary Foot, and Frank A.  Kierman Jr., eds. Chinese Ways in Warfare. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974. Feng, Huiyun. Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-​ Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War. New York: Routledge, 2007.

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Frankum, Ronald B., Jr. Like Rolling Thunder; the Air War in Vietnam, 1964–​1975. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005. Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know:  Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1997. Gadkar-​Wilcox, Wynn. Chapters in “East Asia and the West,” by Xiaobing Li, Yi Sun, and Gadkar-​Wilcox. Unpublished manuscript, 2016. Gaiduk, Ilya V. The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War. Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 1996. Garver, John W. Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-​Hall,  1993. Garzart, Ray T.  U.S. Involvement in Vietnam, 1964–​1968. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Research Coordinator Office, 1997. http://​www.au.af.mil/​au/​ database/​research/​ay1995/​awc/​garzart.htm. Gilks, Anne, and Gerald Segal. China and the Arms Trade. New  York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1985. Girling, John L. S. People’s War; Conditions and Consequences in China and South East Asia. New York: Praeger, 1969. Gittinger, Ted, ed. The Johnson Years: A Vietnam Roundtable. Austin: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas Press, 1993. Godwin, Paul H.  B. “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine:  1949–​ 1999.” In Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting,  23–​55. Goodman, David S. G., and Gerald Segal, eds. China in the Nineties: Crisis Management and Beyond. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991. Graff, David A., and Robin Higham, eds. A Military History of China. Extended ed. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2012. Grasso, June, Jay Corrin, and Michael Kort. Modernization and Revolution in China; From the Opium Wars to World Power. 3rd ed. Armonk, NY:  M. E. Sharpe, 2004. Gries, Peter Hays. China’s New Nationalism:  Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. Halberstam, David. Ho. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1987. Hanson, Victor David. Carnage and Culture; Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power. New York: Anchor Books, 2002. Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–​1975. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw Hill, 1996. —​—​—​ . LBJ and Vietnam:  A Different Kind of War. Austin:  University of Texas Press, 1994. Hershberg, James G., and Chen Jian. “Informing the Enemy: Sino-​American ‘Signaling’ and the Vietnam War, 1965.” In Roberts, Behind the Bamboo Curtain, 193–​258. Hess, Gary R.  Vietnam:  Explaining America’s Lost War. Malden, MA:  Blackwell Publishing, 2009. Hevia, James L.  Cherishing Men from Afar:  Qing Guest Ritual and the McCartney Embassy of 1793. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995.

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Hoang, Ngoc Lung. General Offensives of 1968–​ 1969. Indochina Monographs. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1981. Hunt, Michael H. The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. Jencks, Harlan W. From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–​1981. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982. Joffe, Ellis. The Chinese Army after Mao. Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1987. —​—​—​ . Party and Army:  Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1948–​64. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967. Kaiser, David E. American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. Kang, David C.  East Asia before the West:  Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. Karmel, Solomon. China and the People’s Liberation Army. New  York:  St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Kau, Michael Y. M., ed. The Lin Biao Affair: Power Politics and Military Coup. White Plains, NY: International Arts and Science Press, 1975. Keegan, John. A History of Warfare. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993. Keith, Ronald C. The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989. Kelley, Michael. Where We Were in Vietnam: A Comprehensive Guide to the Firebases, Military Installations, and Naval Vessels of the Vietnam War. Central Point, OR: Hellgate Press, 2002. Kenny, Henry J.  “Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China.” In Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting, 217–​4 0. Khoo, Nicholas. Collateral Damage:  Sino-​Soviet Rivalry and the Termination of the Sino-​Vietnamese Alliance. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. Lanning, Michael Lee, and Dan Cragg. Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnam’s Armed Forces. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008. Lawrence, Mark Atwood. The Vietnam War: A Concise International History. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008. Lawson, Eugene. The Sino-​Vietnamese Conflict. New York: Praeger, 1984. Li, Xiaobing. China’s Battle for Korea: The 1951 Spring Offensive. Bloomington: Indianan University Press, 2014. —​—​—​ . Civil Liberties in China. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-​CLIO, 2010. —​—​—​ . A History of the Modern Chinese Army. Lexington:  University Press of Kentucky, 2007. —​—​—​ . “PLA Attacks and Amphibious Operations during the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954–​1955 and 1958.” In Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting, 143–​72. —​—​—​ . Voices from the Vietnam War; Stories of American, Asian and Russian Veterans. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010.

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—​—​—​, ed. China at War; An Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-​CLIO, 2012. Li, Xiaobing, and Hongshan Li, eds. China and the United States: A New Cold War History. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998. Li, Xiaobing, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu, trans. and eds. Mao’s Generals Remember Korea. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Li, Xiaobing, and Patrick Fuliang Shan, eds. Ethnic China: Identity, Assimilation, and Resistance. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015. Li, Xiaobing, and Xiansheng Tian, eds. Evolution of Power: China’s Struggle, Survival, and Success. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014. Li, Zhisui. The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao’s Personal Physician. New York: Random House, 1994. Liu, Xiaoyuan. “From Five ‘Imperial Domains’ to a ‘Chinese Nation’:  A Perceptual and Political Transformation in Recent History.” In Ethnic China:  Identity, Assimilation, and Resistance, edited by Xiaobing Li and Patrick Fuliang Shan, 3–​38. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015. Lockhart, Greg. Nation in Arms:  The Origins of the People’s Army of Vietnam. Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1989. Logevall, Fredrik. “Bringing in the ‘Other Side’:  New Scholarship on the Vietnam War.” Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 1–​22. —​—​—​ . Embers of War:  The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam. New York: Random House, 2014. Luthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-​Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. —​—​—​ . “The Vietnam War and China’s Third-​Line Defense Planning before the Cultural Revolution, 1964–​ 6 6.” Journal of Cold War Studies 10 (Winter 2008): 26–​51. Lynn, John A.  Battle:  A History of Combat and Culture. New  York:  Basic Books, 2008. Matray, James I., ed. Northeast Asia and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman: Japan, China, and the Two Koreas. Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2012. McMahon, Robert J. Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War Documents and Essays. 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Cengage Learning Publishing, 2003. McNamara, Robert S., with Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Times Books, 1995. Meisner, Maurice. Mao’s China: A History of the People’s Republic. New York: The Free Press, 1977. Mertha, Andrew. Brothers in Arms: Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975–​1979. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014. Michel, Marshall L. Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam, 1965–​1972. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Mikesh, Robert C. Flying Dragons: The South Vietnamese Air Force. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2005.

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Military History Institute of Vietnam. Victory in Vietnam:  The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–​1975. Translated by Merle L.  Pribbenow. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002. Milne, David. “ ‘Our Equivalent of Guerilla Warfare:’ Walt Rostow and the Bombing of North Vietnam, 1961–​68.” Journal of Military History 71 ( January 2007): 169–​203. Moss, George Donelson. Vietnam, An American Ordeal. 6th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2010. Muir, Malcolm, Jr., and Mark F. Wilkinson, eds. The Most Dangerous Years: The Cold War, 1953–​1975. Lexington: Virginia Military Institute, 2005. Needham, Joseph, and Robin D.  S. Yates. Science and Civilization in China. Vol. 5, Military Technology. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Nguyen, Lien-​Hang T. Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012. Niu Jun. “The Origins of the Sino-​Soviet Alliance.” In Westad, Brothers in Arms, 47–​89. O’Balance, Edgar. The Indo-​China War, 1945–​1954:  A Study in Guerrilla Warfare. London: Faber and Faber, 1964. O’Dowd, Edward C. Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War. New York: Routledge, 2006. Ostermann, Christian F. Inside China’s Cold War. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2008. Papp, Daniel S.  Vietnam:  The View from Moscow, Peking, Washington. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1981. Parker, Geoffrey, ed. The Cambridge History of Warfare. New  York:  Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pearson, Willard. The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966–​1968. Vietnam Studies. Washington, DC: Department of the US Army, 1975. Peters, Richard, and Xiaobing Li. Voices from the Korean War:  Personal Stories of American, Korean, and Chinese Soldiers. Lexington:  University Press of Kentucky, 2004. Pike, Douglas. A History of Vietnamese Communism, 1925–​1976. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. —​—​—​ . PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986. —​—​—​ . Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987. Pollack, Jonathan D.  “The Transformation of the Asian Security Order; Assessing China’s Impact.” In Shambaugh, Power Shift, 321–​45. Porter, Gareth, ed. Vietnam:  A History in Documents. New  York:  New American Library, 1981. Prados, John. The Hidden History of the Vietnam War. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995. —​—​—​ . Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–​1975. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009.

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Radchenko, Sergey. Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-​Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–​1967. Washington, DC:  Woodrow Wilson International Scholars Center, 2009. Reed, William P.  An Analysis of the Sino-​Soviet Dispute in Terms of United States Military Strategy in Vietnam. Air War College Research Report, no. 3143. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War University Press, 2010. Roberts, Priscilla, ed. Behind the Bamboo Curtain:  China, Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. Robinson, Thomas W. “The Sino-​Soviet Border Conflicts of 1969; New Evidence Three Decades Later.” In Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting, 198–​216. Robinson, Thomas W., and David Shambaugh, eds. Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1994. Ross, Robert S.  The Indochina Tangle:  China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975–​ 1979. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. —​—​—​ . Negotiating Cooperation:  The United States and China, 1969–​1989. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995. Ross, Robert S., and Jiang Changbin, eds. Re-​examining the Cold War:  U.S.-​China Diplomacy, 1954–​1973. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. Rotter, Andrew Jon. Light at the End of the Tunnel:  A Vietnam War Anthology. Wilmington, DL: Scholarly Resources Books, 1999. Ryan, Mark A., David M.  Finkelstein, and Michael A.  McDevitt, eds. Chinese Warfighting: The PLA experience since 1949. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003. SarDesai, D. R. Vietnam; Past and Present. 4th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2005. Sawyer, Ralph D.  The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New  York:  Basic Books, 2007. Schlight, John. A War Too Long: The USAF in Southeast Asia, 1961–​1975. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, 1996. Schulzinger, Robert D. “The Johnson Administration, China, and the Vietnam War.” In Ross and Jiang, Re-​examining the Cold War, 238–​61. Scobell, Andrew. China’s Use of Military Force:  Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Segal, Gerald. “Foreign Policy.” In Goodman and Segal, China in the Nineties, 166–​79. Shambaugh, David. Modernizing China’s Military:  Progress, Problems, and Prospects. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002. —​—​—​, ed. Power Shift; China and Asia’s New Dynamics. Berkeley:  University of California Press, 2005. Sharp, U.  S. Grant. Strategy for Defeat:  Vietnam in Retrospect. New  York:  Presidio Press, 1986. Shen Zhihua. “China Sends Troops to Korea: Beijing’s Policy-​making Process.” In Li and Li, China and the United States,  13–​48. —​—​—​ . “Conflicts between China and the Soviet Union on Assisting Vietnam and Resisting America, 1961–​1973.” http://​www.shenzhihua.net.

926

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Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia. Mao and the Sino-​Soviet Partnership, 1945–​1959. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015. Sheng, Michael M. Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997. Short, Philip. Mao: A Life. New York: Henry Holt, 1999. Smith, Ralph B. An International History of the Vietnam War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983–​1991. Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. 3rd ed. New York: Norton, 2013. Stephen, Ambrose E. “Bombing Hanoi, Mining Haiphong, and the Moscow Summit.” In Rotter, Light at the End of the Tunnel, 126–​37. Strayer, Robert. The Communist Experiment; Revolution, Socialism, and Global Conflict in the Twentieth Century. Boston, MA: McGraw Hill, 2007. Sun, Yi, and Xiaobing Li. “Mao Zedong and the CCP: Adaptation, Centralization, and Succession.” In Li and Tian, Evolution of Power,  27–​60. Sunzi. The Art of War. Translated and with introduction by Roger Ames. New York: Ballantine Books, 1993. Sutter, Robert G. Chinese Foreign Policy: Power and Policy since the Cold War. 4th ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016. Thompson, Wayne. To Hanoi and Back: The United States Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966–​1973. Washington, DC: US Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000. Tucker, Spencer C. Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999. Tung, Nguyen Vu. “Interpreting Beijing and Hanoi:  A View of Sino-​Vietnamese Relations, 1965–​1970.” In Westad, Chen, Tonnesson, Tung, and Hershberg, eds., Cold War International History Project,  43–​65. Turse, Nick. Kill Anything That Moves:  The Real American War in Vietnam. Los Angeles: Picador, 2013. VanDeMark, Brian. Into the Quagmire:  Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Van de Ven, Hans. Warfare in Chinese History. Boston: Brill Academic Publishing, 2000. Wang, Dong. The United States and China:  A History from the 18th Century to the Present. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. Westad, Odd Arne, ed. Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-​Soviet Alliance, 1945–​1963. Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 1998. —​—​—​ . Reviewing the Cold War:  Approaches, Interpretations, Theory. London:  Frank Cass, 2000. Whiting, Allen S.  The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence:  India and Indochina. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975. Wiest, Andrew. The Vietnam War. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2002. Willbanks, James H. Abandoning Vietnam. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004. —​—​—​ . The Tet Offensive. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

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Williams, William Appleman, Thomas J. McCormick, Lloyd C. Gardner, and Walter LaFeber, eds. America in Vietnam: A Documented History. New York: Norton, 1985. Worthing, Peter. Occupation and Revolution:  China and the Vietnamese August Revolution of 1945. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Yang Kuisong. “Mao Zedong and the Indochina Wars.” In Roberts, Behind the Bamboo Curtain,  55–​96. You, Ji. “Changing Leadership Consensus; The Domestic Context of War Games.” In Across the Taiwan Strait; Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995–​1996 Crisis, edited by Suisheng Zhao, 77–​98. New York: Routledge, 1999. —​—​—​ . China’s Military Transformation. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2016. Young, Marilyn B. The Vietnam Wars, 1945–​1990. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. Yu, Bin. “What China Learned from Its ‘Forgotten War’ in Korea?” In Li, Millett, and Yu, Mao’s Generals Remember Korea,  9–​29. Zhai, Qiang. “Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–​ 1965:  New Chinese Evidence.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos. 6–​7 (Winter 1995–​96): 233–​50. —​—​—​ . China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–​1975. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. —​—​—​ . “Opposing Negotiations:  China and the Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965–​68.” Pacific Historical Review 68, no. 1 (February 1999): 21–​49. —​—​—​ . “Reassessing China’s Role in the Vietnam War: Some Mysteries Explored.” In Li and Li, China and the United States, 97–​118. Zhang, Shuguang. “Beijing’s Aid to Hanoi and the United States-​China Confrontations, 1964–​1968.” In Roberts, Behind the Bamboo Curtain, 259–​88. —​—​—​ . Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-​American Confrontations, 1949–​1958. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992. —​—​—​ . Mao’s Military Romanticism; China and the Korean War, 1950–​ 1953. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. Zhang, Xiaoming. Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979–​1991. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015. —​—​—​ . “The Vietnam War, 1964–​1969:  A Chinese Perspective.” Journal of Military History 60 (October 1996): 731–​62. Zhao, Quansheng. Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996. Zhu, Fang. Gun Barrel Politics; Party-​ Army Relations in Mao’s China. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998. Zubok, Vladislav, and Constantine Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War:  From Stalin to Khrushchev. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.

928

92

INDEX

For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–​53) may, on occasion, appear on only one of those pages. Figures are indicated by f following the page number 

17th parallel, 204, 207 18th parallel, 207 20th parallel, 204, 205, 207, 208, 234 21st parallel, 204 1911 Chinese Revolution, 28–​29 1954 Geneva Conference, 45–​4 6, 47,  49–​50 Accords of, 46 (see also Indochina Settlement) 1958 Lushan Conference, 143 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, 157–​58,  266  AAA (antiaircraft artillery) guns, 45, 109, 125–​26, 153–​54, 157,  177–​78 12.7mm, 103, 110, 141, 172–​73, 200, 206 14.5mm, 110 37mm, 1, 90, 103, 104–​5, 106–​7, 110, 116, 119, 122, 124–​25, 126, 141, 154–​55, 157, 172–​73, 200, 206 55mm, 90, 154–​55

57mm, 90, 103, 110, 119, 124–​25,  140–​41 76mm, 90, 119, 122, 141 85mm, 8, 90, 103, 104–​5, 106–​7, 110, 124–​25, 126, 141, 172–​73, 198–​99,  200 100mm, 90, 119, 122, 126, 140–​41 Chinese-​made, 90, 137–​38, 140, 141–​ 42, 157, 241 machine guns, 184 rounds of, 119, 206 Russian-​made, 69, 90, 103, 137, 151–​52 Abrams, Creighton, 235 Africa,  25–​27 Ainu, 25 air strikes, 68, 73, 74–​75, 102–​3, 109–​10, 117–​18, 121, 151–​52, 165, 171–​72, 174, 176, 177–​78, 182, 183, 199, 200–​2, 206, 244 results of, 118, 140, 173–​74 aircraft, 102 A-​4B,  108–​9

03

300  •  Index

air strikes (Cont.) A-​4C Skyhawk,  108–​9 A-​6 bomber, 211 A-​6A mine-​laying planes, 213 A-​7 bomber, 211, 244 A-​7E mine-​laying planes, 213 B-​52, 140–​41, 182, 230–​31, 241 crash sites of, 104–​5, 111–​12 F-​4 fighter/​bomber, 100,  154–​55 F-​4B,  108–​9 F-​4C Phantom, 104–​5, 137–​38,  153–​54 F-​105 Thunderchief, 106, 109, 116–​17, 122, 125–​26, 139, 153, 154–​55, 200–​1,  202 F-​105D,  139–​4 0 F-​105F, 124–​25,  139–​4 0 F-​105G,  139–​4 0 F-​111,  241 from China, 229 H-​21 unmanned, 243 H-​147 unmanned, 243 MiG-​21, 69, 256 MiG fighters, 102, 256 of America, 103, 104–​5, 108–​10, 114, 118, 122, 126, 127, 138, 141, 152, 153–​54, 167, 172–​73, 174, 175–​76, 184–​85, 200, 241, 243, 244 Qian fighters, 256 Qiang strafing aircraft, 256 reconnaissance drone, 146 RF-​4C, 124–​25,  152 Russian-​made jet fighters, 35, 256 transport planes, 69 Albania, 72 Allied powers, 28–​29 Amur River, 238–​39 Andong (Dandong), 124 Anti-​French movement,  28–​29 Anti-​Japanese War, 31, 33, 174–​75 artillery, 210, 228–​29, 241, 260–​62,  263–​6 4

75mm recoilless guns, 45 82mm mortars, 198–​99 85mm guns, 264 100–​D mortars, 264 130mm guns, 264 152mm howitzers, 264 from China, 43–​4 4, 45, 46–​47, 210,  228–​29 Divisions of, 46–​47 rocket launchers, 45, 264 rounds of, 43–​4 4, 45, 46–​47, 210,  228–​29 training, 47 Asia, 7–​8, 9, 24–​27, 28, 34–​35, 259–​60 Communists in, 30–​31, 32, 68, 236 Asian-​Pacific region, 8–​9, 268  Bac Can, 157 Bac Giang, 204, 205–​6, 243–​4 4 Bac Hao, 139 Bac Ninh, 127 Bac Son, 244 Bacha Island, 238–​39 Ban Phei, 179, 186 Bao Dai, Emperor, 34, 36 Bao Ha, 116–​17, 172–​73 Bao He, 124–​25 Beijing, 2, 29, 34, 50, 63–​6 4, 106, 149, 211, 228–​29, 235, 259 agreements with Hanoi, 4, 230 policy of, 72–​73, 136, 216–​17, 245–​4 6,  257–​58 propaganda of, 71, 245–​4 6, 259 Regional Military Command, 83–​84, 106, 121, 198 Binh Nguyen, 182–​83 Black Flag Army, 27–​28 Bo Yipo, 76–​77 Bolshevik, 32 Border Campaign, 39–​41, 44. See also Cao Bang, Battle of Borodin, Mikhail, 32–​33

310

Index  •  301

Brezhnev, Leonid, 51, 66–​68 Britain, 28, 37 Brunei, 215 Buddhism, 28  Cai Ping, 166 Cam Pha, 199, 211 Cambodia, 25, 27–​28, 42–​43, 49–​50, 87, 120–​21, 209, 234–​35, 258, 259–​60, 262, 263 Communists in, 33, 214–​15, 232, 233 Cao Bang, 38–​39, 260 Battle of, 39–​41 (see also Border Campaign) Carter, Jimmy, 259–​60 CCP (Chinese Communist Party), 30, 41, 142–​43, 147–​48, 157–​58, 258, 267 congresses of, 148, 150, 266–​67,  268–​69 members of, 120, 121–​22 Party Center, 31–​32, 69, 76–​77, 157–​ 58, 225, 227–​28, 237, 267–​69 CCP Central Committee, 31, 37, 78f, 144–​45, 151, 237, 266–​67 Politburo of, 70–​71, 76–​77, 78f, 144–​ 45, 149, 150, 212–​13, 218 Vietnam Aid Leading Group, 228 CCP Central Military Commission (CMC), 1–​2, 37, 39, 77, 79, 81, 143–​4 4, 151, 198, 212–​13, 227, 262, 266 instructions of, 105–​6, 107–​8, 148–​ 49, 157, 217, 242–​43, 260 war policy, 113–​14, 155, 243, 259, 264 Cha Lap, 234 Changsha, 75–​76,  166–​67 Charton, Pierre, 40, 41 Chen Biao, 181 Chen Geng, 38, 39–​41 Chen Huiting, 243–​4 4 Chen Jingxiao, 115f

Chen Pai, 241–​42 Chen Shiqu, 83, 85, 186–​87 Chen Xilian, 218 Chen Yi, 65, 87 Chen Yushan, 109–​10 Chen Zhiguang, 231 Chiang Kai-​shek. See Jiang Jieshi Chiang Mai, 145–​4 6 China, 6, 9, 23, 24–​25, 27, 123 China, People’s Republic (PRC), 1, 45–​4 6, 48, 186, 226, 248,  268–​69 agreements with Vietnam, 75–​76, 229, 230, 231–​32, 233 aid to Laos, 229 aid to Vietnam, 3–​4, 11, 30–​31, 43–​ 45, 46–​47, 49–​50, 170, 189–​90, 225, 226, 227–​30, 233, 235–​36, 237 border of, 5–​6, 11–​12, 36, 44, 45–​4 6,  259–​60 Commission of Economic Affairs, 77 Commission of Foreign Economic Affairs, 77, 230 Commission of State Economic Planning, 77 defense of, 5, 10, 11, 23, 36, 246–​47,  268–​69 embassy in Hanoi, 86–​87, 138, 149, 181–​82,  210 founding of, 23, 29–​30, 215, 226 government of, 29, 65–​66, 71–​72, 74–​ 75, 147–​48, 226–​27, 228 intervention in Korea, 4, 5–​6, 23, 41, 48, 52, 197–​98 involvement in Vietnam, 30–​31, 48, 52, 64, 65, 68, 74, 102, 155, 197–​98,  255 leaders of, 30–​31, 63–​6 4, 70, 225, 245, 258, 266–​67, 268 Ministry of Defense, 148–​49 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 77, 217, 233

302

302  •  Index

China, People’s Republic (PRC) (Cont.) Ministry of Foreign Trade, 77, 233,  234–​35 Ministry of Petroleum Industry,  230–​32 Ministry of Railways, 77, 82–​83 Ministry of Transportation, 77, 233 National People’s Congress (NPC), 1–​2, 70, 71–​72, 227, 228, 267 National Task Team of Supporting Vietnam, 228 National Trade Union, 32–​33 rearm the Viet Minh, 43–​4 4, 49–​50 State Council of, 1–​2, 77, 78f, 227–​28,  230 support Ho, 23, 34, 72 training Vietnamese in China, 43 Transportation Leading Group to Assist Vietnam, 76–​77 War to Assist Vietnam and Resist America, 226 China, Republic of (ROC), 28–​29 Chinese Civil War, 29, 31, 37, 38, 39, 48, 123–​24, 167,  174–​75 Chinese Nationalists, 28.–​29 See also GMD Chinese warfighting, 5, 6–​7 Chiphu, 235 Chongzuo, 243 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 102 CMAG (Chinese Military Advisory Group), 37, 38–​39, 45, 47, 187 advising the PAVN, 39, 41, 42 headquarters, 38, 46 in Laos, 43 organization of, 37, 38 problems with Viet Minh, 39–​4 0, 41 training the PAVN, 42–​43 Co To Island, 199–​200 Cold War, 7–​8, 34–​35, 50–​51, 52, 68, 73,  255–​56 and China, 136, 155, 226, 248, 255

end of, 10, 226, 248 global, 5, 7, 9, 10, 29, 34–​35, 256–​57 Comintern (Communist International Congress), 32 Commando Hunt, Operation of, 63–​6 4 communism, 6, 50, 267 communist, 120 alliance, 29, 34–​35, 50, 225–​26 movements, 29, 30, 50, 51, 225–​26 Confucianism, 6, 7, 27, 28 CPVF (Chinese People’s Volunteer Force), 41, 42, 45, 167, 174–​75 Cui Qingfu, 115f, 116 Cultural Revolution, 7–​8, 90–​91, 119–​ 20, 123, 137, 144–​45, 147, 155–​56 PLA in, 147–​52, 156, 157–​58 CVFAV (Chinese Volunteer Forces to Assist Vietnam), 63–​6 4, 77–​79,  78f air defense, 63–​6 4, 102–​3, 125, 128, 151–​52, 173, 174–​75, 179, 183, 237, 241 casualties of, 3, 152, 165–​66, 174,  177–​78 chain of command, 80, 83–​84, 165 combat engineering, 102, 119, 206–​7 cooperation with NVA, 63–​6 4, 112 court martial of, 189 discipline, 165–​66, 183, 189 highway construction, 102, 165–​66, 179–​89, 190, 206–​7, 237 intelligence of, 63–​6 4, 146–​47 logistics, 78f, 90 morale, 154, 165–​66, 177–​78, 183, 189 officers of, 7 operations, 80 political education, 119, 165–​66 problems of, 177–​78, 189, 241 railway construction, 102, 125, 165–​ 66, 177–​78, 190, 206–​7, 237 training of, 119, 178 veterans of, 1–​2, 3, 13–​14, 178

30

Index  •  303

CVFAV AAA force, 46–​47, 82, 85, 89, 90, 100–​3, 105–​6, 110–​11, 115f, 137, 147, 149, 151–​52, 175, 182 active air defense of, 104, 106–​8, 109, 126–​27,  173 battalions of, 175, 182, 185 “body count” by, 105, 152–​55, 173, 185, 201 casualties of, 109–​10, 112, 114, 116, 125–​26, 127, 139, 140, 152, 153–​55 combat effectiveness, 112–​13, 114, 126, 127–​28, 136,  153–​54 command of, 77–​79, 78f, 115f, 144, 165 fire zones of, 124–​26, 139–​4 0 in central zone, 78f, 102, 115f, 154 in east zone, 78f, 81, 100–​1, 115f in west zone, 78f, 82, 100–​1, 115f, 123–​ 24, 139, 152 interrogating American pilots, 106,  145–​4 6 learning curve of, 114, 127–​28, 144 outcome of battles, 105, 106, 109, 110, 116–​17, 153–​54, 185, 201 outposts, 104–​5, 109, 110, 116, 139 political control, 118, 119–​20 positions of, 108–​9, 127, 153–​54, 175 problems of, 138–​39, 140, 189 protection of, 108–​9, 114, 116–​17, 154, 173 regiments of, 172–​73 rotation of, 82, 100–​1, 113–​14, 124, 165–​66,  178 searchlights,  153–​54 tactics, 117, 126–​27, 136, 151–​53 training, 124, 153–​54 transportation, 103–​4, 107, 121 withdrawal of, 136 CVFAV AAA divisions: Sixth Division, 82 Nineteenth Division, 82 Thirty-​First Division, 1, 82, 100–​1, 102, 115f, 117–​20, 121, 122–​23

1st Regiment, 115f, 118 16th Regiment, 115f, 118 29th Regiment, 115f 319th Regiment, 115f, 118, 119, 121 Thirty-​Second Division, 82, 102, 115f 4th Regiment, 115f 5th Regiment, 115f 6th Regiment, 115f Thirty-​Third Division, 82, 115f 7th Regiment, 115f 8th Regiment, 115f,  154–​55 9th Regiment, 115f 19th Regiment, 115f 22nd Regiment, 115f 28th Regiment, 115f Thirty-​Fourth Division, 82, 115f 18th Regiment, 115f 30th Regiment, 115f 523rd Regiment, 115f 525th Regiment, 115f 528th Regiment, 115f Thirty-​Fifth Division, 82, 115f 13th Regiment, 115f 14th Regiment, 115f 15th Regiment, 115f Thirty-​Seventh Division, 82, 100–​1, 102, 115f,  154–​55 20th Regiment, 115f, 154 21st Regiment, 115f, 154 24th Regiment, 115f, 154 Thirty-​Ninth Division, 115f 25th Regiment, 115f 26th Regiment, 115f 27th Regiment, 115f Sixty-​First Division, 82, 100–​1, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106–​7, 112, 114–​16, 115f,  145–​4 6 601st Regiment, 103, 106, 115f 602nd Regiment, 103, 115f 603rd Regiment, 103, 115f 629th Regiment, 103, 115f commanders of, 103, 104, 145–​4 6

034

304  •  Index

CVFAV AAA divisions: (Cont.) engagements of, 104–​5, 106 Sixty-​Second Division, 82, 102, 115f 604th Regiment, 115f 605th Regiment, 115f 620th Regiment, 115f Sixty-​Third Division, 82, 100–​1, 102, 106–​9, 110, 112, 114–​16, 115f, 118 23rd Regiment, 106–​8, 109, 115f 607th Regiment, 106–​8, 114–​16, 115f 609th Regiment, 106–​8, 109–​10, 115f 627th Regiment, 106–​7, 115f 628th Regiment, 106–​9, 110, 115f casualties of, 109–​10 operational tactics of, 108, 109 Sixty-​Fourth Division, 82, 100–​1, 102, 115f, 123–​28, 140, 152–​54 610th Regiment, 115f,  124–​25 611th Regiment, 115f, 124–​25, 152, 153 612th Regiment, 115f,  124–​25 622nd Regiment, 115f, 124–​25, 152 626th Regiment, 114–​17, 115f, 123–​25,  139 engagements of, 125–​27, 139, 152–​54 Sixty-​Fifth Division, 82, 100–​1, 102, 115f, 117–​18, 123–​25, 140, 152 613th Regiment, 115f, 124 614th Regiment, 115f 615th Regiment, 115f 616th Regiment, 115f 623rd Regiment, 115f Sixty-​Sixth Division, 82, 115f 617th Regiment, 115f 618th Regiment, 115f 624th Regiment, 115f Sixty-​Seventh Division, 82, 100–​1, 102, 114–​16, 115f, 117–​18, 124, 139, 140 608th Regiment, 114–​16, 115f 619th Regiment, 114–​16, 115f 625th Regiment, 114–​16, 115f engagements of, 116–​17

Sixty-​Eighth Division, 82, 115f 2nd Regiment, 115f, 118 3rd Regiment, 115f Seventieth Division, 82, 115f 621st Regiment, 115f 640th Regiment, 115f 641st Regiment, 115f 642nd Regiment, 115f CVFAV Combat Engineering Corps (CVFAV-​CEC), 63–​6 4, 84–​85, 165–​66, 197, 198, 206–​7 AAA units of, 198–​99, 200, 201, 204–​5,  206 air defense of, 199, 200–​1, 206 air force base constructions, 197, 207 casualties of, 200–​1, 202, 206 coastal defense works, 197, 204, 206–​7 command of, 77–​79, 78f,  165–​66 communication establishments, 197, 203 construction machines, 199–​200, 210 construction materials, 199–​200, 205, 210 construction sites, 200, 201, 204, 205, 206 inland defense works, 197, 204, 205–​7 logistics, 202, 205 missions of, 166, 199 offshore island defense works, 197, 210 operations of, 200, 205–​7 problems of, 178, 200–​1, 202, 205, 206 relations with Vietnamese, 202 transportation for, 199, 205, 210 troops of, 197 CVFAV combat engineering divisions: Second Division, 78f, 83–​84, 197, 198, 199, 200–​1, 202, 204 th 7 Regiment, 198, 200–​2 8th Regiment, 78f, 198, 199–​200, 202–​3,  204 9th Regiment, 78f, 198, 201

305

Index  •  305

14th Regiment, 78f officers of, 83–​84, 199, 200–​1 operations of, 201–​2, 203–​4 troops of, 198, 202–​3 Third Division, 78f, 83, 84, 197, 207 Seventh Division, 78f, 197, 204–​7 12th (212th) Regiment, 78f,  204–​6 13th (312th) Regiment, 78f,  204–​7 21st (313th) Regiment, 78f,  204–​6 mission of, 204, 206–​7 operations of, 205–​6 problems of, 205, 206 CVFAV naval operations, 210, 213, 214 air defense, 210, 213 casualties of, 210 chain of command, 78f, 213 Hainan Naval Base, 78f,  210–​11 joint operations with NVA, 210–​11,  213 minesweeping fleet, 213, 214 mine-​sweeping operations, 78f, 212–​14 transport fleet, 78f, 84, 210 troops of, 213 CVFAV RE (Railway Engineering), 63–​6 4, 78f, 125, 149, 165–​67, 173, 177, 178 CVFAV RE First Division, 63, 78f, 82–​ 83, 106–​7, 146–​47, 165–​67, 170–​71, 173, 174–​75, 176, 177–​78 1st Regiment, 78f, 146, 167, 170 2nd Regiment, 78f, 167, 169, 170–​71, 173–​74,  176 3rd Regiment, 78f, 167, 170, 173 4th Regiment, 78f, 167, 170–​71 5th Regiment, 78f, 167, 170, 174–​75,  177 6th Regiment, 167, 177 44th Regiment, 188, 170, 176–​176 58th Regiment, 78f 61st Regiment, 78f casualties of, 167, 174, 177–​78

command of, 83, 166–​67, 170, 173, 174–​75,  176 equipment of, 167 logistics, 178 operations of, 170–​71, 173, 176–​78 problems, 178 troops of, 167, 170, 177–​78 veterans of, 178 CVFAV REC (Road Engineering Corps), 3, 63–​6 4, 84–​85, 149, 179–​ 82, 186, 187, 188–​89 air defense of, 182, 183–​85, 186, 188 casualties of, 174, 182–​83, 185, 188–​89 command of, 77–​79, 78f, 85–​86, 165, 179–​80, 181, 182, 184, 185, 186–​87 construction sites, 183 equipment of, 179, 185, 186–​87 logistics, 178, 179, 185, 188 missions of, 166, 179, 186, 188–​89 new strategies, 184, 186–​87 officers, 182–​84, 185 operations of, 179, 186–​87 problems, 178, 182, 183, 184, 185, 188, 189 protections of, 184, 188 relations with Vietnamese, 183–​84, 186–​87,  188–​89 troops of, 85, 165–​66, 179–​80, 181, 182, 187 CVFAV road engineering divisions: Fourth Division, 78f, 84–​85, 165, 181, 186, 188, 189 16th Regiment, 78f, 181, 186 17th Regiment, 78f, 181, 186 18th Regiment, 78f, 181, 186 19th Regiment, 78f, 181, 186 20th Regiment, 78f, 181, 186 Civilian Construction Brigade, 186 troops of, 181, 188 Fifth Division, 78f, 84–​85, 146–​47, 165, 181, 184, 187, 188, 189 25th Regiment, 78f, 181

306

306  •  Index

CVFAV road engineering divisions (Cont.) 26th Regiment, 78f, 181, 187 27th Regiment, 78f, 181, 187 28th Regiment, 78f, 181, 187 29th Regiment, 78f, 187 40th Regiment, 181 in Laos, 188 operations of, 181, 184, 187, 188 Sixth Division, 78f, 84–​85, 165, 181–​ 83, 185, 186, 188–​89 30th Regiment, 78f 31st Regiment, 78f, 181 32nd Regiment, 78f, 181–​82, 187 33rd Regiment, 78f, 181–​82, 186 34th Regiment, 78f, 181–​82, 185, 186 35th Regiment, 78f, 181–​82, 186 36th Regiment, 181, 182, 186, 188, 189 37th Regiment, 181, 182, 186, 188 40th Yunnan Road Construction Workers Regiment, 181, 186 operations of, 183, 185 Seventh Division, 78f 12th Regiment, 78f 13th Regiment, 78f 21st Regiment, 78f Czechoslovakia, 246, 247  Da Nang, 144, 145–​4 6, 211, 219 Dalai Lama, 51 Damansky Island. See Zhenbao Island Dang Tinh Duc, 100, 106 Dao Cat Ba Island, 200–​2 Daoism (Taoism), 28 de Tassigny, Lattre, 43 Deng Qinghe, 38 Deng Xiaoping, 150–​51, 218, 258, 259–​ 60, 262–​63, 264, 265–​66 Deng Yifan, 38, 39 Diem, Ngo Dinh, 47–​48, 64–​65 Dien Bien Phu, 45, 179, 182–​83 Battle of, 43, 45–​4 6, 187 Ding Tiren, 169

Dinh Tung, 243–​4 4 DMZ (demilitarized zone), 86–​87, 234 Dong Dang, 204–​5 Dong Khe, 39–​4 0 Dong Mo, 167 Dong Trieu, 205–​6 Du Hedi, 107, 115f  East Asia, 4–​5, 9, 10, 28, 52 East China Sea, 255–​56, 268 Eighth Route Army, 33, 38, 174–​75 Europe, 27, 28, 50, 236, 237  Fan Zhensheng, 107–​8, 115f First Indochina War, 23, 45. See also French-​Indochina  War France, 27–​28, 45–​4 6,  74–​75 French force, 30, 36, 39, 40, 45, 46 at Dien Bien Phu, 45 casualties of, 40, 41 defense of, 41, 42, 43 offensives by, 34, 197–​98 French-​Indochina War, 11, 30, 31, 36, 41, 43, 52, 86, 187, 197–​98, 242–​43, See also First Indochina War Fujian, 27–​28, 37 Fuzhou, 27–​28, 37, 127–​28  Gao Peizhang, 200–​1 Gejiu, 189 Giang Dong, 260 Giap, Vo Nguyen, 33, 197–​98 and Border Campaign, 39–​4 0 and China, 44, 65, 73 and CVFAV, 79, 146 as commander in chief, 33–​34, 38–​39 offensives by, 41–​42 setbacks of, 41 GMD (Guomindang), 29–​30, 39 occupation of Vietnam, 29, 34 Revolutionary Committee of, 32–​33 Great Leap Forward, 143, 226–​27

307

Index  •  307

Guam, Island of, 49–​50 Guangdong, 23–​24, 28–​29, 259 Guangxi, 11–​12, 23–​24, 33, 38–​39, 43, 45–​4 6, 69, 81, 82, 100, 106–​7, 112, 154, 168–​69, 259, 260–​62, 264 Guangzhou, 28–​29, 32–​33, 34, 255–​56 Regional Military Command, 81, 85, 166–​67,  259 Guilin, 33 Guo Baolan, 213 Guo Haiyun, 123–​24, 126, 152–​53 Guo Yanlin, 78f, 83, 166–​67, 176  Ha Bac, 157, 177 Ha Giang, 103 Ha Long, Bay of, 200 Ha Tay, 205–​6 Ha Tinh, 241 Hai Phong, 42, 84, 197–​98, 201–​2, 204, 211, 212, 213–​14, 231–​32 Hai Phone-​Hanoi defense, 197 Hainan, 138, 216–​17 Han Deren, 201 Han dynasty, 23–​24, 25 Hangzhou,  150–​51 Hanoi, 23–​24, 27–​28, 46, 47–​48, 65, 149, 170, 171–​72, 176, 179, 186, 204, 226, 238, 263 bridges of, 173–​74, 176 complaints about China, 232–​33, 235–​36, 237, 245, 257–​58 defense of, 74, 204, 205–​7 requests of, 166–​67, 199, 209–​10, 212, 229, 230 Hanoi-​Hai Phong railway line,  168–​6 9 Hanoi-​Lao Cai railway line, 76, 82, 103, 104, 152, 168–​69, 170–​71, 172–​73, 174, 177 Hanoi-​Thai Nguyen railway line, 168–​69,  170 Hanoi-​Vinh railway line, 168–​69

Hanoi-​Youyiguan (Friendship Pass) railway line, 76, 81, 82, 100, 167, 168–​69, 170–​71, 172–​74, 175, 176, 177 Hao Binh, 121 Harbin, 1 He Jing, 78f, 181 He Long, 149 Hekou, 170 Heilongjiang, 1, 238–​39 highways, 84–​85,  102–​3 Highway 1, 42, 121, 174, 179, 181, 186, 188, 234 Highway 2, 103, 188–​89 Highway 3, 179, 181, 187, 188 Highway 6, 181, 188–​89 Highway 7, 82, 179, 181, 186, 187, 188 Highway 8, 179, 181–​82, 186, 187, 188 Highway 10, 179, 181–​82, 185, 186, 187, 188 Highway 11, 179, 181, 186, 187, 188 Highway 12, 179, 181–​83, 186, 188 Ho Chi Minh, 32, 45–​4 6, 71, 87–​88, 174, 197–​98, 207–​8, 209, 226 and CMAG, 37, 39–​4 0 and CVFAV, 177, 182, 188–​89, 202 as Communist leader, 28–​29, 47, 247 founder of DRV, 33–​34 in China, 32–​33, 34, 49–​50, 75–​76 in Moscow, 32, 34–​35 requests for Chinese help, 34–​35, 36, 38, 49–​50, 65, 73, 75–​76, 84–​85,  179 war efforts of, 23, 30, 50, 204, 247 Ho Chi Minh Trail, 2–​4, 49–​50, 63–​6 4, 87–​88, 144, 155, 166, 188, 189–​90, 207–​8, 230–​31, 232,  233–​35 Hoa Lac air force base, 207 Hoang Hoa Tham, Operation of, 42 Hoang Van Hoan, 36, 38–​39 Hoblit, Jerry N., 124–​25, 139–​4 0 Hon Gai, 211

308

308  •  Index

Hongwu, Emperor, 25–​27 Hou Zhenlu, 169, 171, 177–​78 Hu Jintao, 266–​67 Hu Ong Khe, 234 Huang Kecheng, 47 Huang Mingpu, 115f Huang Yongsheng, 149–​50, 151 Hue, 27–​28, 144, 211 Hunan,  166–​67 Hungary, 50 Huu Lung, 167, 172–​73 Huynh Thu Truong, 114  imperialism, 6, 36, 48, 136 Inchon landing, 66, 197–​98 India, 30, 51 Indochina, 4–​5, 27, 43, 45–​4 6, 49–​50,  65 Settlement of, 46, 86 (see also 1954 Geneva Accords) Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), 28–​29, 32–​33, 47, 65 Indonesia, 215  Japan, 25, 27, 28–​29, 30, 49–​50, 259–​60,  268 invasion by, 28–​29, 197–​98 military of, 6, 39 surrender of, 29, 33–​34 Jiang Jieshi, 29, 35 Jiang Qing, 147–​48, 155–​56 Jiang Zemin, 266 Ji’nan Regional Military Command, 83–​84,  198 Jin Feng, 115f Jinzhou, 103 Johnson, Lyndon B., 2–​3, 49–​50, 65–​66, 72, 208, 230–​31, 245–​4 6 administration of, 49–​50, 136, 155, 225  Kazakhstan,  14–​15 Kennedy, John, 49–​50

Kep, 100, 106–​8, 154–​55, 157, 170, 172–​ 73, 175, 176–​77, 244 Kep-​Thai Nguyen railway line, 81, 169, 170, 177 Kep-​Yen Bai railway line, 169, 170 KGB, 87, 237–​38 Khan, Mohammad Ayub, 72 Khrushchev, Nikita, 50, 51, 66–​68 Korea, 4, 23, 25–​27, 36, 48–​49, 66, 70–​71,  91 Korea, North, 5–​6 Korea, South, 6, 49–​50 Korean Armistice, 44–​45, 48 Korean War, 4, 5, 6, 9, 23, 37, 41, 52, 68, 90, 106–​7, 119–​20, 123–​24, 137, 141, 151–​52, 197–​98, 225–​26, 262 experience from, 104, 108, 110–​11, 113, 171–​72,  173 veterans of, 103, 116, 119, 141–​42, 167, 173, 174–​75, 183, 187 Kosygin, Aleksei, 66–​68, 238–​39 Kunming, 33 Regional Military Command, 82, 85,  186–​87 Kuomintang (KMT). See GMD  Lai Guangzu, 212–​13 Laizhou, 243 Lang Son, 27–​28, 107–​8, 121, 167, 199, 234, 244, 260–​62, 263 Lang Son-​Hanoi railway, 107 Lao Cai, 124–​25, 168–​69, 185, 186, 187, 260 Lao Son, 11–​12, 263–​6 4 Laos, 27–​28, 42–​43, 45, 49–​50, 120–​21, 179, 234–​35, 263 Chinese troops in, 1, 2–​3, 63–​6 4, 155, 166, 234 Communists in, 33, 65, 155, 229, 234 Le Duan, 46, 65, 66, 73–​74, 209, 232–​33 LeMay, Curtis E., 63 Leninism, 32, 64

309

Index  •  309

Li Chaoyu, 115f Li Jingyan, 115f Li Kunshan, 181 Li Lianghan, 78f, 83–​84, 198, 199, 202 Li Qiang, 233, 234–​35 Li Qinfu, 115f, 124 Li Qingde, 83, 171–​73, 174 Li Qingshou, 186 Li Quan, 181, 184 Li Shouhan, 82–​83 Li Tianyou, 69, 76–​77, 83, 85, 206–​7 Li Wan’an, 109–​10 Li Wenyi, 38 Li Xiannian, 76–​77, 258 Liang Biye, 83 Liaoning, 103 Lin Biao, 13, 64, 80, 119, 123, 143–​4 4, 225–​26,  246 in the Cultural Revolution, 147–​51,  155–​56 Lin Liguo, 150–​51 Lin Sheng, 106 Linebacker I, Operation, 209, 243,  244–​45 Linebacker II, Operation, 244–​45 Liu Bocheng, 32 Liu Derun, 181 Liu Shaoqi, 31, 74, 150–​51 and CMAG, 37–​38 and CVFAV, 78f, 83 and Ho Chi Minh, 32–​33, 34 as China’s president, 227 assassination attempt on, 87 in Russia, 32 policy toward Vietnam, 31–​32, 34, 71 Liu Tongshan, 78f, 181, 186 Liu Yalou, 242–​43 Liu Yuesheng, 85–​86, 179–​80, 183 Liu Yukun, 201 Liu Zhigao, 199–​200, 202–​3, 204–​5 Liuzhou,  45–​4 6 Lomphat,  233–​34

Lon Nol, 214–​15 Long Bien (Paul Dewey) Bridge, 176 Long Guilin, 78f, 83, 146, 166–​67,  173–​75 Long March, 31–​32, 174–​75 Long Son Mountains, 231 Lorraine, Operation, 43 Lu Han, 29 Lu Jianming, 116 Lu Yinglin, 170 Lu Zhengcao, 82–​83 Lubyanka, 238 Luo Bin, 78f,  181–​82 Luo Guibo, 31–​32, 37, 39, 44 Luo Hongbiao, 85–​86, 179–​80 Luo Ruiqing, 76–​77, 84–​85, 144–​45, 147, 256 and CVFAV, 78f, 79, 105, 106–​7, 111, 113 Lup Nor, 156 Luplow, Bill, 108–​9 Ly Ban, 247–​48 Ly dynasty, 24 Lynn, 177  MacArthur, Douglas, 197–​98 Mao Jiaxiang, 115f Ma Xifu, 38, 39 Malaysia, 215 Malipo, 82 Manchuria, 1 Mao Zedong, 2–​3, 13, 46, 123, 142–​43, 144–​45, 198, 213, 218, 226–​27, 245, 247 active defense of, 5–​6, 36 and CMAG, 38, 39–​4 0, 41, 45–​4 6,  47 and the Cultural Revolution, 147–​51,  155–​56 and CVFAV, 77, 78f, 79, 83, 147, 188, 202–​3,  209 in Moscow, 30–​31, 34–​35

130

310  •  Index

Mao Zedong (Cont.) Little Red Book of, 119–​20 meeting with Ho, 35, 75, 84–​85 military strategy, 7, 66, 70–​71, 209, 245, 265 personality cult of, 9, 64, 119 policy toward the Soviet Union, 29–​ 30, 51, 68, 142–​43, 225–​26, 256–​57 policy toward the US, 7–​8, 48, 257 support to Vietnam, 29, 34–​35, 36–​ 37, 45, 49–​50, 65, 74, 179, 232–​33 theories of, 48–​50, 64, 119–​20, 142–​4 4,  245 McNamara, Robert S., 230–​31 Mei Jiasheng, 38, 39, 43 Mekong River, 214–​15 Meng Xianrui, 231–​32 mine, 229 Chen-​5 river mines, 214–​15 land mines, 11–​12, 229, 265 water mines, 211, 213, 214 mine dredgers, 217–​18 311–​model, 211, 213, 214 312–​model, 211, 213, 214 Ming dynasty, 25–​27 missiles,  156–​57 Chinese technology, 142, 147, 242–​43 Hongqi-​2,  189–​90 intercontinental,  156–​57 intercontinental-​range ballistic missile (ICBM), 256 intermediate-​range,  156–​57 intermediate-​range ballistic missile (IRBM),  8–​9 long-​range,  156–​57 medium-​range ballistic missile (MRBM),  8–​9 short-​range,  156–​57 short-​range ballistic missile (SRBM),  8–​9 Shrike, 139–​4 0, 151–​53, 244

submarine-​launched ballistic missile (SLBM), 256 testing of, 156, 243 Mongol dynasty, 24 Mongolia, 150–​51, 239 Inner Mongolia, 143 Moscow, 5–​6, 9, 49–​50, 64, 69, 211, 226, 236, 237, 245, 247–​48, 262 Oriental University (University of the Toilers of the East) in, 32 Mu Zhang, 206 Muong, 24  Nam Nhe, 234 Nanjing Military Regional Command,  242–​43 Nanning,  44–​45 Nansha Islands, 216–​17, See also Spratly Islands napalm, 42, 182 nationalism, 28 Ng o, Queen, 24 Nguyen dynasty, 27–​28 Nguyen Nhieu, 217 Nguyen Tat Thanh, 32., See also Ho Chi Minh Nguyen Tien, 258 Nie Rongzhen, 13, 32, 147, 156 Ningming, 81, 106–​7, 118–​19, 154, 189, 243 Ninh Binh, 204, 205–​6 Niu Zhishou, 108–​9 Nixon, Richard, 10, 208, 211, 226, 244–​45,  257–​58 administration of, 209, 243 NLF (National Liberation Front), 2, 47–​ 48, 64–​65, 72, 233, 235–​36 aid from China, 49–​50, 74, 189–​90, 225, 233, 234–​36 forces of, 50, 87, 233, 235–​36 logistics of, 233, 234–​35 request from, 232–​33

31

Index  •  311

veterans of, 14–​15 See also Viet Cong nuclear weapons, 8–​9, 51, 143, 156–​57, 239, 242–​43,  255–​57 NVA (North Vietnamese Army), 2, 47–​ 48, 111–​12, 149, 176, 204, 207, 209, 219, 225, 232 AAA troops, 100, 243–​4 4 AD-​AFC (Air Defense-​Air Force Command), 100, 102, 103, 104–​5, 106, 107, 112, 121, 124, 138, 152–​53 Bureau of the Political Tasks, 106 communication, 63–​6 4,  207–​8 cooperation with PLA, 79, 80, 112, 121, 138, 145, 205, 242 General Staff of, 39, 76 generals of, 202, 204 Group 559, 233–​34 guerrilla warfare of, 10, 39, 208 high command, 79, 105, 111, 146, 152–​53,  199 in Cambodia, 208, 234, 259, 263 in Laos, 208, 234 in the South, 50, 64–​65, 73, 87–​ 88, 144, 190, 197–​98, 206–​8, 230–​31,  233–​35 intelligence, 86–​87, 138, 242 leaders of, 73, 198 logistics, 232, 234–​35 missile troops of, 157, 189–​90, 240–​41,  244 naval force of, 210–​11, 214, 219 North Region Command, 74–​75, 83–​ 84, 105, 167, 199 offensive campaigns, 209 officers of, 89, 103, 107, 121, 140–​41, 146–​47, 197–​98, 240–​41,  243–​4 4 offshore defense, 49–​50, 66, 202 problems with CVFAV, 114, 117, 137, 146 representatives from, 181–​82, 185, 198 training of, 199, 240, 241, 243–​4 4

transportation, 63–​6 4, 74, 189–​90, 230–​31,  233–​35 veterans of, 14–​15 views on Chinese, 114, 242, 263 war efforts, 70, 208, 241 See also PAVN (People’s Army of Vietnam)  oil supply, 12, 230 oil tanks, 230–​32 pipelines, 230, 232 Okinawa,  49–​50 Opium War, the First, 27  Page, Marcel Le, 40 Pakistan, 72 Pan Yan, 212–​13 Paracel Islands, 11, 12–​13, 216–​17, 219., See also Xisha Islands Paris,  27–​28 Peace Talks at, 208, 244–​4 6, 247 Peace Treaty of, 214, 258 PAVN (People’s Army of Vietnam), 47, 259,  263–​6 4 casualties of, 262, 263–​6 4 Chinese advisors in, 39 General Bureau of Logistics, 39 General Bureau of Political Tasks, 39, 259 intelligence of, 138, 259 officers of, 86, 140–​41 troops of, 259, 260–​62, 263–​6 4 See also NVA (North Vietnamese Army) PAVN divisions: 304th Division, 39, 42, 45 308th Division, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45,  260–​62 312th Division, 39, 43, 45 313th Division, 263–​6 4 316th Division, 42, 43, 45 320th Division, 42

132

312  •  Index

PAVN divisions: (Cont.) 325th Division, 42 346th Division, 260 351st Division of Artillery and Engineering, 42, 45 PAVN regiments: 95th Regiment, 39 122nd Regiment, 263–​6 4 148th Regiment, 39 174th Regiment, 39, 43 209th Regiment, 39, 40, 43 pirates,  27–​28 Peng Dehuai, 119, 141–​4 4, 150–​51 Peng Zongtao, 78f, 181, 187 Pham Van Dong, 33, 46, 65, 74–​75, 209, 246, 247, 258 Phan Boi Chau, 28–​29 Phan Trong Tue, 233–​34 Phi Mo Mountains, 179, 186 Philippines, 49–​50, 138, 210, 215 Phnom Penh, 214–​15 Phong Nien Mountains, 179, 185 Phung The Tai, 100 Pingxiang, 69, 179 Plei Mok Den, 234 PLA (People’s Liberation Army), 100–​1, 150, 206–​7, 218, 228, 232–​33, 239, 246, 255, 259, 260–​62, 264, 265–​ 66, 268, 269 aid to Vietnam, 44–​45, 179, 206–​7, 228, 234, 237, 257–​58 and the Cultural Revolution, 147–​52,  157–​58 “army of learning,” 8, 144, 255–​57, 264, 265 assistance to Vietnam, 42, 70, 214, 234, 243 casualties, 3, 238–​39, 262, 263–​6 4 civil-​military relations, 150, 228, 267 combat engineering, 73, 75–​76, 197, 198 cooperation with NVA, 79, 145, 146

culture of, 1, 64, 123, 255–​56, 269 education of, 9, 89–​90, 120–​21,  151–​52 generals of, 6, 143, 149, 225–​26, 233 high command, 44, 65, 66, 74–​76, 77–​79, 78f, 110–​11, 113–​14, 136, 138, 142–​43, 147, 166–​67, 178, 179, 184, 189–​90, 197–​98, 217–​18, 239, 241–​42, 256–​57,  265 human wave attacks, 42 in Cambodia, 234–​35 in Laos, 166, 189–​90, 234–​35 in the Korean War, 10, 52 invasion of Vietnam, 259, 260–​62,  263–​6 4 intelligence, 73, 86–​89, 144, 145–​4 6, 238, 242 intervention in Vietnam, 2–​3, 23, 52, 63–​6 4, 73, 77–​79, 78f, 83, 90–​91, 102, 144, 145, 149–​50, 155, 197, 206–​7, 208–​9,  263–​6 4 modernization of, 4, 7–​8, 35, 141–​42, 156, 255, 265–​66, 269 officers, 90–​91, 124, 150, 151, 238, 241–​42,  262 operations in Vietnam, 4, 84, 123, 206–​7, 218, 234–​35, 245, 259,  260–​62 party control of, 4–​5, 64, 79–​80, 119–​ 20, 137, 150, 267–​68 problems in Vietnam, 64, 80, 112–​ 14, 118, 123, 136, 137, 151–​52, 205, 245, 247, 259, 260, 262, 263–​6 4,  265–​66 purge of, 143, 144–​45, 148, 149–​50,  151 railway engineering troops, 74, 75, 237 rearming, 35, 255 technology of, 8–​9, 102, 118, 137, 141, 147, 151–​52, 255, 256, 265–​66 training of, 9, 89–​90, 119, 124, 144, 151–​52, 241–​43,  255

31

Index  •  313

veterans of, 1–​2, 3, 13–​14 withdrawal of, 3, 209, 226, 246–​48, 262 PLA academies: Academy of Railway Engineering Corps, 167 China Academy of Armed Police Force, 14 China Academy of Military Science (CAMS), 13 East China Military and Political University, 38 Logistics Academy, 14 Nanjing Political Academy, 13, 106 National Defense University (NDU), 13, 128 Shenyang Antiaircraft Artillery Academy,  123–​24 PLA Air Force (PLAAF), 1, 8, 70–​71, 77, 78f, 79, 81, 100–​2, 141–​42, 143, 154, 157, 231, 242–​43, 255, 256 AAA divisions in Laos, 166, 189–​90 AAA divisions in Vietnam, 80–​81, 84, 109–​13, 115f, 123, 128, 146, 153, 154, 155, 241 AAA troops of, 73, 74, 75–​76, 91, 103, 118, 147, 169, 241, 264 command of, 105, 147, 149–​50, 256 missile troops, 142, 156–​57, 231,  242–​4 4 Soviet aid to, 35, 141, 256 PLA army groups: Fourth Army Group, 38 Tenth Army Group, 37 PLA armies: Twenty-​First Army, 38 Twenty-​Third Army, 38 Twenty-​Four Army,  123–​24 Twenty-​Seventh Army, 38 Fifty-​fifth Army, 260 PLA Combat Engineering Corps (PLA-​ CEC), 77, 78f, 83–​84, 85, 91, 184, 186–​87, 204, 210

in Vietnam, 79, 80–​81, 84–​85, 179,  209–​10 troops of, 198, 204, 209–​10 PLA Department of General Logistics (DGL), 44–​45, 77, 78f, 79, 86, 90, 233 PLA Department of General Political Tasks (DGPT), 77, 79–​80, 83, 86, 89–​90, 148–​49,  198 PLA Department of General Staff (DGS), 13, 38, 49–​50, 76, 77–​79, 80, 83, 85, 86–​87, 89, 105, 106, 113–​ 14, 144–​45, 146, 198, 206–​7, 233 assessment of, 111–​13, 147, 184 command of, 149–​50, 151, 156–​57,  233–​34 planning and training, 124 research teams of, 144, 145–​4 6, 147, 242 PLA field armies: First Field Army Second Field Army, 37 Third Field Army, 37 Fourth Field Army, 37 PLA Navy (PLAN), 51, 77, 78f, 84, 148, 198, 210, 211, 214, 215, 216–​19,  255–​56 assistance to NVA, 210–​11, 212–​13 attacks by, 11, 217–​18 casualties of, 202, 210 Equipment Department of, 211 in Vietnam, 12–​13, 79, 211, 214, 215 intelligence of, 138, 210, 211–​12 Mine Countermeasures Investigation Team, 213 mine experts of, 211 minesweeping operations, 212–​15 mining operations, 214–​15 Naval Research Institute of, 211, 212 officers of, 211, 212–​13 South China Sea Fleet, 78f, 148, 212,  217–​18

134

314  •  Index

PLA Navy (PLAN) (Cont.) Soviet aid to, 35, 255–​56 submarines of, 217–​18, 255–​56 transportation by, 202, 210, 217–​18,  235 PLA Railway Engineering Corps (PLA-​ REC), 63, 74–​75, 77, 78f, 79, 80–​81, 82–​83, 166–​67,  174–​75 PLA Second Artillery Corps (SAC), 8–​ 9, 156–​57, 256 PLAF (People’s Liberation Armed Force), 47.–​48 See also NLF (National Liberation Front) Pol Pot, 214–​15 Poland, 50 Potsdam agreement, 29 POWs, 87 Preobrazhensky, Konstantin, 237–​38 Prey Veng, 214–​15  Qin dynasty, 23–​24 Qin Jiwei, 186–​87 Qin Shengyun, 109 Qin Shi Huangdi, 23–​24 Qing dynasty, 27–​28 Quang Ninh, 199–​200 Quang Uyen, 38–​39  radar, 104–​5, 116, 126, 152, 153, 241, 243, 244 Chinese-​made, 137–​39, 140–​41, 143–​ 44, 157, 229, 241 gun-​directing, 139–​4 0,  152 long-​range,  152 Model 405, 157 Model 572, 157 Model 586, 157 Model 589, 157 N-​12,  239–​4 0 operators of, 139, 152, 240, 244 Russian-​made, 137, 138–​39, 151–​52,  236

short-​range,  152 technology, 140, 147 Red Guards, 123, 147–​49 Red River, 117, 205, 260 Delta of, 41, 204, 206–​7, 263 Rolling Thunder, 2, 3, 63–​6 4, 65–​66, 70, 73, 76, 80, 90–​91, 100, 105, 107, 116–​17, 124, 128, 136, 139–​4 0, 155, 171–​72, 175, 177, 183, 188, 230–​31, 233–​34, 236, 239 losses in, 102, 106, 110–​11, 116–​17, 126 results of, 102–​3, 107, 118, 125, 126, 140, 172–​74, 176–​77, 205 Russia, 8–​9, 29, 137, 255–​56 aid to Vietnam, 50, 179, 209–​10, 225, 237,  247–​48 Communist Party of, 32, 34–​35, 66–​ 68, 69, 237 military of, 5, 50 missiles of, 10–​11, 66–​68, 69, 100, 102, 140–​41, 142, 240–​41, 242–​43,  247–​48 technology of, 137, 141–​42, 146–​47, 151–​52, 225, 239–​41,  255–​56 troops in Vietnam, 66–​68, 140–​41, 240, 242 veterans,  14–​15 Ryukyu,  25–​27  Saigon, 47–​48, 145–​4 6, 219 Salan, Raoul, 43 SAM (surface-​to-​air missile), 3–​4, 8, 68, 100, 111–​12, 143, 165, 242–​43 Chinese missiles, 78f, 142, 143, 156–​ 57, 229, 242–​4 4 Fan Song (N-​12), 138 Hongqi-​01,  242–​43 Hongqi-​02, 229, 242–​43, 244 Russian operations, 137–​38, 142, 146–​47, 200–​1, 236, 239–​4 0, 241,  247–​48

315

Index  •  315

SAM-​2, 138, 239–​4 0,  242–​43 SAM-​3, 138,  239–​4 0 SAM-​6,  241 SAM-​75C (or C-​75), 138, 239–​4 0 sites of, 146–​47, 231, 241 training Vietnamese, 137–​38, 142, 157, 240,  243–​4 4 Vietnamese regiments of, 157, 240, 241, 243, 244 Sao Ha, 107–​10 Shanghai, 106–​7, 144, 149, 150–​51,  255–​56 Sharp, U.S. Grant, 230–​31 Shenyang, 119 Regional Military Command, 14, 83–​ 84, 85, 118, 198 Shi Wenling, 154–​55 Siam, 25.–​27, See also Thailand Sihanouk Harbor, 235 Sihanoukville, 235 Sino-​French War,  27–​28 Sino-​Indian War,  119–​20 Sino-​Japanese War (1894–​1895), 25 Sino-​Japanese War (1937–​1945). See Anti-​Japanese  War Sino-​Soviet Border War, 10, 225–​26, 238–​39, 246–​47,  256–​58 Sino-​Soviet relations, 4, 9–​10, 68, 69–​70, 142,  225–​26 alliance in, 9, 11, 29, 50 hostility in, 10, 51–​52, 66, 225–​26, 238–​39, 246–​47,  256–​57 polemic debate, 9 rivalry in Vietnam, 68, 69–​70, 111–​12, 225, 226, 236–​37, 245 Sino-​Soviet split, 9–​10, 50–​, 143, 227, 238,  246–​47 Sino-​Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, 35 Sino-​US rapprochement, 10, 226, 248, 257

Sino-​Vietnam relations, 4, 69, 145, 226, 237–​38, 245, 255, 265 agreements, 166–​67, 171–​72, 179, 188, 204, 242 alliance, 34, 226, 246–​47 hostilities, 246, 258, 259 problems in, 10, 146, 219, 245, 246–​47,  257–​58 Sino-​Vietnamese borders, 11, 34, 39–​4 0, 42, 68, 69, 84, 107, 165, 179, 243, 258, 259, 263, 265 Sino-​Vietnamese Border War, 7–​8, 11–​12, 246–​47,  259–​6 4 Chinese casualties in, 11–​12, 262,  263–​6 4 Soc Son, 84 Son La, 207–​8 Song dynasty, 24 Songhua, 173–​74, 175 South China Sea, 11, 12–​13, 215–​19, 255–​ 56, 262, 268 disputed islands in, 215–​17, 218–​19,  259 Southeast Asia, 9–​10, 25–​27, 49–​50, 66–​ 68, 71, 77, 139–​4 0, 218–​19, 225–​26, 245, 246–​47, 256–​57, 258 Soviet military, 50, 51, 238–​39, 246, 255 in Vietnam, 5, 68, 111–​12, 236, 239–​4 0,  247–​48 technology of, 10–​11, 69, 142, 236, 239–​4 0, 242–​43,  245 training programs, 32, 239–​4 0 Soviet Union, 1–​2, 10, 29, 30, 32, 45–​4 6, 52, 136, 143, 150–​51, 227, 236, 239, 248,  255–​56 aid to China, 35, 51, 142, 242–​43 aid to Vietnam, 66–​68, 165, 170, 189–​90, 212, 225, 236–​37, 239–​4 0, 245,  247–​48 embassy in Hanoi, 87 influence, 50, 68, 76–​77, 225, 226, 245,  246–​48

136

316  •  Index

Soviet Union (Cont.) intelligence of, 87, 146, 237–​38 leaders of, 10, 50, 68 policy toward Vietnam, 51, 66–​68, 225–​26, 245, 247–​48, 262 technology of, 138, 140–​41, 142, 212, 236, 239–​4 0, 242–​43, 245 threats by, 11, 66, 225–​26, 238–​39, 246–​47, 248,  256–​57 training in, 123–​24, 199 troops in Vietnam, 100, 140–​41, 146, 236, 239–​4 0, 241 weapons of, 8, 35, 68, 151–​52, 236, 238–​4 0,  242–​43 See also USSR (Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics) Soviet-​Vietnamese relations, 34, 35, 66–​ 68, 69, 145, 146, 225–​26, 236, 262 Spratly Islands, 11, 12–​13, 215, 219. See also Nansha Island Stalin, Josef, 5–​6, 30, 34–​35 Stuchilov, Alexander, 100, 239–​41 Su Baochen, 170 Su Zhenhua, 218 Suixi, 243 Sun Chai, 124–​25, 126 Sun Fengshan, 181 Sun Linquan, 78f, 181–​82, 183 Sun Yat-​sen,  28–​29 Sun Zhang, 85–​86, 179–​80, 186–​87 Sunzi, 6, 7, 105–​6, 108 Svay Rieng, 235  Taiwan, 5, 29, 35, 48–​50, 66, 120–​21,  255–​56 Taiwan Strait, 29–​30, 36, 48, 52, 138–​39,  255–​56 Tan Shanhe, 184 Tang dynasty, 25 Taskti,  238–​39 Tchepong,  233–​34 technology, 28

Tet Offensive, 208, 241 Thai Nguyen, 81, 102, 121, 139–​4 0, 154, 168–​69,  179 Thailand, 25–​27, 120–​21, 138, 145–​4 6, 210, 241, 259 Thanh Hoa, 87–​88, 211, 233–​34 That Khe, 39–​4 0 Third Indochina-​War, 11.–​12, See also Sino-​Vietnamese Border War Three Kingdoms (Korea), 25 Thua Thien, 234 Tianjin, Treaty of, 27–​28 Tibet, 25, 51 Tie Ying, 103, 106 Tieliekti,  238–​39 Tokyo,  259–​60 Ton Duc Thang, 209 Tonkin Gulf, 27–​28, 71–​72, 83, 108, 138, 197–​98, 199, 210–​11, 243 Resolution of, 65–​66, 71 Tran dynasty, 24 Tran Luong, 47–​48 treaty system, 28 tributary system, 23, 24–​27 Trieu, Lady of, 24 Trung Sisters, 24 Truong Chinh, 247–​48 Truong Son Mountain, 234 Tu Duc, Emperor, 27–​28 Turks, 25 Tuyen Quang, 27–​28 Uighurs, 25 Ukraine,  14–​15 UN (United Nations), 37 UNF (United Nations Force), 4, 5–​6, 42, 137 US (United States), 5, 8–​9, 10, 45–​ 46, 52, 136, 225–​26, 236, 248, 255–​56,  258 air bombings, 63, 74–​75, 83–​84, 102–​ 3, 118, 125, 140, 151–​52, 153–​54,

137

Index  •  317

155, 167, 171–​75, 182, 183–​84, 200–​1, 208, 209, 230–​31, 241, 243,  244–​45 armed forces of, 197–​98, 208, 210, 217, 255 escalation of war, 72–​73, 117–​18, 125, 136, 172–​73, 174, 175, 208, 209, 225 government of, 47–​48, 208 intelligence of, 70, 80, 100, 102, 110–​ 11, 176, 182, 236, 239 Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS), 107, 117–​18 military leaders of, 63 military technology, 140–​41, 144, 146, 242 mining operations, 209–​10 officials of, 72–​73 POWs of, 145, 242 relations with the Soviet Union, 8–​9 “threat” to China, 5–​6, 29, 48–​50 veterans of, 14–​15 war efforts, 64–​66, 72 withdrawal from Vietnam, 11, 214, 216–​17, 219,  225–​26 US Air Force (USAF), 63, 106, 124–​25, 137, 138, 139–​4 0, 145–​4 6, 241 bases of, 138, 144, 145–​4 6, 210, 241 CHECO of, 73, 102–​3, 110–​11, 118, 125, 140, 176–​77, 182 pilots of, 104–​5, 106, 109, 117, 124–​25, 126, 136, 145–​4 6, 173 technology of, 144, 146, 147, 151–​52,  241–​42 US Congress, 65–​66, 259–​60 US Navy (USN), 63, 209–​10, 214, 218 ACTOV program of, 217 air force of, 102–​3, 104–​5 mining operations, 211–​12, 213, 214 Naval War College, 217 Seventh Fleet of, 48 technology of, 211, 217 training of VNN officers, 217

USSR (Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics), 10, 29–​30, 66–​68. See also Soviet Union  Van Tian Dung, 65, 76, 79 Vi Xuyen, 103 Viet Cong, 47–​48, 64–​65, 235.–​ 36 See also NLF (National Liberation Front) Viet Minh, 46, 47–​48, 86, 197–​98 Armed Propaganda Team, 33–​34 army of, 33–​34 casualties of, 40, 41, 42 Central Committee of, 34, 45 founding of, 28–​29, 33 high command, 31–​32, 39–​4 0, 41, 42, 43, 45 logistics needs, 41, 43, 44 offensives by, 41–​42, 43 officers of, 39–​4 0, 42, 43 Politburo of, 39 political education of, 42–​43 problems with CMAG, 39–​4 0 strategic mistakes of, 41 troops training, 42, 43, 47 Viet Quang, 103 Viet Tri, 139–​4 0 Vietnam, 5, 14–​15, 23–​24, 25–​28, 33–​ 34, 36, 47–​49, 258, 268 Central Plains in, 41, 42, 44, 144 Languages of, 23–​24 refuges from, 32–​33, 259 students of, 28–​29 villagers in, 203 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (DRV), 2–​3, 29, 30, 33–​34, 46, 68, 197–​98, 212, 226, 245–​4 6 ambassador to China, 212 constitution of, 47 leaders of, 74–​75, 209, 245, 247–​48 local governments of, 203 Ministry of Defense, 105, 199, 202

318

318  •  Index

Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (DRV) (Cont.) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 219 Ministry of Transportation, 74–​75, 186, 187 officials, 83–​84, 187, 199, 204 offshore islands of, 199, 202–​3 road construction in, 75–​76, 84–​85,  185 See also Vietnam, North Vietnam, North, 2, 23, 34, 45–​4 6, 49–​50, 66, 145, 155, 197–​98, 209–​10, 214, 225–​26, 230–​31, 236,  245– ​4 6 air defense in, 81, 100, 140–​41, 154, 184,  240–​41 casualties of, 183–​84 coastal defense works of, 198, 199 communication in, 102–​3, 136 complaints about CVFAV, 203 defense of, 63, 65, 66, 75, 197–​98, 204 highways in, 102–​3, 166, 179, 185, 189–​90, 205,  260–​62 involvements in the South, 102–​3, 208 military strategy of, 5, 197–​98 offshore island defense works, 84, 198, 199–​202,  203 problems with China, 137, 219, 257–​58 railways in, 73, 75, 102–​3, 104, 124–​ 25, 126, 166–​67, 169, 170, 174, 176, 189–​90,  260–​62 relations with the Soviet Union, 11, 69, 226, 236, 237, 245–​4 6, 257–​58 transportation in, 69, 74, 76, 84–​85, 102–​3, 136, 170, 179, 185, 189–​90, 205, 209–​10, 211–​12, 237 war against the US, 70, 136, 208 See also Vietnam, Democratic Republic Vietnam, Republic of, 2–​3, 47–​48, 64–​65,  216–​17 Air Force of (VNAF), 102–​3

ARVN (Army of Vietnam), 50, 208, 218, 219 government of, 217, 219 VNN (Vietnam Navy), 11, 211, 215, 217–​18,  219 See also Vietnam, South Vietnam, Socialist Republic of (SRV), 11 Vietnam, State of (Bao Dai), 34 Vietnam, South, 2–​3, 23, 47–​48, 70, 72, 209, 215, 219, 225, Chinese in, 87–​88, 145, 233–​35 Communists in, 232–​33 intelligence of, 167, 200 See also Vietnam, Republic of Vietnam Workers’ Party (VWP), 3–​4, 47, 65, 66, 73 Vietnamese Communist Party, 29–​30, 32–​33, 65, 209, 236, 237, 247, 258 founding of, 28–​29, 33 leadership of, 33–​34, 209 Vietnamese Nationalist Party, 28–​29 Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth, Association of, 32–​33 Vinh, 139–​4 0, 211, 233–​34 Vinh Phuc, 205–​6 Vinh Yen, 41 Vo Nguyen Giap. See Giap, Vo Nguyen  Wang Baokui, 107–​8, 109 Wang Chunxun, 85–​86, 179–​80, 185 Wang Gengyue, 85–​86, 179–​80 Wang Hongwen, 218 Wang Huaiyi, 115f Wang Hui, 83–​84, 197, 198, 199 Wang Jianshu, 115f Wang Jie, 87–​88 Wang Kai, 124, 181 Wang Mingjiu, 115f Wang Qinghua, 103, 104, 105, 106, 115f Wang Siqian, 115f, 116

139

Index  •  319

Wang Xiangcai, 118–​19, 120–​21, 122–​23 Wang Xisen, 109–​10 Wang Yanquan, 39 Washington, 9, 71, 72, 197–​98, 208–​9,  259–​60 Wei Guoqing, 37, 38–​39, 41, 45–​4 6, 47 Wei Jie, 74–​75 Wei Mingsen, 217–​18 Wenshan, 82, 103–​4 Westmoreland, William C., 125 World War II, 7, 29, 33–​34, 91, 197–​98 Wu Faxian, 149–​50 Wu Kehua, 156 Wu Zhiming, 173 Wudi, Emperor, 23–​24  Xi Boyan, 181 Xi Jinping, 268 Xia Mingxian, 201–​2 Xiao Chunxian, 166–​67, 174–​75 Xiao Jinguang, 212 Xiao Hua, 148 Xie Teshan, 103, 115f Xinjiang,  238–​39 Xiongnu, 25 Xisha Islands, 216–​18, 219., See also Paracel Islands Xu Chenggong, 78f, 181, 187 Xu Changyou, 102 Xu Haoxiu, 206–​7 Xu Kelin, 78f,  204–​5 Xu Shiyou, 259, 260–​62 Xu Xiangqian, 147 Xu Xianzhou, 115f  Yalu River, 5–​6, 124 Yan Fuzeng, 115f, 118 Yan Guitang, 86–​87 Yan’an, 33

Yang Chengwu, 65, 76–​77, 78f, 79, 144–​ 45, 147, 149–​50, 228 Yang Dezhi, 260 Yang Jian, 181 Yao Fuhe, 115f, 125–​26, 127–​28, 152 Ye Conghua, 199–​200 Ye Jianying, 33, 147, 151, 155–​56, 212–​13, 217–​18,  247–​48 Yen Bai, 84, 100, 103–​4, 124–​25, 140, 145–​4 6, 152, 153–​54, 172–​73, 187 air defense in, 104, 125–​26, 152 Provincial Command, 105 Yen Son, 11–​12, 263–​6 4 Yongle, Emperor, 25–​27 Yongle Island, 217–​18 Yongxing Island, 216–​18 Youyiguan (Friendship Pass), 107, 121, 154, 167 Youyiguan-​Kep railway line, 169 Yuan dynasty, 24 Yuan Shaofan, 115f Yuan Yifen, 148 Yue Chih Bridge, 174 Yunnan, 11–​12, 33, 66, 82, 100, 112, 170, 179, 186, 187, 259, 260, 263–​6 4 Provincial Military Command, 38, 105  Zeng Xuqing, 78f, 83–​84, 198 Zhang Keli, 115f Zhang Chunqiao, 218 Zhang Jianzhong, 115f Zhang Jinfan, 115f, 118 Zhang Linjing, 115f Zhang Shouying, 213–​14 Zhang Tongda, 166–​67 Zhang Xipu, 107 Zhang Yongfu, 103–​4 Zhao Dongpo, 78f,  204–​5 Zhao Shunfen, 1–​2, 3, 11–​12, 118–​19,  120–​23 Zhao Tuo, 23–​24

320

320  •  Index

Zheng He, 25–​27 Zheng Yongle, 116 Zhongnanhai, 38, 85, 212 Zhou Enlai, 5–​6, 13, 45–​46, 65, 68, 198, 212 and CVFAV, 77, 78f, 79, 83, 85, 109–​10,  147 leadership of, 70–​71, 74, 155–​56, 238–​39

policy toward Vietnam, 72, 84–​85, 149, 212–​13, 218, 227–​28, 232–​33, 246,  247–​48 Zhou Qing, 103, 104–​5 Zhu De, 32, 38, 79 Zhu Heyun, 39 Zhu Qiwen, 202

312

32

32

324

352

326