The domestic roots of India's foreign policy, 1947-1972 9780195611441, 0195611446

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THE DOMESTIC ROOTS OF

INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 1947-1972

The Domestic Roots of

INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 1947-1972

A. APPADORAI

DELHI O X FO R D UNIVERSITY PRESS BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS

1981

Univ. library, Univ. Calif., Santa Cruz

Oxford University Press OXFORD LONDON GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON NAIROBI DAR ES SALAAM CAPE TOWN KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE HONG KONG TOKYO DELHI BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI

©Oxford University Press 1981

Filmset by Tej Press, New Delhi 110002 Printed by Rajb&ndhu Industrial Co. New Delhi 110064 and published by R. Dayal, Oxford University Press 2/11 Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi 110002

Dedicated with affection to my brother-in-law and sister, the late M r and Mrs P.A .Ram a Iyer, and the late M r P.A.Krishna Iyer of Em akulam

Preface t

This essay on the ‘Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy’ was undertaken by me as a National Fellow appointed by the Indian Council of Social Science Research. When the subject was first suggested by Mr G. Parthasarthy, then Vice-Chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru University, I felt that it was adequate only for a short article; however, as I studied the subject in some depth, I came to the conclusion that what has been written only sketches the outline of an important subject which requires extended treatment in several volumes. In addition, a subject of this kind has to take into account a constantly changing political arena; in the time since the study was completed, Mrs Gandhi’s faction appeared in 1977 to have been extinguished as a political force, together with her own potential for leadership. The years 1977—80 saw the emergence of a new political party of great promise—the Janata Party—formed by the merger of five political parties: the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the Congress (O), the Bharatiya Lok Dal, the Swatantra Party, and the Samyukta Socialist Party. The 1980 elections however saw the triumphant return of Mrs Gandhi, with her emphasis on the forces of discipline and centralism. The opposition is now negligible. Nevertheless, what this finally suggests is that the more things change, the more they are the same; and the ‘roots’ discussed in this work arc fundamentally untouched. I am grateful to the Indian Council of Social Science Research for appointing me a National Fellow and thus giving me an opportunity to work on this theme. The Council is of course not responsible for any opinions expressed by me. Dr Bimal Prasad, Professor of South Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, has been good enough to go through the manuscript and make valuable suggestions. In October 1978, the substance of a part of this book was delivered in the form of three lectures entitled; ‘Tradition and History*, ‘Economic and Political Roots’, and the ‘Impact of Federalism on India’s Foreign Policy’, under the Sulakhani Devi Mahajan Trust. I

viii

Preface

am grateful to the Trust for inviting me to deliver the three lectures. I should also like to thank Dr K. S. Jawatkar, my Research Assistant, for collecting source materials on the subject and preparing some notes; Professor S. V. Kogekar and Mr N. S. Pardasani for their help in clarifying the basic concept of the domestic roots of India’s foreign policy; M. Pattabhiraman for a helpful note on the press and foreign policy and Professor M.S. Advani for helpful suggestions. A. Appadorai

Contents

1 II III IV V VI VII

Preface Introductory Tradition and History Democracy The Demands of EconomicDevelopment A Pluralist Society: ReligiousDivisions Federalism Nehru's Charismatic Leadership A Concluding Note Index

vii 1 27 58 85 119 170 215 232 235

CHAPTER

I

Introductory It is proposed in this introductory chapter to (1) examine the nature of foreign policy and its determinants; (2) give a summary of the essential features of India’s foreign policy; and (3) provide an analysis of the domestic roots of India’s foreign policy which are studied in the chapters that follow.

Foreign Policy, its Nature and Determinants WHAT IS FOREIGN POLICY?

It is remarkable that experts on foreign policy analysis have been unable to arrive at a consensus on what ‘foreign policy’ is. Thus Hugh Gibson defines foreign policy as a well rounded, comprehensive plan, based on knowledge and experience, for conducting the business of government with the rest of the world. It is aimed at promoting and protecting the interests of the nation. This calls for a clear understanding of what those interests are and how far we can hope to go with the means at our disposal. Anything less than this falls short of being a national foreign policy.1

To George Modelski, foreign policy is the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment.2F.S. Northedge considers foreign policy to be the use of political influence in order to induce other states to exercise their law making power in a manner desired by the state concerned; it is an interaction between forces originating outside the country’s bor­ ders and those working within them.3The term ‘the foreign policy of a nation’ is used, according to the Research Staff of the Brookings Institution, to refer to the complex and dynamic political course that a nation follows in relation to other states. The foreign policy of a nation is more than the sum total of its foreign policies (thought-out courses o f action for achieving objectives), for it also includes its

2

Domestic Roots o f India’s Foreign Policy

commitments, the current forms of its interests and objectives, and the principles of right conduct that it professes.4 Joseph Frankel writes that foreign policy ‘consists of decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others.’5 We do not propose to discuss these definitions and descriptions of foreign policy; that would be beyond the scope of this book which is not on the theory of foreign policy. We have merely cited them to help us in arriving at an understanding of the nature of foreign policy. While some authors like Gibson stress ideas (the plan of action), prior to action, and others like Modelski emphasise the action, i.e. policy as executed,6the essential idea of all the authors is that foreign policy is concerned with the behaviour of a state to­ wards other states. This central idea bears elaboration. Every state enters into relations with other states, political, economic, cultural: India and the Soviet Union signed the treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation on 9 August 1971, which provided that in the event of ‘either Party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof’, the two countries would ‘immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.’ President Nixon announced on 16 July 1971 that he had accepted an invitation from China to visit China some time before May 1972; evidently both China and the U.S. realized that it was in their mutual interest to end their unfriendly postures and start the process of rapprochement; India and Nepal signed the treaty of Trade and Transit on 13 August 1971 to regulate trade relations between them; Japan and India signed a cultural agreement on 29 October 1956, with a preamble stating that they had decided to conclude a cultural agreement ‘inspired by a common desire to promote and develop closer cultural relations in the future and desirous of promoting and deepening in every possi­ ble way and putting on a sound basis the relations and understand­ ing between the two countries.’ These instances might suggest that relations between states are always friendly; but, obviously, often the relations between two or more states have been hostile. The cold war which followed the Second World War of 1939-45 is a reminder that, sometimes, though there is no declared war, the relations between states may be unfriendly, though not technically hostile.

Introductory

3

Today, on account of the development of means of transport and telecommunication, there is more contact, confrontation, con•roversy and collaboration than ever before. The focus in foreign policy is on the Foreign Minister, who directs that policy, to change the behaviour of the foreign state in the manner desired by his own country: for instance, in 1971, India’s Foreign Minister desired the United States not to sell arms, or give economic aid, to Pakistan as such a change in policy would have restrained Pakistan in her military subjugation of the ‘rebels’ in East Bengal; in 1972 China invited President Nixon to visit Peking to induce a less hostile attitude on the part of the U.S. The essence of foreign policy, therefore, is the use of the state’s resources—economic, diplomatic, propagandist—to induce such behaviour on the part of other states as would promote what is generally called its national interest. ‘National interest’ is not easy to define: some critics even declare that it is a vague, and meaningless formula, or a pseudo-theory.7It is inevitable, however, that in a system of international politics with the nation-state as the unit, the common man should judge the success of the foreign policy in terms of the benefit accruing to the people. It is also significant that statesmen accept the achievement of national interest as their aim in foreign policy. Thus Jawaharlal Nehru: Whatever policy we may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. . . . Whether a country is imperialistic or socialist or communist, its foreign minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country.8

The time-honoured definition of national interest as ‘the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts” could be accepted as a working definition. If the concept of national interest is clear, what is it in concrete terms? The content is both general and particular. Every state aims at preserving its political independence and territorial integrity, by safeguarding its international boundaries. The means may vary from balance of power and alliances, to non-alignment and panchsheel, but the national interest in the preservation of territor­ ial integrity is clear. Nicholas J. Spykman has put this idea in the clearest terms: Because territory is an inherent part of a state, self-preservation means defending its control over territory; and, because independence is of the

4

Domestic Roots o f India’s Foreign Policy

essehce of the state, self-preservation also means fighting for independent status. This explains why the basic objective of the foreign policy of all states is the preservation of territorial integrity and political independence.10

Implied in this statement is the need for the preservation of independence of policy, internal and external. If, as Jawaharlal Nehru said in 1947, ‘we do not intend to be the playthings of others,’11 the preservation of territorial integrity is clearly essential. Implied in the statement is a second idea. Not only is independence of policy important, but preservation of the way of life of a people is equally important. Thus President Kennedy of the U.S. expressed the view that his country’s basic goal was to seek a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others.12 The particularist element in national interest—of different na­ tions, and even of the same nations at different times—stems primarily from the stage of social and economic development which it has reached. The interest of an affluent society such as the U.S. is, naturally, to preserve it and rid it of such influences as are found by the nation to hamper its healthy and harmonious working; that of a socialist country like the Soviet Union—declared to be in the transi­ tion to Communism—is obviously to conserve the gains of the Revolution, to increase the supply of consumer goods and to pro­ vide the conditions in which it can effectively compete with capitalism. The interest of developing countries, as most Asian and African countries are, cannot obviously be either of these. Their most important national interest, apart from preserving their politi­ cal sovereignty and territorial integrity, is economic development: improving living standards by increased production and equitable distribution. Are the interests of one nation necessarily opposed to the in­ terests of other states? The answer in the one world of today can only be in the negative. States, in pursuing their national interest, are bound to take into account universal ideals, and principles of international law and morality, such as peace, justice, keeping the nation’s word, the sanctity of treaties, non-intervention in other nations’ affairs, freedom and a decent standard of living for all men. Linked as states are now by developed means of transport and communication and other forms of technical development, the

Introductory

5

mutuality of their interests has to be borne in mind even when they pursue their national interests: all nations have an interest in peace and in strengthening the forces of peace such as a strong United Nations and the Rule of Law; the pursuit of national interest has therefore to be consistent with the interests of other nations. Before we pass on to the influences on the making of foreign policy, reference must be made to a view increasingly held by both statesmen and political thinkers that there is hardly any distinction between foreign and domestic policy, since there is now hardly any distinction between foreign affairs and domestic affairs. Thus Senator J.W. Fulbright wrote in 1959: ‘If ever the line between domestic and foreign affairs could be drawn, it is now wholly erased.’13 Hans J. Morgenthau wrote in his well-known Politics Among Nations in 1960: ‘The traditional distinction between foreign and domestic policies tends to break down. One might almost be tempted to say that there are no longer any purely domestic affairs.’14If, as Morgenthau holds, the distinction between domestic politics and foreign policies tends to break down, it is pointless to talk of foreign policy or the domestic roots of foreign policy. It would be more useful to speak simply of ‘public’ policy. We suggest however that it is in fact an exaggeration to say that the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs ‘is now wholly erased’. There is certainly increasing interdependence between domestic and foreign affairs, and, therefore, between domestic and foreign policy — the economic development of India, essentially a matter of domestic concern, is, for example, tied up with seeking foreign capital and foreign technical know-how; similarly the sec­ urity of India is tied up with the purchase of ammunition from abroad and with seeking friends who could, if need be, assist in a crisis (as is illustrated by the Indo-Soviet Treaty).15 So do foreign affairs impinge on domestic affairs: the ill-treatment of the Hindu minority in Pakistan set up a wave of indignation in India and similar ill-treatment of the Muslim minority in India, which led to the Prime Ministers of the two states concluding the Nehru-Liaquat Agreement of 1950;16the defeat of India by China (1962) has had a powerful impact on the modernization of the defence forces of India. The classic study on United Nations and domestic jurisdic­ tion by M.S. Rajan reveals that the United Nations has not hesitated to interpret the phrase ‘domestic jurisdiction’ occurring in Article 2.7 of the Charter in such a manner that many apparently domestic

6

Domestic Roots o f India’s Foreign Policy

matters such as the treatment of racial minorities, economic de­ velopment, the maintenance of full employment, the abolition of forced labour and freedom of association have been held to be of international concern.17 While there is thus increasing interdependence between domestic and foreign affairs, it is our view that, analytically, a distinction between foreign and domestic policy can be drawn. The dividing line is the question: is a modification of the behaviour of a foreign government called for in dealing with it?7To take the example of the economic development of India: while some aspects of it involve skilled application of foreign policy, such as securing foreign capital and technical know-how, foreign markets for indigenous goods and foreign exchange, it would stretch the term ‘interdependence’ too much to say that the increase of home production in wheat and rice, the decision on the nationalization of an industry like sugar, the maintenance of harmonious relations between labour and capital, the removal of regional disparities and such issues of economic development, raise questions of foreign policy. The true answer seems to be that the internationalization of domestic affairs—and, therefore, the blurring of the distinction between domestic policy and foreign policy—depends on the extent to which the needs, security and welfare of the people of a state are satisfied from the human and non-human resources available within the state. The basic distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy stands. The use of the term ‘foreign policy’ to cover both ‘foreign policy’ and ‘foreign policies’, as is attempted in the definition given by the Brookings Institution quoted above,18 while broadly correct gives rise to avoidable confusion. In our view, it will be useful to use two terms, ‘foreign policy’ and ‘foreign relations’, to cover the whole range of the relations of a nation with other nations. The foreign policy is the sum total of the principles, the interests and objectives which a state formulates in conducting its relations with other states. The principles are the codes of right conduct which are consi­ dered desirable in themselves, such as adherence to treaties and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Interests are what a state considers, in general terms, essential for its survival and development: such as territorial integrity, improvement of living standards, and maintenance of a free way of life. Objectives are the more or less precisely delimited interests, formulated in the circum­

Introductory

1

stances in which the relations with another state are conducted. One of India’s objectives in its relations with Pakistan in 1971, for example, was the creation of conditions in the former East Bengal, through diplomacy, which would facilitate the return of the nine million refugees from East Bengal to their homes in safety and freedom. Foreign relations are the actions that a state resorts to in pur­ suance of the foreign policy formulated, such as declaration of war, conclusion of peace, the signing of a treaty, giving or accepting aid, recognition of a state, establishment of diplomatic relations, and carrying on negotiations.

Influences on the Making o f Foreign Policy We have hinted at two broad types of influence that bear on the making of foreign policy, viz. the international environment and the domestic environment. One of the descriptions of foreign policy cited earlier,19 as an interaction between forces originating outside the country’s borders and those working within them, highlights the dual nature of the source of foreign policy. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The complexity of foreign policy arises from the interaction of the desire of states within the international community to achieve their own national interests, and their consequent attitudes to interna­ tional issues, all connected directly or indirectly with issues of peace and war. It is a simplification to say that the establishment of friendly and co-operative relations between nations is the aim of a sound foreign policy; the complexity of the task arises from the very nature of international politics. The multiplicity of attitudes and their interaction apart, the diffi­ culty of conducting foreign policy arises from the fact that a state has no sure means of controlling the behaviour of other sovereign states. It can persuade, promise or deny economic and military aid; it can threaten another state with the use of force; nevertheless, it cannot be certain the state will act in the way it desires. Rogers, who was American Secretary of State from 1969 to 1973, once confes­ sed that the U.S. Government had made a study of how often they had been able to influence another government by withholding

8

Domestic Roots o f India’s Foreign Policy

military aid; they found that it had not been successful in any instance. Even he would not deny, however, that the positive act of giving economic aid has enabled the U.S. to influence the policy of other states. It follows that the government must often choose between a few rational options; it just cannot expect an ‘ideal’ solution. There is a third source of difficulty. The world is continuously changing; new events and personalities create fresh foreign-policy problems for all concerned. To select instances at random, the impact of the October Revolution of 1917, the rise of Communist ower in China in 1949, the rise of de Gaulle to power in France in the fifties, and the emergence of new states in Asia and Africa since 1946, created problems which could not have been foreseen by the Foreign Ministers of the time. Yet it has been rightly said that there is both continuity and change in the foreign policies of all states, for every nation also has its history and its traditions. The statesman who not only merely reacts to events but acts on his own, anticipat­ ing events, has a certain limited advantage over another who is caught by events. THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

There are mainly four elements in the domestic environment of importance in the making of foreign policy: geography, history and tradition, the social structure and the political organization. Geography That the geography of a country is important in shaping its foreign policy is attested by the development of geopolitics as a science. Geographical factors, like the size and the location of a country, its natural resources and the number of its population contribute to the power of the nation, which in turn shapes its foreign policy. But we must not exaggerate their importance, for their effectiveness de­ pends upon a combination of several factors including the quality of governmental leadership and technological strength. The equation of national power contains many variables, and it is the relationship among these variables that largely determines whether nations will be weak or strong. This point needs elaboration. Great Britain was a great power until 1945; today she is not. Part of the explanation undoubtedly lies in her relative deficiency in size and population, and in food supplies. It is not by accident that the

Introductory

9

U.S. and the Soviet Union have become super powers: their size (the Soviet Union, for example, controls a land mass that extends over one-seventh of the land area ofuhe earth and she had a population of about 240 million in 1972) and population are con­ siderable. The U.S. and the Soviet Union are nearly self-sufficient in the raw materials necessary for modern industrial production. The U.S. is also not deficient in food whereas such a deficiency has been a permanent source of weakness for Great Britain; she has to rely on her naval resources to ensure that her population will not starve. For some decades now, oil as a source of energy has become increasingly important for industry and war. Most mechanized weapons and vehicles require oil; and, consequently, countries that possess considerable deposits of oil can acquire great power in international relations. ‘One drop of oil’, said Clemenceau, ‘is worth one drop of blood of our soldiers.’ The Soviet Union is self-sufficient in this respect; Britain lacks oil supplies. West Asia has a large deposit of oil and this gives the countries in the region some influence in international relations, but they are not super or great powers. The possession of a natural resource like oil is only one factor, which unless coupled with other factors like able government, technological organization, and military strength, does not enable its possessor to become powerful. Of the geopolitical factors of power, special attention may be drawn to location. Britain and Japan—small islands off the coasts of Europe and Asia—became great nations because of their ability to use the oceans as highways of commerce. The absence of natural frontiers, as Poland has discovered throughout its history, can de­ cide whether or not national security can be preserved. The fact that the United States is separated from the old world was a considerable factor in its early development; it was secure and free to develop a virgin country. That Britain is separated from Europe by twenty miles of water gave her an advantage denied to several countries such as France and Germany, which had to spend much of their resources in fighting each other on border problems. Air power has of course reduced the significance of this factor. The possession by a potential enemy, say the Soviet Union, of intercontinental ballistic missiles has nullified the protection af­ forded to the U.S. by its location. Britain discovered during the blitz in the second world war that her insular position no longer gave her

10

Domestic Roots o f India’s Foreign Policy

security. Similarly, the location of Pakistan, adjacent to the Soviet Union and China, has undoubtedly moulded her position in interna­ tional politics and given hot an influence out of proportion to her size and population. Kissinger's secret flight to China in July 1971 as a prelude to Nixon's invitation to visit Peking is a telling illustra­ tion of this importance. Nepal's position as an independent buffer state between India and China has also posed problems for India, largely explicable in terms of Nepal's location. History and tradition That the history of a nation has an influence on the making of its foreign policy from time to time may be seen from our earlier remark: there is continuity and change in foreign policy. The ele­ ment of continuity represents the legacy of history. Speaking on 27 October 1949, Frank K. Roberts, a member of the British Foreign Service, said that over the years certain histori­ cal factors had become constant in the British approach to interna­ tional affairs.20 He listed six such factors: 1. The Commonwealth connexion. 2. Friendship with the United States of America. Whatever temporary disagreement there may be, our relationship with America is a spe­ cial one and for the best part of 100 years it has been an axiom of British policy that we and America must never be on opposite sides. This is of course closely connected with the Commonwealth tie in so far as the relationship between Canada and America, not to mention other members of the Commonwealth, is concerned. 3. Friendship with the Low Countries and with France as our nearest neighbours. We may have had quarrels in the past and shall no doubt have disagreements in the future but this special relationship with France and the Low Countries is now part of the British approach to international affairs. 4. In the Mediterranean area we have had similar close relations with. Turkey and the Arab countries and Persia, and the importance of maintaining such relations looms very large in the British approach and must continue to do so, with the Mediterranean forming a link between the Commonwealth and with the importance of the oil of Arabia, which is essential to our modern industrial civilization. 5. South-East Asia also has a special place in British international think­ ing because of our long connexion with many parts of South-East Asia but above all because the economy of Britain and Europe and that of South-East Asia are in so many ways complementary to each other. In co-operation and on a basis of full equality, this relationship can be developed and prosper. 6. Finally, although you may be surprised that I should mention this

Introductory

11

now, a constant factor in British foreign policy hitherto has been the maintenance, despite many frictions and differences, of such rela­ tions with Russia as will enable us to stand side by side, if necessary in the future, as we did against Napoleon and Hitler in the past.

The conclusion which Roberts drew ‘from these historical con­ siderations’ was that history had ‘taught . . . [the British] the vir­ tues of constancy and moderation in approaching international affairs.’ The influence of history can also be seen in the foreign policy formulated by a newly-independent state like India. In his first statement on foreign policy, after he became head of the Interim Government on 7 September 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru said, ‘We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and depen­ dent countries.’ Having been a dependent people and having struggled—non-violently—for freedom, India naturally supported the freedom movement of dependent peoples everywhere—as in Indonesia, Algeria, Vietnam, Morocco. We also spoke of tradition as a factor in the making of foreign policy. Traditional values may be described as those principles embodied in beliefs and practices which have been transmitted through successive generations and have been regarded as worthy of esteem and adoption. Foreign policy is a form of social action undertaken by men; a foreign minister is part of the social milieu in which he operates and he cannot disregard the basic values held in his society. To illustrate: a free way of life, embodied in democratic norms and institutions, is very much a part of the American way of life. The Declaration of Independence categorically stated: We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator, with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.

That is why the former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared that ‘the broad goal of our [American] foreign policy is to enable the people of the United States to enjoy, in peace, the blessings of liberty.’21 Communism was anathema to Dulles; his

12

Domestic Roots o f India’s Foreign Policy

policy of containment can be understood only in the light of the goal of foreign policy enunciated by him as cited above. The structure o f society National morale is recognized to be an important element in the power of a state, and, therefore, in the successful conduct of foreign policy. It is evident that a homogeneous society makes for stronger national unity, and morale, than a heterogeneous one: sharp divi­ sions in society—divisions between rich and poor, divisions on the basis of religion, regional imbalances—make it difficult for a gov­ ernment to count on that immediate and nation-wide co-operation from society which is so essential for a successful foreign policy. Such co-operation is demanded in particular when the society’s wealth and personnel have to be expended in the prosecution of a war. Britain’s firm and united stand, in the blitz during the Second World War under the brilliant leadership of Winston Churchill, or the Soviet Union’s resistance to Hitler at Stalingrad (1942-3) under Stalin’s leadership, are classic instances of how aggressors can be thwarted by unity at home. The leadership provided by Churchill and Stalin also deserves the credit; but the basic honour goes to the people of the two countries who were prepared to endure extreme hardship in order to preserve their freedom. The structure of society has another implication for the analysis of foreign policy: a plural society, with its members following differ­ ent religions as in India, indicates a policy of secularism with inevit­ able repercussions on both domestic and foreign policy (see Chap­ ter V). The political organization The internal political structure of a country has an important impact upon that country’s approach to international affairs, as is evident from a comparison of the decision-making processes in an absolute monarchy or a dictatorship on the one hand, and in a parliamentary democracy on the other. In the former, since the decision-making power rests with an individual (aided by a clique), decisions can be relatively quickly made, and according to the will of the person and the clique in power. It is true that,as David Hume puts it,‘it is .. .on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments as well as to the most free and most popular.’22 There is, however, a crucial differ­

Introductory

13

ence. A despotic government has greater power, through censor­ ship and the promulgation of regulations, to prevent the expression o f undesirable opinions, than a free government does. Indeed the distinguishing mark of a free government is the very freedom al­ lowed the citizens to express their opinions on public policy, domes­ tic or foreign. There are besides, established institutions such as an elected parliament, political parties and a free press for the expres­ sion of opinion. That is why a practitioner of foreign policy could say that in Britain ‘all policy, including international policy, must be decided by, or at least secure the active approval of, the majority in Parliament and of the majority ot the country represented in Parliament.’23 Besides, over important international issues, it has always been felt in Britain that such approval should come from both the great parties in the state: only where public opinion is solidly behind foreign policy, can it be effective in a parliamentary democracy. Several difficult questions arise from this statement: how does public opinion express itself—through the press, political parties, interest groups? When can public opinion be considered ‘public’, and when is it ‘opinion’? Are not these difficulties greater in democ­ racies in underdeveloped countries where the mass of the people are illiterate and where effective influence is wielded only by the rich and elite? What do governments do to educate public opinion in order to ensure an opinion favourable to themselves? Above all, is the general public really competent to judge foreign affairs of which they might have even less knowledge than domestic affairs? That discerning observer of politics, Tocqueville, has said, after a study of American politics: Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient. Democracy is favourable to the increase of the internal resources of a state; it diffuses wealth and comfort, promotes public spirit, and fortifies the respect for law in all classes of society: all these are advantages which have only an indirect influence over the rela­ tions which one people bears to another. But a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience.24

We do not propose to discuss these questions even in summary

14

Domestic Roots o f India's Foreign Policy

form; it is sufficient to make two comments in this brief section on the nature of foreign policy: 1. Public opinion has in recent times been distinctly gaming in power: it compelled the resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare, the British Foreign Minister, in 1935, through its indignation over the deal which he had made with Laval, the French Prime Minister, on the German invasion of Abyssinia; the sharp criticism in Britain of Eden’s Suez adventure in 1956 eventually led to the reversal of that policy; similarly the strong opposition of the American public to the government’s policy on Vietnam led Nixon to adopt a policy of gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam; 2. With Lord Strang, who was Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, we may say that the public ventilation of issues of foreign policy, often at awkward moments, hampers the flexibility, resourcefulness, and imagination with which diplomatic relations might otherwise be more fruitfully conducted.25

India's Foreign Policy26 NATIONAL INTEREST

A study of the speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, who formulated independent India’s foreign policy, and of his record as Foreign Minister, reveals that India’s national interest was the governing principle of his foreign policy. Jawaharlal Nehru told the Constituent Assembly of India on 4 December 1947, ‘We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of the country.’27 The national interest of India was not, however, in Jawaharlal’s view incompatible with the legitimate interests of other nations. Indexed in his view a nation’s self-interest may itself demand a policy of co-operation with other nations. Therefore, he told the Con­ stituent Assembly of India, ‘we propose to look after India’s in­ terests in the context of world co-operation and world peace, in­ sofar as world peace can be preserved.’28 Apart from the maintenance of the territorial integrity of a state, which is the first foreign policy objective for all states, four other objectives of India’s foreign policy are revealed in Nehru’s first

Introductory

15

broadcast to the nation as head of the Interim Government, on 7 September 1946: We shall take full part in international conferences as a free nation with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation. We hope to develop close and direct contacts with other nations and to co-operate with them in the furtherance of world peace and freedom. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particu­ larly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal oppor­ tunities for all races.29

These four objectives are: the maintenance of freedom of policy, the promotion of international peace, the emancipation of colonial and dependent territories and the promotion of racial equality. We must add to this list two other objectives, gleaned from other speeches of Nehru, viz. the economic development of India and the protection of the legitimate interests of people of Indian origin abroad. Independence of policy is a foreign-policy objective for all states, but needs special mention here for two reasons: first, India had emerged into freedom from having been a dependent country for over two centuries; a newly-independent state would naturally stress its desire to maintain its independence of policy from en­ croachment by richer and more powerful nations. That is why in the five principles of peaceful co-existence, first included in the India-China Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India (29 April 1954) ‘mutual non­ interference in each other’s internal affairs’ finds special mention. Secondly, in the late forties when India’s foreign policy was for­ mulated, the cold war between the Communist bloc and the Western democracies induced a general trend among states to join one bloc or the other, thereby jeopardising, according to Nehru, their freedom of policy in international relations. Intervening in a debate in the Constituent Assembly on 8 March 1948, Nehru asked ‘What does joining a bloc mean?’ and answered the question him­ self thus: After all it can only mean one thing: give up your view about a particular question, adopt the other party’s view on that question in order to please it and gain its favour. It means that and nothing else as far as I can see, because if our view is the view of that party, then there is no giving up and

16

Domestic Roots o f India’s Foreign Policy

we do go with that bloc or country. The question only arises when wft are opposed to it on that point; therefore we give up our viewpoint and the other one in order to gain a favour.30

To the promotion of international peace, Jawaharlal gave high priority: it was his conviction that a world war in the nuclear age was suicidal, and since in such a war it would be difficult to be neutral, India too would suffer destruction. He bent his energies to reduce international tensions, to have nuclear tests suspended, and to achieve complete disarmament. The security of India apart, it was also his conviction that world peace was a precondition for the economic development of India which was urgently needed. To a country low in per capita income and in savings, and economically underdeveloped, assistance from the more developed countries by way of capital and know-how was a sine qua non for development and he knew that the outbreak of war would make it impossible to get such co-operation. The support India gave to the freedom struggle of dependent peoples is now part of history and does not need elaboration; Nehru’s convening a conference in Delhi in 1949 to consider the question of Indonesia’s freedom from the Dutch, and India’s sup­ port in the United Nations for the freedom of Algeria and Tunisia from the French, are cases in point. Racial non-discrimination is now accepted by world opinion and a vast majority of states, in principle at least; a work published by UNESCO has established that ‘race’ is a purely biological concept from which it is impossible to draw any valid conclusion whatever as to the disposition or mental capacity of a particular individual.31 Nehru referred lo the injustice of racial discrimination again and again in his speeches on foreign policy; apart from the justification of racial equality as a human right, Nehru also thought racial dis­ crimination was an important cause of potential world conflict. Speaking to the Indian Council of World Affairs on 22 March 1949, he warned that there was bound to be conflict on a big scale ‘because it is a continuous challenge to the self-respect of a vast number of people in the world and they will not put up with it . . . and that conflict will not be confined to particular areas in South Africa or elsewhere; it will affect peoples in vast continents.’32 To improve the living standards of the Indian people was the basic aim of the Government of India; indeed the expectations of a people who had democratic rights gave it high priority in the

Introductory

17

Government’s policies to increase production and bring about equitable distribution. This demanded planned economic develop­ ment. Planned economic development, in turn, demanded in the Indian context, the import of capital and technical assistance from developed countries. Foreign policy had clearly to be used as a tool to get the needed capital and technical assistance from economically-developed countries. Statements on the subject of people of Indian origin made in the Lok Sabha in September and December 1957, clearly indicate the Government of India’s policy in regard to them and may be sum­ marized thus: 1. The Government of India had left it to Indians abroad to decide whether they would continue to remain Indian nationals or adopt the nationality of the country they had settled in. If they adopted the nationality of the country in which they lived, they should be given all the rights of citizenship. India would have no political concern with them though she would continue to have a sentimental interest in their welfare. If, on the other hand, they remained Indian nationals, then abroad they could only claim favoured treatment as aliens, Though as aliens they had no right to vote, they should be given all other civic privileges. 2. Indian settlers should associate themselves as closely as possi­ ble with the interest of the country they had adopted, and should never appear or function as an exploiting agency. They should be friendly and co-operative while maintaining their own dignity and self-respect. ‘That is not only a policy which I consider right’, Nehru said, ‘but the only practical policy, because, if Indians do not do that abroad, they will be ground between the two mill-stones of the local population and the foreign elements from Europe and elsewhere.’ He stated categorically in the Lok Sabha: Where the country has to face difficulties we advise our countrymen to put up with those difficulties. We cannot ask for special privileges. But, where any unfair treatment is given to our countrymen, then, of course, we protest.33

The Means A dopted for Achieving the Objectives NON-ALIGNMENT

India has relied on three means for achieving her foreign policy objectives: non-alignment, the temper of peace, and friendship with all countries.

18

Domestic Roots o f India’s Foreign Policy

The clearest statement on the meaning of non-alignment, as Nehru conceived it, is found in his answer to a question put to him by Adlai Stevenson in 1961: r,

Non-alignment means not tying yourself up with military blocs of nations or with a nation. It means trying to view things, as far as possible, not from the military point of view, though that has to come in sometimes, but indepen­ dently, and trying to maintain friendly relations with all countries.34

When we say that India follows a policy of non-alignment, it means (1) that India has no military alliances with countries of either bloc—or indeed with any nation;35 (2) India has an indepen­ dent approach to foreign policy, not being tied down to a particular line of action through membership of a bloc; and (3) India attempts to maintain friendly relations with all countries. Before we pass on to the temper of peace, three possible miscon­ ceptions should be removed. First, as Nehru was careful to explain in Parliament, non-alignment (not being a party to military al­ liances) does not exclude close relationships with other countries. ‘So our policy’, said Nehru on 8 March 1949,4will continue to be not only to keep apart from power alignments but trying to make friendly co-operation possible.’36 The large number of agreements entered into by India with several nations since 1947, of a cultural, economic, and political (promotion of peace) character will testify to this desire to be friendly with all nations. Secondly, non-alignment does not mean neutrality. Neutrality, as a policy, has little meaning except in times of war. India might be said to be neutral insofar as she has decided that she would not join either bloc in the cold war. But the term ‘neutrality’ is inapplic­ able to India’s policy because it suggests that a country with such a policy has no positive opinions on the issues which divide the blocs, and that, certainly, is not true so far as India is concerned. On significant world issues, especially so far as they relate to war and peace, India has spoken clearly and with conviction. For instance, she condemned the British and French invasion of the Suez in 1956 as ‘naked aggression’; she condemned, belatedly, Soviet inter­ ference in Hungary in 1956; and she considered North Korean troops marching into South Korea in 1950 to be ‘aggression’. Speaking at a press conference at the U.N. Correspondents’ As­ sociation, New York, in October 1960 Nehru brought out this aspect forcefully37 and reiterated it in the Lok Sabha on 22 November 1960:

Introductory

19

As I have said repeatedly, I do not like the word(neutral' as being applied to India. I do not even like India’s policy being referred to as ‘positive neutrality’ as is done in some countries. Without doubt, we are unaligned; we are uncommitted to military blocs; but the important fact is that we are committed to various policies, various urges, various objectives, and vari­ ous principles; very much so.” Thirdly, there is a widespread misconception that non-alignment implies that, when a war breaks out, India is bound to be neutral; said Nehru in the Constituent Assembly on 4 December 1947: Non-alignment has nothing to do with neutrality or anything else or passiv­ ity. If there is a big war, there is no particular reason why we should jump into it. Nevertheless, it is a little difficult nowadays in world wars to be neutral. ... We are not going to join a war if we can help it; and we are going to join the side which is to our interest when the choice comes to it.39 THE TEMPER OF PEACE

In a broadcast from London on 12 January 1951, Jawaharlal said, ‘What we need is a passion for peace and for civilized behaviour in international affairs. . . . If we desire peace, we must develop the temper of peace and try to win even those who may be suspicious of us or who think they are against us. We have to try to understand others just as we expect them to understand us. We cannot'seek peace in the language of war or of threats.’40 The temper of peace approach has two aspects, the negative and the positive. 1. On the negative side, this approach is a protest against what one may call the power politics approach with its concomitants, the reliance on armaments, war, spheres of influence, alliances, and balance of power. The balance of power approach, whether useful or not at one time, cannot preserve peace in the present atomic age. Nehru’s spokesman at the General Assembly forcefully expressed this view on 4 October 1955 thus: We have found that the promotion of neighbourliness, agreements on non-aggression and mutual respect are ways of promoting co-operation. It may be asked: is your system likely to succeed? Can you rely on it? With great respect, we are entitled to ask: have the other systems succeeded? Can anybody turn round to us and say that the doctrine of the balance of power is more likely to help us, or to succeed — that doctrine which is the legacy of Metternich, Castlereagh and of Talleyrand, which wrecked the principle of universalism and culminated in the war of 1914, and which to this day is making its incursions into international affairs? I am reminded of

20

Domestic Roots o f India’s Foreign Policy

the statement of a great Frenchman, Rousseau, who said that the strongest is never strong enough to be always master unless he transfers strength into right and obedience into duty.41

In the social and political conditions of the nineteenth century, the balance of power might have been able to preserve a precarious peace. There were then a number of states more or less equal in power; but since 1945 conditions have been totally different. Be­ sides, the discovery of nuclear weapons has added a new dimension to the problem. It is an ironical but demonstrable law that nations which have armed themselves to preserve the peace have seldom avoided war, if only because reason cannot always control passions, and even if it does, accidents play a part in events. Jawaharlal believed that power politics leading to an uneasy balance of power, cannot guarantee peace but will lead sooner or later to war which in the atomic age may, as Einstein said, lead to the annihilation of any life on earth. 2. In positive terms,42 the approach to peace in the atomic age, while not ignoring the realities of power, is to be looked for in successfully exploring, more fully than was necessary in an earlier age, the potentialities of negotiation and other means of peaceful settlement of conflicts, and in promoting active peaceful co­ operation between states. This positive approach has two elements: first, tackling the roots of conflict (social, economic, and political); and second, attempting to resolve a conflict without recourse to violence so that there may be a reduction in the international tension arising from that conflict, even if the conflict itself is not resolved. The ending of colonialism and racialism, the raising of the living standards of people in underdeveloped countries, and the promo­ tion of the temper of peace in as wide an area as possible will help to tackle the roots of conflict. Promotion of the temper of peace will be facilitated by disarmament and by the ‘recognition of each other’s sovereignty, independence, and integrity, or non-interference in the domestic affairs of each other or of other countries, and by the promotion, both for themselves and for the world, of the approach and conditions of peaceful coexistence’—principles which are all to be found in the United Nations Charter. Wars arise in the minds of men, and the promotion of the temper of peace will help to promote a climate of peace. This, clearly, is a long-term approach and Jawaharlal knew it. He

Introductory

21

knew that conflicts do and will occur as promises are not always kept and panchsheel may be broken, as in the case of Hungary in 1956 and China’s encroachment on Indian territory during 1959-62. To resolve conflicts which have arisen, Jawaharlal’s view was that: Whatever the problems, difficult or simple, the manner of approach will make a difference. And you know if you approach them in anger, hatred, in a spirit of violence, then the problems become difficult and indeed much more difficult and much less amenable to solution. So . . . the philosophy behind the Indian approach is, as far as possible, a friendly approach: to hold to what we consider right, firmly and without fear and yet not to speak about opponents in terms which would worsen the situation. . . . This is not only an idealistic way but in the circumstances of the world today, I submit, the only practical way, strictly from the practical point of view and that is why the leaders of other countries not accepting perhaps the philosophy of this, practically are functioning or coming round to functioning on those lines.43

Jawaharlal’s approach proceeds on the assumption that peace cannot be promoted by creating positions of strength; on the con­ trary, the creation of positions of strength might become a threat to peace—for every party will naturally try to increase its strength vis-a-vis its competitors, and such an attempt is suicidal in the atomic age. Entering into military alliances and the establishment of military bases in foreign territory accentuates discord and the possi­ bility of war. The peaceful approach—which does not absolutely guarantee peace—has to be tried if only because there is no other. Its essential is the determination to avoid force, for the use of violence creates more problems than it solves, if, indeed, its use does not lead to world destruction; hence discussion, negotiation, and accommodation are the only ways left for the settlement of differences. FRIENDSHIP WITH ALL COUNTRIES

A deliberate policy of friendship with other countries, Jawaharlal told the Lok Sabha on 9 December 1958, goes farther in gaining security than almost anything else. Indira Gandhi said at a Seminar at New Delhi on 31 August 1970/1 think that it is possible through friendship to out-manoeuvre hostility.’44 A policy of friendship de­ mands efforts at co-operation, political, economic and cultural. This co-operation is subject to one basic condition, ‘That in our exter­ nal, internal or domestic policy, in our political policy, or in our

22

Domestic Roots o f India's Foreign Policy

economic policy we do not propose to accept anything that involves in the slightest degree dependence on any other authority.' From this it follows that alliances are ruled out, for alliances usually involve military and other commitments and they are binding. Other forms of association, in Nehru’s judgement, which do not bind in this manner, but which help in bringing together nations for the purpose of consolidation and, where necessary, of co-operation, are, therefore, far more desirable th^n any form of alliance which does bind.

Domestic Roots o f India's Foreign Policy Reference has been made earlier to the domestic environment as a major influence on the formulation of foreign policy. The five essential elements in the domestic environment of India are tradi­ tion and history, democracy, the economic factor, the pluralist nature of society in India, and Nehru’s charismatic personality. TRADITION AND HISTORY

We have already described traditional values as those principles which have been regarded through successive generations as worthy of esteem and adoption, e.g., tolerance of viewpoints different from one’s own. The historical factors relevant to our study are five-fold: the nationalist movement, from the foundation of the Indian Na­ tional Congress in 1885; India’s consciousness of racial inequality under British rule’ the resolutions passed by the Indian National Congress on foreign relations; Indian political ihinking in the present century with its interesting mixture of nationalism and in ernationalism; and the exclusion of tfte Indian elite, during British rule, from the decision-making process in foreign relations. Each one of these factors has had its influence on the foreign policy as it was shaped by Jawaharlal Nehru and followed by him and his successors; these form the subject matter of Chapter II. DEMOCRACY

Soon after India became free, she adopted a fully democratic con­ stitution with all its essentials; a parliament elected on adult suf­ frage, periodic elections, responsibility of the Government to the people (directly or indirectly) and freedom of speech, press, and

Introductory

23

association. It is normal in a democracy for the people and their representatives in parliament to claim a decisive voice in determin­ ing the government's foreign policy (as in determining domestic policy). What does popular control of foreign policy in effect mean? How do the people exercise an influence on foreign policy? What are the limits to the control of government, in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, by parliamen and public opin­ ion? Is a leader bound to follow the people always, or is he to lead them in the direction he considers right? Having discussed the theory of popular control of foreign policy, we next consider India's performance. What the constitutional provisions (through which the people and their representatives can influence and even control foreign policy) are, and how far these constitutional provisions have in practice enabled the people to influence foreign policy through Parliament, political parties and the press, are issues dealt with in Chapter III. THE ECONOMIC FACTOR

Though historical and political influences are, of course, important in the shaping of foreign policy, when India's foreign policy is studied in depth, it appears that the economic basis of that policy is even more important: economic development has a high priority in an underdeveloped country and foreign policy (as well as domestic policy ) has to be used in order to develop the living standards of the people. A brief discussion of the Indian economy on the eve of independence, the impact of socialist thinking on policy-makers, the several ways in which foreign policy can, in theory, help economic development, the role of foreign aid, the impact of foreign private capital, foreign-trade policy and the promotion of joint industrial enterprises, are all studied in Chapter IV, on the demands of economic development. A PLURALIST SOCIETY

India has a pluralist society. There are two elements in this which have had some impact on India’s foreign policy. First, in the pluralist Indian society with citizens professing dif­ ferent religions, it is axiomatic that the state should adopt sec­ ularism as its ideal. Secularism essentially means (1) the impartiality of the state towards all religions and religious denominations; (2) a

24

Domestic Roots o f India's Foreign Policy

refusal to acccpt the idea tha the itate should belong to one religion more than another; and (3) the existence of restrictions on the state from passing any law prohibiting the free exercise of any religion. What impact does secularist policy have on the promulga­ tion and implementation of foreign policy? How has it shaped India's foreign relations, e.g. with Pakistan, with West Asia and with Bangladesh? An attempt is made to discuss some aspects of this large question in Chapter V. Secondly, pluralism is also reflected in the fact that India is a federal State. The Constitution of India has, as is common in all federations, vested the subject of foreign policy in the Union Gov­ ernment with ample powers for the Government to implement its foreign policy. At the same time, the Union Government has to take into account the special concern of the several parts of India in particular aspects of foreign policy and foreign relations, such as the special involvement of West Bengal in the problem of Berubari (1958--60), and in the movement of independence for the people of East Pakistan (1971). Gujarat showed particular interest in the problem of Kachchh (1965). Chapter VI analyses the problems raised by foreign policy in a federation and in the Indian context. CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP

In Chapter VII an attempt is made to discuss Nehru’s charismatic leadership. A special chapter is devoted to this as it cannot be put in the same class as the four factors mentioned above. Tradition and history, democracy, the demands of economic development, and pluralism are factors which have a continued bearing on the Indian polity and on India’s foreign policy; charismatic leadership, on the other hand, applies to a particular individual and is obviously trans­ ient in nature. Charismatic authority rests, according to Max Weber, ‘on the uncommon and extraordinary devotion to the sacredness or the heroic force, or the exemplariness of an individual and the order revealed or created by him.’43 Such authority is inherently unstable; its continuance depends upon the continuing success of the indi­ vidual in producing results. An effort is made to examine the nature of charismatic leadership, and the evolution of Nehru’s personality which was the basis of his charisma for the Indian people, and finally its impact on foreign policy.

Introductory

25

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. Hugh Gibson, The Road to Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday, 1944), p. 9. 2. George Modelski, A Theory o f Foreign Policy (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), pp. 6-7, italics ours. 3. F.S. Northedge ed., The Foreign Policies o f the Powers (London: Faber & Faber, 1968), pp. 9,150, italics ours. 4. Major Problems o f United States Foreign Policy 1952-1953 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1952), pp. 373-5. 5. Joseph Frankel, The Making o f Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 1, italics ours. 6. Modelski, Theory o f Foreign Policy, p. 7. 7. Raymond Aaron in International Journal, vol. XXI, p. 194, cited in Joseph Frankel, National Interest (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 18: ‘Is this interest “national interest”, in abstract terms, susceptible of a rational definition which could serve as a criterion or an ideal for a statesman’? The three preceding chapters, it seems to me,dictate a negative answer to this question*Raymond Aaron, Peace and War, English translation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p. 89. 8. Constituent Assembly o f India (Legislative) Debates vol. II, 4 December 1947, pp. 1262-3. See also Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, p. 28. 9. United States’ Foreign Policy 1952-1953, pp. 373-5. 10. Nicholas J. Spykman* America’s Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Williams, 1942), p. 17. 11. Asian Relations Organization,Asian Relations (New Delhi, 1948), pp. 20-7. 12. Department o f State Bulletin, vol. 46, 19 March 1962, p. 449. 13. The Reporter, vol. XX, no. 10, 14 May 1959, p. 19. 14. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 148. 15. See p. 2. 16. See Sisir Gupta, Kashmir (Bombay: Asia, 1966), pp. 212-13. 17. M.S. Rajan, United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction (Bombay: Asia, 1961), Ch. IV, Article 2-7: ‘Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.' 18. Seep. 2. 19. See p. 1. 20. Frank K. Roberts was Private Secretary to Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary from 1947-9, andin October 1949 was Deputy High Commissionei for the United Kingdom in India. The text of his address to the Indian Council of World Affairs on 27 October 1949 on ‘British Approach to International Affairs’ is given in India Quarterly, vol. VI, pp. 18-30. 21. Department o f State Bulletin, vol. 32,28 February 1955, p. 327. The impact of tradition on foreign policy in relation to India is dealt with later in this book.

26

Domestic Roots o f India's Foreign Policy

22. Charles W. Hendel ed., David Hume's Political Essays (New York: the Liberal Arts Press, 1953) p. 24. . 23. Roberts in India Quarterly, vol. VI, p. 25. 24. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. I (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p. 243. 25. Lord Strang, ‘Control of Foreign Policy in a Democracy’, The Listener, 17 January 1957, p. 93. 26. This section owes much to M. S. Raj an and A. Appadorai, India’s Foreign Policy, 1947-72 (in preparation). 27. Debates, vol. II, pp. 1262-3; see also Nehru, India’s Foreign Policyf p. 28. 28. Debates, vol. II, pp. 1262-3. 29. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 2. 30. Debates, Official Report, vol. Ill, p. 1769, see also Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 36. 31. See Michel Leris, The Race Question in Modem Science: Race and Culture, (Unesco: Paris, 1951) p. 6. 32. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 48. 33. Ibid., pp. 129-31. 34. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches (September 1957-April 1963), vol. IV(Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1964), p. 381. 35. The government has maintained that the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 is not a military alliance. See the statement by the Ministerfor External Affairs in the Lok Sabha on 10 August 1971, The Times o f India, 11 August 1971. 36. Speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative)* 8 March 1949. Debates, U, vol. II, p. 1234. 37. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, p. 85. 38. Ibid., p. 86. 39. Speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 4 December 1947, Debates, vol. II, No. 5. p. 1260. 40. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, pp. 184-5. 41. Speech by V.K. Krishna Menon, Chairman of the Indian Delegation, Reportof the Delegation o f India to the Tenth Session o f the General Assembly o f the United Nations (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1956) p. 227. 42. In what follows, I have adapted a few paragraphs from my article,‘On Under­ standing India’s Foreign Policy\ International Relations, October 1960. 43. Address to the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 5 April 1960. A copy of the Address is with the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. 44. Speech at a Seminar on Some Aspects of our Foreign Policy in New Delhi on 31 August 1970. 45. Max Rheinstein ed.f Max Weber on Law and Economy and Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. xi.

CHAPTER

II

Tradition and History Indian Traditions o f Peaceful Coexistence Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said in the Lok Sabha on 9 December 1958: From the larger point of view of the world also, we have laboured to the best of our ability for world peace. . . . It is a privilege to be associated with peace, but it brings one a great responsibility . . . We should . . . try to live up to it. . . . In our domestic sphere also we should work on lines which are compatible with peace. We cannot obviously have one voice for the world outside and another voice . . . internally. Therefore our foreign policy has this positive aspect of peace. The other positive aspects are an enlargement of freedom in the world, replacement of colonialism by free and independent countries and a larger degree of co-operation among nations.. . . It is completely incorrect to call our policy ‘Nehru’ policy. It is incorrect because all that I have done is to give voice to that policy. I have not originated it. It is a policy inherent in the circums­ tances in India, inherent in the past thinking o f India, inherent in the whole mental outlook o f India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom, and inherent in the circumstances of the world today.

In Jawaharlal Nehru’s view, two aspects of India’s foreign policy, viz. the ‘positive aspect of peace’ and the desire to promote ‘a larger degree of co-operation among nations’ were partly due to the impact of India’s past thinking on the formulation of foreign policy. We shall now attempt to elucidate and discuss this connection between traditional values and India’s foreign policy. THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF TRADITIONAL VALUES

We propose to discuss those socially-accepted traditional values which are expressed either in the writings of thinkers or embodied in ancient institutions and customs, and which inculcate peaceful attitudes and practices. Clearly a tradition accepted or desired by the best minds of our society may still fall short of the ideal in

28

Domestic Roots o f India's Foreign Policy

implementation, as with ahimsa or non-violence. Such variance in itself does not prove that the tradition has not been accepted as desirable. The main sources of India's traditional values date back some thousands of years, to the scriptural texts of the Hindus, the Vedas;2 the law books, the Dharmasastras\ the great epics, the Ramayana and Mahabharata; stories, legends, and chronicles of great national events;3 and theological treatises and manuals of worship.4 There are four primary scriptural texts of the Hindus called the Vedas. Veda literally means knowledge or wisdom; the Vedas are books of wisdom. It is the belief of the Hindus that the Vedas contain eternal truths as revealed to ancient saints by God; they are not creations of the human mind. The law books in Sanskrit are termed Dharmasastras; they lay down the rules by which individuals and communities should be guided in their conduct in life. Manu, Yajnyavalkya, and Parasara are among the most well-known of these lawgivers. These jurists rendered an essential service to Hindu society by codifying existing laws (omitting what in their judgement had become out of date) which the community should follow; it was the duty of the kings to enforce them. The Ramayana and the Mahabharata are the two great epics of the Hindus; they are stories of national heroes and their great deeds. As a means of popular education in social values, these epics are even more important than the scriptural texts and law books, knowledge of which is generally confined to a very few. Three further remarks may be made on the sources of our tradi­ tions. First, the values which have come down to us are what may be called social values—those considered desirable in various aspects of social life including the religious, economic, and political; the idea that political or economic life could be separated from other aspects of social life was not, it seems to us, current in ancient India. As Aurobindo Ghosh has said: ‘The true nature of the Indian polity can only be realized if we look at it not as a separate thing, a machinery independent of the rest of the mind and life of the people, but as a part, and in its relation to, the organic totality of social existence’ .5 Gandhi echoed this view when he said in 1938, ‘You cannot divide social, economic, political and purely religious work into watertight compartments.’6 Second, the writings of well-known modern Indian thinkers—in particular, Vivekananda,7 Rabindranath Tagore,8 Bal Gangadhar

Tradition and History

29

Tilak,9 Aurobindo Ghosh,10 M. K. Gandhi,11 Jawaharlal Nehru,12 and J. P. Narayan13—show that belief in ancient social values is still very much alive in modern India, regardless of whether it is prac­ tised or not. Third, these traditional values underwent some modification as a result of the impact of Islam (especially from the eleventh century on) and of Western political and social ideas (from the sixteenth century). This impact has been especially significant in respect of the concepts of equality, the rule of law, and political liberty—all, though indirectly, related to the subject of our discussion. Three of these traditional values have had some impact on India’is foreign policy, viz. tolerance, the equation of means and ends, and non-violence. TOLERANCE

That tolerance constitutes a fundamental part of the Indian tradi­ tion is widely acknowledged. V. Raghavan, the distinguished scho­ lar, even says that ‘Tolerance is one of the most important, if not the most important, among the concepts which invest the Indian tradi­ tional culture with a distinction and distinctness.’14 Its essence is a belief that views other than one’s own should be respected. Hinduism is essentially a catholic religion; religious beliefs in India have not assumed one uniform shape, but range from monotheism to polytheism—thus religion is not something imposed on a man to which he is required to conform, but something which should fit in with his cultural attainments and his status in life. As Mahatma Gandhi put it: ‘Hinduism tells every one to worship God according to his own faith or dharma, and so it lives at peace with all the religions.’15 There is a text of the Rigveda16 which declares that truth is one, though sages call it by different names. The basis for this tolerance seems to be a metaphysical one. Since the human mind is limited, it cannot comprehend the nature of total reality; further, the revelation that is made to it is not only limited but is interpreted by it from its own standpoint. Hence the great sages of Hinduism have said that there are as many religions as there are human minds; the Upanishads17 declare that just as cows which are of varied colours yield the same white milk, all the different paths lead to the same goal. This approach of Hinduism is best summarised in the words of Dr S. Radhakrishnan, the distinguished philosopher: ‘Every view of God represents some aspect or other of

30

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the relation of the human to the divine spirit. Each method of approach, each mode of address, answers to some mood of the human mind. Not one of them gives the whole truth, though each of them is partially true.’18 The idea of tolerance was not merely confined to books but was a social reality. Many immigrants and invaders came to India through the centuries, and were gradually assimilated into the society, each group however retaining its own characteristics. Asoka’s inscription on his rock pillars highlights the prevailing idea of tolerance: ‘The King, beloved of the Gods, honours every form of religious faith, but considers no gift or honour so much as the increase of the substance of religion; whereof this is the root; to reverence one’s faith, and never to revile that of others. Whoever acts differently injures his own religion while he wrongs another’s.’ It is also wellknown that there was hardly, up to the tenth century A.D., any religious persecution: practice was, in general, in accordance with beliefs. It is true that during the Muslim period of Indian history, there was some religious persecution; but the tolerant attitude sur­ vived to some extent even then. There are numerous instances of Muslim kings showing a remarkable tolerance towards other faiths, the most notableof them being Akbar (1556-1605). The great sage Kabir was an apostle of religious unity and understanding. India also possesses one of the oldest traditions of Christianity; and still has a living tradition of Zoroastrianism. Hospitality to the followers of all faiths, bom out of a tradition of tolerance, has been the keynote of Indian history and culture. Despite the rise of a communal outlook in the first half of the twentieth century, ending in the partition of India, and recurrent religious and caste tensions and violence, notwithstanding the clear injunctions of the Constitution and the law of the land, it is still true to say that the tradition of tolerance is fundamental to the thinking and life of the common people in India.19 Granting then that the ideal of tolerance is still an active force in the life of the common man, how is it of any value for modern India in the conduct of her international relations? The answer must be looked for in two directions, viz. non-alignment and peaceful negotiations. The tradition of tolerance is one major factor underlying the policy of non-alignment which India ha^ followed since 1946. India has avoided taking sides in cold-war politics, for while the pluralistic

Tradition and History

31

outlook of the Indian mind has made it react instinctively against communism and the intolerance of its claim to be the sole truth, the bitterness and hatred with which communism is regarded in western countries puzzles it as much; as such an attitude is rooted in intoler­ ance and unwillingness to learn from other social systems. Yet India clearly shares with the west its values of the dignity and freedom of the individual, which it believes a true social democracy alone will help to promote. Belief in tolerance is also the basis of India’s emphasis on the reconciliation of different viewpoints through peaceful negotiation. Many passages could be cited from Nehru’s speeches to show this.20 Speaking in the Rajya Sabha on 12 December 1957, he said, ‘Our approach . . . is not to stress the differences but rather to stress the similarities. It is an approach of reconciliation.’21 Reliance on the reconciliation of different viewpoints and peace­ ful negotiation is not by any means India’s monopoly; every nation resorts to such means to settle disputes or to solve international problems satisfactorily from its own point of view. In the cold-war atmosphere, however, in which many nations were bound by milit­ ary alliances, a non-aligned nation was in a more advantageous position than others to explore fully the possibilities of negotiation: the advantage was that, not being one of the parties in the cold war, its friendly contacts with both the parties would enable it to watch for opportunities to get them together to talk over issues. The right or ideal solutions are not always found, but it helps ‘to establish an attitude that eventually makes these solutions possible’22 through negotiation. In such negotiations, the essence of India’s approach has been that, for a lasting result, an attempt should be made to see that neither of the parties engaged in the conflict suffers a significant loss. That was Gandhi’s technique in trying to resolve India’s domestic tensions, as well as to secure freedom for India—a modern application of the principle of negotiation stated in the Mahabharata. When Sri Krishna was about to proceed for negotia­ tions to bring about a settlement between the Pandavas and the Kurus, he summarised the object of his mission thus: ‘Yes, I will go to King Dhritarashtra, desirous of accomplishing what is consistent with righteousness, what may be beneficial to us and what also is for the good o f the Kurus.'23 Such an approach assumes, too, that in meetings arranged for negotiations concerning vital international questions, one should

32

Domestic Roots o f India*s Foreign Policy

not ‘exclude those who differ’24; it is also necessary, especially in the context of conflict,25 to be aware of and utilize whatever common ground exists in order that from there we may march towards reconciliation. The leader of the Indian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly explained the Indian viewpoint in Ab­ raham Lincoln’s words: There are no great principles which are not flexible. Principles in politics are not like points in geometry, without dimensions. Principles must enable people to meet and reconcile their differences. It is no derogation of principle if the principal divergent points of view can honestly be reconciled withih it.

This approach to negotiation is illustrated by India’s tireless efforts to have Peking admitted to the United Nations, her unwillingness to vote on the resolution naming China an aggressor (1951), her warning to the Western powers not to cross the 38th Parallel (1950), and her efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement on Indochina (1954) and on Suez (1965). We must add that the Chinese invasion of India in 1962 gave a shock to Nehru; he had ruefully to admit/W e were getting out of touch with reality in the modem world and we were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation. We have been shocked out of it, all of us, whether it is the Government or the people.’26 Nehru learnt that the reconciliation of different viewpoints and peaceful negotiation were sound principles, but in dealing with countries which profess friendship but have aggressive intentions, more than ordinary care has to be taken in securing the country’s vital interests. The greater attention given by the Government of India, since 1962, to the strengthening and modernization of India’s defence forces testified to the Government of India’s realization of the limits to peaceful negotiation in the modem world. THE EQUATING OF MEANS AND ENDS

A second traditional value which has come down to us is that the means to be employed to achieve an end are as important as the end itself, and both should be in accordance with moral law—an idea which has best been expressed in recent times in Mahatma Gandhi’s writings.27 Many quotations could be cited from ancient texts in support of this view; but perhaps two will be sufficient: ‘One should not do a good thing by following a bad path;’28 and ‘To seek to

Tradition and History

33

further the welfare of the State by enriching it through fraud and falsehood is like storing water in an unburnt mud pot and hoping to preserve it.’29 The equation of right means and right ends is in the main Indian tradition. However, there are several ancient texts which take the contrary view and hold that, while the end must be good, the means need not be so. Kautilya, for instance, in his Arthasastra30 did recommend the adoption of methods of statecraft according to circumstances, and expressed the view that what produces Un­ favourable results is bad policy; a policy is to be judged by the results it produces. For him diplomacy was an art, not concerned with ideals but with achieving practical results for the State. For instance, he says: A weak king, should avert . . . invasion by making a treaty of peace, or by taking recourse to the battle of intrigue [mantrayudha ], or by a treacher­ ous fight in the battlefield. He may seduce the enemy’s men either by conciliation or by giving gifts, and should prevent the treacherous proceed­ ings of his own men either by sowing the seeds of dissension among them or by punishing them.31

The existence of this tradition, taken together with the record of events in our history, shows, first, that Indian rulers did not always accept the equation of ‘public’ with ‘private’ morality; and second, that social theorists were aware of the difficulty in such an equation—a difficulty which modem political theorists have also failed to meet effectively; that while an individual is free to go to extremes, even to the extent of facing death, in trying to follow a moral principle, the statesman acting on behalf of the State, being rather like a trustee acting on behalf of his ward, has to take into account, in deciding on his action, the interests and wishes of his people. To illustrate, an individual may decide to risk his own life in trying to save a drowning person; a statesman, though convinced that a neighbouring country suffering acutely from famine should be helped, may not be able to send it foodgrains from his own country if his own people are in need themselves (unless it is clear that they would willingly deprive themselves). The difficulty is a real one, and not easy to solve. It is the realization of this difficulty that led Nehru to say, frankly, that moral principles could be followed in statecraft only to a limit. He was indeed aware of the basic Indian tradition and the Gandhian

34

Domestic Roots o f India's Foreign Policy

position that the means to be employed to achieve an end are as important as the end itself, and that both should be according to moral law. In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 20 December 1956, he indeed seemed to stand by the Gandhian position, for he stated, ‘Means are as important as ends. If the means are not right, the end is also likely to be not right, however much we may want it to be right.’32 He also hoped that the ‘World Assembly to which all the nations of the world look’ would set an example to the rest of the world ‘in thinking always about the right means to be adopted to solve our problems’. It is clear, however, that Nehru’s address on 17 October 1949 to the Columbia Univer­ sity represents Nehru, the statesman: . . . a statesman or a man who has to deal with public affairs cannot ignore realities and cannot act in terms of abstract truth. His activity is always limited by the degree of receptivity of the truth by his fellowmen. Neverthe­ less, the basic truth remains truth and is always to be kept in view and, so far as possible, it should guide our actions.33

The action which India took in Goa in 1961 is a clear illustration of this conviction. Nehru knew that the use of force to take Goa from Portugal was not correct, according to traditional interna­ tional law, but also that opinion was slowly moving towards the view that international law against the use of Force could not apply to a situation in which a colonial power refused to negotiate, disregard­ ing even United Nations resolutions against colonialism. But he also knew that India, as a signatory to the Charter, had to get the Charter provisions on the use of force amended before it could legally resort to the use of force to achieve a politically valid objec­ tive. Clearly, it was this awareness which made him declare in Parliament that, on principle, India would not resort to force to integrate Goa with India: ‘The fact that a war (against the Por­ tuguese possessions) is a little war does not make it less than a war.’34 Nevertheless, if Nehru finally decided to use force in December 1961 to integrate Goa with India, it was clearly because he realized that public opinion in India was increasingly impatient to complete the ‘liberation’ of India from foreign control (see Chapter VI). NON-VIOLENCE

The basis of non-violence—ahimsa—is the principle developed

Tradition and History

35

in the Upanishads: there is one undivided and indivisible spirit, above as below, without as within, beginningless and endless; it may be called God or simply ‘Truth’. Truth thus conceived is the ground of all existence and the goal of all life. The universe is an expression of that truth, and all beings are fragments thereof. Non-violence is basic to it, because since perfection consists in realizing the spirit that is identical in all beings, all violence would involve a denial of this truth; the means to realizing the goal of perfection is non­ violence. Since in Gandhi’s view, man is essentially spirit and he must consider his body as only an expression of the spirit, any conduct that makes him brutal is evil. Ahimsa does not mean mere non-killing or abstention from doing harm to other beings. It con­ notes harmlessness in thought, word and deed, and also engulfing the entire universe in boundless love. The Vedic command runs: Do not injure any being! Buddha taught: let a man overcome anger by love; let him overcome evil by good. This ancient tradition did not suggest that non-violence could ever be employed as a weapon to achieve political and social ends. Thinkers before Gandhi had taught that non-violence was a virtue; it was also recognized that the average individual could not achieve perfect non-violence in practice. But the ideal was to reduce viol­ ence as far as possible. The revolution that Gandhi effected was in applying the tradition to politics—first against racialism in South Africa, and then against the British Government in India. Obvi­ ously, Gandhi considered India a fit laboratory for testing his new tactics of war as there had been here a tradition of non-violence and a marked aversion to the taking of life. Gandhi expressed the view that the use of force by the democra­ tic state is immoral. Democracy and violence can ill go together. ‘The states that are today nominally democratic have either to become frankly totalitarian, or, if they are to become truly democ­ ratic, they must become courageously non-violent.’35 It is interest­ ing that Gandhi connected the need for non-violence with the need for preserving the freedom of dissenters and minorities. ‘True democracy’, lie wrote in 1939.36 ‘or the swaraj of the masses can never come through untruthful and violent means for the simple reason that the natural corollary of their use would be to remove all opposition through the suppression or extermination of the an­ tagonists. That does not make for individual freedom. Individual freedoms can have the fullest play only under a regime of unadult­

36

Domestic Roots o f India's Foreign Policy

erated ahimsa.’ Further, democracy, so long as it was sustained by violence, Gandhi thought, cannot provide for or protect the weak. Specifically, in an article in the Harijan in 1946,37 Gandhi said that democracy should cease to rely upon the army: The democracies regard army men as their saviours. They bring wealth and subjugate other countries and sustain authority in times of civil disturbance. What is, therefore, to be wished is that democracy, to be true, should cease to rely upon the army for anything whatsoever.

Gandhi would apply his ideas on non-violence to international relations as well; in his view, the acceptance of the non-violent method is the only way to ensure security in the atomic age: It i§ open to the great powers to take up non-violence any day and cover themselves with glory and earn the eternal gratitude of posterity. If they or any of them can shed the fear of destruction, if they disarm themselves, they will automatically help the rest to regain their sanity. . . . One thing is certain. If the mad race for armaments continues, it is bound to result in a slaughter such as has never occurred in history. There is no escape from the impending doom save through a bold unconditional acceptance of the non-violent method with all its glorious implications.38

We must mention that Gandhi’s interpretation of the Hindu tradition in favour of non-violence in international relations has not always been accepted. Lala Laj pat Rai for instance (in an essay ‘My Political Creed’) stated, ‘I have no faith in non-violence as a creed.’39 He elaborated on this idea in an article entitled ‘Ahimsa Paramo Dharmah—A Truth or a Fad?’40 There is no religion higher than Truth, nor a course of conduct nobler than Ahimsa Paramo Dharmah. Rightly understood and rightly applied to life, the latter makes a man saint and a hero. .. .Some good people, thoroughly well-intentioned and otherwise saintly, made a fad of it, placed it not only at the top of all other virtues, but made it the sole test of good life. .. .They overlooked the fact that individual as well as national interests made it incumbent that the weak should be protected against the strong and that the aggressor and the usurper, the thief and the scoundrel, the lustful villain and the infamous violator of woman’s chastity, the ruffian and the cheat, should be prevented from inflicting injustice and doing harm.

Gandhi himself admitted that in interpreting non-violence as he did, he was ‘giving an extended’, though ‘in no way strained’, meaning to Hinduism, to a friend who had written that:

Tradition and History

37

Hinduism does not stand decisively for nonviolence in regard to organized invasion. It would be straining too much to interpret all our best scriptures in this way. .. .It does not preach what you or the pacifists preach, and, it is no good straining everything into an allegory for this object.41

In reply, Gandhi admitted that the Gita was not a treatise on non-violence nor had it been written to condemn war: Hinduism has certainly not condemned war as I do. What, however, I have done is to put a new but natural and logical interpretation upon the whole teaching of the Gita and the spirit of Hinduism. Hinduism, not to speak of other religions, is ever evolving. I have followed in the footsteps of .our forefathers. At one time they sacrificed animals to propitiate angry gods. Their descendants, but our less remote ancestors* read a different meaning into the word ‘sacrifice’ and they taught that sacrifice was meant to be of our baser self, to please not angry gods but the one living God within. I hold that the logical outcome of the teaching of the Gita is decidedly for peace at the price of life itself. It is the highest aspiration of the human species.42

Jawaharlal often stated publicly that he drew his inspiration from Gandhi, and yet, as a statesman, he thought it practicable to follow the Master only as far as possible. His broadcast from London in 1951 j>ives the gist of his views on the application of non-violence to India’s foreign policy: Unhappily, the world of today finds that it cannot do without force. We have to meet aggression and evil. . . To surrender to evil is always bad. But in resisting evil we must not allow ourselves to be swept away by our own passions and fears and act in a manner which is itself evil. That is the lesson that our great leader Mahatma Gandhi taught us and, imperfect as we are, we drew inspiration from that great teaching.

The application of the tradition of non-violence to India’s foreign policy was thus the deliberate acceptance of a method of approach to foreign-policy problems which emphasised reconciliation, and the temper of peace, as opposed to a spirit of revenge and hatred. This method has its limitations as India discovered in 1961 over Goa, in 1962 (invasion of India by China) and 1965 and 1971 (invasion of India by Pakistan); but undoubtedly India has attemp­ ted the peaceful method of negotiation in every one of these cases. India has learnt that the reality of power has to be taken into account along with a non-violent approach to difficult international problems, if national interests are to be protected.

38

Domestic Roots o f India's Foreign Policy

India as a British Dependency We shall now deal briefly with the impact on independent India’s foreign policy of the major factor in India’s recent history-her having been a dependency of Britain. The character of British rule with its merits and defects, leading to a national freedom move­ ment, is first touched on. The Indian National Congress, forming the vanguard of the freedom movement, developed some ideas on the conduct of foreign relations in a free India which were expressed in the resolutions passed by the Congress in its annual or special sessions. In 1948 (one year after India attained independence) it was specifically stated that ‘the foreign policy of India must neces­ sarily be based on the principles that have guided the Congress in the past years.’43 Jawaharlal Nehru (the first Foreign Minister of independent India) played a significant role in shaping the attitude of the Congress to international developments, and it could be stated that he had his political apprenticeship as an active member of the Congress. Leading thinkers of the period also developed ideas on the interrelationship between nationalism and inter­ nationalism; these ideas are briefly summarised here as they had in our view an abiding impact on India’s foreign policy. Finally, the implications of the fact that the British Government in India kept the international relations of India exclusively under its control—decisions on the foreign relations of British India were taken in Whitehall, not in Delhi—are considered. The exclusion of Indians from the decision-making process has had some effect on the lines of foreign policy adopted after 1947 and this topic is discussed in the concluding section. BRITISH RULE IN INDIA

British rule in India has had, directly and indirectly, a three-fold impact on India’s foreign policy : (1) it gave a stimulus to the national movement for freedom which in turn led to India’s support for the freedom of dependent peoples; (2) racial inequality44clearly existed under British rule; this made India realize the inequity of racial discrimination and, in turn, led her to stress racial equality in her foreign policy; and (3) India continued a member of the Com­ monwealth after she became independent.

Tradition and History

39

THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR FREEDOM

Contrary to the general impression, the national movement for freedom, which found expression in the formation of the Indian National Congress (1885), was not in origin a protest against the ‘tyrannical’ rule of the British. In fact, amongst the majority of the Congress leaders there was a kind of childlike and pathetic belief in the fair play of the British Parliament. ‘We are British subjects', said Dadabhai Naoroji, ‘and subjects of the same' gracious Sovereign who has pledged her Royal word that we are to her as all her other subjects, and we have a right to all British institutions. If we are true to ourselves and perseveringly ask what we desire, the British peo­ ple are the very people on earth who will give us what is right and just.’45 The first President of the Congress declared that there were no more thoroughly loyal and consistent well-wishers of the British Government than himself and the friends around him.46 Indeed it is remarkable that up to the end of the nineteenth century, for most thinking men in India, the British connexion with India was some­ thing which should continue indefinitely for the larger good of India and England, and they wished to stabilize it. Thus Naoroji: ‘In this rule there is every element to produce immeasurable good, both to India and England, and no thinking native of India would wish harm to it.’47 Indian intellectuals, and distinguished men such as Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866-1915) and Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) who were also eminent political leaders, have given credit to Britain for the good her rule had done to India in several respects. ‘The Western type of the administrative machinery has been substituted in place of what we once had’, said Gokhale in 1905, ‘The country enjoys now uninterrupted peace and order. Justice, though costly, is fairly dispensed, as between Indian and Indian. .. .Then you have introduced Western education, with freedom of speech and free­ dom of writing. These are all things that stand to your credit.’48 Nehru wrote in his Toward Freedom (1942) that there was much truth in the British claim that Britain had brought to India western conceptions of parliamentary government and personal liberties, and by transforming British India into a single unitary state it had engendered amongst Indians a sense of political unity and thus fostered the beginnings of nationalism. Besides, the British were responsible for having first opened India’s window to the west and brought her in contact with one aspect of western industrialism and

40

Domestic Roots o f India's Foreign Policy

science, ‘the heralds of industrialism' , such as the railway, tele­ graph, telephone, and wireless.49 C. Sankaran Nair told the Indian National Congress in his Presidential Address in 1897 that the British Government in India provided, as an alien government, a strictly secular rule, so that in a multi-religious society, as in India, true impartiality was preserved in respect of social and religious reform.50 Why then was there a national freedom movement at all? Stu­ dents of the history of the Congress have noted that its demands in its early sessions up to 1906 were modest. The first meeting of the Congress in 1885 thus demanded inter alia the presence of elected members in the Legislative Councils, the right to discuss the budget and ask questions, reference to a standing committee of the House of Commons of issues between the Councils and the Governments, the holding of competitive examinations for the Indian Civil Service simultaneously in India and Great Britain, and the raising of the maximum age-limit for them to twenty-three. The demand for the Indianization of the Services was made and gradually conceded. It was only in 1906 that the President of the Congress, Dadabhai Naoroji, claimed swaraj or self-government for India as a rightt51 ‘We do not ask for any favours’, he said.‘We want only justice. Instead of going into any further divisions of our rights as British citizens, the whole matter can be comprised in one word—“ SelfGovernment” or swaraj, like that of the United Kingdom or the Colonies.’ It is an interesting commentary on the moderate nature of the demands of the Congress then that this was not incorporated in the resolutions of the Congress that year; it was as late as 1920 that the goal of the Congress was declared to be swaraj, and more explicitly in 1927 as ‘Complete national independence’. ‘The gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government’ was offi­ cially declared to be the goal of British policy in India in Montagu’s announcement on 20 August 1917 in the British Parliament; com­ plete independence was gracefully conceded by the Indian Inde­ pendence Act passed on 18 July 1947 by the same Parliament; India became an independent State on 15 August 1947. It seems that the demand for independence grew out of two sets of causes, one arising from the British, the other from the Indian side. While British rule had several merits, as indicated above, it clearly had defects too; and secondly political consciousness de­

Tradition and History

41

veloped in India first among the growing middle classes and later among the masses, making them conscious of these defects, and press for self-government. Each of these points bears some elabo­ ration. 1. Even during the nineteenth century, recent studies have shown,52discontent with British rule had been slowly increasing, for which economic discontent and distress was primarily responsible.53 It was felt that the British colonial economy in India furthered British interests but discouraged the growth of Indian industries. The assumption of racial superiority added to the discontent. Two letters, one by the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy in 1862, and the other by the Viceroy of India to the Secretary of State in 1876, show that the British Government was aware of the evil: ‘There is too much disposition among the lower Englishmen to treat the natives as an inferior race to be bullied ad libitum!54 Lord Lytton wrote: ‘It is really a wonder that our rule is not more unpopular than it i s .-*1 am convinced that the greatest danger we have to deal with in India is from the Whites.’55 Indian analysis of the defects of British rule in the twentieth century is best illustrated from the writings of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) and Jawaharlal Nehru. Gokhale held that the living standards of the people had suffered due to ‘the growing military expenditure’ and ‘the increas­ ing Home Charges’.56 According to Tagore57 and Nehru, the economic and social evils arose from the police conception of the state which the British applied to India. The expenditure on defence and administrative functions was terribly heavy and swallowed up most of the revenue. The economic and cultural needs of the citi­ zens were not looked after: universal education, improvement of public health, care of the poor and the insurance of workers against illness, old age and unemployment.58 On the moral side, the main defect, according to Gokhale, was the steady dwarfing of the race in consequence of its exclusion from power. ‘Our natural abilities, owing to sheer disuse, are growing less and less; and this stunting is, in my opinion, an enormous evil.’59 Similarly, Nehru stated: ‘An authoritarian system of govern­ ment, and especially one that is foreign, must encourage a psychol­ ogy of subservience and crush much that is finest in youth—enterprise, spirit of adventure, originality, ‘pep’—and en­ courage sneakishness, rigid conformity and a desire to cringe and please the bosses.’60

42

Domestic Roots o f India's Foreign Policy

That the yoke of the stranger was felt as the heaviest of all yokes was primarily due to the rise of political consciousness in India in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Essentially this was made possible by the spread of western education and the impact of modem political thought. Following Macaulay’s Minute on Educa­ tion of 1835, the Universities of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta were founded in 1857. Students who had received a ‘liberal educa­ tion’ and had read English political classics such as Mill’s On Rep­ resentative Government and On Liberty, began to apply their minds to political issues. The ideas of liberty, equality and ‘no taxation without representation’ were quickly learnt, and spread. Sri Aurobindo (1872-1950) and Surendranath Banerjea (1848-1925) developed the case for self-government on logical grounds, starting with the premise that ‘a nation must develop military and political greatness and activity, intellectual and aesthetic greatness and activ­ ity, commercial greatness and activity, and moral sanity and vigour’. Sri Aurobindo (Aurobindo Ghosh as he then was) argued like Gokhale in the columns of the Bande Mataram in 1907 that the nation could not sacrifice any of these functions of the organism without making itself unfit for the struggle for life and finally succumbing and perishing•under the pressure of more highly organized nations.61 Further, Aurobindo argued, a foreign government is bound to deny freedom to the individual to develop self-expression. A few members can be bribed into acquiescence and support by the re­ ceipt of honours, employment or other personal advantages. But generally development creates ambition and nothing is more fatal to the continuance of foreign rule than the growth of ambition in the subject race which it cannot satisfy. But, clearly, individual liberty for self-expression is necessary for the development of democratic and national institutions, and to the extent that an alien government is bound to stifle individuals’ freedom of speech and action, it is inimical to the development of these, and thus to their control by the natives of the country. Finally, self-government is necessary not only for individual de­ velopment but is also essential for development of the full national strength. ‘The great weakness of India in the past has been the political depression and nullity of the mass of the population.’62 An alien government necessarily develops a privileged class attached to it, versed in the alien language and identifying with its interests; the

Tradition and History

43

development of the mass of the people is neglected. No foreign ruler would knowingly either foster or allow the growth of that universal political consciousness in the subject nation which the idea of Indian self-government implied. Surendranath Banerjea justified the necessity for self* government on three main grounds. First, the efficiency of the administration should improve with self-government; in his view, self-government was the only guarantee for good government in socially progressive communities. That good government was no substitute for self-government—was for Banerjea only a half truth. He felt it implied that self-government might not result in good government. ‘Good government is no substitute for selfgovernment’, he argued,‘but self-government is necessary for good government and we claim it for the purpose of good government.’63 The second ground on which Banerjea asks for self-government is more debatable: ‘It is our mission to become once again the spiritual guides of mankind, but we cannot fulfil that mission unless and until we ourselves are emancipated, we ourselves are free.’64 It is debata­ ble whether there could be any certainty that any country needs the spiritual guidance of another. The last important argument put forward was that a selfgoverning and contented India would cement the Empire to­ gether: the man-power of India would be available for the defence of the Empire against powerful enemies. Whereas the idea of selfgovernment was justified in 1916 on the ground o f‘the interests of the Empire to which we are proud to belong’;65 by 1939-42, no doubt on account of the vicissitudes of political development, lead­ ers like Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru were chary of extending the co-operation of India for the defence of the Empire unless the substance of independence was conceded to India. Political consciousness was important; but it requires a mass upsurge to make the freedom movement effective. Lenin said ‘Poli­ tics begin where the masses are; not when there are thousands but when there are millions, that is where serious politics begin.’66 Be­ ginning with the widespread protest against the Partition of Bengal (1905), leaders like Aurobindo Ghosh, Bal Gangadhar Tilak— whom Sir Valentine Chirol has called the father of Indian unrest67 —and M. K. Gandhi, who began to develop mass contact wiih his protest against the Rowlatt Act (1919), were men who had a finger on the pulse of the people.’68 The freedom movement truly

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became a national movement for freedom, and found its fulfilment in 1947. Thai independent India supported the freedom movements of dependent peoples will, therefore, be no surprise. ‘We are particu­ larly interested ’, said Jawaharlal Nehru on 7 September 1946, out­ lining India’s foreign policy, ‘in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples.’69 Reference has been made earlier to British social aloofness and assumption of racial superiority. That there was among the large majority of Englishmen in India an abhorrence of equality with Indians and that there was wide dissatisfaction among the people of India at the treatment they received from the ruling race is brought out most clearly in a revealing book written in 1907 by Sir. Henry Cotton, who had served for thirty-five years as a member of the Indian Civil Service. ‘If I appear to have written strongly’, writes Cotton, It is because I feel strongly... .It is painful to observe the habitual and almost universal exhibition of race insolence displayed by our fellowcountrymen as soon as they come in contact with a lower scale of civilization.7'*. . . . A petty rajah, going on a state visit to Agra, takes his seat in a first-class compartment, with a magnificent send-off by his loyal subjects. On his return he sneaks out of the third class, and explains to the expectant crowds that on the former occasion he had been boxed up with a couple of sahibs, muddy from snipe-shooting, who had made him shampoo them all the way. .. .The incident illustrates the length to which British arrogance will go.71

Cotton concludes: ‘The great gulf which separates Englishmen from Indians is widening, and the increased bitterness of race feeling is now reflected by Indian as well as by English prejudice.’72 An extract from a paper by an Indian Professor73 also shows that Sir Henry Cotton was realistic in his judgement: ‘Natives ought to be admitted socially to the conventional circles of Europeans. They ought not to be regarded as an in ferior race, altogether un fitted for polite society.' Independent India’s strong support to the elimination of racial discrimination can now be better understood. Jawaharlal Nehru, in his statement on foreign policy on 7 September 1946, cited above, said, ‘We repudiate utterly the Nazi doctrine of racialism, where­ soever and in whatever form it may be practised.’ He told the Constituent Assembly of India on 16 May 1949: ‘One of the pillars of our foreign policy is to fight against racial discrimination.’74

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45

India a member o f the Commonwealth Would India decide, after she became independent, to continue to be a member of the Commonwealth? The historic decision was taken on 17 May 1949 when the Constituent Assembly approved the motion moved by the Prime Minister of India. Jawaharlal Nehru, while commending the resolution to the As­ sembly, gave several reasons75 for India’s continued association with the Commonwealth, amongst which were: that the indepen­ dence of India would not be limited in the least; continuing to be in the Commonwealth would not, in any way, go against the indepen­ dence pledge taken on 26 January 1930; it would be beneficial to India and to certain causes in the world that it wished to advance, and so on. But the most compelling arguments were, in our view, pragmatic ones, based largely on the historical association of India with Britain, and are best stated in his own words: The House knows that inevitably during the past century and more all kinds of contacts have arisen between England and this country. . . . Many ol them were not so bad, many of them may be good and many of them, good or bad, irrespective of what they may be, are there. Here I am the patent example of those contacts, speaking in this Honourable House in the English language. . . . The fact remains that most other members who will speak will also do so. The fact remains that we are functioning here under certain rules and regulations for which the model has been the British Constitution. . . . Any marked change in this without something to follow creates a hiatus which may be harmful. Largely our educational apparatus has beeen influenced. Largely our military apparatus has been influenced by these considerations and we have groyn up naturally as something rather like the British Army. I am placing before the House certain entirely practical considerations. If we break away completely, the result is that without making sufficient provision for carrying on in a different way, we have a period of gap. . . . If we do not want to pay the price we should not pay it and face the consequences.76

To these practical advantages, we may add that the large and continuing British financial investment in India was of great impor­ tance to India’s economic development. Some such investment might have continued even if India had not remained as a member of the Commonwealth; but economic co-operation of the kind and on the scale needed was perhaps, more likely to be forthcoming in the friendly atmosphere of the Commonwealth. THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

We have referred earlier to the resolution passed by the Congress in

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1948 stating that the foreign policy of India must necessarily be based on the principles that had guided the Congress in the past years. In fact the leading members of the Congress, as early as 1921, had intended the Congress resolutions on international develop­ ments to be a guide to independent India’s foreign policy. Thus M. K. Gandhi: ‘Indeed, while we are maturing our plans for Swaraj, we are bound to consider and define our foreign policy. Surely we are bound authoritatively to tell the world what relations we wish to cultivate with it.’77 The Jaipur resolution referred to above listed the promotion o£ world peace, the freedom of all nations, racial equality and the ending of imperialism and colonialism as having guided the Con­ gress in the past years; to this we may add one more—the duty of people of Indian origin settled abroad to identify themselves with the people of the country in which they had settled and not to exploit them. Resolution alter resolution passed by the Congress in its success $ive sessions shows its adherence to these principles.78 It will thus be seen that Congress was fighting for the liberation of India as a part o f the larger freedom of all the countries and peoples of the world. IDEAS ON NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

We have referred earlier to. Jawaharlal Nehru’s view that the national interest of India was not incompatible with the legitimate interests of other nations and that he proposed to look after India’s interests in the context of world co-operation and world peace. This aspect of India’s foreign policy is based on the views of India’s leading thinkers during the national movement for freedom. We shall cite the opinions of C. R. Das (1870-1925), M. K. Gandhi (1869-1948) and S. C. Bose (1897-1945). Delivering the presidential address to the Indian National Con­ gress held at Gaya in December 1922, C. R Das said that nationalism was a process through which a nation expressed itself and found itself not in isolation from other nations, not in opposition to other nations, but as part of a great scheme by which, in seeking its own expression and therefore its own identity, it materially assists the self-expression and self-realization of other nations as well. Das added that this conception of nationalism ran counter to the concept of nationalism held and practised in the Europe of his day. Nationalism in Europe was, in his view, an

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aggressive, selfish, commercial nationalism of gain and loss. The European practice of nationalism was on the basis that the gain of France was the loss of Germany and the gain of Germany was the loss of France. ‘It is not yet realised’, Das added, ‘that you cannot hurt Germany without hurting humanity, and in consequence hurt­ ing France; and that you cannot hurt France without hurting hu­ manity and in consequence hurting Germany.’79 These are noble words; with an undercurrent of realism they express the central idea held by other Indian thinkers as well, that each nationality constitutes a particular stream of the greater human unity and that no nation can fulfil itsell until, in realizing itself, it also realizes its identity with humanity. M. K. Gandhi struck a similar note.8*Gandhi was prepared to go so far as to say, ‘I see nothing grand or impossible about our expres­ sing our readiness for universal interdependence rather than independence.’81 Gandhi was placing before the meeting of the Indian National Congress in 1924 his view that the Indian people should strive for swaraj within the British Empire, for the retention of the British connection on honourable and equal terms. Similarly S. C. Bose, in his Presidential address to a Students’ Congress in 1929, took the view that a nation should strive hard to make its own contribution ‘towards the growing liberality and greatness of the human society. It should finally aim at turning this world into a happier and nobler place for mankind to live in than it has been so far.’82 The point made by M. K. Gandhi, that Indians might be ready for universal interdependence rather than independence, merits atten­ tion. Its full implication is that the nation might be willing to surrender its sovereignty to a larger whole, say a world federation. This was also the vision of Sri Aurobindo whose approach to nationalism and internationalism was based on the religion of hu­ manity. In his essay, ‘The Ideal of Human Unity’, he took the view that even allowing for the most discouraging features and danger­ ous possibilities existing in the world, such as ideological divisions and the cold war, the arms race and nuclear rivalry, the develop­ ment of some kind of world union was inevitable. He attributed this to the drive of Nature, the compulsion of circumstances and the present and future need of mankind. He considered that the working of nature in human society made tor even larger social units. This results from the combination of two

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factors. Firstly, there is the increasing closeness of interests or at least the interrelation of interests in ever-widening circles, which makes old divisions a limitation. Nation-states and national empires developed in this way. Secondly, there is the force of a common uniting sentiment, often helped by external circumstances such as the need for security against aggression from without. Federations developed in this way. The development of common interests and sentiments postulates the existence of an international world organization dedicated to the maintenance of peace. Among such interests the foremost are security for the prevention of an atomic war, and the optimum use of science and technology to raise living standards throughout the world. Belief in the democratic values of liberty, equality and justice is the common sentiment. The gist of this is that man must tolerate and safeguard man regardless of any distinctions of race, creed, colour, nationality, status, political or social advancement. The body of man is to be respected, strengthened to resist viol­ ence, fortified by science against disease and death. The spirit of man is to be held sacred also, given scope for self-expression, protected from violation, from suppression, from mechanization, allowed freedom and opportunity, and guided in the exercise of its powers towards the service of humanity. And all this is not to be held as a pious sentiment, but given full and practical recognition in the actions of men and nations. Common interests and sentiments are, in the course of time, bound to lead to the creation of a world-state in spite of many dangers and difficulties. The evolutionary urge exists and the law of self-preservation is not likely to be ignored by man. The most desirable form of world state would be, according to Sri Aurobindo, a federation of free nationalities in which all subjection or forced inequality would have disappeared and, though some might preserve a greater natural influence, all would have an equal status. A confederacy would give the greatest freedom to the na­ tions constituting the world state but as it migjit give too much room for fissiparous tendencies to operate, a federal order would be the most desirable. EXCLUSION OF INDIANS FROM THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN FOREIGN RELATIONS

A point which hardly finds mention in discussions on India's foreign

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policy is the exclusion of Indians from the decision-making process in India's foreign policy before the country achieved independence. (This contrasts with the employment of Indians in responsible posi­ tions in the field of domestic policy.) Foreign policy was made at Whitehall, though necessarily consultations with the Viceroy or Governor-General took place in matters in which India’s interests were likely to be affected. It is noteworthy that under the Govern­ ment of India Act 1935, external affairs was a subject in relation to which the Governor-General was to act at his discretion.83 Further, that Act laid down that the Governor-General shall make rules regulating the procedure in the Legislature to ensure that, discus­ sion or questions in respect of ‘the relations of the Crown or the Governor-General and any foreign prince or State could be allowed by the presiding officer’ only with his permission. An adjournment motion in the Legislative Assembly in 1937 to consider China’s appeal to the League of Nations against Japanese aggression on China was disallowed on the ground that it was detrimental to the national interest.84 Briefly, foreign policy and relations, so far as India was concerned, were the prerogative of the Crown although there was a department in the Government of India to deal with foreign relations. After the First World War, a Foreign and Political Department was established, to be replaced by the Department of External Affairs in 1937; a Department of Indians Overseas was established in 1941, renamed the Department of Commonwealth Relations in 1944. But the constitutional subordination of the Gov­ ernment of India to Whitehall limited the powers of these Depart­ ments to routine matters; foreign policy was a subject from which Indians were excluded. It is true that from 1918, formally, India appeared to be gaining a new status. An Indian delegation was sent to the Peace Conference convened at Paris at the end of the First World War; India was an original member of the League of Nations; she was also a member of the International Labour Organization. However a study of the Reports of the Indian delegation to the Assembly of the League of Nations shows that the Indian delegation hardly had the freedom to put forward an independent point of view. Thus the Report of the delegation in 1924 stated: As far as the principal questions before the Assembly, namely, that of reduction of armaments, security and arbitration, were concerned, the

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position of India, like that of the dominions, was necessarily one of subor­ dinate cooperation with the British delegation. Such objections as the Delegation thought fit to urge against certain provisions in the drafts Under consideration it was found more convenient to express in the informal meetings of the Empire Delegation than in open Committee or Assembly.*5

Charles H. Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh have taken the view that ‘India was a quasi-independent entity in international politics before 1917—indeed, since 1917’, and that ‘in the interwar period, India achieved a measure of autonomy in international affairs unprecedented for a nonself-goveming dependency, its interests being influential in the Councils of major States.’86 From the available evidence, we are inclined to agree with Warren F. Ilchman who writes that India’s participation (in the League of Nations and the international Labour Organization) could only be conceived as illusory in that there was no divergence of views between the Indian and British delegations except on very minor issues.87 Even Heim­ sath and Mansingh, who believe that India had a measure of au­ tonomy in international affairs before 1947, admit that it was only in the sphere o f foreign relations and not in foreign policy.** This exclusion of the Indian elite from foreign-policy making is a fact of some significance because the men who were to make foreign policy in independent India, had to start from the beginning; there was no organized foreign service acquainted with the actual working of the international system. It is to the credit of Jawaharlal Nehru and the foreign service which he gradually built up that India attained such prestige in the first decade of Indian independence; India’s voice was listened to with respect and she made an effective impact on the course of international developments more especially in Korea (1950), Indo-China (1954) and the Suez (1956). The history of India’s foreign policy from A947-62 also shows that this prestige had unsure foundations. While every Indian citi­ zen is undoubtedly proud that between 1950 and 1956, India’s prestige in world councils was high, mature consideration will show that such prestige was primarily due to the international setting, the emergence of a large country like India into freedom, and its delib­ erate adoption of the democratic way of life, and the personality of Jawaharlal Nehru rather than to the country’s inherent strength. This is clear from the fact that after 1956, and especially from 1962 to 1971 (when she regained prestige by decisively defeating Pakis­

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51

tan) that prestige sharply declined, showing how correct Nehru was in his assessment in 1954 that a relatively weak country can hardly make a vital contribution to world peace.*9 It was also during this period (1947-61) that India lost thousands of kilometres of her territory in Kashmir and Ladakh. A study of the evidence suggests that our own amateur attempts at diplomacy coupled with the harsh realities of international power politics explain the loss of territory in the Kashmir area; our credulity and negligence coupled with the expansionist ambition of Pek­ ing explain the loss of our territory in Ladakh. Nehru’s famous statement90 before the Conference of State Ministers of Informa­ tion on 25 October 1962 is conclusive evidence of the fact that Nehru had realized that his policies were out of touch with reality. By this he was obviously referring to the fact that his Government had been inclined to give a low place to military power in its scheme of security. An extract from Nehru’s speeches will substantiate the statement: ‘The normal idea is that security is protected by armies. That is only partly true; it is [equally] tru e. . . [that] security is protected by policies. A deliberate policy of friendship with other countries goes further in gaining security than almost anything else.’91 Nehru had depended primarily on non-alignment, the temper of peace, friendship with all countries and the self-confidence of his people for maintaining the territorial integrity of the country. The Chinese invasion of 1962 gave a rude shock to these convictions of his. He realized that military preparedness must go hand in hand with non-alignment and the temper of peace, if the territorial integ­ rity of nations was to be preserved. The reality of international politics demanded greater attention to military power. The lesson has been learnt, a higher place has been given to military power and the weakness in India’s military ability to defend her security has been made up. Its success in meeting Pakistan’s aggression in 1965 and more significantly in 1971, shows that India’s experience in handling foreign affairs after 1947 has made both the Government of India and the people more conversant with the realities of inter­ national politics. We hold that the fact that, before 1947, opportunity was denied to Indians to participate in the decision-making process in foreign policy partly explains the being out of touch with reality in the modem world to which Nehru gave such tragic expression in November 1962.

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Domestic Roots o f India's Foreign Policy NOTES AND

REFERENCES

1. From reply to debate on Foreign Affairs in Lok Sabha, 9 December 1958, vol. 23, second series, cols. 3959-61; italics ours; see also Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, pp. 79-80. 2. There are four Vedas which have come down to us: the Rigveda, the Yajurveda, the Samaveda, and the Atharvaveda; some of these are available to Englishspeaking readers in the English translation of the Riksamhita, from traditional Indian exegesis, by H. H. Wilson and E. B. Cowell (6 vols., 1850-88), and Hymns o f the Atharvaveda, tr. Maurice Bloomfield, Sacred Books o f the East, XLII, 1897. The concluding portions of the Vedas which contain profound spiritual truths are called the Upanishads. There are said to be several Upanishads\ the most important of them are eighteen, available in Roman script and English translation by Dr S. Radhakrishnan (Macmillan). 3. These are called the Puranas, of which eighteen are considered the most important. 4. These are the Agamas. 5. TheSpiritand Form o f Indian Polity (Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1947). 6. Harijan, 24 December 1938, p. 393. 7. The Complete Works o f the Swami Vivekananda (Almora: Adwaita Ashrama, 1950-1). 8. Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1922); Creative Unity (Macmillan, 1922). 9. Gita Rahasya or The Science o f Karmayoga (Poona: Tilak Bros., 1936). 10. The Foundations o f Indian Culture (New York: Sri Aurobindo Library, 1953). 11. Hindu Dharma (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1950). 12. The Discovery o f India (New York: John Day, 1946). 13. Socialism to Sarvodaya (Madras: Socialist Book Centre, 1957). 14. Paper on ‘Traditional Values in Modem India and the United States’. 15. M. K. Gandhi, Hindu Dharma (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1950), pp. 5-8. 16. Rigveda, i. 164.46. 17. Similarly, in the Bhagavad Gita, Sri Krishna says, ‘However men approach me, even so I accept them, for on all sides, whatever path they may choose is mine.’ Chapter IV, verse 11. 18. S. Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View o f Life (George Allen, 1957). 19. The practice has fallen short of the ideal, partly because the transfer of the sense of tolerance from the religious and the philosophical plane to the social and the political plane has been inadequate; research in this field is likely to be a fruitful one, and we certainly commend it for the attention of appropriate research institutions. 20. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, pp. 184-5 . For instance, in a broadcast from London on 12 January 1951, he said, ‘If we desire peace, we must develop the temper of peace, and try to win even those who may be suspicious of us or who think they are against us.’ 21. Parliamentry Debates, Rajya Sabha Official Report, New Delhi, vol. XIX, part II, 6-24 December 1957, cols. 2342-53. See also Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy. 22. Leader of the Indian Delegation at the 533rd Meeting of the General Assembly, 4 October 1955.

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23. Mahabharata, translated by Pratapachandra Roy (Calcutta: Udyoga Parva 1890), p. 256; our italics. 24. The 448th Meeting of the General Assembly, 28 September 1953, p. 199. 25. Ibid., p. 196. 26. Indian Information, vol. V, p. 712. 27. D. G. Tendulkar, Mahatma (Bombay, 1954); Mahatma Gandhi, Young India,. 1924-26 (Madras, 1927), pp. 364, 435; M. K. Gandhi, Sarvodaya,’ (Ahmedabad, 1954), pp. 6-7. 28. Manu, Dharmasastra, Bk. IV, p. 199. 29. The Sacred Book o f Kural-A Selection from the Old Tamil Code for Princes, Statesmen, and Men o f Affairs, Translated by C. Rajagopalachari (Madras: Rochouse and Sons, 1937). 30. Kautilya, Arthasastra, translated by R.Sharma Sastry, Bk.VIl (Bangalore, 1915). 31 .Ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. I. 32. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, p. 179. 33. Jawaharlal Nehru, Visit to America (New York: John Day 1950), pp. 28-9. 34. Rajya Sabha Debates. 6 September 1955, col. 2098. 35. Harijan, 12 November 1938, p. 328. 36. Ibid., 27 May 1939, p. 143. 37. Ibid., 9 June 1946, p. 169. 38. Ibid., 12 November 1938. 39. The People, 26 July 1926, reproduced in Lala Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, vol. II (Delhi University, 1966), p. 242. 40. The Modern Review, July 1916. 41. M. K. Gandhi, Hindu Dharma (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1950). p. 156. 42 . Ibid., pp. 156-7. 43. Text of resolution in Background of India's Foreign Policy, Indian National Congress, 1952, p. 96. 44. Sir Henry Cotton, in New India or India in Transition (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1907), p. 46, uses the expression ‘the bitterness of racial feeling’. 45. Cited in C. F. Andrews and Girija Mukherji, The Rise and Growth of the Congress in India (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958), p. 136. 46. Proceedings of the First Indian National Congress, 2nd ed. (Madras: The Madras Printing Works, 1905), p.9,cited by Bimla Prasad in The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy (Calcutta: Bookland, 1962), p.30. Bimla Prasad’s book is the standard work on the subject. 47. Essays, Speeches, Addresses and Writings (on Indian Politics) o f the Hon’ble Dadabhai Naoroji, edited by Chunilal Lallubhai Parekh (Bombay: Caxton, 1887), pp. 379-80. 48. Speeches ofGopal Krishna Gokhale, 3rd ed. (Madras: G. A. Natesan, 1920), pp. 269-75. 49. Toward Freedom, The Autobiography o f Jawaharlal Nehru (New York: John Day, 1942), pp. 269-75. 50 Congress Presidential Addresses from the Foundation to the Silver Jubilee, First Series (Madras: G. A. Natesan, n. d.), p. 324.

I

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Domestic Roots o f India's Foreign Policy

51. Cited in Andrews and Mukherji, Congress in India, p. 211. 52. Tara Chand, History o f the Freedom Movement in India, vol. II (Delhi: Gov­ ernment of India, 1967), chapters 7 and 12. 53. Ibid., pp. 334-5. ‘The proof of the existence of a chronic state of poverty and starvation, if a proof were needed’, writes Tara Chand, ‘was provided by famines which came in quick succession after the Revolt of 1857. The Indian national leaders attributed the abominable poverty of the Indian masses to a variety of causes among which the land revenue policy of the Government, the “Drain” of wealth from India, and the failure of the Government to help in developing Indian resources and industries were the most important.’ 54. Wood Papers, Sir Charles Wood to Lord Elgin, 1 August 1862. 55. Lytton Papers, Lord Lytton to Lord Salisbury, 28 September 1876. 56. Speeches ofGopal Krishna Gokhale, 3rd ed. (Madras: G. A. Natesan, 1920), p. 944; see also, pp. 830-9. ‘Home Charges' refers to ‘the dividends on East India Stock, interest on Home Debt, the salaries of officers and establishments and cost of buildings connected with the Home Department of the Indian Government, furlough and retired pay to members of the Indian Military and Civil Services when at home, charges of all descriptions paid in this country connected with British troops serving in India, and a portion of the cost of transporting British troops to and from India.’ Wingate, Our Financial Relations with India (London, 1859), pp. 56-64.) 57. ‘In India, the misfortune of being governed by a foreign race is daily brought home to us not only in the callous neglect of such minimum necessities of life as adequate provision for food, clothing, educational and medical facilities for the people, but in an even unhappier form in the way the people have been divided among themselves.’ Rabindranath Tagore, Crisis in Civilization (Calcutta: Visva Bharati, 1941), pp. 12-17. 58. Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography (London: The Bodley Head, 1955), p. 435. 59. Speeches ofGopal Krishna Gokhale, p. 945. 60. Nehru, Autobiography, p. 439. 61. Haridas Mukherjee and Uma Mukherjee, Sri Aurobindo and The New Thought in Indian Politics (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1964), pp. 22-7. 62. Ibid. 63. Speeches and Writings of Hon.Surendranath Banerjea, 1st ed. (Madras: G. A. Natesan, n. d.), pp. 136-41. 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Lenin, Selected Works, vol. VII, p. 295. 67. Valentine Chirol, Indian Unrest (London: Macmillan, 1920). p. 41. 68. The following passage from Gandhi’s writings shows how Gandhi lost faith in the value of the British connection with India and how he became a non­ cooperator: ‘I gave the Government my voluntary and hearty cooperation, criticizing it freely where I felt it was faulty, but never wishing its destruction. Conse­ quently, when the existence of the Empire was threatened ih 1899 by the Boer

Tradition and History

55

Challenge, I offered my services to it, raised a volunteer ambulance corps and served at several actions that took place for the relief of Ladysmith. Similarly in 1906, at the time of the Zulu Revolt, I raised a stretcher-bearer party and served till the end of the rebellion. On both these occasions, 1received medals and was even mentioned in despatches. For my work in South Africa 1 was given by Lord Hardinge a Kaiser-i-Hind Gold Medal. When the War broke out in 1914 between England and Germany, I raised a volunteer ambulance corps in London consisting of the then resident Indians in London, chiefly students. Its work was acknowledged by the authorities to be valuable. Lastly, in India, when a special appeal was made at the War Conference in Delhi in 1918 by Lord Chelmsford for recruits, I struggled at the cost of my health to raise a corps in Kheda and the response was being made when the hostilities ceased and orders were received that no more recruits were wanted. In all these efforts at service, I was actuated by the belief that it was possible by such services to gain a status of full equality in the Empire for my countrymen. The first shock came in the shape of the Rowlatt Act, a law designed to rob the people of all real freedom. 1felt called upon to lead an intensive agitation against it. Then followed the Punjab horrors beginning with the massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and culminating in crawling orders, public floggings and other indescribable humiliations. I discovered, too, that the plighted word of the Prime Minister to the Mussulmans of India regarding the integrity of Turkey and the holy places of Islam was not likely to be fulfilled. But, in spite of the forebodings and the grave warnings of friends, at the Amritsar Congress in 1919,1fought for cooperation and working the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, hoping that the Prime Minister would redeem his promise to the Indian Mussulmans, that the Punjab wound would be healed and that the reforms, inadequate and unsatisfactory though they were, marked a new era of hope in the life of India. But all that hope was shattered. The Khilafat promise was not to be re­ deemed. The Punjab crime was whitewashed and most culprits went not only unpunished, but remained in service and some continued to draw pensions from the Indian revenue, and in some cases were even rewarded. I saw, too, that not only did the reforms not mark a change of heart, but they were only a method of further draining India of her wealth and of prolonging her servitude. I came reluctantly to the conclusion that the British connection had made India more helpless than she ever was before, politically and economically.* Gandhi, Essential Writings (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1970), pp. 219-20. 69. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, pp. 1-3. 70. Cotton, India in Transition, p. vii. 71. Ibid., pp. 67-70. 72. Ibid., p. 76. 73. S. Sathianathan, Professor of Philosophy, Presidency College, Madras, in a paper entitled ‘Social Intercourse between Europeans and Indians’ (1901); italics ours. 74. Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, vol. I (Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1967), p. 279. 75. Ibid., pp. 272-87.

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76 Ibid., pp. 281-2. 77. Young India, 21 October 1921. 78- Thus the Calcutta Congress (1928) congratulated the people of China on their having ended the era of foreign domination in their country and sent its warmest greetings to the peoples of Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Iraq and its assurances of full sympathy with them in theii struggle for emancipation from the grip of Western imperialism. The All-India Congress Committee at its meeting in 1929, congratulated the Indians of East Africa on their friendly and cordial relations with the East Africans and ‘trusts that they will continue to maintain them and treat the interests o f the original inhabitants as superior to all other interests.’ The Wardha meeting of the Congress Working Committee (1936) sent its full sympathy to the Arabs of Palestine in their struggle for independence against British imperialism. The Lucknow Congress (1936) ex­ pressed ‘the sympathy of the Indian nation for the Ethiopian people who were* so heroically defending their country against imperialist action’. The Faizpur Congress (1936) considered imperialism as a continuing cause of war and its elimination essential in the interests of peace. Offering their heartfelt sym­ pathy to the Chinese people in their struggle against Japanese aggression, the Calcutta session of the All India Congress Committee (1935) called upon the Indian people to refrain from the use of Japanese goods as a mark of their sympathy for the people of China; the Haripura Congress (1938) repeated this offer of sympathy, The Arabs of Palestine received the sympathy of the Congress again in 1938 (Haripura Congress); it is interesting that the resolu­ tion added: ‘The Congress holds that the proper methods of solving the problem by which the Jews and the Arabs are faced in Palestine is by amicable setdement between themselves’—a view which the Government of India put forward in 1948 as a solution of the Palestine problem. The Haripura Congress stated afresh the policy of the Indian people in regard to foreign relations and war in these words: ‘The people of India desire to live in peace and friendship with their neighbours and with all other coun­ tries, and for this purpose wish to remove all causes of conflict between them . . . A free India will gladly associate itself with such an order and stand for disarma­ ment and collective security. But world cooperation is impossible of achievement so long as the roots of international conflict remained and one nation dominates over another and imperialism holds away. In order, therefore, to establish world peace on an enduring basis, imperialism and the exploitation of one people by another must end.’ The Calcutta meeting of the Congress Working Committee (1945) gave support to the people's struggle in Indonesia against the Dutch and the people in Indo­ china in their struggle against the French. The Working Committee of the Congress at its meeting in 1946 expressed the view that while the Committee desired and expected that every. Indian who went abroad would be treated honourably and with justice, they do not want Indians to go anywhere as un­ wanted outsiders who exploit the people of the country ’. The Delhi meeting of the Congress Working Comittee (1938) sent ‘profound sympathy to the brave people of Czechoslovakia in their struggle to preserve their freedom'. The All-India Congress Committee meeting at Bombay (1945) warned of the total destruction that atomic war would lead to.

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For the full text of the Calcutta Congress (1928) resolution and of other resolutions referred to in this paragraph see, The Background o f India’s Foreign Policy (Indian National Congress, 1952), pp. 48-95 and Indians Outside India (Delhi: All-India Congress Committee, 1951); italics ours. 79. Deshabandhu China Ranjan: Brief Survey of Life and Work, Provincial Con­ ference Speeches, Congress Speeches (Calcutta: Rajen Sen, 1927), pp. 189-90; italics ours. 80. Young India, 1924-6, p. 1292. ‘It is not nationalism that is evir, Gandhi wrote in Young India, ‘it is the narrowness, selfishness, exclusiveness which is the bane of modem nations which is evil. Each wants to profit at the expense of, and rise on the ruin of, the other.’ Gandhi hoped that Indian nationalism had struck a different path: ‘It wants to organize itself or to find full self-expression for the benefit and service of humanity at large.’ 81. Congress Presidential Addresses, second series (Madras: G. A. Natesan, n. d.), p. 745 82. Subhas Chandra Bose, The Mission of Life, 2nd ed. (Calcutta: Thacker Sping, 1953), pp. 158-9. 83. Excepting relations between India and any part of the King’s dominions; see A. B. Keith, Constitutional History o f India (London: Methuen, 1936), p. 407. 84. Indian Legislative Assembly Debates, Official Report, vol. V, pp. 1888 and 1902. 85. Report o f the Delegates o f India to the Fifth Session o f the Assembly o f the League o f Nations, 1924, p. 407. 86. Charles H. Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, A. Diplomatic History o f Mod­ em India (Bombay: Allied, 1971), pp. 3 and 4. 87. Warren F. llchman, ‘Political Development and Foreign Policy: The Case of India Journal of Commonwealth Studies, vol. IV, no. 3, pp. 227-8. 88. Heimsath and Mansingh, Modem India, p. 3; italics ours. 89. I do not pretend to say that India, as she is, can make a vital difference to world affairs: So long as we have not solved most of our own problems, our voice cannot carry the weight that it normally will and should'. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1949-53, p. 144. 90. Indian Information, vol. V, p. 712. 91. Debates, vol. XXIII, Second Series, col. 39:>9.

CHAPTER

III

Democracy The Theory: Popular Control o f Foreign Policy We shall now discuss how the fact that India has a democratic form of government has influenced her foreign policy. Parliament, as the representative of the people, has occasionally been a useful though perhaps not entirely effective guardian of foreign policy. Public opinion, expressed through the press and studied by public opinion polls, has had to be taken note of by the makers of foreign policy. And, thirdly, political parties have, of course, been keenly in• terested in foreign policy, and no government, even one command^ ing a large majority as successive governments in India have, can afford to ignore their viewpoints. Before we discuss these specific aspects of democracy as a domes­ tic factor in the formation of foreign policy, a preliminary question may be dealt with here: what powers, according to theory, should the demos have in the field of foreign policy? A State may be termed a democracy, we suggest, if it provides institutions for the free expression and, in the last analysis, the supremacy of the popular will on basic questions of public policy; the people, with political power, demand that their will be supreme on questions of social direction and policy. Since foreign policy forms an important segment of public policy, it follows that the people would have an interest in the formation of that policy as well. It is true that informed interest in foreign affairs has still to develop; but it certainly would be correct to say that among the elite there is a growing realization that foreign affairs do affect the national wellbe­ ing and that it behoves the people to follow closely what the gov­ ernment is doing in that field. Inevitably, it is India's relations with her two neighbours—Pakistan and China—that have brought home to the Indian people the importance of foreign affairs for their survival and well-being. When Pakistan, under cover of tribal discontent, occupied a part of Kashmir, and made it part of Pakistan, the nation

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was aroused and asked, was it essential to have taken the question of Kashmir to the United Nations and made it a tool of power politics? Since it was felt that Britain had taken a pro-Pakistan stand in the United Nations Security Council on the question of Kashmir, why continue with the Commonwealth connection? As the Soviet veto in the Security Council had been helpful to India, would it not be wise to cultivate closer relations with the Soviet Union, while taking care not to become part of the Soviet orbit? The conflict with Pakistan in 1965 brought home vividly, especially to the people living in the border areas, the consequences of war and the significance of a correct approach to foreign policy. Black-outs in cities, increased taxes, the dislocation of normal life which a war inevitably involves, and the suffering inflicted by death or severe wounds, necessarily meant that the people in general began to take a more informed 1 interest in foreign policy issues. When in 1968, in connection with the Kachchh dispute, an arbitral award gave a few hundred square kilometres of territory to Pakistan, it was asked, was it wise to have agreed to arbitration over questions which involved sovereignty over one’s territory? Indeed, were we bound to accept the award? The events leading to the conflict with Pakistan in 1971 aroused in the nation a sense of unity, and the war of liberation in Bangladesh was followed with great interest in every household, specially in West Bengal. The flight of some ten million refugees to India from Bangladesh created problems of social and economic adjustment, and every one was made aware that foreign affairs directly affected his life. The Chinese aggression in 1962 had, earlier, similarly awakened the nation not only to a sense of unity but to a sense of guilt that adequate care had not been taken of India’s defences. President Radhakrishnan gave expression to this when he declared on 9 November 1962 that ‘our credulity and negligence have caused some initial reverses’. It was not only the rout of Indian soldiers but the fact that so much Indian territory had been occupied by a foreign power with little hope of its being regained by India that aroused resentment. Assuming that the people are well-informed on foreign affairs, and that it is an imperative of democracy to have popular control over foreign policy (as well as domestic policy), the question may be asked, what does popular control in effect mean? First, of course, it means that Parliament as the representative of

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the people must have a decisive voice in determining the foreign policy to be followed by the Government. (The extent to which Parliament in India shapes and controls foreign policy is dealt with in the following section). Here it may be said that, in theory, Parliament has, in a system of parliamentary executive, various means of exercising that control. Through questions and debates, through the power of voting supply, and, in the final analysis, through its power of expressing no-confidence in the government Parliament can compel the government to bow to its wishes. The text of a treaty is by convention laid on the table of both Houses of Parliament in Britain for twenty-one days before the treaty is ratified to enable Parliament, if it desires, to express its opinion on the treaty. A non-parliamentary executive, as in the U.S.A.. has to be guided by the views of the Senate in respect of treaties entered into by it with other states. Besides, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the Foreign Affairs Com­ mittee of the House of Representatives have powers to require the Secretary of State and officials of the State Department to testify before them on general and detailed matters of foreign policy. Parliament apart, the people exercise an influence on foreign policy through public opinion. However, what is public opinion? Can it be sufficiently well-informed for it to provide the basis of policy? Can it be precisely gauged, so that it is an accurate guide to the government in shaping its foreign policy? May it not be in this age of mass-communication and propaganda, that the government may lead it instead of simply following it? Yet public opinion, be what it may in precise terms, has shown itself to be effective in several instances. We shall cite five. First, came the protest by the British public in 1935 against the Hoare-Laval Agreement on Ethiopia, which compelled the Bald­ win government to jettison the Agreement; Sir Samuel Hoare, the British Foreign Secretary, was compelled by public pressure to resign from the Cabinet. Clearly, public indignation was motivated by the feeling that injustice had been done to a weak State like Ethiopia, and that it was dishonourable for Britain to have been a party to the agreement. Lord Strang, former British Under-Secre­ tary of State, has pointed out in a remarkable broadcast that the government capitulated ‘not only to a revolt by the public but also to a revolt among its own supporters in Parliament.’1. The final settle­ ment of the Suez affair in 1956 through the United Nations—a clear

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surrender by Britain—was clearly hastened by the fact that a good part of British public opinion was strongly against the Suez adven­ ture. (The student cannot ignore the fact that the basic reason for Britain’s acceptance of the U. N. resolution was that the U. S. A. had not supported the British point of view). The third instance is Jawaharlal Nehru’s hesitation in 1959-60 in accepting the sugges­ tion made by Chou En-lai that India drop her claim to Aksaichin in return for China’s recognition of the McMahon Line.2 Public opin­ ion had by that time been fed on the thesis that Aksaichin was in­ disputably India’s and that the McMahon Line was India’s interna­ tional boundary in the north-east. Acceptance by Jawaharlal Nehru of Chou En-Lai’s implied offer would have been interpreted by public opinion as a surrender, and so Nehru bowed to public opin­ ion.3 The Chinese aggression in 1962 clearly led to public pressure for the resignation of V. K. Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister: Jawaharlal Nehru accepted the inevitable. Finally in the sixties and the early seventies, on the Vietnam issue, the re were loud protests by American public opinion against the U. S. A.’s continued in­ volvement in Vietnam. President Johnson started the withdrawal: and though Nixon spoke of the support of the ‘silent majority’ for the continuance of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, he soon com­ pleted the retreat. It is relevant at this point to quote David Hume on the force of public opinion: ‘It is . . . on opinion only that government is founded, and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments as well as to the most free and most popular.’4 It need only be added that in free governments, compared to the despotic and military governments referred to by Hume, there are recognized constitutional channels through which that opinion can express itself. Besides, in a democracy, as the government in power depends on the next election for the continuance of its power, it is likely to pay more heed to public opinion than other governments. Granting that public opinion has been effective in several in­ stances in compelling governments to follow a course acceptable to it, and that a democratic government must be attentive to public opinion, the question must be asked, to what extent are govern­ ments bound to follow public opinion in the formulation and im­ plementation of foreign policy? This question is important because the ability of the public to acquire an informed judgement on foreign-policy issues is limited in three ways. First, foreign affairs,

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unlike domestic affairs, do not come within the actual experience of the people. Issues of domestic policy are known of from direct experience: whether more money must be spent on agriculture than on industry, whether an industry must be left in private hands or be nationalized, whether the number of years spent by the child at school should be eleven or twelve, are matters on which the general public is competent to express an opinion; this cannot be said of most foreign-policy issues. Secondly, it follows from this that people take less interest in foreign affairs than in domestic affairs. That is why Kaplan is right when he says that a democratic system will pay primary attention to internal considerations in the formulation of external policy. Thirdly, the foreign relations of a country are in practically all countries of the world, kept a guarded secret; their motivation becomes known to the public only when the archives are, years after the event, thrown open. The extremely meagre nature of the infor­ mation which is generally available in India on foreign policy, the relative absence of pressure groups, the inadequate attention paid by political parties in general to the concrete problems of foreign policy, the relatively generalized discussions in Parliament (not discussions in depth on specific problems) on foreign affairs and the unnecessarily and unjustifiably secretive nature5of the government with regard to foreign policy, are responsible for the inadequate information on foreign policy available to the general public. The security interests of the country will explain part of the current practice of keeping the foreign relations of a country secret; partly it is the need to avoid putting unnecessary hurdles in the successful conduct of diplomatic negotiations, for public'discussion of matters under negotiation is likely to hinder free discussion and the reaching of compromises, which are the essence of successful negotiation. There is one other general consideration which is relevant in this context: in a democracy, is a leader bound to follow the people always, or is he to lead them in the direction he considers right? Two great political leaders in India, C. Rajagopalachari and Jawaharlal Nehru, concur in the view that the leader must lead, not follow, the mass. The greatest danger to democracy and therefore to civilization occurs, in Rajagopalachari’s view, when the leaders begin to be guided by what they consider the trend of public opinion. The democratization of truth (to give a euphemistic term to this process) is something that must be resisted. More or less the

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same view is taken by Jawaharlal Nehru. In his Foreword to the biography of Gandhi entitled Mahatma, he wrote: How is a leader of men to function? If he is a leader, he must lead and not merely follow the dictates of the crowd, though some modem conceptions of the functioning of democracy would lead one to think that he must bow down to the largest number. If he does so, then he is no leader and he cannot take others far along the right path of human progress. If he acts singly, according to his own lights, he cuts himself off from the very persons whom he is trying to lead. It is not enough for him to perceive truth or some aspect of it. He must succeed in making others perceive it also.’6

These ideas apply equally well to domestic and foreign affairs. Such views are reinforced by authoritative opinion that the con­ trol of the people over foreign affairs is not often for the best. Thus Lippmann holds that public opinion has been destructively wrong at critical junctures and that the people have imposed a veto upon the judgements of informed and responsible officials: They have compelled the governments, which usually knew what would have been wiser, or was necessary, or was more expedient, to be too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiation or too intransig­ ent. Mass opinion has acquired mounting power in this century. It has shown itself to be a dangerous master of decisions when the stakes are life and death.7

According to Lord Strang, it may be questioned, too, whether the impact of public opinion upon the action of governments will always make for peace and international understanding. Even with the most responsible public opinion and the best kind of government, it might on the contrary make for worse rather than for better interna­ tional relations.8 Parliaments, it has been said, are usually more nationalistic and belligerent than executives, and people than parli­ aments. We have discussed above two sets of ideas: one which demands that in a democracy, popular control of foreign policy is clearly indicated; the second that facts and authoritative opinion are against the public imposing a veto on government in handling foreign policy. What then is our conclusion? The people clearly have a stake in the successful outcome of foreign-policy decisions: these decisions may lead to war and all that war implies. This may demand of them sacrifices both in finan-

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cial terms and through personal suffering. Again, defeat in war may deprive the people of their national independence or part of their territory. Active international co-operation in times of peace may promote trade and travel and cultural exchange for the advan­ tage of all peoples. It follows that the public must take a lively interest in foreign affairs, and, through informed discussion and constructive thinking, help the community to arrive at solutions of foreign-policy problems favourable to the national interest. A second function of public opinion is to lay down the broad limits within which governments should function, the limits which the people think should be observed if their sense of justice is to be respected and their welfare to be promoted. To give two illustra­ tions: it was appropriate for the British people to express them­ selves unmistakably on the debacle in Suez, which was not accord­ ing to their conception of justice in international affairs. Nonalignment has now come to be accepted by Indians as a basic principle of India’s foreign relations; if this is to be changed by the government the change can be effected only if the people have been converted to this view. Indeed, the resources available to the gov­ ernment to inform and educate the people on foreign affairs (as in domestic affairs) are enormous; statements in the press, fire-side chats on the radio and television, and public meetings have to be used more extensively to tell the people what government policy is. In this way, as Lord Strang says,9 the government can build up a body of knowledge in the public mind which will ensure that, as policy develops, the public will not be taken by surprise. And normally in a democracy the public is competent to understand the broad lines of policy. To conclude, Parliament has to be consulted and its consent obtained, implicitly or explicitly, for the policy followed by the government; public opinion has to be both respected and educated, and the co-operation of opposition parties has to be sought, espe­ cially in times of crisis. On their part, the people must also cultivate moderation in public disapproval of foreign policy, remembering that the complexities of foreign affairs are more difficult to grasp than those of domestic affairs.

What The Record Shows CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE.

That the Constitution of India has provided the essential institu­

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tions through which the people and their representatives can influ­ ence and even control the foreign policy of the country is beyond doubt. Citizens have the right (1) of freedom of speech and expression, (2) to assemble peaceably and without arms; and (3) to form associations or unions.10 The importance of these rights can hardly be overemphasised. They mean the right to express one’s opinions by speech or writing, or printing, singly or collectively in a public meeting, or through associations, and of course include freedom of the press. These are the essential safeguards for the expression of public opinion to which reference has been made earlier, and which the government in a democracy is bound to respect. In the context of foreign policy, the limits which the Constitution imposes on the three rights mentioned above are that freedom of speech and expression can be restricted in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state and friendly relations with foreign states; the right to assemble peace­ ably and without arms and the right to form associations or unions can be restricted in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India." These constitutional restrictions cannot be considered un­ reasonable; they are imposed by all modern states. Freedom of speech and expression apart, the most important institution provided by the Constitution is, of course, the Parlia­ ment. Elected by the direct vote of adults, and with freedom of election protected by the Election Commission, the lower House of Parliament, the Lok Sabha, has a number of ways open to it to influence and control the government in its formulation and im­ plementation of foreign policy. These can be discussed under three heads: (1) Legislation, (2) Financial control, and (3) Deliberation. Legislation Parliament has exclusive power to legislate on eigh­ teen items enumerated in Schedule VII, List I:(9) preventive deten­ tion for reasons connected with defence, foreign affairs, or the security of India; (10) foreign affairs; all matters which bring the Union into relations with any foreign country; (11) diplomatic, consular, and trade representation; (12) the United Nations; (13) participation in international conferences, associations, and other bodies and implementation of the decisions made thereat; (14) conclusion of treaties and agreements, and conventions concluded with foreign countries; (15) war and peace; (16) foreign jurisdic­ tion; (17) citizenship, naturalization, and aliens; (18) extradition;

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(19) admission into India and emigration and expulsion from India, as well as passports and visas; (20) pilgrimages to places outside India; (21) piracies and crimes on the high seas or in the air; offences against the law of nations committed on land or on the high seas or in the air; (25) maritime shipping and navigation, including shipping and navigation on tidal waters; (37) foreign loans; (41) trade and commerce with foreign countries; import and export across customs frontiers; definition of customs frontiers; (57) fish­ ing and fisheries beyond territorial waters; and (83) duties of cus­ toms including export duties. Besides, the residuary power of legislation is with the Union. The Constitution clearly lays down that Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent list or state list.12 Reference must be made to three other provisions of the Con­ stitution which give the Federal Government full power to match its responsibility in respect of the conduct of foreign affairs. Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement, or convention with any other country or countries, or any decisions made at any international conference, association or other body.13 Second, the Union has full executive power for the implementation of its laws, and any treaties and agreements it might make.14The question may be raised, suppose the states use their executive power to nullify the laws passed by Parliament for implementation of treaties and ag­ reements, what constitutional remedy is available? To prevent such an eventuality it is laid down that the executive power of the states is to be exercised so as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union.15The executive power of the Union also extends to the giving of such directions to a state as may appear to be necessary for the purpose.16 One may, therefore, agree with a distinguished commentator17 on the constitutional law of India that the Constitution confers on the Union of India legislative and executive power which embraces the total field of external sovereignty. It is open to Parliament when a bill is introduced and debates held, on any subject referred to above, to make its views known to the government and, in theory, compel it to accept its views or be prepared to lose Parliament’s confidence and resign. Financial control It is sufficient to say that, under the parliamen­

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tary system which obtains in India, the refusal of supply by Parlia­ ment is sufficient to compel the government to resign; the refusal of supply may be on account of Parliament’s dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of foreign policy (or domestic policy). Deliberation The deliberative function of Parliament is exercised through questions, resolutions, motions and discussion without a vote. The importance of the question may be gauged from the fact that the first hour of a sitting in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha is normally devoted to questions and answers. In answering the ques­ tions, the government can make policy statements or reinforce ear­ lier statements which received wide publicity. Thus in 1968 four members asked the Minister of Commerce to state whether India had staged a walk-out when the leader of the South African delega­ tion rose to address the UNCTAD conference, and if so, the reason for it.18 In answer, the Deputy Foreign Minister stated that India joined a number of other countries in staging a walk-out from the conference hall. He added that the walk-out was in accordance with the Government of India’s disapproval of South Africa’s apartheid policy, and in pursuance of India’s desire to maintain solidarity with other like-minded countries. A second purpose served by the questions is to warn the gov­ ernment about the activities of other nations and their impact on India’s security. For example, four members of the Lok Sabha asked the Minister of External Affairs, in 1967, to state whether it was a fact that the British government was negotiating to buy certain islands in the Indian ocean; who owned them and whether the Government of India did not consider it essential to own those islands for defence purposes.19 The answer was that the British government had been negotiating for the purchase of three islands in the Indian ocean, viz. Farquhar, Desmoches and the Chagos, and that the Government of India were examining the implication for India of British ownership of those islands. Thirdly, the questions notify the government that Parliament is aware of certain shortcomings in the administration, and that Gov­ ernment should take steps to improve on them.20 If a Minister’s answer has not been quite clear or satisfactory, it is open to the House with the consent of the Speaker to pursue the matter through what is known as the half-an-hour discussion. This affords an opportunity for focussing the attention of the govern­

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ment on the views held by Members on some important matters of public importance; such a discussion is not, however, followed by a vote. There is one interesting limitation on the nature of questions asked: questions about the internal affairs of foreign countries are not admissible.21 Questions apart, the discussion of matters of pub­ lic importance is raised through resolutions and motions (both of which are followed by a vote) and through discussions without a vote. All these forms of enquiry afford an opportunity to Parliament to discuss matters of public importance, and, through resolutions and motions, to record their opinion by consensus or by a majority vote. At least twice a year opportunities are given to the Lok Sabha to discuss foreign affairs: once on a motion that the demand for grants for the Ministry of External Affairs be taken into consideration, the other on the motion that the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration.22 A discussion on a motion of no confidence in a ministry is among the well-known examples of discussions which evoke popular interest and serve to highlight Parliament’s right, in theory, to control the government’s handling of public affairs, domestic or foreign. Mention may also be made of the practice by which Parliament appoints consultative committees, which, if properly worked, can be useful instruments for Parliament to influence the government’s decision-making on foreign affairs. Thus we have the Consultative Committee for the Ministry of External Affairs and one for the Ministry of Commerce. The Estimates Committee and the Public Accounts Committee, through financial control, may exercise some influence on policy. We also have the Parliamentary Committee on Minister’s Assurances which examines how far the assurances given by a minister on the floor of the House have been implemented. We have stated above the position in theory, i. e. the various avenues open to the people and Parliament to exercise influence on, and control over, the government’s handling of foreign policy. We shall now discuss the extent of Parliament's influence on, and control over, foreign policy in practice; indicating also the extent to which opposition parties have been able to make government ac­ cept their views. We shall also indicate the role of the press in the shaping of foreign policy.

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PARLIAMENT: PARTIES

A study in depth of the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) and Parliament since 1947—of the legislation passed by it, the work of committees like the Estimates Committee and the Public Accounts Committee, the questions asked in Parliament together with the answers given by members of the government, and the discussions on resolutions and motions—convinces one that the influence of Parliament on the fundamentals of foreign policy and foreign relations was negligible. The government initiated foreign policy and implemented it, with little modification because of the discussions in Parliament and its committees. Only in five instances that we are aware of, until 1972, has the government been noticeably influenced by discussions in Parlia­ ment. Only in two did the government modify its policy in consequ­ ence (the China debacle and the Agreement with the Voice of America); in two instances, discussed below, the government was anxious tc inform Parliament that it was following a policy that Parliament would approve of (Hungary and the air umbrella); and in one instance (British recruitment of Gurkhas on Indian soil) as a result of Parliamentary discussion, the government expedited the action already contemplated. The first issue was the question ot British recruitment of Gurkhas on Indian soil (1952-3). Under a tripartite agreement between the governments of India, the United Kingdom and Nepal signed in 1947, the Government of India agreed to provide transit facilities for Gurkhas recniited for the British army. The agreement also provided for training facilities at Barrackpore in India. Though no time limit was mentioned for the arrangement, it was assumed to be for a temporary period. The issue was raised in Parliament in November 1952. Prhne Minister Nehru emphasised the temporary nature of the facilities provided and said that discussions had been going on to terminate the facilities as early as possible. It is significant that the issue was repeatedly raised by a Com­ munist member (H. N. Mukherjee) in November and December 1952 and again in February 1953. The Communists were, under­ standably, against any such facility being given to a non-Communist State like Great Britain. Their constant criticism, it seems, prompted Nehru to take steps to terminate the facilities as early as possible. It is also significant that Nehru justified the earlier grant of facilities

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on the ground that the tripartite agreement was entered into to oblige the government of Nepal (our neighbour); it was to allow individuals from Nepal to cross over to India.23 The second instance is the uprising in Hungary in 1956 as a consequence of the entry of Soviet troops into that country. The government was anxious to let it be known that in their view a national uprising was taking place in Hungary, that the people of Hungary should be allowed to determine their own future according to their own wishes and that foreign forces should be withdrawn.24 The records certainly do not indicate that this statement of govern­ ment policy was made as a result of Parliamentary criticism. Rather, they show that the government was removing a misconception in the public mind and in Parliament that they were rather lukewarm in their denunciation of the Soviet Union and in their support to Hungary. That there was a misconception in Parliamentary circles is clear from a statement made by Asoka Mehta on 19 November 1956: ‘I am happy that the Prime Minister has today corrected the focus and has set the record straight .. .the Prime Minister and his colleagues, when they make an error of judgement, are able to realize that and they ultimately succeed in rectifying that error.’ 25 A perusal of the records suggests that the misconception had a two-fold origin. First, as the Times o f India wrote in its issues of 29 October 1956 and 5 November 1956, India was cautious in her attitude regarding the happenings in Eastern Europe.‘Recent events in the East European Countries are regarded as internal happenings in which New Delhi has observed extreme caution to the extent of not even expressing opinion.’ This attitutde was in sharp contrast to Nehru’s instant reaction to the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt which Nehru condemned, immediately he heard the news, as a ‘naked aggression’ . Secondly, India’s voting against the five-power resolution on Hungary sponsored by Cuba, Ireland, Italy, Pakistan and Peru on 9 November 1956, calling on the U. S. S. R. to withdraw its forces from Hungary, had created an apprehension in the public mind that perhaps India was supporting the Soviet Union’s action in sending its forces to Hungary. Nehru madd a detailed and frank statement in the Lok Sabha on 16 November 1956 to explain both the causes of misconception. First, he said the situation in Hungary was obscure for some days

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and it was only gradually that the story of the tragic events that have taken place there became known, this should explain the delay in the Government of India’s expression of opinion on the develop­ ments in Hungary. On the question of India’s voting on the United Nations resolu­ tion on 9 November, Nehru was at pains to explain that India voted against the resolution only because it contained one paragraph which was objectionable from the Indian point of view; indeed that paragraph could be used, later, to justify U. N. supervised elections in Kashmir, which was against the national interest. Nehru’s expla­ nation deserves to be quoted in full: There was a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly in regard to Hungary, sponsored by Pakistan, Cuba, Italy, Peru and Ireland, against which we voted, and as some criticism has been made in regard to our vote on this resolution I should like to remove any misunderstanding that may have arisen. The resolution was, in our opinion, improperly worded. But the most objectionable part of it demanded that elections should be held in Hungary under the supervision o f the United Nations. We took strong exception to this because we felt this was contrary to the charter and would reduce Hungary to less than a sovereign state. Any acceptance of interven­ tion of this type and foreign supervised elections seemed to us to set a bad precedent which might be utilised in future for intervention in other countries. The resolution was voted paragraph by paragraph. We abstained from voting on all the other parts of the resolution. In regard to the paragraph about elections under the United Nations supervision, we voted against it. When the whole resolution including this paragraph was put to the vote, we also voted against it because of that particular paragraph to which we objected strongly, (our italics)

The third, and perhaps the most important, instance in whichParliament made its influence felt was over India-China relations. It is well known that for some years after India became indepen­ dent, India had friendly relations with China: visit exchanged by the Prime Ministers of China and India, cultural delegations from and to China, the conclusion of trade agreements, the visits of sports­ men and artistes, participation in industrial and cultural activities, and the exchange of technical experts are ample proof of this. But from October 1954 (on 6 October 1954, during his visit to China, Nehru had raised with the Chinese leaders the question of some maps published in China which had incorporated over 50,000 square kilometres of Indian territory into China), relations began to deteriorate. There were many incursions by the Chinese into Indian

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territory; the Aksaichin in the western sector where the Chinese built a road (1956-7), Barahoti in the middle sector, and Longju in the eastern sector. A study of the proceedings of Parliament in 1959 and I960,26 shows how critical members of Parliament were about the govern­ ment’s weak handling of the Chinese incursions into Indian territory. A preliminary question which they raised was why Parli­ ament had not been taken into confidence about, for instance, the Chinese building a road into the Aksaichin area, which India claimed as her territory. On 12 September 1959, Nehru told the Lok Sabha that he had been accused, with some justification, of having kept matters from Parliament27 and that if he had erred in the past by delaying the placing of papers before the House, he would not err again. This preliminary question apart, the many substantial questions raised in Parliament show how vigilant members of Parliament were about the security and defence of India. Thus when the Prime Minister mentioned that parts of Ladakh were almost inaccessible, though the Chinese had built a road in that area, a member asked ‘Does it mean that in parts of our country which are inaccessible, any nation can come and build roads and camps? The road remains there, the occuption remains there and we do not do anything about it.’ Again, it was asked with some reason, whether in view of the fact that the Chinese claimed that an admittedly Indian territory was within their frontier and had sent Chinese patrols into that territory, the government would not contemplate ousting the Chinese from the Indian territory by force. Again, when the Prime Minister mentioned in Parliament that a portion of Ladakh was absolutely desolate and infertile and that not even a blade of grass grew there, a member of Parliament asked, with some justification, ‘when China is attaching so much of importance to this desolate piece of land, why, when the territory is ours or is under dispute even, do we not attach any importance to it?’ Such questions indicate clearly that members of Parliament were impatient with the handling of the Chinese issue by the government. Prime Minister Nehru reacted by telling Parliament that if it chose it could select people in whom it had greater confidence to run the government. We are not aware of any other occasion when Nehru took such a stand: ‘I do not mean at all that there should be no criticism. But in a moment of crisis one should not do anything to

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encourage the opponent or the enemy. If it is your will and pleasure that I should serve in the capacity in which I have been placed, I am not going to shirk it, and I am going to serve with all my strength and such competence as I have. But if you make me the instrument of your will for this purpose, do not blunt that instrument; keep it sharp for the work that it is intended to do.’28 The government’s anxiety to defer to Parliament also explains in part its unwillingness to consider seriously Chou En-lai’s suggestion to which we have referred earlier: that the government of India recognize China’s claim to Aksaichin in return for China’s recogni­ tion of the McMahon Line as India’s north-eastern boundary. Whether the government of India’s unwillingness was wise or not only time will show; but that it was unwilling to consider it, partly because Parliament and public opinion were against parting with any inch of India’s territory is clear from the record. Finally, that V. K. Krishna Menon had to resign after the Chinese forces had routed the Indian army in 1962 is proof that Parliament was a force in Indian politics. It is true, as Bandhopadhyaya points out in an excellent analysis,29 that it was the Congress Parliamentary Execu­ tive which was responsible for Menon’s departure; but it is also clear that the Parliamentary Executive was in effect voicing the mood of Parliament when they brought pressure on Nehru to see that Menon resigned from the cabinet. The fourth instance we would like to discuss is the question of providing an ‘air umbrella’, debated in the Indian press in early 1963. A study of the debate in the press and in Parliament suggests that there was really no divergence of opinion between the gov­ ernment and the Opposition in Parliament; that the government was as anxious as Parliament was that India should be defended by its own forces and that there was no question of the stationing of any foreign air force or the establishment of any foreign air base in India; but that the government was eager to explain to Parliament its own position in the matter. Since the sudden Chinese attack of 1962, the Government of India had been in touch with friendly countries like the U.S.A. and Great Britain in connection with building up an effective air defence to meet a possible surprise attack, and the longterm threat posed by China. At the suggestion of the government of India, a U.S.A-Commonwealth Air Team visited India in early 1963 to discuss the matter. As a result of the visit, it was found necessary

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(1) to extend existing air-strips; (2) to improve ground control and the communications system; (3) to obtain more and better aircraft and (4) to impart advanced training. The visit of the foreign air team led to speculation in the press about the establishment of foreign bases with a number of airplanes as an ‘air umbrella’ for India. Prime Minister Nehru explained India’s policy in the Lok Sabha on 21 February 1963: there was no question of the stationing of a foreign air force or the establishment of foreign air bases in India; India welcomed help only in procuring equipment and materials to strengthen her air force. ‘The air de­ fence of the country is too vital a matter’, concluded Nehru ‘to be left to improvisation and delays inherent in any project like that of the air umbrella’, and added, ‘India has to be defended by its own forces.’30 Finally we would like to cite the agreement entered into by the Government of India with the Voice of America (VGA) on 9 July 1963. In the wake of the Chinese aggression in late 1962, the Govern­ ment of India felt the need to strengthen All-India Radio’s external broadcasts to counteract the increasingly venomous propaganda unleashed by the Chinese broadcasting services against India. It was therefore decided to acquire a high powered transmitter for the purpose. Enquiries revealed that the only source for such a transmitter was the VO A. The VO A conveyed to the Government of India in March 1963 its readiness to offer the transmitter on certain terms. Following discussions between officials of the two countries, an agreement was signed on 9 July 1963 for purchase of the transmitter, which was to be installed in the Calcutta region. It was agreed that payment for the transmitter would be made in the form of three hours broadcasting time for the VOA to south-east Asia during the optimum listening period. The agreement sparked off sharp criticism in India. The Com­ munist Party of India on 17 July denounced it as a blatant violation of our basic policies. The main criticism centred around the facility given to the VOA for using the transmitter for their broadcasts. This facility, the critics feared, would be used for ‘cold war propaganda’. They regarded the contract as a serious breach of the non-alignment policy of India. They pleaded for renegotiation of the deal, saying that the VOA might ‘contaminate the air against Russia and other countries’. It was also pointed out that the deal would cause Afro-

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Asian countries to think that India was relaxing her non-alignment policy. In August the issue was raised in the Indian Parliament by mem­ bers who mostly belonged to«the Leftist parties. In his statement on 14 August, Nehru admitted in the Lok Sabha that 'this arrangement was not in consonance with our general policy and will, if further pursued, not only make Indo-U. S relations a subject of con­ troversy inside India but will prejudice our main objective of coun­ teracting anti-Indian propaganda broadcast from Chinese radio.1 Hence Lidia, he said, was renegotiating the matter with the U.S. Government. The Indian revised position was that ‘there should be no broadcasts from this transmitter by the VOA.’ The criticism of the agreement, it seems, led to its death, for, as late as 17 February 1964, the Indian Government had not received the reaction of the U.S. Government to the revised terms. The press and Parliament had in this instance, effectively influenced the foreign policy of India.31 We referred earlier to the institution of Consultative Committees attached to the Ministries of External Affairs and of Commerce. A study of the available evidence suggests that these consultative committees were convened infrequently, and when convened were used by the ministries concerned to elaborate on and justify the policies already announced; rarely were new suggestions made by non-official members of the Committees nor were such suggestions encouraged by the government. V. K. Krishna Menon thought that the Consultative Committee was more akin to a Conference, in which a few people tended to monopolise the time. True, there was some sort of give-and-take between ministers and members of Parliament at these Committees, but Menon’s frank opinion was‘it may not always add up to very much.’ There are several reasons why Parliament’s influence in shaping foreign policy has been of marginal significance. First, there is the unfamiliarity of the ordinary member of Parliament with foreign affairs. Acharya Kripalani, a highly respected member of the oppos­ ition, was speaking the plain truth when on 17 September 1953 he confessed in Parliament that ‘a mere member cannot know the internal workings of this crooked international diplomacy’32 and, again, ‘for a mere member of this House it is rather difficult to talk with any amount of assurance on foreign policy.’33 V.K. Krishna Menon echoed the same sentiment when he told Michael Brecher in

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May 1965 ‘The average Member of Parliament has not got the knowledge or the time’34 (to understand foreign affairs). The posi­ tion might be different if a considerable number of retired Foreign Service officers or Cabinet Ministers were elected to Parliament, but at present a member of the government is easily more know­ ledgeable than private members in regard to foreign affairs. A second reason is that, in fact, whatever differences did occur between the government and the opposition parties over foreign affairs were seldom significant enough to evoke serious thinking by the opposition parties on foreign affairs. Here again Acharya Kripalani may be quoted: ‘I am in complete agreement with the basic principles of our foreign policy.’35 Another member told the Lok Sabha: ‘None of us in this country have any quarrel with him [Prime Minister Nehru] on that [the principles of foreign policy]. Where we try to make suggestions or even to criticise the foreign policy of this Government, particularly the policies as enunciated by the Prime Minister, it is only with a view to emphasise certain aspects of our national needs which seem to have been forgotten in respect of the pursuit of foreign policy towards a country, A, B, or Ch'36 What has been said above must not be interpreted to mean that India’s foreign policy has been bi-partisan or multi-partisan in all respects. Prime Minister Nehru clarified this aspect in his reply to the foreign affairs debate in the Lok Sabha on 18 May 1954: ‘The foreign policy in its basic and fundamental approach should be a national policy. In big matters of policy all views^should be consi­ dered. But there are smaller things resulting directly from the fundamental approach, like the branches, the leaves and the flow­ ers, concerning which it is not possible nor necessary to take the views of others.’37 It is also pertinent to note that the Swatantra Party and the Jana Sangh, in particular, did from time to time differ from the ruling party’s views on important aspects of foreign policy. The Swatantra Party was inclined to favour an alliance with the West, in effect the U.S.A., thus differing frdm the ruling party on the very basis of non-alignment. Their election manifesto of 1967 said, ‘The Swatantra Party believes that, when the country’s ter­ ritorial integrity has been violated first by Communist China and then by Pakistan, the concept of non-alignment has lost all meaning and our foreign policy needs to be reviewed and brought into closer

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relation to the realities of the international situation. .. .In the face of the aggressive intentions and activities of some of our neigh­ bours, proper defence alliances with reliable powers are not only legitimate but expedient.’ The election manifesto of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh of 1967 shows how that party also differed in important respects from the Congress over foreign policy during that period. ‘Non-alignment can neither be our creed or a permanent basis of our foreign policy. Today when we are aggressed, we must have allies. Bharatiya Jana Sangh . . . will enter into bilateral alliances with countries irrespective of their allegiance to the two power blocs. Bharatiya Jana Sangh will recognize the government of Taiwan provided the latter recognizes the territorial frontiers of India. Jana Sangh recognizes the independent status of Tibet. Bharatiya Jana Sangh has faith in the ultimate unification of India and Pakis­ tan.’ The third and the most important reason is that the ruling party, i.e., the Congress, had from the beginning of Independence, a solid majority in Parliament (except for a very brief period in 1967-71) and, therefore, they were able to have their way. It is true that the major opposition parties collectively secured a fair percentage of electoral votes: 23.5 per cent of the total votes polled in the first general election, 25.26 in the second general election and 30.84 in the third. It has also been calculated that the ‘percentage of votes polled by all the Opposition parties together with the independents was always higher than that of votes secured by the ruling party.’38 But what mattered in Parliament was the number of members, and hence the Congress remained the dominating factor in Par­ liamentary debates. Besides, it had as its leader Jawaharlal Nehru who enjoyed the overwhelming support of the nation. In fact his charisma enabled the ruling party to dominate Parliament not only in matters of foreign but domestic policy as well. Only in the later years of his Prime Ministership, largely due to the failure of his China policy, did he lose his grip on the situation and even then it could rightly be said that Parliament did not disown him. Jawaharlal Nehru dominated not only Parliament but also the cabinet. There is ample evidence to show that he took the cabinet for granted, that important decisions on foreign policy were taken without cabinet discussion,39 and even when foreign policy ques­

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tions were discussed, few members had the courage to differ from him. V. K. Krishna Menon’s statements to Michael Brecher on Parliament’s influence on foreign policy correctly sum up the posi­ tion: *As for general policy, these debates have been occasions for the assertion of the basic policies of the government. With the large majority the government has in Parliament and with the Prime Minister being an acknowledged pundit in international affairs, the debates could not materially affect issues.'40 Pressed about whether Menon could recall any issue in which Parliamentary pressure was effectively exerted to alter or influence a particular policy, Menon was frank enough to admit that he could not imagine the govern­ ment being defeated on a policy issue. It has been argued, with some justification, that ‘the opposition helped the government to be more strictly non-aligned than would have been otherwise. .. .The Jana Sangh and the Swatantra attempted to influence the government from the Right while the CPI and the PSP from the Left and the government was left with no alternative but to follow a middle-of-the-road policy.’41 Yet this view perhaps ascribes to the Opposition parties more influence on foreign policy than is warranted by the facts. Krishna Menon’s opinion is worth some attention: ‘The opposition would perhaps say that non-alignment was kept from being pro-Russian by their inter­ vention. This again is not the case.’42 Krishna Menon, in our view, was correct because Prime Minister Nehru had earlier evolved the policy of non-alignment because ‘any attempt on the p a r t.. .of the government of the day here, to go too far in one direction would create difficulties in our own country. It would be resented and would produce conflicts in our own country which would not be helpful to us or to any other country.’43 True to the democratic tradition, Nehru had sensed the temper of the country and Parlia­ ment, and reflected the general view in the country; he was, there­ fore, keen that the non-alignment policy should be implemented in its true spirit. We can conclude therefore, that the influence of Parliament on foreign policy was but marginal. Nevertheless, as Menon recog­ nized, Parliament does have an educative impact. First, discussions in Parliament have the result ‘of showing the world what we think and that we do think’. Secondly, ‘it educates our own people.’ Thirdly, it helps to make foreign policy acceptable in many ways:

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You can see that from the results. It’s always the same; there are speeches, but all ends well.’44 THE ROLE OF THE PRESS

In a democratic political system such as India’s, the press is reck­ oned as the Fourth Estate and plays a vital role in the domestic and foreign policy-making process. In the latter field, the most impor­ tant function of the press is to provide information on the basis of which a judgement by the public is made possible. Important hap­ penings in different parts of the world are reported, and, for most of the electorate, press reports are the only available means of under­ standing foreign affairs. The classic philosophy of democracy is built around the idea that it is the people who, directly or indirectly, make decisions in a democratic society; and the press supplies the factual information for them to make decisions. It follows that the better the job the press does in providing the information, the better the people's capacity to make intelligent judgements. The provision of information on foreign affairs is, in our view, the most important function the press performs in the field of foreign policy. Its other functions are interpretative and critical. The interpretative function is performed through the publication of specialized articles on current international developments; these help the public to understand the significance of developments in their country in relation to past developments there as well as to developments in other parts of the world. The critical function is performed through publication of views analysing and criticising the policy of the government in regard to foreign affairs. Not only through letters to the Editor, but in editorials and special articles a critical analysis of the country’s foreign policy is attempted. Finally, the press performs a useful function for Government by publicizing the foreign policy of the government. Government hand­ outs, statements by the Foreign Minister, and discussions in Parlia­ ment on foreign affairs afford the public an opportunity to under­ stand the foreign policy pursued by their government. It is no doubt true that the government has other mass-media such as radio and television to present its policies to the public; but obviously these mass-media cannot supply the same detailed information which the press can. If the press performs such an important role in the foreign-policy making process, two questions arise: how does the press in India

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educate the public on the real issues of foreign policy decisions? Has the press access to inside information? That the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India have agreed to meet at Simla is important news; but what the public would like to know is, what had led to such a meeting? What were the motivations of the parties concerned? In fact, so far as the press is concerned, India’s foreign policy and matters connected with foreign affairs, by and large, continue to be kept a closely-guarded secret. This is the result of historical circum­ stances, for ever since Nehru became Prime Minister of free India and held the External Affairs Portfolio, much of the thinking on foreign affairs was done by him for nearly seventeen years. During most of this period, few press men had direct access to him and the only means by which the press collected news regarding foreign affairs was through the periodical press conferences he held. Here, he would answer all questions pertaining to this subject but they were mostly of an explanatory character. Nehru never made any policy statement at a press conference with the result that whatever answers he gave to searching questions only ‘elaborated’ policy. The pros and cons were discus­ sed and made clear; the impact of decisions on foreign policy on international issues was clarified but in no case was there any attempt on Nehru’s part to explain how a particular policy was arrived at. The press was certainly at a disadvantage in this regard. One of the serious limitations in announcing policy decisions at a press conference is, undoubtedly, the functioning of Parliament. It is one of the accepted principles of Parliamentary practice that, when Parliament is in session, all policy statements should be made in the two Houses and not outside. The press conferences which were the main source of news on foreign affairs during Nehru’s regime, therefore, remained at best gatherings where the press only obtained clarifications. Normally, the press collects its information about foreign policy from the Ministry of External Affairs. In India the Ministry is more dominated by bureaucracy than other ministries are, and the most important officials of the Ministry were, in earlier years, members of the Indian Civil Service. The civil servant was traditionally reluc­ tant to have anything to do with the press and so kept himself aloof, with the result that in the first years after independence newsmen gathered information only from junior officials. The publicity directorate in the Ministry of External Affairs was,

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in the initial years,notadequately organized, with the result that the press was not in a position to discover how Nehru’s mind was working on certain issues. By and large, the press was not able to obtain *scoops’; in fact very little trickled through to it as long as Nehru was the External Affairs Minister. It is reported that even in cabinet meetings, Nehru did not discuss foreign policy with his colleagues. Such was his dominating personality. But in the process of development and with the growing impor­ tance of the press which even Nehru had to recognize, arrangements were devised in the foreign ministry to hand out information to the press as occasion arose. There were the weekly and the biweekly briefings by official spokemen who usually enjoyed the status of a Director-*a post below that of a Joint Secretary. In recent times, a Joint Secretary is usually the official spokesman. Here, clarifications were sought by the press on important foreign-policy statements and events abroad, insofar as their impact on India was concerned. Mostly, these briefings turned out to be post-mortems. The Direc­ tor himself was first briefed by his superior, and he would then answer questions by press men within limits and to the best of his ability. The result invariably was that one obtained only an elemen­ tary clarification of policies. The real reasons for decision-making could never be obtained. Thus, while Indian sources were meagre and continue to be so in regard to foreign policy, most journalists obtained their news from various embassies situated in Delhi. Press men normally have access to embassies and, quite often, ambassadors in their anxiety to obtain information about Indian affairs, would invite them to in­ formal meetings. The more resourceful correspondents got news of policy decisions much quicker and in advance of official announce­ ments, through these sources. An effort was later made by Nehru to streamline publicity, and for several months K. S. Shelvankar, later Indian envoy to the Soviet Union, worked on a scheme to make external publicity purposeful, but his report to the government has not been published. Possibly, the Prime Minister had second thoughts on the matter; in any case external publicity remained as inadequate and enshrouded in secrecy as ever. It was when Lai Bahadur Shastri became the Prime Minister that the idea of having a separate Foreign Minister was first conceived. This is possibly because Shastri was not too familiar with foreign affairs. He, as Home Minister, had solved a number of national

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problems and functioned as a confidant of the then Prime Minister, Nehru. When he became Prime Minister, he appointed Sardar Swaran Singh, who had by then conducted several rounds of meet­ ings with Pakistan on Kashmir, the External Affairs Minister. This was the first time that press men had direct access to the Minister in charge of foreign affairs. While for security reasons it had not been possible for press men to meet Nehru, this difficulty did not exist any more. Journalists talked to Swaran Singh and attempted to gather background information regarding decisions on foreign policy. Here again, foreign affairs continued to be a closed area and neither Swaran Singh nor the Prime Minister was prepared to talk freely about it to press men. There is no reason to think that the position has changed substantially since then. Whatever the opportunities available to joumali ts to unravel the secrets of the Ministry of External Affairs, the more important question is, has the press been able to influence the formulation and implementation of foreign policy? It must be borne in mind that the press is only one of the many influences that shape the foreign policy of any country. The Foreign Minister has to take into account the international setting, the reports received from the ambassadors, the needs of the various government ministries, and discussions in Parliament. Even so, it would be correct to say that the Foreign Minister does take into account the opinions expressed in the press. Clippings from newspapers are filed and press reviews are prepared regularly for the attention of the Foreign Minister; the government also sifts the opinions and reactions of prominent citizens from speculative and interpretative newspaper articles. While the government does note the opinions expressed in the press, it is difficult to give even oiie definite instance where the press was actually able to influence foreign policy. Nehru laid the pattern for foreign relations and no one was prepared to make any depar­ tures from it. After the. Chinese war, several papers suggested that efforts could still be made to make up with China, but this produced no effect on the government’s thinking. Closer relations with For­ mosa were advocated by influential papers but the government did not change its position an inch. The same attitude regarding Israel continued in spite of strong editorials and several articles praising Israel’s phenomenal progress. Later, in regard to Bangladesh, sev­ eral newspapers pleaded for recognition soon after the military regime was imposed, but it had no visible effect on Gov­

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ernment. Raising the status of the diplomatic representative to that of an ambassador in North Vietnam was forcefully advocated by several papers for some years but when the decision was finally taken by the government it came as a surprise. The main factor which influenced the government into taking this decision seemed to be their indignation over the American attitude to India’s war with Pakistan in 1971. In other words, the press seems to have far too little impact on the government in regard to foreign policy. There certainly have been hundreds of instances where the gov­ ernment has had to yield to opinion in the press on matters pertain­ ing to domestic affairs. It should be noted however that decisions on foreign policy cannot be taken without reference to the reactions they produce elsewhere. The government itself is not free to alter policy whenever it likes because of the wide repercussions. To this extent, Government has to be cautious. Also, on specific issues, the Com­ munist press has its own views, which are not shared by other papers. The more important sections in the press differ widely on several international issues and on Government’s handling of them. Which views then should weigh more with the government? The answer is that Government alone is competent to decide foreign policy on an assessment made by its organs. Insofar as yielding to public pressure is concerned, one could cite the instance of V. K. Krishna Menon, then Defence Minister, who was relieved of his portfolio summarily. Even a powerful Prime Minister like Nehru could not resist public opinion against Menon. Years later, when there was a general de­ mand both in the press and elsewhere that there should be a cabinet minister in charge of refugees, following their huge influx from East Pakistan in 1964, Nehru bowed to it and appointed Tyagi in that capacity. It has been calculated that the influence of the press amounts to some three to four per cent of the decision-making. Some legitimate reasons can be suggested for this. The press in India concerns only a small percentage of the population, and largely reflects urban opin­ ion. With more than sixty per cent of the population in the country still illiterate, it cannot have any influence on the press. Since India’s millions live in the villages, to this extent the press is not truly representative of the people. The total circulation of all the news­ papers in the country is less than two crores, i. e. the overwhelming majority of people are not covered by the press in the country. Nor

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do newspaper owners or journalists often take account of the aspirations of the rural people. It is perhaps for this reason that the government is reluctant to be guided by the press, more especially on matters which have an international bearing. Secondly, the opinion of the press is not of an uniform nature and consequently, the government cannot be guided by it in arriving at decisions. Such opinion might change from time to time and this could be another reason why the government cannot solely go by the views expressed in the press. It is sufficient to say that the general impres­ sion among journalists is that the government is not prepared to be influenced by the newspapers for reasons of ‘prestige’. NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. The Listener, 17 January 1957, p. 92. 2. K.P.S. Menon, The Flying Troika (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 320. The proposal Chou En-lai hinted at when he came to India in 1959, was that, in exchange for the eastern portion of Ladakh, China would recognize the McMohan line. 3. Nehru is reported to have observed with reference to the earlier proposal ‘If I give them that I shall no longer be Prime Minister of India—I will not do it.’ 4. Charles W. Hendel ed. David Hume's Political Essays (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1953), p. 24. 5. J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making o f India’s Foreign Policy (Allied Publishers, 1970), p. 107. 6. D. G. Tendulkar,Mahatma, vol. I (Bombay: Vithalbhai K. Jhaveri and D. G. Tendulkar, 1951), p. xiii. 7. Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy (Boston: Little & Brown, 1955), p. 20.

8. Strang. ‘Foreign Policy in a Democracy’, p. 93. 9. Ibid.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

Article 19(1) (a)(b)(c). Article 19 (2), (3) and (4). Article 248. Article 253. Article 73. Article 257. Ibid. H.M. Seervai, The Constitutional Law o f India: A Critical Summary (Bombay, 1967), p. 109. 18. Lok Sabha Debates, 4th series, vol. 13 (1968) cols. 64-5. 19. Ibid., vol. 2(1967), cols. 2358-9. 20. Ibid., col. 2333. Thus in 1967, the Minister of External Affairs was asked to state whether a diplomatic bag had been lost by the Indian Airlines Corporation in 1966, and what was the result of the enquiry, if one had been made into the inci­

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dent. The Minister admitted that a diplomatic bag had been lost, that appropriate departmental action had been recommended against those concerned and that steps had been taken to avoid the recurrence of such mishaps. 21. D. D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution o f India, 5th ed., vol. Ill (1967),p. 26. 22. See, for example, Parliamentary Debates, House o f the People, vol. VIII, cols. 3974-75,17 September 1953. 23. See Parliamentary Debates, House o f the People, part I: 5 November 1952, col. 38; 12 December 1952, col. 1467-8; and 13 February 1953, col. 1-3. 2.1. 24. Nehru’s statement in the Lok Sabha.Lok Sabha Debates, vol. ix, no. 3, part II, 16 November 1956, cols. 261-76. 25. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. ix, no. 4, 19 November 1956, part II, col. 403. 26. Lok Sabha Debates, 28 August 1959,4 September 1959; 12 September 1959; 17 November 1959; 25 November 1959; 27 November 1959; 21 December 1959; 22 December 1959; 29 April 1960.Rajya Sabha Debates, 31 August 1959; 4 September 1959; 10 September 1959; 8 December 1959; 9 December 1959; and 29 April 1960. 27. Nehru India's Foreign Policy, p. 354; see also Reply to Debate in Lok Sabha, 12 September 1959, vol. 34, Second Series, col. 8185. 28. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, p. 365. 29. Bandhyopadhaya, India’s Foreign Policy, pp. 120-2. 30. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. 13, 21 February 1963, col. 546. 31. Asian Recorder, July 30-August 1963, cols. 410-11; vol. 22, 18 November, 1967, cols. 8-17; vol. 24, 16 Decemberl963 ,cols. 4855; vol. 25,17 February 1964, col. 1010; New Age (Weekly) vol. XI, no. 29, 21 July 1963. p. 1; Indian Foreign Affairs, vol. VI, no. 8, August 1963, pp. 7-8, 37, 39. 32. Parliamentary Debates House o f the Peopfe,Official Report,vol. VIII, col. 4007. 33. Ibid. col. 4006. 34. M. Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View o f the World, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 265. 35. Parliamentary Debates, House of the People, Official Report, vol. VIII, col. 4008. 36. Dr Lanka Sundaram, in Parliamentary Debates, House o f the People, 17 September 1953, vol. VII, cols. 4057-8. 37. The Statesman, 19 May 1954. 38. K. Raman Pillai, India’s Foreign Policy: Basic Issues and Political Attitudes (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969), p. 193. 39. V. K. Krishna Menon’s own revelations made in his interview with Michael Brecher also show that the cabinet had hardly any say in the use of force against Portugal in Goa (see Brecher, p. 132). According to Patel, Krishna Menon made radical changes in defence policy with the prior approval of the Prime Minister but without the approval of the cabinet. See A. Appadorai. Essays in Indian Politics and Foreign Policy (Delhi: Vikas, 1971), p. 62. 40. Brecher, India and World Politics, p. 263; italics ours. 41. K. Raman Pillai. India's Foreign Policy, p. 202. 42. Ibid. 43. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, p. 47. 44. Brecher, India and World Politics, p. 263.

CHAPTER

IV

The Demands of Economic Development The focus in public discussions is usually on the political aspects of foreign policy; when that policy is studied in perspective, however, the economic aspect of our foreign policy gets high priority in its formulation and implementation. The economic development of India has been such an urgent need that policy makers were right to use foreign policy as a tool to further that development. In this chapter we shall (1) give a short description of the Indian economy on the eve of Independence—the basic facts on which the Planning Commission had to evolve their successive five-year plans for development; (2) sketch briefly the history of socialist thinking in the country, both before and after Independence, as such think­ ing powerfully influenced policy makers in formulation of the ob­ jective and methods of achieving economic development; (3) con­ sider the five-year plans from the point of view of what they demand of a rational foreign economic policy; (4) discuss the role of foreign aid in economic development; (5) analyse the impact of foreign private capital on development; (6) explain how foreign trade pol­ icy was used as a handmaid to tackle the foreign exchange problem; (7) analyse the factors that led to the promotion of joint industrial enterprises abroad; and(8) conclude with an assessment of what has been achieved with particular reference to the role of foreign policy in making that development possible.

The Indian Economy at Independence Jawaharlal Nehru in his Autobiography, after giving credit to the British for having first opened India’s window to the West and brought her one aspect of Western industrialism and science, wrote: India today is a poor and dismal sight behind all the splendours of the imperial frontage There is a great deal of patchwork and superficiality, and behind it the unhappy petty bourgeoisie, crushed more and more by mod­ ern conditions. Further back come the workers, living miserably in grinding

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poverty, and then the peasant, that symbol of India, whose lot it is to be ‘born to Endless Night’.1

The Planning Commission, in their First Five Year Plan give some details of this backwardness of the Indian economy. While the population had increased by about 39 per cent during the previous four decades (i.e. 1910-50), the production of foodgrains had not kept pace. This indicates an appreciable decrease in per capita availability of foodgrains from internal resources.2 Because of in­ adequate financial resources and absence of timely credit facilities at reasonable rates, many farmers, even though otherwise willing, were unable to go in for improved seeds and manures or to intro­ duce better methods or techniques.3The existence of large numbers of agricultural workers, who lacked continuous employment was a source of serious weakness and even of instability in the agrarian system.4The annual failure of crops in different regions of India was a common feature.5 The relative backwardness of industrial de­ velopment in India could be judged from three facts—that in 1948-9 factory establishments accounted for only 6.6 per cent of the national income; that the total force engaged in such establish­ ments was about 2.4 million or 1.8 per cent of the working popula­ tion of the country; and that the major emphasis in industrial development had been on consumer-goods industries while the development of basic capital goods had lagged behind.6 Statistics relating to expectation of life, the death rate, and infant mortality indicated a low level of health in the country.7 Considering the size of the population, the over-all provision of educational facilities was very inadequate.8 The situation in regard to housing had become particularly serious as the supply of houses had not kept pace with the growth of population; the towns had a large number of sub­ standard houses and slums, containing insanitary mud-huts of flimsy construction, poorly ventilated’, congested and often lacking essential amenities such as water and light.9 The per capita income in 1944-6 was estimated by the Ministry of Commerce at Rs. 198.10 Noting these facts, the Planning Commission rightly stated that the objective of economic development was two-fold: increased production, and a more equal distribution of wealth. The urge to economic and social change, in their view, came from the fact of poverty and of inequalities in income, wealth and opportunity. The elimination of poverty could not be achieved merely by redistribut­ ing existing wealth. Nor could a programme aiming only at raising

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production remove inequalities. They concluded, therefore, that the two had to be considered together; only simultaneous advance along both these lines could create conditions in which the commun­ ity could put forth its best efforts for promoting development.11

Socialist Thinking It has been observed earlier that socialist thinking in the country, both before and after achievement of independence, powerfully influenced policy makers in formulation of the objectives of, and methods of achieving, economic development. A brief survey of socialist thinking will therefore be appropriate. To begin with, what strikes even the casual reader of Indian socialist writings during the past half century is that there is no agreement on what the term means.12 Nehru thought ‘a vague, confused socialism was already part of the atmosphere of India when I returned from Europe in December 1927. .. Mostly they thought along utopian lines.’13 To Subhas Chandra Bose, justice, equality, freedom, discipline, and love were the essence of socialism.14 Clearly, for this political leader, socialism included all the values which he cherished and wanted to see established in India.15 Equality is the essence of socialism according to M. K. Gandhi. ‘In the individual body the head is not high because it is the top of the body nor are the soles of the feet low because they touch the earth. Even as members of the individual body are equal, so are members of Society. This is socialism.’16 Starting from the premise that the ‘socialist way of life is a way of sharing together the good things that common endeavour may make available’ and that the ‘more willingly this sharing is practised the less tension and coercion in society and the more of socialism’, J. P. Narayan believes that unless members of society learn to keep their wants under control, the voluntary sharing of things may be difficult, if not impossible, and society would be bound to split into two: those trying to discip­ line others, and the rest.17 Who then would discipline the disciplin­ e s , rule the rulers? The only solution seems to be to restrict, as much as possible, the need and area of disciplining from above by ensuring that every member of society practises self-discipline and the values of socialism and, among other things, willingly shares and co-operates with his fellow men.18Briefly, the more the indi­ vidual limits his wants, the fewer the occasions for conflict, and the

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less conflict, the less the need for the state and political authority. The general philosophy of Narayan’s concept of people s socialism is clear enough. He has a genuine distrust of the state, since he believes that the more there is of the state, the less there is of individual liberty. He would heartily agree with Gandhi’s maxim that that government was the best which governed the least. The bourgeois state already has a monopoly of political powers. ‘The socialist state threatens to add to that the monopoly of economic power.’ Such a concentration of power could require equal, if not greater, power to control and keep it in check. The economic and political bureaucracy would be so strong and in occupation of such vantage points that the liberties and rights of the people, as well as their bread would be entirely at their mercy. For Narayan, ‘the remedy is to create and develop forms of socialist living through the voluntary endeavour of the people rather than seek to establish socialism by the use of the power of the state.’19 The more of people’s or voluntary socialism and the less of state-enforced socialism, the fuller and more real the socialism. The student of political thought will agree with Narayan that the state Leviathan in state socialism is likely to undermine the freedom of the individual. Such a fear has been expressed before in socialist literature. Yet can people’s socialism be achieved by voluntary agency, and thus ensure freedom, equality, and brotherhood? The only answer that Narayan provides is developed elsewhere in his writings: (1) small village communities, self-governing and not subject to control from above, should be developed to achieve maximum economic and political decentralization; (2) a band of selfless workers must be prepared to live and move in the midst of the people and help them to reorganize their lives in a self-reliant way; and (3) vital, large mass movements, mass action of a non-violent character, uncon­ stitutional but at the same time peaceful, may be adopted.20 If we have the backing of the people, it should be possible to initiate such peaceful activity.2IVoluntary liquidation of the state is impracti­ cable; moreover, even more than in developed societies, under­ developed countries require the services of the state for develop­ ment, for maintaining law and order, and for preventing exploita­ tion of the weak by the strong, though it may readily be conceded that there are fields in which state compulsion is undesirable. The great value of Narayan’s ideas is not in the alternative they offer, but in their criticism of existing society: the acquisitive instinct must be

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curbed; greater decentralization of economic and political power must be achieved; economic inequalities must be reduced, and the domination of the state over the individual must be avoided. But people’s socialism is in our view a mirage just as much as state socialism is a step towards tyranny. To R. Lohia belongs the distinction of having contributed sig­ nificantly to the theory of socialism with special reference to under­ developed countries. In his thought-provoking essay, ‘The Doctri­ nal Foundation of Socialism’ ,22 Lohia propounds the idea that the concept of socialism must be developed, if it is to have an effective appeal, ipto an autonomous doctrine. From communism it has borrowed its economic aims, the establishment of social ownership over existing means of production, their further development, mass production, and some kind of a planned economy; and from capitalism, its non-economic and general aims, the preservation of national freedom, democracy, and human rights, and the securing of peace. ‘There must be,’ he says, ‘adequate doctrinal foundation of consistent logic that gives socialism an autonomous direction in thought and action.’ To explore once again the economic and the general aims of society and to integrate them should be, according to him, a high endeavour of socialist doctrine. According to Lohia the underdeveloped countries of the world cannot provide the capital necessary to initiate the system of largescale production required by both capitalism and communism. An investment of some Rs 300,000 crores ($43,000,000,000) would be required, as a beginning. In underdeveloped countries where savings are marginal, such an investment is impossible. The under­ developed countries, therefore, must evolve a new theory of socialism suited to their social and economic environment. Th» essence of such a theory is decentralized socialism through decentralization of technology and of political power. The small-unit machine run by electricity or oil is the answer. . . . This machine shall be available to hamlet and town as much as to city;. . . it shall be built on the principle of immediacy in operation and output; it shall not require a large capital investment. Such a machine .. .is the embodiment of the whole principle of decentralization, in space and in time, so as to avoid complexity and achieve immediacy. This machine will not only solve the economic problem of the underdeveloped world; it will also enable a new exploration and achievement of the general aims of society.23

Further, this immediacy in science and planning must be matched

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by immediacy in ownership and political control. Ownership of property by the state exclusively at the centre goes with mass production and is disastrous both for bread and freedom; property of appropriate types must be owned by the village and the province as much as the centre and co-operatives. In his Aspects o f Social Policy, Lohia conceives of a Four-Pillar State—the village, the district, the province, and the centre, all having defined functions and integrated in a system of functional federalism. Such a theory of socialism will, in Lohia’s view, make for the provision of bread (economic aim) and the achievement of real freedom (general aim). This is the direction, independent of the economic and general aims of capitalism and communism, in which socialism must move. Aldous Huxley has stated: ‘There is nothing in the results of disinterested scientific research which makes it inevitable that they should be applied for the benefit of centralized finance, industry and government.’24 And as Narayan has noted elsewhere, the dis­ covery of atomic energy has made more possible than ever before the dispersal of production and development of small technology, that is, technology appropriate to production in small units and by small-sized machinery.25 Constructive action, supplemented by peaceful resistance to injustice, is the appropriate form of action Lohia suggests. Electioneering activity—the ballot box—is neces­ sary but by itself inadequate to secure socialist objectives. The organization of the people’s will is of primary importance, and its expression through the vote or revolt or other appropriate forms is a secondary question of passing value. The party of socialism must have power and organization enough so that it can use them in the service of whatever action may be deemed appropriate at the time. In order that such power and organization may be built up, the party of socialism should continually strive to become a spokesman of the people, organizer of its will, resister against injustice, and accomplisher of reconstructions. It must be ready ever to take part in constructive action, to enlighten the popular verdict and be enlightened by it in turn, and to resist injustice: three modes of action already symbolized by the spade, the vote and the prison. Resis­ tance to injustice through peaceful methods, satyagraha, is necessary. Socialism must ever denounce the advocacy and organization of violence, though, as a last resort, the people may well choose to exercise their majesty of power so as to end the agony of the old and give birth to the new. This will be spontaneous violence of the people displayed only for a brief moment.26

Lohia is compelled to bow to violence (the hallmark of com­

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munism), though only for a brief moment. Narayan has criticised this idea:27has not Gandhi taught us that wrong means will not help us to attain the right end? There were critics of socialism too, such as Rajagopalachari, the last Governor-General of India and a lucid thinker. The basic defects of socialism, as he saw them, were that class struggle, the foundation of the socialist analysis, is no solution for unjust distribu­ tion, for class struggle means hatred, a fouling of the atmosphere, unhappiness for all and submission to the crudest type of tyranny at the end; self-alienation, that is, men selling their souls away to the state, is a great potential danger of socialism; there are no rights in the socialist countries except for those who agree with the dictator­ ial rule of a minority in control; management of business by state officials is notoriously inefficient; nepotism and corruption thrive in such conditions; there will be a totalitarian control of thought or of culture in a state which is run on the theory of complete economic state control of the citizen’s life. Rajagopalachari’s own remedy is to leave to private ownership the business of production, for experi­ ence has shown that there is no greater incentive than private ownership to stimulate work and production. What the state should do is to watch, and regulate production and distribution in order to prevent exploitation; by entering business it will be depriving itself of its governmental function.28 We shall now deal at some length with Jawaharlal Nehru’s con­ cept of socialism as it was he, after he became Prime Minister, who had the main responsibility for formulating the objectives and methods of achieving economic development. Presiding over the Indian National Congress at Lucknow in 1936, he said that he used the term socialism in the scientific economic sense: it involved vast and-revolutionary changes in the political and social structure, and the ending of vested interests in land and industry. It meant the ending of private property, except in a restricted sense and the replacement of the profit system by a higher ideal of co-operative service. Briefly it meant a new civilization radically different from the capitalist order. After he became Prime Minister and faced the practical problems of administration, and development of agriculture and industry, he somewhat modified his views. This can be seen clearly in his opposi­ tion to the resolution introduced by a member in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) in 1949 which stated: ‘This Assembly is of

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the opinion that the economic pattern of this country shall be a socialist economy.’29Nehru had by this time come round to the view that any method which worked and satisfied the masses could be used. This pragmatic approach, which I think is Nehru’s contribu­ tion to political thought in India, is clearly reflected in various speeches he delivered between 1948 and 1957 to the business community and in Parliament. It is not a question of theory, of communism or socialism or capitalism. It is a question of hard fact. .. .Our problem today is to raise the standard of the masses, supply them with their needs, give them the wherewithal to lead a decent life, and help them to progress and advance in life not only in regard to material things but in regard to cultural and spiritual things also. What will happen in the distant future I do not know, but I should like to set them on-the right road and I do not care what ism it is that helps me to set them on that road, provided I do it.30

He repeated these views in 1950.31 In specific terms, by pragmatic approach, Nehru meant that, first, production had to be raised before equitable distribution was considered, for unless something was produced, there was little to distribute. Second, nationalization, that is, state ownership and control of the means of production, was essential in defence and key industries such as power, and in other essential and very-eostly projects such as river valley schemes, which would be beyond the means of private enterprise. Third, in the case of other industries, it was better for the state to concentrate on certain specific vital new industries rather than go about nationalizing the many old ones, for large-scale nationalization would expend the state’s limited finan­ cial resources in the payment of compensation without necessarily expanding production. Fourth, the resulting economic situation would be a mixed economy providing for both a private sector, in which a regulated form of free enterprise would operate, and for an expanding public sector with state-owned and controlled industries. Fifth, with production adequately increased, equitable oppor­ tunities for growth must be provided for everyone and there must be equitable distribution of national wealth. Sixth, the changes indi­ cated above would be brought by the government taking the people into confidence, and through Parliament. The Resolution passed by the Indian National Congress at Avadi in 1955—on Nehru’s initiative—succintly sums up his views on socialism. In a socialistic society, the Resolution said, the principal

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means of production are under social ownership or control, production is progressively speeded up and there is equitable dis­ tribution of the national wealth.32 In the context of this discussion of socialist thought in India, the significant point to note is that while Nehru was essentially pragma­ tic in his economic thinking and was content with the social owner­ ship or control o f the principal means o f production, he reiterated his belief in socialism even as late as I960.33 It is clear that in Nehru’s pragmatic view of socialism, there are two distinct ele­ ments: it must reduce social and economic inequalities; and this can be done only by the state, which should nationalize some means of production and control the others to achieve the socialist objective. We may add that under Nehru’s leadership, Parliament adopted in December 1954 the ‘socialist pattern of society’ as the objective of social and economic policy. Nehru’s pragmatic approach to socialism was also followed by Indira Gandhi as is clear from her observations at a Seminar held at Rae Bareli on 22 April 1972: ‘Socialism did not mean wholesale nationalization . . . the Government would nationalize a particular industry only when it was essential’34 It will be relevant to note that the example set by the Soviet Union in planning her economic life also had a significant influence on the thinking of India’s political leaders. Nehru himself visited Russia in 1927 and was impressed by developments there, espe­ cially in education, the freedom enjoyed by women and the im­ provement in the lot of the peasants. In his Soviet Russia he wrote that the Russian experiment was of great interest to India because conditions there were not very dissimilar from conditions in India. Nehru’s Discovery o f India also shows that he was much impressed by the technique of planning adopted in the Soviet Union.35

Foreign Policy and Economic Development The facts relating to the Indian economy stated above as well as socialist thinking in the country, demanded planned economic de­ velopment if the living standards of the people were to be appreci­ ably raised. What are the ways in which foreign policy can help economic development in an underdeveloped country? Foreign policy has an impact on the economic development of an underdeveloped country in four ways: (1) it may help to secure

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foreign aid for economic development; (2) it may encourage or discourage the flow of foreign private capital; (3) it may, through foreign-trade policies and trade agreements, promote or retard exports with their impact on balance of payments as well as on economic growth; and (4) it may, through encouraging joint indus­ trial ventures with parties in other developing countries, give an impetus to increased production which would form an appreciable part of the contribution by the party undertaking to establish the industrial unit. The term ‘foreign aid’, economists have pointed out, is an am­ biguous one. The Development Assistance Committee of the Or­ ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development described it as the flow of long-term financial resources to less developed ' countries and multilateral agencies. Do all long-term financial re­ sources which flow to the less developed countries actually have an element of aid? ‘Strictly defined’, I. M.D. Little and J. M. Clifford write, ‘we believe it [aid] should refer only to the value of the subsidy implicit in the total flow of resources. Thus, grants of convertible currency are certainly aid to their full face value. But loans contain only an element of aid, sometimes an insignificant element. However, following the now accepted practice, we shall use the term “ foreign aid” to mean “ the nominal value of the direct and indirect flow of financial and other resources from governments of rich countries to those of poor countries*’ *36 Foreign aid would thus include both grants and loans. Our justification for accepting this meaning is that even the loans given by governments have a two-fold element of aid in them. First, the option to give the loans or not rests with governments. When the option is exercised in favour of a country, say India, there is an element of conscious assistance in the decision to give the loan; second, the rate of interest on the loans, varying as it does from zero to six per cent is usually less than that charged on commercial loans, for instance, by banks; this must also be reckoned an element of conscious assistance. An underdeveloped country needs for its development foreign aid in at least two forms. First, underdeveloped countries need capital. Their shortage of capital springs essentially from their poverty. India’s per capita in­ come in 1945-6 was Rs 198;37 poor societies are hardly likely to be able to save out of their meagre incomes all the capital needed for development. Even if a poor country tries to save to the maximum

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extent possible, it would still need foreign capital to rapidly moder­ nize its economy, for which it needs improved machinery and equipment. During the period of transformation of the traditional economy into a modem one, machinery worth more than the foreign exchange earned by exports, has to be imported. The amount of capital needed will depend essentially upon the absorp­ tive capacity of the country. The amount of external capital re­ quired to supplement domestic savings is only one factor; the economics of development—now a specialized branch of economics—also shows that the terms under which the external capital is made available (such as the interest charged and the period of repayment, whether the capital made available is tied to projects or to conditions which in effect necessitate the spending of the bulk of the aid in the country which gives the aid, irrespective of the economic cost of such conditions) are important considerations in the optimum utilization of the loans. It cannot be too strongly stressed that a large part of such capital should be available on terms which impose no great burden on the balance of payments of the recipient country. Again, the history of foreign aid to underde­ veloped countries during the last twenty years has shown that where economic growth has to be planned, the continuity of aid and an assurance of the amount which will be available over a period of time are essential for the efficient utilization of the capital made available. In computing the quantum of external capital made avail­ able, it is the net inflow to the recipient country which counts in economic growth, i. e. allowing for a reduction in the total inflow for the amounts needed for the repayment of capital in instalments and the interest due. It is agreed that external capital can only supplement, not supplant, local capital; unless the greater propor­ tion of capital for development comes from the efforts and sacrifices of the people of the developing countries, economic independence will be a mirage; and a people who have won political independence are unlikely to desire to give away their economic independence. Second, underdeveloped countries lack not only capital but tech­ nical know-how. They need skilled manpower, they lack technically- and scientifically-trained personnel as well as manage­ ment personnel, both at the higher and middle levels. ‘It is the failure of the human element’, said the Indian Minister of Interna­ tional Trade at the Conference on the Problems of Economic De­ velopment held at Cairo in July 1962,‘which in the ultimate analysis

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has been the bane of underdeveloped countries. If the history of the countries which have phenomenally progressed within the last fifteen years since the second world war is examined, one could see that those countries which had a well-built foundation and supply of specialized training and skilled manpower, were the first to catch up and accomplish accelerated rates of growth .’3# The skilled man­ power needs required can conceivably be met in two ways: a de­ veloping country can get from the developed countries a number of experts who would impart the know-how to specialists and trainees in the country concerned. It may be necessary also to send trainees abroad to enable them to study technical processes in an industrial setting. While the main objective must be to enable technicians from the underdeveloped country to apply and adapt the know-how learnt to the special conditions of that country, intensive knowledge of the technical processes developed in the industrialized country should be helpful even for such application and adaptation. Also, the flow of foreign private capital and enterprise is im­ portant in the context of economic growth for two reasons: it supplements the capital available from other sources such as loans and grants from foreign governments and the savings made in the country and channelled for investment; it also makes available advanced technological processes, the benefits of foreign research and managerial skills, for equity foreign capital invariably brings with it experienced entrepreneurship and the technical know-how necessary for setting up industries based on advanced technology. It may, in certain circumstances, improve the country’s foreign ex­ change position by increasing exports or by producing commodities which will replace imports. To the extent that it provides an added source of capital for economic growth, it also provides added em­ ployment, especially for the technically skilled. The government of the underdeveloped country may encourage the inflow of private foreign capital and enterprise in one or more of the following ways: it may provide that foreign investors shall, in matters related to their investments, not be subject to treatment less favourable than that accorded to national or other foreign investors in similar circumstances, and that they will be permitted after pay­ ment of taxes to transfer to their country profits, interest, dividends and royalities derived from their investments. Further, the govern­ ment may assure the investors that in the event of total or partial

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liquidation of a foreign investment in the country, the proceeds of such liquidation could be transferred without delay. Again, in the event of nationalization of a foreign concern in the national interest, the investor may be given the guarantee that the government of the country would pay fair and equitable compensation, and ensure the facility to transfer it without undue delay. Tax concessions to foreign firms affecting salaries, wealth tax and super tax, corporate taxes on income and royalties and the conclusion of double-taxation avoidance agreements with foreign countries are other measures which have been found useful to attract foreign capital and enter­ prise. While it is recognized that the participation of foreign capital and enterprise, particularly as regards industrial techniques and know­ ledge, will contribute to the rapid industrialization of the underde­ veloped country, care should be taken to see that such investment will not adversely affect the national interest, by regulating it suita­ bly. Thus it must be remembered that substantial foreign invest­ ment will, in time, lead to large dividend and interest payments with their repercussion on the balance-of-payments position of the coun­ try. Again, the major interest in ownership and effective direction should, as a rule, be in local hands and the training of suitable local personnel to replace foreign experts should be insisted upon. A bold and imaginative policy in regard to foreign trade and the conclusion of appropriate trade agreements should, in particular, promote exports and the earning of foreign exchange to pay for the maintenance imports and the import of capital goods essential for the development of basic and heavy industries. A study of the methods adopted by the developed countries of the world which have a large export trade such as Britain and Japan, should be helpful to the underdeveloped countries. For instance, Japan and Britain have established Export Houses with large resources and efficient organization which render excellent service. Market studies, quality control, attractive packaging and consumer satisfac­ tion become feasible when such Export Houses deal in bulk and on a large scale. Again, exports can be encouraged by linking the availability of foreign exchange for importing essential raw materi­ als and machinery, to the firm’s obligation to export a certain percentage of their quality production. Tax concessions, credit facilities and simplification of procedures are other ways by which such an imaginative commercial policy can give an incentive to

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exports. To service export operations, institutions like export pro­ motion councils linking government and industry, and export credit and guarantee corporations should be useful. Export promotion councils should be a useful medium for expanding existing markets, exploring new ones and introducing diversification in exports. Fi­ nally, payment arrangements in non-convertible currency or through the barter system should be explored to overcome the trade gap inevitable when a country is trying to modernize its industrial structure by importing a large volume of capital goods and know­ how. Finally, joint industrial ventures by a unit (public or private) from a relatively well-developed country with a unit in a relatively underdeveloped country give an impetus to increased production of capital and other goods in the former. To illustrate: the Malaysia Dairy Industries Ltd., Singapore, is a joint industrial venture in which Australia and Singapore participate in producing sweetened condensed milk and sterilized reconstituted milk.39 It has been reckoned that nine out of ten leading British chemical concerns are participating in joint ventures with Indian units.40 Collaboration in joint industrial ventures abroad has been recognized, as S. K. Verghese has pointed out in a stimulating article,41 as a new technique of export promotion; besides, if properly worked, it will also im­ prove the industrial image of the developing country. We say prop­ erly worked, for there are many problems to be looked into in order that the image may be a favourable one. The country which estab­ lishes the industrial venture must be sufficiently developed itself to do a good job; it must not seek majority participation in the industry as this is likely to smack of economic imperialism; it must take particular care to use all available local resources physical and human; it must be able to provide training facilities to local person­ nel so that the latter may take over as soon as circumstances permit. Given these conditions, joint ventures of the kind suggested should be a valuable adjunct to export promotion, provided that when the joint venture succeeds in establishing the industry in the underde­ veloped country on a sound basis, export to that country of the product will be restricted in the long run.

The Role o f Foreign A id Before we deal with the details of foreign aid which has accrued to

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India such as the amounts received, the principal donors, and the purposes for which the aid has been given and its utilization, it seems necessary to make three preliminary observations. First, the attitude of the Government of India to receiving foreign aid has been stated over and over again: they would welcome foreign aid, provided no strings were attached to it. Thus Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru told the Constituent Assembly on 8 March 1948, ‘We want the help of other countries; we are going to have it and we are going to get it too in a large measure.’42 He told the Lok Sabha on 12 June 1952: Other countries realize that we cannot be bought by money. It was then that help came to us; we shall continue to accept help provided there are no strings attached to it and provided our policy is perfectly clear and above board and is not affected by the help we accept. . . . If at any time help from abroad depends upon a variation, howsoever slight, in our policy, we shall relinquish that help completely and prefer starvation and privation to taking such help; and I think, the world knows it well enough.43

Government spokesmen expressed similar sentiments in 1972. On 14 February 1972, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, at a public meet­ ing at Jabalpur, reiterated her Government’s determination against accepting foreign aid with strings and said, ‘No country should even think of using aid to make India change its fundamental policies. If any country has such ideas, it is nurturing wrong notions.’44 Is it, in practice, possible to accept aid, and not be influenced at all by the donor’s views on the policies pursued by the government? It is interesting to recall that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru fore­ saw the risk. ‘I realize—I frankly admit’, he told the Lok Sabha, ‘that there are always certain risks involved. There may be no apparent risk but our sense of obligation might affect our policy without our knowing it. All I can say is that we should remain wide awake and try to pursue our policy consistently and honestly.’45 Does our experience justify Jawaharlal’s view that acceptance of foreign aid permits following an independent, consistent and honest policy? This is one of the fields in which evidence is hard to come by, for the issue is how far, exercise of overt pressure apart, our sense of obligation (to use Jawaharlal’s phrase) has subconsciously in­ fluenced the government towards those policies which would be favoured by the donor countries. We content ourselves with giving the opinion of an independent foreign scholar, who, after studying such evidence as was available, observed that ‘on the foreign policy

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front, while pressures have been extensive, it is clear that aid has made no significant impact though it may have encouraged some modification in certain instances. Pressures have undoubtedly in­ creased on this front since the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, but the impact on India’s foreign policy approach and military emphasis seems negligible. 46 One instance he cites is India’s failure to recog­ nize East Germany: ‘India’s failure to officially recognize East Germay is generally assumed to be the result of the West German policy of making aid conditional on non-recognition. There has never been any significant public debate on this issue and one may there­ fore assume that Indian leaders do not feel that any important point of principle is at stake.’47 It is true that, as Eldridge points out, policies have been substantially altered subject to pressures of various types; however, there is no evidence to show that India has made any changes she considers to be against her interests, simply in order to receive aid. This is even more true in the sphere of foreign policy where sovereignty is quite clearly asserted 48 Second, there is one serious difficulty in making a quantitative estimate of the impact of foreign aid on economic development: the economic development of an underdeveloped country—indeed of any country—is a function not only of foreign policy, but, also, and more important, of domestic factors; and it is difficult to separate the effects of the one from the effects of thfe other. Thus, assuming that a friendly foreign policy is able to secure abundant loans from abroad its full utilization depends largely upon efficient and know­ ledgeable administration, which may be hampered, among other things, by bureaucratic procedures. While a quantitative study of the impact may be difficult until economists apply their mind to this aspect of the problem, it is possible to indicate broadly some changes in the economy which may be clearly traced to foreign aid and commercial policy. Third, we should like to dispel the widely prevalent notion that a non-aligned foreign policy enables a country to get more foreign aid than an aligned country, for, so the argument runs, the nonaligned country can get aid from both the parties to the cold war. One fact should dispel such a notion: the aid per capita to India on an average in 1962 and 1963 was only 1.8 U.S. dollars as against Pakistan’s 4.4 U.S. dollars49 Even granting that India’s aid needs in absolute figures are so vast that it cannot expect to get the same per capita aid as Pakistan, non-alignment has certainly not enabled it to get more than an aligned nation.

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We may now consider the amount, the principal donors, the purposes and utilization of the foreign aid received. The latest report in the series entitled External Assistance issued by the Minis­ try of Finance gives the following break-up of the aid received in various forms from its inception to 31 March 1973:50

A. Loans B. Grants C. Other assistance including PL 480 imports, PL 665 imports, third-country products

Authorization Utilization (in millions of rupees) 107,928.2 92,428.1 9,467.1

9,002.4

23,158.0

22,764.8

External Assistance also shows that India received foreign aid from various countries, international agencies and other organiza­ tions. Twenty-four countries are listed in addition to international agencies like the United Nations, World Bank and International Development Association, and other organizations like the Ford Foundation. The twenty-four countries are distributed over all the continents except Africa; they cover aligned countries like U.S.A. and Great Britain, and non-aligned countries like Yugoslavia, communist countries like the U.S.S.R. and Poland, and non­ communist countries like France and Sweden. The largest amount of aid has come from the U.S.A., followed by West Germany, Britain and the U.S.S.R. Some items of aid are tied to projects; the most well-known are the amounts provided by the U.S.S.R, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany for the Bhilai steel plant, Durgapur steel works and Rourkela steel plant respectively. The emphasis during the last few years has been on seeking non-project assistance. Non-project aid enables the country to finance imports of specific items needed to sustain her industrial manufacturing programme. Besides, as External Assistance points out, the higher content of non-project aid in total aid in recent years has enabled the Government to improve the pace of utilization of foreign aid.51 The purposes for which the aid has been given cover, among other things, steel works, railway development, equipment for power and irrigation projects, port equipment, transport and com­ munication, machine-tool factories, fertilizer plants, ship-building

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machinery and exploration and development and production of all gas. A few loans are free of interest such as some loans from Canada.52 On the bulk of the loans, the interest charged ranges from % per cent to eight per cent per annum. The repayable period ranges from five to fifty years, in some cases with an initial moratorium of five to ten years. Several questions arise regarding the foreign aid asked for and received by India: Have we made a rational choice with regard to the nature, terms and conditions of external assistance'53,e.g.would it not have been possible to get the loans on a minimum interest, say of 2V2 per cent repayable over the longest period possible, say fifty years? Should not efforts have been made to get more generalpurpose loans instead of tied loans, and with the freedom to buy the essential capital goods in the cheapest market? (Lloyd D. Black calculates that nearly 90 per cent of the annual appropriation of the Agency for International Development is transferred to U.S. firms and private organizations for goods and services supplied to the underdeveloped areas).54 Could the impact of external assistance have been more favourable than it has been so far ‘if your planning process were more rational?’55 Such questions seem pointless be­ cause of the limited options available to a country anxious to hasten its pace on the road to economic development. A more fruitful question to raise is, has the foreign aid asked for and received been adequate and used to optimum advantage? P.N. Dhar, formerly Director of the Institute of Economic Growth, writes that ‘a critique’ of the government’s policies will certainly indicate that sometimes resources have been used less productively than was ideally possible.’56 I.M.D. Little and JM . Clifford find that India has considerably under-estimated the amount of aid needed for her plans. The other side of this coin is that she has consistently over-estimated the amount of industrial and infrastructural investment which she could under­ take with the foreign exchange resources available. This tendency has been buttressed by planning to do without aid in too short a time, with the consequent determination to build more capacity for import-substitution, in a somewhat indiscriminate manner, than was possible with the aid available in the period. This has resulted in costly interruptions to schemes initiated, and a low productivity of capital.57

Stanley Katz does not agree that the external resources were inadequate and holds that in the decade 1951-61, the substantial

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volume and considerable variety of assistance received by India made an important quantitative and qualitative contribution to the economic growth and development of the decade.58 He also esti­ mates that, quantitatively, external assistance contributed 6 per­ centage points of the 44 per cent growth realized by the Indian economy during the decade. Economists are wont to disagree among themselves; we do not feel competent to pronounce on the validity of the one conclusion or the other. Three points can, how­ ever, be safely made. First, at the critical level, external assistance has enabled India to develop heavy industries like steel and an infrastructure of power and transport, which would not have been otherwise possible, sim­ ply because the equipment and the know-how were not available in India (even if India had adequate domestic savings to purchase it). Second, it is a fact that the terms on which India contracted external debts during the earlier years (during the Second Plan period and early period of the Third Plan) were somewhat stiff, increasing the cost of debt servicing considerably, as will be seen from the table. Period 1 1965-6 1966-7 1967-8 1968-9 1969-70

Gross aid (bans) 2

Debt payments

Net aid

3

4(2-3)

784 675 824 752 733

227 275 333 375 413

557 400 491 377 320

The significance of this fact cannot be overlooked: the inflow of net aid has been declining rapidly due to larger debt-servicing charges; in 1969-70 the net aid was only 3200 million rupees, though the total loans were of the order of 7330 million rupees.59 The high cost of the foreign debt-servicing charges may be brought home in another way. The targeted export figure for the Fifth Plan (1974-9) was Rs. 12,580 crores,60 out of which it has been calcu­ lated, Rs. 2557 crores or 20.33 per cent of the total export earnings will have to be set apart for debt-servicing.61 Thirdly, evidence points to the fact that there has been lack of proper project planning, which resulted perhaps in avoidable delays

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in the utilization of the loans which had been authorized. In the table, the difference between the amount authorized and the amount utilized is about Rs. 16,358 million; this gap is partly explained by inadequate project planning. The Estimates Commit­ tee of the Lok Sabha points out, for instance, that the utilization of the credits authorized by USAID in March and May 1963 was delayed for several months for reasons such as delays in the finalization of specifications and of procurement orders and con­ tracts for want of drawings.62 This is not a solitary instance.63 The strictures of the Rao Committee, appointed in 1964 to look into the causes of the slow utilization of authorized funds, are worth quot­ ing: We have been impressed by the fact that the projects included in the lists put forward to the Consortium are often not ready for immediate im­ plementation in the event of funds being available. In fact, there is a dearth of well conceived projects for which all the necessary preparations have been made for the placing of orders as soon as foreign exchange becomes available.64

It is true, as Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Padma Desai have pointed out, some allowance must be made for the fact that in a developing country learning by doing takes time;65 but the fact that the Rao Committee had to make such comments, after some eleven years of planning, suggests that the learning could have been quicker.

The Impact o f Foreign Private Capital The flow of foreign private capital to India has been relatively small in volume. The Finance Minister declared in the Rajya Sabha that the foreign capital in India at the end of March 1963 amounted to Rs. 694 crores and it increased to Rs. 1298 crores in March 1970.66 Government policy in respect to foreign investment is laid down in the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948, the Prime Minister’s statement in Parliament on 6 April 1949 on foreign investments in India, and the Industrial Policy Resolution of 30 April 1956. The main points which emerge from these policy statements are: 1. The Government recognizes that participation of foreign capi­ tal and enterprise, particularly as regards industrial techniques and knowledge, will be of value for the rapid industrialization of the country. 2. Existing foreign interests would be accorded national treat­

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ment; Government do not intend to place any restrictions or impose any conditions which are not applicable to similar Indian enter­ prises. 3. New foreign capital would be encouraged: Government would so frame their policy as to enable further foreign capital to be invested in India on terms and conditions that are mutually advan­ tageous. 4. Scrutiny and approval by the Central Government of every individual case of participation of foreign capital and management in industry is necessary. 5. As a rule, the major interest in ownership and effective con­ trol should always be in Indian hands; but power will be granted to deal with exceptional cases in a manner calculated to serve the national interest. 6. The training of suitable Indian personnel for the purpose of eventually replacing foreign experts will be insisted upon. 7. Profits and remittances abroad would be allowed as would capital remittances of concerns compulsorily acquired. 8. Fair compensation would be paid if and when foreign enter­ prises are compulsorily acquired.67 Studies made of the manufacturing and other industries which have grown under the scheme of encouraging private foreign capital have come to the following conclusions:68of the foreign investments in India in March 1968 (amounting to Rs. 1542.8 crores) those in manufacturing industries totalled 821.6 (53 per cent); these in­ cluded textile products, machinery and machine tools, metals and metal products, electrical goods and machinery, and chemicals and allied products. Plantations, mining and petroleum account for Rs 328.5 crores (some 22 per cent); service industries (construction utilities and transport, trading and financial institutions) accounted for Rs 393 crores, i.e. 25 per cent of the total foreign investments.69 Much of the investment has moved into the newer technologically-intensive industries and patent-protected indus­ tries such as the chemical and pharmaceutical industry which attract 29 per cent of the foreign investments in manufacturing industries, or light electrical and engineering goods where large profits and an assured international market have exercised a magnetic pull on foreign investments; few foreign private investors have a stake in capital-intensive projects such as steel mills, heavy-electrical machinery or heavy-transport equipment. It has also been ob­

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served that most new foreign private enterprises cater primarily to the internal market, little of their product being available for ex­ ports. Finally, although the volume of foreign private investment has been modest, it has provided an added source of capital for economic growth and has also brought in the application of superior methods of production as well as increased production in many spheres of industry. One final point under this head merits notice; we mentioned earlier that the flow of private foreign capital to India has been quantitatively small. Two reasons were suggested for this by the Commerce and Industries Minister in his address to the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry in 1955. First, about the low returns to capital in India as compared to possible returns else­ where, the Minister said: In a country with a low standard of living, very high marginal rates of profits are not possible in any industry. . . . Owing to these reasons, India might remain for quite a number of years unattractive to the venture capital. But his is a matter on which we can do nothing.70

A second reason was suspicion. The Minister said: If behind the foreign investor or would-be investor there js a feeling that by starting ventures in this country the market for home production will ultimately suffer or there is a hesitation to entrust the Indian concerns with the know-how for a period of years, I cannot help feeling that there is an atmosphere of suspicion.71

A third reason is the existence of a number of controls and allocation procedures which, it is felt, act as a major inhibiting factor to the smooth flow of private investment. The then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, in her address to the Economic Club of New York on 30 March 1966, admitted the existence of this inhibiting factor and agreed with the plea for a rationalization and simplification of procedures for operating these controls. She added, ‘In this area (controls), wherever the supply situation has improved, such as in steel or cement, we have loosened the allocation procedures. We have also undertaken a number of steps to streamline the approval mechanism.’72

Foreign Trade Policy On foreign trade as an instrument of growth, the main facts may be

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summarised as follows:73 during the period of the First Five-Year Plan, 1951-6, not much attention was paid to export promotion. The First Plan contained the following statement: ‘In periods of relatively easy foreign exchange supplies, the need for export promotion will be less evident.’ Basically, the availability of a large quantum of foreign exchange resources in the shape of the sterling balances inherited by India in 1947 led the government into under­ rating the importance of the adoption of early measures for conserv­ ing available foreign exchange resources and augmenting them. The result of such underrating was evident during the Second Five Year Plan. That Plan, it will be recalled, ‘envisaged heavy investment in creating the capital infrastructure and laying the foundations for a sustained growth of economy to be achieved by 1970.’ The sterling balances were deflated and in 1957, balance of payments became a serious problem. The following criticism o f the government’s trade policy is well-merited: ‘over the decade 1951-61, the country neglected the serious balance-of-tradequestion and the official policy hardly suggested the use of trade as an important factor in facing the deteriorating foreign-exchange situation at home or in countering the swiftly-shifting balances in the world-trade scene. Further, there was little appreciation of the correlation of foreign trade with other vital sectors such as shipping facilities, financing, and other servicing institutions. No thought was applied to the important role which sales personnel and organiza­ tions played in developing exports. In fine, not much was expected from trade as an instrument of economic growth during the first decade of planning, nor were efforts made in that direction except­ ing on an ad hoc basis. There was hardly any aggressive export policy. The planning betrayed a lack of design and perspective.’74 Learning from this experience, more rational import and export policies were evolved during the next decade. Imports of nonessential items for consumption were cut down and the items which were required for import substitution and export promotion were liberalized; the import policy was completely oriented towards securing the essential items needed for economic development and for stimulating exports.75 The essential features of this export policy were spelt out in the Export Policy Resolution of the Government of India dated 30 July 1970..76 We give below the main features of the resolution under eight heads:

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1. Increase in export-oriented production. A steady increase in export earnings is dependent on the continuous development and expansion of export-oriented production. The aim of such de­ velopment should be the promotion of economic efficiency, diversification of production and utilization of skilled and unskilled manpower. In agriculture, horticulture, sericulture, forestry, fisheries, minerals, textiles, chemical and engineering industries, etc., new areas of growth and product adaptation will be identified. For instance, in agriculture, the production of cash crops such as cashew kernels will be developed further through increased provi­ sion of requisite inputs including irrigation, fertilizers and improved seeds; in the mineral sector, iron ore being one of our principal exchange-eamers, investment in the development of mines and in processing the new ore for export is called for. Every effort will be made to assist export-oriented units in the private and public sectors to achieve economies of scale, improve efficiency of production, reduce costs and adapt production to meet the requirements of their customers abroad. To this end, the proce­ dures relating to foreign investment, licensing of creation or expan­ sion of industrial capacity and licensing of import of capital goods and raw materials or other inputs will be suitably adapted. Every effort will be made to secure that indigenous industrial raw materi­ als required for export production are made available in the right quality and quantity, and at fair prices. In order to encourage export-oriented production, the investor must have the assurance that export policies will be reasonably stable and that production for exports would be advantageous to the producer. To this end, export policies should enjoy a degree of stability at least over the period of the Fourth Plan. 2. Quality control.11 As the quality of production for export needs special attention, Government will strengthen, expand and intensify its policy of compulsory quality-control and pre-shipment inspection. 3. Restraints on domestic consumption1B Exportable surpluses do not always arise automatically. Sometimes when there is a short­ fall in production or indigenous production on an adequate scale is yet to be developed, there tends to be a temporary conflict between domestic consumption and export. Since export markets once lost can hardly be regained, a part of the production must always be made available to earn needed foreign exchange through, if neces­

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sary, temporary restraints on home consumption. 4. Marketing,79 Export marketing and product development have now become highly specialized disciplines. Our efforts to improve marketing research, to build up marketing skills and to train export managers will be intensified and expanded. To help in speedy marketing, Government proposes to improve shipping facilities; to intensify its efforts to expand the national merchant marine fleet, to start new services and to strengthen existing ones, as may be necessary for the development of our trade. 5. Finance for production and marketing.80 Provision of ade­ quate and timely finance is indispensable both for export product­ ion and export marketing. Packing and post-shipment credits are already being provided on concessional terms by commercial banks with the support of the Reserve Bank of India, while the Export Credit and guarantee corporation provides credit insurance facilities. Every effort will be made to strengthen and expand these credit arrangements and to strengthen the framework of financial institutions for the purpose. 6. Efforts to modify the commercial policies followed by indus­ trialized countries.81 Developing countries like India face various tariff and non-tariff barriers in the markets of developed countries on account of the commercial policies followed by these countries; Government proposes to concentrate its efforts on securing speedy modification of these policies, especially by implementation of the resolution adopted by the Second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in New Delhi for the institution by indus­ trialized countries of a system of generalized non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences in favour of the products of de­ veloping countries. 7. The role o f the public sector.*2The role of the public sector in the development and expansion of our foreign trade will be ex­ panded progressively and substantially. Its competence to pene­ trate new markets and to market new products as well as to provide merchandizing service^ to Indian producers will be built up. 8. Adequate export performance a national goal.83 A steady growth of export earnings can be achieved only if adequate export performance is accepted as a national goal of very high priority. The Central Government is committed to vigorously pursuing approp­ riate policies to this end. A similar commitment is necessary from state governments, local bodies and all the sectors of the economy

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and the sections of society vitally concerned with the export effort. Several institutions (some of them mentioned in the export policy resolution) have since been built up or strengthened in order to stimulate exports. These include the Trade Development Authority (to provide package assistance to export firms), the Export Credit and Guarantee Corporation, Export Promotion Councils, the State Trading Corporation and the Minerals and Metal Trading Corpora­ tion. The Export Policy Resolution and institutions apart, bilateral trade agreements have been entered into, stipulating payment ar­ rangements through non-convertible rupees. These payment ar­ rangements have helped to increase the volume of exports, particu­ larly to the countries of Eastern Europe. Exports to this region have risen from about Rs 9 crores during 1951-2 to Rs 308 crores in 1969-70.84 The cumulative effect of the measures taken after 1960 is ap­ parent in the export performance from 1968 onwards. According to an article in the Hindustan Times, at Rs 1360 crores, exports during 1968-69 exceeded the previous year’s total by Rs 161 crores, or about 13.5 per cent. This increase reflects the progress of the national search for new markets or markets for new pro­ ducts abroad. Our export trade is undergoing a two-fold diversification. More of the products of our industry are breaking into the list of export merchandise and we are selling to more and more countries.*3

The export figures for the period 1969-75 are given below: 1969-70 1970-1 1971-2 1972-3 1973-4 1974-5

Rs in crores 1413.3 1535.2 1608.2 1970.8 2483.2 3298.6

The performance must be considered as, on the whole, hopeful.

The Promotion o f Joint Industrial Enterprises We have already noted earlier the value of joint industrial enter­ prises in giving impetus to an increase in the export of capital goods and, therefore, to increased production of capital goods in the

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country which offers to set up an industrial unit in another country (in collaboration with a local unit). Other advantages offered by such joint industrial enterprises are that they improve prospects for continued exports of components and spare parts, raw materials, etc.; they widen the knowledge of recipient countries about India’s ability to co-operate in other areas of industrialization, and help in building up its image as an industrial nation; they provide oppor­ tunities for gathering first-hand market information from foreign countries and widen the area of contacts; by creating fresh avenues for export, they help in the utilization of idle capacity in capitalgoods industries and the consequent reduction of cost and prices. The challenge of operating in foreign countries under the pressure of keen competition will increase the efficiency of our industries in both marketing and production. Industries cushioned by high pro­ tection are likely to be indifferent to research and development. The high cost of production and the relatively poor quality of some of our products are to a great extent due to this lack of healthy competition within the country.88 In 1964 the Government of India began exploring possibilities of encouraging joint industrial enterprises in other developing coun­ tries; it could not have thought of them earlier as the country had to reach a certain stage of industrial growth, including diversification of its industrial structure, before such ventures could become feasi­ ble. They have laid down the following guidelines in considering proposals for setting up joint industrial ventures abroad: 1. Indian investment abroad is limited to the supply of indigenous machineries, equipments, tools, structural, etc. required for industrial ventures. 2. Cash remittances for investment are not permitted. 3. Normally only minority participation by Indian parties, i.e. up to 49 per cent is eiicouraged. 4. Schemes in which Indian parties are in a position to supply machinery, plants, equipments, etc. worth more than their equity participation in the industrial venture are given preference because the excess machinery, etc. could be sold straightaway for cash. 5. Capital-goods exported should be of Indian make. Second-hand or reconditioned machinery is not allowed for export against Indian invest­ ment, as it is feared that this might eventually bring India a bad name. 6. Joint Ventures, in which association of local parties in the host coun­ tries and also local development banks, financial institutions and govern­ ments of the host countries is forthcoming, receive consideration on a priority basis.

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7. As far as possible, Indian industrialists are advised to propose turn­ key jobs, as this will lighten the responsibilities of foreign enterprises. 8. Indian parties providing training facilities in India to nationals of the host country are preferred. 9. An outline of the proposed scheme for investment should be sent to the Government of India for approval.89

By 1 January 1976, over 233 joint venture projects had been accorded sanctions by the Government of India. Of these, sixty-five projects had gone into production; sixty-eight were in various stages of implementation. The remaining 100 projects remained unim­ plemented or were abandoned.90 Collaboration covers a wide range from the manufacture of tex­ tiles (cotton, jute, synthetic fibres and wool), hardboard, aluminium sheet-rolling, chemical and pharmaceutical products, pipes, cycle tyres and tubes and air-conditioners, to the making of tractors, trucks, scooters, automobile components, diesel engines and other engineering products.91 Most of these joint ventures take place in the developing countries of Asia and Africa92 and a few in de­ veloped countries like the U.S.A., West Germany, Canada and Great Britain. That the large majority of them are found in develop­ ing countries is understandable: they consider India’s experience in technological development useful in the context of their economic situation (neither very sophisticated nor capital-intensive, but labour-intensive). AN ASSESSMENT

We have seen how the demands of economic development have been an important factor in the evolution of India’s foreign policy of non-alignment and friendship with all countries. We have seen, too, that they led to the evolution of a foreign economic policy including the seeking of foreign aid, the encouragement of private foreign capital, the evolution of a foreign trade policy and the encourage­ ment of joint industrial ventures. One more question arises from this analysis: were these foreign policies able to meet the needs of economic development? It is clear that the hope entertained in the Second Five Year Plan that a self-sustaining economy would be achieved by 1970 was too op­ timistic; we are far from the goal. According to the Planning Com­

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mission, ‘Foreign aid net of debt charges and interest payments will be reduced to about half by the end of the Fourth Plan (i.e. 1974) compared to the current level.’93 According to Manubhai Shah, a former Commerce Minister, ‘it would be somewhere in 1982 when we may be able to extinguish the size of our foreign assistance.’94 Even at the beginning of 1972, political leaders were talking of limiting foreign aid to the critical sectors of the economy and becoming self-reliant. Indira Gandhi, for instance, when Prime Minister said, ‘while we shall not deny ourselves such friendly assis­ tance as will enable us to strengthen critical sectors of the economy, we shall redraw our economic programmes and mobilize our mater­ ial and intellectual resources so as to be able to do without foreign aid.* In the final analysis, it should be clear even to the pessimist that the Indian economy, with external assistance varying from 5.9 per cent in the First Plan to 17 per cent in the Third Plan,95 has moved forward appreciably. A distinguished economist, P.S. Lokanathan, writes that India is poised for rapid development. Sufficient over­ heads have been created, sufficient basic industries have been estab­ lished, and, as for technical personnel, the country has an edge over many other developing countries.96 The fact that India is venturing out to establish joint ventures in other developing countries and that she is able to compete in world tenders (in 1967, she secured an order for the supply of railway wagons to South Korea)97 is evidence that economic development has progressed reasonably well.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. Dorothy Norman, Nehru: The First Sixty Years, Vol. II (London: The Bodley Head, 1965), pp. 553-4. 2. Government of India, Planning Commission, The First Five Year Plan (Delhi, 1952), p. 157. 3. Ibid., p. 254. 4. Ibid., p. 264.

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5. Ibid., p. 250. 6. Ibid., pp. 420-1. 7. Sec for comparative figures relating to health in U.S.A., Britain and India, ibid, pp. 488-9. 8. Ibid., p. 525. 9. Ibid., pp. 593-4. 10. Statistical Outline o f Indian Economy, compiled by V.G. Kulkami. 11. The First Five Year Plan, p. 8. 12. ‘We do not understand socialism. We have never studied it. We do not go by dogmas and doctrines.' Lajpat Rai, The Call to Young India (Madras, 1920), PP. 83-5. 13. Jawaharlal Nehru, Toward Freedom: The Autobiography o f Jawaharlal Nehru (New York, 1942), p. I3y. 14. J.S. Bright ed., Important Speeches and Writings o f Subhas Bose (Lahore, 1947), pp. 102-4. 15. Ibid. 16. Harijan, 13 July 1947, p. 232. 17. This analysis of J.P. Narayan’s ideas is based on the ideas presented in From Socialism to Sarvodaya, 2nd ed. (Kashi, 1959). Students of Indian politics arc aware that there has been an evolution in J. P. Narayan’s thinking: from being a Marxist, he came to believe in democratic socialism (he was Secretary of the Congress Socialist Party founded in 1934 and later a member of the Pr^ja Socialist Party). In October 1957, he addressed a letter to his ‘Colleagues ol the Praja Socialist Party and to the public generally’ explaning why he had decided to withdraw from party politics and also giving the evolution of his own social philosophy. From Socialism to Sarvodaya gives the text of this letter and the statement of his own social philosophy: that democratic socialism as founded on a centralized democratic State to usher in and maintain socialism as a way of life is inadequate to achieve freedom and equality which are the essentials of a just social order. 18. Narayan, From Socialism to Sarvodaya, p. 32. 19. Ibid., p. 39. 20. See ‘Reconstruction of Indian Policy’ in Bimal Prasad (ed.), Socialism, Sar­ vodaya and Democracy: Selected Works o f Jayaprakash Narayan (Bombay, 1964). 21. Narayan, Socialism, Sarvodaya and Democracy, pp. 100-18. 22. Ram Manohar Lohia, Marx, Gandhi and Socialism (Hyderabad, 1953), pp. 320-49. 23. Ibid. 24. Aldous Huxley, Science, Liberty and Peace (London: Chatto & Windus, 1947), p. 22. 25. Narayan, From Socialism to Sarvodaya, p. 42. 26. Lohia, Marx, Gandhi and Socialism, pp. 320-49. 27. Narayan, From Socialism to Sarvodaya, p. 113. 28. Satyam Eva Jayate: A Collection o f Articles contributed to Swarajya and Other Journals from 1956 to 1961 by C. Rajagopalachari, vol. 1 (Madras, 1961,) pp. 464-7; vol. II, pp. 792-4. 29. Our italics.

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30. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, vol. I, 2nd ed. (Delhi: The Publications Division, Government of India, 1958), pp. 140-3. 31. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1949-53, 2nd Imp. (Delhi: The Publications Division, Government of India, 1957), pp. 13— 8. 32. Our italics. 33. R.K. Karanjia, The Mind o f Mr. Nehru, p. 57. 34. The Sunday Standard, 23 April 1972. 35. Nehru, The Discovery of India. 36. I.M. Little and J.M. Clifford, International Aid (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1965), p. 13. 37. Ministry of Commerce, Government of India, National Income of Indian Pro­ vinces 1945-46 (New Delhi, 1949). 38. Foreign Affairs Record (hereafter FAR), vol. VII, pp. 152-6. 39. Asian Industry, Singapore, August 1967. 40. J. Batliwala, ‘Impact of Foreign Private Capital on Indian Economic Develop­ ment’, in Impact o f Foreign Aid on Indian Economic Development (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1968), p. 26. 41. ‘Joint Industrial Ventures’, tn Foreign Trade Review, vol. IV, No. 1, pp. 66-90. 42. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, p. 35. 43. Ibid., p.63. 44. The Hindu, 15 February 1972. 45. India's Foreign Policy. 46. P.J. Eldridge, The Politics o f Foreign Aid in India (Delhi: Vikas, 1969), pp. 175-6. 4 7 .'Ibid., p. 266. 48. Ibid., p. 64. East Germany Recognition India has, since then, accorded full diplomatic recognition to East Germany, on 8 October 1972. The two govern­ ments simultaneously raised on that day the status of their diplomatic represen­ tation to embassy level—set Asian Recorder, October 21-7,1972, p. 11050. It is known that in 1966, the World Bank attempted to pressurize the Govern­ ment of India to change economic policies in regard to foreign private invest­ ment and the greater use of the private sector for economic development, if aid were to be sanctioned; it is also known that devaluation of the rupee was adopted in June 1966 under heavy pressure from the World Bank. See Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Padma Desai, India, Planning for Industrialization (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 487. 49. P.S. Lokanathan, ‘Foreign Aid and Economic Development’, in A. Appadorai (ed.), India: Studies in Social and Political Development 1947-1967 (Bombay: Asia, 1968), p. 142. 50. Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Delhi, External Assistance: 1971 -72 & 72-73, 1974, pp. 155-7. 51. Ibid., 1968-69 and 1969-70, p. 1. 52. Ibid., 1971-72 and 72-73, pp. 40-1. 53. Impact o f Foreign Aid on Indian Economic Development, p. xiv. 54. Lloyd D. Black, The Strategy o f Foreign Aid (Princeton, 1968), p. vi. 55. Impact o f Foreign Aid on Indian Economic Development, p. xiii. 56. P.N. Dhar, ‘Achievements and Failures of the Indian Economy’, in India: Studies in Social and Political Development, p. 117.

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57. Little and Clifford, International Aid, pp. 228-9. 58. S. Stanley Katz, External Assistance and Indian Economic Growth (Bombay: Asia, (1968) p. 62. 59. External Assistance, 1968-69 and 1969-70, p. 1 60. Government of India, Planning Commission, Draft Fifth Five Year Plan, 1974-79, Vol. I, 1974, p. 80. 61. Ibid., p. 74. 62. Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Eleventh Report o f the Estimates Committee, 1967-68, p. 124. 63. See the Eleventh Report o f the Estimates Committee for further instances. 64. Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Report o f the Committee on Utiliza­ tion o f External Assistance (New Delhi, 1964), p. 8. 65. Bhagwati and Desai, India, Planning for Industrialization (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 194. 66. Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha Official Report^ 16 November 1971; Hindustan Times, 17 November 1971. 67. Constituent Assembly o f India (Legislative) Debates Official Report (hereafter CAILD) vol. V, pp. 3296-7; CAILD part II, vol. IV, pp. 2385-6. 68. ‘Impact of Foreign Private Capital on Indian Economic Development’, in Impact o f Foreign Aid on Indian Economic Development, pp. 11-27; ‘India’s International Investment Position in 1967-68’, Reserve Bank o f India Bulletin, March 1971, pp. 352-93. 69. See Table in Reserve, Bank o f India Bulletin, March 1971, p. 374. 70. Hindu, 13 December 1955. 71. Ibid. 72. FAR, vol. XII, No. 3, March 1966, p. 81 73. See the informative article by R.L. Sharma, Director, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, in Foreign Trade Review, vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 164-75. 74. Ibid. 75. ‘The present import policy reinforces the link between imports and exports, to provide more facilities to those who export more and to discourage imports by those whose contribution to the export is inadequate.’ ‘Export Effort of India’, by H.D. Shourie, paper prepared for the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, New Delhi, p. 7. 76. Export Policy Resolution {Debates, Fourth Series), paras 1,4,5, 9,11,12 and 23, XLII, p. 238 77. Ibid.. para 16. 78. Ibid., para 17. 79. Ibid., paras 18 and 24. 80. Ibid., para 22. 81. Ibid.. paras 27 and 28. 82. Ibid., para 21. 83. Ibid., para 33. 84. Foreign Trade Review, October-December 1971, p. 265. 85. V. Balasubramaniam, Editor, Eastern Economist, in Hindustan Times, 11 July 1969. 86. Government of India, Economic Survey, 1971-72, pp. 140-1; ibid., 73-74 p. 99; 74-75, p. 103.

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87. Statistics published by DGCIS, Calcutta, quoted by Deepak Nayyar, ‘Indian Export Performance in the 1970s\EPW, vol. XI, no. 20,15 May 1976, p. 733 (table 3). 88. See S.K. Verghese, ‘Joint Industrial Ventures’, in Foreign Trade Review, vol. IV, no. 1, pp. 75-6. 89. Statesman, 23 August 1969. 90. S.P.Godrej,4India’s Rightful Place in World Trade*,Foreign Trade Review, vol. X, no. 4 {UNCTAD-IV Special Number) January-March 1976, p. 400. See also Ram Gopal Agarwal. ‘Indian Industrial Joint Ventures Abroad’, Journal o f Industry and Trade, vol. XXVI,no. 7, July 1976,p. l0;SA.Somwanshi,‘Indian Joint Ventures AbroacT, The Indian Journal o f Commerce, vol. XXIX, part 1, no. 106, March 1976, pp. 37-46; A.P. Gupta,‘Indian Industrial Joint Ventures Abroad’, The Indian Journal o f Commerce, pp. 65-8. 91. Nabagopal Das, ‘Joint Ventures Abroad’, The Statesman, 7 December 1971. 92. By 31 March 1976,116 joint ventures had been approved for establishment in Asian and African countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thai­ land, and Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia. More than 45 of them had already been established by that time. Set Journal o f Industry and Trade, July 1976, pp. 64-7. 93. Government of India, Planning Commission, Fourth Five Year Plan 1969-74, p. 14. 94. Manubhai Shah in ‘Development Without Aid’, National Council of Applied Economic Research, 1966, p. 67. 95. Excluding food aid. See P.S. Lokanathan, ‘Foreign Aid and Economic De­ velopment’ in India: Studies in Social and Political Development, p. 139. 96. Ibid., p. 142. 97. The total value of the order was Rs 8,25,00,000. The countries which had tendered unsuccessfully for the order, according to a report, were Japan, the U.S.A., France, Britain, Belgium, and West Germany. Hindustan Times, 28 August 1967.

CHAPTER

V

A Pluralist Society: Religious Divisions Reference has been made earlier to the pluralist character of Indian society. India is a nation; national unity, developed by the administrative unity established under British rule, and fostered by the desire of the Indian people to achieve independence from British rule, was proved to exist in 1962,1965 and 1971, when India was subjected to aggression; the whole nation stood behind the government, forgetting sectional and regional differences. At the same time, India has not yet attained that cohesiveness which, for example, one associates with such nations as Britain and Sweden. In particular, there are two elements in the pluralist society which have had some impact on foreign policy: 1. India has followers of different religions so distributed that (after India became independent) the Hindus have an over-all majority, as well as a majority in most of the component units of the Indian Union; they number, according to the 1971 census, 453 million (82.72 per cent of the total population of 547 millions); there are 61.4 million Muslims (11.21 per cent) ; 14 million Christ­ ians (2.6 per cent); 10 million Sikhs (1.89 per cent); 3.8 million Buddhists (0.70 per cent) and 2.6 million Jains (0.47 per cent). The policy of secularism has been deliberately adopted to meet the situation in which the state has to deal with followers of different religious denominations. How these religious divisions have af­ fected foreign policy will be examined in this chapter. 2. India is a federal state, with twenty-two member states. The adoption of federalism shows recognition of the fact that, while the different territorial units desire union for some specified purposes, they do not want complete union which might prevent them from developing in their own way. How federalism has affected India’s foreign relations will be examined in Chapter VI.

Secularism Perhaps the easiest way to convey the meaning of the concept of

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secularism is to cite the provisions of the Indian Constitution bear­ ing on it. Articles 15, 16, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of the Constitution embody the essentials of the concept. The state shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, cas e, sex, place of birth or any of thenu no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment or the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of state funds or dedicated to the use of the general public; no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth or any of them be ineligible for, or discrimi­ nated against, in respect of, any employment or office under the state; subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this part [ Part 111], all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion; subject to public order, morality and health every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charita­ ble purposes, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, to own and acquire movable and immovable property and to administer such property in accordance with law; no person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination; and no religious in­ struction shall be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of state funds and no person attending any educa­ tional institution recognized by the state or receiving aid out of state funds shall be required to take part in any religious instruction that may be imparted in such institution or to attend any religious worship that may be conducted in such institution or in any premises attached thereto unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian, has given his consent thereto. This bare summary of the provisions of the Constitution bearing on secularism indicates that: 1. The Constitution has refused to accept the idea that the State should belong to one religion more than to another, i .e th e State as such has no religion and it has to be impartial to all religions and religious denominations; 2. In deciding whether a person is a citizen or not, his religion is totally irrelevant:

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and 3. All citizens, irrespective of the religion which they profess, are equally entitled to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and, in particular, the State is prohibited from passing any law prohibiting the free exercise of any religion. It has to be clarified that the word secular is not a synonym for multi-religious as was suggested, for instance, by some delegates at the Second State Peoples’ Convention held in Srinagar in 1971. The essence of secularism is the compulsion on the state to be im­ partial to all religions and to permit the free practice of all reli­ gions. A tolerant and broad-minded appreciation of all creeds and denom inations and a respect for one another’s religious beliefs and practices are inherent in the concept of sec­ ularism. The mere statement of the existance of a number of relig­ ions in the society, implied by the term multi-religious, hardly does justice to the ideal of secularism. As Cantwell Smith, the disting­ uished analyst of Islam, has taken care to point out, humanism, the religion of man, is at the basis of secularism. A reference to the Constitutions of the U.S.A., Britain and Pakistan will make the meaning of secularism clearer by bringing out both the resemblance and the contrast. The U.S.A., like India, is a secular state. Article I (Amendment) of the U.S. Constitution (1791) states that Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Interpreting this Article, the U. S. Supreme Court has authoritatively explained that there is complete separation of the state from religion and that the state cannot, through law, compel the acceptance of any creed or form of worship. Neither a State nor the Federal Government can set up a Church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, and all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from Church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever form they may adopt to teach or practise religion. Neither a State nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the aflairs of any religious organizations or groups or vice versa.'

While the Supreme Court of the United States held the view that Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, it has also held that the Congress was left free to control

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actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order: Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose that one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? . . . To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and, in effect, permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.2

In Britain, however there is no separation of Church and State. The Crown in England is the supreme head of the Established Church which is entitled, legally, to public financial support. The Act of Se tlement (1701) also provides that Roman Catholics and those who marry Roman Catholics cannot ascend the British throne. The Pakistan Constitution of 1956 (abrogated later) was entitled The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and contained, among other provisions, the following: ‘No law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, hereinafter referred to as Injunctions of Islam and the existing laws shall be brought into conformity with such injunctions.’ The Constitution proclaimed by Ayub Khan in 1960 also contains the injunction, no law should be repugnant to Islam (Article 6(2) 1). The Constitution adopted in 1973 contained a similar provision. The preamble also provides that sovereignty belongs to Almighty Allah and the authority exercised by the peo­ ple of Pakistan will be within the limits prescribed by Allah. Clearly, the Pakistan Constitution is non-secular and theocratic. Jawaharlal Nehru said in an address to the Aligarh Muslim University in 1948 that in a state like India which includes people of all religions and shades of opinion, secularism is axiomatic; the theocratic concep­ tion ot a State which regards people of other faiths as beyond the pale is not only outmoded, the world having given up theocracy some centuries ago, but it would be impracticable. We have so far stated the essentials of secularism as a concept; two further questions have to be answered if the content of sec­ ularism in practice is to be clearer. 1. Is secularism anti-religious? The question is relevant because, unlike in the Pakistan Constitution to which reference has been

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made, the word God does not occur in the text of the Indian Constitution;7 a reference to God occurs onlv in Schedule III of the Constitution which offers the alternative o f ‘either swearing in the name of God or solemnly affirming.' It can, however, be stated categorically that the Indian Constitution is not anti-God or ir­ religious: Dr Radhakrishnan has said, ‘Secularism does not mean frreligion. It means we respect all faiths and religions. Our State does not identify with any particular religion.’ jsecularism does not mean a negation of, or indifference to, religion. It is true that, following the French Revolution, the secular state which developed in Europe showed an anti-religious spirit exhibiting itself in an attack on the Church. But that is not implicit in secularism. American society, which as has been explained earlier, is essentially secular, believes in a policy of encouraging all religions and religious activity to support the secular state. The sanctions of religion, supported by faith in God, are very valuable in controlling human behaviour, and achieving social stability: the fear of punishments given by human agencies is less effective'for the mass of men than the fear of God-given punishment. Especially in India, where religion still has an important place, to consider secularism to be a negation of religion would be a serious blunder. For a society must have values if there is to be order, justice and reason. As Cantwell Smith says: ‘Western secularism at its noblest is a positive system of values, based ultimately on Greek ideas of justice, order, reason and humanity.’ Secularism is simply the positive concept that values should not be tied to religious faith. 2. How do we distinguish religious activities from secular ac­ tivities? Both the Hindu and Muslim religion prescribe a way of life, which necessarily involves the daily life of the citizen. Mohammad Ali Jinnah told the All-India Muslim League at Lahore in March 1940 that Islam and Hinduism were not religions in the strict sense of the word but, in fact, different and distinct social orders. 3 While one may say that Jinnah was exaggerating the differences between the two social systems, it cannot be gainsaid that both Islam and Hinduism are in fact social orders; they prescribe a way of life to be followed by those who profess the religion concerned, relating to worship, food, marriage, divorce, education, trade, etc. How then do you separate the secular from the religious activities, so that legislation and the administrative authorities, following the Con­

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stitution, do not interl re with every person's right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion as guaranteed to him by the Con­ stitution? The text of the relevant Article in the Constitution reads as follows: 25. (1) Subject to public order, porality and health and to the other Freedom of conscience and free profession. provisions of this Part, all persons are practice and propagation of religion. equally entitled tO freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion. (2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law (a) regulating or restricting any economic, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice; (b) providing tor social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. Explanation I-The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion. Explanation II-In sub-clause (b) of caluse (2), the reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikhjaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious in­ stitutions shall be construed accordingly.

The meaning of the ‘religion’ mentioned in this Article has been considered by the Supreme Court of India on several occasions; and the Court has held that in considering what matters pertain to religion, it is essential to bear in mind the difference between matters which are essential to religion and matters which are not essential to religion, which, in substance, are secular in character;4 the Court has upheld the right of the Legislature and the Executive to regulate the latter. The Court has to perform the difficult task of discriminating between essentially religious matters with as much objectivity as it can command. An extract from the judgement of the Court in one case will indicate the trend of the judicial interpretation of Article 25 (2) (a): What constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascer­ tained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be

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given to the idol at particular hours of the day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities would not make them secular activities partaking of a commercial or economic character.. . . What Art. 25(2)(a) contemplates is not regulation by the State of religious practices as such, the freedom of which is guaranteed by the Constitution except when they run counter to public order, health and morality, but regulation of activities which are economic, commercial or political in their character though they are associated with religious practices.3

The effect of the provisions of the Constitution taken together with judicial interpretation has been that when the State is dealing with economic, social, political or other secular problems or is attacking the problem of social welfare and reform, including the problem of throwing open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus, the discussion and decision of these issues will proceed on secular, social, economic, rational and scientific grounds, and religion or any considerations associated with religion will have no relevance in that sphere.6

Communalism There is considerable truth in the judgement of a contemporary historian that it is not possible to divide and rule unless the ruled are ready to be divided.7 The same British historian frankly concedes that at the time of the Morley-Minto reforms, and up to the transfer of power, the Muslims were regarded and from time to time em­ ployed as a counterpoise to the Hindu majority, and the Muslims’ resistance to majority rule, as a counterpoise to the swelling de­ mand for democratic self-government; yet while the British may have used the Hindu-Muslim rivalry to their own advantage, they did not inven it.8 The root of whatever separatist feeling exists among the Muslims, is, we suggest, contained in the admission of a Muslim leader who wrote in 1940 in the EasternTimes.9‘A Muslim cannot reconcile his allegiance permanently to the theory of a single nation wherein he is required to merge his identity and lose contact with his religion as a dominating force or Muslims in other parts of the world.’ The result is that many Hindus question the loyalty of Muslims to the nation of which they are citizens. Even Sardar Patel, one of the three makers

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of modem India, suggested that for such [Muslims] it was better to go to Pakistan.’10 The extract cited above gives an explanation for the continuance of communalism in independent India; there is also no doubt that Muslim and Hindu communalists have incited each other to viol­ ence. The Muslims on their part have several grievances: the use of Urdu has not been encouraged; they suspect discrimination in employ­ ment; an official study some time ago showed that less than 2 per cent of those who sat for the U.P.S.C. examinations were Muslim (but, as Kuldip Nayar writes11, no efforts have been made to en­ courage more members of the community to sit for these examina­ tions). The recruitment of Muslims to public sector undertakings is few and far between. It is felt by Muslims that there is prejudice against them in the private sector as well. Muslims are also unhappy that public functions begin with a Hindu prayer and end with puja. These are done in the name of Indian culture but none can dispute that they are purely Hindu ceremonies which members of other communities at best tolerate. Again, there are the communal riots. While from 1954 to 1960 there was a consistent downward trend in the numbers of communal clashes, from 1965 on there was an increase.12 The states most affected were Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Mys­ ore, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh. In most cases, the riots started with the misbehaviour of individuals belonging to one or the other community, which soon took a communal turn; for instance, the rape of a Hindu girl by Muslim youths; a false rumour that a Muslim had poisoned refugees from East Bengal; in Ahmedabad, a quarrel between a group of Muslims and Sadhus, which damaged a glass pane on a temple’s outer gate, sparked off savage riots.13 A.G. Noorani lists the grievances of Muslims thus:14 1. The feeling of insecurity of person and property from com­ munal riots; (2) discrimination in the recruitment to the Services, especially in the Defence Services and in the Police; (3) unequal treatment meted out to Muslims in respect of loans and licences for industries; (4) inadequate representation in the legislatures and in the government; (5) inadequate share in admissions to colleges and technical and professional institutions; (6) the prescription of textbooks which offend the religious susceptibilities of the Muslims; (7) the unfair .treatment' meted out to the Urdu language;

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(8) encroachment on Wakf properties, mosques and burial grounds of Muslims; (9) the unsatisfactory mode of cho.ce of members of Wakf Boards; and (10) the unequal administration of law by the State. The formation of parties, political and other, on communal lines (and the strengthening of those communal parties which had existed before 1947) is one of the consequences of the prevailing distrust between the main communities. It is unfortunate that political par­ ties in India have failed to perform one of their main functions: to bring together under their fold citizens belonging to different social groups. A political party, according to a classic definition, is a more or less organized group of citizens who act together as a political unit, have distinctive aims and opinions on the leading political controversies in the State, and who, by acting together as a political unit, seek to obtain control of the government. The pluralist charac­ ter of Indian society partly explains this failure; the formation of communal parties flows directly from this failure. Among the Muslim communal parties are the Jamaat-e-Islami, Majlis-e-Mushawarat and the Muslim League. The Jamaat-eIslami was founded in 1941 by Abul Ala Maudoodi (who later migrated to Pakistan). It is, clearly, a religious organization which aims at establishing the Islamic way of life in India, and eventually, by persuading non-Muslims to accept Islam, to establish an Islamic State in India. Democracy and elections are un-Islamic; by par­ ticipating in the elections, Muslims may lose their Islamic identity. Hence, said Maudoodi, ‘we should try to create, on a large scale, a public opinion among the Muslims that they should, as a commun­ ity, have nothing to do with the government and its administration and should assure Hindu nationalism by this attitude that there is no other political nationality in the field to fight against it.’15 Hindus and Muslims form two nations. ‘The political strategy of the Jamaat is , writes Shakir,16*to have a separate united front of the Muslim organizations wherein its lead­ ership is accepted; the operational basis of the united front will be the solidarity of the Muslims derived from the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah.' The Jamaat succeeded in the formation of such a united front in the Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat to safeguard the social and cultural interests of the Muslims. The Muslim League also continues to exist; after independence, the members of the League remaining in South India, led by Mohammed Ismail, dc-

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cided in March 1948 to continue the Muslim League as a separate organization named the 'Indian Union Muslim League’ ‘to devote its attention principally to the promotion of the religious, cultural, educational and economic interests of the Muslims of the Union.’17 Among the Hindu communal parties, it is sufficient to mention the Hindu Mahasabha and the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, with the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (R.S.S.) as an allied organization to support it. The Hindu Mahasabha ceased to be of political impor­ tance, as the poor electoral support received by it in the general elections in 1972 indicated. The resolution of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh at its plenary session held at Patna on 30 December 1969 clearly indicates its attitude to the Muslims: Bharatiya Jana Sangh demands . . . Indianization by which we mean the subordination of all narrow loyalties like those of religion, caste, region, language or dogma to the over-riding loyalty to the nation, of all fissiparous elements, especially of those with extra-territorial loyalties or allegiance, overt or covert, to the two-nation theory.18

Indian Muslims and Bangladesh The foregoing paragraphs relating to communalism will be ade­ quate to explain why the Muslims, by and large, have not partici­ pated in the mainstream of national life to the extent that their numbers and skills would call for. A survey of the Indian press in 1971 and 1972 during the days of the liberation of Bangladesh and, in particular, of Muslim opinion on that momentous development will throw further light on the Muslim participation in important areas of national life. It will be recalled that in the elections held in Pakistan on 7 December 1970, the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, secured an absolute majority with 167 out of 169 seats allotted to East Pakistan in the National Assembly; Mujibur Rehman had fought the elections on the basis of a six-point programme whose essence was autonomy (not independence) for East Pakis­ tan. Negotiations among the political leaders of West Pakistan and East Pakistan on the quantum of autonomy for East Pakistan broke down. From the night of 25 March 1971 began a reign of terror over the people of East Pakistan, the like of which, accord­ ing to unbiased accounts, had not been witnessed in history. On 26 March a declaration of independence was made from Chittagong

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radio in the name of the Awami League. The Pakistan army replied by resorting to killing, raping, burning and looting on a large scale Mujibur Rehman had in the meantime been arrested and kept in prison. Millions of terrified people ran across the border to India. Public opinion in India was shocked by the atrocities perpetrated upon unarmed and innocent people in Bangladesh. On 31 March 1971 the Parliament of India called upon all peoples and govern­ ments of the world to take urgent and constructive steps to prevail upon the Government of Pakistan to put an end immediately to the systematic decimation of people which amounted to genocide. The people of East Bengal were assured that their struggle and sacrifice would receive the whole-hearted sympathy and support of the people of India. It is in this context of the widespread support that the Indian public gave to the liberation movement in East Bengal that Muslim opinion on the subject must be gauged. We give below Muslim opinion as expressed in the press under four heads: (1) intellectuals and the modem educated elite, (2) the Muslim Con­ ventions on Bangladesh, (3) the Urdu press, (4) a section of Muslim opinion which toed the Yahya line, and conclude with (5) an as­ sessment of Muslim opinion. THE VIEWS OF THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE MODERN EDUCATED ELITE

On 7 April 1971, speaking in the Rajya Sabha, Akbar Ali Khan (Congress) said that his religion was one of peace and goodwill. He looked with loathing upon the happenings in Bangladesh because atrocities and injustice were being perpetuated on a people struggl­ ing for freedom and justice. The member for Kashmir, Syed Husain, said that Pakistan, which was created on hatred by Jinnah, was now crumbling. What was happening in Pakistan today had demolished the two-nation theory, on which Pakistan had been founded.19 In a letter to the editor of the Times o f India,20 Zafar Futehally said: ‘The Muslims of India have an excellent opportunity to atone graciously and effectively for their part in the partition and its aftermath by offering such relief as lies in their power to offer to the people of East Bengal.’ At a meeting organized by the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies at India International Centre, New Delhi, M.C. Chagla (a former Union Minister) echoed Syed Husain’s view that it was not religion which constituted a nation but race, culture, background and past history. If Bangladesh

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was constituted, Chagla said, India would have a friendly neighbour with which it had many things in common. But if India failed Bangladesh, then the latter would look to China. He pleaded that nothing prevented India from recognizing Bangladesh, which had already gained the moral support of almost the whole world. At the same meeting Professor Rashid-Ud-Din Khan quoted from the Shariat to show that the concept of resistance was part of Islamic law. The people could resist if the ruler was a Muslim but unjust and also if he was both an infidel and unjust. He also quoted from the 20 March 1940 resolution of the Muslim League in Lahore to the effect that units shall be autonomous and sovereign. ‘It is amazing how the founding father of Pakistan had visions of Bang­ ladesh as an autonomous and sovereign state’, Khan said amid laughter.21 On behalf of the preparatory committee of the All India Conference of the representatives of all political parties for aiding Bangladesh, Chaudhury A. Mohammad, MP, said, ‘No civilized nation in the world can tolerate the mass killings by Pakistan in the name of Islam.’22 In Kerala, the Muslim League leader and Home Minister C.H. Mohammad Koya had warned that disciplinary ac­ tion would be taken against League members who defied the party’s decision on Bangladesh. Koya reiterated the demand made by League President Mohammad Ismail, MP, that the genocide by the Pakistan army forces on Bangladesh freedom fighters should be stopped. Addressing the members of the Assam Pradesh Congress Com­ mittee, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad, then Union Food Minister, said on the same day that the revolt of the people of Bangladesh against the Pakistani military rulers had proved that religion alone could not make a nation. He said: Our policy is not to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. But what is happening in neighbouring Bangla Desh cannot by any standard be considered purely ‘domestic affairs’ of Pakistan because whatever happens there will have profound impact on our own national life.23

The view was supported by Moin ul Haq Chaudhury, Minister of Industrial Development, on 22 April 1971 at the teach-in at the School of International Studies, organized by the teachers and students of the Jawaharlal Nehru University.24 Abdul Qaiyum Ansari, MP, and President of the All-India Momin Conference, on 28 April 1971, urged the Government of India and other coun­

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tries to accord recognition to the Government of Bangladesh.25 Forty-four leading Indian intellectuals, scientists, artists and writers appealed to men and women all over the world to join in compelling the military rulers of West Pakistan to end this insensate carnage in East Bengal.26 In June 1971, five Muslim MPs accused the Majlis-e-Mushawarat of mortgaging its conscience to Pakistan in not condemning the brutality in Bangladesh. They also said, the party was isolating the Indian Muslims from the mainstream on the issue, that ‘our friends of the Majlis are prepared to condone their crimes in the name of Indo-Pakistan friendship.’27 The Delhi State Jamiat Ulema, in a resolution adopted by it at a Convention held in Delhi on 14 July 1971, said it was a matter of extreme shame and concern that the Yahya regime was committing these barbarities in the name of Islam. ‘Whatever has happened in Pakistan, in the last two de­ cades and more, has proved that religion cannot be taken as the basis of nationalism.' The resolution admitted that there were cer­ tain elements in the country which were creating misunderstandings among Muslims and indulging in false propaganda against them. It, therefore, warned the Indian Muslims to beware of these mischief-mongers.28 On 31 July 1971, in the Rajya Sabha, M.C. Chagla called upon the Government to pluck up courage and rec­ ognize Bangladesh immediately without being afraid of its conse­ quences. ‘It will be a belated action. But let us do it now and face the consequences of doing the right thing’, Chagla said, while speaking on a non-official resolution which sought recognition before the end of the then current session of Parliament. He deplored the delay and India’s failure to recognize Bangladesh at the time when a govern­ ment was set up there. ‘It is the greatest blunder, for which history will not forgive us’, he said. He was convinced that even then if a referendum was held, 90 per cent of the people would vote for recognition. ‘Neither there was a secession in Bangladesh nor what has happened was a military coup where there is justification to pause and think in regard to recognition.’29 Over 200 Muslims (all from Delhi),men and women with children demonstrated outside the Prime Minister’s house on 6 August 1971 to demand recognition of Bangladesh. The demonstration was or­ ganized by the Jan Sangh. Anwar Ali Dehlvi, a member of the Metropolitan Council who led the demonstration, presented a memorandum to the Prime Minister in which they requested the

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Prime Minister to ‘dissociate herself from communal Congressmen who have been trying to rouse communal feelings among Muslims by saying that while the Jan Sangh wants the destruction of Pakistan the Congress wants to maintain the integrity of Pakistan.’30 On an earlier occasion, while speaking on the Metropolitan Council’s resolution on Bangladesh recognition, on 30 March 1971, Anwar Ali Dehlvi said that he was surprised that local Muslim members of the Congress had remained silent on this important issue. They should have expressed solidarity with their Muslim brethren in Bangladesh.31 On 12 August 1971, twenty Muslim MPs32 appealed to all the Muslim countries to raise their voice against the un-Islamic acts of Pakistan’s military junta in Bangladesh that had created a situation endangering peace in the sub-continent. In a statement, the MPs said: ‘We feel that the silence on the part of the Muslim countries may be taken as an approval of all the atrocities perpetrated by the military junta of Pakistan which is against the basic and fundamen­ tal principles of Islam .’The MPs expressed the hope that the Muslim countries without exception would raise their voice in support of the just cause of the 75 million people of Bangladesh. Islam had always stood for protection of life and liberty and the Muslim countries should act to force President Yahya Khan and his military junta to stop genocide, restore peace and put an end to all the inhuman acts perpetrated in Bangladesh. Two days later, sixteen Muslim33 MPs appealed to ‘all Muslim countries and the civilized world’ to raise their voice against Presi­ dent Yahya Khan’s acts ‘which are barbarous and against all ethical values of Islam.’ On 29 August 1971 in a resolution by its Central Advisory Council, the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind blamed the leadership of Pakis­ tan for the happenings in East Bengal. Breaking its silence on events in Pakistan, the Jamaat-e-Islami said the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman would be helpful in creating an atmosphere of mutual understanding. The resolution, however, warned against the disastrous consequences of any talk of war. It praised the attitude of the Government of India in withstanding the pressure for recogniz­ ing Bangladesh: ‘The Government should stick to this attitude.’ Conditions should improve as soon as possible so that the refugees could return to their land with a guarantee of protection to their life, property and honour.34

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On 17 October 1971, the Indian Union Muslim League Presi­ dent, Mohammad Ismail, MP, said in Vijayawada that his party would extend its full support to the country in the event of a war with Pakistan.35 MUSLIM

CONVENTIONS ON BANGLADESH

Divergent counsels on Bangladesh among Indian Muslim leaders were evident in two rival conventions held in the first week of June 1971. The first, under the banner of the National Convention of Minorities on Bangladesh, was held in Lucknow. It was attended by many leaders of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and presided over by Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, Union Minister for Food and Agriculture. This Convention unreservedly condemned the ‘unparalleled brutalities and genocide committed by the Pakistani military government in the act of suppressing the legitimate democratic aspirations of their people in Bangladesh .’It extended whole-hearted support to the cause of freedom and autonomy of Bangladesh.36 The other was organized in Delhi by the Majlis-e-Mushawarat, a combination of about a dozen Muslim organizations and groups in India which includes the Muslim League, the Muslim Majlis, and the Jamaat-e-Islami, on 5 and 6 June 1971. While the resolution refrained from condemning the military junta in Pakistan for the carnage in Bangladesh, its wording appears to be conditioned by Pakistani propaganda that martial law was necessitated because the Bengali Muslims were engaged in a campaign to liquidate the non-Bengali Muslims. It further sought to give credibility to Pakis­ tani propaganda that they were willing to take back all their nationals in the reception camps which they claimed to have estab­ lished all along the border. In its principal resolution, the Mushawarat expressed regret over the events in ‘East Pakistan’ and made tortuous attempts to save the Government of Pakistan from any condemnation for the tragedy for whose victims it expressed sympathy. Both conventions however recognized the full measure of the refugee problem and held Pakistan responsible for creating the conditions for the early return of the refugees to their homes. In its editorial the Hindustan Times said: What is puzzling, however, is the Mushawarat’s soft-spokenness on 3akis tan’s responsibility for the tragedy in Bangladesh and its curious and insubstantiated appeal to the Government of India to view the refugee

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problem without discrimination in a humanitarian manner and to repatriate the refugees as desired by Pakistan rather than jail some of them as suspected spies. Surely there is a significant loss of proportion here. The Mushawarat has in the past been visibly agitated by the wanton loss of Muslim lives, whether in this country or elsewhere. But in this case it has spoken with reservations even though a majority of the victims in East Bengal are, incidentally, Muslim. Condemnation of Pakistan is not the only way for any section of Indians to identify themselves with the national mainstream. But it is a pity that the Mushawarat should have recoiled from making a more candid declaration on the merits of a human and political issue of such monumental proportions.37

The 400-word resolution was processed by a six-member com­ mittee consisting of Mohammad Ismail, President of the Indian Union Muslim League, Mirza Afzal Beg of the Kashmir Plebiscite Front, Dr A.J. Faridi, President of the Muslim Majlis, Mohammad Tufail of Jamaat-e-Islami, with Mufti Atiq-ur-Rehman as its President.38 Sheikh Abdullah was reported to have played a promi­ nent role in the conference which passed the resolution. The thinking of these and many Muslim leaders appeared quite similar to Pakistani propaganda. The Mushawarat and its con­ stituents thus appeared to represent the viewpoint of such Muslims who still feel that Pakistan was created by them and that it should survive so that they may always find refuge there.39 ‘The recent resolution of the Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat’, S.E. Hasnain, the editor oi Jamhooriyat, and of The Urdu Press said, ‘is inconsistent with its Lucknow resolution on genocide. This clearly indicates the double standards of the self-styled, ‘honest, truthful, pious and bold’ Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat.’40 According to him, the majority of innocent Muslims were led to believe that,‘Pakistani President Yahya Khan had to act to halt the massacre of non-Bengali Muslims by Bengalis. Whatever is being done is only to maintain the unity and integrity of the Islamic State of Pakistan. It is Pakistan’s internal affair’, and so on Some of these people, he said, were trying to mislead the innocent Muslim masses by comparing Bangladesh with Kashmir and some other Indian states. Thriving on the ignorance and political immaturity of the Muslim masses, ‘they do not realize that there is not an iota of similarity between the political, social and economic situation of Bangladesh and of Kashmir or any other state of India, Our democ­ ratic and secular national Government is helping every state to achieve all-round progress and prosperity.’42

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THE URDU PRESS

The attitude of the bulk of the Muslims of India towards Bangladesh was amply demonstrated at the All-India Urdu Editors’ Seminar on ‘Current Situation in the Indian Subcontinent and the Role of Urdu Press’held in New Delhi from 25 to 27 June 1971. Almost all the eighty-five editors of leading Urdu papers and journals, of which an overwhelming majority was Muslim, unanimously supported the policy of the Government of India towards Bangladesh and une­ quivocally condemned the military junta of Pakistan for the genocide and the repression of the helpless minority community. On the problem of Bangladesh refugees in India, they expressed their wholehearted sympathy and pledged support to the Union Government for its humanitarian stand.43 An overwhelming major­ ity felt that restoration of secularism and democracy in Bangladesh was essential for peace in the subcontinent. A.R. Sherwani, Con­ vener of the Seminar, explained that it was necessary to hold the seminar as allegations were levelled against the Urdu press that it was condoning the genocide. He said, he did not find much evidence for it.44 Hayatullah Ansari considered the presence of six million Bangladesh refugees on Indian soil an international problem and urged the editors to uphold the principles of democracy, socialism and secularism by supporting the cause of Bangladesh. The editors from West Bengal played a substantial role at the seminar, one of the best speeches coming from Ahmad Sayeed Malihabadi, editor of Azad Hind (Calcutta), the leading Urdu daily of Eastern India 45 Commenting on the Urdu newspapers’ confer­ ence; the daily Mulk-o-Milat (2 July 1971) was of the view that only a few papers had taken an anti-national line. However, it said,‘it cannot be denied that these few have tried their best to infect the whole flock 46 In September 1971, editors of Urdu periodicals published from Andhra Pradesh appealed to the kings and presi­ dents of Muslim countries of the world to ‘effectively intervene and end the worst tragedy in the history of Islam—the genocide in Bangladesh.’47 The then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, expressed satisfaction* at the role of Urdu newspapers on the tragedy of Bangladesh. ‘There might be a few exceptions among these newspapers but they hardly reflected the general feeling in the country,’ she said.48

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PRO-PAKISTAN MUSLIM OPINION

Some of the individuals belonging to the Indian Muslim community were not happy over the reaction of the Indian Government. Shamim Ahmed Shamim (Ind.) MP from Kashmir State, speaking in the Lok Sabha on 27 March 1971, said India still recognized the Yahya Khan Government and should not appear to be supporting a secessionist movement in East Pakistan. The worst service India or its people could render to Sheikh Mujibur Rehman would be to create a situation in which West Pakistani imperialists could hold him up as an agent of this country.49 The pro-Pakistan Awami Action Committee’s Chairman, Maulana Mohammad Farooq, charged that India’s solidarity with the freedom struggle in Bang­ ladesh was a 'flagrant violation of international behaviour*50Abdul Waheed Owaisie, President of All-India Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, was very much against India recognizing Bangladesh. Owaisie said India had kept herself aloof during the Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary and had not raised her voice during the Biafran crisis and the Chinese invasion of Tibet. Consis­ tent with her policy of not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, she should refrain from taking sides in the upheaval in East Bengal. She should be more alive to the danger of chain reactions to recognizing the Bangladesh Government, for he thought it would be difficult for the Centre to suppress divisive forces. While Mrs Gandhi was free to express her personal opinion on the recognition issue, she should not commit India to what he considered a dangerous path.51 In her letter to the editor of the Hindustan Times Miss Sarla Sawhney, Information Officer, Press Information Bureau, New Delhi, gave abstracts from Urdu newspapers, which in her opinion, were not only out of step with national sentiment but overtly anti-national, even pro-Pakistan.52 Sheikh Abdullah, in an interview with an Indian newspaper, Rehnuma-i-Deccan;53was re­ ported to have said that no Government in the world would tolerate movements that were designed to disintegrate the country. Pakistan’s President, General Yahya Khan, was left with no choice but to do what he did to save the country’s unity and integrity. He hoped that, while pretending to be sympathetic to East Pakistan, the Indian Government would realize the importance of undertak­ ing a realistic and extremely careful policy on the issue. While expressing its anxiety about the right of self-determination for the

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people of East Pakistan, India had forgotten the role it had been playing in Kashmir for the last twenty-three years. He said that this conflict of words and deeds provided food for thought for all freedom-loving people.54 In an editorial on the Prime Minister’s trip abroad, the Dawat, the Jamaat-e-Islami’s Urdu daily, said: In simple terms, our problem boils down to this: The refugees should go back. President Yahya has declared so many times that he is ready to take them back irrespective of the considerations of caste, creed and religion. The Government of East Bengal has also appealed to the refugees to return. After such assurances, the safety of life and property of the refugees become the responsibility of the world community. Therefore, we need not be unduly worried about them.35

In its issue dated 14 July, the daily Al-Jamiat severely criticized Jayaprakash Narayan’s demand for the recognition of Bangladesh and military action. The paper supported the official attitude of caution and restraint. It came down heavily on ‘the leaders who strike a discordant note and have made it difficult for the Govern­ ment to breathe even.’56 The Muslim League had avoided expressing any opinion on the recognition issue, though it did not avoid condemning atrocities in East Bengal. The party took the line that only the Government was competent to take a decision on the question. The Muslim League would support whatever decision the Government took. The Presi­ dent of the Muslim League, Mohammad Ismail, told K. Rangaswamy57 that as no one in the Government desired the disin­ tegration of Pakistan and also as no one wanted war with Pakistan, it would be for the Government to evolve an appropriate policy in regard to Bangladesh. The Muslim League members in Parliament refused to sign the all-party MPs memorandum to the U. N. Secretary-General, U Thant, seeking his intervention to save the life of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. In a statement issued on 7 August 1971, P. Parameshwaran, Vice-President of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, said that the Muslim League members’ insistence on demanding that any refer­ ence to the Pakistani atrocities on the people of Bangladesh be deleted, before they could sign it, ‘unmistakably proves that they identify themselves completely with the Pakistani line of approach and not with the Indian line’, Parmeshwaran said. ‘Yet,’ he addled, ‘they have the audacity to claim that they support the policy of the

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Indian Government on the question of Bangladesh.’58 It was because of this attitude of the Indian Union Muslim League that Dr Mazhar-ul-Islam, a noted Bengali scholar, who was Professor and Head of the Bengali Department in the Rajshahi University, East Bengal, till the West Pakistan army took over, told a press conference in Trivandrum: The Muslim League and Muslims in India are still hugging the illusion that Pakistan is a safe place for Muslims; but we the Muslims of Bangladesh know what this illusion of religion has cost us being the victims of the genocide perpetrated by the Muslims of West Pakistan in the name of Islam. It is because of this illusion that the Muslim League and Muslims in India have not tried to understand the spirit and character of our movement.59

The views of that section of Muslim opinion—which is not in the mainstream of Indian opinion in the happenings in Bangladesh—are best expressed in the language of a letter to the Editor written by three Muslims from Lucknow and published in the Hindustan Times60 in May 1971: If freedom of conscience, speech and writing is available to Indian Muslims, they must be allowed to give expression to the honest feelings they really harbour. At present, there are two sections of Indian Muslims living in India. One voted for the creation of Pakistan and the other against it. Those Muslims who did not want the creation of Pakistan have every right to share the sympathy of the rest of the country for East Pakistan. But those Muslims who wanted Pakistan to come into being cannot tolerate seeing its ruin and disintegration. The majority of Indian Muslims voted in favour of the creation of Pakistan. It was not then a gesture of disloyalty to India or an act of treason to do so. If the feelings and opinion of majority of the people are respected and taken into consideration, the majority o f Indian Muslims must not be expected to encourage those who are torch-bearers o f disruptive tendencies in Pakistan. If to denounce Sheikh Mujibur Rehman of Pakistan is not an act of dislovalty to India, let us say very honestly and. frankly that the responsibil­ ity of the carnage and bloodshed in East Bengal lies entirely on him. AN ASSESSMENT

As D.R. Mankekar puts it,61the strange reaction and inhibition displayed by many of the Muslim newspapers and leaders on the frightful events in former East Pakistan underlines the ambivalence with which the Indian Muslim community has always regarded matters Pakistani.

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It would be useful to try to understand the factors that influenced the Muslim mind in present-day India towards the develop­ ments in Bangladesh. There are two generations of Indian Muslims. One consists of the people who were mature when Pakistan came into existence; the other comprises the younger generation which has gathered knowledge of the creation of Pakistan either from books or as tales from their parents. Even among the elder generation there are two groups: there is a class of people who were whole-heartedly for the creation of a separate theocratic state for the Indian Muslims. They had their own justification for their cause: they fought for it, and fortunately or unfortunately won it. A statistical investigation, however, shows that the majority of this class of people lived in what is now Pakistan even before its birth, or settled in Pakistan after its coming into existence. Those among them who lived in the far east or far west of undivided India were themselves declared to be in Pakistan and others in the middle east and middle west readily drifted into Pakistan. Nevertheless, though a small minority, there still exists a class of people among the Indian Muslims who shared the responsi­ bility for the creation of Pakistan. It is these Indian Muslims whose attitude remained the same even when the problem of the suppres­ sion of the then East Pakistan raised its head. This narrow class of Indian Muslims regarded the creation of Bangladesh as a victory of the Hindus over the Muslims of the subcontinent. Yet there are also people who have been opposed to the partition of India since the very beginning. They took the independence of Bangladesh neither as the victory of the Hindus nor as the defeat of the Muslims. There are also two groups among the younger generation. One consists of those who were either bom into nationalist families or those who became nationalist on their own. The latter kind hold the elder generation solely responsible for the misunderstanding bet­ ween the two communities in present-day India. They feel that the older generation having created Pakistan, has left them in India, subjected to the resulting hatred between the Hindus and the Muslims.62 The younger generation, broadly speaking, is in tune with the national sentiment in respect of the liberation of Bang­ ladesh. We have so far dealt with the adoption of secularism as the official policy of the Government of India, which appeared natural in the context of a pluralist society, and the existence of communalism in

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society which set a limit to the success of the secular policy. The reaction of the Indian Muslims to the historic events leading to the emergence of Bangladesh as a free nation, which we surveyed in this section, shows that the younger generation and the modem edu­ cated Muslims have, broadly speaking, fallen in line with the main­ stream of national opinion on the subject. In the remaining three sections of this chapter we shall outline the impact of secularism on the foreign relations of India: India’s re­ fusal to hold a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir, India and West Asia, and India’s interest in the independence of Bangladesh.

India's Refusal to Hold a Plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir The genesis and development of what is generally known as the Kashmir problem may be briefly told. The Indian Independence Act (1947) had released the Indian States from the paramountcy of the Crown, and, in law, had made them independent; Mountbatten’s advice to their rulers, Sardar Patel’s statesmanship, and the pressure of circumstances had in fact led all the Indian States but three (Junagadh, Hyderabad and Jammu & Kashmir) to accede to one of the two Dominions, India or Pakistan. The ruler of Jammu and Kashmir had not come to a decision. The Indian Government’s policy had been to refrain from inducing Kashmir to accede. Indeed the States Ministry, under Patel’s direction, went out of its way to take no action which could be interpreted as forcing Kashmir’s hand and to give assurances that accession to Pakistan would not be taken amiss by India .63 While the ruler was thus undecided, some five thousand tribesmen attacked and captured several towns in the state and were little more than thirty-five miles from Srinagar, the state capital. To get military help from India in order to drive out the invaders, it was legally necessary that Kashmir should accede to India; an Instrument of Accession was signed by the Maharajah on 26 October 1947 and sent to India. Mountbatten ‘urged that in the reply his Government asked him to send on their behalf to the Maharaja accepting his accession offer, he should be allowed to add that this was conditional, on the will of the people being ascertained as soon as law and order were restored.’ This principle was at once freely accepted and unilaterally proposed by Nehru.64 The Instrument of

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Accession sent by the Maharaja of Kashmir was duly accepted; Mountbatten’s reply dated 27 October 1947 conveying India’s acceptance of the accession contained the following: In consistence with their policy that in the case of any State when the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government’s wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people.

Was the accession of Jammu and Kashmir valid? Alan Campbell-Johnson says, ‘The legality of the accession is beyond doubt. On this particular issue Jinnah has been hoist with his own petard, as it was he who chose,over Junagadh, to take his stand on the over-riding validity of the ruler’s personal decision ’65 It is not only Jinnah’s acceptance of the principle in respect of the Junagadh case which is important. Jammu and Kashmir’s legally-valid acces­ sion was buttressed by the fact that the leader of the strongest political party in the state had advised the ruler to accede to India. We have earlier referred to the tribal invasion of Kashmir. The invasion had begun on 22 October 1947; published evidence sug­ gests that the activities of the tribesmen, supported by Pakistan, had begun as early as 6 September 1947.66 The help given by the Government of India, after Kashmir acceded to India, saved Srin­ agar; but several square kilometres of territory had been occupied and the invasion had not been stopped. Prime Minister Nehru appealed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 22 December 1947 to deny to the raiders all access to and use of Pakistan territory for operations against Kashmir and all military and other supplies. As there was no response to the appeal, the Government of India decided to lodge on 1 January 1948 a complaint against Pakistan under Article 35 of the Charter, which allows a member of the United Nations to bring to the attention of the Security Council any situation the continuance of which is likely to endanger the mainte­ nance of international peace and security. The complaint listed the following charges against Pakistan: 1. The invaders were allowed transit through Pakistani territory; 2. They were allowed to use Pakistani territory as a base of opera­ tions; 3. They included Pakistani nationals; 4. They drew much of their military equipment, transportation

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and supplies (including petrol) from Pakistan; and 5. Pakistani officers were training, guiding, and otherwise actively helping them. India requested the Security Council to ask Pakistan to prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil, from participat­ ing or assisting in the invasion of the Jammu & Kashmir State; to call upon other Pakistani nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in the State; and to deny to the invaders (1) access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir; (2) military acid other supplies; and (3) all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the struggle. In India’s view, the assistance which Pakistan was giving to the invaders was an act of aggression against India. The Security Council’s reaction was first, to expand at Pakistan’s request, the scope of the discussion to the India-Pakistan question as Pakistan wanted to bring in the questions of Hyderabad and Junagadh for discussion; to refuse to consider pronouncing on Pakistan’s guilt; and to send a Mission—the United Nations Com­ mission for India and Pakistan—to the subcontinent to help in stopping the fighting and in creating the proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir was to accede to India or Pakistan. The Commission visited the subcontinent and had discussions with the representatives of India and Pakistan, and was able to get the agreement of the two governments to two resolutions, of 13 August 1948, and 5 January 1949, with three parts: a cease-fire, a truce, and the plebiscite. The resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 5 January 1949 contains inter alia the follow­ ing passage: ‘The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan having received (from the Governments of India and Pakistan, in com­ munications dated 23 December and 25 December 1948, respectively, their acceptance of the following principles which are supplementary to the Commission’s resolution of 13 August 1948: 1. The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite; 2. A plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission that the cease-fire and truce arrangements as set forth in parts I and II of the Commission’s resolution of 13 August 1948 have been carried out and the arrangements for the plebiscite have been completed.

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The statements of the Prime Minister and other representatives of the Government of India on why the Government of India decided not to hold a plebiscite and its relevance to the secular policy followed by the Government, are summarized below. In the Security Council on 23 January 1957, V. K. Krishna Menon refused to accept the thesis that because the population of a particular area is of one religion, some political issue is involved.67 He said: ‘We refuse to recognize what is called the “ two-nation theory” . India is a secular State, where any person, Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, or whatever he is, is an equal son or daughter of India, with rights of citizenship guaranteed by our Constitution. We are not a theocracy; we are a modem secular State governed on democratic principles, where the right of citizenship is based on residence, upon domicile and upon loyalty to the Constitution.’68 He argued that ‘if our Government were to accept the view that because people are Muslims, they should belong to another State, I ask the Security Council, in all conscience, to consider what would happen to the considerable Muslim minorities in my country. They are distributed over the whole of our land. In some places, they are sparse minorities, in some places they almost form the majority in the area.’69. . . ‘Are we to say that they are second-class citizens? We refuse to accept that position in India. We have almost as many Muslims in India—and I qualify the word “ almost”—as in the whole of Pakistan. . . . One religion does not mean one race, nor does it mean that there is a separation between two religious groups.’70 ‘We have this considerable Muslim population inside India, but it is not regarded as a minority. . . . The secular State is one of those ideas and one of those possessions which we regard with great jealousy, because in this world the rivalry of religion and the amount of violence that has been carried out in the name of religi­ ous loyalty has been to an extent that should shame humanity at any time.’71 On the eve of the Security Council debate on Kashmir in May 1962, a six-page pamphlet—Salient Aspects o f the Kashmir Situation— was issued by the Government of India. The main objec­ tion to a plebiscite was the communal trouble it would let loose both in India and Pakistan. The economic stability of Jammu and Kash­ mir State would also be irreparably damaged, the document said. India supported its prognosis by referring to the observation of the United Nations Representative, Gunnar Jarring, who came to this

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subcontinent to study the problem. Gunnar Jarring’s observation that the changing political, economic and strategic factors surrounding the whole of the Kashmir question, together with the changing pattern of power relations in West and South Asia, was an impor­ tant one; the factors mentioned by him made implementation of the U. N. resolutions on the plebiscite impracticable. The document explained at some length and quite frankly the communal troubles that would inevitably come in the wake of the wholesale reopening of the Kashmir issue: ‘It is widely recognized that any upsets in Jammu and Kashmir will result in serious consequences to the people of the State and will also have grave repercussions in the rest of India and Pakistan. . . . Stability, peace and progress have been brought about in Kashmir in the teeth of opposition from the aggressor and by democratic methods—a tribute to the freedomloving people of Kashmir and the community of Indian people of which they form an integral part .’72The pamphlet said that ‘the virus of religious frenzy and hatred fanned by the Muslim League leaders who advocated a theocratic state of Pakistan led to the hideous events which followed Partition. Pakistan is welcome to follow any policies it likes, but India cannot allow her dearly gained stability and independence to be undermined by permitting Pakistan to apply archaic theocratic principles to disrupt her traditional integ­ rity.’ The document also explained with a mass of evidence that Pakistan’s only standing with regard to the Kashmir question was that of an aggressor. This position had been recognized by the U. N. Although Pakistan had initially denied having sent troops to Kash­ mir with the tribal raiders, by subsequently confessing to its guilt it stood self-condemned. The document, therefore, found no legal or moral right for Pakistan to harp on the plebiscite demand, particu­ larly when the plebiscite offer had been made to the people of Kashmir and not to the Pakistani aggressors. ‘The assurance was’, it adds, ‘that after Pakistan’s invasion had been liquidated and the entire territory of the State cleared of Pakistani hordes and tribes­ men, India would again ascertain, if necessary, the will of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.’73 Subsequent events clearly showed that the assurance had been more than fulfilled.74 In his reply on 3 May 1962 to Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan’s, Pakistan’s Representative, speech in the Security Council, V.K. Krishna Menon referred to the theory that because the population of Kashmir is in the majority Muslim in its religion, therefore they

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should accede, by some written or unwritten right, to Pakistan and declared: 'Religion is not a qualification or a disqualification in our country, and we stand by this as fast as we can. In fact, Kashmir is one of the acid tests of this.’74 In June 1962, Prime Minister Nehru reiterated m New Delhi that the fundamental issue raised by Pakistan’s argument—that Kash­ mir being a Muslim-majority area should go to Pakistan—vitally affected the secular policy followed by India for a long time. Again, when in 1956 Nehur was asked by Michael Brecher, ‘What makes Kashmir so important to India? Does it have any implications for India’s efforts to establish a secular stale and to maintain communal harmony in this country?’, Nehru replied: 35 million Muslims remained in India [ after Partition ] Today, there are more Muslims in India than there are in West Pakistan. . . . The National Movement of Kashmir deliberately rejected the Muslim League idea of the two-nation theory .. . and, when Kashmir joined India . . . it was very important for us because it helped our thesis of nationalism not being related to religion. If the contrary thesis were proved in Kashmir, it would affect somewhat—I don’t say it would break up India—but it would have a powerful effect on the communal elements in India, both Hindu and Muslim. That is of extreme importance to us—that we don’t, by taking some wrong step in Kashmir, create these terribly disruptive tendencies within India.75

Chagla, India’s chief delegate, told the U.N. Security Council in February 1964 that ‘under no circumstances can we agree to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir’. The Security Council’s two resolu­ tions dealing with a plebiscite were conditional on Pakistan’s vacat­ ing her aggression and as this condition had not been complied with, the resolutions were no longer binding. In reply to the charge that India was trying to integrate |Cashmir into the Indian Union, Chagla said that when the Ruler of Kashmir had executed the Instrument of Accessionto India and Lord Mountbatten (then Governor-General) had accepted it, Kashmir had become an integral part of the Union. The Independence Act of 1947 provided that it was open to every Princely State to accede either to India or Pakistan, but it did not provide that the Instru­ ment of Accession could be conditional, nor was there any provision for consulting the people of the State concerned. The possibility of a plebiscite had been envisaged because at that time no elections had

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been held in Kashmir, but since then Kashmir had three general elections, at all of which a party had been returned which supported integration with India. Chagla went on: ‘Pakistan has pretended to show a great sol­ icitude for the Muslims living in India. . .. Now let me inform the Council that Muslims are not a minority in the ordinary sense of the term. They constitute 50 million of India’s population. India is the third-largest Muslim State in the world—the first being Indonesia and the second Pakistan .76They are sons of the soil, they are Indians by race and they enjoy all the rights of citizenship. Every office is open to them, and in fact many of them hold the highest offices in the land. Our civilization is a synthesis of many diverse cultures and the Muslim contribution is one of the most significant. Fundamental rights under the Constitution are guaranteed to every citizen. We have no first-class or second-class citizenship. Before the law everyone is equal.’77 Rejecting Pakistan’s thesis that Kashmir, as a Muslim-majority State, should naturally form part of Pakistan, Chagla said, this was a wholly erroneous view of the legal and constitutional position. The partition of India was confined to British India. While drawing frontier lines, the question of Muslim-majority provinces had been taken into consideration with regard to British India. There was no question whatsoever with regard to the religious complexion of the population of the princely States and the question of accession to India or Pakistan was left to the determination of the ruler of the State.78 In July 1964 Mrs Indira Gandhi, then India’s Minister for Infor­ mation and Broadcasting, said, ‘Now, this whole question has at­ tained far more importance because of the Chinese invasion. Kashmir has its frontiers not only with India and Pakistan but also with the Soviet Union and China, a fact which people tend to ignore here [in B ritain]. Therefore, both these countries are intensely interested in what happens there, specially because there are American bases in Pakistan very close to the Kashmir border.’ She said the first point was that the strategic importance of Kashmir ‘had increased since the Chinese aggression, specially since Pakistan made a pact with China and even offered her a bit of land in the north of Ladakh, which is a part of Kashmir.’ The second point, she added, was the religious basis of the Pakistani demand for Kashmir.79

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It will be seen from the above authoritative statements that among the reasons given for not holding the plebiscite are: a plebis­ cite would let loose communal trouble in India and Pakistan; the economic stability of Jammu and Kashmir would be damaged; Pakistan had not fulfilled the conditions laid down by the Security Council for a plebiscite to be held, viz., vacating her aggression, and, therefore, the question of holding a plebiscite did not arise; while drawing frontier lines, the question of Muslim-majority provinces had been taken into consideration with regard to British India, but there was no such question with regard to the population of the princely States, whose accession to India or Pakistan had been left to the determination of the ruler of the State; after the Chinese invasion of India in 1962, the strategic importance of Kashmir had increased; and India is a secular state which does not accept the two-nation theory. The last reason seems to us the most important of all: that a secular policy for India demanded that a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir should not be held because its premise, that Hindus and Muslims are two nations, was wrong. India was, indeed, keen that this basic idea should be conveyed in unambiguous terms—the impact of secularism on the domestic and the foreign policy of India. While no survey has been taken on the views of the Indian Muslims, fair evidence exists to show that a large number of Muslim organizations and Muslim newspapers in India publicly support the Government of India’s view.80We give three examples* Kashmir is a symbol of secularism’, six Muslim organizations of Udaipur told the President of the Security Council in a telegram dated 2 May 1964, ‘and should be considered an integral part of India. Any division of Kashmir on the basis of religion will endanger our safety. We strongly denounce in unequivocal terms the so-called theory of self-determination under the garb of communalism.’81 A resolution adopted at a meeting of the All-India Rajasthan Mohibban-Wattan Kashmir, Ajmer, on 2 May 1964 said: ‘It is both in the interest of Indian Muslims and also the Muslims of Kashmir that Kashmir should continue to be an integral part of India. Under the sec­ ularism of India, all citizens, including 50 million Muslims, have equal rights and opportunities and are quite safe despite the false and mischievous propaganda of Pakistan which is based on religious sentiments.’82 A statement of Maqbool Ahmed Ansari, published in the Urdu

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weekly Subh-e-Watan, Gorakhpur, contained the same view.83 It is appropriate to conclude this section with a reference to the views of a former Chief Justice of India, P.B. Gajendragadkar, on the subject. Delivering the Patel Memorial Lectures, the former Chief Justice of India said that it is of the utmost importance to state clearly and unambiguously that India’s reluctance to hold a plebis­ cite arises from the basic and fundamental fact that she genuinely fears that whatever the result of the plebiscite, her secularism will be exposed to the very grave risk of resurgent military chauvinism on the part of the majority communities in both India and Pakistan.84

India and West Asia The impact of the presence of a large Muslim minority in India on India’s foreign relations is perhaps best seen in India’s relations with West Asia. India has important political, economic and security interests in West Asia. Politically, it has been important to gain the support of the Arab world (the large bulk of whose population is Muslim), if only to counter Pakistan’s propaganda against India, especially in respect of the Kashmir question. Economically, the value of India’s trade with the Arab world was estimated in 1963-4 at more than Rs. 100 crores per annum85 not to speak of the impor­ tance of the region for the supply of oil to India. From the security point of view, the region is of great interest to India: Dr S. Mahmud told the All-India Palestine Conference in August 1967, ‘Arab countries are the first line of defence for India. Alexander invaded India from that side and Napoleon also tried to attack India from the same direction. If the Arab countries continued to be the allies of India, the invasion of Imperialism on this country will never succeed.’86 India has, therefore, always been, as Mrs Gandhi said in June 1967, ‘extremely friendly to the Arab countries’ and had sup­ ported their just cause. The Prime Minister said that some inciden­ tal advantages of Arab friendship were that India would not be isolated in view of Pakistan’s persistent propaganda that this coun­ try was anti-Arab. Pakistan had already initiated a move for the formation of an Islamic bloc and in this she was being encouraged by some Western countries. If such a bloc were formed, it was bound to be detrimental to India. India’s support to the Arab cause was likely to cause a set-back to Pakistani efforts to drive a wedge between India and the Arab countries and its move for the formation of an Islamic bloc.

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We shall discuss India’s pro-Arab policy under five heads:(l)The creation of Israel; (2) The establishment of diplomatic relations; (3) The Suez Crisis; (4) The Arab-Israeli war of 1967; and conclude the discussion with a brief examination of (5) whether there has been a national consensus in favour of the policy followed by the Gov­ ernment of India. THE CREATION OF ISRAEL

It is important to note that even before India became independent, the Indian national movement had extended sympathy and support to the Arabs in their struggle for freedom; the Indian National Congress had opposed the many schemes of partition of Palestine and the intrusion of Zionism into the Arab world. Thus the Haripura session of the Congress in 1938 condemned the decision of Great Britain as a mandatory power to bring about the partition of Palestine and the appointment of a Commission to carry out this project.‘The Congress’. the resolution added,‘records its emphatic protest against the reign of terror in Palestine to force this policy upon the unwilling Arabs. The Congress expresses its full sympathy with the Arabs in their struggle for national freedom and their fight against British imperialism.’ Indian political leaders of the stature of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru strongly condemned the Zionist intrusion into, and the partition of, Palestine* It is wrong and inhuman’,wrote Mahatma Gandhi, to impose the Jews on the Arabs . . . They [the Jews] can settle in Palestine only by the goodwill of the Arabs. They should strive to convert the Arab heart.’ 87 He was clear in his mind that Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English, or France to the French.8®Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to his daughter on 29 May 1933, commenting on the Balfour Declaration of 1917: ‘One not unim­ portant fact seems to have been overlooked. Palestine was not a wilderness, or an empty uninhabited place. It was already some­ body else’s home.’89 The Palestine question came before the United Nations in 1947 (28 April 1947-15 May 1947) and the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine was appointed (with India as one of the eleven members) to investigate all questions relating to the Pales­ tine problem and to make recommendations. The committee pre­ sented two sets of proposals. The majority proposal recommended

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the partition of Palestine into two independent states, a Jewish State and an Arab State, the city of Jerusalem to be placed under the International Trusteeship system. The partition plan was opposed by India, which with two other members submitted a minority report and proposed an independent federal State, consisting of an A rab State and a Jewish State with Jerusalem as its federal capital. Speak­ ing in the Constituent Assembly on 4 December 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru defended India’s pro-Arab decision in the Palestine Com­ mittee: ‘We suggested a federal state with, naturally, an Arab majority in charge of the federal state but with autonomy for the other regions—the Jewish regions. After a great deal of thought we decided that this was not only a fair and equitable solution of the problem, but the only real solution of the problem. Any other solution would have meant fighting and conflict.. . . I have no doubt that the position we had taken was the right one and I still have no doubt that it would have brought about the best solution.’90 Mrs Gandhi (then Minister for Information and Broadcasting), clinched the issue when in an interview vnthAl-Ahram, Cairo, in 1966 she said, ‘We oppose Israel not only because of our friendship with the Arabs but also because we are opposed to the creation o f States on a religious basis."*1 When the majority plan was, in its essentials, adopted by the United Nations and a Jewish State was proclaimed on 14 May 1948 under the name of Israel, India voted against Israel's admission. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

On 17 September 1950 India granted de jure recognition to Israel on the general principle accepted by India that ‘governments estab­ lished in sovereign nations should be recognized even if we do not agree with their policies. This was the rationale in our recognizing China and in our recognition of Israel.’92 V.K. Krishna Menon, who was among Nehru’s trusted advisers on foreign affairs, has given another reason for India deciding to recognize Israel: ‘I have always taken the view that whatever counry is recognized by the U.N. should be recognized by us. . . . The only place where the Arabs sit with the Israelis is the U.N. That is why I said to the Prime Minister, “ the Israelis are in the U.N., we must recognize them” .'93 Let it be stressed, as M.S. Agwani has pointed out, that an official statement clearly stated that India’s recognition of Israel did not

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mean that it endorsed the Israeli position regarding its boundaries.94 But India did not immediately follow up the de jure recognition with the exchange of diplomatic personnel, no doubt because the Government of India did not want to wound the susceptibilities of Indian Muslims. Asked at a press conference on 7 August 1958 why India had not exchanged diplomatic representatives with Israel, Jawaharlal Nehru was careful not to give away the basic reason mentioned above; he admitted that this was a matter on which two opinions could be held but India’s attitude was adopted ‘after a careful consideration of the balance of factors. It is not a matter of high principle, but it is based on how we could best serve and be helpful in that area. We should like the problem between Israel and the Arab countries to be settled peacefully. After careful thought we felt that while recognizing Israel as an entity, we need not at this stage exchange diplomatic personnel.’95 Dinesh Singh, then Minister of External Affairs, was more forth­ right. He told the Conference of Indian envoys accredited to West Asian and North African countries, held at New Delhi on 27 May 1969: ‘India had not established diplomatic relations with Israel because Israel had followed wrong policies against the Arabs par­ ticularly the Palestinians. It was persisting in this policy and until there was a revision of this policy it would be difficult for India to revise her policy. One could also fully justify India’s policy in this regard from the point of view of national interest.’96 Muslim opinion in India has not been reconciled even to India’s de jure recognition of Israel. The following paragraph taken from the Radiance substantiates our position: Mr. Chagla had to confess in the Lok Sabha that India had recognized Israel even though it had not established diplomatic relations with it. This obvi­ ously places the Government in an awkward position. Why does not it recognize Taiwan also, in that case? If the Government of India is really convinced that the very existence of Israel is based on an unjust and imperialistic usurpation, it should extend no kind of recognition to it. Even consular relations should not have been there. Falsehood and injustice deserve no support of any kind from a lover of truth and justice.97

Walter Eytan, the then Director-General of the Israel Foreign Office, has recorded that in February and March 1952, he con­ ducted negotiations in Delhi seeking recognition of Israel and that ‘the Prime Minister had approved the proposal .. .the formal deci­ sion to establish diplomatic relations remained to be confirmed by

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the Cabinet. . . . Nobody, in fact, outside Nehru’s most intimate circle has ever discovered why the Government of India did not establish diplomatic relations with Israel in the spring or summer of 1952, and no convincing explanation has been given for its sudden change of mind.’98 One explanation may be that Nehru accepted the advice of his trusted adviser in regard to the Arab world, Maulana Azad, the Minister of Education in the Government of India, that the ex­ change of diplomatic relations with Israel was not worth the risk it certainly entailed. Pakistan would fan the flames of communal hatred in India by reference to Israel and this would embarrass the Indian Muslims; besides, India’s position in the Arab world would be especially affected as at that time India was seeking the support of the Arab nations on the Kashmir question and the Muslim State of Pakistan was also doing likewise." thl

sutz CRISIS

In a speech at Alexandria on 26 July 1956, President Nasser an­ nounced that (1) the Egyptian Government had nationalized the Suez Canal Company and would use the income from the Canal to build the Aswan Dam; (2) shareholders in the Suez Canal Company would be paid in accordance with the last closing prices on the Paris Bourse; and (3) all Suez Canal Company funds in Egypt had been frozen. Describing the Suez Canal Company as an exploiting com­ pany and a state within a state, President Nasser declared that it had been nationalized in the name of the nation and that all its assets and commitments would pass to the Egyptian State.100 The British and French governments immediately took military and naval precautions more especially in the Mediterranean; an­ nounced the bolding of a 24-Power Conference at London to con­ sider the establishment of an international agency for the Canal to ensure freedom and security of transit, with due regard to the interests of Egypt; and took steps to set up a Canal Users’ Associa­ tion (inaugurated on 1 October 1956) to operate the Canal, collect transit dues and pay Egypt appropriately. The Security Council considered the Suez question and passed a resolution on 13 October 1956 which stated that any settlement of the Suez question should meet six requirements: free and open transit; respect for Egyptian sovereignty; insulation from the politics of any country; tolls to be

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fixed by agreement between Egypt and the users; a fair proportion of dues to be allowed to developments; and unsolved disputes between Egypt and the Suez Canal Company to be settled by arbitration. On 29 October, the Israeli army launched an attack on Egyptian positions in the Sinai Peninsula with the avowed aim of eliminating the fedayeen (Egyptian commandos) bases from which frequent attacks had been made into Israeli territory. Two days later, the British and French forces also launched an attack on Egypt. The Security Council, which met on 29 October to consider the situation arising out of the Israeli aggression on Egypt, could not take any decision due to the vetoes exercised by Britain and France on a U.S. draft resolution calling for immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of Israeli forces behind armistice lines. The General Assembly then considered the situation; acting on the Assembly resolutions, the British and French forces completed their withdrawal from Egypt by 22 December 1956, and Israel in the first week of March 1957. A U.N. emergency force was set up in the Gaza strip to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities. Throughout the crisis, it is clear from the records, India supported Egypt wholeheartedly. Prime Minister Nehru supported Egypt in her nationalization of the Suez Canal: in a statement in the Lok Sabha on 8 August 1956, Nehru defended Egypt’s action in nationalizing the Suez Canal, and sharply criticised the Western Powers for the military and naval measures taken. The nationaliza­ tion of the Suez Canal, he said, ‘had been precipitated by the decision of the Western Powers not to assist in the construction of the Aswan Dam, and there had arisen a grave crisis which, if not resolved peacefully, (could) lead to a conflict the extent and effects of which it is not easy to assess. While the sudden-ness of the decision to nationalize and the thorough manner in which it had been implemented might have contributed to violent reactions’, he said, the terms of nationalization itself under the laws of Egypt were within the province of that Government. The sovereignty of Egypt was beyond question.’101 The proposal for tne establishment of a Canal Users’ Association (which was in fact inaugurated on 1 October 1956) was in Nehru’s view, full of dangerous potentialities. He told the Lok Sabha on 13 September 1956: ‘The consequences which may flow from it may well be very grave. One thing is clear and that is that the action

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proposed is not the result of agreement, co-operation or consent, but is to be taken unilaterally, and thus is in the nature of an imposed decision. The Government of India deeply regret this development which is very unusual and which will render a peaceful settlement more difficult of realization . . . To seek to impose a settlement by force or by threats of force is to disregard the rights o f nations.’102The Government of India vehemently condemned in an official statement Israeli and the British and French aggression on Egypt.103 In addition, the following message was sent by the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to the U.N. Secretary-General: We have been profoundly shocked by recent developments in the Middle East and, more particularly, by the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt after their rejection of the Security Council resolution moved by the United States. It is clear that Israel has committed large-scale aggression against Egypt. Instead of trying to stop this aggression, the U.K. and France are themselves invading Egyptian territory. .. .The argument that this invasion is meant to protect the Canal and to ensure free traffic has no force, as the first result of this invasion is for this traffic to cease. In view of the disastrous consequences of the invasion of Egyptian territory, I earnestly trust that the U.N. will take strong steps in this matter to prevent the world plunging into war, and demand the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Egypt. The procedures of the U.N. must be swifter than those of invasion and aggression. In sending you this message I am not only reflecting the unanimous views of my Government and people but also, I am sure, of a large number of other peoples.104

In a speech at Hyderabad in November 1962, Nehru described the Anglo-French action in Egypt as ‘naked aggression’ which would not be tolerated by ‘the self-respecting and independent nations of Asia and Africa’. After declaring that India’s sympathies were entirely with Egypt, he went on: There has been the sudden invasion of Egypt by Israel in breach of an armistice and of theU.N. Charter. In these disputes our sympathies have been for the Arab nations. They have had a raw deal and this must be remedied. But we have no enmity towards Israel. I am not thinking of Israel being wiped out. The fact remains that it is a case of clear and naked aggression on Egypt by Israel. Every member of the U.N. should try to stop it and resist it. But Britain and France issued an ultimatum to Egypt. .. .The Suez Canal was functioning properly. If there was any danger to the Canal it was from Israel, which advanced 90 miles inside Egypt. Britain has been a force for peace in the past two years, and because of this my sorrow and distress is all the greater for the amazing adventure which Britain and France have entered into.105

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Constructively too, in finding a solution to the crisis, India was helpful. As Nehru told the Lok Sabha on 25 March 1957,‘in regard to the situation in Egypt, in the Suez Canal and round about, we have had the privilege of being in consultation with the Egyptian government on the one side, and in the United Nations with others intimately connected with these matters on the other.’106 India’s friendship with Nasser was a key factor in the situation. ‘We put up the formula for them’, Krishna Menon has said,‘that they would carry out the obligations of the [Constantinople] Convention of 1888. That put them in the right.’107India evolved what is known as the Indian plan (issued on 20 August 1956) for a negotiated settle­ ment of the crisis and submitted it to the London Conference referred to earlier. The plan was based on six principles: 1. the recognition of the sovereign rights of Egypt; 2. the recognition of the Suez Canal as an integral part of Egypt and as a waterway of international importance; 3. free and uninterrupted navigation for all nations in accor­ dance with the Convention of Constantinople of 1888; 4. the tolls and charges being just and equitable, and the facilities of the Canal being available to all nations without discrimination; 5. the Canal being maintained at all times in proper condition and in accordance with modem technical requirements relating to navigation; and 6. the interests of the users of the Canal receiving due recognition.108 These proposals were revised and issued on 24 October 1956;109 India’s representative, V.K. Krishna Menon,canvassed support for these proposals from the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Egypt and from the Secretary-General of the United Nations whom he met during the time of the Security Council meeting; it has been surmised that the principles accepted by the Security Council and the revised Indian proposals were more or less identical principles.110 India also co-operated with the United Nations in the setting-up of the U.N. Emergency Force in Egypt and readily accepted the invitation by the U.N. Secretary-General to send forces to that area. Besides, Krishna Menon, as the leader of the Indian Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, helped to define the functions of the U.N. Emergency Force in relation to Egypt and to safeguard Egypt’s sovereignty. He told the Assembly that the United Nations

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Emergency Force should not and could not be used as an army of occupation on the soil of Egypt,111 and that it has been basic to the whole functioning of U.N.E.F. that it could not set foot anywhere on Egyptian soil except in full accordance with international law and practice and with recognition of the sovereignty of Egyptian territory. Therefore, there could not be any question of ordering these forces to operate anywhere, he told the Assembly, excep in terms of Egyptian sovereignty and with Egyptian consent.*12 This position was accepted by the General Assembly. A word may be added on the reasons for India’s pro-Egypt policy. Nehru’s personal friendship with Nasser had something to do with it; but basically this attitude stemmed from three sources: first, Nehru was clear in his mind that threats by Britain and France to settle the dispute by display or use of force recalled colonial memories, and great resentment was caused in Asia by such threats: 'It does not belong to this age.’113 ‘I think’, said Krishna Menon, ‘the Israelis lost by joining the French and the British. The invasion angered Asia and Africa; it placed them in the role of allies, and abettors of Imperialism.’114 Secondly, India was not a disinterested party: ‘She is a principal user of this waterway, and her economic life and development is not unaffected by the dispute, not to speak of worse developments in regard to it.’n5Finally, Egypt was an Arab State. THH ARAB—ISRAELI WAR OF 1967

The tension in West Asia culminating in the six-day war of June 1967 began with the receipt by the Secretary-General on 18 May of an official request from the U.A.R. Government for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (U.N.E.F.) from the area it had been occupying since 1957; the Secretary-General had to com­ ply with it. The situation took a menacing turn with President Nasser’s an­ nouncement on 22 May that Israeli ships would be denied the right of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. The possibility of such a move was implicit in his demand for the immediate withdrawal of the U.N.E.F from the U.A.R. territory and the Gaza Strip. But it had been widely hoped that he would not use his forces at Sharm el-Shaikh to block the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships in the immediate future and allow the crisis to blow

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over. Israel immediately declared that it would regard the closing of the Strait to Israeli flag-ships and ships of other countries proceed­ ing to Isrltcl, as a casus belli. The Arab-Israeli war broke out on 5 June with Israel firing the first shot and ended on 10 June; it ended only after Israel had taken over more Arab territory. The Security Council met several times both before and after the war; the General Assembly also con­ stantly met in special Session. The crisis ended for the time being with the Security Council adopting a resolution on 22 November 1967 setting forth principles for a just and lasting peace. These principles were: 1. withdrawl of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; 2. termination of all claims of states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. In its resolution, the Council also reaffirmed the necessity for: (1) guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international water­ ways in the area; (2) achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; and (3) guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and polit­ ical independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones. Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to desig­ nate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned, in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and princi­ ples of the Council’s resolution.116 India’s attitude to the Arabs in 1967 was as friendly as it had been to Egypt in 1956: addressing a meeting of Congress M.P.s in May 1967, the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said that India’s interests required peace in the area and ‘we would like our Arab friends to know that Indo-U A.R. friendship is firm and abiding’.117 In a statement in the Lok Sabha on 25 May 1967 on develop­ ments in West Asia, M.C. Chagla, then Minister of External Affairs, reiterated the stand taken by India as far back as 1957 that the Gulf of Aqaba was an inland sea and that ‘the entry to the Gulf lies within the territorial waters of the United Arab Republic and Saudi

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Arabia ’ He blamed Israel for the tension that had developed in the area and defended the precautionary measures taken by the U. A .R. to deter Israel from any aggressive designs against Syriat3yria had apprehended an attack following heavy troop concentration by Israel on its borders. The Israeli Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Chief of the Army Staff were quoted as saying that they would ‘teach Syria a lesson’ and even march up to Damascus. The U.A.R., which had signed the mutual defence agreement with Syria in November 1966, feared that Israel wanted to bring about a change of government in Syria through pressure and even by invasion. Chagla also condemned the Israeli provocation in opening fire on the U.N. plane carrying General Inderjit Rikhye, Commander of U.N.E.F.. when it was flying inside the Gaza Strip He commended General Rikhye’s courage in refusing to comply with the Israeli bid to force his plane down. The External Affairs Minister fully en­ dorsed the decision of the U.N. Secretary-General to withdraw the U.N.E.F. Force from the Israeli-U.A.R. border at the request of the U. A.R. The Government of India, he said, could not be party to any procedure which would make U.N.E.F.118an occupation force; nor could it agree to U.N.E.F.’s continued presence there in the absence of U.A.R.’s consent. And in any case Indian troops could not remain part of U.N.E.F. without U.A.R.’s approval.119 He appreciated the reasons which impelled the U.A.R. to ask for the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. from its territory. The continuing consent of a host country was a basic principle which had been applied all along to all U.N. peace-keeping operations. The Secretary-General himself had conceded that U.N.E.F. was conducting a peace­ keeping and not an enforcement operation. Speaking in the Sec­ urity Council debate on the situation in West Asia, G. Parthasarathy, India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, supported the U.A.R.’s stand on the Gulf of Aqaba.120 After the outbreak of war, India continuing to side with the Arabs, took the correct position that not only must the Security Council ask for a cease-fire, but demand the withdrawal of all forces to positions held by them on 4 June 1967 (i.e., before the outbreak of war). Chagla enunciated what he called ‘the cardinal principles’ of international law, practice, morality and behaviour by which alone a lasting peace could be established whether in West Asia or else­ where:

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First, it is not open to a country to start a war merely because it feels that a threat to its security exists. If it feels that such a threat exists, the Charter prescribes various courses of action open to it through peaceful means and, of course, it could come to the Security Council. But it is, in spirit and letter of the Charter, illegal to deal with a threat which one State thinks is being held out by a neighbouring State through recourse to arms. Secondly, no aggressor can be permitted to retain the fruits of aggression. Thirdly, it is not permissible for a country to acquire the territory of another State in order to be able to bargain from a position of strength. Finally, rights cannot be established, territorial disputes cannot be set­ tled, and boundaries cannot be adjusted through an armed conflict.121

India, he said, was committed to the principle of settlement of international disputes through peaceful means and the right of all nations to live in freedom and enjoy the fruits of freedom. He added:(Where peace is threatened or aggression is committed we find it impossible to remain silent or passive. We have, therefore, voiced our sincere and wholehearted sympathy for and solidarity with the Arab peoples in their hour of trial and tribulation.’122 NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN FAVOUR OF A PRO-ARAB POLICY?

That the Indian Muslims were with the Government of India in its pro-Arab policy is evident; they were against the creation of the State of Israel, they were against establishing diplomatic relations with it, they supported the Government of India’s policy in regard to the Suez crisis and they supported the Government of India’s policy in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967. A representa­ tive statement was made by a Muslim writer on 11 June 1967fThe Government of India deserves all praise for its courageous stand in favour of the Arabs.’123 We have pointed out earlier that if the Government of India had not given de jure recognition to Israel, the Muslims would have been happier. The rest of the Indian people were generally behind the Government of India in regard to its de jure recognition of Israel, non-establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, and its pro-Arab policy in regard to the Suez crisis. Regarding the conflict of 1967, however, a study of the proceed­ ings of Parliament and of meetings of various political parties as well as editorials and articles in the leading newspapers suggests that there was no consensus. For instance, on 25 May 1967 H.V. Kamath, Chairman of the P.S.P. Parliamentary Board, said at Bangalore that India should

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collaborate with other nations in striving for the return of peace in West Asia and not worsen the situation by blindly backing the U.A.R. He deplored Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s stand and said that the Arab-Israeli conflict presented a mangled scene where the facts of the situation were obscure. It should be in our own national interest that we remain neutral. He recalled in this connection that the Arab countries had remained neutral during India’s conflict with China in 1962 and with Pakistan in 1965 and asked why th e country should make a mistake now by supporting the U A .R .124 The Indian Express on the other hand wrote editorially on 2 June 1967: By rushing to the unqualified support of the UAR in the current crisis, India has needlessly thrown away an opportunity to play a constructive role in restoring sanity in West Asia. It may be that the Israeli position on the international maritime status of the Gulf of Aqaba is not indisputable. But the dispute over the Gulf is only a symptom of a deeper mala&e. The A rab countries are not willing to accept the legitimacy of the Israeli State. They are determined to destroy Israel sooner or later. India cannot share that objective---- Consequently, the objective of India’s policy should be to bring about co-existence between Israel and its Arab neighbours. It cannot do this so long as it mechanically adopts a partisan stand in support of the UAR everytime there is a conflict between Cairo and Tel Aviv. India’s support to Cairo during the Suezerisis was correct and just, based as it was on merits of the case. It is most regrettable that on this occasion New Delhi’s support to the UAR has been given without reference to the merits of the dispute.125

That there was no national consensus may also be seen from the fact that the opposition leaders including those of the Jan Sangh, the Swatantra, the Samyukta Socialist Party and the Praja Socialist Party refused to endorse the draft of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s statement on West Asia policy for which she also wanted the support of the Opposition, before she made it in the Lok Sabha on 6 June 1967 (in view of the serious crisis, she felt that the Opposition parties should support the government stand). Their main objection to endorsing the government’s policy was two-fold: they felt it would be partisan to blame Israel for escalating the conflict; secondly, the government must avoid taking a position which would make it difficult for it later to use such influence as it had to promote a reasonable and just settlement.126

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India's Interest in the Independence o f Bangladesh We have referred earlier to India’s interest in the emergence of Bangladesh; and to the resolution passed by the Indian Parliament on 31 March 1971 expressing its profound sympathy for and sol­ idarity with the people of East Bengal in their struggle for a democ­ ratic way of life. The object of Indian diplomacy, after Parliament had declared its unequivocal support for the people of Bangladesh, was to mobilize world opinion against the wanton killings and destruction in Bang­ ladesh; and to persuade the nations, especially the major powers, to intercede with Pakistan to find a political solution to the problem. Thirteen ministerial delegations visited seventy countries to explain the crushing burden imposed by the refugees on India. The Minister of External Affairs told the General Assembly on 27 September 1971: The first and foremost action which this assembly and all other international organs, within or without the United Nations system, can take is to impress on the military regime of Islamabad the fact that force will not succeed, and that therefore, a political settlement between the military regime and the already elected leaders is essential. We consider it wholly short-sighted to wait until worse crises have arisen. Bilaterally, all governments can do their utmost to ensure, by whatever means are availa­ ble to them, that the military regime stops its repression, enters into negotiations with the elected leaders to achieve a political settlement with their consent, and sends the army back to the barracks.'

Only by these measures could the flow of refugees be stopped and refugees already in India return home with safety, dignity and honour. The Prime Minister herself undertook journeys to the Soviet Union, Belgium, Austria, Britain, the U .SA ., France and West Germany. She emphasised in the course of her discussion with the leaders in these countries, the need for the military regime to settle with the already elected leaders of East Bengal. While her stand was appreciated by enlightened opinion throughout the world, says a Government Report; Governments were either un­ able or reluctant to reverse the course of events in peaceful and humanitarian directions.127 Meanwhile in East Bengal, developments of far-reaching significance were taking placc. On 14 April the elected leaders of the National Assembly proclaimed the formation of a Provisional

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Government of Bangladesh and called upon the people of East Bengal to wage a war of liberation against the Pakistani occupation forces, large areas were liberated from the military yoke, and local administration was set up in those areas by the Provisional Gov­ ernment. On 17 April, at a meeting at Mujibnagar, the members of the Provisional Government including the acting President and the Prime Minister ratified the Declaration of Independence and proc­ laimed the birth of the Republic of Bangladesh. The war of libera­ tion continued. The Pakistan army was massed on the Indian bor­ der: many border violations and border incidents took place. On 24 November Pakistan declared a state of emergency; and on 3 D e­ cember 1971, surprise attacks were launched on Indian airfields along the frontier in Punjab, Rajasthan and Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan; on 4 December the Indian Prime Minister told the Lok Sabha: ‘This morning the Government of West Pakistan has de­ clared war on us.’128 She added: ‘We are fighting to safeguard our territorial integrity and national honour. Above all we are fighting for the cause of human freedom.’ On 6 December 1971 the Government of India accorded recog­ nition to Bangladesh. The war was fought on two fronts, the eastern and the western, and India was able, in co-operation with the Mukti Bahini (East Bengal freedom fighters), to defeat the Pakistani forces in Bangladesh, who surrendered on 16 December 1971. The Prime Minister of India ordered a unilateral ceasefire; on the morn­ ing of 17 December, India’s offer was accepted by Pakistan. The fourteen-day war had secured the liberation of Bangladesh and confirmed its establishment as a sovereign independent state. There were several reasons for the support and active assistance which India extended to Bangladesh. Inaction by the Government of India would have affected the credibility of India’s foreign policy which was committed to supporting struggles against colonial op­ pression; the return of the ten million East Bengal refugees to their homeland was clearly desirable; a neighbour friendly to India would be an asset; India had to safeguard her own territorial integrity when Pakistan had declared war on India on 4 December 1971. The most important consideration which, in our judgement, explains India’s friendly interest in the emergence of Bangladesh was the fact that the Government of India rightly realized that by declaring the independence of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was trying to build a secular state, which accorded with India’s deep commit­

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ment to the ideal of secularism. Though the Sheikh had been in favour of the creation of Pakistan twenty-four years earlier, Bang­ ladesh reflected the change in his political beliefs. H.R. Choudhury, Head of the Bangladesh Mission, New Delhi, rightly said: We have buried religion-based nationalism for ever. We refuse to identify our nationhood with religion. We shall be good Muslims, good Christians, good Hindus and good Buddhists. But together we shall be good citizens of Bangladesh.129

According to Masood Ahmed the development of Bangladesh, perceived in the context of the long-term interests of Indian Mus­ lims, was welcome‘as the emergence of Bangladesh as an indepen­ dent nation may, in the long run, alleviate much of the general doubt and suspicion being entertained about Indian Muslims. A pruned Pakistan will mean greater popular confidence in Indian Muslims and increased frankness on their part in dealing with national issues.’ The existence of pro-Pakistani elements among Indian Muslims, though small in number, could not be denied. The separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan would ‘dampen the morale of these nefarious elements and this will have a salubrious effect on the national standing of Indian Muslims.’130 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, addressing a public meeting soon after his arrival from London in New Delhi, expressed his and his people’s gratitude to India’s people and Government, and particu­ larly to the Prime Minister, for securing his freedom and helping the Bangladesh freedom movement. The two countries had an identity of ideals, outlook and values and would live in amity, he said. Bangladesh, he said, stood on the four pillars of nationalism, demo­ cracy , socialism and secularism. These were not mere slogans: ‘We sincerely believe in these principles.' His country, like India, firmly believed in secularism. He was saying this because he had seen that the Pakistani rulers used to encourage communal riots whenever the people of Bangladesh started any movement. This had simul­ taneous repercussions in India, which hampered the movement in Bangladesh. He said he could assure the people of India that the cancer of communalism would never be allowed to raise its head in Bangladesh and hoped it would also be banished from India.131 The joint communique issued on 8 February 1972 at the end of the talks between the Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh said:

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They [the two Prime Ministers] resolved to give practical shape to the legitimate and deeply felt aspirations of the common peoples of the two countries, guided by the principles of democracy, socialism, secularism, non-alignment and opposition to racialism and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. Towards these ends, they expressed their determina­ tion to promote in every possible way co-operation between the Govern­ ments and peoples of Bangladesh and India, inspired by a vision of lasting peace, amity and good neighbourliness.132 /

In its editorial on the joint communique, the Amrita Bazar Patrika observed: More than ordinary significance attached to the joint communique issued by the Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh, even if it only reiterates the ideals commonly shared by the peoples of the two countries. The importance lies in the fact that the communique codifies, in concrete terms, these ideals and the principles flowing from them thereby making it a historic document. Nothing brings two countries closer together than iden­ tity of outlook and common ideals. As Sheikh Mujibur Rehman pointed out in his address to the public meeting at the Brigade Parade Ground, it was not out of any selfish motives that India had rushed to the help of the Mukti Bahini in liberating Bangladesh from the colonial yoke of West Pakistan. It was to uphold the ideals of democracy, secularism and nationalism that India had come to the aid of the people of Bangladesh. Reiteration of these ideals in the joint communique completely vindicates India's stand, even though certain countries which pose themselves as champions of democracy have yet to reconcile themselves to the realities of the situation.133

The 25-year Treaty of Peace signed by Mrs Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in March 1972 in Dacca set the seal on these common ideals which both India and Bangladesh believe in.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. Everson v. Board of Education, (1947), 350 US I (59). 2. Reynold v. United States, (1878) 98 U.S. 145. 3. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed.), Some Recent Speeches and Writings o f Mr. Jinnah, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1942), pp. 153-4. 4. P.B. Gajendragadkar, a former Chief Justice of India, ‘Secularism and the Indian Constitution', White Star (Bombay), vol. VIII, pp. 4-7. 5. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, (1954), Supreme Court Reports, vol. V (1954), (Manager of Publications, Civil Lines, Delhi), p. 1025. 6. See Gajendragadkar, *Secularism'.

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7. H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide—Britain-Jndia-Pakistan (New York: Atheneum, 1971), p. 16 8. MRT in India's Problem o f Her Future Constitution. A Collection o f Essays by Various Authors (Bombay: M.H. Saiyid), pp. 51-6. 9. The Statesman, 19 September 1947. 10. M.S. Golwalkar, Bunch o f Thoughts (Bangalore, Vikrama Prakashan, 1966), pp. 127-8. 11. Kuldip Nayar, The Statesman, 11 April 1973, p. 8. 12. Report o f the Commission o f Enquiry on Communal Disturbances, 1967; see also Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report, 1968-69, p. 71; Report, 1969-70 (p. 81), however, says that there were 346 communal incidents in 1968; see also Annual Report, 1973-74, pp. 1-2. 13. Mohammed Ghouse, Secularism, Society and Law in India (Delhi: Vikas, 1973), pp. 64, 66-9. 14. A.G. Noorani. ‘The Grievances of Indian Muslims’, Secular Democracy, vol. II, August 1969. pp. 31-2 and 37. 15. Quoted by Moin Shakir in Secular Democracy, Annual 1972, p. 32. 16. Ibid. 17. See The American Political Science Review, vol. IX, p. 583. 18. See the text of the resolution in Annexure II to Balraj Madhok,Indianisation? What, Why and How (Delhi: S. Chand, 1970), pp. 100-2. It is interesting to recall that originally adopted by the Executive Committee of the Conference the Indianizadon clause carried a specific reference to Muslims: ‘This particularly applies to Indian Muslims because over 93 per cent of them had voted for Muslim League and Pakistan in the General Elections of 1946 which preceded Partition. Indianizadon of this section of Indian Muslims was an imperative necessity for peace and unity of India.' Asian Recorder, 1970, p. 9408. 19. Times o f India, 8 April 1971. 20. Ibid., 9 April 1971. 21. Times o f India, 10 April 1971; Indian Express, 10 April 1971. 22. Hindustan Times, 11 April 1971. 23. Patriot, 12 April 1971. 24. National Herald, 23 April 1971. 25. Indian Express, 29 April 1971. 26. Ibid., 8 May 1971. 27. Hindustan Times, 18 June 1971. 28. Indian Express, 15 July 1971. 29. Hindu, 1 August 1971. 30. Hindustan Times, 7 August 1971. 31. Times o f India, 31 March 1971. 32. The signatories to the statement were M M . Hashim, Jamil ur-Rehman, M B . Rana, Syed Ahmad Agha, Salebhoy Abdul Kader, Asghar Hussain, Abdul Shafee, Zia-ur-Rehman Ansari, M. Tahir, Aziz Imam, Shafquat Jung, LutfulHaque, PJvi. Sayeed, Akbar Ali Khan, Baharul Islam, A.Q. Ansari, Usman Arif, Sher Khan and A. Mohammad. National Herald, 13 August 1971. 33. Among the signatories to the statement were Messrs Abdul Qaiyum Ansari, Mohd. Usman Arif, Akbar Ali Khan, Rashid-ud-Din Khan, Gulam Nabi Untoo, S. Nurul Hasan, Baharul Islam, Chaudhury A. Mohammad, Lutful- Haque, Chaudhury Tayyab Hussain Khan, Aziz Imam, M. M. Hashim, Jamilur.

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Rahman, Ziaur Rahman Ansari, Mohammad Yusuf and Sher Khan.Hindustan Times, 15 August 1971. 34. Times o f India, 30 August 1971. 35. Statesman, 18 October 1971. 36. Hindustan Times, 9 June 1971 (Editorial). 37. Ibid. 38. SE. Hassnain, ‘Indian Muslims and Bangladesh", Free Press Journal (Bombay), 17 June 1971. 39. Ansari Harvani, ex-MP, in a letter to The Motherland, 25 June 1971. 40. Ibid. 41. SE. Hassnain, 'Indian Muslims and Bangladesh'. 42. Ibid. 43. Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 4 August 1971. 44. Indian Express, 28 June 1971. 45. Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 4 August 1971. 46. Motherland, 5 July 1971. 47. Statesman (Delhi), 4 September 1971. 48. Patriot, 26 June 1971. 49. Samar Guha (P.S.P.) castigated Shamim for trying to underrate the move­ ment for a separate Bangladesh. Statesman, 28 March 1971. 50. Indian Express, 3 April 1971. 51. Statesman, 29 April 1971. 52. Hindustan Times, 16 July 1971. 53. Radio Pakistan, quoting Associated Press of Pakistan, referred to Sheikh Abdullah’s interview. 54. Indian Express (Delhi), 7 June 1971. 55. Motherland, 12 November 1971. 56. Ibid., 19 July 1971. 57. K. Rangaswamy, ‘Indian Parties and Bangladesh’, Motherland, 21 July 1971. 58. Motherland, 8 August 1971. 59. Hindu, 1 September 1971. 60. Hindustan Times, 7 May 1971 (italics ours). 61. Motherland, 27 April 1971. 62. Arif Hameed Khan Ghouri, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, in a letter to the editor, National Herald, 5 February 1972. 63. Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, Ind. ed. (Bombay: Jaico, 1951), p. 188. 64. Ibid., p. 190. 65. Ibid. 66. Entries in the Diary of General Scott, Chief of Staff, Jammu and Kashmir. Security Council Official Proceedings, 762nd meeting, 23 January 1957, p p .13—16. 67. Security Council Official Records, 763rd Meeting, 23 Januaiy 1957, p. 21. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid. 70. Ibid. 71. Security Council Official Records, 763rd Meeting, 23 January 1957, p. 22. 72. Salient Aspects o f the Kashmir Situation (Information Service of India), p. 6.

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This view found further expression in a pamphlet published by the Indian High Commission in London in May 1962 which inter alia stated that a plebiscite held under existing conditions ’would doubtless rouse religious passions all round which, in turn, might well lead to a worse holocaust than before.' 73. Ibid., p. 5. 74. Security Council Official Records, 1009th meeting, 3 May 1962, p. 22. 75. Michael Brecher, The New States o f Asia: A Political Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 207-8. 76. After the emergence of Bangladesh. India is now the second largest Muslim State in the world—the first being Indonesia. 77. M.C. Chagla’s speech at 1088th meeting of the Security Council on 5 February 1964. Security Council Official Records, 5 February 1964, pp. 2-3. 78. Security Council Official Records, 5 February 1964, pp. 5-6. 79. Hindustan Times, 23 July 1964. 80. The texts of statements issued and resolutions passed by some 76 Muslim individuals and organizations during the years 1963 and 1964 have been conveniently collected in a booklet entitled Kashmir: Indian Muslims*Chal­ lenge (Information Service of India, 1965). 81. Ibid., p. 14. 82. Ibid., pp. 13-14. 83. Ibid., p. 54. 84. P.B. Gajendragadkar, Kashmir Retrospect and Prospect: Patel Memorial Lec­ tures (Bombay: University of Bombay, 1967), p. 123. 85. The Journal o f Industry and Trade, vol. XV, p. 1040. In 1963-4, the total trade was of the value of Rs. 108.86 crcjres: imports Rs. 57.93 crores and exports Rs. 50.93 crores. 86. Radiance: Views Weekly (Delhi) vol. V, no. 5, 20 August 1967, pp. 3, 12. 87. Tendulkar, Mahatma, vol. IV, pp. 379-82. 88. Harijan, 26 November 1938, reprinted in Homer A. Jack (ed.), The Gandhi Reader: A source book o f his life and writing (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956), p. 318. 89. Jawaharlal Nehru, Glimpses o f World History (London: Lindsay Drummond, 1949), p. 763. 90. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 26. 91. Italics ours. 92. Statement by Dinesh Singh, Minister of External Affairs, at the Conference of Indian Ambassadors accredited to West Asian and North African countries held at New Delhi on 27 May 1969. FAR vol. XV, p. 110. 93. Brecher, India and World Politics, pp. 78-9. 94. B.R. Nanda (ed.), Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1976), p. 75. 95. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, pp. 414-15. 96. Foreign Affairs Records vol. XV, p. 110. 97. Radiance: Views Weekly (Delhi), vol. IV, no. 46, 4 June 1967, p. 15. 98. W. Eyton, The First Ten Years (New York, 1958), pp. 169-70. 99. See also M. Brecher, The New States o f Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 130.

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100. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. X, July 28—August 4,1956,p. 15001. 101. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, pp. 527-32. 102. Debates, vol. VIII, Part II, Cols. 6963-7; See also Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, pp. 532-4. 103. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. X, November 17-24,1956, p. 15209. 104. Ibid. 105. Ibid. 106. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, p. 539. 107. Brecher, India and World Politics, p. 63. 108. Foreign Policy o f India: Texts o f Documents 1947-64 (New Delhi, 1966), p. 252. 109. Ibid., pp. 254-7. 110. M.S. Rajan, India in World Affairs 1954-56 (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964), pp. 162-3: ‘The similarity of the six principles of the Security Council resolution to those in the Indian proposals canvassed by Krishna Menon in the course of the Security Council meeting was not just fortuitous. They were understood to have been incorporated in the Anglo-French draft resolution at the instance of the UN Secretary-General in the course of the informal discus­ sions outside the Security Council with the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Egypt to all of whom Menon had earlier presented the revised Indian proposals and which included more or less identical principles.’ 111. Official Records o f the General Assembly Plenary Meetings Verbatim Records o f Meetings (New York, United Nations), Eleventh Session, 641st Meeting, 18 January 1957, paras 44-7. 112. Ibid., 2 January 1957, paras 121-31. 113. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 529. 114. Brecher, India and World Politics, p. 77. 115. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, p. 531. 116. Every Man’s United Nations: A Summary o f the Activities o f the United Nations for the Period 1966-1970: A Five-Year Supplement (New York: United Na­ tions, 1971), p. 36. 117. Hindustan Times, 22 May 1967. 118. United Nations Emergency Force. 119. He added that the U-N-EJr. was set up in 1956 ‘to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities between the UAR and Israel. U N E P , was stationed with UAR’s consent on the UAR side of the border, while Israel had all along refused to allow it on its side.’ 120. Statesman, 31 May 1967. 121. Times o f India, 23 June 1967. 122. Ibid. 123. Radiance: Views Weekly, vol. IV, no. 47, 11 June 1967, pp. 1 and 16. 124. Hindustan Times, 26 May 1967. 125. It added: ‘It is worth recalling and repeating that New Delhi recognized the State of Israel within a few days of its creation by a UN resolution. Moreover, the maintenance of peace in West Asia is in India's vital interests.’ 126. See Times o f India, 7 June 1967. 127. Ministry ofDefence, Report 1971-72 (New Delhi, Ministry of Defence, 1972), p. 6.

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128. Times o f India, 5 December 1971, p. 6. 129. Hindustan Times, 24 November 1971. 130. Masood Ahmed, ‘Bangladesh and Indian Muslims’, Amrita Bazar Patrika, 19 October 1971. 131. Hindu, 7 February 1972. 132. National Herald, 9 February 1972. 133. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 9 February 1972.

CHAPTER

VI

Federalism The Impact o f Federalism on Foreign Relations We have earlier stated that federalism is a domestic factor which may have an impact on foreign relations. This needs elaboration. A federal State is one in which there is a central authority that represents the whole, and acts on behalf of the whole in external affairs and in such internal affairs as are held to be of common interest, and in which there are also provincial or state authorities with powers of legislation and administration within the sphere allotted to them by the C onstitutionIt is, in the words of Hamilton, ‘an association of States that forms a new one’; or, as Dicey put it, it is a political contrivance intended to reconcile national unity with the maintenance of the state’s rights. The distinctive feature of federation is the formal division of governmental powers, by a Constitution, between the constituent units (states, provinces, or cantons) and the larger State which they compose. The units have power to pass laws on the subjects allotted to them and to administer and interpret them; and the Federal Authority has similar power on the subjects allotted to it. Both the units and the Federal Authority may exercise their legislative, ad­ ministrative and judicial powers only within the limits set by the Constitution. The supremacy of the Constitution is, therefore, a second important feature of federation. The Constitution of the U.S., for instance, explicitly declares: ‘This constitution and the laws of the U.SA. which shall be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.’ This supremacy implies that the laws passed by any authority in the State, if contrary to the Constitution, may be declared ultra vires \; some authority, such as a Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution and decide conflicts of jurisdic­ tion between the Centre and the units is therefore essential. It also means that neither the Federal Authority, nor any unit thereof, has

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the power to change the Constitution as it likes; for then one of the two, and not the Constitution, becomes supreme. These basic aspects of federalism have been recounted as they have an intimate bearing on the location of the authority, desig­ nated by the Constitution, to deal with foreign affairs and the limitations, if any, imposed by it on that authority, and, therefore, on the effectiveness of the implementation of foreign policy in that State. Two aspects of this subject may be dealt with separately: (l)th e limitations arising from the division of powers between the Federal Government and the constituent units; and (2) the special problems which the constituent units may have in regard to their neighbour­ ing foreign States and the possible special economic interests which they may have which may not call for an overall national commit­ ment. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUENT UNITS

Most federal constitutions give the monopoly of the conduct of foreign affairs to the federal government and also prohibit the units from having any significant power in this sphere. In the U.S.A., for instance, while there is no specific enumeration of any general power of Congress over foreign affairs, the Constitution (Article VI) says: ‘This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority o f the United States, shall be the supreme law o f the land and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws o f any state to the contrary notwithstanding.’2Article 1 section 10 says: ‘No state shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation. . . No state shall, without the consent of Congress, keep Troops, or ships of war in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Cbmpact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.’ Taken together, judges have held, the power of the federal govern­ ment to conduct foreign affairs is, for the most part, unlimited ‘except by those restraints which are found in that instrument (the Constitution) against the action of the government or of its depart­ ments and those arising from the nature of the government itself

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and of that of the states. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorise what the constitution forbids or a change in the character of the government or in that of one of the states or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter without its consent.’3It is interesting to note, however, that no treaty, or part of a treaty, has so far been declared ultra vires by the courts. It should be noticed too that the states in the U.S.A. can with the consent o f Congress enter into agreements or compacts with other States. A study of the constitutional practice of the U.S.A. reveals that the Congress has exercised this power, in appropriate cases, by giving or refusing its consent4 to a proposed agreement by a state with a foreign State. The normal practice, when the Congress is willing to give its consent, is to pass a joint affirmative resolution; it is also seen that the Congress often insists on a representative of the federal government being present at the registration of such agree­ ments and that the agreement entered into shall be subject to approval by the Secretary of State. The entering into political treaties by states is not permitted. One instance will make this clear beyond doubt. The Congress gave, in 1947, limited authority to the states of the Union to enter into agreement with the United Nations, whose headquarters were established in New York: ‘Any States or to the extent not inconsis­ tent with State law, any political sub-divisions thereof, affected by the establishment of the headquarters of the United Nations in the United States are authorized to enter into agreements with the United Nations or with each other, consistent with the agreement and for the purpose of facilitating compliance with the same: Pro­ vided, that, except in case of emergency and agreements of a routine contractual character, a representative of the United States to be appointed by the Secretary of State, may, at the discretion of the Secretary of State, participate in the negotiations, and that any such agreement entered into by such State or States or political sub­ divisions thereof shall be subjected to approval by the Secretary of State.’5 Granting then that^ constitutionally, the Federal Government’s power to make treaties and conduct foreign affairs is not signifi­ cantly limited by the powers reserved to the states, it would be too facile a conclusion that the federal government does ride rough-shod over the rights of the states. It is sufficient, in this brief discussion, to state that the federal government hesitates to use its undoubted constitutional power to do so.

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A joint resolution introduced in the U.S. Senate on 16 February 1953 stated that a treaty would become effective as internal law in the U.S.A. only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty. R. C. Ghosh, the author of Treaties and Federal Constitutions, correctly argues that this Constitution Amendments Resolution was directed against the power of a treaty to extend the federal jurisdiction at the cost of the states. Public opinion in the U.S.A. was of the view that, through the treaty-making power, the federal Government should not be allowed to invade the sphere reserved to the states by the Constitution. About the same time, the point was under the consideration of the U.S. Government whether they would ratify the Human Rights Covenants—one on economic, social and cultural rights, and another on civil and political rights—subjects which were largely within the sphere of the states. Secretary Dulles, sensing the trend of public opinion, declared before the Senate Judiciary Sub-committee on 6 April 1953 that ‘the United States had decided not to ratify the Human Rights Coven­ ants, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, ana other similar multilateral treaties.’6 This trend is also proved by the unwillingness of the Federal Government to implement all the Conventions and Recommenda­ tions of the International Labour Organization (I.L.O.) at federal level. The Cooperation at the Level of the Undertaking Recom­ mendation was the list of a series of instruments adopted by the International Labour Conference between 1948 and 1952 in the field of freedom of association and industrial relations. The Report o f the Committee o f Experts on the Recommendations had this to say in 1951. ‘In . . . the United States they [the matters dealt with in the Recommendation] are considered as appropriate partly for federal and partly for state action.’7 Indeed the Constitution of the I.L.O. has officially recognized the special problems of the federal states arising from the constitutional division of powers between the Federal Government and the constituent states. Article 19(7) of the Constitution of the I.L.O. reads: OBLIGATIONS OF FEDERAL STATES (a) in respect of Conventions and Recommendations which the federal government regards as appropriate under its constitutional system for federal action, the obligations of the federal State shall be the same as those of Members which are not federal States; (b) in respect of Conventions and Recommendations which the federal

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government regards as appropriate under its constitutional system, in. whole or in part, for action by the constituent states, provinces, or cantons rather than for federal action, the federal government shall— (i) make, in accordance with its Constitution and the Constitutions of the States, provinces or cantons concerned, effective arrangements for the reference of such Conventions and Recommendations not later than 18 months from the closing of the session of the Conference to the appropriate federal, state, provincial or cantonal authorities for the enactment of legis­ lation or other action; (ii) arrange, subject to the concurrence of the state, provincial or cantonal governments concerned, for periodical consultations between the federal and the state, provincial or cantonal authorities with a view to promoting within the federal-state co-ordinated action to give effect to the provisions of such Conventions and Recommendations; (iii) inform the Director-General of the International Labour Office of the measures taken in accordance with this article to bring such Conventions and Recommendations before the appropriate federal, state, provincial or cantonal authorities with particulars of the authorities regarded as approp­ riate and of the action taken by them; (iv) in respect of each such Convention which it has not ratified, report to the Director-General of the International Labour Office, at appropriate intervals as requested by the Governing Body, the position of the law and practice of the federation and its constituent states, provinces or cantons in regard to the Convention, showing the extent to which effect has been given, or is proposed to be given, to any of the provisions of the Convention by legislation, administrative action, collective agreement, or otherwise; (v) in respect of each such Recommendation, report to the DirectorGeneral of the International Labour Office, at appropriate intervals as requested by the Governing Body, the position of the law and practice of the federation and its constituent states, provinces or cantons in regard to the Recommendation, showing the extent to which effect has been given, or is proposed to be given, to the provisions of the Recommendation and such modifications of these provisions as have been found or may be found necessary in adopting or applying them.

It will be seen that the Federal Government is allowed the free­ dom to decide which of the Conventions and Recommendations are appropriate for federal action and which of them are appropriate for action by the constituent units. The trend has been, as indicated earlier, for the federal government in the U.S.A. not to commit itself to federal action in case of doubt. Co-ordinated action by the federal government and the constituent units is clearly indicated. We have dealt at some length with the constitutional division of powers in the U.S.A. as, in some ways, the U.S.A. Constitution provided the model for later federal constitutions. We shall now refer to the Canadian Constitution to note another set of problems

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which federalism raises in connection with the exercise of full au­ thority in regard to foreign affairs. Section 132 of the British North-America Act states as follows: ‘The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all powers necessary or proper for performing the obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries arising under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign Countries.’ It is clear that so long as Canada implemented treaties to which the Empire was a party, the above provision was adequate to enable the Federal Government to implement them. But after 1918, when Canada gradually acquired the power (with the growth of Domi­ nion Status), to make and implement treaties without any reference to the Empire, it became equally clear that the provision would not validate federal legislation to implement treaties which would affect the rights given to the provinces by the Constitution. The test case arose in 1937* In March 1935, the Dominion Government of Canada had ratified the I.L.O. Conventions relating to limiting the hours of work and of weekly rest in industrial under­ takings. By the law of the Canadian Constitution, these were within the sphere of the provinces, as property and civil rights were within their jurisdiction. The issue was taken to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (then the highest appellate court for Canada). In a famous decision in 1937, the Judicial Committee laid down the rule that there is a distinction between the legislative powers given to the Dominion ‘to perform obligations imposed upon Canada as part of the Empire by an Imperial executive responsible to and controlled by the Imperial Parliament’ and the legislative power of the Domi­ nion ‘to perform obligations created by the Dominion executive responsible to and controlled by the Dominion Parliament.’8 The latter, in the view of the Judicial Committee, was not covered by section 132 of the Act; any treaty other than a British Empire treaty could be implemented only by that legislature which had power to make laws upon the subject with which the treaty dealt. It was clear that the Dominion Government by itself had no power to ratify the Convention referred to above; only after ascertaining if the legisla­ tures of the provinces were willing to accept the obligations imposed by the Convention, could the Dominion Government ratify it. ‘In totality of legislative powers’, said the Judicial Committee, ‘Dominion and provincial together, she [Canada] is fully equip­ ped. But the legislative powers remain distributed, and if io the

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exercise of her new functions derived from her new international status Canada incurs obligations, they must, so far as legislation be concerned, when they deal with provincial classes of subjects, be dealt with by the totality of powers, in other words by co-operation between the Dominion and the Provinces.’9 The resulting situation is that, where through signing a treaty, Canada has to undertake obligations which can be fulfilled only in co-operation with the provinces, she is cautious. In regard, for instance, to the covenants on human rights (to which reference has been made earlier), the Canadian spokesman told the Third Com­ mittee of the Assembly that the participation of the Canadian delegation in the discussion of the Coven­ ant . . . has been, and will continue to be, based on the assumption that the Covenants as they finally emerge, will contain provisions which will ade­ quately take care of the jurisdictional problems which are peculiar to federal states such as Canada. Indeed without such provisions it will be impossible for the Canadian Government to adhere to these Convenants, even if they are acceptable in other respects.10

The lack of power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to make treaties relating to certain subjects (reserved to the provinces) explains Canada’s difficulty; we have seen earlier, that even though the Constitution gives such powers to the Federal Government as in the U.S.A., that Government is, due to its regard for constitutional propriety, cautious in contracting obligations on matters reserved to the states. This impact of federalism on a nation’s capacity to enter into obligations with international organizations and foreign States, has become noticeable because in recent years many matters such as economic and social rights which immediately concern the relation­ ship between States and their own citizens are being increasingly taken up for regulation through international Conventions—a heal­ thy trend from the international point of view but hindered by the constitutional law and practice of individual States.11 SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND INTERESTS OF THE CONSTITUENT UNITS

‘In an interdependent world’, writes I.D. Duchacek, ‘one could indeed imagine that special cultural, economic and even political links that affect subnational units but that cross international boun­

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daries may develop, specially between territorial communities that are contiguous yet separated by their respective nation’s frontiers.’12 A few illustrations will bring out the nature of these special problems and interests. The American on the east coast has been traditionally more concerned with European problems than his compatriot in the west. Similarly, the West Australian has greater interest in the Indian Ocean than the East-Coast Australian. The vastness of these coun­ tries makes its peoples living in opposite comers of the land lay special emphasis on certain geopolitical realities which they per­ ceive more clearly than others. In a country with a homogeneous population, as in Australia, geography is often the sole determinant of such special concerns but where the population of a large country is not homogeneous and there are linguistic, cultural, racial and religious differences, these become equally relevant factors in the growth of special interests. The Jewish American, with his highlydeveloped identity as a Jew, is more interested in the Middle East than others, just as the Negro American is taking an increasing interest in Black Africa. On the question of people of Indian origin overseas, the special concerns are equally the product of geography, and cultural and linguistic groupings. The Tamils in the south have been far more concerned with the fate of people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka across the Strait and in Malaysia across the Bay of Bengal, just as the Gujaratis in western India have an interest in the fate of people of Indian origin in East and South Africa. While geography might have played a part in the growth of these special concerns, obviously the most relevant fact is that the problem of people of Indian origin in East and South Africa has largely centred on the welfare of the Gujaratis, and the problem of people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka has largely been a problem of the welfare of the Tamils. In 1934, with the consent of Congress, the state of New York (U.S.A.) entered into an agreement with Canada regarding the establishment of a joint authority—the Buffalo13 and Fort Erie14 Public Bridge Authority—to operate a highway bridge over the Niagara River.15 In 1968 Ukraine, a constituent unit of the J.S.S.R., negotiated a trade agreement with Poland.16 It would ppear that in Yugoslavia, a trend has developed ‘to create special commissioners for foreign affairs in all six federal republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia) for the

J

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purpose of influencing the national Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Belgrade to pursue foreign policies that would be brought into line with [their] internal policies.’17 It is interesting that, according to Duchacek, there is suspicion among the Republics that foreign trade policy in particular was ‘excessively determined by the interests as perceived by Serbia and its capital Belgrade.’18 The most telling example of the special trade interests of a con­ stituent unit of the Federation is to be found in the recent history of Pakistan, a federal State. Until 10 April 1971 when Bangladesh came into being as a sovereign independent republic, East Pakistan was one unit in the Federal State of Pakistan. Under the Constitution promulgated by President Ayub on 1 March 1962, Pakistan was a federal State with two provinces, West Pakistan and East Pakistan; the division of legislative powers gave the Centre 49 items including trade and commerce between the provinces and with other countries, and national economic planning. The experience of East Pakistan as a province of Pakistan in the matter of economic benefits has been surveyed by three distin­ guished academicians in a paper entitled ‘History of Economic and Political Domination of East Pakistan’.19 According to it, the Cen­ tral Government’s instruments of tariffs, import controls, industrial licensing, foreign aid, budgeting and investment allocation were used to direct investments and imports to develop high-cost indus­ tries in West Pakistan whose profitability was guaranteed by an East Pakistan market held captive behind tariff walls and import quotas. Though 60 per cent of all Pakistanis lived in former East Pakistan, its share of Central Government development expenditure fluctuated between a low of 20 per cent during 1950-1 to 1954-5 and a high of 36 per cent in the period 1965-6 to 1969-70. Again, 50 to 70 per cent of Pakistan’s export earnings were earned by East Pakistan’s products, mainly jute, hides and skins. Yet its share of foreign imports (which were financed by export earnings and foreign aid) remained between 25 and 30 per cent. Basically, the East’s balance-of-payments surplus was used to help finance the West’s deficit on foreign account leading to a net transfer of resources, estimated by an official report to be approximately Rs. 2.6 billion over the period 1948-9 to 1968-9. The subordination of the East’s economic interests was accomplished by the overwhelming concentration of governmental authority in the hands of West Pakistanis.20

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The sense of injustice which this discriminative treatment aroused, found expression in an autonomy movement in East Bengal. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the leader of the Awami League, won the elections to the Constituent Assembly in December 1970 on the strength of a six-point programme, the fifth of which related to foreign trade and foreign exchange. The Sheikh recommended that: (1) there shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings of the two wings, (2) earnings of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan Government and that of West Pakistan under the control of West Pakistan Government, (3) foreign exchange requirement of the Federal Government shall be met by the two wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed, (4) indigenous products shall move free of duty between two wings, (5) the Constitution shall empower the unit Governments to establish trade and commercial relations with, set up trade missions in and enter into agreements with, foreign countries. Now, a panoramic glance at the economic history of Pakistan since its creation will show the following consistent incidents: (a) East Pakistan has earned bulk of the annual foreign exchange of Pakistan. (b) East Pakistan’s earnings have been spent in West Pakistan in indus­ trializing that wing, and earnings from those industries have been rein­ vested in West Pakistan as the earnings of that wing. (c) East Pakistan’s earnings are not being spent in East Pakistan on the plea of its inability to absorb them due to absence of capital formation. (d) Import to East Pakistan is less than her export, whereas import to West Pakistan is more than her export. (e) Two-thirds of Pakistan’s foreign exchange is earned by jute; but that earning is utilized neither for the benefit of the jute-growers nor for East Pakistan. (f ) Almost all foreign aids and loans are secured against foreign ex­ change earned by East Pakistan; but they are spent in West Pakistan on the same plea of non-absorbing capacity of East Pakistan. The irony is that interest on these loans and their instalments are being borne by East Pakistan.

It is clear, from statements made by the Sheikh elsewhere, that in his view former East Pakistan would stand to benefit by developing closer economic relations with the neighbouring State of India. He said at Calcutta on 6 February 1972 ‘that during the two decades West Pakistanis had taught the people of his country three lessons. They were “ Islam in danger” , “ Kashmir is ours” and “ Hindustan is

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our enemy” . They persecuted me because I failed to toe their line and questioned why Hindustan should be looked upon as our enemy.’21 To summarise: the impact of federalism on foreign policy has been two-fold. First, the powers reserved to the constituent units in a federal State have acted as an inhibiting factor in the federal government’s ability to make treaties and contract obligations with foreign States in respect of the subjects so reserved. This applies in practice even to those federal States like the U.S.A. which, constitu­ tionally, vest the Federal government with full power to make treaties. Second, the special interests which the constituent units may have to develop trade and other relations with neighbouring States have to be taken note of by Federations if there are to be harmonious relations between the Federal government and the governments of the constituent units.

The Position in India India is a federal State with a written Constitution. There is a division of powers between the Union and the units (termed ‘ states') and the constitutional provisions must be examined to see if the power vested in the Union is adequate to enable it to carry out the responsibilities in regard to foreign affairs vested in it by the Con­ stitution. Parliament has exclusive power to legislate on eighteen items enumerated in Seventh Schedule List I: preventive detention for reasons connected with defence, foreign affairs or the security of India (9);22 foreign affairs; all matters which bring the Union into relation with any foreign country (10); diplomatic, consular and trade representation (11); United Nations Organization (12); par­ ticipation in international conferences, associations and other bodies and implementing of decisions made thereat (13); entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implement­ ing of treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign countries (14); war and peace (15); foreign jurisdiction (16); citizenship, naturalization and aliens (17); extradition (18); admission into, and emigration and expulsion from, India, passports and visas (19); pilgrimages to places outside India (20); piracies and crimes on the high seas or in the air; offences against the law of nations committed on land or the high seas or in the air (21); maritime shipping and

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navigation including shipping and navigation on tidal waters (25); foreign loans (37); trade and commerce with foreign countries; import and export across customs frontiers; definition of customs frontiers (41); fishing and fisheries beyond territorial waters (57); and duties of customs including export duties (83). Besides, the residuary power of legislation is with the Union; one Article of the Constitution23 clearly lays down that4Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the concurrent list.’ Reference must be made to three other provisions of the Con­ stitution which give the Federal Government full power to match their responsibility in respect of the conduct of foreign affairs. First, Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other body.24 Second, the Union has full executive powers for the implementation of its laws and the treaties and agreements it might make.25Third, to prevent the states from obstructing the Union’s administration of its laws, it is laid down that the executive power of the states is to be so exercised as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union.26 The executive power of the Union also extends to the giving of such directions to a state as may appear to be necessary for that purpose.27 One can, therefore, agree with a distinguished commentator on the constitutional law of India that our Constitution confers on the Union of India legislative and executive power which embraces the total field of external sovereignty.28 The legal position is clear and impressive from the point of view of the powers vested in the Central Government to enable it to implement the obligations which it has undertaken in regard to foreign countries and international organizations. Nevertheless constitutional practice shows the need for the Centre to secure the co-operation of state governments if the implementation is to be effective. The practice of consultation with the states on such mat­ ters has grown up to the mutual advantage of both. Such co­ operation has been facilitated by the political fact that, during most of the two decades since the Constitution was formulated, the governments in practically all the states were formed by the same party which formed it at the Centre (barring the few years after the elections of 1967 to 1971).

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The extent of the co-operation required from state Governments varies according to the nature of the subjcct—whether it is exclu­ sively under the jurisdiction of the Union Government, a concur­ rent subject, or exclusively under the jurisdiption of the states. Where a subject is in the Union list, e.g. trade with foreign countries, prima facie no difficulties should arise; but to provide against possible obstruction from any state, the Constitution has, as we have noted earlier, clearly stated that the executive power of every state shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in th at state, and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a state as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose.29 When a subject is on the concurrent list, e.g., labour welfare, there are three possibilities: a law may be passed by a state and administered by it; a law may be passed by the Union and adminis­ tered by it; a law may be passed by the Union and administered through the state agency. When a subject is exclusively a state subject, e.g. education,30the advantage of taking the states into full confidence before the Union Government commit themselves to a course of action is obvious. The experience of the Education Ministry of the Government of India is valuable in this connection. As adequate time is not availa­ ble for consultation, the state governments are often not consulted by the Ministry before their delegations are briefed on the subjects which come up before UNESCO. It is, therefore, their experience that the state authorities are tardy in implementing the recommen­ dations. For instance, UNESCO recommends the revision of his­ tory textbooks in order to improve international understanding: the State Education authorities who are to implement the recommen­ dations are not familiar with the background of such decisions. While they usually agree with what is recommended they do not have sufficient incentive for putting it into practice. It is true that the Constitution has, as we have noted earlier, made ample provision against serious difficulties of this kind, learning from the experience of other federations like Canada and Australia by laying down that Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India to implement any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other

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body. But a legal right does not necessarily lead to willing and enthusiastic co-operation. The method evolved by the Ministry of Labour, Employment#and Rehabilitation to secure full state co­ operation is therefore interesting and will be discussed here. 1. Before the Government of India puts forward a proposal before the I.L.O., the state Governments are given the chance to put forward their views on the proposal. Usually the I.L.O. discusses each subject at two successive con­ ferences before a Convention is adopted. Before the subject comes up for first discussion, the I.L.O. prepares a report containing the law and practice on the subject. This report contains at the end a questionnaire inviting the opinion of member states on the broad lines on which a Convention or a Recommendation may be adopted. When a report like this is received, the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Rehabilitation circulates it to all state govern­ ments, Chief Commissioners, all the ministries concerned in the Central Government, and to workers and employers’ organizations, inviting their suggestions for the Government of India’s reply to the questionnaire. These replies are then analysed and studied in the Labour, Employment and Rehabilitation Ministry which finally prepares a reply to each question. These replies are approved by the Minister before they are forwarded to the I.L.O. On the basis of replies from member states, the I.L.O. prepares a draft memorandum containing definite suggestions on the lines on which, if it is so decided, a Convention or a Recommendation may be adopted. This second report, containing suggestions in the form of memoranda, is for discussion at the Conference. When this report is received it is circulated again to all state governments, etc. inviting suggestions on the definite proposals. The Government of India’s brief to the delegates for the first discussion on the subject is prepared in the light of the suggestions received from all sources after careful study. This brief is approved by the Cabinet. Next the I.L.O. circulates a third report which contains the proposed text of a draft Convention or Recommendation based upon the decisions of the Conference on the several memoranda discussed at the previous Conference. This text is again circulated to state Governments, etc. for their comments on each dause of the proposed Convention, and the same procedure is repeated in the Ministry for examining the draft Convention clause by clause, and for preparing a draft brief for the Government delegate. This brief is to be approved by the

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Cabinet. Thus the state governments, ministries and organizations are given three chances to put forward their views on each proposal which the Government of India puts forward before the I.L.O. In addition to these, the draft replies of the Government of India are discussed at the session of the Indian Labour Conference or the Standing Labour Committee, both of which have a tripartite com­ position and are fairly representative of all state Governments and employers’ and workers’ organizations. At the time of these meet­ ings the reply from the Government of India is considered round the table by all the parties together. The views expressed at these meetings are fully taken into consideration in the preparation of the brief for the Government delegates. Through this process of invit­ ing suggestions and examination at various stages and discussions in the Indian Labour Conference or the Standing Labour Committee, most differences are either eliminated,or the Central Government is able to find out the view most generally acceptable to the country. There is no doubt that the individual opinions of the states, organi­ zations, etc. generally differ but the final view of the Government of India takes into account all these differences. 2. When a Convention has been adopted it is forwarded to the member states again for ratification. When the Government of India receives the final text of a Convention the Labour, Employ­ ment and Rehabilitation Ministry studies each provision in the light of the brief and the existing law. If the Convention is already covered by existing legislation and does not require any radical change in the laws, the decision about its ratification is taken im­ mediately by the Central Government. Where ratification involves amendment of existing legislation or fresh legislation, state go­ vernments are consulted about the desirability of ratification of the Convention and implementation of the Recommendation. The proposals in this respect by the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Rehabilitation are made after fully taking into account the views expressed by the state governments. Questions of vital impor­ tance, such as the ratification of the Convention pertaining to free­ dom of association adopted by the I.L.O. in 1948, are also discussed at the Labour Ministers’ Conference which is composed of all the Labour Ministers of state governments. If the Government of India decide to ratify a Convention, they undertake the necessary legisla­ tion to bring the Indian law into consonance with the provisions of the Convention. Here again, the state governments are consulted

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on the draft Bill, as the Bill when passed by Parliament applies to the whole country. Again so as to take into account the practical difficulties of the state governments, the Act may be variously applied in different states, either on different dates or to the extent it is practicable. Some flexibility is generally kept in the Act to provide for adjustments to local conditions. So far there has hardly been any case where any of the state governments has taken a defiant attitude and has refused to enforce an Act passed by the Central Parliament: on the whole the states have fallen in line with the decisions of the Centre once an Act has been passed. Obviously, this is mainly due to the fact that the states are taken into full confidence by the Government of India at every stage of the consi­ deration of matters relating to international organizations. This picture of the harmonious working of the Centre and the states must be supplemented by two facts: First, there is a growing awareness in the Central Government that it may not be wise to cut into the autonomy of the states through the method of ratifying a treaty or an international convention. Only such an awareness can explain why India, jointly with Australia and the U.S.A.,sponsored the following proposal for a Federal-State Article (at the eighth session of the Human Rights Commission) to be included in the Human Rights Covenant then being discussed by the Commission: 31 1. A federal State may at the time of signature or ratification of, or accession to, this Covenant make a declaration stating that it is a federal State to which this article is applicable. In the event that such a declaration is made, paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall apply to it. The SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations shall inform the other States Parties to this Covenant of such declaration. 2. This Covenant shall not operate so as to bring within the jurisdiction of the federal authority of a federal State making such declaration, any of the matters referred to in this Covenant which, independently of the Covenant, would not be within the jurisdiction of the federal authority. 3. Subject to paragraph 2 of this article, the obligations of such a federal State shall be: (a) In respect of any provisions of the Covenant, the implementation of which is, under the constitution of the federation, wholly or in part within federal jurisdiction, the obligations of the federal Government shall, to that extent, be the same as those of Parties which have not made a declaration under this article; (b) In respect of any provisions of the Covenant, the implementation of which is, under the constitution of the federation, wholly or in part within the jurisdiction of the constituent units (whether described as States, pro­

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vinces, cantons, autonomous regions, or by any other name), and which are not, to this extent, under the constitutional system bound to take legislative action, the federal Government shall bring such provisions with favourable recommendations to the notice of the appropriate authorities of the con­ stituent units, and shall also request such authorities to inform the federal Government as to the law of the constituent units in relation to those provisions of the Covenant. The federal Government shall transmit such information received from constituent units to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

This proposal was not accepted; but the sponsoring of the proposal by India shows the Government of India’s caution in respect of bringing within the jurisdiction of the federal authority through signing an international Covenant matters which, independently of the Covenant, would not be within the jurisdiction of the federal authority. Secondly there are complaints about the ‘neglect’ of the states by the Centre in the formulation of foreign policy, and demands for a greater share in policy making, etc. Thus the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu (one of the constituent states) told the Tamil Nadu Legislative Council on 3 April 1971 that the states were ignored when the Centre took important decisions including those concern­ ing India’s foreign policy. He asked whether such treatment was meted out to the states becaused they had accepted the Centre’s foreign policy in full. While the Prime Minister had consulted leaders of the Opposition in the Parliament including the D.M.K.,32 he wished to point out that the Chief Ministers could have been invited to express their views on an important issue like develop­ ments in East Pakistan and a decision taken at the highest level.33 Similarly, the Maharashtra Chief Minister, presiding over a meeting of the State Board of Export Promotion in June 1971, said that the states should have a voice in formulating export policies in respect of products which were produced substantially in their areas; the state governments were somewhat handicapped, he felt, in making an effective contribution to export promotion by not being as­ sociated with the formulation of export policies.34The Rajamannar Committee (a Committee appointed by the Tamil Nadu Govern­ ment to examine Centre-state relations) would make the Centre responsible for providing the foreign exchange needed by any in­ dustrial undertaking licensed or started by a state, through block grants on the recommendation of a permanent finance commission acting in consultation with the Planning Commission. It would vest

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the states with wider powers with regard to the public sector and would enable them to start such undertakings even with foreign collaboration.35 It is interesting that the President of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry supported the idea that the different states should be allowed a certain amount of foreign exchange.36 In April 1971, the Nagaland Government ex­ pressed to the Centre its resentment over the border-demarcation agreement between India and Burma concluded in 1967, as it affected Nagaland adversely in respect of some fifty villages.37 These complaints should not be construed to be defiance of the Centre, but rather as requests that the states be taken into confi­ dence in policy making in areas that affected them, which is a natural requirement.

Special Interests o f Constituent States We shall now deal with five foreign-policy issues in which some of the constituent states have taken special interest, viz., the proposed transfer (in 1958) of a part of the Berubari Union No. 12 to Pakistan, the proposed transfer of 900 sq. km of the Rann of Kutch to Pakistan (1965), the liberation of Goa (1961), the liberation of Bangladesh (1971) and the status of the Indian Tamil Estate population in Sri Lanka (1972). It will be observed that the first two relate to the cession of Indian territory to foreign States, the third and the fourth to the liberation of neighbouring territories held by foreign States, and the last concerns a Tamil-speaking minority in Sri Lanka, ethnically and linguistically related to the Tamil­ speaking population of Tamil Nadu. BERUBARI UNION NO. 12

The facts relating to the agreement made in 1958 between India and Pakistan for the cession of one half of the area known as Berubari Union No. 12 to Pakistan in exchange for some enclaves within that country, may be summarised thus. Berubari Union No. 12 has an area of 23 sq. km and a population of ten to twelve thousand inhabitants. The Radcliffe Award demar­ cated the boundary between West Bengal and East Bengal; from the date of the Award, Berubari Union No. 12 formed part of West

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Bengal and was governed as such till September 1958. In 1952, however, Pakistan claimed that, under the Radcliffe Award, it should form part of East Bengal. The Radcliffe Award, in the map annexed with it (Annexure B), showed Berubari Onion as part of East Pakistan, though in the description of the demarcated boundary in Annexure A it was clear that Berubari Union was part of West Bengal.38 In addition to the Berubari issue there was also the question of the former state of Cooch Behar enclaves. On 28 August 1949, the Ruler of the former State of Cooch Behar had entered into an agreement of merger with the Government of India. The Indian government had taken over the administration of Cooch Behar which was ultimately merged with West Bengal on 1 January 1950. It was found that certain areas which belonged to the State of Cooch Behar became enclaves in East Pakistan after the partition, and similarly certain Pakistani enclaves fell into Indian territory. There were border disputes and tensions. In order to remove the tension and border conflicts, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan entered into an agreement called the Indo-Pakistan Agreement on 10 September 1958; items 3 and 10 of the agreement provided for an equal division of Berubari Union between India and Pakistan, and for an exchange of Cooch Behar enclaves in Pakistan for Pakistani enclaves in India. Doubts having risen regarding the method of implementation of the agreement relating to Berubari Union and the exchange of the Cooch Behar enclaves, the advice of the Supreme Court was sought under Article 143 of the Constitution. In particular, the opinion of the Court was sought on whether (if any legislative action were necessary for the implementation of the agreement relating to those items),a law relateable to Article I of the Constitution39would be adequate or whether an amendment of the Constitution was neces­ sary in accordance with Article 368. The Supreme Court held that Parliament could pass or amend Article 340of the Constitution to cover cases of the cession of the territory of India, and could subsequently pass a law under the amended Article 3 to implement the agreement. Government was not in favour of amending Article 3; Nehru explained this was because it would make it easy in future to enable cession of territories.41 They therefore decided to bring in two Bills: (1) the Constitution Ninth Amending Bill—to deal with

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the cession of territory, and (2) the Acquisition of Territories (Merger) Bill to deal with the territories acquired by exchange. These bills were passed by an overwhelming majority in December 1960, and the cession of one half of Berubari to Pakistan and the exchange of the enclaves were effected in due course. Our main concern here is not constitutional issues but the federal element in foreign-policy decisions, i.e. how far, in effecting the cession of territory, the Centre is bound to carry the state con­ cerned with it, and what impact the decision of the Centre on the Berubari issue had on West Bengal. West Bengal's opposition to the transfer West Bengal stoutly opposed the transfer on basically political grounds.42 One of the main reasons given was that West Bengal continues to suffer from a sense of injury following partition, and popular emotions get inextricably mixed with political motives.43 The Nehru-Noon agreement was intended to solve certain vexed border disputes by an exchange of territory and a rectification of the border. Nevertheless the solution finally adopted in regard to the bisection of Berubari Union did seem to involve genuine hardship for people who had come over from former East Pakistan and who had been settled there at great expense by the West Bengal Gov­ ernment. What had perhaps caused the greatest disquiet in West Bengal was the fact that under the agreement there was no provi­ sion for exchange of population. The joint communique issued after the agreement stated: ‘The Prime Ministers agreed that when areas are exchanged. . . as a result of settlement and demarcation of these disputed areas, an appeal should be made to the people in the areas exchanged to continue staying in their present homes as nationals of the State to which the areas are transferred.’ The communique^said nothing about the future of the people of those areas who, for some reason, could not reconcile themselves to a change in their political status consequent on the exchange of territory.44 The most curious aspect of the agitation in West Bengal was that the Congress Gov­ ernment and party were as much committed to it as the Opposition. Some pronouncements of Dr B.C. Roy, then Chief Minister, in the early stages of the controversy, make one wonder whether he was speaking as the head of the state Government or the leader of the Opposition.45

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West Bengal Assembly’s reaction On 29 December 1958 the West Bengal Assembly unanimously expressed its disapproval of the proposal in the Nehru-Noon ag­ reement to transfer a part of the Berubari Union to Pakistan. Congress, Communist, Praja-Socialist Party, Forward Bloc, R e­ volutionary Socialist, Socialist Unity Centre and Lok Sewak Sangh members alike supported a special motion demanding that the Union be retained in India. The resolution stated that the area known as the Berubari Union had always been under the lawful control and possession of West Bengal and contended that its transfer to Pakistan would adversely affect the economic life and security of its inhabitants. It pointed out that the state government had spent large sums of money on the development of the area, where many refugees from East Pakistan had settled down. All seven members who spoke during the debate vehemently criticised Prime Minister Nehru. A Socialist Unity member, Subodh Banerjee, described the transfer move as an act of treason. He and other critics deplored the failure of the Prime Minister to consult the state government or the people before making the proposal. Sudhir Roy Choudhury (P.S.P.) accused the Prime Minister of irresponsible action. Winding up the debate, the Chief Minister Dr B.C. Roy said that the state Government had not been asked for its opinion on the proposed transfer. He believed, however, that the Government of India should be made aware of all shades of opinion in West Bengal on this issue; that was why a debate had been held in the House. Though the state had not been consulted, it had supplied maps a month before the Nehru-Noon discussion. It was, therefore, incor­ rect to think that maps supplied by Pakistani officers alone had been taken into consideration.46 In November 1960, in a statement on the reported intention of {the Centre not to consult the state Legislature over the transfer of Berubari to Pakistan, Dr B.C. Roy assured the House that the proposed transfer could not be effected without the state’s approval.47 This was, however, contradicted by Nehru and Home Minister Pant next day in the Lok Sabha, stating that there was no constitutional obligation on the Central Government to get the approval of the state legislatures concerned for, the transfer of certain areas from India to Pakistan under the agreement between the Prime Ministers of the two countries48 Dr B.C. Roy repeated

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his stand over the transfer of Berubari and said that he, along with other members of the House, were signatories to the resolution in which the West Bengal Assembly unanimously expressed its at­ titude in regard to Berubari. On 29 November 1960 the West Bengal Assembly unanimous­ ly adopted a special resolution reiterating its opposition to the transfer of Berubari Union to Pakistan under the NehruNoon agreement of 1958.49 The draft resolution said that in view of the fact that ‘any adjustement of boundary which may result in the transfer of any part of the territory of Berubari Union in Jalpaiguri to East Pakistan will adversely affect the economic life and security of the people of the area and that the Government of West Bengal has spent large sums of money for the area where a large number of refugees from East Bengal have settled, the Assembly is of the opinion that the said Berubari Union should remain a part of the territory of the Union of India.’50 This resolution, sponsored by the Chief Minister Dr B.C. Roy, was debated for three hours at the end of which Dr Roy declared: ‘We ought to lodge our formal protest and communicate our strong feelings to the Central Government over the issue.’ Dr Roy made it abundantly clear that ‘at no point of time was the opinion taken of my revenue officers, or of the Government or of myself before the Central Government had agreed to the transfer of Berubari to Pakistan. It was being argued that this transfer was agreed to in a spirit of give-and-take to ensure friendly relations between India and Pakistan. But the question was the method of doing it. ‘We should have been consulted informally before an attempt was made to alter the position of Berubari,’ Dr Roy said. There was an uproar in the House when Dr Roy said: ‘We are sorry that Berubari is going away.’ When Jyoti Basu, leader of the Opposi­ tion, asked whether the Chief Minister had taken it for granted that the fate of Berubari was sealed, Dr Roy said: ‘Let us be realists.’ The Chief Minister’s resolution was an exact repetition of the Assembly’s resolution of 29 December 1958, in which the House had unanimously voiced the opinion that Berubari should remain part of India. Communist, P.S.P., R.S.P. and Congress benches generally criticised the Prime Minister for agreeing to part with Berubari without giving the West Bengal Assembly an opportunity to express its opinion on the subject. The demand for a referendum on Berubari was also made by a member. Replying to the discussion on the resolution, Dr Roy said that the proper course for the

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Government of India, after the Supreme Court’s judgement on the issue, was to amend Article 3 of the Constitution, so that the state most affected by the alteration might have an opportunity of ex­ pressing its opinion on it.51 At a later meeting of the Assembly Dr Roy made a significant statement: ‘We do not want to quarrel with the Central Govern­ ment; but we want to point out our difficulties.’ He recalled Nehru’s own remarks in the Rajya Sabha in 1958 that the responsibility for taking the decision on Berubari was that of the Centre and not of the revenue officers of West Bengal. His own interpretation of Nehru’s statement was that the decision to transfer Berubari was taken not on the advice of Revenue Officers, and certainly not on the advice of the Government of West Bengal.32 Dr Roy was later reported to have sent a strong letter to Prime Minister Nehru, objecting to the procedure adopted by the Central Government to give effect to the Nehru-Noon Agreement about Berubari. In his letter, Dr Roy listed about twelve grounds on which he considered the Bill to be unconstitutional and inconsistent with the judgement of the Supreme Court. He also reiterated that West Bengal’s consent had not been sought on the question of the transfer of Berubari to Pakistan.53 The Centre's stand In a statement in the Lok Sabha on 12 September 1958, Nehru said: ‘We have come to an agreement and after all we have to honour it. If I have made any mistake you can censure me but I have to honour it so far as I am concerned.’54 This attitude of the Centre was constant throughout the controversy. Later on, on 18 De­ cember 1958 Nehru informed the West Bengal Government that the decision to transfer parts of Berubari Union to Pakistan was taken on the responsibility of the two Prime Ministers. The text of the telegram in which Nehru clarified his statement in Parliament says: I am reported to have said, ‘We accepted the advice chiefly of the revenue authorities and others of West Bengal that this might be done*. As reported this might create some misapprehension. I used this phrase broadly in the sense that we were consulting these people for all these problems. I was not thinking at the time of Berubari Union only. It is certainly not true to say that we took the decision to transfer parts of Berubari Union on the basis of

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the opinion of revenue officers of West Bengal. The revenue officers had nothing to do with this particular matter. This was an ad hoc decision taken after consultation between our officers and West Bengal officers. Respon­ sibility was on us, not on the revenue officers.35

Prime Minister Nehru categorically declared in the Lok Sabha on 30 November 1960 that it was absolutely incorrect to say that the decision on transfer of territory in Berubari under the Nehru-Noon agreement was reached without consulting the representatives of the West Bengal Government. He assured members that on no account would he proceed in such matters without consulting the representatives of the state governments concerned. He em­ phasised three points in this connection. In the first place, the state government’s representatives had discussed the matter with the External Affairs Ministry, though he was not there and could not vouch from personal knowledge. Secondly, this was discussed by the officials of the External Affairs Ministry with Pakistani rep­ resentatives. Thirdly, when specific proposals were put forward before him (Nehru), he asked the Commonwealth Secretary whether this had been agreed to by the representatives of the West Bengal Government. The official said it had been agreed to. Only after that did he take the decision. Nehru, however, said that he did not rule out the possibility of some confusion or misunderstanding in the minds of officials.56 On 5 December 1960, in his long and detailed statement in the Lok Sabha, Nehru said that the transfer of half of the Berubari Union was part of an over-all deal with Pakistan on the boundary question, and, viewed as a whole from the legal or common-sense or any other angle, it was to the advantage of West Bengal and India. He quoted from earlier correspondence and minutes of meetings and said the decision over Berubari had been taken with the tacit consent, if not approval, of West Bengal officials. He also re­ pudiated the position taken up by the West Bengal Assembly and said that, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s advice, two Bills had to be prepared to give effect to the agreement with Pakistan. About the West Bengal Assembly’s view that the method of imple­ menting the agreement with Pakistan by two Bills was objection­ able as the state legislature was deprived of the right to express its opinion, Nehru said: ‘Such a result flows from the provisions of the Constitution itself.’ Nehru said that Berubari was not an enclave. It was one of the matters that was in dispute between India and

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Pakistan in regard to the interpretation of the Radcliffe Award. The Government had felt earlier that it was not technically a cession of territory though it resulted in cession and, therefore, it felt that amendment of the Constitution was not necessary. But since some felt that the Constitution would have to be amended, the Govern­ ment had referred the matter to the Supreme Court and had acted according to its opinion. Nehru said that so far as the question of Berubari was concerned, it was correct that the West Bengal Go­ vernment did not recommend the division—neither did the officials of the Government of India: ‘But the division of the Berubari Union was a part of a number of counter-proposals made by the Pakistan Government and the question at issue was whether we should accept these proposals as a whole. The West Bengal Government officials did not object to the acceptance of the counter-proposals.’ Details were worked out for the division of the Berubari Union which would retain areas through which essential communication passed in West Bengal. Nehru said: I accept entirely, of course, that the major responsibility was that of the Government of India's, and more particularly of mine___The question before us was not whether we liked it. We thought it was definitely advantageous to West Bengal and for India of course, that this agreement should be carried out not merely as a whole but, I would like to say, even in regard to the Berubari division itself. The other way was sending it 10 a tribunal which would have decided in favour of Pakistan or India. If it had been in favour of Pakistan the whole of the Berubari Union would have gone to Pakistan. It was considered in the larger context. Naturally we did not like it but things have to be agreed to sometimes which we do not like. In the balance we agreed to it.57

Commenting on Nehru’s statement, the Hindu said that Nehru’s statement in Parliament had convincingly answered every one of those objections raised by the West Bengal Assembly in its resolu­ tion, with regard to the procedure adopted by the Indian Govern­ ment. The Indian Government were following precisely the proce­ dure recommended by the Supreme Court with regard to cession of territory.58 Pakistan Government consulted President Ayub Khan of Pakistan disclosed in Dacca on 1 De­ cember 1960 that he had received through the Pakistan High Commissioner in India a suggestion that the Indian Government was finding difficulty in getting the Bill passed for the transfer of Berubari to Pakistan under the Noon-Nehru agreement, and a feeler had been put out whether Pakistan would consider some

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alternative to the transfer of Berubari to Pakistan. But he said that he had advised the Government of India that they should stick to what they had agreed upon. Once solemn pledges weVe broken by a constitutional government there was no certainty that any agree­ ment would be implemented in future: ‘If the writ of the Central Government of India did not prevail in West Bengal and Assam, then no alternative or agreement would be implemented.’ he added.59 This was also confirmed by Nehru when he told the Be­ rubari People’s delegation, which met him on 11 December 1960 at the External Affairs Ministry that in view of the discouraging re- ' sponse from Pakistan they had no choice but to implement the agreement. It only sounded the Pakistan High Commissioner in Delhi, A.K. Brohi, on the desirability of Pakistan accepting any modification. Brohi then went to Rawalpindi to consult President Ayub Khan. Nehru said that the Indian suggestion was that some other area of the same size as the Berubari area, which would not involve any human problem, could be transferred to Pakistan.60 Speaking during the debate on Berubari in the State Assembly, Dr B.C. Roy made it clear that so far as he, his party and his Government were concerned, they would stand by the Prime Minister’s pledge to honour the agreement reached with Pakistan. Right or wrong, the Prime Minister Cof India] has come to an agreement with the Pakistan Prime Minister. I do not want it to be said in the world that our country did not honour its words. Mr Nehru is, after all, the Prime Minister of the country and I cannot lower the prestige of the Prime Minister.

Commenting on the Lok Sabha’s passing the two Bills, The Times o f India61 said: The majority which the ruling party was able to muster in the House could not, however, convert what was in truth a moral defeat into victory for the Government. The success of the general strike in Calcutta on the very day the two Bills seeking to put the seal of parliamentary approval on the transfer of territory were passed shows that the general public is still unreconciled to the transfer. . . . The whole affair has been an essay in ineptitude. The Government cannot argue, as its spokesman tried to, that the transaction was in the larger interests of the country when, on the Prime Minister’s own admission, even the full implications of the agreement were not clear to the negotiators at the time they put their signature to it. In fact at the time the agreement was concluded the Government did not even know that it would involve the cession of so much territory. And even when it found that the agreement would involve the cession of a large chunk of

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territory, it did not fully realize the impact it would have on public opinion in West Bengal. If the Government had any inkling of the strength of public feeling on the issue and had consulted the West Bengal Government at every stage of the negotiations, it would have refused to agree to so inequitable a settlement. As it was, it failed to take into account, even after the searing experience of partition, the human aspect of the problem in the areas proposed to be transferred. . . . What has been done cannot be undone. But the manner in which the Government has bungled in this matter should give it food for thought. It must in the future examine the implications of every international agreement more thoroughly before it decides to commit the country to it.

From the federal point of view, the central question at issue is: is it necessary and is it wise, for the Central Government to consult the state government and obtain its concurrence before the Central Government decides to cede the territory of the state government to a foreign state? We have seen, earlier, in our discussion of the constitutional position in India that the power of the centre to deal with foreign affairs and to make treaties, coupled with the authority given by Article 25 3,62gives it wide powers in respect of treaty mak­ ing; in which the power to acquire and cede territory, we submit, is implicit. Prime Minister Nehru was correct in his assumption that, constitutionally, the state’s concurrence was not necessary to em­ power the Centre to cede a part of Berubari to Pakistan. This view is re-inforced by the Supreme Court’s advice that the transfer of Berubari could be effected by an amendment of the Constitution and consequent amendment of Article I read with Schedule I; and the concurrence of a state is not necessary for the introduction of a Constitutional Amendment. Apart from making cession of territory too easy, was it also a reason that dealing with the matter of cession of territory under Article 3 (amended) could bring the Centre into conflict with the state, for under this procedure for the cession of territory, the state legislature must be consulted; the West Bengal Assembly had clearly expressed itself against the cession of Berubari before the Government decided not to take action under Article 3. It is significant, too, that the West Bengal Chief Minister expressed the view that the proper course for the Government of India, after the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion was given, was to amend Article 3 of the Constitution so that the state most affected by the alteration might have an opportunity o f expressing its opinion on it.

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While it seems unnatural and politically unwise to suggest that part of the territory of a state may be ceded to a foreign State without the concurrence of the state most affected, yet if concurr­ ence is made essential, it may be that that state may withhold its consent to a cession which in the opinion of the Central Govern­ ment may be essential in the overall national interest. This perhaps explains why in the U.S.A. there is growing opinion that a state territory can be ceded without its consent: The better opinion would seem to be, that such a power of cession of the territory of a state without its consent resides exclusively in the treatymaking power, under the Constitution of the USA, yet sound discretion would forbid the exercise of it without the consent of the local government, who are interested, except in cases of great necessity, in which the consent might be presumed.63

Finally we may add, the fact that the West Bengal Government was of the same political complexion as that of the Centre, helped; while the Assembly protested, in the last analysis, the Chief Minis­ ter did add that he and his government would stand by the Prime Minister’s pledge to honour the agreement. Political forces, not purely legal texts, ultimately shape political decisions.64 THE RANN OF KUTCH

The Rann of Kutch is a vast marshy wasteland of almost 22,000 sq. km lying along the Gujarat-West Pakistan border; in the rainy season from June to October, it is usually flooded partly by rain water, partly by the overflowing water from adjacent rivers, and partly by the water from the adjoining sea. Pakistan claimed some 900 sq. km of this territory which it argued had always been under the control and administration of Sind, until, at the time of the partition of the sub-continent, it became a subject of dispute with India.65 (Sind became part of Pakistan and Kutch part of India by the partition of 1947). India claimed that there was no territorial dispute as there was a well-established boundary running roughly along the northern edge of the Rann of Kutch as shown in the pre-partition maps, which needed only to be demarcated on the ground.66 This was India’s reply to Pakistan’s attempts from 1948 on to lay claim to the territory. It was Pakistan’s case that the Rann of Kutch was a lake, and, according to the principles of international

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law, the boundary line runs through the middle of a boundary lake or a landlocked sea.67 India, on the other hand, contended that the Rann of Kutch was a marsh rather than a lake.68 Her view was that the boundary runs roughly along the northern edge of the Rann as shown in the pre-partition maps. This is the traditional, well-established and wellrecognised boundary between Sind, on the one hand, and Kutch and the Indian States of Jodhpur, Wav, and Suigam, on the other hand, which, in the course of time, became crystallized and consolidated. This boundary was acknowledged, recognised, admitted and acquiesced in by the Paramount Power. The Paramount Power explicitly settled a part of the Sind-Kutch boundary by a Resolution of the Government of Bombay in 1914. The same Resolution implicitly confirmed the rest of the boundary.’69

In February 1956, there was a border incident at Chhad Bet, in Kutch; a strong contingent of Pakistani forces trespassed into the territory and attacked the Indian military patrol.70Discussions were held in 1960 between the two Governments on the subject and it was agreed that they would collect further data regarding the Kutch-Sind boundary. However, in 1965, hostilities broke out which would probably have continued but for the good offices of Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister. Acting on his sugges­ tion, an Indo-Pakistan Agreement was concluded on 30 June 1965: the two Governments were to order a cease-fire and to negotiate an agreement on the disputed Kutch border; if, within two months, an agreement could not be reached, they would submit the dispute to arbitration. As it happened, an agreement could not be reached within two months, and so an arbitration tribunal was constituted as provided in the agreement. An Indian nominee from Yugoslavia, a Pakistani nominee from Iran and a Chairman from Sweden appointed by the Secretary-General of the U.N. formed the Tribunal. The Tribunal made its award in February 1968, by a majority conceding Pakistan’s claim to the extent of about 900 sq. km or approximately one-tenth of the territory claimed by Pakistan. India and Pakistan accepted the award and the dispute was settled. Similarities between the Berubari and the Kutch issues In some respects the Berubari and Kutch issues are similar; some territory was ceded to Pakistan in both cases, in the first case by agreement between the two Prime Ministers, in the second by

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India’s acceptance of the arbitral award. The Governments in West Bengal and Gujarat, which dealt with the respective issues, were of the same persuasion as the Government at the Centre. In both instances public opinion in the concerned state was agitated over the proposed cession of territory and expressed itself unmistakably against it. We have referred earlier to the agitation among the public on the issue of Berubari.71 On the Kutch issue, the expression of public opinion against the transfer of part of Kutch was equally pronounced. On 19 February 1968, when the substance of the arbitral award became known in India, the Opposition members in the state Assembly reacted sharply and sought an adjournment of the House as ‘members were too agitated to participate in the proceedings’ ;72 the mover of the adjournment motion, an Independent member, said, ‘We are not prepared to give even an inch of our land to Pakistan’. Even the Chief Minister, a member of the Indian National Congress, which wasiri power at the Centre as well, said in the Assembly that it was natural that the feelings o f‘all of us’ had been hurt by the news of the award.73 When the Speaker disallowed the adjournment motion on the ground that an official version of the Award had not been received, the Opposition staged a walk-out and sent a telegram to the Prime Minister saying that the people of Gujarat would never forgive the Central and state Governments if any piece of land was surrendered to Pakistan.74The opinion was freely expressed that 19 February 1968 was a black day in the history of India in general and in the history of Kutch in particular;75 it was a mistake, it was felt widely, on the part of India to have referred the Rann of Kutch dispute to an international tribunal. On 20 February 1968, an agitated State Assembly adjourned ten minutes earlier than scheduled as a protest against the Kutch Tribunal award; many members urged the Indian Government to reject the verdict of the tribunal as it was ‘politically motivated’. Demonstrations were or­ ganized near the Assembly Chamber to protest against the award, the demonstrators shouting ‘The entire Rann of Kutch is ours’, and ‘Defend our territory of Kutch’.76On the same day, there was a hartal77throughout Kutch and in several towns in the state. A public meeting of the citizens organized at a town called Mandvi unaniously passed a resolution requesting the Union Government to preserve the rights of the people of Kutch and protesting against handing over any part of Kutch to Pakistan. Another resolution said

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that the Gujarat Government had failed to give protection to the Kutch border area because of lack of administrative ability, and demanded protection by the Central Government. The meeting wanted the Centre to be directly responsible for Kutch.78 Differences between the Berubari and Kutch issues On the Kutch issue, the Central Government was able to carry th e state government of Gujarat along with it, at every stage—an d not just at the last stage as in West Bengal over the Berubari issue. The reason is that the state government was taken into confidence throughout the crisis; it is possible that the Central government had learnt a lesson from the experience of Berubari. Thus when the Kutch cease-fire agreement was entered into with Pakistan, the Gujarat government did not protest to the Centre; this was confirmed by the Union Home Minister G.L. Nanda in reply to questions by correspondents on 19 July 1965 at Ahmedabad. The Chief Minister of the state, who was present, agreed with Nanda and added, 'There is no question of Gujarat differing with the national policy in the m a tte r79Later, when a member of Parliament, Indulal Yagnik, asked the Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri, whether the Gujarat Government had been consulted on the agreement, the Prime Minister replied, ‘Not exactly when we signed this agree­ ment. But there were talks and discussions about this with the Gujarat Government officials some time back.’80 When the state Assembly discussed the question on 19 February 1968—and an adjournment motion was moved to protest against the Tribunal’s award—the Chief Minister pleaded for restraint and said that he was prepared to discuss the Award after an official version of it was available; he added that so far as the Congress (Ruling) party was concerned, ‘our feelings are equally strong’.8'After the text of the Award was officially made available, the Government of India invited the Chief Minister of Gujarat for consultations to apprise the Central leaders of the reactions of the people of Gujarat on the Kutch award. Before his departure for Delhi, he had talks with his Cabinet colleagues and, if reports are correct, at least three of his senior colleagues strongly favoured the rejection of the Award.82 At Delhi he was invited to attend the meeting of the Cabinet called to discuss the Kutch award; he apprised the Cabinet of the strong feelings of the people of Gujarat against the award. He also at­

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tended, by special invitation, a meeting of the members of Parlia­ ment from Gujarat, called by the Prime Minister to hear their views on the question. It stands to the credit of the Chief Minister that he did not agree with the Opposition in the state Assembly that the Award should be rejected. Instead he took the view that the Central Government was bound to accept the Kutch award as it was binding and final under an international agicement; what was important, after the Award was announced, was to stress the need for effective defence of the Gujarat border with Pakistan.83 Statesmanship on the part of both the Government of India and the state Government had led to understanding and mutual ad­ justment on the part of the two Governments—instead of a conflict as in the case of Berubari. THE LIBERATION OF GOA

Only the salient facts relating to the Government of India’s policy on Goa and to the public agitation for the liberation of Goa need, briefly, be mentioned here. Since the beginning of the sixteenth century (1510), Portugal had ruled over Goa, a 3300 sq. km area and the two small enclaves of Daman, 383 sq. km, and Diu, 50 sq. km, with a total population of some 650,000. Goa lies about 600 km south of Bombay. After Britain transferred power to India in 1947, India was anxious that the remaining vestiges of colonial power in India, i.e. the French and the Portuguese, should also be removed; only then, India felt, would Indian independence be complete. France parted with her possessions (Pondicherry and Chandernagore) with grace, but Por­ tugal refused to negotiate with India on the question, holding to the point that Goa was a province of Portugal and not a colony. India’s reaction to the Portuguese refusal to part with Goa was crystallized in Jawaharlal Nehru’s statement in the Lok Sabha in September 1955: ‘Portuguese domination in Goa cannot and must not con­ tinue, not only for normal reasons and causes, but because it has become an affront to civilised humanity.’84 In the face of Portugal’s obstinate refusal even to discuss the issue, it remained for the Government of India to decide how to bring about the liberation of Goa. The Indian Government steadfastly stuck to the view until 16

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August 196185 that the use of peaceful means to achieve a nation’s interests was one of the corner-stones of India’s foreign policy; in June 1955 the Prime Minister declared at a public meeting in Pune that‘we will never resort to police or military action to secure the merger of Goa and other Portuguese settlements.®6 The fact that a war to liberate Goa was a little war did not justify it.87 At the same time, the public in India was restive; both in Goa and outside, freedom fighters organized themselves, and, in the Gandhian way offered satyagraha to demonstrate the moral case for the liberation of Goa from Portuguese rule. Early in 1955 the Portuguese gov­ ernment armed itself with powers to deport Indians, including Goan satyagrahis, to serve sentences in general establishments in Portugal and other Portuguese colonies, at which the Government of India protested and said that any attempt to deport Indian and Goan satyagrahis would have serious and far-reaching repercussions in India.88 On satyagraha being offered by Indian nationals and Goans, the Government of India at first took the view that the satyagraha should be restricted to Goans, for it would bring out the fact that the freedom movement, with which they wholly sympathised, was es­ sentially a movement of the Goan people;89 besides, the Govern­ ment of India did not want to create a situation which might lead to large-scale shooting and killing and passions being aroused in India and elsewhere. There was no objection, however, to some indi­ vidual Indians offering satyagraha. Some Indian nationals did take part in satyagraha; some were arrested and others ill-treated. On 23 July 1955, the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress passed a resolution which said that the Committee did not favour attempts at mass entry into Goa from outside to offer satyagraha, reflecting the official view of the Government of India. Nevertheless, on 15 August 1955 more than 2000 satyagrahis entered Goa at several points; there was firing, several were in­ jured, and some 27 were reported to have been killed.90There were protest meetings and hartals throughout the country. Later, on 4 September 1955, the All-India Congress Committee adopted a resolution expressing its firm opinion that in the circumstances it would be inappropriate for Indian nationals to enter Goa; it there­ fore urged them to desist even from individual satyagraha. Follow­ ing the resolution, the Bombay Government issued orders on 7 September 1955 to the police on the Bombay-Goa and

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Bombay-Daman borders to stop Indian satyagrahis from entering the Portuguese settlements. On 18 December 1961 under public pressure, and the stubborn defiance of Portugal, India took ‘police’ action against Goa, and Goa became part of India. Maharashtra's interest This background for the Government of India’s policy, and of the public interest evinced in the liberation of Goa has been given to enable us to identify (1) the special interest of Maharashtra in Goa; and (2) the attitude the Government of Maharashtra took vis-a-vis the policy of the Government of India. 1. First, the Goa question was clearly one of national interest, concerning all the people of India, and it was treated as such by the Government of India. ‘The Government of India’, Nehru told the Lok Sabha in April 1954, ‘reaffirm their view in the most categori­ cal terms that they regard the foreign colonial enclaves in India as anachronisms which should come to an end and that their existence is inconsistent with the historic developments that resulted in the termination of imperial rule in India itself.’91 Nevertheless, Maharashtra certainly took the lead in educating public opinion on the issue and in organizing the agitation which clearly had its impact on government policy. That Maharashtra took the lead is natural: it was contiguous to Goa. The largest concentra­ tion of Goans outside Goa was in Bombay—125,000—where they had been settled for years, sending money to their dependents in Goa. Perhaps the Maharashtrians also hoped that if Goa became part of India, it would become part of Maharashtra—a hope not fulfilled as in the ‘opinion poll’ held on 16 January 1967, Goa preferred to continue to be a Union territory. Thus on 15 July 1954 an ‘Action Committee’ formed in Bombay announced that volun­ teers would carry out a ‘march on Goa’. An All-Party Goa Vimochan Sahayak Samiti92 was formed in Pune in Maharashtra and under its auspices satyagraha was planned and organized. N. G. Goray, a Maharashtrian leader of the Praja Socialist Party, led the first batch of satyagrahis on 18 May 1955; and other batches fol­ lowed led by Maharashtrians and others. V. G. Deshpande, a Maharashtrian leader, said on 22 June 1955 that from his ‘personal experience, he had come to the conclusion that the problem of Goa’s liberation could not be solved without police action by the

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Government of India’93—a course of action which was later adopted. It is of interest that the views of the Government of India and the Indian National Congress on mass satyagraha were opposed by the All-Party Goa Liberation Committee of Maharashtra. The Com­ mittee which concluded its three-day deliberations at Pune on 25 September 1955 stated that there was no moral or political justification for stopping the satyagraha, to abandon which would be highly detrimental to the cause of Goa; it was ‘a betrayal of the people’.94 It announced that a batch of satyagrahis would be sent to offer satyagraha in Goa on 2 October 1955 and another batch on 26 January 1956. 2. The attitude of the Government of Maharashtra to the method to be used for the liberation of Goa and to satyagraha was identical with that of the Government of India. Morarji R. Desai, then Chief Minister, said in the Bombay Legislative Assembly on 23 March 1955: We are charged with preventing Indian citizens from going into Goa to wage the satyagraha battle there against the Portuguese Government.. . . If people want to go there and they do not complain afterwards if anything happens to them and they do not ask us to go to their rescue, I certainly have no objection to anybody going to Goa. But it must be recognised that we cannot launch a war against the Portuguese Government for taking Goa. We have got to solve this problem by peaceful means, by peaceful methods that we have evolved.. . . There is a permit system, and unless a permit obtained, nobody can enter that territory . . . it cannot be the purpose of anybody to say that we must break the rules and that we should have no respect for the rules which we ourselves have framed.. . . I do not want to make any other policy statement, in the matter of Goa because . . . that is the function of the Government of India. We have to carry out the policy of the Government of India; we have no other policy of our own. That is all that I can specify.95

On 11 August 1955, the Chief Minister of Bombay once again repeated the Maharashtra government's policy on the peaceful liberation of Goa.96 The identity between the views of the Govern­ ment of India and the Government of Maharashtra can be ex­ plained by the fact that both the Governments were Congress ones. THE LIBERATION OF BANGLADESH97

It is obvious that the people of West Bengal have a much greater interest in the future of Bangladesh than people in the rest of the

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country: the fact that an overwhelming majority of the refugees who sought shelter in this country, were concentrated in West Bengal created there a degree of special concern for events in former East Pakistan. Not only were these refugees located in West Bengal but the prospects of their being dispersed throughout the country were extremely bleak. Just as the rest of the international community could only share the economic burden of India’s refugee problem, leaving India alone to bear the social and political costs of this influx of some 10 million people, so within the Indian Union the other states could only bear the economic burden of refugee relief, leaving it for West Bengal to cope with the social and political dislocation caused by this phenomenon. If the refugees had remained in India, they would have settled in West Bengal. What is more, those who were already in other eastern states such as Assam, Tripura and Meghalaya, might have been victimised by the local population precisely because they were Bengalis, and eventually found their way to West Bengal. Therefore, the concern of the Bengalis in India for Bangladesh was much greater than that of others. There are especially strong bonds of language and culture bet­ ween the peoples of the two Bengals, and for a variety of reasons, religious and communal loyalties have become weaker in both Bengals. In West Bengal, the left-wing political parties have emerged as the dominant parties and the Hindu communal groups have little or no support. The leftist parties have weakened Hindu consciousness among the Bengali Hindus. The focus in Bengali politics is on social and economic issues rather than communal or caste issues. Historically, the Bengali Hindus and the Bengali Muslims have been less divided in regard to language, manners, customs and culture than the Hindus and Muslims in other parts of the country. For example, they have a common language, using the same script; they adore the same literary figures like Tagore and Nazrul Islam. In food habits also, there is very little difference among the Hindu and Muslim Bengalis: both Hindus and Muslims have virtually the same diet, which makes a great deal of difference to the degree of social intercourse possible among these groups. More profound was the change in the communal attitudes in East Bengal. Soon after partition, Bengali Muslims began to perceive a high stake in the security and welfare of the Bengali Hindu, for, if

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the 20 per cent non-Muslim population in the province were to be massacred or driven away East Bengal's numerical superiority would have been lost. Also, once the threat of Hindu domination had receded, Bengali Muslims found in the Bengali culture de­ veloped and nurtured in Calcutta, a great source of sustenance. The Pakistan Government had from the very beginning disliked the cultural intercourse between the two Bengals and there were re­ peated attempts to prevent this through official dictates. For exam­ ple, Tagore’s songs were banned on Radio Pakistan for some time. These measures, however, only helped to deepen the Bengali Mus­ lims’ commitment to the concept of a distinctive Bengali culture. Another factor is that whereas both in north-western India and in West Pakistan, a high rate of economic growth has been main­ tained, leading to the creation of a prosperous middle-class on both sides of the border, economic growth has been much slower in both West and East Bengal, resulting in discontent and in a degree of alienation98 of the two Bengals from their respective unions. This nas produced a search for special identity. The fact that the British came to Bengal first and that a westernized Bengali middle class had originated as early as the early 19th century were contributory factors in the growth of literary and other cultural activities in Bengal, much before a similar impact of the west was felt in some other parts of India. The resulting pride of the Bengalis in themselves has tended to grow in inverse proportion to the economic performance of the Bengali people. Notwithstanding the existence of such special pressures on the issue of Bangladesh, there was a common Indian attitude to the problem. In many ways, Pakistan represents a country in which the whole of India and all its peoples have a high degree of interest and any policy pertaining to Pakistan tends to be a national policy. The number of state assemblies which adopted resolutions on Bang­ ladesh is one significant pointer to this fact. In discussing this prob­ lem, therefore, no undue emphasis should be put on the interplay of these special interests. While in many ways, the leaders and the people of West Bengal took the lead in educating public opinion on this issue, the rest of India was also interested in such liberation, though admittedly not to the same extent.

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THE STATUS OF THE INDIAN TAMIL ESTATE POPULATION IN SRI LANKA

That Madras9* (one of the constituent units of the Indian Union) would evince great interest in the Indian Tamil Estate population in Sri Lanka is natural. These ‘Indian Tamils’ (as they are designated officially in Sri Lanka) had migrated some 150 years ago, to work mainly on plantations, first coffee and, later on, tea and rubber. In 1961, they numbered nearly one million.100 After enjoying franchise rights in the elections of 1931,1936 and 1947, virtually all of them were deprived of such rights soon after Sri Lanka became indepen­ dent; under the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act of 1949, most of them had to apply and qualify for Sri Lanka citizen­ ship. During 1949-64 only some 134,000 Indian Tamils out of a total of over one million had qualified to become citizens. There was a genuine fear among those who had not been given citizenship that a large majority of them would be rendered ‘stateless’ or repatriated to India. The problem was ultimately settled in 1964 by an agree­ ment between India and Sri Lanka; its net effect was that 525,000 persons (out of an estimated 975,000 persons of Indian origin who were without citizenship) together with the natural increase in their number would be granted Indian citizenship and repatriated to India within fifteen years; 300,000 (together with the natural in­ crease in their number) would be granted Sri Lanka citizenship during the same period; and the status and future of the balance of 150,000 persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka were to be the subject of a separate agreement between the two countries, to be nego­ tiated later. The interest of Tamil Nadu in the problem can be gauged not only from the fact that a large number of Tamilians have found employ­ ment in Sri Lanka; many of these estate labourers had dependents in Tamil Nadu to whom regular remittances were being sent. When citizenship rights were denied to a large number of Indian Tamils, immigration laws introduced restricting the right of entry (1948)101 and remittances subjected to a system of individual permits (1951),102 the concern of Tamil Nadu can well be appreciated. What is the nature of the demand that Tamil Nadu made on the Central Government to share in the making of policy in respect of the Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka, and what is the nature of the response to the demand on the part of the Central Government?

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It may at once be said that the Central Government could not ignore Madras in its policy decisions, for the successful implementa­ tion of some of these decisions depends on the co-operation of the state government. For instance, when Indian Tamils are repatriated to India under an agreement between the Governments of India and Sri Lanka, as for instance in 1964,'03 the rehabilitation of the repatriates becomes the primary responsibility of the Tamil Nadu Government; the state government was under pressure from the state legislature to give economic assistance to the repatriates, for which they sought the Centre’s assistance.104 The Government appointed a special liaison officer to supervise the relief and re­ habilitation of repatriates and prepared a comprehensive scheme ‘to make the lot of the Ceylon returned repatriate as happy as possible’.103 From 1948 the state government took the stand that their view should be heard by the Central Government before policy decisions were made. They communicated to the Central Government the resolutions passed by the State Assembly from time to time on the subject of Indians in Sri Lanka. Thus in 1948, for instance, the Assembly passed a resolution to the effect that all Indians in Sri Lanka with five years’ continuous residence should be given citizen­ ship rights and that ‘suitable provisions be made for the continuance of essential human ties between the Indians settled in Sri Lanka and their relations and dependents in India by the grant of facilities for easy movement of persons and funds between the two countries at least for this purpose.*11,6Occasionally voices were heard in the state legislature blaming the Government of India ‘for their lack of con­ cern for the interests of South Indian Tamils’107 and for inadequate consultation with the state representatives be lore agreemcms were signed.108 While the Central Government kept in close touch with the former Madras state on Indo-Sri Lanka issues;,0V 10Prime Minister Shastri included in his delegation, representatives from Madras with a view to assuaging their feelings when he went to Colombo to find a settlement of the issue in October 1964:111 while their sympathies have clearly been with the Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka, it has also to be recorded that the Central Government have not encouraged attempts on the part of the Tamil Nadu Government and people to interfere in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka. One instance is ade­ quate in this connection: when, in 1952, the Ceylon Indian Con-

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gress launched satyagraha, as a protest against disfranchisement of a large number of people of Indian origin (for the election of 1952), it was learnt that many persons from South India were planning to join the satyagrahis in Sri Lanka; at the request of the Sri Lanka Prime Minister, the Government of India refused them passport facilities.112 That the chauvinistic expressions of a small minority of Tamils in Madras—not the Tamil Nadu Government—could cause embar­ rassment to the Government of India is brought out by the stand taken by some parties in Madras on the concept of a united Dravidian state. There has been a movement amongst the Sri Lanka Tamils for regional autonomy, in a federal set-up; they also advocate parity for the Tamil language with Sinhalese. Sometimes they speak vag­ uely of a Tamil nation comprising the Tamil provinces of Sri Lanka and the state of Tamil Nadu in India, with support from chauvinistic elements in another party, the D.M.K. in Sri Lanka.113 The Sinhalese, naturally, resent the advocacy of such secessionist ideas which may end the existence of Sri Lanka as a separate state. These ‘fears were exacerbated by the opinions expressed by the leading parties of Tamil Nadu expressing similar sentiments of forming a United Dravidian State.’114 S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, the Sri Lanka Prime Minister, ‘was greatly shocked and alarmed at a map published in a South Indian newspaper showing parts of Sri Lanka as a territory of Tamil Nadu’.l15 Jawaharlal Nehru spoke of the ‘irresponsible attitude’ of parties such as the Nam Tamizhar and of ‘the tremendous’ problems which that attitude created for harmonious Indo-Sri Lanka relations.1,6 After the D.M.K. came to power in Tamil Nadu after the elections of 1967, Mrs Gandhi visited Sri Lanka and found some of its leaders rather concerned over the D.M.K.victory in Tamil Nadu and reassured the Sri Lanka Prime Minister, Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike, that it was inconceiv­ able for one state in India to go against the Government’s policy of peace and friendship towards the neighbour.117 While no generalization of universal application can as yet be drawn, two points emerge from this study of Federal-State relations in the conduct of foreign affairs. First, whatever be the law of the Constitution regarding the powers in regard to foreign affairs re­ served to the Centre as in the U.S.A. and India, the efficient implementation of foreign affairs requires the willing co-operation of the units. And this co-operation has to be mutually cultivated.

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Second, as stated earlier, it is political forces, not the legal phrasing in a Constitution, that shape political developments and interna­ tional relations. Thus when the same party is in power both at th e Centre and in the states, it is easier to conduct foreign relations harmoniously than when different parties are at the helm of affairs; even so, it is useful for the government at the Centre to develop systematic procedures for consultation with state governments b e­ fore decisions on foreign affairs are taken.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4.

H. Samuel in The Nineteenth Century, No. 428, p. 676. Italics ours. Justice Field in De Geofrey v. Riggs (1890), 133 2-5 258, p. 267. See for illustrations R.C. Ghosh, Treaties and Federal Constitutions; Their Mutual Impact (Calcutta: The World Press, 1961), p. 64. 5. Public Law No. 337, approved August 4,1947,80th Congress, Secs. 1,61 Stat. 756, 767. Cited in Ghosh, Treaties and Federal Constitutions, pp. 64-5. 6. Ghosh, Treaties and Federal Constitutions, p. 289. 7. International Labour Conference: Report of the Committee of Experts on the application of Conventions and Recommendations (Geneva: ILO, 1959), p. 135. 8. Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario (1937), AC 326, pp. 349-54. 9. See text of the project given in Jennings and Young, Constitutional Laws o f the Commonwealth (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 260. 10. Canadian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly (Eleventh Session), Press Release No. 47, p. 2. 11. See Max Sorensen, ‘Federal States and the International Protection of Human Rights*, American Journal o f International Law, vol. 46. pp 195-218. 12. I.D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimensions o f Poli­ tics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 213. 13. A city in the State of New York. 14. A village in Canada. 15. Ghosh, Treaties and Federal Constitutions, p. 63. 16. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism, p. 213, n. 2H. 17. Ibid.. pp. 214-15. 18. Ibid. 19. Paper reviewed for the Ripon Society by J. Lee Auspits, President Ripon Society, Stephen A. Marglin, Professor of Economics, Harvard University, and Gustav F. Papenek, Lecturer in Economics and former Director, Development Advisory Service. Harvard University. The paper is included in Ministry of External Affairs, Bangladesh Documents (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1971), pp. 5-9.

Federalism 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

211

Bangladesh Documents, p. 6 Hindustan Times, 7 February 1972. The number of the item in Seventh Schedule List I is given within brackets. Article 248. Article 253. Article 73. Article 257. Ibid. HM. Seervai, Constitutional Law o f India (Bombay: N. R. Tripathi, 1968), p. 109. 29. Article 256. 30. With the passing of the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, education has become a concurrent subject. 31. United Nations, Report o f the Ninth Session o f the Commission on Human Rights (7 April-30 May 1953), E/2447 E/CN.4/689, p. 51. 32. The party to which the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu belonged. 33. Hindu, 4 April 1971, p. 1. 34. Hindu, 24 June 1971, p. 6. 35. The Government of Tamil Nadu, Report of the Centre-State Relations Enquiry Committee (Madras, 1971), p. 220. 36. In his address at the annual session of the Federation on 10 April 1971. See Hindu, 11 April 1971, p. 6. 37. Times o f India, 16 April 1971, p. 7. 38. Supreme Court Reports, 1960,3 SCR (Delhi, 1960), p. 266. It should be added for clarity that Radcliffe had stated, ‘The map is annexed for the purpose of illustration, and if there should be any divergence between the boundary as described in Annexure A and as delineated on the map in Annexure B, the description in Annexure A is to prevail.’ 39. Article 1 says: (1) India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States. (2) The States and the territories thereof shall be as specified in the First Schedule. (3) The territory of India shall comprise— (a) the territories of the States; (b) the Union territories specified in the First Schedule; and (c) such other territories as may be acquired. 40. Article 3: 'Parliament may by law— (a) form a new State by separation of territory from any State or by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State; (b) increase the area of any State; (c) diminish the area of any State; (d) alter the boundaries of any State; (e) alter the name of any State; Provided that no bill for the purpose shall be introduced in either House of Parliament except on the recommendation of the President and unless, where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the States. . . the Bill has been referred by the President to the Legislature of that State for expressing its views thereon within such

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period as may be specified in the reference or within such further period as the President may allow and the period so specified or allowed has ex­ pired.’ 41. Debates, Second Series, vol. XLII1,1960, col. 3854. 42. Hindustan Times, 7 November 1960. 43. Times of India, 29 November 1960, Article by Prem Bhatia. 44. Hindu, 17 March 1960. 45. Indian Express, 7 December 1960. 46. West Bengal Legislative Assembly Debates vol. XXI »PP- 476~95 (15 December 1958 -2 January 1959). 47. Statesman, 22 November 1960. 48. Hindu, 23 November 1960. 49. Hindustan Times, 30 November 1960. 50. Ibid., 26 November 1960. 51. Ibid., 30 November 1960. 52. Ibid., 2 December 1960. 53. Indian Express, 5 December 1960. 54. Statesman, 13 September 1958. 55. Hindustan Times, 19 December 1958. Dr B.C. Roy had inquired of the Prime Minister if he had stated in Parliament that the decision on die transfer of parts (of Berubari Union) was taken after consulting the State officials. The query was made after the Opposition demand in the State Assembly for a debate on the subject. 56. Debates, Second Series, vol. 48, 1960, Cols. 3224-6 57. Statesman, b Deccmbei i960; Debates, vol. 48 (i960), cols, 3862-70 for a detailed explanation by the Prime Minister to what extent the officials of the West Bengal Government were consulted. 58. Hindu, 7 December 1960. 59. Ibid., 2 December 1960. 60. Hindustan Times, 12 December 1960. 61. Times o f India, 22 December 1960. 62. See above, p. 181. 63. Kent, Commentaries, pp. 166-7 and Note. 64. The implementation of the Acts was held up because of stay orders issued by the West Bengal High Court in consequence of a petition by residents of West Bengal; on an appeal to the Supreme Court the provisions of the Act authoris­ ing the transfer of territory and the exchange of the enclaves were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1971. The actual transfer of territory and the exchange of enclaves were delayed because of new developments in Bangladesh. It is understood the Government is now seized with the question of demarcating the boundaries of Bangladesh with India in the course of which the provisions of the Acts referred to above are expected to be implemented. 65. Letter dated 19 April 1965 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the President of the Security Council S/6291, dated 20 April 1965. 66. Article 3 (a) in Text of the Agreement between India and Pakistan concerning the Rann of Kutch, 30 June 1965 in SCORS 1965, July, August and Sep­ tember, pp. 29-31.

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67. See the excellent article by R.P. Anand, ‘The Kutch Award’, India Quarterly, vol. XXIV, pp. 184-5. 68 Ibid. 69. Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal Award (Government of India, 1968), Introduction, p. 9. 70. See M.S. Rajan, India in World Affairs, 1954-56 (Bombay, 1964), pp. 499-500. 71. See above, p. 195. 72. National Herald, 22 March 1968. 73. Hindustan Times, 21 February 1968. 74. Times o f India, 20 February 1968. 75. Ibid 76. Ibid., 22 February 1968. 77. The closing of shops and other places of work. 78. Times o f India, 22 February 1968. 79. Statesman, 20 July 1965. 80. Hindu, 19 August 1965; Debates, Series 3, vol. 44, col. 715. 81. Hindu, 20 February 1968. 82. Patriot, 22 February 1968. 83. Ibid., 3 March 1968. 84. Debates, part II, vol. VII, col. 14212. 85. ‘The time may come’, Nehru told the Rajya Sabha on 16 August 1961, ‘when we may even dedde to send our army there.' Statesman, 17 August 1961; India, Rajya Sabha, Debates, vol. 35, col. 399. 86. Times o f India, 5 June 1955. 87. ‘If a little war is justifiable under [certain] circumstances, a big war is also justifiable under certain other circumstances. There is no ground or principle left then in saying that war should be avoided and solutions sought on peaceful lines.’ Rajya Sabha, Debates, vol. X, col. 209C. 88. Statement by A.K. Chanda, Deputy Minister for External Affairs in the Lok Sabha on 12 March 1955, Times o f India, 13 March 1955. 89. Times o f India, 1 June 1955. 90. Statesman, 16 August 1955. 91. Debates, part II, vol. Ill, col. 4808. 92. The Goa Aid Liberation Committee. 93. Hindustan Times, 3 August 1955. 94 Ibid., 26 September 1955. 95. Bombay Legislative Assembly Debates, part II, vol. 28, 23 March 1955, p p .1366-67. 96. Hindu, 12 August 1955. Morarji Desai was answering a question-and-answer meeting organised by the Bombay Pradesh Youth Congress. 97. This section owes a great deal to a note prepared on the subject by Prof. Sisir Gupta at the author’s request. 98. It should, however, be noted that by no means were the two Bengals equally alienated from India and Pakistan. With 60 per cent of the population, East Bengal had contributed only one brigade to the army of Pakistan, whereas with less than 10 per cent of the population, West Bengal had contributed a Chief each to the Indian army, Indian navy and to the Indian air force. Neither in the

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matter of representation in politics and the civil service nor in the matter of the discrimination against the Bengali population were the two Bengals compara­ ble. In many ways, the struggle of the people of East Bengal was against privilege whereas the struggle of the middle class people in West Bengal was for the retention of their privileges. Therefore, there is no question of the grievances of the two Bengalis producing simultaneously a movement for separation in both India and Pakistan. Foreign commentators were off the mark on this issue because they equated the position of East Pakistan and West Bengal in the two States. Nevertheless, one of the factors contributing to West Bengal’s special concern for Bangladesh was the feeling that the entire Bengali people on both sides of the border were in dire straits. 99. After-1970, the state has been known as ‘Tamil Nadu’. 100. See Table compiled by S.U. Kodikara from Ceylon Census Reports. S. W. Kodikara, Indo-Ceylon Relations Since Independence (Colombo: The Ceylon Institute of World Affairs, 1965), p. 6. 101. kodikara, Indo-ceylon Relations, p i4.v 102. Ibid., p. i70. 103. Ibid., pp. 224. 104. Madras Legislative Assembly Debates, 16.3.1956, vol. XXXII, pp. 14-17. l(b. See for details Kodikara, Indo-Leylon Relations, p. 225. 106. Madras Legisbtive Assembly Debates, 25.10.1948, vol. XVI, p. 719; see also kodikara, Indo-LeyIon Relations, p. 221. 107. Madras Legislative Assembly Debates, 1954,vol. 15,pp. 747-50. One member of the Madras Assembly went so far as to say in 1949, ‘The fete of the Tamils of Ceylon must be decided by the Madras Ministry and not by the Central Ministry’! 108. Ibid., 25.10.1948, vol. XVI, p. 738. 109. Ibid., 25.8.1955, vol. XXVI, p. 661. 110. Debates, 22.5.1957, second series, vol. I, cols. 1350-3. 111. Madras Legislative Assembly Debates, 12.5.1952, vol. I, p. 246. 112. Debates, vol. 2, part I, cols. 2293-4, 29 July 1952. 113. Urmila Phadnis in The Hindustan Times, 6 March 1972. 114. Ibid. Urmila Phadnis has not named the parties; perhaps D.M.K. is one of them. When the D.M.K. (the ruling party in Tamil Nadu, 1967-76) had not become the ruling party, it advocated secession of Tamil Nadu from the Indian Union and supported the idea of the United Dravidian State. After the Govemment of India enacted legislation making the preaching of secession from the Indian Union a criminal offence, the D .M.K. gave up its earlier objective of secession {Hindu, 2 December 1963) and pari passu gave up its support to the idea of the United Dravidian State. 115. Ceylon News, 7 July 1960. 116. Debates, second series, vol. XI, col. 1375. 117. Phadnis,‘Infra- Structural Linkages in Sri Lanka-India RelationsEconomic and Political Weekly, vol. 7, Special number, August 1972, p. 1497. See also Ceylon Daily News, 20 September 1967.

CHAPTER VII

Nehru’s Charismatic Leadership Edward Shils concluded a brilliant article on ‘Charisma, Order and Status’, contributed to the American Sociological Review in Feb­ ruary 1965, with a reference to Weber’s famous proposition about the revolutionary character of charisma and added significantly,‘As in so much else that he said, much truth resides. But the truth of the matter is more complicated, the phenomenon is more protean and the distance to be traversed for its understanding is still very great.’1 A study of Nehru’s leadership will perhaps provide some under­ standing of four aspects of the nature of charisma: (1) the situation in which the leader with charisma emerges; (2) factors which help acceptance of such a leader; (3) methods employed by the charis­ matic leader in exercising his leadership and (4) the decline of the leader. It was clearly because of charismatic leadership that the foreign policy evolved evoked acceptance on such a national scale.

What is Charisma? Charisma is the aggregate of those special gifts of mind and character which are the source of exceptional personal power, and upon which depends the capacity to secure the allegiance of, and exercise decisive authority over, large masses of people. Weber’s analysis of charisma is a similar one: ‘a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhu­ man, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.’3 In Weber’s view, these exceptional powers or qualities are not accessi­ ble to ordinary persons, but are regarded as being of divine origin ‘or as exemplary’, and it is because of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader. Recognition of the leader’s authority is essen­ tial for the validity of charisma; there must be absolute trust in the leader. Uncritical acceptance of the leader’s decisions follows from

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the confidence reposed in him. The leader’s charismatic power will disappear if he is unsuccessful for a long period. Charismatic autho­ rity is a revolutionary force, as it repudiates the past; in traditionally stereotyped periods, charisma provides the greatest revolutionary force, ‘The equally revolutionary force of “ reason”5, says Weber, ‘works from without by altering the situations of action, and hence its problems finally in this way changing men’s attitudes toward them; or it intellectualizes the individual. Charisma, on the other hand, may involve a subjective or internal re-orientation bom out of suffering, conflicts or enthusiasm. It may then result in a radical alteration of the central system of attitudes and directions of action with a completely new orientation of all attitudes toward the differ­ ent problems and structures of the world.'4

Nehru as a Charismatic Leader That Jawaharlal Nehru was a leader of unusual stature is now generally admitted. ‘Few statesmen in the twentieth century’, writes Michael Brecher, ‘have attained the stature of Jawaharlal Nehru. As the pre-eminent figure in India’s era of transition he bears comparison with Roosevelt and Churchill, Lenin and Mao, men who towered above their colleagues and guided their peoples through a period of national crisis.’5 C. Rajagopalachari, the last Governor-General of India, said of Nehru, ‘There is not anyone who would do as well in his place.** Nehru ‘more than any one other person, had foreseen, had helped to shape and form, and had led, the trend of the times.'7 What explains the emergence of a leader of such unusual stature? In our judgment, the situation in India on the eve of the transfer of power from Britain to India is the main factor which explains the emergence of Nehru as a leader of unquestioned authority; coupled with this are, of course, the ‘gifts of mind and character’ which Jawaharlal possessed in abundance. T H t SITUATION

In 1947 when Britain transferred power to India by the Indian Independence Act, this meant in effect a three-fold revolution. First, it was a transfer of political power from one nation to another, a newly-elected independent one. It signified the

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fulfilment of the national urge for freedom. The British government in India, whatever its merits, had always been considered an alien government; 1947 witnessed a historic political revolution in so far as it saw the achievement of swaraj—a concept incorporated in the Constitution of the Indian National Congress in 1920. Secondly, that power was transferred from Britain to the people of India through the Constituent Assembly. The Independence Act transferred to the Constituent Assembly of India ‘the full Legislative power which by Clause 6 (1) [of the Act] is vested in the Legislature of each Dominion [ India and Pakistan]’.8 The Constituent Assembly was representative of the people of India, as is evident from the pledge taken by the members of the Constituent Assembly, after the last stroke of midnight on 14 August 1947: ‘At this solemn moment when the people of India, through suffering and sacrifice, have secured freedom, I , . . . a member of the Constituent Assembly of India, do dedicate myself___’The second revolution was, therefore, the recognition of the supremacy of the people, the idea of democracy: the govern­ ment of the Indian people was thenceforward to be by the people and for the people. The Constitution of India, hammered out by the Constituent Assembly, became effective from 1950. Its preamble declared: ‘We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign democratic Republic . . . in our Constituent Assembly this twenty-sixth day of November 1949 do Hereby Adopt, Enact and Give to ourselves this Constitution.’ The third revolution was also stated clearly in the preamble; it said that the people of India had resolved to constitute India into a sovereign democratic republic and to secure to all its citizens justice, social, economic and political.9 All the three revolutions had been telescoped in one act, the transfer of power from Britain to India in 1947. ‘The nation-state; the people’s stale; and the welfare state—Mazzini, Mill, and Marx—seek simultaneous birth.’10 In Weber’s analysis of the revolutionary situation, in which a charismatic leader emerges, stress is laid on ‘a radical alteration of the central system of attitudes and directions of action’ which the leader had to bring about if the revolution was to succeed. The three revolutions implicit in the transfer of power from Britain to India demanded such a radical alteration. The national political revolu­

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tion demanded willing, enthusiastic acceptance of loyalty to native government (in particular, the vested interests loyal to an alien government for some two hundred years had to accustom them­ selves to the new situation); people’s government entailed the development of disciplines among the voters and the leaders ap­ propriate to democracy, such as taking an active interest in political problems and using political power in the public (and not private) interest; and the establishment of the welfare state demanded willingness on the part of the ‘haves’ to give up their economic privileges for the sake of the underprivileged. The creation and development of these attitudes were clearly, a long-drawn-out pro­ cess; the success of the revolution depended upon the ability and wisdom of the leader, and on the capacity of the people to adjust themselves to the new situation. That Nehru was aware of the historic importance of the transfer of power is clear from a broadcast he made to the nation on 3 June 1947:4We stand’, he said, ‘on a watershed dividing the past from the future And again . . . ‘We end today a period of ill fortune and India discovers herself again . . . Freedom and power bring respon­ sibility. The responsibility rests upon this Assembly, a sovereign body representing the sovereign people of India. . .. [The ] future is not one of ease or resting but of incessant striving so that we may fulfil the pledges we have so often taken and the one we shall take today. The service of India means the ending of poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity.’12Again in a message to the Press on 15 August 1947, he said: ‘The appointed day has come—-the day appointed by destiny—and India stands forth again after long slumber and struggle, awake, vital, free and independent. .. .History begins anew for us, the history which we shall live and act and others will write about. .. .It is a fateful moment for us in India.’ One significant idea which these passages bring out is that Nehru was acutely conscious of the fact that the transfer of power was the dividing line between the old and the new—and if he asked the people to ‘face the future not with easy optimism or any compla­ cency or weakness but with confidence and firm faith in India,’13 it was because, as leader, he knew that much remained to be destroyed out of the old, and much remained to be built. Caste, communalism and all such divisive forces must be ended; India’s unity must be maintained and given a more meaningful content; democracy and

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socialism must be built up, bringing in equality and economic pro­ gress; and India’s international relations had to be placed on a sound basis. Briefly, as he himself said on 14 August 1947, ‘we have to build the noble mansion of free India where all her children may dwell.’14 He worked hard to achieve this. It is well known that he kept before him on his desk a passage from Robert Frost the American poet, acting as a spur to activity: ‘The woods are lovely, dark and deep, But I have promises to keep; And miles to go before I sleep, And miles to go before I sleep.’ Clearly, Jawaharlal had a sense of mission in building the new India. That he knew even during the struggle for freedom, that he had to lead the people admits of no doubt: when negotiations for the transfer of power from Britain to India were being carried on in 1944, Nehru told Pethwick Lawrence: ‘Do not forget that if you and I come to an agreement, you are laying down a burden and I am picking it up.’15 We spoke earlier of the abundant gifts of mind and character which gave Jawaharlal confidence. He worked hard; from all ac­ counts, he worked some sixteen hours a day: attending committees and conferences of all kinds, studying state papers, receiving visitors, sitting in Parliament and the Cabinet, writing minutes and letters, travelling, delivering speeches. It will be recalled that in addition to being Prime Minister, he held the portfolios of External Affairs and Atomic Energy; he was the leader of the Congress Party, which had formed governments in several states in addition to the Centre. Nehru’s biographers have pointed out that his intel­ lectual endowments were also exceptional. He had also a wide range of interests, and could discourse on history, economics, poli­ tics, general science and literature with ease. He had great courage and charm. He was a man of integrity; the people of India knew that he never used his vast power for personal ends. ‘He wanted pow ef, as a biographer put it, but ‘he wanted it for a cause, not for himself*,16 i.e., he was a disinterested helper of India and mankind. He loved the Indian people deeply. Winston Churchill is said to have remarked, ‘Here is a man without malice and without fear.’17 Gandhi said of him in 1929: ‘He is as pure as crystal; he is truthful beyond suspicion__ The nation is safe in his hands.’ This perhaps is as good an assessment of Nehru’s personality as any and explains his rise to a position of unquestioned leadership.

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Acceptance o f the Charismatic Leader The acceptance of the charismatic leader by the people is made possible primarily by the situation in which he emerges and the exceptional qualities which he possesses; this is certainly true of the emergence of Jawaharlal Nehru as leader. There are a few secondary factors which helped the acceptance of Nehru as the unquestioned leader of the new nation. First in impor­ tance is the fact that Jawaharlal Nehru was named by Gandhi as his political heir. Gandhi was admittedly the father of the nation. In January 1942, (when the Second World War was on) the question of the Congress co-operating with the Government in the conduct of the war was being discussed and rumours of a split between Gandhi and Jawaharlal were rife. Gandhi declared publicly: ‘It will require much more than differences of opinion to estrange us. We have had differences from the moment we became co-workers, and yet I have said for some years and say now that not Rajaji [Rajagopalachari] but Jawaharlal will be my successor. He says he does not understand my language, and that he speaks a language foreign to me. This may or may not be true. But language is no bar to a union of hearts. And I know this that when I am gone he will speak my language.’18Nehru became the acknowledged heir of Gandhi. This was a tremendous asset to Nehru, for it gave him enormous prestige among a people accustomed to hero-worship. He had himself observed once, the Indian masses have ‘the ingrained habit of expecting everything to be done from the top’. To such a people, being pronounced the political heir of the father of the nation was, clearly, an important factor in their acceptance of him as the leader. A second reason is the fact that Nehru gave up a comfortable life—he was born into a wealthy and aristocratic family accustomed to luxury, in order to serve the people. Renuciation of the mater­ ial pleasures of life has always been held up as an ideal in India; here Nehru deliberately chose the hard life, was imprisoned nine times and spent some nine years (nine years less twenty-three days to be precise) in prison. The common man knew, for instance, that when the Simon Commission visited Lucknow in 1928,19 Jawaharlal ‘was in the forefront of the crowd when the mounted police charged it with swinging batons and lathis (long sticks weighted at the end). He was beaten, bruised and covered with blood .*20The people of India instinctively gave such a man all their affection.

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A third factor which must be mentioned is that Nehru loved being in the midst of crowds, talking to them and mingling with them; people felt that he was like a father to them. It has been said of him that from quite early in his political career, he felt at home with crowds, ‘drawing from them strength, exhilaration, even exultation, and in turn communicating the same feelings to them.’21 Nehru’s affection for the Indian people expressed itself in many ways; mingling with them in big mass meetings was but one expression of it. ‘I have received so much love and affection from the Indian people’, Nehru wrote in his will, that nothing I can do will repay even a small fraction of it.’22 This factor also reminds us that Nehru had become a popular hero, i.e. had built up his charisma even before 1947; the transfer of power to India in 1947 enabled him to become the leader of an independent State with the capacity to secure the allegiance of, and exercise decisive authority over, large masses of people. Finally, the first decade of Nehru’s term as Prime Minister witnes­ sed a remarkable rise in India’s prestige abroad, and the Indian citizen participated in the exhilaration it produced. Nehru’s desire, and work, for international peace struck a sympathetic chord among people all over the world. In Korea, Indo-China and Suez, India’s voice was heard and Indian attempts at reconciliation were appreciated. The rising stature of India in international councils found its best expression in the Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s proposal to include India in a Summit Conference of five powers in 1958 ‘to take steps to put an end to the military conflict which has broken out'23 in West Asia., after the U .SA . had intervened in the civil war in the Lebanon; the other four were the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., Britain and France. Though the conference did not materialize, the publicity given to the proposal raised India’s prestige very high. It was natural to attribute the rising prestige of India to Nehru’s personality and initiative; Nehru’s leadership was hailed as great and beneficial. METHODS

One of the methods used by the leader to maintain his unchal­ lenged authority, has already been mentioned, viz. meeting the public at large public meetings and addressing them on the affairs of the nation, advising, admonishing, and rebuking them. ‘He talks to

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them like a teacher to his pupils’, writes his official biographer, ‘showing them the errors of their ways, pointing out the proper path of conduct, stressing the need for discipline, hard work, unity, tolerance and faith, drawing on the inspiration of Gandhi and the freedom struggle, painting a picture of the India of the future, pledging himself to their welfare, calling for re-dedication to the cause of a good society.* J4No contemporary statesman has spoken at such a large number of public meetings as Jawaharlal. It was a tool used by him for the education of his people. In a remarkable self-portrait composed in 1937 Nehru explained his methods of winning popularity with crowds, and his desire for power: Rashtrapati Jawaharlal Ki Jai. The Rashtrapati looked up as he passed swiftly through the waiting crowds, his hands went up and were joined together in salute and his pale hard face was lit up by a smile. It was a warm personal smile and the people who saw it responded to it immediately and smiled and cheered in return. The smile passed away and again the face became stern and sad, impas­ sive in the midst of the emotion that it had roused in the multitude. Almost it seemed that the smile and the gesture accompanying it had little reality behind them; they were just tricks of the trade to gain the goodwill of the crowds whose darling he had become. Was it so? Watch him again. There is a great procession and tens of thousands of persons surround his car and cheer him in an ecstasy of abandonment. He stands on the seat of the car balancing himself rather well, straight and seemingly tall, like a god, serene and unmoved by the seething multitude. Suddenly there is that smile again, or even a merry laugh, and the tension seems to break and the crowd laughs with him not knowing what it is laughing at. He is godlike no longer but a human being claiming kinship and comradeship with the thousands who surround him, and the crowd feels happy and friendly and takes him to its heart. But the smile is gone and the pale stem face is there again. Is all this natural or the carefully thought-out trickery of the public man? Perhaps it is both and long habit has become second nature now. The most effective pose is one in which there seems to be least of posing, and Jawaharlal has learnt well to act without the paint and powder of the actor. With his seeming carelessness and insouciance, he performs on the public stage with consummate artistry. Whither is this going to lead him and the country? What is he aiming at with all his apparent want of aim? What lies behind that mask of his, what desires, what will to power, what insatiate longings? . . . Steadily and persistently he goes on increasing his personal prestige and influence both with the masses and with all manner of groups and people. He goes to the peasant and the worker, to the zamindar and the capitalist, to the merchant and the pedlar, to the Brahmin and the untouchable, to the

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Muslim, the Sikh, the Parsi, the Christian and the Jew-to all those who make up the great variety of Indian life. To all these he speaks in a slightly different language, ever seeking to win them over to his side. With an energy that is astonishing at his age, he has rushed about across this vast land of India, and everywhere he has received the most extraordinary of popular welcomes. From the far North to Cape Comorin he has gone like some triumphant Caesar passing by, leaving a trail of glory and a legend behind him. Is all this for him just a passing fancy which amuses him, or some deep design or the play of some force which he himself does not know? Is it his will to power of which he speaks in his autobiography that is driving him from crowd to crowd and making him whisper to himself: 1 drew these tides o f men into my hands and wrote my will across the sky in

stars. What if the fancy turn? Men like Jawaharlal with all their capacity for great and good work are unsafe in [a] democracy. He calls himself a democrat and a socialist, and no doubt he does so in all earnestness, but every psychologist knows that the mind is ultimately a slave to the heart and that logic can always be made to fit in with the desires and irrepressible urges of man. A little twist and Jawaharlal might turn a dictator sweeping aside the paraphernalia of a slow-moving democracy. He might still use the language and slogans of democracy and socialism, but we all know how fascism has fattened on this language and then cast it away as useless l umber. . . . Jawaharlal cannot become a fascist. And yet he has all the makings of a dictator in him-vast popularity, a strong will directed to a well-defined purpose, energy, pride, organizational capacity, ability, hardness, and, with all his love of the crowd, an intolerance of others and a certain contempt for the weak and inefficient. His flashes of temper are well-known and even when they are controlled, the curling of the lips betrays him. His overmas­ tering desire to get things done, to sweep away what he dislikes and build anew, will hardly brook for long the slow processes of democracy. He may keep the husk but he will see to it that it bends to his will. In normal times he would just be an efficient and successful executive, but in this revolutionary epoch Caesarism is always at the door, and is it not possible that Jawaharlal might fancy himself as a Caesar? Therein lies danger for Jawaharlal and for India.25

Jawaharlal’s career as Prime Minister and leader of the Congress Party in Parliament shows that he had great deference for Parlia­ ment and the people’s will; indeed with all his other work, he attended Parliament and participated in its proceedings more than most other ministers who had much less work to do. This deference to Parliament shows that he did not behave as a dictator; this part of his self-portrait has been belied by events. Indeed, it can be stated categorically that it was through the democratic method, i.e. with the support of the people, that he

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maintained his power. Apart from his deferring to Parliament, the best evidence of his belief in democracy was that he was primarily responsible (expert opinion apart) for the making of a fully demo­ cratic Constitution for India with free elections, adult suffrage, the responsibility of the Cabinet to Parliament, freedom of speech and of press, and constitutional safeguards for individual rights. The democratic method appealed to him because of its reliance on peaceful means for resolving conflicts.‘The very essence of a demo­ cratic state’, he wrote on 25 August 1954 to the Presidents of the Pradesh Congress Committees, ‘is its functioning in an atmosphere of peace. Problems, however difficult, are solved by peaceful methods, by discussion, negotiation, conciliation and persuasion.’ He also strove to give a sound economic basis to democracy by the five-year Plans for development. For him the reduction of economic inequality was essential to make democracy meaningful to the common man. ‘Democracy means equality*, Jawaharlal wrote, ‘and democracy can only flourish in an equal society. It is obvious enough that the giving of votes to everybody does not result in producing an equal society. In spite of adult suffrage and the like there is today tremendous inequality. Therefore, in order to give democracy a chance, an equal society must be created.’26 Jawaharlal nurtured democracy in India, and through it estab­ lished his own unquestioned leadership. There is a revealing pas­ sage in his Foreword to the biography of Gandhi en­ titled Mahatma, which shows his deep understanding of the essentials of democratic leadership P In stressing that (1) a leader must lead and not merely follow, and (2) it is not enough for him to perceive truth, he must succeed in making others perceive it also, Jawaharlal has stated the essentials of democratic leadership. There are two instances in recent history when Jawaharlal at­ tempted to apply the principle o f‘no surrender to crowd opinion’, prima facie, successfully. The first was on the language question in India, when he stood firmly by the view that, until the non-Hindi speaking people agreed, English should continue to be an associate language, and, second, he decided, and educated public opinion to the view that India gained by remaining in the Commonwealth.28 DECLINE OF LEADERSHIP

Jawaharlal Nehru’s record as Prime Minister also gives us some

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inkling of the factors which led to the docline of a charismatic leader. Michael Brecher notes that 1956-7 marked ‘the beginning of dis-enchantment with Nehru’s political leadership’. ‘The masses continued to adore him’, he adds, ‘but in the vocal section of India’s population questioning and critical voices multiplied. Some focus­ sed on his vacillation during States Reorganization, others on his initial rationalization of the Soviet onslaught on Hungary; some commented on his alleged inability to put the Congress house in order, and still others were dissatisfied with his handling of the economic problem.’29 It was, however, the growing threat from China, that increased Nehru’s unpopularity: first by claims to Indian territory on maps, then by actual military aggression in 1962. In Parliament, in particu­ lar, there was strong criticism of the government’s handling of the Chinese problem. Parliament took exception to Nehru having kept them uninformed about the details of the Chinese threat to India’s security; at one stage Nehru himself confessed to his error. Apart from this Issue, Nehru felt that Parliament was not fully satisfied with the way he had handled the Chinese. There is a remarkable passage in the Lok Sabha Debates in 1959 which, in our judgement, marks the beginning of the dccline of Nehru’s leadership, for he told Parliament then that if it did not have complete confidence in him and his colleagues in the government, it was open to it to‘choose more competent men in whom it has faith’—a statement which could not have been expected from him in his earlier years.30 In 1962, Nehru was compelled by public pressure to accept the resignation of V.K. Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister, from the Cabinet. The defeat of India and the occupation of so much Indian territory by China, quite naturally, lessened the people’s faith in Nehru’s ability to lead the nation. Even the President of India publicly admitted the leadership’s ‘credulity and negligence’. Above all, China’s treachery disillusioned Nehru himself:he said, ‘We were living in an artificial world of our own creation’. Nehru was never his former self again. We shall not attempt a detailed assessment of Nehru’s charisma. He had himself spoken of ‘his overmastering desire to get things done, to sweep away what he dislikes and build anew’, but he clearly failed to abolish casteism, regionalism and communalism; and he did not fully succeed in achieving his vision of democratic socialism. Yet few will question that his leadership helped to maintain stability

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in a period of transition, that it helped to maintain India’s unity, that it laid the foundations of democracy and that, through a planned economy, it built up an infrastructure which would, in due course, speed up India's economic development. In this task his charismatic powers obtained the unstinted co-operation of the masses. The ‘decline’ of his personal authority in his later years is another way of stating that the tremendous problems of raising the living standards of 500 million people, maintaining the territorial integrity of the country and of sustaining the social and political health of the nation were not tasks which could be accomplished in one generation; they are long-term problems which need to be tackled with persistence over many generations.

Impact on Foreign Policy Some space has been devoted above to a discussion of Nehru’s remarkable power of leadership to enable us to appreciate its im­ pact on India’s foreign policy, relevant to a study of the domestic roots of that policy. Nehru’s leadership left its impress both on domestic and on foreign policy; there is, however, one significant difference. In domestic policy, he built primarily on an existing framework; in foreign policy, he had to lay the foundations. India’s administrative unity had been built up by the former rulers: there was a Civil Service; the rule of law had been established. The beginnings of Indian democracy could be traced to the Morley-Minto Reforms. Large-scale industry and modern transport had been developing in India since the middle of the nineteenth century. True, Nehru did much to reorganize the Civil Service, re-draw the administrative map of India, extend democracy and to plan economic develop­ ment; but the base was already there, while the basic elements of foreign policy had to be formulated: building up official contacts with sovereign States and with the international community or­ ganized in the United Nations; creating a foreign service; framing a foreign policy. One fact which reveals itself clearly from the records is that, at home, India’s foreign policy was practically a national policy, i.e. its basic outlines had the approval of all political parties and the mass of thinking people, a fact which must, clearly, be traced to the acceptance of Nehru’s leadership. N.G. Ranga, the Swatantra

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leader, was correct when he wrote in Indian Foreign Affairs in April 1958, ‘India is today in the fortunate position that there is almost complete unity among all her political parties over her foreign policy. The Panchsheel approach towards international affairs is accepted by all.'31 Even the best-informed critic of our foreign policy, and a respected statesman—Acharya Kripalani—began his criticism of foreign policy in Parliament by avowing his ‘complete agreement with the basic principles of our foreign policy’,32 peace, anti-colonialism and non-alignment with power blocs. The discussions in Parliament show that there were differences in the approach of political parties to various aspects of foreign policy. Thus it might be that the Praja Socialist Party, as Nehru said on 31 January 1957,33 would align itself more closely with the Western bloc, and the Communist Party with the Soviet bloc. But there is no doubt that on the fundamentals of our foreign policy there was a near national consensus during Nehru’s time. The national agreement on foreign policy apart, there are three aspects of the foreign policy, viz. non-alignment, panchsheel, and the continuance of India’s connection with the Commonwealth, which were due to Nehru’s creative mind; the wide acceptance of these by the people of India, in our judgement, is also largely due to Nehru’s personality. It is not necessary to discuss these aspects here in any detail as these have been dealt with, in an earlier chapter;34 we shall merely deal briefly with the impact of Nehru’s personality on these vital elements of our foreign policy. Non-alignment with power blocs is India’s distinctive contribu­ tion to international politics; Nehru originated it, and, since 1947, it has been accepted by some fifty states in Asia, Europe, and Africa as part of their foreign policy. Till 1947 it was normal for States to join the democratic bloc led by the U.S.A., or the Communist bloc led by the U.S.S.R.; this policy was in keeping with the balance-ofpower system then current. Nehru struck a new bold path; to him it appeared that a newly-independent state was likely to lose its independence of action if it was a camp-follower of the one or the other bloc; he also wanted to avail himself of the help which coun­ tries of both blocs might be in a position to give in the economic development of India. He also expounded with clarity and vigour that non-alignment was not the same thing as neutrality; it was not a negative policy but a positive one; and that it would contribute to peace insofar as the area of peace built up by the non-aligned

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countries would speak the language of peace, not of war. To the Indian people, he commended the policy as it was in keeping with the Indian tradition of tolerance. All in all, it was a new way of looking at international politics, which found favour with the bulk of newly-independent states which appeared after 1947. The second basic idea to which Nehru was committed—and which he propagated with enthusiasm—was panchsheel, the five principles of peaceful coexistence. These principles, which first found mention in the India-China Agreement on Trade and Inter­ course between Tibet Region of China and India (1954) were: (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. The essence of panchsheel was, as Nehru himself explained in Parliament, that there may be different ways of progress, possibly different outlooks, but that broadly, the ultimate objectives are the same. It follows that each country should carve out its own destiny without interfering with o th e T s .35 In the same speech h e claimed that ever since these ideas of peaceful co-existence were initially mentioned and promulgated, not only have they spread in the world and influenced more and more countries, ‘but they have acquired progressively a greater depth, and a greater meaning too. That is, from being perhaps a word used rather loosely, it [panchsheel ] has begun to acquire a specific meaning and significance in world af­ fairs.’ There were indeed critics of panchsheel: Acharya Kripalani had two criticisms to make: (1) it was bom in sin, and (2) it had been destroyed by those who promised to keep its principles. It was bom in sin because it was enunciated (in 1954) ‘to put the seal of our approval upon the destruction of an ancient nation [Tibet] which was associated with us spiritually and culturally’. Tibet, it was clear, ought to have been allowed its independence; that it was not. This basic principle of panchsheel, non-interference, was broken. Se­ condly, panchsheel was shattered, Kripalani thought, when the Soviet Union invaded Hungary in 1956. Thus China and the Soviet Union, which had subscribed to the principles, had no qualms about breaking them when it suited their purpose. His conclusion was that one could not be too optimistic about the effectiveness of panchsheel in maintaining national sovereignty and compelling na­

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tions to keep to the code of international morality expressed in panchsheel. Coexistence, one of the five principles, T.K. Chaudhury thought,36 was no panacea for all ills. The theory of coexistence might transform itself into an argument for the status-quo; it might, then, mean, coexistence ‘with imperialism, with colonialism, with exploitation, with inequality and suppression of human liberties’. Again in the discussions in the United Nations, several critics said that the five principles of peaceful coexistence were nothing new; they were all to be found in the United Nations Charter. Nehru readily admitted, in answer to his critics both at home and abroad, that there was ‘nothing new about these ideas except their application to a particular context’. He also admitted that some States, while professing these principles, might break them in prac­ tice, e.g. the Soviet Union in 1956 and the Chinese in 1962. ‘The fact that it will not be acted upon here and there’, Nehru thought, was of little relevance, for ‘you make a law and the law gradually influences the whole structure of life in a country, even though some people may not obey it.’ Criticism and answers apart, what is relevant to our discussion of the impact of Nehru on a vital principle of his foreign policy was that the panchsheel principles appealed to a large number of nations as widely different in their foreign policies as the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union and China. V.K. Krishna Menon claimed in the political committee of the General Assembly on 13 December 1957 that they had been agreed to directly or indirectly by ‘a large number of states in all continents, almost 21 including the Federal Republic of Germany in Europe, and Chile in South America’. The third aspect of foreign policy in which Nehru influence is seen is India’s continued association with the Commonwealth—a decision which was ratified by the Constituent Assembly on 17 May 1949. The Prime Minister, as the representative of India, had agreed to the declaration on the continued membership of India in the Com­ monwealth of Nations at the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London on 19 April 1949. There were critics of this decision in the Constituent Assembly, and elsewhere. Answering them, Nehru pointed out that in agreeing to India’s continuance in the Commonwealth, they were not breaking any pledge they had taken in earlier years to achieve Purna Swaraj or complete inde­ pendence; the Commonwealth did not take away an iota of Indian

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independence. Besides, it would be to India’s advantage to continue her association with a group of nations to further certain causes, peace for instance, in which India was interested. It was always open to India to leave the Commonwealth. He told the nation in a broadcast: I want to tell you that I have not the least doubt in my mind that I have adhered in letter and spirit to every pledge that I, in common with millions of my countrymen, have taken in regard to the independence of India during the past twenty years and more. 1 am convinced that far from injuring the honour or interest of India, the action I took in London has kept that honour bright and shining and enhanced her position in the world.

Nehru’s point was that continuing the connexion with the Com­ monwealth, instead of reducing the independence of India, was indeed independence plus. The leader had his way.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. Edward Shils, ‘Charisma, Order and Status’, American Sociological Review, vol. XXX, p. 213. 2. See Funk and Wagnalls, Standard Dictionary of the English Language, 1963. 3. Max Weber, The Theory o f Social and Economic Organization, translated by A.H. Henderson and Talcott Pansans (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 358. Weber’s analysis summarised here is contained on pp. 358-63. 4. Edward Shils in the article referred to earlier has given an extended meaning to charisma. 4It seems to me', says Shils, ‘that an attenuated,mediated in­ stitutionalized charismatic propensity is present in the routine functioning of society. There is, in society, a widespread disposition to attribute charismatic properties to ordinary secular roles, institutions, symbols and strata or aggre­ gates of persons.’ The discussion in this chapter restricts itself to Weber's concept of charisma as a certain quality of an individual; it does not deal with the charisma of institutions or of aggregates of individuals. 5. Brecher, Nehru, p. 595. 6. Monica Felton, I meet Rajaji (London: Macmillan, 1963), p. 151. 7. Hindu, 4 January 1955. 8. From the speeches by the Earl of Listowel, Secretary of State for India and Burma on the Indian Independence Bill, 10 July 1947, given in Gwyer and Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, vol. II, p. 689. 9. Italics ours. 10. George G. Thomson, ‘The Emergence of Political Leadership in the Change from Colonialism to Nationalism’, in Gehan Wijayewardene (ed.), Leadership and Authority (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1968), p. 38. 11. Gwyer and Appadorai, Documents, p. 683.

Nehru's Charismatic Leadership 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

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Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, pp. 13-14. Gwyer and Appadorai, Documents, p. 683. Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, vol. I, p. 26. Lord Pethwick-Lawrence recalls this statement in his ‘My successor in office’, in Rafiq Zakaria (ed.),y4 Study of Nehru (Bombay: The Times of India, 1959), p. I l l ; italics ours. Walter Crocker, Nehru (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 147. Quoted by B. Shiva Rao in the Hindu Weekly Review, 18 November 1957. Indian Annual Register, vol. I, pp. 282-3. The Simon Commission had been appointed in 1928 in order to look into possible changes in the earlier Constitution of India; as it was an all-white Commission, including no representative of India, nationalist opinion in India decided to boycott it. Krishna Nehru Hutheesing, We Nehrus (Bombay: Pearl Publications Ltd., 1967), p. 77. Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru, A Biography (Macmillan, 1956), pp. 78-9. Hutheesing, We Nehrus, p. 300. Security Council Official Records Supplement XIII year, July August & Sep­ tember 1958, pp. 53-4. Brecher, Nehru, p. 12. Chanakya,‘The Rashtrapati’, Modem Review, November 1937, pp. 546-7. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote the article under the pseudonym ‘Chanakya’, to per­ suade the Congress against re-electing him President of the Congress for a third term. Rashtrapati means President. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, p. 825. Tendulkar, Mahatma, vol. I, p. xiii. No doubt there are several instances when Jawaharlal, in fact, abdicated the role of a leader, more specially in the linguistic reorganization of states, with disastrous consequences. Brecher,Nehru, pp. 25-6. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, p. 365. IFA, vol. I, No. 2, April 1958, p. 30. Debates, vol. I, part II, 25 March 1957, cols. 722-3. Hindu, 2 February 1957. See above. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. VII, 17 September 1955, part II, cols. 14198-202. Ibid., vol. X, 17 December 1957, cols. 5960-1.

A Concluding Note It has been indicated in the Preface that the present study is an introductory one; more detailed study and research are required before firm conclusions are drawn for re-orientation of policy—domestic and foreign. Admittedly, a united and strong nation is the sine qua non of an effective foreign policy. There is sound wisdom in Gladstone’s observation that the first condition of a good foreign policy is a good domestic policy. A united people well above the poverty line and bereft of the baneful influence of casteism, communalism and re­ gionalism is the only sure base for a sound foreign policy. To the extent that our top leaders, supported by the people, realize the meaning of this statement and bend all their energies to secure unity and succeed in their efforts, to that extent they will not only improve India’s image abroad but will also enhance the ability of India to use foreign policy as a tool to achieve her national interests. Nehru himself realized the close connection between foreign policy and domestic policy. He told the Constituent Assembly, ‘External af­ fairs will follow internal affairs.’1 He told the Lok Sabha more clearly that (any part we want to play in world affairs depends entirely on the internal strength, unity and conditions of our coun­ try. Our views might create some impression on others for the moment but they will attach importance to our voice only in propor­ tion to the strength they know we have. Therefore, both from the point of view of our primary needs and from the point of view of any desire we might have to play a part in world affairs we have to pay the first attention to our own country’s affairs.’2 A united and strong nation is the watchword. This raised several questions: What changes are called for in the political system to ensure a stable leadership devoted to the public good? How can the economic system be made to achieve optimum production and equitable distribution? The education imparted to the young must not only fit them for the tasks of life, but promote a sense of national unity and the democratic temper; can a beginning be made in this direction? Finally, is the institutional framework for the conduct of foreign policy adequate? The author does pot, of course, presume to know the answers to these large questions; it is hoped, however, that the discussion of the domestic roots of foreign policy in these

A Concluding Note

233

pages will help to stimulate further thinking on the relation between domestic and foreign policy and on the re-orientation of policy, domestic and foreign, which such thinking may suggest. NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. Constituent Assembly o f India (Legislative) Debates, vol. ID, p. 1767.

INDEX

Abdullah, Sheikh 134, 136 Abyssinia 14 Accession of states 140 Africa 102, 113, 151, 154, 156, 177, 227 Afro-Asian states 4, 8, 74-5 Agricultural development 87, 92, 109 Ahimsa 28, 35-6 see also Non-violence ‘Ahimsa Paramo Dharmah' 36 Aid factor 5-8, 16-17, 23, 86-7, 95-107, 113-14 Air power 9 Air umbrella (question) 69, 73-4 Aksaichin 61, 72-3 Al-Ahram 150 Al-Jamiat 137 Aliens, naturalization of 65 Aligarh Muslim University 122 All India Conference (of all parties) for aiding Bangladesh 130 All India Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen 136 All India Momin Conference 130 All India Muslim League 123, 130, 144-5 See also Indian Union Muslim League, and Muslim League All India Palestine Conference 148 All India Rajasthan Mohibban-Wattan Kashmir, Ajmer 147 All India Urdu Editors seminar 135 All-Party Goa Liberation Committee of Maharashtra 204 All-Party Goa Vimochan Sahayak Samiti 203 Andhra Pradesh 126, 135 Anwar Ali Dehlvi 131-2 Apartheid policy 167 see also Racialism Arab countries and the Arabs 10,148-52, 154, 156-7, 159-60 and Israel 149, 151-2, 154, 156-7, 159-60

the Muslims, feelings for 151-2, 159 and sympathies with Pakistan 160 Armament, disarmament 20, 47, 49 Arthasastra 33 Assurances Committee of Parliament 68 Australia 99, 182 geopolitical factors and interest in the Indian Ocean region 177 sponsorship of the Federal-State Article at the Human Rights Com­ mission 185 Avadi 93 Awami Action Committee (pro Pakistan) 136 Awami League 128-9 Ayub Khan 122, 178, 194-5 Azad (Abul Kalam) Maulana 152 Balance of payments 95-6, 98, 108 Balance of power 3, 19, 20, 227 Baldwin government 60 Balfour Declaration (1917) 149 Bandaranaike, Sirimavo 209 Bande Mataram 42 Bandhopadhyaya 73 Banerjea, Surendranath 42-3 Banerjee, Subodh 190 Bangladesh 3, 7,24, 59, 82, 128-40, 161-3 178-9, 187, 204-6 as East Pakistan 68-9, 206 West Pakistan oppression and geno­ cide 135, 137, 161 refugee influx into India 7, 59, 135, 137, 161, 205 uprising and struggle for independ­ ence 3, 7,24, 59,82, 135, 161-2, 204-5 independent state 162-3, 205-6 question of recognition 130-2, 136-7 cultural kinship with West Bengal

236

Index

205-6 Indian Muslim reaction 128-35,137-40 Basu, Jyoti 191 Bengal, Partition of 43, 187-9; Hast and West Bengal, cultural kinship of 205-6 Berubari Union No 12, transfer of ter­ ritory to Pakistan 24, 187-201 Bharatiya Jana Sangh 76-8, 128, 131-2, 137, 160 Black, Lloyd D. 103 Bombay-Goa border 202 -Daman border 203 Bose, Subhas Chandra 46-7, 88 Brecher, Michael 75, 78, 145, 216, 225 British—North American Act 175 Brohi, A.K. 195 Buddha and Buddhists 35, 119, 143, 163 Calcutta 42, 74, 135, 179, 195, 206 Calcutta University 42 Campbell-Johnson, Alan 141 Canada 10, 103, 113,174-7,182 Federal Constitution, effect on inter­ national deals 175-7,182; U.S.A., deals with 10, 177 Capital flow see Foreign Capital Capitalism 4, 90-1, 93 Caste and casteism 30,120,205,218,225, 232 Castlereagh, legacy of 19 Census (1971) 119 Ceylon see Sri Lanka Chagla, M.C. 129-31, 145-6, 151, 157-8 Charisma, 24, 215-17 Chaudhury, A. Mohammad 130 Chhad Bet 198 China 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 15, 21, 32, 37, 49, 58-9, 61, 71-4, 76-7, 82,130, 136, 146, 150, 160, 225, 228-9 admission to U.N.O. 32 relations .with Japan 49 relations with Pakistan 146, 160 relations with U.S.A. 2, 3, 10 Tibet, occupation of 15, 136 Chirol, Valentine 43 Chou En-Lai, 61, 73 Churchill, Winston 12, 216, 219

Clemenceau 9 Clifford, J.M. 95, 103 Co-existence, principles of see peaceful co-existence Cold war politics 2, 15, 18, 30-1, 47, 74 Colonialism 15, 20, 27, 34, 44, 46, 164, 201-2, 229 Commonwealth association 10, 38, 45, 49, 59, 73, 193, 224, 227, 229-30 air team 73 Communalism and its effects 30, 125-8, 131, 139, 144-5, 147, 152, 163,205-6, 218, 225, 232 Communism and Communists 4,11,15, 31, 69, 83, 90-3, 190 Communist Party of India 74, 78, 227 Congress (political party) see Indian National Congress Constantinople Convention (1885) 155 Constituent Assembly of India see India, Constituent Assembly Constitution 170-1, 174, 180-1, 188, 193, 210 see also India, Constitution Consultative Committee, External Affairs Ministry 68, 75 Convention on Political Rights of Women 173 Cooch Behar enclaves 188 Credit and aid see Aid Cultural exchanges 64 Customs frontiers 66, 181 Dacca 194 Daman 201, 203 Das, C.R. 47-8 Dawat 137 Defence 5, 32, 93 services