The Dispersion O Nuclear Weapons: Strategy and Politics 9780231893114

Table of contents :
The Contributors
Preface
Contents
I. Introduction
PART ONE: National and International Nuclear Experience
II. British-American Collaboration on the A-Bomb in World War II
III. British Incentives to Become a Nuclear Power
IV. British Defense Strategy: 1945–1952
V. The British Effort to Secure an Independent Deterrent, 1952–1962
VI. British Unilateralism
VII. France as a Nuclear Power
VIII. Communist China and Nuclear Force
IX. Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country
X. Nuclear Strategic Options and European Force Participation
PART TWO: The Impact of Future Technology
XI. The Emergent Genie
XII. Technology, Prediction, and Disorder
PART THREE: Conclusion
XIII. International Stability and Nuclear Diffusion
APPENDIX: Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water
Selected Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons

The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons Strategy and Politics

Edited by R. JV. ROSECRANCE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS Mew York and London 1964

This book is a publication of the National Security Studies Program, University of California, Los Angeles.

Copyright © Columbia University Press 1964 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-17019 Manufactured in the United States of America

The Contributors HARVEY A. DE WEERD is a Staff Member of the Social Science Department of the RAND Corporation, former Professor and Chairman of the Department of History, University of Missouri, and a specialist in military history and contemporary British and American defense policy. He is the author of Great Soldiers of the Two World Wars and Great Soldiers of World War II. MALCOLM HOAG is a Staff Member of the Economics Department of the RAND Corporation, former Professor of Foreign Affairs at the National War College, and a long-time student of NATO problems. He has written extensively on strategy, military operations research, and the economics of defense policy. ALICE LANGLEY HSIEH is a Staff Member of the Social Science Department of the RAND Corporation, former officer of the Department of State, and a specialist in Communist Chinese and Far Eastern affairs. She is the author of Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era. ARNOLD KRAMISH is a Staff Member of the Physics Department of the RAND Corporation and a consultant to the Atomic Energy Commission. He is the author of Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union and The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy. R. N. ROSECRANCE is Coordinator of the National Security Studies Program and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is the author of Action and Reaction in World Politics. ALBERT WOHLSTETTER is Ford Research Professor, 1963-64, at the University of California at Berkeley. He has lectured and taught at various universities and written extensively on strategic topics. He is the author of Scientists, Seers, and Strategy. CIRO ZOPPO is a Research Associate of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, on leave from the Social Science Department of the RAND Corporation. He is a specialist on arms control problems.

Preface Although nuclear weapons have existed since 1945, they have not been acquired by a large number of states. At present writing only the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France have exploded nuclear bombs, and France still has to develop the hydrogen bomb and to provide a viable delivery system. It is uncertain how many other nations will be capable of making bombs and preparing the necessary carrier force in years to come. The dispersion of nuclear weapons, however, is a matter of concern to the United States and to the more than one hundred other governments which signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The treaty will probably slow down the spread of nuclear weapons, though it will not halt it entirely. Despite the ban, other countries may resolve to become nuclear powers; nuclear diffusion may continue. Fundamentally, the ensuing study is an attempt to glean from existing nuclear experience lessons that might be useful in a world in which nuclear weapons are more widely disseminated. Why do states acquire nuclear bombs? What uses do they make of them, once acquired? What advantages or disadvantages does their possession involve? How is the nuclear spread likely to be affected by developments in future technology and politics? This study endeavors to cast new light on these questions, though it does not pretend to answer them. If any single conclusion emerges, it is that the problem of nuclear diffusion may be adjusted and affected by strategy and foreign policy. The advantages of a nuclear capability are perhaps less than they once seemed. Nuclear and thermonuclear weapons are not likely to spread rapidly in the next few years. Even if they do proliferate, the consequences for the international system may possibly be held within bounds. The collective effort this work represents is the result of a special cooperative arrangement linking the National Security Studies Program at the University of California (Los Angeles) and the RAND

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Preface

Corporation. Initiated in 1961, the National Security Studies Program has benefited from RAND participation and assistance since its inception; many of the chapters which follow emerged from seminars given at U.C.L.A. by RAND Staff Members. I am particularly grateful for the creative stimulus and thought of Harvey DeWeerd and Albert Wohlstetter, who served as Senior Fellows in the Program in the past two years. Their intellectual contribution to the investigation of strategic problems is reflected in their important essays in this volume. As Senior Fellow in the Program, Amrom Katz made significant additions to our understanding of the arms race and the shape of future technology. Malcolm Hoag contributed greatiy to the illumination of the political and military problems of NATO; he served with the Program during 1963-64. All of the other contributors led seminars under the auspices of the National Security Studies Program. Their thinking is not only codified in this book; it helped to influence the design and framework of the study from its earliest stages. Many others assisted the research effort. Mrs. Alice Hsieh wishes to express her gratitude to M. G. Weiner, L. Gouré, S. T. Hosmer, B. F. Jaeger, P. F. Langer, and Colonel R. L. Blachly for assistance in formulating many of the concepts in chapter VIII. I am grateful to Colonel William Stewart and Mrs. Sara Edelstein for help in the preparation of chapter IV, and would like to acknowledge my debt to Michael Michaud, John Mueller, Pauline Halperin, and Hanno Weisbrod for their perceptive investigations of various aspects of the nuclear diffusion problem. Daniel Weiler, in addition to providing the selected annotated bibliography, has made multiform contributions to our work over the past two years. Robert G. Neumann, Director of the Institute of International and Foreign Studies, did not participate in the volume, but his acuity and support have enlivened and assisted the enterprise at every point. Lynn Henderson rendered the editor's scrawlings into typed copy with accuracy and discernment. Finally, I wish to thank the Yale Review and Foreign Affairs for permission to reprint certain material. Portions of chapter VI originally appeared in the Yale Review for Summer, 1962. Chapter IX appeared in Foreign Affairs in April, 1961, and is reprinted without

Preface

ix

change. Chapter X began as "Missiles for France" (RAND P-2594-1) and, in slightly altered form, was published in Foreign Affairs in January, 1963. It has been revised to incorporate material from two subsequent papers: "Nuclear Control after Nassau" (RAND P-2733) and "The Nuclear Europe Myth" (RAND P-2743). It is altogether fitting that the book be dedicated to our children; they may have to go on living with nuclear weapons. R. N. BOSECRANCE

Pacific Palisades, California November, 1963

Contents I.

Introduction, by R. N. Rosecrance PART ONE.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EXPERIENCE

II. III. IV. V.

British-American Collaboration on the A-Bomb in World War II, by H. A. DeWeerd

29

British Incentives to Become a Nuclear Power, by R. N. Rosecrance

48

British Defense Strategy: 1945-1952, by R. N. Rosecrance

66

The British Effort to Secure an Independent Deterrent, 1952-1962, by H. A. DeWeerd

VI. VII. VIII. IX. X.

87

British Unilateralism, by H. A. DeWeerd

101

France as a Nuclear Power, by Ciro Zoppo

113

Communist China and Nuclear Force, by Alice Langley Hsieh

157

Nuclear Sharing: Nato and the N + 1 Country, by Albert Wohlstetter

186

Nuclear Strategic Options and European Force Participation, by Malcolm W. Hoag

222

PART TWO.

THE IMPACT OF FUTURE TECHNOLOGY

XI.

The Emergent Genie, by Arnold Kramish

261

XII.

Technology, Prediction, and Disorder, by Albert Wohlstetter

274

Contents

xii

PART THREE.

XIII.

CONCLUSION

International Stability and Nuclear Diffusion, by R. N. Rosecrance Appendix.

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests

293 315

Selected Bibliography

319

Index

337

The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons

I Introduction R. N. ROSECRANCE

There are those who believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by many countries may well constitute one of the most dangerous problems in future international relations.1 It does seem likely that nuclear weapons will be developed or obtained by a number of countries in the next twenty years. Today more than a few countries possess the technical, scientific, and industrial competence to manufacture nuclear explosives should they decide to do so.2 Several years hence, continued peaceful exploitation of the atomic reactor will give still other nations an option to develop nuclear bombs. Indeed, some specialists remark that what is surprising about the current situation is not that three countries have been able to fabricate nuclear weapons since 1945, but rather that a dozen nations have not already done so. It seems desirable, then, to look at the problem of nuclear diffusion as a whole, and not at separate third, fourth, and fifth country problems. The Nth Country Problem is now recognized as the general form of the question of nuclear dissemination. There is widespread agreement that the Nth Country Problem will introduce novel elements into future world politics. Estimates of the precise impact it may have, however, have varied from prophecies of doom to exuberant optimism. Some have seen weapons available to semi-official and unofficial groups within society, thereby affecting not only international, but also domestic social 1 See particularly Herman Kahn, "The Arms Race and Some of Its Hazards," in Donald G. Brennan, ed., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York, 1961), pp. 119-20. 2 W . Davidon, M. Kalkstein, and C. Hohenemser, The Nth Country Problem (Washington, D.C., 1958), and Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (London, 1962), chap. 1.

2

Introduction

order.3 Others have claimed that the spread of weapons will ensure against wholesale violence and contribute to international stability and peace.4 Many have contended that the diffusion of weapons systems will break up bipolar alliances and contribute to a growing multipolarity of international politics.5 Others have believed that the Nth country phenomenon would confirm and extend bipolar alliance structures to new geographical areas. Certain strategic analysts have argued that the spread of weapons would irretrievably complicate the problem of arms control and disarmament; 6 others have rejoined that the consequences of diffusion might be more easily controlled after diffusion has taken place.7 In the chapters which follow two fundamental approaches are taken to the problem of nuclear diffusion and development. In Part One, the experience of existing nuclear powers is examined, and the underlying presumption is that nuclear dissemination in the future may follow paths already marked out in the present. In Part Two, the future is assayed, not as a projection of the past, but as a novel phenomenon, resting on new technological assumptions. Both approaches are necessary to an understanding of the impact of weapons spread upon international politics. It is necessary to study existing and incipient Nth powers to understand the constraints upon future nuclear behavior. In this important sense, the Nth Country Problem is not a future imponderable, it is a present issue. The incentives to nuclear weapons acquisition have been experienced already by Britain, France, Communist China, and the North Atlantic Alliance. The technical, economic, and political consequences of attempts to develop an independent nuclear capability are portrayed clearly in the British case, the most fully developed of the four. We know within relatively narrow limits how successful the British have been in acquiring an independent deterrent capable of forestalling a Russian attack. We know what the costs have been, economically and politically, of attemptKahn, p. 118. * On the count of optimism, see the Strang-Gallois view adverted to in Wayland Young, Strategy for Survival (Baltimore, 1959). s See Arthur Lee Burns, "From Balance to Deterence: A Theoretical Analysis," World Politics (July, 1957), pp. 509-26. ' Beaton and Maddox, chap. 13. 7 Fred Ilde, "Nth Countries and Disarmament," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Dec., 1960), pp. 393-94. a

Introduction

3

ing to create such a formidable force. Hence, the British case has been examined in some detail for the clues it might provide to Nth country development in other cases. Whatever lessons may be adduced from the present, however, the future may hold different portents. Technology is proceeding so rapidly that projections from current experience may be undermined by future nuclear development. While it would be unwise to overlook the knowledge we have accumulated about existing Nth powers, it is just possible that that knowledge will be rendered obsolete by events. An inspection of future technology and armaments becomes necessary to understand the dissemination problem as it may exist twenty or more years from now. Finally, both strands of analysis are woven together in the final chapter, which seeks to assess the Nth Country Problem in its generality. No ultimate solutions are possible, for in actuality, the problem of nuclear diffusion is the problem of international relations in the future. There are few problems which have so many ramifications or which are so inextricably linked with political alignments. The final denouement of the dissemination problem can be known only to the clairvoyant. Nevertheless, the implications of this study offer some guidelines to possible future developments and consequences of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional countries. INCENTIVES FOR NUCLEAR DIFFUSION

Incentives for the development of a nuclear weapons capability are varied. Most obviously perhaps, nuclear weapons may be sought as a means of waging or terminating a struggle with a major foe. The events of World War II clearly indicate this motivation. The original British program of research and the American effort after 1942 were spurred by the need to build the nuclear bomb before Hitler's scientists did,8 and the urgency of the Manhattan Project is inexplicable except in terms of the war emergency. While research in the field of atomic energy was already well advanced in Russia before the war, presumably the Soviet effort after 1945 should be viewed in the light of the Cold War and rivalry with the United States.9 "See Ronald W. Clark, The Birth of the Bomb (London, 1961), chap. 10. ' See Arnold Kramish, Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union (Stanford, 1959).

4

Introduction

But existence of a potent enemy is not the only incentive to independent nuclear development. Great Power status is assumed to be confirmed or conferred by an autonomous nuclear capability, and states desirous of such recognition may want the nuclear bomb as a talisman of greatness. The need may be the more insistent when events have called a state's primacy into question. It is perhaps not accidental that Britain and France, powers no longer of the first rank, have been respectively the third and fourth countries to seek an independent nuclear force. In the French case in particular, it seems that political and military failures have served to intensify the nuclear effort.10 In the Communist Chinese instance, on the other hand, while there may be a rationale for a return to the past grandeur of imperial China, there is also the demand for nuclear capability as evidence of an enhanced and novel station in world politics. A third possible incentive to nuclear status is the well-understood psychological mechanism of task-completion. Once embarked on a nuclear course, a nation may wish to carry that effort to completion and consummate it with nuclear weapons. The British began their bomb project in the environment of wartime urgency, and their proximate object was a weapon for use against Nazi Germany. Even after that incentive disappeared with the end of the war, however, the British nuclear program was not abandoned. At some point, the atomic bomb itself, and not victory over Germany, became the overriding goal of nuclear efforts. Perhaps for similar reasons, no French government gave up the nuclear energy project. And despite occasional protestations that the project was devoted to exploitation of the atom for peaceful purposes, a nuclear bomb was eventually built. In this way nuclear power motivations may, stage-by-stage, be transformed into incentives for nuclear weapons. It will be interesting to note, in this connection, whether India and Canada will devote their highly developed capabilities in the nuclear power field to nuclear military purposes at some point in the future. A fourth motivation for nuclear development is, of course, electric power. Particularly after World War II, it was assumed that nuclear 10 See Ciro Zoppo, "France as a Nuclear Power," RAND P-2485 (April, 1962), p. 4.

Introduction

5

power would in the fairly short run be competitive with conventional power sources. The depletion of coal and oil stocks, it was held, would make nuclear power all the more attractive. In fact, coal surpluses and the large-scale production of petroleum in the late 1950s prevented this prediction from coming true within the estimated time period. Several nations, however, had resolved on the development of nuclear energy before the abundance of conventional sources had been demonstrated, and other nations, lacking in coal, oil, and foreign exchange, may well do so in the future. What is perhaps remarkable, however, is that past and immediate future nuclear diffusion has taken place within the ambit of very powerful alliance structures. Britain and France wished independent nuclear capacities even though the dominant power in the Western coalition, the United States, had nuclear capabilities to spare. China's capability in the next decade can add very little militarily to the strength of the Soviet bloc.11 In both instances the desired capability was to be used to increase the bargaining position of the newly arrived Nth power in alliance-decision processes, and to assert an influence outside alliance bonds. In this sense, the "nuclear umbrella" of American and Russian power did not obviate the political desire for nuclear weapons, and it may even have accentuated it. In contrast, the uncommitted states, unprotected by a specific nuclear alliance or guarantee, have been loath to proceed to an independent nuclear force. Up to mid-1963, the Nth Country Problem has been concerned with de facto redundancies, not with an extension of nuclear defense outside the major alliance systems. DOMESTIC, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY

CONSEQUENCES

OF NUCLEAR DIFFUSION

One of the greatest imponderables surrounding diffusion is the political impact of nuclear capability. In part, its political consequences are tied up with the actual military objectives achieved. A functioning, independent, and self-sustained nuclear retaliatory capability has the minimal advantage that it fulfills original goals: u This does not mean that there is no military significance to the prospective Chinese capability. The likely military-political impact on Asia of a Chinese bomb might justify the cost irrespective of other factors.

6

Introduction

nuclear ambitions may be realized. Where fulfillment has taken place and war deterred (as by the United States), the movement for renunciation of the bomb has been relatively delayed and is not yet very strong. It is always easier to attack failure than success. From this point of view, it might be permissible to speculate that a successful independent and relatively invulnerable British nuclear capability would have hampered the left-wing and unilateralist attack upon British defense policy. One of the props of unilateral nuclear disarmament, after all, was a deeply held desire for a return to greatness and independence of the United States. In the unilateralist conception, Britain would become the leader of the "non-nuclear club," and so assert a moral preponderance as vindication for departed political predominance. Conversely, a genuine physical independence, made possible by nuclear deterrent weapons, would cater to lingering sentiments of past primacy and partially undercut the basis for unilateralist assertion. It is not altogether surprising that both the campaign for nuclear disarmament and the program for an independent British deterrent received stimulus from the disastrous Suez venture of 1956.12 Too much, however, should not be attributed to failures in deterrent capability. The revulsion against the British rearmament program began at least as early as 1950-51 when increased defense costs began to impinge upon social welfare measures. The unilateralist movement burgeoned after 1957 partly as a social protest against the recession or disappearance of political issues and opportunities for social reform. It represented a "reactive revolt" against the growing apathy and apoliticism of the British voter. The very prosperity of Britons and the absence of marked differences between the major parties may have occasioned a type of political "withdrawal" and "disorientation" which transformed strongly contested elections into passive plebiscites.13 Protest, in such circumstances, could only be expressed outside the political amphitheater. But "protest" required an issue, and it may be significant that no u See Harvey A. DeWeerd, "British Unilateralism: A Critical View," The Yale Review (Summer, 1962), p. 574, and the same author, "British Defense Policy: An American View," RAND (August, 1961). " S e e Norman Bimbaum, "Great Britain: The Reactive Revolt," in Morton A. Kaplan, ed., The Revolution in World Politics (New York, 1962), p. 46.

Introduction

7

pressing social or economic questions of the sort that agitated British politics for more than a century could be found. Unilateralism is, in this sense, a product of the relative disappearance of internal political issues and alternatives. It is essentially a derivative question in domestic politics, and one would expect its emergence only after certain economic and social discontents had been stilled. It is interesting, in contrast, to note that while protest movements have been and are characteristic of the French political system, none have been unilateralist in inspiration; 14 other issues have been deemed of greater importance. In this regard, while unilateralism has been associated with the development of nuclear capability in England, it does not now seem to be an intrinsic phenomenon of the Nth Country Problem. Nor, as the Danish instance proves, is it necessarily confined to nations which possess or are in prospect of developing a nuclear force. As a mass movement, unilateralism seems at present to be confined to developed liberal societies where major political alternatives are restricted, and where certain basic material and economic needs have already been met. 15 Nuclear capabilities also induce profound changes in military strategy. Dr. Henry Kissinger speculates that there are three distinct stages through which nuclear countries proceed in their application of military doctrine.16 The first, or immediately post-development phase, is one of marked lack of awareness of the revolutionary impact of nuclear weapons. In this stage nuclears are likely to be regarded as new forms of artillery or ancillary aids to strategic bombardment and are assimilated to World War II conceptions.17 In the second stage, the revolutionary consequences of nuclear strategy are understood almost too well. Nuclear weapons are now slated for employment in a wide range of conflicts, and are viewed as a substitute for substantial land forces. Even fairly minor conflicts are presumed in some quarters to lead to nuclear involvement. A nuclear strategy is deemed adequate for all major military tasks. " See Stanley Hoffmann, "Protest in Modern France," ibid. ™ This formulation would apply to Japan as well. It would, however, tend to exclude the possibility of a mass unilateralist movement in India. M See Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1957), pp. 388 ff. " I t seems unlikely that future nuclear powers will undergo the first stage, the dynamic impact of nuclear weapons now having been amply demonstrated.

8

Introduction

To some degree it is held that such a strategy actually makes best use of limited economic resources. The third stage emerges when the disadvantage of primary reliance upon nuclear weapons becomes clear. At this stage the nuclear threat becomes too large to be tolerable, and the credibility of its use against conventional attack declines. The employment of nuclear weapons is reserved for only the most central of enemy challenges. The increasing emphasis upon conventional response in the United States has suggested that this country has entered the third stage. The Soviet Union is also cognizant of the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons and has been unwilling to employ them on the least provocation. The Russian response to the Cuban confrontation with the United States was perhaps a case in point. In Britain and France, on the other hand, nuclear forces have been regarded as a substitute for conventional ones.18 And in the British instance the formal commitment to use nuclear weapons, either strategic or tactical, has not receded very much from its enunciation in 1958. Neither Britain nor France has been willing to sacrifice nuclear preparedness to create large non-nuclear forces. Perhaps only a marked revelation of the very limited applicability of the nuclear deterrent would force a reconsideration of conventional strategy. Thus, Nth countries encounter special problems in the transition between the stages outlined by Dr. Kissinger. Limited in resources and national product, they may be unable to develop conventional forces as an alternative to the Great Deterrent. They may thus remain for an inordinate period in a stage of strategic thinking which emphasizes a nuclear response to all or almost all challenges. If this phenomenon persists, the military strategy of Nth powers may be significantly different from that of the major nuclear states. T Y P E OF WEAPONS DIFFUSION

The type of weapons capability achieved by a nuclear country may range over a wide spectrum. At one extreme, a new nuclear power might be able to develop a capability which would allow it to retaliate against a major nuclear state after withstanding an 18 While France has relatively large conventional forces, her official rationale for an independent nuclear capability stresses the adequacy of a nuclear strategy in response to Soviet challenge.

Introduction

9

attack. At the other, it might develop a capability so minimal that it could not penetrate the active defenses of one of the core nuclear powers. The capacity actually developed will depend not only on numbers of bombs, but on warning systems, degrees of mobility, concealment and dispersal, command and control networks, and delivery capabilities. The physical accumulation of bombs may be relatively one of the easiest of these tasks. In 1960 Chairman John McCone of the Atomic Energy Commission estimated that a country could produce one plutonium bomb per year with an investment of $50 million. Any industrialized country could afford such a capital outlay. More substantial programs, ranging above 500 kilograms of fissionable plutonium per year should cost at least $350 million for the initial installations. Continuing operating expenses would be of the order of $45,000 per kilogram of material. The larger weapons effort would be out of reach of all but the most potent middle powers, and it would probably involve intensive work for five years or more before the required production could be attained.19 The associated warning, command, and delivery systems will be even more difficult to achieve. The great advantage of the core nuclear states, the United States and the Soviet Union, lies in their ability to spend very large sums each year on delivery and defense vehicles, and on warning and command networks. Hardened, concealed, or mobile systems are required to survive a massive attack by one of the major nuclear nations. Penetration of enemy air defenses would require decoys, electronic counter-measures, and other costly devices. By mid-1963, neither Britain nor France, the third and fourth countries, had been able to develop an independent deterrent, capable of reliable retaliation after such an attack. The British capability, in addition, was heavily dependent upon cooperation with the United States as the controversy over the cancellation of the Skybolt missile demonstrated. The failure to create such a force, vis-à-vis the core nuclear powers clearly underscored the manifold problems of Nth country capability. The rising threshold of deterrence might well preclude independent retaliatory capacities against the two major nuclear nations. And if second strike capabilities were finally gained, they 18

See Beaton and Maddox, chap. 1.

10

Introduction

would be likely to depend upon very close interchange and cooperation with one of the charter members of the nuclear club. Nuclear submarines and Polaris missiles, mobile medium-range missiles— all of these might aid the deterrent power of their possessor. But their acquisition would depend heavily upon grants of technology by a major nuclear state. The contemporary development of the Nth Country Problem therefore, has suggested that certain of the major incentives in acquiring weapons have been belied by events. Nuclear weapons by themselves have not elevated a nation to Great Power status, nor have they reestablished a waning grandeur. Insofar as they have been destined to be employed against one of the great nuclear powers, the weapons may even have contributed to their owner's net vulnerability. The possession of such weapons requires a major opponent to add them to a target list; but the inability to retaliate dependably provides no compensating defensive advantage. In the context of the major bipolar confrontation, then, nuclear weapons may have conspicuous liabilities. In another situation, nuclear capabilities may produce greater rewards. If the capacity is not desired for the purpose of defense against a core nuclear state, atomic weapons may greatly enhance military potency. As against other Nth countries, a nuclear state's force may be entirely sufficient for retaliatory purposes. As against non-nuclear states, it may be capable of delivering a paralyzing blow. Because of the manifest military advantages of nuclear weapons in a conventional environment, it may be anticipated that if diffusion takes place in such realms, it will proceed quite rapidly. In such areas military balances may be transformed or altogether reversed by the nuclear factor. Such an outcome would be in contrast to the outcome in Europe, for example, where Nth country capabilities do not seem to have affected appreciably the overall balance between the West and the Soviet Union. RECIPIENTS OF DIFFUSION

Different types of capability may be acquired by states with different dispositions to use them. A nation's ability to advance its position in world politics is affected not only by its military strength,

Introduction

11

but also by its willingness to employ it. An opposing state's ability to resist incursion will be similarly determined. While gradations of physical military capability can be established, it may also be feasible to construct a scale of activism in international relations. Such a scale may be plausible since it is generally believed that some states are more disposed to use their military capability (are more reckless) than others. Hitler's almost heedless precipitation of the war in Europe, and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor are examples of reckless use of force in the recent period. 20 The Nth Country Problem has caused anxiety not only because of the physical spread of weapons, but because it is tacitly assumed that other possessors of nuclear capability might be somewhat less "responsible" in their military strategy than the United States and the Soviet Union. A rabid nationalist movement or militantly expansionist African or Asian state might conceivably be more disposed to use nuclear bombs in fulfillment of its interests, than the established nuclear nations. There have been occasions in human history where the existence of a formidable opposing military force has apparently failed to deter a patently revisionist state from launching an aggressive attack. 21 In some instances at least, a virulent ideology has heightened adventurism in the international sphere. States highly dissatisfied with the existing status quo may risk a great deal to improve their position. At the extreme, it is even conceivable that a reckless nationalist state, acting upon a chauvinistic ideology, might risk its own existence to redress an unfavorable balance against a hostile metropolitan or Communist power. This might be the case even when the predictable outcome was nuclear oblivion. If the dispositions to use military force vary in this manner, the diffusion of nuclear weapons may have a vital impact among the dissatisfied fraction of the world. This perhaps can be made clear by the following paradigm. If we assume that relative international stability occurs when the threat potentials of the major participants in the system are equalized, and that threat potential is a product "For the latter see Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, 1962).

21 S e e R o b e r t North, Report to the Ford Foundation Integration Project at Stanford University ( 1 9 6 1 ) .

on the Conflict

and

12

Introduction

of military capability and disposition to use force, equilibrium conditions hold only when military capabilities are unequal. More concretely, if a state has a disposition of 3, but a military capability of 10, its threat potential is 30. If a second, more reckless, state has a disposition of 6 and a capability of 10, its threat potential is twice that of the first. Equal military capabilities in this instance are destabilizing; equilibrium could be produced, however, by holding the second nation's capability to 5. This paradigm illustrates certain explosive features of the Nth Country Problem. If nations which acquire nuclear capability are much more inclined to use it than existing atomic powers, the capability may be disruptive. If (which may not be the case) central thermonuclear war is a function of the frequency and destructiveness of violence in the international system the spread of nuclear weapons raises the probability of central war. ALLIANCE, OPPOSITION, AND THE PROCESS OF DIFFUSION

Assuming for the moment that psychological dispositions are equalized, we can observe tendencies of nuclear diffusion in patterns of alliance and opposition. These tendencies may not be overriding or decisive, but they may nonetheless affect the strength and durability of alliance bonds. Let us imagine a case in which a developing nuclear state, D, has two different alliances: one with a major nuclear country (Mi) to offset the strength of a second major state (M2); and another with a minor nuclear state (Ni) to counter a second Nth country (N 2 ). As the nuclear state D, enhances its military capability, its alliance partners will react differently to D's vulnerability or selfsufficiency.22 And D itself will find different motivations for maintaining or rejecting its alliances, depending on its own strength. At a beginning stage of capability, for example, D might be able to get 22 Malcolm Hoag has pointed out to me that this discussion and the following matrix depend on the assumption of a common target system for both Nth country and core power ally. If, for instance, the Nth country ( D ) planned to hit the cities and the core power ally (Mi), the forces of the core power antagonist (M 2 ), a substantial Nth power capability would be even more disadvantageous to the core power ally ( M i ) than a vulnerable capability. See pages 15 and 16.

Introduction

13

through the defenses of N2 but be incapable of penetrating the active defenses of M 2 on an offensive thrust. In neither case, perhaps, would D be able to retaliate after an attack by N2 or M2. D's major ally, M1 then would be likely to have a neutral attitude toward his alliance with D. D would be dependent on Mi for defense against M 2 , but at the same time, D's capability is so minimal, that it would not provoke M 2 to launch a preemptive attack. D's minor ally, N1 would be more concerned. N1 would be likely to have a negative attitude toward his alliance with D because of the special dangers it would pose. D could pose a threat to N2 by striking first (he could penetrate N2's defenses), but he could not retaliate after N2's first strike. N1, then, would be likely to worry that D's capability against N2 could lead to a preemptive strike by N 2 . D'S own attitudes toward his two alliances would be different still. He would conclude that his alliance with Mi would be necessary for both offensive and defensive purposes, to deter M 2 . His alliance with N1 would be necessary for defensive purposes, but not offensive ones. Without Mi and N1 he would be exposed to attack; both alliances, therefore, would be essential to him. Suppose now that D's capability increased and that he could now penetrate the defenses of M 2 on a first strike, and retaliate against N2 on second strike. This would mean that his core power ally Mi would now be worried and likely to have a negative attitude toward the alliance. D could strike first against M 2 but would be vulnerable to a preemptive attack. M 2 might be tempted to strike to eliminate a dangerous nuisance, but this would require Mi to come to D's defense and pose hazards for Mi as well. N1, on the other hand, would now tend to have a positive attitude toward his alliance with D. D would now be a deterrent power against their mutual antagonist N2, and N2 would be foolish to attack. At the same time, D's incentives will have changed with his capability. He now desperately needs his link with Mi, for that is what prevents a surprise attack by M2. But he does not particularly need his alliance with N1, for he can now stand on his own feet against N2. If D's capability is further enhanced, incentives are once again transformed. Let us assume now that D can retaliate against M 2 and launch a successful preemptive knockout blow against N2.

14

Introduction

Now Mi will be likely to have a positive attitude toward his connection with D.23 D will no longer be vulnerable to Mis preemptive strike. Ni, on the other hand, will probably be enthusiastic over D's formidable capability. It imposes no burdens on Ni and yet contributes mightily to the strength of their alliance against N2. D's attitude toward his alliances will also have changed. Now neither alliance is of much use to him. He needs no offensive or defensive support against M2, and Ni's help against N2 is no longer necessary. Insofar as alliances impose reciprocal obligations, the alliance with N1 is actually a hindrance. These considerations are summarized in "Patterns of Alliance." What is most noteworthy in the three stages of D's capability is that allies do not have similar incentives or motivations. When D is most in need of assistance, the allies are often least inclined to give it. When D is able to stand on its own feet without the aid of allies, allies are eager to render support. The incentives to strengthen or weaken alliances do not seem to operate symmetrically in both directions.24 While this matrix does not have full application to the real world, it does portray certain of the stresses and strains alliances undergo when a state strives to acquire nuclear capability. As one of the two major core powers, the United States has seen the potential hazards of a vulnerable nuclear ally: one that might be able to launch a first-strike itself, but which could not withstand a preventive attack by a major enemy. In these circumstances there are two possible alternatives. One is to reduce or eliminate the ally's vulnerable force; the other is to aid it to develop genuine deterrent capacity. For a time, the American response to the French force de frappe was fundamentally the first, and to the British Bomber Command, fundamentally the second. Now the question has been raised whether an independent deterrent capability can be attained even in the British case.25 The United States 28 See footnote 22. " See also Robert Tucker, Stability and the Nth Country Problem (Washington D.C., Institute for Defense Analyses, Nov. 8, 1 9 6 1 ) , pp. 17-20. 26 The matrix on p. 15 assumes a deterrent core power (Aii) will welcome a deterrent capability on the part of a militarily developing ally ( D ) . The core power presumably will desire to be relieved of its military obligations. From a military point of view there is warrant for this assumption. From the political point of view, nuclear independent capability on the part of D may bring

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