The devil and John Foster Dulles 9780316372350
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Table of contents :
Frontmatter (page N/A)
Acknowledgements (page xi)
Preface (page xiii)
1 In the Beginning (page 3)
2 Princeton, the Hague, and Paris (page 17)
3 Struggle and Success in Wall Street (page 33)
4 Response to World Crisis (page 46)
5 Discovering the Russians (page 62)
6 Pleasures and Perils of Partisanship (page 75)
7 Japanese Peace -- Korean War (page 89)
8 "Victory" and the American Temperament (page 114)
9 The Partisan's Return (page 124)
10 The New Dispensation (page 134)
11 Policy Beginnings (PART ONE) (page 161)
12 Policy Beginnings (PART TWO) (page 178)
13 Massive Retaliation and the New Look (page 191)
14 "United Action" in Indochina (page 202)
5 The Geneva Negotiations--1954 (page 222)
16 Vietnam--Aftermath and Prologue (page 240)
17 Ambiguity at Quemoy (page 262)
18 To the Summit (page 284)
19 A Gathering Immobility (page 303)
20 The Middle East--Prelude to Crisis (page 318)
21 The Fateful Aswan Renege (page 329)
22 Cross-Purposes and Cardboard Proposals (page 345)
23 The Alliance in Peril (page 367)
24 Applying Principle (page 382)
25 On the Defensive (page 394)
26 A Time of Twilight (page 415)
27 Radical Nationalism in the Middle East (page 431)
28 Reprise at Quemoy (page 442)
29 Berlin--The Last Crisis (page 460)
30 Death and Assessment (page 480)
Afterword (page 492)
Notes (page 507)
Bibliography (page 537)
Index (page 541)
Citation preview
By Townsend Hoopes
THE LIMITS OF INTERVENTION THE DEVIL AND JOHN FOSTER DULLES
THE DEVIL AND JOHN FOSTER DULLES
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SM sR eee NEN RSS ST HON ATS HANG i 0s Sea
BY TOWNSEND HOOPES
= ow AN ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS BOOK LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY — BOSTON — TORONTO
COPYRIGHT (C) 1973 BY TOWNSEND HOOPES ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. NO PART OF THIS BOOK MAY BE REPRODUCED
IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY ELECTRONIC OR MECHANICAL MEANS INCLUDING INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEMS WITHOUT PERMISSION IN WRITING FROM THE PUBLISHER, EXCEPT BY A REVIEWER WHO MAY QUOTE BRIEF PASSAGES IN A REVIEW. FIRST EDITION
T 11/73
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Hoopes, Townsend, 1922-
The devil and John Foster Dulles. "An Atlantic Monthly Press book."
Bibliography: p.
1. Dulles, John Foster, 1888-1959. I. Title. E835. D85H66 973 ..921'092'4 [B] 73=-12690 ISBN 0-316-37235-8
ATLANTIC-—LITTLE, BROWN BOOKS
ARE PUBLISHED BY LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS
Published simultaneously in Canada by Little, Brown & Company (Canada) Limited PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO ANN
For her patience and her love
Contents
Preface X11 1. In the Beginning 3 Acknowledgments x1
2. Princeton, the Hague, and Paris 17 3. Struggle and Success in Wall Street 33
4. Response to World Crisis 46 5. Discovering the Russians 62 6. Pleasures and Perils of Partisanship 75
7. Japanese Peace — Korean War 89 8. “Victory” and the American ‘Temperament 114
g. The Partisan’s Return 124
10. The New Dispensation 134
11. Policy Beginnings (PART ONE) 161 12. Policy Beginnings (PART TWO) 178
13. Massive Retaliation and the New Look 191
14. “United Action” in Indochina 202 15. The Geneva Negotiations — 1954 222 16. Vietnam — Aftermath and Prologue 240
17. Ambiguity at Quemoy 262
18. To the Summit 284
X CONTENTS
ig. A Gathering Immobility 303 20. The Middle East — Prelude to Crisis 318
21. The Fateful Aswan Renege 329
22. Cross-Purposes and Cardboard Proposals 845
23. The Alliance in Peril 367
24. Applying Principle 382 25. On the Defensive 304 26. A Time of Twilight 415 27. Radical Nationalism in the Middle East 431 28. Reprise at Quemoy 442 29. Berlin — The Last Crisis 460
30. Death and Assessment 480
Afterword 492 Notes 507
Index 541
Bibliography 537
Acknowledgments
I AM GRATEFUL to a number of people and institutions for their individual and collective assistance during the preparation of the manuScript; especially to the Trustees of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for a two-year fellowship that greatly facilitated the research, and to the Director, Benjamin H. Read, for his warm interest in the work and his helpful comments on it. IJ am indebted to William Dunn of the Center for his unfailing administrative support; to librarians Mary Anglemyer and Marcella Jones for whistling up needed reference volumes, cheerfully and on short notice, from a wide variety of libraries in Washington; to Helen Clayton for typing the early drafts with discernment and patient skill; and to Frances Hunter and Mernie Weathers for a thousand undefinable kindnesses. For access to the John Foster Dulles papers at Princeton University Library, and for permission to quote from the various articles, speeches, memoranda and letters contained therein, I am grateful to the Committee for the John Foster Dulles Papers. The identification and reproduction of particular papers, including interviews from the Dulles Oral History Project, were greatly assisted by Mrs. Wanda Randall, Assistant to the Curator of Manuscripts in the Rare Books Collection of the Princeton University Library, who together with her associates extended every courtesy and consideration.
The manuscript benefits greatly from interviews, attributable and otherwise, which a large number of former government officials, journalists, historians and other close observers of the Eisenhower years were willing to give me. Many of these persons are friends of mine or were professional associates in government during the Truman or Johnson administrations. All of them either worked directly with John
X11 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Foster Dulles or were otherwise involved in the foreign policy process of his era. My friend and editor Robert Manning was a much valued source of professional counsel, as were his associates Michael Janeway, Upton Brady, and Natalie Greenberg. Melissa Clemence was a gentle fanatic in the matter of perfecting the voluminous, often imprecise, source notes. To Mrs. Frank Carlin, who somewhat inadvertently provided that snug and sea-bound hut on the Connecticut shore for the final drafting, and to Cynthia Vincent who typed the final manuscript with pace and verve, I want to say a special thanks.
Pretace
I EARLY 1968, when the Tet offensive and Lyndon Johnson’s withdrawal from further political combat tore away the final veil hiding the misperception and failure of America’s freedom-defending and nation-
building in South Vietnam, I faced, along with many others, the dawning realization that an era in American foreign policy had ended. It was an era of some twenty years’ duration in which the American people found a large measure of their raison d’étre, as well as moral comfort, in fusing their perception of the national interest with what seemed an unarguable ideological imperative — the absolute need to confront and defeat, or at least oppose, every manifestation of Communism at every point on the globe.
Standing in 1970 among the crumbled premises of that posture, it seemed necessary to ask how and why America had come to press its quite legitimate concern for freedom and world order to extremes that increasingly failed to meet the tests of interest or reason, proportion or morality.
The question led inevitably backward in time to an examination of the roots and tendrils and spreading branches of the cold war. That dominating phenomenon, of course, had its origins in the period immediately following World War II, in the fundamental clash between the demand of the Western democracies for “self-determination” in Eastern Europe and the counterdemand of the Russian tyranny for “‘Soviet security.” lt was fed by the Russian threat to paralyze Western European recovery through both direct subversion and the manipulation of large Communist minorities within the West. The initial Western responses — GreekTurkish aid, the Marshall Plan, and NATO — were bold and strong, but they were in the main guided by a conscious rhetorical restraint, a determined effort by the Truman administration to avoid setting in motion the runaway locomotive of a global ideological crusade. That barrier was, however, bent and then broken by the nation’s intensely emotional reaction to the victory of the Communist faction in the Chinese civil war, by the Russian-supported attack on South Korea, and by the Chinese Com-
X1V PREFACE
munist entrance into that war. All were events that provoked severe American frustration, fear, anger, and sense of betrayal. In the ensuing period of the Eisenhower presidency the cold war was pervasively institutionalized in the United States. Its chief manifestations were a strident moralism, a self-righteous and often apocalyptic rhetoric,
a determined effort to ring the Soviet Union and China with antiCommunist military alliances, a dramatic proliferation of American overseas military bases, and a rising flow of American military equipment for
foreign armies accompanied by American officers and men to provide training and advice. ‘The posture of imperative, total confrontation thus came to full development during the Eisenhower period. By 1960, the United States government was not only positioned and determined to restrain the major Communist powers, but also determined — through an implicit extension of logic and the inertial momentum generated by a large and powerful military-foreign affairs bureaucracy — to control the pace and character of political change everywhere. From the vantage point of the early seventies, the compelling questions to be asked about these developments in our foreign policy were what caused them and whether or not they were inexorable — to what extent were they an unavoidable legacy of the Truman-Stalin period, to what extent a condi-
tioned response to events and political pressures arising during the Eisenhower period itself, and in what measure a product of the philosophy, conviction, intellect, and style of particular American leaders? The attempt to answer such questions led to a close look at the foreign
policy of the Eisenhower years and so moved in a straight line to an appraisal of John Foster Dulles — what he thought, considered, understood, misunderstood, did, tried to do, or failed to carry out. While Eisenhower knew his own mind in foreign policy and demonstrated at several critical junctures a humane, practical wisdom and a firm restraint, Dulles was indisputably the conceptual fount, as well as the prime mover, of United States foreign policy during those years. His was the informing mind, indeed almost the sole keeper of the keys to the ramified web of understandings and relationships that constituted America’s posture of categorical anti-Communism and limitless strategic concern. Because in his nearly six years as Secretary of State, Dulles came gradually not merely
to dominate but to personify United States foreign policy, it is fair to say that it was in large measure his legacy that was bequeathed to Presi-
dents Kennedy and Johnson. This book is about the nature of that legacy, the power of its impact, the length and density of the shadow it cast upon successor presidents, foreign policy practitioners, and the national psyche. ‘TOWNSEND HOOPES
May, 1973
McLean, Virginia
THE DEVIL AND JOHN FOSTER DULLES
In the Beginni CPSiInNnNINns
H: stoop on the steps of the State Department in the penetrating
January cold, a solid tree trunk of a man, gnarled and weathered and durable. The sandy gray hair was tousled by the wind, crowning a rectangular brow and aquiline nose, a thin and drooping mouth, a strong jaw, the whole creating an effect of ultimate seriousness and at the same time of ultimate plainness, as if fashioned by Grant Wood. The flat blue eyes, at once assured and suspicious, peered intently from behind thinrimmed glasses across the nest of microphones into or beyond the faces of the several hundred people — Foreign Service officers, officials, secretaries, clerks and curious bystanders — gathered below. His overcoat was open, hands thrust into the trouser pockets of a vested suit, well-tailored but conventional and worn without distinction. Thus John Foster Dulles
on January 28, 1953, a week after he became Secretary of State in the
first Republican administration to gain the White House in twenty years.
It was remarkable that he stood there at all. That he did, while ultimately attributable to Dwight D. Eisenhower's electoral triumph, owed much to his own missionary concern for the fate of the world, a tenacious
ambition for high office, a capacity for shrewd maneuver between the warring factions of the GOP, and the conspicuous competence with which he had handled advisory assignments for successive Democratic Secretaries of State since 1945. He was sixty-five years old, and he had
reason to doubt that he had been Eisenhower’s first choice for the senior cabinet post. Four years earlier, his chief political sponsor, Thomas E. Dewey, had gone down to a second straight defeat in his quest for the White House, an event that eclipsed the tough prosecutor
4 IN THE BEGINNING
and New York governor as a national figure when he was only forty-six.
In the aftermath, Dulles had seemed merely one more distinguished victim of Republican hopes dashed yet again, and at sixty-one too old for further consideration. Nor were his prospects visibly brightened a year later when, after serving four months as an appointed United States senator from New York, he lost a bitterly contested special election
to Herbert H. Lehman.
At low ebb in his public fortunes, he had turned to his powerful friend Senator Arthur Vandenberg, of Michigan, for help in engineer-
ing a return to the State Department as the symbol of continuity in bipartisan policy beyond the water’s edge. And because they badly needed Vandenberg’s support against the mounting hostility of the ‘‘new isolationists’” in the Republican right wing, President Truman and Secretary
of State Acheson had taken him back, but without enthusiasm, as a political necessity. Yet they had asked him, in the late spring of 1950, to take the lead in negotiating a peace treaty with Japan, and his performance on that assignment had established him as a widely known and highly regarded public figure, architect of ‘‘the peace of reconciliation.”’ A 1952 poll conducted by the Saturday Review, on the question ‘What Living American?” would make the most effective and distinguished President of the United States, showed Dulles in fourth place, behind Dwight Eisenhower, Robert Taft, and Estes Kefauver, but ahead of Ear] Warren, Harold Stassen, and Eleanor Roosevelt.
Leaving the State Department in the late winter of 1952, he had abruptly discarded the mantle of bipartisanship to become a rough, hard-
hitting critic of the Truman-Acheson foreign policies, with many of which he had been intimately and sympathetically associated. Gaining the confidence of both leading Republican candidates, Taft and Eisenhower, he had accepted their joint call to author the foreign policy plank of the party platform. A few hours before the convention turned to formal selection of the nominee, he had declared publicly for Eisenhower. The rest was history. Positive Loyalty
The ceremony on the steps had been hastily arranged — Dulles was flying that evening to Europe to inquire pointedly of six North Atlantic Treaty Organization members why the project for integrating their armed forces into the European Defense Community was not moving more rapidly toward ratification by their parliaments, having been initialed by their governments the previous May. But his worried aides were persuaded that some special effort must be made to take the curse off
IN THE BEGINNING 5
two characteristically blunt statements — statements that had further shaken a department already brought to near panic by Senator Joseph McCarthy’s demonic search for Communists and security risks in govern-
ment, particularly among those in any way related to the conduct of United States foreign policy in the period since the end of the Second World War. Their somewhat remarkable solution was a pep rally in the
raw open air of a January afternoon.
The first offending statement was an internal memorandum, issued on January 21 after Dulles had developed it in longhand on a lined yellow pad as he flew from New York to Washington. It said in part: “We are front-line defenders of the vital interests of the United States which are being attacked by a political warfare which is as hostile in its purpose and as dangerous in its capabilities as any open war.” Such a situation of peril, it added, required the Foreign Service to demonstrate not only competence and discipline, but “positive loyalty” to policies “that our President and Congress may prescribe.’’ Less than that was “not tolerable at this time.’”’1 The second statement was contained among the concluding paragraphs of his maiden address as Secretary of State, delivered just the previous evening over nationwide television. Offering on
the latter occasion “new policies’ based on the principles of “openness, simplicity, and righteousness,” he had also dealt with the issue of public doubt regarding the trustworthiness of the department he now headed: “Now I suppose some of you are wondering whether the State Department can really be trusted to take a strong lead against Russian communism. There have been some shocking revelations which showed
that some Communists and sympathizers have found their way into high places and betrayed secrets, even that of the atomic bomb. I can assure you that all of the resources of Government, and that includes the FBI, are going to be employed to be sure that any such people are detected and cleaned out.” ? In a less traumatized political climate, such words might have passed without arousing the special concern of a confident foreign affairs bureaucracy. In January 1953 they could only be received with foreboding
by people already living in an atmosphere of anxiety, and who had rather desperately hoped the new chief would be, in combination with the Eisenhower White House, their stout and effective defender against bitterly partisan attack. But Dulles had other priorities. His principal concern was to reassure Republican leaders in the Congress that the new Secretary was alive to their own fears of Communism (whether in or Out of government) and to their pronounced antipathy to policies of the previous management. He was moved also by personal suspicion that the State Department’s senior operatives, who had worked under Democratic auspices for twenty years, were prepared to resist new initiatives
6 IN THE BEGINNING
and directions in foreign policy put forward by Republicans; he wanted
to put them on notice that the penalties for sabotage would be high. ‘Thus, when he arrived in Paris the following day, his first words to a private gathering of senior American diplomats amounted to a stiff paraphrase of the “positive loyalty” injunction. There must be no illusion,
he said, that things remained as before in Washington. A new administration was in charge, and loyalty to that new administration was the highest imperative. ‘The words themselves and the graceless manner
of their delivery left a bad taste with his auditors, nearly all of whom were professional diplomats, pledged by oath and habituated by experience to faithful, nonpartisan service to their country. “He assumed our disloyalty,’’ one of them said later.®
So the prospect that a special mass meeting could mitigate the effect of hard words was not bright, for Dulles had not arrived at his position inadvertently. There was, moreover, the factor of personality, including, as time would show, a marked inability to foresee the impact of phrases he had painstakingly shaped and polished. Tough, selfcentered, suspicious, insensitive, he was not cut out to project warmth and reassurance to a large assemblage of worried employees (as an admirer, Elliott Bell, once noted, ‘Foster was not a man with a great deal of come-hither’’).4 But his aides did not yet know this. Standing on the steps, he now contented himself with designating the assemblage before him as “ ‘shock troops’ in the cold war that is being waged against us, > then turned to the introduction of three new Republican appointments to the State Department: the Undersecretary, General Walter Bedell Smith; the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Carl McCardle; and the Undersecretary for Administration, Donald Lourie. Except for Bedell Smith (who had been Eisenhower’s exceptional chief of staff in World War II, later ambassador to Russia, and most recently Director of the Central Intelligence Agency), the appointments were not impressive. Of Lourie, a former president of the Quaker Oats Company, whose difhdence and ignorance of politics were soon to prove him conspicuously unsuited for government service, Dulles said: “A few years ago, he was an all-American quarterback. And I think that that is the kind of thinking and creative action we are going to see.’’* In the main, however, he talked about himself and his family’s historic linkages with diplomacy
and the State Department, thus signalling the proprietary attitude he would take toward the formulation and conduct of foreign policy over the next six years, and confirming the widely held supposition that to become the President’s First Minister had indeed been a lifelong quest. His remarks were pervaded by a vibrant sense of personal and family pride which, as frequently happens, tended to an unconscious stretching
of the facts. “I could tell you that it is a wonderful thrill to me to
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20 PRINCETON, THE HAGUE, AND PARIS
mar or widely in literature: “It is hard to write five hundred words on one’s preperation [sic] in English when one has not spent five hun-
dred minutes preparing it... . It is true that I have never taken an English course at school. Altho [sic] I have, at one time or another, entered classes, I have as often, voluntarily or otherwise, dropped out. As a result of this my knowledge of grammatical rules and parsing 1s slight. . . . My knowledge of English Literature is somewhat larger, but
that is not saying much for it. Whatever of the masterpieces of literature that I have read, I have read not as a task. In this way they are much more enjoyable. ...I have memorized —and forgotten — several short poems of Longfellow, Tennyson & Whittier, but am not
so thoroughly acquainted with those books which are required for anterance [sic] into most Universities as those who have studied and dis-
sected them with an eye, more directly, toward the examination... . As to compositions and essays I have written very few, as the present writing will testify. In fact I am surprised that I was ever allowed to enter the college, as far as English preparation is concerned.” > The instructor started to correct the paper with blue-penciled interlineations,
but gave up halfway through and wrote at the top: “Where did you study English? Rewrite.” * Forty-eight years later, in 1952, when Dulles stood on the threshold of high public office, the same defiance, but none
of the candor, was discernible in a short speech he gave to the assembled townspeople of Watertown: ‘‘My family could not afford to send me to private school, and I am glad that they could not. I learned here solidly the fundamentals of reading, writing, and arithmetic, plus American history.” 7
By senior year, however, Princeton had improved his prose style, and the developing force of a naturally bold, powerful and logical mind was evident in both debate and written argument. He was a serious and able student headed for a strong finish. Having enrolled at Princeton in
the parental expectation that he would prepare for the ministry, he majored in philosophy, taking courses in logic and pragmatism under Professor John Hibben and one in ethics under Woodrow Wilson. In one essay, which analyzed the works of William James and John Dewey,
Dulles doubted that pragmatism was in any way superior to other philosophies as an explanation of reality; he argued that it went too far
in its tendency to “supplant all reason by feeling and desire.’’ His conclusion was that “reason must be left the ultimate judge of truth.” § His senior thesis (a modest nineteen pages of double-spaced typescript)
addressed “The Theory of Judgment,’ and was good enough to earn him the Chancellor Green Mental Science Fellowship, providing a year
of study at the Sorbonne under the preeminent French philosopher Henri Bergson. One passage is indicative of the Dullesian logic: “When
PRINCETON, THE HAGUE, AND PARIS 21
I cry ‘fire’ in a house, my total judgment is ‘there is a fire here which is dangerous.’ But I am pressed for time. I know that if I simply express a part of my judgment, the rest of it will be awakened by constant asso-
ciation and habit in the minds of my hearers .. .”° As Secretary of State, and pressed for time, he often found it convenient to avoid lengthy
explanation of difficult situations by crying fire. At Princeton, he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa, stood second in the class of 1908, and was chosen to deliver the valedictory speech at graduation exercises.
The Question of a Career All during his Princeton years, Dulles was pondering the question of a career. His father especially wished him to enter the ministry, thereby to carry on a long and strongly held family tradition. On the other hand, his mother, beneath a surface deference to her husband’s wishes, seems to have encouraged wider and more worldly prospects both directly
and through her father. In any event, the attraction of a career in law or politics or diplomacy, stimulated by the examples of Grandfather
Foster and Uncle Bert Lansing, exerted an ever stronger pull upon Dulles’s imagination and ambition, especially after the spring of 1907, when he went off to Europe as a minor participant in the Second Hague Peace Conference. Grandfather Foster, who was designated as a delegate for the Imperial Government of China, persuaded Princeton to part with his grandson before the end of junior year, making special arrangements for him to take the year-end exams the following autumn. As he later wrote in the second volume of his Diplomatic Memoirs, “I sailed from New York on May 31, 1907, accompanied by my wife and my grandson, John Foster Dulles, a student of Princeton University, aged nineteen, who, on our arrival at The Hague, was made a secretary of the Chinese delegation, and because of his knowledge of the French language was enabled to render useful service to the delegation.” 1° Like its predecessor of 1899, the Second Hague Conference of 1907 (both convened on the formal invitation of Czar Nicholas of Russia) was precluded from a discussion of arms limitation by opposition from the Great Powers. It turned accordingly to a series of important secondary questions, offering in the end thirteen separate treaties on subjects that ranged from the peaceful settlement of international disputes to rules for warning civilian populations of impending military attack. On the whole, this buffet table of diplomatic hors d’oeuvres was viewed with cynicism by the leaders of Europe, and seven years later the fateful spark was struck at Sarajevo. But the tragic inadequacy of European diplomacy in 1907 was at the moment less impressive for a young
22 PRINCETON, THE HAGUE, AND PARIS
man from Princeton than the opportunity to see the operation of a major international conference at firsthand, rub elbows with men of high reputation, and himself play a modest but exhilarating part in the proceedings.
Dulles’s task was to assist the Chinese delegation with French translations and a range of modest problems involving administration and diplomatic etiquette, and he appears to have abetted the solution of a silly but sticky problem created by a failure of the participating nations to agree on the order of precedence for courtesy calls. Protocol required that such calls be exchanged before the conference could begin, but no nation was willing to move first, the principle of sovereign primacy demanding obeisance from other nations before reciprocation. After an embarrassing impasse, during which it seemed that the conference might well be canceled, cool heads determined that honor could be satisfied if every delegation called on every other at the same time. ‘This meant in practice the simultaneous delivery of calling cards all around. On behalf of the Chinese delegation, Dulles thus set out one fine afternoon in a hired carriage, attired in a Prince Albert coat and high silk hat, to deliver neat bundles of engraved cards.1*
As for his contribution to French translations, there seems room for dispute. His grandfather’s memoirs are the authority for his “knowledge” of French, and no doubt he spoke better French than Chinese. It is also possible that he was relatively more proficient in the language during his college years. But close associates of later years, at both his law
firm, Sullivan and Cromwell, and the State Department, hold firmly to the view that he was competent only in English. A professor of interna-
tional law at Columbia, who as a young law associate in the 1930s worked closely with him on a number of legal problems in Europe and Latin America, has said that Dulles could usually understand spoken French and Spanish, and was especially keen at picking out those foreign words that were crucial to the legal transaction at hand and thus in need of meticulous translation. But his ability to carry on a conversation in either language reminded the professor of a line from P. G. Wodehouse: “ ‘Qui,’ the man said in fluent French.” 12 At a private luncheon in Paris on May 5, 1952, given in Dulles’s honor by the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann, C. L. Sulzberger recorded the proceedings: ‘‘Schumann speaks excellent English but made the mistake of saying to Dulles that, of course, the latter spoke French. Dulles smugly agreed and from there on a crisscross of misunderstanding developed with conversations like: ‘Do you think German rearmament is a good thing?’ being answered with observations such as ‘I am sorry she isn’t here.’ I was sitting next to André Maurois who was equally fascinated.” *° A year after the Hague conference, on June 10, 1908, Dulles was gradu-
PRINCETON, THE HAGUE, AND PARIS 23
ated from Princeton, still apparently undecided about a career, but possessed of a six-hundred-dollar scholarship to the Sorbonne. If his sister Fleanor’s account is taken at face value, “he meditated on his father’s life’ and reached a conclusion “which he did not often discuss but which I knew was a genuine feeling — that he could not follow adequately in his father’s footsteps.” 1* He wondered if he was ‘‘good enough.” ** In the light of a subsequent career that revealed little self-doubt, not to mention a central striving for place and power, one finds it easier to interpret this plea of unworthiness for the ministry as the means chosen, in part perhaps
subconsciously, for letting down his father as gently as possible. On the one side stood the example of Grandfather Foster, holding out the prospect of money, fame, travel and the world; on the other stood devoted service to a Presbyterian flock in a small town at three thousand dollars a year. For a strong-willed young man in the dawning awareness of his exceptional powers, the choice seemed foreordained, and one senses his mother’s acquiescence. Yet Dulles put off a formal decision, and the whole
family (showing either a remarkable capacity to stretch a very small income or further assistance from Grandfather Foster) went off to Paris for the summer, taking a corner apartment in the Boulevard Raspail. There was a brief period of mountain climbing in Switzerland —the Dent du Midi at the head of Lake Geneva and the Diableret.1*® Then they packed for home again, placing Allen (age fifteen) in a French boarding school, L’Ecole Alsacienne, and leaving Foster (age twenty) to pursue his scholarship at the Sorbonne.
The ensuing school year found Foster, affecting a bowler hat and umbrella, busily tasting the fruits of French culture at the Sorbonne and the canapés at embassy parties. At one point he was caught up in a student riot incited by members of the “‘action francaise’ (who were responding to slurs on the memory of Jeanne d’Arc by a certain Professor ‘Thalamus), doused with a fire hose, and arrested by the French police. Many years later the French chargé in Washington, Charles Lucet, had the matter researched, and reported to Secretary of State Dulles that his arrest had been a mistake.'7? While concentrating his studies on philosophy, in accordance with the terms of his scholarship, Dulles revealingly elected to
take some courses in international law, and there remains among his personal papers a book of notes which he wrote out, more or less in French, while attending lectures on international fishing rights. Law and Marriage
At the end of a stimulating and maturing year, Dulles went home to Auburn, New York, where the family was now established, his father
24 PRINCETON, THE HAGUE, AND PARIS
having assumed the chair in apologetics at Auburn Theological Seminary.
Almost at once he broached to his parents the concept of a career that would combine the practice of law with dedicated lay service to the church. His father’s disappointment was apparently overcome by the maturity and logic with which he presented the case, and both parents ended up thoroughly approving his decision to become “a Christian lawyer.” ‘That delicate hurdle surmounted, he made arrangements to enter the George Washington Law School and to live with his devoted, supportive grandfather in the four-story brick house on Eighteenth Street.
Then, prefiguring a persistent peripatetic urge, he left the somnolent summer pleasures of Auburn and took himself off to Madrid, where he lived for six weeks in the house of a middle-class Spanish family that spoke no English, an experience that he later felt had given him a rudimentary ability to read and speak Spanish, and that thus proved helpful to his extensive legal work in Latin America. At law school, Dulles plunged into his studies with the vigor and intensity that were to characterize all of his later life in law, religion, politics and diplomacy. His intellectual powers were fast maturing, and he was refining the uses to which a good memory can be put. On the night before an exam, he would memorize important case citations and their substantive judicial findings. Arriving at the examination room, he would quickly write down the essence of what he had memorized. Then attacking the examination questions, he would apply appropriate citations to the particular points of law he was expounding. This technique suggested a thoroughness and precision which his instructors found very impressive.t8 Whether inadvertently or by design, he completed the three-year course in two years, but was refused a degree on the technical grounds that a diploma from George Washington University required three years of resident study — a matter that was rectified only twenty-five years later, when he received his diploma, backdated to 1911.
Those two years in Washington, for all their intense application to the dry bones and living spirit of the law, appear to have been one of the few really gay social periods of Dulles’s life. His grandparents’ position gave entrée to houses of the politically and socially prominent, President Taft occupied the White House, and Dulles was frequently in attendance at parties with the President’s two sons, Robert and Charles. Occasionally he squired Martha Bowers, who was later to marry Robert Taft, and he
appears to have danced a good deal, returning home from a hard day of law classes to take a nap before rising late in the evening to put on his dancing shoes and go off to some embassy ball.’®
Back home once more in Auburn in the early summer of 1911, he crammed sixteen hours a day for the New York State bar exams, but also found time to rediscover a local girl named Janet Avery, who had been
PRINCETON, THE HAGUE, AND PARIS 25
keeping company with his brother Allen. At twenty-three, his formal education now completed, he was, although inexperienced with women, ready to consider love and marriage, and he found in Janet’s attractive, shy reserve an appealing and manageable dependence to complement his own. assertive character. By all accounts it was a genuine love match and,
in what may have been his first application of brinkmanship, Dulles skipped the last several questions on the bar exam in Rochester in order to catch an afternoon train back to Auburn for a dinner date with Janet. His calculation, which proved correct, was that he had already written enough to pass.?°
But success on the bar exam cut no ice with the leading Wall Street law firms with which he then sought to make a connection. Most of their partners, having been trained at Harvard or Columbia, found Dulles’s
superlative record at a little known and little reputed school in the southern village of Washington something less than an impressive credential; he lacked, moreover, any formal law degree. And some of his interviewers, showing no concern for consistency, disdained Princeton as both a parochial seminary and a country club. After six weeks of making the rounds, Dulles found himself without a single offer, facing an apparent stone wall. Despairing, he turned once more to his worldly grandfather,
and the old lawyer-diplomat was able to draw upon an association that went back to Cincinnati and the years before the Civil War: as a young lawyer there, he had worked for Algernon Sullivan, who later moved to New York to form Sullivan and Cromwell. By 1911, Sullivan was dead, but Cromwell proved responsive to the frankly emotional plea of the former Secretary of State: ‘‘Isn’t the memory of an old association enough to give this young man a chance?” *} Dulles, exhibiting a mixture of shy
gratitude and humiliation, was thus taken on as a law clerk at fifty dollars a month, this munificent sum reflecting the enlightened personnel policies of Sullivan and Cromwell in a day when it was the practice of many firms to apprentice young lawyers without any monetary compensation.
The connection was to prove of great mutual benefit. Sullivan and Cromwell was a firm already expanding the concept of the lawyer’s relationship to the corporate client, in a sense anticipating the later development of management as a professional function. The firm’s lawyers made it their business to be thoroughly conversant with the competitive position of each client company, with the growth prospects for the industry of which it was a part, and with broad political developments that might affect the economy as a whole. William Nelson Cromwell had also been a leader in the effort to persuade the United States to build the Panama
Canal, and was counsel for both the Panama Canal Company and the Panama Railway Company. The firm served a number of foreign clients,
26 PRINCETON, THE HAGUE, AND PARIS
including French, German, and British investors in Latin America. Aided by his rudimentary grounding in the Spanish language, Dulles was soon traveling to that region on legal business. On one trip to British Guiana, where his task was to persuade the authorities not to impose a tariff on United States flour entering the various British territories in the Caribbean, he contracted malaria and nearly died. ‘The heavy quinine dosage that saved his life also damaged the optic nerve, leaving him with slightly impaired vision and a noticeable tic in his left eye. At the end of one year, Sullivan and Cromwell raised his salary to one hundred dollars a month, and this persuaded him he could now afford to marry. What gave confidence to an otherwise still precarious financial condition was the promise of further support from Grandfather Foster who, having announced his intention to leave twenty thousand dollars
to each grandchild, invited Dulles to begin drawing on the bequest as needed. He thought well of Janet Avery and warmly encouraged the marriage.” ‘Thus buttressed, the young couple was married on June 26, 1912. After three days of waiting at her family’s summer house on Owasco
Lake to complete a prescribed course of treatment for Foster’s malaria, they departed for a honeymoon in the Catskills. Though a happy match, it was hardly a marriage of equals. Janet gave wholehearted devotion, bordering on worship, to her strong and intellectually remarkable husband, and found comfort in his steady, protective domination. Their life together soon came to revolve almost entirely around him and his career,
and was lived rather precisely as he prescribed it. With the financial cushion provided by Grandfather Foster’s legacy, she began at once to accompany him on his far-flung business trips, a practice she was to continue even after the arrival of their three children, and all through his years as Secretary of State.
The First World War Dulles had been practicing law for five years, developing as a respected
associate at Sullivan and Cromwell, when he received a confidential assignment from his uncle Robert Lansing, who was now Secretary of State. It was early 1917, and America’s entrance into the merciless stale-
mate that was bleeding Europe to death was an event that President Wilson and his cabinet now grimly anticipated; precautionary planning was in order. Wilson and Lansing needed assurances that the governments of Panama, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua would harmonize their policies toward Germany with that of the United States, that they would in fact synchronize a declaration of war. German agents were known to be operating in Central America, and Washington feared sabotage of the
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82 PLEASURES AND PERILS OF PARTISANSHIP
“Catholic” on Dulles’s personal staff, O’Connor was dispatched to see Father Robert I. Gannon, who was a former president of Fordham and “well known as a strong Republican in the Jesuit Order.” ** Avery Dulles was at the time in a seminary near Woodstock, New Jersey, and permitted’ to leave only one weekend every six months. With Father Gannon’s help,
however, his weekend leave was advanced, he met cordially with his father at their townhouse on Ninety-first Street, and a smiling photograph was taken. Hagerty had carefully planned to release the picture only to New York City papers, in an effort to avoid alienating the genuine anti-Catholic attitudes upstate. But the ‘““Lehman forces” made certain
that it was printed all over the state, which essentially neutralized the ploy. Avery later described the incident as “‘one of those sort of unpleasant
things one had to go through”’ for the sake of “general historical truth” and the “reputation of the family.” 19 It was perfectly clear on the facts that Dulles was neither anti-Semitic nor anti-Catholic; nor indeed was he pro-Hitler, as certain disgruntled leftists sought to show. It was equally clear that Lehman was neither a Communist nor influenced by Communist support. Perhaps to a greater than normal extent both candidates were victimized by their own campaign organizations.
Even by New York standards, it was an exceptionally harsh and unsavory campaign. In the end Lehman won, as expected, but by a margin of fewer than 200,000 votes, which some Republicans regarded as a “remarkable achievement” for Dulles. Janet was visibly unhappy about the whole affair and lastingly embittered by the false and nasty charges against her husband. On the whole, however, and after he gained
his stride in the campaign, Dulles appeared to enjoy the rough and tumble, for he was essentially a hard-boiled advocate who did not shrink from a fight. And one thing more was certain: the campaign marked the beginning of the end of both his reputation and his inner capacity for nonpartisanship. During the previous years as adviser to Byrnes, Marshall
and Acheson, “he might as well have been a career Foreign Service officer,” as a senior diplomat, Robert Murphy, remembered.”° But the run for the Senate changed things a good deal. Except for the notable interlude of the Japanese treaty negotiations, Dulles was thereafter an avowed Republican partisan. The Dewey staff had shown him how to shorten his sentences, simplify his phrases, and pitch his arguments more to the “average person.” As such techniques served mainly to reinforce innate and already manifest elements of his mind and operating style, he absorbed them quickly, but many believed in retrospect that they did not serve him well as Secretary of State.
PLEASURES AND PERILS OF PARTISANSHIP 83
A Reflective Interlude
In the quiet winter of 1949-1950, following his defeat in the Senate race, Dulles wrote his second book, War or Peace. It is an interesting work on several levels, being a rather lively reportorial account of his experiences at international conferences since 1945, a statement of his then current position on specific foreign policy issues, and a reflection of his progressive tendency to fuse morality with politics in the power struggle against the Kremlin. Apparently dictated and polished in the space of only a month or so, its brisk, choppy, journalistic style and tendency to polemic suggest the influence of the recent political campaign and distinguish it sharply from War, Peace and Change, which was a rather more detached and philosophical inquiry. Comparison with the 1946 Life articles shows also that four years had measureably toughened his anti-Communism, deepened his pessimism, and enlarged his self-righteousness.
For Dulles, the nature of the struggle had now become pervasively moral: “Soviet Communism starts with an atheistic, Godless premise. Everything else flows from that premise’’ ?1— especially the totally expedient behavior of Communists. The Kremlin’s offensive was succeed-
ing because Communism had a “universal appeal,” because it had ‘perfected a superb organization to conduct indirect aggression” — and because ‘it had no counteroffensive to fear.” ?? Here was the first appearance in Dulles’s thought of the “liberation” virus. The proposals were indirect, yet in notable contrast to his 1946 dictum that an attempt to crush alien systems would “prove nothing.” The Truman-Acheson policies of containment were, he argued, sensible enough; they had temporarily rescued Western Europe, Greece, Turkey and Iran. But they had failed to save Eastern Europe or China. Moreover, a great disadvantage of regional security pacts like NATO was that they drew lines on a map and thus permitted the inference that “we would not fight an aggressor who kept on the farther side of the line.” 23 The NATO boundaries offered “immunity to aggression in the Pacific, Asia and the Near East’; even worse, they implied a readiness to “divide the world with Communism.” To draw precise lines might “leave us in the position of consolidating about one-fifth of the population of the world and acquiescing in the consolidation of the other four-fifths by hostile, despotic forces.” 2 The Soviet despotism suffered from major weaknesses, but these would prove “‘fatal’’ only under
pressure. “If there is no pressure, purges can occur, organizational wounds can be healed at leisure, and the despotism can go on.” 75 ‘This
84 PLEASURES AND PERILS OF PARTISANSHIP
Dullesian thesis was, at least on the level of rhetoric, a clearing of the ground for a clarion call to ideological crusade, to a “manifest universalism” in which democracy must everywhere prevail, to the preparation of a diplomatic posture which, by transforming every difference with the Soviet Union into a moral issue, would make every compromise settlement seem immoral, and thus politically unacceptable. Precisely because of the dangers involved in thus unleashing the latent self-righteousness in American public opinion, Truman and Acheson had rather carefully suppressed the natural urge to declare holy war on Communism — with the notable exception of Truman’s speech of March 17, 1947, which placed a request to Congress for a program of arms and economic assistance for Greece and Turkey in the context of a broad fight against “International Communism.” No one can doubt their temptation. To expose the difficulties of containment was easy enough, but to devise a formula for counteroffensive was either to openly court a large-scale war
or else to cruelly dash the hopes that would be raised behind the Iron Curtain. The Democratic administration had chosen instead to concentrate on matters more neafly within its control —i.e., a series of major measures to strengthen the non-Communist areas, particularly Western Europe. By 1950, such restraint seemed to run against the messianic strain in Dulles, for in War or Peace he plunged without hesitation into the bog.
If counterpressure beyond containment was needed to open up the “fatal” weaknesses in the diabolical Stalinist system, what kind of pressure did he advocate? He acknowledged candidly that armed revolt was
not feasible: “The people have no arms, and violent revolt would be . . . worse than futile, for it would precipitate massacre.” ?° He stood firmly against ‘preventive war” or any direct U.S. military coercion, and was indeed concerned by the danger of overmilitarization in America: “Top policy decisions have been influenced too much by the military,”
resulting in the concentration of attention on a “hot” war that might never come. “It is time to think less of fission bombs and more of establishing justice and ending terrorism in the world.” 27 But how? By what program and set of operational measures? His attempts at definition were all very vague, never moving beyond an anguished protest of the grisly brainwashing in Eastern Europe and of related Stalinist inhumanities.
‘We can picture these haggard persons; for example, Cardinal Mindszenty and Robert A. Vogeler in Hungary. . . . We see what can happen to minds and spirits when individuals are cut off from all normal contacts, terrorized and exposed to the insistent repetition of falsehood.” There was accordingly ‘“‘a duty to prevent whole peoples from being
broken in mind and spirit ... free peoples must try to frustrate this gruesome process.” 25
There is no reason whatsoever to doubt the passionate sincerity of this
PLEASURES AND PERILS OF PARTISANSHIP 85
call to “moral offensive,’ but it was intellectually thin and politically mischievous. For there was here, and there remained in his later formulations of “liberation,” a marked and dangerous gap between analysis
and prescription, between the necessary action implied by the cruel nature of the problem and the actual constraints to action imposed by overpowering circumstance. While the book thus contained a number of interesting and perceptive observations, it seemed, taken as a whole, to complete the fusion in Dulles of a rather simplistic anti-Communism and a simplistic moral ethic. The result was a triumph for ideology, but not for wise diplomacy, yet the pith and clarity of his exposition undoubtedly gave sharper focus to the views of a large segment of American public opinion. Rescue from Oblivion
A few weeks after Dulles’s defeat in the special Senate race, Lucius Battle, who was personal assistant to Secretary of State Acheson, received
an evening telephone call. The caller was a Philadelphia journalist named Carl McCardle who had come to know and respect Acheson since the days of the Bretton Woods conference when Acheson had given him material help with the esoterics of international finance, thereby enabling him to win a Pulitzer Prize. It now appeared he had also been courting John Foster Dulles. The talk lasted for more than an hour. The burden of McCardle’s story was that Dulles hoped that his partisan thrusts, made in the heat of the Senate campaign, would not disqualify him for further
work in foreign affairs under the Truman administration; in short, at the age of sixty-one, Dulles wanted rescue from the threat of political oblivion.?9
Battle reported the conversation to the Secretary’s staff meeting the following morning, adding that he himself judged the idea worthy of serious consideration. The collapse of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and its retreat to Formosa in October were raising gale winds of partisan anger and protest in the Congress; nor were these calmed by cumulative evidence that Truman and Acheson intended to wash their hands of the Chinese civil war —no further political involvement with Chiang, nor any use of U.S. armed forces to defend Formosa. (It was also their hope to extend recognition to the Chinese Communist regime in due course, but the Mao group proved so harsh in word and deed, jailing the American consul general in Mukden and subjecting other American officials to
related humiliations, that a full-scale withdrawal of the United States diplomatic representation was carried out by the end of 1949.) The ugly demagoguery of Senator Joseph McCarthy (which would combine with
86 PLEASURES AND PERILS OF PARTISANSHIP
explosive effect the “CCommunists-in-government” issue with the “fall of
China’ issue) was gathering in the wings. Moreover, the Soviets had detonated their first atomic weapon in September, forcing Washington to reappraise the extent to which it could in future rely on the nuclear deterrent, and pushing it toward a decision on the question of H-bomb production. It seemed to Battle that the need to restore a larger measure of bipartisanship in foreign policy was urgent and self-evident.*° Undersecretary James Webb, who was presiding over the staff meeting that day (Acheson being out of town), acknowledged the need for bipartisanship, but nonetheless found the Dulles initiative a remarkable piece
of gall. He instructed Battle not to pursue it, not even to raise it with Acheson, as he thought President Truman would be most irate. Battle obeyed his instructions. In late December, however, when Battle was with Acheson at a NATO meeting in Paris, a cable arrived from Webb urging that Dulles be taken on as a special adviser. The Undersecretary had been turned around by Senator Vandenberg, who had expressed, informally, an urgent need to restore ‘“‘unpartisan unity” following “the fall of China,” and who believed Dulles the best qualified Republican for a high advisory position in the State Department. Acheson’s first re-
action was strongly negative, but Battle persuaded him to weigh the advantages and disadvantages with care, and, after reconsidering, Acheson cabled Webb that he would agree if the President found the arrangement acceptable.*t Webb then approached the White House, but, encountering opposition in the President’s staff, chose not to press the proposal.
Accordingly, the matter did not come to a head for another three months when, at the end of March 1950, Dulles went to Washington to press his own case with the senator from Michigan. Vandenberg’s conversion to internationalism had been quite probably the decisive factor in congressional support for the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Treaty (almost certainly, there would have been no Marshall Plan without his wholehearted cooperation and support). Now he was dying of cancer, a fact that may have added an intangible increment to the already great weight of his influence at the White House. According to Dulles’s confidential memorandum of record
(which he dictated following his talk with the senator in the latter’s apartment at the Wardman Park, March 30), Vandenberg told him he was “much disturbed . . . by the collapse of bipartisanship.” 3? Moreover, while Vandenberg had no objection to the recent appointment of another defeated Republican senator, John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, as a consultant to the State Department, “‘he did not think .. . that bipartisanship would have much reality so long as the Democrats chose to ignore my position in this field . . . the needs of bipartisan
PLEASURES AND PERILS OF PARTISANSHIP 87
cooperation . . . could only be met by dealing with me.” ** Vandenberg said the ‘‘one embarrassment” which had kept him from pressing the matter formally was the question of whether or not Dulles would be running for the Senate again. Dulles replied “that I was reluctant to run; that I had no desire to be for six years in the Senate.” If he could “play a responsible part’’ in averting the serious danger of war which he perceived, then that, he told Vandenberg, would constitute “a greater call of duty” than running for ofhce again. Vandenberg replied that this statement “cleared away the last vestige of doubt” and that he would accordingly write an appropriate letter to Acheson for delivery the following morning.*4
Later the same day, Dulles called on Dean Rusk, then Deputy Undersecretary of State, who told him that “top people” at the State Department were anxious to bring him back, but that there was an obstacle at the White House. They talked about the recent political campaign and Dulles, revealing an open bitterness about his run against Lehman, told Rusk he felt “a grave blow had been struck to bipartisanship when the Democratic high command during the Senatorial campaign had tried to smear me and to destroy public confidence in my qualifications for inter-
national work, and to belittle my contribution to bipartisan foreign policy.”” How he conducted himself from this point forward ‘‘would depend on the attitude of the Administration. If they really wanted bipartisanship, they could have it so far as I was concerned. If they did not want it, that would be their choice, not mine.” Although he had given Vandenberg a rather categorical indication of his disinclination to run again for the Senate, he now dangled the positive possibility before Rusk, using it as a bargaining chip to bring the State Department to a decision. He would have to decide “whether or not to make the Senate race within the next two or three weeks”; indeed he was breakfasting the next morn-
ing with Dewey’s chief party factotum “to discuss the state political situation.” 35
As the conversation with Rusk was ending, Acheson sent word that he would welcome a short chat, and Dulles thus moved on to see the Secretary of State. He told Acheson that he and Rusk had enjoyed a “very full and frank” talk, which Rusk ‘‘was authorized [sic] to report to him.” %¢ In the course of pressing Acheson on the need to restore bipartisanship, he complained again of having been smeared in the Senate race “as [a] fascist, nazi and bigot by the Democratic political organization, when none of the Administration had publicly or privately said a word of protest.” 3’ ‘There was apparently no direct discussion of Dulles’s possible return to the State Department, but Acheson closed the meeting cordially by saying he looked forward to reading Dulles’s new book when he went abroad in May. However, after receiving the Vandenberg letter the fol-
88 PLEASURES AND PERILS OF PARTISANSHIP
lowing day, he telephoned ‘Truman in Key West on April 4 and recommended an affirmative decision.*®
It was now the President’s turn to react with negative feeling. In his peppery way, Truman was angry at Dulles’s sharp campaign attacks on the Fair Deal domestic policies, and he was not in a forgiving mood. Acheson chose not to press the matter, confident that his chief would develop a more reflective view after a few days, and indeed this happened. Weighing the administration’s need for bipartisan support, Truman concluded it would be cavalier to risk the loss of Vandenberg’s momentous assistance in the Senate; and Dulles, whatever his shortcomings, was an able man. However, in view of the hard positions Dulles had taken in the campaign, Truman was unwilling to make him a part of the administration with the title of ambassador at large: he was prepared to make him a “‘consultant,’”” provided Senator Lehman agreed to the appoint-
ment. Acheson promptly undertook to clear the appointment with Lehman, who was glad to have the assurance that Dulles would not run
again for the Senate. Dulles, although unhappy about the measured denigration of his new title, promptly accepted, and was sworn in on April 26.39
Two days later, he had a long conversation with the President in which
he expressed his pleasure and gratitude for this further opportunity to work for bipartisanship. Aware of ‘Truman’s cool reaction to his return, he added that his ability to serve effectively depended, of course, on the
President’s confidence in him, as well as on the development by the administration of policies which he could, as a Republican, loyally endorse. He had no wish, he said, to run again for elective office; indeed his acceptance of the Senate appointment had reflected the consideration that, with Dewey’s second defeat and Vandenberg’s illness, it behooved
him as a Republican internationalist to gain some personal stature, so that he would not be wholly reliant on the influence of distinguished sponsors. Bipartisanship, Dulles told ‘Truman, was the key to regaining the confidence of the American people in the fight against Communism. ‘Truman was sympathetic, saying that he understood Dulles’s position in the recent campaign, and that he fully shared Dulles’s views on the importance of a bipartisan approach to foreign policy. Moreover, he had
read and liked Dulles’s “very good book,” which had been published just a month before.*° Dulles was thus back in harness. His return owed something to his own initiative, more to Vandenberg’s sponsorship, and most to the acute need of the administration for the kind of bipartisanship that would, by rally-
ing the Republican moderates, help to neutralize the rabid right wing. ‘Three personal negatives (Webb, Acheson, and Truman) had been, on reflection, converted into an official afhrmative.
Japanese Peace —
Korean War
I: THE SPRING of 1950, events were moving American opinion toward
the view that a rather prompt peace treaty with Japan was an in-
trinsically desirable step — and a political imperative if Japan were to be brought to America’s side in the cold war. The cost of military occupation was a rising popular concern, the New York Times having declared editorially as early as August 1949 that “no agreement and no moral law requires us to perpetuate a situation which costs us hundreds of millions of dollars yearly,’ and Senator Taft having soon thereafter expressed his own fiscal alarm. As early as 1948, General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Allied Commander in Tokyo, recommended a prompt and generous peace treaty, arguing that Japan’s “‘spiritual revolution,” which he had largely engineered, had prepared that once-warrior nation for a new era of peace and democracy.! In MacArthur’s view, Japan should be neutral, ‘‘the Switzerland of the Pacific,’ but not stripped of industrial capacity, except for the right and ability to manufacture armaments and
aircraft. There should be a well-trained national police to deal with internal disorder, but no regular military forces, Japan’s best defense against external threat being, in his judgment, the moral authority of the United Nations. By 1949, however, the deepening cold war had moved him away from this somewhat idealistic position; now, he argued, Japan should be allowed, following a peace treaty, to “assure herself of security in the Communist-threatened Western Pacific by entering into a pact providing her with military defenses.” 2 While State Department thinking had by no means coalesced, it was in 1948-1949 generally doubtful about the efficacy of a “‘hasty’’ treaty. The democratic reforms imposed by the Allied Occupation had been
go JAPANESE PEACE — KOREAN WAR
dramatic and pervasive —e.g., the effective removal from influence of 180,000 professional army officers, 30,000 imperial police officers, 10,000
imperial teachers, and most of the high bureaucracy. But the purging of those who were responsible for the prewar policies of military conquest had also removed most of the nation’s trained leadership, and in the State Department view, not enough time had yet passed for the Japanese people to bring forth a new group of able leaders and functionaries
who wholeheartedly embraced the reforms. State thus feared that an early termination of controls would reveal a vacuum of leadership that only the old ruling cliques could fill. Moreover, Japan was still enfeebled economically; to set it loose in a fiercely competitive world might well bring on economic collapse, which would in turn brand the whole occu-
pation effort a failure and, worst of all, open the doors to Communist infiltration.? By early 1950, however, the State Department had swung around to the conclusion that, however cogent its reservations might be, the occupation was a wasting asset, and an early treaty a political necessity. As Dean Acheson later wrote: “Force can overcome force, but a free
society cannot long steel itself to dominate another people by sheer force.” * In addition to fiscal and political unease in the United States, the Japanese themselves were becoming restive. And the European and Asian peoples who had suffered death and destruction at Japanese hands were beginning to press for reparations, for punitive restrictions on post-
war Japanese trade and industry, and for strong assurances against a revival of Japanese militarism. At the same time, the rising tempo of the
cold war strengthened the argument for bringing the Japanese power potential into alignment with the free nations. As a general consultant to the State Department, Dulles was without specific assignment, but at Acheson’s suggestion he was soon conferring
on Asian policy questions with ranking Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Although Vandenberg continued to urge “maximum cooperation” on a “unified foreign policy” in every part of the world, it was evident that his fellow Republicans were not in fact willing to accept and support the Truman-Acheson policies in Asia. These policies, centering on the decision to let the dust settle in the Chinese civil war, seemed to them dubious and imbued with high risk, making failure a probability; and Democratic failure spelled Republican political advantage in the next presidential election, which lay only two years ahead. Japan seemed the only area in the Far East where they were willing to offer genuine bipartisan support. A few days after these consultations, Dulles asked for a briefing on the department’s plans for a Japanese peace treaty. After listening closely for an hour, he turned to Walton Butterworth, the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, and said to him: “You'll never get anything done unless you select someone
JAPANESE PEACE — KOREAN WAR Ql
in whom you have confidence, give him a job to do, and then hold him to results.” > The logic of the situation soon led to a decision that Dulles should work on the treaty. Obstacles
Yet if an early treaty was now broadly regarded as necessary, the problems of conception, methodology, and procedure remained largely unresolved. How to satisfy the victims of Japan, while avoiding a punitive and self-defeating settlement? How to prevent the Russians from creating an endless conference deadlock that would frustrate the signing of any treaty? How to determine which “China” should participate in the
proceedings, now that Mao had captured the mainland and driven Chiang Kai-shek to Formosa? There remained, moreover, a serious split inside the United States government. As Acheson described it: “In plan-
ning content and method, four groups had to be reckoned with: the Communists, the Pentagon, our allies, and the former enemy. Of these, the Communists gave the least trouble. Their opposition to any tenable ideas was predictable and irreconcilable. It could only be ignored. The most stubborn and protracted opposition to a peace treaty came from the Pentagon.” ® Setting themselves against both General MacArthur and the State Department, the Defense Secretary, Louis Johnson, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that it would be feckless to exchange the “secure” status of military occupation for the manifold uncertainties of a multilateral peace conference. For the Pentagon, military strength was the overriding consideration, and its leaders wanted to retain unrestricted use of Japanese territory for American bases. The British had begun pressing for a treaty in early 1949, both as a matter of British interest and on behalf of the Commonwealth countries. Acheson’s talks with the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, in September of that year, revealed a common desire to draw Japan into the free world camp. But they also uncovered the British feeling that more attention must be paid to the Commonwealth anxieties concerning the revival of Japanese militarism and economic competition, and to strong Commonwealth demands for reparations. There also existed a good deal of international opposition to the idea
of a treaty without the participation of Russia or Communist China. Such a “separate peace” was incompatible with India’s hopes for moderating the ideological struggle and strengthening the neutral bloc, and
a number of neutral countries supported India. Australia was also opposed, fearing that a settlement dominated by the United States would lead rapidly to Japanese rearmament. American opinion appeared to be
g2 JAPANESE PEACE — KOREAN WAR
plastic and as yet unformed, a Gallup poll of November 1949 showing only 20.5 percent in favor of any long-term United States—Japanese rela-
tionship that involved American political or military obligations. The Dulles Approach
On May 18, 1950, a presidential announcement formally assigned Dulles to work on the treaty, adding that responsibility for the project rested with the Secretary of State; the latter point was designed both to underline Dulles’s consultant status and to signal foot-draggers at the Pentagon to fall in line. Working without staff, except for John Allison, the able director of the Bureau of Northeast Asian Affairs, who was detailed as his special assistant, Dulles quietly examined all of the muis-
cellaneous drafts, analyses, and memoranda that had served as raw material for three years of inconclusive debate within the U.S. Government. These included a National Security Council paper (approved by President Truman in November 1948) which had aimed at beginning to treat Japan less like a defeated enemy and more like a potential member of the family of free nations: MacArthur was authorized to create a 150,000 man national police force; the Japanese were granted wider discretion in determining the pace and method of assimilating the occupation reforms; new efforts were aimed at strengthening the economy. This approach reflected the work of the policy planning staff at the State Department and of its director, George Kennan.’ Dulles then prepared an initial memorandum. Because it drew substantially on the 1948 NSC paper and because these elements were em-
bodied in the treaty as eventually negotiated and ratified, the Asian scholar Frederick S. Dunn was led to write that it was perhaps not accurate to refer to Dulles as “the architect of the Japanese peace treaty,” but “rather as the [statesman] who successfully negotiated and carried out, albeit with various improvisations and innovations, a previous blueprint.” § Intellectual vanity appeared, however, to create an obstacle to Dulles’s acknowledgment of this essential truth, and he sought to create a different impression at a press conference on July 11, 1951, two months
before the treaty was signed at San Francisco. A reporter asked, “Did you start with a clean sheet of paper, or did you have a good deal of work already prepared and the outline given over to you?” Dulles answered, ‘There were, I suppose, a good many drafts of a Japanese peace treaty which had been the product of various stages of thinking over the preceding five years. I will have to admit I never read any of them.” ° In any event, his initial memorandum had the great virtue of brevity and it reflected two deeply held personal convictions: (1) that any attempt
JAPANESE PEACE — KOREAN WAR 93
to impose vengeful terms on a defeated enemy was a self-destructive approach; and (2) that the intensity of the cold war now made it imperative to align Japanese interests and assets with the coalition of free nations.1° On the first point, he was insisting that the world must finally learn and apply the tragic lesson of Versailles — that magnanimity and generosity were essential ingredients of any sane solution, on both moral and practical grounds. (At about this time, his friend Elhott Bell taxed him with the statement that surely it was impossible to forgive the Japanese for an outrage like the Bataan Death March; to which Dulles replied, “Jesus teaches us that nothing is unforgivable.’’) *t On the second point, he was reflecting the growing view that the former Asian enemy must now become an ally. The memorandum also contained three procedural recommendations. One called for a preliminary conference of all interested nations to con-
sider proposals put forward by the United States. A second defined a method for handling the difficult “two Chinas” problem —i.e., both the Nationalist and Communist regimes would be invited to send delegates to the conference; on issues where they agreed, only one vote would be cast for “China”; where they disagreed, each would be given a vote. ‘The third aimed at encouraging Japanese immigration into the United States as a means of stimulating a Japanese feeling that they were racially pre-
ferred by America in comparison to the Chinese, Koreans and other Asians; by this means Dulles hoped to induce a Japanese desire to join the free world club.1? Acheson disapproved all three procedures. Taking account of both the Russian capacity for procedural obstruction and the heavy pressure for reparations and restrictions certain to be applied by the victims of Japan, he considered the idea of a general conference to be unworkable. The proposal for dealing with the China question, while legalistically adroit, looked equally unworkable in the cold light of prac-
tical diplomacy. The suggestion that the United States should pander to Japanese racial prejudices seemed to Acheson a shallow and divisive approach to Asian problems. In putting forward these rather curious measures, Dulles—for neither the first nor the last time — apparently became rather too absorbed in the tactics of the problem. Heading into Storm
On June 14, Dulles embarked with Allison on a reconnaissance trip to Japan to begin his firsthand education into the details of the problem. Traveling by way of South Korea, so that he could assure his friend Syngman Rhee that a treaty with Japan would not be developed at the
94 JAPANESE PEACE — KOREAN WAR
expense of that small country, he ran head on into the Korean war. Arriving in Seoul just a week before the fighting broke out, he toured what Allison later described as the “meager” defenses at the 38th parallel near the town of Uijongbu, with South Korean and American military
officers. The Russians later distributed a photograph of the occasion, charging that Dulles had been sent to start the war that began on June 25. Dulles had been something of a sponsor of South Korean independence, having argued the case for it in the 1948 UN General Assembly. Strong American and other Western support had made this a reality, but a corollary effort to obtain Seoul’s membership in the United Nations
had been blocked by Soviet insistence on equal treatment for North Korea, which the Western majority refused. Dulles admired Rhee as a tough-minded Christian and anti-Communist, and it was rather clear from views he had expressed both on the Senate floor and in his book War or Peace that he did not agree with the Truman-Acheson decision to let the dust settle in Asia. To him the struggle against Communism had become unavoidably universal, without room for accommodation in any sector.
All during 1949 while his regime fell apart, Chiang Kai-shek had worked at trying to build an anti-Communist alliance in the Pacific comparable to NATO. He found support in South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines, but the United States held firmly to the view that the time was not ripe for an Asian alliance despite ‘‘serious dangers.” 1° Acheson supported Nehru’s view that internal conflicts in several Asian countries should be resolved first. Even when President Quirino of the Philippines pleaded in Washington for American endorsement of an allAsian “organizing conference’ to be held in the spring of 1950, ‘Truman and Acheson promised only to “watch sympathetically.” At its meeting in September 1949, the new NATO Council had strongly rebuffed the idea of a Pacific pact, with the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, expressing the view that it was useless to try to “‘save” the Chiang regime on Formosa. The NATO action accurately reflected the considered judg-
ment of the Truman administration: the recovery and protection of Western Europe was the vital first priority; and given the major commitments to Greek-Turkish aid, the Marshall Plan, and NATO defense,
the American political system could neither undertake nor sustain a comparable effort in Asia. On December 23, 1949, the State Department had sent to all Far Eastern posts a circular telegram advising that Formosa was expected to fall
to the Chinese Communists and that it was United States policy not to interfere. On January 2, Senators Taft and Knowland demanded that the United States Navy be ordered to defend Formosa against invasion; on January 3, the circular telegram was leaked from Tokyo, which raised
JAPANESE PEACE — KOREAN WAR 95
the first suspicions of MacArthur’s collusion with the Republicans, and which forced Truman to be more explicit than he would have preferred. The President did not flinch. At a press conference on January 5, he read a prepared statement saying that the United States would not give ‘“mili-
tary ... aid or advice” to Chiang and would not ‘“‘pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.” ?#* On Janu-
ary 12, Acheson, in a carefully considered policy speech, defined the United States defense line in Asia to exclude both Korea and Formosa —a position fully endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He added that, if military attack should occur on areas outside that line, “initial reliance
must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations.” 25
By mid-January 1950, then, it was plain that United States policy intended no defense of either Formosa or South Korea, but it was equally plain that angry and anxious resistance to this position was rising in the Congress, particularly among Senate Republicans. McCarthy’s attack on the State Department began the same month. In South Korea Syngman Rhee was increasingly unpopular, but the basic issue was his harsh and dictatorial method of governing in the south; there was not much illusion, even among liberal South Koreans, that a negotiated unification with North Korea was a wise or desirable course. On March 31, Rhee issued a decree postponing prescribed parliamentary elections from May until November. Acheson quickly and _ severely warned him that South Korea would lose all United States aid unless the elections were held on schedule. Compliance followed, and proved a near catastrophe for Rhee, whose supporters won only 45 out of 210 seats. About 60 percent of the seats were won by “independents” who, although detesting Rhee, were strongly anti-Communist. It is plausible that North Korea may have read these election results as indicating that
it could count on substantial support in the south, if it should try to resolve the unification problem by force. In any event, its military prep-
arations were well advanced. On May 10, the South Korean defense minister cited North Korean troop movements and warned of imminent danger of invasion.1¢ Dulles was, of course, generally aware of these developments, and tried
to take account of them in an address to the South Korean parliament on June 19. The people of South Korea, he said, were “today .. . in the front line of freedom, under conditions that are both dangerous and exciting.” The danger was “Soviet communism ... north of the 38th Parallel,” which “seeks, by terrorism, fraudulent propaganda, infiltration, and incitement to civil unrest, to enfeeble and discredit your new Republic.” 17 Then, moving to provide assurances of American moral
g6 JAPANESE PEACE — KOREAN WAR
support, and at least to imply some promise of unspecified help in time of trouble, he said: “The United Nations considers you as, spiritually,
one of them. ... The American people welcome you as an equal partner in the great company of those who make up this free world, a world which commands vast moral and material power, and whose resolution is unswerving. . . . Therefore, I say to you: You are not alone. You will never be alone, so long as you continue to play worthily your part in the great design of human freedom.” !* John Allison thought at
the time that, through these remarks, Dulles had “rather tried to make
up for what he thought Dean Acheson had omitted in his January speech .. .” 19 Dulles and Allison flew on to Tokyo the following day, where Dulles went immediately into a private ninety-minute conference with General MacArthur. Emerging in a cheerful mood, he told a press conference he “predicted ‘positive action’ by the United States to preserve peace in
the Far East.’’?° Pressed as to the meaning of “positive action,” he retreated into generalities, saying merely that he was confident his talks with MacArthur and others would lead to a positive result. He insisted later that this reference was confined to the Japanese peace treaty. But he added a comment which was broader, and also at cross-purposes with the ‘ITruman-Acheson position: American foreign policies are, he said, “constantly under review, taking account of changing situations. This generality applies to Formosa also.” ?1
Over the next four days, he talked to a wide range of Japanese, beginning with Prime Minister Yoshida and the opposition leader, Mr. Miki. He met with members of the Diet, industrialists, labor union leaders, journalists, and intellectuals; also with various American businessmen and churchmen living in Japan, and with foreign diplomats, including especially the British and French ambassadors in Tokyo. His aim was to gain a wide sense of what kind of treaty was considered desirable and acceptable. One vital purpose was to bring the Japanese themselves into the discussions from the beginning, which to the world’s sorrow had not been done with the Germans at Versailles. In the main, Dulles found the Japanese leaders remarkably vague about methods and arrangements for safeguarding their nation’s security in the aftermath of a peace treaty, some choosing to place their faith solely in the United Nations, arguing rather desperately that Japan’s constitutional renunciation of war would ensure her safety. Prime Minister Yoshida indicated that, while he had developed no clear defense concept of his own, neither was he ready to commit himself on the question of United States base rights in a post-treaty period.
JAPANESE PEACE — KOREAN WAR 97
War Comes to Korea
When the Korean War started on Sunday, June 25, Dulles and his wife were sightseeing in Kyoto; Allison was in Tokyo lunching with his old friend, the Norwegian Minister. Returning to the Imperial Hotel at three in the afternoon, Allison found the foreign editor of Newsweek,
Harry Kern, drinking tea in the lobby with a former Japanese ambassador to the United States. Kern asked him if he had heard about the war in Korea. Allison, who was “dumbfounded,” immediately telephoned
MacArthur’s headquarters and there learned that Dulles had been notified and was returning to Tokyo. Ambassador William Sebald, MacArthur’s political adviser, who had been making a speech in Yokohama, was also on his way back. A meeting in the Supreme Commander’s office was set for six o’clock.??
At the meeting, Dulles and Allison learned that Washington had already requested a UN Security Council meeting for the next morning. They also learned, to their surprise, that MacArthur’s assessment of the fighting was bland and nonchalant. Striding about his palatial office in
an open-necked khaki shirt, he called the attack a reconnaissance in force, and easily handled by the South Koreans alone. Syngman Rhee had asked for some fighter planes and MacArthur would send, them, but
recognizing they would contribute only to morale since the South Koreans were incompetent airmen. There were no American combat troops in Korea and, in MacArthur’s view, no need to send them. The situation was not serious: “If only Washington will not hobble me, I can handle it with one arm tied behind my back.” ?3
Although they had no independent sources of intelligence information, both Dulles and Allison reacted uneasily to such imperial complaisance; both instinctively felt the situation to be more serious. As soon as they left MacArthur, they conferred in Dulles’s embassy apart-
ment. Dulles had “vividly in mind” the moral implications of his ‘you are not alone” speech to the Korean National Assembly; both men wondered if this attack was the first fruit of the Soviet-Chinese mutual defense treaty of February 1950, and if the assault on Korea was a prelude to the building of a direct threat against Japan. After twenty minutes of discussion they sent a joint cable to Acheson and Rusk through Sebald: ‘It 1s possible that the South Koreans may themselves contain
and repulse the attack and, if so, this is the best way. If, however, it appears that they cannot do so, then we believe that United States force should be used.’ To remain passive “would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war.” ?4
98 JAPANESE PEACE — KOREAN WAR
En route to lunch at the British embassy the following day, the two men stopped by MacArthur’s office for the latest word. The general now
acknowledged that the fighting was somewhat more severe, but still thought it within the capacity of the South Koreans to handle. Ambassador John Muccio in Seoul had asked for help, including air cover, in evacuating American women and children, and MacArthur was going to accommodate him, although he thought Muccio’s action somewhat premature.?® ‘That afternoon Dulles had a final meeting with Prime Minister Yoshida and later with a group of Japanese labor leaders. He and Mrs. Dulles then dined quietly with General and Mrs. MacArthur, and afterwards attended a movie in MacArthur’s quarters. There was little
or no talk of Korea.?° Meanwhile, Allison had gone to a black-tie dinner at the home of one of the embassy officers, and there got ominous word from the Australian ambassador, a cantankerous personality named W. R. Hodgson who was brimful of anti-Americanism. Hodgson described with some relish a tele-
phone conversation he had just completed with the Australian member of the UN commission in Seoul: “Well, I’ve just had the last conversation
anyone will have with Korea. .. . The Korean army is retreating all
along the front and... the American military advisory group is getting ready to pull out.’ ?”? On hearing this report, the NBC Tokyo correspondent, George Folster, left the party, returning an hour later to confirm Hodgson’s information. Allison, by now alarmed, went to the American embassy, where he telephoned Ambassador Muccio in Seoul. It was a quarter to eleven Monday night, June 26. The boom of artillery fire and the hectic rattle of small arms were plainly audible over the telephone. Muccio told him flatly that South Korean resistance was ‘‘disintegrating.” 28 Allison then telephoned Dulles, who had returned unenlightened from MacArthur’s dinner. They quickly concluded that Mac-
Arthur’s subservient staff, under strict orders not to disturb him after ofhce hours, had decided to hold the bad news until the following day. Thinking this was folly, Dulles immediately called the general and gave him the Hodgson-Allison-Muccio report. The general assured him he would “get something started.” The following morning Allison again called Muccio, who now told him the Rhee government was evacuating Seoul and retreating ninety miles south to the city of Taejon, below the Han River.?®
Their own business finished, Dulles and Allison were scheduled to take a Pan American flight back to Washington at noon that same day (Tuesday, June 27). The general and Sebald arrived at the airport to see them off, ‘“‘a vastly different MacArthur from the jaunty, confident General” of Sunday evening. In a mood of deep pessimism, he now told them
the position in Korea was down the drain: “All Korea is lost,’’ and the only remaining action was to “get our people safely out of the country.”
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O: a nN ull " ate a ity) er int ificati France, G es came 1 nd modifi non Nn I 9 offic e . n a itla q uesti O eir . Bene gover se arila men . stion o bet ments gatheri dh;yet led an emed ad initi Sreat In 1brati ul enced »pular and po , but .ux Influ it, afri ood posit1o y;dhis O ‘oe f Ptheate courpropo me tluropea 1i1tyy to unif ot* of Ang] Europe.” By .the erican time: ense Com time dDuy emand for deb muni f thei y t ly and , the six
164 POLICY BEGINNINGS (PART ONE)
Dulles had long believed that the “world’s worst fire hazard” must not be rebuilt on the old foundation of “rickety national structures,” and he thus made EDC the heart of his European policy. It was to be another vital building block — to be placed beside the Coal and Steel Community, the Council of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly — in what must become the sturdy edifice of the supranational European system. Noting in his maiden speech that “the plan now seems to be somewhat stalled,” + he promptly flew to Paris to push it forward. Aside from the gracelessness of his encounters with senior American
diplomats, that first European trip was notable for the sheer intensity of willpower he applied to the discouraging prospects for EDC. Gathering
all the mission chiefs or their deputies at a meeting in the American embassy in Paris, and after rather curtly paraphrasing his expectation of “positive loyalty,” he stressed the absolute necessity for full ratification of EDC within six months. Then he listened with mounting distaste to a lucid but somber assessment of the German paliamentary situation by
Samuel Reber, the American deputy in Bonn, and to the even more depressing estimate of the French situation from Ambassador James Dunn. One participant remembered that Dulles glared intently at Reber as though he were blaming the messenger for bearing bad news.® Julius
Holmes, the American Minister in London, advised that, while the British supported EDC in principle, the extent of their support was problematical and they would flatly refuse to join. At the end of the meeting, Dulles told the assembled diplomats that EDC was so urgent a necessity, so fundamental a goal of United States policy, that they were not to tolerate any discussion of alternatives within their embassies, nor
to admit in their dealings with European officials and the press that alternatives even existed.® This instruction reflected the effort of a power-
ful idealist to harness power to a specific ideal and thereby bring it to life in the real world. It was a noble effort, yet in the end self-defeating:
by binding so ramified a question in an unnatural diplomatic straitjacket for the next eighteen months, Dulles left the whole Western Alliance adrift and without a coherent fallback position when the final collapse came. It was then left to Anthony Eden, in a remarkable diplomatic tour de force, to pick up the pieces and put together a workable alternative.
French ratification was crucial for EDC, but the French were a troubled people, deeply divided by an inability to define a postwar role that was at once satisfying to the national ego and financially sustainable; they were, moreover, gnawed by a sense of weakness and a continuing fear of Germany. Abroad, their government was attempting to maintain
an essentially unchanged hold over colonial territories at a time when colonial peoples everywhere were ready to fight for their independence,
POLICY BEGINNINGS (PART ONE) 165
and when the exertions required for a French policy of suppression served primarily to underline the economic backwardness and political weakness of metropolitan France. But while France was thus beset by contradiction and self-doubt, West Germany across the Rhine was building a healthy and bustling new society on the ghastly ruins of the old.
Stripped of both the honors and burdens of their former empire, the West Germans were developing their economy, expanding their exports,
and emerging as the major creditor nation of Europe. The French people, in a state of emotional agitation over what seemed the profound unfairness of life, balked at EDC because it both threatened the disappearance of the French army (which was a national symbol dear to the hearts of even the most unmilitary Frenchmen) and forced them into intimate military collaboration with a feared and hated neighbor. The
uncertainty of British military support for the enterprise further fed French anxiety, for it opened the appalling prospect that, if Britain defaulted, they would once again be left alone on the Continent with an uncaged German tiger. A month before Dulles arrived in Paris, Premier René Mayer, who had
newly come to office with the open support of anti-integrationist followers of General de Gaulle, had asked for “clarifications” of EDC that were in fact so far-reaching as to require renegotiation of the treaty. The amendments were aimed at retaining for France a large measure of control over the French army, particularly the right to withdraw French forces from EDC for emergency use within the French Union (i.e., Indo-
china and North Africa). But they also sought a tighter promise from Britain to maintain substantial military forces on the Continent, and the permanent separation of the Saar territory from Germany and its transference to “European” status (which amounted to French economic control). Although these were stiff demands, the five other treaty powers
addressed them seriously, and by mid-June had conceded all that was in their authority. All five powers granted Paris the right to withdraw French troops under certain emergency conditions. And the Germans, although affronted by French insistence on the Saar question, were willing to pay a high price to end the Allied occupation and restore West German sovereignty, which were linked features of the EDC proposals. Moreover, Adenauer, who strongly supported EDC, pressed the Bundestag to a favorable vote on ratification (on March 19) after a bitter debate. Of the conditions asked by France, only the matter of a stronger
British commitment remained unresolved by mid-1953. Yet French reluctance was unaffected.
166 POLICY BEGINNINGS (PART ONE)
Dulles and Eden But now in early February Dulles flew from Paris to London for talks with a British government still far from ready to merge its institutions
with those on the Continent, and indeed in active resistance to the construction of a supranational Europe.
Beyond a lack of political foresight that was later to prove painful (when Britain, having scorned the Treaty of Rome in 1955, was later refused entrance to the Common Market by De Gaulle’s curt veto), the negative British position in 1953 appeared to reflect something more than traditional Foreign Office ambivalence toward Europe. A significant
factor was Prime Minister Churchill’s passionate hope to reestablish the special Anglo-American intimacy that had been at the heart of all planning and action in the wartime Western Alliance. With his old comrade-in-arms now established at the center of American power, the hope must have seemed tantalizingly real. But the world had moved swiftly onward since 1945, creating a wider discrepancy of power between
the United States and Britain than had existed (or than had seemed to exist) during the war years. And while the gap had been partially camouflaged during the Truman-Acheson period by Washington’s dedication to genuinely collective efforts, it was soon to be exposed by Dulles’s
rather different approach; for Dulles was, as a consequence both of Versailles and of his international law practice, oriented to the Continent, to the problems of France and Germany, rather than to Britain. He had played no official role in the Second World War. More to the point, as one historian wrote, he “never went through the experience of that peculiarly close wartime partnership with the British,” 7 which was so formative an experience for Eisenhower (as for Marshall, Harriman, Lovett, Forrestal, McCloy, et al.). What Dulles saw when he came to office was that Europe's urgent need was integration and that Britain opposed this; that British power was in serious decline, while America’s superiority was indisputable; that this established a power relationship in which Washington needed to pay no special attention to London’s views or sensitivities in formulating policies for the future. The judgment was accurate enough as to the facts. It was Dulles’s readiness to proceed from blunt analysis to blunt action, unsoftened by ties of sentiment, that dashed whatever element
of reality remained in Churchill’s dream of reestablishing the “inner club.” The tragedy for the British was that, holding out hope where there was none, they put themselves in a rather false position.
POLICY BEGINNINGS (PART ONE) 167
When Dulles arrived in London on February 3, however, a discussion of EDC had to be deferred, for it was first necessary to deal with the running Anglo-American differences over China. Eisenhower had delivered his first State of the Union Message the previous day and, even as Dulles put down at the London airport, Eden was trying to soothe a House of Commons angered by the passage that “unleashed” Chiang Kai-shek by changing the orders of the Seventh Fleet. Since the outbreak
of the Korean War, its mission had been to interpose itself in the Formosa Strait as an obstacle to hostilities initiated by either side. Now
Eisenhower had asserted there was no “logic or sense” in having the United States any longer assume “defensive responsibilities on behalf of
the Chinese Communists ...a nation fighting us in Korea.” ® Like other informed and experienced men, Eden was less worried that this pronouncement would lead to serious Nationalist Chinese operations against the mainland than that it would, as he told the Commons, “have unfortunate political repercussions without compensating military advantages.” ° It was, as he saw it, a mischievous device, deliberately employed to please the China Lobby by seeming to reopen the Chinese civil war. And he probably judged that Dulles was the mastermind behind
the ploy. After his arrival, however, Dulles was able to persuade Eden to make a further statement, assuring the Commons that “grave events’ would not necessarily follow from the President’s new orders to the fleet and that, in any event, Her Majesty’s Government would be fully con-
sulted. He may have told Eden that one purpose of the ploy was to increase the pressure on mainland China for an early settlement in Korea.
Eden gratified his guest by agreeing that EDC was indispensable and that London fully supported it short of direct British participation. This latter was a helpful, even handsome reassurance in the circumstances, for the British Foreign Office had been quite affronted by the passage in Dulles’s maiden speech that threatened to give “a httle rethinking” to
basic American relations with Europe “if... France, Germany, and England should go their separate ways.” 1° ‘The implication here was that
both Marshall Plan aid and the U.S. commitment to NATO had been based on the condition that Europe, including Britain, must quickly achieve institutional unity. The implication having no basis in fact, the British took it unkindly as a dishonest form of pressure.1? In this first meeting, Dulles tried to put his best foot forward in an earnest effort to lay to rest the widely expressed British displeasure at his appointment. But despite his efforts, and Eden’s reciprocal gestures of goodwill, there was tension in the relationship from the outset. Dulles was obviously vexed to find not only that his campaign hyperbole had created mistrust, but
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POLICY BEGINNINGS (PART ONE) 169
that his first official policy speech had apparently deepened it. Try as they might, Dulles and Eden were probably doomed to mutual misunderstanding and dislike, for they were utterly different kinds of men.
In appearance and style, Eden was the quintessential upper-class Englishman, with a calculatedly languid manner to match the elegance of his tailoring and the perfection of his cravat. He was handsome. He was brilliant. He had studied Oriental languages at Oxford, with emphasis
on Persian; he had also studied Arabic and the Koran. Like many seasoned diplomats, his judgments tended to be rather intuitive, based on long experience, and he was in any case not very receptive to lengthy and didactic dissertation. Dulles was surely a contrasting study in his green-hued suits, indifferent neckwear, and garterless socks. He hunched slightly forward when he talked and showed a tendency to slur his words (he called Eden “Ant-ny’’), and was chronically afflicted with bad breath. More intellectual, more legalistic, more insistently logical, less experi-
enced than Eden, he was given to droning, slow-motion monologues, which carried him and his listeners (always with painful care and precision, occasionally with impressive sweep) down the winding path of
his thought. In this first meeting, according to his special assistant, “it was quite obvious that [Dulles] was carefully weighing every word and putting it down on the table exactly next to the last word.” }? But Eden, whose own speech was “all flowing rose petals,” 1% was temperamentally incapable of following Dulles’s every labored step through the logical forest. He half listened and, at the end, often turned the conversation in ways that seemed to depreciate or wholly ignore many of the subtler points in the Secretary of State’s dissertation.
At this first set of meetings, the talk turned to the Middle East and more particularly to Egypt, where Britain was beginning the painful negotiation of its withdrawal from the major military base at Suez. Eden referred passingly to the treaty of 1936, an instrument running for twenty years and which constituted Britain’s legal right to maintain military forces in Egypt. The pre-Nasser Egyptian government had unilaterally abrogated the treaty in October 1951, amid riots and bloodshed, but had been unable to achieve any practical result in the face of British military power based at Suez. Dulles asked to see a copy of the document. The British side of the table seemed much taken by surprise at this request, and there ensued an embarrassing half-hour’s search by Eden’s private secretary before the document was finally produced. Dulles, in his formidable lawyer’s manner, locked onto it,
quickly devoured it line by line, and then turned to a blunt crossexamination of the Foreign Secretary, discovering that Eden was impre-
cisely informed on a number of details. From this he drew the sharp and rather too hasty conclusion that Eden ran a slipshod operation and did not personally do his homework. It was the beginning of his growing
170 POLICY BEGINNINGS (PART ONE)
contempt for Eden’s ability.‘* On the other side, Eden thought Dulles’s
mania for legal detail was irrelevant in the context of a general discussion, and resented his overbearing manner. The incident, which foreshadowed more consequential friction between the two men over Indochina and Suez, was also rich in ironies, not the least of them being
that Eden had personally negotiated the treaty in question and was widely regarded as the “official in politics” with the rather narrow talents of a technician. Dulles, on the other hand, was considered by admirers as a seminal thinker with the wide-ranging perspectives of a statesman, unconfined by detailed staff papers. At the 1948 UN General Assembly
meeting in Paris, for example, he had enlivened an interview with Henry Brandon of the London Times by tossing a large stack of staffwritten “position papers” high into the air and exclaiming “words, words, words,” as they fluttered to the floor beside his desk."
Opposition to Détente
The pervasive intensity of the Stalinist threat was, in early 1953, the dominating fact in every capital of the world. From the perspective of official Washington, moreover, it seemed that the malignant qualities of the Soviet system were heavily institutionalized and would not be much affected by the passing of one chieftain. ‘Thus, when Stalin died rather suddenly on March 4, U.S. diplomats and intelligence experts expected the new Soviet regime to move cautiously and with a careful concern not to repudiate the recent past. But in his oration at Stalin’s funeral, the new premier, Georgi Malenkov, stressed ‘“‘peaceful coexistence and competition,” and soon thereafter declared the categorical need for the world (not merely the Communist system) to avoid global war; he also hinted at a major shift in Soviet economic allocations away from heavy war-supporting industries and toward measures aimed at raising the levels of public consumption. Eisenhower found these statements to be “‘startling departures from the ways of his predecessor.” 1° Stalin’s death, the ensuing evidence of both flexibility and weakness in the new Soviet government, and the question of how the United States should respond uncovered in fact a significant difference of instinct and feeling between the President and his Secretary of State. It became clear that Eisenhower stood instinctively on the side of hope, seeing the new
situation as an opportunity for renewed appeal to the common aspirations of mankind, while Dulles stood sternly on the side of moral rectitude, seeing enhanced opportunity for a policy of pressure. Eisenhower found in the Malenkov speeches a signal that a forthcoming American response might just possibly reduce suspicions and lead to a climate in
POLICY BEGINNINGS (PART ONE) 171
which rational negotiation was possible. Dulles read them as evidence of weakness and uncertainty in the Kremlin, indicating that it was time
to apply the thumbscrews. On March 20, he told a press conference, “I can say we have evaluated these speeches, but we do not receive any great comfort.” 1* And he said later to the President, ‘““What they are doing is because of outside pressures, and I don’t know anything better we can do than to keep up those pressures right now.” 1* On March 24, while acknowledging “‘a certain softening” in Soviet language and _ behavior, he argued, in remarks before the White House Conference for the Advertising Council, that the key to understanding such gestures was to be found in Problems of Leninism. He then proceeded to read
from the chapter on “tactical retreats,” and ended by declaring the Soviets were now engaged in a “peace offensive’ because they feared “the forces of disintegration at work within the Soviet empire.’ 1° He was girded for, indeed seemed temperamentally to require, uncompromis-
ing struggle against a Communism whose goal was total conquest of the world in the most literal and physical sense. Stalin was capable of making such a goal seem real, as his successors were not. In an important sense, Stalin did Dulles a philosophical and practical disservice by dying,
but Dulles retaliated by continuing to act as though the death had not occurred.
By late March, however, Eisenhower was seriously considering some public acknowledgment of this major political event and some reflections on what it could mean for the world. As he told his favorite speech writer,
Emmet Hughes, he and everyone else were tired of “just plain indictments of the Soviet regime’’; indeed it would be “asinine” for him to get
up before the world and deliver another one. The main question, he thought, was what the United States was prepared to offer by way of a positive approach, in a new situation, to the overriding problem of peace.?° He went on, with Hughes’s encouragement, to develop the idea of making an appeal to the new Soviet leadership. He would assert Amer-
ica’s belief that security could not be found in the amassing of armaments, for an arms race would lead ‘‘at worst, to atomic warfare. At best,
to robbing every people and nation on earth of the fruits of their own toil . . .”.?! He would express an earnest American desire for cooperation and détente, and he would regard even a few “clear and specific acts” of reciprocation as “impressive signs’ that the new men in the Kremlin shared this desire.2? Dulles had serious objections to such an approach, but sensing the President’s strong attraction to it and being at an early stage in their relationship, he confined himself to oblique expression of his doubts. Such an approach, he told Eisenhower, would show that the United States was taking the baited hook of a new Commu-
nist “peace offensive,’ a hook concealed not only in the Malenkov
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speeches, but in Chou En-lai’s initiative of March go for a Korean prisoner exchange. His suspicion extended even to Russia’s agreement to join with the West in supporting Dag Hammarskjold as the new Secretary-General of the United Nations! ?* Indeed, evidence of AmericanSoviet agreement on any issue troubled him, for he judged it could only be a ruse designed to cause the free world to “let down its guard.” Eisenhower, however, was now determined to make the speech, and Hughes was preparing it for delivery in mid-April. Dulles accordingly addressed his objections to Hughes. In a written notation on the semifinal draft, he commented that the “reference to ending of wars in Asia”’ caused him concern because it might seem to ‘commit us to end the Chinese civil war and again to ‘neutralize’ Formosa,’ 24 a comment which made plain to the dedicated, world-weary Bedell Smith that “Dulles is
still dreaming his fancy about reactivating the civil war in China.” * What the Secretary wanted in the speech was a posture that would give the United States a free hand to run a liberation-rollback policy against mainland China, but would at the same time refuse U.S. agreement to a Korean armistice unless the Kremlin explicitly promised to end the antiFrench rebellion in Indochina. Neither Hughes nor Paul Nitze (who as outgoing director of policy planning made a major contribution to the tone and content of the final speech) was sure that Dulles was fully conscious of this highly selective approach to peacemaking in Asia, but they decided to “forget’’ his proposals (while not disputing the broadly held, erroneous view that Communism was a tightly efficient monolith which, for example, gave the Kremlin decisive control over events in Indochina). Beyond the Asian question, Dulles thought the speech should also demand of the Soviets a list of “deeds” as a test of their desire to improve relations: not only an Austrian peace treaty and the release of German prisoners of war still held in Russia (which were acceptable to Eisenhower), but also a manifest move toward genuine political self-determination for the captive nations of Eastern Europe. As Dulles surely understood that this last point went to the roots of the emotional Soviet concern for its own security, it is safe to say that his move to include it was another effort to foreclose any possibility of serious negotiation with the post-Stalin government. The speech, when finally delivered on April 16 to the American Society
of Newspaper Editors, was eloquent, noble, and somewhat naive: “The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than thirty cities. . . . We pay for a single fighter plane with a half mil-
lion bushels of wheat. . . . This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.” ?° “We seek, throughout Asia as throughout the world, a peace that is true and total.” The “first great step” must be “conclusion
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of an honorable armistice in Korea”; then the United States government
would declare ‘total war, not upon any human enemy, but upon the brute forces of poverty and need,” and would “ask its people to join with all nations in devoting a substantial percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction.” **
The New York Times called the speech a “magnificent and deeply moving” peace initiative. Richard Rovere of the New Yorker found it
“an immense triumph” for the President, one which “reéstablished American leadership in the world.” 28 And reflecting the fluid new order in Moscow, both Pravda and Izvestia printed the full text. For his own part, however, Dulles moved swiftly to fit the speech within the frame of a strategy of pressure. “When President Eisenhower first took office,” he told the same audience of newspaper editors just two days later, “a plea for peace such as he made this week might have been interpreted as a sign of weakness or a mere gesture of sentimentality. . . . It was first necessary to demonstrate . . . [the] will and capacity to develop foreign policies so firm, so fair, so just that the Soviet leaders might find it expedient to live with these policies rather than to live against them.” ?° This amounted to a wildly unreal claim that the Eisenhower-Dulles policies had transformed the international situation — in the space of two months! Of graver consequence than the crass effort at credit-taking was
the subtle distortion of Eisenhower's generous humanitarian impulse. The clear signal from Dulles was that only a policy of pressure had made the President’s speech possible, and that a policy of pressure would therefore continue. Guardedly disturbed by what he felt to be Eisenhower’s naiveté, he was in any event temperamentally incapable of pursuing the intended implications of the President's speech. Eisenhower, of necessity,
turned to other pressing problems. The President’s brave little speech was thus a paper boat launched against the tide. The currents of opposition, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, were too strong and too dependent for their political or bureaucratic survival on a posture of continued hostility. Opposition to a Summit Conference
Anxious to be certain that Europe also got his message, Dulles was back in Paris in late April warning the NATO Council that Malenkov’s moves were purely tactical, that the West must not drop its guard, indeed
that the new situation underlined the urgent need for ratification of EDC. He left Paris feeling he had convinced the allies that they must resist the deadly perils of Malenkov’s “phony peace campaign,” 3° and so reported to Eisenhower. In fact, the Europeans were rather uncon-
174 POLICY BEGINNINGS (PART ONE)
vinced. Carefully pondering the evolution in the Kremlin, they discerned new possibilities for East-West accommodation which it seemed to them unwise to foreclose without exploration. The feeling spread,
particularly in France, that EDC and German rearmament were now less urgent, and on May 11 Prime Minister Churchill proposed a parley at the summit with an informal, flexible agenda and an avoidance of specific prerequisites. It would be unwise, Churchill argued, “to assume that nothing can be settled . . . unless or until everything 1s settled.” * Eisenhower, who now became confused by the evidence (contrary to Dulles’s report) of disarray in the Western Alliance on the fundamental issues Of Russia and EDC, asked the Secretary to arrange a quiet meeting with the French and British heads of state. Churchill was anxious to see the President, and the new French premier, Joseph Laniel (another of those minor parliamentary figures thrown up by the revolving door system of the weak and troubled Fourth Republic), was equally willing. A meeting in Bermuda was set for early June. Dulles, however, was unhappy at Eisenhower’s insistence that the three Western heads of state
should meet to unify and coordinate their approach, for he felt that differences within the alliance would be magnified by the publicity attending a meeting at the top, and that dramatic failure might well strengthen isolationism in America. And he was particularly irritated by Churchill’s initiative, for 1t seemed to him to imply Britain’s “incipient
tendency” to mediate the conflict between the free world and Communism.°?
But the Western Big Three meeting did not come off in June. Churchill had suffered a stroke in April, the full seriousness of which had been withheld, and Eden was still recuperating from an operation for gallstones that would keep him out of action until late in the year. Rather than cancel the meeting, however, the decision was made to transform it into a conference of Foreign Ministers. Hence the “Little Bermuda,’ convened in Washington on July 10, with Dulles playing host to Georges Bidault of France and the Marquess of Salisbury, who was acting head of the British Foreign Office in Eden’s absence. The main topic was Churchill’s idea for a four-power summit, a proposition ably argued by Salisbury. The Russians, Salisbury said, were not in fact dealing from weakness; they could march to the English Channel in two months and their nuclear weaponry was growing. Malenkov’s general softening of the Soviet line should therefore not be rejected out of hand,
but carefully and thoroughly probed at the earliest opportunity.*? Bidault reinforced the British position by making quite clear that the French Assembly could not be persuaded to ratify EDC until there had been a serious effort to negotiate the German question with the new Soviet regime; at the same time, however, he opposed a wide-open meet-
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ing featuring, in Churchill’s phrase, “a fluid or flexible agenda.” ** From the Anglo-French differences, Dulles was able to fashion a compromise agreement: the West would ask the Russians for a four-power conference
of Foreign Ministers in early autumn, with an agenda limited to Germany and Austria. Salisbury, who did not fully share his own Prime Minister’s optimism about a summit, accepted the compromise in good grace, but indicated publicly as he left Washington that a summit conference remained a distinct possibility. A major factor in Dulles’s willingness to countenance any meeting at all with the Russians was a recent plea from Adenauer, whose regime, still an instrument of the Allied High Commission, was facing its first
electoral test on September 6. The German leader, with whom the American Secretary of State was to develop bonds of special trust and warmth, urged that a four-power conference on the German question be held soon, as a means of dramatizing Russia’s categorical opposition to free elections in the truncated German nation. Adenauer stood absolutely for free elections, while his Social Democratic opponent, accepting the reality of a Soviet veto over such a process, proposed that unification
be achieved through negotiations between East and West Germany. Adenauer’s electoral tactic was to show that both his German opponent and the Russian devils held the same position — namely, opposition to free elections.*> The Russians, however, declining to play this game, balked on both the scope and timing of the Western proposal for a conference. They wanted a wider agenda, to include arms levels and foreign
base agreements, and they seemed in no hurry. Thus, as the autumn approached without agreement to a meeting, Dulles apparently concluded that some other form of dramatic help for Adenauer would have to be found. And at a press conference on September 3, after declaring that Russia’s enforced partition of Germany was not merely “a scandal,” but ‘“‘a menace to the peace,” he took the unusual step of directly endorsing Adenauer’s candidacy, asserting that any other result would be disastrous for Germany and the cause of freedom.*® ‘The State Department staff was dumbfounded. Whether this was a calculated diplomatic indis-
cretion (in the manner of the Yoshida letter), or, as Robert Bowie thought, another instance when Dulles was momentarily carried away by the strength of his conviction and the power of his advocacy, Adenauer’s coalition won a smashing victory at the polls, thereby assuring
a continuity to Western policy that Washington, London and Paris
considered vital.
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Two Ghosts of Yalta
The Republican party platform for 1952 contained the promise to “repudiate all commitments contained in secret understandings such as those of Yalta which aid Communist enslavements.’’ While this was a wish deeply embedded in the demonology of the GOP perspective on
world affairs, still it was surprising that Dulles should have initiated implementing action by dictating a paragraph for the President’s first State of the Union Message in early February — for despite the fixation of the right wing, there were no “secret understandings . . . of Yalta.” What had produced enslavement in Eastern Europe was not secret American acquiescence, but clear Russian violation of a Yalta agreement that called for democratic and independent states in that area. Dulles’s proposed language nonetheless used the word “repudiate” in keeping with the GOP platform. Fortunately for the administration, Emmet Hughes, who was editing the speech, struck that verb in favor of more ambiguous language, and as finally delivered the passage read: “I shall ask Congress
at a later date to join in an appropriate resolution making clear that this Government recognizes no kind of commitment contained in secret
understandings of the past ... which permit [this kind of] enslavement.” 3?
But ambiguity is a limited virtue, and the Republican senators and congressmen who heard the speech found in it confirmation of their be-
lief that secret understandings did in fact exist. And they wished to proceed to a vote on a resolution of righteous repudiation. At this point embarrassment set in. As there existed no secrets to repudiate, the administration hardly wished to sponsor or endorse a resolution that the Democrats would tear factually to shreds. What was therefore needed, the White House now decided, was a resolution in which the Democrats could join, but they, of course, were not prepared to condemn Roosevelt and Truman, even obliquely, and especially not for a crime never committed. A watered-down version, merely deploring Communist enslavement of Eastern Europe, was at length painfully sold to Senator Lyndon Johnson and the other Democratic leaders by Thruston Morton, the hard-working Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs. At the last moment, however, Dulles nearly upset the applecart a second time by persuading Eisenhower to sign a message to Congress which again asked for the repudiation of ‘‘past agreements committing us to such enslavement.”’ Another
eleventh hour intervention by Emmet Hughes was needed to save the day.2? Knowing Dulles’s precision as a legal technician, it is difficult to believe he was merely careless with language on two separate but related
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occasions. Yet to assume that his actions were knowing and deliberate is unavoidably to condemn his judgment, for his course, before it was deflected, led straight to acute political embarrassment for the President. The final point of absurdity was reached when the congressional Re-
publicans, discovering the administration intended no rebuke to its Democratic predecessors, angrily refused their support. The result was that no resolution of any kind issued from either the Senate or the House. A sturdier ghost of Yalta was the Bricker amendment to the Constitution, which sought drastic limitations on the presidential treaty-making power and the assertion of broad congressional control over foreign affairs. Sponsored by the conservative senator from Ohio who had been Dewey’s running mate in 1944, it reflected not only concern over excessive executive power, but fear that the United Nations could legislate international covenants (in areas like human rights) that would be binding on the United States. In the 1952 campaign, Dulles had warned publicly of “great dangers” inherent in presidential authority, and had added that modification of the treaty-making power was “desirable under modern conditions.” °° Now of course the shoe was on the other foot. The most notable features of the struggle, which lasted into early 1954,
were the President’s determination to avoid a head-on collision with Republican leaders in the Congress, and his exasperation at their refusal to support him. Bricker needed two-thirds of the Senate to win, but it was not clear that he could be defeated. Broad support came from the
South and Middle West, and from organizations that included the Daughters of the American Revolution and the Vigilant Women for the Bricker Amendment. “If we can’t get thirty-three senators to vote with us,’ Eisenhower asked impatiently, ‘“‘what kind of a team is this?’ 4° Seek-
ing a compromise, he talked at length with Bricker, but found no satisfaction. By the middle of July, Dulles said rather sharply at a cabinet meeting: “We just have to make up our minds and stop being fuzzy about this.” The President replied tartly that he had not been fuzzy: “There was nothing fuzzy in what I told Bricker. I said we'd go just so far and no further.” ‘To which Dulles responded with equal tartness, “I know, sir, but you haven’t told anybody else.” 41 So finally the President went on record declaring himself “‘unalterably opposed” to an amendment which, if passed, ‘““would be notice to our friends as well as our enemies that our country intends to withdraw from its leadership in world affairs.” #2 Despite his great popularity, his intervention had almost
no effect. When the vote was finally taken in early 1954, the Bricker amendment failed of passage by only one vote! Sixty senators voted for it (including thirty-two Republicans and twenty-eight Democrats) and only thirty-one voted against it.
Poli inn olicy Beginnings (PART TWO)
Liberation Is Tested On June 16, 1953, rioting broke out in East Berlin and quickly spread to Halle, Jena, Leipzig and other cities in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany. From the perspective of twenty years, 1t now seems doubtful that vague, even though strident, Republican promises to assist captive peoples on the day of liberation were ever more than a minor motivating factor in producing those acts of supreme courage and supreme folly by angry, desperate East German workers. ‘The evidence is that they began as spontaneous protests against “higher work norms” imposed by the East German authorities, quite possibly against the advice and wishes of the Malenkov regime. The Soviets had themselves just announced several minor concessions to workers, apparently to sweeten public opinion on the eve of the arrival of a new Soviet High Commissioner for East Germany.! Moreover, since Stalin’s death there had been a perceptible relaxation of Soviet policy in the belt of satellite states, attributable to the Malenkov speeches and no doubt to uncertainty on the part of the resident Russian proconsuls as to the plans and intentions of the new ruling group in the Kremlin. Dulles always feared that any evidence of American-Soviet agreement to relax tensions would deepen the discouragement of the captive peoples. But Ambassador Bohlen in Moscow believed it would have precisely the opposite effect: as he reasoned it, the Soviets could not publicly come to terms with the West and at the Same time justify retention of harsh police controls that were ostensibly aimed at protecting “Socialism” from “imperial wreckers, spies and assassins’; he thus thought a relaxation of tensions would stimulate in-
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ternal dissension. It does not seem implausible to argue that the East German rioters drew as much subconscious encouragement from the hope (which proved false) that a new and apparently more tolerant regime in Russia might take their side against an old and intolerable regime in East Germany, as they drew from campaign rhetoric in distant America.
But whatever the causation, the uprising put the Dulles doctrine of liberation to immediate and critical test in the halls of Congress and the chancellories of Western Europe. While brave and angry rioters piled Communist banners on blazing bonfires along the Unter den Linden, broke into Communist jails to free wretched political prisoners, and fought Russian tanks with fists and stones, Washington remained inert. Beyond campaign rhetoric, there was neither strategy nor plan. In twentyfour hours the workers had been ground under and a deathly silence de-
scended. It was all over. While Europe watched and waited with tense anxiety, Washington officially concluded (what all serious observers had known) that no meaningful action was possible without unacceptable risk of general war. After moral protest, Dulles offered $15 million worth of free food, which Molotov contemptuously spurned, calling it a deliberate provocation. Soup kitchens were briefly established in West Berlin for those East Berliners who would come over, but the Russians quickly closed down the traffic. The episode added nothing to Dulles’s reputation
for probity at home or abroad, yet American inaction was in fact the occasion of considerable relief in Western Europe; it encouraged the feeling that, however bombastic his rhetoric, neither Dulles nor President Eisenhower was disposed to rash action in an actual crisis. Moreover, by putting an end to whatever hopes of American support existed in Eastern
Europe, the tragedy gave inadvertent support to the case for a more peaceful evolution. The unfolding of the ill-fated Hungarian rebellion three years later was not much influenced by the prospect of Western support; tragedy there resulted from serious Hungarian miscalculation as to the limits of Russian tolerance.
But the East German riots also threw Dulles onto the defensive with his domestic critics and produced another of those reactions that seemed to combine conviction with heavy layers of political self-protection. He now argued that the Soviet empire was seething with restlessness and turmoil, and that steady Western pressure upon an uncertain, mutually distrustful leadership group could break the Kremlin’s control or force it to a series of formal accommodations with the West. He took the July announcement of Lavrenti Beria’s summary execution as a sign that “freedom is again in the air. A new convulsion is underway. The old system may remain and may continue to threaten, but inherent weakness is disclosed.’’? He told a cabinet meeting that “this is the kind of time
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when we ought to be doubling our bets, not reducing them — as all the Western parliaments want to do. This is the time to crowd the enemy — and maybe finish him, once and for all.’ ? Moreover, noth Dulles and his immediate subordinates displayed a tendency to portray these convulsions behind the Iron Curtain as at least the indirect result of their own handiwork. Emmet Hughes recorded a telephone conversation in which Roderic O’Connor told him: ‘Well, this is the time for us to talk it up — remind people how our policy has been getting results right on down the line. Anyone can see, with this business of Beria, that we’re accomplishing everything we said we could with a dynamic policy.” * Stalin’s death, the riots in East Germany, the fall of Beria, and the uneasy new Kremlin leadership were indeed evidence of grave weakness in the Soviet system, but they were also evidence of change, gestation, and the possibility of new direction in policy. Ambassador Bohlen, who arrived in Moscow in April, believed in retrospect that the situation in the spring of 1953 had presented a rare opportunity. There were rumors that the new Russian leaders were considering ‘‘the possibility of giving up East Germany,” ® a piece of information which he felt tended to be confirmed several years later when Khrushchev charged both Malenkov and Beria with plotting
such a policy. Had the West accepted Churchill’s appeal for prompt parley with the Kremlin, Bohlen thought, “this would have been a very fruitful period,” and might have “led to a radical solution in our favor on the German question.” ® He readily acknowledged, however, that such hopeful prospects were less clear at the time. What was clear at the time was Dulles’s firm opposition to any form of détente. Cross-Currents in the Middle East
When Dulles flew off to the Middle East on May g, accompanied by Harold Stassen, the director of mutual security, he seemed to have three purposes in mind: (1) to promote the idea of a Middle East security pact as a barrier to Soviet Communist penetration; (2) to restore a greater measure Of balance and evenhandedness in American policy toward Israel and the Arabs; and (3) to acquaint himself at firsthand with the leaders of the area. Attempts to establish indigenous support for a Middle East command
desired by London and Washington had foundered badly in the last two years of the Truman administration. A British effort, in April 1951, to embody joint defense arrangements and British retention of the military base at Suez in a revision of the 1936 treaty had been rejected by an Egyptian government that was pledged to get Britain out of both Egypt and the Sudan. In September of that year, a British-American working
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eroup had developed another plan. This centered on a Supreme Allied Commander with headquarters in Cairo; he would be British, but high Egyptian officers would participate, the base at Suez would be turned over to Egypt, and all British forces not allocated to the Supreme Commander would be withdrawn. By such means it was hoped to transform the character of remaining British forces from occupiers to defenders. Although the plan was quickly endorsed by several non-Arab nations, including Turkey, it had wholly failed to measure the rising force of Arab nationalism and the Arab inability to perceive any serious Russian threat to the Middle East. When it was presented to Egypt on October 13, Prime Minister Nahas Pasha rejected it without reading it, and two days later moved to abrogate both the 1936 treaty and the Anglo-Sudan condominium. As Dean Acheson later remarked, “Jf ever there was a political stillbirth, this was it.” 7 The British, refusing to accept these proclaimed abrogations, stood fast on the power of their large resident armed force, but guerilla fighting soon broke out in the Suez Canal Zone. And on the following January 26 (1952), mobs incited and led by agents of the government sacked and burned downtown Cairo, killing several dozen Europeans including nine Englishmen who were forced by fire out of the exclusive Turf Club and then slaughtered in the street — this episode came to be known as Black Saturday. Churchill and Eden, who had been returned to power just two months before, warned King Farouk that British forces would move out from their Suez base to reoccupy Cairo and Alexandria if Egypt refused to protect British lives and property. Farouk promptly capitulated. Six months later a group of young Egyptian army officers deposed the jaded monarchy, changed the political order in Egypt without bloodshed, and demanded serious negotiations for British withdrawal. Getting rid of the British was, initially, the most profound commitment of the Nasser revolution.
But ending the British occupation proved to be a difficult and bitter task, for the concern in London focused not only on the tangible problem of how to guarantee passage through the Suez Canal for the oil supplies on which British industry increasingly depended. It extended, particularly among Tory politicians, to the psychological question of British power and prestige, creating dense emotional barriers to acceptance of an orderly reduction and transformation of the British role in the Middle East — and indeed throughout the world. The ensuing Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were hot-tempered, and were played out against a backdrop of intense anti-British feeling in Egypt. Sabotage, thievery, terrorist attacks on British soldiers steadily increased, converting a supposed freeworld operating base into a besieged redoubt and making it abundantly
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clear that, without Egyptian goodwill, the base could only be a heavy liability in time of war. Fundamentally, the West wanted to trade British military evacuation for Egyptian membership in a defense pact that would secure the British right of return to the Suez base in a crisis affecting Western strategic interests. Nasser, on the other hand, was firmly opposed to any Arab pact with the West, although he seemed ready to countenance Western defense arrangements with non-Arab states of the “northern tier” —e.g., Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. He understood that any “outside aggression” must necessarily come from a Communist source, for the West was already present in the Middle East, indeed engaged in the protection of its
lines of communication and its oil investments. In the Arab countries of the “southern tier,”” however, he wanted an Arab pact without Western
participation. In time, as he told Nuri as Said of Iraq, the Arab people might come to understand the need for new defense agreements with Western powers, but first there had to be a period of complete Arab independence.®
Churchill and Eden sought to strengthen their hand by bringing the United States directly into the negotiations, but Nasser stubbornly resisted this, and both Eisenhower and Dulles refused to join the talks without Egyptian consent. Their refusal reflected an instinctive American reluctance to associate U.S. policy with a colonial power in confrontation with a nation aspiring to gain its independence from that power. But a major consideration was also to maintain at least the appearance of primary British responsibility for Western interests in the area. Yet
refusing a larger American role created a certain dilemma, for Dulles believed the Middle East was vulnerable to Communist penetration, and that American counterforce was an essential ingredient of its prevention. In 1953, however, he was still feeling his way through the intricate and treacherous minefield of the Middle East situation. Arriving in Cairo, where he first met with the nominal leader of the junta, General Naguib, he presented him with a plated .38-caliber pistol from President Eisenhower (a gift which, though not an inappropriate offering from one soldier-statesman to another, evoked a wide range of different yet uniformly negative symbolism in Cairo, Tel Aviv and London). At the same time, he took a rather tough pro-British line, telling
the Egyptian leader that Washington desired a settlement satisfactory to both sides, but one that would retain the elaborate military installations at Suez in effective readiness, ‘“‘available for immediate use on be-
half of the free world in the event of future hostilities.” ° Over dinner at the American embassy amid “the usual gold-plated and elegant trappings,” 1° Dulles found, however, that the junta leaders — Naguib, Nasser, Sabry, Sadat, Amer, et al. — were nearly impervious to warnings of Soviet
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Communist menace to the Middle East. They had no illusions that Russia was friendly, but a threat seemed to them remote, far lower on their scale of fears than British imperialism and Israel; as Roderic O’Connor
remarked later, “It was a little hard to get them convinced that they really had to take some steps.” 11 On the record, Egyptian skepticism about the Communist menace seemed understandable. During the 1920s and 19308, Russian diplomatic relations with the Arab world were almost
nonexistent, and the Kremlin treated such bumbling and beleaguered local Communist cells as were formed with almost total indifference; and these made no inroads into Moslem society. Even when diplomatic relations were established after World War II, the Kremlin seemed remark-
ably blind to the advantages of identifying with the emergent anticolonial forces. And during the current negotiations for British withdrawal, the Soviet press was still depicting Nasser as a “Fascist lackey of the West,” castigating his every reluctant concession to the British as a step that would ensure the permanence of British control.1? The Cairo
junta therefore regarded Russian policy as an annoyance, but, with Greece and Turkey in NATO and the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, the idea of a military threat from the north seemed far away.
Dulles appeared to accept the thrust of Egypt’s position during this first trip, although it complicated his felt need to widen the anti-Communist barrier to Soviet expansion southward. In a broadcast on June 1, Shortly after his return, he said that while ‘‘the northern tier of nations shows awareness of the danger,” the Arab countries to the south were far more concerned with their disputes with Israel, Britain, and France.13 This set of facts led him to the conclusion that a regional security system was not an immediate prospect, for any such system would have to “grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger.” 14 And in a private memorandum, he showed an accurate perception of the realities and the limits that these factors imposed on his preferred policy line. Noting that “almost the entire area is caught in a fanatical revolutionary spirit” that was causing local countries to “magnify their immediate problems and depreciate the Soviet threat,’ he concluded that “we must accept the fact that the political situation is such that Arab states will not, at this time, openly join defense arrangements with a combina-
tion of Western powers.” * The memorandum added bleakly that the
British and French positions in the area had probably deteriorated beyond the point of repair, and that the “Israeli factor” plus the Arab tendency to link the United States with the colonial policies of European states were “millstones around our neck.’ '° From this analysis, he drew the wise conclusion that it was necessary to “avoid becoming fascinated
with concepts that have no reality.” 17 Yet a year later, when he was fresh from exhilarating efforts to bring the Southeast Asian Treaty Or-
184 POLICY BEGINNINGS (PART TWO)
ganization into being and to rebuff the Chinese Communists at Quemoy, he sent a new ambassador to Iraq with special instructions to see what could be done to promote Iraqi adherence to a northern tier pact.'® Israel
Also high on Dulles’s list of Middle East objectives was a desire to restore a greater measure of evenhandedness to American policy toward
Israel and the Arabs. The Truman administration, he thought, had “gone overboard in favor of Israel,’ 19 through a combination of Zionist pressure and personal preference, and he was resolved to restore the balance, encouraged by the fact that Eisenhower’s victory had not depended in any important sense on the American Jewish vote. The Israeli leader, David Ben-Gurion, thus received him in Tel Aviv with a mixture of hope and apprehension, but apparently paid lip service to the new thesis, for Dulles was able to say in his televised report of June 1 that “the leaders in Israel themselves agreed with us that United States policies should be impartial so as to win not only the respect and regard of the Israeli but also of the Arab peoples.” 7° In truth, however, the Israeli leaders were not at all receptive to the idea that their influence in Washington should be diluted, as they were
soon to make plain in word and deed. And as time passed, the Dulles shift seemed more apparent than real. As Abba Eban, then Israeli ambassador to Washington, later reflected on this phenomenon, the Eisenhower administration in 1953 was characterized by “a certain reluctance to confess that American policy anywhere was a continuation of what it was before. . . . Everything had either to be different, or one had to pretend that it was different.” 2! From Dulles came “certain moralistic and virtuous assertions that American foreign policy would not be influenced by internal considerations, that the Arab interest would be upgraded, that Israel would be looked after, but downgraded. . . . Nothing very much
came of it in terms of fact . . . but there was substantial misyudgment and a deep psychological error in the talk of change. It gave the Israeli public the impression that American friendship for Israel had been a fleeting and accidental circumstance of history, linked organically with the Truman administration.” ?? The resulting uncertainty produced a sense of isolation in Israel which led in turn to a posture of militant selfreliance, finding expression in “‘a very active policy of retaliation on the frontiers.”’ 25
But if Dulles’s earnest efforts, in 1953 and later — to allay Arab resent-
ment against the United States without at the same time abandoning Israel — fell short of his hopes, the central difficulty lay in the impossibil-
POLICY BEGINNINGS (PART TWO) 185
ity of the task. From the day of Israel’s creation, the Middle East was riven
beyond foreseeable repair; and the United States, having sponsored and supported Israel, yet having undeniable economic interests in the Arab countries, could not subsequently find a policy that met with the acceptance of both parties. The Arab-Israeli struggle proved too bitterly irrational for evenhanded compromise.
Ending the Korean War An immediate goal for Eisenhower and Dulles was ending the Korean War. It had run on for two and a half years when the new administration entered office and its high cost in human life, money, and societal disruption had contributed in a major way to Eisenhower’s victory. But now the problem was his, and it needed prompt solution, for its debilitating inconclusiveness continued to fuel the wild demagoguery of McCarthyism. Eisenhower was firmly decided against any attempt to ‘“‘win’” the Korean
struggle, but his military experience told him that an honorable compromise depended on convincing his adversaries that the United States under his leadership was prepared to intensify the fighting unless a satisfactory settlement were promptly reached. By a combination of words and deeds
— the “unleashing” order to the Seventh Fleet, disclosure of plans to enlarge the South Korean army, the dispatch of more American airpower to Korea, the placement of nuclear missiles on Okinawa — he and Dulles set out to persuade the other side that this was indeed the U.S. posture. On the continuing leg of his Middle East-South Asian trip, Dulles visited
India on May 22 and is said to have quietly passed the word through Nehru to Chou En-lai that, failing an early settlement, the United States would bomb the Manchurian sanctuaries north of the Yalu River. By late March, the ice jam at the negotiating table in Panmunjom had begun to show signs of breaking up, a development perhaps attributable as much to Stalin’s death as to the combination of threats from Washington. On March 28, the Communist side accepted a long-standing
UN proposal for the exchange of all sick and wounded prisoners, and two days later Chou En-lai advanced a formula to accommodate Western insistence on the principle of nonforcible repatriation: those prisoners refusing to go home could be handed over to a neutral state. Negotiations moved forward until by late May the United Nations was ready to state its “final offer’ for a settlement. But the idea of any compromise was hemlock to Syngman Rhee, the Princeton-educated, Christian septuagenarian who still ruled South Korea.
He informed Eisenhower that he could accept an armistice only if he had an ironclad American promise to resume the war, should the unifi-
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y ithi et days Fisenhower vouitbhe nee nN ete n | n e war invoives ging misery that other |O } Iof “clear abandonment o ar witn a tne ; 1 t reflectin ed. truce met that h test. r e fruits of agg secu , ere ettmo V | ee V unification 1teral 1 b eaceful means. aTo Korean utthe V dseventy-eig these entreaties. nee€ 1 ee reruse . Wh h a a . osing . ment onlators the pnego iatl his itternes n the ni y dramatic act of sabotage. O a 7 North 1attered efused repatr y Yrs Wno on, an c Korean prisone , fles dic a over b ded D ulles d delicate an ks d dan erous, situation. y in y tenl ugh old ou K | nom : | I d talked him‘ j hen, after Rhee ha and frustration. ’2 ; poured out his anger ates e,ate ou 1 State 2 bertamaae itfull pial wa om for € § ; truce. ; -. equen O ile ower b itl ce ea en V be itl achie rence Pp within nin tion of Korea not “at ’s reply argued that Pp we would J; ieved b olitical confe
o
e
proved willing to sign an agr e
r ? 24 hou ht the pr Pp y he promised a bila
ct, ru Yr
d every effort to achieve y -year-O
| theless unjom none
signed a June agree
isoner repatriation 1ssue, ed m to ight of June 18, he released n K
V th Korea. A d pa ched Assistant 1Secretary Robertson to y he b € a ion. Robertson spent nearl
pa ent and mpathetic listenin tne to orean .J
de 1 lain that the Unite
Se ; e WwW lV I su ort to South Kore d Or if at a subs g t p litical con .
POLICY BEGINNINGS (PART TWO) 187
wanted Rhee’s promise to keep South Korean forces under UN command
and to avoid any act of obstruction. With persistence and southern charm, Robertson persuaded Rhee to trust Eisenhower and Dulles and accept the U.S. position. The Chinese Communists, while they denounced Rhee’s sabotage, declined to use the incident as a basis for breaking off negotiations. Ihey too wanted an agreement.
Rhee’s stand was, however, supported by a number of Republican leaders in the Congress whose uncomplicated purpose had now become the overthrow of the Peking regime and the restoration of Chiang Kaishek, and who saw in a Korean compromise a measurable victory for Mao and a serious danger that UN membership for Communist China would shortly follow. Senator Knowland thought that acquiescence in a divided Korea would mean a truce without honor, and that “inevitably we will lose the balance of Asia.” Senator Taft found the prospective settlement “‘extremely unsatisfactory,’ because it would leave the Chinese
free to attack elsewhere.?> But Eisenhower was firmly resolved on a Korean truce, and the American people seemed to recognize the larger wisdom of his course. The armistice was finally signed on July 26. It was
promptly followed by a declaration that reflected the new, but as yet unannounced, FEisenhower-Dulles doctrine of deterrence. Issued in the name of the sixteen nations who had fought for the United Nations, but sounding like Dulles, it warned that the consequence of any renewed ageression on the Korean peninsula “would be so grave that in all probability it would not be possible to confine hostilities to Korea.” The Big Bermuda
After the middle months of Sturm und Drang in East Germany and Korea, Dulles’s attention in late 1953 shifted back to the issues of EDC
and a parley with the Russians. In order to advance the prospects of EDC in France, give support to Adenauer’s election in West Germany, and avoid undue strain on the Anglo-American tie, he had compromised his opposition to Soviet talks at any level, but he continued to resist the idea of a summit conference. October found him in London, explaining to the Prime Minister that President Eisenhower, beset by the widely diverse duties devolving upon him under the American Constitution, could not afford to be away from Washington for an extended period; moreover, EDC must be ratified first. Churchill, who was irritated by this line, said he might meet alone with Malenkov, to which Dulles replied that such a move would give the American people the unfortunate im-
pression that Britain was shifting from ally to intermediary. In spite of this somewhat disagreeable exchange, he departed London with the
188 POLICY BEGINNINGS (PART TWO)
impression that neither Eden nor Salisbury, who had been present, were enthusiastic supporters of a summit conference.¢ The Western heads of state finally met in Bermuda in early December, with Winston Churchill, a “visibly enfeebled figure, housing a visibly unenfeebled spirit,” ?”7 in the role of host. Eden was physically recovered and on hand. The French team was composed of Premier Laniel and Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, but Laniel spent much of the conference in bed with a cold (real or diplomatic), leaving the burden of presenting the French case to the brilliant and courageous, but erratic, former hero of the underground and former professor of philosophy. ‘The talks covered four or five subjects, of which the most consequential was EDC. Here Bidault, in the presence of Laniel and several other ministers in the precarious new French coalition, set forth at great length the French conditions and misgivings. It was a brief that depressed his allies by its profound negation. Not only, he told Eisenhower and Church-
ill, must West Germany permanently accept the Saar territory as an autonomous political state under French economic control, but American and British ground forces must remain in Europe at substantially their present strength for twenty years. When Eisenhower and Churchill promptly protested that such a guarantee of their forces was not possible,
Bidault replied that without it the EDC treaty stood no chance of approval by the French Assembly. A point that struck Bidault’s listeners
was his repeated reference to the “humiliating sacrifice’ involved for France in integrating her forces with those of a long-standing enemy, a “sacrifice” that the EDC protocols demanded only of France, among the Western Big ‘Three.”®
Churchill’s response noted, with characteristic candor, that the underlying theme of Bidault’s whole presentation was French fear that Germany would dominate EDC. He did not share Bidault’s pessimism, he said, for under the EDC protocol Germany would have neither a complete military force nor the industrial means of its support. Still, he was convinced there must be a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe; only that could give adequate strength and geographic depth to the NATO military position. He was astonished, he said, that Bidault should speak in such negative, defeatist terms, for surely EDC was an alternative preferable to a national German army. EDC must therefore be accepted; if it were not, he would urge national German rearmament as a measure indispensable to the safety of the West. Eisenhower supported Churchill, adding that “EDC would function effectively as a part of NATO.” But it proved impossible to modify Bidault’s position, and the French refusal to confront the inexorable alternative cast a pall over the proceedings.*°
Discussion aside, the only action taken at Bermuda was a note to the
POLICY BEGINNINGS (PART TWO) 189
USSR agreeing to January talks in Berlin. The Western leaders were prepared to hold such a conference, at the Foreign Minister level and provided the agenda was confined to Germany and Austria. Eisenhower explained to his colleagues that the United States would also insist on the exclusion of Communist China from both the conference table and the United Nations until the Mao regime met a number of moral and political-military conditions. These were: withdrawal of Chinese forces from Korea, cessation of support for the anti-French rebellion in Indochina, abandonment of the military threat to Formosa, and adoption of “decent deportment” in contacts with the West.*° These unrealistic demands, reflecting the administration’s strong disinclination to challenge the rampant prejudices and presumed power of the Republican right wing, reflected no less Dulles’s own determination to pursue a policy of
pressure in Asia, unembarrassed by any serious prospect of a general Asian settlement. The President’s brave speech of April 16 seemed far away. Recognizing the categorical nature of the American position on this issue, Britain and France did not press their differences. This first postwar meeting of the Western heads of state does not rank as either very notable or consequential. For one thing, its news value was immediately eclipsed by Eisenhower's dramatic “Atoms for Peace’ pro-
posal to the United Nations, which he flew directly from Bermuda to deliver before the General Assembly on December 8. For another, it was further overshadowed, two weeks later, by Dulles’s public warning that the United States could not avoid an “agonizing reappraisal” of its basic commitments in Europe if EDC were not soon ratified. Clearly exasperated by the French performance at Bermuda and now gathering his full
stride at the end of an arduous yet exhilarating first year in office, he moved on the mistaken assumption that he could frighten the French into enlightened behavior. According to CBS news sources in Paris, the Dulles move was a “calculated political risk” which recognized and accepted the dangers of an emotional French reaction.*! It was also a_performance that rather perfectly reflected Dulles’s particular blend of qualities — a persistent sense of tactical urgency, a strong impulse to act, a stubborn will placed in the service of a genuine idealism, too much logic,
too little intuition, and an almost total absence of empathy. His threat exploded like a bomb at the NATO Council where he delivered it, and quickly raised a mushroom cloud of infuriated protest from Frenchmen in every walk of life. Senator Michel Debré, who was later to be Premier in De Gaulle’s government, set the tone with his charge of “intolerable interference in internal French affairs.” 32 Bidault, who acknowledged that Dulles had grounds for anger at the skittish unreliability of the French Assembly, said privately: “But what a thing to say to me, when I was doing everything conceivable” to obtain ratification.*3
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On the other hand, the aging vice-premier, Paul Reynaud, thought Dulles “spoke the truth” and was “perfectly justified.” 34
It is unlikely that any tactic, any form or combination of threat or inducement, could then or later have brought the French Assembly to approval of EDC. The trauma of defeat in 1940 had produced a national
malaise too deep and too complicated to permit a rational response. If anything, the prospect for ratification was to grow worse in 1954, when
France faced the bitterness of defeat and humiliation in Indochina. But when EDC was finally defeated eight months later, and there ensued no basic American reappraisal, agonizing or otherwise, Dulles merely added to his reputation for making hollow threats. Despite its seeming inconsequence, however, the Bermuda meeting recorded a tentative new Western consensus that an old era had ended and a new one begun. In its quiet assessment that “‘the danger of aggression now seems less imminent,” the conference communiqué seemed to confirm the world’s arrival at a new stage in the cold war. The immediate postwar fear had been that Western Europe would succumb to local Communist penetration supported by the threat of Russian invasion; that fear had been surmounted by the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and NATO. In 1950 the attack on South Korea raised the new fear that “International Communism’ would now use open force at many confrontation points; this fear had been relieved by valiant collective response in Korea, the dispatch of U.S. forces to Europe, and the swift arming of NATO. Stalin’s death and the armistice in Korea now seemed to usher in a declining sense of apocalypse. And although Dulles deplored and feared the implications of even partial relaxation, there was widening evidence at the end of 1953 that the world was beginning to breathe normally again for the first time in many years.
M ° ° ° assive Retaliation and the New Look HE “NEW LOOK” POSTURE took its name from a 1953 reexamination
of military policy by a newly appointed group of military chiefs of staff. It was later applied not only to this analysis, but to the substance of a modified grand strategy which emphasized the threat of nuclear punishment against centers of Communist power and deemphasized localized efforts to block or contain Communism’s expansionist tendencies. It was the product of two compelling impulses of the new administration: to save money, and to regain control of an American policy that was perceived to have become largely a reflexive reaction to Communist initiative. In Greece and Turkey, in Berlin, in Korea, the Communists had precipitated crisis, forcing a hasty, costly, disruptive Ameri-
can response. The new men were determined to put an end to such humiliation and discomfort. As he entered office, Eisenhower seemed
overridingly concerned with the danger that he might inadvertently spend the country into bankruptcy; at the same time, he shared Admiral
Radford’s instinct that the major part of American military forces abroad should be drawn back from their far-flung outposts into a strong home-based reserve, and that the United States should henceforward guard against violent change across the world by placing more reliance on threatened American action and less on the physical presence of American forces. As both men were aware, such military redeployments were necessary concomitants of serious budget reduction. Dulles, who fully shared both the budgetary and strategic impulses, had been a persuasive force in the development of Eisenhower’s outlook. In his Life article of May 1952 * (which was in substance the memoran* “A Policy of Boldness.”’
192 MASSIVE RETALIATION AND THE NEW LOOK
dum he had sent to Eisenhower a few months before), he complained
that, in response to the Communist “strategy of encirclement and strangulation,” the Truman administration had “adopted a series of emergency measures which are fantastically costly not only in money but in their warping of our American way of life.” Present “negative
policies . . . will never end the peril nor bring relief from the exertions which devour our economic, political and moral vitals.” 1 The only escape from a fatal treadmill was to develop ‘community punishing power,’ the means “‘to hit with shattering effectiveness the sources of power and lines of communication of the Sovietized world.” 2 Yet there was here something of a paradox, for despite the deliberate schrechklichkeit, Dulles was, on the record, philosophically opposed to war and also something of an antimilitarist, convinced that a steady growth of military expenditures must inexorably produce a disturbing increase of military influence in the life of the nation. In 1950, when the defense budget stood at a level of $13.5 billion,* he feared “‘we have gone militaristic.” And in his book War or Peace, he had warned against the tendencies of military leaders both to enlarge their own establishments and to encroach upon foreign policy. “Military advice is professional advice” and “naturally and properly, they advise full insurance,” but “it is not their business to measure the resources of diplomacy.” 3 It is “always tempting to accede to military requests because they take
a tangible, concrete form. You can see guns, battleships, airplanes, bases. . . . On the other side are intangibles, things not seen. In reality, these are vitally important.” * The arms race is “very exciting,’ but precisely for that reason there is danger that the military men who must follow it closely will “lose their sense of proportion.” 5 He noted admiringly that Soviet political leaders were never “‘overawed by military advice,’ nor were their tactics dominated by military considerations.® These expressions of undoubted conviction help to throw needed
light on Dulles’s real attitudes toward nuclear deterrence. What he evidently sought was a military posture sufficiently powerful to support
an effective warning to those who dared pursue a course of violent change in the world, yet sufficiently moderate in cost and size to avoid the adverse economic and political implications he feared. It would be
incorrect to suggest that he was unwilling to use force, particularly against an opponent of secondary strength like Communist China. At the same time, the evidence suggests that because he abhorred war and had concluded from his study of Marxism-Leninism that the leaders in the Kremlin would not risk destruction of their home base for the sake of peripheral expansion, he regarded the nuclear strike force more as * Compared to $78 billion in 1970.
MASSIVE RETALIATION AND THE NEW LOOK 193
a political instrument to brandish than as a military force to use. That his listeners, particularly in the free nations he sought to protect, could not fully share this perspective, but were bound to examine the appalling implications for them should deterrence fail, seems in the main not to have occurred to him. A Bigger Bang for a Buck
The driving force in the “New Look” planning was a determination to reduce military spending. Coming into office, Eisenhower inherited a military budget of about $42 billion,* as well as a paper (NSC-141) prepared by Acheson, Lovett, and Harriman which proposed an additional $7 billion to $9 billion in defense expenditures, mainly for an improved air defense against the growing Soviet capacity to attack the United States with bombers carrying nuclear weapons. With the Secretary of the Treasury leading the way, but reinforced by considerable pressure from Senator Taft, the figure for the new fiscal year (beginning July 1, 1953) was pared down to $36 billion, a reduction accomplished primarily by deferring certain long-range financing for air force procurement, and by lowering the somewhat abstract force goal for that service from 143 to 120 wings. Critics like Senator Stuart Symington charged that the new administration was effecting a dangerous “stretch-out” in the buildup of air power, but the economy mood in the Congress not
only sustained the President, but resulted in further defense budget reductions — down to $34.5 billion. On April go, the President also announced a “radical” change in the approach to defense planning. It involved rejection of the idea that “we must build up to a maximum attainable strength for some specific date”
on the assumption that the Soviets intended to go to war at the theoretical peak point in their own military development.’ ‘Defense is not a matter of maximum strength for a single date,” he said, but rather a matter for the “long haul,’ meaning that military programs should be stabilized at a level which the economy could sustain for many years
without serious strain.’ The presumed antithesis of the “long haul” idea was the concept of the “crisis year,’ a term that had appeared in studies made during the Truman period (especially in NSC-68, a comprehensive reassessment of the American security position prepared by the State and Defense Departments in late 1949 following the first Soviet nuclear explosion). NSC-68 had argued that by 1954 the Soviets would
probably achieve the capability of launching a devastating nuclear *In “new obligational authority”; the actual spending level was slightly higher.
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attack on the United States, a fact that would neutralize the existing American nuclear advantage. Thus, 1954 would be the year in which the Soviets might take advantage of their great superiority in conventional forces; it would be a “crisis year’? unless America and the West moved, before that date, to redress the balance in conventional forces. However, the sponsors of NSC-68 had proposed not a vast and precipitous military mobilization, but rather a moderate and balanced strength-
ening of forces that could be sustained indefinitely after the “crisis year.” As General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in 1949: “Our way toward security lies not in any sudden burst of activity, but in the steady, unwavering, purposeful application of energy over a long period of years. .. . We are in for a long pull.” ® While the sudden onset of the Korean War severely upset this deliberate
approach, producing a swift and somewhat open-ended mobilization, still the Eisenhower “long haul’ was not so radical a shift from the “long pull” as the administration supposed it to be. Also in late April 1953, Senator Taft and other powerful Republicans in Congress urged the immediate appointment of a new set of military chiefs, a recommendation reflecting their conviction that the holdovers in the Pentagon were deeply imbued with the Truman-Acheson policies and thus bound to resist new departures in military policy. General Bradley had publicly scorned Taft’s “Gibraltar theory of defense,” and his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed to the Republicans wholly oriented toward a Europe-first policy. As a result of these strong representations, Eisenhower was persuaded to appoint new chiefs in early May, and to put them to work on defining future policy about four months before they would assume full responsibility as chiefs of their respective services. Defense Secretary Wilson obtained Taft’s approval of all the names over whiskey and soda in the latter’s apartment in the Wardman Park.?° Thus Admiral Radford (as chairman) and General Ridgway, Admiral Robert Carney, and General Nathan Twining (as chiefs of army, navy and air force) became the new Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Radford appointment in particular went a long way toward satisfying GOP complaints of an excessively Europe-first orientation, for the dashing, articulate naval commander (whose maxim as a carrier
admiral in the war against Japan had been “kill the bastards scientifically’) advocated a “‘strong’’ and “positive” policy toward China, and was known to favor primary reliance on air and sea power. The President promptly put the new group to work on the next year’s military budget (to take effect on July 1, 1954), instructing them to make their study without benefit of staff and enjoining them to strike a proper balance between an ideal military posture and the danger of economic bankruptcy. It was quite untraditional to ask military men to consider
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factors outside their area of professional concern, but Eisenhower stressed his desire for personal views based on broad and varied experience. He did not want an exhaustive military staff study. Moreover, he wanted no “split papers,” only unanimous decisions." Concurrently, the President launched a reexamination of basic politi-
cal-military strategy, a study that came to be known as “Operation Solarium” (for the White House sunroom where he met on May 8 with Bedell Smith, Allen Dulles, C. D. Jackson, and Robert Cutler, to define the problem). This involved the creation of separate task forces to examine three possible approaches: (1) whether to continue the “containment” strategy essentially as pursued by the Truman administration;
(2) whether to “draw a line” between the Soviet orbit and the free nations, and warn the Kremlin that it ran severe risks if it dared to move across the line; or (3) whether to adopt a serious “liberation” strategy based on a vigorous program of psychological, political, economic and paramilitary measures. By October (and having the benefit of several important intervening events —1.e., the Korean armistice, the unsuccessful East German uprising, and the Soviet detonation of a hydrogen bomb), the senior planners essentially confirmed the validity of “containment” with the understanding that American air-nuclear deterrent power might play a somewhat larger role in containing proxy insurgencies in the unstable Third World. The alternative of “liberation” was firmly rejected.12 Robert Bowie represented Dulles and the State Department on the senior staff group that reached these conclusions. As the new military chiefs analyzed the related problems of military force composition and cost, they found themselves working in an atmosphere of rising expectations for budgetary savings. The Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey, who wanted both a balanced budget and a tax cut in February 1955, had established a savings target of $12 billion and was expecting to obtain at least half of this from cuts in defense spending. Eisenhower also wanted a balanced budget, but was unwilling to cut deeply into defense in order to achieve it. Nevertheless, he judged that the end of the Korean War should produce significant savings in manpower and hence in money. This consequential process came to a
kind of climax on October 13 at a meeting of the National Security Council, at which Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford presented their conclusions. Their estimated requirement for the new fiscal year was $35 billion in “‘new obligational authority,” or $500 million more
than the sum finally appropriated for the then current year. To this conclusion Humphrey reacted with “surprise and dismay,’ as he had anticipated a figure of about $30 billion; the President was also disappointed.'? Meeting this decidedly cool reaction, Radford then undertook to argue that the desired economies might well be feasible if the basis
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for military planning were more sharply defined — that is, if, instead of having to develop forces for a wide range of contingencies (all-out nuclear war, conventional general war, limited nuclear war, and limited conventional war), the Joint Chiefs of Staff were allowed to make plans
on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used whenever it was technologically advantageous to do so. No decision was taken at the October 13 meeting, but these remarks of Radford’s were soon to become
the heart of the “New Look” doctrine and the official rationale for
manpower reductions in the army and navy.'# On October 30, the President approved a new paper (NSC-162/2) which approved the planning assumption that nuclear weapons would be used in limited war situations. While such situations were not defined, the implication was that they included potential conflicts in which the United States would previously have used moderate-to-large-scale conventional forces —e.g., Korea. The President retained in his own hands sole authority to order the use of nuclear weapons, but the new planning guidance had the effect of stimulating the development of “tactical”
nuclear weapons and of operational doctrine for their use in a wide variety of contingent situations; it also had the effect of virtually foreclosing the army and navy from establishing requirements for manpower and equipment on the assumption that the United States would have to fight a sustained and large-scale conventional war. Impassioned and cogent, but unavailing, protests came from General Ridgway, the Army Chief of Staff, and from Robert Anderson, the Secretary of the Navy. They argued that, faced with an impending neutralization of American nuclear forces (owing to the growth of Soviet nuclear power), it was dangerous to base the security of American interests so heavily on the
narrow doctrine of nuclear retaliation. The official rejoinder by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roger Keyes, was a dubious, technologically
inspired assertion that the nation must “have the courage to discard the outmoded procedures and weapons which no longer serve more than tradition.” 1° And the Secretary of the Treasury applied the budget-
ary clincher: “There would be no defense,” he declared, but only “disaster in a military program that scorned the resources and problems of our economy — erecting majestic defenses and battlements for the protection of a country that was bankrupt.” *° The ‘New Look” was thus, in its essence, a military posture based not upon a rigorous analysis of enemy capabilities (present or potential) nor even of enemy intentions; it grew out of domestic considerations of economy and _ political-psychological preference. It consisted, first and
foremost, of a presidential decision to plan for the use of nuclear weapons in situations short of all-out war (though it involved no absolute increase in American nuclear striking power). Its philosophy was
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to accept greater destructiveness in war in return for a lower cost in the preparation for war. The “Massive Retaliation” Speech
Dulles played only a small role in the detailed debate leading to the
new posture, particularly with respect to its military logic and the question of whether or not it would seriously weaken the American capability to fight limited, ‘“‘brush-fire’ wars. In part, his limited participation simply reflected his nonmilitary background and his preoccupation with foreign affairs, but it also reflected his concentration on the ‘deterrent’ as distinguished from the “war fighting” aspects of the doctrine — that is to say, on the political as distinct from the military problem.
It was characteristic of his approach that he did not often find it necessary to think about military matters beyond the problem of devising and issuing political warnings. All through his tenure as Secretary of State, he displayed a broadly uncritical acceptance of Pentagon representations as to what American armed forces could or could not do — a tendency that dismayed his senior staff assistants, like Robert Bowie, who felt that Radford seriously misled him with assurances that tactical nuclear weapons were only “moderate” in their destructiveness and that American conventional forces were ‘‘adequate’”’ for a range of contingent
situations in which the use of even small nuclear weapons would be appallingly inappropriate. In part, Dulles’s aloofness from military detail reflected a simple lack of interest; in part, it seemed a piece of calculated political prudence. As Dulles reasoned it, according to Bowie, the President was a military expert whereas he was not; thus, an effort on his part to debate military issues with Eisenhower could only reveal Eisenhower's greater understanding; this in turn would tend to diminish
Eisenhower’s respect for Dulles’s judgment—a diminution which might extend beyond military affairs into the domain of foreign policy. For the same reason—a concern to maintain preeminence in his own domain — Dulles generally declined to cross swords with Radford and the Pentagon on technical military issues.%7
Nevertheless it fell to Dulles, by inadvertence or design, to make the first, most inclusive and most dramatic announcement of the new mili-
tary strategy —on January 12, 1954, In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations. Previously, Dulles told his audience, he had spoken
of “‘various parts of our foreign policy’; on this occasion he would present the ‘over-all view of those policies which relate to security.” 1° What followed was a terse, choppy lawyer’s brief, faithful to fact in its
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description of the considerations set out in NSC-162/2, but giving that document a more dramatic interpretation than its framers had intended. It was also a strikingly personal interpretation, for the threat of nuclear retaliation was couched, almost verbatim, in the vivid language of his 1952 article in Life
There was some good in past policies, the Secretary said, but “we need to recall that what we did was in the main emergency action, imposed on us by our enemies. . . . Emergency measures are costly, they are superficial and they imply that the enemy has the initiative.” The new aim, he said, must be to make collective security more effective and less costly “by placing more reliance on deterrent power, and less dependence on local defensive power.” Local defense must be reinforced by “the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.” He then briefly
traced the transition from the old to the new posture: “So long as our basic policy concepts were unclear, our military leaders could not be selective in building our military power. If an enemy could pick his time and place and method of warfare — and if our policy was to remain the traditional one of meeting aggression by direct and local opposition — then we needed to be ready to fight in the arctic and in the tropics;
in Asia, the Near East and in Europe; by sea, by land and by air; with old weapons and with new weapons.”’ But all this had now been changed by reason of the President’s having taken ‘“‘some basic policy decisions.”
The “basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing,” for that “permits Of a selection of military means instead of a multiplication of means.” 19
It seems doubtful that Dulles was fully aware of the difficulties he faced in making a persuasive case for the new doctrine; more likely, its virtues were to him self-evident, but if he did recognize vulnerable points he trusted to his own powers of advocacy to shore them up or make them disappear. In any event, his text revealed itself as an advocate’s pleading, more declaration than analysis, and carefully avoiding logical weaknesses
and awkward questions. It concentrated, for example, entirely on what the United States could do to the enemy, and ignored both what the enemy might do in return and what this would mean to people and nations located near the point of nuclear conflict. Thus it failed to mention that the Soviets also possessed nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, or that their capability was steadily growing. Nor did it try to anticipate the question of whether or not it was reasonable for the world to assume that the United States would “instantly” apply maximum destructive power to any breach of the peace wherever it might occur, knowing the Soviets could respond in kind against European or American
cities. The failure in this respect was probably another example of
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Dulles’s chronic trouble in dealing with multiple audiences. The speech was written as a stern warning to the Kremlin; unfortunately, the rest of the world was listening in. The speech also revealed the strong unilateral, quasi-isolationist strain in the outlook of the new administration. In declaring that American
military action would be “by means and at places of our choosing,’ Dulles served notice that whatever the complexities of treaty obligations
and alliance politics, the United States reserved the right to act alone and would no longer tolerate a situation wherein the Soviets, by creating a provocation through a satellite, could commit America to inconclusive collective action. Showing through the argument for greater reliance on “massive retaliatory power” was a yearning to disengage from complexity, while at the same time continuing to exercise a dominant influence. And beyond this discernible unilateralism, at least one passage seemed to reflect Dulles’s personal zeal for a sort of “‘pacifist reform” of the interna-
tional system (which had its roots, certainly not in NSC-162/2, but in Woodrow Wilson and in Dulles’s first book, War, Peace and Change). It implied accepting for the United States the role of world policeman, but
to give this conception a logical framework, he found it necessary to define the world as if it were a homogeneous community. Thus, he argued
that maintenance of a central deterrent power “is accepted practice so far as local communities are concerned. We keep locks on our doors; but we do not have an armed guard in every home. We rely principally upon a community security system so well equipped to punish any who break in and steal that, in fact, would-be aggressors are generally deterred.” That, he argued, was the “modern” way to get “maximum protection at a bearable cost.?° It was neither a happy nor an apt analogy. Reaction
The Dulles theory of deterrence (as previously propounded) had possessed one overriding aim: to make United States intentions “‘crystal clear,” so that a “potential aggressor’ would not “miscalculate” the certainty and the strength of the American response. Perhaps the deepest irony of the January 12 speech was that its net effect was to compound the ambiguities for friend and foe alike. No doubt, in addressing the Soviets, a measure of ambiguity had its uses, but the speech failed to define any single area, interest or objective which the United States would definitely defend, with nuclear weapons or otherwise; at the same
time it broadly implied that the new policy extended the prospect of instant nuclear retaliation well beyond the agreed NATO commitment to the farthest fringe areas of Asia. Public reaction was thus not sur-
200 MASSIVE RETALIATION AND THE NEW LOOK
prisingly an uproar of confusion, consternation and disbelief. While the speech did contain a few caveats (“Local defense will always be impor-
tant’), the press and public read it either as the serious intent of the U.S. government to transform every border incident into a nuclear show-
down, or else as a glaringly transparent bluff that would (by proving wholly inapplicable to the task of guiding revolutionary change in the fringe areas) serve to weaken the credibility of American policy everywhere. The tactical advocate had loosed a verbal rocket at the Kremlin, but the side effects spread psychological devastation in a hundred other capitals. All the logical weaknesses of the doctrine, all the awkward questions, which his presentation had consciously or unconsciously pushed under the rug, were now embarrassingly thrown up to the administration in a thousand protests. A hasty and endless attempt was made to answer them, which led Walter Lippmann to the comment that “official explana-
tions of the new look have become so voluminous that it is almost a career in itself to keep up with them.” ?1 Dulles’s law partner, Eustace Seligman, later put his finger on the psychological flaw in the doctrine with a disarming and innocent candor: Dulles “felt that the ideal way of preventing another war would be for us to have such a powerful aviation force with nuclear weapons that no other country would dare to start a war. . . . Of course, it subsequently proved that the weakness was that nobody took the threat seriously. And in so far as they did take it seriously, our allies got very worried that we might start a nuclear war without their approval — so we were caught between those who were afraid we'd do it, and those who didn’t believe we would.” 22 Thrown once more on the defensive, Dulles published (on March 16 in Foreign Affairs) a heavily qualified version of his thesis. This acknowledged that “massive atomic and thermonuclear retaliation is not the kind of power which could most usefully be evoked under all circumstances’; ?8
it also denied that, in the event of “a Communist attack somewhere in Asia, atom or hydrogen bombs will necessarily be dropped on the great industrial centers of China or Russia.” #4 Nevertheless, reflecting the basic policy decision (NSC-162/2), it insisted that should the free world attempt
to “match the potential [of the] Communist forces, man for man and tank for tank . . . 1t could bankrupt itself and not achieve security over a sustained period.” ?> A “better strategy for its defense’ must be devised by the free world, based upon “‘its own special assets’ of air and naval power and atomic weapons; “imaginative use’’ must be made of these for deterrent purposes, with the aim of building ‘‘a system in which local defensive strength is reinforced by more mobile deterrent power.” 2° ‘This
far more careful formulation of the ‘““New Look” suggested that it was much closer to the original intent of the Eisenhower decision. There are times when style makes all the difference. Stentorian warnings appeared
MASSIVE RETALIATION AND THE NEW LOOK 201
to be a compulsive element of the Dulles theory of deterrence. Eisenhower, on the other hand, tended to view the nuclear force as a quietly unassailable backdrop whose relation to policy should be rather more subtly communicated. He had ordered the phrase “retaliatory striking power” deleted from the GOP platform in 1952, and presumably he felt at least as great a distaste for ‘“‘massive retaliatory power,’ which was Dulles’s current phrase. It is interesting to imagine how the doctrine might have emerged if he himself had chosen to announce and explain it. The difference probably would have been notable. Yet he presumably approved the Dulles presentation. After all the explanations and qualifying amendments were in, Lippmann commented that, while the words of the Dulles speech ‘‘convey the impression that something momentous and novel has been decided,” the
sum of the subsequent comments by the military chiefs and by Dulles himself nevertheless “make it plain that there has been no radical change in our strategy policy.” ?7 This was broadly speaking an accurate statement, but it was not quite precise to imply that nothing had changed. The “New Look” did involve a deliberate shift toward greater emphasis on nuclear warning, and this did have a marked effect on the administration’s attitude and approach to possible conflict and “crisis management.”” Moreover, it greatly influenced military planning and the composition of U.S. armed forces (stimulating development of small nuclear weapons and their supporting operational doctrines, and discouraging consideration of non-nuclear weapons, forces and techniques). The effect was to make the United States progressively dependent on a nuclear capability it could not safely or rationally use, and at the same time to deny it a confident capability for engaging in limited conventional war. From the perspective of 1973, it is plausible to argue that the absence of a strong conventional capability was an important factor in keeping the Eisenhower administration from a military intervention in Vietnam, both in 1954 and toward the end of the decade. In any event, the ‘New Look” represented changes from the Truman-Acheson period.
“Ty ° ° 99 °° nited Action” in Indochina | \ | ONE OF DULLES’S ACTIONS was to bring forth a darker harvest than
his refusal to allow United States policy to support or even
countenance a diplomatic settlement of the French colonial war in Indochina in the period from 1954 to 1956. That the opportunity for genuine
settlement was there seems now beyond reasonable dispute. The new Soviet government, still moving to reduce its arms burden and shift its resources toward greater emphasis on consumer goods, evidenced a serious
desire to avoid a new confrontation. The Peking regime was on its best
behavior, anxious to end its isolation and restore its prestige in the world community by playing the role of peacemaker. Both Russia and China imposed concessions on the Vietminh which the military situation did not require and which Ho Chi Minh, left to his own devices, would probably have successfully resisted. The British worked firmly and responsibly for a compromise solution. The French, after the fall of the Laniel government, were at last prepared to accept reality. Only the
United States refused the uses of genuine diplomacy. Although he demonstrated tactical flexibility beneath a strident rhetoric, Dulles steadfastly refused to acknowledge the existence of any reasonable or legitimate claims on the Communist side. When these were nonetheless reflected in the Geneva Agreements, he refused all entreaty from Eden, Molotov and Chou En-lai that he be bound by them; this would, he said, risk “‘prejudicing basic principles to which the United States must adhere if it is to be true to itself.” 4 His posture owed a good deal to his fear of the Republican right wing.
Acheson had paid dearly for his considered conclusion in 1949: “The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil
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war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United
States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result.” ? Senators Knowland, Bridges, Jenner, and Wherry and other members of the China Lobby scathingly denounced the State Department’s China White Paper as ‘‘a 1,054-page whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of Soviet conquest.” # Nor was this the worst. In an atmosphere supercharged by the Russian coup in Czechoslovakia, the first Russian atomic test, and the convictions of Alger Hiss and Dr. Klaus Fuchs, the archdemagogue McCarthy raised the cry of treason. ‘“‘How can we account for our present situation unless we believe that men high in this government are concerting to deliver us to disaster? This must be the product of a great conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous venture in the history of man.” * In 1954, McCarthy’s personal power was waning, but the Republican Asiafirsters remained a reckless and destructive cabal. But if Dulles demonstrated a strong disinclination to challenge these forces in the Congress, acting with a prudence that seemed to verge at times on moral cowardice, it must be appreciated that he shared many of their views: their militant anti-Communism, their impatient unilateralist tendencies, and their belief that America possessed the power — and the moral right to use it —to make the world safe for a moral America. He had argued that the geographical boundaries of NATO were too restrictive to meet the global Communist problem. He endorsed rollback and liberation in Asia. At the “Little Bermuda” in 1953, he had told Bidault
that the further French measures of July 3 to “perfect” Indochinese independence were deeply gratifying because they removed the colonial stigma from the struggle. And speaking before the American Federation of Labor, three months later, he claimed that this action “transformed” the struggle, making it far easier for Americans to support victory for the anti-Communist forces with a clear conscience.’ Dulles’s contemporary
Victor Bator has called his negative contributions to Geneva and its somber aftermath a genuine tragedy “caused not by his weakness, but by his innate moral and spiritual strength, which made his anti-Communist fervor a blinding dogma and deprived him of flexibility when wisdom demanded it.” * Thus, lacking the foresight and the capacity for objectivity which are the marks of genuine statesmanship, Dulles fastened the United States to a policy which (as Molotov said with prophetic truth on April 29, 1954) seriously erred in its tendency to “attribute to Communism every movement of the oppressed peoples toward freedom and
national independence,” and had “no prospects whatever, for it is in
conflict with the entire course of the historical development in Asia.” 7
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French and American Perspectives
After seven years of cruel and frustrating struggle, the French forces had steadily lost ground to the insurgency led by the Communist-trained Ho Chi Minh; the war had become a running sore, draining away French
blood and treasure and bitterly dividing metropolitan France. But although the national will to carry on the battle was in fact ebbing fast, the French government, pressed by a willful bureaucracy whose strength lay in its continuity, still dreamed elaborate dreams. In early 1954, the new scheme for victory was the Navarre Plan, a forerunner of ‘Vietnamization,” which called for raising another 100,000 Vietnamese forces and for sending out from the metropole another 50,000 volunteer French legionnaires. If everything went well, total forces on the French side would be increased from 400,000 to 550,000. But it would take time, and there was general agreement that it could never succeed unless the French provided the Vietnamese with sufficient incentive to make their own larger, more effective fighting effort. The only adequate incentive was genuine political independence. Here lay the rub: not only all the French political parties who wanted to fight on, but also most of those who favored a negotiated settlement, were passionately wedded to the view that Indochina must remain within the French Union, that there must be impediments upon the sovereignty of the Associated States of Indochina, or else there was no warrant for
further struggle. If the Emperor Bao Dai were so ungrateful for the fruits of French culture as to demand total independence, so the reason-
ing ran, why then should Frenchmen fight for Bao Dai? The French constitution imposed a particular legal status on the Associated States, and the existing chaos of parties in the French parliament precluded amendment. But beyond legalities lay more fundamental political and strategic obstacles, related to France’s self-image as a Great Power. Genu-
ine independence for Indochina would trigger similar demands in the French colonies of Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria; for this reason, it was
a development to be avoided at all costs. Caught in the toils of an identity crisis, proud in spirit, poor in resources, divided in purpose, unwilling to fight and unable to settle, France drifted. The United States showed itself to be, on the whole, unsympathetic to the French dilemma. For Dulles and his colleagues in Washington, Indochina was less a deplorable colonial problem than a crucial link in the chain of global resistance to International Communism. Still judging the Mao regime to be basically the agent of a unified, compulsively expansionist movement controlled by the Kremlin, they thought a breaching
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of the chain in Southeast Asia would set off a whole series of Communist insurrections throughout Asia. Dulles, who seemed most concerned by the threat of direct Chinese military invasion on the Korean model, had warned in September 1953 that “the Chinese Communist regime should realize that such a second aggression [sic] could not occur without grave
consequences which might not be confined to Indochina.” § But while American politics was thus transfixed by the menace of Chinese Communism in Asia, there was no broad-based public readiness to under-
write a deeper American commitment or involvement, the strident minority in the Senate to the contrary notwithstanding. Less than a year away from the pain and frustration of the Korean War, the American people were not yet ready to countenance more American bleeding and dying. The evident gap between the sense of threat and the willingness to meet it thus tended to be filled by a judgment that the French must go
on fighting in Indochina. Continued French resistance on the rim of China for the sake of “freedom” everywhere became something of an American political imperative. The United States would supply the arms. The Berlin Conference
The French policy of drift came to an end in late January 1954, at the Foreign Ministers conference in Berlin, the first such meeting to be held with the Soviets in five years. Although its agenda was ostensibly confined to the problems of Germany and Austria, Molotov soon proposed a fivepower conference — to include the Chinese Communists — hinting that
in such a forum the questions of both Korea and Indochina could be discussed. Dulles’s reply was hardly calculated to advance the proposition:
“Who is this Chou En-lai whose addition to our circle would make
possible all that so long seemed impossible? He is the leader of a regime
which gained de facto power on the China mainland through bloody war, which has liquidated millions of Chinese . . . which so diverts the economic resources of its impoverished people to military efforts that they starve by millions; which became an open aggressor in Korea and was so adjudged by the United Nations; which promotes open aggression
in Indochina by training and equipping the aggressors and supplying them with vast amounts of war munitions. Such is the man Mr. Molotov urges would enable the world to solve all its problems and to gain lasting peace and mounting prosperity.” 9 Bidault, to whom the proposal seemed more directly addressed, replied that France did indeed desire negotiations, but first needed “pledges of goodwill” *° that China would cease its material support of the Vietminh. This seemed to close the matter for a while. As the conference wore on,
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however, the French military situation in Indochina steadily worsened, and soon reached such a point of deterioration that Premier Laniel concluded that his government could not survive unless Bidault brought home from Berlin a firm agreement to negotiate the Indochina war. Dulles now recognized that France could not avoid negotiations, and that the United States could not frontally oppose such an effort. A stiffnecked American reaction would split the Western alliance, confirming in Paris the widely held belief that the United States was insisting on
unlimited French sacrifice for the sake of Washington’s strategy of global anti-Communism, and raising the level of exasperation in London. He thus accepted the inevitable, but went to elaborate lengths to protect
his domestic flanks. In agreeing to a Geneva conference on Korea and Indochina that would include Communist China, he insisted on inserting into the communiqué the understanding that “neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.” +1 And he drew a sharp, not altogether real, distinction between sitting down with Peking on broad matters “dealing generally with the peace of the world” and on narrow, practical matters. “It is ... one thing,” he told his American television audience on February 24, “to recognize evil as a fact. It is another thing to take evil to one’s breast and call it good.” }? Despite these legal caveats and moral disclaimers, the GOP right wing
was not appeased. At meetings of the Foreign Relations Committee on
February 23 and 24, Senator Knowland warned Dulles against any “slips” that might lead to diplomatic recognition of Red China, and said bluntly the administration would be held accountable. In public speeches, he and other members of the China Lobby then moved to vent their fury at any proposal that seemed to presage a negotiated settlement of the Indochina war, for this would be, in their view, an intolerable Far Eastern Munich.** Dulles defended himself fundamentally on the ground that Indochina was France’s war, and that the United States could not obstruct a French desire to negotiate unless it were willing to sacrifice both EDC and basic relations with France. He laid particular emphasis on his refusal to attend a conference with Red China without a written agreement that no American recognition would be involved, and even sought to gratify his obsessive critics with an emotional account of his struggle with the devil at Berlin: until Molotov’s final capitulation on this point, he said, the clever Bolshevik had “sought by every artifice and device, directly and through our allies, to tempt us to meet with Com-
munist China. ... We refused and our... . allies stood with us.” 14 Moreover, he assured the nation, the Chinese regime “will not come to
Geneva to be honored by us, but rather to account before the bar of
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world opinion.” +5 Political theatrics aside, these statements reflected deep-seated conviction. Dulles looked forward to the Geneva negotiations with pronounced distaste, and feared a French sellout of a vital free-world salient.
The Ely Visit
In mid-March, the French military situation in Indochina began to fall apart. Parachute battalions sent to form a strong fortress base at Dien Bien Phu, in a deliberate effort to lure an elusive enemy into a set battle and there destroy him with superior firepower, suddenly found themselves beleaguered. Vietminh raids destroyed more than a dozen
troop-transport aircraft on the ground, cutting off the bastion’s chief means of resupply. Within two days of the first attacks, General Navarre,
who had conceived and ordered the operation, apparently concluded that Dien Bien Phu would fall, in the absence of some dramatic relief operation.’® General Ely, the French chief of staff, fresh from an Inspection trip to Saigon, now arrived in Washington on a diplomatic mission
of gravest import: to inform the United States that France had decided it could not win a military victory in Indochina, and to ask for help in securing a settlement. While he was, of course, anxious for any immediate American assistance that might lift the siege of Dien Bien Phu, his main purpose was to convey the strong impression that time was running out
for France, that the crisis was not remote but immediate, and that a settlement short of military victory was not avoidable.” Washington encountered difficulty both in receiving and accepting the
message. On March 22, Eisenhower met with Ely, accompanied by Admiral Radford, and heard his pessimistic assessment. But the President’s soldierly concern focused primarily on the immediate military problem — the fate of the besieged fortress — and at the conclusion of the meeting he instructed Radford to do everything possible to meet French
requests for help in lifting the siege. Eisenhower’s preoccupation with Dien Bien Phu prevented Ely from laying emphasis on the far more fundamental strategic point. The next day, however, Ely was able to tell Dulles with clarity and force that France was now determined upon a
settlement, and that all military operations would henceforward be restricted in time and scale to what was judged necessary to bring that about.1® Dulles seems to have received this information with conspicuous
coldness. Not even bothering to express an opinion on the French decision, nor to ask any questions about the military situation, he instead declaimed to Ely on the necessity of preventing Communist domination
of Southeast Asia and the need for a regional defense pact.19 With
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magisterial arrogance he then issued his own statement, which said: ‘“We
have no reason to abandon the so-called Navarre Plan. . . . There have been no military reversals. . . . I do not expect that there is going to be a Communist victory in Indo-china.” 2° The statement also denigrated the forthcoming negotiations at Geneva by insisting that peace would come only through the achievement of military supremacy. Meanwhile Radford, a very hard-liner who believed a showdown with Communist China was sooner or later inevitable, had taken his instructions from Eisenhower very literally. On March 25, he gave Ely his
opinion that tactical air strikes on the surrounding enemy positions could relieve the garrison at Dien Bien Phu, and he thought it feasible to
use B-29’s based in the Philippines, covered by carrier planes from the Seventh Fleet. As he recalled it in 1965, “We could have helped the French with air strikes. Whether these alone would have been successful
in breaking the siege of Dien Bien Phu is debatable. If we had used atomic weapons, we probably would have been successful.’ 24 But he added, “I never felt that it was basically a question of atomic weapons at all. ‘That could have been decided one way or the other at the time of a specific military operation.” But if conventional bombing had been tried and had failed, “then the question would have come up.” Ely departed for Paris on March 26 with the impression that “everything was in the bag” regarding American air support for the beleaguered
fortress, but Radford later insisted that the French general must have failed to grasp two central points: one, that Radford had no authority to commit the United States government; and two, that France could not
realistically expect to obtain American air support without “‘internationalizing” the war. As he recalled it, “Ely wanted us to come in, strike Dien Bien Phu, and break the siege . . . then withdraw and leave the fighting to them.” But “‘you can’t just get one foot wet and then pull out again. . . . We would have to have a voice in the war — in the command — in the planning from then on. And the question was whether we should run it or not. I was in favor of running it.” ?8 Despite these polite disclaimers, the episode showed the disturbing readiness of a forceful, cocksure Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to push the administration into a military fait accompli of unknown dimensions, on the strength of a vague presidential instruction and without serious consideration and reflection by other responsible elements of the government. Immediately following Ely’s departure, the upper echelons of the State and Defense Departments were locked in anxious debate on the Radford
proposal: support was expressed for further aid to the French, and the possible need for American military force was not excluded; but serious doubts were cast upon the wisdom of any attempt to bomb Dien Bien
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Phu, and troubled questions were raised as to whether or not the nation, through Radford, had given a commitment. “United Action” Details to one side, the Eisenhower administration was plainly sobered, even shocked, by the import of the Ely visit, for it brought home to them, really for the first time, how fragile was the French position in Asia and how imminent the prospect of its collapse. The first instinctive reaction
was that France must not be allowed to quit. Dulles, noting with concern the general passivity of public and congressional opinion, quickly
set about to arm himself and the President with a mandate for bold
action in the event their worst fears should be realized. He had misgivings about the proposal to use American bombers at Dien Bien Phu, considering it “a poor way for the U.S. to get involved,” ?* but his doubts
were not rooted in an aversion to a tough policy involving war or the serious risk of war. He felt, rather, that the Radford proposal was too narrow in scope, that it imposed no conditions on French colonialism, that it failed to address the broad question of how to organize a longterm anti-Communist defense position in Southeast Asia. His own view was that the problem could be met by an organized warning, involving a tailored application of the deterrence doctrine he had expounded to such clamorous effect in his already famous “massive retaliation” speech of
January 12. Such a warning implied the readiness to fight, and the political objective was not compromise settlement; it was Communist defeat. As he reported to the President at this time, he had reminded Ely that “if the United States sent its flag and its own military establishment — land, sea or air — into the Indo-China war . . . we would want to have a success.” *> ‘The absolutist tenor of his thinking was similarly revealed at a press conference two weeks later:
Q: What would you regard as a reasonably satisfactory settlement of the Indochina situation?
Dulles: The removal by the Chinese Communists of their apparent desire to extend the political system of Communism to Southeast Asia.
Q: That means a complete withdrawal of the Communists from Indochina?
Dulles: ‘That 1s what I would regard as a satisfactory solution. Q: Is there any compromise that might be offered if that is not entirely satisfactory to the Communists? Dulles: I had not thought of any.?®
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On March gg, he delivered a major policy address before the Overseas Press Club of America, to alert the American people to the prospect of dramatic and possibly grave choices. Putting the most favorable face on equivocal French measures to provide political freedom for the Associated States, he blamed Ho Chi Minh for “attempting to prevent the orderly development of independence.” Then he turned to developing the theme of Indochina as a vital economic and strategic asset of the free world. It is important, he argued, not alone because it provides vital raw materials, but because it sits “astride the most direct and best developed sea and air
routes between the Pacific and South Asia.’ If it should fall to Communist control, not only the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, but the entire Western Pacific area would be “strategically endangered.” Indeed the imposition of such control “under the conditions of today” would be a “grave threat to the whole free community.’”’ Having set the stage, he then declared the operational policy: “The United States feels
that that possibility [of Communist control] should not be passively accepted, but should be met by united action.” 27
The timing of the speech —only three days after Ely’s departure — seems to reflect an urgent compulsion to reassert personal control over American policy, which had drifted toward Radford and the French. An official request from Paris for the American bombing effort was expected
momentarily, and it was not certain how Eisenhower would respond. There were, in addition to Radford, several highly placed supporters for it in the executive branch, including Vice-president Richard Nixon and Chairman Lewis Straus of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Dulles counterformulation was certainly artful. The operational statement of policy, which seemed so resolute, proved on close examination to be a model of Sullivan and Cromwell ambiguity. It did not say that the grave threat must be actively resisted; it left open the possibility that ultimately it might have to be accepted. And what was “united action”? The ambiguity was surely deliberate, and for a very good reason — no clear line of action had been decided even within the executive branch, and no consultations had been undertaken with either Congress or allies. The fine
print, although scrutinized in foreign chancellories, was for the most part lost upon the journalists. What they heard and reported was in essence that holy struggle against Communism was necessary in Southeast Asia, because vital American interests were at stake, and because attempted settlement would compromise American principles. The New York Times said editorially: “Dulles was as plain as words would allow in insisting that the United States look upon this struggle as vital to its interests and . . . not stand passively by.” 28 Not until five days later was there a move to consult with Congress. On Saturday morning, April 3, Dulles called a secret meeting at the State
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Department at which Radford explained his proposal for air strikes at Dien Bien Phu to eight senior members of the legislature (Senators Knowland, Milliken, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Russell, and Clements; Congressmen Joseph Martin, John McCormack, and J. P. Priest). Radford admitted that his proposal risked war with China, and acknowledged that it did not have the support of the other chiefs of stafl. Under questioning, it became clear that, if the bombing failed to achieve its objective, the fact that U.S. prestige would have been committed might well require the sending of American ground forces (this was the central point of General Ridgway’s strong dissent as Army Chief of Staff). The coneressional reaction was mixed, but a majority was troubled by the uni-
lateral nature of the proposed action and equally by the prospect of having to commit ground forces. The senior Democrats, Senators Russell and Lyndon Johnson, implicitly stated the Democratic condition for support in variants of the question: “Where do the British stand?” No one could answer that question.*®
The following evening, Sunday, April 4, Dulles and Radford met alone with the President, from which discussion emerged Eisenhower’s decision that the United States would not act in Indochina except with congressional support. And such support, it was calculated, would be contingent upon three conditions: (1) the United States must act as part of a coalition including the free nations of Southeast Asia, the Philippines and “the British Commonwealth”; (2) the French must “accelerate their independence program” for the Associated States, so that no American military action could be interpreted as support for French colonialism; and (3) the French must agree not to withdraw their forces if American forces were put in.*° This was, as it turned out, an extremely important meeting, in which Eisenhower effectively sidetracked the Radford proposal for an immediate bombing effort, and reasserted presidential command in a fluid situation that could easily get out of control. Radford was a clever, fast-moving operator whose supporters on Asian issues included Vice-president Nixon, General Curtis Lemay of the Strategic Air Command, and most of the China Lobby senators. Over the years, Eisenhower treated Radford’s judgments with skepticism and, on the issue of intervention in Indochina, he thought General Ridgway’s dissents were cogent and compelling. The three conditions which Eisenhower imposed before he would seriously entertain intervention were not, at the time, considered impossible to meet, but to meet them would take time and wide consultation. In retrospect, they reflect the solid common sense of a President with a feeling in his bones that military adventures ought not to be undertaken without allies, and that decisions involving war and peace must have explicit congressional participation and support. So the meeting neutralized Radford. Did it also neutralize Dulles? The
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Secretary of State was not enthusiastic about an air strike at Dien Bien Phu, and one recent historian has suggested that the April 3 meeting was a deliberate stratagem by Dulles to defuse the Radford proposal by demonstrating the opposition of congressional leaders, thus avoiding a bruising struggle with Radford supporters inside the executive branch.*! On this theory, Eisenhower’s absence from the meeting was significant, for it implied that he was not prepared to argue for the Radford proposal. The theory tends to be sustained by Dulles’s prompt and negative response when Laniel and Bidault, having conferred with General Ely, conveyed a formal French request for air strikes on April 5. He replied that the United States could not act without congressional approval or in advance of allied consultations. On balance, it seems clear that Dulles wanted and needed the new presidential ground rules as a means of restoring his own control of policy, and he had probably prepared the first draft. On the other hand, in light of his own hyperthyroid performance over the next month and his strong tendency to unilateral action, it also seems clear that presidential insistence on both British and congressional support were restraints on Dulles that constituted a helpful “management control” for Eisenhower. The three ground rules now formed the boundaries of Dulles’s operational guidance, and no one could charge him with giving them a passive treatment or a strict construction: during the next month he was galvanized to build a base of domestic and allied support for a wide range of apparently broad, though carefully unspecified, actions. Richard Rovere of the New Yorker wrote in early April that the Secretary of State was conducting “‘one of the boldest campaigns of political suasion ever undertaken by an American statesman.” ** Congressmen, political leaders of
all colorations, newspapermen and television personalities were being “rounded up in droves and escorted to lectures and briefings on what the State Department regards as the American stake in Indo-China.” #3 Were
that area to be “Jost,” the color charts showed that “Communist influence” would radiate dramatically in a semicircle outward from Indochina to Thailand, Burma, Malaya and far down across the South China Sea to Indonesia; the briefing officers listed strategic raw materials that would accrue to Russia and China and thereafter be denied to the free nations; if America should fail to save the day, the prospect was faltering resistance to Communism in the whole Asian arc from India to Japan. On the
basis of both his public and off-the-record remarks to the press, Dulles was represented as believing that “‘we should not flinch at doing anything
that is needed to prevent a Communist victory’; indeed if American moral and material support should prove unable to hold the French in line, “then we ought to commit our own forces to the conflict.” *+
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The Europeans Balk As Dulles moved forward to win support for “united action,’ he seemed surprised at the nervous irritation and suspicion he had aroused in Lon-
don and Paris by his presumption to speak for Europe, even tacitly to bind Europe to American concepts and plans, without consultation. He operated, instinctively, on the assumption that America’s clear power superiority gave it an unquestioned right to lead in a peremptory manner, but to London and Paris in 1954, this was still an intolerable assumption. And reinforcing European resentment over his address of March 29 was a powerful emotional resistance to the apocalyptic implications of his “massive retaliation” speech.
There was also the ambiguity of “united action,” and, while subsequent messages clarified this somewhat, the clarifications did not please
the Europeans. In a letter to Churchill of April 4 (almost certainly drafted by Dulles), the President said a primary purpose of “united action’’ was to prevent a French capitulation and keep France in the war
whatever the cost: “I can understand the very natural desire of the French to seek an end to this war which has been bleeding them for eight years,” but “there is no negotiated solution ... which in its essence would not be either a face-saving device to cover a French surrender or a face-saving device to cover a Communist retirement. The
first alternative is too serious... to be acceptable.” ** The situation, Eisenhower wrote, called for a new grouping of nations which share “a vital concern” in checking Communist expansion in Asia: “The impor-
tant thing is that the coalition must be strong and it must be willing to. . . fight if necessary.” °° A message of similar import was sent to the French. Though Dulles later emphasized the deterrent aspect of the proposal, the April 4 letter to Churchill in fact made plain the American intention to build a coalition prepared in the last analysis to fight beside the French in an ongoing war, and strongly to oppose any serious search for a settlement at the forthcoming Geneva conference. Some thought
that, at. this stage, Dulles hoped his coalition plan would scuttle the conference. To Dulles, and presumably to Eisenhower, any conceivable settlement was anathema. The French and British were quick to see that the American proposal, particularly if promptly implemented, would absolutely close the door to settlement. The French reply accordingly suggested further study, ex-
plaining that the sudden creation of an anti-Communist united front would only harden the attitude of the Vietminh and the Red Chinese, thereby creating new difficulties for negotiation that French public opin-
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ion would not understand. The British response was equally tepid. Churchill, while not opposed in principle to a joint public warning to Red China, thought that to make it now would further diminish the already slight chances for successful negotiation at Geneva. And while he did not object to some new regional grouping in Southeast Asia, he felt this must be a careful diplomatic undertaking, involving months of preparation, not something to be thrown together in time for a conference at Geneva that was scheduled to begin just three weeks thence (on April 26).%?
Meanwhile, Dulles was orchestrating a range of actions and statements designed to demonstrate Washington’s resolve. ‘The State Department began a vigorous round of diplomatic consultations, in an effort to line
up members of the new coalition; the effort included talks with the Chinese Nationalists. “Two aircraft carriers from the Seventh Fleet steamed into the South China Sea. Eisenhower held a press conference on April 7 at which he described the strategic situation in Southeast Asia as ‘“‘a row of falling dominoes.” Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Dulles called attention to the passage of his March 29 speech which asserted that the free world would be threatened by Communist conquest of Indochina, “by whatever means” it might occur. This phrase was quite deliberate, he said; it meant that United States concern “should not be mitigated by the fact that the means [of conquest] are perhaps technically evasive.” °® Rumors of impending United States intervention flew around Washington. Having thus rather thoroughly confused his allies, Dulles flew to Europe on April 10 to continue his aggressive quest for their support. Talks with the British lasted for two days, with Dulles trying to convince Eden that the prompt formation of an ad hoc coalition would not undermine
the Geneva negotiations, but would on the contrary strengthen the Western bargaining position. Eden’s rejoinder was that a joint warning
to China would be useless, if Dulles hoped thereby to frighten the Chinese into halting arms aid to the Vietminh. Dulles now said that, contrary to Eisenhower’s April 4 letter, he no longer believed in the efficacy of a joint warning for that purpose. What he really sought was a regional security alliance that would deter China from direct intervention with her own forces; if this were accomplished, he said, then American and British military intervention in Indochina would be unnecessary.*° This tactical shift, designed to sweeten the spoon for Eden, unfortunately overlooked the fact that the Vietminh could in all probability defeat the French without the help of Chinese troops; it thus left unclear just who would fight to save Indochina while the new coalition held off the Red Chinese. ‘The charitable view is that this was simply another example of Dulles, the advocate, being carried away by the tactical necessities. To
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obtain congressional support for American action, it was imperative to bring the British on board; how and under what pretexts one got them there was a secondary consideration. Once they were committed, many things would be possible, not excluding unilateral American military action under the cover of a nominal coalition. Eden was willing to move toward a regional security organization, but thought he made plain that, as the British saw it, this would take time
and careful diplomatic preparation. He did agree that first priority should be given to coordinating allied preparations for the Geneva negotiations and that this effort might include some preparation for a regional grouping. The Dulles-Eden communiqué of April 13 thus said: “We are ready to take part, with the other countries principally concerned, in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense . . . to assure the peace, security, and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific.”’ 4° “That Eden had in mind no serious effort to form a coalition before the Geneva conference seems borne out by his statement to the
Commons on the following day that the “desirability” of a collective defense arrangement would be greatly influenced by what happened at Geneva.
Dulles went on to Paris for a full day of talks with the French on April 14, where Bidault insisted that France’s first consideration must be to gain an honorable peace at Geneva. He thought no steps should be taken that would risk a hardening of the Chinese attitude, for Red China’s willingness to accept a compromise was of the essence for France.
But Dulles now revived the joint warning proposal he had presumably discarded in London. A joint warning, he argued, could compel Russia to press both Red China and the Vietminh to accept a compromise. Why? Because the Soviets were just as worried as the Western powers over the
risks attendant on “internationalizing” the war.*! Bidault was not impressed, and the Paris communiqué, while granting the desirability of a regional defense pact, carefully subordinated it to the more urgent reality: “No effort should be spared to make the Geneva Conference a success’; moreover, the evolution of a defense arrangement “would be profoundly conditioned by the outcome of the conference.” #2
By any normal standard of judgment, this diplomatic mission had failed to achieve the purposes Dulles sought, yet within three days of his
return to Washington he dispatched invitations to the ambassadors of nine countries (Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the three Associated States) to convene on April 20 in Washington for the purpose of establishing a staff-level group for preparatory work on a collective defense pact for Southeast Asia. Dulles acted, in short, as though he had clear British and French support for “united action.” It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this move was an attempt to bull-
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doze his allies, a blunt effort to build, upon the tenuous base of generalized public agreement, a fait accompli which they, overawed by American power and determination, would not dare to defy openly. He may have
justified this action to himself by reference to the moral and strategic imperatives of his cause; a more mundane truth was that, having committed his prestige in the speech of March a9, he could ill afford the political consequences of a conspicuous allied refusal to support his policy line.
The ploy failed. Eden reacted with swift and uncharacteristic sharpness, cabling his ambassador not to attend the meeting, and adding:
“Americans may think the time past when they need consider the feelings or difficulties of their allies. It is the conviction that this tendency becomes more pronounced every week that is creating mounting difficulties for anyone in this country who wants to maintain close Anglo-
American relations.” 42 Dulles received this news on Easter morning, April 18, in the form of a telephone call from the British ambassador, Sir Roger Makins. His sister Eleanor was standing alone with him in the front hall of his house on Thirty-second Street in Washington: ‘He
was visibly disturbed,” she reported, and he said to her, “Eden has reversed himself and gone back on our agreement.” 44 While it 1s very doubtful that there was a meeting of minds in London, there is no rea-
son to doubt the genuineness of Dulles’s agitation, for the domestic consequences were swift and sharp, and they unquestionably fed his developing antipathy for Eden. One powerful senator castigated him for having demanded broad action “before finding out in advance whether he had the support of the Congress, the French and the British.” #° Another Republican legislator told him at a hearing that “you’re
either a liar or Eden is a double-crosser.” 4 A Fevertsh Weekend
But Dulles was tough, determined, and resourceful. Back in Paris on April 21 for a NATO Council meeting, he again conferred with Eden and Bidault on the Indochina problem. On April 23, a highly agitated Bidault showed him a message just received from General Navarre, warning that the fall of Dien Bien Phu was imminent and that its loss would permit the Vietminh to move rapidly into the Red River Delta. Bidault again asked Dulles to save the situation by air bombardment which, to be effective, would have to be delivered within seventy-two hours; the only alternative for France, he said, was an effort to achieve an immediate cease-fire. Dulles promised to report this urgently to the President, and also to discuss it with Admiral Radford, who was arriving
“UNITED ACTION’ IN INDOCHINA 217
in Paris the following day, but he told Bidault that a “B-29 intervention as proposed seemed to [be] out of the question under existing circumstances.” #* He added in a cable to Eisenhower that “Bidault gives the impression of a man close to the breaking point . . . it has been painful
to watch him. ... He is obviously exhausted and is confused and rambling in his talk.’ 4* Eden found Bidault’s desperate request “all too reminiscent of the French demand for our last R.A.F. squadrons in 1940," #9 but Radford, when he joined the discussions on April 24, showed himself unready to forgo the bombing option: “There must be some military effort to assist the French without delay,” he argued; otherwise the fortress would fall and “the whole military situation .. . would get out of control within a few days.” °° Dulles, however, concluded that the situation at Dien Bien Phu was too far gone to be saved by a bombing raid,*t and Eisenhower cabled his agreement that “there
would be no intervention without allies.” °? He meant the British. Dulles, who was becoming depressed by the irresoluteness of the French
government and its strong tendency to view the fall of the fortress as a matter of strategic consequence, cabled the President: “There is, of course, no military or logical reason why loss of Dien Bien Phu should
lead to collapse of French will, in relation both to Indochina and EDC.°? Eisenhower in reply expressed his “full understanding of the feeling of frustration that must consume you. . . . There is little I can say now to help you . . . but I am so confident of the unity of conviction you and I hold on these and related matters, that I do not even feel the need of assuring you again of my complete support . . .” *4 Dulles remained fiercely determined to obtain the necessary minimum of allied cooperation on which to build his case for “united action” — not to rescue Dien Bien Phu, but, as he saw it, to save Indochina and Southeast Asia. How he expected to do this, even assuming full British and French cooperation, remained a carefully veiled mystery, but when the three Foreign Ministers met again in the early afternoon of Saturday, April 24, he produced the rough draft of a rather peculiar paper. Addressed to Bidault, it stated that, while American support for Dien Bien Phu was now impossible, the United States was nevertheless prepared to move ‘‘armed forces’’ into Indochina, if France and the other
allies so desired, for the purpose of protecting Southeast Asia as a whole.®> The letter was passed to Eden, who read it glancingly, and then handed it on to Bidault. Dulles offered to send the letter formally if Bidault would find that helpful. After hesitating for several minutes, Bidault said he was prepared to receive the letter formally.** Suddenly events stood at a new watershed; if this striking new development were real, it meant the war would be internationalized. Eden concluded he must return at once to London to consult his cabinet colleagues. As he
218 “UNITED ACTION” IN INDOCHINA
put it to the Foreign Office in a cable sent just prior to his departure, “It is now quite clear that we shall have to take a decision of first-class importance, namely whether to tell the Americans that we are prepared to go along with their plan or not.” 5? Arriving in London, however, he received a message from the British embassy in Paris saying that, upon further reflection, Bidault was far from enthusiastic about the American proposal and would probably advise Laniel against its acceptance.
Eden conferred with Churchill in the late evening of the twentyfourth, and reported his belief that Dulles and Eisenhower were now prepared to ask congressional approval for broad but vague American military actions, provided only that Britain pledged adherence and a very nominal participation. Both men agreed that the action contemplated by the Americans would not solve France’s problems, and might well lead to major war; moreover, they thought they were being asked to assist in misleading the Congress.5* The circumstances indeed suggest
that the letter (which apparently was never formally sent) was a ploy by Dulles to force the British to take a clear-cut stand on the issue of intervention, without really committing the United States to particular action; if it produced even a symbolic British willingness to associate with “united action,” then that might provide a sufficient color of alliance to persuade Eisenhower to seek congressional support for strong American action; if it produced a negative response, then Britain and not the United States would bear the onus of having refused the frantic French plea for help. In terms at least of forcing the British hand, it worked. The British cabinet met the next morning (Sunday, April 25) and approved the position put forward by Churchill and Eden. The essence of this was: “We are not prepared to give any undertaking now, in advance of the Geneva Conference, concerning United Kingdom military action in Indo-China.” 59 The matter, however, did not end there. The French cabinet, meeting on Saturday evening, declined to accept the Dulles letter offering gen-
eral U.S. intervention; it chose instead to draft another plea for an air strike at Dien Bien Phu. This was the perhaps predictable course of a panic-stricken government facing within hours the fall of a symbolic fortress —an event certain to produce gripping anguish throughout France, and to be followed by explosive resentment against the government that had exposed heroic soldiers to such humiliation and defeat. According to the memoirs of Premier Laniel, the new French request was discussed with Dulles that same evening, a few hours before his departure for Geneva, where the negotiations were to begin on Monday.
Choosing to exploit the French panic, Dulles now told Laniel and Bidault that, if they could bring the British even nominally into a
“UNITED ACTION’ IN INDOCHINA 219
coalition “proclaiming their common will to check the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia,’ °° and if France agreed to United States
assumption of strategic command in Indochina, then President Eisenhower would seek congressional approval for intervention, and air strikes might well be carried out against the besiegers of Dien Bien Phu within the seventy-two-hour deadline defined by General Navarre. The desperate French apparently accepted this new proposition.*! Dulles then flew off to Geneva.
There remained to be played out at least two more acts in the feverish weekend drama. A copy of the new French plea for an air strike was cabled to the French embassy in Washington and carried that same Saturday evening (Washington time being five hours behind Paris time) by Ambassador Henri Bonnet to Acting Secretary of State
Bedell Smith. After speaking immediately with Eisenhower, Smith informed Bonnet (that same evening) that a response to the French plea could be made only within the context of a declared allied intention to establish a regional security organization, but that with such a declaration, supported by authorized signatures, a positive U.S. response was likely. Smith emphasized that British adherence was the keystone. If London were willing, then an agreement among ambassadors in Washington could be signed in two days (by Monday, April 26). Moreover,
he told Bonnet, a resolution authorizing the President to use air and naval forces in Indochina had already been prepared; it might be approved by Congress as early as April 28.°? Acting swiftly on the basis of this strong encouragement, which directly reinforced the line Dulles had
taken at his last talk with Laniel, the French sent their ambassador in London, René Massigli, to the Foreign Office the following day (Sunday,
April 25), where he met with Eden on the latter’s return from the special cabinet session. Massigli detailed the talk between Smith and Bonnet and urged the British to accede. Eden was notably dismayed and irritated to learn that, on so pressing a matter, the United States had not only allowed and encouraged the French to be a direct channel to the British government, but was in effect using the French as an instrument of pressure.® The British cabinet met again at 4:00 p.M. and reaffirmed its position.
Eden then flew to Geneva, stopping briefly at Orly Airport to inform Bidault of the decision. Still the French persisted, apparently strong in their belief that if Britain would merely give nominal consent, American military action to save Dien Bien Phu would follow. On Tuesday, April 27, Massigli once more pressed the matter upon Churchill, who told him bluntly that the British government had made its decision.* Later that day, the Prime Minister rose in Commons to reassure the House that Britain had not entered upon “any new political or military
220 “UNITED ACTION’ IN INDOCHINA
commitments” with the United States or France; and that, while the French trial by fire at Dien Bien Phu was unfortunate, it should not ‘prejudice the sense of world proportion” that ought to guide and inspire the Geneva conference. Even after this rebuff, Bedell Smith rather amazingly sought to find
a formula for action that was not dependent on the British. Without consulting Dulles, he conceived a joint action under the ANZUS treaty, and sounded out the Australian and New Zealand ambassadors on the evening of Monday, April 26, reporting to Eisenhower that they were “ready to listen” to any proposals the United States might put forward
with regard to “collective action for entering the Indochina war.” ® Smith’s purpose appeared to be prompt military action to save Dien Bien Phu, rather than the more deliberate gathering of a nucleus for a regional alliance. By April 29, however, the Australian and New Zealand governments (upon reflection and no doubt after consultation with
London) indicated that they were not prepared to pursue this line.* It is also doubtful that Eisenhower could have been persuaded. It was an inherently frail proposition and, in his memoirs, he recalled that he would have been “most unhappy’ to urge a collective action ‘“‘without sturdy Britain as a participant.” ° This curious episode was vastly revealing of Dulles’s mental attitude toward allies, and of his operational style. Convinced of the imperative need to halt further Communist advance in Southeast Asia and confident that solution lay in skillfully orchestrating threats of condign
punishment from afar, he moved to develop the elements of such a solution with titanic energy, iron determination, and a tactical guile that did not hesitate to mislead and manipulate his allies. He would have been far happier to conduct a unilateral United States effort (as he was later to do with the Formosa Resolution and the Eisenhower Doctrine), but here both the President and the Congress had decreed the necessity of allied support. His aim was accordingly to fashion a nominal coalition, one that could provide at least the semblance of an alliance as a cover for American power and initiative. What he sought from both allies and Congress were broad precommitments, proxies
given in advance, that would leave the management of the affair to himself and the President. The British refusal to be stampeded by French and American pressures showed wisdom, moral courage, and a sense of proportion. Churchill and Eden simply did not share Washington’s alarmist assessments of
the Chinese Communist threat to Southeast Asia; they recognized the considerable political and military independence of Ho Chi Minh; they were under no illusion that France could be persuaded to continue the
war for an indefinite period. For them a compromise settlement was
“UNITED ACTION’ IN INDOCHINA 221
the unavoidable diplomatic requirement and, being relatively free of the impassioned anti-Communism that hypnotized American policy makers, they were confident that practical settlements of mutual benefit
could be negotiated. Beyond these differences with Washington on substantive issues of policy, their resistance to signing on to a vague and open-ended plan for military coordination, in advance of negotiations, reflected their growing lack of confidence and trust in Dulles. At some
point during this period, Churchill remarked privately that Dulles “is the only case of a bull I know who carries his china closet with him.” ® It was not a good omen for the Western Alliance.
The Geneva Negotiati g ions
—
| HE UNITED STATES thus entered the Geneva conference on April 26
in a mood of apprehension and moral disapproval. The British arrived with a determination to be realistic, and with a confidence that both Russia and China desired a compromise. The French, who were determined to negotiate an end to the war, came to Geneva with a quite inflated view of what kind of settlement was possible. It is customary to rotate the chairmanship of international conferences, but Dulles refused to countenance Chou En-lai or the North Korean, Nam I], in the chair, and this obstruction led to an agreement between Eden and Molotov whereunder they would assume the duties of chairman on alternate days (excepting only that Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand would preside at the first session of the Korean phase of the talks). Dulles accepted this arrangement, which had the dual advantage of subordinating the Chinese role and of providing the United States with a measure of detachment from responsibility. To underline the impression of detachment, he remained in Geneva for only one week, and while there conducted himself with the pinched distaste of a puritan in a house of ill repute, “quite brusquely” refusing to shake hands with Chou En-lai and instructing the American delegation to ignore at all times the presence and existence of the Chinese delegation. He also reopened the argument with Eden for immediate British-American action to create a Southeast Asian defense pact in time
to influence the current negotiations. At dinner with Eden, Lord Reading, and Bedell Smith (who would remain as the U.S. representative after he departed), Dulles subjected the British to what Eden called a “prolonged, and at moments somewhat heated, onslaught upon our
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226 THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS — 1954
the Dulles approach was “to keep it vague, avoid the use of ground troops under any conditions, and be sure the United States did not simply supplant France.” 1° Moreover, certain domestic factors were in opposition to his own abstract anti-Communist imperative, including a public opinion decidedly lukewarm about the prospect of American intervention, and the President’s coveted budget ceiling which would be blown sky-high by war. Finally, he and Eisenhower were not at all times on the same wavelength. Thus, as the Geneva conference opened, the President delivered a speech in which he declared that the United States could not be the gladiator of the free world, but must work in Geneva for a “modus vivendi.” 11 Dulles was reported to be dismayed by these remarks.?? It is possible that Eisenhower was seeking here to offset the effects in Asia of the Chinese-Indian agreement to the “‘five principles of peaceful coexistence’ which were proclaimed at this time in Peking: (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual nonaggression; (3) mutual noninterference in each other’s internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; (5) peaceful coexistence. Although apparently compiled with the aid of a dictionary of synonyms, they were soon
to become the basis of the neutralist platform throughout the Third World.
The Fall of Dien Bien Phu The Korean phase of the conference started first, and was hopelessly deadlocked from the opening day. Syngman Rhee’s government naturally wanted unification by means of Korean elections supervised by the UN, but North Korea, supported by Molotov, argued that the UN had disqualified itself from playing a disinterested supervisory role by reason of
its “illegal” intervention in Korean affairs in 1950. ‘he Western participants vigorously rejected this contention, as well as Nam II’s proposal
for an electoral commission that would give North Korea both equal representation and a veto in the development of an electoral law. At the heart of the difficulty was the fact that North Korea contained only a third of the Korean population, and thus could not win more than a minority position in a unified government under the most favorable circumstances. The final plenary session, held on June 15, ended with an exchange of unfriendly statements. The Thai representative insisted the UN was entirely competent to take collective action not only to repel aggression, but to restore peace. Nam II replied that both the rejection of his government’s proposals and the breaking off of negotiations were without justification.1%
On May 7, one day before the Indochina phase of the conference was
THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS — 1954 227
to open, the exhausted defenders of Dien Bien Phu were overwhelmed in a final human-wave assault, plunging France into anguish and pessimism. Yet as the talks began, Bidault’s negotiating position took no
account of the debacle. He called for an immediate and guaranteed cease-fire in Vietnam, with all the political problems to be settled later during a transitional period. He wanted to hold the Associated States at least nominally within the French Union, as a means of assuring protec-
tion for French commercial, economic and cultural privileges. He opposed partition. Pham Van Dong, who headed the Vietminh delega-
tion, said that the French proposals proceeded from an “outworn imperialist colonial conception,” and asked for a settlement that dealt
concurrently with both military and political problems. He also demanded recognition of the “resistance governments’ under Vietminh
control in Laos and Cambodia. Eden and Bedell Smith supported Bidault, while Molotov and Chou lined up behind Dong.'* A French spokesman who held a press conference to discuss this initial deadlock gave the unfortunate, though not entirely incorrect, impression that Bidault had rejected the Vietminh position more or less out of hand. An uproar rocked the French parliament, causing renewed and bitter debate on the war. It ended on May 13 in a vote of confidence, which the government survived by only two votes, making it clear that the LanielBidault policy hung by a slender thread.1®
Following the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the Washington air was filled with intense recriminations against Dulles and American policy on the one hand, and against Eden and British policy on the other. Senator Knowland called Britain an “‘undependable ally.” 1° Harsh words were used against Eden in the State Department — among them that he was slipping, and lacking in moral stature —~ and some of the epithets were attributed directly to Dulles.17 Walter Lippmann diagnosed the Western alliance as ‘‘shaken,’’ but warned against the “most dangerous fantasy”
of the Asia-firsters who believed “it would be feasible for the United States alone to take over the war in Indo-China and to win it.” 18 For
the Democrats, Senators Herbert Lehman and Theodore Green denounced the administration’s Indochina policy as a ‘diplomatic disaster’”’ and “insulting toward our allies and friends.” And Senator Lyndon Johnson, declining ad hominem comment (but prophetically implying that the war in Indochina was America’s own fight), declared that “American foreign policy has never in all its history suffered such a stunning reversal. . . . We have been caught bluffing by our enemies.” 19
228 THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS — 1954
Dulles Shifts Gears
On May 7, the day of final collapse at Dien Bien Phu, Dulles delivered a major speech in which he conceded that “‘present conditions . . . do not provide a suitable basis for the United States now to participate with its armed forces,” although the administration would be “gravely con-
cerned” by a settlement that opened a “road to a Communist takeover.”’ 2° On ‘May 11 he caused further pain to Paris by seeming in a press
conference remark to write off the whole French effort: ‘“Even if Indo-
china were lost,” he said, ‘the balance of Southeast Asia could be defended.” 71 In light of the subsequent shift of U.S. policy, this proved to be a revealing remark, signaling the conclusion that he and Eisenhower had basically given up on the efficacy of the French effort, yet remained determined to organize a wider Asian defense as a means of limiting the damage. To Paris, of course, the statement looked suspiciously like the
beginning of an American retreat from serious support for the French negotiating effort, and it thus forced the Laniel government to reexamine
its basic premises. Acting with a swiftness born of desperation, the cabinet on May 12 instructed Ambassador Bonnet to ask Washington what it would be prepared to do if an honorable cease-fire should prove impossible to obtain, or if the French military position in the Red River Delta should rapidly fall apart.?? The French demarche of May 13 thus posed anew for Washington the fundamental questions: What was the true nature and extent of United
States interest in the Indochina struggle? What were the compelling domestic and international factors to be considered? What was the Presi-
dent prepared to do? The administration’s response was, in terms of substance, a measurable retreat from the bold and rampant activism of March and April. But the substantive response, conveyed privately, was
accompanied by a number of public gestures that were designed to demonstrate forward movement and tough American resolve, thereby to disarm domestic critics of immobilism and to bolster the sagging French negotiating position at Geneva. The public gestures were dramatized for the press: a swift but full-dress review by State, Defense and CIA, followed by forma] discussion in the National Security Council, and ending with
an undisclosed decision by the President. The May 14 edition of the New York Herald Tribune carried a story which said, “The U.S. and France will shortly begin discussion of the exact conditions under which
the United States would consider military intervention in the French Indochina war.” It added that agreement had been reached on a joint
THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS — 1954 229
conference, to be held probably in Paris. Other newspapers later spoke of impending ‘“‘Franco-American military discussions.”
Under cover of these pyrotechnics, however, Ambassador Douglas Dillon delivered to the Quai d’Orsay on May 15 a memorandum bearing conditions so formidable that they could be judged only as having been carefully calculated to impede, if not indeed to preclude, American mili-
tary involvement. For the weak and faltering coalition behind Laniel, they were manifestly impossible to meet. President Eisenhower, the memorandum revealed, could ask Congress to use American military forces (air and naval units, but no ground forces) in Indochina if seven conditions were met. These included the indefinite retention of French forces
“during the period of united action”; “unqualified freedom” for the Associated States to withdraw from the French Union; United Nations willingness to send an observation commission to Southeast Asia; and agreement on American-French command arrangements and on training the Vietnamese armed forces. They also stipulated that the French request for assistance must be formal, must be approved by the French Assembly as well as the cabinet, and must be addressed to Britain and several Asian nations in addition to the United States (all of whom must agree to meet the request, except Britain, whose “acquiescence” would suffice).23 From the American point of view, such conditions were perhaps not unreasonable, but they seemed hardly designed by an impulsive government eager to commit its military forces. Some observers have suggested that administration officials did not fully appreciate the difficulties for Laniel and Bidault, and thus put forward their memorandum in the serious expectation that all seven conditions could be met. ‘This seems a highly dubious view. Even if the Laniel government had been willing to act, the French Assembly would most certainly have balked, which
would have led to the immediate defeat of Laniel and the emergence of a new government far more disposed to make “peace at any price.” Taken together, the seven conditions were a set of interlocking booby traps for the French, and, if by some miracle they had been able to render them harmless and acceptable, it is likely that a now thoroughly disenchanted Eisenhower would have developed further obstacles. Describing the May 15 memorandum in his memoirs, the President wrote that these were “preconditions under which I might ask Congress for authority to use armed forces.” ?* (The italics were his own.) Robert Bowie, who was close to Dulles, called the conditions “makeweights.”’ ?5
From that point forward, the French could hardly have been under any illusion regarding the likelihood of American military intervention, yet negotiations ensued in Paris over the next several weeks between Dillon and Laniel. Gradually it began to be clear that the French aim
230 THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS — 1954
was not to obtain U.S. military support, but rather to use the aura of its possibility to strengthen French bargaining for a settlement at Geneva. Laniel emphasized his view that EDC would have no chance of ratification if the government were to pledge indefinite retention of the French
troops in Indochina. The French people, he said, desired to save their army, not enmesh it in larger Asian adventures under foreign command; for that reason, the Assembly would never approve a formal governmental request to “internationalize’”’ the war. As to the right of the Associated States to withdraw from the French Union, Laniel predicted the French people would never grant it. Why? Because the people of Indochina had never asked for it; moreover, he anticipated that even the Vietminh would wish to join.?° He also asked Dillon for a response to two questions: (1) could the United States guar-
antee the borders and the independence of Laos and Cambodia in the event the French withdrew from these countries? and (2) could the United States provide “written assurance’ of prompt air intervention to meet a Chinese Communist air attack on French forces? Dulles (replying through Dillon) gave Laniel a flat negative answer to the first question “in view of the military and legal impracticalities.”’ As to Chinese air attack, Dulles thought it so unlikely as to rule out the need for a written commitment, but he told Laniel that a collective regional defense arrangement would provide protection against such a contingency.?* When the French, later in the month, pressed again for a U.S. promise to retallate against a Chinese air attack without reference to the seven conditions, Dulles was reported to fee] that unilateral U.S. action would be entirely proper in such a case of “overt aggression.” The President, however,
came down fiercely and categorically on the other side. The United States, he insisted to his NSC assistant Robert Cutler, ‘““would not inter-
vene in China on any basis except united action.” Indeed, he “would not be responsible for going into China alone unless a joint Congressional resolution ordered him to do so. . .. Unilateral action by the United States in cases of this kind would destroy us’ by creating the expectation that we would also be prepared “to intervene alone in other parts of the world.’’?* Despite this stern presidential caveat, however, Dulles issued on June 11 what can only be interpreted as a warning of unilateral American action against China, in a statement that seemed to move the United States defense line to the Chinese border of Indochina. Referring to the possibility of Chinese attack, he said, “If such overt military aggression occurred, that would be a deliberate threat to the United States itself”; and while Washington would, of course, consult with its allies and avail itself of the United Nations, “we could not escape
ultimate responsibility for decisions closely touching our own security and self-defense.” 2°
THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS — 1954 231
Although the exchanges in Paris led Dillon on May gg to the rather remarkable conclusion that agreement “in principle’ had now been reached on the “political side,” °° in fact the seven American conditions and the French responses to them served mainly to underscore the gulf between the perspectives of Washington and Paris. But while these desultory exchanges remained secret, the public received the contrary impression that the United States might soon intervene, not only with air and naval forces, but with three ground divisions. The British having been neither consulted nor informed, Eden was left to read of these developments in fragmentary and misleading newspaper reports, until an aide of Bidault’s showed him a copy of the secret American memorandum. He was understandably annoyed that Washington had ‘“‘resurrected”’ the issue of intervention, for he felt this could only complicate and jeopardize his efforts to reach an acceptable settlement.*! British irritation and anger over American policy had indeed been mounting since the Dulles attempt to stretch the intent of the military staff talks; now his effort to pull Australia and New Zealand into a separate defense
pact, and the fact of the French-American talks, were adding fuel to a smoldering fire. For his own part, Churchill had shown patient forbearance, confining himself, in answering angry questions from the floor of the Commons, to brief and factual answers that fell short of criticizing Washington — e.g., “Britain had nothing to do with United States—France negotiations.” 2 On May 20, however (the day after Eisenhower's remark
that Britain was perhaps not an “indispensable” party to an Asian defense pact), the Prime Minister associated himself with the remarks of a Labour MP that the words and actions of American and French officials were contrary to the spirit of the Western Alliance.**
Fall of the Laniel Government
Following the press leak on May 13, which, by suggesting Bidault’s categorical rejection of the Vietminh proposals, nearly brought down the Laniel government, Eden had taken the lead in obtaining general agreement to secret sessions, on the assumption that serious negotiations were possible only if they could be reasonably insulated from the daily pressure of public opinion. From that point the conference had gradually gained its stride, with Eden pursuing the goal of a negotiated end to the war with a skill, tenacity and objectivity that produced both admiration and irritation in the French and American delegations. Eden and Molotov having come to a good working relationship, there was some progress during the last ten days of May. On the twenty-first, Molotov put forward a five-point proposal for settlement: (1) cease-fire, (2) regroupment of
232 THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS — 1954
troops into zones, (3) measures to prevent troop reinforcement after a cease-fire, (4) methods for controlling such arrangements, and (5) an inter-
national guarantee of a settlement. And while this proposal omitted any mention of disarming the “volunteers” in Laos and Cambodia, Bidault accepted it as a basis for discussion.** By May 29, the conference had agreed to establish a military committee of experts to study and report on the technical problems of cease-fire and regroupment; moreover, Pham Van Dong had agreed to de facto partition of Vietnam as an initial step, and both Molotov and Chou had agreed that there could be some transitional period between a military armistice and a political settlement. The Vietminh continued, however, to make steady military progress in the Red River Delta and that fact, combined with Bidault’s continued refusal to negotiate directly with Dong, or even to explore his offer of temporary partition, led to Communist stalling that became evident in early June.*> Molotov and Chou now reversed their positions on political issues, demanding that they must be considered concurrently with a ceasefire, and the Vietminh showed a stiff resistance to Eden’s statement that progress was impossible unless they were willing to withdraw their “volunteers” from Laos and Cambodia. The conference was suddenly stalemated. Eden, sensing that a critical point had been reached, indicated
on June io that he was willing to act as intermediary for only one or two more weeks: “Gentlemen, if the positions remain as they are today, I think it is our clear-cut duty to say so to the world and to admit that we have failed.” 3& Eisenhower and Dulles, who now concluded that the Communist side was “‘only spinning things out to suit their own military purposes,’’ cabled Bedell Smith that, if the French insisted on continuing
the negotiations “in spite of their obvious futility,’ he should return home, thereby reducing the level of American representation, and advise
Eden to do the same.37 This combination of events made it evident
that the end was near for the government in Paris. The Laniel cabinet fell on June 12, produced a suspension of formal negotiations at Geneva until July 14, and ushered in Pierre MendeésFrance as the sixteenth premier of the Fourth Republic with a promise to achieve an honorable settlement within thirty days or resign. ‘The new premier was a tough realist of the non-Communist Left who had declared a few months before he took office that “continuation of the Indochina war, with the human and material sacrifices it entails, does much less to bar the road to communism in Asia than to open it in France.” °° Washington seemed to view the new situation with a mixture of apprehension and relief. On the one hand, there was distrust of the new premier’s readiness to negotiate directly with the Vietminh and a feeling that the self-imposed thirty-day deadline could only benefit the Communists (there seemed a failure to appreciate the Mendeés-France calculation
THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS — 1954 233
that the deadline was a useful means of neutralizing an otherwise unmanageable Assembly during the specified period). On the other hand, the conference deadlock offered the hope that Britain might now be willing to participate in a collective security arrangement for all of Southeast Asia. On June 15, Dulles told a press conference he had never expected the negotiations to be “productive of anything good”; indeed, “it looked now as though the Geneva conference would be terminated, recessed, or reduced to a lower level of negotiation.” *®° But he looked forward, he said, to talks with the British that would be held in Wash-
ington on June 25. .
Before Eden left Geneva, however, there was evidence that a com-
bination of events — Laniel’s fall, Eden’s decision to quit, the announcement of Anglo-American talks, the clear failure of the Korean phase, and
Dulles’s unilateral warning to China—had produced a certain shock effect on Russia and China, and led them to concessions which revived the conference. On June 17, Molotov called on Eden to express his willingness to accept a Communist minority (Poland and Czechoslovakia) on a five-nation supervisory commission, provided the other three members were “nonaligned” states (India, Pakistan, Indonesia). Pham Van Dong agreed to withdraw Vietminh “volunteers” from Laos and Cambodia, and Chou told Eden that China would be willing to recognize the royal governments in those two states.!° These were concessions significant enough to indicate that the Communist side did not want the conference to fail.
Anglo-American Talks
Churchill and Eden came to Washington on June 25 for talks which had been originally set for a date in advance of the Geneva conference. They now seemed imperative to check the widening estrangement in Anglo-American relations, and to devise some definite plan for helping the French to make the best of a situation that was bad and growing worse. Mendeés-France was pledged to a quick settlement (by July 20). The problem was how to ensure that his efforts did not end in a wholesale sellout. As the discussions opened, the London Times said editorially: “It is generally agreed by those who believe that the future of the free world depends on the intimacy of the relationship between its two leaders that the talks have not begun a minute too soon.” #1 Unfortunately for the “atmospherics,” Eden made a speech in the House of Commons on the eve of the Washington talks which inadvertently exposed the American horror of “contact” with China and of any arrangement that would give the appearance of approving “the fruits of
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306 A GATHERING IMMOBILITY
Adams were quickly dispatched to Denver, and an effort soon organized
to give the appearance that the President and his administration were functioning normally. Eisenhower's encouraging recovery and the coming
and going of cabinet officers lent a verisimilitude to the operation, and both the press and the public seemed to recognize the constitutional delicacy and chose not to probe a number of evident anomalies — e.g., although not permitted to read newspapers for a month, and otherwise shielded by his doctors from contact with problems that might prove emotionally disturbing, the President was nevertheless reported to be working actively on his State of the Union Message. Fortunately his recovery was steady and visible to the public, which ereatly eased the tension and uncertainty in Washington. And the cabinet members displayed a selflessness and unity that reflected, among other things, Eisenhower’s singular gift for commanding the loyalty and affection of his associates. Vice-president Nixon presided over regular meet-
ings of the cabinet, but with the now explicit understanding that the presidency was operative in Denver, and that measures that could not be decided routinely would be sent to the temporary White House through Sherman Adams. The quiet power play to neutralize Nixon was not lost upon the sensitive Washington press corps, Rovere reporting in the New Yorker on October 8 that Sherman Adams “‘as the President’s appointed
caretaker” was “doing everything he can to cut Mr. Nixon down to size.” > In terms of policy, the U.S. government marked time for at least
two months, but the vital constitutional appearances were preserved, and public opinion remained calm. Reflecting on this surrealistic situation, Rovere concluded that “the power to communicate is in fact the most important of the presidential powers,’ and that the press secretary, James Hagerty, who spoke in the President's name and who conveyed to
the world each day the only authoritative view of the presidency in operation, was accordingly for a crucial period the largest figure in the administration.* In late October, Eisenhower addressed a message to the cabinet: “The doctors are relenting slightly their rigid rules as to my conduct here in the
hospital and have allowed me to try to thank, however inadequately, each one of you for the competent and completely selfless manner in which you have carried on the governmental business during these last few weeks. Sometimes I think I take too much for granted the loyalty and devotion of each of you.” > By November 11, Eisenhower was back in
Washington, able to walk down the ramp of the airplane without assistance. On November 14 he went to his Gettysburg farm for further convalescence. On January 13, 1956, he polled his closest colleagues on the question of running again, and they unanimously urged him to do
A GATHERING IMMOBILITY 307
so. (Dulles told him he should go on using his “God-given ability” for reconciling differences among men and nations.) On February 25, having
evidently decided he was not ready for retirement, he told a press conference that his decision would be “‘positive; that 1s, affirmative,” and four days later he spelled this out for a national television audience:
while he had “not the slightest doubt that I can now perform” the presidential duties, his acceptance was necessarily conditioned upon a public understanding that his doctors insisted on “‘a regime of ordered work activity, interspersed with regular amounts of exercise, recreation and rest.” ®° This pledge of further service was heartwarming to Republicans whose political salvation continued to depend decisively on Eisenhower’s popularity (George Bender, a congressman from Ohio, declared,
“I have faith in God and Dwight Eisenhower’). It seemed equally welcome to the great mass of Americans, who, whatever flaws they detected in the man, were deeply reassured by his saneness and practicality in foreign affairs, by his readiness to restrain Dulles and override the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the transcendent questions of war or peace. The conditions he attached to his future service, however, betokened no discernible change in his life style or habits of governing, and left the rather clear impression that the country should not look to an Eisenhower second term for exceptional intellectual energy, vision, or innovation. Defending the Status Quo
With Eisenhower still in the hospital, Dulles faced the prospect of attending the post-summit meeting of Foreign ‘Ministers in Geneva in solitary charge of American foreign policy. Although his outward appearance showed no change, Dulles was disquieted by the prospect of taking decisions visibly alone, without the assurance of Eisenhower’s political support at his side, and without the benefit of Eisenhower’s intuitive and sensitive judgment. Maxwell Rabb, the cabinet secretary, thought Dulles seemed “very upset, and not just because of his emotional feelings,’ and Sherman Adams found to his own surprise that ‘Foster seems lost without the Boss.’”’* Perhaps sensing the problem, Eisenhower wrote a polite but firm note to Nixon a week before the new Geneva conference, reminding him (and through him the cabinet) that Dulles was going to Europe with “my complete confidence” and that there must be no attempt to circum-
scribe his position: ‘“He must be the one who both at the conference table and before the world speaks for me with authority for our country. 8 The Foreign Ministers meeting, held from October 27 to November
308 A GATHERING IMMOBILITY
16, revealed all of the basic disagreements that had surfaced at the summit, but revealed them in an atmosphere of greater asperity. The West was still stuck with its unsalable demand for free all-German elections. The West also continued to insist that a German settlement was the priority question, to be settled ahead of disarmament and East-West
security arrangements. For their part, the Soviets wanted not only an inviolable status for the East German regime, but also disarmament — by
which they meant an end to NATO and a withdrawal of both British and American forces from the Continent. One consequence of total deadlock was that Dulles was not burdened by the need to take any far-reaching decisions during the critical period of Eisenhower’s convalescence; another was the tendency in Europe (and to a lesser extent in the United States) to blame Dulles for the “sterile, rigid” linkage between security arangements and German _ unification, for most Europeans were deeply interested in the former, while the latter left them quite cold. This criticism was mitigated somewhat by the harsh unreasonableness of the Soviet demands, for NATO was now universally recognized as the cornerstone of West European security. A third probable consequence of the Foreign Ministers meeting was that the specific focus of the issues under debate tended to obscure for Dulles the wider manifestations of change in the world power balance and of the new flexibility in Soviet diplomacy toward the Third World. While Democratic critics, like Adlai Stevenson, charged that the nation was drifting into new peril because “our Government is unprepared for
this new Communist offensive, which has been in the making since Korea and the death of Stalin,’ ® Dulles continued to insist that the change in Soviet tactics proved the correctness of past Western policies and demonstrated the need for holding steady on the course of collective security backed by deterrent retaliatory power. Moreover, while others stressed the need to meet the new Soviet tactics with larger infusions of
economic and technical assistance, Dulles continued to focus on the political-military aspects of global confrontation. He thus tended to see
the Soviet economic aid drive not as a serious new challenge to be countered in kind, but rather as evidence that Soviet expansion by mulitary means had been blocked; in short, as an indirect source of satisfaction. This was a position that placed him in comfortable alignment with most of the military professionals, and with the economic conservatives whose steadfast opposition to new foreign aid programs reflected a concern that these would unbalance the budget.
Nothing perhaps better revealed Dulles’s inner judgment as to the crucial elements of his policy than the interview he gave to Life magazine in January 1956. This was not an extemporaneous exercise, but a planned
ff ' °
Don t Be Afraid --- I Can Always Pull You Back"!
: :P.. f 7 PA . Za “2 y : .
ing Black won Nasser’s confidence and his approval of the conditions set out in the bank loan. He could not, however, persuade him to accept also the conditions attaching to the American and British offers of grant money which, in the form of azdes-mémoires, were sitting on Nasser’s desk heavily marked with red pencil. Black explained that these offers contained standard loan conditions aimed at guarding against Egyptian inflation and at concentrating available Egyptian funds on the Aswan project, but Nasser was also worried by the absence of assured funding beyond the initial phase, and told Black “‘he was still going to see if he couldn’t get some change in the terms. . .”® His refusal to close the deal quickly proved a fateful hinge, for a mere ten days later Dulles’s enthusiasm for the project had markedly cooled, and later events in March and April reinforced the negative sentiments in both Washington and London. Support for the Aswan High Dam presented definite political problems for the Eisenhower administration. Zionist opposition was predictable and reflexive; so too was the resistance of hard-liners in the Congress who scorned all neutralism and thought Nasser’s purchase of Soviet arms was ideological treason. The most curious source of trouble, however, was a group of “cotton senators’ from the South who asserted that the dam would, by increasing the acreage available for Egyptian cotton (fifteen to eighteen years thence) intensify a trade competition already tougher than their hking. Dulles could not ignore the aggregate of these pressures, but they do not appear to have been anything that could not have been overborne by a determined and popular President. A postmortem study by the Fulbright subcommittee (of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) pointed out that the congressional opposition had been narrowly confined to the Senate Appropriations Committee, but that no serious effort was ever made to overcome it.?7 Dulles, who was cool to Nasser and convinced that neutralism or nonalignment was a political fiction, was unwilling to expend his own limited political capital with the Congress unless the political risks of the venture could be substantially reduced. And Eisenhower, recovering slowly from his heart attack, had neither the energy nor the political desire to make the fight. Walking in the woods at Camp David on December 8, where Eisenhower was continuing his convalescence, Dulles explained the pros and cons to the President, and then recommended a special, very secret plan to improve the domestic risks: send a personal emissary to the Middle East in a renewed attempt to reach a basic Arab-Israeli settlement. Al-
332 THE FATEFUL ASWAN RENEGE
though no direct linkage between a settlement and the Aswan financing would be made, still Nasser would be given to understand that the West, by strengthening his domestic position via the Aswan financing, would
be placing him in a safer position to negotiate a genuine peace with Israel. Eisenhower approved the proposal and, after some discussion, made his choice of emissary: Robert B. Anderson, a Texas lawyer and businessman who had already served the administration as Secretary of the Navy and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and who would later return in 1957 as successor to Secretary Humphrey at the Treasury. On December 12, 1955, the New York Times reported that “the U.S. Government is tying its proposals for a ten-year aid program to build the High Aswan Dam in Egypt to a settlement of the Egyptian-Israeli disputes. The hope
here is that the negotiations for economic aid to Egypt can lead to a general settlement of the disturbing Near East situation.” Except for this one breach, however, the mission remained a secret for many years.
One historian of the period learned of it from a reference in an early draft of Eisenhower’s memoirs which did not appear in the published book.®
But the mission was destined to fail. Nasser was prepared to suggest a framework for peace talks and to develop formulae for possible settlements, but he could not speak for other Arab states, and could not accept politically intolerable terms — that is, terms which would so alienate Arab opinion as to bring about his own overthrow. Nor was Israel prepared for concessions. Ben-Gurion could not be persuaded that the Aswan
High Dam, which would strengthen Nasser, was good for Israel.1° Indeed, having returned to the cabinet as defense minister in November 1955, he was pressing the Israeli cabinet to approve a military seizure of the Sinai, and he launched a severe raid on Syria on December 12, which
caused Egypt to respond with fedayeen terrorist attacks in order to prove the viability of the new Egyptian-Syrian alliance.11 Anderson’s effort had, moreover, to be carried on against the background of the December crisis in Jordan; all in all, it was not a propitious season for peacemaking. As Anderson shuttled quietly between Cairo and Tel Aviv, it became apparent that Dulles had failed to measure the full depth of the differences between the parties. Failure of the Anderson mission was undeniable by February, and it rapidly chilled the enthusiasm for the Aswan project which Dulles had conveyed to Black only ten days before.
When, a few days later, Nasser submitted his request for substantial changes in the Anglo-American azdes-mémoires, the temperature dropped to freezing in both Washington and London.
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The Crisis in Jordan
In late 1955, for reasons that seemed grounded more in traditional, instinctive British concern to uphold the Hashemite family in Iraq and Jordan than in geopolitical considerations, Eden acceded to powerful urgings from fellow Arabists in the Foreign Office that Jordan be brought into the Baghdad Pact. The new Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan,
a man of strong and unrepentant imperial tendencies, was in the vanguard of the effort, and Eden was persuaded — despite his private agreement with Nasser to freeze Arab membership in exchange for a suspension of overt Egyptian opposition to the pact (an agreement which Nasser had substantially honored).
As in the original approach to Iraq, the British put the Turks out in front, President Celal Bayar of Turkey traveling to Amman for a state visit in early November. Concurrently, Nuri in Iraq asked Washington to find some means of stopping American oil payments to Saudi Arabia for perhaps six months, in order to prevent Saudi financing of the antic-
ipated street demonstrations against the pact in Jordan.1? It was a bizarre request, and Eisenhower and Dulles promptly refused it. They
also advised the British against an attempt to bring Jordan into the pact, but primarily on the grounds that no member should have a com-
mon border with Israel. But Macmillan had the bit in his teeth and Washington, like London, continued to underestimate the latent strength of Pan-Arabic feeling and the capacity of Radio Cairo to in-
fluence it. Against the background of hopeful British-American-Egyptian talks looking toward Western financing of the Aswan Dam, Nasser was
slow to believe the violation of his agreement with Eden. But in early
December, when the chief of the British imperial staff, General Sir Gerald Templer, arrived in Amman to consummate the military agreements, the scales fell from Egyptian eyes. As the Jordanian cabinet, which was riven by the issue of pact membership, began to break up between pro-Nasser nationalists and traditional supporters of the mon-
archy, Radio Cairo opened up on the Templer mission, calling it a Zionist-Imperialist plot to drag Jordan into a network of disastrous foreign alliances, Rioting broke out in several Jordanian cities with largescale loss of life and on December 18 King Hussein found it prudent to
drop the idea of joining the Baghdad Pact. Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia at once sought to add insult to British injury by offering to sub-
stitute their own aid for the full amount of the long-standing British subsidy, which sustained the Jordanian army and thus the throne, but the king refused.15
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The crisis was painful and costly for all concerned, and a harbinger of future troubles. Nasser concluded that Eden could not be trusted. Eden, who came under severe political attack at home for an ill-conceived and unsuccessful venture, concluded that Nasser was the supreme enemy
of British influence in the Middle East. He also moved to assume personal control of foreign affairs by a cabinet shuffle that sent the fire-eating
Macmillan to the Exchequer and named the more manageable Selwyn Lloyd to the Foreign Office. Dulles was made more keenly aware of crucial differences in American and British perceptions of interest in the Middle East, and of the many vicious crosscurrents beyond Washington’s control.
Eden Loses His Touch
On March 1 there occurred another event in Jordan which, in retrospect, seems rather clearly to have marked the beginning of Eden’s alarm-
ing and tragic deterioration. ‘The acknowledged master of diplomacy, he began to appear, as Prime Minister, insufficiently rough and robust for the exercise of effective leadership in the contentious arenas of democracy. Possessing the technique of the specialist rather than the broad perspective of the statesman, he was soon being castigated by the London press for a “dithering” performance on both domestic and foreign issues.
Said one newspaper, he was “a fidget, a fusspot . . . slow to make up his mind and quick to change it.’’ An editorial in the Daily Telegraph of January 3, 1956, said that it was Eden’s habit, when speaking, to make a point by placing a clenched fist in the palm of his other hand, ‘But the smack is seldom heard.” Anthony Nutting, the young number three at the Foreign Office, later wrote that he came upon Eden the following day “positively writhing in the agony of this barbed shaft which . . . had struck him at his weakest point.” 1 Eden was not, in fact, a tough planner with the tenacity to chart and hold steady to a long-term course. He was a negotiator, a tactician who planned his advance in limited moves; moreover, to the political pressures upon him were added the toxic effects of a damaged bile duct, operated on three times during 1953, yet still in imperfect repair, which was eating away at his whole system, edging his nerves and blurring his judgment. On March 1, 1956, King Hussein abruptly dismissed Glubb Pasha, the
British general who had built and who commanded the famous Arab Legion in Jordan. If Hussein’s memoirs can be taken at face value, this action was “‘a strictly Jordanian affair. .. . My main motive in dismissing him was because we were in disagreement on two issues: the role of Arab officers in our Army, and defence strategy.” 15 Nationalist sentiment was no doubt a factor, and it was being inflamed by daily personal attacks
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from Radio Cairo, depicting Glubb as the real ruler of Jordan. But whatever the mix of elements, King Hussein, who claimed to have ruminated on the matter for a year, brought the issue to a head on February 29 when a list of officers whom Glubb proposed for dismissal from the army was
brought to him for signature. “Their only fault, as far as I could see,”
Hussein wrote, “was that they were nationalists and ambitious... . That night I decided Glubb ... would have to go immediately.” 1° Despite grave and angry warnings from the British ambassador of very serious consequences for “‘yourself, the monarchy, and the whole future of Jordan,’ 17 Glubb was gone by 7:00 A.M. on March 1. An era had ended.
Eden blamed Nasser totally for the Glubb dismissal. It put him in a passionate frenzy, and drove him to a declaration of personal war. As Anthony Nutting later wrote, on that “fatal day,’’ Eden decided “the world was not big enough to hold both him and Nasser.’ ?8 And from that point forward, Nutting believed, “Eden completely lost his touch.” 19 After a desperate week of vainly trying to restore his domestic position
by persuading Eisenhower to bring the United States fully into the Baghdad Pact, he was attacked in debate for a Middle East policy that
was “ill-formed, ill-prepared ... both weak and provocative at the same time,’ ?° and for the first time in his career, appearing ill and exhausted, he lost his temper in the House of Commons. Randolph Churchill, who bore him no love, wrote that this “marked the beginning of the disintegration of the personality and character that the public thought him to possess.” 2! What seemed to goad him most was pressure from the right, from the small but vocal “Suez Rebel’ group and the jingo press, both of whom reflected wounds to the national and imperial pride inflicted by the “Egyptian upstart.” Julien Amery, one of the back-bench
rebels, wrote a letter to the Times charging that Glubb’s dismissal attested to “‘the bankruptcy of a policy of appeasement in the Middle East. . . . We are now very close to the final disaster.” ?? Refusing to acknowledge that Britain now stood as a middle power in the shadow of thermonuclear giants, that it faced changes beyond its control in the Middle East, the ‘Tory diehards and at least half of the British press insisted
that “a lost grip . . . had to be recovered.” It was enough to stampede Eden, who was relatively unaccustomed to harsh criticism, who had been perhaps too much “the ‘Golden Boy’ of the Conservative Party’ basking “in the sunshine of Churchill’s admiration.” ?? In quick succession, he now associated himself with the French position on Algeria, reversed his position on the Aswan Dam, opened talks with his military chiefs that
appeared predicated on the assumption of certain future conflict with Nasser, and began to treat every small incident in the Middle East as a major challenge to British authority (and to see Nasser’s hand in every
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incident). This visible toughening of British policy, which ran hard against the grain of Eden’s temperament and style, represented a victory for what another British minister called the ‘“whiff-of-grapeshot school” led by “those overgrown Boy Scouts personified by Duncan Sandys.” *4 Nor was this the worst. Selwyn Lloyd brought back from an unhappy visit to Cairo the conclusion that Nasser was another Mussolini, and Eden was soon persuaded the analogy was apt, indeed was ready to believe that Nasser’s willingness to negotiate the British withdrawal from Suez had been merely a means of clearing the way for the entry of Communism and a march against Israel. His insistence on the Mussolini analogy, which showed a total lapse of historical perspective, is difficult to explain in a man of such wide and deep experience. One concludes that the com-
bined attacks on his political manhood and on his internal physical balance were bringing him to a state of controlled frenzy. In April, he received an able memorandum from the Foreign Office pleading for calm
analysis and realism in dealing with Egypt. His response was to take Nutting away from a dinner at the Savoy Hotel where he was entertain-
ing Harold Stassen, and to shout into the telephone: “What’s all this nonsense about isolating Nasser or ‘neutralising’ him, as you call it? I want him destroyed, can’t you understand? I want him removed, and if you and the Foreign Office don’t agree, then you had better come to the
Cabinet and explain why.” An Anxious Spring
The Aswan matter thus drifted in a moribund state, while further developments — in London, Cairo, and Washington — conspired against
its revival. Dulles’s instinctive recoil from neutralism was not his only political allergy; he was also rendered nervous by any evidence of normal relations between the West and the Communist powers. Thus he viewed with wary distaste the visit to London of Khrushchev and Bulganin on
April 18, a trip that had been arranged during that brief moment of East-West cordiality at the Geneva summit the preceding July. Although there were some hostile demonstrations, the British public and _ press treated ‘“Khrush and Bulge,” on the whole, with a warmhearted curtosity normally reserved for performing bears in a traveling circus, and the official talks were lively and unexpectedly friendly (Khrushchev later told the British ambassador in Moscow, “‘Bulganin can vote Labor if he likes, but I’m going to vote Conservative’’).?® At a press conference on
April 27, however, Khrushchev inadvertently triggered an Egyptian move toward Communist China which could only worsen the prospect for Aswan financing in Washington. Responding to a question about
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arms shipments to the Middle East, he denied that Soviet arms were going to Egypt (insisting with less than candor that they came from Czechoslovakia), but then went on to say that the USSR really preferred
a general arms embargo in that area and would participate in this if it could be worked out by the United Nations. It was a measure of the extreme anxiety in Cairo that Nasser read this remark as a serious threat to his continued flow of arms from Russia, and that he moved with unseemly haste (and no consultation) to recognize Red China. The move was a piece of sad and fateful foolishness, for, while the Red Chinese had little to offer in the way of modern arms,
the act of inviting them into an already turbulent area could only set Washington’s teeth on edge. As late as April 3, and in partial answer to Eden’s emotional warnings that Nasser had become a clear enemy of the West, Dulles told a press conference he thought the Cairo regime
was actuated by a desire for “genuine independence” and he saw no evidence of ‘‘vassalage to the Soviet Union.” #7 But in Dulles’s pantheon
of devils, the Red Chinese represented perhaps the highest and purest evil, and this view was shared by a large majority of the Congress, the press, and the American people. That he was nettled and affronted by Nasser’s action, and that it had some effect on the Aswan decision, seems
clear from subsequent statements. A year later (April 2, 1957), in one of the varied defenses he employed to explain and defend his disastrous termination of the Western offer on Aswan, he told a press conference that Egypt’s recognition of China “forced upon us an issue to which I think there was only one proper response: That issue was, do nations which play both sides get better treatment than nations which are stalwart and work with us?” 28 This variation on the theme of immoral neutralism was a particularly thin rationale for the Aswan renege, however, for the Soviet arms deal and the Western desire to neutralize its effect had, after all, been the primary motivating force behind the offer to finance Aswan. Nasser was already ‘‘playing both sides,” and his recognition of China changed nothing of substance in that respect. As the Fulbright subcommittee pointed out in its later investigative report, Dulles
really could not have it both ways: ““To argue that the arms deal was both the reason for making the offer and also the reason for withdrawing the offer is wholly illogical.” 9
Fugene Black visited Nasser again on June 21 (in the course of a swing through several other Middle East countries), and found the Egyp-
tian leader “rather surprised and hurt that he had gotten no answer to his suggested changes in the terms of the grants.” 9° Nasser may have been hurt, but it 1s doubtful he was really surprised, for his own ambassador had hurried home from Washington on May 21 to tell him of the extra trouble stirred up by his recognition of China, and Eden’s hostility
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was, of course, being spread daily upon the public record. Black again urged Nasser to retract his request for amendments, and accept the ardesmémotres as they were presented, but he left Cairo without knowing that Nasser would shortly decide to take this advice. On his return to Washington, Black asked for an appointment with Dulles and, at a meeting which included Hoover and Murphy, reported the nature of his advice to Nasser and also the World Bank’s unchanged view that the Egyptian economy could fully meet the burdens of the project. Dulles met the latter statement with heavy skepticism, remark-
ing that he had “been thinking about this Aswan project, and I just wonder if this isn’t too much for the Egyptian Government to undertake.” 31 Black assured him there had been no change in the capacity of that economy since the deal was offered the preceding November; the general magnitude of Egypt’s obligations under the Soviet arms deal had
been known at the time and had not changed. Dulles, however, had turned off his mental hearing aid. He was now pacing slowly up and down the room, saying, “I just don’t know whether we should go through
with this or not.” 3? Black, acknowledging that the project was large and difficult, said that, speaking purely as a banker, he would be saved a
good deal of exertion if the deal were called off. But speaking as an American citizen, he was concerned. Recognizing that the Aswan Dam was the premium project for the Egyptian people, and that Nasser had staked his political fortune on public promises that it would be built, Black was afraid “Hell might break loose” if the American offer were terminated. At that point, Dulles gave him a cold sideways glance and walked out of the room, bringing the meeting to an abrupt close.** The Miscalculation
Dulles had now rather evidently decided to let the Aswan offer lapse, although he appears to have withheld the fact of this decision from his State Department colleagues, his British and French allies, and possibly even from the President, who had by now suffered a new physical setback — a sharp attack of ileitis on June 8. Always sensitive to conservative
opinion, Dulles accepted Treasury Secretary Humphrey’s fear that the Egyptians would probably default along the way, leaving the United States to rescue the project with large infusions of capital or else to bear the stigma of its failure. This was a real and practical consideration, but Humphrey’s opinion was largely intuitive, and quite superficial compared to the exhaustive studies made by the World Bank; it was, however, an opinion that came from a far more politically powerful quarter. In addition, Dulles distrusted Nasser and was rankled by the Egyptian
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temerity to try to bargain between the American and Russian offers. Himself the coldest of bargainers, never hesitant to exert tremendous pressure on an opponent, he was rather quick to characterize the same quality in others as ‘‘blackmail’” — especially if he perceived that a moral issue was at stake along the spiked periphery where freedom confronted
the Communist dictatorship. Finally, he was inwardly convinced that a system as evil as Soviet Communism could not really compete with the great citadel of American capitalism, that the Russian offer to build the Aswan Dam was an empty threat. The best way to prove this, and not only in the Middle East but across the whole span of the undeveloped world, was to let Russian backwardness join with Egyptian incompetence. The resulting humiliation would expose the emptiness of Soviet economic boasts and promises; at the same time, it would cause Nasser’s fall from power, thus demonstrating the perils of neutralism. If Mohamed Heikal’s account is accepted, Nasser had also concluded by late June or early July that Dulles would terminate the Aswan offer. Talking to his agitated pro-American ambassador, Ahmed Hussein (who remained in Cairo for nearly two months before returning to see Dulles on July 19), Nasser said: “I have concrete evidence that even if you went back and accepted all their conditions, they will not give us the Aswan
Dam.’ When the ambassador demurred, Nasser told him: ‘‘Well, all right. .. . Go and tell [Dulles] that we have accepted everything. But don’t humiliate us. Because we are not going to get the High Dam.” 34 Word then reached Dulles in early July that Nasser now fully accepted the Anglo-American azdes-mémoires and was sending his ambassador back to Washington to conclude the Aswan deal. It was an unwelcome surprise, for it created a deadline for decision and sharpened the context in which decision would have to be taken, making an angry reaction throughout the Arab world a virtual certainty. It would have been much easier if Cairo had simply chosen to accept Moscow’s offer, permitting the Western offer to be superseded. But the new circumstances did not change the basic situation, as Dulles saw it, and they did offer a dramatic Opportunity to demonstrate America’s staunch resistance to “immoral blackmail.” He carried the news to Eisenhower on July 193 at his Gettysburg farm, where the President was still recovering from his ileitis attack, and expressed the judgment that Cairo’s shift of position probably meant that Nasser had failed to get a firm commitment from the Soviets.*5 Eisenhower expressed his annoyance at the complication, indicating that, in the circumstances and on the threshold of a presidential campaign, he should not be asked to take domestic political risks for Nasser. Still, the issue presented a quandary, and the President did not resolve it. While the discussion clearly moved in the direction of a negative decision, not only its manner and timing but even its substance were
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left largely to Dulles’s discretion, pending consultation with the British and further reflection. Dulles subsequently told the British ambassador that he was “dubious” about the loan, but would have to see the Egyptian ambassador on July 19. Makins’s own advice, which was reinforced the next day by a further exchange of cables with Eden, was that Dulles should consider his decision with utmost care.** The British had no desire to make the loan; indeed, they were embarrassed that the offer still lay open for Nasser to pick up. At the same time, having negotiated long and painfully with Nasser, they feared a volatile reaction to a perceived slight. Uneasily, they decided to leave the matter to Dulles’s judgment, but urged him
“to play it long’; that is, to adopt the tactics of delay and avoid the dangers of a flat or abrupt rejection.*7 In partial response to British advice, Dulles instructed Robert Bowie
to draft a press statement that would minimize the sense of offense to the Cairo government. The product of Bowie’s labor was conciliatory in tone, yet contained a comment on Egypt's credit standing and economic capacity that could only be read in Cairo as a gratuitous slur. It said that because of “developments” since December 1955, “the ability of Egypt to devote adequate resources to assure the project’s success has become more uncertain than at the time the offer was made.” Bowie has said subsequently that this language was designed primarily to assure congressional understanding and support for the decision, but was not intended to injure or provoke Nasser.?* Since Dulles’s aim was to hand the political-economic hot potato of the Aswan project to Cairo and Moscow in the belief that they could not make a success of it, there is no reason to doubt Bowie’s recollection. Still, the statement reflects a remarkable insensitivity to the raw anxieties and pride of the Cairo regime, a deficiency that would almost surely have been corrected and softened if Dulles had shown it to Eugene Black, or the British ambassador. Moreover, the French ambassador in Washington, Couve de Murville, had told the State Department just a few days earlier that “to deny the
loan... is a very dangerous action; it can affect the Suez Canal.” *° He had served in Cairo for several years. Dulles consulted with none of these men, and indeed brushed the final statement through the President in a meeting that lasted only twelve minutes.*° In perhaps no other decision during his tenure at the State Department did he play so lone a hand. The Renege
The fifty-minute meeting with Ambassador Hussein started at about 11:30 A.M. on July 19, with Dulles explaining in a kindly manner the
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difficulties he was encountering in the Congress. The ambassador sat nervously on the edge of the divan in the Secretary’s office, while Dulles
sat to one side in an armchair with his legs stretched out on the table. Undersecretary Hoover and Assistant Secretary Allen were also present on the American side, while one Egyptian diplomat accompanied his ambassador. An ebullient pro-American, Hussein said that he recognized
the problems facing the United States, but that the Aswan High Dam was of absolutely transcendent importance to Egypt and the Middle East. He emphasized how much he personally wanted the West to support the project, and how concerned he was by the potential consequences of the Russian offer.41 Dulles nodded. Then speaking in his ponderous,
pedantic style, slowly and powerfully, all in sad tones, he began to marshal the arguments in support of his conclusion that it was now impossible for the United States to participate in the Aswan project. About
halfway through this exposition, Hussein caught the unmistakable drift, became agitated, and finally interrupted Dulles with an anguished plea. “Don’t please say you are going to withdraw the offer,” he said in effect, ‘because [and here he patted his pocket] we have the Russian
offer to finance the dam right here.” 4? This interjection apparently irritated Dulles, who resented any attempt to maneuver him, but it also gave him his cue. Although he must have known that Hussein’s statement, far from being attempted blackmail, was the desperate plea of a pro-American Arab who feared that Soviet financing for the dam was
inevitable if the United States withdrew its offer, Dulles retorted, in effect: ““Well then, as you already have the money, you have no need of our support. The offer is withdrawn.” 4%
It is plausible that Dulles was genuinely angry, that he brought the meeting to a more abrupt and heated conclusion than he had intended, and that it was Hussein’s report of the discussion to Nasser, when coupled with the public statement, that produced the Egyptian leader’s bitter
reaction: ““This is not a withdrawal,’ Nasser told Heikal and Foreign Minister Fawzi as he studied the radio messages on his aircraft, flying back to Cairo from a meeting in Brioni with Tito and Nehru. “It is an attack on the regime and an invitation to the people of Egypt to bring it down.” #4
Immediately after the meeting with the unhappy Hussein, Dulles joined Henry Luce and C. D. Jackson for lunch in his inner sanctum. The publisher and his senior editor (who had earlier served a stint as Eisenhower’s assistant for “psychological strategy”) found the Secretary exhilarated as he recounted his decision, especially his remark to Hussein that Nasser could “‘go to Moscow” for his money. But Jackson also gained
the impression that Nasser was only an incidental factor, that Dulles
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had hurled his spear primarily at the Kremlin: he had decided to use the Aswan issue as a means of meeting Russia’s ‘“‘“economic counteroffen-
sive... there and then.” * The Secretary emphasized his extreme allergy to “blackmail” and his refusal to temporize with any of its manifestations. He evidenced little or no concern with possible Egyptian re-
taliation. Yet by the end of the same working day, he had apparently suffered at least one or two pangs of doubt. About 7:30 p.M., his special assistant, William Macomber, was laboring in a small outer office, sorting out cables and memoranda to be sent on down the line for action, when he glanced up in surprise to find Secretary Dulles sitting directly before him, hat on and briefcase in hand. Macomber recalled his visual impression: “It looked like he had no neck. He had a perfectly normal neck. It was just a very big neck, and he was a very massive fellow.” 4 After he had jumped to his feet and been waved back down again, the following colloquy occurred: Dulles: Well, this has been quite a day. Macomber: Yes, sir. Dulles: Well, I certainly hope we did the right thing. Macomber: Yes, sir, I hope so. Dulles: 1 certainly hope we did the right thing. Dulles then got up and walked out to the waiting elevator. He had never before stopped by Macomber’s desk, and he never did again.‘
Rationalization after the Fact
A week later, on July 26, when Nasser’s amazing nationalization of the Suez Canal exposed the immensity of Dulles’s miscalculation, a storm broke over him, raining down attacks on his competence and judgment like hailstones, and lasting for months and even years afterwards. Against these he developed a variegated and rather contradictory set of defenses, including (1) responsiveness to congressional feeling, (2) resistance to “‘blackmail,” (3) weakness of the Egyptian economy, and (4) the claim that Nasser had deliberately provoked a negative action in order to justify his own prior decision to nationalize the canal. None of these proved particularly convincing to either critics or friends. In reply to Senator Clifford Case during a hearing at which he was
defending himself against the charge of having triggered the Canal seizure, he said: ““There is one thing I want to make clear, Senator. I do not believe in the U.S. being blackmailed, and any time I sense a purpose on the part of any country to try to get money out of us by threaten-
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ing that if we don’t pay the money it will do something, at that point I say, ‘Nothing doing.’ ”’ #8 But the blackmail charge stands on very slender evidence, residing chiefly in Ambassador Hussein’s anguished interyjection of July 19, and in an interview Nasser gave to the New York Times on April g. On the earlier occasion, Nasser said he still held a Soviet offer
to finance the dam and would “consider accepting” it if negotiations with Washington were to break down. But he added: “I do not mention the Soviet offer of aid as a threat or as bluff. The Soviet offer was very general and, really, we have not studied it.” #° He was still doing business with the World Bank and keeping the Russians at arm’s length.
The assertion that the Egyptian economy was inadequate to the task of shouldering the Aswan burden was not much more impressive. Eugene
Black, who was not consulted, continued to insist that the project was sound and the strength of the Egyptian economy adequate. And later events proved that that economy was able to carry about $900 million in capital burdens, in the context of an arrangement whereunder the Soviets supplied some $310 million (or nearly 20 percent less than the total amount of the Western offer).5° Moreover, the economy concurrently assumed the added burden of a later Soviet arms deal that was arranged to replace Egyptian equipment losses suffered in the Suez War. Even the President taxed his Secretary of State, raising questions he might better have asked before the renege. Dulles replied to one query by saying that, if he had not acted as he did, Congress would itself have imposed the termination “almost unanimously.” *4 A year later, with a skeptical President still probing, Dulles introduced a wholly new line of defense. In a letter of October 30, 1957, he wrote: “President Nasser has since said that he planned for nearly two years to seize the Suez Canal
Company, but was waiting for a good occasion. He knew that if he pressed for a decision from us when he did the result would be negative because the Congressional action had been announced.* Nevertheless he pressed for a definitive answer, and I suspect he did so in order to create the occasion for which he was looking.” 5? Eugene Black called this theory “impossible — completely ridiculous,’ 5? and he was supported by the American, British, and French ambassadors in Cairo at
the time. They all agreed that Nasser had contingency plans, but, in their considered judgment, he was not eager to cut short the Suez Canal Company’s concession; if Dulles’s negative had been couched in softer terms, they believed he would simply have picked up the Soviet offer.>+ On this analysis, Nasser reacted violently because he interpreted Dulles’s statement and manner as designed to do him fatal political injury. Yet it 1s necessary to ask, on Dulles’s behalf, why the manner of the * Presumably, this is a reference to the report of the Senate Appropriations Committee.
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renege made such a difference, why the sensible course for Nasser, even after Dulles’s abrupt “punch in the stomach,” would not have been to embrace the Soviets? ‘The answer may lie in veiled regions beyond reason, yet there are clues. There are the ingrained factors of Arab dignity and Arab revenge. There is also evidence of a distinct preference for relations with
the West, notwithstanding the junta’s bitter experience with colonial exploitation, and there is a discernible aversion to Communism (which time and attempted Russian-Egyptian collaboration have now confirmed). Aly Sabry, one of Nasser’s closest aides, told an American shortly
after the Canal seizure that “Nasser chose nationalization to keep free of Russia. Russian aid would have been the simple solution. . . . Nationalization was dangerous.” *5
From which emerges an irony. Dulles, bent upon pursuing his own highly abstract brand of global anti-Communism, was only incidentally interested in bringing Nasser down. His principal aim was to expose what he regarded as the pretensions of Soviet economic aid programs. Demonstration that these consisted of unfillable promises would break the momentum of the Soviet drive for “competitive coexistence”; that it might also humiliate regimes in small countries that had staked their own futures on those Soviet promises would be a salutary, but quite secondary, result. It was precisely Dulles’s ignorance of Arabs, his tendency to treat Nasser as an undifferentiated pawn in a larger game, that produced the specifically Arablike and rashly human nationalization of the Suez Canal.
Cross-Purposes and Cardboard Proposals Powe of a trained lawyer’s capacity to switch his attention quickly
and almost totally from one problem to another, Dulles emplaned for Latin America on July 20 to join President Eisenhower at a meeting of the Organization of American States in Panama, apparently confident he had laid the Nasser problem to rest. Intent upon other matters, he took no notice of Nasser’s first reaction, a speech delivered in a black rage on July 24, after five days of brooding on the American rebuff: “Our reply today is that we will not allow the domination of force and
the dollar. I will tell you on Thursday, God willing, how Egypt has acted so that all its projects — such as this project — may be projects of sovereignty, dignity, and not those of humiliation, slavery, domination, rule, and exploitation. . . . When Washington sheds every decent principle on which foreign relations are based and broadcasts the lie, snare, and delusion that Egypt’s economy is unsound, then I look them in the face and say: Drop dead of your fury for you will never be able to dictate to Egypt.” 3
Two days later, on July 26, having brought a daring plan of physical seizure to completion in record time, Nasser went to Alexandria by train
to address a large expectant throng at sundown in Liberation Square. In a long, rhythmic, emotional speech, during which he descended often
into the Arabic vernacular, he “played the throng like an immense organ” for two hours and forty-five minutes. ““They are punishing Egypt,”
he declared of the Western powers, “‘because she refused to side with military blocs.’ 2 Russia had offered to finance the Aswan High Dam, but Nasser did not want Russian help; Egypt would build the dam with profits from the Canal. “This money is ours and this canal belongs to
346 CROSS-PURPOSES AND CARDBOARD PROPOSALS
Egypt because it is an Egyptian limited liability company. .. . We dug the Canal with our lives, our skulls, our bones, our blood.” ? By prearrangement, when he uttered the name of Ferdinand de Lesseps (the builder of the Suez Canal), as he was to do fourteen times in ten minutes, hand-picked civilian-military teams moved to take physical possession of
the Suez Canal Company facilities at Port Said, Port Suez and Cairo. ‘Therefore, I have signed today and the government has approved . . . a resolution . . . for the nationalization of the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal.” * The deed was done. When Dulles heard of the Canal nationalization and seizure, he was
in Peru to attend inaugural ceremonies for the new President-elect, Manuel Prado Ugarteche. His first reaction was unvarnished shock and surprise; he was caught almost totally off guard. Still, it did not occur to him to rush home until he received a copy of Eden’s July 27 cable to kisenhower reflecting London’s sense of anger, urgency, and immediate
readiness to use force. Anxious to leave, but persuaded that he must stay at least until the ribbon of office had been bestowed on President Prado, he remained in Lima all during the twenty-eighth, perspiring uncomfortably in white tie and tails through a lengthy mass, several processions, a large ceremonial lunch, and finally the inaugural proceed-
ings in the Peruvian senate. Preoccupied, his face set with worry, he glanced from time to time at the thin platinum pocket watch that had been a gift from his uncle Robert Lansing. The Scene in London
Eden received news of the Canal seizure on the evening of July 26, while he was entertaining the young King of Iraq and his Prime Minister, Nuri as Said, at dinner at Ten Downing Street. The party immediately
broke up and, as the Iraqis departed, Nuri expressed his anger not only at Nasser’s act, but at his failure to consult with other Arab states before taking an action that would affect them all. He reportedly said to Eden: “Hit him, hit him hard, and hit him now.” > Eden then went downstairs to the double-doored privacy of the cabinet room, accompanied
by Selwyn Lloyd and the Marquess of Salisbury, who were among the dinner guests, and they were soon joined by the defense minister, the chiefs of staff, the French ambassador and the American charge d’affaires (Ambassador Winthrop Aldrich being in the United States on leave). The dramatic meeting, late at night, to consider the course for embattled Britannia found most of the participants in full evening dress
and decorations, “Anthony and Bobbety [Salisbury] with the sash
CROSS-PURPOSES AND CARDBOARD PROPOSALS 947
and kneebreeches of the Garter.” ® Eden and the other ministers present were eager for immediate military action. But recognizing that Nasser’s act of expropriation had certain precedent in law, they talked of issuing
an order to withdraw all European canal pilots from Egypt, as this would, they judged, impair operation and maintenance of the Canal and thus constitute a technical violation of the 1888 Convention, justifying intervention. Long since determined upon a policy of force to bring Nasser down, Eden and his cabinet colleagues thus saw the new crisis
as creating the pretext they had been seeking. What decided the issue in favor of delay that night was the adafnant opposition of the military chiefs, who refused to risk an airdrop of troops on Suez unless land and naval forces could come to their support within twenty-four hours. But such was the state of British military unreadiness that this support would take six weeks to organize, equip and position. Pressure from the cabinet for an immediate airdrop was intense. It ended when the three military chiefs threatened to resign, but only the First Sea Lord, Admiral Louis Mountbatten, was opposed to a Suez War on the merits.’
From the beginning, Eden tried to keep the argument on _ political and emotional grounds, and away from the legalities of the question. In his definitive cable to Eisenhower of July 27, he called for a “firm stand” by Britain and the United States on pain of seeing the influence of both parties “irretrievably undermined” in the Middle East. In one sense this assessment was instinctively correct, for Nasser had rendered his nationalization speech with such emotion and ferocity, and with so undisguised an aim of striking a paralyzing blow at the whole Western position in the area, that its effect was to widen out the issues beyond a dispute over the Canal. Arab opinion was moved to transient ecstasy at the sight of Arab leadership facing down the financial exploiters of the West; at the same time Europe was astonished and then anxious at the realization that the “world’s neck” had passed into unpredictable hands. Eden was quick to reinforce this feeling of anxiety: Nasser’s “thumb on our windpipe,” he asserted, was an intolerable state of affairs. While Dulles was speeding home from Peru, Eisenhower was conclud-
ing that the first task was to cool off British and French emotion. He sent a cautionary reply to Eden and told him he was sending Robert Murphy to talk things over. From the outset, Eisenhower felt categor-
ically that no justification for military action arose from the act of nationalization. He was also skeptical of the British view that Egypt lacked the technical competence to maintain Canal operations, for in his experience Suez was merely a ditch cut in the desert —a simple operation compared, for example, to the Panama Canal, where mechanical locks must be used to lift and lower the ships traversing a ruggedly
348 CROSS-PURPOSES AND CARDBOARD PROPOSALS
uneven terrain. He felt the only way to determine whether or not Egypt
was willing and able to meet its international obligations under the 1888 Convention was to wait and see.
Robert Murphy, in London, was given a small dinner on July 30 by his old Algiers colleague Harold Macmillan, who wrote in his memoirs: ‘Here was my opportunity and, with the Prime Minister’s full acquiescence, I was determined to make full use of it.’”’8 On this occasion Murphy made clear he “was left in no doubt” that the British govern-
ment regarded Suez as a test that “could be met only by the use of force,” and he commented that this conclusion “‘seemed not unjustified.” ®
Macmillan added that “we . . . did our best to frighten him, or at least to leave him in no doubt of our determination.” ?° At lunch the following
day, which included Eden, Lloyd and Salisbury as well as Macmillan, there was wider evidence of the jingo spirit and an unquestioning British assumption that the United States would give at least tacit support to an Anglo-French military operation. The British leaders assured Murphy there would be no need for direct U.S. help, except in the unlikely event of Russian intervention; in that case, as Murphy reported it, Eden said: “We do hope you will take care of the Bear.” 1! Eisenhower’s memoirs
record the “depth of the regret I felt in the need to take a view so diametrically opposed to that held by the British.” 1?
Enter the Secretary of State
After a taut talk with Eisenhower on July 31, Dulles, having just arrived from Peru, departed for London within two hours, carrying with him a letter for Eden from the President, a copy of the 1888 Convention,
and a translation of Nasser’s nationalization speech. Working with Herman Phleger on the plane, he set about to stress the legal issues which Eden was so ready to avoid, for Egypt’s seizure of property on her own territory, when combined with both a readiness and an ability
to compensate the former owners, was a right firmly established in international law. Moreover, as Nasser’s expressed purpose was to use Canal profits to finance the Aswan Dam (as a means of avoiding further dependence on Russia), there seemed no reason to doubt that he had
an incentive to maintain uninterrupted trafic through the waterway, and thus to charge fares that would promote traffic, as opposed to fares
(and political obstructions) that would drive it around the Cape of Good Hope. It was also a fact that Egypt had physically controlled the
Canal entrances since World War II (by reason of that fact it had effectively asserted the sovereign right to bar Israeli shipping since 1948).
CROSS-PURPOSES AND CARDBOARD PROPOSALS 349
But the Tory inner circle was impervious to such logic, and Dulles rather too quickly compromised a conclusive legal case.
Macmillan wrote: “I told Foster, as plainly as I could, that we just could not afford to lose this game. It was a question not of honour only
but survival. ... I think he was quite alarmed; for he had hoped to find me less extreme, I think.’ 13 If Nasser was allowed to “get away with it,” the Tories argued, then Britain was finished as a world power. There was in this reaction — of the same men who had stood bravely against the perilous drift of 1938 —a tragic inability to transcend the Munich syndrome, a tragic tendency to equate Nasser with Mussolini (or Hitler), the Middle East with Europe, and 1956 with 1938. Yet how-
ever misguided the reaction, behind it lay a felt sense of impending doom. The anguished, terrible struggle for survival in World War II had brought the momentary exhilaration of richly deserved triumph, but there had followed a series of imperial erosions and defeats across the whole of that once-glorious span of authority on which the sun never set, forcing the sad awareness that Britain’s strength was substantially spent. Now for reasons imbedded deep in the British psyche, Suez seemed
the intolerable threat of coup de grace. In broad terms, the average Englishman shared this anxiety and foreboding. “If Eden’s fevered policies had not struck a responsive chord in the hearts of half his countrymen,’ wrote one observer, “they would have been like a fuse without a bomb.” 14
In this atmosphere, Dulles labored to persuade the unpersuadable that an “international solution” could meet Britain’s needs and win the overwhelming support of world opinion. Dominating the proceeding with his intellect and personal force, he made apparent headway by expressing sympathy for both the predicament and the impulse of his allies — a tactic that led to later difficulties, for while Murphy and others were inclined to discount several of the Secretary’s offhand remarks (e.g., that Nasser must be made to “‘disgorge’” the Canal), Dulles did not conceal the truth that he disliked Nasser and the Egyptians. And he refused to rest his case on the simple legal sufficiency of Nasser’s
expropriation. Had he done so, the outcome might have been quite different. But he insisted on sustaining a tortured ambiguity. He thought
the seizure was legal, but he frowned upon it as bad international practice and so would not give it full countenance.!> A vague insistence
that “justice” must be done tended to mislead pent-up Tories into thinking that a difference over the means required to dispose of the problem was a relatively minor matter. Eden later wrote, accurately enough, that Dulles ‘agreed emphatically that the seizure of a great international waterway was intolerable.” 1°
350 CROSS-PURPOSES AND CARDBOARD PROPOSALS
Out of this first meeting came an agreement to convene an international conference in London that would, Dulles hoped, bring world opinion to bear upon the equities in the case and thus cool the superheated Anglo-French determination to use force. The Western Big Three would submit to the conference a plan, designed by Dulles, creating an
“international authority” to operate the waterway, ensure freedom of transit under the 1888 Convention, fix tolls, carry out improvements, and negotiate the compensation of the old Suez Canal Company. While all of this suggested that the United States had regained control of alliance diplomacy, the extent of Dulles’s real persuasiveness is open to doubt. Britain and France had already accepted their inability to conduct
military operations until at least the middle of September (a fact they carefully concealed from the Americans). So they had six weeks in which
to rally domestic and world opinion to their support, and to lock the United States into a firm acceptance of their strategy. Equally to the point, the substance of Dulles’s proposal must have invited skepticism,
if its purpose was in fact to define a negotiable solution; for its implementation would effectively undo the Egyptian nationalization — indeed, it would involve a worse infringement on Egyptian sovereignty than the original concession of 1888. While this presented no problem for Eden and the French, it was a proposal that Nasser could not accept and survive —and must therefore reject — and it is probable that the Arabist Eden understood this more clearly than the Wall Street lawyer Dulles; the one knew the substantive texture of the people, the culture and the issues; the other was an ingenious deviser of ad hoc formulae
based on rather abstract assessments of a required balance between equity and global order. On the basic question of whether or not Dulles really believed in his proposal, and in others that he put forward during this bout of fevered
diplomacy, there are differences of view. Robert Murphy had the impression that the Secretary was “merely throwing out ideas’ 17 to gain time in the somewhat desperate hope that one of them would prove to be workable. But Herman Phleger, who accompanied him on the plane trip when the first proposal was developed, thought “the logic of it was wonderful” and never doubted Dulles’s own conviction as to the efficacy
of his handiwork.'8 Robert Bowie also thought Dulles believed his proposals provided a basis for serious negotiation and settlement.?® Aside from the question of whether or not the proposal would appeal to Nasser, the accompanying communiqué showed cavalier treatment of
the legalities. Ignoring Egypt’s insistence that only the Suez Canal Company was affected by nationalization, and that Egypt would fully meet its obligations to assure free passage through the waterway under the 1888 Convention, the London communiqué asserted that Nasser’s
CROSS-PURPOSES AND CARDBOARD PROPOSALS 351
action “threatens the freedom and security of the Canal.” ?° And although the original de Lesseps concession of 1866 made clear that the company “being Egyptian, is governed by the laws and customs of the country,” 7?
the communiqué asserted that Nasser’s action involved the seizure of “an international agency’ and thus fell outside the boundary of the normal, justifiable nationalization of property. This was slippery and fallacious legalizing, and Dulles’s full participation in it showed for the first time a view at some variance with Eisenhower's flat rejection of the moral and legal assertions of the Anglo-French. The difference remains, even when one acknowledges that Dulles faced the difficult problem of having to deal face-to-face with valued allies, to express sympathy, and to concede what he judged were secondary points, in the effort to bring them closer to the Eisenhower position of “no war.” But during the critical three months following nationalization, Eisenhower and Dulles were not really on the same wavelength: Eisenhower was Olympian and categorical in his opposition to force; Dulles seemed more to share the Anglo-French anxiety that an unpredictable Nasser could not be trusted, and that force might thus be justified in the last resort. He conveyed this feeling to his allies with a prudent obliqueness, but he maddened them at critical junctures by suddenly shifting his stance to avoid the danger of a public difference with the President. In the period between August 5 and the opening of the first London conference on August 16, Eden strove to persuade both Eisenhower and the British public that Nasser must be destroyed. Writing to Eisenhower,
he assumed broad agreement “to undo what Nasser has done and to set up an International Regime for the Canal.” 2? But he then pushed beyond the Canal issue to argue that, because Nasser’s course “is unpleasantly familiar” and “the parallel with Mussolini is close,” the “removal of Nasser, and the installation in Egypt of a regime less hostile to the West, must therefore rank high among our objectives.” 7%
On August 8, he attacked Nasser on British television, drawing an analogy with fascism and stating: “Why don’t we trust him? The answer
is simple. Look at his record. Our quarrel is not with Egypt, still less with the Arab world; it is with Colonel Nasser.’ 24 The Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, was also brought in to assert the case for imperial destiny, and never mind the legalities. In a speech over the BBC facilities, arranged by Eden over the objections of its management that the BBC was not a propaganda arm of Her Majesty’s Government,
Menzies scorned the “disposition in some ... quarters to find legal virtues in what Nasser has done. . . . If such nonsense is the law, why have any international agreements at all?” 25 Eisenhower, who was growing annoyed at Eden’s persistent efforts to
push him beyond what he considered a clear and basic position — to
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CROSS-PURPOSES AND CARDBOARD PROPOSALS 353
focus on the Canal problem and avoid any attempt to link it with the wider question of the Nasser regime — replied bluntly on September 2: “There must be no grounds for our several peoples to believe that anyone
is using the Canal difficulty as an excuse to proceed forcibly against Nasser.’ °°
The First London Conference
Dulles arrived back in London on August 15 in the wake of certain American press reports, traceable to an Eisenhower-Dulles meeting with congressional leaders on August 12, that the United States was softening
its position on an international authority to run the Canal. According
to a dispatch in the Washington Post, the United States would be content with an international body that was merely advisory to an operation run by Egypt. At lunch that day with Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and the French Foreign Munister, Christian Pineau, Dulles was confronted by adamant insistence that Britain and France would accept
nothing less than an international authority with genuine operational control.** Whatever may have been in his mind by way of a compromise,
he thus emerged with the realization that he would have to support the Anglo-French position, or cause an open split of the Western Big Three on the first day of the conference. Unready to face a major breach, he went on to make an address the following afternoon, the centerpiece of which was a proposal that “the operation of the Suez Canal in accordance with the 1888 Treaty and the principles therein set forth’? would be made the responsibility of an international operating board to be established by treaty and associated with the United Nations. The international confidence which previously rested upon the 1888 Convention and the Suez Canal Company had been “grievously assaulted,’ and the question was whether or not that confidence could “peacefully be repaired.” If it could not, then “we face a future of the utmost gravity.’ He laid stress on the need to solve the “practical problem” of giving “effective practical expression to the principles of the 1888 Treaty.” 28° As a whole, the speech was a superior
example of lucid advocacy, demonstrating a mastery of the subject matter, a strong purpose and a moderate tone. Yet the fatal flaws remained: it argued from shaky legal premises for a proposal that was manifestly nonnegotiable.
The Indian counterproposal, introduced the following day, came much closer to being a practical and workable solution. The Indian spokesman, Krishna Menon, was a diplomat whose effectiveness suffered
from the wide dislike of him in the West for both his neutralist views
354 CROSS-PURPOSES AND CARDBOARD PROPOSALS
and his arrogance. But he asserted accurately that the effect of the Dulles
proposal “is to repeal the act of nationalization; not to repeal it in the sense of replacing what was before, but to substitute an international body.” ‘This would not work, he said, because it did not reflect the
realities of the situation: “The factual position is that the rulers of Fgypt, whoever has sovereign power in Egypt, are really the people who can guarantee freedom of navigation.’’ As Egypt had acted legally and
properly in nationalizing the Canal, he found no merit in seeking to undo that act; there was, however, merit in creating an international advisory body to assure the right of free passage and fair tolls. Cutting the ground out from under Dulles’s obscuring references to the evil of Egyptian political control, Menon argued that “our interest in this Canal is not a political one, it 1s a user interest, and that user interest can best be served by negotiation, by trying to make the interest a mutual one, by persuasion, by making Egypt a party to a solemn agree-
ment which comes under the obligations of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations.” He went on to recommend “a consultative body of user interests . . . with advisory, consultative and liaison functions .. . without prejudice to Egyptian ownership and operation.” 7°
On August 19, Dulles received Eisenhower’s cabled comments on his
proposal of August 16. Although the President was unaware of the Indian proposal, his own thoughts coincided almost exactly: “Nasser may find it impossible to swallow the whole of this as now specified... .
I see no objection to a board with supervisory rather than operating authority .. . with operating responsibility residing in someone appointed by Nasser, subject to board approval.” *° Dulles replied in considerable agitation on the twentieth that Anglo-French agreement to such modifications might well be impossible. Such a major concession,
he thought, should be held in reserve ‘“‘as a matter of last resort in order to obtain Egypt’s concurrence.” Eisenhower promptly cabled back, “T understand the box you are in,” and left the matter to his Secretary of State, assuring him of his support and approval ‘“‘in whatever action you finally decide you must take.” 31 A more detached, constructive, and imaginative reaction from Dulles could have made this a major turning point in the crisis. The American
President was ready and willing to put his weight behind a proposal that Nasser would almost surely have accepted, that was supported by governments which, though small in number, represented a large percentage of the world’s people — India, Russia, Indonesia and Ceylon. If vigorously led by the United States, this combination could almost certainly have isolated Britain and France at the conference and brought
about a negotiation with Nasser which London and Paris could have
CROSS-PURPOSES AND CARDBOARD PROPOSALS 355
threatened to disrupt by military action only at great peril to their reputations and their security. But Dulles could not transcend his abhorrence at the thought of even temporary alliance with Russia against America’s traditional friends, or his dislike of neutralists. Moreover, his prestige and his intellectual vanity were now staked on his own proposal. He had the situation well in hand, he assured the President. And Eisenhower, husbanding his energies for the coming campaign for reelection, too readily receded from his instinctively sound feeling for the middle ground where serious negotiation was possible. By passively “leaving it to Foster,” he lost the opportunity. Dulles moved ahead with undiminished vigor to develop support for his own proposal. Applying considerable pressure on four countries who
were heavily dependent on American economic and military aid — Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Ethiopia — he persuaded them to cosponsor
a slightly amended resolution. In the end, eighteen nations lined up behind the United States position, while four nations — India, Russia, Indonesia and Ceylon — supported the Indian position. By prearrangement with Dulles, New Zealand’s Foreign Minister, Thomas MacDonald,
proposed that a committee of “‘assenting nations’ call upon Nasser to present and discuss the eighteen-nation proposal, and the motion carried.
Dulles wanted the committee to conduct genuine negotiations with Nasser, but Lloyd and Pineau adamantly insisted that the proposal must be presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitri
Shepilov protested, accurately, that this would be an “ultimatum” to Nasser.
Eden then made a major effort, directly and through Assistant Secretary Carl McCardle, to persuade Dulles that he was “‘the only one, the only man, who is capable of handling the matter in Cairo.” *? But Dulles, protesting he was too busy, insisted on returning to Washington.
Here, again, an opportunity may have been lost. Eden’s purpose in recruiting Dulles was no doubt to bind the United States more tightly to the enterprise wherever it led, yet if Dulles had gone to Cairo it 1s more than likely that a genuine negotiation would have ensued, moving the issues at least closer to settlement. But such a course would have meant placing the United States in the role of apparent spokesman for
colonial-imperial interests, and it also carried with it a high risk of failure. Although he had invented, presented, argued for, and dragooned
others into accepting what became the majority proposal, Dulles now wished to slip away from further responsibility. Caught between distasteful choices, his tactical sense prevailed. He cabled Eisenhower, saying, “I think it is preferable that we should become less conspicuous.” *°
and returned home after agreeing that Menzies should lead the mission to Cairo.
356 CROSS-PURPOSES AND CARDBOARD PROPOSALS
The Menzies Mission
Sending Menzies was to guarantee failure, and failure was what Eden and Guy Mollet, the new French Premier, wanted. On a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the eighteen-nation proposal was doomed to rejection by Cairo irrespective of who made the presentation, for its unspoken premises were Egyptian technical incompetence and the unreliability of Nasser. Still, Menzies appears to have made the worst of a bad situation. Rugged, florid, with white hair and heavy jowls, the Australian Prime Minister was, at sixty-one, a man of blunt charm, ingrained prejudices, and hardly any feeling for the raw sensitivities of Asian and African nationalists.
The Egyptian press thought him “blunt, hostile, and arrogant... a bull in a china shop.” ** After putting the proposal and engaging in several days of talk that showed no hope of agreement, he plainly warned
Nasser of the seriousness of the Anglo-French military preparations. “Frankness as between two Heads of Government requires me to offer my personal opinion that you are facing not a bluff but a stark condition
of fact which your country should not ignore.” #> As Heikal recalled the incident: ‘Menzies leaned forward over the desk, his thick eyebrows bristling, and growled: ‘Mr. President, your refusal of an international administration will be the beginning of trouble.’’’ In response, Nasser closed the papers in front of him and said: “ ‘You are threatening me. Very well, I'am finished. There will be no more discussions. It is all over.’ Menzies grew very red. Then the Ethiopian Foreign Minister and the American representative, Loy Henderson, intervened to smooth it out.* At a press conference on August 31, President Eisenhower was asked if French military movements into Cyprus were consistent with the working out of a Suez settlement in a calm and deliberate atmosphere. His reply was that he was “‘not going to comment on the actions of any other government.” But when pressed to say whether or not he had given any orders to American military forces as a result of the Canal nationalization, he replied he had done “nothing that isn’t absolutely consistent” with his hopes for a peaceful settlement. Pausing, he then added: “We are committed to a peaceful settlement of this dispute, nothing else.” 37 Menzies later claimed this statement had undermined his mission by so emphasizing United States commitment to a peaceful solution that Nasser felt safe in rejecting the eighteen-nation plan. But the Eisenhower remark, which Menzies appeared to confuse with a somewhat later one, provided no comfort to Egypt. On September 12, three days after Menzies had departed, Nasser told Ambassador Byroade
CROSS-PURPOSES AND CARDBOARD PROPOSALS 357
he was sure that “the British and French are going to stay out there in the Mediterranean until they find a pretext to come in.” ** Anwar Sadat, a junta colleague who succeeded to the Egyptian presidency after Nasser’s death, wrote a newspaper article on September 8 which sald:
“It has now become quite clear that Eden wants nothing but war... .
He has no other course open to him than either to declare war or resign.” 39
Thrust and Parry
Anticipating failure of the Cairo talks, London and Paris pressed forward in early September with a three-part plan to bring matters to
a head. One was to assure that their planned military assault on Alexandria (Operation Musketeer) would be ready to embark from Cyprus and Malta by September 15; a second was to order the European canal pilots off the job at about the same time, thereby disrupting ship
trafic and creating the legal pretext for intervention; the third was to “go through the UN hoop.” Both London and Paris understood that taking the issue to the United Nations was a gesture necessary to satisfy the amenities of international discourse before resorting to force. If the tactic was cynical, it was not insincere. ‘They proposed to put forward a resolution embodying the eighteen-nation proposal that Menzies was at that moment presenting in Cairo. If, as seemed certain, the Soviets should veto it, or if, as seemed equally certain, attempts to amend it unfavorably should call forth their own veto, they would have exhausted the possibilities of international adjudication and freed themselves to act. The snarling of Canal traffic resulting from the departure of the European pilots would reinforce their case. They would knock out the Egyptian air force, land armed forces, and take possession of the Canal. Nasser would fall from power and the “international authority” scheme would be accepted by his successor.
Dulles, perceiving where this effort was leading, found himself in the curious position of opposing a move by his allies to obtain redress of their grievances through the United Nations—a position doubly awkward for a principal architect and champion not only of this permanent agency for international justice but also of the specific proposals on which the Anglo-French now chose to rest their case. Yet suddenly he was telling Eden and Mollet that the Security Council was like quicksand: “Once in it, we would not know how deep it would prove, or whether we would ever get out.” 4° Eden sent him the draft resolution, which added nothing substantive or rhetorical to the Big Three communiqué of August 6 and the eighteen-nation proposal of August 23,
358 CROSS-PURPOSES AND CARDBOARD PROPOSALS
but Dulles managed to find, as Macmillan complained, “‘every possible objection to almost every clause,’ 41 and refused to give assurance that
the United States would reject any resolution falling short of the eighteen-nation formula, or would support allied ‘freedom of action” in the event the Anglo-French resolution was defeated. While Eden and Mollet listened to these Dullesian reservations, they
also moved their plans ahead, the British cabinet deciding to recall Parliament from summer recess for a meeting on September 12, at which time Eden could draw conclusions from the Cairo talks, announce his appeal to the United Nations, and make a veiled disclosure of contingent
military plans. Eisenhower, poised for the electoral campaign which would officially get under way after Labor Day, was leaving the initiative
and operational control in foreign policy almost entirely to Dulles. Thus left largely alone to face a concerted resurgence of Anglo-French determination to resolve the Suez crisis by force, the Secretary of State
retreated to his cabin on Duck Island in Lake Ontario for the long Labor Day weekend, there to try to identify and develop a scheme that
would both frustrate the Eden-Mollet intention to use the United
Nations as a means of securing freedom of action for a military attack,
and prevent their using a pilot shortage as a pretext. He set himself an immense task, but he tackled it with characteristic self-confidence and in characteristic solitude. The SCUA Scheme
From his ruminations, as he chopped wood and washed dishes beside the lake in company with his wife, came forth what was to be known as the Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA), a scheme whereunder the
users would band together, employ their own pilots, and transit the Canal according to their own needs; they would pay tolls to the SCUA and would pass on to Egypt what they considered a fair share. These ‘fresh thoughts,” as Eden’s memoirs characterized this new Dullesian ingenuity, were given to the British ambassador on September 4, who passed them to London. As well he might, Eden asked: “Is he serious?” Makins answered in the afhrmative.4? Opinions differ as to whether Dulles really believed this scheme could be made to work. But those who doubt it tend to miss the central fact that Dulles’s modus operandi was essentially tactical. He was a man who went from the specific to the specific, without any enduring ideas to offer, and he was so susceptible to immersion in the twists and turns of his tactical ingenuity that he chronically lost his sense of proportion and not infrequently his sense of reality. The urgent tactical problem before him was to gain time.
CROSS-PURPOSES AND CARDBOARD PROPOSALS 359
At any rate, during the next six days he argued the case for SCUA, face-to-face and in the cable traffic, with remarkable zeal, ingeniously tailoring his approach to suit the prejudices and predilections of each individual who had to be persuaded. ‘Thus, he presented SCUA to Eisenhower as a rather moderate measure, a device requiring Nasser to bargain because he could not oppose its operation unless he himself initiated force; and after all, SCUA would not take over the Canal, he told the President; its ships would merely pass through it.** ‘To Eden he said the 1888 Convention gave Egypt no right to make a profit from the Canal; accordingly SCUA would legitimately deprive Nasser of Canal revenues without violating the treaty.44 To the French ambassador he
seemed to give assurances that the United States would do whatever was required to assert the full authority of the SCUA; at a minimum it would support economic sanctions if Nasser refused passage; and such economic deprivations were “certain to make Nasser a laughingstock throughout the world.” *° In plain truth, as any casual observer could confirm, SCUA possessed a transparently grotesque, unreal quality. First, it repudiated the whole basis of the eighteen-nation proposal (which postulated the need for a new agreement with Nasser) by assuming that no new agreement was necessary. Second, it embodied the staggering presumption that somehow
the problem could be handled on a purely technical level, bypassing the political questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction. As Dulles said a few days later at a press conference: “If we get operating problems out of the hands of diplomats, the statesmen, and get it down perhaps into a situation where practical ship operators are dealing with practical
people on the part of Egypt, maybe some of these problems will be solvable.” 46 Nasser quickly replied to this piece of nonsense by saying, “It is impossible to have two bodies to regulate navigation through the Canal”; and by way of example he suggested a “Port of London Users
Association” which would operate at will in that harbor and pay the British what it thought was a fair share of the port charges.*" To Mollet and Pineau, the SCUA scheme was immediately seen as a device to postpone or prevent a showdown with Nasser. Selwyn Lloyd was also full of misgivings and Macmillan began to be “disillusioned as to Dulles’s intellectual integrity over this whole affair.” *® Eden,
however, was willing to listen. It seemed to him that so ardent an advocacy must mean Dulles and Eisenhower were seriously concerned and hence could not fail to support their own proposal. He was attracted by the element in the plan that called for paying Canal tolls to SCUA (and thus withholding them from Nasser). British and French pressure on various shippers had already cut Egypt’s Canal tolls by more than 50 percent. If the United States fully cooperated, Nasser’s revenues would
360 CROSS-PURPOSES AND CARDBOARD PROPOSALS
be reduced by another 35 percent! Moreover, Eden was certain that SCUA would involve for Nasser a more serious affront to Egyptian sovereignty and dignity than even the earlier proposal. As Nasser could not acquiesce, SCUA was thus an opportunity to bind the United States to a policy of severe economic pressure at the minimum, and possibly to the acceptance of a military solution. Moreover, it was now becoming apparent that ordering the European pilots off the job would not disrupt Canal traffic, for the Egyptians were ready and able to run the show; thus a different pretext was needed. After some further cable exchanges on September 10 and 11 (in which Dulles adverted to the lawyer’s dictum
that Egypt, having refused the eighteen-nation proposal, “could not expect such good terms again’’), Eden agreed to give SCUA a try, and then insisted to the skeptical French that the scheme could be put to Anglo-French purposes. Because a French military effort at Suez was dependent upon British logistical support, they could only acquiesce. The decision was to prove another humiliation for the tense and ail-
ing Prime Minister, not alone because he agreed to accept a tinselthin plan, but because he agreed to sponsor it — which committed him, but left Dulles in a more flexible position. Eden’s press secretary loy-
ally asserted to reporters that the plan was of British origin, but he permitted himself the uneasy indiscretion that it had a “foster father.’ *°
The thrust of the two-day debate in Parliament was accordingly altered: appeal to the UN would be deferred. Describing the SCUA plan to the Commons on September 12, Eden acknowledged that “the attitude of the Egyptian Government will have an important bearing on the capacity of the association to fulfill its functions.” °° From the opposition benches rose up a roar of derisive, incredulous laughter, in which even a number of Tories joined. But when the Prime Minister went on to assert that, if Nasser should interfere with the operations of the association, then Egypt would be in violation of the 1888 Convention, he was met with cries of “Deliberate provocation!’’ “What a peacemaker!” “Resign!” Shouting above the tumult, Eden insisted that what he was saying reflected “exchanges of views between three governments” and that, in the event of Egyptian interference, “Her Majesty’s Government and others concerned will be free to take such further steps as seem to be required.” **
Fisenhower’s concern at the increasingly emotional tone of Eden's cables had led him to write the Prime Minister on September 2 saying,
“I must tell you frankly that American public opinion flatly rejects the thought of using force,” and urging British acceptance of SCUA. Now closely following the September 12 debate from Washington, Dulles quickly caught the drift of Eden’s presentation and moved to make
certain his own position was publicly aligned with the President's.
CROSS-PURPOSES AND CARDBOARD PROPOSALS 361
He held an immediate press conference and coldly disassociated the United States from every implication of the SCUA plan that made it palatable to Eden. As Macmillan wrote bitterly, “Dulles, who had made the statement on SCUA quite correctly, and strictly in accordance with the agreed terms, fell down (as usual) on ‘supplementary questions.’ He said that, if opposed, American ships would not repeat not ‘shoot’ their way through the Canal. No. They would go round the Cape.” *?
To Eden and the Tory inner circle, this refusal to leave even a shred of ambiguity regarding the use of force came as the harshest shock; it
cut the last remaining strands of trust and engendered an enduring bitterness. And adding insult to injury, the timing of the Dulles press conference permitted Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the Labour opposition, to hurl the American Secretary of State’s words across the well of the House of Commons as Eden prepared to wind up the debate. “Is he prepared to say on behalf of Her Mayjesty’s Government,” challenged Gaitskell, ‘‘that they will not shoot their way through the Canal?” 4 Amid rising tumult, Eden attempted a circuitous evasion, citing the unexceptionable dictum that no government could categorically deprive
itself, in advance, of recourse to force. But, goaded, he added that
“it would certainly be our intention ... to refer a matter of that kind to the Security Council.” °°
The episode made for Dulles a prominent and permanent place in the British pantheon of devils. Eden, with elegant circumlocution, later called him a liar, writing in his memoirs that his difficulty in working
with the Secretary of State “was to determine what he really meant and in consequence the significance to be attached to his words and actions.” >> Macmillan said: “It is only fair to the Ambassador, Winthrop Aldrich, to record that he was persistent in his warnings — he knew Dulles well.” ** Alastair Buchan, who acknowledged that Dulles’s
“skill with words enabled him to make rings around cleverer men than the British Foreign Secretary,* and gave him a complete dominance over his nominal master,’ considered Dulles “one of the most unattractive figures in modern history.” °* Even to more detached observers, the Dulles performance was dishonorable: he insisted on _playing the leading role in formulating the “international authority” and SCUA plans, and he ardently advocated their adoption by his allies; the readiness of those allies to accept and pursue the proposals rested heavily on the supposition that the United States was a serious party
at interest; moreover, by any objective reckoning, neither plan was realizable without concerted Western pressure and probably not without resort to force. Yet Dulles showed no hesitancy in backing away * The reference here is to Eden rather than Macmillan or Lloyd.
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from all such implications after his allies, at his urging, were publicly
committed. He insisted, in short, on total control, but very limited responsibility. The result, as one careful British observer put it, was a performance marked by “a chilling dishonesty which has done permanent damage to his own reputation.” °° At bottom the trouble seemed to lie in the Secretary of State’s innate inability or refusal to build constructively upon Eisenhower’s categorical opposition to the use of force. For the statesmanlike task of developing a genuine diplomatic solution (the elements of which became
progressively clear), he assumed no responsibility. In part this was instinctive recoil from the knowledge that such a solution would have required collaboration with Russia and India against Britain and France, but it also reflected an enduring discrepancy in outlook between him and the President. He clung to the need for some abstract form of “justice” for Britain and France, and did not entirely rule out the legitimacy of force “in the last resort.” As Allen Dulles, who was quite touchy and defensive about his brother’s Suez performance, said much later to his CIA colleague, Richard Bissell: “Don’t you realize that the individual who was really furious with the British and French
and absolutely insistent on the action we took was Eisenhower not Foster?” Left alone, ‘Foster probably would have played this quite differently.” °° At the deepest level, however, there seemed a basic limi-
tation of the man and his métier. For neither in this crisis (nor in others) did Dulles ever demonstrate the statesman’s measure of disinterest, empathy and concern for the whole which are the supreme prerequisites of creative diplomacy. Only as these qualities are brought to bear can a higher harmony be fashioned from disparate and conflicting national interests. In the Suez crisis he never rose above the
role of lawyer to the President engaged in an adversary proceeding with suspect allies; his tactical maneuvers were designed merely to keep them off balance, postpone a showdown, and thus buy time for Eisenhower’s reelection.
The Second London Conference
Despite this massive display of ineptitude and disjunction, Dulles and Eden managed to reassemble the eighteen supporters of the earlier proposal for a second conference in London on September 1g. But it was touch and go, for the other parties were bitterly affronted by the total absence of consultation on the SCUA proposals and by the implications of the proposals themselves. Without last-minute assurance from Dulles that SCUA was a purely voluntary undertaking imposing
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no obligations upon its members, there would have been no second conference. To most of these middle powers, SCUA appeared as either
a plan for boycotting the Canal or as a pretext for a showdown leading to the use of force. And they disliked both, being opposed to the economic consequences of the one and the political-strategic consequences of the other. The estimated cost of a boycott was an extra $500 million a year for Western Europe, but Secretary Humphrey was opposed to any loans, except for oil imports from the United States. Moreover, Nasser had made clear on September 16 (three days in advance
of the conference) his flat opposition to SCUA: “We shall not allow the Western-proposed Canal Users’ Association to function through the Canal. We Egyptians shall run the Canal smoothly and efficiently’;
if the Western powers attempted to force their way through, “then it would mean aggression and would be treated as such.” * In answer to a question as to the role being played by Washington, he said, “Really, the United States is a puzzle to me. I am not able to follow it.” ®
The conference itself came close to being a personal disaster for Dulles, for the Anglo-French could see no merit in SCUA unless it led to force, while the other participants were now openly opposed both to force and to Dulles’s apparently preferred course of economic boycott. Moreover, the conference debate cruelly exposed the hastily contrived and ramshackle illogic of the SCUA plan itself. There were three agenda items: (1) Menzies’ report on his Cairo mission; (2) Nasser’s proposal for a universal conference on Canal guarantees; and (3) the SCUA plan. The second item was contemptuously dismissed by the Western Big Three as “too imprecise to afford a useful basis for discussion,’ Dulles admitting as the conference closed that “we have not really ever discussed it.’ ° In a sharp speech, the Italian Foreign Minister, Gaetano Martino, challenged the right of SCUA to employ its own pilots, arguing that this would be a violation of the clear precedent in international law that the pilot is held responsible for the canal as well as the ship. From this it followed, he said, that ships seeking passage must accept pilots provided by the canal administration. He was supported in this con-
tention by the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. Pakistan then urged that negotiations with Nasser be the sole purpose of SCUA, add-
ing that, if SCUA were rejected by Nasser, the matter should be referred to the United Nations Security Council.*¢ This latter was an unwelcome interjection to which Dulles responded the next day—a grim note of warning was sent to the Pakistani delegate stating that “it would be difficult for my Government to understand” Pakistan’s rejection of SCUA, and asking if Pakistan (which was heavily dependent on American economic and military aid) ought not to weigh care-
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fully the “‘pros and cons of precipitate negative action.” © The Japanese delegate, who spoke next, raised a series of penetrating questions that rather pitilessly exposed the gossamer underpinnings of SCUA.
When Dulles rose to speak after the noon recess on September 21 (the last day of the conference), it was plain that the whole undertaking
was in a state of intellectual shambles and on the verge of collapse. Control of events now visibly slipping from his hands, his own prestige at stake, he was faced with the necessity to restore some semblance of credibility to his brainchild, or else incur further damage to his reputation. His answers to the Japanese questions were not very effective.
Would Egypt’s cooperation be required for the operation of SCUA? Well, “de facto operating cooperation at the local level’’ would be required. So, contrary to what he had originally told Eden, some new agreement with Nasser was in fact needed. What if Egyptian law required that the Canal be operated exclusively with Egyptian pilots? Well, then, SCUA pilots would not have much to do “and that part of the plan would have collapsed.” But the use of SCUA pilots was the very heart of the plan, for use of Egyptian pilots would mean Egyptian operation and control of the Canal. Would SCUA members be forbidden to use Egyptian pilots? Well, the United States “has no authority to enforce such a prohibition on its own shipowners, and no doubt other nations are in a similar position.’”’ The SCUA scheme, though it may have looked like a brilliant invention at Duck Island, was exposed as a strangely unreal and unworkable contrivance.*® His manner now reflecting resentment, worry, even a touch of panic, Dulles tried desperately to find and reflect a common denominator that would suffice to keep the eighteen nations from flying apart, that would
hold them together in some semblance of concerted purpose — even in total inactivity if necessary. If there was a discernible majority view
at the conference, it was that the Canal dispute should be taken to the United Nations without further delay. But by the richest irony, the Secretary of State who conceived peace and world order in Wilsonian
terms was now opposed to such a course on tactical grounds: Security
Council debate on a resolution unacceptable to Britain and France would lead to use of the veto power by those two nations. Such action would weaken the Charter which was passionately close to Dulles’s heart. Worse still, it would fill American newspapers with accounts of the rift in the Western Alliance in the midst of a presidential campaign, one of whose prominent issues was the administration’s handling
of foreign policy. It would compel the United States to take a clear public position on the question of force; if that position was against force, but force was subsequently used, this fact could gravely embarrass Eisenhower’s campaign, whatever the outcome of the conflict.
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Casting about in this welter of contradictions for a common denominator that would pass muster at least temporarily, Dulles found and developed, in the course of his postluncheon remarks, the theme of moral immobilism. It was a formula that placed him morally behind the Anglo-French in their quest for “justice,” yet sought simultaneously to prevent their taking any active steps to achieve it — whether by UN
debate, economic sanction, or military force. On the one hand, he argued that a merely peaceful solution was not enough, that the nations present would be derelict in their moral duty to civilization and the United Nations Charter unless the solution were also just: “There has been exercised, and is being exercised, a great restraint in the face of a great peril. But you cannot expect that to go on indefinitely unless those of us who appreciate the problem, who are sympathetic with it, rally our forces to try to bring about a settlement which is not only a peaceful settlement but a settlement in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.’”’ To seek a solution merely devoid of war was to address ‘‘only half of the problem, and you cannot solve the problem just by half-way measures. . . . So I say, let's stick together in this proposition [SCUA] and continue to work not only for ‘peace,’ but for peace ‘in conformity with the principles of justice and international law!’ ” & But where did justice lie? Egypt was demonstrating its ability to run the Canal, and stood ready to convene a universal conference of users to work out guarantees of access, agreement on tolls, and related matters.
Most of the nations at the conference were prepared to accept this situation and to work out a technical solution within the context of Egyptian control, believing that Nasser had a large political stake in making the Canal both an operational and a financial success. This was the essence of Eisenhower’s repeatedly stated position; it had also seemed to be Dulles’s position during his several rambling press conference appeals for practical, technical cooperation with the Egyptians
at the working level. Yet Dulles had never in fact relinquished the contrary principle of user control — that is, political-operational control of the Canal by the user nations. It was imbedded in both the “‘international authority’ and SCUA schemes, and it now remained integral to his conception of “justice.” Thus did inner contradictions and irreconcilable purposes combine to paint him into a corner. A negotiable modus vivendi accepting Egyptian control was available, but he
insisted that morally the situation demanded something more. This extra something was not negotiable; nevertheless, he insisted it could not be pursued either by economic sanction or by force. His position came to intellectual stultification. As he spoke, an intent hush descended upon his listeners, for the elderly Secretary was obviously strug-
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gling for coherence; he was close to tears, his glasses moist, his eyes blinking involuntarily, his voice choked with nervous tension.®
A less complex, less clever, more straightforward man would not have drifted into this untenable impasse. But Dulles had chosen to play
a game that insisted at once on leading and frustrating the AngloFrench, while never deciding clearly what kind of solution, within the realm of reality, he wanted or was willing to put his country’s weight
behind. His “international authority’ plan was a plausible basis for negotiation, but he proved unwilling (1) to pursue the EisenhowerIndian proposal to transform it from an operating to an advisory authority, or (2) to accept any responsibility for talks with Nasser. ‘The SCUA scheme was a logical monstrosity, but Dulles made it worse by
refusing to support it even as an instrument of economic boycott. If his proposals were seriously advanced, that fact reflects badly on his judgment; if they were put forward primarily as a tactical means of holding off an explosion until Eisenhower was safely reelected, that fact indicates that his statecraft was capable of marked deception and cynicism. The chief mitigating factor in this harsh assessment — and it is a large one — is that the Anglo-French were never interested in a com-
promise settlement of the canal dispute, but were determined, for the sake of broader purposes, to bring Nasser down. Yet up to September 21, they had found no adequate pretext for war, and world opinion was gathering steadily behind the idea of a peaceful compromise. A strong
American move for negotiations with Nasser might well have succeeded, but Dulles was not prepared to make it.
The Alliance in Peril
HE SCUA CONFERENCE cost Dulles his remaining credibility with
the Anglo-French. They would be put off with empty gestures no longer. Although he had conversed at length with Eden in the late after-
noon of September 21, just before emplaning for home, and had appealed to Eden (with what he took to be success) to keep the Suez matter out of the United Nations for the time being, Undersecretary Hoover met him at the Washington airport at 3:00 P.M. the following day with word that the Anglo-French were going at once to the United Nations. Dulles was visibly angered by this news. A few days later, Mac-
millan, who was in the United States on treasury business and saw Dulles alone, received a further outburst of the Secretary's indignation at the move to the UN: “He really felt that he had been badly treated. . . . We should get nothing but trouble in New York; we were court-
ing disaster. (From the way Dulles spoke you would have thought he was warning us against entering a bawdy-house.)” + On Sunday, September 23, however, appearing on “Meet the Press,” he maintained the
curious double position that so tantalized his allies and confounded the middle powers, denying flatly that the United States had given tacit consent to the Anglo-French use of force if the United Nations failed
to provide a solution, but repeating the line that peace and justice were two sides of the same coin. He wanted, he said, a solution that recognized “‘the real rights of the users.” ? But as fifteen nations gath-
ered once more in London to go through the futile exercise of actually establishing the now thoroughly emasculated Suez Canal Users Association, he seemed to move closer to the President’s unequivocal position. Answering a press conference question, he said: “There is
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talk about the ‘teeth’ being pulled out of it. There were never ‘teeth’ in it, if that means the use of force.” 5 UN Negotiations
By the time the Anglo-French resolution came up for UN debate in early October, Dulles had managed to delete its reference to a requirement for “international control,’ and had successfully insisted that the
initial meetings should be private; he thought this would permit a freer exchange of views (it would also minimize publicity in the United States as the presidential campaign entered its climactic month).
Nasser continued to act with reason and restraint, instructing his Foreign Munister, Fawzi, to accept an international advisory board, even one organized by SCUA. During the private talks, Lloyd dictated “Six Principles” that should govern a Suez settlement, and Fawzi surprisingly expressed Egypt’s agreement. When the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, promptly made these public and secured their for-
mal adoption by the Security Council on October 13, it seemed suddenly that the whole crisis had been brought to the edge of resolution. Fawzi reported to Cairo Hammarskjold’s judgment that “Selwyn Lloyd
genuinely wanted an agreement but that Pineau did not’; * unfortunately, it also appeared to the Secretary-General that, while Lloyd was “nice, sentimental, easily agitated, and without influence,’ the “arrogant” Pineau was under orders not to reach an agreement.’ Whatever the Anglo-French discrepancies in New York, Eden and Mollet were fully agreed that the situation had drifted uncomfortably close to a settlement, and one, moreover, that Nasser would survive! In an obvious attempt to present him with another unacceptable proposition, they thereupon introduced a rider to the principles requiring that Egypt
“promptly” submit detailed implementing proposals, in advance of any further negotiations. But Russia and Yugoslavia vetoed this, and the “Six Principles” were left standing as the basis for negotiation. This last development produced a brief period of euphoria in Wash-
ington that served both to delay the administration’s realization that Anglo-French policy had gone underground, and to sharpen the shock of realization when it came. Dulles expressed to his staff the confident view that his delaying tactics had caused the Suez crisis to “‘wither on the vine,” and Eisenhower confided his gratification to a_ television interviewer that “a very great crisis is behind us.’ ® However, when Hammarskj6ld urged further private negotiations to begin on October 29 in Geneva, Egypt agreed, but France and Britain backed sharply off.
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War Preparations and Collusion
Meanwhile, the British and the French, jointly and separately, were
advancing their plans for war, and the fateful collusion with Israel was also moving forward. Eden and Lloyd flew to Paris an September 26 for talks with Mollet and Pineau, whom they found in high spirits and ‘a very belligerent mood.’’? While the French leaders declined to disclose their developing arrangements with Israel, they were now so certain that Israel would provide a pretext for war against Nasser that they were willing to drop their objections to the United Nations de-
bate. Unknown to the British, the French had decided to join Israel in attacking Nasser even without British participation.® General Dayan, now the Israeli chief of staff, and an official party, including Golda Meir, were in Paris on September 29 with a final list of military equipment requirements — including 100 tanks, 300 halltrack vehicles, 1,000 bazooka rocket launchers, and a squadron of transport planes. Back in Tel Aviv on October 2, Dayan issued the basic “early alert’’ order for the conquest of Sinai, setting October 20 as the tentative date for attack. Although actual mobilization was postponed until the last possible moment, Israel began in early October to cultivate a crisis with Jordan as a cover for preparations against Nasser. As the British had as yet no clear view of French-Israeli plans, these actions very nearly led to a British-Israeli clash. Following a heavy Israeli raid on the Jordanian town of Qualqilya on October 10, King Hussein asked the British Middle East commander to honor the Anglo-Jordanian alliance, and squadrons of the RAF were very nearly sent into action against the Israeli air force. When London rescinded the order, a disillusioned Hussein
sent his Foreign Minister to Cairo to ask for immediate assistance. Eden (who five days before had collapsed and lost consciousness in an elevator, with a fever fit so severe his aides thought he was going to die) was now stung by King Hussein’s evident lack of confidence in the British government. He hastily cabled Nuri to send an Iraqi brigade. Israel then publicly warned that such an act would be “a direct threat to the security of Israel.”” Temporarily balked, Eden, who felt it was imperative to provide some measure of assistance for Hussein, now pro-
posed that Nuri hold the troops in northeast Jordan far from the Israeli border, and that the force be reduced from a brigade to a regi-
ment, but Israel refused to be mollified. Anthony Nutting advised Eden to stand firm behind Jordan even at the risk of war with Israel.°
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With the fat nearly in the fire, Mollet hastily intervened with Eden to explain why an Anglo-Israeli clash would be fatal to the larger scheme, and the order to Iraq was rescinded. Dayan commented on this confusion of affairs in his diary entry of October 21: “I must confess to the feeling that, save for the Almighty, only the British are capable of complicating affairs to such a degree.” 1° At the eleventh hour, then, October 13, Mollet had sent emissaries
to Eden to explain the urgent need to prevent the sending of Iraqi troops to Jordan, and to enlist the British in full-scale collusion against Nasser. Eden received them in his study at Chequers some thirty miles outside of London, accompanied only by Nutting and his private secretary. che French emissaries were Albert Gazier, minister of labor, and General Maurice Challe of the French air force. After dealing with
the Iraqi matter, Challe outlined the basic plan. Israel would attack Egypt in the Sinai; Britain and France would then call upon both sides to withdraw from the Canal area, would land forces to “separate the combatants,” and would occupy the Canal on the pretext of preventing damage to it. Challe did not say that Israel] had definitely agreed
to the plan, but made it clear that the plan proceeded from FrenchIsraeli talks at the highest levels. Eden, who listened with mounting excitement, promised to send Nutting to Paris with a definitive British answer within two days.'t He then telephoned Lloyd at the UN and instructed him to fly home immediately. But instead of sending the disillusioned Nutting, Eden went himself to Paris on October 16, accom-
panied by Selwyn Lloyd. There at a secret five-hour meeting with Mollet and Pineau, at which no notes were taken, the British leaders endorsed the French plan without reservation.!2 On October 18, Eden reported his discussions to the British cabinet, including, according to his less than candid memoirs, “the growing danger that Israel, under provocation from Egypt, would make some military move.’ #3 On Oc tober 19, the Anglo-French invasion commanders were told to prepare for action within ten days. Eden’s one-time protegé, Nutting, was appalled by the immorality of the war plan, by its violation of the United Nations Charter, and by the disastrous pitfalls in it for British interest in the Arab world. He foresaw accurately that it would not only provoke a widespread anti-
Western reaction among the Arabs, ruinous to British interests and destructive of pro-Western Arab leaders like Nuri, but would also divide
the Commonwealth, alienate the United States, and seriously disrupt Furopean oil supplies. But Eden was beyond persuasion, and Nutting was pushed aside. Ben-Gurion and the Israeli military staff, however, saw these same British difficulties and therefore harbored dark sus-
picions that Eden would not, in the crunch, follow through on his
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promises. Ben-Gurion accordingly demanded the British commitment in writing. Acting again as intermediary, the French arranged a deeply secret meeting in an undistinguished suburban villa at Sévres (midway on the road from Paris to Versailles) to which Ben-Gurion, Dayan and Peres descended by plane through darkness and heavy fog on the night of October 22. When talks began the next morning, Ben-Gurion insisted to Selwyn Lloyd that British bombers must begin their attacks on the Egyptian air force simultancously with the start of the Israeli ground attack; otherwise, he said, Israel’s cities would be open to destruction from the air and the risk would be too high. But Anglo-French intervention was planned as a “police action,” to “separate the combatants”’
in an ongoing battle; to maintain such a pretense required a certain interval of hostilities before the Anglo-French ultimatums could be issued, be rejected, and run their course. The British were angered at Ben-Gurion’s persisting lack of faith, but after a further intercession by Pineau (who flew to London), Eden promised a written commitment
to destroy the Egyptian air force if Israe] would launch an attack in the direction of the Canal. As this did not fully meet Ben-Gurion’s requirement for simultaneity, the French, who were far less concerned about secrecy than Eden, finally closed the gap by agreeing to deploy three French fighter squadrons to Israel, prior to hostilities. It 1s probable that Ben-Gurion exaggerated the air threat, for a basic element
of the Israeli plan was a paratroop drop deep into the Sinai, only twenty miles from the Canal, and deliberately designed to confuse the
Egyptians into thinking the operation was a reprisal raid, rather than part of a sustained invasion. Dayan doubted that Nasser’s reaction would be a “rush to bomb civilian targets in Israel.’ 4 The final accord at Sevres was reached on October 24, a document
in three copies. Israel would initiate action at dusk on October 29 with a para-drop at Mitla Pass to create the appearance of an immediate threat to the Canal. When the Anglo-French learned of this ‘threat,’ they would issue ultimatums on the afternoon of October 30 with a twelve-hour deadline. The ultimatums (predrafted at Sévres) called for “temporary occupation” of the Canal Zone whether or not the combatants accepted a cease-fire. The Anglo-French force would accordingly attack Port Said at the mouth of the Canal and move down its length to cut off the Egyptian army’s retreat from the Sinai. That army would then be trapped and destroyed between the Israeli and the Anglo-French forces. Israel agreed to stop ten miles east of the Canal,
and Britain agreed to help Israel win an advantageous peace.1® The British cabinet gave its final approval on October 25. Except for Sir Walter Monckton, who resigned as defense minister on October 11,
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deciding he could not accept responsibility for the coming war, but who
agreed to remain in the cabinet as paymaster general for the sake of appearances, the cabinet stayed remarkably firm. Several other ministers suffered misgivings, but remembered the mood of imperial Gotterdaimmerung immediately after nationalization. Anthony Nutting, who was not a member of the cabinet, had told his superior, Selwyn Lloyd, that
he would have to resign if “this sordid conspiracy” were carried through; 1* and he did so.
Eden, alone among the colluders, remained insistent on maintaining every aspect of the circumstantial pretexts for a “police action,” and it was this rigidity that robbed the enterprise of whatever chances it may have had for political and military success. The central political requirement was for a swift military fait accomph. But Eden’s deter-
mination to fight in the guise of a peacemaker meant he would not permit the ships at Malta to begin combat-loading until the expiration of the ultimatums. This, however, condemned the operation to an incredible ten-day lag (four days to load the ships and six days to sail the convoy to Egypt), an interval which was to be filled with air bombardment by the RAF. Only the French commander seems to have sensed the truth that world opinion would not tolerate ten days of bombing, but would act to halt the invasion. He was able to persuade his British
military superior to grasp the nettle and begin loading the ships on October 27 (four days early) under the pretense of preparing for a previously scheduled training exercise. This reduced the lag to six days,
but it was not enough. The Hungarian Uprising
The official “clam-up” (as Ambassador Douglas Dillon in Paris dubbed it) of normal British and French communications with their American ally began about October 14, following Eden’s meeting with General Challe. It covered all diplomatic and military levels, yet was
not immediately noticed. Sir Roger Makins, the retiring British ambassador, had left Washington on October 11, and his successor, Sir Harold Caccia, did not arrive in Washington until November 8, having
chosen to make the crossing by sea. The French ambassador, Hervé Alphand, was out of Washington; the Israeli ambassador, Abba Eban, was called to Tel Aviv. The CIA began overflying the Middle East with U-2 aircraft at about the same time, and thus picked up a heavy increase in modern French fighter planes (Mystere IV) on Israeli airfields and also the beginnings of Israeli mobilization. But, as Israel had hoped, Eisenhower and Dul-
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les drew the wrong conclusion. Surmising that Ben-Gurion’s “‘obviously
ageressive attitude’’ was aimed at Jordan and at action during the sensitive period of the American election, the President instructed Dulles to send the Israeli Prime Minister a blunt and personal warning that concern about the Jewish vote would not affect his stern deter-
mination to act against any disruption of peace in the Middle East:
“Foster, you must not soften this thing and put it in diplomatic language. This has got to be absolutely my words.” ** Ben-Gurion continued, however, to hold the view that no American government would risk the Jewish vote to frustrate Israel in an election year. By October 25, Dulles was uneasily aware of the deepening silence out
of London, Paris, and Tel Aviv. Israel seemed to be mobilizing, and Anglo-French military preparations were evident at Cyprus and Malta. But by this time, his attention was focused on the dramatic unfolding of events in Eastern Europe. On October 19, the Polish government dismissed its Russian defense minister, Marshal Rokossovsky, and brought Wladyslaw Gomulka forward to be premier. Khrushchev flew to Warsaw
with a threat to crush the dissidence with Russian military force, but the tough Poles defied him, declaring the whole nation would fight if necessary, and this led to negotiations and a dramatic agreement on a new basis. On October 22, in the wake of Gomulka’s success, demonstra-
tions broke out in the Hungarian capital of Budapest demanding the return of a Communist moderate, Imre Nagy. Here the Red Army did intervene with tanks and jet aircraft against rebel barricades, but the action served mainly to intensify the anti-Russian feeling of the populace.
On October 24, Nagy was named premier and began to establish a reform government that could negotiate with the Soviets. Dulles followed these developments with fascination, telling his staff they represented a clear vindication of the liberation doctrine, and declaring to the Council on World Affairs in Dallas on October 26 that “the weakness of Soviet imperialism is being made manifest. Its weakness is not military weakness nor lack of material power. It is weak because it seeks to sustain an unnatural tyranny by suppressing human aspirations . . .” 18 On October 30, the same day the Anglo-French ultimatums were issued, Khrushchev made the momentous offer to negotiate the full withdrawal of Red Army units from Hungary and establish a new basis of Soviet relationships throughout Eastern Europe — 1.e., “noninterference in each other’s internal affairs.” He was working in very delicate circumstances to bring about a more rational, more “liberal” balance in an inherently unequal relationship, seeking to eliminate the most abrasive aspects of Russian domination without giving up what the Kremlin regarded as
essential controls. For a breathless interlude, it appeared that a new modus vivendi between master and slave had been achieved. Allen Dulles
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called it “a miracle.” 1° He was somewhat premature. The more ardent freedom fighters around Nagy broke (or could not exercise the necessary discipline to maintain) the cease-fire; moreover, they pressed demands (especially for Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact) that even Khrushchev was not prepared to accept. Negotiations broke down. The Red Army reentered Budapest in force on November 4 and _ bloodily crushed the rebellion. It was a decision made easier for the Kremlin by
the fact that the action of Israel, Britain and France undermined any Western claim to higher morality. The Suez War Begins With Israeli mobilization now an evident fact, Dulles sent Ambassador Aldrich to dine with Selwyn Lloyd on October 28, to ask its significance.
Lloyd said she British were in the dark, but had warned Israel not to attack Jordan. Well, Aldrich asked, was Israel going to attack Egypt? Lloyd said he had no information at all. Aldrich returned to the Foreign Office thirty-six hours later at 10:00 A.M. on October 30, the morning after the Israeli attack in the Sinai. In response to his urgent question as to what the British now intended to do, Lloyd said that, in his own judgment, Britain would have to charge Israel as an aggressor against Egypt,
but that Mollet and Pineau were at that moment en route from Paris and the matter had not been decided. He would arrange to see Aldrich again after lunch. But in the afternoon, Lloyd having been called away to the House of Commons, Aldrich was received at 4:45 by the permanent undersecretary, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, who simply handed him the ultimatums, saying they were being made public at that moment. The failure to inform the United States in advance was a calculated affront to Eisenhower and Dulles.?° Word of the Sinai invasion reached Eisenhower at about 6:00 P.M. on
October 29 (nearly six hours after it began) when he arrived in his aircraft, Columbine, for a campaign speech in Richmond, Virginia. Making the speech, he hastened to Washington for a meeting at the White House with Dulles, the intelligence men, and the military chiefs. “That same night he ordered Dulles to let Ben-Gurion have it with both barrels: “All right, Foster, you tell ’em that, goddamn it, we’re going to apply sanctions, we’re going to the United Nations, we’re going to do everything that there is so we can stop this thing.”-?? He also made an urgent request for a UN Security Council meeting the following morning, and issued a public reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration. Later that evening, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Cabot Lodge, was
offended when his British counterpart, Sir Pierson Dixon, told him
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that London now regarded the Tripartite Declaration as ‘“‘ancient history
and without current validity,” ?? and that Britain would take no action against Israel.
Eisenhower, astonished at Dixon’s remark, cabled Eden asking for help ‘“‘in clearing up my understanding as to exactly what is happening between us and our European allies.” ?? Eden’s reply was that Nasser’s “equivocal attitude’ toward the Tripartite Declaration had relieved the Western powers of their obligations thereunder, and that Egypt had brought the war on itself. Eisenhower at once cabled his stern disagreement, stating that the declaration “was a commitment among the three signatories and its validity in that respect was invulnerable to the reservations expressed on several occasions by both Israel and the Arabs.” 4 This “transatlantic essay contest,” as Eisenhower later described it,?® was brought to a rude end the next day when news of the Anglo-French ultimatums reached the White House via the wire services, and before Ambassador Aldrich could report officially. Eisenhower was infuriated by both the substance and the insult, and not at all soothed by Eden’s soon cabled explanation that he had decided not to “invite” United States association with the “declarations”? because of his consideration for Eisenhower’s “Constitutional and other difficulties” (i.e., the presidential election).?¢ On the morning of October 30, Lodge introduced an American resolu-
tion in the UN Security Council; it demanded that Israel withdraw be-
hind the agreed armistice lines, and called upon other members to refrain from using force or the threat of force in the area, and also to refrain from aid to Israel. In response to this the British and French, who were determined to maintain their freedom to carry out their collusive war plan, vetoed the resolution, this being the first such British action in the history of the United Nations. A softer Russian resolution was then introduced, calling merely for a cease-fire and an immediate Israeli withdrawal; this too was vetoed by Britain and France. Temporarily, at least, the United Nations was paralyzed. Eisenhower's genuine anger at news of the ultimatums, however, soon took a turn toward amazement and stupefaction as he contemplated the
fact that his major allies would so rashly court the real risks of general war without even consulting the keystone member of the alliance. As Macmillan later noted, “the President is wounded and rather mystified.” 27 Yet until the British bombing began, which dropped the final veil from Anglo-French intentions, he could not entirely repress an inherent optimism and an expression of faith in the British. Thus at 5:00 P.M. on October go, he felt hopeful enough to tell Emmet Hughes that he thought the problem “will take care of itself if the Israelis stop fighting, and I’m pretty sure they will, with this ultimatum from the British.”
376 THE ALLIANCE IN PERIL
And if not, asked Hughes, would the United States honor its obligation under the Tripartite Declaration by joining Nasser against the Western allies? “Hell, I don’t know where we'll be at,” the President replied.?8 Nasser’s first reaction to the Israeli attack was to believe it was a genuine invasion of the Sinai, but not to believe that Britain would jeopardize her remaining assets in the Arab world by conniving with Israel.?° With the issuance of the ultimatums, however, he understood there was collusion among his enemies; then when the twelve-hour deadline passed
without any overt act by the British or French (London inexplicably delayed the bombing until nightfall in Cairo on October 31, some twelve hours after the expiry of the ultimatums), he thought he was facing an Israeli attack plus an Anglo-French feint designed to prevent him from
making a full defense in the Sinai. When bombing began at nightfall, however, Nasser realized an Anglo-French invasion was coming, making it imperative to extricate his army from the Sinai and draw it back into
central Egypt.®° Retreat began that night, and, although mercilessly pounded by Israeli and French air forces, the great bulk of the Egyptian army made good its escape to the Canal by the morning of November 2. Also, as soon as the British bombings began, the Egyptians sank a cementloaded blockship athwart the Canal, as well as several other large vessels.
Thus a total blockage of the waterway was the first result of Eden’s action to ‘“‘save the Canal.” The Syrians blew up three pumping stations
on the Iraq Petroleum Company line running across Syria to ‘Tripoli, and Egypt began distributing arms and communication sets to the populace in anticipation of guerilla war. Nothing had been said in the ultimatums about bombing, and it was impossible to square this action, which was directed solely against Egypt, with the declared aim of ‘‘separating the combatants.”’ The other trans-
parent discrepancy was the demand in the ultimatums that both combatants should halt 10 miles from the Canal (Israel to the east and Egypt to the west) — for at the moment they were issued, Egyptian forces were
resisting the Israeli advance at least 100 miles east of the Canal. The ultimatums thus demanded that one party withdraw 110 miles, while inviting the other to advance go miles. The Labour opposition in the British House of Commons quickly smelled a rat, and the war minister’s announcement of the bombing produced a pandemonium of such shout-
ing, booing and disorder that debate had to be suspended for thirty minutes.*1
The Eisenhower Speech
October 30 and 31 were days of tension and harried assessment at the White House. A campaign trip to Texas was cancelled, so that Eisen-
THE ALLIANCE IN PERIL 377
hower could remain at the center of events. He was distressed by the “complete mess and botch of things” created by Israel and his two major allies, but he did not seem to share his staff’s thick and righteous wrath at the temerity of the London government so to complicate the position
of the American President near the climax of his electoral campaign. Dulles shared the general anger on this point, but seemed more nettled by the way in which the Anglo-French depredations had prejudiced the West’s moral posture with respect to events in Hungary: “It is nothing less than tragic that at this very time, when we are on the point of winning an immense and long-hoped-for victory over Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe, we should be forced to choose between following in the footsteps of Anglo-French colonialism in Asia and Africa, or splitting our course away from their course.”’ °?
Sometime on October 30, Sherman Adams and others began to conclude that the President must make a “report to the nation” on the Suez crisis, although no one was clear as to what he should say. Undaunted by a lack of direction, however, a decision was made the following morning to request television time for 7:00 p.M. the same day (October 31),
and Adams telephoned Dulles to ask for a speech draft which could be polished by Emmet Hughes and the President. Hughes had prepared a speech for delivery in Philadelphia on November 1 — a statement on the theme that the United States could not subscribe to one law for the weak and another for the strong, that there could be only one law or there would be no peace. It proved adaptable (with major and feverishly applied editorial work) to the new situation, and this was fortunate, for the Dulles text did not arrive at the White House until 3:15 and was then found to be useless. Hughes found Eisenhower ‘“‘shaking his head sadly over it. . . . It recites and rambles with no force of argument.” *? So at 4:00 P.M. Hughes was forced to start fresh, dictating to two secretaries in
relays, building on the Philadelphia speech with a desperate awareness of the seven o’clock deadline.
Dulles, who was called from the State Department to scan the pages as they emerged from the typewriter, seemed to Hughes almost totally exhausted, “ashen gray, heavy-lidded, strained,” shaking his head in glazed disbelief at the news, just received, of British bombers over Cairo.*4
He suggested only the most trivial changes in the text while the President, to escape the tension, walked out on the White House lawn and began hitting golf balls from a point just beyond the windows of the cabinet room. At 6:45, dressed and fresh, Eisenhower sat down at his desk while Hughes, sitting opposite, finished underlining the large-type reading copy for “speech emphasis” with a grease pencil, handing it page by page to the waiting President. Receiving the final page at four minutes
378 THE ALLIANCE IN PERIL
to seven, Eisenhower grinned and said to Hughes: “Boy, this is taking it right off the stove.” *> The speech, which the President read with calm and strong assurance, came out, Hughes thought, “surprisingly coherent.” It was not a sharply anti-British or anti-French speech. Asserting that the
United States had been neither consulted nor informed by its allies regarding “these actions . . . taken in error,’ Eisenhower said it was the nation’s intention to maintain its allied partnership.** “At the same time it is — and it will remain — the dedicated purpose of your government to do all in its power to localize the fighting and to end the conflict.” °” Emotional Climax and Physical Collapse At Eisenhower’s urgent request, Dulles went to the United Nations the following afternoon, where debate had now shifted to the General Assembly, to renew the pressure for immediate cessation of hostilities. Eisenhower insisted privately that the British were “‘still my right arm,’ but he and Dulles were agreed that there could be no special concessions for
their wayward allies. The catalyst of the Anglo-French conspiratorial resort to force had had the effect of fusing (in an emotional sense perhaps even reversing) the positions of the two men. Before the event, the President had flatly and at times heatedly opposed the use of force as a means of settling the Canal dispute, while Dulles obliquely defended its legiti-
macy in the last resort. Now the President, while still firmly opposed, was more dispassionate, while Dulles took the Anglo-French action as a personal affront, a sinister breach of trust. He went to New York bearing an explosive resentment toward those who had cost him his hard-won control over the situation.
Macmillan, who acknowledged that the British cabinet had made a “profound miscalculation” of Washington’s reaction, later wrote, not without prejudice or disproportion or a touch of malice, that “Dulles had all along regarded himself as the legal adviser in the Suez case. He had given much attention to the case and devised one contrivance after another. Now his clients had taken the matter out of his hands and acted on their own. This was an insult, almost a betrayal. Consequently, Dulles
showed in the vital period a degree of hostility amounting almost to frenzy. . . . Perhaps the grim disease which was later to prove mortal had affected his psychological and intellectual equilibrium. ... He clearly lost his temper; he may have also lost his nerve.” 8 To present the President’s case against the use of force, it was necessary
for Dulles to jettison whatever nuances he still clung to regarding the demands of “justice” for the Anglo-French over and above a merely peaceful solution. But this was easier now that there had been a flagrant
THE ALLIANCE IN PERIL 379
transgression of a higher law, for nothing lay closer to Dulles’s heart and
mind than the sanctity of the United Nations. Thus, he found perfect harmony between his own theme and the President’s in a defense of the resonant Wilsonian principle that international justice must be looked for within the structures and processes of the established world organization, that these were mankind’s highest expression of decency, mutual accommodation, and law, that nothing justified breaching them for selfish ends. His speech was thus a sermon, an appeal to the ideals of Western
Man and an implied demand that these ideals must be met at least by the leading nations of the Western world. No matter, for the moment, that the Soviet Union could not be brought to account for its savagery in Hungary or (on a far less glaring level of disparity) that India could not be forced to accept the United Nations resolution on Kashmir. In the Anglo-French-Israeli case, it was possible to appeal to reason, to exert moral pressure and, if necessary, economic and political sanctions! Speaking slowly and powerfully from fragmentary notes, he called the
military attacks “a grave error’; worse than that, they put in jeopardy the very existence of the United Nations. No doubt the world organization “may have been somewhat laggard, somewhat impotent in dealing with many injustices which are inherent in this Middle Eastern situation,’ and no doubt we ought to “give our most earnest thought to the problem of how we can do more to establish and implement principles of justice,” but “the first thing is to stop the fighting as rapidly as possible lest it become a conflagration which would endanger us all... . What has been called a police action may develop into something which is far more grave.” Accordingly, a failure to act strongly and promptly against the wrongdoing would condemn the United Nations to an “apparent impotence’ that would lead other nations “‘to take into their own hands the remedying of what they believe to be their injustices.” If that should happen, “‘the future is dark indeed.’”’ The United States was accordingly impelled to act against “three nations with whom it has ties,
deep friendship, admiration and respect” because our “disagreement” with their actions “involves principles which far transcend the immediate issue.”” 39
It was a speech of abstractions, but then much of the world lives by abstractions, and Dulles did so more than most. In retrospect, the Secretary thought it one of his best efforts. As he later told close associates, and especially churchmen, “If that had been my very last act on earth, it would have been exactly as I would have wished it. I would have liked it for my epitaph.” #° After a long and bitter debate, the U.S. resolution (essentially the same as the one vetoed in the Security Council) was adopted at 2:00 A.M. on November 2, by a vote of 65 to 5. Only Australia and New Zealand joined Britain, France and Israel in Opposition; there
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THE ALLIANCE IN PERIL 381
except Suez. That situation he intended to manage even from the hospital; indeed, Macomber was to establish himself there the following Monday, so that messages and papers could be sent for Dulles’s study and decision.*! But the three-hour operation revealed cancer; it was serious; and Dulles did not return to the State Department until January. Control of Middle East policy passed, during a critical period, to other hands. On November 17, after the Suez cease-fire was in effect, but during the period of American pressure for British, French and Israeli withdrawal, Selwyn Lloyd and the British ambassador came to pay a visit at Walter Reed Hospital. Dulles, in comfortable trousers, a sweater, and slippers. came slowly forward to meet them, shook hands, and immediately said:
“Well, once you started, why didn’t you go through with it and get Nasser down?” Lloyd was somewhat startled. Recovering, he said, ‘Foster,
why didn’t you give us a wink?’ Dulles answered, “Oh! I couldn’t do anything like that!’ #? Although some have cited this incident as evidence
of a nasty sense of humor, there is more reason to regard it as a quite serious remark, revealing the enduring if subtle differences between Eisenhower and Dulles with regard to the ultimate legitimacy of force at Suez and, equally, the impossibility for Dulles to get more than an impercepti-
ble half step out of cadence with the President.
Applying Princ pplying Principle
[en DULLES’S RESOLVE to hold the reins on the fast horse of Suez, the cancer operation took him out of service for several weeks. From the morning of November 3, Eisenhower was in firm command of American policy in the Middle East, exerting a wide variety of pressures for a cease-fire and withdrawal, personally coordinating all major events,
determined to act on pure principle as he understood it. Eden Gives Way
Also on November 3, Egypt announced its full compliance with the UN demand for a cease-fire, and on the following day so did Israel — to the utter consternation of Britain and France! — for these acceptances meant that the basic condition of the ultimatums was met, and that all remaining pretext for the Anglo-French invasion was nullified. But the invasion force was now combat-loaded, moving across the Mediterranean and scheduled to land at Port Said in three days. When Ben-Gurion thus joined Nasser in accepting the cease-fire, Britain and France (as Dayan put it) “nearly jumped out of their skins.” 1 Ben-Gurion was moved by indications that Eden was faltering in the face of mounting pressures on every side. They came from the United States and the United Nations, and the Commonwealth was up in arms
(Nehru called the collusive military action an extraordinary case of “naked aggression” in which “Israel is the invader and Egypt is made to suffer”’).2 The situation in the House of Commons was an unmanageable
APPLYING PRINCIPLE 383
tumult that seemed to threaten a breakdown of all political discourse: “A storm of booing would break out as soon as Anthony entered the Chamber, and would rise to a crescendo of hysteria when he actually rose to speak.” ? In the face of such pressures, and unable to provide persua-
sive answers to questions that punctured the moral pretension of the official posture, Eden gave the impression of a man looking for a way out. Now, however, he desperately urged Mollet to press Ben-Gurion to retract, and this Mollet did. Angry, but feeling he could not face the com-
bination of American, Russian and United Nations pressures for withdrawal from the Sinai without strong Anglo-French support, Ben-Gurion reneged on the cease-fire on November 4 by insisting on a number of conditions plainly unacceptable to the UN. Eden nevertheless continued to give way under severe pressure, which angered the impatient French, who had now ceased to be concerned with appearances. They devised an independent plan for a French paratroop attack on November 4, with open Israeli support and cover (the paratroops would drop inside Israeli lines near Kantara, then move out to seize the Canal), but Eden responded to this with outrage and indignation.‘ He now clutched at the straw of Anglo-French association with a larger UN peace-keeping force that seemed to be in the making, and persuaded Mollet that the British and French forces were the natural vanguard of a United Nations effort. In their joint reply to the United Nations, they accordingly promised to cease fire if the UN agreed “‘forth-
with to limited detachments of Anglo-French troops to be stationed between the combatants.” > The reply also included Eden’s remarkably perfidious idea that the Anglo-French military presence was necessary “‘to secure the speedy withdrawal of Israeli forces’; ®° this was an argument that Mollet had reluctantly accepted as a means of getting Eden to speed up the landings, but it was too much for Ben-Gurion.
At 8:20 A.M. on November 5, British and French paratroops began stepping out of their transports six hundred feet above Port Said. Forty minutes later and several hundred miles to the south, the Israeli assault on the fortress at Sharm al-Sheikh, commanding the Strait of Tiran, gained for Israel the final and most important objective of the Sinai campaign — it opened the Gulf of Aqaba, permitting seaborne access via
the Red Sea to the Israeli port of Elath. Within two hours, Ben-Gurion reinstated the Israeli agreement to the cease-fire, once more embarrassing
the Anglo-French, who now had paratroop contingents on the ground, but amphibious forces still twenty-four hours from landing. Eden cabled Eisenhower insisting that the “police action” that had begun had to be carried through, if only to avoid a military vacuum while a United Na-
tions force was being constituted. He added: “I have always felt .. .
384 APPLYING PRINCIPLE
that the Middle East was an issue over which, in the last resort, we would
have to fight. . . . If we had allowed things to drift, . . . Nasser would
have become a kind of Moslem Mussolini ... taking the tricks all around the Middle East. ...I am sure this is the moment to curb Nasser’s ambitions. . . . By this means, we shall have taken the first step towards re-establishing authority in this area for our generation.” 7 Meanwhile, the Soviets, who had now crushed the Hungarian rebel-
lion, proposed to Eisenhower the “joint and immediate use’ of Soviet and American forces operating under a UN mandate to end the Suez war. Momentarily taken aback, Eisenhower soon pronounced the proposal “unthinkable’’ and an “‘obvious attempt” to divert world opinion from the bloody suppression of hope in Hungary.® He sharply warned Bulganin against Soviet intervention in the Middle East. There followed a series of ominously worded Soviet messages addressed to Britain, France and Israel that seemed to be thinly veiled threats of ballistic missile attacks. As a soldier, Eisenhower was not much impressed with these rum-
blings out of the Kremlin, but he was at the same time not averse to letting them add to the pressures on the three powers whom he was seeking to move toward cease-fire and withdrawal; indeed, there was indica-
tion during this period that the CIA manufactured several reports of Russian military activity which were without any basis in fact.® Eden appears to have been equally unfrightened by the Soviet threats,
feeling the primary Russian purpose was to prevent the United States from emerging from the crisis as the principal savior and protector of the Arabs. Nevertheless, he decided to quit shortly after receiving the Russian note, but his principal reason was the “threatened disaster to our whole economic position.” 1° Britain’s dollar reserves fell by $57 million in September and $84 million in October. But the November panic drained away $279 million, or 15 percent of London’s total dollar reserves. Macmillan, perhaps the most avid supporter of the war against Nasser, was spun around by the financial crisis, telling Eden he could not any more be responsible for Her Majesty’s Exchequer unless there was relief. But relief depended on stopping the war. The Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey, operating at Eisenhower's behest, firmly
refused to approve a British request for a large withdrawal of dollars from the International Monetary Fund (with which London proposed to buy sterling and thus shore up its price). Humphrey told Macmillan that financial help would be forthcoming only if Britain promised an immediate cease-fire.
After a long and shattering day in Parliament, Eden telephoned Mollet at 1:30 A.M. on November 6 to express his view (which fell short of a final decision) that the game was up. Mollet, who opposed such a conclu-
sion, but who seemed to misunderstand Eden’s principal motivation,
APPLYING PRINCIPLE 385
summoned Ambassador Dillon to the Matignon Palace within the hour to ask for U.S. assurances against a Russian attack on Anglo-French forces in the Middle East, explaining that such support was imperative if he were to hold the faltering British in line. While Dillon was still in Mollet’s room, Eden telephoned again to say he had definitely decided to stop. Mollet then told Dillon that France had no choice but to comply, since French forces were dependent on British logistics. It is a measure of Eden’s ambivalence or fatigue that these personal decisions at the highest level did not prevent the seaborne assault from going forward at dawn, and the cease-fire was not proclaimed until midnight of November 6 (some twenty-one hours after Eden’s second phone call). Deciding that, with Israeli-Egyptian hostilities at an end, Britain had no choice but to abide by the language of its own ultimatum, the British cabinet acted at 10:00 A.M. In the French cabinet, however, the stubborn Pineau argued for going on without the British in full cooperation with Israel,
but this ignored both the logistical factor and the evidence that even Israel was not prepared further to antagonize the United States. At 5:00 p.M. Mollet telephoned Eden with France’s agreement to quit. Eisenhower got the news at noon Washington time, on November 6, as he returned by helicopter from Gettysburg where he and Mrs. E1senhower had cast their votes in the presidential election. He immediately telephoned Eden to offer congratulations, but also to caution him against
setting any conditions on the cease-fire and to insist that none of the major powers should participate in the UN peace-keeping force. Thus was the fighting brought to an end. Inexorable Logic
Eden, however, choosing to ignore Eisenhower’s advice, sought with Mollet to include their troops in the UN emergency force and to delay any withdrawal until that force was fully established; they also wanted a major role in physically clearing the Canal. As Eden later wrote: “We were ashore with a sufficient force to hold Port Said. We held a gage. Nasser had received a humiliating defeat. . . . His position was badly
shaken. Out of this situation intelligent statesmanship should, we thought, be able to shape a lasting settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict and for the future of the canal.” ™ Thus determined to maintain the Anglo-French military position as a strong bargaining counter, Eden sought simultaneously to effect a dramatic and visible repair of the broken bonds of alliance. On November 7 he telephoned Eisenhower to propose that he and Mollet should fly at once to Washington for a broad review of the whole situation. The President’s steady inner self-confidence, forth-
386 APPLYING PRINCIPLE
rightness, dislike of pretense, and insistent refusal to personalize issues made him a bulwark of sanity and wise proportion in every crisis, but these same qualities led occasionally to a naive disregard for appearances. On this occasion, his ingrained conviction that NATO was the indispensable cornerstone of Western security and his quiet sympathy for an old friend led him to give an affirmative off-the-cuff response to Eden’s proposal. It was, after all, only a family quarrel; principle was one thing, but friendship and mutual interest were another. The State Department, including Acting Secretary Hoover, was visibly dismayed by the impropriety of such a meeting. The United States had led the fight for the UN resolution against Britain and France, and the Anglo-French were still in defiance of the resolution. From his hospital bed, Dulles strongly concurred, fearing such a meeting would undermine the authority of the United Nations and suggest to the Arabs the existence of a permanent Anglo-American conspiracy. He intervened with blunt advice. The President accepted these representations “with reluctance and impatience,’ and telephoned the Prime Minister two hours later to rescind the invitation, telling Eden his advisers “think our timing is very, very bad. . . . We will have to postpone it a little bit. I am sorry. 1?
The next day, he paid a visit to Dulles at Walter Reed Hospital. Despite the myriad dangers and problems that swirled unresolved around his head, Eisenhower was a man of innate optimism and ebullience, and on this occasion he still carried the natural elation of both the fact and the margin of his reelection to the presidency just two days before.* The gaiety of his greeting to Dulles was, however, rather quickly absorbed in the Secretary’s wholly somber response, and it became ap-
parent to the President that he must explain himself and his humanitarian impulses to his principal adviser on foreign affairs. Sitting in a chair that required him to look up to the high hospital bed where Dulles sat like an old owl propped up by numerous pillows, the President seemed somewhat in the position of a schoolboy trying to explain away some misdeed to a skeptical and unyielding headmaster: “Foster, I understand why you thought it was a bad idea [to invite Eden] and why it should have been called off, and as you know we called it off. . . . But I want to explain to you what I had in my mind when I did it.’ 78 He went on at some length, but if he expected sympathy and understanding, he failed to get it. Nodding silently, the sixty-eight-yearold Dulles peered down at the man who had just been reelected to the highest office in the most powerful nation in the world. Only after
Eisenhower had run out his string did he say anything, and then it *In 1956, Eisenhower defeated Adlai Stevenson by 457 to 73 electoral votes. He carried 41 states to Stevenson’s 7.
APPLYING PRINCIPLE 387
was a comment that crisply closed the subject: “Well, Mr. President, I think it was right that we called it off.” 1 For two weeks, Eden and Mollet clung fast to their defiant position on withdrawal, but when the UN emergency force arrived in Suez on November 21, Eisenhower moved with implacable determination to end the impasse. The desperate state of the pound sterling had forced Eden to a cease-fire. Now the urgent need for oil brought submission on the issue of withdrawal. The French, who had been less vulnerable on the monetary issue, were equally jeopardized by the prospect of a severe oil shortage; rationing had already begun in both countries and winter was coming on. Before Suez, 73 percent of Europe’s oil came from the Middle East (one-half of that through the Canal), but with the Canal closed and the Syrian pipelines destroyed, Europe was drawing only g percent of its total requirements from that area. As 27 percent came from non—Middle East sources, this meant that total supply was down to 36 percent of norma]. A supplement from the Western Hemisphere was urgently needed, but the United States insisted first on total withdrawal.
Although the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, had _labored to create the UN emergency force in large part to provide a means of permitting the Anglo-French to give way with a semblance of dignity, there was never a serious chance that London and Paris could escape total withdrawal. The United Nations is a confederation of national sovereignties and its Charter provides no justifiable encroachment by one member on the territory of another; this strict and pristine rule is embedded in the very bone structure of the organization. Accordingly, the UN being seized of the Suez problem and the United States having committed itself to support of the UN, there could be no mitigation of the judgment. By an inexorable logic, Egypt had the sovereign right to refuse the presence of foreign forces on Egyptian soil. No matter what the extenuating circumstances, within the framework of a United Na-
tions operation the Anglo-French withdrawal had to be total and unconditional. Such hard logic naturally generated resentment; indeed, anti-American feeling mounted throughout Europe. A resolution supported by 110 Tory members of the British Parliament congratulated Selwyn Lloyd for his efforts “to secure international control of the Suez Canal” and deplored “the attitude of America, which is gravely endangering the Atlantic Alliance.”’ Harold Nicolson wrote in his diary that “for the moment, all ‘Tory opinion, bemused though it be, is in favour of Eden. Simple minds work simply. The ladies of Bournemouth do not like the Russians, the Americans or Nasser: Eden has dealt a blow to
these three enemies: therefore Eden must be right. It is as simple as that.” 1° But Eden departed, sick and exhausted, for a rest in Jamaica
388 APPLYING PRINCIPLE
on November 23, leaving R. A. Butler, the Lord Privy Seal, to bear the political onus of the inevitable capitulation. On November go, President Eisenhower declared himself satisfied with Anglo-French assurances, and Selwyn Lloyd announced a phased troop withdrawal on December 3 which was duly completed on December 22. Sanctimony at NATO On November 18, Dulles flew off to Key West for further convalescence;
on December 3 he was back in harness at the State Department, preparing for the December 11 meeting of the NATO Council which seemed certain, in the circumstances, to be a test of the alliance’s capacity for survival. The bonds that held together the crucial American-BritishFrench nucleus were torn or badly strained, and the prospects for quick repair clouded by embittered and distrustful personal relationships. In a major address delivered on the second day of the conference, Dulles extended an olive branch to estranged allies and, displaying a hitherto unsuspected gift for understatement, admitted that “history
may record that neither we nor our allies were without fault in our handling of the events which led to the crisis in which we now find ourselves.” 1° Unfortunately, he did not stop there, but insisted on entering a claim to moral and tactical victory for the United States, and then, in his most egregious manner, went on to wrap himself in a mantle of such exclusive rectitude that he ended by exacerbating the already nettled state of his European colleagues. As the London Times of December 12 reported it, he did not hesitate to lecture his colleagues on morality, pointing out that even grave injustices were not grounds for resort to force, and that restraint in the face of provocation was proof of moral strength; indeed, that kind of strength “created a moral climate which stimulated and encouraged the forces which were destroying the Soviet system.” 17 The Anglo-French action at Suez, he said, had violated not only the United Nations Charter, but also Article I of
the North Atlantic Treaty (on the rather strained interpretation that that treaty requires all parties to renounce the use of force even with respect to problems outside the NATO area). Having thus laid down the dictum that force could not be justified by any nation under any circumstances, except self-defense, and that this stricture applied with particular point to members of NATO, he proceeded to make plain that the United States was exempt from such a rule because of its special position. As the nexus of numerous collective security arrangements, involving some forty other countries, the United States would insist on
APPLYING PRINCIPLE 389
its right to act alone, indeed without any obligation to consult with its NATO allies, on matters beyond the NATO borders.
Without doubt, there was a case to be made for America’s broad responsibilities and preeminent power position in the free world. But to link a naked claim to the unilateral use of force for oneself with a sanctimonious lecture on the immorality of force if contemplated by others was yet another example of that incredible Dullesian gratuitousness and insensitivity that left his admirers sadly shaking their heads
and his critics gnashing their teeth. It also showed to perfection the now largely unconscious fusion of preacher, politican and lawyer. His
instinct was to bind the other party (preferably to high moral principles), while preserving freedom of action for himself and his client. Obviously he had forgotten his private “why did you stop?” question to Selwyn Lloyd in the hospital. But if the moral discrepancy here involved
entirely escaped him, it did not escape others. One London editorial, reflecting the mounting intensity of European reaction to the Dulles personality, began with the biblical quotation, ““Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye.” At the same time he showed, in private meetings, a sharp resentment at suggestions, then circulating freely in the NATO Council and the European press, that he must bear a large measure of blame for having triggered the Canal nationalization, for having misled his allies, for
having reduced NATO to its current state of malaise. In a talk on December 12, Macmillan found him “discursive and vague... in a querulous and unhappy mood.” After complaining about the removal
of Makins as British ambassador in Washington, “he went on to a long defence of himself and his policies . . . clearly hurt at the criticisms that had been made. He said that it was an error to believe that he and the President could be separated. He wrote most of the Presi-
dential statements himself. When they had to be tough, they were made by the Secretary of State. ... When they were idealistic, they were made by the President but written by the Secretary of State. He seemed very sensitive to any suggestion that there was a rift between them.” 48
Shoe-horning Israel
Immediately after accepting the cease-fire, Israel began its fight to retain the new lands won by military conquest. The basic theme of Ben-Gurion’s speech to the Knesset on November 7 was that, as the Sinai was historically a part of Israel, there had been no invasion of Egypt. “Our operations were restricted to the area of the Sinai Peninsula
390 APPLYING PRINCIPLE
alone.” 19 ‘The earlier armistice agreements and the boundaries they defined were accordingly “dead and buried and will never be resurrected.” ?°
Eisenhower, who abhorred both Ben-Gurion’s logic and his defiance of the UN, cabled him immediately that such intransigence could “impair the friendly cooperation between our two countries.” 74 At the same time, Acting Secretary Hoover warned the Israeli Foreign Office of possible economic sanctions and of what he discerned as an incipient move by the neutral countries to expel Israel from the United Nations.
Ben-Gurion took a prudent backward step on November 8, telling Eisenhower that “we have never planned to annex the Sinai,” ?? but such was his tenacity that the last Israeli soldier was not pressured out
of that peninsula until five months later, on March 16, 1957. But if Ben-Gurion now resigned himself to having eventually to yield up the Sinai, he remained adamant about Gaza and Sharm al-Sheikh, repeatedly defying UN resolutions over the next three months and lobbying tirelessly for sympathetic support in the American Jewish community. Eisenhower, however, who was consistently cavalier about the consequences of Zionist opposition at home, both before and after the election,
gave him little room for encouragement: “I got calls from New York City and some of my friends [said]: ‘Well, you’ve lost New York.’ And I said I don’t give a goddamn. . . . We thought the American Jew was . . . an American before he was a Jew so we'll just take the salt thataway.” 3 He carried New York state by 1,600,000 votes.
On February 11, Dulles handed Ambassador Eban an aide-mémoire which expressed the considered American view that “Israeli withdrawal from Gaza should be prompt and unconditional.” ?* With regard to Sharm al-Sheikh, however, he was more forthcoming, expressing the United States belief that the Gulf of Aqaba ‘‘comprehends international waters,” thereby making it unlawful for any nation to “prevent free and innocent passage”; indeed, said Dulles, the United States was prepared, on behalf of American-registry vessels, to exercise the right of free and innocent passage ‘‘and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.” 2° This was a constructive American effort (which, however, fell short of a guarantee except as to ships of American registry) to provide free passage for Israeli shipping in the gulf and particularly through the Strait of Tiran, after the removal of Israeli armed forces from the commanding heights at the mouth of the gulf. Ben-Gurion, who held promises to be less valuable than physical control, did not budge.
By this time a large majority in the United Nations General Assembly was angry and restive at Israel’s repeated defiance, and looking to the
United States to apply the sanctions that would bring that Spartan
APPLYING PRINCIPLE 391
country to heel. The latest Ben-Gurion intransigence convinced Dulles and Cabot Lodge that the United States must now take a public stand on severe sanctions against Israel, or else be confirmed at the United Nations as the creature of Jewish interests in America. On the Secretary of the Treasury’s plantation in Thomasville, Georgia, where Eisenhower and Humphrey were shooting quail, they accordingly descended on
February 16. Out of the meeting came a firm decision not only to suspend governmental assistance to Israel but also to eliminate the generous tax credits and to take other administrative action to restrict private assistance from American sources (the latter figure being roughly
$100 million annually, comprising $40 million in cash gifts and }$60 million in the purchase of Israel bonds; a record of the figures was available to the Treasury because of the tax deductions accorded both types of transaction). When the President returned to Washington, on February 20, to brief congressional leaders on this plan, the pervasiveness of Jewish influence in American politics quickly surfaced. Senator Lyndon Johnson was in the pro-Israeli vanguard for the Democrats, while the Senate Republican leader, William Knowland, threatened to resign from the U.S. delegation to the United Nations if any sanctions were applied against Israel. At a tense and strained meeting, Eisenhower refused to be deflected, but the congressional leaders pointedly declined to make his position their own.?* In a television speech the following
evening, he argued the literal letter of the law: “If the United Nations once admits that international disputes can be settled by using force, then we will have destroyed the very foundation of the organization.
... The United Nations has no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions. . . .” 27 Six nations introduced a supporting UN resolution the next day. With a howl of rage, Ben-Gurion finally yielded on March 1. Transition in London As the bits and pieces of information about the Suez collusion began to find their way into the public domain, mainly from the insouciant French, they were met by categorical denials from the British defense and foreign ministries, and there was also a certain public disinclination
in Britain to believe so unsavory a truth. Eden nevertheless returned from Jamaica on December 14 to a “malodorous” political atmosphere.?* As he entered the House of Commons, he was met with “a stony silence
from the Opposition and the feeblest of cheers from the Government benches. . . . It was a grim and revealing episode.” ?? On December 20, he was cornered in a tight debate, and extricated himself only by making
392 APPLYING PRINCIPLE
a directly false statement: “There was not,” he said, “foreknowledge that Israel would attack Egypt.” 3° Within a week his doctors advised him to resign, and he ended a long and largely illustrious career on January 9, 1957, leaving behind him a wounded but loyal Tory party and a deeply divided country. It was a towering personal and political tragedy. Eminently effective in the role of diplomatic specialist, which he performed with distinction for nine-tenths of his official life, he had failed as a political leader. On his final day in office, just two hours before he bid farewell to the cabinet, he talked privately with Macmillan at Ten Downing Street in the one small drawing room with a “window to the west, looking
over the garden,’ the only room on the north side that provided a “touch of warmth and glow” to the winter gloom of London.*! Learning of Eden’s decision, Macmillan found himself unprepared for the ‘‘sud-
den and tragic end to the adventure on which we had set out so gaily some twenty months before. . . . I can see him now on that sad winter afternoon, still looking so youthful, so gay, so debonair — the represen-
tative of all that was best of the youth that had served in the 1914-18 War.” *? He might have added that both he and Eden, and indeed many others in the Suez cabinet, were also among the best of those who in 1938 had “‘stood up to Hitler’ and refused to “let Mussolini get away with it.”’ That had been their triumph, and their supreme contribution to Britain and humanity. Their tragedy had been their strange collective lapse of historical perspective which led them to insist that Nasser was an incarnate Mussolini (and an incipient Hitler). More understandable, though no less tragic, had been their failure to perceive that ten years after the glorious copartnership of World War II, Britain was, in relation to the United States, only one among several middle powers in the constellation forming around the Washington superpower, that there was no longer an automatic identity of American and British interest, and that Washington was rather unlikely to support the last convulsive reflex of a spent imperial instinct. After Eden had resigned, the Marquess of Salisbury and Lord Kilmuir
were instructed to poll the cabinet to determine which one of the two obvious contenders for succession, R. A. Butler or Harold Macmillan, would be chosen. ““‘Bobbety” Salisbury, who suffered a speech difficulty,
asked each man, in the privacy of a small office off the cabinet room, “Well, which is it, Wab or Hawold?’ 33 By this means it was decided
that the name of Macmillan, the more traditional, the tougher, the more ruthless man, would be sent to the Queen. The Suez debacle was a graveyard for careers and reputations on every side. Like Eden, Dulles was grievously wounded — in health and prestige —but unlike Eden (who lacked a politically invulnerable sponsor and
APPLYING PRINCIPLE 393
protector), Dulles survived professionally. If there was in the whole inglorious spectacle any major figure who emerged with his reputation
more or less intact, it was surely the President of the United States. Plunged into the fait accompli of Nasser’s nationalization by Dulles’s wholly private decision to use the Aswan issue as an anti-Soviet ploy in the global cold war, he immediately saw the Canal problem in true perspective and never changed his view. He can be faulted for not having insisted on a flatter, blunter presentation of his position, although his own statements were hardly subject to misinterpretation. But he was preoccupied with a campaign for reelection, he trusted Dulles, and his allies (who were bound by their own obsessions) were incapable of taking
him at his word until it was too late. Yet even after the worst had happened, he retained a sense of proportion and an attitude of firm dispassion that were qualities displayed by no other participant.
On the Defens! CNSIVE
| \ | INETEEN FIFTY-SEVEN Was a year marked by steadily accelerating
change in the world situation and by a deepening refusal of
American policy to acknowledge or adjust to it. The ‘nuclear stalemate” was now nearly universally accepted as a political fact, and it strength-
ened the determination of the Third World countries to fashion a policy of “nonalignment” as between the two Superpowers, a fact which translated to relations with the West ranging from benign neutrality to
outright hostility. Soviet offers of economic and military aid, and unqualified Soviet support for national independence in Asia and Africa, were meeting with a favorable response; “freedom from Communism” was not everywhere the instinctive, overriding consideration it had proved to be in the democratic West; there was rising resistance to the granting of air and naval bases, transit rights and other concessions which figured prominently in American calculations of feasible containment, military advantage, and prestige. Within the belt of Eastern Europe, the Soviets were faced with similar impulses to self-determination, flowing from the energies released by Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization program and _ his endorsement of Tito’s doctrine of “separate roads to Socialism.’ These currents had already produced the Polish and Hungarian challenges to Soviet authority and were generating a counterreformation movement in
the Kremlin aimed at deposing the author of this dangerous liberal leniency. Accelerated change thus threatened the viability of old policies on both sides in the East-West struggle. Everywhere, arrangements and
relationships which had long defined the postwar scene seemed to be shifting, breaking up, pulling loose from their moorings. Everywhere the yeast of change was at work, and more swiftly than most had imagined.
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Ce ae :INNO aNOMIC : oo aeCO aCUCU .... oe eeSI a eeeT eo— ee ee ee oo ee NIE NON USS Ee ee LE RO CeO OS ee eee ee er pao ley I ERS eG oe eee Be eee re tern ek se i FOR CEN CRESS OSE LO Co TOR OU Ta MURINE sy EO Oe BoUe eco, a UO aoes ee ee eee oe Oe) ok ee eS oe : ;: ee OOO ENTE Ces ROE ENN A non Bee ee ee ee ee — er a .. a. hls oo oo oe |... RES.NN MINN DNS ESSN Rs ee! OO It SO A Ta a,oo ET TO ee : ; ;: me UE, Le a. oo a a i ee ..... Ls ce oa eee | ee a ee a . oe ....:—i‘“C i But except for accusing Nasser of “Communist methods,” no suggestion was made that either the Soviet Union or “International Communism” was implicated. The UN Security Council proposed to send an observation team and, with no objection from any major power, this was dispatched by June 14. Nor did Egypt raise any objection; indeed, Nasser called in the American ambassador and put forward suggested proposals for ending the trouble
— Chamoun should finish out his term, but should then give way to General Shehab, as the strongest politician acceptable to both factors; in addition, the rebels should be granted full amnesty. In retrospect, Dulles’s refusal to see these proposals as the ingredients of a reasonable settlement, and to use them as the point of departure for a serious negotiation between Chamoun and the rebels, perhaps with UN mediation, was rather clearly a missed opportunity. The final settlement consisted
almost precisely of these terms, but there remained in Washington a basic antipathy to Nasser’s Pan-Arabic aspirations, a state of mind which preferred military intervention to mediation. Dulles accordingly passed the proposals to Chamoun without endorsement, and Chamoun did not
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act on them. The observation team failed to stop the fighting, and indeed it greatly disheartened the Chamoun government by its report on July 4 that the “vast majority” of armed dissidents were Lebanese. This report may have been literally true, but it was misleading in the sense that
it implied an absence of outside support from Egypt and Syria. Later evidence showed that the UN team had been able to work in the mountainous frontier area only during daylight hours and had thus missed a considerable flow of arms and saboteurs crossing into Lebanon after dark.
Such a flow was proved when the U.S. Marine units later tapped the telephone lines between Damascus and the rebel center in Beirut.®
The Explosion in Iraq With the scale and tempo of fighting on the rise in Lebanon, and with the Chamoun government moving toward an appeal to Washington for direct military intervention, the situation in Iraq suddenly blew up on the morning of July 14. On February 14, just two weeks following the proclamation establishing the political union of Egypt and Syria, King Faisal of Iraq and King Hussein of Jordan, who were blood relations, had moved to form a counterfederation, the Arab Union, as a means of strengthening their thrones and regimes against radical Pan-Arabism. Nasser was considerably annoyed, attacking this new combination at several mass rallies, and this no doubt sharpened the social and political tensions inside Iraq. On July 14, two brigades of the Iraqi army, whose
loyalty to the king was known to be uncertain, were improvidently allowed not only to march through Baghdad on their way to another encampment, but contrary to the usual practice were issued live ammunition. Led by a brigadier named Kassim, who apparently decided to seize the opportunity presented, the troops attacked the Royal Palace and ran amok. King Faisal and the Crown Prince were brutally murdered. The Prime Minister, Nuri as Said, escaped in disguise, but was discovered the
next day and not only killed but, as Macmillan wrote, ‘‘treated with utmost barbarity, his body being dragged naked through the streets for the delectation of the lowest section of the mob.” 7 Kassim promptly de-
clared that the uprising was a wholly independent act against Iraq’s “corrupt ruling class,” unrelated to any Nasserist plotting, and later evidence bore him out. So ended the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq. Inevitably, however, the event threw panic into the governments of Lebanon and Jordan, and President Chamoun promptly called in the American, British and French ambassadors to ask them all for immediate military help:
“Well, you see what is happening . . . Lebanon is in real danger.” ® Although there had been some prior Anglo-American discussions re-
RADICAL NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 435
garding joint military action in Lebanon, the American decision to intervene was taken unilaterally and without contemplation of British participation. Eisenhower and Dulles seem to have made a quick intultive judgment that the risks of attempting to undo the new situation in Iraq were too great; nor was Jordan included in the focus of their attention. Dulles walked into a meeting of the National Security Council prepared to elaborate a recommendation for intervention in Lebanon, but the President waved him off: “Foster, I’ve already made up my mind.
We're going in.” ® Congressional leaders, who were then called to the White House to be informed of the President’s decision, presented, as expected, a mixture of reactions. Speaker Sam Rayburn feared the United
States was involving itself in a civil war; Senator Fulbright seriously doubted that the crisis had any connection with Communism and accordingly felt the Eisenhower Doctrine did not apply. John Vorys of Ohio, a senior Republican member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, professed,
however, to see the Soviet hand behind Nasser; and Car] Vinson, the leonine chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, supported the President and was ready to “go the distance.”’ 1° Eisenhower, in later
explaining his own thought process on this occasion, set out a balance sheet of pros and cons that, to say the least, did not seem self-evidently persuasive in favor of intervention. In Lebanon, he wrote, “the question was whether it would be better to incur the deep resentment of nearly all of the Arab world (and some of the rest of the Free World) and in doing so to risk general war with the Soviet Union or to do something worse — which was to do nothing.” 1! Immediately after the decision was taken, on July 14, he telephoned to inform Macmillan, who said in jest, “You are doing a Suez on me.” The President laughed.1? —The American ambassador in Beirut informed President Chamoun that “the American forces will be here tomorrow at two o'clock.” 18
Feeling that there had been inadequate consideration of the situation in Jordan, Macmillan called Eisenhower later that same night to propose
that “it might well be better to act in both places rather than to let the situation drift.’ 24 Getting no definitive reply, but meanwhile receiving a “poignant” appeal for help from King Hussein, Macmillan assembled his military chiefs and was thereupon exposed to the equally poignant weakness of Britain’s military position. It would be possible, said the military leaders, to airlift two battalions from Cyprus to Amman, but only if heavy weapons were left behind and only if Israel granted overflight rights. Feeling that after the Suez debacle London dare not act alone, Macmillan telephoned Dulles, who thought the operation “‘rash but praiseworthy” and promised moral and logistical support. The British cabinet thereupon decided to carry out “this rather ‘quixotic’ act,”
436 RADICAL NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST
feeling that “we would not forgive ourselves if the King were murdered tomorrow, like the Royal Family of Iraq.” 4 Intervention
Poised off the Lebanese coast, the Sixth Fleet landed the first marine
contingents on July 15, and they were quickly followed by airborne troops from Germany and additional marines, bringing total U.S. troop strength to 14,300. British paratroopers began landing in Jordan on July 17, and were quickly built up to a strength of 3,000. For the British this was perhaps the final rearguard action of empire in the Middle East and, though modest in scale, it was in continuous danger of losing its line of communication. The Israelis proved to be very sticky about overflight rights, some elements of the government at Tel Aviv preferring a Jordanian collapse that would provide a pretext for the Israeli seizure of the coveted West Bank territory. On August 3, when Israel demanded a total cessation of British overflights, the United States assumed responsibility for the British aerial supply line, flying materials from Cyprus to Amman in American military aircraft; Tel Aviv was not prepared to refuse Washington. Although applauded by the “northern tier’ countries, the intervention caused, as predicted, another violent outburst of anti-American and anttiBritish feeling in the Arab world, which Khrushchev naturally sought to exploit so that the Soviet Union might once more shine forth as the ardent defender of Arab rights. By numerous warnings, including a renewed threat to send “volunteers” to the Middle East, he succeeded in raising the public apprehension of war in much of the world, but in fact his policy was a model of operational caution. ‘The intervention itself was also entirely peaceable, although the attitude of the Lebanese army was not precisely known in advance. General Shehab and the American ambassador, Robert McClintock, met the United States commander, Admiral Holloway, and the leading contingent of marines on the road from the airport and led them into the city of Beirut. There was some tension but no shots were fired in anger.* Nasser, however, who was uncertain of both Soviet and American intentions, urgently boarded a plane for Moscow to deal with two somewhat contradictory problems: he wanted Russian assurances in the event * The following day, additional combat marines came ashore across the bathing beaches in front of Beirut’s expensive hotels. One private looked at the cluster of bikini-clad young women who were taking the sun, idly watching the operation or wholly indifferent. He put down his rifle, thoughtfully scanned the scene, and proclaimed in tones of wonder and appreciation: “So this is Eye-Rack.”
RADICAL NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 437
the United States showed itself to be the spearhead of a new Western military campaign to bring him down; at the same time, he wanted to warn Khrushchev against any drastic or precipitous action until the situation was clearer. He had no desire for further Soviet intervention in the Middle East. From all of this activity there ensued a flurry of confusing diplomatic exchanges. Khrushchev demanded a “Summit Conference” of the Big Four plus India, to be held within three days, in order to deal with “one of the gravest moments in history.”” Eisenhower replied that he was ‘“‘not
aware of any factual basis for your extravagantly expressed fear of the danger of general war.” 1° But it proved impossible to ignore the acute anxiety of public opinion in Europe (including Britain) and throughout Asia, which carried with it the implicit demand that the Great Powers must come to an understanding that would spare mankind these frightful, unending alarms that turned every local problem into a global confrontation and brought the world to the apparent brink of catastrophe.
While resisting any “Summit” on the 1955 Geneva model, Dulles accepted Macmillan’s proposal that the heads of government should meet within the framework of the UN Security Council, as this seemed to provide a more mundane setting and thus to entail smaller risks in the likely event the conference failed. Here Khrushchev seemed tentatively willing, but General Charles de Gaulle, who was newly returned to power in France, not only expressed a strong preference for the original Russian proposal, but formally accepted the Russian invitation to parley at Geneva. With the West thus openly divided, Khrushchev added to the contusion, following a visit to Mao in early August. He now declared that a heads of government meeting within the framework of the UN Security Council was “inadmissible” because it would allow participation by Mao’s nemesis, “the political corpse, Chiang Kai-Shek.”’ The conierence, he argued, must be a special meeting of the UN General Assembly.17 The West accepted this modification.
Meanwhile, the Deputy Undersecretary of State, Robert Murphy, sat
down in Beirut to mediate Lebanon’s internal political disputes. He found Chamoun nervous, depressed, and near exhaustion after sixtyseven days as “a self-made prisoner” in the Presidential residence.1* But thanks largely to Murphy’s skillful efforts, an agreement was reached on July 31 providing for Chamoun’s dignified departure and for a special election that would ensure success for General Shehab, the candidate of
“national reconciliation.”” Murphy then flew to Baghdad for a quick visit to the new government of Iraq; Kassim received him cordially, and persuasively insisted that the condign actions taken against the monarchy had been of a purely internal character. He also expressed his suspicion of the purposes of American forces in Lebanon, and hoped they would
438 RADICAL NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST
soon be withdrawn. On the strength of Murphy’s report, Washington extended diplomatic recognition on August 2 and even accompanied this with an “expression of its good wishes.” 1° Extrication
Thus, by the time the special General Assembly was convened on August 8, the danger of war in the Middle East had largely abated. The Soviet Union had made clear it would send no “volunteers,” the political crisis in Lebanon was over, and the situation in Iraq was being understood and not exploited. The main problem now was how to extract the
American and British troops. All through the latter part of July, the Security Council had sought a way to transfer to the UN the burden that
the United States and Britain had unilaterally assumed, but, as in the Suez case, Nasser insisted on their unconditional withdrawal and was supported by repeated Soviet vetoes. Apparently undaunted, Dulles developed a six-point peace plan which Eisenhower personally presented to the General Assembly on August 13. Its basic premise, Wilsonian in its insistence on a comprehensive system of justice, was that the UN must
develop alternatives to the American and British presence, in order to safeguard Lebanon and Jordan. As to the Middle East as a whole, it proposed “a standby United Nations Peace Force,” measures to control inflammatory broadcasts across national boundaries, and a new effort at arms control, all of these being efforts to protect against “indirect aggression.” ?°
The trouble, of course, was that not only Nasser but also most of the Arab states were opposed to measures that would inhibit a general development of the new nationalism under conditions and at a pace determined by Arabs; even the King of Jordan was unenthusiastic about a UN peace-keeping force on his territory, preferring arms and a direct promise of Anglo-American protection. Such vigorous opposition from the inhabitants of the region rendered the American proposals infeasible in the General Assembly. After nearly six weeks of impasse, during which
General Shehab succeeded Chamoun in Lebanon and the Jordanian situation did not exceed the normal state of tension, a Sudanese resolution was unanimously accepted (on September 20) which vested wide discretion in Secretary-General Hammarskjéld to make “practical arrangements’ to uphold “the purposes and principles of the Charter,’ and to “facilitate the early withdrawal” of American and British forces.21 Its successful passage owed much to Nasser’s willingness to drop, or at least to blur, his demand for unconditional withdrawal. Lebanon accepted the continued presence of the UN observer group, but declared itself
RADICAL NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 439
no longer bound by the Chamoun government’s endorsement of the Eisenhower Doctrine; there was to be no UN presence in Jordan; American and British forces were to leave by the end of October. Once more Dulles had attempted to impose international authority, and safeguards for the status quo, through the agency of American power. He gained an initial success, but then foundered on the jagged realities of Arab nationalism. The net effect of the venture was a stable compromise in Lebanon, but at an enormous cost in general Arab distrust and ill will, a cost that illumined the continued failure of American policy to find a basis for constructive relations with the one man who was far and away the preeminent Arab leader and hero, and the embodiment of Arab aspirations. Nasser was not basically anti-Western, but he was determined to hold a middle position free of Western lead strings. Dulles’s policies never sought to build upon these realities, but reflected always his preoccupation with the abstract macro-effort to control the pace and method of change and to arrest the spread of “International Communism.” Fearing or misperceiving the Pan-Arabic movement, he seems to have acted out of unresolved contradictions within himself and within the fabric of American opinion: convinced that colonialism must come to an end, he was drawn in logic to an active sympathy for the rising forces of Arab nationalism, yet such a move was inhibited, not only by his Wilsonian insistence on a universal order, but more specifically in this case by the interests and judgments of his British ally. They were judgments that reinforced his own stubborn belief that Nasser was, wittingly or not, the principal agent of Soviet Communist expanion in the Middle East. The substance of the agreement that Murphy negotiated in Beirut was a sensible compromise — it was, in fact, the only solution that could have prevented prolonged civil strife in which United States Marines would have faced the tragic task of defending an unpopular and unrepresentative government in Lebanon, and perhaps a spreading guerilla warfare throughout the area. Eisenhower later wrote that General Shehab was “almost ideal” because he was “acceptable to both the rebels and to the government.” 72. Acceptance of the compromise showed Dulles’s seasoned pragmatism and tactical skills, but it also raised the question of ends and means, of whether the crisis might not have been solved with less hoopla and fanfare and without military intervention if Dulles had been willing merely to urge Chamoun’s serious consideration of proposals
that embodied the elements of a rather evident practical settlement. Chamoun, who was treated to both the sweeping promises and the strict practical limits of the Eisenhower Doctrine, rather acutely perceived the contrast between the bold conception of Dullesian schemes at the outset and his readiness for retreat to rather riskless compromise at the
440 RADICAL NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST
end. As Chamoun saw it: “He didn’t go to the end in any of his initiatives. . . . He used to start very great, very big, according to the mood of his heart, and then retreat when he was in touch with realities.’ 23 The settlement as finally negotiated by Murphy was almost precisely identical with the proposals put forward by Nasser in June. The result of acting out of unresolved contradictions was that Dulles’s Middle East policy was chronically fitful and episodic, reflecting shortterm considerations and little or no long-range planning, powerfully reactive to ‘“‘Communist-inspired”’ crises, yet slack and rather aimless
in periods of relative calm. Many actions seemed irrelevant or had the effect of driving Nasser closer to the Russians. Thus, although as a barrier to Soviet influence to the south the Baghdad Pact had become a sieve, Dulles moved (on July 31) to reinforce it by entering upon separate
bilateral security agreements with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. In Baghdad itself, however (the ostensible seat of the alliance), tension mounted between local Communists and Nasserists. Kassim removed his pro-Nasser deputy, Colonel Arif, from political power by packing him off as ambassador to West Germany, and turned to greater reliance on local Communist groups who, following the demise of the monarchy, were among the few remaining organized political forces in Iraq. Matters came to a head on November 4 when the same Arif, who had secretly returned from Europe, was arrested in Baghdad. Severe repression followed against the Nasserists, including the meting out of several death sentences, which brought into the open the simmering antagonism between local Communists and Pan-Arabists. The Kassim government’s pro-Russian sympathies continued to grow, and in the spring of 1959 Iraq formally withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and terminated all military agreements with the British. The last RAF units left the famous
base at Habbaniyah on May 31. Without Iraq the pact reverted to a “northern tier’ alliance, established its headquarters in Ankara, and changed its name to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Soviet influence, whose southward movement it was intended to block, had long since leaped the barrier and established itself through economic and military assistance programs in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Yet owing to the
strong inertial tendency of institutions (including military alliances), CENTO has survived, albeit in a moribund state, to the present day. Despite his fierce struggle against local Communists, however, Nasser’s state relations with the Soviet Union appeared to be unaffected. On October 23, 1958, two years and three months after Dulles’s fateful renege,
Khrushchev announced Russia’s readiness to provide technicians, machinery, tools, and money to help finance the Aswan High Dam. Nasser now accepted, and the ensuing agreement led to Russian collaboration on the project which was of surpassing interest and consequence tor
RADICAL NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 441
every Egyptian (as one historian wrote, it will be “seventeen times greater than the pyramid” and “will shelter, not a solitary dead soul, but endless millions of living souls until its story is as shrouded in legend as the pyramid’s. It will be a legend of Nasser and the Russians in which any mention of the United States, which was otherwise the richest and most generous of nations, will be a footnote of irritability and meanness’’).2* Questioned by a congressional committee regarding the implications of this new development, Dulles replied: “I don’t think it is anything to get terribly excited about.”
Reprise prise at Quemoy
] es: HANDLING of the second Quemoy crisis in the early autumn
of 1958 was probably, in purely technical terms, his most brilliant and successful piece of brinkmanship, yet (as discussed in chapter 26) the
fact that such a performance was necessary said a good deal about his supreme unreadiness to lead public opinion toward acceptance of the need for any normalization of relations with Peking during the long lull between 1955 and 1958. It also reflected his ad hoc style, for, while Dulles
was consumed by other crises, Chiang very substantially reinforced his offshore island garrisons (with the quiet encouragement of senior American military officers) and this, of course, enlarged the political consequences in the event they should be overrun. Neither Dulles nor Eisenhower seems to have been fully aware of this development until they were confronted with the new crisis. The View from Peking
Communist China’s decision to renew its military threat to Quemoy in August 1958 appeared to flow from a complex of domestic and foreign policy considerations. Confident about its stability and control at home,
yet pessimistic about prospects for dramatic economic advance in the absence of drastic new programs, the regime had just launched the “Great
Leap Forward” in industry and the agricultural communes. Although both were to prove devastating failures (and the communes to demonstrate the regime’s utter readiness to pulverize human beings for the sake
of the revolution), Mao and his colleagues appeared to be supremely
REPRISE AT QUEMOY 443
confident at the outset.1 In foreign affairs, there was a similar mix of dissatisfaction with the limited result of past efforts and of belief that events were now opening up new opportunities. The line of peaceful coexistence laid down at Bandung in the spring of 1955 had won for Peking a widening respect, but had done little to advance Mao's claim to China's seat in the United Nations and to diplomatic recognition by the United States. Restive, the regime was inclined to view the sputnik launchings not merely as having changed the psychology of the international scene,
but as having produced an important shift in the actual balance of power.? In their own judgment on this point, the Russian leaders were more realistic, but the 1957-1958 period rather clearly marked the beginning of a more assertive Soviet conduct of foreign affairs, combining pungent Khrushchevian threats of nuclear destruction with efforts to begin a serious dialogue with the West at the heads of government level. It was also a brief period of relatively harmonious Moscow-Peking relations, and Khrushchev surely shared the assessment expressed in Mao's proclamation, made in the course of his November 1957 visit to Moscow, that “the East wind is now prevailing over the West wind.”
The anti-American riot in Taipei, the extended American economic recession (1957-1958), and Washington's readiness to let the anti-Sukarno rebels in Indonesia go down to defeat (after giving them some aid) also contributed to Peking’s conclusion that the United States might in 1958
be a less resolute opponent in the Formosa Strait, and that a further turning of the screws on Quemoy might now weaken Chiang’s contro] of ‘Taiwan.? Mao appeared to be impressed less by the American intervention in Lebanon than by the absence of an American effort to reverse the coup in Iraq.* But the Peking plan for renewing the threat to Quemoy was nevertheless a carefully calibrated combination of military and propaganda moves, and tightly controlled so that it could be pressed for-
ward or quickly curtailed, depending on the nature and extent of the U.S. reaction. The military objective appeared to be a blockade of Quemoy, which, if effective, could cause the island to fall without a direct assault.
Although several air engagements and at least one naval encounter between Communist and Nationalist forces took place early in August, the artillery bombardment of Quemoy in the early evening of August 23
nevertheless achieved a stunning tactical surprise.6 The Nationalist minister of defense, Yu Ta-wei, was that day on an inspection trip to Quemoy, and a banquet was planned in his honor. A large number of high-ranking officers, many from Taiwan, were gathering for dinner when the Chinese Communist artillery shells fell out of a calm blue sky like a sudden deadly hailstorm, many of them aimed at the banquet site.
444 REPRISE AT QUEMOY
Within a few seconds there were 200 casualties and, at the end of two hours, at least 500, of whom 200 were dead men. The Communist guns fired 40,000 rounds, and the disarray of the Nationalist garrison was so great that not an answering shot was fired during the first forty-five minutes. ‘The defense minister escaped injury, but the casualties included
a number of senior officers. The following day, the Communists fired 36,000 rounds against the island and bombed and strafed the western beaches with aircraft. The greatest military clash in the Formosa Strait since the attempted invasion of Quemoy in 1949 was under way.® Initial Response Confronted with this sudden new challenge, Dulles predictably sought to justify three years of mismanagement and errors of omission by appeal to moral principle. What was at stake, he declared, was ‘‘world order,” and above all the principle that “‘armed force shall not be used to achieve territorial ambitions.” 7 Such a dictum possessed legal and moral author-
ity in the UN Charter as to relations between sovereign nations, but Dulles’s use of it here conveniently ignored the truth that both international law and the overwhelming weight of world opinion were in no doubt that the offshore islands constituted an integral part of the territory of mainland China. He favored an immediate and unequivocal statement of American intentions to defend those islands, but the President preferred not to take such a flat position in advance, and instead instructed the Secretary of State to make public a letter of reply which Dulles had recently written to the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Eisenhower seemed to fear that a categorical statement would intensify attacks by critics, both at home and abroad, and might provide Chiang with an additional handle for manipulating U.S. policy.’ Since there were other offshore islands which the United States was clearly
unwilling to defend, he may also have wanted to avoid defining any specific defense perimeter.
The text of the Dulles letter technically reserved the President’s position, but it possessed an ambiguity only paper thin. Its key passage read: “It would be highly hazardous for anyone to assume that if the Chinese Communists were to attempt to change this situation by attacking and seeking to conquer these islands [Quemoy and Matsu] that this act could be considered or held to a ‘Hmited operation.’ It would, I fear, constitute a threat to the peace of the area.” ° A group of American military leaders arrived in Taiwan on August 26, and the following day Washington announced that the carrier Essex and four destroyers from the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean were en route to strengthen the
REPRISE AT QUEMOY 445
Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Strait. On August 31, Russia entered the picture by suggesting that the crisis might have global implications. Pravda declared ominously that “he who threatens today to attack the Chinese Peoples’ Republic must not forget that he threatens the Soviet Union as well.” Such actions, Pravda argued, could not be localized,
but “will inevitably increase international tension and result in the spreading of the war to other areas.” 1°
Meanwhile, the heavy artillery bombardment continued, reinforced by the employment of aircraft and PT boats against Nationalist ships bringing supplies from Taiwan, and accompanied by broadcasts calling on the Quemoy garrison to surrender: “Chinese Compatriots on Quemoy and Matsu: you have come to the critical moment of choice. . . . There is a road of life open for you — kill the US advisers and defect to our side. There is no other way out.’ Your situation is as ‘“‘hopeless as a pair of turtles entrapped in a flask.” 1? Although the propaganda broadcasts had little effect, the military effort to blockade and isolate Quemoy appeared to be succeeding, for Nationalist efforts at resupply were disorganized and tentative. During this initial period, Eisenhower received a “frantic” letter from Chiang that expressed in terms of anguish his fear that communications between Taiwan and Quemoy might be cut at any time, and that the Seventh Fleet might not be able to prevent a Communist assault on Taiwan itself; unless the Nationalists were allowed to take offensive air actions on a large scale, Quemoy might be doomed to starvation and surrender. What was needed, he argued, was a categorical statement of American intention to defend Quemoy and Matsu, and a broad delegation of authority to Admiral Smoot (the Taiwan defense commander) so that he could employ U.S. forces without reference to Washington. It was a blatant effort to force Eisenhower’s hand. It was coolly rejected. The President thought Chiang’s concern over Quemoy’s vulnerability to blockade “totally inconsistent” with his obstinate ‘“‘loading down the offshore islands with far more troops than were necessary for defensive purposes’; he disagreed with Chiang’s lack of confidence in the Seventh Fleet, and he categorically refused to delegate authority for U.S. military action. Throughout the crisis, Eisenhower was “continually pressured” by both Chiang and American military leaders for a delegation of authority that would in effect place the question of war in the hands of a field commander. Knowing Chiang’s basic desire to enmesh the United States in his struggle to regain the mainland, and understanding the latent itch of certain American commanders for a showdown with Communist China, he wisely refused. “I insisted that I would assess developments as they occurred. Therefore, I kept to myself the decision to employ U.S. forces.” 18
446 REPRISE AT QUEMOY
The Newport Memorandum Eisenhower proved more susceptible to the Secretary of State’s force-
ful and rather crafty effort to nail him to a categorical commitment to defend Quemoy. With the supply situation visibly worsening, Dulles flew to Newport, Rhode Island, on September 4, where Eisenhower was
vacationing, carrying with him a memorandum that reflected his own distillation of a broad assessment prepared by the Pentagon, the CIA, and the Far East bureau of the State Department. The document was a classic exposition of the “domino theory’ carried to remarkable extremes: in the absence of a manifest U.S. determination to protect Quemoy, it argued, the Communists would either overrun that island by amphibious assault, or bring about the collapse of its defenses by protracted bombardment and blockade. This was a reasonably accurate statement. But the analysis then moved to two dubious conclusions: (1) that loss or surrender of Quemoy would expose Taiwan to action (subversive or military) which would “probably” lead to Chiang’s overthrow and to the emergence of a government prepared to advocate union
with Communist China; and (2) that, in such event, the whole United States “anti-Communist barrier’ in the Western Pacific, including Japan, Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, and even Okinawa “would probably come fully under Communist influence. . . . The consequences in the Far East would be even more far-reaching and catastrophic than those which followed when the United States allowed [szc] the Chinese mainland to be taken over by the Chinese Communists.”’ Such an assessment led inexorably to one — and only one — course of action, an open and avowed readiness to defend Quemoy.?* Nor was this the only requirement of the Dulles recommendation. If the Communists were to begin an assault, there “might” be a short period of time during which conventional weapons could persuade them to reverse their effort, but in all proability nuclear weapons would have to be used. This would admittedly cause ‘“‘a strong popular
revulsion against the US in most of the world’; on the other hand, “if the matter were quickly closed, the revulsion might not be longlived.” In either case, the memorandum argued, it was necessary to accept the risks, for no alternative course was consistent with “the safety of the free world and our influence on it.” 15 With the passage of time and the exercise of power, Dulles seemed progressively to shed the philosophical inhibition regarding the actual
use of force (as distinguished from the political threat to use it) with
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474 BERLIN — THE LAST CRISIS
allied unity and accusing the United States of not having consulted with
France. Why had Dulles remained silent in the face of so blatant an untruth, Schoenbrun asked? “Well,” Dulles replied, “there’s no point —as President Eisenhower is fond of saying — of getting into a pissing
contest with a skunk’; he was faced, he said, with the fact that he couldn’t answer the attack “without contradicting the President of France,” and he stirred up the ice in his drink with a thick forefinger and shook his head slowly.‘
Also while in Paris, he dropped his guard to a concerned and admiring General Lauris Norstad, the NATO commander, briefly revealing something of the grim ordeal he was living through. Norstad, although privately shocked at Dulles’s appearance, had said lightly that for a man who was still “running around” Europe after a stiff “bout with the doctors,’’ he was delighted to say that the Secretary looked “surprisingly well.” 4° Dulles looked at him in pain and sadness, then slumped his head down on his chest and said: “Well, I’m tired. . . . You know, I can’t rest in an airplane anymore.” #6 That quiet haven between arduous engagements no longer existed. Norstad later reflected that this last round of diplomatic talks “must have been an almost unbearable ordeal for a proud man, because he wasn’t the strong force that he’d been, and he knew that.” 47
In Bonn, Dulles and Adenauer achieved a general meeting of minds, encapsulated in Adenauer’s phrase that there would be “no concessions without counter-concessions.” #® The old German remained exceedingly nervous about British proposals for a nuclear-free zone and profoundly suspicious of Macmillan’s intentions in Moscow. But he was heartened by Dulles’s report that De Gaulle stood ready to defend Western rights in Berlin, by war if necessary, and he accepted the American and British decision to seek negotiations before the May 27 deadline. Basically, he put his trust in Dulles and the United States to see the crisis through. It was indeed his only real choice, for the fate and future of the Fed-
eral Republic lay at that moment largely with the United States and the NATO alliance. The meeting in Bonn was more notable for its human drama, the last poignant scene in the “love affair’? between the two aging tartars who
had stood together through many battles and must now part forever. As had become the chancellor’s regular gesture of the unusual respect in which he held this man who was not a head of government, Adenauer met Dulles at the airport. A photograph was taken of the arriving Secretary of State standing in the doorway of his plane, waving to the chancellor who waited at the foot of the steps, his hand also outstretched. At
their meeting in the Palais Schaumburg, Dulles leaned far back in his chair and rubbed his chest from time to time, his hands moving over his
BERLIN — THE LAST CRISIS 475
vest in a slow circular motion. He seemed tired and in pain, but his mind
was clear. The anxious and troubled chancellor provided him with a special strained porridge during a break for refreshments, and Dulles, finding it unusually palatable, asked for the recipe. As they drove back to the airport, in the privacy of Adenauer’s limousine, he told his host he had a hernia and would enter Walter Reed Hospital immediately on his return to Washington. He said that, except for President Eisenhower, no one else knew of this, but he wanted Adenauer to know so that he would not believe, upon learning of the hospitalization, that the problem was a recurrence of cancer. Adenauer was deeply convinced that Dulles was speaking the truth, as he then knew it.4? It was a truth, no doubt, he desperately wanted to believe, but there had been a revealing episode in Mexico City three months before, in November. There to attend the inauguration ceremonies of the new president-elect, Dulles had suffered through a period of severe pain, lying on his bed at the American embassy with his hands pressed against his stomach. His friend the American ambassador, Robert C. Hill, wanted to summon doctors, but Dulles refused, saying he did not want to cause unfortunate diplomatic reper-
cussions around the world, nor to take headlines away from the new Mexican president. In addition, he told Hill, “he suspected that for what was wrong with him the doctors could be of little assistance.” ®° Arriving back in Washington from Bonn, he asked the President for
permission to turn over his duties temporarily to Undersecretary Herter, and immediately entered the hospital. A few days later, when the medical diagnosis showed a recurrence of the cancer, Dulles cabled
Adenauer to express regret that “what I told you turned out to be wrong. But I am confident I can overcome this.” >t Soon, however, Adenauer also received two copies of the photograph taken at the Bonn airport. There was no inscription, but simply the words “John Foster Dulles” on both copies. In an accompanying note, the Secretary of State asked his friend to autograph one copy and send it to him at the hospital.
Adenauer later said he knew then “that my friend Dulles was saying farewell to me forever.” >?
Macmillan in Moscow
Macmillan’s trip to Moscow (between February 21 and March 3) proved a personal ordeal, yet one of immense practical value to the Western cause and to the ultimate easing of the grim Berlin crisis. He had to endure several blistering sessions at which Khrushchev criticized his allies — especially Eisenhower and Dulles—in harsh terms, as well
476 BERLIN — THE LAST CRISIS
as a surprising public speech in which the Russian leader both disparaged the West and offered Britain a “treaty of friendship and non-aggression”’ about which nothing had been said in the private discussions. Macmillan felt 1t necessary at their next meeting to point out to Khrushchev, with “much deliberation and seriousness,” that Britain could not be separated from her allies either by stratagem or attacks upon their leaders.*? In a tough extemporaneous reply, in which he showed himself angry
and disturbed, Khrushchev told Macmillan he really could not understand the West. ‘““The Soviet Government had proposed a free city of West Berlin in which the population would be free of all danger and they were ready to surround this arrangement with all necessary guarantees. In their replies, the West talked about rights of access and occupation status which merely meant a continuation of the state of war. The West talked about defending three million people who did not need to be defended. But, when they talked about war, what was really involved were the deaths of hundreds of millions of people.” 5+ The Soviets, Khru-
shchev said, had advanced certain proposals regarding Germany, but the Western replies were not in any way responsive (as Macmillan translated this, “our last note of 16 February was not a reply to his note —
it had no connection except a reference to the date’’).°> Moreover, Western insistence on meetings at an intermediate level was merely, the Russian leader said, an attempt “‘to inveigle us in diplomatic talk, in the labyrinth of which the Soviet Union has had many years of experience — a bog without an exit.’ 5§
The status quo, Khrushchev insisted, must give way in Berlin, but Macmillan was confirmed in his earlier impression that the true Soviet motivation was defensive, that despite their new wealth and power the Russians were still obsessed by a sense of insecurity (“the old bogey of encirclement has not yet been laid’”’),57 and that their primary aim was to stabilize the East German frontier with the West and the GermanPolish borders. “By now,” Khrushchev said, “enough time has passed and the situation has sufficiently changed for us to recognise that the difference between our systems must not create obstacles to the establishment of friendly relations between our peoples, between our countries. The social conditions in one country or another depend on the will of the people of a given country. We must recognise this fact, just as we recognise that the sun rises every morning, and must proceed from the
fact that we live under different systems, but on one planet; that we breathe the same air, enjoy the blessings of nature and the warmth of the same sun.” 58 Despite the conflict and tension of the meeting, Macmillan was encouraged by developments, and he found Khrushchev, “with all his faults and crudities” a charming contrast to the usual run of stony-faced and wooden Soviet bureaucrats. An “expansive, irrepres-
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