The Development of the Komnenian Army 9004117105, 9789004117105

Table of contents :
5 The Development of the Komnenian Army, 1081-1180
The Development of the Komnenian Army, 1081-1180
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
Preface
List of Maps
Maps
Chapter One Textual Sources for 12th- and 13th-Century History
Chapter Two Historical Overview of Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century Byzantium
Chapter Three The Campaigns of Alexios I Komnenos (1081–1118)
Chapter Four The Campaigns of John II Komnenos (1118–43)
Chapter Five The Campaigns of Manuel I Komnenos (1143–80)
Chapter Six Supporting the Komnenian Army
Chapter Seven Komnenian Siege Warfare
Chapter Eight The Komnenian Army in Battle
Conclusion
Appendix 1 The Sieges of John II and Manuel I
Appendix 2 Glossary
Appendix 3 Chronology of the Komnenian Historians
Bibliography
Index
History of Warfare

Citation preview

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE KOMNENIAN ARMY 1081-1180

HISTORY OF WARFARE General Editor KELLY DEVRIES Loyola College

Founding Editors THERESA V ANN PAUL CHEVEDDEN

VOLUMES

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE KOMNENIAN ARMY 1081-1180 BY

JOHN W BIRKENMEIER

BRILL

LEIDEN . BOSTON' KOLN 2002

Illustration on the cover: A pole-framed trebuchet illustrated in the manuscript of the Chronicle ofJohn Skylitzes in Madrid (Bib!. Nac. Cod. 5-3, N2, fo!' 15Iv.).

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnalune Birkenmeier,John W. : The development of the Komnenian army / by John VV. Birkenmeier. - Leiden ; Boston; Kaln : Brill, 2002 (History of warfare ; Vol. 5) ISB:"J 90-()4-11 710-5

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is also available

ISSN 0928-0731 ISBN 9004117105 © Copyright 2002 by Koninklyke Brill j\rv, Leiden, The Netherlands

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in anyform or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or othemise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocofl)' items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fies are paid direct£v to The Copyr~!!,ht Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers AlA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRI:-ITED IN THE NETIIERLA:-.IDS

To

A1Y Mother and Father

For their love, encouragement and support Throughout my studies

CONTENTS Acknowledgements ......... ............. ..... ...... ....... ..... ...... ........ .........

IX

Preface ........................................................................................

Xl

List of

~1aps

..............................................................................

xv

Maps

..........................................................................................

XVII

Chapter One Textual Sources for l2th- and 13th-Century History ................................................................................... . Chapter Two Historical Overview of Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century Byzantium .................................................. Chapter Three (1081-1118)

The Campaigns of Alexios I Komnenos

Chapter Four The Campaigns of John II Komnenos (1118-43) .............................................................................. Chapter Five (1143-80) Chapter Six

The Campaigns of Manuel I Komnenos Supporting the Komnenian Army ................. .

27 56 85 100

139

Chapter Seven

Komnenian Siege Warfare

182

Chapter Eight

The Komnenian Army in Battle

206

Conclusion

231

Appendix 1 The Sieges of John II and Manuel I ............. .

237

Appendix 2 Glossary

239

YIn

CONTENTS

Appendix 3 Chronology of the Komncnian Historians

243

Bibliography

245

Index

253

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project has taken many years to come to fruition, and many people deserve thanks for their help. Professor George Dennis, Sj., first directed my attention to the army of the Komnenian period. He has been a patient and accessible advisor, and he has also been as good a friend as he has been a professional mentor. I cannot thank him enough for all of his help. Dumbarton Oaks provided me with a Junior Fellowship for the year 1996-97, which enabled me to complete the basic research for this work. The Byzantine library, and in particular Dr. Irene Vaslef and the late Dr. Virgil Crisafulli, have provided invaluable help with courtesy and professionalism. Dr. Vaslef deserves particular thanks; without her guiding hand the Byzantine library would be a lesser place. I would also like to thank John Rosser of Boston College's Department of History for introducing me to the Byzantines, and for nurturing my enthusiasm through the travails of early graduate study. My patient and persistent editor, Mr. Charles Dibble of the American Research Center in Egypt, deserves very special thanks. He has corrected many of my errors, and made many suggestions that have improved this work. Any errors that remain are mine. Dr. Karen Rasmussen of Archeographics deserves thanks for the first-rate maps she has provided for this work. An additional note of appreciation is due to Dr. Ralph Bellamy, Associate Professor of Surgery, of the F. Edward Hebert School of Medicine, and to Ms. Colleen Quick, Associate Editor of the U.S. Army's Textbook if Military Medicine, for their help with Chapter Eight. I would also like to thank my publisher, whose patience in waiting for this book has been exemplary. My deepest gratitude is always owed to my parents, whose love and encouragement has followed wherever my studies have led me.

PREFACE This work grew out of a fascination with the military society of the Komnenian Emperors. It seemed almost miraculous that the Byzantine Empire managed to survive the destruction of its army at Manzikert (1071) and the military collapse that followed. How did the empire recover so many lost territories, pursue aggressive military policies, and flourish economically? Furthermore, the Komnenian period is rich in historical documents; historians and orators loved to praise or vilify the Komnenian emperors. These sources are engaging, and if examined together provide a clear picture of Komnenian military policy, goals, and army structure. Alexios I Komnenos (1081--1118),john II (1118-1143), and Manuel I (1143-1180) restored the political and military fortunes of the Byzantine state. This included rebuilding the army under A1exios, who simultaneously parried invasions of Normans from the west, Seljuk Turks from the east, and Pecheneg and Cuman raiders from the north. john extended the empire's borders in Asia Minor, laying siege to dozens of cities and attempting to control the crusader states in the Levant. Manuel further extended Byzantine military operations, personally campaigning in Serbia, Hungary, and in Syria. He also launched large expeditions under subordinate commanders that attacked Egypt and the Norman Kingdom in Italy. Finally, he twice gathered the formidable Byzantine siege train and attempted to destroy Ikonion, capital of the Byzantines' greatest foe in the east, the Seljuk Turks. The goal of this study is to examine the restoration and use of the Komnenian army: how, and with what resources the Komnenian emperors restored the Byzantine military position in the Balkans, Asia Minor, and the Levant. We will examine the army as an institution, considering how Alexios rebuilt it, and how john and Manuel modified it. We will examine the Komnenian campaigns, looking for patterns that might shed light on Byzantine military and political policy. \'\T e will observe how the army was supported, and how the Byzantine army conducted its most characteristic activity-the siege. It is my hope that these topics and questions will provide a basis for further inquiry into the nature of Komnenian society; how the

xu

PREFACE

empire was preserved in an era of increasingly complicated interstate relations. The military system that had provided the empire's defense between the eighth and the late eleventh centuries was destroyed before Alexios came to power. Alexios spent twenty years developing a new army, one that was composed of native Byzantine soldiery, albeit always with several mercenary contingents. The native soldiers came from Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, which replaced the empire's Asia Minor recruiting grounds. By the end of Manuel's reign the Asia Minor coastlands and western provinces were filled with military colonies, districts, and fortified enclaves; these provided a new defensive system against the empire's Turkish enemies. This structure was not as resilient as had been the earlier system of large provincial armies and defense in depth. However, it was as effective as could be managed with the resources available to the KomnenIan emperors. Historians frequently place great importance upon field battles, which occurred when armies lined up their cavalry and charged each other. Despite the prominence of such accounts in our sources (and in the secondary literature), close examination of eleventh and twelfth century texts and oratorical sources provide a different picture. Successful Komnenian warfare was marked by aggressive military campaigns culminating in sieges, followed by defensive warfare and diplomacy to preserve gains. Open battles, even important clashes like Myriokephalon (1176), were not desired. The army existed to protect the siege engines and transport them to their destination. There, they would crush the enemy's walls (as well as the interior, civilian, buildings), and enable the imperial soldiers to storm the burning and demoralized city. Field battles were avoided because they were uncertain affairs, a fact that both emperors and their chroniclers recognized. Alexios, John, and Manuel each developed military strategies for their differing goals. These goals did not (generally) include the reconquest of central Asia Minor. Alexios and John were more often than not successful in their military operations. Manuel's military operations were not as successful. There were inherent limitations to medieval military operations. Defensive operations (whether between armies, or in defense of cities) usually held a considerable advantage. This explains why the Komnenian emperors were both umvilling and unable to reassert control over the lost heartland of Asia

PREFACE

Xlli

Minor. It also demonstrates why ostensibly friendly crusading armies were so dangerous to the Byzantine state (and were clearly perceived as such by the Byzantines). Supporting them meant allowing them past all defensive perimeters, fortifications and armies. This was antithetical to the basic strategy of the Komnenian emperors, which was to fight enemies at the frontier, using fortifications and terrain to delay them until disease and fatigue weakened their fighting capabilities. Imperfect hindsight can lead us to see this fear (particularly during the first crusade) as a bit paranoid. However, this attitude, as with other military problems, reflected a realistic and finely tuned Byzantine perception of military threats and strategic necessities.

LIST OF MAPS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

The Wars of Alexios I in Europe The Wars of John II in Europe The Wars of John II in Asia The Wars of Manuel I in Europe The Wars of Manuel I in Asia Komnenian Supply Points & Provinces in Asia Minor

MAPS

XVII

XG.

~chialos

r::;J

Aegean

Sea