The De Primo Principio of John Duns Scotus: A Revised Text and a Translation

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A

Franciscan Institute Publications Philosophy Series No. 5 Editedby Philotheus H. Boehner, O. F. M. and Allan B. Wolter, O. F, M.

THE DE PRIMO PRINCIPIO OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

A REVISED TEXT

AND

A TRANSLATION

By EVAN ROCHE, O. F. M., PH. D.

MEUS (1ON

Published by THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE ST. BONAVENTURE, N. Y. and . E. NAUWELAERTS LOUVAIN, BELGIUM 1949

FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS

PHILOSOPHY SERIES

1. The Tractatus Ockham.

de Successivis

Attributed to

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Edited by Philotheus Boehner,

O.F.M.,

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By Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M.,

Ph.D. 4.

Intuitive Cognition. Later Scholastics.

A Key to the Significance of the By Sebastian Day, O.F.M., Ph.D.

5. The De Primo Principio of John Duns Scotus. Text and a Translation. Ph.D.

A Revised

By Evan Roche, O.F.M.,

THE DE PRIMO PRINCIPIO of JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

A REVISED TEXT and A TRANSLATION

Duns, Joannes , Scotis .

Franciscan Institute Publications · PHILOSOPHY SERIES No. 5 Edited by Philotheus H. Boehner, O. F. M. and Allan B. Wolter, O. F. M.

THE DE PRIMO PRINCIPIO OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

A REVISED TExt AND

A TRANSLATION

By EVAN ROCHE, O. F. M., PH. D.

DEUSMEUS ET OMNI

A

Published by THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE ST. BONAVENTURE , N. Y. and E. NAUWELAERTS LOUVAIN, BELGIUM 1949

BX 3601 .S143 5

no.

Nihil Obstat: PHILOTHEUS H. BOEHNER, O.F.M.

Censor Deputatus August 1 , 1948 Imprimi Potest: BERTRAND CAMPBELL, O.F.M. Minister Provincialis

September 15, 1948 Imprimatur: MATHIAS FAUST, O.F.M.

Delegatus Generalis November 15, 1948 Imprimatur: PATRICK A. O'BOYLE

Archiepiscopus Washingtonii

August 5, 1948

COPYRIGHT, 1949, BY THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE

THE ACADEMY PRESS WASHINGTON D. C. Printed in U. S. A.

13

To

CHRIST, THE KING OF THE UNIVERSE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE xiii

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

THE DIVISIONS OF ORDER

3

DIVISION

Orders of eminence and dependence ..

5

The two members of the order of dependence ..

7

III.

Subdivision of the second member ..

9

IV.

Subdivision of the first member....

I. II.

11

CHAPTER TWO

RELATIONSHIP IN THE ESSENTIAL ORDER

13

Nothing at all has an essential order to itself.

13

II.

In every essential order a circle is impossible . .. . . . .

13

III.

That which is not posterior to the prior is not

CONCLUSION I.

posterior to the posterior .. IV.

15

That which is not ordered to an end is not effected .

15

That which is not effected is not a finitum.

17

VI.

That which is not effected is not a materiatum .....

21

VII.

That which is not a materiatum is not a formatum,

V.

23

and conversely vii

Contents

viii

PAGE

CONCLUSION VIII.

That which is not an effect of extrinsic causes is not 25

an effect of intrinsic causes The four kinds of causes in causing the same thing

IX.

25

are essentially ordered .... If two effects are compared to the same cause, they

X.

are compared, therefore, either to a proximate or 29

to a remote cause XI.

Not every more immediate effect of a cause is the cause of a more remote effect of the same cause. Therefore some effect is prior, but not prior be-

29

cause it is a cause ..

Nothing depends essentially, except upon a cause or ..... upon a more immediate effect of some cause...

XII.

XIII.

Not everything which is

exceeded

sentially upon that which is eminent.

29

depends es-

Therefore

the first member of the first division does not imply the second XIV.

XV.

XVI.

31

Not every dependent is exceeded by that upon which it depends ...

33

Plurality is never to be posited without necessity ...

33

Everything ordered to an end is exceeded ...

35

CHAPTER THREE

THREE-FOLD PRIMACY IN THE FIRST PRINCIPLE

39

CONCLUSION I.

It is possible that among beings there is some nature which effects

39

ix

Contents

PAGE

CONCLUSION II.

It is possible that something which effects is simply first; that is, it is not possible that it is effected or that it effects in virtue of another .

III .

41

It is possible that the simply first efficient is uncausable, because it is not effected and it effects 49

independently IV.

The simply first efficient in the possible order is

actually existing, and some nature actually exist49

ing is effective in this way… V.

The uncausable is a being which is necessary of 51

itself VI.

The necessity of being of itself belongs to only

333

53

one nature ... VII.

It is possible that among beings there is some nature

57

which is an end ... VIII.

It is possible that something which is an end is simply first; that is, it is not possible that it is

for others in virtue of another .. IX.

X.

57 5

ordered to another or that it is fit to be an end

57

It is possible that the first end is uncausable .....

The first end in the possible order is actually existing, and this primacy belongs to some nature 59

actually existing Among the natures of beings some one excels ....

XII.

Some eminent nature is simply first according to perfection

XIII .

The supreme nature is uncausable .

XIV.

The supreme nature is some nature actually existing

59 559

XI.

59

59

61

Contents

X

PAGE

CONCLUSION XV.

To some one and the same nature actually existing, there belongs the three-fold primacy in the three-fold order previously mentioned, namely,

of efficiency, end, and eminence ... XVI.

It is impossible for the same being to depend essentially upon two, by both of which its de-

pendence is totally terminated ... XVII.

63

Every primacy of extrinsic cause of one type belongs to only one nature .

XVIII.

61

63

The first efficient in the possible order is com-

pletely actual because it virtually contains every possible actuality.

The first end is the best,

virtually containing every possible goodness.

The first eminent is most perfect, eminently containing every possible perfection ...... XIX.

65

Only one existing nature is first in the aforementioned three-fold order, with respect to every other nature, so that every other nature is thus posterior to that first nature in a three-fold way

67

CHAPTER FOUR

SIMPLICITY AND INFINITY OF THE FIRST BEING

73

CONCLUSION

I. II.

The First Nature in itself is simple ...

73

Whatever is intrinsic to the Highest Nature is such

in the highest degree .....

77

xi

Contents

CONCLUSION III.

PAGE

Every pure perfection is predicated of the Highest Nature as necessarily existing there in the highest

77

degree IV.

The First Efficient is intelligent and endowed with

81

will

V.

VI.

The First Principle in causing causes contingently whatever It causes . For the First Nature to love Itself is identical with the First Nature ...

VII.

93

No act of understanding can be an accident of the

95

First Nature ..... VIII.

89

The intellect of the First Principle actually understands every intelligible always and necessarily and distinctly, prior in the natural order to its

101

existence

IX.

The First Principle is infinite, and incomprehensible 103

by what is finite .

103

First proof, from the intelligibles ..

Second, from the perfection of the divine intellect ... 107 Third, from the substantiality of the divine

115

act of understanding..

119

Fourth, from simplicity in essence . Fifth, from eminence ...

• 119

Coloring of argument of St. Anselm .

123

Sixth, from the part of the end..

125

Seventh, that of Aristotle, from efficient caus-

ality

125

xii

Contents

CONCLUSION

PAGE Difference between omnipotence and infinite

power · X.

...

From infinity there follows every kind of simplicity

XI.

131

135

First proof, from the essence .

135

Second, from magnitude ...

135

Third, from the nature of accident ..

139

Prayer

143

Thou art the one God, outside of Whom there is no other, as Thou hast said through the Prophet .

Closing prayer......

149 153

INTRODUCTION

There is a crying need for a better acquaintance with the authentic writings of John Duns Scotus, especially among readers whose mother tongue is English. It is our whole purpose in this little book to satisfy that need to the limited extent of presenting in simple form the text and translation of the De Primo Principio, the greatest of the shorter works of Duns Scotus .

We have chosen the De Primo Principio for several reasons. First, it is certain that it is an authentic work of Duns Scotus. It has always been ascribed to him, and no doubt as to its authenticity can be sustained.

In this connection it must be carefully

distinguished from the De Rerum Principio, a work which was formerly attributed to Duns Scotus but which has been proved to be the work of Cardinal Vitalis de Furno.¹ A recent article of Dr. Carl Balić, O.F.M. ,2 contains evidence that a redactor other than Scotus himself may have given us the De Primo Principio in its present form.

However, after

presenting all his arguments showing the presence of another hand in the final redaction of this work, Dr. Balić himself insists that the De Primo Principio must be considered as a true work of Duns Scotus. The work is substantially

complete

and is not

essentially

1 Confer Ephrem Longpré, La Philosophie du Duns Scot ( Paris, Librairie S. François d'Assise, 1924 ) , pp. 22-29; "Nouveaux Manuscripts des Reportations du Duns Scot" in the Wissenschaft und Weisheit, II ( 1935 ) pp. 229-236 ; LongpréMueller, "Stand der Skotus-Forschung," 1933 in the Wissenschaft und Weisheit, I ( 1934) , p. 67. Confer also F. Delorme, O.F.M., “Le Cardinal Vital du Four", in Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, 1927, pp. 151 ff. (Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. ) Confer also P. Glorieux, "Pour en finir avec le 'De Rerum Principio' " AFH, XXXI ( 1939) pp. 225-234. 2 De Critica Textuali, Extract of the Antonianum, Annus XX, 1945, Fasc. 1-4; Rome 1945. pp. 289-296. xiii

xiv

Introduction

weakened by the omissions and interpolations which occur in the third and fourth chapters.3 It is not our purpose to examine here the arguments concerning the possible date of composition of this work.

However, after

weighing the evidence of the various opinions we would judge that it is probably a late work of Scotus.* A second reason why we have chosen the De Primo Principio is because it contains some of the best thoughts and efforts of Duns Scotus. When reference is made to one work as the masterpiece of Duns Scotus, either the De Primo Principio or the Oxoniense is indicated . The latter can be said to be more important, because of its great length and the range that it covers. The De Primo Principio, on the other hand, is more systematic and is free from the relatively unimportant questions that are found in any Commentary on the Sentences.

Besides, the greater

part of the De Primo Principio is paralleled by some of the very best portions of the Oxoniense. The third and most important reason why we have chosen the De Primo Principio is because it presents at length a proof for the existence of God, which, in our opinion, has never been equaled.

Unfortunately, this proof has been neglected, especially

its presentation in the De Primo Principio.

Accordingly, our text

and translation should be of help to others in further studies of Scotus ' proof. We have divided our work into two parts:

first, a revised

text Edition of the De Primo Principio, containing references and those variants which are important for an understanding of the text, and secondly, an English translation of our revised text. In preparing the Latin text we have had direct access to seven manuscripts which contain the complete text of the De Primo 3 Confer Balic, loc. cit.; confer also Ludovico Ciganotto, O.F.M., Saggi di critica interna sull' autenticita redazionale integrale secundo l'edizione Waddinghiana del trattato "De primo principio" del B. Giovanni Duns Scoto, Dottore Sottile (Gerona, G. Toso, 1926) esp. pp. 43 ff. 4 Confer Balic, loc. cit. For an opposing view confer Dr. Marianus Mueller, O.F.M., Ioannis Duns Scoti Tractatus de Primo Principio, Herder, Freiburg, 1941 , pp. XIII-XVII.

Introduction

Principio.

XV

We have followed Mueller" in the manner in which

he has indicated these and all the other manuscripts to which reference will be made. Accordingly, we have referred to these manuscripts in the footnotes to the text as Ma, O2, Mu, V1, T, A, and R.

Apart from the direct information received from

these seven manuscripts, we have used the findings of Mueller with reference to three other complete manuscripts

(listed as

W, C, and P) and five fragments of the De Primo Principio (listed as B, 01, 03, 04, and V2) .

We have also compared our reading

of the first seven manuscripts mentioned with the reading of In addition to the manuscripts, we have consulted the Wadding text and the text edited by Garcia," and have studied

Mueller.

the findings of Ciganotto.8 Despite that fact that there are three different texts of the De Primo Principio in modern print we have deemed it advisable to bring out another text. The text in the Garcia Edition , as well as the text in the Vivès Edition of Wadding, can be had only in large volumes containing the spurious De Rerum Principio. It may be wondered why we were not satisfied to use the recent critical Edition of Mueller.

Such was our original inten-

tion ; however, on reading Dr. Mueller's text we noted so many points which we would have put differently that we decided to We wish to acknowledge the great bring out our own text. benefits we have derived from the use of Mueller's critical text, especially with regard to the manuscripts that were not directly available to us. We wish to emphasize here that we consider Dr. Mueller's text to be far superior to any that preceded it. Throughout our work we have mentioned only those points on which we disagree with Dr. Mueller's findings, but these are few in comparison with the many times that we have been impressed by the excellence of his work. We accept almost in full his critical evaluation of the manuscripts to which we refer 5 op. cit., pp. XVIII-XXIV. 6 loc. cit. 7Quaracchi, 1910. 8 op. cit. 9 loc. cit.

xvi

the reader. noted.

Introduction

However, a few important qualifications must be

We believe that Dr. Mueller has given too great a preference to the Madrid manuscript ( listed as Ma) .

The arguments which

he advances could be met by similar arguments in favor of several other of the manuscripts.

When these differences are important

for a better understanding of the text, we have indicated them in the footnotes. It is not our purpose here to give any further critical evaluation of the manuscripts. Suffice it to say that from our readings of the manuscripts we feel that Dr. Mueller has also given too great weight to the fragments he has used, namely, O1, 03, 04, V2, and especially B, which last is very brief. On the other hand , we feel that in his evaluation Dr. Mueller has not given sufficient importance to the manuscripts Mu, V₁, and T, which he places in a secondary family. We agree with Dr. Mueller that A and R are of lesser value because they are the latest of the manuscripts used and seem to have only a remote connection with the original text. In very many instances we have punctuated the text in a manner quite different from that of Dr. Mueller.

For the most

part the punctuation is largely a matter of taste, but there are times when the whole thought is thereby changed.

We have

hoped by means of very careful punctuation to make the reading of the text as clear and easy as possible.

We have disagreed in

practically every instance with the references of Mueller to the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Finally, we have found several printing errors in the work of Mueller. By the enumeration of the above differences it is our intention to aid the reader in arriving at the true text and thought of Duns Scotus.

The serious student will certainly refer to the

work of Dr. Mueller because of the completeness of his critical apparatus in the enumeration of virtually all the variants of all the manuscripts. It would be contrary to our purpose to enumerate all the variants here because of the corresponding length of the parallel

Introduction

English translation.

xvii

Even in the footnotes we have used it was

our primary purpose to be of assistance to English-speaking readers. In our translation we have tried to adhere closely to the text; as a result our English text is an almost literal translation, which We have preferred to may at times be somewhat obscure. keep very close to the text so that the reader may have a safe basis upon which to make his own interpretations. When the phrases can be turned into a more elegant form without any danger of modifying the original meaning, we have attempted thus to give a smoother English reading. We have omitted the Additiones to the De Primo Principio because so little is known as to their authenticity, and because a reading of these Additiones convinced us that they were not essential to our text. We have given only the references to the other works of Scotus which are directly pertinent to the present text as such. Numerous other references which would help in the development of our understanding of the content will be included in a Commentary on this text which we hope to bring out in the not too distant future.

THE DE PRIMO PRINCIPIO of JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

A REVISED TEXT and

A TRANSLATION

IOANNIS DUNS SCOTI TRACTATUS DE

PRIMO PRINCIPIO

CAPITULUM PRIMUM

Primum rerum Principium mihi ea credere, sapere, ac proferre concedat, quae ipsius placeant maiestati et ad eius contemplationem elevent mentes nostras. Domine Deus noster, Moysi servo tuo, de tuo nomine filiis Israel proponendo,

a te Doctore

verissimo¹

sciscitanti,

sciens

quid posset de te concipere intellectus mortalium, nomen tuum benedictum

reserans,

respondisti:

EGO SUM,

QUI

SUM.²

Tu es verum esse, tu es totum esse. Hoc, si mihi esset possibile, scire vellem. Adiuva me, Domine, inquirentem ad quantam cognitionem de vero esse, quod tu es, possit pertingere nostra ratio naturalis ab ente, quod de te praedicasti, inchoando. Quamvis

entis sint

plurimae

passiones

quarum

consideratio

valeret ad propositum prosequendum, tamen de ordine essentiali tamquam de medio foecundiori primo prosequar isto modo: In hoc primo capitulo divisiones quatuor ordinis praemittam, quibus colligetur quot sunt ordines essentiales.

ex

Manifestatio vero divisionis tot requirit : primo, ut dividentia notificentur et sic ostendantur contineri sub diviso ; secundo , ut

dividentium

repugnantia

declaretur ;

tertio,

ut

probetur

dividentia evacuare divisum. Primum fiet in hoc capitulo, alia in secundo. Hic igitur divisiones narrando ponam , et rationes dividentium assignabo .

Mueller selects this reading . However, 1 veracissimo -MaO, 0,0,0, BC. though God is certainly most truthful, we believe that Scotus wishes to emphasize that He is most truly a Doctor, just as, three lines later, He is called the most true Being. 2 Exod. 3, 14. 2

A TRACT CONCERNING THE FIRST PRINCIPLE

By JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

CHAPTER I

May the First Principle of things grant me to believe, understand,¹

and make known those things which may please His

Majesty and elevate our minds to the contemplation of Him. O Lord our God, when Moses thy servant asked Thee, the most true teacher, about thy Name, so that he might tell it to the children of Israel, Thou, knowing what the intellect of mortals could conceive of Thee, didst answer: I AM WHO AM, thus disclosing thy Blessed Name. art total Being. know.

Thou art true Being, Thou

This, if it be possible for me, I should like to

Help me, O Lord, in my inquiry as to how much

knowledge our natural reason can attain concerning the true Being, which Thou art,-beginning with "being"," which Thou hast predicated of Thyself. There are many properties of "being", the consideration of which would be valid for the pursuit of our purpose. However, from the essential order as from a more fruitful means, I shall first proceed in the following manner: In this first chapter I shall set forth the four divisions of order; from these divisions it will be gathered how many essential orders there are.

For the manifestation of a division this much is required : first, that the resultants be made known and be shown to be thus contained under that which is divided; secondly, that the resultants be shown to be mutually exclusive; thirdly, that it be proved that the resultants exhaust the content of that which is divided.

The first requirement will be met in this chapter, the

others in the second chapter.

Here then I shall simply set down the divisions and assign the meanings of the resultants. 1 Though there are other meanings of sapere, "to understand" would be Scotus' main requirement for giving a scientific demonstration . 2 We put this word in quotations to emphasize that it refers to the notion of being.

3

4

De Primo Principio

Accipio autem ordinem essentialem,

non stricte-ut quidam

loquuntur, dicentes posterius ordinari sed prius vel primum esse supra ordinem-sed communiter, prout ordo est relatio aequiparentiae dicta de priori respectu posterioris, et e converso, scilicet ordinatum sufficienter dividitur per prius et

prout

Sic

posterius.

igitur

de

quandoque

ordine,

de

quandoque

prioritate vel posterioritate fiet sermo. PRIMA DIVISIO.

Dico ergo primo quod ordo essentialis

videtur primaria divisione dividi, sicut aequivocum in aequivocata, scilicet, in ordinem eminentiae et in ordinem dependentiae. Primo modo prius dicitur eminens, et posterius, quod est excessum . Ut breviter dicatur, quidquid est perfectius et nobilius secundum essentiam est sic prius. Hoc modo prioritatis actum esse priorem potentia,

probat Aristoteles 9° Metaphysicae

ubi istud prius vocat secundum substantiam et speciem: inquit,

generatione

sunt

posteriora,

specie

et

substantia

Quae, sunt

priore.

Secundo

modo

prius

dicitur,

a

quo

aliquid

dependet,

et

posterius, quod dependet. Huius prioris hanc intelligo rationem, quam etiam Aristoteles 5° Metaphysicae testimonio Platonis ostendit :

Prius secundum naturam et essentiam est quod contingit

esse sine posteriori, non e converso.

Quod ita intelligo , quod ,

licet prius necessario causet posterius et ideo sine ipso esse non possit, hoc tamen non est quia ad esse suum egeat posteriori, sed e converso; quia si ponatur posterius non esse, nihilominus prius erit sine inclusione contradictionis. Non sic e converso , quia posterius eget priore, quam indigentiam possumus dependentiam appellare, ut dicamus omne posterius essentialiter a priore necessario dependere; non e converso, licet quandoque necessario posterius consequatur istud. Prius et posterius possunt dici 3 Metaph., Bk. 9, ch. 8 ( 1050a 4) . Mueller cites a parallel text (Metaph., Bk. 1, ch. 8 (989a 15-16) instead of the one that is clearly indicated by Scotus. 4 Metaph., Bk. 5, ch. 11 ( 1019a 1-5 ) . Mueller again cites only a parallel text -Metaph., Bk. 7, ch. 1 ( 1028a 30-31 ) . In all his references to the Metaphysics of Aristotle (except for the first Book) , Mueller gives the Book number as one less than our findings. He seems to have combined Book A and Book a as one Book, as is sometimes done.

5

The Division of Order

I do not take essential order in the strict sense, as some do who say that the posterior is in an order but that the prior or first is above order. Rather, I take it in its common meaning, in so far as order is a relation of mutual comparison predicated of ‣ the prior with regard to the posterior, and conversely—that is, in so far as that which is ordered is sufficiently divided into that which is prior and that which is posterior. Hence at times there will be mention of order and at others of priority or posteriority. First Division.

I say then first that essential order seems to be

divided by a primary division, as an equivocal term into its equivocates, namely, into the order of eminence and the order of dependence. In the first mode the prior is called the eminent, and the posterior is called that which is exceeded.

To put it briefly,

whatever is more perfect and noble according to essence is thus prior.

In this manner of priority Aristotle proves in the ninth

book of the Metaphysics that act is prior to potency, when he calls the former prior according to substance and species.

For he

says that those things which are posterior in generation are prior in species and substance.

In the second mode the prior is called that upon which something depends, and the posterior is called that which depends. With regard to this prior I understand the following meaning (which Aristotle likewise shows in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, using the testimony of Plato) : The prior according to nature and essence is that which is able to exist without the posterior, but not conversely. I take this in the following sense: Even if the prior necessarily causes the posterior and therefore cannot exist without it, still this is not because it needs the posterior for its own being, but conversely. For if it be assumed that the posterior does not exist, the prior will nevertheless exist without the inclusion of a contradiction. The converse will not be true, because the posterior needs the prior; this need we can call dependence . Thus we can say that everything which is essentially

posterior depends necessarily upon its prior, but not conversely, even though sometimes the posterior necessarily fol-

6

De Primo Principio

secundum substantiam et speciem, sicut alia dicta sunt.

Tamen,

ad distincte loquendum, dicantur prius et posterius secundum dependentiam.

SECUNDA DIVISIO.

Ordine secundum eminentiam indiviso

manente subdivido

ordinem dependentiae; quia dependens aut est causatum et illud a quo dependet est eius causa, aut dependens est causatum remotius alicuius causae et illud a quo dependet

est causatum propinquius eiusdem causae. Huius divisionis secundae ratio primi membri satis nota est, Patet enim quid causa et et quod illud continetur sub diviso . quid causatum, et quod causatum essentialiter dependet a causa et quod causa est a qua dependet, secundum rationem suprapositam prioris hic divisi. Sed secundum membrum huius secundae divisionis nec in se patet, nec qualiter sub diviso continetur. Primum declaratur sic:

Si eiusdem causae sint duo effectus,

quorum unus prius et immediatius natus est causari ab illa causa, alius autem non nisi illo immediatiore iam causato, dico illum alium esse posterius causatum respectu eiusdem causae, et immediatiorem esse prius causatum. Haec est ratio huius membri.

Ex hoc secundo ostendo quod continetur sub diviso, quod scilicet effectus remotior dependet essentialiter a propinquiore: tum, quia non potest esse illo non existente; tum, quia causalitas causae respicit illa ordinate; igitur; et a converso ista habent ordinem essentialem inter se, ut comparantur ad tertium, quod est causa amborum; igitur et inter se absolute; tum tertio , quia

7

The Division of Order

lows it.

These can be called the prior and the posterior accord-

ing to substance and species, as the others were called above. However, for the purpose of speaking clearly, let them be called the prior and the posterior according to dependence.

Second Division.

Leaving the order according to eminence

undivided, I subdivide the order of dependence.

For,

either

the dependent is an effect and that upon which it depends is its cause, or the dependent is a more remote effect of some cause and that upon which it depends is a more proximate effect of the same cause. With regard to this second division the meaning of the first member is sufficiently known, as well as the fact that it is contained under what is divided. For it is clear what a cause is and what an effect is, likewise that an effect essentially depends upon a cause and that the cause is that upon which it depends, according to the above meaning of the first member of that which is divided here. But the second member of this second division is not evident in itself, nor is it clear how it is contained under what is divided . The first part is explained thus:

If of the same cause there are

two effects, one of which is by its nature fit to be caused by that cause in a prior and more immediate way, and the other only through that more immediate effect already caused, I say that this other is a posterior effect with regard to the same cause, and the more immediate one is a prior effect. of this member.

This is the meaning

From this I show, secondly, that this member is contained under that which is divided, that is, that the more remote effect depends essentially upon the more proximate effect . it

For first,

cannot exist if the more proximate effect does not

exist ;

secondly, the causality of the cause is related to them within • ; and conversely, they have an essential an order; therefore order between each other, being compared to a third, which is the cause of both of them; therefore, they also have an essential

8

De Primo Principio

causa talis non intelligitur ex se nisi causa

propinqua solius

proximi; et illo non causato intelligitur quasi remota respectu aliorum; sed illo iam causato intelligitur ut proxima respectu A causa autem remota sola inquantum remota, non est

secundi. causatum.

Ergo secundum dependet a causa

quae posuit pro-

pinquius in esse; igitur et ab esse propinquiore.

TERTIA

DIVISIO.

Istius

secundae

divisionis

utrumque

membrum subdividitur subdividendo primo secundum, quia consonat iam praedictis.

Nam prius, quod est causatum propinquius

causae, non tantum dicitur quod est propinquius causae proximae utriusque sed etiam remotae; puta si proxima causa

unius, sit

A, non est aliquo modo causa alterius, sit B ; sed aliqua

alia

causa prior est causa eius B proxima et est causa remota illius cuius alia est causa proxima; adhuc inter ista causata erit ordo essentialis ut causati prioris ad posterius causatum, et hoc si causalitas causae communis amborum secundum essentialem ordinem illa respiciat ut causata. Secundum membrum huius divisionis minus videtur esse sub diviso.

Hoc autem sic probatur :

Nam et utrumque

causatumⓇ

respectu tertii, quod est causa ipsorum, essentialiter ordinatur ;" igitur et inter se; tunc etiam causa communis quasi remota causa intelligitur respectu posterioris, priore non causato ; tunc etiam posterius non potest esse sine priore.

5 ut add. WBO₁0203 (also Mueller's text) . 6 om. WBO₁0203 (also Mueller's text) . 7 om. MaWBO₁020304 (also Mueller's text ) ; unumquodque V₁. 1 (also Mueller's text) ; om. CV2. 1 8 tunc MaWBO₁020304TV₁ 9 ordinantur MaWCBO1020304 (also Mueller's text) .

The Division of Order

9

order between each other in an absolute way; thirdly, such a cause of itself is understood only as the proximate cause of the proximate effect alone; and if that one is not caused , the cause is understood as somehow remote with regard to the others; but if that one is already caused, the cause is understood as proximate with regard to the second effect. However, from the remote cause only in so far as it is remote, no effect follows. Therefore the second effect depends upon the cause which has brought the more proximate effect into being; consequently it depends also upon the more proximate being.

Third Division.

Each member of this second division is sub-

divided, and I subdivide the second member first, because this is in harmony with what has already been said. For the prior, which is the more immediate effect of the cause, is declared to be the more immediate effect not only of a proximate cause of both but of a remote cause as well. Take for example: The proxi-

S mate cause of one effect-let it (viz. the proximate cause) be Ais in no way the cause of the other effect, B. But some other prior cause is the proximate cause of this B and is the remote cause of that effect of which the other (viz. A ) is the proximate cause. Nevertheless, between these effects there will be an essential order as of a prior effect to a posterior effect, and this is true if the causality of the common cause of both according to an essential order is related to them as to its effects.

. It is not so apparent that the second member of this division is under that which is divided . way:

However, it is proved in this

Since each effect is in an essential order with reference to

a third, which is the cause of both of them, it follows that they are in an essential order with reference to each other. Besides, the common cause is understood as if it were a remote cause with regard to the posterior, if the prior is not caused. the posterior cannot exist without the prior.

Moreover,

10

De Primo Principio

QUARTA DIVISIO.10 quod

est

causa,

famose

Primum membrum secundae divisionis, subdividitur

in

quatuor

notas: finalem, efficientem, materialem, et formalem.

causas

satis

Et posterius

sibi oppositum dividitur in quatuor sibi correspondentia, scilicet in ordinatum ad finem, quod, ut breviter loquar, dicatur finitum; et in effectum; et in causatum ex materia, quod dicatur materiatum; et in causatum per formam, quod dicatur formatum. Huius divisionis dividentium rationes hic transeo, quia alibi¹¹ diffusius haec tractavi et inferius quandoque tangentur quando materia id requiret . Huius capituli fructum summatim colligo. per

sex

ordines

dividentes

evacuatur;

Ordo essentialis

videlicet

per

quatuor

ordines causae ad causatum; et per unum causati ad causatum comprehendendo hic sub eodem duo membra tertiae divisionis; et per unum eminentis ad excessum. Harum divisionum ostensio duo adhuc ostendi requirit, scilicet quod membra cuiuslibet inter se repugnent, et quod evacuent rationem divisi ; quae duo in sequenti capitulo , quantum opus erit ad propositum, ostendentur ; in quo etiam quaedam generales propositiones necessariae proponentur, et praedicti ordines et eorum extrema secundum necessariam vel non necessariam concomitantiam conferentur quia dictorum comparationes ad sequentia bene valent.

10 om. WO₁OB MuTV, AR. 11 Confer Oxon. I, d. 3, q. 7, n. 3 ; IX, 338b-339b.

The Division of Order Fourth Division.

11

The first member of this second division,

viz., the cause, is subdivided in the well-known manner into the four causes sufficiently known : final, efficient, material, and formal. The posterior opposite to it is divided into four corresponding parts, viz., that which is ordered to an end, which may be succinctly called the finitum; and the effect; ³ and that which is caused from the matter, which may be

called the

materiatum; and that which is caused through the form, which may be called the formatum. I here pass over the meanings of the resultants of this division, because I have dealt with them rather fully elsewhere and they will be touched upon below when the matter requires it. In summing up I gather together the fruit of this chapter. The essential order is exhausted through six orders which divide it: viz. , four orders of cause to effect; and one of effect to effect, by including here under the same order the two members of the third division; and one of eminent to that which is exceeded.

The manifestation of these divisions requires that two things still be shown, viz. , that the members of each are mutually exclusive, and that they exhaust the content of that which is divided. These two things will be shown in the following chapter, in so far as it is necessary for our purpose.

In this same chapter also,

certain general necessary propositions will be propounded, and the aforementioned orders and their extremes will be compared according to a concomitance that is necessary or not necessary, because comparisons of the things mentioned are very valuable for what will follow.

3 The term effectus (or the verbal form effectum) always means the effect of an efficient cause, as distinguished from the term causatum, which is the effect of any cause.

CAPITULUM SECUNDUM

De dictis quatuor divisionibus ostendendis dictorum ordinum essentialium comparandis

et de extremis hic proceditur

arguendo. Domine Deus noster, qui doctorem venerabilem Augustinum de te trino scribentem infallibiliter docuisti, quod ipse in primo libro de Trinitate¹ scribit dicens: seipsam gignat ut sit-nonne tu

Nulla omnino res est quae nobis aeque certitudinaliter

impressisti hanc similem veritatem:

PRIMA CONCLUSIO. ordinem habet ad se.

Quia nulla omnino res essentialem

Nam de ordine eminentiae quid est impossibilius quam idem seipsum excedere secundum perfectionem essentialem?

De aliis

sex ordinibus quid impossibilius quam idem a se essentialiter dependere, quam sine seipso posse esse secundum intellectum huius superius assignatum? Hoc etiam consonat veritati :

SECUNDA CONCLUSIO .

Quia in quocumque ordine es-

sentiali est circulus impossibilis. Quia si quidquid est prius priore, est prius posteriore; sequitur oppositum primae ex secunda negata.

Idem etiam

erit prius

essentialiter et posterius eodem, et ita perfectius et minus perfectum eodem, vel dependens et independens respectu eiusdem; quae longe sunt a vero. Hunc circulum excludit Aristoteles a demonstrationibus 1 ° Posteriorum,2 nec minus impossibilis est in rebus.

1 St. Augustine, De Trinitate, Bk. 1 , ch. 1 , n. 1 (PL 42, 820) . 2 Analyt. Post., Bk. 1 , ch. 3 (72b 25 ) .

12

CHAPTER II

Here we proceed by way of argument to manifest the four divisions mentioned above and to compare the extremes of the aforementioned essential orders. O Lord, our God, Who didst infallibly teach the venerable Doctor, Augustine, when writing about Thee, the three-fold God, that which he writes in the first book of De Trinitate saying:

"There is not anything at all which brings itself to being"-

hast Thou not with equal certitude impressed upon us this like truth: First conclusion.

That nothing at all has an essential order to

itself. For, in the case of the order of eminence, what is more impossible than for the same being to exceed itself according to essential perfection? In the case of the other six¹ orders, what is more impossible than for the same being to depend essentially upon itself; what more impossible than to be able to exist without itself, according to the meaning of this expression assigned above? The following also is in harmony with truth: Second conclusion.

That in every essential order a circle is

impossible. For if anything is prior to the prior, it is prior to the posterior. The opposite of the first conclusion follows from the denial of the second. Besides, the same will be essentially prior and posterior to the same, and thus more perfect and less perfect than the same, or dependent and independent with respect to the same. All these propositions are far from true. In the first book of the Posterior Analytics Aristotle excludes this circle from demonstrations, and it is no less impossible in things. 1 The two sub-divisions of the order of effect to effect are here considered as separate orders-hence the number six here where we should expect five.

13

14

De Primo Principio

Iuxta hanc secundam, tertiam³ quandam, quae a prima probatur et in ipsa satis includitur, explico, quia inferius utar ipsa:

TERTIA CONCLUSIO.

Quod non est posterius priore nec

posteriore. Sequitur ex affirmativa dicta. Et ex ista sequitur : Quod non dependet a priore nec dependet a posteriore . Et ultra: Quod non est causatum causae prioris, nec posterioris, quia posterior in causando dependet a priore causante.

Iam, te Deo duce, dictos sex ordines invicem comparemus, et primo

quatuor

ordines

causae

ad

causatum .

Istorum

tamen

differentiam vel in dividendo sufficientiam, quia satis nota videtur utraque, hic prosequi praetermitto -quia prolixum posset esse nec ad propositum necessario requisitum. Tantummodo dictos ordines quantum ad concomitantiam vel consecutionem ex parte causati, in sex conclusionibus comparabo .

QUARTA CONCLUSIO.

Quod non est finitum non est

effectum. Probatur primo sic : quia quod non est ab aliqua causa per se efficiente non est effectum; quod non est ad finem non est a causa efficiente per se; igitur, etc. Maior sic probatur:

quia in nullo genere per accidens

primum; quod Aristoteles satis

exprimit

2°

Physicorum,*

est ubi

casu et fortuna tamquam causis per accidens, priores ponit necessario naturam et intellectum tamquam causas per se in illo genere causae; quod autem non est a primo, non est a posteriori, ex tertia iam praemissa. Et loquor de positivis, quae sola sunt proprie effectibilia.

Patet igitur maior .

Minor sic

probatur :

Agens per se omne agit propter finem quia nullum frustra, quod ³ MaMuPTV₁V₂AR have a different word order and some variants, but the meaning is the same. 4 Phys., Bk. 2, ch. 6 ( 198a 7-9) .

15

Relationship in the Essential Order

According to this second conclusion I explain a third, which is proved from the first and is sufficiently included in it. I do this because I shall use it below: Third conclusion.

That which is not posterior to the prior

is not posterior to the posterior. This follows from the aforesaid affirmative.

From this it

follows also that whatever does not depend upon the prior does not depend upon the posterior.

Further:

What is not an effect

of the prior cause is not an effect of the posterior cause, because the posterior in causing depends upon the prior in causing.

With Thee, O God, to lead us, we shall now compare the aforementioned six orders with one another, and first of all the four orders of cause to effect. However, I here decline to pursue the investigation of the differences among these and the sufficiency of division , because both seem to be sufficiently known. For it could be prolix, and besides it is not necessary for our purpose.

In six conclusions I shall compare the aforesaid orders,

with reference only to the concomitance or consequence on the part of the effect. Fourth conclusion.

That which is not ordered to an end is

not effected. This is proved in the first place as follows:

What is not

from some cause effecting by itself is not effected ; what is not ordered to an end is not from a cause effecting by itself; therefore, etc. The Major is proved as follows:

In no class is the incidental

first. Aristotle sufficiently expresses this in the second book of the Physics, where he says that nature and intelligence as causes by themselves in that class of cause are necessarily prior to spontaneity and chance as incidental causes. But that which is not from the first is not from the posterior, from the third conclusion already set down.

I speak of positive things, which alone

are properly capable of being effected . is evident.

The Minor is proved thus:

Therefore the Major Every agent by itself

acts for the sake of an end, because it does nothing in vain.

In

16

De Primo Principio

Aristoteles in 2° Physicorum determinat de natura, de qua minus videtur; ergo tale nihil efficit nisi propter finem.

Finis est prima Probatur conclusio principalis secundo sic: causa in causando; ideo ipsum dicit Avicenna® esse causam causarum. Quod etiam probatur ratione: quia enim finis movet metaphorice ut amatus, ideo efficiens efficit formam in materia; non autem movet finis ut amatus, quia aliqua alia causa causat ; est ergo finis prima causa essentialiter in causando. Hoc finem

etiam sic esse

probatur :

causam

ostendit,

Aristoteles quia per

in

5°

Metaphysicae'

ipsum respondetur

ad

quaestionem propter quid, quae quaestio quaerit causam ; ergo cum per ipsum detur primum propter quid, erit prima causa. Assumptum patet; quaesito enim quare efficit, respondetur : quia amat vel intendit finem, non e converso . Ex primitate finis tripliciter iam ostensa sequitur

conclusio

principalis, quia cuius non est causa prior, nec posterior, iuxta tertiam iam praemissam .

QUINTA CONCLUSIO.

Quod non est effectum non est

finitum. Probatur:

quia finis non est causa nisi inquantum ab ipso

tamquam a priore essentialiter dependet esse finiti. Patet, quia Non autem quaelibet causa est sic prior inquantum causa. dependet finitum quantum ad

esse a fine ut sic priore,

nisi

inquantum finis ut amatus movet efficiens ad dandum illi esse, ita quod efficiens non daret esse in suo genere nisi fine causante in sua causalitate.

Nihil ergo causat finis, nisi quod efficitur ab

efficiente quia amante finem. 5 Phys., Bk. 2, ch. 2 ( 194a 28-30) . ! 6 Metaph., 6, c. 5 429. 7 Metaph., Bk 5, ch. 2 ( 1013 b 2) .

17

Relationship in the Essential Order

the second book of the Physics Aristotle determines this about nature, about which it seems less evident. Therefore, such a

one effects nothing except for the sake of an end. The principal conclusion is proved secondly thus: The end Wherefore Avicenna says that it is the first cause in causing. is the cause of causes. This is proved also by reason. For the end moves metaphorically as beloved. It is for this reason that The end the efficient cause effects the form in the matter. moves as beloved , but not because some other cause causes.

The

end is therefore essentially the first cause in causing. This is also proved thus :

Aristotle in the fifth book of the

Metaphysics shows that the end is a cause, since through it an answer is given to the question "for the sake of which". And this question asks for a cause.

Therefore since through it there

is given the first "for the sake of which", it will be the first cause.

The Minor is evident; for to the question why it effects,

the answer is given: because it loves or intends the end, but not conversely. From the primacy of the end, which has already been shown in a threefold way, the principal conclusion follows .

For that

which does not have a prior cause does not have a posterior cause, according to the third rule already set down.

Fifth conclusion.

That which is not effected is not a finitum.2

This is proved: because the end is a cause only in so far as the being of the finitum depends upon it essentially, as upon a This is evident, because every cause is prior precisely because it is a cause. However, a finitum depends for its being prior.

upon the end precisely as prior, only in so far as the end as beloved moves the efficient to give it being, so that the efficient would not give being in its class unless the end caused in its Therefore, the end causes nothing except that which

causality.

is caused by the efficient because it loves the end .

2 We retain the Latin word finitum, since it is impossible to give an English equivalent in a single word. It means, of course, the effect of a final cause.

18

De Primo Principio

Hic corollarium sequitur non tacendum, quod falsa imaginatio est de fine, quod illud est causa finalis entis, quod est operatio ultima vel obiectum, quod per illam operationem attingitur. Si intelligatur quod tale inquantum tale est causa finalis, falsum est, quia illud consequitur esse; nec esse finiti dependet essentialiter ab illo inquantum tale, sed praecise illud, propter quod amatum ab efficiente, efficiens facit aliquid esse , quia ordinatum ad amatum , illud inquantum amatum est causa finalis facti .

Quandoque bene obiectum operationis ultimae est tale amatum, ideo finalis causa, non quia terminus operationis talis naturae sed Tamen bene operatio quia amatum a causante illam naturam. ultima alicuius, vel quod per ipsam attingitur, quandoque dicitur finis, quia ultimum et aliquo aliquas conditiones causae finalis.

modo

optimum,

et

ita

habet

Non igitur Aristoteles poneret Intelligentias proprie habere causam finalem et non efficientem; sed vel tantum finem extendendo finem ad obiectum operationis optimae vel, si proprie daret efficiens, non quidem per motum neque per mutationem, quia causae quatuor pertinent ad considerationem Metaphysici et sic abstrahunt a seipsis ut pertinent ad considerationem Physici.

Nec poneret Primum dare eis esse post non esse, si ponit eas sempiternas et necessarias, saltem " post" duratione, sed "post" ordine tantum naturae, sicut exponit Avicenna rationem creationis 6° Metaphysicae capitulo 2 °.9 Utrum autem causato 8 finiti add. CO4; effecti vel finiti add. PAR. 9 Metaph., 6 c. 2 380.

Relationship in the Essential Order

19

There follows here a corollary, which should not be passed over in silence, namely, that there is a false opinion about the end, which says that that is the final cause of a being, which is the ultimate operation or the object attained through this operation . If it be understood that such in so far as it is such is the final cause, it is false, because such an operation or object follows the existence ( of the finitum) ,³ and the existence of the finitum does not depend essentially upon it as such; but precisely that which is beloved by the efficient and for the sake of which the efficient brings something to being because it is ordered to the beloved-that, in so far as it is beloved , is the final cause of that which is done. Sometimes, certainly, the object of the ultimate operation is such a beloved, and therefore it is the final cause, not because it is the term of the operation of such a nature but because it is beloved by that which causes that nature. With reason, however, the ultimate operation of anything, or that which is attained by it, is sometimes called the end, because the ultimate is also in some way the best, and thus has some conditions of a final cause.

Therefore, Aristotle would not hold that the Intelligences have a proper final cause without a proper efficient cause. Either he would hold that they have an end only if end is extended to mean the object of the ultimate operation, or , if he would allow them a proper efficient cause, he would hold that it would not be through motion nor through mutation , because the four causes pertain to the consideration of Metaphysics and thus abstraction is made from them in so far as they pertain to the consideration of Physics. If he posits them as eternal and necessary, he would not hold that the First Being gives them being after non-being, at least if "after" is understood in the order of duration, though it is true if "after" is understood in the order of nature, according to Avicenna's explanation of the meaning of creation in the sixth book of the Metaphysics, chapter 2.

Whether or not necessity

3 Five manuscripts add finiti, and it can be casily taken as understood in the others. Confer text.

20

De Primo Principio

repugnet necessitas an non, propositum non infringit.

Si posset

aliquod efficiens simpliciter necessario causare et finis aliquis necessario finiret, et non e converso, saltem quodlibet causatum non tantum est possibile ut opponitur impossibili, sed etiam ut opponitur necessario

ex se,

quia

est obiectum sive terminus

potentiae suae causae; licet non sit possibile, ut opponitur necessario in communi secundum philosophos, quia talem contingentiam a separatis negarent. Patet aliud corollarium, quod finis non est causa finalis efficientis, sed effectus ; unde quod dicitur, agens agit propter finem, non intelligendum est suum, sed sui effectus.

SEXTA CONCLUSIO . materiatum.

Quod non

est

effectum non

est

Probatur: quia materia de se est in potentia contradictionis ad formam; igitur non est ex se actu per formam; ergo ab alio reducente istam potentiam

ad actum-illud est

efficiens

com-

positum, quia idem est "facere compositum" et "materiam esse actu per formam”. Prima consequentia patet, quia potentia mere passiva et contradictionis non se reducit ad actum. Et si dicas formam reducere ipsam potentiam ad actum, verum est formaliter, sed cum praeintelligantur forma et materia non unita, illud a quo uniuntur habet rationem causae efficientis, quam sequitur actuatio formalis. Secundo probatur conclusio, quia efficiens est proxima causa finali, igitur prior materia; cuius non est prior nec posterior. Nam metaphorice movere ut Prima propositio hic probatur: amatum est causatio finis; sic movet efficiens, non aliam causam .

Relationship in the Essential Order

21

is repugnant to an effect, however, does not interfere with our purpose.

If some efficient cause could simply cause necessarily,

and if some end could serve as an end necessarily, and not conversely, at least then every effect is possible, not only as it is opposed to impossible, but also as it is opposed to necessary by itself, because it is the object or term of the power of its cause; even though it is not possible as opposed to necessary in general, according to the philosophers, who would deny such contingency to the separated substances. Another corollary is evident, namely, that the end is not the final cause of the efficient cause, but of the effect. Hence, when it is said that the agent acts for the sake of an end, it must not be understood to be for the sake of its own end, but the end of its effect.

Sixth conclusion .

That which is not effected is not a mate-

riatum. This is proved:

because matter by itself is in the potency of Therefore it is not by itself in act

contradiction to the form.

through a form. Therefore it is in act by something else, which reduces that potency to act; and this is that which effects the composite, because "to make the composite" and "for matter to be in act through the form" are the same.

The first consequence is evident, because a potency merely passive and of contradiction does not reduce itself to act. If you say that the form reduces that potency to act, this is true formally, but since the form and matter are understood first as not united, that by which they are united has the character of the efficient cause, which the formal actuation follows. The conclusion is proved secondly, because the efficient is the cause next to the final cause; therefore it is prior to the matter ; but that which does not have a prior cause does not have a posterior cause.

The first proposition is here proved:

For to

move metaphorically as beloved is the causation of the end; thus it moves the efficient cause, not another cause.

22

De Primo Principio

Tertio probatur, quia compositum est vere unum; ergo habet aliquam entitatem unam quae nec est entitas materiae nec formae ; et ista¹º una entitas est causata non a duabus entitatibus¹¹ primo quia nihil unum est ex pluribus nisi virtute unius, nec ab altero duorum primo quia utrumque illorum est diminutum entitatis totalis; ergo ab uno aliquo extrinseco.¹2 SEPTIMA CONCLUSIO.

respectu

Quod non est materiatum non est

formatum, e converso.

Probatur:

Quod non est materiatum non est compositum ex

partibus essentialibus, quia in omni sic composito per se uno altera pars est potentialis, quia non fit unum per se nisi ex 13 potentia et actu-7 ° et 8 ° Metaphysicae.' Quod igitur non habet partem per se potentialem non

est

compositum; igitur nec formatum, quia formatum est compositum habens formam partem sui. Sicut argutum est de materia et forma, ita potest argui de subiecto et accidente suo modo.¹4 Confirmatur ista probatio¹5 iuxta illud Aristotelis 7 ° physicae.16 imo

illud non

secundi.17

Meta-

Si quid esset ex unico elemento, non esset nisi illud; esset

elementum-ex

Igitur a simili:

prima

conclusione

huius

Si quid habet tantum unam partem

essentialem, non est nisi illa; imo illa non est pars nec causa, propter primam dictam; ergo omne causatum ex aliqua causa intrinseca habet etiam aliam intrinsecam concausantem, 18 et ita patet propositum.

10 ita-MuTV , V,AR. 11 duobus entibus-MuPTV , AR. 12 et sic patet conclusio principalis add. MuPAR, quod. (q. om. P) quidquid non habet causam efficientem, nec materialem add. MuP. 13 Aristotle, Metaph., Bk 7, ch. 8 ( 1033 b 16-19 ) ; Bk. 7, ch . 11 ( 1036 b 21-24) ; Bk. 8, ch. 6 ( 1045 b 20-21 ) . (Mueller gives only the last one of these three references to Aristotle ) . Confer Metaph., Bk. 8, ( 1042 a- 1045 b ) passim. 14 Confer Scotus, Metaph., 4, q. 2, n. 12 ; VII, 164 a ; Oxon. I, d. 8, q. 2, n. 2; IX, 575 b. 15 propositio-MuPV₁ . Mueller reads propositio in Ma and T, although in our judgment these two manuscripts clearly have probatio. 16 Mueller gives three quotations from Aristotle's Metaphysics, none of which is from the seventh Book or even near it, and none of which gives Aristotle's solution of the present problem. We refer the reader to our references to the seventh Book in note 13. 17 quae est nihil a se essentialiter dependere add. MuPAR. 18 concomitantem-O₁MuPTV₁ ; concausalitatem- Ma.

23

Relationship in the Essential Order

It is proved thirdly, because the composite

is truly

one.

Therefore it has some one entity which is neither the entity of the matter nor that of the form.

This one entity is caused neither

by the two entities primarily, because there is not something one from more than one except in virtue of one, nor by either one of the two primarily, because each of them is something less with respect to the total entity. Therefore it is from some one extrinsic thing.* Seventh conclusion.

That which is not a materiatum is not a

formatum, and conversely. This is proved: That which is not a materiatum is not a composite of essential parts; for in every such composite that is one by itself one part is potential, because it does not become one by itself unless it is composed from potency and act-from the seventh and eighth books of the Metaphysics. Therefore, that which does not have a proper potential part is not a composite. Therefore, it is not a formatum, because a formatum is a composite having a form as part of itself. As it was argued concerning matter and form, so it can be argued concerning subject and accident in their mode. This proof is confirmed according to the statement of Aristotle in the seventh book of the Metaphysics.

If anything were from

only one element, it would be only that one; nay, that one would not be an element-from the first conclusion of this 5 second chapter. Therefore by using the topical rule a simili: If anything has only one essential part, it is only that part; nay, the latter is not a part nor a cause, because of the first rule mentioned.

Therefore, every effect of some intrinsic cause has

also another intrinsic cause causing with it, and thus the proposed conclusion is evident.

* (And thus the principal conclusion is evident, viz., that whatever does not have an efficient cause does not have a material cause.) Confer text. 5 (which is, that nothing depends essentially upon itself. )

Confer text.

De Primo Principio

24

OCTAVA CONCLUSIO. Quod non est causatum a causis extrinsecis non est causatum ex intrinsecis.

Haec ex praemissis quatuor satis patet ; habet tamen probationes Prima est quia causalitates causarum extrinsecarum

speciales.

perfectionem dicunt, cui non est annexa necessario imperfectio. Causae intrinsecae de necessitate habent imperfectionem annexam; itaque causae extrinsecae sunt priores in causando intrinsecis, sicut perfectum imperfecto.

Adiunge tertiam conclusionem ;19

sequitur propositum. Secunda est ista, quia intrinsecae possunt esse in se causatae respectu extrinsecarum; ergo sunt posteriores in causando respectu earum . Antecedens patet de forma. Patet etiam de materia inquantum pars est; sed de20 ipsa in se inferius ostendetur.

NONA CONCLUSIO. Quatuor genera causarum in causando idem essentialiter ordinantur.

Patet ex quinque praemissis.

Sed ex se videtur rationabile21

quod multa a quibus idem essentialiter dependet ordinem habeant, Nam22 multa secundum quem illud ab eis ordinate dependet. nullam omnino vel potentia et actu ex ut unum fit ex quibus non habent unitatem ordinis, non causant aliquid essentialiter idem. Cum igitur quatuor genera causarum23 non sunt partes alicuius unius compositi ex ipsis sicut ex actu et potentia , nec omnino nullam habent unitatem inquantum causant, quomodo tunc unitatem ordinis Igitur habent unitatem aliquid idem causarent? 24 inquantum

causant

causatum,

quo

ordine

omnes

sunt

unum

respectu tertii, scilicet in causando , sicut multa in universo per ordinem sunt unum in essendo .

19 quae est: (q. e. om. R) Quod non est (e. om. A ) causatum causae prioris, nec posterioris. add. MuPAR. 20 om. MaO₁MuPTV₁V2 (also Mueller's text ) . 21 rationabilis-MaWCO₁O₂OV₁ (also Mueller's text) ; rationalis 04V2; haec conclusio add. CO₂0304 ( videtur enim rationale add. O4 ) ; scilicet add. MaAR. 22 omnia add. MaO1O2O3O4CV½ (which is also Mueller's reading) . 23 causae quatuor generum MaО₁04WT (also Mueller's reading) . Our reading is the same as that in the conclusion heading and seems more natural, though the other reading can be interpreted in the same manner. 24 causaretur-0304CV2 (also Mueller's reading) . PV₁T have an addition of a dozen lines here (Confer Mueller's text ) .

25

Relationship in the Essential Order

Eighth conclusion.

That which is not an effect of extrinsic

causes is not an effect of intrinsic causes. This is sufficiently clear from the aforementioned four conclusions.

However, it does have special proofs.

The first is that

the causalities of extrinsic causes bespeak perfection, with which imperfection is not necessarily connected. Intrinsic causes of necessity have imperfection connected. Therefore, extrinsic causes are prior in causing to intrinsic causes, as the perfect to the imperfect. Join to this the third conclusion . conclusion follows.

The proposed

The second proof is this, that intrinsic causes can in themselves be caused with respect to extrinsic causes.

Therefore, they

are posterior in causing with respect to them. The antecedent is evident about form. It is evident also about matter in so far as it is a part; but about matter in itself it will be shown below.

Ninth conclusion.

The four kinds of causes in causing the

same thing are essentially ordered. This is evident from the five aforementioned conclusions .

But

of itself it seems reasonable that the many upon which the same thing essentially depends should have an order according to which it depends upon them ordinately. For the many from which there is not made one as from act and potency, or which have no unity of order at all, do not cause something essentially the same.

When, therefore, the four kinds of causes are not

parts of some one thing composed from them as from act and potency and have no unity at all in so far as they cause, how then would they cause something the same?

Therefore, they

have unity of order in so far as they cause an effect; and in this order all are one with respect to a third, namely, in causing, just as many things in a whole are through order one in being.

6 (which is: That which is not the effect of a prior cause is not the effect of a posterior cause.) Confer text.

26

De Primo Principio

Et qualis sit ordo istorum generum causae, patet ex dictis de fine et efficiente inter se-ex secunda probatione quartae et secunda probatione sextae et ad alias ex eisdem, et ex octava. Qualis autem sit intrinsecarum inter se, nolo hic prosequi inquirendo. Parum illis utar in processu .

multum Videtur

tamen materia prior secundum independentiam, quia contingens et informans videtur dependere a permanente et informato, quia informanti praeintelligitur formabile. Et ita exponunt quidam Augustini Confessiones25 de prioritate materiae respectu formae. Et si quaeras quo ordine est prior, respondeo : sicut causatum propinquius eidem causae remotae; propinquius, inquam,26 necessario secundum istum ordinem, secundum quem nunc forma causatur ab ipso.

Tamen forma est prior secundum eminentiam

quia perfectior, quod tamquam planum accipit Aristoteles 7° Metaphysicae27 ubi comparat ea, licet ex dictis eius alibi 9° Metaphysicae28 de actu et potentia, possit probari.

Intellige autem, quod aliud est causas in causando sive secundum causationem esse essentialiter ordinatas, et aliud est ea quae sunt causae esse essentialiter ordinata, sicut patet per Avicennam 6° Metaphysicae 5 °.29 Nam primum verum est et ostensum; alias "Quia amat finem, ideo efficit effectum " et istae essent falsae : "Quia efficit, ideo forma informat et materia materiat" ; quae tamen communiter admittuntur.

25 The Confessions of St. Augustine, Bk. 12, ch. 4 ( PL 32, 827) : "Cur ergo non accipiam informitatem materiae, quam sine specie feceras? 26 inquantum-WO₁CPV1 ; ita quod-AR. 27 Metaph., Bk. 7, ch. 10 ( 1034 b- 1036 a) . Mueller gives a brief text-Metaph., Bk. 8, ch. 2 ( 1043 a 4-5) . 28 Metaph., Bk. 9, ch. 8 ( 1049 b-1051 a) . 29 Metaph., 6 c. 1 367-379.

27

Relationship in the Essential Order

Of what sort the order of these kinds of cause is, is clear from what has been said about the end and the efficient cause in relation to each other-in the second proof of the fourth conclusion and in the second proof of the sixth conclusion and elsewhere in the same conclusions and in the eighth conclusion . I do not wish to investigate here at great length what sort of order the intrinsic causes have in relation to each other. I shall use them but little in proceeding.

It seems, however, that matter

is prior according to independence, because that which is contingent and informs seems to depend upon that which is permanent and informed; for that which can be formed is understood before that which informs.

Thus do certain ones interpret the

Confessions of Augustine on the priority of matter with respect to the form. Should you ask in what order it is prior, I answer:

as an effect

more proximate to the same remote cause ; more proximate, I say, necessarily according to that order according to which the form is now caused by it (viz. , the remote cause ) .

However, the form

is prior according to eminence, because more perfect, which Aristotle accepts as evident in the seventh book of the Metaphysics, where he compares them, although from statements of his elsewhere-in the ninth book of the Metaphysics-about act and potency, it can be proved. Understand , however, that it is one thing for causes to be essentially ordered in causing or according to causation, and it is another thing for those things which are causes to be essentially ordered, as is clear from Avicenna in the sixth book of the Metaphysics, chapter 5.

For the first is true and has been shown .

Otherwise these following propositions would be false : "Because it (viz., the efficient ) loves the end, therefore it causes the effect" and "Because it effects, therefore the form informs and the matter functions as material cause"; but these things are commonly admitted. 7per Avicennam-The per, always used in a citation of Avicenna, indicates that Scotus refers to Avicenna as an expositor of Aristotle, as a medium through which he refers back to Aristotle, the original source.

28

De Primo Principio

Secundum autem falsum est.

Nam illud quod est finis non est

causa eius quod est efficiens, nec quandoque e converso .

Com-

muniter autem illud quod est efficiens non est causa eius quod est materia, quia eam supponit. Expedito de comparationibus membrorum quartae divisionis, de tertia breviter transeo, quia planum est eius dividentia repugnare et evacuare divisum. Quia:

DECIMA CONCLUSIO.

Si duo comparantur ad eandem

causam, aut igitur proximam, aut remotam. Prima est de

De secunda divisione duas conclusiones propono. distinctione membrorum.

UNDECIMA CONCLUSIO.

Non omne causatum

causae

propinquius est causa causati remotioris ab eadem causa; igitur est aliquod causatum prius, non tamen prius quod est causa. Antecedens huius probatur exemplo et ratione. exemplum:

Ponitur tale

Quantitas est propinquius causatum qualitate, non

tamen eius causa.

Patet discurrendo per causas.

Probatur etiam

ratione, quia secunda conclusio est de sufficienta divisionis.30

DUODECIMA CONCLUSIO.

Nihil dependet essentialiter,

nisi a causa vel a causato propinquiori alicui causae. Probatur: quia si dependet³¹ ab aliquo alio , sit illud aliud A et dependens sit B.

A non existente, B non erit.

Sed A non

existente, omnes per se causae ipsius B possunt concurrere , et etiam omnia causata istis causis propinquiora quam B, possunt esse iam causata, quia A nullum istorum est parte ; igitur omnibus causis per se concurrentibus et omnibus causatis propinquioribus ipso B iam positis, B non erit ; igitur omnes istae causae per se non sunt sufficientes causae, etiam illis propinquioribus iam causatis. Consequentia

patet,

quia

causae

sufficientes,

iam

causatis

propinquioribus positis, possunt causare remotius causatum.

30 Confer ch. 1 , Secunda Divisio, Paragraph 5 . 31 dependeret-O₂O¿MuTV₁AR.

29

Relationship in the Essential Order The second, however, is false.

For that which is the end is not

the cause of that which is the efficient, nor is the converse true at times.

Commonly, moreover, that which is the efficient is

not the cause of that which is the matter, because it supposes matter.

Having finished the comparisons of the members of the fourth division, I pass over the third briefly, because it is clear that its resultants are mutually exclusive and exhaust the content of that which is divided . For: Tenth conclusion:

If two effects are compared to the same

cause, they are compared, therefore, either to a proximate or to a remote cause. About the second division I propose two conclusions. first is about the distinction of the members.

Eleventh conclusion .

The

Not every more immediate effect of a

cause is the cause of a more remote effect of the same cause. Therefore some effect is prior, but not prior because it is a cause. The antecedent of this is proved by example and by reason. Such an example is presented:

Quantity is a more immediate

effect than quality but is not its cause. perusal of the causes.

This is evident from a

It is proved also by reason, because the second conclusion deals with the sufficiency of the division. Twelfth conclusion.

Nothing depends essentially, except upon

a cause or upon a more immediate effect of some cause. This is proved:

If it depends upon some other, let that other

be A, and let the dependent be B. If A does not exist, B will not exist. But if A does not exist, all the proper causes of this very B can concur, and also all the effects nearer to these causes than B is can already be caused, because A is none of them as a part. Therefore, when all the proper causes concur and all the effects nearer than B are already posited, B will not exist.

Therefore,

all these proper causes are not sufficient causes, even though those more immediate effects are already caused. The consequence is evident,

because sufficient

causes,

when the more immediate

effects are already posited, can cause a more remote effect.

30

De Primo Principio

Si dicas quod argumentum non concludit quin possint sed quod non causant, hoc nihil est. Nam A non potente esse parte , B non potest esse; omnibus praedictis ex parte causarum omnium et causatorum priorum, A non potest esse per illa, quia non est aliquod illorum nec causabile ab eis; ergo B non potest esse per illa. Nam per nihil potest aliquid esse, per quod non potest esse sine quo impossibile est illud esse. Si dicas:

"Compositum potest esse per agens naturale,

non

tamen potest materia esse per ipsum sine qua impossibile est compositum esse," -instantia nihil valet, quia agens naturale non est causa tota compositi, a quo, scilicet circumscripto quocumque alio, potest esse compositum. De tali loquor, quia si omnes causas in omni genere causae ordinatas ad B coniungam, et effectus omnes propinquiores ipso B sint producti, per omnes istas A non potest esse, quia non est causa, nec causatum de numero istorum, et sine A, B non potest esse ; ergo per omnes istas simul iunctas B non potest esse; ergo omnes istae simul iunctae non sunt totaliter causa ipsius B, quod est oppositum positi.

De prima divisione similes conclusiones duas pono.

Prima,

quod32 eius membra invicem distinguuntur.

DECIMA

TERTIA

CONCLUSIO.

dependet essentialiter ab

eminente.

Non

omne

Ergo primae

excessum

divisionis33

primum membrum non infert secundum. Probatio antecedentis :

Species nobilior est eminens respectu

minus nobilis, puta contrarium respectu minus contrarii ; nec tamen respectu eius est aliqua causa-patet inductive ; nec causatum propinquius, quia causalitas causae communis non respicit secundum ordinem essentialem illa ut causata. Tunc enim non posset causare excessum, nisi prius causaret eminens; quod est patens falsum de quacumque causa, quia si contrarium vilius producitur ab hac causa, contrario nobiliori a nulla causa producto, igitur respectu nullius causae sic ordinantur.

32 Pertinet ad distinctionem membrorum (eius) et est:-MuPAR. 33 prius add. MaO, WMuPV1 , (also Mueller's text) .

31

Relationship in the Essential Order

If you say that the argument does not conclude that they cannot cause but merely concludes that they do not cause, this is of no avail.

For if A cannot be a part, B cannot exist.

With

all that has been said concerning all the causes and the prior effects, A cannot be through them, because it is not something of them nor causable by them. them.

Therefore B cannot be through

For something (B) cannot be through anything through

which there cannot be that (A) without which it is impossible for it (B) to exist. If you say that a composite can be through a natural agent but that matter cannot be through that very agent without which it is impossible for the composite to exist, the objection has no value, because the natural agent is not the total cause of the composite, so that when every other cause is cut out the composite can be from it, namely, the agent. I speak of such, because if I shall join all the causes in every kind of cause ordered to B, and if all the effects more immediate than B are produced, then through all these A cannot exist, because it is not a cause nor an effect of the number of these, and without A, B cannot exist.

Therefore, through all these joined together, B cannot

exist.

Consequently, all these joined together are not totally

the cause of this very B, and this is the opposite of what was posited. About the first division I present two similar conclusions : First, that its members are distinguished from each other. Thirteenth conclusion.

Not everything which is exceeded

depends essentially upon that which is eminent.

Therefore, the

first member of the first division does not imply the second. The proof of the antecedent:

A nobler species is eminent with

respect to a less noble, for instance, a contrary with respect to a less contrary; but it is not a cause with respect to it. clear inductively.

This is

Nor is it a more immediate effect, because the

causality of the common cause does not regard them as effects according to an essential order.

For then it could not cause that

which is exceeded, unless it would first cause the eminent; and this is patently false about any cause, because if the more ignoble contrary is produced by this cause, while the more noble contrary is not produced by any cause, then with respect to no cause are they thus ordered.

32

De Primo Principio

Ulterius:

Si eminens aliquod non est causa respectu excessi,

nec causatum propinquius causae amborum; igitur excessum non dependet ab ipso essentialiter. Consequentia patet ex proxima praeostensa. Ex abundanti adiungo eius conversam:

DECIMA QUARTA CONCLUSIO.

Non omne dependens

est excessum ab illo a quo dependet. Patet: perfectius.

Compositum dependet a materia, cum sit ipsa multo Similiter forma fortassis a materia dependet-tactum

est

conclusione nona; tamen forma est perfectior 7 ° Meta34 physicae. In motibus etiam ordinatis, quod est posterius generatione dependet a priore, quia prius est effectus propinquior causae amborum; tamen posterius est perfectius-9° Metaphysicae.³5

Tertio, pro sufficientia huius divisionis hanc generalem propono apud Aristotelem satis notam:

DECIMA QUINTA CONCLUSIO. ponenda sine necessitate.

Numquam pluralitas est

Cum igitur nulla necessitas appareat ponendi plures ordines essentiales primos quam duos praedictos, illi soli sunt. 36 Haec etiam generalis ostendit tantum sex esse ordines essentiales ; tot ostensi sunt, et ad ponendum alios necessitas non apparet.

Comparatis membris primae divisionis ad invicem in communi, comparo in speciali posterius primi ordinis ad duo posteriora specialia secundi ordinis ; comparo scilicet excessum ad effectum et finitum. Hic conclusionem unam propono, quae talis est : 34 Mueller gives only a reference to Aristotle's De Anima, Bk. 2, ch. 1 (412 a 9-10) ; we give the same reference to Aristotle as in the 9th Conclusion. Confer note 27. 35 Metaph., Bk. 9, ch . 8 ( 1049 b 19-22 ; also 1050 a 3-5 ) ; ch. 9 ( 1051 a 4-15 ) . Mueller gives two references to the ninth Book, which according to our enumeration, actually refer to the tenth Book-Bk. 10, ch. 1 ( 1052 a 19-30 ) and Bk. 10, ch. 4 ( 1055a 9-16) . 36 ponendi add. MuPT AR; ( Ma manu sec. in marg.)

Relationship in the Essential Order Further:

33

If some eminent is not a cause with respect to that

which is exceeded, nor a more immediate effect of a cause of both, then that which is exceeded does not depend upon it (viz ., the eminent) essentially. The consequence is evident from the last conclusion already shown. Though it is not necessary to do so, I add its converse:

Fourteenth conclusion :

Not every dependent is exceeded by

that upon which it depends.

It is clear that the composite depends upon the matter, although the composite itself is much more perfect. Similarly, the form depends perhaps upon the matter. This was touched upon in the ninth conclusion.

However, the form is more perfect-from

the seventh book of the Metaphysics.

Also in ordered move-

ments, that which is posterior in generation depends upon the prior, because the prior is a more immediate effect of a cause of both. However, the posterior is more perfect-from the ninth book of the Metaphysics. Thirdly, for the sufficiency of this division, I propose this general proposition of Aristotle, which is sufficiently known :

Fifteenth conclusion .

Plurality is never to be posited without

necessity. Since, therefore, there is no apparent necessity for positing more prime essential orders than the two already mentioned , these are the only ones. This general proposition likewise shows that there are only six essential orders . This many orders have been shown, and the necessity of positing others is not apparent.

Having compared the members of the first division with one another in general, I compare in particular the posterior of the first order with two special posteriors of the second order ; I compare, namely, that which is exceeded with the effect of an efficient cause and with the finitum (viz. , that which is ordered Here I propose one conclusion, which is as follows:

to an end) .

34

De Primo Principio

DECIMA SEXTA CONCLUSIO: sum .

Omne finitum est exces-

Probatur: quia finis est melior eo quod est ad ipsum. Hoc probatur: quia finis ut amatum movet efficiens ad causandum. A igitur non est minus bonum ipso B, nec aequale ; ergo maius. Secunda pars antecedentis probatur,37 quia qua ratione aequale moveret, eadem ratione et idem posset movere, quia aeque est amabile et desiderabile, et ita posset esse causa finalis sui, contra primam huius secundi.

Item:

Ex hoc concluditur quod nec minus.

Natura agit propter finem, sicut ars ageret si ageret

naturaliter; sed a fine in artificialibus sumitur principium cogniDe finito est conclusio-2 ° Physicorum.39 tionis artificialis.38 Principium autem est verius.

Ergo finis, qui includit illam veri-

tatem virtualiter, est perfectior subiecto conclusionis . Obiicies: Aliqua voluntas causat aliquid propter minus bonum amatum; igitur ibi finis est excessus. Antecedens patet in actu omni bono ex genere et malo ex fine, quia ordinatur ab agente ad finem inferiorem se. Respondeo : Conclusio procedit de fine ex natura rei , qualis est semper finis naturae et finis voluntatis ordinatae. Sed nec instantia de voluntate inordinata destruit conclusionem, quia talis non est prima causa effectus; 10 igitur si a tali est ad finem non perfectiorem, ¹¹ ab alia superiore causa ordinata est ad perfectiorem, quia alias non esset ordinata, ut probatio conclusionis ostendit; et si, ut a superiore producitur, habet finem perfectiorem,

ergo

aliquem perfectiorem; ergo omne finitum est excessum ab aliquo fine suo, licet non a proximo, propter quem amatum agens proximum inordinatum causat ipsum.

37 quod non aequale add. O₂O3Mu PAR. 38 vel moralis add. MuPTV₁ (MaW manu. sec. in marg.) 39 Phys., Bk. 2, ch. 2 ( 194 a 21 -b 9) . 40 efficiens-010203V2AR; effectiva-CO4. 41 est ad ... / aliquid fieret non propter perfectiorem finem. MuPTV₁V₂AR. (This variant renders the same sense as our text. )

35

Relationship in the Essential Order

Sixteenth conclusion.

Everything ordered to an end is ex-

ceeded.

It is proved: because the end is better than that which is ordered to it.

This is proved because the end as the beloved

moves the efficient to cause.

A therefore is not less good than B

itself, nor equal ; therefore it is greater.

The second part of the

By whatever reason an equal would move, antecedent is proved : by the same reason the same also could move, because it is equally lovable and desirable; thus it could be the final cause of itself, against the first conclusion of this second chapter.

From

this it is concluded also that it (viz. the end ) is not less good. Moreover:

Nature acts for the safe of an end, just as art

would act if it were to act naturally. But from the end in things of art the premise of knowledge in art is taken . The conclusion is about that which is ordered to an end-from the second book of the Physics.

The premise, however, is truer.

Therefore the

end, which includes that truth virtually, is more perfect than the subject of the conclusion. You will object:

Some will causes something for the sake of a

lesser good which is loved ; therefore in this instance the end is exceeded . The antecedent is evident in every act which is good in itself but evil by reason of the purpose for which it is done, because it is ordered by its agent to an end inferior to itself. I answer:

The conclusion proceeds from that end which is of

the nature of the thing, and such are always the natural end and the end of an ordinate will . The instance of an inordinate will, however, does not destroy the conclusion, because the primary cause of the effect is not of this kind.

Therefore, if by such

a one it is ordered to an end that is not more perfect, it is ordered by another higher cause to a more perfect end, because otherwise it would not be ordered, as the proof of the conclusion shows; and if, as it is produced by a higher cause, it has a more perfect end, therefore some more perfect end.

Therefore, every-

thing ordered to an end is exceeded by some end, even though not by the proximate end for the sake of which, as beloved, an inordinate proximate agent causes it (viz. the finitum) . 8 (that it is not equal) . Confer text.

36

De Primo Princip

io

Posset etiam dici quod finis ille est finis eius secundum quid. Hoc non placet, quia efficientia causae inferioris est efficientia simpliciter; ergo si non efficit praecise ut motum, sicut baculus, tali non correspondet finis proprius, quia non est agens proprie sed quasi effectum propinquius-si, inquam, non sic efficit,

finis

eius est finis simpliciter, quia omnis per se efficientis est aliquis per se finis.

Relationship in the Essential Order

37

It could also be said that that end is its end in a qualified sense. This is not satisfactory, because the efficiency of the lower cause is an efficiency in an unqualified sense .

Therefore,

if it does not cause precisely as it is moved, as does a staff, to which there does not correspond a proper end, because it (viz. the staff) is not an agent properly speaking, but, as it were, a more immediate effect-if I say, it (viz., the lower cause ) does not effect in this manner, its corresponding end is an end in an unqualified sense, because for every proper efficient there is some proper end.

CAPITULUM TERTIUM

De triplici primitate in Primo Principio. Domine Deus noster, qui te primum esse ac novissimum praedicasti, doce servum tuum, te esse primum efficiens et primum eminens finemque ultimum ostendere ratione, fide tenet .

quod certissima

De sex quippe ordinibus essentialibus supradictis, tres placet eligere: duos causalitatis extrinsecae et unum eminentiae, atque in istis tribus ordinibus aliquam naturam unam simpliciter primam Ideo autem dico naturam unam, esse, si dederis, demonstrare . quia in hoc capitulo tertio praedictae tres primitates, non de unico singulari seu secundum numerum ostendentur, sed de unica quidditate vel natura. De unitate vero numerali inferius erit sermo.

PRIMA CONCLUSIO. Quod ostenditur : Consequentia patet

Aliqua est natura in entibus effectiva.

Aliqua est effectibilis ; ergo aliqua¹ effectiva. Antecedens per naturam correlativorum.

probatur: tum, quia aliqua est contingens; igitur possibilis esse post non esse; ergo non a se, nec a nihilo-utroque enim modo ens foret a non ente; ergo ab alio effectibilis; tum, quia aliqua natura est mobilis vel mutabilis, quia possibilis carere aliqua perfectione possibili incipere, et ita effici.

sibi

inesse;

ergo

terminus

motus

potest

1 est add. MuPTV₁AR. Cf. Codex Assisiensis 137 f. 15 vb- 16 ra; Oxon. I, d . 2, q. 2, n. 15 ; VIII, 419 ab; Rep. Par. I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 4; XXII, 64 b -65 a. 38

CHAPTER III

The three-fold primacy in the First Principle. O Lord, our God, Who didst proclaim that Thou art the first and the last, teach Thy servant to show by reason what he holds by the surest faith, that Thou art the first efficient and the first eminent and the last end . From the six essential orders mentioned above, it seems good to choose three, two of extrinsic causality and one of eminence, and in these three orders to demonstrate, if Thou wilt grant it, that some one nature is simply first. However, I say one nature for this reason, because in this third chapter the aforesaid three primacies will be shown, not about a unique singular or one in There will, number, but about a unique quiddity or nature. however, be mention of numerical unity later. First conclusion .

It is possible that among beings there is some

nature which effects.¹ This is shown:

It is possible that there is some nature which is

effected ; therefore, it is possible that there is some nature which effects. The consequence is evident from the nature of correlatives.

The antecedent is proved:

Some nature is contingent;

therefore it is possible for it to be after not being; therefore not from itself, nor from nothing-in both these cases being would be from non-being.

Therefore it is possible that there is a nature

which is effected by another. The antecedent is proved furthermore: It is possible for some nature to move or change, for it is possible for it to lack some perfection that is possible to be in it. Therefore, the term of motion can begin, and so be effected .

1 We use the expression "It is possible that" in order to make clear that the mode of possibility affects the whole proposition (sensus compositionis) . What Scotus intends, of course, is that the proof proceed in the possible order so that its demonstrable power be guaranteed. 39

40

De Primo Principio

In hac conclusione et quibusdam sequentibus possem proponere actum sic:

Aliqua natura est efficiens, quia aliqua est effecta,

quia aliqua incipit esse, quia aliqua est terminus motus et conSed malo de possibili proponere conclusiones et prae-

tingens. missas.

Illis quippe de actu concessis, istae de possibili

ceduntur; non e converso.

con-

Illae etiam de actu sunt contingentes ,

licet satis manifestae ; istae de possibili sunt necessariae. Illae ad ens existens, istae ad ens etiam quidditative sumptum possunt proprie pertinere. Et existentia² illius quidditatis inferius ostendetur, de qua nunc ostenditur efficientia.

SECUNDA CONCLUSIO.

Aliquod effectivum est simpliciter

primum, hoc est, nec effectibile, nec in virtute alterius effectivum. Probatur ex prima :

Aliquod est effectivum; sit A.

Si est

primum, hoc modo exposito, propositum mox habetur ; si non, igitur est posterius effectivum, quia effectibile ab alio, vel in virtute alterius effectivum. Si negatur negatio , ponitur affirmatio. Detur illud alterum; sit B, de quo arguatur sicut de A argutum est, aut procedetur in infinitum in effectivis, quorum quodlibet respectu prioris erit secundum, aut stabitur in aliquo non habente prius. Infinitas est impossibilis ascendendo ; ergo primitas necessaria, quia non habens prius nullo posteriore se est posterius, nam circulum in causis destruit conclusio secunda secundi. 2 ex natura-MaWO₁MuT. If this reading is taken, a subject must be found to give meaning to the sentence. So, after quidditatis MuPAR add. efficiens. For the best meaning in this reading, finally, for efficientia MaTV₁ have effectiva, and MuPAR have effectivum. This reading now is : Et ex natura illius quidditatis efficiens inferius ostenditur, de qua nunc ostenditur effectiva (um) . It has the same meaning essentially as our reading. Mueller gives a text, each word of which, when considered separately, has a strong support from the manuscripts. But the resulting sentence-"Et ex natura illius quidditatis inferius ostendetur, de qua nunc ostenditur efficientia”—has, for us at least, no meaning. While it is a fact that ex natura and existentia are easily confused in the manuscripts, nevertheless a combination should be chosen which gives some meaning.

41

Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

In this conclusion and certain following ones, I could propose the actual thus:

Some nature is an efficient cause, because some

nature is effected, because some nature begins to be, because some nature is the term of motion and contingent.

But I prefer to sub-

mit conclusions and premises about the possible, for if those about the actual are conceded, those about the possible are conceded, but not conversely.

Also, those about the actual are contingent,

though manifest enough; those about the possible are necessary. The former pertain to existing being; the latter can properly pertain also to being quidditatively taken.

And later on there will

be shown the existence of that quiddity about which there is now shown the efficiency.2

Second conclusion.

It is possible that something which effects

is simply first; that is, it is not possible that it is effected or that it effects in virtue of another. It is proved from the first conclusion: It is possible that there is something which effects. Let it be A. If it is first, in this manner expounded, our purpose is soon attained .

If it is not,

then it is a posterior possible efficient cause, because it is possible that it is effected by another or that it effects in virtue of another. If the negation is denied , the affirmation is posited.

Let that

other be given; let it be B, and about that let it be argued as it was argued about A.

Either there will be an infinite process in

possible efficient causes, of which every one will be second with respect to a prior, or there will be a stop in some one not having a prior.

Infinity is impossible in ascent.

Consequently a

primacy is necessary, because that which does not have a prior is not posterior to anything posterior to itself, for the second conclusion of the second chapter destroys a circle in causes. 2 Confer Latin text for a variant reading of this sentence. It may be translated thus: "And from the nature of that quiddity, the actually existing efficient cause will be shown later on ; with reference to it there is now shown the possible efficient cause."

42

Hic

De Primo Principio 3 instatur,

quia

secundum

philosophantes

est

possibilis

infinitas ascendendo, sicut ipsi ponebant de generantibus infinitis, quorum nullum esset primum, sed quodlibet secundum, et tamen hoc ab eis sine circulo poneretur. Hanc instantiam excludendo

dico

quod

philosophi

non

posuerunt

infinitatem

possibilem in causis essentialiter ordinatis, sed tantum accidentaliter, sicut patet per Avicennam 6°

Metaphysicae

5°,

ubi

loquitur de infinitate individuorum in specie. Sed ad propositum ostendendum

expono

essentialiter et quae accidentaliter ordinatae

quae

sint

causae

ubi sciendum quod

aliud est loqui de causis per se et per accidens, et de causis per se sive essentialiter et accidentaliter ordinatis.

Nam in primo est

tantum comparatio unius ad unum, causae ad causatum; et est causa per se, quae secundum naturam propriam, non secundum aliquid sibi accidens, causat.

In secundo est comparatio duarum

causarum inter se, inquantum ab eis est causatum . Et differunt essentialiter et per se ordinatae in tribus ab accidentaliter ordinatis. Prima differentia est quod in per se secunda, inquantum causat, dependet a prima; in per accidens non, licet in esse vel in aliquo alio dependeat. Secunda est quod in per se ordinatis est causalitas alterius rationis et ordinis, quia Et haec sequitur superior est perfectior ; in accidentaliter non. ex prima; nam nulla causa a causa eiusdem rationis dependet essentialiter in causando, quia in causatione alicuius sufficit unum Tertia sequitur, quod omnes causae per se unius rationis. ordinatae simul necessario requiruntur ad causandum ; alioquin aliqua per se causalitas deesset effectui ; non requiruntur simul accidentaliter ordinatae.

3 For a parallel to our text for the following six paragraphs, confer Ockham's quotation of Scotus in our article in Franciscan Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 178-9. The slight variations between these two authentic and reliable texts should help us obtain a clearer understanding of both of them. 4 Metaph., 6 c. 5 425 sq. “Ut sint individua post individua sine fine; igitur infinitas individuorum." 5 et om . WO ,O , CO TV • et per accidens add. MaO₁ (also Mueller's text) .

Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

43

Here it is objected that according to those who philosophize an infinity is possible in ascent, as they posited about infinite generating beings, of which none would be first but every one would be second; and nevertheless this would be posited by them without a circle. In excluding this instance I say that the philosophers did not posit an infinity as possible in causes essentially ordered, but only in causes accidentally ordered , as is clear from³ Avicenna-in the sixth book of the Metaphysics, chapter 5- where he speaks of the infinity of individuals in a species. In order to show forth our purpose I explain what essentially ordered causes are, and what accidentally ordered causes are. Hence it must be known that it is one thing to speak of causes by themselves (per se ) and incidental causes ; and it is another thing to speak of causes per se or essentially ordered , and causes For in the first case there is only a comparison of one to one, of cause, namely, to effect; and that is

accidentally ordered.

a cause per se which causes according to its own nature and not according to something accidental to it. In the second there is a comparison of two causes with each other, in so far as there is an effect from them. Eessentially and per se ordered causes differ from accidentally ordered causes in three respects. essentially

The first difference is that in

ordered causes the second, in so far as it causes,

depends upon the first ; in accidentally ordered causes it does not, although in its being or in some other way it does depend.

The

second difference is that in essentially ordered causes there is a causality of another nature and order, because the higher is more perfect; in accidentally ordered causes there is not. This difference follows from the first.

For no cause depends essentially

in causing upon a cause of the same nature, because in the causation of anything, one of one nature suffices.

The third difference

follows, that all essentially ordered causes are necessarily required simultaneously for causing.

Otherwise some proper causality

would be lacking to the effect.

Accidentally ordered causes are

not required simultaneously.

3 Confer note 7, chapter 2. 4 It is difficult to translate the expression per se. When it is used in conjunction with the term ordinatae, we have translated per se as "essentially". Elsewhere, as for instance when it is used with the term causae, we have translated per se as "proper" or "by itself." Often, however, this expression is best left in the Latin, even in a close translation such as ours.

44

De Primo Principio

Ex istis ostenditur propositum sic: Infinitas essentialiter ordinatorum est impossibilis; et infinitas accidentaliter ordinatorum est impossibilis nisi posito statu in essentialiter ordinatis ; igitur Si omnino est impossibilis infinitas in essentialiter ordinatis . etiam negatur ordo

essentialis, infinitas

igitur

est impossibilis;

omnino est aliquod primum simpliciter effectivum. Hic sunt tres propositiones assumptae.

Propter brevitatem

prima dicatur A, secunda B, tertia C.

8 Probatio istarum:

Primo A probatur,

tum quia universitas

causatorum essentialiter ordinatorum est causata; igitur ab aliqua causa quae nihil est universitatis ; tunc enim esset causa sui ; tota enim universitas dependentium dependet et a nullo illius universitatis; tum quia infinitae causae essentialiter ordinatae essent simul in

actu-ex

differentia tertia

supra;

consequens

nullus

philosophus ponit; tum tertio, quia prius est principio propinquius —ex 5 ° Metaphysicae; igitur ubi nullum principium, nihil essentialiter prius; tum quarto, quarto, quia superior est perfectior in causando -ex secunda differentia ; igitur in infinitum superior est in infinitum perfectior et ita infinitae perfectionis¹º in causando; est igitur non causans in virtute alterius, quia omnis talis imperfecte causat quia est dependens in causando; tum quinto, quia effectivum

nullam

imperfectionem

ponit

necessario-patet

in

propositione octava¹¹ secundi ; igitur potest esse in aliqua natura sine imperfectione ; sed si in nulla est sine dependentia ad prius, in nulla est sine imperfectione; igitur effectivitas independens potest

inesse alicui

effectivitas

naturae;

simpliciter

prima

simpliciter

illa

est

est

possibilis ;

inferius ex hoc concludetur quod est in re. bus patet A.

prima;

sufficit

hoc,

ergo quia

Sic quinque rationi-

7 Mueller has read si as sic without giving any variants. MuT also have sic. O₂V₁AR have si. Ma has sic deleted to si. 8scilicet quod in essentialiter ordinatis impossibilis est infinitas add. MuPAR. 9 Metaph., Bk. 5, ch. 11 ( 1018 b 8-11 ) . Mueller again gives only a parallel text in Aristotle-Problem. 17, c. 3 ( 916 A 18, 22-23 ) . 10 infinita perfecta-MaO, O₂ (also Mueller's text) . 11 probatione octavae-Ma (also Mueller's text) .

45

Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

From these considerations our purpose is shown thus :

An in-

finity of essentially ordered causes is impossible, and an infinity of accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless it be posited that it is based on essentially ordered causes.

Therefore, an infinity

in essentially ordered causes is altogether impossible .

And even

if an essential order is denied , infinity is impossible.

Therefore,

it is altogether possible that something which causes is simply first. Here there are three propositions assumed : For the sake of brevity let the first be called A, the second B, the third C. 5 The proof of these.

First A is proved:

The totality of

essentially ordered effects is caused ; consequently by some cause which is nothing of that totality ; for then it would be the cause of itself; for the whole totality of dependents depends, and upon nothing of that totality.

Furthermore, infinite causes essentially

ordered would be simultaneously in act-from the third difference above-a consequent no philosopher posits.

Thirdly, the prior

is nearer the beginning-from the fifth book of the Metaphysics; consequently, where there is no beginning, there is nothing essentially prior.

Fourthly, the higher is more perfect in caus-

ing-from the second difference; consequently what is infinitely higher is infinitely more perfect and thus of infinite perfection in causing; it is therefore not causing in virtue of another, since every such a one causes imperfectly because it is dependent in causing. Fifthly, that which is able to effect does not necessarily posit any imperfection-this is evident in the eighth conclusion of the second chapter; consequently it can be in some nature without imperfection; but if it is in none without dependence upon a prior, it is in none without imperfection ; therefore , independent efficient causality can belong to some nature; that nature is simply first ; consequently an efficient causality simply first is possible; this suffices, because later it will be concluded Thus by five reasons A is

from this, that it exists in reality. evident.

5 (namely, that in essentially ordered causes an infinity is impossible. ) text.

Confer

46

De Primo Principio

B probatur, 12 quia infinitas accidentalis, si ponatur, hoc non est simul, patet, sed successive tantum, alterum post alterum, ita quod secundum, licet aliquo modo fuerit a priore , tamen non dependet ab ipso in causando .

Potest enim causare illo

existente, sicut filius generat, patre mortuo, sicut ipso vivo .

non Talis

infinitas successionis est impossibilis, nisi ab aliqua natura infinite durante, a qua tota successio et quidlibet eius dependeat.

Nulla

enim difformitas perpetuatur, nisi in virtute alicuius permanentis, quod nihil est successionis, quia omnia successionis sunt eiusdem rationis; sed est aliquid prius essentialiter, quia quidlibet successionis dependet ab ipso, et hoc in alio ordine quam a causa proxima, quae est aliquid illius successionis.

Patet igitur B.

Probatur C,13 quia cum ex prima aliqua natura sit effectiva, si negatur ordo essentialis effectivorum, igitur illa in nullius alterius virtute causat; et licet ipsa in aliquo singulari ponatur causata, tamen in aliquo est incausata, quod est propositum de natura prima; quia si in quolibet ponatur causata, iam contradictio implicatur negando ordinem essentialem; quia nulla natura potest poni in quolibet causata, ita quod sit ordo accidentalis sub ipsa , sine ordine essentiali ad aliam naturam-ex B.

12 scilicet quod infinitas accidentaliter ordinatorum est impossibilis, nisi statu posito in essentialiter ordinatis. add. MuPAR. 13 scilicet quod si negatur ordo essentialis, infinitas est simpliciter impossibilis add. MuPAR.

Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

47

6 B is proved:

For if an accidental infinity is posited, this

evidently occurs not simultaneously, but successively only, one member after the other; so that the second, although in some way it will be from the prior, nevertheless does not depend upon it in causing. For it can cause when the former does not exist, as, for instance, a son generates when his father is dead just as when he is living. For such an infinity of succession is impossible, unless it depends upon some nature of infinite duration,

upon which the whole succession and everything of it

depends. For no difformity is perpetuated, unless in virtue of something permanent which is nothing of the succession, because all the members of the succession are of the same nature; but it is something essentially prior because every member of the succession depends upon it, and this in a different order than that in which a member depends upon the proximate cause, which is something of that succession ; therefore B is evident. C is proved:

Since from the first conclusion of this chapter

it is possible that there is some nature which effects, if the essential order of possible efficient causes be denied, then that nature causes in virtue of no other; and even if it be posited as caused in some singular, nevertheless in some one singular it is uncaused, and this is the goal regarding the first nature. For if in every one it be posited as caused, a contradiction is already implied in denying the essential order.

The reason is that no

nature can be posited as caused in every one, so that there is an accidental order under it, without there being an essential order to another nature-from B.

!

6 (namely, that an infinity of accidentally ordered causes is impossible, unless it be posited that it is based on essentially ordered causes) . Confer text. 7 (namely, that if the essential order is denied, infinity is simply impossible) . Confer text.

De Primo Principio

48

TERTIA CONCLUSIO.

Simpliciter primum effectivum est

incausabile, quia est ineffectibile et independenter

effectivum.

Hoc patet ex secunda, quia si sit ab alio effectibile vel virtute alterius causativum, igitur processus in infinitum, vel circulus, vel statur in aliquo ineffectibili et independenter effectivo ; illud dico primum, et aliud patet quod non est primum, ex datis¹¹ Ulterius concluditur: Si primum est ineffectibile , igitur tuis. incausabile, quia non finibile-ex quinta secundi ; nec materiabile— ex sexta eiusdem; nec formabile-ex septima ibi ; simul etiam de forma et materia—ex octava ibidem.

QUARTA CONCLUSIO. in actu existens,

et

Simpliciter primum effectivum est

aliqua natura

existens

actualiter

est sic

effectiva. Probatur:

Cuius rationi repugnat posse esse ab alio illud, si

potest esse, potest esse a se ; rationi primi effectivi simpliciter repugnat posse esse ab alio -ex tertia; et potest esse-ex secunda ; imo ibi quinta probatio A , quae minus videtur concludere, 15 hoc concludit. Aliae possunt tractari de existentia, et sunt de contingentibus,

tamen manifestis;

vel de natura

et

quidditate et

possibilitate, et sunt ex necessariis; igitur effectivum simpliciter primum potest esse a se. Quod non est a se non potest esse a se, quia tunc non-ens produceret aliquid ad esse, quod est impossibile ; et adhuc tunc illud causaret se, et ita non esset¹6 incausabile omnino. Haec quarta conclusio aliter declaratur, quia inconveniens est universo deesse supremum gradum possibilem in essendo. 14 dictis-MuAR. 15 de add. WMuPTV₁1. 16 tenetur-MaCO₁04 (also Mueller's text) .

Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

Third conclusion.

49

It is possible that the simply first efficient

is uncausable, because it is not effected and it effects independently. This is evident from the second conclusion .

For if it is possible

that it is caused by another or that it causes in virtue of another, then there will be an infinite process, or a circle, or there is a stop in something uncausable and capable of causing independently ; I say that that is first and the other, as is clear from your admissions, is not first. It is concluded further: If the first is ineffectible, then it is uncausable, because it cannot be ordered to an end-from the fifth conclusion of the second chapter; and it cannot be caused from the matter-from the sixth conclusion of the same chapter; and it cannot be caused through the formfrom the seventh conclusion there ; and it cannot be caused from the matter and form together-from the eighth conclusion of the same chapter. Fourth conclusion.

The simply first efficient in the possible

order is actually existing, and some nature actually existing is effective in this way.

It is proved:

That to the definition of which it is repugnant

to be able to be from another, if it can be, can be by itself. It is simply repugnant to the definition of that which can be the first efficient to be able to be from another-from the third conclusion; and it can be-from the second conclusion.

Indeed,

in that place the fifth proof of A, which does not seem conclusive, concludes this. Other proofs can be treated with regard to existence, and they are about contingent facts, though manifest; or with regard to nature and quiddity and possibility, and they are from necessary facts.

Consequently that which can be the

simply first efficient can be by itself.

That which is not by

itself cannot be by itself, because then non-being would bring something to being, and this is impossible; and besides, then it would cause itself and so would not be altogether uncausable. This fourth conclusion is declared in another way because it is inconvenient for the universe to be lacking the highest degree possible in being. 8 To translate this conclusion heading in the same fashion as the three preceding ones would give a weak and possibly misleading sentence, where a very strong statement is certainly intended.

50

De Primo Principio

Iuxta istam quartam nota corollarium, quod primum effectivum non tantum est quod est prius aliis, sed quo prius esse includit Probatur ut contradictionem ; sic inquantum primum existit. quarta.

Nam de ratione illius maxime includitur incausabile;

igitur si potest esse, quia non contradicit entitati, potest a se, et ita est a se.

QUINTA CONCLUSIO. Probatur:

quia excludendo

esse

Incausabile est ex¹7 se necesse esse. omnem

causam aliam a se,

in-

trinsecam et extrinsecam, respectu sui esse, ex se est impossibile non esse. Probatio: Nihil potest non esse, nisi aliquid sibi incompossibile positive vel privative possit esse, quia saltem alterum contradictoriorum est semper verum. Nihil incompossibile incausabili potest positive vel privative esse, quia vel ex se vel ab alio ; non primo modo, quia tunc esset sic ex se-ex quarta-et ita incompossibilia simul essent; et pari ratione neutrum esset, quia concedis¹8 per illud incompossibile, illud incausabile¹9 non esse, et ita sequitur e converso; non secundo modo, quia nullum causatum habet vehementius esse vel potentius a causa quam incausabile habet a se , quia causatum dependet in essendo, incausabile non. Possibilitas etiam causabilis ad esse non necessario ponit actu esse eius, sicut est de incausabili ; nihil autem incompossibile iam enti potest esse a causa, nisi ab illa recipiat vehementius vel potentius esse quam sit esse sui incompossibilis. 17 a-O, MuPTV₁AR. 18 concederetur-MuPTV₁AR. 19 causabile-MaWO₁COT ( also Mueller's text) ; causale-V₁. We have chosen incausabile with О₂O,MuPAR, because the sense of the sentence seems to demand it. For Scotus is still arguing primo modo, where that which is incompatible with the incausabile would be ex se. Hence it too would be incausabile, and so neither incausabile could exist. Our translation brings out this point.

Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

51

According to this fourth conclusion note a corollary, that that which can be the first efficient is not only that which is prior to others, but that to be prior to which includes a contradiction ; thus, in so far as it is first, it exists. conclusion was proved.

This is proved as the fourth

For in the definition of this there is

especially included the uncausable .

Therefore, if it

can be ,

because it does not contradict being, it can be by itself, and so it is by itself.

Fifth conclusion.

The uncausable is a being which is necessary

of itself. It is proved:

For by excluding every cause different from it-

self, both intrinsic and extrinsic, with regard to its being, of itself it is impossible not to be.

Proof:

Nothing is able not

to be unless something positively or privatively incompatible with it can be, because in any case one of two contradictories is always true.

Nothing incompatible with the uncausable can

be, either positively or privatively, because it would be either of itself or from another; not in the first manner, because then it would be so of itself-from the fourth conclusion- and so incompatibles would exist simultaneously ; and for a like reason neither would be, because you concede by that incompatible that the uncausable does not exist ; and so it follows conversely ; not in the second manner because no effect has more intense or more powerful being from a cause than the uncausable has by itself, because an effect is dependent in its being, whereas the uncausable is not. Also the possibility of the causable to exist does not necessarily posit its actual being, as is the case with the uncausable. However, nothing incompatible with an already existing being can be from a cause, unless it receive from that cause a being more intense or more powerful than is the being of that which is incompatible with it.

52

De Primo Principio

SEXTA CONCLUSIO.

Necessitas

essendi

ex se uni

soli

naturae convenit.

20 Probatur sic:

Si duae naturae possunt esse ex se necesse esse,

communis est necessitas essendi; igitur et aliqua entitas quidditativa secundum quam est eius commune, a qua accipitur quasi genus ipsarum; et praeter hoc distinguuntur formalitatibus suis actualibus ultimis.

Ex hoc sequuntur duo incompossibilia: primum, quod utrumque erit primo necesse esse per naturam communem, quae est minoris actualitatis, et non per naturam distinguentem, quae est maioris actualitatis; quia et si per illam formaliter sit necesse esse, ergo bis erit necesse esse, quia illa formaliter non includit naturam Videtur autem imposcommunem , sicut nec differentia genus. sibile quod minor actualitas sit qua primo aliquid est necessarium, et maiore nec primo nec per se sit aliquid necessarium .

Secundum impossibile est quod per naturam communem , qua ponitur utrumque esse primo necesse esse, neutrum sit necesse esse, quia neutrum est sufficienter per illam naturam.

Quaelibet

enim natura est illud quod est, per formale ultimum.

Per quod

autem aliquid est necesse esse, per illud ipsum est in effectu, circumscripto omni alio.

Si dicas naturam communem sufficere ad esse praeter naturas distinctas,21 igitur ipsa communis ex se est in actu et indistincta, et per consequens indistinguibilis, quia necesse esse iam existens non est in potentia ad simpliciter esse; esse generis in specie est simpliciter esse respectu eius.

20 necesse esse/necessariae- MaCO₁0304 (also Mueller's text ) . 21 distinctivas-MaO,O3O4 ( also Mueller's text) .

Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

53

The necessity of being of itself belongs to

Sixth conclusion. only one nature.

It is proved thus:

If two natures can be necessary of them-

selves, their necessity of being is common; therefore also some quidditative entity according to which the necessity is common to them and from which is taken, as it were, their genus; and besides this they formalities.

are

distinguished

by their

ultimate

actual

From this there follow two incompatibles. First, each will be a necessary being first of all through the common nature, which is of lesser actuality, and not through the distinguishing nature, which is of greater actuality.

For if it is formally a necessary

being through that distinguishing nature also, then it will be a necessary being twice, because that distinguishing nature does not formally include the common nature, just as a difference does not include the genus.

However, it seems impossible that

a lesser actuality is that by which something is first of all necessary, and that by a greater actuality it is necessary neither first of all nor per se.

The second impossible consequence is that through the common nature, by which it is posited that each is first of all a necessary being, neither one is a necessary being, because neither is sufficiently through that nature. For every nature is what it is through the ultimate formal element. However, through whatever something is a necessary being, through that same element it is in effect, regardless of every other thing.

If you say that the common nature suffices for its being, besides the distinct natures, then it follows that that common nature itself is of itself actual and not distinguished, and consequently cannot be distinguished, because the necessary being already existing is not in potency to being in an unqualified sense; the being of a genus in a species is simply being with regard to it.

54

De Primo Principio

Item:

Duae naturae sub eodem communi non habent gradum

aequalem. Probatur per differentias dividentes genus ; si sunt inaequales, ergo et esse unius erit perfectius esse alterius; nullum esse perfectius ipso necesse esse ex se.

Item:

Si duae naturae essent ex se necesse

esse,22 nullam

dependentiam haberet una ad aliam in essendo; ergo nec aliquem ordinem essentialem; igitur alterum nihil esset huius universi, quia nihil est in universo, quod non habet essentialem ordinem inter entia, quia ab ordine partium est unitas universi.

Hic instatur: quia utrumque habet ordinem eminentiae ad Alterum ad Contra: partes universi, ille sufficit ad unitatem. alterum nec illum ordinem habet, quia eminentioris naturae est perfectius esse; nullum perfectius ipso necesse esse ex se. Alterum etiam

nullum

ordinem habet

ad partes universi ;

tamen

quia

unius universi est unus ordo, unus ordo est ad unum primum. Probatio:

quia

ad

duas

naturas

primas,

si

ponantur,

natura

proxima primae non habet unicum ordinem aut unicam dependentiam, sed duas, sicut sunt duo termini ad quem, et ita de qualibet natura inferiori; igitur sic in toto universo erunt duo ordines primi, et ita duo universa ; vel tantum ad unum necesse esse erit ordo, ad aliud nullus.

Tamen, quia rationabiliter23 procedendo nihil videtur ponendum in universo nisi cuius apparet aliqua necessitas, cuius entitatem ostendit ordo aliquis ad alia manifeste entia, quia plura non sunt ponenda sine necessitate-ex 1 ° Physicorum24-necesse esse ostenditur in universo ex incausabili ; et illud ex primo causante, et illud ex causatis. Nulla necessitas apparet ex causatis, ponendi plures naturas primas causantes; imo est impossibile, ut ostendetur infra, conclusione

decimaquinta

huius

tertii;

igitur

nec

est

necesse

22 necesse esse/necessariae-MaO₁ (also Mueller's text) . 23 Mueller's text has rationaliter. It is very difficult to judge from the abbreviated spelling of this word in the manuscripts which word is intended. There is only a shade of difference, however, in their meaning. A has clearly rationabiliter. Ma has rationaliter. V₁1 has rationandum. The rest are doubtful. 24 Phys., Bk. I, ch. 4 ( 188a 17-18) .

55

Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

Besides, two natures under the same common class are not of the same degree.

This is proved through the differences

dividing a genus; if they are unequal, then the being of one will be more perfect than the being of the other; no being is more perfect than a being which is necessary of itself. Moreover, if two natures were necessary of themselves, one would have no dependence upon the other in being; consequently neither would it have any essential order to the other. Therefore one of them would be nothing of this universe, for there is nothing in the universe which does not have an essential order among beings, because the unity of the universe derives from the order of the parts. Here it is objected that because each has an order of eminence to the parts of the universe, that order suffices for unity. this objection:

Against

The one does not have that order to the other,

because the more perfect being is of a more eminent nature; but none is more perfect than that very being which is necessary of itself.

Likewise, one of them has no order to the parts

of the universe; because of one universe there is one order, there is one order to one first .

The proof : To two first natures, if

they are posited, the nature next to the first does not have only one order or only one dependence, but two, as there are two termini ad quem, and so with regard to every lower nature . Therefore, there will accordingly be in the whole universe two first orders, and so two universes, or there will be an order to only one necessary being and no order to the other. reasonably

However, because in proceeding

it

seems that

nothing must be posited in the universe unless some necessity for it is apparent and some order towards other beings manifestly shows its entity, since plural beings are not to be posited without necessity-from the first book of the Physics-a necessary being is shown in the universe from the uncausable; and that (viz., the uncausable) is shown from the first being causing, and that, in turn, is shown from the effects.

It is not apparent from the

effects that there is a necessity of positing more than one first nature causing; nay, it is impossible, as will be shown later in Therefore it is the fifteenth conclusion of this third chapter.

56

ponere

De Primo Principio

plura

secundum

naturam incausata

nec

necesse

esse ;

igitur rationabiliter25 non ponuntur . Iuxta quatuor conclusiones primas huius capituli de effectivo propono quatuor similes de causa finali, quae etiam similiter ostenduntur. Prima est:

SEPTIMA finitiva. Probatur:

CONCLUSIO:

Aliquid

Aliqua

est finibile.

est

natura

Probatio :

quia

in

entibus

aliquid

est

effectibile-ex probatione primae huius; igitur et finibile. Consequentia patet ex quarta secundi. Hoc est manifestius de ordine essentiali -ex decimasexta secundi-quam fuit de effectivo .

OCTAVA CONCLUSIO:

Aliquod finitivum est simpliciter

primum; hoc est, nec ad aliud ordinabile, nec in virtute alterius natum finire alia. Probatur huius tertii.

quinque probatiohibus

similibus illis ad secundam

NONA CONCLUSIO: Primum finitivum est incausabile. Probatur:

quia infinibile; alias non primum; et26 ultra, igitur

ineffectible ex quarta secundi ; tertiae conclusionis huius tertii.

ultra,

ut

supra

in

probatione

25 rationaliter-O₁O,MuPTV₁R. 26 Mueller's text has ut instead of et. Since et ultra is a common expression in Scotus, and since Mueller mentions no variants, we can only conclude that his use of ut is the result of a printing error. All seven of the manuscripts we have used clearly have et.

Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

57

not necessary to posit more than one uncaused or necessary being according to the nature.

Consequently with reason they are not

posited. According to the first four conclusions of this chapter concerning the possible efficient cause, I submit four similar conclusions about a final cause, and these conclusions will be shown in a similar manner .

The first is:

Seventh conclusion. It is possible that among beings there is some nature which is an end. It is proved:

It is possible that there is something which is

ordered to an end.

Proof:

It is possible that there is something

which is effected-from the proof of the first conclusion of this chapter; therefore, it is also possible that there is something which is ordered to an end.

The consequence is evident from the

fourth conclusion of the second chapter.

This is more manifest

with regard to the essential order-from the sixteenth conclusion of the second chapter-than it was with regard to the possible efficient.

Eighth conclusion.

It is possible that something which is an

end is simply first; that is, it is not possible that it is ordered to another or that it is fit to be an end for others in virtue of another. It is proved by five proofs similar to those of the second conclusion of this third chapter.

Ninth conclusion.

It is possible that the first end is uncausable.

It is proved: because it cannot be ordered to an end; otherwise it would not be first; and further, it is therefore ineffectible -from the fourth conclusion of the second chapter; further, as above in the proof of the third conclusion of this third chapter.

58

De Primo Principio

DECIMA CONCLUSIO.

Primum finitivum est actu existens,

et alicui naturae actu existenti convenit ista primitas. Probatur ut quarta tertii. impossibile est prius esse. dictae. Conclusionibus

Corollarium:

Est ita primum quod

Probatur ut corollarium quartae prae-

quatuor

de

utroque

ordine

causalitatis

ex-

trinsecae iam positis, similes quatuor propono de ordine eminentiae. Prima talis :

UNDECIMA excedens.

CONCLUSIO. In

naturis

entium

aliqua

est

Probatur: aliqua est finita-ex septima huius; ergo et excessaex decimasexta secundi.

DUODECIMA CONCLUSIO:

Aliqua natura eminens est

simpliciter prima secundum perfectionem.

Hoc27 patet-ordo essentialis;28 secundum Aristotelem formae se habent ut numeri, 8 ° Metaphysicae.29 In hoc ordine statur; probatur illis quinque probationibus positis ad secundam.

DECIMA

TERTIA

CONCLUSIO.

Suprema

natura

est

incausabilis. Probatur:

Est infinibilis -ex decimasexta secundi ; ergo ineffecti-

bilis-ex quarta eiusdem; et cetera,30 ut supra in probatione tertiae huius.

Item: quod suprema sit ineffectibilis probatur ex B, in

probatione secundae huius; nam omne effectibile habet aliquam causam essentialiter ordinatam.

27 Mueller has hic-and attributes hic to MaWO₁O2O3O4C. Of the seven manuscripts we have read, only O2 has hic. The other six, MaMuTV , AR, have boc. 28 ordo essentialis/ex ordine essentiali-MuPAR. 29 Metaph., Bk. 8, ch. 3 ( 1043 b 33-1044 a 14) . Mueller again gives only a parallel text-Metaph., Bk. 5 , ch. 6 ( 1016 b 36) . 30 etiam-CO₂TV₁R.

Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

Tenth conclusion.

59

The first end in the possible order is

actually existing, and this primacy belongs to some nature actually existing.⁹ It is proved in the same manner as the fourth conclusion of the third chapter.

Corollary :

It is so first that a prior being is

impossible. This is proved in the same manner as the corollary of the aforesaid fourth conclusion. Having posited four conclusions about each order of extrinsic of

causality, I submit four like conclusions about the order eminence.

The first such conclusion is this:

Among the natures of beings some one

Eleventh conclusion. excels.

It is proved:

Some nature is ordered to an end-from the

seventh conclusion of this chapter ; therefore it is also surpassed -from the sixteenth conclusion of the second chapter. Twelfth conclusion .

Some eminent nature is simply first ac-

cording to perfection. This is evident from the essential order ;10 according to Aristotle forms are like numbers-from the eighth book of the Metaphysics. In this order there is a stop; this is proved by those five proofs posited in the second conclusion.

Thirteenth conclusion .

The supreme nature is uncausable.

This is proved: It is not possible that it is ordered to an end -from the sixteenth conclusion of the second chapter. Consequently it is ineffectible-from the fourth conclusion of the same chapter; and for the rest, as above in the proof of the third conclusion of this chapter.

Besides: That the supreme nature is

ineffectible is proved from B, in the proof of the second conclusion of this chapter ; for every possible effect has some essentially ordered cause .

9 Confer note 8, page 49. 10 Another reading, that of Mueller, could be translated: order is evident."-Hic patet ordo essentialis.

"Here the essential

60 DECIMA

De Primo Principio QUARTA CONCLUSIO.

Suprema

natura

est

aliqua actu existens.

Probatur ut quarta huius.

Corollarium:

Ipsa aliquam

esse

perfectiorem vel superiorem contradictionem includit; probatur ut corollarium quartae praedictae.

DECIMA QUINTA CONCLUSIO.

Alicui unicae et eidem

naturae actu existenti, inest triplex primitas in triplici ordine essentiali praedicto, scilicet, efficientiae, finis, et eminentiae.

Haec decimaquinta fructus est huius capituli. Sequitur evidenter ex ostensis sic : Si unicae naturae inest necesse esse ex se-ex sexta huius-et cui inest primitas quaecumque dictarum trium, illud est necesse esse ex se-ex quinta et tertia de una primitate, et ex quinta et nona de alia primitate, et ex quinta et decimatertia de tertia primitate-igitur unicae naturae inest quaecumque primitas pradicta, cui etiam naturae inest una et alia; quia quaelibet alicui naturae inest actu-ex quarta et decima et decimaquarta

et non alii et alii naturae; igitur eidem.

Probatur minor, quia tunc multae naturae essent necesse esseex secunda argumenti iam facti.

Item:

Probatur propositum per

incausabile, quia illud est unicum primum; quodlibet dictum est incausabile ; quare, etc. Quomodo multitudo Maior probatur: erit a se?

Ista conclusio est valde praegnans ; nam sex continet in virtute, tres de unitate naturae cui inest quaecumque primitas praedicta, et tres de identitate naturae sic primae ad naturam sic primam comparando

invicem

primitates.

Et

haec

sextam solam, quasi maiorem ostensa est.

ita

praegnans

per

Expedit ad sex con-

61 Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

Fourteenth conclusion.

The supreme nature is some nature

actually existing. It is proved in the same manner as the fourth conclusion of this chapter. Corollary: For any nature to be more perfect or higher than the supreme nature includes a contradiction . This is proved in the same manner as the corollary of the aforesaid fourth conclusion. Fifteenth conclusion.

To some one

and the same nature

actually existing, there belongs the three-fold primacy in the three-fold order previously mentioned, namely, of efficiency , end, and eminence. This fifteenth conclusion is the fruit of this chapter.

It follows

evidently from the conclusions shown, in this manner: If a being which is necessary of itself belongs to only one nature-from the sixth conclusion of this chapter-and if that is a being necessary of itself to which every primacy of the aforementioned three conclusions belongs-from the fifth and the third conclusions with reference to one primacy, and from the fifth and the ninth with reference to the second primacy, and from the fifth and the thirteenth with reference to the third primacy-then every aforesaid primacy belongs to that unique nature to which the others also belong. For every primacy belongs actually to some nature-from the fourth and tenth and fourteenth conclusionsand not to different natures; consequently, to the same nature . The Minor is proved : because then many natures would be necessary beings, from the second proposition of the argument already made. The argument is likewise proved through the uncausable, because that is the one and only first; every one of the above-mentioned is uncausable ; therefore, etc. is proved:

The Major

How will a multitude be from itself?

This conclusion is very weighty.

For it contains six con-

clusions virtually, three about the unity of the nature to which every aforesaid primacy belongs, and three about the identity of the nature thus first with the nature similarly first by a comparison of the primacies with one another. And this so weighty conclusion has been shown through the sixth alone as through a

62

De Primo Principio

clusiones iam dictas proprias maiores exprimere , si quae poterunt inveniri. Ad duas primas conclusiones ostendendas praemitto unam conclusionem : 31

DECIMA SEXTA CONCLUSIO:

Impossibile est idem ad

duo essentialiter dependere, ad quorum utrumque eius dependentia totaliter terminatur. Haec probatur : Sicut una causa totali causante aliquid in aliquo genere causae, impossibile est aliam causare idem in eodem genere, quia tunc idem bis causaretur vel neutra esset

causa

totalis-similiter tunc illud causaret, quo non causante nihilominus esset

causatum,

quod

est

absurdum-ita

impossibile

est

idem

quacumque dependentia dependere a duobus, quorum alterum totam eius dependentiam terminat. Iam enim alterum non sufficienter terminat, si adhuc ad reliquum dependet. Similiter tunc dependeret ad aliquid, quo non existente, nihilominus esset secundum eundem ordinem essendi ; quod est contra rationem dependentiae, intelligendo eundem ordinem.

quod

nihilominus

esset

secundum

Hac conclusione ostensa, nunc et primas in decimaquinta simul inclusas propono sic: DECIMA SEPTIMA CONCLUSIO .

Uni soli naturae inest

quaecumque primitas causae extrinsecae unius rationis.

Probatur:

quia si pluribus insit talis primitas, aut respectu

eorumdem posteriorum, aut aliorum; non primo modo-ex decimasexta iam praemissa; similiter in quolibet posteriore essent duae dependentiae eiusdem rationis, quia ad duo prima non est una dependentia.

Consequens est inconveniens.

secundo modo, ) 32 quia si sit aliud³

(Nec potest poni

primum et aliorum,

erit

illorum aliud universum, quia entia illa et ista nec ordinabuntur 31 talem add. MaWCO4 (also Mueller's text) . 32 Only the two latest manuscripts, AR, have this parenthesis, and it does not seem to have been in the original. However, we are convinced that it makes clear what Scotus wished to say, and that without it ( as in Mueller's text) the meaning and logical construction of the paragraph is lost. 33 ad- MaCO OPT.

Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

63

quasi-Major. It is helpful for the six conclusions already mentioned to express proper Majors, if these can be found. To show forth the first two conclusions I offer as premise one conclusion:

Sixteenth conclusion .

It is impossible for the same being to

depend essentially upon two, by both of which its dependence is totally terminated. This is proved: Just as with one total cause causing something in some genus of cause it is impossible for another to cause the same thing in the same genus, because then the same would be caused twice or neither would be the total cause-similarly then that would cause, without the causing of which there would nevertheless be an effect, but this is absurd-so it is impossible for the same being to depend by any dependence upon two, one of which terminates its total dependence .

For one does not now

sufficiently terminate, if the dependent still depends upon the remaining one. Similarly then it would depend upon something without the existence of which it would nevertheless be in the same order of being. This is against the meaning of dependence, however, to understand that it would nevertheless be in the same order. Having shown forth this conclusion, I now submit also the first ones included together in the fifteenth conclusion thus:

Seventeenth conclusion:

Every primacy of extrinsic cause of

one type belongs to only one nature. It is proved:

If such a primacy belongs to more than one,

it belongs to them either with reference to the same posteriors or with reference to different posteriors; not in the first manner -from the sixteenth conclusion just set forth; similarly in every posterior there would be two dependences of the same type, because there is not one dependence upon two first beings. consequent is inconvenient.

The

It cannot be posited in the second

manner because if there is another first also of other posteriors, there will be another universe of them, because those beings and

64

De Primo Principio

inter se nec ad idem.

Sine

unitate

ordinis

non

est

unitas

universi. In ipso fine uno ponit Aristoteles bonitatem principalem universi. Et quia ad unum summum est unus ordo, sufficit mihi loqui de solo universo, non fingere aliud de quo nullam habeo rationem, imo potius obviantem. Item:

Probationes probabiles apponuntur.

In ordine essentiali

ascendendo itur ad unitatem et paucitatem; igitur statur in uno. Item: Causalitas causae superioris ad plura se extendit ; ideo quanto superius itur, pauciora sufficiunt; ergo, etc.

Haec declarat

proximam. Item:

De

impossibile

primo

est

duas

eminente35 naturas

esse

videtur

manifestum,

non sic

ordinatas,

quia

si

quarum

scilicet una aliam non excedat-quia in hoc numeris comparanturmulto impossibilius est duas esse in eodem gradu primo. Item de fine:

Tunc nullus finis esset omnis alterius

a se

quietativus; cum hoc sit inintelligibile, sequitur ut prius. Item:

Alias nulla natura contineret perfectionem omnis alterius

naturae virtualiter; cum igitur hoc sit inintelligibile

sine con-

tradictione, nulla esset perfectissima.

Ad tres alias conclusiones sunt probationes etiam speciales. Nam:

DUODEVIGESIMA CONCLUSIO. actualissimum

quia

Primum effectivum est

virtualiter

continens omnem actualitatem possibilem. Primus finis est optimus, virtualiter continens omnem bonitatem possibilem . Primum eminens est perfectissimum, eminenter continens omnem perfectionem possibilem . 34 Metaph., Bk. 12, ch. 10 ( 1075 a 11-1076 a 6 ) . 35 eminentiae -WO₁MuPTV₁ . 36 non intelligibile -020304C . This reading gives the same sense as our text. intelligibile-MaWO₁PT (also Mueller's text) . This gives a meaning which is the opposite of ours and which would seem to destroy the logical arrangement and wording of these conclusions .

Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

65

the former ones will not be ordered to one another nor to the same first. universe.

Without unity of order there is no unity of the Aristotle places the principal goodness of the universe

in the one end.

And because there is one order to one highest

it suffices for me to speak of this universe alone and not to fashion another for which I have no reason, nay rather an opposing reason. In addition:

Probable proofs are added .

In the essential order

an ascent is made toward unity and fewness.

Therefore there is

a stop in one.

Again: one.

The causality of a higher cause extends to more than

Therefore as one goes higher, fewer things suffice .

fore, etc. Again:

There-

This proof clarifies the previous one. With regard to the first eminent it seems manifest that

if it is impossible for two natures not to be ordered thus, of which the one does not exceed the other-because in this they are compared to numbers-much more impossible is it for two natures to be in the same first degree. Likewise about the end:

Then no end would be able to

give rest to everything different from itself; since this is unintelligible, it follows as before.

Finally: Otherwise no nature would contain virtually the perfection of every other nature ; since, therefore, this is unintelligible without a contradiction,

no nature would be the

most perfect.

For the three other conclusions there are also special proofs. For:

Eighteenth conclusion:

The first efficient in the possible order

is completely actual because it virtually contains every possible actuality. The first end is the best, virtually containing every possible goodness.

The first eminent is most perfect, eminently

containing every possible perfection.

66

De Primo Principio

Haec tria non possunt separari, quia si unum esset in una natura, aliud in alia, quod illorum simpliciter emineret non posset dari. Unde istae tres primitates videntur exprimere tres rationes summae bonitatis necessario concurrentes, quae sunt summa communicabilitas, summa amabilitas, et summa integritas sive totalitas ; bonum enim et perfectum idem-5 ° Metaphysicae;37 et perfectum et totum idem-3 ° Physicorum.38 appetibile-1 °

Ethicorum³ -et

nam 6° Metaphysicae.40

Nihil

Patet autem de bono, quod est communicativum-per

Avicen-

enim perfecte communicat, nisi

quod ex liberalitate communicat, quod vere convenit summo bono, quia ex communicatione

non expectat aliquam retributionem, 43 quod est proprium liberalis-per Avicennam ibidem¹2 capitulo 5 ° .

UNDEVIGESIMA CONCLUSIO.

Unica natura existens est

prima in triplici ordine praedicto , respectu cuiuscumque alterius naturae, ita quod quaelibet alia est sic tripliciter posterior illa prima. Posset quis protervus tenendo decimamquintam dicere quod praeter illam sunt multae naturae, non quidem sic primae, sed nec posteriores illa Prima** secundum aliquem ordinum

prae-

dictorum, aut non secundum quemlibet, sed tantum eminentiae, vel eminentiae et finis; non quidem efficientiae, sicut quidam dicunt

Aristotelem

sensisse

fortassis de materia prima.

de

Intelligentiis

post

Primam,

et

Hoclicet posset refelli ex praedictis,

tamen expedit explanari. Primo quidem improbatur ex sexta ; quia si necesse esse ex se uni

naturae

inest,

quidquid

autem

non

est

posterius-et

hoc

negando in quocumque trium ordinum-est necesse esse ex se; ergo unica natura non est posterior qualibet posterioritate; igitur Secunda propositio sic tripliciter quaelibet alia est posterior. 37 Metaph., Bk. 5 , ch. 16 ( 1021 b 18-20 ) . 38 Phys., Bk. 3, ch. 6 ( 207 a 13-14) . 39 Nicom. Ethics, Bk. 1 , ch. 1 ( 1094 a 3) . 40 Avicenna, Metaph., 6, c. 5 435. 41 nullum-WCOMuPV₁AR. 42 Mueller's text has ibi, which he also attributes to MaO1O4C. 43 Avicenna, Metaph., 6, c. 5 424. 44 From here on we shall capitalize all such references to God.

Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

67

These three cannot be separated , because if one were in one nature and another in another nature, it could not be given that one

of them would be simply eminent.

Hence these three

primacies seem to express three attributes of the highest goodness, necessarily concurring; these are the highest communicability, the highest amiability, and the highest integrity or totality .

For

"good" and "complete " are the same-from the fifth book of the Metaphysics; and "complete" and "whole" are the same-from the third book of the Physics.

However, it is evident of “good” that

it is desirable-from the first book of the (Nicomachean ) Ethics -and capable of sharing-from Avicenna in the sixth book of the Metaphysics.

For nothing perfectly shares unless it shares

out of liberality, and this truly belongs to the highest good, because from its sharing it does not look for any reward; and this is properly liberal-from Avicenna in the same book, chapter five. Nineteenth conclusion .

Only one existing nature is first in the

aforementioned three-fold order, with respect to every other nature, so that every other nature is thus posterior to that first nature in a three-fold way. Some hair-splitting philosopher in holding the fifteenth conclusion could say that besides that nature there are many natures, not indeed first in the same way, but not posterior to that First Nature¹¹ according to one of the aforesaid orders, or not according to every order, but only that of eminence, or of eminence and end; not indeed of efficiency, as certain ones say that Aristotle felt with reference to the Intelligences following after the First Nature, and perhaps with reference to prime matter. Although this could be refuted from what has been said previously, nevertheless, it is helpful that it be explained. In the first place it is certainly disproved by reason of the For if a being which is necessary of itself sixth conclusion. belongs to one nature, and whatever is not posterior-and this denial refers to every one of the three orders-is a being which is necessary of itself, then a unique nature is not posterior by Consequently every other nature is any kind of posteriority. 11 From here on we shall capitalize all such references to God.

De Primo Principio

68

argumenti patet-ex tertia, nona tertii; adiunge cuilibet sextam huius.

huius

Secundo probatur in speciali :

et

decimatertia

huius

Quod non est finis nec ad finem

aliquem, est frustra; in entibus nihil est frustra; igitur quaelibet natura alia a Primo Fine est ad aliquem finem; et si ad aliquem, ergo ad Primum-ex tertia secundi.

Similiter de eminente:

Quod non est Supremum nec excessum

ab aliquo, nullum gradum habet; sic nihil est; igitur omne quod non est Supremum est excessum ab aliquo ; igitur a Supremo - ex tertia secundi.

Ex his ostenditur de efficientia, quae negatur:

Quidlibet est

Finis Primus vel finitum-iam supra; ergo est Primum Efficiens vel effectum, nam membra huius disiuncti convertuntur cum membris illius de posterioritate. Patet ex quarta et quinta secundi. 45 Primo patet ex proxima praecedente .

Similiter per eminentiam:

Si quidlibet

est

De

Supremum vel

excessum a Supremo, ergo Primum Efficiens vel effectum, quia et haec membra convertuntur-ex paenultima et ultima secundi et decimaquinta huius tertii. Positio etiam alicuius entis nullum ordinem habentis irrationalis est valde , sicut in secunda ratione ad sextam et in probatione decimae septimae huius aliqualiter est ostensum. 45 prima-WMuPTV₁AR.

Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

69

thus posterior in a three-fold way. The second proposition of this argument is evident-from the third, ninth, and thirteenth conclusions of this third chapter. this chapter to each.

Join the sixth conclusion of

Secondly it is proved in a special way:

What is not an end

nor ordered to some end, is in vain. Among beings nothing is in vain. Therefore every nature different from the First End is ordered to some end; and if to some end, therefore to the First End-from the third conclusion of the second chapter.

Similarly with regard to the eminent:

What is

not the

Supreme Being nor exceeded by some one, has no degree; so it Therefore everything which is not the Supreme is nothing. Being is exceeded by some one; consequently, by the Supreme Being-from the third conclusion of the second chapter.

From these it is shown with regard to efficiency, which is denied.

Everything is the First End or is ordered to an end, as

already shown above; therefore everything is the First Efficient or an effect; for the members of this disjunct are replaced with the members of that other with regard to posteriority. It is clear from the fourth and the fifth conclusions of the second chapter.

With regard to the First End it is clear from the

argument immediately preceding.

Similarly through the order of eminence :

If everything is

the Supreme Being or is exceeded by the Supreme Being, then everything is the First Efficient or an effect, because these members also are replaced-from the next to the last and the last conclusions of the second chapter and the thirteenth conclusion of this third chapter.

Moreover the positing of some being

which has no order is exceedingly irrational, as is shown in the second reason of the sixth conclusion and in another way in the proof of the seventeenth conclusion of this chapter.

70

De Primo Principio

Vere, Domine, omnia in sapientia ordinata fecisti, ut cuilibet intellectui rationabile videatur quod omne ens est ordinatum. Unde absurdum fuit philosophantibus ordinem ab aliquo amovere. Ex hac autem universali "omne ens est ordinatum" sequitur quod non omne ens est posterius et non omne prius; quia utroque modo vel idem ad se ordinaretur, vel circulus in ordine poneretur. Est ergo aliquod ens prius non posterius, et ita primum; et aliquod posterius et non prius;46 nullum autem quin vel prius vel posterius. Tu es unicum Primum; et omne aliud a te posterius est te, sicut in triplici ordine, ut potui, declaravi.

46 primum-MuPTV₁AR.

Three-fold Primacy in the First Principle

71

Truly, O Lord, Thou hast made all things ordered in wisdom, so that it seems reasonable to every intellect that every being is ordered.

Hence it was absurd for the philosophers to take away

order from some being.

But then from this universal "every

being is ordered" it follows that not every being is posterior and not every being prior; because in both ways either the same would be ordered to itself or a circle would be posited in order. There is, therefore, some being prior, not posterior, and so first ; and some being posterior and not prior, but nothing without being either prior or posterior .

Thou art the unique First; and

everything different from Thee is posterior to Thee in the threefold order, as I have declared according to my ability.

CAPITULUM QUARTUM

De simplicitate et infinitate et intellectualitate Primi Entis. Domine Deus noster, de tua natura unica, vere prima, vellem perfectiones quas inesse non dubito, aliqualiter ostendere, si faveres. Credo te simplicem, infinitum, sapientem et volentem; et quia nollem uti circulo in probando, de simplicitate quaedam praemittam, quae possunt primo probari ; alia de simplicitate usque ad suum locum, ubi probari possunt, differam. Est igitur huius quarti capituli haec prima conclusio ostendenda :

PRIMA CONCLUSIO:

Prima Natura in se est simplex.

In se, dixi, quia tantum de simplicitate essentiali intelligo hic, quae excludit omnem compositionem in essentia absolute. Hoc probatur sic: Prima Natura non est causata —ex tertia tertii; igitur non habens partes essentiales, materiam et formam. Item: Nec diversas perfectiones, qualitercumque in re distinctas, habet, ex quibus sumi possit ratio generis et differentiae. Probatur ex prima probatione sextae tertii ; quia, vel altera illarum secundum propriam rationem esset qua totum esset primo necesse esse, et reliqua nec primo nec per se-et tunc, cum reliqua essentialiter includatur in toto, totum non erit necesse esse, quia includit non necessarium formaliter ; aut si utraque realitate esset totum primo necesse esse, esset bis necesse esse et haberet duo esse primo, quorum neutrum essentialiter includeret alterum. Similiter utra72

CHAPTER IV

The simplicity and the infinity and the intellectuality of the First Being. O Lord our God, with regard to Thy unique nature, truly first, I should like with Thy assistance to show forth in some way the perfections which I do not doubt are present therein.

I

believe Thee to be simple, infinite, wise, and endowed with will ; and because I should not like to use a circle in proving, I shall first of all set forth certain things about simplicity, which can be proved first. Other things regarding simplicity I shall keep for their proper place, where they can be proved. Of this fourth chapter then there is this first conclusion to be shown: First conclusion.

The First Nature in itself is simple.

I have said " in itself" because I have an understanding here only of essential simplicity, which absolutely excludes all composition in essence. This is proved as follows:

The First Nature is not caused

-from the third conclusion of the third chapter ; therefore It does not have the essential parts, matter and form. Besides, It does not have different perfections, really distinct in any way, from which may be taken the notion of genus and difference. This is proved from the first proof of the sixth conclusion of the third chapter.

Either the one of those perfections according

to its own proper nature would be that by which the whole would be first of all a necessary being and the remaining perfection would be neither first of all nor per se-and then, since this remaining perfection is essentially included in the whole, the whole will not be a necessary being, because it formally includes what is not necessary ; or if by each of these two realities the whole would be first of all a necessary being, it would be a necessary being twice and would have two beings first, neither of which would essentially include the other. 73

Likewise each

74

De Primo Principio

que esset non¹ utraque, quia non esset unum ex eis,² si utraque primo dat necesse esse. Utraque enim³ erit actualitas ultima, et ita vel nihil idem ex eis vel nulla differentia earum, et ita non utraque.

Corollarium :

Prima Natura non est in genere.

Patet ex ista.

Probatur etiam quia natura in genere tota exprimitur per definitionem, ubi non importatur idem omnino

per

genus

et

dif-

ferentiam, propter nugationem; oppositum in sic simplici invenitur.

Hic instatur:

Si duorum existentium in eodem, altero tantum

potest ipsum esse necessarium, et ita reliquum

non necessarium-

alias esset bis necesse esse-sequitur quod nulla distincta secundum formales rationes possent poni esse in necesse esse; ergo nec in Persona Divina essentia et relatio. Consequens falsum; ideo proSimiliter arguitur contra secundam: quia batio prima peccat. utraque eorum esset actualitas ultima, vel alterum non necessarium .

dis6 tinguuntur, scilicet ut actus et potentia, si sint componibilia, vel ut duo nata actuare idem-tunc si unum est infinitum, potest includere per identitatem aliud , imo includit ; alias infinitum esset Respondeo:

Quaecumque secundum

rationes formales

componibile, quod improbatur conclusione nona huius.

Si autem

1in-WMuPTV₁ . 2 et add. WMuPTAR. 3 om. MuPAR. The text of Wadding (Vivès Edition ) which includes the above three variants is as follows: Similiter utraque esset in utraque, quia non esset unum ex eis ; et si utraque primo dat necesse esse, utraque erit actualitas ultima, .... . (The rest of the sentence does not vary .) 4 reliquo-CO ,MuP. This gives a slightly different but equally correct meaning. It also gives a better form to the Latin sentence, reliquo balancing and being contrasted with altero. However, because of its weaker support from the manuscripts, we leave it as a variant reading. 5 si sint/et sic. MuPA. 6 • scilicet ut ... /si sint compossibilia-ut actus et potentia MaCO2O4 (also Mueller's text) . 7 om. MuPTV₁

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

75

reality would not be the other, because there would not be one from them if each reality first gives necessary being. For each will be the ultimate actuality,' and so there will be either nothing the same from them or no difference between them, and so there will not be two of these realities. Corollary:

The First Nature does not fall under a genus.

It

is evident from this preceding argument. It is proved also because the nature which falls under a genus is wholly expressed through the definition, whereas something not altogether the same is expressed through the genus and through the difference; otherwise there would be useless repetition .

The opposite is found in

a nature which is simple in this manner. Here it is objected:

If a being can be necessary by only one

of two realities existing in that same being-and so the other reality is not necessary ;

otherwise it would be a necessary being

twice-it follows that no realities which are distinct according to their formal rationes could be placed in a necessary being. Therefore essence and relation are not in a Divine Person. The consequent is false.

Therefore the first proof is erroneous.

is similarly argued against the second proof.

It

Each of them

would be the ultimate actuality, or one would not be necessary.

I answer:

Whatever entities are distinguished according to

their formal rationes, if they are compatible, namely as act and potency or as two fit to actuate the same being-then if one is infinite, it can include the other through identity, nay, it does include; otherwise the infinite would be able to be compounded, and this is disproved by the ninth conclusion of this chapter .

If,

1 The variant reading of this sentence can be translated thus : "Likewise each reality would be in the other, because there would not be one from them, and if each reality first gives necessary being, each will be the ultimate actuality," etc. Confer text. 2 According to a variant reading (confer text) this would read : “and so not necessary by the other reality," 3 It is impossible to translate rationes adequately by one English word whenever it is qualified by formales. Perhaps the best single corresponding word would be "meaning" or "definition." However, these terms would bring out only the logical character and not the real basis, which is emphasized here. For here the rationes formales point also and more especially to the realitates considered as act and potency in the real entity.

76

De Primo Principio

sit finitum, non includit per identitatem illud quod est primo diversum secundum suam formalem rationem, quia finitum tale est perfectibile illo vel componibile cum illo . Ergo ponendo necesse esse habere duas realitates, quarum neutra per identitatem contineat aliam-quod requiritur ad compositionem-sequitur quod altera non erit necesse esse, nec formaliter nec per identitatem, vel totum erit bis necesse esse; et ita tenet probatio utraque. Instantiae de Persona Divina nullae sunt, quia illae duae realitates non faciunt compositionem; sed una est alia per identitatem quia una est infinita.

Quod si obiicias: Ita dicam in proposito quod est compositio et duae realitates in necesse esse, sed altera est infinita-contra9 dicis tibi dupliciter: primo, quia infinitum est incomponibile ut pars alteri realitati, quia pars minor toto ; secundo, quia si ponis compositionem, neutra realitas est alia per identitatem, et tunc currit probatio utraque .

SECUNDA CONCLUSIO.

Quidquid est intrinsecum Sum-

mae Naturae, est summe tale. Probatur:

quia-ex

proxima-est

idem

omnino

illi

naturae

propter simplicitatem; ergo sicut illa natura est summe natura, ita illud est summe tale quia idem est ; alias, si posset intelligi excedi secundum suam entitatem, ergo et natura posset intelligi excedi secundum suam entitatem, quae eadem est entitati illius.

TERTIA CONCLUSIO. Omnis perfectio simpliciter, et in summo, inest necessario Naturae Summae. Perfectio simpliciter dicitur, quae in quolibet est melius ipsum, quam non ipsum. Haec descriptio videtur nulla, quia si intel8 contradicit-WO4MuPTV₁ ; contradico-C. 9 dupliciter: primo/secunda probatio-WMuTV₁ ; secunda propositio-P

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

77

however, it is finite, it does not include through identity that which is first of all diverse according to its formal ratio, because such a finite is perfectible by it or capable of being compounded with it. Therefore by positing that a necessary being has two realities, neither of which contains the other through identitywhich condition is required for composition-it follows that one reality will not be a necessary being either formally or through identity, or the whole will be a necessary being twice; and so both proofs hold. The instances about the Divine Person are not real instances, because those two realities do not make a composition ; but one is the other through identity because one is infinite. But if you object:

"Thus I shall say in our case that there is

a composition and two realities in the necessary being, but one is infinite," you contradict yourself in a two-fold way: first, because the infinite is not capable of being compounded as a part with the other reality, since the part is less than the whole ; secondly, because if you posit composition, neither reality is the other through identity, and then both proofs are true . Second

conclusion .

Whatever is intrinsic to the Highest

Nature is such in the highest degree. This is proved: because-from the last conclusion - it is altogether identical with that Nature because of that Nature's simplicity.

Consequently, as that Nature is a nature in the

highest degree, so anything intrinsic is such in the highest degree because it is identical with that Nature.

Otherwise, if any-

thing intrinsic could be understood to be exceeded according to its own entity, then the Nature also could be understood to be exceeded according to the Nature's own entity, which is identical with the entity of that which is intrinsic.

Third conclusion.

Every pure perfection is predicated of the Highest Nature as necessarily existing there in the highest degree. That is said to be a pure perfection, which is better in everything than that which is not-it.

78

De Primo Principio

10 ligitur de affirmatione et negatione, ut est in se,¹º affirmatio non est melior sua negatione-in se et in quolibet si in eo posset esse; si autem intelligitur non in se tantum et in quolibet si posset inesse, sed in quolibet simpliciter, falsum est. Non melior est in cane sapientia, quia nihil est bonitas in illo cui contradicit.

Respondeo:

Famosa est descriptio. "

Exponatur sic: "melius

quam non ipsum," id est, quam quodcumque positivum incompossibile in quo includitur " non ipsum".

Est, inquam, sic melius

"in quolibet" -non cuilibet, sed "in quolibet"-quantum esset ex se; quia melius est suo incompossibili , propter quod non potest inesse.

Breviter igitur

dicatur :

Perfectio simpliciter

est,

quae

simpliciter et absolute melius quocumque incompossibili ;

est

et ita

exponatur illud "in quolibet quam non ipsum" , hoc est, quodlibet¹² quod non est ipsum. Alias de illa descriptione non curo; accipio primam, quae plana est.

Et debet intelligi de incompossibilitate

secundum praedicationem muniter sermo .

denominativam,

quia

Probo tertiam conclusionem sic intellectam:

ita

fit

com-

Perfectio simpli-

citer ad omnem incompossibilem aliquem habet ordinem secundum nobilitatem, non excessi-per descriptionem-sed eminentis ; igitur vel est Naturae Supremae incompossibilis et ita excedit eam, vel compossibilis et ita potest illi inesse, et etiam in summo, quia sic est sibi compossibilis, si est alicui compossibilis. Inest sibi sicut est sibi compossibilis.13

Non autem inest ut accidens contingens ;

igitur vel ut idem vel ut propria passio saltem; habetur propositum, quod necessario inest. 10 ut est in se/quae est-MaWO₁ (also Mueller's text ) ; om. CO4. 11 St. Anselm, Monologion, ch. 15 ( PL 158, 162-163 ) . 12 quolibet-MaMu (also Mueller's text ) . 13 Inest sibi . . . . / By a homoioteleuton Ma and T omit this entire sentence. Mueller, no doubt because of his very great preference for Ma, uses the text of these two manuscripts but fails to mention that at least five other manuscripts (O₂MuV₁AR) and probably the other five he used at this point have this sentence. Ma also omits the preceding compossibilis.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

79

This description seems to be of no value because if it is understood of affirmation and negation, as it is in itself, an affirmation is not better than its negation-in itself and in anything, if it could be in it; if, however, it is understood not only in itself and in anything, if it could be in it, but in anything in an unqualified sense, it is false. Wisdom is not better in a dog, because nothing is goodness in that with which it is incompatible.

I answer: pounded thus:

This is a celebrated description.

Let it be ex-

"better than that which is not-it", that is, than

anything positive which is incompatible with it, in which is included "that which is not-it" . It is thus better, I say, "in everything" -not for everything, but "in everything”—as much as it would be of itself; because it is better than its incompatible, on account of which it cannot exist there.

Briefly, then, let it be said that a pure perfection is that which is absolutely and in an unqualified sense better than everything incompatible with it ; and thus let this be expounded: "in everything than that which is not-it", that is, everything which is not itself. For the rest I do not bother about this description ; I accept the first part, which is clear.

And incompatibility should

be understood according to denominative predication, because it is commonly treated in this way.

I prove the third conclusion thus understood. A pure perfection has some order according to nobility towards everything incompatible with it, not of an excessum (viz . , that which is exceeded) —from the description-but of an eminent. Therefore it is either incompatible with the Supreme Nature and hence exceeds It, or compatible and hence can exist there, and also in the highest degree, because thus it is compatible with It if it is compatible with some being. It exists there, as it is compatible with It. However, it does not pertain to It as a contingent accident; therefore either as identical with It, or at least as a proper attribute. The proposed conclusion is reached, that it is necessarily existing there.

De Primo Principio

80

Quod autem non ut accidens per accidens contingenter insit, probo:

quia in omni perfectione cui non repugnat necessitas,

perfectius habet illam quod habet necessario quam quod contingenter.

Perfectioni simpliciter non repugnat necessitas, quia

tunc aliqua incompossibilis sibi excederet eam ut illa quae est necessaria vel potest esse. Nihil autem potest perfectius habere perfectionem simpliciter quam prima natura-ex secunda huius; ergo, etc. Infinitati et caeteris de simplicitate ponendis, praemitto de intellectu et voluntate, quia inferius supponentur. talis est:

QUARTA CONCLUSIO. volens. Ista probatur:

Prima conclusio

Primum Efficiens est intelligens et

Primum est per se agens, quia omni causa per

accidens, prior est aliqua per se, -2 ° Physicorum; ¹

agens per se

omne agit propter finem . Ex hoc arguitur dupliciter.

Primo sic:

Omne naturale agens,

praecise consideratum, ex necessitate et aeque ageret, si ad nullum finem ageret, si esset independenter agens ; ergo si non agit nisi propter finem, hoc est quia dependet ab agente amante finem; quare, etc.

Secundo arguitur sic:

Si Primum agit propter finem, aut ergo

finis ille movet Primum Efficiens ut amatus actu voluntatis, et patet propositum, aut ut naturaliter tantum amatus.

Hoc falsum,

quia non naturaliter amat finem alium a se, ut grave centrum et materia formam; tunc esset aliquo modo ad finem, quia inclinatus ad illum .

Si tantum naturaliter amat finem, qui est ipse, hoc nihil

est nisi ipsum esse ipsum; hoc non est salvare duplicem rationem causae in ipso. 14 Phys., Bk. 2, ch. 6.

( 198 a 7-9) .

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

81

However, I prove that it is not existing there contingently as an accident per accidens, because in every perfection to which necessity of inherence is not repugnant, whatever possesses it necessarily possesses it more perfectly than that which possesses it contingently. Necessity of inherence is not repugnant to a pure perfection, because then something incompatible with it would exceed it, as that which is necessary or can be. Now nothing can possess a pure perfection more perfectly than the First Nature-from the second conclusion of this chapter; therefore, etc. Because infinity and other qualities of simplicity are to be posited, I treat first of the intellect and will, because they will be supposed later on.

The first such conclusion is the following : Fourth conclusion. dowed with will. This is proved:

The First Efficient is intelligent and en-

The first

efficient is an agent by itself,

because any proper cause is prior to every incidental cause,-from the second book of the Physics; every agent by itself acts for the sake of an end. From this it is argued in a two-fold way.

First in this way:

Every natural agent, precisely considered, would act from necessity and in like manner if it were to act for no end, in case it were independently an agent. Therefore if it acts only for the sake of an end, this is because it depends upon an agent loving the end. Therefore, etc.

Secondly, it is argued thus: If the First Efficient acts for the sake of an end, then either that end moves the First Efficient as it (viz., the end) is beloved by an act of the will, and the intended The conclusion is evident, or as it is only naturally loved. latter is false, because the First Efficient does not naturally love an end different from Itself, as something weighty loves the center of the earth and matter loves the form ; for then It would be in some manner ordered to the end because inclined toward it.

If It only naturally loves the end which is Itself,

this is nothing except that Itself is Itself; this will not save the two-fold character of cause in It. 4 Grave refers to a material object such as a stone. Our term gravity, which refers not to the object but to the force, is a later derivative of grave.

82

De Primo Principio

Primum Efficiens dirigit effectum suum ad finem; ergo vel naturaliter vel amando illum; non primo modo, quia non Item:

cognoscens nihil dirigit nisi in virtute cognoscentis; sapientis enim est prima ordinatio ; Primum in nullius virtute dirigit, sicut nec causat.

Item tertio sic:

Aliquid causatur contingenter; ergo Prima

Causa contingenter causat; igitur volens causat. consequentiae:

Probatio primae

Quaelibet causa secunda causat inquantum move-

tur a Prima; ergo si Prima necessario movet, quaelibet necessario movetur et quidlibet necessario causatur. Probatio secundae consequentiae : Nullum est principium contingenter operandi nisi voluntas vel concomitans voluntatem, quia quaelibet alia agit ex necessitate naturae, et ita non contingenter.

Obiicitur contra primam consequentiam quia nostrum velle Philosophus Item: posset adhuc contingenter aliquid causare. concessit antecedens et negavit consequens intelligendo de velle Dei, ponendo contingentiam in inferioribus ex motu, qui necessario causatur inquantum uniformis, sed difformitas sequitur ex partibus eius, et ita contingentia.

Contra secundam : Aliqua mota oppositum contingenter evenire.

Ad primum:

Si

possunt

est Primum Efficiens

impediri

respectu

et

ita

voluntatis

nostrae , idem sequitur de ipsa quod et de aliis ; quia , sive immediate necessario¹5 moveat eam , sive aliud immediate, et illud necessario motum necessario moveat , quia movet ex hoc quod movetur. Tandem proximum necessario movebit voluntatem ; et ita neces15 om. MuPTV₁AR.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being Likewise:

83

The First Efficient directs its effect to an end;

therefore either naturally or by loving that end; not in the first manner, because something which does not know directs nothing except in virtue of something which does know; for the first 5 The First Efficient ordering is characteristic of a wise being. does not direct in virtue of anything else, just as it does not cause in virtue of anything else. Thirdly thus: Something is caused contingently. Therefore Consequently it causes the First Cause causes contingently. freely. The proof of the first consequence: Every second cause causes in so far as it is moved by the First Cause . Consequently if the First moves necessarily, every other cause is moved necessarily and everything is caused necessarily. the second consequence :

The proof of

Nothing is a principle of operating

contingently except the will or something accompanying the will, since every other cause acts from the necessity of nature, and so not contingently. It is objected against the first consequence that our act of Moreover, the will could still cause something contingently. consequent denied the antecedent and conceded the Philosopher in reference to God's act of will, by placing contingency in the things below from motion, which is necessarily caused in so far as it is uniform, but difformity follows from its parts, and so contingency.

It is objected against the second consequence :

Some moved

things can be impeded, and so the opposite can come about contingently . Answer to the first objection :

If there is a First Efficient

with respect to our will, the same follows with reference to our will as applies also to other effects.

For the First Efficient either

immediately moves our will necessarily or It moves another immediately, and that being necessarily moved moves necessarily because it moves from this, that it is moved. Finally a proximate efficient will necessarily move our will, and so it will necessarily will and be willing necessarily.

There follows a further

5 Confer Aristotle, Metaph., Bk. 1 , ch. 2 (982 a 19) .

84

De Primo Principio

sario volet et erit volens necessario.

Sequitur ulterius impossibile,

quod necessario causat quod volendo causat.

Ad secundum :

Non dico hic contingens quodcumque non

est necessarium nec sempiternum, sed cuius oppositum posset fieri quando istud fit. non:

Ideo dixi:

"Aliquid contingenter causatur,"

"Aliquid est contingens."

Modo dico quod Philosophus non potuit consequentiam negare salvando antecedens per motum; quia si ille motus totus¹6 necessario est a causa sua, quaelibet pars eius necessario causatur quando causatur, hoc est, inevitabiliter, ita quod oppositum tunc non posset causari. Et ulterius: Quod causatur per quamcumque partem motus, necessario tunc causatur, id est, inevitabiliter. Vel igitur nihil fit contingenter, id est, evitabiliter, vel Primum sic causat, etiam immediate, quod posset non causare.

Ad tertium:

Si alia causa potest impedire istam, nunc potest

virtute superioris causae¹8 impedire, et sic usque ad primam; quae si immediatam causam sibi necessario movet, in toto ordine usque ad istam impedientem erit necessitas; igitur necessario impediet; 19 igitur tunc non posset alia causa causare contingenter causatum .' Quarto probatur conclusio:

Aliquod malum est in entibus;

igitur Primum contingenter causat; et tunc ut prius. consequentiae :

Agens

ex

necessitate

naturae

agit

Probatio secundum

ultimum potentiae, et ita ad omnem perfectionem possibilem produci ab ipso; igitur si Primum agit necessario et per consequens omne aliud agens-ut iam deductum est-sequitur quod totus ordo causarum causabit in isto quidquid est possibile eius causare in isto; igitur nulla perfectione caret, quae potest ab omnibus causis agentibus induci in ipso; igitur nulla caret, quam potest recipere; igitur non est in ipso aliqua malitia.

Consequentiae

sunt planae: quia omnis perfectio receptibilis in isto est causabilis ab aliquo vel20 ab omnibus causis ordinatis.

Ultima patet ex

ratione mali, et concludit probatio ita de vitio in moribus sicut de peccato in natura.

16 om. MaÓ₁V₁T 1 (also Mueller's text) . 17 in tali MuPTV1. 18 superioris causae/superiorum causarum-WMuPAR. 19 contingenter causatum om. WO¿COAR. 20 et MaWPTV₁ ; om. Mu.

85

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

impossible consequence, that the First Efficient necessarily causes what it causes by willing. Answer to the second:

I do not call contingent here whatever

is not necessary or perpetual, but that the opposite of which could come to be when in fact it comes to be. Therefore I have said,

"Something is caused contingently," and not "Something

is contingent."

Now I say that the Philosopher was not able to

deny the consequence by saving the antecedent through motion; because if that whole motion is from its cause necessarily, every part of it is necessarily caused when it is caused, that is, inevitably, so that the opposite then could not be caused.

Further:

That

which is caused through every part whatsoever of motion is caused then necessarily, that is, inevitably . Either then nothing happens contingently, that is, avoidably, or the First Efficient causes, even immediately, that which It would be able not to cause.

Answer to the third:

If another cause can impede that cause,

it can impede now in virtue of a higher cause, and so up to the First Cause; and if this First Cause necessarily moves a cause immediate to itself, there will be necessity in the whole order even as far as this impeding cause. Therefore it will impede necessarily.

Consequently then, another cause could not contin-

gently cause an effect. The conclusion is proved fourthly:

There is something evil

among beings ; therefore the First Efficient causes contingently; and then as before.

The proof of the consequence :

That which

is an agent from the necessity of its nature acts according to the ultimate of its power and so toward every perfection which can be produced by it.

Therefore if the First Efficient, and

consequently every other agent, acts necessarily-as was already deduced-it follows that the whole order of causes will cause in this universe whatever it is possible for them to cause in it. Therefore the universe lacks no perfection which can be introConsequently there is duced into it by all the causes acting. The consequences are plain, not any evil in the universe. because every perfection that can be received in it is causable by one or by all the ordered causes. The last is evident from the definition of evil, and the proof concludes for a moral fault in the same way as for a sin in nature.

86

De Primo Principio

Dices:

"Materia

non

oboedit."

Nihil

est;

agens

potens

vinceret inoboedentiam.

Haec conclusio quinto probatur, quia omni non vivo vivum est melius, et inter viva omni non intelligente intellectivum est melius.

Hanc conclusionem probant aliqui sexta via ex tertia praeostensa; quia intelligere, velle, sapientia, amor, sunt perfectiones simpliciter, quod supponunt quasi manifestum.

Sed non videtur unde istae magis possunt concludi esse perfectiones simpliciter quam natura primi angeli. Si enim accipias sapientiam denominative, est melior omni denominativo incompossibili, et non probasti quod Primum est sapiens.21 petis.

Dico quod

Tantum potes habere quod sapiens est melior non sapiente,

excluso Primo.

Isto modo primus angelus est melior omni ente

denominative sumpto incompossibili sibi, praeter Deum; imo essentia primi angeli in abstracto potest esse melior simpliciter sapientia.

Dices:

"Repugnat multis; ideo non cuilibet est melius denomi-

native quam oppositum." Respondeo quod nec sapientia est melius cuilibet denominative; repugnat multis.

Dices:

"Imo esset cuilibet,22 si posset inesse, quia cani esset

melius, si canis esset sapiens." Respondeo: Ita de primo angelo, si posset esse canis, esset melior, et cani esset melius, si posset esse primus angelus.

Dices:

"Imo illud destruit naturam canis; igitur non est bonum

cani."

Respondeo: Ita sapiens destruit eius naturam. Non est differentia, nisi quod angelus destruit ut natura eiusdem generis, 21 Et si accipias add. MuPAR quod Deus est sapiens add. MuP. 22 optima add. MuPAR.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

You will say:

"Matter does not obey."

87

This is of no avail;

a powerful agent would conquer disobedience. This conclusion is proved fifthly, because a living thing is better than every non-living thing, and among living things an intellective one is better than every non-intelligent one. Some prove this conclusion in a sixth way from the third conclusion previously shown, since they suppose as somehow manifest that understanding, will , wisdom, love, are pure perfections. However, it is not evident whence these can be concluded to be pure perfections, any more than the nature of the first angel. For if you take wisdom denominatively, it is better than every denominative incompatible, and you have not proved that the First Efficient is wise. I say that you are begging the question. You can only hold that a wise being is better than a non-wise being, leaving out the First Efficient.

In this manner the first

angel is better than every being denominatively taken which is incompatible with it, apart from God ; and indeed, the essence of the first angel in the abstract can be better than wisdom in an unqualified sense. You will say:

"It

(viz., the essence of the first angel) is

repugnant to many things; therefore not for everything is it better denominatively than its opposite." I answer that neither is wisdom better denominatively for everything; it is repugnant to many. You will say: "Nay, rather, wisdom would be best for everyone, if it could be present; for it would be better for a dog, if the dog were wise."

I answer:

"So with regard to the first

angel, if he could be a dog he would be better, and it would be better for a dog if it could be the first angel." You will say: "No, that destroys the nature of the dog. Consequently it is not good for the dog." I answer: "In the same way being wise destroys its nature.

There is no difference

except that the angel destroys as a nature of the same genus, 6 (And if you accept that God is wise, )

Confer text.

88

De Primo Principio

sapiens ut alterius; incompossibilis tamen, quia determinans sibi pro subiecto naturam eiusdem generis incompossibilem; et cui repugnat primo subiectum, eidem per se, licet non primo, passio subiecti repugnat. Vulgaris sermo de perfectione simpliciter saepe vacillat. Intellectuale23

videtur

generis, ut substantiae.

dicere

gradum

supremum

Item :

determinati

Unde igitur concludetur quod est per-

fectio simpliciter? De passionibus entis in communi secus est, quia consequuntur omne ens, vel passio communis, vel alterum disiunctorum.

Si

protervus

diceret

cuiuslibet generis improbares?

omne

quod

generalissimi

est

denominativum

perfectio

primum

simpliciter,

unde

Diceret enim quodlibet tale esse melius quocumque

incompossibili sibi, si intelligitur denominative, quia incompossibilia sibi non sunt nisi denominativa sui generis, quae omnia illud excellit ; si intelligatur de substantiis denominatis, inQuod24 si subtantia25 quantum denominata, similiter diceretur. determinatur,26 istud determinat sibi nobilissimum. Si non, saltem subiectum quodlibet, inquantum27 denominatur isto, est melius quolibet, inquantum denominatur alio sibi incompossibili . QUINTA CONCLUSIO.

Primum causans quidquid causat,

contingenter causat. Probatur, quia quod immediate causat, contingenter causat-ex tertia probatione quartae praemissae-igitur et quidlibet, quia contingens non praecedit naturaliter necessarium, nec necessarium dependet a contingente. Item ex volitione finis:

Non necessario est aliquid volitum

nisi illud sine quo non stat illud quod est volitum circa finem. Deus amat se ut finem; et quidquid circa se ut finem amat, stare potest, si nihil aliud ab ipso sit, quia necessarium ex se a nullo

23 Intelligibile-MuPTV, A; Intelligere-R. 24 Quia-MaWV₁ (also Mueller's Text) . 25 subiectum-CO₁AR. 26 determinat-PTAR. 27 hoc add. MaWTV, (also Mueller's text) . In Mueller's text these two lines read thus: Quia si substantia determinatur istud, determinat sibi nobilissimum . Si non, saltem subiectum quodlibet, inquantum hoc denominatur isto,

89

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

The angel is while being wise destroys as of another genus. incompatible, however, because it determines for itself for subject an incompatible nature of the same genus; and to whatever first of all the subject is repugnant, to the same thing per se, though not first of all, a property of the subject is repugnant. Popular treatment of a pure perfection is often faulty.

Further :

The intellectual seems to bespeak the highest degree of a determinate genus, as for example, of substance. Hence, shall it be therefore concluded that it is a pure perfection? With regard to the properties of being in general it is not so, because they follow every being, whether they be a common attribute or one of the disjunctives. If a hair-splitting philosopher were to say that every first denominative of every category is a pure perfection, how would you disprove it?

For he would say that every such a one is better

than everything incompatible with it, if it is understood denominatively, because the incompatibles with it are only denominative of their own genus, and it excells all of them. If it should be understood with regard to the denominated substances, in so far as they are denominated, it would be said in a similar manner.

But

if substance is determined, this determines the most noble being for itself.

If not, at least every subject in so far as it is denomi-

nated by this, is better than everything in so far as it is denominated by another incompatible with it.

Fifth conclusion .

The First Principle in causing causes con-

tingently whatever It causes. It is proved, because what It immediately causes, It causes contingently-from the third proof of the fourth conclusion set forth-therefore also

everything, because the

contingent does

not naturally precede the necessary, nor does the necessary depend upon the contingent . Likewise from the willing of the end: Nothing is willed necessarily except that without which there does not stand that which is willed about the end. God loves Himself as end and whatever about Himself as end He loves can stand, even if nothing different from Him exists, because what is necessary of

90

De Primo Principio

dependet; igitur ex volitione² nec causat necessario.

Contra:

nihil aliud necessario vult; igitur

Velle aliud est idem Primo; igitur necesse esse; igitur

non contingens.

Item: Si tertia probatio praemissae, cui ista innititur, bene tenet, ergo nulla est contingentia cuiuscumque causae secundae in causando nisi² contingentia Primi in volendo; quia sicut necessitas Primi in volendo concludit necessitatem cuiuscumque alterius in causando, ita determinatio eius in volendo concluderet determinationem cuiuscumque alterius in causando ; sed determinatio eius in volendo est aeterna; igitur quaecumque causa secunda priusquam agat est determinata, ita quod non est in potestate eius determinari ad oppositum.

Hoc ulterius declaratur; quia si in potestate huius est determinare se ad oppositum, igitur cum determinatione Primae Causae in volendo stat istius indeterminatio in causando, quia non est in potestate eius facere Primam Causam indeterminatam; et si30 cum

determinatione Primae

stat indeterminatio

huius,

ita

videtur quod cum necessitate eius staret possibilitas et non necessitas istius.

Vel igitur tertia probatio nihil valet, vel voluntas

nostra non videtur esse libera ex se ad opposita.

Item:

Si Prima determinata determinat, quomodo potest aliqua

causa secunda movere ad aliquid, aliquo modo , ad cuius oppositum prima moveret si moveret, sicut est de voluntate nostra peccante?

Item quarto: Omne efficere erit contingens, quia dependet ab efficientia Primi, quae est contingens.

Ista sunt difficilia, quorum plena et plana solutio multa narQuaerantur in quaestione quam de rari et declarari requirit. scientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium disputavi. 28 sui add. MuPAR. 29 sit add. MaMu. 30 sicut-MaCO2O4V₁ (also Mueller's text) .

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

91

itself depends upon no other.

Therefore from His willing He

wills nothing else necessarily.

Consequently neither does He

cause necessarily. Against this proof:

To will another thing is identical with

the First Principle; therefore to will another thing is to be necessary; therefore not contingent. Likewise: If the third proof of the previously set forth conclusion, upon which this rests, stands up well, then there is no contingency of any second cause in causing, unless there is contingency of the First Principle in willing.

For just as the neces-

sity of the First Principle in willing concludes to the necessity of every other in causing, so its determination in willing would conclude to the determination of every other in causing. its determination in willing is eternal.

But

Therefore every second

cause is determined before it acts, so that to be determined to the opposite is not in its power.

This is declared further:

If it is in the power of this second

cause to determine itself to the opposite, then with the determination of the First Cause in willing stands the indetermination of this one in causing, because it is not in its power to make the First Cause indeterminate ; and if with the determination of the First Cause there stands the indetermination of this second cause, then it seems that with its necessity there would stand the possibility and not the necessity of this second cause. Either then the third proof is worth nothing, or our will does not seem to be free of itself toward opposites. Again:

If the First Cause being determined determines, how

can some second cause move to something, in some way, to the opposite of which the First Cause would move if it were to move, as is the case with regard to our will sinning? Fourthly:

Every act of effecting will be contingent, because

it depends upon the efficiency of the First Principle, whose efficiency is contingent. These are difficult problems, the full and clear solution of which requires many things to be narrated and explained .

Let them be

sought in the question which I have treated upon the knowledge of God with respect to future contingent facts.

92

De Primo Principio SEXTA CONCLUSIO.

Primam Naturam amare se est idem

Naturae Primae.

Hanc probo sic: Causalitas et causatio causae finalis est simpliciter prima-ex quarta secundi; et ideo causalitas Primi Finis, et eius

causatio,

est

penitus incausabilis

secundum

causationem in quocumque genere causae.

quamcumque

Causalitas autem Primi

Finis est: "movere Primum Efficiens ut amatum", quod est idem isti:

"Primum Efficiens amare Primum Finem".

Nihil aliud est :

"obiectum amari

a voluntate",

ectum".

"Primum Efficiens amare Primum Finem" est

Igitur:

nisi:

"voluntatem amare

obi-

penitus incausabile, et ita ex se necesse esse-ex quinta tertii; et ita erit idem Naturae Primae-ex sexta eiusdem; et deductio patet in decimaquinta tertii.

Deducitur aliter, et in idem redit.

Si " Primum amare se" est

aliud a Prima Natura, igitur est causabile-ex decimanona³¹ tertii ; igitur effectibile-ex quinta secundi ; ergo ab aliquo per se efficiente-ex probatione quartae huius ; ergo ab amante finem-ibidem. Igitur "Primum amare se" esset causatum ex aliquo amore finis, priore isto causato, quod est impossibile. Hoc Aristoteles ostendit 12 ° Metaphysicae³2 de intelligere ; alias Primum non erit optima substantia, quia per intelligere est honorabile ; alias laboriosa erit continuatio, quia si non sit illud sed in potentia contradictionis ad illud, ad illam sequitur labor, secundum ipsum.

Istae rationes possunt declarari .

Prima: 33

quia,

cum

omnis

entis in actu primo ultima perfectio sit in actu secundo quo coniungitur optimo, maxime si sit activum, non tantum factivumomne autem intellectuale est activum, et Prima Natura est intel31 decima-WO, MuPTV₁AR. 32 Metaph., Bk. 12, ch. 9 ( 1074 b 15-29) . Metaph., Bk. 14, ch. 4 ( 1091 b 12.) 33 Primo-O,CO, MuPV₁AR.

Mueller gives only a parallel text-

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

93

Sixth conclusion. For the First Nature to love Itself is identical with the First Nature. I prove this conclusion as follows:

The causality and causa-

tion of the final cause is simply first-from the fourth conclusion of the second chapter.

Therefore the causality of the First End,

and its causation, is entirely uncausable according to every causation in every kind of cause.

But the causality of the First End

is: "to move the First Efficient as beloved", which is the same as this: "for the First Efficient to love the First End".

"For the

object to be loved by the will", is nothing else but:

"for the

will to love the object".

Therefore, "for the First Efficient to

love the First End", is entirely uncausable; and so it will be necessary of itself, -from the fifth conclusion of the third chapter; and so it will be identical with the First Nature-from the sixth conclusion of the same chapter; and the deduction is clear in the fifteenth conclusion of the third chapter. It is deduced in another way, and it comes back to the same. If "for the First Principle to love Itself" is different from the First Nature, then it is causable-from the nineteenth conclusion of the third chapter; therefore effectible-from the fifth conclusion of the second chapter; therefore from some per se efficient-from the proof of the fourth conclusion of this chapter; therefore from some one loving the end-from the same place.

Therefore

"for the First Principle to love Itself" would be caused from some love of the end which would be caused previously; but this is impossible.

Aristotle shows this in the twelfth book of the

Metaphysics with reference to the act of understanding; otherwise the First Principle will not be the best substance, because through the act of understanding it is noble; otherwise the continuation (i. e. to continue the thinking ) will be laborious because if it is not that (i. e. if the First is not the act of understanding) but in potency of contradiction to that, labor follows upon that potency, according to him (viz., Aristotle ) . These reasons can be declared.

The first :

Since the ultimate

perfection of every being in first act is in second act to which it is joined as to the best, especially if it is active , not only capable of doing-but every intellectual is active, and the first

94

De Primo Principio

lectualis, ex prima³ -sequitur quod eius ultima perfectio est in actu secundo.

Igitur si ille non est eius substantia, non est eius

substantia optima, quia aliud est suum optimum.

Secunda : quia

potentia, solummodo receptiva, est contradictionis; igitur.35

Tamen nec ista secunda secundum Aristotelem est demonstratio, sed tantum probabilis ratio. etc.336

Unde praemittit:

"Rationale est,”

Aliter ostenditur ex identitate potentiae et obiecti³7 inter se ; igitur actus est idem eis. Consequentia non valet. Instantia : Angelus intelligit se, amat se ; actus38 non est idem substantiae.

Haec

conclusio foecunda est in

corollariis.

Nam

sequitur

primo quod voluntas est idem primae Naturae, quia velle non est nisi voluntatis; igitur illa est incausabilis ; ergo, etc. Similiter: Velle intelligitur quasi posterius,

et tamen velle est idem illi

Naturae; igitur magis voluntas.

Sequitur secundo quod intelligere se est idem illi Naturae , quia nihil amatur nisi cognitum ; ergo intelligere est necesse esse ex se; similiter quasi propinquior est illi Naturae quam velle. Sequitur tertio quod intellectus est idem illi Naturae, sicut prius de voluntate ex velle argutum est. Sequitur quod ratio intelligendi se est idem sibi, quia necesse esse ex se, et quasi praeintelligitur intellectioni.

SEPTIMA

CONCLUSIO .

Nullum intelligere

potest

esse

accidens Primae Naturae.

Probatur: quia illa Natura Prima ostensa est in se esse Primum Effectivum; igitur ex se habet unde potest quodcumque causabile causare-circumscripto

alio quocumque-saltem ut prima

34 praemissa-0₁O₂CO4 ; quarta—AR. 35 in potentia et imperfecta add. MuP; impotentia ( impotens R) . perfecta add. AR. 36 Metaph., Bk. 12 , ch. 9 ( 1074 b 27-8) . 37 et add. MaMuPTV₁ ( also Mueller's text) . 38 tamen add. MaW (also Mueller's text ) . 39 ipsi add. MaO₁0₂ (also Mueller's text) .

causa

et im-

95

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

nature is intellectual-from the first part of the fourth conclusion ; it follows that its ultimate perfection is in second act.

Therefore

if that (viz ., the act of understanding ) is not its substance, it does not have the best substance, because something different is its best. The second: Potency which is only receptive is a potency of contradiction; therefore. However, this second reason according to Aristotle is not a demonstration but only a probable reason. "It is reasonable," etc.

Hence he says first :

It is shown in another way from the identity of potency and object with each other. Therefore the act is identical with them. The consequence is not valid. An instance: An angel knows himself, loves himself; the act, however, is not the same as his substance. This conclusion is fruitful in corollaries.

For it follows first

of all that the will is identical with the First Nature, since the act of willing is only of the will.

Therefore the will is un-

causable; therefore, etc. Similarly: The act of willing is, as it were, posterior, and nevertheless the act of willing is identical with that Nature ; therefore all the more is the will identical.

It

follows secondly that the act of understanding is identical with that Nature, because nothing is loved unless it is known.

There-

fore the act of understanding is a being which is necessary of itself; similarly it is, as it were, nearer to that Nature than the act of willing is.

It follows thirdly that the intellect is identical

with that Nature, as it was argued previously about the will from the act of willing.

It follows that the basis of the act of under-

standing Itself is identical with the intellect itself, because the former is a being which is necessary of itself and is understood , as it were, before the intellection.

Seventh conclusion .

No act of understanding can be an acci-

dent of the First Nature. This is proved: because that First Nature has been shown in Itself to be that which is the First Efficient in the possible order. Therefore of Itself It has that whence it can cause every causable -setting aside

everything else—at least as first cause of that

96

De Primo Principio

illius causabilis ; sed circumscripta cognitione eius, non habet unde possit illud causare; igitur cognitio cuiuscumque non est aliud a sua natura.

Assumptum ultimum probatur:

quia nihil potest causare nisi

ex amore finis, volendo illud, quia non potest esse aliter per se agens, quia nec propter finem.

Ipsi autem velle alicuius propter

finem, praeintelligitur intelligere ipsum; ergo ante primum signum quo intelligitur causans sive

volens,

necessario

praeintelligitur

intelligens A, et ita sine hoc non potest per se efficere A, et ita de aliis.

Item:

Omnes intellectiones eiusdem intellectus habent similem

habitudinem ad intellectum, secundum identitatem essentialem aut accidentalem.

Patet de quocumque intellectu creato ; quod osten-

ditur: quia videntur perfectiones eiusdem generis; ergo si aliquae habent receptivum, et omnes habent idem: et ita si aliqua est accidens, et quaelibet; alia¹º non potest esse accidens in Primo -ex praecedente; igitur nulla.

Item:

Intelligere, si quod potest esse accidens, recipietur in

intellectu ut in subiecto ; igitur et intelligere , quod est idem sibi, et

ita

perfectius

intelligere,

erit

potentia

receptiva

respectu

imperfectioris.

Item: natorum;

Idem intelligere potest esse¹¹ plurium obiectorum ordiigitur

quanto

perfectior,

tanto

plurium;

ergo

per-

fectissimum, quo impossibile est esse perfectius intelligere, erit idem omnium intelligibilium.

Intelligere Primi est sic perfectis-

simum-ex secunda huius; igitur idem est omnium intelligibilium ; et illud quod est sui, est idem sibi -ex proxima praecedente; ergo, etc.

Eandem conclusionem intellige de velle.

40 aliqua AR (also Vivès text ) . The parallel passage in the Oxoniense (Oxon. I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 23 ; VIII, 455 b ) also has aliqua. Balic in his De Critica Textuali Scholasticorum scriptio accommodata (Extract from the Antonianum, Annus XX, 1945-Fasc. 1-4 Rome) p. 27 ( 291 ) has cited this difference (along with other differences) between the text of the De Primo and the parallel text of the Oxoniense as evidence that the De Primo is a redaction made from the Oxoniense. We must agree with Balic that aliqua gives a much better meaning. 41 respectu add. MuPTV, A.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

causable .

97

But if Its cognition is set aside It does not have that

whence It can cause that causable.

Therefore Its cognition of

everything whatsoever is not different from Its nature. The last premise is proved :

Nothing can cause except from

the love of the end, by willing it, because it cannot otherwise be a proper agent, since it would not be acting for the sake of the end. But before the very act of willing of something for the sake of an end there is understood the act of understanding it. Therefore before the first moment in which it is understood to be causing or willing, it is necessarily understood to be understanding A, and so without this, there cannot be the proper act of effecting A, and so with reference to others. Moreover:

All the intellections of the same intellect have a

similar relation to the intellect, according to essential or accidental identity. It is evident with regard to every created intellect. This is shown: because they are seen to be perfections of the same kind; consequently if some have a receptive intellect, all of them also have the same; and so if some one of them is an accident, all of them also are ; some intellection' cannot be an accident in the First Principle-from the preceding conclusion. Therefore no intellection in It is an accident. Likewise :

If some act of understanding can be an accident, it

will be received in the intellect as in a subject; therefore also, the act of understanding which is identical with the intellect, and which is consequently the more perfect act of understanding, will be a receptive potency with respect to the less perfect. Again:

There can be the same act of understanding for

several ordered objects.

Therefore the more perfect the act of

understanding, the greater will be the number of ordered objets. Therefore the most perfect, than which it is impossible that there be a more perfect act of understanding, will be the same one for all the intelligibles. The act of understanding of the First Principle is most perfect in this way-from the second conclusion of this chapter; therefore it is the same for all the intelligibles ; and that act of understanding which is of It is identical with Itfrom the last preceding conclusion ; therefore, etc. Understand the same conclusion with regard to the act of willing.

7We have translated the variant reading. Confer Latin text.

98

De Primo Principio

Item sic arguitur :

Ille intellectus nihil est nisi quoddam intel-

ligere; ille intellectus est idem omnium, ita quod non potest esse alius alterius obiecti; igitur nec intelligere aliud ; vel igitur idem 42 Respondeo : 12 Fallacia est accidentis ex

intelligere est omnium. identitate

aliquorum

inter se

absolute

concludere

respectu tertii, respectu cuius extraneantur. ligere

idem

est

Intel-

est velle ; igitur si ipsum est intelligere alicuius,

ipsum est velle eiusdem. velle

identitatem

Exemplum:

aliquid

Non sequitur; sed est velle, quod quidem

eiusdem,

quia intelligere

eiusdem,

ita

quod

divisim potest inferri, non coniunctim, propter accidens.

Item sic arguitur:

Intellectus Primi habet unum actum adae-

quatum sibi et coaeternum, quia intelligere sui est idem sibi; igitur non potest habere alium. Consequentia non valet. Instantia de beato simul vidente Deum et tamen aliud: Etiam si videat Deum secundum ultimum capacitatis suae, ut ponitur de anima Christi, adhuc potest videre aliud.

Item arguitur: Intellectus ille habet in se, per identitatem, perfectionem maximam intelligendi ; igitur et omnem aliam. Respondeo: Non sequitur; quia alia, quae minor est, potest esse causabilis et ideo differre ab incausabili ; maxima non potest. Tamen aliter probatur ista consequentia, quia : 46 42 om. WCO₁₂O4 (also Mueller's text) . 43 Sophisma-MaO, O4 (also Mueller's text) . 44 divinum add. MuPAR. 45 illud-MaWO₁TV₁ (also Mueller's text) . 48 Tamen ... / om. MaO₁ ( also Mueller's text) .

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

99

Again it is argued thus: That intellect is nothing else but a certain act of understanding; that intellect is the same for all objects, so that it cannot be different for different objects; therefore neither is the act of understanding different; or therefore there is the same act of understanding for all objects. I answer: It is a fallacy of the accident to conclude absolutely from the identity of some things with one another, to their identity with a third, with respect to which they are extraneous. Example : The divine act of understanding is identical with the act of willing; therefore if the act of understanding is of one thing, the act of willing is of the same thing. It does not follow. But it does follow that there is an act of willing, which act of willing indeed is something with reference to the same thing because it is the act of understanding of the same thing, so that the inference can be made in separation but not in conjunction, because of the accidental relation.

Furthermore it is thus argued :

The intellect of the First

Principle has one act, adequate to itself and coeternal, because Its act of understanding is identical with It; consequently It cannot have another.

The consequence is not valid.

An instance of a

Blessed seeing God and nevertheless seeing something else at the same time:

Even if he sees God according to the ultimate of his

capacity, as is posited of the soul of Christ, he can still see something else.

It is likewise argued:

That intellect has in itself through

identity the greatest perfection of understanding; therefore it I answer: also has every other perfection of understanding. understandof perfection another This does not follow; because ing, which is less, can be causable and therefore different from the uncausable; the greatest cannot. However, this consequence is proved in another way, because:

100

De Primo Principio

47 OCTAVA CONCLUSIO.

Intellectus Primi intelligit actu

semper et necessario et distincte, quodcumque intelligibile , prius naturaliter quam illud sit in se.

Prima pars probatur sic : Potest cognoscere quodcumque intelligibile sic, quia hoc est perfectionis in intellectu posse distincte et actu intelligere, imo necessarium ad rationem intellectus, quia omnis intellectus est totius entis communissime sumpti, ut alibi declaravi; nullam autem intellectionem potest habere nisi eandem sibi-ex proxima ; igitur cuiuslibet intelligibilis habet intelligere actuale et distinctum, et hoc idem sibi.

Arguitur etiam prima pars aliter per hoc, quod artifex perfectus distincte cognoscit omne agendum antequam fiat ; alias non perfecte operaretur, quia cognitio est mensura iuxta quam operatur ; ergo Deus omnium producibilium a se habet notitiam distinctam actualem, vel habitualem saltem, et priorem eis.

Contra istam instatur quia ars universalis sufficit ad singularia producenda.

Secunda pars de prioritate probatur sic, quia quidquid est idem sibi est necesse esse ex se-ex quinta tertii et prima quarti; sed esse aliorum a se intelligibilium, est non necesse esse¹8 -ex sexta tertii; necesse esse ex se est prius natura omni non necessario.

Probatur aliter: quia esse omnis alterius a se dependet ab ipso ut a causa-ex decimanona tertii ; et ut causa est alicuius talis, necessario includitur cognitio eius ex parte causae; igitur illa prior est natura¹⁹ ipso esse cogniti.

47 OCTAVA CONCLUSIO om. WOO₂CV₁AR. However, this conclusion heading as above, in their table of conclusions. 48 om. MaWO₂T (also Mueller's text) . 49 naturaliter-MaWCO₁O₂ ( also Mueller's text) .

UL

WV₁AR list

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

Eighth conclusion.

101

The intellect of the First Principle actually

understands every intelligible always and necessarily and distinctly, prior in the natural order to its existence.

The first part is proved as follows:

It can know every in-

telligible thus, because this is of the perfection in the intellect, namely, to be able distinctly and actually to understand ; nay, it is necessary to the nature of the intellect, because every intellect is of all being taken in the common sense, as I have elsewhere explained. But the intellect of the First Principle can have no intellection except that which is identical with itself-from the last conclusion.

Therefore, it has the actual and distinct act of

understanding of every intelligible, and this identical with itself.

The first part is argued also in another way by the fact that the perfect artist distinctly knows everything that is to be done, before it is done; otherwise he would not work perfectly, since knowledge is the measure according to which he works. Consequently God has from Himself a distinct, actual or at least habitual knowledge of all the things capable of being produced, and He has this knowledge prior to them.

It is objected against this that universal art suffices to produce singulars.

The second part with regard to priority is proved thus :

What-

ever is identical with It is a being which is necessary of Itself -from the fifth conclusion of the third chapter and the first conclusion of the fourth chapter.

But the being of intelligibles

different from It is not necessary-from the sixth conclusion of the third chapter.

A being which is necessary of itself is prior

by nature to every non-necessary being.

It is proved in another way: Every being different from It depends upon It as upon a cause-from the nineteenth conclusion of the third chapter; and as It is the cause of some such being, there is necessarily included the cognition of it on the part of the cause; therefore that cognition is prior by nature to the very being of that which is known.

102

De Primo Principio

O altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae tuae, Deus, qua omne intelligibile comprehendis ! poteris concludere:

NONA CONCLUSIO.50

Numquid intellectui meo parvo

Te esse infinitum,

et incompre-

hensibilem a finito? Tentabo inferre conclusionem valde foecundam, principio

fuisset

de

faciliter patuissent.

te

probata,

praedictorum

quae si

in

quam plurima

Infinitatem igitur tuam, si annuas, ex dictis

de intellectu tuo primo conabor inferre ; deinde alia quaedam adducam, an valeant vel non valeant ad concludendum propositum, inquirendo. Nonne, Domine Deus, intelligibilia sunt infinita, et haec5¹ actu in intellectu actu omnia intelligente? actu intelligens est infinitus.

Igitur intellectus illa simul

Talis est tuus, Deus noster,

ex

septima iam praemissa ; igitur et Natura cui intellectus est idem est infinita. Huius52 ostendo antecedens et consequentiam.

Antecedens: 53

Quaecumque sunt infinita in potentia, id est, in accipiendo alterum 54 nullum possunt habere finem; illa omnia, si simul post alterum , actu sunt, sunt actu infinita.

Intelligibilia sunt huius respectu

intellectus creati, sicut patet; et in tuo sunt simul omnia actu intellecta, quae a creato sunt successive intelligibilia; igitur ibi sunt actu infinita intellecta. Huius syllogismi probo Maiorem, licet satis evidens videatur ; quia omnia talia acceptibilia, quando sunt simul existentia, aut sunt actu infinita aut finita; si actu finita, ergo accipiendo alterum post alterum, tandem omnia possunt esse accepta; igitur si non possunt esse actu accepta omnia, si actu simul sunt, sunt actu infinita.

50 NONA CONCLUSIO om. WO₁O₂CMuTV₁AR. in their table of conclusions.

It is given by WV, AR

51 boc-O₁₂CV₁A. MaMu and R can be read either as haec or hoc. 52 enthymematis add. MaCO₁O₂ ( also Mueller's text) . 53 sic add. Ma AR (also Mueller's text) . 54 quae add. MaO₁ (also Mueller's text) .

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

103

Oh, the depth of the riches of thy wisdom and of thy knowledge, O God, by which Thou dost comprehend every intelligiCouldst thou conclude for my puny intellect: ble! Ninth conclusion.

That Thou art infinite, and incomprehen-

sible by what is finite?

I shall attempt to draw an exceedingly fruitful conclusion, and if it had been proved about Thee in the beginning, how many of the aforementioned would easily have been manifest ! I shall try then to prove Thy infinity, if Thou dost grant it, first of all from what has been said with reference to Thy intellect; then I shall bring forward certain other arguments by investigating whether they are able or not able to reach the proposed conclusion. O Lord God, are not the intelligibles infinite, and are not these intelligibles actually in the intellect actually understanding all things? Therefore the intellect actually understanding them simultaneously is infinite. Such is Thy intellect, our God-from the eighth conclusion already set forth; therefore the Nature also with which the intellect is identical is infinite.

I show the antecedent and the consequence of this enthymeme . The antecedent : Whatever things are infinite in potency, that is, when taken one after the other, can have no end; if all these are actually simultaneous, they are actually infinite. The intelligibles are such with respect to a created intellect, as is evident; and all those which are successively intelligible by a created intellect are actually understood simultaneously by Thy intellect. actually infinite objects are understood there.

Therefore

I prove the Major of this syllogism, although it seems evident enough.

When all such objects capable of being received are

existing simultaneously, they are either actually infinite or actually finite; if actually finite, then when they are taken one after the other, finally they can all be taken.

Therefore, if they cannot all be actually taken, they are actually infinite if they are actually simultaneous. 8 The manuscripts all have septima, but this is due to the fact that the majority of them do not give the enumeration of the eighth conclusion within the text. Confer Latin text. The reference above is clearly to what we have enumerated as the eighth conclusion heading.

De Primo Principio

104

Consequentiam

enthymematis ita probo:

Quando pluralitas

requirit vel concludit maiorem perfectionem quam paucitas, infinitas numeralis concludit infinitam perfectionem. Exemplum : Posse ferre decem maiorem perfectionem requirit virtutis motivae quam posse ferre quinque; ideo posse ferre infinita concludit infinitam virtutem motivam.

Ergo in proposito, cum posse simul

intelligere duo distincte55 maiorem perfectionem intellectus concludat quam posse unicum intelligere, sequitur propositum.

Hoc ultimum probo: quia requiritur applicatio et determinata conversio intellectus ad intelligibile distincte intelligendum ; ergo si ad plura potest applicari, ad quodlibet est illimitatum, et ita ad infinita applicabilis est omnino illimitatus.

Similiter

probo

propositum,

saltem

sequitur propositum de intellectu.

de

intelligere,

ex

quo

Nam cum intelligere A sit

aliqua perfectio, et intelligere B sit similiter aliqua perfectio, numquam idem intelligere est ipsius A et B aeque distincte, ut duae essent, nisi perfectiones duorum intelligere includantur, et sic de tribus, et ultra.

Dicetur:

Quando per eandem rationem intelligendi multa intel-

liguntur, non concluditur maior perfectio ex pluralitate.

Aliter, quod ratio de intelligere concludit, quando illa plura intelligere

nata

essent

habere

perfectiones

formales

distinctas,

quales non sunt intellectiones nisi diversarum specierum; tales non sunt infinitae intelligibiles sed individua, quorum plurium intellectiones, quia non alias perfectiones formales dicunt, non concludunt maiorem perfectionem actus qui est respectu plurium talium .

55 om. WMUPTV1.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being I prove the consequence of this enthymeme as follows:

105

When

plurality requires or concludes to a greater perfection than does fewness, numerical infinity concludes to infinite perfection. Example: To be able to carry ten requires greater perfection of motive power than to be able to carry five. Therefore to be able to carry infinite objects concludes to infinite motive power. Therefore in the intended conclusion, since to be able simultaneously to understand two objects distinctly concludes to greater perfection of intellect than to be able to understand only one, the conclusion follows. I prove this last: because there is required the application and the determinate concentration of the intellect upon the intelligible that is to be distinctly understood; therefore if an intellect can be applied to several, it is unlimited with regard to every object; and so an intellect which is applicable to infinite objects is altogether unlimited .

I prove the intended proposition in a similar way, at least with regard to the act of understanding , from which follows the proposed conclusion with regard to the intellect.

For since the

act of understanding A is some perfection and the act of understanding B is in like manner some perfection, the same act of understanding is never of A and B equally distinctly, in order that there might be two perfections, unless the perfections of two acts of understanding are included, and so with regard to three, and so on. It will be said: When many things are understood through the same means of understanding, a greater perfection is not concluded from the plurality. In another way, the proof with regard to the act of understanding is conclusive when those several acts of understanding would be of such a nature as to have distinct formal perfections; but such are intellections only of diverse species; there are not infinite intelligibles of this kind but individuals, of a plurality of which the intellections, because they do not bespeak other formal perfections, do not conclude to a greater perfection of the act which is with respect to such a plurality of individuals.

106

De Primo Principio

Contra primum: quia et de ipsa ratione intelligendi arguitur, sicut de intellectu et actu, quia maior perfectio concluditur ex pluralitate illorum, quorum est ratio intelligendi, quia oportet quod includat eminenter perfectiones omnium propriarum rationum intelligendi, quarum quaelibet secundum propriam rationem aliquam perfectionem ponit; igitur infinitae concludunt infinitam.

Contra secundam responsionem:

Individua in ratione

versalis imperfecte intelliguntur, quia non secundum

uni-

quidlibet

entitatis positivae in eis, sicut in quaestione de individuatione ostendi;56 ergo intellectus intelligens quidlibet intelligibile secundum omnem rationem intelligibilitatis positivae, intelligit distinctas entitates positivas plurium individuorum, quae maiorem perfectionem ponunt in intellectione quam intellectio unius illorum ; quia intellectio cuiuscumque entitatis absolutae positivae, ut est eius, est aliqua perfectio; alias illa non existente

intellectus non

esset minus perfectus-nec intelligere ; ergo non oportet

illud

ponere in intellectu divino , quod excluditur per octavam.

Item:

Infinitas intelligibilium specie concluditur ex numeris

et figuris; confirmatur per Augustinum 12 ° de Civ. cap.

Secundo propositum sic ostendo :

18."

Causa prima, cui secundum

ultimum suae causalitatis causa secunda aliquid perfectionis addit in causando, non videtur posse sola ita perfecte

causare, sicut

ipsa cum secunda, quia causalitas sola primae diminuta est respectu causalitatis simul ambarum. Igitur si illud quod natum est esse a causa secunda etº¹ prima simul sit multo perfectius a sola prima, secunda nihil perfectionis addit primae; sed omni finito

aliud

additum addit aliquam perfectionem; ergo talis causa prima est infinita. 56 Scotus, Metaph., 7, q. 13 ; VII, 402-426. 57 inexistente-MaWCA (also Mueller's text) . 58 oporteret-O,C. 59 De civ. Dei, Bk. 12, ch. 18 (PL 41 , 367-368) . 60 effectum-add. MaWCO₁O₂2 (also Mueller's text) . 61 ipsa add. MuPTV₁AR.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

107

Against the first: It is also argued with regard to the very means of understanding, as it is with regard to the intellect and the act of understanding, that the greater perfection is concluded from the plurality of those of which it is the means of understanding, because it is necessary that it include eminently the perfections of all the proper means of understanding, every one of which posits some perfection according to its own proper means. Therefore perfections numerically infinite conclude to infinite perfection.

Against the

second

response :

Individuals

are imperfectly

understod in the meaning of a universal because they are not understood there according to everything of positive entity in them , as I have shown in the question about individuation . Therefore the intellect understanding every intelligible according to every meaning of positive intelligibility understands distinct positive entities of many individuals, which entities posit greater perfection in an intellection than the intellection of one of them; because the intellection of every positive absolute entity, inasmuch as it is an intellection of that, is some perfection ; otherwise, if it were not existing, neither the intellect nor the act of understanding would be less perfect. Therefore it would not be necessary to place it (namely, the act of understanding of individuals as such) in the divine intellect; but this is excluded by the eighth conclusion. In addition: The infinity of the intelligibles in species is concluded from numbers and figures; it is confirmed by Augustine in the twelfth book of "The City of God", chapter 18 . Secondly I show the proposed conclusion thus:

The first cause,

to which according to the ultimate of its causality a second cause adds something of perfection in causing, does not seem to be able alone to cause so perfectly as it does along with the second, because the causality of the first alone is diminished with respect to the causality of both together. Therefore if that which is fit to be from a second cause and the first together is much more perfectly from the first alone, the second adds nothing of perfection to the first . adds some perfection.

But to every finite, something else added Therefore such a first cause is infinite.

108

De Primo Principio

Ad propositum:

Notitia cuiuscumque nata est gigni ab ipso

sicut a causa proxima, maxime illa quae est visio. alicui intellectui inest sine actione quacumque

Igitur si illa talis obiecti,

tantummodo ex virtute alterius obiecti prioris quod natum est esse causa superior respectu talis cognitionis, sequitur quod illud obiectum superius est infinitum in cognoscibilitate, quia inferius nihil sibi addit in cognoscibilitate.

Tale obiectum superius est

Natura Prima, quia ex sola praesentia eius apud intellectum Primi, nullo alio obiecto concausante, est notitia cuiuscumque obiecti in intellectu -ex septima62 huius-et perfectissima-ex secunda huius; igitur nullum aliud intelligibile aliquid sibi addit in cognoscibilitate ; igitur est infinitum; sic igitur et in entitate, quia unumquodque, 63 sicut ad esse, sic ad cognosci.

Hic instatur:

Igitur

nulla

causa

secunda,

quae

est

finita,

potest facere notitiam causati ita perfectam sicut nata est causari ab ipsomet causato ; quod falsum est, quia cognitio per causam est perfectior quam rei ex se sine causa. Item :

Ex hoc quod Causa Prima aeque perfecte causat sine

secunda sicut cum illa, non videtur sequi nisi quod perfectionem secundae habeat perfectius quam ipsa secunda; hoc non videtur concludere infinitatem, quia finita perfectio potest esse eminentior perfectione causae secundae. Item:

Licet nihil addat in causando Primae causanti secundum

ultimum potentiae, quomodo probatur quod nihil addit in essendo? Nam in causando lumen in medio,64 si iste sol causaret quantum medium posset recipere, alius sol nihil adderet sibi in causando et tamen adderet sibi in essendo, cum esset additio.65

Ita in intel-

lectu Primi est notitia quanta potest inesse ex praesentia Naturae Primae ut obiecti ; secunda igitur causa nihil addit in causando, 62 octava-AR. This reading gives the intended meaning, but since it is given by only the two latest manuscripts, we have kept the earlier reading. Confer note 8 of the English translation. 63 cognoscibilitatem-MaCO2 (also Mueller's text) . 64 Based on five manuscripts (MaWCO₁O₂) Mueller's text reads : nam in causando lumen: in medio, si iste Sol causaret, quantum medium posset recipere, alius Sol nihil adderet, tamen in essendo esset additio. 65 alius sol-MuPAR.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

To the point:

109

The knowledge of everything is fit to be pro-

duced by it as by a proximate cause, and especially that knowledge which is vision (namely, intuitive knowledge ) .

Therefore

if that knowledge is present to some intellect without any action of such an object, but only from the power of another prior object which is fit to be a higher cause with respect to such cognition, it follows that that higher object is infinite in cognoscibility, because the lower adds nothing to it in cognoscibility.

Such a higher object is the First Nature, because from its

presence alone to the intellect of the First Principle, with no other object causing along with It, there is the knowledge of every object in the intellect-from the eighth conclusion of this chapter-and the most perfect knowledge-from the second conclusion of this chapter.

Therefore no other intelligible adds

anything to it in cognoscibility.

Therefore it is infinite ; so

therefore also in entity, because as everything stands to being, so to cognoscibility. Here it is objected :

Consequently no second cause, which is

finite, can make the knowledge of an effect so perfect as is fit to be caused by the effect itself; but this is false, because the cognition through a cause is more perfect than of the thing from itself without a cause. In addition:

From this fact , that the First Cause causes just

as perfectly without the second cause as with it, it seems to follow only that It has the perfection of the second more perfectly than the second itself; this does not seem to conclude to infinity, because a finite perfection can be more eminent than the perfection of a second cause. Again:

Even though it adds nothing in causing to the First

Cause causing according to the ultimate of its power, how is it proved that it adds nothing in being? For in causing light in a medium , if this sun would cause as much as the medium could receive, another sun would add nothing to it in causing, and nevertheless it would add to it in being, since there would be an addition.

So in the intellect of the First Principle there is as

much knowledge as can be present from the presence of the First Nature as object .

Consequently a second cause adds nothing in

110

De Primo Principio 66

quia non est nata

agere in illum intellectum iam summe actuatum,

sicut nec alius sol in medium.

Unde si67 ex hoc probatur nihil

addere in essendo, videtur a simili argui quod terra nihil addat soli in essendo, qui nihil addit in causando lumen in medio.

Ad ista respondeo : ad primum, quod quia nihil scientifice concluditur de aliquo, nisi in se simpliciter praeconcepto, ideo in scientia nostra, quando causatum scimus per causam, causa non facit notitiam causati simplicem, qualem ipsum causatum natum 68 esset gignere, secundum Augustinum 9° Trin. capitulo ultimo : 69 "A cognoscente et cognito paritur notitia," aut si quam simplicem posset facere, sed non illam quae est intuitiva, de qua alibi70 multum dixi. Unde ultra omnem cognitionem per causam, aliqua expectatur quae non nisi ab obiecto in se causatur in nobis.

Si igitur intellectionem intuitivam habet Deus de lapide, ipso nullo modo causante, oportet quod lapis in cognoscibilitate etiam propria nihil addat cognoscibilitati essentiae Primi, per quam lapis sic cognoscitur.

Cum igitur infers: de causato , " concedo:

Cum dicis: ibi72

includitur

"Nulla causa finita facit perfectam notitiam "Perfectissimam possibilem etiam"¹ nobis.”

"Cognitio per causam est perfectior," dico quod cognitio effectus simplex73 causata ab ipso.

Cognitio

complexi causatur simul a cognitionibus causae et causati ; et verum est quod a causa prima et secunda simul est aliquid perfectius quam a secunda sola. 66 natum-WO,CMuPTV, AR. 67 cum O₁ ; om. MaWCO₂T ( also Mueller's text) . 68 om. MaWCMuT (also Mueller's text ) . 69 De Trinitate, Bk. 9, ch . 12, n. 18 ( PL 42, 970 ) "Ab utroque notitia paritur, a cognoscente et cognito." 70 Confer Oxon. I, d. 3, q. 7, n. 41 ; IX, 395 ab. 71 et C; om. MuPT; inesse add. MuPTAR. 72 om. Ma; in cognitione per causam MuPAR. 73 simpliciter-MaWO₁P (also Mueller's text) . 74 complexa MuPTAR.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

111

causing, because it is not fit to act upon that intellect already actuated to the highest degree, just as another sun would not act upon the medium. Hence if from this it is proved that it adds nothing in being, it seems to be argued by using the topical rule a simili that the earth adds nothing to the sun in being, because it adds nothing in causing light in the medium.

To these objections I reply: to the first, that because nothing is scientifically concluded about something except in that which is simply known first in itself, therefore in our scientific knowledge, when we know the effect through the cause, the cause does not make the simple knowledge of the effect such as the effect itself would be fit to produce-according to Augustine in the ninth book on the Trinity, the last chapter:

"Knowledge is

produced by the knower and by what is known; " or if the cause could make some simple knowledge, it could not however make that which is intuitive, about which I have said much elsewhere. Hence beyond all cognition through the cause, some cognition is sought which is caused in us only by the object in itself.

If therefore God has an intuitive intellection of a stone, the stone in no way being a cause, it is necessary that the stone in cognoscibility, even that which is proper, adds nothing to the cognoscibility of the essence of the First Principle, through which cognoscibility the stone is thus known.

When, therefore, you argue :

"No finite cause makes perfect

knowledge of an effect", I concede:

"No finite cause makes

that knowledge of an effect which is the most perfect possible even for us. "

99 When you say: "Cognition through a cause is more perfect,' I say that there is included there that simple cognition of an effect caused by the effect. Cognition of what is complex (namely,

of a syllogism ) is caused by the cognitions of cause and effect together. And it is true that from the first cause and the second together there is something more perfect than from the second cause alone.

112

De Primo Principio

Contra:

A sola causa finita prima potest esse perfectior quam

a sola secunda, et a sola secunda est eius visio.75

Respondeo :

A sola prima finita potest esse aliquid perfectius-puta visio eius– quam a sola secunda; sed non effectus natus causari a secunda, vel ut secunda, vel magis ut prima respectu cuiuscumque alterius causae finitae ; quia in causando talem cogitionem videtur accidentaliter ordinata ad causam priorem finitam, quia talis non est nata esse per causam finitam priorem ipso viso; esset, etiamsi visum esset incausatum a tali causa ; vel esset sine omni causa priore finita.76

Ad secundum :

Licet causa prior finita contineret essentialiter"

perfectionem totam secundae in causando et in hoc excederet secundam, quae tantum formaliter habet illam, tamen ipsa ut eminenter habita et formaliter etiam habita excedit se etiam in causando ut tantum eminenter habita.

Et universaliter:

Quando

ipsa ut formaliter aliquam perfectionem addit sibi ut eminenter, tunc ambo excedunt utrumque divisim. eminens est finitum, alioquin

non

Talis additio est, quando

quia finitum additum finito facit

perfectius

esset

universum

quam

prima

maius ; natura

causata; sed illa ponitur a quibusdam omnem perfectionem inferiorum eminenter continere,78 quod ego supra negavi in ultima secundi.

Ad tertium :

Illa perfectio quae, ubi est causabilis, nata est

causari a solo aliquo formaliter tali, quod respectu eius habet rationem quasi causae primae ad priores finitas accidentaliter ordinatae, aut solummodo est causabilis ab aliis finitis, illo formaliter tali concausante-illa perfectio nusquam potest esse, nisi virtute alicuius infiniti cui illud formaliter tale, si addatur, nihil addit in causando.

Sic tenet ratio supra posita, quia si quid

75 ergo et a sola prima add. MuPAR . 76 et intellectus esset add. MaWCO₁O₂ ( also Mueller's text) . 77 eminenter O₂CAR . 78 Confer the 44th of the propositions condemned in 1277 : "Non potest probari Deum posse aliquid immediate producere nisi tantum unun effectum primum." By "quibusdam” Scotus has reference most probably to Aristotle, Averroes, and especially Avicenna.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

113

Against it: From the first finite cause alone there can be a more perfect effect than from the second alone, and from the From the first second alone is the vision of it." I answer: finite cause alone there can be something more perfect-for instance, the vision of that which is seen-than from the second cause alone ; but not an effect fit to be caused by the second cause either as the second cause or rather as the first with respect to For in causing such cognition the every other finite cause. second cause seems to be accidentally ordered to a prior finite cause, because such a second cause is not made to be through a finite cause which is prior to itself as seen; that which is seen would exist even if it were uncaused by such a prior cause; or it would exist without any prior finite cause.10 To the second:

Even though a prior finite cause would con-

tain eminently the whole perfection of a second cause in causing, and in this would exceed the second cause, which has that perfection only formally, nevertheless that perfection as eminently had and also as formally had exceeds itself also as it is in causing when only eminently had.

And universally:

When that

perfection as formally had adds something to itself as eminently had, then both together exceed each taken separately. There is such an addition when the eminent is finite, because a finite added to a finite makes something greater . Otherwise the universe would be no more perfect than the first nature caused ; but that first nature caused is posited by certain ones to contain every lower perfection eminently, which I have denied above in the last conclusion of the second chapter.

To the third: That perfection which, where it is causable, is fit to be caused by only one formally such, which with respect to it has the character, as it were, of a first cause accidentally ordered to prior finite causes, or where it (viz ., that perfection) is only causable by other finite causes when that one formally such causes with them-that perfection can in no way exist, except in virtue of some infinite to which that one formally such, if it is added, adds nothing in causing.

The reason placed above

9 (therefore also from the first cause alone) . Confer text. 10 (and the intellect also would exist.) Confer text.

114

De Primo Principio

adderet, tunc propria ratio causalitatis eius, ut est formaliter tale, deesset, et a tali ut tale dependet vel ab illo cui tale nihil addit in causando.

Ulterius:

Igitur nec in essendo, quia ista causatio est propria sibi secundum esse formale eius; igitur si in essendo aliquid adderet Primo," deesset illa proprias causalitas quae est eius ut formaliter tale, et ita non haberet ex se illud eminentius, quod natum est a tali, ut tale est, causari.

Patet igitur quod instantia de sole nulla est, quia si huic soli aliquid causare competeret inquantum iste, alius illud non causaret nec in se haberet sine isto .

Si iste illi aliquid addit,8¹—non curo tunc, ad quod passum compares-breviter dico: nihil eiusdem rationis cum causabili necessario ab aliquo, ut est tale formaliternecessario, inquam, ita quod non aliter potest esse causatum, vel incausatum perfectius causabili-nisi in virtute alicuius cui hoc ut tale nihil addit in causando nec in essendo.

Instantias

de terra nihil valet; lumen non est natum ab ipsa,

ut a causa aliqua, dependere.

Tertio conclusionem nostram sic ostendo : finita eiusdem rationis perfectioni accidentali

Nulla perfectio est substantialis ;

intelligere nostrum est accidens, quia essentialiter qualitas; igitur 83 nullum intelligere finitum est substantia. Sed intelligere Primi est substantia-ex quinta et sexta et septima huius.

79 Primo (2) add. MaO₁ ( also Mueller's text) . 80 prima-MuPTV₁AR. 81 in causando sicut etiam in essendo add. MuPAR. 82 om. MaWCO₂O₂V1. 83nostrum MuTV₁AR. 84 om. MuTV₁AR.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

115

holds in this way because if the cause formally such were to add anything, then the proper character of the causality of it (viz., the infinite) as it is formally such, would be lacking; and there is a dependence upon such a cause as such or upon that to which such a finite cause adds nothing in causing.

Further-

more then, this cause does not add in being, because this causation is proper to it according to its formal being.

Therefore if

it were to add something in being to the First Principle, there would be lacking to the First Principle that proper causality which belongs to this other cause as it is formally such, and so the First Principle would not have of itself that more eminent effect which is fit to be caused by such another cause as it is such.

It is evident therefore that the instance about the sun is not a real instance, because if it were to belong to this sun to cause something in so far as it is this sun, another sun would not cause that nor would it have it in itself to cause it without this first sun.

If this first sun adds something to it-I do not care

then to what thing acted upon you will compare it-briefly I say: It adds nothing of the same kind with a causable that is necessarily from something as it is such formally-necessarily, I say, so that it can in no other way be an effect or an uncaused thing which is more perfect than the causable-except in virtue of something to which this as such adds nothing in causing or in being.

The instance about the earth has no force; the light is not made to depend upon it as upon some cause.

Thirdly, I show our conclusion in this way:

No finite per-

fection of the same standing as an accidental perfection is substantial ; our act of understanding is an accident, because essentially it is a quality; therefore no finite act of understanding is a substance. But the act of understanding of the First Principle is a substance-from the fifth and the sixth and the seventh conclusions of this chapter.

116

De Primo Principio

Probatio Maioris : quia quae conveniunt in ratione formali , a qua accipitur differentia, conveniunt in genere si utraque perfectio formalis sit finita; quia talis differentia finita in quocumque est eiusdem generis contractiva. Secus85 si differentia in uno sit finita, in alio infinita; tunc enim sunt eiusdem rationis secundum aliquid, quia secundum rationem formalem; sed illa, ubi est finita, contrahit genus; ideo constitutum per ipsam est in genere differentia ubi est infinita, nihil potest contrahere. constituitur in genere .

Ideo tale non

86 Hoc modo intelligo illud, quod species transfertur ad divina, Hoc non genus, quia species dicit perfectionem, genus non. contradictionem includit si intelligatur de specie tota, quia in eius intellectu essentiali includitur genus.

Debet igitur intelligi ratione

differentiae, quae perfectionem dicit; non sic genus.

Hoc est

bene possibile ; neutrum enim per se includit aliud.

Sed

nec

transfertur differentia, ut differentia—quia sic est finita et constituit in genere necessario-sed absoluta ratio differentiae, quae absolute perfectionem dicit indifferentem ad infinitum et finitum, quae dicunt modos perfectionis illius entitatis, sicut magis et minus in albedine.

Novi

quod

aliqua

hic

aliquorum, sed non hic alibi locus erit.

narrata

assumpsi

contradicunt

opiniones varias

opinionibus improbare ;

Iuxta istam tertiam rationem potest fieri quasi similis ratio e converso sic : Nulla substantia finita est eadem perfectioni quae secundum rationem suam esset accidentalis si esset finita; Substantia Prima est eadem intellectioni, etc. Et ita potest addi Maiori Nulla perfectio eiusdem rationis cum aliqua tertiae rationis: accidentali est substantialis vel idem substantiae, quia genera sunt primo diversa; et quod uni est accidens, nulli est substantia; ergo

85 est add. OCTAR. 86 Deum-MaWCO₂ (also Mueller's text) .

117

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

Those things which agree in a The proof of the Major: formal aspect, from which is taken the difference, agree in the genus if every formal perfection is finite ; because such a finite But difference in everything is contractive of the same genus. such is not the case if the difference in one is finite, in the other infinite; for then they are of the same aspect according to something, because according to the formal aspect; but when the difference is finite, it contracts the genus; therefore that which is constituted by it is in a genus; the difference, when it is inTherefore such a thing is not finite, can contract nothing. constituted in a genus . In this manner I understand that dictum that

" species" is

applied to God, but not "genus", because "species" bespeaks perfection, whereas "genus" does not. This includes a contradiction if it is understood of the whole species, because in the essential understanding of it the genus is included. Therefore it ought to be understood because of the difference, which bespeaks perfection; not so the genus.

This is certainly possible, for neither

includes the other by itself. But the difference is not applied as difference-because thus it is finite and is constitutive within the genus necessarily-but as the absolute meaning of the difference, which absolutely bespeaks perfection indifferent to infinite and finite, which bespeak modes of perfection of that entity, as greater or less in whiteness.

I know that some things here affirmed contradict the opinions of certain ones, but I have chosen not to disprove these various opinions here; there will be place for that elsewhere. According to this third reason there can be made, as it were, a like reason conversely in this fashion : No finite substance is identical with a perfection which according to its definition would be accidental if it were finite; the First Substance is identical with the intellection, etc. And so it can be added to the Major of the third reason that no perfection of the same standing with some accidental perfection is substantial or identical with a substance, because the genera are first of all diverse; and what is an Therefore the act of accident to one is a substance to none.

118

De Primo Principio

intelligere nulli substantiae quae est in genere substantiae est idem; haec, si est finita, est talis ; si non, propositum.

Iuxta hoc propono quartam rationem : est in genere; Prima Natura etc.

Omnis substantia finita

non est-ex prima huius; quare,

Maior patet, quia in conceptu communi substantiae con-

venit cum aliis et formaliter distinguitur; patet; ergo distinctivum est

idem

aliquo

modo

cum

entitate

substantiae ,

non

per

omnimodam identitatem, quia eorum rationes sunt primo diversae, et neutra infinita ; ideo neutra omnino includit aliam per identitatem; igitur est unum ex eis sicut ex contrahente et contracto, actu et potentia; igitur genus et differentia ; ergo species.

Breviter sic arguitur, et est idem: Omne realiter conveniens convenit et differt realitate non formaliter eadem. realitas qua convenit est illa qua differt per identitatem, nisi sit altera infinita; et tunc includens utrumque erit infinitum; si autem sequitur compositio.

Omne

igitur conveniens essentialiter et differens essentialiter,

neutra sit altera per identitatem,

aut est

compositum ex realitatibus formaliter distinctis, aut est infinitum. Omne per se existens convenit sic et differt; quare si est in se omnino simplex, sequitur quod erit etiam infinitum.

His viis quatuor videtur infinitas posse concludi de Deo : tribus ex mediis sumptis de intellectu, quarto ex simplicitate in essentia, quae superius est ostensa.

Quinta videtur via eminentiae, secundum quam arguo sic: Eminentissimo incompossibile est esse aliquid perfectius-ex incompossibile est corollario quartae tertii ; finito non est aliquid incompossibile esse Minor probatur, quia infinitum non perfectius;88 quare; etc. repugnat entitati ; omni finito maius est infinitum.

87 substantia-MaV, (also Mueller's text) . 88 MuPAR have a completely different word order for this sentence, and also me variants, but the meaning is essentially the same.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

119

understanding is identical with no substance that is in the genus of substance. If this substance is finite, it is such (viz., in the genus of substance) ; if it is not, the intended conclusion is reached.

According to this I submit a fourth reason:

Every finite sub-

stance is in a genus; the First Nature is not-from the first conclusion of this chapter; therefore, etc. The Major is evident, because in the common concept of substance it agrees with the others and is formally distinguished ; this is evident ; therefore that which distinguishes is the same in some way with the entity of the substance, but not through every kind of entity, because their definitions are primarily diverse, and neither is infinite; therefore neither includes entirely the other through identity; therefore there is one resulting from them as from the contracting and the contracted, from act and potency; therefore there is a genus and difference; therefore, a species. Briefly it is argued in this manner and it is the same:

Every-

thing really agreeing and really differing agrees and differs by a reality not formally the same. But the reality by which it agrees is not that through identity by which it differs, unless the other be infinite; and then that which includes each of them will be infinite.

But if neither is the other through identity, there

follows a composition.

Everything therefore agreeing essentially

and differing essentially is either a composite from realities formally distinct, or is infinite. Everything existing per se agrees and differs thus ; therefore if it is altogether simple in itself, it follows that it will also be infinite. By these four ways it seems that infinity can be concluded about God: from three means taken from the intellect, the fourth from simplicity in essence, which has been shown above. There seems to be a fifth way of eminence, according to which I argue thus:

It is incompatible to the most eminent that there

be something more perfect-from the corollary to the fourth conclusion of the third chapter. It is not incompatible to what is finite that there be something more perfect. Therefore, etc. The Minor is proved, because what is infinite is not repugnant to entity; what is infinite is greater than every finite being.

De Primo Principio

120

Aliter

arguitur,

et

est

idem.

Cui

non

repugnat

infinitas

intensive, illud non est summe perfectum, nisi sit infinitum; quia si est finitum, potest excedi, quia infinitas sibi non repugnat; enti non repugnat infinitas; igitur perfectissimum est infinitum.

Minor huius, quae in praecedenti argumento accipiebatur, non videtur a priori posse ostendi; quia, sicut contradictoria ex rationibus propriis contradicunt, nec potest per aliquid manifestius hoc probari, ita non-repugnantia ex rationibus propriis non repugnant. Nec videtur posse ostendi nisi explicando rationes 89 ens per nihil notius explicatur ; infinitum intelligimus ipsorum; per finitum ; et hoc vulgariter sic expono :

Infinitum est, quod

finitum datum secundum nullam finitam mensuram praecise excedit, sed ultra omnem habitudinem assignabilem adhuc excedit.

aliquod

Sic tamen propositum suadetur : possibile cuius non apparet

Sicut quodlibet est ponendum

impossibilitas,

ita

et

compossibile

cuius non apparet incompossibilitas ; hic nulla apparet, quia de ratione entis non est finitas. Nec apparet ex ratione entis quod finitum sit passio convertibilis cum ente; alterum eorum requiritur ad repugnantiam praedictam. Passiones primae vertibiles satis videntur notae sibi inesse.

Tertio sic suadetur:

entis

et

con-

Infinitum suo modo non repugnat quan-

titati , id est, in accipiendo partem post partem; ergo nec infinitum suo modo repugnat entitati, illud est, perfecte⁹0 simul essendo. 89 rationes ipsorum om. MuPTV₁AR. 90 imperfecte-MaWCO2O4AR (also Mueller's text) . This reading is evidently in contradiction to the true meaning of Scotus, which is found also in the parallel passage of the Oxoniense, thus : “id est, in perfectione simul essendo” (Oxon. I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 31 ; VIII, 479 a) . Balic, loc. cit., has cited this difference. However, he accepts Mueller's reading as the correct reading of the De Primo and then uses it to support his own opinion that the De Primo has many such errors, due to the mistakes of the one who copied these passages from the Oxoniense. But since four good manuscripts (MuPTV, ) have the correct reading perfecte, Balic has only a weak argument in citing this passage.

121

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being It is argued in another fashion, and it is the same.

That to

which infinity intensively taken is not repugnant is not supremely perfect unless it is infinite.

For if it is finite it can be exceeded,

because infinity is not repugnant to it ; therefore that which is most perfect is infinite.

The Minor of this proof, which was accepted in the preceding argument, does not seem to be able to be shown a priori. For, just as contradictories contradict from their own meanings, and this cannot be proved by anything more manifest, so by the non-repugnance of their own meanings they infinity and being) are not repugnant.

(viz. , the terms ,

Nor does it seem that

it can be shown except by explaining their meanings .

Being is

not explained by anything better known; infinite is explained through finite; and the latter I explain in a popular definition: The infinite is that which precisely exceeds any given finite, not according to any finite measure but even beyond every assignable proportion.

Nevertheless the proposed conclusion is persuaded in this way: Just as everything is to be posited as possible, the impossibility of which is not apparent, so also everything is to be posited as compatible, the incompatibility of which is not apparent .

Here

no incompatibility is apparent, because finiteness does not belong to the meaning of being.

Nor is it apparent from the meaning

of being that finite is a property convertible with being; one of these is required for the aforesaid repugnance.

The properties of

being which are primary and coextensive seem to be sufficiently known to belong to it.

Thirdly, it is persuaded thus:

The infinite in its own mode

is not repugnant to quantity, that is, in taking part after part; therefore neither is the infinite in its own mode repugnant to 11 entity, that is, in being perfectly at once.¹

11 Confer Latin text.

122

De Primo Principio

Quarto: Si quantitas virtutis est simpliciter perfectior quantitate molis, quare erit possibilis infinitas in mole, i non in virtute? 92 Quod si est possibilis , est in°2 actu-ex quarta tertii. Quinto sic: quia intellectus, cuius obiectum est ens, nullam invenit repugnantiam intelligendo ens infinitum; imo videtur perfectissimum intelligibile. Mirum est autem, si nulli intellectui talis contradictio patens foret circa primum eius obiectum , cum discordia in sono ita faciliter offendat auditum.

Si, inquam,

disconveniens statim percipitur et offendit, cur nullus intellectus ab ente infinito naturaliter refugit, sicut a non conveniente, ita primum obiectum destruente? Per illud potest colorari illa ratio Anselmi93 de summo cogitabili. Intelligenda est descriptio eius sic :

"Deus est quo " cogitato sine

contradictione "maius cogitari non potest" sine contradictione. Nam in cuius cogitatione includitur contradictio, illud dicitur** non cogitabile, et ita est.

Duo enim tunc sunt cogitabilia opposita,

nullo modo faciendo unum cogitabile, quia neutrum determinat alterum.

Sequitur tale summe cogitabile praedictum esse in re,

per quod describitur

Deus, primo de esse quidditativo,⁹

in tali cogitabili summo summe quiescit intellectus.

quia

Igitur est in

ipso ratio primi obiecti intellectus, scilicet entis et in summo.

91 mobile-WTV₁ (also Mueller's text, but this is no doubt a printing error, for in the critical apparatus at the bottom of the page ( p. 107 ) Mueller gives mole as his reading, and mobile as a variant) . The parallel text in the Oxoniense has mole. (Oxon. I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 32 ; VIII, 479 a.) Ma, Mueller's favorite manuscript, clearly has mole. 92 et MaWCO2O4 (also Mueller's text) . 93 St. Anselm, Proslogion, ch. 3 (PL 158 , 228) : "Sic ergo vere est aliquid quo majus cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse: et hoc es tu, Domine Deus noster." 94 debet dici MuPAR; dicit 04 95 distinguitur Ma (also Mueller's text) . Mueller's very great preference for Ma is strikingly brought out here. He has carefully listed the other ten manuscripts he used at this point, indicating that W first had distinguitur, which was deleted with describitur added in the margin. We wish merely to point out how Mueller follows Ma alone even in the face of nine other manuscripts, when the whole paragraph treats of the celebrated descriptio of St. Anselm. 96 Mueller's text has quidditative, which is also obviously a printing error, as can be judged from reading the bottom of the page, where quidditativo is given as his reading. The parallel text in the Oxoniense has quidditativo (Oxon . I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 32; VIII, 479 b) . Ma clearly has quidditativo.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

123

Fourthly, if the quantity of power is simply more perfect than the quantity of mass, why will infinity be possible in mass, and not in power? But if it is possible, it is also actual-from the fourth conclusion of the third chapter.

The intellect, the object of which is being, finds no repugnance in understanding infinite being; on the conFifthly, thus:

trary, it (viz., infinite being) seems to be the most perfect intelligible. However, it is strange if such a contradiction would not be evident to any intellect about its first object, since discord in sound so easily offends the hearing. If, I say, that which disagrees is immediately perceived and offends, why does no intellect naturally shrink from infinite being, as from something not agreeing, and thus something destroying its first object?

Through this means the argument of Anselm about the highest being thinkable can be touched up. His description must be understood thus : "God is a being than which" -when thought of without a contradiction-" a greater cannot be thought of"12 For that in the thought of which there is included a contradiction is said to be not thinkable, and it is without a contradiction.

truly so . For there are then two thinkables opposed, in no way making one thinkable, because neither determines the other. It follows that there exists in reality such a highest thinkable as mentioned, through which God is described. This is shown first with regard to quidditative being, because in such a highest thinkable the intellect reposes in the highest degree. Therefore there is in it the character of the first object of the intellect, namely, of being, and in the highest degree. 12 St. Anselm's text of the Proslogion, ch. 3, may be translated: “There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being Thou art, O Lord, our God." Confer text.

124

De Primo Principio

Ultra, de esse existentiae:

Summum cogitabile non est tantum

in intellectu cogitante; quia tunc posset esse, quia cogitabile, et non posset esse, quia rationi eius repugnat esse ab alio -secundum tertiam et quartam tertii. Maius igitur cogitabile est illud quod est in re quam quod in intellectu tantum; non sic intelligendo quod idem, si cogitetur, per hoc sit maius cogitabile, si existat, sed omni quod est in intellectu tantum, est maius aliquod cogitabile quod existit.

Vel aliter coloratur sic:

Maius cogitabile est, quod existit, id

Quod non existit, nec est, perfectius cogitabile quia visibile. addit, non est visibile ; visibile in se nec in nobiliori, cui nihil est perfectius cognoscibile non visibili, tantummodo intelligibili abstractive; ergo perfectissime cognoscibile existit.

Sexta via ad propositum ex parte finis

Voluntas

est talis:

nostra potest omni fine finito aliquid maius appetere vel amare, sicut et intellectus intelligere; et videtur inclinatio naturalis ad summe amandum bonum infinitum. Nam inde arguitur inclinatio naturalis in voluntate ad aliquid, quia ex se sine habitu prompte et Voluntas libera, ita videtur quod⁹8 delectabiliter vult illud. experimur in amando bonum infinitum, non videtur in alio perfecte quietari. Quomodo non illud naturaliter odiret, si esset oppositum sui obiecti, sicut naturaliter odit non esse?

Septima via est ex parte causae efficientis quam tangit Aristoteles 8° Physicorum et 12 ° Metaphysicae-100 quia movet motu infinito; ergo habet infinitam potentiam .

Haec ratio coloratur quantum ad antecedens sic:

quia aeque

concluditur propositum si posset movere per infinitum, sicut si movet, quia aeque oportet ipsum esse in actu . Quantum ad consequentiam sic:

quia si ex se et non virtute alterius movet

97 om. MuPV1 . 98 ita videtur quod/sicut MuPAR. These four manuscripts likewise have a different word order for this sentence, but the meaning is the same. 99 Phys., Bk. 8, ch. 5 ( 256a 12–256 b 2) . 100 Metaph., Bk. 12, ch. 6 ( 1071 b 2-22 ) . Mueller merely gives two references to the 14th Book, neither of which seems to pertain directly to the question; they are Metaph. 14, ch. 1 and ch. 5 ( 1087 a 30-36 and 1092 a 10-17 ) .

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

Furthermore, with regard to the being of existence :

125

The

highest thinkable is not merely in the thinking intellect ; because then it could be, because thinkable, and it could not be, because it is repugnant to its meaning for it to be from another-according to the third and fourth conclusions of the third chapter.

There-

fore that which is in reality is a greater thinkable than that which is in the intellect only. It is not meant by this that the same thing, if it be thought of, is a greater thinkable on the condition that it exists, but that any thinkable which exists is greater than everything which is in the intellect only. Or it is touched up in another way thus :

A greater thinkable

is that which exists; that is, it is a more perfect knowable because it is visible. That which exists neither in itself nor in a nobler being to which it adds nothing, is not visible. Something visible is a more perfect knowable than something non-visible, which is only abstractively intelligible.

Therefore that which is most

perfectly knowable exists. The sixth way to the proposed conclusion from the part of the end is as follows: Our will can seek or love something greater than every finite end, as also our intellect can understand such; and there seems to be a natural inclination to love the infinite good in the highest degree.

For a natural inclination in the will

toward something is argued from this, that of itself without a habit it promptly and delectably wills it.

The free will, as it

seems from our experience in loving the infinite good, does not seem to be satisfied perfectly in any other.

How would it not

naturally hate that ( viz. , the infinite) if it were opposed to its object, just as it naturally hates non-being? The seventh way is from the part of the efficient cause-which Aristotle touches in the eighth book of the Physics and the twelfth book of the Metaphysics ; because it moves with an infinite motion, therefore it has an infinite power. This argument is touched up in this fashion with regard to the antecedent:

The proposed conclusion is reached just as well if it could move infinitely, as if it does move, because it is equally necessary for it to be in act. With regard to the consequence thus:

If from itself and not by the power of another it moves

126

De Primo Principio

infinito motu, igitur non ab alio accipit sic movere, sed in sua vi habet totum effectum simul, quia independenter; quod simul habet virtualiter effectum infinitum est infinitum ; igitur ; etc.

Aliter coloratur ratio, quia primum movens simul101 habet in virtute sua activa omnes effectus possibiles produci per motum ; illi sunt infiniti, si motus infinitus ; ergo ; etc.

Non videtur consequentia bene probari. quia duratio maior nihil perfectionis

Non primo modo,

addit;102 non perfectior

albedo, quia uno anno manet quam si uno die; igitur motus quantaecumque durationis non est perfectior effectus quam motus unius diei ; igitur ex hoc, quod agens habet in virtute activa et simul, non concluditur maior perfectio hic quam ibi, nisi quod Et ita esset ostendendum quod agens diutius movet et ex se. aeternitas agentis concluderet eius infinitatem; alias ex infinitate motus non potest concludi. Tunc ultima propositio colorationis negatur, nisi de infinitate durationis.

Secundus color abluitur:

quia non maior perfectio intensiva

concluditur ex hoc, quod agens

quodcumque eiusdem speciei

potest producere succesive quamdiu manet, quia quod potest in unum tale uno tempore, eadem virtute potest in mille, si mille temporibus maneat. Non est autem possibilis apud philosophos infinitas-nisi numeralis effectuum producibilium per motum, scilicet generabilium et corruptibilium-quia in speciebus finitatem ponebant. Si quis alius probet infinitatem specierum possibilem, probando aliquos motus coelestes esse incommensurabiles et ita numquam posse redire ad uniformitatem etiamsi per infinitum durarent,

et

infinitae

coniunctiones

specie

causare¹03

infinita

generabilia specie de hoc, quidquid sit in se; sed nihil intentionem Aristotelis, qui infinitatem specierum negaret. 101 om. MaCO4 ( also Mueller's text) . 102 quia add. MuPTV₁AR. 103 causarent AR; causaret MuP.

ad

127

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

with an infinite motion , then not from another does it receive the power so to move, but in its own active force does it have its total effect at once, because independently. has virtually an infinite effect at once, is infinite.

But that which Therefore, etc.

The argument is touched up in another way, because the first mover has at once in its own active power all the effects possible to be produced through motion; these are infinite if the motion is infinite; therefore, etc. The consequence does not seem to be proved well.

Not in

the first manner, because a greater duration adds nothing of perfection; whiteness is not more perfect because it remains for one year than if it remains for one day; therefore a motion of no matter how great duration is not a more perfect effect than a motion of one day.

Therefore from this, that the agent has

in active power and at once all the effects, there is not concluded a greater perfection here than there, except that the agent moves longer and of itself.

And so it would have to be shown

that the eternity of the agent would conclude to its infinity ; otherwise from the infinity of motion it cannot be concluded . Then the last proposition of the touching up is denied, except with reference to infinity of duration. The second color ( i. e. , touching up) is removed:

A greater

intensive perfection is not concluded from this, that an agent can produce every one of the same species successively as long as it remains, because what an agent can do to one such at one time, by the same power it can do to a thousand, if it remains for a thousand times.

However, according to the philosophers there is

not possible an infinity-except the numerical infinity of effects producible through motion, namely, of generables and corruptibles-because they posited finiteness in species. If anyone else should prove that the infinity of the species is possible, by proving some heavenly movements to be incommensurable and so never able to return to uniformity even though they should be of infinite duration , and that infinite conjunctions in species cause infinite generables in species- about this I do not argue, whatever it may be in itself; but that is immaterial as regards the intention of Aristotle, who would deny the infinity of the species.

128

De Primo Principio

Obiicitur hic ulterius, inquirendo quomodo in primo argumento nitebaris concludere infinitatem quia Essentia Divina est causa cognoscendi infinita, et hic negas hoc posse concludi ex hoc , quod est causa essendi infinita , cognitum quam ens verum.

quasi maius sit facere aliquod Item:

esse

Quomodo in secundo argu-

mento concludere voluisti infinitatem ex hoc solo, quod natura Primi est ratio totalis videndi aliquam naturam aliam, et non concluditur hic si104 est ratio totalis essendi respectu eius?

Nam

saltem proximae naturae sibi est totalis causa essendi .

Ad primum: Quidquid potest aliqua multa simul , quorum quidlibet requirit aliquam perfectionem propriam, illud concluditur perfectius ex pluralitate talium; ita est de intelligere infinita simul ; et ita concederem, si probares, quod posset causare simul infinita , quod esset virtus infinita; non ita, si successive .

Contra: Simul habet; etiam, quantum est ex se, simul posset; sed natura effectus nigrum

non

causabilia.

non

permittit,

est minus

sicut potens

perfectum quia

ista

causare

album et

non sunt

simul

Hoc enim est ex repugnantia ipsorum, non ex defectu

agentis.

Respondeo:

Non est probatum quod Primum est tota causa

istorum infinitorum et quod simul habet totaliter illa, quia non est probatum ex causalitate efficientiae, quin causa secunda sit necessaria propter aliquam propriae formalitati.

Contra:

causalitatem

correspondentem

suae

Hoc bene probatur, quod habet eminenter omnem

causalitatem causae secundae, etiam propriam illi, licet non sit probatum quod illa ut formaliter nihil addat sibi ut eminenter ; habet igitur simul eminenter omnem causalitatem respectu omnis effectibilis, etiam infinitorum, licet ista fiant successive.

104 quod-MuPAR; sed-W.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

129

It is objected here further by inquiring how in the first argument you attempted to conclude to infinity because the Divine Essence is the cause of knowing infinite objects, and here you deny that this same can be concluded from this, that it is the infinite cause of being, so that it is, as it were, greater to cause some thought-being than to cause a true being.

Furthermore:

How did you wish to conclude to infinity in the second argument from this only, that the nature of the First Principle is the total reason of seeing some other nature, and how is it not concluded here, if it is the total reason of being with respect to it? For it is the total cause of being at least of the nature next to itself.

To the first:

Whatever can do many things together, every

one of which requires some proper perfection, is concluded to be more perfect, from the plurality of such things; so it is with regard to the act of understanding infinite objects simultaneously ; and so, if you would prove that it would cause infinite objects simultaneously , I would concede that it would be an infinite. power; not so, if successively. Against it: It has that power at once, and, in so far as it is in itself, it could cause infinite objects simultaneously; but the nature of the effect does not permit it , as that which is able to cause white and black is not less perfect because these are not causable together. This is from their mutual exclusiveness, not from a defect of the agent. I answer:

It is not proved that the First Principle is the total

cause of these infinite objects and that it has them totally together, because it is not proved from the causality of efficiency that a second cause is not necessary because of some causality corresponding to its proper formality.

Against it: This is well proved, that it has eminently every causality of a second cause, even a causality proper to it (viz., the second cause) , although it is not proved that that causality as formally had adds nothing to itself as eminently had .

Conse-

quently it has eminently at once every causality with respect to every possible effect, even infinite effects, even though these happen successively.

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Respondeo:

Hoc est ultimum quod colorat dictam

conse-

quentiam Aristotelis, quantum video, et ex isto probo infinitatem sic:

Si Primum haberet omnem causalitatem formaliter et simul,

licet non possent causabilia simul poni in esse, esset infinitum, quia simul, quantum est ex se, posset infinita; et posse plura simul concludit maiorem potentiam intensive; igitur si habet perfectius quam si haberet omnem causalitatem formaliter, magis sequitur infinitas intensiva ; sed habet omnem secundum totum, quod est in ipsa eminentius quam sit in ipsa formaliter ; igitur est infinitae potentiae intensive.

Licet igitur omnipotentiam proprie dictam, secundum intellectum Catholicorum, usque ad Tractatum de Creditis distulerim, tamen illa non probata, infinita potentia probatur quae simul ex se habet eminenter omnem causalitatem, quae simul, quantum est ex se, si esset formaliter, posset in infinita, si essent simul factibilia.

Si obiicitur : Primum non potest ex se simul in infinita, quia non est probatum quod sit totalis causa infinitorum, hoc nihil obstat.

Si enim haberet simul unde esset totalis, nihil perfectius

esset quam nunc sit, sic quando habet unde sit Prima; tum¹05 quia illae duae non requiruntur propter perfectionem addendam in causando, quia tunc remotius esset perfectius, quia perfectiorem causam requireret—sed si requireretur secundum philosophos, hoc est propter imperfectionem, ut Primum cum aliqua causa imperfecta possit causare imperfectum, quod secundum ipsos non posset immediate causare-tum quia perfectiones totae secundum Aristotelem eminentius sunt in Primo quam si ipsae formalitates earum inessent, si possent inesse. Sic videtur posse concludere ratio Aristotelis de potentia infinita. 105 Mueller gives tum for only one manuscript, R, and has Tamen in his text as the first word of the following sentence. Since it is difficult to decide between tamen and tum in the manuscripts, it is necessary to decide from the sense that each gives. In trying Tamen we could reach no complete meaning, and not even a complete sentence. Tum, on the other hand, is found almost always in conjunction with another tum. Six lines later there is a second tum, and, though the sentence is very long, the two together give a satisfactory twofold reason. Ma and Mu have tum, in our judgment. O, has tamen. V₁ has tantum.

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131

I answer:

This is the last that touches up the aforementioned consequence of Aristotle, as far as I see, and from this I prove the infinity thus:

If the First Principle should have every

causability formally and together,

even though the

causables

could not be brought into being together, It would be infinite, because, inasmuch as It is of Itself, It could produce infinite things together; and to be able to produce more together concludes to a greater power intensively. Consequently if It has something more perfectly than if It were to have every causality formally, Its intensive infinity follows all the more ; but It has every secondary power in its totality, and this is more eminent than to have it formally; therefore It is of infinite power intensively. Even though I have deferred omnipotence properly so - called according to the understanding of Catholics to the Tract upon the Things Believed, nevertheless, even though that is not proved, an infinite power is proved, which of itself has eminently every causality together, and which, inasmuch as it is of itself, if it were formally simultaneous, could act upon infinite objects, if they were capable of being produced together. If it is objected that the First Principle cannot of Itself act upon infinite objects together because it is not proved that It is the total cause of infinite objects, this is no obstacle . For if It would have at once whence It would be the total cause , It would be nothing more perfect than It is now in this way when It has whence It is the First Cause; both because those two causes are not required on account of the perfection to be added in causing, for then the more remote effect would be the more perfect because it would require a more perfect cause -but if it would be required according to the philosophers, this is because of the imperfection of the effect, so that the First Principle with some imperfect cause can cause an imperfect effect, which according to them (viz., the philosophers) It could not immediately cause-and because all the perfections according to Aristotle are more eminently in the First Principle than if their formalities were present, if they could be present.

Thus the

argument of Aristotle seems to be able to conclude with regard to infinite power.

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Ad secundum obiectum supra dico quod quia Essentia Divina sola est ratio videndi lapidem perfecte, sequitur quod lapis nihil perfectionis addat illi Essentiae. Non sequitur hoc, si est ratio causandi lapidem immediate, etiam ut tota causa ; nam respectu supremae naturae Prima Causa est totalis causa.106

Iuxta istam viam efficientiae arguitur: quia creat, inter creationis extrema est distantia infinita. De hoc antecedens ponitur creditum, et verum est ut non-esse quasi duratione praecedat esse, ut tamen quasi natura, secundum viam Avicennae. Antecedens ostenditur ex decimanona tertii, quia saltem prima natura post Deum est ab ipso et non a se, nec accipit107 esse108 aliquo praesupposito .

Et, ut iam dictum est, effici non requirit mutari ; sed sic

accipiendo prius natura non-esse quam esse, non sunt ibi extrema mutationis quam causaret illa virtus.

Sed quidquid sit de ante-

cedente, consequentia non probatur ; quia quando inter extrema nulla est distantia, sed ipsa dicuntur distare praecise ratione extremorum in se, tanta est distantia quantum est maius extremum. Exemplum: Deus distat in infinitum a creatura.109

Ultimo ostenditur propositum ex negatione causae intrinsecae: quia forma finitur per materiam; igitur quae non est nata esse in materia, est infinita.

Hoc reputo nihil valere, quia secundum ipsos angelus immaterialis, non est infinitus. Numquam110 esse posterius essentia, secundum ipsos, essentiam finitabit. Unde quaelibet entitas habet intrinsecum gradum perfectionis, non per aliud ens .

Et si forma

finitur ad materiam, igitur si non ad illam, non finitur-fallacia est consequentis.

Corpus finitur ad corpus; igitur si non ad corpus,

106 quae tamen, cum sit finita, non concludit infinitatem primae causae respectu ipsius; non est autem probatum, quod respectu aliorum sit totalis causa; ideo etc. add. MuPAR. 107 potest- MuPTAR . 108 ab eo-add. MuPAR. 109 quia est infinitus add. MuPAR. 110 Nonne-W; Numquid-Ma (also Mueller's text) .

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

133

To the second objection above I say that because the Divine Essence alone is the reason for seeing the stone perfectly, it follows that the stone adds nothing of perfection to that Essence. This does not follow if it is the reason for causing the stone immediately, even as total cause ; for with respect to the highest 13 nature caused the first cause is the total cause. According to this way of efficiency it is argued: Because It creates, there is an infinite distance between the extremes of creation.

With regard to this the antecedent is posited to be believed, and it is true that non-being by a quasi-duration precedes being, but only as a quasi-nature, according to the way of Avicenna.

The antecedent is shown from the nineteenth con-

clusion of the third chapter, because at least the first nature after God is from Him and not from itself, nor does it receive being from something presupposed . And, as has already been said , "to be effected" does not require "to be changed" ; but by so taking non-being before being according to nature, there are not there the extremes of the change which that power would cause. But whatever is the case with regard to the antecedent, the consequence is not proved; because when there is no distance between the extremes, but they are said to be distant precisely by reason of the extremes in themselves, the distance is as great as the greater extreme. Example: God is infinitely distant from 14 a creature.

Lastly the proposed conclusion is shown from the denial of intrinsic cause: The form is limited through the matter; consequently what is not fit to be in matter, is infinite. I consider this reason to have no value, because according to Existence will

them an angel is immaterial but is not infinite.

never limit the essence , since according to them it is posterior to essence. Hence every entity has an intrinsic grade of perfection, not through another being. And if the form is limited in relation to matter, consequently, if it is not in relation to that, it is not limited-this is the fallacy of the consequent. A body 13 (which, however, since it is finite, does not conclude to the infinity of the First Cause with respect to Itself; moreover it is not proved that with respect to others It is the total cause; therefore, etc. ) Confer text. 14 (because He is infinite) . Confer text.

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De Primo Principio

est infinitum; ultimum caelum erit infinitum-sophisma est tertii Physicorum.

Quia corpus prius in se finitur, ita forma finita prius

in se est finita-quia scilicet prius¹¹² est talis natura in entibus quam finiatur per materiam.

Nam secunda finitas praesupponit primam,

non causat eam.113 In aliquo igitur signo naturae est essentia finita; igitur non finibilis per esse; ergo in secundo signo non finitur per esse.

Breviter dico unam propositionem: 114 DECIMA CONCLUSIO.

Ex infinitate sequitur ommimoda

simplicitas.

Prima, intrinseca in essentia-quia aut componeretur ex finitis in se aut ex infinitis in se; si primum, igitur finitum; si secundum, igitur pars minor toto. Secundo: quod non componitur ex partibus quantitativis, quia infinita perfectio non est in magnitudine, quia illa, si finita est, in maiore esset maior ; infinita magnitudo esse non potest. Haec ratio Aristotelis 8 ° Physicorum¹15 et 12 ° Metaphysicae.116 Sed instatur quia perfectio infinita in magnitudine esset elusdem rationis in toto et in parte, et ideo non in maiori maior, sicut modo anima intellectiva est perfectissima forma, et ita perfecta est in modico corpore sicut in magno, et in parte corporis sicut in toto; quia¹¹ si ipsam secundum essentiam suam consequeretur in111 Confer Aristotle, Phys., Bk. 3 , ch. 5 ( 204 b 11-15) . 112 om . MaWCO₂OV ₁ ( also Mueller's text) . Four of these manuscripts, however, namely CO₂2O4V₁ , have variants for quam. Mueller's text, with Ma and W, retains the quam without the preceding prius. 113 Prius add. O₂MuPTAR. 114 Breviter ... / om. MaV₁ (also Mueller's text) . As Balic points out, loc. cit., we must add with the Vivès edition, and with the parallel text, Oxon. I , d. 2, q. 2, n. 33 ; VIII, 482 a, the rest of this proposition: quod quaecumque essentia absolute finita in se est finita, ut praeintelligitur omni comparationi sui ad aliam essentiam. 115 Phys., Bk. 8, ch. 10 ( 266 a 25–266 b 26) . 116 Metaph., Bk. 12, ch . 7 ( 1073 a 2-12 ) . Mueller gives a text which mentions magnitude yet does not seem to pertain to the present question. In his enumeration it belongs to Book 12, but in ours to Book 13 —Metaph., Bk. 13, ch. 9 (1085 a 9-23 ) . 117 quare-R; quod - MaWCO2O4 (also Mueller's text) .

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

135

is limited in relation to a body ; therefore, if it is not in relation to a body, it is infinite; the ultimate heaven will be infinite-this is the fallacy of the third book of the Physics. For a body in itself is limited, and so a limited form in itself is limited, because there is such a nature among beings before it is limited through the matter. For the second limitation presupposes the first, it does not cause it.

In some instant of a nature, therefore, the

essence is limited; therefore it is not capable of being limited through existence ; therefore in the second instant it is not limited through existence .

Briefly I speak one proposition : 15

Tenth conclusion.

From infinity there follows every kind of

simplicity.

The first kind of simplicity, intrinsic in the essence—because it would be composed either from finite parts in themselves or from infinite parts in themselves.

If the first, then it is finite ;

if the second, then a part is less than the whole.

Secondly:

That it is not composed of quantitative parts is

proved from the fact that infinite perfection is not in a magnitude; because that perfection, if it is finite, would be greater in a greater magnitude ; but there cannot be an infinite magnitude. This is the argument of Aristotle in the eighth book of the Physics and the twelfth book of the Metaphysics.

But it is objected that infinite perfection in a magnitude would be of the same type in the whole and in a part, and therefore not greater in a greater magnitude, as now the intellective soul is the most perfect form and is thus perfect in a small body as in a great one, and in a part of a body as in the whole. For if the infinite power, namely, of understanding infinite intelligibles , 15 (that every absolute finite essence is finite in itself, as it is understood before every comparison of it with another essence) . Confer Latin text.

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De Primo Principio

finita potentia, scilicet intelligendi infinita intelligibilia, ita sequeretur eam in magnitudine modica ; quod si maior poneretur, non Omnis potentia in esset maior potentia . Haec ergo negatur : magnitudine maior est in maiori magnitudine.

Ratio Aristotelis coloratur, quod probat perfectionem infinitam non esse in magnitudine, sic quod extendatur per accidens, quod scilicet pars sit in parte; quia tunc maior esset in toto quam in parte, quantum ad efficientiam in operando, licet non secundum intensionem in se, sicut de igne magno et parte eius ; sequitur quod in magnitudine finita non sit potentia

et

ita

infinita

secundum efficientiam , et hoc extensa ; ergo nec secundum intensionem in se infinita.

Haec secunda consequentia patet, quia non concluditur infinita in se nisi ex infinitate in efficientia. Sed quod primum sequitur, ostenditur dupliciter :

Primo, quia in qualibet parte aliquota magnitudinis finitae est potentia finita secundum efficientiam; alias non minor tota; ergo et in tota est finita, quia compositum ex finitis in se et finities sumptis est finitum.

Secundo, quia¹18 intelligatur magnitudo crescere, crescet potentia sic secundum efficientiam; igitur prius fuit finita et semper erit, quamdiu intelligitur posse crescere, quod semper est, dum est in magnitudine finita.

Ergo numquam intelligitur impossibilis cres-

cere, nisi sit in magnitudine infinita, et ita nec alias est infinita secundum efficientiam; ergo nec secundum intensionem.

Sed quid ad propositum, quod potentia infinita intensive, non extenditur per accidens, ita quod pars sit in parte magnitudinis? Quomodo hinc sequetur quod omnino non sit in magnitudine? Suppletur ratio ultima sic : 118 si add. O₂V₁AR.

Extensio aliquid extendit quod est

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

137

would follow it (viz., the intellective soul) according to its essence, it would follow it thus in a small magnitude ; but if a greater magnitude were posited, there would not be a greater power.

This therefore is denied:

Every power in a magnitude

is greater in a greater magnitude. The argument of Aristotle is touched up, and it proves that infinite perfection is not in a magnitude, so that it is extended accidentally, so that, namely, a part is in a part.

For then there

would be a greater perfection in the whole than in a part, as regards efficiency in operating, although not according to intensity in itself, as in the case of a large fire and a part of it . And so it follows that in a finite magnitude there is not an infinite power according to efficiency, in case the power is extended ; therefore there is not an infinite power according to intensity in itself. This second consequence is evident, because an infinite power Howin itself is concluded only from infinity in efficiency. ever, that the first follows is shown in a two-fold manner: First, because in every singular part whatsoever of a finite magnitude there is a finite power according to efficiency; otherwise the part would not be less than the whole magnitude; therefore also in the whole magnitude there is a finite power, because a composite from finite things in themselves and taken a finite number of times is finite. Secondly, because if the magnitude is understood to increase, the power will increase thus according to efficiency ; therefore it was previously finite and always will be, as long as it is understood to be able to increase, which is always the case while it is in a finite magnitude .

Therefore it is never understood to be

impossible to increase, unless it is in an infinite magnitude, and so in no other way is it infinite according to efficiency; therefore not according to intensity.

But what about the proposed conclusion, that infinite power intensively taken is not extended accidentally, so that a part is in a part of the magnitude?

How will it follow from this that

it is not altogether in a magnitude?

The last reason is supplied

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De Primo Principio

subiectum, et non illam perfectionem infinitam, nec materiam, cuius illa sit forma, sicut intellectiva est corporis; quia illa perfectio non est in materia-ex prima huius; ergo; etc.

Ita et Philosophus

ante istam probationem probavit non inesse materia, 12 ° Meta119 physicae, ¹¹⁹ et virtute illius conclusionis prioris et istius, sequitur propositum sufficienter.

Propositum brevius sic probatur:

Intelligere non est subiectum

extensionis ; Prima Natura est intelligere-ex sexta huius—et non receptum in materia, quae possit dici quanta-ex prima huius .

Tertio concluditur quod non est componibilis alicui accidenti ; quia omne perfectibile caret secundum se entitate perfectionis ; alias non esset in potentia ad ipsam; ideo perfectio additur perfectibili, et totum est aliquid perfectius altero unitorum. Infinito nihil deest; nihil perfectionem120 addit, quod sit ei unibile ; tunc enim Infinito aliquid maius esset.

Secundo, quia accidentia mate-

rialia sibi inesse non possunt, quia non est quantus. Accidentia immaterialia pertinentia ad intellectum et voluntatem non sunt in ipso , quia quae videntur ibi maxime esse accidentia, sunt idem sibi sicut intelligere et velle-ex sexta huius.

Aliter arguitur ad hoc, quia in Primo nihil est per accidens, quia per se ante omne¹21 per accidens. Primo nulla est potentia.

In Primo nihil est causatum; in

Hoc ostendit quod accidens non sit de

essentia Primi, non autem quod non insit accidentaliter.

Primum

non, quia in essentia Primi, quae prima est, nihil esset per accidens, licet aliquid aliud ab ipsa accidentaliter sibi inesset; et ideo illo per accidens esset aliquod per se prius, quia essentia 119 Metaph ., Bk. 12, ch . 6 ( 1071 b 20-21 ) . Mueller gives Metaph., Bk. 13 , ch. 9 ( 1085 a 9-12, 21-22 ) . Confer note 116. 120 perfectioni-Ma (also Mueller's text, in which, however, this is obviously a printing error, since he gives perfectionem as the correct reading in the critical apparatus). 121 om. MaWO,OV₁1 (also Mueller's text) .

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

thus:

139

Extension extends something that is a subject, and not that

infinite perfection nor the matter of which that perfection is the form, as the intellective soul is the form of the body. For that perfection is not in matter-from the first conclusion of this chapter; therefore,

etc.

So also the Philosopher before this

proof proved that that perfection has no matter, in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, and in virtue of that prior conclusion and of this one, the intended conclusion follows sufficiently. The intended conclusion is proved more briefly thus : The act of understanding is not the subject of extension ; the First Nature is an act of understanding-from the sixth conclusion of this chapter-and is not received in the matter, which could be called quantitative-from the first conclusion of this chapter. Thirdly, it is concluded that the Infinite cannot be composed with any accident, because everything capable of being perfected lacks according to itself the entity of a perfection; otherwise it would not be in potency to that perfection ; therefore a perfection is added to that which is capable of being perfected, and the total is something more perfect than either of the things united. Nothing is lacking to the Infinite; and nothing that is able to be united to It adds a perfection ; for then something would be greater than the Infinite.

In the second place, material accidents

cannot belong to It, because It is not quantitative.

Immaterial

accidents pertaining to intellect and will are not in It, because those things which seem most of all to be accidents there, are identical with It, such as the act of understanding and the act of willing-from the sixth conclusion of this chapter. It is argued in another way to this, that in the First Principle nothing is accidental, because what is per se is before everything that is accidental. In the First Principle there is nothing caused ; in the First Principle there is no potency. This shows that an accident is not of the essence of the First Principle, not, however, that it is not present accidentally. Not the first, because in the esence of the First Principle, since the essence is first, there is nothing accidental, even if something different from it would accidentally exist in it ; and therefore something per se would be prior to that per accidens, because the first essence would be

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De Primo Principio

prima prior esset illa unione accidentis ad se.

Secundum non,

quia essentia prima esset incausata, licet aliquod causatum ipsam accidentaliter informaret; quaelibet essentia substantiae causatae est non causa sui, licet aliqua sit causa sui accidentis. Tertium non, quia potentia ad accidens est potentia secundum quid.

Unde

ostenditur, quod non possit esse in aliquo, quod in essentia sua est tantum actus.

Aliter arguitur: quod nihil est in Primo nisi perfectio simpliciter --ex secunda huius; quaelibet talis est idem essentiae illi; alias illa non esset optima ex se, vel plura simpliciter optima.

Non concludit, quia-sicut patet per illud quod dictum est in quarta huius probatione sexta-non repugnat rationi perfectionis simpliciter quod sint multae perfectiones simpliciter, et quaelibet summa in suo gradu, et tamen unum summum melius alio et omnibus illis summis ; et quolibet eorum melius sit essentia Primi, licet nulla earum sit eadem sibi, sed inhaerens tantum; quia non sequitur: Est denominativum melius quocumque sibi incompossibili, et est secundum suam rationem in summo, igitur est simpliciter optimum.

Sed tantum sequitur:

Igitur est optimum totius illius

generis, in quo est ipsum, et denominativa¹²² sibi incompossibilia.123

Sed si¹24 omnes perfectiones quae dicuntur simpliciter includerent se per identitatem, quidquid haberet unam perfectius aliquo et aliam sic haberet; consequens falsum.

Materia enim

magis est necessaria quam forma, tamen minus est actus; accidens125 dependens ad substantiam, tamen est simplicius126 ipsa. 122 denominativum-MaWV₁ (also Mueller's text) . 123 incompossibile-MaV, (also Mueller's text ) . 124 Sed si, our reading, is given by most of the manuscripts. Mueller's text omits si, and he attributes his reading to MaW and T. But Ma clearly has si and not sed. 125 om. MaWCT (also Mueller's text) . 126 simpliciter MaWC (also Mueller's text) .

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

141

prior to that union of an accident to itself. Not the second, because the first essence would be uncaused, even though something caused would accidentally inform it; no essence of a caused substance is the cause of itself, although some are the cause of their accidents. Not the third, because a potency to an accident is a potency in a qualified sense. Hence it is shown that it cannot be in something which in its essence is purely act.

It is argued in another way that there is nothing in the First Principle except perfection in an unqualified sense-from the second conclusion of this chapter; every such perfection is identical with that essence; otherwise that essence would not be the best of itself, or there would be more than one best in an unqualified sense.

This is not conclusive, because-as is evident through that which was said in the fourth conclusion of this chapter, the sixth proof-it is not repugnant to the meaning of pure perfection that there be many pure perfections, and every one the highest in its own grade, and yet one highest being better than another and than all those highest in their own grades ; and that that which is better than every one of them is the essence of the First Being, even though none of them is identical with it but only inherent to it. For it does not follow: There is a denominative better than everything incompatible with it, and it is according to its own type in the highest degree ; therefore it is the best in an unqualified sense.

But all that follows is:

Therefore it is the

best of that whole kind in which there is itself and the denominatives incompatible with it.

But if all the perfections which are said to be pure perfections would include one another through identity, whatever would have one perfection in a more perfect manner than another would have it, would also have another perfection in a more perfect manner; the consequent is false. For matter is more necessary than form; however it is less an act. An accident is dependent with reference to a substance ; however it is more simple than a substance.

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De Primo Principio

Saepe¹27 coelum incorruptibilius est mixto ; tamen nostrum corpus animatum nobilius est inquantum animatum .

Ideo sequitur

quod differunt perfectiones simpliciter-nisi aliquae,

quae sunt

passiones entis-et inter se, et a subiecto forte, et una intense habetur, alia non intense vel omnino non habetur.

Sed nec prima propositio huius rationis est ostensa; nam illa secunda quae allegatur non probat de accidente inhaerente, sed de intrinseco Naturae Summae.

Si autem accidens poneretur in Primo ab aliquo protervo , difficile esset contra ipsum ostendere illud esse perfectionem simpliciter, quia quandoque nobiliores naturae denominantur a denominativo minus nobili, et minus nobiles a nobiliori, quod dicitur perfectio simpliciter. Exemplum: Materia prima est simplex, homo non est simplex; simplicitas est tale denominativum. Imo difficile esset ex istis quatuor mediis ultimis, et forte impossibile, probare quod in Primo non sit accidens per accidens contingenter inhaerens, et secundum quod possit per accidens mutari, sive a se sive ab aliquo posteriori ; quia voluntas nostra ponitur ex se mutari ad velle, licet Prima Causa ponatur respectu actuum nostrorum.

Si bene esset probata in Primo simplicitas accidenti repugnans, foecunda128 conclusio esset valde. Si cui duae primae probationes hic positae non placeant, afferat meliores.

Domine Deus noster, plures129 perfectiones a philosophis de te notas, possunt Catholici utcumque¹30 concludere ex praedictis. Tu Primum Efficiens . Tu Finis Ultimus . Tu supremus in perfectione, cuncta transcendis.

Tu penitus incausatus, ideo ingen-

erabilis et incorruptibilis; imo omnino impossibilis non esse, quia ex te necesse esse; ideoque aeternus, quia interminabilitatem dura-

127 Similiter—AR. 128 secunda—V₁R. It is difficult to decide between foecunda and secunda in some of the manuscripts. 129 plerasque-WO,CO ; plurimasque-MuPT; plurimas AR. 130 necessario-O₂V₁ ; ut cu ? —A; vere R. The rest of the manuscripts seem to have utcumque, but perhaps it should be read utique.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

143

Similarly: The heaven is more incorruptible than a compound; yet our animated body is nobler in so far as it is animated. Therefore it follows that pure perfections differ-except some, which are attributes of being-both from one another and perhaps from a subject; and one perfection is had intensively ; another is either not had intensively or is not had at all . But the first proposition of this reasoning has not been shown; for that second which is adduced does not give a proof with regard to an inherent accident, but with regard to something intrinsic to the Highest Nature. If, however, an accident were posited in the First Principle by some hair-splitting philosopher, it would be difficult to show against him that it would be a pure perfection, because sometimes nobler natures are denominated by a less noble denominative, and less noble natures by a nobler, which is called a pure Prime matter is simple, man is not perfection. Example : simple; simplicity is such a denominative.

Indeed it would be

difficult and perhaps impossible to prove from these four ultimate means that in the First Principle there is not an accident accidentally and contingently inherent, and according to which It (viz., the First Principle) could be accidentally changed, either by Itself or by something posterior ; because our will is asserted to be changed of itself toward an act of willing, even though the First Cause is posited with respect to our acts. If it were well proved that in the First Principle simplicity would be repugnant to an accident, the conclusion would be exceedingly fruitful.16

If anyone does not like the first two

proofs here posited, let him bring forward better ones. O Lord our God, Catholics can somehow¹7 conclude, from the things that have been said, to many more perfections that were known of Thee by the philosophers. Thou are the First Efficient. Thou art the Last End. Thou art supreme in perfection, Thou dost transcend all things.

Thou art completely uncaused,

therefore ingenerable and incorruptible; indeed it is altogether impossible for Thee not to be, because of Thyself Thou art a necessary being; and therefore Thou art eternal, because Thou 16 or (the second conclusion would be valid.) 17 or (surely) . Confer text.

Confer text.

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De Primo Principio

tionis simul habens sine potentia ad successionem; quia nulla successio esse potest, nisi in continue causato aut saltem in essendo ab alio dependente, quae dependentia longe est a necessario ex se in essendo.

Tu vivus vita nobilissima, quia intelligens et volens .

Tu beatus,

imo essentialiter beatitudo, quia tu es comprehensio tui ipsius. Tu visio tui clara et dilectio iucundissima; et licet in te solo beatus et tibi summe sufficias, tu tamen omne intelligibile simul actu intelligis.

Tu omne causabile simul contingenter et libere potes

velle et volendo causare ; verissime igitur es potentiae infinitae. Tu incomprehensibilis, infinitus; nam nihil omnisciens est finitum; nullum infinitae potentiae est finitum, nec supremum in entibus; nec finis ultimus est finitus; nec per se existens simplex penitus est finitum.

Tu es in fine simplicitatis, nullas partes habens re distinctas, nullas realitates in essentia tua habens realiter131 non easdem. In te nulla quantitas, nullum potest accidens inveniri ; et ideo es secundum accidentia non mutabilis, sicut te in essentia esse immutabilem superius iam expressi.

Tu solus simpliciter es perfectus; non perfectus angelus aut corpus, sed perfectum ens, cui¹32 nihil deest entitatis possibilis alicui inesse .

Non potest omnis entitas alicui formaliter inesse ;

sed potest in aliquo formaliter vel eminenter haberi, quomodo tu Deus habes, qui es supremus entium, imo solus in entibus infinitus.

Tu bonus sine termino, bonitatis tuae radios liberalissime communicans, ad quem amabilissimum singula suo modo recurrunt ut ad ultimum suum finem.

131 veraciter-MaO2. Mueller reads this as veraciter, and does not give any variants, though at least five manuscripts (MuTV, AR) have realiter. 132 tibi-MaW (also Mueller's text) .

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

145

hast at once an interminability of duration without a potency to succession.

For there can be no succession except in that which

is continuously caused, or at least in that which has its being dependent upon another; and this dependence is far from that which is necessary of itself in being.

Thou art living by a most noble life, because Thou art intelligent and willing. Thou art happy, nay, Thou art essentially beatitude, because Thou are the comprehension of Thyself. Thou art the clear vision of Thyself and the most joyful love; and although Thou art happy in Thyself and supremely sufficient unto Thyself, nevertheless Thou dost actually understand every intelligible at once. Thou canst will every causable at once contingently and freely and, by willing, cause them. Most truly, then, art Thou of infinite power.

Thou art incomprehensible , For nothing omniscient is finite; nothing of infinite power is finite; neither is that which is supreme among beings or the ultimate end finite; nor is the completely simple per se infinite.

existing being finite.

Thou art at the end of simplicity, having no parts really distinct, having no realities in Thy essence which are really not the same. In Thee no quantity, no accident can be found ; and therefore with regard to accidents Thou art immutable, as I have expressed above that Thou art immutable in essence.

Thou alone art perfect in an unqualified sense; not a perfect angel or body, but a perfect Being to Whom nothing is lacking of entity possible to belong to any being.

Every entity cannot

formally belong to some one being; but it can be formally or eminently had in some one, as Thou, O God, dost have it, Who art the highest of beings, indeed the only Infinite among beings.

Thou art good without end, communicating rays of Thy goodness most liberally, to Whom as the most amiable every being has recourse in its own way as to its ultimate end.

De Primo Principio

146

Tu solus es Veritas Prima; quippe, quod non est quod apparet, falsum est. Igitur est aliud sibi ratio apparendi, quia si sola eius natura esset sibi ratio apparendi, appareret esse quod est. Tibi nihil aliud est ratio apparendi, quia in tua essentia tibi primitus apparente; ac per hoc tibi nihil posterius est ratio apparendi.

In illa, inquam, essentia omne intelligibile sub perfectissima ratione intelligibilis est intellectui tuo praesens. Tu es ergo intelligibilis veritas praeclarissima et veritas infallibilis, et veritatem omnem intelligibilem certitudinaliter comprehendens. Non enim alia , quae in te apparent, ideo tibi inesse apparent ut te fallant, quia in te apparent; quia haec ratio apparendi non prohibet propriam rationem ostensi per ipsam tuo intellectui apparere. Sicut noster visus fallitur, quando extranei apparentia prohibet illud quod est apparere, non ita est in tuo intellectu; imo, tua essentia apparente, quidlibet in ipsa relucens ex eius perfectissima claritate, tibi secundum propriam

rationem

apparet.

De veritate tua et ideis in te, non est opus amplius pertractare propter

meum

propositum

exsequendum.

Multa

de

ideis

dicuntur quibus numquam dictis, imo nec ideis nominatis, non minus de tua perfectione scietur.

Hoc constat, quia tua essentia

est perfecta ratio cognoscendi quodcumque cognoscibile sub ratione quacumque cognoscibilis-appellet ideam, qui vult-hic non intendo circa Graecum illud et Platonicum vocabulum immorari.

Praeter praedicta, de te a philosophis praedicata, saepe Catholici te laudant omnipotentem, immensum, ubique praesentem, iustum et misericordem, cunctis creaturis et specialiter intellectualibus providentem, quae ad tractatum proximum differuntur. In hoc quippe tractatu primo tentavi¹33 videre qualiter¹³ metaphysica de te dicta ratione naturali aliqualiter concludantur. In sequenti

133 tractavi Ma; tentabo-MuTAR; om. P. 134 generaliter-B; quomodo-MuPTAR.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

147

Thou alone art the First Truth; indeed, that which is not as it appears, is false. Therefore the reason of appearing is different from itself, because if only its nature were the reason of appearing for it, it would appear to be what it is.

For Thee

nothing else is the reason of appearing, because Thou art in Thy essence appearing first of all to Thyself; and through this nothing posterior to Thee is the reason of appearing. In that essence, I say, every intelligible under the most perfect reason of an intelligible is present to Thy intellect. Thou art therefore the most clear intelligible truth and infallible truth, and Thou dost comprehend every intelligible with certitude. For other things, which appear in Thee, do not therefore appear to be present in Thee that they might deceive Thee, because they appear in Thee. For this reason of appearing does not prevent the proper reason of what has been shown through itself from appearing to Thy intellect. As our sight is deceived when the appearance of something extraneous hinders that which is from appearing, it is not so in Thy intellect; nay, with Thy essence appearing, whatever shines in it from its most perfect clarity is appearing to Thee according to its own proper reason. There is no need to treat more fully of Thy truth and the ideas in Thee, in order to carry out my purpose. Many things are said about the ideas, but even if they were never said, nay, even if the ideas were not mentioned, no less will be known about Thy perfection.

This is established, that Thy essence is the

perfect reason of knowing every knowable whatsoever under every reason of the knowable. Let him who wishes call it an idea; I do not intend here to delay over that Greek and Platonic word.

Besides those things mentioned, predicated of Thee by the philosophers,

Catholics often praise Thee as omnipotent, im-

mense, everywhere present, just and merciful, provident of all creatures and especially of intellectual ones, which matters are deferred to the next tract. In this first tract I have tried to see¹8 how in some way metaphysical attributes are concluded about 18 or (In this tract I have first tried to see) .

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De Primo Principio

ponentur credibilia, in quibus ratio captivatur, quae tamen eo sunt Catholicis certiora, quo non intellectui nostro caecutienti et in pluribus vacillanti, sed tuae solidissimae veritati firmiter innituntur. Unum tamen est, quod hic pono, et in quo hoc opusculum consummabo :

UNDECIMA CONCLUSIO.

Quod scilicet unus Deus sis,

extra quem non est alter, sicut per Prophetam dixisti. Ad quod ostendendum non puto deficere rationem. Ad hanc conclusionem propositiones quinque propono, quarum quaelibet probata, infert propositum principale. Prima est: Secunda:

Unicus tantum numero est infinitus intellectus. Una numero tantum est infinita voluntas.

Tertia:

Una numero tantum est infinita potentia.

Quarta:

Unum numero tantum est necesse esse.

Quinta:

Unica sola est bonitas infinita.

Quod ex qualibet harum sequatur Probantur per ordinem. Primo prima:

propositum,

satis

patet.

Infinitus intellectus quidlibet perfectissime intel-

ligit, hoc est, quantum ipsum est intelligibile; et in intelligendo a nullo alio dependet, quia tunc non esset infinitus. Si duo sint intellectus infiniti-sint A et B-in utroque deficiet perfecta intellectio independens. Nam A, si intelligat B per B, dependet in intelligendo B ab ipso B sicut actus ab obiecto, quando non est idem. Si autem A per se intelligit B et non per B, non intelligit B ita perfecte sicut B est intelligibile ; quia nihil est perfectissime praesens, nisi vel in se vel in aliquo eminentissime continente; ipsum A non continet B.

Si dicas quod est simile-Contra:

Cognitio per simile est tantum cognitio in universali, inquantum assimilantur; per hoc non cognoscerentur propria, in quibus

149

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being Thee by the aforementioned natural reason.

In the following

tract shall be set forth the things that are subject to belief, in which the reason is captivated, which however are the more certain to Catholics, the more firmly they rest not upon our intellect, which is blind and weak in many things, but upon Thy most solid truth.

However, there is one attribute which I posit

here, and in which I sum up this little work: Eleventh conclusion .

Namely, that Thou art the one God, out-

side of Whom there is no other, as Thou hast said through the Prophet. For showing this I do not think that proof is lacking.

Towards

this conclusion I submit five propositions, every one of which, when it has been proved, implies the principal proposed conclusion. The first is:

An infinite intellect is only one in number.

The second: The third:

An infinite power is only one in number.

The fourth:

The fifth:

An infinite will is only one in number.

A necessary being is only one in number.

An infinite goodness is only one.

That the proposed conclusion follows from every one of these is evident enough.

They are proved in order.

First of all the first :

An infinite intellect understands every-

thing most perfectly, that is, in so far as it is intelligible; and in understanding it depends upon no other, because it would not be infinite. If there are two infinite intellects-let them be A and B-in each there will be lacking perfect independent intellection. For A, if it understands B through B, depends in understanding B upon that very B as an act upon an object, when it is not the same.

But if A through itself understands B and not through B,

it does not understand B so perfectly as B is intelligible; because nothing is most perfectly present, except either in itself or in something containing it most eminently; but A does not itself contain B. If you say that it is similar, I say against this:

Knowl-

edge through what is similar is only knowledge in universal, inasmuch as they (viz., the objects) are assimilated ; there would

150

distinguuntur.

De Primo Principio

Haec etiam cognitio in universali non est intuitiva,

sed abstractiva; et intuitiva est perfectior.

Item: Idem actus non habet duo obiecta adaequata; A adaequatur sibi ; igitur non intel-

ligit B.

Secundo probatur propositio de voluntate infinita:

Ipsa summe

amat summe amabile; sed A non summe amat B,

tum

quia

naturaliter magis amat se-igitur similiter voluntate libera et recta sic amat-tum quia beatus esset in B, quo tamen destructo , nihil minus esset beatus. Ideo impossibile est idem in duobus posse beatificari, quod sequitur ex datis; nam ipso B non utitur A; ergo fruitur; ergo in ipso est A beatus.

Tertia propositio sic probatur de potentia infinita:

Si essent

duae potentiae infinitae, utraque esset prima respectu eorundem quia dependentia essentialis est ad naturam, et aeque ad quodlibet in natura. Ad duo prima non possunt eadem dependere-ex sextadecima tertii; non bona ergo pluralitas principatuum, 135 quia aut impossibilis aut uterque princeps erit diminutus et partialiter principans; et tunc est quaerere virtute cuius unius coniunguntur in principando.

Quarta propositio sic probatur de necesse esse.

Species multi-

plicabilis est ex se multiplicabilis in infinita; ergo si necesse esse potest multiplicari, possunt esse talia infinita; ergo et sunt, quia quodcumque necessarium, nisi sit, non potest esse.

Quinta de bono sic ostenditur:

Plura bona sunt meliora uno,

quando unum alteri addit bonitatem; infinito bono nihil melius. luxta hoc sic arguitur :

Quaecumque voluntas omnino in bono

uno infinito quietatur; sed si esset aliud, posset rationabiliter¹36 magis velle ambo esse quam unicum; ergo non omnino quietaretur in unico summo bono.

135 Confer Aristotle, Metaph., Bk. 12, ch. 12 ( 1076 a 5) . 136 recte-WCBO2O4V₁ ( also Mueller's text) .

151

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

not be known through this the proper characteristics by which they are distinguished. Besides, this knowledge in universal is not intuitive but abstractive; and intuitive knowledge is more perfect. Again: the same act does not have two adequate objects; A is the adequate object for itself; therefore it does not understand B.

Secondly there is proved the proposition about an infinite will: It supremely loves what is supremely lovable ; but A does not supremely love B both because by nature it loves itself more— therefore similarly by free and right will it so loves-and because it would be happy in B; but if B were destroyed it would neverTherefore it is impossible for the same being to be able to be made happy in two objects; this follows from theless be happy.

the things given; for A does not use this B; therefore it enjoys B; therefore in it (viz., B) A is happy. The third proposition about infinite power is proved thus:

If

there were two infinite powers, each would be first with respect to the same things because essential dependence is referred to the nature and equally to everything in the nature. The same things cannot depend upon two firsts-from the sixteenth conclusion of the third chapter; therefore a plurality of first rulers is not good, because either it is impossible or both rulers will be diminished and partially ruling; and then we have to ask by virtue of which one they are joined in ruling. The fourth proposition is proved thus about a necessary being: A multiplicable species is of itself infinitely multiplicable ; therefore if a necessary being can be multiplied , there can be an infinity of necessary beings; therefore also there are, because every necessary being, unless it be, cannot be. The fifth proposition, about the good, is shown thus:

Many

good things are better than one, when one adds goodness to another ; there is nothing better than the infinite good . to this it is argued thus:

According

Every will is completely satisfied in

the one infinite good; but if there were another, it (viz., the will) could rightly wish that both exist rather than only one ; therefore it would not be completely satisfied in only one highest good.

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De Primo Principio

Possent alia media adduci, sed ad praesens praedicta sufficiant. Domine Deus noster! numeraliter.

Tu es unus naturaliter.

Tu es unus

Vere dixisti quod extra te non est Deus.

Nam

etsi sint dii multi nuncupative vel putative, sed tu es unicus naturaliter. Deus verus, ex quo omnia, in quo omnia, per quem omnia, qui es benedictus in saecula.

Amen.

Explicit tractatus de Primo Principio Ioannis Scoti.

Simplicity and Infinity of the First Being

153

Other means could be adduced , but for the present let the aforesaid suffice.

O Lord our God!

Thou art one in nature.

Thou are one

in number. no God.

Thou hast said truly that outside of Thee there is For although there are many gods in name or in opin-

ion, however, Thou art the only one by nature.

Thou art the

true God, from Whom are all things, in Whom are all things, through Whom are all things, Who art blessed forever. Amen. Here ends the tract of John Duns Scotus concerning the First Principle.

1