The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism 9004094482, 9789004094482

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The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism
 9004094482, 9789004094482

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THE CONTINUITY OF MADHYAMAKA AND YOGACARA IN INDIAN MAHAYANA BUDDHISM

BRILL'S INDOLOGICAL LIBRARY EDITED BY

JOHANNESBRONKHORST ADVISORY BOARD RICHARD GOMBRICH (OXFORD) • OSKAR VON HINUBER (FREIBURG) KATSUMI MIMAKI (KYOTO) • ARVIND SHARMA (MONTREAL)

VOLUME 6

THE CONTINUITY OF MADHYAMAKA AND YOGACARA IN INDIAN MAHAYANA BUDDHISM BY

IAN CHARLES HARRIS

E.J. BRILL LEIDEN· NEW YORK· K0BENHAVN· KOLN 1991

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Harris, Ian Charles. The continuity of madhyamaka and yogadira in Indian Mahayana Buddhism/by Ian Charles Harris. p. cm. - (Brill's Indologicallibrary, ISSN 0925-2916 ; v. 6) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 9004094482 1. Madhyamika (Buddhism)-Relations-Yogacara (Buddhism) 2. Yogacara (Buddhism)-Relations-Madhyamika (Buddhism) I. Title. II. Series. BQ7471.H37 1991 294.3'42-dc20 91-26581 CIP

ISSN 0925-2916 ISBN 90 04 09448 2

© Copyright 1991 by E.J. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands

All rights reserved. No part if this book may be reproduced or translated in any form, by print, photoprint, micrqfi.lm, micrqfi.che or any other means without written permission from the publisher Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by E.]. Brill provided that the appropriate Jees are paid direct{y to Copyright Clearance Center, 27 Congress Street, SALEM .MA 01970, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

For Gwen, Joseph, Saoirse and Catherine

CONTENTS Preface .....................................................................................................ix Introduction ............................................................................................ 1 1.

A Preliminary Examination of Madhyamaka Ontology ................... 7

2.

Nagarjuna and Logic ........................................................................... 25

3.

Nagarjuna and the Continuity of Tradition ..................................... 44

4.

The Problem of Mahayana "Schools" .............................................. 63

5.

The Conception of Truth in Early Buddhism .................................. 84

6.

The Two Truths and the Three Natures ........................................ 102

7.

The Nature of Reality ....................................................................... 132

8.

The Problem of Idealism ................................................................... 152 Conclusion ........................................................................................... 176 Bibliography ........................................................................................ 180 Abbreviations ...................................................................................... 186 Index..................................................................................................... 187

PREFACE This book started life as a doctoral thesis presented at the University of Lancaster in 1985. Since that time a good deal of scholarly effort has been expended in re-examining the relationship between the early schools of Indian Mahayana Buddhism and I have attempted, where appropriate, to draw on these fresh insights in the present text. While it is probably true to say that Madhyamaka philosophy has received a major share of the attention of English speaking scholars, a gentle shift to the Yogacara is now underway, particularly in the U.S.A. One must, of course, be aware of the more positive treatment given to the Yogacara on the continent of Europe and this is, no doubt, in some part due to the differing philosophical and cultural proclivities in that geographical region. Anyone embarking on work in this field must therefore be aware of their enormous debt to scholars such as Louis de la Vallee Poussin, Sylvain Levi, Eric Frauwallner, Etienne Lamotte and Lambert Schmithausen for substantial labours already completed. The problem for the present writer has been in the drawing together of sources generally confined to hermetically sealed compartments in an attempt to reassess the overall development of the early Mahayana tradition of thought. I am all too well aware of my lack of competence in many facets of this work, not the least my lack of knowledge of relevant Chinese materials, and am conscious of the many loose ends and vague generalisations which I have been forced to make. A great deal still needs to be done on the reasons for, and background to, the new terminology of the Yogacara, for instance. Similarly a more in depth treatment of the relationship between spiritual practice and philosophy in a religious context, particularly in the early Mahayana period, would greatly enhance our overall appreciation of the interconnections between individual Buddhist thinkers. Nevertheless I am encouraged to publish the results of my deliberations, despite their provisional nature, since many of my conclusions appear, at least partially, congruent with those of other researchers. I dare say that some of the views expressed in this book will need to be modified in the light of constructive criticism, but my hope is that this work will at the least stimulate debate in this exciting area of Buddhist studies. Not surprisingly my views have undergone a good deal of evolution since I started work in this field a decade ago and I would particularly like to thank Dr Andrew Rawlinson for his encouragement and valuable comments. It is astonishing how a discussion on forms of negation in Buddhist logic can naturally progress to considerations of life in other solar systems, but perhaps this demonstrates the relevance of such studies in our

x

PREFACE

present age! Professor Ninian Smart and Dr David Bairstow have both read early drafts of this text and I am grateful to them for a number of suggestions which I have been more than happy to incorporate. I am especially indebted to the kind assistance given to me by Professor Christian Lindtner in preparing this work for publication. His work on Nagarjuna, Bhavaviveka and Kambala has been a tremendous inspiration to a new generation of younger researchers and his compendious knowledge and thoughtful criticism have helped me to .appreciate the decisive role played by Bhavya in the late Madhyamaka attitude to the Yogiiciira. In view of the generous help and guidance given to me from so many sources it is a matter of regret that many matters are not resolved to my satisfaction. This of course is entirely due to my own insufficient theoretical and practical grasp of the texts. A number of institutions have supported me with generous grants and scholarships throughout various stages of this work. Thanks are therefore due to the Department of Education and Science for the award of a Major State Studentship (1978-1981), to the late K.DD. Henderson CMG (Secretary) and the Trustees of the Spalding Trust for their help in providing the funding necessary to bring this research to the light of day, and finally to the Research Committee of S. Martin's College, Lancaster for their generous offer of assistance over the last two years. May I also register my thanks to Julie Robinson for the tedious business of transferring the manuscript text to disk, and Martin Lister Publishing Services for his technical advice. AIl that remains is to thank Gwen for her endless patience and support.

INTRODUCTION The overall purpose of this book will be to re-examine the relationship between the Madhyamaka and Yogacara in early Indian Mahayana Buddhism. It may be said that I have attempted to minimise the differences between these two great movements of thought, and this is certainly the case. Nevertheless I am fully aware of the substantial discrepancies of style, scope and terminology which may be traced across the work of the respective representatives of these traditions and I hope that I shall not be accused of uncritical assimilation in this context. My purpose will be to uncover the methodological and philosophical presuppositions present in the writings of authorities on Mahayana Buddhist thought, be they ancient or modern. In the first chapter the intention will be to demonstrate that Nagarjuna implicitly accepts a distinction between the enlightened and the unenlightened state. These two modes of being may be understood as mental states. The former will then be represented by the Sanskrit terms jfiana/prajfia, while the latter corresponds to vijfiana. The essential difference between the two is that vijfiana is contaminated by a variety of mental concomitants such as dichotomous thought (prapafica) and discrimination (vikalpa), while jfiana is not. Conditioned by ignorance (avidya), vijfiana is unable to reproduce a true picture of things. The world appears to be constructed of substantial entities. The arising ofjfiana brings about the destruction of this erroneous world view. Through jfiana things are understood not as independent, but as interdependent (pratltyasamutpanna). However, and this is a discussion which is examined in more detail in chapter five, since language is itself a form of expression entirely implicated in the distorted world view, it follows that the truth about reality mu&t be inexpressible. Chapter two examines the logical stance taken by Nagarjuna. This clearly shows that he does not always adhere to the prasanga method often associated with him. His method is based on certain axioms common to Buddhist tradition as a whole, and one would be wrong, in consequence, in seeing him as an independent thinker. It is the view of this author that N~garjuna both adheres to the doctrine of the inexpressibility of truth, and maintains the existence of an indeterminate truth realm. As such he is not a nihilist. Truth must be revealed beyond the borders of language. In a sense then it would be correct to say that for Nagarjuna the true nature of things lies midway between the dichotomies inherent in language; i.e. between existence' and non-existence. The structure of language cannot exhaust the way things truly are. This being the case, Nagarjuna does not deny the existence of reality nihilistically. In consequence, one may be

2

INTRODUCTION

inclined to admit an ontologically indeterminate realm, a realm which cannot be determined in terms of existence or non-existence. The doctrine emptiness of (sunyatil) is intimately tied to this. The true nature of things is dependently originated (prantyasamutpanna). This state of affairs is falsely cognised in the unenlightened state. Enlightenment (bodhi) represents the mind purged of ignorance (avidyil). Bodhi then is sunyatil in the sense that it is empty of the defilements of ignorance. Sunyatil is not a term with ontological significance, but rather a state in which there is a true identification of cogniser and cognised, but regrettably a state incapable of articulation. In chapter three Nagarjuna's connection with early Buddhism is analysed and a general continuity of thought discovered. The chapter continues by examining the nirvilfUl/sarrzsilra dichotomy in the light of foregoing discussions. As a result nirvilJ:la can be clearly associated with bodhi - that state of mind in which the dichotomies generated by prapafica have been eradicated, w~ile sarrzsilra becomes identified with the world picture composed through the agency of vijfiilna. Neither nirvil1Ja nor sarrzsilra then are ontological terms. On the contrary, they are shown to be orientations to one ontic, unpredictable, realm which is itself the base for the arising of both vijnana and jfiilna/prajfiil. With chapter four attention is turned to the Yogilcilra. We question the view of the older generation of scholars who wished to establish radical differences between this school and the position of Nagarjuna. We show that many of these attempts are based on an interpretation of Nagarjuna's teaching through the agency of CandrakIrti, and on certain presuppositions inherited from the history of Western thought. CandrakIrti's understanding of Yogilcilra was that it was preliminary to the study of Madhyamaka. We are able to show that this is simply not so. CandrakIrti misunderstands the basis of Yogilcilra teachings and attributes views to them which they do not in fact hold. CandrakIrti's analysis is not of course a new element in the Madhyamaka arsenal but depends to a great extent on the prior arguments of Bhavaviveka with the Yogilcilra. these are analysed in some detail. On closer examination, the axioms of the Madhyamaka and Yogilcilra are found to be held fundamentally in common. The idea of an initiatory scheme of Buddhist teaching, with the Madhyamaka in pre-eminent position is shown to be a fairly late development in the history of Indian Mahilyilna Buddhism, and in may respects out of sympathy with a correct understanding of the Yogilcilra. The important doctrine of the levels of truth as it crops up throughout the history of Buddhist thought is explored in chapters five and,six. We discover a bewildering assortment of differing formulations which can, however, be simplified quite consistently. Two strands can be identified in the early material. Both are underpinned by a theory of language, though

INTRODUCTION

3

these theories are divergent. In the first theory two separate areas of discourse may be identified; implicit (nftattha) language about-things, and that which is termed .explicit (neyattha). The former is in accordance with conventional usage, while the latter reflects the Buddhist understanding of reality. The latter is therefore accurate and supplies a true picture of the world. This particular teaching is the forerunner of the dharma theory of the Abhidharma which seems to be refuted, or at least amended, in the writings of the Mahayana. In the Abhidharma, language, which takes into account the dharmic constitution of things, is said to be ultimately true (paramattha), while language which does not is only conventionally so (sammuti). . The second theory of truths, i.e. that which is developed in the Mahayana, can also be found in the early tradition. This doctrine is entirely consistent with the understanding of language discussed in chapters one and two and accepted by both the Madhyamaka and Yogacara. According to this way of thinking, whatever is expressed is essentially contaminated by vijiiana and its mental concomitants, and as such constitutes a false picture of things. Ultimately truth, and hence the teaching of the Buddha, is equated with silence. Truth then may not be attained through rational enquiry, but rather through its elimination. The problem with this particular formulation is that in accepting it one is automatically led to its corrolary; i.e. that everything which is expressed is false. The doctrine of three natures (trisvabhava) expounded in the Prajiiaparamita and by the Yogacara sfUras and Stistras is an attempt to show that the two trll;th doctrine should not be taken in such a manner. There are no essential differences between the two and three nature formulations - the latter simply makes explicit what was implicit in the former. This takes us back to our distinction between an ontotogically inderterminate realm and its two epistemic orientations. In the Madhyamaka it is quite clear that the ultimate (paramtirtha) and the conventional (sarrzvrd) truths refer to the perspectives associated with jiiana and vijiiana respectively. Now, chapter three demonstrated that these viewpoints only have efficacy because they relate to the ontic realm identified with pratftysamutpada. Examination of early Madhyamaka thought clearly reveals a hidden central term, though it is less hidden in Bhavaviveka's thought than in CandrakIrti's. Hidden of course because it is not amenable to articulation. The three nature theory then merely supplies this seemingly missing term, while at the same time recognising its essential non-predictability. It is difficult to maintain that the teachings of the Madhyamaka and Yogacara are at odds on this particular point if this is the case. The diagram below will clarify matters.

4

INTRODUCTION

Paratantra (Pratityasamutpada )

/

Parikalpita

~

The ontologically indeterminate base

Parini;;panna

Sm?1vrti

Paramtirtha

Defilement

Purification

DIFFERENCE

IDENTITY

The two orientations

Chapter seven looks at the nature of the base for the appearance of the defiled and purified visions of things in more detail and finds that the Buddhist tradition as a whole supports the stance taken by both the Madhyamaka and the Yogacara. Pratftyasamutpada is the key concept in both Buddhist systems. It is identical with the way things truly are, and as such is inexpressible. It provides the rational for the workings of the Four Noble Truths and hence for the apparent existences of sarrzsara and nirval)a. Two separate treatments ofpratityasamutpada are actually found in Buddhist literature. Firstly, the fundamental doctrine itself which was discovered by, though is seemingly independent of, the Buddha. Secondly we have the twelve-linked formula. While the former is itself identical with the inexplicably true state of things, the twelve-fold formula is a rationalisation of the two epistemic orientations and as such helps to explain the Four Noble Truths. The forward sequence corresponds to the first and second truths, while the reverse is connected with the third and fourth. These different treatments ofpratltyasamutpada exactly mirror the two and three-fold truth formulations as expounded in the previous two chapters. The body of this book is an attempt to argue against the traditional, scholarly view that the Madhyamaka and the Yogacara present two radically opposed sets of doctrines. It is hoped that the foregoing discussion will indicate that on a number of grounds, this traditional view is difficult to sustain. One further problem remains however. A great number of scholars believe that what distinguishes the Yogacara from the rest of Buddhism are its idealistic tendencies. The final chapter represents an attempt to test such an attitude. By examining early Buddhist texts concerned with the notion of mind the final chapter argues that, while taken out of context, certain sections of texts may seem idealistc, this,is not so when seen against their proper background. From the earliest times Buddhism has recognised the distinction which was treated in the first chapter; namely the distinction between the defiled and the purified mind.

INTRODUCfrON

5

Remembering the fact that ultimate truth is inarticulable, one may equate, at least metaphorically, enlightenment (bodhi) With the purified mind, and the unenlightened state with defilement. Talk of a luminous mind (prabhasvara citta) in the Nikayas, and at other places is a clear reference to bodhi. However at various stages in its history Buddhism has found the nee9 to explain to its critics how karma, and general mental continuity, may be maintained, without at the same time falling into the trap of positing any permanent, unchanging mental entity. This is the function of terms like the limb of existence (bhavii:nga) and the Yogiiciira storehouse consciousness (iilayavijnana). Both of these concepts should not be confused with a Brahmanical absolute such as iitman. They both perform an explanatory function while at the same time avoiding the pit falls of absolutism. If this is so it will be difficult to make the charge of idealism stick. The principle difference between the Yogiiciira and Madhyamaka on this point is that for the former questions of mental continuity are crucial in the attempt to argue agains Brahmanic tendencies, while for the latter they are not. However the Yogiiciira does follow a traditional line on this matter, and does not, as in the case of the storehouse consciousness (iilayavijiiiina) introduce any surprisingly novel concepts. Chapter eight then provides the final link in the argument. There is a certain continuity of thought from the early period, through Madhyamaka to the Yogiiciira. The doctrine of iilayavijiiiina represents no substantial deviation from tradition. In fact the only matters which differentiate such individual elements of tradition may be demonstrated to be ones basically indicative of preoccupation and not of essential disunity. The differing terminologies associated with Nagarjuna and the Yogiiciira are explained accordingly. For the former issues of logic and ontology are to the fox:.e. In the writings of the latter, while these matters are of importance, psychological and soteriological considerations are more prominent.

CHAPTER ONE

A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF MADHYAMAKA ONTOLOGY In the past many assumptions have been made concerning the relationship between the Madhyamaka and Vijftanavada schools of Mahayana Buddhism which on further analysis may prove to be unfounded. Typically the Vijftanavadin is seen as someone who wishes to hypostatise consciousness (vijftana, citta, vijftapti) leading to the conclusion that consciousness is the sole reality (vijftaptimiitra). On the other hand the Madhyamaka maintains a non-committal attitude towards ontology. It is very easy, particularly given the present nature of scholarship into the subject, to be led into adopting such an attitude but, on further reflection one is forced to ask a number of questions. In the first place when we speak of the Madhyamaka school of thought we ordinarily think, mainly because of its dominant position in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, of the Madhyamaka-Prasangika school founded sometime in the 7th century AD. by CandrakIrti.1 That CandrakIrti was an opponent of a particular point of view regarding the doctrine of consciousness only (cittamatra) and the existence of a store-consciousness alayavijftana, both of which are generally associated with the Vijftanavadins, there can be no doubt. 2 However two questions follow from this statement. Firstly, has CandrakIrti faithfully reproduced the doctrines of his root texts which in this case are the writings of Nagarjuna, and secondly, in his argument with the Vijftanavada, has he adhered to his prasanga method of reasoning and therefore not ascribed to his opponents doctrines which they do not in fact hold? The second major query concerns the doctrinal position of Nagarjuna and in particular the range of Nagarjuna's authorship. It has been paradigmatic among the older generation of scholars, when dealing with the works of Nagarjuna to brush aside the evidence of the Buddhist tradition and treat only those works which deal exclusively with the doctrines of 1

Ruegg (1981 p. 71) gives the date c.60()...{j50 A slightly earlier date (53()...{j00) is given by Lindtner inActa Orientalia 40 (1979)

2

Candrakirti's critique of Vijiilinavlida is to be found in Ch. 6 of his Madhyamaklivatlira a partial translation of which was carried out by L. de la Vallee Poussin (1907-11). The Tibetan text is available (with autocommentary) as Madhyamaklivatlira par Candrakirti edited by L. de la Vallee Poussin (Osnabriick: Biblio Verlag, reprint, 1970). A detailed investigation of Candrakirti's argument will be found supra Ch. 8.

p.91.

8

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF MADHYAMAKA ONTOLOGY

emptiness (sflnyatii) and the non-existence of the self nature of dharmas (dharmanil;7.svabhiivata) as being exclusively authentic works of our author. T.R.Y. Murti is a good case in point. In his study of the Madhyamaka he lists the works ofNagarjuna ascribed by the Tibetan and Chinese tradition 3 and then abandons all but two, the Madhyamakakiirikii4 and the Vigrahavyiivartani 5 in the elucidation of the distinctive Madhyamaka philosophy, irrespective of the fact that many of the other texts, firmly held to be works of Nagarjuna by the Buddhist tradition, express ideas which in some respects would lead to an attenuation of the overall doctrine. Such a state of affairs could be compared to one in which for many years a group of researchers based all their knowledge of Shakespeare's work, life and times solely on the sonnets simply because as a corpus a certain underlying theme runs through them all. As a consequence the plays, being formally different and treating disparate themes, are relegated into being the works of others, fraudulently ascribed to the bard. There seem to be a number of objections to such judgements. In the first place why would someone having produced a major work of literature, and in our case elevating religious discourses, wish to deny authorship and by so doing pass this distinction on to someone whose output was meagre (two works) and in any case died possibly hundreds of years before? Secondly the judgement of authenticity based on doctrinal accord with an axiomatically authentic text, such as the Madhyamakakiirikii is really just as unsound as judgement based on other criteria, since we have no knowledge of Nagarjuna's intentions when he embarked on his writing career. This situation has been noted by Buddhist scholars of the younger generation and the tide now seems to be turning in the field of Nagarjuna studies. The recent publication of a book by Chr. Lindtner 6 perhaps exemplifies more than any others this change of thinking. Although Lindtner regards the authenticity of the kiirikiis as axiomatic he nevertheless applies a number of important criteria to arrive at his list of Nagarjuna's works. Firstly a work may have been ascribed by a "trustworthy" witness such as CandrakIrti, Bhavaviveka, Santarak~ita and the like. Secondly a work must have a place in a grand scheme which Lindtnerwants to propose was really in Nagarjuna's mind. In other words it needs to be part of a comprehensive treatment of the doctrine and path of Buddhists of the Mahayana persuasion along the lines of Asailga's Mahiiyiinasa1?Igraha 7. Thirdly throughout the corpus of texts there should be a general agree3 4 5 6 7

Murti (1960) p. 88-91. cf. Niigtirjuna's Filosofiske Vaerker Lindtner (1982) and Candrakirti Prasannapadti Madhyamakavrtti J. May (1959). The Vigrahavytivartani Johnson, E. H. & Kunst, A. (eds.) (1951). Lindtner (1982). La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asaliga 2 vols. Lamotte, E. (ed. and trans.)(1938).

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF MADHYAMAKA ONTOLOGY

9

ment in style, scope and doctrine. As a result of his deliberations Lindtner passes nyelve works (in addition to the kiirikiis) as being authentic. These are the Sflnyatiisaptati, Vigrahavyiivartanl, Vaidalyaprakarm;a, Yukti$a$tikii, Catu/:zstava, Ratniivall, Pratltyasamutpiidahrdayakiirikii, Sfltrasamuccaya, Badhicittavivarm;a, Suhrllekha and the Badhisambhiira. With the kiirikiis themselves, the first five of the above works are held by the Tibetan tradition to belong to the theoretical/scholastic works of Nagarjuna otherwise known as the logical (yukti; Tib: rigs tshags) corpus. P. Williams8 has subjected Lindtner's method to scrutiny and points out various defects. To start with the first of Lindtner's trustworthy witnesses, Bhavaviveka, lived approximately 350 years after Nagarjuna 9, and the others lived a considerable time after that. With regard to consistency in style, scope and doctrine, Williams lO points out that to be convincing when working from Tibetan and Chinese translations of the original Sanskrit is in itself a highly dubious enterprise. However Williams' most severe criticism is very much in conformity with the views expressed by older scholars mentioned above. He believes that if we hold the authenticity of the kiirikiis as axiomatic then a putative work of Nagarjuna concerning a topic not dealt with in the kiirikiis is difficult to ascribe since we have left the safety of comparison and have given first priority to witnesses etc. in our criteria of judgement. Williams therefore ends up in the position adopted by D.S. Ruegg who feels that because of the: ... opacity and confusion in the records as well as the uncertainty concerning the authorship of several works ascribed to Nagarjuna, it will be convenient for the historians of the Madhyamaka to take as his point of departure the treatise universally considered as the Madhyamakasiistra par excellence-namely the MMK (Mula-Madhyamakakiirikii)-together with any other texts ascribable to the same author that are doctrinally related, and to regard this textual corpus as a standard of reference when describing Nagarjuna's philosophy.ll

As demonstrated there are no good grounds for holding such a position. It is my intention to adopt a modified version of Lindtner's list of authentic works bearing in mind the criticisms of Williams, who admits" ... my caution is not damning. It is simply calltion",12 As both the Tibetan and Chinese tradition are unanimous and Lindtner's analysis confirms tradition I intend to work on the basis that the texts of the logical (yukti) corpus are original works of Nagarjuna. However before turning to an examination of the doctrines of the 8 9

Williams (1984). For the dates of Nagarjuna, vide Ruegg op. cit. p. 4 n. 11. Ruegg places Nagarjuna "early in the first millenium PC." 10 Williams op. cit. p. 75. 11 Ruegg op. cit. p. 8--9. 12 Williams op. cit. p.76.

10 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF MADRYAMAKA ONTOLOGY kiirikiis, which must nevertheless still be considered the most important of the texts from the point of view of the development of the latter Madhyamaka tradition, let us look briefly at the other works mentioned to find any evidence which can confirm the often expressed opinion that the Madhyamaka and the Vijiiilnavilda are doctrinally irreconcilable systems of thought. ONTOLOGICAL SPECULATION IN NAGARJUNA'S SUBSIDIARY WORKS

In the first place it must be quite clearly stated that nowhere in the corpus of works which we accept are authentically those of Nagarjuna, is there to be found an explicit condemnation of the notion that prajiiil represents a state of awareness in which things are seen as they are (yathilbhuta). This is a very surprising fact given Nagarjuna's insistence that all phenomena (dharma) are empty (sunya) since they lack own-being (svabhilva) because they occur only in mutual dependence (pratztyasamutpanna). That which has arisen dependently on this and that, that has not arisen substantially (svabhiivata). That which has not arisen substantially, how can it literally (niima) be called arisen?13

The nearest we find Nagarjuna coming to a specific criticism of consciousness is his demonstration that vijiiilna, as a member of the group of skandhas, is dependent and hence empty. This may be found in chapter four of the Madhyamakakiirikiis. However vijiiilna in this treatment is always considered as a thing dependent on internal and external sensefields (ilyatana) and can not be equated with the notion of an abiding consciousness such as the bhavanga put forward in the Pali texts and subsequently elaborated by the Yogilcilra. These particular doctrines will be examined in detail in chapter eight of this work. However it should be noted that Nagarjuna's understanding of vijiiilnaskandha is totally in accord with that of the earliest Buddhist writings. Of equal importance is the fact that the Vijiiilnavildins also adopt such a position. For them the six evolved consciousnesses (pravrttivijiiilna), since they arise in dependence, must from the ultimate point of view be considered to be empty (sunya). This seems to be all that Nagarjuna means when he says: Consciousness (vijiiiina) occurs dependent upon the internal and external sensefields (iiyatana). There consciousness is empty (sunya), like mirages and illusions (maricimiiyiivat). Since consciousness (vijiiiina) arises dependent on a discernible object (vijiieya), the discernible does not exist (in itself).14

13

Yuktisa${ikii-karika (YS) in Nagarjunialla Lindtner op. cit. p. 102-119 YS. v.19. tat tat prapya yad utpannal?1llotpanllal?1 tat svabhavata(l svabhiivena yall notpannal?1 utpanllal?1llama tat kathal?1 cf. W. 22 and MMK. xxiv. 18. 14 SUllyatasaptati-karika (S.S.) ibid. p. 34-69

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF MADHYAMAKA ONTOLOGY

11

Both consciousness and the external object. then are dependent and consequently devoid of own-being (svabhiiva). It is a curious fact that the Bodhicittavivara1;la is the only work attributed by tradition to Nagarjuna which features an obvious critique of a position similar to that adopted by the Vijiianaviida. However this work is never mentioned by Candrakirti, the only trustworthy witness for its authenticity being Bhavaviveka in his Ratnapradipa.15 In this text the author attacks the three nature doctrine often associated with the Yogiiciira: .. the imagined (parikalpita), the dependent (paratantra) and the absolute (parin~panna) have only one nature of their own: emptiness. They are the imaginations (kalpanii) of mind (citta ).16

but one must be aware of the fact that this is a standard canonical devise, found amongst other places in the Lank!ivattirasfltra, a textual source for the Yogtictira itself. Thus: When intelligently investigated, there is no imagined [nature], no dependent [nature] and no absolute [nature]. How then can they be intelligently discriminated?!7

As we shall see later18 the notion that the three natures are ultimately empty is one quite acceptable to AsaiJ.ga and Vasubandhu themselves. Further on in the Bodhicittavivara1;la we hear that: Mind (citta) is but a name (niimamiitra). It is nothing apart form (its) name. Consciousness must be regarded as but a name. The name has no own-being (svabhiiva ).19

Ss. v. 56-7.

15 16

17

18 19

nan dan phyi yi skye mched la brten nas mam par ses pa 'byun de Ita bas na mam sed med smig rgyu sgyu ma btin du ston mam ses ses bya la brten nas 'byun Ia ses bya yod ma yin ses bya ses pa med pa 'i phyir , de phyir ses pa po iiid med ibid. p. 180. Bodhicittavivara7;la v. 28 kun brtags dan ni gian dbQli dan YOils su grub pa 'di iiid ni ston iiid bdag iiid gcig pu yi no bo sems Ia brtags pa yin. Lanka. II. 198. buddhyii vicecyamiina;p. tu na tantraTfl niipi kalpitaTfl n~panno niisti vai bhiival;! kathaTfl buddhyii vikalpyate. cf. ch. 6 infra. Bodhicittavivara7;la v. 40. sems ni min tsam yin pa ste

12

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF MADHYAMAKA ONTOLOGY

Now if Nagarjuna is the author of this text one wonders why he is not aware of the fact that this statement is liable to give rise to the objection outlined at the beginning of the Vigrahavyavartani, an objection we will discuss in more depth in chapter two. The opponent in this text asks how it is possible for Nagarjuna to maintain the truth if he also allows that all things are empty. Since emptiness applies to words themselves, how can they be used for the purpose of demonstrating such truth? On applying ourselves to the statement that mind (citta) is merely a name and hence has no own-being, we are met by incoherence. In the first place the logic of the claim is confused and in the second, even if we were to accept that names have no svabhava, we would be unjustified in making the assumption that the object denoted by the name, i.e. mind (citta) is also devoid of svabhava. Actually reading through the BodhicittavivaralJll carefully, one is struck by many inconsistencies. The author at one point reverses his critique of the Vijiianavada by affirming a central doctrine of the school. Thus The (Buddha's) instruction about the aggregates, elements etc. (merely) aims at dispelling the belief in a self (atmagraha). By establishing (themselves) in consciousness only (cittamatra) the greatly blessed (bodhisattvas) also abandon that (instruction).20

Returning to our theme let us ask ourselves a question. If Nagarjuna is totally opposed to the existence of a mind, would he not also be concerned to refute notions which rely for their existence and efficaciousness on such a mental substratum? I am in particular thinking of terms which are derived from the verbal root jiia. We can answer this question to the contrary. Nagarjuna uses many terms of this type that indicate the fact that knowledge (jiiana) seems to exist from the ultimate point of view. Thus we are told in the Yukt4a${ikii-kiirikii: Just as the Buddhas have spoken of "my" and "I" for pragmatic reasons, thus they have also spoken of the aggregates (skandha), the sense-fields (ayatana) and the elements (dhatu) for pragmatic reasons. The great elements etc. (mahabhutadi) are absorbed in consciousness (vijiii'ina). They are dissolved by understanding them. Certainly they are falsely imagined (mithyi'i vikalpitam ).21 miil las gian du 'ga' yail med miil tsam du ni mam rig blta miil yail rail biin med pa yill. 20 Bodhicittavivaraila v. 25 bdag tu 'dzin pa bzlog pa 'i phyir phuil po khams sogs bstan pa yin sems (sam po la gnas nas ni skal chen mams kyis de yail spGlis. 21 Ys. v. 33-4 dogs pa'i dbail gis rgyal ba mams ila dail ila'i ies gsuils pa ltar phu;" po khams dail skye mched mams

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF MADHYAMAKA ONTOLOGY

13

Here then two separate domains of knowledge are explicated. The first, with referents such as "I" and "mine", has a pragmatic truth value which on a higher level is seen as characterised by false imagination. A higher form of knowledge appears to be born when the notions at the pragmatic level are dissolved in understanding (tajjfiiine vigamarrz).22 It seems difficult to believe that Nagarjuna would refute the notion of mind while at the same time adhering to this distinction between forms of knowledge. Knowledge seems to presuppose some mental apparatus through which the former gains efficacy. In the above quotation from the Yukt4~tikii-kiirikii we have the classical distinction between a mundane form of consciousness usually associated with the term vijfiiina, and a higher level from of consciousness to which Nagarjuna gives the name jfiiina or prajfiii. These two forms of consciousness reflect the two level of truth doctrine held by all the Madhyamako.s (and as we shall see, in chapters five and six, by all the Buddhist schools) and would appear to represent the mechanisms by which the world view of an ordinary person (prthagjana) and a saint (iirya) differ. However this point of view is not peculiar to the Madhyamakas. The distinction is made inAbhidharmakosa: En effet la connaissance speculative (prajliii) par laquelle on penetre et comprend, a Ie meme domaine (v;,yaya) que la connaissance vulgaire (vijfiiilla).23

and la Vallee Poussin goes on to say: D'apres les Vzbhajyaviidins, Ie jfiiilla est bon en soi; Ie vijliiilla est bon quand il est associe ajfiiilla (Kasa iv 8b, p33 n.3): ce qui peut s'entendre que Ie jliiilla est Ie "savoir supramondain", et que Ie vijiiiilla savoir mondain, est bon lorsqu'il est consecutif au savoir supramondain.24

The precise definition of these various psychological terms, all of which are derived from the rootjfiii-is a matter of some debate among scholars and will be left to a more suitable occasion for detailed discussion, but at least one point is already clear. This is the distinction between the mundane form of knowledge designated by the term vijfiiina and the knowledge, or knowledges, of a higher ordertermedjfiana or prajfia. It seems in

de biin dgas pa 'i dban gis gsUlis 'byun ba che la sags Mad pa mams par ses su yan dag 'du de ses pas ni 'bral 'gyur na log pas mam brtags ma yin nam. 22 This verse (YS. v. 34) is also cited in theliiiinasrimitranibandhiivali cf. Thakur, A. (ed.)liiiinasrimitranibandhiivali Patna (1959) p. 545 and 405. 23 Abhidharmakosa ed. par L. de la Vallee Poussin (1971) AK. ix. 244: prajiiavijliiinayol;l samiillav;,yayatviit. 24 AK. ix. 248 n.v.

14 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF MADHYAMAKA ONTOLOGY fact that prajnii and jniina are more or less interchangeable terms. J. May tells us that: ' ... il existe entre citta et prajiiii la meme opposition qu'entre vijiiiina et jiiiina, connaissance empirique discursive et connaissance metaphysique intuitive. 25

In Nagarjuna's system one of the fundamental features is the emphasis on the development of higher order forms of knowledge. This is stated again and again. Thus: When one sees that which arises conditioned by ignorance (avidyiipratyaya) with a correct knowledge (samyagjiiiina), no origination (utpiida) or destruction (nirodha) whatsoever is perceived (upalabhyate).26

When someone has developed this correct knowledge (samyagjniina) then reality (tattva) is seen clearly and ignorance (avidyii) is destroyed. It follows that since avidyii is the first link in the twelve fold chain of mutual dependence (dviidasiiligika-pratltyasamutpiida), it is the cause of vijniina (the third member in the series). Hence when avidyii is destroyed by jnilna then so too is vijnilna. We will examine this in detail in chapter seven. However this is the meaning of MMK. xxvi. 11. One who has arrived at such a realisation possesses a mind (citta) without a standpoint (sthilna). 27 He achieves the eye of knowledge (jnilnaca!qu )28 and in consequence the errors of defilement (klesado~a), that torment due to false knowledge (mithyiljniina), do not arise. 29 Now most scholars recognise that the task of Nagarjuna was partly to bring about an integration of the thought contained in that corpus of literature generally called Prajnilpilramitil (P.P.). Murti typifies this notion: The Miidhyamika philosophy is a systematisation of the Prajiiiipiiramitii treatises. 30

A typical and early text of the P.P. corpus is theA$tastthasnkil. In this work the perfection (pilramitil) of prajnil is mentioned in a number of places as the chief of the other five perfections (i.e. dilna-charity, slla-morality, !qiintia-forbearance, dhyilna-meditation and vlrya-heroic energy) in the sense that it is a guiding and regulating factor by which the other five may operate effectively. To quote Murti again: 25

Candrakirti Prasannapadii Madhyamakv.rtti traduit par J. May (1959) p. 104 n. 252.

26 YS. v.IO. ma rig rkyell gyis bywi ba la yan dag ye ses kyis gzigs na skye ba dan ni 'gags pa'an run 'ga' yan dmigs par mi 'gyur roo

27 YS. v. 51. 28

YS. v. 54

29 Y$. v. 57. 30 Murti op. cit. p. 213.

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF MADHYAMAKandhu or AsaIiga hold to such a position. Enlightenment then is the destruction of the diseased mind in its manifold forms. At the same time it is not to be understood as total non-existence. Vasubandhu sums up such a realisation in his treatment of vijflaptimiitratii: This is no-mind (acitta) and no-perceiving, and this is wisdom (jiiiina) beyond this world. This is the revolution at the basis (iiSrayapariiv{tti) at which the two fold wickedness [the defilements of emotion and intellect = kleSiivaralJa andjiieyiivaralJa1are removed. This is the realm of no out-flow (aniisrava). It is inconveivable, virtous and unchangeable. This is bliss, the body of emancipation. It is said to be the dhanna (body) of the great sage.85

This is clearly nirviir;a. Vasubandhu actually agrees with Candrakirti that in the last analysis it is inconceivable (acintya), and in consequence inarticulable. It is the total suppression of the working of the vijiiiinaskandha since it is no-mind (acitta), but at the same time Vasubandhu avoids the implication that is non-existence, since he holds such a state to represent wisdom (jiiiina). As a result of the destruction of the avarar;as no further defilements are produced. For Yamada: Here the vijiiiina turns into supra-mundane jiiiina, transcendental wisdom in the higher level of the religious realm. In the jiiiina there is no more conceptualisation regarding Self and Elements. 86

There is nothing here that Nagarjuna could have any objection to on our interpretation, and I believe we have clearly shown that whatever differences there may have been between the early period of Buddhist thought and that reflected by Nagarjuna and the brothers Vasubandhu and Asailga, it is one of stress and not of essential discord.

85

TrbrIS. 29 & 30

acitto 'nupalambho'saujiiiinam lokottara1/1 ca tat iiSrayasya pariivrttir dvidhii da~thulya hiinita/:l sa eva aniisravo dhiitur acintyalJ kuSalo dhruvalJ sukho vimuktikliyo 'sau dhannlikhyo 'yam mahiimune/:l 86 Yamada (1977) p. 171.

CONCLUSION It is now possible to construct amode1 (diagram 1) to explain theinterconnections, and essentially identical structure, of the Madhyamaka and Yogiiciira understanding of the enlightened and unenlightened states.

THE ONTOLOGICAL INDETERMINATE

I

Prantyasamutpiida

/'

/

Reverse 12 Link Formula

Vijfiiina

~

Forward 12 Link Formula

~Jfiiina

Paratantra

Parini.ypanna

Parikalpita Prapafica

Dharmatii

Atraya

Defilement

Purification

Tattva/Satya

--

Sarnv,-tisatya

Sarnsiira

Paramiirthasatya

,/ TWO EPISTEMIC ORIENTATIONS

NirviilJ-a

There is an ontological existence realm which is not amenable to predication. Any attempt to describe it is doomed to failure since, by definition, description is intimately associated with a dichotomised world view based on the abstractive tendencies of a mind infected by ignorance. Since the structure of language itself is so infected it will be impossible to state the precise status of reality. Any definition will be dependent on such basic dichotomies as existence or non-existence. This being so one is inclined, bearing in mind what has been said throughout this work, to refer that state of being uncontaminated by the processes of thought as an Ontologically Indeterminate Realm. What is clear is that this is not to be understood in a monistic sense. The general opposition of Buddhism to

CONCLUSION

177

the Brahmanical systems precludes this. All the Buddhist authors studied above, either explicitly or implicitly, acknowledge this realm to be dependently originated (pratityasumutptida) in the sense that it is not composed of separate entities but rather exists as a flux of mutually conditioned processes. It may be understood as truth (satya) since it is the ground of being (sat). It is often referred to as thatness (tattva). In the Madhyamaka it is not referred to by name, for obvious reasons connected with the Madhyamaka theory of language, but this does not mean that its presence may not be inferred in the writings of Nagarjuna, etc. In fact without such an existence realm at the basis of Nagarjuna's system, the teachings lose their coherence. The Yogtictira is less reticent at providing a name, but again clearly recognises the provisional nature of such denotation. In line with earlier Buddhist tradition, reality is characterised in its aspect of dependence and hence, in the Yogtictira, it is termed the dependent (paratantra) .

Now this central, ontologically indeterminate existence realm may be understood as the base (tiSraya) for the arising of the purified and the defiled vision of the world. These ways of seeing are quite clearly the enlightened (bodhi) and the unenlightened respectively. The latter is intimately associated by thought construction (vikalpa) and dichotomous mental tendencies (prapaftca), which themselves mutually condition the language process (ntimarapa/prajftapti). As a result the mental processes of an unenlightened being (vijfttina) misinterpret reality as a conglomeration of entities (dharma) each capable of permanent and independent existence (svabhtiva). In such a situation the mind habitually constructs a picture of reality from which there is no escape (saf!1,stira), which is inherently unsatisfactory (dul;kha) and which leads to suffering. This condition unfolds itself in the forward sequence of the twelve-linked pratityasamutptida formula. The form of knowledge associated with this state is termed conventional truth (saf!1,vrtisatya) by the Madhyamaka, and the imagiried nature (parikalpitasvabhtiva) amongst the Yogtictirins. In line with the soteriological nature of Indian thought in general all the systems we have examined hold out the possibility of emancipation from this vicious circle through the destruction of ignorance. By putting into practice the Buddhist path (mtirga), and by refraining from metaphysical speculation, unenlightened consciousness (vijfttina) may be extirpated, and gnosis (jfttina/prajftti) encouraged to flower. Such a transformation, since it is intimately connected with the destruction of the factors associated with ignorance and its concomitants, is adequately represented by the reverse pratityasamutptida formula. When this process is successfully completed one enters nirvti]Ja and sees things as they are (yathtibhiltam). Thought construction no longer operates (nirvikalpajfttina) and one comes to know the true nature of things (dharmatti). One is at peace (stinta). Such

178

CONCLUSION

a state is of course not knowledge in the conventional sense since it is empty (sunya) of the presuppositions, such as the dichotomy between self and others, being and non-being, which provide the ground for the unenlightened state. Human perfection then is to be understood as the total destruction of all the factors associated with ignorance. As such nirvalJa is inaccessible to the domain oflanguage and thought. This is what emptiness (sunyata) is all about. Again both the Madhyamaka and Yogacara are agreed on this. For the former the enlightened state is referred to as the ultimate truth (paramarthasatya), while for the latter it is the accomplished nature (parini.ypannasvabhava). In the writings of both groups this condition is understood as the complete identification of knower and known. Both systems therefore regard the ultimate end of human perfection in non-dual terms. This being so it makes little sense to characterise early trends in Mahayana thought in either idealistic or realistic terms. The traditional Tibetan designation of Yogacara as teaching mind only (cittamtitra; tib: sems-tsam) is particularly unhelpful in this regard, especially when retrojected into the writings of Vasubandhu and AsaIiga. If one persists in talking of nirvalJa as a state of mind one must constantly be aware of the provisional nature of such a statement. Both Madhyamaka and Yogacara authors are generally agreed on this matter. It is hoped that the above discussion will have established a shared epistemological and ontological structure common to both Madhyamaka and Yogacara, at least in the early period ofMahttyana philosophy. On this basis of general agreement one must regard scholarly attempts to highlight discrepancies between the two in a cautious manner. It is obviously true that from the time of Bhavaviveka a rivalry, sometimes gentle, sometimes less so, existed between the two systems. Assessment of this rivalry depends on ones's attitude to the final centuries of development of Buddhism in its native land. Some will regard the sixth century debates between Yogacarins and Madhyamikas as productive of the finest flowering of Buddhist philosophy. Others will see in these developments an indication of philosophical decadence and the start of the final slide into Tantric obscurity. Whatever one's perspective, the point is that all of these developments are late. Such rivalry cannot be traced in the seminal texts of either tradition. Nevertheless one should not be blind to the clear differences in style and terminology that exist between Nagarjuna on the one hand and AsaIiga and Vasubandhu on the other. It would be quite wrong to conclude that later traditions in Buddhist literature are simply restatements of former work. Newproccupations continually arise. Differing aspects ofthe Buddhist path rise to prominence to meet contempoarary needs, be they pedagogical or apolgetic. It seems likely that the prime focus of Nagarjuna's attentions in his yukti corpus was directed towards matters ontological and logical, hence his extreme reluctance to explicitly commit

CONCLUSION

179

himself to a positive depiction of reality. Vasabandhu and Asariga, on the other hand, and as the term Yogtictira implies, appear to show a greater interest in the complexities of the path. In this context an apparently looser perspective on ontology may be expected. These two authors concentrate on the strong motivating factor necessary if one is to make the fundamental changes consistent with the life of a Buddhist. This said one hopes that the model which unfolds in the text above will help in the appreciation of the essential harmony underlying the thought of Nagarjuna, Asariga and Vasubandhu, particularly when seen against the background of earlier Buddhist traditions in ontology and epistemology.

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Abhidharmasamuccaya P. Pradhan, (ed.) (Santinekitan 1950)

Asailga

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Asailga

BodhisattvabhUmi U. Wogihara, (ed.) (Leipzig 1908)

Asailga

La Som.me du Grand Vehicule D'Asanga, MahliyiinasaTJ1.graha, 2 vols. E. Lamotte. (ed. and trans.) (Louvain 1938)

Asailga

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Candraldrti

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Candrakirti

Madhyamakiivatiira. Introduction au Traite du Milieu de L ~carya Candrakfrti L. de la Vallee Poussin (trans.) Le Museon Vol III (1907) p. 249-317; VI (1910) p. 271-358; XII (1911) p. 235-328.

Candraldrti

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Nagarjuna

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Nagarjuna

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Nagarjuna

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Sthiramati

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Sthiramati

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Sthiramati

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Vasubandhu

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being a subcommentary on Vasubandhu's Bhii~a on the Madhyiintavibhiigasiltra ofMaitreyaniitha, V. Bhattacharya and G. Tucci (eds.) (London 1932)

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Vasubandhu

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Vasubandhu

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Vasubandhu

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Vasubandhu

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Vasubandhu

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Vasubandhu

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E.

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ABBREVIATIONS A. A.A. A.K. A.M e.S. D. J.I.A.B.St. J.LB.St. J.LP. KT.R Lanka M. M.A. Me. MCB MH.K MMK MRP. MS.

MV. P.E.W: P.P. P.P.D. S Sn. S.S. T.

TrirrzS T.S.N.

u. Vil7iS.

Anguttara Nikiiya Anguttara Nikiiya Atthakathii Manorathapurar;zi Abhidhannakosa la Vallee Poussin (ed.) Alokamiilii in Lindtner (1985). Catul;!stava cf.. Lindtner Nagarjuniana 121-161 D~haNikiiya

Journal of the International Association ofBuddhist Studies Journal of Indian alld Buddhist Studies Journal of Indian Philosophy Kalatalarama Lankiivatarasutra N anjio (ed.) Majjhima Nikiiya Majjhima Nikiiya Atthakathii Papafzcasudani Maitreya Chapter Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques Madhyamakahrdayakiirikii Mulamadhyamakakiirikii Madhyamakaratnapradipa Mahiiyiinasarrzgraha. Lamotte (ed.) Madhyiintavibhiigaklirikli Levi and Yamaguchi (ed.) Philosophy East and West Prajfziipiiramitii Prajfziipradipa Sarrzyutta Nikliya Sutta Nipiita Sunyatiisaptati cf. Lindtner Nligiirjuniana 31-69 Taisho Shillsu Daizokyo Tril7iSikiiklirikii Levi (ed.) Trisvabhiivanirde.fa Mukhopadhyaya (ed.) Udiina Vil7iSatikiikiirfkii Levi (ed.)

Vm.

Vmaya

v. v.

Vigrahavyiivartani Johnston and Kunst (ed.) Yuktiya$tikii cf. Lindtner Nagarjuniana 100--120

Y.S.

Index Abhidhammatthasangaha 160 Abhidharma 3, 39, 44, 61, 86f, 91, 94, 96, 100,129, 138f, 143f, 157, 159, 170 Abhidharmakosa 13 64 88 Abhidharmanyiiyiimlsiirdsiistra 88 Abh~harmasamuccaya 168,174 Abhidharmasutra 123 Abhisamayala1!lkiira 72, 103 abhUtaparikalpa 67,68, 123f, 130, 147ff absolutism 5, 67 Acelakii.fyapa 46 Acintyastava 18, 23, 27, 46, 87 advaya 3Q,52,60, 102,115,124 iigama 46,110,121,122,154,167174 iigantuka 154ff, 157, 162 ' ~hetuviida 132,144,156 Ajivaka 156 iikiisa 27f Ak!;ayamatinirdesasutra 82, 87 iilayavijiiiina 5,78,81, 127, 163ff, 166ff, 172,174f Alokamiilii 127ff, 166 Arnitabha 165 anabhiliipya 121, 150, 171 Andhaka 154 Aliguttara Nikiiya 18,87,137,140 annihilation 16 aparyiiyaparamiirtha 76, 118ff, 120 apaviida 129, 130 apperception 106f Aramaki, N. 23, 126 arhat 18, 81, 168 iirya 13, 72, 77, 121 Aryadeva 73,156 Aryasiilistambasutra 134 iisrava 51, 56 asraya 81, 104, 116, 126, 127, 151, 162, 174f, 176f A$tasiihasrikii 14,15,53, 102, 154 Atisa 17,71,73,75,80 iitman 5,22,139,162 iivajjana 157 iivarar;a 81, 175 avidyii 1,2, 14f, 19f, 50, 52, 54, 57, 60, 74, 102, 107, 115, 134, 136ff, 145f, 149,153,16Of,168

avyiikata 95 iiyatana 10, 12, 170 Bahu.smtika 98, 99, 103 Biihyiirthasiddhikiirikii 93 Bareau, A. 98, 154 Betty, L.S. 41 Bhattacarya, K 39, 147 bhiivanii 120, 146 bhavaliga 5,78, 157ff, 166, 174 bhavasota 158 Bbavaviveka 2, 3, 8, 11, 36, 53, 64f, 70f, 76f, 82, 116ff, 120f, 129f, 156 178 bhumi 76, 121 ' bhutakoti 53, 107 bodhi 2,5,177 Bodhibhadra 71 Bodhicittavivarana 9 11£ 79 163 Bodhimiirgadipapaiijikii Bodhipathapradipa 71 Bodhisambhiira 9 bodhisattva 76, 102, 121 BodhisattvabhUmi 87, 123, 164 Brahmajiilasutra 47,96 Brahman 141,154, 158ff, 168 Brahmanism 5 bSam-yas 75 Bu-ston 63, 72, 75, 109, 122 Buddhaghosa 69, 94 Buddhapalita 117

7I, 80

cak!;urvijfliina 162 Candrakirti 2, 3, 7, 8, 11, 17, 22, 25f, 30, 36f, 52, 64f, 73, 76ff, 82, 84, 87, 97, 113, 116ff, 120, 156, 163f Cartesianism 112 Catu/:lstava 9, 16, 18, 22, 27 ca~koti 26, 34, 46f Ch'an 75 Chatterjee, A.K 67 Chatterjee, KN. 67,80 citta 7, 11f, 45, 69, 147, 148, 152, 154f, 159, 167 cittagocara 45, 49, 56, 115 cittamiitra 67, 69f, 74f, 78f, 82f, 152, 164ff, 173, 174

188

INDEX

Conze, E. 43,102,109,117,120,121, 163f Culamalunkyasutta 95, 157 Dasabhumikasutra 78f, 83, 148, 152, 165 Dasgupta, D.S. 169 death 18 defilement 2, 4f, 50, 55, 176 Demieville, P. 98, 99 determinism 132f Devadatta 40f Dezhung Rinpoche 121 Dhammapada 152 dharma 29,32, 41, 47f, 60f, 69, 77, 86, 91, 99, 102f, 109, 116ff, 124, 133, 137ff, 150, 152f, 167, 171, 173, 175 dharmadhlltu 107, 142, 151 dharmakiiya 23 Dharmakirti 53,72,108,156,172 Dharmapala 71 dhatu 12,133,142 Dhatuvibhangasutra 47 dichotomy 1, 16, 55, 150 difference 4, 21 Dignaga 52,72, 108, 172 dravyasat 92f, 95 dreams 170 duality 16 du~a 19,21,46,54,89,98,136,149, 150,174,177

Eckel, M.D. 117,129,130 eternalism 31, 96, 132 excluded middle 17f Fenner,P. 34,36,77 four noble truths 4,21, 57, 89f, 134, J36ff,144 Frauwallner, E. vii, 63, 64 gandharva 29, 45, 60 Ghanavyuhasutra 78, 123 gnos~ 17,37,55,74,80,124,128,151 golden mean 96 Gomez, L.O. 48 grahyagrahaka 15,82,124,147

Hall, B.C. 128, 130 hallucinations 170 Haribhadra 52, 73 Harivarman 97, 99ff, 103 Harrison, P.M. 165 Hegel, G.W.F 57,66

Hinayana 30,119,164 Hva-saI,l 75

idealism 152ff identity 4"21 !ida, S. 119, 121 inexpressibility 1 Jaini, P.S. 64 javana 160f Jayatilleke, KN. 84,96,132,139,142 jiilina 1, 2, 3, 12f, 19, 23, 33, 37, 52, 54, 57,74,81,102, 129, 149, 175ff Jiianasrimitra 53 Johannson, R. 50 Jung, C.G. 156 Kajiyama, Y. 35, 64, 116ff Kalupahana, D.J. 25,47 klima 51 Kambala 127ff, 156, 166 Kant, I. 66 Karatalaratna 81 karma 55,78,136,157, 159f, 167, 174 Karmasiddhiprakara7;a 162, 166 KliSyapaparivarta 44 Kathlivatthu 160 Kli~liyanlivada 46,97,98 Katz,N. 119 Keith, AB. 140f kZesa 50, 81, 113, 155, 162, 175 Kochumuttam, T.A 80, 82, 125, 169, 171f lqanavlida 157 Kumarajiva 99 Kumarila 116ff, 119 Kunst,A 17 Kusulupa 71 la Vallee Poussin, L. de. vii, 7, 22, 64, 67 Zalqa7;a 28, 99, 102 Lamotte, E. vii, 30f, 63, 70, 123, 137, 167 language If, 25, 41, 97, 114 Lanklivatlirasutra 11, 45, 78f, 122, 127, 134 Legs-bshad snying-po 104 Leibniz 105,106,172 Uvi, S. vii, 65f light 29 Lindtner, Chr. viii, 7f, 20, 39, 45, 116, 117,128,156,167 logic 25ff

189

INDEX

loka 134f Lok~ema

127, 149f, 157, 164, 167, 175f 165

madhyama pratipade 31, 57f, 71, 96, 130 11adhyanaakahrdayakarika 119 Madhyamakala/?1kara 73f Madhyamakaratnapradipa 53, 76, 118 Madhyamakarthasamgraha 119 Madhyamakavatara 64, 77, 95 Madhyantavibhaliga 56, 67, 123, 130, 146,148

Mahasa/?1ghika 98f, 154, 162f Mahavastu 137 Mahavibha~a 115 Mahilyanasa/?1graha 8, 23, 123, 126, 167 MahilyanaviTfl$atika 80 MahiSasaka 162f 11aitreya 63, 65, 71, 72, 104, 122ff

Maitreya chapter 104ff, 109ff, 120f, 122f, 155

Majjhima Nikaya 51, 55, 135 Makkhali Gosilla 132,144 manas 152, 167f manovijfiilna 169, 172 marga 90,132,138,177 11ay,J. 13,18,66,155,169

maya 23, 29 11ehta, 11. 40

Milindapaiiha 92f, 95, 98, 100, 103, 157, 159

mithya 118f, 164 11onier-WiIlianas,11. 154 monism 66, 84 mulavijfiilna 162, 174 11urti, T.R.V. 8,14,25,30, 52f, "63,67, 102 Niigasena 92, 95, 159

Naiyayika 39 Nakamura, H. 32,135

nama 10, 104ff . ~amarUpa 54,135,156,177 Niinananda, Bhikkhu 114 negation 35ff neyartha 3, 70, 78, 85ff, 91f, 100, 109, 118ff nihilism 31,35,96,11,131,132,143,147

Nirakiiraviida 53 nirodhasamapatti 166, 168 nirvlilJa 2, 4, 18, 21, 23, 28, 36, 38, 49, 51,54,57,88,98, 112f,114, 124,

nirvikalpa 16,33,74,129,150 nitlirtha 3, 70, 85ff, 9lf, 100, 109, 118ff non-contradiction 17 non-duality 17,52, 128 non-substantiality 17 Obermiller, E. 72, 109, 123 objectivity 133, 147 Olsen, R.F. 164 ontology 7,38, 176f

Paiicavir{!Satiklisahasrikli 103, 120, 155 Paramartha 63, 98, 99

paramlirtha 4, 22f, 29, 33, 37, 60, 73, 78, 82, 89f, 93, 99, 102, 114ff, 118ff, 124,151,155, 157,176ff paratantra 4, 23f, 106ff, 122ff, 147ff, 172, 176ff parav.rtti 81, 174f parikalpita 4, 106ff, 122ff, 129, 147ff, 150,155, 171f, 176ff

parinlima 168 parinirvalJa 161,162,174 parini$panna 4, 107ff, 122ff, 128f, 147, 149ff, 155, 171f, 176ff Piiriiva 88 paryudasa 35f, 38, 42, 106, 120 perception 105f, 108f, 172 permanence 16 P'ingkia 90

Pitaputrasamagamasutra 115 Prabbamitra 71

prabhlisvara citta 5, 154, 156, 160, 162 prajiia 1, 2, 10, 13ff, 21, 46, 51ff, 54, 118, 12~140ff,

149,153,156

Prajiiaparamita 3,14,47, 52f, 60, 70, 72, 102, 105, 109, 123, 154f, 165

Prajiiapradipa 82, 118, 129 prajiiapti 98f, 104f, 177 prajiiaptimatra 104, 164 prajiiaptisat 92f, 95 Prajliaptivada 97ff, 103 prakrti 112, 154, 160, 162 prapaiica 1, 2, 18, 19f, 29, 33, 47f, 54, 59, 74,95,108,115,124,141,146,174, 176ff prasajya 35f, 38, 42, 120 prasaliga 1, 7, 25, 29f, 34, 38f, 84 PrasOligika 7,25,34, 36f, 41f, 72, 77, 84, 116f, 119f, 163, 173

190

INDEX

Prasannapadii 25, 52, 73, 76 pratijfili 39, 42 pra~edha 35f, 42, 120 pratityasamutpiida 1, 3, 4, 19ff, 25ff, 31, 32f, 37, 47, 53, 59ff, 69, 111, 130, 132f, 137ff, 142ff, 149, 153, 159, 174, 176ff Pratityasamutpiidahrdayakiirikii 9 pratyak$a 108,172 Pratyekabuddha 56 Pratyutpannasutra 165 pravrtdvijfiiina 10, 174 Priestley, C.D.C. 99 prthagjana 13, 19, 121 pudgala 86, 87, 170 PiiralJa Kassapa 132, 144 purification 4 pu~a 122 Rahula, W. 69, 167 Rahulabhadra 63 Raju, P.J. 31 Ratniikiirasiinti 53 RatnakIrti 53 RatnakUta 44 Ratnapradipa 11 Ratniivali 9, 44f, 47 Rawlinson, A. vii Robinson, R.H. 26f, 30, 32 Ruegg, D.S. 9,17, 30f, 33, 35, 37ff, 42, 44,63,73f riipa 103ff, 147

Siikiiraviida 53 Samiidhiriijasutra 156 samiiropa 129, 163 Samayabhedoparacanacakra 98 Srup.ghabhadra 88ff SiiJTIkhya 112 saJTIsiira 2, 4, 18, 21, 57, 98, 112ff, 124, 141,145,150, 156, 176f sa/flSkiira 54, 98, 113, 145 saJTIvJ1i 22f,29f, 57, 78, 89f, 93, 99, 102, 113f~118,121,151, 155, 163~176f SaJTIyutta Nikiiya 18, 46 Sandhinirmocanasutra 70, 77f, 105ff, 109ff, 122, 165 Sa]Jkara 154 Siintarak~ita 8, 73ff Siintipa 71 saparyiiyapariimartha 118~, 120, 122

Sarathchandra, E.R. 159 Siiriputra 155 sarvabijaka 168,174 Sarviistiviida 27,60,61" 93f, 143, 146f, 154 Siiti Bhikkhu 142 satya 84,87,110,112, 176f SatyasiddhiSiistra 99ff, 103 Sautriintika 64,172 Schmithausen, L. vii, 64, 78, 164ff, 172 Shackleton Bailey, D. 63 skandha 10,12,99,162,167,174 Slokaviirttika 116 Smart, N. viii Sprung, M. 113,114 Sriivaka 56,76,118,167 SriivakabhUmi 165 Staal, J.F. 34f Stcherbatsky, Th. 25,56,59,66,69, 146f Sthaviraviida 61, 98, 100, 110, 154 Sthiramati 64f, 73, 80f, 124, 127, 146ff, 168 Streng, F.J. 41 Subhagupta 93 Subhiiti 155 Suhrllekha 9 Sukhaviiti 165 sunya 10,15,20,31,36,111,114,124, 143f,151f sunyatii 2,30ff,36,39,41,44,54,56~ 68f, 74, 99, 110f, 114, 125, 146, 148, 150,178 Sunyatiisaptati 9f, 16f Sutrasamuccaya 9 Sutta Nipiita 47f, 53, 84f, 88, 134f Suzuki, D.T. 68 svabhiiva 10,12,20,31,38,57,61,74, 100, 105ff, 110f, 113, 120, 124, 127, 139,143~ 146,150~166, 177 svatantra 103, 107 Sviitantrika 36f, 117ff, 120 Takakusu, J. 63f Takasaki, J. 154 Tamrapamiya 163 Tathiigata 18, 38, 49, 52, 8S, 95, 96, 115, . 133f, 165, 167 tathiigathagarbha 164 tathatii 53,69,108,133,142,146,148, 150 tathya 118; 119f, 121

INDEX

tattva 14,16, 19ff, 27, 49, 54, 56f, 74, 90, 114,124,129, 145f, 148, 177 Theragathii 50 Theravada 47,154,167,175 Thengatha 51 three natures 11, 108ff, 166 thusness 17 Tibet 9,66,70,75 trilak.yana 109 Trirrllika 64f, 80, 125, 147, 168f, 172, 175 Tripitaka 30, 38, 44, 53, 61, 69, 75, 97, 152,167 ~vabhava 3,23, 78,109,122~ 171 Trisvabhiivanirdesa 123, 125 Tsong-kha-pa 71, 73, 104, 105ff, 109, 120, 122 Tucci, G. 39,80, 122, 147 twelve-linked pratityasamutpada 4, 14, 19, 21, 49, 54, 134ff two truths 110f Udana 28 Ui, H. 64, 122 ultimate truth 3 Upan4ad 140f, 154, 158f, 161f upaya 122 Vaibhii~ika 65, 88, 92f, 154, 166, 171 Vaidalyaprakarm;a 9 Vaipulyasiltra 123 VaiSe~ika 65 vliSana 170,172,174 vastu 106 Vasumitra 98 Vatsiputriya 154 Vedanta 25, 84, 157 V1bhajyavada 13,98,103,154 Vibhiisa 88ff V1grahavyavartani 8,9, 12, 35, 38f, 47, 116, 129

191

vlJnana 1,2,3,7,23,33,37, 50f, 67, 69, 80, 135, 142, 152, 155, 167, 169, 172,176ff vijnanaparinama 80f Vijnanavada 7, 10, 12, 15f, 17, 24, 61, 63,65~ 74, 77ff,129,131, 155 vijnapti 7, 80 vijnaptimatra 7, 15, 23, 65, 69, 74, 80, 83, 128, 150, 164f, 174f V1jnaptimatratasiddhi 67, 162 vikalpa 18ff, 29, 33, 47, 54, 59, 74, 80, 83,124,141,146,172,174 vikalpita nlpa 103ff V1malakirtinirdesasutra 30 V1rrllatika 64~ 80, 149, 169, 170f Vimuktisena 72, 73 V1naya 134 vinliti(lasota 158, 174 vipaka 166,168 VlSuddhimagga 157 vitarka 18 vyavahiira 15, 103, 104 Walleser, M. 63,118 Warder, AK. 44,46, 60f, 63 Wayman, A 115 Whitehead, AN. 149 Williams, P.W. 9, 45f, 47, 67, 93f Winternitz, M. 63 Won ch'uk 70, 71 Yamada,1. 63,76,146,175 Yasomitra 141 yathiibhilta 10,57, 81f, 85, 90, 108f, 125, 139ff, 145, 148, 150, 153, 155, 172, 175 Yogticara-Madhyamaka 72, 73 Yogacarabhilmi 76, 164f yukti 9,44,74, 121 Yukt4a~tikti 9ff, 16, 18