The Contemporary Evolution and Reform of Utilitarianism: Contemporary Development of Utilitarianism (Interests Politics Series) 9819973627, 9789819973620

Table of contents :
Contents
1 Introduction
1.1 Crises and Changes: New Developments of Utilitarianism
1.2 A Review of Research on Utilitarianism
1.2.1 Different Definiens of Utility
1.2.2 Different Perceptions of Criterion on Behavior Justification
1.2.3 Different Perceptions of Personal Conduct Codes
1.3 The Research Value of Utilitarianism
1.3.1 The Attraction of Consequentialism
1.3.2 The Attraction of Welfarism
1.3.3 Utilitarianism is a Concise and Powerful Theoretical System
1.4 Public Ethics of Utilitarianism
References
2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism
2.1 The Ideological Origin of Utilitarianism
2.1.1 The Epicurean School
2.1.2 Hume’s Utilitarian Thought
2.1.3 Smith’s Utilitarian Thought
2.2 The Primary Theory of Utilitarianism
2.2.1 Bentham’s Utilitarian Theory
2.2.2 Mill’s Utilitarian Theory
2.2.3 Sidgwick’s Utilitarian Theory
2.3 The Academic Criticism of Utilitarianism
2.3.1 Leading to Immoral Results
2.3.2 Violating the Separateness of Individuals
2.3.3 Excluding Other Obligations
2.3.4 Ignoring Social Equality
2.3.5 The Wrong Concept of Public Interests
References
3 The Fundamental Schools of Contemporary Utilitarianism
3.1 Different Understandings Based on the Concept of Utility
3.1.1 Preference Satisfaction Utilitarianism
3.1.2 Objective List Utilitarianism
3.1.3 Experiential Utilitarianism
3.2 Different Guidelines Based on Individual Actions
3.2.1 Act Utilitarianism
3.2.2 Rule Utilitarianism
3.2.3 Two-Level Utilitarianism
3.3 Based on Different Subject of Decision-Making
3.3.1 Government House Utilitarianism
3.3.2 Choice-Utilitarianism
References
4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism
4.1 The Inheritance of Classical Utilitarianism
4.1.1 The Extension of Consequentialism
4.1.2 The Continuation of Welfarism
4.1.3 The Inheritance of Aggregation
4.1.4 The Reaffirmation of Impartiality
4.2 The Evolution of Utilitarianism Common Features
4.2.1 The Integration of Utility and Right
4.2.2 The Substitution of Objective Welfare for Subjective Welfare
4.2.3 Aggregation Built on Unanimous Consent
4.3 The Transcending of Classical Utilitarianism
4.3.1 Expected Utility Replaces Actual Utility
4.3.2 Multiple Values Replace Value-Monism
4.3.3 Substantive Equality Replaces Formal Equality
References
5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual and the Community
5.1 The Individualistic Nature of Classical Utilitarianism
5.1.1 Fictious Community
5.1.2 Individualistic Political and Economic System
5.2 Theoretical Limitations Posed by the Individualism of Classical Utilitarianism
5.2.1 Epistemological Limitations
5.2.2 Theoretical Paradox
5.2.3 Blind Spots in Distribution
5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary Utilitarianism
5.3.1 The Basic Connotation of the Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation
5.3.2 Reorientation of the Relationship Between the Individual and the Community
5.3.3 Cooperation Creates New Public Benefits
References
6 Development of Contemporary Utilitarianism
6.1 The Development of Interest Theory
6.1.1 Overcoming the Dilemma of the Dualism of Practical Reason
6.1.2 Breakthrough in Promoting the Combination of Interest Subjectivity and Interest Objectivity
6.2 Contributions to the Theory of Equality
6.2.1 A New Cognition of the Basis of Equality
6.2.2 More Reasonable Distribution Results
6.3 The Real Public Interest Theory
6.3.1 Contemporary Utilitarianism Confirms the Public Interest
6.3.2 Establish the Value and Content of Social Public Interest Politics
6.4 The Balance of Governance Values
6.4.1 Achieving Compatibility with Efficiency and Fairness
6.4.2 Reconciling Individual Rationality with Collective Rationality
References
7 The Evaluation of the Utilitarianism Evolution
7.1 The Root Causes Analysis of Theoretical Evolution
7.1.1 Ideological Criticism and Response
7.1.2 The Change of Theoretical Paradigm
7.1.3 The Realistic Requirement of Equal Value
7.2 The Analysis of Gains and Losses for Utilitarianism Evolution
7.2.1 Theoretical Achievements of Contemporary Utilitarianism
7.2.2 Theoretical Inadequacy of Contemporary Utilitarianism
References
8 Conclusion
Afterword

Citation preview

Interests Politics Series

Shuyang Liu

The Contemporary Evolution and Reform of Utilitarianism

Interests Politics Series Series Editor Puqu Wang, Peking University, Beijing, China

Interest is the basic variable of political research, the original motive for people to form political relations, and the foundation and premise of the formation of a country. “Interest Politics Series” takes interest and interest relations as the basic object, exploring the concepts, evolution paths and practical significance of interest in western political philosophy, Chinese traditional political philosophy and political theory. The series attempts to illustrate the fundamental role of interests in political development and change. It aims to collect titles which construct a political analysis paradigm based on interest, to reveal the fundamental causes of political development and institutional change in human society, to form a school of interest politics.

Shuyang Liu

The Contemporary Evolution and Reform of Utilitarianism

Shuyang Liu Institute of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era; Institute of National Governance Studies Peking University Beijing, China

ISSN 2731-5940 ISSN 2731-5959 (electronic) Interests Politics Series ISBN 978-981-99-7362-0 ISBN 978-981-99-7363-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7363-7 Jointly published with Peking University Press The print edition is not for sale in China (Mainland). Customers from China (Mainland) please order the print book from: Peking University Press. © Peking University Press 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Crises and Changes: New Developments of Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . 1.2 A Review of Research on Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1 Different Definiens of Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2 Different Perceptions of Criterion on Behavior Justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3 Different Perceptions of Personal Conduct Codes . . . . . . . . . 1.3 The Research Value of Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.1 The Attraction of Consequentialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.2 The Attraction of Welfarism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.3 Utilitarianism is a Concise and Powerful Theoretical System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Public Ethics of Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 3 9 10

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The Ideological Origin of Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 The Epicurean School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 Hume’s Utilitarian Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3 Smith’s Utilitarian Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Primary Theory of Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 Bentham’s Utilitarian Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Mill’s Utilitarian Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 Sidgwick’s Utilitarian Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 The Academic Criticism of Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Leading to Immoral Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Violating the Separateness of Individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Excluding Other Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4 Ignoring Social Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.5 The Wrong Concept of Public Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29 29 29 32 35 39 39 43 48 53 53 57 61 62 65 67

18 20 22 23 24 24 25 26

v

vi

Contents

3 The Fundamental Schools of Contemporary Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Different Understandings Based on the Concept of Utility . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Preference Satisfaction Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 Objective List Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3 Experiential Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Different Guidelines Based on Individual Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Act Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Rule Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3 Two-Level Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Based on Different Subject of Decision-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 Government House Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Choice-Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71 72 72 75 76 78 78 80 82 83 84 85 85

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The Inheritance of Classical Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 The Extension of Consequentialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2 The Continuation of Welfarism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.3 The Inheritance of Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.4 The Reaffirmation of Impartiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The Evolution of Utilitarianism Common Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 The Integration of Utility and Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 The Substitution of Objective Welfare for Subjective Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3 Aggregation Built on Unanimous Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 The Transcending of Classical Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Expected Utility Replaces Actual Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Multiple Values Replace Value-Monism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 Substantive Equality Replaces Formal Equality . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87 87 87 90 92 96 98 98

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual and the Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 The Individualistic Nature of Classical Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 Fictious Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.2 Individualistic Political and Economic System . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Theoretical Limitations Posed by the Individualism of Classical Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 Epistemological Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 Theoretical Paradox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.3 Blind Spots in Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 The Basic Connotation of the Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

104 113 115 116 117 119 124 127 127 128 132 139 139 142 143 146 146

Contents

vii

5.3.2 Reorientation of the Relationship Between the Individual and the Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 5.3.3 Cooperation Creates New Public Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 6 Development of Contemporary Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 The Development of Interest Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.1 Overcoming the Dilemma of the Dualism of Practical Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.2 Breakthrough in Promoting the Combination of Interest Subjectivity and Interest Objectivity . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Contributions to the Theory of Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 A New Cognition of the Basis of Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 More Reasonable Distribution Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 The Real Public Interest Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1 Contemporary Utilitarianism Confirms the Public Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.2 Establish the Value and Content of Social Public Interest Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 The Balance of Governance Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.1 Achieving Compatibility with Efficiency and Fairness . . . . . 6.4.2 Reconciling Individual Rationality with Collective Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

175 175

7 The Evaluation of the Utilitarianism Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 The Root Causes Analysis of Theoretical Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1 Ideological Criticism and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.2 The Change of Theoretical Paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.3 The Realistic Requirement of Equal Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 The Analysis of Gains and Losses for Utilitarianism Evolution . . . . 7.2.1 Theoretical Achievements of Contemporary Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.2 Theoretical Inadequacy of Contemporary Utilitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

201 201 202 202 208 209

176 179 182 182 185 192 192 194 195 195 196 198

209 212 214

8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 Afterword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

Chapter 1

Introduction

Utilitarianism is an important and influential school of political thoughts, which for the first time systematically links morality and the maximization of human happiness, explaining the origin and essence of morality from the perspective of human needs and the actual interest relationship between people and taking the greatest happiness of man as judgment criterions of moral principles. It can be said that utilitarianism essentially realizes that “man is the measure of all things”, and takes the subjective manifestation of human interests (utility) as the basis of all existing relations in society. From the nineteenth century, utilitarianism has become the dominant theory in Western society, impacting profoundly on the political and economic life of Western society. But, in today’s discourse system, utilitarianism is considered an outdated theory, and “a once widely accepted faith”. As the famous contemporary British philosopher and jurist Hart put it, starting from the middle of the twentieth century, the field of political philosophy has experienced “the progress of a transition from a once widely accepted old faith that some form of utilitarianism, if only we could discover the right form, must capture the essence of political morality. The new faith is that the truth must lie not with a doctrine that takes the maximization of aggregate or average general welfare for its goal”.1 People believe that utilitarianism is a theory that purely pursues the maximization of utility. Deeply shaped by utilitarianism, the political and economic life of modern society are riddled with pragmatic assumptions and demonstrations, and economic supremacy, efficiency supremacy and even money supremacy have become the primary standard guiding people’s behavior. In the face of utility maximization, moral principles and value propositions become meaningless. Therefore, many researchers put forward that utilitarianism is no longer applicable to the discourse system of contemporary political philosophy, in which the

1

Hart (1979).

© Peking University Press 2023 S. Liu, The Contemporary Evolution and Reform of Utilitarianism, Interests Politics Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7363-7_1

1

2

1 Introduction

primary virtue of the social system is to achieve social fairness and justice. The principle of utilitarianism is not an effective means to discover the core values of society, but a stumbling block that hinders the realization of social fairness and justice. Utilitarianism needs to be completely abandoned. “The important issues that utilitarianism raises should be discussed in contexts more rewarding than that of utilitarianism itself. The day cannot be too far off in which we hear no more of it.”2 So how should we treat utilitarianism? Is it necessary to completely abandon the principles and logic of utilitarianism? As Rawls and Kymlicka remarks: “in our society utilitarianism operates as a kind of tacit background against which other theories have to assert and defend themselves”.3 On the one hand, utilitarianism is an ideological system that truly considers the principles of public life from the perspective of humans, since it fits in well with the psychological demands of people to care about their own interests. Utilitarianism values people’s interests, believe that all social principles and customary norms need to be ultimately tested by interests, and thus take the interests of the majority of people as the highest rule of conduct for individuals and society. On the other hand, utilitarianism regards interests as the ruling power of human beings, and believes that individual pursuit of self-interest is the only driving force for social development, promoting the realization and growth of overall social interests in the process of pursuing self-interest. It can be said that utilitarianism is not only a moral philosophy, but also a theory of interests. At the same time, utilitarianism is not a flash in the pan. Although contemporary political philosophy has undergone a shift in its theoretical paradigm, utilitarianism has not disappeared. Since the second half of the twentieth century, new works and achievements have been constantly emerging on utilitarianism theories. On the basis of reflecting on the defects of classical utilitarianism theories, contemporary utilitarianism, a new branch of utilitarianism thought, has taken shape. This book is a comprehensive study of contemporary utilitarianism theories. Starting from the source of utilitarianism, it traces back the theoretical foundation of contemporary utilitarianism and summarizes the essential characteristics of utilitarianism theory. Through an analysis of the contrasting views held by different schools of contemporary utilitarianism, the author believes that although there are many different schools within contemporary utilitarianism, all contemporary utilitarianism theories have inherited the theoretical traditions of classical utilitarianism in terms of consequentialism, welfarism, aggregation and impartiality, and retained the basic qualities of utilitarianism theory. In order to overcome the theoretical dilemma of classical utilitarianism, contemporary utilitarianism has made a series of improvements, such as proving that utilitarianism can accept human right, heightening the objective standards of utilitarian connotations, and constructing its pluralistic value goals. By virtue of these improvements, contemporary utilitarianism has gradually met requirements of contemporary political philosophy. On this basis, the author further notes the fundamental differences between classical and contemporary utilitarian theories stem from their theoretical paradigm differences, and utilitarianism 2 3

Eggleston and Miller (2014), p. 1. Kymlicka (2002), p. 10.

1.1 Crises and Changes: New Developments of Utilitarianism

3

evolves in the direction from individualism to a balance between the community and the individual. The change of theoretical paradigm has made contemporary utilitarianism form a unique concept of equality and public interest, realizing the development from utility politics to interest politics, and also has provided reasonable and effective solutions for solving the conflict and ranking of pluralistic social values, offering a more rational philosophical foundation and ethical basis for social public governance. Finally, the author objectively evaluates the development and contributions of contemporary utilitarianism, analyzes the factors that account for the evolution of the theory, and clarifies the important value of contemporary utilitarianism to contemporary political philosophy.

1.1 Crises and Changes: New Developments of Utilitarianism Utilitarianism holds that the core of morality and politics lies in (and should be) contributing to the greatest happiness of the members of society, that is, “the morally right act or policy is that which produces the greatest happiness for the members of society”.4 In retrospect, utilitarian political thoughts have a long history, at least dating back to the Epicureanism in ancient Greece. Utilitarianism, as a kind of political philosophy, came into existence in England in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. Jeremy Bentham briefly expounded the political theory of utilitarianism in his first book, A Fragment on Government in 1776. “It is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong”.5 Later, with the continuous improvements by John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick and other utilitarians, utilitarianism became the dominant principle of Western political philosophy in the nineteenth century, and gradually a systematic and integrated theoretical system was developed. For almost all the important issues in political philosophy, utilitarianism has given unique explanations within the theory. Therefore, by 1960s, the dominance of utilitarianism had reached such an extent that unless a moral system featured utilitarianism elements in some sense, moral philosophers would not regard it as a “moral system”, utilitarianism having become the dominant ideology in Western society. However, since the 1970s, utilitarianism has confronted unprecedented challenges, not only being pulled down from the altar, but even predicted by opponents to disappear from the discussions of political philosophy. Critics argue that there are five obvious defects in the logic of utilitarianism: First, utilitarianism tends to result in immoral acts. Many critics believe that utilitarians only use the consequences of an act as a measure of its legitimacy, without caring about the subjective intentions and value judgments of the subjects. If a wrong act can produce sufficient utilitarian consequences, or the utilitarian consequences 4 5

Ibid. Bentham (1990), p. 3.

4

1 Introduction

of such act can offset the bad influences of the wrong act itself, then the wrong act gains its legitimacy on the horizon of utilitarianism. If breach of an agreement can generate greater overall social utility, the breach will be allowed and encouraged by the utilitarianism theory. Opponents emphasize that utilitarianism reverses the causal logic of things: An act is wrong, not because of its ability to produce bad influences, but because of the wrongness of the act itself, the bad social influences being merely by-products of the wrong act. Utilitarians are constantly calculating utilities, and regard the calculations of utilities as a measure of the legitimacy of their actions. In fact, utilitarianism tends to encourage people to speculate and show extreme selfishness. “Cleverly” breaching an agreement without being noticed by anybody, if it is possible to do so, seems to be an effective way to maximize utilities. Just as the critics have said, utilitarian principles, logically carried out, would result in far more cheating, lying and unfair action.6 Second, utilitarianism does not attach importance to the independence and integrity of an individual. John Rawls and Bernard Williams are the main critics holding this view. According to Rawls, utilitarians misleadingly draw an analogy between the principle of utility maximisation and prudence. Rawls said, in the logic of utilitarianism, an individual compensates for current pain with more happiness in the future, which is equivalent to compensating for the pain of one person in the community with greater benefits for another. Such misleading analogy ignores the independence and separateness of individuals, making it impossible for utilitarianism to provide an effective rights theory. “It does not matter, except indirectly, how this sum of satisfaction is distributed among individuals any more than it matters, except indirectly, how one man distributes his satisfaction over time”.7 In addition, Williams argued that the utilitarian calculation principle requires individuals to give up their intentions and propositions, which is a violation of personal integrity, and only serves to distance man and his action. Third, utilitarianism rejects other moral obligations. In the logic of utilitarianism, everyone has only one moral obligation, that is, to promote the maximization of overall utility in a society. “If you have employed a boy to mow your lawn and he has finished the job and asks for his pay, you should pay him what you promised only if you cannot find a better use for your money”.8 In this case, utilitarianism clearly leads to an absurd conclusion. At the same time, utilitarianism also raises harsh moral requirements for people, and the theory requires people to treat every stakeholder with impartiality, and without the slightest preference for their relatives, friends and themselves. Critics point out that by the standard of utilitarianism, individuals will eventually become the “slaves” of the greatest happiness, working day and night to strive for the greatest utility. Fourth, utilitarianism does not care about the distribution of social welfare, and lack concerns of egalitarianism.

6

Ewing (1964), p. 40. Rawls (1999), p. 23. 8 Sartorius (1969), p. 79. 7

1.1 Crises and Changes: New Developments of Utilitarianism

5

Critics hold that under the premise of the same total utility, utilitarianism does not care about the distribution of utility between different individuals. Utilitarianism separates interest and its subject, and does not care about whose interests are ultimately realized, nor does it care whose interests are increased or damaged in the process of interest aggregation. Critics further claim that in utilitarianism, equality only has the attribute of tools, that is, equality makes sense only when it can facilitate the improvement of utility. Utilitarians will choose unequal distribution methods if inequality can produce greater total social utility. Fifth, utilitarianism lacks the basic concept of public interest. Although utilitarianism takes the maximization of the total utility in a society or the general happiness of society as the basic goal, the theory lacks the basic position of publicity, and the so-called public interest is only a simple aggregation of personal interests. Public interest is like a function of personal interest, which not only does not have the normative value, but even does not have its independence. According to the utilitarian theory, public interest is a superfluous concept, which can neither be used to evaluate nor measure personal interests, nor to regulate interpersonal conflicts of interest. Or rather, it has even become a tool to achieve private goals effectively. Therefore, in 1973, Williams predicted that “The day cannot be too far off in which we hear no more of it”9 Ronald M. Dworkin also pointed out that “Now the wheel is turning again: utilitarianism is giving way once again to recognition of individual rights”.10 In the discourse system of contemporary political philosophy, which regards justice as the primary virtue of social system, utilitarianism is undoubtedly an outdated political theory. Is utilitarianism really out of date? The answer is no. Utilitarianism remains an important and active theory to this day. When we scrutinize the views and propositions of utilitarianism, we will find that the above criticism applies to classical utilitarianism only.11 Since the middle of the twentieth century, new theoretical achievements have continuously emerged within the utilitarian theory, and gradually developed into a new type of utilitarianism— contemporary utilitarianism. When we study contemporary utilitarianism thoroughly and get rid of various prejudices to contemporary utilitarianism born out of labeling cognitions about the theory, we will find that contemporary utilitarianism not only has sufficient theoretical resources to give reasonable explanations and responses to the above criticism, but also is able to provide more reasonable philosophical guidelines for social public governance. Starting in the late 1950s and early 1960s, contemporary utilitarianism gradually rose in English-speaking countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, and is still in the ascendant. While inheriting the essence of classical utilitarianism, contemporary utilitarianism differs greatly from classical utilitarianism 9

Scarre (2002), p. 2. Dworkin (2011), p. 414. 11 The classical utilitarianism in this book refers to the utilitarian political philosophy theories that emerged in the late eighteenth century, and the representative figures are Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, etc. 10

6

1 Introduction

in terms of utilitarian content, measurement standards, value system and theoretical concerns. More importantly, contemporary utilitarianism has overcome the theoretical dilemma of classical utilitarianism to a certain extent. Contemporary utilitarianism has abandoned the principle of direct utilitarianism and allowed the systems and rules to play greater roles, thus avoiding conflicts between utilitarian calculation and moral common senses. Contemporary utilitarianism has realized the integration of utility maximization and individual rights within the theory, ensuring the independence and integrity of individuals. By successfully integrating utilitarianism and equal treatment for all, contemporary utilitarianism not only transforms the theory into an egalitarian theory, but also provides a distribution scheme more conforming to people’s intuition. Contemporary utilitarianism has replaced the traditional perception that considers public interest as the aggregation of individual interests with an independent concept of public interest, developed a public interest concept with utilitarian characteristics, and given a balanced consideration to both personal and public interests. Contemporary utilitarianism is a new type of utilitarianism theory. When it comes to the relationship between individuals and society, contemporary utilitarianism is oriented towards an equilibrium state between individual and community, and reconstructs the basic factors of utilitarianism from this balanced treatment. Thus, the theory differs from the traditional view on the relationship between individuals and the community, forming a unique perspective of common interest, where the community interest sometimes takes priority over individual interests. Contemporary utilitarianism has changed its individualism perspective to some extent, which is the biggest transformation of the theory, and it is also the fundamental reason why contemporary utilitarianism can overcome the dilemma of traditional theories, meanwhile continue to take its place in the discussions of contemporary political philosophy. However, current academic attention to contemporary utilitarianism is quite limited. On the one hand, contemporary utilitarianism is a theoretical faction formed in the debate of political philosophy, and lacks a systematic elaboration of its basic content. Thus, it is regarded by academia as only minor repairs to classical utilitarianism, without breaking out of the logical framework of classical utilitarianism. On the other hand, due to the paradigm shift of contemporary political philosophy, people tend to hold a critical rather than a research attitude towards utilitarianism. In the academic field, scholars generally believe that as a theory of the nineteenth century, utilitarianism arose and served the industrial bourgeoisie’s fighting for economic rights and free trade. Therefore, utilitarianism is a theoretical doctrine that starts from basic human nature and seeks a basis for people’s pursuit of profit, aiming to justify the behavior of the emerging bourgeoisie to chase interests and seize wealth. However, when the time enters the twenty-first century, the theme of political philosophy has changed from emphasizing that man is the measure of all things, to how to construct a fairer and more just social structure, how to use institutional forces to limit individual profit-seeking behaviors, and how to guide rational individuals to accept certain public responsibilities for achieving social fairness and justice. At this time, the utilitarianism that simply emphasizes the maximization of the happiness of the majority shows obvious backwardness. As Williams argues, utilitarianism provides

1.1 Crises and Changes: New Developments of Utilitarianism

7

only a single principle system of social decision-making that makes only minimal commitments at the societal level, namely the promise of improving the well-being of citizens, but a good social decision-making system also needs to consider other morals values, such as fair distribution, which are completely outside the consideration of utilitarianism. Therefore, the simplicity of the utilitarian theory is not to be commended, since “A system of social decision which is indifferent to issues of justice or equity certainly has less to worry about than one that is not indifferent to those considerations.”12 Utilitarian social systems that offer only minimal commitments are clearly not in line with people’s hearts. In addition, critics further argue that utilitarian theory is based on the assumption that individual interests share a considerable degree of identity with the public interest, which classical utilitarians clearly inherited from Smith’s view. Guided by the invisible hand, every individual “by pursing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.”13 However, due to the contradiction and conflict of interpersonal interests, personal interests and public interests often presents obvious heterogeneity in real life, which indicates acting according to the logic of personal interests may result in the actions that infringe on public interests. Or the social utility formed by the aggregation of personal interests may cause discrimination, infringement and other acts that clearly violate the norms of social publicity. As Engels noted in his work British Situation: 18 Century: Bentham believed that the individual and the public interest were the same. In his argument that human love is nothing more than enlightened self-interest, Bentham acknowledged that individual and general interests are the same, and replaced the ‘general welfare’ with the greatest happiness of the greatest number, an argument later further developed by his student Mill. Here, Bentham makes the same mistake in his own experience that Hegel made in theory; He did not seriously address the incompatibility of the two, he subordinated the subject to the predicate, the whole to the part, and thus turned everything upside down. At first, he said that the general good and individual good were inseparable, but later he ends up talking only one-sidedly about the naked individual interest; His argument is only the empirical manifestation of another argument that a man is human. Because it is empirical, it confers the rights of human not on the free, self-realized and self-made man, but on the wild, blind, caught-in-conflict man.14 The empirical facts of social development history also show that the situation of interpersonal interest alignment is very limited, and interest contradictions and conflicts are the normal state of interest relations between people. Therefore, many scholars believe that utilitarian theory not only runs counter to the basic theme of contemporary political philosophy, but also its theoretical original intention and logical structure are out of touch with the basic requirements of public management

12

Smart and Williams (1973), p. 137. Smith (1993), p. 130. 14 The Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Volume 1), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009, p. 106. 13

8

1 Introduction

and public governance in modern society. No matter how the utilitarian theory is transformed, it cannot get rid of the fate of being abandoned. In fact, if we carefully study the contemporary development process of utilitarianism and examine the theoretical starting point and logical context of contemporary utilitarianism, we will find that the above criticism only applies to classical utilitarianism, but not to contemporary utilitarianism. Contemporary utilitarianism is a new utilitarianism, which is formed by sympathizers and defenders of utilitarianism, in the debate with non-utilitarians on issues such as rights, equality, and social welfare. How to realize the fairness and justice of social structure, and how to urge rational individuals to voluntarily choose behaviors that contribute to the public interest, are the basic issues of contemporary utilitarian research, and also the core symbol of the theory’s difference from classical utilitarianism. Contemporary utilitarianism mostly abandons the monistic value structure, holding diverse and open attitude towards various social values and ideological concepts. Contemporary utilitarianism can not only respond to the theoretical concerns of contemporary political philosophy for social fairness and justice, but also remind us from the perspective of consequentialism that the superiority of any value, procedure and rule need to be ultimately implemented in the rationality and effectiveness of its result. If the results produced by a certain concept are not ideal, it is worth reconsidering whether it is necessary to adhere to this concept. More importantly, contemporary utilitarianism reveals the central paradoxes of classical utilitarianism. On the one hand, classical utilitarianism regards the happiness of the majority as the highest moral principle. On the other hand, the theory has a distinct tendency to individualism, emphasizing that only personal interests are real and effective, and in real life “the great majority of good actions are intended, not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up”.15 Pure individualism makes classical utilitarianism form only a formal and false view of public interest, which indicates that public interest is understood as the sum of individual interests. The false concept of public interest separates the organic connection between the individual and the community, so that the public interest is always in a virtual and marginal position. At the same time, the false concept of public interest cannot prevent egoists from exploiting others, and cannot maintain stable social cooperation. Contemporary utilitarianism corrects the individualistic standpoint of classical utilitarianism, and holds that the community is not a fiction, but an organic entity with its own purpose. Community interests arise from interpersonal social cooperation, and community interests originate from individual interests and are independent of individual interests. The core criterion of community interests is the maintenance of social cooperation and the provision of the same degree of protection for all types of social interests. Contemporary utilitarianism regards rules and institutions as effective tools for coordinating interpersonal conflicts of interests. In the conflict of interests, the utilitarian consequences of the situation are used to determine the priority of the behavior of the subject of rights, and take this as the standard for the distribution of interests among people. At the same 15

Mill (2009), p. 34.

1.2 A Review of Research on Utilitarianism

9

time, treating the individual and the community with a balanced attitude is a major feature of contemporary utilitarianism, and it is also the key factor that contemporary utilitarianism can eventually form a realistic theory of distribution and the theory of public interest. The changes in the ontology of contemporary utilitarianism not only freed the theory from the core paradox of utilitarianism, but also made it possess the equalization characteristics, which provides us with a basis for analyzing the interests of individuals and groups, as well as thought inspiration of weighing the relationship between individuals and groups. Also, it provides theoretical guidance for solving the compatibility problem of individual rationality and collective rationality in public governance.

1.2 A Review of Research on Utilitarianism In order to analyze the evolution process of contemporary utilitarian theory, it is necessary to clarify the theoretical differences between classical and contemporary utilitarianism. From the very beginning, contemporary utilitarianism is very different from classical utilitarianism. As Frederick Rosen said, classical utilitarianism and later utilitarian theories (contemporary utilitarianism) have obvious differences.16 The reason is that, on the one hand, contemporary utilitarianism was born when utilitarianism was beleaguered, and the primary task of the theory was to correct the theoretical defects of classical utilitarianism and defend the core tenets of utilitarianism. On the other hand, the theoretical paradigms and basic issues faced by contemporary utilitarianism are completely different from the period of classical utilitarianism. Contemporary utilitarianism emerged in a new historical context, in which justice is the primary good of the social system. “Laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust.”17 Contemporary utilitarianism needs to respond to the basic issues in the discussion of contemporary political philosophy, such as guaranteeing individual rights, paying attention to social equality and realizing fair distribution. Therefore, contemporary utilitarianism is different from classical utilitarianism in terms of its theoretical form, basic issues and theoretical concerns. Contemporary utilitarianism is a new type of utilitarianism. However, there are still theoretical differences on how to distinguish the two kinds of utilitarianism. As usual two types of utilitarianism are distinguished in form. For example, classical utilitarianism belongs to hedonism, while contemporary utilitarianism belongs to non-hedonism; classical utilitarianism belongs to action utilitarianism, while contemporary utilitarianism belongs to rule-utilitarianism; classical utilitarianism belongs to direct utilitarianism, while contemporary utilitarianism belongs to indirect utilitarianism; etc. However, the above classification does not strictly distinguish between classical and contemporary utilitarianism. On the one 16 17

Rosen (2003), p. 3. Rawls (1999), p. 3.

10

1 Introduction

hand, there are many internal factions of contemporary utilitarianism, of which ruleutilitarianism and indirect utilitarianism are only branches of the genre, and cannot reflect the full picture of contemporary utilitarianism. On the other hand, the formal distinction does not fundamentally reveal the core differences between the two utilitarianisms, and is not sufficient to explain the contemporary development of utilitarian theories, nor is it sufficient to determine whether contemporary utilitarianism is a new utilitarian theory or the continuation of classical utilitarianism in contemporary times. Therefore, this book explains the differences between classical and contemporary utilitarianism from three levels: the connotation of utility, the criteria for the legitimacy of behavior, and the criteria for individual action, and reveals the current research status of utilitarian theory in the academia, laying a theoretical foundation for the further research.

1.2.1 Different Definiens of Utility For utilitarians, the first question is, what is utility? The goal of utilitarianism is to maximize the total utility of society. However, different utilitarians have different explanations for what is the total utility of society and what kind of consequences is the maximization of utility. Since ancient times, the basic concept of utility has undergone multiple changes, such as happiness, pleasure, welfare, interest, preference satisfaction and so on.18 “Utility” is not only the basic concept of utilitarian theory, but also contains different understandings of moral principles in the theory. Different understanding of the concept of utility is the primary difference between classical utilitarianism and contemporary utilitarianism. Generally speaking, from the perspective of classical utilitarianism, utilitarianism refers to the subjective feeling of happiness, the subjective feeling of conscious beings (not limited to human beings). In the logic of contemporary utilitarianism, utilitarianism represents an individual’s welfare or interest, which is the reflection and cognition of the individual’s own welfare.

1.2.1.1

Classical Utilitarianism: Utilitarianism is the Subjective Feeling of Happiness

In general, the concept of utilitarianism in classical utilitarianism is relatively clear. On the one hand, all classical utilitarians promote hedonism in different ways. Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick all believed that utility is to promote happiness, and happiness is equivalent to increasing pleasure and reducing pain. “What happiness consists of we have already seen: enjoyment of pleasures, security from pains”.19 “From Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility, meant by it, not 18 19

Brock (1973), pp. 241–245. Bentham (1907), p. 64.

1.2 A Review of Research on Utilitarianism

11

something to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain”.20 So, from the perspective of classical utilitarianism, the connotation of utilitarianism is unified. Utilitarianism is equivalent to happiness. “A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be for the interest, of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains”.21 An action is morally justified and should be taken if and only if it produces more pleasure (or avoids more pain). Pleasure, on the other hand, has a unique intrinsic value. Pleasure is valuable only for its own sake. Pleasure is never a means to promote other values. “The ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality”.22 Bentham pointed out that only pleasure has positive value, only pain has negative value, everything else is a means to promote pleasure, and pleasure is the only real existence. Starting from the nature of human beings, Bentham pointed out that obtaining happiness and avoiding pain are the fundamental starting points of all human behaviors, and also constitute the binding force of human behaviors. Mill inherited Bentham’s hedonistic tradition and further clarified the ultimate value of pleasure. Mill believes that, first, it is human nature to seek pleasure and avoid pain, and it is desirable for everyone to enjoy pleasure and reduce pain. Second, people simply do not desire anything other than pleasure, “all desirable things are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure”.23 People appreciate music, value health, and prize virtue because these are inherently part of pleasure. Sidgwick also pointed out: “The only thing that is ultimately valuable is ‘desirable consciousness’”.24 However, within the pleasure theory of classical utilitarianism, there are also many differences around the specific meaning of utility. Overall, there are four main categories of debate: (1) the actual content of pleasure, (2) whether there is a qualitative difference in pleasure, (3) the subject scope of pleasure, and (4) whether all pleasure has intrinsic value.

The Actual Content of Pleasure Hedonism seems to have a clear explanation of the concept of utility, but after further exploration of the meaning of pleasure, the definition becomes vague. What is pleasure? This is the fundamental question that no hedonists can avoid. In the discussion of contemporary political philosophy, there are generally two directions for the interpretation of the meaning of pleasure. First, it is believed that pleasure is only a 20

Mill (2009), p. 7. Bentham (1907), p. 17. 22 Mill (2009), p. 14. 23 Mill (2009), p. 9. 24 Morgan (2007), p. 34. 21

12

1 Introduction

certain emotion, feeling or state, which is a subjective reflection of creatures and a purely psychological hedonic experience. An extreme example is the state of pleasure created in the electrode experiments.25 Second, it is believed that pleasure is doing what one wants to do. For example, Ryle said, “Pleasure is ‘taking pleasure in’ or ‘enjoying’ doing what he is doing”.26 A similar divide exists in classical utilitarianism. Pleasure, according to Bentham and Mill, is a pleasant mood and state. Griffin, for instance, points out, that “Bentham and Mill are, with ample reason, taken to be offering a psychological account of ‘utility’. Pleasure or happiness is presented as ‘a state of feeling’, and pain or unhappiness as a feeling on the same scale as, and the opposite of, pleasure or happiness”.27 Utility is the subjective feeling of pleasure. In contrast, Sidgwick’s conception of pleasure is closer to contemporary theory of pleasure, “pleasure is a kind of feeling which stimulates the will to actions tending to sustain or produce it—to sustain it, if actually present, and to produce it, if it be only represented in idea—; and similarly, pain is a kind of feeling which stimulates to actions tending to remove or avert it”.28 Therefore, Sidgwick’s concept of happiness incorporates preference factors in addition to psychological factors. Namely, happiness is the psychological state desired by the subject, which will lead individuals to take actions to achieve goals.

Differences on the Quantity and Quality of Pleasure Whether there is a difference in quality of pleasure, and whether there is a dividing line between higher pleasure and lower pleasure, is an important theoretical debate in classical utilitarianism. According to Bentham’s famous saying, if the game of push-pin can produce as much pleasure as music or poetry, then it has the same value as music or poetry. There is no difference in nature of any kind of pleasure or pain. Every pleasure is homogenous, whatever its nature and source. From Bentham’s perspective, pleasure consists of both sensual pleasures and advanced and complex human emotions, all of which differ only in quantity. Poetry has higher value only if it produces a greater quantity of pleasure in the seven dimensions of intensity, duration, certainty, distance, abundance, purity and breadth. Bentham’s pleasure homogeneity theory has been criticized since its birth, and Carlyle accused it of being “a pig philosophy”.29 As a result, Mill improved Bentham’s pleasure homogeneity theory, contending that there are not only differences in quantity of pleasure, but also differences in quality of pleasure, and differences in quality are more important. “It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds

25

The so-called electrode experiment is an experiment in which some electrodes will be inserted into the brain of an organism in order to obtain certain stimulus. See Good (1962), pp. 199–200. 26 Ryle (1949), pp. 107–108. 27 Griffin (1986), pp. 7–8. 28 Sidgwick (1962), p. 42. 29 Morgan (2007), p. 23.

1.2 A Review of Research on Utilitarianism

13

of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others”.30 But how to distinguish higher pleasures from lower pleasures? Mill proposed a method that relies on “competent judges” to make judgments. “If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account”.31 Although Mill’s pleasure theory has revised certain Bentham’s unreasonable views, it has brought new debates: first, whether higher pleasure is an evaluative pleasure; second, whether “a competent judge” is reliable. For the first question, the prevailing view is that Mill’s higher pleasure is not an evaluative concept. As Sosa makes the point: “differences in quality only serve to classify different experiences according to the degree of pleasure they tend to produce, are reducible to differences in degree, and do not constitute a standard logically distinct from degree or quantity for evaluating pleasure”.32 Jane Naverson also argues that Mill uses “Pleasure Quality” in a non-evaluative sense only simply to describe those experiences that people more prefer.33 In fact, all the classical utilitarians including Mill use the concept of utilitarianism in a descriptive sense. Mill’s proposal for higher pleasure aims to better accommodate the actual situation, rather than make a rational cognition and objective evaluation about pleasure. For the second question, the academic community has expressed widespread doubts: on the one hand, the distinction between higher pleasures and lower pleasures makes it more difficult to compare utility, and Mill to a certain extent undermines the integrity and self-consistency of Bentham’s theory; On the other hand, when all “competent judges” agree that poetry is more important than the game of push-pin, perhaps simply because there is some value in the mind of “competent judges” that is more important than pleasure (such as a preference for morality). Resorting to the judgment of a “competent judge” may fundamentally subvert the basic idea of utilitarianism.

Differences on the Subject Scope of Pleasure For Bentham, all pleasure has the same value, and the pleasure of each subject has the same weight no matter who the subject is. Hence, Bentham further argues that subjects of pleasure include not only human beings, but also other sentient beings, such as animals. “It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate” (the fate of being killed, tortured by humans); and “a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more 30

Mill (2009), p. 10. Mill (2009), pp. 16–17. 32 Brock (1973), p. 243. 33 Narveson (1967), pp. 79–82. 31

14

1 Introduction

rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old”.34 Bentham believes that pleasure of animals is also a kind of happiness. Although pleasure of animals does not have the same value as the pleasure of humans (because animals do not have rich emotions and complex psychological activities like humans), animals have sensory satisfaction and pain, and in this sense, animals should also become the subject of pleasure. In other words, as long as it is an emotional creature, its utility needs to be included in the calculation of utility, and animals’ pain and pleasure are also of moral value.35 From Bentham’s perspective, the subject scope of pleasure includes all conscious beings, which differs from other classical utilitarians and contemporaneous political philosophers. In contemporary utilitarian theory, Peter Singer has inherited Bentham’s understanding of the scope of the subject of pleasure. Singer contends that “The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way”,36 utilitarianism requires people to treat the pleasure and pain of all living individuals equally. On this basis, Singer perfected the equality theory of utilitarianism, which played an important role in issues such as refugee and animal protection.

Differences on the Intrinsic Value of Pleasure The theoretical disagreement about the intrinsic value of pleasure lies in whether all pleasures have intrinsic value, and whether false pleasures such as pleasure of malevolence, pleasure of cruelty, etc. have intrinsic value as well as other pleasures. According to Bentham, all pleasures are of the same nature, and that pleasure of doing evil is also a pleasure, having its intrinsic value as well. “The pleasures of malevolence are the pleasures resulting from the view of any pain supposed to be suffered by the beings who may become the objects of malevolence”37 ; Mill, however, persists that false pleasure is neither pleasure nor intrinsic value, because no “competent judge” will favor it. Subsequent scholars have mostly objected to the idea that all pleasures have intrinsic value, with a famous contemporary objection coming from Sidgwick’s student Moore. Moore make it clear that pleasure of malevolence or pleasure of doing evil is intrinsically wrong, “the evil of the state is heightened not only by an

34

Bentham (1907), p. 330. The idea that animals’ pain and pleasure also have moral value is the core difference that distinguishes Bentham from other contemporary political philosophers who held views against animal cruelty. For example, Kant also disapproved of cruelty to animals, but Kant’s objection stemmed from his objection to the vulgarity of human nature. 36 Singer (2011), p. 50. 37 Bentham (1907), p. 39. 35

1.2 A Review of Research on Utilitarianism

15

increase in the evil or ugliness of the object, but also by an increase in the enjoyment”.38 Pleasure an abuser derives from the abusive behavior does not partially offset his evil deeds, but rather exacerbates his guilt. In fact, the theoretical debate on the intrinsic value of pleasure reflects the academic disagreement about whether “utility” should be a descriptive concept or an evaluative concept. When people start talking about “right pleasure” and “wrong pleasure”, an evaluative component has already been added to the concept of pleasure. In the classical utilitarian theory, “utility” is primarily a descriptive concept; however, in the discussion of contemporary utilitarianism, the mainstream utilitarian concept possesses both descriptive and evaluative characteristics. Consequently, in terms of the connotation of utilitarianism, the core difference between classical and contemporary utilitarianism is whether utilitarianism needs to have the function of evaluation.

1.2.1.2

Contemporary Utilitarianism: Utility is the Subjective Cognition of Personal Interests

In terms of the connotation of utility, there is a basic consensus among contemporary utilitarians that utility is not only a subjective reflection of personal feelings, but utility needs to be able to actually enhance personal welfare or interests. If merely considering utility as the pleasure or happiness that an individual can feel subjectively, not only does it ignore numerous valuable psychological experiences that do not lead to pleasure feelings, but it also separates pleasure from individual wellbeing. If the experience of pleasure or happiness does not lead to the promotion of personal interests, then the experience of pleasure or happiness itself is questionable. Therefore, contemporary utilitarianism abandons the utilitarian interpretation of pure personal experience in classical utilitarianism, and maintains that the concept of utilitarianism should include evaluative and cognitive factors.39 Differences of contemporary utilitarianism are mainly lie in two aspects: first, the differences on the content of utility, that is, whether the concept of utility measures the individual’s psychological experience or the satisfaction of personal preferences; Second, the disagreement about the nature of utility, that is, whether the contemporary concept of utility is an objective criterion or a subjective criterion. The first disagreement derives from theoretical disputes between different schools of contemporary utilitarianism. The core of the debate is that since utility needs to reflect actual changes of personal interests, then, whether it is the psychological experience utilitarianism or the preference satisfaction utilitarianism can better represent individuals’ actual interests. The second disagreement arises in the debate between utilitarianism and non-utilitarianism. Non-utilitarians claim that, both psychological experience and preference satisfaction are subjective criteria after all. Utility

38 39

Moore (2004), p. 194. Haslett (1990).

16

1 Introduction

concept constructed on subjective criteria is bound to be lack of effective objectivity and therefore cannot provide effective distributive justice.

Differences on Content of Utility Experience theory believes that utility is a psychological experience that can induce pleasure or happiness feelings. Experience theory includes factors of introspection on the content of experience, personal conduct based on experience can better promoting the growth of personal interests. Experience theory argues that taking utility as preference satisfaction will lead to deviations between human behavior and human actual interests. First, Preference is not an event that contains an introspectable element.40 The desire that an individual wants to satisfy may be a wrong desire based on incorrect cognition and wrong information, such as an addict’s desire for drugs. If satisfying a desire leads to worse outcomes than before, then desire cannot be taken as a criterion to justify an individual’s behavior. Second, personal desire subjects to changing all the time. An individual may desire S at a certain moment, but when S is satisfied, S may be no longer valuable to himself. Third, the emphasis of preference theory is on satisfaction, but the enhancement of personal utility lies in learning the satisfaction. In preference theory, there is no necessary connection between satisfaction and learning the satisfaction.41 If a person’s desire is that all the inhabitants of a remote town where he once lived lead a prosperous life, the satisfaction of this desire——that the inhabitants of the small remote town do live a prosperous life—does not contribute to an increase in utility of himself, which will only occur when he learns that this desire is satisfied. Fourth, personal preferences may transcend one’s actual experience.42 Preferences include both the preferences of the living and the preferences of the dead. Experience theory holds that the preferences with intrinsic value only exist in individual’s actual state of consciousness, and the satisfaction of the dead’s preferences cannot produce intrinsic value, and utilitarian calculation is not supposed to include satisfactions of the dead’s preferences.43 As a result, the core point of experience theory against preference satisfaction theory comes to be that satisfying personal preferences will contribute to the improvement of personal interests, because preference satisfaction usually leads to personal happiness experience. Consequently, preference satisfaction cannot be regarded independently as the basic connotation of utility. In other words, only when those preferences that lead to personal happiness experience are satisfied, does positive correlation between preference satisfaction and personal utility occur. As Shaw argues, the

40

Brandt (1992), p. 160. Ibid., p. 161. 42 Sprigge (1991), p. 39. 43 Smart (1978), p. 249. 41

1.2 A Review of Research on Utilitarianism

17

reason why people take preference satisfaction seriously is because people believe that the satisfaction of personal preferences will lead to a happy experience.44 In contrast, preference satisfaction theory argues that the promotion of personal interests lies in maximizing satisfaction of an individual’s actual preferences. This view holds that if utility is considered as a personal psychological experience, it will not only make it difficult to measure utilitarian consequences, but also make it hard to compare interpersonal utilities.45 An important reason why classical utilitarianism has been criticized is that the concept of utilitarianism based on subjective psychological experience is difficult to provide an objective and fair comparison method, making it impossible to weigh gains and losses among individuals. Preference satisfaction theory provides a realistic and feasible method for comparing utilitarian outcomes by observing people’s choices. In addition, preference satisfaction theory believes that what has intrinsic value is not the happiness experience produced by preference satisfaction, but preference satisfaction itself, which itself has intrinsic value, and the psychological experience after satisfaction is just a byproduct of preference realization. For example, for an athlete who has finally won a gold medal at the Olympics after years of hard-working, what is valuable is not the happy experience of winning the gold medal, but the event of winning the gold medal itself. If what an individual pursues is the happiness feeling mixed with positive emotions such as joy, excitement, and satisfaction after winning the gold medal, then this utilitarian perspective will not make any sense in guiding the individual to pay attention to his own real life.46 Meanwhile, preference satisfaction theory puts forward that the phenomenon of “disconnection” between preference satisfaction and personal interests can be compensated by modifying the concept of preference. The pursuit of preference satisfaction is not the maximum satisfaction of the individual’s actual preference, but the maximum satisfaction of the individual’s justified preference. As Harsanyi said, in preference satisfaction theory, we need to distinguish between individual’s true preferences and manifest preferences. Manifest preferences are personal preference distorted by factual errors and logical errors; true preferences are individuals’ ideal state, fully possessing relevant information and doing one’s best to rationally reason about one’s preferences. The utility maximization pursued by utilitarianism is the maximum satisfaction of personal true preferences.47

Differences on the Nature of Utility This debate takes place between utilitarianism and non-utilitarianism. Nonutilitarians such as Scanlon, Nagel, and Dworkin believe that, in terms of the nature of the concept of utilitarianism, there is no essential difference between contemporary utilitarianism and classical utilitarianism. Whether it is preference satisfaction 44

Shaw (1999), p. 63. T. L. S. Sprigge, “The Greatest Happiness Principle”, p. 38. 46 Sumner (2003), p. 96. 47 Harsanyi (1977), pp. 644–647. 45

18

1 Introduction

utilitarianism or experiential utilitarianism, utility is eventually a subjective concept and a subjective measure, based on which, the justice theory will inevitably lead to unjust consequences. According to Scanlon, only with objective criterion beyond personal experience, interests and preferences as the utilitarian measuring standard, can we achieve equal treatment among individuals.48 Greg Bognar holds that the objectification path of experience theory is not plausible.49 The objectification of the existing experience theory can only exclude wrong experience caused by individuals’ wrong cognition. If a rich man living in a comfortable environment but sincerely believes that he is not living well, the self-utility judgment which the very rich man formed based on his psychological experience will be very low. If, based on his lower utility figure, more social wealth is assigned to the rich to improve his life, which is obviously unreasonable. Preference satisfaction utilitarianism also suffers the subjectivity problem. As Dworkin put it: “A person’s own judgment (even if fully informed of the facts) will reflect his own philosophical convictions about what gives value to life, and these might be, from the standpoint of the objective judgment, confused or inaccurate or just wrong.”50 More seriously, personal preferences measured by utilitarianism include both personal preferences and external preferences. Imposing one’s external preferences on others will erode the foundations of treating individuals with equal concern and respect.51 If the majority with discriminatory preferences imposes their views on the minority, according to the preference calculation, the minority’s right to be treated equally will be depredated. Contemporary utilitarianism does not share the criticism of its opponents. In contemporary utilitarianism’s perspective, whether happiness experience or preference satisfaction, it can to some extent be classified into rational happiness experience and irrational happiness experience. As Kymlicka argues, every plausible political theory has to confront difficulties of utilitarian content objectivity when it comes to providing proper account of human welfare.52 Even if the utilitarianism theory is controversial in terms of utilitarian objectivity, it is still reliable for us to make decisions in real life.

1.2.2 Different Perceptions of Criterion on Behavior Justification The criterion on behavior justification is how to judge whether an action is moral or not. Generally speaking, classical utilitarianism belongs to act-utilitarianism, while contemporary utilitarianism belongs to rule-utilitarianism. Therefore, the 48

Scanlon (1975). Bognar (2010). 50 Dworkin (2002), p. 32. 51 Hart (1979), p. 87. 52 Kymlicka (2002), p. 20. 49

1.2 A Review of Research on Utilitarianism

19

difference between classical utilitarianism and contemporary utilitarianism in the criteria for determining the behavior justification is the very difference between actutilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism. Act-utilitarianism holds that an action is justified if and only if the total social utility generated by the action is no less than that of other alternative actions. Rule-utilitarianism, however, holds that an action is justified if and only if the action conforms to a set of generally accepted rules and that compliance with the rules produces a utility-maximizing outcome. According to Dworkin’s evaluation, rule-utilitarianism is “treating the right or duty as a complete justification”,53 and it only needs to act in accordance with the right and duty requirements recognized by the rules when judging the legitimacy of specific actions. However, some scholars have raised objections to the independence of “taking rules as the criterion for determining the behavior justification”. Lyons and Scheffler have argued that rule-utilitarianism is not an independent moral proposition, “ruleutilitarianism reduces to act-utilitarianism if calculation is carried out sufficiently minutely and completely”.54 In the broadest sense, rule-utilitarianism will be the same as act-utilitarianism, or rule-utilitarianism will eventually reduce into action utilitarianism.55 Suppose that action X should be taken according to the established rules, but if a new situation C arises, making another action Y in situation C will bring better results. Rule-utilitarianism, then, needs to adapt itself to the new situation, i.e. “do X behavior except in case C”. Lyons further argues that this revision method illustrates a general principle: as long as there is a certain exception, the rules should be revised in this manner. Obviously, the rule-utilitarianism cannot maintain the integrity of the theory itself, and the criterion for determining behavior justification that rule-utilitarianism ultimately adheres to can still be reduced to the principle of maximizing utility. Under this case, rule-utilitarianism does not differ from actutilitarianism. After examining different consequentialism theories, Scheffler also shares the point that rule consequentialism is just a variant of act-consequentialism. All such theories specify some principle for ranking overall states of affairs from best to worst from an impersonal point of view and have common in managing to produce the best available outcome overall.56 On the basis of the above, contemporary utilitarianism defends the independence of rule-utilitarianism from the following two perspectives. On the one hand, Russell Hardin emphasizes that taking overall utilities maximization as the criterion for behavior justification is in principle impossible, actutilitarianism making an unrealistic estimate of an individual’s rational computing ability.57 If we take overall utilities maximization as the criterion in evaluating behavior justification, then, in practice, we can always find better alternative actions than the existing one, and thus every action performed by individuals may not be justified. Hence, acting following the rule provides a new choice for individual behavior 53

Dworkin (1989), p. 39. Hooker (1993), p. 133. 55 Lyons (1978), pp. 115–160. 56 Scheffler (1982), pp. 2–3. 57 Hardin (1988), p. 17. 54

20

1 Introduction

judgment. Rule utilitarians, on the other hand, evaluates acts by reference to the rules selected, and there is in the theory no overarching commitment to maximize the good.58

1.2.3 Different Perceptions of Personal Conduct Codes Utilitarianism is not only the criterion for measuring behavior justification, but also the basic code for individual actions. As a principle of personal action, utilitarianism has two controversies: first, whether individuals should always act according to the principle of utilitarianism, that is, always take actions maximizing the overall utilities; second, whether personal actions need to maximize the promotion of overall utilities to the greatest extent. For the first argument, two schools have formed within utilitarianism: direct utilitarianism and indirect utilitarianism. For the second argument, a theoretical dividing line between maximal utilitarianism and moderate utilitarianism has formed.

1.2.3.1

Code of Conduct in Classical Utilitarianism

In general, Bentham is a chief advocate of direct utilitarianism; Mill and Sidgwick are more in favor of indirect utilitarianism. Bentham remarks: “of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility one may always say either that it is one that ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be done. One may say also, that it is right it should be done; at least that it is not wrong it should be done: that it is a right action; at least that it is not a wrong action”.59 Bentham’s direct utilitarianism has faced criticism from various parties since its inception. Critics describe Bentham as a calculating utilitarian, arguing that Benthamite direct utilitarianism fails from both an intuitionistic and a utilitarian perspective. From the intuitionism view, direct utilitarian calculation will go against common sense or rules. For example, under the guidance of the utilitarian principle, there will be behaviors such as breaking promises, harming innocent people, sacrificing the interests of a minority. Meanwhile, constant utilitarian calculation is by no means the best way to maximize utility, “If our target is maximum welfare, we will sometimes do better if we do not aim directly at that target”.60 However, some scholars clarifies that the criticism of Bentham’s direct utilitarianism above is too simplistic to understand Bentham’s thoughts. There is always room left for rules and rights in Bentham’s theory. For example, Bentham adds

58

Hooker (1996), p. 539. Bentham (1907), p. 18. 60 Morgan (2007), p. 115. 59

1.2 A Review of Research on Utilitarianism

21

four important secondary principles to the main utilitarian principle.61 On the other hand, Bentham objects to the priority of moral rights over legal rights,62 and opposes insisting on the existence of pre-institutional moral rights. Therefore, the biggest difference between Bentham’s theory and Right theory is that: from Bentham’s perspective, rules and rights are not the most primary focus. Rules and rights need to be constructed on the utility theory; in practical field, the importance of rules and rights is built on the promotion of the overall human welfare, if the special situation of human changes, the importance of rules and rights will also be lost correspondingly. Mill and Sidgwick believed that the principle of utilitarianism is the only criterion in measuring behavior justification, but individuals often do not adopt utilitarian action in order to obtain the greatest utilitarianism. In the logic of Mill and Sidgwick, act-utilitarianism and moral rights can be integrated with each other. Mill asserts that it is absurd to directly use the first principle to guide all human behavior; people need the help of secondary principles.63 “Only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to”.64 In fact, both direct and indirect utilitarianism do not deny the existence of secondary principles, but the difference is that indirect utilitarianism takes secondary principles as moral principles, while direct utilitarianism regards secondary principles as rules of thumb. Moral principles differ from rules of thumb: on the one hand, moral principles have an internal driving force. When a person recognizes a certain rule as a moral principle, he will take actions spontaneously following the rule and resist actions against the rule; on the other hand, when an individual violates a certain moral principle, they will feel guilt or remorse, and they will also have a disgusting attitude toward others violating principles.65 It can be said that although moral principles belong to secondary principles, they also have intrinsic value. That is why Mill emphasizes in the last chapter of Utilitarianism: “To have a right is to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general utility”.66 In Mill’s view, there is no conflict between utility principles and moral rights, and the goal of maximum utility can be achieved by taking the morality principles as an individual’s action criterion.

61

Bentham states his famous secondary principle in a discussion of civil law. “In every country, and for every race, at every time—of the all-comprehensive and only defensible end—the greatest happiness of the greatest number—of the four most comprehensive particular and subordinate ends, viz. subsistence, abundance, security and equality”. Schofield and Harris (1998), p. 291. 62 Rosen (2003), p. 225. 63 Mill (1969), p. 173. 64 Mill (2009), p. 31. 65 Brandt (1979), pp. 164–167. 66 Mill (2009), p. 67.

22

1 Introduction

1.2.3.2

Code of Conduct in Contemporary Utilitarianism

Most contemporary utilitarian theories belong to indirect utilitarianism, such as ruleutilitarianism and two-level utilitarianism. Rule-utilitarianism holds that individuals should act in line with the requirements of generally accepted rules, and the principle of utilitarianism is not a guideline for person action. Two-level utilitarianism holds that individuals should act in accordance with their moral intuition demands, and that only when different moral principles conflict is it time for the utilitarian principle to play its role. In fact, most contemporary utilitarians do not accept direct utilitarianism, arguing that direct utilitarianism not only cannot achieve maximum utility, but even lead to extremely bad consequences. For example, acting directly on the utilitarianism principle may lead to the occurrence of tortious acts, may encourage people’s violations in a disguised way, and may also result in the exclusion of special obligations. In addition, constantly insisting on maximization utility will seriously affect individual’s life planning. As Williams remarks, if one is required to sacrifice his living plan that is of great personal value in order to achieve maximum social utility, the requirement, then, is an invasion of personal integrity, alienating an individual from some of his fundamental commitments. Hence, for most contemporary utilitarians, direct utilitarianism cannot serve as a guiding principle for individual action, because direct utilitarianism can lead to action that is clearly contrary to common moral and deontological requirements, and thus is fundamentally detrimental to the overall social utility enhancement. Indirect utilitarianism can alleviate the interference of utility target on personal life. Taking indirect utilitarianism as a rule for people’s actions not only does not conflict with daily behavioral norms or people’s moral intuition, but can even be referred when moral principles conflict by providing grounds for moral principles ranking. In addition, contemporary utilitarianism has developed a “moderation good” utilitarian theory that replaces “maximization”, typically represented by Michael Slote’s satisficing consequentialism.67 This theory takes “moderation good” as theory of decision-making, and suggests that decision-making procedure in which “moderation” is treated as criterion for individual action can achieve the greatest value in the long run.

1.3 The Research Value of Utilitarianism In his book Contemporary Political Philosophy, Kymlicka explained why utilitarianism should be used as an opening theory of contemporary political philosophy. “In our society utilitarianism operates as a kind of tacit background against which other theories have to assert and defend themselves”68 Utilitarianism represents a theoretical tradition that takes consequences of actions as a measuring criterion. In 67 68

Slote and Pettit (1984). Kymlicka (2002), p. 10.

1.3 The Research Value of Utilitarianism

23

discussions of contemporary political philosophy, even strict deontologists cannot completely abandon utilitarian way of thinking, and must answer the question of whether there is any benefit in insisting on a certain value. Narveson remarks that “a theorist urging us to embrace strong schemes of rights could hardly be understood if he did not imply that a world in which those schemes were respected would be a better world”,69 and Narveson also does not believe there is such a world in which people live well on the one hand and their rights are full of violations on the other. The core appeal of utilitarianism lies in the fact that it conforms to people’s two intuitions: “First, human well-being matters; second, moral rules must be tested for their consequences on human well-being”.70 In fact, utilitarianism represents a theoretical tradition attaching importance to consequences and human interests. Although many philosophical ideas throughout history have had the nature of consequentialism or welfarism, utilitarianism is by far the most concise and complete form of Consequentialism and Welfarism combined theoretical idea. This is also the fundamental reason why utilitarianism still plays a role in contemporary political philosophy.

1.3.1 The Attraction of Consequentialism Utilitarianism is a consequentialism theory, and holds that whether a rule or a value is effective ultimately depends on the quality of its consequences. The only ultimate moral aim is to produce the best outcome. As Lewis remarks, “without reference to what is good and what is bad there could be no determination of anything as right or wrong “,71 and “no judgement of right and wrong can validly be made except by reference to appraisal of predictable consequences of the act in question as good or bad”.72 The emphasis on consequences and the pursuit of greater welfare, are implicitly accommodated in the code of conduct for individuals and public policies. For example, in the allocation of scarce medical resources, it is common for individual patients to be given priority according to their possible outcomes. In Sheffield, England, a publicly funded IVF (in-vitro fertilization) service prioritizes patient eligibility based on expected results of IVF treatment. Women of the right age for pregnancy who have a greater chance of successful conception will obtain this scarce resource with a greater opportunity. Another example, in the 1980s and 1990s, Frohlich and Oppenheimer also proved the intuitive advantage of utilitarian focus on consequences through a series of experiments. Froehlich and Oppenheimer simulated Rawls’s “original position”, requiring test subjects behind a “veil of ignorance” to choose among four different distributive principles: maximizing the welfare of the worst-off individual, maximizing average income, maximizing average income with 69

Narveson (2004), p. 157. Kymlicka (2002), p. 12. 71 Shaw (1999), p. 97. 72 Ibid., p. 98. 70

24

1 Introduction

a floor constraint, maximizing average income with a range constraint. The test results show the overwhelmingly preferred principle is maximizing the average income with a floor constraint.73 Moreover, this experiment has achieved same results in tests of different countries and different population groups. Although this experiment cannot prove that utilitarianism is the most reasonable distribution principle, it can directly illustrate that a utilitarian principle—especially the emphasis on consequences in its theory—conforms to people’s moral intuition.

1.3.2 The Attraction of Welfarism Welfarism is another characteristic of utilitarianism and it is also one of the theoretical attractions of utilitarianism. Welfarism claims that only personal welfare has unique intrinsic value, and moral judgments need to rely on the impact of events on personal welfare (utility). First, promotion of interests is the primary driving force of individual action. Bentham make it clear that the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain is a selfevident human nature, and it is also the only motivation of personal behavior. Whatever people do is to increase pleasure and reduce pain. Second, morality has a certain correlation with welfare. As Shaw states, no one would deny that personal actions and their impact on the increase or decrease of welfare are morally relevant. If moral consideration no longer has any connection with the enhancement of personal utility, then the importance of moral consideration will also decrease accordingly.74

1.3.3 Utilitarianism is a Concise and Powerful Theoretical System The third attraction of utilitarianism theory is the simplicity of its content. Maximization of utility is the core principle of utilitarianism. Hence, utilitarianism can solve many specific problems in reality. Compared with intuitionism, which always appeals to intuition, utilitarianism has stronger operability in fields of moral philosophy and political philosophy, providing rational individuals with a consistent guideline for action. Therefore, the theory of utilitarianism is widely applied in the fields of politics and economy in modern society, especially the social public policy. The economic policy, legal policy and management policy of modern society all prove to be characterized of utilitarianism to some extent.

73 74

Frohlich et al. (1987). Shaw (1999), p. 99.

1.4 Public Ethics of Utilitarianism

25

1.4 Public Ethics of Utilitarianism Since the nineteenth century, utilitarianism has had profoundly influenced people’s political and economic life. In more practical disciplines such as public policy, utilitarianism has always played an important role, even the dominating ethics of public policies. First, the consequentialist character of utilitarianism has matched the basic problem-orientated requirements of public policy. Public policy is the means adopted by the public sectors to solve specific public problems, involving authoritative distribution of social resources. Therefore, the issue of efficiency, namely, which policy choices can produce the greatest overall social benefits and how policies should be implemented to generate the greatest overall social benefits, has become a factor that public policy makers and implementers must take serious considerations. Utilitarianism argues that the judging criterion of all decisions can only be the utilitarian consequences, that is, the sum of benefit changes of all involved individuals under the influence of given public policies. When the figure is positive, it can be judged that the decision is correct; when the figure is negative, it can be judged that the decision is wrong. Utilitarianism takes the overall social benefits as the decision criterion and provides the basic operating principles for public policies assessment and evaluation. Second, the impartial and just stance of utilitarianism conforms to the moral requirement of public policy. The so-called impartial and just stance means that utilitarianism requires that all individuals affected by the policy should be treated equally, and advocates that everyone’s profits and losses should be given equal weight. Moreover, the impartiality pursued by utilitarianism does not need to appeal to thought experiments such as the “veil of ignorance”. It only needs to strictly carry out utilitarian aggregation and utilitarian comparison from a neutral standpoint, with the maximization of overall social benefits as the ultimate measuring standard. As Robert Goodin states, as moral ethics, impartiality will pose too high moral demands on individuals, but as public ethics, the impartiality required by utilitarianism is exactly in accordance with the justice requirement of public policy.75 Finally, utilitarianism is in line with the public spirit that public policy advocates. Utilitarianism champions that the most efficient policy can produce the greatest overall social benefits, satisfying the greatest happiness of the greatest number and serving the majority well, thus automatically realizing the public spirit of public policy. Born during the rising an upswing period of capitalist society, the theory of utilitarianism is a development-oriented political theory. On the basis of inheriting the pursuit of maximizing social efficiency, contemporary utilitarianism incorporates the idea of equality into the theoretical system, and proposes a social distribution scheme that takes into account both efficiency and fairness. The author has reason for believing that the new development of contemporary utilitarianism can provide a new philosophical explanation and reference for the public governance of modern society. 75

Goodin (1995), pp. 4–8.

26

1 Introduction

References Bentham J (1907) An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Clarendon Press, Oxford Bentham J (1990) A fragment on government. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Bognar G (2010) Authentic happiness. Utilitas 22(3):272–284 Brandt RB (1979) A theory of the good and the right. Oxford University Press, Oxford Brock DW (1973) Recent Work in Utilitarianism. Am Philos Q 10(4):241–276 Dworkin R (1989) In: Daniels N (ed) The original position Dworkin R (2011) Justice for hedgehogs. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London Dworkin R, Virtue S (2002) The theory and practice of equality. Harvard University Press, London Ewing AC (1964) Ethics. English Universities Press, London Frohlich N, Oppenheimer JA, Eavey CL (1987) Laboratory results on Rawls’s distributive justice. Br J Polit Sci 17(1):1–21 Good IJ (ed) (1962) A problem for the hedonist Goodin RE (1995) Utilitarianism as a public philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Griffin J (1986) Well-being: its meaning, measurement, and moral importance. Clarendon Press, Oxford Hardin R (1988) Morality within the limits of reason. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London Hart HLA (1979) Between utility and rights. Columbia Law Rev 79:5 Harsanyi JC (1977) Morality and the theory of rational behavior. Soc Res 44(4):623–656 Haslett DW (1990) What is utility? Econ Philos 6(1):65–94 Hooker B (ed) (1993) Rationality, rules and utility: new essays on the moral philosophy of Richard B. Brandt. Westview Press, Boulder Hooker B (1996) Ross-style pluralism versus rule-consequentialism. Mind 105(420):531–552 Eggleston B, Miller DE (eds) (2014) The Cambridge companion to utilitarianism. Cambridge University Press, New York Kymlicka W (2002) Contemporary political philosophy: an introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford Lyons D (1978) Forms and limits of utilitarianism. Clarendon Press, Oxford Law I (1999) Rule-consequentialism’s dilemma. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 2(3):263–275 Mill JS (1969) Whewell on moral philosophy. In: Robson JM (ed) Essays on ethics, religion and society. University of Toronto Press, Toronto Mill J (2009) Utilitarianism. The Floating Press, Auckland Moore GE (2004) Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press, London Morgan T (2007) Understanding utilitarianism. Cromwell Press, Trowbridge Narveson J (1967) Morality and utility. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore Narveson J (2004) Rights and utilitarianism. Can J Philos 5:137–160 Rawls J (1999) A theory of justice. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Richard B (1992) Brandt, morality, utilitarianism, and rights. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Rosen F (2003) Classical utilitarianism from Hume to Mill. Routledge, London Ryle G (1949) The concept of mind. Hutchinson House, London Sartorius R (1969) Utilitarianism and obligation. J Philos 66(3):67–81 Scanlon TM (1975) Preference and urgency. J Philos 72(19):655–669 Scarre G (2002) Utilitarianism. Routledge, London Scheffler S (1982) The rejection of consequentialism. Clarendon Press, Oxford Schofield P, Harris J (eds) (1998) Legislator of the world: writings on codification, law, and education (the collected works of Jeremy Bentham). Clarendon Press, Oxford Sidgwick H (1962) Methods of ethics. Macmillan and Company Limited, London Singer P (2011) Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

References

27

Slote M, Pettit P (1984) Satisficing consequentialism. Proc Aristot Soc 58:139–176 Smart JJC (1978) Hedonistic and ideal utilitarianism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3(1):240 Smart JJ, Williams B (1973) Utilitarianism: for and against. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Smith A (1993) An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge Sprigge TLS (1991) The greatest happiness principle. Utilitas 3(1):37–51 Sumner LW (2003) Welfare, happiness, and ethics. Clarendon Press, Oxford William H (1999) Shaw, contemporary ethics: taking account of utilitarianism. Blackwell Publishers, Malden

Chapter 2

The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

Contemporary utilitarianism is a political philosophy thought formed in the middle of the twentieth century, which is a new utilitarianism theory based on traditional utilitarianism and classical utilitarianism. Looking into its ideological connotation, we can find that the formation of contemporary utilitarianism has three theoretical origins: early utilitarian thought, classical utilitarian theory, and non-utilitarian criticism of utilitarianism.

2.1 The Ideological Origin of Utilitarianism 2.1.1 The Epicurean School Although Bentham is the ancestor of utilitarianism theory, Mill believes that Epicurus in ancient Greece had greatly influenced Bentham’s theory. Epicurus, born in 341 or 342 BC, began studying philosophy at the age of 14 and founded his school in 311 BC. The doctrines of the Epicurean school were completely defined by Epicurus, and his disciples made no additions or amendments to these doctrines. The Epicurean school or Epicureanism gives a comprehensive elaboration of hedonism in ancient Greece. In fact, Epicureanism was not utilitarianism, but it had a great influence on utilitarianism. Russell once commented on the influence of Epicurus on utilitarianism: “Doctrines very similar to his, however, were revived by the French philosophes at the end of the eighteenth century, and brought to England by Bentham and his followers”.1 Epicurus’ influence on utilitarianism manifested itself in three aspects: consequentialism, hedonism and individualism.

1

Russel (1967), p. 251.

© Peking University Press 2023 S. Liu, The Contemporary Evolution and Reform of Utilitarianism, Interests Politics Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7363-7_2

29

30

2.1.1.1

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

The Consequentialist Tradition in Epicurean Theory

In terms of the standards for moral legitimacy, Epicurus believed that moral evaluation should be based solely on the consequences of one’s actions (whether they make one’s life better or worse), and that the only criterion for moral judgment when evaluating each event is the feeling of happiness. Epicurus, for example, notes: “We declare that pleasure is the beginning and the goal of a happy life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good and as inborn; It is from this that we begin every choice and every avoidance. It is to pleasure that we have resource, using the feeling as our standard for judging every good”.2 Epicurus believed that happiness alone has the only intrinsic value. For example, everyone is isolated, and therefore, making friends or friendships is important. Everyone needs a reliable and selected group of friends. However, friendship is important not because of the intrinsic value of friendship itself, but because it enables people to live a safe and fearless life, produces more happiness, and ultimately leads to a better life. It can be seen that people pursue friendship not because of friendship itself, but because friendship has an instrumental value in promoting happiness. As Epicurus remarked, “All friendship is desirable for itself, but it begins with need”.3 For Epicurus, virtue itself has no intrinsic value, but is valued for its practical benefits. In Epicurus’ thought, there is a distinct consequentialism feature, which has profoundly influenced the later utilitarianism theory. For strict utilitarians, the only thing of value is utilitarianism itself.

2.1.1.2

The Hedonistic Tradition in Epicurean Theory

Hedonism is also the central feature of Epicurean theory. The core tenet of utilitarianism—that happiness is about increasing pleasure and avoiding pain— comes directly from this. Like other contemporary philosophers in ancient Greece, Epicurean theory was also answering a central question: how can an individual live a rich human life? However, the difference of Epicurus is that his thought has a strong anti-mystery and empirical. Epicurus acknowledged the existence of gods, but believed that they would not interfere with people’s lives, and that people should not attribute things incompatible with immortality and ultimate happiness to gods. In addition, Epicurus’ thought has a plain materialist, believing that after death the soul dissipates and there is no more feeling. Therefore, a good life is an earthly life in pursuit of happiness. On this basis, Epicurus elaborated his theory of hedonism. Firstly, happiness is the highest good, the only thing that has intrinsic value. Happiness is based on sensual enjoyment, “The beginning and the root of all good is the pleasure of the stomach; Even wisdom and culture must be referred to this”.4 However, the pleasure of the senses is not a pleasure worth choosing.

2

Epicurus (1993), p. 65. Epicurus (1993), p. 79. 4 Russel (1967), p. 243. 3

2.1 The Ideological Origin of Utilitarianism

31

Epicurus disagreed with Aristippus’ view that “pleasure is the strongest momentary sensual gratification”. However, Epicurus holds that the pleasure of the mind is more important than the pleasure of the body, the quiet pleasure is more important than the dynamic pleasure, and the permanent pleasure is more important than the momentary pleasure. Epicurus’s hedonism, therefore, did not advocate individual indulgence, but “contentment” and “prudence”. Happiness is not endless feasting and revelry, but carefully choose the object of desire, adjust oneself into a virtuous person who is content with the simple needs of life. Epicurus asserts, when we see the wealth and loot of others, as long as remember that we are not distracted by these desires and that we do not play the game of satisfying them, we can then obtain great contentment. Thus, there is something puzzling about Epicurus’ idea of pleasure: since all pleasures are intrinsically good, why are some pleasures not worth seeking? For this issue, a great debate has been formed on utilitarianism in later generations. Utilitarians of later times have reinterpreted it respectively from the perspectives of quality of happiness and justified happiness, etc., and formed different interpretations of utilitarianism. Second, happiness is an individual’s rule of action. Epicurus’ hedonism contains not only criteria for judging the legitimacy of behavior, but also rules for individual behavior. Individuals who pursue happiness first need contentment and prudence to distinguish which happiness is natural happiness and which happiness is vain happiness, and use rational analysis to eliminate empty and worthless desires in order to obtain long lasting spiritual peace. Later, Epicurus argued that happy people should adhere to the principles of justice, in order to prevent people from doing harm to each other. The principles of fairness or justice refers to principles which arouse neither fear in themselves nor anger in their neighbors. Justice is not a kind of eternal and unchanging noble morality, but a contract between people for a better life, and the contract is neither a priori, nor intrinsically valuable. As he puts it, “There is no such thing as ‘justice in itself (absolute justice)’, rather, always a certain compact made during men’s dealing with one another in different places, not to do harm or to be harmed”.5 In fact, Epicurus’ principle of justice differed from the “contract theory” of later liberalism. What Epicurus advocates is only instrumental agreements, which lose their meaning of existence when they no longer promote happiness.

2.1.1.3

The Tradition of Individualism in Epicurean Theory

Epicurean theories laid the theoretical foundation of individualism for later classical utilitarianism. Lindsay found many elements in Epicurean theory that make up modern individualism, such as society as a collection of individuals; the state, law and justice merely a necessary evil; psychological atomism and hedonism; and the high evaluation of voluntary association and contractual relationships.6 According to 5 6

Epicurus (1993), p. 71. Lindsay (1930–1935)

32

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

the modern theory of individualism, there are at least three important individualistic ideas in Epicurus’ thought. First, the perspective of the individual standard. Ancient Greek political thought before Epicurus generally took community as the basis for research, for example, leaving the city-state either gods or beasts. Epicurus broke the paradigm of community, arguing that the value of individual can be self-manifested without resorting to public life. Thus, Epicurus turned his focus to the individual, on how he or she could achieve a meaningful and good life through his or her own efforts. Second, Epicurean theory is built on the freedom of individual mind. Epicurus broke down all the powers that controls the individual mind from the outside world: on the one hand, against superstition of human beings; On the other hand, to banish individual’s fear of death, “grow accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us, since every good and evil lie in sensation. However, death is the deprivation of sensation”.7 Thus, Epicurus encouraged individuals to focus only on real life and live in the moment. Third, construction of private space. Another contribution of Epicurus to individualism is the construction of the individual’s private space in the form of a contract, arguing that natural justice is a mutual commitment made by people about the consequences of their actions—not to harm others and not to be harmed by others. This private space is similar to Mill’s “No-harm Principle”. Epicurus focuses on individual self-improvement in personal private space and even advocated withdrawing from public life. Making friends is the main way for Epicurus to prevent public life from invading private space, and through friendship he or she could acquire knowledge and peaceful happiness. It can be said that Epicurus created a new theoretical paradigm, replacing the community with the individual as the basic point of political analysis. In this sense, Epicurus is also recognized as the pioneer of individualism.

2.1.2 Hume’s Utilitarian Thought David Hume (1711–1776), a native of Edinburgh, Scotland, made devastating criticism of natural law theory and its branches and was a key figure in the transition from contractual liberalism to classical utilitarianism. Hume’s ideas had a great influence on Bentham. Bentham borrowed or adopted Hume’s views extensively in his works, as it goes in A Fragment on Government: “no sooner had I read that part of the work which touches on this subject (the foundations of all virtue are laid in utility), than I felt as if scales had fallen from my eyes. I then, for the first time, learnt to call the cause of the people the cause of Virtue”.8 However, Hume does not consider the utilitarian measure of consequences, i.e., the maximization of pleasure or happiness, as the only criterion for the justification of behavior, and Hume does not regard utilitarianism as a moral principle. The author believes that Hume’s contribution to 7 8

Epicurus (1993), p. 63. Bentham (1990), note 2, p. 154.

2.1 The Ideological Origin of Utilitarianism

33

later utilitarianism mainly lies in his empirical methodology and the discussion of individual behavioral motivation from the perspective of psychology. Hume is an empiricist who believes that all human knowledge fundamentally comes from experience, and there can be no knowledge without experience. In the discussion of his political philosophy, Hume also adopted the methodology of empiricism, holding that the research subject of politics is the social and interdependent human beings, and politics is a science about human beings, which must be built on experience and observation. Hume opposed the establishment of political science on the basis of a à priori assumptions, even the most general and elaborated principles can be learned by human experience. Therefore, Hume first challenged the theory of natural law in methodology, contending that reason is not an absolute criterion in guiding individual behavior. The concept of reason in the theory of natural law is confusion of three rational meanings without criticism: (1) the necessary connection between ideas, (2) cause and effect, and (3) certain legitimate and inevitable human actions. Hume believed that the truth of the first case exists, but in practice, the necessary connection between ideas only exists in strict logical reasoning relations such as mathematics, and such truth phenomenon is very limited in real life. In the second case, which regards truth as cause and effect, is a fictitious necessary connection, which is in fact only an empirical correlation, and are “events that actually happen and the correlations that actually occur between them”.9 In the third case, truth is considered as some legitimate and inevitable human behavior resulted from some human desire or habit, and reason itself does not govern any practical activity. It is absurd, therefore, to think that appealing to reason can lead to a universal moral code guiding human behavior, since “first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will”.10 Moreover, Hume argues that emotions can only be irrational in the following two cases: first, when a passion is founded on the supposition which really do not exist; second, when the methods chosen to exert any passion in action do not achieve the designed end. Hume holds that “where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it”.11 Since reason can only serve emotion, then the entry of human beings into political life is not à priori necessity, but an emotional necessity. Hume supports that human formed a political community out of the consideration of utility and custom. Subsequently, Hume discussed the relationship between utility, moral rules and historical customs from the perspective of empiricism. First, moral rules emerge from people’s convenience and needs, and the usefulness is the benchmark of moral rules. Human’s happiness is the only ultimate end of all these laws and regulations. In order to achieve human peace and security, people form communities to live together, for which it is necessary to formulate a series of moral principles including the rules of justice. Hume holds that moral rules are 9

Sabine (1961), p. 600. Hume (1740), p. 633. 11 Hume (1740), p. 637. 10

34

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

neither existed all the time, nor à priori, but a product of the existing stage of human beings, that is, the principle of fairness and justice only exists in moderately deprived societies. If the material abundance of human society is so great that every man has more than he needs, then the principle of justice is not necessary, because the claim of self-right is superfluous; If all men are generous and friendly, and each regards the other as a second self, there is no place for justice. Virtue will replace justice as the principle of association; If a society is desperately deprived of resources and on the verge of extinction, violence will replace justice and establish new rules. Therefore, the laws of justice and equity are entirely dependent on the particular situation and environment in which people live, and the actual benefits to the public generated by strict and normal compliance with these laws are the root of their emergence and existence. In other words, moral rules not only arise from the practical needs of individuals, but also require verification through experience. The criterion for verification is whether the rules are valid. As Hume put it, the public good is the only source of justice, and people’s serious consideration on the beneficial effects of this morality is the sole basis of its value. Second, historical customs have greatly influenced the political obedience of individuals. Hume rejects to take majority consent as the origin of human political life. Hume argues that the process of majority consent is inconsistent with historical accounts of the origins of government. Both the existing government and the historical establishment process of governments have been primarily established through usurpation and conquest. There has never been a process in which the majority of people voluntarily agreed to submit to the political rule. “The original establishment was formed by violence, and submitted to from necessity. The subsequent administration is also supported by power, and acquiesced in by the people, not as a matter of choice, but of obligation”.12 Even if states by unanimous or majority consent did exist in distant ancient times, the obligation to observe contracts is different from the obligation of political obedience, and no government would seek the consent of its subjects for political obedience. Therefore, Hume argued that human beings established political society for three practical reasons: utilitarian factors, natural instinct factors and environmental factors. The so-called utility factors namely refer to the reason why human beings form political society is to maintain order and protect property, and further pressed is to meet the needs of self-interest. In other words, people establish political society and live in groups so as to make their personal lives better. Regarding the natural conditions of human, human beings have neither muscular limbs nor sharp claws, which makes a single individual extremely weak in the face of nature. Only by forming a community can human beings make up for the deficiency of strength lacking and achieve an advantage in the survival game with nature and other animals. In addition, the diversity of human desires and the limitation of individual ability also make cooperation an inevitable choice for human to fulfill their own needs. “By the conjunction of forces, our power is augmented: By the partition of employments, our ability increases: And by mutual succor we are less exposed to fortune and 12

Hume (1994), p. 257.

2.1 The Ideological Origin of Utilitarianism

35

accidents. It is by this additional force, ability, and security, that society becomes advantageous”.13 The so-called natural factors refer to the fragile and evil aspects of human nature, such as being easily tempted to deviate from one’s original intention, breaking existing rules for the maximum of personal interests, breaking promises and breaking agreements, etc. On the one hand, human beings realize that basic rules are the prerequisite for maintaining a good a good life for individuals. On the other hand, it is human nature to constantly break and violate the rules, in which case, punishment should be performed to force people to obey the established basic rules and behave in line with their long-run interests. Hume maintains that “In a word, OBEDIENCE is a new duty which must be invented to support that of JUSTICE; and the ties of equity must be corroborated by those of allegiance”.14 The so-called environmental factors are political obedience reinforced by tradition, history, and custom. Hume imagines a most likely scenario to illustrate how historical conventions reinforce political obedience. In war, people with superior intelligence and bravery are most likely to stand out, and others will recognize their talents and obey their leadership out of self-interest. A sustained state of war may make a man of ability gradually become a leader, and if the leader also possesses the virtues of prudence and equity in peacetime, the leader will gradually establish authority. If the leader’s successor inherits these good qualities, authority is consolidated and government tends to be established. After that, the leader has his own fixed income, forming a set of rules to reward obedience and punish opponents. Afterwards, obedience is no longer a matter of individual choice, but the enforcement of authority. Hume illustrates through this hypothetical situation that although initial obedience was only an accidental choice (for victory in wartime), with the frequent occurrence of authority obedience, people developed the habit of obedience; As traditions, histories, and customs continue to strengthen, the temporary obedience relationship of human beings is transformed into lasting political obedience after entering the political society.

2.1.3 Smith’s Utilitarian Thought Adam Smith (1723–1790), born in Kirkcaldy, Fife County, Scotland, wrote his master works with The Theory of Moral Sentiments and An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (hereinafter referred to as the Wealth of Nations). Smith was not only an economist but also a philosopher, and Bentham once regarded him as a moral philosopher. For Smith’s contribution to utilitarianism, later scholars generally believe that Smith is not a utilitarian, and the concept of utilitarianism does not occupy a fundamental position in his theory, but utilitarianism plays an important role in Smith’s moral theory. Smith had a profound influence on Bentham, and in 13 14

Hume (1740), p. 738. Hume (1994), p. 85.

36

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

Bentham’s works we can find numerous ideas from The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations. Smith’s contribution to later utilitarianism mainly consists of three aspects: First, the concept of the impartial spectator; Second, idea of interest harmony; Third, individual freedom theory. First, Smith argues that moral judgment should resort to the impartial position of justice, namely the impartial judge in each individual’s mind. The impartial spectator has a significant influence on the later utilitarian theory. Smith remarks in The Theory of Moral Sentiments that the basis of morality founded on moral sentiments, and the moral basis of interpersonal interaction is “sympathy”. Sympathy, namely empathy and compassion, is a human nature of caring for fellow human beings. When one person sees another person in a state of distress, “sympathy” is to feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or conceive it in a very lively manner. Sympathy is a primitive human feeling, the most sensitive feeling that everyone has, and even for the evilest people, human beings will not completely lose sympathy. Therefore, the criterion for judging behavior legitimacy is to put oneself in the case of another through “sympathy”, that is, to think morally about the propriety of a certain behavior by feeling the emotions and states of another in his or her shoes. For example, when a person tries to amuse a companion by telling a joke to him, the companion needs to laugh happily in return, or we say it is appropriate for the companion to laugh loud in return. At the same time, Smith further argues that people’s judgment of propriety is not innate, and whether it is appropriate must have a reference. It is impossible for a completely isolated and enclosed individual to judge whether it is suitable or not. The judgment of suitability can only be produced in social life and needs to be tested in social public life. For example, for isolated individuals, there is neither physical beauty or ugliness, nor will they think about whether their appearance is beautiful or ugly. The concept of beauty or ugliness appears in comparison and is only generated in social life. Thus, the individual in Smith’s concept is the individual in community, and Smith studies the moral motivation of individual behavior by placing it in the social relations between people. When an individual enters into the society, all his passions will give rise to new passions. He will see what others agree with and what they dislike, which will evoke his new emotions. Then the individual learns to view himself in the light of others from a distance. For example, look in the mirror to observe their own appearance, clothing, behavior, and stand in the position of others to examine themselves from the perspective of others. “We should view ourselves, not in the light in which our own selfish passions are apt to place us, but in the light in which any other citizen of the world would view us”.15 Because, to others, we are but a drop in the ocean. Therefore, Smith maintains that the right way to make moral judgments is to appeal to an impartial spectator, when evaluating one’s own behavior, one needs to examine whether it can be sympathized by others, when evaluating someone else’s behavior, you need to put yourself in their shoes and think about whether the behavior will win your own sympathy. It is similar to dividing oneself into two persons: “I, the 15

Smith (1976), p. 158.

2.1 The Ideological Origin of Utilitarianism

37

examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of. The first is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his situation, and by considering how it would appear to me, when seen from that particular point of view. The second is the agent, the person whom I properly call myself, and of whose conduct, under the character of a spectator, I was endeavouring to form some opinion. The first is the judge; the second the person judged of”.16 However, there are still three passions in human feelings: friendly passions, unfriendly passions and selfish passions, and unfriendly passions mainly include hatred and resentment. When the passion is particularly strong, it is difficult for an impartial judge to make a fair judgment, because people tend to be biased in the judgment of the appropriateness of their own behavior. Thus, Smith believed that justice is a passive virtue that prevents harm to others, that justice is forced to obey by external forces, and that whoever violates justice will be punished. Second, under the influence of “an invisible hand”, individuals pursuing their own interests can eventually promote the improvement of social interests, that is, the “invisible hand” can harmonize personal interests with social interests. The rich, in order to satisfy their various desires, employ thousands of men to work for them, but “they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species”.17 For another example, out of self-interest, every individual strives to run his own industry to maximize the value of the product. Although an individual has no intention to promote the public interest, but under the leading of an invisible hand, he may often promote the interests of society more effectively than in the case of the real intention. Smith makes a metaphor to explain why “the invisible hand” became a means of distributing the necessities of life. Although the rich have many desires and are capable to fulfill them, they can actually consume little more than the poor, because their stomachs are as large as the poor. Then, in the pursuit and fulfillment of their desires, the rich will inevitably bring the distribution of necessities of life. For example, to satisfy the desire to enjoy delicious food, the rich need to pay a portion of their income to chefs, and to satisfy the desire for convenience, part of the income needs to be paid to a large entourage. Thus, the rich simply enjoyed the most precious and agreeable. Smith pointed out, “In ease of body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses that security which kings are fighting for”.18 Smith further explaines that this situation stems from the deception of natural instincts on humans. Utility is one of the sources of beauty, because utility creates a sense of propriety, such as the mechanical perfection brought about by an extremely 16

Smith (1976), p. 141. Smith (1976), p. 206. 18 Smith (1976), p. 206. 17

38

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

punctual watch. However, the aesthetic feeling brought by utility will exist independently from utility itself, leading people mistakenly believe that aesthetic feeling has independent value. This is the main reason why Smith is not recognized as a utilitarian. According to Smith, people often mistake the pleasure brought by wealth and status as important and intrinsically valuable things, and mistakenly assume that they can enjoy all the utility as long as they possess these things. Yet, on the one hand, beauty does not exist objectively. There is no great difference in the utility of an extremely expensive and accurate watch and an ordinary one. For a person living on a desert island, a tool kit that can provide life convenience may promote his happiness more than a palace. On the other hand, a man can only consume a limited amount of means of subsistence, just as the stomachs of the rich hold little more than those of the poor. Thus, the deception of nature imposed upon on us, on the one hand, arouses and maintains the motive for human toil. “It is this deception first prompted them to cultivate the ground, to build houses, to found cities and commonwealths, and to invent and improve all the sciences and arts”.19 On the other hand, the “invisible hand” promotes the natural distribution of wealth, and the problem of distributive justice can be solved naturally in the process of development. Therefore, Smith opposed Hume and the traditional idea of distributive justice, arguing that promoting the redistribution of wealth and income by active intervention was to violate social freedom and justice with charitable legislation. In “an invisible hand” society, namely a society dominated by the market, the pursuit and realization of selfinterest by individuals can naturally foster the promotion of the interests of others in the community and realize the growth of the interests of all people. Therefore, fundamentally speaking, interpersonal interests are coordinated and accordant. Third, individual freedom is a basic condition for the normal functioning of society. Smith believes that individual liberty is the guarantee for the effective operation of the system whether it is the economic system of a society or the political system. Smith inherited the negative concept of liberty, believing that liberty is security and free from invasion, and is the legal rights an individual possesses to protection from arbitrary interference by other individuals and from government.20 Smith maintains that it is a violation of legitimate liberty of the laborer to deny a poor man the use of his strength and skill in the manner he deems proper; It is also a violation of the legitimate liberty of an employer not to allow him to employ the person he considers fit. And that the legislature is pretending to be concerned that employers are hiring inappropriate workers is also an infringement of liberty.21 In addition, Smith holds that individual liberty is a key factor for the poor to enjoy the fruits of social development, and that a society with a division of labor would be accompanied by general prosperity.

19

Smith (1976), p. 206. Rosen (2003), p. 107. 21 Smith (1976), p. 85. 20

2.2 The Primary Theory of Utilitarianism

39

In a word, Smith’s ideas are absorbed into the later utilitarian theory, and the controversies in Smith’s thoughts also led to the theoretical defects of later utilitarian theory. For example, whether the accordance of interests between people can really be achieved by appealing to the perspective of impartial spectator, and whether the development model of a free economy can really solve the distribution contradiction on its own and achieve social justice and equity. These problems have had a profound influence on the formation and development of utilitarianism in subsequent generations, and have also made the utilitarian theory highly controversial.

2.2 The Primary Theory of Utilitarianism In the late eighteenth century, utilitarianism became an independent school of political philosophy, namely classical utilitarianism theory. The main representatives of classical utilitarianism are Bentham, John Mill and Sidgwick. In fact, classical utilitarianism also includes some other theorists, such as William Paley, William Godwin, James Mill, etc. However, Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick are the core representatives of classical utilitarianism. Their thoughts not only reflect the whole theoretical picture of classical utilitarianism, but also contemporary utilitarianism carry out reform and innovation on the basis of their theories. Therefore, this book illustrates the theoretical characteristics of classical utilitarianism by merely reviewing and sorting the three classical utilitarians’ argumentations on the theory of utilitarianism.

2.2.1 Bentham’s Utilitarian Theory Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), the founder of utilitarian theory, laid the basic form of utilitarian theory. Bentham’s thought inherits the theoretical tradition of empiricism and applies the principle of empiricism to human behavior and society. Utilitarianism is the foundation of all Bentham’s political philosophy theories, and all of Bentham’s defense and interpretation are on the ground of utilitarianism. The goal of Bentham’s theory is to offer advises to the legislator. According to Bentham, “the legislator’s job is to use her knowledge of human nature to design laws that maximize the happiness of her people”.22

2.2.1.1

Principle of Utility Is the Only Right Law of Conduct

Bentham believed that the simplest expression of the so-called principle of utility is “the greatest happiness principle”, and pleasure and pain are the only sources of judging what is right and wrong. Bentham himself has made a clear statement of the 22

Morgan (2007), p. 9.

40

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

principle of utility: “By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness”,23 including not only every action of a private individual, butt every measure of government. As to why the principle of utility should be upheld, and why the it is the only correct law of conduct, Bentham argues that it is unnecessary and impossible to prove. The reason why there is no need to prove it is because it is human nature and instinct to seek pleasure and avoid pain, and pleasure and pain are the two sovereign masters governing human destiny. “It is by reference to experience, and to that standard alone, that the tendency of any such modifications to produce more pleasure than pain, and consequently to be right—or more pain than pleasure, and consequently to be wrong—is made known and demonstrated”.24 Mill also believed that the principle of utility was self-evident for Bentham.25 It is impossible to prove because the principle of utility is the commencement of the chain of proofs.26 When a person refutes the principle of utility, his theory also derives from the principle of utility itself, but he is just unaware of it. Whereafter, Bentham proves the principle of asceticism and the principle of sympathy and antipathy to be wrong. Bentham argues that all opponents of utilitarianism can be reduced to the above two cases: By being constantly opposed to it, this is the case with a principle which may be termed the principle of asceticism; By being sometimes opposed to it, and sometimes not, this is the principle of sympathy and antipathy. Asceticism is a moral judgment on the approvement of any action in an inverse way: if actions tend to augment happiness, they are morally wrong, and if actions tend to diminish happiness, they are morally right. Bentham insists that asceticism is simply a misuse of utilitarianism, and that asceticism can never be carried out thoroughly anyway. Even if self-pursuit of pain is a virtue, inflicting pain on others without their consent is not a virtue in any way. Therefore, the principle of asceticism is self-defeating. The principle of sympathy and antipathy was a popular philosophical thought in the society at that time. Both Hume and Smith held the theory of sympathy, which is the criterion for judging the justification of an action lies in the individual’s emotion towards the action. If it is approved, it is justified; if it is disapproved, it is not justified. The principle of sympathy and antipathy in most cases will hold the same position as utilitarianism, because an action that augments happiness will tend to cause approval of others, while an action that increases pain will often cause people’s criticism, which is precisely out of human nature. However, the principle of sympathy and antipathy cannot provide an accurate standard, and it cannot even be called a principle to some extent. Taking sentiments as the basis of moral judgment is most apt to cause biased consequences. Because, under this theory, the proportion of 23

Bentham (1907), p. 16. Shaw (1999), pp. 69–70. 25 Mill (1969), p. 111. 26 Bentham (1907), p. 18. 24

2.2 The Primary Theory of Utilitarianism

41

punishment is also determined by the degree of hate: if you hate much, punish much; if you hate little, punish little and if you hate not at all, punish not at all. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish what kind of hate is a moral error and what kind of hate is just a difference in taste. Under this theory, any difference in taste or in opinion can lead to profound disgust. For example, simply because of dislike of another’s living habit, hatred may arise, and even criminal behavior may occur towards him. Therefore, Bentham emphasizes, “The only right ground of action, that can possibly subsist, is, after all, the consideration of utility, which, if it is a right principle of action, and of approbation, in any one case, is so in every other”.27 Because of the limitation of the principle of sympathy and antipathy, theories based on sentiments as the moral foundation gradually lost its influence after Smith.28

2.2.1.2

Calculation Method of Utility

Since the principle of utility is the sole guiding principle of individual behavior, is also the ultimate principle, then the goal of all laws is to augment the sum of social happiness as much as possible. To this end, Bentham proposed a famous calculation method of utility, which mainly includes the principle of happiness with same quality and the estimation of utility value. Firstly, there are four different sources of pleasure and pain, but all pain and pleasure have the same quality. According to Bentham, there are four distinguishable sources of pleasure and pain: the physical, the political, the moral, and the religious. All these pleasure and pain are capable of giving a binding force to any law or rule, and they may all of them be termed sanctions.29 For example, if a man is caught in a fire, if the disaster comes from an ordinary natural process, it is called a punishment of the physical sanction. If it is the result of a decision by a political official, it is a punishment belonging to the political sanction. If it is caused by the neighbor’s dislike of his moral character and refuses to give help, it is a punishment of the moral sanction. If it is caused by a sin he has committed or is upset by fear of divine punishment, it is called a religious sanction. However, in either case there is no difference in nature between pleasure and pain, and the difference only lies in the circumstances in which they are produced. As for the pleasure with same quality principle, Bentham famously stated that “the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry”.30 This phrase is often reduced to “the game of push-pin is as good as poetry”, and further evolved into “whether to be the unsatisfied Socrates or a satisfied fool”. In fact, this interpretation is a misunderstanding of Bentham’s ideas. The full statement of pleasure with same quality principle in Bentham’s original text is that, “Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game 27

Bentham (1907), p. 28. Schneewind (1998), p. 388. 29 Bentham (1907), p. 29. 30 Rosen (2003), p. 176. 28

42

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

of push-pin furnishes more pleasure, it is more valuable than either. Everybody can play at push-pin: poetry and music are relished only by a few”.31 The real significance of pleasure with same quality principle is that even if legislators prefer music and poetry, they need to be impartial to everyone’s preferences regardless of their personal opinions. In a social community of many people, legislators should not use public resources (state tax revenue) to support pleasures favored only by a few. Therefore, for Bentham, pleasure with same quality principle does not mean that pleasure is no simple or complex. Bentham explicitly acknowledges that pleasure has both sensory pleasure and complex human emotions, and Bentham also does not think that satisfied fools will produce more social efficiency than the unsatisfied Socrates. The meaning of the principle pleasure of same quality lies in the requirement to give equal weight to each pleasure and treat each pleasure of each person with the same attitude。 Secondly, measuring utility requires a set of strict and perfect calculation procedures, calculating the total amount of utility according to different types and sensitive conditions of pain and pleasure. Bentham argues that the value of each pleasure and pain can be measured in seven circumstances: intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness, fecundity, purity, and extent.32 For the tendency of an action to affect the interests of the community, first estimate the utility value of each stakeholder according to the above seven aspects, and sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on the other. If the total value of pleasure is larger, the balance indicates the good tendency of action as a whole; If the total value of pain is larger, the balance indicates an evil tendency upon a whole. In addition, Bentham also considers the impact of different personal sensitivities on utility values, such as health, strength, moral sensibility and other factors may have an impact on the actual pain felt by an individual. Bentham hopes that through careful utility calculations, the principle of utility would become the measuring criterion of political and legal systems.

2.2.1.3

Guide Legislators with the Principle of Utility

Russell noted, “Bentham’s merit consisted not in the doctrine, but in his vigorous application of it to various practical problems”.33 Bentham believes that the principle of utility is not the guiding principle of individuals, but the guiding principle of legislators. It is the basic principle guiding the operation of legal norms and social systems. First, do not interfere with individual free choice. Bentham inherited and developed Smith’s view that the individual is the best representative of his own interests. When individuals are free to determine what to produce and how to produce it, and to contract freely, things will generally turn out to be the best. Through the hand of the market, individual interests and the overall interests of the society can be harmonized 31

Ibid. Bentham (1907), p. 34. 33 Russel (1967), p. 775. 32

2.2 The Primary Theory of Utilitarianism

43

and unified. Therefore, in the market, everyone’s free choice can promote the social community to automatically reach the result of utility maximization.34 According to Bentham, utilitarianism and reasonable egoism are integrated. As long as everyone pursues his own real happiness, the ultimate social result must be the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The value of the existence of legislators only lies in guiding individuals to make the right choice when they fail to recognize their own true happiness. Second, reconcile conflicts of interest from a public perspective. Bentham believed that the coordination and unity of individual interests and public interests could be realized through legislators. “It is to the interest of the public that I should abstain from theft, but it is only to my interest where there is an effective criminal law”.35 The role of the legislator is to restrain the egoistic behavior of individuals and to constrain people to conduct behaviors that contribute to the maximization of total utility. Third, ensure the publicity of legislators through democracy. Bentham realized that for the principle of utility to work smoothly, it was necessary to overcome the legislator’s own selfish motives and align the legislator’s interests with the public interest. By appealing to the democratic system, Bentham placed the legislator under the supervision of the democratic system to ensure that the legislator could act in accordance with the public interests. Bentham maintains that since the individual is the best judge of his own interests, and only the individual is most concerned with his own interests, the best political system requires the community members periodically elect their own governors. Bentham’s strategy is to place constitutional power directly in the hands of the community members, through democracy forcing political power not to go against the well-being of the majority. Bentham expects to connect legislators’ interests with the public interest through democratic institutional procedures.36 Because of this, Bentham strongly advocates granting the right to vote to all adult men, and privately holds that women should also have the opportunity to vote. This view is considerably advanced than that of political jurists of the same period.

2.2.2 Mill’s Utilitarian Theory John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was an important representative of classical utilitarianism. Mill believed in utilitarianism since he was a child. After critically inheriting Bentham’s utilitarianism, Mill tried to provide a more rigorous philosophical defense for his utilitarianism with the help of the prevailing philosophical thoughts at that time. Like Bentham, Mill advocated a strong form of empiricism, which claimed all knowledge should to be based on empirical induction. Mill denied the possibility of 34

Reeve (1990), pp. 99–100. Russel (1967), p. 775. 36 Schofield (1996). 35

44

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

a priori knowledge and opposed the explanation of political phenomena by rational laws. He believed that political research should be grounded on human interests, needs and experience habits. Mill’s utilitarianism is more logically complex than Bentham’s, who for Mill is not a great political philosopher, but a reformer in the field of philosophy.37 Mill had a profound influence on later utilitarianism in two aspects: First, Mill provided a proof of the principle of utility; Second, Mill’s theory narrowed the gap between the principle of utility and the customary morality. By invoking the secondary principle, Mill advocate realizing the goal of maximizing utility in an indirect form. Mill’s theory made it possible for utilitarianism to integrate with other political thoughts. In the subsequent development of utilitarianism, almost all utilitarians with indirect characteristics would seek theoretical basis from Mill.

2.2.2.1

Argumentation of the Utility Principle

From the perspective of Mill, the primary proposition of the principle of utility is: “happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end”.38 Mill, like Bentham, also believed that the principle of utility is self-evident, and there is no strict proof of the principle of utility, because the ultimate problem cannot be proved in the everyday sense. “To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles; to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct”.39 However, first principles can be proved by appealing to facts, and it is by this method that Mill accomplished his proof of the principle of utility in this way. “The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it……except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons”.40 It can be found that, Mill’s deduction of utility principle can be divided into three steps. (1) From “people desire x experientially” deduces that “x is desirable”. (2) From “the happiness of each person is a good for himself” deduces that “the general happiness is a good for the aggregate of persons”. (3) Happiness is the only end: that everything we desire is either a part of happiness, or a means to happiness.

37

Mill (1969), p. 83. Mill (2009), p. 63. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid., pp. 63–64. 38

2.2 The Primary Theory of Utilitarianism

45

Obviously, Mill’s argument for the principle of utility was not sufficient, as Mulgan says, many later generations of philosophers have cut their teeth exposing the fallacies of Mill’s simple proof.41 For the first step of the argument, Sidgwick gives a classic critique. Mill argues that what is desirable can only be found out from what people actually want, that is, if they find X is actually desired, then X is something desirable. However, actual desire for something does not necessarily lead to it is worth desiring. In daily life, there are a lot of phenomena that what people actually desire is not worth desiring. For example, drug addicts have a real desire for drugs, but they themselves will admit that drugs are not worth desiring. Moore accused Mill of committing the “naturalistic fallacy”42 —from a factual “is” unreasonably direct deduce a logical “ought”.43 “X is worth desiring” means “X ought to be desired” or “it is morally right to desire X”. But someone desires X, it doesn’t directly deduce that X is morally right. Therefore, there is a logical error in the first step of Mill’s argument. As for the second step of the argument, from “the happiness of each person is good for him” directly deducing that “the general happiness is a good for the aggregate of persons”, embodies an obvious defect. Sidgwick shows that even if the first step of Mill’s argument could be accepted as valid, the idea that what is actually desired is what is worth of desire, it cannot be deduced that the general happiness of society is the goal of all to strive for. Because “for an aggregate of actual desires, each directed towards a different part of the general happiness, does not constitute an actual desire for the general happiness, existing in any individual”;44 “There being therefore no actual desire–so far as this reasoning goes–for the general happiness, the proposition that the general happiness is desirable cannot be in this way established”.45 In Sidgwick’s supplementary proof, Sidgwick asserts that Mill’s flaw can only be closed by the intuition of Rational Benevolence. Many later scholars have also noted that Mill, in his utilitarian argument, deduced directly from the perspective that everyone pursues the maximization of self-utility that society needs to pursue the maximization of general happiness. However, this utilitarianism fundamentally ignores the separateness of individuals and calculates the overall happiness of all people by simply adding up different individual happiness indexes in utility calculation. For the third step of the argument, happiness is the only end: that everything we desire is either a part of happiness, or a means to happiness. Mill gives a series of explanations for this step. For example, people sometimes desire money for itself. When money itself is desired, money only becomes a part of happiness. However, this step is also controversial. According to Mill, when people are desirable for x, all they really desired is the pleasure they get from x. But Moore notes that when we desire for something, we don’t always expect pleasure. When someone desire to 41

Morgan (2007), p. 21. Moore argues that Mill’s “naturalistic fallacy” is the assertion that “good means nothing but some simple or complex notion, which can be defined in terms of natural qualities.“ See Moore (2004), p. 76. 43 Moore (2004), pp. 73–77. 44 Sidgwick (1962), p. 42. 45 Ibid. 42

46

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

drink a glass of wine, if the object of the desire is only pleasure and does not include wine, then the desire cannot lead to the behavior of drinking wine, “If the desire were directed solely towards the pleasure, it could not lead me to take the wine”.46 Moreover, this argument further leads to the debate over whether pleasure is the sole good. Contemporary utilitarianism generally holds that pleasure is not the sole good. There are many things in the world that have value but do not have the experience of pleasure, and these things also have utilitarian value.

2.2.2.2

The Fusion of Utilitarianism and Customary Morality

Another major contribution of Mill was to open the door to indirect utilitarianism. By invoking the secondary principle, Mill tried to bridge the gap between the principle of utility and customary morality, thus showing that utilitarianism is not a destroyer of the existing order, but can accommodate people’s sense of justice and recognize people’s moral rights. First, the basic social system operating on the principle of utilitarianism can accommodate people’s sense of justice, and there is no contradiction between utility and justice. The general view is that justice has a theoretical source independent of utility, and justice is a priori and independent of utilitarianism or consequentialism. Mill argues that this perception is wrong, that there is a special connection between justice and utility, and that the criterion for justice is also the Greatest Happiness Principle. First of all, justice is the rules of human behavior, the core requirement is to respect or not violate the legitimate rights of others, “Wherever there is a right, the case is one of justice, and not of the virtue of beneficence”.47 Mill describes five universally recognized norms of justice, including nor violating the legal, moral, deserved, contracted, and innate rights of individuals. Second, Mill argues that the sentiment of justice is an innate human emotion that involves a compelling obligation, that justice in general is associated with compelling someone to do something. The compulsion of justice comes from the sentimental origin of the sense of justice, which consists of two essential elements: “the desire to punish a person who has done harm, and the knowledge or belief that there is some definite individual or individuals to whom harm has been done”.48 The desire to punish the aggressor comes from two primitive human sentiments: self-defense and sympathy. When we are about to be harmed or have been harmed, the impulse of self-defense is instinctively aroused. Human sympathy makes people feel that there is a shared interest between themselves and the social community to which they belong. Any conduct that endangers the social community is regarded as an infringement of personal interests, thus arousing the instinctive impulse of self-defense. Therefore, Mill argues, the primal impulse to defend oneself under the influence of sympathy develops in the direction 46

Moore (2004), p. 74. Mill (2009), p. 91. 48 Ibid., p. 92. 47

2.2 The Primary Theory of Utilitarianism

47

of safeguarding the public interest of society. “The righteous man will be angry at acts that harm society, even if they do not harm himself”.49 Finally, Mill elaborated on the relationship between justice and utility. (1) Justice comes from the impulse of self-defense when rights and interests are violated, and justice is the protection of individual rights and legitimate interests. (2) A just society can often produce a greater overall social utility. Society needs to protect individual rights because there is a vital interest involved in protecting individual rights—the security interest. “The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in which we must never forget to include wrongful interference with each other’s freedom) are more vital to human well-being”.50 (3) The principle of utility is a measuring standard between different principles of justice. Justice is a passive utilitarian concept, which focuses on preventing harmful behaviors between people.51 However, because justice comes from the moral sense of human beings, different people have different understandings of justice. Whenever different standards of justice conflict, only by appealing to utilitarian principles can it be solved. Second, Mill proposes the liberty principle from utilitarianism, which protects individuals from external forces in self-regarding fields. Mill pioneers indirect utilitarianism by distinguishing between the judgment aspect of legitimacy of an action and the practical aspect of an individual’s action. In everyday actions, people only need to follow customary morality, and only when customary morality conflicts with each other or lack clear instructions, is it needed to directly resort to the principle of utility. Mill’s principle of liberty not only have resolved the moral dilemma that the pursuit of utilitarian maximization may infringe on individual liberty, but also have further improved classical utilitarian thought. The principle of liberty proposed by Mill is namely the No-harm Principle: “The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign”.52 Mill also offer a strict criterion for what is harmful to others. First of all, the conduct must cause definite harm or have definite danger of harm. By ‘definite’, it means the harm directly follows the action in a predictable way. Second, it must be the harm done to others, not just to oneself. As long as an individual’s conduct does no harm to others, they are not allowed to be interfered with, and individuals have complete liberty of action to pursue their own purposes. In other words, under the premise of no harm to others, there exists a space of absolute liberty, within which people have the right to do whatever they want.53 There has always been a great debate on the principle of no-harm to others. From the perspective of utilitarianism, one of the primary debates is that is there a contradiction between the principle of no-harm and the principle of utility? The 49

Ibid., p. 94. Ibid., p. 107. 51 Lyons (1994), p. 117. 52 Mill (2006), p. 19. 53 Liu (2013), pp. 336–337. 50

48

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

principle of no harm seems to recognize the fact that an individual’s behavior cannot be interfered with as long as it does not cause harm to others, and an individual has the right to do anything, even if it is harmful to his own interests. In this regard, Stephen argues that the no-harm principle does not work at all in Mill’s theory, because utilitarianism is a moral theory that adheres to a single principle, and only the principle of utility is the sole criterion for policies and institutions.54 The principle of utility is generally a cohesive principle, while the principle of liberty or the principle of rights is a distributive principle and there are conflicts of basic values between these two kinds of principles, which cannot be coordinated in the same theory. Bain proposes an eclectic explanation. Bain believes that Mill’s principle of no harm and the principle of utility can be unified. Mill’s principle of no harm inherits Bentham’s concept of private ethics, that is, “Private ethics teaches how each man may dispose himself to pursue the course most conducive to his own happiness, by means of such motives as offer of themselves”.55 Therefore, individual happiness consists of two parts, one dependent on himself, the other dependent on others. For the part of happiness that depends on oneself, the best way is not to be disturbed by the conduct of others. However, Bain’s interpretation does not completely rule out the conflict between the principle of liberty and the principle of utility, because if individuals are allowed to freely hurt themselves, the total utility of individuals will inevitably be reduced, and there will still be conflict between the principle of no harm and the principle of utility. The best explanation comes from Gray. Gray argues that Mill’s theory belongs to indirect utilitarianism. Mill distinguishes between the practical and the critical levels of reasoning about conduct,56 arguing that it is only at the critical level of reasoning about conduct that the Principle of Utility is typically invoked. At the practical level, people’s conduct only relies on the “considerations built into the various precepts”.57 Gray notes that only when “one does not grasp the distinction between those considerations which an agent ought to invoke in his practical deliberations and those which ultimately justify his actions”,58 that he would believe that there is some conflict between Mill’s principle of utility and principle of liberty.

2.2.3 Sidgwick’s Utilitarian Theory Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) was the last important classical utilitarian. Rawls once commented that Sidgwick provided the most clear and easy to understand outline of classical utilitarian theory.59 Different from Bentham and Mill, Sidgwick’s utilitarian thought was more philosophical, and his philosophical views were deeply influenced by German philosophers, especially Kant. Although Sidgwick inherited 54

Stephen (1993). Bentham (1907), p. 246. 56 Gray (2003), p. 41. 57 Gray (2003), p. 42. 58 Gray (2003), p. 42. 59 Rawls (1999), p. 20. 55

2.2 The Primary Theory of Utilitarianism

49

the empiricism tradition of Bentham and Mill, he claimed more attention to reason. In Sidgwick’s theory, the principle of utility was not only based on empirical observation, but also on rationality. Sidgwick was not only a utilitarian, but also a moral philosopher. He promoted the development of utilitarianism from two aspects: one is to further improve the theoretical proof of the principle of utility; the other is to guide the development of act utilitarianism to rule utilitarianism in the process of balancing utilitarianism and moral common sense.

2.2.3.1

Perfect the Proof of Utilitarianism

Sidgwick argues that the utilitarian view of maximizing universal happiness is the best illustration of a system of universal moral common sense, but Mill’s argument for utilitarianism is fatally flawed. As mentioned earlier, Sidgwick holds that Mill’s argument for the utility principle jumps directly from everyone’s concern with maximizing self-happiness to the maximization of universal happiness that everyone should pursue. There is a breaking point in this argument, which needs to be supplemented by appealing to moral intuition, namely the principles of justice, prudence, and benevolence. Different from Bentham and Mill, Sidgwick introduced moral intuition into the argumentation of utilitarianism, and believed that utilitarianism needed moral intuition as a theoretical basis. Sidgwick notes: “There are certain absolute practical principles, the truth of which, when they are explicitly stated, is manifest; but they are of too abstract a nature, and too universal in their scope, to enable us to ascertain by immediate application of them what we ought to do in any particular case; particular duties have still to be determined by some other method”.60 Therefore, utilitarianism needs some revision of the self-evident principle, and the self-evident principle needs the utilitarian method to resolve moral differences. The principles of Prudence, Justice, and Benevolence are three self-evident principles in intuitionism. First, the principle of “justice” can be obtained by considering the similarity of the individuals that make up a Logical Whole or Genus. For example, we believe that if it is morally justified for one person to do an act, it is morally justified for others to do it in similar conditions; If someone is judged to be morally wrong for doing the same thing, then there must be a difference between the “similar conditions” in the two examples. The principle of justice can be expressed as doing to others what you would like to be done to yourself. However, there are some mistakes in this statement. For example, if there are two people, A and B. A expects B to help A do something bad, and A expects to do something in return to B in the same manner, this situation conforms to the above statement of principle of justice, but obviously it does not conform to people’s moral intuition. Therefore, the principle of justice is only expressed in a negative form. If the way A treats B is not morally justified, it is wrong for B to treat A in the same way, that is, “What you do not want done

60

Sidgwick (1962), p. 379.

50

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

to yourself, do not do to others”. Although the principle of justice is self-evident, it does not provide comprehensive guidance. Second, the principle of “prudence” emerges in the consideration of the similar parts of a Mathematical or Quantitative Whole. The principle of prudence is the principle “of impartial concern for all parts of our conscious life”.61 In other words, people should pay as much attention to present pleasures and pains as they do to future ones, and should not choose present pleasures because they have greater certainty. The principle of prudence implies that chronological order should not be a reason to prefer happiness at one moment over another, and that one’s overall happiness should be viewed from a holistic perspective, that is, greater happiness in the future should not be given up for the sake of small happiness in the present. The principle of Prudence requires people to look beyond the confines of the present moment and make choices that serve their practical interests in the big picture. Finally, the principle of benevolence emerges by considering the relation of the integrant parts to the whole and to each other. “The good of anyone individual is of no more importance than the good of any other; unless, that is, there are special grounds for believing that more good is likely to be realized in the one case than in the other”.62 Sidgwick remarks, "it is evident to me that as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, not merely at a particular part of it.63 The principle of benevolence is actually the combination and extension of the principle of prudence and justice. A rational individual should look neutrally at his own pleasures and pains at all points in time and give equal weight to all pleasures and pains. The rational individual, then, should also be neutral about the pleasure and pain of everyone affected by his actions, and the pleasures should not be more important than the pleasure of others just because it is his own. Through the benevolence principle, Sidgwick acknowledges an "impartial" perspective of observation, believing that everyone has equal importance and should be treated equally in the utilitarian calculation. Thus, Sidgwick argues, the principle of benevolence enables people to transition from the pursuit of individual overall happiness to the pursuit of the general happiness of the community, complementing the missing link in Mill’s argument. In regrading to the self-evident principle of benevolence, individuals who pursue the maximization of individual happiness admit that the pursuit of the maximization of community happiness also has moral legitimacy, which proves the moral legitimacy of the principle of utility. As Sidgwick put it, "the Intuitional method rigorously applied yields as its final result the doctrine of pure Universalistic Hedonism, which it is convenient to denote by the single word, Utilitarianism.64 However, Sidgwick’s appealing to intuition brought about new problems, which were not only solved by Sidgwick, but also the main problems that utilitarianism was criticized. On the one hand, how does the prudence principle communicate with the benevolence principle, and from what considerations does a rational individual make 61

Ibid., p. 381. Sidgwick (1962), p. 382. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid., pp. 406–407. 62

2.2 The Primary Theory of Utilitarianism

51

the transition from pursuing the principle of prudence to pursuing the principle of benevolence? A far-fetched answer is that the principle of prudence and benevolence can be communicated through the self-evident principle of self-esteem. Because everyone pursues the realization of self-value, and the way to realize self-value is to make contributions to the community. Therefore, for the sake of self-esteem and reputation, rational individuals will take the initiative to go beyond the principle of prudence, pursue the maximization of social total utility, and contribute to the improvement of the general happiness of society. The more fundamental challenge, however, is that, since both the principles of prudence and benevolence derive from the rationality of the individual, it is entirely possible for rational individuals to reject the principle of benevolence in regarding to the principle of prudence, since the method of direct obedience to the interests of the individual is more fundamental than the method of obedience to the interests of the community. Therefore, the conflict between the principle of prudence and the principle of benevolence eventually formed the Dualism of the Practical Reason in Sidgwick, which also became a difficult problem that plagued Sidgwick’s life. Brink points out that the dualism of practical reason leaves us with the question of how individuals should make a choice in the face of equally reasonable moral choices.65 Although Sidgwick fails to provide a sound theoretical proof for the principle of utility, Sidgwick raised an important question for utilitarianism, especially for classical utilitarianism, that is, whether there is the possibility of fundamental harmony and consistency among interpersonal interest relations within the community. On this issue, utilitarians before Sidgwick always believed that interpersonal interest relations did not fundamentally conflict, and utilitarians narrowed the gap between the principle of prudence and the principle of benevolence by emphasizing the consistency of people’s real interests. Bentham maintains that there is no contradiction between the pursuit of the maximization of personal interests and the pursuit of the maximization of community interests. As long as an individual realizes his own interests in accordance with the principle of prudence, he will naturally realize the goal of utilitarianism. Therefore, utilitarianism requires an “impartial” attitude towards all people around, and promotes the aggregation of individual interests into public interests from an “impartial” perspective. However, Sidgwick realizes that an “impartial” perspective is insufficient to solve all problems from individual utility maximization to community utility maximization. Individual interests are independent and cannot be compensated for by the benefit of others, and “it would be irrational to sacrifice any portion of my own happiness unless the sacrifice is to be somehow at some time compensated by an equivalent addition to my own happiness”.66 In other words, whether it is egoism based on the principle of prudence or it is utilitarianism based on the principle of benevolence, both possess logical rationality. For egoists, the principle that individuals should focus on their own quality of life is self-evident; For utilitarians, the principle that one’s own happiness cannot be valued more than that of 65

Brink (1992). Henry Sidgwick, “Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies”, in Marcus G. Singer (ed.), Essays on Ethics and Method, p. 43. 66

52

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

others is also self-evident. Therefore, how to resolve the dualism of practical reason is a problem that not only Sidgwick but also many later utilitarians have tried to overcome. In the existing research results, a more reasonable way is to leave some space for human self-interest in the moral judgment. Only when human self-interest crosses the boundary, that is, human self-interest starts to damage the total social utility, can we resort to the principle of utility and deny the principle of self-interest on the ground of utility principle. It is in this manner that later rule-utilitarianism, two-level utilitarianism, and institutional utilitarianism achieve the compatibility of the two positions within the theory and achieve the unity of utilitarianism and self-interest.

2.2.3.2

Consistency Between Principle of Utility and Morality of Common Sense

In his proof of the principle of utility, Sidgwick holds that the utility principle is consistent with common sense morality: “the truth of a philosopher’s premises will always be tested by the acceptability of his conclusions: if in any important point he be found in flagrant conflict with common opinion, his method is likely to be declared invalid”.67 Sidgwick believes that common sense morality generally has a tendency to promote utilitarianism, which is unconscious utilitarianism. If it can be proved that utilitarianism is the basic principle used to demonstrate common sense morality, then the proof of utilitarianism can be perfected to the greatest extent. Sidgwick also made great efforts in this regard. On the one hand, Sidgwick inherited Mill’s indirect utilitarianism, believing that people should follow other moral principles and custom norms in daily life. “Universal Happiness is the ultimate standard must not be understood to imply that Universal Benevolence is the only right or always best motive of action……the end which gives the criterion of rightness should always be the end at which we consciously aim: and if experience shows that the general happiness will be more satisfactorily attained if men frequently act from other motives than pure universal philanthropy, it is obvious that these other motives are reasonably to be preferred on Utilitarian principles”.68 On the other hand, Sidgwick regards moral common sense as “a machinery of rules, habits, and sentiments, roughly and generally but not precisely or completely adapted to the production of the greatest possible happiness for sentient beings generally”.69 Sidgwick’s utilitarianism already has a certain nature of rule utilitarianism, affirming the effectiveness of common-sense morality in guiding individual conduct. However, when different common-sense morality and custom norms conflict, the principle of utility is the ultimate criterion.

67

Sidgwick (1962), p. 373. Sidgwick (1962), p. 413. 69 Sidgwick (1962), p. 475. 68

2.3 The Academic Criticism of Utilitarianism

53

2.3 The Academic Criticism of Utilitarianism In the development of utilitarianism, the criticism of utilitarianism by non-utilitarians is also the theoretical source to promote the development and evolution of utilitarianism, and further contemporary utilitarianism is a theoretical school emerged in the debate with non-utilitarianism. Although some theoretical criticisms misinterpret or misunderstand the theoretical intention of utilitarianism, the criticism itself prompts contemporary utilitarianism to conduct more in-depth exploration on some issues, and even forms a new theoretical focus. Therefore, the academic criticism of utilitarianism also provides an ideological source of contemporary utilitarianism. Regarding all the existing literature, the theoretical criticism of utilitarianism by non-utilitarians mainly focuses on the following five aspects: First, the theoretical criticism of the consequentialism features of utilitarianism believes that utilitarianism only takes the number of results as the criterion of moral judgement, which is easy to lead to immoral results; Second, the theoretical criticism of the aggregation characteristics of utilitarianism argues that in the process of pursuing the maximization of total social utilitarianism, utilitarianism ignores the independence and integrity of individuals; Third, the criticism of the impartiality theoretical characteristics of utilitarianism claims that it is too demanding on human nature to treat all people with an impartial attitude all the times; Fourth, the criticism holds that utilitarianism ignores the problem of distribution, and utilitarianism is not an egalitarian theory; Fifth, the criticism declares that utilitarianism lacks the basic concept of public interests, and as a public ethic, utilitarianism lacks reasonable attention to publicity.

2.3.1 Leading to Immoral Results Many critics of utilitarianism point out that utilitarianism can lead to immoral or morality-violating results. As long as the utilitarian result of the conduct is large enough, utilitarianism can allow cases of breach of contract, breaking of rules, and even invasion of an individual’s life. An oft-cited example is in a remote town, the law enforcers decided to kill an innocent person in order to stop a riot. Opponents argue that if only consequences are taken as the criterion for determining the justification of a conduct, then there will always be a situation where the negative value of the violation of an individual’s right to life is outweirgted by the positive value of the benefit received by the majority. In such case, utilitarianism allows for infringement. It is evident that opponents believe utilitarianism will produce immoral results due to the denial of the consequentialism characteristics of utilitarianism. As Williams put it, “No one can hold that everything, of whatever category, that has value, has it in virtue of its consequences”.70 “There are things it would not be right to do, no matter what the consequences”.71 There are two type theoretical criticisms of 70 71

Smart and Williams (1973), p. 73. Sosa (1993), p. 104.

54

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

the consequentialism characteristics of utilitarianism: Firstly, the denial of utilitarian theory itself, holds that the consequentialism characteristics of utilitarianism make it impossible to accommodate the theory of rights, so utilitarianism no longer has theoretical applicability in contemporary times, and thus utilitarianism should be abandoned; Secondly, the technical criticism of utilitarianism, argues that the inherent defects of consequentialism leads utilitarianism to results contrary to its original intention, making it necessary for utilitarianism to revise its theoretical characteristics of consequentialism.

2.3.1.1

Consequentialism Cannot Accommodate the Theory of Rights

First, right outweighs utility. To some critics who insist that right is a trump card, any theory with consequentialism characteristics is unjustified. Because rights are supreme, violating of rights itself is incorrect, and the illegitimacy of infringement has nothing to do with the actual or inevitable consequences caused by it. Man, by virtue of a certain dignity or a certain sacred qualification, has the right to demand certain treatment, regardless of the relationship a person is with others, this right gives rise to corresponding duties to others. The concept of rights constitutes a Side Constraint. Nozick also adopts Kant’s statement that “individuals are only ends, and not merely means” to support the idea of Side Constraints. In the example of killing innocent people, the legislator’s violation of an individual’s right to life in order to quell the riot is exactly taking the individual as a means of achieving greater social utility and does not respect the autonomy of individual. In other words, the concept of rights forms Side Constraints, in which individual rights cannot be infringed within a specified range. Even in special circumstances where the infringement of one person’s rights can protect the same rights of multiple people, the Side Constraints also renders it unjustified. Nozick is hostile to any form of utilitarianism theory by virtue of the absoluteness of rights. According to Nozick, all violations of rights commit crimes against the rights owners. “Side constraints express the inviolability of others, in the ways they specify… ‘Don’t use people in specified ways.’”72 If some people are subjected to certain sacrifices for the good of society as a whole, they are being used for the benefit of others, “To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has”.73 The view of side constraints prohibits anyone from violating moral rights in pursuit of his own goals. Nozick further notes that the community is only a collection of independent individuals, and there is no social entity with community interests. Therefore, the power of the state cannot go beyond the duty of the night watchman, which is to protect individual rights from violence, fraud, theft and other violations, beyond which all policies aim to promote general happiness are all unjust and constitute “forced labor”. 72 73

Nozick (1971), p. 32. Nozick (1971), p. 33.

2.3 The Academic Criticism of Utilitarianism

55

Second, rights have intrinsic value. In fact, few scholars today hold the view of binding rights in a strict sense. Even Nozick admits that side constraints are not absolute and can be violated if it is to avoid catastrophic moral horror.74 In other words, right theory and consequentialism are not completely opposite. However, critics argues that in the view of utilitarianism, rights have no intrinsic value but only instrumental value, which is the most unacceptable reason for the utilitarian theory. Critics believe that in the theoretical framework of utilitarianism, rights are merely guides to those choices that may normally be expected to be good,75 and rights are only “shadows cast by calculations of utility”.76 For example, Critics hold that Bentham’s view adequately reflects the utilitarian perception of the instrumentalization of rights. Bentham once pointed out that there was no right independent of recognition or enforcement, and that “to have a right, is to be the beneficiary of another’s duty or obligation”.77 Accordingly, critics argue that utilitarianism recognizes a right only because acting on it enhances the general well-being of society, and that infringement is permissible at a time when it can produce a greater total social utility. For example, A promises B to give B’s estate to B’s nephew abroad when B is about to die. Suppose that this promise is only known to A and B, and A knows that B’s nephew was a gambler. After B’s death, A does not give this inheritance to B’s nephew, but donates it all to charity, because A believes that doing so will make the wealth more socially effective. Opponents believes that utilitarians will agree with what A does. Although A has broken his promise, the total social utility enhanced by A’s behavior is higher than the negative social effect resulted from breaking his promise. Therefore, A’s behavior is justified. In this light, Ross notes that people keep their promises because they are inherently supposed to, rather than depending on the consequences to make the decision.78 If so, utilitarianism fundamentally denies the intrinsic value of rights. Other critics argue that even if utilitarians recognize the intrinsic value of rights, the consequentialism form of utilitarian theory does not support this claim. For example, Scheffler argues that consequentialism means that the agent should rank various possible consequences from good to bad, and consequentialism always requires the theory of maximizing the benefit of consequences, leaving little room for the agent’s autonomy.79 Therefore, the rigid consequentialism character cannot be compatible with the theory of rights with intrinsic value, and utilitarianism can only be integrated with the instrumental theory of rights.

74

Nozick (1971), p. 30. Hamlin (1989), p. 170. 76 Hamlin (1989), p. 170. 77 Lyons (1969), p. 2. 78 Ross (2007), p. 44. 79 Sosa (1993), pp. 113–114. 75

56

2.3.1.2

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

Consequentialism Will Lead to Inappropriate Results

Firstly, individuals cannot accurately estimate the actual consequences of every conduct. Critics claims that utilitarianism always takes the actual consequences of a conduct as the criterion for determining the justification of a conduct, that is, only when a conduct actually produces a good social effect, is it morally justified. Utilitarianism ignores the importance of motivation factors, and even holds that whether a motivation is good or bad also depends on its effect. Namely, if the conduct under a certain motivation generates more pleasure or tends to generate more pleasure, the motivation is good. A motive is bad if the conduct causes more pain or tend to cause more pain. In practice however, it is impractical to only use the actual objective consequences as a measure of legitimacy. People’s limited ability to collect and process information is very likely to make a good motive produce bad results. For example, the man A kindly finances a beggar, but the beggar uses the money to commit a crime. In this case, A’s behavior is not right if judged in terms of direct consequences, because his actions directly brought about a bad result, but this consequence was completely unforeseeable by A. In addition, the motives of the conduct are not worthless, and motives can partially determine the justification of the conduct.80 For example, in the case of A sponsoring beggars, A’s good motive to help the weak makes his behavior defensible. In this regard, critics argues that an individual’s actions are hardly foolproof, and that the efforts of a person who strives to do good can justify his mistakes even if he ultimately fails to do so. Secondly, following the utilitarian maximization rule of conduct can greatly interfere with an individual’s daily life. Many scholars believe that utilitarianism is not only an explanatory criterion for the justification of behavior, but also the basic criterion for individual actions, such as Bentham and Smart. Smart makes it clear that behavioral utilitarianism also provides a decision-making procedure to some extent– "the utilitarian criterion, then, is designed to help a person who could do various things if he chose to do them, to decide which of these things he should do”.81 However, the consequentialist character of utilitarianism makes it necessary for utilitarianism to adhere to the principle that S doing A is correct if and only if doing any alternatives produces no much better results than doing A. Utilitarianism places excessive demands on individual behavior, because there will always be an alternative action that yields greater effects than the action we take. For example, it is generally considered the right thing to do to take a portion of one’s living budget to support the poor, but if, according to the utilitarian maximization standard, donating only a portion of the money does not achieve the goal of maximization, then the act of donating money is not morally correct. In this regard, utilitarianism has reached a conclusion that defies common sense. Slote also advocates that utilitarianism should abandon the consequentialism character of maximization, and that being good enough is already deserved to be considered a morally correct behavior.82 80

Jackson (1991). Quoted from Eugene Bales (1971), p. 262. 82 Slote and Pettit (1984). 81

2.3 The Academic Criticism of Utilitarianism

57

Thirdly, utilitarianism may encourage a rule-breaking behavior. According to Brant, act-utilitarianism has a serious flaw in that the theory does not explain the obligation of individuals to make certain sacrifices or assume certain responsibilities in cooperation in order to promote the general good.83 Brant assumed that in wartime England, in order to save gas and electricity, the government required a maximum temperature of 50 °F for rooms. At this point, a utilitarian may reason as follows: if the vast majority of Englishmen will conform to the governmental directive. Thus, the war effort will not suffer if only a few people use enough gas and electricity; the few people who uses more gas and electricity will feel warmer, and the state of affairs in which a few people are warm is better than one in which no one is. Therefore, I ought to use more gas and electricity”. If many people use more fuel based on this reasoning, then the war will definitely lose, but utilitarians may make the following reasoning: if many people decide to use gas and electricity, so that the war is lost, my own use of more won’t have made any difference to the war effort, but it will have made a lot of warm in my room to use enough gas and electricity, thus decreasing the general harm. Therefore, I also ought to use more gas and electricity. Brant points concludes that utilitarians who act directly on the principle of utilitarian maximization may well cause great public harm in the pursuit of public good.84

2.3.2 Violating the Separateness of Individuals The so-called aggregation characteristics of utilitarianism means that utilitarianism needs to merge the pleasure and pain, happiness and misfortune of different individuals from an impartial perspective, and finally form an objective utilitarian value. Utilitarianism believes that the community is a collection of independent individuals, and individuals are the only form of utility manifestation, and the total utility of society can only be reflected by the sum of the utility values of all social members. Opponents criticize the characteristics of utilitarian aggregation, ignores individual independence and integrity in the process of transitioning from individual utility maximization to social total utility maximization. As Mackie put it, “on a utilitarianism view, transferring a satisfaction from one person to another, while preserving its magnitude, makes no morally significant difference”.85 “The boundaries between persons are here being ignored, in that one person’s satisfaction can simply replace another’s and outweigh that other’s miseries of frustrations. “86 The problem noted by critics is the problem that Sidgwick encountered in the dualism of practical reason, which is also the important theoretical crux of utilitarianism. Early utilitarians viewed

83

Eugene Bales (1971), pp. 259–260. Eugene Bales (1971), pp. 259–260. 85 Mackie (1996), p. 53. 86 Ibid., pp. 58–59. 84

58

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

interpersonal conflicts of interest too optimistically, believing that fundamental interests between people are consistent, and the inconsistency between individual interests and overall interests is only due to individual prejudice. Therefore, classical utilitarians believed that as long as they restricted personal prejudice from an impartial perspective, the process of transition from individual utility maximization to social total utility maximization would be logical. However, Sidgwick argues in his research that individuals’ preference for self-interest is reasonable and rational, a human reason that is even more basic than utilitarianism. Relying solely on an impartial perspective cannot effectively explain the idea that individuals must transition from the maximization of individual utility to the view of universal happiness. Regarding the aggregation characteristics of utilitarianism, Rawls, Nagel, Williams and other scholars have criticized it from different angles. On this issue, the general logic of the critique of all scholars is the same: the aggregation character of utilitarianism is fundamentally opposed to the independence of the individual. Therefore, utilitarianism cannot provide theoretical protection for the independence of the individual, and utilitarianism is incompatible with the discourse system of contemporary political philosophy.

2.3.2.1

Utilitarianism Ignores Differences Between People

Many scholars, in their critique of utilitarian aggregation characteristics, have noted that utilitarianism improperly applies the internal interest accounting process of the individual to different individuals, “While balancing goods and harms may be acceptable within a life, many think that it is not acceptable to balance goods and harms across lives”,87 because people are living individuals with significant differences. Rawls, Nagel and other scholars have fiercely criticized utilitarianism on the issue of personal separateness, such as the process of aggregation of interests in utilitarianism that denies the identity between individual preferences, feelings, requirements, etc. and that of the overall; In the process of interest aggregation, the separateness of individuals are completely ignored. Rawls argues that utilitarianism, especially classical utilitarianism, achieves the aggregation of individual utilitarianism through the perspective of a rational, sympathetic, and the view of an impartial spectator. First, the spectator needs to be in a position where his own interests are not threatened, possessed with sufficient information and the necessary capacity for reasoning, and has equal sympathy for the satisfaction of all people’s desires; Second, the spectator takes turns to put himself in everyone’s position, empathetically experiences everyone’s desires and satisfactions, and derives the net balance of each person’s satisfaction; Finally, the net balance satisfied by all is combined into the net balance of overall satisfaction. Rawls notes that the aggregation process of utilitarianism is most clearly expressed by Lewis: “Value to more than one person is to be assessed as if their several experiences of value

87

Brink (1993), p. 252.

2.3 The Academic Criticism of Utilitarianism

59

were to be included in that of a single person”.88 Classical utilitarianism is characterized by “Impersonality resulted in the conflation of all desires into one system of desire”.89 Nagel also made a similar statement to Rawls: utilitarianism mistakenly transplants the way that an individual deals with self-interest conflicts to deal with interpersonal interest conflicts, merges all living individuals into one person, and weighs the benefits and losses from the perspective of one person. This utilitarian approach completely distorts the essence of the independent individual. Sacrificing the interests of one person for the greater interests of another is completely different from sacrificing one of his own satisfactions in exchange for another’s greater satisfaction.90 The aggregation feature of utilitarianism ignores the objective fact that different individuals are completely independent living individuals. Nagel further argues that the aggregation feature of utilitarianism is difficult to accept because it aggregates interests by way of majority voting. Although everyone’s claim is counted, anyone’s claim may, in principle, be rejected by the demands of others. In the final outcome, an individual’s claim may not be satisfied at all. The aggregation character of utilitarianism separates the demand from the subject of the demand, thus ignoring the form peculiar to the original individual. In fact, Sidgwick has suggested that his principle of benevolence is an interpersonal extension of the principle of prudence: “but just as this notion is constructed by comparison and integration of the different ‘goods’ that succeed one another in the series of our conscious states, so we have formed the notion of Universal Good by comparison and integration of the goods of all individual human-or sentient existences”.91 In this way, utilitarianism forms a “utility monster”,92 whether utility is perceived as the subject’s preference or subjective feelings, utility exists alone from the subject, and the individual becomes only “receptacles”93 for dressing preferences or experiences. In fact, whether it is preference satisfaction or subjective feelings are the preferences and feelings of specific subjects, there is a direct correspondence between the two. One person’s loss cannot be compensated by another person’s greater benefit, and personal loss can only be compensated by his own benefit at other times. The aggregation character of utilitarianism will inevitably lead to the sacrifice of the interests of some people for the greater benefit of others, or even the fundamental interests of some people.

88

Lewis (1971), p. 550. Rawls (1999), p. 188. 90 Nagel (1978), p. 138. 91 Sidgwick (1962), p. 382. 92 Nozick (1971), p. 41. 93 Hart (1982), p. 99. 89

60

2.3.2.2

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism Ignores the Integrity of the Individual

Williams argues that utilitarianism ignores the integrity of the individual in the process of aggregating individual preferences (subjective feelings). Utilitarianism views individual life choices from an impersonal perspective, not concerning itself with whose happiness is maximized or who contributes to the maximization of happiness, but only requiring individuals to act in accordance with the goal of utilitarian maximization. Therefore, utilitarianism often requires individuals to abandon life plans that are of great value to themselves and to carry out actions that promote utilitarian maximization. Therefore, utilitarianism violates the integrity and unity of the individual’s life. In fact, the violation of personal integrity and the violation of personal separateness are two sides of the same coin. Williams elaborated on the unacceptability of utilitarianism from the perspective of personal integrity. As Rawls argues, utilitarianism misinterprets impartiality as impersonality, and the aggregation character of utilitarianism not only separates the direct relationship between personal preferences (subjective feelings) and the agent, but also requires a person to abandon his own intentions and decisions, strictly acting on the requirements and decisions of utilitarian calculation results. Williams asserts that this process is a denial of personal integrity. The utilitarian aggregation process makes the individual into a utilitarian running machine, by entering the intentions and claims of everyone (including the agent himself) at the entrance, and the best decision calculated according to utilitarianism at the exit. The utilitarian aggregation process completely ignores the individual’s own intentions, claims, preferences, and utilitarianism “alienates” the individual from some of its fundamental convictions. The utilitarian claim “neglects the extent to which his actions and his decisions have to be seen as the actions and decisions which flow from the projects and attitudes with which he is most closely identified. It is thus, in the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity”.94 Williams completes his critique of utilitarianism’s violation of personal integrity with the following steps. First, some fundamental plans and claims are important to the individual, “a person will stick to what that person regards as ethically necessary or worthwhile”,95 which Williams calls “commitments”. “Commitments… which the agent takes seriously at the deepest level”,96 if utilitarianism and commitments are irreconcilable, then utilitarianism and personal integrity are difficult to coexist. Second, when an individual’s important plans and claims enter the process of preference aggregation, if the content of his preference has nothing to do with utility, that is, the important plan that the individual adheres to cannot make the individual’s life better, then this preference will be ignored in the utility calculation; If the preferred content is related to utility improvement, the preference also needs to go through the non-personal perspective of interests calculating. “A man who has such a ground project will be required by Utilitarianism to give up what it requires in a given case 94

Smart and Williams (1973), p. 101. Williams (1995), p. 213. 96 Harcourt (1998), pp. 189–190. 95

2.3 The Academic Criticism of Utilitarianism

61

just if that conflicts with what he is required to do as an impersonal utility maximizer”.97 Thus, in the process of aggregation of preferences (subjective feelings), utilitarianism requires individuals to give up their fundamental life plans. Utilitarianism alienates the individual from the life he wants, and fundamentally does not guarantee that the individual will live a worthy life, because the true value of the individual’s life lies in keeping one’s fundamental commitments.

2.3.3 Excluding Other Obligations Critics argue that the impartial theoretical characteristics of utilitarianism fails to accommodate the individual’s responsibility to others. Impartiality has two aspects: First, the values that utilitarianism aims to promote are those that are generally perceived as neutral by the agents. Second, the arrangement and calculation of total utilitarianism is independent of the specific identity of the agent. In other words, the impartiality of utilitarianism requires the agent not to favor himself or those with whom he has a special relationship, treating all those affected by his actions from a neutral perspective. Critics holds that utilitarian impartiality not only imposes too high moral demands on the individual (e.g., excluding personal preference for family and friends based on special relationships), but also excludes other special obligations of the individual due to its obligation to act in accordance with utilitarian principles. First, critics insists that an impartial stance actually assumes that individuals have the same moral relationships as everyone else, and therefore does not allow individuals to assume greater obligations to those with special moral relationships. For example, if you hire a boy to mow your lawn and when he completes the work as agreed and asks you for pay, critics argue that, in a utilitarian and impartial view, you should pay the boy only if you have no a better way to use the money. This example applies both to a critique of the consequentialism character of utilitarianism and to a critique of the character of impartiality. Because, in light of critics, for utilitarians, the special obligations of the employment relationship do not outweigh an individual’s obligation to maximize utility impartially. As long as the negative effects on boys do not outweigh the positive effects of using the money in other ways (for example, donating it to poor, sick children), then donating the money instead of paying wages is justified. As Williams said, utilitarianism is not concerned with the source of the goods to be distributed. “All causal connexions are on the same level, and it makes no difference, so far as that goes, whether the causation of a given state of affairs lies through another agent, or not”.98 Back to the example of mowing the lawn, Kymlicka argues that if the boy did not mow the lawn at all but mistakenly thought he had done the job, or mistakenly believed that the employer had promised to pay him, it would not affect the utilitarian 97 98

Williams (1981), p. 14. Smart and Williams (1973), p. 92.

62

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

final judgment. As Rose also put it: “to make a promise is to put oneself in a new relation to one person in particular, a relation which creates a specifically new prima facie duty to him, not reducible to the duty of promoting the general well-being of society”.99 Second, critics argue that the character of impartiality negates the special relationship between people. Family, friends, neighbors, compatriots, creditor’s rights and debts, etc., everyone lives in a special social relationship. It is not necessary for an individual to spend the same time and energy to care for the obligations of others as he does for his own obligations, nor is it necessary to care for the interests of each person involved as he does for his family. Here is another example often used by critics: a father finds two young children drowning, one of whom is his own son. If two children have the same basic information (health status, age, etc.), and the father only has time to save one child, how should the father choose? From the view of utilitarianism, it is morally equivalent for the father to save any child, but as far as common sense is concerned, the father should save his son first, just because he is his own son. The impartial character of utilitarianism makes it pay no attention to who performs an act, while the assessment of the overall state of affairs of the result of an act depends on who performs the act.

2.3.4 Ignoring Social Equality Critics generally argue that utilitarian theory ignores the issue of equality. Equality is the core issue of contemporary political philosophy, “On Dworkin’s view, every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality”.100 Utilitarianism, especially classical utilitarianism’s neglect of equality, is the core flaw of its theory. Critics criticize the view of equality in utilitarianism from three aspects. First, utilitarianism is not an egalitarian theory. Second, utilitarianism can at most satisfy the requirement of formal equality, and can only support the equal treatment between people. Third, it acknowledges that utilitarianism is a substantive theory of equality, but the utilitarian view of equality will lead to unjust distribution results.

2.3.4.1

Utilitarianism Is Not an Egalitarian Theory

Scholars for this view claims that utilitarianism does not care about equality at all. Utilitarianism has only one fundamental principle—the principle of maximum utility. Utilitarians only concern about whether the maximization of utilitarianism can be achieved, and do not care about how utilitarianism is distributed among people. Welfarist economics, which takes utilitarianism as its philosophical foundation, also holds that production and distribution are two issues, and economists should 99

Kymlicka (2002), p. 32. Kymlicka (2002), p. 4.

100

2.3 The Academic Criticism of Utilitarianism

63

only focus on the issue of maximizing production. Goldstick points out that Mill has clearly stated in Utilitarianism that the principle of utility is the only principle of utilitarianism. Although Mill believes that justice is very important, different people with different stands will have different views of justice. When deserved justice and fair justice conflict, social utility alone can decide the preference. Goldstick then notes: “Social utility maximization really is the only fit criterion, ultimately, for determining whether and when and in what way and to what extent people ought to be treated equally”.101 When analyzing the utilitarian view of equality, Nagel believes that utilitarianism must oppose Rawls’s principle of difference, because granting more weight to the interests of the least advantaged is an act of giving up larger interests for smaller ones. Utilitarianism holds that “It is better to have more of what is good and less of what is bad, no matter how they are distributed”.102 In fact, there are scholars within utilitarianism who hold this view, such as Smart. Smart believes that the primary criterion of utilitarianism is utilitarianism maximization. In the case of the same total utilitarianism, utilitarianism does not care about interpersonal distribution. There is no moral difference between A’s happiness and B’s happiness in the view of utilitarianism. However, Smart argues that in the process of maximizing the total utility of society, acting according to the principle of utility often brings equal results. Sen challenges the claim of utilitarians that utilitarianism results in equality even though it does not care about equality. Sen holds that utilitarianism is not an egalitarian theory. It not only does not care about equality, but also results in unequal consequences. In On Economic Inequality, Sen uses an example to criticize the utilitarian theory of equality: suppose there are two people, A is in good health, while B has some handicap (e.g., B is a cripple). Because of the different natural conditions between A and B, at any income level, A will get twice as much utility from that income as B will get from the same. Sen argues that according to the utilitarian principle, to maximize utilitarianism, more resources need to be provided to A. The different natural conditions between A and B make the utility of A higher than that of B in the case of equal income distribution, but A is still supposed to be given a higher income according to the utilitarian distribution principle, even though A’s situation is better than B originally.103 Sen argues that the distribution results of utilitarianism far fail to adjust income disparities between people, but further exacerbate inequality. After Sen, many scholars have challenged the utilitarian equality problem with the example of the seriously ill or disabled. Critics argue that, instead of paying more attention to these people, utilitarianism will abandon them. In fact, the essence of the debate on whether utilitarianism is an egalitarian theory is whether equal value can be given an independent status within utilitarianism, so that equality is not only an instrumental means to promote utilitarianism maximization. If, within utilitarianism, equality is not an inherently independent value, or utilitarians will agree with the principle of equality only when equality can promote utilitarian 101

Goldstick (1991), p. 70. Nagel (1979), p. 110. 103 Sen (1985), pp. 17. 102

64

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

maximization, and will abandon it once equality conflicts with utilitarianism, then utilitarianism is not a true egalitarian theory. As Mark Rowlands put it, equality must be castrated beyond recognition by the principle of utility.104

2.3.4.2

Utilitarianism Supports Formal Equality at Most

Some scholars believe that utilitarianism can support formal equality and is a theory of treating people equally. This view is mainly an interpretation of Bentham’s “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”.105 In fact, the impartial feature of utilitarianism implies the basic position of treating people equally, like an impartial spectator weighing everyone’s happiness objectively. Hart argues that Bentham’s principle is an anti-discrimination principle, which can eliminate the interference of irrelevant factors to treat people equally.106 For utilitarianism, the so-called equality is that the same pleasure is given the same treatment, and the same pain is also treated the same. The feeling of pain and joy is the only common value shared between different individuals. In the face of the same pleasure and pain, all individuals are equal. Taking pain and pleasure as the criterion for treating people equally can not only eliminate the interference of social accidental factors such as race, gender and birth, but also exclude the interference of natural endowment factors such as intellectual ability and individual rationality on equality. Singer also believes that the utilitarian view of equality is the first base point reached by the generalization of the principle of self-interest, and “the only defensible basis for the principle of equality is equal consideration of interests”.107 However, in the view of contemporary political philosophy, treating people equally is only the most basic position. Equality not only requires equal treatment, but also equal distribution. Utilitarianism needs to provide a substantial theory of equality to solve its theoretical dilemma. Critics asserts that utilitarianism can only provide a defense of formal equality at most, not a theory of substantive equality, and utilitarianism cannot solve the problem of equal distribution.

2.3.4.3

Utilitarian View of Equality Will Lead to Unjust Distribution Results

Dworkin admits that utilitarian theory involves the idea of equality, “In any of its standard versions, utilitarianism can claim to provide a conception of how government treats people as equals, or, in any case, how government respects the fundamental requirement that it must treat people as equals”.108 However, critics such as Dworkin 104

Rowlands (2009), pp. 31-57. Mill (2009), p. 112. 106 Hart (1982), pp. 98–99. 107 Singer (2011), p. 28. 108 Fitzpatrick (1988), p. 42. 105

2.3 The Academic Criticism of Utilitarianism

65

argue that the utilitarian equality theory has serious flaws, which will lead to unjust distribution results. In the view of contemporary utilitarianism, equality means equal treatment of everyone’s preferences. Dworkin remarks that each person’s preferences include personal preferences, which refers to the preference everyone has about what himself shall do or have, and external preferences, which refers to the preferences people have about what others shall do or have. Although the equality basis of utilitarianism can exclude discrimination caused by factors unrelated to equality and ensure that the interests of all people are treated equally. However, once the external preferences are brought into the utilitarian calculation, it will corrode the impartial position of utilitarianism. External preferences will not only distort the theoretical motive of utilitarianism, but also affect the distributive results of utilitarianism. Dworkin points out that once the external preferences enter into the utilitarian calculation, the government or public power will lose its basic position of treating all people impartially, and external preferences hinder the theoretical motive of utilitarianism to treat everyone equally by treating the benefits of each individual equally. For example, suppose that in a community including Sarah, everyone’s preferences are equal. Since many people like Sarah, Sarah’s preferences will be double-counted, making a double effect in political decisions.109 The existence of external preferences violates the utilitarian maxim of equality that “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”.110 Utilitarianism cannot fulfill two duties at once: on the one hand, a duty to refute that some people’s preferences are more important than those of others; On the other hand, a duty to satisfy some people’s external preferences as to satisfy other preferences.111 The existence of external preferences subjects the final distribution result to the influence of others’ will. If it is argued that A should not be treated equally, the aggregate of A’s interests will suffer as a result. As Nagel said, the direction for utilitarianism to perfect its equality theory is “taking into account the interests of each person…in determining what would be best overall”.112

2.3.5 The Wrong Concept of Public Interests With utilitarianism being a public ethic, it is crucial for utilitarianism to understand public interests. Utilitarianism is different from egoism. Utilitarianism believes that the core of politics and morality is to promote the maximization of social utility as a whole. Therefore, in terms of theoretical logic, utilitarianism should have certain

109

Dworkin (1985), p. 361. Mill (2009), p. 112. 111 Dworkin (1985), p. 363. 112 Nagel (1979), p. 118. 110

66

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

altruism components. However, classical utilitarianism is also a pure theory of individualism, holding that individuals have logical priority, that the existence of individuals precedes the community, and that the community is a collection of individuals. Individuals are driven by the nature of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, and their basic behavior mode is to pursue the maximization of individual utility. Therefore, how to transition from individual utilitarianism maximization to aggregate utilitarianism maximization and why self-interested individuals should choose to promote social aggregate utilitarianism maximization have become the core issues of utilitarianism theory, which Sidgwick illustrates as the dualism of practical reason. For this issue, classical utilitarians adopt a way to simplify the contradiction, viz., regarding the total social utility as the sum of individual utility, and describe the community as an individual function, stitching all the gulfs between egoism and altruism. Although this method formally solves the theoretical flaws of utilitarianism, it causes the absence of the concept of public interest in the view of classical utilitarianism. On the one hand, the goal of utilitarianism is to maximize the total utility of society; On the other hand, the so-called total utility is fictitious, a sum function of individual utility. Classical utilitarianism fundamentally lacks the basic power to safeguard social fairness and justice. Bentham offers a specific expression about this false notion of public interests: “The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then is, what?—the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it. It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding what is the interest of the individual”.113 Marx once evaluated and analyzed Bentham and the public interest concept of classical utilitarianism represented by Bentham. Marx held that social interests did not have reality in classical utilitarian theory. For example, Marx criticized that “the interests of the individual must be subordinate to the interests of society. But … What does that mean? Is not every man as much a part of society as all others? This social interest which is personalized is an abstraction: it is merely the sum of individual interests … Personal interest is the sole real interest”.114 It is manifested that for classical utilitarianism, the public interests are composed of each real individual interest. Although the end of the public interest is to maximize the total social utility, “the worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it”.115 Therefore, the public interest confirmed by classical utilitarianism—the maximization of the overall utility of a society—not only originates from and depends on individual interests, but is automatically realized in the process of individuals pursuing the maximization of their own happiness. In fact, the cognition of the public interest of classical utilitarianism continues the individualism characteristics of classical liberalism. It breaks the connection between individuals and the community, ignores the social attributes of human beings, and contradicts the increasingly close tendency of cooperation and cooperation between 113

Bentham (1907), p. 59. Marx-Engels Collected Works (Vol. 2), 1975, p. 170. 115 Mill (2006), p. 174. 114

References

67

people in the sense of social development. In fact, the flaws and risks of classical utilitarian theory itself are closely related to the theory’s view that the public interest is the sum of individual interests. On the one hand, the classical utilitarian concept of the public interest encourages individual violations to some extent. In social life, in order to achieve universal aspirations, people need to cooperate with each other, and this cooperation is typically manifested by following rules. However, if the public interest is only comprehended as the aggregation of personal interests or a function of personal interests, the behavior of “Free-riding” can bring greater total social utility. For example, people who violate directive of restrictions and use more gas and electricity during wartime. In other words, the classical utilitarian view of the public interest not only does not require individuals to bear a certain price in order to promote the general good, but even justifies the individual’s self-indulgence as long as it contributes to the practical interests of the individual. On the other hand, the classical utilitarian view of the public good can also lead to contempt for individual interests. According to classical utilitarianism theory, public interest is the sum of individual interest, and the sum value of individual interests is the criterion for judging legitimacy. Thus, in the process of aggregating individual interest into the public interest, interests are separated from the subject of interests, and the satisfaction of one person can be replaced by that of another and exceed the misfortune or frustration of others in value. Although classical utilitarianism believes that individual interests are fundamental and unique, the subjectivity of interests is disregarded in the process of aggregating social total utility. In order to achieve greater social total utility, individuals may be required to give up their own interest. Consequently, the classical utilitarian view of public interest may even become an excuse for oppressing individual interests.

References Bain A (1952) The moral philosophy of Paley: with additional dissertations and notes. William and Robert Chambers, Edinburgh Bentham J (1990) A fragment on government. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Bentham J (1907) An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Clarendon Press, Oxford Brink D (1993) The separateness of persons, distributive norms, and moral theory. In: Frey RG, Morris CW (eds) Value, welfare, and morality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Cummiskey D (1990) Kantian consequentialism. Ethics 100(3):586–615 Dworkin R (1985) A matter of principle. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Epicurus (1993) The essential Epicurus: letters, principal doctrines, vatican sayings, and fragment, translated by Eugene O’Connor. Prometheus Books, New York Eugene Bales R (1971) Act-utilitarianism: account of right-making characteristics or decisionmaking procedure. Am Philos Q 8(3):257–265 Fitzpatrick JR (1988)John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy. Continuum, London Goldstick D (1991) Distributive justice and utility. J Value Inquire 25(1):65–71

68

2 The Source of Contemporary Utilitarianism

Goldworth A (ed) (2002) Deontology together with a table of the springs of action and the article on utilitarianism. Clarendon Press, Oxford Gray J (2003) Mill on liberty: a defense. Routledge, New York Hamlin AP (1989) Rights, indirect utilitarianism and contractarianism. Econ Philos 5(2):167–187 Harcourt E (1998) Integrity, practical deliberation and utilitarianism. Philos Q 48(191):189–198 Hart HLA (1982) Essays on Bentham studies in jurisprudence and political theory. Clarendon Press, Oxford Hume D (1740) A treatise of human nature. The Floating Press, Auckland Hume D (1994) Political essays. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Jackson F (1991) Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection. Ethics 101(3):461–482 Kymlicka W (2002) Contemporary political philosophy: an introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford Lewis CI (1971) An analysis of knowledge and valuation. Open Court Publishing Co., La Salle Lindsay AD (1930–1935) Individualism. In: Encyclopedia of the social science. The Macmillan Company, New York, vol VII, p 676 Liu S (2013) The right to do wrong. J Shenyang Univ (Soc Sci Edn) 3:336–337 Lyons D (1969) Rights, claimants, and beneficiaries. Am Philos Q 6(3):173–185 Lyons D (1994) Rights, welfare, and Mill’s moral theory. Oxford University Press, New York Mackie JL (1996) Rights, utility, and universalization. In: Hamlin AP (ed) Ethics and economics. An Elgar Reference Collection, Cheltenham, vol 2, p 53 Mill J (2006) On liberty. The Floating Press, Auckland Mill JS (1969) Bentham. In: Robson JM (ed) Essays on ethics, religion and society. University of Toronto Press, Toronto Mill J (2009) Utilitarianism. The Floating Press, Auckland Moore GE (2004) Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press, London Morgan T (2007) Understanding utilitarianism. Cromwell Press, Trowbridge Nagel T (1978) The possibility of altruism. Princeton University Press, Princeton Nagel T (1979) Mortal questions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Nozick R (1971) Anarchy, state and Utopia. The Clarendon Press, Oxford Rawls J (1999) A theory of justice. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Reeve A (1990) In: Allison L (ed) Individual choice and the retreat from utilitarianism. In: Allison L (ed) The utilitarian response: the contemporary viability of utilitarian political philosophy. Sage Publications, London Rosen F (2003) Classical utilitarianism from Hume to Mill. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, New York Ross WD (2007) The right and the good. Clarendon Press, Oxford Rowlands M (2009) Animal rights: moral theory and practice. Mark Rowlands, London Russel B (1967) A history of western philosophy. Simon & Schuster, New York Sabine G (1961) A history of political theory, 3rd edn. Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., New York Schneewind JB (1998) The invention of autonomy: a history of modern moral philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Schofield P (1996) Bentham on the Identification of Interests. Utilitas 8(2):223–234 Schultz B (ed) (1992) Essays on Henry Sidgwick. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Sen A (1985) On economic inequality. Oxford University Press, Oxford Sidgwick H (1962) Methods of ethics. Macmillan and Company Limited, London Singer P (2011) Practical ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Slote M, Pettit P (1984) Satisficing consequentialism. Proc Aristot Soc 58:139–176 Smart JJC, Williams B (1973) Utilitarianism: for and against. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Smith A (1976) The inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Sosa D (1993) Consequences of consequentialism. Mind 102(405):101–122

References

69

Stephen J (1993) Liberty, equality, fraternity. Liberty Fund Inc. Williams B (1995) Replies. In: Altham JEJ and Harrison R (eds) World, mind and ethics: essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge William H (1999) Shaw, contemporary ethics: taking account of utilitarianism. Blackwell Publishers, Malden Williams B, Luck M (1981) Philosophical papers 1973–1980. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Chapter 3

The Fundamental Schools of Contemporary Utilitarianism

The main contents of contemporary utilitarianism are almost all formed, developed and proved in the academic debates and even theoretical conflicts between contemporary utilitarianism and non-utilitarianism, and those between different schools of contemporary utilitarianism. The theoretical debates between utilitarianism and non-utilitarianism and those between different factions of contemporary utilitarianism constitute the basic driving force and trajectory of the evolution of contemporary western utilitarianism. To this end, centering on the core proposition of utilitarianism, carefully sorting out and accurately analyzing the basic viewpoints and ideological propositions of different schools of contemporary utilitarianism, step by step, we can effectively reveal the overall logic and development course of contemporary utilitarianism and reflect the overall theoretical picture of contemporary utilitarianism. Overall, contemporary utilitarianism has three dominant concerns: What exactly is happiness? How is morality connected to happiness? Who is the subject of decisionmaking for happiness maximization? Focusing on these three main issues, utilitarianism has formed theoretical research in three aspects, namely, the basic connotation of utility, the individual action criterion and the subject of decision-making for utility maximization. Almost all the hot issues of contemporary utilitarianism are derived and expanded from these three aspects. The different answers to these three questions also result in different theoretical schools of contemporary utilitarianism.

© Peking University Press 2023 S. Liu, The Contemporary Evolution and Reform of Utilitarianism, Interests Politics Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7363-7_3

71

72

3 The Fundamental Schools of Contemporary Utilitarianism

3.1 Different Understandings Based on the Concept of Utility The first question that needs to answer for utilitarians is, “What is utility?” The classical utilitarians were all, in different ways, hedonists.1 Hedonism refers to an intrinsic, pleasurable, valuable experience or state of consciousness. Therefore, classical utilitarianism is a psychological experience based on the happiness or pleasure. Nozick was extremely critical of the psychological experience of utility that classical utilitarianism promoted. Nozick hypothesized a machine that could bring people into any psychological state. Through a variety of electrodes, the experience machine stimulates various psychological experiences.2 Nozick argued that, if utility is only the pursuit of pleasurable or valuable psychological experiences, then life in the experience machine can undoubtedly maximize utility. If utilitarianism is used as a major principle for institutional design, forcing people to live in the experience machine will maximize the total utility of society. In response to Nozick’s problems, contemporary utilitarianism began to reflect on the shortcomings of traditional utilitarianism and formed a new understanding of the connotation of utility in the process of reflecting on traditional utilitarianism. As a result, three new schools of contemporary utilitarianism developed: Preference Satisfaction Utilitarianism, the Objective List Utilitarianism, and Experiential Utilitarianism.

3.1.1 Preference Satisfaction Utilitarianism3 Preference satisfaction is the mainstream view of utilitarianism in contemporary times. Harsanyi, Hare and others support this point of view. At the same time, the preference model is also widely used in the research of other fields such as economics and sociology. “What modern economists call utility reflects nothing more than rank ordering of preference”.4 Preference (Desire) satisfaction utilitarianism holds that the way to enhance utility is not to achieve people’s general psychological state, but to satisfy their specific needs and realize their preferred desires. “What a person prefers is what is valuable to him”,5 and the maximization of personal utility is to maximize the satisfaction of his or her desire. 1

Morgan (2007), p. 61. Nozick (1971), p. 42. 3 Preference satisfaction is also called desire satisfaction, the two meanings are the same, can be used interchangeably. In actual use, philosophers prefer to use desire satisfaction, and economists mainly use preference satisfaction. This book believes that preference satisfaction is more in line with the characteristics of the theory from an external observation, measuring individual utility, so it adopts a unified expression of preference satisfaction. 4 Hirshleifer et al. (2005), p. 73. 5 Hausman and McPherson (1996), p. 73. 2

3.1 Different Understandings Based on the Concept of Utility

73

For contemporary utilitarianism, preference satisfaction utilitarianism stems from the theoretical reflection on classical hedonism. Nozick pointed out the fatal flaw of classical hedonism. If utilitarianism is the pursuit of a happy mental state or a pleasant spiritual experience, then entering the experience machine life is undoubtedly the best.6 Compared with real life, life in the experience machine can produce greater happiness.7 Therefore, for strict hedonists or altruistic hedonists, entering the experience machine life is not only morally justified but also mandatory. Nozick’s criticism reveals an important aspect that classical utilitarianism ignores: what is valuable is not only the feeling of happiness, but also the real realization of the desired goal. Even the feeling of happiness, which is a psychological experience that follows the achievement of the goal, is only a by-product of achieving the desired goal. It is generally accepted in academia that preference satisfaction utilitarianism has two important theoretical advantages: first, this school recognizes and respects individual preferences. Individuals are best qualified to speak on what they need, so preference satisfaction utilitarianism only requires giving people what they want, without making value judgments about the content of preferences. As a result, preference satisfaction utilitarianism can effectively avoid authoritarianism and paternalism8 and help to achieve and maintain human independence and self-reliance. Second, the preference model is better suited for empirical research because “preferences” are simpler to define and compare than “pleasure”. “Preferences theory provide a ranking of the importance of different desires for individuals”,9 and individual desire order and desire intensity can be observed without resorting to psychological experiments. Preference satisfaction utilitarianism can provide an effective operational procedure for utilitarian decision-making. However, preference satisfaction utilitarianism also has theoretical flaws: not all preference satisfaction can promote the actual improvement of individual interests. For example, Griffin points out: “It is depressingly common that when even some of our strongest and most central desires are fulfilled, we are no better, even worse, off”.10 This typically manifests itself in two types of preferences - mistaken preferences and adaptive preferences. The mistaken preferences refer to those preferences that are based on erroneous cognition or insufficient information. For example, a community votes to decide 6

See Nozick (1971), p. 58. Nozick hypothesizes there is an experiential machine that can give people any experience: “Super-duper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain.” 7 Some scholars also argue that Nozick’s experience machine example does not pose a challenge to hedonism or other types of psychological experience theory, see Goldsworthy (1992), p. 18. However, most political philosophers agree with Nozick’s experience machine example and believe that it poses a fatal challenge to traditional hedonism or psychological experience theory, such as Kymlicka, Morgan, Shaw and others. Therefore, most of the later utilitarian theories adopt preference satisfaction utilitarianism. 8 Griffin (1988), p. 10. 9 Hooker (1993), pp. 118–119. 10 Griffin (1988), p.10.

74

3 The Fundamental Schools of Contemporary Utilitarianism

whether the vacant land in the community is built into a large flower bed or a fitness activity area. At the time of voting, one resident thought that it would be more advantageous to build a fitness activity area, but he was completely unaware that the noise of the fitness activity area after it was built could greatly interfere with his life. Therefore, the preference he holds when voting is not actually in his best interest. Regarding the problem of mistaken preferences, Kymlicka has clearly pointed out that “preferences are predictions about our good”, and “preferences do not define our good"11 The existence of mistaken preferences makes preference satisfaction utilitarianism deviate from the core requirement of utilitarianism to a certain extent. Adaptive preferences are a more difficult problem in preference satisfaction theory. Adaptive preferences refer to the phenomenon that people unconsciously change their preferences according to their possible options, typically manifested as the “sour grapes phenomenon”. Faced with preferences that cannot be realized, people will convince themselves that the goal is not worth pursuing, or turn to cultivate preferences that are easier to achieve. Elster points out adaptive preferences are harmful because they undermine individual autonomy.12 And in daily life, there is a worrying fact in preference satisfaction utilitarianism, that is, people’s preferences can be shaped by the living environment, and as well as adding preferences, social conditioning can also remove or distort them.13 As long as a preference is deprived for long enough, people will lose their preference for it, or even not generate this preference at all. For example, slaves claim that they do not need freedom at all in order to adapt to the state of slavery; women without voting rights do not show any interest in participating in politics. According to preference satisfaction utilitarianism, the utility level of people living in a closed and backward society may be higher than that of people in an open society, not because people in a closed society have more preferences satisfied, but because the closed environment makes them self-prohibit most of the preferences that cannot be realized. In this sense, preference satisfaction utilitarianism actually supports injustice and oppression.14 Based on this, preference satisfaction utilitarianism began to change, from the satisfaction of actual preferences to the satisfaction of rational preferences.15 Rational preference satisfaction utilitarianism also recognizes and respects people’s preferences, and agrees with the method of determining individual preference priority by observing individual behavior, and takes preference satisfaction as the criterion for measuring utility. However, at this time, the preference is not the individual’s actual preference, but the person’s true preference obtained through rational reflection after eliminating as much as possible erroneous information and irrational factors, that is, the preference that can improve the person’s actual interests. Rational preferences have three aspects of characteristics, first, sufficient relevant information, that is, we 11

Kymlicka (2002), p. 15. Quote from Colburn (2011). 13 Morgan (2007), p. 89. 14 Ibid. 15 Actual preferences are also referred to as strong preference theory, and rational preferences are called weak preference theory, see Haslett (1990). 12

3.1 Different Understandings Based on the Concept of Utility

75

have all the relevant information and also have the ability to proper use of this information.16 Griffin points out that rational preferences based on sufficient information can eliminate the interference of mistaken preferences and ensure the correctness of people’s choices. Second, the prudence principle. Calculate the value of actual preferences by ideal prudence principle and rank preferences according to prudence principle.17 Third, totality principle. Griffin and Harsanyi both proposed the importance of totality principle in overcoming the shortcomings of actual preferences. Griffin believes that: We have local desires (say, for a drink) but also higher order desires (say, to distance oneself from consumers’ material desires) and global desires (say, to live one’s life autonomously).18 Rational preferences require that choices be made in terms of the interests of the individual as a whole throughout his or her life, rather than the sum of all preferences.19 Rational desires require making rational judgments on individual choices from the perspective of one’s overall interests and from the perspective of one’s complete life cycle. It can be seen that rational preferences have gone beyond the subjectivity of actual preferences. They are not only a descriptive concept, but also an evaluative concept. Rational preferences shift the focus of attention from “what people want” to “what people should want”. Rational preferences are utilitarianism’s efforts to make the concept of “utility” fit people’s real interests. In order to make the concept of utility closer to personal interests, the concept of utility begins to have a normative color.

3.1.2 Objective List Utilitarianism Critics of the utilitarian view of preference satisfaction point out that preference satisfaction theory seems to invert the relationship between preference and value, and that in fact satisfying people’s desires is important because what they value has independent value. In other words, things are not to be valuable because they are desired, but to be desired because they are valuable. “It is more perplexing to argue, ‘I value x because I desire it’, than to say the opposite, ‘I desire x because I value it’; ‘desiring is a natural consequence of valuing’ ‘But desire can scarcely be an adequate basis of valuation, in general’.”20 Based on this, contemporary utilitarianism puts forward the objective-list theory, which believes that there are some things in real life that are beneficial to everyone, and that people’s utilitarian level will naturally increase by satisfying these universally beneficial things. However, contemporary utilitarians give different answers as to what values or universal matters should be included in the list of utilitarianism, i.e., what is the content of the list of objective list utilitarianism. Griffin argues that: “The rough 16

Hooker (1993), p. 122. Arneson (1990). 18 Griffin (1988), p. 14. 19 Hooker (1993), p. 122. 20 Amartya Sen (1987), p. 10. 17

76

3 The Fundamental Schools of Contemporary Utilitarianism

explanation of basic needs is clear: they are what we need to survive, to be healthy, to avoid harm, to function properly”.21 Parfit argues that the list should include both some good things and some bad things that are supposed to be refrained from. “The good things might include moral goodness, rational activity, the development of one’s abilities, having children and being a good parent, knowledge, and the awareness of true beauty. The bad things might include being betrayed, manipulated, slandered, deceived, being deprived of liberty or dignity, and enjoying either sadistic pleasure, or aesthetic pleasure in what is in fact ugly.24”22 Morgen builds on these theorists by arguing that components of well-being: basic needs; achievement or accomplishment; understanding or knowledge; Agency, autonomy, freedom; friendship; religion; and fame or respect.23 There is no doubt that the content of the objective list is highly controversial. Theorists are unable to state where the items in the list originate or to determine exactly which items should be included in the list. Opponents point out that although utilitarianism is a matter of what makes a person well, it is not possible to present these matters in a list, nor is it possible to detail the circumstances in which each need is met, so the objective list theory represents only the good intentions of utilitarianism, but not its implementation. Nevertheless, objectively speaking, the objective list theory is not useless; the contents of the list actually reveal the source of utilitarianism, and the values in the list become the value basis for modifying the subjectivity of the utilitarian subject.

3.1.3 Experiential Utilitarianism Experiential utilitarianism inherits the tradition of happiness theory of classical utilitarianism, which considers utilitarianism as a psychological experience or state of consciousness. However, contemporary experiential theory argues that, on the one hand, the content of well-being in classical pleasure theory is too narrow, and there are many valuable experiences beyond pleasure, such as the experience of watching a tragedy or the painstaking creative process of a poet, which are not pleasurable experiences but are equally valuable. On the other hand, contemporary experiential theory needs to avoid Nozick’s criticism, that is, to avoid the wrong experiences from entering into the utilitarian calculation. Therefore, contemporary experiential theory integrates the elements of preference satisfaction, objective list theory and traditional happiness theory to form a more reasonable utilitarian view of experiential utilitarianism. The representative views are Haslett’s hybrid theory, Brandt’s “justified-gratification” and Sumner’s “authentic happiness”. Haslett’s view of utilitarianism mixes experiential and preference satisfaction theories. “This compromise model does not identify utility with any particular kind 21

Griffin (1988), p. 42. Parfit (1984), p. 499. 23 Morgan (2007), p. 84. 22

3.1 Different Understandings Based on the Concept of Utility

77

of personal experience, such as pleasure. Rather, it identifies a person’s utility with whatever personal experiences that person would prefer.”24 Haslett’s utilitarian view expands the scope of traditional happiness theory to include not only the experience of pleasure, but also the experience of all preferred things. However, utilitarianism should not be the satisfaction of preferences, but the experience of preference satisfaction, “well-being is a function of the experiences one would desire to have if fully informed”.25 At the same time, utilitarianism is not the experience of all preferences that individuals desire, but the experience of rationally modified and reasonable preferences. “Rational experience” can prevent experiences such as irrational impulses, superstitions, prejudices, etc. that violate personal practical interests from entering the calculation of utility, thus avoiding criticisms such as Nozick’s “experience machine”. Brandt’s utilitarian view is a carefully evaluated theory of happiness. According to Brandt, happiness is an experience of pleasure, which may come from sensory pleasure or from some good deed. However, not all pleasurable experiences are worth desiring.26 But only those that have been tested by cognitive psychotherapy, which is “This whole process of confronting desires with relevant information, by repeatedly representing it, in an ideally vivid way, and at an appropriate time, I call cognitive psychotherapy”.27 If a person’s desire or pleasure passes the test of cognitive psychotherapy, the desire is regarded as rational; if not, it is irrational. Through cognitive psychotherapy, the experiencer can clearly know whether an experience comes from real feelings or from the stimulation of an “experience machine”. This theory of experience not only avoids the irrational critique of traditional psychological experience theory, but cognitive psychotherapy also achieves a certain degree of communication between experience and actual accomplishment. Sumner applies the ideas of objective list theory to the theory of happiness and believes that utilitarianism should be objective happiness. Happiness is the feeling of overall satisfaction of life, which contains both emotional and cognitive components: the former mainly refers to the feeling of happiness and pleasure, while the latter requires an objective evaluation of the process of one’s life with full consideration of all factors.28 It can be seen that whether it is preference satisfaction, objective list or experiential theory, the contemporary view of utility contains an evaluative element, i.e., utility is not only a subjective experience, but the concept of utility also contains an element of “ought”. According to Smart, the concept of utility should be a combination of descriptive and evaluative elements29 Contemporary utilitarianism generally uses objective criteria to modify one’s subjective feelings or subjective preferences, and tries to remove irrational factors from the concept of utilitarianism, 24

Haslett (1990), pp 65–94. Shaw (1999), p. 65. 26 Brandt (1996), p. 40. 27 Brandt (1979), p. 113. 28 Quote from Shaw (1999), p. 66. 29 Smart and Williams (1973), p. 25. 25

78

3 The Fundamental Schools of Contemporary Utilitarianism

so that the concept of utilitarianism can be compatible with the actual interests of people. However, contemporary utilitarianism still ignores the influence of social relations on people’s actual interests, which is the social transformation of people’s needs. The utilitarian view of contemporary utilitarianism is, at best, the subjective understanding of individual’s self-interest.

3.2 Different Guidelines Based on Individual Actions Utilitarianism holds that politics and morality are (and should be) centered on promoting the maximization of utilitarianism. The question of how individuals should act in order to maximize the utilitarian interests of the community has become another focus of contemporary utilitarian debates. Based on different action guidelines, contemporary utilitarianism is divided into three major schools of thought: act utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism, and Two-level utilitarianism.

3.2.1 Act Utilitarianism Act utilitarianism inherits the classical utilitarian idea to the maximum extent. The school believes that an act is right when and only when the act can contribute to the level of utilitarianism; only the empirical consequences of the act can be used as a criterion for judging the justification of the act. However, different views have been formed within contemporary act utilitarianism as to whether individuals should act in accordance with utilitarian principles. Subjective act-utilitarianism requires that both the criteria for judging behavior and the guidelines for individual action adhere to the principle of utilitarianism, i.e., the actor always acts in accordance with the principle of maximizing utilitarianism. The representative figure of this school is Smart. According to Smart, “one ought to do that which will produce the best consequences”, and “the only reason for performing an action A rather than an alternative action B is that doing A will make mankind (or, perhaps, all sentient beings) happier than will doing B.”30 For subjective utilitarianism, promoting the maximization of overall utility is the only criterion for act: if action A yields 10 utility values and action B yields 8 utility values, then the subjective act utilitarian will take action A. If both actions A and B yield 10 utility values, then there is no difference between actions A and B. The subjective act-utilitarianism will take action A if action A yields 10 utility values and action B yields 8 utility values. Subjective act-utilitarianism is not concerned with factors other than total utility. Smart believes that moral principles should be based on universal benevolence, and that “the agent counting himself neither more nor less

30

Smart and Williams (1973), p. 30.

3.2 Different Guidelines Based on Individual Actions

79

than any other person”.31 Only based on the principle of universal benevolence can the theory always take the maximization of overall utility as the basic criterion for individual actions. In its theoretical construction, Subjective act-utilitarianism faces the problem of how to define “rules”. Subjective act-utilitarianism considers rules as summary of experience, and although in practice subjective act utilitarianism does not reject rules and also act by appealing to them. “Though even the act-utilitarian may on occasion act habitually and in accordance with particular rules, his criterion is, as we have said, applied in cases in which he does not act habitually but in which he deliberates and chooses what to do”.32 In this regard, Smart explains that, first, the situation would only occur at exceptional moments, such as when there is no time for utilitarian calculation. Adequate utilitarian calculation is a prerequisite for action when conditions permit. Second, the rules on which act utilitarianism is built are rules that have been confirmed by utility calculation in ordinary times, and acting directly in accordance with them does not violate the highest requirements of utility maximization. Third, rules do not have intrinsic value. Under the perspective of act utilitarianism, all rules do not have intrinsic value, and if breaking existing rules can achieve greater total social utility after utility calculation, then it is right to break the rules or violate them.33 However, subjective act-utilitarianism also faces many challenges: First, the school rejects special relationships between people. Subjective act-utilitarianism uses utilitarian maximization as the only criterion, placing everyone in exactly the same moral position and not allowing anyone to have special weights. However, in real life, people are always in a particular social relationship, and it is against human moral intuition to demand a completely unbiased treatment of all people. Second, the school does not take seriously the differences between people. Subjective act-utilitarianism continues the defects of classical utilitarianism in its argumentation and crosses over directly from maximizing individual utilitarianism to maximizing collective utilitarianism, which in practice may easily lead to the sacrifice of minority rights for the sake of the utilitarianism of the majority. Third, the school is difficult to operate in practice. As critics have pointed out, the code of action advocated by Subjective act-utilitarianism can only be realized if the agent is smart enough, well-informed enough, and without time constraints. The limitations of subjective act-utilitarianism have led some act-utilitarians to turn to indirect ways of maximizing utilitarianism, resulting in objective actutilitarianism. By invoking Mill’s concept of “secondary principles,” the objective act-utilitarians point out that the agent should act according to an independent code of action, which can be utilitarian or non-utilitarian, but that agent needs to act according to a code of action that promotes a higher level of utilitarianism. In other words, the overall goal of objective utilitarianism is still the maximization of the utilitarian

31

Ibid., p. 31. Ibid., p. 42. 33 Smart (1978), pp. 99–115. 32

80

3 The Fundamental Schools of Contemporary Utilitarianism

benefit of behavior, but direct utilitarian calculation is not the best way to maximize the utilitarian benefit of behavior; the best rule of action is to act according to common sense and moral rules. Taking common sense and moral rules as secondary principles to guide act can effectively avoid the problems of insufficient time for utilitarian calculation, limited personal rationality, and lack of information for decision making, and can also alleviate the contradiction between pursuing utilitarian maximization and following rules to a certain extent. However, this modification has not convinced critics. The critics point out that objective act-utilitarianism raises the problem of theoretical inconsistency. The overall goal of objective act-utilitarianism is to maximize the utilitarian benefit of behavior, so how can one be sure that independent rule of conduct will necessarily lead to the goal of maximizing the utilitarian benefit, and does agent need to invoke other principles to ensure the internal unity of objective act-utilitarianism theory? After carefully examining the arguments for and against objective act-utilitarianism, Lang notes that “Utilitarians should therefore either reassess the prospects of SAU, or embrace other forms of utilitarianism—motive-utilitarianism”.34

3.2.2 Rule Utilitarianism Rule utilitarianism emerged late in the 1950s, but developed rapidly and has become a significant utilitarian theory. Utilitarianism believes that a proper action is one that is permitted by a moral code and that the moral code is generally beneficial to the society in which the agent lives, and that a good moral code is one that is designed to maximize welfare or goodness. In other words, rule utilitarianism believes that the utilitarian principle is the evaluation standard of moral codes, and all moral codes should be tested by the utilitarian principle; the rightness or wrongness of an individual’s act does not depend on the result of the act, but on whether the act conforms to the rule. Many utilitarians believe that rule utilitarianism is more in line with people’s moral intuition35 and easier to achieve the maximization of utilitarianism. There are two major schools of thought within rule utilitarianism: actual rule utilitarianism and ideal rule utilitarianism. The former believes that people’s code of conduct is the actual moral code of social operation; the latter believes that the ideal moral rule is the individual action normative code of conduct. In comparison, ideal rule utilitarianism is more influential and is the mainstream of current rule utilitarianism. Ideal rule utilitarianism points out that the reason why actual rule utilitarianism struggles is that the actual rules of human society are flawed. First, actual rule utilitarianism is too conservative. Actual rule utilitarianism allows, but does not require

34 35

Lang (2004). Harsanyi (1985).

3.2 Different Guidelines Based on Individual Actions

81

individuals to improve current moral code and practices through positive action.36 It believes that following the prevailing moral code in current society will produce the greatest amount of utility. However, the moral code prevailing in current society sometimes conflict with utilitarian principles. For example, if a society accepts slavery, then the act of owning, enslaving, or even mistreating slaves in that society is justified. So, Feldman refutes that actual rule utilitarianism is not a utilitarianism at all, it is simply a conservatism.37 Second, actual rule utilitarianism is imperfect. actual rules may be vague, contradictory, or the minimum standard for regulating human behavior, and they do not provide accurate guidelines for individual actions based on actual rules. Therefore, people tend to use ideal rules as guidelines for personal behavior. Ideal rule utilitarianism holds that “An act is right if and only if it would not be prohibited by the moral code ideal for the society”.38 What is an ideal moral code? According to Brandt, first, an ideal moral code is one that is generally acceptable. Violation of a moral code not only causes guilt, but also invites widespread social condemnation. Thus, when calculating the utilitys and deutilitys, one needs to weigh not only the benefits of a moral code, but also the costs of implementing it. If the cost of implementation is too high, the rule is not an ideal moral code. Second, the ideal moral code is pluralistic. The ideal moral code is not monistic, and the pure pursuit of utilitarianism does not produce the most desirable results. For the ideal rule utilitarianism, different moral rules have different weights, for example, hurting a person is much more serious than lying. Third, ideal moral rules are open-ended. When the ideal moral rule conflicts with the principle of utilitarian maximization, it should be allowed to violate the moral rule for the sake of the utilitarian principle. However, this situation needs to be strictly limited, otherwise, rule utilitarianism will slide into act utilitarianism. At the same time, ideal rule utilitarianism also faces an inescapable challenge, and act utilitarianism refers to ideal rule utilitarianism as “rule worship”. Act utilitarianism argues that the worship of rules in rule utilitarianism has led the theory to depart from the basic tenets of utilitarianism. If following generally beneficial rules is not a utility-maximizing choice, then refusing to break generally beneficial rules is irrational.39 Rule utilitarianism undermines the central tenet of utilitarianism, which is that moral rules must be tested according to their consequences for human well-being.

36

Miller (2009). Ibid. 38 Brandt (1992), pp. 119–120. 39 Smart and Williams (1973), p. 10. 37

82

3 The Fundamental Schools of Contemporary Utilitarianism

3.2.3 Two-Level Utilitarianism The bias between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism contributed to the further development of utilitarianism. R. M. Hare proposed a Two-level utilitarianism based on behavioral utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. R. M. Hare distinguished two levels of moral thinking: the intuitive level, and the critical level. Accordingly, he argues that most of people’s philosophical thinking occurs at the intuitive level, and that people internalize their moral intuitions into their own moral principles, which further guide their daily lives. However, these moral principles are primary principles, and when there is a conflict between primary principles, recourse to moral intuition is invalid. For example, suppose I promise to accompany my friend A to a movie that afternoon, but then another friend B visits me unexpectedly and needs my help to solve some difficult problems. At this point, the principle of keeping my promise and the principle of helping my friend are in conflict, so that I cannot fulfill them at the same time. R. M. Hare believes that it is time to think critically. As a utilitarian, Hare believed that critical thinking is the essence of thinking. As an ideal, transcendental utilitarian, one needs to weigh and compare the different implications of various outcomes, while anticipating all possible outcomes. The function of moral thinking at the intuitive level is to generate primary principles that govern everyday behavior. The function of critical level moral thinking is twofold: First, to test and choose the primary principles that daily behavior should follow, i.e., to test the basic norms of people’s daily behavior with the principle of utility maximization; Second, to resolve conflicts between different principles, when different intuitive principles (primary principles) conflict with each other, critical thinking helps to weigh and decide which principle is more important, or only under critical thinking, can people choose between different primary principles. It is only with critical thinking that one can choose between different primary principles. Therefore, Two-level utilitarianism argues that at different levels of thinking, people need to follow different guidelines for action: at the intuitive level, people need to act according to moral principles derived from moral intuitions; at the critical level, people need to prioritize different intuitive principles by utilitarian principles. It can be said that R. M. Hare’s Two-level utilitarianism combines the advantages of act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism and has certain rationality. At the intuitive level, R. M. Hare appeals to rules to guide people’s daily actions, avoiding the defects of act utilitarianism; at the critical level, R. M. Hare takes the utilitarian principle as the highest scrutiny principle, ensuring the consistency between rules and utilitarianism and the utilitarian orientation of individual behavior. To sum up, utilitarianism, as a political-philosophical theory, not only provides a criterion for judging justification, but also provides a guiding principle for individual action. To a certain extent, contemporary utilitarianism has modified classical utilitarianism, solved its theoretical dilemmas, improved the logical self-consistency of the theory itself, and made the theoretical structure of utilitarianism more refined. At the same time, contemporary utilitarianism also enhances the practical applicability of utilitarianism theory, injecting utilitarian ideas into the decision-making process

3.3 Based on Different Subject of Decision-Making

83

of public and political life in an indirect way. Instead of requiring people to make moment-by-moment utilitarian calculations and to act strictly according to the criterion of utilitarian maximization, contemporary utilitarianism only requires people to follow the rules, and even believes that “the best world, from a utilitarian point of view, is one in which no one ever reasons in an explicitly utilitarian manner”.40 However, this change has also caused contemporary utilitarianism to lose its original political critique. As Goodin argues, “The utilitarian philosophy, before the First World War and for many years after it, …was still a bold, innovative, even a subversive doctrine, with a record of successful social criticism behind it. I believe that it is losing this role, and that it is now an obstruction.”41 Contemporary utilitarianism believes that the reliability of existing institutions and rules have been proven, but the benefits of new rules are not clear, and that existing rules should be followed in daily life, and that the help of utilitarian principles should be sought only when existing moral rules are in conflict. It can be said that classical utilitarianism and contemporary utilitarianism have a distinct difference in their attitudes toward rules and common sense—classical utilitarianism is skeptical of all rules and emphasizes that only rules and common sense tested by utility principle are justified; contemporary utilitarianism tends to follow existing norms, and utility principle becomes an auxiliary measure to optimize existing rules.

3.3 Based on Different Subject of Decision-Making The third major debate in contemporary utilitarianism is who makes the arbitral decisions, i.e., whose perspective is used to judge that an act, rule, or institution maximizes utilitarianism. Critics point out that utilitarianism is more or less paternalistic or paternalistic. According to Jeremy Bentham, the arbitral decision-maker of utilitarianism is the unbiased legislator, for only the legislator can objectively understand the true interests of each individual and arrive at how an individual should act by fairly calculating each individual’s pleasure and pain. However, Jeremy Bentham did not deny the value of individual choice: first, through the invisible hand of the market, individual interests and the overall utility of society can be harmonized, so that in the market sphere, individual choice can automatically produce the maximization of utility.42 Second, Jeremy Bentham believed that not only does the sovereignty of the state belong to the people, but the people should also participate in the operation of sovereignty, and if we compare democracy with monarchy and aristocracy. If we compare democracy with monarchy and aristocracy, we will find that it is easier to maximize utilitarianism in a democracy. Democracy gives the opportunity for individual choice to enter into political decision making and makes it easier to achieve

40

Kymlicka (2002), p. 46. Goodin (1995), p. 3. 42 Reeve (1990), pp. 99–100. 41

84

3 The Fundamental Schools of Contemporary Utilitarianism

the growth of utility. It can be seen that there are both elite and democratic decisionmaking tendencies in Jeremy Bentham’s thought, which form the two contemporary schools of Government House Utilitarianism and choice-utilitarianism respectively.

3.3.1 Government House Utilitarianism Bernard Williams refers to a utilitarian view with an elitist bent as Government House Utilitarianism. This theory makes the utilitarian principle the fundamental principle of moral judgment, but the utilitarian principle is only open to a small number of people. In Government House Utilitarianism, the principle of utilitarianism is held by a small group of social elites, and these utilitarians even want the majority of the people in society to reject the principle of utilitarianism. The situation is similar to that of the British colonial officials and the colonized population. In the view of some British colonial officials in India and other British colonies: the British officials would understand that rights are simply ingenious devices for maximizing utility; the natives would be taught to think of rights as intrinsically justified and inviolable.43 The most extreme utilitarian of Government House Utilitarianism in history was Sidgwick. Sidgwick has argued that rulers in society should govern the state according to utilitarian principles, but that it was not necessary for the many ruled to accept utilitarian principles.44 Sidgwick’s Government House Utilitarianism is undoubtedly elitist in the extreme, and the idea has become obsolete in the face of the historical trend of growing democratic politics. In fact, in the context of contemporary utilitarianism, almost no one fully subscribes to this utilitarian view. In contrast, contemporary utilitarians have developed the utilitarian theory of monopoly of public policy making into the new Government House Utilitarianism, of which Griffin is the representative figure. Griffin distinguishes between utilitarianism as a criterion for formulating public policy and utilitarianism as a criterion for individual action, and calls utilitarianism for formulating public policy criteria Government House Utilitarianism. Government House Utilitarianism states that the particular nature of public policy making makes it necessary for public policy makers to act on some particular type of utilitarianism, but that this utilitarianism cannot be used as a guideline for individual action. Although this school of thought is somewhat free from extreme elitism, it still in fact distinguishes between two groups of members of society: policy makers and the public. As a special type of utilitarianism, Government House Utilitarianism remains only an arbitration standard by which a few public policy makers measure and judge the public policy and actual conduct.

43 44

Kymlicka (2002), p. 31. Robert Goodin, “Government House Utilitarianism”, in Allison (1990), p. 141.

References

85

3.3.2 Choice-Utilitarianism Unlike Government House Utilitarianism, choice-utilitarianism emphasizes that man is the best judge of his own interests.45 According to Brittan, the representative of choice-utilitarianism, the main difference between classical utilitarianism and choice-utilitarianism is that the former seeks to maximize satisfaction, while the latter seeks to maximize choice. Since the individual is the best judge of his or her own interests, the maximization of utilitarianism can be truly achieved only by maximizing human choice. For choice-utilitarianism, “choice is thus apparently replace happiness as the object of maximization, and welfare is not to be measured by happiness”.46 Choice-utilitarianism indeed combines freedom and utilitarianism by merging the terms “choice” and “utilitarianism,” and it changes the paternalism of classical utilitarianism with liberalist theory. However, choice-utilitarianism contains a number of internal contradictions: First, the outcome of a choice does not always advance utility of society as a whole. Ultimately, utilitarianism is measured by the consequence, but choice does not necessarily lead to an increase in utility. Poor decisions can be the result of ignorance, incomplete information, and incorrect decision-making procedures, which eventually lowers the overall level of utility. The decision-making process is also uncontrollable. Theoretically, a person’s preferences are more likely to be satisfied the more choices he or she has. In reality, though, people tend to make mistakes easier with more choices. The increase of choice undoubtedly increases the complexity of the decision-making procedure, and may eventually lead to the decline of utility level.

References Allison L (1990) The utilitarian response: the contemporary viability of utilitarian political philosophy. Sage Publications Amartya Sen (1987) The standard of living. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Arneson R (1990) Liberalism, distributive subjectivism, and equal opportunity for welfare. Philos Public Aff 19(2):158–194 Brandt RB (1979) A theory of the good and the right. Oxford University Press, Oxford Brandt RB (1983) The real & alleged problems of utilitarianism. Hastings Cent Rep 13(2):37–43 Brandt RB (1992) Morality, utilitarianism and rights. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Brandt RB (1996) Facts, values and morality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Colburn B (2011) Autonomy and adaptive preferences. Utilitas 23(1):52–71 Goldsworthy J (1992) Well-being and value. Utilitas 4(1):1–26 Goodin RE (1995) Utilitarianism as a public philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Griffin J (1988) Well-being: its meaning, measurement, and moral importance. Oxford University Press, Oxford Harsanyi JC (1985) Rule utilitarianism, equality, and justice. Soc Philos Policy 2(2):115–127 45 46

Samuel Brittan, “Choice and Utility”, in Allison (1990), p. 78. Reeve (1990), p. 108.

86

3 The Fundamental Schools of Contemporary Utilitarianism

Haslett DW (1990) What is utility? Econ Philos 6(1):65–94 Hausman DM, McPherson MS (1996) Economic analysis and moral philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Hirshleifer J, Glazer A, Hirshleifer D (2005) Price theory and applications: decisions, markets and information. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Hooker B (ed) (1993) Rationality, rules and utility: new essays on the moral philosophy of Richard B. Brandt. Westview Press, Boulder Kymlicka W (2002) Contemporary political philosophy: an introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford Lang G (2004) A dilemma for objective act-utilitarianism. Polit Philos Econ 3(2):221–239 Miller RB (2009) Actual rule utilitarianism. J Philos 106(1):5–28 Morgan T (2007) Understanding utilitarianism. Cromwell Press, Trowbridge Parfit D (1984) Reasons and persons. Clarendon Press, Oxford Reeve A (1990) Individual choice and the retreat from utilitarianism. In: Allison L (ed) The utilitarian response: the contemporary viability of utilitarian political philosophy. Sage Publications, London Robert N (1971) Anarchy, state and Utopia. The Clarendon Press, Cambridge Shuyang L, Puqu W (2017) Analysis of the main schools of contemporary utilitarianism. J Party School Fujian Provincial Committee CPC 11 I Smart JJC (1978) Extreme and restricted utilitarianism. In: Bayles MD (ed) Contemporary utilitarianism. Peter Smith, Gloucester Smart JJ, Williams B (1973) Utilitarianism: for and against. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Shaw WH (1999) Shaw, contemporary ethics: taking account of utilitarianism. Blackwell Publishers, Malden

Chapter 4

The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

“If the wood on the ship of Theseus is gradually replaced until all the wood is not the original wood, will the ship still be the same ship?” (Theseus paradox), and contemporary utilitarianism are also confronted with this problem. In response to the theoretical critique of utilitarianism, contemporary utilitarianism needs to constantly replace the unacceptable parts of classical utilitarianism with new components, and utilitarianism has completed its own theoretical evolution in this very process. Some scholars argues that it is the concessions to the radical ideas of classical utilitarianism that contemporary utilitarianism have constantly made in exchange for the reconciliation of utility principle and moral rules. In the process of theoretical evolution, has contemporary utilitarianism lost its core symbol and fundamental characteristics? In what ways is contemporary utilitarianism different from classical utilitarianism? Is its theoretical reform an effective response to non-utilitarian theoretical critiques? These all are essential issues that must be answered in the study of contemporary utilitarianism.

4.1 The Inheritance of Classical Utilitarianism 4.1.1 The Extension of Consequentialism Consequentialism is a defining feature of utilitarianism, and both classical and contemporary utilitarianism belong to consequentialist theories. Consequentialism, in its simplest form, says that the consequences of an action determine whether it is right or wrong. In general, if a moral theory holds that whether a conduct is morally correct depends only on its consequences, not on the intrinsic nature of the conduct or anything before it occurs, then the theory is a consequentialist moral theory. Consequentialist theories tend to specify some value as the goal to be promoted by moral © Peking University Press 2023 S. Liu, The Contemporary Evolution and Reform of Utilitarianism, Interests Politics Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7363-7_4

87

88

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

action, and the effect of an action on this assigned value is the consequence of the action. Utilitarianism believes that the core of morality and politics is to promote the maximization of social utility and realize the maximum interests of the social community. Utility maximization is the moral end that utilitarianism aims to promote. According to utility maximization, utilitarianism proposes a set of criteria for judging moral validity: conduct that can promote utility maximization is morally justified. Classical utilitarianism belongs to hedonistic consequentialism. Pleasure and pain have a sole intrinsic value, and all other values are subordinate to this highest value. However, classical utilitarians disagreed on the evaluation of consequences, with Bentham and Sidgwick advocating purely quantitative hedonism, and Mill arguing that there was an essential difference in nature between different pleasures. In Bentham’s view, good, benefit, pleasure, profit, and happiness are all the same thing, which can all be referred as happiness, while damage, pain, mischief, and misfortune are the same thing, which can all be reduced to pain, and the ultimate result is the net balance between the two, which is a number. Mill, however, holds that the experience of pleasure not only has differences in quantity, but also has superiority or inferiority in quality, and when measuring happiness, we should not only consider the quantity, but also pay attention to the quality of pleasure. Higher pleasures are better than the lower; mental pleasures are superior to the worldly; complex pleasures are better than the simple, and “it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied”. Sidgwick, on the contrary, argues that the higher pleasure is not really the feeling itself, but the result of a particular kind of action may be psychological or physiological,1 and therefore, that it is unnecessary to lay particular stress on the differences in quality of pleasure in the calculation of consequences. It follows that classical utilitarianism is undoubtedly a consequentialist theory. Is contemporary utilitarianism, which is quite different from classical utilitarianism, also a consequentialist theory? Overall, from the perspective of consequentialism, contemporary utilitarianism differs from classical utilitarianism in two major ways. First, for classical utilitarianism, the goal of an act is to promote value directly, viz., the criterion of moral validity is taken as a decision-making process to guide people’s actions; For contemporary utilitarianism, the goal of an act is often to promote value indirectly, that is, the criterion of moral validity is separated from the decision-making process. The agent acts according to the non-utilitarian goal, which is typically manifested as objective act-utilitarianism. Second, the focus of classical utilitarianism is behavior, which directly takes the consequences of behavior as the criterion for judging the legitimacy of behavior; The focus of contemporary utilitarianism is rules, which requires behaviors to conform to established rules and norms, and only behaviors that meet the rules and norms can foster the improvement of utility. Therefore, this paper answers the question of whether contemporary utilitarianism has consequentialist characteristics by examining objective act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism. Is objective act-utilitarianism a consequentialist theory? The common answer is that objective act-utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory, because consequentialist 1

Sidgwick (1962).

4.1 The Inheritance of Classical Utilitarianism

89

theory only cares about whether the consequences of a conduct is used as the criterion to judge whether the conduct is right or wrong, and does not deal with how individuals act. However, this answer does not reveal the significance of contemporary utilitarianism in indirect promoting overall social utility, and it breaks the unity between moral standards and rules of conduct, making utilitarianism lose its original function of guiding practice. Regarding this, Peter Railton distinguishes between the Subjective consequentialism and the Objective consequentialism, holding that Subjective consequentialism is the view that “whenever one faces a choice of actions, one should attempt to determine which act of those available would most promote the good, and should then try to act accordingly”. Objective consequentialism, on the other hand, is the view that “the criterion of the rightness of an act or course of action is whether it in fact would most promote the good of those acts available to the agent”.2 In other words, objective consequentialism still takes the consequences of actions as the ultimate criterion for moral judgment, but requires that the judgment be made according to the final consequence in the long run. Because what actions to take will maximize a person’s utility is an empirical question. According to the historical experience accumulated by human beings over a long period of time, compliance with daily norms, conventions, or moral rules is more likely to achieve an increase of utility. Meanwhile, objective act-utilitarianism makes up for the influence of restrictive factors such as insufficient time, limited personal rationality, and lack of decisionmaking information in utility calculation, so that the utilitarian principle can be applied to more real environments with more complicated situations. Hare has made it clear that only when their moral rules or moral intuitions conflict, is utility principle needed to decide how individuals should act.3 Therefore, contemporary utilitarianism, which indirectly enhances the level of utility, is still a consequentialist theory, and this theory, to a certain extent, overcomes the theoretical limitations of classical utilitarianism in the calculation of utility. Now that consequentialism does not have to promote a given value in a direct way, following certain rules to maximize the value can also be called a consequentialist theory, namely rule-consequentialism. Rule consequentialism asserts that “an action is correct if and only if: first, it conforms to a set of rules (or one of them); Second, adequate obedience to this set of rules maximizes a specific value than obedience to other rules.” Therefore, rule utilitarianism is also a consequentialist theory. Rule utilitarianism largely avoids critics’ theoretical critique of utilitarianism on the ground of consequentialism characteristics. On the one hand, rule utilitarianism avoids the critique that “the end justifies the means”, that is, an action is justified as long as it leads to a better overall result. Rule utilitarianism maintains that murder, abuse, breach of contract, etc., even if sometimes they can produce greater social total utility than others, are still wrong acts. Rule utilitarianism does not take the consequences of certain individual action as the criterion for justification. On the other hand, rule utilitarianism also avoids self-sacrifice beyond the obligation. According to strict act 2 3

Railton (1984), p. 152. Hare (1981).

90

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

utilitarianism, individuals should be sensitive to the needs of others all the time and make self-sacrifice constantly to maximize the total social utility until such sacrifice is no longer conducive to the total social utility in the long run. Rule utilitarianism avoids this problem by following moral rules that object the demand for excessive sacrifice. On the basis of the above, although contemporary utilitarianism no longer regards utilitarianism as a rule of conduct but only as an evaluation criterion of legitimacy, rules (especially ideal rules) replace acts, coming to the core position of theoretical judgment. However, whether it is indirect-utilitarianism or rule-utilitarianism, the theoretical goal is still the maximization of utility. In other words, people follow the rules because they believe that it will leads to greater social utility. If practice proves that following the rules only brings bad results, rule utilitarians will abandon the rules or make new rules. Thus, contemporary utilitarianism still possesses the theoretical characteristics of consequentialism.

4.1.2 The Continuation of Welfarism Both classical and contemporary utilitarianism are welfarist theories, because they both hold that everything of value is related to individual welfare. Welfarism advocates that only individual welfare has sole intrinsic value, and moral judgment are supposed to depend on the impact of events on individual welfare (utility). Welfarism is also a consequentialist theory, except that it excludes all non-utilitarian consequences in moral measurement, arguing that the core of politics and morality is to make individuals better off. In other words, the maximization of individual interests is the core goal of welfarism,4 and the ultimate moral result depends on the influence of events on individual interests. Classical utilitarianism is a welfarist theory and adheres to a substantive welfare view, which champions that for individuals, pleasure or happiness has the sole intrinsic value.5 Everything that has intrinsic value is associated with pleasure or happiness, either as a component of pleasure or happiness or as a means to achieve it. For classical utilitarianism, the maximization of individual happiness is the maximization of individual real interests. However, classical utilitarianism pursues the goal of maximizing the total social utility, and as a theory of welfarism, classical utilitarianism needs to answer whether individual welfare will be improved in the pursuit of general happiness. Although many critics argue that there is a contradiction between general happiness and individual happiness it is even possible to sacrifice individual happiness of some people in order to achieve general happiness. However, according to classical utilitarians and supporters of classical utilitarianism, the utility maximization pursued by classical utilitarianism does not exclude the consideration of the utility 4 5

Keller (2009), p. 82. Hausman and McPherson (1996), pp. 72–73.

4.1 The Inheritance of Classical Utilitarianism

91

changes of individuals and utilitarianism ultimately demands the growth of individual welfare. In contemporary theoretical research on Bentham, some scholars believe that in the view of Bentham, the promotion of individual utility is one of the goals to maximize total utility. On the one hand, the total utility of society is equal to the sum of individual utility, the interests of the community are the sum of the interests of certain members of the community, and individual utility or happiness is the basis of Bentham’s utilitarianism theory. On the other hand, the maximization of social total utility is the maximization of social universal interest, that is, the maximization of interests shared by all individuals in the community. Postema argues that Bentham divided individual interests into two sets: universal interests and special interests. The former is the collection of individual interests owned by all members in the community, which namely is the collection of the same parts of individual interests of all members in the community. The latter is the collection of the special interests of all community members. The maximization of social utility promotes the maximization of the universal interests shared by the members of society. Therefore, although there is a general interpersonal conflict of interest within the community, and it is inevitable that some people’s interests may be damaged while others’ interests may be increased, “no individual’s interest may be excluded from the universal interest” and the promotion of total utility will inevitably promote the growth of the part of universal interest in individual interests.6 According to this interpretation, classical utilitarianism can also justify itself within the theory of welfarism. Contemporary utilitarianism is also a welfarist theory, which believes that moral results depend on the change of individual utility. In the meantime, contemporary utilitarianism makes utilitarianism much closer to an individual’s real interests by revising the concept of “utility”. For what is welfare, there are two types of understanding within contemporary utilitarianism: First, welfare is the experience of happiness; Second, welfare is the satisfaction of preferences. The former belongs to the theory of substantive welfare, same with classical utilitarianism, holding that happiness has the sole intrinsic value. The latter belongs to the theory of formal welfare, which specify how to find out what things are intrinsically good but does not say what those things are. “To maintain that welfare is the satisfaction of preferences is to offer a formal theory of well-being. This theory does not say what things are good for individuals. Instead, it says how to find out: by seeing what people prefer.”7 In political science, “welfare” is generally depicted and explained through the concept of preference satisfaction. On the one hand, this explanation contains less philosophical analysis, reducing the theoretical debate over the concept of “welfare” itself; On the other hand, preference satisfaction can accommodate pluralistic value theory, with “welfare” accommodating more items related to people’s interests. In fact, substantial welfare theory and formal welfare theory are not opposites, and the two are compatible to a large extent. In contemporary utilitarian theory, there is often a fusion between the theory of happy experience and preference satisfaction. 6 7

Postema (2006), p. 117. Hausman and McPherson (1996), p. 72.

92

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

However, the formal welfare theory faces a serious criticism, namely that satisfying human preferences does not properly reflect the value of human welfare.8 On the one hand, individuals may develop false preferences based on wrong ideas, that is, I think that what I desire can promote my personal interests, but in fact what I desire does not improve my well-being; Preferences, on the other hand, are highly malleable and people’s preferences can be changed through indoctrination, manipulation, social control, and some other behaviors. One person exerts power over another either by enforcing his or her will or by shaping the desires of another through manipulation.9 In reality, advertising creates new desires and demands of consumers by means such as information control and mass media. A new consumption hotspot emerges perhaps not due to the fact that merchants have discovered new desires of consumers, but have shaped new desires through various forms. Thus, as critics argue, the existence of adaptive preferences is a serious problem for utilitarianism, which can deviate utilitarianism from its welfarist nature. Adaptive preferences break the connection between what one desires and what one actually benefits. Observing one’s preferences is not an effective way to discover and promote one’s welfare. As Isaiah Berlin remarks: “If degrees of freedom were a function of the satisfaction of desires, I could increase freedom as effectively by eliminating desires as by satisfying them: I could render men (including myself) free by conditioning them into losing the original desires which I have decided not to satisfy.”10 In order to defend the characteristics of welfarism, contemporary utilitarianism has revised the formal welfare theory: welfare is not to satisfy the actual preferences of the individual, but to satisfy the rational preferences of the individual, that is, to look rationally at what a person prefers in the principle of prudence. Justified preferences require individuals to consider what they desire from a rational, holistic and comprehensive perspective. Contemporary utilitarianism believes that justified preferences can exclude the influence of wrong preferences and adaptive preferences, so that contemporary utilitarianism maintains the characteristics of welfarism.

4.1.3 The Inheritance of Aggregation Aggregation is also a fundamental feature of utilitarian theory. Both classical and contemporary utilitarianism takes the form of combining the luck and misfortune, gain and loss, profit and damage of different individuals, to judges the utility value generated by different behaviors. Aggregation is characterized by a basic doctrine adhered to by both classical and contemporary utilitarianism, and almost all utilitarians hold that it is self-evident to weigh interests in the way of aggregation as a whole. As Hare puts it, an equal focus on the interests of each individual necessarily leads us to weigh together the different interests of different individuals “in the way 8

Sen (2004), pp. 45–46. Lukes (1974), p. 23. 10 Berlin (2002), p. 31. 9

4.1 The Inheritance of Classical Utilitarianism

93

in which a single thoroughly rational egoist would weigh together all his own desires or satisfactions. To do this is not to fail to insist on the separateness of persons.11 Contemporary utilitarians maintains that utilitarianism is not fundamentally different from many theories that claim to have the characteristics of non-aggregation. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the theoretical difference between aggregation and non-aggregation, so as to explain whether the aggregation feature of contemporary utilitarianism has overcome the problem of ignoring individual independence. The so-called aggregation is the aggregation of different morally relevant parameter values into a single value in order to determine the comparative relationship between multiple events. Interpersonal aggregation is to combine the morally relevant parameters of different individuals—such as welfare, happiness, demands, loss, pain, etc.—into a utility function, and the increase of the value of one parameter will inevitably lead to an increase in the overall result. Namely, if all the other conditions remain unchanged, the increase in any welfare of any member of the community will lead to the increase of the total welfare of the community. Interpersonal aggregation of interests is the exchange of gains and losses among members of the community, that is, through the gain of one person to compensate for the loss of another. According to the moral principles of aggregation, the increase of interests is morally justified because everyone has the same moral value for his gain and loss. In the view of utilitarianism, the theory of aggregation is quite practical, especially suitable for dealing with interpersonal conflicts of interest, because if an alternative solution promotes the interests of some people while no one harms, then the solution will definitely be chosen, and there is even not a need to resort to moral principles.12 Interpersonal aggregation contains three basic characteristics: interpersonal comparability, impartiality and Pareto. First, interpersonal comparability, i.e., the parameters of moral relevance that one person has are comparable with those of others. Interpersonal comparability is the theoretical premise of utilitarian aggregation. Take the reef rescue for an instance: Six innocent swimmers are trapped by rising tides on two reefs, with five swimmers on one reef and one swimmer on the other. If there is only one lifeguard and there is only enough time left for the patrol boat to get to a rock and save the people on it, how should the lifeguard choose? The different answers to this case can, to some extent, reveal different perceptions of interpersonal comparability in different theories. Utilitarians argue that the lifeguarded should go to the reef with five trapped people, because the utility value of five people aggregated is far exceeds the utility value of one person, and thus it is justified to save five people in a limited time. Opponents, however, argue that there is no difference of moral relevance among the six swimmers, that each person’s life should be viewed from an equal perspective, that the loss of five lives is no worse than the death of one person, and that the direction of rescue should be decided by flipping a coin. In other words, it should be ensured that everyone has the same chance to survive.13 In fact, utilitarianism does 11

Hare (1996). Hirose (2013), p. 185. 13 Taurek (1977). 12

94

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

not deny that all six human lives have the same moral value, but when we choose to drive a rescue ship to a certain reef, we also foresee the consequences of this action. Since whatever we do will have an impact on the situation, utilitarianism proposes that the fewer people harmed within the foreseeable range, the better.14 Second, impartiality, that is, evaluating consequences from a neutral perspective. Impartiality is a fundamental feature of aggregation, and only by adhering to an impartial perspective can the results of aggregation meet the requirements of justification. As Smart remarks, the utilitarian principle is the expression of universal sympathy, and there is no moral difference between the happiness of one person and that of another.15 For example, in A community composed of two people A and B, if an action may lead to two consequences: X = (A loses an arm; B does not lose an arm); Y = (A does not lose an arm; B loses an arm). For utilitarianism, there is no moral difference between X and Y, and X and Y should be dealt with equally. Third, Pareto, which refers to that, moral judgments need to keep sensitive to utility improvement. In any case, the promotion of utility poses a positive effect. A more accurate formulation is if ai * > ai , then ƒ(a1 ,… ai * ,…an ) > ƒ(a1 ,…ai , …an ). If the principle of aggregation is compared with the principle of non-aggregation, the real differences between the two can be found. For example, Rawls’ difference principle is the principle of non-aggregation. The difference principle, on the contrary, argues that the sum of transfers and benefits from essential public goods should be arranged so as to enhance the expectations of the least advantaged while it is consistent with the required savings and the maintenance of equal liberties.16 That is to say, just distribution should take full account of the interests of the least advantaged and maximize the benefits of the least advantaged. Rawls’s difference principle is a maximum-minimum principle: Suppose there are two social distribution plans X and Y, X = (W1 , W2 ,…Wi , …Wn ),Y = (W1 * , W2 * ,…Wi * , …Wn * ). Wi represents individual welfare, and only when min ( W1 , W2 ,…Wi , …Wn ) min (W1 * , W2 * ,…Wi * , …Wn * ), can plan X be considered at least as good as Y. The reason why make comparisons between difference principle and the utility principle is that the principle of difference is a typical non-aggregation principle, while the utility principle is a typical aggregation principle. Moreover, the two have great similarities in the setting of basic conditions: both consider themselves to be the basic principles of social system and the operating principles of a just society chosen by rational individuals after abandoning self-interest and prejudice. The core differences between aggregation theory and non-aggregation theory can be clearly identified by comparing the two theories, making it possible to further answer the question of whether characteristics of aggregation will really cause utilitarianism to ignore individual separateness and fail to protect people’s basic rights in the true sense of it. First, the difference principle does not object comparability between people. According to the definition of the difference principle, assuming that in a society of 14

Kamm (1992). Smart (1991). 16 Rawls (1999), p. 304. 15

4.1 The Inheritance of Classical Utilitarianism

95

only two people, the social distributive plan X = (10, 15) and the distributive plan Y = (11, 13), in the absence of any other restrictions, utilitarianism would consider scheme X to be better while the difference principle would consider plan Y better. However, whether supporting X or Y, both principles admit that it is comparable between people, both approaches recognize that interests can be weighed between people. The difference lies in that the two theories support different ways of comparing interpersonal interests. In other words, the difference principle does not believe that it is wrong to weigh interests among people, but what it objects is taking the sum of values as the criterion for weighing interests. Secondly, the principle of difference is also characterized by impartiality, and there is no contradiction between respect for individual independence and the demand for impartiality. What Rawls creates through the “veil of ignorance”17 is the primary environment in which individuals can make impartial moral judgments. An impartial and neutral perspective is the basic position necessary for all moral judgments, and only in an impartial state can the influence of many social contingency factors be eliminated to ensure the choices are rational and objective. It can be said that the impartial perspective is exactly the prerequisite for rational individual to choose difference principle. Third, the difference principle does not support the Pareto principle, which is the only difference between the utility principle and the difference principle. There are three cases of the Pareto principle: Pareto improvement, Pareto-inferior, and Pareto-incomparable. (1) Pareto improvement, i.e., state X is better than state Y, if and only if at least one person is better than Y in state X and no one is better than X in state Y. (2) Pareto-inferior, if X for Y is a Pareto improvement, then Y for X is a Pareto-inferior. (3) Pareto-incomparable, that is, at least one person is better than Y in the state of X, and at least one person is better than X in the state of Y. Aggregation is the principle to address interpersonal conflicts of interest, that is, aggregation is mainly applied to situations of Pareto-incomparable. The difference principle argues that it is precisely because of its support of Pareto principle that utilitarianism agrees to compensate for the losses of one person with the gains of the other in the social distribution, thus fundamentally ignoring the separateness of individuals. The Pareto principle neglects a fundamental criterion in social distribution: sacrifice without compensation is unacceptable. Because each person is an independent individual, and each person’s life has an independent meaning, sacrifice is acceptable only if the individual is sure that a sacrifice can be compensated in some way, in the same amount at some other moments. If a sacrifice is enforced on an individual without compensation, it is the exploitation and coercion of the individual. On the premise of non-compensation, independent individuals have the right 17

The veil of ignorance is a thought experiment designed by Rawls to exclude the influence of some accidental factors. Under the veil of ignorance, individuals do not know their social status, class origin, natural endowments, and personal abilities; do not know their own concept of goodness and psychological characteristics such as whether or not to take risks; do not know the special environment and civilization of their own society. The individual knows only that society is governed by just circumstances and whatever that means. See Rawls: A Theory of Justice, pp. 136–142.

96

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

to reject any form of weighing of interests.18 Therefore, many opponents argues that the aggregation feature of utilitarianism makes it unable to meet the moral requirement of “compensation for sacrifice” when dealing with interpersonal conflicts of interest, and consequently unable to respect the independence of individuals in social distribution. In this regard, Contemporary utilitarianism does not share this perception. Contemporary utilitarianism argues that all of the distributive justices cannot satisfy the principle of “compensation for sacrifice” in a full sense, and the legitimacy of this theory as a theory of social distribution cannot be denied by saying that utilitarianism cannot compensate for sacrifice. Classical utilitarianism’s ignoring individual independence stems not from it cannot meet the moral requirement of compensating for sacrifice, but from the sacrifice is not the result of the rational consent of individuals and classical utilitarianism enforces social distribution based solely on the total value of utility. Contemporary utilitarianism revises the aggregation theory of classical utilitarianism, taking consent of individuals as the premise of aggregation, so that the aggregation characteristics of utilitarianism are no longer opposed to the maintenance of human independence. In the following part of this book, the author will illustrate the theoretical refutation of contemporary utilitarianism and explain how it achieves compatibility between the aggregation feature and respect for individual independence through contract theory in detail.

4.1.4 The Reaffirmation of Impartiality In terms of consequence evaluation, all utilitarian theories uphold a universal view: when evaluating the moral justification of a conduct, we must consider not only the impact of it on ourselves, but also the impact on others, which means we should adopt a holistic and impartial perspective. The evaluation criterion of utilitarianism is not egoism but universalism, all living individuals affected by behavior (not only human beings) need to be included in the category of equal consideration, and the harm and benefits of any affected one have the same moral status in the view of utilitarianism. The moral tradition of impartiality of utilitarianism can be traced back to Adam Smith’s perspective of “Sympathy and the impartial spectator”, which Bentham interprets as “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”.19 Utilitarianism argues that in the social environment, it is easy to be influenced by emotions when evaluating consequences only from one’s own perspective. If consequence assessment is to be based on a fair and just stand, the perspective of an impartial observer must be adopted. Classical utilitarianism deals with interpersonal conflicts of interest from the perspective of “ideal spectator”. The ideal spectator is usually able to fully perceive the interests of all parties and make an impartial judgment that best serves the public 18 19

Brink (1993). Mill (2009), p. 112.

4.1 The Inheritance of Classical Utilitarianism

97

interest. For example, in Bentham’s theory, the legislator is required to deal with the interests of all in a neutral and fair manner, and in the legislator’s view, the happiness of the poorest and powerless was as important as that of the richest and most powerful. Sidgwick also argues that utilitarianism promises an impartial view that one’s own happiness is no different from others’ happiness, and that what is morally right is to treat the interests of all people fairly from the perspective of an ideal spectator, to maximize the total welfare of society. Contemporary utilitarianism inherits the characteristics of impartiality in consequence assessment, and with the help of the theoretical content of modern philosophy, perfects the perspective of “ideal observer” and realizes the moral requirements of impartiality in a more refined and sophisticated form. First, to achieve impartiality through the generalization of individual positions. This idea comes from Kant, who argues that moral rules can be distinguished from other rules of conduct by relevant formal principles, especially the principle of generalization.20 Regarding the content of morality, Kant’s principle of generalization expresses the idea of reciprocity, “to treat others the way you would expect them to treat you.” In its simplest form, the utilitarian principle of generalization states that a person can do conduct A when and only when everyone is in a similar situation, doing A will produce a predictable result of maximizing the overall utility. In fact, many utilitarian theories, beginning with Mill, have met Kant’s requirement that the theory should be universalization, and thus guaranteed impartiality in the evaluation of consequences. In the theory of contemporary utilitarianism, Hare achieves impartiality by means of transpositional experiments. Suppose that there are two given choices between conduct A and action B, I would carefully imagine that I might occupy the social position of each person affected by my conduct. My choice of A is justified when and only when each individual affected by my conduct can achieve a greater preference satisfaction in choosing A than in choosing B.21 In fact, Hare’s transposition experiment is the combination of “ideal observer” and “sympathy”. Through the experiment of arbitrary transposition between individuals and others, Hare ensures the impartiality of individuals in the evaluation of consequences. Singer fulfils the demand of impartiality in another way of generalization. “If everyone were to do X, the consequences would be disastrous (or undesirable), meanwhile the consequences of no one doing X would be desirable, therefore no one ought to do that.”22 Singer also obtains a fair and objective perspective of judgment through the generalization of self-interest position. Since self-interest is the most fundamental moral position of an individual, then, if I want others to treat my desires justly, I need to treat others’ desires justly. Gruzalski further argues that how can a conduct be judged to be wrong?

20

John C. Harsanyi, “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior”, Social Research, Vol. 44, No. 4, p. 624. 21 Hare (1989). 22 Singer (1971), p. 73.

98

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

When and only when each individual does the act, the corresponding value generated is less than the corresponding value generated by doing other acts.23 Second, to achieve impartiality in a form similar to the “veil of ignorance”. As can be seen from the above, although Rawls opposes utilitarianism to realize utility maximization in the way of aggregation, Rawls does not oppose taking an impartial objective position in the process of aggregation. In fact, Rawls’s veil of ignorance is designed to ensure that individuals can have an impartial and objective position in choosing the principles of justice. In contemporary utilitarian theory, Harsanyi adopts a similar form. When individuals make moral judgments, Harsanyi demands the assumption that any individual will be in any position in society with the same probability, making best efforts to eliminate the interference of information unrelated to morality (such as people’s gender, race, social status, property, etc.) on personal moral judgments, and preventing personal bias from entering utility calculation. For example, if someone is asked to choose between two social systems—capitalist and socialist—one must first shield himself from morally unrelated factors, assuming that he will be in either position in either of the two societies with equal probability, so that he can choose the social system that maximizes the expected utility in an impartial state.24 Thus, it is clear that contemporary utilitarianism has not abandoned the core characteristics of utilitarian theory, but instead, it aims to perfect the theoretical pursuit of utilitarianism in a new way.

4.2 The Evolution of Utilitarianism Common Features 4.2.1 The Integration of Utility and Right Critics of utilitarianism argue that the consequentialist character of utilitarianism makes it difficult to integrate with the theory of rights. In this regard, contemporary utilitarianism refutes the critics’ opinions, and in the theoretical reform, completes the utilitarian evaluation of the consequences of behavior in an indirect way, and realizes the organic combination of utility principle and right principle. Contemporary utilitarianism believes that this theory is fully capable of incorporating rights into the theoretical framework of utilitarianism and that utilitarianism can provide a utilitarian explanation of moral rights. In fact, utilitarians never consider that their theories will conflict with individual rights, nor do they consider that utilitarianism is to be an anti-rights theory. Utilitarianism holds that rights are the basic interests of human beings and that the serious consequences of infringing rights cannot be reconciled by other types of 23

Brandt (1979), p. 278. John C. Harsanyi, “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior”, Social Research, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp.623–656.

24

4.2 The Evolution of Utilitarianism Common Features

99

positive values. The infringement of rights, especially the infringement of fundamental human rights, will cause huge negative effects that cannot be compensated for by any other type of gain. A typical explanation is that the negative value generated by infringement is not of the same magnitude as the value generated by other acts. If it is expressed in a graph, then the negative utility of the infringement of rights is a line segment, while the utility of other acts is points; Even though others can benefit from the infringement of rights, the amount of gains can never outweigh the negative effects of the infringement. For example, in the case of killing innocent people in exchange for good social order, the infringement of the right to life by the law enforcement, once exposed, would lead to a fundamental distrust of the system among all members of the community, which would result in more serious disasters. Thus, utilitarians defend themselves by saying that utilitarianism can never lead to infringement of rights. However, this defense does not make the critics satisfied. In fact, the core of the criticism of consequentialist characteristics by anti-utilitarians lies in the fact that the justification of behavior cannot be judged solely on whether it has promoted individual welfare. The fact that a conduct can enhance the total utility of society cannot reasonably deduce the legitimacy of the conduct. The utility reason—promoting the well-being of individuals—is a defensible moral reason, but not the sole one. Because some rights are thought to exist independently of social recognition and enforcement, which is what we usually mean by “moral rights.” Moral rights are independent of particular environments and do not depend on any special conditions, and “moral rights, in general, do not depend on social recognition or enforcement, as is shown by the fact that they are appealed to even when it is not believed that they are enforced or recognized by law or by prevailing opinion”.25 There are many types of moral rights, ranging from special rights arising from special relationships, such as the rights of creditors to the debtor, to general rights, such as the right to life, liberty, property, etc. There is a certain tension between moral right and utilitarian principle. Arguments for moral rights need not appeal to their consequences. For example, the right to freedom of expression means that a person’s actions should be free from interference even if the direct consequences of freely expressing their ideas would undermine the maximization of the general welfare. In this regard, critics argue that utilitarianism can only be combined with legal rights, and that what the individual can have as a means and an intermediary of utility maximization is only the smallest part of rights, and rights are subordinate to utility maximization.26 If so, there is a contradiction between utilitarianism and moral rights. “Rights” are only regarded as tools for promoting welfare from the perspective of utilitarianism, and then utilitarianism fails to take rights seriously. However, contemporary utilitarianism contends that the criticism that utilitarianism pay little attention to moral rights does not apply to contemporary utilitarianism,27 and the consequentialist characteristics are not irreconcilable with moral 25

Lyons (1982). McCloskey (1985). 27 Hare (1989), p. 96. 26

100

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

rights. In fact, the core of whether utilitarianism and moral rights can be reconciled lies in whether rights can be endowed with an independent status within utilitarian theory, that is, whether utilitarianism can ensure that rights themselves can evaluate the legitimacy of behaviors. Frey argues that contemporary utilitarianism achieves this goal through the strategy of separating consequentialist characteristics from individual rights.28

4.2.1.1

Accommodating Moral Rights with Indirect Utilitarianism

Hare’s two-level utilitarianism is the most typical representative of this approach, and also provides a good demonstration for the combination of utilitarianism and moral rights. Hare distinguishes between two levels of moral thinking: intuitive level and critical level. The intuitive level is the practical and operational level, which belongs to the lower level. On the intuitive level, the agent directly uses the general moral rules and principles to guide his actions. Due to the lack of time and energy, insufficient information, and weaknesses in human nature, appealing to general rules is more effective than direct utility calculations. Hare maintains that the concept of rights and obligations belongs to the intuitive level and guides individual’s specific actions at the intuitive level.29 Right offers evaluation and judgment criteria for most individual actions. In the intuitive level of moral thinking, the utility principle does not interfere with the operation of the principle of rights. Therefore, the principle of rights has obtained an independent position in the theoretical logic of utilitarianism. However, the principle of intuition is not self-evident, and the conflict between intuitions cannot be resolved by appealing to intuition. When faced with the situation where I should do A and I also should do B, but I can’t do A and B at the same time, I can solve it only by resorting to the critical level. The critical level is a high level of judging the conflict of intuitions, determining which rules and principles can be adopted preferentially when intuitive conflicts occur. Utilitarianism only operates on the critical level. In virtue of sufficient information and an impartial neutral attitude, utilitarianism prudently compares the moral principles behind different intuitions, takes the expected utility value achieved by different moral principles as the basis for ranking different moral principles, and makes it the ultimate criterion for individual actions. For example, when the right to free speech conflicts with the right of minorities should be treated equally, it can only be resolved by resorting to the critical level, with utility as the basis for determining which rights have priority. While there are many critiques of Hare’s efforts to embrace rights theory through a stratification strategy, even Mackie, a challenger to Hare’s theory of rights, admits that there is no difference between Hare and other rights theorists who in wanting rights to be recognized and to be regarded as useful elements of moral norms in individual actions.30 This statement actually affirms the independent status of rights in Hare’s 28

Frey (1985). R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Methods, and Point, pp. 147-167. 30 Mackie (1996), p. 69. 29

4.2 The Evolution of Utilitarianism Common Features

101

theory. In fact, as for intuitive level, Hare’s attitude towards rights is no different from that of normal advocators of rights. In the sphere of rights, there will be certain rights which we are sure that we and other people have, and we shall treat these rights, in Ronald Dworkin’s word, as ‘trumps’. We share Hampshire’s feelings of ‘outrage of shock’ when we see our rights infringed. There is no difference between utilitarians behaving on an intuitive level and ordinary intuitionists.31 It can be seen that through stratification strategy, Hare’s two-level utilitarianism has already endowed “rights” with independent status and space. On the issue of rights, the difference between utilitarians and rights theorists lies in that the rights theorists believe that the intuition they appeal to is self-evident, and the principle of rights not only needs to be applied to the intuitive level, but also need to replace the utility principle on the critical level.32 Utilitarians believe that the principle of rights appealed to is not self-evident, which can also be cast doubt on, and that in the face of conflicts between rights principles, only by resorting to other principles can the problem be solved. For example, there is a conflict between freedom and equality. The right to freedom of speech, the right to dispose of personal property freely, may infringe the right of others to be treated equally. Then, when freedom and equality conflict, appealing to intuitive proof can only be caught in a circular reasoning. Utilitarians further argues that there are no absolute rights, even though the right to life does not automatically justify its absolute justification in any course of action, or absolutely deny the justification of being taken by others. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that utilitarianism does not take rights seriously just because there are some cases within utilitarianism in which the principle of rights is denied by the principle of utility. In his theoretical design, Hare supplements his utility principle with a formal principle of rights—treating each individual’s interests equally or treating the same interests in the same way. On the one hand, this principle does not determine what a person has the right to do or what he has the right to have in a particular situation,33 but only calls for giving equal weight to the same interests of different individuals in moral thinking. In other words, it is necessary to treat everyone’s interests impartially and exclude the interference of irrelevant factors in equal treatment. On the other hand, equal treatment can be built on the formal basis of moral concepts. According to Hare’s universalism, this form requires that the interests of each stakeholder should be treated as if they were his own. As mentioned above, Hare uses an arbitrary transposition experiment to ensure that the parties can treat everyone’s interests prudently in order to realize the emphasis of rights theory that “everyone should have a fair go”.34

31

R. M. Hare, “Arguing about Rights”, in Essays on Political Morality, p. 109. Mackie (1996), p. 70. 33 R. M. Hare, “Arguing about Rights”, in Essays on Political Morality, p. 110. 34 Mackie (1996), p. 53. 32

102

4.2.1.2

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

Accommodates Moral Rights with Rule Utilitarianism

Rule utilitarianism adopts another strategy to achieve the separation of consequentialism and rights, thus realizing the combination of utilitarianism and moral rights. How to decide a moral principle is desirable? How do you decide that a moral principle is worth pursuing? Rule utilitarianism holds that if and only if the moral principle is unanimously obeyed by all members of society, and no other moral principles can produce a greater predictable utility, in everyday life, then, individuals only need to act in accordance with the moral principle and do not have to make utility calculations. In other words, when a person’s moral code requires him to do A, if and only if (1) he has strong, normally overriding motivation to perform acts of the type A for no further reason and especially reason of self-interest, (2) he tends to feel guilty if he fails to do A without justification or excuse, (3) he tends to think less of others not (spontaneously) motivated to perform acts of the type A up to a standard level, and (4) he thinks all the foregoing dispositions on his part are justified in some appropriate way.35 Rule utilitarianism contends that there is no discordance between the utility principle and moral rights, and moral rights and corresponding moral obligations constitute the basic norms that individuals should follow in their daily behaviors. Similar to the stratification theory, rule utilitarianism also enhances the complexity of utilitarian theory, so that consequentialism characteristics and rights theory function independently at different levels. Rule-utilitarians argues that their theory attaches much importance to rights no less than rights theorists do, because an act is exactly judged by whether it conforms to the rules, and the most desirable moral principle for society is respect for individual rights. If Mary rents a house with a garage and acquires the right to use the private driveway through the garage, then Mary has the right to use the lane freely and that right is also morally defensible. In other words, Mary exercises the right without regard to whether her actions can maximize the utility; Others who violates Mary’s rights simply for their own convenience will have a duty to apologize and make appropriate compensation. As Hooker argues, rule-utilitarianism does not conflict with considered moral rules, because utility principle does not work here. How do rights and utility relate? Rule utilitarianism holds the view that the principle of utility only works when people choose moral rules to follow, that is to say, the moral rules most desirable to the society are selected according to the principle of utility. First, the utility principle provides a way to find out what rights individuals have. People determine whether it would maximize long-range expectable utility to include recognition of certain rights in the moral code of a society, or to include a certain right with a certain degree of stringency as compared with other rights.36 For example, when the right to life conflicts with the right to liberty, it is necessary to resort to utility principles to rank the stringency of rights. Second, the utility principle provides a way to protect individual rights. Under the utility maximization moral system, the protection of the right to life will require individuals to 35 36

Brandt (1992), p. 199. Brandt (1992), p. 199.

4.2 The Evolution of Utilitarianism Common Features

103

avoid infringing on the life of others, provide active medical security to protect life, restrict abortion and euthanasia, and restrict the killing of prisoners of war, and so on. Rule utilitarianism, however, believes that rule utilitarianism beats Ross-style intuitionist deontology: on the one hand, rule utilitarianism does no worse than intuitionism in dealing with conflicts between our considered moral judgments in our daily life; On the other hand, rule utilitarianism provide a principle to explain and justify our considered particular moral judgments, “whereas intuitionism in the end presents morality as a motley heap of unconnected judgments”.37 Rule utilitarianism proves itself superior to absolutist deontology that assert that there are some things we absolutely must do, whatever the consequences, which may offend many of our most strongly held moral convictions.38 However, within rule utilitarianism, there is still a deep conflict between utilitarianism and rights, as critics say, rule utilitarianism can easily transform into act utilitarianism. Although rule utilitarianism endows rights with space for independent operation, whether a right is accepted by social moral rules and the boundary of each right is determined according to the principle of utility. Critics argue that if the infringer of the right confirms that the violation of a moral right will necessarily lead to an increase in total utility, it becomes highly questionable whether ruleutilitarianism allows the infringement to occur. Moreover, rule utilitarianism itself reserves “exception clauses” according to utility principle. In the case of previous mentioned Mary’s Lane, rule utilitarianism holds that Mary’s right to freely use the lane is not absolute, and that rescue vehicles can occupy Mary’s lane in emergency even if Mary strongly opposes, and other vehicles also can be justified in occupying Mary’s lane in an emergency. Then, if Mary’s neighbor makes sure that his unauthorized occupation of Mary’s lane will produce greater social utility, does the neighbor also have the legitimacy to use Mary’s lane? Does this mean that rule utilitarianism eventually degenerates into act utilitarianism? Scheffler also argues in his evaluation of rule consequentialism that rule-consequentialism is a variant of act consequentialism that shares the same characteristics with act consequentialism, that is, a non-agent-relative principle for ranking overall states of affairs from best to worst,39 while the end of morality is to strive to achieve the best state of affairs. In this way, not only will the main advantages of rule utilitarianism disappear, but the claim that rule utilitarianism can accommodate moral rights will also become a false proposition. Hooke argues that the above critique does not hold the water and rule utilitarianism does not have such problems. Rule utilitarianism usually judges rules separately from act: rules are judged according to their generally accepted consequences; act is judged on whether it complies with the rules. Rule utilitarianism itself should be measured by the overall degree of conformity with the prudent judgment we make in the balance of reflection, so that there will be no degeneration of rule utilitarianism into act utilitarianism. In addition, rule utilitarians assert that Hume made this situation 37

Arneson (2005), p. 237. Arneson (2005), p. 237. 39 S. Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, p. 2. 38

104

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

clear. Hume made it clear that in fact there are many cases where breaking the rules brings greater social utility than obeying the rules, for example, breaking inheritance rights may create greater social total effects, but absolute obedience to the rules of justice is still very necessary. Justice is like an arch. If one brick is pulled out of it, the whole building may collapse with a bang. Even if rules do not always produce utility maximization results, it is necessary to obey the rules, and even a single violation of the principle of justice can cause great harm. Brandt prevents the degradation of rule utilitarianism by introducing an element of “cooperation”. Brandt argues that a thoughtful utilitarian will consider not only how individuals can act to produce utility maximization, but also how people can act in a cooperative state to produce utility maximization, and then rational individuals will forgo “expedient” act (such as the act of the neighbor in occupying Mary’s lane) and choose the actions dictated by moral rules. “An act is wrong if and only if it the overwhelming majority of everyone everywhere in each new generation’ has maximum expected value in terms of wellbeing.”40 In this way, within rule utilitarianism, rights have independent intrinsic value, and rule utilitarianism can realize the coordination and unity of the principle of utility and the principle of rights.

4.2.2 The Substitution of Objective Welfare for Subjective Welfare In general, contemporary utilitarianism encompasses two types of utilitarian concepts: the theory of happiness experience and the theory of preference satisfaction. The theory of happiness experience holds that the real interests of people lie in obtaining the maximum experience of happiness. The theory of preference satisfaction holds that the real interests of people lie in satisfying actual desires of individuals to the greatest extent. Happiness experience is a substantive welfare view, and preference satisfaction is a formal welfare view. Unlike classical utilitarianism, contemporary utilitarianism emphasizes that utilitarianism must include evaluative factors. The principle of happiness maximization or maximum satisfaction of preferences adhered to by utilitarianism needs always to be consistent with the actual well-being of individuals. Therefore, contemporary utilitarianism calls for the replacement of subjective welfare with objective welfare.

4.2.2.1

Objective Happiness Theory

The objective happiness theory is an objectified revision of the utilitarian concept by contemporary utilitarian scholars who persist in the theory of happiness experience, aiming to make the utilitarian concept consistent with individual welfare. On the one hand, objective happiness theory inherits the tradition of classical happiness 40

Hooker (2000), p. 32.

4.2 The Evolution of Utilitarianism Common Features

105

experience theory, that is, welfare is a valuable psychological experience which contributes to pleasure feelings; On the other hand, the objective happiness theory corrects the theoretical defects of the classical happiness theory, with the happiness experience leading people to the improvement of welfare. As Sumner notes, the only way for the concept of utility and individual welfare (interests) to have an identity, is to adopt an objectified theory of true happiness. Objective happiness is the striving direction of contemporary utilitarians to revise the classical view of utilitarianism. In the process of objectification, contemporary utilitarianism has evolved a series of theoretical achievements. The reason for seeking objectified happiness is that contemporary utilitarianism has found that happiness and welfare are not the same thing,41 and building utilitarianism theory on purely subjective experiences of happiness may not be conducive to the improvement of individual welfare. Nozick’s illustration of the “experience machine” poses the most serious challenge to utilitarian theories built on purely subjective heart rhythm experience. As Griffin puts it, the example of the “experience machine” points to the most serious error of classical happiness experience, which fails to make an effective choice between reality and illusion. If a person cherishes an experience of happiness and considers it an important part of his or her personal well-being, but this psychological experience is merely an illusion or the result of electrodes, then his or her life is no doubt morally absurd. Meanwhile, when an individual is faced with a more comfortable state of hallucination and a bitter reality, classical experientialism will not lead the individual back to reality, but will believe that the state of indulging in illusion is happier. For example, when teenagers are obsessed with online games and give up their studies, according to the classical view of happiness, addiction to the Internet world will generate greater happiness than forced learning, bringing a higher utility level. Therefore, utilitarianism will believe that teenagers should play online games every day rather than restrain themselves to study hard. This conclusion is clearly contrary to the actual welfare of the individual. Therefore, contemporary utilitarianism argues that judging the welfare of individuals only by their subjective experience only illustrates one dimension of life value. A valuable life contains not only psychological experience of pleasure, but a richer content. A person’s welfare does not lie in having more pleasant psychological experiences, but in having more happy experiences that can actually promote personal welfare. As Griffin and Nozick agree on, people should prefer reality not because it is morally superior or aesthetically superior, but simply because favoring real life can create a better life. In general, the theory of objective happiness has two characteristics: First, objective happiness theory is still a subjective happiness theory; Second, what objective happiness pursues is prudent happiness.

41

This is different from classical utilitarianism, which holds that happiness and welfare are identical. Anything that can promote an individual’s welfare can bring about the experience of individual happiness, and anything that can bring about the experience of happiness can also improve the individual’s welfare. See L. W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, pp. 83–92.

106

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

Happiness is an individual’s psychological experience, and happiness theory itself is subjective. Any kind of happiness theory must preserve its subject-relativity, if not, the welfare nature of the theory cannot be recognized by everyday concepts.42 The so-called objective happiness pursues a valuable happiness experience that can reflect the real welfare of the individual and contribute to people’s pleasant emotions. This happiness experience must involve the individual’s self-identification with his own living environment, and the individual’s evaluation of real-life situation according to his own evaluation standards and psychological expectations. Therefore, objective happiness theory is a happy experience involving rational reflection. In addition, objective happiness theory is also non-reductive,43 that is, happiness cannot be reduced to the happiness or enjoyment of a certain moment, or it can be said that objective happiness is not the collection of all happy moments of an individual. Objective happiness theory requires a holistic perspective, an impartial attitude, and a fair and objective view of each segment of life. Objective happiness theory focuses on the satisfaction of life as a whole, rather than the pleasurable experience of a single moment. The difference between objective happiness theory and classical happiness theory is that the true happiness is an experience of happiness with intrinsic value, a carefully weighed experience of happiness that needs to be relevant, sincere, and considered.44 First, relevant, it means, happiness is related to personal life experience. In other words, only personal experience can be used as the evaluation standard of happiness, rather than in terms of whether it is valuable according to some ethical standard, or whether it conforms to some aesthetic ideal, or whether it is a life that is appropriate to the kind of life it is in some perfectionist sense. Sumner argues that there are four dimensions of value, prudential value, aesthetic value, perfectionist value and ethical value. However, in the evaluation of personal welfare, only prudential value is considered, namely how well it is going for the individual whose life it is.45 Happiness does not depend on whether it conforms to a specific value, but on the perception of the subject, who has the authority to evaluate his own happiness. If the subject does not experience a happy mental state in a state of affairs, but others believe that the subject is happy in this state, this situation is not supported by the objective happiness theory. Second, sincere, that is, individuals cannot exaggerate or belittle when evaluating self-happiness. Otherwise, the evaluation will lose its value. Sincerity means that objective happiness theory needs certain means (for example, Brandt’s “cognitive psychotherapy test”, etc.) to block the influence of subjective factors such as bias and emotions on personal happiness assessments. In other words, individuals need to maintain an impartial position in the assessment of happiness experience. Third, considered, that is, when assessing self-happiness, individuals need to measure the overall happiness of the individual from a holistic perspective, and treat the experience of happiness in the present and the happiness 42

Sumner (2003), p. 42. Greg Bognar, “Authentic Happiness”, Utilitas, p. 274. 44 Greg Bognar, “Authentic Happiness”, Utilitas, p. 274. 45 Sumner (2003), p. 20. 43

4.2 The Evolution of Utilitarianism Common Features

107

experience throughout the life cycle equally. In fact, “sincere” and “considered” are an extension of the “principle of prudence” in Sidgwick, which contemporary utilitarianism only guarantees in a more sophisticated way. How to achieve objective happiness? In general, objective happiness theory has two striving directions. First, by adding cognitive components, avoid the wrong happiness experience formed by insufficient information, human weakness or personal prejudices, and eliminate individual irrational happiness experience. Second, by adding the spontaneity factors, break the stereotypical influence of environmental factors such as living environment and existing experience on the concept of personal happiness and inspires individuals to review the authenticity of existing happiness experience.

Revising Individual Subjective Psychological Experience by Adding Cognitive Factors Haslett believes that the experience of happiness which is consistent with individual’s welfare is a rational experience,46 and Brandt make the claim that the so-called rational experience is the experience which has been tested by logic and evidence.47 The process of testing mental experiences with cognitive factors is the process of distinguishing which experiences are rational and which are irrational. According to Brandt, there are generally four types of irrational experiences: psychological experience dependent on false beliefs, psychological experience formed artificially in the process of cultural transmission, psychological experience formed by the generalization from untypical examples, and psychological experience brought about by exaggerated valences produces by early deprivation.48 First, Psychological Experience Dependent on False Beliefs. Hume once noted: “It is only in two senses, that any affection can be called unreasonable. First, when a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition or the existence of objects, which really do not exist. Secondly, when in exerting any passion in action, we choose means insufficient for the designed end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects.”49 Brandt argues that psychological experiences dependent on false beliefs contain the two irrational affections in Hume’s sense. For example, if a person thinks that a food is pathogenic and thus develops an aversion to that food, but in fact the food does not make him sick, then the person’s disgust is based on false belief and is therefore unreasonable. If a person thinks that lottery will bring wealth and that to get a luxurious life requires constantly buying lottery tickets, then the happiness that the person produces when buying lottery tickets is built on irrational experiences brought by false causal connections. 46

Haslett (1990). Brandt (1979), p. 110. 48 Ibid., pp. 115–126. 49 Hume (1740), p. 637. 47

108

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

Second, Psychological Experience Formed Artificially in Cultural Transmission. This psychological experience is not emerged from an individual’s actual experience, but is shaped by the influence of others, and is therefore likely to deviate from the true welfare of the individual. For example, if parents cultivate their child to be an official when he grows up and instill the benefits of being an official at his early age, then the child may have a strong desire to become an official. However, it cannot be illustrated that this desire is really in line with the true interests of the child, or it can be said, whether striving to realize the desire of becoming an official is in line with the child’s personal interests needs to be judged by the child’s rational cognition. Third, Psychological Experience Formed by the Generalization from Untypical Examples. For example, a person who is attacked by a dog in childhood may develop feelings of dislike for dogs or even for all animals, which is a generalization of untypical events. All learning involves some generalization. Therefore, it is easy for individuals to generalize all situations indiscriminately, resulting in irrational emotions. Fourthly, Psychological Experience Brought about by Exaggerated Valences Produces by Early Deprivation. Brant cites a wife’s complaint to her husband as an example of the characteristics of such irrational psychological experiences. This wife remarks that her husband grew up in a single-parent family during the Great Depression (fatherless, lack of a major labor force). Even though he is 50 years old now, with a decent job, a stable income, and considerable savings, her husband still only buys second-hand clothes, day-old bread, and refuses all non-essential consumption.50 This psychological experience is an irrational experience caused by early experiences of deprivation. How to exclude irrational psychological experiences with cognitive factors? Brandt argues that sufficient information alone is not enough to distinguish between rational and irrational experiences, and that some irrational experiences can only be removed through psychological “therapy”. Cognitive psychotherapy can help people eliminate harmful, irrational psychological experiences. Cognitive psychotherapy refers to “the whole process of confronting desires with relevant information, by repeatedly representing it, in an ideally vivid way, and at an appropriate time”.51 First, the so-called an appropriate time, that is, the moment when the influence of a desire is maximized. For example, the best time for a smoker to reflect on the harm of smoking is the moment when he finishes smoking, and the utility benefits of reflection go beyond the pleasure smoking brings, or the moment when he desires to light a cigarette. Second, the ideal clarity means that the information about the desire needs to be as clear and detailed as possible, so as not to arouse hesitation or doubt. Third, repeatedly representing means that one-time thinking cannot get the right answer, the process of interpretation is a gradual process. The more repeated interpretation, the greater the role of reflection. Therefore, if a psychological experience can pass the test of cognitive psychotherapy, the experience is rational, and hence direct the improvement of personal welfare. 50 51

Brandt (1979), p. 123. Brandt (1979), p. 113.

4.2 The Evolution of Utilitarianism Common Features

109

It’s manifested that by adding cognitive factors can make individuals evaluate their own happiness experience with a prudent attitude. However, Sumner argues that adding cognitive factors alone is not enough to solve all the problems caused by subjective evaluation. Cognitive factors can exclude irrational problems caused by factors such as false beliefs, prejudices, but cannot avoid the plastic influence of environment and experience on personal happiness evaluation. For example, a housewife, who has adapted to her circumstances as well as the expectations and satisfaction that that environment can bring to her, may genuinely believe that she is living a happy life, even if her life is not as good as imagined. Sumner argues that objective happiness requires not only reasoned evaluation led by cognitive factors, but also spontaneous evaluation of individuals. Only in this way can objective happiness reflect the true welfare of people. Therefore, contemporary utilitarianism attempts to improve the objectivity of one’s own happiness perception by adding a spontaneous factor.

Avoiding Environmental Interference on Personal Happiness Evaluation by Adding Autonomous Factors An individual’s living environment and existing experience will shape an individual’s concept of happiness, and non-autonomous evaluation results in the loss of objectivity in the evaluations.52 The so-called autonomous evaluations require individuals to judge whether they are happy or not, and how happy they are, regardless of their own living environment. According to Sumner, a series of questions about the living environment can be used to test whether an individual’s evaluation of happiness is objective, that is, whether an individual’s assessment of self-happiness will change when the living environment changes. If the living environment does change, and the assessment subject also believes that the change of the environment will affect his judgment of personal happiness, then the individual’s judgment of self-happiness is not objective. For example, if a housewife imagines herself as a working woman, and after comparing her life as a housewife and a working woman, she still thinks that her life as a housewife is happy, then her happiness experience is objective; If the housewife believes that her current life is not ideal, then her experience of happiness is not sufficiently objective. This objective happiness theory usually adopts the method of quality-of-life research commonly used in sociology to carry out autonomous query, assuming that one is in different production and living environments by means of questionnaire, and reflecting on whether one still agrees with the current happiness experience. The inclusion of autonomous factors further promotes people’s understanding of objective happiness theory, whit the consequent view that objective happiness experience not only needs to eliminate irrational components by cognitive factors, but also needs to avoid the shaping of personal concepts by social environment and existing experience. In addition, this method also provides a view on the influence 52

Greg Bognar, “Authentic Happiness”, Utilitas, p. 275.

110

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

of manipulative factors on individual happiness experience, and designs a method to eliminate manipulative factors. However, this approach often fails to achieve the desired results. First, the manipulation or shaping of behavior in life is often hidden and difficult for individuals to detect. The manipulated person will insist on the correctness of self-evaluation and the authenticity of self-happiness. Therefore, it is difficult to achieve breakthroughs by relying solely on the requirement of autonomy. Second, the inclusion of autonomous factor is intended to promote the objectification of evaluation, but it may lead to more subjective results in evaluation. Suppose there are two persons, A and B, and person A lives in poverty, ruins his career, and has no friends; B has a moderate standard of living, a decent job, and a stable circle of friends, but B does not like his current life. In common sense, people would say that B is happier than A, but according to the objective theory of happiness, which incorporates autonomous assessment, B is likely to be just as unhappy as A, because B is not satisfied with his current situation.

4.2.2.2

Satisfying Rational Preferences

Another more influential utilitarian view is the preference satisfaction utilitarianism, which holds that individual welfare lies in the maximum satisfaction of individual preferences. “The principle, in deciding what is good and what is bad for a given individual, the ultimate criterion can only be his own wants and his own preferences.”53 However, preference satisfaction is not identical to individual welfare, and satisfying preferences is a necessary condition for achieving individual welfare rather than a sufficient condition, as Kymlicka remarks, preference satisfaction theory “leaves too much in” their account of well-being.54 An individual’s preferences include both rational preferences and irrational preferences, both justified preferences and unjustified preferences. If all preferences of individuals are met indiscriminately, it not only won’t help to improve personal welfare, but may even deviate from the moral rights necessary to be respected in people’s daily lives. Therefore, in order for utilitarianism to maintain its theoretical characteristics of welfarism, contemporary utilitarians should be capable of effectively distinguishing between rational preferences and irrational preferences, and utilitarianism aims to maximize the satisfaction of rational preferences. Rational preferences are preferences of an individual who “had all the relevant factual information, always reasoned with the greatest possible care, and were in a state of mind most conducive to rational choice”.55 In other words, rational preferences are primarily the actual preferences of the individual, the actual desires in the

53

John C. Harsanyi, “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior”, Social Research, Vol. 44, No. 4, p.645. 54 Kymlicka (2002), p. 15. 55 John C. Harsanyi, “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior”, Social Research, Vol. 44, No. 4, p. 646.

4.2 The Evolution of Utilitarianism Common Features

111

individual’s heart, not the individual’s possible preferences.56 If the actual psychological desires of the individual are not regarded as the basic elements of the preference, then utilitarianism may demand the individual to alter his or her own preferences in order to reach maximum preference satisfaction, or put forth a Stoics-like demand— if what you desire cannot be easily obtained, then you should turn to some new preferences that are easy to achieve. In this case, what utilitarianism supports is “a fair-weather-fan”: if there is no hope for the football team you support to win, then you should simply switch to supporting some team with good long-run prospects of winning.57 This situation is by no means supported by utilitarian theory, and also the result is absurd in the view of utilitarianism. Therefore, for a rational preference, it must be personal preference, and the actual desire of an individual’s heart is the primary condition for the establishment of the preference. Similar to objective happiness theory, rational preference only removes irrational preferences from an individual’s actual preferences through some corresponding measures, rather than taking certain principles and values as the evaluation criteria of preferences. In the concept of rational preferences, the self-evaluation of the subject of preference has the sole authority. Whenever there is a need to speculate the real preferences hidden behind on the ground of the irrational preferences, it is usually necessary to take the actual preferences as the ultimate criterion for judging the true interests of an individual. How to distinguish between rational preferences and irrational preferences? Harsanyi maintains that the first thing we have to do is to distinguish between a person’s manifest preferences and his true preferences. The manifest preferences are his actual preferences as manifested by his observed behavior, “including preferences possibly based on erroneous factual beliefs, or on careless logical analysis, or on strong emotions that at the moment greatly hinder rational choice”.58 In contrast, a person’s true preferences are those consistent with personal welfare, which are the individual’s actual preferences with all the relevant truthful information, and reasoned with the greatest possible care in a state of mind most conducive to rational choice. What utilitarianism aims to satisfy is the true preferences of an individual, and the goal of utility maximization should be the maximum satisfaction of the true preferences of the individual. Then, how to distinguish between manifest preferences and true preferences? Utilitarianism provides three criteria. Firstly, possession of sufficient information, which means that the information that the individual possessed can enable the individual to fully understand and recognize how to live a better life, and when the further increase of information is not helpful in judging the individual’s situation, it indicates that the information at this time is sufficient. Secondly, the actual preferences of the moment are judged from the perspective of the individual’s overall life, which means, the preference is the judgment of the current personal preference after comprehensive 56

Goodin (1991). Barry (1989), p. 280. 58 John C. Harsanyi, “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior”, Social Research, Vol. 44, No. 4, p. 646. 57

112

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

consideration of the overall situation of the individual. Thirdly, carefully weighing the current preferences, that is, examine the actual preferences of the moment through a series of critical reflections.59 However, it is not enough to exclude all irrational preferences only by distinguishing between manifest preferences and true preferences. Although some preferences are true preferences, they have obvious antisocial tendencies, such as discrimination, jealousy, abuse, etc. According to utilitarian theory, an individual’s moral obligation to others stems from good will and universal sympathy, but there is absolutely no such goodwill, in which case individual X can impose moral obligations on individual Y, so that Y has a moral obligation to help X hurt individual Z through abuse, hatred, resentment, and other means. In other words, sympathy cannot require one individual to help another who wants to do something evil to do evil. More importantly, utilitarianism is not only the fundamental ethics that guides the way individuals behave, but also a political theory that provides operating principles of the social system, and the utility principle is closely related to the operation of political life. Therefore, when defining social utility, it is essential to avoid the influence of preferences with antisocial tendencies, preventing antisocial preferences from distorting the social public goals pursued by utilitarianism. In order to achieve the rational preferences, an effective measure is to “filter” both inputs and outputs simultaneously. The so-called input filters work by refusing to count certain classes of desires and preferences when aggregating individual utilities: “Input filters might be regarded as barriers erected at the front end of the social decision machinery, preventing perverse preferences from ever entering into consideration”.60 The so-called output filters work by erecting barriers “at the back end of the social decision machinery, preventing policies predicated on perverse preferences from ever emerging as settled social choices”.61 In other words, output filters provide a blocking mode to prevent people from choosing institutions and policies that infringe on rights or violate basic social norms in the view of utility considerations. In fact, distinguishing between rational preferences and irrational preferences is the main work that needs to be done at the inputs end, and inputs filtering is also an important part of ensuring that utilitarianism does not deviate from welfarism. The output filtering is an insurance mechanism provided by contemporary utilitarianism, preventing unreasonable preferences that do not effectively eliminated at the inputs, especially aggressive and antisocial preferences involving others, and by appealing to moral rights and basic rules stopping them from ever emerging as settled social policies.

59

James Griffin, Well-being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance, pp. 13-15. Goodin (1995), p. 134. 61 Ibid. 60

4.2 The Evolution of Utilitarianism Common Features

113

4.2.3 Aggregation Built on Unanimous Consent As can be seen from the foregoing, opponents argue that the Pareto character of aggregation does not meet the moral requirement of “compensation for sacrifice” and therefore cannot take the differences between people seriously. However, contemporary utilitarianism argues that this critique does not hold the water. Aggregation can be compatible with independent individuals, and respect for individual independence cannot be viewed as a reason against aggregation. Contemporary utilitarianism effectively achieves respect for individual independence by incorporating contract theory. Firstly, the view is wrong which holds that respect for individual independence can only be achieved if the principle can meet “compensation for sacrifice”. Compensation for sacrifice has made too strict demands on all moral theories that involve the comparison of interpersonal interests, and almost all current theories of distributive justice cannot meet this requirement.62 For all the theories that recognize the moral obligation of mutual assistance among individuals in the community, it is impossible to respect individual independence in the sense of “compensation for sacrifice”. The non-aggregation principle with egalitarian tendency advocated by Rawls and Nagel also fails to realize the demand of respect for individual independence in light of “compensation for sacrifice”. Because all these theories hold that individuals have an obligation to help the vulnerable groups in society, even if such help would be at the expense of their own interests. For example, Rawls’s principle of difference takes the situation of the least advantaged as the criterion for judging the legitimacy of the situation, and interpersonal interest balance needs to take the maximization of the interests of the least advantaged as the criterion. In the principle of difference, those who are better off in society are “victims” who are not compensated. The better-off not only need to lower their expectations in order to benefit the worst-off, but also bear the actual losses for them. However, Rawls asserts that there is no reason for the better-off to complain about this.63 Brink argues that only Nozick’s theory meets the criteria of “compensation for sacrifice.“64 Now that the requirement of “compensation for sacrifice” is a criterion what cannot be satisfied by all moral theories containing the obligation of mutual assistance, whether they possess the characteristics of aggregation or not, it cannot be assumed that utilitarianism is bound to fail to respect individual independence, just because utilitarianism cannot fulfill this requirement. “Compensatory for sacrifice” should not be regarded as a measure of whether the principles of distribution have respected individual independence. Utilitarians further argue that since individual independence is not given priority in non-aggregation theory, there is no logical relationship between respect for individual independence and non-aggregation characteristics. Therefore, it cannot be taken for granted that utilitarianism necessarily infringes on individual independence just because utilitarianism contains aggregation characteristics. 62

David Brink, “The Separateness of Persons, Distributive Norms, and Moral Theory”, p. 258. Robert (1971), p. 185. 64 David Brink, “The Separateness of Persons, Distributive Norms, and Moral Theory”, p. 257–258. 63

114

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

Secondly, contemporary utilitarianism argues that aggregation can be compatible with respect for individual independence.65 First, in the view of aggregation characteristics, each one is morally relevant. For aggregation, the change of anyone’s utility situation will be reflected in the overall utility aggregated. Aggregation holds a positive attitude towards each one’s utility increase, and a negative attitude towards each one’s utility decrease, and everyone’s utility change has its moral relevance. Second, contemporary utilitarianism can also develop doctrine of equality, such as “the lives of each should go equally well”.66 This egalitarian argument does not exclude the characteristics of aggregation. Third, contemporary utilitarianism argues that classical utilitarianism cannot take the difference between people seriously because it lacks the element of individual consent. As Nagel remarks, the aggregation characteristic of utilitarianism makes everyone’s ideas seem to enter a “big hopper”, and “anyone’s claims can in principle be completely outvoted by the claims of others. In the final outcome a given individual’s claims may be met hardly at all, though they have been counted in the majoritarian calculation used to arrive at that outcome.“67 In other words, classical utilitarianism, in the process of aggregating interests, without the consent of individuals, vetoes individual’s claims only by virtue of utility outcomes, which is the roots leading to its neglect of individual independence. Contemporary utilitarianism contends that as a principle of social justice, utilitarianism must involve reconciliation of interpersonal interests, and it is inevitable that some people will benefit while others will suffer, but the adjustment of any interpersonal interests needs the consent of the individual. “Moral principles must be acceptable to every person so that the imposed burden will be acceptable to any person no matter who bears that burden.”68 Contemporary utilitarianism achieves the compatibility between characteristics of aggregation and independence of individual by complementing the element of unanimity. Scanlon argues that it is unreasonable to reject a principle built on general agreements that everyone knows and complies with willingly, even if it imposes a burden on individuals.69 If all the people, including each individual, agrees to a principle under a fair assumption, then an individual needs to accept it even if the principle imposes some burden on him. The burden imposed in such a case can be regarded as a result of a weighing of interpersonal interests, with respect for individual independence. Therefore, in order to make it compatible between the characteristics of aggregation and individual independence, it is necessary to make independent individuals agree to a rule under a hypothetical state, namely, to adopt a contractualism idea. Contemporary utilitarian Harsanyi derives the principle of maximizing average 65

It should be noted that utilitarianism does not hold that its theory is the best interpretation of individual independence. Utilitarianism only emphasizes that there is no exclusive relationship between aggregation characteristics and respect for individual independence. Aggregation theory can also respect individual independence. 66 Parfit (1984), p. 471. 67 Nagel (1979), p. 122. 68 Hirose (2013), p. 197. 69 Scanlon (1990).

4.3 The Transcending of Classical Utilitarianism

115

utility from the contractualism. Harsanyi supposes a situation where a given individual I, one of the society consisting of n individuals, would express a preference for the capitalist system over the socialist system without knowing in advance what particular social position he would occupy under either system. He only knows that he would have the same probability of occupying any one of the available social positions. In this case, if individual I chooses a social system, then the choice is made under the premise of respecting individual independence, and individual I can neither refuse the actual benefits and burdens brought by the chosen social system. Harsanyi’s argument can be broken down into three steps: (1) Moral principles must be ideas that are acceptable in the context of impartiality, (2) individuals make choices without knowing their own circumstances, and (3) make the rational thinking under the assumption that each one would have the same probability of occupying any one of the available social positions.70 According to Harsanyi, each individual has two different sets of preferences: personal preferences and moral preferences. Personal preferences dominate his daily behavior and manifest themselves through his utility function Ui; Moral preference is the view from an impartial position. Moral preference gives equal weight to the interests of all the people including the individual himself. Moral preference can be represented by the social welfare function Wi:71 1∑ Uj . n j=1 n

Wi =

Harsanyi’s argument suggests that aggregation can also be the moral principle chosen by independent individuals in a hypothetical situation with an impartial and objective attitude. Then, utilitarian theories with the characteristics of aggregation can fully achieve the theoretical goal of taking the differences between people seriously.

4.3 The Transcending of Classical Utilitarianism Contemporary utilitarianism not only makes theoretical reflection on common characteristics of utilitarianism theory, but also supplements some new content to contemporary utilitarianism theory, so as to adapt to the discourse system of contemporary political philosophy.

70

Ibid., p. 121. John C. Harsanyi, “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior”, Social Research, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 631-636.

71

116

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

4.3.1 Expected Utility Replaces Actual Utility As far as the content of the utility, contemporary utilitarianism has made two amendments: firstly, replacing the purely subjective utilitarian concept with an objectified utilitarian concept; secondly, replacing actual utility with expected utility. Classical utilitarianism advocates the view of actual utility, and the criterion for determining the justification of an act depends on the actual consequences of the act. “The general tendency of an act is more or less pernicious, according to the sum total of its consequences……Wherever consequences are spoken of, such only are meant as are material. Of the consequences of any act, the multitude and variety must needs be infinite: but such of them only as are material are worth regarding.”72 However, using actual consequences as the criterion for judging justification will result in obvious violations of moral intuition. For example, for cases in which good intentions do bad things or bad motives lead to good results, the actual utilitarian view will give rise to wrong judgments. The view of actual utility ignores the important role of human motivation in the judgment of consequences. Imagine an objective, prudent agent who carefully acts in a direction that maximizes happiness, only to accidentally produce bad results. If judged according to the actual utility view, the agent’s conduct is wrong, and neither good motives nor prudent processes can justify the wrong consequences. If this agent and another agent with bad motives cause the same bad consequences, the view of actual utility will conclude that there is no difference in moral judgment between the conduct of the two agents. As the opponents of the view of actual utility noted, if only the actual consequences of an act are used as the criterion of justification, then there is no difference in the evaluation of the consequences between killing a person out of subjective intentions and causing the death of a person objectively by a certain act. In fact, there are fundamental differences between the two. It is impractical to evaluate behavior in terms of actual consequences, because not only can one not accurately estimate and calculate the consequences of an act (people’s ability to gather and process information is limited), but there are at least some consequences that an act produces are beyond the control of the agent himself. For example, a doctor who struggles to save the life of a patient, even if there is no mistake in his operation, may still end up with the death of the patient, and the consequence of the patient’s death should not be taken as the only criterion for judging the doctor’s wrongdoing. “We must leave room in our theory for the tragedy of unintentional wrongdoing through nonculpable ignorance.”73 Therefore, on the basis of reflecting on classical utilitarianism, contemporary utilitarianism advocates taking the expected utility—the consequences that the agent can reasonably anticipate—as the criterion of justification of the act, so as to ensure that there is a direct connection between the subjective intention of the agent and the consequences of judgment. Contemporary utilitarianism holds that an action is justified if and only if it produces the maximum predictable utility on the basis of existing information. If a physician makes all his efforts to save a patient with the 72 73

Bentham (1907), p. 64. David Sosa, “Consequences of Consequentialism”, Mind, New Series, Vol. 102, p.112.

4.3 The Transcending of Classical Utilitarianism

117

goal of predictable utility maximization, the physician’s conduct is defensible even if the final result does not achieve the desired goal. Then, can the expected utility of an act be calculated, and how is the expected utility calculated? Contemporary utilitarianism proposes a set of criteria: multiply the utility value (whether positive or negative) of each possible consequence of the act by the probability of the occurrence of the situation, and add the values of all possible situations to get the expected utility of the act. For example, a doctor wants to treat a patient with drug A, who has a non-fatal but extremely life-threatening skin disease. The use of drug A may result in three circumstances: (1) 80% chance of cure, (2) 19% chance of no effect, and (3) 1% chance of sequelae damaging other organs. Suppose that if the cure of the patient can produce 3 units of utilitarian value, no effect will produce −1 unit of utility value, and the sequelae will produce −5 units of utility value, then the expected utility value of the doctor using drug A is: 3 × 80% + (−1) × 19% + (−5) × 1% = 2.16. If the actual utility generated by the patient after the doctor uses drug A is less than 2.16, it can only be said that the situation is unfortunate, but the doctor’s conduct is justified. With the replacement of actual utility with expected utility, individuals only responsible for what they can be responsible for, and thus to a certain extent, the utility principle avoids excessive requirements for the agents.

4.3.2 Multiple Values Replace Value-Monism Classical utilitarianism insists on a monistic theory of value, in which the consequences of all actions depend only on the pleasure and pain affected. The feelings of pleasure and pain are the highest good, and other values need to be subordinated to this highest good. Bentham contends that all values are reducible: all values with positive qualities can be reduced to pleasure, all values with negative qualities can be reduced to pain, and utility calculations can also be made between pleasure and pain. Mill’s monism differs from that of Bentham. Mill acknowledges that values are pluralistic and that some values are irreducible (e.g., higher pleasure and lower pleasure), but Mill believes that these different values can be integrated into an organic whole-happiness, and everything worth pursuing can be integrated into the pursuit of happiness. Therefore, Mill’s utilitarianism is also monism.74 On the ground of value-monism, classical utilitarianism holds that individuals have only one moral obligation—to promote the maximization of utility, and all other obligations need to be subordinated to this highest moral obligation. However, individuals in daily life are often confronted with multiple moral obligations, some 74

Holbrook argues that Mill’s utilitarian theory distinguished between higher pleasure at the intellectual level and lower pleasure at the sensory level, and therefore it belonged to dualism. The author does not agree with this view. In Mill’s theory, both higher and lower pleasure are part of the organic integrity of happiness, and Mill, like other classical utilitarians, regards happiness as the sole highest value. Holbrook (1988), pp. 101-105.

118

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

of which are independent of or cannot be reduced to utility maximization. Therefore, contemporary utilitarianism abandons monadic value theory and embrace the characteristics of pluralistic value orientation. First, the contemporary utilitarianism is characterized by pluralism. Contemporary experiential theory, preference satisfaction theory, and objective list theory all support pluralistic value theory, arguing that for individual welfare, there are some basic items that are meaningful to everyone’s welfare, and these items are independent and indispensable. For example, we cannot say that a person who is deprived, a person who is suffering from illness, a person who is lonely, and a person who is immersed in the illusion formed by drugs is happy, because some basic material and psychological conditions are the primary basis of a good life. For these basic material conditions, Rawls elaborates them as, liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and self-respect75 ; Parfitt elaborates them as “moral goodness, rational activity, the development of one’s abilities, having children and being a good parent, knowledge, and the awareness of true beauty”.76 Singer elaborates them as, “avoiding pain, satisfying basic needs for food and shelter, to love and care for any children one may have, to enjoy friendly and loving relations with others, and to be free to pursue projects without unnecessary interference from others, etc.”77 Although different theorists have different understandings of the basic content of utilitarian needs to be satisfied, all of them recognize that some items have independent status and function for the welfare of an individual. These are fundamental values that utilitarianism needs to satisfy. Second, utilitarianism is also pluralistic in the moral code that individuals need to follow on a daily basis. Ross divides prima facie duties into six different types: (1) Some duties rest on previous acts. These duties seem to include two kinds, the duties of fidelity and the duties of reparation. (2) The duties of gratitude, that is, gratitude for the previous acts of other man. (3) The duties of justice, namely, the duty to upset or prevent improper and unjust distribution. (4) The duties of beneficence, which rest on the mere fact that there are other beings in the world whose condition we can make better. (5) The duties of self-improvement, which lie in the fact that we can improve our own conditions in respect of virtue or of intelligence. (6) The duty not to harm others.78 Contemporary utilitarianism also recognizes and respects these preliminary duties, and it is only necessary to resort to utility principles when there is a conflict among preliminary duties. Moreover, contemporary utilitarianism argues that in addition to these basic moral principles that apply to all people, there are also different special rules in different social groups. For example, doctors, teachers, lawyers, civil servants, etc., all have special ethical rules that their groups need to follow. Only when different social groups all follow the moral rules that are in accordance to the characteristics of their own groups is the moral system of society as optimal. 75

Rawls (1999), p. 62. Parfit (1984), p. 625. 77 Singer (2011), pp. 21–22. 78 Ross (2007), p. 21. 76

4.3 The Transcending of Classical Utilitarianism

119

4.3.3 Substantive Equality Replaces Formal Equality Critics generally argue that utilitarianism does not support the equality theory or ignores the equality theory, and the recognition of equality in utilitarianism can at most realize the anti-discrimination principle that “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”. However, contemporary utilitarianism believes that treating people equally is the theoretical basis and premise of utilitarianism, and only on the basis of treating people equally can the maximization of utility be achieved. Contemporary utilitarianism further states that utilitarianism can go beyond formal equality to achieve substantive equality, and its theory will also produce justice distribution results that favor the disadvantaged groups in society. Every theory of egalitarianism needs to first answer the question—why should different individuals need to be treated equally? The answer to this question reveals what type of view of equality the theory supports. Intuitively, the differences between individuals are obvious. “We are deeply diverse in our internal characteristics (such as age, gender, general abilities, particular talents, proneness to illnesses, and so on) as well as in external circumstances (such as ownership of assets, social backgrounds, environmental predicaments, and so on), It is precisely because of such diversity that the insistence on egalitarianism in one field requires the rejection of egalitarianism in another.”79 Therefore, in the face of the empirical facts of interpersonal diversity, it is essential to find the basis for equal treatment, that is, the logic and social premise of equal treatment between individuals. Utilitarianism argues that the ability to perceive pleasure and pain is the only thing in common among different individuals and it is also the basis on which individuals should be treated equally. Based on this theoretical premise, contemporary utilitarianism believes that the so-called equal treatment of people means to take each one’s interests into consideration to the same extent and also give equal weights to the realization of these interests, that is, same interests should be treated in the same way, regardless of whom the interests belong to. As Hare puts it, if we ask how we are to be just between the competing interests of different people, it seems hard to give any other answer than that it is by giving equal weight, impartially, to the equal interests of everybody.80

4.3.3.1

The Unity of Utility Maximization and Equal Treatment

Contemporary utilitarian view of equality organically combines the moral claims of equality with the standard of interests, and this combination is achieved through two aspects of theoretical logic.

79 80

Sen (1992), p. xi. R. M. Hare, “Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism”, p. 216.

120

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

The Moral Possibility of the Integration of Utility Maximization and Equal Treatment Contemporary utilitarianism holds that the unity of utility maximization and equal treatment of people is morally possible. However, regarding the relationship between this moral possibility and the implementation of other moral principles, interpretations from different perspectives have been elaborated by contemporary utilitarianism. Exclusive Moral Unity Hare argues that the principle of utility and the principle of equality are not only can be unified, but the acceptance of the equality principle commits one to accepting the principle of utility and excludes any other substantive moral principle.81 If I were to choose the best behavior for myself who may be at any position randomly, it is necessary to satisfy my preferences in all possible positions to the greatest extent. When the interests of all were taken into account equally, there is no other principle can be more capable of promoting all the interests (than utility principle). Hare argues that the so-called equal treatment of people means that the same interests of those affected by my actions should be treated exactly the same. This tendency of treating people equally will automatically lead to the utility aggregating standards. Therefore, the principle of utility is unified with the principle of equality, and the utility principle is the only principle to be deduced by principle of equality. Inclusive Moral Unity Singer argues that the principle of utility and the principle of equality are unified. But acceptance of equality principle only requires that one accept utility principle as a minimal moral principle, while leaving the principle of equality open to other moral principles. That is, the minimum line for treating people equally is to act in line with utilitarianism, while utilitarianism does not exclude other moral principles.82 Singer’s argument stems from a natural inclination of egoism, that is, everyone wants his or her interests to be taken care of, and wishes others can take them into consideration seriously, so as to guarantee his or her interests are at least equally considered. Therefore, “If my interest in x is the same as yours, then I shall want you to give the same weight to my interest as you give to yours. If you do not, then you will have lapsed back into egoism”.83 Considering people’s natural inclinations, Singer asserts that individuals would agree to universalize their moral judgments in order to secure their own interests. If I want others to value and treat my interests equally, then I need to value the interests of all those affected by me actions and treat them equally. Based on people’s natural inclinations, Singer argues that treating people equally means to give equal consideration to the similar interests of all those affected, and that one’s own interests should not outweigh those of others simply because they 81

Regan (1983). Singer (2011), p. 18. 83 Tom Regan, “Utility and Equality”: some Neglected Problems”, p. 36. 82

4.3 The Transcending of Classical Utilitarianism

121

are the interests of himself or herself. Treating people equally the agent to give equal weight of all interests and then adopt the course of action “most likely to maximize the preferences of those affected”.84 Therefore, utilitarianism is compatible with equal treatment of people. However, the acceptance of the utility principle stems from its natural inclination, and the utility principle is only the minimum moral principle. “The preference utilitarian position is a minimal one, a first base that we reach by universalizing self-interested decision making”,85 and there is a necessity for utility principle to be supplemented by other moral principles.

The Practical Feasibility of the Integration of Utility Maximization and Equal Treatment Equal treatment of each one’s interests can effectively achieve equal treatment of people, can make the society free of racists, sexists, and can even reject all discriminatory principles, but relying on this principle alone cannot effectively deal with inequality in the economic field.86 In other words, one can deduce equally treat everyone according to the principle of giving equal weight of all interests, but one cannot deduce equal distribution from it. Therefore, the utilitarian view of equality also needs other concrete measures to constrain the inequality in distribution, so as to realize the demand of economic and social equality. The principle of the declining marginal utility is the main theoretical basis of equal distribution proposed by contemporary utilitarianism. Brandt argues that considering the declining marginal utility of money, the equal distribution of income is a realistic strategy to achieve utility maximization.87 For example, at a limited income level, individuals will use their income to purchase the most needed necessities of life. If we double a person’s incomes, he will spend the extra money on goods he wants less. In the same manner, the higher the income, the less the utility brought by the extra income, and the more money one spends, the less happiness each dollar brings. Thus, Brant proposes that an equal distribution of income will contribute to utility maximization, and that “the real income (monetary income adjusted for differing price-levels) after any taxes should be equal, except (a) for supplements to meet special needs, (b) supplements recompensing services to the extent needed to provide desirable incentive and allocate resources efficiently, and (c) variations to achieve other socially desirable ends such as population control”.88 Utilitarians oppose extreme economic inequality, especially those that come with inherited wealth. Harsanyi maintains that extreme poverty and affluence, especially the extreme economic inequality brought about by inherited wealth, are not conducive to the effective functioning of democratic political systems. In contrast, utilitarians 84

Singer (2011), p. 12. Singer (2011), p. 14. 86 Arthur and Shaw (1991), p. 126. 87 Brandt (1979), p. 312. 88 Ibid., p. 310. 85

122

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

support active equality policies. For example, by providing medical equipments such as wheelchairs for the disabled, increasing auxiliary facilities such as exclusive access for the disabled, and supporting educational policies that favor the disadvantaged groups and underdeveloped areas, utilitarianism attempts to achieve the equality of actual utility among social members through these positive equality policies.

4.3.3.2

Contemporary Utilitarianism Can Achieve Distribution Results that Obviously Favor the Disadvantaged Groups

Transcending of Formal Equality Even without taking the declining marginal utility into account, the utilitarian view of equality itself demands to transcend formal equality. In this regard, contemporary utilitarianism inherits the classical utilitarian view represented by Bentham. Bentham argues that now that equality is built on human’s perception of pleasure and pain, then pure formal equality is hollow, and utilitarian equality must reflect some quantitative regulation of welfare. Equality means that everyone has a justified reason to claim equal means to achieve happiness. The contemporary utilitarian Singer further develops Bentham’s ideas. Singer argues that since accidental factors such as race, gender, intelligence, origin, and family environment have nothing to do with equal consideration of human interests, then it is unjust for these factors to determine whether people can enter the upper class of society. For example, children from large cities may perform better than children from remote mountainous areas, but the difference in achievement may be due to the huge difference in education between urban and mountainous areas–urban children may have excellent teachers, abundant materials, and a superior environment. In order to bridge the huge gap between them in these aspects, a positive action policy or a reverse discrimination policy is needed, that is, a strategy in favor of children in remote mountainous areas in the admission of universities. Singer believes that through such positive action policies, it is necessary to make up for the differences in the means of realizing interests of different individuals as far as possible, so as to achieve equal consideration of interests. In fact, contemporary utilitarians argues that the consequences of formal equality are often unequal, and that equality is a substantive principle which is supposed to ensure that the quantity of welfare between people is as close as possible.89 Of course, it should be noted that although utilitarianism advocates some quantitative adjustment of certain welfare, it by no means advocate that everyone should have exactly the same result. Utilitarianism objects to the absolute egalitarianism of distribution results.

89

Rosen (1998).

4.3 The Transcending of Classical Utilitarianism

123

Equality of Distribution Results Can utilitarianism provide a justice of distribution? In this regard, contemporary utilitarianism explains the justice of distribution under utilitarian principles by refuting Amartya Sen’s criticism. In the second chapter of the book, Sen’s hypothesis is elaborated in which we suppose there are two individuals in society: A is in good health, while B is disabled. Because of the different physical conditions between A and B, at any given income level, A will get more utility from the same resources than B. therefore, Sen argues that social resources will be tilted in favor of A. However, contemporary utilitarians have challenged it by saying that it is precisely because of the different natural conditions between A and B that, under the utilitarian distribution criterion, B will get more instead. Because it is exactly because B is disabled and A is healthy, B’s marginal utility must be greater than that of A for any additional income.90 Suppose that A and B have the same income. Because B suffers from disability, B will inevitably need to bear certain medical consumption in addition to satisfying the necessary consumer goods, such as purchasing wheelchairs or other medical equipment, and then part of B’s income for purchasing such medical equipment as wheelchairs will inevitably produce marginal utility far greater than that of normal people. At the same time, the existence of medical consumption makes B’s residual income [residual income = fixed income − (consumption of necessities + medical consumption)] less than A’s residual income [residual income = fixed income − consumption of necessities]. As a result, the marginal utility of B’s non-medical income is also higher than that of A. Since B’s marginal utility is higher than that of A, utilitarianism will distribute more additional income to disabled B rather than the healthy A. Utilitarianism does not produce distributional results that contradict egalitarian intuitions. For utilitarianism, the right way to allocate resources is to allocate resources to people who can produce greater marginal utility, and the only reason someone will get the resource is that he can use that resource to produce greater utility. It can be seen that the utilitarian distribution principle has nothing to do with the social and economic status of the people to be distributed. However, because the poor, the disabled and other socially vulnerable groups have fewer social resources, they may have a greater marginal utility of the additional income, that is, the same resources will play a greater role in the hands of the vulnerable groups. Therefore, the actual distribution result of utilitarianism will favor the disadvantaged people in society, and the distribution results of utilitarianism is in line with the moral requirement of egalitarianism.

90

Stein (2006), pp. 41–45.

124

4 The Theoretical Evolution of Utilitarianism

References Arneson R (2005) Sophisticated rule consequentialism: some simple objections. Philos Issues 15:235–251 Barry B (1989) Utilitarianism and preference change. Utilitas 1:278–282 Bentham J (1907) An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Clarendon Press, Oxford Berlin I (2002) Liberty: incorporating four essays on liberty. Oxford University Press, Oxford Brandt RB (1979) A theory of the good and the right. Oxford University Press, Oxford Brandt RB (1992) Morality, utilitarianism, and rights. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Brink D (1993) The separateness of persons, distributive norms, and moral theory. In: Frey RG, Morris CW (eds) Value, welfare, and morality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 255 Frey RG (ed) (1985) Act-utilitarianism, consequentialism and moral rights. In: Utility and rights. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 121–136, pp. 61–85 Goodin RE (1991) Actual preferences, actual people. Utilitas 3(1):113–119 Goodin RE (1995) Utilitarianism as a public philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Hamlin AP (ed) (1996) Ethics and economics, vol 2. An Elgar Reference Collection, Cheltenham Hare RM (1981) Moral thinking: its levels, methods, and point. Clarendon Press, Oxford, p 180 Hare RM (ed) (1989) Ethical theory and utilitarianism. In: Essays in ethical theory. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 212–230 Hare RM (1996) Rights, utility, and universalization: reply to J. L. Mackie. In: Hamlin AP (ed) Ethics and economics, vol 2. An Elgar Reference Collection, Cheltenham, p 73 Haslett DW (1990) What is utility? Econ Philos 6(1):65–94 Hausman DM, McPherson MS (1996) Economic analysis and moral philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Hirose I (2013) Aggregation and the separateness of persons. Contemp Eth Utilitas 25(2):182–205 Holbrook D (1988) Qualitative utilitarianism. University Press of America, Lanham Hooker B (2000) Ideal code, real world: a rule-consequentialism theory of morality. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York Hume D (1740) A treatise of human nature. The Floating Press, Auckland, New Zealand Kamm F (1992) Non-consequentialism, the person-as-an-end-in-itself, and the significance of status. Philos Public Affairs 354–389 Keller S (2009) Welfarism. Philos Compass 4(1):82–95 Kymlicka W (2002) Contemporary political philosophy: an introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford Lukes S (1974) Power: a radical view. The Macmillan Press, London Lyons D (1982) Utility and rights. In: Pennock JR, Chapman JW (eds) Ethics, economics, and the law: Nomos XXIV. New York University Press, New York, pp 107–138 Mackie JL (1996) Rights, utility, and universalization. In: Hamlin AP (ed) Ethics and economics, vol 2. An Elgar Reference Collection, Cheltenham, p 69 McCloskey (1985) Respect for human rights versus maximizing good. In: Frey RG (ed) Utility and rights. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp 121–136 Mill J (2009) Utilitarianism. The Floating Press, Auckland, New Zealand Nagel T (1979) Mortal questions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Parfit D (1984) Reasons and persons. Clarendon Press, Oxford Postema GJ (2006) Interests, universal and particular: Bentham’s utilitarian theory of value. Utilitas 18(2):109–133 Railton P (1984) Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality. Philos Public Aff 13(2):134–171 Rawls J (1999) A theory of justice. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Regan T (1983) Utility and equality: some neglected problems. J Value Inq 17(1):33–52 Robert N (1971) Anarchy, state and Utopia. The Clarendon Press, Cambridge

References

125

Rosen F (1998) Individual sacrifice and the greatest happiness: Bentham on utility and rights. Utilitas 10(2):129–143 Ross WD (2007) The right and the good. Clarendon Press, Oxford Scanlon TM (1990) Contractualism and utilitarianism. In: Sen A, Williams B (eds) Utilitarianism and beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 111 Sen A, Williams B (eds) (1990) Utilitarianism and beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Sen A (1992) Inequality reexamined. Oxford University Press, Oxford Sen A (2004) On ethics and economics. Blackwell Publishers, Malden Sidgwick H (1962) Method of ethics. Macmillan and Company Limited, London Singer MG (1971) Generalization in ethics. Russellk Russell, New York Singer P (2011) Practical ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Smart JJC (1991) Distributive justice and utilitarianism. In: Arthur J, Shaw WH (eds) Justice and economic distribution. Prentice Hall, Englewood Clifs, p 110 Stein SM (2006) Distributive justice and disability: utilitarianism against egalitarianism. Yale University Press, New Haven and London Sumner LW (2003) Welfare, happiness, and ethics. Clarendon Press, Oxford Taurek JM (1977) Should the numbers count. Philos Public Aff 6(4):293–316

Chapter 5

The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual and the Community

Although contemporary utilitarianism inherits the basic features of classical utilitarianism, it is already a new utilitarian theory. The “new” development of contemporary utilitarianism is manifested in the change of its ontology, and in the process of reflecting on classical utilitarianism, contemporary utilitarianism no longer holds a purely individualistic position, but holds a claim that requires attention to the relationship between human beings, and calculates the utility value of an act in the relationship of interpersonal interaction. Contemporary utilitarianism attaches great importance to the role of rules, treats individuals and communities in a relatively balanced approach, endows communities a relatively independent subject status, and reconstructs the basic norms of utilitarianism on the position of treating individuals and communities in a balanced manner. It is because of the breakthrough of ontology that contemporary utilitarianism undergoes the theoretical evolution abovementioned and achieves the effective compatibility of the utility principle with the theory of rights, the theory of equality with the theory of public interests, so that utilitarianism had won a place in discussion of contemporary political philosophy. It can be said that the trajectory of contemporary utilitarianism’s evolution is along the direction from individualism to community-individual equilibrium.

5.1 The Individualistic Nature of Classical Utilitarianism Sumner, in his evaluation of classical utilitarianism, makes it clear that classical utilitarianism is an individualistic theory.1 The utility is the individual’s utility, the individual is the bearer of the experience of pleasure, and the individual’s judgment has sole authority in the evaluation of consequences. No one knows his interest better than an individual himself, and the individual himself is the best judge of his 1

Sumner (1981), p. 178.

© Peking University Press 2023 S. Liu, The Contemporary Evolution and Reform of Utilitarianism, Interests Politics Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7363-7_5

127

128

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

utility. At the same time, the individual has a logical priority, the individual exists preceding the community, and the community is a collection of individuals. Classical utilitarianism believes that the individual is the basic unit of analysis, and that the total social utility or the greatest happiness of the society is just the aggregation of individual’s happiness; the total social utility is a function of the individual utility, and the change of the individual utility directly affects the change of the total social utility. As Mill put it, “The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it”.2 In addition, classical utilitarians generally advocate that an individualistic political and economic system, with the defense of individual interests as the basic principle of social political and economic life.

5.1.1 Fictious Community 5.1.1.1

Community is a Tool for Maximizing Individual Utility

The goal of classical utilitarianism is to maximize the overall social utility, but classical utilitarianism never considers the social community as an organic body. In this regard, Bentham explicitly states that “the community is a fictitious body”,3 which is a collection of all the individuals who composes the community. First of all, classical utilitarianism takes the individual’s subjective experience as the basis of one’s knowledge of the external world, which is characterized by epistemological individualism. The reason why classical utilitarianism recognizes utilitarianism as the subjective psychological experience of human beings is that the theory holds that only the actual experience of individuals is uniquely true and that experience is the only source of human knowledge of the world. As Lukes states, “(individual) experience is the source of knowledge, that all knowledge arises within the circle of the individual mind and the sensations it receives.”4 According to Bentham, although there are different types of pleasure and pain, for example, complex mental experiences such as the pleasures (pains) of memory, the pleasures (pains) of imagination; and simple mental experiences such as the pleasures (pains) of senses, and the pleasures of acquisition (the pains of privation). All types of pleasures and pains can be reduced to perception, and all types of pleasure and pain experiences are based on the subject’s sensations. F. Rosen argues that “Bentham wanted to link his account of pleasure and pain more closely to what humans actually experienced, and not exclude any pleasures and pains actually felt as elements of human experience.”5 James Mill inherits the view of Bentham that the difference between pleasure and pain lies only in the different sensations felt by individuals. One can understand things only through actual experience, and actual personal experience is the whole 2

Mill (2009b). Bentham (1907), p. 17. 4 Lukes (1984), p. 107. 5 Rosen (1998). p. 135. 3

5.1 The Individualistic Nature of Classical Utilitarianism

129

source of phenomena explanation.6 Mill even insists on a strong empiricist form of epistemology, arguing that all knowledge needs to be based on empirical induction, and that we know that the sun will rise tomorrow because we have seen it rise countless times before. Mill denies the possibility of a priori knowledge based entirely on reason, claiming even that knowledge of logics and mathematics also rests on the generalization of high probability which is derived from experience. Among the theories of classical utilitarianism, only Sidgwick gives some importance to the idea of reason, but Sidgwick also emphasizes that “For all pleasures are understood to be so called because they have a common property of pleasantness”.7 It can be said that epistemological individualism is a universal feature of classical utilitarianism, which makes classical utilitarianism regard the individual as the sole bearer of utility. Second, classical utilitarianism regards the individual as the best judge of selfinterest, arguing that no one understands his own interests better than himself. For example, Bentham argues that the individual is the best judge of self-interest, and that if individuals are free to determine what they can produce, how to contract, as well as what they can purchase, things will generally turn out to be the best. Mill also argues that society can never know the individual as well as the individual knows himself, that only the individual knows his own interests and motives best, and that the intervention of others or the community in the individual’s choices is likely to lead to wrong consequences. In the famous book On Liberty, Mill asserts that “the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place”.8 “But the opinion of a similar majority, imposed as a law on the minority, on questions of self-regarding conduct, is quite as likely to be wrong as right; for in these cases public opinion means, at the best, some people’s opinion of what is good or bad for other people; while very often it does not even mean that; the public, with the most perfect indifference, passing over the pleasure or convenience of those whose conduct they censure, and considering only their own preference.”9 Thus, Mill’s emphasis on personal feelings alone as a criterion for determining the level of human utility, and the classical utilitarians’ emphasis on human subjectivity in utilitarian judgment, made utilitarianism at that time a progressive theory capable of refusing to bend the knee to conventions. Third, the value of the legislator is to discover the true utility of people. Utilitarianism is a social and public ethic, a political philosophy that guides the legislator in the use of power to make people better off. Many later researchers have argued that the legislator exists to serve the general well-being of society, often citing the classic Bentham statement that “the legislator’s job is to use her knowledge of human nature to design laws that maximize the happiness of her people”.10 In fact, in the context of classical utilitarianism, the maximization of the general or overall happiness of 6

Mill (1992), p. 143. Sidgwick (1962). 8 Mill (2009b), pp. 141–142. 9 Mill (2009), p. 142. 10 Morgan (2007), p. 9. 7

130

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

society is identical to the maximization of individual happiness. Based on epistemological individualism, classical utilitarianism takes human feelings of pleasure and pain as the only source of people’s knowledge of the world. Since nature puts all human actions under the domination of pleasure and pain, people’s perceptions of pleasure and pain can be communicated, and it is possible to reach a general agreement on “what makes people happy”. Therefore, the legislators do not impose certain policies and regulations on the community according to their own preferences or a priori value standards. Instead, they try to find the way of conduct from the perspective of the majority, which will maximize the happiness of the most community members, in order to correct individual biases in the perception of pleasure and pain due to prejudice, short-sightedness, misunderstanding and other factors. In other words, the value of the legislator’s existence is to stand in a neutral perspective and use feelings of pleasures and pains of the majority as a universal rule to guide both the individual and the public conduct. As Kelly argues, the legislator has only accepted the general principles that contribute to the well-being of each individual, and the difference in conduct between the legislator and the members of the community is that the members of the community adopt an act-utilitarian decision-making process, while the legislator adopts a rule-utilitarian decision-making process.11 It is exactly for this reason that the principle of utility has become a universal principle guiding legislation, and according to the principle of utility “the same arrangement that would serve for the jurisprudence of anyone country, would serve with little variation for that of any other”.12 It is the duty of the legislator to artificially unite individual interests with general happiness when individuals are blinded by prejudice, that is, to make human’s behavior fit with human’s general perception of pain and pleasure by means of law, and to achieve, by law, what cannot be achieved by natural sentiments.13 The existence of the legislator is not, in the final analysis, to achieve the general happiness of society, but to guide the individual in maximizing his or her self-utility by means of laws and policies, and social life with the form of community is the necessary way to maximize the individual’s utility.

5.1.1.2

There is no Independent Public Interest

By saying there is no independent public interest, it means the public interest is not a concept opposite to individual interest; rather, the public interest is the sum of each individual’s interest. In this regard, classical utilitarianism has a clear statement. For example, Bentham has remarked: “the interest of the community is one of the most general expressions that can occur in the phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning of it is often lost. When it has a meaning, it is this. The community is a

11

Schofield (2006), p. 41. Bentham (1990), p. 119. 13 Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism, translated by Mary Morris, London: Faber & Faber limited, p. 67. 12

5.1 The Individualistic Nature of Classical Utilitarianism

131

fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then is, what?—the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it. It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding what is the interest of the individual.”14 In other words, the public interest of classical utilitarianism is embedded in the individual interest, and in the process of maximizing one’s own happiness, the individual also objectively achieves the goal of maximizing the overall utility of the community. The process of aggregation of interests in classical utilitarianism is the process of formation of the public interest, in which the individual is an isolated atomized individual and the public interest changes with the change of individual interest. First, the individual, in the classical utilitarian perspective, is the abstract individual. Lukes argues that the abstract individual is one of the basic elements of the individualism. “According to this conception, individuals are pictured abstractly as given, with given interests, wants, purposes, needs, etc.” “The crucial point about this conception is that the relevant features of individuals determining the ends which social arrangements are held (actually or ideally) to fulfil, whether these features are called instincts, faculties, needs, desires, rights, etc., are assumed as given, independently of a social context.”15 Although Bentham, in his criticism of Locke’s social contract theory, does not agree with Locke’s claim that “a man is fully mature as soon as he comes into the world”, the individual under classical utilitarianism does not jump out of this logic. The “utilitarian individual” was also a given, abstract individual who detached from the social environment and historical stage. In classical utilitarian theory, everyone is a rational person who seeks pleasure and avoids suffering, pursues his own happiness or pleasure maximization, and the pursuit of maximum happiness has become the fundamental characteristic of human beings, and has subsequently become a universal criterion to guide individuals in moral judgment and social practice. Second, individuals, in the view of classical utilitarianism, are isolated individuals who are not related to each other. Classical utilitarianism holds that the individual has only one moral obligation—to promote the maximization of utility. Classical utilitarianism cannot accommodate the special relationships between people, even the most basic social relationships of family and blood relatives and the special obligations that arise from them. If the family can be accommodated in the natural state of Hobbes’ sense, then classical utilitarianism completely ignores all special relationships between people. Finally, the public interest changes with the individual interest. Classical utilitarianism holds that only individuals are observable objects in the social sphere and only individuals are the undertakers of utility. Therefore, individual’s interest is the fundamental and only existing interest entities. The public interest is only an aggregation of individual interests, a function that changes according to the individual interests. Community is neither an independent interest subject nor an independent 14 15

Bentham (1907), p. 17. Lukes (1984), p. 68.

132

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

type of interest, and there is no social public interest in social life with community as its subject.

5.1.2 Individualistic Political and Economic System In the public life of society, the basic principles of classical utilitarianism give rise to a political and economic system characterized by individualism. Since the individual is the only independent entity and the best judge of self-interest. The best political system, then, is a democracy that allows people to elect their leaders periodically, and only the democracy can ensure that the interests of leaders are consist with the public interests. In this regard, Bentham uses the example of people choosing shoes to illustrate utilitarianism needs democracy. “It is not every man that can make a shoe; but when a shoe is made, every man can tell whether it fits him without much difficulty”.16 In terms of economic system, classical utilitarianism inherits the theoretical tradition of Adam Smith: supporting market economy and opposing economic control by the state.

5.1.2.1

The Ideal Political System is Representation

Classical utilitarianism inherits the liberal view of political individualism. On the one hand, government is built on the consent of individuals, or the consent of individuals is the primary source of governmental legitimacy or authority. However, classical utilitarianism rejects the “consent” that precedes government, i.e., it rejects the contract made by individuals in the state of nature as the source of legitimacy of governmental authority. Classical utilitarianism holds that all political institutions do not appear out of thin air, but are man-made products, and that the origin and development of any political system depends on the will of humans. Moreover, political systems do not grow on their own once they arise; any stage of their development is the result of the interaction of people’s willpower. Thus, the source of legitimacy of government is never a contract made by individuals in a state of nature, but it is manifested in successional approbation in free elections. On the other hand, political representations are representations of individual interests, not of orders, groups, estates, social functions or social classes.17 Classical utilitarianism holds that the best form of government is one in which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, should be vested in the entire community. Every citizen not only has a voice in the exercise of this ultimate sovereignty, but is also, at least at certain times, required to play a part in the government’s participation in and deliberations of state affairs, to perform certain local or general public

16 17

Morgan (2007), p. 18. Lukes (1984), p. 79.

5.1 The Individualistic Nature of Classical Utilitarianism

133

duties personally.18 However, the size and demographics of modern society make it impractical for everyone to participate personally in public affairs, so the ideal form of government is representative government.

Electoral System—The Best Political Arrangement Ensuring the Public Interest in Line with the Individual Interest Classical utilitarians were all proponents of democracy. In his later years, Bentham raised the question of “who will guard the legislator”? If it is the realistic choice of everyone to pursue the maximization of individual utility, how can we ensure that the legislator is not using public resources to maximize his own utility? In other words, if there is no identity between the legislator’s interest and the overall happiness, the legislator’s interest may be transformed into an evil interest that is detrimental to the social utility. As Bentham repeatedly fails in his political practice of persuading monarchs or legislators to adopt his views, especially after the rejection of his Panopticon Proposal, Bentham begins to cast doubts on the motives of legislators’ own conducts. Bentham begins to realize that the rulers or legislators themselves were selfishness, “in politics as everywhere else, the spirit of corporation is the worst enemy of the spirit of the principle of public utility; and the aristocracy is a corporation, a particular society formed at the heart of society as a whole, with interests other than those of that society”.19 Thus, in his later writings, Bentham places great emphasis on democracy, arguing that the best political arrangement is the one that allows people to elect their own rulers periodically, and that only a system of periodic elections can force the rulers or legislators to align with the interests of the people (the many individuals who have the right to vote). Since the public interest is the aggregation of the interests of all individuals in the community, the secret ballot will allow everyone to elect the most eligible candidate—who will advance the voters’ interests to the greatest extent. Thus, the candidate elected is the one who has attracted the greatest number of votes, and the candidate elected represents the greatest interest of the largest number of people. A system of periodic elections would force the elected candidate to maintain the interests he or she campaigned for so as not to lose votes in the next round of elections. Bentham argues that once individuals in a community generally realize that democracy meets their own interest needs, they will demand democracy, and then, even if legislators are completely selfish, in order to stay in power, legislators need to align themselves with the public’s interests. James Mill fully inherits the claim of Bentham that representative government is the only form of government that could guarantee public power from abuse. At the same time, representative government requires two safeguard measures: one, regular elections; and two, the right of every adult male to vote. Regular elections ensure that 18

Mill (2011), p. 38. Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism, translated by Mary Morris, London: Faber & Faber limited, p. 254.

19

134

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

the interests of representatives are always in line with the interests of the constituents they represent, and prevent representatives from abusing the power granted to them by the people. James Mill argues that regular elections can effectively curb the growth of nefarious interests, just as the free market can produce maximum social benefits under the command of “an invisible hand”, so a political system under a regular election system can best maximize the satisfaction of people’s respective interests. At the same time, granting the right to vote to all adult males is an important measure to ensure that representative government can maintain its superiority. If only some people have the right to vote, then the elected representatives will only represent some people’s interests, using public power to promote some people’s interests as much as possible, even by sacrificing the rest interests to maximize some people’s special interests. So, the rest people in the community will become the slaves of some people who have the right to vote.20 If this happens, the interests of the elected representatives will no longer be in line with the interests of the community, and the government will gradually become a bad government that sacrifices the general interests for special interests. John Mill further states that the importance of a regular electoral system. “The rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded when the person interested is himself able, and habitually disposed to stand up for them”. Moreover, “the general prosperity attains a greater height, and is more widely diffused, in proportion to the amount and variety of the personal energies enlisted in promoting it.”21

Universal Suffrage and Affirmative Action The classical utilitarians advocate universal suffrage.22 Bentham’s demand that suffrage should be extended to all adult males was quite radical for its time, and in private, Bentham also argues that there is virtually no practical reason to disenfranchise women. However, out of concern not to anger conservative forces, Bentham rarely defends women’s struggle for the right to vote in public. Bentham and James Mill have made the point that the broader the extension of suffrage, the more likely it is that the interests of legislators formed through elections will coincide with the interests of the community (the aggregation of all individual interests). John Mill’s discussion of universal suffrage is more specific and detailed, and he argues that women should be treated equally with men in politics, i.e., women should also have equal suffrage. Mill’s argument as to why universal suffrage should be implemented is elaborated from the following three aspects. 20

Mill (1979), p. 73. Mill (2011), p. 39. 22 Sidgwick is different from the other classical utilitarians. Although Sidgwick is a moral philosopher who is also active in public life in seeking greater educational opportunities for women, Sidgwick remains silent in his writings about the practical issues of philosophy, and thus there is no reference of universal suffrage or the struggle for women’s access to suffrage in Sidgwick’s writings. 21

5.1 The Individualistic Nature of Classical Utilitarianism

135

First, political life is a school of values, and the exercise of public rights is a powerful tool for the spiritual advancement of the individual (especially the manual laborer). This view is demonstrated by Tocqueville’s statement in his book Democracy in America that active political participation makes every American a patriot and an educated individual, and that universal political participation allows the lower and middle classes in the United States to demonstrate a clear superiority in intellectual development. Through political discussion and collective action, individuals who are confined to their private lives or who are self-interested can learn sympathy and extend it to all their fellow citizens within the community, thus transforming a self-interested individual into conscious a member of a great society. But political discussion has nothing to do with those individuals who are not entitled to vote. “Their position, in comparison with the electors, is that of the audience in a court of justice compared with the twelve men in the jury-box.”23 In a democratic society, an individual who does not have the right to vote or does not expect to fight for it, just like a looker-on who has no business with the laws except to obey them, thus making no contribution to the development and progress of the society. Therefore, “The larger wrong done by the repression of women is not the loss to women themselves who constitute one half of the community, but the impoverishment of the community as a whole, the loss of all the elements in the common stock which the free play of the woman’s mind would contribute.”24 Second, it is unjust to deprive a person of the right to vote without just cause. Everyone should be treated equally in the face of the same interest, unless it is to prevent a greater degree of disaster. In a civilized society, there should be no untouchables, viz., there should be no situation in which others can forcibly determine one’s fate without consultation with him or her. Classical utilitarianism holds that through the electoral process, the interests of the ruler can be aligned with those of the members of the community, or at least that the ruler needs to consider the interests of each individual expressed in the electoral process. However, for individuals who do not have the right to vote, their interests and desires not only cannot be treated fairly by the ruler, but also cannot be even included in the scope of the social public interests. If a person is forced to pay taxes, forced to fight in a war, forced to obey legal norms without ever being consulted, then this rule itself is unfair. “No arrangement of the suffrage, therefore, can be permanently satisfactory in which any person or class is peremptorily excluded—in which the electoral privilege is not open to all persons of full age who desire to obtain it.”25 Third, women should have the same right to vote as men. According to Mill, “All human beings have the same interest in good government; the welfare of all is alike affected by it, and they have equal need of a voice in it to secure their share of its benefits.”26 Therefore, there is no reason to maintain that women should not have the same right to vote. On the one hand, in terms of the difference between men 23

Mill (2011), p. 108. Hobhouse (2009). 25 Mill (2011), p. 109. 26 Mill (2011), p. 119. 24

136

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

and women, women are born physically weaker than men and need more protection from the law and society. Moreover, even if we consider women to be a subordinate class or group that is naturally subordinate to the family, we also cannot deny that women need political rights, that their natural vulnerability makes them more in need of protection, and that the right to vote protects women from abuse of domestic authority. In this respect, women, like men, do not need political rights in order to rule, but in order to protect them from the scourge of misrule. On the other hand, if modern society recognizes that women should not be in a state of slavery, but can have the same ideas, desires, and property as men, and can be educated and hold certain jobs, then there is even less reason to deny women the right to have equal suffrage.

Political Representatives Represent Individuals’ Interests According to Mill, representative democracy is “alone equal, alone impartial, alone the government of all by all, the only true type of democracy”.27 Under representative system, an individual elects among candidates the representative who can best promote his or her interests, and thus the representative who has the most support can represent the best interests of the largest number of people. What representatives (senators) represent is the interests of many majorities rather than certain collective interest, such as the interest of a particular group or class. Each representative is a representative of a group of like-minded voters, who may represent a thousand or two thousand or five thousand voters according to a quota; each voter will approve his or her representative, and the representative will identify with his or her voters. Each voter may be willing to entrust the representative to represent his or her own interests because the representative can best express the voter’s own interests, or because he or she respects the representative’s competence and character. In short, the representative is the representative of the voter’s personal interests, representing the voter himself.

5.1.2.2

Objection to State Interference in the Free Choice of Individuals

The expression of classical utilitarianism on individual liberty is concentrated in Mill’s book On Liberty, where Mill believes that liberty plays an important role in the moral growth and personality development of individuals. Although legislation can regulate the specific behavior of individuals, laws that restrict liberty ultimately affect the morality and self-development of individuals. Therefore, according to Mill, it is necessary to leave a certain space for the development of individual liberty, and even the principle of utility cannot infringe upon the negative liberty of individuals. According to Mill, some conducts that affects only the agent himself is then the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises “first, the inward domain of 27

Ibid., p. 106.

5.1 The Individualistic Nature of Classical Utilitarianism

137

consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological… Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.”28 For any form of society, if the three types of liberty mentioned above are not absolutely respected in the society, it then is not a free society; if there is any restriction or hindrance to the three types of liberal behavior, it is not a real free society. Mill further states that individual behavior is subject to the regulation of social rules only in regions that involves others—when it causes direct and definite harm to the interests of others; In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute, and “over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”29 Mill’s principle of liberty, the “no-harm principle,” not only defines the space for individual freedom, indicating that the individual has absolute sovereignty in the area that concerns him or her only, but also, “no-harm” liberty plays an important role in the overall development of the individual. The “no-harm” freedom plays an important role in the overall development of the individual. “Among the works of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself.” “Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing”.30 Therefore, the development of human nature requires constant trial and error. Only by allowing individuals to live as they wish without harming others, can they provide an adequate, learnable template for a worthwhile life. For example, Mill suggests that our eccentrics perform for us an essential service. They are willing to take on a hostile society in the hope of discovering something beyond the status quo. While these ways of behaving may seem bad or even disgusting to others, the eccentricity can provide resources that can be drawn upon in the search for a life that is truly worth living. “It should be noted that Mill finds a clear connection between the search for a life that is worth living, and a search for the truth.”31 Only under the premise of liberty can an individual live a life on his or her own terms, and only then can he or she continually discover the foundational patterns that can be used to build a life of value. Therefore, since a worthy life is supported by the principle 28

Mill (2009), pp. 22–23. Mill (2009), p. 19. 30 Mill (2009), pp. 99–100. 31 Fitzpatrick (1988), p. 74. 29

138

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

of utility, absolute individual liberty, a necessary precondition for the discovery of a worthy life, is also supported by utilitarianism.

5.1.2.3

Opposition to State Intervention in Economy

In the socio-economic sphere, classical utilitarianism supports economic individualism. Individualism seeks for the inevitable basis of socio-economic organization in the individual and his psychological tendencies, believes that individual behavior is sufficient to provide the principle of social and economic organization, and strives to achieve social progress through the individual by bringing the individual every opportunity to develop themselves freely as far as possible. The economic individualism of classical utilitarianism comes from the tradition of Adam Smith. It holds that all government interventions in the market is questionable and it supports a laissez-faire form of economy, arguing that through the “invisible hand”, individuals can realize the promotion of social public interests in the process of pursuing the maximization of self-interests. Bentham argues that the state should not interfere with the private economy because the individual is the best judge of his or her own self-interest, and the state should remain neutral and act as a night watchman for individuals competing for their personal interests in a fair environment. According to Bentham, the economic policy of free economy, free competition, and free trade should be implemented, and without the intervention of the state, the richer the individual is, the richer the state will be. In his Defense of Usury, Bentham focuses on his economic philosophy of laissez-faire and objects to the idea of government intervention. The main debate on the issue of usury is whether the interest rate on loans should be limited or whether a ceiling should be set to ensure the good functioning of the social economy. Smith believes that the statutory interest rate for loan should be higher than market interest rate, and that if the statutory loan rate lower than the interest rate spontaneously formed, there would be a situation in which people would circumvent the law and use the private rate of interest. However, the statutory interest rate also should not be too high, otherwise all the money to be borrowed will be transferred to speculators and wasters, because only these people can afford such a high interest rate. In this way, “A great part of the capital of the country would thus be kept out of the hands which were most likely to make a profitable and advantageous use of it, and thrown into those which were most likely to waste and destroy it. Where the legal rate of interest, on the contrary, is fixed but a very little above the lowest market rate, sober people are universally preferred, as borrowers, to prodigals and projectors. The person who lends money gets nearly as much interest from the former as he dares to take from the latter, and his money is much safer in the hands of the one set of people than in those of the other.”32 Bentham points out that Smith’s accepted notion of setting a statutory rate of interest conflicts with his notion of liberty, and since the borrower is willing to pay 32

Smith (1993), p. 475.

5.2 Theoretical Limitations Posed by the Individualism of Classical …

139

a high rate of interest on the loan, then it is unreasonable to prevent the borrowing by government intervention. First, since the loan interest is set voluntarily by the borrower and the lender, it is difficult to justify the prohibition of usury by law. According to Bentham, Smith’s objection to usury is motivated by people’s general prejudice, and people’s general hostility to the borrower stems from their frugal habits, because the lender behaves like a child who keeps his cake at a birthday party until all the other children have eaten their share. Thus, although the act of usury is objectionable on some occasions, it is an act that has been carried out with the consent of the market subjects, belonging to punishment is groundless,33 and it is not reasonable to restrict or prohibit cases that punishment is groundless. Second, banning usury does not prevent excessive waste. In reality, a large amount of profligacy is based on existing property, and there is little squandering and wasting is done through borrowing. Third, the lender is actually postponing the time of his or her enjoyment of pleasure, and is sacrificing present happiness for future happiness. By limiting the interest rate of borrowing by law, the lender will not be able to make profit and thus refuse to exchange present happiness for greater future happiness, which will have a negative impact on the economy. Fourth, restricting the interest rate of borrowing may breed more underground transactions, which not only make people evade the existing laws, but also create contempt for laws. Mill also argues that, on the whole, free markets are more efficient. As Murray states, “The freer a market is, the more abundantly it produces wealth.”34 Mill argues that “both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere.” “Restrictions on trade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, qua restraint, is an evil.” “As the principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of Free Trade, so neither is it in most of the questions which arise respecting the limits of that doctrine”.35 On the issue of freedom, it is much better to leave people to their own devices than to restrict them.

5.2 Theoretical Limitations Posed by the Individualism of Classical Utilitarianism 5.2.1 Epistemological Limitations As can be seen from the preceding content, classical utilitarianism is characterized by epistemological individualism, which regards personal experience as the sole source of all knowledge. As Locke remarks, Our knowledge conversant about our ideas 33

Bentham (1907), p. 141. Murray (1997), p. 27. 35 Mill (2009), pp. 161–162. 34

140

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

only. “Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them.”36 Knowledge is “nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this perception is, there is knowledge, and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge.”37 Based on this, Mill argues that the first principle, the principle of utility, can only be acquired by appealing to one’s senses and inner consciousness. Just as the only proof that an object is visible is that one really sees it, the only proof that an object is audible is that one really hears it, and the only proof that something is worth desiring is that people really desire it. Classical utilitarianism holds that pleasure and pain are actual experiences of the individual’s senses or inner consciousness, that pleasure is a pleasurable experience perceived by the individual, that pain is an unpleasant experience perceived by the individual, and that a pleasurable sensory state or mental experience is the only thing worth desiring for its own sake. Therefore, what people say and what people think is governed by pleasure and pain, and all things worth desiring are related to achieving pleasure and avoiding pain. “The ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality.”38 Therefore, for classical utilitarianism, utilitarianism is the pursuit of pleasurable experiences of pleasure, which are purely subjective personal experiences and do not include the evaluation of the external world. On the basis of the above, the author has explained the disadvantages of the purely subjective utility concept of classical utilitarianism. However, these criticisms about purely subjective utility concept have overlooked an important aspect, namely, the errors caused by the epistemological limitations of classical utilitarianism. It is precisely because classical utilitarianism has the characteristics of epistemological individualism that the classical utility concept possesses pure subjectivity. The pure subjective interpretation of utility also makes classical utilitarianism fall into a dilemma. Taking the experience of pain as an example, classical utilitarianism holds that pain is morally wrong, and therefore the act of causing pain to people is also morally wrong. But why is pain morally wrong? There are two explanations in the context of classical utilitarianism. The first interpretation holds that the pain itself is morally wrong, and this view is represented by Bentham. A pain is a sensation of a special sort,39 and each kind of pain is a particular, non-reductive experience. Regardless of the source and causation of pain, pain itself is evil or morally wrong. However, it is difficult to explain why pain should be given a moral value if it is understood only 36

Locke (1975), p. 525. Ibid. 38 Mill (2009), p. 14. 39 Ryle (2009). 37

5.2 Theoretical Limitations Posed by the Individualism of Classical …

141

as a particular experience; in other words, if pain is only an emotion or experience, it cannot be deduced that pain has the moral role claimed by classical utilitarianism. The reason why classical utilitarianism believes that the pain has moral significance is because pain is a negative value for the subject of suffering, a negative value perceived by the subject, and pain is equivalent to harm. However, if a patient is exemplified by such psychosurgical techniques as lobotomy. In these cases, subjects often report that, while they still feel the pain, they no longer mind it.40 This example, although extreme, breaks with the classical utilitarian understanding based on epistemological individualism—that pain itself has a moral role, or that pain itself has an inherent negative value. In people’s everyday experience, whether sensory or psychological, a subjective experience of pain is often associated with an actual harm to the individual. For example, a memory is painful because an actual harm to the individual’s interests takes place at the moment of remembering, or a physical pain is painful because the subject has suffered an actual physical injury. Pain is a signal of harm, although it is not the harm itself. Thus, pain as a psychological experience does not have moral value in itself, but is the subject’s reflection of the actual harm. Why is pain morally wrong? The second interpretation of classical utilitarianism is that pain is always accompanied by injury, which is a subjective emotion produced by the subject after being injured, and is the feedback from the subject to the injury. Sidgwick agrees more with this understanding of the pain experience. However, it is too arbitrary to assume that pain is always accompanied by injury. For example, Sumner notes, “I can remember vividly the shrieking of my leg muscles after I first completed a marathon in my younger days; since the pain was the continuing reminder of my accomplishment, I would have felt cheated without it.”41 It can be seen that the experience of pain is not always associated with actual injury, and there are even some “welcome pains”. Futhermore, the value judgment of the pain experience cannot be separated from its specific context. Therefore, in reflecting on classical utilitarianism, contemporary utilitarianism puts forth the idea that the reason why the classical utility view embodies pure subjectivity is that it believes that only personal experience is uniquely real and reliable. As a result, classical utilitarianism arbitrarily assumes that only pleasure and pain have the only intrinsic value simply by observing people’s tendency to avoid suffering in their lives, thus making the classical utilitarianism lack the evaluative component it should have. In this regard, contemporary utilitarianism argues that emotions of pleasure are not always associated with valuable experiences and emotions of pain are not always associated with negative experiences, and that people’s subjective experiences cannot be used as a direct basis for moral judgment, so utilitarianism must be built on objectified utilitarian standards. Only based on an objective view of utilitarianism, can utilitarianism provide an evaluation standard and a distribution theory that are consistent with the actual situation.

40 41

L. W. Sumner, "Welfare, Happiness, and Pleasure", Utilitas, p. 208. L. W. Sumner, "Welfare, Happiness, and Pleasure", Utilitas, p. 209.

142

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

5.2.2 Theoretical Paradox There is a paradox within the classical utilitarian theory: individuals who seek to maximize their self-interest under the guidance of the principle of utility may be led to the results of their self-interest damaged. Classical utilitarianism holds that, because individuals are driven by the nature of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, each one strives to maximize utility of himself or herself, as Hobbes asserts, everyone’s spontaneous behavior always aim for some kind of benefit that is beneficial to himself. However, classical utilitarianism allows for the sacrifice of some individual interests for the sake of achieving the greater total social utility. In other words, classical utilitarianism produces the result of disrespecting individual interests under the original theoretical intention of respecting individual interests. Why does such a theoretical paradox arise? Classical utilitarianism recognizes that each one is an independent individual and that each person’s interests have equal moral value. Classical utilitarianism also believes that the interest of the community is the sum of all individual interests within the community, and that each individual in the process of maximizing the interest of himself objectively forms the result of maximizing the total utility of the community, as it goes “every Part was full of Vice, Yet the whole Mass a Paradise”.42 However, the actual situation is that each individual’s interest enters the aggregation process like a big hopper, and each individual’s interest is given the same weight and is given equal importance, but each individual’s interest also becomes part of the community’s interest. In the process of aggregation of interests, the independence of individual interests is removed, and each individual’s interests claims may be denied for utilitarian reasons. When the majority of the community with the same interests converge to form the majority interests, the different interests of the minority may be rejected or sacrificed for utilitarian reasons. Therefore, although classical utilitarianism is built on individual’s interests, taking individual’s interests as the only independent entity, classical utilitarianism cannot really guarantee the realization of individual’s interests in the aggregation of interests. For the end of the greater total social utility, the minority in the community either gives up its interests as independent individuals or changes its position to support the majority’s opinion. Consequently, public policy under classical utilitarianism is often characterized by the “Tyranny of the Majority”. As Tocqueville argues, under the theoretical premise of equality of identity and independence of the individual, the majority has a natural advantage in a democracy, and “the absolute sovereignty of the will of the majority is the essence of democratic government, for in a democracy there is nothing outside the majority capable of resisting it”.43 “Hence, the majority in the United States has immense actual power and a power of opinions which is almost as great. When once its mind is made up on any question, there are, so to say, no obstacles which can retard, much less halt, its progress and give it time to hear the wails of those it 42 43

Mandeville (1988), p. 9. De Tocqueville (1969), p. 246.

5.2 Theoretical Limitations Posed by the Individualism of Classical …

143

crushes as it passes.”44 Regarding this, Mill, in his book On Liberty, carves out a relatively independent space for individual liberty through the “no-harm principle,” which to some extent mitigates the infringement of individual rights by the power of the majority.

5.2.3 Blind Spots in Distribution Politics is the authoritative distribution of social values, and any policy must contain a series of decisions and actions to distribute values. However, public policies dominated by classical utilitarianism tend to focus only on the efficiency generated by policies, that is, how much total social utility can be generated by a policy is the only criterion for the authoritative distribution of social resources. Classical utilitarianism is therefore often criticized by other political philosophical theories, arguing that classical utilitarianism is indifferent to the issue of fair distribution, and there are blind spots in distribution within classical utilitarianism. However, classical utilitarianism is not an anti-egalitarian theory; classical utilitarianism attaches great importance to the value of equality and takes the rule of treating the same pain in the same way and treating the same pleasure in the same way as the egalitarian basis of utilitarianism. In practice, classical utilitarian theory also pioneers in advocating egalitarian claims such as equal rights for men and women, anti-discrimination, and the need for public policy to treat all stakeholders impartially. Why, then, would classical utilitarianism, which values equality, be indifferent to the issue of equal distribution, or even focus only on the efficiency dimension of policies and institutions in their actual operation, without any concerns about the specific distribution of total social utility among the population? In essence, the theoretical defects of classical utilitarianism in terms of equal distribution are closely related to the individualistic nature of the theory. First, classical utilitarianism over-optimistically estimates the conflict of interests between people. The theory is built on the assumption that individual interests are fundamentally aligned with the general interests of the community. Classical utilitarianism holds that so-called morally right act is act that is good for both individual utility and the general utility of the community. Since good act can benefit both the individual and the community, there is no conflict between the act that aim to enhance the individual’s utility and the act that aim to enhance the community’s utility. As Mill states, “so long as they are co-operating, their ends are identified with those of others; there is at least a temporary feeling that the interests of others are their own interests. Not only does all strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others; it also leads him to identify his feelings more and more with their good, or at least with an even greater degree of practical consideration for it. He comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a being who of course 44

De Tocqueville (1969), p. 248.

144

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

pays regard to others. The good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to, like any of the physical conditions of our existence.“45 From Mill’s statement, it is clear that for classical utilitarianism, it is superfluous to consider equal distribution or to rely on the power of the state to impose a certain redistributive policy. For the interests of the individual are fundamentally consistent with the interests of others, and if the interests of each individual are thoroughly understood and unrestricted by outside interference, the principle of pleasure and pain will inevitably lead him to do what is good for others and for society as a whole. As long as individuals appeal to an impartial and neutral perspective, and adopt it to correct misconceptions based on emotional obscurity and misunderstanding bias, they can naturally achieve equal concern for the interests of others, and thus achieve an equal distribution of the total social utility among people. In other words, individuals only need to slightly limit their self-interest and control their short-sighted behavior to resolve the inherent conflict between their personal interests and the interests of others, so as to achieve harmony and consistency between people. For example, in Sidgwick’s theory, the principle of benevolence, which is used to guide the regulation of interpersonal interests, is developed from the principle of prudence in which individuals consciously balance the gains and losses of interests and take into account the interests comprehensively as a whole. For the classical utilitarians, the conflict of interests between people is quite mild, just as rational individuals weigh their short-term interests against their long-term interests, so it can be agreed upon with some consideration. Since individuals can naturally achieve equal treatment of other people’s interests, or take care of other people’s interests as if they were their own, there is obviously no need to rely on external regulation by the coercive power of the state, and therefore classical utilitarianism does not take equal distribution as a problem that requires serious attention. However, practical experience shows that classical utilitarianism’s perception of interpersonal conflicts of interest is too naive and optimistic. Due to the individualistic nature of classical utilitarianism, the theory does not place interpersonal conflicts of interest in the context of real social relations, nor does it take into account the impact of social relations and interpersonal interactions on human interests. As critics have argued, if everyone is required to consciously treat the interests of everyone affected to the same degree, as required by classical utilitarianism, then this theory undoubtedly places too high a moral demand on the individual. Second, classical utilitarianism opposes redistributive policies imposed by the state, and believes that coercive redistributive policies are not justified. (1) The “invisible hand” will automatically allocate social resources, and the state should not interfere with the natural operation of the social economy. Classical utilitarianism argues that since individual interests are consistent with the public interests of society in the long run, individuals will automatically maximize the total social utility in the process of maximizing their own interests. The authoritative distribution of social resources should also be formed naturally in the process of maximizing the individual’s own interest. According to the 45

Mill (2009), pp. 58–59.

5.2 Theoretical Limitations Posed by the Individualism of Classical …

145

description of Smith in his book The Theory of Moral Sentiments, although the proud and unfeeling landlord gazes upon his vast fields without considering the needs of others, he unconsciously contributes to the distribution of social utility due to his finite consumption and self-interest in pursuing a better life. To satisfy their desire for delicious food, the wealthy must allocate a portion of their harvest to chefs; for sweet wine, they need someone who can make it well; for comfortable living arrangements, they require builders; and for convenient lives, they rely on those who provide and maintain various trinkets. “The produce of the soil maintains at all times nearly that number of inhabitants which it is capable of maintaining. The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable.”46 As can be seen, classical utilitarianism holds that the distribution of resources is naturally formed in the economic process and that the control and intervention of the state and other powers (such as the church) in the economy is not justified. (2) According to the theory of individualism, the goal of government is to protect the interests and rights of individuals, allowing individuals to compete for personal interests to the maximum extent under the market mechanism, and government should not interfere with their free choice. Classical utilitarianism argues that the government should play the role of a night watchman or an arbitrator in social life. Moreover, the individual is the best judge and decision-maker of selfinterest, and in a fair environment the individual freely pursues the maximization of his or her interest, which often leads to the maximization of utility. (3) The classical utilitarianism contends that the basic starting point of everyone’s conduct is to maximize his or her own interest; the process of maximizing individual interest not only does not affect the interests of others, but also contributes to the enhancement of the total social utility. Therefore, for classical utilitarians, as long as the goal of utility maximization is achieved, other goals can also be achieved accordingly. As Smart notes, equal distributional outcomes are the most common distributional outcomes of act-utilitarianism theory, but not the theoretical goal it aims for.

46

Smith (1976).

146

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary Utilitarianism In the development of utilitarianism, the change of ontology is the most prominent change. In contemporary utilitarianism theory, people are no longer independent, atomized individuals, social relations and interpersonal interactions profoundly influence people’s judgment of interests and behavior choices, and social life also closely connects independent individuals together. Therefore, the social community is not just a fictitious body, but the organic entity of the community is increasing as interpersonal interactions become closer and closer; the public interest is also not just the sum of individual interest, and new social public interest with the community as the main body are constantly emerging in the increasingly frequent cooperation and interaction. Therefore, in terms of ontology, contemporary utilitarianism has gradually formed an equilibrium orientation featuring both individual priority and community consideration. Both individuals and communities have become organic entities under the vision of contemporary utilitarianism. Both individuals and communities have their initiatives in the interaction of interests and the game of interests.

5.3.1 The Basic Connotation of the Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation The community-individual equilibrium orientation is a theoretical reflection of individualism. Various theories of individualism, including classical utilitarianism, ignore the social relations formed between people in social life and the important influence of social relations on human behavior. The orientation of communityindividual equilibrium demands to attach importance to the role of community, and emphasize the important value of social public interest in political life. On the one hand, the equilibrium objects that individual interest is opposite to the interest of community. The interest of individual can only be realized in the community, and the dependence of individuals on community makes public interest and individual interest are equally important. On the other hand, the limited nature of individual rationality makes people prone to make mistakes when evaluating the consequences of individual conduct, and people may mistakenly regard some trivial goals or goals that fundamentally deviate from personal interests as goals of great value in practice, and thus make incorrect judgments on the value of an act. Therefore, the orientation of community-individual equilibrium is to recognize the relationship between individuals and the community from the dimension of social relations, and to rediscover the value and the role of community on the basis of the politics of rights, compensating for the defects of the politics of rights with the politics of public interest.

5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary …

5.3.1.1

147

The Theoretical Tension Between Communitarianism and Individualism

The theoretical tension between community orientation and individualism is also one of the driving forces in the development of political philosophy. In the classical period, the community was the basic object of political analysis, and the individual existed in dependence on the community. Since modern times, the individual has gradually become the starting point and foothold of political analysis, and the community has gradually become a fictional body composed of many individuals. In the discussion of contemporary political philosophy, the development of social practice has made scholars realize that neither a single community orientation nor an individualistic orientation can fully depict the interaction relationship and behavior choices between people. Therefore, political philosophy needs to go beyond the binary opposition between communitarianism and individualism, so as to achieve the integration of the two positions by the approach of community-individual equilibrium orientation.

Individuals Are Dependent on the Community From the ancient Greek to the Middle Ages, the emphasis on the priority of the community and public interest, and the subordination of individuals to the community, were the core ideas of political philosophy in this period. In the polis period, the individual existed dependent on the community and there was no concept of an independent individual. The individual lives in the community as a citizen of the polis, and the individual who leaves the polis has no intrinsic value. In Plato’s theory, both the intrinsic value of the individual and prospects of life all depend on the status and role of the individual in the polis. “What the individual possesses, therefore, is first and foremost a status in which he is privileged to act, and the freedom which the state secures him is not so much for the exercise of his free will as for the practice of his calling.”47 Aristotle further clarifies the dependence between the individual and the community. First, “by nature man is a political animal”,48 once leaves the polis, he is a god or a beast. The individual is an individual in the polis, and once he leaves the polis and is separated from public life, the individual loses the realistic carrier of “a man is so-called a man”. Second, “The State, though later in time than the family, is prior to it, and even to the individual, by nature”,49 the state (polis) is the product of the full development of human society, and the family and the individual are the composing parts of the state (polis). Third, the polis exists not only for material production and daily life, but the end of the polis is the good moral life. “The State is the union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by

47

Quoted from Sabine (1937). Aristotle (1998), p. 76. 49 Russel (1967), p. 185. 48

148

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

which we mean a happy and honorable life”.50 It is evident that in the polis period, the individual was not only not the basic unit of political analysis, but even not an independent conception. In the study of political philosophy, the emergence of the conception of “individual” begins with the decline of the polis. And Sabine notes “the failure of the city-state is drawn like a sharp line across the history of political thought”.51 “Man as a political animal, a fraction of the polis or self-governing city state, had ended with Aristotle; with Alexander begins man as an individual This individual needed to consider both the regulation of his own life and also his relations with the other individuals who with him composed the ‘inhabited world’”.52 After the decline of the polis, political philosophy began to focus on the concept of the individual, who not only needed to organize his or her own life individually, but also needed to adapt to life in a social association much larger than a polis. However, although the individual gradually became an independent conception, there was still a very obvious community orientation in the classical political period. The community took precedence over the individual, the interest of the community took precedence over the interest of the individual and the individual had to sacrifice his or her own personal interests for the public interest.

Awakening of Individual Values Along with the celebration of human values in the Renaissance, the individual gradually became the basic unit of political analysis, and individualism replaced the community orientation as the main mode of political analysis. In the theories of Hobbes and Locke, there are clear characteristics of individualism. Hobbes is an important representative of the theory of individualism. In Hobbes’ theory, the community is no longer a whole that takes precedence over the individual, but a collection of scattered individuals. A community is a pure fiction, and such a community cannot exist at all unless it can achieve cooperation among members of the society. Moreover, the individual is the basic unit of political analysis, and individual rights become the starting and ending point of politics. The state is created by the consent of individuals who, in order to protect their own interests from the violence of others, agree to cede their rights, establish a state, and submit to its rule. Contractarianism is a theory that envisages the process in which independent individuals form a state, moving from a state of nature to a state of society. In the state of nature, the individual has all the nature right, and “the right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own

50

Russel (1967), p. 186. Sabine (1937). 52 Tarn (1952), p. 79. 51

5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary …

149

life”.53 “Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind”,54 and this state of parity plunges individuals in the state of nature into a state of war between people. In order to protect themselves, rational individuals agree to give all their rights to the sovereign, and the state is therefore formed. According to Hobbes, the process by which the state is formed is the process by which each person promises to others to give up the innate right of self-government and to give it to the sovereign. However, the individual gives up the right of self-government and grants it to some entity (such as the sovereign) on the condition that others will also grant their right to some entity and in the same manner recognize all the actions of that entity. It is manifested that the state is an artificial creation by individuals for self-protection, that individual freedom has a higher priority than state power, and that there are limits to the individual’s obedience to the sovereign. In Hobbes’ theory, self-protection is an absolute right, and when the sovereign acts in a way that endangers the selfprotection of the individual, the individual has the right to overturn the contract and rebel against the sovereign. The individualistic character of Locke’s theory is further strengthened. Locke’s theory also appeals to the state of nature, but Locke considers the state of nature as a state of liberty, not a state of indulgence. “Though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession”.55 Individuals in the state of nature are equal and independent, and no one may infringe upon the life, health, liberty, or property of another. To better protect the individual’s right to life, liberty and property, individuals form a state by contract, which comes from the unanimous consent of all individuals. Therefore, “he that has once, by actual agreement, and any express declaration, given his consent to be of any commonwealth, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and remain unalterably a subject to it”.56 Locke especially emphasizes the protection of property rights by the state. Locke argues that in the state of nature every man has the right to the means of subsistence in nature, and that the individual has a natural right to the natural resources in which his own labor is embedded, and Locke sees the right to ownership of unowned things as arising from someone mixing his labor with unowned things. In other words, the right to property has existed in the state of nature, and the state, based on the transfer of individual rights, did not create the right to property and could not, in general, regulate it in a proper way. The scholar who has given individualism its modern meaning and made it an influential concept is Alexis de Tocqueville. Tocqueville argues that individualism is a product of modern democratic society, and that individualism is not only a sign of social progress but also a latent crisis of modern democracy. In the process of development from hierarchy to democracy, the equality of identity between people is an irresistible historical process. The equality of identity has fundamentally changed 53

Hobbes (1998), p. 86. Ibid., p. 82. 55 Locke (1690), p. 9. 56 Ibid., p. 65. 54

150

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

the relationship between people, altered the way society is connected, and given rise to independent individuals. Although individuals “who, though neither rich nor powerful enough to have much hold over others, have gained or kept enough wealth and enough understanding to look after their own needs. Such folk own no man anything and hardly expect anything from anybody. They form the habit of thinking of themselves in isolation and imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands.”57 It can be said that the democratic society breaks down the dependent connection between people formed according to the order of superiority and inferiority in the hierarchy system, and creates a social community which is built on independent and equal individuals. Tocqueville pointed out that the independence of the people is the trend of democratic society and is the result of God’s will. However, unrestricted individualism can also bring various negative effects to modern society. Although individualism is not a radical personal feeling, individualism can also destroy social virtues and eventually degenerate into egoism. “Egoism sterilizes the seeds of every virtue; individualism at first dams the spring of public virtues.”58 Individualism is a self-centered and yet self-satisfied feeling that isolates every citizen from his fellow citizens and from his friends and relatives. Under individualism, people only live for themselves, rush about and toil for personal material pleasure, take the individual as the center, and only pay attention to the life of themselves and their families. Under individualism, “Mankind, for him, consists in his children and his personal friends. As for the rest of his fellow citizens, they are near enough, but he does not notice them.”59 as Bellah put it “American cultural traditions define personality, achievement, and the purpose of human life in ways that leave the individual suspended in glorious, but terrifying, isolation.”60 It can be seen that in Tocqueville’s theory, individualism is, on the one hand, an inevitable product of the modern democratic society that comes with equality of identity. On the other hand, unrestrained individualism is bound to become a potential threat to modern democratic society, because it drags individuals away from public life, indulges individuals in the realm of private life, and alienates fellow citizens from each other. The excessive development of individualism inevitably weakens social cohesion. The excessive development of individualism inevitably weakens social cohesion. Therefore, unrestricted individualism is a threat to the cohesion within the community and a disaster unique to modern society. Consequently, the modern society needs to overcome the negative effects of individualism by maintaining public ideas and principles and institutional design, so as to prevent individuals from alienating themselves from the community under individualism. Although Tocqueville accurately foresees individualism as a new threat to modern democratic society, he does not propose an effective solution, or rather, the solution

57

De Tocqueville (1969), p. 508. De Tocqueville (1969), p. 507. 59 Ibid., p. 692. 60 Robert N. Bellah etc., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985, p. 52. 58

5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary …

151

Tocqueville proposed does not fundamentally overcome the inherent defects of individualism. By observing the operation mode of grassroots society in the United States, Tocqueville believes that the solution to the potential threat of individualism is to give full play to the role of virtue and morality, restrain the individual’s profitseeking behavior with virtue and morality, and realize self-interest in an attitude of self-discipline and self-control. In other words, Tocqueville also demands individuals to correctly understand self-interest from a relatively neutral perspective, restrain unscrupulous and mercenary profit-seeking behavior, and limit the egoistic tendency of individualism. Tocqueville’s solution does not jump out of the theoretical logic of individualism.

Rediscovering Community Under Individualism The discovery of individual value is an important progress of modern political philosophy. Under the concept of individualism, human subjectivity has been developed unprecedentedly, truly making it possible that man is the measure of all things. However, the theoretical assumption of individualism separates the actual relation between individual and community, and ignores the social relations and social attributes of human beings. From the perspective of individualism, people are only self-interest, and each one is a rational individual who pursues the maximization of interests. However, in real life, all people’s profit-seeking behavior occurs in the real social relationship network, in the joint-labor and cooperation-game with others. The maintenance, existence and development of the social community is the foundation for people to realize all self-interests. With the increasingly expansion of the scale of production, cooperation has become the main form of social and economic life, and the theory of individualism that separates the individual from the community contradicts the tendency of closer cooperation between people. More and more cooperative behavior goes beyond the interpretation of egoistic behavior. In addition, in the process of pursuing hedonism, individualism gradually deviates from the original intention of the theory of equal opportunity and free association, and individualism’s excessive emphasis on free competition and survival of the fittest has caused the phenomena of social oppression and inequality, which has in turn strengthened the centrifugal force of society. As a result, traditional individualist theories, which emphasize individual values and individual principles and set the individual against the community, have been increasingly losing their explanatory power. In discussions of political philosophy, the value of community is to be rediscovered. In Rousseau’s theory, the importance of the ethical value of community and the tendency to rediscover community is manifested. On the one hand, Rousseau believes that the individual needs to acquire spiritual and moral abilities from the community, and that all the ideas of the individual, even the self-interest of the individual, all stem from the community. “We conceive a general society on the model of our particular societies…… and only after having been citizens do we begin properly to become

152

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

men.”61 On the other hand, the public interest is the source of the individual interest. Rousseau maintains that: “There would be a universal language which would be taught to all men by nature, and which would be the first instrument of communication between them; there would be a kind of common sensorium which would ensure that all parts were coordinated; the public utility, or its opposite, would not merely be the total of individual utility and ills as in a simple aggregation, but would reside in the conjunction between the individuals and would be greater than this total; and public felicity, far from being founded on the happiness of individuals, would be the source of it.”62 Dewey, by criticizing traditional individualist thought, has proposed a new type of theory of individualism that was compatible with the social development background at that time. The difference between the new theory of individualism and the traditional theory of individualism is that former theory has eased the binary opposition between individual value and community value, and put forward the idea of rediscovering the community within the theory of individualism. First, individuals are affected by public life. Dewey rejects to the notion of individual in theories of Hobbes, Locke and other traditional individualists, arguing that the individual is either a “given, complete in itself ”,63 nor a “Newtonian atom”,64 but “is a blanket term for the immense variety of specific reactions, habits, dispositions and powers of human nature”.65 The individual has rights because he is part of society, part of the state, and the rights afforded to him depend on the protection by society and the law. Second, the real driving force of social development comes from the common reason, that is, the collective wisdom. According to Dewey, it is wrong to attribute the development of society to the profit-seeking behavior of isolated individuals in pursuing their own interests. “Individualistic initiative and enterprise have sequestrated and appropriated the fruits of collective cooperative intelligence. Without the aid and support of organized intelligence they would have been impotent—perhaps even in those activities they have shown themselves to be socially most powerful.”66 Third, the individual needs to realize his or her self-interest in social cooperation. An individual who is separated from the social process is no longer an individual in society. Social cooperation and interaction are essential for the growth of the individual and, conversely, the full development of the individual is essential for the democratization and liberalization of social life. Fourth, the realization of individual liberty needs the organized control and support of society. Dewey’s new individualism still aims to achieve full individual freedom, but Dewey believes that unrestricted economic liberty is not the best way to achieve freedom, and that social control over economic forces is necessary to achieve individual freedom. True individual freedom is “a

61

Rousseau (1994), p. 278. Ibid., p. 274. 63 Dewey (1946), p. 135. 64 Ibid. 65 Dewey (1920), p. 199. 66 Dewey (1946), p. 108. 62

5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary …

153

kind of individual freedom that is general and shared and that has the backing and guidance of socially organized intelligent control”.67 It can be seen that the New Individualist thought, which is formed in the process of reflecting on individualism, has a certain degree of the germ of the communityindividual equilibrium orientation, which tries to moderate the antagonism between the individual principle and the community principle by recovering the community. The New individualism rejects the Hobbesian-Lockean theory of individualism, arguing that it is isolating the individual against the community. However, efforts to reclaim the community within the framework of individualism have not been universally accepted. Hayek refers to this type of individualist idea, which attempts to reclaim the value of community, as pseudo-individualism, and considers it as an ideological variant of collectivism and socialism. Community theory, however, argues that the new individualism does not go beyond the analytical framework of individualism. On the one hand, the community is not an organic entity that exists in contrast to the individual, and the new individualist theory does not recognize the existence of collective rights, and thus the community cannot intervene in individual choices, neither. When the interests of the individual conflict with those of the community, New Individualism cannot restrict the exercise of individual rights on the basis of collective rights. On the other hand, New Individualism is not able to effectively regulate economic inequalities between individuals. Although New Individualism allows for state macroeconomic regulation in the economic sphere, it imposes multiple restrictions on the redistributive behavior of the state, and the community does not have a positive moral function to make its members better off, and the field of state intervention is limited to the protection of freedom.

5.3.1.2

Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation: Bridging the Binary Opposition Between Communitarianism and Individualism

The communitarianism and individualism are both extreme interpretations of the relationship between the individual and the community. In the context of contemporary political philosophy, the fundamental difference between these two orientations is that the former believes that the interest of each individual lies in the development of some talent that can be shared by all, while the latter believes that the individual interest is an interest that cannot be shared with others. Individualism holds that no one understands his or her interests better than himself or herself, and that the life of the individual can only be possibly better when the individual follows the inner feelings of himself or herself. However, community orientation alone and individualism are all undoubtedly one-sided, and people’s interests are neither universally valid nor especially unique. On the one hand, a worthwhile life must stem from the free choice of the individual. Even if the way of life that the state compels individuals to follow is the most worthwhile way of life, that compulsion itself is meaningless 67

Dewey (1946), p. 101.

154

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

unless the lifestyle can be approved by the individuals. If I don’t think an activity is meaningful, I then get nothing out of it. On the other hand, although free choice is a theoretical prerequisite for living a worthwhile life, individual choice can be wrong, and the satisfaction of goals built on false beliefs does not advance actual interests of the individual. What is important for the individual is to live a truly good life, not a life that the individual himself think it is a good life. Therefore, the so-called community-individual equilibrium orientation is, on the basis of introspecting individualism, by adding the community perspective, reconciling the theoretical tension between the two traditional analysis modes and realize the integration of individualism and community orientation. Purser and Montuori argue that the Western thinking has always been immersed in binary opposing choices, such as individualism and collectivism. Many problems in western society are exactly due to the ontological view of these phenomena as mutually exclusive and opposite existence, and consequently the basic way to solve the problems is to think beyond the view of binary opposites.68 The community-individual equilibrium orientation goes beyond the binary opposition between the individual and the community, which attempts to strike a balance between the individual’s free choice and an authentic and valuable life. At the ontological level, the community-individual equilibrium orientation does not consider the individual to be an appendage of the community, and individual values can only be embodied in a collective way; Nor does it think of community as a collection of individuals, a fictitious body without independent intrinsic value. The communityindividual equilibrium orientation recognizes the independence of both the individual and the community, both individuals and the community are independent entities, and there is not only the interaction of interests between individuals in the social community, but also the interaction of interests between individuals and the community. The community-individual equilibrium orientation not only solves the longstanding binary opposition between the principle of community and the principle of the individual in Western political philosophy, but also achieves a certain degree of equilibrium between the two. The community-individual equilibrium orientation represents a new direction of development of political philosophy after the reflection of individualistic theories. At present, many theories and ideas in contemporary political philosophy are beginning to be characterized by a community-individual equilibrium orientation. For example, Rawls’ concept of the individual in his book political liberalism is characterized by a certain equilibrium between the community and individual. In this book, Rawls clearly absorbs the concept of integration, emphasizes the social cooperation of the individual, and regards the individual as a member of the social community. “It should be emphasized that a conception of the person, as I understand it here, is a normative conception, whether legal, political, or moral, or indeed also philosophical or religious, depending on the overall view to which it belongs.”69 “Thus, we say that a person is someone who can be a citizen, that is, a normal and fully cooperating 68 69

Purser and Montuori (2000). Rawls (1893), note 77, p. 532.

5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary …

155

member of society over a complete life.”70 Donohue argues that no restriction on individual choice is as harmful as too much restrictions on individual choice. The individual is within the community, and cannot be opposed to the community; the community connects individuals and transforms the collection of individuals into a social group.71 Therefore, community’s restriction on individual freedom is integral. In order to ensure the proper functioning of society, human communities in any civilization require that individual interests be subordinated to the public interests. In the process of theoretical revolution of utilitarianism, contemporary utilitarianism also begins to have the theoretical characteristics of the community-individual equilibrium orientation. On the one hand, contemporary utilitarianism redefines the relationship between the individual and the community, changing the tendency of classical utilitarianism to fictionalize and instrumentalize the community; On the other hand, from the perspective of social cooperation, contemporary utilitarianism has launched a new study on public interests as well as the relationship between individual interests and public interests.

5.3.2 Reorientation of the Relationship Between the Individual and the Community Classical utilitarianism believes, first, that individuals are separate and independent entities, that the community is a collection of all individuals, and that the community is a fictitious body; second, individuals are the sole creators of their own needs and preferences, and are the best judges of their own interests. Contemporary utilitarianism has a new understanding of the relationship between the individual and the community: first, the community is not a fictitious body but an organic one; second, the individual’s judgment of self-interest needs to be bound by social rules and institutions.

5.3.2.1

The Community is an Organic Entity

Classical utilitarianism is a branch theory of classical liberalism, or a theoretical form of classical liberalism. Since the twentieth century, liberalism has begun to carry out a series of theoretical reflections on the relationship between the individual and the community, which has also had a profound impact on the utilitarians after Bentham and Mill. First, the community is not a collective but an organism. On the one hand, as a key figure connecting the old and the new liberalism, Mill clearly delineates the boundary between the individual and the community through 70 71

Ibid., p. 60. Donohue (1990), p. 8.

156

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

the “no-harm principle”; On the other hand, Mill’s theory also reflects the contradictory understanding of the community within classical utilitarianism (liberalism). Mill acknowledges that the individual depends on the cooperation of others in the pursuit of self-happiness, and that the individual cannot achieve the goal of selfhappiness without the support of the community. In this sense, Mill admits that no one exists in complete isolation. However, Mill also concerns that the community has an absolute advantage over the individual, and that the power of the community is sufficient to overwhelm the individual. As he remarks, when the individual is in a Tocqueville-style society, the individual is likely to abandon self-effort and rely entirely on the general arrangements of society, and under unfavorable conditions, interpersonal social interactions may lead to serious social violations of personal space.72 Later liberals argues that the beneficial, rational, cooperative, and sympathy functions of interpersonal social interaction could not be ignored; The old “collective model” needs to be replaced by a new model of relationship between the individual and the community in order to overcome the ambivalence of classical liberalism about community. As Hobhouse puts it, “Freedom is only one side of social life. Mutual aid is not less important than mutual forbearance, the theory of collective action no less fundamental than the theory of personal freedom.”73 Hobhouse has replaced the old concept of the collective with the concept of the organic body, proposing that the community is not a collection of all individuals but an organism. Hobhouse believes that a community is an organism of rational cooperative individuals. “A thing is called organic when it is made up of parts which are quite distinct from one another, but which are destroyed or vitally altered when they are removed from the whole.”74 The concept of social organism is a new concept formed by learning from biological organism, providing a new way to understand the relationship between individual and community, which goes beyond individualism. From the perspective of the organism, individuals are no longer isolated, unconnected beings; Although each individual is still an independent entity, there is an organic interconnection between the individual and the individual, and the individual and the community depend on each other. The organism is composed of many completely independent parts. Each independent part survives, operates and develops in a way that promotes the development of the whole organism, and each part supports and is supported by the other parts to achieve common development through mutual support.75 Hobhouse further draws an analogy between social community and living organisms to illustrate the organic nature of community. The human body is an organism, and the continuation of an individual’s life depends on the good performance of its functions by each organ. Although each organ exists independently, every organ belongs to and depends on the same living organism. If it is separated from the living body, it will perish or die. The life of society is also the life of many 72

Freeden (2006), p. 151. Hobhouse (1911), p. 33. 74 Hobhouse (1911), p. 34. 75 Hobhouse (1928), p. 87. 73

5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary …

157

interacting individuals. It means that “the life of the individual would be something utterly different if he could be separated from society. A great deal of him would not exist at all.”76 Even Robinson, who is stranded on a desert island, derives his mind and spirit, moral outlook and survival skills from his experience of living in a community, and thus Robinson is not a completely isolated individual. In fact, the individual and the community are always in an interactive relationship; the development of the individual needs the support of the community, and the prosperity of the community also depends on the full development of the individual. Contemporary utilitarianism absorbs and borrows from the theory of the social organism and improves the classical utilitarian understanding of the relationship between the individual and the community. First, the individual is not an isolated, atomic being; the individual is an individual in the community, and membership in the community is the basis for the individual to realize his or her self-interest in the community. Second, self-interest remains the driving force of development. The individual is an independently existence, who acts in accordance with self-interest, and individuality is the fundamental driving force of individual development and community progress. Some important functions of human beings depend not on the similarity between people, but on individuality; the pursuit of one individual can positively contribute to the pursuit of others.77 Third, it is necessary to leave some independent room for individuality to development. Hobhouse argues that “Under self-guidance individuals will diverge widely, and some of their eccentricities will be futile, others wasteful, others even painful and abhorrent to witness. But, upon the whole, it is good that they should differ. Individuality is an element of well-being, and that not only because it is the necessary consequence of self-government, but because, after all allowances for waste, the common life is fuller and richer for the multiplicity of types that it includes, and that go to enlarge the area of collective experience.”78 Fourth, contemporary utilitarianism corrects classical utilitarianism’s misconceptions about interpersonal interests and acknowledges the universal existence of social contradictions. Hobhouse, for example, maintains that classical utilitarianism builds the relationship between human interests on the assumption that interpersonal interests are “naturally consistent”, an idea that is not only inconsistent with historical experience but also overly optimistic about human nature. According to history and experience, under the guidance of self-interest, the individual’s pursuit of maximizing self-interest does not automatically lead to social peace and progress, and there are very limited situations in which interpersonal interests are consistent. In the face of limited resources, every divergence in choices will bring a conflict of interest, and the final result of the choice is at least frustrating and tragic for some people. Fifth, although there is no natural consistency of interests between people, mutual cooperation between people is the basis for the coordination of interpersonal interests. There is not only fierce competition between people, but also extensive support and cooperation. The need for support from others is the fundamental reason 76

Hobhouse (1911), p. 34. Hobhouse (1928), p. 92. 78 L.T. Hobhouse, p. 30. 77

158

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

why an independent individual automatically seeks to compromise in the process of realizing his or her own interests. Second, the community is not a fictious body but an independent entity with its own ends. Classical utilitarianism holds that the community is a fictitious body, that the community has no purpose of its own, and that the isolated, atomized individual is the sole subject of utilitarianism. Ritchie is the first to argue that the community should be seen as an organism with a certain sense of purpose and self-control, and that the community is not a fictitious body but an entity. Hobson further develops Ritchie’s view, arguing that only when something is socially desirable from the community’s point of view does it truly contribute to the welfare of the individual. Therefore, Hobson replaces the principle of maximum happiness with social utilitarianism and replaces the individualistic social view with an organic social view, claiming that taking social utility as the measuring standard is the mark of distinguishing old utilitarianism from new utilitarianism. Hobson argues that the classical utilitarianism failed in being excessively individualistic, hedonistic and quantitative.79 Hobson puts forth that organic welfare should replace pleasure or happiness as the criterion for justifying behavior. In addition to demanding the satisfaction of the higher physical and spiritual needs of individuals, organic welfare reminds us that the community is more than an aggregation of individual men and women. Each community and society should be seen as a group-life, which “possesses a collective consciousness and will” and is “capable of realizing a collective vital end”.80 Therefore, when evaluating individual conduct and public policy, it is necessary to consider not only whether the conduct contributes to the improvement of personal utility, but also whether the conduct contributes to the interests of the community. In other words, although Hobson’s neo-utilitarian and classical utilitarian are all committed to maximizing of the total utility of the society, under the vision of new utilitarianism, the community is an independent organic entity with its own consciousness and will. Hobson’s utilitarianism has completely transformed the classical utilitarian understanding of community: it replaces the atomized, individualistic fictitious body with an organic common entity. Therefore, the relationship between the individual and the community changes from the fact that the individual acts as the independent variable and the community acts as the dependent variable to the fact that the two act together while influence each other.

5.3.2.2

The Community’s Restriction on Individual Choice

Built on ontological individualism and epistemological individualism, Classical utilitarianism proposes that the individual is the best judge and the only judge of selfinterest. Built on the organic relationship between the individual and the community, contemporary utilitarianism holds that in most cases the individual is the best judge 79 80

Weinstein (2011), pp. 165–166; Hobson (1996), pp. v–vi. Weinstein (2007), p. 170.

5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary …

159

of self-interest, but the individual’s judgment of self-interest needs to be limited by social rules and institutions. The individual’s pursuit of self-interest cannot infringe on the public interest of the community, and the community needs to intervene in the individual’s behavior choices to a certain extent to achieve the goal of utility maximization. On the one hand, contemporary utilitarianism recognizes that the complexity and diversity of individual interests make it impossible for a community to achieve a consistent answer to the question of how to maximize the utility. Since individuals know their actual needs best, it is up to the individuals to make scattered and partial decisions according to their own interests, which is instrumental in helping maximize the utility. In addition, there are frequent contradictions and conflicts of interests between individuals and others, and it is difficult for individuals to treat the interests of all the involved fairly from a completely impartial perspective. For example, people generally more value the interests of those who are close to them than those of strangers. Therefore, allowing each individual to judge what is the best choice for himself or herself can also contribute to the promotion of overall utility. On the other hand, the nature of individual bounded rationality and the contradiction between personal interests and others’ interests or public interests often leads individuals to act in a way that is harmful to the public interest in the process of maximizing selfinterest. For example, shepherds who choose to overgraze for their own interests in the “tragedy of the commons” and individuals who use more gas and electricity illegally for their own comfort during wartime. If utilitarianism does not limit and restrict the behavior of individuals in pursuing their own interests, it cannot achieve and fulfill each individual’s “duty to assume fair share of the burden when a cooperative sacrifice has to be made for the general good.”81 Therefore, contemporary utilitarianism asserts that the community can intervene and correct the behavior of individuals that are harmful to the public interest on the ground of public interests, and the community’s intervention of individual behavior is justified. As Hardin put it, a good community can punish all individuals who violate rules and institutions.82 From the previous description and introduction of utilitarianism, it is clear that there are two main schools of utilitarianism: act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism. Classical utilitarianism is a typical act-utilitarianism, while contemporary utilitarianism mostly takes the form of rule-utilitarianism. Rule utilitarianism, especially ideal rule utilitarianism, constructs its theory based on the following three aspects. First, individuals possess rationality. Rationality is a natural characteristic of human beings, and utilitarianism theory is built on the recognition of individual rationality. Only by acknowledging that the individual as a chooser has certain rational ability can we believe that the goal of utility maximization can be achieved through individual utility calculation. Individual rationality manifests itself in the fact that the individual not only knows which items contribute to a good life for oneself, but also 81

R. Eugene Bales, "Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-making Characteristics or DecisionMaking Procedure", pp. 259–260. 82 Brad Hooker (ed.), Rationality, Rules and Utility: New Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Richard B. Brandt, p. 146.

160

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

is smart enough to determine how to achieve one’s own good, being capable of evaluating evidence and predict the likely outcomes of one’s actions. Second, individual rationality has a finite nature. On the one hand, the options that benefit an individual’s good life are not always obvious to the individual, and the individual needs to rely on rich background knowledge and certain cognitive skills when judging what is beneficial to the individual’s real interests, or when judging how to achieve his or her own interests. As mentioned above, the comprehension of the concept of utility must include cognitive factors, otherwise utility is likely to deviate from the true interests of the individual. Bailey argues that individuals are supposed to possess a wealth of background information and cognitive skills to not make stupid mistakes in utility calculations.83 Therefore, individuals cannot accurately calculate the utility of all actions. On the other hand, even if an individual has rich information and cognitive skills, there is no way to exhaust the utility calculation of all possible behaviors, and the behaviors that an individual can perform utility calculation are very limited. As Devlin illustrates, “If the reasonable man ‘worked to rule’ by perusing to the point of comprehension every form he was handed, the commercial and administrative life of the country would creep to a standstill.”84 Third, there is strategic interaction between individuals. The actual consequences of an action are influenced by many contingent factors, the most important of which is the strategic interaction between an individual’s behavior and those of others. The individual cannot directly determine the utility situation of his or her behavior; the ultimate utility outcome is the result of the individual’s strategic interactions with others. “Even if all of these people share a commitment to utilitarianism, they may run afoul of strategic interactions that lead them into less than optimific results.”85 Based on the above three theoretical foundations, contemporary rule utilitarianism holds that although no one knows his or her own interests better than the individual himself or herself, an individual’s judgment of his or her own interests are necessary to be restricted by many external objective factors. Individuals not only need to rely on cognitive factors to make their judgment of self-interest as close as possible to their real interests, but also need to be constrained and tested by the rules and institutions formed on the basis of community. It is plain that what the classical utilitarianism has emphasized about the individual being the sole judge of self-interest has made unrealistic expectations about the rational ability of the individual and the capacity of calculating of the individual. The individual’s pursuit of self-utility maximization needs to be universally restricted by rules, and the existence of rule-based factors is the community’s restriction on individual choice. However, whether rule utilitarianism can really play a role in restricting individual behavior depends on whether rule utilitarianism is an independent moral theory. If,

83

Bailey (1997), p. 139. Devlin (1965), p. 49. 85 Brad Hooker (ed.), Rationality, Rules and Utility: New Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Richard B. Brandt, p. 132. 84

5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary …

161

as Lyons86 and Scheffler87 argue, rule utilitarianism is not an independent theoretical claim, which is only a more complex and sophisticated act utilitarianism, and even in a broad sense rule utilitarianism may reduce to act utilitarianism, then contemporary utilitarianism has failed to achieve community-individual equilibrium. Rule utilitarianism argues that Lyons’ critique88 does not hold true for utilitarianism that appeals to general, universal, or institutionalized rules. The cognition of institutional behavior is fundamentally different from the cognition of individual behavior. Institutions and systems are stable structures formed by individuals in a community based on their cooperation, and institutions and systems provide the basis for individual cognition. Lyons’s criticism assumes that there is no cost to the replacement of social cognition. But in fact, even if the violation of the institution (general rules) can produce greater utility in some circumstances, the cost of the process to establish a new institution (general rules) to determine when the institution can be violated and when the institution cannot be violated, is far more than the utility produced by a particular behavior that violates the institution can compensate for. Rule utilitarianism asserts that: “The typical individual cannot be supposed to know enough to know that violation of a rule in this case would be good but is supposed to know enough to know that following some rule is typically good.”89 Therefore, ruleutilitarianism, which appeals to general rules, will not reduce to act-utilitarianism, and the community will help to achieve the goal of maximization of overall utility by restricting individual behavior to pursue self-utility.

5.3.3 Cooperation Creates New Public Benefits Classical utilitarianism holds that the so-called public interest is the sum of the interests of all members of the community. Contemporary utilitarianism holds that the overall interests produced by all the individuals in a community based on social cooperation, are greater than the sum of the individual interests produced by the same members of a society based on individual efforts, and that the newly added interests come from the social cooperation. The community is one of the creators of new interests, and through social cooperation the community generates new public 86

Lyons (1965), pp. 119–160. Scheffler (1982), pp. 2–3. 88 Lyons argues that rule-utilitarianism is the same as act-utilitarianism in a broad sense. Lyons maintains that under rule-utilitarianism, “taking one certain course of action X” means to accept the best result this rule may produce; if taking another course of action Y in case C will produce a better result, then the rule will be revised to “taking the course of action X, except in case C”. Lyons argues that this type of revision includes a general situation in which the rule will be modified in such a way whenever an exception occurs. This means that in virtually every case, the truly justifiable action is still the one that produces the best result, and in this regard, the rule-utilitarian criterion for judging the result of actions is the same as that of act-utilitarianism. 89 Brad Hooker (ed.), Rationality, Rules and Utility: New Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Richard B. Brandt, p. 133. 87

162

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

interests that are independent of individual interests. Therefore, there is an interactive relationship between public interest and individual interest in social life. The community can restrict individual interests based on collective rights, and individual interests need to be restricted not only by the “no harm principle”, but also by the no harm to public interest. Hobhouse argues that social cooperation is as important as social competition, and that social cooperation is a fundamental fact that has existed since human beings come to exist. Hobson further points out that social cooperation can create additional social wealth. If there are three people to build a ship together, the value eventually generated will exceed the sum of their individual contributions, and the additional part is the value created by the community and belongs to the interests of the community. As an independent entity, the community creates value in the same way as individuals and is therefore entitled to claim its own rights to the additional interests in the same way as individuals. Hobson holds that the value created by the community does not come from individual activities, but from public causes and public needs, and organic cooperation is a productive force.90 “By providing him a market of exchange, has given a social value to his product which cannot be attributed to his individual efforts. In recognition of the co-operation of society in all production of wealth, the community claims the right to impose such conditions upon the individual as may secure for it a share in that social value it has by its presence and activity assisted to create.”91 From the perspective of demands, the community as an organic entity also has a legitimate right to claim a share of wealth to maintain its own survival and development. “Because societies are organisms with their own interests above and beyond the summed interests of their members, they must have property as a means of expressing those interests.”92 Just as the self-expression of the individual depends on the possession of a certain amount of property, so the self-expression of the community also requires the possession of a certain amount of wealth. In a word, Hobson believes that the community is an organic entity, which is one of the creators of social wealth, and which also needs a certain amount of social wealth to maintain self-development; The cooperation between independent individuals is the basis for the community to create new social wealth. To a certain extent, contemporary utilitarianism inherits the ideas of Hobhouse and Hobson, and further deepens the theoretical understanding of the public interest. Since the public interest or the community interest is independent of individual interest, and there is a possibility of conflict between public interest and individual interest, why should rational and self-interested individuals choose to cooperate? Is interpersonal cooperation spontaneous or based on some coercive force? Contemporary utilitarianism argues that cooperation is not spontaneous, that rules are the key factor that motivates rational individuals to choose to cooperate with each other, and that the new public interest formed in cooperation strengthens the binding force of rules on individual behavior. 90

Weinstein (2007), p. 192. Hobson (1891), p. 198. 92 Weinstein (2007), p. 193. 91

5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary …

5.3.3.1

163

Guarantee Cooperation with Rules

Rule-utilitarianism holds that individuals cannot decide the utility magnitude of certain conducts alone, and interpersonal strategic interaction is a key factor affecting the level of utility. Why should self-interested and rational individuals choose to cooperate? A traditional explanation is that as long as the game activity is repeated many times, the rational individual will automatically choose to cooperate, because the individual clearly knows that if he does not choose to cooperate, his or her conduct will be punished in the next round of the game. Therefore, if an individual chooses to cooperate, it is based on individual utility consideration, and cooperation is the spontaneous rational behavior of individuals, not the result of community coercion. And therefore, the community has no right to claim the new wealth created by individuals in cooperation. This interpretation essentially denies that the community is an independent organic entity, and also denies the unique function of the community to promote cooperation. There are three basic categories of strategic interactions in society: conflict, coordination, and exchange,93 and all mutually influencing actions fall into one of these categories. In a pure conflict interaction, one party can gain only if another loses, and cooperation is difficult to achieve if both parties are rational individuals. In a coordination interaction, the benefits of one party must be the necessary condition for the benefits of the other, and thus cooperation is easy to achieve. In the interactive mode of coordination, the individuals themselves have the will to participate in cooperation, in which circumstance there is no cost to choose cooperation, and the individuals can also benefit from collaboration, as it is said fitness leads not merely to survival but also to increasing fitness.94 The most common mode of cooperation interactions is exchange, which involve elements of both conflict and coordination. Exchange means I have something you want and you have something I want. I would rather have what you have than what I have and you would rather have what I have. We can both benefit by exchanging to achieve a win–win situation. The exchange model contains both common interests and conflicting interests. For a rational individual, the best option is that other people choose to cooperate while he or she choose to violate, like the person who overuses gas and electricity during wartime as mentioned several times above. As he or she imagines, if everyone else follows the rules and uses a limited amount of gas and electricity, his or her excess use will not as a result affect the final outcome of the war, while at the same time will make the winter more comfortable. This situation is widespread in social cooperation, and the “Prisoner’s

93

In One for All – the Logic of Group Conflict, Harding argues that the three forms of socialstrategic interaction are conflict, coordination, and cooperation. Cooperation is mainly manifested as exchange. Namely, there is both conflict and coordination, but the term “cooperation” used in a general sense includes coordination and cooperation. For the sake of distinction, this book uses the concept of “cooperation” in a general sense, and the “cooperation model” used by Hardin and Bailey is uniformly called the “exchange model”. See Russell Hardin (1995). 94 Hardin (1995), p. 28.

164

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

Fig. 5.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma

A Cooperate

1 year

Cooperate 1 year

Defect

3 months 10 years

B Defect

10 years 3 Months

8 years 8 years

Dilemma”95 best serves to illustrate individual’s choice of behavior in this model, and the circumstance in which cooperation can occur automatically. The premise of strategic interaction is that individuals are assumed to be selfinterested and rational. By saying “self-interested”, it does not mean selfishness, but rather it means that personal interests are distinct from those of others and there is a potential conflict between personal interests and those of others. By saying “rational”, it does not mean calculating and consciously pursuing the maximization of personal interests; Rationality here is only distinguished from altruism, that is, the individual’s choices are supposed to serve the individual’s own interests. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is an interactive model in which both A and B are faced with two choices, namely cooperate or defect. The final utility situation of each person depends on the result of the strategic interaction of the two: if both A and B choose to cooperate, then each of them will get the suboptimal result, which is after all better than both of them choose to defect; However, both A and B have an incentive to choose defection, because when one chooses to defect while the other chooses to cooperate, the payoff will maximize the utility of the defector, as shown in Fig. 5.1. The reason for believing that self-interested and rational individuals can spontaneously cooperate is that the repetitive and reciprocal nature of strategic interactions will lead rational individuals to choose to cooperate spontaneously, because if a person’s misconduct will definitely be punished in the future, then even an egoist will also choose to cooperate. In other words, fear of future punishment is a restraining 95

The Prisoner’s dilemma is a game model proposed by Merrill M. Flood and Melvin Dresher, and formally established as a game model by Albert W. Tucker. The model can be shown as follows. Two suspects are taken to a detention facility and kept separately. The district attorney is convinced they are guilty of a crime, but he didn’t have enough evidence to prove them guilty at trial. He tells each prisoner separately that they have two choices: plead guilty or not guilty. If both offenders plead not guilty, the district attorney have to make up some very minor charge such as theft or illegal possession of a weapon, and both of them will receive a light penalty. If both plead guilty, they will be prosecuted, but the prosecutor will put forward a propose that they not be given the harshest punishment. However, if one confesses and the other does not, the person who confesses will receive leniency as a result, while the person who does not confesses will be charged with more crimes or increasing years in prison as a result. This strategic issue is summarized and shown in Fig. 5.1.

5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary …

165

factor that ensures an individual’s choice to cooperate of the moment. Therefore, as long as the strategic interaction is repeated and everyone holds the idea of “tit for tat”, cooperation will be achieved spontaneously. Regarding this, Robert Axelrod contends that under certain circumstances, individuals who seek to maximize their own utility, in the prisoner’s dilemma with continuing interaction and reciprocity rules (tit for tat) being taken, will form a stable system of cooperation.96 Because each participant has a memory of how his opponent has performed in the previous move, if his opponent chooses to defect in the first move, he will be punished in the second move. The fear of future penalties prevents any participant from making a choice with a high discount rate. The continuing strategic interaction between people makes the rational individual give up the accidental greatest benefit obtained by withdrawing from the cooperative relationship, and instead choose the equilibrium state of power expected by all parties, so consequently cooperation becomes the inevitable choice of a rational individual. However, in the real-world settings, fear of the future punishment does not work all the time to ensure that rational individuals choose cooperative strategies. First, in the real world, the threat of retaliation from others is not enough to compel individuals to choose to cooperate. The complexity of the real world and the wide range of interpersonal communication make “future retaliation” full of uncertainty and infrequency. Although game behavior in social communication has appeared many times, repeated games between the same opponents are not common, and thus it is difficult for “future retaliation” to pose effective constraints on individual behavior. Second, individuals may misinterpret the move of others. Just as individuals may misinterpret the true interests of their own, so individuals are likely to misunderstand the actions of others. A person’s cooperative behavior is much likely to be misinterpreted by their opponent as defection, and if the opponent take punishment in the next interaction based on his own misinterpretation, it will undoubtedly bring bad results. Third, in the strategic interaction with the participation of multiple individuals, cooperation is difficult to form spontaneously. As the number of participants increases, so will the number of people who choose to take “free ride”. The cost of supervising whether everyone cooperates will increase dramatically, and the rise in the cost of supervision and the expansion of the scale of the number of people to be supervised may all lead to the crumble of cooperation. It can be seen that iterated and reciprocal games can only be achieved in very limited circumstances, and in reality, rational individuals will not spontaneously achieve cooperation. It is essential for cooperation to rely on the mandatory constraints based on rules formed by the community. Randall Calvert presents a view of how to achieve cooperation between individuals in complex societies.97 The reciprocity of “tit for tat” does not work in real-world settings, because in real life there is a large population, and the opportunity for two individuals to play multiple games is very limited. As a result, the fear of future punishment is not enough to restrain the individual’s self-interest. Therefore, maintaining stable cooperation requires the 96 97

Axelrod (1984), pp. 55–72. Randall (1955), pp. 57–94.

166

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

help of external constraints and pressures. Calvert argues that there should be an observer to record the behavior of each participant in the previous game.98 Suppose an individual can enter a prisoner’s dilemma in random combination with others, while one participant is designated as the leader, who independently supervises the other individuals’ gaming behavior, communicating with each participant to know whether his opponent has performed defection in the game. Since the leader bears all the costs of oversight and communication alone, the leader’s loss should be borne by the participant who unilaterally chooses to defect. In this way, every participant can be effectively bound by “tit for tat”, and the fear of future punishment can play a role in each set of game activities. It can be seen that self-interested and rational individuals can achieve cooperation in social life, but the cooperation demands the coercion of certain external forces. In fact, in the coordination model, external coercion is also required to achieve cooperation. There are two types of coordination interaction patterns: pure coordination and impure coordination. The former implies that the actors have no objections to reaching coordination in any situation. For example, the question of which side of the road to drive on is usually a case of pure coordination. Suppose A and B are two car drivers and their payoff matrices are shown in Fig. 5.2. A and B have the same interests and are both willing to cooperate, or it can be said, neither A nor B is willing to give up cooperation, and the problem only lies in that A and B need to decide whether to drive left or right. For the original choice, there is often no rational basis, and the choice between driving on the left and driving on the right only stems from habit. Utilitarianism may have some rather commonsensical advice to offer in some cases of pure coordination, in that it would recommend the choice of Pareto-superior equilibria. The impure coordination interaction model means that the preferences of the players involved diverge. For example, if driver A prefers to drive on the left side rather than drive on the right side; driver B prefers to drive on the right side rather than drive on the left side, we will have an example of impure coordination, described in Fig. 5.3. For impure coordination interaction models, a utilitarian should prefer that equilibrium in which the aggregate utility is greatest. It can be seen that for the coordination interaction model, it is also necessary to establish one custom as a convention through rules and no longer to consider the others. Therefore, since social cooperation is formed under the constraints of the community, it can be said that the community is one of the creators of the new social value. The community can guide rational individuals to choose goals that are conducive to the maximization of total utility. The public interest built on social cooperation will further reinforce social cooperation and augment the deterrent power of punishment for defections. As Hume says: “No man would have any reason to fear the fury of a tyrant, if he had no authority over any but from fear; since, as a single man, his bodily force can reach but a small way, and all the farther power he possesses must be founded either on our own opinion, or on the presumed opinion of others.”99 98 99

J. W. Bailey, Utilitarianism, Institutions, and Justice, p. 81. Hardin (1995), p. 29.

5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary … Fig. 5.2 Pure coordination interaction100

167

A

Drive Left

Drive Right

Drive Left

B

Drive Right

Fig. 5.3 Impure coordination interaction101

A

Drive Left

Drive Right

Drive Left

B

Drive Right

100

Assume that driver A and B have no particular preference for driving on the left or right, as long as both parties choose to cooperate, each of them will get the same maximum benefit (free driving, namely the payoff is both 2). If they do not choose to cooperate, everyone will get the same worst outcome (accidents, namely the payoff is both 0). Therefore, in a pure coordination interaction model, no one has a motive to defect. See J. W. Bailey, Utilitarianism, Institutions, and Justice, pp. 74–75. 101 Suppose driver A and driver B have different driving habits: A prefers to drive on the left, and B prefers to drive on the right. If driving on the left is designated as the general rule of road driving, both A and B will benefit from it (both A and B can enjoy safe and smooth driving), but A’s payoff (assuming it is 2) exceeds that of B (assuming it is 1), because A still keeps his original driving habits, and B, however, needs to change his original driving habits. If driving on the right is designated as the general rule for road driving, then B’s payoff (assuming it is 2) exceeds that of A (assuming it is 1). If A or B chooses not to cooperate (A chooses to drive left and B chooses to drive right, or A chooses to drive right and B chooses to drive left), the most unfavorable situation occurs for both A and B (the payoff of both is 0). Therefore, in an impure coordination interaction model, rational individuals have no incentive to defect, but have an incentive to compete for rules of collaboration in their favor. See J. W. Bailey, Utilitarianism, Institutions, and Justice, pp. 75–76.

168

5.3.3.2

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

Cooperation Leads to a Positive Community

Classical utilitarianism holds that the community can only play a negative role in social and economic life, i.e., the role of a night watchman, an arbiter, or a traffic policeman. The role of the community is to maintain the basic order of social life, it should not interfere with the individual’s pursuit of their own interests in an environment of fair competition. Contemporary utilitarianism forces individuals to choose cooperation by rules, and through cooperation the community can acquire new power. As Hardin puts it, “Coordination produces power that produces sanctions that motivate collective exchange.”102 Contemporary utilitarianism argues that the community should play a more active role in social life, and that the community are supposed to not only protect individual interests but also safeguard the collective interests. When there is consistency between various types of interests, contemporary utilitarianism achieves Pareto improvement of the total social utility in a way that guarantees the respective rights of each party; When there is a conflict between various types of interests, contemporary utilitarianism fosters the promotion of overall social utility in a way that ensures the form of resource redistribution. First, the community is not only the protector of individual interest, but also the protector of all subjects of interests. Classical utilitarianism is concerned only with individual interests or the sum of individual interests. Contemporary utilitarianism believes that not only the individual is the subject of interests, but also the small-scale group, large-scale group, and even the whole society are all the subjects of interests. The community needs to provide the same degree of protection for all types of interests. Hardin has divided the different types of interests into three categories, arguing that the community should protect the following three classes of interests to the same extent. First, secure benefits to individuals that are independent of other individuals’ benefits; Second, secure benefits that are mutual but that are generally available only to dyads or very small numbers independently of benefits to the larger society; Third, secure benefits to larger groups or even the whole society.103 When there is consistency between various types of interests, the community’s protection of different subjects of interests is mainly embodied in the protection of their rights. Thus, in social life, the community needs to protect three classes of rights: the right to ownership of property, the dyadic right of voluntary exchange based on common interests (two people are the most typical state, and this right can also be extended to the right to voluntary exchange between small groups), and collective rights. First, the protection of individual rights. One ground on which virtually all individual protections can be based is the supposition that individuals are generally the best judges of their own interests. Therefore, guaranteeing them the control over their lives to determine their own consumptions will generally make them better off. Moreover, in the absence of supporting information about interpersonal comparisons of interests, leaving the judgment of their 102 103

Hardin (1995), p. 34. Hardin (1986), pp. 49–50.

5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary …

169

own interests to the individuals themselves often leads to better outcomes. However, the subjectivity of individual judgment means that the protection of individual rights or interests should be controlled within the scope of Pareto improvement, that is, the protection of an action can make some people better off, while no one will be worse off. Contemporary utilitarianism holds that the absoluteness of individual rights cannot go beyond the scope of Pareto improvement. If the protection of certain individual rights will produce a better effect on the whole, this behavior is undoubtedly justified; However, if the protection of an individual right will bring about a decline in the interests of another individual or groups or even the community as a whole, the protection of that individual right should be weighed carefully and prudently. Second, the protection of the dyadic right of voluntary exchange. For a small community consisting of two people or a small number of people who share common interests with each other, it is typically represented by the voluntary exchange between two people. Each of the two parties will benefit from the exchange, and therefore voluntary exchange are in line with the shared interests of the both, which, however, is distinct from the interests of larger scope of community. Suppose there are two people, A and B, who make a transaction voluntarily in which A wants to sell his car for B’s money, and B wants to spend his own money in exchange for A’s car. The transaction is beneficial to both A and B, but it is not necessarily consistent with a larger collective right. For example, if A sells his own organs instead of a car, then the right to trade is in conflict with the collective rights. If the right to free trade between A and B is regarded only as an act of exchange between self-interested and rational individuals, then the two-level interest structure contained in the right to free trade is ignored. If there is only simple dyadic exchange between A and B, then it goes like the strategic structure of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, as represented in Fig. 5.4. For A, keeping his car and getting B’s money at the same time is the optimal situation (4, 1); exchanging the car for B’s money is the second-best situation (2, 2); maintaining the status quo without trading is the third-best situation (3, 3); and losing the car and not getting the money is the worst situation (1, 4); and vice versa for B. However, the right to free trade involves the protection of two classes of interests: protecting the interests of individuals in the transaction from the infringement of others, and protecting the common interests of both parties in free transactions. Therefore, the right of voluntary exchange includes two different levels of right: right of individual ownership and right to free exchange. The protection of individual ownership means that neither A nor B can lose their possessions without gain, and the result of (1, 4' ) (4, 1' ) will be blocked from happening as a result of considering the principle of individual ownership. Consequently, the right of voluntary exchange is simply to choose between (2, 2' ) and (3, 3' ). Considering the actual wishes of both parties, A wanting to get money and B wanting to get the car, it is obvious that the (2, 2' ) outcome is much better than (3, 3' ) outcome. Therefore, based on the protection of the right of voluntary exchange, the final result can only be (2, 2' ) outcome, that is, A gets money B gets the car. In order to protect the right of voluntary exchange, the existence of external coercive forces is necessary, which can prevent the exchange from happening when

170

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

Fig. 5.4 Interaction model of the two sides of the exchange

A Yield Car

Yield the money

Keep Car

2,2'

1,4'

4,1'

3,3'

B Keep the money

one party is coerced by the other party and can help to establish a long-term and stable relationship that guarantees that both parties of the exchange can be treated equally. In this regard, some critics argue that contemporary utilitarianism has paternalistic tendencies. They hold the view that the right of voluntary exchange, which itself possesses the nature of protecting both the right of individual ownership and right of voluntary exchange, can autonomously realize the exchange outcome that is in line with the common interests of both parties without any external pressure, such as the voluntary exchange between A and B mentioned above. However, contemporary utilitarianism offers a firm rebuttal that in the absence of external coercive forces, the natural power difference between the two parties will put the two in an unequal position, and the mode of strategic interaction at this circumstance is far from the same as the theoretical premise of the prisoner’s dilemma. For example, recall the early history of labor unions in the United States. The Supreme Court held that collective efforts by workers to negotiate for higher wages were illegal, that workers must individually enter dyadic contracts with their employers, that is, each worker and his employer entered into a contract separately. In essence, this provision to restrict contracts to dyads only virtually therefore guaranteed greater bargaining power to employers over potential employees (than they would have had against employees legally capable of bargaining collectively), the result of which is only to leave employees make contracts with their employers on the premise of inequality. Third, the protection of collective rights. Contemporary utilitarianism holds that there are two basic classes of collective rights: the first category of collective rights refers to those that help to bring about particular collective benefits more or less to the whole society, as in the freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, etc. Although the type of collective right takes the individual as the subject of the right and guarantees that the individual can do what he or she wishes to, the result of protecting this class of rights serves well the interests of the community as a whole. Therefore, the right of individuals to do something freely according to their own will is also a collective right. The second category of collective rights refers to those that protect particular classes against themselves and against adversary classes, as in various so-called inalienable rights, such as the freedom from servitude. Those of the second class are generally

5.3 The Community-Individual Equilibrium Orientation of Contemporary …

171

binding on the individual: they require that the individual not do certain things. In this sense, rights of the second class are sometimes considered duties. Classical utilitarianism mainly focuses on the first class of collective rights and believes that the protection of the first class of rights is beneficial to the maximization of the overall utility. According to view of critics, classical utilitarianism does not recognize the second class of collective rights, and if someone voluntarily sells himself, the result of the transaction also increases the overall level of utility, then this act will not be prohibited. There is no objection the acceptance of the first class of rights, and what is established on the basis of the first class of rights is the liberal democratic government in the general sense. As liberals argue, rights can make political or collective decisionmaking more open, and the political process less fettered by particular powerful interests. What is at issue lies in that why these rights are protected as collective rights rather than defended as individual rights. The interpretation of contemporary utilitarianism is that the protection of these rights, which generally benefit the community as a whole, is not about preventing the intervention from others, but more importantly about the strategic or structural impact exerted by such a right.104 Take the right of individual ownership for an example, the protection of individual ownership of his property is not only to prevent others from plundering one’s own property but also to give extraordinary incentive to anyone capable of doing so to enhance the well-being of all or many of us by creating new wealth. The second class of collective rights derives from the autonomy of the individual. Autonomy requires not only that one’s own life be determined by oneself, but also that the foundational conditions for one’s existence be enhanced and expanded. As Knight says, “freedom is a ‘value,’ a thing the individual ought to want, even ought to have if he may not choose it, a part of the modern ideal of the dignity of the person. Thus, the laws of liberal states do not allow men to sell themselves (or their children) into ‘involuntary servitude,’ even if they so choose.”105 The inalienable rights contain a compelling that requires all members of the community not to do something. Second, the community should effectively regulate different types of interests. When multiple types of rights are protected at the same time, conflicts are bound to arise in the operation of various rights. Contemporary utilitarianism argues that in order to maximize the total social utility, the community should effectively regulate different types of subjects of interests. There are two general classes of conflicts. First, conflicts of rights are between the same levels, such as the conflict between different individual rights, or conflict between different group rights. For example, protecting one person’s right to play the piano in his own home may harm another person’s right not to be disturbed in his own home, and protection for the workers’ equal employment right may conflict with the employers’ labor autonomy right. Second, conflicts of rights are between different levels. The protection of the right of two persons to trade freely may violate collective rights. If a worker enters into a contract with an employer in violation of 104 105

Hardin (1986), p. 57. Knight (1963), p. 259.

172

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

the minimum wage stipulated by the national law, the right to voluntary transaction in this case violates the collective right of the minimum wage established to protect the rights of all workers. The issue of conflicts between rights is a fundamental issue in the theory of rights. Some rights theorists advocate the autonomous resolution of conflicts of rights by bargaining, in which the externalities of the harmful act support the party being injured to continue bargaining with the party doing injuring until the party injured believes that the benefits it receives can offset the harm, or that the harm and the benefits are morally symmetric. If, on the one hand, I have a right to prevent you from undertaking a certain activity, you will bargain with me to allow you to undertake it, which means it is worth more to you to do it than to me to prevent you from undertaking it. In other words, you are willing to pay some price for me to allow you to undertake it; On the other hand, if you have the right to do it, I will bargain with you to get you to refrain, which means preventing you from doing it is worth more to me than doing it is to you. In other words, I am willing to pay a certain price for you to give up doing it.106 It can be seen that whether the subject undertake a certain activity depends only on the comparison of the different values arising from undertaking it or not undertaking it, and the subject are supposed to undertake the activity that is more favorable to itself.107 Contemporary utilitarianism argues that Coase’s bargaining approach can only solve the problem of conflict of rights in the same levels, such as the conflict between the right of one person to play the piano at home and the right of another person to demand a quiet rest at home. However, Coase’s approach fails to solve the problem of conflicts of rights between different levels. If a worker enters into a contract with his employer that violates the minimum wage or maximum working hours on the basis of his or her own disadvantage, the right to free trade between the worker and the employer in this situation conflicts with the collective rights of the worker as a whole, which cannot be resolved by bargaining. Because the freedom of trading is this case fundamentally violates the rights of the worker as a whole, it puts other workers at a disadvantage when they enter into the dyadic contracts of wages and working hours. In this case, the Community has the power to negate the right to free trade on the basis of collective rights. When the Community has the right to enforce or prohibit the performance of a contract, the Community inevitably has the power to determine one party to gain and the other to lose. When the community has the power to regulate and distribute different subjects of rights conflict, it means that in the view of contemporary utilitarianism, the community has become an organic entity with enthusiasm and initiative. Contemporary utilitarianism’s regulation and distribution of different subjects of rights has formed the theory prototype of utilitarian distributive justice. Harding has remarked that “If we assume that transferring a bit of my resources to you will do less harm to me than good to you, without any perverse incentive effects on us or others, then we may conclude, on welfare ground, that you have a right to 106 107

Coase (2013). Russell Hardin, "The Utilitarian Logic of Liberalism", p. 68.

References

173

receive the transfer from me.“108 Contemporary utilitarianism refers to this right as the “right to welfare”, namely the right to subsistence, including the right to food, housing, and medical care. The right to welfare is justified in a social context in which it is capable of meeting that need of a large community and doing so will increase the welfare of the community as a whole. Contemporary utilitarianism asserts that the theoretical basis for the existence of the right to welfare is only that it is conducive to the enhancement of total social utility, and this explanation clearly reflects the limitations of utilitarian theory on the issue of distribution. However, contemporary utilitarianism has explicitly regarded the right to welfare as a collective right, and built on the right to welfare, utilitarianism has formed a theory of distributive justice aimed to maximize the total utility of the society.

References Aristotle (1998) Politics. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis and Cambridge Axelrod R (1984) Evolution of cooperation. Basic Books, New York Bailey JW (1997) Utilitarianism, institutions, and justice. Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford Bentham J (1907) An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Clarendon Press, Oxford Bentham J (1990) A fragment on government. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Cassell EJ (1998) The nature of suffering and the goals of medicine. Loss Grief Care 8:129–142 Coase RH (2013) The problem of social cost. J Law Econ 56(4):837–877 De Tocqueville A (1969) Democracy in America, translated by George Lawrence. Doubleday & Company Inc., New York Devlin P (1965) The enforcement of morals. Oxford University Press, Oxford Dewey J (1920) Reconstruction in philosophy. Henry Holt and Company, New York Dewey J (1946) Problems of men. Philosophical Library, Inc., New York Donohue WA (1990) The new freedom: individualism and collectivism in the social lives of Americans. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London Fitzpatrick R (1988) Fitzpatrick, John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy. Continuum, London Freeden M (2006) Ideologies and political theory: a conceptual approach. Clarendon Press, Oxford Hardin R (1986) The utilitarian logic of liberalism. Ethics 97(1):47–74 Hardin R (1995) One of Al–the logic of group conflict. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey Hobbes T (1998) Leviathan. Oxford University Press, Oxford Hobhouse (1911) Liberalism. Oxford University Press, London Hobhouse LT (1928) Social evolution and political theory. Columbia University Press, New York Hobhouse (2009) Liberalism.Oxford University Press, London, p 30 Hobson JA (1891) Problems of poverty: an inquiry into the industrial condition of the poor. Methuen & Co., London Hobson JA (1996) The social problem. Thoemmes, Bristol Knight FH (1963) On the history and method of economics: selected essays. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago Knight J, Sened I (eds) (1955) Explaining social institutions. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 108

Russell (1988), p. 124.

174

5 The Basic Trajectory of Theoretical Evolution: Balancing the Individual …

Locke J (1690) Second treatise of government. Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge Locke J (1975) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Clarendon Press, Oxford Lukes S (1984) Individualism. Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited, Oxford Lyons D (1965) Forms and limits of utilitarianism. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 119–160 Mandeville B (1988) The fable of the bees or private vices, public benefits. Liberty Fund, Indianapolis Meng L (2013) The state of nature and the family. J Peking Univ (Philos Soc Sci Edn) 5 Mill J (1979) An essay on government. Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, Indianapolis Mill J (1992) Analysis of the phenomena of the human mind (Vol 2). Routledge / Thoemmes Press, London Mill J (2009) On liberty. The Floating Press, Auckland, New Zealand Mill JS (2011) Considerations on representative government. Andrews UK Limited, Luton Morgan T (2007) Understanding utilitarianism. Cromwell Press, Trowbridge Murray C (1997) What it means to be a libertarian: a personal interpretation. Broadway Books, New York Purser RE and Montuori A (2000) “In Search of Creativity: Beyond Individualism and Collectivism”, Journal of Consumer Psychology, 1(1) Randall C (1955) “Rational actors, equilibrium, and social institutions”. In J. Knight and I. Sened (eds.), pp.57–94 Rawls J (1893) Political liberalism. Columbia University Press, New York Raz J (1988) The morality of freedom. Clarendon Press, Oxford Robertson HM (1933) Aspects of the rise of economic individualism: a criticism of Max Weber and his school. Cambridge University Press, London Rosen F (1998) Individual sacrifice and the greatest happiness: Bentham on utility and rights. Utilitas 10(2):129–143 Rousseau J-J (1994) Discourse on political economy and the social contract. Oxford University Press, Oxford Russel B (1967) The history of western philosophy. Simon & Schuster, New York Russell H (1988) Morality within the limits of reason, Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, p. 124 Ryle G (2009) The concept of mind. Routledge, New York, p 109 Sabine G (1937) A history of political theory, 3rd edn. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, p 49 Scheffler S (1982) The rejection of consequentialism. Clarendon Press, Oxford Schofield P (2006) Utility and democracy: the political thought of Jeremy Bentham. Oxford University Press, Oxford Sidgwick H (1962) Methods of ethics. Macmillan and Company Limited, London, p 94 Singer MG (ed) (2000) Essays on ethics and method. Clarendon Press, Oxford Smith A (1976) The theory of moral sentiments.Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 215 Smith A (1993) An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (book 2). Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, p 475 Sumner LW (1981) Abortion and moral theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton Sumner LW (1992) Welfare, happiness, and pleasure. Utilitas 4(2):199–223 Tarn WW (1952) Hellenistic civilization. The World Publishing Company, Cleveland and New York, p 79 Weinstein D (2007) Utilitarianism and the new liberalism.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Weinstein D (2011) Utilitarianism and the new liberalism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Chapter 6

Development of Contemporary Utilitarianism

6.1 The Development of Interest Theory Marx once clearly asserts that “everything for which man struggles is a matter of his interest”,1 and with the advancement of industrialization and the development of social economy, material and interest conflicts in a society have increasingly become the focus of people’s attention, and interests have been elevated to be the ruler of humans. Moreover, human is a kind of existence that constantly reflects and explores his own interests, and people not only have practical interests, but can be aware of their own interests, possessing a consciousness of their own interests; On the basis of this consciousness, a man also tries to understand and explain his own interests. Utilitarianism is a theory that takes interests as its theoretical starting point and ultimate goal. To some extent, the development course from classical utilitarianism to contemporary utilitarianism also reflects the deepening of human understanding of interests. The author firmly believes that the evolution process and trajectory of utilitarianism also provide an important ideological source for the development of theories of interests. In general, contemporary utilitarianism has promoted the development of interest theory from two perspective. First, to some extent, contemporary utilitarianism has solved the challenge of “dualism of practical reason” put forth by Sidgwick, taking rules and institutions as the solution to alleviate the internal conflicts between selfinterest and public interest. The theory holds that self-interested individuals, under the guidance of rules, are likely to choose behaviors that will promote the maximization of public interest. Second, starting from the recognition of the subjectivity of individual interests, contemporary utilitarianism promotes the subjective objectivity of the concept of interests by constantly revising the concept of utility to improve the compatibility between utilitarianism and interests.

1

Marx and Engels (1975), p. 171.

© Peking University Press 2023 S. Liu, The Contemporary Evolution and Reform of Utilitarianism, Interests Politics Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7363-7_6

175

176

6 Development of Contemporary Utilitarianism

6.1.1 Overcoming the Dilemma of the Dualism of Practical Reason The question of the dualism of practical reason, proposed by Sidgwick, is a practical problem that utilitarian theory and other theories of interest need to deal with. The so-called dualism of practical reason states that individuals sometimes need to make a choice between “promoting the maximization of the general interest” and “promoting the maximization of individual interest”. As Brick argues, egoism and utilitarianism are both defensible, but egoism and utilitarianism are certainly incompatible in some sense; they give agents different directions for action.2 The dualism of practical reason is a contradiction discovered by Sidgwick in practical reason, which not only reveals a moral dilemma, but also indicates a core issue in the field of interest theory: since there is a regular conflict between individual interest and public interest, why rational individuals choose to act to promote the public interest. In other words, political philosophical theories are supposed to be able to provide an effective explanation of individual behavior in order to achieve a “logical transition from the Egoistic to the Universalistic principle.”3 To a certain extent, rule-utilitarianism has provided a theoretical possibility for the effective convergence of the two principles, egoism and utilitarianism. In the Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick has twice explicitly raised the issue of the existence of a “Dualism of the Practical Reason”. The first statement is that conscience and rational self-love are both authoritative demands to guide individual behavior, with neither overwhelming the other, as he himself said “my difficulty was that this claim of conscience, whether utilitarian or not, had to be harmonized with the claim of Rational Self-love”.4 The second statement is that it is reasonable for a person to regard his own happiness as the ultimate happiness, and at the same time, “it may yet be actually reasonable for an individual to sacrifice his own good or happiness for the greater happiness of others”,5 while the contradiction between the two is manifested in the dualism of the practical reason. Sidgwick made a further elaboration of the dualism of the practical reason in his paper “Some Basic Ethical Controversies”, which has formed the clearest expression. The dualism of the practical reason expresses the conflict between the moral reasons on which people base their general moral thinking: on the one hand, there is the fundamental moral conviction that I ought to sacrifice my own happiness, if by so doing I can increase the happiness of others to a greater extent than I diminish my own; On the other hand, there is also another conviction-which it would be paradoxical to call “moral”- but which is none the less fundamental-that it would be irrational to sacrifice any portion of my own happiness unless the sacrifice is to be somehow at some time compensated by an

2

Brink (1988), p. 295. Sidgwick (1907), p. 498. 4 Sidgwick (1907), p. 18. 5 Ibid., p. 404. 3

6.1 The Development of Interest Theory

177

equivalent addition to my own happiness.6 According to Sidgwick, the two moral reasons are independent of each other, and the conflict between the two moral reasons is clear and certain. For an individual, it is reasonable to act according to the principle of egoism or the principle of utility. For the conflict between the two, reason cannot give clear guidance, and can only guide individuals to abandon excessive attention to their own personal happiness, through sympathy and sentiments protective of social wellbeing, imparted by education and sustained by communication with other men. In fact, the problem of the dualism of practical reason is a difficult problem that all utilitarians must face. Utilitarians before Sidgwick generally avoided the problem of practical rational dualism by assuming that there was a “natural consistency” between the individual interests and the public interests. It is believed that as long as individuals fully understand their true interests and fully pursue their true interests without external intervention, everyone’s pursuit of self-utility maximization will lead to the maximization of the overall interests of society, in which sense, acting according to the moral requirements of egoism will eventually produce the final result pursued by utilitarianism. This view holds that there is no disagreement between egoism and utilitarianism, and that the requirements of egoism will guide society to achieve the result of maximizing utility. However, Sidgwick argues that this hypothesis is fundamentally false: not only does egoism and utilitarianism in practice lead to completely different choices of individual behavior, but in theory if a person affirms, “either implicitly or explicitly, that his own greatest happiness is not merely the ultimate rational end for himself, but a part of Universal Good”,7 then he may also avoid the proof of utilitarianism in the same way. Suppose that there is consistency between individual interests and public interests, if the goal of maximizing overall utility of the society can be achieved through individual pursuit of self-utility maximization, rational individuals will only choose egoistic behavior, and can only get the behavior results of egoism in practice. Beginning with Sidgwick, utilitarians solve the dilemma of dualism of the practical reason by appealing to an “impartial” perspective of observation, that is, to step out of human self-interest and treat everyone’s interests with a neutral attitude. If I value the interests of others as much as mine, then if my sacrifice can be exchanged for a greater increase in the interests of others, I should sacrifice that part of the interests for that purpose. The perspective of an impartial observer realizes the moral logic or “conscience” logic of practical reason, but it ignores the logic of rational self-love, putting forward excessive moral demands on the individual. “Utilitarianism might therefore be criticized, not because it encourages egoism, but on the contrary because it demands too much of individuals in requiring that they sacrifice themselves to increase the total utility.”8 It can be seen that to solve the dilemma of the dualism of the practical reason, it is necessary to recognize the theoretical logic of egoism and utilitarianism at the same time, recognize both as moral obligations that individuals should perform, and 6

Henry Sidgwick, “Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies”, Mind, p. 43. Moore (2004), p. 99. 8 Lewin (1991), p. 15. 7

178

6 Development of Contemporary Utilitarianism

further find the compatibility between the two. Rule utilitarianism, especially rule utilitarianism that appeals to general rules and systems, provides the possibility of a theoretical logic that is compatible with both egoism and utilitarianism. Although both egoism and utilitarianism are based on human reason, they have different fields of operation: egoism belongs to individual reason, whereas utilitarianism belongs to collective reason, and the conflict between the two reasons cannot be resolved by a single standard. However, egoism and utilitarianism are not incompatible, and “there is no reason why those two standpoints cannot be combined and reconciled within a single moderate moral theory”.9 According to Hardin, the conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality or between individual interests and collective interests can be resolved through institutions,10 so that rational individuals, not only because of the existence of external coercive pressure, make the decision to choose the action plan to promote collective rationality, which is namely the plan of public interests.11

6.1.1.1

Rational Individuals Voluntarily Obey the Rules

Drawing on the research on collective action, rule utilitarianism argues that rules arise from multiple times and iterated games played by rational individuals. Taking the prisoner’s dilemma shown in Fig. 5.1 as an example, both A and B are motivated to defect out of egoism, because defection can yield the most favorable result for themselves. But, after the game was infinitely iterated, the repetition of the lose-lose outcome forces rational individuals to change and voluntarily seek an agreement to punish the defector. Thus, rules that are voluntarily accepted by both parties arise. This hypothesis has also been confirmed by anthropological research, and Leacock, in his study of the Montagnais people living around Quebec, found that the establishment of a private land system in the region was directly related to the strategic interaction between individuals based on the fur trade. Because hunting is uncontrolled and no one is interested in investing in increasing or maintaining wildlife availability, overhunting occurs. Thus, one successful hunt can be seen as an external cost imposed on subsequent hunters. Before the development of fur trade, hunting was only used to meet the basic living things of the family, such as its food, clothing, housing and transportation, so the amount of hunting was limited, and the externality of hunting behavior was minimal. However, after the beginning of the fur trade, the high profit of fur trade led to a sharp expansion of the hunting range and quantity, and the arbitrary hunting caused serious disputes among hunters, even causing a fight to the death for a prey. While the conflict ended up hurting both, it led hunters to divide their hunting ranges, and gradually developed ground rules that were widely followed. Hunters usually cut down trees to delimit their chosen 9

Morgan (2007), p. 42. The so-called institution is a kind of general and universal rules, which is different from concrete rules. Institution utilitarianism also belongs to rule utilitarianism. 11 Hooker (1993), p. 136. 10

6.1 The Development of Interest Theory

179

hunting areas so as not to trespass each other’s boundaries. “By the beginning of the eighteenth century, we begin to have clear evidence that territorial hunting and trapping arrangements by individual families were developing in the area around Quebec. The earliest reference to such arrangements in this region indicates a purely temporary allotment of hunting territories”.12 It is obvious that, based on the severe negative external effects, rational individuals will voluntarily restrain their egoistic tendencies and reach mutually beneficial behavior rules.

6.1.1.2

Rules Regulate the Conflict Between Egoism and Utilitarianism

After the rules are established, the logic of egoistic behavior is limited to a certain realm, that is, the realm of daily life as referred to by rule utilitarianism. In the realm of everyday life, the reasonable self-interest motives of the individual are protected by a series of individual rights, and the individual can arrange his or her life according to his or her own will, as long as the self-will-led behavior does not harm the interests of others. Therefore, rule-utilitarianism does not require an individual to be sensitive to the needs of others at all times, nor does it—just because it would produce a greater total social utility if transferring a portion of my property to someone—require me to carry out property transfers or determine that others have the right to acquire the part of my property. However, the logic of egoistic behavior cannot go beyond the boundaries of collective rights. Once egoistic behavior infringes on the collective interest, rule utilitarianism can negate the egoistic behavioral logic based on the utility principle.

6.1.2 Breakthrough in Promoting the Combination of Interest Subjectivity and Interest Objectivity 6.1.2.1

All Utilitarian Theories Recognize the Subjectivity of Interests

The so-called subjectivity of interests means that individuals can be aware of their own interests or individuals have a conscious awareness of their own interests. In fact, all conscious activities of human beings will be branded as interest subjects, and the subjectivity of interests is the consciousness, self-behaving and autonomy shown by people in dealing with the interest objects they face in certain activities. The subjectivity of interests includes the subjectivity of both material interests and spiritual interests. Human is the subject of interests, and human’s needs are the essential embodiment of the subjectivity of interests. Interest represents the category of the specific relationship between subject and object, that is, the object satisfies the subject’s needs and the subject is satisfied by the object. An Individual himself is the best judge of self-interest, which exactly reflects the subjectivity of interests. 12

Leacock (1952), p. 33.

180

6 Development of Contemporary Utilitarianism

Whether it is experiential utilitarianism or preference-satisfaction utilitarianism, the satisfaction of human needs is regarded as the basic concept of utilitarianism. Whether a thing is beneficial to the individual, and which thing is more beneficial to the subject than other things, it all need to be based on the satisfaction of individual needs. In other words, the actual needs of the subject are the intrinsic scale of whether things have interests and what size is the interests, and thus, it is in this sense that utilitarianism becomes an important part of the theory of interests. Contemporary utilitarianism’s modification of the concept of utility is carried out on the basis of recognizing the subjectivity of interests, which examines the subjective component of the concept of utility with evaluative criteria and removes the erroneous subjective factors in personal cognition. Objective happiness theory is to modify the wrong psychological experience formed by individuals due to wrong belief, insufficient information and limitations of the living environment, by adding cognitive evaluation factors. Rational preference is to correct the wrong preference that violates the actual interests of individuals based on evil motives, inadequate information and adaptive preference, by adding cognitive evaluation factors. In short, contemporary utilitarianism believes that what utility measures is individual psychological experience and actual preference, and individual self-evaluation is the basic criterion of utility measurement. If a person feels that he is unhappy, but a third person thinks that he is happy, in this case self-evaluation can be the basis of utility. Utilitarianism’s recognition of individual subjectivity is different from the contemporary political philosophy which requires objective indicators to be used as the measurement criteria of interests and needs. Scanlon argues that any principle of distribution must be based on the criterion of objectivity, with objective criteria as the basis for measurement. Thus, Scanlon argues, utilitarianism basing itself on subjective criteria for equal treatment will lead to unacceptable consequences. For there must be some special element of personal interest in the subjective measure. For example, the fact that someone would be willing to forego a decent diet in order to build a monument to his god does not mean that his claim on others for aid in his project has the same strength as a claim for aid in obtaining enough food (even assuming that the sacrifices required of others would be the same).13 Therefore, Scanlon contends that, even if we acknowledge that the maximization of utility is a moral goal worth pursuing, it is necessary to choose a measure that is fair to everyone. Despite these considerations, it seems clear that the criteria of well-being that we actually employ in making moral judgments are objective. By an objective criterion, Scanlon means “a criterion that provides a basis for appraisal of a person’s level of well-being which is independent of that person’s tastes and interests, … even though it conflicted with the preferences of the individual”.14 In other words, Scanlon argues that objective measures should not be influenced by the subject’s choices and judgments, or even should be independent of the subject’s choices. Using external objective indicators as a measure of interpersonal interest comparison implies a judgment that there are certain objective values that are beneficial to 13 14

T. M. Scanlon, “Preference and Urgency”, pp. 659–660. Ibid., p. 658.

6.1 The Development of Interest Theory

181

everyone, which can be independent of individual choices. Regarding this, the utilitarian answer is that there are certain objective values that are beneficial to everyone’s lives; however, these objective values are not easy to identify and exhaust. Like the critique of the objective list theory within utilitarianism, the source of these objective values and the interrelationship between the content and value of these objective values can never be argued and proved. Moreover, measures that are completely independent of individual choice no longer make the individual as the supreme arranger of his own life. Therefore, for utilitarians, the individual is always the first judge of selfinterest, and objective criteria can only be used to measure and evaluate the choices made by the individual. Only under the premise of clear utilitarian comparison can the individual be required to give up his own experience and preferences.

6.1.2.2

Contemporary Utilitarianism Emphasizes that the Subjectivity of Interests Is Not the Same as the Subjectification of Interests. It Is Necessary to Realize the Objectivity of Interests Under the Premise of Recognizing the Subjectivity of Interests

Classical utilitarianism starts from the recognition of the subjectivity of interests, and takes subjective feelings, namely the experience of pleasure and pain, as the measure of interests. As discussed above, the pure subjective feelings of individual are not equivalent to individual interests. Guiding one’s personal behavior only by one’s subjective feelings may deviate the behavior from his true interests. Interests originate from the needs of the subject, but the realization of interests ultimately depends on whether the object of interests can actually meet the needs of the subject. The object of interest is the property and function of objective things related to and corresponding to the satisfaction of the subject needs. It includes nature, human society, human culture, and the behavior of others and people relative to the subject, etc. The object of interest is the objective basis for human needs to be satisfied. Without the object of interest, the needs of the subject are only the subjective imagination of the individual, which can neither form the interest relationship nor satisfy the individual’s needs. The objectivity of interest includes two aspects: First, although the interest arises from the needs of people, whether the interest can be satisfied depends on the condition of the object, while the objective basis of interest is the inherent attribute of objective things. Whether a thing is beneficial to an individual and how beneficial it is, first depends on whether the specific attributes of the thing can be used by an individual and how is the effects after the use. Second, human needs and the degree of satisfaction of needs are limited by the actual conditions of the objects from the particular social practice level and historical development stage. The realization of human needs is not only limited by social conditions, but also changes with the development of social practice. It is starting from the first level of the objectivity of interest that contemporary utilitarianism reveals that individual needs are not the product of pure subjectivity. To admit the subjectivity of interests does not mean that interests are purely subjective. Subjectivity and subjectification have different connotations. The subject of interest contains not only subjective factors, such as

182

6 Development of Contemporary Utilitarianism

human feeling, thinking, concepts, etc., but also objective factors, such as production level and social practice. Although subjectivity contains subjective factors, it cannot be all attributed to human subjectivity. Recognizing the subjectivity of interests does not deny the objectivity of interests which is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity. The mistake of the classical view of utility is that individual interests are only understood as individual subjective psychological experience, thus having pure subjective subjectivity. To a certain extent, contemporary utilitarianism has realized the integration of interest subjectivity and interest content objectivity. On the one hand, contemporary utilitarianism holds that interests are the interests of the subject, and the individual is the first judge of self-interest; On the other hand, contemporary utilitarianism also argues that the individual’s judgment of self-interest is not absolute. Individuals’ judgment of self-interest should not only be examined by rational factors, but also subject to the limitations of community factors, so as to achieve a balance between individual interests and social public interests.

6.2 Contributions to the Theory of Equality 6.2.1 A New Cognition of the Basis of Equality In the tradition of political philosophy, an egalitarian argument that has been widely recognized by scholars is based on moral personality. Rawls states in his A Theory of Justice: “the capacity for moral personality is a sufficient condition for being entitled to equal justice”.15 He further illustrated that, just like drawing a unit circle on a piece of paper, all points in the circle possess the properties of the unit circle equally, regardless of their specific positions within the circle. Similarly, the so-called moral personality is the moral attribute that all the people equally have, and it is the basis for people to ignore interpersonal differences and achieve equal treatment. In other words, although in reality some people are naturally intelligent, while others are ignorant; some are in high positions of power while others are weak; some are physically strong, while others are born disabled. However, all these natural and social differences should not be a reason for people to be treated morally differently in social life, and everyone should be treated equally based on equal moral personality. However, both research and experience have shown that the concept of equality, built on moral personality, has inherent defects in the sense of analysis and verification. First, the concept of moral personality is vague.16 Sometimes moral personality is the capacity of having (and are assumed to have) a conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life); and sometimes it is the capacity of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and 15 16

Rawls (1999), p. 505. Ibid., p. 509.

6.2 Contributions to the Theory of Equality

183

to act upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum degree.17 Second, there are differences in the degree of moral personality, some people will be highly sensitive to morality, while others have limited cognition of it, which therefore causes inequality in implementation and feeling. In fact, even if moral personality is treated in the weakest sense, such as understanding it only as a person with a certain sense of justice, then infants, young children, people with intellectual disabilities, etc., will be excluded. Third, moral personality is a priori in nature and cannot provide a solid foundation for social justice and equal treatment, and therefore cannot compare the distribution of interests. In fact, the basis for equal treatment of moral personality comes from contract theory, and equal treatment is the reciprocal requirement of both parties to the contract. However, reciprocity presupposes the equal strength of the two parties, and it can be said that moral personality to a certain extent excludes the absolutely vulnerable groups in society, that is, people who cannot truly have full moral personality, and these people are the groups that need equal values to be given. Thus, moral personality does not provide a satisfactory argument for the basis of equality. In contrast, utilitarianism regards interests as the basic element of equality, and universal interests form the basis of universal equality. Singer argues that the unique contribution of utilitarianism to the discourse of the basis of equality is to look at every demand for equality from a universal perspective: What matters is not whose interest but the interest itself; when the interest of the personis taking into account, the same consideration must apply to the interest of everyone affected. Namely, the same interests should be paid the same attention. In utilitarianism, the principle of equal consideration of interests acts like a pair of scales, “weighing interests impartially”.18 From the perspective of classical utilitarianism, utilitarian measurement of interests is people’s feelings of pleasure of pain, and the same sensibility of pleasure and pain is the basis for people to be equally treated. For example, Bentham believes that the ability to perceive pain and pleasure was fundamental for an individual to be entitled to equal treatment. Nature places the individual under the domination of pleasure and pain, which are not only the psychological basis for determining what the individual actually does, but also the moral basis for pointing out what the individual should do. Pleasure and pain are the foundation of rearing the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law.19 The sensibility of pleasure and pain is a prerequisite for having all interests, not only a sufficient condition for living creatures to have interests, but also a necessary condition. Therefore, if a living creature feels pain, there is no moral reason to refuse to consider this pain. Regardless of whether the living creature has the additional conditions such as the capacity for reason, the ability to communicate, and some sense of justice, the individual’s pain should be considered equally; If a living creature cannot feel pain or pleasure, then there is no need to consider its interests.

17

Rawls (1999), p. 505. Singer (2011), p. 20. 19 Bentham (1907), p. 16. 18

184

6 Development of Contemporary Utilitarianism

Classical utilitarianism takes the criterion of pleasure and pain sensibility as the whole meaning of interests. The pleasure and pain sensibility is the instinctive perception of the living creature to the outside world. Taking this as the standard for treating people equally, it can not only eliminate the interference of social factors such as social status, education level and life opportunities, but also eliminate the interference of natural factors such as intellectual ability and physical fitness, thus expanding the scope of equal subjects. For this reason, utilitarianism believes that pleasure and pain sensibility is the premise of equal treatment between people and is the sole common value shared between different individuals. In the face of the same pleasure and pain sensibility, all individuals are equal. Except for pleasure and pain sensibility, none of the other elements can be used as a criterion for interpersonal comparison of interests. Therefore, in the face of the distribution of social resources and the conflict of interests between different groups or individuals, the so-called equality of treatment is to achieve the outcome of the same happiness to be treated the same, and the same pain to be treated the same. In terms of the basis of equality, contemporary utilitarianism inherits the impartial perspective of classical utilitarianism, and at the same time, it develops pleasure and pain sensibility of classical utilitarianism from three perspectives, and puts forward a corrective explanation on the basis of equality. First, the objectivity of the basis of equality. Classical utilitarianism takes individual perception of pain and pleasure as the basis of equal treatment, that is, the basis of equality is based on the same subjective feelings of individuals. However, subjective feelings still cannot provide sufficient theoretical prerequisites for equality. On the one hand, the feelings of pain and pleasure excludes a large number of objective objects that exist objectively and have value, but cannot cause the feeling of pleasure; On the other hand, due to the uniqueness of individuals, it is difficult to make accurate interpersonal measurement and comparison of subjective happiness. Based on this, contemporary utilitarianism has objectively revised the basis of equality, holding that there are always some basic needs that everyone needs, and therefore the basis of equality is the equal consideration of individual interests. According to Singer, the best outcome is to promote the interests of those involved and fulfill the desires of those affected. This not only includes increasing pleasure and to reducing pain, but also includes “satisfying basic needs for food and shelter, to love and care for any children one may have, to enjoy friendly and loving relations with others and to be free to pursue one’s projects without unnecessary interference from others”, etc.20 Second, the plurality of the basis of equality. Classical utilitarianism is monism, which holds that all good things can be reduced to happiness, all disasters and misfortunes can be reduced to pain, therefore, the subject’s feelings of pain and pleasure is the basis of equality. Most contemporary utilitarians hold the view of “pluralistic value theory”, arguing that not all values are reducible in all cases, and that “although we are to bring about as much as possible, well-being is not the only thing we are to promote; it is not the only thing that is good in itself”.21 For example, knowledge, 20 21

Singer (2011), pp. 21–22. Shaw (1999), p. 61.

6.2 Contributions to the Theory of Equality

185

achievement, friendship, autonomy, etc. all have intrinsic value that are not reducible. Therefore, the basic values that compose a good life for an individual are all things that utilitarianism needs to be treated equally. Third, the distributive nature of the basis for equality. The feelings of pain and pleasure under the classical utilitarianism can only exclude the discriminatory principle of inequality, that is, “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”,22 but classical utilitarianism cannot settle the issue of equal distribution. Because from the perspective of classical utilitarianism, each person is an individual in the form of aggregation, and as Hart puts it, the individual is only a “receptable” of pleasure and pain. In this regard, contemporary utilitarianism corrects the classical utilitarian concept of equality, which holds that individual interest has its equal and independent status. Contemporary utilitarianism views the transition from individual utility to social utility from a distributive perspective, and believes that the goal of utilitarianism is the promotion of individual utility. Contemporary utilitarianism goes beyond the classical utilitarian equality foundation of pure subjective and idealistic feelings of pain and pleasure, tries to put the basis of social equality on the individual interests of utilitarianism, and constructs a new equality foundation of utilitarianism by introducing the idea of equal treatment of everyone’s interests. It replaces pleasure and pain sensibility with interests, replaces the purely subjective feelings of individual isolation with equal objectivity and pluralism, and replaces the individual’s inner perception of pleasure and pain with equal treatment of interests in interpersonal relationships. This theoretical change not only shows contemporary utilitarianism’s efforts to correct classical utilitarianism, but also reflects contemporary utilitarianism’s attention to the practical requirements of equality and the social realization mechanism.

6.2.2 More Reasonable Distribution Results The contemporary utilitarian view of equality advocates more reasonable distribution results. Utilitarianism tends to allocate resources to those who can produce greater marginal utility. According to diminishing marginal utility, the same resources will exert greater utility in the hands of vulnerable groups such as the poor and the disabled, therefore, the distribution results of contemporary utilitarianism are, like other egalitarian principles, are more favorable to the disadvantaged groups in the society. Moreover, due to utilitarianism’s emphasis on consequences, in the special case of extremely limited resources, utilitarianism can often make limited social resources play a greater role, so as to obtain distribution results that are more in line with people’s moral intuition.

22

Mill (1879), p. 112.

186

6.2.2.1

6 Development of Contemporary Utilitarianism

Comparison Between the Distribution Results of Contemporary Utilitarianism and Rawls’s Difference Principle

The contemporary utilitarian principle of distribution and Rawls’s principle of difference are both choices made by rational individuals about the basic institutional arrangements of society after blocking out personal self-interest information that has nothing to do with morality. In choosing between the two social system arrangements of A and B, utilitarianism assumes that the individual does not know in advance what position he will be in each society, only that he may be in either society with equal probability. The veil of ignorance assumes that individuals are ignorant of their own social situation (including class, birth, social status, etc.), natural conditions (including gender, intelligence level, natural aptitude and natural ability, etc.), moral concepts, and psychological traits (optimism or pessimism, risk-taking or conservative, etc.) when making choices. They are also ignorant of the special environment, economic and political conditions, civilization and cultural level of the society in which they live. It can be observed that the distribution principle of contemporary utilitarianism and the difference principle represent different choices made by rational individuals for social system arrangements under the same theoretical assumption. Utilitarianism believes that rational individuals will select institutional arrangements that can maximize expected utility, while Rawls believes that rational individuals will choose institutional arrangements that maximize the utility of the least advantaged. Harsanyi argues that the reason why these two theories make completely different theoretical choices based on the same theoretical assumptions is that they apply different analytical tools of decision-making theory. Contemporary utilitarianism adopts Bayesian theory as a decision-making analysis tool, and Rawls chooses the Maximin Principle as a decision-making analysis tool. The Maximin Principle was a method that was popular in the middle 1940s and middle 1950s of the twentieth century, and was no longer used because it would lead to serious paradoxes and absurd results. Bayesian theory is a popular decision-making analysis tool. According to Bayesian theory, rational individuals tend to choose institutional arrangements that maximize expected utility in situations of uncertainty.23 Taking the Maximin Principle as a decision-making analysis tool is the main reason why the principle of difference leads to absurd and paradoxical results. The Maximin Principle takes the worst case as the criterion. Among all the alternatives, the worst case of each option is compared, and the option that can produce the best result under the worst case is selected. The Maximin Principle is an extreme insurance principle that rejects any risk-taking factor. It is unscientific for individuals to use absolute conservative criteria as decision-making analysis tools when they are completely ignorant of their risk preference information. Hysanyi illustrates the absurdity of using the Maximin Principle as a tool for decision-making analysis with an example. Suppose you live in New York City and are offered two jobs at the same time. One is a tedious and badly paid job in New York City itself, while 23 Harsanyi (1975), p. 594; John C. Harsanyi, “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior”; Radner and Marschak (1954), pp. 61–68.

6.2 Contributions to the Theory of Equality

187

Table 6.1 Decision-making analysis of the maximin principle If the N.Y.-Chicago plane has If the N.Y.-Chicago plane has an accident no accident If you choose the N.Y. job

You will have a poor job, but will stay alive

You will have a poor job, but will stay alive

If you choose the Chicago job

You will die

You will have an excellent job and will stay alive

the other is a very interesting and well-paid job in Chicago. But the catch is that, if you wanted the Chicago job, you would have to take a plane from New York to Chicago (e.g., because this job would have to be taken up the very next day). Therefore, there would be a very small but positive probability that you might be killed in a plane accident. Thus, the situation can be represented by the following double-entry Table 6.1.24 The maximin principle says that you must evaluate every policy available to you in terms of the worst possibility that can occur to you if you follow that particular policy. Therefore, you have to analyze the situation as follows. If you choose the New York job then the worst (and, indeed, the only) possible outcome will be that you will have a poor job. In contrast, if you choose the Chicago job then the worst possible outcome will be that you may die in a plane accident. Thus, the worst possible outcome in the first case would be much better than the worst possible outcome in the second case. Consequently, if you want to follow the maximin principle then you must choose the New York job. Clearly, this is a highly irrational conclusion. Utilitarianism states that whether it is a small probability of a plane accident or a person’s strong preference to work in Chicago, it should be factored into the calculation of expected utility and choose the outcome with the greatest expected utility. In this case, of course, the individual should choose to fly to Chicago immediately to take the job. “It is extremely irrational to make your behavior wholly dependent on some highly unlikely unfavorable contingencies regardless of how little probability you are willing to assign to them.”25 The wrong decision-making analysis tool used by Rawls makes the principle of difference produce unreasonable distribution results in some special cases. The principle of difference holds that a just social distribution system needs to maximize the utility for the least advantaged. In other words, whether the measure of justice of a social system is just lies in whether it is in line with the interests of the least advantaged. Hysanyi shows, by taking two counterexamples, that distributional outcomes under the principle of difference may have unacceptable moral implications.26 As a first example, consider a society consisting of one doctor and two patients, both of them critically ill with pneumonia. Their only chance to recover is to be treated by an 24

John C. Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory”, p. 595. 25 John C. Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory”, p. 595. 26 John C. Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory”, pp. 596–597.

188

6 Development of Contemporary Utilitarianism

antibiotic, but the amount available suffices only to treat one of the two patients. Of these two patients, individual A is a basically healthy person, apart from his present attack of pneumonia. On the other hand, individual B is a terminal cancer victim but, even so, the antibiotic could prolong his life by several months. Which patient should be given the antibiotic? According to the difference principle, it should be given to the cancer victim, who is obviously the less fortunate of the two patients. In contrast, under utilitarian distribution principle, the antibiotic should be given to A because it would produce more expected utility. As a second example, consider a society consisting of two individuals. Both of them have their material needs properly taken care of, but society still has a surplus of resources left over but it is not possible to divide up the surplus resources between the two individuals. This surplus can be used either to provide education in higher mathematics for individual A, who has a truly exceptional mathematical ability, and has an all-consuming interest in receiving instruction in higher mathematics. Or, it could be used to provide remedial training for individual B, who is a severely retarded person (the training could achieve only trivial improvements in B’s condition). The difference principle would require that these resources should be spent on B’s remedial training, since he is the less fortunate of the two individuals. In contrast, both utilitarian theory and common sense would suggest that they should be spent on A’s education, where they would accomplish “much more good,” and would create a much deeper and much more intensive human satisfaction. In fact, utilitarianism maintains that the error of the principle of difference is to give absolute priority to the worst-off individual, no matter what, even under the most extreme conditions, the social resources need to give priority to the interests of the worst-off. Even if the interests of the worst-off were affected only in a very minor way, and all other individuals in society had opposite interests of the greatest importance, his interests would always override anybody else’s. For the criticism contemporary utilitarianism, Rawls’s response is that utilitarianism raises objections through counterexamples which is bound to have limited validity, “since these may tell us only what we know already, namely that our theory is wrong somewhere. The important thing is to find out how often and how far it is wrong. All theories are presumably mistaken in places”.27 However, utilitarianism holds that if the counterexample objects to the details of the theory, then the counterexample has a limited role and can only show that the theory needs to be modified in certain aspects. In this case, however, the utilitarian counterexample is put forward in response to the basic criterion of the principle of difference, the Maximin Principle, and the role of the counterexample in this situation means that there is a fundamental error in the principle of difference. Consequently, the basic social system operating according to the principle of difference will often contribute to unreasonable results. Moreover, the principle of difference and the principle of utility generally produce the same distributional results: contemporary utilitarianism tends to allocate resources to those who can produce greater utility, and individuals who have a smaller share of resources in the initial allocation obviously need more additional resources and thus produce greater utility. Therefore, it is only through comparison in special cases 27

Rawls (1999), p. 52.

6.2 Contributions to the Theory of Equality

189

that it is possible to discover which theory can produce better distribution results. In fact, the distribution principle of contemporary utilitarianism is widely used in the daily distribution system, especially for the allocation of scarce resources, such as the IVF service supported by public funds as mentioned above, and also the distribution scheme of organ transplant ranking and other distribution schemes. Utilitarianism has provided a more efficient and fair distribution method.

6.2.2.2

Comparison Between the Distribution Results of Contemporary Utilitarianism and Dworkin’s Insurance Principle

Contemporary utilitarianism holds that Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance principle is homogeneous with the utilitarian distribution principle, and Dworkin’s distribution principle can be regarded as a principle of hypothetical-choice utilitarianism.28 Dworkin hopes that his theory of equality can achieve the goal of “choiceinsensitive, endowment-insensitive”. Dworkin argues that equality is not only a political issue but also an economic issue. It is the state’s responsibility for the inequality caused by non-individual selective factors (e.g., natural endowments and social contingencies), which needs to be adjusted through social redistribution. However, not all inequalities have political significance, and individuals need to be responsible for their own choices. Economic inequalities which are formed on the basis of individual different efforts and aspirations are morally defensible, while economic inequalities caused by personal choices do not need to be regulated. Dworkin argues that a reasonable goal of equality is “choice-sensitive, endowment-insensitive”, and that equality that can achieve this goal is the equality of resources at the initial starting point, that is, “equality of resources is a matter of equality in whatever resources are owned privately by individuals”.29 Equality of Resources is intended to create an equal starting point, ensuring that the outcomes of subsequent distribution are only related to individual choices and efforts. Dworkin argues that equality of resources is superior to Rawls’s equality of results, because equality of resources has achieved the unity of respecting human subjectivity and respecting human moral equality. Suppose that under the premise that everyone has the same natural endowment, and the distributor auctions all the resources within the community. Everyone participates in the auction and everyone has the same degree of purchasing power, that is, 100 clamshells. People use the clamshells in their hands to bid for the resources that best fit their life plan.30 In this process, individuals can change the goods they bid for and their bids until everyone is satisfied with the goods they are bidding for and do not want to exchange with others, that is, “everyone declares himself satisfied, and goods are distributed accordingly”.31 Dworkin asserts that this result means that the distribution has passed the “envy 28

Stein (2006), pp. 130–135. Dworkin (2002), p. 65. 30 Ibid., pp. 68–75. 31 Ibid., p. 68. 29

190

6 Development of Contemporary Utilitarianism

test”, in which although there are differences between people, the differences are determined by the different choices and life attitudes of individuals, which do not affect the equal moral status of everyone. Everyone also enjoys the equal care given by the community, and lives a self-satisfied life. However, in the real world, equality of starting points can only ensure choicesensitive, and there are differences in natural endowments between people, such as innate differences caused by disabilities. Differences in natural endowments make individuals unequal in their starting point, and people with disabilities need to use a portion of the clamshells to meet their special needs, and the left can just be used to obtain benefits. Dworkin argues that differences in natural talents are not the result of individual selectivity, and therefore the community needs to provide adequate compensation to the disadvantaged so that they have the same starting point as everyone else. How to realize the compensation for the disadvantaged of natural endowments has become the core issue of Dworkin’s theory of distributive justice. In Dworkin’s view, the way to maximize the compensation of the most disadvantaged is not reasonable. Some differences in natural endowments can be compensated for, and some differences, even if all social public resources are invested, it can only improve their situation and cannot make them have the same starting point as others. Dworkin argues that compensating for differences in natural endowments by purchasing insurance is a more rational distribution principle. The individual imagines himself in a thought experiment similar to the veil of ignorance, where the individual does not be aware of the actual situation of the natural endowment he has, and is only aware that everyone has the same probability of being subject to various natural disadvantages, with everyone to have the same probability of becoming the disadvantaged of natural endowment. At this point, the allocator asks the individual how much of his or her equal share of resources (100 clamshells) he or she is willing to spend on insurance to compensate him or her for a possible disadvantage in the random allocation of natural endowments. Dworkin’s insurance principle is to guide people to decide how much social resources a community should devote to helping people who are disadvantaged by the random distribution of natural endowments, or how much social resources a society should devote to correcting social inequalities caused by non-individual choices. The reason why Dworkin’s insurance principle and utilitarian distribution principle are homogeneous is mainly reflected in the fact that both theories hope to achieve the optimal of social expected utility on the basis of treating people equally. First of all, the principle of insurance is a rational, self-interested individual’s decision on whether to buy insurance and how much insurance to buy, in order to prevent poor endowment situations that occur with equal probability in the case of ignorance of their actual natural endowments.32 The principle of insurance is not an absolutely fair distribution scheme, because it is true that there are some differences in natural endowments that are not individually selective, which cannot be fully compensated for by the principle of insurance. The principle of insurance is a middle choice

32

Varian (1985), p. 117.

6.2 Contributions to the Theory of Equality

191

between equality of outcome and ignorance of the existence of inequality. This principle is, without knowing the true endowments of individuals, a relatively neutral perspective on the extent to which a community can provide emergency back-up for the disadvantaged with natural endowments through tax-backed welfare policies. The insurance principle does not ignore and take for granted the real differences between people in terms of natural qualifications; Nor does it make some attempt to bring about full equality of human conditions in vain. As Kymlicka puts it, although Dworkin’s insurance principle is a suboptimal solution to achieve “choice-sensitive, endowment-insensitive”, “everyone can recognize and accept the fairness of letting their compensation be determined by what they would have chosen in such a hypothetical position of equality”.33 Moreover, Dworkin argues that, in terms of achieving equitable distribution in society, optimal solutions that compensate those who are disadvantaged with natural endowments are even less desirable. If a society sets aside most of its wealth to compensate those who are disadvantaged with “natural endowments, it will result in the phenomenon of “slavery of the talented”. A man with a high natural endowment must “work hard enough to cover his premium before he is free to make the tradeoffs between work and consumption, he would have been free to make if he had not insured. If the level of coverage is high then this will enslave the insured.”34 Moreover, high insurance premiums will make highly talented people have to go all out to work, and even be unable to freely choose in different types of work. In this way, insurance schemes will seriously dominate people’s life choices. Second, the insurance principle is the choice of insurance buyers after calculating among related benefits according to the greater-benefit criterion. The insurance principle is a middle zone between the principle of result equality of and the principle of resource equality. The essence of the insurance principle is to ensure that the vast majority of people in the community can have a relatively fair starting point when entering social life, so as to maximize the average expected utility of social members. The consideration of the total social utility is the basic factor to determine the insurance share, in other words, the setting of the insurance limit cannot be unhelpful in improving of the total social utility. Therefore, Dworkin’s insurance principle has chosen a decision-making analysis tool that is more closely resemble to contemporary utilitarianism. Dworkin opposes extreme risk attitudes, namely the maximin principle or maximax principle, arguing that a risk-neutral approach is preferable.35 A risk-neutral attitude means that individuals need to be sensitive to the calculation 33

Kymlicka (2002), p. 78. Dworkin (1981), p. 322. 35 The Maximin Principle is to give priority to maximizing the benefits of the least advantaged in the distribution, that is to say, only when the least advantaged can benefit the most from the unequal distribution, the unequal distribution can be justified. If the Maximin principle is adopted, then Dworkin’s insurance principle will allocate a large amount of resources as insurance shares to compensate the disadvantaged in natural endowment to the greatest extent, but Dworkin’s insurance principle opposes this tendency. If the Maximax principle is adopted, the insurance principle will not provide any compensation for the disadvantaged in natural endowment, and the distribution result will be strict equality of resources. Therefore, the decision-making analysis tool of the insurance principle is neither the Maximin principle nor the Maximax principle, but the risk-neutral principle. 34

192

6 Development of Contemporary Utilitarianism

of relevant benefits when making decisions, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of various circumstances to make choices that ensure that average returns are maximized. In this sense, Dworkin’s insurance principle also has the color of utilitarianism. Third, Dworkin’s insurance principle produces the same distribution results as the utilitarian distribution principle. Both the insurance principle and the utilitarian distribution principle require compensation for those with unfavorable natural endowments in the allocation of social resources. For utilitarianism, the allocation of resources should be prioritized in favor of individuals who can produce greater expected utility. In the case of uneven distribution of natural endowments, the utilitarian distribution principle will also give priority to those with poor natural endowments, such as people with disabilities, because those with poor endowments need additional resources to meet their special needs due to natural disadvantages, such as buying wheelchairs, hearing aids, braille books, etc. The same resources can produce more utility in the hands of those with poor endowments. Distribution in favor of the disadvantaged with natural endowments will stop only when the natural disadvantages in natural endowment can be remedied or when individuals with normal endowments can produce higher levels of utility from the same resources. It’s plain that both the utilitarian distribution principle and the insurance principle need to compare the benefits obtained from social resources by those with unfavorable natural endowments and the benefits obtained from social resources by those with normal natural endowments to determine whether to continue to allocate resources to the disadvantaged with unfavorable natural endowments or whether to increase the amount of insurance purchased. Therefore, the two theories produce the same distributive results in real operation.

6.3 The Real Public Interest Theory 6.3.1 Contemporary Utilitarianism Confirms the Public Interest Contemporary utilitarianism has proved to be the actual independent existence of public interest by detailed inquiring the subject of public interest. Interests arise from the satisfaction of certain needs of a specific subject, so any type of interests must have the subject as the carrier, which makes subjectivity the natural attribute of interests. According to this, if there is no specific subject bearing public interests, it is difficult for public interests to exist realistically. For individualists, there are only individual people existed in society. Only existed individual people can carry out activities to meet their own needs, and make sacrifices or bear the costs for obtaining a certain benefit, and “there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some

6.3 The Real Public Interest Theory

193

sacrifice for its own good”.36 In this regard, the reason why classical utilitarianism is considered to be lacking in the idea of public good is that, first of all, the theory regards the social community as a collection of individuals or a fictitious body of collectives. Contemporary utilitarianism argues that it is wrong to interpret the community as a collection of individuals, because in many cases people need to generally cooperate with each other in order to achieve their desired goals, and we have the “duty to assume our fair share of the burden when a cooperative sacrifice has to be made for the general good”.37 Therefore, Contemporary utilitarianism draws on the concept of the social organism, replacing the collective with the organism: the community is not merely a collection of independent individuals; The individual and the community are in an organic relationship of interactive influence, which means, the development of the individual needs the support of the community, and the prosperity of the community also depends on the full development of the individual. Obviously, contemporary utilitarianism is more inclined to understand the community as an organic entity with a certain sense of purpose and self-control ability. John Hobson argues that replacing the principle of individual maximum happiness with social utility is the basic criterion to distinguish traditional utilitarianism from new utilitarianism. On the one hand, contemporary utilitarianism has made a new definition of the connotation of utility, that is, the concept of utility must be a happy experience or rational preference tested by objective criteria, so as to remove “preferences possibly based on erroneous factual beliefs, or on careless logical analysis, or on strong emotions that at the moment greatly hinder rational choice”,38 and also remove the preferences that obviously violate the public nature of society. It holds that only when something is also desirable from the perspective of the community, can it be regarded as truly contributing to the welfare of the individual and thus should enter into the utility calculation. At the same time, when evaluating individual behavior and public policy, it is necessary to consider not only whether the behavior contributes to the improvement of individual utility, but also whether it contributes to the interests of the community. On the other hand, the consideration of social utility in contemporary utilitarianism has changed from calculating the superposition of interests of agents to calculating the overall interests of the community. What determines social utility is no longer the sum of individual utility, but the promotion of overall utility by systems and rules.

36

Nozick (2013), p. 50. R. Eugene Bales, “Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-making Characteristics or DecisionMaking Procedure”, pp. 259–260. 38 John C. Harsanyi, “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior”, Social Research, p. 646. 37

194

6 Development of Contemporary Utilitarianism

6.3.2 Establish the Value and Content of Social Public Interest Politics Under the logic of consequentialism, contemporary utilitarianism constructs the concept of public interest based on community, and coordinates the relationship between public interest and individual interest in the form of public rules. This realization aligns with the original theoretical intention of guiding rational individuals to voluntarily choose behaviors that are conducive to public interest to a certain extent, while also partially resolving Sidgwick’s dualism of the practical reason. On this basis, contemporary utilitarianism demonstrates the independent and objective existence of social public interest, and establishes the value and content basis of social public interest politics in the sense of the function of public interest to social equity and justice and collective rights. In the logic of classical utilitarianism, there is a paradox between the priority of individuals and the perspective of legislators with the characteristics of holism, which makes it difficult for classical utilitarianism to describe the objective attribute of public interest, so that the public interest in its theory swings between dependence and independence. It can be concluded that under the vision of classical utilitarianism, there are ideas and contents that reflect the concept of public interest, but public interest does not exist objectively and independently. Contemporary utilitarianism redefines the relationship between the individual and the community, and further demonstrates the actual objective existence of social public interests. In terms of philosophical foundations, contemporary utilitarianism has got rid of the theoretical perspective of the individual-community binary opposition, and has changed from the construction of a society that is “self-centered” to the construction of a society in which “I and we” are interconnected. Contemporary utilitarianism criticizes classical utilitarianism for overestimating the rational calculation ability of individuals, emphasizing that the actual consequences of individual actions need to be influenced by interpersonal strategic interactions. In terms of the generation of public interest, contemporary utilitarianism holds that public interests are actually abstracted from the individual interests of all members or most members, the actual holders of public interest are an unspecified majority in the community, and system rules are the guarantee for achieving public interests. Contemporary utilitarianism recognizes the limitations of rational calculation, and proposes to take public rules (especially system rules) as the basic norms of individual action, so as to develop the social function of public interest through a new institutionalism combining system and behavior, and incorporate public interest into the theoretical framework of maximizing the overall social utility. As far as social functions are concerned, contemporary utilitarianism holds that the social functions of public interest are illustrated in the protection and regulation of different types of rights. When one right is denied by another right based on the consideration of public interests, it is also equivalent to confirming that the gain of one subject exceeds the loss of another subject. In this regard, the public interest thought of contemporary utilitarianism shows a certain degree of distributive justice orientation. In addition,

6.4 The Balance of Governance Values

195

for the sake of maximizing the overall utility of society, collective rights often have priority when conflicts occur between different types of rights. Therefore, it can be concluded that the public interest thought of contemporary utilitarianism has actually paid attention to and recognized the value status of the public nature of social life.

6.4 The Balance of Governance Values In policy practice, the government is often confronted with contradictory social values, such as efficiency and fairness, individual rationality and collective rationality. Although these values are the core concepts of public policy, due to their contradictions and conflicts, policies only determine the value orientation of one side: either pay attention to efficiency or fairness, either value individual interests or safeguard the public interest. Achieving compatibility with conflicting values is a central issue in public policy ethics, and contemporary utilitarianism has made specific efforts in this regard.

6.4.1 Achieving Compatibility with Efficiency and Fairness Efficiency and fairness are both important social values. The former emphasizes “making the cake bigger”, while the latter hopes to “share the cake fairly”. However, efficiency and fairness have historically been regarded as contradictory social values, and public policies are either efficiency-oriented or fairness-oriented. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, the public service outsourcing carried out by the American public sector was an efficiency-oriented public policy. The original intention of this policy was to improve the supply efficiency of public services, improve the quality of public services, and enhance people’s satisfaction. Therefore, no matter it is value selection or result evaluation, it basically has nothing to do with fair distribution. However, for some policies involving basic rights or basic social welfare for emergency back-up, fairness is its basic value orientation, such as children’s education policy or basic medical security, in which case, efficiency factors often do not play an important role. Therefore, taking into account both fairness and efficiency have been the striving direction of public policy value research. Contemporary utilitarianism argues that there is a possibility of consistency between fairness and efficiency. The contemporary utilitarian Hare argues through the “arbitrary transposition experiment” that when policies meet the requirements of the principle of “the same interests, the same treatment”, the need for fairness and the need for efficiency can be met at the same time.39 Because I may occupy any position in society, out of self-interest, I need to pay equal attention to my interests in any position. In other words, according to the contemporary utilitarian view, the way 39

Mackie (1996), p. 53.

196

6 Development of Contemporary Utilitarianism

to maximize the total utility of society is: first, the same interests are given the same degree of satisfaction; Second, maximize the satisfaction of all the same interests. Accordingly, contemporary utilitarianism provides allocating resources for public policy. It is neither devoted to improving the situation of the least advantaged, as advocated by egalitarians, nor does it only focus on maximizing the sum of individual utility, as championed by advocates of efficiency. Instead, it is committed to maximizing the equal interests of all involved to the greatest extent. “The same interests, the same treatment” not only means equal opportunities, but also substantive equality. Achieving “the same interests, the same treatment” requires the implementation of a large number of proactive policies. For example, equal treatment of the interests of school-age children in education means that financial funds and education policies need to be tilted toward poor areas and disadvantaged groups to minimize the difference in the rights to education between these children and urban children as much as possible. Contemporary utilitarianism also advocates that if the same interests cannot be treated in the same way in reality, then the resource allocation should be dominated by the principle of diminishing marginal utility of the beneficiary subject. Because the better off people are, the lower the marginal utility of the same resource is, and thus the allocation of resources is still tilted towards the disadvantaged or the group with higher needs.

6.4.2 Reconciling Individual Rationality with Collective Rationality At different levels, the main value trade-off issue facing public policy is how to reconcile individual rationality with collective rationality. For independent individuals, there are actually two kinds of rationality at the same time, namely individual rationality and collective rationality. The former is a self-interested behavioral choice, seeking to maximize personal interests; The latter is an altruistic choice of behavior which holds that individuals are obliged to promote the advancement of the collective interests and bear some responsibility for this. Since both individual rationality and collective rationality are primordial, there is a constant conflict between the two rationalities. One of the major tasks of public policy is to guide self-interested individuals to give up the behavior of maximizing individual rationality and choose behaviors that contribute to collective rationality. Based on the basic requirement of utility maximization, contemporary utilitarianism has provided a set of coordinated schemes.

6.4 The Balance of Governance Values

6.4.2.1

197

Providing Equal Protection for Different Types of Interests

Contemporary utilitarianism neither negates collective rationality with individual rationality, nor negates individual rationality with collective rationality, but it adopts a compromise choice. Contemporary utilitarianism holds that the most effective institutional arrangement is one that provides equal protection for different types of interests. Hardin divides the different types of interests into three categories: ➀ individual interests independent of the interests of others; ➁ small group interests independent of society; ➂ the interests of the whole society. A public policy should protect all three types of interests equally. The protection of the interests of different types of subjects is manifested in the protection of their rights, so in this sense public policies need to protect three types of rights: the right to ownership of property, the dyadic right of voluntary exchange and collective rights.

6.4.2.2

Defining the Operating Space of Individual Rationality

The protection of interests is manifested in the protection of rights, and the restriction of rights is also the regulation of interests. Contemporary utilitarianism holds that every right is limited, and utility determines the priority of rights. Based on the consideration of utility, contemporary utilitarianism defines the operating space of individual rationality. First, define the limits of individual rights. Contemporary utilitarianism gives individuals the right to make decisions about their own lives, believing that individuals are the best judges of their own interests, and that an individual can generally live a better life when they themselves can decide how to live. However, the protection of individual rights cannot go beyond the scope of Pareto improvements, and once the protection of one’s rights leads to a decline in the utility of others, the boundaries of individual rights depend on the outcome of the bargaining with the people affected. In other words, the boundaries formed by bargaining are the boundaries within which individual rights can operate freely. Second, define the limits of the dyadic right of voluntary exchange. The dyadic right of voluntary exchange consists of two aspects: individual ownership and equal trading rights. Contemporary utilitarianism argues that in equal exchanges, the situation of all people will improve and no one’s situation will be worse, so it advocates public policy to protect the right of voluntary exchange. The boundary of the right of voluntary exchange lies in the fact that collective rights cannot be violated, i.e., if an exchange conflicts with the collective rights of society, the exchange should not be protected. Since the right of voluntary exchange is actually an extension of individual ownership, individual rationality contains the content of individual ownership and equal trading rights. It can be said that from the perspective of contemporary utilitarianism, the operating space of individual rationality is not in conflict with collective rights. In other words, as long as collective rights are not violated, the protection of individual rational behavior can promote the improvement of the utility level.

198

6.4.2.3

6 Development of Contemporary Utilitarianism

Clarifying the Priority of Collective Rationality

The so-called collective right is to protect the interests of all people. As Hardin contends, collective rights take the society as a whole as the interest subject, and aim to protect the society as a whole from the infringement of individual members. First of all, collective rights are the basis of building collective rationality. Since collective rationality does not have an actual interest subject, in the process of building collective rationality, collective rationality must be based on collective rights in order to prevent it from being engulfed by powerful social groups and deviating from established value objectives. Second, collective rights can deny the behavioral logic of egoism. Once individual rationality conflicts with collective rights, based on the principle of utility, collective rights can negate self-interested ways of behaving, because the total social utility represented by collective rights is much higher than the benefits obtained by individual rationality. It can be seen that contemporary utilitarianism not only attempts to provide specific strategies for reconciling individual rationality with collective rationality, but also believes that the strategies it provides can maximize the total utility of society. Therefore, some scholars have commented that contemporary utilitarianism is a governance philosophy that can be compatible with multiple values.

References Bentham J (1907) An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Clarendon Press, Oxford Brink DO (1988) Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason. Austr J Philos 66(3) Dworkin R (1981) What is equality? Part 2: equality of resources. Philos Publ Affair 10(4) Dworkin R, Virtue S (2002) The theory and practice of equality. Harvard University Press, London Harsanyi JC (1975) Can the maximin principle serve as a basis for morality? a critique of John Rawls’s theory. Am Polit Sci Rev 69(2) Hooker B (ed) (1993) Rationality, rules and utility: new essays on the moral philosophy of Richard B. Brandt. Westview Press, Boulder Kymlicka W (2002) Contemporary political philosophy: an introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford Leacock E (1952) The Montagnais hunting territory and the fur trade. Columbia University ProQuest Dissertations Publishing Lewin L (1991) Self-interest and public interest in western politics. Oxford University Press, Oxford Mackie JL (1996) Rights, utility, and universalization. In: Hamlin AP (ed) Ethics and economics. An Elgar Reference Collection, Cheltenham Mark S (2006) Stein, distributive justice and disability: utilitarianism against egalitarianism. Yale University Press, New Haven Marx K and Engels F (1975) Marx-Engels Collected Works (Vol. 1), London: Lawrence & Wishart, p. 171 Morgan T (2007) Understanding utilitarianism. Cromwell Press, Trowbridge Moore GE (2004) Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press, London Mill J (1879) Utilitarianism. The Floating Press, Auckland, p. 112 Nozick R (2013) Anarchy, state, and Utopia. Basic Books, A Member of the Perseus Books Group, New York

References

199

Puqu W (2022) Principle of interest politics. Springer Radner R, Marschak J (1954) Note on some proposed decision criteria. In: Thrall RM, Coombs CH (eds) Decision processes. Wiley, New York Rawls J (1999) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Shaw WH (1999) Contemporary ethics: taking account of utilitarianism. Blackwell, Oxford Shuyang L (2020) An analysis of contemporary utilitarian public interest thought. Political Sci Res 3 Shuyang L (2020) An analysis of the utilitarian ethics of public policy. China Adm Manage 8 Shuyang L, Puqu W (2017) An analysis of the contemporary utilitarian concept of equality. Political Sci Res 6 Sidgwick H (1907) The methods of ethics. Macmillan, London Singer P (2011) Practical ethics. Cambridge University Press, New York Varian HR (1985) Dworkin on equality of resources. Econ Philos 1(1)

Chapter 7

The Evaluation of the Utilitarianism Evolution

7.1 The Root Causes Analysis of Theoretical Evolution The theoretical evolution from classical utilitarianism to contemporary utilitarianism reflects the transformation of utilitarian theory from simply paying attention to the absoluteness and priority of the individual to a theory that takes both the individual and the community into account and attaches importance to the coordinated development of the individual and the community. Contemporary utilitarianism has changed the misconception of classical utilitarianism about community—the community is not a fictitious but an organic entity, which is not only an activity field for individuals to freely obtain their own interests, but also an interest subject that regulates individual interests, coordinates conflicts of interests, and safeguards and promotes the development of social public interests. The theoretical transmutation from pure individualism to the community-individual equilibrium is the internal root of contemporary utilitarianism to overcome the theoretical defects of classical utilitarianism and realize development and innovation in utilitarianism. It is precisely for this same reason that contemporary utilitarianism shows different theoretical characteristics from classical utilitarianism in many aspects such as utilitarian content, measuring standards, value system and theoretical concerns. Why does utilitarianism undergo theoretical evolution? On the one hand, contemporary utilitarianism needs to solve the problems left by predecessors, overcome the theoretical dilemma of classical utilitarianism, and defend the theoretical status of utilitarianism in contemporary political philosophy. It can be said that the optimization and perfection of utilitarianism and the effective response to the attacks and challenges of critics are the internal roots for the evolution and development of contemporary utilitarianism. On the other hand, contemporary utilitarianism also needs to answer the important questions raised by the current era, to solve the realistic dilemma faced by the current social and economic development as well as to address the theoretical issues and debates of this dilemma formed in academic thinking. It is precisely under the common driving forces of both theory and practice

© Peking University Press 2023 S. Liu, The Contemporary Evolution and Reform of Utilitarianism, Interests Politics Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7363-7_7

201

202

7 The Evaluation of the Utilitarianism Evolution

that contemporary utilitarianism realizes the reform and innovation of utilitarianism theory.

7.1.1 Ideological Criticism and Response Responding to the theoretical criticisms of non-utilitarians and defending the position of utilitarianism in the discussion of contemporary political philosophy are the direct causes of the utilitarianism evolution. Critics argue that utilitarianism is a political philosophical idea of nineteenth century, which is not only obsolete but also must be replaced in contemporary discussions of political philosophy. As Williams argues that there are so many flaws in utilitarianism that it is bound to disappear from today’s political or philosophical discussions. Critics hold that utility is a purely subjective concept, which cannot provide an appropriate foundation for justice and distributive justice in utilitarianism. And utilitarianism transplants the method of personal weighing of self-interest into interpersonal relationships, which is used to solve the issues of weighing interests among different individuals, resulting in the consequences of ignoring the moral significance of individual separateness. Utilitarianism regards the experience of pleasure and pain of all sentient beings as the highest good, and all the other values need to be subordinated to this highest value, thus denying that there are other social values in people’s real life that cannot be reduced to pleasure, leading to the consequence of the dilemma of value monism. In the field of practice, utilitarianism ignores the issue of equality, and the theory fails to adjust the inequalities in social distribution and fails to provide a theory of distributive justice. But contemporary utilitarians have responded to these criticisms one by one in the debates with non-utilitarians. Contemporary utilitarianism maintains that what is obsolete and should be replaced is the classical utilitarianism, and different from classical utilitarianism, Contemporary utilitarianism itself has considerable theoretical resources to respond to the above non-utilitarian criticism. At the same time, utilitarianism represents the moral intuition that people value consequences. Good consequence itself is a defensible moral reason, and any theoretical idea that completely abandons the assessment of consequences, or does not take the actual impact on consequences into consideration, must also be absurd. Therefore, it is too arbitrary, solely based on the theoretical dilemma faced by utilitarianism, to determine that utilitarianism is no longer suitable for the discourse discussion of contemporary political philosophy or that utilitarian theory is bound to decline in modern times.

7.1.2 The Change of Theoretical Paradigm Another important factor that has contributed to the theoretical evolution of utilitarianism in contemporary times is the paradigm shift in the field of political philosophy

7.1 The Root Causes Analysis of Theoretical Evolution

203

since the second half of the twentieth century. Especially after the revival of political philosophy in the 1970s, the politics of rights, represented by the theories of Rawls, Nozick, and Dworkin, quickly replaced the utilitarian theory that has dominated political philosophy for more than a hundred years and became the theoretical paradigm of political philosophy. The politics of rights have completely replaced the politics of utility, and political morality has shifted from maximizing the total utility of the society as much as possible to safeguarding the moral rights of individuals and realizing the basic freedoms of people. In addition, value pluralism and communitarianism that advocates rediscovering the value of community have also influenced the ideological trend of contemporary western political philosophy to a certain extent, forming a new research paradigm. These paradigm shifts are all important reasons for the theoretical evolution of utilitarianism.

7.1.2.1

The Politics of Rights Replace the Politics of Utility

The reason why utilitarianism can be a dominant political philosophy theory over a considerable period of time is that utilitarian theory is systematic. Using the basic propositions of utilitarianism can provide reasonable and adequate explanations for many problems in political philosophy. Thus, although utilitarianism has been subject to a variety of theoretical criticisms since its birth, until the advent of Rawls’s theory of justice, critics “failed to construct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose it.”1 The critics’ overly narrow theoretical criticism makes it seems that we often are forced to choose only between a certain form of utilitarianism and a certain form of intuitionism, and the ambiguity of intuitionist theory itself makes the final result of theoretical revision stay on the specific utilitarianism constrained by intuitionism. Rawls was one of the early pioneers in breaking through utilitarian theory, trying to provide a systematic political theory that could be a comprehensive alternative to utilitarianism. Rawls argues that utilitarianism cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens as free and equal individuals, and is therefore not suitable as a theoretical basis for constitutional democracy. At the same time, Rawls points out that a convincing interpretation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the human is the primary goal of social justice, and that the focus of political philosophy should and need to shift from a focus on what form of utility maximization there is to respect for the moral rights of individuals. Hart argues that there are two theoretical forms in the process of replacing politics of utility with politics of rights—one is taken from the liberal left of the political spectrum, which seeks to erect a theory of rights on their moral title to equal concern and respect of each individual, which is dominated by the duty of government to treat their subjects as equals, with equal concern and respect; The second theory comes from the emphasis on human independence and separateness and builds a theory of rights on the moral importance human person, which is dominated by the duty of all 1

Rawls (1999), p. 8.

204

7 The Evaluation of the Utilitarianism Evolution

government or all social public power to respect the separateness and independence of persons.2 The former is represented by Rawls and Dworkin, and the latter by Nozick. Dworkin asserts that “Government must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect”,3 equal concern and respect are the basic premise of political morality, and “Citizens governed by the liberal conception of equality each have a right to equal concern and respect”.4 Rights theorists of the liberal left argue that politics of utility must be replaced by politics of rights because utilitarianism implicitly denies one thing—social community has a duty to give equal concern to every social members, and that the right of each individual of society to be treated equally is independent of the level of utility the individual produces. Rights theorists believe that from the perspective of utilitarianism, the separate individual does not have intrinsic importance, and the individuals are only approaches and places to discover something valuable. As long as it can promote the improvement of overall utility, no matter how innocent a person is, the happiness and pleasure he pursues can be sacrificed in order to achieve a higher level of utility; Utility interpersonal substitution—compensating the loss of one person by the gain of another, is not only not constrained by utility principles, but is also advocated and even required by strict utilitarianism. In the view of many rights theorists who emphasize equality, the calculation process of utility maximization is to put different individuals’ happiness and pain, happiness and misfortune, satisfaction and depression, and various preferences into a huge “black box”, and obtain a net outcome of utility according to the majority principle. According to the previous theoretical analysis, this criticism is based on the characteristics of aggregation in utilitarianism, arguing that utilitarianism loses the basic political obligation to respect everyone equally in the process of interest aggregation, and the interests of a small number of people become sacrifice of utility maximization in the process of utility aggregation. In his criticism of rights theory, Dworkin takes a slightly different position. What Dworkin objects to is not the process of aggregation itself, but the fact that utilitarianism does not exclude the influence of people’s “external preferences” on the calculation of utility in the process of aggregation. According to Dworkin, the personal preferences that utilitarianism aims to aggregate include both the individual’s distribution tendency of the benefits and rights of his or her own, and the individual’s distribution tendency of the benefits and rights of others, and therefore the final aggregation result of utility will be affected by the prejudice of others. “Dworkin’s argument is not that some liberties must be safeguarded as rights because their value has been compared with that of the increase in general welfare and found to be greater than it, but because such liberties are likely to be defeated by an unfair form of utilitarian argument which by counting in external preferences fails to treat men as equals.”5 In other words,

2

H. L. A. Hart, “Between Utility and Rights”, p. 77. Dworkin (2013), p. 326. 4 Dworkin (2013), p. 327. 5 H. L. A. Hart, “Between Utility and Rights”, p. 90. 3

7.1 The Root Causes Analysis of Theoretical Evolution

205

utility calculations that include “external preferences” do not really treat everyone’s rights equally, and thus utilitarianism needs to be replaced. For Nozick, almost absolute individual rights are the cornerstone of political morality, and respect for individual rights is a basic political duty. Individual rights express the sanctity and inviolability of the individual and reflect the fact that an individual has separateness and independence. Since the individual is the only entity that exists in reality, and there is no social entity or community entity with interests, then the denial of individual interests based on public interests and the denial of individual needs based on public needs is the exploitation and utilization of this person. Or to say, to use a person for the benefits of others, does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact “that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him—least of all a state or government that claims his allegiance”.6 Nozick demands that the state or government should to be neutral between its citizens, otherwise it would be a violation of individual rights. As a result, Nozick is hostile to any form of utilitarianism, arguing that no matter what type of utilitarianism it is, it does not respect the separateness of the individual. Under the big theoretical background that the politics of rights replaces the politics of utility, contemporary utilitarianism must make theoretical adjustments on how to protect individual rights, how to accommodate individual rights within the utility theory, and how to treat individual rights equally. Utilitarianism, while adhering to the basic principles of utility, must protect the separateness and independence of individuals through a new structural form, and ensure that individual rights have an independent position in the utilitarian structure.

7.1.2.2

Value Pluralism Replaces Value Monism

Since World War II, the wave of globalization and democratization has swept the world, and value pluralism has received increasing attention. In the theoretical circle, value monism has been almost completely liquidated, and how to respond to the challenge posed by value pluralism to the existing mainstream has become one of the focuses of political philosophy. The emergence of this theoretical paradigm makes contemporary utilitarianism also need to change the traditional position of value monism, so as to be in line with the theoretical requirements of value pluralism. Classical utilitarianism is characterized by value monism, which holds that the consequential value of an action depends solely on the feelings of pleasure and pain of the affected individual, that pleasure and pain are the summum bonum, and that all other values are subordinate to this highest value. In other words, for classical utilitarianism, only pleasure has the only intrinsic value. Most contemporary political philosophies mostly take the position of value pluralism, arguing that “there is no common measure for all goods, which are qualitatively heterogeneous”,7 and “that 6 7

Nozick (1974). Galston (2004), p. 5.

206

7 The Evaluation of the Utilitarianism Evolution

there are no comprehensive lexical orderings among types of goods”.8 The reason why value pluralism can surpass value monism on the one hand is that monism often leads to theoretical distortion in moral debates in order to impose consistency. For example, classical utilitarianism reduces all values to pleasure and pain feelings, but in fact, not all valuable feelings can be reduced to pleasure and pain. On the other hand, due to the heterogeneity between various theoretical values, which further brings about the inherent tension between values. Objectively, a good life needs to be built on the satisfaction of a wide variety of values, and there is no single value that has an overwhelming influence on the others. Therefore, “different dimensions of value to bear on specific occasions of judgment and to determine how they are best balanced or ordered, given the facts of the case”,9 can, on the contrary, achieve better results. Value pluralism began with the liberal theory of Isaiah Berlin. As far as value pluralism is concerned, an important issue is whether value pluralism will conflict with some form of universal rules, which is also a theoretical problem that must be faced when the theory of value is transformed from monadic to pluralistic. Regarding this issue, a series of liberals have developed different discussions. By observing how liberalism embraces the problem of value pluralism, we can reveal the development process of value pluralism. Berlin first offers an important explanation of the relationship between value pluralism and liberalism. He argues that human value systems and cultures are pluralistic. There are extensive conflicts between value systems, and there is no a unified system through which these values systems can be integrated. Liberalism needs to be derived from multiple value systems, and consequently, value pluralism and negative liberty have become the two pillars of liberalism. Liberty is understood as the capacity of individuals, unimpeded by external coercion or constraint, to choose for themselves among competing conceptions of good or valuable lives. As for Berlin’s argument, Gray maintains that value pluralism and negative liberty cannot be combined, and value pluralism will weaken the status of negative liberty. Gray’s theory exerts the explanatory tension of value pluralism to its limit and fully unleashes its deconstructive and destructive force. Gray argues that value pluralism will ultimately undermine the priority of liberty, and it will be difficult for liberalism to maintain its claim to universality. However, Galston disagrees with Gray’s criticism. Galston argues that what Berlin emphasizes about pluralism is limited pluralism, that not all values can be replaced by other values, and that some values, such as negative liberty, cannot be completely replaced. “We must preserve a minimum area of personal freedom if we are not to ‘degrade or deny our nature’. We cannot remain absolutely free, and must give up some of our liberty to preserve the rest. But total self-surrender is self-defeating. What then must the minimum be? That which a man cannot give up without offending against the essence of human nature.”10 In fact, Berlin provides a universally acceptable bottom line for the political community 8

Ibid. Ibid., p. 6. 10 Berlin (2002), p. 173. 9

7.1 The Root Causes Analysis of Theoretical Evolution

207

by finding minimum universal rules. Williams holds that: “if there are many and competing genuine values, then the greater the extent to which a society tends to be single-valued, the more genuine values it neglects or suppresses. More, to this extent, must mean better.11 The theoretical trend of value pluralism has had a great impact on contemporary utilitarianism, which is an important factor in promoting the evolution of utilitarianism from monism to a pluralistic value system. Contemporary utilitarianism had abandoned the idea that all values are reduced to a good and holds that there are many important values for individuals, such as knowledge, virtue, achievement, health, wealth, friendship, etc., and these values are not reducible and comparable. In addition, contemporary utilitarianism generally attaches importance to institutions and rules, and contends that individuals should act in accordance with the requirements of institutions or rules. That is to say, contemporary utilitarianism not only recognizes the value norms generally recognized by the society, but also recognizes that these value norms are independence to a certain degree, thus transforming utilitarianism into a pluralist theory.

7.1.2.3

Attach Importance to Community Values

During this period, communitarianism has also been an important theoretical school. Communitarianism holds that the individual does not exist in isolation, with the individual being dependent on the community. The individual is “embedded” in the social norm, who can exercise self-determination only in the social role. On the one hand, communitarianism’s criticism to the individualistic concepts such as self, atomized individuality, and negative rights, prompts contemporary utilitarianism to conduct theoretical reflection on these concepts. On the other hand, the theoretical trend of attaching importance to community and protecting community brought about by communitarianism has prompted contemporary political philosophy to carry out centralized theoretical self-examination on individualistic orientation, and finally promoted the development of contemporary utilitarian theoretical paradigm from individualism to community-individual equilibrium orientation. First, the individual depends on community. Sandel argues that the concept of the individual under individualism is an unlimited self. The individual is detached from the actual social environment, is not limited by any external conditions such as social historical background, economic status, cultural traditions, social customs, etc., and is a bare concept of human. The concept of an unlimited self stems from individualism’s misconception of the relationship between the individual and the community. The individual is the product of society, and the value and purpose of human beings are not innately formed, and is bound to be shaped by the community. Alasdair C. Macintyre notes: “the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity. I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off

11

Galston (2004), p. 59.

208

7 The Evaluation of the Utilitarianism Evolution

from that past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships.”12 Second, the individual is always in social relations. “Individuals inherit a particular space within an interlocking set of social relationships; lacking that space, they are nobody, or at best a stranger or an outcast.”13 Macintyre argues that it is an established fact that the individual is in the midst of multiple connections in social relations, and although the individual’s dependence on society or community does not necessarily require the individual to accept the special moral limits of the community, the individual as an independent individual cannot be separated from the individual as a member of the community, and the two identities can coexist harmoniously. In addition, individualism, especially Hobbesian-Locke doctrine of individualism, has the characteristics of atomism. Individualism denies the dependence of individuals on social relations, and denies that the obligations of individuals to society have the same important status as individual’s rights. Taylor has criticized the logical error behind this view. When we say that a person has rights, it is because the individual has some kind of ability worthy of respect as a human being, and human capacity can only be developed in society. Therefore, human beings have social attributes, and individuals have the obligation to maintain social stability. When individuals do harm to the society, individuals, they are also weakening their ability to realize their own rights.

7.1.3 The Realistic Requirement of Equal Value In the transition from classical to contemporary theory, utilitarianism has paid more and more attention to the value of equality. Not only does contemporary utilitarianism transcend formal equality and becomes a theory that can achieve equal distribution, but also its distribution results can realize the compatibility of utility goals and equal treatment. The theoretical driving force that makes utilitarianism attach importance to equal value, and realize the integration of maximization of utility and respect for human moral equality within the theory comes from the increasingly strong realistic demand for equal value in Western society in the second half of the twentieth century. Since the 1960s, the Western society led by the United States has set off a number of rights movements, such as the anti-war movement, anti-discrimination movement and anti-poverty movement. The essence of these social movements is to fight for the equal rights of the public, and to expand the scope of application of equality. Members of society not only need political equality, but also demand economic income equality. Policy preferences are needed to correct the unequal position of vulnerable groups in the market economy. For a long time, people’s attention to equality was limited to political equality, such as “equality before the law”, but as Engels said: “Equality should not only be superficial—should not only implemented in the sphere of the state; it also should be practical—should implemented in the 12 13

Macintyre (1981), p. 262. Ibid., p. 54.

7.2 The Analysis of Gains and Losses for Utilitarianism Evolution

209

social and economic sphere.”14 Although political equality can liberate people from the shackles of identity politics, it immediately plunges people into a new structure of inequality—a new inequality resulting from unequal distribution. In the real society, the increasingly obvious polarization of the rich and the poor, the solidification of classes and the marginalization of the vulnerable groups also remind people that inequality is widening in the social structure, and relying solely on ensuring that people enjoy equal political identities cannot effectively solve the problem of economic inequality. Therefore, how to correct economic inequality and what kind of distributive policies should be adopted to achieve social distributive justice have become the core issues of political philosophy in this period. As Dworkin puts it, equality is a fundamental value at the heart of contemporary political philosophy discussion, and “every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality”.15 If a political theory has an anti-egalitarian or non-egalitarian tendency, it cannot stand in the current political discussion. Therefore, utilitarianism must shift its theoretical characteristic that it focuses only on utility outcomes and is indifferent to interpersonal distribution of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism not only needs to take equal treatment of people as the theoretical starting point, but also needs to provide a distributive justice scheme that can correct economic inequality, so as to achieve the organic unity of maximizing total social utility and equal distribution.

7.2 The Analysis of Gains and Losses for Utilitarianism Evolution 7.2.1 Theoretical Achievements of Contemporary Utilitarianism It can be seen from the foregoing that through a series of theoretical evolution, contemporary utilitarianism not only has had a different theoretical form from classical utilitarianism, but also has, to a certain extent, overcome the theoretical dilemma of classical utilitarianism and has obtained new theoretical vitality. The theoretical characteristics of community-individual equilibrium orientation of contemporary utilitarianism have made the theory achieve certain theoretical progress in the following three aspects.

14 15

Marx-Engels Collected Works (Vol. 3), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012, p. 484. Kymlicka (2002), p. 3.

210

7.2.1.1

7 The Evaluation of the Utilitarianism Evolution

The Objectivity of the Concept of Utility

One of the drawbacks of classical utilitarianism is that it is built on the purely subjective concept of utility. Classical utilitarianism believes that utility is one’s pleasure or pain, which is the subjective psychological experience of human, and the goal of utilitarianism is to maximize human pleasure. But the utilitarian theory based on purely subjective concept of utility may deviate from the basic requirements of welfarism, and cannot provide correct behavioral guidance for individual behavior that is conducive to the actual improvement of personal interests. In addition, the purely subjective concept of utility cannot provide an effective standard for interpersonal comparison of utility, and consequently it cannot provide an appropriate theoretical basis for justice theory or distribution theory in utilitarianism. Contemporary utilitarianism asserts that utility is not only a descriptive concept, but also an evaluative concept. Only by adding cognitive factors and eliminating misunderstanding and prejudices caused by misperceptions, can it provide a relatively objective basis for interpersonal interest comparison and interest measurement. Therefore, contemporary utilitarianism often requires that the individual’s happiness experience or actual preferences should be examined and verified by a certain recognized objectivity standard, so as to realize the subjective objectivity of the concept of utility and make utilitarianism have a relatively objective measurement standard. In general, the objective concept of utility has three important values. First, it guarantees the welfare tendency of utilitarianism. The concept of utility tested by cognitive factors has a higher degree of accordance with the actual interests of individuals, which can eliminate irrational behaviors that harm the long-run interests of individuals due to their short-sightedness, and provide theoretical guidance for improving the actual well-being of individuals. Secondly, the utility concept with characteristics of objectivity realizes, to a certain extent, the organic unity of the subjectivity of interest and the objectivity of the content of interest. Contemporary utilitarianism provides a theoretical path that not only recognizes the subjectivity of utility, but also maintains the objectivity of utility measuring standard to a certain extent. Utilitarianism holds that the needs of the subject are the prerequisite of the production of utility, and whether it is the experience of happiness or the satisfaction of preferences, it can only be the experience or preference of the subject of utility. If it is detached from the subjectivity of the concept of utility, utilitarianism will lose the basic yardstick that takes human interests as the measuring criterion; At the same time, the subjectivity of the concept of utility does not mean the subjectification of the concept of utility. As a philosophy of interest distribution, utilitarianism must be constructed on the basis of objective utility. The efforts of contemporary utilitarianism to objectify the concept of utility reveal that subjectivity and subjectification can run parallel, and contemporary utilitarianism has made contribution to the realization of the subjective objectivity of the concept of interests. Thirdly, the objective concept of utility provides a proper basis for constructing the utilitarian theory of justice. The objective concept of utility can provide an effective measure for the comparison of utility between people and solve the difficult problem of utility comparison in traditional utilitarian theory. Taking Brant’s research as an example,

7.2 The Analysis of Gains and Losses for Utilitarianism Evolution

211

although there are great differences between people, it can be assumed that people have the same psychological characteristics and the same rule of causal experience, and the subjective experience obtained by each person under the premise of having the same information is also the same. Therefore, the subjective experience tested by cognitive psychotherapy therapy can sufficiently serve as the objective basis for interpersonal utility comparison.

7.2.1.2

Pluralism of Value Systems

Another contribution of the evolution of utilitarianism theory is that contemporary utilitarianism theory can meet the requirements of value pluralism. Classical utilitarianism reduces all valuable things to pleasure and pain, which is the main criticism point that utilitarianism has been constantly attacked by all sides. In fact, a good life depends on the satisfaction of people’s diversified value needs. The list of objective values is not only pluralistic, but also diverse, and is constantly changing according to the development of the times. Forcibly reducing all values to an overwhelming value not only ignores the underlying tension within the value system, but also reduces the explanatory power of the theory itself. Classical utilitarianism’s tendency to reduce all values into feelings of pleasure and pain has made the theory have been labeled as “vulgar hedonism”, as if utilitarianism is only a political theory and a life philosophy pursuing hedonism. Contemporary utilitarianism has made utilitarianism compatible with the theoretical features of value pluralism through two initiatives. On the one hand, replace pure pleasure and pain with preferences or comprehensive subjective experiences; On the other hand, use rules to accommodate pluralistic values. In rule utilitarianism, the individual’s rule of action is to comply with the rules, in other words, as long as a value is recognized by the basic norms of society, the value will be recognized by rule utilitarianism, and only when there is competition and conflict between different values, will the principle of utility be needed to play a role.

7.2.1.3

Equality of Distribution Outcomes

The theoretical achievements of the equality view of contemporary utilitarianism have abundant significance to the self-perfection and self-compensation of the theoretical logic of utilitarian political philosophy and equality philosophy, and also have considerable theoretical support for the political practice of promoting the value of equality in social life. The contribution of contemporary utilitarianism in the direction of equality theory is mainly reflected in the following three aspects. First, the contemporary utilitarian view of equality expands the scope of application of equality. The equality theory in utilitarianism advocates to eliminate the interference of irrelevant moral factors on equal treatment to the greatest extent, which not only excludes discrimination caused by different races, different genders, and

212

7 The Evaluation of the Utilitarianism Evolution

different social status, but also excludes discrimination against people with disabilities and discrimination caused by differences in human intelligence and ability, and can even reject species discrimination to a certain extent. At the same time, the objectivity and pluralism of the basis of equality also contribute to the interpersonal comparison between the subjects of utility. Second, the equality view of contemporary utilitarianism emphasizes the harmony and unity of treating people equally and maximizing utility. For a long time, in the view of political philosophy, utility and equality are a pair of contradictory value concepts. Most critics also hold that utilitarianism’s pursuit of utility maximization is bound to undermine the realization of equal value. Starting from the perspectives of interest pluralism and universalism, contemporary utilitarianism defines equal treatment of people as “the same interests, the same treatment and the same pain, the same treatment”, thus achieving beyond the equal morality of classical utilitarianism based on the feelings of pain and pleasure, self-consistently realizing the integration of the utility principle and the equality principle, and laying a logical foundation for the distributive justice of utilitarianism. Third, contemporary utilitarianism provides a more rational distribution result. Utilitarianism tends to allocate resources to people who can produce greater marginal utility, and according to the diminishing marginal utility, the same resources will play a greater utility in the hands of the poor, the disabled and other vulnerable groups. Therefore, the distribution result of contemporary utilitarianism is often the same as the egalitarian principle such as the principle of difference, and it is more favored to the disadvantaged groups in the society. Moreover, the consequentialism feature of contemporary utilitarian theory will always be sensitive to the effectiveness of distribution results. In the special case of limited resources, the contemporary utilitarian view of distribution requires taking into account the dual values of efficiency and equality, thus producing distribution results that are more in accordance with people’s moral intuition.

7.2.2 Theoretical Inadequacy of Contemporary Utilitarianism Through theoretical evolution, contemporary utilitarianism has overcome some theoretical defects of classical utilitarianism, and has formed a more refined theoretical structure, so that the good way of life pursued by contemporary utilitarianism blends with moral beliefs strongly held by people. The theoretical evolution has revitalized contemporary utilitarianism in contemporary political philosophy and has reemerged as an attractive political theory. However, this evolution has not been entirely beneficial, and post-transmutation contemporary utilitarianism has also raised new problems.

7.2 The Analysis of Gains and Losses for Utilitarianism Evolution

7.2.2.1

213

Increasingly Conservative Contemporary Utilitarianism

Contemporary utilitarianism requires individual actions to follow the established institutional arrangements, doses not courage agents to break the existing system, and holds that the behavior that follows the existing system and rules is the behavior that can promote the maximization of utility. Although this change of contemporary utilitarianism has expanded the practical applicability of the theory, it has also lost the original political criticism and political evaluation functions of utilitarianism, making utilitarianism increasingly conservative. In terms of political function, classical utilitarianism belongs to the “philosophical radicals”. Kymlicka has once commented that utilitarianism is a strong weapon against prejudice and superstition, and is a political philosophy that truly realizes that “man is the measure of all things”. “Utilitarianism has provided a standard and a procedure that challenge those who claim authority over us in the name of morality.”16 Utilitarianism requires taking the maximization of utility as the basis for political and social reform. In political practice, classical utilitarians also put forward quite a number of political issues that were very progressive and challenging in the society at that time, such as expanding the qualifications of voters to implement universal suffrage, and implementing social welfare policies. It can be concluded that classical utilitarianism, which only takes the total social utility as the criterion for measuring all behaviors and institutions, is a political thought with a very critical function of society, and this bold and innovative critical spirit gradually disappears in the theoretical evolution of utilitarianism. In this regard, Goodin argues that the post-transmutation utilitarianism has lost the political critical function of classical utilitarianism, and has even become an obstacle to political criticism.17 Although contemporary utilitarianism had proved, through increasingly sophisticated theoretical arguments, that its theory achieves effective compatibility between consequentialism and respect for rules, it is undeniable that contemporary utilitarianism is no longer a doctrine that dares to subvert. In the process of adapting to multiple values, the contemporary utilitarianism has abandoned the original function of social criticism, and instead required people to abide by the existing institutions and rules. Contemporary utilitarianism holds that the value of existing institutions and rules have already been proven, but the benefits of new rules are uncertain. The existing rules should be followed in daily life, and only when existing moral rules conflict, is it necessary to seek the help of the principle of utility. However, there is always room for optimization and improvement of existing institutions and rules. In order to prevent rule-utilitarianism from reducing to classical act-utilitarianism, contemporary utilitarianism is very cautious about the improvement of rules. After the evolution, contemporary utilitarianism gradually turns into an “extreme follower” of the existing social system and norms, and no longer puts forward theoretical and practical solutions that compete with the actual system. Contemporary utilitarianism has become increasingly conservative in political criticism and political evaluation. 16 17

Kymlicka (2002), p. 12. Goodin (1995).

214

7.2.2.2

7 The Evaluation of the Utilitarianism Evolution

The Elitist Orientation of Contemporary Utilitarianism

After the evolution, contemporary utilitarianism advocates reducing the application of utility principle in the field of social life as much as possible. Whether it is twolevel utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism or institution utilitarianism, they all hope to isolate the operating scope of utility principle from that of daily moral norms. This change makes contemporary utilitarianism no longer conflict with daily moral norms and the moral obligations imposed by moral norms, nor does it require people to make utility calculations at all times and remain sensitive to the utility consequences of their actions at all times. After the transformation, utilitarianism has become simpler and easier to implement, and it is now more closely aligned with real-life situations. However, this has led to a tendency of promoting simplified religious moral imperatives or original rules to the public. Conversely, a small number of elites have taken control over rule formulation, and utilize the utility principle as the basis for rule-making and adjustment, making it easier to ahieve social utility maximization. Contemporary utilitarianism, in order to achieve the goal of maximizing utility, hides the utility principle under the institutional norms, making most people believe that legitimate behavior needs to be consistent with the social system requirements and social moral norms. But only a small number of people know that the reason why everyone should obey some customs and morality, and further internalize them into human behavior norms is that it contributes to the long-term total utility of society. In this way, the rules and institutions advocated by contemporary utilitarianism have the meaning of deception. Behind the seeming respect for human subjectivity, the rules and the individuals who abide by the rules have become the tools to maximize the overall utility of society. Moreover, the principle of utility is increasingly hidden in the operation of policy, becoming a secret known only to a few elites. The maximization of total social utility pursued by contemporary utilitarianism after the evolution may only be the maximization of total social utility from the perspective of a small number of elites, and the elitist orientation of utilitarianism is increasingly obvious.

References Berlin I (2002) Liberty: incorporating four essays on liberty. Oxford University Press Inc., New York Dworkin R (2013) Taking rights seriously. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, London Galston GA (2004) Liberal pluralism: the implications of value pluralism for political theory and practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Goodin RE (1995) Utilitarianism as a public philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Kymlicka W (2002) Contemporary political philosophy: an introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford Macintyre AC (1981) After virtue, 3rd edn. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana Nozick R (1974) Anarchy, state, and Utopia. The Clarendon Press, Oxford, p 50 Rawls J (1999) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Chapter 8

Conclusion

Utilitarianism is an important theory of political philosophy. By analyzing the evolution process of utilitarianism, this book shows the core differences between the two development stages of utilitarianism, and elaborates the basic driving force, the basic trajectory of the evolution and the development trend of utilitarian theory. The basic driving force for the evolution of utilitarianism is the new understanding of the relationship between individual and community, and the basic trajectory of the evolution is the development from individualism to community-individual equilibrium. Therefore, classical utilitarianism and contemporary utilitarianism are two different theories of utilitarianism. Through theoretical evolution, contemporary utilitarianism not only overcame the theoretical dilemma of classical utilitarianism to a large extent, but also obtained new resources for theoretical development. It can be said that through the theoretical evolution, utilitarianism has got rid of the embarrassing situation of being “scorned” by other political philosophy theories, and has gained new vitality in the discussion of contemporary political philosophy. Why should we continue to pay attention to the development of utilitarian theory in contemporary discussions of political philosophy? Throughout the development history of utilitarian theory, on the one hand, utilitarianism has a long history, germinated in the ancient Greek period, run through the whole development of Western political theory, and became a thriving and dominant theory in the nineteenth century. According to Rawls, it has always been some form of utilitarianism that prevails in the theory of modern moral philosophy. On the other hand, utilitarianism has been accompanied by many misunderstandings and prejudices since its birth, and is regarded as a vulgar hedonistic philosophy. Sometimes people even think that utilitarianism conflicts with morality. In our daily expressions, “utilitarianism” also has a certain pejorative connotation. In fact, utilitarianism is a theoretical doctrine that focuses on individual interests, and the correlation between interests and morality established by utilitarianism is the core element of utilitarian thought that has endured the long history and has been passed down to this day. However, taking interests as the only explanation of morality is also the fundamental reason why utilitarianism has been

© Peking University Press 2023 S. Liu, The Contemporary Evolution and Reform of Utilitarianism, Interests Politics Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7363-7_8

215

216

8 Conclusion

suffering criticism. The important value of utilitarianism lies in the fact that the theory finds that the fact of promoting interests itself is a defensible moral justification, and that an action can improve the total utility of society itself can be one of the reasons to justify the behavior. However, the promotion of interests cannot be used as the only reason for moral defense, and the main defect of classical utilitarianism is that utility maximization is the only reason for moral defense, resulting in the neglect or even infringement of other social values. Therefore, in contemporary times, the reason why we should focus on the further development of utilitarianism is that if utilitarianism can accommodate the multiple values such as rights, equality, autonomy, which are important in contemporary political philosophical discussions, then it will be likely to achieve compatibility between efficiency and equality. This would provide a social justice principle that is more in line with people’s intuition. In the research of this book, the author is delighted to find that contemporary utilitarianism has achieved the compatibility of the principle of utility with other moral values within the theory, and in terms of the theory of equality, utilitarianism has proposed a distribution theory that surpasses other egalitarian distribution principles. In addition, as a political and moral philosophy, utilitarianism has a distinct practical dimension. Since the birth of theory, utilitarianism has become the intrinsic ethics of political practice, and has continued to influence the political systems and public policies of different countries and regions. Utilitarianism pays attention to the characteristics of efficiency and output, which was once regarded as the natural ethics of public policies. As for China, its development has also experienced a transition from a utilitarian orientation of public policies to a more balanced one that takes efficiency and equity into consideration. For China, the tension between development and equity is the main development problem in the current society and the compatibility thoughts of contemporary utilitarianism has provided some ideas and references for solving this problem.

Afterword

This book is finished based on the revising of my doctoral thesis, and it is a great honor for me with this book to be published by Springer as one of the Interests Politics Series. The successful publication of this book relies on the strong support of the Institute of National Governance studies in Peking University, Springer Publishing House and Peking University Press. I would like to tell the whole story of this book in this afterword to remember great help and support of my teachers and friends, and encourage me to continue to forge ahead. This book is a study of interest theory and interest philosophy of utilitarianism. Through the analysis of the evolution process of utilitarian theory, it reveals its evolution logic from politics of utility to politics of interest, and then evaluates the value and significance of utilitarian ethics in contemporary political philosophy, especially in governance philosophy. Since I entered the research field of political science, I have been interested in the study of interest politics. Interest and interest relations are the fundamental driving force of political development and change, and the basic orientation of the actions of social members. Therefore, when choosing the topic of my doctoral dissertation, under the guidance of my doctoral advisor, Professor Wang Puqu, I chose utilitarianism as the basic research object. On the one hand, in the logic of intellectual history, utilitarianism itself is one of the ideological sources of interest theory, which has profoundly influenced the development of interest theory; On the other hand, as far as the connotation of utilitarianism is concerned, utility is actually the subjective expression of interests, and is an individual’s subjective cognition of self-interests. Whether utility is perceived as pleasure, happiness, preference or welfare, utilitarianism is always the description and generalization of self-interest by the interest subjects. Utilitarianism is not the interests, but a guidance for it. With the deepening of the research, I further realize the value of in-depth analysis of utilitarianism for the study of interest politics. First of all, utilitarianism is a relatively mature theoretical form in the philosophy of interests. In the history of Chinese and Western political thoughts, although there are many theoretical ideas that attach importance to human interests and the consequences of interests, utilitarianism is undoubtedly a unique one. Utilitarianism flourished in the nineteenth century. © Peking University Press 2023 S. Liu, The Contemporary Evolution and Reform of Utilitarianism, Interests Politics Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7363-7

217

218

Afterword

In order to establish the dominance of capitalism, utilitarianism not only attached importance to interests, but also established a direct connection between interests and morality. This theory holds that interest is not only a necessary condition for a moral life, but also a measure of moral life, and only behaviors and lives that can make people benefit can be virtuous. Therefore, in utilitarian theory, how to discover, measure, compare and aggregate interests are important research topics, and have produced rich theoretical achievements, all of which have directly inspired the study of interest politics. Second, utilitarianism took the lead in raising the issue of the unity of opposition between personal interests and public interests. On the one hand, utilitarianism believes that the public interest is consistent with the individual interest, and there is no public interest can be separate from the individual interests. On the other hand, there are constant conflicts between individual interests and public interests, and individuals constantly need to choose between “promoting the maximization of the general interests” and “promoting the maximization of personal interests” in daily life. It can be said that although utilitarianism has not solved the contradiction between individual interests and public interests well, it has long realized that there are both similarities and differences between individual interests and public interests. Contemporary utilitarianism puts forward a realistic solution to the conflict between personal interests and public interests, which is exactly built on the objective fact that similarities and differences coexist, and safeguards the priority of social public interests on the premise of respecting human subjectivity. Finally, the process of the evolution of utilitarianism from the classical form to the contemporary form is a process of moving from politics of utility to the politics of interest. To a certain extent, contemporary utilitarianism has realized the objectivity of utilitarian content, the pluralism of utilitarian value system and the balanced treatment of different interest subjects. The theoretical evolution makes utilitarianism form a more rational interest comparison scheme, which can realize the distribution principle of promoting the maximization of the overall social interests on the premise of respecting the basic rights and interests of different interest subjects. It is with the promotion of these ideas that this book was finally formed; However, the process of writing was not smooth, and the final manuscript was able to be published, genuine thanks to those people who care and support me. First of all, I would like to thank my Ph.D. advisor, Professor Wang Puqu, and it is relying on his careful guidance and encouragement that this book can be finished. From the determination of the title, the design of the framework, to the content arrangement and the layout of the article, this book is permeated with the teacher’s painstaking efforts. Professor Wang’s logic is rigorous and his thinking is profound. Every time I talk with him, I am enlightened, and many difficulties in writing are solved one by one in the discussion with Professor Wang. Moreover, Professor Wang often urged me to write out my ideas as soon as possible, emphasizing that good articles are finished in frequent revising. Although I am far from reaching his requirements, I have benefited greatly from Professor Wang’s supervision and guidance.

Afterword

219

Thanks to my master advisor, Professor Zhou Guanghui. It was Professor Zhou who led me into the door of political science. Professor not only laid a solid theoretical foundation for my study, but also endowed me a taste of the joy for academic research. It is this interest that enables me to bury my head in the book quietly and peacefully and enjoy the simple and quiet time in the sound of tapping on the computer. I would also like to thank every teacher in my growth, it’s their instruction and encouragement that keep me moving forward. Thanks to my friends, classmates and colleagues, it is their love and tolerance that make me grow. The successful publication of this book is especially thanks to the editors of Springer Publishing House and Peking University Press. Their patient, meticulous, rigorous and responsible work has made a significant contribution to the publication of this book, and I would like to express my sincere thanks to them. Finally, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my parents. Their love and support have always been my strongest support. I sincerely dedicate this book to my parents, my teachers and my friends. I will take this gratitude to keep forging ahead on the road of the future.