The Collected Writings of Jaysankar Lal Shaw: Indian Analytic and Anglophone Philosophy 9781474245050, 9781474245081, 9781474245074

Table of contents :
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Mokṣa-śāstra
Ānvīkṣikī
Darśana
Notes
Part One Metaphysics
Chapter 1 Causality: Sāṃkhya, Bauddha and Nyāya
Introduction
Part I: The View of the Sāṃkhya Philosophers
Part II: The View of the Bauddha Philosophers
Part III: The View of the Nyāya Philosophers
Notes
Chapter 2 Buddhism on Suffering and Nirvāṇa
I
II
Notes
Chapter 3 The Referent of ‘I’: An Indian Perspective
Introduction
Memory Diagram
Recognition Diagram
Notes
Chapter 4 The Nature of Nyāya Realism
Part Two Epistemology
Chapter 5 The Nyāya on Sources of Knowledge—Perception, Inference, Analogy and Testimony: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from the Nyāya Perspective
Introduction
Section One: Perception 
Section Two: Inference
Section Three: analogy
Section Four: Verbal cognition or Testimony
Notes
Chapter 6 Knowledge, Belief and Doubt: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from the Nyāya Perspective
Introduction
I Knowledge
II Belief and Doubt
Notes
Chapter 7 A Note on Cognition of Cognition in Indian Philosophy
Note
Chapter 8 Subject and Predicate
I
II
III
IV
V
Notes
Chapter 9 Navya-Nyāya on Subject – Predicate and Related Pairs
Part I
Part II
Part III
Notes
Part Three Logic and Mathematics
Chapter 10 Austin on Falsity and Negation
Notes
Chapter 11 Empty Terms: The Nyāya and the Buddhists
Notes
Chapter 12 Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning
I
II
III
IV
Notes
Chapter 13 The Nyāya on Double Negation
I
II
Notes
Chapter 14 Universal Sentences: Russell, Wittgenstein, Prior, and the Nyāya
I
II
III
Notes
Chapter 15 Singular Existential Sentences: Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyāya
I
II
Notes
Chapter 16 The Nyāya on Number
Note
Chapter 17 The Concept of Relevance (Saṅgati) in Gaṅgeśa
1 Memory-context (prasaṅga)
2 Justification (upodghāta)
3 Cause (hetu)
4 Cessation of objectionable questions (avasara)
5 Having the same cause (nirvāhaka-aikya or nirvāhaka-ekatva)
6 Having the same effect (kārya-aikya or kārya-ekatva)
Part Four Philosophy of Language
Chapter 18 Proper Names: Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyāya
I
II
Notes
Chapter 19 Demonstrative Pronouns
Notes
Chapter 20 Descriptions: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from the Nyāya Perspective
I
Notes
Chapter 21 Conditions for Understanding the Meaning of a Sentence: The Nyāya and the Advaita Vedānta
Introduction
I
II
III
IV
Notes
Chapter 22 Levels of Meaning
Introduction
Part I
Part II
Notes
Chapter 23 ‘Saturated’ and ‘Unsaturated’: Frege and the Nyāya
I
II
Notes
Chapter 24 Some Reflections on Kripke
I
II
III
IV
V
Notes
Part Five Morals and Values
Chapter 25 Dharma and the Law of Karma in Indian Culture
Introduction
I
II
III
Notes
Chapter 26 The Nature of Human Beings: East and West
Part One
I
II
III
IV
Part Two
Notes
Chapter 27 Freedom: East and West
Introduction
I
II
III
Notes
Chapter 28 Swami Vivekananda and Bertrand Russell on Conception and Development of Human Being
Introduction
I Conception of the human being: Views of Vivekananda & Russell
II Concepts of sustainable human development: Views of Vivekananda & Russell
III Human development at the global level
Notes
Chapter 29 Concepts of Harmony in Indian Philosophy
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JAYSANKAR LAL SHAW

Also available from Bloomsbury The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art Edited by Arindam Chakrabarti The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics Edited by Joerg Tuske The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Ethics Edited by Shyam Ranganathan Comparative Philosophy without Borders Edited by Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber Doing Philosophy Comparatively Tim Connolly An Introduction to Indian Philosophy Christopher Bartley Understanding Asian Philosophy Alexus McLeod

THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF

JAYSANKAR LAL SHAW Indian Analytic and Anglophone Philosophy Jaysankar Lal Shaw

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

LON DON • OX F O R D • N E W YO R K • N E W D E L H I • SY DN EY

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

1385 Broadway New York NY 10018 USA

www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc This collection first published 2016 © Jaysankar Lal Shaw, 2016 Jaysankar Lal Shaw has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: 978-1-4742-4505-0 ePDF: 978-1-4742-4507-4 ePub: 978-1-4742-4506-7 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Shaw, Jaysankar Lal, 1939- author. Title: The collected writings of Jaysankar Lal Shaw: Indian analytic and Anglophone philosophy / Jaysankar Lal Shaw. Description: New York: Bloomsbury, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016012994 (print) | LCCN 2016028413 (ebook) | ISBN 9781474245050 (hardback) | ISBN 9781474245074 (epdf) | ISBN 9781474245067 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Indian philosophy. Classification: LCC B5134 .S531 2016 (print) | LCC B5134 (ebook) | DDC 181/.4–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016012994 Cover design: Catherine Wood Cover image © www.indian-heritage.org Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

This volume is dedicated to my students for their continued support and encouragement, and their dedication to promoting comparative thought.

vi

CONTENTS

Preface

ix

Acknowledgements

xi

Introduction1 PART ONE METAPHYSICS 1

Causality: Sāṃkhya, Bauddha and Nyāya

15

2

Buddhism on Suffering and Nirvāṇa

45

3

The Referent of ‘I’: An Indian Perspective

55

4

The Nature of Nyāya Realism

66

PART TWO EPISTEMOLOGY 5

The Nyāya on Sources of Knowledge—Perception, Inference, Analogy and Testimony: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from the Nyāya Perspective73

6

Knowledge, Belief and Doubt: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from the Nyāya Perspective

121

7

A Note on Cognition of Cognition in Indian Philosophy

155

8

Subject and Predicate

160

9

Navya-Nyāya on Subject – Predicate and Related Pairs

179

PART THREE  LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS 10 Austin on Falsity and Negation

197

11 Empty Terms: The Nyāya and the Buddhists

201

12 Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning

209

13 The Nyāya on Double Negation

224

viii CONTENTS

14 Universal Sentences: Russell, Wittgenstein, Prior, and the Nyāya

238

15 Singular Existential Sentences: Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyāya

253

16 The Nyāya on Number

274

17 The Concept of Relevance (Saṅgati) in Gaṅgeśa286 PART FOUR  PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 18 Proper Names: Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyāya

293

19 Demonstrative Pronouns

323

20 Descriptions: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from the Nyāya Perspective

328

21 Conditions for Understanding the Meaning of a Sentence: The Nyāya and the Advaita Vedānta

362

22 Levels of Meaning

378

23 ‘Saturated’ and ‘Unsaturated’: Frege and the Nyāya

397

24 Some Reflections on Kripke

412

PART FIVE  MORALS AND VALUES 25 Dharma and the Law of Karma in Indian Culture

427

26 The Nature of Human Beings: East and West

440

27 Freedom: East and West

455

28 Swami Vivekananda and Bertrand Russell on Conception and Development of Human Being

472

29 Concepts of Harmony in Indian Philosophy

483

Bibliography

493

Index

503

PREFACE

The distinctive feature of this book is that it focuses on the relevance of Indian analytical philosophy, including philosophy of language, to contemporary Western philosophy, so that each can derive insights from the other. This is how Indian and Western philosophy can speak to each other and assist each other in solving shared problems. This book is divided into five parts, each of them demonstrates how Indian philosophy, especially the Nyāya School, can suggest new or better solutions to some of the current problems of philosophy. It can also reconcile some of the conflicting views on topics such as proper names, or add a new dimension to current discussions in Western philosophy, as some of the questions have not been discussed at all in Western thought. In my discussion of causality, I have focused on Sāṃkhya, Bauddha, and Nyāya, as they suggest quite different views of reality. In my discussion of the Nyāya view on sources of knowledge, I have reconstructed, extended and offered new interpretations to epistemic concepts, including the classification of fallacies. In order to focus on comparative thought or the relevance of the Nyāya to contemporary philosophical problems, I have discussed most of the topics with my Guru, the late Pandit Visvabandhu Tarkatīrtha, one of the few classical scholars of the Navya-Nyāya tradition. I have also presented versions of some of my papers on proper names, descriptions, existence, causality, levels of meaning, inference, negation, subject-predicate, knowledge, belief, number, nature of human beings, freedom and harmony, at conferences or seminars at City University of New York, LaGuardia College, McMaster University, University of Toronto, University of Hawaii, University of Alabama, Oxford University, Cambridge University, University of Nottingham, University of Liverpool, King’s College London, The Science University of Tokyo, Waseda University, The Logico-Linguistic Society of Japan, Calcutta University, Jadavpur University, Jawaharlal Nehru University, IIT Bombay, Hyderabad University, The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Indian Academy of Philosophy, University of Hong Kong, Belgium Academy of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of Liège, University of Amsterdam, University of Uppsala, Stockholm University, The University of Vienna, amongst others. I also acknowledge with gratitude the discourses or discussions I had with my teachers, the late Pandit Dinesh Chandra Shastri, the late Professor Gopinath Bhattacharya, the late Professor Prabas Jiban Chaudhuri, the late Professor Bimal Krishna Matilal, the late Professor Sibajiban Bhattacharya, the late Professor Pranab Kumar Sen, the late Shyamapada Sen, and Professor Jitendra Nath Mohanty. I am also grateful to Professor Max Cresswell, the late Professor George Hughes, Professor Peter Donelan, Professor Purushottama Bilimoria and Professor Anand Vaidya, for their continued support and encouragement for focusing on comparative philosophy. I also recognise with appreciation the discussions I had with my students of comparative philosophy, Michael Hemmingsen,

x Preface

Piripi Whaanga, Reece Baker, Alex Janet, Joseph Carlson and Thomas Prout as well for inviting me to present papers at seminars or conferences of Victoria University’s Society for Philosophy & Culture. I am also very grateful to the representatives of the publisher Bloomsbury, especially Colleen Coalter and Andrew Wardell, for their continued encouragement to submit a manuscript on comparative philosophy for the benefit of scholars from around the world. This preface cannot be complete without my heartfelt thanks, both to Reece Baker and Michael Hemmingsen for the preparation of this manuscript, and to Colleen Coalter of Bloomsbury for a grant for these purposes. Of course without the cooperation and support of my family, my wife Shipra Shaw, my daughter Natalie Shaw and my granddaughter Maya, this book would not have been possible. I also record my deep gratitude to my preceptor, the late Pandit Visvabandhu Tarkatīrtha, with whom I studied Navya-Nyāya for more than a decade. If there is any merit in this book, it is to be attributed to him. For all the shortcomings, imperfections, I am to be held responsible.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am very grateful to the publishers and editors for their permission to reuse the following articles in this volume: I would like to thank Springer for permission to reuse the following articles. From the Journal of Indian Philosophy: ‘Empty Terms: The Nyāya and the Buddhists’, September 1974, Volume 2, Issue 3, pp. 332-343; ‘Subject and Predicate’, September 1976, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp. 155-179; ‘Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning’, September 1978, Volume 6, Issue 1, pp. 59-77; ‘Universal Sentences: Russell, Wittgenstein, Prior and the Nyāya’, June 1991, Volume 19, Issue 2, pp. 103-119; ‘Conditions for Understanding the Meaning of a Sentence: the Nyāya and the Advaita Vedānta’, June 2000, Volume 28, Issue 3, pp. 273-293; ‘Causality: Sāṃkhya, Bauddha, and Nyāya’, June 2002, Volume 30, Issue 3, pp. 213-270; ‘Navya-Nyāya on Subject-Predicate and Related Pairs’, December 2010, Volume 38, Issue 6, pp. 625-642. From Logique et Analyse: ‘Some Reflections on Kripke’, 1980, pp.153-187. From Sophia: ‘Freedom: East and West’, September 2011, Volume 50, Issue 3, pp. 481-497. From Synthese: ‘ “Saturated” and “Unsaturated”: Frege and the Nyāya’, September 1989, Volume 80, Issue 3, pp. 373-394. From the book Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective, edited by J. L. Shaw and B. K. Matilal, 1985: ‘Proper Names: Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyāya’, pp. 327-372. I also thank the Asian Studies Institute at Victoria University of Wellington for permission to reuse Knowledge, Belief and Doubt: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from the Nyāya Perspective, 2007. I thank Punthi Pustak for permission to reuse ‘The Relevance of Indian Philosophy of Language to Contemporary Western Philosophy’, in Contemporary Philosophy and J. L. Shaw, edited by P. Bilimoria, 2006, pp. 175-221. I thank Alpana Enterprises for permission to reuse ‘The Referent of “I” and the Nature of Human Beings: An Indian Perspective’, in Perspectives on Person and Personal Identity, edited by Mithu Sinha Ray & Tamoghna Sarkar, 2014, pp. 161-172. I thank the Centre for Studies in Civilization, Ministry of Human Resources, Government of India, for permission to reuse ‘The Nyāya on Sources of Knowledge’, in Materialism and Immaterialism in Indian and the West: Varying Vistas, edited by P. Ghose, 2010, pp.117-152. I thank the UGC Programme, Government of India, for permission to reuse ‘Dharma and the Law of Karma in Indian Culture’, in Religion and Popular Culture in the Indian Subcontinent, edited by Gopa Gupta, Sima Kundu and Shuchismita Mitra, 2012, pp. 1-17. I thank Professor S. K. Sen at the Indian Academy of Philosophy for permission to reuse the following articles from The Journal of Indian Academy of Philosophy: ‘Descriptions: Some Contemporary Problems and Their Solutions from the Nyāya Perspective: Part I’, Volume

xii Acknowledgements

36, 1997, pp. 39-62; ‘Descriptions: Some Contemporary Problems and Their Solutions from the Nyāya Perspective: Part II’, Volume 37, 1998, pp. 53-76; ‘The Relevance of Indian Philosophy of Language to Contemporary Western Philosophy: Part I’, Volume 42, 2005, pp. 12-37; ‘The Relevance of Indian Philosophy of Language to Contemporary Western Philosophy: Part II’, Volume 45, 2008, pp. 58-76. I thank Kaveri Books for permission to reuse ‘Buddhism on Momentariness and Suffering’, in Concept of Suffering in Buddhism, edited by N. K. Dash, 2005, pp. 6-24. I thank the R. K. Mission Institute of Culture to reuse the following: ‘Knowledge: Some Contemporary Problems and Their Solutions from the Nyāya Perspective’, in Concepts of Knowledge: East and West, 2000, pp. 244-261; ‘The Advaita Vedānta on Meaning’ in Vedānta: Concepts and Application, 2000, pp. 360-373; ‘Consciousness: Mental States and Mind: A Comparative Study’, in Philosophy and Science: An Exploratory Approach to Consciousness, 2003, pp. 244-287. I thank the Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion for permission to reuse ‘The Nyāya on Number’, Volume 13, October 2008, pp. 111-130. I thank the Department of Indian Philosophy, University of Nagoya, for permission to reuse ‘The Concept of Relevance (saṅgati) in Gaṅgeśa’, in the journal Sambhāṣā, Volume 16, 1995, pp. 133-136. I thank the Istituto di glottologia at the Università di Bologna for permission to reuse ‘Austin on Falsity and Negation’, from the journal Lingua E Stile, Volume 26, 1991, pp. 81-86. I thank Duke University Press for permission to reuse ‘The Nyāya on Double Negation’, from the Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Volume 29, Number 1, 1987, pp. 139-154. I thank Sri Satguru Publications for permission to reuse ‘Singular Existential Sentences: Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyāya’, from Religious and Comparative Thought, edited by P. Bilimoria and P. Fenner, 1988, pp. 211-240. I thank Emerald Group Publishing for permission to reuse ‘Vivekananda and Bertrand Russell on Conception and Development of Human Being’, from the International Journal of Development Issues, October 2014, Volume 13, Issue 3, pp. 231- 241. Finally, I thank the International Society for Intercultural Studies and Research for permission to reuse ‘Concepts of Harmony’, from the journal Culture and Quest, December 2010, pp. 102-112.

Introduction The aim of this book is to demonstrate how Indian philosophy can contribute to the discussion of shared problems with Western philosophy, and especially how Indian philosophy and Western philosophy can derive insights from each other. There are several ways of introducing Indian philosophy and all of them are required at some stage or the other, although some of them may not appear to be useful to Western philosophers.

1) To translate the texts from the original sources into English or to write commentaries with the translation



2) To compare Indian philosophy with some trends of Western philosophy, ancient or modern, such as comparison of Advaita Vedānta with Hegel or Bradley, or the existentialist’s conception of ‘angst’ (anxiety) with the Buddhist conception of duḥkha (suffering)



3) To demonstrate the relevance of Indian philosophy with respect to certain shared problems or questions, especially to the contemporary problems of epistemology and philosophy of language.

Since this book focuses on the third approach listed above, I would like to focus on the following questions:

1) How to reconcile some of the conflicting views in contemporary Western philosophy by using the techniques of the Nyāya tradition



2) How to suggest new or better solutions to some of the problems of contemporary philosophy



3) How to suggest solutions to some age-old or unsolved problems of Western philosophy



4) How to add new dimensions to Western philosophy.

Before mentioning how Indian philosophy can contribute to contemporary philosophical debates, in Western analytical philosophy and otherwise, I would like to say a few words about the way in which the Indian concept of philosophy is broader than its Western counterpart. The word ‘philosophy’ in Western culture means ‘love of wisdom’, as it is derived from the words ‘philo’ (wisdom) and ‘sophia’ (love), although Russell claimed, ‘The definition of “philosophy” will vary according to the philosophy we adopt.’1 In the context of Indian culture, it has a wider connotation as the following three words have been used: mokṣa-śāstra, ānvīkṣikī and darśana.

2

THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JAYSANKAR LAL SHAW

MOKṢA-ŚĀSTRA Mokṣa-śāstra means the science of liberation or freedom from all types of suffering. In Indian metaphysics, ‘freedom’ means ‘liberation from bondage’. Indian philosophers have used the word mokṣa, or nirvāṇa, to refer to the metaphysical concept of freedom. In spite of a range of meanings of the word mokṣa in different systems of Indian philosophy, all of them have accepted one cardinal meaning; namely, cessation of all types of suffering. Hence I would like to mention the following three types of suffering discussed by all the major systems of Indian philosophy, such as Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vedānta and Buddhism. It is claimed that human beings are affected by sufferings that are due to body (ādhibhautika), sufferings due to natural disasters (ādhidaivika) and sufferings due to mental conditions (ādhyātmika). Hence the sufferings due to old age or disease will come under ādhibhautika category. But the sufferings caused by global warming, flood, earthquake, tsunami or climate change will come under ādhidaivika category. It is to be noted that the climate change due to global warming is caused by the actions of human beings. Hence the term ‘ādhidaivika’ should not always be interpreted as natural disasters or acts of God. Sufferings, such as alienation, abandonment, loneliness and anxiety, are considered mental or spiritual (ādhyātmika). These sufferings may also be due to certain thoughts, desires or questions. Hence, in order to save mankind from total extinction or the world from total destruction, it is necessary to address the question of freedom at personal, social and global levels.

ĀNVĪKṢIKĪ The word ānvīkṣikī has been defined as the lamp of all the sciences, the resource of all actions and the shelter of all virtues. (pradīpaḥ sarvva-vidyānām-upāyaḥ sarvvakarmaṇām āśrayaḥ sarvvadharmāṇām śaśvadānvīkṣikīmatā, kauṭilya) Hence, philosophy deals with all the basic questions of all the sciences – physics, biology, material sciences, mathematics, psychology – to name a few, and it deals with the methods for doing things in a better way. Also, it mentions all the virtues, the practice of which will lead us to liberation.

DARŚANA In ordinary language, the word ‘darśana’ is to be understood as visual perception. But in the context of philosophy it means apprehension through mind (mānascakṣura darśana). It implies apprehension or realization of the ultimate reality. The secondary meaning of the word ‘darśana’ is the indirect realization of the truths about ultimate reality through the study of the scriptures or through the discourse with a guru. In the context of Indian philosophy, not only are the questions of Western philosophy discussed, but also the methods for realizing certain truths, or practising or promoting certain values, have been introduced. Hence, it does not end with theorizing activities. To use the language of Wittgenstein, Darśana is intended to ‘show the fly the way out of the fly bottle’.

Introduction

3

This book is divided into five chapters, each dealing with a branch of philosophy. The first chapter emphasizes the metaphysical questions, focusing on causation, the nature of self, the Buddhist conception of suffering and liberation (nirvāṇa). Since the chapter on causality deals with the views of Sāṃkhya, Bauddha and Nyāya philosophers, it gives different interpretations of ultimate reality, as well as our relationship to it, and raises several ontological issues. It examines the thesis of the Sāṃkhya that the effect in its subtle form is present in its material cause and reconstructs the arguments of the Buddhists that the critique of causation leads to momentariness or the philosophy of becoming. The discussion on the Nyāya view covers a number of topics, including the definition of cause, how causal conditions are related to one another and how the concepts of action, event, moment, time and cause are related to each other. Since causation is used to draw the distinction between different types of perception or define the distinction between valid and invalid inferences, or draw the distinction between sources of knowledge, it will pave the way for the Nyāya discussion on epistemology. Causation, in the context of Indian philosophy, is one of the central concepts, as it is used in almost all the branches of philosophy, including ethics and philosophy of language. Regarding Buddhism, I have discussed how the concept of causation is related to momentariness and how the concept of suffering is related to nirvāṇa. In this context, I have mentioned as many as seven senses of nirvāṇa, and discussed several interpretations of the proposition ‘Everything is suffering,’ including the existentialist interpretation assigned by contemporary philosophers. Since most of the metaphysical propositions are not descriptive, but suggestive, we come across a proposition that is prescriptive for the seekers of nirvāṇa. Since most of the classical Indian philosophers are neither materialists nor behaviourists, we come across as many as eight views regarding the metaphysical nature of the self. Hence, in my paper on ‘The Referent of “I”: An Indian Perspective’, I have mentioned two views of the Upaniṣadic thinkers who have paved the way for further discussion on this context, and four views of the classical systems of Indian philosophy. My discussion on Buddhism focuses on the causal connection between ālayavijñāna and pravṛittivijñāna. I have also tried to explain how memory and recognition can be explained in terms of causal links, as there is no permanent self. I have reconstructed a conception of self from some of the remarks of Swami Vivekananda, a late-nineteenthcentury philosopher, and compared this view with that of Russell or Strawson, as it cuts across the mind–body dichotomy on the one hand and the solipsism–behaviourism dichotomy on the other. The view of the early-twentieth-century philosopher, K. C. Bhattacharya, focuses on the grades of freedom of the self and leads to the indescribable nature of it, as it cannot be categorized. I think he has gone beyond the Advaita conception of self as it cannot be identified with anything else, not even the ultimate reality. In K. C. Bhattacharya, we come across a new animal in our zoo. Similarly, we come across a new type of realism in the Nyāya philosophy which cannot be identified with Western concepts of realism. According to the Nyāya, entities such as numbers higher than one, or tallness or shortness, nearness or remoteness, are objective but dependent on a type of conjunctive cognition (apekṣābuddhi). It is to be considered a causal condition for the production of mathematical entities as well as for the objective nature of entities corresponding to relative terms, such as higher, lower, taller, elder and younger. These entities depend on our cognitions for their origination as well as for their existence in the world, although

4

THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JAYSANKAR LAL SHAW

not mental. Since they are not part of the ultimate reality, this type of realism cannot be identified with ontological realism. Moreover, it cannot be identified with epistemological realism as these entities are not discovered but created, although not mental in nature. Hence, here also we come across a new metaphysical position, as the Nyāya conception is a different type of realism. We move from metaphysics to epistemology in the second chapter of this book, as we discuss sources of knowledge, belief, doubt, subject-predicate distinction and several related pairs. The Nyāya epistemology plays an important role in defining several cognitive terms which are discussed in contemporary Western philosophy. Regarding sources of knowledge or valid cognition, there is a lively debate among the systems of Indian philosophy, as the sources of knowledge vary from one to eleven. The followers of Cārvāka, a type of materialism, emphasize perception only; the followers of Vaiśeṣika and Bauddha philosophy emphasize perception and inference; the supporters of Sāṃkhya, Rāmānuja and Bhāsarvajña accept perception, inference and verbal testimony; but the Nyāya accepts comparison in addition to perception, inference and verbal testimony. Other sources of knowledge, such as presumption (arthāpatti), nonapprehension (anupalabdhi), entailment (sambhava), tradition (aitihya), gesture–posture (ceṣṭā), a type of counterfactual conditional (tarka) and memory (smṛti), are reduced to the above sources of knowledge by the Nyāya philosophers. The Nyāya discussion on perception will throw light on contemporary philosophy as the Nyāya philosophers reduce arguments for global scepticism to absurdity and avoid solipsism in their discussion of non-qualificative cognition, which is analogous to Russell’s knowledge by acquaintance. The discussion of testimony by Indian philosophers will challenge Russell’s claim that philosophy has not done justice to this problem.2 The Nyāya discussion on various types of extraordinary perception will add another dimension to contemporary philosophy as Nyāya philosophers try to solve problems related to erroneous perception without postulating tertiary entities. The Nyāya conception of inference raises several issues, as it is neither purely deductive nor inductive. Moreover, it is related to relevant logic as it emphasizes the relation of relevance between premises, as well as the premises and the conclusion. In an inference, each step is related to its immediate successor via a question. Unlike Western symbolic logic, the conclusion q cannot be derived from the contradiction p and not-p, as it violates the condition of relevance. The Nyāya conception of fallacy is wider than the Western concept, as a fallacy is a true cognition that prevents the inferential cognition. In my classification of fallacies, I have differed from the standard texts of the Nyāya literature. In this context I discuss the causal conditions for analogical cognition as well as verbal cognitions. A contradictory sentence or its denial is a well-formed sentence (or formula) and has a truth value, although it does not generate a unified cognition. This chapter also throws light on contemporary discussions of knowledge and belief, including Gettier and post-Gettier counterexamples, as well as Goldman’s no-relevant alternatives approach. Following the Nyāya tradition, I have discussed the causal conditions of a perceptual, inferential or verbal cognition; the causal conditions of a false perceptual, inferential or verbal cognition; the causal conditions of a true perceptual, inferential or verbal cognition; and the causal conditions that will guarantee the truth of a perceptual, inferential or verbal cognition. Unlike the views of some contemporary philosophers, the Nyāya claims that

Introduction

5

belief, truth and justification are not independent properties, as justification is a property of truth, and truth is a property of belief. In our discussion of belief sentences, I have discussed a range of sentences, including a higher-order belief – or a belief about a belief – for example, John believes that Tom believes that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley. I point out how false beliefs can be explained without postulating propositions, sentences or intensional entities as contents of these beliefs. My discussion of doubt or types of dubious cognitions throws further light on current discussions on scepticism. A dubious cognition, according to the Nyāya, rests on certainty. This chapter also focuses on subjects and predicates of a sentence, including the epistemological level or the level of understanding, the meaning of a sentence and the topical level in a discourse or conversation. I have also introduced the interpretation of Indian philosophers regarding the chief qualificand of the cognitive content of a sentence. I also compare the deep structural level of Pāṇini with that of Chomsky, so that the semantic–syntactic distinction may be introduced at the level of deep structure. Nyāya philosophers have introduced the distinction between the following pairs that are similar to the subject–predicate distinction in Western philosophy: 1. anuyogī – pratiyogī (first term – second term) 2. ādhāra – ādheya (substratum – superstratum) 3. viśeṣya – viśeṣaṇa (qualificand – qualifier) 4. viśeṣya – prakāra (qualificand – relational qualifier)3 5. uddeśya – vidheya (subject – predicate) 6. pakṣa – sādhya (the locus of inference – probandum) These terms are used to refer to the same thing in different contexts, but the ways they refer are not the same. These ways specify the relations between cognitions and their contents. The distinction between the perceptual, the inferential and the verbal cognitions of the same object may be explained in terms of these pairs, as all the pairs are not involved in all of these sources of knowledge. I have included a note on the topic of cognition of cognition, mentioning the importance of the triangular debate from the perspective of Indian philosophers. There is a fuller discussion of this topic in a previous book. The next chapter focuses on logic and mathematics, as I have introduced discussion on negation in the Nyāya and Buddhist philosophy, including sixteen types of double negation. This chapter begins with J. L. Austin’s arguments for the thesis that negation of a statement is not the same as its falsity. Hence, the view of the formal semanticists that ‘ “p” is false’ is logically equivalent to ‘not p’ is not tenable. Since Austin raises doubts about the thesis that there is a contradictory statement corresponding to every statement, his discussion paves the way for the Nyāya view that the contradictory of certain statements, such as everything exists, is ill-formed. In the context of Indian philosophy, negation is also related to empty terms, as, according to the Nyāya philosophers, the negation of the term ‘round square’ or ‘the horn of a hare’ is ill-formed. Our discussion also introduces the topic of proper names and the question as to whether they are empty. The comparison between Nyāya and Russell throws

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further light on contemporary philosophy, as Nyāya philosophers such as Udayana have put forward arguments in favour of the non-emptiness of proper names. This discussion also leads to the topic of meaning, including the meanings of terms and sentences, both atomic and non-atomic. Since the Buddhist philosophers explain the meaning of a term in terms of double negation, we have discussed the distinction between two types of negation, namely, paryudāsa and prasajya-pratiṣedha, for the interpretation as well as the reconstruction of the Buddhist theory of meaning. My discussion on negation as well as meanings of empty or non-empty terms of Buddhist philosophy focuses on the four cardinal propositions:

a) Everything is momentary



b) Everything is unique



c) Everything is suffering



d) Everything is void or śūnya.

Our discussion also leads to the question whether metaphysical propositions are descriptive or prescriptive in nature. In order to reconstruct the view of the Buddhists, I have also referred to Dignāga, Jinendrabuddhi, Ratnakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. In order to discuss the sixteen types of double negation of the Nyāya philosophers, I have introduced the following four types of negation:

a) the negation of an object prior to its production, known as not-yet type of absence (prāgabhāva);



b) the absence of an object after its destruction, known as no-more type of absence (dhvaṃsa);



c) the absence of an object in another object without beginning or end, known as never type of absence (atyantābhāva), and



d) mutual absence or difference (bheda).

Regarding the ontological status of the double negation of a positive entity, there is a difference of opinion among the Nyāya philosophers, as some of them have identified with a positive entity while others with a negative entity. Since there are several senses or types of negation in the schools of Indian philosophy, our discussion will draw the attention of Western logicians or semanticists as it adds a new dimension to Western philosophy. Similarly, our discussion on the logical locution ‘all’ is relevant to contemporary philosophy as the Nyāya philosophers have discussed not only the different uses of it, but also the question of whether there is a universal fact corresponding to a universal proposition. They have also discussed several definitions of this term which is explained by using the conception of pervasion, or the pervader–pervaded (vyāpti) relation. Since there are several definitions of this term in the Nyāya literature, I have discussed the definitions of Vyāpti-pañcaka, as well as Gaṅgeśa’s conclusive definition mentioned in his siddhāntalakṣaṇa. My discussion aims to throw further light on the issue as discussed by Russell, Wittgenstein and Prior. Moreover, since I have also discussed the meanings of sentences which are equivalent to a universal sentence, the discussion might throw further light on contemporary semantics.

Introduction

7

My paper on singular existential sentences focuses not only on the use of the quantifier ‘some’, but also on the uses of the word ‘exists’, both in contemporary philosophy and in the philosophy of the Nyāya. After having discussed the views of Frege, Russell, Moore, Quine, Wittgenstein, Nakhnikian, Salmon and Redmon, I have reconstructed as many as seven views from the Nyāya perspective. Most of the senses are applicable to an individual, such as Scott, although none of them can be equated with the concept of identity or reference. Attention to these new dimensions of the meaning of ‘exists’, which cannot be identified with the quantifier of logic, gives us a more fine-grained conception of it. As there are different uses of ‘exists’, so are there different uses of the word ‘number’. The Nyāya philosophers have used different senses of the word ‘two’ in the sentence ‘This (one) object is not two, but it is the locus of two.’ In my paper on number, I have focused on several epistemic and ontological issues related to number as a quality of objects. I also discuss causal conditions for the generation of numbers in this context, as numbers from two and above are not eternal and are caused by certain cognitions. Gadādhara, a Navya-Naiyāyika, has used a number in the sense of ‘only’. Hence the sentence ‘One person is in this room,’ means ‘Only one person is in this room.’ In this context I have compared his analysis of definite descriptions with that of Russell and mentioned certain advantages in favour of his view, as it refers to a negative property. Since the Nyāya concept of number cannot be categorized as logicism, intuitionism or formalism, once again we have a new animal in our zoo. I have also reconstructed the Nyāya concept of fractions, negative numbers and ordinal numbers. Since they have been explained in terms of positive integers, the suggestions of the Nyāya might be useful to contemporary mathematicians or logicians. The paper ‘The Concept of Relevance’ will demonstrate how certain problems of logic, epistemology or philosophy of language can be solved or dissolved by using the techniques of Indian philosophers. The next chapter focuses on meaning, including the meanings of a proper name, a demonstrative pronoun, a definite description and a sentence, as well as on how to solve some of the problems of Frege, Strawson and Kripke. Regarding the meaning of a proper name, following the tradition of Nyāya philosophers, I have tried to demonstrate how to reconcile the conflict between the description theory and the causal theory of proper names. In this context I have discussed how the sense-reference distinction of Frege can be used in the discussion of proper names. I have also mentioned several interpretations of ‘sense’ proposed by the followers of Nyāya. Since the Nyāya philosophers have used two terms, namely, śakyatāvacchedaka (the limitor of the property of being the referent) and pravṛttinimitta (the reason for applying the term to the object to which it applies), the conflict between the above two views in contemporary philosophy can be reconciled, as any method for fixing the referent of a term can be covered by pravṛttinimitta. Regarding demonstrative pronouns, such as ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘he’, ‘she’ and ‘it’, Nyāya philosophers have drawn a distinction between the referent of a term, the property of being the referent, the mode of presentation of the referent, the rule for its use, the method of learning the rule, and its application. Moreover, the question of whether a demonstrative pronoun is a homonymous expression has also been addressed. Hence, the Nyāya view, unlike the thesis of some contemporary philosophers, does not equate the meaning of a

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demonstrative pronoun with the rule for its use. Moreover, the sense-reference distinction has been retained in this context. Regarding definite descriptions, the Nyāya claims that they are sentences. This is a radical departure from the views of contemporary philosophers, such as Frege, Russell, Quine, Strawson, Kripke and the free logicians. Hence the Nyāya, unlike contemporary philosophers, draws the distinction between ‘the so-and-so’ and ‘the so-and-so exists’. Regarding the Nyāya analysis of definite description, we come across remarkable similarities with Russell’s theory of definite descriptions, as neither of them postulate a separate realm of non-spatio-temporal objects in addition to actual past, present and future objects. This paper also focuses on all types of identity sentences, containing proper names or definite descriptions, both empty and non-empty. But the semantics of the Nyāya is richer than its ontology, as we can draw the distinction between ‘the winged horse’ and ‘the winged horse exists’. In a Meinongian frame of reference, the former would be true, but not the latter, but in the Nyāya ontology, both of them would be false. The Nyāya has drawn the distinction between a sentence (vākya), the meaning of a sentence (vākyārtha) and understanding the meaning of a sentence (vākyārthabodha). A sentence is an ordered n-tuple, such that n  2 morphemes. So, a sentence is a set of morphemes with syntactical expectancy. The meaning of a sentence is not just the function of the meanings of its parts which are morphemes, as it includes the relation of the referent of the second term to the referent of the first term. Hence, the meaning of the sentence ‘Socrates is a human being’ as distinct from the meanings of its terms lies in the relation of a human being to Socrates, which is identity in this case. In other words, Socrates is to be identified with a human being. Regarding the understanding of the meaning of a sentence, the cognition of the relation between a word and its referent, the memory-cognition of the referents of the words, syntactic expectancy between the words (ākāṅkṣā), semantic compatibility (yogyatā), contiguity of words in space and time (āsatti) and the cognition of the intention of the speaker (tātparyajñāna) are considered causal conditions for it. Both the Nyāya and the Vedānta philosophers have used these expressions in their discussion of understanding the meaning of a sentence, but not in the same senses of these terms. According to my thesis, the conditions mentioned by the Nyāya or the Vedānta are necessary for understanding the meaning of a sentence, as the conditions of the former are implicitly present in the latter, and vice versa. Since the meaning of a sentence lies in the relation as well as in the direction of the relation of the referents of the terms of a sentence, transformationally equivalent sentences do not have the same meaning. Hence, the sentence ‘Brutus killed Caesar’ does not have the same meaning as the sentence ‘Caesar was killed by Brutus.’ Our discussion will throw further light on contemporary philosophy of language, as linguists or philosophers such as Chomsky, Katz, Fodor, Fillmore and Jackendoff are concerned with the question whether transformation preserves the sentence’s meaning. Regarding the understanding of the meaning of a molecular or non-atomic sentence, such as ‘The deer has a brown horn,’ the Nyāya has discussed both an analytical (or atomistic) and a holistic understanding. In the case of atomistic understanding, first we understand the meaning of the embedded sentence(s) and then we understand the meaning of the entire sentence. But in the case of holistic understanding, we understand both of them simultaneously. Since the Nyāya has developed a method for holistic understanding, this discussion adds another dimension to contemporary philosophy.

Introduction

9

According to my positive thesis, there are six levels of meaning, namely, etymological, conventional, deep structural, causal, metaphorical and suggestive. Metaphysical terms such as ‘Brahman’, ‘God’ and ‘Absolute’, or metaphysical propositions, such as ‘Brahman is truth,’ and ‘Everything is Brahman,’ are not meaningless, as logical positivists claim. Moreover, these terms are not referential in the sense in which the term ‘John’ is; similarly the propositions are not to be thought of as true or false in the same way as we consider the proposition ‘The table is brown’ to be true or false. These propositions have suggestive meanings, as they suggest certain ideals that are to be pursued. Similarly, meanings in literature or art have suggestive meaning as they are related to the realization of certain rasas, some of which are supermundane in nature. This is due to the fact that at the level of the realization of certain rasas, such as bhaktirasa (realization of devotion), we uplift ourselves and the distinction between I and thou is dissolved in a state of consciousness called ‘impersonalization’. Hence, the introduction of levels of meaning not only retains the meaningfulness of metaphysical or religious discourses, but also introduces finegrained distinctions or nuances in our discussion of meaning. Unlike some contemporary philosophers, this discussion does not allude to reductionism. This chapter also suggests solutions to the question of why predicate expressions alone are unsaturated or incomplete, instead of subjects or subject expressions. The Nyāya view aims to solve this problem in contemporary philosophy, a problem that has been around since Plato and Aristotle. My discussion of the meanings of proper names, definite descriptions, or the meaning of a sentence, also throws light on Kripke’s philosophy, as I have suggested how to reconcile the conflict between the description and the causal theory of proper names. Since I have introduced different types of senses in our reconstruction of Frege’s sense theory, some of the remarks or the counterexamples of Kripke are either false or wide of the mark. Similarly, my discussion of levels of meaning will contradict his claim that metaphysical or philosophical propositions are false. This is how this non-reductionistic approach can demonstrate the relevance of Indian philosophy to contemporary philosophy. The last chapter of the book emphasizes topics related to morality and how to alleviate the suffering or achieve freedom from suffering at individual, social and global levels. Since this chapter is directly related to mokṣa-śāstra, which is another name for philosophy, I focus on Indian concepts of dharma and the law of karma, as they are related to mokṣa or nirvāṇa. Moreover, I focus on the nature of human beings and free will, as they are related to the practice of dhārmic activities. The word ‘dharma’ cannot be translated as ethics or religion in the Western sense. This is the due to the fact that it deals with not only the conduct of human beings towards other human beings, but also their conduct towards animals, or plants or nature at large. The practice of dhārmic activities supports not only society but also the world. It is related to peace, bliss and harmony at individual, social and global levels. Since dhārmic activities are not based on blind faith or dogmas, they are not opposed to science or an experimental attitude. Some Upaniṣadic thinkers have even identified dhārmic activities with truth. This chapter also focuses on the law of karma which is related to the concept of dharma, as the practice of dhārmic (righteous) or adhārmic (non-righteous) activities affects the life of an individual. Since both topics are related to certain conceptions of human beings and free will, I have focused on both the topics from the perspective of Indian philosophers, though I have included the views of Western philosophers.

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Regarding the law of karma, I have claimed that the traditional interpretation of this idea is consistent with the principle of universal justice and it does not lead to fatalism. I also mention the views of non-Classical philosophers, such as Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan, and I compare them with certain Western philosophers such as Kant. Regarding the nature of human beings in Western philosophy, I have classified the views of Western philosophers into four types, mentioning the views of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, theologians, those who are pro-choice on the matter of abortion and existentialists. Following the suggestions of Indian philosophers, I have described the form of life of human beings, focusing on the concepts of ought or ought-not, creativity, suggestive meaning, participation in infinity, realization of certain rasas and metaphysical freedom or mokṣa. Since the concept of ought or ought-not presupposes some form of freedom or free will, I have introduced the discussion between fatalism, determinism, compatibilism and libertarianism. Regarding Indian philosophers, I claim that most philosophers have accepted compatibilism in psychology or philosophy of mind. In their psychology of action, not only freedom or free will is presupposed, but also knowledge or cognition or belief plays an important role. According to most Indian philosophers, our desire (icchā) depends on cognition (jñāna), mental effort (kṛti) on desire, physical effort (ceṣṭā) on mental effort and action (kriyā) on physical effort. Some philosophers have included a few more processes, such as inclination to fulfil the desire (cikīrṣā) in this causal series. Since knowledge or cognition is a causal condition for choice, almost all the schools of Indian philosophy have emphasized knowledge about reality, or what would lead to liberation or freedom from suffering. Regarding the nature of metaphysical freedom, we come across several views, as in Buddhism alone there are as many as seven views. In spite of a range of meanings of mokṣa or nirvāṇa, there is a cardinal meaning described as cessation of suffering. Some systems, especially the Advaita Vedānta, consider it a blissful experience. Hence, the life of a liberated person is characterized by peace, bliss, compassionate feelings or love towards all beings or the entire creation. For the development of human nature, I have focused on the philosophy of Vivekananda,  comparing it with Russell’s conception of human nature and education. ­Vivekananda’s conception of human development emphasizes both the spiritual, mental and the bodily aspects, as he emphasizes the necessities of life, such as food, as well as a set of yogas for development. For mental development, he has paid special attention to courage and individual freedom. Righteous actions such as love and compassionate feelings towards all, without selfish motives, have been emphasized for the spiritual development of our life. His view of human development cannot be equated with material well-being, success in life or with knowledge of the empirical world. Regarding the nature of human beings, Vivekananda rejects the traditional view holding that children are born wrathful and wicked. He thinks that human beings are potentially divine, as they can practice dhārmic activities, such as love and kindness, without selfish motive. Hence, the aim of education is to help an individual in manifesting his or her divine potentiality in this life. His view cuts across two extreme views, namely that human beings do not have any nature or that their nature is characterized by wrath and wickedness. Since Vivekananda has emphasized the holistic nature of human beings, which includes physical, mental, moral and spiritual aspects, his view would also suggest solutions to the current discussion on this topic, as we are confronted with problems related to global

Introduction

11

warming, terrorism and discrimination. His message for human development is ‘help and not fight’, ‘[mutual] assimilation, not destruction’, ‘harmony and peace, not dissension’. Regarding how to achieve harmony at individual, social or global levels, my paper on this topic mentions the methods from the perspective of Indian philosophers, including the Advaita Vedānta. The traditional Vedic method resolves the conflict between worldly possessions (artha), sensuous pleasures (kāma), righteous actions (dharma) and liberation (mokṣa) by arranging them in a hierarchical order. The Jaina method resolves the conflict by introducing manifold views (anekāntavāda), but the method of Nāgārjuna resolves the conflict between different philosophical theses or views by demonstrating them to be false. Another method resolves the conflict by treating each of the views as a means to the realization of the same goal. The Advaita Vedānta resolves the conflict by postulating oneness. Hence ‘unity-indiversity’ becomes another method for resolving the conflicts in our lives or existence. This method might be useful to resolve disputes at a social or global level. Since there is a wide gap between the haves and have-nots, or between the developed and the developing nations, we can apply the Advaita method to unify them. Oneness, or the ‘unity-indiversity’, at the global level can be realized if states are governed by a single world body and global resources are shared evenly. This would remove the root causes of poverty, the root causes of terrorism and the root causes of war between nations. Thus, it would pave the way for peace and harmony at social and global levels. This is how we can also demonstrate the relevance of Indian philosophy to contemporary problems of the world. Each chapter of this book focuses on a branch of philosophy, but the book as a whole demonstrates the relevance of Indian philosophy to comparative philosophy. The techniques of diverse systems of Indian philosophy can be utilized for reconciling the conflicting views of contemporary philosophy or can suggest better solutions to pressing problems of philosophy than are currently present in contemporary discussions. Since I have focused on several branches or diverse aspects of philosophy, both theoretical and practical, this book presents a world view that is holistic in nature.

NOTES 1. B. Russell, An Outline of Philosophy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1961), p. 1. 2. Ibid., p. 8. 3. The Sanskrit term ‘prakāra’ has been translated as ‘relational qualifier’ so that it can be distinguished from the word ‘viśeṣaṇa’ (‘qualifier’).

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PART ONE

Metaphysics

14

CHAPTER ONE

Causality: Sāṃkhya, Bauddha and Nyāya INTRODUCTION The concept of causality is a widely discussed topic in philosophy, both east and west. In the context of Indian Philosophy, it plays an important role not only in metaphysics, but also in epistemology, ethics, and all other branches of philosophy. It is presupposed in the discussion of almost any topic in philosophy. Causality is also used to define different sources of valid cognition, such as perception, inference, comparison, testimony, etc. The nature of ultimate reality is also dependent on a particular conception of causality. It is also used to determine the relationship between different goals of life such as righteous actions (dharma), worldly possession (artha), pleasure (kāma), and liberation (mokṣa). Righteous actions will include moral actions which sustain the society or nature at large. Hence righteous actions would include our duties towards other human beings, animals, and nature at large. Righteous or moral actions are considered as conducive to liberation. Therefore, they are also causally related to liberation. In this paper I have discussed the following questions, amongst many others, from the standpoint of the Sāṃkhya, the Bauddha and the Nyāya philosophical systems of Indian philosophy: ●●

●●

●●

●●

●●

Whether the cause or the material cause (upādāna kāraṇa) contains the effect in any form prior to its production, Whether causality (kāraṇatva) can be defined in terms of efficacy or productivity (artha-kriyākāritva), How to define and classify causal conditions (kāraṇas), Whether the terms ‘effect’, ‘event’ and ‘action’ refer to the same thing or have the same meaning, How the concept of moment or time is related to that of causality.

In the first part I have discussed the first question with reference to the controversy between the Sāṃkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. The second question has been discussed in the second part with reference to the views of the Bauddha philosophers. I have reconstructed the arguments of the Buddhists that causality substantiates the philosophy of becoming or momentariness. The remaining questions have been discussed in the third part with reference to the views of the Nyāya philosophers. In the final part, I have pointed out that the different schools of Indian philosophy have focussed on different aspects of causality. The Sāṃkhya philosophers have emphasized the

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importance of the material cause and the presence of the effect implicitly in this cause. Hence they have accentuated the appearance or the disappearance of an effect. But the Nyāya philosophers have emphasized the production or the destruction of an effect. Since they have focussed on the functional analysis of the concepts of cause and effect, an effect has not been identified in any sense with its material cause. Moreover, the Nyāya philosophers have emphasized the relation between the casual conditions and their classifications. The Mīmāṃsa philosophers have focussed on the power, or potentiality (śakti), of the material cause, as it is related to a specific effect. But the Buddhist philosophers have highlighted the actual production of a cause. Hence they have tried to establish the process philosophy, or the philosophy of becoming, not the philosophy of being. This is how they have tried to establish a thesis that everything is momentary. Since different schools of Indian philosophy have focussed on different aspects of causality, they propose alternative explanations of the world, or Weltanschauungen.

PART I: THE VIEW OF THE SĀṂKHYA PHILOSOPHERS In this part I shall deal with the arguments of the Sāṃkhya philosophers that the material cause implicitly contains the effect.1 In other words, the effect in its subtle form is present in its material cause. Hence the Sāṃkhya philosophers emphasize the appearance or the disappearance of an effect, not the creation or the destruction of an effect. I.  Difference between the Material Cause and the Inherent Cause The followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsa claim that there is an absolute difference (atyanta-bheda) between the cause and the effect. The effect cannot be said to be identical with its material cause (upādāna kāraṇa). In this context it is to be noted that the upādāna kāraṇa (material cause) of the Sāṃkhya philosophers is not the same as the samavāyī kāraṇa (inherent cause) of the Nyāya. According to the Nyāya an effect resides or inheres in its samavāyī kāraṇa (inherent cause). Hence the latter exists as long as the effect exists. When milk is transformed into yoghurt, the milk does not exist. Hence the milk cannot be considered as the inherent cause of the yoghurt. When milk is transformed into yoghurt, there are chemical changes in the ultimate parts or the atoms of the milk. Therefore, the transformed atoms of the milk are in the yoghurt. Since the yoghurt resides in the parts by the relation of inherence, the latter would be the inherent cause according to the Nyāya. But the Sāṃkhya philosophers consider milk as the material cause and the effect in its subtle form resides in its material cause. In other words, the effect in its unmanifest (avyakta) form is present in its material cause. Hence the sprout in its unmanifest form is also present in the seed. Similar is the case with oil or any other effect. But according to the Nyāya philosophers an effect is not present in its cause or set of causes in any form. Moreover, milk is not the inherent cause but an instrumental cause of yoghurt. Similarly, the seed is the instrumental cause of the sprout and the oil seed is the instrumental cause of oil. From this difference between these two systems one should not conclude that the material cause of the Sāṃkhya is always different from the inherent cause of the Nyāya. For example, a pot resides in its parts which are inherent causal conditions of the Nyāya, but they are material causes of the Sāṃkhya. Similarly, the threads of a piece of cloth are inherent causes of the Nyāya, but the material causes of the Sāṃkhya. Hence these two types of condition are not totally different.

CAUSALITY: SĀṂKHYA, BAUDDHA AND NYĀYA

17

From the above remark it follows that according to the Nyāya the causal conditions do not contain the effect in any form prior to its production. Similarly, when a pot is destroyed or ceases to exist, the parts of the pot do not have the pot even in its subtle form. The theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsa philosophers is known as asatkāryavāda (the doctrine that the effect is non-existent prior to its production). The Sāṃkhya philosophers claim that the effect in its subtle form is present in the material cause or the set of causal conditions. In other words, the effect in its essence is not different (abheda) from its cause or causal conditions. In the Sāṃkhya philosophy, the word ‘production’ does not mean ‘creation of a totally new object’. Similarly, ‘destruction’ does not mean ‘total cessation of an object’. Everything is a manifestation of Nature called ‘prakṛti’. Instead of the word ‘production’ or ‘creation’ the Sāṃkhya philosophers use the expression ‘manifestation’ or ‘appearance’. Similarly, instead of ‘destruction’ or ‘cessation’ they prefer the word ‘disappearance’. No one denies that causality involves change, but the Sāṃkhya philosophers interpret change as a state from unmanifest to manifest or from manifest to unmanifest. II.  Five Arguments of the Sāṃkhya Īśvarakṛṣṇa in his Sāṃkhyakārikā has put forward five arguments in favour of the view that the effect is real or exists (sat) in some form even before its production.2 Hence the word ‘appearance’ is more appropriate than ‘creation’. Let us discuss these arguments of the Sāṃkhya philosophers: It is claimed that what is unreal cannot be subject to causal operation (kāraṇavyāpāra), or cannot be produced by a set of causal conditions. If something is unreal, then nothing can produce it. For this reason the horn of a hare and the son of a barren woman are treated as unreal. An effect is not unreal in this sense. It is related to a particular cause or set of causal conditions. For this reason milk is transformed into yoghurt, a sprout comes out of a seed, oil can be extracted from oil seeds, a building can be constructed out of bricks, mortar, etc. All the five arguments of the Sāṃkhya philosophers have the form modus tollens. Hence by using the rules of modus tollens and double negation they have tried to establish the existence of the effect prior to its production.

1. The first argument may be stated in the following way: ●●

If the effect does not exist prior to its production, then its cause does not exist or it has no cause. In other words, if something is unreal, then nothing can make it an existent entity (or it has no cause).

●●

But there are causes of an effect.

●●

Therefore, the effect does exist prior to its production (or manifestation).

Against this argument of the Sāṃkhya, the opponents have claimed that the effect is not unreal or non-existent like the horn of a hare. If it were non-existent like the horn of a hare, then nothing can produce it or it does not come under causal operation (kāraṇavyāpāra). When it is said that an effect is unreal or non-existent (asat) what is meant is that it has no being or existence prior to causal operation or the set of causal conditions (kāraṇa sāmagrī). Since the opponents of the Sāṃkhya have used a counter-probans (pratihetu) to establish the conclusion that the effect does not exist, the argument of the Sāṃkhya involves the fallacy of satpratipakṣa (existence of counter-thesis).

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In other words, the Sāṃkhya philosophers have proposed the following thesis: If the effect is non-existent like the horn of a hare, then it has no cause. In this thesis the locus of inference (pakṣa) is the effect, the probans (hetu) is the property of being non-existent like the horn of a hare, and the probandum (sādhya) is having no cause. But the Nyāya philosophers would propose the following counter-thesis: If the effect is not non-existent like the horn of a hare, then it has a cause.

2. The second argument of the Sāṃkhya philosophers emphasizes the invariable relation between a material cause (upādāna kāraṇa) and its effect. It may be formulated in the following way: ●●

●●

●●

If the effect does not exist prior to its production, it cannot be related to its material cause. But an effect is related to its material cause. Consider the relation between a seed and the sprout, between milk and yoghurt, between oil seeds and oil, or between the parts of a pot and the pot. Hence the effect exists prior to its production.

The second argument emphasizes the need for an appropriate material for an effect. If the effect were non-existent, the material cause could not bring it about. It is due to this relationship that the effect is considered as existent prior to its production. In response to this argument the Nyāya philosophers would say that if the effect were present in the material cause, then the things or actions done by the effect could have been done by the material cause. But this does not happen. For example, the things done by oil cannot be done by the oil seeds. Hence from the fact that the effect is related to its material cause it does not follow that the effect is present prior to its production. Therefore, this argument of the Sāṃkhya commits the fallacy of vyabhicāra (deviation). In other words, the probans is present in the locus of inference but not the probandum. In this case the probans is the property of being related to its material cause, and the probandum is the property of being present prior to its production.

3. The third argument rules out the possibility of an effect which is not related to a specific cause. It may be expressed in the following way: ●●

●●

●●

If an effect does not exist prior to its production, then it can be produced by an object (or cause) as it (effect) is not related to anything. But an effect is produced by a specific cause. In other words, it is not produced by any arbitrary thing. Hence the effect exists prior to its production.

From this argument it follows that an effect cannot be said to be unrelated entity. It is related to a specific cause. Hence a related effect (sambaddha-kārya) is due to a related cause (sambaddha-kāraṇa). This argument emphasizes the specific relation between an effect and its cause. It is due to this relation that oil comes from oil seeds, not from heaps of sand. Against this argument also the followers of the Nyāya would claim that from the fact that the effect is related to its cause or to a specific object it does not follow that it exists prior to its production. If the effect would have existed prior to its production, then whatever can be done by the effect can be done by the cause. But this does not happen. Hence this

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argument also commits the fallacy of vyabhicāra (deviation). In this case the probans is the property of being related to its cause (or to a specific object), and the probandum is the property of being present prior to its production.

4. The fourth argument is directed against the view which tries to establish the invariable relation between a cause and an effect in terms of the ability (śakti) of the cause to produce a particular effect without postulating the existence of the effect prior to its production. Since this view is directed against the Mīmāṃsā philosophers as well, let us explain their conception of ability (śakti or sāmartha).3

According to the Mīmāṃsā philosophers an effect is non-existent prior to its production. Hence, unlike the Sāṃkhya view, it is not related to its cause. But from this fact it does not follow that there is no invariable connection between a cause and its effect. A cause has the potentiality or power (śakti) to produce a particular type of effect, not any type of effect. Having observed the effect of a particular object we infer the potentiality of the cause to produce its effect. This is how the invariable connection between a cause and its effect can be explained even if the effect does not exist prior to its production. According to the Mīmāṃsā philosophers this power (śakti) in a cause is a separate entity (padārtha). Against this view, the Sāṃkhya philosophers claim that the ability or the potentiality (śakti) of a cause must be related to a specific effect. If it is not related to a specific effect, then it might produce any effect. On the contrary, if it is related, then we have to accept the existence of the effect as it cannot be related to a non-existent effect. Hence the argument of the Sāṃkhya may be presented in the following way: ●●

If the effect does not exist prior to its production, then its cause cannot have the ability or potentiality to produce it.

●●

But a cause produces a specific effect as it has the ability (śakti) to produce it.

●●

Therefore, the effect cannot be said to be non-existent prior to its production.

It is to be noted that according to the Sāṃkhya the ability or the power (śakti) of a cause is not a separate entity. It is nothing but the potentiality to manifest the effect. Therefore, the effect which is related to its cause cannot be said to be non-existent. Against this argument the Nyāya philosophers claim that they do not accept this type of ability which is related to the effect. According to the Nyāya causality (kāraṇatva) is defined in terms of the property of being always immediately prior to the effect and the property of being simpler than other competing conditions. Hence causality (kāraṇatva) does not depend upon the effect. Since the probans of the Sāṃkhya philosophers is unreal, the fourth argument involves the fallacy of unestablished probans (hetvasiddha). The fifth argument tries to establish the existence of the effect in terms of the view that the effect is of the nature of its material cause.4 Since a non-existent cannot be of the nature of an existent, the effect which is of the nature of its cause cannot be said to be non-existent. This argument may be stated in the following way: ●●

If the effect is non-existent prior to its production, then it cannot be of the nature of its cause.

●●

But the effect is of the nature of its cause.

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Therefore the effect exists prior to its production.

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The fact that the effect is not different (abheda) from its material cause has been demonstrated is several ways:5 Let us consider the relation between a piece of cloth and the threads which are material causes of the cloth. The inference, which establishes the non-difference between them, takes the following form: The cloth is not different from the threads, because the cloth is the property of the threads. This is due to the thesis that if X is different than Y, then X cannot be a property of Y. For example, a cow is not a property of a horse as the former is different from the latter. The second proof takes the following form: If X is different from Y, then they can be conjoined or disjoined. For example, a flower and a flower vase. Since a cloth cannot be dissociated from its threads or conjoined with its threads, it cannot be said to be different from its threads. Another argument may be formulated in the following way: If X is different from Y, then X might not have the same weight as Y. In other words, they might have different weights. But the weight of the effect cannot be more than the weight of its material cause. For example, the threads of a piece of cloth and the cloth. The weight of the latter is the same as the weight of the former. Hence the effect is not different from its material cause. III.  The Nyāya Arguments Against the Identity of the Sāṃkhya The Nyāya philosophers put forward the following five arguments against the nondifference between the cause and the effect:6 (a) If effect is not different from its cause, then the effect cannot be produced from its cause. Since we have knowledge of one being produced from the other, they cannot be said to be non-different. For example, a cloth is being produced from a collection of threads. (b) If the effect is not different from its cause, then it cannot be the case that the effect is destroyed but not the material cause. Since we come to know the destruction of the effect in its material cause, they cannot be said to be non-different. For example, we cognize the destruction of a cloth in its threads, or the destruction of a building in its bricks and mortar. (c) If the cause and the effect are not different, then one cannot be cognized as the substratum (ādhāra) of another. But the cause is cognized as the substratum of the effect. Hence they are different. For example, the cloth is cognized as the superstratum of its threads which are the substrata. (d) If the cause and the effect are not different, then the things that can be done by the cause and the things that can be done by the effect can be done by any one of them. In other words, the set of activities assigned to the cause or the effect can be assigned to any one of them. For example, threads are used for sewing and the piece of cloth made out of these threads is used to cover certain things such as a table. If they are not different, then both the types of function can be performed either by the cause alone or by the effect alone. But this does not happen. Hence they are different.

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(e) If the cause and the effect are not different, then certain functions cannot be performed exclusively by the cause or by the effect. In other words, this argument claims that certain functions can be performed by the cause only and certain other functions can be performed by the effect only. If they are not different, then this is not possible. But threads are used for sewing, not for covering a table. Similarly, the cloth is used for covering a table, not for sewing. Hence the cause and the effect cannot be said to be non-different. It is to be noted that the fourth argument emphasizes the negative aspect, while the fifth argument emphasizes the positive aspect. In other words, the fifth argument presupposes our knowledge of certain functions assigned exclusively to the cause and certain other functions assigned exclusively to the effect. Hence the functions of one cannot be said to be a proper subset of the other. But the fourth argument is not used to demonstrate this aspect of the cause and the effect. The fourth argument will hold good even if the set of functions assigned to one of them is a proper subset of the set of functions assigned to the other. The following diagrams may be used to draw this distinction between these two arguments, where ‘C’ stands for the functions assigned to the cause and ‘E’ stands for the functions assigned to the effect.

The fourth argument will be valid if 1, 2, 3, or 4 holds. But the fifth argument will be valid only if 3 holds. IV.  The Reply of the Sāṃkhya Philosophers Against the above five arguments of the Nyāya the following arguments have been put forward by the followers of the Sāṃkhya:7 It is claimed that one thing appears from another even if they are not different. For example, the head of a turtle appears from its shell, although it is not different from the turtle. Similarly, an earthen jar appears from a lump of clay, although the former is not different from the latter. Hence from the fact that the effect appears from the cause, or is manifested by the cause, it does not follow that the effect is different from its cause. Similarly, one thing may disappear into another without being two separate entities. For example, the head of a turtle disappears into its shell. Again, the earthen jar, when destroyed, disappears in its parts or the clay. Hence from the fact that the effect disappears it does not follow that it is different from its cause. From the above two arguments it follows that the existence and the non-existence of an effect are to be explained in terms of appearance or disappearance of it. As regards the use of substratum – superstratum relation between the cause and the effect, the Sāṃkhya claims that this relation is to be understood by introducing difference

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in non-difference. This is what we do when we use expressions such as ‘Pine trees are in this forest’. Similarly, we have to understand the expression ‘This piece of cloth is in its threads’. As pine trees are in the forest, so an effect is in its cause. As regards the fourth argument, the Sāṃkhya claims that from the fact that different functions are performed by the cause and the effect, it does not follow that they are different. Sometimes different functions are performed by things which are not different. For example, the same fire can be used for revealing things, for burning, or for cooking. Hence from the diverse functions such as sewing and covering it does not follow that the difference between a piece of cloth and its threads can be established. Again from the fact that sewing is exclusively performed by the threads, and covering is exclusively performed by the cloth, it does not follow that they are different. This is due to the fact that the same thing or person can perform certain functions in isolation and certain other functions in conjunction with other things or persons. For example, a palanquin can be carried by four persons together but not by each of them separately, although each of them separately can lead the way or carry the lantern. Similarly, each of the threads can be used for sewing but all of them together arranged in a certain way can be used for covering a table. When the threads are conjoined together, we use the word ‘cloth’, and the conjoined threads can be used to cover something such as a table. Hence a piece of cloth is not different from its threads. Therefore, an effect is not different from its material cause. Now the Nyāya philosophers have raised another type of objection against the view of the Sāṃkhya. They have asked the question whether the effect exists or does not exist prior to the operation (vyāpāra) of the material cause. If it does not exist, then the Sāṃkhya thesis is to be rejected. On the contrary, if it does exist, then the operation of the cause (kāraṇavyāpāra) would be of no use. In response to this question the Sāṃkhya philosophers claim that the causal operation is necessary for the manifestation or the appearance of the effect. Now the question is whether manifestation exists or does not exist. Since the manifestation is related to the effect which exists, the Sāṃkhya philosophers cannot claim it to be non-existent. If the manifestation also exists, then the causal operation would be redundant, because both the effect and its manifestation are existent. On the contrary, if the operation is required to manifest the manifestation of the effect, then we require another operation to manifest the second manifestation and so on. Thus there will be an infinite regress in the thesis of the Sāṃkhya philosophers. Now the followers of the Sāṃkhya raise a similar objection against the Nyāya. If the effect does not exist, then its production (utpatti) also does not exist. If the production of the effect requires a production, then it also does not exist. Thus there will be an infinite regress of productions. In order to avoid this regress it may be said that the production of an effect is not different from the effect. Hence a piece of cloth and its production are not different. The production of an effect is to be identified with the effect. Now an objection has been raised against this defence of the Nyāya. If we accept this view, then a sentence about the production of an effect such as ‘A cloth is produced’ ceases to be informative. Since the use of the word ‘cloth’ entails its production, this sentence would mean ‘The production of the cloth is produced’, which is a tautology. From this view it would also follow that a sentence about the destruction of an effect is a contradiction. Since the word ‘cloth’ entails its production, there will be a contradiction if the predicate ‘destruction’ is applied to the cloth. Hence the sentence ‘The cloth is destroyed’ would mean

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‘The production of the cloth is destroyed’, which is a contradiction. In order to avoid this type of undesirable consequences, the Nyāya philosophers would identify the production of an effect with the relation of inherence (samavāya) which relates an effect to its inherent cause, or with the relation of inherence which relates the universal existence (sattā) to the effect. In either case, there will not be any production. Since the relation of inherence is permanent in the ontology of the Nyāya, the production that is not different from it would also be permanent. It is to be noted that this objection does not apply to the views of some Navya-Nyāya philosophers such as Raghunātha.8 According to Raghunātha the relation of inherence is neither one nor permanent (nitya). Hence the relation which relates an effect to its inherent cause is also impermanent (anitya). From the above discussion it follows that the Nyāya philosophers insist on the use of the words ‘production’ and ‘destruction’ in the context of causation, while the Sāṃkhya philosophers emphasize the use of the words ‘appearance’ (‘manifestation’) and ‘disappearance’ (‘unmanifestation’). Hence according to the Sāṃkhya the same thing can appear, disappear and reappear. But according to the Nyāya a thing cannot reappear once it is destroyed. So an earthen jar when destroyed, cannot reappear. But according to the Sāṃkhya, reappearance cannot be ruled out. Hence there is no creation in the literal sense of this term. Therefore, these two systems suggest two different interpretations of reality.

PART II: THE VIEW OF THE BAUDDHA PHILOSOPHERS In this part, I would like to discuss the view of the Bauddha philosophers in general.9 The following may be considered as some of the distinctive features of Buddhist conception of causality: ●●

An effect has one cause, not a set of causal conditions.

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The cause of an effect ceases to exist when an effect is produced.

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The auxiliary conditions (sahakārīs) are not to be treated as causal conditions. They are also called ‘upakārīs’ (‘benefactors’). In other words, the cause derives some benefit from them. It also leads to the view that everything is momentary (kṣaṇika).

The Buddhist also try to establish the equivalence between the following sentences amongst others:

a) X is a cause (kāraṇa),



b) X is an agent for an action or a result (arthakriyākārī),



c) X is real or existent (sat),



d) X is momentary (kṣaṇika), and



e) X is an event (kādācitka)

Hence the terms ‘kāraṇa’, ‘arthakriyākārī’, ‘sat’, ‘kṣaṇika’, and ‘kādācitka’ are co-extensive. Since ‘sattva’ (‘reality’ or ‘existence’) is defined in terms of ‘arthakriyākāritva’ (‘the property

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of being the agent for an action or a result’), the terms ‘sat’ (‘real’) and ‘arthakriyākārī’ (‘the agent for an action’) would be synonymous. But the other terms would not be synonymous with these two. The word ‘causality’ (kāraṇatva) is defined in terms of ‘the property of being always immediately prior’ (‘niyata avyavahita pūrvavarttitva’) to the effect. If a is the cause of b, then a is always immediately prior to b. It is to be noted that this definition does not require the repeated occurrence of a or b. Hence it can be explained in terms of the counterfactual proposition ‘If a would have occurred again, then b would have also occurred.’ Moreover, there is no plurality of causation. Hence if a is the cause of b, then b is due to a and it cannot be without a.10 The word ‘momentariness’ (‘kṣaṇikatva’) is defined in terms of ‘the property of ceasing to exist after origination’. It is to be noted that the word ‘momentary’ does not signify a time segment or a split of a second. If a thing is momentary, then it does not have any duration. According to the followers of other systems of Indian philosophy most of the things have three moments, viz., origination, duration and cessation. But according to the Buddhist philosophers things have only two moments, viz., origination and cessation. Hence a thing ceases to exist after its origination. Therefore, it has the property of being the counterpositive (negatum) of the no-more type of absence which occurs at the second moment (dvitīya kṣaṇavṛttidhvaṃsa pratiyogitva).11 In order to establish the thesis that whatever exists has causal efficacy, i.e., the property of being the agent for a result (arthakriyākāritva), some Buddhists have used the premise ‘If an object does not have casual efficacy, then it does not exist’. In favour of this premise they have used examples such as the hare’s horn, the son of a barren woman, etc. If this premise can be substantiated, then by applying the rules of logic it can be proved that ‘If an object exist, then it has causal efficacy’. But the followers of the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and other systems have criticized this method of the Buddhists. It is claimed that unexampled (aprasiddha) entities such as the hare’s horn cannot be used to substantiate the thesis ‘If a thing has no causal efficacy, then it does not exist’. Since there is no example in favour of this proposition, it cannot be used to establish the thesis that if a thing exists, then it has causal efficacy.12 In order to overcome this type of objection the later Buddhist philosophers tried to establish the thesis ‘Whatever exists has causal efficacy’ and ‘Whatever has causal efficacy is momentary’ in terms of examples such as rain-bearing clouds (jaladharapaṭala)13 and the last sound in a series of sounds (antyaśabda). Rain-bearing clouds have both existence and causal efficacy. Moreover, they are also momentary. The last sound in a series of sounds is not destroyed by its successor as it has no successor. It is to be noted that according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika most of the entities have duration in addition to origination and cessation. In the case of a series of sounds, each member of the series except the last one has duration and is destroyed by its successor. The last member of this series has no duration. Hence it ceases to exist after its origination. Therefore, it is momentary (kṣaṇika). Similar is the case with respect to the last member of a series of mental states such as cognition or desire. Since the last sound ceases to exist or is destroyed without producing anything, it has no causal efficacy. Since it has no duration, it is momentary. But the rain-bearing clouds have causal efficacy as they produce rain. Since they do not have duration, they are also momentary. These are examples of momentary entities. Now the Buddhist philosophers try to prove that this is true of everything. The proof takes the form of reductio ad absurdum. In other words, they try to refute the denial

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of this thesis. Hence the view that a thing has causal efficacy but is not momentary (sthir) is not tenable. I.  Arguments for Momentariness Now let us discuss the refutation of the view that a thing has causal efficacy but is not momentary. This view can take three forms. Suppose x, y, and z are existent objects; F, G, and H are effects (results of actions); t1, t2, and t3 are past, present and future respectively, or three time-segments. There are three alternatives if a thing is not momentary:14 1. x exists at t1, t2, and t3; but produces the same effect, say F, at t1, t2, and t3. 2. y exists at t1, t2, and t3. It produces something, say F at t1, but nothing at t2, or t3. 3. z exists at t1, t2, and t3; but produces different things at different times. Suppose z produces F at t1, G at t2, and H at t3. The Buddhists would reject the first alternative on the ground that nothing can be repeated. In other words, if x produces F at t1, then it cannot produce the same effect at t2, or t3. As regards the second alternative, it is said that if y does not produce anything at t2, or t3, then it becomes unreal at that time. Since reality is defined in terms of the property of being the agent for an action or result, y would be unreal at t2, or t3. In other words, the Buddhists claim that a real object cannot be distinguished from an unreal object if it (real object) does not produce anything. For this reason y would lack existence at t2or t3. Hence this alternative is to be rejected. With respect to the third alternative the Buddhists would ask whether z has the ability (sāmarthya) to produce G or H at t1. (a) If it does not have the ability to produce G at t1, then the question would be how to explain the production of G at t2. Similarly, the question would be how to explain the production of H at t3. In reply, it may be said that z produces G when the auxiliary causal conditions are present. Suppose z produces G at t2 in conjunction with the auxiliary cause (sahakārī kāraṇa) m. Now the question is whether the auxiliary causal condition does something to z or not. If it does something to z, then it produces some effect in z, say n. This n produces G, not z. If the auxiliary causal condition does nothing to z, then it becomes superfluous. If it is said that x and m together produce G, then the collection (sāmagrī) or the coming together is the cause of G, not z. Hence this alternative is not tenable. (b) If z does have the ability to produce G at t1, then the question would be whether this ability is explicit or implicit. (c) If the ability (sāmarthya) to produce G at t1 is explicitly present in z and it does not require anything else for its production but does not produce G at t1, then there would be a contradiction. In other words, z does not produce G at t1, although it has the explicit ability to produce G at t1 without any auxiliary causal condition. (d) In order to avoid the contradiction if it is said that z requires something else, say p, to produce G although the ability is explicitly present, then the previous objections would arise. In other words, the auxiliary causal condition produces something

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in z, say q, which produces G at t2. Hence z is not the cause. If z and p together produce G at t2, then the collection (sāmagrī) becomes the cause, not z. (e) In order to avoid the above objections it may be suggested that the ability (sāmarthya) to produce G at t2 is implicitly present in z at t1. Similarly, the ability

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to produce H at t3is implicitly present in z at t1 and t2. When the auxiliary causal condition, say r, is present, the implicit ability becomes explicit and the effect G is produced at t2. Now the question is whether z is to be identified with this ability. (f) If it is identified with this ability, then it is not the same z which produces F at t1. Hence we cannot say that z produces F at t1 and G at t2. (g) If z is not identified with this ability, then the ability which is manifested by r produces the effect G at t2. Therefore, z does not produce G at t2. If it is claimed that z in conjunction with the manifestation of the ability produces G at t2, then the collection (sāmagrī) is to be considered as the cause, not z. This is how the Buddhist philosophers would reject the third alternative which supports the view that a thing which has causal efficacy need not to be momentary. Since all the three possible alternatives are untenable, the Buddhists claim that if a thing has causal efficacy, then it is momentary. The above arguments of the Buddhists may be represented by the following diagram on page 26. II.  Critics of Momentariness Now the critics ask, if the auxiliary causal conditions are not to be treated as causes, then the seed which is lying on the table would also produce a sprout. In other words, there would not be any difference between the seed which is on the table and the seed which has been sown. The latter produces sprout because it has the required auxiliary causal conditions such as soil, water, etc. Hence the seed which is on the table would produce a sprout if there are some auxiliary causal conditions. From this type of example the critics conclude that an effect cannot be produced by a single cause, but by a set of causal conditions. Moreover, since all the causal conditions are necessary for an effect such as sprout, the distinction between auxiliary and non-auxiliary causal conditions is not tenable. In reply, the Buddhists claim that the distinction between the seed which is on table and the seed which produces the sprout can be drawn without treating auxiliary conditions as causal conditions of the sprout. The seed which produces the sprout has a special property called ‘aṅkura-kurvvadrūpatva’ (‘the ability to produce the sprout’). This property will produce the sprout as soon as it is produced in the seed. Hence the seed qualified by this property is immediately prior to the sprout. For this reason it is to be treated as the cause of the sprout, not the seed which is on the table. This property is due to certain auxiliary conditions, such as soil, water, etc. Hence the auxiliary conditions are not causal conditions of the sprout, but are causal conditions of the property by virtue of which the seed has produced the sprout. Since the auxiliary conditions are not causal conditions of the sprout, they are treated as benefactors (upakārīs) of the seed. Now the opponents point out that if the Buddhists claim that the cause of the sprout is the seed qualified by the ability to produce the sprout (aṅkura-kurvvadrūpatva), then there would be substance–quality distinction in the cause. This would contradict the thesis of the Buddhists that there is no qualified object. In other words, there is no distinction between a property and a property-possessor (dharma-dharmī). Since the qualifier would precede the qualified object, there cannot be any qualified object. This is due to the fact that everything is momentary. Moreover, the Buddhists have used the term ‘ability to produce the sprout’ (‘aṅkura-kurvvadrūpatva’) which signifies a universal. Since this property is present in 15

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any seed which produces a sprout, it is to be treated as a universal. This contradicts the thesis of the Buddhists that everything is unique (sarvaṃ svalakṣaṇam). Furthermore, the Buddhists claim the seed which is on the table also produces another seed of the same type or kind. Hence they have to accept entities over and above unique particulars. In reply, the Buddhists point out that the word ‘aṅkura-kurvvadrūpatva’ (‘the ability to produce the sprout’) does not signify a universal. It is a specific condition of the seed which is a unique particular. In order to convey this new condition or the modified condition of the seed, the language of property and property-possessor (dharma-dharmī) has been used. In fact, the referents of this expression are all unique particulars. The seed has been imagined to have this property, although there is no substance–quality distinction in reality. Secondly, the seed which is on the table produces another seed which is also equally a unique particular. The word ‘kind’ is used simply to signify that it is caused by its predecessor. Hence such expressions should not be taken literally. Therefore, the seed which produces the sprout and which is imagined to be qualified by the ability to produce the sprout (aṅkura-kurvvadrūpatva) is as unique as the seed which is on the table. Hence both the cause and the effect are unique particulars. Moreover, the Buddhists claim that their one-cause theory is simpler than other theories of causality. According to all other systems of Indian philosophy there are many causes of an effect. These causal conditions have been classified into different types by using different principles of classification. In addition to the many-cause theory, some systems of Indian philosophy have accepted one ultimate cause. The Sāṃkhya claims that the ultimate cause is prakṛti (nature), but the followers of the Advaita Vedānta claim it to be Consciousness which appears to be qualified by Māyā (cosmic nescience or ignorance). Since the Buddhists do not accept any ultimate cause or the many-cause theory, their theory is simpler than other theories of causation. As regards the nature of causation, the critics have raised a serious objection. Since, according to the Buddhists, everything is momentary, the cause ceases to exist when the effect comes into being. For example, the sprout comes into being when the seed is destroyed. Hence the destruction of the seed is to be considered as the real cause of the sprout. Since destruction is a negative entity or an absence, it cannot give rise to something positive. In order to avoid this objection if the Buddhists suggest that the destruction of the cause and the origination of the effect are simultaneous, then there cannot be any cause–effect relation. Since both the cessation of the cause and the origination of the effect happen at the same time, one does not depend upon the other. Since causation implies dependence, this view goes against the very conception of it. The difference between these two views may be stated in the following way: Suppose the seed which produces the sprout comes into being at t1. According to the former view, the seed ceases to exist or is destroyed at t2, and the sprout comes into being at t3. But according to the latter view the seed ceases to exist at t2 and the sprout is also produced at t2. Since none of the views is plausible, the Bauddha conception of causality is not tenable. In reply, the later Bauddha philosophers, such as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, claim that there is no gap between the cause and the effect. In other words, they have rejected the former view which claims that first there is destruction of the cause, then there is origination of the effect. According to their positive thesis the effect begins to appear as the cause begins to disappear. The analogy of a weighing scale may be used to illustrate

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this point. As one side of a scale goes down the other side goes up; similarly, as the cause ceases to exist the effect comes into being. This is how they have tried to avoid the above objections of the critics. III.  Memory and Recognition Now the question is how the Buddhists would explain memory and recognition if everything is momentary. Since the self is also momentary, it would be difficult to explain memory-cognitions such as ‘I remember a table’ or recognitions such as ‘This is the same table which I saw yesterday’. In order to explain memory and recognition some Buddhists have used the concept of series or flow (prabāha). It is claimed that an object such as a table or seed is a series or flow (prabāha or santāna) of momentary entities. Similarly, what we call ‘self ’ is a series or flow of experiences or mental entities. Hence each self is a flow or series of experiences. Since this flow remains the same, the memory-cognition of previous perception or recognition is possible. Now the question is whether this flow (prabāha) is identical with its members or different from them. If it is identical with its members, then it must also be momentary. If not, then what would be its nature? Since there is no whole in addition to parts of an object in Buddhism, the flow or the series cannot be analogous to a whole. If it is not momentary, then the Buddhists cannot claim that everything is momentary. In order to avoid the above problems some Buddhists might claim that each mental state has the disposition of its predecessors. Since a mental state is related to its immediate predecessor, it has the disposition of its predecessor. Memory would be explained in terms of the revival of this disposition. Now the critics point out that on this view there would be innumerable mental dispositions in a particular mental state if there are innumerable predecessors. Moreover, questions may be asked about the ontological status of dispositions. Are they implicit in a conscious mental state? How are they related to a mental state? In order to avoid some of these questions another model might be suggested for the explanation of memory and recognition. This model might be called the ‘causal model’ as only the category of causality is involved. The following diagram may be introduced to explain memory in terms of causality.

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Suppose ms5 to ms9 are mental states, and dms1 to dms3 are dispositional mental states. Again, suppose ms5 is caused by a table, ms6 by a bed, ms7 by a jar, and ms8 by a chair. The sign ‘→’ is used to signify causal relation. The dispositional mental states are due to mental states such as the awareness of a table or a chair. Again the awareness of a table is causally related to a table if it is perceptual. Hence dms1 is due to ms5, dms2 due to dms1, and dms3 due to dms2. Now ms8 which is due to a chair revives dms3. Since a chair and a table have been perceived together, one may revive the disposition of the other. Hence ms8 revives dms3, which causes ms9. In our diagram ms9 is the memory-cognition of the table which was perceived in the past. This memory-cognition is due to the revival of the dispositional state dms3. This revival is due to ms8. Again dms3 is causally related to the previous perception of the table i.e. ms5. Hence a memory is caused by a disposition which is due to a previous perception. So the explanation of memory-cognition does not involve any non-momentary entity. Now let us explain recognition in terms of the following diagram.

Here also ms5 to ms8 are mental states, and dms1 to dms3 are dispositional mental states. The mental state ms5 is due to table4. Again table5 is causally related to table4, table6 to table5, and table7 to table6. Each of them is momentary. Now the mental state ms8 is due to table7, and it revives the dispositional mental state dms3 which is casually related to ms5 which is due to table4. The revived dispositional state dms3 produces the mental state ms9, which can be expressed by ‘This is the same table which was apprehended in the past’. In this diagram also, the sign ‘→’ signifies a causal relation. As the arrows are in 6 directions, there are 6 causal chains. Since they are all related to each other, recognition can be explained in terms of these relations. Moreover, this explanation also does not presuppose any non-momentary object. In this context it is to be noted that there are two views regarding the relation between recognition and the revived disposition. According to one of them the revived disposition is the immediate predecessor of recognition, while according to the other the memory-cognition is the immediate predecessor of recognition and the memory-cognition is due to the revived disposition. If we accept the second view, then there will be one more causal chain in our above diagram. Now the critics of this theory would claim that the above models for the explanation of memory and recognition are complex and cumbersome. There are not only different causal

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chains, but also different directions of these chains. If we accept non-momentary objects, then our explanation of memory and recognition would be much simpler. Moreover, our explanation would be closer to ordinary usage as the latter presupposes non-momentary objects. Since the acceptance of non-momentary objects at the empirical level is very useful, the view of the Buddhists that everything is momentary is not acceptable to the followers of other systems of Indian philosophy.

PART III: THE VIEW OF THE NYĀYA PHILOSOPHERS In this part I shall discuss the relationship between the terms ‘effect’ (‘kārya’), ‘event’ (‘kādācitka’), ‘action’ (‘karma’), and ‘moment’ (‘kṣaṇa’) in the ontology of the Nyāya system. I shall also define the term ‘cause’ (‘kāraṇa’) and classify causal conditions from the Nyāya point of view. I.  Event, Effect, Action, and Moment According to the Nyāya system an event is either positive or negative. Since destruction or cessation is also an event, it is considered negative. Moreover, according to the Nyāya philosophers, unlike the Buddhists, every event has a set of causal conditions, both positive and negative. Hence every event is an effect, although it is not defined in terms of effect. An effect (kārya) is the negatum (counterpositive) of a not-yet type of absence (prāgabhāva). Hence it is defined in terms of an absence. Most of the Nyāya philosophers have accepted four kinds of absence (or negation).16

1. The absence of an object prior to its production is a not-yet type of absence (prāgabhāva). For example, the absence of this table before its production. This absence is present in each of the parts of the table prior to its production.



2. The absence of a positive object (bhāva padārtha) after its destruction is a no-more type of absence (dhvaṃsa). For example, the absence of an earthen jar (ghaṭa) when it is destroyed. Here also the absence characterizes each of its parts after its destruction.



3. If an object cannot characterize another object by the relation of substratumsuperstratum (ādhāra-ādheya sambandha), then there is a never-type of absence (atyantābhāva). For example, the absence of colour in air or the absence of consciousness in an inanimate object such as a stone.



4. If an object is not identical with another object, then there is mutual absence. For example, John is different from Tom and Tom is different from John.

The first three types are called ‘relational absence’ (‘saṃsargābhāva’), and the fourth type is called ‘difference’ (‘anyonyābhāba’ or ‘bheda’). The negatum of an absence is not an unreal (alīka) entity. Since an effect is the negatum of a not-yet type of absence, it is a real entity. But the definition of an event does not refer to an absence. It is defined in terms of the property of being occurrent in time. The following may be considered as the definition of an event.17

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x is an event (kādācitka) Df (Ǝt1) (Ǝt2) (x is related to t1, but not to t2), where t1 and t2are segments of time. Hence the words ‘effect’ and ‘event’ do not have the same connotation or meaning, although they have the same extension in the ontology of the Nyāya. Again, since the definition of the word ‘effect’ has no reference to the word ‘cause’, there is no circularity in this definition. Therefore, the words ‘event’, ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ do not have the same meaning. Now let us discuss whether action (karma) is a causal condition of an effect (kārya). The word ‘karma’, in the Nyāya system, is used in two senses. In its primary use, it refers to one of the seven categories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. Since it refers to different types of movements such as throwing upwards as well as downwards, contraction, expansion, etc., it is translated as ‘action’. In other words, it refers to any type of motion or movement. Every action, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, resides in a substance by the relation of inherence. The word ‘karma’ is also used to refer to the locus of the result of an action. Hence any change of place would be the locus of the result of an action. In this paper I shall be using the word ‘karma’ in the sense of ‘action’. Due to karma there will be conjunction (saṃyoga) and separation (vibhāga), which are qualities in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. It has been defined in the following way:18 x is a karma (action) Df x is different from a conjunction, but x is similar-to-inherent cause (asamavāyī-kāraṇa) of a conjunction. If we do not use ‘different from a conjunction’, then it would refer to entities which are not actions. In this context it is to be noted that a conjunction is either due to an action or due to a conjunction. Let us consider the following example. When I touch a branch of a tree with my hand, there is a contact (conjunction) between my hand and the branch. This contact could be due to the movement of my hand, or due to the movement of the branch, or due to both. According to the Nyāya philosophers if there is a contact with a part of a thing (avayava), then there is a contact with the entire thing or the whole (avayavī). Hence there would be contact between my hand and the tree. This contact would be due to the contact of my hand with the branch, and the latter contact would be the similar-to-inherent cause of the former contact. Similarly, my body is in contact with the branch of the tree. This is also due to the fact that my hand is in contact with the branch. Here also one contact is the similar-to-inherent cause of another contact. Hence if we do not use the expression ‘different from a conjunction’, the definition would refer to a contact which is causally related to another contact. This point of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system has a far reaching consequences. It is used to explain the perception of a whole as distinct from its parts and thereby to avoid scepticism. In order to substantiate the perception of the whole from the perception of its parts, the Nyāya philosophers have used a reductio ad absurdum argument. It is claimed that if we do not accept the contact with the tree which is a whole (avayavī), then there cannot be contact with its branch which is also another whole. The question is whether there is contact with the entire branch or with its parts. If we apply the same argument, then we have to say that there is contact with a part of a branch, not with the whole. Now the question is whether we are in contact with this part which is another whole. If it is said that we are in contact with a part of this part, then it will involve a regress. In order to stop the regress it might be said that the hand is in contact with the ultimate parts or some of the

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atoms of the tree. But this position is not tenable. Since the atoms are not amenable to our senses (atīndriya), the contact with an atom will not be amenable to our senses. If it were so, then we cannot have contact with any object. Since we do accept contact with the things or objects, the above view is to be rejected. In other words, we have to accept the contact with the branch which is a whole. Hence we have to accept the contact with the tree, of which the branch is a part. In order to explain the perception of a whole, amongst other things, the Nyāya philosophers have accepted contact which is due to another contact. So every contact is not due to an action. In order to exclude such cases the expression ‘different from a contact’ is necessary for the definition of ‘action’. Similarly, if we do not use the expression ‘similar-to-inherent’ (‘asamavāyī’), then the definition would apply to a substance which is an inherent cause (samavāyī-kāraṇa) of a conjunction. Hence it is also necessary for the definition of ‘action’ (‘karma’). Now let us discuss whether a set of causal conditions would include an action. According to the Nyāya all physical effects are due to some action or the other. Mental effects such as cognitions are due to contact of the mind (manas) and the self. Hence they are not caused by actions, but they presuppose actions which are causes of causal conditions. But mental dispositions (saṃskāras) which are due to cognitions do not even presuppose actions as causes of causal conditions. Mental dispositions called ‘bhāvanā’ are to be distinguished from two other types of disposition.19 The disposition which is due to an action and which is a cause of another action is called ‘bega’. For example, the movement of a ball when struck with a certain velocity. A movement, in the Nyāya ontology, is an action. In this case there is a series of actions. The first action is due to contact with certain velocity, but all other subsequent actions are due to dispositions called ‘begas’. The disposition which is present in objects, such as rubber is called ‘sthiti-sthāpaka’. It is due to this disposition a piece of rubber comes back to its original form or size when it is left after being stretched. From the above discussion it follows that some mental states such as cognitions presuppose certain actions as causes of causal conditions, but certain other mental states such as dispositions do not even presuppose actions as causes of causal conditions. But if we take ‘cause’ in the sense of ‘prayoyaka’, then an action would be a cause of the cause of the cause of a mental disposition. Again, since the relation of conjunction between the internal sense organ (manas) and the self is a cause of dispositional mental state, an action is presupposed by this relation of conjunction as well. Hence an action is not a cause, but a cause of the cause of a mental disposition. Therefore, it is a prayoyaka of any mental state. Now it may be asked whether the cessation or destruction of a mental disposition is due to an action. Sometimes our mental dispositions are lost, not due to disease, but due to some gap or long gap in the revival of these dispositions. Hence time may be considered as the cause of the cessation of our disposition. Since no action is involved in such cases, we cannot claim that cessation or destruction is always due to an action. Now it may be asked whether we can understand time without any action. According to the Nyāya philosophers we cannot understand time without an action. If it were so, then an action in terms of which we understand a gap or a long gap is to be considered as the cause of the loss of a disposition. For example, the rotations of the earth in terms of which the gap has been understood. From the above discussion it follows that the cessation of a mental state such as disposition involves an action in the above manner as its cause, but its origination

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does not involve an action as its cause. For this reason action is not considered as a causal condition of every effect. Now the question is whether ‘moment’ is to be defined in terms of an action. If it is, then the moment of duration of the cognition which is the cause of a disposition involves an action. It is to be noted that a cognition, according to the Nyāya, has a moment of origination, of duration and of cessation. Hence it has three moments. During the moment of its duration it produces its disposition. At the third moment it is destroyed by its disposition or by a new cognition. Hence the explanation of the cause of a disposition refers to an action. This objection is based upon the Nyāya conception of moment. A moment is defined in terms of an action. Every action, according to the Nyāya, has origination and three successive effects. Hence it lasts for four moments. The first moment is to be explained in terms of the origination of an action and its immediate effect. The three successive effects of an action are separation, destruction of the previous contact (conjunction) and the origination of the next contact. Hence the first moment is to be described as the action which is qualified by the not-yet type of separation which is due to it. Therefore, the time (kāla) which is limited by this complex imposed property is the first moment. The second moment is the origination of separation which is due to the same action. The action qualified by the separation becomes the imposed property of the second moment. Therefore, the time limited by this imposed property is the second moment. The third moment is the cessation of previous conjunction. The same action qualified by the cessation of the previous conjunction becomes the imposed property of the third moment. Hence the time limited by this imposed property is the third moment. The fourth moment is the origination of the next conjunction. The same action qualified by this conjunction becomes the imposed property of the fourth moment. So the time limited by this imposed property is the fourth moment. Among these four moments the first one is qualified by the not-yet type of separation which is due to the action. Since the action has not yet produced its effect, the first moment is not qualified by any effect. But the remaining three moments are qualified by the effects of this action. In this context it is to be noted that a moment can be described by several imposed properties. A particular moment can be described by the origination of an action, or by the effect of another action, or by the originations of several actions, or by the effects of several actions. From the above discussion it follows that the concept of earlier than or later than is to be explained in terms of moments which are to be explained in terms of actions. Hence the moment described in terms of the origination of an action is earlier than the moment described in terms of its effect. Now a question may be asked in the following way: How can we explain the use of the word ‘moment’ in the context of a mental entity such as cognition which is a quality, not an action? The cognition which produces a disposition must have the moment of duration and must be earlier than its effect. If we assign activity to a cognition, then it goes against the Nyāya thesis that mental entities are qualities of the self. Since the self in the Nyāya ontology is not qualified by any action, mental states such as cognition, disposition, desire, etc., are its qualities. If they are qualities, how can we describe them in terms of ‘moments’? In order to answer this question and a few others the Nyāya has postulated the Absolute time. Everything is in Absolute time by the relation called ‘temporal self-linking’

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(‘kālika-svarūpa-sambandha’). The use of the word ‘moment’ in the context of mental qualities has been explained in terms of an action of something else. Absolute time also explains the nature of certain relational qualities such as the property of being older than (jyeṣṭhatva) and the property of being younger than (kaniṣṭhatva). These qualities are effects of certain actions which are not obvious to us. According to the Nyāya they are qualities of our body. They are related to some other action such as the rotation of the earth, which is related to Absolute time. The property of being older than is related to the same time to which certain rotations of the earth are related. Hence the relation between the property of being older than and certain rotations of the earth is having the same locus (sāmānādhikaraṇya) as both of them are related to the same Absolute time. It may be represented in the following way: If F is related to t1 and G is also related to t1, then F is related to G by having the same locus, where t1 is the locus. Similarly, we have to explain the property of being younger than. When we say x is younger than y, what we mean is that the number of rotations of the earth to which x is related by the relation of having the same locus is less than the number of rotations of the earth to which y is related by the relation of having the same locus. Similarly, a is older than b means that the number of rotations of the earth to which a is related by the relation of having the same locus is more than the number of rotations of the earth to which b is related by the relation of having the same locus. As we have explained the relation between the property of being older than and the rotation of the earth, we have to explain the relation between the moments of a cognition and an action. The origination, or the duration, or the cessation of a cognition is to be explained in terms of the moments of an action. In other words, a cognition is related to the same locus to which an action is related. So the relation between them is also having the same locus (sāmānādhikaraṇya). This is how the Nyāya philosophers would explain the use of the terms ‘origination’, ‘duration’, ‘cessation’, or ‘earlier than’ in the context of mental qualities. Hence a cognition which has duration can be causally related to a mental disposition without being an action. Therefore, action is not involved in every set of causal conditions. From the above discussion it follows that the Nyāya philosophers have shown how the terms ‘cause’, ‘effect’, ‘event’, ‘action’, ‘moment’ and ‘time’ are related to each other. II.  Definition of a Cause Now let us discuss the nature of causal conditions.20 The Nyāya philosophers have defined causal conditions in terms of the following three properties: ●●

●●

●●

The property of being related to the locus of the effect immediately prior to the effect (avyavahita pūrvavartitva). The property of being always present (niyatatva). The property of being simpler than other competing conditions (ananyathāsiddhatva).

From the first condition it follows that if x is a causal condition for the effect E, then x is present immediately prior to E. From the second condition it follows that x is always present

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whenever E occurs. Hence from these two conditions it follows that a causal condition has the property of being the pervader which is limited by the property of being present immediately prior to the effect. The third condition specifies the principle for selecting the conditions which have satisfied the first two conditions. Let us illustrate with an example of the Nyāya system. When an earthen jar is produced, there are innumerable conditions which are present immediately prior to this effect. Moreover, all of them are, directly or indirectly, related to the locus of the effect. These conditions can be divided into three types. Some of the conditions are such that they are present whenever an effect is produced. Positive causal conditions such as space and time are always present whenever an effect is produced. Hence they are called ‘common causal conditions’ (‘sādhāraṇa kāraṇa’). But there are certain conditions which are present whenever a type of effect such as a jar is produced. The conditions such as the jar-maker, the parts of the jar, the conjunction between the parts of a jar, the wheel, the stick and the thread are present whenever an earthen jar is produced. This type of condition would come under uncommon causal conditions (asādhāraṇa kāraṇa). Some of the uncommon causal conditions remain the same for different types of effect. For example, thread is used for making a jar as well as for making a piece of cloth, among many other types of effect. But the set of uncommon causal conditions for one type of effect would never be the same as the set of uncommon causal conditions for another type of effect. Hence the set of causal conditions for making a jar would not be the same as the set of causal conditions for making a piece of cloth. The third type of causal conditions may be called ‘unique conditions’ (‘ananya kāraṇa’). These causal conditions would explain the particularity of the effect as distinct from the effects of the same type. In this example, the particularity of a jar is to be explained in terms of the particularities of its parts. All the parts and the relations of conjunction between the parts are positive unique causal conditions. The not-yet type of absence of the jar would be the negative unique causal condition. Hence the distinction between different types of effect would be drawn in terms of the uncommon causal conditions and the distinction between the effects of the same type in terms of the unique causal conditions. Now the question is whether the conditions, such as the colour of the stick, stickiness, etc., which satisfy the first two conditions in the case of a jar, are to be considered causes of a jar. Similarly, in the case of a particular jar, the conditions, such as the donkey which has brought the clay or the father of the pot-maker, are to be considered causes of it. The Nyāya philosophers have introduced the third condition to eliminate these conditions which satisfy the first two criteria of a cause. The third condition emphasizes the simplicity of a causal condition in relation to other competing conditions. As regards the criteria of simplicity, the Nyāya claims that an entity is simpler than another in respect of quantity, or knowledge, or relation. Let us state these criteria: (a) x is simpler than y in respect of quantity iff the limitor of x has less elements than that of y. For example, in the case of perception, both the magnitude of the object (mahatva) and being present in its several parts by the relation of inherence (anekadravya samaveta) equally satisfy the first two conditions. It is to be noted that in the case of perceptual objects only there is mutual pervader–pervaded relation between them. Since ubiquitous objects such as space and time have magnitude but lack the property of being present in several parts (substances)

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by the relation of inherence, these two terms do not have the same extension. Moreover, the acceptance of any one of them would explain the occurrence of our perceptual cognitions. Now we have to consider whether one of them is simpler than another in quantity. The object which is present in several parts (substances) by the relation of inherence is qualified by properties such as manyness, substancehood, the property of being inherence, but the magnitude is qualified by the universal magnitudeness (mahatvatva) only in the ontology of the Nyāya. For this reason the latter is simpler than the former. Hence, the latter, not the former, is to be considered as a causal condition. (b) x is simpler than y in respect of knowledge iff the knowledge of x presupposes less than the knowledge of y. Let us consider the causal conditions of the smell of flower. According to the Nyāya both the not-yet type of absence of the smell and the not-yet type of absence of the colour of the flower satisfy the first two criteria of a causal condition. It is to be noted that in the ontology of the Nyāya smell resides in the earth only. Hence the not-yet type of absence of smell is a cause of smell. The relation between the absence of smell and the absence of colour is pervaderpervaded. The absence of smell is the pervaded (vyāpya) and the absence of colour is the pervader (vyāpaka). Since both of them satisfy the first two criteria of a cause and do not differ in quantity, the question is whether both of them are to be considered causes of smell. On this point the Nyāya claims that the knowledge of the not-yet type of absence of the smell is simpler than that of the not-yet type of absence of the colour. Since we are determining the causal conditions of the smell of a flower, we already know its smell or we know what a smell is. But in order to know the not-yet type of absence of the colour we require the cognition of a colour which we may not have. Again, the knowledge of a colour alone is not sufficient as we are determining the causal conditions of the smell of a flower. Hence we require the knowledge of the smell in addition to the knowledge of the colour. This is how the Nyāya claims that the knowledge of the not-yet type of absence of the smell is simpler than that of the not-yet type of absence of the colour. (c) x is simple than y in respect of relation iff the relation of x to the locus of the effect involves fewer relations than the relation of y to the locus of the same effect. For example, the relation of the stick to the parts of a jar, which is the locus of the effect, involves fewer relations than the relation of the colour of the stick or the universal stickness to the parts of the same jar. The stick is related to the parts of the jar by the relations S and T, where S is the relation of the stick to the movement of the wheel, and T is the relation of the movement of the wheel to the parts of the jar. But the colour of the stick or stickness is related to the parts of the jar by the relations R, S, and T, where R is the relation of the colour or stickness to the stick. Here R is the relation of inherence in the ontology of the Nyāya. Hence the stick, not its colour or the universal stickness, is considered a causal condition of a jar. Similarly, the father of the jar-maker and the donkey which has brought the clay are not considered as causal conditions of any jar or a particular jar even if they satisfy the first two criteria of a cause in the case of a particular jar. Since the jar-maker is a simpler condition than his father, the former is to be considered as a causal condition. Similarly, the lump of

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clay is simpler than the donkey which has brought it. Hence the lump of clay is a causal condition, not the donkey which has brought the clay. III.  Operation (vyāpāra) and Special Instrumental Cause (karaṇa) Now let us explain the distinction between the terms ‘vyāpāra’ (‘operation’) and ‘karaṇa’ (‘special instrumental cause’), which are technical terms of the Nyāya21. An operation (vyāpāra) is defined in terms of the relation of one causal condition to another. An operation is itself a causal condition, but it is due to another causal condition (tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakatvam). Hence it may be defined in the following way: (A) x is an operation of the effect E Df (Ǝy) (y is a cause or a set of causes of E and x is a cause of E, but x is due to y). In our above example, the movement of the wheel is due to the stick and the jar is due to the movement of the wheel. For this reason the movement of the wheel is considered an operation. Since the movement is due to the stick, the stick becomes the operationpossessor (vyāpāravat). Other intermediary conditions such as the conjunction relation between the stick and the wheel are to be eliminated by applying the third criteria of a causal condition. Since the stick is related to the parts of the jar through this operation and becomes a cause by virtue of this relation, it is called ‘karaṇa’ (vyāpāravat kāraṇaṃ karaṇam). Hence karaṇa may be defined in the following way: (B) x is a karaṇa of the effect E Df x is a causal condition, x is related to the locus of E through an operation, and it is considered as a cause due to this relation only. In this context I would like to mention, two more definitions of the word ‘karaṇa’ as suggested by the Nyāya philosophers. (B’) x is a karaṇa of the effect E Df x is a cause of E and x is different from the causal conditions which are not directly related to E (phalāyogavyavacchinnaṃ kāraṇameva karaṇam). This definition emphasizes the direct relationship with the effect. Hence it would refer to what has been referred to by the word vyāpāra (operation), although not in the same way. In other words, both the them would have the same reference, but not the same meaning. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa22, a follower of the old Nyāya, has suggested the following definition of ‘karaṇa’ (B’’) x is a karaṇa of the effect E Df x is the totality of causal conditions (kāraṇasāmagrī) of E. Jayanta claims that an effect cannot occur in the absence of any of the causal conditions. Hence every causal condition is equally important and there is no scope for the use of the expression ‘auxiliary causal condition’ (‘sahakārī-kāraṇa’). Since the effect occurs when all the causal conditions are together, Jayanta emphasizes the togetherness of causal conditions. Hence karaṇa is the most important condition (sādhakatama). In this context it is to be noted that according to Jayanta the totality of conditions is not a separate cause over and above its members. Since most of the new Nyāya philosophers have used the word ‘karaṇa’ in accordance with the first definition i.e. (B), in our subsequent discussion it will be used in this sense only.

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With reference to our example of the jar, two more points are to be noted. Since there are several movements of the wheel, which are due to the stick, there are several operations. Moreover, the wheel is also related to the parts of the pot through the movements which are due to the wheel, and the wheel becomes a cause due to this relation. Hence the wheel is also regarded as a special instrumental cause (karaṇa). Therefore, in this case, there are at least two special instrumental causes and several operations. The special instrumental causes are related to the parts of the jar through these operations only. So this is an example of many–many relation between operations and special instrumental causes. According to the Nyāya, all the four types of relation, viz., (1) many–many, (2) one–one, (3) many–one, and (4) one–many, hold good between operation and special instrumental cause depending on the examples of causation. The example of jar illustrates the many-many type of relation. The following examples would illustrate the remaining types of relation. In the case of felling the tree by striking an axe with certain velocity the operation is the contact between the axe and the tree, and the special instrumental cause is the axe. Hence it is an example of one–one relation between an operation and a special instrumental cause. The wood-cutter or the agent is not a special instrumental cause as it is determined by the agent. Hence in determining a special instrumental cause we have to exclude the agent. The agent is simply an instrumental cause (nimitta-kāraṇa). When a piece of cloth is made by conjoining several threads together, the conjunctions between the threads would be the operations and the loom (vemā) of the weaver would be the special instrumental cause. So it would be an example of many–one relation between the operations and the special instrumental cause. The act of cooking is an example of one–many relation between the operation and the special instrumental causes. The fire or the heat would be the operation and the logs of wood or the pieces of coal used in generating this fire would be the special instrumental causes of cooking. From the above discussion it follows that there is at least one operation and at least one special instrumental cause. It is to be noted that even in the case of destruction (dhvaṃsa), which is a negative effect, there is an operation and a special instrumental cause. Consider the destruction of a jar with a stick. The stick is the instrumental cause and the contact between the jar and the stick with certain velocity is the operation. Hence, according to the Nyāya, every effect, positive or negative, has an operation and a special instrumental cause. The operation is defined in terms of the relation between causal conditions, but the special instrumental cause is defined in terms of the operation and its relation to the locus of the effect. In other words, it is related to the locus through the operation only. Now it may be asked whether the Nyāya philosophers would accept the operation of an operation. Since they have accepted the cause of a cause in determining the causal conditions of an effect, they might accept the operation of an operation as well. It may also be asked: Why do we need karaṇa at all? Is not operation adequate for determining the cause of an effect? In reply, the Nyāya philosophers have put forward two types of argument. As regards the operation of an operation, it is claimed that it would lead to a regress. Hence higher order operations and thereby higher order special instrumental causes of these operations are to be excluded by applying the third property of a causal condition (ananyathāsiddhatva). As regards other questions, the Nyāya makes an appeal to ordinary usage. In the case of felling the tree, if we consider the contact between the axe

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with a certain velocity and the tree as the only cause, then we are going against the ordinary usage. In our ordinary language (parlance) we consider the axe also as a cause. Since the Nyāya philosophers try to retain our ordinary usage as far as possible, they consider axe also as a causal condition. Since it is related to the locus of the effect through the contact which is the operation, it is considered the special instrumental cause (karaṇa) of the effect. Now another objection may be formulated in the following way: In our above example, the axe is the special instrumental cause (karaṇa), and the contact between the axe and the tree is the operation (vyāpāra). Both of them are immediately prior to the effect. But in some other examples the special instrumental cause is not immediately prior to the effect. Let us consider the memory-cognition of an object, which has been apprehended or perceived sometime ago. According to the Nyāya the previous apprehension (anubhava) is the special instrumental cause (karaṇa) of the memory-cognition, but it is not present immediately prior to the memory. In order to answer this type of objection the Nyāya philosophers claim that the special instrumental cause is related to the locus of the effect through the operation. In the case of memory, the energized disposition (udbuddha-saṃskāra) is the operation. Sometimes the word ‘saṃskāra’ (‘disposition’) is used to refer to ‘udbuddha-saṃskāra’ (‘energized disposition’). It is to be noted that the disposition (saṃskāra) is due to some previous apprehension, and the latter is related to the locus of the memory through this disposition. The operation plays the role of a relation, and the previous apprehension becomes one of the relata of this relation. Hence the previous apprehension is present as one of the relata of the operation. Moreover, the previous apprehension is considered as a cause by virtue of this relation only. This interpretation of special instrumental cause (karaṇa) also explains why our moral or immoral actions are to be treated as special instrumental causes. Righteous or morally good actions produce certain results such as happiness or pave the way to liberation (mokṣa). Immoral actions would cause suffering or misery. They would create bondage, including rebirth. But these actions, moral or immoral, are not always present immediately prior to their effects. The Nyāya claims that these actions are also related to the locus of their effects through adṛṣṭa (merit or demerit). The word ‘adṛṣṭa’ literally means ‘unseen’, but as a technical term of the Nyāya it refers to merit or demerit. It is the operation of effects such as happiness or suffering. In other words, righteous actions would produce certain results called ‘merit’ (‘puṇya’) which are not amenable to our senses. Similarly, immoral actions produce certain results called ‘demerit’ (‘pāpa’) which are not amenable to our senses. These results would eventually produce happiness or suffering. Since the virtuous and the vicious actions are related to happiness or suffering through adṛṣṭa (merit or demerit), they are considered as special instrumental causes (karaṇas). This is how the Nyāya philosophers have tried to substantiate the law of karma. IV.  The Nyāya Classification of Causal Conditions Now let us discuss the Nyāya classification of causal conditions into three different types. The principle of division is the relation between a causal condition and the locus of the effect. Let us consider our example of a jar. Since it resides in its parts, they are its loci. Now we have to consider the relation between a causal condition and the parts of a jar. Since

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a part of a jar is also a causal condition, it is related to the locus of the jar by the relation of identity. According to the Nyāya a causal condition which is related to the locus of the effect by the relation of identity is an inherent cause (samavāyī-kāraṇa). Hence each of the parts of a jar is an inherent cause. Another type of causal condition is called ‘asamavāyī-kāraṇa’. The word ‘asamavāyī’ consists of the words ‘nañ’ and ‘samavāyī’. The suffix ‘nañ’ in Sanskrit is used in six different senses.23 Only some of them signify absence. These senses are the following: ●●

Similarity (sādṛśya), for example, abrāhmaṇaḥ (similar to a brahmin).

●●

Absence (abhāva), for example, apāpam (absence of sin).

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Difference (bheda), for example, aghaṭaḥ (different from a pot).

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Smallness (alpatā), for example, anudarā (small tummy).

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Despicable (aprāśastya), for example, akāryam (despicable act).

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Opposition (virodha), for example, asuraḥ (that which is opposed to gods or goddesses).

Since asamavāyī kāraṇa is similar to samavāyī kāraṇa, the suffix ‘nañ’ signifies ‘similarity’. Hence the expression ‘asamavāyī kāraṇa’ may be translated as ‘similar-to-inherent cause’. It is defined in terms of the relation of inherence, direct or indirect. If a causal condition inheres directly or indirectly in the inherent cause of an effect, it is called ‘similar-toinherent cause’. In the case of a jar, the relation of conjunction between the parts inheres in the locus of the effect, so it is called ‘similar-to-inherent cause’. But if we consider the causes of the colour of an object, then the similar-to-inherent cause is related to the locus of the effect by two relations, viz., inherence and the converse of inherence. In this context I am using the term ‘inherence’ for the relation called ‘samavetatva’ and ‘the converse of inherence’ for ‘samavāyitva’. If we consider the colour of a jar as the effect, then its locus is the jar. The colour of the parts of this jar is a causal condition of the colour of the jar. The colour of the parts is related to the parts by the relation of inherence, and the parts are related to the jar by the converse of the relation of inherence. Hence the colour of the parts is related to the jar by the relation of inherence and the converse of inherence. It is to be noted that both the types of causal conditions in our above two examples are called ‘similar-to-inherent causes’ for two reasons:24 ●●

●●

The inherent cause remains as long as the effect remains. The similar-to-inherent cause also remains as long as the effect remains. It thus shares this feature with the inherent cause. The destruction of the inherent cause leads to the destruction of the effect which inheres in it. The similar-to-inherent cause shares this feature also with the inherent cause. Hence the destruction of the similar-to-inherent cause also leads to the destruction of the effect.

The third type of causal condition is called ‘instrumental cause’ (‘nimitta kāraṇa’). If a causal condition is related to the locus of the effect by a relation other than identity, or inherence, or inherence and its converse, then it is an instrumental cause. For this reason the jar-maker, the stick, the wheel, the movement of the wheel, the contact between the

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movement of the wheel and the clay, etc., are considered instrumental causes of a jar. Hence by drawing the distinction between the inherent cause, the similar-to-inherent cause, and the instrumental cause, the Nyāya philosophers have shown how a causal condition is related to the locus of the effect. This classification throws further light on the relationship between the causal conditions on the one hand, and the relationship between certain causal conditions and the effect on the other. V.  Aspects of Causality From our above discussion it follows that different schools of Indian philosophy have emphasized different aspects of causality. The Sāṃkhya philosophers have emphasized the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) and thereby the continuity in the realm of causality. From the nature of the material objects they have postulated one ultimate material cause, which is called ‘prakṛti’ (‘nature’). Since our real self is not part of the inanimate (jaḍa) world or nature, it does not come under causality. The noumenal self, according to the Sāṃkhya philosophers, is pure consciousness. Hence it is not a cause for the production of mental states. The phenomenal self is a buddhi which is an evolute of prakṛti, and it is qualified by a reflection of pure consciousness. The ego (ahaṃkāra) is an evolute of buddhi or mind, and the mental states are modifications (pariṇāma) of buddhi. According to the Sāṃkhya philosophers, the knowledge of the nature of the material world and the self would pave the way for liberation (mokṣa). The followers of the Yoga system have accepted the Sāṃkhya conception of causality and have suggested detailed methods for attaining liberation. The Bauddha philosophers have emphasized the importance of the principal or primary cause (mukhya kāraṇa) and thereby the one-cause theory. They have also tried to demonstrate how causality leads to momentariness. Since the concept of permanence creates bondage or suffering, the realisation that everything is momentary would lead us to freedom from suffering. As regards the nature of a person, the Buddhist claim that it is a collection of twelve āyatanas (items), consisting of five sense-organs, five motororgans, manas and buddhi. But all of them are momentary. Hence a person is a set of twelve series of momentary entities, both inner and outer. Buddhi is included in the inner aggregates (āntarasamudāya) and it refers to both ālayavijñāna and pravṛttivijñāna. Our ego is explained in terms of ālayavijñāna, and our experiences such as red or blue in terms of pravṛttivijñāna. But both of them together explain what we mean by ‘my experiences’. As regards the relation between them, ālayavijñāna has been compared with the undercurrent of a river and pravṛttivijñāna with its waves. Hence the relation between them would be causal. As a particular wave depends on both the undercurrent and other waves, so a particular pravṛttivijñāna would depend on ālayavijñāna and on other pravṛttivijñānas, which are its upakārīs (benefactors). Ālayavijñāna may also be compared with a seed and other pravṛttivijñānas with its benefactors such as water, air, soil, etc. The effect would be another pravṛttivijñāna. The referent of the word ‘I’, according to the Buddhists, would be a buddhi. The self is to be equated with the buddhi of a person.25 Since both the ālayavijñāna and the pravṛttivijñāna are series of momentary entities, the self is a series of momentary entities. Since the self is also momentary, the ultimate freedom (nirvāṇa) lies in the cessation of the series of momentary selves. In other words, it lies in the cessation of the

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continuity between birth and rebirth. Both knowledge and the cultivation of righteous actions are necessary for the attainment of liberation (nirvāṇa). But the Nyāya philosophers have emphasized the novelty in the realm of causality. The effect is not present in any form in the similar-to-inherent cause, or the instrumental cause, or the inherent cause (samavāyī kāraṇa). Moreover, the effect is not present in the totality of causal conditions. The Nyāya philosophers have emphasized the distinction between different types of instrumental causal conditions such as the distinction between karaṇa (special instrumental cause) and vyāpāra (operation). They have also classified the causal conditions into different types. In terms of causal conditions they have drawn the distinction between different types of mental states and cognitions. In fact, causality has been used for the explanation of almost everything. Moreover, their formulation and the application of the law of parsimony would be very useful not only in the context of Indian philosophy, but also in the context of philosophy of science as the scientists are guided by the principle of simplicity. The Nyāya philosophers are also concerned with the attainment of liberation. The discussion of causality would give us knowledge about the world. This knowledge is a requirement for certain practical or ethical activities which would lead us to freedom from suffering. Both the theistic and the atheistic systems of Indian philosophy have emphasized the concept of liberation and the methods for achieving it, although not in the same way. By and large, Indian philosophers have emphasized the path of unselfish righteous action, or the path of knowledge, or the path of love (devotion) in varying degrees for the realisation of the ultimate goal of life. Since causality is involved in all the methods for attaining liberation, it is one of the most important topics in any system of philosophy. Hence causality is not only the cement of the universe, but also a method for realising the goals of life, such as dharma (righteousness) and mokṣa (liberation).

NOTES   1. Purnachandra Vedāntacuñcu, Sāṃkhyakārikā, pp. 75-94; see also Jogendranath Bagchi, ‘Sāṃkhyamata Samīkṣā’, Tattva o Prayoga, 1991, pp. 1-78; Bhupendranath Bhattacharya, Sāṃkhyadarśana, pp. 69-83; Bidhubhusana Bhattacharya, Sāṃkhyadarśanera Vivaraṇa, pp. 95-103, pp. 189-210; Narayana Chandra Goswami, Sāṃkhyatattva-Kaumudī, pp. 90-110; Gopinath Kaviraj, Aspects of Indian Thought, pp. 90-114; Rajanikanta Dolai, Paramāṇu Kāraṇavāda Samīkṣā, pp. 121-127; Narayana Kumar Chattopadhya, Bhāratīya Darśane Sāṃkhya-Yogadarśana-Pramāṇatattva, pp. 8-12.   2. Purnachandra Vedantacuñcu, Sāṃkhyakārikā, p. 75.   3. Ibid., p. 82.   4. Ibid., p. 83.   5. Ibid., p. 84.   6. Ibid., p. 85.   7. Ibid., pp. 85-86.   8. Madhusudana Nyāyācārya, Padārthatattva-Nirūpaṇam of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, pp. 66-70.   9. Anantakumar Nyāyatarkatīrtha, Vaibhāṣika Darśana, pp. 102-149; see also Panchanana Bhattacharya, Bauddha-Darśanam, pp. 25-62; Phanibhusana Tarkavāgīśa, Nyāyadarśana,

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Vol. 3, pp. 254-286; Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, Tattvasaṅgrahaḥ, translated by G. Jha, Vol. 1, pp. 227-284. 10. yasmin sati yatutpadyate, yasmin asati yannotpadyate, tat tasya kāraṇasya kāryamiti, quoted in Bauddha-Darśanam, p. 119. 11. Bauddha-Darśanam, p. 24. 12. B. K. Matilal, ‘Reference and Existence in Buddhist Logic’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, 1970, p. 97; see also J. L. Shaw, ‘Empty Terms: the Nyāya and the Buddhists’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2, 1974, p. 337, and ‘Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 6, 1978, pp. 59-77. 13. Bauddha-Darśanam, p. 25. 14. Vaibhāṣika Darśana, p. 104. 15. Nyāyadarśana, Vol. 3, pp. 254-286. 16. For a comprehensive discussion on this topic, see J. L. Shaw, ‘The Nyāya on Cognition and Negation’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 8, pp. 279-302 and ‘The Nyāya on Double Negation’, Notre dame Journal of Formal Logic, 1988, pp. 139-154. 17. Srimohan Bhattacharya and Dinesh Chandra Shastri, Bhāratīya Darśana Koṣa, Vol. 1, p. 56. 18. Narayana Chandra Goswami, Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 37-39. 19. Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, pp. 578-580. 20. Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, pp. 5-6, pp. 102-118, pp. 287-288; Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 30-31, pp. 227-245; Padārthatattva-Nirūpaṇam, pp. 60-64; Bhāratīya Darśana Koṣa, Vol. 1, pp. 56-57; Sibajiban Bhattacharya, Gadādhara’s Theory of Objectivity, Part 1, pp. 111-138. 21. Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 227-229; Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, pp. 287-289. 22. Jayanta, Nyāyamañjarī, Chapter I, p. 12, pp. 22-25, quoted in Aruna Chakraborty’s Nyāyadarśane Parāmarśa, p. 109. 23. Purnachandra Vedāntacuñcu, Pātañjala-Darśana, p. 111. 24. Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 243-244. 25. For a comprehensive discussion on self in Indian philosophy, see J. L. Shaw, ‘Consciousness: Mental States and Mind—A Comparative Study’, Philosophy and Science: An Exploratory Approach to Consciousness, pp. 244-287; Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, Tattvasaṅgrahaḥ, translated by G. Jha; Anil Kumar Ray Choudhuri, Self and Falsity in Advaita Vedanta, pp. 1-101; Dinesh Chandra Shastri, Prācīna Bhāratīya Manovidyā, pp. 5-24.

CHAPTER TWO

Buddhism on Suffering and Nirvāṇa The aim of this paper is to discuss the Buddhist conception of suffering and nirvāṇa, as the former paves the way for latter. It is claimed that the Buddhist Philosophers have asserted the equivalence between the following propositions:1

a) Everything is momentary



b) Everything is suffering



c) Everything is unique



d) Everything is void

In this paper I shall discuss the nature of the second proposition and how it is related to nirvāṇa. I shall try to establish the thesis that the proposition everything is suffering is prescriptive. Hence there are both descriptive and prescriptive propositions in the metaphysics of Buddhism. Thereby some of the objections raised by contemporary interpreters can also be answered.

I In this section I shall discuss in what sense the proposition everything is suffering has been used by the Buddhist philosophers. Let us start with the meaning of the word ‘duḥkha’ and the types of duḥkha mentioned by the Buddhist philosophers. (A) The term ‘duḥkha’ which is the correlative of ‘sukha’ (‘happiness’) is primarily used to refer to a mental state. It is something which is disliked (hated) for its own sake (svataḥ dveṣaviṣayaḥ). Hence it is something which is considered as repulsive to all creatures (sarveṣāṃ pratikūlavedanīyaṃ duḥkham).2 It is to be noted that there are two types of ‘dveṣa’ (‘disliking’ or ‘hatred’). One type of hatred presupposes the knowledge that the thing disliked will lead to greater pain than pleasure. If we know that an action or a thing, say a, will lead to greater pain than pleasure, then there is a repulsive attitude towards it. But the hatred towards duḥkha does not presuppose any knowledge of this sort. Hence the hatred towards duḥkha is spontaneous.3 But when the Buddhists claim that everything is suffering (duḥkha), they are using this term in a broader sense. As regards the translation of the term ‘duḥkha’ as ‘suffering’, Professor Potter Claims: Duḥkha is often translated as ‘pain’, ‘misery’, ‘sorrow’ - indeed, as used in, e.g., the Buddha’s famous sermon on the Four Noble Truths appears to mean anything unsatisfying or frustrating, anything which does not come to expectation. By contrast, ‘suffering’ in English has connotations of dramatic pain, hardship, Angst.4

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Even if we accept Potter’s claim that the word ‘duḥkha’ is used to signify any unsatisfying or frustrating state, it does not explain the claim of the Buddhist philosophers that everything is duḥkha (suffering). This is due to the fact that frustration or dissatisfaction is a state of mind and it is the correlative of satisfaction. Hence, on this view, the word ‘duḥkha’ cannot refer to everything. Moreover, ‘dissatisfaction’ being the correlative of ‘satisfaction’ cannot refer to everything as its meaning depends on there being experiences which are not frustrating. Hence, far from making the claim that everything is duḥkha, we cannot even substantiate the view that all life is duḥkha or all our experiences are duḥkha. Now let us explain the view of some contemporary interpreters, who have claimed that Buddhism is deeply existentialist. To quote Winston King:5 One has left behind the miasmatic swamps of human passion permeated by an overpowering sense of obscure guilt, where friend and foe can be distinguished only with difficulty, but only to find oneself alone in an infinitely complicated maze in which he, like a lost soul – or lost no-soul – is condemned to wander endlessly about looking for an exist from this dark and lonely misery but finding none. It is the world of Buddhist dukkha (in Pali, dukkha) It is true that according to Buddhism our life is full of suffering. Birth is suffering, aging is suffering, sickness is suffering, death is suffering. Sorrow, grief, lamentation and despair are suffering. To quote a passage from The Book of the Kindred Sayings (Sanyutta – Nikāya):6 To be conjoined with things which we dislike: to be separated from things which we like, -- that also is Ill. Not to get what one wants, -- that also is Ill. In a word, this body, this fivefold, mass which is based on grasping, -- that is Ill. The Buddhist philosophers have explained an individual or a person in terms of five aggregates (skandhas). Broadly speaking, they are divided into physical form (rūpa) and psychical factors (nāma). The physical form consists of four material elements, namely, earth, water, air and fire. The psychical factors are divided into four types, namely, sensation or feeling (vedanā), perception or conception (saṃjñā), mental disposition (saṃskāra) and intellect or consciousness (vijñāna). They all are suffering (duḥkha). Winston King also claimed that the plight of a human being is due to endless repetitious existence. I think he is referring to the ‘Wheel of Intervolved Causation’ which consists of the following 12 root-causes7 called ‘nidānas’: 1) Ignorance (avidyā), 2) Disposition (saṃskāra), 3) Cognition or consciousness (vijñāna), 4) Name and Form (nāma-rūpa), 5) Six fields of sense-organs (ṣaḍāyatana), 6) Contact (sparśa), 7) Sensation or feeling (vedanā), 8) Craving and desire (tṛṣṇā), 9) Attachment (upādāna), 10) Existence or character (bhava), 11) Birth (jāti), 12) Old age and death (jarā-maraṇa). Since it is a twelvefold wheel of causation, each of them is caused by its immediate predecessor and is a cause of its immediate successor. According Winston King, there are two types of human predicament. One of them is due to this wheel of causation. We are lost in this wheel having infinite number of past existences and having the possibility of infinite number of future existences of the type we are experiencing now or in this life. Another human predicament, according to Winston King, is eternal aloneness. Hence the suffering of a human being is due to an eternally individualized repetitious existences. The individualized existence of a human being is suffering and it is interpreted in the same way as an existentialist philosopher would interpret the suffering of a human being.

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James W. Boyd,8 another contemporary interpreter of Buddhism, has also assigned an existentialist concept of existence to suffering (duḥkha), although he has not claimed that all life is suffering. He claims: The Buddhist view is not that life is full of suffering, but that the unenlightened life I am living is without real meaning and truth.9 According to James Boyd, the fundamental concern of the Buddhist philosophers is with human existence, not with the existence of the insentient objects. Hence they are concerned with the meaning of human existence. As regards the relation of a human being to the world, he has assigned the Heideggerian concept of being-in-a-world to the Buddhist concept of a person. We are already in the world and conditioned by it. The world becomes part and parcel of a human being. A human being is actively engaged in the world. He/she affects the world and is affected by it. This mode of being or human existence is fundamentally misdirected, unenlightened and ill-at-ease. This is what the Buddhist concept of duḥkha is, according to James Boyd. In order to substantiate his claim, he has given a different interpretation to the three types of duḥkha. Let us state the Buddhist concept of threefold duḥkha as stated in the Pali literature: a) dukkha dukkha: It includes ordinary sufferings as well as the fivefold aggregates which constitute an individual. Hence it refers to sufferings due to birth, old age, sickness, death, association with unpleasant things or persons, separation from loved ones and pleasant conditions, not getting what one wants, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair. Hence it includes all types of physical and mental suffering.10 b) vipariṇāma dukkha: This type of suffering is due to change. There are times of enjoyment, pleasure or happiness. A happy feeling or condition does not last long. When a feeling of happiness disappears or a happy situation ceases to exist, there is suffering or pain. Hence the experience of disappointment or dissatisfaction is due to change. c) saṅkhāra-dukkha: This type of dukkha refers to any type of conditioned state. Since, according to the Buddhist, everything is conditioned, this type of dukkha would refer to everything. But James Boyd claims that the word ‘saṅkhāra’ has two meanings. In one of its uses it refers to dispositional mental states (saṅkhārakkhaṇḍa), which is one of the five aggregates constitutive of our existence. Another use of it refers to all conditioned things. Hence according to the second usage everything is suffering. But James Boyd claims that the first sense is more important than the second as it deals with human existence. Moreover, he follows the view which claims that the dukkha assigned to the insentient realm is not The Noble Truth of dukkha. He says: … The Noble Truth of dukkha has to do with the sentient realm only, and specifically, with the actual process of my existing (my actions and defilements). The meaning of dukkha directly relates to my being-in-the world. When, however, dukkha is conceived as a factual claim having to do with a theory of the nature of things – an ontic mode of inquiry – it is not a Noble Truth.11

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The interpretation of James Boyd has several shortcomings: 1) This interpretation would reduce the third type of suffering to the first type as the latter includes the sufferings which are due to five aggregates. 2) Since the Aṅguttara-nikāya12 also states that every conditioned entity is impermanent, without self and suffering, the existentialist approach will go against the classical Buddhism. Hence the interpretation of Winston King would also contradict the claim that everything is suffering. Therefore, neither the thesis that all life is suffering nor the thesis that all unenlightened life is suffering can correctly interpret the view of the Buddhist philosophers that everything is suffering. (B) Now I would like to explain the claim of the Buddhist philosophers that everything is suffering. It is to be noted that the proposition everything is suffering cannot be expressed by the following symbolic expressions. a) (x) (If x is an experience of a human being, then x is suffering or produces suffering). b) (x) (If x is an experience of a sentient being, then x is suffering or leads to suffering). This is due to the fact that these formulations are confined to the experiences of human beings or sentient beings. Hence the proposition is to be symbolized by the following expression. c) (x) (x is suffering or leads to suffering). In order to substantiate this claim we have to prove that pleasant feelings would also lead to suffering. Moreover, we have to establish that insentient objects, such as wind, rocks, distant stars or planets, would also lead to suffering. It is said in the Sanyutta-Nikāya that pleasant feelings should be regarded as ill. To quote: ‘When a brother regards pleasant feelings as ill, painful feelings as a barb, neutral feelings as impermanence, such an one is called, brethren, “right seeing” ’.13 In support of the claim that pleasant feelings are also suffering it may be said that there is no unmixed or pure happiness. What we call ‘pleasure’ is saturated with suffering as it is transitory or leads to craving and thereby suffering. Since the union with the loved one does not last long, separation is inevitable. Hence the pleasant feeling due to union with the loved one would also lead to suffering. Similarly, any pleasure due to possession of something would lead to suffering when we lose our possession. Sometimes the thought that we may lose our possession, not the actual loss, produces anxiety and thereby suffering in our life. Hence the so-called pleasant feelings are either momentary or saturated with anxiety, or would lead to pain and suffering. Similarly, the five aggregates which constitute an individual are causally related to pain, sorrow, anxiety or suffering. Hence they are also to be considered as suffering. As regards insentient phenomena such as wind, rain or rocks, it may be said that they are also causally related to pain or suffering, although they are not pain or suffering if taken in isolation from a sentient being. Since rain causes flood or damages, it is causally related

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to sorrows or sufferings of sentient beings. Similarly, heat or wind may produce pain or suffering in sentient beings. Hence an inanimate object is also causally related to suffering. The proposition that everything is suffering may be stated in the following way: (d) (x) (x is suffering iff x is related to suffering or the feeling of pain by the relation of identity or it is related to suffering or the feeling of pain by causal relation, direct or indirect). As regards the nature of this proposition, it is to be noted that it is neither analytic nor a priori. Hence the meaning of the word ‘object’ or ‘thing’ does not contain the concept of suffering. Since the justification put forward in favour of this proposition is empirical, it cannot be claimed to be a priori. Hence it is a synthetic a posteriori proposition. As regards the nature of the argument, unlike the argument in favour of the view that everything is momentary, the supporters of this thesis have not used the reduction ad absurdum argument. The critics of this type of argument would raise the following objections against the thesis that everything is suffering:

1) Even if we claim that wind or rain is causally related to the suffering of a sentient being, we cannot claim that a distant star or a planet is similarly related to the pain of a sentient being. This is due to the fact that their signals have not yet affected any sentient being or might not be causally related to any sentient being. Hence the phenomena which are not causally related to suffering or pain would not come under the range of the values of the variable ‘x’ in the proposition (d).



2) Even wind or rain cannot be said to cause suffering unconditionally. If there is drought, the rain, far from causing sorrow, will bring the message of hope and happiness. Moreover, the same cold wind, which causes suffering to one, may cause happiness to another. Hence a phenomenal object is not unconditionally related to suffering or happiness.



3) By using this type of argument one may equally come to the conclusion that everything is happiness. Since our sorrows and sufferings are transitory, they are passing phases of our life. When suffering ceases to exist, we experience happiness. Hence we can also utter with Shelly, ‘If winter comes can spring be far behind?’.



4) Moreover, if it is claimed that nirvāṇa is something positive, not simply negative, then it is something which is also outside the range of the values of the variable ‘x’ in our formulation (d). The state of nirvāṇa has been claimed to be beyond death. It is not caused, not born, not produced: It is also beyond all becoming.14 Since the world of being is outside the scope of the quantifier ‘all’, we have to say that every phenomenal object or thing is suffering, not everything. If suffering is used as a stepping stone to the attainment of nirvāṇa which is a state of being and bliss, then suffering, being causally related to something which is not suffering, cannot be contrasted with happiness or bliss. Hence this interpretation of nirvāṇa would create more problems than it solves.

From the above discussion it follows that neither the existentialist approach nor the nonexistentialist (essentialist) approach to the proposition that everything is suffering is

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satisfactory. The former ends up with the discussion of human suffering and consequently denies the truth of the proposition that everything is suffering. The latter approach is hard to substantiate, either as a scientific or metaphysical truth. According to our positive thesis both the approaches are unsatisfactory because both of them have taken this proposition as descriptive. This proposition is to be taken as prescriptive or evaluative. For this reason there is no reductio ad absurdum proof in favour of this proposition as we have in favour of the proposition that everything is momentary. Since the proposition everything is suffering is not descriptive, it cannot be said to be true or false. Since it is prescriptive15 in nature, it is prescribed for those who are seekers of truth, knowledge and reality. In other words, it is prescribed for the seekers of liberation, mokṣa or nirvāṇa. The prescriptive form of this proposition may be stated in the following way: (e) (x) (If x is a seeker of nirvāṇa, then x ought to treat everything as suffering). This imperative is similar to the Categorical Imperative of Kant if it is stated in the following way: (x) (If x seeks to realize moral values, then x ought to treat human beings not simply as a means to an end but as an end in itself).16 From the above discussion of the nature of the proposition that everything is suffering it follows that it is not on a par with the proposition that everything is momentary. The former is prescriptive in nature, while the latter is descriptive in nature. The former is evaluative as it implies a value judgment, while the latter is not evaluative as it does not imply a value judgment. But both of them are synthetic a posteriori propositions.

II In this concluding section I would like to point out how both the propositions are related to the Buddhist concept of nirvāṇa (nibbāna in Pali), and focus on several concepts or uses of nirvāṇa. It is to be noted that the word ‘nirvāṇa’ or ‘nibbāna’ has been interpreted in several ways or it has several connotations. It consists of ni+vāṇa (or nir+vāṇa).17 The negative particle ‘ni’ means absence or cessation and the word ‘vāṇa’ means weaving or craving. Hence the etymological meaning of ‘nirvāṇa’ is cessation or extinction of craving. The following three types of craving have been mentioned in the Buddhist literature:18

1) The craving that motivates physical and vocal actions;



2) The craving that stimulates the imagination or fantasy;



3) The craving which is latent as a disposition.

The first type of craving motivates the transgression of ethical conduct. The second type of craving is a causal condition for the thought (or imagination) of objects which we usually desire. The third type of craving yields the craving for existence. Since ‘nirvāṇa’ implies or connotes cessation of craving, it would imply cessation of all the three types of craving. The state of nirvāṇa does not imply the extinction or the cessation of the individual, but only the cessation of his/her cravings which are causally related to the defilements of

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attachment, aversion and delusion. Hence nirvāṇa does not imply the total extinction of life, but only the extinction of the life of illusion, passion and craving.19 I think cessation of craving maybe taken as a cardinal meaning of nirvāṇa even though it is negative. But some of the Buddhist texts, including Dhammapāda, have emphasized the positive aspects of the state of nirvāṇa. To quote Dhammapāda: Health is the highest gain; contentment is the greatest wealth, trustful are the best kinsmen; nibbāna is the highest bliss.20 Even if ‘nirvāṇa’ implies a positive state of bliss or peace, or tranquillity, there cannot be nirvāṇa without the cessation of craving or the extinction of selfish desires or defilements. In addition to these two meanings of the word ‘nirvāṇa’, the following may be introduced. Nirvāṇa may also be equated with the cessation of the following wheel of intervolved causation.

Since craving is one of the links in this wheel, the cessation of craving would lead to the cessation of the wheel itself which is nirvāṇa. Since craving leads to other defilements such as anger, jealousy, etc. one may characterise nirvāṇa as a mental state free from all defilements (kleśa). This concept of nirvāṇa called ‘pure cognition’ (viśuddha vijñāna) is mentioned in Sarvadarśana – saṃgraha of Mādhavācārya, quoted in Panchanan Bhattacharya’s Bauddhadarśanam, p. 123. Another sense of the word ‘nirvāṇa’ after death may be represented by the following diagram: x=

a1 b1

a2 b2

b3

b4

Here in the above diagram a1 and a2 represent experiences such as red, green, blue, etc. called ‘pravṛttivijñāna’, and b1 to b4 represent ālayavijñāna. Arrows indicate how they

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are related causally. Since the arrows are going in different directions, horizontal arrows represent the main cause and other arrows represent benefactors. The word ‘x’ refers to the inner aggregate of an individual. Hence nirvāṇa may be equated with the cessation of both the components of inner aggregate of an individual. According to almost all Buddhists, a person is a collection of twelve āyatanas (items), consisting of five sense-organs, five motor-organs, manas and buddhi. But all of them are momentary. Hence a person is a set of twelve series of momentary entities, both inner and outer. Buddhi is included in the inner aggregate (āntarasamudāya) and it refers to both ālayavijñāna, and our experiences of an entity such as red or blue explained in terms of pravṛttivijñāna. Both of them together explain what we mean by ‘my experience’. Hence the referent of ‘I’ is a buddhi. In this context it is to be noted that both of them are series of momentary entities. The successor of each of them is caused by its immediate predecessor. What persists after the death of an individual is the ālayavijñāna so that the individual can reap his or her kārmic residue. If one has achieved nirvāṇa then kārmic residue has been exhausted, hence there is no rebirth. In other words, the ālayavijñāna may continue without having pravṛttivijñāna or ālayavijñāna will also cease to exist. Another sense of nirvāṇa may be equated with the apprehension of truths, free from conceptualisation. Hence it is equated with the apprehension of momentariness, as everything is coloured by concepts. Suchness, emptiness, excellence, nirvāṇa, realm of truth (Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, III : 31)21. Another sense of nirvāṇa may be constructed from the type of questions which cannot be answered. It is said that the type of questions called ‘pañha ṭhapaṇīya’ should be set aside. The question about nirvāṇa may be considered a question of this type, as nirvāṇa also means ‘blowing out’. Hence nirvāṇa is indescribable or inexpressible in language. From our above discussion it follows that there are at least seven senses of the word ‘nirvāṇa’, some of them are related to each other but they do not have the same connotation or Fregean sense. The distinctive feature of Buddhism is that both the theses that everything is momentary and that everything is suffering would lead to the cessation of craving, but not in the same way. It is claimed that the unwavering idea (vāsanā) that all impressions are momentary is the way which will lead us to liberation.22 Hence the thesis that everything is momentary would lead us to nirvāṇa by removing ignorance about the nature of things and thereby craving for things. It is to be noted that due to ignorance about the reality we take things to be permanent or semi-permanent. We cling to objects of our liking as we take them to be permanent or to have some duration. Since we take the objects to have some duration, we expect the same type of actions or reactions from them over a period of time. We get hurt or frustrated when our expectations are not being fulfilled. But if we realize that things are momentary, then we do not expect the same type of actions or reactions from an object. Moreover, it would pave the way for the feeling of non-attachment as objects cannot remain the same. Hence the doctrine of momentariness by removing the veil of ignorance about the real nature of things would lead us to the cessation of craving. The thesis that everything is suffering has also been proposed by other schools of Indian philosophy, such as the Yoga system. To an enlightened yogī, according to the yoga system, every object will give rise to suffering.23 Hence an omniscient yogī will be able to grasp

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the truth of the proposition that every object can cause suffering or will lead to suffering. But according to the Buddhist philosophers the prescriptive proposition that everything is suffering is used as a means to nirvāṇa. If we realize that a thing will cause suffering, then far from having craving for it, there will be a repulsive feeling against it. When there is a cessation of craving for any object, we realize nirvāṇa. It is also claimed that it can be realized here or in this life. So the Buddhist philosophers have used both the propositions for the cultivation of the feeling of detachment (or non-attachment) towards objects of this world. But the other schools of Indian philosophy have used only the pervasive features of suffering for the cultivation of the feeling of detachment as they have not accepted the thesis that everything is momentary. Moreover, some Buddhist masters have emphasized the importance of suffering so much that it has assumed the status of a guru. To quote Gampopa,24 a Tibetan Mahāyāna master: Sorrow, being the means of convincing one of the needs of the religious life, is a guru. Misfortune, being the means of leading one to the Doctrine, is also a guru. Moreover, it is claimed that illness and tribulations are teachers of piety. In other words, sorrows or sufferings help us cultivate moral virtues such as benevolence towards all creation (maitrī) and compassion towards the distressed (karuṇā). Hence the prescriptive proposition that everything is suffering has twofold effect on us. The negative effect is the cessation of craving and the positive effect is the promotion of the cultivation of moral virtues. The cultivation of moral virtues will dissolve our ego but the cessation of craving will lead us to the realisation of nirvāṇa. From the above discussion it follows that both the propositions are related to nirvāṇa, but not in the same way.

NOTES 1. sarvaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ duḥkhaṃ duḥkhaṃ svalakṣaṇaṃ svalakṣaṇaṃ śūnyaṃ śūnyamiti, Sarvadarśana – saṃgraha of Mādhavācārya, quoted in Panchanan Bhattacharya’s Bauddhadarśanam, p. 23; see also author’s ‘Causality: Sāṃkhya, Bauddha and Nyāya’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2002. 2. Dinesh Chandra Shastri, Aspects of Indian Psychology, (West Bengal: Ramakrishna Mission Ashrama, 1988). p. 32. 3. Ibid., p. 34. 4. K. Potter, ‘Suffering in the Orthodox Philosophical Systems : Is There Any?’, in Suffering: Indian Perspectives, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986) edited by K.N. Tiwari; see also B.K. Matilal’s ‘On the Universality of Suffering’ in Suffering: Indian Perspectives and ‘The Enigmas of Buddhism’ in Language, Logic and Reality. 5. Winston L. King, Buddhism and Christianity: Some Bridges of Understanding, (London: Westminster Press, 1962) p. 111; see also David E. Cooper’s Meaning, (Chesham: Acumen, 2003) ch7. 6. The Book of Kindred Sayings (Sanyutta-Nikāya), Vol. 5, translated by F.L. Woodward, (Oxford: The Pali Text Society, 1997), p. 357. 7. G. Jha, Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, Vol 1, (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1988), p. 1. 8. James W. Boyd, ‘Suffering in Theravāda Buddhism’, in Suffering: Indian Perspectives.

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  9. Ibid., p. 162. 10. Ibid, pp. 154-155; see also The First Discourse of the Buddha by Venerable Dr. Rewata Dhamma, pp. 56-57. 11. Ibid., p. 160. 12. The Book of the Kindred Sayings (Sanyutta-Nikāya), translated by F.L. Woodward, p. 139. 13. Ibid. 14. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 3, 1979, p. 378; see also Suffering: Indian Perspectives, p. 165. 15. For more on this topic, see author’s ‘Empty Terms: The Nyāya and The Buddhists’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1974, and ‘The Advaita Vedānta on Meaning’, in Vedānta: Concepts and Application, (Calcutta: The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 2000), pp. 360-373. 16. I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated by H. J. Paton, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 95-98. 17. Dipak Kumar Barua, ‘The Foundations of Living Faiths’, in Faith, Morality & Culture, edited by U. R. Bhattacharya and H. Bandopadhyay, (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1996), p. 50; and Monier Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 557. 18. Rewata Dhamma, The First Discourse of the Buddha, (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 1997), p. 87. 19. See also Hajime Nakamura, A Comparative History of Ideas, (London: Kegan Paul International, 1975) pp. 259-262; and Haridas Bhattacharya, ‘Early Buddhishm’, in History of Philosophy : Eastern and Western, edited by S. Radhakrishnan, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1952), pp. 152-172. 20. The Dhammapāda, translated by Narada Thera, (Calcutta: Maha Bodi Society of India, 1991), p. 57. 21. Quoted in Karma and Creativity, Christopher Chapple, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 46. 22. kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṃskārā iti yā vāsanā sthirā, sa mārgaḥ iti vijñeyaḥ sa ca mokṣo ’hbhidhīyate, quoted in Bauddhadarśanam, p. 129. 23. Pātañjala Darśana, translated with commentary by Purna Chandra Sharma, (West Bengal: West Bengal State Book Board, 1983), pp. 126-127, sūtra 2/15; see also Sāṃkhyakārikā, translated by Purna Chandra Sharma (West Bengal: West Bengal State Book Board, 1983), pp. 6-14. 24. Quoted in Suffering: Indian Perspectives, p. 170.

CHAPTER THREE

The Referent of ‘I’: An Indian Perspective INTRODUCTION The aim of this paper is to discuss the referent of the word ‘I’ from the perspective of Indian philosophers. Hence this paper will deal with the theories of the referent of the word ‘I’ in the systems of Indian philosophy. In this context I will mention the suggestions of the Upaniṣadic thinkers, and I would like to mention as many as six views of the Indian philosophers, including the view of K. C. Bhattacharya, a neo-Advaita Vedāntin. Our discussion would also explain the unity of consciousness. Regarding the referent of the word ‘I’, most Indian philosophers claim that it is the possessor of mental states. Before introducing the views of the systems of Indian philosophy, I would like to mention the views of the Upaniṣadic thinkers, as from the very dawn of Indian philosophy they were concerned with the nature of a person or personal identity. A) In the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, the following five sheaths of a person have been mentioned:

a) The outermost sheath nourished by food and water (annarasamaya),



b) The sheath of vital airs or life (prāṇamaya),



c) The sheath of mind or internal sense (manomaya)



d) The sheath of intellect, thought, or knowledge (vijñānamaya),



e) The sheath of bliss or freedom (ānandamaya).

Regarding the relation between these sheaths, we come across the following interpretations:

i) The sheath a) is manifested in the sheath b), which is manifested in c), which in turn is manifested in d), and which is manifested in e).

ii) The sheath a) gets fulfillment in the sheath b), b) in c), c) in d), and the latter in e). iii) The a) is evolved in b), b) in c), c) in d), and the latter in e). iv) The e) pervades over d), d) over c), c) over b), and b) over a).1 It is to be noted that this Upaniṣadic view tries to explain the identity of a person in terms of the identity of the sheath e), which pervades over all other sheathes. Hence the referent of the word ‘I’ at the phenomenal level is the person who is described in one of the above four ways. Therefore, the referent of ‘Tom’, when he utters the word ‘I’, is the body which is pervaded by vital airs, which in turn is pervaded by mind which is pervaded by intellect, which is pervaded by bliss. The referent may also be described as the blissful soul delimited

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by intellect, which is delimited by mind, which in turn is delimited by vital airs which is delimited by the body. Hence memory or recognition is to be explained in terms of the identity of the soul which is ultimately delimited by the body. It is also said: ‘He who is this (Brahman) in man, and he who is that (Brahman) in the sun, both are one. He who knows this, when he has departed this world, reaches and comprehends the Self which consists of food, the Self which consists of breath, the Self which consists of mind, the Self which consists of understanding, the Self which consists of bliss.’2 This passage emphasises the noumenal or the metaphysical Self, as Brahman is the same in everything. Hence the identity of the real self lies in identifying it with Brahman. It is to be noted that the later Vedāntins consider the annarasamaya-kośa as gross body (sthūla-śarīra); prāṇamaya-kośa, manomaya-kośa and vijñānamaya-kośa as subtle body (sūkṣma-śarīra); but ānandamya-kośa as causal body (kāraṇa-śarīra). It seems to me that the identity of the individual is to be explained in terms of the ānandamaya-kośa, as it pervades all other kośas. Hence it will explain the memory or the recognition of the individual. If it is identified with the causal body, as Vedāntins claim, then it explains rebirth or transmigration of the soul. Hence it will carry the kārmic residue of the individual, which will determine the next life, including the birth of the individual. B) In the Kaṭha-Upaniṣad, the self has been compared to the lord of the chariot, the body to the chariot, the intellect (buddhi) to the charioteer, the mind to the reins, the senses to the horses, and the sense-objects to the roads. It is claimed that the individual soul being associated with the body, mind and senses is the experient or enjoyer (bhoktṛ). To quote: ‘Know the self to be sitting in the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the intellect (buddhi) the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses they call the horses, the objects of the senses their roads. When he (the Highest Self) is in union with the body, the senses, and the mind, then the wise people call him the enjoyer’.3 According to this view, the referent of the word ‘I’ is the embodied soul which is the lord of the body–mind complex. Since the soul has no origination or cessation, it is the gross body which comes into being and ceases to exist when an individual passes away. It seems to me that this view would explain rebirth in terms of the transmigration of the subtle body, which may be identified with buddhi. Here also memory and recognition of the individual are to be explained in terms of the identity of soul. C) As regards views of the referent of ‘I’ in the systems of Indian philosophy, we can classify them into six groups: (1) According to the followers of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā, Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, Murārimiśra Mīmāṃsā, and Jaina, the referent of ‘I’ is the soul (self) qualified by mental states such as knowledge, belief, desire, feelings of pleasure or pain. These mental states are due to certain causal conditions. As regards perceptual cognition, the Nyāya claims that there are both a set of positive and a set of negative causal conditions. The self, the internal sense-organ (manas), the external sense-organs such as eyes, the objects of perception, the sense-object contact, etc., are positive causal conditions. Perceptual cognition also requires certain negative causal conditions such as not being too far, not being too close, not being overshadowed by a more powerful object, not being mixed up with

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similar objects, etc.4 A perceptual cognition is produced in the self when manas is related to the self on the one hand and external sense-organs on the other. Hence it bridges the gap between the external senses and the soul (self). Manas is different from the material objects on the one hand and self on the other. Since manas is not made out of five material elements called ‘bhūtas’ and lacks certain properties of material objects such as colour, touch, etc., it is different from material objects. Again, since it lacks certain properties of the soul such as cognition, pleasure, pain, etc., it is different from the soul. Hence it not only plays an intermediary role but also lacks some of the properties of the terms to which it is related. This view tries to explain the unity of conscious states in terms of the unity of self or soul which is a permanent entity. Hence this unity explains memory or recognition. But rebirth is to be explained in terms of the kārmic residue which characterises the soul. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers use the word adṛṣṭa for the Kārmic residue of an action. The Karmas, moral or immoral, which have not yet produced the results, are stored as dispositional causal conditions. They reside in the soul even after the cessation of the previous body, and act as causal conditions for having another body and thereby for having happiness or suffering in the embodied soul. So the results (phalas) are produced in the soul delimited by the body (śarīrāvacchinna-ātmā).5 (2) According to the supporters of Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, and Yoga, the referent of the word ‘I’ does not include the noumenal self which is either pure consciousness, or pure existence, consciousness and bliss. This transcendental self is not a causal condition for the production of mental states. According to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system, the word ‘I’ refers to a buddhi which is an evolute of prakṛti (nature), and which is qualified by a reflection of pure consciousness. The ego or ahaṃkāra is an evolute of buddhi or mind. Five external sense-organs, five motor-organs and the internal sense manas are evolutes of ahaṃkāra. The buddhi of which the mental states are modifications (pariṇāma) is the referent of the word ‘I’. But according to the Advaita Vedānta, the mind is called antaḥkaraṇa, and it is material in nature. It is a composite entity, made out of five subtle elements, namely, earth, water, air, fire, and ether (ākāśa). An antaḥkaraṇa has four aspects, viz., buddhi (the function which ascertains whether an object is favourable or unfavourable to the subject), ahaṃkāra (the ego), citta (the faculty of memory and recollection), and manas (the internal sense-organ). According to the Advaita Vedānta, the antaḥkaraṇas are ultimately products of cosmic ignorance or nescience called ‘māyā’. The word ‘māyā’ refers to something which cannot be considered real, or unreal, or both real and unreal, although it has a force which covers reality and projects something which is not ultimately real. Moreover, the Advaitins have used the following fourteen words to refer to this māyā, having different connotations: i) avidyā: ignorance which is something positive, not negative. ii) prakṛti: it refers to the realm of cause and effect in Indian philosophy. So anything which is a cause or an effect is not ultimately real. Hence it is not Brahman. iii) agrahaṇa: it means that which cannot be fully known, or it is indescribable. iv) avyakta: unmanifest. This is due to the fact that the things in this world have potentialities which have not been realised. v) tamaḥ: literally, it means darkness as it lacks illumination.

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vi) kāraṇa: cause: So māyā refers to a realm of causes, material or instrumental. vii) laya: that which is annihilated or dissolved. viii) śakti: that which has the ability to produce an effect (distinct from kāraṇa). ix) mahāsupti: that which ceases to exist, without residue. x) nidrā: literally means sleepiness. Hence it refers to things which are not fully active. xi) kṣara: it refers to flow of things coming into being and ceasing to exist. xii) ākāśa: it is used here in the sense of emptiness, since it is not ultimately real. xiii) namarūpa: name and form. That which can be named and can be grasped through our senses. xiv) avyākṛta: that which is not made of anything else. These words refer to the same thing (māyā) under different modes of presentation. So they have the same referent, but different senses to use Frege’s terminology. Hence, according to the Advaita Vedānta, God is also a product of māyā, which is not ultimately real. In regard to the supposed relation between the ultimate reality or pure consciousness (Brahman) and an antaḥkaraṇa, there are three views, namely,

1) The theory of reflection (pratibimvavāda),



2) The theory of limitation (avacchedavāda), and



3) The theory of seeming reflection (ābhāsavāda).

It seems to me that, following the theory of reflection, we can add another view:

4) The theory of seeming limitation (ābhāsa-avacchedavāda),

Hence the referent of the word ‘I’ would be the antaḥkaraṇa qualified by the reflection of consciousness (cit), or the reality delimited by antaḥkaraṇa, or the antaḥkaraṇa qualified by the seeming reflection of consciousness, or the reality seems to be delimited by antaḥkaraṇa. In this context it is to be noted that the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system would explain the unity of our mental states in terms of the unity of buddhi and the supporters of the Advaita Vedānta in terms of the unity of the antaḥkaraṇa, but the supporters of the NyāyaVaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Jaina would explain this unity in terms of the identity of the self (ātman). Hence the memory and recognition would be explained in terms of the unity of the respective type. Regarding rebirth, the Sāṃkhya would explain in terms of transmigration of the subtle body (sūkṣma-śarīra), not in terms of gross body (sthūla-śarīra), as there are two types of body according to most followers of Sāṃkhya philosophy. But according to Vijñānabhikṣu there are three types of body, namely, gross (sthūla), subtle (sūkṣma), and substratum (adhiṣṭhāna). According to the Advaita Vedānta, the body is the delimitor (avacchedaka) of a sentient being (Jīva), and it is for experiences, such as pleasure, pain, etc., which are due to actions of the individual. The body is divided into three types, namely, gross (sthūla), subtle (sūkṣma), and causal (kāraṇa). The causal body (kāraṇa-śarīra) is equated with individual nescience (ajñāna). It is also called ‘ānandamaya-kośa’. But the subtle body consists of the

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following seventeen items: five types of organs of knowledge, namely, sight (cakṣu), hearing (śrotra), touch (tvak), taste (rasana)and smell (ghrāṇa); five types of organs of action, namely, speech (vāc), grasping (pāṇi), moving (pāda), excretion (pāyu), and generation (upastha); five types of air (vāyu), namely, the vital air of life moving upward and situated in the tip of the nose (prāṇa), the vital air moving downward and situated in places like anus (apāna), the vital air moving in all directions (vyāna), the vital air moving upward and located in the throat (udāna), and the vital air for digestion and located in the middle of the body (samāna); buddhi, and manas. The subtle body (sūkṣma-śarīra) consists of prāṇamaya-kośa, manomaya-kośa, and vijñānamaya-kośa. But the gross body is equated with annarasamaya-kośa. Rebirth is explained in terms of causal body (kāraṇa-śarīra) as it transmigrates from one body to another. (3) According to Śākta Āgama, Yogavāsiṣṭha, Pratyabhijñā Śaiva darśana and some Tāntrics, the referent of ‘I’ is the degenerated form of pure consciousness limited by a knowable or knowables. According to this view, the ultimate reality is pure consciousness which is not a static entity. When it is limited by a knowable, it degenerates from the state of pure consciousness and becomes mind (manas). Here we do not have prakṛti or māyā as the material cause (upādāna kāraṇa) of a mind. The pure consciousness itself is the upādāna kāraṇa. The nimitta kāraṇas (instrumental causes) are being limited by a knowable, the unrestricted freedom of pure consciousness, etc. Since this view does not accept manas (internal senseorgan or mind) as a separate entity, it is simpler than the previous two views. This view would explain the unity of our mental states in terms of the unity of the degenerated form of pure consciousness. But rebirth would be due to the kārmic residue which qualifies the degenerated consciousness. (4) According to almost all Buddhists, a person is a collection of twelve āyatanas (items), consisting of five sense-organs, namely, sight (cakṣus), hearing (śrotra), touch (tvak), taste (rasana), smell (ghrāṇa); five motor-organs namely speech (vāc), grasping (pāṇi), moving (pāda), excretion (pāyu), generation (upastha); manas and buddhi. But all of them are momentary. Hence a person is a set of twelve series of momentary entities, both inner and outer. Buddhi is included in the inner aggregates (āntarasamudāya) and it refers to both ālayavijñāna and pravṛttivijñāna. Our ego is explained in terms of ālayavijñāna, and our experiences, such as red, blue, pleasure, pain, etc., in terms of pravṛttivijñāna. But both of them together explain what we mean by ‘my experiences’. As regards the relation between them, ālayavijñāna has been compared with the undercurrent of a river and pravṛttivijñāna with its waves. Hence the relation between them would be causal. As a particular wave depends on both the undercurrent and other waves, so a particular pravṛttivijñāna would depend on ālayavijñāna and other pravṛttivijñānas which are its upakārīs (benefactors). Ālayavijñāna may also be compared with a seed and other pravṛttivijñānas with its benefactors such as water, air, soil, etc. The effect would be another pravṛttivijñāna. The referent of the word ‘I’, according to the Buddhists, would be a buddhi. In this context it is to be noted that according to the Buddhists, everything is momentary. Since both the ālayavijñāna and pravṛttivijñāna are momentary or series of momentary

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entities, the question is how to explain the unity of consciousness, or memory, or recognition. The Buddhists would suggest a causal model so that the momentary mental states are related to each other by causal relation.6 The following diagram may be introduced to explain memory in terms of causation:

MEMORY DIAGRAM

Suppose ms5 to ms9 are mental states, and dms1 to dms3 are dispositional mental states. Again, suppose ms5 is caused by a table, ms6 by a bed, ms7 by a jar, and ms8 by a chair. The ‘→’ is used to signify causal relation. The dispositional mental states are due to mental states such as the awareness of a table or a chair. Again, the awareness of a table is causally related to a table if it is perceptual. Hence dmsl is due to ms5, but dms2 is due to dmsl, and dms3 due to dms2. Now ms8 which is due to a chair revives dms3. Since a chair and a table have been perceived together, one may revive the disposition of the other. Hence ms8 revives dms3, which causes ms9. In our diagram ms9 is the memory-cognition of the table which was perceived in the past. This memory-cognition is due to the revival of the dispositional state dms3, and the revival is due to ms8. Again, dms3 is causally related to the previous perception of the table, i.e., ms5. Hence a memory is caused by a disposition which is due to a previous perception. So the explanation of memorycognition does not involve any non-momentary entity. Now let us explain recognition in terms of the following diagram.

RECOGNITION DIAGRAM

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Here also ms5 to ms8 are mental states, and dmsl to dms3 are dispositional mental states. The mental state ms5 is due to the perception of table4. Again, table5 is causally related to table4, table6 to table5, and table7 to table6. Each of them is momentary. Now the mental state ms8 is due to the perception of table7, and it revives the dispositional mental state dms3 which is causally related to ms5 which is due to the perception of table4. The revived dispositional state dms3 produces the mental state ms9 which can be expressed by ‘This is the same table which was apprehended in the past’. In this diagram also, the ‘→’ signifies a causal relation. As the arrows are in 6 directions, there are 6 causal chains. Since they are all related to each other, recognition can be explained in terms of these relations. Moreover, this explanation also does not presuppose any non-momentary object. In this context it is to be noted that there are two views regarding the relation between recognition and the revived disposition. According to one of them, the revived disposition is the immediate predecessor of recognition, while according to the other, the memorycognition is the immediate predecessor of recognition and the memory-cognition is due to the revived disposition. If we accept the second view, then there will be one more causal chain in our above diagram. Since an individual is to be identified with buddhi, which is included in the inner aggregates (āntarasamudāya), the difference between one individual and another may be represented by the following diagram:

=

a1 b1

a2 b2

a3 b3

b4

b5

You =

x1 y1

x2 y2

x3 y3

y4

y5

I

where a1, a2, a3 stand for the pravṛttivijñānas of I (mental states of I) b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 stand for the ālayavijñānas of I (undercurrent of I) x1, x2, x3 stand for the pravṛttivijñānas of you (mental states of you) y1, y2, y3, y4, y5 stand for the ālayavijñānas of you (undercurrent of you) ‘< >’ stands for ordered set, ‘→’ stands for casual links, but ‘ ’ and ‘↑’ stand for upakārīs (benefactors) relation. In Buddhism the difference between two persons will remain even if both of them are liberated. From the above discussion it follows that the Buddhists can explain both memory and recognition without postulating any permanent entities. Regarding rebirth, they would claim that what transmigrates from this life to another is the ālayavijñāna, which is related to the kārmic residue of an individual. But liberation would lead to the cessation of rebirth and thereby transmigration of the ālayavijñāna of the individual. It is to be noted that there are several conceptions or connotations of the term nirvāṇa or liberation in Buddhism. (5) We come across another conception of self and thereby the referent of ‘I’ in the philosophy of Swami Vivekananda. To quote Swamiji: Without the ‘I’ there can be no ‘you’ outside. From this some philosophers came to the conclusion that the external world did not exist save in the subject, that the ‘you’ existed

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only in the ‘I’. Others have argued that the ‘I’ can only be known through the ‘you’ and with equal logic. These two views are partial truths, each wrong in part and each right in part. Thought is as much material and as much in nature as body is. Both matter and mind exist in a third, a unity which divides itself into the two. This unity is the Atman, the real self.7 This remark of Swamiji suggests how he would avoid both solipsism and behaviourism widely discussed in contemporary philosophy of mind. It also suggests a type of neutral monism. Since Russell has developed neutral monism to solve some of the contemporary problems of the mind and body, Swamiji's suggestions would also lead to similar solutions to those problems. At epistemic level this view would be similar to Strawson's concept of person. According to Strawson, both the corporeal predicates and mental predicates are ascribed to the same person. Moreover, he claims that one cannot identify oneself unless one identifies others. To quote Strawson: ‘The condition of reckoning oneself as a subject of such predicates is that one should also reckon others as subjects of such predicates’.8 As Strawson avoids both solipsism and behaviourism, Swamiji's remarks may also be taken to avoid both. The above remark of Swamiji also suggests the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal self. The unity of consciousness at phenomenal level of an individual is to be explained in terms of the identity of the mind of that individual. Hence this identity would explain both memory and recognition of the individual. But at noumenal level an individual is related to other individuals, as both matter and mind are manifestations of the same Ātman. (6) According to K. C. Bhattacharya (hereafter KCB), a neo-Advaita Vedāntin, the subject is freedom, as it cannot be categorized by any of our categories, although the word ‘I’ refers to different types of entity at phenomenal level. According to him, the meaning of spiritual progress lies in the realisation of the freedom of the subject. The realisation of freedom involves a feeling of dissociation of the subject from the object. Hence a move from outward to inward or subject is a move towards freedom. KCB also introduces grades of subjectivity or modes of freedom from the object in his uses of the word ‘I’. KCB introduces a new use of the word ‘I’ in the sentence ‘I am this’. He claims that ‘the word “I” as used by a speaker is not understood by the hearer …’9 Similarly, when the hearer uses the word ‘I’, he would intend himself, not the previous speaker. Here the author claims that the hearer understands who has been referred to, but not through the meaning of the word ‘I’ or as used by the speaker. Here the author draws a distinction between the communicating act of the speaker and the meaning of a word. The word ‘I’ conveys the communicating act of the speaker, which is not a part of the meaning of a word. But in the case of other words this does not happen. When we use the term ‘table’, what is communicated is the object, not the speaking of it. ‘But when his self-consciousness is communicated, it is not his self only but the self as speaking, communicating or expressing itself that is understood. His self-consciousness may in this sense be said to be not merely expressed but incarnated in the word “I”.’10 In this use of the word ‘I’, there is no distinction between the symbol and what is symbolised as the subject is expressed or incarnated in it.

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KCB also introduces grades of realisation of subjectivity or freedom. The first step towards freedom is the realisation of our own bodily consciousness, which involves freedom from the perceived object. Hence the first inkling of freedom is realised in our conscious body. At this stage of freedom, the subject is not dissociated from the body, although there is realisation of distinction between the extra-organic object and the body. The second stage of freedom is realised when we grasp the distinction between the perceived object, including our body on the one hand, and the images, ideas or meaning on the other. All these mental entities are included under the category of presentation. When consciousness is not dissociated from such presentations, but dissociated from the felt and perceived body, it is treated as presentational or psychic subjectivity. Hence the realisation of this subjectivity is a higher grade of freedom. The next higher grade of subjectivity lies in the dissociation from presentation, which is another type of object. This type of subjectivity or freedom is called ‘spiritual’ or ‘nonrepresentational’. Hence the word ‘I’ at one level refers to conscious body, not the body as such. At another level it refers to presentational consciousness, or conscious mental states. But at another higher level, it does not refer to body or psychic state. This stage of spiritual freedom would eventually lead to the realisation of the subject as absolute freedom, free from all types of constraints. Hence it will be free from all types of categorisation. According to KCB, body represents a stage of being of the subject. But it is not materialism as the subject is not the body. As he says, ‘… even if the subject is taken as nothing but one’s own perceived body, it involves the knowledge of something unknown as such in the object, something that cannot be understood in terms of the perceptible object in the merely objectivistic attitude. It still implies the mystic awareness of dissociation from the object in which subjectivity consists. What is intended by the word I cannot be characterised even in the lowest stage of subjectivity as simply this object.’11 Body can be perceived as well as felt, but the perceived body can be distinguished from the felt body. In the feeling of the body we realise the first hint of freedom as freedom lies in the feeling of detachment. ‘When the perceived body is distinguished from the felt body, or the exterior from the interior, we have an explicit feeling of distinction, detachment or freedom from the perceived object.’12 At the psychic level the subject does not identify itself with any aspect of the body, rather it negates the bodily aspect. After rejecting the bodily aspects, the subject tends to identify itself with the psychical facts such as image or idea. Since images or ideas are also objective in nature, it dissociates itself from them, and thereby they are also negated. Hence anything which is believed or thought is rejected as subjective when we move from the psychic level to the spiritual level of subjectivity. The spiritual level of subjectivity or freedom has been divided into three sub-stages, namely, feeling, introspection, and beyond introspection. At the level of feeling, there is no reference to anything objective or presentation. At this level, there is no distinction between awareness and its content. This stage of subjectivity is free from meaning-awareness as the subject is detached from actual or possible thought. But there is another sub-stage in feeling as the subject is not detached from feeling. Here the next step is the feeling of not having feeling. Hence the subjectivity cannot be identified with the feeling, as it cannot be identified with any content. The rejection of feeling as

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subjectivity paves the way for the realisation of introspective subjectivity. As regards the nature of introspection, KCB says, ‘Introspection is not believing in the I; it is the I, the believing that is not fact at all but is not, therefore, illusory.’13 It amounts to believing in itself, without any content. So at this stage the subject is free from content, but not free from the category of identity as there is ‘believing in itself.’14 Again he says, ‘This possible detachment from all distinct being is introspective awareness. Introspection is essentially annulment of all distinct feeling, being selfidentification or the conscious identity without being of the self.’15 At this self-evidencing level the possibility of a silent self-enjoying is intelligible. In other words, the application of the category identity is intelligible. Hence it is bound by this category, although it is detached from all types of content. At this level there is no distinction between consciousness and its content. But at the level of introspection the meaning function of the word ‘I’ also remains. As KCB says, ‘Thus it may be said that a speaker calling himself I is understood through the word but not through the meaning of the word. The word here has a meaning function but not a meaning: it is the expression of introspection or what may be called the I-function.’16 I think this is due to the fact that the self is understood under the mode of the category identity. Moreover, at introspective level the possibility of ‘a silent self-enjoying I is intelligible.’17 Hence there is a need to go beyond the stage of introspection and to postulate the nonbeing of distinction in the absolute self. It seems to me that KCB has rejected even the category of identity as it is necessary for the identity of each individual. Hence real freedom or absolute freedom lies in rejecting all categories, including ‘the category of distinctness’.18 For this reason he claims that in real freedom, the I is equated with you. As he says, ‘The other person is to me another I …’19 Hence the distinction between you and I in terms of being identical with oneself is rejected. From the fact that you are another I to me it does not follow that all types of distinction will disappear as you become part of my I. In order to reject this distinction also he claims, ‘Lastly there is the consciousness of the overpersonal self.’20 As regards the nature of the transcendental self or freedom, he says, ‘… it is consciously being nought and not consciousness of I as nought.’21 I think what he meant by the word ‘nought’ is the rejection of all categories, subjective or objective, including the category of identity or difference. In this respect he has gone beyond the classical Advaita Vedānta, where metaphysical freedom of the individual lies in identifying oneself with the Absolute. Moreover, the over-personal self is not to be interpreted as sat, cit and ānanda, as these are also categories or values. From the above discussion it follows that in KCB we come across degrees of freedom or progressive realisation of freedom, and thereby different uses of the word ‘I’. At phenomenal level the referent may be equated with bodily consciousness or conscious representation. Hence the identity of a person is to be explained in terms of the identity of consciousness. But at spiritual level it cannot be identified with any entity. This is due to the fact that his concept of transcendental freedom cannot be expressed by any category, as it is the rejection of all categories. Hence his conception is unparalleled in the history of philosophy, Eastern or Western. In this respect he has gone beyond the classical Advaita concept. Therefore, it is a new animal in our zoo.

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From our discussion of Indian theories of mind or self it follows that from the very dawn of Indian philosophy, consciousness has not been reduced to something material or functions of matter or brain. Only the followers of Cārvaka would attribute consciousness to our body or senses, and consider body as the referent of the word ‘I’. Hence the Indian philosophers, by and large, are not materialists. Moreover, they have tried to explain the unity of consciousness in terms of something permanent or in terms of causal relationship between mental states.

NOTES   1. Srimat Anirvana, Upaniṣad Prasaṅga, Vol 6, (West Bengal: Bardhamana University, 2007), pp. 79-93.   2. The Upaniṣads, Part II, translated by F. Max Muller, (New York: Dover Publications, 1962), pp. 61-62.   3. Ibid., p. 12.   4. For a comprehensive discussion, see J. L. Shaw, ‘Causality: Sāṃkhya, Bauddha and Nyāya’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2002.   5. Phanibhusana Tarkavāgīśa, Nyāya-darśana, Vol III, (India: West Bengal Book Board, 1982), pp. 429-435.   6. For a discussion on momentariness, see J. L. Shaw, Sāṃkhya, Bauddha and Nyāya, (Calcutta: Punthi Pustak, 2005).   7. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. VII, (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1989), p. 101.   8. P. F. Strawson, ‘Person’ in The Philosophy of Mind, edited by V. C. Chappel, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1962), p. 137.   9. Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy Vol. II, edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1956), p. 381. 10. Ibid., pp. 382–383. 11. Ibid., p. 413. 12. Ibid., p. 416. 13. Ibid., p. 443. 14. Ibid., p. 444. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid., p. 445. 17. Ibid., p. 449. 18. Ibid., p. 451. 19. Ibid., p. 476. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Nature of Nyāya Realism In this brief note I would like to mention the nature of Nyāya realism, as it cannot be identified with Western realism. The followers of the Nyāya, especially Navya-Nyāya, have accepted the following types of entities: substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), action (karma), class-character (jāti), particularity (viśeṣa), inherence relation (samavāya), and absence (abhāva). There are nine types of substances, namely, earth (kṣiti) , water (ap), air (vāyu), fire (tejas), space (dik), time (kāla), ether (akāśa), soul (ātman), and mind (manas or internal sense-organ, not mind in the Western sense). They have accepted the following twenty-four types of qualities: colour (rūpa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha), touch (sparśa), sound (śabda), heaviness (gurutva), liquidity (dravatva), oiliness (sneha), number (saṃkhyā), magnitude (parimāṇa), distinctness (pṛthakatva), contact or conjunction (saṃyoga), disjunction or disjoining (vibhāga), remoteness (paratva), nearness (aparatva), cognition (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), desire (icchā), aversion (dveṣa), effort (prayatna), impression (saṃskāra), merit (dharma), and demerit (adharma). Actions are divided into the following five types: throwing upward (utkṣepaṇa), throwing downward (avakṣepaṇa), contraction (ākuñcana), expansion (prasāraṇa), and locomotion (gamana). Regarding class-character (jāti), it is to be noted that it cannot be identified with the Western concept of universal. This is due to the fact that a class-character (jāti) is eternal and resides in its instances by the relation of inherence. But there is another concept of universal (sāmānya) which is much wider than that of class-character as it includes properties that are not related to their loci by the relation of inherence. Moreover, complex objects residing in several places are also treated as universals. According to the Nyāya ontology the ultimate particularities belong to eternal objects, atomic or ubiquitous. The particularity or the uniqueness of a non-eternal object, such as a table, is a function of the ultimate uniquenesses of its ultimate parts. Inherence, in the Nyāya ontology, comes under the category of relation. Hence it cannot be identified with any other category. It relates a whole to its parts, a quality to its locus (or substance), an action to its locus (or substance), an ultimate particularity to its locus (or substance), and a class-character (jāti) to its instances. The Nyāya philosophers have accepted absence as a separate category. This is due to the fact that it is not reducible to any set of positive objects, although it depends on positive objects. An absence has two-fold relational dependence. An absence is always an absence of something and it is present in some locus. For example, the absence of a table in this room. Moreover there cannot be an absence of an unreal object, such as the golden mountain or the round square. Absences are divided into two types, viz., relational absence (saṃsargābhāva) and

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difference (anyonyābhāva). The former is expressed by the form ‘x is not in y’ or ‘x does not occur in y’, while the latter by the form ‘x is not y’ or ‘x is different from y’, where ‘x’ and ‘y’ are non-empty terms. Again, the former is divided into three types, viz., not-yet type of absence (prāgabhāva), no-more type of absence (dhvaṃsa), and never-type of absence (atyantābhāva). The absence of the table before its production is an example of the not-yet type of absence. The absence of a particular table when it is destroyed is an example of the no-more type of absence. Absence of colour in air is an example of the never-type of absence. The fact that a table is different from a chair is an example of the mutual absence or difference. The Nyāya philosophers have also used the pair property and property-possessor (dharma-dharmī) to demonstrate the relation between substances as well as the relation between a substance and other categories. A property is defined in the following way: x is a property = Df. (Ǝy)( y is a locus of x). The diagram on page 68 represents the Nyāya concept of property (dharma): Now I would like to focus on the nature of Nyāya realism. According to epistemological realism the object of knowledge is not dependent on the knowing mind. Hence the table which I perceive does not depend on my perceiving. According to the Nyāya philosophers almost all the objects of knowledge, such as table, tree, etc., are independent of the knowing mind. Hence the substances are not dependent on any cognition. But qualities, such as numbers greater than one, remoteness and nearness in space or time, are dependent on a type of conjunctive cognition called ‘apekṣābuddhi’ (‘interdependent conjunctive cognition’) for their origination as well as existence. Hence our cognition plays a dual role in such cases. It is one of the causal conditions for the origination of these qualities which are objective or outside our minds. But they cease to exist when our cognitions of these qualities cease to exist. It is to be noted that an apekṣābuddhi is different from a cognition which corresponds to a conjunctive sentence such as ‘This is red and that is blue’. The word ‘and’ signifies the following three functions:

a) At the level of the language it makes a sentence out of two sentences, such as ‘This is hard and that is soft’, or ‘This is hard and this is hard’. Hence a conjunctive sentence has the form ‘p and q’, where ‘p’ and ‘q’ range over sentences.



b) It is also used to refer to a collection. For example, a and b are red. In this cognition both a and b are qualificands. The property of being the qualificand residing in a and b is limited by bothness or the number two. Regarding the number of the property of being the qualificand, there is difference of opinion among the Nyāya philosophers. According to some Nyāya philosophers, there is only one property of being the qualificand (viśeṣyatā), while according to others there are two properties of being the qualificand. If the property of being the qualificand is identified with the qualificand, there is a need for postulating two properties of being the qualificand. On the contrary, if it is treated as a limitor, then we have to postulate only one property of being the qualificand. But according to both the views it is limited by bothness (ubhayatva) or the number two.



c) The word ‘and’ also signifies along with or withness (sāhitya). Hence the expression ‘a and b’ in the sentence ‘a and b are red’ may signify a along with b. In this case a will be primary qualificand and b the secondary qualificand. In other words, b will be qualifier in relation to a, but qualificand in relation to red.

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There is another interpretation of ‘a along with b’. According to this view also a is the primary qualificand, but along with (sāhitya) is its qualifier, not b. The qualifier of the along with is b. Now the question is, what does the word ‘along with’ signify? In reply, the followers of this view claim that it signifies the relation of having the same locus. Hence the sentence ‘a and b are red’ means ‘b resides in the same locus of red in which a resides’. In the case of a conjunctive cognition corresponding to the sentence which contains the word ‘and’, there is no mutual dependence of one cognition on another. Either both the conjuncts are independent or the qualificand of one of the conjuncts is primary and that of the other is secondary. But in the case of the conjunctive cognition corresponding to apekṣābuddhi the cognition of one conjunct depends on another. Hence we know that one is different from another, but we do not cognize a collection in an apekṣābuddhi. For this reason it may be translated as ‘interdependent conjunctive cognition’. Hence it is represented by the expression ‘this is one, that is one’, or ‘this is one, this is one’ with reference to two objects. In other words, there would be cognition of different ones. Moreover, the properties of being the qualificand residing ‘a and b’ are limited by their respective limitors. For this reason if we say ‘this is one, this is one’ with reference to the same object, it does not correspond to an apekṣābuddhi as one is not dependent on another, although it would be a conjunctive cognition. Hence the word ‘and’ may be called ‘samuccayārthaka śabda’ (‘an expression which refers to a collection’), but not the expression for an apekṣābuddhi as it does not refer to a collection. Now the question is whether we require the cognition of the number of ones cognized in the process of counting type of interdependent cognition (gaṇanārūpa-apekṣābuddhi). If so, then there would be an infinite regress as we require another apekṣābuddhi for this cognition. The Nyāya Philosophers have proposed two-fold reply to this question. It is claimed that we do not require cognition of the number of ones which have appeared in this apekṣābuddhi. Moreover, it is said that the number which resides in the ones of this cognition is not a quality. It is to be identified with the property of being the object of cognition (viṣayatā-svarūpa). Hence it is the relation between the cognition and the ones which are its objects. According to the Nyāya these numbers will exist so long as their respective instrumental causes i.e. interdependent conjunctive cognitions will continue to exist. Hence the cessation of the interdependent conjunctive cognition of the table and the chair will lead to the cessation of the number two which resides in them. In favour of an interdependent conjunctive cognition being an instrumental cause, the Nyāya has suggested the following argument. If the numbers are not caused by any cognition of counting and revealed to us like the colour or the shape of an object, then we can cognize a large number, such as fifty, after looking at fifty objects without the process of counting. But this is contrary to our experience. When we look at this collection of fifty objects, we do not cognize the number fifty as we cognize their colours. For this reason the numbers beginning with two are dependent on the mental process of counting which is a type of interdependent conjunctive cognition (apekṣābuddhi). Let us consider number two. According to the Nyāya, the number two of a table and a chair is not the same as the number two of a pen and a paper. Hence each pair class has its own number two. The inherent cause of the number two of the table and the chair is the table and the chair. But the similar-to-inherent cause is the number one of the table and

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that of the chair. Now the Nyāya philosophers claim that the interdependent conjunctive cognition of the table as this is one and of the chair as this is one is the instrumental cause of the number two. It is to be noted that this number two qualifies the pair class but resides in each of the members of this class by the relation of inherence. Moreover, this number exists as long as this process of counting exists. Hence the cessation of the latter will lead to the cessation of the former, although it is an objective external entity. There would be as many particular twos as there are countings of two. It is to be noted that the Nyāya theory of number cannot be equated with logicism (realism or Platonism), intuitionism (conceptualism), or formalism (nominalism). It cannot be identified with logicism as numbers greater than one are not discovered by us or independent of us, or reducible to sets. Again these numbers are not mental concepts or constructed entities, but qualities of objects and properties of sets. Hence this view cannot be equated with intuitionism. Moreover, it cannot be equated with formalism as numbers are real qualities of substances or properties of sets of entities. Again, the cognition of temporal or spatial remoteness (paratva) or nearness (aparatva) is dependent on interdependent conjunctive cognition (apekṣābuddhi). Suppose John is 50 years old and Tom is 40 years old. Now the interdependent conjunctive cognition of it will generate the property of being older (jeṣṭhatva) in John and the property of being younger (kaniṣṭhatva) in Tom. Hence the property of being older will be cognized in John and the property of being younger in Tom. Similarly, we have to explain the cognition of spatial remoteness or nearness. For example, the cognition that Delhi is further away from Calcutta than Varanasi. This is due to the interdependent conjunctive cognition of the distance between Calcutta and Varanasi as well as the distance between Calcutta and Delhi. Here also both the production and the existence of remoteness (paratva) in Delhi and nearness (aparatva) in Varanasi will depend on this type of conjunctive cognition. Similarly, we have to explain the cognition of tallness, shortness etc. Suppose there is only one 10 storied building in the town and all other buildings are less than 10 storied. Suppose Tom had not seen any building higher than 10 storied. Now the interdependent conjunctive cognition of this building and some other building of this town will produce tallness in this 10 storied building, and he will cognize it in this building. Suppose John, who lives in New York, has the interdependent conjunctive cognition of this building as well as some other tall building in New York. He may claim that this 10 storied building is not tall. Hence both tallness and absence of tallness will be cognized by Tom and John respectively. Similarly, Tom having cognized a 20 storied building may claim that this building is not tall. But this situation does not violate the law of contradiction as the same building is not cognized as tall and not tall from the same perspective or at the same time by a cognizer. Hence the Nyāya philosophers can explain the objectivity of the ascription of relative qualities or properties without violating the law of contradiction. Since this type of explanation put forward by the supporters of Nyāya system is not present in Western philosophy, our discussion will throw some light on contemporary discussion on relative terms. From the above discussion it follows that the Nyāya system, by and large, supports realism as almost all the objects of cognition are independent of the knowing mind. But the qualities which are due to interdependent conjunctive cognitions are dependent on mind both for their origination and duration, although they are objective.

PART TWO

Epistemology

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CHAPTER FIVE

The Nyāya on Sources of Knowledge—Perception, Inference, Analogy and Testimony: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from the Nyāya Perspective INTRODUCTION The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the relevance of Indian epistemology to Western philosophy so that it can be integrated with the mainstream of Western philosophy. Hence I shall discuss: (1) how to suggest solutions to some unsolved problems of Western philosophy, (2) how to suggest better solutions to certain epistemological problems of Western philosophy, and (3) how to add new dimensions to Western philosophy. In the first section I shall mention the Nyāya concept of perception. In this context I shall explain the perception of a whole as distinct from its parts. This discussion will demonstrate how to avoid the sceptical argument raised against the perception of an object. Again, the Nyāya discussion of extraordinary perception will add a new dimension to Western philosophy. The Nyāya distinction between qualificative and non-qualificative perceptual cognition will further illuminate Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Russell’s concept of acquaintance leads to solipsism. Since the Nyāya concept of non-qualificative perceptual cognition does not lead to solipsism, it is superior to Russell’s concept of knowledge by acquaintance. The second section deals with the Nyāya concept of inference which cannot be claimed to be purely inductive or deductive in character. Moreover, it will reveal the relevance between the premises and the conclusion of an inference as it is called ‘a large sentence’ (‘mahāvākya’). Hence the inference of q (conclusion) from p and not p (contradictory premise) violates the condition of relevance. This discussion would throw some light on relevant logic, which is concerned with this problem. The third section deals with the causal conditions of an analogical cognition (upamiti) which is related to perception and inference, but not reducible to any other sources of knowledge.

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The fourth section deals with the causal conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence, simple or complex. According to several schools of Indian philosophy, the cognition of words, the memory – cognition of objects, the cognition of the relation between a word and its referent, the syntactic expectancy between the words (ākāṅkṣā), semantic compatibility (yogyatā), contiguity of words (āsatti) and the intention of the speaker (tātparya) are treated as causal conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence. Since the discussion of Indian philosophers is very comprehensive, it would add a new dimension to Western philosophy. Furthermore, the Nyāya philosophers have explained both the atomistic and the holistic understanding of a molecular sentence. Since the Western philosophers have not yet developed a logic or mechanism for holistic understanding, the Nyāya discussion would add lustre to Western philosophy. As I shall be discussing the relevance of Indian epistemology to Western philosophy, let me introduce the Nyāya concept of relevance in this context. According to Gaṅgeśa, the founder of Navya-Nyāya, relevance is a relation between the contents of expressions, sentences, or sets of sentences. According to him, if P is relevant to Q, then Q is an answer to a question, say S, and S is due to a cognition, say T, and the content of this cognition, say R, is the relation of relevance. Since the content of P is related to that of Q by the relation R, the former is the second term and the latter the first term of this relation. It is to be noted that the cognition T is causally related to S, and S is causally related to Q. In this context Indian epistemology is our P and the questions, such as whether it can solve some of the problems of Western philosophy, whether it can suggest a better solution, and whether it can add a new dimension to Western philosophy, will be our S. The cognitions, such as better solutions to the problems of Western philosophy, which are causally related to these questions, will be our T. The content of T, i.e. R, will be the relation of relevance. Our answers to these questions will be Q. The R will relate P to Q by the relation of relevance. Hence our justification of relevance or suggestions for better solutions will correspond to Q. As regards sources of valid cognition or knowledge, all the systems of Indian philosophy have emphasized perception. Hence I shall focus on perception with special reference to the Nyāya point of view. In this context I would like to point out that there is a substantial difference of opinion among the different schools of Indian philosophy regarding the sources of knowledge. For the Cārvāka (a type of materialist) philosophers, perception is regarded as the only source of valid cognition. The Bauddha and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers accept both perception and inference as sources of knowledge. The Sāṃkhya, Rāmānuja and Bhāsarvajña accept perception, inference, and verbal testimony; the Nyāya accepts perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony. But the followers of the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā accept presumption in addition to the four sources accepted by the Nyāya. The followers of the Kumārila Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita Vedānta accept non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) in addition to the previous five sources of knowledge. The followers of the Purāṇas accept two more, namely, entailment (sambhava) and tradition (aitihya). The followers of the Tantra accept gesture and posture (ceṣtā) in addition to the eight other sources of knowledge. The Jaina philosophers have accepted two more sources of valid cognition, namely, the use of a type of counterfactual conditional (tarka), and memory (smṛti). Since the Nyāya philosophers do not accept presumption as a source of valid cognition, it is reduced to agreement in absence type of inference (vyatirekī-anumāna). Similarly,

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non-apprehension is reduced to perception, entailment to inference, tradition to verbal testimony, and gesture (or posture) to inference. But tarka is not reduced to an inference. It gives rise to an inference and thereby becomes auxiliary to an inference. Similarly, memory is not reduced to some other source of valid cognition. But the truth of a memory-cognition depends upon the truth of a previous apprehension which is derived from perception, inference, comparison, or verbal testimony. In this paper I shall discuss the Nyāya concept of perception, inference, analogy and testimony.

SECTION ONE: PERCEPTION A) Ordinary Perceptual Cognition The Nyāya claims that there are both a set of positive and a set of negative causal conditions of perception. The perceiver (the self), the internal sense-organ (manas), the external sense-organs such as the eyes, the objects of perception, the sense-object contact, etc., are positive causal conditions. As regards negative causal conditions, the Sāṃkhya philosophers1 have mentioned the following, some of which have been accepted by the Nyāya philosophers:

a) Not being too far (atidūratābhāva),



b) Not being too close (atisāmīpyābhāva),



c) Absence of loss of sense-organs, such as deafness, blindness, etc. (indriyanāśābhāva),



d) Not being inattentive (mano’navasthānābhāva),



e) Not being too subtle (sūkṣmābhāva),



f) Not having intervening objects such as wall, screen, etc. (vyavadhānābhāva),



g) Not being overshadowed (or covered) by a more powerful object (abhibhavābhāva), e.g., during the day stars are not visible as they are overshadowed by the rays of the sun,



h) Not being mixed up with similar objects (samānābhihārābhāva), e.g., rain water cannot be perceived in a lake or a river separately as it is mixed up with similar objects.

The Nyāya philosophers would consider only a), b), g) and h) as negative causal conditions. The sense-object contact is the operation (vyāpāra) and the sense-organ is the special instrumental cause (karaṇa) of perception. The object of perception is an uncommon instrumental cause (asādhāraṇa kāraṇa). Since we have introduced some technical terms, let us explain the Nyāya conception of causality. The Nyāya philosophers have defined causal conditions in terms of the following three properties: ●●

●●

●●

The property of being related to the locus of the effect immediately prior to the effect (avyavahita pūrvavartitva). The property of being always present (niyatatva). The property of being simpler than other competing conditions (ananyathāsiddhatva).

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From the first condition it follows that if x is a causal condition for the effect E, then x is present immediately prior to E. From the second condition it follows that x is always present whenever E occurs. Hence from these two conditions it follows that a causal condition has the property of being the pervader which is limited by the property of being present immediately prior to the effect. The third condition specifies the principle for selecting the conditions which have satisfied the first two conditions. Let us illustrate with an example of the Nyāya system. When an earthen jar is produced, there are innumerable conditions which are present immediately prior to this effect. Moreover, all of them are, directly or indirectly, related to the locus of the effect. These conditions can be divided into three types. Some of the conditions are such that they are present whenever an effect is produced. Positive causal conditions such as space and time are always present whenever an effect is produced. Hence they are called ‘common causal conditions’ (‘sādhāraṇa kāraṇa’). But there are certain conditions which are present whenever a type of effect such as a jar is produced. The conditions such as the jar-maker, the parts of the jar, the conjunction between the parts of a jar, the wheel, the stick and the thread are present whenever an earthen jar is produced. This type of condition would come under uncommon causal conditions (asādhāraṇa kāraṇa). Some of the uncommon causal conditions remain the same for different types of effect. For example, thread is used for making a jar as well as for making a piece of cloth, among many other types of effect. But the set of uncommon causal conditions for one type of effect would never be the same as the set of uncommon causal conditions for another type of effect. Hence the set of causal conditions for making a jar would not be the same as the set of causal conditions for making a piece of cloth. The third type of causal conditions may be called ‘unique conditions’. These causal conditions would explain the particularity of the effect as distinct from the effects of the same type. In this example, the particularity of a jar is to be explained in terms of the particularities of its parts. All the parts and the relations of conjunction between the parts are positive unique causal conditions. The notyet type of absence of the jar would be the negative unique causal condition. Hence the distinction between different types of effect would be drawn in terms of the uncommon causal conditions and the distinction between the effects of the same type in terms of the unique causal conditions. Now let us explain the distinction between the terms ‘vyāpāra’ (‘operation’) and ‘karaṇa’ (‘special instrumental cause’), which are technical terms of the Nyāya. An operation (vyāpāra) is defined in terms of the relation of one causal condition to another. An operation is itself a causal condition, but it is due to another causal condition (tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakatvam). Hence it may be defined in the following way: (i) x is an operation of the effect E Df (Ǝy) (y is a cause or a set of causes of E and x is a cause of E, but x is due to y). In our above example, the movement of the wheel is due to the stick and the jar is due to the movement of the wheel. For this reason the movement of the wheel is considered an operation. Since the movement is due to the stick, the stick becomes the operationpossessor (vyāpāravat). Since the stick is related to the parts of the jar through this operation and becomes a cause by virtue of this relation, it is called ‘karaṇa’ (vyāpāravat kāraṇaṃ karaṇam). Hence karaṇa may be defined in the following way:

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(ii) x is a karaṇa of the effect E Df x is a causal condition, x is related to the locus of E through an operation, and it is considered as a cause due to this relation only. According to the Nyāya philosophers, we do not infer the object of perception from its look or from the apprehension of sense-data. Since we perceive the object without intermediary entities, the Nyāya view may be called ‘direct realism’. But the supporters of the sense-data theory in Western philosophy claim that we cannot perceive an object directly. According to some supporters of this theory an object is an inferred entity, while according to others it is a logical construction out of sense-data. But these views create more problems than they solve as they lead to scepticism or solipsism. The Nyāya philosophers claim that if we are in contact with a part of an object, then we are in contact with the whole. Hence, when we are in contact with a branch of a tree, we are in contact with the entire tree. In order to substantiate the perception of the whole from the perception of its parts the Nyāya philosophers have used a reductio ad absurdum argument. It is claimed that if we do not accept the contact with the tree which is a whole, then there cannot be contact with its branch which is also another whole. The question is whether there is contact with the entire branch or with its parts. If we apply the same argument, then we have to say that there is contact with a part of a branch, not with the whole. Now the question is whether we are in contact with this part which is another whole. If it is said that we are in contact with a part of this part, then it will involve a regress. In order to stop the regress it might be said that our sense-organ is in contact with the ultimate parts or some of the atoms of the tree. But this position is not tenable. Since the atoms are not amenable to our senses (atīndriya), the contact with an atom will not be amenable to our senses. If it were so, then we cannot have contact with any object. Since we do accept contact with the things or objects, the above position is to be rejected. In other words, we have to accept the contact with the branch which is a whole. Through this contact our sense–organ is in contact with the entire tree, which is a whole. In order to explain the perception of a whole, amongst other things, the Nyāya philosophers have accepted contact which is due to another contact. This is how the Nyāya philosophers would reply to the sceptical arguments put forward by Western philosophers against the perception of the whole. This would also lead to the rejection of sense-data theory of perception or phenomenalism, which claims that a physical object is a construction out of sense-data. It is to be noted that the Nyāya philosophers have discussed not only the causal conditions of perception in general, but also the causal conditions of false perception, the causal conditions of true perception, and the causal conditions which justify the truth of a perceptual cognition. To illustrate this point, let us consider the example, The table has a book. In this case our visual sense-organ is the special instrumental cause, and the contact between the visual sense-organ and the table is the operation. As our sense-organ is related to the table by the relation of contact, it is also related to the book which is on the table by a complex relation. Since the cognition that the table has a book is due to the sense–organ, it is considered as perceptual. The cognition is related to the table, the book and the conjunction relation. It is to be noted that the cognition will be related to these items even if it is false. Hence in terms of the relation between these items and the cognition alone we cannot draw the distinction between a true and a false cognition. When a perceptual cognition is true, our sense-organ is related to the qualified object.

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Hence, in our above example, our visual sense-organ is related not only to the table but also to the table qualified by a book on it. In the technical language of the Nyāya, the relation of the cognition to the qualified object or the fact is called ‘viśiṣṭa viṣayatā’, and the converse of this relation is called ‘viśiṣṭa viṣayitā’. It is to be noted that these are relational properties. The former qualifies the object, while the latter qualifies the cognition. Hence a true perceptual cognition presupposes certain additional conditions. A false perceptual cognition could be due to a defect (doṣa) or an inappropriate causal condition (kāraṇavaiguṇya). A defect (doṣa) is the negatum of a negative causal condition of a true perceptual cognition; but an inappropriate causal condition (kāraṇavaiguṇya) is the weakness or the absence of a positive causal condition of a true perceptual cognition. So a visual perception could be false due to distance (dūratva) which is the negatum of a negative causal condition of a true perception. Similarly, it could be false due to weakness of the visual sense–organ. In the case of a false cognition, our sense-organ is not related to the qualified object or the fact as there is no such fact. In addition to the relations of our cognition to its objects, the Nyāya philosophers have accepted the relations of the cognition to the qualifiers of its objects. Hence, in our above example, the cognition is related to the universal tableness as well as to the universal bookness. These additional relations will explain our ability to identify or discriminate the objects of cognition, which is necessary for knowledge. It is to be noted that, on Goldman’s theory, if S knows that p, then S can discriminate the truth of p from relevant alternatives. But his theory cannot explain why a person is able to discriminate the truth of p from relevant alternatives, but another person is not able to discriminate it from relevant alternatives. Since the Nyāya view can explain this phenomenon in terms of certain epistemic relations to the qualifiers of the objects, it would be relevant to contemporary philosophy. B) Types of Ordinary Sense-Object Contact The Nyāya philosophers have accepted several types of sense-object contact2 for the perception of different types of entities. Hence there are several types of operation for the perception of these objects. The following may be considered a comprehensive, but not an exhaustive, list of these relations: (1) When we perceive a substance, our sense-organs are related to it by the relation of conjunction (saṃyoga). For example, when we perceive a table, our visual or tactual senses are in contact with it. In this context it is to be noted that for the sake of convenience the expression ‘conjunction’ (or ‘contact’) is used to refer to both the conjunction relation of b to a and the conjunction relation of a to b, although the latter is the converse of the former. In the technical language of the Nyāya, the former is called ‘saṃyuktatva’ and the latter ‘saṃyogitva’. (2) The perception of the qualities such as colour or the actions of a substance is causally dependent upon a complex relation of conjunction-cum-the-converse of inherence (saṃyukta-samavāya). The relation of our visual sense-organs to a substance such as a table is conjunction and the relation of a quality of the table such as the brown colour to the table is inherence. If the former relation is called ‘R’ and the latter ‘S’, then the relation of the visual sense-organs to the colour of the table would be R/Š. Hence the complex relation R/Š is the relative product of

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conjunction and the converse of inherence. The relative product R/Š is defined in the following way: x R/Š y Df. (Ǝz) (x R z and z Š y). Our above example would be an instance of it if we substitute visual or tactual sense-organ for the variable ‘x’, the brown colour for ‘y’, and the table for ‘z’. According to the Nyāya the relative product R/Š is the operation (vyāpāra) for the perception of a quality or an action of a substance, or for the perception of the universal which inheres in a substance. (3) When we perceive a universal such as redness, of which a red colour is an instance, our sense-organs are related to it by a more complex relation. It is the relation of conjunction-cum-the converse of inherence and the converse of inherence (saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya) in the ontology of the Nyāya. Our visual senseorgans are related to the table by the relation of conjunction. But the universal redness is related to a particular red colour by the relation of inherence in the ontology of the Nyāya. Again, a particular red colour is related to its locus by the relation of inherence. Hence the relation of the locus to its red colour is the converse of inherence and the relation of the red colour to the universal redness is also the converse of inherence. Therefore, the relation of the visual sense-organs to the redness would be R/ Š /Š, which is the relative product of three relations. This relative product is defined in the following way: xR/Š/Šy Df. (Ǝu) (Ǝv)(xRu. uŠv. vŠy). (4) When we perceive the sound, our auditory sense-organs are related to the sound by the converse of inherence. This is due to the fact that sound resides in ākāśa (which is usually translated as ‘sky’ or ‘ether’) by the relation of inherence and an auditory sense-organ is ākāśa limited by the walls of the outer ear (karṇa-śaṣkulī). (5) When we perceive the universal soundness, our auditory sense-organs are related to it by a complex relation. Since the universal soundness resides in a particular sound by the relation of inherence and a particular sound resides in ākāśa by the relation of inherence, our auditory sense-organs are related to the universal soundness by the converse of inherence-cum-the converse of inherence (samavetasamavāya). Hence, in symbols, it is to be represented by Š/Š, which is a relative product of two relations. (6) When we perceive an absence, our sense-organs are usually related to it by the relation of conjunction-cum-the property of being the qualifier (saṃyuktaviśeṣaṇatā). This is due to the fact that the relation between sense-organs such as eyes and an object such as a table is conjunction (saṃyoga) and the relation between the table and an absence such as the absence of a cat is the property of being the qualifier (viśeṣaṇatā) in the ontology of the Nyāya. In this context it is to be noted that all types of absences, including destruction (no-more type of absence), have some locus or loci. If the cat is not on the table, then the absence of the cat characterizes the table. Similarly, when the table is destroyed, the no-more type of absence of the table characterizes the parts of the table. Since a destruction which is an effect has only instrumental causes, it cannot reside in its locus by the relation of inherence. An effect which has an inherent cause resides in it by

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the relation of inherence. For this reason the Nyāya claims that the relation of the locus to the destruction is the property of being the qualifier (viśeṣaṇatā) which is a type of self-linking relation (svarūpa-sambandha). A self-linking relation, according to the Nyāya, is not a separate ontological entity, distinct from its relata. It is to be identified either with the first term or with the second term. In general, if a is related to b by a self-linking relation, then it is to be identified with b and the relation of b to a is to be identified with a. Hence the relation of destruction to its locus is to be identified with its locus and the relation of the locus to the destruction is to be identified with the destruction. The latter relation is called ‘viśeṣaṇatā’ (‘the property of being the qualifier’) and the former ‘viśeṣyatā’ (‘the property of being the qualificand’). From the above discussion it follows that our sense-organs are related to an absence such as the absence of a cat or the destruction of a table by the relation of conjunctioncum-the property of being the qualifier. But this cannot be universalized to explain the relation between our sense-organ and an absence. When we perceive the absence of a sound, our auditory sense-organs are related to it by the property of being the qualifier (viśeṣaṇatā) relation only. This is due to the fact that our auditory sense-organs themselves are limitations of ākāśa where a sound resides. Again, when we perceive the absence of a red colour in a brown table, our visual senses are related to it by a relation which is more complex than the relation of conjunction-cum-the property of being the qualifier (saṃyukta-viśeṣaṇatā). In this example, the relation of our visual sense-organs to the table is conjunction, the relation of the table to its brown colour is the converse of inherence, and the relation of the brown colour to the absence of red colour is the property of being the qualifier (viśeṣaṇatā). Hence the relation of our sense-organs to the absence of a red colour is the relation of conjunction-cum-the converse of inherence-cum-the property of being the qualifier (saṃyukta-samaveta- viśeṣaṇatā). In addition to the sense-object contact, the Nyāya philosophers have accepted the relation of conjunction between the sense-organs and the mind or the internal sense (manas) as well as the relation between the mind (manas) and the self. These relations are simply causal conditions, neither special instrumental causes (karaṇas) nor operations (vyāpāras) of perceptual cognitions. Now the question is whether both the sense-organ and the object are to be treated as special instrumental causes (karaṇas). Since the conjunction (contact) which is the operation characterizes both the sense-organ and the object, both of them become operation – possessor (vyāpāravat). Hence both of them are to be treated as special instrumental causes. On this point the Nyāya philosophers would point out that being operation-possessor (vyāpāravat) is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for being a special instrumental cause. When the operation-possessor (vyāpāravat) is considered a cause by virtue of this relation only, then it is to be considered a special instrumental cause (karaṇa). In the case of perception the sense-organ is related to the locus of perception through this relation only. For this reason it is to be treated as a special instrumental cause (karaṇa). The object of perception is also characterized by the same contact, but it is not considered as a cause by virtue of this relation. Its causal role is to be explained by the relation of identity which is much simpler than the relation of operation. Hence on the ground of simplicity the sense-organ alone is considered the special instrumental cause (karaṇa).

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From our above discussion it follows that there are different types of relations between the sense-organs and the objects of perception. We have mentioned several types of relations, three of them relate our sense-organs to absences. But all of them are concerned with ordinary perceptual cognitions. C) Extraordinary Perceptual Cognition The Nyāya discussion of extraordinary perceptual cognition would also be relevant to Western philosophy. The Nyāya philosophers, by and large, have postulated three extraordinary relations3 for the explanation of certain types of perceptual cognitions. These relations are called ‘sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa’ (‘universal or cognition of universal as a relation’), ‘jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa’ (‘cognition as a relation’), and ‘yogaja sannikarṣa’ (‘the property produced by yoga as a relation’). In this paper I shall mention these relations as some of them suggest solutions to some problems of Western philosophy. (I) Sāmānyalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa: As regards the nature of sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa (universal or cognition of universal as a relation) there are two views in the Nyāya literature. (1) According to one of them the universal’s cognition or the cognized universal (jñātasāmānya) is the relation which relates our sense-organs to all its instances or loci, past, present and future. Here the word ‘universal’ (‘sāmānya’) signifies a property which has more than one locus. Hence not only class-characters (jātis) such as cowness but also physical objects such as a table are treated as universals. This conception of universal may be defined in the following way: x is a universal (sāmānya) Df (Ǝy) (Ǝz) (y is a locus of x and z is a locus of x). When our sense-organs are related to an object which is universal in the above sense through an ordinary perceptual relation, the universal’s cognition (or the cognized universal) serves as a relation. This relation relates our sense-organs to all the loci of that universal. When we perceive a cow, our visual sense-organs are related to the individual cow through light rays. For simplicity let us consider this relation to be a case of conjunction between our sense-organs and the cow. Since cowness inheres in a particular cow, our visual senseorgans are related to it through the complex relation of conjunction-cum-the converse of inherence. According to this view the universal’s cognition (or the cognized universal), not the cognition of the universal, relates our visual sense-organs to all the loci of cowness. This is how we can cognize all cows, past, present and future, as loci of cowness. In other words, all cows are presented under the mode of cowness. Similarly, when we cognize a table in a room through ordinary perceptual relation, all the loci of it (table) are also cognized through this table’s cognition (or cognized table). In this context it is to be noted that in a universal’s cognition (or cognized universal) the universal is the qualificand and the cognition is the qualifier. Since a qualified object is dependent upon its qualificand, there cannot be universal’s cognition if the universal which is the qualificand ceases to exist. In this context it is also to be noted that, in general, there cannot be a qualified object unless it is qualified by its qualifier which exists. But there are a few exceptions. The existence of an absence or a cognition does not depend upon the existence of its qualifier. It

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is to be noted that there cannot be the absence of a table in this room unless there is a table. But once an absence is produced, its existence does not depend upon its negatum. Hence the absence of table would exist even if there is no table anywhere. Since the negatum (pratiyogī) of an absence is its qualifier, the existence of this type of qualified object does not depend on the existence of its qualifier. Similarly, the existence of a cognition does not depend upon its object, which is its qualifier. But, in the case of universal’s cognition, the universal is the qualificand, not the qualifier of the cognition. Its existence is dependent upon the qualificand as well as upon the qualifier. Now let us consider an impermanent universal (anitya sāmānya) such as a table. When it ceases to exist, we cannot cognize its loci which were cognized when it existed. This is due to the fact that its cognition is the relation. Since this relation depends upon the existence of the table and the cognition of table’s loci depends upon this relation (i.e. the table’s cognition), we cannot cognize the loci of the table if the table ceases to exist. (2) In order to avoid this type of problem the cognition of a universal is considered as the relation. In this case the cognition is the qualificand and the universal is the qualifier.4 On this view the cognition of a universal exists even if the universal ceases to exist. Hence there will be the cognition of the table when the table no longer exists. This view has been interpreted in two ways. Let us discuss the difference between them. (2a) According to the followers of the Old Nyāya the cognition of the universal as a qualifier (sāmānya-prakāraka-jñāna) is the relation which relates our sense-organs to the loci of the universal. According to this view also our sense-organs must be related to the universal and its locus through ordinary perceptual relation. When we perceive a pot, our visual senseorgans are related to it by the relation of conjunction. Since potness resides in a pot by the relation of inherence, our visual sense-organs are related to it by the relation of conjunctioncum-the converse of inherence. Then we have a non-qualificative (nirvikalpaka) perception of the pot and the potness. In other words, the pot as such and the universal potness as such are cognized. After this cognition we have a qualificative (savikalpaka) cognition of a pot being qualified by potness. In this cognition the pot is the qualificand (viśeṣya) and the potness is the qualifier (prakāra). This cognition is followed by an extra-ordinary perception of all the pots which are loci of the universal potness. In this extraordinary perception the second term (pratiyogī) would be our visual sense-organs, the first term (anuyogī) all the loci of potness, but the special relation would be the cognition of potness as a qualifier. This cognition would also presuppose the ordinary relation of the visual sense-organs to the internal sense-organ called ‘manas’ and the relation of manas to the cognition of potness. But both the perceptual cognition of all the loci of potness and the cognition of potness as a relation are considered extraordinary (alaukika). This is due to the fact that the relations of ordinary perception cannot relate our sense-organs to innumerable particulars or all the loci of a universal. The Nyāya philosophers have also accepted an extraordinary perception of all the instances of a universal which resides in a mental state such as happiness. When we perceive all the instances of the universal happiness (sukhatva), our internal sense manas is related to them through the cognition of the universal happiness (sukhatva) as a qualifier. Similar is the case with respect to other types of mental states such as pain. (2b) But according to the followers of the New Nyāya the cognition of a universal (sāmānya-jñāna) itself is the relation which relates our sense-organs to the loci of the

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universal. It is claimed to be simpler than the view of the Old Nyāya philosophers. Let us explain why it is simpler than the view of the Old Nyāya in terms of our previous example of a pot. When we perceive a pot through an ordinary perceptual relation, our senseorgans such as eyes are related to the pot and the potness. Then we have a non-qualificative perception of the pot and the potness. After this perception we have an extraordinary perception of all the pots which are loci of potness. In this extraordinary perception the relation is the non-qualificative perceptual cognition of potness. The object of this nonqualificative cognition cannot be said to be either the qualificand or the qualifier. This follows from the very nature of a non-qualificative cognition. The qualificative cognition of the pot qualified by potness occurs after the non-qualificative cognition of the pot and the potness. Hence the cognition which occurs after the non-qualificative cognition is ordinary with respect to the perception of the particular pot, but extraordinary with respect to the perception of all other pots. As regards the relation, it is ordinary with respect to the particular pot, but extraordinary with respect to all other pots. Unlike the view of the Old Nyāya it does not presuppose two separate qualificative perceptual cognitions such that the extraordinary follows the ordinary. There is only one qualificative cognition which follows the non-qualificative cognition. For this reason it is claimed to be simpler than the view of the Old Nyāya philosophers. Now the question is: Why should we accept this type of extraordinary perceptual relation? In reply, the Nyāya philosophers have put forward the following arguments:5 (a) It is claimed that we cannot explain certain types of dubious cognition unless we postulate this type of relation. A dubious cognition has the form: Is x F or G?, where x is the property-possessor, F and G are incompatible properties. Hence G could be not F as well. A dubious cognition presupposes the non-dubious cognition of the property-possessor. Hence a person who doubts whether x is F or not F has the non-dubious cognition of x. Now the Nyāya philosophers claim that after having observed the co-presence of smoke and fire in a kitchen or hearth one may doubt whether all other smokes are accompanied by fire. Hence the doubt takes the form: Are all other smokes accompanied by fire or not? A doubt of this type presupposes the cognition of all the property-possessors. In this case it presupposes the cognition of all the instances of smokeness. Hence we cannot explain this type of doubt unless we postulate the cognition of the universal as a relation which relates our senses to all the loci or the instances of the universal. (b) Secondly, we require the cognition of the invariable concomitance of the probans (hetu) with the probandum (sādhya) for an inferential cognition (anumiti). Having observed the smoke on the mountain we infer the presence of fire on it. The cognition of smoke being pervaded by fire is the special instrumental cause (karaṇa) of this inferential cognition. The cognition of the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire presupposes the cognition of all the particular smokes and all the particular fires. If we postulate sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa (the cognition of universal as a relation), then we can explain the perception of all the smokes through the cognition of the universal smokeness and all the fires through the cognition of fireness.

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(c) Thirdly, the perception of a generic absence (sāmānyābhāva) cannot be explained unless we postulate sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa (the cognition of a universal as a relation). For example, the cognition of the absence of a cow presupposes the cognition of all the cows. In order to explain the possibility of the latter cognition the Nyāya claims that the cognition of cowness relates our perceptual sense-organs to all the cows which are loci of the universal cowness. (d) Similarly, the cognition of a not-yet type of absence cannot be explained unless we postulate sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa (the cognition of universal as a relation). Let us consider the cognition of the absence of a jar before its production. Since the jar has not yet been produced, we cannot have ordinary perception of it. Hence we have to postulate an extraordinary perception of it. The acceptance of sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa will explain how we can perceive this jar as well. Since we have perceived all the loci of jarness through the cognition of jarness, we have also perceived the negatum of this not-yet type of absence. (II) Jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa (cognition as a relation): As the postulation of sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa solves some of the problems of epistemology, so does the postulation of jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. Here the word ‘lakṣaṇa’ is used to emphasize the fact that the relation is of the nature of cognition. Hence in jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa the cognition itself is the relation which relates our sense-organs to its object. It has been postulated by the Nyāya philosophers to solve the following epistemic problems.6 (a) Sometimes we perceive the hardness of a wall or the softness of a flower without touching it. The hardness or the softness of an object is perceived through tactual sense-organ. Similarly, the smell of an object is to be perceived through olfactory sense-organ. But sometimes we perceive the smell of a sandalwood when we look at it from a distance. The Nyāya philosophers are trying to explain this type of perception in terms of jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. Let us suppose our visual perception of the hardness of the wall is true. The Nyāya philosophers claim that it presupposes our previous perception of the hardness of the wall through tactual sense-organ. When we look at a wall, our visual sense-organs are related to it. But our visual senses cannot be related to its hardness through ordinary perceptual relation. But in the case of a perceptual cognition our sense-organs are to be related to the qualificand as well as the qualifier of it. In this case our visual sense-organs are related through ordinary perceptual relation to the qualificand, but not to the qualifier. In order to relate our visual sense-organs to the qualifier the Nyāya philosophers have made the following suggestion: When the previous cognition of the instances of hardness is revived in the form of a memory-cognition, it would relate our visual sense-organs to the hardness of the wall. Since it is a case of true perceptual cognition, we have to cognize the hardness which belongs to this wall. The Nyāya philosophers explain this cognition in the following ways: (i) If we have cognized the hardness of this wall in the past through our tactual senses, then the memory-cognition of it would relate our visual sense-organs to the hardness which belongs to the same wall. Hence our visual sense-organs are

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related to the qualifier of perception through an extraordinary relation called ‘jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa’. (ii) Another alternative has been suggested to explain this type of perception if we have not cognized the hardness of this wall through an ordinary perceptual relation. This alternative presupposes sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa (the cognition of universal as a relation) by means of which our tactual sense-organs are related to all the instances of hardness. In other words, we have already cognized all the instances of hardness through the cognition of hardness. Hence we have also cognized the hardness which belongs to this wall. The cognition of the hardness which belongs to this wall is the relation which relates our visual sense-organs to the hardness of the wall. If the cognition of some other hardness is the relation, then we attribute the hardness which does not belong to this wall. If it were so, our cognition of the hardness of the wall would be false. Since we have considered our cognition to be true, this possibility is to be ruled out. Therefore, the hardness which belongs to the wall has been cognized. This alternative presupposes both sāmānyalakṣaṇa and jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. (b) Secondly, it is used for the explanation of certain types of perceptual errors. Suppose our perceptual cognition of the table being red is false. According to the Nyāya this presupposes the cognition of the table, a red colour and the relation of inherence which relates a quality to a substance. Since the cognition is false, the table lacks red colour. Hence the red colour which has been cognized in this case does not belong to this table. But it has been cognized elsewhere or elsewhen. The mental disposition (saṃskāra) of the previous cognition of a red colour is revived, and the memory-cognition of it is the relation which relates the visual sense-organs to the red colour. The red colour which has been cognized elsewhere or elsewhen is being cognized in the table. Hence jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa (cognition as a relation) is required to relate our visual sense-organs to the red colour cognized in the past. In this context it is to be noted that the Nyāya philosophers have discussed several types of erroneous cognitions, but only one type of perceptual erroneous cognition requires jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. Let us briefly mention the Nyāya classification of erroneous cognitions. First of all, they are divided into two types, namely, errors of apprehension (anubhavātmaka-bhrama) and errors of memory-cognition (smṛtyātmaka-bhrama). Errors of apprehension have been classified into four types, namely, perceptual (pratyakṣātmaka), inferential (anumityātmaka), analogical (upamityātmaka) and verbal (śābdātmaka). This classification is based on the fact that according to the Nyāya perception, inference, analogy and testimony are sources of valid or true cognition. As regards memory-cognition, the Nyāya claims that it is reproductive, not a source of true cognition. Hence if a memorycognition of a is F is true, then there is a true cognition of apprehension. In other words, the true cognitions of a is F is derived from perception, inference, analogy, or testimony. Similarly, if the memory-cognition of a is F is false, then it is derived from perception, inference, analogy, or testimony. Again, the errors of perceptual cognition are divided into two types. If a perceptual erroneous cognition does not depend upon external sense-organs, then it depends upon

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internal or mental sense (manas). In order to emphasize the dependence upon the mental sense (manas) it may be called ‘mental perceptual erroneous cognition’. In this case a may be cognized as F even if a has not been cognized as F in ordinary perceptual, inferential, analogical, or verbal cognition. For example, in dream or in a deliberate cognition of the contradictory (āhāryajñāna) a may be cognized as F. If a perceptual erroneous cognition is dependent upon external sense-organs such as eyes or touch, then it may be called ‘external perceptual erroneous cognition’. Most of our perceptual errors would come under this category. Again, it has been divided into two types, namely, qualified (aupādhika) and non-qualified (anaupādhika). If our senses are related to both a (locus, adhiṣṭhana) and F (superimposed, āropya) through ordinary relations, then it is called ‘qualified error’ (‘aupādhika-bhrama’). On the contrary, if our senses are related to a through ordinary relations but to F through an extraordinary relation, then it is called ‘non-qualified error’ (‘anaupādhika-bhrama’). For example, the perception of a snake in a rope, or the perception of a silver in a mother-of-pearl. But the perception of the moon in water or the perception of one’s own face in a mirror is a case of qualified external perceptual error. When we perceive the moon in the water, our external senses are related to both the reflection of the moon and the moon through ordinary relations, although directly to the reflection and indirectly to the moon. Similarly, when one perceives one’s own face in a mirror, one is directly related to the reflection of the face but indirectly to the face. In the case of any error of reflection, our senses are related to the reflection directly, but to the thing reflected indirectly or via the reflection, although both of them are ordinary relations. The perception of bentness of a straight stick half merged in water may also be interpreted as an error of reflection. The bentness is due to reflection, which does not belong to the stick, although our senses are related to it. Since our senses are related to both the stick and the reflection of bentness, which is imposed upon it, through ordinary relations, this type of erroneous cognition may also be treated as qualified external perceptual error. If a bent stick is half merged in water, then it would look more bent than it is. Hence here also both the reflection of bentness and the bent stick are related to our sense-organs through ordinary relations. In addition to errors of reflection, there are certain other types of qualified perceptual errors. For example, the taste of molasses as bitter. If it is due to some defect in our bile, then the bitter taste of it is imposed upon the molasses. Here also our senses are related to both the molasses and the bitterness imposed upon it through ordinary relations. Hence in the case of any qualified external perceptual error our senses are related to both the locus and the imposed entity through ordinary relations. But in the case of a non-qualified external perceptual error our senses are related to the locus through ordinary relation, but to the imposed entity through extraordinary relation. For this reason the Nyāya philosophers have postulated jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa (cognition as a relation) which relates our senses to the thing imposed upon the locus of error. In the case of perception of a rope as a snake, our external senses are related to the rope through ordinary relation (laukika-sannikarṣa), but not to the snake through ordinary relation. The postulation of jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa explains how our senses are related to the elsewhere or elsewhen snake through an extraordinary relation. The Nyāya classification of erroneous cognitions mentioned above may be represented by the following diagram:

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(c) Thirdly, jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa is necessary for the explanation of recognition (pratyabhijñā). Consider the cognition of This is that Tom. In this cognition the person Tom is characterized by the property of being this (idantā) and by the property of being that (tattā). The property of being this signifies presentness and being in front of the cognizer. The visual sense-organs of the perceiver are related to Tom as well as these properties of Tom through ordinary perceptual relations. But the property of being that (tattā) signifies the property of being present at some past time or at a different place. The visual sense-organs of the cognizer cannot be related to these properties through ordinary perceptual relations. But the Nyāya philosophers claim that our sense-organs are related to the elsewhere or elsewhen Tom through the memory-cognition of Tom. Hence it presupposes a previous cognition of Tom. In this context it is to be noted that pastness in Tom will be cognized when we are aware of the temporal difference between the memory-cognition and the previous cognition of Tom. Therefore, jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa is required for the attribution of pastness or elsewhereness to Tom, although Tom is related to the perceiver through ordinary perceptual relation. (d) Fourthly, in order to explain a higher order cognition (anuvyavasāya) the Nyāya postulates jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. Let us consider a second order cognition. The object of it is both the first order cognition and the object of the latter cognition. Since a higher order cognition is a mental perception, the mental (internal) senseorgan (manas) must be related to both the objects of a higher order cognition. Consider the cognition of the cognition of a table. The mental (internal) sense is the special instrumental cause (karaṇa) of a higher order cognition. The relation of the internal sense to the object of a higher order cognition is the operation of it. Hence the manas must be related to both the cognition of the table and the table. The internal sense manas is related to the cognition of the table through the relation of conjunction-cum-the converse of inherence. In other words, the manas is related to self (soul) through the relation of conjunction and the self

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(soul) is related to the cognition of the table through the converse of inherence relation. Now the question is: How can manas be related to the table which is an external object? In order to answer this question the Nyāya postulates jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. In this case the cognition of the table itself becomes the relation and the object of this cognition becomes one of the relata of this relation. Hence the manas is related to the table through the relation of conjunction-cum the converse of inherence-cum the property being the object of the cognition of the table. Hence the internal sense manas is related to the cognition of the table through an ordinary relation, but to the table through an extraordinary relation. In this context it is to be noted that jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa need not always be a memory-cognition. In the case of a higher order cognition the lower order cognition itself, not its memory, is the relation. For this reason the cognition of the table itself becomes the relation. Moreover, the object which is one of the relata of this relation becomes its qualifier. Hence the table becomes the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) of the cognition of the table which is the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) of the second order cognition. This is how the table becomes the qualifier of the qualifier of the second order cognition of the table. (e) Fifthly, jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa is necessary for the perception of any absence. Consider the absence of a cat in this room. In the perception of this absence, our visual sense-organs are related to the room through the relation of conjunction. Since the absence characterizes the room, our visual sense-organs are related to it by the relation of conjunction-cum-the property of being the qualifier (saṃjuktaviśeṣaṇatā). Since a cat is the qualifier of this absence, our visual sense-organs must be related to it as well. But our visual senses cannot be related to a cat as it is opposed to the absence of a cat. In other words, if there is the absence of a cat, then there cannot be a cat in the same locus by the same relation, and vice versa. For this reason our visual sense-organs cannot be related to a cat through an ordinary perceptual relation, although a cat is a qualifier of the absence of a cat. In this context it is to be noted that the relation of an absence to its negatum is called ‘pratiyogitā’ (‘the property of being the second term or negatum’). But the relation of the locus of an absence to the absence is called ‘viśeṣaṇatā’ (‘the property of being the qualifier’), although both the absence and the negatum are qualifiers. In order to distinguish the negatum from other qualifiers of an absence such as the property of being the occurrent on the floor (bhūtalavṛttitva) the Nyāya philosophers have used the term ‘pratiyogī’. Hence the relation of the absence of a cat to the property of being the occurrent on the floor is called ‘viśeṣaṇatā’ (‘the property of being the qualifier’) and the converse relation is called ‘viśeṣyatā’ (‘the property of being the qualificand’), but the relation of the absence of a cat to a cat is called ‘pratiyogitā’ (‘the property of the negatum or the second term’) and the converse relation is called ‘anuyogitā’ (‘the property of being the first term’). Now the question is: How can our visual sense-organs be related to a cat which is a qualifier of the absence of a cat? The Nyāya philosophers have answered this question by postulating jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. The memory-cognition of a cat relates our visual sense-organs

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to a cat. Hence our visual senses are related to the absence of a cat through an ordinary relation, but to a cat through an extraordinary relation. From the above arguments it follows that we cannot explain the perceptual nature of certain cognitions unless we postulate jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa (cognition as relation). As regards the relation between sāmānyalakṣaṇa and jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa, the Nyāya philosophers would emphasize the following points:7 (i) First of all, one cannot be reduced to the other. The sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa is required for the cognition of all the loci of a universal. The cognition of a universal relates our sense organs, internal or external, to all the loci of it. But jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa is required for relating our sense-organs, internal or external, to the object of a cognition, not to the locus or the loci of this object. Since they perform different functions, one cannot be reduced to the other. (ii) Secondly, in general, the jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa is a memory-cognition. Only in the case of anuvyavasāya (cognition of cognition) it may not be a memorycognition. This is due to the fact that the object of anuvyavasāya becomes the jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. Since the object of anuvyavasāya could be any type of qualificative cognition, jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa may not always be a memorycognition. It may be a cognition of apprehension (anubhavātmaka-jñāna). But in the case of sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa all the loci of a universal are cognized when we cognize the universal. Hence the memory-cognition of a universal is not necessary for the cognition of its loci. (iii) Thirdly, in the case of jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa the object of cognition which is the first term of this relation becomes the qualifier, not the qualificand, of the cognition which is due to this relation. In the case of a true visual cognition of the wall being hard, our visual sense-organs are related to the hardness of the wall through the cognition of this hardness, and it becomes the qualifier of the wall. In the case of non-qualified perceptual erroneous cognition also the object to which our senses are related by jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa becomes the qualifier of the locus of illusion. Hence, in the case of the false cognition of the table being red, the red colour which is the first term of the jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa becomes the qualifier of the table. Our visual senses are related to the table through an ordinary relation but to the elsewhere or elsewhen red colour through a complex relation which includes jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. This relation consists of the following four relations: the relation of our visual senses to the manas by the relation of conjunction, the relation of manas to the self by the relation of conjunction, the relation of the self to the cognition of a red colour by the converse of inherence relation, and the relation of this cognition to the elsewhere or elsewhen red colour through the property of being the object of this cognition. Similarly, in the case of recognition the property of being elsewhere or pastness which is the first term of jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa becomes the qualifier of the qualificand of recognition. In the case of a higher order cognition the lower order cognition becomes the relation which relates our internal sense manas to its object. In this case the lower order cognition becomes the qualifier of the higher order cognition, and the object of

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the lower order cognition becomes its qualifier. Hence the object becomes the qualifier of the qualifier of the higher order cognition. Therefore, the first term of the jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa becomes the qualifier of the cognition which is due to this relation. On the contrary, the first term of the sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa is not a qualifier in the cognition which is due to this relation. The cognition which is due to this relation is of the loci of the universal. In this cognition the loci are qualificands. This is how we can draw the difference between these two types of extraordinary relations. (III) The third type of extraordinary perceptual relations is called ‘yogaja sannikarṣa’ (‘the property produced by yoga as a relation’).8 It is claimed that the yogīs can perceive past, present, future, or distant objects. They can also perceive things which are not amenable to our senses (atīndriya). In order to explain the extraordinary nature of this type of perception most of the systems of Indian philosophy, including the Nyāya, have postulated an extraordinary relation. Yogaja is a type of property which is produced in the self of a yogī. This property is due to yogic practice. It serves as a relation which relates the sense-organs of a yogī to past, present, future, or distant objects. From the above discussion it follows that the Nyāya philosophers have accepted three types of extraordinary relations between our sense-organs and objects in order to explain the nature of certain types of perceptual cognitions. These relations are operations (vyāpāras) of extraordinary perceptions, and the sense-organs which are related to objects through these relations are considered special instrumental causes (karaṇas) of these perceptions. From our discussion of sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa and jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa it follows that the Nyāya philosophers can explain the perceptual nature of certain cognitions which cannot be explained in terms of ordinary relations. Hence the Nyāya discussion of extraordinary perception would add a new dimension to Western philosophy. D) Qualificative and non-qualificative cognition (savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka jñāna) The Nyāya distinction between qualificative and non-qualificative cognition would also throw some light on contemporary epistemology as some philosophers have used Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. This distinction is analogous to the distinction between knowing things and knowing about things. Russell has introduced this to explain the difference between our knowledge of sense-data and that of physical objects, among many other things. The knowledge by acquaintance is a direct awareness of an entity, without any process of inference or knowledge of truths. According to Russell, in the presence of my table I am directly aware of its colour, shape, size, etc., but not the table. As he says: The table is ‘the physical object which causes such-and-such sense-data’. This describes the table by means of the sense-data. In order to know anything at all about the table, we must know truths connecting with things with which we have acquaintance: we must know that ‘such-and-such sense-data are caused by a physical object’. There is no state of mind in which we are directly aware of the table; all our knowledge of the table is really knowledge of truths, and the actual which is the table is not, strictly speaking, known to us at all.9

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From this remark it follows that our knowledge of sense-data is knowledge by acquaintance, while our knowledge of the table is knowledge by description. Since we are not directly acquainted with the table, our knowledge of the table is indirect and hence inferential. Since the public or the physical objects are not amenable to our senses, Russell’s theory has paved the way for scepticism or phenomenalism. Moreover, this theory would lead to private language as the objects of acquaintance are not public. But there is no such problem in the Nyāya conception of non-qualificative perception. The contents of non-qualificative cognition are public objects, such as a chair or a table, not something private. Moreover, the Nyāya philosophers do not postulate sense-data for the explanation of our perception of physical objects. According to the Nyāya, the possibility of qualificative perception cannot be explained without postulating non-qualificative perception. Let us consider the qualificative perception of a table, which is atomic in nature. In this cognition there are three elements, viz., a particular table which is a substance, tableness, and the relation of inherence. Since the perceptual cognition of a relation presupposes the cognition of its relata, the cognition of the inherence relation in this case presupposes the cognition of both a particular table and tableness. Hence they are cognized in a nonqualificative perceptual cognition.

i) It is to be noted that only the qualificand and the qualifier of an atomic qualificative cognition are cognized in a non-qualificative perceptual cognition, but not as a qualificand or as a qualifier. They are cognized as such, without any mode of presentation. Since a qualificative cognition presupposes the cognition of the ultimate qualificand and qualifier, the Nyāya postulates the non-qualificative cognition in which these elements are cognized as such.

ii) The objects of a non-qualificative cognition cannot be cognized by expressions. In other words, a non-qualificative cognition cannot be generated by an expression. For example, the expression ‘a table’ or simply ‘table’ will not generate a cognition of a table which is not qualified by a property. Similarly, the word ‘tableness’ will not generate simply the cognition of tableness. According to the Nyāya philosophers the word ‘table’ will generate the cognition of a table presented under the mode of tableness. Similarly, the word ‘tableness’ will generate the cognition of tableness presented under the mode of the property of being present in each and every table and not in anything but a table. In other words, it is something which is present in tables and tables only. Hence the cognition generated by an expression will not be the same as a non-qualificative cognition. This is due to the fact that the former will contain a qualificand–qualifier relation, but not the latter. iii) As regards the validity (pramātva) or the truth of a non-qualificative cognition, the Navya-Nyāya philosophers claim that it is neither valid nor invalid. This is due to the fact that both valid and invalid cognitions presuppose qualificand–qualifier relations. Since there is no qualificand–qualifier relation in a non-qualificative cognition, it is outside the scope of both validity and invalidity. iv) A non-qualificative cognition is always perceptual. It cannot be inferential, analogical, or verbal. Since it is a cause of our perceptual qualificative cognition, it is always immediately prior to a perceptual qualificative cognition. When an

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external sense-organ is related to its objects, the initial cognition which is due to this contact is non-qualificative. Thereafter a qualificative cognition is generated.

v) As regards the relation of a non-qualificative cognition to its object, the Nyāya claims that it cannot be any of the relations present in a qualificative cognition. Since relations such as the property of being the qualificand (viśeṣyatā), the property of being the qualifier (viśeṣanatā), and the property of being the relation (saṃsargatā) are present in a qualificative cognition, none of them can hold good in a non-qualificative cognition. Hence we can simply say the relation of a nonqualificative cognition to its object is different from those which are present in a qualificative cognition.

vi) Since it has been postulated to give an account of qualificative perceptual cognition, it is also considered as perceptual in character, not inferential, analogical, or verbal. The objects of non-qualificative cognition are cognized as being related in a qualificative perceptual cognition. Hence the objects of nonqualificative perception are public, not private sense-data. From the above discussion it follows that the Nyāya concept of non-qualificative perception does not lead to relativism or phenomenalism. Therefore, the problems of Russell do not arise in the Nyāya philosophy, although the Nyāya postulates the non-qualificative cognition to give an account of our qualificative cognition.

SECTION TWO: INFERENCE An inference, according to the Nyāya, involves three terms, viz., sādhya, pakṣa (locus of inference), and hetu. These terms may be simple or complex, empty or non-empty. The term ‘sādhya’ refers to what is to be inferred. In other words, it refers to the predicate of the inferential cognition, which corresponds to the conclusion of an inference. The term ‘pakṣa‘ refers to the locus of an inference where there is some doubt about the presence of the sādhya (sandigdha-sādhyavān pakṣaḥ). Since the pakṣa has pakṣatā (a special relational property of the pakṣa, which is due to its relationship to a dubious cognition), the term ‘pakṣatā’ signifies some doubt about the presence of the sādhya in the locus of inference. The term ‘hetu’ (or ‘liṅga’) refers to the reason by means of which the sādhya is inferred in the pakṣa. The validity of an inference depends on certain characteristics of the hetu. Since the terms ‘sādhya’ and ‘hetu’ are usually translated as ‘probandum’ and ‘probans’ respectively, I shall follow this convention. A) Causal Conditions of an Inferential Cognition An inference, according to the Nyāya, is a cognition, which results from certain other cognitions.10 Hence it may be defined in terms of its causal conditions. Since an inferential cognition is a quality of the cognizer, it inheres in the self of the cognizer. Hence the cognizer is the inherent cause (samavāyī-kāraṇa) of an inferential cognition. Since in the Nyāya system cognition is due to the contact of the mental sense-organ (manas) with the self, the contact (i.e. the relation of conjunction) is the similar-to-inherent cause (asamavāyīkāraṇa) of an inferential cognition.

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In addition to these two types of causal conditions, an inferential cognition has certain instrumental causal conditions (nimitta-kāraṇas) such as parāmarśa (operation), vyāptijñāna (the cognition of invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum), and pakṣatā (a special relational property of the locus). An inferential cognition is usually defined in terms of parāmarśa (operation) and pakṣatā (a special relational property of the locus). Parāmarśa (operation) is defined as the cognition of the presence of the probans pervaded by the probandum in the locus of the inference. It has the form: a has F which is pervaded by G, where a is the locus of inference, F is the probans and G is the probandum. Hence it presupposes the cognition of the invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum. Pakṣatā refers to certain epistemic attitude of the cognizer towards the probandum. The ancient Nyāya defines pakṣatā as doubt about the presence of the probandum (sādhyasaṃśaya) in the locus of inference (pakṣa). But this definition is not acceptable to the modern Nyāya (Navya-Nyāya) philosophers, as the desire to infer leads to inferential cognition even if there is no doubt about the presence of the probandum in the locus. Hence the Navya-Nyāya philosophers define it as the absence of certainty about the probandum in the locus qualified by the absence of desire to infer (siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣṭa-siddhyabhāva pakṣtā). This definition may be explained in terms of the following disjunction: There is absence of certainty about the probandum in the locus or there is desire to infer the probandum in the locus. Hence this definition rules out the possibility of inferential cognition in a cognizer in the presence of parāmarśa (operation) if the cognizer is certain about the presence of the probandum in the locus and there is no desire to infer the probandum in the locus. In this context it is to be noted that this explanation cannot be identified with the definition of ‘pakṣatā’, although they are equivalent. If this explanation is equated with the definition of ‘pakṣatā’, then it would violate the law of parsimony, as the former is simpler than the latter. This is due to the fact that the latter would refer to innumerable differences which would qualify the desire to infer and the absence of certainty. This is involved in the meaning of ‘one or the other’ (‘anyatara’), which will occur in the latter definition of ‘pakṣatā’. Since these innumerable differences (e.g. difference from a table, difference from a chair, etc.) are limitors of the property of being the cause (kāraṇatāvacchedaka), this definition would violate the law of parsimony. Moreover, it would be difficult to know so many differences residing in both the alternatives, viz., absence of certainty and the desire to infer. For this reason the above explanation should not be taken as the definition of ‘pakṣatā’. The above definition does not violate the law of parsimony as it is stated in terms of the negation of a qualified entity. It has the form ~(a qualified by F), where ‘~’ stands for absence, ‘a’ for certainty about the probandum in the locus of inference, and ‘F’ for absence of desire to infer. Since this formulation does not refer to the expression ‘one or the other’, it has no reference to innumerable differences. From the above discussion of pakṣatā it follows that a dubious mental state or a desire to infer, or simply absence of certainty is related to pakṣa (the locus of inference). Therefore, when we say that pakṣa has pakṣatā what we mean is that an attitude of doubt or a desire to infer is directed towards the pakṣa (the locus of inference).

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B) Types of Inference for Others The Nyāya philosophers have classified inferences into three types depending upon the nature of the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) of the probans with the probandum. Again the probantia (hetus) have been divided into three types depending upon the nature of the invariable concomitance. If the rule of invariable concomitance used in an inference takes the form of agreement in presence of the probans with the probandum, then the inference is called ‘anvayī’ (‘agreement in presence’). If this rule takes the form of agreement in absence, then the inference is called ‘vyatirekī’ (‘agreement in absence’). And if the rule takes both the forms, then the inference is called ‘anvaya-vyatirekī’ (‘agreement in presence and absence’). Similarly, the probantia involved in these inferences are divided into three types. The inferences for others would take the following forms if ‘p’ stands for the locus, ‘h’ for the probans and ‘s’ for the probandum. (a) Agreement in presence type of inference: (1) p has s.

(2) Because of h.



(3) Wherever there is h, there is s, and an example in favour of this rule.

(4) p has h which is pervaded by s (or, h which is present in, or related to, p is pervaded by s).

(5) Therefore, p has s (or, s is present in p).

(b) Agreement in absence type of inference: (1) p has s.

(2) Because of h.



(3) Wherever there is absence of s, there is absence of h, and an example in favour of this rule.

(4) p has h which is the negatum of the absence which is the pervader of the absence of s.

(5) Therefore, p has s (or, s is present in p)

(c) The third type of inference is a combination of (a) and (b). It refers to both the types of invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum. Let us mention the usual example of the Nyāya philosophers which comes under the category (c). The hill has a fire. Because of smoke. Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, such as a kitchen, etc.; and wherever there is absence of fire, there is absence of smoke, such as a lake, etc. The hill has smoke which is pervaded by fire; or the hill has smoke which is the negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of fire. Therefore, the hill has a fire. If the rule of invariable concomitance is of the agreement in presence type only, then the inference is called ‘kavalānvayī-anumāna’ (‘agreement in presence type of inference

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only’). The probans of this type of inference is called ‘kevalānvayī-hetu’ (‘agreement in presence type of probans only’). If the rule of invariable concomitance is of the agreement in absence type only, then the inference is called ‘kevalavyatirekī-anumāna’ (‘agreement in absence type of inference only’). The probans of this type of inference is called ‘kevalavyatirekī-hetu’ (‘agreement in absence type of probans only’). In the case of inference for oneself all the premises in (a) or (b) are not needed. What we need is the parāmarśa i.e. the fourth member in our above formulation of (a) or (b) provided pakṣatā is present. In our above example what is needed is ‘The hill has smoke which is pervaded by fire’. Therefore, it requires the premise of the form: p has h which is pervaded by s. C) Valid and Invalid Inferences Now let us discuss the Nyāya distinction between valid and invalid (or fallacious) inferences.11 If the inference is of the agreement in presence and agreement in absence type (anvyavyatirekī-anumāna), and it is used to generate the inferential cognition (anumiti) in others, then it is expressed by the following form: Thesis (pratijñā): a is G. Reason (hetu): Because of F. Example (udāharaṇa): Wherever there is F, there is G, as in b, etc; and wherever there is absence of G, there is absence of F, as in c, etc. Application (upanaya): a has F which is pervaded by G; or a has F which is the counterpositive (i.e. negatum) of the absence which pervades the absence of G. Conclusion (nigamana): Hence a is G, or G is present in a, where a is the locus of the inference (pakṣa), F is the probans, G is the probandum, b is the locus where G is known to be present (sapakṣa), and c is the locus where the absence of G is known to be present (vipakṣa). According to the Nyāya each of the sentences in an inference for others is an answer to a question and each of them except the last one will give rise to a question. Moreover, each of them is used to generate cognition in the hearer. Since a self-contradictory sentence such as ‘a is both G and not G’ cannot generate a cognition, it cannot be used either as a premise or conclusion of an inference. If the inference (not the inferential cognition) is valid (nyāya), then all the sentences must be true and the conclusion will follow from the premise or the premises. In other words, there is no true preventer cognition. Hence the application (upanaya-vākya), which represents the operation (vyāpāra) of an inferential cognition (anumiti), will entail the conclusion. Invalid inferences (nyāyābhāsas) are divided into two types. One type of invalid inference contains a false premise or premises, but the other type does not contain any false premise. Hence the former may be called ‘logically invalid’ and the latter ‘epistemically invalid’, although the Nyāya uses the word `nitya’ (‘permanent’) for the former type of invalidity and `anitya’ (‘impermanent’) for the latter type of invalidity. Hence the truth of the premises and the conclusion is not sufficient to define the validity of an inference. But

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any inference, valid or invalid, must satisfy the relevance condition.12 If there is no relevance between the two sentences, then no inference arises. This point also is very important for understanding the difference between the Western and the Indian concept of inference. In an inference for others, all the five sentences are needed, because each of them is an answer to a different question and gives some new information. But in an inference for oneself all of them are not required and there is no need to use a sentence. Hence a deaf and a mute person can also have an inferential cognition. What is required is the operation (parāmarśa), which corresponds to the application in our above example and the cognitions that will give rise to this operation. In our above example, the thesis (pratijñā-vākya) is an answer to the question what is to be established in a (pakṣa). a is usually considered as something where there is doubt about the presence of the probandum. The reason (hetu-vākya) is an answer to the question what signifies the probandum. Hence it states that the probans signifies the probandum. The signifier-significate (jñāpya-jñāpaka) relation holds between the objects of two cognitions. The cognition of the signifier (jñāpaka) gives rise to the cognition of the significate (jñāpya). The reason does not state that the locus a (pakṣa) is characterized by the probans. If it is stated as a is F, then one of the premises would be superfluous. Now it may be asked, why should we consider the probans as the signifier? The answer is given by stating a rule (vyāpti) along with some examples which give rise to the cognition of the invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum (vyāpti-jñāna). For this reason the third step is called ‘example’. Both the examples of agreement in presence and agreement in absence are to be stated in support of this rule of invariable concomitance. The observation of the presence of the probans and the probandum in some loci and the non-observance of the presence of the probans and the absence of the probandum in some other loci are required for the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. The rule takes the form of a universal sentence that can be stated as: (x) (If F x, then G x). As regards the range of the variable x, the Nyāya claims that all the loci including a in our above example will come under its range, but the cognition of this rule does not entail the cognition of a qualified by a unique mode of presentation. Hence a (i.e. pakṣa) is known as something different from b (i.e. sapakṣa ) and we know that if it has F, then it has G. Therefore, in order to avoid the inferential circularity (siddha-sādhana), the Nyāya claims that the cognition of the rule does not entail the cognition of the inferential locus qualified by F and G, although the cognition of the rule rests upon the cognition of some of the instances of the rule.13 According to another interpretation, the sentence ‘Wherever there is F, there is G’ simply states the pervader - pervaded relations between F and G. It does not refer to any instances or loci of these properties. Hence the rule by itself does not refer to a, b, or c in our above example. But the cognition of the rule, according to both the interpretations, presupposes the observation of the presence of the probans and the probandum in the same loci and the non-observation of the probans in a locus, which is characterized by the absence of the probandum. If the cognition of the rule is true, then F is pervaded by G. In other words, F has the property of being pervaded by G.

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The application (upanaya-vākya) is an answer to the question whether a (i.e. pakṣa) is characterized by this type of F. Since the reason does not state that a is characterized by F, the application gives us some new information about a. The reason simply states that F is the signifier of G. Hence the application gives us some new information, which is not already contained in the previous sentences. The conclusion (nigamana-vākya) is an answer to the question whether the probandum which is the significate of that type of probans is in a. Hence it is an answer to the question whether G which is the significate of F which is pervaded by G is present in a. The difference between the thesis and the conclusion lies in the fact that the thesis simply states what is to be established in the locus, but the conclusion states how it is to be established in the locus. The word ‘hence’ or its synonym in the conclusion means ‘the significate of the cognition of the probans’. Hence the conclusion (nigamana-vākya) means that G which is the significate of F, which is pervaded by G and is in a, is present in a. Here the new information lies in the fact that G is the significate of that type of F. This is how the Nyāya philosophers would explain the difference between the thesis and the conclusion. Since each of the members in an inference is related by the relation of relevance, an inference, valid or invalid, is considered a large sentence (mahāvākya).14 As regards the utility of operation (parāmarśa) which is expressed by application there is some difference of opinion among the different schools of Indian philosophy. The Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta philosophers claim that there is no need to accept operation (parāmarśa) as distinct from the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus (pakṣa-dharmatā-jñāna) and the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance (vyāpti-jñāna) for the inferential cognition. Hence the inferential cognition of the mountain has fire is causally dependent upon the cognitions of wherever there is smoke there is fire and the mountain has smoke. Now the Nyāya philosophers claim that if the above view is tenable, then there is no difference between the following two inferences as both of them equally satisfy the above two conditions of an inference. (a) Wherever there is smoke, there is fire. The mountain has smoke. Therefore, the mountain has fire. (b) Wherever there is smoke, there is fire. The mountain has light. Therefore, the mountain has fire. In this context it is to be noted that both smoke and light are pervaded by fire. Hence both the inferences contain the rule of invariable concomitance and the presence of the probans in the locus. But in (b) the inferential cognition will not be generated by these two conditions alone. In response to this objection the followers of the Mīmāṃsā claim that if the mode of presentation of the probans which resides in the locus is the same as the limitor of the property of being pervaded (vyāpyatāvacchedaka), then these two conditions will yield the inferential cognition. In (a) smokeness is both the limitor of the property of being the probans (hetutāvacchedaka) and the limitor of the property of being the pervaded (vyāpyatāvacchedaka). But in (b) lightness is the limitor of the property of being the probans and smokeness is the limitor of the property of being the pervaded. For this rea-

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son the cognition of the mountain has fire will not be generated by the cognitions of the presence of the probans in the locus and the rule of invariable concomitance. Now the Nyāya philosophers raise another objection against this view. Suppose John has the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus, Tom has the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance, and the limitor of the property of being the probans cognized by John is the same as the limitor of the property of being the pervaded cognized by Tom. Since all the conditions are satisfied, the inferential cognition will be generated either in John or in Tom. But this does not happen. Hence some additional conditions are needed in support of the view of the Mīmāṃsā. On this point the supporters of the Mīmāṃsā claim that if a person has cognized the limitor of the property of being the probans in the way he/she has cognized the limitor of the property of being the pervaded, then he/she will have the inferential cognition. Hence the above counterexample does not refute the view of the Mīmāṃsā. Now the Nyāya philosophers raise another objection. It is claimed that the explanation of the Mīmāṃsā goes against the law of parsimony in two ways. First, the causal explanation has reference to persons. Second, since persons are different, the causes of the inferential cognitions would also be different. Hence the instances of the causal law would take the following form: If x cognizes p and q, then x cognizes r, If y cognizes p and q, then y cognizes r, and so on. But the causal explanation offered by the Nyāya philosophers does not have any reference to a person. It simply states that the operation (parāmarśa) will yield the inferential cognition. In other words, the cognition of a is F pervaded by G will generate the cognition of a is G. Hence the causal explanation of the Nyāya is simpler than that of the Mīmāṃsā. Moreover, the Nyāya claims that the inferential cognition may be due to the cognition of the locus characterized by something, which is pervaded by the probandum (sādhyavyāpyavāna-pakṣaḥ). Hence the cognition of (Ǝx) (a has x which is pervaded by G) will yield the inferential cognition a is G. In other words, the cognition of any specific probans is not needed for an inferential cognition. If the Mīmāṃsā philosophers accept it also as a causal condition for an inferential cognition, then they have to accept two separate sets of causal conditions for the same inferential cognition. One of them will be the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus and the cognition of the rule of the invariable concomitance, and the other one will be the cognition of the locus characterized by something, which is pervaded by the probandum. But the Nyāya philosophers accept only one type of causal condition for an inferential cognition. What is required for an inferential cognition is the cognition of the locus, which has a property which is characterized by the property of being the pervaded (vyāpti-prakāraka-pakṣadharmatā-jñāna). In our above two inferences, the operation ‘the mountain has smoke which is pervaded by fire’ and the operation ‘the mountain has light which is pervaded by fire’ satisfy the causal condition of the inferential cognition. Hence either of the operations will yield the inferential cognition ‘the mountain has fire’. Moreover, the more generic cognition of the mountain has something which is pervaded by fire also satisfies the above definition of the causal condition for the inferential cognition. Hence it also yields the inferential cognition ‘the mountain has fire’.

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As regards the nature of the operation, which is a cognition, the Nyāya claims that there are different types depending on the source of its origin. It could be perceptual or inferential. In other words, it is derived from perception if the probans is perceived in the locus of the inference. It will be inferential if it is cognized as a conclusion of another inference. Moreover, an operation (parāmarśa) may be due to a mental disposition (saṃskāra), and thereby it will be a type of memory-cognition. Again, it may be generated by verbal testimony. Hence it may be a case of verbal cognition as well.15 As regards the form of an operation, the Nyāya accepts four types, if the probans is mentioned. As there are two types of rule of invariable concomitance, namely, agreement in presence (anvaya-vyāpti) and agreement in absence (vyatireka-vyāpti), so there are two types of operation, namely, agreement in presence (anvayī-parāmarśa) and agreement in absence (vyatirekī-parāmarśa). Again, each of them may take two different forms at cognitive level. In one case the locus of inference becomes the qualificand, as in the cognition of the mountain has smoke, which is pervaded by fire. In another case, the pervaded becomes the qualificand, as in the cognition of the smoke, which is pervaded by fire, is on the mountain. Similarly, the agreement in absence type of operation has two forms. In one case the locus of inference becomes the qualificand, as in the cognition of the mountain has smoke which is the negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of fire. In another case the pervaded becomes the qualificand, as in the cognition of smoke which is the negatum of the absence, which pervades the absence of fire, is on the mountain. The Nyāya has also discussed whether the two types of inferential cognition, namely, a is G and G is in a, are derivable from different types of operation. Here we come across two different views: (I) According to some Nyāya philosophers both the types of inferential cognition are derivable from any of the following four types of operation: (i) a is F which is pervaded by G. Since the locus is the qualificand in this cognition, it is called ‘locus-qualificand type of agreement in presence operation’ (‘pakṣa –viśeṣyaka-anvayī-parāmarśa’). (ii) F which is pervaded by G is in a. Since the pervaded is the qualificand in this cognition, it is called ‘pervaded-qualificand type of agreement in presence operation’ (‘vyāpya-viśeṣyaka-anvayī-parāmarśa’). (iii) a has F which is the negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of G. Since the locus is the qualificand, it is called ‘locus-qualificand type of agreement in absence operation’ (‘pakṣa -viśeṣyaka-vyatirekī-parāmarśa’). (iv) F which is the negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of G is in a. Since the pervaded is the qualificand, it is called ‘pervaded-qualificand type of agreement in absence operation’ (‘vyāpya-viśeṣyaka-vyatirekī-parāmarśa’). (II) According to some other Nyāya philosophers the locus-qualificand type of inferential cognition (pakṣa-viśeṣyaka-anumiti) will be generated by the locus-qualificand type of operation (pakṣa-viśeṣyaka-parāmarśa), and the probandum-qualificand type of inferential cognition (sādhya-viśeṣyaka-anumiti) will be generated by the pervaded-qualificand type of operation (vyāpya-viśeṣyaka-parāmarśa). Hence a is G is derivable from either a is F

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which is pervaded by G, or a is F which is the negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of G. Similarly, G is in a is derivable from either F which is pervaded by G is in a or F which is the negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of G is in a. Now let us discuss the nature of the probans in a valid inference.16 If the valid inference is of the agreement in presence and agreement in absence type, then its probans has the following five characteristics: (a) It is present in the locus of the inference (pakṣa ). Hence it has the property of being present in the locus (pakṣa sattva). (b) It is also present in some of the loci which are known to be characterized by the probandum. Hence it has the property of being present in similar loci (sapakṣa sattva). (c) It is not present in those loci which are known to be characterized by the absence of the probandum. Hence it has the property of being absent from dissimilar loci (vipakṣāsattva). (d) It has no counter-probans (prati-hetu) which will demonstrate the absence of the probandum in the locus of the inference. A counter-probans is different from the probans in question and it is pervaded by the absence of the probandum. Hence it has the property of not having a counter-probans (asatpratipakṣattva). (e) It is different from the probans which can be used to establish the probandum in the locus which is characterized by the absence of the probandum. Hence it has the property of being different from this type of probans (abādhitattva). An inference of the agreement in presence type only (kevalānvayī-anumāna) has no dissimilar cases (vipakṣa) as examples. In other words, there is no locus which is known to be characterized by the absence of the probandum. For example, this table is knowable, because of nameability. Since there is no locus which is characterized by the absence of knowability, the agreement in absence type of invariable concomitance (vyatireka-vyāpti) is not possible. Hence the probans of this type of inference has no vipakṣāsattva. But it has the remaining four characteristics of a valid probans (sad-hetu). Similarly, an inference of the agreement in absence type only has no similar cases as examples (sapakṣa). In other words, there is no locus which is known to be characterized by the probandum. For example, earth is different from other things, because of smell. Since in the Nyāya ontology earth alone has smell and since earth is the locus of the inference (pakṣa), there is no example in favour of the rule ‘whatever has smell is different from other things’. Hence the probans of this type of inference has no sapakṣa sattva. But it has the remaining four characteristics. An inference, according to the Nyāya, will be fallacious if the probans lacks one of these characteristics. In other words, if the probantia of the inferences of the agreement in presence and absence type do not have all the five characteristics, and the probantia of the other types of inferences do not have the remaining four characteristics, then they are fallacious. It is to be noted that there are two types of fallacies. One of them would render some of the sentences false and hence the cognitions expressed by those sentences would not correspond to facts. Another type of fallacy would simply prevent the occurrence of doubt free cognitions expressed by the sentences of an inference.

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Since the Nyāya has ascribed the term ‘fallacy’ to the probans of an inference, a f­ allacious inference is called `hetvābhāsa’ (‘defective probans’). The probans which is free from all the defects will generate a true inferential cognition, and the sentences used to generate the inferential cognition in others will also be true. Hence the validity of an inference will be defined in terms of the presence of these properties in the probans. But an invalid inference will lack some of these properties. Since a probans is used to infer the probandum, the ­fallacy of an inference has been ascribed to the probans. A fallacy or hetvābhāsa has been defined in the following way: x is a hetvābhāsa iff the true cognition of x prevents the occurrence of an inferential cognition (anumiti) or the operation (parāmarśa) which is the vyāpāra of an inferential cognition, where x is a qualified object of cognition. Let us consider a fallacious inference, for example, this lake has fire because of smoke. In this case the inferential cognition this lake has fire is false. From the above definition of fallacy it follows that if the person would have known that this lake has no fire, then the inferential cognition would have been prevented. The absence of fire in the lake which is the object of cognition is the defect of the probans. Since smoke is the probans in this inference, it is infected with this defect. Hence, in our above example, the defect is the absence of fire in the lake, and smoke is the object qualified by this defect. Now the question is, how can smoke be qualified by this defect? The Nyāya philosophers explain the relation between them in terms of the relation of a cognition to its object, which is called ‘viṣayatā’, and the limitor of the property of being the probans (hetutāvacchedaka). In other words, it is explained in terms of a conjunctive cognition such that one of them is the defect and the other one is the probans. In our above example, one of the objects of this conjunctive cognition would be the lake qualified by the absence of fire and the other one would be smoke. Since both the objects are objects of the same cognition, the property of being the object of one cognition (eka-jñāna-viṣayatā) resides in both. The property of being the object of one cognition is not something over and above the property of being the qualificand and the property of being the qualifier residing in the qualificand and the qualifier respectively. Since these properties are determined by the same cognition, the objects of this cognition have the property of being the object of one cognition. Hence the objects will be related to each other at epistemic level. This is analogous to the relation between two persons who have the same father. In our above example, since the property of being the object of the conjunctive cognition resides in both smoke and the lake qualified by the absence of fire, they are related to each other. Now the question is whether this relation by itself can uniquely make the lake qualified by the absence of fire the qualifier of smoke which is the probans. In order to specify the relation of the lake qualified by the absence of fire to smoke, it may be said that the property of being the object of the same conjunctive cognition residing in smoke is limited by a unique property of smoke such as gaseous carbon particles. Now the question is whether this relation of the lake qualified by the absence of fire to smoke is the same as the relation of defect to that which is infected with this defect. If it is considered sufficient, then in the following example a pot would also be infected

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with this defect. Consider a conjunctive cognition of the lake qualified by the absence of fire and a pot. Here also the property of being the object of the conjunctive cognition resides in both the pot and the lake qualified by the absence of fire. Here also we can specify the property of being the object of the conjunctive cognition residing in the pot in terms of a unique property of the pot such as potness. If this method of specifying the relation were sufficient, then the pot would also be infected with the same defect. And if there is a more complex conjunctive cognition in which the lake qualified by the absence of fire is a conjunct, then all the remaining members would be infected with this defect if the relations were specified. In order to exclude such cases we have to show that the specific relational property of being the object of the same conjunctive cognition residing in a pot is not the same as the relation of the defect to that which is infected with the defect. Hence it has been proposed that the relation which relates the lake qualified by the absence of fire to smoke is qualified by a property which resides only in the probans. In other words, the limitor of the property of being the probans (hetutāvacchedaka) which is smokeness will qualify this relation. Hence the relation of the defect to that which is infected with it will be the property of being the object of the conjunctive cognition qualified by the limitor of the property of being the probans. Since smokeness is the limitor of the property of being the probans, and not the gaseous carbon particle, smokeness will be used to specify the relation of the defect to that which is infected with it. Hence the complex relation in which smokeness is the qualifier will make the lake qualified by the absence of fire, which is the defect, the qualifier of the probans which is smoke. If we would have known this property of smoke, then we would not have inferred the presence of fire in the lake. Since smoke was used to make this inference, and since this function of smoke will be restricted by our cognition of smoke qualified by the absence of fire in the lake, smoke as a probans is considered defective. In other words, it will fail to perform its function as probans for the above inference. Now it may be said that the fallacious inference is due to the lack of knowledge about reality. In our above example, the person who infers that the lake has fire does not know that the lake is qualified by the absence of fire. Hence the fallacy is due to this lack of knowledge. In reply, the Nyāya would say that even in a valid inference the person, who infers that the lake has absence of fire, does not know that the lake is qualified by the absence of fire. Here also the person lacks the same knowledge. Hence in terms of the lack of knowledge the distinction between the valid and the invalid inferences cannot be drawn. From the above discussion it follows that the probans is used to infer the probandum in the locus of an inference. If the inferential cognition or the operation (parāmarśa) of an inference is prevented by a true cognition, then the probans is considered defective and thereby the inference becomes fallacious. Moreover, it also follows that if the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus (pakṣadharmatā-jñāna) or the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance (vyāpti-jñāna) is prevented, then the operation (parāmarśa) will also be prevented as the contents of the former two cognitions are necessary for operation. Hence the inference will be fallacious if the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus or the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance is prevented by a true cognition. Therefore, the cognition of the defect (doṣa) is opposed to the cognition of the

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presence of the probans in the locus or the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance or the inferential cognition. If the inference is fallacious, the probans will lack at least one of the characteristics of a valid probans (sad-hetu). D) Types of Fallacies Now I would like to discuss the fallacies which are due to the defects of the probantia.17 There are five types of fallacies, viz., (1) asiddha (unestablished), (2) vyabhicāra (deviation), (3) viruddha (opposed), (4) satpratipakṣa (existence of a counter-thesis), and (5) bādha (absence of the probandum in the locus). (1) asiddha (unestablished): If the probans cannot be established, it is called ‘asiddha’. This type of fallacy can occur in five ways: (a) The locus of the inference (pakṣa) is not real. For example, the golden mountain has fire, because of smoke. Here the golden mountain is the locus (pakṣa), smoke is the probans, and fire is the probandum. Since the locus is unreal or unexemplified (aprasiddha), the probans cannot reside in it. Since the locus cannot be established, this fallacy is called ‘āśrayāsiddha’ (‘unestablished locus’).   Here the defect is the absence of gold in the mountain or the mountain not being made of gold. The cognition of this defect is opposed to the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus (pakṣadharmatā-jñāna) and the inferential cognition (anumiti). Here the probans lacks the property of being present in the locus (pakṣa sattva).   The absence of gold in the mountain, which is the defect, is related to smoke in a conjunctive cognition. Since the cognition of this defect will prevent the occurrence of the operation or the inferential cognition, the probans will fail to perform its function. Hence the probans will be considered defective. (b) The probans does not reside in the locus of the inference, although the locus is real and the probans is real. For example, sound is non-eternal, because of visibility. Here both sound and visibility are real entities, but visibility does not qualify sound. Since the probans cannot qualify the locus of the inference, this type of fallacy is called `svarūpāsiddha’ (‘unestablished in the locus’).   This type of fallacy is opposed to the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus (pakṣadharmatā-jñāna). Here also the probans lacks the property of being present in the locus (pakṣasattva). The defect (doṣa) is the absence of visibility in the sound. Hence the cognition of the absence of visibility in the sound would prevent the occurrence of the operation which contains the presence of probans in the locus. (c) The probans is unreal or unexemplified, although the locus is real. For example, the mountain has fire, because of golden smoke. In this case the golden smoke which is the probans is itself unreal. Since the probans is unreal, this type of fallacy is called ‘hetvasiddha’ (‘unestablished probans’).   This type of fallacy is opposed to the cognition of the presence of the probans in the locus of inference and the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. Since the probans is unexemplified,

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it cannot have any property of a genuine probans. That is, it lacks all the five properties of a genuine probans (sad-hetu). Here the defect (doṣa) is the absence of gold in smoke. Hence the cognition of the absence of gold in smoke would prevent the occurrence of the operation (parāmarśa) which contains the golden smoke. (d) Another type of asiddha (unestablished) fallacy will occur if the probans of an unexemplified probandum is not present in the locus of an inference. For example, the mountain has golden fire, because of smoke. In this case, smoke is present on the mountain, but not as the probans of the golden fire. Hence this type of fallacy is called `sādhyāsiddha’ (‘unestablished probandum’). Here the probans lacks both sapakṣasattva (the property of being present in similar cases) and vipakṣāsattva (the property of being absent from dissimilar cases).   Here the defect is the absence of gold in fire. Hence the cognition of the absence of gold in fire (i.e. fire not being made of gold) would prevent the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between smoke and golden fire and the inferential cognition. Hence the cognition of this defect is opposed to both the operation and the inferential cognition. (e) There is another type of asiddha fallacy known as vyāpyatvāsiddha. In this case the locus is real, the probans is real and the probans is present in the locus but the probans is not qualified by the property of being the pervaded which is limited by a property. In other words, the probans lacks the property of being the pervaded of the probandum as the property of being the pervaded is not limited by the appropriate limitor. It is to be noted that the property of being the pervaded which is a relational property of the probans is limited by a property-limitor, and this limitor also fixes the referents of the ‘probans’. The observation of the co-presence of the probans and the probandum in some loci, and the non-observation of the presence of the probans without the probandum in some other loci are causal conditions for the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. Now the mode under which the probans has been cognized becomes the limitor of the property of being the pervaded (vyāpyatāvacchedaka). This type of fallacy will occur when the mode under which the probans has been cognized does not limit the property of being the pervaded which resides in the probans. For example, the mountain has fire, because of blue smoke. If blue smoke is the probans, then the rule of invariable concomitance would be between blue smoke and fire. The property of being the pervaded residing in blue smoke will be limited by blue smokeness (i.e. blueness and smokeness). But this rule of invariable concomitance cannot substantiate the rule of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. Hence we have to postulate two rules of invariable concomitance, viz., (i) wherever there is blue smoke, there is fire, and (ii) wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Therefore, there would be two properties of being the pervaded. The property of being the pervaded residing in any smoke will be limited by smokeness only but the property of being the pervaded residing in blue smoke will be limited by both blueness and smokeness. Now the question is whether there is any need to postulate two properties of being the pervaded. The postulation of the property of being the pervaded limited by blue smokeness cannot explain the rule of invariable concomitance between any smoke and fire. But the

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postulation of the property of being the pervaded limited by smokeness only can explain the invariable concomitance between any smoke and fire, and thereby between blue smoke and fire as well. Hence, on the ground of simplicity, the Nyāya philosophers accept only the property of being the pervaded which is limited by smokeness. Since there is no property of being the pervaded which is limited by blue smokeness and resides in blue smoke, the type of fallacy present in the above inference is called ‘vyāpyatvāsiddha’ (‘unestablished property of being the pervaded’). Here the defect will be the absence of the property of being the pervaded which is limited by blue smokeness and which resides in blue smoke. The cognition of this defect would prevent the cognition of the invariable concomitance between blue smoke and fire. Hence during the observation of the co-presence of smoke and fire we have to cognize smoke, blue or black, under the mode of smokeness alone, because this mode of presentation will be the limitor of the property of being the pervaded. If the blue smoke is not cognized under the mode of smokeness alone, then it will lack the property of being present in sapakṣa (similar cases). This is due to the fact that other modes of presentation such as blue smokeness cannot limit (or determine) the property of being the pervaded of fire, which resides in a blue smoke. Hence the property of being present in sapakṣa (similar cases) requires not only the presence of the probans in similar cases but also the mode under which it is to be cognized. In this case, blue smoke is present in the locus of fire, but blue smoke lacks the property of being the pervaded limited by blue smokeness. If the mode under which the probans is cognized cannot be the limitor of its property of being the pervaded, then also the probans lacks the property of being present in sapakṣa. Hence in this technical sense of the word `sapakṣasattva’ blue smoke as probans, in our above example, lacks this property. On the contrary, if blue smoke is cognized in sapakṣa under the mode of smokeness only, then it will satisfy one of the conditions for the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. Since blue smokeness is not the limitor of the property of being the pervaded, the cognition of the probans under the mode of blue smokeness will prevent the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. From the above discussion it follows that blue smoke lacks the property of being the pervaded limited by the blue smokeness. The cognition of this defect will prevent the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between blue smoke and fire, and thereby the operation of this inference. (2) vyabhicāra (deviation): There are three types of fallacy of deviation. In all the three cases the cognition of the defect would prevent the cognition of the rule of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. (a) sādhāraṇa-vyabhicāra (common deviation): If the probans is present in pakṣa (locus of the inference), sapakṣa (locus known to be characterized by the probandum) and vipakṣa (locus known to be characterized by the absence of the probandum), then this type of fallacy would occur, and the probans is called ‘sādhāraṇa-vyabhicārī-hetu’ (‘common deviating probans’). For example, the mountain has fire, because of knowability. Since the probans is present in the locus of the absence of the probandum, the cognition of deviation (vyabhicāra) is opposed to the cognition of the invariable concomitance between

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the probans and the probandum. If we take a lake as vipakṣa, then fire is absent from the lake, but knowability is present in it. Hence there cannot be a cognition of the invariable concomitance between knowability and fire. Moreover, since there is deviation, the rule of invariable concomitance will not hold good between the probans and the probandum. In this case, the defect (doṣa) is the absence of fire in a lake which has knowability. Hence the cognition of this defect will prevent the cognition of the invariable concomitance between knowability and fire. Since the cognition of the invariable concomitance is prevented, the operation will also be prevented. In this fallacy the probans lacks the property of not being present in vipakṣa. (b) asādhāraṇa-vyabhicāra (uncommon deviation): If the probans is present in the locus of the inference (pakṣa) only, then it is called ‘asādharaṇa-vyabhicārī-hetu’ (‘uncommon deviating probans’). In other words, the probans is not present in sapakṣa (the locus of the probandum) and in vipakṣa (the locus of the absence of the probandum), but is present in pakṣa (the locus of the inference). For example, sound is non-eternal, because of soundness. In this case, sound is pakṣa, a non-eternal object such as a pot is sapakṣa and an eternal object such as space is vipakṣa. Since soundness is not present in a pot, it lacks the property of being present in sapakṣa. Since soundness cannot be perceived in non-eternal objects, there cannot be cognition of the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum. But the probans is absent from the eternal objects. Since the agreement in absence between the probans and the probandum can be observed, the agreement in absence type of invariable concomitance (vyatireka-vyāpti) can be cognized. In this example, the defect is the absence of soundness in a non-eternal object such as a pot, and the probans lacks the property of being present in sapakṣa . The cognition of this defect would prevent the cognition of the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance (anvaya-vyāpti). But it will not prevent the cognition of the agreement in absence type of invariable concomitance (vyatireka-vyāpti). Since there are two types of invariable concomitance, there would be two types of operation. Since the agreement in presence type of operation depends on the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance, it will be prevented by the cognition of this defect. But the agreement in absence type of operation which depends on the agreement in absence type of invariable concomitance will not be prevented by the cognition of this defect. Hence the cognition of this type of defect does not prevent the cognition of all types of invariable concomitance or operation. For this reason it may be treated as an epistemic fallacy as opposed to a logical one (where some of the sentences or cognitions are false). In the example above, the sentences would not be false, but we fail to cognize the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance and thereby the agreement in presence type of operation. Moreover, this type of epistemic defect can also be removed. In our example, this defect can be removed if there is certainty about the presence of the probandum in some sounds such as the sound of a music. If it were so, then the locus would not be sound in general as it is in the above example, but some specific sounds such as the one which follows lightning. From the observation of the copresence of the probans and the probandum in some loci (sapakṣa) and the non-observation of the probans in the locus of the absence of the probandum one may cognize the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance.

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Hence the cognition of both the types of invariable concomitance is possible. Again in our example, the defect remains so long as there is doubt about the presence of the probandum in every sound. Since this defect can be removed, it is called ‘anitya’ (‘impermanent’). (c) anupasaṃhārī-vyabhicāra (unsupported deviation): If everything becomes pakṣa and thereby the probans does not have either sapakṣa or vipakṣa , then the fallacy of anupasaṃhārī-vyabhicāra will occur. Let us consider the following two examples. (i) Everything is non-eternal, because of knowability. (ii) Everything is nameable, because of knowability. In both (i) and (ii) everything is the locus of inference. There is doubt about the presence of non-eternality in (i) and nameability in (ii). Since everything is pakṣa, there is no sapakṣa or vipakṣa. Since the co-presence of the probans and the probandum cannot be observed, the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance cannot be cognized. Similarly, since the co-absence of the probans and the probandum cannot be observed, the agreement in absence type of invariable concomitance cannot be cognized. Since neither type of invariable concomitance is cognized, neither the agreement in presence nor the agreement in absence type of operation will occur. Hence this type of fallacy prevents the occurrence of any type of operation which is necessary for an inferential cognition. Since there is neither sapakṣa nor vipakṣa , the probans lacks both the property of being present in sapakṣa and the property of being absent from vipakṣa . As regards the nature of this fallacy, it is not logical, but epistemological. If a person does not have doubt about the presence of the probandum in everything, then this epistemic defect can be removed. From the observation of the co-presence of the probans and the probandum and the non-observation of deviation, one will have the cognition of the invariable concomitance between them. In (i), if everything ceases to be pakṣa, then the cognition of the invariable concomitance may be possible on the basis of the observation of co-presence and non-observation of deviation. But this cognition will be false as there are eternal objects such as space and time which are knowable in the Nyāya system. Hence there will be another type of fallacy. In (ii) if everything ceases to be pakṣa, then the cognition of the invariable concomitance between knowability and nameability will be possible from the observation of co-presence and the non-observation of deviation. Moreover, the cognition of invariable concomitance will be true as the invariable concomitance holds good in the Nyāya system, and the inference will be valid. From the above discussion it follows that this type of defect can also be removed. Hence it is also epistemological, not logical. It is due to the fact that the person in question has doubt about everything and as a result he cannot cognize the invariable concomitance. This type of defect will last so long as there is doubt about the presence of the probandum in everything. From the above discussion of three types of fallacies of deviation, it follows that the last two are epistemic and hence impermanent, but the first one is logical and hence permanent. But all of them are opposed to the cognition of the invariable concomitance although not in the same way. Moreover, all of them are infected with the fallacy of deviation, but not

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in the same way. The probans of the first one occurs in the locus of the absence of the probandum, and it is vyabhicārī (deviating) in this sense. But the probantia of the other two types are not vyabhicārī (deviating) in this sense. The probans of the second type is vyabhicārī (deviating) in the sense that it does not reside in the locus of the probandum i.e. sapakṣa. The probans of the third type is vyabhicārī (deviating) in the sense that there is neither sapakṣa nor vipakṣa . Since there is neither sapakṣa nor vipakṣa, the cognition of the co-presence of the probans with the probandum or the cognition of the co-absence of the probans with the probandum is not possible. Hence the cognition of any type of invariable concomitance is not possible so long as this defect remains. In spite of these senses of the word `vyabhicāra’ (‘deviation’), all the three types of deviation have one thing in common. Each of them refers to the object of a true cognition which is opposed either to the cognition of the agreement in presence type of invariable concomitance or to the cognition of the agreement in absence type of invariable concomitance. (3) viruddha (opposed): If the probans is pervaded by the absence of the probandum, the probans is called ‘viruddha-hetu’ (‘opposed probans’). Hence the invariable concomitance would be between the probans and the absence of the probandum, not between the probans and the probandum. In other words, wherever the probans is present, the probandum is absent. For example, sound is eternal, because of the property of being an effect. Since an effect is non-eternal, the probans, far from establishing the probandum, establishes the absence of the probandum. In the case of viruddha fallacy, the probans lacks the property of being present in sapakṣa and the property of being absent from vipakṣa. In other words, it is absent from the loci of the probandum, but is present where the probandum is absent. Hence the agreement in presence (anvaya-sahacāra) and agreement in absence (vyatireka-sahacāra) cannot be observed. From this it follows that neither the invariable concomitance in presence nor the invariable concomitance in absence can be cognized. Moreover, since both the types of invariable concomitance are false, the defect would be the falsity of the invariable concomitances. Hence the cognition of this defect will be opposed to the cognition of both the types of invariable concomitance and thereby both the types of operation. It is also opposed to the inferential cognition. Since it is a permanent defect, it may be called ‘logical fallacy’. (4) satpratipakṣa (existence of counter-thesis): The word ‘satpratipakṣa’ has two meanings. It may mean either the thesis of the opponent or a type of defect (doṣa) which will prevent an inferential cognition. In the context of a debate it simply means the thesis of one’s opponent, which tries to establish the opposite conclusion. Hence there would be two operations so that two opposite conclusions can be established. The operation of the proponent has the form: (a) p has h which is pervaded by s, but the operation of the opponent takes the form. (b) p has counter-h (different from h) which is pervaded by the absence of s. Since the opponent uses a counter-probans, the word ‘satpratipakṣa’ in a debate refers to the probans of the operation of the opponent. The opponent tries to establish the conclusion p has absence of s, which is the contradictory of the conclusion of the proponent. The

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operations of both the proponent and the opponent may be false, but the conclusions of both of them cannot be false as they are contradictories. Let us consider the following operations of the proponent and the opponent respectively. (c) The lake has smoke which is pervaded by fire. (d) The lake has light (counter-probans) which is pervaded by the absence of fire. The proponent will deduce the conclusion ‘The lake has fire’, and the opponent the conclusion ‘The lake has absence of fire’. Since the opponent uses a counter-probans to establish the absence of the probandum in the same locus, there is a satpratipakṣa. If the opponent uses the probans of the proponent, then it will not be an example of satpratipakṣa. For example, (e) The lake has smoke which is pervaded by the absence of fire. Hence from the very definition of satpratipakṣa it follows that the probans of the opponent is different from that of the proponent. Now let us consider what happens to those who remain non-committal to the thesis of the proponent or the opponent. In our above examples, both (c) and (d) will generate cognitions in those who are not committed to either of the conclusions. But the operation (c) will prevent the occurrence of the inferential cognition which is due to (d), and the operation (d) will prevent the occurrence of the inferential cognition which is due to (c). Hence we cannot say that these two operations are mutually opposed to each other in the sense that the cognition of (c) will prevent the cognition of (d) and vice versa. But the very existence of satpratipakṣa is opposed to the inferential cognitions among the non-committals. There is another use of the word ‘satpratipakṣa’ which identifies a satpratipakṣa with a fallacy (satpratipakṣa doṣa). It is to be remembered that a fallacy or a defect (doṣa) is the object of a true cognition which is opposed to the occurrence of the operation or the inferential cognition. In our above examples, neither the object of the operation (c) nor the object of the operation (d) is a defect (doṣa), because both the cognitions are false. An example of this type of defect would be the object of a true cognition such as (f) The lake has water which is pervaded by the absence of fire. Therefore, the defect will be the object of any true operation which has the same locus (pakṣa) as (c) and the counter-probans of this operation is pervaded by the absence of fire. The operation (f) will prevent the occurrence of the inferential cognition the lake has fire, which is due to the operation (c). Since the object of the operation (f) is the defect, the probans of (c) will be infected with this defect. Since there is a counter-probans which is pervaded by the absence of fire, the probans of (c) lacks the property asatpratipakṣattva (the property of not having a counter-probans which is pervaded by the absence of the probandum). But the probans of the opponent used in (d) is not infected with this defect as it is also pervaded by the absence of fire. It commits the fallacy of svarūpāsiddha (unestablished in the locus). Hence the probans of (c) only commits the fallacy of satpratipakṣa. But the defect called ‘satpratipakṣa doṣa’ is not the object of either (c) or (d). If the opponent would have used the operation (f) instead of the operation (d), then (f) would have been a satpratipakṣa.

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Hence the object of (f) would have been the defect, and the probans of (c) would have been infected with this defect. Similarly, the inferential cognition from (c) would be prevented by any other operation, the object of which is a satpratipakṣa defect. It may also be noted that whenever there is a fallacy of satpratipakṣa, there are other fallacies as well. In the example above, (c) commits the fallacy of svarūpāsiddha (unestablished in the locus) and bādha (absence of the probandum characterizing the locus). If a person does not know that the locus is characterized by the absence of the probans and also does not know that the locus is characterized by the absence of the probandum, then also his inferential cognition can be prevented by a true operation the object of which is a defect of satpratipakṣa. The fallacy of satpratipakṣa is a logical one. Since it does not depend upon the epistemic attitude of the agent, the Nyāya calls it a ‘permanent defect’ (‘nitya doṣa’). (5) bādha (absence of the probandum characterizing the locus): The fallacy of bādha occurs when a probans is used to establish a probandum in a locus which is characterized by the absence of the probandum. For example, Fire is cold, because of substancehood, as in water. In the case of a bādha fallacy the inferential cognition is directly prevented by the cognition of the absence of the probandum in the locus. In the above example, the operation is the cognition expressed by the sentence ‘Fire has substancehood which is pervaded by coldness’. This operation will yield the cognition ‘Fire is cold’. But the cognition ‘Fire has absence of coldness’ will prevent the occurrence of the inferential cognition. Since the preventer cognition is true, its object is the defect (doṣa). Hence the cognition of bādha fallacy is directly opposed to the inferential cognition. In the example above, the preventer cognition may be due to direct perception of fire through our sense organs. Since the Nyāya accepts four sources of valid cognition, a preventer cognition may be derived from perception, comparison, verbal testimony, or some other inference. It may also be noted that whenever there is a bādha fallacy, some other fallacy such as vyabhicāra (deviation) or svarūpāsiddha (unestablished probans in the locus) is also involved. But these fallacies are not directly opposed to the inferential cognition. Hence if someone does not have the cognition of other fallacies in connection with this type of inference, then the inferential cognition will be prevented by the cognition of the bādha fallacy i.e. the knowledge that the locus lacks the probandum. Since this type of fallacy does not depend on the epistemic attitude, it is also a permanent defect. It is to be noted that there is a difference between satprtipakṣa and bādha fallacy, although both of them are directly opposed to the inferential cognition. The difference may be explained in the following way. Let us consider the following satpratipakṣa: The lake has water which is pervaded by the absence of fire. This satpratipksa would prevent the occurrence of the inferential cognition the lake has fire, which is derivable from the operation the lake has smoke which is pervaded by fire. Moreover, this operation is directly opposed to the cognition the lake has fire as it yields the cognition the lake has absence of fire. Therefore, it is directly as well as indirectly the preventer of the cognition the lake has fire. But the cognition of the bādha fallacy is directly opposed to the inferential cognition the lake has fire.

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From the Nyāya discussion of different types of fallacies it follows that the Nyāya philosophers are dealing not only with the falsity of the premise(s) or the conclusion of a fallacious inference but also with the different ways the operation or the inferential cognition of an inference can be prevented. From the above discussion it follows that the Nyāya philosophers have emphasized the relevance condition for any inference, valid or invalid. Hence the inference does not have the form: P, Therefore, Q, where ‘P’ and ‘Q’ range over sentences or cognitions. Hence the following valid inference of Western logic is not treated as an inference in the Nyāya logic: P and not P, Therefore, Q. This is due to the fact that it violates the relevance condition as well as certain epistemic conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence. As a result, we cannot derive 2+2=4 from it is raining and not raining, which is valid in classical symbolic logic. Since the Nyāya logic has emphasized the relevance condition, it might throw some light on contemporary discussion on relevant logic. Since it deals with the preventer–prevented relation at epistemic level and the ways a cognition can be prevented, it will throw some light on epistemic logic as well. E) Tarka and Inference In this context it is to be noted that tarka (the use of a type counterfactual conditional) cannot be identified with an inference. Let us consider the sentence ‘If there would have been smoke, then there would have been fire’. This counterfactual sentence is not used to support the vyāpti sentence ‘Wherever there is smoke, there is fire’. On the contrary, it presupposes the vyāpti (invariable concomitance) relation of smoke to fire. Moreover, it is used to generate an inference which dispels doubt about the presence of smoke, or which demonstrates the falsity of the cognition of smoke. Suppose the opponent knows that there is absence of fire and the pervader–pervaded relation between smoke and fire; but has some doubt about the absence of smoke or thinks that there is smoke. Now the proponent utters the above counterfactual sentence. The use of this sentence will give rise to the following inference: Pratijñā (thesis): There is absence of smoke. hetu (reason): Because of absence of fire. Udāharaṇa (example): Wherever there is absence of fire, there is absence of smoke, such as a lake. upanaya (application): There is absence of fire which is pervaded by absence of smoke. nigamana (conclusion): Therefore, there is absence of smoke. Hence tarka, understood in the above sense, is an auxiliary to an inference, and its purpose is to remove certain doubts or to show the falsity of certain cognitions. There is another type of tarka sentence which helps in establishing the vyāpti relation between smoke and fire by giving rise to another form of inference. But this type of tarka

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presupposes some other vyāpti relation, and the inference it gives rise to is different from the previous one. Here the aim is to remove doubt about smoke being pervaded by fire or to show the invalidity of the cognition that smoke is not pervaded by fire. Here the tarka sentence is ‘If smoke were not the pervaded of fire, then it would lack the property of being caused by fire’. The vyāpti which it presupposes is the following: Wherever there is absence of the property of being pervaded by fire, there is absence of the property of being caused by fire. In a non-technical way, it may be said that this tarka presupposes that smoke is caused by fire. In this case the vyāpti relation which is presupposed by the tarka is not the same as the vyāpti relation which it establishes. Here also the tarka sentence gives rise to an inference which is much more complex than the previous one. Since this inference dispels doubt about the vyāpti relation between smoke and fire, the tarka is considered as an auxiliary to this inference. If the presupposed vyāpti sentence is ‘P’ and the vyāpti sentence to be established by using this tarka sentence is ‘Q’, then there is a vyāpti relation of P to Q. In other words, the truth of ‘P’ entails the truth of ‘Q’. If the opponent questions the truth of ‘Q’, but accepts the truth of ‘P’ and the pervader – pervaded relation of P to Q, then by using the above tarka sentence which gives rise to an inference it can be shown that the acceptance of ‘P’ would lead to the acceptance of ‘Q’. If the cognition of P is valid (pramā), then the cognition of Q is also valid. Since the opponent has accepted the validity of P, he/ she cannot doubt the validity of Q. But this type of tarka cannot remove the doubt about P, if there is any. It can only dispel doubt about Q if the opponent accepts P or considers the cognition of P as valid. Thus it establishes ‘Q’ which is a vyāpti sentence. This is how the Nyaya philosophers would demonstrate the relation between a counterfactual sentence and an inference.18

SECTION THREE: ANALOGY Now let us discuss the causal conditions of analogical cognition (upamiti).19 In an analogical cognition (upamiti) we cognize the property of being the referent of an expression (vācyatva) in its referent. Hence it takes the following form: (A) y is the referent of ‘x’ under the mode y-ness, where ‘x’ is the expression and y is its referent. An analogical cognition presupposes the cognition of the following sentence: (B) That which is similar to z is the referent of ‘x’, where z is the referent of the term ‘z’ which is different from ‘x’, and the cognizer already knows the referent of ‘z’, but not the referent of ‘x’. Moreover, an analogical cognition presupposes a perceptual cognition, which is described by the following sentence: (C) This is similar to z.

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Let us illustrate with an example of the Nyāya philosophers: (a) That which is similar to a cow is the referent of the word ‘gavaya’. (b) This is similar to a cow (c) Gavaya is the referent of the word ‘gavaya’ In this example, (c) is the analogical cognition (upamiti). It presupposes the understanding of the meaning of the sentence (a), which the cognizer might have heard from someone else or read in a book. Here (b) represents the perceptual cognition. The inherent and the similar-to-inherent causes would be the same as other types of cognition. In our above example, the special instrumental cause (karaṇa) is the cognition of similarity with a cow in the animal which is being perceived. This cognition would give rise to the memorycognition of (a). Hence the memory cognition of (a) is the operation (vyāpāra) of the analogical cognition (upamiti). In this analogical cognition gavaya which is the referent of the word ‘gavaya’ is cognized under the mode gavayaness (gavayatva), not under the mode of thisness or being similar-to-a cow. For this reason, according to the Nyāya philosophers, it cannot be reduced to an inferential cognition (anumiti).20

SECTION FOUR: VERBAL COGNITION OR TESTIMONY Like other sources of cognition, verbal cognition has also been explained in terms of its causal conditions. The verbal cognition lies in cognizing the meaning of a sentence or a complex expression. The meaning of a sentence as distinct from the meanings of its terms lies in the relation of the referents of its two terms. Let us consider a sentence of the form ‘a is (has) F’. The meaning of this sentence lies in the relation of the referent of ‘F’ to the referent of ‘a’. Hence both the relation and its direction are important for the Nyāya theory of meaning. For this reason the following sentences do not have the same meaning: (i) The pot is on the floor (ii) The floor is pot-possessor (or the floor has a pot). Usually the cognition of words, the memory – cognition of objects, the cognition of the relation between a word and its referent, syntactic expectancy between the words (ākāṅkṣā), semantic compatibility (yogyatā), contiguity of words in space and time (āsatti) and the intention of the speaker (tātparya or tātparyajñāna) are considered as causal conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence.21 As there is a difference of opinion among Indian philosophers with respect to the referent or the meaning of a word, so there is a difference of opinion with respect to the conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence. This paper deals with the nature of understanding the meaning of a sentence as well as its causal conditions from the Nyāya point of view.22 A) The Nature of Understanding the Meaning of a Sentence As regards the understanding of the meaning of a sentence, the Nyāya philosophers claim that it lies in cognizing a relation between the referents of the words which have occurred in a sentence. According to the Nyāya the same relation may be cognized in other types

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of cognition such as perceptual or inferential. In other words, the same object may be cognized in perceptual, inferential, or verbal cognition, but not in the same way. The causal conditions of these cognitions would not be the same. The set of causal conditions for each of them would be different. Moreover, the mode under which an object is cognized in a perceptual cognition cannot be the same as the mode under which it is cognized in an inferential or verbal cognition. Let us consider the cognition of a mountain having fire. In a perceptual cognition the sense-organs are related to the mountain, fire and the relation of conjunction. The mountain, which is related to our senses, is presented under the universal mountainhood, and its particularity (viśeṣatva) is also cognized. Similar is the case with fire or the relation of conjunction. But in an inferential or a verbal cognition the same mountain can be cognized under the mode of the universal mountainhood, but not under the mode of its particularity. Hence its particularity (viśeṣatva) will not be cognized. Similar will be the case with fire and the relation of conjunction. In other words, in a verbal cognition corresponding to the sentence ‘A mountain has fire,’ we cannot cognize the particularities of the mountain such as its height. Similarly, we cannot cognize the particular properties of the fire or the conjunction relation. B) Causal Conditions for Understanding the Meaning of a Sentence According to the New Nyāya the cognition of a word (padajñāna) is a karaṇa (special instrumental cause) and the memory – cognition of the referent of a word is a vyāpāra (operation) of understanding the meaning of a sentence. But according to the Old Nyāya the karaṇa is the cognized word or the word’s cognition (jñāyamānapada). There is an important difference between ‘the cognized word’ (‘jñāyamānapada’) and ‘the cognition of a word’ (‘padajñāna’). In the former case the word is the qualificand (viśeṣya) and the cognition is its qualifier (viśeṣaṇa). If the word is not present, there cannot be word’s cognition (jñāyamānapada). Hence the presence of the word is necessary for its cognition. This theory cannot explain the understanding of the meaning of a sentence, which is due to the memory-cognition of the words that have been apprehended in the past. Sometimes memory-cognitions of words are due to inscriptions, or gesture and posture. For this reason the New Nyāya considers the cognition of a word as a karaṇa (special instrumental cause). From the above discussion it also follows that the memory-cognition of the referent of a word depends upon the cognition of the relation between a word and its referent, and upon the cognition of the word. According to the Nyāya philosophers, the cognition of ākāṅkṣā, not simply ākāṅkṣā, is a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence.23 It is to be noted that ākāṅkṣā is a property of a sentence or well-formed expression. As regards the nature of a sentence, the Nyāya claims that it is an ordered n-tuple such that n  2 morphemes or meaningful expressions. A sequence of morphemes having mutual syntactic expectancy would constitute a sentence. Hence expressions, such as ‘cooks’, ‘is cooking’, (‘pacati’), ‘cooks rice’ (‘taṇḍulaṃ pacati’),’Rama cooks rice’ (‘Ramaḥ taṇḍulaṃ pacati’), would be considered sentences. Let us explain the meaning of a simple sentence such as ‘John is tall’. The utterance of this sentence would generate a cognition of the relation between

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the objects referred to by the words ‘John’ and ‘tall’. Since each of the terms is meaningful or non-empty, each of them would generate the memory – cognition of its referent if the hearer knows its referent. This is due to the fact that if two entities are related by a relation and if the hearer knows this relation and cognizes one of the terms, then the memorycognition of the other will be generated. Now let us consider the sentence ‘cooks’ (‘pacati’). Since it consists of the words ‘cook’ (‘pac’) and ‘s’ (‘ti’), it is treated as a sentence. It is to be noted that according to the Nyāya verbal and nominal suffixes are words (padas). In this example the word ‘cook’ (`pac’) is characterized by the property of being the immediate predecessor of the word ‘s’ (`ti’) and the latter by the property of being the immediate successor of the word ‘cook’. When it is said that there is ākāṅkṣā between them, what is meant is that the order between them is conducive to understanding the relation between the referents of the words ‘cook’ (‘pac’) and ‘s’ (`ti’). Since the word ‘cook’ refers to cooking activity and the suffix ‘s’ refers to mental effort or mental preparedness (kṛtitva), the expression ‘cooks’ would give rise to the cognition of conduciveness (anukūlatva), which will relate cooking activity to mental effort. Hence the word `ākāṅkṣā’ is defined in terms of the properties of a sequence (an ordered n-tuple, where n  2) and the ability of this sequence to generate the cognition of a relation, which will relate the referents of the second term (pratiyogin) to the referent of the first term (anuyogin). The cognition of ākāṅkṣā is considered as a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence as distinct from the meanings of the words which have occurred in a sentence, such as ‘cooks’. The cognition of the words and the memory-cognition of their referents or meanings are also causal conditions for understanding the relation between the referents. According to the Old Nyāya, the cognition of yogyatā is another causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence. Let us consider the sentence ‘a is F’. The word ‘a’ would generate the memory-cognition of a under a mode, say m, and the word ‘F’ would generate the memory-cognition of F under a mode, say n. Suppose there are three types of relation, namely, R, S, T, and the relation which relates F to a comes under the type T. If we know that neither R nor S relates F to a, then the sentence ‘a is F’ would generate the cognition of amTFn. But the sentence would not generate the cognition of the specific relation with its particularity. The relation T which relates F to a will be cognized under a description. Hence it may be expressed by the definite description ‘The T which relates F to a’. In other words, the T will not be cognized as a mode of presentation (prakāra) of F. The Old Nyāya also claims that a doubt-free cognition (niścayātmaka jñāna) of T or a dubious cognition (saṃśayātmaka jñāna) of T is a causal condition for cognizing the meaning of the sentence ‘a is F’. If it is a dubious cognition, then it is expressed by the sentence ‘Is a F or not F’? If it is doubt-free, then it is expressed by ‘a is F’. Since a verbal cognition is always doubt-free, the yogyatā jñāna, which could be dubious, cannot be equated with it. Now it may be asked whether the verbal cognition can be identified with the cognition of yogyatā if the latter is non-dubious. On this point the Old Nyāya would claim that the cognition of yogyatā is never cognized as doubt-free even if it is non-dubious. In other words, it is presented under the mode of cognitionhood (jñānatva), not under the mode of certainty (niścayatva). But the verbal cognition is presented under the mode of certainty. Hence the non-dubious cannot be equated with certain cognition. In other words, the limitor of the property of being the cause (kāraṇatāvacchedaka) is cognitionhood (jñānatva), but the limitor of the property of being the effect (kāryatāvacchedaka) is certainty (niścayatva).

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Hence there is no circularity in accepting the cognition of yogyatā as a causal condition for verbal cognition. Moreover, we can have a true or a false verbal cognition from a non-dubious cognition of yogyatā. Similarly, we can have a true or a false verbal cognition from a dubious cognition of yogyatā. If the verbal cognition is true, then its cause would be the true cognition of yogyatā (relation). The cause of the latter could be a previous true perceptual or inferential cognition of it. If its cause is some previous verbal cognition of yogyatā, then the cause of the latter would be some previous perceptual or inferential cognition. If the verbal cognition corresponding to our sentence ‘a is F’ is false, then its cause would be the false cognition of yogyatā (relation). The latter could be some previous false perceptual or inferential cognition. If it is also verbal, then its cause would be some other false perceptual or inferential cognition about the same object. Now the question is whether the sentence ‘He irrigates the field with fire’ would generate any verbal cognition. The followers of the Old Nyāya claim that since there is neither a dubious nor a non-dubious cognition of the relation, this sentence cannot generate a verbal cognition. On this point the followers of the New Nyāya claim that it is due to the fact that there is a preventer cognition. In other words, we have a cognition that fire has the absence of irrigation. That is to say, we know that one cannot irrigate the field with fire. Since the presence of a preventer cognition can explain the non-occurrence of a verbal cognition from this sentence, there is no need to consider the absence of a dubious or a non-dubious cognition of it (He irrigates the field with fire) as a causal condition. Moreover, since the absence of a preventer cognition is a common causal condition for the occurrence of any other type of cognition, the acceptance of it would satisfy the principle of parsimony. Hence the view of the Old Nyāya multiplies the number of conditions. The followers of the New Nyāya interpret yogyatā as the absence of bādha. ‘Bādha’ refers to a preventer cognition. If the cognition is F being related to a by the relation R, then the doubt-free cognition of F not being related to a by the relation R is bādha. In other words, it would be a contrary or a contradictory cognition. The absence of it is yogyatā. Hence according to the New Nyāya, yogyatā, not the cognition of yogyatā, is a causal condition for verbal cognition. Furthermore, the followers of the New Nyāya do not rule out the possibility of cognizing a new relation in a verbal cognition, which has not been cognized before. In such cases the relation is cognized in its generic feature. If it is a relation of conjunction, then it is cognized under the mode of conjunctionhood, not under the mode of its particularity (viśeṣatva), although it has not been cognized before. According to the New Nyāya, the causal condition for cognizing it in a verbal cognition would be the cognition of ākāṅkṣā (syntactic expectancy between the words). Hence the view of the Old Nyāya may be rejected on the ground of inadequacy and the violation of the principle of simplicity. Now let us discuss whether a contradictory sentence or its denial can generate a cognition in a hearer or a speaker. According to the Nyāya philosophers, both Old and New, a contradictory or a contrary sentence does not generate a cognition as it has no yogyatā (semantic compatibility). Since it is considered as a sentence, it has ākāṅkṣā (syntactic expectancy). Hence it is a well-formed formula. The relation between the cognition generated by p and the cognition generated by not p is called ‘preventer-prevented’. In other words, the occurrence of the former prevents the occurrence of the latter and vice versa. According to the Nyāya there is no contradiction in reality as well as in thought,

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although contradictory expressions are sentences. Now it may be asked, why should we consider contradictory or contrary expressions as sentences? The Nyāya might claim that since the denial of a contradiction is an analytic or an identity sentence, which is true, a contradiction may be considered as a sentence. Let us consider the following sentences: (a) This brown table is not brown. (b) This brown table is brown. (c) John is not John. (d) John is John. According to the Nyāya (a) is a contradiction. Hence it cannot generate a unified cognition. The expression ‘this brown table’ would generate a cognition and the expression ‘not brown’ would generate a cognition, but the entire sentence would not generate a cognition. In other words, there is no unified cognition such that this brown table is the qualificand and the absence of brown colour is the qualifier. As regards (b), it is claimed by the followers of the Nyāya that it cannot generate a cognition as the limitor of the property of being the qualifier (viśeṣaṇatāvacchedaka) is part of the limitor of the property of being the qualificand (viśeṣyatāvaccedaka). According to the Nyāya if the former is not contained in the latter or is not identical with the latter, then a cognition can be generated. Since in (d) they are identical, it cannot also generate a cognition. Since (c) is a contradiction, it cannot generate a cognition. Hence two types of argument may be put forward against the generation of verbal cognition. One type of argument would be applicable to contrary or contradictory sentences. Another type of argument would be applicable to identity sentences. Against the second type it may be said that the limitor of the qualifier of an identity or analytic sentence is neither identical with the limitor of the qualificand nor is it contained in it. Since the relation of the qualifier to the qualificand is also a limitor of the qualifier, the set of the limitors of the qualifier is neither identical with nor contained in the set of the limitors of the qualificand. In reply the Nyāya philosophers would argue that by the word ‘limitor’ in this context they mean property-limitors only. Even if the objection can be avoided in this way, the fact remains that there are two types of rules for two types of sentences. The type of rule for contradictory sentences can be substantiated in terms of the ontological claim that there is no contradiction in reality. Hence there is no contradiction at the level of thought or in the content of thought. In other words, we cannot think of a contradiction. On the contrary, in favour of identity sentences it may be said that the ontological claim is that everything has its own identity. Hence every sentence of the form ‘a is a’ is true. On this point it may be proposed that since a contradiction cannot generate a cognition, its negation which is an analytic sentence cannot also generate a cognition. If we do not accept this, then we have to put some restriction on the use of ‘not’ and thereby the law of parsimony would be violated. Hence the claim is that both the types of expression are sentences and meaningful, but neither of them would generate any unified cognition. Now it may be asked: If they cannot generate cognitions, then how can we know their truthvalues? On this point the followers of the Nyāya have given an ingenious reply. In order to know the truth of an identity sentence such as ‘John is John’ it is not a requirement that

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it must generate a cognition. In order to know the truth of ‘John is John’ what we need to know is the truth of a sentence about John, such as ’John is tall’ or ‘John exists’. Since there is an entailment relation, the latter would establish the former. Hence the truth of ‘John exists’ or ‘John is tall’ entails the truth of ‘John is John’. As regards a contradictory sentence such as ‘John is not John’, we know it to be false when we come to know the truth of the sentence ‘John is John’.24 From the above discussion of yogyatā it follows that there is no one-to-one relation between the members of the sets corresponding to ‘ākāṅkṣā’ and ‘yogyatā’. The set, which corresponds to ‘yogyatā’, is a proper subset of the set, which corresponds to ‘ākāṅkṣā’. It also follows that the Nyāya has avoided two extreme positions present in contemporary philosophy. According to one of them a contradictory expression is meaningless.25 Hence it cannot be treated as a sentence or well-formed expression. Therefore, an analytic sentence, which is a negation of a contradiction, has no meaning. According to the other both the types of expression are meaningful sentences and we can understand their meanings. Since a contradiction is a meaningful sentence, it can be a content of thought. This goes against the standpoint of Aristotelian philosophy, which claims that there is no contradiction at the level of thought or reality. But the Nyāya philosophers have avoided both the views as they lead to undesirable or counter-intuitive consequences. Now let us discuss the Nyāya concept of āsatti, the cognition of which is a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence. The word ‘āsatti’ refers to spatio-temporal contiguity between the words of a sentence. Hence the words ‘cook’ and ‘s’ which have occurred in the sentence ‘cooks’ are contiguous in space and time. Similar is the case with other sentences such as ‘John is tall’, or ‘John cooks rice’. Here ‘contiguity’ means absence of a gap or a long gap between the words of a sentence or in an utterance. The gaps, which are not conducive to understanding the meaning of a sentence, are not permissible. The cognition of āsatti (contiguity) is a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence. Now the question is whether there is any need for āsatti in addition to the cognition of ākāṅkṣā and yogyatā. In reply, it is said that there are certain examples where āsatti is necessary for removing the ambiguity of understanding the relation, which is the meaning of a sentence. Consider the sentence, ‘Here comes the son-king’s-man should be removed’ (‘ayam eti putro-rājñaḥ puruṣo ’pasāryatām’).26 It is said that this sentence would give rise to the cognition of the relation of the king to his son or the cognition of the relation of the king to his officer (man). Hence it means either (a) Here comes the son of the king; the officer (man) should be removed, or (b) Here comes the son; the king’s officer (man) should be removed. In such contexts the ambiguity has been removed in terms of āsatti. In our above example, since the word ‘man’ (‘puruṣa’) is contiguous with the word ‘ ’s’ (the suffix ‘ṅs’ in Sanskrit), the relation of the king to his officer should be cognized, not the relation of the king to his son as the word ‘son’ (‘putra’) is not contiguous with the suffix ‘ ’s’ (the suffix ‘ṅs’ in Sanskrit). Therefore, it means (b), not (a). Hence āsatti of the Nyāya philosophers plays the role of scope notations or is a substitute for scope notations. Therefore, it removes the ambiguities, which are due to scope notations. The cognition of āsatti, not simply āsatti, is a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence. Now let us discuss the need for the cognition of the intention of the speaker for understanding the meaning of a sentence. If a word is ambiguous or homonymous,

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then the sentence in which it is used would give rise to different cognitions even if all other conditions for understanding its meaning are fulfilled. Consider the sentence ‘saindhavamānaya’ (‘Bring saindhava’). Since the word ‘saindhava’ in Sanskrit means both salt and horse, the sentence would generate the cognition of ‘Bring salt’ or ‘Bring a horse’. In order to remove this type of ambiguity the cognition of the intention of the speaker is necessary. From the context of utterance the intention of the speaker may be cognized. Moreover, there are contexts where the intention of the speaker is necessary for understanding the meaning of a sentence, although the sentence does not contain any homonymous expression. For example, Protect the yoghurt from the crow (kākebhyo dadhi rakṣatām). Here the speaker intends to use the word ‘crow’ to refer to any animal or bird, which will spoil the yoghurt. Hence the cognition of the intention of the speaker is necessary for understanding the meaning of a sentence, which contains a metaphorical or suggestive expression. From the above discussion it follows that according to the Nyāya philosophers the cognition of words which have occurred in a sentence, the cognition of the relation between a word and its referent(s), the memory-cognition of the referents, the cognition of syntactic expectancy between the words of a sentence, the cognition of semantic compatibility, the cognition of contiguity of words in space and time, and the cognition of the intention of the speaker are considered instrumental causal conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence or complex expression. The New Nyāya philosophers consider the cognition of a word as the special instrumental cause (karaṇa). The operation (vyāpāra) is the memorycognition of the referents of the words, which have occurred in a sentence. The cognizer is the inherent cause, and the relation between the mental sense-organ and the self is the similar-to-inherent cause.

NOTES 1. Purnachandra Vedāntacuñcu, Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Tattva-Kaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra, with Bengali translation and commentary, (India: West Bengal Book Board, 1983), first published in 1901, pp. 66-68. 2. Panchanana Bhattacharya, Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ and Siddhāntamuktāvalī of Viśvanātha, with Bengali translation and commentary, (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Bengali year 1377), pp. 260-264; Phanibhusana Tarkavāgīśa, Nyāya–Darśana, Vol. I, (India: West Bengal Book Board, 1982) pp. 110-114. 3. Nyāya–Darśana, Vol. I, p. 114, Vol. 3, p. 132; Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, pp. 297-310; Goswami, Narayana Chandra, Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ and Dīpikā of Annaṃbhaṭṭa, with Bengali Commentary, (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Bengali year 1390), pp. 270-284; Gaṅgeśa, Tattvacintāmaṇi. 4. Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, pp. 302-304. 5. Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 276-278. 6. Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, pp. 308-309; Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 278-282. 7. Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 282-283. 8. Nyāya–Darśana, Vol. I, p. 114; Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, p. 310; Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, p. 283; Purnachandra Vedāntacuñcu, Pātañjaladarśana, (India: West Bengal State Book Board, 1983), pp. 228-229. 9. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 26.

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10. Nyāya–Darśana, Vol. 1, pp. 150-184, Vol. 2, pp. 208-250; Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, pp. 311-373; Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 284-294; Sabita Misra, Navyanyāye Anumiti, (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, Bengali year 1372); Aruna Chakraborty, Nyāyadarśane Parāmarśa, (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1978). 11. Nyāya–Darśana, Vol. 1, pp. 287-344, pp. 390-442; Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, pp. 374-406; Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 322-340. 12. Nyāya–Darśana, Vol. 1, p. 151; see also J. L. Shaw, ‘The Concept of Relevance in Gaṅgeśa’ in this volume. 13. For a comprehensive discussion, see J. L. Shaw ‘Universal Sentences: Russell, Wittgenstein, Prior, and the Nyāya’ in this volume; Rajendranath Ghosh, Vyāpti–Pañcaka, (India: West Bengal State Book Board, 1982), pp. 3-25; Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 304-310; Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, pp. 324-355; Nyāya–Darśana, Vol. 1, pp. 306-319; D. H. H. Ingalls, Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951). 14. Nyāya–Darśana, Vol. 1, pp. 326-337. 15. For a more comprehensive discussion, see Nyāyadarśane Parāmarśa, pp. 22-47. 16. Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 319-321; Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, pp. 374-387; Nyāya–Darśana, Vol. 1, pp. 390-393. 17. It is to be noted that in my classification of fallacies I have differed from the standard texts of the Nyāya system. 18. See also, J. L. Shaw, Review of Form and Validity in Indian Logic by V. Bharadwaja, Asian Philosophy, Number 2, 1992, pp. 187-193. 19. Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 340-346; Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, pp.407-409; Nyāya–Darśana, Vol. 1, pp. 184-189. 20. For a brief summary for the views of the old Nyāya philosophers, see Nyāya–Darśana, Vol. 2, pp. 268-279. 21. Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 347-386; Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, pp. 410-476; Nyāya–Darśana, Vol. 1, pp. 190-196, Vol. 2, pp. 493-523; Gadādhara, Śaktivāda, edited by G. D. Sastri, Kashi Sanskrit Series, (Varanasi: Chowkhamba, 1929). 22. For a comparison with Advaita Vedānta, see J.L. Shaw, ‘Conditions for Understanding the Meaning of a Sentence’, see this volume; Panchanana Bhattacharya, Vedānta–Paribhāṣā of Dharmarāja, with Bengali translation and commentary (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Bengali year 1377). 23. Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, p. 464; Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ, pp. 382-383; Jagadīśa, Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, Part I and Part II, with translation and commentary by Madhusudana Nyāyācārya, Our Heritage, (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1972-77). 24. For a discussion on this topic see J. L. Shaw, ‘Descriptions: Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyāya’, in this volume. 25. G. E. Moore, ‘Is Existence a Predicate?’, Philosophical Papers, p. 118. For a few more views on this topic, see P. F Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory and A. N. Prior, Objects of Thought. 26. Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ, p. 473.

CHAPTER SIX

Knowledge, Belief and Doubt: Some Contemporary Problems and their Solutions from the Nyāya Perspective INTRODUCTION The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the relevance of Indian epistemology to Western philosophy so that it can be integrated with the mainstream of Western philosophy. Hence I shall discuss:

1. how to suggest solutions to some unsolved problems of Western philosophy,



2. how to suggest better solutions to certain epistemological problems of Western philosophy, and



3. how to add new dimensions to Western philosophy.

The first section will deal with the definition of knowledge as justified true belief as well as the causal no-relevant alternatives approach of Goldman after a brief introduction to the contemporary theory of knowledge. In this context I shall try to show how to solve the ageold problem of knowledge in Western philosophy by using the concepts or the techniques of the Nyāya philosophers. Hence I shall focus on the Nyāya conception of knowledge and its sources, such as perception, inference and testimony. According to our positive thesis, belief, truth and justification are not three independent properties. Justification is a property of truth, and truth is a property of belief. The second section will deal with belief-sentences as discussed by contemporary Western philosophers. In this section I shall point out that none of the six theories found in contemporary Western philosophy are satisfactory. According to my positive thesis, the Nyāya philosophers can give an account of belief-sentences without postulating propositions, or sentences, or intensional entities as contents of our beliefs. Since, according to the Nyāya, belief is a doubt free cognition, I shall discuss the nature of doubt and how the Nyāya concept of doubt is incompatible with certain types of scepticism. I shall also point out how to solve Kripke’s puzzle about belief from the Nyāya point of view. Moreover, I shall point out that the Nyāya theory is comprehensive enough to deal with almost all types of belief-sentences of human language generally.

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I KNOWLEDGE In this section, after a very brief historical introduction to this problem, I shall discuss primarily the views of contemporary Western philosophers about knowledge and the Nyāya solutions to the problems related to the definition of knowledge as justified true belief. Therefore, I shall discuss (A) the historical background to the contemporary discussion on knowledge, (B) the contemporary definition of knowledge as justified true belief, which has its origin in Plato’s Meno, (C) Gettier’s counterexamples to this analysis of knowledge, (D) post-Gettier counterexamples to the standard analysis of knowledge, (E) the causal no-relevant alternatives approach of Goldman, (F) some problem cases for standard versions of reliabilism, (G) the Nyāya solutions to these problems, and (H) the Nyāya conception of knowledge. A) Historical Introduction In this context, I shall discuss the views of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant. (1) Plato  According to Plato, knowledge does not entail belief. The distinction between knowledge and belief can be drawn in the following ways: (i) Knowledge and belief are different faculties of the mind. Different faculties of mind are distinguished from each other in terms of their aims or what they achieve. The aims of knowledge and belief are their objects. (ii) The objects of knowledge are different from those of belief. The objects of knowledge are eternal unchanging Forms or Ideas, but the objects of belief are temporal, changing ephemeral things of this world. Hence the objects of knowledge are universals, whereas the objects of belief are particulars. (iii) Knowledge is related to reason, but belief is related to senses. The objects of knowledge are grasped through reason, while the objects of belief are apprehended through our senses. (iv) Knowledge requires instruction, not persuasion; whereas belief can be induced through persuasion. Hence knowledge is resistant to persuasion. If you know that 2+2=4, then no-one can persuade you to give up this knowledge. (v) Knowledge is incorrigible or infallible, while belief is corrigible or fallible. Hence knowledge as a mental state is to be distinguished from belief which is also a state of mind. (vi) Knowledge forms a system, but not belief. The objects of knowledge i.e. Ideas are related to each other in a certain way, but not the objects of belief. (vii) The objects of knowledge do not revive the objects of belief. On the contrary, the objects of belief revive the objects of knowledge as the former participate both in being and non-being but not the latter. (viii) Knowledge is directly related to its objects. It is like mental seeing or experiencing. But belief may be related to its objects indirectly. This is due to the fact that belief may depend on the views of others. Hence knowledge is related to its objects by acquaintance, but belief by description

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(ix) If I know something, then I know why it is so. But this does not happen in the case of belief. (x) Knowledge is explained in terms of recollection as the soul lived in the realm of Ideas, but belief is not a case of recollection as it depends on senses. (xi) Knowledge is virtue, but not belief. If a person knows the Good which is at the apex of the hierarchy of Ideas, then it affects his/her entire being. His/her acts, thoughts and desires converge on the ultimate end which is the summum bonum of life. Hence the knowledge of the Good, once attained, determines will and action. There is no doubt that Plato has laid the foundation for serious speculative philosophy and Platonism has survived through centuries or millennia. In spite of several commendable features, his official theory of knowledge has some shortcomings. It does not have much appeal to empiricists or scientific realists as they are concerned with the objects of experiences or natural science. His theory presupposes a dichotomy between the world of Ideas and the world of sense. Hence, it is difficult to bridge the gap between these two worlds. Moreover, it presupposes a conception of soul which is hard to substantiate. Furthermore, his official theory does not explain our ordinary uses of the word ‘knowledge’ as it is concerned with transcendent objects. For this reason it does not have much appeal to the philosophers of science or cognitive scientists. But there are suggestions for another definition of knowledge which has influenced the subsequent development of Western philosophy. In the Meno of Plato, it has been said that what turns a true belief into knowledge (episteme) is an aitias logismos, i.e. the working out of an explanation.1 In the Theaetetus also ‘episteme’ (‘knowledge’) is defined as ‘true belief with an account.’2 Hence justification is necessary for knowledge. Therefore, Plato is the forerunner of the contemporary thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. (2) Aristotle  Aristotle has added another dimension to our discussion of knowledge, although he has been influenced by some ideas of Plato as found in dialogues such as Meno and Theaetetus. He has applied the word ‘epistasthai’, translated as ‘know’, to a range of propositions about general laws, observable and non-observable states of affairs, etc. But his primary use is confined to demonstrative science. According to him a scientific theory must be demonstrative in character. A set of theorems must be deducible from certain fundamental principles or first principles which are necessarily true. Hence his theory is applicable to deductive sciences such as logic and mathematics, or even to rigorous scientific theories where the axioms are necessarily true or indubitable. Since the empirical propositions are not necessarily true or indubitable, it is hard to deduce them from first principles. Hence there is a gap between his theory and its application to our world of contingent facts or propositions. Terence Irwin, a contemporary commentator on Aristotle, says: ‘… he (Aristotle) does not explain how he reconciles this relation of theory to experience with the epistemological status that he claims for the first principles of a scientific theory’.3 From this remark it follows that his view of knowledge is confined to deductive sciences. Hence he does not explain our ordinary or empirical uses of the word ‘know’. Therefore, his view is not comprehensive enough, although he has explained the use of the word ‘knowledge’ in formal or rigorous sciences.

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(3) Kant  Kant is concerned with the question of how knowledge is possible, not with the question of whether knowledge is possible. Since he has used the word ‘knowledge’ in the sense of ‘synthetic a priori judgement’, he is concerned with the question how synthetic a priori judgement is possible. According to both Plato and Kant, knowledge is a priori, although the word ‘a priori’ does not have the same meaning for both of them. The Platonic definition may be stated in the following way: x is a priori if and only if x is acquired before experience. According to Plato knowledge is a case of recollection. Hence it is acquired before experience as the soul lived in the realm of Ideas or Plato’s heaven. But the Kantian definition does not presuppose a Platonic conception of soul or Ideas. His definition may be stated thus: x is a priori if and only if x is not derivable from experience. As regards the criterion of a priori Kant claimed that universality and necessity are marks for a prioricity. Since Kant is concerned with propositional knowledge, he considers judgement as the unit of knowledge. A judgement consists of a subject-concept and a predicate-concept. Synthetic judgement is defined in the following way: a judgement is synthetic if and only if the predicate-concept is not contained in the subject-concept. Hence the synthetic character of a judgement emphasises novelty. Since knowledge is synthetic a priori judgement, it must be characterised by novelty, universality and necessity. According to Kant, knowledge is a product of a process which involves both the faculties of sense and the understanding. Hence it involves both percepts (intuitions) and concepts. Percepts, according to Kant, without concepts are blind and concepts without percepts are empty. Hence knowledge cannot be derived from experience alone or understanding alone. According to Kant, thorough-going empiricism cannot explain the necessity and the universality in our knowledge. Again, thorough-going rationalism cannot explain the novelty in our knowledge. Since knowledge is a product of percept and concept (or categories), it retains novelty, necessity and universality. It involves both the passive and the active faculties of mind. According to Kant, the judgments of arithmetic such as ‘7+5=12’, the judgments of geometry such as ‘Three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles’, the assumptions or postulates of natural science such as ‘Every event has a cause’, and the principles of ethics or moral science such as ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ exhibit novelty, necessity and universality. Since necessity and universality are not derivable from experience, the judgments which exhibit them must be a priori. For this reason the judgments of arithmetic and geometry, and the principles of natural science and ethics, are a priori. Again, since these judgments exhibit novelty, they are synthetic. Hence, they are synthetic a priori. It is to be noted that, according to Kant, synthetic a priori judgments are not possible in deductive logic and metaphysics. Hence these judgments do not express knowledge. From the above discussion of Kant it follows that he cannot assign the status of knowledge to true empirical propositions (or judgments) such as ‘I am in this room’, ‘The table is brown’, etc. Hence his system also like Aristotle’s cannot explain our ordinary uses of the word ‘know’ or ‘knowledge’. B) Contemporary Philosophy The English verb ‘know’ is followed by different constructions that signify a wide range of things that are claimed to be objects of knowledge.

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(a) S knows that p, where ‘p’ expresses a proposition or a judgment. (b) S knows how to Ø, where ‘Ø’ stands for activities such as swimming, singing, dancing, speaking, driving, etc. (c) S knows x, where ‘x’ stands for an entity or a thing, or a person. Hence the verb ‘know’ is followed by a noun or noun-phrase. In addition to ‘knows that p’, ‘knows how to Ø’, and ‘knows x’, there are other constructions such as ‘knows whether’, ‘knows why’, etc; that is, the verb ‘know’ takes a wh-nominalisation. Most contemporary philosophers have emphasised the ‘knows that’ formulation, but Ryle has emphasised the ‘knows how’ formulation.2 Since most contemporary philosophers have focused on the ‘S knows that p’ formulation, I shall confine my discussion to propositional knowledge. Almost all twentieth-century Western philosophers have accepted the suggestion of Plato that knowledge cannot be equated with true belief. Hence contemporary philosophers, in general, have defined knowledge as justified true belief (JTB), although there is no unanimity with respect to the definition of ‘justification’ or ‘belief ’. A. J. Ayer has suggested the following definition:4 S knows that P iff (i) P is true, (ii) S is sure that P is true, and (iii) S has the right to be sure that P is true. Similarly, R. Chisholm has proposed the following definition:5 S knows that P iff (i) P is true, (ii) S accepts P, and (iii) S has adequate evidence for P. D. M. Armstrong, in his book Knowledge, Belief and Truth, has claimed that the following definition would satisfy different formulations:6 S knows that P iff (i) P is true, (ii) S believes that P or S is certain that P, and (iii) S has adequate evidence for P or S has good reasons for believing that P. C) Gettier’s Counterexamples But Gettier, in 1963, argued that the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief is incorrect. He has put forward the following two counterexamples to this analysis of knowledge:7

1) Both Smith and Jones have applied for a job. Suppose the director of the company told Smith that Jones would get the job. Smith found ten coins in the pocket of Jones. On the basis of the following two premises: a) Jones is the person who will get the job, b) Jones has ten coins in his pocket,

Smith infers,

c) The person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Now suppose Smith got the job and he also had ten coins in his pocket. Since Smith has justified true belief in c), the standard definition of knowledge applies to c), but he does not know c).

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2) Suppose Smith has always seen Jones driving a Ford, and just now Jones gave Smith a ride in a Ford. From these evidences Smith believes that Jones owns a Ford. From the premise (a) Jones owns a Ford,

Smith validly infers (b) Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. Now suppose Jones does not own a Ford, and Brown happens to be in Barcelona. It is just a lucky guess of Smith that Brown is in Barcelona. Hence (b) turns out to be true. Since it has satisfied the other two criteria of knowledge, it is a case of justified true belief. But Smith does not know (b). Subsequently many other counterexamples were put forward, and they are called ‘Gettier-type counterexamples’. These examples have the following features8 in common if we take the form ‘S knows that P’: (a) The truth-condition holds regarding P; (b) The belief-condition holds regarding P; (c) The justification or evidence-condition holds regarding P; (d) Some proposition, Q, is false; (e) S is justified in believing Q; (f) S does not know that P. The first attempt to avoid the Gettier-type counterexamples was suggested by adding a fourth condition, which may be stated thus: S’s justification for P does not include any false beliefs.9 D) Post-Gettier Counterexamples But subsequently other types of counterexamples were put forward by philosophers such as Goldman, Lehrer and Feldman.10 In their counterexamples the justification does not include any false beliefs. They are called ‘post-Gettier counterexamples’. Let us state the following counterexamples:

3) Suppose John is driving through the countryside, and sees something which he takes to be barns. These things look like barns, and some of them are barns. John believes that they are barns, and his belief is also true by virtue of there being barns among them. Since all the appropriate conditions for visual perception are present, his belief is justified as well.

Now suppose people around that countryside area have constructed several barn facades which cannot be easily distinguished from real barns. Since John cannot distinguish real barns from barn facades, he cannot claim to know that what he has seen are barns, although he has justified true belief.

4) Suppose a ball looks red to you and on this basis you judge it to be red, and it is really red. But the ball is illuminated by red lights, and you do not know that it is illuminated by red lights. Since it is illuminated by red lights, it would look red to

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you even if it were not red. Hence you do not know that the ball is red, although your belief has been justified as the appropriate conditions of perception are present and your belief is true.11

5) Suppose Smith knows the following proposition: P: Jones, who is an extremely reliable person and works in Smith’s office, has told Smith that he, Jones, owns a Ford. Suppose Jones was in a state of hypnosis when he mentioned this to Smith, and he has just won a Ford in a lottery. But the fact that he won a Ford remained unknown to both of them. Now Smith deduces the following proposition from P. Q: Someone, who is extremely reliable and works in his office, has told Smith that he owns a Ford. Now Smith deduces the proposition R from Q. R: Someone who works in my office owns a Ford.

Now it is claimed that Smith has justified true belief in R, as he has evidence for R, but does not know that R.12 Counterexamples of this type have led to a number of defeasibility analyses of knowledge. A defeasibility analysis requires that there be no true defeaters. Following Klein and Pollock the defeasibility condition may be stated in the following way:13 There is not a true proposition t such that if t were added to S’s beliefs then S would no longer be justified in believing P. By applying the defeasibility condition it is claimed that the above examples do not represent cases of knowledge. In our last example, if Smith had known the true proposition that Jones had entered a state of hypnosis, then he would not have believed that Jones owned a Ford. Hence Smith would no longer be justified in believing that someone who works in his office owns a Ford. But Lehrer and Paxson have put forward the following counterexample to the above defeasibility analysis of knowledge:14

6) ‘Suppose I see a man walk into the library and remove a book from the library by concealing it beneath his coat. Since I am sure the man is Tom Grabit, whom I have often seen before when he attended my classes, I report that I know that Tom Grabit has removed the book. However, suppose further that Mrs Grabit, the mother of Tom, has averred that on the day in question Tom was not in the library, indeed, was thousands of miles away, and that Tom’s identical twin brother, John Grabit, was in the library. Imagine, moreover, that I am entirely ignorant of the fact that Mrs Grabit has said these things. The statement that she has said these things would defeat any justification I have for believing that Tom Grabit removed the book, according to our present definition of defeasibility....

The preceding might seem acceptable until we finish the story by adding that Mrs Grabit is a compulsive and pathological liar, that John Grabit is a fiction of her demented mind, and that Tom Grabit took the book as I believed. Once this is added, it should be apparent that I did know that Tom Grabit removed the book.’ Since this example involves a true defeater defeater, the above formulation of defeasibility analysis cannot handle such cases. In order to deal with this type of example Moser15 has

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suggested a more complex form of defeasibility analysis. According to him, S knows that P on the justifying evidence e then e must be truth-sustained. In other words, for every true proposition t, when t joined with e undermines S’s justification for P on e, then there is a true proposition, t’, such that when it is conjoined with e and t, it restores the justification of P for S. Against this formulation it may be said that we can never be sure that we know the proposition in question, because it is not always possible to know a true proposition which will restore the previous belief. Moreover, this type of defeater defeater regress may occur again. It is also claimed that by adding a true proposition which will restore the previous belief we may be adding new reasons for believing the previous proposition. Hence we may not be restoring the old reason.16 Some philosophers are also sceptical about the fourth condition of knowledge, which can handle both the Gettier and the post-Gettier type of counterexamples. Pollock17 claims that no proposal of this sort has been worked out in the literature. Similarly, Moser claims that there is no consensus among philosophers with respect to the fourth condition of knowledge. To quote Moser: ‘The history of the attempted solutions to the Gettier problem is complex and open-ended; it has not produced consensus on any solution.’18 It may also be claimed that the proposals put forward to handle the Gettier-type of counterexamples are ad hoc. I think this is due to the fact that the belief-condition, the truth-condition and the justification-condition have been taken separately or in isolation. For this reason, even if all the conditions are satisfied we fail to establish that it is a case of justified true belief, where justification is a qualifier of truth, and truth is a qualifier of belief. Before discussing the above six counterexamples from the Nyāya point of view let us mention the reliable process theory of Goldman, which claims to solve some of the problems of Gettier-type counterexamples. E) Reliable Process Approach of Goldman Goldman considers the causal factor of knowledge, but not pseudo-causal factors. Let us consider his example. Tom wakes up in a foul mood one morning and says, ‘Today is going to be a miserable day’. Suppose his day was miserable, and hence his belief was true. This type of causal justification is not adequate for knowledge. But the same belief will have the status of knowledge if it is based on an authority. Suppose Tom gets a phone call from his colleague who reports on excellent authority that half of the staff will be laid off and Tom is one of them. Hence Tom believes that today is going to be a miserable day, and suppose his belief is true, as he will be laid off. In this case Tom’s belief will assume the status of knowledge as it is based on an authority. But a belief based on feelings or moods can easily go wrong. This is due to the fact that these processes are not reliable. Goldman claims that if a true belief is based on a reliable causal process, then it will have the status of knowledge. For this reason Goldman’s theory is called the ‘causal reliability approach’, which is different from the ‘reliable-indicator approach’ of Armstrong.20 Ramsey, for the first time, introduced the reliable process approach. He says, ‘I have always said that a belief was knowledge if it was (i) true, (ii) certain, and (iii) obtained by a reliable process’.21 Now we have several types of reliable-process approaches. The following pairs would give rise to several types of reliable-process theories: (a) global reliability and local 19

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reliability, (b) actual reliability and counterfactual reliability, (c) pure subjunctive reliability and relevant alternatives reliability. The last pair is the division of counterfactual reliability. The following diagram may represent different types of reliability theories:

If we combine the members of one pair with the members of another, then several other types of reliability approach can be generated. The distinction between global and local reliability is drawn in terms of the ranges of uses of the process. Global reliability is applicable to all uses of the process, but local reliability deals with the reliability of process in a particular case. The actual-counterfactual distinction deals with the reliability of a process in actual or counterfactual situations. The counterfactual approach is divided into pure subjunctive and relevant alternatives. The pure subjunctive approach considers the situations in which the proposition in question were false. The relevant alternatives approach of Goldman considers situations which are relevant alternatives to the truth of the proposition in question. According to this approach, a true belief, say P, fails to acquire the status of knowledge if there are relevant alternative situations in which the proposition P would be false, but the process would cause the agent to believe in P. Hence the process cannot discriminate the truth of P from other alternatives. For example, Smith sees Judy crossing the street and correctly believes that Judy is crossing the street. If it were Trudy, Judy’s twin sister, Smith could mistake her for Judy. If Smith could make this type of mistake, he does not know that Judy is crossing the street. The relevant alternatives approach considers only those alternatives which are relevant in that situation. Hence it considers the situation in which Judy’s twin sister is crossing the street. But the pure subjunctive account considers the situations in which Judy is not crossing the street or Judy is not there. If, in such counterfactual situations, Smith would not believe that Judy is crossing the street, then Smith knows that Judy is crossing the street. Since this theory allows several types of possibilities, Goldman thinks it is too permissive. For this reason he does not subscribe to the pure subjunctive approach.22 As regards the local and the global reliability approach, Goldman thinks that they are not mutually exclusive, and he subscribes to a theory which requires both. If a theory requires both, then a true belief assumes the status of knowledge, if it results from a

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generally reliable process and not just reliable in a particular case. Moreover, Goldman follows the relevant alternatives approach. Hence knowledge of a proposition P involves discriminating the truth of P from relevant alternatives that are counterfactuals. If the word ‘reliable’ is interpreted in this way, then Goldman’s definition of ‘knowledge’ may be expressed as follows: S knows that P df. S’s belief in P results from a reliable belief-forming process. As regards the nature of reliable belief-forming processes, Goldman says: ‘For a belief to count as knowledge, I am arguing, it must be caused by a generally reliable process. Exactly how reliable I have not said. Nor do I think this can be answered with precision. The knowledge concept is vague on this dimension …’23 In a recent paper, Adam Morton24 proposes a similar thesis from the standpoint of an externalist. Hence he supports the conception of knowledge as belief that results from a reliable process. As regards the explication or definition of ‘reliable process’, he also says, ‘There are hard questions about the definition of reliability.’25 With respect to the question of whether belief-forming processes include or involve external factors, Goldman says: ‘One thing we do not want to do is invoke factors external to the cogniser’s psychology. The sorts of processes we’re discussing are purely internal processes.’26 Now let us see whether the reliable relevant alternatives approach of Goldman can solve the Gettier or the post-Gettier problem. As regards example (2), Goldman claims that Smith does not know that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, although it is true. This true belief is defeated by the following relevant counterfactual alternative: Jones does not own a Ford and Brown is not in Barcelona. In other words, Smith will hold the same belief even if Jones does not own a Ford and Brown is not in Barcelona. Hence Smith fails to discriminate this counterfactual situation from the actual state of affairs. Our example (6) is similar. In this case I fail to discriminate Tom Grabit from John Grabit. Hence I cannot discriminate Tom Grabit’s stealing the book from the library from John Grabit’s stealing the book from the library. Here John Grabit’s stealing the book is considered as a relevant alternative. Goldman also claims that when I come to know that John was a fiction of Mrs Grabit’s demented mind, this alternative ceases to be a relevant alternative, and I can be credited with knowledge. In view of doubts about the definition of ‘reliability,’ it seems to me that Goldman’s theory is still in the form of a programme. His theory requires a comprehensive account of counterfactual situations. He also needs to spell out in detail the concept of relevant alternative. Since the relevant alternatives vary from one context to another, it is doubtful whether a precise definition can be formulated. He has also admitted that he does not have a theory of relevance. To quote: ‘I do not, however, have a detailed theory of relevance.’27 Moreover, his solution to the post-Gettier problem does not seem satisfactory. With respect to our example (6), he claims my belief in Tom Grabit’s stealing the book ceases to be a case of knowledge as I fail to discriminate Tom Grabit’s stealing the book from John Grabit’s stealing the book. But when I came to know that John Grabit is a figment of imagination, then I am credited with knowledge. Since it is not a genuine alternative, the question is whether my initial belief is a case of knowledge. If it is, then I had knowledge

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prior to discrimination, and I do not have knowledge when I fail to discriminate, and again I am credited with knowledge when I come to know that John is a figment of imagination. It is doubtful whether the original justification has been restored or a new justification has been smuggled into the original one. Moreover, if an imaginary or non-existent entity is introduced in the relevant alternatives, then again I will cease to have knowledge if another relevant alternative is constructed. Hence it might be difficult to establish the very possibility of knowledge in view of relevant alternatives. For this reason Goldman’s theory cannot solve either the Gettier or the post-Gettier problem. F) Problem Cases for Reliabilism In his paper ‘Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology’, Goldman28 tries to identify the concept of justified belief with the concept of belief obtained through the exercise of intellectual virtues (excellences). To quote Goldman: ‘Beliefs acquired (or retained) through a chain of “virtuous” psychological processes qualify as justified; those acquired partly by cognitive “vices” are derogated as unjustified.’29 According to Goldman, virtuous psychological processes include belief formation based on sight, hearing, memory and reasoning in certain ways, among others. But vices include belief formation based on guesswork, wishful thinking, etc. He explains the virtuous belief forming process by reference to their reliability. Hence, again he refers to the concept of reliability. In this paper Goldman mentions some well-known problem cases for standard versions of reliabilism. Let us consider the following cases: (7) Suppose a Cartesian demon gives people deceptive visual experiences which generate false beliefs. These beliefs are vision-based and the visual processes involved in these beliefs are similar to our visual processes. As regards justification, Goldman says: ‘For most epistemic evaluations, this seems sufficient to induce the judgment that the victims’ beliefs are justified. Does our account predict this result? Certainly it does.’30 From this remark it follows that the standard versions of reliabilism are not adequate to handle such cases. This is due to the fact that they rely on internal processes for justification, and justification is not considered as a qualifier of truth or true beliefs. (8) Consider the clairvoyance example, which has been repeatedly mentioned by Goldman and Bonjour, among many other epistemologists. Suppose a person possesses the power of clairvoyance. Suppose he believes that the Prime Minister of New Zealand is in Auckland, and it happens to be true. Similarly, whenever he believes that the Prime Minister of New Zealand is in Christchurch, the Prime Minister happens to be in Christchurch. Regarding this example, Goldman, in his paper on ‘Reliabilism’, says: ‘The clairvoyance example challenges the sufficiency of reliabilism. Suppose a cognitive agent possesses a reliable clairvoyance power, but has no evidence for or against his possessing such a power. Intuitively, his clairvoyantly formed beliefs are unjustified, but reliabilism declares

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them justified’.31 But in his paper on ‘Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology’,32 Goldman claims that clairvoyantly formed beliefs are nonjustified. Hence they are neither justified nor unjustified. G) Solutions from the Nyāya Perspective Now I would like to discuss how the Nyāya would handle the Gettier and the post-Gettier counterexamples as well as the two problem cases for reliabilism. With respect to the first counterexample of Gettier, the Nyāya philosophers such as Udayana would claim that the conclusion of this inference is false. Therefore, it cannot be a case of knowledge. The belief or the cognition of Smith expressed by the sentence ‘The person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket’ can be expressed in the following way: ‘The person who will get the job being identical with Jones has ten coins in his pocket.’ This is due to the fact that the conclusion is derived from the belief that Jones is the person who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Since Smith got the job and has ten coins in his pockets, the belief of Smith is false. Since this sentence can be used to express different beliefs, we are not simply concerned with the truth of the sentence, but with the belief expressed by this sentence. In this case the belief it expresses is false. With respect to the second counterexample of Gettier, it is a case of belief, truth and justification, but not a case of justified true belief, where justification is a qualifier of true belief. The belief (or cognition) expressed by the sentence ‘Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona’ is true by virtue of the fact that Brown happens to be in Barcelona. Since it is deduced from the premise ‘Jones owns a Ford,’ it is in accordance with the rules of logic. If ‘justification’ means ‘being derived from premise(s) by applying the rules of logic,’ then it has justification. Hence justification comes from the fact that it is derived from ‘Jones owns a Ford.’ Since Jones does not own a Ford, the truth of the conclusion does not come from the premise ‘Jones owns a Ford.’ The truth of the conclusion comes from the fact that Brown is in Barcelona but its justification comes from the fact that it is derived from ‘Jones owns a Ford.’ Hence justification has nothing to do with its truth. Therefore, justification is not a qualifier of its truth. If the truth of the conclusion were derived from the truth of ‘Brown is in Barcelona,’ then it would have been a case of justified true belief. In other words, if ‘Brown is in Barcelona’ were the premise, then the conclusion would have been a case of justified true belief. Hence this counterexample of Gettier lacks justified true belief, although it is true and has justification. This is analogous to the truth of the sentence ‘The man with a red iron mask is in this room.’ This sentence cannot be claimed to be true by virtue of having a man in this room, an iron mask in this room and a red object in this room. Hence from the Nyāya point of view justification is a qualifier of true belief. Here justification means some sort of guarantee for its truth. As regards the post-Gettier counter example (3), the Nyāya claims that a physical object is not inferred from its look. Our sense-organs are related to the physical object, and the latter is one of the causal conditions of perceptual cognition or belief. Since there are both real barns and barn facades, our sense-organs are related to both. If we know the mode (or the limitor) under which a barn facade is presented, then we can discriminate a real barn from a barn facade. A limitor, according to the Nyāya, is a mode of presentation of the object(s) and it uniquely determines the referent(s) of a term. In this example, John has cognized

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both a real barn and a barn facade. Since he cannot discriminate a real barn from a barn facade, he has not cognized the mode under which a real barn is presented and the mode under which a barn facade is presented. Since John believes that these are barns while some of them are barn facades, his belief cannot be said to be true. Hence it cannot be treated as a counterexample. Even if his belief were true if he would have referred to real barns when he says ‘These are barns’, his belief does not have the status of knowledge. This is due to the fact that barns are not presented under the mode of barnness. Hence he lacks the ability to discriminate real barns from barn facades. Therefore, his true belief lacks justification. As regards (4), the Nyāya would claim that our sense-organs are related to both the ball and its red colour as it is red. Moreover, both the objects and the relations between objects and sense-organs are causal conditions for perceptual cognitions. If the red colour of the ball is presented under the mode of redness which is its limitor, then it would be a case of knowledge. If a person knows redness that determines red colours only, and not the reflection due to red light, then he can discriminate a real red colour from the reflection of red colour, which is due to illumination of red lights. Hence the Nyāya claims that if the red colour is presented under the mode of redness, then the perceiver would be able to discriminate and his/her cognition would have the status of knowledge. On the contrary, if he/she cannot discriminate, then the truth of the belief that the ball is red lacks justification. As regards example (5), the Nyāya claims that Jones does not satisfy the criteria for being an āpta (authority or trustworthy person). A person is an āpta iff (a) he/she has a true cognition of what he/she says, (b) he/she selects the appropriate expressions to convey his/her true cognition, (c) he/she is not lying, and (d) his/her sense-organs that are causal conditions for utterance or inscription do not suffer from any defect or weakness.33 In this case, Jones does not know that he has won a car in a lottery. Hence he ceases to be an āpta or a trustworthy person. For this reason his utterance cannot be considered as a source of valid cognition, although the sentence he has uttered is true and the sentence would generate a true cognition in the hearer. Since there is no guarantee or justification for the true cognition generated by his utterance, it does not have the status of knowledge. As regards example (6), the Nyāya claims that if Tom Grabit is presented to me under the mode of a unique property, then I would be able to identify him in every situation. Hence there would be no relevant alternatives which would defeat my knowledge-claim. If Tom Grabit is cognized under the mode of a unique property which will distinguish him from all other individuals, then there would be guarantee for the truth of the belief that Tom Grabit has removed the book from the library. If there is a guarantee for the truth of this belief, then there cannot be a true defeater. Hence it rules out the possibility of true defeater defeater regress. As regards example (7) of Goldman, it is neither a case of perception nor is it a case of testimony. Obviously, it is not a case of an inferential cognition as it is not derived from a mark (hetu). Hence it does not come under any sources of valid cognition. It is to be remembered that, according to the Nyāya, the object of cognition, the sense-contact with the object and the contact with the qualified object of the form a being F are causal conditions of a true perceptual cognition. Since these conditions have not been satisfied, this example cannot be treated as a case of true perception. Again, since the demon wants to deceive us, he fails to satisfy the conditions for being an āpta or trustworthy person. Hence it cannot be a case of testimony.

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With respect to example (8), it may be said from the Nyāya point of view that the reliable clairvoyance power is not a case of perception, including the Yogic perception, or inference, or testimony. Hence it is not derivable from any valid sources of cognition. The beliefs of the agents who have clairvoyant faculty lack justification, although they are true. Hence these beliefs do not have the status of knowledge. From the above discussion it follows that the Nyāya theory of sources of valid cognition (pramāṇas) can handle both the Gettier and the post-Gettier type of counterexamples. Moreover, the Nyāya theory can answer some of the questions raised by contemporary philosophers such as Goldman. According to our positive thesis which is based on the intuitions of the Nyāya system, knowledge is a justified true belief if justification is taken as a qualifier of true belief. Hence justification is not a property of belief independent of truth. The word ‘justification,’ in this context, means ‘some sort of guarantee for the truth of a belief.’ Since a true belief is a result of a process, it is justified in terms of certain features of the process which guarantee its truth. In other words, it is justified in terms of certain causal conditions which are not identical with the conditions of its truth. Moreover, if there is justification for the truth of a belief, then the believer can identify or discriminate the fact which corresponds to this belief. The process which guarantees the truth of a belief is repeatable and objective. It can be used to generate a similar belief in others. Hence if I know that p, then you can also know that p. Since the process guarantees the truth of a belief, if I know that p, then I cannot be wrong. Furthermore, there are different types of knowledge depending on the sources such as perceptual, inferential, or verbal. Hence there are different types of processes and different types of justification depending on the sources. Even if the sources are different, the content of a perceptual, inferential, and a verbal cognition may be identical. But the ways our mental states are related to the same content are not the same. In order to describe the content of a perceptual cognition the Nyāya uses the pairs: anuyogī – pratiyogī (first term – second term) ādhāra – ādheya (substratum – superstratum) viśeṣya – viśeṣaṇa (qualificand – qualifier) viśeṣya – prakāra (qualificand – relational qualifier). But in the case of a verbal cognition the Nyāya uses the following pairs: viśeṣya – viśeṣaṇa (qualificand – qualifier) viśeṣya – prakāra (qualificand – relational qualifier) uddeśya – vidheya (subject – predicate). The explanation of an inference for others involves the pair pakṣa–sādhya (the locus of inference – probandum) in addition to all the five pairs mentioned above.34 H) The Nyāya on Knowledge The Nyāya philosophers have discussed the conditions or causal conditions of cognition, conditions of a true cognition, conditions of a false cognition, and conditions which justify

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the truth of a cognition. The causal conditions involved in the process are not exclusively internal. Hence some conditions are external. The Nyāya claims that there are both a set of positive and a set of negative causal conditions of perception. The perceiver (the self), the internal sense-organ (manas), the external sense-organs (such as eyes), the objects of perception, the sense-object contact, etc., are positive causal conditions. In addition to these causal conditions, there are certain negative causal conditions. In this context it is to be noted that the Sāṃkhya philosophers have mentioned the following negative causal conditions of perception, some of which have been accepted by the Nyāya: (a) Not being too far (atidūratābhāva); (b) Not being too close (atisāmīpyābhāva); (c) Absence of loss of sense-organs, such as deafness, blindness, etc. (indriyanāśābhāva); (d) Not being inattentive (mano’navasthānābhāva); (e) Not being too subtle (sūkṣmābhāva); (f) Not having intervening objects such as wall, screen, etc. (vyavadhānābhāva); (g) Not being overshadowed (or covered) by a more powerful object (abhibhavābhāva), e.g., during the day, stars are not visible as they are overshadowed by the rays of the sun; (h) Not being mixed up with similar objects (samānābhihārābhāva), e.g., rain water cannot be perceived in a lake or a river separately as it is mixed up with similar objects. But the Nyāya philosophers have not treated all of them as negative causal conditions. They would consider only (a), (b), (g) and (h) as negative causal conditions. The remaining four will be considered positive. Therefore the third one will be normal senseorgans instead of absence of loss of sense-organs. The fourth one will be attentive instead of not being inattentive, and the fifth one having some magnitude (mahatva) instead of not being too subtle. The sixth one is to be rejected as negative on the ground that the senseobject contact is a positive causal condition. Hence the Nyāya philosophers would consider only (a), (b), (g) and (h) in the above list as negative. In the case of an ordinary perceptual cognition sense-organs are special instrumental causes (karaṇas), and the sense-object contact is the operation (vyāpāra). The technical terms ‘karaṇa’ and ‘vyāpāra’ may be defined in the following way: (i) x is a vyāpāra (operation) of the effect E iff (Ey) (y is a cause of E and x is a cause of E, but x is due to y). (ii) x is a karaṇa (special instrumental cause) of the effect E iff x is a causal condition, x is related to the locus of E through an operation, and it is considered as a cause due to this relation only.35 Let us consider the following example of the Nyāya philosophers: The floor has a pot. In this case our visual sense-organ is the special instrumental cause, and the contact between the visual sense-organ and the floor is the operation. Since our

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sense-organ is related to the floor, it is also related to the pot which is on the floor. Since the cognition that the floor has a pot is due to a sense-organ, it is considered as perceptual. In this case the objects of cognition such as the floor, the pot and the relation of conjunction are related to the cognition. Hence the cognition is also related to all these items. The cognition will be related to these items even if it is false. Hence in terms of the relation between these items and the cognition alone we cannot draw the distinction between a true and a false cognition. When a perceptual cognition is true, our sense-organ is related to the qualified object. In the above example, our visual sense organ is not only related to the floor, but also to the floor that is qualified by a pot on it. Hence the cognition generated by this process will be related to the qualified object or the fact. The relation of the cognition to the fact is called ‘viśiṣṭa viṣayatā,’ which is a relational property of the object of cognition. The cognition is characterized by the converse of this relational property, which is called ‘viśiṣṭa viṣayitā’. Thus a true perceptual cognition presupposes certain additional conditions. A false perceptual cognition could be due to a defect (doṣa) or an inappropriate causal condition (kāraṇavaiguṇya). A defect (doṣa) is the negatum of a negative causal condition of a true perceptual cognition, but an inappropriate causal condition (kāraṇavaiguṇya) is the weakness of a positive causal condition of a true perceptual cognition such as a defective visual sense organ or the absence of a positive causal condition of a true cognition. So a visual perception could be false due to distance (dūratva), which is the negatum of a negative causal condition of a true cognition. Similarly, it could be false due to weakness of the visual sense organ. In our above example, if the cognition is true, then it is related to the floor, the pot, the relation of conjunction, and the qualified object, i.e., the floor qualified by a pot on it. The causal conditions of this perceptual cognition would include the relation of the visual sense organ to these items. But, in addition to these relations of the cognition to its objects, the Nyāya philosophers have accepted the relation of the cognition to universal floorness and the relation of the cognition to universal potness. Now the question is, what is the need for these additional relations? In this context it is to be noted that some contemporary epistemologists claim that identification and discrimination are necessary for knowledge. On Goldman’s theory, if S knows that p, then S can discriminate the truth of p from relevant alternatives. In his system these alternatives are counterfactual. But his theory cannot explain why a person, say Smith, is able to discriminate the truth of p from relevant alternatives, but another person, say Jones, is not able to discriminate the truth of p from relevant alternatives. The Nyāya can explain this phenomenon in terms of the relation of Smith’s cognition to the universal floorness and the universal potness which are limitors of a floor and a pot respectively. Since Smith’s sense-organ is related not only to the floor and the pot, but also to their limitors, his cognition is related to these limitors as well. Since the cognition of limitors can explain our ability to discriminate, there is a need for these limitors in epistemic contexts. Similarly, in the case of an inference,36 the Nyāya philosophers have discussed the causal conditions of an inferential cognition (anumiti), the causal conditions of its truth or falsehood, and the causal conditions which justify the truth of an inferential cognition or

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the ability to discriminate. An inference, according to the Nyāya, has three terms, namely, sādhya (probandum), pakṣa (locus of inference), and hetu (probans, or reason). The term sādhya refers to what is to be inferred. The term pakṣa refers to the locus of inference where there is some doubt about the presence of sādhya. The term hetu refers to the reason by means of which the sādhya is inferred in the pakṣa. In this context it is to be noted that an inference for others, according to the Nyāya, involves five members, which are related to each other by the relation of relevance. Relevance is a relation between the contents of expressions or sentences via some questions.37 Let us consider the following inference for others: Thesis (pratijñā): The mountain has a fire. Reason (hetu): Because of smoke. Example (udāharaṇa): Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen, etc. Application (upanaya): The mountain has smoke which is pervaded by fire. Conclusion (nigamana): Therefore, the mountain has a fire. This inference has the following form: Thesis (pratijñā): a is G. Reason (hetu): Because of F. Example (udāharaṇa): Wherever there is F, there is G, as in b, etc. Application (upanaya): a has F which is pervaded by G. Conclusion (nigamana): Hence a is G, or G is present in a, where a is the locus of the inference (pakṣa), F is the probans, G is the probandum, b is the locus where G is known to be present (sapakṣa). An inferential cognition, according to the Nyāya, has certain instrumental causal conditions (nimitta-kāraṇas) such as parāmarśa (operation), vyāpti jñāna (cognition of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum), and pakṣatā (a special relational property of the locus). An inferential cognition (anumiti) is usually defined in terms of parāmarśa (operation). Parāmarśa (operation) is the cognition of the property of being the pervaded which appears as the qualifier of the probans which is present in the locus (vyāpti-prakāraka-pakṣadharmatā-jñāna). In other words, an inferential cognition of the form ‘a is G’ is derivable from the cognition of the form ‘a is F which is pervaded by G’, where a is the locus, F is the probans, and G is the probandum. The latter is a causal condition of the former. But the truth of the inferential cognition does not depend on this causal condition. Hence the truth of the cognition a is G does not depend on the cognition of a is F which is pervaded by G. The truth depends on the fact that the locus which is cognized in the operation is characterized by the probandum. Now the question is whether a true inferential cognition would assume the status of knowledge. In this context it is to be noted that a false operation such as ‘the mountain has fog which is pervaded by fire’ might lead to the true inferential cognition ‘the mountain has fire.’ Since the occurrence of a false cognition can be prevented by a true one, the occurrence of the above false operation can be prevented by the true cognition that fog is not pervaded by fire. If the occurrence of the operation is prevented, then the occurrence of the inferential cognition which is due to this operation would also be prevented. In other words, if a person knows that fog is not pervaded by fire, then he would not use this

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operation to infer that the mountain has fire. For this reason the Nyāya would claim that the above true inferential cognition does not have the status of knowledge. In other words, if the inferential process which leads to a true cognition contains a false cognition, then the true inferential cognition does not have the status of knowledge. The Nyāya philosophers have also discussed our ability to discriminate in the case of inferential cognition. Consider the following inference: (a) Wherever there is blue smoke, there is fire. (b) The mountain has blue smoke. (c) Therefore, the mountain has fire. In this inference the conclusion follows from the premises, and both the conclusion and the premises are true. Now the Nyāya raises the question whether the cognition expressed by the sentence ‘wherever there is blue smoke, there is fire’ is such that the property of being the pervaded residing in blue smoke which is signified by the expression ‘wherever’ is limited by blue smokeness or by smokeness only. In other words, the question is whether the property of being the pervaded is presented under the mode of blue smokeness (i.e. blueness and smokeness) or under the mode of smokeness. If it is presented under the mode of blue smokeness, then the person, who has inferred the mountain has fire from the above two premises, would not be able to infer the same conclusion from the cognition of ‘the mountain has black smoke.’ On the contrary, if he/she would have inferred ‘the mountain has fire’ from ‘wherever there is smoke, there is fire, and the mountain has smoke’, then he/she would be able to infer ‘the mountain has fire’ from the observation of black smoke as well. This is due to the fact that the mode of presentation of the property of being the pervaded signified by the expression ‘wherever’ is smokeness, not blue smokeness. Since the property of being the pervaded residing in any smoke, blue or black, is limited by smokeness, the cognitions expressed by sentences such as ‘wherever there is blue smoke, there is fire,’ and ‘wherever there is black smoke, there is fire’ would be true. In other words, if the property of being the pervaded is cognized under the mode of smokeness, then it reveals an ontological property of smoke, blue or black. Hence the cognition of smoke as qualified by smokeness, not as qualified by blue smokeness, gives us a guarantee for making similar inferences. Therefore, a person is able to infer fire from any smoke, blue or black, if he/she has cognised the property of being the pervaded under the mode of smokeness. Hence the Nyāya not only emphasizes our ability to discriminate in the case of inference, but also explains this ability in terms of the cognition of certain properties. In this case, it is the cognition of the limitor of the property of being the pervaded which resides in the probans. With respect to a verbal cognition (testimony) also, the Nyāya philosophers have discussed its causal conditions, the causal conditions of its truth or falsehood, and the causal conditions which justify its truth. The chief instrumental cause (karaṇa) of the cognition of the meaning of a sentence is the cognition of the words contained in it, and the operation of this cognition is the memory-cognition of the referents of the words. According to the Nyāya, the cognition of the meaning of a sentence, as distinct from the cognition of the meanings of its parts, lies in cognizing the relation between the referents of its parts which are sets of expressions. Hence the cognition of the meaning of the sentence ‘a flower is red’ lies in cognizing the

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relation of a red colour to a flower. If the sentence is true, then it would generate a true cognition, and the cogniser would apprehend the relation which holds between a red colour and a flower. If the sentence is false, then it would generate a false cognition, and the cogniser would apprehend a relation which does not hold between a red colour and a flower, but which holds between some other objects such as between a red colour and a table. Now the question is whether a true cognition generated by a true sentence has the status of knowledge. On this point the Nyāya claims that it would be a case of knowledge if the true sentence is uttered or inscribed by an āpta (a trustworthy person). This is due to the fact that a true cognition generated by the utterance of an āpta has justification. Therefore, it has the status of knowledge. From our above discussion it follows that knowledge is justified true cognition or belief, provided justification is a qualifier of true cognition or belief. A true cognition is justified by certain perceptual causal conditions, or by certain inferential causal conditions, or by certain verbal causal conditions. Hence the Nyāya technique for justifying a true cognition may be used for interpreting or explicating the meaning of the word ‘knowledge.’ From the above discussion it also follows that the Nyāya philosophers have treated justification as a qualifier of true belief, and have emphasized the sources of valid cognition, which will explain why certain true beliefs have justification. Moreover, the Nyāya explains the ability to discriminate an object or a set of objects in terms of the cognition of limitor(s). This explanation allows us to solve some problems of contemporary Western philosophy.

II  BELIEF AND DOUBT In this section I shall discuss the Nyāya conception of belief as well as doubt. Since there is no proposition as distinct from a sentence, beliefs are considered true or false. Moreover since the Nyāya philosophers could also accept the definition of knowledge as justified true belief, I’d like to focus on the Nyāya concept of belief. Moreover, the Nyāya discussion of belief suggests solutions to some problems of belief in the Western philosophy. Since belief, according to the Nyāya, is a doubt-free cognition, I shall explain the Nyāya concept of doubt as well. The importance of belief has been emphasized very widely in Western philosophy in which it is considered as the central problem. To quote Russell: Belief … is the central problem in the analysis of mind. Believing seems the most ‘mental’ thing we do, the thing most remote from what is done by mere matter. The whole intellectual life consists of beliefs and of the passage from one belief to another by what is called ‘reasoning’. Beliefs give knowledge and error; they are the vehicles of truth and falsehood. Psychology, theory of knowledge and metaphysics revolve about belief, and on the view we take of belief our philosophical outlook largely depends.38 Ramsey also claimed that a belief is ‘a map of neighbouring space by which we steer.’39 So he attributes two characteristics to a belief: it is a map, and it is something by which we steer. I would like to claim that the set of beliefs of a person represents his/her form of life. It determines the entire mental life of a person, including emotions, feelings and attitudes. There are four views in Western tradition concerning the category to which belief belongs: (i) Belief is a faculty of mind; (ii) it is a disposition of the believer; (iii) it is

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a conscious occurrence in the mind of the believer; and (iv) it is a mental state of the believer’s mind. Since I would like to focus on the nature of belief-sentences, in this paper I do not intend to discuss the category to which belief belongs. However, I consider belief as a mental state of the believer, dispositional or conscious. In this section I shall discuss A) contemporary theories of belief; B) the Nyāya concept of doubt; and C) the Nyāya explanation of belief-sentences. A) Contemporary Theories There are six approaches to the problems of belief-sentences in contemporary Western philosophy, which I will outline below. Suggestions for the sixth approach can be found in Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy,40 but this approach has not been developed either by Russell or by his followers to solve the problems of belief-sentences. In the context of our discussion of the Nyāya view, we shall see how the Nyāya view is related to some of the suggestions of Russell, and how the Nyāya philosophers can give an account of belief-sentences without postulating either propositions or sentences or intensional entities such as concepts or images as contents of our beliefs. Moreover, following the Nyāya technique we shall explain the difference between different types of belief-sentences. Furthermore, we shall see how the Nyāya philosophers would restrict the principles of substitutivity and existential generalisation in the context of belief-sentences. a) One of the approaches to belief-sentences may be attributed to early Wittgenstein, who writes: ‘It is clear, however, that “A believes that p”, “A has the thought p” and “A says p” are of the form “p” says p’. (Tractatus 5.542).41 Since this approach eliminates belief as an entity from our ontology, it would not be acceptable to those who would consider belief as a new phenomenon which is not reducible to any other fact or entity. In this context, the remark of Russell is worth quoting. He says: ‘I have got on here to a new sort of thing, a new beast for our zoo.’42 Hence the view of Wittgenstein is not acceptable to a philosopher who is not already committed to his assumptions. b) The second approach reduces a belief to a set of behaviour. This approach has been followed by pragmatists such as James and Dewey, some American realists, and other behaviourists. According to this view, if a person believes something, then he behaves in a certain fashion. Either we identify a belief with a set of behaviour in the case of strong behaviourism or we correlate a belief with a set of behaviour in the case of weak behaviourism. With respect to the view of James and Dewey, Russell says: When I believe a proposition, that means that I act in a certain fashion, that my behaviour has certain characteristics, and my belief is a true one if the behaviour leads to the desired result and is a false one if it does not.43 From this remark of Russell’s, it follows that the meaning of a belief-sentence is to be identified with the meaning of a sentence about behaviour. The Rylean approach is not identical with the above type of behaviourism, although there is some close affinity between these two views. According to Ryle, a belief-sentence,

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taken literally, has made a category mistake. But if it is taken as a dispositional statement, not descriptive of something, then it is ultimately reducible to a hypothetical statement about our behaviour. Since this view is also committed to many dubious assumptions about the nature of mind (or self) or human being, it will not be acceptable to those philosophers who are not already committed to those assumptions. c) Another approach to the problems of belief-sentences is to be found in Frege, and this approach has been defended by Church. Frege says: In indirect (oblique) discourse we speak of the sense, e.g., of the words of someone else. From this it becomes clear that also in indirect discourse words do not have their customary nominata; they here name what customarily would be their sense. In order to formulate this succinctly we shall say: words in indirect discourse are used indirectly, or have indirect nominata. Thus we distinguish the customary from the indirect nominatum of a word; and its customary sense from its indirect sense.44 From this remark of Frege, along with his other remarks about belief, it follows that in the sentence, (1) John believes that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley, the proposition expressed by the sentence (or subordinate clause) ‘Shakespeare is the author of Waverley’ is the content of his belief and it is the nominatum in this context. Now the question is, if the customary sense becomes the nominatum, then what would be the sense of this customary sense which is the indirect nominatum? Since the sense of a sentence is a function of the senses of its terms, in the above example the sense of ‘Shakespeare’ would be a part of the sense of the sentence ‘Shakespeare is the author of Waverley,’ which is the subordinate clause in (1). If the sense of ‘Shakespeare’ is the author of Hamlet and if this sense is a part of the proposition which is the indirect nominatum, then we require the sense of this sense in an indirect context. If we consider a proposition as one indivisible unit, then also we can ask about the mode of its presentation, which will be the indirect sense of it in an indirect context. Fregean scholars, including Dummett, find it difficult to give a straightforward answer to this question.45 Secondly, another difficulty, which Carnap46 thinks to be the greatest complexity of the Frege-Church method, is that there are infinitely many senses of an expression depending on the context of its use. Moreover, this type of proposition theory of belief ends up with the postulation of both eternally true and false propositions. According to the upholders of this view, corresponding to a true proposition such as 2+2=4, there will be an infinite number of false propositions, such as 2+2=5, 2+2=6, etc. For this reason many contemporary philosophers such as Tarski47 and Quine do not accept an intermediary entity such as proposition in addition to concrete things and expressions. d) According to another approach, the content of a belief is a sentence, or belief is a relation between a person and a sentence.48 Let us consider the sentence (2) John believes that the earth is round. If a sentence is the content of John’s belief, then (2) is interpreted as (3) John believes ‘the earth is round’. But if belief is a relation between a person and a sentence, then (2) is to be interpreted as (4) John has the relation B to the sentence ‘the earth is round.’

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On either of these interpretations we cannot derive (5) John believes that die Erde ist rund, or any other sentence which is synonymous with (2). If we apply this view to a sentence such as (6) John believes in Shakespeare, then we have to paraphrase it in such a way that a sentence follows the verb ‘believes’. But if we do not paraphrase it, then either we fail to give an account of such sentences, or we have to claim that belief is also a relation between a person and a word or the content of belief could also be a word, in addition to a sentence. Since this view is very restrictive in the sense that it rules out the possibility of belief in animals, newborn babies and in persons who do not speak or understand any sentence, it may be rejected on this ground. e) According to another view what occurs in a belief context is neither an expression nor its sense, but a vivid conception of an object. Kaplan calls it ‘vivid name’. He says: Our most vivid names can be roughly characterized as those elaborate descriptions containing all we believe about a single person. Such names will almost certainly contain inaccuracies which will prevent them from actually denoting anyone.49 From this remark of Kaplan it follows that a vivid name need not always be referential. A referential vivid name for a person, say Ralph, symbolized as ‘R(α, x, Ralph)’ fulfils the following conditions according to Kaplan: (i) α denotes x, (ii) α is a name of x for Ralph, and (iii) α is (sufficiently) vivid. By introducing a distinction between a merely vivid name and a referentially vivid name, Kaplan explains Quine’s distinction between sentences such as (7) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy, and (8) There is a person Ortcutt such that Ralph believes him to be a spy. In (7) merely a vivid name of Ortcutt will occur in the belief of Ralph, whereas in (8) a referentially vivid name of Ortcutt will occur. (8) is symbolized as (9) Eα [R(α, Ortcutt, Ralph) & Ralph B α is a spy] Since the name ‘Ortcutt’ does not occur referentially in (7), it does not imply the existence of Ortcutt. What occurs in the content of a belief is neither an expression, nor the sense of an expression, but another type of entity. In order to characterize this type of entity Kaplan says: Many of our beliefs have the form: ‘The color of her hair is --’, or ‘The song he was singing went --’, where the blanks are filled with images, sensory impressions, or what have you, but certainly not words. If we cannot even say it with words but have to print it or sing it, we certainly cannot believe it with words.50 Since the postulation of intermediary entities such as images can give a better explanation of belief sentences than the postulation of sentences or expressions as contents of belief, Kaplan favours the former approach to the problems of belief-sentences. But if belief

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sentences can be explained without postulating the intermediate entities of Kaplan, then he cannot claim that his theory is better than one which does not postulate intermediate entities. In the context of the Nyāya view I shall discuss a theory of this type. f) There is still another approach to the problems of belief-sentences, which has been proposed by Russell, but not followed or refined or extended by other philosophers. Since the view of Russell has some affinity with that of the Nyāya, it will pave our discussion for the latter and hence it is worthy of consideration. Russell, in ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,’ claimed that in a belief-sentence there are at least two verbs. Let us consider his example. (10) Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio. Here the verbs ‘believes’ and ‘loves’ have occurred as genuine verbs, and the verb in the subordinate clause seems to relate Desdemona to Cassio; but in fact it does not do so. He says, This is what constitutes the puzzle about the nature of belief. You will notice that wherever one gets to really close quarters with the theory of error one has the puzzle of how to deal with error without assuming the existence of the non-existent.51 Now the question is how to explain the nature of (10) without postulating non-existent love as an entity, which will relate Desdemona to Cassio. Moreover, Russell claimed that ‘loves’ should be treated as a verb. This requirement leads to the rejection of his earlier view proposed in The Problems of Philosophy,52 where (10) has been analysed as a four-place relation between Othello, Desdemona, loves, and Cassio. Hence (10) is to be analysed as (11) B (Othello, Desdemona, loves, Cassio). Since the verb ‘loves’ in (11) is on a par with the terms ‘Desdemona’ and ‘Cassio,’ this analysis does not fulfil one of the above requirements of Russell. Mark Sainsbury, one of the recent commentators on Russell, has pointed out a few more shortcomings of Russell’s earlier view, as proposed in The Problems of Philosophy. He says: ... the PP (Problems of Philosophy) theory of belief is defective in that it makes all belief relational and all occurrences of names in the believed-sentence transparent. A further difficulty is that it is hard to see how the theory is to be extended to cases in which the believed-sentence is non-atomic.53 As an explanation of what Sainsbury means by ‘relational belief ’ he makes the following comment: Let us say that a sentence built on the following lines attributes a relational belief: ‘A believes, concerning ..., that it is -----’ (where the pronoun picks up the reference of what fills the dots). The place occupied by the dots is referentially transparent: ‘A believes, concerning t, that it is F,’ together with ‘t = s’, entails ‘A believes, concerning s, that it is F.’54 From the above remarks of Sainsbury it follows that Russell’s account of belief-sentences in The Problems of Philosophy cannot draw the distinction between de re and de dicto beliefsentences; it makes all names transparent; and it is difficult to apply to non-atomic beliefsentences. In spite of these shortcomings, I think, Russell’s great contribution lies in the view that what occurs in a belief-sentence is not a proposition, but the constituents of a

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proposition, and in his suggestions that a satisfactory theory of belief should not postulate non-existent objects and should not reduce the verb in the subordinate clause to a term. In the context of our discussion of the Nyāya we shall see how the Nyāya philosophers have avoided the shortcomings of Russell’s theory and at the same time followed the suggestions of a satisfactory theory of belief. B) The Nyāya Concept of Doubt Since the Nyāya claims that belief is a doubt-free cognition, I would like to discuss the Nyāya conception of dubious cognition. Moreover, the Nyāya analysis or conception of doubt may also solve some problems of Western philosophy or add a new dimension to Western philosophy, as the Nyāya claims that a dubious cognition rests on certainty. Doubt, according to the Nyāya, is a type of invalid (false) cognition. A dubious cognition can be expressed by the form ‘Is x F or G?’, where x is the property-possessor, F and G are mutually incompatible properties. Since F and G are mutually incompatible, one of them may be the absence of the other. Hence it may be stated as ‘Is x F or not F’. As regards the number of alternatives in a dubious cognition, such as ‘Is it a stump or a human being?’, there is some difference of opinion among the Nyāya Philosophers. But all of them have accepted the thesis that there are at least two mutually incompatible alternatives in a dubious cognition. It is to be noted that a dubious cognition cannot be identified with a question. A question presupposes the cognition of one of the alternatives. For example, the question ‘Is it a stump?’ presupposes the cognition of stump only. But a dubious cognition presupposes the cognition of both the alternatives. Moreover, in a question there is desire to know; but not a state of doubt, although there may be desire to know afterwards. From the Nyāya conception of doubt it also follows that there is certainty about the property-possessor in a dubious mental state. Hence the dubious cognition of the form ‘Is x F or G’ presupposes certainty with respect to x. Therefore, we do not doubt the existence of x. The property-possessor may be an object of doubt in another mental state, where it is one of the alternatives. Hence a doubt presupposes certainty or rests on something which is free from doubt. When I doubt the colour of the table in the mental state ‘Is the table brown or red?’, I do not doubt the existence of the table. Again, when I doubt the existence of the table, I presuppose something else. For example, consider a mental state of doubt ‘Is there a table or a bed in this room?’ In this case, I presuppose the existence of the room. Hence there cannot be universal doubt, even if there is doubt about any specific thing or set of specific things. Moreover, there is no dubious mental state without presupposing something certain. Hence the Nyāya concept of doubt rules out universal scepticism. We may doubt almost anything, but not everything, and every dubious state has some element of certainty. The Nyāya has classified doubts into four types depending upon the causal conditions of their origins. One of them is due to the observation of some common property or properties of the referents of ‘F’ and ‘G’, and the non-observation of any specific or unique property of the referents of ‘F’ and ‘G’. Consider again, for example, ‘Is it a stump or a human being?’ The observation of common properties, such as identical or similar heights and widths, will give rise to the memory-cognitions of the alternatives that are causal conditions of a dubious cognition.

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The second type of dubious cognition is due to the observation of an uncommon property. An uncommon property is something which is known to be not present in the known alternatives. For example, ‘Is sound eternal or non-eternal?’ In this case, soundness is known to be not present in both eternal objects such as the soul and in non-eternal objects such as a pot. If this type of doubt is expressed in the form ‘Is x F or G?,’ then one of the causal conditions of this type of doubt is that x-ness or the property of being x is not known to be present in the known examples of F or G. The third type of dubious cognition is due to the understanding of the meanings of the words which have occurred in contradictory or contrary sentences. This type of doubt will arise in those who are not committed to one of the alternatives or who do not have certain cognition of one of the alternatives. Consider now, for example, the dubious state ‘Is mind physical or spiritual?’ or ‘Is soul eternal or non-eternal?’ The Vedāntins claim that the soul is eternal, but the Buddhists claim it to be non-eternal. If a person is not committed to one these views, or convinced by the arguments of the Vedāntins or the Buddhists, then he/she will doubt whether the soul is eternal. The fourth type of doubt is due to doubt about the truth of a cognition, as in the doubt ‘Is the cognition of a chair in this room true or false?’ This doubt implies doubt about the presence of a chair in this room. In other words, doubt about the truth of a cognition would give rise to doubt about the content of this cognition. Hence a higher type of doubt would imply a lower type of doubt if these doubts are arranged in an hierarchical order. Here too the Nyāya discussion of doubt can also be integrated with the mainstream of Western philosophy and answer some of its questions about doubt. C) The Nyāya on Belief-Sentences Now I would like to discuss the Nyāya view which, unlike Russell, does not reduce all belief-sentences to relational belief-sentences, which does not postulate some intermediary entities such as propositions or non-existent entities in the case of false beliefs. Moreover, the Nyāya view does not reduce a verb to a term, or treat all names as transparent. Let us begin with the Nyāya analysis of the sentence: (i) John believes that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley. In this sentence, according to the Nyāya, we are not talking about Shakespeare or the author of Waverley, but about the belief of John, which is a mental state of John, and which is related to the self by the relation of inherence in the ontology of the Nyāya. Before discussing the nature of this belief let us discuss its content, which consists of what Russell called ‘the constituents of a proposition,’ which are things or objects in the world. In the content of this belief there are three major elements, viz., Shakespeare, the author of Waverley, and the relation of identity which has not been mentioned by the word ‘identity.’ In the content of this belief, Shakespeare is the qualificand, the author of Waverley is the qualifier, and the relation of identity is the qualification relation. Since these elements are the contents (or objects) of this belief, they have the property of being the content (viṣayatā).55 In other words, the property of being the content is the relation of a belief mental state to a content (or object). Relational properties such as viṣayatās are introduced by the Nyāya philosophers for, amongst many other things, semantical analyses of sentences and for

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drawing the distinction between the cognitions generated by sentences such as ‘Brutus killed Caesar’ and ‘Caesar was killed by Brutus.’ As to the ontological status of these relational properties, there is some difference of opinion among the Nyāya philosophers. Some Nyāya philosophers such as Raghunātha have assigned them a separate category such that they are not reducible to any other type of entities or identifiable with anything else, while others have tried to identify them with the second terms of relations. But in the case of the properties of being the content (viṣayatās), it seems to me that these relational properties have been introduced simply to emphasize the role of the elements of the content of a belief or cognition. With reference to our above example, when we say ‘Shakespeare has the property of being the content,’ what we mean is that Shakespeare has the role of the qualificand in the content of this belief. Similarly, the author of Waverley has the role of qualifier, and the relation of identity has the role of qualification relation in the content of this belief. There are also other elements in its content. Since both ‘Shakespeare’ and ‘the author of Waverley,’ have occurred in (i), both Shakespeare and the author of Waverley, according to the Nyāya, must be presented under some mode of presentation. In other words, the property of being the qualificand residing in Shakespeare is limited by the property of being Shakespeare, and the property of being the qualifier residing in the author of Waverley is limited by the property of being the author of Waverley. Since identity has not been mentioned, it is not presented under some mode of presentation. So we have, broadly speaking, two terms called ‘qualificand’ and ‘qualifier,’ the relation of identity, two property-limitors or modes of presentation and three relational properties of being the content. Now the question is how to explain the relation among these elements. The Nyāya claims that they are related in the following way:

1. The property of being the qualificand residing in Shakespeare is limited by the property of being Shakespeare.



2. The property of being the qualifier residing in the author of Waverley is limited by the property of being the author of Waverley.



3. The property of being the qualifier residing in the author of Waverley is also limited by the relation of identity.



4. The property of being the qualificand residing in Shakespeare is determined by the property of being the qualifier residing in the author of Waverley.



5. The property of being the qualifier residing in the author of Waverley is determined by the property of being the qualificand residing in Shakespeare.



6. The property of being the qualification relation residing in identity is determined by the property of being the qualifier residing in the author of Waverley.



7. The property of being the qualifier residing in the author of Waverley is determined by the property of being the qualification relation residing in identity.

In this context it is to be noted that the above three types of relations which relate a belief to its content, viz., the property of being the qualificand, the property of being the qualifier and the property of being the qualification relation, are present in any belief, true or false. But in a true belief there is another type of relation which relates the belief to the unified content or the fact by virtue of which a sentence is considered as true. Hence a knowledge

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which implies a true belief involves a relation of the belief to the fact that makes the belief true. For this reason, the Gettier-type objection does not apply to the Nyāya conception of knowledge. Now let us discuss the nature of the belief-state. As a belief is related to its contents, so are the contents related to the belief. If the above three relations, viz., the property of being the qualificand, the property of being the qualifier and the property of being the qualification relation are called R, S and T respectively, then the relation of Shakespeare to this belief is the converse of R, the relation of the author of Waverley to this belief is the converse of S, and the relation of identity to this belief is the converse of T. These are all properties of John’s belief, and they are related to each other in the following way: (a) The converse of R is determined by the converse of S. (b) The converse of S is determined by the converse of R. (c) The converse of S is determined by the converse of T. (d) The converse of T is determined by the converse of S. In other words, if Shakespeare is the author of Waverley is the content of John’s belief, then his belief is characterised by the converse of R, the converse of S, and the converse of T, and they are related to each other in the above way. Hence by introducing the relations (a)-(d), the Nyāya emphasizes the unity of the belief-state. Moreover, the truth of the sentence ‘John believes that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley’ does not depend on the truth of the sentence ‘Shakespeare is the author of Waverley.’ Now the question is, how can the belief-state of John be related to the relation of identity which does not exist between Shakespeare and the author of Waverley? If there is no such relation, then the converse of the property of being the qualification relation cannot characterise the belief-state of John. In reply, the Nyāya philosophers claim that the belief-state of John is related to an identity relation that is real elsewhere or elsewhen. For example, the belief state is related to the relation of identity that holds between John Key and the present Prime Minister of New Zealand. Since this relation is real elsewhere and the belief-state is related to this relation, it is characterised by the converse of the qualification relation. Hence the belief-state of John is related to a real relation. It is to be noted that, according to the Nyāya, a relation performs two functions. It can be defined in the following way: R is a relation Df. (Ǝx) (Ǝy) (It is due to R that x appears as the qualificand and y as the qualifier in the cognition xRy), and (Ǝx) (Ǝy) (It is due to R that there is a qualified object or fact xRy). It is to be noted that the x and the y of the cognition need not be the same as the x and the y of the fact. If the cognition is true, then the x and the y of the cognition correspond to the x and the y of the fact. In our above example, the relation of identity is real elsewhere or elsewhen, to which the belief-state is related. The cognizer is related to the relation of identity which holds between John Key and the present Prime Minister of New Zealand. Hence one of the functions of a relation has been satisfied. Again, it is due to this relation of identity that Shakespeare appears as the qualificand and the author of Waverley as the qualifier in the belief-state of John. This is how the Nyāya philosophers have avoided the

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postulation of non-existent entities in the explanation of false beliefs. Since the Nyāya philosophers do not postulate any intermediary entities, such as propositions, images or vivid concepts, their explanation is simpler than the explanations of some contemporary philosophers, such as Frege or Kaplan. Moreover, unlike early Russell, the verb in the subordinate clause of a belief sentence has not been reduced to a term. Furthermore, in terms of these relational properties, the Nyāya philosophers explain the difference between (i), namely, John believes that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley, and (ii) John believes that the author of Waverley is Shakespeare. In (ii) the author Waverley has the property of being the qualificand and Shakespeare has the property of being the qualifier. Hence the converse of the property of being the qualificand in (ii) will not be the same as the converse of the property of being the qualificand in (i). Similarly, the converse of the property of being the qualifier in (ii) will not be the same as the converse of the property of being the qualifier in (i). From this it follows that the truth of (i) does not entail the truth of (ii). Similarly, the truth of (ii) does not entail the truth of (i), although the truth of ‘Shakespeare is the author of Waverley’ entails the truth of ‘The author of Waverley is Shakespeare’ and vice versa. Hence the Nyāya analysis in terms of the relational properties of a belief-state explains the difference in truth-value between (i) and (ii), and consequently the difference in meaning between them. This analysis of the Nyāya also explains why the principle of substitutivity fails. From (i) we cannot infer ‘John believes that the author of Hamlet is the author of Waverley’, although the sentence ‘Shakespeare is the author of Hamlet’ is true. Since the mode of presentation of Shakespeare is the property of being Shakespeare and the mode of presentation of the author of Hamlet is the property of being the author of Hamlet, we cannot derive ‘John believes that the author of Hamlet is the author of Waverley’ from (i). But we can derive ‘John believes that Sir Walter is the author of Hamlet’ from ‘John believes that Scott is the author of Hamlet’ if ‘Scott’ and ‘Sir Walter’ refer to the same person who is presented under the same mode in both the cases. In other words, the principle of substitutivity holds good only in those cases where the terms refer to the same thing that is presented under the same mode of presentation. Now let us consider the following sentences: (iii) John believes in Shakespeare. (iv) John believes in Pegasus. (v) John believes that Shakespeare exists. (vi) John believes that Ortcutt is a spy. (vii) John believes that (Ǝx) (x is a spy) (viii) (Ǝx) (x = Ortcutt and John believes that Ortcutt is a spy) (ix) John believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. (x) John believes that Ortcutt is a spy and Ortcutt is not a spy. (xi) Tom believes that John believes that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley. If (iii) is true, and ‘Shakespeare’ is treated as a proper name, then the belief-state of John is related to Shakespeare, the property of being Shakespeare56 and a relation which relates the property of being x to x, where x is a place-holder for a proper name. If these three relations

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are called u, v and w respectively, then the converse of these relations, viz., u-converse, v-converse and w-converse, would characterise the mental state of John. If (iii) is false and ‘Shakespeare’ is a proper name, then John thinks of someone else, say Scott, as Shakespeare, although his mental-state is related to the property of being Shakespeare and the relation of qualification. Hence his mental-state is not related to the fact, namely, Shakespeare being qualified by the property of being Shakespeare. On the contrary, if ‘Shakespeare’ is not a proper name but a definite description in disguise, then the form of (iii) does not differ from that of (iv). In (iv) the belief-state of John is not related to any winged horse. It is related to a horse (or a unique horse), wings, and the relation of a wing to an animal which has wings. But it is not related to the qualified object, viz., the winged horse. Hence the converse of the first three relations only would characterise the belief-state of John. As his belief-state is not related to the qualified object, the converse of this relation cannot qualify his belief. (iv) gives us the model for the treatment of empty singular terms which have occurred in believed-sentences or expressions. In (v) the belief-state of John is related to Shakespeare qualified by the property of being Shakespeare, an object qualified by the property existence,57 and the relation of identity. If the believed sentence is true, then his belief-state is also related to Shakespeare as being identical with an existent object, and the converses of these four relations would characterise the mental state of John. This analysis also shows how the Nyāya draws the distinction between (iii) and (v), and thereby explains the difference in meaning between ‘Shakespeare’ and ‘Shakespeare exists’. In this context, it is to be noted that the Nyāya, unlike some contemporary philosophers, has not identified the meaning of ‘Shakespeare exists’ with that of ‘Shakespeare is Shakespeare’. Similarly, the Nyāya has drawn a distinction in meaning between ‘The author of Waverley’, ‘The author of Waverley exists’ and ‘The author of Waverley is the author of Waverley’. Since (vi) can be true without implying the existence of Ortcutt or without implying Ortcutt being a spy, the Nyāya claims that the belief-state of John is related to Ortcutt, but need not be related to Ortcutt qualified by the property existence. This is due to the fact that existence is a property in the Nyāya system. Therefore, the relation to the property-possessor does not imply the relation to its properties, such as existence. The belief state is also related to a spy, and a relation of identity, but not to Ortcutt being identical with a spy. Hence the converses of these three relations would qualify the belief-state of John. This analysis also shows why the rule of existential generalisation cannot be applied to it. (vii) could be true even if no one is a spy, and hence the belief-state cannot be related to a spy. According to the Nyāya in this case, the belief-state is related to the property spyhood, an existent object, and the relation of instantiation, but not to an existent object qualified by spyhood. Hence the belief-state is qualified by the converse of these three relational properties only. If spyhood is an unexemplified property, then the word ‘spyhood’ cannot be treated as an atomic expression. Hence it is to be explained in terms of at least two non-empty terms, and the belief-state is related to the referents of these non-empty terms. In (viii) the belief-state is not only related to Ortcutt, a spy and the relation of identity, but also related to Ortcutt qualified by existence. But it is not related to Ortcutt qualified by

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existence being identical with a spy. Hence the mental state is qualified by the converses of the first four relations only. Hence the truth of (viii) will depend on the truth of ‘(Ǝx)(x = Ortcutt)’ but not on the truth of ‘Ortcutt is a spy.’ In (ix) the belief-state is related to Ortcutt, the absence of spyhood which is present somewhere, and the relation of an absence to its possessor,58 but it is not related to Ortcutt qualified by the absence of spyhood. Hence the truth of (ix) does not depend on the truth of ‘Ortcutt is not a spy’. As regards (x), the Nyāya claims that it cannot be made true under any condition. Since there is no contradiction anywhere, there cannot be any contradiction at the level of thought or belief-state.59 The sentence ‘Ortcutt is a spy and Ortcutt is not a spy’ is meaningful, but it does not generate a cognition either in a hearer or a speaker. Each of the conjuncts of this conjunctive sentence would generate a separate cognition, but there is no one unified cognition which will correspond to this sentence. The thought of ‘Ortcutt is a spy’ would prevent occurrence of the thought of ‘Ortcutt is not a spy’ and vice versa. Hence these two thoughts or belief-states are related to each other by the preventer–prevented relation.60 (xi) describes the mental or the belief-state of Tom, and it could be true even if John does not believe that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley or no one believes that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley. In this case Tom’s belief-state is related to a belief-state, not necessarily to a belief-state of John. Furthermore, his belief-state is related to the converse of the relation of a belief to Shakespeare, the converse of the relation of a belief to the author of Waverley, and the converse of the relation of a belief to the relation of identity. Moreover, Tom’s belief-state is related to John and to the relation of inherence which relates a belief-state to its possessor in the ontology of the Nyāya. Let us use the following symbols for these relations:

A for the relation of Tom’s belief-state to some other belief-state.



B for the relation of his belief-state to the converse of the relation of a belief to Shakespeare



C for the relation of his belief-state to the converse of the relation of a belief to the author of Waverley.



D for the relation of his belief-state to the converse of the relation of a belief to an identity relation.



E for the relation of Tom’s belief-state to John.



F for the relation of his belief-state to the relation of inherence, which relates

a belief-state to its possessor in the ontology of the Nyāya. Now the converses of these relations would characterise the belief-state of Tom. Since these converses are related to each other by the determiner–determined relation which holds between the correlative terms, the complex (E-converse, F-converse and A-converse) determines and is determined by the complex (B-converse, D-converse and C-converse). This analysis of the Nyāya shows how (xi) can be true even if John does not believe that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley or no one believes that Shakespeare is the author of Waverley.

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Since the Nyāya philosophers can explain belief-sentences which contain negation, conjunction, quantifier, or which express higher-order beliefs, they can explain all types of belief-sentences in a standard language. Now let us consider Kripke’s puzzle about belief.61 He claims that co-designative proper names are not interchangeable in belief contexts salva veritate. Hence one may assent to ‘Cicero was bald’ and to ‘Tully was not bald’, although both ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ refer to the same person. Kripke has put forward the following example to substantiate this point. Pierre, a native of France, asserts in French (a) Londres est jolie. After moving to London from France, he assents to (b) London is not pretty. From this example Kripke concludes that co-referential terms cannot be substituted for each other without changing the truth-value. From the Nyāya point of view we can say that co-designative terms are interchangeable in belief contexts if they have the same limitor. Suppose Cicero has a unique and an essential property, say F. According to the Nyāya, the meaning of the name ‘Cicero’ includes both the person referred to by the word ‘Cicero’ and the limitor F. If ‘Tully’ also refers to the same person under the same mode of presentation, then both of them have the same meaning. Since we are concerned with belief, we can use any language to describe it. Hence it has nothing to do with assenting to a sentence, which requires mastery over a language, including knowing the meanings of the terms. Even if a person does not know any language, we can describe his belief-state in our language. If we come to know that Pierre believes that Londres est jolie, then we can use English or any other language to describe the same belief-state. Hence we can claim that Pierre believes that London is pretty. Therefore, any synonymous expression or sentence can be used to describe the same belief. This is how the Nyāya philosophers would solve the puzzle about belief. From the above discussion it follows that Nyāya techniques may be used to suggest new solutions to some problems of contemporary Western philosophy. It has also been shown how these techniques can solve the Gettier and the post-Gettier problems of epistemology. Since justification is considered as a qualifier of truth and truth as a qualifier of belief, we have solved one of the age-old problems of knowledge. It has also been demonstrated how the Nyāya philosophers have used epistemic relational properties, such as the property of being the qualificand, the property of being the qualifier, the property of being the qualification relation, the property of being the limitor, the property of being the determiner, the property of being the qualified object, the property of being the subject and the property of being the predicate. By using these relational properties and their converses, we can draw not only the distinction between different belief-sentences but also the distinction in meaning between sentences, such as ‘Brutus killed Caesar’ and ‘Caesar was killed by Brutus’. Hence the Nyāya techniques may be used to draw the distinction in meaning between sentences which are transformationally equivalent. Moreover, it has been shown how the Nyāya philosophers have avoided the postulation of intermediary entities, such as images or propositions, as well as universal scepticism in epistemology. Hence the Indian philosophers have not only discussed some of the problems and puzzles of contemporary philosophers such as Frege, Russell, Chomsky and Kripke, but also suggested better solutions. This is how Indian philosophy can add a new dimension to Western philosophy.62

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NOTES   1. Stephen Everson (ed.), Companion to Ancient Thought I, Epistemology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 4.   2. Ibid., p. 4.   3. Terence Irwin, A Companion to Epistemology, edited by Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 28.   4. A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1956), p. 31.   5. R. M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 16.   6. D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 137.   7. Edmund L. Gettier, ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis 23, 1963, pp. 121-123.   8. Robert K. Shope, The Analysis of Knowing, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 4.   9. John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, (New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1986), p. 181. 10. Ibid., pp. 181-182. 11. Ibid., p. 181. 12. Paul K. Moser, ‘Gettier Problem’, A Companion to Epistemology, edited by Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 158. 13. Ibid., p. 158. 14. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, p. 182. 15. Moser, ‘Gettier Problem’, p. 158. 16. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, p. 182. 17. Ibid. 18. Moser, ‘Gettier Problem’, p. 158. 19. Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, Chapter 3, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986). 20. D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, p. 159. 21. F. P. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics, (New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1960), p. 258. 22. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, p. 45. 23. Ibid., p. 51. 24. Adam Morton, ‘Saving Epistemology from the Epistemologists: Recent Work in the Theory of Knowledge’, British Journal of Philosophy of Science, Vol. 51, 2000, pp. 685-704. 25. Ibid., p. 689. 26. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, p. 51. 27. Ibid., p. 55. 28. Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1995). 29. Ibid., p. 97. 30. Ibid., p. 98. 31. Alvin Goldman, ‘Reliabilism’, in A Companion to Epistemology, edited by Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 435.

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32. Alvin Goldman, ‘Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology’, in Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, edited by Alvin I. Goldman, (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1995), p. 99. 33. Pandit Narayana Chandra Goswami, Tarkasaṃgraḥ and Dīpikā of Annaṃbhaṭṭa, (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1983), p. 348. 34. J. L. Shaw, ‘Subject-Predicate and Related Pairs’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 38, December 2010, pp. 625-642. 35. For a more comprehensive discussion on causality, see J. L. Shaw, Causality: Sāṃkhya, Bauddha and Nyāya, (Calcutta: Punthi Pustak, 2005). 36. For a more comprehensive discussion on inference, see J. L. Shaw, ‘Cognition of Cognition’, Part I, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Vol. 24, 1996. 37. For a discussion on relevance, see J. L. Shaw, ‘The Concept of relevance (Saṅgati) in Gaṅgeśa’, Saṃbhāṣā, Vol. 16, (Japan: University of Nagoya, 1995), pp. 133-136. 38. B. Russell, The Analysis of Mind, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1949), p. 231. 39. F. P. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics, (New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1960), p. 238. 40. B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 69-75. 41. L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 109. 42. B. Russell, ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’, Logic and Knowledge, edited by R. C. Marsh, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 226. 43. Ibid., p. 219. 44. G. Frege, ‘On Sense and Nominatum’, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, edited by H. Feigl and W. Sellars, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc., 1949), p. 87. 45. For a comprehensive discussion, see J. L. Shaw, ‘Belief-Sentences: Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyāya’, Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta, 1999, pp. 225-233. 46. R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 232. 47. A. Tarski, ‘The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics’, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, edited by H. Feigl and W. Sellars, (New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1949), p. 53. 48. For a more comprehensive discussion of this view, see Quine’s Word and Object, Carnap’s Meaning and Necessity, and D. Kaplan’s ‘Quantifying In,’ reprinted in The Philosophy of Language, edited by A. P. Martinich, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). 49. Kaplan, ‘Quantifying In’, p. 363. 50. Ibid., p. 366. 51. B. Russell, ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’, p. 225. 52. B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 73. 53. M. Sainsbury, Russell, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 225. 54. Ibid., pp. 63-64. 55. For a detailed discussion on viṣayatā, see Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya’s Viṣayatāvāda, translated with explanations by Sibajiban Bhattacharya, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Volume 14, No. 2, pp. 109-193 and No. 3, pp. 217-302.

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56. For a discussion on this topic, see J. L. Shaw, ‘Proper Names : Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyāya,’ in Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective, edited by B. K. Matilal and J. L. Shaw, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1985). 57. For the Nyāya concept of existence, see J. L. Shaw, ‘Singular Existential Sentences: Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyāya,’ in Religious and Comparative Thought, edited by P. Bilimoria and P. Fenner, (Delhi: Indian Books Centre, l988) and ‘The Nyāya on Existence, Knowability and Nameability’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1978. 58. For a discussion on various types of negation, see J. L. Shaw, ‘The Nyāya on Double Negation’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 1988, pp. 139-154. 59. For a comprehensive discussion, see J. L. Shaw, ‘Conditions for Understanding the Meaning of a Sentence: the Nyāya and the Advaita Vedānta’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 273-293. 60. For a comprehensive discussion on preventer–prevented relation, see S. Bhattacharyya, ‘Some Principles and Concepts of Navya-Nyāya Logic and Ontology,’ Our Heritage, (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1976). 61. Saul A. Kripke, ‘A Puzzle about Belief ’, in Propositions and Attitudes, edited by Nathan Salmon and Scott Scames, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 122-128. 62. I am grateful to Dr Stephen Epstein for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper as well as for his editorial suggestions.

CHAPTER SEVEN

A Note on Cognition of Cognition in Indian Philosophy In this note I shall discuss whether cognitive mental states are self-revealing (self-luminous) or not. In other words, whether the cognition of P is self-intimating or implies I cognise that P. Since cognition is a causal condition of our desire, inclination, or mental effort, this discussion would throw some light on other types of mental states as well. Moreover, since there are several views on this topic, and the discussion is technical and comprehensive, it might throw some further light on contemporary philosophy of mind.1 As regards the cognition of a mental state, there is a difference of opinion among the Indian philosophers. There are three views about how a cognitive mental state is to be cognised (or revealed). These views are as follows:

1. a cognition reveals itself (or is self-revealing),



2. a cognition is to be inferred from the effect the property of being cognised,



3. a cognition is the object of a mental perception.

The followers of the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā, the Vedānta, the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, the Jaina and the Bauddha systems claim that a cognition reveals itself. Hence it has the property of being self-revealed. The followers of the Bhatṭṭa Mīmāṃsā accept the view that a cognition is to be inferred from the mark jñātatā (the property of being cognised). But the followers of the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Murārimiśra Mīmāṃsā claim that a cognition is to be perceived by the mind. Hence the mental perception of a cognition is to be accepted in order to reveal a cognition. The supporters of the self-revealing theory use different types of argument to establish their view. One of them may be stated in following way: since a cognition reveals its object, its nature is to reveal. In other words, if something reveals something else, it must be capable of revealing itself. Again, they try to establish the self-revealing nature of cognition by refuting the counterthesis that it is revealed by something else. This argument may be presented in the form of a dilemma. If a cognition is required to reveal another cognition, then there will be an infinite regress. Suppose there is a cognition of a flower. In order to reveal this cognition, we require another cognition which in turn requires another cognition and so on. If there is an infinite regress, then the cognition of anything else is not possible. If, on the other hand, the regress stops at a particular point, then all the previous cognitions would remain unrevealed. Suppose it stops at the third level cognition. Hence the third level cognition remains unrevealed. If it were so, then the second level remains unrevealed. Therefore, the first level remains unrevealed. Since there are only two alternatives for the non-self-revealing

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theory and both of them are unsatisfactory, the non-self-revealing theory is to be rejected. The argument of the supporters of self- revealing theory is called ‘presumption’ (arthāpatti). In other words, it is a fact that cognition is revealed. Now the question is how to explain this phenomenon of cognition. One alternative is to make the claim that it is revealed by another cognition. Since this alternative cannot be substantiated, we have to accept the view that a cognition has an intrinsic property of being self-revealed. Hence the implication (anupapatti) of this presumption (arthāpatti) would take the following form: The revelation of a cognition cannot be established unless it has the property of being self-revealed. But the Nyāya philosophers have raised several objections against the self-revealing theory. One of the objections emphasises the fact that there is a cause–effect relation between a cognition and the cognition of this cognition. As the cognition of the table is dependent upon the table, so the cognition of the cognition of the table is dependent upon the cognition of the table. This point has been expressed in another form. It is said that as the cognition of the table is the agent for the use of the table, so the second order cognition is the agent for the use of the first order cognition. But the supporters of the self-revealing theory deny this type of cause–effect relation between the first order and the second order cognition. They claim that a cognition has the property of being the agent for its own use as well as the property of being its own object. Moreover, they try to establish the latter in terms of the former. But the Nyāya philosophers have raised a few technical objections against this type of argument of the supporters of the self-revealing theory. Moreover, the supporter of the non-self-revealing theory claim that a cognition can never be its own object. According to the Nyāya, whenever something becomes an object of a cognition, there is something in the object which acts as a causal condition and makes it an object. Consider the perception of a table. It is the sense-contact which is present in the table, and it is a causal condition for its perception. Similar is the case with respect to other types of cognition, such as inferential or verbal. Since certain conditions are necessary for being an object of a cognition, perceptual, inferential, or verbal, a cognition such as the cognition of a table cannot be an object of a cognition without those conditions. Hence the view of the self-revealing theory that a cognition is its own object is to be rejected. Now, the supporters of the self-revealing theory might claim that as contact with sense-organ is considered as a causal condition for being the object of a perceptual cognition, so the self-identity of a cognition might be considered a causal condition for being the object of a cognition. In other words, the supporters of the self-revealing theory are suggesting two types of condition. One type of condition such as sensecontact applies to first order cognition but another type of condition such as self-identity applies to a higher order cognition. But the supporters of non-self-revealing theory do not accept self-identity as a casual condition for a higher order cognition. Hence the debate between them gives rise to the question whether the model or the causal model for the first order mental states including cognitions can be applied to higher order mental states. Therefore, this issue suggests a problem for the cognitive scientists. The question is whether the higher order mental states can be interpreted in the way we interpret lower order mental states.

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Among the followers of the non-self-revealing theory, the supporters of Bhatṭṭa Mīmāṃsā claim that a cognition is inferable. According to this view a cognition, such as the cognition of a flower, reveals the flower but not the cognition of a flower. We infer the cognition from the probans (mark) called ‘jñātatā’ (the property of ‘being cognised’). It is to be noted that this property of being cognised (jñātatā) is not the same as the property of being the object (viṣayatā) of the Nyāya, which is to be explained in terms of the relation of cognition to its object or content. According to the Bhatṭṭa theory, as the cognition of a flower reveals the flower, flowerness and other properties of it, so does it reveal the property of being cognised which is present in the same flower. Hence the property of being cognised is apprehended by us when we cognise an object (viṣaya-jñāna). We infer the cognition from this property. Hence cognition is our probandum (sādhya) and the property of being cognised is the probans or mark. According to the Bhatṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, cognition is an activity. Hence the verb ‘to cognise’ (jñā) refers to an activity analogous to the activity of cooking. As softening of the rice is due to the result of cooking, so the property of being cognised is due to the activity of knowing. In this context it is to be noted that the word ‘action’ is used in the sense of the grammarians, not in the sense of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But the opponents of this view claim that the analogy between an ordinary activity such as cooking and a mental activity such as knowing does not hold good. In the case of cooking activity we apprehend the result of cooking in the object such as rice, but in the case of cognising we do not experience any result in the object such as flower. Hence there is no such property called ‘the property of being cognised’. In the case of mental events such as cognition, desire, mental effort, etc., the meaning of a verbal root does not refer to any property produced in the object or objects. In reply, the supporters of this view claim that the use of a thing presupposes our cognition of it. Hence the ability to use a thing (vyavahārayogyatā) is due to our cognition of it. In the case of the verb ‘to cognise’, the property of being the object (karmatva) is the ability to use the object of this verb. This property is to be treated as the property of being cognised (jñātatā or prākaṭya), and the cognition is to be inferred from this property. Now the critics of this view point out that the property of being able to use an object is nothing but the relation of a cognition to its object. Hence it is the same as the property of being the object of a cognition (viṣayatā). Since this property of being the object is the relation of a cognition to its object and it is not due to a cognition, this property (viṣayatā) cannot be used to infer the cognition. In addition to these objections, the Nyāya philosophers have raised a few technical objections against this view of the Bhatṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. From the above arguments and counter-arguments it follows that the Bhāṭṭa supporters treat cognitive mental states as actions on a par with cooking activity, while their opponents do not treat them as actions. The followers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and many other systems consider mental states as qualities or properties. Hence this discussion raises an ontological issue as to the nature of mental states, including cognitive states. Now let us discuss the third alternative. The supporters of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and a few other schools of Indian philosophy claim that a cognition is to be perceived by the mind. It is said that when a cognition occurs, we use the following languages to describe it: ‘I have a perceptual cognition of such and such’, ‘I have an inferential cognition of such and such’, or

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‘I have a verbal cognition of such and such’. We can also apprehend the absence of certain cognitions. This type of apprehension is neither self-revealing nor inferential. Moreover, an apprehension of a cognition does not involve any external sense-organ. For this reason it is called ‘mental perception’. The sense-organ required for mental perception is called ‘manas’. It is to be noted that manas, in the Nyāya system, plays a dual role. In its role as a mental entity (manastva) it is a cause, though not the chief instrumental cause (karaṇa), of mental states, including cognition, desire, etc. But in its role as a sense-organ (indriya) it is the chief instrumental cause (karaṇa) of mental perception of mental entities. In the case of mental perception also it is a cause as a mental entity (manastva), although not the chief instrumental cause (karaṇa). Since mental perception is a type of perception, manas plays both the roles. Hence in terms of the dual role of manas we can draw the distinction between mental perception and other types of mental states. The Nyāya philosophers claim that a cognition or a feeling is present at the time of its apprehension. In other words, a cognition or a feeling is always present before its apprehension. From the fact that a cognition which is the object of apprehension is a cause of its apprehension, it follows that the apprehension of a cognition is perceptual in character. Moreover, it is claimed that in a mental perception such as ‘I apprehend a flower’, manas as an internal sense-organ is related to all the items, directly or indirectly. The relation of the manas to the self is conjunction. The relation of manas to the cognition is an indirect relation of conjunction-cum-the converse of inherence. The relation of manas to a flower is a complex relation of conjunction-cum-the converse of inherence-cum-the property of being the object. Now an objection may be raised against this view in the following way: if the first order cognition is due to the relation of conjunction-cum-converse of inherence with manas, then the second order cognition should also be due to the same relationship with manas as this also is a cognition. Again, after the second order cognition there should be a third order cognition as manas is related to the second order cognition. In this way a series of one type of cognition will continue without any break. This process will prevent the occurrence of any other cognition or any other type of mental states such as feeling or desire. In reply, the supporters of the mental perception theory claim that there is no law that whenever a cognition occurs there will be a cognition of it. Usually, after the occurrence of a cognition such as the cognition of a flower there is a mental perception of it due to the contact with manas and other causal factors. But there is no such law that there will be a mental perception of this second order cognition. Sometimes the series of higher order cognition ends with a cognition which is not amenable to sense-organs (atīndriya). Hence every cognition may not be cognised. This is how the regress of cognitions can be prevented. Again, the above objection can be answered in terms of the relative strength of a cognition or mental state. The causal conditions of a feeling such as pleasure or the causal conditions of the cognition of pleasure are stronger than the causal conditions of the cognition of a cognition. Hence if the causal conditions of a feeling of pleasure and the causal conditions of a higher order cognition are present at the same time, then the feeling of pleasure will occur, not the higher order cognition. Similarly, the cognition of pleasure will occur if its causal conditions are present, not the cognition of a cognition.

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Moreover, the causal conditions of inferential cognition, verbal cognition, or analogical cognition of some other object are stronger than the causal conditions of a higher order cognition. But if the objects of an inferential cognition are the same as the objects of a mental perception, then the causal conditions of mental perception are stronger than the causal conditions of the inferential cognition. Similar would be the case with respect to verbal or analogical cognition. Similarly, the causal conditions of external perception are stronger than the causal conditions of any other type of cognition. Hence the causal conditions of perceptual cognition, external or mental, overrides the causal conditions of other types of cognition. Again, in the case of a continuous perception such as the visual perception of a flower, the occurrence of the first cognition does not lead to a series of higher order cognitions. After the first cognition of the flower, there will be another cognition of it, and so on. In this context it is to be noted that according to the Nyāya, a cognition usually lasts for two moments. Hence the continuity of perception is explained in terms of the occurrence of a series of cognitions of the same sort. If a visual perception, say a occurs at t1, then another visual perception, say b, will occur at t2. At the next moment, i.e. t3 the former will be destroyed by the latter. Hence a will last for two moments only. If one thing is destroyed by another, then both must be present at the same time. In this case both a and b are present at t2. This is how the Nyāya explains the occurrence of a continuous perception of an object. From the Nyāya psychology of mental states it follows that the causal conditions which are stronger than the causal conditions of a higher order cognition, will be considered as preventers of the higher order cognition. The supporters of other views have raised a few more technical objections against the Nyāya thesis. Since a discussion of these objections and counter-objections requires a separate paper by itself, it is outside the scope of this paper. From the above discussion it follows that the Nyāya philosophers have applied the model of external perception to mental perception and have discussed the relation among different types of mental states, including cognitions, feelings and desires. Hence from our discussion of the question whether a cognition reveals itself we come across three views. This discussion also raises many questions regarding the nature of mental states, both cognitive and non-cognitive, and the relation between these states. Since the contemporary philosophers are also concerned with some of these problems, our discussion might throw some light on these issues.

NOTE 1. For a comprehensive discussion, see my papers J. L. Shaw, ‘Cognition of Cognition’, part I, vol. 24, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1996, pp. 165-207; and J. L. Shaw, ‘Cognition of Cognition’, part II, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1996, pp. 231-264.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Subject and Predicate The aim of this paper is to show that the question, ‘What are the subject and the predicate of a sentence?’ is ambiguous. We should make our question more specific, and relate it to a particular language and to a particular level. What we mean thereby is that we should ask the question in the following form: ‘What are the subject and the predicate of S in L at level X?’, where ‘S’ stands for a sentence, ‘L’ stands for a particular language, and ‘X’ stands for a level. The distinction between some of the levels will be discussed in the context of Pāṇini’s syntax and semantics.1 In this context we shall introduce four levels, viz., phonological, surface structure, deep structure, and semantical. In addition to these levels we shall introduce epistemic, ontological, and logical levels. In this paper we do not intend to claim that in every language all the above-mentioned levels must be present or all the levels must be related in the same way. In the first section we shall discuss the grammatical, the category, and the mediating criteria for distinguishing subject from predicate. We shall also discuss certain objections to this entire program. At the end of this section the topical criterion will be introduced to make the distinction between subject and predicate. In the second section we shall discuss the syntax and the semantics of Pāṇini’s system. It will also be shown that the semantical level of Pāṇini’s system cannot be equated with the ontological level. Since Pāṇini’s system is the most complete grammar of a natural language, it might throw some light on the various problems of philosophy or the philosophy of language. In the third section the epistemic level will be introduced via the controversy between the Nyāya and some grammarian philosophers as to the nature of a sentence.2 The ontological level will also be introduced in this section. In the fourth section we shall discuss the distinction between subject and predicate at the logical level. In this section we shall also discuss whether the logical level can be equated with the deep structure level. In the fifth section we shall show that we should ask the question in the form: ‘What are the subject and the predicate of S in L at level X instead of in the form, ‘What is the subject and the predicate of a sentence?’

I In this section we intend to discuss the grammatical, the category, and the mediating criteria as formulated by Strawson.3 The grammatical criterion distinguishes subject from predicate by means of the mode of introduction of terms which occur in a proposition. The mode of introduction signifies whether a term is introduced referringly or ascriptively. The

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category criterion distinguishes subject from predicate by reference to the nature of the objects signified by the terms of a proposition. Strawson has formulated the grammatical criterion in four ways. (a) In asserting a proposition two complementary activities or functions are involved. These two activities may be expressed by pairs of expressions like ‘referring to something and describing it’, ‘naming something and characterising it’, ‘indicating something and ascribing something to it’. (b) When these functions are expressed in language, we can have another way of distinguishing subject from predicate. These two linguistic elements of a proposition are expressed by pairs of expressions like ‘singular term and predicate expression’, ‘referring-expression and predicate-expression’, ‘proper name and ascriptive expression’. (c) We can make a distinction between the two elements of a proposition in terms of the objects towards which two different activities are directed. Each activityexpression represents the activity as directed to some object. Corresponding to the two activities we have two non-linguistic items or terms which are combined to yield a proposition. ‘The two items are that which we ascribe and that to which we ascribe it, that which we predicate and that of which we predicate it.’4 These two non-linguistic items may be called ‘subject and predicate’ or ‘subject-term and predicate-term’. According to Strawson this criterion simply distinguishes terms but not their roles. This suggests another criterion which divides terms and their roles together. (d) According to Strawson, the fourth way of distinguishing the two terms of a proposition corresponds to Frege’s distinction between object and concept. The most important of these formulations is the style of term-introduction. The subjectexpression merely introduces its term and the predicate-expression introduces its term in an assertive or propositional style. The style of introduction points out why one term is substantival and the other non-substantival and verb-like. The incompleteness or unsaturatedness of the non-substantive, verb-like expressions is signified by saying that the predicate-expression is introduced in an assertive or propositional style. Now the question is whether such a distinction should be regarded as fundamental for logic and philosophy. Ramsey is of the opinion that this distinction is not at all fundamental for logic and philosophy. He says, ‘Now it seems to me as clear as anything can be in philosophy that the two sentences ‘Socrates is wise’, ‘wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates’ assert the same fact and express the same proposition.’5 Moreover, the style of term-introduction may be allotted to linguistic devices other than term-introducing expressions. The sentence ‘Socrates is wise’ can be written as ‘(Socrates wisdom)’. In the latter expression we introduce two terms, namely, ‘Socrates’ and ‘wisdom’. The assertive or propositional symbolism is expressed by a bracket round the two substantives (terms). Similarly, time-indication can be expressed by some symbolism which is extraneous to the term-introduction. All these criticisms show that the grammatical criterion or the style of term introduction is not important for logical or philosophical purposes. But Strawson tries to keep the significance of the grammatical criterion by introducing the mediating criterion which serves as a bridge between the grammatical and the category criterion or between

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grammar (language) and ontology. Before taking up the mediating criterion let us discuss the category criterion. The category criterion is based on the difference of type or category of terms introduced in a proposition. According to the category criterion a particular is a subject and a universal or universal-cum-particular is a predicate. From this it does not follow that a universal cannot be a subject. In the proposition ‘Redness is a colour’, redness, a universal, is the subject. In the proposition ‘Tom is married to Janet’, being married to Janet is a universalcum-particular. Hence we have ‘the doctrine that particulars can appear in discourse as subjects only, never as predicates; whereas universals, or non-particulars generally, can appear either as subjects or as predicates.’6 The grammatical criterion rests on the mode of term-introduction, but the category criterion rests upon the nature of the term introduced. At the outset these two criteria appear to be independent of each other. But Strawson points out that there are some affinities between them. In propositions like ‘Socrates is wise’, ‘Socrates is a philosopher’, ‘is wise’ and ‘is a philosopher’ are predicates according to the grammatical criterion. According to the category criterion also ‘being wise’ and ‘being a philosopher’ are predicates. Now let us consider Ramsey’s pair of sentences where this affinity between the two criteria does not seem to be obvious. (1) Socrates is wise. (2) Wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates. In (1), according to both grammatical criterion and category criterion Socrates is the subject of predication and wisdom is predicated of Socrates. The category criterion, when applied to (2), yields the same result as in (1). But the grammatical criterion, when applied to (2), does not yield the same result. According to the grammatical criterion ‘wisdom’ is the subject-expression and ‘is a characteristic of Socrates’ is the predicate-expression in (2); whereas the category criterion requires us to say that ‘wisdom’ is the predicate-expression and ‘Socrates’ is the subject-expression. Strawson tries to resolve this type of difficulty by introducing the mediating criterion. According to the mediating criterion the subject-term carries certain empirical presuppositions, while the predicate-term does not carry such presuppositions. The necessary condition for particular introduction is that an empirical proposition should be known to be true, but the necessary condition for universal introduction does not involve any empirical presupposition. ‘Either something is Ø or nothing is Ø’ forms the necessary condition for universal introduction into a proposition. According to this criterion the subject-expression presents an empirical fact in its own right, while the predicateexpression presents no such fact. The former is complete to the extent it presents a fact, whereas the latter is incomplete to the extent it does not present a fact. This new criterion harmonizes with the grammatical as well as with the category criterion. Like the grammatical criterion, the predicate-expression gets completion into an explicit assertion when it is coupled with the subject-expression. Again the subjectexpression of this new criterion is complete like that of the grammatical criterion so far as it carries the weight of fact with it. Like the category criterion the particular-denoting expression can never be a predicate-expression according to this criterion. So the main thesis of the category criterion that a particular can never be a predicate and a predicate

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is either a universal or universal-cum-particular is admitted by this criterion. In this way Strawson bridges the gap between the grammatical and the category criterion by introducing the mediating criterion. Thus he substantiates the thesis that the subjectpredicate distinction in grammar parallels the particular-universal distinction in logic. Against this doctrine several objections have been raised. Let us consider the criticism raised by Mei.7 His main objection is that the parallelism between the subject-predicate distinction in grammar and the particular-universal distinction in logic is valid for IndoEuropean languages only. A similar distinction between subject and predicate does not seem to exist in the Chinese language. Mei claims that Strawson has exploited the following grammatical features of English: (A) Congruence requires the inflection of the verb in the predicate-expression. (B) This particular kind of inflection (‘is wise’, ‘smokes’)… differs from all other types of modification appropriate to the use of the ‘morpheme’ (‘wis–’, ‘smok–’) in other parts of speech.8 In Chinese both (A) and (B) are absent. Chinese predicate-expressions do not demand completion into propositions. Again, they cannot be regarded as unsaturated or incomplete in the sense of Strawson. Mei says, ‘Strawson does exploit two well-known features of English grammar to make his criterion work, namely, the requirement of congruence and uniqueness of TSP [third person singular present tense] endings.’9 These features are not present in Chinese grammar. From this fact we should not, according to Mei, conclude that no syntactical criterion for the subject–predicate distinction is applicable to Chinese. The word-order criterion which is a type of syntactical criterion is applicable to Chinese. One way of formulating this criterion is that the subject-expression is the anterior component of a sentence and the predicate-expression is the posterior component of a sentence. Both in English and in Chinese the predicate follows the subject in an assertive sentence. In ‘Socrates is wise’, ‘is wise’ follows ‘Socrates’. In Kungdz tsungming, ‘Confucius is wise’, tsungming, ‘is wise’ follows Kungdz, ‘Confucius’. Now the question is, how do we find out the first component of a sentence? Why should we not treat ‘Socrates is’ as the first component in the sentence ‘Socrates is wise’? Mei contends that by the linguistic notion of Immediate Constituents (ICs) we can determine that ‘Socrates’ is the first component in the above sentence. The word-order criterion is purely a syntactical one. It has nothing to do with the particular–universal distinction. The argument of Mei can be summed up as follows: Since the Chinese predicateexpressions are as ‘complete’ and ‘saturated’ as the subject-expressions, they can enter into any kind of remark equally. The Chinese predicate-expressions introduce their terms in the same style as the Chinese subject-expressions. Therefore, on the basis of style of introduction we are unable to distinguish subject-expressions from predicate-expressions. An objection similar to Mei’s has been raised by B. L. Whorf.10 Whorf, on the basis of his analysis of some American Indian languages, shows that the distinction between substantives and verbs, or between complete and incomplete, peculiar to certain languages is not drawn from nature. In some American Indian languages there are sentences which cannot be broken into subject–predicate form. The simplest utterance is a sentence, and long sentences are complex sentences. According to Whorf the reading of nature into language leads us to the assertion of sentences like ‘It flashed’ or ‘A light flashed’. Here ‘it’ or ‘light’ is used as substantive to

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perform the action of flashing. In the Hopi language no such distinction is present. This language reports the flash with a simple verb, rehpi: ‘flash (occurred)’. This utterance, according to Whorf, cannot be divided into subject and predicate. Robert Price in his paper ‘Descriptive Metaphysics, Chinese and Oxford Common Room’11 tries to answer the objection of Mei. He points out that the rejection of the Aristotelian distinction between particular and universal does not follow from the fact that Chinese grammar does not make the subject–predicate distinction as English makes it. He claims that the uses of English expressions serve as the paradigm of all languages. ‘If there is imperialism involved it is conceptual and not linguistic; Aristotelianism is being imposed upon us, not English.’12 According to him this becomes evident when we consider the distinction between expressions and the uses of expressions, or between types and the uses of types. It is claimed that the subjectexpression has the referring use. Referring to something i.e. introducing a term in a substantival style, is done not by the expression, but by the use of an expression. ‘Thus the expression “the man” can be used to refer, as in “the man is Sam”, and can be used to predicate as in “Sam is the man”.’13 According to him Mei’s main mistake lies in making a confusion between types and the uses of types, or between expressions and the uses of expressions. Now the question is whether the classification of the uses of an expression is based on any criterion. The uses of an expression cannot be classified in terms of the grammatical criterion, because the grammatical criterion deals with the expressions, not with the uses of an expression. Again the uses of an expression cannot be classified by the category criterion which deals with the nature of the terms introduced into a proposition. According to our positive thesis the classification of the uses of an expression presupposes the context of its utterance. The same sentence might be analysed in different ways depending on the different context of its utterance. This situation can be described in terms of the topic–comment distinction.14 In sentences like ‘John is smoking’, ‘Glass is elastic’, we cannot say that ‘John’ and ‘glass’ are necessarily used as referring expressions, and hence are subjects. We have to consider whether they are used to answer the questions, What is John doing? What is glass? Here John and glass are to be considered as topics. If the questions are, Who is smoking? What is elastic?, then smoking and elastic or elasticity are to be considered as topics. A topic is to be determined by the question asked, which in turn determines the use of an expression. By applying the topic–comment distinction it may be said that in the sentence ‘John is smoking’, John is the topic in one context, and smoking is the topic in another context. Again, by using the topic–comment distinction it can be shown that there might be more than one subject in a sentence. In the sentence ‘John sends a letter to Mary’ both ‘John’ and ‘Mary’ are to be treated as subjects if the sentence is an answer to the question, who sends a letter to whom? Hence the topic–comment distinction allows the multiplicity of subjects in a sentence. Moreover, the topic–comment distinction gives us a rationale for the classification of the uses of an expression. According to our positive thesis the topical subject is not the only type of subject. The subject–predicate distinction can be drawn at many other levels as well. That which is the subject of a sentence at one level might not be the subject at some other level. Moreover, all the different levels may not be present in the same language or may not be related in

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the same way. In the next section we shall introduce Pāṇini’s discussion on syntax and semantics to explain the distinction between some of the levels.

II In this section we would like to introduce the distinction between four different levels with reference to the syntax and semantics of Pāṇini. According to Kiparsky and Staal,15 Pāṇini’s main contribution to syntax is the theory of Kāraka relations. The Kāraka relations are the underlying relations of sentences. In some contexts the Kāraka theory explains the sameness or identity of meaning. According to Kiparsky and Staal, ‘Pāṇini’s grammar is a system of rules for converting semantic representations of sentences into phonetic representations, via two intermediate levels which may be respectively compared with the levels of deep (underlying) structure and surface structure in a generative grammar.’16 The four levels have been represented in the following way:

(1) The level of semantic representations is characterized by concepts such as goal, agent, and location. (2) The Kārakas which are in the deep structure are characterized by relations such as underlying subject, underlying object. (3) The surface structure is represented by different cases, derivational affixes, etc. (4) The phonological level is represented by various case-endings which express different cases, or by various verbal affixes which express different voices, etc. Let us consider the example of Kiparsky and Staal in order to make the distinction between different levels more explicit. From the semantic representation of the sentence akṣair dīvyati ‘he plays with dice’, we get the information that the dice stand to the action of playing in the instrumental relation. Following the Kiparsky–Staal model of analysis one has to say that this relation is between categories which are not ontological. At the next level i.e. at the level of deep structure this semantic relation between the action of playing and dice is represented by several Kāraka relations. The chief of these Kāraka relations representing the relation between the action of playing and dice is called karaṇa. Again this karaṇa relation is represented by different cases at the surface structure level. The chief way of representing the karaṇa relation is the instrumental case. At the phonological level the instrumental case is represented by different case endings. In the above example the instrumental case is represented by the suffix –bhis. Then the suffix -bhis is changed into -ais by a rule. So akṣabhis is converted into akṣais. Then the phonological rule for conjoining the words turns akṣais dīvyati into akṣair dīvyati. In the above example, the karaṇa Kāraka (the chief instrumental relation) is at the level of deep structure. But there are certain options at the level of deep structure. The same

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semantic relation can be represented by different Kāraka relations in the deep structure. In the above example, the semantic relation between dice and the action of playing can be represented by karman (deep object) relation in the case of the verb div-. If we take this option, then we have to assign a different case at the surface structure level and a different phonological expression at the phonological level. If we follow this option, then we will get akṣān dīvyati instead of akṣair dīvyati. Since both akṣair dīvyati and akṣān dīvyati ultimately represent the same semantic relation, we can explain the identity of meaning between them in spite of the differences at other levels. The fact that Pāṇini was primarily concerned with the deep structure can be shown by introducing the distinction between the base phrase-marker and the derived phrasemarker.17 Let us explain this point with reference to the karman (that which is primarily desired) relation. If a sentence is immediately derived from a base phrase-marker, the karman relation is represented by the Accusative case which is represented by different case endings at the phonological level. The sentence (1) kumbhān karoti ‘he makes pots’ is immediately derived from the base phrase-marker and is expressed by the Accusative case ending. In its passive (2) kumbhāḥ kriyante ‘pots are made by him’, the same karman is represented by the first case ending, and a passive marker is attached to the verb at the phonological level. Similarly, in (3) kumbhāḥ kṛtāḥ ‘pots are made’ the same karman relation is represented by the first case endings at the phonological level. Again in the expression (4) kumbhānāṃ kartā ‘maker of pots’ the same karman relation is expressed by the Genitive case which is expressed by the Genitive case ending at the phonological level. In the nominal compound (5) kumbhakāra ‘pot-maker’ the same karman relation is expressed at the phonological level. The last four expressions are transformationally related to (1). It is also claimed that the expressions which are related transformationally have the same meaning or the same semantic import, or express the same fact. In Pāṇini the transformation rules are stated in terms of verbal terminations, a class of primary suffixes, a class of secondary suffixes, and the nominal compound. In Pāṇini the relation between the semantic level and the deep structure level is many-many. In some cases the same semantic relation is represented by different Kāraka relations which are in the deep structure. In other cases the different semantic relations are represented by the same Kāraka relation in the deep structure. Again the same Kāraka relation may be represented by different cases and the same case may be expressed by different case endings. So Pāṇini starts with the semantic relations at level (1), and then at level (2) those relations are represented by the relations in the deep structure. These relations in the deep structure are called Kāraka relations. At level (3) the relations in the deep structure are represented by various cases which are expressed by various case endings, affixes, etc., at level (4) i.e. the phonological level. The Pāṇinian model can be utilized for the subject–predicate distinction at different levels. The surface structure and the phonological level of Pāṇini might be interpreted as the surface level of the contemporary linguists in Western philosophy. In terms of the cases or the case endings, and other affixes the distinction between subject and predicate can be drawn at the surface structure level. An expression having a first case ending (prathamā vibhakti) might be considered as the surface subject. In the sentence rāmaḥ kumbhān karoti ‘Rama makes pots’, rāmaḥ which is marked by the first case ending is the subject at surface structure level. In its passive rāmeṇa kumbhāḥ kriyante ‘pots are made by Rama’,

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kumbhāḥ ‘pots’ which is marked by the first case ending is the surface subject. But in the deep structure the same karman relation is expressed by kumbhān in the sentence rāmaḥ kumbhān karoti ‘Rama makes pots’, and by the verbal suffix -ante in the sentence rāmena kumbhāḥ kriyante ‘pots are made by Rama’. If the kartṛ Kāraka relation is taken as the sign of deep subject, then in the above sentences ‘Rama’ would be the subject at the deep structure level. In sentences like rāmeṇa kārayati devadattaḥ ‘Devadatta causes Rama to make’, ‘Devadatta’ is the surface subject; but in the deep structure both ‘Rama’ and ‘Devadatta’ are subjects, because both of them are related by the kartṛ Kāraka relation. The following would be the underlying phrase-marker for this sentence in the Chomskyan model.

If in the deep structure the ‘subject-of ’ relation is defined as [NP, S], then in the above sentence ‘Devadatta’ would be the subject of S0 and ‘Rama’ would be the subject of S1. Now let us discuss the question whether the semantic level can be distinct from the deep structure level. If there is a purely syntactic deep structure, then the distinction between them can be drawn. Chomsky18 claims that the deep structure is generated by the syntactic component of a generative grammar. ‘The syntactic component specifies an infinite set of abstract formal objects.’19 ‘The semantic component determines the semantic interpretation of a sentence. That is, it relates a structure generated by the syntactic component to a certain semantic representation.’20 The syntactic component contains a system of rules that generate basic strings called base phrase-markers. The deep structures of sentences consist of base phrase-markers generated by the syntactic component. The syntactic component also includes the transformational rules. The rewriting rules constitute part of the base of the syntactic component. The rewriting rules of the following form are included in the syntactic component: (1) S → NP ͡ VP (2) VP → V ͡ NP (3) NP → (Det) ͡ N ͡ (S) where ‘S’ stands for ‘sentence’, ‘→’ for ‘can be rewritten as’, ‘NP’ for ‘noun phrase’, ‘VP’ for ‘verb phrase’, ‘V’ for ‘verb’, ’N’ for ‘noun’; the parentheses indicate option, ‘͡ ’ indicates

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concatenation, and ‘Det’ stands for ‘determiner’. The category symbols (NP, VP, N, etc.) might be used to define certain grammatical functions such as ‘Subject-of ’, ‘Predicate-of ’. ‘Subject-of ’ and ‘Predicate-of ’ might be defined in the following way.21 (a) Subject-of: [NP, S] (b) Predicate-of: [VP, S] The ordered pairs in the definition signify the functional character of ‘Subject-of ’ and ‘Predicate-of ’. In the sentence ‘John likes Mary’, ‘John’ is the subject-of the sentence, and ‘likes Mary’ is the predicate-of the sentence. If the category symbols S, NP, VP, N and V are treated as syntactical, then the above definitions of ‘subject-of ’ and ‘predicate-of ’ are given in terms of syntax only. In addition to the category rules or branching rules such as ‘S → NP ͡ VP’, Chomsky requires subcategorisation rules and the lexicon to construct the base phrase-marker for sentences like ‘sincerity may frighten the boy’ and to explain the deviant character of sentences like ‘the boy may frighten sincerity.’ The following are some of the subcategorisation rules of Chomsky:22 (i) V → CS (ii) N → CS (iii) [+Det-] → [Count] (iv) [+Count] → [Animate] where ‘CS’ stands for complex symbol. The following is an example of Chomsky’s lexicon:23 (sincerity, [+N, +Det-, -Count, + Abstract,…]) Some of the rewriting rules which include both branching and subcategorisation rules are called selectional rules. A selectional rule defines a selectional relation between two positions in a sentence. In terms of the selectional rules we give an account of the subjectverb relation between sincerity and frighten, and the verb-object relation between frighten and boy in sincerity may frighten the boy. If the subcategorisation rules, as Chomsky has suggested, are included in the lexicon, then the syntactic component of a grammar consists of a base which includes categorical rules and lexicon, and a transformational component. The base generates the deep structures and the transformational rules map them into the surface structures. The transformational rules account for the difference between sentences like ‘a specialist examined John’ and ‘John was examined by a specialist’. Moreover, on Chomsky’s thesis the grammatical functions like ‘Subject-of ’ or ‘Predicate-of ’ can be defined in terms of the category symbols S, NP, VP, V, N, which are parts of the syntactic component of a grammar. Hence the subject of a sentence is defined syntactically at the level of deep structure. But Chomsky’s thesis that the deep structure is purely syntactical is not acceptable to most of the followers of his school. As Searle observes: ‘… they generally agree that syntax and semantics cannot be sharply separated, and hence there is no need to postulate the existence of purely syntactical deep structures.’24 This remark throws some light on Pāṇini’s deep structure which is not purely syntactical. The Kāraka relations which are in the deep

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structure are defined in terms of semantic concepts. For example, Kartṛ Kāraka is defined as svatantraḥ kartā ‘independent agent’.25 From the above discussion it follows that the distinction between the deep structure level and the semantical level can be drawn if the deep structure is considered as purely syntactical. But if the categories of the deep structure are semantical or there is no sharp distinction between the syntax and the semantics, then it would be difficult to articulate the distinction between the deep structure level and the semantical level. Hence we cannot ask two separate questions, viz., (1) What is the subject or the predicate of a sentence at the deep structure level? (2) What is the subject or the predicate of a sentence at the semantical level? But we can ask the question, what is the subject or the predicate of a sentence at the deep structure level?, even if the deep structure is semantical or there is no sharp distinction between syntax and semantics.

III The aim of this section is to introduce two more levels in addition to the levels introduced in the previous section. These two levels might be called ontological level and epistemic level. The semantic level cannot always be equated with the ontological level. Following Pāṇini’s system we can draw a distinction between the semantic level and the ontological level. In Pāṇini’s model some semantic terms are interpreted by reference to the intention of the speaker. The semantic representation of the karman relation which is in the deep structure is the thing most desired by the deep subject. The semantic representation of the kartṛ relation is the independent agent. In the sentence ‘sincerity frightens the boy’, ‘sincerity’ will be in kartṛ Kāraka relation. Hence it will be the subject at the level of deep structure. But it may not be a subject at the ontological level. If an ontological system assigns agenthood only to a concrete object, then sincerity ceases to be an agent. Hence it cannot be an ontological subject. This type of argument can be given with respect to other Kāraka relations. Kiparsky and Staal also hold the same opinion. As they observe: ‘There is no justification for supposing that the semantical, let alone the level of Kārakas, has any kind of ontological significance …’26 Again they observe, ‘… a noun which occurs in the Instrumental case may express karaṇa or hetu. But this does not imply that this noun refers to what is really an instrument or cause in the outside world; it merely signifies that the speaker supposes or intends it to be such.’27 If the ontological level is different from the semantic level, then the subject at the ontological level might not be the same as the subject at the semantic level. If one accepts the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories as the ontological categories, one is inclined to equate dravya ‘substance’ with the ontological subject, and other categories are predicated of dravya ‘substance’. Similarly, if one accepts a Bradleyan type of ontology, one equates the ontological subject with the Substance which has existence. According to Bradley, in the sentence (Bradley uses the word ‘judgment’) ‘the table is brown’, the ideal content table being brown is predicated of Reality which is the ultimate subject of predication. On the contrary, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system the ontological subject of this sentence would be a dravya ‘substance’ which is a table in this case. Now let us introduce the epistemic level which is different from the linguistic levels on the one hand, and the ontological or the semantic level on the other.

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It is claimed by the Nyāya28 as well as by many other schools of Indian Philosophy that the śābdabodha ‘understanding of the meaning’ of a sentence is a qualificative cognition which involves the qualificand–qualifier relation. Let us consider the sentence (1) raktaṃ puṣpam ‘a flower is red’. The cognitive level or the understanding of the meaning of this sentence might be expressed in two different ways: (2) Q (Q (Flower – Flowerness) Q (Red – Redness)) (3) Q (Flower-individual (Flowerness and red colour)), where ‘Q’ stands for the qualificand–qualifier relation.29 In (2) the chief qualificand is Flower-Flowerness and the chief qualifier is Red-Redness, while in (3) the qualificand is Flower-individual and the qualifier is Flowerness and Red colour. Now let us consider the sentence (4) puṣpe raktaḥ ‘red-colour (occurs) in a flower’. The cognitive content of this sentence might be expressed in the following way: (5) Q (Red colour – occurrence-in-a flower). In (5) Red colour is the qualificand and occurrence-in-a flower (puṣpa-vṛttitva) is the qualifier. Now if we claim that (1) and (4) are related transformationally and if we accept the view that transformations do not change the meaning, then (1) and (4) have the same meaning, although they represent different cognitive contents i.e. they have different śābdabodhas ‘understanding of the meaning’. It may also be claimed that (1) is ambiguous, for it can represent two different cognitions. If we equate the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition, then (1) and (4) do not differ in meaning. Their difference at the cognitive level might be accounted for by postulating a separate level called ‘the level of understanding’ or ‘the cognitive level’. The Nyāya view suggests another interesting point. According to this view even the word ‘flower’ represents a cognitive content which can be expressed in the following way: (6) Q (Flower-individual – Flowerness) If a qualificative cognition (i.e. the content of a qualificative cognition) is always expressible by a sentence, then the word ‘puṣpam’ expresses a sentence according to the Nyāya.30 There is a dispute among the Indian philosophers as to the nature of the chief qualificand of the cognitive content of a sentence. According to the Nyāya the chief qualificand is expressed by the first case termination, and according to the grammarian philosophers it is expressed by the finite verb or the verbal root; but the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas differ from both the Naiyāyikas and the grammarians. Let us illustrate the difference between them in terms of the following sentence:31 (7) devadattaḥ pacati ‘Devadatta is cooking’. The cognitive content of (7) is represented by the following expression or sentence by the Pāṇiniyas who are also grammarian philosophers:

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(8) devadatta – niṣṭho vartamāna – kāliko viklittya – anukūlo vyāpāraḥ ‘an action, located in Devadatta, which is currently going on and leads to the softening (of food)’. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas the cognitive content of (7) is represented by (9) devadatta – niṣṭhā pākānukūlā bhāvanā ‘an act of bringing about a result, which is located in Devadatta and leads to softening’. The Naiyayikas would represent the cognitive content of (7) by (10) pākānukūla – kṛtimān devadattaḥ ‘Devadatta is qualified by a conscious effort which leads to cooking’.32 According to the Pāṇiniyas or the grammarians the chief qualificand of (7) is the act of cooking, according to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas it is the act of bringing something into being, and according to the Naiyāyikas it is Devadatta. Now if we claim that (8), (9), and (10) have different meanings, then we cannot claim that meaning is the truth-condition, because all of them are made true by the same fact. Moreover, if (8), (9), and (10) have different meanings, then we cannot claim that they are related transformationally, because usually transformations do not change the meaning of an expression. Hence if they are not related transformationally, we require different underlying phrase-markers for them to give an account of their difference in meaning. Now a problem arises regarding the correlation of the word ‘meaning’ or ‘sense’ with the Sanskrit term ‘śābdabodha’. Both Matilal33 and Cardona34 explained the notion of śābdabodha, and thought that it might correspond to the notion of meaning or sense of a sentence. But in modern philosophical writings the notion of meaning or sense is usually contrasted with the notion of reference (cf. Frege’s distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung). If we take this notion of meaning into account, then it is difficult to see how the Sanskrit śābdabodha would correspond to it.35 For in that case we have to accept that the same sentence i.e. (7) will have three different meanings expressed by (8), (9) and (10). In other words, even the elementary sentences such as ‘Devadatta is cooking’ would be, in this way, ambiguous like the sentence ‘vegetarians don’t know how good meat tastes’. It would be hard to find an unambiguous sentence. Now the question is whether we can solve this puzzle by some other simplified method. If we postulate a separate level called ‘the epistemic level’ or ‘the level of cognitive content’, then we can solve this puzzle without sacrificing many intuitive notions. It may be said that the meaning of the sentence (7) is not changed by the paraphrases (8), (9) and (10). They represent different cognitive contents at the epistemic level, and all of them are made true by the same fact. If meaning is equated with the truth condition, then they have the same meaning. If we are not willing to equate meaning with truth-condition, then also we can explain their identity in meaning by deriving them from the same base phrase-marker by applying transformation rules, provided we accept the view that transformations do not change the meaning. Now the question is how this discussion is related to the subject–predicate distinction. If the epistemic level is different from the other levels, then we can talk about the subjectpredicate distinction at this level also. If the subject at the epistemic level is equated with the

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chief qualificand, then we can have different subjects at the epistemic level corresponding to the same sentence. If (7) is used to represent the cognitive contents of (8), (9) and (10), then at the epistemic level we have different subjects, although at the level of surface structure or deep structure ‘Devadatta’ is the subject. In most ontological systems also Devadatta would be the ontological subject of (7). Similarly, (1) and (4) will have different subjects at the epistemic level, but they might not have different subjects at the ontological level. Since (1) and (4) are transformationally related, we might claim that they have the same meaning. From this discussion it follows that the acceptance of the epistemic level as distinct from other levels solves many puzzling problems.

IV In this section we shall discuss the logical subject and predicate of a sentence, and we shall show that the logical level cannot be equated with the deep structure level. In logic the simple sentences of ordinary language are expressed by the forms ‘Fx’, ‘Gxy’, ‘Hxyz’, etc., or they are represented by the logical notations which involve quantifiers and variables. Strawson36 tries to show the formal distinction between subject-terms and predicateterms in logic by showing the formal distinction between the symbols in terms of which we paraphrase or symbolize the simple sentences of ordinary language. If ‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’ are treated as place holders for subject-terms, and ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’ are treated as place holders for predicate-terms, then a predicate-term is restricted in a way in which a subject-term is not. A predicate-term is restricted to a form which has one place for a subject-term or two places for subject-terms or three places for subject-terms and so on. The same predicateterm cannot have both one place for a subject-term and two places for subject-terms. A subject-term is not restricted in this way. The same subject-term may occur in a form with any number of subject places. Secondly, it is said that we can enrich our logic with negative and compound predicateterms, but we cannot enrich our logic in the same way with negative and compound subject-terms. The sentence ‘– (Fa)’ is logically equivalent to ‘~Fa’, but ‘F~a’ is not logically equivalent to ‘-(Fa)’. Similarly, ‘(Fa) and (Ga)’ is equivalent to ‘(F and G) a’ in which ‘F and G’ is a compound predicate, but ‘(Fa) and (Fb)’ is not equivalent to ‘F (a and b)’ in which ‘a and b’ is a compound subject-term. Again ‘(Fa) or (Ga)’ is equivalent to ‘(F or G) a’, but ‘(Fa) or (Fb)’ is not equivalent to ‘F (a or b)’.37 This argument has been put forward to show the difference between subject-term and predicate-term in logic. Thirdly, it is claimed that a predicate-term is true of or false of what a subject-term stands for; but not conversely. In the sentence ‘Fa’, ‘F’ is true of or false of a; but we cannot say that ‘a’ is true of or false of F. Fourthly, Quine38 claims that variables and quantifiers are substitutable for subjectterms, but not for predicate-terms. In the logical language of Quine all subject-terms or singular terms are eliminated in favour of variables and quantifiers. The sentence ‘a is F’ is transformed into the sentence ‘the thing which is-A (or A-izes) is F’, if ‘a’ is not an abbreviated description. By applying Russell’s theory of descriptions the latter sentence is transformed into the following sentence: (Ǝx) (Ax • (y) (Ay • É • x = y) • Fy)

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Ultimately, there is nothing like names or singular terms in the logical vocabulary of Quine. Instead of the traditional distinction between subject-term and predicate-term we can draw the distinction between variables of quantification and predicate-terms. From the above discussion it also follows that there is no one logical analysis or logical system. In Russell’s logic, descriptions, not logically proper names, are eliminable in favour of variables of quantification, while in Quine’s logic all singular terms are eliminable in favour of variables of quantification. In Russell’s system ‘a’ would be the logical subject and ‘F’ would be the logical predicate in the sentence ‘Fa’, while in Quine’s system variables of quantification, i.e., ‘something’, ‘everything’, would be the logical subjects of sentences, if we want to draw the distinction between subject and predicate. Moreover, in Russell’s system the meaning of a logically proper name such as ‘a’ is its denotatum, while in Quine’s logic ‘a’ as a logically proper name does not occur at all. Russell’s logic presupposes a system of ontology which includes the denotata of logically proper names. In both ‘Fa’ and ‘~Fa’ we have to presuppose a denotatum for ‘a’, which will be the meaning of ‘a’. But in free logic,39 in the sentence ‘Fa’, ‘a’ is simply a name or a noun-like expression whose meaning is not its denotatum. In free logic the names do not have any existential import. They will remain meaningful even if the domain is empty. Furthermore, free logic can be contrasted with the Russell-Quine logic on several other points. The supporters of each logical system claim certain advantages over other logical systems. Quine claims certain advantages for his logical system which shuns singular terms altogether. He says, Laws of logic become simplified through not having to provide for the instantiation of quantifications by terms other than variables. The simplification is greater for the fact that the instantiations thus avoided were ones that depended awkwardly on existence assumptions. Certain gains in philosophical clarity ensue also. Variables, rather than names, come to be seen as the primary avenue of reference. Little puzzles about names that fail to name anything are swept aside.40 As there are certain advantages there are also certain disadvantages in Quine’s system. He says, The elimination of singular terms is not at all good, however, even for logic and mathematics. Inference moves faster when we can instantiate quantifications directly by names and complex singular terms, rather than working through the variables and paraphrases. And complex singular terms are in practice vital for algebraic technique. An algebraist who was not free to substitute complex expressions directly for variables, or to substitute one side of a complex equality directly for the other, would soon give up.41 From the above remarks of Quine it follows that his system is useful for certain logical purposes, but not for certain other purposes. Similarly, Russell’s system or Lejewski’s system is more useful for certain purposes, but not for certain other purposes. From the above discussion it also follows that the subject–predicate distinction at the logical level can be drawn in different ways depending on the logical system we accept. Now let us consider the question whether the logical level is different from the deep structure level of a language. We shall show the difference between them in terms of their functions.

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One of the major functions of deep structure is to describe the underlying structure of a sentence. The deep structure of a sentence is represented by the underlying phrase-markers which are connected with the final derived phrase-markers by transformational rules. In any deep structure analysis the aim is to reveal the underlying structure of a sentence. Even if we accept different theories about the deep structure of a sentence, the aim is to derive the surface structure of a sentence from the underlying phrase-markers by applying transformational rules. In the deep structure of Chomsky the subject phrase of a sentence is followed by the predicate phrase, while in the deep structure of Gilbert Harman42 the predicate phrase is followed by one or more arguments. These two models are represented in the following way:

The above-mentioned aim of deep structure analysis might not be present in a logical analysis. Even Quine subscribes to the view that logical analysis does not reveal the underlying structure of a sentence. He says, ‘I find the phrase “logical analysis” misleading, in its suggestion that we are exposing a logical structure that lay hidden in the sentence all along.’43 If we accept Quine’s logical analysis which eliminates all singular terms in favour of the variables of quantification, we cannot derive the sentences of ordinary language which contain singular terms. As to the relation between the sentences of ordinary language and the sentences of logical language, it can be said that in some cases the logical structure of a sentence resembles the underlying structure of a sentence in ordinary language.44 Hence a logical structure is not devised to reveal the underlying structure of a sentence in ordinary language. But one of the principal aims of the deep structure analysis is to reveal the underlying structure of a sentence and to derive the surface structure of a sentence from its deep structure by applying transformational rules. Since the aim of the deep structure analysis is so different from that of logical analysis, it is more plausible to say that one cannot be equated with the other, and they do not differ in the way two different logical analyses differ from each other.45 This substantiates the claim that the deep structure level cannot be equated with the logical level.

V In section one we introduced the topical subject–predicate distinction in terms of the topic-comment distinction which gives an account of the different uses of an expression. There might be more than one topic in a context which is determined by the question asked. A topical subject might not coincide with the subject at the surface structure level or the deep structure level of a language.

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In section two we have introduced four different levels in the context of Pāṇini’s syntax and semantics following the interpretation of Kiparsky and Staal. It is also claimed that the phonological level and the case level of Pāṇini might be considered as the surface structure level for our purpose. At the level of surface structure the subject–predicate distinction can be drawn without reference to the semantics of a sentence. The word-order criterion might be used to determine the subject and the predicate of English or Chinese sentences. The subject of a sentence is the prior Immediate Constituent, and the predicate is the posterior Immediate Constituent. But this criterion is not applicable to the sentences of a language where the word order is free. In Sanskrit where the word order is free the subject–predicate distinction can be drawn at the surface structure level in terms of the first case endings and the verbal terminations. In the sentence kumbhān saḥ karoti ‘he makes pots’, saḥ ‘he’ is the subject at the surface structure level. In the sentence tena kumbhāḥ kriyante ‘pots are made by him’, kumbhāḥ ‘pots’ becomes the subject at the surface structure level. Now the question is whether any criterion of surface structure is applicable to a language which treats one word as a sentence. If the simplest utterance is a sentence, we cannot apply the surface structure criterion. From this it does not follow that the subject–predicate distinction cannot be drawn at some other level. Even if we fail to draw the subject–predicate distinction at the surface structure level, we might succeed in drawing the subject–predicate distinction at the deep structure level, or the qualificand–qualifier distinction at the epistemic level, or the particular–universal distinction at the ontological level. Such distinctions would account for the subject–predicate distinction at these levels. The criterion for the subject–predicate distinction at the deep structure level might be stated in terms of the Kāraka relations in Pāṇini’s system. The Kartṛ (what is independent) Kāraka relation signifies the subject at the deep structure level. The same Kartṛ Kāraka relation is expressed by the following sentences: (a) saḥ kumbhān karoti ‘he makes pots’ (b) tena kumbhāḥ kriyante ‘pots are made by him’. In (a) the Kartṛ Kāraka relation is expressed by the first case ending along with the verbal termination, while in (b) it is expressed by the instrumental or third case ending. In a Chomskyan model the subject-predicate distinction at the deep structure level can be drawn in terms of the categorial symbols such as S, NP, VP, and V. Chomsky proposes the following definitions: (1) Subject-of: [NP, S] (2) Predicate-of: [VP, S] Now the question is whether we can draw the subject–predicate distinction at the semantic level as distinct from the deep structure level. This question leads us to the discussion whether the deep structure can be purely syntactical. In the context of Chomsky we briefly dealt with this problem also. If the deep structure is not interpreted semantically, the subject–predicate distinction can be drawn at the semantic level also. The semantical subject might be equated with the agent (or, in other words, what the speaker intends to be the agent). From this we should not conclude that the subject at the semantic level must be the ontological subject. What the speaker intends to be an agent might not be an agent

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at the ontological level. Moreover, a particular system of ontology might not assign any ontological status to the category of agent. The ontological subject might be something analogous to the Bradleyan Substance, or it might be a particular as opposed to a universal, or it might be a dravya ‘substance’ of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. In section three we have introduced the ontological and the epistemic levels in addition to the surface structure, the deep structure, and the semantic levels. The concept of śābdabodha ‘understanding of the meaning’ is used to draw the distinction between the epistemic level and other levels. From the distinction between these levels it does not follow that the subject–predicate distinction at a particular level will not parallel the subject–predicate distinction at some other level. As a matter of fact, in most cases the subject–predicate distinction at a particular level parallels the subject–predicate distinction at some other level. In section four we have introduced the logical level which is distinct from the surface structure level on the one hand, and the deep structure level on the other. In this section we have also shown how the subject–predicate distinction can be drawn in the Russellian or Quinean system. The introduction of different levels makes our question about the subject–predicate distinction more specific and less ambiguous. Instead of asking the question, ‘What are the subject and the predicate of a sentence?’ we should ask more specific questions of the form: (i) What are the topical subject and predicate of S in L? (ii) What are the subject and predicate of S in L at level X? where ‘X’ stands for a particular level, ‘S’ for a sentence, and ‘L’ for a language.

NOTES   1. P. Kiparsky and J.F. Staal, ‘Syntactic and Semantic Relations in Pāṇini,’ Foundations of Language, Volume 5, 1969, pp. 83-117.   2. B.K. Matilal, ‘Indian Theorists on the Nature of the Sentence (vākya),’ Foundations of Language, Volume 2, 1966, pp. 377-393.   3. P.F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1969), pp. 137-247.   4. Ibid., p. 140.   5. F.P. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics (Paterson, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1960), p. 116.   6. P.F. Strawson, Individuals, p. 137.   7. T.L. Mei, ‘Subject and Predicate: A Grammatical Preliminary,’ The Philosophical Review, Vol. 70, No.2, 1961, pp. 153-175.   8. Ibid., p. 156.   9. Ibid., p. 159. 10. B.L. Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1964), p. 241. 11. R. Price, ‘Descriptive Metaphysics, Chinese and the Oxford Common Room,’ Mind, Vol. 73, 1964, pp. 106-110. 12. Ibid., p. 107. 13. Ibid.

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14. J.F. Staal, ‘Some Semantic Relations between Sentoids,’ Foundations of Language, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1967, pp. 66-88. The topic–comment distinction was introduced in another form by J. Cook Wilson, Statement and Inference, Vol. 1 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1926). 15. P. Kiparsky and J.F. Staal, ‘Syntactic and Semantic Relations in Pāṇini,’ Foundations of Language, Vol. 5, 1969, pp. 83-117. 16. Ibid., p. 84. 17. J.F. Staal, Word Order in Sanskrit and Universal Grammar (D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1967). pp. 37-41. 18. N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1975). 19. Ibid., p. 16. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid., p. 71. 22. Ibid., p. 107. 23. Ibid. 24. J. Searle, ‘Chomsky’s Revolution in Linguistics,’ reprinted in On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays, edited by G. Harman (New York: Anchor Press, 1974), p. 17. 25. Panini 1-4-54. 26. P. Kiparsky and J.F. Staal, ‘Syntactic and Semantic Relations in Pāṇini,’ Foundations of Language, Vol. 5, 1969, p. 109. See also J.F. Staal, Word Order in Sanskrit and Universal Grammar (D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1967), p. 44. 27. P. Kiparsky and J.F. Staal, ‘Syntactic and Semantic Relations in Pāṇini,’ p. 109. 28. B.K. Matilal, ‘Indian Theorists on the Nature of the Sentence (vākya),’ pp. 377-393. 29. For detailed application of this technique see B.K. Matilal, The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), chapters 2 and 3. 30. ‘Word’, however, does not mean a pada in this context. The Nyāya interprets puṣpam as a combination of two padas, viz., the nominal stem and the inflection. I am grateful to B.K. Matilal for pointing this out to me. 31. G. Cardona, ‘Paraphrase and Sentence Analysis: Some Indian Views,’ Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 3, No. 3/4, 1975. 32. Ibid., p. 260. 33. B.K. Matilal, ‘Indian Theorists on the Nature of the Sentence (vākya),’ pp. 377-393. 34. G. Cardona, ‘Paraphrase and Sentence Analysis: Some Indian Views,’ pp. 259-281. 35. I understand, of course, that the meaning of ‘meaning’ is ambiguous, and hence the remarks of both Matilal and Cardona might admit of a different interpretation. 36. F. Strawson, Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1974). 37. Ibid., pp. 6-7. 38. W.V.O. Quine, Methods of Logic (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961); W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961); W.V.O. Quine, Philosophy of Logic (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970). 39. C. Lejewski, ‘Logic and Existence,’ The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 5, No. 18, 1954-1955, pp. 104-119; H.S. Leonard, ‘The Logic of Existence,’ Philosophical Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1956, pp. 49-64; K.J.J. Hintikka, ‘Existential Presuppositions and Existential Commitments,’ The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 56, No. 3, 1959, pp. 125-137; Karel Lambert,

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40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

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‘On Logic and Existence,’ Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1965, pp. 135-141. W.V.O. Quine, ‘Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory,’ in Semantics of Natural Language, edited by D. Davidson and G. Harman (D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1972). Ibid., p. 452. G. Harman, ‘Deep Structure as Logical Form,’ in Semantics of Natural Language, edited by D. Davidson and G. Harman (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1972). W.V.O. Quine, ‘Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory,’ p. 451. Tarski made a similar remark in a different context. See A. Tarski., ‘The Semantic Conception of Truth,’ reprinted in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, edited by H. Feigl and W. Sellars (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949). But Quine holds the opposite thesis. He says, ‘They differ in the same sort of way that the logician’s two paraphrases differ from each other.’ See W.V.O. Quine, ‘Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory,’ p. 453.

CHAPTER NINE

Navya-Nyāya on Subject – Predicate and Related Pairs The aim of this paper* is to discuss how:

1. Indian philosophy is relevant to contemporary Western philosophy,



2. perceptual, inferential and verbal cognitions are related to the same object or fact,



3. certain terms of contemporary analytical philosophy such ‘unsaturated’ or ‘incomplete’ can be interpreted, and



4. Indian philosophy can suggest solutions to some of the problems related to subject – predicate in contemporary philosophy.

In order to substantiate the above claims I shall discuss (a) the pair of terms ‘subject – predicate’ and other related pairs of the Nyāya philosophers, (b) the doctrine of contemporary philosophers that the subject or the subject – expression of a sentence is saturated (or complete) and the predicate or the predicate – expression is unsaturated (or incomplete), and (c) the Nyāya reason for considering the predicate alone as unsaturated. In the first section of this paper I shall discuss the distinction between the six pairs of terms of the Nyāya philosophers. The second section will deal with the concepts of saturated and unsaturated as found in contemporary Western philosophy. In the third section I shall deal with the Nyāya argument for considering the predicate alone as unsaturated.

PART I The Nyāya philosophers have discussed the distinction between the following pairs of terms: 1. anuyogī – pratiyogī (first term – second term) 2. ādhāra – ādheya (substratum – superstratum) 3. viśeṣya – viśeṣaṇa (qualificand – qualifier) 4. viśeṣya – prakāra (qualificand – relational qualifier)1

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5. uddeśya – vidheya (subject – predicate) 6. pakṣa – sādhya (the locus of inference – probandum) In order to explain the difference between these pairs I would like to begin with the Nyāya concept of relation. A relation may be defined in the following way: R is a relation if (Ǝx) (Ǝy) (It is due to R that x appears as the qualificand and y as the qualifier in the cognition xRy), and (Ǝx) (Ǝy) (It is due to R that there is a unified, or qualified object, or fact xRy), where ‘x’ and ‘y’ range over the entities of the Nyāya system. In this definition it is to be noted that the x and the y of a cognition need not be the same as the x and the y of a fact. If the cognition is true, then the x and the y of it would correspond to the x and the y of the fact xRy. Now it is to be noted that the terms of the above pairs may refer to the same object in different contexts, but the ways they refer are not the same. These ways specify the relations of our cognitions to objects. Now let us define these terms and explain their roles in different types of cognition, such as perceptual, inferential, and verbal. Suppose a and b are related by the relation R. A) a is anuyogī (the first term) iff b is related to a by the relation R. At the level of cognition the relation R is cognized in a, but not in b. The other term of the relation R, namely b, is pratiyogī (the second term). The relation of our cognition to this aspect of a is expressed by the term ‘anuyogitā’ (‘the property of being the first term’). Hence anuyogitā (the property of being the first term) is a relational property of a. Similarly, b has pratiyogitā (the property of being the second term). As regards the relation of a to b the Nyāya claims that the former is related to the latter by the converse of R i.e. Ř. Hence b can be cognized as anuyogī (the first term) and a as pratiyogī (the second term) of R-converse i.e. Ř. The relation of cognition to b is anuyogitā (the property of being the first term), and the relation of cognition to a is pratiyogitā (the property of being the second term). This is what happens when two objects are related by the relation of conjunction (or contact) but one is not in another. For example, the contact between the two palms in salutation, or the contact between two animals in a herd. In such cases one term is not cognized in another. The relation between anuyogitā (the property of being the first term) and pratiyogitā (the property of being the second term), according to the Nyāya, is mutual determiner – determined (paraspara nirūpya – nirūpaka). In other words, they are correlative terms. Again, the cognition of anuyogī (the first term) presupposes the cognition of pratiyogī (the second term) and vice versa. Hence anuyogī (the first term) and pratiyogī (the second term) are also correlatives. But the entities referred to by these terms may not be correlatives. In this context it is to be noted that in specifying the direction of a relation the Nyāya philosophers use the terms anuyogitā (the property of being the first term) and pratiyogitā (the property of being the second term). If a is anuyogī (the first terms), b is pratiyogī (the second term) and the relation between them is conjunction, then the relation of b to a is the property of being the first term determined by the property of being the second term which is limited by the relation of conjunction (saṃyoga – sambandhāvacchinna – pratiyogitā – nirūpita – anuyogitā). The relation of a to b is the property of being the second term limited by the conjunction relation but determined by the property of being the first

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term (anuyogitā – nirūpita – saṃyoga – sambandhāvacchinna – pratiyogitā). The former and the latter may be represented by the following forms respectively: (i) a (cNds) b (ii) b (dsNc) a, where ‘a’ stands for the first term, ‘b’ for the second term, ‘c’ for the property of being the first term, ‘d’ for the property of being the second term, ‘s’ for conjunction relation, ‘ds’ for d is limited by s, and N for determined by relation. The distinction between the relation limited by and the relation determined by may be explained thus: x is limited by y if and only if a) x and y are properties, b) x is a relational property, and c) y is a mode of presentation of the object(s) where the relational property x resides. For example, particular cows having the relational property of being the referent (śakyatā) of the word ‘cow’ are limited by the property cowness. In the technical language of the Nyāya, the property of being the referent of the word ‘cow’ residing in particular cows is limited by cowness (gotva-avacchinna-śakyatā-avacchedaka). x is determined by y if and only if both x and y are relational properties of correlatives. For example, the property of being the first term is determined by the property of being the second term and vice versa. The Nyāya philosophers have used this technique for the explanation of the meaning of a sentence. According to them the meaning of a sentence as distinct from the meanings of its parts lies in the relation along with its direction. Hence the meaning of ‘a is related to b by the relation R’ cannot be equated with that of ‘b is related to a by the converse of R’. This technique of the Nyāya philosophers may be used to explain the difference in meaning between the following pairs of sentences: 1 Brutus killed Caesar 1’ Caesar was killed by Brutus 2 John gave a book to Tom 2’ Tom received a book from John 3 John sprayed paint on the wall 3’ John sprayed the wall with paint 4 Bees are swarming the garden 4’ The garden is swarming with bees 5 The speeches preceded a buffet luncheon 5’ A buffet luncheon followed the speeches Contemporary philosophers of language are concerned with the problem whether transformation preserves the meaning of a sentence. Philosophers such as Chomsky, Katz, Fodor, Fillmore, and Jackendoff are concerned with this problem, but there is no unanimity among their views as they have not yet developed a comprehensive theory to deal with this problem. On the contrary, the Nyāya theory of relation and meaning can explain why the above pairs of sentences do not have the same meaning. Since the direction of the relation is part of the meaning of a sentence, the meaning of 1 cannot be identified with that of 1’. Similar will be the case with the remaining pairs of sentences in the above list.

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B) Now let us discuss the pair ādhāra – ādheya (substratum – superstratum). If an object resides in another object, then the latter is ādhāra (substratum) and the former is ādheya (superstratum). For example, a book is on the table. The table is ādhāra (substratum) and the book is ādheya (superstratum). If a pen is on the book, then the book becomes the ādhāra (substratum) and the pen becomes the ādheya (superstratum) of the book. Here the book is ādheya (superstratum) in relation to the table, but ādhāra (substratum) in relation to the pen. If everything resides in time and time does not reside in anything, then time becomes the ādhāra (substratum) but not the ādheya (superstratum). The relational properties ādhāratā (the property of being the substratum) and ādheyatā (the property of being the superstratum) signify the relation of a cognition to the ādhāra (substratum) and the relation of a cognition to the ādheya (superstratum) respectively. Hence they are viṣayatās (a type of relational properties of the objects). If b is related to a by an occurrence – exacting relation (vṛttiniyāmaka – sambandha) R, then the cognition of a as ādhāra (substratum) would imply the cognition of b in a by the relation R, but the cognition of b would not imply the cognition of a in b by the relation R-converse i.e. Ř. When a is cognized as ādhāra (substratum), it is not only cognized as anuyogī (the first term) and b as pratiyogī (the second term), but also as something in which b resides. In other words, the cognition of a as ādhāra (substratum) is something more than the cognition of it as anuyogī (the first term). Hence the terms ‘ādhāra’ (‘substratum’) and ‘anuyogī’ (‘the first term’) do not have the same meaning although in this case they refer to the same thing. Similarly, the cognition of b as ādheya (superstratum) implies something more than the cognition of it as pratiyogī (the second term). Hence b cannot be cognized as ādhāra (substratum) in relation to a. But in the case of anuyogī – pratiyogī (the first term – the second term) b can be cognized as the pratiyogī (the second term) of a if b is related to a by the relation R and it can also be cognized as the anuyogī (the first term) of the converse of R i.e. Ř. Here also we have to specify the direction of the relation in terms of ādhāratā (the property of being the substratum) and ādheyatā (the property of being the superstratum). If a is ādhāra (substratum), b is ādheya (superstratum), and R is the relation of conjunction (contact), then the relation of b to a is the property of being the substratum determined by the property of being the superstratum which is limited by the relation of conjunction (saṃyoga – sambandhāvacchinna – ādheyatā – nirūpita – ādhāratā). The relation of a to b is the property of being the superstratum limited by the relation of conjunction and determined by the property of being the substratum (ādhāratā – nirūpita – saṃyoga – sambandhāvacchinna – ādheyatā). For this reason the pairs of sentences such as ‘the floor possesses a pot’ (ghaṭavad bhūtalam) and ‘a pot is on the floor’ (bhūtale ghaṭaḥ) do not have the same meaning, although they are logically equivalent. C) As regards viśeṣya – viśeṣaṇa (qualificand – qualifier) distinction, the Nyāya philosophers claim that it is applicable to every qualificative or relational cognition (savikalpaka – jñāna). Only non-qualificative cognition (nirvikalpaka – jñāna) is excluded from its scope. A qualificative cognition has the form aRb, where a is the qualificand, b is the qualifier and R is the qualification relation which relates b to a. Let us consider the cognitions expressed by the following sentences: (a) A fire is on the mountain (parvate vahniḥ) (b) The mountain has a fire (vahnimān parvataḥ)

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In (a), a fire is the qualificand and the mountain is the qualifier, while in (b) the mountain is the qualificand and a fire is the qualifier. The qualifier plays the role of a distinguisher. Hence it distinguishes something from other things or a collection from other collections. That which is distinguished by it is the qualificand. Since in (a) a particular fire is distinguished from other fires in terms of the mountain, the mountain becomes the qualifier. Since a particular fire is distinguished from other fires, it is the qualificand of this cognition. The relation of this cognition to the fire is viśeṣyatā (the property of being the qualificand), and the relation of this cognition to the mountain is viśeṣaṇatā (the property of being the qualifier). These relational properties are used to characterize the roles of these objects in this cognition. In (b), a fire is the distinguisher. Hence it distinguishes a particular mountain from other mountains. Since it is distinguished from other mountains, it is the qualificand of this cognition. Since the terms ‘qualificand’ and ‘qualifier’ are correlatives, the cognition of one presupposes the cognition of the other. Here also the property of being the qualificand (viśeṣyatā) and the property of being the qualifier (viśeṣaṇatā) are related to each other by the determiner – determined relation (paraspara – nirūpya – nirūpaka – sambandha). The category of qualificand – qualifier relation emphasizes the distinguisher and the distinguished aspects of the objects of a qualificative cognition. In this context it is to be noted that according to the Nyāya philosophers one of the causal conditions of a qualificative cognition is the cognition of its qualifier.2 Hence in (a) the cognition of the mountain is a causal condition of the qualificative cognition, but in (b) the cognition of a fire is a causal condition of the qualificative cognition. In the case of perception, the Nyāya philosophers have used the category of qualificand – qualifier (viśeṣya – viśeṣaṇa), not the category of subject – predicate (uddeśya – vidheya). Let us consider the above examples for the description of a perceptual cognition. If the cognition of a fire is present prior to the perception and the cognition of the mountain is absent, then the sentence ‘the mountain has a fire’ will be used to describe this perceptual cognition. But if the cognition of the mountain is present prior to the perception and the cognition of a fire is absent, then the sentence ‘A fire is on the mountain’ will be used to describe it. This is due to the fact that in the former case the mountain is the qualificand and a fire is the qualifier, while in the latter case a fire is the qualificand and the mountain is the qualifier. But if the cognition of both of them are present prior to the perception, then it will take either of the two forms. Hence it can be described either by (a) or by (b). If none of them is present prior to the perception, then the perceptual cognition will not take place. D) Now let us discuss the category of qualificand – relational qualifier (viśeṣya  – prakāra). It is to be noted that in both (a) and (b) the relation of conjunction is the qualification relation. The Nyāya philosophers have tried to establish the thesis that the qualification relation is a mode of presentation of the qualifier, not the qualificand.3 Hence in (a) the conjunction relation is a mode of presentation of the mountain, but in (b) it is a mode of presentation of a fire. In general, according to the Nyāya, the qualifier is presented under the mode of the qualification relation. Hence, in the qualificative cognition aRb, the qualifier b is presented under the mode R. In the technical language of the Nyāya, the property of being the qualifier residing in b is limited by the relation R. The qualifier which is presented under the mode of the qualification relation is called ‘prakāra’ (‘relational qualifier’), and the relation of the cognition to this type of qualifier is called

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‘prakāratā’ (‘the property of being the relational qualifier’). Now the question is whether every qualifier is presented under the mode of its qualification relation. On this point the Nyāya philosophers claim that certain qualifiers are not presented under the mode of their qualification relations. When one relation is a qualifier of another relation, the former is simply a qualifier (viśeṣaṇa), not a relational qualifier (prakāra). Consider the following example: A fire is in a container and the container is on the mountain. Let us suppose the fire is related to the container by the relation R and the container is related to the mountain by the relation S. Hence the fire is related to the mountain by the indirect relation R and S. In the cognition of the fire being related to the mountain, the relations R and S are related by the qualificand – qualifier relation (viśeṣya – viśeṣaṇa – sambandha). Hence R is the qualifier of S which is its qualificand. The relation of R to S would be the property of being second term of the relation S such that the second term is the locus of the relation R (svāśrya – pratiyogīkatva). In other words, this relation is a property of S if a is related to b by R and b is related to c by S. According to the Nyāya the relation of R to S is not considered a mode of presentation of R which is the qualifier of S. This is due to the fact that if the relation of R to S becomes the mode of presentation of R, then there will be an infinite regress at epistemic level. Suppose R1 is the relation of R to S. If R1 becomes the mode of presentation of R, then R1 becomes the qualifier of R. Again, the relation of R1 to R, say R2, becomes the mode of presentation of R1 and so on. In order to avoid this type of regress the Nyāya claims that a relation which is a qualifier of another relation is simply a qualifier (viśeṣaṇa), not a relational qualifier (prakāra). But in all other cases the object which is the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) is also the relational qualifier (prakāra). In a qualificative cognition aRb, b is not only a qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) but also a relational qualifier as b is presented under the mode R, if a and b are not relations. Hence in this cognition the relation of the cognition to b is not the same as the relation of it to b under the mode R. In order to signify this difference, the word ‘viśeṣaṇatā’ (‘the property of being the qualifier’) applies to the former relation and the word ‘prakāratā’ (‘the property of being the relational qualifier’) applies to the latter relation. Hence these two words do not have the same meaning. Now the question is whether the relation of R to b is a mode of presentation of R if R is a mode of presentation of b. If the relation of R to b is to be cognized in order to cognize R as the mode of presentation of b, then there will also be an epistemic regress similar to the previous example. On this point the Nyāya philosophers claim that it is not necessary that the relation of R to b is to be cognized in order to cognize R as the mode of presentation of b. This relation may be cognized in a higher order cognition (anuvyavasāya), but it is not necessary for cognizing R as the mode of presentation of b. Hence there is no epistemic regress in such cases. In this context it is to be noted that a qualificative perceptual cognition involves all the four pairs discussed above if the relation is occurrence – exacting (vṛtti – niyāmaka). But if the relation is non - occurrence – exacting (vṛtti–aniyāmaka), then it will involve only three pairs, namely, anuyogī – pratiyogī (the first term – the second term), viśeṣya viśeṣaṇa (qualificand-qualifier), and viśeṣya - prakāra (qualificand – relational qualifier).

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These terms signify the ways our perceptual cognition is related to the same object. They also give us information about the roles of the objects of perception. E) The pair uddeśya - vidheya (subject - predicate) is used in the context of some verbal cognition, but in every inference. In the verbal context it occurs in a question – answer or topic – comment situation. Suppose the question is: Where is fire? And the answer is: A fire is on the mountain. In this context a fire is uddeśya (subject) and the mountain is vidheya (predicate). But if the question is, What is on the mountain? and the answer is, A fire is on the mountain, then the mountain is the subject and the fire is the predicate. The subject, according to the Nyāya, is that which is already known to us, but the predicate is not already known to us. In the context of verbal cognition a sentence is used to establish it in the subject. Hence a predicate is that which is not already known to us but is to be established, but a subject is that which is already known to us and where the predicate is to be established. Here also the terms ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ are correlatives. The relation of the cognition to the uddeśya (subject) is uddeśyatā (the property of being the subject), and the relation of the cognition to the vidheya (predicate) is vidheyatā (the property of being the predicate). In the context of verbal cognitions the Nyāya uses only three pairs of terms, namely, viśeṣya – viśeṣaṇa (qualificand – qualifier), viśeṣya – prakāra (qualificand – relational qualifier), and uddeśya – vidheya (subject – predicate). This is due to the fact that the superstratum (ādheya) or the second term (pratiyogī) takes the role of a distinguisher in a verbal cognition. Hence in understanding the meaning of the sentence ‘a pot is on the floor’, a pot is cognized as the qualificand (viśeṣya) and the property of being the superstratum (ādheyatā) residing in it is cognized as its qualifier. This qualifier is limited by the relation of conjunction but determined by the property of being the substratum residing in the floor (bhūtala – niṣṭha – adhikaraṇatā – nirūpita – saṃyoga – sambandhāvacchinna – ādheyatā). Since a pot is to be distinguished in terms of this qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) or relational qualifier (prakāra), it takes the role of a distinguisher. Similarly, in understanding that the left hand is related to the right hand by the relation of conjunction from the sentence ‘The left hand is related to the right hand’, the left hand is the qualificand and the property of being the second term (pratiyogitā) residing in it is cognized as its qualifier. This qualifier is limited by the relation of conjunction but determined by the property of being the first term (anuyogīta) residing in the right hand (dakṣiṇahasta-niṣṭha-anuyogitā-nirūpita-saṃyoga-sambandhāvacchinna-ādheyatā). So the left hand is distinguished in terms of this qualifier or relational qualifier. For this reason the pairs anuyogī – pratiyogī (the first term – the second term) and ādhāra – ādheya (substratum – superstratum) do not play any role at the level of verbal cognition. F) Now let us discuss the pair of terms ‘pakṣa’ (‘the locus of inference’) and ‘sādhya’ (‘probandum’). Since this pair occurs only in an inference and since all the remaining pairs are also involved in an inference, I shall discuss it in the context of an inference for others. In this context I shall also point out the significance of the distinction between the pairs anuyogī – pratiyogī (the first term-the second term) and ādhāra – ādheya (substratum – superstratum). In order to substantiate these claims let us consider the following inference for others:

1. Thesis (pratijñā): The mountain has a fire.



2. Reason (hetu): Because of smoke.

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3. Example (udāharaṇa): Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in kitchen, etc.



4. Application (upanaya): The mountain has smoke which is pervaded by fire.



5. Conclusion (nigamana): Therefore, the mountain has a fire.

According to the Nyāya philosophers these sentences will ultimately give rise to an inferential cognition in the hearer. Initially, the hearer will understand the meanings of these sentences, and thereafter he/she will have a mental cognition (mānasa – jñāna) of the operation (parāmarśa) which corresponds to the application or the 4th premise. The operation (parāmarśa) will yield the inferential cognition (anumiti). The parāmarśa (operation), which is a cognition, is not generated by external sense – organs or by the causal conditions of indirect cognitions (parokṣa – jñāna). For this reason it is considered a mental perception. In this inference the locus (pakṣa) is the mountain, the probandum (sādhya) is fire, and probans or mark (hetu) is smoke. The old Nyāya defines pakṣa as something where there is doubt about the presence of the sādhya (sandigdha – sādhyavān – pakṣaḥ). The word ‘pakṣatā’ (‘the property of being the locus of inference’) refers to this dubious cognition of the presence of the sādhya (probandum) in the pakṣa (the locus of inference). But this definition of ‘pakṣatā’ is not acceptable to the followers of the Navya-Nyāya as the desire to infer leads to an inferential cognition (anumiti) even if there is no doubt about the presence of the probandum in the locus of an inference. For this reason the followers of the Navya-Nyāya define ‘pakṣatā’ as the absence of certainty about the probandum in the locus qualified by the absence of desire to infer (siṣādhayiṣā – viraha – viśiṣṭa – siddhyabhāva). Hence ‘pakṣatā’ which is a type of dubious cognition or the absence of certainty or a desire to infer qualifies the self of the person who is making the inference, and it is related to the locus of inference by the relation of the property of being the qualificand (viśeṣyatā). In other words, the locus of inference is the qualificand of this mental state. For this reason the qualificand of the mental state pakṣatā is called ‘pakṣa’. The above definition of ‘pakṣatā’ is usually explained in the following way: There is absence of certainty about the probandum in the locus or there is desire to infer the probandum in the locus. From the above discussion of pakṣatā it follows that a dubious mental state or a desire to infer, or simply absence of certainty is related to pakṣa (the locus of inference). Therefore, when we say that pakṣa has pakṣatā what we mean is that an attitude of doubt or a desire to infer is directed towards the pakṣa (the locus of inference). In our above example of inference, the mountain which has occurred in the cognition of the thesis has the relational property pakṣatā. Since a fire is to be inferred on the mountain and there is doubt about its presence or there is desire to infer it on the mountain, it is called ‘sādhya’ (‘probandum’). Hence it is something to be established or inferred in the pakṣa. The way this cognition is related to the sādhya is called ‘sādhyatā’. Moreover, sādhyatā is the correlative of pakṣatā. Hence they are dependent on each other. Now the question is whether sādhya (probandum) is a correlative of hetu (probans or mark). According to the Nyāya, the relation between them is signifier and significate (jñāpya – jñāpaka – sambandha). Hence they are also correlatives. Again, the property of being the signifier (jñāpakatva) is determined by (nirūpita) the property of being the significate (jñāpyatva) and vice versa. Hence hetutā which is the same as jñāpakatva is the correlative of sādhyatā which is the same as jñāpyatva.

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Now let us contrast the cognition of the thesis (pratijñā) with the inferential cognition (anumiti). In an inferential cognition, which is the result of an inference, the locus (pakṣa) is no longer characterized by pakṣatā as there is no doubt about the presence of the probandum (sādhya) or desire to infer the probandum (sādhya). Hence the mountain which has occurred in the inferential cognition lacks pakṣatā, and thereby the fire lacks sādhyatā. Since the fire is the significate of smoke which is the hetu (probans), the fire would remain as sādhya or significate in the inferential cognition. Hence it has sādhyatā (the property of being the probandum) which is the correlative of hetutā (the property of being the probans), although it lacks another type of sādhyatā which is the correlative of pakṣatā. From this discussion it follows that there are two types of sādhyatā. The cognition of the thesis has both the types of sādhyatā, but the inferential cognition has only one type of sādhyatā, namely, the one which is the correlative of hetutā. As regards the subject (uddeśya), the mountain remains the subject both in the thesis as well as in the inferential cognition. This is due to the fact that the mountain is already known to us. Since the fire was not already known to us on the mountain, it remains the predicate in both the cognitions. As regards the difference between the predicate (vidheya) and the probandum (sādhya), it may be said that the probandum (sādhya) is the correlate of the probans (hetu) but the predicate (vidheya) is the correlate of the subject (uddeśya), although neither the predicate (vidheya) nor the probandum (sādhya) is already known to us if there is doubt about the presence the probandum in the locus of inference. The fact that the probandum (sādhya) is the correlate of the probans (hetu) is not conveyed by the use of the term ‘predicate’ (‘vidheya’). Hence the fire, in the above example, plays a dual role. As a correlate of the subject (uddeśya) it is the predicate (vidheya), but as a correlate of the probans (hetu) it is the probandum (sādhya). For this reason the Nyāya philosophers have used the term ‘vidheya’ (‘predicate’), not the term ‘sādhya’ (‘probandum’), in the context of verbal cognition which cannot be identified with an inferential cognition. From the above discussion it follows that both terms are necessary for the description of an inferential cognition (anumiti). Now let us demonstrate the relevance of the remaining pairs of terms in the context of an inference. It is to be noted that both the inferential cognition and the operation which is directly related to the inferential cognition may take different forms. The inferential cognition in the above inference is also expressed by the sentence ‘A fire is on the mountain.’ In this cognition also the pakṣa (the locus of inference) and the sādhya (probandum) would remain the same. Again, the uddeśya (subject) and the vidheya (predicate) would also remain the same. In other words, in this cognition also the mountain would be both pakṣa (the locus of inference) and uddeśya (subject), and the fire would be both sādhya (probandum) and vidheya (predicate). But the qualificand, the qualifier and the relational qualifier of this cognition would not be the same as those of the cognition of the mountain has a fire. In the latter cognition the mountain is the qualificand (viśeṣya), the fire is the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa), and the fire presented under the mode of the qualification relation, which is conjunction in the ontology of the Nyāya, is the relational qualifier (prakāra). In the former cognition, the fire is the qualificand (viśeṣya), the mountain is the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa), and the mountain presented under the mode of the qualification relation is the relational qualifier (prakāra). This is how the Nyāya philosophers describe the fine-grained distinction between these two forms of the inferential cognition.

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Now I shall mention the importance of the difference between the pairs anuyogī  – pratiyogī (the first term – the second term) and ādhāra – ādheya (substratum – superstratum) with reference to the different interpretations of parāmarśa (operation) which is the vyāpāra of the inferential cognition. The vyāpāra which is a causal condition has been defined in the following way: x is the vyāpāra of the effect E = Df (Ǝy) (y is a cause or a set of causes of E and x is a cause of E, but x is due to y) In our above example, the application (upanaya – vākya) expresses the vyāpāra of an inferential cognition. It is called ‘parāmarśa’ in the context of an inference. The Nyāya philosophers define parāmarśa as vyāpti – viśiṣṭa – pakṣadharmatā – jñāna. One of the interpretations of this definition is as follows: The cognition of the property of being the superstratum (ādheyatā) residing in the probans qualified by the property of being the pervaded (vyāpyatva) in the locus of inference. If we take this interpretation, then there will be only one type of parāmarśa, viz., pervaded qualificand (vyāpya – viśeṣyaka), positive or negative. This is due to the fact that the category of ādhāra – ādheya (substratum – superstratum) has been used in this interpretation. If we take our previous example, then the following parāmarśas (operations) will be derivable from this interpretation: (i) The smoke which is pervaded by fire is on the mountain (vahni – vyāpya – dhūmaḥ – parvate). (ii) That which is pervaded by fire is on the mountain (vahni – vyāpyaḥ – parvate). (iii) The smoke which is the negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of fire is on the mountain (vahni – abhāva – vyāpakībhūta – abhāva – pratiyogī – dhūmaḥ parvate). (iv) The negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of fire is on the mountain (vahni – abhāva – vyāpakībhūta – abhāva – pratiyogī – parvate). If we take this interpretation, then we cannot derive other formulations of parāmarśa, including the one mentioned in our above example, namely, The mountain has smoke which is pervaded by fire. Moreover, we get only one type of inferential cognition as there is only pervaded qualificand (vyāpya – viśeṣyaka) type of parāmarśa. Hence in our above example the inferential cognition would be: A fire is on the mountain; instead of the mountain has a fire. It is to be noted that there are four more formulations of parāmarśa which cannot be derived from the above interpretation which uses the category of ādhāra – ādheya. In order to derive these formulations another interpretation has been suggested, which may be stated in the following way: The cognition of the relation which is the limitor of the property of being the probans or the pervaded whose first term (anuyogī) is the locus of inference (pakṣa) and the

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second term (pratiyogī) is the probans (or that) which is qualified by the property of being the pervaded. If we accept this interpretation which uses the category of anuyogī – pratiyogī (first term – second term), not the category of ādhāra – ādheya (superstratum – substratum), then the following parāmarśas would also be derivable: (v) The mountain has smoke which is pervaded by fire (parvataḥ – vahni – vyāpya – dhūmavān). (vi) The mountain has something which is pervaded by fire (parvataḥ – vahni – vyāpyavān). (vii) The mountain has smoke which is the negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of fire (vahni – abhāva – vyāpakībhūta – abhāva – pratiyogī – dhūmavān – parvataḥ). (viii) The mountain has the negatum of the absence which pervades the absence of fire (vahni – abhāva – vyāpakībhūta – abhāva – pratiyogīmān – parvataḥ). This is how the Nyāya philosophers have shown the importance of the category of anuyogī – pratiyogī in the context of an inference. Since all the six pairs of terms are involved in an inference, the Nyāya philosophers can express several types of epistemic differences, which cannot be expressed in terms of one or two pairs of terms such as ‘subject – predicate.’ Hence the Nyāya distinction between the six pairs of terms would add a new dimension to contemporary epistemology. In terms of these pairs we can describe the phenomenological properties of perceptual, inferential, or verbal cognitions. Moreover, since there are altogether twelve terms in the six pairs, our cognition may be related to the same thing in twelve ways in different contexts. Hence by using these terms we can specify the roles of the same object in different epistemic contexts. This is how we can show the relevance of our discussion to contemporary phenomenology.

PART II In this section I shall discuss how the Nyāya philosophers would interpret Frege’s use of the terms ‘saturated’ and ‘unsaturated’. Frege claimed that the subject-expression of a sentence is saturated (or complete) while the predicate – expression is unsaturated (or incomplete). At the level of thought also the subject is saturated but the predicate is unsaturated. As an answer to the question why the predicate or the predicate – expression alone is unsaturated, but not the subject or the subject – expression, certain passages may be cited. Frege says: ‘An object … cannot logically adhere to another object … without a link, which however, cannot be an object but must be incomplete. A logical combination which gives rise to a whole can take place only when an incomplete part is completed or saturated by one or several parts.’4 Again he says: ‘For not all the parts of a thought can be complete; at least one must be ‘unsaturated’, or predicative; otherwise they would not hold together.’5 These passages of Frege presuppose the view that an object which is the referent of a subject  – expression is complete, but a concept which is the referent of a predicate –

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expression is incomplete. Moreover, a genuine whole cannot be formed unless at least one part is incomplete. Again, according to Frege, a concept is necessarily incomplete. For this reason, he claims that the concept horse is not a concept. In the sentence ‘Dobbin is a horse’ the subject – expression refers to an object and the predicate – expression refers to a concept, but in the sentence ‘The concept horse is derived from experience’, the subject – expression does not refer to a concept but an object. Hence a concept – word used as a subject – expression does not refer to a concept. In this context it is to be noted that Frege’s object – concept distinction does not parallel the substance – quality or the particular – universal distinction. The latter distinctions are ontological and hence they do not depend on their roles in epistemic contexts. For this reason a quality or a universal will not be transformed into a substance or a particular when we ascribe a predicate to it or talk about it. But, in Frege, when we talk about a concept, it becomes an object. From our above remarks it follows that Frege has substantiated the thesis that a complete whole cannot be formed unless one part of it is incomplete, but he has not ruled out the possibility of both the parts being incomplete and the subject part being incomplete. Hence in order to substantiate Frege’s view we have to rule out the possibility of subject part being incomplete. As regards the predicate or the predicate – expression of a sentence, there are several views. In Frege alone we come across six ways of expressing a predicate. Hence the predicateexpression of a sentence such as ‘John is a man’ may be expressed in the following ways:6 (1) being a man (2) x is a man (3) is a man (4) a man (5) man (6) ( ) is a man Following other philosophers such as Cook Wilson7, Quine8 and Strawson9, we may add a few more items as predicates or predicate – expressions. The following may also be treated as predicates: (7) - is a man (8) 1  is a man (9) that he is a man (10) humanity From the above discussion it follows that at least one item is to be treated as incomplete in order to make a whole. According to Frege it is the predicate which remains incomplete, but not the subject, although subject alone cannot form a whole. Now let us discuss the Nyāya conception of unsaturated and saturated. This presupposes the Nyāya conception of qualificative cognition. A qualificative cognition necessarily involves three elements, viz., qualificand, qualifier and a qualification relation. Hence it has the form ‘aRb’, where a is the qualificand, b is the qualifier and R is the qualification relation which relates b to a. Let us consider the cognition of a red flower. In this cognition

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a flower is the qualificand, a particular red colour is the qualifier, and the qualification relation is the relation of inherence which relates the particular red colour to the flower. The flower which is the qualificand is presented under the mode of flowerness, and the particular red colour which is the qualifier is presented under the mode of redness. In the technical language of the Nyāya, the property of being the qualificand residing in the flower is limited by the universal flowerness and the property of being the qualifier residing in the particular red colour is limited by the universal redness. The relation limited by may also be explained in the following way: x is limited by y iff (i) y is a mode of presentation of x or the object where the relational property x resides, and (ii) y determines the x or the object where the relational property x resides. In a non-technical language we may say that a limitor is used to fix the referent or the referents of a term. It is both a mode of presentation of the object and determines the object. In our above example, the limitors are properties. Hence they are called ‘property – limitors.’ The Nyāya philosophers have accepted relations also as limitors. In our above example, the relation of inherence which relates the particular red colour to the flower is also a mode of presentation of the red colour. Hence the property of being the qualifier residing in the red colour is limited by both the property – limitor redness and the relation – limitor inherence. In an atomic qualificative cognition neither the qualificand nor the qualifier is presented under the mode of a property – limitor. Let us consider the cognition corresponding to the expression ‘a flower’. In this cognition a particular flower is the qualificand and the universal flowerness is the qualifier, but neither of them is presented under the mode of a property – limitor. As regards the qualification relation which relates the universal flowerness to the particular flower, the Nyāya philosophers claim that it is a mode of presentation of the qualifier flowerness, not the particular flower which is the qualificand. Hence in any qualificative cognition, atomic or non-atomic, the relation of the qualifier to the qualificand is the mode of presentation of the qualifier. Since the relation is a mode of presentation of the qualifier alone, it may be said to be incomplete or unsaturated, and the qualificand may be said to be complete or saturated. If we are using the terms ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’, then the predicate is incomplete in the sense that it depends on the relation as its mode of presentation, but the subject does not depend on the relation as its mode of presentation. This is how the Nyāya philosophers would interpret the terms ‘saturated’ and ‘unsaturated’.

PART III In this section I shall discuss why the predicate or the predicate – expression alone is to be considered as unsaturated. In the context of the Nyāya philosophy the question is: Why should we consider the qualification relation as the mode of presentation of the qualifier alone? The Nyāya philosophers claim that if the qualification relation is considered as the mode of presentation of the qualificand (or the subject), then in some cases we cannot describe

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the cognitions which are prevented by a particular cognition. It is to be noted that the Nyāya conception of preventer – prevented relation between cognitions is the epistemic counterpart of the relation between contrary or contradictory propositions. Hence the Nyāya view may be stated in terms of propositions as well. Let us consider the cognition corresponding to the sentence ‘Everything has the absence of time by the relation of inherence’ (‘sarvaṃ samavāyena mahākālābhāvavān’). This cognition would be prevented by the following cognitions: (i) Everything is related to time by the relation of inherence (sarvaṃ samavāyena mahākālavān), (ii) There is at least one thing which is related to time by the relation of inherence (samavāyena mahākālavān), and (iii) Rāma is related to time by the relation of inherence (Rāmaḥ samavāyena mahākālavān), Śyāma is related to time by the relation of inherence (Śyāmaḥ samavāyena mahākālavān), and so on. Since (iii) refers to each member of our domain, it is not possible to enumerate each of them if there are infinite objects. Now the question is whether the prevented cognitions can be described. The Nyāya philosophers have suggested the following descriptions: (a) The cognitions in which the property of being the qualifier is limited by the property of being time and the relation of inherence (samavāya – sambandhāvacchinna – mahākālatvāvacchinna – prakāratāśālī – buddhi). (b) The cognitions in which the property of being the qualificand is limited by the relation of inherence and determined by the property of being the qualifier which is limited by the property of being time (mahākālatvāvacchinna – prakāratā – nirūpita – samavāya – sambandhāvacchinna – viśeṣyatāśālī – buddhi) Now let us compare (a) with (b). Since (b) has mentioned the property of being the qualificand, it refers to all the qualificanda of the prevented cognitions. Hence it refers to (i), (ii) and (iii) mentioned above. Therefore, the previous problem of enumeration cannot be overcome. In order to avoid this problem (a) has been suggested by the Nyāya philosophers. Since (a) does not mention the property of being the qualificand of the prevented cognitions, it does not refer to each of the qualificanda of the prevented cognitions. So the description (a) is simpler than that of (b). This is due to the fact that the relation is considered as the mode of presentation of the qualifier, not the qualificand. Hence the qualifier is dependent on the relation, not the qualificand. The above example of the Nyāya may be generalized in the following way: Consider any sentence of the form ‘(x) (x has (is) F)’ and ask the question, what are the cognitions which are prevented by the cognition of this sentence? The Nyāya philosophers would reply that the cognitions in which the predicate is described by ‘has not F’ (‘is not F’) are prevented by the cognition of (x) (x has F). Since the description of the prevented cognitions in terms of ‘has not F’ (‘is not F’) is simpler than the one which refers to the qualificanda of the prevented cognitions, it is better to consider relation as a mode of presentation of the qualifier. This technique of the Nyāya philosophers

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may be applied at the level of language. Since the qualifier along with its relation – limitor corresponds to the expression ‘has F’ or ‘has not F’ (‘is F’ or ‘is not F’), the predicate – expression is not simply ‘F’ or ‘not F’, but ‘has F’(‘is F’) or ‘has not F’(‘is not F’). Hence in any sentence of the form ‘x has F’ (‘x is F’) or ‘x has not F’ (‘x is not F’), x is the subject and the remaining portion is the predicate. Therefore, in the case of the sentence ‘John is a man’, the subject – expression is ‘John’ and the predicate – expression is ‘is a man’, rather than ‘a man’ or ‘man’. The rationale for the inclusion of ‘has’ or ‘is’ or its analogue as part of the predicate – expression lies in the description of certain prevented cognitions. Since the predicate depends on the relation signified by ‘has’ or ‘is’, it is considered unsaturated. Hence in the Nyāya philosophy we come across an argument for considering the predicate alone as unsaturated. This is how one of the problems of contemporary philosophy can be solved.10

NOTES    * This paper is dedicated to the memory of my teacher Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Visvabandhu Takatīrtha (1920-2006), with whom I studied Navya-Nyāya for more than a decade and who inspired me to carry out my research in the field of comparative philosophy. One of the creative philosophers and outstanding scholars of the Nyāya-Vedānta tradition of Indian philosophy, he taught for more than fifty years at Balananda Sanskrit college, Ramakrishna Veda Vidyalaya, Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta, Visva Bharati University, Jadavpur University, Indian Academy of Philosophy, and Ramakrishna Mission institute of Culture, Calcutta. He has published several books and articles on Navya-Nyāya and Vedānta in Sanskrit as well as in Bengali. Since he was a source of inspiration to scholars of classical Indian philosophy, he will always be remembered with deep gratitude and exemplary admiration.   1. The Sanskrit term ‘prakāra’ has been translated as ‘relational qualifier’ so that it can be distinguished from the word ‘viśeṣaṇa’ (‘qualifier’).   2. For a discussion of this point, see author’s paper ‘Cognition of cognition’, Part II, note 17, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1996.   3. As regards the discussion for considering the qualification relation as a mode of presentation of the qualifier, see author’s article ‘ “Saturated” and “Unsaturated”: Frege and the Nyāya’, Synthese, 1989.   4. E. Klemke (ed.), Essays on Frege, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1968), p. 259.   5. Gottlob Frege, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gotlob Frege, (New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980), p. 54.   6. Ibid., pp. 13-46.   7. John Cook Wilson, Statement and Inference, Vol. I, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926), p. 115.   8. W. V. O. Quine, Methods of Logic (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), p. 131.   9. P. F. Strawson, Individuals, (London: Methuen, 1979), p. 175. 10. For the Nyāya view, I am greatly indebted to Pandit Visvabandhu Tarkatīrtha, an authority on Navya – Nyāya.

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PART THREE

Logic and Mathematics

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CHAPTER TEN

Austin on Falsity and Negation The aim of this paper is to construct Austin’s arguments for the thesis that the negation of a statement is not the same as its falsity, based on some of his remarks in essay ‘Truth’.1 There is a widespread thesis of formal semanticists that ‘ “p” is false’ is logically equivalent to ‘not p’. In this paper I would like to state some of the arguments for the view that ‘ “p” is false’ does not mean the same as ‘not p’. 1. From Austin’s theory of truth it follows that ‘ “p” is true’ does not mean the same as ‘p’, where ‘p’ is a statement. He claims that the statement ‘p’ refers to the world or any part of it, but it does not refer to itself; while the statement ‘ “p” is true’ refers to the world or any part of it and the statement ‘p’. That is to say, a true statement has reference to the world and the statement which is in question. A similar description will apply to a statement which is false. It may be said that the statement ‘ “p” is false’ does not mean the same as ‘not p’. The negation of a statement has reference to the world exclusive of itself; while the falsity of a statement has reference to the world as well as to the statement in question. Since their references are different they cannot mean the same thing if by the word ‘meaning’ we mean both sense and reference. Since Austin follows the correspondence theory of truth, two items, viz., the statement and the world, are required to decide whether a statement is true or false, but a similar requirement does not arise when we affirm or negate a statement. Hence ‘ “p” is false’ does not mean the same as ‘not p’. 2. The second argument of Austin is based on the view that what holds good of ordinary expressions might not hold good of extraordinary expressions. He claims that the thesis that if two statements are logically equivalent, then they have the same meaning, might not be taken as a universally valid proposition. It might be valid within a logical system or with respect to the uses of expressions in logic or mathematics or even with respect to the uses of ordinary expressions such as ‘red’ or ‘growl’ in statements. But it might not be valid when we consider ‘is true’ or ‘is false’ as applied to a statement. There is a similar view with respect to the word ‘exists’. Words like ‘red’ or ‘growl’ are treated as predicates, but the word ‘exist’ in ‘I exist’ or ‘exists’ in ‘This exists’ is not treated as a predicate according to some philosophers. Moreover, even the classical symbolic logic does not consider ‘exists’ as a predicate of an individual, although predicates like ‘red’ or ‘growl’ are considered as predicates of individuals. Similarly, it may be said that although predicates ‘is true’ and ‘is false’ look like ordinary predicates, they are not. Since they are extraordinary predicates, what holds good with respect to ordinary predicates might not hold good with respect to extraordinary predicates. Hence the statement ‘ “p” is false’ does not mean the same as ‘not p’ even if they are logically equivalent. This argument of Austin makes an appeal to the distinction between logical and grammatical predicates or real and apparent predicates. As there is a need for such a

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distinction within the category of predicates, so there is a need for a similar distinction within the category of logical equivalences. In most cases logically equivalent statements mean the same thing, but there are a few logically equivalent statements such as ‘ “p” is false’ and ‘not p’ which do not mean the same thing. 3. Another argument may be reconstructed from his remarks about the presupposition for the making of the statement ‘It is false that he is at home’. It is claimed that the presupposition for the making of this statement is the statement ‘He is at home’. If no one has made the statement ‘He is at home’, we do not make the statement ‘It is false that he is at home’. The making of the statement ‘He is not at home’, however, does not presuppose the making of the statement ‘He is at home’. From this observation it may be said that ‘It is false that p’ presupposes the making of the statement ‘p’, while ‘not p’ does not presuppose the making of the statement ‘p’. Hence these two statements do not have the same meaning. From this it follows that falsity and negation do not have the same meaning. 4. Two more arguments may be reconstructed from his remarks in footnote 22. He claims that there are two sets of logical axioms for falsity and negation. One set of axioms may be satisfied by a language but not the other set. He claims that Aristotle has drawn a distinction between axioms (a) and (b). (a) No statement can be both true and false. No statement can be neither true nor false. (b) Of two contradictory statements: Both cannot be true. Both cannot be false. The second set of axioms requires a definition of contradictories, and it is usually presupposed that there is a contradictory statement corresponding to every statement. That is to say, if there is a statement ‘p’, then there is a statement ‘not p’, and vice versa. But Austin raises doubts about this type of presupposition. He thinks there might be a language which does not satisfy axiom (b), but satisfies axiom (a). That is to say, the law of contradiction in the form of axiom (a) might be satisfied but not in the form of (b). Although Austin has not mentioned any language system which fulfils this requirement, the Nyāya system of Indian philosophy has constructed a language system which fulfils precisely this requirement of Austin. The Nyāya does not subscribe to the view if ‘p’ (i.e. a statement of the form ‘S is P’) is well-formed, then ‘not p’ (i.e. ‘S is not P’) is also well-formed as a universal law. According to the Nyāya, it depends on the nature of the predicate. If the predicate is a universal property of every object, then it cannot be negated. According to the Nyāya predicates like existence, knowability and nameability are properties of everything. Hence the statement ‘this table exists’ or ‘this table is knowable’ is true. Since according to the Nyāya a negated term must represent a locatable property, and since there are no locatable properties corresponding to the terms ‘non-existence’ (i.e. ‘does not exists’), ‘unknowable’ and ‘unnameable’, these terms are ill-formed. Hence sentences like ‘this table does not exist’ or ‘this table is unknowable’ are ill-formed expressions. From this it follows that statements like ‘this table exists’ do not have any contradictories. But such statements cannot be both true and false, and cannot be neither true nor false. Sentences like ‘ “this table exists” is true’ and ‘ “this table exists” is

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false’ are well-formed; and we can make statements by using these sentences. From this it follows that corresponding to every statement of the form ‘ “p” is false’, there might not be a statement of the form ‘not p’. Hence falsity is not the same as negation.2 5. Another argument of Austin is based on a distinction between a paradox and a contradiction. Since a paradox uses the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’, and since the logicians are trying to resolve the paradoxes by propounding different theories such as Russell’s theory of types or Tarski’s distinction between object-language and meta-language, it follows that they are not genuine contradictions of the form ‘p and not p’. Most of the semantical paradoxes have the form ‘ “p” is true if and only if “p” is false’. ‘ “p” is false’ is derived from the assumption ‘ “p” is true’ by using some other statements and the rules of logic, and similarly ‘ “p” is true’ is derived from the assumption ‘ “p” is false’. Some of the theories which try to resolve these paradoxes put restrictions on the use of the predicates ‘is true’ and ‘is false’, but there is no such restriction on the use of a negation sign. According to most logicians ‘is true’ and ‘is false’ are predicates of object-language sentences, while ‘not’ is a logical constant. If ‘p’ is in the object-language, then ‘not p’ is also in the object-language, but ‘“p” is false’ is in the meta-language. Hence falsity cannot be equated with negation. 6. Another argument may be reconstructed from his remarks that the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ are in the same class of terms as ‘exaggerated’, ‘vague’, ‘bald’, ‘rough’, and ‘misleading’. These terms, Austin claims, have various degrees and dimensions of success. A description might be said to be vague or rough, or misleading. A description which is appropriate in one context may be vague in another context. Similarly a statement which is considered as true in one context, may be treated as exaggerated in another context or for certain other purposes. If falsity is equated with negation, then we cannot accept the thesis that there are various degrees and dimensions of success in making statements with the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’. Since falsity, according to Austin, has degrees and dimensions and negation lacks these properties, they cannot be equated with each other. 7. Another argument may be reconstructed from his comparison of ‘truth’ with ‘freedom’. It may be said that as the word ‘freedom’ is not purely descriptive so is the word ‘truth’. The concept of freedom carries with it some element of evaluative force and it might be an ideal which we strive to achieve. It may be that it is an illusory ideal. Similarly, the concept of truth carries with it some element of evaluative force and the ideal it posits may be an illusory one. In a similar way it may be argued that the concept of bondage which is opposed to that of freedom and the concept of falsity which is opposed to that of truth are in the same category. Just as we should strive for freedom and shun bondage, similarly we should strive for truth and shun falsity, even if the whole truth might be an illusory ideal. From this it follows that the use of the word ‘false’ at least in some contexts is a term of condemnation, but the use of the word ‘not’ has no such connotation or force. Hence falsity cannot be equated with negation. 8. From Austin’s3 remarks on a promise which is false another argument may be put forward to show that falsity and negation do not have the same meaning. If ‘ “p” is false’ means the same as ‘not p’, then ‘“I promise to give you sixpence” is false’ would mean the same as ‘It is not the case that I promise to give you sixpence’. Since the latter statement does not mean the same as the former, falsity cannot be equated with negation. Austin claims that a performative utterance like ‘I promise to give you sixpence’ presupposes certain conditions for making the appropriate utterance. These conditions

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include the circumstances for making the promise, the right person to make the promise and the intention to keep the promise. If some of these conditions are not fulfilled, a performative utterance such as ‘I promise that ...’ becomes infelicitous or void or inept. But when someone says, ‘I promise to give you sixpence’, but he/she does not give you sixpence, then you might say that he/she has made a false promise. We cannot say that he has not made a promise. ‘For he does promise: the promise here is not even void, though it is given in bad faith’.4 But the sentence ‘It is not the case that I promise to give you sixpence’ may mean either ‘I do not promise to give you sixpence’ or ‘I promise not to give you sixpence’. Taken in either of these senses the sentence ‘It is not the case that I promise to give you sixpence’ does not mean the same as a false promise. A promise is false, not by virtue of not making a promise, but by virtue of not doing the relevant things subsequently. Hence a false promise is a case of a promise. But the negation of a promise is not usually a case of a promise. Hence the sentence ‘It is not the case that I promise to give you sixpence’ does not amount to a promise, much less a false promise. This argument also substantiates the thesis that falsity is not the same as negation.

NOTES 1. J.L. Austin, ‘Truth’, in Truth, edited by G. Pitcher, Prentice-Hall Inc., Engle-wood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964. 2. In this context I have followed the thesis that there is no difference between ‘S is not P’ and ‘It is not the case that Sis P’, if ‘S is P’ is an atomic sentence. 3. J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Lecture 1, edited by J.O. Urmson, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965. 4. Ibid., 11.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Empty Terms: The Nyāya and the Buddhists The purpose of this paper is to explain the Buddhists’ conception of empty term, which is linked up with their conception of Śūnyatā, and to answer some of the questions raised by certain contemporary writers1 on Nyāya and Buddhism. Moreover, the aim is to show an important function of language which is embedded in the Buddhist philosophy as a whole. As to the background of this controversy between the Nyāya and the Buddhists the reader will find an excellent exposition in B. K. Matilal’s Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis. The controversy between the Nyāya and the Buddhists occurs in the context of the proof of the proposition ‘whatever exists is momentary’. In this context it is to be remembered that the Buddhists wanted to prove in some sense of the term ‘proof ’ the following propositions. (At the end of this paper we shall see in what sense they wanted to prove these propositions.) (1) Whatever exists is momentary. (2) Whatever is momentary is suffering. (3) Whatever is suffering is śūnya. (Sometimes the proposition ‘whatever is momentary is unique’ is included in this list.) In this paper we are mainly concerned with an implication of (1) and (3). The proof of (1) requires agreeing and disagreeing examples. In this context it is to be noted that according to Indian logicians both agreeing and disagreeing examples are to be cited, unless the possibility of having both types of examples is ruled out by the very nature of the inference in question. The disagreeing examples to prove the proposition ‘whatever exists is momentary’ refer to empty terms. The Buddhists use examples such as ‘A hare’s horn which is non-momentary does not exist’. The Nyāya points out that if the Buddhists assign existence to the locus of non-momentariness, then they are contradicting their position, and if the locus is unreal, then it cannot be used as an example to prove the above proposition. The Nyāya also claimed that the Buddhists would consider the proposition ‘The (A) rabbit’s horn is not sharp’ as true. It is also claimed by the Nyāya that if the proposition ‘The (A) rabbit’s horn is not sharp’ is to be considered as true on the ground that we simply refuse to attribute a property to a fictitious object, then the proposition ‘The (A) rabbit’s horn is sharp’ should be considered as true on similar grounds. Let us consider the Nyāya analysis of the proposition ‘A rabbit’s horn is sharp’. If this proposition represents a cognitive state, it can be symbolized in the following way:2 (C) Q (Q (Q (rabbit-rabbitness) Q (horn-hornness)) Q (sharp-sharpness)),

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where ‘Q’ stands for the relation ‘qualificand-qualifier’. (C) represents a complex cognitive state which involves three elementary cognitive states, viz., Q (rabbit-rabbitness), Q (hornhornness), Q (sharp-sharpness). These cognitive states are valid because they correspond to reality and the propositions corresponding to these states are true. But the cognitive state, Q (Q (rabbit-rabbitness) Q (horn-hornness)), is erroneous because it does not correspond to reality. Hence the proposition corresponding to this cognitive state is false. Now the question is whether the proposition ‘A rabbit’s horn is sharp’ is true or false. Since the qualificand of the qualifier sharp is erroneous, it may be said that the whole cognitive state is erroneous and the proposition which represents this cognitive state is false. A similar analysis of the proposition ‘A rabbit’s horn is not sharp’ can be given and on similar grounds it can also be regarded as false. Now the question is whether the propositions ‘Devadatta is white’ and ‘Devadatta is not white’ can be considered as false if there is no one called ‘Devadatta’. Udayana3, a Naiyāyika, says: If nobody has ever seen or known a person called ‘Devadatta’ anywhere at any time, then the question ‘Is Devadatta white, or is he black?’ results simply from some outrageous perversion. And if, without caring to understand what this is all about, someone answers the question by saying ‘he is white’ another person has as much right to answer by saying ‘he is black’. Nothing is established by such questions and answers. In each case, the lack of our means of knowledge (to establish the subject term) and (the consequent possibility of) self-contradiction remain the same. From the above comment of Udayana it seems to us that he would consider both the propositions ‘Devadatta is white’ and ‘Devadatta is not white’ as neither true nor false.4 There is no parallel between ‘A rabbit’s horn is sharp’ and ‘Devadatta is white’ or between ‘A rabbit’s horn is not sharp’ and ‘Devadatta is not white’. In the proposition ‘Devadatta is white’ ‘Devadatta’ is not a disguised sentence or proposition, while in the case of ‘A hare’s horn is sharp’ ‘A hare’s horn’ is a disguised sentence or a proposition. Moreover, in the proposition ‘Devadatta is white’ there is no qualificand corresponding to ‘Devadatta’, while in the proposition ‘A hare’s horn is sharp’ there is a qualificand corresponding to ‘A hare’s horn’. On this point one might draw some similarity between Russell and the Nyāya. According to both Russell and the Nyāya the proposition ‘A hare’s horn is sharp’ is meaningful, but false. Russell has analyzed this proposition into the following propositions: (a) At least one thing is characterized by the property hare’s horn. (b) Whatever is characterized by hare’s horn is sharp. The proposition ‘A hare’s horn is sharp’ is equivalent to the conjunction of (a) and (b). Since (a) is false, the conjunction of (a) and (b) is false. The Nyāya would also analyze this proposition in a similar way. Since the cognitive state corresponding to ‘A hare’s horn’ is erroneous, the complex cognitive state corresponding to ‘A hare’s horn is sharp’ is erroneous. Hence the sentences or propositions corresponding to these cognitive states are false. According to the Nyāya the proposition ‘A hare’s horn is sharp’ is meaningful because it corresponds to a cognitive state, while according to Russell a sentence or a proposition

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means a certain fact. He says, ‘... the sentence ‘Socrates is mortal’ means a certain fact.’5 If the Russellian facts are equated with the Nyāya cognitive states or intentional objects, then there would be no difference between the two. It seems to us that we require many more points in common if we want to equate the Russellian facts with the Nyāya cognitive states or intentional objects. As regards the proposition ‘Devadatta is white’ Russell would consider it as meaningless if ‘Devadatta’ is treated as a logically proper name and if there is no object denoted by ‘Devadatta’. On the other hand, if ‘Devadatta’ is like an ordinary proper name, then the proposition ‘Devadatta is white’ would be meaningful and it would be analyzed by applying his theory of definite descriptions. As to the nature of logically proper names Russell says, ‘A name, in the narrow logical sense of a word whose meaning is a particular, can only be applied to a particular with which the speaker is acquainted, because you cannot name anything you are not acquainted with.’6 From the above quotation of Udayana it seems to us that he would consider ‘Devadatta’ as a logically proper name. But so far as the nature of a particular and our means of knowing a particular are concerned Udayana would differ from Russell. According to Russell, a proposition involving a logically proper name would be meaningless if there is no object denoted by that name. It seems to us that Udayana would also consider propositions like ‘Devadatta is white’ as meaningless, unless he is willing to accept truth-gaps. If ‘Devadatta is white’ is meaningless, then according to the significance criterion for negation ‘Devadatta is not white’ is equally meaningless. Let us consider the proposition ‘Devadatta exists’. According to Russell it is meaningless if ‘Devadatta’ is treated as a logically proper name. Russell’s argument might be construed in the following manner. If ‘Devadatta exists’ is meaningful, then according to the significance criterion for negation ‘Devadatta does not exist’ would be equally meaningful. If the latter proposition is meaningful, then it is either true or false. If it is true, then ‘Devadatta’ does not denote a particular which will be the meaning of ‘Devadatta’. Since a logically proper name becomes meaningless if it does not denote a particular, ‘Devadatta’ would be meaningless. If it were so, then the sentence or the proposition in which it occurs would be meaningless. So the proposition ‘Devadatta does not exist’ becomes meaningless. If it were so, then ‘Devadatta exists’ would be equally meaningless. Let us see whether according to the Nyāya such propositions are meaningful or meaningless. The cognitive state corresponding to the proposition ‘Devadatta exists’ would be: Q (Devadatta – existence). In this cognitive state Devadatta would be qualificand and existence would be qualifier. Since there is no person called ‘Devadatta’, there is no qualificand of the cognitive state. If it were so, then the proposition ‘Devadatta exists’ would be meaningless. If the Nyāya accepts the significance criterion for negation, then ‘Devadatta does not exist’ becomes equally meaningless. In another way it can be shown that the proposition ‘Devadatta does not exist’ is meaningless if ‘Devadatta’ is treated as a logically proper name. The proposition ‘Devadatta does not exist’ asserts that the absence of Devadatta qualifies the possible qualificand of Devadatta. If Devadatta is not cognisable, the absence of Devadatta is also not cognisable. If it were so, the cognitive state in which the absence of Devadatta is a qualifier would not be possible. Hence the proposition ‘Devadatta does not exist’ does not represent a cognitive state.

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But the situation is different in cases like ‘A rabbit’s horn exists’, ‘A rabbit’s horn does not exist’. In such cases we have cognitive states. The proposition ‘A hare’s horn exists’ represents the following cognitive state or intentional object: ((Q (hare-hareness) Q (horn-hornness)) Q (existence)) Since such propositions correspond to some cognitive states, they are meaningful. They will be true or false depending on whether they correspond to reality or not. Against the Nyāya analysis of ‘a rabbit’s horn’ or ‘unicorn’ it may be urged that the Nyāya analysis is not tenable if such terms are treated as atomic expressions referring to indivisible unexemplified properties. The proposition ‘A hare’s horn exists’ would not represent a cognitive state if the term ‘a hare’s horn’ signifies an unexemplified atomic property. The Nyāya puts forward two arguments against this criticism, (a) If there are two expressions signifying two different unexemplified atomic properties, there is no means of distinguishing the meanings of these expressions.7 (b) Moreover, it cannot be proved that such expressions signify atomic unexemplified properties. Since there is no means of learning the meanings of such terms, it cannot be claimed that such terms are meaningful. If they are meaningful, they must refer to complex properties and each constituent of such complex properties must have exemplification. The above two arguments might be considered as criticisms of Quine’s thesis that propositions like ‘Pegasus exists’ are meaningful even if we consider the notion of Pegasus as obscure and basic.8 The descriptive expression ‘the (a) thing that is – Pegasus’ or ‘the (a) thing that Pegasises’ would be meaningless according to the Nyāya. There would be no means of making the distinction between the meanings of ‘the (a) thing that pegasises’ and ‘the (a) thing that unicornises’. Since such expressions refer to basic unexemplified properties, there is no means of learning the meanings of such expressions. From the above discussion it follows that the Nyāya tries to establish the following points: (a) The propositions of the form ‘a is F’ and ‘a is not F’ are false, if ‘a’ is a descriptive expression signifying a complex unexemplified property and ‘F’ refers to a property other than existence. For example, ‘The (A) hare’s horn is sharp’. (b) The propositions of the form ‘a exists’ and ‘a does not exist’ are contradictories if ‘a’ is a descriptive expression. (c) The propositions (or sentences) of the form ‘a is F’ and ‘a is not F’ are meaningless if ‘a’ is a name such that nobody has ever seen or known the object or person called ‘a’ anywhere at any time and ‘F’ refers to a property including existence. (d) There cannot be a meaningful descriptive term signifying an atomic unexemplifiable property. Let us now consider the objections raised against the Buddhists’ conception of empty terms. The Nyāya has raised the following objections against their conception of empty terms: (1) The disagreeing examples like ‘The hare’s horn is non-momentary and nonexistent’ involve contradictions if the minor terms of the arguments refer to real objects. If the minor terms refer to unreal objects or entities, then those unreal

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objects can never be established by any means of knowledge. Hence the Buddhists cannot use disagreeing examples to establish the thesis that whatever exists is momentary. (2) If the Buddhists claim that the proposition ‘The hare’s horn is not sharp’ is true on the ground that its sharpness cannot be tested by any means of knowledge, then the proposition ‘The hare’s horn is sharp’ can be claimed to be true on similar grounds. Let us also consider the interpretations of the Buddhists’ conception of empty terms by some contemporary writers. Professor Potter said, ‘In India the positions I have called “realism” and “relativism” are espoused, respectively, by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists of Dignaga’s school.’9 According to him, ‘relativism’ ‘allows that there is an external world but denies that the things in it have any characteristics in themselves; the relativist holds that in the world there are at best bare particulars, whose apparent clothing is entirely contributed by the mind.’10 We shall see that Professor Potter’s interpretation represents a small part of the story about Buddhism as a whole. His interpretation does not take into account the Mādhyamika Buddhists’ utterance that everything is śūnya. We shall show that unless we take into account this utterance we cannot explain the nature of the utterance that everything is momentary or that every momentary object is unique. Moreover, according to Professor Potter’s interpretation the Buddhists would consider the propositions ‘This hare’s horn is sharp’ and ‘This hare’s horn is not sharp’ as neither true nor false. Professor McDermott11 has also discussed the Buddhists’ conception of empty terms. According to her interpretation, Ratnakīrti has allowed the ascription of a class of attributes to an unreal subject. Let us see how Ratnakīrti would analyze the proposition ‘A hare’s horn is not sharp’. According to Professor McDermott’s interpretation, Ratnakīrti would consider this proposition as true. It simply says that sharpness and hare’s hornness do not occur in any possible locus. By using Professor McDermott’s technique it can be symbolized as follows: (1) ~ (Ǝ1x) (O (hare’s horn-ness, x). O (sharpness, x)) where ‘Ǝ1x’ means ‘for some possible x’. The symbolic counterpart of the proposition ‘A hare’s horn is not sharp’ shows that a possible locus of hare’s horn has not been denied. That is to say, from (1) we cannot derive (2) ~ (Ǝ1x) (O (hare’s horn-ness, x)) It is claimed that the disagreeing examples for the proof of the proposition ‘whatever exists is momentary’ are to be treated in the way the proposition ‘A hare’s horn is not sharp’ has been treated. The fact that certain attributes or properties are denied of a non-momentary entity does not imply that there are non-momentary entities. From the above interpretation of Ratnakīrti it follows that he would consider the propositions ‘A hare’s horn is not sharp’ and ‘A non-momentary object does not exist’ as true without positing an actual hare’s horn or non-momentary object. Now Professor McDermott raises the following questions: ‘(1) If it is true that the son of a barren woman cannot speak, is it also true that the son of a barren woman is not

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male (and simultaneously not not male as well)? (2) And is a hare’s horn identical with itself? (3) Is it the case that a non-momentary entity is non-momentary? (It would seem so.) (4) Can a non-momentary entity be characterized by various other (albeit ‘unreal’) attributes? (Also likely, but not explicitly affirmed by Ratnakīrti.) (5) Is there one such nonmomentary entity or are there finitely many or infinitely many distinguishable ‘unreal’ members of Ratnakīrti’s universe of discourse?’12 All these questions can be answered in some sense if we take into account the implication of the expression ‘everything is śūnya’. It seems to us that none of the critics has linked the Buddhist conception of empty terms with the Buddhist philosophy of ‘emptiness’ śūnyatā. Professor Potter claims that the Buddhist logician has accepted the propositions ‘This hare’s horn is sharp’ and ‘This hare’s horn is not sharp’ as neither true nor false. Professor McDermott claims that Ratnakīrti has accepted the proposition ‘A hare’s horn is not sharp’ as true. Professor Matilal13 has ascribed exclusion-negation rather than choice-negation to the Buddhists’ conception of negation. The following are the truth-tables for choice-negation and exclusion-negation.

If we accept Professor Matilal’s interpretation, then according to the Buddhist the proposition ‘A hare’s horn is not sharp’ is true if the proposition ‘A hare’s horn is sharp’ is indeterminate i.e. neither true nor false. From the conflicting interpretations of the Buddhist doctrine of empty terms one might come to the conclusion that the Buddhist philosophers have propounded inconsistent theories or their utterances are so vague and ambiguous that one might interpret them in different ways. But none of the conclusions seem to follow if these utterances are taken in the context of the Buddhist philosophy as a whole. The meaning of the empty term, in some sense of the word ‘meaning’, is tied up with the meaning of the term ‘śūnya’. The problems and their solutions are parallel in both cases. Sometimes ‘śūnyatā’ is said to be the negation of all views or standpoints. From this, one might say that a term is empty if nothing can be predicated of the object referred to by that term. But this does not represent the view of the Buddhists because this interpretation presupposes that one can make statements about ‘śūnyatā’ and about empty terms. As a matter of fact, in this context the Buddhists are not trying to prove some propositions which are either descriptive or prescriptive in terms of some other propositions which are either descriptive or prescriptive. The expressions like ‘everything is śūnya’ or ‘everything is momentary’ are used as pointers to something which cannot be stated in language. It is true that the Buddhists have started with the proof of the proposition ‘everything is momentary’ and this proof involves reference to empty terms. Now it may be asked, if the expression ‘everything is momentary’ is neither descriptive nor prescriptive, then what is the function of this expression? In reply it may be said that the Buddhists are refuting the thesis that there are permanent or relatively permanent things. Now it may be said that the negation of a thesis presupposes the acceptance of some other

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thesis. This type of objection has been raised against the dialectic of Nāgārjuna, which rejects the different philosophical views about reality by deducing contradictions from those views. The critics of Nāgārjuna might point out that if the presence of a contradiction is used as the criterion for the unreality (falsity) of a particular view, then the absence of a contradiction must be the criterion of the reality (truth) of a view. In reply it may be said that this would follow if the expressions of the Buddhists are taken as statements or propositions. The Buddhists are not refuting in the usual sense of ‘refutation’. This language of refutation is used as a pointer to something which cannot be expressed in language. The Buddhists wanted to show certain things by using language as a pointer. First of all, they have criticized the views of other philosophers either by showing a contradiction in those views or by proposing a counter thesis such as ‘everything is momentary’. Secondly, they have shown that even the concept of identity is not applicable to these momentaries, because they are unique. Thirdly, this concept of uniqueness is used to show the śūnyatā of our talk about reality. Now let us see how the Buddhists would interpret the empty terms in the light of the above discussion. They would not mind accepting both ‘A hare’s horn is sharp’ and ‘A hare’s horn is not sharp’ as true. This simply shows that the term ‘a hare’s horn’ is empty. As by deducing contradiction a view about reality is rejected, so by ascribing contradictory properties the unreality of a thing may be claimed. If both the propositions ‘The son of a barren woman is male’ and ‘The son of a barren woman is not male’ are true, then it follows that the term ‘the son of a barren woman’ does not signify anything real. Now it may be argued that if the presence of contradiction is the sign or criterion of emptiness, then the absence of contradiction is the criterion of non-emptiness. A term is non-empty if contradictory properties are not ascribable to the referent of that term. A parallel argument has been put forward in the context of metaphysics. It is said that if contradiction is the criterion of unreality, then the absence of contradiction or identity must be the criterion of reality. But the Buddhists rule out identity also as the criterion of reality. They will not accept the thesis ‘x is real or exists iff x is identical with itself ’, for their thesis ‘everything is unique’ rules out even self-identity. Hence self-identity would be a criterion not of reality but rather of unreality. In the context of empty terms the Buddhist would argue in the same way. If it is claimed that the proposition ‘A hare’s horn is a hare’s horn’ is true, then it follows that identity has been ascribed to a hare’s horn and hence the term is empty. If it is claimed that the proposition ‘A hare’s horn is not a hare’s horn’ is true, then also it follows that the term is empty because contradictory properties have been ascribed to the same thing. Now it may be asked whether there is any criterion which will mark the distinction between real and unreal, between empty and non-empty terms. On this point a consistent Buddhist would not claim that the presence or absence of contradiction is a criterion of reality or unreality, although the presence of contradiction is used as a pointer to the unreality of a thing. Most of the questions and objections raised by the critics of the Buddhists are based on the assumption that the utterances of the Buddhists express propositions which are either true or false, or neither true nor false in the sense of indeterminate. In some sense none of them is applicable to the utterances of the Buddhist. As a matter of fact we cannot say even this if it is taken as a statement or proposition. Their entire talk about reality should

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be taken as a pointer. We should not try to introduce the statement and meta-statement distinction or the thesis and metathesis distinction in interpreting the utterances of the Buddhist. Now it may be asked, if we cannot say anything about reality, then what is the purpose and the function of this language used in this context? A Buddhist might answer in the following way: Language might be used ‘to show’ something which cannot be said in language.

NOTES   1. K. H. Potter, ‘Realism, Speech-Acts, and Truth-Gaps in Indian and Western Philosophy,’ Journal of Indian Philosophy 1, 1970; A.C.S. McDermott, ‘Empty Subject Terms in Late Buddhist Logic,’ Journal of Indian Philosophy 1, 1970.   2. B.K. Matilal, The Navya-Nyaya Doctrine of Negation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), Part 1, Ch. 2.   3. Quoted from B.K. Matilal, ‘Reference and Existence in Buddhist Logic,’ Journal of Indian Philosophy 1, 1970.   4. I would like to interpret Udayana’s remark ‘Nothing is established by such questions and answers’ as referring to spurious questions and spurious answers which are neither true nor false.   5. B. Russell, ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,’ reprinted in W.P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian (eds.), Readings in Twentieth-Century Philosophy (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 305.   6. Ibid., p. 316.   7. B.K. Matilal, ‘Reference and Existence in Buddhist Logic,’ Journal of Indian Philosophy 1, 1970, p. 97.   8. W.V.O. Quine, ‘On What There Is,’ reprinted in Paul Benacerraf Hilary Putnam (eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 188.   9. K.H. Potter, ‘Realism, Speech-Acts, and Truth-Gaps in Indian and Western Philosophy,’ Journal of Indian Philosophy 1, 1970, p. 16. 10. Ibid., p. 15. 11. A.C.S. McDermott, ‘Empty Subject Terms in Late Buddhist Logic,’ Journal of Indian Philosophy 1, 1970. 12. Ibid., p. 28. 13. B.K. Matilal, ‘Reference and Existence in Buddhist Logic,’ Journal of Indian Philosophy 1, 1970.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning The aim of this paper is to explain and reconstruct the Buddhist theory of meaning which is formulated in terms of double negation. One of the main aims is to find out whether different types of negation are involved in explaining the meaning of an expression. This problem leads us to an investigation of different senses of negation used in Indian logic. In the first section we discuss the different classifications of negation. Since the Buddhists have mentioned the paryudāsa and the prasajya-pratiṣedha type of negation in connection with their theory of meaning, our discussion will aim at drawing a distinction between these two. In the second section we shall discuss the Buddhist theory of meaning as propounded by Dignāga, Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Ratnakīrti. In this context we shall notice three different strands of thought as to the nature of the meaning of an expression. In the third section the views of certain contemporary writers on the Buddhist theory of meaning will be discussed. In the fourth section we shall reconstruct the Buddhist theory of meaning in terms of two senses of negation. In this context it will also be shown how to retain the distinction between direct and indirect reference of an expression or between two different senses of meaning.

I In this section we shall discuss the different attempts made by some contemporary writers to draw the distinction between the paryudāsa and the prasajya-pratiṣedha types of negation. Staal1 in his paper on ‘Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought: A Comparative Study’ has mainly discussed the views of Mīmāṃsā philosophers and the grammarians. It is claimed that a distinction between vidhi and niṣedha ‘affirmation and negation’ or ‘positive injunction and negative injunction’ has been drawn by different schools of Indian philosophy. The Mīmāṃsā philosophers have emphasised injunctions rather than indicative sentences in this context. Let us consider the injunction na bhakṣayet ‘he shall not eat’. It is claimed that this injunction should not be translated as ‘he shall not eat’ but as ‘he shall-not eat’. This injunction does not prescribe an action different from eating. It simply prohibits eating. If the positive injunction bhakṣayet ‘he shall eat’ is symbolised by N[F(x)], where ‘N’ stands

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for the obligation operator, then its negation would be N~[F(x)]. This type of negation is called prasajya-pratiṣedha or niṣedha type of negation. Now the question is whether negations of the form N[~F(x)] or N[F(~x)] are permissible. According to the Mīmāṃsā all cases of negation other than prasajya-pratiṣedha which is symbolised by the form N~[F(x)], are called paryudāsa ‘exclusion’ type of negation. It is also claimed that the paryudāsa ‘exclusion’ type of negation is to be understood where the negative is connected either with the verbal root or with the noun, and the prasajya-pratiṣedha ‘prohibition’ type of negation is to be understood where the negative is connected with the verbal ending. In the injunction nekṣeta ‘he shall not look’, the ‘not’ is attached to the verb or the verbal root. Hence it is to be translated as ‘he shall not-look’ and this negation is to be considered as a paryudāsa ‘exclusion’ type of negation. It positively prescribes something other than looking. Hence it can be symbolised by N [~F(x)]. There are also injunctions where a noun is negated. Let us consider the injunction nanuyājeṣu yeyajāmahaṃ karoti ‘at the after-sacrifices he shall not say ‘ye-yajāmahe’. Here ‘not’ is applied to the name of a sacrifice called ‘after-sacrifice’. Hence it means ‘at sacrifices other than the after-sacrifices he shall say ye-yajāmahe’. This injunction can be symbolised by the form N[F(~x, y)], and the negation involved in this injunction is to be called paryudāsa ‘exclusion’ type of negation. The generalised version of the Mīmāṃsā view can be expressed in the following way. If the expression of a positive injunction involves n expressions, the negation of the modal operator which is a necessity operator in this context would represent the prasajyapratiṣedha ‘prohibition’ type of negation, and the negation of any other component would represent the paryudāsa ‘exclusion’ type of negation. Some grammarians have also made a distinction between the two types of negation called ‘prasajya-pratiṣedha’ and ‘paryudāsa-pratiṣedha’. In this context it is to be noted that these grammarians are discussing indicative sentences only. If a positive or an affirmative sentence is symbolised by F(x), then the prasajya-pratiṣedha type of negation is symbolised by ~F(x), and the paryudāsa-pratiṣedha type of negation is symbolised by F(~x). The generalised version of this view can be stated in the following way. If a positive indicative sentence involves n expressions, then the negation of the verb or the verbal root would represent the prasajya-pratiṣedha type of negation and the negation of any other component would represent the paryudāsa-pratiṣedha type of negation. Now let us discuss Kajiyama’s2 account of two types of negation in Buddhist philosophy. He has explained the distinction between the paryudāsa and the prasajya-pratiṣedha types of negation by reference to some Buddhist texts. By citing a passage from Avalokitavrata he has explained the distinction between them in the following way. Negation having the following characteristics must be regarded as paryudāsa: (1) it states implication (arthāpatti); (2) by a single sentence (3) affirms a positive entity [too]; (4) having [the characteristics of] implication and the affirmation of a positive entity, does not use the very word [of the entity], as when one, meaning a kṣatriya, uses not the word kṣatriya but the word abhrāhmaṇa.3

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The praṣajya-pratiṣedha negation has been claimed to be any negation different from the paryudāsa negation. The former has been explained in the following way. This [prasajyapratiṣedha] has the following characteristics: (1) it does not show the sign of arthāpatti; (2) is devoted to negation, aims only at negation, i.e. simply negates what is asserted by the other party; (3) does not affirm the existence of an entity or a nonentity; (4) having [the characteristic of] negation and without having [those of] implication and the affirmation of an entity, expresses [the object of negation] by its own word, as when one, meaning ‘not a Brahman’ says ‘not a Brahman’ by which he simply makes negation.4 By citing another passage from Arcaṭa’s Hetubinduṭīkā Kajiyama substantiates Avalokitavrata’s distinction between the paryudāsa and the prasajya-pratiṣedha types of negation. He says, ... it is clear that paryudāsa has the following characteristics: (1) affirmation primarily intended; (2) negation is understood by implication; (3) the object to be affirmed is not mentioned by its own name, as in the case of abrāhmaṇa (non-Brahman) which means a member of another caste – kṣatriya, vaiśya, śūdra; (4) a positive idea is yielded by the negative expression, and both ideas are conveyed in a single sentence (ekavākyatā) because both refer to the same object.5 In characterising the prasajya-pratiṣedha type of negation the following characteristics have been mentioned: ... (1) the primary aim is negation; (2) affirmation may be understood, but it is only secondary to negation; (3) the negation, e.g., sūryaṃ na paśyanti forms a separate sentence from that which it tentatively supposed, i.e. sūryaṃ paśyanti; the two sentences must be understood in two steps; (4) the object of negation is explicitly mentioned by its own word, as in the case of sūrya in sūryaṃ na paśyanti ...6 The above characterisation of the distinction between the two types of negation in modern terminology might be expressed more clearly in terms of semantics and pragmatics rather than in terms of syntax. Pragmatics is involved when it is claimed that in paryudāsa negation affirmation is primarily intended, but in prasajya-pratiṣedha negation affirmation is not primarily intended if there is any affirmation. Semantics is involved when it is said that both the negative sentence and its implicate describe the same fact in paryudāsa negation. The negative sentence ‘he is not a Brahmin’ and its intended implicate ‘he is a kṣatriya’ describe the same fact, and the expressions ‘not a Brahmin’ and ‘kṣatriya’ refer to the same thing. But in the case of prasajya-pratiṣedha negation ‘he is not a Brahmin’ and ‘he is a kṣatriya’ do not have the same meaning, and the former does not imply the latter. Kajiyama’s account of the distinction between the two types of negation is closely connected with Matilal’s7 account of the distinction between paryudāsa negation and prasajya-pratiṣedha negation. Kajiyama’s account emphasises the qualitative rather than the quantitative distinction between the two types of negation, while Matilal’s account emphasises the quantitative rather than the qualitative distinction.

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According to Matilal an ordinary negation has a denial aspect and a commitment aspect. Both the commitment aspect and the denial aspect may vary in different degrees. He says, When we say ‘That flower is not red’ we are committed to admit that the flower has some other colour (which may even be closer to red in shade). When we say ‘Man is not the creator of the universe’ the degree of commitment is very low. One could even argue in this case that we are hardly committed to accept the view that the universe has a creator.8 As the commitment aspect varies in varying degrees, so does the denial aspect. The intensity of the denial aspect of the sentence ‘That flower is not red’ is lower than that of the sentence ‘Man is not the creator of the universe’. Now it is claimed that in paryudāsa type of negation the commitment aspect predominates over the denial aspect, but in prasajyapratiṣedha type of negation the latter aspect predominates over the former aspect. Matilal has not ruled out the possibility of an extreme form of prasajya-pratiṣedha type of negation where the commitment aspect is reduced to zero. The idea behind Matilal’s account of the distinction between the two types of negation might be expressed by representing a sentence as a two-fold proposition. The first member of this ordered pair might be called the presupposition of a sentence and the second member might be called the manifest content or the asserted content of a sentence. Much the same idea is conveyed by the terms ‘determinable’ and ‘determinate’ as used by W. E. Johnson.9 The sentence ‘This flower is red’ is represented by the ordered pair . The negation of this sentence would be represented by the ordered pair . This negation denies the second member of the ordered pair only. But the negation of the sentence ‘Man is the creator of the universe’ denies both the manifest content and its presupposition. It can be represented in the following way: Man is the creator of the universe = . Man is not the creator of the universe = . Now the question is whether in denying the presupposition of a sentence we are committed to the presupposition of the presupposition. It seems to me that the answer would be positive unless there is no presupposition of the presupposition. When all presuppositions are denied, the commitment aspect becomes zero. The symbolic counterpart of this thesis can be represented in the following form: (1) p = < r1, m> (2) ~p = < r1 , m̄ > (3) ~p = < r̄ 1, m̄ >, where ‘p’ stands for a sentence, ‘r1’ stands for the presuppositional element of the sentence, and ‘m’ stands for the manifest or asserted content of the sentence. (2) would represent the form of paryudāsa negation and (3) would represent the form of prasajya-pratiṣedha negation. If there is a commitment aspect in (3) also, then (3) would

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be equal to the ordered triple , where r2 is a presupposition of r1. The paryudāsa negation might be defined as one where only the manifest content is negated, and all other negations might be called ‘prasajya-pratiṣedha’ negations. The extreme form of the prasajyapratiṣedha negation would be one where the ultimate presupposition of the presuppositionseries is also negated. In the concluding section of this paper we shall see how this distinction between the two types of negation is linked up with the Buddhist theory of meaning. It seems to me that the above discussion does not provide an adequate tool for reconstructing the Buddhist theory of meaning. In addition to the above distinction between the two types of negation we need one element from the Nyāya concept of double negation for reconstructing the Buddhist theory of meaning. According to the Nyāya10 there are two main types of negation. These might be represented by the following forms: (1) x is not in y or x does not occur in y, or not-x is in y (2) x is not y, where ‘x’ and ‘y’ are non-empty terms in both cases. (1) represents relational absence and (2) represents mutual absence or difference. The difference between the two types of negation has been explained in terms of their limiting relations. According to the Nyāya, if ‘x’ denotes a positive entity, then ‘not-x’ denotes a negative entity, and x is the counterpositive of not-x, i.e. the negation of x. The manner of presentation of x in the cognition of not-x is called ‘the limitor of the property of being the counterpositive’.11 In the case of relational absence the limitor of the property of being the counterpositive is an occurrence-exacting relation, but in the case of mutual absence the limitor of the property of being the counterpositive is the relation of identity. The difference between them can be explained in terms of their positive counterparts. The sentence ‘x is in y’ or ‘x occurs in y’ expresses an occurrence-exacting relation which relates the denotatum of ‘x’ with the denotatum of ‘y’, but the sentence ‘x is y’ expresses an identity relation between the denotata of ‘x’ and ‘y’. The negation of the former type of sentences would represent relational absence and the negation of the latter type of sentences would represent mutual absence. Let us use the symbol ‘~’ for relational absence and the symbol  ‘–’ for mutual absence. Now the question is whether the law of double negation holds good. According to most Nyāya philosophers the law of double negation holds good if the same type of negation is used. But according to most of the Naiyāyikas ~ –x would not be identical with x, rather it would be identical with x-ness. The expression ‘–x’ means ‘different from x’, and the property signified by the expression ‘different from x’ or ‘–x’ resides in objects other than x. The relational absence of this property signified by the expression ‘~ –x’ resides in x only. Hence it is equated with x-ness. This shows how a property can be signified when a double negation involving two different types of negation is applied to a term. In the concluding section of our article we shall utilise this element from the Nyāya conception of negation for reconstructing the Buddhist theory of meaning.

II In this section we shall state the theory of meaning propounded by different Buddhist philosophers.

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(1) The view of Dignāga According to Dignāga, as quoted by Mallavādī,12 a word expresses its meaning by excluding the meanings of all other words from its own meaning. This remark suggests that in order to express the meaning of a word the meanings of all other words are to be excluded. For example, the word ‘cow’ expresses its meaning by excluding the meaning of ‘non-cow’, i.e. the meanings of words like ‘horse’, ‘dog’ etc. This view might suggest that the exclusion of the meanings of other words is not the meaning of a word. This exclusion is simply necessary to express the meaning of a word. It has also been said13 that according to Dignāga a word is caused by or has its origin in an imaginative construction or concept (vikalpa), and an imaginative construction (vikalpa) is caused by or has its origin in a word. This remark suggests that both a word and an imaginative construction have the same nature, i.e. both of them are in the realm of unreality. Since the imaginative constructions or the concepts are unreal, the words which are caused by them are also unreal. If the words are taken as unique particulars, then there can be no relation between a word-particular and an object-particular, because both of them are equally unique particulars (svalakṣaṇas).14 Hence the meaning-relation (vācya-vācaka-sambandha) holds between a word-universal (i.e. a word-imaginativeconstruction) and an object-universal (i.e. an object-imaginative-construction). But some commentators like Matilal15 have suggested that according to Dignāga a word can refer to a real particular in an indirect way. ‘The only way a name can identify, or refer to, a particular is through negation and elimination of other concepts.’16 ‘A word expresses a concept and a concept being a fiction cannot POSITIVELY qualify or characterise the particular (as a Nyāya realist believes), but it can NEGATIVELY disqualify the particular from being claimed by other fictions or concepts.’17 (2) The view of Jinendrabuddhi According to Jinendrabuddhi, who claims to expound the view of Dignāga, the exclusion of the meanings of other words is the sole meaning of a word. He says, ‘... the repudiation of the contrary is the exclusive meaning (of every word)’.18 Again he says, ‘the own meaning of the word is just repudiation of the contrary (and nothing else)’.19 If we accept this interpretation, then the meaning of ‘A’ is the same as the meaning of ‘exclusion of non-A’ or ‘not non-A’. Since both ‘A’ and ‘not non-A’ refer to the same imaginative construction (vikalpa), we can assert an identity between them. If the Buddhist theory of meaning is stated in this form, then several objections can be raised against it. As a matter of fact innumerable objections have been raised by the followers of the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā. The obvious objection is that this explanation of meaning involves either infinite regress or circularity. If the meaning of ‘A’ is given in terms of ‘not non-A’, then the meaning of ‘not non-A’ should be given in terms of ‘not non not non-A’, and the meaning of the latter should be given in terms of eight negations and so on. On the contrary, if the meaning of ‘not non-A’ is given in terms of ‘A’, then it involves circularity. In addition to these objections many logical, epistemological and metaphysical objections have been raised against this doctrine. In order to avoid the objections raised by the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā philosophers the later Buddhist philosophers like Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti,

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have modified the Buddhist theory of meaning without giving up the main theme of their predecessors. Now let us discuss the views of some later Buddhist philosophers. (3) The view of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla20 According to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla the verbal cognition does not give rise to the apprehension of absolute negation or nullity (niṣedha), nor does it give rise to the apprehension of the specific individuality of the momentary particulars. It is claimed that apoha ‘exclusion’ or the meaning of an expression consists in the reflection of the objects. ‘... Apoha, in the form of ‘Reflection’, being brought about directly by words, forms the primary denotation of words.’21 It is also claimed that the other two kinds of Apoha form the secondary (indirect) denotation of the words.22 In this context the expression ‘the other two kinds of Apoha’ means a momentary particular which is excluded from other momentary particulars, and an object of ordinary cognition or an ordinary thing in the external world, which is excluded from other ordinary things in the external world. So in this passage we find an indirect reference to unique particulars, and a distinction between primary and secondary meanings of an expression. According to the above authors a word or an expression produces a reflection, and after having cognised this reflection we cognise that this reflection excludes other reflections. The relation between the two cognitions is called the relation of implication. This relation of implication has been explained in terms of an example. In the case of the sentence, ‘Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day’, the direct meaning consists of the denial of ‘eating during the day’, and the implied meaning consists of the affirmation of ‘eating during the night’; in the same manner, in the case of the word ‘Cow’, which is affirmative (positive) in character, the idea of affirmation is the direct resultant, and the idea of negation is the indirect resultant due to implication.23 So according to them the meaning of an expression or the direct denotation of an expression is a reflection or an imaginative construction which is an internal and subjective entity. These entities are neither unique particulars nor universals like redness. Moreover, it is said that a reflection or an imaginative construction is qualified by the exclusion of other reflections. This remark shows that the primary denotation of an expression ‘A’ and the exclusion of non-A are related by the relation qualificand-qualifier. Now the question is whether the qualifier i.e. exclusion of non-A is different from the qualificand i.e. A. As an answer to this question it is said that the exclusion of non-A is in the reflection A itself. Now it may be asked whether anything by itself can be both a qualificand and a qualifier. In reply it is said that in reality nothing can be qualified by anything. The qualificandqualifier distinction is a creation of our mind. This remark can be explained by introducing a distinction between an ontological level and an epistemic level. Ontologically the thing called ‘A’ and the thing called ‘the exclusion of non-A’ are the same thing, but epistemically or from the point of view of their meanings the latter is a qualifier of the former. So the qualificand-qualifier relation holds at the level of meaning. Now the question is what status is to be assigned to the ordinary external objects of the world. It is said, ‘People, not knowing the distinction between what is “perceived” and what is “fancied” regard it to be something “external”.’24 From this remark it follows that the

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externalised reflections are to be called the objects in the world. This externalisation is due to the illusion inherent in human beings. As regards the nature of an expression it is said that it is also a reflection or an imaginative construction which is neither a unique particular nor a universal. The denoter-denoted relation (i.e. the relation between an expression and its meaning) holds between reflections. The terms of this denoter–denoted relation are considered as external things by deluded persons. ‘In reality there can be nothing that can be either denoter or denoted, – as all things being in perpetual flux, no concomitance is possible.’25 From this remark it follows that the meaning-relation holds at the level of reflections only. Now the question is whether this explanation of the meaning of an expression is applicable only to nouns or noun-like expressions, or to all expressions of a language. According to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla this explanation (i.e. the explanation in terms of a positive reflection and the exclusion of others) is applicable to all expressions of a language. The meaning of a verb-expression is a reflection which is qualified by the exclusion of other reflections corresponding to the words for action. It is said, That ‘in the case of verbs the exclusion of other things is not apprehended’ cannot be admitted. For when a person uses a word, it is not because he is addicted to such use, but for the purpose of bringing about the cognition, - in the person hearing the word in regard to a certain thing that is intended, desired, to be known. Consequently, when the desired thing is apprehended, the exclusion of the undesired thing also becomes apprehended by implication; ...26 Again it is said, When the verb ‘pacati’ (‘cooks’) is uttered, what is understood is that ‘he is not doing nothing’, - nor is he eating or gambling’ - where the ‘exclusion of other acts’ is clearly apprehended. Thus, whatever is intended (to be spoken), there is always something ‘excluded’ by the ‘Relative Negation’, - this something being ‘doing nothing’ and also other acts (than the one meant to be spoken of by the verb used).27 From the above remarks it follows that the qualificand–qualifier relation holds good in the case of the meaning of a verb, and the qualifier is apprehended by implication. According to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla even a logical particle such as ‘and’ means a reflection which is qualified by the exclusion of other reflections such as option. The meanings of the words like ‘all’, ‘knowable’ or ‘cognisable’ are also explained in terms of the exclusion of others in the context of a sentence. The meaning of the sentence ‘All things are soulless’ excludes the meanings of sentences like ‘Only external things like the jar are soulless’.28 Similarly, the meaning of the sentence ‘Colour is cognisable through visual sense-organ’ excludes the cognisability of colour through other sense-organs. From the exposition of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla it follows that the meaning of an expression, e.g. ‘A’, is not identical with the exclusion of non-A. The exclusion of non-A is a qualifier in the meaning-complex of the expression ‘A’. So we cannot say that A = the exclusion of non-A, or p = the exclusion of non-p, where ‘A’ is a word and ‘p’ is a sentence. From this fact we should not conclude that according to this doctrine the law of double negation does not hold good. The ‘exclusion’ operator and the ‘non’ operator in ‘exclusion

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of non-A’ or ‘exclusion of non-p’ might be two different types of negation. As a matter of fact the law of double negation in sentences like ‘It is not the case that he does not cook’ is retained. This sentence means the same as ‘He cooks’.29 If a third negative is added, what is understood is either that ‘He is doing nothing’ or that ‘He is doing something other than cooking’; and when a fourth negative is added, what is understood is something differentiated from this last, that is, ‘He is cooking’.30 From this remark it follows that the meaning of an expression and the meaning of its double negation would be the same. Since ‘the exclusion of non-A’ does not mean the same as ‘A’, the former cannot be the same as ‘not-not-A. But ‘not-not-A’ means the same as ‘A’. This is due to the fact that ‘exclusion’ and ‘non’ are different types of operator. The difference between them is very important for the reconstruction of the Buddhist theory of meaning. (4) The view of Ratnakīrti Ratnakīrti in his Apohasiddhiḥ says, By the term ‘Differentiation’ what is intended is not merely a positive entity (A); nor merely exclusion of (the other) non-A, but the meaning of the term is the positive thing (A) qualified by the exclusion of the other (non-A).31 This passage emphasises the qualificand–qualifier aspect of the meaning-complex. In this respect his view coincides with the view of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. As regards the apprehension of the positive, i.e. the qualificand and the negative, i.e. the qualifier component of the meaning the view of Ratnakīrti differs from that of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Ratnakīrti says, ... we do not find any successive stages of grasping (of affirmative and negative) meaning. No one apprehends a negative meaning, after having understood an affirmative meaning by logical implication. Nor, conversely, does anyone apprehend a distinct positive meaning, after having understood a (primary) negative meaning.32 From the above remarks of Ratnakīrti it follows that the meaning of an expression is a positive entity qualified by the exclusion of other entities, and the qualificand and its qualifier are apprehended or grasped simultaneously. He also admits that the meaning of an expression is an imaginative construction. The unique particulars are not expressible by any expression. In this respect also his view coincides with the view of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.

III In this section we shall discuss Herzberger’s33 reconstruction or explication of the Buddhist theory of meaning. According to Herzberger the problem in the context of the Buddhist theory of meaning is how to explain the meaning of the term ‘not-not-A’ if the meaning of ‘A’ is given in terms of ‘not-not-A’. He asked, ‘If the meaning of the word “cow” were to be given by the doubly negative complex “not-non-cow”, what would its meaning be within that complex?’34

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If the meaning of ‘not-non-cow’ is given in terms of ‘not-not-not-not-cow’, then it will lead to infinite regress. Since this is not what is intended by the Buddhists, this view requires some non – classical account of negation. He claimed, The doctrine requires a semantic distinction between terms and their double negations, and it also requires some partial semantic equivalence between them. Minimally then it requires a logic rich enough to represent a term and its double negation as equivalent on one semantic level and non-equivalent on another.35 As a logical reconstruction of the Buddhist theory of meaning Herzberger suggested a two-fold proposition which is an adaptation from a suggestion of Emil Post. A two-fold proposition is an ordered pair of classical propositions such that ‘g’ represents the ground and ‘m’ represents the manifest content of some sentence. He said, ‘Ground and manifest content are classical propositions, perhaps to be thought of as regions of logical space, or as sets of possible worlds.’36 Now several kinds of negation can be formulated by applying the two-fold proposition. He thinks that the Buddhist negation might be formulated in the following way: N = The negation operator ‘N’ suspends the presuppositional ground and denies the manifest content of a sentence. The double negation would take the following form: NN = According to Herzberger the semantic interpretation of unity (1) is a tautology or a necessarily true proposition representing a vacuous presuppositional ground. Since the Buddhists are nominalistic philosophers, the presuppositional ground includes all platonic elements and the manifest content includes the nominalistic elements. Thus the first component in the content of the sentence Socrates is ill might be some proposition to the effect that there exists such a property as illness; and its second component might be some proposition to the effect that the term ‘ill’ applies to the man Socrates.37 When the above-mentioned double negation is applied to the sentence ‘Socrates is ill’, it will yield ‘Socrates is not non-ill’. The latter sentence will have the same manifest content as the former, but it will have a vacuous ground, and hence it will have a purely nominalistic import. Now let us consider Herzberger’s reconstruction of the Buddhist nominalistic theory of meaning. The first question which naturally comes to a reader of the Buddhist texts is whether the Buddhists would admit the reality of particular individual objects like the man Socrates or the word ‘ill’. A Buddhist would treat such objects as constructed entities. They are externalised imaginative constructs. There is no difference between these objects and the platonic universals so far as they are considered as imaginative constructions. Only the unique momentary particulars are considered as real objects. In order to overcome this objection the supporters of Herzberger’s theory of sentence and negation might suggest that as all platonic elements are included in the presuppositional

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part so all constructed entities might be included in the presuppositional part. If all constructed elements are included in the presuppositional part, then it cannot be said that in the sentence ‘Socrates is not non-ill’ the word ‘ill’ is applied to the man Socrates. At the most what can be said is that the momentary unique word-particular ‘ill’ applies to the momentary unique object-particular Socrates. Now the question is whether it is possible to assert this sort of relation in a Buddhist metaphysical system. The Buddhists claim that no word is applicable to the unique momentary particulars. Hence they cannot be named by any expression. If it were so, then the relation called ‘applies to’ cannot hold between them. In addition to this objection a few more objections can be raised against Herzberger’s reconstruction of the Buddhist theory of meaning. Herzberger’s reconstruction does not take into account the two senses of meaning or reference found in the Buddhist texts. In the primary sense of meaning, a word refers to an imaginative construction and the meaning of an expression is given in terms of its positive content which is qualified by the exclusion of all other contents. In the secondary sense of meaning, a word indirectly refers to reality without specifying any positive content. In our reconstruction of the Buddhist theory we shall see how these two senses of meaning can be represented. Moreover, Herzberger’s account does not draw the distinction between the two types of negation present in the meaning-complex expressed by the form ‘exclusion of non-A’. For our purpose it is very important to draw a distinction between the first negation which is expressed by the expression ‘exclusion’ and the second negation which is expressed by the expression ‘other than’ or ‘non’.

IV Now let us reconstruct the Buddhist theory of meaning in the light of the above discussion. Our positive thesis can be developed along the line of Herzberger’s two-fold proposition, but it differs substantially from his reconstruction. The suggestion of the two-fold proposition has been mentioned in our discussion of the distinction between paryudāsa negation and prasajya-pratiṣedha negation. In that context it has been suggested that a negative expression has a commitment aspect and a denial aspect. In an extreme form of prasajyapratiṣedha negation the commitment aspect is reduced to zero. This concept along with the idea of the two-fold proposition or content would be necessary for our reconstruction of the Buddhist theory of meaning. We would like to draw a distinction between the ‘exclusion’ operator and the ‘non’ operator which occur in expressions like ‘exclusion of non-cow’. In this context we can utilise the Nyāya distinction between the relational absence and the mutual absence. The operator ‘non’ is similar to the operator for the mutual absence of the Nyāya. The operator ‘non’ divides the universe of discourse into two parts. When it is applied to the expression ‘cow’, it yields two classes which are mutually exclusive, but their union exhausts the universe of discourse. One class includes only cows, and the other class includes everything other than cows. The law of double negation also holds good with respect to this operator. In this respect this operator is similar to the Nyāya operator for mutual absence. But the ‘exclusion’ operator when applied to an entity forms a property. The exclusion of cow is a property which resides in all objects other than cows. As in the Nyāya the relational absence of the mutual absence of cow is not identical with cow, but

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with cowness, so the exclusion of non-cow is not identical with cow, but with the essential qualifier of cow. Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Ratnakīrti claimed that the meaning of a term is a positive entity qualified by the exclusion of the other. So the meaning of the term ‘A’ cannot be equated with the exclusion of non-A. The exclusion of non-A is only a part of the meaning of the term ‘A’. Moreover, two different semantic levels are involved in this discussion. The semantic level where the terms ‘exclusion’ and ‘non’ occur might be called the level of meaning. But the semantic level where words like ‘not-cow’ or sentences like ‘not-p’ occur might be called the level of language. If the Language-Metalanguage distinction is introduced, then the former level would form the object language and the latter level would form the metalanguage. The meaning of an expression is an ordered pair such that the second member of the ordered pair is a qualifier of the first member, and the first member is a positive entity. The meaning of a term might be represented in the following way: ‘A’ means In this meaning-complex the expression ‘A’ stands for an imaginative construction, and the expression ‘non-A’ stands for all other imaginative constructions from a given universe of discourse. Moreover, exclusion of non-A, not the expression ‘exclusion of non-A’, is a qualifier of A. Now the question is how the word ‘A’ is related to A which is an element in the meaning of the word ‘A’. As an answer to this question it might be suggested that A is the referent of the word ‘A’. But A is apprehended as something qualified by the exclusion of nonA. Now what follows from this interpretation is that we cannot assign a meaning to an expression unless it has a reference. Since in Buddhist philosophy the primary reference of an expression is an imaginative construction, the Buddhist would claim that every word has a reference unless it is an expression like ‘all’ or ‘knowable’ whose meaning cannot be given in isolation. Now the question is, how do we give the meaning of the word ‘not-A’? If we accept Ratnakīrti’s definition as a general definition of meaning, then the meaning of ‘not-A’ might be stated in the following way: ‘not-A’ means Here the expression ‘non-A’ stands for a set of imaginative constructs which does not include the imaginative construct called ‘A’. In this context it is to be noted that the expression ‘other than non-A’ is the same as ‘A’. So the law of double negation with respect to the operator ‘other than’ or ‘non’ holds good. Now the question is whether the law of double negation holds good with respect to the operator ‘not’ when it is applied to an expression. The Buddhists would claim that ‘not-not-A’ means the same as ‘A’. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla claimed that the sentence ‘It is not that he is not cooking’ means the same as ‘He is cooking’. So the law of double negation with respect to the operator ‘not’ holds good when it is applied to a word or to a sentence. The difference between the operator ‘non’ and ‘not’ is this. The operator ‘non’ is at the semantic level of meaning, while the operator ‘not’ is at the level of language. In other words, the former is in the object language and the latter is in the metalanguage.

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Now what we have said about the meaning of a word can be said about the meaning of a sentence. The meaning of a sentence is an ordered pair such that the second member of this ordered pair is a qualifier of the first member. It can be expressed in the following way: The sentence ‘p’ means . Here ‘p’ stands for a complex imaginative construction, and ‘non-p’ stands for all other complex imaginative constructions. The former is qualified by the exclusion of the latter. In this explication the p (or non-p), not the sentence ‘p’ (or the sentence ‘non-p’) is a set of complex imaginative constructions. They might be taken as propositions or thoughts in the sense of Frege. It does not matter for our purpose if they are taken as sets of possible worlds. The negation of a sentence ‘p’ might be defined in the following way: The sentence ‘not-p’ means Here also the expression ‘non-p’ stands for a set of imaginative constructions which does not include the imaginative construction called ‘p’, and the law of double negation holds good with respect to the operator ‘other than’ or ‘non’. And ‘not-not-p’ would mean the same as ‘p’. Now the question is how to explain the indirect reference of an expression to reality. The indirect reference to reality might be called a negative characterisation of reality or it might be called the secondary meaning of an expression. When an expression is taken as indirectly referring to reality or signifying the secondary meaning, the commitment aspect or the first member of the ordered pair of the meaning-complex becomes zero. It can be represented in the following form: ‘A’ means Here ‘0’ does not stand for an entity. So no positive entity has been referred to. We are left with a qualifier which excludes all imaginative constructs except A. Now it may be said that the imaginative construct A qualifies reality. But this cannot be said because A as an imaginative construct does not appear in the meaning of ‘A’. What appears in place of A is zero. So we are left with a negative characterisation of reality. The secondary meaning of the expression ‘not-A’ can be represented in a similar way. ‘not-A’ means 2.3 (4) The morning star is Venus.4 (5) The morning star is a planet.5 (6) Jesus falls under the concept man.6 (7) This rose is red.7 (8) There is at least one square root of 4.8 (9) The concept square root of 4 is realised.9 With respect to (1) Frege claims that ‘if we imagine ‘Cato’ as replaceable at its first occurrence, then ‘killing Cato’ is the function; if we imagine ‘Cato’ as replaceable at its second occurrence, then ‘being killed by Cato’ is the function; finally if we imagine ‘Cato’ as replaceable at both occurrences, then ‘killing oneself ’ is the function’.10 According to Frege there is only one predicate-expression in (1), although there are three separate functions in it. The subject being the principal argument is to be equated with the first occurrence of ‘Cato’,11 but the predicate-expression designates the function killing Cato.

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Since a subject-expression designates an object and a predicate-expression designates a concept, in this example Cato would be the object and killing Cato would be the concept. With respect to (2) Frege claims that it can be split up into two parts: ‘One complete in itself and the other in need of supplementation, or “unsaturated”. ’12 In this example ‘Caesar’ is the subject-expression and ‘conquered Gaul’ is the predicate-expression. A predicate-expression, according to Frege, contains an empty place, and when this place is filled up with a proper name, there is a complete sense.13 This example of Frege emphasizes the point that the sense of a predicate-expression is also incomplete. From this it follows that not only a predicate-expression is incomplete but also its sense is incomplete. In the case of (3) Frege claims that it can be split up into ‘3’ and ‘x > 2’. The first one is saturated while the second one is unsaturated. So the subject-expression is ‘3’ which designates the object 3 and the predicate-expression is ‘x > 2’ which designates a concept. In this context it is to be noted that a variable occurs in a predicate-expression while in (1) or (2) no such variable has occurred. Even if it does not make any conceptual difference between a predicate-expression which contains a variable and the one which does not contain a variable, it does make some linguistic difference between them. In (4) two proper names have occurred, but only the first one is to be treated as the subject-expression. Simply ‘Venus’ cannot be taken as a predicate-expression. The sign ‘is’, according to Frege, is a blend of both the predication-sign or copula and a part of the predicate-expression. According to Frege what (4) means is the same as ‘The morning star is no other than Venus’. Hence the predicate-expression is ‘no other than Venus’, although the first three words of the predicate-expression do not occur in (4). Again (4) can be restated in the sentence ‘The morning star is identical with Venus’ or ‘The morning star is not different from Venus’.14 Hence ‘identical with Venus’ or ‘not different from Venus’ can also be treated as the predicate-expression in (4). What follows from this thesis of Frege is that sometimes the apparent predicate-expression or the sentence in which it occurs requires some transformation to reveal the real nature of the predicate-expression. From the Nyāya theory of meaning or cognition it will follow that the sentences ‘The morning star is Venus’, ‘The morning star is identical with Venus’ and ‘The morning star is not different from Venus’ do not have the same meaning or cognitive content, although they have the same truth-value. In (5) Frege claims that the concept-word is ‘planet’. If a predicate-expression is equated with a concept-word, then it follows that the word ‘planet’, not the words ‘a planet’ or ‘is a planet’, is the predicate-expression according to Frege. With respect to (6) Frege says, ‘... setting aside the copula, the predicate is: someone falling under the concept man and this means the same as: a man’.15 If the predicate-expressions ‘someone falling under the concept man’ and ‘a man’ do not differ in meaning, then the sentences ‘Jesus falls under the concept man’ and ‘Jesus is a man’ would not differ in meaning. If it were so, then in the sentence ‘Jesus is a man’, the predicate-expression would be ‘a man’, not simply the expression ‘man’. But in the sentence ‘The morning star is a planet’, Frege claims that the predicate-expression or the conceptword is simply ‘planet’. In (7), according to Frege, the grammatical predicate is ‘is red’ and the subject is ‘this rose’. Here he has not excluded the copula from the grammatical predicate. If a grammatical subject refers to an object, then a grammatical predicate would refer to a concept. Hence the expression ‘is red’ would refer to a concept in (7).

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From (1) to (7) Frege was concerned with splitting up the sentence into two parts. But from his comparison of (8) with (9) it follows that he is concerned with different ways of splitting up the same thought. Frege claims that in (8) we are talking about the concept square root of 4, while in (9) we are talking about the object expressed by the subjectexpression ‘The concept square root of 4’. He says, This will be surprising only to somebody who fails to see that a thought can be split up in many ways, so that now one thing, now another, appears as subject or predicate. The thought itself does not yet determine what is to be regarded as the subject.16 From this remark of Frege it follows that the same thought is expressed in (8) and (9), but the subject of (8) is different from that of (9). Similarly, the predicate of (8) is different from that of (9). The difference between active and passive, according to Frege, also substantiates the thesis that the same thought is expressed, although there are differences in the manner of splitting up the same thought. The difference in the manner of splitting up the same thought is reflected at the linguistic level in terms of the difference in the subjectexpressions and the predicate-expressions. From our discussion of Frege’s examples (l)-(7) it follows that the predicate-expression of the sentence ‘Socrates is a man’ might be expressed in the following ways: (a) being a man (b) x is a man (c) is a man (d) a man (e) man In addition to those ways of representing the predicate-expression of ‘Socrates is a man’, another might be added to this list. In his article ‘What is a Function?’ Frege has represented a function by adding empty brackets to the expression for a function. The function ‘sin x’ is represented by the expression ‘sin ( )’. Since a concept is a function, it can also be expressed by introducing empty brackets. In the sentence ‘Socrates is a man’ the predicate-expression would be (f) ( ) is a man. Following Cook Wilson,17 Quine,18 Strawson19 and other philosophers the list of predicateexpressions or predicates could be expanded. The following items may be added as predicate-expressions or predicates in the above example: (g) - is a man (h) ① is a man (i) that he is a man (j) humanity. Here (g) is analogous to Frege’s ‘( ) is a man’, and (h) is analogous to Frege’s ‘x is a man’. But (i) and (j) introduce new items into our discussion on predicates. Item (i) has the form of a statement or proposition. That is to say, what is said about the subject Socrates can be stated in terms of a proposition. Item (j) claims that the predicate is neither an expression,

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nor a term of a proposition, but a universal. This gives rise to the question whether the terms ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ refer to linguistic entities or terms of a proposition, or epistemic entities such as parts of a thought, or ontological entities such as particulars and universals.20 Barring the question whether the words ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ refer to linguistic, epistemological or ontological entities, let us discuss why Frege has claimed that a predicateexpression (or a predicate) alone, not a subject-expression (or a subject), is unsaturated. As an answer to this question, certain passages from Frege might be cited: An object ... cannot logically adhere to another object... without a link, which, however, cannot be an object but must be incomplete. A logical combination which gives rise to a whole can take place only when an incomplete part is completed or saturated by one or several parts.21 Again Frege says, For not all the parts of a thought can be complete; at least one must be ‘unsaturated’, or predicative; otherwise they would not hold together.22 Both the passages rely on the doctrine that an object which is the referent of a subjectexpression is complete, and a concept which is the referent of a predicate-expression is incomplete. A genuine whole, according to Frege, cannot be formed unless at least one part is incomplete. Moreover, according to Frege a concept is necessarily incomplete. For this reason ‘The concept horse is not a concept’ and ‘The predicate “is red” is not a predicate’. In the sentence ‘Dobbin is a horse’ the predicate-expression refers to a concept, but in the sentence ‘The concept horse is acquired from experience’, the subjectexpression does not refer to a concept but an object. That is to say, when a conceptword is used as a subject-expression, it no longer refers to a concept. A concept is to be defined in terms of the role it plays at the level of thought. Hence Frege’s object–concept distinction does not parallel the traditional substance-quality or particular–universal distinction. Since the latter distinctions are ontological and do not depend on the role, a quality or a universal will not be transformed into a substance or a particular when we ascribe a predicate to it or talk about it. But in Frege any talk about a concept transforms a concept into an object. In other words, there is no way we can talk about a concept and retain it as a concept. From the above discussion it follows that Frege has succeeded in substantiating the thesis that we cannot form a complete whole unless one part of the whole is incomplete, but he has not refuted the possibility of both the parts being incomplete or the subject part being incomplete. It may be asked, why should we not consider the subject part to be incomplete and the predicate part to be complete? Any answer to this question in terms of distinct ontological entities or categories such as particular-universal will not retain Frege’s distinction between objects and concepts, which is based on their roles. An explication and a defence of Frege’s distinction between saturated and unsaturated parts of thought may be given in terms of Strawson’s distinction between subject and predicate by using his mediating criterion. Strawson has introduced the mediating criterion in order to bridge the gulf between the grammatical criterion and the category criterion. The grammatical criterion draws the distinction between subject and predicate

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by means of the mode of introduction of terms in a proposition. The mode of introduction signifies whether a term is introduced referringly or ascriptively, or, in other words, whether a term is introduced in a propositional style or not. According to the grammatical criterion a subject-expression merely introduces its term, while a predicate-expression introduces its term in an assertive or propositional style. The category criterion distinguishes subject from predicate in terms of the nature of the entities signified by the terms of a proposition. In order to draw some affinity between these two criteria Strawson introduces the mediating criterion. According to this criterion a subject-term carries certain empirical presuppositions, while a predicate-term does not carry such presuppositions. In the proposition ‘Socrates is wise’, the subject-term ‘Socrates’ carries some empirical presuppositions. In other words, some identifying reference to particular Socrates has been made. Strawson says, ... in order for an identifying reference to a particular to be made, there must be some true empirical proposition known, in some not too exacting sense of this word, to the speaker, to the effect that there is just one particular which answers to a certain description.23 But there is no such condition for the introduction of a universal into a proposition. The necessary condition for the introduction of a universal is that either something is φ or nothing is φ, where ‘φ’ stands for a universal. The introduction of the universal being wise or wisdom presupposes the condition that either someone is wise or no one is wise. Hence our knowledge of a universal, according to Strawson, does not entail our knowledge of any empirical fact. It merely entails our knowledge of the language in question. A subject-term is complete in the sense that it has some empirical or factual presupposition, and a predicateterm is incomplete in the sense that it has no such factual or empirical presupposition for its introduction into a proposition. This way of explaining the distinction between the saturated nature of a subject-term and the unsaturated nature of a predicate-term has several shortcomings. First of all, Frege’s distinction between an object and a concept cannot be explained in terms of Strawson’s distinction between a particular and a universal. In Frege, the concept horse in the sentence ‘The concept horse is derived from experience’ is not a particular. Frege’s object–concept distinction does not parallel the ontological distinction between a particular and a universal. Hence the saturatedness of an object cannot be equated with the completeness of a particular, and the unsaturatedness of a concept cannot be equated with the incompleteness of a universal. Second, Strawson’s thesis has a very limited application. The mediating criterion cannot be extended to propositions such as ‘3 is greater than 2’ or ‘Redness is different from whiteness’. Since mathematical entities such as 3 and universals such as redness are not particulars, Strawson’s mediating criterion is not applicable to any proposition whose subject-term refers to a non-particular. Third, there are some inherent problems in this theory of Strawson’s. If the introduction of the term ‘Socrates’ in the proposition ‘Socrates is wise’ presupposes the knowledge of some empirical proposition such as ‘Socrates is the teacher of Plato’, then the introduction of the term ‘Socrates’ in the latter proposition must presuppose the knowledge of some other empirical proposition if we want to avoid circularity. In order to avoid both circularity

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and infinite regress, Strawson has introduced feature-placing statements which will be the ultimate basis for the introduction of particulars. Sentences such as ‘Now it is raining’, ‘Snow is falling’ and ‘There is coal here’ are treated as feature-placing statements. He says, Though feature-placing sentences do not introduce particulars into our discourse, they provide a basis for this introduction. The facts they state are presupposed, in the required sense, by the introduction of certain kinds of particular.24 These ultimate facts do not contain particulars as constituents but they provide the basis for the conceptual step to particulars. The propositions stating them are not subject-predicate propositions, but they provide the basis for the step to subject-predicate propositions.25 If these basic feature-placing propositions are not of the subject-predicate form as Strawson claims, then it is difficult to assign any truth-value to them. If we cannot assign any truth-value to these basic propositions, then they cannot be taken as presuppositions for propositions which introduce particulars. According to his theory of presupposition, if p presupposes q, then the truth of q is a precondition for the ascription of truth or falsity to p. If it is claimed that these basic propositions can never be false, i.e., always true, then we require a criterion for distinguishing this type of truism from the truisms of logic and mathematics. Since Strawson has not proposed any such criterion, he cannot draw the distinction between these two types of truisms if he accepts feature-placing statements as truisms. If feature-placing statements can also be false like any empirical singular statement, such as ‘This is red’, then they should be analysable into subject-predicate form. But the assignment of subject-predicate form to these statements will contradict Strawson’s thesis. Hence the postulation of feature-placing statements raises as many problems as it solves.

II In this section I would like to discuss, with reference to the classical Nyāya system of Indian philosophy, two questions, viz., in what sense the predicate is unsaturated and the subject is saturated, and why we should consider the predicate as unsaturated but not the subject. Since this discussion presupposes the Nyāya distinction between the ontological level, the epistemic level and the linguistic level, I shall briefly mention the Nyāya ontology, epistemology and philosophy of language. The classical Nyāya philosophers have accepted seven types of ontological entities.26 Each thing in this universe is included in one of the seven types. These entities are considered as referents of terms, and these types are analogous to Aristotelian categories. The seven categories of the Nyāya are as follows: (1) Substance: There are nine kinds of substance, viz., earth, water, air, fire, sky (or ether), space, time, mind and self. A quality, an action or a universal inheres in a substance. (2) Quality: The classical Nyāya recognizes twenty-four kinds of qualities, viz., colour, taste, smell, touch, number, magnitude (quantity), distinctness, contact (conjunction), disjoining, remoteness, nearness, sound, heaviness (or weight), liquidity, oiliness, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire (will), aversion, effort, impression, merit and demerit. Some of them are qualities of physical objects,

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while others are qualities of mental objects. A quality of a particular substance has been conceived of as a property-instance. Hence the colour of a table is a colourparticular, not colourness. Therefore, there will be as many colour-particulars as there are coloured objects. (3) Action: There are five kinds of action, viz., upward movement, downward movement, contraction, expansion, and locomotion. These actions, like qualities, are particulars and they inhere in substances. (4) Universal: The classical Nyāya has accepted class-characters corresponding to natural kind terms. Hence there is a horseness corresponding to the kind term ‘horse’, humanity corresponding to the term ‘man’, and so on. A universal is an unanalysable property of the members of a class, and it resides in each of the members by the relation of inherence. Moreover, it is considered as an eternal entity in the Nyāya ontology. (5) Ultimate Particularity: In order to distinguish an ultimate or eternal substance from another ultimate or eternal substance the Nyāya has accepted an ultimate particularity for each of the eternal substances. Hence the atoms of the earth, fire, etc., have different ultimate particularities. There will be as many ultimate particularities as there are ultimate or eternal substances. These ultimate particularities or differentiae reside in their loci by the relation of inherence. (6) Inherence: The classical Nyāya has accepted an inherence relation which relates a whole to its parts, a quality to its substance, an action to its substance, a universal to its instances. Hence a substance such as a table is related to its parts by the relation of inherence. Similarly, a shade of blue colour which is a quality is related to a table by the relation of inherence, and the universal blueness is related to a blue colour by the relation of inherence. (7) Absence: Absences such as the absence of a cat are considered as negative entities in the Nyāya system. They are considered as properties, not qualities, of their loci, and they are related to their loci by the relations of self-linking. In this context it is to be noted that a property or a relation other than the relation of inherence is not a separate category. The Nyāya definition of a property or a relation is such that almost any entity from different categories can play the role of a property or a relation. A property may be defined in the following way: P is a property iff (Ǝx) (x is a locus of P). From this definition it follows that things such as a table or a chair are properties of this floor. Similarly, qualities such as a particular colour of a table, actions such as walking and universals such as horseness become properties of their loci. Properties are divided into two types, viz., class-characters (or universals in the above sense) and imposed properties. A class-character such as horseness is an unanalysable property and it resides in its members by the relation of inherence. But an imposed property is either unanalysable or analysable into a set of unanalysable properties. Properties such as the property of being Scott or absenceness or positivity are considered as unanalysable properties, while

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properties such as being the author of Waverley, a particular colour of a table, or the table, an action of a person, or the person, are analysable properties. Hence on this definition of the term ‘property’ everything other than ubiquitous objects, such as time, is considered as a property. Since a ubiquitous object such as time does not reside somewhere (in that it has no locus), it is not to be considered a property. Hence the word ‘property’ applies to everything other than a ubiquitous object. As regards the term ‘relation’, the Nyāya gives a functional definition of it, which makes a reference to both the ontological level and the epistemic level. A relation, according to the Nyāya, could be any entity so long as it makes one object (simple or complex) appear as a qualifier of another object at the epistemic level, and it relates these two objects at the ontological level so that the complex might be called ‘a fact’. Hence a formal definition of a relation might be given in the following way: R is a relation iff (i) it is due to R that x appears as a subject (or qualificand) and y appears as its predicate (or qualifier) in the cognition (or thought) xRy, and (ii) it is due to R that the entities x and y form a unified object (or fact) which corresponds to ‘xRy’. From the above definition it also follows that a fact involves a relation and two entities, simple or complex. When an entity b is related to an entity a by the relation R, a is called ‘the first term’ and b is called ‘the second term’. Since a is the first term of the relation R, and b is the second term, a has the property of being the first term and b has the property of being the second term. Hence corresponding to every relation the Nyāya recognizes two relational abstract properties such that one of them resides in the first term and the other one resides in the second term. As to the ontological nature of these relational abstract properties, there is some difference of opinion among the Nyāya philosophers. The classical Nyāya philosophers have identified these properties with their loci, while some of the Navya-Nyāya (New Nyāya) philosophers such as Raghunātha have considered them as separate ontological entities forming a new category.27 The Nyāya recognizes both direct and indirect relation. If a relation is not constituted by another relation, then it is considered a direct relation. Relations such as inherence, conjunction (or contact), and self-linking are direct relations. The brown colour of a table resides in its locus by the relation of inherence; the book resides on the table by the relation of conjunction; but the absence of a cat qualifies the table by the relation of self-linking. These are all direct relations. In the case of an indirect relation some other relations are presupposed. Let us consider the relation between a cloth and the colour of its threads. In the Nyāya ontology the cloth as a separate substance resides in its threads which are its parts by the relation of inherence, and the colour of the threads resides in the threads by the relation of inherence. Hence there is an indirect relation between the colour of the threads and the cloth. Therefore, the colour of the threads resides in the cloth by this indirect relation which consists of two cases of the relation of inherence. The relation of the colour of the threads to the threads is inherence and the relation of the threads to the cloth is the converse of the relation of inherence. Since both the colour of the threads and the cloth reside in the threads or have the same locus, the relation of the colour of the threads to the cloth is also called ‘having the same locus relation’. Since there is no upper limit as to the number of relations involved in an indirect relation, and there is no category restriction similar to the Russellian theory of types, any entity in the Nyāya ontology can

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be said to be related to any other entity by an indirect relation at least, if not by a direct relation. In other words, any two entities can form a fact by a direct or an indirect relation in the Nyāya ontology. Again, relations have been divided into two types depending on whether the second term occurs in the first term. If the second term occurs in the first term, then the relation is called ‘an occurrence-exacting relation’; and if it does not occur in the first term, then the relation is called ‘a non-occurrence-exacting relation’. Inherence, most of the conjunction relations, and self-linking relations are considered as occurrenceexacting relations. The relation of the property of being Scott to Scott or the relation of the property of being the author of Waverley to Scott, or the relation of the absence of a cat to this table is a self-linking relation. Moreover, temporal and spatial relations are considered as self-linking relations. A self-linking relation is not a separate ontological entity. It is ontologically identified with at least one of its terms. Usually it is identified with the first term. That is to say, the first term itself plays the role of a relation. It might be said that the introduction of a self-linking relation is just an instrumental device to stop the infinite regress of relations or the puzzle of Bradley. In the case of a non-occurrence-exacting relation the second term does not occur in the first term. Relations like pervasion, identity, the relation of cognition to its content or the relation of a content to its cognition, and almost all the indirect relations are considered as non-occurrence-exacting relations. When we say ‘All men are mortal’, we assert the pervasion relation between the property mortality and humanity. In other words, the relation of mortality to humanity is called ‘the pervaded relation’ and the converse of this relation is called ‘the pervader relation’. Neither mortality nor humanity occurs in the other by one of these relations. Similarly, when we know an object, there is a relation between them; but one does not occur in the other. For this reason they are called ‘non-occurrence exacting relations’. Moreover, by a non-occurrence-exacting relation any two apparently unrelated objects are related to each other in this universe. When two things are related by a relation they form a fact, and the direction of the relation specifies the first term and the second term of it. In aRb, a is the first term and b is the second term of R. When the aRb is cognized, a is called ‘the qualificand’ (or ‘the subject’) and b is called ‘the qualifier’ (or ‘the predicate’). Since the Nyāya answer to the question why a predicate is unsaturated and a subject saturated involves a description of certain cognitions, we cannot avoid a reference to the epistemic and the linguistic levels when we discuss the relation between a cognition and a sentence, or the relation between the truth or the falsity of a sentence and the validity or the invalidity of a cognition. The Nyāya has recognized four sources of a valid cognition. It may be derived from perception (i.e., sense-object contact), inference, analogy, or verbal testimony. Since the Nyāya philosophers are direct realists, they do not accept ideas or images as intermediary entities between the knower and the known objects. A cognition is considered a quality in the knowing-self, and is to be distinguished from another cognition in terms of its content. The Nyāya has also drawn a distinction between a qualificative and a non-qualificative cognition. A qualificative cognition can be described or expressed in language. It necessarily involves three elements, viz., qualificand, qualifier and a qualification relation. Since it necessarily contains a qualification relation it is also called ‘a relational cognition’.

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Since a qualificand, a qualifier and a qualification relation are epistemic entities, there need not always be three distinct items in the fact which will correspond to a qualificative cognition. Since there are three elements in a qualificative cognition, it has the form ‘aRb’ such that a is the qualificand, b is the qualifier, and R is the qualification relation of b to a. Hence the simplest qualificative cognition has as its object, say, a particular table together with tableness in a certain relation. This complex may be expressed by the term ‘a table’ or described by the sentence ‘A particular table has tableness by the relation of inherence’. In an atomic qualificative cognition neither the qualificand nor the qualifier, nor the qualification relation is further analysable. But in a complex qualificative cognition some of the elements are further analysable into the form ‘aRb’. That is to say, either the qualificand, or the qualifier, or the qualification relation has the form ‘aRb’. For example, in a qualificative cognition of a brown table, a table is the qualificand, a brown colour is the qualifier, and the qualification relation is the relation of inherence which relates a quality to a substance. In this cognition both the qualificand and the qualifier has the form ‘aRb’. The qualificand involves a particular table, the universal tableness and the relation of the latter to the former. Similarly, the qualifier involves a particular shade of brown colour, the universal brownness and the relation of the latter to the former. In this example, a particular table is presented to us under the mode of universal tableness, and a particular colour is presented under the mode of universal brownness. In order to emphasize the epistemic role of these objects the Nyāya has accepted certain relational abstract properties such as the property of being the qualificand, the property of being the qualifier and the property of being the qualification relation. Since every qualificative cognition has the form ‘aRb’, a will have the property of being the qualificand, b will have the property of being the qualifier, and R will have the property of being the qualification relation. In other words, in a cognition aRb, a plays the role of a qualificand, b plays the role of a qualifier and R plays the role of a qualification relation. Hence the same entity in another cognition, say, cRa, may play a different role. Here a is a qualifier, and hence it has the property of being the qualifier. If the cognition is non-atomic, then some of the elements require a further mode of presentation. If aRb is an atomic cognition, then neither a nor b is presented to us under the mode of a property, but b is presented to us under the mode of the relation R. That is to say, b is cognized as the second term of the relation R. But if aRb is a non-atomic qualificative cognition, then a requires a mode of presentation, and b also requires a mode of presentation in addition to R. In order to convey this idea the Nyāya has used the terms ‘property-limitor’, ‘relation-limitor’, and ‘the limited by relation’ in addition to certain relational abstract properties. To use the language of the Nyāya, the property of being the qualificand residing in a is limited by a-ness which is a property-limitor, and the property of being the qualifier residing in b is limited by b-ness which is a property-limitor and the relation R which is a relation-limitor. The relation limited by, in such cases, is explained in the following way: x is limited by y iff (i) both x and y are properties, (ii) x is a relational property, (iii) the property y is a mode of presentation of the object where the relational property x resides, and (iv) y determines the object where the relational property x resides. In other words, a limitor is analogous to the Fregean sense. It is both a mode of presentation of the object and that which determines the object. From the above characterisation of a non-atomic qualificative cognition of the form ‘aRb’ it follows that the mode of presentation of the qualificand a is only a property,

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but the mode of presentation of the qualifier b is both a property and a relation. Since a qualifier is dependent upon a relation also, it may be said to have a double dependence in such cases when it is contrasted with a qualificand. A cognition of this sort can be represented by sentences such as ‘Socrates is wise’, ‘This is red’, ‘A flower is red’, ‘The King of France is bald’, ‘Everything is material’. Since ‘Socrates is wise’ expresses a cognition of the form ‘aRb’, ‘Socrates’ is the linguistic correlate of a, ‘wise’ is the linguistic correlate of b, and ‘is’ is the linguistic correlate of R which relates b to a. But ‘is wise’ as a whole represents the qualifier b along with its relation-limitor R. In this example the propertylimitor of Socrates is the property of being Socrates, and the property-limitor of the quality wise is the universal wisdom, and the relation-limitor of the quality wise is the relation of inherence in the Nyāya ontology. In this context it is to be noted that neither the property-limitor nor the relation-limitor has been mentioned at the level of language. In other words, the sentence ‘Socrates is wise’ does not mention the property of being Socrates or the universal wisdom, or the relation of inherence. In an atomic cognition which is expressible by expressions such as ‘a horse’ or ‘Socrates’, neither the qualificand nor the qualifier is presented under the mode of a property-limitor, but the qualifier is presented under the mode of a relation-limitor. In a non-qualificative cognition the ultimate elements of a qualificative cognition are presented as such. In other words, an acquaintance with the ultimate elements of a qualificative cognition is the presupposition for a qualificative cognition. In a non-qualificative cognition an entity is not cognized in relation to some other entity or as qualified by some other entity. This type of cognition cannot be expressed in language and is not amenable to introspective awareness. It has been postulated to give an account of qualitative cognition. Now let us explain in what sense the subject is saturated and the predicate is unsaturated in the Nyāya system. From the above discussion it follows that in a cognition aRb, the relation of b to a is necessarily a mode of presentation of b. This applies to both an atomic and a non-atomic qualificative cognition. Since the relation of the predicate (qualifier) to the subject (qualificand) is a mode of presentation of the predicate alone, it may be said to be incomplete or unsaturated, and the subject may be said to be complete or saturated. In an atomic qualificative cognition the subject does not depend on any mode of presentation, but the predicate depends on a relation, and in a non-atomic qualificative cognition the subject depends on a property-limitor, but the predicate depends on both a property-limitor and a relation-limitor. Hence to say that the predicate is unsaturated is to mean that the relation of the predicate to the subject is a mode of presentation of the predicate, and to say the subject is saturated is to mean that this relation is not a mode of presentation of the subject. In order to discuss another problem of Frege we have to introduce the Nyāya distinction between a sentence which gives rise to a cognition and a sentence which describes a cognition. This distinction is analogous to the distinction between an object-language and a metalanguage in the sense that the sentence which describes a cognition is essentially richer than the sentence which generates it. Let us explain it with an example. Consider the sentence ‘This flower is red’. The cognition generated by this sentence has this flower as its qualificand (or subject), a particular red colour as its qualifier (or predicate), and the relation of inherence as its qualification relation. The property-limitor of the property of

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being the qualificand residing in this flower is a complex one consisting of the property of being this and the universal flowerness. The property-limitor of the property of being the qualifier residing in a red colour is the universal redness. In addition to this propertylimitor, the property of being the qualifier is limited by the relation of inherence. Since the property of being the qualificand and the property of being the qualifier are correlatives, they are again related to each other by the relation of determination. The Nyāya admits the relation of determination (or the determined by relation) between any two correlative properties. Hence the correlative properties such as the property of being the cause and the property of being the effect, the property of being the subject and the property of being the predicate, the property of being the preventer and the property of being the prevented, are related to each other by the relation of determination. Now the cognition generated by the sentence ‘This flower is red’ may be described in the following way: (a) The cognition in which the property of being the qualificand residing in this flower is limited by the property of being this and flowerness, and determined by the property of being the qualifier residing in a red colour, which is limited by redness and the relation of inherence. Since (a) mentions the limitors of the cognition generated by the sentence ‘This flower is red’, the cognition generated by (a) would contain the modes of presentation of these limitors as well, and hence it would be much more complex than the cognition generated by ‘This flower is red’. The Nyāya distinction between an expression which generates a cognition and an expression which describes it may be utilized to answer the question whether the concept horse is a concept or not. According to the Nyāya in the cognition generated by the sentence ‘Dobbin is a horse’, Dobbin is the qualificand (or subject), and a horse is the qualifier (or predicate). But in the cognition generated by the sentence ‘A horse is the qualifier’, a horse becomes the qualificand, not the qualifier. Now the question is whether a horse is both a qualificand and a qualifier. The Nyāya answers this question by introducing the distinction between an expression which generates a cognition and an expression which describes a cognition. If we take the sentence ‘A horse is the qualifier’ as a description of an element of the cognition generated by the sentence ‘Dobbin is a horse’, then it is a true sentence. But in the cognition generated by the sentence ‘A horse is the qualifier’, a horse no longer remains the qualifier; it becomes the qualificand. Since a horse is the qualificand of this cognition, the sentence ‘A horse is the qualifier’ is false if it is taken as a description of this cognition. Similarly, in the case of Frege’s example, the Nyāya would say that the sentence ‘The concept horse is a concept’ is true if it is taken as a description of an element of thought generated by the sentence ‘Dobbin is a horse’; but in the cognition generated by the sentence ‘The concept horse is a concept’, the concept horse no longer remains a concept. Since it becomes an object in this cognition, the sentence ‘The concept horse is a concept’ is false if it is taken as a description of this cognition. Hence in this case we can say truly ‘The concept horse is not a concept’. Now let us answer the question, Why should we consider the predicate (or the predicate-expression) alone to be incomplete or unsaturated? In the context of the Nyāya this question may be restated in the form of the question, why should we consider R in the cognition aRb to be a mode of presentation of b alone?

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The Nyāya answers this question in the following way. If R is considered as a mode of presentation of the subject (i.e., the qualificand), then in some cases we cannot describe the cognitions which are prevented by a particular cognition. The concept of preventerprevented relation between cognitions is the epistemic counterpart of the contrary or contradictory relation between two sentences or propositions. From the Nyāya concept of preventer–prevented relation between cognitions it follows that the cognition represented by the sentence ‘Socrates is wise’ is prevented by the cognition represented by the sentence ‘Socrates is not wise’, and vice versa. Hence a self-contradictory sentence such as ‘p and not p’ would not generate a unified cognition, although ‘p’ as such or ‘not p’ as such would generate a cognition. Similarly, a contrary sentence such as ‘This table is brown and red’ would not generate a unified cognition, although ‘This table is brown’ or ‘This table is red’ would generate a cognition. Hence the Nyāya accepts what is sometimes called ‘the epistemic’ or ‘the psychological’ formulation of the law of contradiction. In order to explain this answer of the Nyāya let us begin with the example of the Nyāya and then generalize it. Let us consider the cognition corresponding to the sentence ‘Everything has the absence of time by the relation of inherence’. Since according to the Nyāya ontology time is not related to anything by the relation of inherence, the sentence ‘Everything has the absence of time by the relation of inherence’ is true. Hence the cognition corresponding to this sentence is valid. The Nyāya use of the word ‘valid’ is the epistemic counterpart of the word ‘true’ when it is applied to a sentence. A sentence, according to the Nyāya, is considered as true or false, but a cognition is considered as valid or invalid. In order to draw the distinction between the epistemic and the linguistic levels the Nyāya has used two separate pairs of terms. In this context the Nyāya use of the word ‘Everything’ or ‘all’ also requires some explanation. The word ‘Everything’ is a pronoun and it refers to a collection of objects. This collection is qualified by a positive number depending on the number of objects in it. A particular use of the word ‘all’ would refer to a collection of objects which are the referents of the expression which follows the word ‘all’, as in ‘All men are mortal’. If nothing follows the word ‘all’, then it refers to a collection greater than which cannot be conceived. The limitor of the property of being the referent of the word ‘all’ is the property of being the collection which is nothing but a positive number, and this number is also present in each member of the collection by the relation of inherence. In the above example, time has been denied of everything by the relation of inherence. In the language of the Nyāya time is the negatum and the property of being the negatum residing in time is limited by the property of being time and the relation of inherence. Now the cognition corresponding to the sentence ‘Everything has absence of time by the relation of inherence’ would prevent the occurrence of the cognitions which will correspond to the sentences which are contrary or contradictory of this sentence. Hence the cognition corresponding to ‘Everything has absence of time by the relation of inherence’ would prevent the occurrence of the cognitions expressible by (i) ‘Everything has time by the relation of inherence’ (i.e., ‘Time is related to everything by the relation of inherence’), (ii) ‘Something has time by the relation of inherence’ (i.e., ‘Time is related to something by the relation of inherence’), and (iii) ‘John has time by the relation of inherence’, ‘Tom has time by the relation of inherence’, and so on. Since the sentences in (iii) would refer to each member of our domain, it is practically impossible to say of each

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member that it has time by the relation of inherence. Hence either we cannot enumerate each of the prevented cognitions or it will be a very long list of prevented cognitions. On this point the Nyāya philosophers have suggested the following descriptions of the prevented cognitions: (A) The cognitions in which the property of being the qualifier is limited by the property of being time and the relation of inherence. (B) The cognitions in which the property of being the qualificand is limited by the relation of inherence and determined by the property of being the qualifier which is limited by the property of being time. Now let us compare (A) with (B). In (B) a reference to the property of being the qualificand has been made. So it would refer to the cognitions represented by ‘Everything has time by the relation of inherence’ (i.e., ‘Time is related to everything by the relation of inherence’), ‘Something has time by the relation of inherence’, ‘John has time by the relation of inherence’, etc. So the previous difficulty of enumeration cannot be overcome if we accept (B). Since (A) makes no such reference to the property of being the qualificand of the prevented cognitions, there is no need to refer to each of the qualificanda of the prevented cognitions. So the description (A) in terms of the predicate and its relation to the subject is much simpler than the description (B) which ultimately refers to the subjects and the relation. This is how the Nyāya justifies the postulate that the relation is a mode of presentation of the predicate, not of the subject. It is incomplete in the sense that it depends on its relation to the subject, but the subject is not incomplete in the same sense. Now we can generalize the Nyāya example in the following way. Consider any sentence of the form ‘(x)(x has (is) F)’, and ask the question, What are the cognitions which are prevented by the cognition generated by this sentence? As an answer to this question, it may be said that the cognitions in which the predicate is described by ‘has not F’ are prevented by the cognition which corresponds to ‘(x) (x has (is) F)’. Since the description of the prevented cognitions in terms of ‘has not F’ is simpler than the one which contains ‘x has (is)’, or its particular substitutions such as ‘John has (is)’, it is better to include the relation signified by the word ‘has’ or ‘is’ as part of the predicate rather than as part of the subject. For this reason the Nyāya has postulated the relation of F to its possessor as a mode of presentation of F rather than its possessor. Now we can apply this technique at the level of language. If the predicate corresponds to the expression ‘has F’ or ‘has not F’, then the predicate-expression should be ‘has F’, or ‘has not F’ rather than ‘F’ or ‘not F’, and if the subject corresponds to the expression ‘x’ or ‘John’ rather than ‘x has’ or ‘John has’, then the subject-expression should be ‘x’ or ‘John’ rather than ‘x has’ or ‘John has’. Hence at the level of language we can consider ‘is a man’ as the predicate-expression of the sentence ‘Socrates is a man’, rather than ‘man’ or ‘a man’, and ‘Socrates’ as the subject-expression rather than ‘Socrates is’. Hence the rationale for the inclusion of ‘has’ or ‘is’ or its analogue as part of the predicate-expression lies in the description of certain cognitions which are called ‘prevented cognitions’ by the Nyāya philosophers. Since it is a part of the predicate-expression and not of the subject-expression, and since the subject does not depend on the relation signified by ‘has’ or ‘is’ and the predicate does depend on it, we can consider the subject-expression as saturated and the predicate-expression as unsaturated.

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NOTES 1. G. Frege, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, third edition, edited by P. Geach and Max Black, (New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefieid, 1980), p. 13. 2. Ibid., p. 31. 3. Ibid., p. 38. 4. Ibid., p. 44. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., p. 47. 7. Ibid., p. 46 (fn.) 8. Ibid., p. 49. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., p. 13. 11. Ibid., p. 14. 12. Ibid., p. 31. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., p. 44; and Frege, Posthumous Writings, edited by H. Hermes, F. Kambartel and F. Kaulbach, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), p. 91, (fn.). 15. Frege, p. 47. 16. Ibid., p. 49. 17. J. C. Wilson, Statement and Inference, vol. I, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926), p. 115. 18. W. V. O. Quine, Methods of Logic, revised edition, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1959), p. 131. 19. P. F. Strawson, Individuals, (London: Methuen, 1979), p. 175. 20. J. L. Shaw, ‘Subject and Predicate’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1976, pp. 155-79. 21. E. Klemke (ed.), Essays on Frege, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1968). See William Marshall’s translation, p. 259. 22. Frege, p. 54. 23. P. F. Strawson, Individuals, (London: University Paperbacks, 1979), p. 183. 24. Ibid., p. 203. 25. Ibid., p. 212. 26. For a summary of the old Nyāya ontology see Karl H. Potter (ed.), ‘Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology’, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy, vol. II, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977). 27. For an introduction of Navya-Nyāya see D. H. H. Ingalls, Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951); B. K. Matilal, The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968); and S. Bhattacharya, ‘Some Principles and Concepts of Navya-Nyāya Logic and Ontology’, Our Heritage, (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1976), pp. 1-60. For the Nyāya view I am greatly indebted to Pandit Visvabandhu Tarkatīrtha.

CHAPTER TWENTY FOUR

Some Reflections on Kripke The aim of this paper is to discuss the view of Kripke as formulated in his articles on ‘Naming and Necessity’1 and ‘Identity and Necessity’.2 Kripke’s discussion, according to our view, can be classified in the following way: (a) His criticism of philosophers like Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Searle and Strawson. His positive theses can be classified into two groups. (b) The views which are not different from some other philosophers, and (c) The views which are different from other philosophers. In our discussion we shall see how far his view is different from other philosophers, and we shall also examine his positive thesis which he claims to be different from other philosophers. Before we start our discussion we would like to mention three more points. (i) One of the aims of Kripke is to draw a distinction between ‘a priori’ and ‘necessary’. He claimed that most philosophers have made a confusion between these two concepts. From time to time he also discusses the relation between ‘analytic’, ‘a priori’ and ‘necessary’. This discussion reminds us of Kant’s discussion between dichotomies such as analytic synthetic, a priori - a posteriori, necessary – contingent. In this context we would like to mention that in addition to these dichotomies there are many more which are closely related to them. The following may be cited as examples. 1. Universal – particular; 2. essential – accidental; 3. formal – material; 4. actual – potential; 5. clear & distinct – confused; 6. activity – passivity; 7. thought – experience; 8. understanding – sense; 9. conception – perception; 10. rational – irrational; 11. linguistic – non–linguistic truths; 12. reality – appearance. Under certain interpretations most of the members on the left-hand side of the dichotomies can be said to be co-extensive, and the same will be true of the members on the right-hand side. For various reasons we do not intend to discuss the relation between the members of these dichotomies in this paper. At the end of the paper we will discuss only the relation between necessity and universality, which has not been made distinct in the Kripkian type of semantics. (ii) There is some problem about Kripke’s positive thesis. One might say that he has no thesis or theory. In order to substantiate this claim one might quote a passage where he is discussing the cluster concept theory of names. Kripke says: ‘It is wrong. You may suspect me of proposing another theory in its place; but 1 hope not, because I am sure it is wrong too if it is a theory’.3 As against this criticism of other philosophers one might claim that those theories have limited applications. The same thing might be said with respect to the view of Kripke. We

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shall see whether his view, even if it is not a theory, is wrong or had a limited application or coincides with the view of some other philosophers. (iii) Most of the things Kripke has said in these papers rest on a distinction between the attributive and the referential use of definite descriptions. Keith Donnellan in his paper on ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions’4 has drawn a distinction between the two uses of a definite description. He says, To illustrate this distinction, in the case of a single sentence, consider the sentence, ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’. Suppose first that we come upon poor Smith foully murdered. From the brutal manner of the killing and the fact that Smith was the most lovable person in the world, we might claim, ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’. I will assume, to make it a simpler case, that in a quite ordinary sense we do not know who murdered Smith (though this is not in the end essential to the case). This, I shall say, is an attributive use of the definite description. The contrast with such a use of the sentence is one of those situations in which we expect and intend our audience to realise whom we have in mind when we speak of Smith’s murderer and, most importantly, to know that it is this person about whom we are going to say something. For example, suppose that Jones has been charged with Smith’s murder and has been placed on trial. Imagine that there is a discussion of Jones’s odd behaviour at his trial. We might sum up our impression of his behaviour by saying, ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’. If someone asks to whom we are referring, by using this description, the answer here is ‘Jones’. This, I shall say, is a referential use of the definite description.5 In addition to this example sometimes another example from Donnellan is cited to illustrate the referential use of a definite description. The person who utters the sentence ‘The man over there with champagne in his glass is happy’, intends to refer and does refer to a person he thought had champagne in his glass, although in fact he had water in his glass. The audience also might succeed in singling out this person. In this case the description does not fit the person fully. The person in question partially satisfies the description in the sense that he is holding a glass. Now the question is whether this use of a definite description can single out an object which does not satisfy the description at all. In other words, whether the above description can single out a person who is not even holding a glass in his hand, or can single out an object which is not even a person. If it were so, then the content of a descriptive expression does not play any role in singling out a person. The expression ‘(ix) Fx’ is used not as a description, but as a name, perhaps as a logically proper name. If it were so, then the Russellian distinction between a logically proper name and a definite description can take care of Donnellan’s distinction between the attributive and the referential use of a definite description. In addition to these two uses of definite descriptions there is a third use of a definite description, which has not been discussed at all by these philosophers. This use of a definite description plays an important role in the Vedānta philosophy where a description might play the role of a pointer. This use of a definite description cannot be classified either as attributive or referential. A discussion on this third use of a definite description is beyond the scope of this paper. With this introductory note let us introduce our discussion of Kripke.

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I According to Kripke, both Frege and Russell have equated the meaning or the sense of a name with the sense or the meaning of a definite description. According to Russell names like ‘Socrates’ are descriptions in disguise. According to Frege also the sense of the name ‘Aristotle’ might be the same as the sense of ‘the teacher of Alexander the Great’ or ‘the Stagirite teacher of Alexander the Great’. Frege admits the fluctuation in the sense of a name. In any given context the sense of a name might be equated with the sense of some definite description. According to Kripke, many philosophers who claim to reject the theory of Frege-Russell end up with a similar theory of names. It is claimed that according to Wittgenstein the meaning of a name is a family of descriptions. In order to substantiate this claim the paragraph 79 from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations has been quoted by Kripke. It is doubtful whether this type of theory can be attributed to Wittgenstein. Barring this disputed question one might develop a similar theory of names. As a matter of fact, according to Searle the referent of a name is determined not by a single description, but by some cluster or family of descriptions. This theory, according to Kripke, can be formulated in the following way: (1) To every name or designating expression ‘X’, there corresponds a cluster of properties, namely ‘the family of those properties j such that A believes ‘j X’. (2) One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely, (3) If most, or a weighted most, of the j’s are satisfied by one unique object y, then y is the referent of ‘X’. (4) If the vote yields no unique object, ‘X’ does not refer. (5) The statement, ‘If X exists, then X has most of the j’s is known a priori by the speaker. (6) The statement, ‘If X exists, then X has most of the j’s’ expresses a necessary truth (in the idiolect of the speaker).6 The thesis (1) is a definition of the cluster theory of names. By citing counterexamples to (2) – (6) Kripke claimed that they are false. The thesis (2) fails when ‘we say Feynman is a famous physicist without attributing anything else to Feynman.’7 A man in the street uses the name ‘Feynman’ to refer to Feynman without associating the sense of a definite description to it. With respect to thesis (3) he said that even if most of the j’s are satisfied by a unique object that object might not be the referent of a name. He says, ‘Columbus was the first man to realise that the earth was round. He was also the first European to land in the Western hemisphere. Probably none of these things arc true, and therefore, when people use the term ‘Columbus’ they really refer to some Greek if they use the roundness of the earth, or to some Norseman, perhaps, if they use the ‘discovery of America’. But they don’t. So it does not seem that if most of the j’s are satisfied by a unique object y, then y is the referent of the name. This seems simply to be false’.8,9

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As regards thesis (4) he said that even if the vote yields no unique object it does not follow that the name does not refer. Even if all our beliefs about the referent of a name are false and no one else satisfies those beliefs, then also it does not follow that a name does not refer to something. With respect to thesis (5) he claimed, Even when Theses (2) - (4) are true, Thesis (5) is usually false; the truth of These (3) and (4) is an empirical ‘accident’, which the speaker hardly knows a priori. That is to say, other principles really determine the speaker’s reference, and the fact that the referent coincides with that determined by (2) - (4) is an ‘accident’, which we were in no position to know a priori.10 Thesis (6) is also false, because the referent of a name might not satisfy most of j’s. If properties like being the teacher of Alexander the Great and being the author of such and such books are attributed to Aristotle, it does not follow that if Aristotle exists, then he satisfies most of the properties in all possible worlds. It is not a necessary truth that Aristotle has the properties commonly attributed to him. He might have existed without satisfying those properties. Hence thesis (6) is false. According to Kripke the above theories of names are false because the supporters of those theories did not realise that proper names are rigid designators. A name is a rigid designator if in any possible world it designates the same object. The name ‘Aristotle’ designates Aristotle even if all the properties usually ascribed to Aristotle are not satisfied by Aristotle. The root cause of the above theories is that they equate the sense of a name with the sense of a definite description or with a cluster of descriptions. Now let us discuss whether Kripke is justified in criticising the sense theory of Frege. Frege’s method of determining the referent of a name is a cognitive determination. A cognitive determination is a mode of presentation of the object, which determines the referent of a name. Frege’s thesis can answer the question how the different users of a name can determine its referent. A name or a term by itself does not perform the referring function. We use a term to refer to something. Now in order to refer to something, that thing must be presented in a certain way. The mode of presentation constitutes a cognitive state which must be expressible in the form of a judgement or proposition. As a judgement or a proposition can be analysed into a subject and a predicate, so can the epistemic counterpart of it. The subject–predicate relation at the epistemic level might be called the ‘qualificandqualifier’ relation. We cannot refer to something without a qualifier which is an epistemic element or a mode of presentation. So Frege’s sense is to be understood as an epistemic element of a judgement or proposition. Moreover, from Frege’s theory of sense it does not follow that a mode of presentation must be an essential property of the object. According to Frege, the property corresponding to a sense of a name belongs to the object. But according to Kripke a name refers to an object. Kripke is not concerned with the problem how a user of a name determines its referent, while Frege is mainly concerned with this problem. So if we give an epistemic interpretation to Frege’s theory and if Kripke’s theory of name is treated as an ontological or semantic theory, then Kripke’s criticism from the ontological standpoint might not be considered as an internal criticism of Frege’s theory. Certain alternatives to Frege’s theory might be formulated in the following way: (1) It might be suggested that we can refer to an object without having any mode of presentation

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or without any knowledge about that object. Now if we take this alternative, then we cannot distinguish the referent of ‘a’ from that of ‘b’ because we do not know anything about a or b. (2) It might be suggested that we can refer to an object by a name provided we are acquainted with the object. This acquaintance does not involve any mode of presentation, and the cognitive state of this acquaintance does not take the form of a qualificand– qualifier relation. Since this acquaintance does not involve any qualificand–qualifier relation it cannot be expressed in the form of a judgement or proposition. There is no harm in having a cognitive state or knowledge by acquaintance of this type. The problem arises when we want to distinguish the objects of such acquaintances. This cannot be done without introducing a qualifier at epistemic level, which is nothing but Frege’s sense. So the Frege’s theory of sense as a way of determining the referent at the cognitive level cannot be replaced by some other theory without some absurdity. But it is this epistemic thesis of Frege which Kripke claims to reject. Kripke also rejects the claim that the sense of a designator or a name is expressible by a definite description, and he has attributed this thesis to Frege. We shall see whether this thesis follows from the sense-theory of Frege. If we accept the meaning-reference dichotomy and claim that the meaning of a designator is an epistemic concept, then we have to explain the meaning of a designator by reference to what happens when one understands an expression. Frege’s explanation of this meaning is in terms of sense. From Frege’s explanation of sense it does not follow that the sense of a designator must always be expressible by a definite description. Since the sense of a designator is a mode of presentation, it might not be always expressible by a definite description. The sense of a designator, say ‘a’, might be expressible by the expression ‘a man’. Now what follows from this view is that one might not be able to determine or recognise the unique object, i.e. the referent of a designator or name; but from this view it does not follow that an indeterminate sense of a term is not a sense. An indeterminate sense which is expressible by an indefinite description might be considered as an incomplete or partial sense of a designator. Following Frege one might develop three different types of sense of a designator. (1) Incomplete Sense: an incomplete sense of a name is expressible by an indefinite description. (2) Partially complete sense: this type of sense would be sufficient for a particular user of a name to identify the referent of a name in a particular world or a possible world. (3) Semi-complete sense: this type of sense would be sufficient to identify an object in any possible world. The epistemic counterpart of an essential and a unique property of an object would be a sense of this type. What belongs to an object is not a sense, but a property corresponding to a sense. If we can cognise an object under the mode of an essential and a unique property of an object, then we can identify it in any possible world. The term ‘Complete sense’ is reserved for all possible modes of presentation of an object. But a finite human being cannot grasp all possible modes of presentation of an object. Frege has admitted it in the following passage: ‘A complete knowledge of the nominatum would require that we could tell immediately in the case of any given sense whether it belongs to the nominatum. This we shall never be able to do.’11 If we try to understand Frege’s theory of sense in the light of our above remarks, then some of the remarks or the counterexamples of Kripke are either false or wide of the mark. Kripke’s example ‘Feynman was a famous physicist’12 does not constitute a counterexample

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to Frege’s theory of sense. According to Frege’s thesis the mode of presentation of Feynman in this case would be an incomplete sense. Secondly, Kripke’s method of fixing the referent of a name in terms of a referential definite description does not constitute a counterexample to Frege’s theory of sense. A referential definite description, according to Frege, would be a partial sense of the name or the designator. Frege would not equate the meaning or the sense of ‘Aristotle’ with the sense of the definite description ‘the teacher of Alexander the Great’, if the latter expression is used to fix the referent of Aristotle. The latter expression simply expresses one of the modes of presentation of Aristotle and this mode of presentation is sufficient to determine the referent of ‘Aristotle’ in this world. Thirdly, if the referent of a name is fixed in terms of an essential and a unique property of the referent, then also it does not constitute a counterexample to Frege. If a name designates the same object in all possible worlds, then the mode of presentation of the referent would be an epistemic counterpart of an essential and a unique property of the referent. This mode of presentation will constitute a semi-complete sense of Frege.

II Now let us discuss Kripke’s distinction between proper names and descriptions in modal contexts. According to Kripke a modal context makes the distinction between a proper name and a description transparent. A definite description is capable of scope distinctions in modal contexts, while a proper name is not. The name ‘Aristotle’ cannot be equated with ‘the teacher of Alexander’. It is true to say that the teacher of Alexander might not have taught Alexander, but it is not true to say that Aristotle might not have been Aristotle. The former sentence can be symbolised in the following way: (1) (Ǝx) ((Tx . (y) (Ty É x = y)). ◊ ~ Tx), where ‘Tx’ means ‘x taught Alexander’. In this context it is to be noted that (1) does not mean the same as ‘It is possible that the teacher of Alexander did not teach Alexander’. The latter sentence can be symbolised in the following way: (2) ◊ (Ǝx) ((Tx . (y) (Ty É x = y)). ~ Tx), Kripke claimed that (2) is not what is intended when it is said that the teacher of Alexander might not have taught Alexander. Now let us discuss why, according to Kripke, the sentence ‘Aristotle might not have been Aristotle’ is false. This sentence might be symbolised in the following way: (3) ◊ Aristotle ≠ Aristotle Now (3) is false, not because Aristotle is a name, but because ‘Aristotle exists’ is defined in terms of identity and identity statements of the form ‘a = a’ are taken as logical truths. If singular existential statements are considered as contingent statements, then it makes perfect sense to say that Aristotle might not have been Aristotle, and this simply means that Aristotle might not have existed. A similar argument has been put forward by G.E. Moore as a criticism of Russell in the context of the discussion whether ‘this might

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not have existed’ makes sense or not.13 So if we treat ‘exists’ as a predicate and do not define it in terms of identity, then an interpretation similar to sentences containing definite descriptions can be given to sentences containing proper names. The sentence ‘Aristotle might not have been Aristotle’ might be symbolised in the following way: (4) Ea. ◊ ~ Ea, where ‘Ea’ means ‘Aristotle exists’. In a many sorted logic which does not treat ‘exists’ as a predicate, the sentence ‘Arislotle might not have been Aristotle’ can be symbolised in the following way: (5) (Ǝ1x) (∀2y) (x≠y. ◊Aristotle = x), where ‘Ǝ1’ signifies the ‘non-existential’ use of the quantifier and ‘∀2’ signifies the ‘existential’ use of the quantifier. So we suggested two alternative symbolisations for sentences of the form ‘Aristotle might not have been Aristotle.’ Now let us discuss the causal or historical explanation theory of names which is attributed to Kripke. At least Kripke claimed that this is what most of us do. He says: ‘Someone, let’s say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain. A speaker who is on the far end of this chain, who has heard about, say Richard Feynman, in the market place or elsewhere, may be referring to Richard Feynman even though he can’t remember from whom he first heard of Feynman or from whom he ever heard of Feynman. He knows that Feynman was a famous physicist. A certain passage of communication reaching ultimately to the man himself does reach the speaker. He then is referring to Feynman even though he can’t identify him uniquely.’14 What Kripke is saying can be expressed in the following way. After the initial baptism the subsequent users of a name, say ‘Feynman’, refer to the same person even if they cannot identify that person or even if they cannot remember from whom they have heard of the name ‘Feynman’. Again Kripke says: ‘On our view, it is not how the speaker thinks he got the reference, but the actual chain of communication, which is relevant’.15 ‘... it’s in virtue of our connection with other speakers in the community, going back to the referent himself, that we refer to a certain man’.16 So Kripke repeatedly claimed that a chain of communication will lead us to the referent of a name even if the users of a name cannot identify the referent of that name. This theory does not rule out the possibility of using the same name to refer to different persons or objects. The difference can be explained in terms of initial baptism and the causal link which connects a name with a person or an object. In Kripke the causal chain plays the role of identification. The different referents of the name ‘Feynman’ might be distinguished in the following way: (a) The person who is connected with the causal chain j such that after the initial baptism the name was passed on to such and such a person via A, B, C etc. (b) The person who is connected with causal chain y such that after the initial baptism the name was passed on to such and such a person via D, E, F etc.

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Now this causal chain which ultimately links a name with its referent cannot be considered as a substitute for Frege’s sense theory. The sense theory also tries to link a name with its referent via its sense. The former cannot be taken as a substitute for the latter, because the former is a semantic theory, while the latter is an epistemic theory. Frege’s theory is concerned with the question how the user of a name can identify its referent. The identification cannot be achieved without the sense of a name. Since Kripke is not concerned with this question, his criticisms of Frege from the semantic standpoint are wide of the mark. Secondly, Kripke claimed that this is how most of us fix the referent of a name. But this is not what most of us in fact do. We can hardly go back to the initial baptism via the chain of communication which is necessary for explaining the different uses of a name. This theory can work only if we had a complete history of all the names used in our language. Since we do not have such a history, this theory does not seem to be a plausible theory of names. Moreover, since there is no history for all the names used in our language, sometimes we do not know whether such and such a person existed.17

III In this section we would like to introduce Kripke’s discussion of ‘a priori’ and ‘necessary’. According to Kripke, a priori and a posteriori are epistemic concepts, but necessary and contingent are metaphysical concepts. Moreover, necessary and a priori are not co-extensive concepts. Hence we can have a priori contingent and a posteriori necessary statements. His discussion on a priori starts with Kant’s conception of a priori, which he states in the following way: ‘a priori truths are those which can be known independently of any experience.’18 Kantian scholars might not accept this as a view of Kant. According to Kant a priori truths are not derivable from experience. Since necessity and universality are not derivable from experience and since necessity and universality are marks of a priority, the a priori truths are not derivable from experience. These truths are dependent on experience in the sense that they cannot be known without experience, but their necessity and universality are not dependent on experience. Barring the question whether Kripke’s interpretation of the term ‘a priori’ represents Kant’s conception of a priori, let us discuss whether Kripke’s example, ‘One meter is the length of a stick S in Paris at t0’, represents an a priori contingent truth. First of all, Kripke in order to substantiate his thesis that it is an example of an a priori contingent truth has criticised Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein says, There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one meter long nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris. But this is, of course, not to ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of measuring with a metre-rule.19 On commenting on this passage of Wittgenstein, Kripke says, ‘This seems to be a very “extraordinary property”, actually, for any stick to have. I think he must be wrong.’20 This remark of Kripke is based on a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. What Wittgenstein is saying can be explained in the following way: Let us say, a, b, c are objects. If they satisfy the standard S, they will have the property j. Now if we claim that S is j, then some other standard is to be satisfied, and this process goes on ad infinitum. If we say that S is not

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j, then also we face a similar problem. To say that S is not j is to say that there is a standard which S has not satisfied, and this process goes on ad infinitum. In order to avoid the question whether S is or is not j, our language-game, according to Wittgenstein, is such that the standard cannot be said either to have or not to have j. In this context we are simply saying that Kripke’s comment on Wittgenstein is not justifiable. Secondly, Kripke claimed that the phrase ‘the length of the stick S at t0’ is used to fix the reference of the term ‘one metre’. The phrase ‘one meter’ is meant to designate rigidly a certain length in all possible worlds, but in the actual world it happens to be the length of the stick S at t0. The expression ‘the length of the stick S at t0’ is not a rigid designator. Since in some possible world the length of the stick S might have been longer than or shorter than what it is at t0, this phrase cannot be considered as a rigid designator. Kripke claimed that this holds good wherever a definite description is used to fix the referent of a term and the description is satisfied by the referent. The above example of Kripke is used to prove that there are contingent a priori statements. The statement ‘stick S is one meter long at t0’ is considered as a priori by someone who has fixed the referent of ‘one meter’ by using the referential description ‘the length of the stick S at t0’. ‘For if he used stick S to fix the reference of the term “one meter”, then as a result of this kind of “definition” (which is not an abbreviative or synonymous definition), he knows automatically, without further investigation, that S is one meter long.’21 But the metaphysical status of ‘stick S is one meter long at t0’ is contingent, because S might have been longer or shorter than what it is at t0. This example of Kripke has been criticised by Dummett. He says, ‘... if someone has no idea at all what length a metre is, save for knowing that it is the length of some rod in Paris which he has never seen, he may still know a priori that the metre rod is 1 metre long, but, in an intuitive sense, he does not know how long the metre rod is, and hence does not give expression, by his remark, to knowledge of any contingent fact.’22 It seems to me that Dummett is right in claiming that the person who is not acquainted with the length of a metre does not express a knowledge of a contingent fact when he makes the statement that S is one metre long at t0. Since he does not know the length of the stick, the statement does not express a contingent a priori truth. From this criticism of Kripke I do not want to conclude that there is no a priori contingent truth. I simply want to point out that Kripke’s method of proving a contingent a priori truth is difficult to justify.

IV Now let us discuss whether there are necessary a posteriori truths. According to Kripke, all identity statements of the form ‘a = b’, where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are rigid designators, are necessary, if true. If an identity statement of this form is false, then it is necessarily false. In the case of theoretical identifications such as heat = the motion of molecules, identity statements are necessary if true, and knowledge of such statements, according to Kripke, is a posteriori. This leads us to a discussion on identity. It is claimed that the notion of contingent identity leads us to a problem in the following way:

1) (x) (y) [(x = y) É (Fx É Fy)] (From the Law of Leibnitz)

2) (x) □ (x = x) (Logical truth)

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3) (x) (y) [(x = y) É (□ (x = x) É □ (x = y))] (From (1) by substitution)



4) (x) (y) [(x = y) É □ (x = y)] (From 2) and 3))



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Five reactions to this problem are suggested by Wiggins.23 (a) Like Quine one might reject de re modality and claim that expressions of the form ‘□ (a = a)’ are not well-formed. (b) If ‘a’ and ‘b’ are treated as logically proper names, then no contingent identity statement can be made. (c) The conclusion can be blocked by giving up Leibnitz’s Law. (d) ‘(= x)’ cannot be treated as a property-expression.   What can be formed by abstraction of a constant or free variable is ‘( = )’. Hence (3) cannot be derived from (1). (e) One might deny that ‘a = a’ is of the same form as ‘ja’ or ‘Raa’. Hence (3) cannot be derived from (1). But Kripke did not follow any of these suggestions. On the contrary he claimed that anyone who accepts 2) is committed to 4). According to him if ‘x’ and ‘y’ are rigid designators, then necessarily x = y, if it is true. From this it does not follow that all the so-called contingent identity statements are necessary if they are true. The statements like ‘The first Postmaster General of the United States is identical with the inventor of bifocals’ are contingent identity statements. According to Kripke identity statements of the following form are contingent, if at least one of the designators is non-rigid: 1. (ix) (Fx) = (ix) (Fx) 2. (ix) (Fx) = (ix) (Gx)

3. a = (ix) (Fx)

The contingency of (1) is shown by the example ‘The teacher of Alexander might not have been the teacher of Alexander’; the contingency of (2) by the example ‘The first Postmaster General of the United States might not have been the inventor of bifocals’, and the contingency of (3) by the example ‘Aristotle might not have been the teacher of Alexander the Great.’ Moreover, according to Kripke, the terms for natural kinds, some mass terms, and some terms referring to natural phenomena, are rigid designators like proper names. So we get the necessary identity statements of the following type:

a. Heat = the motion of molecules.



b. Water = H2O.



c. Gold = the element with the atomic number 79.

These identity statements are necessarily true, if true at all, and they are a posteriori truths. As regards the demand for a logical proof of his thesis he says, ‘How can one possibly defend such a view? Perhaps I lack a complete answer to this question, even though I am convinced that the view is true.’24

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In addition to the above-mentioned a posteriori necessary identity statements Kripke considers statements of the form ‘This table is made of wood’ as necessary, if they are true, and their truths are known from experience. Given the fact that this table is made of wood, not of ice, he says, ... one cannot imagine that under certain circumstances it could have been made of ice. So we have to say that though we cannot know a priori whether this table was made of ice or not, given that it is not made of ice, it is necessarily not made of ice. In other words, if P is the statement that the lectern is not made of ice, one knows by a priori philosophical analysis, some conditional of the form ‘if P, then necessarily P’. If the table is not made of ice, it is necessarily not made of ice. On the other hand, then we know by empirical investigation that p,...25 So according to Kripke P⊃□P P ∴ □ P, where ‘P’ is a statement like ‘This table is made of wood’. Let us discuss his second type of necessary a posteriori statements. If we accept this thesis, then we cannot make any true counterfactual statement like ‘If this table were made of ice, then I would have sold it’. In David Lewis’ counterpart theory we can make such counterfactuals true. Now Kripke has to give a theory which will explain what sort of counterfactuals can be made true. He has to say that a counterfactual statement about the essential property of an object cannot be made true, because an object cannot lack its essential property in any possible world. So in saying that this table is made of wood, not of ice, what in fact we are saying is that this table is necessarily made of wood. Now if this statement implies the statement that it is necessary that this table is made of wood, then de re modality implies de dicta, which is not what Kripke would like to say. What Kripke would like to say is that if the table exists, then it is necessary that it is made of wood provided being made of wood is an essential character of this table. This is a valid argument. But to say this is not equivalent to what he is saying in the formula ‘P É □ P’. Secondly, Kripke has criticised a lot of philosophers on the ground that they have confused epistemic issues with metaphysical issues. But is he not himself confusing these issues by using the term ‘imaginable’ in the context of counterfactual situations when he said, ‘One cannot imagine that under certain circumstances it (this table) could have been made of ice’?26 Thirdly, Kripke’s thesis that ‘a = b’ is necessary if true is not something new. It has been said by Russell that ‘a = b’ is analytic if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are treated as logically proper names. Since the meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, once we know that they refer to the same thing we know that the corresponding identity statement is necessary. A distinction between Russell and Kripke might be brought by introducing the concept of possible worlds. The referent of a logically proper name, according to Russell, is an object of our acquaintance, while the referent of Kripke’s rigid designator might not be an object of our acquaintance. A rigid designator refers to the same thing in any possible world. Both Russell and Kripke have taken a denotative view of such terms. Kripke’s use of the term ‘rigid designator’ is

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much wider than Russell’s ‘logically proper name’. It includes ordinary proper names also. In this respect Kripke’s thesis might be considered as an extension of Russell’s thesis.

V Kripke repeatedly claimed that the concept of necessity is a metaphysical concept. By a metaphysical concept we mean a concept which tries to capture or explain a mode of being as opposed to a mode of knowing. As an explanation of this concept Kripke repeatedly claimed that a statement is necessary iff it is true in every possible world. It seems to us that this explanation does not give any reason for the necessity of a mode of being. The term ‘necessary’ can be used in different senses depending on the context. In one of its senses it can be contrasted with ‘accidental’, and both the terms ‘necessary’ and ‘accidental’ can be used to characterise the properties of objects. We might say that a property F is an accidental property of an object a if there is no reason for its having that property. Similarly, the property F might be an accidental property of a even if in all possible worlds it has the property F provided no reason is given for having the property F. The examples from mathematics might be used to illustrate this point. The statement ‘The number 4 is divisible by 2 in all possible worlds’ is an example of a universal statement. This statement would be necessary if we explain why 4 would be divisible by 2, or if we give reason for having the property being divisible by 2. Hence a property F is a necessary property of an object a iff the occurrence of F in a or the characterisation of a by F is justifiable by reason.27 The justification by reason might take different forms. One way of justification is to show that a is what it is by virtue of F if F is a necessary property of a. Aristotle’s concept of form, and Kant’s concept of categories or the Categorical Imperative in moral contexts might be considered as necessary in this sense. Kant’s Categorical Imperative is necessary for moral judgements. Wherever there is moral judgement, there is Categorical Imperative; but the Categorical Imperative is more than universality. It explains why the moral judgements have the forms they do have. Hence it is necessary as well. Similarly, an object a’s having the form F in all possible worlds does not make the form F a necessary property of a. But if the form F explains why a is what it is, then the form F becomes a necessary property of a. Our above definition of necessity emphasises the nature of the relation between a quality and a particular, or the nature of the relation between different judgements, or the nature of the relation between different particulars related by a relation. When this relation is not intelligible or it does not explain why something is what it is, then it cannot be considered as necessary even if it is present in the relevant objects in all possible worlds. So the concept of necessity cannot be equated with the concept of universality. The distinction between these two concepts has been emphasised by a lot of classical philosophers. So Kripke who has accused other philosophers of making a confusion between necessary and a priori has not realised the importance of the distinction between necessary and universal truths.

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NOTES 1. S. Kripke, ‘Naming and Necessity’, in Semantics of Natural Language, edited by D. Davidson and G. Harman, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1972). 2. Kripke, ‘Identity and Necessity’, Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, edited by S.P. Schwartz, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977). 3. Kripke, ‘Naming and Necessity’, p. 280. 4. K.S. Donnellan, ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions’, Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, edited by S.P. Schwartz, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977). 5. Ibid., pp. 46-47. 6. Kripke, ‘Naming and Necessity’, p. 285. 7. Ibid., p. 292. 8. Ibid., p. 295. 9. It is not clear how in such cases there is a unique y satisfying most of the j’s. In Kripke’s example both the descriptions seem not satisfied by the unique y. 10. Kripke, ‘Naming and Necessity’, p. 290. 11. G. Frege, ‘On Sense and Nominatum’, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, edited by Feigl and Sellars, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), p. 86. 12. Kripke, ‘Naming and Necessity’, p. 299. 13. G.E. Moore, Philosophical Papers, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1959), p. 126. 14. Kripke, ‘Naming and Necessity’, pp. 298-299. 15. Ibid., p. 300. 16. Ibid., p. 301. 17. Dummett has also raised several objections against this theory of names. M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, (London: Duckworth, 1973), pp. 147-51. 18. Kripke, ‘Naming and Necessity’, p. 260. 19. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1953), Paragraph 50. 20. Kripke, ‘Naming and Necessity’, p. 274. 21. Ibid., p. 275. 22. Dummett, pp. 122-123. 23. D. Wiggins, ‘Identity-Statements’, in Analytical Philosophy, second series, edited by R.J. Butler, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965), pp. 41-42. 24. Kripke, ‘Identity and Necessity’, p. 77. 25. Ibid., p. 88. 26. Ibid. 27. W.H. Walsh in his book, Reason and Experience, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947) has developed this point.

PART FIVE

Morals and Values

CHAPTER TWENTY FIVE

Dharma and the Law of Karma in Indian Culture INTRODUCTION Culture may be defined as behaviours peculiar to human beings, as it refers to languages, ideas, beliefs, religions, rituals, ceremonies, customs, laws, codes, institutions, tools, works of art, etc. Higher animals have societies, as they move together or live together, but they do not have culture in the sense human beings have. This ability of human beings is due to rational or abstract thought, which distinguishes human beings from other animals or higher animals. In order to refer to this ability of human beings the word ‘symbolling’ has been used.1 One of the aims of culture is to make life secure or enduring. In other words, it aims to reduce suffering, or aims to promote the conditions favourable for growth or happiness. Since the concept of dharma and the law of karma in Indian culture aim at the promotion of these values, I intend to discuss them in this paper. It is also claimed that the practice of dhārmic activities will lead us to mokṣa or liberation (freedom from bondage or suffering). Since all the streams of Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism have focussed on these concepts, I would like to mention the paths which will lead us to mokṣa or nirvāṇa (cessation of all types of suffering). In the first section of this paper I shall discuss the concept of dharma, which cannot be translated as ‘religion’ or ‘ethics’. This is due to the fact that the concept of dharma does not entail the conflict between reason and faith, or between science and religion. This section will be divided into two parts. The first part will mention the concept of dharma as discussed in the classical systems of Indian philosophy. The second part will focus on Swami Vivekananda’s conception of dharma, although he uses the word ‘religion’. The second section will deal with the law of karma, as it is related to our practice of dharma. The law of karma is a living thesis as there are classical and modern interpretations of this law. Some of the interpretations of the law of karma and their shortcomings will be discussed in this context. Hence this section will focus on the classical as well as the nonclassical formulations of the law of karma in Indian philosophy. In the third section I shall discuss how to realize freedom from suffering, or the paths leading to liberation. Since the practice of certain virtues, or dharma, knowledge and devotion are necessary for achieving the ultimate goal of life, I shall discuss the views of both classical and contemporary philosophers. Regarding knowledge, righteous action, and devotion as alternative paths, I claim that the difference is initial, not final, as all of them are present in any one of them.

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Since Indian philosophers from antiquity are concerned with suffering, and how to achieve liberation, or freedom from all types of suffering (duḥkha), philosophy is also called mokṣaśāstra (the ‘science of liberation’). Almost all the systems of Indian philosophy have accepted the following three types of suffering: a) Ādhibhautika: this type of suffering is due to body; hence sufferings due to illness, old age, etc., come under this category. For this reason it is called ‘bodily suffering’. b) Ādhidaivika: sufferings due to natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, droughts, tsunami, etc., are called ‘acts of God’. It is to be noted that suffering due to global warming may not always be due to natural disasters, or acts of God, as in some cases they are caused by human actions, such as the emission of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide. Hence, these types of suffering are not always due to natural disasters or acts of God. c) Ādhyātmika: mental or spiritual suffering, such as loneliness, anxiety, alienation, and abandonment, come under this category. Hence these sufferings are due to certain thoughts, desires or questions. Contemporary existentialist philosophers are concerned with anxiety, or similar types of mental states, but Indian philosophers are concerned with not only mental but also spiritual suffering, which may be due to certain metaphysical questions about reality. The aim of philosophy (or ‘religion’), in the context of Indian philosophy, is to alleviate the suffering of beings, including humankind.

I A) In this context I shall focus on the concept of dharma¸ the practice of which will pave the way for, or will lead to, mokṣa or nirvāṇa, which is a state of mind free from suffering, or characterized by peace, bliss, or harmony. The word ‘dharma’ consists of the verbal root ‘dhṛ’ and the suffix ‘man’. Since the word ‘dhṛ’ means ‘to hold’ and the suffix ‘man’ refers to the agent, the word ‘dharma’ means ‘that which holds or supports’. From the root meaning of the word ‘dharma’ it follows that x is a dharma means that 1) x supports the world (dharati lokān) 2) x supports the human society as well as the world ( yo-lokān-dhārayati, yenamānava-samājo-dhṛtaḥ-sa-dharmaḥ) 3) x will help those who have fallen, are about to fall, or will fall (patitaṃ-patantaṃpatiṣyantaṃ-dharatīti-dharmaḥ) 4) x is the foundation of the universe as well as the world (dharmo-viśvasya-jagataḥpratiṣṭhā) 5) x also leads to something higher, such as peace and bliss (ya-eva-śreyaskaraḥ-saeva-dharmaśabdena-ucyate)

6) If you put an end to x (dharma), then it will put an end to you; if you restore x, then it will restore you (dharma eva hato hanti, dharmo rakṣati rakṣitaḥ)

7) x not only supports but also nourishes (dhāraṇa-poṣaṇayoḥ)

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8) x leads to happiness as well as beatitude (yato’bhyudaya-niḥṣreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ) 9) x leads to a higher state or a more noble state, but adharma leads to a lower or degraded state (dharmeṇa-gamanaṃ-ūrdhva-gamanaṃ-adhastāt-bhavatiadharmeṇa)2 10) x is real or truth (yo-dharmaḥ-satyaṃ-vaitat) It is to be noted that satya and dharma have been equated in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (1.4.14) (it) is the most excellent Law (dharma). It is the ksatra (power) of the ksatra, therefore there is nothing higher than the Law. Thenceforth even a weak person rules a stronger with the help of the Law, as with the help of a King. Thus the Law is what is called ‘the truth.’ And if a person declares what is truth they say the person declares the Law; and if a person declares the Law, they say the person declares what is true. Hence both are the same.3 (sa-naiva-vyabhavat, tacchreyorūpaṃ-atysṛjata-dharmaṃ, tadetat-kṣtrasya-kṣtraṃyad-dharmaḥ, tasmāddharmāt-paraṃ-nāstyatho-abalīyān balīyāṃ-samāsaṃ-sate dharmeṇa-yathā rājñaivaṃ, yo vai sa dharmaḥ satyaṃ-vaitat, tasmāt satyaṃ vadantaṃ āhur dharmaṃ vadatīti, dharmaṃ vā vadantaṃ satyaṃ vadatītyetad hyevaitad ubhayaṃ bhavati, 1.4.14)4 Since dharma is equated with truth, it substantiates scientific investigation, or scientific truths. Hence it is not opposed to reason, as scientific truths are discoveries. Dharma, far from being faith, or blind faith, has its roots in reason, or justified by reason. Hence, the laws of dharma are as real as the laws of nature. It is to be noted that these formulations give us general directions for rules or maxims. Hence they are to be compared with the categorical imperative of Kant. The particular laws or moral codes of dharma ‘are to be learned from each generation, from what has been observed or allowed by learned persons who are good and ever free from hatred and inordinate affections.’5 Hence the specific rules of dharma are not fixed for all time to come. The rules are evolutionary in nature and consistent with the theory of adaptation. Hence there are rules such as violence is adharma, or speak the truth. Violence is adharma, as it leads to suffering, and ultimately it would eliminate the entire living being. It is to be noted that the Yoga system has mentioned 81 types of violence, three of them cardinal or non-derivative. These are i) killing or torturing someone, ii) ordering to kill or torture someone, and iii) approving of killing or torture. The word ‘approval’ implies both implicit and explicit approval. Remaining silent or not opposing violence is also another type of approval. Here the word ‘violence’ is used in such a way that the cause leading to violence or destruction is also considered as violence. If there is any conflict between the rules, such as if speaking the truth would cause injury to a person, then the rule of non-violence would supervene over the rule of speaking the truth. This is stated in the principle ‘non-violence is the basic, or fundamental, or higher dharma (ahiṃsā paramo dharmaḥ).’6 It is to be noted that the word ‘dharma’ cannot be translated as ‘ethics’ in the Western sense. This is due to the fact that ethics in Western civilisation is considered as ‘the

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normative science of the conduct of human beings living in societies.’7 Hence the ethical or moral judgements are passed on the conduct of human beings living in societies, especially how it affects others. But the Indian concept of dharma goes far beyond the conduct of human beings living in societies. It deals with (i) the conduct of human beings livings in societies; (ii) the conduct of human beings not living in societies, such as living in caves; (iii) the behaviour of human beings towards animals, such as cats or dogs; (iv) the behaviour towards plants; (v) the behaviour towards inanimate objects; (vi) the thoughts, not expressed in behaviour; (vii) the dream experiences which are due to dispositions of waking life. It is to be noted the concept of violence of Indian philosophers is so subtle and pervasive that it applies to trees as well. Hence injuries to trees with fruits and flowers is considered as a violence and there is a provision for expiation for this type of violence as well.8 From the above discussion of dharma it follows that it cannot be equated with religion, as it is not based on blind faith or dogma. Moreover, it is not opposed to science. Again, it cannot be translated as ‘ethics’ in the Western sense, as it deals with the behaviour of human beings, overt or covert, towards all other beings, or nature at large. Moreover it deals with the ethical value of our experiences, including thoughts and dreams. B) Now I would like to discuss the view of Swami Vivekananda, although he uses the word ‘religion’ to signify ‘dharma’. (i) According to him, the goal of any religion is to alleviate the suffering of all beings. Since the same goal is to be realized through religious practices, the difference between religions will be in name only. In favour of this view, he has quoted the following passage in several places: ‘That which exists is One, but sages call it by various names (ekaṃ-sadviprābahudhā-vadanti).’ (ii) He also claims that every religion must be universal if it is to be called religion in the true sense of the term. To quote Swamiji, ‘Religious ideas will have to become universal, vast and infinite; and then alone we will have the fullest play of religion, for the power has only just begun to manifest in the world.’9 ‘The power of religion, broadened and purified, is going to penetrate every part of human life.’10 Since Swamiji emphasizes universality, and all-pervasiveness of religion, everyone can participate in the religious practices of others, and philanthropic activities, such as free schools or hospitals are not meant for the followers of a particular religion or sect. They are for all and everyone, irrespective of one’s religious denomination, caste, colour, or country of origin. When Swamiji claims that religious truths are universal and eternal, what he meant is that certain moral virtues are for the good of all. Since brotherhood, justice, love, etc., lead to the realisation of the ultimate goal of life, they remain the same in every situation. Hence, they are to be treated as eternal. Moreover, they cannot be confined to the believers of any particular faith, such as Christianity or Islam. Hence the principle which is applicable to everyone, without any exception or discrimination, is the principle of dharma, which is for the good of all beings. (iii) Swamiji also claims that the principles of religion should not contradict reason. To quote, ‘the first test of true teaching must be that the teaching should not contradict reason.’11 In other words, the principles of ethics and religion should be justified on rational grounds, and hence they should be universal as reason is the same for every human being. Since both the ethical and religious doctrines are justified on rational grounds, they are not

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dependent on a personal supernatural being for their justification and thereby acceptance. In this respect Swamiji’s teaching has far reaching consequences. Kant, in the Western tradition, has tried to make ethics independent of religion, but Swamiji has tried to make both ethics and religion independent of any supernatural being. Hence he has reified human beings and thereby asserted the identity between the soul and the ultimate reality. (iv) Regarding the God of religion, Swamiji claims that it is not external to our soul. Rather, it is to be realized in every soul. To quote, ‘the end of all religions is the realising of God in the soul. That is one universal religion. If there is one universal truth in all religions, I place it here – in realising God.’12 According to Swamiji one becomes religious when one sees God in others. As he says: ‘I shall call you religious from the day you begin to see God in men and women ... .’13 He even identified human beings with God. He says: ‘Every man and woman is the palpable, blissful, living God.’14 This identification justifies the principles of ethics and religion, and thereby ethics and religion become autonomous, not dependent on any supernatural or unmanifested being. As regards the question of how to realize the goal of religion in our lives, Swamiji says, ‘The first step towards the realisation of religion is to give up all types of superstition. We have to overcome a huge mass of ancient superstitions, ancestral superstition; class superstition, city superstition, country superstition, and behind all, the vast mass of superstition that is innate in every human being.’15 Since ignorance is the root cause of superstition, we require knowledge or proper understanding to remove these semi-innate superstitions. Once our superstitions are removed, the feeling of superiority on the basis of caste, colour, creed, region, language and nation will disappear, and thereby some of the causes of discord, envy, jealousy, etc., will be eliminated. Secondly, we have to foster fellow-feeling and love towards others with the utmost sincerity. According to Swamiji this love has no boundary and it does not discriminate between the I and the you. As he says: ‘Love for yourselves means love for all, love for animals, love for everything, for you are all one. It is the great faith which will make the world better.’16 Swamiji even went one step further and identified religion with love. He says: It is in love that religion exists and not in ceremony, in the pure and sincere love in the heart.17 Love opens the most impossible gates; love is the gate to all the secrets of the universe.18 Love also produces some practical results which will help in reducing the suffering of others and thereby pave the way for the realisation of freedom and bliss. To quote Swamiji: He who sees Shiva in the poor, in the weak, and in the diseased, really worships Shiva; ... . He who has served and helped one poor man seeing Shiva in him, without thinking of his caste, or creed, or race, or anything, with him Shiva is more pleased than with the man who sees Him only in temples.19 Swamiji has even identified life with love. As he says: ‘Life is love, and when a man ceases to do good to others, he is dead spiritually.’20

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Hence the love of Swamiji is not a wishful thinking or an emotion present as a mere feeling. Rather it does something positive to alleviate the suffering of others. Moreover, there is no selfish motive in our actions which are due to love. Hence the combination of knowledge, love, and unselfish action will lead us to the ultimate goal or the realisation of the highest good. In this context it is to be noted that Swamiji’s concept of the essence of religion is not different from the concept of dharma stated in our scriptures, or philosophical systems, as the practice of true religion, or dharma, will alleviate not only the suffering of human beings, but also the suffering of all living beings. It is to be noted that dhārmic activities pave the way for the realisation of higher values in life, which are related to spirituality. The following may be mentioned in this context: i) Dhārmic activities would purify our thoughts, desires or mind as a whole (cittaśuddhi). This is due to the fact that they are opposed to violence, falsehood, malign intentions, dishonesty, back-biting, etc. The thought which is free from defilements (vimala-jñāna) is also equated with the realisation of mokṣa or nirvāṇa. In this context the following prayers may be mentioned as they lead to dhārmic activities:   a) Let everyone be happy and free from sickness and disease (sarve sukhinaḥ santu sarve santu nirāmayāḥ); b) By offering water, I invite the beings who are starving and who are fallen from righteousness (nirāhāraśca ye jīvāḥ pape dharme ratāśca ye, teṣām-āpyāyanāya-aitat-dīyate salilaṃ mayā); c) Let everyone be fully satisfied, as I offer water to those who are my friends, who are not my friends in this world, who were friends in the previous life, and who expect water from me (yeha bāndhavāḥ-abāndhavāḥ va yehanyajanmani bāndhavāḥ; te tṛptimakhilāṃyāntu ye ca-asmāt-toya-kāṅkṣiṇaḥ) ii) Moreover, dhārmic activities would reduce our egoistic or hedonistic attitudes, and thereby pave the way for the dissolution of I-consciousness (kartṛtva-abhimāna). This is how we participate in the feelings of other beings, both human and non-human. iii) They would help us in realising certain supra-mundane experiences, such as nirveda or tranquillity, and generate bhaktirasa or spirit of dedication, which would lead us to the realisation of higher values, such as renunciation. iv) Furthermore, they would unite us with others, including the living being or the nature at large. From our above discussion it follows that morality or dharma is related to spirituality, as the practice of certain virtues would lead us to the realisation of our spiritual life, which is necessary for harmony and peace at personal and global levels, without postulating any supernatural beings. Moreover, it would lead to the preservation of nature at large, which is for the wellbeing of all.

II Now I would like to discuss the concept of karma, which is related to the concept of dharma, as the practice of dharma or adharma produces certain results and affects the life of an individual. It is to be noted that the law of karma, in some form or another, is present not only in the culture of the Indian subcontinent, but also in other cultures. The

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law of karma is also treated as an application of causation at the moral level, so that moral actions do not become superfluous. The law is usually stated as ‘As you sow, so you reap’, or ‘You reap what you sow’. Expressed in everyday terms, ‘If you sow an apple seed, you get an apple tree, but if you sow a lemon seed, you get a lemon tree’. Bruce Reichenbach, a contemporary philosopher, has claimed that the law of karma implies the following features:

a) All actions for which we can be held morally accountable and which are done out of desire for their fruits have consequences



b) Moral actions, as actions, have consequences according to the character of the actions performed: right actions have good consequences, wrong actions have bad consequences



c) Some consequences are manifested immediately, or in this life, some in the next life, and some remotely



d) The effects of kārmic actions can be accumulated



e) Human persons are reborn into this world21

In this context it is to be noted that Reichenbach has discussed only the intentional actions of individual, but the law of karma is concerned with both the intentional and the unintentional actions of the doer. An unintentional action, such as accidentally hurting a baby or a child on the floor, would also affect the agent, but it would produce a very low degree of kārmic residue (karmāsayaleśa). This is due to the fact that the agent could have avoided hurting the child, if he were more attentive or careful. Reichenbach has also questioned whether the law is consistent with the principle of universal justice, or compensatory justice. This is due to the fact that some of our sufferings are caused by the wrongdoings of others. According to the classical interpretation, the law of karma is consistent with the principle of universal justice. This is due to the fact that, if an innocent person suffers due to the wrongdoings of others, she or he will be compensated with happiness or reward, either in this life, or in a future life, and the person who has caused the suffering of the innocent person would receive her/his due. Hence the interpretation of Reichenbach is either inadequate, or requires further clarification or substantiation. A.B. Keith, another contemporary writer, claims ‘the conception of karman serves indeed an excellent way to defend and protect the established order of things, but it is essentially fatalistic; and fatalism is not for a normal mind a good incentive to moral progress.’22 It is to be noted that these interpretations are based on misunderstandings about the nature of Indian philosophy, as Indian philosophers have claimed that you are the architect of your fate. Almost all the systems of Indian philosophy have accepted some concept of freedom or other. It is to be noted that most Indian philosophers are either Compatibilists or Libertarians, although some of them have gone beyond both categories. Indian philosophers, by and large, emphasize the ability and the achievement of human beings by their effort. Human effort or freedom has been emphasized from the very dawn of Indian philosophy. Some of the problems of our existence can be solved by our effort. To quote Maitrī Upaniṣad: Saṃsāra is just one’s thought, with effort one should cleanse it.

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... The mind, in truth, is for mankind the means of bondage and release. If bound to objects, bondage follows, from objects free – that is called release.23 From this passage it follows that we can overcome some of the obstacles to our existence by our effort or free will. In the Yoga system also we can overcome our suffering by controlling our senses or internal organs, including various modifications or ‘modes of mind.’ Through our effort we can transform our minds, which is necessary for liberation. The practice of yoga to control our internal and external senses is present not only in the Hindu tradition, but also in the Buddhist tradition, especially the Yogācāra system. According to Laṅkāvatāra sūtra (a Buddhist text) also an enlightened mind, or a pure mind is transformed into the Buddha’s mind. To quote: ‘Suchness, emptiness, excellence, nirvāṇa, realm of truth, the various bodies made from mind – I call these Buddha.’24 In the Mahābhārata also human effort plays a great role, as there is no scope for fatalism. What is called ‘fate’ (‘daiva’) is nothing but the kārmic residue of one’s effort. To quote: Just as a field sown without seed is barren So without human effort there is no fate. ... The doer himself enjoys the fruit of his or her actions This is seen clearly in the world in regard to activity and inactivity.25 Since there is no limit to what a human being can attain, Godly power has been ascribed to human effort. To quote: ‘Heaven, enjoyment, and the desired state are all attained by actions or human effort here in this world.’26 The Yogavāsiṣṭha, which assumed the status of a proto-epic, and contains philosophical thoughts of Vedānta, Yoga, Sāṃkhya, Śaiva Siddhānta, and Mahāyāna Buddhism, lays much emphasis on human effort than on anything else. It is claimed that our actions determine our future, as there is no fate. To quote a few passages from the Yogavāsiṣṭha:27 Whoever wishes to turn back fate by human action has his/her wishes completely fulfilled in this world and the other world ( II:7.2). Those who abandon their diligence and take their last resort in fate destroy all righteousness, wealth, and pleasure and are their own enemy ( II:7.3). By human exertion Bṛhaspati became teacher of gods ( II:7.7). Whoever exerts one’s self obtains the desired result. But for the one who stands quietly, indeed, what result is obtained? (II:7.19) A person is born in this world,

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grows up and ages. There is no fate seen here, merely the progression from childhood to old age ( II:7.23). By pure creativity, pure results are gained quickly, Impure always follows impure. That which is called fate does not exist (II.7. 18) According to the Yogavāsiṣṭha, liberation, or freedom, can be achieved in the bodily form and there is no difference between the embodied and the disembodied types of liberation. As regards the nature of a liberated person, it is said:28 Although externally engaged in worldly actions, he or she has no attachment in his or her mind to any object whatsoever ... he or she behaves like an ideal citizen and friend of all. He or she is free from the restrictions of caste, creed, stage of life, custom, and scriptures. It is also claimed that activities of a liberated person are free from personal desires. This type of person spreads happiness around. To quote: Having seen him or her, having heard about him or her, having remembered him or her, all creatures feel delighted.29 From the above discussion it follows that Indian philosophers, by and large, have emphasized free will or effort for achieving our desired ends, including metaphysical freedom or liberation. Hence fatalism has no role to play in the context of Indian philosophy. Regarding the law of karma, it is to be noted that different systems of Indian philosophy have accepted different sets of presuppositions or theses, although there is unanimity with respect to the claim that this law is an application of causation at moral level. The Mīmāṃsā school presupposes (a) the Vedas, (b) a permanent self, (c) rebirth, (d) afterlife, unless one is liberated in this life, and (e) the kārmic residue in the form of invisible dispositions or impressions. The word apūrva is used to refer to it. It also includes the force or the ability to produce the final result. The followers of the Nyāya-VaiŚeṣika accept God in addition to all the five presuppositions of the Mīmāṃsā system. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers use the word adṛṣṭa for the kārmic residue of an action. The Karmas, moral or immoral, which have not yet produced the results, are stored as dispositional causal conditions. They reside in the soul even after the cessation of the previous body, and act as causal conditions for having another body and thereby for having happiness or suffering in the embodied soul. So the results (phalas) are produced in the soul delimited by the body (śarīrāvacchinna-ātmā).30 The followers of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the Vedānta also accept the Vedas, rebirth or afterlife, a permanent self, and kārmic residue. But the Buddhists do not accept the Vedas, God, or a permanent self. They accept only rebirth or after-life, and the kārmic residue in the form of impressions which are also momentary and governed by the law of dependent origination. The Jaina philosophers accept a permanent self in addition to rebirth or afterlife and kārmic residue. Now the critics point out that the postulation of rebirth, kārmic residue, apūrva, and God are dubious assumptions. Moreover, the materialists and the Marxists do not subscribe to this type of thesis. Hence, it is difficult the substantiate the traditional law of karma.

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Even the interpretations of contemporary philosophers, such as Sri Aurobindo and Sarvapelli Radhakrishnan, are not free from dubious assumptions. According to both of them, ‘the world is in a great evolutionary process which is not illusory.’31 Moreover, this evolutionary process is traceable to the divine itself. To quote Sri Aurobindo, ‘the pure existent is then a fact and no mere concept, it is the fundamental reality. But let us hasten to add, the movement, the energy, the becoming are also a fact, also a reality.’32 According to him, the process is an unfoldment of the Absolute Divine. Hence it is a developing, progressive process. Human beings by performing good actions are promoting the goal of this evolutionary process. He says: ‘Rebirth is the only possible machinery for such a soul-evolution.’33 In short, Sri Auroindo tries to justify karma and rebirth in order to explain his conception of an evolutionary process of which the individuals are integral parts and which is progressive. Hence his view presupposes an Absolute Spirit, progress, evolution, rebirth, kārmic residue, etc. Radhakrishnan also asserts an evolutionary progress in the world. To quote, ‘thus, everything in the universe, instead of being dismissed as illusory, is thought to be produced by Brahman. But this principle of Brahman is recognized as immanent in the universe.’34 He also claims that the absolute reality is an organism, and ‘the different parts of the organism are but differentiations of the absolute.’35 His view also presupposes a particular concept of the absolute, evolutionary process, rebirth, and kārmic residue. Hence, both of them have certain common assumptions, although the evolutionary process of Radhakrishnan is not as real as that of Sri Aurobindo. Swami Vivekananda is also aware of the dubious assumptions of the traditional interpretations of the law of karma. According to him, liberation or freedom is a dimension or an aspect of morality. As he says, ‘the moment I have realized God sitting in the temple of every human body, the moment I stand in reverence before every human being and see God in him – that moment I am free from bondage, everything that binds vanishes, and I am free.’36 Now the critics would claim that this view also postulates divinity in human beings, and God is to be interpreted as divinity in human beings. Hence the materialist or the Marxist would claim that the view of Swamiji is also not free from dubious assumptions, although it does not presuppose rebirth or afterlife. On this point I would like to claim that the talk of divinity is another way of talking about the dignity of human beings, which is priceless. Moreover, we would like to retain the causal status of the law of karma, without postulating afterlife, rebirth, or kārmic residue, as we can realize our dignity through moral or virtuous actions. Hence, I would like to formulate the law of karma thus: As you do unselfish moral actions, you realize your dignity as a human being, and as you do immoral actions, you lose your dignity as a human being. Hence, by performing unselfish moral actions you attain a holy, impersonal, or universal state, but by doing immoral actions you degrade yourself, or lose your dignity. Hence the practice of moral virtues, such as compassion, love, brotherhood, would help us realize our dignity, or real nature, but the practice of immoral actions, such as torture, cruelty, or

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killing, would deprive our dignity as a human being. If the law of karma is interpreted in this way, it is free from all the dubious assumptions, and we retain its causal status.

III In this section I would like to discuss the methods for realising the ultimate goal of life, called ‘mokṣa’, or ‘nirvāṇa’. It is to be noted that in the course of the realisation of the ultimate goal of life, worldly possessions (artha) and worldly pleasures (kāma) have not been denied, or annulled, or ignored. For this reason, dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa are considered as goals of life. There is a hierarchy among these goals, as artha supervenes over kāma, and dharma supervenes over both artha and kāma. Hence, the performance of dharma, which supervenes over artha, which in turn supervenes over kāma, will lead us to mokṣa. Now the question is whether the performance of dhārmic activities alone can lead us to the ultimate goal of life. The Bhagavad-Gītā, the source of all the streams of Hinduism or Hindu philosophy, has mentioned three paths for the realisation or achievement of mokṣa, or freedom from all types of suffering. The Bhagavad-Gītā emphasizes the practice of dharma, knowledge about reality, including the self, and the attitude of dedication or devotion. For this reason, these paths are known as ‘karma’ (the path of holy or unselfish work), ‘bhakti’ (the path of devotion) and ‘jñāna’ (the path of knowledge). Different systems of Hindu philosophy or streams of Hinduism emphasize these paths in varying degrees. Some of them have claimed that these paths are independent. Hence any one of them would lead us to the realisation of mokṣa. Others have introduced hierarchy among these paths, and have claimed that all of them are necessary, as one will lead to another. The followers of Śaṃkara would claim that karma would lead to bhakti, and the latter would lead to jñāna. Hence jñāna is at the apex of the hierarchy. But the followers of Rāmānuja would claim that bhakti is at the apex of the hierarchy. Jñāna is subservient to bhakti, and karma is subservient to jñāna. But Maṇḍana Miśra, a follower of Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, claims that karma is the direct means for the realisation of ultimate reality, or ultimate goal. Hence, jñāna and bhakti are subservient to karma. It is said that some Mīmāṃsakās claim that one can achieve liberation if 1) one’s actions are not due to desire for their fruits, 2) one does not perform prohibited actions, but 3) performs the obligatory ones (nitya) which destroy the results of previous karmas (karmāśaya, or kārmic residue). Since jñāna is already in the soul, it is not to be acquired through any means; hence karma alone is sufficient for the realisation of the ultimate goal. But some other Mīmāṃsakās claim that both jñāna and karma are necessary for liberation. Hence it is called jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda. In other words, the performance of Vedic duties and the knowledge of Brahman would lead us to liberation.37 According to Swami Vivekananda, these paths are not independent of each other, as they criss-cross or overlap. To quote, ‘there is not really so much difference between knowledge (jnana) and love (bhakti) as people sometimes imagine … in the end they converge and meet at the same point. So also is it with Raja-yoga.’38 I think each of the paths refers to the rest, as each of them is related to the rest. Hence, knowledge without unselfish (holy) work or devotion/love will not lead to freedom from bondage. Similarly, devotion/love without any holy work and knowledge will not lead to liberation (mokṣa). Again, an action which does not presuppose knowledge or

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devotion cannot be distinguished from an inert mechanical action. But an action, which is enlightened by knowledge and is dedicated to the Almighty, becomes unselfish and free from any craving. Let us quote a few passages from the Bhagavad Gītā in favour of this interpretation: (4:33) But greater than any earthly sacrifice is the sacrifice of sacred wisdom. Wisdom is in truth the end of all holy work. (śreyān dravyamayād yajñāj-jñāna-yajñaḥ, parantapa, sarvaṃ karma ’khilaṃ Pārtha-jñāne parisamāpyate) (5:4) Ignorant persons, but not the wise, say that Sāṃkhya and Yoga are different paths; but he/she who gives all his/her soul to one reaches the end of the two. (sāṃkhyayogau pṛthag bālāḥ-pravadanti na paṇḍitāḥ ekam apyāsthitaḥ samyag-ubhayor vindate phalam) (11:55) The person who works for me, who loves me, whose End Supreme I am, free from Attachment to all things, and with love for all creation, he/she in truth comes to me.39 (matkarmakṛn matparamo-madbhaktaḥ saṅgavarjitaḥ nirvairaḥ sarvabhūteṣu-yaḥ sa mām eti pāṇḍava) From the above remarks it follows that since Sāṃkhya and Yoga are not different paths, the path of knowledge and the path of unselfish righteous action are also not different paths. Similarly, if a person loves God then he or she works for Him; and thereby loves His creation and works for His creation. Therefore, each of the paths will ultimately involve the rest, and the difference between them is initial, but not final. Hence the Bhagavad Gītā does not prescribe renunciation of action, but renunciation in action, as our actions are to be guided by knowledge and are to be considered as offerings to the Almighty. It is to be noted that since the Bhagavad Gītā emphasizes both action and knowledge, it is not opposed to science, or the experimental method. Since science gives us knowledge about the empirical world, it is required for the successful performance of a good, just, or virtuous action. From the above discussion it follows that human beings are guided by the concept of ought or ought not (dharma or adharma), which presupposes freewill or psychological freedom. The practice of unselfish dhārmic activities enlightened by knowledge, saturated with dedication or devotion, will lead us to mokṣa or nirvāṇa, interpreted negatively as freedom from suffering, or positively as realisation of peace and bliss.

NOTES 1. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 8, London and New York, 1979, pp. 1151-1153. 2. D. N. Shanbhag, ‘Concept of Dharma and Dharmaśāstra’, in Dharmaśāstra and Social Awareness, edited by V. N. Jha, (Delhi: Indian Books Centre, 1996), pp. 34-43. 3. The Upaniṣads, Part 2, translated by F. Max Muller, (New York: Dover Publications, 1962), p. 89. 4. See V. N. Jha (ed.), Dharmaśāstra and Social Awareness, (Delhi: Indian Books Centre, 1996), pp. 1-43. 5. Manu, II.I, in History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western, edited by S. Radhakrishnan, p. 117.

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  6. Mahābhārata, 1.11.12a, quoted in Dharmaśāstra and Social Awareness, p. 27.   7. C. William Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics, (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1964), pp. 12-13.   8. See Dharmaśāstra and Social Awareness, edited by V.N. Jha, p. 17.   9. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1984), Vol. II, p. 68. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid., p. 390. 12. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 324. 13. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 326. 14. Ibid., p. 326. 15. Ibid., p. 248. 16. Ibid., p. 301. 17. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 141. 18. Ibid., p. 225. 19. Ibid., p. 142. 20. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 493. 21. Bruce Reichenbach, The Law of Karma: A Philosophical Approach, (Hawaii: Hawaii University Press, 1990). 22. Ibid., p. 44. 23. Christopher Chapple, Karma and Creativity, (New York: University of New York Press, 1986), p. 36. 24. Ibid., p. 46. 25. Ibid., p. 60. 26. Ibid., p. 61. 27. Ibid., pp. 110-112. 28. B. L. Atreya, Yogavāsiṣṭha and Its Philosophy, pp. 56-57, quoted in Karma and Creativity, pp. 76-77. 29. Robert N. Minor, ‘In Defense of Karma and Rebirth: Evolutionary Karma’, in Karma and Rebirth, edited by R. Neufield, (New York: State University of New York, 1986), p. 17. 30. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa, Nyāya-darśana, Vol III, (India: West Bengal Book Board,1982), pp. 429-435. 31. Sri Aurobindo, Birth Centenary Library, Pondicherry, XXI, p. 599, quoted in Karma and Rebirth, 1986, p. 17. 32. Ibid., p. 17. 33. Ibid., XVI, p. 112. 34. R. Neufield, Karma and Rebirth, p. 19. 35. Ibid., p. 20. 36. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. II, p. 321. 37. Pandit Dinesh Chandra Shastri, ‘Post-Saṅkara Advaita’, in Aspects of Vedānta, (Calcutta: R. K. Mission Institute of Culture, 1995), pp. 98-107. 38. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. III, p. 32. 39. The Bhagavad-Gītā, translated by Juan Mascaro, (England: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 19.

CHAPTER TWENTY SIX

The Nature of Human Beings: East and West The aim of this paper is to discuss the nature of human beings, both from the Western and the Eastern perspectives. The first part will deal with Western concepts of human being, beginning with Plato. Since we come across four views in Western philosophy, this part will be divided into four sections, dealing with the following views: a) rationality as the defining property of human beings; b) certain attitudes or experiences, such as caring, loving, etc., as the defining properties of human beings; c) theological concepts of human beings, and d) the existentialist concepts of human beings. The second part will deal with Indian concepts of human beings. Since the form of life of human beings cannot be described in terms of a particular character or property, I shall focus on the following six features, or dimensions, of human beings: a) the concept of ought and ought not; b) free will, presupposed by the concept of ought; c) the concept of infinity, or participation in both finite and infinite concepts; d) creativity, as well as suggestive meaning; e) the realization of rasas, and f) liberation (mokṣa, nirvāṇa) or freedom from bondage.

PART ONE In this part I shall discuss four concepts of human beings from Western philosophy.

I Traditionally, human beings are defined as rational animals. Hence, x is a human being if and only if x has rationality and animality. Since rationality is the distinctive feature of human beings, we have to explain this concept. Regarding the use of the term ‘reason,’ it is said ‘a word used in many, various, often vague senses, with complex and sometimes obscure connections, one with another.’1 I think the following uses of this term may be mentioned: i) x has rationality if and only if x can apprehend universals which are eternal, nonspatial and non-temporal entities. This type of thesis we come across in the philosophy of Plato, as he has divided the human soul into three parts. The highest part of the soul is reason. Reason being a faculty of the mind, or soul, apprehends Platonic Ideas, and relationships between these Ideas. The other two parts are irrational and called ‘noble’ and ‘ignoble’ respectively. It is claimed that emotions such as love, courage, etc., belong to the irrational noble part of

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the soul, but sensuous appetites belong to the ignoble part of the irrational soul. The noble part can be treated as instinct, not reason. Plants possess only the ignoble, or the appetitive part of the soul, but animals possess both the noble and ignoble parts of the soul. Human beings alone possess all the three parts of the soul. Hence, human beings are to be distinguished from other beings in terms of reason, which is the immortal part of the soul. Since the rational part is the faculty of knowledge, human beings alone can have knowledge. Hence the knowledge of Ideas such as redness, blueness and colouredness, or the knowledge of ethical Ideas, such as justice, beauty and goodness, is due to the rational part of the soul. Moreover, it is the rational part of the soul which transmigrates and recollects the Ideas, as this part of the soul lived in the realm of Ideas, or Plato’s Heaven.2 ii) x has rationality if and only if x is able to use deductive, inductive, or abductive arguments. According to the Aristotelian definition, deduction is a valid inference, such that the premises are more general than the conclusion. Hence, a syllogistic inference such as ‘all human beings are mortal, all kings are human beings, therefore all kings are mortal,’ is an example of deduction. Similarly, a valid inference, having a general premise and a particular premise and a particular conclusion is an example of deduction. For example, ‘all kings are mortal, Ozymandias is a king, therefore Ozymandias is mortal.’ But, in induction, we proceed from a set of particular premises to a general conclusion. But these definitions are not acceptable, as in a valid deductive inference, both the premise(s) and the conclusion may be particular. For example, ‘a is taller than b, therefore b is shorter than a.’ Similarly, in an inductive inference, both the premise(s) and the conclusion may be particulars. For example, ‘the crow in my garden is black, the crow in your garden is black, therefore, the crow in the garden of John is black.’ Modern logicians do not define deduction or induction in terms of generality. According to them, in a valid deductive inference, the conclusion necessarily follows from the premise(s). But in an inductive inference, this does not happen. In other words, in a deductive inference, if the premises are true, then the conclusion cannot be false. But in an inductive inference, the conclusion may be false or probable, although the premises are true. Therefore, in a valid deductive argument, the conclusion cannot be denied without denying the premise(s). But, in an inductive argument, the conclusion may be denied without denying the premise(s). For example, ‘swans in New Zealand are white, swans in Asian countries are white, therefore all swans are white.’ The premises are true, but the conclusion is false, as black swans have been discovered in Australia. Regarding abduction, some philosophers, such as C.S. Peirce, treated it as the third type of inference. This type of inference corresponds to the postulation of a scientific hypothesis to explain some given phenomena. Suppose a set of facts, say y, are given. In order to explain these facts, the hypothesis x may be postulated, such that if x, then y. Hence, the hypothesis x is treated as probable, or highly probable, although falsifiable. In this context it is to be noted that Aristotle has used it to refer to a syllogistic inference such that the conclusion is merely probable, although the major premise is certain, and the minor premise is merely probable.3 iii) x is rational if and only if the reasoning of x leads to an action.

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It is claimed that the practical reason of Aristotle leads to an action. To quote Aristotle, I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, that ‘I have to make a cloak,’ is an action. And he acts from a starting-point. If there is to be a cloak, there must necessarily be this first, and if this, then this. And this he does at once.4 It is claimed that, according to Aristotle, we must act in order to realize our reason, which is the intrinsic good of a human being. Hence, the good of a human being lies in performing actions which exhibit reason. The nature of life of a human being is determined by the function of reason, as the human good lies in reason. Since Aristotle’s ethics is treated as virtue ethics, the good of an agent lies in having virtuous characters or dispositions. If a person is virtuous, then he or she chooses the right object, or acts in the right ways, at the right time and place, for the right reasons. Wisdom, justice, courage and temperance are considered virtues by Aristotle. Since, human good is a function of reason, the decisions justified by reason are considered as good. From the above discussion it follows that a function of practical reason in Aristotle is to correlate means with ends.5 iv) x is rational if and only if x can apprehend certain categories or generic universals, such as unity, plurality, totality, existence, possibility, necessity, etc., or intuit moral principles. We come across this type of rationality, theoretical or practical, in the philosophy of Kant. According to Kant6, certain categories which are forms or principles of synthesis are necessary for knowledge. Kant deduces his categories from the faculty of judgement or thought, as the unit of thought is judgment. Since there are twelve types of judgements, he accepted twelve categories, one corresponding to each judgement. There are three types of judgements of quantity, namely, singular (this s is p), particular (some s is p) and universal (all s is p). The categories corresponding to these judgements are unity, plurality and totality. Similarly, there are three types of judgements of quality, namely, affirmative (s is p), negative (s is not p), and infinite (s is not-p). The categories corresponding to these judgements are reality, negation, and limitation respectively. According to relation, judgements are divided into categorical (s is p), hypothetical (if s is p, then q is r), and disjunctive (s is either p or q). The categories corresponding to them are inherence-subsistence, ground-consequence, and reciprocity between agent and patient respectively. Similarly, modal judgements are divided into problematic (s may be p), assertoric (s is p) and apodeictic (s must be p). The categories corresponding to these judgements are possibility-impossibility, existence-nonexistence, necessity-contingency. It is to be noted that these categories are contributions of understanding, which is a faculty of theoretic reasoning. The faculty of reason, which is a technical term in Kant, produces the Ideas of the unconditioned, such as soul, God, or the world. Reason, in its practical aspect, or in morals, produces the principles of morality, which are categorical, not hypothetical. These principles are called ‘Categorical Imperatives’. Kant has formulated them in the following five ways:

a) Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.



b) Act as if the maxim of your action were to become, through your will, a universal law of nature.

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c) So act as to use humanity, both in your own person, and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means.



d) So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim.



e) So act as if you were always through your maxims a law-making member in a universal kingdom of ends.7

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Regarding the relation between the theoretical and the practical reason, opinions have been divided. Some claim that the latter is derivable from the former. Others claim that the theoretical is derivable from the practical. But in Kantian philosophy, they are manifestations of, or the functions of, the same reason.8 v) x is rational if and only if x is real. We come across this type of concept of reason in the philosophy of Hegel.9 According to Hegel, thought or reality is moving dialectically from thesis and antithesis to synthesis, which is higher than both of them. The synthesis becomes a new thesis and leads to antithesis. Again, both of them lead to a higher synthesis. This process goes on until the opposition between thesis and antithesis is fully resolved. Since human beings, according to Hegel, are rational beings, they are real. The evolution of the absolute is the progressive realization of the reason manifested in the world. If we consider everything as real, then they would be equally rational. Hence the distinction between human beings and other beings cannot be drawn in terms of reason, as it is present in other beings as well. Of course, we can draw the distinction in terms of degrees of manifestation of reason, but not in terms of kind. On the contrary, if it is claimed that other beings lack reason, then they would be unreal. For this reason it is difficult to use the Hegelian notion of reason to draw the qualitative distinction between human beings and other beings. From the above definitions of reason it follows that the function of reason is: i) to correlate an end with a means, sometimes with the best available means; ii) to apprehend certain categories, generic universals, principles, ends or goals, iii) to apply the principle to a particular case or to be guided by these principles, goals or aims. It seems to me that these concepts of rationality cannot be used to differentiate human beings from certain higher animals. In other words, they cannot be used to draw the distinction between human beings and higher animals. Higher animals such as chimpanzees can correlate certain means with certain ends; they are also guided by certain goals or ends; they can also apprehend certain categories, such as existence, non-existence, plurality and causality. Hence, rationality, theoretical or practical, is not adequate to draw the qualitative distinction between humankind and animal kind.

II In this section I would like to discuss some definitions of human beings or persons proposed by pro-abortionists.10 i) x is a human being if and only if x is formed by certain experiences, such as loving, caring, learning, etc.

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Pro-abortionists claim that a foetus, or an unborn child, is not a human being, as it does not have the experience of loving, caring, etc. Hence, the destruction of a foetus, or the termination of pregnancy, does not amount to murder or killing a human being. This definition also is not adequate to draw the distinction between human beings and other higher animals, such as chimpanzees. This is due to the fact that we cannot substantiate the thesis that higher animals do not have experiences, such as loving, or caring, or learning. The following definitions also suffer from similar shortcomings: ii) x is a human being if and only if x can communicate with others. iii) x is a human being if and only if x possesses a concept of self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states. Since higher animals can also communicate with others, have expectations, or continuity of experiences, and recognize objects or creatures, the above criteria cannot be used to distinguish human beings from higher animals.

III Now I would like to mention the views of theologians, especially the Orthodox Christianity. i) x is a human being if and only if x is created by God after His image. This definition is put forward to explain our idea of God as a perfect being, or the idea of perfection itself. Human beings are conscious of their defects or finitude because they compare themselves with the absolute perfection of God. Since God has created human beings after His imagine, they are born with the idea of perfection or perfect being. Other beings are created by God, but not after His image.11 ii) The Hasidic concept of human being, which has its origin in the Kabbalistic concepts, emphasizes the origin of the soul, creation, and the participation in the Divine Realm. Hence it may be stated thus:  x is a human being if and only if the soul of x has its origin in the divine, x is formed after the model of the supernal elements, and x has influence in the Divine Realm. This view emphasizes the reciprocal relation between human beings and God. To quote Teshima:12 ‘God gives man life, blessings and judgement, and man in his turn restores the cosmic order through his devotion, eventually strengthening the upper world. To the Kabbalists, the divine origin of the soul was most important in dealing with the nature of man, because it is by virtue of the soul that man is qualified to participate with God’. iii) x is a human being if and only if x is ensouled. According to Orthodox Christianity, a foetus gains a soul at the moment of quickening, and the mother feels its movement. Hence, according to this view, ensoulment distinguishes human beings from other beings.

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But the views of theologians lack empirical or rational justification. It depends on a lot of assumptions which are difficult to accept or substantiate. Hence, these views are either dogmas, or articles of faith, or myths.

IV In this section I would like to mention the views of existentialist philosophers such as Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Ortega and Sartre. Following the suggestions of these philosophers, the following definitions or characteristics of human beings may be suggested: i) x is a human being if and only if x is an emotional being. In this context the expression ‘emotions’ refers to some turbulent states of mind, such as anxiety, dread, alienation, forlornness, abandonment, etc. It is to be noted that the traditional concept of human beings emphasizes the cognitive, or the rational, aspect, but the existentialist philosophers focus on the emotional, or non-cognitive, aspect of human beings. Philosophers of the Enlightenment claim that reason can solve not only problems of science, but also the problems of human beings. ‘Reason, in the form of the scientific method, was viewed as the magic wand by means of which ignorance, injustice, prejudice, and superstition were to be eliminated.’13 But, existentialists such as Kierkegaard claim that reason cannot solve central problems of life. The self is to be understood, not in terms of rationality, or thought, but in terms of possibilities, dread, or anxiety, and the decisions that follow them. Similarly, truth is not revealed by reason. Truth depends on our choices or decisions. Kierkegaard also claims that anxiety, or dread, is the defining property of human beings. Animals have fear, but not anxiety. He says,14 ‘One does not therefore find dread in the beast, precisely for the reason that by nature the beast is not qualified by spirit.’ Anxiety has no object, but fear has an object. Hence, it is claimed that nothingness is the content of anxiety. The possibility of freedom appears in anxiety or dread. ‘... dread is the dizziness of freedom.’15 But, according to Heidegger, the object of anxiety is not anything particular. It is also claimed that, since the object is not any specific thing, it is everything in general, and this everything is the world. For this reason, a human being asks ‘why am I here?’ or ‘why am I being abandoned in this world?’ Regarding anxiety he also says:16 ‘... anxiety reveals in human beings the being of the possibility of being one’s own, that means, of being free for the freedom of choosing and defining oneself.’ He also claims that it is anxiety that individuates, pulls us back from the world of everyday living, where we are a part of what one does, what one says, what one thinks.17 ii) x is a human being if and only if the essence of x lies in its existence. We come across this type of characterization in Heidegger. It is claimed that the essence of a human being (Dasein) lies in its ‘to be.’ Hence, its essence must be conceived in terms of its existence.18 The so-called properties of human being are to be conceived as ‘possible ways for it to be’.19 Hence, there are no Platonic essences anywhere. Since each mode of being of an individual is its essence, each of them would be particular. Hence, neither the

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Platonic essences, nor the universals, are to be postulated for the explanation of the nature of a human being. iii) x is a human being if and only if the being of x is ahead of oneself, always on the way (unterwegs). We come across this type of characterization also in the philosophy of Heidegger. In order to understand his use of the word ‘Dasein,’ which refers to a human being, we have to understand his use of the word ‘sorge,’ translated as ‘care.’ To quote Heidegger:20 ‘The primary factor of care, ‘being ahead of itself,’ however, means that dasein always exists for the sake of itself.’ There is always something outstanding in Dasein which has not yet become real, although it remains as a possibility of its being. ‘A constant unfinished quality thus lies in the essence of the constitution of Dasein.’21 In other words, we cannot give an account of a human being without reference to his or her projects, hopes, aspirations, intentions, etc. Hence, a human being is always in the process of becoming. The reference to the process of becoming, or striving for something, will define or describe a particular human being. Hence, an individual is necessarily unfinished or incomplete. According to Heidegger, we can never grasp the wholeness of Dasein. This is due to the fact that it reaches its wholeness in death, and when it happens, Dasein loses its being of the there. Hence this view emphasizes the becoming aspect of our being. iv) x is a human being if and only if x is what x is not. We come across this type of view in the philosophy of Spanish existentialist Ortega y Gasset. According to Ortega, human beings do not have nature, but history. They live in the realms of planning, hopes and aspirations which are constructed throughout their history. Regarding desire, he says:22 ‘... a constant mobilisation of our being towards something beyond itself; untiring bowman, shooting without rest on exciting targets.’ His conception of future is worth mentioning, as we live in the future coloured by past and present. The existence of a human being is what it is going to be, not what it is. Human beings are characterized in terms of future, unlike other beings who are characterized by present. This is due to the fact that we are constantly betting on projects, and struggling for their achievement. To quote Ortega:23 ‘First of all, living is running into the future. No, it is not the present nor the past what we first live; life is an activity executed towards, and present and past are only discovered later, in relation to the future. Life is making future, life is what it is not yet.’ Hence, the time of human being is future. Past and present are interpreted in terms of future or ‘get sense from future.’ We are living in the unrealized future projects. It seems to me that he is emphasizing the unfulfilled aspects of our life, not simply unterwegs (on the way aspects of our lives) or the becoming aspect of our life. Hence, iii) emphasizes incompleteness of our being, but iv) emphasizes the unfulfilled aspects of our being. This is how we can draw the distinction between iii) and iv). v) x is a human being if and only if x is constituted of a set of free choices or decisions. In other words, x is formed out of choices. According to this view one individual can be distinguished from another in terms of sets of choices and the circumstances in which those choices are made. Since a set of decisions

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is the defining property of an individual, he or she does not have any essence prior to his or her existence. For this reason, the existence of a human being precedes his essence, not the other way around. Moreover, the essence of a human being is not universal, as it explains the uniqueness or the individuality of the person. Regarding choice, Sartre says24 ‘... the choice is nothing other than the being of each human reality, this amounts to saying that a partial particular behaviour is or expresses the original choice of this human reality since for human reality there is no difference between existing and choosing for itself.’ As an example of a situation for the exercise of freedom or free choice, Sartre mentions the condition of a young man who cannot decide whether to join the French Liberation Forces or to serve his ailing mother. Sartre claims that there is no pre-existing guideline or moral rules for making a choice in this situation. He has to choose. This is what is meant by the word ‘abandonment.’ To quote Sartre:25 ‘We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.’ As regards the nature of choice or exercise of freedom, Sartre has rejected the traditional ‘cause-intention-act-end’ model or ‘motive-act-end’ model. He claims that the motive is to be understood in terms of an end which is non-existent. To quote him:26 ‘The motive is understood only by the end; that is, by the non-existent. It is therefore in itself a negatite. If I accept a niggardly salary it is doubtless because of fear; and fear is a motive. But it is fear of dying from starvation; that is, this fear has meaning only outside itself in an end ideally posited, which is the preservation of life which I apprehend as “in danger”.’ Sartre also claims that a motive is not the cause of an act, as motive, act and end constitute a single upsurge. To quote him again:27 ... the motive, the act and the end are all constituted in a single upsurge. Each of these structures claims the two others as its meaning. But the organized totality of the three is no longer explained by any particular structure, ... it is the act which decides its ends and its motives, and the act is the expression of freedom. From the above discussion if follows that Sartre defines human beings in terms of choices which are not caused by any antecedent motives or desires. It is doubtful whether the causal model can be rejected for the explanation of human freedom. Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish human beings from other animals in terms of certain emotions which are precursors of the exercise of free choices. A chimpanzee also experiences anxiety, or dread, in the absence of her child or partner. She also experiences grief, or abandonment, if there is mishap. Hence, the feelings of higher animals are similar to ours, although there may be difference in degree. They also make choices similar to ours. Similarly, they have also hopes and desires. They are also in the process of becoming. Hence the above characterizations of the existentialist philosophers are not adequate to distinguish human beings from higher animals, although they have rightly emphasized the emotional or the free-choice aspect of human beings.

PART TWO In this part I would like to discuss the nature of human beings from the perspective of Indian philosophers. Unlike Western philosophers, Indian philosophers do not define human beings in terms of reason or certain attitudes, such as caring, etc., or in terms of

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certain emotions, such as anxiety. This is due to the fact that these properties are present in higher animals, such as chimpanzees. According to Indian philosophers, human beings exhibit not only rationality at the level of thought, or anxiety at the level of emotion, but also certain other characteristics which will distinguish them from other higher animals. The form of life of a human being can be described by the following features:

a) Some of their actions are guided by the concept of ought or ought not. In other words, human beings are guided by the concept of dharma (righteousness), or adharma (unrighteousness). The word ‘dharma’ has been used in a very wide sense by Indian philosophers. The core meaning of the word ‘dharma’ is derived from the root ‘dhṛ’, meaning ‘to hold’, ‘to support’, etc. Hence x is a dharma means that 1) x supports the world (dharati lokān), 2) x supports the human society as well as the world (yo-lokān-dhārayati, yena-mānava-samājo-dhṛtaḥ-sa-dharmaḥ) 3) x will help those who have fallen, are about to fall, or will fall (patitaṃ-patantaṃpatisyantaṃ-dharatīti-dharmaḥ) 4) x is the foundation of the universe as well as the world (dharmo-viśvasya-jagataḥ-pratiṣthā), 5) x also leads to something higher, such as peace and bliss (ya-eva-śreyaskaraḥ-sa-eva-dharmaśabdena-ucyate)28, 6) x is real or truth (yo-dharmaḥ-satyaṃ-vaitat), 7) If you put an end to x (dharma), then it will put an end to you; if you restore x, then it will restore you (dharma eva hato hanti, dharmo rakṣati rakṣitaḥ).29

From these uses of the word ‘dharma’ it follows that our total wellbeing is dependent on dharma. The laws of dharma are as real as the laws of nature. Hence any type of violence, which is a type of adharma, will cause our suffering and would ultimately lead to the elimination of living beings. It is to be noted that the Yoga system has mentioned 81 types of violence, three of them cardinal or non-derivative. These are: i) killing or torturing someone, ii) ordering to kill or torture someone, and iii) approving of killing or torture. The word ‘approval’ implies both implicit and explicit approval. Remaining silent or not opposing violence is also another type of approval. Here the word ‘violence’ is used in such a way that the cause leading to violence or destruction is also considered as violence. Hence the destruction of nature that causes suffering or leads to the extinction of living beings is a type of violence.

b) The concept of ought presupposes what we can do and what we cannot do. In other words, if I ought to do x, then it follows that I can do x. Again, the latter presupposes freedom. Almost all the systems of Indian philosophy have accepted some concept of freedom or other. It is to be noted that most Indian philosophers are either Compatibilists or Libertarians, although some of them have gone beyond both categories. Indian philosophers, by and large, emphasize the ability and the achievement of human beings by their effort.

Human effort or freedom has been emphasized from the very dawn of Indian philosophy. Some of the problems of our existence can be solved by our effort. To quote Maitrī Upaniṣad:30 Samsara is just one’s thought, with effort one should cleanse it. ...

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The mind, in truth, is for mankind the means of bondage and release. If bound to objects, bondage follows, from objects free – that is called release. From this passage it follows that we can overcome some of the obstacles to our existence by  our effort of free will. In the Yoga system also we can overcome our suffering by controlling our senses or internal organs, including various modifications or ‘modes of mind.’ Through our effort we can transform our minds, which is necessary for liberation. The practice of yoga to control our internal and external senses is present not only in the Hindu tradition, but also in the Buddhist tradition, especially the Yogācāra system. According to Laṅkāvatāra sūtra (a Buddhist text) also an enlightened mind, or a pure mind is transformed into the Buddha’s mind. To quote:31 ‘Suchness, emptiness, excellence, nirvana, realm of truth, the various bodies made from mind – I call these Buddha.’ In the Mahābhārata also human effort plays a great role, as there is no scope for fatalism. What is called ‘fate’ (‘daiva’) is nothing but the kārmic residue of one’s effort. To quote:32 Just as a field sown without seed is barren So without human effort there is no fate. ... The doer himself enjoys the fruit of his or her actions This is seen clearly in the world in regard to activity and inactivity. Since there is no limit to what a human being can attain, Godly power has been ascribed to human effort. To quote: ‘Heaven, enjoyment, and the desired state are all attained by actions or human effort here in this world.’ The Yogavāsiṣṭha, which assumed the status of a proto-epic, and contains philosophical thoughts of Vedānta, Yoga, Sāṃkhya, Śaiva Siddhānta, and Mahāyāna Buddhism, lays much emphasis on human effort than on anything else. It is claimed that our actions determine our future, as there is no fate. To quote a few passages from the Yogavāsiṣṭha:33 Whoever wishes to turn back fate by human action has his/her wishes completely fulfilled in this world and the other world (II:7.2). Those who abandon their diligence and take their last resort in fate destroy all righteousness, wealth, and pleasure and are their own enemy (II:7.3). By human exertion Bṛhaspati became teacher of gods (II:7.7). A person is born in this world, grows up and ages. There is no fate seen here, merely the progression from childhood to old age (II:7.23). By pure creativity, pure results are gained quickly, Impure always follows impure. That which is called fate does not exist. According to the Yogavāsiṣṭha, liberation, or freedom, can be achieved in the bodily form and there is no difference between the embodied and the disembodied types of liberation. As regards the nature of a liberated person, it is said:34

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Although externally engaged in worldly actions, he or she has no attachment in his or her mind to any object whatsoever ... he or she behaves like an ideal citizen and friend of all. He or she is free from the restrictions of caste, creed, stage of life, custom, and scriptures. It is also claimed that activities of a liberated person are free from personal desires. This type of person spreads happiness around. To quote: ‘Having seen him or her, having heard about him or her, having remembered him or her, all creatures feel delighted.’ From the above discussion it follows that Indian philosophers, by and large, have emphasized free will or effort for achieving our desired ends, including metaphysical freedom or liberation. Hence fatalism has no role to play in the context of Indian philosophy.35

c) Human beings are guided by the concept of infinity. This happens both in morality and knowledge. There is an inherent craving for the unknown and a search for the knowable. We ask the question whether there are any unknown or unknowable objects. Some systems even claim that whatever exists is knowable. No matter how much I know, I can say ‘I could have known more’. Similarly, no matter how much righteous activities I perform, I can say ‘I could have performed more’. Hence the form of life of a human being exhibits participation in Infinity both at the level of knowledge and morality.

Since we participate in Infinity or there is a craving for infinite knowledge, love or compassion, it is said that we are potentially infinite. Several scriptures have also mentioned that we are Infinite knowledge and bliss. Now the question is, how can a finite being be infinite in certain respects? When it is said that we are potentially infinite or infinite bliss or knowledge, what is meant is that we cannot draw any limit to our knowledge, practice of dharma, compassion, or love. Regarding the origin of the concept of infinity, it may be said that it is derived from our knowledge of arithmetic, as the number series has no end. Moreover, since we know what a finite object or being is, we also know, at least implicitly, its correlate, which is infinite. From our conception of time also, we derive the concept of infinity, as time series has no beginning.

d) Another dimension of our form of life is creativity or suggestive meaning. This is exhibited in our language or understanding of language, art, music, literature, etc. At the level of literature or art, suggestive meaning has been introduced in addition to conventional or metaphorical meaning. It is claimed that those who understand only the literal meaning do not realize the significance of speech. It is said in the Vedas36 that the person who understands only the literal meaning is the person who sees, but does not see, or hears, but does not hear.

Let us consider the sentence ‘The village is on the Ganges’ (‘gangāyaṃ ghoṣaḥ’). The literal meaning of the word ‘gangā’ is the river Ganges. Hence the literal meaning of the sentence is ‘The village is on the river Ganges’. Since the literal meaning gives rise to inconsistency as the village cannot be on the river, we take resort to metaphorical meaning, and interpret the sentence as ‘The village is on the bank of the river Ganges’. But the suggestive meaning goes beyond the metaphorical meaning in several directions. There are no rules for suggestive meaning as we have for metaphorical meaning.

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Moreover, it presupposes creativity on the part of the subject. For this reason one may attribute holiness to the village, another purity, and still another may consider it to be a suitable place for making a journey. Similar is the case with the sentence ‘The sun has set.’ Hence a person may interpret this sentence as ‘now the time is to go back home.’ Another may interpret it as ‘it is time to worship.’ Still another as ‘it is time to meet my beloved,’ and so on. Hence, we cannot put any limit to the suggestive meaning of an expression. The creativity of human beings gives us a clue to our life which is not purely mundane or governed by a fixed set of rules.

e) The realization of certain rasas, that are impersonal in nature, suggests the spiritual nature of human beings. Rasa cannot be identified with our usual emotions, although it presupposes our ordinary emotions for its manifestation or realization.

According to some literary critics37, there are ten permanent emotions (sthāyibhāva) and thirty-three variant emotions (vyabhicāribhāva). The permanent or the abiding emotions are: 1) rati (love), 2) hāsya (mirth or laughter), 3) śoka (grief), 4) krodha (anger), 5) utsāha (inspiration), 6) bhaya (fear), 7) jugupṣā (disgust), 8) vismaya (wonder), 9) sama (state of tranquillity or spirit of renunciation), 10) bhakti (spirit of devotion). The last two are very important for distinguishing human beings from others. They are latent in human beings, and are manifested under certain conditions, such as association with noble or saintly persons, study of scriptures, spiritual discourse, or association with holy places. The variant emotions are: 1) nirveda (indifference), 2) viṣāda (melancholy), dainya (affliction), 4) glāni (depression), 5) śrama (fatigue), 6) mada (intoxication), 7) garva (pride), 8) śaṅka (anxiety), 9) trāsa (terror), 10) āvega (mental uneasiness or agitation), 11) unmāda (lunacy), 12) apasmṛti (hysteria), 13) vyādhi (mental state in disease), 14) moha (infatuation), 15) mṛti (dying state), 16) ālasya (idleness), 17) jāḍya (temporary mental inaction, or lacking warmth), 18) brīḍā (shyness or shame), 19) avahitthā (hiding tendency), 20) smṛti ( remembrance), 21) ūha (guess or conjecture), 22) cintā (brooding), 23) mati (ascertainment), 24) dhṛti (contentment), 25) harṣa (elation), 26) autsukya (inquisitiveness), 27) augra (fierceness), 28) amarṣa (intolerance), 29) asūyā (jealousy), 30) cāpala (fickleness), 31) nīdrā (drowsiness), 32) supti (sleep), 33) bodha (waking). It is to be noted that permanent emotions are abiding impressions of our mind, and produce rasa, a type of realization. Rasa is a kind of super mundane (lokottara) experience, although it has its origin in certain intense emotions. Hence it cannot be identified with an emotion even if it is caused by it. Rasa is enjoyed by the sympathetic readers of literature or spectators of drama, or performances. The process which leads to the realization of rasa is called ‘sādhāraṇī-kṛti’ (‘universalisation’ or ‘impersonalisation’). By this process a mundane emotion is transformed into a super mundane, blissful experience or rasa. Hence emotions, such as grief, anxiety, dread, etc., are transformed into a universal experience. Thus laukika (mundane) state of mind becomes lokottara (super mundane), the individual self is dissolved into a universal self. Viśvanātha, a literary critic, describes the states of the realization of rasas in the following way:38 These states belong to me and do not belong to me; they also belong to others and do not belong to others.

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There is no distinction between you and me In the realization of these rasas. (parasya na parasyeti mameti na mameti ca; tadāsvāde vibhāvādeḥ paricchedo na vidyate.) Hence at this level we rise above the difference between I and thou, or between you and me, as we participate in universal state of mind. Some philosophers have recognized the following rasas; śṛiṅgāra (love), vīra (courage), hāsya (mirth), rudra (fury), karuṇā (compassion), vibhatsa (disgust), bhayānaka (fearful), āścarya (wonder), sānta (tranquility), and bhakti (devotion). It is also claimed that bhaktirasa is intrinsically super mundane, as it is a state of the realization of divinity in us. It is enjoyed by anyone at any stage of one’s life. Hence the realization of rasas, especially bhaktirasa, is another spiritual dimension of human beings.

f) Human beings can realize metaphysical freedom or liberation (mokṣa or nirvāṇa) in varying degrees. Systems of Indian philosophy have interpreted the term mokṣa or nirvāṇa in different ways. The connotations may be classified as positive or negative. Negatively, it is a state of mind free from sorrows, suffering, craving, selfishness, or defilements.

The word ‘nirvāṇa’ consists of the word ‘ni’ plus ‘vāna’ or (‘nir’ plus ‘vāna’). The negative particle ‘ni’ signifies absence, or cessation, and the word ‘vāna’ signifies weaving or craving. Hence the word ‘nirvāṇa’ means cessation or extinction of all types of craving, including physical, vocal, imaginary, or dispositional. If there is no craving then there is no transgression of ethical conduct. Therefore, the state of nirvāṇa does not imply the extinction of the individual or the person, but only the cessation of one’s craving or desires which are due to attachment, aversion, or delusion. It implies the extinction of the life of illusion, passion, and craving. Positively, mokṣa or nirvāṇa is a blissful experience. The Advaita Vedānta characterizes it as realization of truth, knowledge and bliss. Dhammapāda, a Buddhist text, has also emphasized its blissful nature. To quote:39 ‘Health is the highest gain; contentment is the greatest wealth; trustful are the best kinsmen; nibbāna (derived from ‘nirvāṇa’) is the highest bliss.’ The life is also characterized by enlightenment as there is wisdom or higher knowledge. Hence, the mind of a liberated person is characterized by peace, bliss, compassionate feeling, or love for all beings or the entire creation. Even if these are ideals, human beings can realize these ideals in varying degrees in this life.

NOTES   1. Anthony Flew (ed.), A Dictionary of Philosophy, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1983), p. 300.   2. W. T. Stace, A critical History of Greek Philosophy, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1969), pp. 211-217.   3. T. Mautner (ed.), The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, (London: Penguin Books, 2000), p. 1.

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  4. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 701a 17-22, quoted in ‘Rationality and Freedom in Aristotle and Hayek,’ by Fred D. Miller Jr., (New York: Reason Papers No. 9, 1983), p. 31.   5. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 3.1112b 11-12.   6. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N. Kemp Smith, (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 104-119.   7. H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), p. 129.   8. ‘Rationality, Practical’, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol 8, (New York: Routledge, 1998).   9. W. T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel, (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), pp. 50-98. 10. For a comprehensive discussion, see Don Marquis, ‘Why Abortion is Immoral’, The Journal of Philosophy, 1989, pp. 183-202; Mary Anne Warren, ‘On the Moral and the Legal Status of Abortion’, The Monist 1973, reprinted in Morality and Moral Controversies: Readings in Moral, Social and Political Philosophy, edited by John Arthur, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002), pp. 204-210; and John T. Noonan, ‘An Almost Absolute Value in History’, reprinted in Arguing About abortion, edited by Lewis Schwartz, (Belmont: Wadsworth Press, 1993), pp. 55-59. 11. R. Descartes, Meditation III, A Discourse on Method, translated by John Veitch, (London: Everyman’s Library, 1953), pp. 95-110. 12. J. Y. Teshima, Zen Buddhism and Hasidism, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1995), p. 108. 13. Reinhardt Grossman, Phenomenology and Existentialism, (London: Routledge, 1984), p. 69. 14. S. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, quoted in R. Grossman, p. 71. 15. Ibid., p. 72. 16. Ibid., pp. 160-161. 17. Ibid., p. 161. 18. See R. C. Solomon, Existentialism, (New York: Modern Library, 1974), p. 96. 19. Ibid., p. 96. 20. G. Marino, (ed.), Basic Writings of Existentialist, pp. 299-300. 21. Ibid., p. 300. 22. Y. G. Ortega, The Subject of Our Time, quoted at http://www.e-torredebabel.com, p. 17. 23. Y. G. Ortega, What is Philosophy, quoted at http://www.e-torredebabel.com, p .11. 24. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, (The Wisdom Library, 1968), p. 76. 25. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism, quoted in Existentialism From Dostoyevsky to Sartre, edited by Walter Kaufman, (New York: Meridian Books, 1968), p. 295. 26. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1968), p. 564. 27. Ibid., p. 565. 28. D. N. Shanbhag, ‘Concept of Dharma and Dharmaśāstra’, in Dharmaśāstra and Social Awareness, edited by V. N. Jha, (Delhi: Indian Book Centre, 1996), pp. 35-36. 29. D.C. Shastri, ‘bhāratīya dharmanīti o tāra kayekati dika’, in Bhāratīya Dharmanīti, edited by Amita Chatterjee, (Calcutta: Allied Publishers, 1998), pp. 29-30. 30. C. Chapple, Karma and Creativity, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 34. 31. Ibid., p. 46. 32. Ibid., pp. 96-97. 33. Ibid., pp. 110-111.

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34. B. L. Atreya, Yogavāsiṣṭha and Its Philosophy, pp. 56-57, quoted in Christopher Chappel, Karma and Creativity, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), pp. 76-77. 35. For a more comprehensive discussion on free will, see J. L. Shaw, ‘Man and Freedom’, Bulletin of the R K Mission Institute of Culture, 2000. 36. K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, (Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1969), p. 278. 37. D. C. Shastri, Aspects of Indian Psychology, (West Bengal: Ramakrishna Mission Ashrama, 1988), pp. 36-39. 38. Ibid., p. 41. 39. The Dhammapāda, translated with notes by Narada Thera, (London: John Murray, 1954), p. 57.

CHAPTER TWENTY SEVEN

Freedom: East and West INTRODUCTION The aim of this paper is to discuss some of the uses of the word ‘freedom’ in the West as well as in the East. In the philosophy of mind, psychology, and ethics, the word ‘freedom’ usually refers to free will. Hence I shall discuss whether human beings have free will. This discussion will lead us to the controversy between fatalism, determinism, compatibilism (soft determinism), and libertarianism. In this context I shall point out that most of the Indian philosophers have accepted compatibilism in psychology or philosophy of mind. But in metaphysics, especially in the context of Indian metaphysics, ‘freedom’ means ‘liberation from bondage’. Indian philosophers have used the word ‘mokṣa’, or ‘nirvāṇa’, to refer to the metaphysical concept of freedom. In spite of a range of meanings of the word ‘mokṣa’ in different systems of Indian philosophy, all of them have accepted one cardinal meaning; namely, cessation of all types of suffering. Hence I would like to mention the following three types of suffering discussed by all the major systems of Indian philosophy, such as Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vedānta, and Buddhism. It is claimed that human beings are affected by sufferings that are due to body (ādhibhautika), sufferings due to natural disasters (ādhidaivika), and sufferings due to mental conditions (ādhyātmika). Hence the sufferings due to old age or disease will come under ādhibhautika category. But the sufferings caused by global warming, flood, earthquake, tsunami, or climate change will come under ādhidaivika category. It is to be noted that the climate change due to global warming is caused by the actions of human beings. Hence the term ‘ādhidaivika’ should not always be interpreted as natural disasters or acts of God. Sufferings, such as alienation, abandonment, loneliness, or anxiety, are considered mental or spiritual (ādhyātmika). These sufferings may also be due to certain thoughts, desires, or questions. Hence, in order to save mankind from total extinction or the world from total destruction it is necessary to address the question of freedom at personal, social and global levels. As regards the nature of metaphysical freedom, we come across as many as seven senses of the word ‘nirvāṇa’ in Buddhism. Moreover, I shall discuss Swami Vivekananda’s concept of freedom, as he claims that it can be realized here and now (or in this life). Professor Krishna Chandra Battacharya, a neo-advaita vedāntin, has discussed both the psychological concept of ‘free will’ and the metaphysical concept of ‘freedom.’ In this context I shall focus on his concept of subject as freedom, as it cannot be described by any of our categories. I shall compare his views with the existentialist philosophers (especially Sartre). Indian philosophers, by and large, claim that freedom, or having ‘free will,’ is an essential property of human beings. In their psychology of action, knowledge or cognition plays a very important role. This is due to the fact that desire depends on cognition or knowledge, mental effort on desire, physical effort on mental effort, and action on physical effort.

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As regards paths for the realisation of the metaphysical freedom, all the systems have emphasized knowledge, the practice of righteous actions, and devotional love, in varying degrees. According to our positive thesis there are degrees of freedom, both psychological and metaphysical, depending on the context or situations. Hence, we can realize it in varying degrees, depending on our station in life (the situation we find ourselves in) or competence. Moreover, psychological free will is related to metaphysical freedom, as the righteous (dhārmic) actions will lead us to freedom if performed without selfish motive. Therefore, a type of soft soft determinism in moral actions will pave the way for metaphysical freedom.

I In this section I would like to focus on the psychological or the ethical concept of freedom. Hence I shall discuss whether our will is free in some sense or the other. Broadly speaking, we come across three views in Western philosophy, known as determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism. In order to draw the distinction between these views let us begin with the following examples: Suppose, after your main course of dinner in the dining hall, you have been asked to select either a creamy chocolate cake or an apple. Suppose that you selected the former. After eating the creamy chocolate cake you realized that you should not have eaten it, as you are putting on weight. So you said to yourself ‘I could have chosen an apple instead of the big creamy chocolate cake.’ Here comes the problem of free will. Let us consider another example. Suppose you went to buy an expensive dress in a shop and a really needy person was begging for money, as she was hungry. Instead of giving her anything you spent the entire money on your dress. The next day you realized that you could have helped that person, as it is our moral duty to help others. Let us deal with these examples to show the difference between the views on free will or freedom. Determinism The determinists claim that you could not have chosen an apple instead of the chocolate cake. They claim that every event has a cause and the same set of causal conditions cannot produce two different effects. Hence it is not possible for you to do something different from what you did in the past. It is claimed that what you do depends on your beliefs, choices, desires, circumstances, heredity, socio-economic situations, etc. Hence all the factors taken together will determine a particular or specific action of an individual; given the same set of conditions you would not have chosen an apple instead of a piece of chocolate cake. This is true of the other example as well. Your choice was determined by the situation which had occurred just prior to your choice. If the circumstances, beliefs, or desires were different, you could have acted differently. Therefore, a person cannot claim that he or she could have chosen something which he or she has not chosen. The consequences of determinism may be stated in the following way:

a. If determinism is true, then every action is causally necessitated.



b. If every action is causally necessitated, we can never do otherwise than we do.

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c. If we can never do otherwise, then we are not free agents.



d. Hence, if determinism is true, then we are not free agents.



e. If we are not free agents, then we are not responsible for our actions.1

The view of the determinists raises the problem of moral responsibility. How can we praise someone who is kind and generous, or condemn someone else who is a serial killer? Their actions are caused by their experiences, desires, beliefs, hereditary constitutions, and socio-economic conditions. Hence, there is neither moral responsibility nor autonomy of an individual. This is the position of determinism. In this context it is to be noted that determinism is not identical with fatalism, although sometimes it is equated with fatalism. According to fatalism, as we cannot change the occurrence of any past event, so we cannot change the occurrence of any future event. In other words, if an event E is going to occur, then no matter what we do we cannot prevent its occurrence. Similarly, if something is not going to occur, we cannot make it occur. Hence, what will happen in the future is determined, even if we struggle to avoid it. Our efforts – mental, physical – have no influence on future events. They are superfluous. But determinism claims that what will happen is at least partly determined through our struggle or mental effort. Moreover, it is to be noted that determinism relies on causal necessitation, but fatalism is compatible with randomness, or miracles. If someone is fated to die at such and such a time, then it will occur no matter what we do to prevent it. Similarly, if a person is fated to recover from a certain deadly disease, then she will recover no matter what the doctors predict. Hence fatalism may defy causal necessitation and substantiate miracles or our inability to explain certain phenomena. Therefore, it leads to the rejection of the deterministic thesis, that an event is necessitated by what has occurred before it. Compatibilism The theory known as ‘compatibilism’ tried to solve some of the problems of determinism. It takes different forms. The Hume-Mill-Schlick variety of compatibilism is called ‘soft-determinism’. According to this view, there is no contradiction between the propositions that every event has a cause and that some of the actions of human beings are free. In other words, freedom is not opposed to the principle of causation. According to this view, ‘free action’ does not mean ‘uncaused action’. The supporters of this view would define freedom in the following way. The action x of A is free iff A is not compelled or constrained to perform x. Here the word ‘compelled’ or ‘constrained’ refers to external ‘compulsion’ or ‘constraint’. To quote Paul Edwards: Sometimes people act in a certain way because of threats or because they have been drugged or because of a posthypnotic suggestion or because of an irrational overpowering urge such as the one that makes a kleptomaniac steal something he does not really need. On such occasions human beings are not free agents. But on other occasions they act in certain ways because of their own rational desires, because of their own unimpeded effort, because they have chosen to act in these ways. On these

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occasions they are free agents although their actions are just as much caused as actions that are not deemed free. In distinguishing between free and unfree actions we do not try to mark the presence and absence of causes but attempt to indicate the kind of causes that are present.2 According to Schlick, the free will controversy arises due to the confusion of compulsion with causality, and necessity with universality. To quote him: Freedom means the opposite of compulsion; a man is free if he does not act under compulsion, and he is compelled or unfree when he is hindered from without in the realisation of his natural desires. Hence he is unfree when he is locked up, or chained, or when someone forces him at the point of a gun to do what otherwise he would not do.3 It is to be noted that Schlick excludes external compulsion only. It does not exclude causality or the relation between natural desires and our actions. Hence compulsion and causality are two different concepts. Similarly, necessity and universality are different concepts. Schlick says: If natural laws are nothing but descriptions of what happens in nature, of how the world behaves, then even the natural laws concerning man are nothing but descriptions, general formulae which state how man actually behaves. But such laws do not compel man and his willing to decide in a certain way; it would be meaningless to say so: they are merely formulae describing how the will actually takes effect. The concept of compulsion does not occur there, ‘necessity’ here has the meaning only of universal validity.4 From the above remarks of Schlick it follows that ‘causality’ should not be interpreted as ‘compulsion’, or ‘universality’ as ‘necessity’ in the context of laws of nature or man. Since the traditional problem of free will rests on the misuse of language, it is to be considered as a pseudo-problem. But if ‘freedom’ is defined as ‘absence of compulsion or interference’, then there is no contradiction between freedom and causality. Hence the Hume-MillSchlick version of compatibilism defines human freedom in a negative way. In Kant, we come across another version of compatibilism. Here also freedom is not lawlessness. It is compatible with causation. According to Kant, free will is goodwill, moral will, will which is determined by the Categorical Imperative or by the concept of duty. It is a will which is good, not as a means to some further end, but in itself. It is the highest good and the condition of all other types of goodness, ‘even of all our demands for happiness’. According to Kant, will is determined by inclination or by reason, but not by both. If a will is determined by inclination, which is nothing but our habitual desires for pleasure or happiness, then our will is not free. But, on the contrary, if our will is determined by the Categorical Imperative, which is a manifestation of practical reason, then our will is free. The will in morals comes under a law which follows from the nature of reason common to all human beings. The principle of the Categorical Imperative has been formulated in the following five ways:5

1) Act as if the maxim of your action were to become, through your will, a universal law of nature.

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2) Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.



3) Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.



4) The idea of the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal law.



5) Act as a member of a ‘kingdom of ends.’

It is to be noted that according to Kant the moral law follows from our own nature as a human being. Kant said: ‘Freedom would then be the property this causality has of being able to work independently of determination by alien causes, ... . Hence freedom of will, although it is not the property of conforming to laws of nature, is not for this reason lawless.’ From the above remarks it follows that a will is considered free when it comes under moral law. Kant’s conception of freedom emphasizes the positive aspect of it. It is not only free from external determination or determination by inclination, but also determined exclusively by reason or moral law. But the compatibilism of Hume-Mill-Schlick emphasizes only the exclusion or compulsion by external forces. Another type of compatibilism may be constructed from the philosophy of Gilbert Ryle. In his philosophy mental epithets, such as ‘will’, ‘motive’, ‘intelligence’, ‘vanity’, ‘jealousy’, etc. are dispositional terms. They do not refer to any entities, overt or covert. Hence motives and intentions cannot be considered causes. A person who acts out of jealousy is not a person who had a feeling of jealousy immediately prior to his act. Mental epithets are used to talk about our behaviour or to make predictions about our behaviour in different situations. Hence when we say that a person has acted out of free will, we are referring to his manner of doing things. It may be distinguished from an action which is done under compulsion. Hence free will is adverbial to our actions, not a cause or an entity. Since both the principle of causality and free will in the form of manner of doing things can be retained, it may be considered as another type of compatibilism but not another type of soft-determinism as desires or motives are not entities. Libertarianism The libertarians assign freedom to the agent. Hence a person would have made a different choice even if all other conditions were the same. In our examples, you could have chosen an apple instead of a piece of creamy chocolate cake in the same situation. Similarly, you could have given the money to the needy person instead of buying an expensive dress for yourself. The choice of the agent is not determined by his/her character or by any external influence. C. D. Broad has characterized the libertarian position in terms of the following two propositions:

i) Some (and it may be all) voluntary actions have a causal ancestor which contains a cause-factor the putting-forth of an effort which is not completely determined in direction and intensity by occurrent causation.

ii) In such cases the direction and the intensity of the effort are completely determined by non-occurrent causation, in which the self or agent, taken as a substance or continuant, is the non-occurrent total cause.6

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It is to be noted that the self or the agent is the non-occurrent cause, although it is not totally disconnected to our past experiences. This is how it avoids randomness. Again, it cannot be said to be an effect of past experiences. Thus, it avoids determinism. It is also claimed that the agent is a causa sui, or self-caused. But these claims do not seem to be consistent with each other. As regards the explanation of choice from the perspective of Indian philosophy, most of the systems have proposed a type of compatibilism. Our choice is not random; it is determined by a set of causal conditions, including our desires and beliefs. Almost all the systems have claimed that a desire is due to the cognition that the object of desire is more conducive to pleasure than pain. In other words, if a person desires x, then he/she has the cognition that x will not give rise to undesirable consequences or pain, but will yield desirable consequences or happiness. If there are two alternatives, say x and y, then there will be cognition that y on balance is not as good as x. This complex cognition is a causal condition of our desire for x. In technical language, these two cognitions are called ‘iṣṭasādhanatājñāna’ and ‘balavattarāniṣṭājanakatvajñāna’. Hence the desire for x follows this complex cognition. The mental effort (kṛti) for x follows the desire for x. The latter is a causal condition of the former. Again the mental effort (kṛti) is a causal condition of physical effort (ceṣṭā), which in turn is a causal condition of action. This causal process has been mentioned in the following oft-quoted śloka (verse): jñānajanyā bhavedicchā, icchājanyā bhavet kṛtiḥ, kṛtijanyā bhavecceṣṭā ceṣṭājanyā bhavet kriyā. A few more mental processes are also to be included in this causal series. It is claimed that cikīrṣā or inclination to fulfil the desire is a causal condition of kṛti or mental effort. Hence cikīrṣā comes between desire (icchā) and mental effort (kṛti). Again the cognition that the object of desire can be attained through our effort (kṛitisādhyatvajñāna) is considered a causal condition of inclination to fulfil the desire (cikīrṣā). As regards the types of mental effort (kṛti), all the schools have accepted pravṛtti (mental effort towards an object) and nivṛtti (mental effort to withdraw from an object). But many philosophers have accepted jīvanayoni or mental effort for the sustainment of one’s life in addition to pravṛtti and nivṛtti. It is regarded as an invisible mental state. From the above discussion it follows that our choice, or desire, or effort is dependent upon certain beliefs or cognitions. If the cognition, say S, is causally related to the object of desire, say x, then the same cognition cannot be a cause of another object of desire, say y. Hence our choice or desire is determined by certain beliefs. When we say ‘I would have chosen an apple,’ what we mean is that ‘if 1 had the cognition that an apple is conducive to my wellbeing and will not produce any undesirable consequences, then I would have chosen it.’ On this view, our will or choice is free in the sense that it is not determined by external causal conditions such as compulsion, coercion, or persuasion. Hence it is a type of compatibilism or soft-determinism. Since knowledge is very important for our choice, almost all the schools of Indian philosophy have emphasized knowledge about reality or what would lead us to liberation or total cessation from undesirable suffering. It is said that there is no better purifier than knowledge (na hi jñānena sadṛśaṃ pavitraṃ iha vidyate). If we have knowledge about righteous actions (dharma) which would lead us to liberation, then we will have desire for it. For this reason almost all the systems have discussed righteous actions and

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prescribed certain methods so that we learn to desire these activities. In order to focus our desires towards liberation, the study of scriptures or holy books, the company of good or wise people, and the exercise of our discriminative power have been recommended by these philosophers. From the above discussion it follows that Indian philosophers, in general, favour compatibilism. But the followers of the Śākta Āgama and a few other minor schools favour a type of libertarianism. This is due to the fact that the self, which is the agent of our actions, is free to some extent even at the empirical or phenomenal level. Hence, according to this view, it is the agent which decides or makes a choice. This type of libertarianism is to be distinguished from the Western type, as the agent is a free flow of consciousness, limited by knowables. When it is limited by knowables, it is called ‘degenerated consciousness’. Hence the consciousness which is limited or degenerated makes the choice. In our above example, it could have chosen an apple instead of a creamy chocolate cake. Since only a few minor schools have proposed this view, it is not part of the main stream of Indian philosophy. Indian philosophers, by and large, have accepted compatibilism or soft-determinism. Therefore the claim that Indian views are fatalistic, deterministic or libertarian is not tenable.

II In this section I would like to mention Swami Vivekananda’s conception of free will or freedom. He has tried to make both morality and religion independent of any supernatural beings. At the end of this section I will mention the Bhagavad Gītā’s paths for the realisation of freedom. Vivekananda’s view of free will may be called ‘soft-soft-determinism’, and it coincides with the conception of liberation or mokṣa. I shall also point out that his conception of freedom does not presuppose the traditional law of karma or its presuppositions. Since his view follows from his conception of morality, I would like to discuss it. Swamiji considers all traditional virtues such as love, kindness, compassion, brotherhood, justice, etc., as moral. But his conception of morality is more comprehensive than the traditional Western conception. These virtues will unite us with others. As regards love, he says: ‘Love for yourselves means love for all, love for animals, love for everything, for you are all one.’7 He has even identified life with love. To quote him: ‘Life is love, and when a man ceases to do good to others, he is dead spiritually.’8 As regards our duties towards others, he says: Man has no right to live in a house himself, until he builds for the poor also, or for anybody who needs it. ... No man has the right to cook food only for himself, it is for others, and he should have what remains.9 As regards our duties towards animals, he says: ‘One portion of food cooked in a household belongs to the animals also. ... they shall be fed and taken care of.’10 His conception of morality is based on the Vedic ideal that the entire world is your relation (vasudhaiva kutumvakam). Hence he emphasizes unity as a dimension of morality. He has also emphasized another dimension of moral action called ‘unselfishness’. He claims that a moral action must be unselfish. To quote Swamiji: ‘That which is selfish is immoral,

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and that which is unselfish is moral.’11 Moreover, Swamiji has extended unselfish action to the level of thought or thinking. He says: Every act of charity, every thought of sympathy, every action of help, every good deed, is taking so much of self-importance away from our little selves and making us think of ourselves as the lowest and the least, and therefore, it is all good.12 He has also emphasized the realization of divinity through moral action, overt or covert. He says: ‘... the right performance of duties of any station of life without attachment to results, leads us to the highest realisation of the perfection of the soul.’13 Hence the realization of divinity or perfection may be considered as the third dimension of morality. Another dimension of morality is freedom. He says: Selfish work is slave’s work. ...14 Every act of selfishness or thought of selfishness makes us attached to something, and immediately we are made slaves.15 If we give up our attachment to this little universe of the senses or of the mind, we shall be free immediately.16 From these passages it follows that, according to Swamiji, selfish actions make us slaves and unselfish actions make us free. Hence freedom may be considered as the fourth dimension of morality. In this context it is to be noted that Swamiji’s conception of freedom is not the same as Kant’s conception of free will. According to Kant a free will and a will which is determined by the Categorical Imperative are one and the same thing. In Kant the free will does not dissolve our inclination or desire for pleasure. Hence the duties which are determined by the Categorical Imperative may be in accord with our inclinations. But in Swami Vivekananda moral actions, far from being related to happiness, dissolve the very concept of ego. Hence a moral action is free in the sense that it is not performed under the compulsion of our ego and its associates. I would like to claim that his conception of free will is different from all the Western concepts mentioned in section two. It is a case of soft-soft-determinism. Since in a moral action our will is not compelled by any external forces or interferences, it satisfies the requirement for soft-determinism. Again, since it is not determined by any selfish motive or the concept of ego, it is free from internal compulsion. So it is free from two types of compulsion, outer and inner. For this reason it may be called ‘Soft-Soft-Determinism’ Moreover, his conception of free will in morality is related to the metaphysical concept of freedom or mokṣa. Since freedom is a dimension of morality and depends on our being unselfish, it can be realized by any individual in this life. Furthermore, Swamiji’s conception of morality is independent of the traditional presuppositions of the law of karma. It is to be noted that according to Swamiji we can realize freedom here and now, as it is an aspect of morality. He says: The moment I have realized God sitting in the temple of every human body, the moment I stand in reverence before every human being and see God in him – that moment I am free from bondage, everything that binds vanishes and I am free.17 This passage substantiates the claim that freedom is not a consequence of morality; rather it is an aspect of it. It is to be noted that Swamiji has not correlated morality with happiness,

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and immorality with suffering. This is due to the fact that the unconditional value of morality cannot be retained if it is correlated with happiness. I think an unselfish action not merely makes us free, but also leads to the realisation of our dignity as a human being. In other words, by performing unselfish moral actions we attain a holy, transcendental, impersonal, or universal state; but by doing immoral actions we get a degraded or ignoble state. Both unselfishness and not having desire or craving for the fruit of one’s action have been repeatedly mentioned in the Bhagavad Gītā for the attainment of liberation, or freedom from bondage. To quote: In liberty from the bonds of attachment, do thou therefore the work to be done; for the one whose work is pure attains indeed the supreme.18 In the bonds of work I am free, because in them I am free from the fruits of desires. The person who can see this truth finds freedom in his/her work.19 The Bhagavad Gītā has also suggested methods for achieving the state of mind which is free from egoism and desire or craving for the fruits of actions. In order to achieve this state we have to practise dharma and illuminate our mind with the knowledge of the ultimate reality, including the self. In this context it is to be noted that there cannot be any dispute regarding dharma, as it is for the good of all, although there may be dispute regarding a particular religion or a sect of a religion. For this reason the word ‘dharma’ cannot be translated as ‘religion.’ The Bhagavad Gītā emphasizes our duty, not only for the sake of itself, but also to free us from ‘I-consciousness’, as the goal is to dissolve the distinction between ‘I’ and ‘You.’ Hence the real freedom lies in dissolving not only egoism but also the foundation of it; that is the distinction between ‘I’ and ‘You’. In order to achieve this type of freedom, the Bhagavad Gītā has recommended both dhārmic actions, knowledge and devotion or dedication. Different systems of Hindu philosophy, or streams of Hinduism, have emphasized these paths in varying degrees; some of them have emphasized the independence of these paths also. But a closer examination of the Bhagavad Gītā may reveal that they are not independent methods or paths. I think each of them refers to the rest, as each of them is related to the rest. Hence, knowledge without any unselfish (holy) work or devotion/love will not lead to freedom from bondage. Similarly, devotion/love without any holy work and knowledge will not lead to liberation (mokṣa). Again, an action which does not presuppose knowledge or devotion cannot be distinguished from an inert mechanical action. But an action, which is enlightened by knowledge and is dedicated to the Almighty, becomes unselfish and free from any craving. Let us quite a few passages from the Bhagavad Gītā in favour of this interpretation:20 (4:33) Wisdom is in truth the end of all holy work. (5:4) Ignorant persons, but not the wise, say that Sāṃkhya and Yoga are different paths; but he/she who gives all his/her soul to one reaches the end of the two. (11:55) The person who works for me, who loves me, whose End Supreme I am, free from Attachment to all things, and with love for all creation, he/she in truth comes to me. From the above remarks it follows that since Sāṃkhya and Yoga are not different paths, the path of knowledge and the path of unselfish righteous action are also not different

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paths. Similarly, if a person loves God then he or she works for Him; and thereby loves His creation and works for His creation. Therefore each of the paths will ultimately involve the rest, and the difference between them is initial, but not final. Hence the Bhagavad Gītā does not prescribe renunciation of action, but renunciation in action, as our actions are to be guided by knowledge and are to be considered as offerings to the Almighty. It is to be noted that since the Bhagavad Gītā emphasizes both action and knowledge it is not opposed to science, or the experimental method. Since science gives us knowledge about the empirical world, it is required for the successful performance of a good, just, or virtuous action. From the above discussion is follows that a type of soft-soft determinism will lead us to metaphysical freedom (mokṣa) which is interpreted as cessation from all types of suffering.

III In this section I would like to explain K.C. Bhattacharya’s concept of freedom, and to compare it with the views of Bauddha philosophers, classical Advaita Vedāntins, Swami Vivekananda, and the existentialist philosophers. In this context, I would like to focus on his concept of grades of realisation of subjectivity or freedom. K. C. Bhattacharya (hereafter KCB) claims that the subject is free from the object as it is known by itself. In order to emphasize the positive aspect of the freedom of the subject, he mentions the knowing function of the subject. In the knowing function, ‘the subject is related to the object without getting related to it.’21 This point of KCB requires some explanation, because it emphasizes the direction of a relation. When we say ‘b is related to a’ we emphasize the direction of the relation from b to a. If b is related to a, then a is also related to b by the converse of the same relation. KCB would accept this feature of the relation. But he introduces another aspect of a relation which may be captured by the expression ‘constraint’. In other words, the relation of subject to the object is not under compulsion or it is not a necessary relation. This is due to the fact that freedom of the subject lies in freeing itself from objectivity or relationship to the objects of various types. As regards the knowledge of the subject, he says: ‘The reality of the subject is known in the direct understanding of the word ‘I’ as used by a speaker, which is neither the understanding of its meaning nor a mystic intuition of an unspeakable content.’22 This passage also emphasizes the contingent relationship to the object as the subject can be experienced without reference to the object, although in our normal experience it is related to something or the other. The study of the function of the subject, including the knowing function, is called ‘spiritual or transcendental psychology’. According to KCB, the subject is also symbolized by objective relations as it relates itself to the objects, although the relation is contingent. In spiritual discipline the modes of relating are at the same time the modes of freeing from objectivity. As he says, ‘the outgoing reference to the object is turned backwards and the immediate knowledge of the I as content is realized in an ecstatic intuition’.23 According to KCB, the meaning of spiritual progress lies in the realisation of the freedom of the subject. The realisation of freedom involves a feeling of dissociation of

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the subject from the object. Hence a move from outward to inward or subject is a move towards freedom. KCB also introduces grades of subjectivity or modes of freedom from the object. The first step towards freedom is the realisation of our own bodily consciousness, which involves freedom from the perceived object. Hence the first inkling of freedom is realized in our conscious body. At this stage of freedom, the subject is not dissociated from the body, although there is realisation of distinction between the extra-organic object and the body. The second stage of freedom is realized when we grasp the distinction between the perceived object, including our body on the one hand, and the images, ideas or meaning on the other. All these mental entities are included under the category of presentation. When consciousness is not dissociated from such presentations, but dissociated from the felt and perceived body, it is treated as presentational or psychic subjectivity. Hence the realisation of this subjectivity is a higher grade of freedom. The next higher grade of subjectivity lies in the dissociation from presentation, which is another type of object. This type of subjectivity or freedom is called ‘spiritual’ or ‘nonrepresentational’. So there are three types of subjectivity or freedom, namely, bodily, psychic and spiritual. The stages of spiritual freedom would eventually lead to the realisation of the subject as absolute freedom. According to KCB, body represents a stage of being of the subject. But it is not materialism as the subject is not the body. As he says, … even if the subject is taken as nothing but one’s own perceived body, it involves the knowledge of something unknown as such in the object, something that cannot be understood in terms of the perceptible object in the merely objectivistic attitude. It still implies the mystic awareness of dissociation from the object in which subjectivity consists. What is intended by the word I cannot be characterized even in the lowest stage of subjectivity as simply this object.24 Body can be perceived as well as felt, but the perceived body can be distinguished from the felt body. In the feeling of the body we realize the first hint of freedom as freedom lies in the feeling of detachment. ‘When the perceived body is distinguished from the felt body, or the exterior from the interior, we have an explicit feeling of distinction, detachment or freedom from the perceived object.’25 The first feeling of freedom is realized in the bodily feeling, which is presupposed in all higher grades of freedom. The three sub-stages of bodily freedom are: (a) perceived body, (b) felt body, and (c) absence of object. The perceived body occupies a unique position as other objects are treated in space in relation to our own perceived body. The next step is concerned with the interior feeling of the body. It is claimed that the felt body is potentially dissociated from the perceived body. Here the author emphasizes the feeling of detachment from the object. The next step in the realisation of bodily subjectivity is the cognition of the absence of an object, or the conscious non-perception of an object cognized before. ‘The subject that knows absence through conscious non-perception is consciously dissociated from it.’26

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Hence progressive realisation of the bodily subject lies in dissociating the subject or the I from the body, from the felt body, and from the sense-conditioned cognition of an absence or an absent object. The psychical fact begins with the realisation of what the present is not. ‘Conscious non-perception is the distinguishing of the present from the detached presentation.’27 At the psychic level the subject does not identify itself with any aspect of the body, rather it negates the bodily aspect. The psychic stage has also several sub-stages, such as image, idea-image, pictorial idea, and non-pictorial idea. Broadly speaking, it may be divided into image and thought. After rejecting the bodily aspects, the subject tends to identify itself with the psychical facts such as image or idea. Since images or ideas are also objective in nature, it dissociates itself from them, and thereby they are also negated. Hence anything which is believed or thought is rejected as subjective when we move from the psychic level to the spiritual level of subjectivity. As regards thought, KCB says, ‘Thought is complete as dissociated altogether from time, not merely from time-position … .’28 So thought is free from both spatial and temporal objectivity. But still it is not fully subjective as it is about the object which is called ‘presentation’. The spiritual level of subjectivity or freedom has been divided into three sub-stages, namely, feeling, introspection, and beyond introspection. At the level of feeling, there is no reference to anything objective or presentation. At this level, there is no distinction between awareness and its content. This stage of subjectivity is free from meaning-awareness as the subject is detached from actual or possible thought. But there is another sub-stage in feeling as the subject is not detached from feeling. Here the next step is the feeling of not having feeling. Hence the subjectivity cannot be identified with the feeling, as it cannot be identified with any content. The rejection of feeling as subjectivity paves the way for the realisation of introspective subjectivity. As regards the nature of introspection, KCB says, ‘Introspection is not believing in the I; it is the I, the believing that is not fact at all but is not, therefore, illusory.’29 It amounts to believing in itself, without any content. So at this stage the subject is free from content, but not free from the category of identity as there is ‘believing in itself.’30 Again he says, ‘This possible detachment from all distinct being is introspective awareness. Introspection is essentially annulment of all distinct feeling, being selfidentification or the conscious identity without being of the self.’31 At this self-evidencing level the possibility of a silent self-enjoying is intelligible. In other words, the application of the category identity is intelligible. Hence it is bound by this category, although it is detached from all types of content. At this level there is no distinction between consciousness and its content. But at the level of introspection the meaning function of the word ‘I’ also remains. As KCB says, Thus it may be said that a speaker calling himself I is understood through the word but not through the meaning of the word. The word here has a meaning function but not a meaning: it is the expression of introspection or what may be called the I-function.’32 I think this is due to the fact that the self is understood under the mode of the category identity.

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Moreover, at introspective level the possibility of ‘a silent self-enjoying I is intelligible.’33 Hence there is a need to go beyond the stage of introspection and to postulate the nonbeing of distinction in the absolute self. It seems to me that KCB has rejected even the category of identity as it is necessary for the identity of each individual. Hence real freedom or absolute freedom lies in rejecting all categories, including ‘the category of distinctness’.34 For this reason he claims that in real freedom, the I is equated with you. As he says, ‘The other person is to me another I … ’.35 Hence the distinction between you and I in terms of being identical with oneself is rejected. From the fact that you are another I to me it does not follow that all types of distinction will disappear as you become part of my I. In order to reject this distinction also he claims, ‘Lastly there is the consciousness of the overpersonal self.’36 As regards the nature of the transcendental self or freedom, he says, ‘… it is consciously being nought and not consciousness of I as nought.’37 I think what he meant by the word ‘nought’ is the rejection of all categories, subjective or objective, including the category of identity or difference. In this respect he has gone beyond the classical Advaita Vedānta, where metaphysical freedom of the individual lies in identifying oneself with the Absolute. Moreover, the over-personal self is not to be interpreted as sat, cit and ānanda, as these are also categories or values. Now I shall construct a model to interpret the theory of KCB and to compare his theory with the views of other systems or philosophers. Hence, the question is whether there is any model which will lead us from the rejection of the first stage of subjectivity or freedom in KCB to the last stage of subjectivity. I think he has followed the modal judgement of the form ‘I might not have been such and such’, and the concept of constraint. Since Western philosophers are familiar with both concepts, our discussion will throw further light on KCB. According to Hume-Mill-Schlick an action is free if it is not due to any external constraint. Now the concept of constraint may be used to interpret KCB. It may be said that there are degrees of constraint, as well as internal and external constraint. Even identifying with something or the other is a type of constraint. In KCB, freedom implies freedom from all types of constraint, even identification with any type of categories. Hence the I of KCB realizes the first step of freedom when it realizes that it is not the body. This realisation may be expressed in the judgement ‘I might not have been the body’. Similarly, ‘I might not have been any psychical state’. So we move from bodily freedom to psychic freedom. At the level of spiritual freedom we rise above the categories such as subject-object, cognition-content, I-you, or identity. Since he is talking about the grades of subjectivity, he has sub-divided the bodily subjectivity into perceived body, felt body, and absence of object known as present fact. Similarly, he has sub-divided psychic subjectivity, broadly speaking, into image and thought. The spiritual subjectivity has been subdivided into feeling, introspection and beyond introspection. As there are grades of subjectivity, there are grades or degrees of freedom. The model of KCB may be stated thus: If I am x, then there is a judgement ‘I might not have been x’. The latter judgement suggests freedom from x with which I cannot be identified. At the highest level of freedom, there is freedom from all categories, including identity. Hence the stage of freedom called ‘beyond introspection’ implies a stage where the possibility of the judgement ‘I might not have been x’ is ruled out. This stage of freedom is not

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only free from all correlatives, such as subjective-objective, existence - non-existence, being - non-being, but also free from epithets such as nameability, describeability, and speakability. At this level we cannot say that it is the subject which contemplates or enjoys, or which is truth, beauty or goodness. It is truly a transcendent subjectivity or freedom which is different from all types of metaphysical freedom found in different systems of philosophy, East and West. Hence the type of freedom KCB is talking about cannot be identified with the classical Advaita concept of freedom where the individual self is identified with the Absolute. This is due to the fact that it is also not free from all categorisations. Similarly, KCB’s freedom cannot be identified with Swami Vivekananda’s concept of freedom. According to Swamiji freedom implies freedom from both external and internal constraint. Since the internal constraint is equated with selfishness, Swamiji’s freedom implies cessation of selfishness, not the cessation of all types of unselfish thoughts or feelings. Again, KCB’s freedom is different from the Buddhist concept of freedom. In Buddhism, the difference between individuals will remain even if they are free. This is due to the fact the ālayavijñās of one individual cannot be identified with those of another. Now let us compare KCB’s concept of freedom with the existentialists’ concept of freedom. According to almost all existentialists the existence of a human being or the real self of a human being is realized in certain emotions, such as anxiety (angst), boredom, and dread, which do not have any content, or which have nothingness as the content. In the language of Kierkegaard, these emotional states are characterized by ‘the dizziness of freedom’, as they are followed by free actions or free choices. According Sartre, ‘… the choice is nothing other than the being of each human reality, this amounts to saying that a particular partial behaviour is or expresses the original choice of this human reality since for human reality there is no difference between existing and choosing for itself ’.38 In other words, a human being is to be identified with a set of choices. As regards the nature of choice, Sartre has rejected the traditional ‘cause-intention-act-end’ or ‘motiveact-end’ model. He says, ‘… the motive, the act and the end are all constituted in a single upsurge.’39 Again, he says, ‘it is the act which decides its end and its motives, and the act is the expression of freedom.’40 It is to be noted that according to the existentialists our actions are free if they are not determined by causal or rational constraint. Hence freedom is to be interpreted in terms of the absence of causal as well as rational constraint, but not in terms of the absence of emotional states. Hence freedom is related to these states or constrained by these states. But in KCB freedom is free from all types of constraint, cognitive or non-cognitive, causal or non-causal. This is due to the fact that the transcendental freedom of KCB is free from all types of categorisation, cognitive or non-cognitive. Hence the transcendental freedom would imply the cessation of judgements of the form ‘I might not have been x’, where ‘x’ stands for a category, subjective or objective. From the above discussion it follows that in KCB we come across degrees of freedom and progressive realisation of it. Moreover, his concept of transcendental freedom cannot be expressed by any category as it is the rejection of all categories. Hence his conception is unparalleled in the history of philosophy, Eastern or Western, although it is related to the classical Advaita concept. Therefore, it is also a new animal in our zoo.

The following diagram represents the types of freedom discussed in this paper:

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From the above discussion it follows that there are several types of psychological concepts of freedom and several concepts of metaphysical freedom, especially in the context of Indian philosophy. As mentioned before, Indian philosophers are concerned with the question, ‘how to alleviate different types of suffering?’ We have also demonstrated how psychological freedom leads to metaphysical freedom, or the realisation of our true nature through the practice of dhārmic activities as free agents without selfish motive. Combining Eastern with Western thoughts we get a holistic approach to the topic of freedom.

NOTES   1. Gary Watson, ‘Free Will’ in A Companion to Metaphysics, edited by J. Kim and E. Sosa, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 179.   2. S. Hook (ed.), ‘Hard and soft Determinism’, in Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science (New York: Collier Books, 1961).   3. W. Sellers and J. Hospers (eds), ‘The Problem of Ethics’, Rynin translation, quoted in Readings in Ethical Theory, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952), p. 150.   4. M. Schlick, ‘The Problem of Freewill’, quoted in The Problems of Philosophy in Their Interconnection, edited by H. L. Mulder, A J. Kox, & R. Hegselmann, (Netherlands: Springer, 1987).   5. I. Kant, Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals, translated and analysed by H. J. Paton, Harper (London: Torchbooks, 1956), pp. 88-114.   6. C. D. Broad, ‘Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism’, quoted in Free Will and Determinism, edited by Bernard Berofsky, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 159.   7. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, (Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1984), p. 301.   8. Ibid., p. 493.   9. Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 9. 10. Ibid., p. 10. 11. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 110. 12. Ibid., p. 84. 13. Ibid., p. 71. 14. Ibid., p. 57. 15. Ibid., p. 100. 16. Ibid., p. 98. 17. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 321. 18. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 6. 19. Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 14. 20. Juan Mascaro, The Bhagavad Gītā, (England: Penguin Books, 1962). 21. K.C. Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy, edited by G. Bhattacharyya (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1956), p. 388 22. Ibid., p. 389. 23. Ibid., p. 394. 24. Ibid., p. 413. 25. Ibid., p. 416. 26. Ibid., p. 438

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27. Ibid., p. 423. 28. Ibid., p. 433. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., p. 444. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid., p. 445. 33. Ibid., p. 449. 34. Ibid., p. 451. 35. Ibid., p. 476. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, (The Wisdom Library, 1968), p. 76. 39. Jean-Paul Satre, ‘Being and Nothingness’, quoted in Free Will and Determinism, edited by Bernard Berofsky, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 181. 40. Ibid., p. 181.

CHAPTER TWENTY EIGHT

Swami Vivekananda and Bertrand Russell on Conception and Development of Human Being INTRODUCTION This paper will focus on Swami Vivekananda’s (or Swamiji’s) conception of human being and his methods for the development of human nature, so that a human being can attain the ultimate goal of life. I shall discuss his conception of education, which is an integral part of the development of a human being. A comparison will also be made with Bertrand Russell’s conception of both human nature and education. Swamiji’s conception of human development emphasizes both the spiritual, mental and the bodily aspects as he focuses on food or the necessities of life and a set of yogas for a sound body; courage and freedom of an individual for mental development; and righteous actions such as love and compassion without selfish motive for spiritual development. Hence his view of development is not to be equated with richness of material possession or with knowledge about the empirical world, which are sometimes necessary for the successful performance of virtuous actions. He has emphasized the apprehension of truths, not only for our intellects, but also for our hearts. He has shown how to apply the Advaita Vedānta in our life for our development, as it is for every station of life. Moreover, since Swamiji emphasizes the ultimate goal of life, which is freedom from all types of suffering, and harmony in life, I will focus on his conception of oneness as he wants to realize the oneness of Advaita Vedānta in our life in this world. In section I, I will discuss Swamiji’s conception of the human being and then compare it with that of Bertrand Russell. This will be followed by section II, in which a comparative method for human development will be introduced. The concluding section III will emphasize the importance of sustained human development at a global level for global peace and harmony.

I  CONCEPTION OF THE HUMAN BEING: VIEWS OF VIVEKANANDA & RUSSELL It is claimed that each human being is divine in nature, and is a manifestation of the same divine consciousness. Vivekananda says: ‘... man is divine, ... Everything that is strong, and good, and powerful in human nature is the outcome of that divinity, ...’1 ‘So, potentially,

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each one of us has that infinite ocean of Existence, Knowledge and Bliss as our birth right, our real nature; and the difference between us is caused by the greater or lesser power to manifest that divine.’2 In this context, it is to be noted that the use of the word ‘infinite’ in the above quotation simply means that we cannot draw a limit to our knowledge, practice of our activities, or the exercise of our freedom. Similarly, the words ‘existence’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘bliss’ also require explanation. This is due to the fact that knowledge includes knowledge about phenomenal reality as well as knowledge about ultimate reality, including the nature of the self. The word ‘existence’ in the philosophy of Swamiji could refer to our righteous activities, as he emphasizes dhārmic or unselfish righteous activities as our real existence. The word ‘bliss’ would refer to states of harmony and peace. It is to be noted that the divinity present in a human being does not disappear. To quote Swamiji:3 ‘In no man or woman, however vile, does that divinity die. Only he or she does not know how to reach it and is waiting for the Truth.’4 In the next section I shall discuss Swamiji’s methods for the realization of divinity or our true nature, as he emphasizes the development of both body and mind through a set of activities. He had such a respect for the divinity of man that he claims that man is greater than gods or devas. Hence, there is nothing higher than man.5 This is another way of saying that what man can achieve through his highest efforts, no one else can achieve. For this reason he says: ‘Man is the highest being that exists, and this is the greatest world. We can have no conception of God higher than man, so our God is man, and man is God.’6 Since human beings can achieve perfection or realize his or her divinity in this world through free actions, this world is treated as the best world. Regarding the body and the mind of a human being, Swamiji emphasizes both, as both mind and matter are manifestations of the same ultimate reality. To quote Swamiji: ‘Without the “I” there can be no “you” outside. From this some philosophers came to the conclusion that the external world did not exist save in the subject; that the “you” existed only in the “I”. Others have argued that that the “I” can only be known through the “you” and with equal logic. These two views are partial truths, each wrong in part and each right in part. Thought is as much material and as much in nature as body is. Both matter and mind exist in a third, a unity which divides itself into the two. This unity is the Atman, the real Self.’7 This remark not only avoids both solipsism and behaviourism in the philosophy of mind, but also emphasizes development of both mind and body. This is also due to the fact that both of them ‘are one and the same substance.’8 He had such a respect for the human body that it is treated as the most holy place. As he says: ‘... know it for certain that there is no greater tirtha (holy place) than the body of man.’9 It has also been compared with a temple, since it is through body that we can realize the values of life, it is considered as the best instrument. Hence, it is our duty to keep it strong and healthy. To quote Swamiji: ‘... the body must be kept strong and healthy. It is the best instrument we have.’10 Since our most important duty is to look after our body, he has emphasized both food and physical activities, not religious ceremonies or rituals. As he says: ‘It is an insult to a starving people to offer them religion.’11, ‘All the forces that are working in this body have been produced out of food.’12, ‘First bread and then religion.’13 Since we have to realize the goals of religion through our body, we have to make ourselves healthy and strong. Hence he says: ‘First of all, our young men must be strong. Religion will

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come afterwards. Be strong, my young friends, that is my advice to you. You will be nearer to heaven through football than through the study of the Gītā.’14 In this section I would like to compare Swamiji’s conception of the human being with that of Russell, as he is also concerned with the development of human character through education and the unity between mind and body in his metaphysics of neutral monism. Regarding the nature of the human being, Swamiji rejected the traditional view of the West that children are born with wrath and wickedness. To quote Russell: ‘The traditional view ... was that we are all born Children of Wrath, with a nature full of Wickedness; before there can be any good in us we have to become Children of Grace, a process much accelerated by frequent castigation.’15 He thinks that we are not born with any disposition, either good or bad. To quote Russell: ‘The fact is that children are not naturally either “good” or “bad”.’16 The critics will point out that, if we are not born with the disposition to become good, or to have a virtuous character, then no amount of education or teaching would help us in manifesting moral virtues, such as love, kindness, spiritual renunciation, or unselfishness. Since the view of Swami Vivekananda claims that human beings are potentially divine, we require a type of education or environment which will help in manifesting this divine nature. So the purpose of education is to actualize the potentiality which is inherent in every human being. Hence this view cuts across both the extreme views, namely that human beings do not have any nature, or that their nature is characterized by wrath and wickedness. Regarding dualism between mind and body, Russell tried to solve some age-old problems such as the causal relationship between them by positing neutral monism. So mind and body do not differ in stuff, but in the arrangement of the same neutral entities. In this respect the unitary thesis or the neutral monism of Swami Vivekananda also throws some light on contemporary issues and thereby suggests solutions to them.

II  CONCEPTS OF SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: VIEWS OF VIVEKANANDA & RUSSELL In this section, I shall discuss Swamiji’s conception of human development, as he has emphasized several aspects of human nature, mentioned in the previous section of this paper. Regarding sustainable development, the United Nations programme focuses on economic, social and environmental objectives, as mentioned in the following message of the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon: ‘Sustainable development recognizes that our economic, social and environmental objectives are not competing goals that must be traded off against each other, but are interconnected objectives that are most effectively pursued together in a holistic manner.’17 Since Swamiji has emphasized not only physical, mental and moral, but also spiritual development through the practice of yogas, and unselfish righteous activities, his view would supplement the contemporary discussion on this topic. Moreover, since his philosophy is based on the Advaita Vedānta, he emphasizes oneness, or unity-in-diversity for resolving conflicts or disputes at social or global levels. He has also mentioned how to remove some of the root causes of hindrance to human development, such as superstition,

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bigotry and fanaticism. His message for human development is: ‘ “Help and not Fight”, “Assimilation and not Destruction”, “Harmony and Peace and not Dissension”.’18 A. The first step to human development is to have faith in human nature, as Swamiji says, ‘Never forget the glory of human nature. We are the greatest God that ever was or ever will be.’19 This message gives us hope for the equal development of all, as it has suggestive meaning, and thereby refers to an ideal which can be realized in varying degrees.

B. Swamiji has proposed equal opportunities for all, irrespective of gender, caste, creed or nationality. Regarding equal opportunity and respect for women, he says, ‘All nations have attained greatness by paying proper respect to women. That country and that nation which do not respect women have never become great, nor will ever be in future.’20 Quoting a passage from Manu, he says: ‘Where women are respected, there the gods delight; and where they are not, there all works and efforts come to naught.’21

C. Regarding freedom, Swamiji thinks that it is the foundation for development. As he says: ‘... Freedom is the first condition of growth.’22 He has also attributed the development in science to freedom. To quote: ‘... through freedom the sciences were built.’23 He has also claimed that the freedom of an individual should not prevent the freedom of another or cause harm to another. It is not only our duty to exercise our freedom for our development, but also our duty to help others in promoting their freedom. Swamiji has not only emphasized physical, social and political freedom, but also spiritual freedom which purifies our minds. As he says, ‘One may gain political and social independence, but if one is a slave to his passions and desires, one cannot feel the pure joy of real freedom.’24 Freedom is also the basis of all virtues, such as love: ‘love cannot come through fear. Its basis is freedom.’25 D. Another precondition for human development is the removal of superstition and bigotry, as they prevent rational justification and free thinking. To quote Swamiji, ‘[We] have to overcome a huge mass of ancient superstitions, ancestral superstition, class superstition, city superstition, country superstition, and behind all the vast mass of superstition that is innate in every human being.’26 Regarding bigotry, he says, ‘superstition is a great enemy of man, but bigotry is worse.’27 Since ignorance is the root cause of superstition, we require knowledge or reason to remove these semi-conscious or unconscious superstitions. Once our superstitions are removed, the feeling of superiority on the basis of caste, colour, creed, region, language, and nation will disappear, and thereby some of the root causes of conflict, war, or suffering will be eliminated, paving the way for our growth or development.

E. Regarding education, he has emphasized critical thinking, rational justification and creativity. To quote, ‘Education is not filling the mind with a lot of facts. Perfecting the instrument and getting complete mastery of my own mind [is the ideal of education]. If I want to concentrate my mind upon a point, it goes there, and the moment I call it is free [again] ...’28 Hence, he has emphasized the cultivation of concentration of mind as part of our education. He has also emphasized positive factors such as courage or strength, confidence, and the application of truths in

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our lives. As he says, ‘Let us be brave, know the truth, and practice the truth.’29 Regarding practice, he says, ‘One ounce of practice is worth twenty thousand tonnes of big talk.’30 Since all the children are not equally gifted, Swamiji claims that less gifted or deprived children of our society need more attention or encouragement than the gifted or privileged: ‘Give to the weak, for there all the gift is needed. If the Brahmin is born clever, he can educate himself without help. If the others are not born clever, let them have all the teaching and the teachers they want. This is justice and reason as I understand it.’31 This passage echoes not only socialistic thought, but also compensatory justice, as the deprived section of our community needs more help or attention than the privileged class.

F. Since knowledge is required to remove our ignorance and bigotry, Swamiji emphasizes a rational approach to life for realizing our inherent potentialities present in every human being. He is not willing to accept anything which goes against reason for our growth and development. Hence, according to Swamiji, the set of principles in ethics or religion which we should accept must be justifiable by reason. It is to be noted that Swamiji, for the first time, has tried to make both ethics and religion independent of supernatural beings. This is due to the fact that those principles are to be justified by reason for growth, development or harmony, at individual, social and global levels. In this respect his view has far-reaching consequences. Kant, in the Western tradition, has also tried to make ethics independent of religion, although without success as he postulated a God and an afterlife later on. But Swamiji has tried to make both independent of any supernatural being, as divinity is not an external entity and the realisation of this divinity is due to a set of methods, including the practice of righteous activities.

G. Swamiji uses the expression ‘Practical Vedānta’ for the yogas mentioned in the Bhagavad-Gītā for our living. So he has emphasized these yogas for human development, including that of our body and mind, irrespective of caste, creed, colour and nationality. He has classified the yogas in the following way:32

i. Karma-Yoga: The manner in which a human being realizes his/her divinity through works and duty.



ii. Bhakti-Yoga: The realization of divinity through devotion to, and love of, a Personal God.

iii. Rāja-Yoga: The realization of divinity through the control of mind. iv. Jñāna-Yoga: The realization of one’s own divinity through knowledge. Regarding these four yogas or paths, Swamiji has suggested individual freedom to choose any one of them depending on one’s disposition or station in life, although he has emphasized Karma-Yoga for all. To Quote: ‘One must follow the path for which one is best suited; but in this age special stress should be laid on Karma-Yoga.’33 Hence Swamiji has emphasized righteous actions without selfish motive for the realization of divinity or one’s dignity as a human being. H. Regarding righteous actions, he claims that we have to foster fellow-feeling and love towards others with utmost sincerity. To quote: ‘love for yourselves means

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love for all, love for animals, love for everything, for you are all one. It is a great faith which will make the world better.’34 Swamiji even went one step further and identified religion with love. He says: ‘It is in love that religion exists and not in ceremony, in the pure and sincere love in the heart.’35 ‘Love opens the most impossible gates; love is the gate to all the secrets of the universe.’36 Swamiji has even identified life with love. As he says: ‘Life is love, when a man ceases to do good to others, he is dead spiritually.’37 Hence the love of Swamiji not only gives meaning to our life, but also inspires us to alleviate the suffering of others, considering them as divine and service as offerings to divinity. From the above discussion of Swamiji’s conception of human development, it follows that he has emphasized both knowledge and righteous actions without selfish motive. His conception of knowledge focuses not only on facts or empirical truths, but also on reason, assimilation and creativity. His philosophy is also an application of Advaita Vedānta, as service to sentient beings, including human beings, is considered a service to God or divinity. It is realisable by everyone ‘here and now’, as the unselfish love is itself the manifestation of divinity. His philosophy is universal in the sense that it does not depend on the acceptance of a set of doctrines, as he says ‘the Karma-yogi need not believe in any doctrine whatever. He may not believe even in God, may not ask what his soul is, nor think of any metaphysical speculation.’38 Since Swamiji has emphasized the realisation of our essence through our actions, it is not confined to a privileged class or the elite of our society. As he says, ‘It shall no more be a Rahasya, a secret, it shall no more live with the monks in caves and forests, and in the Himalayas; it must come down to the daily, everyday life of the people; it shall be worked out in the palace of the king, in the cave of the recluse; it shall be worked out in the cottage of the poor, by the beggar in the street, everywhere; anywhere it can be worked out.’39 In this context, I would like to compare Russell’s view on education with Swamiji’s thoughts on human development. Russell also claims that education for our children presupposes the nature of human character. As he says, ‘The education we desire for our children must depend upon our ideals of human character, and our hopes as to the path they are to play in the community.’40 Regarding the aim of education, Russell claimed that people would differ due to their perspectives. The pacifist would differ from the advocates of militarism, and similarly a communist would differ from an individualist. So the advocates of these views would try to instil or inculcate certain beliefs or dogmas from the beginning of our system of education; thereby pupils would lose their ability to think independently. Since Russell has insisted upon ‘independent thinking or judgement’, the view of Swamiji in this respect agrees with that of Russell, although Swamiji has focussed on development of rational thinking, as reason is an inherent faculty of human beings. Since reason is universal, we may come to agreement over certain issues by applying this method, which is independent of perspectives. Like Russell,41 Swamiji would also draw the distinction between education in knowledge and education in character. As Swamiji claims that knowledge of facts is not sufficient for moral or spiritual progress. Virtuous character depends on the practice of righteous activities without selfish motive and craving for the result. In this respect,

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Swamiji’s philosophy may be considered an application of one of the themes of the Bhagavad-Gītā. Like Russell, Swamiji would not agree with the advocates of utility, that the aim of education is only to produce results which are useful for body, such as food, clothing, housing, etc., although both of them emphasize the physical needs of life. To quote Russell, ‘When this is what is really meant, the advocate of utility is certainly in the wrong. If he is enunciating an ultimate philosophy, though in a world where many people are starving, he may be right as a politician, since the satisfaction of physical needs may be at the moment more urgent than anything else.’42 Swamiji, from the very beginning, has emphasized the importance of body, as it is an insult to offer religion or metaphysics to a starving person. Since body is the best instrument for the practice of righteous activities, it ‘must be kept strong and healthy.’43 Moreover, Swamiji emphasizes the purity of food for the purity of the mind. To quote, ‘Without pure food, how can the indriyas perform their respective functions properly?’44 According to Russell, ‘The real issue is: should we, in education, aim at filling the mind with knowledge which has direct practical utility, or should we try to give our pupils mental possessions which are good on their own account?’45 Regarding the knowledge of literature, he says ‘… it gives a man a mental possession which he would be sorry to be without, and makes him in some sense a more excellent human being. It is this latter sort of knowledge that is preferred by the man who argues that utility is not the sole aim of education.’46 Like Swamiji, Russell has also emphasized the humanistic elements in our education, as they are not less important than the utilitarian elements. Regarding moral education and the training of character, Russell has proposed freedom, not external compulsion,47 vitality, courage, and love.48 But the love of Russell may be ‘generalized to embrace the human race.’49 In spite of having several common perspectives or views in the development of human beings, and the emphasis on both knowledge and love, there are certain differences, as Swamiji’s philosophy aims at the realisation of spiritual values. The love of Swamiji is for all, including animals; it is unselfish, as there is no lust or utilitarian motive; it is service to sentient beings considering them as the manifestation of divinity. Hence, Swamiji has focussed on both the physical and the mental as well as the spiritual dimensions of our life. Since Swamiji has insisted on ‘harmonious development’50 of all faculties, or dimensions of one’s life, including one’s attitude towards living beings or nature at large, and service to ‘living God,’51 his view would supplement Russell’s quest for human excellence.

III  HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL In this section, I would like to discuss whether human development at a global level can be realized, even if some individuals, following the path of Swamiji, can achieve it here and now. So the question is: how are we to realize human development at a global level when there is a very wide gap between the haves and have-nots, between the rich and the poor, between the developed and the developing nations?

1. Regarding global wealth, the top 1% own 41%; top 10% own 86%; bottom half own just 1%; and 3.2 billion adults of the global population own nothing at all.52

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2. The richest 300 people in the world are more wealthy than the poorest 3 billion combined, and every year rich countries take over 10 times more money from poor countries than they give in aid.53



3. The total wealth of Africa is less than 3 trillion, while the total global wealth is some 241 trillion.



4. At present approximately twenty per cent (20%) of the total population of the world own sixty per cent (60%) of the land and natural resources.



5. In Oceania 0.5% of the global population occupy 6.3% of the land, while in Asia approximately 60% of the global population is living in 20.3% of the land. Hence the density of the population in Asia is nearly forty times higher than that of Oceania.



6. The per capita gross national product (GNP) in some countries such as the USA or Australia is eighty times higher than that of developing nations such as Cambodia, Nepal, or Bangladesh.



7. The gap between the rich and the poor nations has been widened. In 1970, the ratio was 30:1, but after thirty years it was more than 61:1.



8. Still one billion people are living on less than US$1 a day.



9. Regarding per capita consumption of electricity, some rich nations consume 100 times more than some poor nations.

10. Still some 2.6 billion people do not have access to sanitation, and more than one billion people do not have access to clean water. In the United States, the average water use per person per day is nearly 600 litres, while in countries, such as Cambodia, Ethiopia and Uganda, it is less than 20 litres.54 When there is such a wide gap between the developing and the developed nations, between the haves and have-nots, between the rich and the poor, it is mockery to talk about human development at global level. One B-2 stealth bomber, a weapon for destruction, costs 3 billion dollars, while billions are still without shelter, without sanitation, and without access to the benefits of modern technology.55 In order to achieve human development at a global level so that the ideals of Swamiji can be applied to everyone, without discrimination, and thereby make the world better for everybody, I would like to refer to the following message of the Vedic tradition: vasudhaiva kutumbakam (the entire world is your relation) and the Oneness of the Advaita Vedānta introduced as ‘Practical Vedānta’ by Swamiji. To quote: ‘The watchword of all well-being, of all moral good is not “I” but “thou”. Who cares whether there is a heaven or a hell, who cares if there is a soul or not, who cares if there is an unchangeable or not? Here is the world, and it is full of misery. Go out into it as Buddha did, and struggle to lessen it or die in the attempt. Forget yourself; this is the first lesson to be learnt, whether you are a theist or an atheist, whether you are an agnostic or a Vedāntist, a Christian or a Mohammedan. The one lesson obvious to all is the destruction of the little self and the building up of the Real Self.’56 The Vedas and the Upaniṣads have added a spiritual dimension to our life for the betterment of the entire world, as they have introduced the Real self. One of the great sayings is ‘ahaṃ Brahmāsmi’. Literally, it means ‘I am identical with Brahman’.

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Now it may be asked, what is Brahman? In reply, it is said, ‘khalu-idaṃ-Brahma’, meaning ‘Everything is Brahman’. Hence ‘I am identical with everything’. Now it may be asked how I can be identical with Brahman. The followers of the Non-dualistic Vedānta claim that at deeper level my consciousness is the same as the universal consciousness. But the supporters of the Dualistic Vedānta claim that what it means is that I am subservient to, or at the service of, God or divinity. It is to be noted that all the schools of Vedānta or streams of Hinduism emphasize righteous actions (karma), dedication or devotion (bhakti), and knowledge (jñāna) in varying degrees or at different levels of the realization of divinity in us. But the materialists or the Marxists would contradict this thesis, as I am different from other things and there is no God or divinity. Since the Advaita Vedānta accommodates a range of truths without having inconsistency (nirvirodhavāda) as Gaudapāda, the great master of Saṃkara, claims, we can accommodate the views of the atheists or the materialists without abandoning the Oneness or the unity-in-diversity of the Vedāntins. On this point I would like to suggest that the great saying ‘I am Brahman’ means ‘I am related to everything’, as my welfare, peace, or happiness depends on others, including other beings and nature at large. This is how the holistic outlook of Oneness or the concept of universal dharma or global development may be introduced for the betterment of all. The ideal of Oneness at global level can be realized if the countries are governed by a single world body and global resources such as food, water and land are shared evenly. This would remove the root cause of the poverty of the teeming billions, the root cause of terrorism and the root cause of the conflict or war between nations at global level. It would also resolve some of the problems due to global warming, as there will be common projects or rules for the reduction of carbon dioxide emission. This Oneness would promote some basic or core values, such as non-violence and love, and teach us how to realize them in this life, and thereby pave the way for the development of human beings at a global level. If several nations, such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom, can form a Union having a single currency and common passport, then all the nations in the world can also form a single Government. Similarly, if fifty states in the USA can form a single government, then all the states in the world also can form a single Government for the betterment of all. This will make the world nuclear free, armament free, strife free, and warming free. Thus it would pave the way for global peace and harmony. Hence it is our duty to make the rich nations feel for the developing nations, and to make the rich nations realize that their occupation of disproportionately large areas of land or resources is unfair, unjust, and unreasonable. This can be achieved by changing peoples’ hearts, and by carrying the message of Oneness and universal brotherhood to every individual, to every city, to every community, and to every nation. Hence the message ‘vasudhaiva kutumbakam’ (‘the entire world is your relation’) is the message of freedom, peace, bliss, harmony, and global development, as it is for the betterment of all and every being.

NOTES 1. The complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. I, (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1984), p. 388. 2. Ibid., p. 288. 3. Ibid., p. 388.

SWAMI VIVEKANANDA AND BERTRAND RUSSELL ON CONCEPTION

  4.   5.   6.   7.   8.   9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

481

Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 186. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 142 and p. 400. Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 30. Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 101. Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 34. Ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 119-120. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 142. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 20. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 136. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 432. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 242. Bertrand Russell, On Education, (New York: Routledge, reprinted 1994), p. 26. Ibid., p. 29. http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/forum2012/ The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. I, p. 24. Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 78. Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 215. Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 215; Manu, III, 56: yatra-nāryāḥ-tu-pūjyante-ramante-tatra-devatāḥ;yatraetāḥ-tu-na-pūjyante-sarvāḥ-tatra-aphalā. 22. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 115. 23. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 116 24. Ibid., Vol. V, p. 419. 25. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 322 26. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 248. 27. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 15. 28. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 510. 29. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 87. 30. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 212. 31. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 193. 32. Ibid., Vol. V, p. 292. 33. Ibid., Vol. V, p. 414. 34. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 301. 35. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 141. 36. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 224. 37. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 493. 38. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 111. 39. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 427. 40. Bertrand Russell, On Education, (New York: Routledge, reprinted 1994), p. 10. 41. Ibid., p. 11. 42. Ibid., p. 18. 43. The complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. I, (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1984), p. 142. 44. Ibid., Vol. V, p. 479. 45. Bertrand Russell, On Education, (New York: Routledge, reprinted 1994), p. 19. 46. Ibid.

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47. Ibid., p. 26. 48. Ibid., p. 46 49. Ibid. 50. The complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. VII, (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1984), p. 98. 51. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 442. 52. http://thenextrecesion.wordpress.com/ 53. www.youtube.com/watch?v=uWSxzjyMNpU 54. UN Human Development Report 2006. Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis. The United Nations Development Programme, New York, 2006. 55. http://news.antiwar.com 56. The complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. II, (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1984), p. 353.

CHAPTER TWENTY NINE

Concepts of Harmony in Indian Philosophy The aim of this paper is to discuss some of the concepts of harmony, including the Vedāntic concept as applied by Swami Vivekananda in his Practical Vedānta. At the end of this paper I shall demonstrate the relevance of the Vedāntic concept to moral, social and spiritual or religious contexts. The concept of harmony is a correlative of discord, incongruity, conflict, or inconsistency. The concept of harmony is present not only in music and art but also in our moral or spiritual values. Moreover, the concept of harmony is very useful for the resolution of any conflict or the avoidance of any undesirable situations such as suffering. Almost all the systems of Indian philosophy have discussed the different types of suffering and their casual conditions. They have also suggested how to resolve conflicts and how to remove sufferings, both mundane and spiritual. Hence the thoughts of the classical Indian philosophers can be used to solve current problems as well. Therefore, the disputes over creed, colour, race, language, region and nation can also be resolved. As you know, disputes between different communities, races, nations and religions are responsible for wars or conflicts. Millions have been massacred and billions have been made homeless, destitute, and impoverished. Unless we remove the basic causes of disputes or wars the entire human race and civilization will be extinct. For this reason, the concept of harmony, which aims at the elimination of conflicts or wars, was relevant in the past, is relevant today and will remain relevant for all time to come. Now we have the problem of global warming, which is more serious than any other problems human kind has been confronted with. This is due to the fact that global warming will lead to the extinction of not only human beings but also other living beings and vegetation. Hence it will lead to the extinction of the entire world. Indian philosophers have addressed this question as well in their classification of sufferings in the following three types: It is claimed that human beings are affected by sufferings that are due to body (ādhibhautika), sufferings due to natural disasters (ādhidaivika), and sufferings due to mental conditions (ādhyātmika). Hence the sufferings due to old age or disease will come under ādhibhautika category. But the sufferings caused by global warming, flood, earthquake, tsunami, or climate change will come under ādhidaivika category. It is to be noted that the climate change due to global warming is caused by the actions of human beings. Hence the term ‘ādhidaivika’ should not always be interpreted as natural disasters or acts of God. Sufferings, such as alienation, abandonment, loneliness, or anxiety, are considered mental or spiritual (ādhyātmika). These sufferings may also

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be due to certain thoughts, desires, or questions. Hence, in order to save mankind from total extinction or the world from total destruction it is necessary to bring about harmony at personal, social and global levels. Several attempts have been made to bring about harmony from different points of view, or by applying different methods. In this respect Indian philosophy or religion is one of the best examples of some of these attempts. Now I would like to mention the following theories or methods for reconciling some of the disputes or conflicts: (1) We come across a method for reconciling conflicts in the Vedas, the oldest surviving literature on earth. According to this method some of our conflicts can be resolved by arranging items in a hierarchical order. The conflicts between dharma (righteous actions), artha (worldly possessions), kāma (sensuous pleasure), and mokṣa (liberation) have been resolved by arranging them in a hierarchical order. In this context it is to be noted that the Indian concept of dharma goes beyond the usual concept of Western ethics in several directions. It deals with (i) the conduct of human beings livings in societies; (ii) the conduct of human beings not living in societies, such as living in caves; (iii) the behaviour of human beings towards animals, such as cats; (iv) the behaviour towards plants; (v) the behaviour towards inanimate objects; (vi) the thoughts, not expressed in behaviour; (vii) the dream experiences which are due to dispositions of waking life. According to the Vedic method, artha and kāma are subservient to dharma and the latter would lead us to mokṣa which is the highest goal of life. All the systems of Indian philosophy have accepted mokṣa as the supreme goal of life, as it is a state of mind which is free from suffering. It is to be noted that Indian philosophers have accepted both artha and kāma as goals of life (puruṣārthas). The Vedic model of a hierarchy of values may be used to harmonize some of the moral conflicts, or the conflicts between the three guṇas (constitutive principles), namely, the principle of intelligence (sattva), the principle of activity (rajas) and the principle of passivity (tamas). The manifestation of the sattva may be more desirable than the manifestation of the other two. Similarly, the manifestation of the rajas is more desirable than the manifestation of the tamas. But this method of ranking the values in a hierarchical order cannot be applied to some of the disputes between different religions, sects of the same religion, or different castes. Since the goal of religions is to alleviate the suffering, we cannot claim that one of them is superior or inferior to another. Hence religions such as Judaism and Christianity, or streams of Hinduism, such as Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism, cannot be arranged in a hierarchical order. Similarly, since every work, pursued disinterestedly or without any selfish desire, is noble and is a means to the realisation of the absolute goal, one work cannot be considered as higher than another. Similarly, one caste cannot be considered as higher than another. Hence we have to reject not only the hereditary caste system, but also the difference between the actions of different castes where they are performed without selfish motive. Hence this method has a limited application. This method may also be used to discuss the problems related to global warming. Some of the nations are responsible for global warming, as they are concerned with their material

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prosperity at the expense of dharma. Since dharma is for the welfare of all, the excessive emission of carbon dioxide by these nations goes against the principle of dharma. I think the present conception of nationhood, which encourages unhealthy competition among nations and does not promote universal fellow-feeling or brotherhood, is responsible for some of the global problems we are confronted with today. In my concluding section I shall propose the concept of Oneness of the Advaita Vedāntins to resolve some of the global problems. (2) The second approach to harmony is to consider each view or thesis as true from a particular point of view. The seven-fold judgment (saptabhaṅgīnaya) and the many-fold views (anekāntavāda) of the Jaina philosophers are paradigm examples of this type of approach. According to Jaina philosophers there are many facets or aspects to reality. From a particular point of view, an object has a property, say F, while from another point of view it does not have F, still from yet another point of view it is indescribable. By combining these points of view, we get the following four points of view: It is F as well as not F. It is F and indescribable. It is not F and indescribable. It is F as well as not F and indescribable. Suppose from the perspective of x the table is round, but from the perspective of y the same table is elliptical or not round. If there is no viewer, the table, according to Jaina philosophers, is indescribable. Now if we combine these points of view, then we get four more judgments, namely, the table is round and not round; it is round and indescribable; it is not round and indescribable; it is round as well as not round and indescribable. By applying the Jaina method, the epistemological question about the real nature table will be answered not by giving one answer, but by pointing out several answers to this question. In other word, it is round from a perspective, but not round from another perspective, and indescribable from still another perspective. Hence it cuts across the debate between the traditional realism and idealism. Similarly, when applied to ethics, an action is good from one point of view, bad from another point of view, both good and bad from still another set of perspectives, and so on. This method may be used to settle some of the conflicts in epistemology or philosophy in general, but it cannot be universalized to resolve all types of dispute. Discrimination on the basis of religious beliefs, caste, race or colour can never be justified from any point of view. Similarly, exploitation, deprivation, or treating a human being as a means to one’s selfish end cannot be vindicated from any stand point. Hence anything which is a hindrance to the realisation of the highest goal of life or liberation can never be justified. Suffering, if it purifies the soul or if it is a means to the realisation of the highest goal, may be acceptable, but if it leads to the extinction of one’s existence or hindrance to the realisation of the highest goal, it cannot be justified from any standpoint. Since the aim is to solve our existential problems including the suffering of human beings, the Jaina method cannot be applied to the conflicts which lead to deprivation, suffering and ultimately extinction. Similarly, the inability of a religion or nation to tolerate or accept the existence of another religion or nation, cannot be justified from any point of view. Hence this method also has a limited application. (3) The third method will consider all points of view or theses, or beliefs as false. We come across this method in Nāgārjuna who is one of the greatest Buddhist

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philosophers. Since each view leads to contradictory result, all of them are equally false. According to him any judgment of the form ‘x is F’ is false, as it leads to, or implies dialectically, that it is not F. Similarly, ‘x is not F’ is false, as it leads to the conclusion that it is F. The judgment that x is both F and Not F, being a contradiction, is obviously false. The judgment x is neither F nor not F does not hold good, as there is no category other than F and not F. The reality, according to Nāgārjuna, is free from all the four alternatives (catuṣkoṭi vinirmukta). He has tried to substantiate his thesis with respect to the debate whether the effect is identical with the cause, or by his critique of the categories of identity and difference. Hence the questions of being superior or inferior, less true or truer, do not arise with respect to any particular view, as all the views are false. In recent philosophy Kripke has also made a similar comment with respect to philosophical theses, as he claims them to be false. This method cannot be applied to resolve all the conflicts we come across at social and personal levels, even if it can be applied to philosophical disputes. From the ultimate point of view, our philosophical theses may be false, but from the phenomenal point of view our beliefs and desires have a certain utility and value, and some of them are conducive to the realisation of the ultimate goal of life. As on empirical grounds we justify certain scientific hypothesis, so on empirical grounds we can justify some of our beliefs as being more useful than others for achieving certain goals of life, including alleviation of suffering. Moreover, this method of Nāgārjuna may not be consistent with the teaching of Buddha who taught that compassion and love are the highest values in this life. Similarly, this method is not consistent with the teaching of Swami Vivekananda who has emphasized acceptance, not rejection, with respect to different religions or religious beliefs. Furthermore, since it cannot be applied to resolve most of the conflicts or disputes of our daily life, it does not have much practical value or utility. (4) Another method claims that a conflict can be resolved if each of the views is considered as a means to the realisation of the same goal. By being sincere to one’s own view or conviction one may reach the same goal, although there are different means to it. For example, different systems of Indian philosophy, such as Vedānta, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, or different standpoints in philosophy, such as dualism, qualified non-dualism, monism, present different world-views. Their function is not fully descriptive, but prescriptive as well. Depending on one’s disposition, background, or station in life one may accept one of these outlooks or world-views as one’s attitude towards reality. If one is sincere to one’s beliefs and devoutly follows one of the above methods, one may realize the ultimate goal of life. Hence each of the world-views or methods may be considered self-sufficient for attaining the ultimate goal. This method has some appeal with respect to some issues in religious practices, rituals, or ceremonies, and with respect to different paths for the realisation of the ultimate goal as mentioned in Hinduism. Hence the path of devotion or love, the path of knowledge and the path of unselfish actions are considered alternative methods for attaining liberation or

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freedom from bondage. Hence there is no conflict between different religious ceremonies, and between different paths for realising the ultimate goal of life. This method however also cannot be universalized for resolving all types of conflict or dispute in our life and society, even if this method works with respect to the three paths for realising the same ultimate goal. If the goals themselves are different, this method cannot be applied to resolve the conflict. Hence harmony cannot be achieved by this method in all cases. For example, the materialists emphasize earthly goods and the pleasures of the senses, but some other systems of philosophy and almost all the religions of the world emphasize the spiritual values of our life and existence. Hence the conflict between these two types of values cannot be resolved by this method. (5) Another method for resolving the disputes may be found in the dialectic of Hegel. Hegelian dialectic is a method of thought or reality through thesis and antithesis to a synthesis. The conflict between thesis and antithesis is partially resolved at the higher level of synthesis. But this synthesis gives rise to another antagonism which is partially resolved at the level of another synthesis. This process goes on until the Absolute is realized. Hence it is a process for realizing degrees of harmony through contradictions. This method may be applicable to settle disputes between two rival groups or political parties, but it cannot be applied to settle some of the disputes at moral, spiritual or religious level. Moreover, some of the countries such as the former Soviet Union have applied this method at social or political level, but without much success. Furthermore, it is difficult to postulate a contradiction which is obviously false. (6) In the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta we come across another method for reconciling the conflicts of our life and society. Since Swami Vivekananda has applied this method in the case of certain disputes, such as religious, let us explain this method in the light of his Practical Vedānta. His method is to introduce the concept of oneness to resolve conflicts or disputes. Hence ‘one-inmany’ or ‘unity-in-diversity’ becomes the central thesis of his philosophy. The following passage from the Vedas has been mentioned in several places: ekaṃ sadviprā bahudhā vadanti (That which exists is One, but sages call it by various names). The oneness mentioned here is not a God or a supernatural being. It is the ultimate goal of life and is present in every religion. This goal is freedom from suffering and the realization of certain values in our life or society. It is also claimed that every religion must be universal. Hence certain values, such as brotherhood, friendship, justice and love, must be practised universally. Again, the oneness is introduced in the form of rationality. It is claimed that the principles of religion should be justified on rational grounds. In this respect, the view of Swami Vivekananda has gone beyond the Western concept of religion. By reifying human beings he has tried to make both ethics and religion independent of any supernatural being. The God is not external to our soul. It is to be realized in every soul. Hence every soul is divine and potentially infinite.

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Again, according to Swami Vivekananda, one becomes religious when one sees God in others. As he says, ‘I shall call you religious from the day you begin to see God in men and women …’1 Harmony, which is the goal of religion, will be achieved when we realize that everything is the manifestation of the same reality. As regards the realization of the goal of religion, Swami Vivekananda says that an important step towards the realization of religion is to give up all types of superstition. Since ignorance is the root cause of superstition, we require knowledge or proper education to remove our superstitions. Once our superstitions are removed, the feeling of superiority on the basis of caste, colour, creed, language, or nation will disappear. Secondly, we have to foster fellow-feeling and love towards others with utmost sincerity. As he says, ‘Love for yourselves means love for all, …’.2 He even identified religion with love. ‘It is in love that religion exists and not in ceremony,…’.3 It is to be noted that the love of Swamiji’s Practical Vedānta is not a wishful thinking or merely an emotion; rather it makes one do something positive to alleviate the suffering of others without any selfish motive. Hence the combination of knowledge, love and unselfish action will lead us to the realization of the highest good. Now the question is: How to realize the goal of Practical Vedānta at the level of society or at global level? How can an individual or a group of individuals remove the suffering of a large community when there is a very wide gap between the haves and have-nots, between the rich and the poor, between the developed and the developing nations? If religion or philosophy is to be more practical then we must address this question as well. At present approximately twenty percent (20%) of the total population of the world own sixty percent (60%) of the land and natural resources. In Oceania 0.5% of the global population occupy 6.3% of the land, while in Asia approximately 60% of the global population is living in 20.3% of the land. Hence the density of the population in Asia is nearly forty times higher than that of Oceania. Similarly, the per capita gross national product (GNP) in some countries such as the USA or Australia is eighty times higher than that of developing nations such as Cambodia, Nepal, or Bangladesh. The socio-economic condition of the nations may also be summarized in the following way.

1) Twenty percent of the global population living in developed countries consumes 16 times more than the twenty per cent of the global population living in developing countries.



2) The GDP of 20 per cent of the global population living in developed countries is twenty times higher than the GDP of 80 percent population of the developing countries.



3) The gap between the rich and the poor nations has been widened. In 1970, the ratio was 30:1, but after thirty years it was more than 61:1.



4) Still one billion people are living on less than US$1 a day. The poorest 20% of the world’s people account for 1.5% world income.



5) In relation to per capita consumption of electricity, some rich nations consume 100 times more than some poor or developing nations.

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6) Still some 2.6 billion people do not have access to sanitation, and more than one billion people do not have access to clean water. In the United States, the average water use per person per day is nearly 600 litres, while in countries, such as Cambodia, Ethiopia and Uganda, it is less than 20 litres.



7) At present the richest 20% of the global population consume 80 per cent of the resources, while the poorest 20% consume only 1.3 percent of the resources.4

When there is such a wide gap between the developing and the developed nations, between the haves and have-nots, it is difficult to realize harmony in the world, and thereby peace or happiness. As you are aware, one B-2 stealth bomber, a weapon for destruction, costs several billion dollars, while billions are still without shelter, without sanitation, and without access to the benefits of modern technology. In order to achieve harmony at global level and to save the world from total disaster, I would like to refer to the following message of the Vedic tradition: vasudhaiva kutumbakam (the entire world is your relation) and the Oneness of the Advaita Vedānta. The Vedas and the Upaniṣads have added spiritual dimension to our life for the betterment of the entire world. One of the great sayings is ‘ahaṃ Brahmāsmi’. Literally, it means ‘I am identical with Brahman’. Now it may be asked, what is Brahman? In reply, it is said, ‘khalu-idaṃ–Brahma’, meaning ‘Everything is Brahman’. Hence ‘I am identical with everything’. Now it may be asked how I can be identical with Brahman. The followers of the Non-dualistic Vedānta claim that at deeper level my consciousness is the same as the universal consciousness. But the supporters of the Dualistic Vedānta claim that what it means is that I am subservient to, or at the service of, God or divinity. It is to be noted that all the schools of Vedānta or streams of Hinduism emphasize righteous actions (karma), dedication or devotion (bhakti), and knowledge (jñāna) in varying degrees or at different levels of the realization of divinity in us. But the materialists or the Marxists would contradict this thesis, as I am different from other things and there is no God or divinity. Since the Advaita Vedānta accommodates a range of truths without having inconsistency (nirvirodhavāda) as Gaudapāda, the great master of Saṃkara, claims, we can accommodate the views of the atheists or the materialists without abandoning the Oneness or the unity-in-diversity of the Vedāntins. On this point I would like to suggest that the great saying ‘I am Brahman’ means ‘I am related to everything’, as my welfare, peace, or happiness depends on others, including other beings and nature at large. This is how the holistic outlook and the universal of dharma may be introduced for the betterment of all. In order to realize the unity with the world, or practice universal brotherhood or love, we have to remove our doubts or the preventer cognitions that stand on our way. Indian philosophers, by and large, have suggested the following three methods:

i. Study of scriptures, including satsaṅga (discourse with, or company of, good or realized people)



ii. Rational justification for the theses of the scriptures, or their utility in our life

iii. Concentration or meditation on the truths of the scriptures

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For concentration or realization we require eight-fold Yogas known as yama (restriction on certain activities such as violence and falsehood (truthfulness in thought and speech); control of passions, non-stealing, non-acceptance of unnecessary gifts), niyama (cultivation of ­certain activities, such as purification of body and mind, friendliness, kindness, cheerfulness for the virtues of others, and indifference to vices of others, contentness, observance of vows, penances, study of scriptures, etc.), āsana (discipline of the body or ­postures, adoption of steady and comfortable postures for healthy body and mind), praṇāyāma (­regulation of breathing processes, or respiratory exercises for improving the function of the heart, lungs and general health of the body), pratyāhāra (control of the senses by the mind, or bringing senses under the control of the mind so that it is not disturbed by the sights and sounds), dhāranā (focus on truths, fixing the mind on desired objects such as, images of gods or goddesses or dharma), dhyāna (meditation or steadfast contemplation on the above desired objects), and samādhi (total absorption of the mind in these truths). So the Indian philosophers emphasized restrictions from certain activities, such as violence (dama in Upaniṣads), and the promotion of certain activities such as giving (dānam in Upaniṣads), kindness (dayā in Upaniṣads), compassion, love, etc. The ideal of Oneness at global level can be realized if the countries are governed by a single world body and global resources such as food, water and land are shared evenly. This would remove the root cause of the poverty of the teeming billions, the root cause of terrorism and the root cause of the conflict or war between nations at global level. It would also resolve some of the problems due to global warming, as there will be common projects or rules for the reduction of carbon dioxide emission. This Oneness would promote some basic or core values, such as non-violence and love, and teach how to realize them in this life. If several nations, such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom, can form a Union having a single currency and common passport, then all the nations in the world can also form a single Government. Similarly, if fifty states in the USA can form a single government, then all the states in the world also can form a single Government for the betterment of all. This will make the world nuclear free, armament free, strife free, and warming free. Thus it would pave the way for global peace and harmony. Hence it is our duty to make the rich nations feel for the developing nations, and to make the rich nations realize that their occupation of disproportionately large areas of land or resources is unfair, unjust, and unreasonable. This can be achieved by changing peoples’ hearts, and by carrying the message of Oneness and universal brotherhood to every individual, to every city, to every community, and to every nation. Hence the message ‘vasudhaiva kutumbakam’ (‘the entire world is your relation’) is the message of freedom, peace, bliss and global harmony. It is for the betterment of all and every being. All the above methods as well as their interpretations can be represented by the  following diagram, where ‘M’ stands for harmony or mokṣa, the ultimate goal of life:

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NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4.

The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. II, (Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1984), p. 326. Ibid., p. 301. Ibid., p. 141. UN Human Development Report 2006. Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis. The United Nations Development Programme, New York, 2006.

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INDEX

a posteriori  49–50, 412, 419–22 a priori  49, 124, 295, 300, 412, 419–22 abduction  441 ābhāsa-avacchedavāda  58 ābhāsavāda  58 abhāva  41, 66, 188–9, 265, 276 abhāvatva  230 abheda  17, 20 abhidhāna-śakti  383 abhidheya-artha  379 abhihitānvaya  381–4 absence  31, 36–8, 66–7, 135–6, 188–9, 226–37, 247–51, 265–8, 351–6, 363, 367–9, 371, 403–5, 465–8 Absolute  63–4, 215, 259, 378, 436, 443–4, 453, 465–8, 484, 487 acquaintance  73, 90, 91, 122, 407, 416, 422 action  23–5, 31–5, 209, 262–4, 379–81, 402–4, 427, 432–8, 449, 455, 456–67 actual-counterfactual  129 ādhāna-śakti  384 ādhāra  20, 31, 134, 179, 182, 185, 188–9, 385 ādhāratā  182, 247, 385 ādheya  31, 182, 185, 385 ādheyatā  182, 188, 247, 385 ādhibhautika  2, 455, 483 ādhidaivika  2, 455, 483 adhikaraṇatā  185 ādhyātmika  2, 455, 483 adṛṣṭa  40, 57, 435 Advaita  10–11, 28, 54, 57–8, 64–5, 120, 154, 362, 369–71, 377, 379, 392, 396, 439, 452, 464, 467–82, 485–9 agrahaṇa  57 ahaṃkāra  42, 57 āhāryajñāna  86 ajñāna  58 ākāṅkṣā  74, 113–16, 310–12, 364–9, 371, 374, 383–4 akhaṇḍapakṣa  379

ākṛti  307, 308, 321, 392 Ālaṅkārikas  383 alaukika  82 ālayavijñāna  3, 42, 51–2, 59, 61, 468 analogy  75, 85, 112, 389 ānanda  64, 467 ānandamaya-kośa  55, 58 ananya-kāraṇa  36, 275 ananyathāsiddhatva  35, 39, 75, 274 anaupādhika-bhrama  86 anekāntavāda  11, 485 aneka-samavetatva  275 anitya doṣa  95, 107 aṅkura-kurvvadrūpatva  26 annarasamaya-kośa  55–6, 59 antaḥkaraṇa  57 antya-viśeṣa  315 anubhavātmaka-bhrama  85 anupalabdhi  4, 74 anupasaṃhārī-vyabhicāra  107 anuvyavasāya  87, 89, 184 anuyogī  115, 180, 226–7, 263, 309, 313, 364 anuyogitā  88, 180–1, 185, 347, 385 anvayabodha  310–11, 384 anvaya-sahacāra  108 anvayī-parāmarśa  99 ānvīkṣikī  1–2 anvitābhidhāna  362, 371, 379–83 anxiety  1–2, 48, 428, 445, 447–8, 451, 455, 468, 483 anyonyābhāva  31, 67 apekṣābuddhi  3, 67, 69–70, 278–9, 285 apoha  215 aprasiddha  24, 103 āpta  133, 139 apūrva  435 Arislotle  118, 164, 402, 418, 441 Armstrong, D. M.  125, 128 artha  11, 15, 340, 437, 484 artha-kriyākāritva  15

504 Index

arthāpatti  4, 156, 210–11 asādhāraṇa kāraṇa  36, 76, 274 asādhāraṇa-vyabhicāra  106 asamavāyī-kāraṇa  32, 41 asatkāryavāda  17 āsatti  8, 118, 362, 369 aśeṣatvaviśiṣṭa  243 āśrayāsiddha  103 astitva  261, 264–5, 248–9 atidūratābhāva  75, 135 atisāmīpyābhāva  75, 135 ātman  58, 62, 66 Ātmatattvaviveka  237 atomistic theory of meaning  379 atomistic understanding  8, 74, 360, 363, 375 attributes  205–6 atyantābhāva  6, 31, 229 atyanta-bheda  16 aupādhika-bhrama  86 Aurobindo, S.  10, 436 Austin, J. L.  5, 197–200, 390 avacchedaka  58, 308, 313–15 avacchedakatā  308 avacchedavāda  58 avasar saṅgati  287 avidyā  46, 57 avyākṛta  58 avyakta  16, 57 Ayer, A. J.  125 bādha  103, 110, 116, 367 baptism  303, 312, 316, 319, 418–19 Bauddha  3–4, 15, 23, 28, 42, 53, 65, 74, 153, 155, 379, 464 bega  33 belief-sentences  121, 140–3, 145, 151, 153 Bhagavad-Gītā  437, 439, 476, 478 bhakti  393, 437, 451–2, 480, 489 bhaktirasa  9, 452 bhakti-yoga  476 Bhartṛhari  377, 379, 394 Bhāsarvajña  4, 74 Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā  56, 74, 381 Bhattacharya, K. C.  62–4, 464–8 Bhattacharya, S.  44, 153, 222 bhāvanā  33 bhāvatva  230, 232–3, 262–3 Bilimoria, P.  154 Bradley, F.  1, 169, 176, 342, 405

Brahman  9, 56, 57–8, 211, 378–9, 388, 391–4, 436–7, 479–80, 489 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad  429 Buddha  45, 54, 434, 449, 479, 486 buddhi  42, 52, 56–9, 61, 66, 192, 277 Buddhism  2–3, 10, 23–31, 45–53, 61, 201, 204–22, 379, 427, 434–5, 449, 455, 468, 485 Burge, T.  338 Cardona, G.  171 Carnap, R.  141, 153, 260–1, 330–1, 360 Cārvāka  4, 65, 74 Categorical Imperative  50, 423, 429, 442, 458, 462 category criterion  161–3, 400 causal meaning  390 causation  3, 7, 11, 15–43, 48–53, 57–60, 69–70, 75–83, 90–8, 112, 116, 119, 124, 129–30, 135, 156, 158, 235, 275–6, 287–9, 365–6, 370–1, 374, 429, 431, 447–8, 451, 455–9, 460, 468, 473–5, 480, 486, 491 ceṣtā  74, 460, 469 Chisholm, R. M.  125 Chomsky, N.  5, 8, 151, 167–8, 174–5, 177, 181, 376, 388 cikīrṣā  10, 460 Citsukhācārya  383–4, 395 class-character  66, 81, 230, 262–4, 266–7, 284, 307–9, 312–18, 341–4, 392, 403 cognition  3–5, 24, 34, 35, 37, 57, 66–70, 75–121, 132–9, 144–7, 155–9, 182–216, 224–8, 277–89, 306, 311–16, 324–6, 340–1, 345–8, 352–7, 362–75, 380–4, 404–10, 455, 460, 465, 466 compatibilism  74, 113, 116, 119, 362, 367, 383, 433, 448, 455–61 complete sense  304 conceptualism  70, 274 contiguity  74, 113, 118–19, 311, 345, 362, 369, 372–4, 383 contradiction  4, 22–3, 116–18, 150, 198–9, 204, 207, 209, 228, 231, 235, 257, 346, 367–8, 409, 486–7 conventional meaning  389 Cook Wilson, J.  190, 399 correlatives  180–1, 183, 185–6, 226, 309, 408, 468 counterexamples  4, 9, 98, 122–8, 132–4, 303–5, 414, 416–17

Index

505

counterpositive  31, 95, 213, 227–34, 249–51 counter-probans  17, 100, 108–9

existentialism  453, 471 extraordinary  4, 73, 81–6, 88–90, 197, 419

darśana  1, 2, 43–4, 54, 59, 119–20 deduction  441 deep structure  5, 160, 165–9, 172–6, 379, 388–90 defeasibility  127–8 demonstratives  7, 123, 305, 323–8 descriptions  7–9, 172–3, 274, 285, 295–303, 312, 319, 328–39, 345, 351–2, 413–18 determined by relation (nirūpya-nirūpaka sambandha)  181, 226, 342 determinism  10, 455–7, 459, 460–2, 464, 470–1 Dhammapāda  51 dharma  9, 11, 15, 43, 66, 263, 266, 277, 427, 430, 432, 437–8, 448, 450, 460, 463, 480, 484–5, 489, 491 dharma-dharmī  27, 28, 67 dhvaṃsa  6, 31, 39, 67, 229 dhvani  394 Dhvanyāloka  393, 396 Dignāga  6, 209, 214 dispositions  29–30, 33–5, 46–7, 50, 57, 60–1, 85, 99, 139–41, 435, 442, 452, 459, 474, 476, 484, 486 Donnellan, K. S.  326, 413 doṣa  78, 102–4, 106, 108–10, 136 double negation  5–6, 209, 213–14, 217, 221, 230–7, 265 duḥkha  1, 45–7, 53, 66, 277, 428 Dummett, M.  141, 293, 295, 420

fallacy  4, 17, 19, 100–10 fatalism  10, 433–5, 449–50, 455, 457, 461 feature-placing  402 Fillmore, C.  8, 181, 376, 388 Fodor, J.  8, 181, 376–7, 388, 395 free logic  173, 257–61, 270, 328, 331–4, 337–40, 351 free will  9–10, 434–5, 440, 449–50, 455–6, 458–9, 462 freedom  2, 3, 9, 42–3, 62–4, 199, 427–8, 435–8, 447–50, 455–70, 475–8, 491 Frege, G.  7–9, 141, 148, 151, 161, 171, 189–90, 221, 225, 240, 250–5, 260, 269, 270, 293–312, 319–20, 324, 328–35, 338–43, 349, 360, 378, 385, 397–401, 406–8, 414–17, 419

Ebersole, E. B.  259–61, 270 education  10, 472, 474–8, 488 eka-vyakti-bodhaka  340 eka-vyakti-vācaka  340 empty-term  234, 270 epistemology  15, 73–4, 84, 131–2, 155–9, 176, 189, 201, 284–6, 294, 296, 299, 304–5, 310, 313, 319, 341–2, 352–4, 485 errors  85–6, 89, 139, 143, 202, 364, 372 essence  17, 390, 432, 445–7, 477 etymological meaning  9, 50, 308, 379, 388–9, 391, 394 existence  21, 23, 46–7, 50, 57, 67, 81–2, 142–4, 149, 168–9, 198, 201, 203–4, 227, 229, 241, 243, 253–70, 280, 328–40, 348–51, 355–6, 379, 391–2, 433–4, 442–9, 468, 473, 485, 487

Gadādhara  7, 44, 120, 153, 243, 247, 310, 321–2, 326, 327, 342, 361, 376 gananārūpa-apekṣābuddhi  279 Gaṅgeśa  6, 74, 230, 233, 247, 251, 286–9, 381 Geach, P. T.  328, 336–7 Gettier, E. L.  4, 122, 126, 128, 130–4, 151 Goldman, A.  4, 78, 121–2, 126, 128–36, 152–3 grammatical criterion  160–4, 401 Hall, R.  259 Harman, G.  174 harmony  9, 11, 428, 472–6, 480, 483–5, 487, 489, 491 Hegel, G.  1, 10, 443, 453, 487 Heidegger, M.  47, 445–6 Herzberger, H.  217–19, 223 hetu  18, 83, 92, 95, 111, 133, 137, 169, 185–7, 247, 287 hetutāvacchedaka  97, 101–2 hetvābhāsa  101 hetvasiddha  19, 103 higher order cognition  5, 89, 155–9, 287 Hilbert-Bernays  328, 331–2 Hinduism  427, 437, 463, 480, 484, 486, 489 Hintikka, J.  177, 257, 272, 337, 339, 361 holism  379 holistic understanding  8, 10, 11, 74, 360, 363, 375–7, 379, 470, 474, 480, 489 homonymous expression  7, 118–19, 323, 367, 382

506 Index

human beings  9–10, 48–50, 427–36, 440–52, 455, 457, 473–4, 478–80, 483–4 Hume-Mill-Schlick type of compatibilism  457–9, 467 icchā  66, 277, 460 idealism  485 identity  20, 41, 49, 55–6, 58, 62, 80, 117, 145–50, 165–6, 207, 213–14, 226, 228, 234, 257–9, 268, 270–1, 276–7, 282–3, 295, 303–5, 311–18, 338, 341, 344–50, 354–8, 367–8, 370, 374, 385, 390, 405, 412, 417–18, 420–2, 431, 466–7, 486 indexical  323–7 indicator  310, 326, 342, 392 indivisible  141, 204, 341–2, 347, 379 induction  441 inference  3–5, 15, 18, 20, 73–5, 85, 92–112, 132, 134, 136–8, 173, 180, 185–9, 247, 287–9, 334, 405, 441 intensional  5, 101, 121, 140 intentional  203–4, 306, 382–4, 433 Irwin, T.  123 Jackendoff, R.  8, 181, 376, 388 Jagadīśa  267, 308, 315–17 Jaina  11, 56, 74, 155, 438, 485 Jainism  427 jāti  46, 66, 230, 262–3, 308–9, 314, 317, 341, 344, 392 Jayanta  38, 44, 312, 314–15, 321, 382, 384 Jinendrabuddhi  209, 214–15 jñāna  10, 81, 84–90, 96, 98, 101–3, 114–15, 157, 182, 186, 188, 214, 279, 365–6, 383, 391, 432, 437, 460, 476, 480, 489–90 jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa  81, 84–90 Jñānaśrīmitra  214 jñātatā  155, 157 justification  77, 134, 136, 138, 233, 264–5, 287, 420, 436, 486 kādācitka  23, 31–2 Kajiyama, Y.  210–11, 222 kāma  11, 15, 437, 484 Kamalaśīla  6, 28, 209, 214–17, 220 Kant, I.  10, 50, 122, 124, 412, 423, 429, 431, 442–3, 453, 458–9, 462, 476 Kaplan, D.  142–3, 148, 153, 324 kāraka  165–6, 167, 175, 388–9, 390

kāraṇa  15–18, 23–5, 32–3, 36, 41, 58–9, 76, 92–3, 137, 274–7 karaṇa  38–40, 43, 75–6, 87, 113–14, 119, 158, 165, 365, 370, 374 kāraṇa-śarīra  56, 58–9 kāraṇavaiguṇya  136 karma  9–10, 31–3, 157, 314, 427, 432–3, 435–7, 461–2, 480, 489 karmāsayaleśa  433 kārmic residue  435, 436, 437 kartṛtva-abhimāna  432 kāryānvitābhidhāna  379–81 Katz, J.  181, 376, 388 kevalānvayī-anumāna  100 kevalānvayī-hetu  95 kevalavyatirekī-anumāna  95 kevalavyatirekī-hetu  95 khalu-idam-Brahma  480 khaṇḍapakṣa  379–81 Kierkegaard, S.  445, 453, 468 Kiparsky, P.  165, 169, 175–7, 389, 395 knowability  100, 105–7, 198, 227, 250–1, 348 knowledge  36–7, 42–3, 50, 55, 56, 59, 63, 67, 73–4, 78, 90–1, 110, 121–39, 146–7, 202, 205, 239, 246, 286–8, 298, 304, 331, 334, 347–8, 356, 379, 391–3, 401, 416, 420, 427, 431–2, 437–8, 441–2, 450–6, 460, 463–5, 472–3, 475, 476–8, 480, 486, 488–9 Kripke, S.  7–9, 121, 151, 293, 297, 299–306, 310, 312, 316, 318, 319, 326, 412–23, 486 kriyā  10, 460 kṛti  343, 365, 393, 460 kṣaṇika  23–4 lakṣaṇā  306–7, 370, 382–4, 392 lakṣyārtha  392 Lambert, K.  177, 257–8, 272, 337, 339, 361 Laṅkāvatāra sūtra  434, 449 laukika-sannikarṣa  86 law of karma  9–10, 40, 427, 432–7, 461–2 Leibnitz, G.  420, 421 Lejewski, C.  173 Leonard, H. S.  257–8, 337–8 levels of meaning  9, 379, 388–94 libertarianism  10, 455–6, 459, 461, 470 limited by relation (avacchedakāvacchinna sambandha)  181, 226, 342 limitor  36, 67, 97–9, 101–2, 104–5, 115, 117, 132–3, 138–9, 151, 188, 191, 193, 213,

Index

227–30, 243–5, 251, 278, 297, 308–9, 312–18, 324–7, 341–2, 345–8, 406–9 logically proper name  171, 203, 241, 243, 255–6, 269, 297–9, 314, 332–5, 422–3 lokottara  393, 451 Mackie, J. L.  271 Mādhavācārya  51, 53 mahāsupti  58 Maitrī Upaniṣad  433, 448 mānascakṣura  2 Maṇḍna Miśra  490 manomaya-koṣa  55–6, 59 material cause  16–17 Mathurānātha  234 Matilal, B. K.  171, 201, 206, 211–12, 214 māyā 28 meaning of ‘I’  55–64 meaning of a sentence  6, 8, 113, 379–88 meaning-reference  416 meaning-relation  214, 216, 306–7, 316, 321, 340, 343, 370, 380 mediating criterion  161–3, 400–1 Mei, T. L.  163–4, 176 Meinongian  8, 332 memory-cognition  29–30, 40, 60–1, 84–5, 87–9, 99, 114–15, 119, 138, 287, 364–6, 370–2 metaphorical meaning  9, 119, 369, 372–3, 379, 382, 388, 390–1, 394, 396, 450 Mīmāṃsā  16–17, 19, 56, 58, 74, 97–8, 155, 157, 170–1, 209–10, 214, 379–81, 435, 437 Mohanty, J. N.  395 mokṣa  10–11, 15, 40, 42, 43, 437–8, 440, 452, 455, 461–4, 484 mokṣa-śastra  2 moment  3, 15, 31–5 momentariness  3, 15, 24–6, 42, 52 Moore, G. E.  7, 120, 259–60, 270, 272, 417, 424 Morton, A.  130 Moser, P.  127–8, 152 mukhyārtha 391–2 Nāgārjuna  11, 207, 485–6 Nakamura, H.  54 Nakhnikian, G.  7, 208, 257, 270–1 nāmarupa  58 nameability  100, 107, 154, 198, 250–1, 322, 348, 468

507

Navya-Nyāya  23, 74, 91, 93, 179, 186–93, 229–30, 235–7, 243, 249, 262, 267, 282, 284, 308, 310, 313–18, 326, 342, 382–4, 404 necessary  78, 80, 87–8, 102, 136, 162, 184, 300–4, 369–70, 387, 412–15, 419–23 negation  17, 31, 93, 117–18, 151, 197–200, 203, 206, 209–21, 224–37, 240–3, 250, 254, 256, 265, 269–70, 330, 340, 350–2, 355, 357, 368, 379, 394, 411, 442 neo-Advaita  55, 62, 455 never-type of absence  31, 67 nidānas  46 nigamana  95, 97, 111, 137, 186 nimitta-kāraṇa  39, 93, 137, 277 nirūpaka  180, 183 nirūpya  180, 183 nirvāṇa  9–10, 42–3, 45, 49, 50–3, 61, 427–8, 432, 437–8, 440, 452, 455 nirveda  393, 432, 451 nirvikalpaka-jñāna  82, 90, 182, 279 nirvirodhavāda  480, 489 niścayātmakajñāna  115, 366 niṣedha  209–10, 215 nitya doṣa  110 nominalism  70, 274 non-qualificative cognition  224–5 no-relevant alternavies approach  4, 121–2, 128–31 number  7, 67, 69–70, 244–5, 274–85 Nyāya  1–9, 15–24, 31–44, 56–8, 66–297, 306–411, 435, 455, 486 Nyāyamaṅjarī  44, 321 object-concept  294, 400–1 occurrence-exacting relation  213, 226, 228, 230, 237, 341, 405 ontology  8, 23, 31–4, 37, 66, 79, 100, 140, 145, 150, 162, 169, 173, 176, 187, 231, 233, 243–4, 250–1, 267–70, 275–7, 281, 311, 318, 331–2, 385–6, 402–5, 407, 409 operation  17, 22, 38–40, 43, 75–80, 87, 93–9, 101–4, 119, 135, 137–8, 186–8, 287, 365, 371 ordinal number  7, 283–5 Ortega, Y. G.  445–6 Orthodox Christianity  444–5 pada  115, 117, 363–4, 384, 386 padārtha  19, 31, 362–3 padavṛttijñāna  372, 374

508 Index

pakṣa  5, 18, 92–100, 103, 105–7, 109, 134, 137, 180, 185–8 Pakṣadhara Miśra  231 pakṣadharmatā-jñāna  97, 102, 103 pakṣatā  92–3, 95, 137, 186–7, 289, 322 Pāṇini  5, 160, 165, 168–71, 175, 389–90 parāmarśa  44, 93, 95–9, 101–2, 104, 137, 186, 188, 286–7 paribhāṣā  307 pariṇāma  42, 57, 379 parokṣa  186 paryāpti  244, 280, 282–3 paryudāsa  209–11, 213, 219 Patañjali  395 Peirce, C. S.  323 perception  2–4, 15, 29–30, 32–3, 36, 46, 56, 60–1, 73–99, 133–6, 155–9, 183, 185–6, 262, 264, 275, 279–80, 287–8, 373, 405, 412 performatives  199–200 perlocutionary act  390 pervader-pervaded relation (vyāpya-vyāpaka sambandha)  6, 36–7, 245–7, 250–1, 274, 326 Plato  9, 10, 122–5, 256, 304–5, 312–14, 401, 440–1 Platonism  70, 123, 274 Pollock, J. L.  127–8 Portner, P. H.  381, 388 post-Gettier counterexamples  126–8 Prabhākara  56, 74, 155, 380 Practical Vedānta  476, 479, 483, 488 prāgabhāva  6, 31, 67, 228 prakāra  5, 11, 82, 115, 134, 179, 183–5, 187, 193, 366 prakāratā-avacchedaka-sambandha  313 prākaṭya  157 prakṛti  17, 28, 42, 57, 59 pramā  112, 134 pramātva  91 prāṇamaya-koṣa  55–6, 59 prasajya-pratiṣedha  6, 209, 210–13, 219 prasaṅga saṅgati  286 pratibimvavāda  58 pratijñā  95–6, 111, 137, 185, 187 pratiyogī  5, 82, 88, 115, 134, 179–82, 185, 188–9, 309, 313, 384–5 pratiyogitā  88, 180, 181, 185, 347, 385 pratiyogitāvacchedaka  237 pratyakṣa  85, 373

pravṛtti-nimitta  262–3, 309–10, 318, 341–2 pravṛttivijnāna  42, 51–2, 59, 61 prayojaka  343 predicate  22, 92, 134, 151, 160–4, 166–76, 179–83, 185, 187, 189–93, 197–9, 239, 242–6, 254–9, 262, 269–71, 294, 298–9, 312, 329, 333, 346–9, 385, 397–411, 415, 418 predicate-concept  124 prescriptive propositions  3, 6, 45, 50, 53, 206, 379, 393, 486 preventer-prevented relation (pratibadhyapratibandhaka sambandha )  111, 116, 150, 154, 227, 231, 353, 367, 409 Price, R.  164 Prior, A.  6, 241–4, 251 pro-abortionists  443–4 probans  18–19, 83, 92–110, 137–8, 157, 186–9, 247–51 proper names  6–8, 148, 151, 293–322 proposition-negation  224 puruṣārthas  484 qualificand  5, 67, 69, 80–4, 88–92, 99, 101, 114, 117, 134, 145–8, 151, 170–2, 175, 179–80, 182–8, 190–2, 202–3, 215–17, 225–8, 278–9, 294, 312–13, 315, 317, 324, 341–2, 345–7, 353, 355, 357–60, 365–8, 375–6, 386, 404–10, 415–16 qualifier  5, 67, 69, 78–5, 88–92, 99, 101–2, 114, 117, 131–2, 145–9, 151, 170–2, 175, 179–80, 182–8, 190–3, 202–3, 215–17, 220–1, 225–8, 278–9, 309–10, 312–13, 317, 324–6, 341–2, 345–7, 353, 355, 357–9, 365–9, 375–6, 387, 404–10, 415–16 Quine, W. V. O.  7–8, 141–2, 172–4, 176, 190, 204, 257, 261, 270, 328, 332, 334–5, 337, 349, 399, 411, 421 Radhakrishnan, S.  10, 54, 436, 438 Rāmānuja  490 Ramsey, F. P.  128, 139, 161–2 rasa  66, 277, 391, 393, 451 rationality  440–5, 448, 453, 487 Ratnakīrti  6, 205, 206, 209, 214, 217, 220, 222 realism  3, 4, 66, 67, 70, 77, 205, 208, 274, 285, 485 recognition  29–31, 56–62, 87, 89 Redmon, R. B.  7, 260, 261, 271 reductionism  9, 378, 394

Index

reference  7–8, 32, 38–9, 143, 171, 173, 197, 206, 209, 215, 219–21, 242, 268, 271, 296, 302–3, 305, 323, 335–40, 343–4, 347–9, 362, 380, 390, 401, 413, 415–16, 418, 420, 464, 466 Reichenbach, B.  323, 433, 439 relation  37, 41, 55, 66, 78–80, 147, 169, 180–1, 184, 213, 226, 244, 270, 286, 306, 311, 317, 340, 350, 356, 371, 375, 380, 385, 405–7 relation-limitor  227, 228, 230, 232, 237, 346, 352, 406, 407 reliabilism  128–32 Rescher, N.  337 rigid designator  301–2, 305, 415, 420–2 Rucyaka  383 Russell, B.  3–8, 10, 62, 73, 90–2, 139–40, 143–5, 148, 151, 172–3, 199, 202–3, 224, 238–43, 246, 253, 255–6, 274, 282, 285, 293, 297–9, 314, 316, 320, 322–3, 332–9, 341, 343, 348–51, 355–6, 404, 412–14, 417, 422–3, 472, 474, 477–8 Ryle, G.  125, 140, 459 śābdabodha  170–1, 176, 310, 313, 384 sādhakatama  38 sādhāraṇa kāraṇa  36, 274 sādhāraṇa-vyabhicāra  105 sādhāraṇa-vyabhicārī-hetu  105 sādhya  5, 18, 83, 92, 134, 157, 180, 185–7, 247 sādhyāsiddha  104 sādhyatā  186, 187, 460 sahakārī-kāraṇa  38 Sainsbury, M.  143 śakti  16, 307, 382–4 śakya  7, 181, 308–9, 317, 324, 341, 382 śakyatāvacchedaka  308, 324, 341 Salmon, W. C.  7, 257, 270 sāmānādhikaraṇya sambandha  35, 264, 282 sāmānyābhāva  84 sāmānyalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa  81, 83–5 samavāya  23, 66, 192 samavāyī-kāraṇa  16, 33, 41, 43, 92, 276–7 Śaṃkara  437, 480, 489 saṃketa  306, 307 Sāṃkhya  3, 15–23, 66, 277, 455 Sāṃkhya-Yoga  57–8, 435 saṃsargābhāva  31, 66, 233 saṃskāra  33, 40, 46, 66, 85, 99, 277, 393 saṃyoga  32, 66, 78–9, 180–2, 185, 277 saṅgati  286–9

509

Śāntarakṣita  28, 209, 214–17, 220 sapakṣa  95–6, 100, 105–8, 137 sapakṣasattva  100, 104–5 saptabhaṅgīnaya  485 śarīrāvacchinna-ātmā  435 Sartre, J.  445, 447, 453, 455, 468, 471 satpratipakṣa  17, 103, 108–10 sattā  23, 261–4 saturated  48, 163, 179, 189–93, 225, 397–8, 400–10, 438 savikalpaka-jñāna  82, 90, 182 scepticism  4–5, 32, 77, 91, 144, 151 Schlick, M.  458, 470 Searle, J.  168, 177, 299, 412, 414 self  29, 34, 42, 48, 56–65, 75, 87, 89–92, 135, 435, 467–8 semi-complete  304–5, 416, 417 sense  32, 38, 41, 51–2, 108–9, 141–2, 200–1, 203, 209, 219, 221, 231, 242, 244, 254, 257, 264–71, 274, 276, 295–309, 324, 327–31, 342–3, 345–6, 348–51, 356, 362, 372, 379, 382, 390–4, 398, 403, 406–7, 410–23, 429–30, 446, 448, 455, 477, 478 sense-object contact  78–81 sense-reference  7–8 senses of ‘nañ’  41 sentence-sphoṭa  379 Shastri, D.  44, 53, 396 Shelly, P.  49 siddhānta-lakṣaṇa  247 siddha-sādhana  96 similar-to-inherent cause  32–3, 41–3, 69, 92, 113, 119, 276–8 Śiromaṇi, Raghunātha  23, 146, 230–4, 236, 262–5, 282, 284, 310, 318–22, 342, 404 skandhas  46 Skyrms, B.  338 smṛti  4, 74, 451 smṛtyātmaka-bhrama  85 soft determinism  455 soft soft determinism  456, 464 solipsism  3–4, 62, 73, 473 spirituality  432 Śrīdhara  264 Staal, F.  165, 169, 175–7, 209, 222, 389, 395 sthāyibhāva  393, 451 sthūla-śarīra  56, 58 Strawson, P. F.  7–8, 62, 160–3, 172, 190, 299, 328, 335–8, 397, 399–402, 412

510 Index

subject  4–5, 57, 61–4, 124, 134, 160, 176, 179–80, 185–93, 205, 244–6, 266, 294, 297–9, 312, 332–3, 345–8, 385, 390, 397–410, 415, 444, 455, 464–6, 468, 473 subject-object  467 substratum  20–1, 58, 134, 179, 182, 185, 188–9, 246–8, 385–6 suffering  47–53 suggestive meaning  9–10, 119, 369, 378–9, 388, 391, 393–4, 440, 450, 451, 475 sūkṣma-śarīra  56, 58–9 śūnya  6, 201, 205–6 superstratum  20–1, 134, 179, 182, 185, 188–9, 246–50, 385–6 surface structure  160, 165–6, 168, 172, 174–5, 389, 390 svarūpa-sambandha  35, 80, 226, 284, 341 svarūpāsiddha  103, 109–10 tadvyaktitva  266–7, 313, 317–18, 392 Taittirīya Upaniṣad  55, 391 tamaḥ  57 Tāntrics  59 tarka  4, 74, 111–12 Tarkatīrtha, V.  193, 321 Tarski, A.  141, 199, 381 tātparya  74, 113, 362, 371–2, 382, 384 tātparyajñāna  8, 113, 362, 372 tautology  22, 218, 266 term-introduction  161–2 Teshima, I.  444, 453 testimony  4, 74–5, 85, 99, 110, 113–18, 138 theologians  10, 444–5 time  15, 24–5, 34–6, 66–7, 268, 270, 349 topic-comment  164, 174, 177 transcendental  57, 64, 463–4, 467–8 transformation  166–8, 170–2, 181, 245, 366, 376–9, 385–6, 388, 394–5, 398 truth-condition  126, 128, 170–1, 381–2, 385, 387 truth-conditional semantics  381 truth-gaps  203, 208, 335 types of inference  94–5 ubiquitous  36, 66, 268, 270, 349, 404 udāharaṇa  95, 97, 111, 137, 186 Udayana  6, 132, 202–3, 208, 237, 265–7, 273, 361 uddeśvatāvacchedaka  312

uddeśya  134, 180, 183, 185, 187 unanalysable imposed property  230, 234, 263, 314–15, 343–4, 403 undercoverage  248–9, 251 understanding the meaning of a sentence  74, 111, 113–19, 311, 340–5, 358–60, 362–75 unexampled  24 unintentional  433 uniqueness  66, 163, 207, 309, 314, 318–19, 330–1, 344, 352, 447 unity-in-diversity  11, 474, 480, 487, 489 universal-cum-particular  162–3 universals  66, 81, 122, 162, 215, 218, 268–9, 400–1, 442–6 unnameable  198, 352 unsaturated  9, 163, 179, 189–91, 225, 397–8, 400–2, 405, 407, 408, 410 unselfishness  436–8, 461–3, 468, 473–4, 477–8 upādāna-kāraṇa  42 upādhi  230, 263, 341 upalakṣaṇa  310, 318–20, 326, 342 upamiti  73, 85, 112–13 upanaya  95, 97, 111, 137, 186, 188 upodghāta saṅgati  287 upsurge  447, 468 Vācaspati, Miśra  228 vācya-vācaka-sambandha  214 Vaiśeṣika  15–17, 24, 32, 56–8, 155, 157, 169, 176, 205, 277, 284, 317–18, 379, 435 vākya  8, 176, 188, 310–11, 344, 384 vākyārtha  8, 310, 372, 383–4 vākyārthabodha  8, 310–11, 344, 384 valid  74–5, 95–7, 102–3, 110–12, 133–4, 139, 227–8, 231, 233–4, 241–2 van Fraassen, B.  337 Vardhamāna  309–10, 342–3 Vātsāyayana  265 Vedānta  10–11, 57–8, 154–5, 362–4, 369–75, 377, 379–80, 388, 392, 396, 413, 434–5, 437, 439, 449, 452, 455, 467, 472, 474, 476–7, 479–80, 486–9 Vedas  391, 435, 450, 479, 484, 487, 489 verb-like  161 vidheya  5, 134, 180, 183, 185, 187 Vijñānabhikṣu  58 vijñānamaya-koṣa  55–6, 59 vipakṣa  95, 100, 105–8

Index

viruddha  103, 108 viṣayatā  69, 101, 136, 145, 153, 157, 357 viśeṣa  66 viśeṣaṇa  11, 79–80, 88, 114, 134, 179, 182–5, 187, 193, 317, 365–6, 375, 387 viśeṣaṇatā  79–80, 84, 88, 183–4, 368, 375, 385 viśeṣaṇatāvacchedaka  117, 368 viśeṣyatā  67, 80, 84, 88, 92, 183, 186, 278, 375 viśeṣyatāvaccedaka  117, 368 viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa  312 viśiṣṭa-viṣayatā  78, 136, 188, 228 viśiṣṭa-viṣayitā  78, 136 Viśvanātha  396, 451 Vivekananda, Swami  10, 61, 65, 396, 427, 430, 436–7, 439, 461–2, 464, 468, 470, 472, 474, 480–3, 486–8, 491 Vorsteg, R.  336 vṛtitva  267 vṛtti  184, 306 vṛttiniyāmaka sambandha  182 vyabhicāra  18, 19, 103, 105, 108, 110 vyabhicāribhāva  451 vyakti  392 vyāpāra  22, 38, 40, 43, 75–6, 79–80, 90, 95, 113–14, 119, 135, 171, 188, 365, 371 vyāpāravat  38, 76, 80 vyāpti  94–6, 111–12, 120, 137, 188, 289 vyāpti-jñāna  93, 96–7, 102

511

vyāpyatāvacchedaka  97, 104 vyāpyatva  188 vyāpyatvāsiddha  104–5 vyatireka-sahacāra  108 well-formed  198–9, 243, 270, 350, 355–7, 366–8, 374, 421 weltanschauungen  16 wheel of causation  45 Whorf, B. L.  163–4 Wiggins, D.  421, 424 Wittgenstein, L.  120, 140, 153, 238–43, 252, 260, 272, 299, 334, 412, 414, 419–20, 424 word-order  163, 175 world-views  486 yama  489 yaugika  389 Yoga  42, 52, 57, 81, 90, 155, 429, 434, 438, 448–9, 455, 463 Yogācāra  449 yogaja-sannikarṣa  81, 90 Yogavāsiṣṭha  434–5, 449 yogyatā  74, 113, 115–16, 118, 311, 345, 362, 366–9, 371, 373, 383 yogyatājñāna  115, 366 zero  212, 219, 221

512

513

514

515

516