The CIA's Black Ops; Covert Action, Foreign Policy, and Democracy 1573927422

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
LOOKING GLASS WAR
Part I - The Third Option
Chapter 1 Like Moths to Light:
BIPOLARITY AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF AMERICAN INTERESTS
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND COVERT ACTION
OSS BUCCANEERS AND THE INTELLIGENCE ELITE
THE BREAKDOWN OF BIPARTISANSHIP AND COVERT ACTION
COVERT ACTION: THE SEDUCTIVE OPTION
SUBVERSION, ROLLBACK, AND COVERT ACTION
THE AGE OF CONFIDENCE
PUPPETMASTER'S DREAM: CIA IN THE FIFTIES
"LIE, CHEAT, AND STEAL": AMERICAN POLICY PAPERS
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND COVERT ACTION
THE LEADER OF THE FREE WORLD
NOTES
Chapter 2 The Wars That Came in from the Cold
The Shores of Tripoli
The Founding Father Goes Covert
Conclusion
COVERT ACTION IN THE COLD WAR
The Forties: From OSS to CIA
The Fifties: Heyday for the Operators
The 1960s: Icarus Falling
The 1970s: Rogue Elephants and Red Sandwiches
The 1980s: The Real Phoenix Rises
The 19908: Get Saddam!
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES
Chapter 3 Covert Action: The Black Ops Menu
WHAT COVERT ACTION Is
COVERT ACTION: THE MYRIAD WAYS
Asset Development
Political Action
Propaganda and Disinformation
Economic Warfare
Paramilitary Action
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES
WHAT COVERT ACTION Is
COVERT ACTION: THE MYRIAD WAYS
Political Action
Propaganda and Disinformation
Economic Warfare
Paramilitary Action
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES
Chapter 4 Making New Friends: The Coup d'Etat
OUR SONS OF BITCHES TAKE OVER
The Only Horse We've Got
Brazil!
Down Under-Handed*
TAKING OVER THE GOVERNMENT: A PRIMER FOR PLOTTERS21
Coups: SOMETIMES GOOD, USUALLY BAD, ALWAYS UGLY
Every Coup Isn't One of Ours
Shooting Ourselves in the Foot
Covert Action, Successful Coups, and Backlash
The Cold War and Counterfactuals
The Philosophy of Overthrow
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES
Part II - Covert Operations Red, White, and Black
Chapter 5 Assassination as Foreign Policy*
JOE FROM PARIS
The Station Chief, the Scientist, and the Postman
THE MAN! N HAVANA
Getting Smoked by a Cigar
No More Mister Nice Guy
AM/LASH
HANKIES AREN'T JUST FOR SISSIES
LYING DOWN WITH DOGS
Letting the Sunshine In
ISSUES AND ASSASSINATIONS
Deniability is Critical
CIA, Assassination, and Intelligence
The Morality of Assassination
Assassination and the Law
Where Do We Get Assassins?
Off-the-Shelf: Executive Action
We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us...
The Logic of Elimination:
Or, How Assassination "Works"
Assassination: Playing the Poor Man's Game
Authorizing Assassination: No Paper, No Control
Assassination of Terrorists and Others
"We Don't Target Individuals": Nonassassination Assassinations
ASSASSINATION: A NOT-SO-SlMPLE OPTION
NOTES
Chapter 6 They Were Expendable: Covert Armies
BLEEDING THE KURDS2
HMONG MEANS "FREE"6
THE MONTAGNARDS! SONS OF THE MOUNTAINS
CONFLICTING GOALS: THE POLITICS OF TRAGEDY
VICTORY AND ITS AFTERMATH
DEFEAT
DEFEAT ISN'T ALWAYS LOSING
THE FUTURE OF "SECRET ARMIES"
THE INEVITABLE ATTRACTION
NOTES
Chapter 7 An Offer You Can't Refuse: Organized Crime and the CIA
ON THE WATERFRONT
CONTRACT ON FIDEL
WHY TURN TO THE MOB?
YOU KNEW! WAS A SNAKE...
NOTES
Just Say Yes:
Covert Action and Drug Empires
Chapter 8 Just Say Yes:Covert Action and Drug Empires
THE COLD WAR, U. S. INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FRENCH CONNECTION
COLD WAR, GOLD TRIANGLE
LAND OF A MILLION ELEPHANTS
THE GREAT GAME
COCAINE, COWBOYS, AND CONTRAS
DRUG EMPIRES: AN OFFER YOU CAN'T REFUSE?
You KNEW I WAS A SNAKE WHEN YOU PICKED ME UP... AGAIN
Is THE LEARNING CURVE FLAT?DRUGS AND COVERT ACTION
NOTES
Chapter 9 My Heroes Have Always Been Cowboys
THE COWBOY WAY
RlP ROBERTSON: YOU COULDN'T MAKE HIM UP
"HAPPY (HO CHI MlNH) TRAILS"
BLACK OPS AND OPERATIONAL LIMITS
To RlDE, SHOOT STRAIGHT, AND SPEAK THE TRUTH
BACK IN THE SADDLE AGAIN: COWBOY FOREIGN POLICY
THE CODE OF THE WEST
BONANZA! WHEN SPOOKS Go PRIVATE
TERRORISM 101
THE BLACK REVOLVING DOOR
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES
Chapter 10 If You're Not for Us, You're Against Us: Covert Actions at Home
BLACK OPS AND BLACK BAGS:
COVERT ACTION COMES HOME
COINTELPRO
NO THIRD-RATE BURGLAR?
THE HUSTON PLAN
DEBATEGATE AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
THE OPERATORS COME HOME
COVERT OPERATORS, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND FREEDOM
WHERE THE LINE IS...
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES
Chapter 11 The Political Economy of Covert Action I:
ASK NOT WHAT YOU CAN DO FOR YOUR COUNTRY...
DEFENDING THE CORPORATE INTEREST
A SYSTEM IS NOT A CONSPIRACY
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES
Chapter 12
The Political Economy of Covert Action II:
BLACK OPS AND GREEN OPS
"MAKE THE ECONOMY SCREAM"
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DON'T WORK"
IRAQ
COUNTERCOUP
CONTRAS, CORDOBAS, AND CREDITS
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES

Part III - Off-the-shelf
Chapter 13
Private Armies: We Shoot for Loot
HAVE GUN, WILL TRAVEL2
WHERE YOU STAND DEPENDS ON WHERE YOU SlT: SAFE HAVENS AND BLACK OPERATIONS
MISS NELLI'S BOARDING HOUSE
PRIVATE ARMY, PRIVATE WAR
COLD WAR, HOT PURSUIT
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES
Chapter 14 The Political Economy of Covert Action III: "Off-the-Books"
WHAT "OFF-THE-BOOKS" MEANS
THE ENTERPRISE?
MONEY, GUNS, AND DRUGS: THE NUGAN HAND BANK
LOOTING THE U. S. TREASURY, PART H:
THE SAVINGS AND LOAN SCANDAL AND BLACK OPS*
"OFF-THE-BOOKS":
SECRECY, DEMOCRACY, AND BLACK OPS
Off-the-Books Operations and Foreign Affairs
OFF-THE-BOOKS OPERATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES
Part IV - Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Covert Action
Chapter 15 "Hell, Mr. President,We Are Involved! ":
Covert Action, Operational Limits, and Prestige Investment
COVERT ACTION, DENIABILITY, AND OPERATIONAL LIMITS
BREAKING THE GLASS
PRESSURE FROM WlTHIN:FAILURE AMD EXPOSURE IN COVERT OPERATIONS
CREATING PROVOCATIONS
COMING HOME TO ROOST
THE KEY QUESTIONS
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES
Chapter 16
Innocents Abroad: Covert Action and the Advising Process
COVERT ACTION: PLAYING WITH HOUSE MONEY?
WHEN THE UMPIRE GETS TO BAT:
THE CIA AND THE COVERT ACTION ADVISING PROCESS
PRESIDENTS, POLITICIANS, AND PLANS
"How could I have been so stupid? "
REINVENTING THE WHEEL, REINVENTING THE WHEEL...
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES
Chapter 17 Covert Action and Democracy
THE COVERT MENTALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
COVERT ACTION AND THE CONSTITUTION
COVERT ACTION AND THE LAW
COVERT ACTION AND DEMOCRACY:
CAREFUL BALANCE OR MORTAL COMBAT?
THE EVOLUTION OF PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY
THE OVERSIGHT MYTH
DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND BLACK OPERATIONS
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES
Part V - Conclusions: Deja Vu All Over Again
Chapter 18 A Circle in a Spiral:
What Covert Action Accomplished
HOW CAN WE JUDGE?
JUDGING SUCCESS AND FAILURE
SUCCESS AND FAILURE: A BRIEF LEDGER
IT'S THE ECONOMY, STUPID: ONE LAST TIME
POLITICAL OUTCOMES OF COVERT ACTION
WINNING AND LOSING THE COLD WAR
POSTSCRIPT: FIGHTING FIRE WITH WATER
NOTES
Chapter 19 Meet the New Boss:
ALL THE DRAGONS AREN'T SLAIN
AGENCIES IN SEARCH OP A MISSION
THE CONTINUING APPEAL OF BLACK OPERATIONS
COVERT ACTION AND NEW WORLD ORDERS
CONCLUSIONS
NOTES
Chapter 20 Same as the Old Boss:
Spookspeak:A Glossary of Fun and Useful Terms
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

The CIA's Black Ops: Covert Action, Foreign Policy,and Democracy. Copyright 2000 by John Jacob Nutter. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews Inquiries should be addressed to Prometheus Books, 59 John Amherst, Glenn New Drive,York 14228-2197. VOICE: 716-691-0153. ext. 207. FAX: 716-564-2711. WWW.PROMETHEUSBOOKS.COM 04 03 02 01 00

54321

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nutter, John Jacob. The CIA's black ops: covert action, foreign policy, and democracy / John Jacob Nutter, p. cm. ISBN 1-57392-742-2 (cloth) 1. United States. Central Intelligence Agency. 2. United States Foreign relations. 1. Title. II. Title: Central Intelligence Agency's black ops. JK468.I6N88 1999 327.1273'009'045—dc21 99-10404 CIP

Contents

Acknowledgments

9

Introduction: A Tale of Two Operations: SUCCESS and Failure

11

PART I: THE THIRD OPTION 1. Like Moths to Light: The Attraction of Covert Action

25

2. The Wars That Came in from the Cold

47

3. Covert Action: The Black Ops Menu

73

4. Making New Friends: The Coup d'Etat

94

PART II: COVERT OPERATIONS: RED, W HITE, AND BLACK 5. Exploding Cigars, Poisoned Wet Suits, and the Body in the Buick: Assassination as Foreign Policy

111

6. They Were Expendable: Covert Armies

154

7. An Offer You Can't Refuse: Organized Crime and the CIA

170

8. Just Say Yes: Covert Action and Drug Empires

178

9. My Heroes Have Always Been Cowboys

193

10. If You're Nor lor Us, You're Against Us: Covert Actions at Home

207

11. The Political Economy of Covert Action 1: The National Interest and the Corporate Interest

221

12. The Political Economy of Covert Action II: It's the Economy, Stupid! 231

PART H I: OFF-THE-SHELF 13- Private Armies: We Shoot for Loot

247

14. The Political Economy of Covert Action III: "Off-the-Books"

257

PART IV : DEMOCRACY, FOREIGN POLICY, AND COVERT ACTION 15. "Hell. Mr. President, We Are Involved! ": Covert Action, Operational Limits, and Prestige Investment

275

16. Innocents Abroad: Covert Action and the Advising Process

287

17. Covert Action and Democracy

298

PART V: CONCLUSIONS: DEJA Vu ALL OVER AGAIN 18. A Circle in a Spiral: What Covert Action Accomplished

315

19 Meet the New Boss: Covert Action and Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century

330

20. Same as the Old Boss: The Power of Covert Institutions and the End of the Cold War

336

Spookspeak: A Glossary of Fun and Useful Terms

339

Bibliography

349

Index

355

Acknowledgments

I learned a great deal from my students at Michigan State University, and am especially indebted to those who contributed to my senior seminar, Democ­ racy, Foreign Policy, and Covert Action. There is probably a piece of each of you somewhere in this book. I have also benefited from some wonderful and perspi­ cacious academic colleagues, including Colleen Tremonte, Robert Aponte, Donald Lloyd, Linda Racciopi, Norman Graham, Peter Dorman, Kenneth Walzer, Jessica DeForest, and Dixie Platt. I am also grateful to a number of friends who have helped maintain sanity (I think) through some difficult times, including Steve DeVore, Brian Rowe, Mark Bellaire, Matt Thompson, Alec Lloyd, and Randy Cowell. In the course of producing this work, I have learned a great deal from the current and former intelligence officers and operators who have spared the time to educate me in some of the nuance and nitty-gritty of black ops. You will not agree with all of my analyses or conclusions, but I hope you think your contri­ butions improved them nevertheless. You know who you are, and you have my gratitude. This research has also been deliberately obstructed by a number of people and organizations, and is produced here in spite of their malignant efforts. You are who you are, and nothing I can say can be worse than that. I am particularly grateful to my agent, Sheree Bykofsky, and to Janet Rosen. Your encouragement and belief in this work, as well as your efforts in teaching a novice author some of the trade, have helped make The CIA's Black Ops a reality I have also enjoyed the editorial skill of Meghann French, who has made this a much better work, and a much better experience. Most importantly, my family has been my reason for writing as well as the rock upon which I have stood during some trying times. My wife, Susan, has put up with so many evenings and weekends while I pounded the keyboard, and is still here. My mother's faith in her son never wavered, and that is worth a lot. It has been most difficult for my son, who nonetheless has been understanding

beyond his years for the times his dad has had to forego playing pirates while writing about spooks. Well, from now on, "Yo ho ho."

ih&*oducfior: A Tale of Two Operations: SUCCESS and Failure

LOOKING GLASS WAR

TH

he rebel DC-3 came in low and fast,' a gray-green shadow thundering out A of the jungle and across the rooftops of the Guatemalan town, its twin Pratt and Whitney engines shaking loose the red roof tiles as the campesinos in the marketplace scattered for cover. Wind buffeted the face of the "bombardier" through the open cargo door as he took aim, then released his "payload"—an empty Coca-Cola bottle. It exploded on the worn cobblestones of the market square with a startling "boom" that quite resembled a bomb burst. "Mission accomplished," the pilot might have thought to himself in Chinese (for he was a Taiwanese soldier of fortune) as he turned the cumbersome aircraft toward home. He planned to enjoy the sunshine on the way back, for there were no enemy fighters in the sky; the Guatemalan air force was grounded by the most dangerous weapon of all: propaganda. It was just another day for the secret army of OPERATION PB/SUCCESS, a United States covert action that proved you could overthrow governments with smoke and mirrors—and a few Coke bottles. This is the story of the secret operations of the cold war. It was a war fought with exploding seashells, fake sex films, Frank Sinatra letters, and yes, Coke bot­ tles. It was a war fought with student front groups and with the world's largest airline. It was a heartless war, with guns supplied by Americans and Soviets and blood supplied by Kurds, Cubans, Hmong, Montangards, Afghans, and Miskitos, who would each in their turn be cast aside. It was a war for the highest ideals; it was a war for the lesser evil. It was war through the looking glass; it was the war of

OPERATION PB/SUCCESS' In November 1950, the people of Guatemala freely and fairly elected as presi­ dent Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, a populist with genuine concern for the lives of the impoverished Guatemalans. By August 1954, Arbenz had fled the country, both his regime and the democratic institutions of Guatemala destroyed by a coup d'etat, largely psychological in nature, which was created and implemented by the Central Intelligence Agency. In fact, the operation was so effective that casu­ alties were virtually nil, except for the accidental sinking of the British ship Sprinlgfdewhose owners were compensated by Lloyds of London. OPERATION PB/SUCCESS, as it was code-named by the CIA, became a model for future covert actions against uncooperative foreign regimes.3 Jacobo Arbenz assumed office aiming to improve the lot of his people, a desire that crashed head-on into a brick wall of interests called the United Fruit Company (UFCO). UFCO was Guatemala's largest landowner, and also con­ trolled the nation's railroads, ports, and telephone facilities. La Frutera, as UFCO was known locally, followed a traditional practice of U S. corporations in Latin America; it bought land not only to grow crops, but also to keep it out of the hands of other fruit companies. More than half a million acres of the finest agri­ cultural land in Guatemala lay uncultivated while native Guatemalans starved. To remedy this, Arbenz nationalized some 400,000 acres out of the 550,000 held by LaFrutera. 4 Yet this was no gunpoint expropriation, for Arbenz paid for the land. United Fruit, however, was not amused by the compensation, which was the taxable value that UFCO had assigned to the land. It was at this point in 1953 that Thomas Corcoran (aka "Tommy the Cork") chief counsel to UFCO (and to Civil Air Transport, a CIA proprietary airline), discovered the "Communist threat" in Guatemala, bringing it to the attention of Undersecretary of State Waiter Bedell Smith (who was the former director of Central Intelligence and future director of the United Fruit Company). As Arbenz had recently legalized the small Guatemalan Communist Party in addition to his expropriation of land, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Eisen­ hower were easily convinced that immediate action had to be taken to stamp out the "Soviet beachhead" in our hemisphere. The action was OPERATION PB/SUCCESS. The CIA moved rapidly to assemble a group of legendary covert operators, including Allen Dulles, "Rip" Robertson, Al Haney, Richard Bissell, David Atlee Phillips, and E. Howard Hunt (yes, E. Howard Hunt). The operation relied mainly on psychological operations (psyops) to strip Arbenz's regime of support, especially from the middle class and the army. Operational assets consisted of a radio station, a couple dozen aircraft, a replacement president (Carlos Castillo Armas), and an "army of liberation" that "overran" the border in six trucks and a station wagon. It was a "smoke-and-mirrors" affair, and it worked. The crux of the operation was Dave Phillips's propaganda shop, which ran a

multifaceted psychological campaign aimed at the military, the general popula­ tion, and Arbenz's fear. Posters and leaflets were posted all over the country which simply said "Is this Your Wall?"; the message was that this was where dis­ sidents would be stood up when Arbenz unleashed his Stalin-like reign of terror. The radio station broadcast popular music mixed with propaganda aimed at cre­ ating distrust of Arbenz's regime and fear of the invading forces, boasting of the size, quality, and success of the "forces of liberation."One particularly clever ruse was to announce that all those who supported the rebels should leave their lights on ail night. When Arbenz responded by prohibiting this, the rebels announced that night bombing would only hit the dark areas of the towns. The lights burned all night. The station also employed black propaganda (fake announce­ ments that seemed to be from Arbenz's government) by "snuggling" (broad­ casting on a frequency very close to the official government frequency), and clev­ erly using denials to start rumors, e g., "It is not true that the waters of Lake Ati tlan have been poisoned." The second key to the operation was an aerial blitz by a small, ragtag, yet by Latin American standards, powerful air force, including roughly six P-47 Thunderbolts, three P-51 Mustangs, a dozen C-47 transports, a Cessna 180, and a PBY-5 naval patrol bomber. These were supplied by the United States, flown by CIA contract pilots (mostly Americans but also several Taiwanese soldiers of fortune who spoke only Chinese) secretly based in Honduras and Nicaragua. Ordnance (i.e.„ bombs) was limited, but then the primary purpose of the air force wasn't to actually fight, but to create the illusion of a powerful rebel force. To this end, the bombers resorted to dropping hand grenades, sticks of dyna­ mite, and empty Coca-Cola bottles. During "bombing runs" over Guatemala City, a tape of bombing sounds was blasted over loudspeakers hidden on the roof of the American embassy. At a critical moment, the rebel air force lost three aircraft, almost crippling the air offensive. Without constant bombing to show the populace that a rebellion was underway, the operation would collapse. While CIA Deputy Director Charles Cabell pressed for deployment of U S. aircraft, CIA Director Allen Dulles believed that this would expose the United States as the true "rebel," and he had promised President Eisenhower that the role of the United States would be invisible. "Tacho" Somoza, "president " of Nicaragua, came to the rescue by supplying two Nicaraguan P-5 Is on the condition the U S. would replace them. When Allen Dulles reported to Eisenhower that the chances of the operation succeeding were zero without the additional aircraft, Ike approved and the air offensive continued. Once Arbenz believed that an actual force was attacking his regime, he made a fatal error. He had purchased a shipload of generally useless weapons from Czechoslovakia, including railroad guns, antitank guns, and some small arms, and on 25 June 1954, he announced that he would arm the peasants to aid in the fight against the invaders. This infuriated the officers of the Guatemalan army, who saw this as an insult to their manhood as well as a threat to their social status. Amazingly, the Guatemalan army chose to remain neutral during an Original from

invasion of their own country; the army remained in its barracks, to all intents and purposes handing the CIA the keys to the presidential palace. Without army support, who would stand against the rebels? As things turned out, the key to the whole operation was that the Guatemalan air force remained grounded. On 18 June 1954, rebel commander Castillo Armas led his intrepid band of 150 "liberators" across the border from Honduras into Guatemala, moved about six miles into Guatemala, and stopped to see what would happen. Meanwhile, Dave Phillip's "rebel" radio fabricated breathless reports of fierce combat ending in rebel victories; simulated radio transmissions between dozens of nonexistent rebel units filled the airwaves. If Arbenz had gotten a single aircraft in the air, he might have discovered the trivial size of the rebel "army"and the true outcome of the "battles." Yet his aircraft, like his army, remained at home. How had the CIA achieved this coup de main? Realizing early on that the linchpin of the operation would be control of Arbenz's information, CIA propaganda broadcasts continuously reported defec­ tions of pilots from Communist Bloc nations, thereby planting the seeds of mis­ trust in Arbenz's mind and ideas in the minds of Guatemalan air force pilots. Eventually, one Guatemalan pilot didefect. When asked by the CIA to appeal to his fellow pilots via the rebel radio, he refused, fearing for his family, who had remained in Guatemala. Not to be put off, CIA operatives got the man drunk one evening and asked him "hypothetically" what he would say to encourage more defections. They secretly taped this conversation, then sent it out over the rebel radio.5 Fearing that all his pilots would fly off to Honduras, Arbenz grounded his entire air force. Thus blind, when rebel radio reported columns of well-armed insurgents converging on the capital, the beleaguered president believed them. On 27 June 1954, as the army demanded his resignation, Arbenz turned the government over to Colonel Carlos Diaz and fled to refuge in the Mexican embassy. Shortly after that, Diaz relinquished authority to Castillo Armas. PB/SUCCESS had lived up to its name. Soon after, when Dave Phillips stopped in Guatemala City, he borrowed a pair of especially comfortable golf shoes during a round at the country club. The shoes that fit so well had belonged to a former member: Jacobo Arbenz.

NOTHING SUCCEEDS LIKE

OPERATION ZAPATA6

SUCCESS:

PB/SUCCESS, along with OPERATION AJAX (the 1953 overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in Iran), convinced the CIA that a little force, a few million dollars, and plenty of American "can-do" could shape world events. Even a "covert " fiasco in Indonesia (1957, see chapter 3) failed to dampen the enthusiasm with which such actions were advocated, and when doubts about Fidel Castro's political leanings arose,7 the first impulse was to dispose of him with "the Guatemala scenario. " Thus was born OPERATION ZAPATA.

The regime of Fulguencio Batista imploded on New Year's Day 1959, and Fidel Castro, guerrilla prince, marched triumphantly into Havana to assume the mantle of power. A former lawyer and baseball pitcher (a lefty, naturally), Castro espoused Fidelismo ostensibly a form of nationalism that was not Marxism, but he quickly aroused the wrath of American economic concerns (both legitimate and Mafia) by confiscating hotels, casinos, sugar mills, and plantations. By March I960, President Eisenhower's National Security Council and the "54/12 Group " (a group of advisors that supervised covert actions) considered Castro a Soviet puppet in the Western Hemisphere, and began a program of guerrilla infiltration and support of indigenous insurgents against him. This program was run by many of the guiding lights of PB/SUCCESS, including Director of Central Intel­ ligence (DCI) Allen Dulles, Deputy Director for Plans, (DDP) or head of covert operations, Richard Bissell, Assistant Deputy Director for Plans (ADDP) Tracy Barnes, David Phillips, J. C. King, and E. Howard Hunt (yes, again). In an overzealous and perhaps fatal effort at secrecy, the CIA's own intelligence analysts were excluded from the operation.8 By November I960, the CIA realized that its halfhearted guerrilla cam­ paign was failing, due to the continuing popularity of Castro, his repression of those dissenters who remained in Cuba, and problems in keeping the guerrillas supplied (in particular, efforts to parachute-drop supplies consistently failed). Therefore, the guerrilla program metamorphosed into an invasion /?/