The China-India Nuclear Crossroads 9780870032707, 9780870032691, 2012019679

Table of contents :
Front Cover
Title Page
Copyright Information
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Foreword
Introduction
Bridging Historical Nuclear Gaps
Thinking Beyond Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy
Comparing Nuclear Pledges and Practice
Revisiting No First Use and Mininum Detterence
Linking Strategic Stability and Ballistic Missile Defense
Recalibrating Deterrence Theory and Practice
Parsing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Verifying Fissile Material Futures
Shoring Up the Nonproliferation Regime
Sizing Up the Nuclear Suppliers Group
Converging Nuclear Energy Programs
Building Mutual Confidence
Conclusion: Comparing the Comparable
Appendix
Index
Contributors
Back Cover

Citation preview

THE

NUCLEAR CROSSROADS

EDITOR & TRANSLATOR

LORA SAALMAN

© 2012 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without written permission from the Carnegie Endowment. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 202-483-7600, Fax 202-483-1840 www.ceip.org The Carnegie Endowment does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented here are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Endowment, its staff, or its trustees. To order, contact: Hopkins Fulfillment Service P.O. Box 50370, Baltimore, MD 21211-4370 1-800-537-5487 or 1-410-516-6956 Fax 1-410-516-6998 Cover design by Jocelyn Soly Composition by Beth Schlenoff Printed by United Book Press

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The China-India Nuclear Crossroads / Lora Saalman, editor. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-87003-270-7 (cloth)—ISBN 978-0-87003-269-1 (pbk.) 1. China—Foreign relations—India. 2. India—Foreign relations—China. 3. Nuclear weapons—Government policy—China. 4. Nuclear weapons— Government policy—India. I. Saalman, Lora. JZ1734.A57I4 2012 327.54051—dc23 2012019679

CONTENTS

acknowledgments vii FOReWoRD ix INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1

Bridging Historical Nuclear Gaps

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Arun Prakash | Yang Yi CHAPTER 2

Thinking Beyond Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy

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Pan Zhenqiang | P. K. Singh CHAPTER 3

Comparing Nuclear Pledges and Practice 35 C. Uday Bhaskar | Nie Hongyi CHAPTER 4

Revisiting No First Use and Minimum Deterrence 47 Li Bin | Srikanth Kondapalli CHAPTER 5

Linking Strategic Stability and Ballistic Missile Defense 65 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan | Yao Yunzhu

CHAPTER 6

Recalibrating Deterrence Theory and Practice 77 Li Deshun | Kalyan Kemburi CHAPTER 7

Parsing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 95 Swaran Singh | Fan Jishe CHAPTER 8

Verifying Fissile Material Futures 107 Zou Yunhua | M. S. Prathibha CHAPTER 9

Shoring Up the Nonproliferation Regime 121 Rajesh Rajagopalan | Li Hong CHAPTER 10

Sizing Up the Nuclear Suppliers Group 137 Liu Siwei | Rajesh Rajagopalan CHAPTER 11

Converging Nuclear Energy Programs 151 V. S. Arunachalam, Meera Sudhakar, S. Rajgopal, and Dipak Sundaram | Gu Zhongmao and Zhou Zhiwei CHAPTER 12

Building Mutual Confidence 161 Cheng Ruisheng, Zhang Li, and Ma Jiali | Dipankar Banerjee, Rukmani Gupta, Avinash Godbole, and Gunjan Singh CONCLUSION 171 appendix 191 INDEX 197 CONTRIBUTORS 215 CARNEGIE-tsinghua center for global policy 219

Acknowledgments

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he editor wishes to express her gratitude to all of the participants at the event “China and India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Dynamics” and to the contributors to the book The China-India Nuclear Crossroads. She would also like to offer her sincere thanks to George Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for his editorial comments, to Paul Haenle, director of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, and to the Stanton Foundation for its support of this project. The editor would also like to thank the Carnegie-Tsinghua staff, in particular support staff member Liu Hailuan and intern Jason Fortin, for their work on the event and final transcript, as well as program coordinator Yan Yan, communications coordinator Gao Xin, and all of the Carnegie-Tsinghua global interns for their efforts. Finally, the editor would like to thank Carnegie’s communications team, in particular senior publications manager Ilonka Oszvald and designer and marketing manager Jocelyn Anderson Soly, for their significant contributions. And, as always, the editor wishes to express her heartfelt gratitude to Thomas Ofner for his infinite patience and support throughout the entire process.

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FOREWoRD

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he China-India Nuclear Crossroads fills a paradoxical void in the literature on Chinese-Indian nuclear relations. Global power is shifting to Asia. The U.S. Defense Department is leading an American “pivot” to the Indo-Pacific region. Asian “theaters” attract the bulk of global arms spending. India and China have unresolved border disputes, and New Delhi’s strategists increasingly express an imperative to balance China’s “hard power.” Questions remain over China’s potential “sprint to parity,” while India and Pakistan are thought to be building up their nuclear arsenals. The only two countries in the world that are producing new fissile material for weapons are India and Pakistan. China is by far the world’s largest “market” for new nuclear energy production, and India aspires to be on a similar trajectory. Yet, despite these trends, The China-India Nuclear Crossroads is the first serious book by leading Chinese and Indian experts to examine the premises, perceptions, objectives, and technological underpinnings of the two countries’ nuclear relations. The Carnegie Endowment typically resists publishing edited volumes. Such works often have an uneven quality and chapters that simply rehash authors’ well-established views. The importance of this book’s topics and the absence of existing literature on them are not sufficient reasons in and of themselves to overcome that resistance. Thus, when Lora Saalman began recruiting outstanding Indian and Chinese experts for this project,

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many of whom have records of distinguished government and military service, we did not plan on turning their contributions into a book. It was only after we received their papers and heard the quality of their interactions at a conference held at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing in June 2011 that we began to contemplate this publication. We held off making a final decision, however, until we saw how fulsomely the authors—both established and emerging experts in the field—addressed the comments and critiques on their original drafts. Once we received the revised papers we could not resist the conclusion that the collection deserved to be transformed into a book, and that the volume would be a valuable resource for scholars, journalists, and government officials interested in China, India, security studies, and international relations. We are very grateful to each of the authors. Collectively, they collaborated well in creating the parallel structure of this book, wherein each chapter covers a particular issue from the perspective of a Chinese and an Indian author. In its totality, the book explores the full range of political, perceptual, military, and technical factors that affect Indian and Chinese approaches to nuclear competition with each other. From this rich raw material, Lora Saalman, as editor and translator, has produced an exceptionally constructive framework and comprehensive set of initiatives that China and India could pursue to enhance cooperation and minimize the unintended consequences of their security dilemmas. Sino-Indian relations, including their nuclear elements, are becoming increasingly important in Asia and globally. This volume will not be the last word on these topics, but the chapters contained here provide a valuable entrée into them. The Carnegie Endowment’s Nuclear Policy Program is proud to provide this service. George Perkovich Vice President for Studies Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

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INTRODUCTION

LORA SAALMAN

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he differing status of China and India as nuclear weapons powers has long impeded constructive interaction between the two in both the civil and military nuclear realm. China’s internationally recognized status as a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) under the nonproliferation regime sharply contrasts with that of India, which remains marginalized despite efforts to integrate it into the system. This strategic asymmetry has contributed to an atmosphere of Sino-Indian rivalry, exacerbated by ongoing territorial disputes and respective ties to third parties, namely Pakistan and the United States. Despite these differences, there are numerous arenas in which the two countries exhibit overlapping nuclear policies and practices, from no first ​ use to fast-breeder reactors. This book explores the convergence and diver­ gence in Chinese and Indian perceptions of their own and each other’s nuclear programs. It provides firsthand Chinese and Indian accounts of how each country’s nuclear pursuits affect and are affected by the other. This book does not seek to validate or contradict these views. Understanding perceptions and misperceptions is integral to moving forward on

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confidence building measures and cooperation. The volume also intentionally concentrates on bilateral Sino-Indian nuclear dynamics, placing the United States and Pakistan in the role of intervening variables. Prior to delving into the often-ambiguous realm of perceptions, it is useful to establish a baseline of facts or assessments of China’s and India’s extant capabilities. This introduction will focus on military-oriented nuclear systems. Exactitude is impossible, of course, in light of the relatively low levels of transparency of these two countries. This, in turn, is partially due to each state’s belief that opacity helps preserve force survivability, enabling credible minimum deterrence.1 Drawing on open Western sources, the exposition here represents a good faith effort to provide details on these programs prior to exploring how each side perceives them. The original version of China’s 2010 Ministry of Defense white paper notes that China “…will continue to maintain its nuclear forces at the lowest level needed to maintain the requirements of national security.”2 Instead of explicitly stating China’s nuclear force posture to be “minimum deterrence” (zuidi heweishe), this phrase suggests that the “lowest level” (zuidi shuiping) needed to meet these aims is fungible and potentially contingent upon other countries’ postures. A 2011 U.S. Department of Defense report takes this assessment one step further by describing China’s significant investments to “maintain a limited nuclear force, also referred to by some PRC writers as ‘sufficient and effective,’ to ensure the PLA can deliver a damaging retaliatory nuclear strike.”3 This ambiguity of Chinese posture and intent is found in writings within China and abroad. Nonetheless, some public assessments are regarded as useful. The Federation of American Scientists and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimate China’s total inventory of nuclear weapons at 240.4 In terms of delivery vehicles and modernization, China’s nuclear capabilities remain largely focused on increasing survivability vis-à-vis one potential adversary, namely the United States. However, many of these systems have implications for other powers with which China has unresolved disputes or tense relations, including India. Overall, China deploys a total of approximately 120 land-based, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Among these, China’s nuclear arsenal is reported to consist of 55 to 65 intercontinental ballistic missiles, the longest range of which are the silo-based, 13,000-km range DF-5 (CSS-4)

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and the 11,200-km range DF-31A (CSS-10 Mods 1 and 2).5 There have also been indications of possible development of a new road-mobile ICBM, capable of carrying a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV).6 In addition to these aforementioned capabilities that have implications for the United States, China also possesses a number of delivery systems that could affect its neighbors’ security. These include the solid-fueled, road-mobile, 7,200-km range DF-31 (CSS-10), the 3,100 km range DF3A (CSS-2), the 5,400 km range DF-4 (CSS-3), and the DF-21 (CSS-5), which depending on its variant can reportedly range between 2,150 and 3,000 kilometers.7 Among these, a 2011 U.S. Department of Defense report indicates that to “strengthen its deterrent posture relative to India,” China has replaced liquid-fueled, nuclear-capable DF-3A intermediate-range ballistic missiles with more survivable solid-fueled DF-21s.8 A 2008 report released by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists further suggests that the DF-31 will replace the DF-3A and DF-4 as China’s main weapon for “regional targeting.”9 Such missiles are of concern to India not only in terms of range and payload, but more broadly for their potential to lead to arms racing. And this possibility is not limited to ballistic missiles; China’s arsenal is also reported to contain the nuclear-capable cruise missile Dong Hai (DH-10), which is reputed to have a range exceeding 2,000 kilometers and to consist of both ground- and air-launched nuclear-capable versions.10 Improvement of “the survivability, flexibility, and effectiveness of China’s nuclear forces” suggests that India could be looking at new challenges in its near vicinity.11 In addition to newer capabilities, China retains older nuclear-capable bombers such as the Hong-6 and Qian-5. Yet, while such systems may have some bearing on India’s security, they would be unlikely to be the delivery vehicles of choice. Even more so than its land- and air-based deterrent, China’s pursuits in the naval arena are increasingly drawing attention for their impact on its nuclear posture and capabilities. Beijing’s efforts to produce a new class of nuclear-powered submarines, if armed with nuclear-tipped submarine launched ballistic missiles, would provide it with greater survivability, second-strike capability, and new nuclear mating practices.

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While not necessarily targeting India, such advances offer China a larger deterrence footprint and leverage, particularly given the location of one of China’s nuclear submarine bases along the southern coast of Hainan Island.12 This base, which incorporates submarine tunnel facilities and can hold attack and ballistic missile submarines and advanced surface combatants including aircraft carriers, would facilitate rapid deployment to not only the South China Sea, but also to the Indian Ocean. While the operational status of China’s one Xia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and two variants of 1,700 to 2,500-km range JL-1 (CSS-N-3) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) remain questionable, two second-generation Shang-class (Type 093) nuclearpowered attack submarines are already in service and are meant to replace the older Han-class (Type 091).13 But these are not the systems with the greatest implications for India. Instead, it is the new Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN that appears to be advancing and reportedly has appeared at the Yulin naval base, closer to India’s maritime sphere of influence.14 The Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN is destined to carry the JL-2 (CSSN-4) SLBM with an estimated range of 7,400 kilometers, which would give the PLA Navy its “first credible sea-based nuclear capability.”15 While the JL-2 SLBM requires further tests, it is nonetheless a major part of China securing a second-strike capability, particularly among regional rivals. Furthermore, China is also anticipated to add five third-generation Type 095 SSNs, with better quieting technology that will improve its ability to conduct surveillance and interdiction of surface vessels with torpedoes and antiship cruise missiles.16 In sum, the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s pursuit of platforms such as nuclear-powered submarines and its first aircraft carrier suggests that China is seeking to support additional military missions beyond Taiwan. Much like Indian concerns that as Mainland China’s relations with Taiwan improve it will re-purpose some of its land-based ballistic missile systems to target India, there remain questions that this shift of maritime priorities further afield equates with challenging Indian interests in the Indian Ocean. Prior reports on China’s interest in the Gwadar port in Pakistan and more recent articles regarding Chinese cooperation with the Seychelles on a refueling base contribute to these concerns.17

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While these projects are purportedly civilian in nature, they nonetheless could lay the groundwork for future military activities and deployments. This potential “dual-use” role suggests that should China seek a greater blue water combat capability, it may be increasing its logistical ability to do so. So while China’s nuclear developments predominantly continue to target U.S. developments and force adjustments, expansion of its range and efforts to bring the Indian Ocean into greater reach have implications for India’s own military development and nuclear force structure. Whereas China seeks to deter the United States, Russia, and India, New Delhi develops and deploys capabilities to deter China and Pakistan. However, Indian threat perceptions do not allow a neat separation between potential adversaries. India expresses concern over “two-front” scenarios in which China and Pakistan work in tandem to exert pressure on India. The Federation of American Scientists estimates India’s total inventory of nuclear weapons at between 80 and 100, with approximately 70 assembled nuclear warheads of which about 50 are fully operational, as suggested by a report from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.18 Unlike China, whose delivery vehicles are dominated by land-based and increasingly sea-based ballistic missiles, India’s “mainstay” is currently based in aircraft, namely the Mirage 2000H, the Jaguar IS/IB, and MiG27 most likely to be assigned to nuclear missions.19 With in-flight refueling capabilities on the rise and India’s stationing of other aircraft, such as the nuclear-capable Su-30 MKI near the Sino-Indian border, aircraft are likely to continue to exert a good deal of influence in terms of both conventional and nuclear deterrence. In terms of nuclear ballistic missiles, India has the 150-km range Prithvi-I, while longer-range missiles that have undergone tests reportedly include the 700 to 1,200-km range Agni-I, the 2,000 to 2,500-km range Agni-II, the 3,000 to 5,000-km range Agni-III, and the 3,200 to 3,700-km range Agni-IV, as well as the 5,000-km range Agni-V that was successfully test launched on April 19, 2012, and effectively brings Beijing and Shanghai into range.20 Of the aforementioned systems, the Agni series, particularly the AgniIII, the Agni IV, and the recently tested Agni-V, has drawn the most attention in China for a number of reasons. In part this is because the Agni series has a maneuverable re-entry vehicle, MRV-Mk.2, with a

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claimed circular error probability (CEP) of approximately 40 meters.21 If true, this means that its high level of accuracy would allow Indian weapon designers to mount nuclear warheads with a smaller yield, greater accuracy, and larger range. With the successful test launch of the AgniV, India’s ability to strike at the power centers of Beijing and Shanghai has led a number of Chinese experts to debate the political and security implications for China and abroad. Another system under discussion is the intermediate-range land-attack cruise missile, known as the Nirbhay, which is reportedly under development by the Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL) in Hyderabad.22 The subsonic cruise missile, which is reportedly similar to the Pakistani Babur cruise missile, is earmarked to have a range of 1,000 kilometers and is proclaimed to be capable of carrying 24 types of warheads.23 While it is unclear whether the missile will be nuclear-capable, much like reported Chinese cruise missile advances, this system would provide India with greater flexibility in terms of deploying its nuclear deterrent. At sea, India has two naval weapon systems for the sea-based leg of its nuclear triad, namely the approximately 350-km range Dhanush and the 300 to 700-km range Sagarika missile.24 While the former has been successfully test-fired on multiple occasions, its short range would require close proximity for effectiveness. Regarding the latter, the K-15 is a version of the Sagarika that has been test-launched and is due to be integrated with the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV), a nuclear-powered submarine that has undergone a trial launch. While this system has yet to become operational, there are suggestions that it, in combination with the Russian nuclear-powered Akula-class attack submarine leased by India, is destined to be a platform for completing India’s nuclear triad. However, given the current stage of development of the ATV and short range of the SLBMs, they are unlikely to threaten China in the near to medium term. Despite the evident gaps, there remains crossover between China’s and India’s respective pursuits of capabilities vis-à-vis the United States and Pakistan and what they might mean for one another. Survivability, range, mobility, and flexibility are all part of Chinese and Indian nuclear deterrents that are based upon credible minimum deterrence, no first use, non-mating, negative security assurances in name. However, possible pursuit of a number of capabilities above, such as MIRVs and

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submarine-launched ballistic missiles, would make it harder to achieve such policies in practice. And in making threat assessments shaped by Chinese and Indian policies and practice, just as much as capabilities play a central role, so do perceptions. This book provides an overview of Chinese and Indian expert views of similarities and differences in nuclear posture and practice, and concludes with initiatives to enhance communication and cooperation in those arenas in which crossover is greatest. The chapters address key topics in Sino-Indian nuclear relations, with each containing paired essays, one by a Chinese expert and one by an Indian expert. In chapter 1, Arun Prakash and Yang Yi provide the historical context for understanding India’s and China’s current nuclear relations. Prakash forecasts the decline of U.S. hegemony and looks to a future in which China and India may be headed toward “balance of power” politics. He delineates the concerns attached to such potential rivalry, emphasizing that China is not viewed in nuclear isolation, given its support for Pakistan. Yang keeps his sights firmly fixed on the U.S. threat to China, detailing China’s pursuit of nuclear submarine advances to meet the maritime and deterrence challenges it faces. While describing these systems’ utility as second-strike vehicles, Yang emphasizes that India is not China’s target. He posits that India’s use of the “China threat” as an impetus for its nuclear program is damaging to bilateral trust, and he advocates increased exchange on nuclear issues. In chapter 2, Pan Zhenqiang and P. K. Singh offer their assessment of where China and India stand on nuclear doctrine and strategy. Pan argues that the Chinese government tends not to use the terms “nuclear doctrine” or “nuclear strategy,” instead opting for “nuclear strategic guidelines.” However, he maintains that if a nuclear doctrine were to be ascribed to China, it would be encapsulated in the concept of verifiable no first use. Singh provides an overview of the conditions contributing to the evolution of what he calls a “dynamic” nuclear doctrine on the part of India. Singh cites the centrality of China’s decision to test nuclear weapons in 1964 in the wake of its border war with India and its strategic assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program as integral to India’s decision to establish itself as a military, as well as civil, nuclear power. In chapter 3, C. Uday Bhaskar and Nie Hongyi compare and contrast India’s and China’s nuclear pledges and practices. Bhaskar cites atrophied

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mutual trust on the nuclear front to China’s use of Pakistan as a proxy. While arguing that India views itself as caught in a nuclear triangle with China and Pakistan, Bhaskar notes that a Sino-Indian bilateral declaration of no first use (NFU) would go a long way toward alleviating India’s concerns about Sino-Pakistan collusion. Nie underscores the internal and external debate over China’s policies of NFU and credible minimum deterrence, subscribing to the view that China continues to maintain both these postures and citing the national “Great Wall Engineering” project as evidence. However, he also notes that China’s concept of deterrence is not static, with the size of its arsenal affected by potential new threats, such as rapid conventional strike weapons systems and missile defenses. He details similarities between China and India in overall nuclear policy, but explains how potential cooperation has been stymied by India’s assumption of China as its “imagined enemy” and their unresolved border dispute. In chapter 4, Li Bin and Srikanth Kondapalli revisit the similarities of credible minimum deterrence and NFU within China’s and India’s postures toward nuclear weapons. Li explores China’s and India’s NFU in practice, suggesting concrete means whereby both sides could bilaterally reaffirm and strengthen their NFU commitments vis-à-vis one another. By undertaking these measures, he argues that both countries would create a more balanced discussion platform, thereby mitigating the impact of their different statuses under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Kondapalli details changes occurring in both countries’ policies. He describes China’s movement toward “limited” deterrence and increasingly sophisticated targeting practices, combined with shifts in operational doctrine toward conventional preemptive (changgui xianfazhiren) strike. Kondapalli asserts that India also retains a malleable nuclear doctrine and has made qualifications on its own stance of NFU, in the event of a biological or chemical attack. In chapter 5, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Yao Yunzhu explore the impact of nuclear doctrine and BMD on India’s and China’s views on strategic stability. Rajagopalan discusses the core differences between China’s and India’s BMD programs, arguing that China’s BMD pursuits are derived from its ASAT program, whereas India’s programs have evolved from BMD objectives to anti-satellite possibilities. She argues that China’s BMD program remains fixated on the United States, whereas the

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impetus for India’s program is Pakistan. Given China’s missile assistance to Pakistan and India’s increasing intercept range, she suggests that India’s BMD program may have future implications for China. Yao undertakes an evaluation of China’s nuclear relationship with the United States and compares it with that between India and the United States. She concludes that the NFU-based strategic stability between China and India is much more reliable and stable than that between China and the United States, which is based on asymmetric deterrence and mutual vulnerability. In chapter 6, Li Deshun and Kalyan Kemburi seek new means of measuring deterrence in both theory and force structure, using China and India as case studies. Li inserts the variable of “interdependence” into his assessment of strategic stability. He argues that given the drastic changes in the international framework following the collapse of the U.S.-Soviet divide, indirect losses caused to one’s own country by engaging in a nuclear strike—whether economic, social, or environmental—must be factored into strategic stability calculations. He argues for a Sino-Indian strategic stability model that hinges upon reducing the importance of nuclear warhead quantity and enhancing strategic exchanges to reduce the chance of miscalculation. Kemburi applies theory to practice, by evaluating how changes to force structure affect deterrence, namely, with the increasingly central role of cruise missiles. He advocates that China and India should address these weapons systems in their strategic discussions and assessments of deterrence, in order to clarify whether or not they accord with claims of minimum deterrence. In chapter 7, Swaran Singh and Fan Jishe provide their accounts of the political imperatives and shifting views within India and China on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Singh details the evolution of India’s move from support for a test ban under its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to a more resistant position motivated in part by concerns that India has technical reasons to conduct further tests. He notes that a new shift is under way, with recent indications that India would be compelled to reconsider its stance if the United States and China were to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Fan creates a United States– centric framework for analyzing the past, present, and future status of the CTBT, arguing that the United States has shown marked progress in its recent efforts to create an environment in which the treaty could be

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ratified. However, he notes that changes in the U.S. Senate’s composition could have an adverse impact on this shift toward ratification. He emphasizes that the United States’ ratification of the CTBT remains a key factor in how China, India, and other countries proceed. In chapter 8, Zou Yunhua and M. S. Prathibha provide their assessments of the future of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and China’s and India’s roles. Zou confirms China’s support for the FMCT, while noting that several key issues merit further attention, namely, the scope of prohibition, the status of stockpiled fissile materials, as well as implementation and verification measures. She argues that the future treaty should limit its ban to fissile material production for nuclear weapons purposes, and exclude production for civil or military use, including that for nuclear submarines. Zou notes that, contrary to Pakistan’s position, the FMCT should not cover stockpiled fissile materials due to verification problems. Prathibha argues that whereas China has increasingly become invested in the nonproliferation regime, it continues to practice realpolitik, particularly when it comes to the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. She cites the examples of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, where China blocked the call for nuclear powers to uphold the moratorium on the production of highly enriched uranium and separation of plutonium for weapons, and China’s efforts to thwart moves to negotiate the FMCT outside the Conference on Disarmament. In chapter 9, Rajesh Rajagopalan and Li Hong take on the issue of the differing statuses of China and India within the nonproliferation regime. Rajagopalan provides the rationale for India’s decision not to sign neither the NPT nor the CTBT and questions the nature of China’s own arms control commitments and nuclear modernization drive. While arguing that India will not enter into an arms race, he advocates more research into how China’s nuclear relations with the United States will affect nuclear stability and balance between China and India. Li describes India’s attempts to get out from under the “NPT shadow” that keeps it outside the nuclear system. He attributes China’s reluctance to explicitly address nuclear issues with India to both a difference in nuclear status as well as the recognized asymmetry of the two countries’ nuclear arsenals. Nonetheless, he argues that there have been some signs suggesting that Beijing is interested in relaxing its tough posture on nuclear dialogue with New Delhi.

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In chapter 10, Liu Siwei and Rajesh Rajagopalan squarely address questions of the viability of the nonproliferation regime by investigating both countries’ relationships with the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Liu provides an overview of the current climate of Chinese and Indian opinion on the Nuclear Suppliers Group. She describes Chinese concerns over United States–India nuclear cooperation and contrasts this with China’s nuclear exchanges with Pakistan. Rajagopalan discusses China’s role in the NSG’s transformation, as well as India’s position on membership. He details how China has undertaken an obstructionist role in opposition to India’s integration into the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, as has been evident in its approach to the United States–India civil nuclear deal. He argues that if China demands a criteria-based approach rather than a stand-alone decision on India, then it should propose such criteria. In chapter 11, V. S. Arunachalam, Meera Sudhakar, S. Rajgopal, Dipak Sundaram, Gu Zhongmao, and Zhou Zhiwei weigh in on China’s and India’s burgeoning nuclear energy programs. In the wake of the Fukushima disaster, Arunachalam and Gu argue that whereas China’s and India’s nuclear programs will undertake necessary safety precautions in terms of siting, designing, and building nuclear power reactors, their overall programs will proceed as planned. Both Chinese and Indian experts emphasize the importance of fast-breeder reactor programs in their respective countries, highlighting the dual needs of fuel supply and capacity as driving factors for both China and India. Arunachalam and Gu stress the importance of self-sufficiency for both countries’ nuclear futures. In chapter 12, Cheng Ruisheng, Zhang Li, Ma Jiali, Dipankar Banerjee, Rukmani Gupta, Avinash Godbole, and Gunjan Singh offer suggestions for confidence-building measures that can be implemented to enhance Sino-Indian engagement on nuclear issues. Following Cheng and Banerjee’s discussion of convergences between China’s and India’s nuclear interests, the various experts contribute dozens of potential cooperative measures, initiatives, and topics for further discussion. They conclude that although India’s official status outside the NPT regime is likely to preclude an official exchange on nuclear issues in the near term, unofficial dialogue through Track-2 mechanisms is the way forward. Gupta argues that nuclear issues are of “high visibility” and thus provide a strong platform for advancing overall strategic interaction between China and India.

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Notes 1 Some experts, most notably Alastair Iain Johnston, have argued that China’s nuclear posture hews closer to limited deterrence, and this is alluded to in the chapter 3 essay by Nie Hongyi. Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security, vol. 20, no. 3 (Winter, 1995‒1996): 5–42. 2 Office of the State Council, “2010 nian zhongguo de guofang” (2010 China’s National Defense), Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, March 2011, www.mod.gov.cn/reports/201101/bpsz/2011-03/31/content_4235224.htm. 3 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011,” A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (U.S. Department of Defense 2011), 34, www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.pdf. 4 “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, February 29, 2012, www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html; Shannon N. Kile, Vitaly Fedchenko, Bharath Gopalaswamy, and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chapter 7. World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2011 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2011), www.sipri.org/yearbook/2011/07; Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008,” Nuclear Notebook, vol. 64, no. 3, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 2008): 42–44. 5 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011,” 34. 6 Ibid., 3. 7 Ibid., 34; The range and payload of the weapons have been inverted in the charts provided by the authors. However, cross-referencing with other sources reveals a relative degree of accuracy. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008,” Nuclear Notebook, vol. 64, no. 3, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/ August 2008): 42–44. 8 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011,” 38. 9 Norris and Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008.” 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011,” 3. 13 The JL-1 was purportedly never fully operational. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011,” 34. 14 Norris and Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008.”

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SAALMAN 15 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011,” 3. 16 Ibid., 4. 17 Jeremy Page and Tom Wright, “Chinese Military Considers New Indian Ocean Presence,” Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001 424052970203518404577096261061550538.html. 18 “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, February 29, 2012, www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html; Norris and Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008.” 19 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2008,” Nuclear Notebook, vol. 64, no. 5, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 2008): 38–40. 20 Y. Mallikarjun and T. S. Subramanian, “Agni-V Propels India into Elite ICBM Club,” Hindu, April 19, 2012, www.thehindu.com/news/national/article3330921.ece; Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2008,” 38–40. 21 Arun S. Vishwakarma, “India’s Strategic Missiles,” Indian Defence Review, vol. 22.1 (January-March 2007), www.indiandefencereview.com/military-and-aerospace/ Indias-Strategic-Missiles.html. 22 Norris and Kristensen, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2008.” 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid.

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CHAPTER 1

Bridging Historical Nuclear Gaps THE VIEW FROM INDIA Arun Prakash

T

he five-hundred-year cycle of Western dominance of the East, which started when Vasco da Gama set foot in India, has ended, and the power shift from the West to the East has begun. Even as Asia is about to demand its rightful place at the high table, it must be borne in mind that the region’s stability and prosperity have thus far been underwritten by the United States’ military presence. There is a possibility that as U.S. power declines, Asia may be on the threshold of an era of “balance of power” politics. Although China is perceived as the clear favorite, India, because of its huge potential, is also considered a contender. At one time, it was said of India and China that these were two great neighbors that in one thousand years had never gone to war. This was because of the natural barrier formed by the towering Himalayan range, which limited contact between the two ancient civilizations and precluded conflict. Now, however, technology

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has rendered geography almost irrelevant, and thus it will require a sincere and conscious effort by these two rising powers to avoid stepping on each other’s toes. In this respect, the nuclear arena requires the closest attention, but unfortunately it is rarely addressed. The security perceptions of each country have been shaped by its unique historical experience as well as its political philosophy. In China, the People’s Liberation Army participated fully in the revolutionary struggles and processes of nation building. It remained a fighting and working force that was closely identified with the civilian population and that participated in implementing ideological, cultural, and economic policies of the Communist Party. In India, the success of Gandhi’s strategy of nonviolence transmuted, after independence, into foreign policy concepts such as nonalignment and peaceful coexistence. This greatly reduced the role of the Indian military, which has traditionally remained apolitical and accepted subordination to political authority. After independence, India remained focused on Pakistan as a threat, especially because Jawaharlal Nehru’s vision did not envisage a conflict with China. This view was superficially reflected in the popular Indian slogan of the 1950s: “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai,” or “Indians and Chinese are brothers.” The reality, however, was that tensions between the neighbors had been building up over the twin issues of Tibet and border demarcation. In the winter of 1962, they culminated in a brief war, in which India suffered a military defeat. This Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 was followed by China’s first nuclear test in 1964, which led to an agonizing reappraisal by India of its security environment. Apart from initiating a military procurement program, which was spread over the next few decades, Indian scientists commenced work on a nuclear device. In May 1974, a decade after China’s first nuclear test and four years after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force, India conducted a nuclear test—which it designated a peaceful nuclear explosion. In contrast to China’s resolute and rapid quest for nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, India debated for the next twenty-four years whether it should acquire “the bomb.” This frequently open public debate, unique in itself, had moral as well as economic dimensions.

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For the majority of India’s politicians, who professed commitment to Gandhian ideals of nonviolence and universal disarmament, nuclear weapons were anathema. On economic grounds, calculations were often produced to convince public opinion that a nuclear weapons program would wreck India’s development plans and was unaffordable. It must be noted here that India was one of the first developing countries to initiate a nuclear power generation program. It acquired, at an early stage, the wherewithal to manufacture nuclear weapons. Between 1956 and 1961, it commissioned three research reactors. In 1962, a heavy-water production facility commenced production. And by 1964, a plutonium reprocessing plant was functioning at Trombay. However, for two decades, as Indian policymakers continued their nuclear debate, evidence steadily mounted that Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear weapons program was gathering pace. There is a strong view in India that Pakistan may not have weaponized except for the extra­ ordinary decision by China in the 1980s to assist Pakistan in acquiring a nuclear arsenal. For Indians, such a radically destabilizing move was not just historically unprecedented, but also politically incomprehensible. At that stage, India was prepared to seek a mutually accommodative relationship with China, which sustained peace, stability, and the status quo. However, the arming of Pakistan with missiles and nuclear weapons not only triggered a subcontinental arms race, but also created deep misgivings in India about China’s own long-term intentions. It seemed that China cared neither about stability on the subcontinent nor about India’s vital security concerns. If China had adopted the role of a revisionist power, then India was left with no choice but to weaponize in 1998. Although India sought deterrence stability with respect to China, it clearly understood that China’s strategic calculus and nuclear arsenal went well beyond India to also include the United States and Russia. Regrettably, Pakistan was unwilling to acknowledge that India’s arsenal was similarly predicated on factors other than Pakistan and thus has sought to acquire parity with India. Because of these events, the China–India bilateral relationship has now acquired a third pole. One cannot discuss the Sino-Indian nuclear issues without addressing Pakistan. China’s vital nuclear assistance to

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Pakistan has become inextricably linked in the Indian mind with the Pakistani military’s belligerent and often irrational conduct. And this has contributed to a deeply rooted anxiety about China’s intent. In my assessment, China showed considerable restraint and, over many years, was content to create a modest arsenal of megaton-yield weapons carried by aircraft or missiles of low accuracy. However, there are currently clear indications that China has undertaken an extensive modernization of its nuclear arsenal and now fields medium-yield weapons, carried by longer-range and more accurate DF-21 and -31 land-based ballistic missiles, along with JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. For India’s part, soon after the 1998 tests, it sought to reassure its neighbors by declaring a no-first-use policy and unilaterally shunning further tests. Its credible minimum deterrent envisages a second-strike triad consisting of silo-based and rail-mounted Agni series intercontinental ballistic missiles, aircraft-borne bombs, and submarine-launched missiles to be in place during this decade. Pakistan, in its quest to checkmate India, seeks a nuclear arsenal whose scope and trajectory remain a matter of conjecture. No one knows if Pakistan seeks a second- or even third-strike capability, or if it has adopted a policy of “flexible response.” What is evident is that it is engaged in a desperate race to enhance the production of fissile plutonium-239, and to deploy both cruise missiles and tactical nuclear weapons. It is hardly a secret that all of this is being undertaken with China’s help, as well as that from other sources. And the fact that all this is happening within a fast-deteriorating internal security environment in Pakistan has become an issue of serious international concern. Those who worry about a possible clash of interests between China and India may take reassurance from the frequent assertions by India’s prime minister, Manmohan Singh, that India and China are not in competition and enough economic space remains for both. However, Indian realists feel that Singh’s sanguinity may be misplaced because China and India are clearly contesting with each other in three main areas where the room for maneuver is rapidly diminishing. First, the economic ambitions of both countries need to be fueled by natural resources, which are becoming scarce. Energy is the prime example.

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Both China and India seek hydrocarbons in Africa, Central Asia, and the Bay of Bengal, where thus far they have been pitted against each other as commercial rivals. In the South China Sea, where India has acquired exploration rights from Vietnam, China has openly expressed displeasure at what it sees an intrusion into an area of “undisputed sovereignty.” Second, China’s economic boom, having become inextricably linked to overseas trade, has led to its dependence on Indian Ocean sea-lanes. China perceives these as a strategic vulnerability. Because China is fearful that in the event of a confrontation, its economy could be held hostage through the threat of interdiction at sea, it is implementing an elaborate Indian Ocean strategy to safeguard its maritime interests. This is seen b​ y India not just as an intrusion into its area of influence, but also as a potential threat virtually on its doorstep. This is a situation tailor-made for a naval arms race and a rise in regional tensions. Third and last, China is illegally occupying Aksai Chin, and it stakes a serious claim to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. The Indian public largely views China’s current conduct as a historical continuum, in which this bullying neighbor first swallowed Tibet and then attacked India in 1962. Whatever the legal or historical merits of China’s case, that it is India’s territory remains nonnegotiable by any democratically elected Indian government. China has maintained a subtle form of political and diplomatic intimidation when it comes to these issues. Consequently, the image of a powerful China evokes past visions, in India, of the unfulfilled imperial Japanese “Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” and also of Hitler’s concepts of Lebensraum and the Anschluss. Given the veil of opacity cast by China over its continuing military buildup, India has had no choice but to divert scarce resources to reinforcing its northern defenses. Under these circumstances, the possibility of events escalating into a military clash on land or sea cannot be completely ruled out. This line of thinking is reinforced by the international relations theory propounded by George Modelski.1 Citing the historical precedents of Portugal, the Dutch Republic, Britain, and the United States, he says that hegemonic dominance occurs in a series of long cycles, each lasting about a century, and warns that transition is often accompanied by conflict. These long cycles are underpinned by naval power and economic

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dominance, to which one can now add nuclear weapons. According to Modelski, 1970 marked the beginning of America’s decline, and the new cycle, now under way, will throw up a new hegemon. If China is to be the new hegemon, many in India see their country as being faced with an existential threat from the north. They foresee China’s inexorable economic rise accompanied by an accretion of unwarranted and excessive military strength, leading to overbearing and coercive postures in international relations. There is no doubt that the key issue is economics, but the choices before India are stark. India could try to accelerate its economic growth and catch up with China, in which case the military asymmetry would also diminish. But for a ponderous and fractious democracy such as India, this is an unlikely prospect. Or India could seek alliances to redress the balance of power. This is again something that is culturally alien to Indian policymaking. Given this scenario, the best India could hope is that its diplomats would ensure peace and give it breathing space for a few more decades. In the interim, India would need to rely on an effective nuclear deterrent and powerful conventional forces—especially a navy—to fend off intimidation and coercion. In 1998, we know that the United States and China came to an agreement not to target nuclear weapons at each other.2 The accord was called a “non-targeting” agreement. I would suggest that if such an agreement could be emulated by China and India, it could become a major factor for peace and stability in the region, and perhaps serve to slow down the pace of nuclearization in South Asia. However, this can only follow China’s recognition, formal or informal, of the fact that India possesses a nuclear second-strike capability. Fortunately, the international arena has provided opportunities for India and China to work together on issues such as environmental protection, climate change, as well as food and energy security. However, it would be naive to ignore the continuing mistrust and suspicion that hover over issues like China’s growing defense spending, its unyielding territorial claims, its opposition to the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, management of river waters, and naval initiatives in the Indian Ocean. Ultimately, however, the biggest and perhaps most dangerous lacuna in this relationship is the lack of an official dialogue on nuclear issues.

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THE VIEW FROM CHINA YANG YI

I

n an era of globalization, with the interchanges of interests and countries in possession of an absolute weapon like that of nuclear force, the chance of large-scale conflict between great powers has not been completely eliminated—but it could be said to be decreasing. However, nuclear weapons, which once served as a central factor in maintaining global strategic stability during the Cold War, have not yet vanished from the international stage. The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (known as New START), which was concluded by the United States and Russia at the beginning of 2010, held a positive significance for global disarmament.3 However, though reducing the scale of nuclear weapons arsenals, the United States and Russia have not slowed their nuclear weapons modernization. Other countries are also modernizing the multidimensionality of their nuclear weapons delivery systems, pursuing, in addition to land-based nuclear arsenals, sea- and aircraft-based nuclear forces. In 1964, when China conducted its first nuclear test, its government declared to the international community that it would under no circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons and would not threaten to use nuclear weapons against non–nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon– free zones. China also advocates for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the complete and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. However, as long as nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence exist, and powers continue to possess large nuclear stockpiles and improve the technological capabilities of these arsenals, China must ensure the security, reliability, and strategic retaliatory capability of its nuclear arsenal. For the foreseeable future, the primary utility of China’s strategic nuclear force will be to prevent a nuclear threat or attack by the United

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States. Although the world’s other nuclear powers—Russia, France, and Britain—also have the capability to conduct a nuclear strike against China, none has the intention or incentive to do so. The United States is the only country that theoretically has the capability, intent, and incentive to employ nuclear deterrence or a nuclear strike against China—because the two countries could enter into a military conflict over Taiwan. The mission of China’s strategic nuclear force is to ensure that the United States is adequately concerned by China’s retaliatory strike capabilities, such that it will not dare employ a nuclear threat or nuclear attack against China. To this end, in the past few years, China and the United States have held numerous Track-2 strategic nuclear force dialogues. These meetings have had an extremely positive role in strengthening understanding and communication between the two countries on nuclear strategy and nuclear war-fighting theory. In terms of theory, China and the United States’ relations are marked by strategic nuclear deterrence, but the two countries must put forward their greatest effort to avoid strategic misunderstandings and to end all risks that might result in a strategic nuclear conflict. It is impossible that China would engage the United States in a nuclear arms race and would pursue a “balance of terror.” However, for China it is essential to ensure that it has a reliable second-strike capability. To this end, a sea-based nuclear force is an irreplaceable component. When one observes the current nuclear arsenals of nuclear powers, it is clear that sea-based weapons occupy an extremely important position. The basic reason is that nuclear submarine-based ballistic missiles have the dual advantages of stealth and survivability to ensure the effectiveness of nuclear retaliation. Britain’s nuclear arsenal is 100 percent based on its submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The majority of France’s nuclear weapons are deployed on strategic ballistic missile nuclear submarines. The United States has the greatest number of and the most advanced systems, including the Ohio-class ballistic missile nuclear submarine and the Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Whether in terms of its multiple warhead penetration capabilities, strike accuracy, or range, the United States has the strongest nuclear capabilities in the world. Much like its land-based and aircraft-based nuclear forces, the U.S. seabased deterrent maintains a high level of alert status from start to finish.

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It does so with a cadre of strategic missile submarine vessels cruising the ocean 24 hours a day and hundreds of nuclear warheads that maintain a state under which they can be launched at any moment. Among the five nuclear-weapon states that are permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members, China maintains the least number of land-based and sea-based nuclear weapons and to date has no aircraft-based nuclear weapons. Although China’s strategic ballistic missile nuclear submarines have been active for a number of years—in comparison with the United States, Russia, Britain, and France—no matter whether in terms of number or quality, they are still in a nascent phase. Although China is currently researching and developing new strategic ballistic missile nuclear submarines, from a technological and tactical perspective, it will have difficulty in the near term in catching up to the United States and other developed countries’ levels. From a numerical perspective, China will also only be able to maintain nuclear weapons on a small scale. Even if China’s economic power greatly increases in the future, however, it would not be likely to excessively increase the scale of its nuclear forces. This is decided by China’s national security strategy and military strategy. China wants to maintain a “lean and effective” (jinggan, dingyong) strategic nuclear force. To achieve this goal, as a naval officer, I have long advocated that China increase its investments in sea-based strategic forces. These improvements are intended to expand the scale of China’s seabased nuclear arsenal, improving its sea-based strategic defense operations as well as its level of technology and combat capability. The primary goal is for China’s sea-based strategic forces to become its most effective deterrent among its nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Of course, these developments will only serve as a second-strike function. At no time and under no circumstances will China’s nuclear arsenal be used in a preemptive fashion against any country or region. This is in line with China’s political characteristics and choice to follow a path of peaceful development and defensive military strategy. China and India are two neighboring powers that both have important influence in the international community. They should maintain good, cooperative relations. This not only fulfills the basic interest of both countries’ people, but also has significant implications for regional and

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global security, stability, and prosperity. India is not a factor in China’s development of strategic nuclear weapons. In the minds of China’s political decisionmakers and strategic planners, there has never been a strategic scenario under which they envision a nuclear exchange with India. Although the nuclear strategy and nuclear theory expressions of these two countries differ, both have maintained a consistent principle of no first use. Therefore, the chance of these two countries engaging in a nuclear exchange is hard to envision. However, India’s baseless claim that the so-called China threat (suowei de zhongguo weixie) served as an impetus for its first nuclear explosion, its development of nuclear weapons, and the modernization of its nuclear arsenal is not conducive to bilateral strategic mutual trust. Although the international community does not yet recognize India as a nuclear power, it is an indisputable fact that India’s nuclear arsenal continues to expand and modernize. As a result, it is essential for China and India to undertake an active nuclear dialogue to continuously enhance strategic mutual trust. When it comes to China’s and India’s interaction on nuclear war theory, I can credibly assert that China’s nuclear weapons, whether land-based or sea-based, are not targeted against India. I hope, and am willing to believe, that India’s nuclear arsenal should also not be directed against China. The promotion of global nuclear disarmament and the eventual complete destruction of nuclear weapons remains the most promising area of cooperation for China and India.

Notes 1 George Modelski, “The Evolution of Global Politics,” Journal of World-Systems Research 1, no. 7 (1995), http://jwsr.ucr.edu/archive/vol1/v1_n7.php. 2 “U.S.-China Non-Targeting Agreement,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, updated January 1999, www.nti.org/db/china/chusdet.htm. 3 In the original Chinese version, this treaty name was written as “START II”; the translator changed it to “New START” for accuracy.

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CHAPTER 2

Thinking Beyond Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy THE VIEW FROM CHINA Pan Zhenqiang

“N

uclear doctrine” refers to a theory based on principles that have been carefully worked out, in other words a codification of beliefs, or philosophical perspectives toward nuclear weapons. Moreover, the word “doctrine” can be defined at different levels. “Strategic doctrine” is defined as a fundamental set of principles that guide military forces, or elements thereof, in support of national objectives. “Tactical doctrine” applies to the concept of an established procedure for under­ taking complex operations in warfare. On the basis of nuclear doctrine, a nuclear-weapon state develops its nuclear strategy chiefly to optimize its planning for the production and use of the nuclear weapons it needs, according to its threat perceptions. Major issues that nuclear strategy must address include the following: Under what conditions does it serve a nation’s interest to develop nuclear weapons? What types of nuclear weapons should be developed? When and how should such weapons be used?

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“Doctrine” and “strategy” are often used interchangeably. This is understandable, given that both concepts offer overall guidance for different aspects of overall military operations. Doctrine is principle or philosophy, whereas strategy is science and art. To put it another way, doctrine seeks to provide a common conceptual framework for military action. The former guides the latter. At the same time, they are closely interrelated and mutually reinforced. The Chinese government has preferred not to use the terms “nuclear doctrine” or “nuclear strategy” since its acquisition of nuclear weapons. Beijing’s preferred term until recently has been “nuclear strategic guidelines.” This contains elements of both nuclear doctrine and nuclear strategy. This does not suggest, however, that China lacks its own view of its nuclear doctrine or nuclear strategy. Many Chinese experts believe that China’s nuclear doctrine can best be expressed in its pledge of no first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. The rationale is that nuclear weapons, as one of the most devastating categories of weapons of mass destruction, should be banned from both production and use. Pending their complete prohibition and thorough destruction, however, all the nuclear-weapon states should at least limit the role of nuclear weapons to only retaliation against the use of nuclear weapons. On the basis of this doctrine, China’s nuclear strategy can be called a strategy of nuclear self-defense. It is based chiefly on two fundamental assumptions. The first is that China has been forced to seek and maintain its nuclear option. No other country has faced more serious and manifest nuclear threats from a major nuclear power—on multiple occasions, even from the two major nuclear powers—since the start of the Cold War. This nuclear threat continues even today, two decades after the end of the Cold War. As long as this nuclear threat exists, Beijing has no alternative to the continued possession of nuclear weapons for self-defense. The second assumption is that, being a nuclear power itself, China strives to be a responsible nuclear state. This finds particular expression in its nuclear retaliation strategy, which one might call delayed second strike. This means that China will retaliate only after withstanding a nuclear strike, rather than attempting either a strategy of launch under attack or a strategy of launch on warning. In doing so, China hopes that

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its nuclear weapons do not constitute a threat to any other countries, as long as they do not plan to launch a nuclear attack on China. The Western media and pundits have argued that China’s NFU is nothing but rhetoric, given that it cannot be verified. From China’s perspective, its NFU pledge can effectively be verified. NFU not only regulates the nature and mission of China’s nuclear force, but also determines its size, configuration, readiness, and pace of development. According to this view, if any nuclear power is truly serious about its NFU pledge, then it has: • no need for a large nuclear force for preemptive strikes; • no need to put its nuclear force on a hair-trigger alert; • no need to mate warheads to carrier vehicles; • no need to seek a war-fighting capability, or weapons for nonstrategic

purposes; • no need to deploy its nuclear weapons abroad; and • no need to be engaged in a nuclear arms race with any other nuclearweapon power. All these can serve as the physical benchmarks as to the seriousness of a country’s NFU pledge. China is proud to claim that it has followed this course of maintaining a nonprovocative nuclear posture. It can be argued that if the two major nuclear powers had also followed China’s model, the alarming nuclear threat with which humankind must live today would not exist. NFU also has five main weaknesses. First, by taking an NFU nuclear posture, China is put in the position of having to confer the initiative to the other side in any possible nuclear exchange. To maintain this posture of passivity, China must resort to concealment as part of its efforts to ensure the survival of its small nuclear arsenal. In the current situation, therefore, it is difficult for Beijing to be tactically transparent regarding its nuclear capability, although it is completely transparent in the strategic sense. Second, NFU still acknowledges the use of nuclear weapons as legitimate in certain circumstances, thus also creating a moral problem for China’s use of nuclear weapons. NFU is only the second-best option for China’s nuclear security efforts. Third, with the U.S. deployment of its

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missile defense system, the effectiveness and credibility of China’s nuclear retaliatory capability may be called into question. Fourth, with the rapid development of science and high technology, conventional precision-guided munitions can replace part of the role of nuclear weapons as a new form of strategic force. Strategic strikes will not necessarily come from the employment of nuclear weapons, which could complicate the context in which the NFU policy has been traditionally envisaged. How these new developments should be addressed would be a new challenge for China with regard to its NFU pledge. Fifth, last but not least, NFU cannot deal with the emerging nuclear threats posed by the possession and use of nuclear weapons by nonstate actors. The nuclear landscape has become much more complex than it was during the Cold War. This explains why China has become increasingly proactive in joining world efforts for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in the post–Cold War era. China believes, more than ever, that only by moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons can there be hope for global nuclear security. Many Western scholars also argue that having entered the post–Cold War era, China’s nuclear strategy seems to be undergoing a noticeable shift “from minimum deterrence toward limited deterrence in which China would possess a more sophisticated nuclear force structure capable of controlling nuclear escalation during a conflict and bringing about intra-war deterrence.”1 They suspect that the new shift may also lead China to seek “nuclear war fighting in specific circumstances.”2 Some Chinese peers seem to have also embraced this view. But to lump China’s nuclear strategy into a Western framework of nuclear deterrence blurs an important point, this being that China has fundamentally distinguished itself from other nuclear powers in terms of both nuclear doctrine and nuclear strategy. It is true that any military strategy has a deterrent effect. But a deterrent effect does not equate with the deterrence strategy of the Western powers, which from the very outset has been offensive, and thus aimed at reaching political or military objectives via the first use of nuclear weapons. Thus, the concept of nuclear deterrence violates China’s philosophy on nuclear weapons. Furthermore, in retrospect, nuclear deterrence required a nuclear capability that was adequate to prevail over one’s rivals in a nuclear exchange,

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if deterrence failed. But the question of how much capability would be enough eternally perplexed the policymakers for these nuclear powers. Much depended on subjective threat perception, which more often than not tended to exaggerate the other side’s capability, thereby precipitating a preference to build a nuclear arsenal larger than necessary for the sake of better insurance. This competitive and paranoid mind-set led the United States and the Soviet Union to possess more than 70,000 nuclear bombs at the peak of the Cold War—an overkill capacity that could wipe out the world’s population several times. Two decades have passed since the end of the Cold War. Despite the increasingly remote possibility of a nuclear war between the United States and Russia, the two countries continue to insist on each maintaining a nuclear arsenal of nearly 10,000 nuclear warheads, in line with their nuclear deterrence strategies. It is no exaggeration to say that nuclear deterrence has been the source of the global arms race. Nuclear deterrence, in accordance with this Western approach and definition, would inevitably lead China to join in this escalating nuclear game, however modified by the terms of either minimum or limited deterrence. Unlike China, which was forced to develop its nuclear option under a clear nuclear threat, India has never been faced with an immediate major military or nuclear threat that would require New Delhi to have a nuclear option to ensure its national survival. Its acquisition of nuclear weapons appears to have been almost entirely motivated by politics. India seems to have an explicit strategic goal: to be accepted as a world power. And this goal seems to reflect India’s deeply rooted belief that nuclear weapons constitute an effective physical signature of world-power status, and even a shortcut to this status. However, India seems to have paid a big price for achieving its nuclear option. From a military point of view, India’s quest for nuclear status inevitably triggered Pakistan—its long-term rival on the subcontinent—to also become an open nuclear state. The emergence of two nuclear states in South Asia has not only generated the risk of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race, but also has somewhat offset India’s conventional superiority over Pakistan. This has complicated, and has not improved, India’s security situation in South Asia. Thus, the challenge confronting India is the growing difficulty of maintaining strategic stability with Pakistan in South Asia.

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Another perhaps more significant challenge to New Delhi is that by choosing to become a de facto nuclear-weapon state at a time when the whole international community is determined to strive for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, India has greatly tarnished its image as a responsible power. India cannot afford to be a maverick outside the international nonproliferation regime forever, so it must define a way to join the world-concerted efforts for nuclear disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation as a nuclear-weapon state. India’s announcement of its no-first-use pledge is certainly a great help in this regard. However, India’s NFU commitment still appears to be ambiguous. India perhaps needs renewed reflection on the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategy. Nonetheless, China sees a great deal of common interest in working together with India to stabilize nuclear relations between the two countries, as well as overall strategic stability in South Asia.

THE VIEw FROM INDIA P. k. sIngH

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ndian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated on May 27, 1988, that “India is a nuclear-weapon state. . . . It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant.”3 When one considers India’s and China’s nuclear doctrines and dynamics, it is imperative that one look at the historical trends and the geopolitical realities. Doctrines are not developed in a void. India’s nuclear ambitions and policies have been consistent since it gained its independence. From 1948, when India’s Atomic Energy Commission was created, the country’s leadership rightly believed that nuclear technology would

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help alleviate its energy shortages, sustain its economic development, provide deterrence, and enable it to stake a claim for greater influence in the global order. From the construction of the first light-water research reactor in Asia in 1956 through its first nuclear test in 1974, a number of developments in the strategic environment had an impact on India’s decisionmaking. Among these, China’s actions in Tibet and the U.S.-Pakistan Mutual Defense Assistance Pact, as well as Pakistan’s dalliance with the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), marked worrisome trends. However, the most transformative event for India was the 1962 Sino-Indian War, followed by China’s nuclear tests in October 1964. This rapid succession convinced the Indian leadership of the need to have its own nuclear deterrent. The Indo-­Pakistani War of 1965 and the perceived possibility of a second front being opened by China only helped to strengthen this resolve. By the 1970s, the United States’ tilt toward Pakistan in the 1971 IndoPakistani War, accompanied by a deepening China–Pakistan nexus and United States–China rapprochement, increased the pressure on India. These geostrategic developments merged with Pakistan’s desire, from 1972, to possess a nuclear weapon. This final trend built upon the numerous others in helping to merge the anti-nuclear and pro-nuclear Indian lobbies into a greater accord when it came to the nuclear weapons issue. If India had chosen to forgo nuclear weapons, this would neither have stopped Pakistan from acquisition nor have induced China to cap its own program. It is important to note that when China tested its nuclear device in October 1964, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which banned atmospheric testing, had already existed for one year. Yet, China continued its atmospheric tests until 1980. Furthermore, when China tested its first nuclear device, it was not even a member of the United Nations. This makes China’s talk of adherence to global nonproliferation regime norms even more specious. From the start of its nuclear program, China was outside the international regime. Moreover, China’s statement following its test on October 16, 1964, does not make a distinction between de jure and de facto nuclearweapon states, omits reference to international bodies like the United Nations, and suggests the anticipation that other countries would follow

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suit. Because the next country to follow suit was in fact India, this makes China’s objections to India’s nuclear status all the more problematic. From its program’s inception, China was practically welcoming other countries to the nuclear weapons table. With these historical arguments in place, the current status of the global nuclear power structure becomes clearer. In terms of disarmament, there is a paradox. All nuclear-weapon states, though possessing nuclear weapons, support nuclear disarmament. There is a core difference between Indian and Chinese views. Although India believes in global, verifiable, and nondiscriminatory nuclear disarmament, at the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament, China advocated that nuclear disarmament be carried out in conjunction with conventional disarmament. This proposal is too idealistic and unrealistic. Is it feasible that conventional disarmament will go hand in hand with nuclear disarmament? The Chinese stance implies that if we cannot attain one, then we should forgo the other. In the absence of global nuclear disarmament, India’s strategic interests require maintenance of effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability in case deterrence fails. India’s doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence is not about numbers. It is a dynamic concept—it is not evolving in a void—related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives, and the needs of national security. And it will, without a doubt, be based on a nuclear triad—ground-, air-, and submarine-based nuclear weapons. Regarding no first use, India’s position is absolutely clear, but recently some media articles have suggested a change in China’s no-first-use policy. This indicates that China may be considering adopting the same policy as the other nuclear-weapon states. Another interesting concept, which demands clarification from Chinese experts, pertains to “nuclear stability” and “nuclear balance.” These terms seem to be used interchangeably, possibly because in the Chinese language one word conveys two different strands of thought. The question remains how China proposes to maintain nuclear stability and nuclear balance with the United States, thereby making an impact on the same two issues between China and India. We must explore whether nuclear stability or balance can exist without the issue

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being discussed multilaterally between the United States, Russia, China, and India. Also, the role of conventional weapons must be part of this discussion. India, for its part, will maintain highly effective conventional capabilities, which may include precision strikes with conventional missiles and a robust ballistic missile defense, so as to raise the threshold on the outbreak of conflict. On the nuclear arms race, the simple answer is that India will not get into such a race. Since it has acquired nuclear weapons, India has steadfastly pursued its economic reforms and accelerated globalization efforts in all fields. A blind pursuit of nuclear weapons increases will not be allowed to dilute or hinder the country’s economic, political, or strategic aims. The bottom line is that India will maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. By contrast, though China says that it will not enter a nuclear arms race, it is clear that the Chinese nuclear arsenal will grow and diversify. Major General Pan Zhenqiang wrote in 2009 that China has no other alternative than to quicken the pace and scope of its modernization drive, including increasing the number of its warheads and building more mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles.4 My basic question is: What will become of the missiles and nuclear weapons that are being replaced by more modern ones? There have not been any reports on decommissioning, so this indicates to me that the shorter-range, older nuclear weapons are being re-deployed toward the Sino-Indian border, possibly in Tibet or even potentially in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Another issue that arises from the writings of Major General Pan pertains to his views that China should continue to maintain a defensive nuclear posture and that the United States should ensure that its further nuclear posture developments and conventional strike capability, along with ballistic missile defense capabilities, do not threaten the retaliatory capability of Beijing’s smaller nuclear force. This suggests that he is placing the onus of responsibility on the United States not to threaten or weaken China’s retaliatory nuclear force. The question remains as to what China’s response would be if similar demands were made with respect to India’s nuclear retaliatory capability vis-à-vis China. Nuclear terrorism is another issue of mutual interest, including the issue of nuclear weapons in failing states or in the hands of nonstate actors.

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China has long expressed concerns about the provision of “nuclear umbrellas” to non–nuclear-weapon states, and yet there remains a view in India that Pakistan’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs exist because of China’s support. The real danger would arise if other countries were to employ this proxy model to create a nuclear-armed terrorist organization. Such issues could be dealt with in a bilateral forum that also addresses how to work in concert to meet the challenges of nuclear proliferation and illegal nuclear commerce of the variety carried out by the A. Q. Khan network. Given these unanswered questions, China and India should pay more attention to spelling out their vision for how to identify and deal with nuclear red lines between the two countries. Only in attempting to answer these questions and comparing these stances will Sino-Indian strategic relations be empowered to move forward.

Notes 1 “China’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 25, 2003, www.nti. org/db/china/doctrine.htm. 2 Ibid. 3 “Suo Motu Statement by Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihar Vajpayee in Parliament,” NuclearFiles.org, May 27, 1998, www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/ issues/policy/indian-nuclear-policy/suo-motu-statement-pm.html. 4 Pan Zhenqiang, “China’s Nuclear Strategy in a Changing World Strategic Situation,” Unblocking the Road to Global Zero: Perspectives of Advanced Nuclear Nations: India/ China, edited by Barry Blechman (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2009), 44.

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CHAPTER 3

Comparing Nuclear Pledges and Practice THE VIEW FROM india C. Uday Bhaskar

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hina and India have distinctive nuclear weapons trajectories in terms of capabilities and their relationship with the prevailing international system. China was the fifth country to become a nuclear-weapon state (NWS), and its ties with the Soviet Union provided the initial material and geopolitical support for acquiring a rudimentary nuclear weapons capability. China was a critical swing factor in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Beijing’s subsequent estrangement with Moscow and rapprochement with Washington contributed to the evolving global strategic framework. India, conversely, has had a complex and unique nuclear weapons trajectory, along with a troubled relationship with the global system. India’s unique status stems from the fact that it is the only “state with nuclear weapons” (SNW) that began with a civilian nuclear program and then embarked upon the military route.1 By contrast, all the other states—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, Pakistan, and

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Israel—commenced their trajectories with the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding the rapprochement between India and the global community over New Delhi’s distinctive nuclear status, which was initiated bilaterally between India and the United States in 2005 and concluded multilaterally at the Nuclear Suppliers Group in September 2008, China remains reluctant to accept India’s position as a SNW and engage with it accordingly. Beijing continues to perceive the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 as a proliferation transgression. Put simply, in the view of many Indians, China refuses to acknowledge India’s nuclear status. Still, there remain similarities. Both nations eschew any kind of officially mandated transparency about their nuclear weapons inventory, and all estimates are usually referred to as the most sincere “guesstimates.” However, it must be acknowledged that this is not a desirable feature in the India–China context and extends to other strands of the bilateral relationship. A lack of transparency in the inventory and capability niche transmutes to the realm of “intent.” Today, there is deep apprehension and mistrust about the weapons of mass destruction capabilities and the intent of the “other” as far as the Sino-Indian weapons of mass destruction dyad is concerned. The very classification of the semantic “dyad” is under review in India, and this stems from the manner in which the China–Pakistan nuclear relationship is perceived. A number of experts in India view the country as caught in a nuclear triangle with China and Pakistan acting in tandem—well beyond the accepted framework of classical deterrence. India’s nuclear weapons trajectory was largely shaped by its anxiety about China’s NWS status and catalyzed by the imperative to catch up with Pakistan and redress the asymmetry between the two that had grown in Islamabad’s favor since May 1990. In this evolution, Pakistan’s Army acquired credible status as a “state with nuclear weapons” on May 26, 1990, and China played a pivotal role. Thomas Reed of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and Danny Stillman of Las Vegas Laboratory have corroborated a view that China tested a weapon design for Pakistan on May 26, 1990, and that this was part of a complex and deliberately tangled nuclear proliferation lattice among Cold War rivals.2 Pakistan’s Army, in essence, embarked upon a high-stakes gamble against India that utilized its covert nuclear weapons

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capability as a firewall to step up terrorism and low-intensity conflict in the Kashmir Valley. In retrospect, this was the period when Pakistan’s Army introduced the concept of nuclear-weapons-enabled terror and the use of weapons of mass destruction as a shield to embark upon high-stakes covert territorial intrusion. This was far removed from the “core” mission of nuclear weapons and deterrence that was supported by responsible nuclear-weapon states. The former strategy was adopted in May 1990 and the latter in May 1999 during the Kargil War under General Pervez Musharraf. These assertions illustrate a deeply held view in India that China is using Pakistan as a nuclear proxy. This view leads to overarching concerns about Chinese intent. Questions linger in India as to whether China might have the intention of using its superior and more flexible nuclear capability in a revisionist or coercive fashion to manage the disputed border issue. The modernization of the Chinese arsenal draws much concern within India for its impact on the bilateral relationship. And though it contradicts the manner in which Beijing has traditionally projected its own nuclear posture— namely, as one of classical deterrence and no first use (NFU)—there are suggestions that China may be in the process of reviewing and ultimately changing its nuclear doctrine. Despite China’s often-stated reasons for opacity and seeming rigidity in the nuclear domain, Beijing has shown its ability to be pragmatic and flexible in making strategic choices. Thus, the time has come for Beijing to review its nuclear relationship with New Delhi. Paradoxically, China and India have held many common positions in their nuclear evolution—since becoming independent nations. Whether with respect to NFU or their commitment to global disarmament, both nations have followed a path that is different from the NWSs that have preceded them. Converging principles have allowed China and India to avoid the “strategic excesses” of the Cold War. Moreover, they have contributed to China’s and India’s articulation of the need to dilute the salience of nuclear weapons in their national security policies. India, it may be recalled, introduced the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for disarmament at the United Nations in late 1988. As such, a joint proposal for global NFU may not seem as farfetched as it now sounds.

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However, despite these common touchstones for cooperation, following the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear agreement, there seems to be a prevalent view in China that India has become an “unthinking appendage” of the United States. This is far from the truth, as the elephant cherishes its relative autonomy. In keeping with Chairman Mao Zedong’s exhortation to search for truth from facts, it is time for China to study the Indo-U.S. relationship more objectively to discover its implications for China. As part of this exercise, India and China are in desperate need of much greater candid exchanges on strategic and security issues. Currently, the apparent reticence on the part of Beijing to do so has left both countries at a standstill. As such, more Track-2 interactions should be initiated and sustained in both countries—across a wide cross-section of the expert and diplomatic community—to differentiate between varying views on complex and opaque nuclear issues.

THE VIEw FROM CHINA nIe HongYI

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hether due to shifts in the international strategic environment or the scale of the development of nuclear power, China’s and India’s nuclear strategies share common principles. These similarities can serve as a platform for strengthening communication and cooperation in the nuclear field. However, differences in the security and geopolitical environment can also have an impact on their nuclear strategies and result in obstacles to Sino-Indian mutual trust. The basic characteristic of a nuclear weapon is its capacity for “overkill” (chaosha). This capability can be applied to the well-known concept from the strategist Clausewitz that war is the continuation of politics by

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other means. Fortunately, there exists a “nuclear taboo” (he jinji), and nuclear weapons thus have not attained their full “overkill” potential. Yet, this characteristic has made the concept of “deterrence” inseparable from countries’ development of nuclear strategy. And despite changes to U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategies, the basic characteristics of nuclear weapons have remained the same ever since their inception.3 Given the evolution of nuclear strategy from the Soviet-U.S. dynamic through the present day, the concept can be summarized as a theory consisting of two basic types.4 The first type is the strategy of minimum nuclear deterrence. Counter-nuclear deterrence (fan weishe) also falls into this category. This form of nuclear strategy is based on a pure theory of deterrence, which consists of retaining only second-strike capability and not seeking war-fighting capability. The second type of nuclear strategy is war-fighting (zhanzheng duikang) strategy. This requires full preparations for nuclear war, in the event that deterrence fails. It is usually linked with two basic elements: first, the existence of a credible nuclear force; and second, the ability to use this force if need be. China and India, as possessors of nuclear weapons, have also inevitably attributed to the word “deterrence” (weishe) a specific meaning in the development of their respective nuclear strategies. Given their similar backgrounds, there are many points of intersection between the two countries’ nuclear strategies. Overall, China’s nuclear strategy has three significant characteristics or principles—NFU of nuclear weapons, maintenance of a limited but effective nuclear force, and support for nuclear disarmament. With respect to the first, the same day that China conducted its first nuclear test, October 16, 1964, the Chinese government solemnly declared that at no time, under no circumstances, would China be the first to use nuclear weapons. NFU is the core principle that limits the role of China’s nuclear weapons to counterattack and reflects a purely self-defensive stance. China has adhered to this same principle for forty years and in this regard is unique among the NWSs.5 This position is all the more legitimate because China was forced down the nuclear path by the nuclear threat it faced from the United States. NFU demonstrates that China’s nuclear strategy is to prevent nuclear war.

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A central reason why China will not be the first to use nuclear weapons pertains to its building of survivability capabilities through such initiatives as the “Great Wall Engineering” (changcheng gongcheng) project.6 According to the PLA Daily, this initiative emerged from an official decision by the central government in 1979. By the summer of 1995, the People’s Liberation Army had spent sixteen years to complete the “Great Wall Engineering” project, which consists of a variety of types of strategic missile bases around the country that are capable in terms of strike, defense, storage, command, and survivability. This project could be called a Chinese-style of “missile defense” (daodan fangyu), in that its main purpose is to sustain China’s nuclear forces after experiencing a nuclear attack. It ensures that these forces will be able to survive and carry out a nuclear counterattack. From the perspective of limited nuclear deterrence strategy, the existence of the “Great Wall Engineering” project has greatly enhanced China’s nuclear deterrent capability. It reduces China’s need to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal and bolsters its policy of unconditional NFU. These various factors ensure that China will not be as constrained in terms of the specific timing of its response.7 As for the second principle, most scholars maintain that China possesses a strategy based on minimum nuclear deterrence. This assessment is primarily rooted in the small size of China’s nuclear arsenal. However, there is a lack of consensus among domestic and foreign scholars about whether the size of China’s arsenal meets the requirements of minimum nuclear deterrence to be able to “inflict unacceptable losses” (zaocheng buke chengshou sunshi). The limited size of China’s nuclear force does not mean that its number of nuclear weapons is static. In fact, this size is measured in accordance with the dynamic of what constitutes an effective nuclear arsenal. Given improvements in the development of international rapid precision strike weapons systems and missile defense, the minimum level required for self-defense and technical specifications must be raised accordingly. China’s so-called nuclear force modernization is a response to global missile defense and precision strike capability. Its objective is to improve nuclear security, reliability, survivability, mobility, and penetration capabilities. In short, by improving the overall survivability of its nuclear

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forces, China is ensuring the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence under any conditions.8 This overview may be compared with that of India. In May 1998, India undertook five underground nuclear explosions and made public that its development of nuclear weapons was primarily for containing and deterring China. During former Indian defense minister George Fernandes’ tenure, India not only strengthened its military and developed nuclear weapons, but also took China to be its primary rival. Fernandes declared on public television that China is “still potential threat number one.”9 After India conducted its May 1998 nuclear tests, it did not immediately release an official document declaring its nuclear strategy. This elicited a great deal of speculation and concern in the international community. It was not until August 17, 1999, that India’s national security adviser, Brajesh Mishra, issued a draft nuclear doctrine through the National Security Advisory Board.10 This official government document reaffirmed the core principles of India’s draft nuclear strategy, namely pledges of NFU and credible minimum deterrence. The main points of India’s nuclear strategy are as follows:11 • establish and maintain credible minimum nuclear deterrence; • pledge nuclear weapons use only as a means of counterattack,

namely as a response to a nuclear strike against Indian territory and biological or chemical weapons attack; • implement nuclear counterstrike via the civilian Nuclear Command Authority; • maintain nuclear forces’ command and control via the Political Affairs Committee and Executive Affairs Committee; • forswear the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries; • control the export of nuclear and missile-related materials and technology; • enter into Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations; • continue the moratorium on nuclear testing; and • pursue global, verifiable, nondiscriminatory nuclear disarmament.12 When comparing China’s and India’s nuclear strategies, one discovers several points of intersection, including NFU, credible minimum nuclear

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deterrence, and disarmament. These similarities between the two countries provide the fundamentals for nuclear communication and exchange, and thus for reducing suspicions to avoid a nuclear arms race. Despite this convergence, India’s concept of “military threat” comes from two main areas: China to its north and Pakistan to its west. The development of its nuclear program not only serves as India’s “great-power dream” (daguo meng), but also as an effective form of containment against Pakistan and China. Regarding India–Pakistan relations, they have not only faced several decades of war and conflict but have also been engaged in an arms race. This has compelled India to invest a great deal of resources in armaments, and as a result it has become both a strong military power and a regional military power. Nonetheless, from the beginning, India’s nuclear weapons development has built China into its imagined enemy (jiaxiang dishuli). This has contributed to Chinese suspicions regarding India’s nuclear weapons program and has seriously affected the trust level of China’s military toward India. It has also forced the two countries’ nuclear strategies into an antagonistic construct. This threat scenario—coupled with the characteristic of mutual restraint brought on by the overlap of strategic interests and security space—can lead to strategic, political, and security suspicion, and even competition. The low level of mutual trust between China’s and India’s militaries leads to differences in the basic orientation of their nuclear strategies.13 These strategies have already been made manifest in certain specific arenas of nuclear modernization. India has achieved the ability to strike China with nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. It has indigenously developed the Agni-III missile, which has a range capable of reaching Beijing and Shanghai. There is no doubt that India’s nuclear force development will have a significant impact on China’s security. Moreover, the inability of China and India to resolve their territorial dispute has resulted in a basic antagonism in their implementation of nuclear strategy. On this point, the Sino-Indian border dispute is a direct cause of the deterioration of relations between the two countries and has long stymied the smooth and healthy development of relations on other important issues.

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The border issue is not only a territorial dispute; it also relates to national dignity and popular sentiment. As a result, it has the potential to contribute to extreme nationalism and escalation or to a deterioration of the Sino-Indian relationship. The fact that these territorial boundary disputes have not been properly resolved has contributed to the two countries’ national military and nuclear strategies inevitably taking on an adversarial quality. If China and India were to reach a fair and reasonable solution of the border issue, this would greatly promote the establishment of mutual trust, weakening antagonism in the two sides’ nuclear strategic positioning. It would also be conducive to China and India playing good role models for neighboring countries in achieving regional peace and stability with respect to nuclear disarmament and arms control. Although there is competition between China and India, this does not mean that the two countries must inevitably move in the direction of confrontation and conflict. In the end, the two countries’ bilateral relations will depend on their fundamental interests and national policies. Competition is not zero-sum. In the quest to reap the developmental benefits of globalization in today’s world population, competition is everywhere. The key to avoiding deleterious competition is to rise above extreme nationalism to transform it into manageable, healthy competition. China’s and India’s nuclear strategies should not become based on a balance of “terror deterrence” (kongbu weishe), forcing the two countries to become hostages to one another. Overcoming mistrust and psychological conflict is a difficult task in international relations. It requires that China and India move beyond their geopolitical differences through the establishment of additional confidence-building measures. If they can do so, the chances of the two countries fighting and harming each other in the nuclear field can be greatly reduced. These efforts could have a positive impact on nuclear arms control and disarmament in Asia and around the globe, turning nuclear pledges into practice.

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Notes 1 “State with nuclear weapons” (SNW) is a term used by the author in the original draft. It reflects India’s status as a country that possesses nuclear weapons, but refuses to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as it would be ineligible for the appellation of nuclear-weapon state (NWS), having conducted its nuclear test after the cut-off date of 1968. 2 Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman, The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2009). 3 Rong Yu and Hong Yuan, “Cong fan he weishe zhanlue dao zuidi he weishe zhanlue: Zhongguo he zhanlue yanjin zhilu” (From Anti-nuclear Deterrence Strategy to Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: China’s Evolutionary Path of Nuclear Deterrence), Dangdai yatai (Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), issue 3 (2009): 120–32. 4 Sun Xiangli, “Zhongguo he zhanlue xingzhi yu tedian fenxi” (An Analysis of the Nature and Characteristics of China’s Nuclear Strategy), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics), issue 9, 2006. 5 Unlike China, the United States, Britain, and France have refused to make a clear commitment to NFU. In 1982, the Soviet Union announced an NFU policy, only to have it relinquished by Russia in 1993. 6 Chen Dechun, Zhang Jiajun, and Sun Jilian, “Jun zhongjiang zhuying: Ji erpao ‘changcheng gongcheng’ zhuyao shejizhe zhiyi huang binghua” (The Military’s Jiang Zhuying: Remembering One of the Main Designers of the Second Artillery’s ‘Great Wall Engineering’ Huang Binghua), Jiefangjun bao (People’s Liberation Army Daily), May 20, 1995. 7 According to official media reports, tactical exercises and training programs undertaken by China’s strategic missile forces demonstrate that they are capable of a counterstrike ten minutes (shifen zhong) following an initial nuclear attack. Moreover, in a closed tunnel, forces can subsist for several days up to even a month before issuing a nuclear counterattack. See Yu Yeqing and Wang Qingyong, “Dui ‘jinpai kemu’ jinxing cuihuo” (Quenching the “Subject of Gold Medals”), Jiefangjun bao (People’s Liberation Army Daily), January 11, 2008. 8 Xie Guangzhu, Dangdai zhongguo de guofang keji shiye (Modern China’s National Defense Science and Technology Enterprise), (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 1992): 223. 9 “China Potential Threat Number One: George Fernandes,” Press Trust of India, March 30, 2008, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-03-30/news/ 27729485_1_potential-threat-number-one-tibet-defence-minister-george-fernandes. 10 The draft outlines India’s nuclear doctrine and concept of minimum nuclear deterrence. It is called a draft because Atal Bihari Vajpayee, as caretaker prime minister, had not approved it. Under domestic and international pressure, after winning the general election Prime Minister Vajpayee neither endorsed the draft nor openly

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denied it. When on January 4, 2003, the government of India officially announced India’s nuclear strategic doctrine, it contained eight elements: preamble, objectives, nuclear forces, credibility and survivability, command and control, security and safety, research and development, as well as disarmament and arms control. “India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine,” Arms Control Today, July–August 1999; “The National Security Advisory Doctrine,” India News, October 1, 1999. 11 See Harsh V. Pant, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command Structure: Implications for India and the World,” Comparative Strategy 24, no. 3 (January 2005): 277–93; Zu Zhaoheng, “Yindu he zhengce yanjiu” (India’s Nuclear Policy Studies), doctoral dissertation, Fudan University, 98. 12 “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” Indian Embassy, www.indian embassy.org/pic/nuclear test/htm. 13 Both countries have a significant impact on East Asia and South Asia. Southeast Asia serves as the locus of intersection between the two. South Asia and Southeast Asia are two regions where India and China have important strategic, security, and economic interests. For a long time, India has been disturbed by China’s development of relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Burma, and even intimated that China has sought to take advantage of these countries to encircle India. China is similarly concerned about India’s “Look East” policy, along with India’s military and security cooperation with some East Asian countries. In accordance with the ongoing development of the Chinese and Indian economy and their increasing energy demands on the international market, there is a need on the part of both countries for a greater economic, security, and strategic space. Interaction between the two countries has expanded into a larger area—such as Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean—resulting in increased overlap between the security and strategic interests of these two countries.

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CHAPTER 4

Revisiting No First Use and Minimum Deterrence THE VIEW FROM china li bin

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lthough security relations between India and China have improved over the last decade, they are not yet sufficiently stable. To avoid a dangerous nuclear confrontation, it is important that the two countries learn to manage their nuclear weapons relations. For this reason, bilateral engagement on nuclear issues should be on an equal basis. However, China is a nuclear-weapon state, as defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whereas India is not. This difference poses difficulties for equal engagement. Therefore, it is important to carefully choose the topics and format of Sino-Indian interaction to make sure that both sides feel that their exchange is equal and does not harm their nonproliferation commitments. In addition to their bilateral nuclear relations, the two countries participate in global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regimes. As the world’s two oldest civilizations, India and China should also strive to bring their wisdom to global efforts to reach a nuclear-weapon–free world.

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First of all, both India and China should commit not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, under no first use (NFU). A full NFU commitment should include, at a minimum, the following four components: • not to use nuclear weapons first against other countries that possess

nuclear weapons; • not to threaten to use nuclear weapons first against other countries that possess nuclear weapons; • not to use nuclear weapons against other countries that do not possess nuclear weapons; and • not to threaten to use nuclear weapons against other countries that do not possess nuclear weapons. These bilateral pledges would avoid the problem of identifying countries as “have” or “have-nots” in accordance with the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty. It would thereby provide an equal basis for the two countries to positively engage on nuclear weapons issues and an opportunity for them to contribute to global disarmament efforts. To better explain these synergies of cooperation, it is useful to begin with the political significance of NFU. At a philosophical level, there are two divergent views on the roles of nuclear weapons. The first view is that governments may use nuclear weapons if deemed necessary. The second is that nuclear weapons are not usable weapons. Advocates of the first view believe that an NFU commitment makes no difference, because the decisionmakers will certainly use nuclear weapons when needed. However, international security practice since World War II suggests that the use of nuclear weapons by governments has been constrained by a nuclear taboo.1 Contrary to the claim that countries must resort to nuclear weapons when faced with losing conventional wars, the fact is that countries in possession of nuclear weapons have not resorted to the use of nuclear weapons when faced with a conventional loss to non–nuclearweapon states. This was evident in the United States’ military engagement in Vietnam and the Soviet Union’s in Afghanistan. These cases reflect the fact that government leaders felt that the first use of nuclear weapons was not a realistic choice when they were faced with losing conventional wars. A commitment of NFU seems to be much more

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convincing than a claim of first use in almost all situations. If the national security policy of a country is largely based on a first use of nuclear weapons, it represents a false promise upon which to base its national security. Indian and Chinese leaders fully understand the role of this nuclear taboo and wisely chose to make a public promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Their NFU commitments do not weaken the capabilities of the two countries in defending their national security, as it is already impossible for them to use nuclear weapons first when facing conventional threats. The following analysis explores the political and strategic differences between the NFU commitments made by India and China and three basic ways of claiming the first use of nuclear weapons. The first method is the use of nuclear weapons as a last resort, which in essence constitutes launching nuclear retaliation against the enemy’s threat of conventional annihilation. The concept underpinning this approach is that the nuclear taboo may not constrain the use of nuclear weapons as a last resort when a country’s existence comes under threat.2 The nuclear taboo is a prohibitive social norm. If a society is faced with annihilation, no matter whether nuclear or conventional, it is possible that the norm of not using nuclear weapons may collapse. So nuclear weapons may have some impact in deterring conventional annihilation. However, given that both New Delhi and Beijing have unconditional NFU declarations, this suggests that the two governments have confidence in the ability of their conventional military to avert annihilation. Because small conventional conflicts do not change the nuclear taboo, nuclear weapons offer hardly any deterrent effect against such scenarios. However, they may have some effect against a debilitating strike. As a ​ result, one’s rival has the opportunity to undertake a strategy of gradual aggression to challenge any claims of last resort. Although it is not feasible for a country to launch a nuclear attack in response to small conventional conflicts, the accumulation of gradual aggression may be considered to be large in scale. As a result, a claim of last resort may lose its credibility. However, both India and China have chosen not to use their nuclear weapons to deter conventional annihilation in their nuclear strategies. Thereby, they have avoided a loss of credibility when it comes to nuclear deterrence.

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To counter gradual aggression, the second means of claiming first use maintains the development of a flexible nuclear response. This capability technically allows a country to launch a small nuclear attack to respond to a small conventional aggression. The assumption underlying this concept is that the moral constraints regarding a small nuclear attack would be limited, such that a claim of a small nuclear response might generate a credible deterrent effect against gradual aggression. However, a nuclear strategy of flexible response faces serious dilemmas. If a country launches a small nuclear attack in response to a conventional conflict, it invites massive nuclear retaliation from its enemy. This may undermine the country’s determination and credibility in launching a small first nuclear strike. For the purpose of credibility, a country that takes the strategy of flexible response would have to have a capability to win a nuclear war at any level. This would dissuade the enemy from launching gradual aggression and any consequent nuclear exchanges. But it is almost an impossible mission to win a nuclear war against a nuclear rival, if the rival possesses or can cache its nuclear weapons. Furthermore, an attempt to establish such a capability would lead to a significant nuclear buildup, because the strategy of flexible response requires different categories and a large number of nuclear weapons to engage in nuclear war at varying levels. India and China have publicly ruled out the possibility of using nuclear weapons first, including flexible response. Therefore, the two countries have little strategic incentive for engaging in a nuclear buildup toward a large number or multiple categories of nuclear weapons, as required under a strategy of flexible response. The concept behind flexible response is to improve the “credibility” of nuclear deterrence against conventional threats, but the strategy of flexible response elicits additional “incredibility.” The nuclear taboo constrains nuclear attack against small conventional conflicts. Once the claim of using nuclear weapons proves to be false, however, it loses credibility. To avoid this failure, one approach is not to specify the situations in which a country will use nuclear weapons. Instead, the country may intentionally maintain some uncertainty as to when nuclear weapons may be used. This is the third means of claiming the first use of nuclear weapons. A nuclear strategy based on uncertainty regarding nuclear weapons use, however, leads to a dilemma. If a country’s rival does not believe that

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its opponent would use nuclear weapons first under certain conditions, this country’s nuclear weapons would not have a coercive effect when it was faced with a particular scenario. If a country’s rival believes that its opponent would use nuclear weapons first under certain conditions, this could lead its nuclear rival to undertake preemption or nuclear escalation when faced with a particular scenario. The above-mentioned strategy also encourages countries that do not have nuclear weapons to think that they could make strategic use of nuclear weapons in a wide range of situations and thus need to develop them. Both India and China explicitly exclude the uncertainties in nuclear weapons use in conventional conflicts. They do not expect any coercive effect of their nuclear weapons in such situations, and their commitments may be useful to limit the escalation of nuclear confrontation in a crisis. In addition to the above-mentioned differences between NFU commitments and first-use claims, there is another more significant difference. If a country publicly makes an NFU commitment, it gives up the option of threatening to engage in the first use of nuclear weapons in conventional conflicts. It also forgoes its ability to exercise nuclear coercion in such conflicts. Countries that do not make an NFU commitment still attach a coercive role to their nuclear weapons in conventional conflicts. This is the major political and strategic difference brought by an NFU commitment. India and China have taken the lead in giving up nuclear coercion in conventional conflicts by forswearing the first use of nuclear weapons against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons. China’s and India’s NFU commitments are politically important because they do the following: • constrain them from threatening to use nuclear weapons first and

therefore reduce the chance of nuclear confrontation and escalation in crises; • prevent them from sending coercive nuclear signals to countries that do not have nuclear weapons and reduce the incentives of others to develop nuclear weapons; • provide the opportunity to lay an equal basis for the two countries to have nuclear dialogues and to build healthy nuclear relations; and

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and make a significant contribution to global nuclear disarmament.

An often-mentioned criticism of NFU is that it remains unverifiable. This argument is simply wrong. The purpose of verification efforts for arms control commitments is to detect violations. For example, in the case of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), verification is intended to detect clandestine nuclear tests after they occur. In the case of NFU, verification is intended to detect a nuclear attack after it happens. In point of fact, an NFU commitment is much more verifiable than compliance with the CTBT and most other arms control agreements. The real dilemma posed by an NFU commitment is that there is a demand for early warning on NFU violations—nuclear attack—so that there is adequate time to prepare and mount a response before the violation. Many other arms control arrangements, including the CTBT, face the same issue. In the CTBT verification system, there is no formal arrangement to detect preparation for nuclear tests. As a result, this structure did not provide an early warning before North Korea’s nuclear tests. However, the early warning problem in an NFU commitment is more acute than other arms control agreements, because the consequences of a violation are more serious. As a result, it is important to attach early warning mechanisms to NFU commitments so that enough time is allowed for response to possible violations. Two categories of measures serve this purpose. The first category is detection of preparations for a nuclear weapons launch. For example, this could be achieved by deploying internationally controlled sensors on the tops of missile silos. The methods in this category can be made reliable, but they are also very intrusive. In the process of achieving a nuclearweapons–free world—that is, when all countries that have nuclear weapons reduce them to very small numbers—countries should consider these methods to ensure that no country prepares for a nuclear weapons launch. At their current stage, however, to help build confidence regarding their NFU commitments, both India and China could develop methods in the second category of measures, which consists of observing the visible technical characteristics of nuclear strategies based on NFU commitments. These methods may not be able to uncover sudden changes in nuclear

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strategies in a timely manner, but they may provide confidence in longterm trends and do not require complicated and intrusive verification arrangements. If a country seriously applies its NFU commitment to the development and operation of its nuclear force, there must be some compatible physical characteristics in terms of its nuclear force. These include the force’s size and composition, along with the trade-off between survivability and counterforce capability. This evidence allows for making a judgment as to the seriousness of a country’s NFU pledge. Although an isolated characteristic may not provide enough information to make a definitive judgment, observation of characteristics from different perspectives can help in making a persuasive judgment. If a country commits to NFU, the only situation in which it may use nuclear weapons is to launch nuclear retaliation after receiving a nuclear attack. Under this pledge, a country’s nuclear weapons may serve two purposes. The first is minimum nuclear deterrence, which is only to deter a nuclear attack. If the size of a country’s nuclear force can barely generate the level of damage necessary to be deemed “intolerable” under a retaliatory strike, it lacks first-strike capability. In this case, the size of its nuclear force is compatible with its NFU commitment and builds confidence among other countries vis-à-vis its commitment. After a country absorbs a nuclear attack, only a fraction of its total nuclear force is able to engage in retaliation. Some nuclear warheads are lost in suffering the first strike. Some are lost in penetrating its rival’s defenses. And the remaining weapons constitute retaliatory warheads. To successfully deter a nuclear attack, the number of retaliatory warheads should be larger than the minimum number of warheads required to produce intolerable damage. This minimum required number is usually estimated as several hundred warheads.3 But it could be as small as several warheads, according to my research.4 Thus, the number of nuclear warheads needed for minimum nuclear deterrence should include three types of warheads: (1) those warheads necessary to generate intolerable damage in nuclear retaliation, (2) those warheads lost in suffering a first strike, and (3) those warheads intercepted by missile defenses. The total number of warheads needed by a country for minimum deterrence depends on the survivability and

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penetration capability of its nuclear weapons and may vary from tens to hundreds. Both Indian and Chinese nuclear forces have numbers that are in this range, as is compatible with their NFU commitments. However, a small nuclear arsenal may not necessarily correspond to a nuclear strategy based on an NFU commitment. It could correspond to a strategy of last resort, such as that of Britain and France in the Cold War and Pakistan today. However, if the size of a country’s nuclear force is much larger than that required for minimum nuclear deterrence—at the level of a thousand warheads—this would serve as an indicator that a country is far from making an NFU commitment. Because a government’s first use of nuclear weapons is constrained by the nuclear taboo, the government’s nuclear attack does not constitute the primary nuclear threat today. Threatening to use a nuclear weapon, or nuclear coercion, is a more realistic possibility. As such, the second purpose of a nuclear force under an NFU commitment is to counter nuclear coercion. If a country has a minimum nuclear deterrent capability, any threat from its rival regarding a potential nuclear attack would not be credible and would lack coercive effect. So the numerical requirements for minimum nuclear deterrence and for countering nuclear coercion are about the same. A country that has tens to hundreds of nuclear weapons should be able to significantly reduce its rivals’ nuclear coercive effect. More nuclear weapons are unnecessary for this purpose. Thus, no matter whether India’s and China’s nuclear strategies are more about achieving minimum nuclear deterrence or countering nuclear coercion, the sizes of their nuclear forces are compatible with their NFU commitments. In U.S.-Soviet strategic arms control, a simple and easy demarcation was drawn between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons according to their ranges. However, short-range nuclear weapons could also be used to attack strategic targets if the targets are close enough. A more accurate demonstration should be based on the purpose of the nuclear weapons, but this brings additional complexities in identifying their role. Without defining tactical nuclear weapons, it is illustrative to focus on those that are specially designed for battlefield use and are easily recognized. Nuclear land mines are just such an example. Technically,

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they may be useful to attack enemies on the battlefield, but not quite in nuclear retaliation. Other examples include antiship nuclear missiles, nuclear artillery, and nuclear penetration warheads. These weapons’ common characteristics are that they have special functions on the battlefield and are technically or economically much less competitive than typical strategic nuclear weapons in nuclear retaliation. Using the two definitions given above, if a country deploys tactical nuclear weapons, this suggests that it has a plan for the first use of nuclear weapons. Neither India nor China has deployed tactical nuclear weapons, and this is an indicator of each nation’s NFU commitment. Survivability of nuclear weapons is very important for both deterrence and war-fighting purposes. So survivability itself is not an indicator of NFU. A country’s counterforce capability may naturally grow due to the progress of its technical and industrial base, such as better intelligence, missile flight control, and geophysical knowledge. So counterforce capability itself is also not an indicator of no first use. However, a country that is serious about its NFU commitment should place more emphasis on the survivability of its nuclear weapons than its counterforce capabilities. It should never develop its counterforce capability at the sacrifice of losing survivability. As a result, what remains observable in terms of NFU commitments is the method whereby a country makes a trade-off between its survivability and counterforce capability. One indicator is multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on silo-based ballistic missiles. Usually, several nuclear warheads are needed to destroy one silo-based nuclear missile, so the exchange rate of warheads in a first strike is low if all land-based nuclear missiles are tipped with single warheads. MIRVs are very different. If MIRVed missiles are not launched before suffering a first strike, more warheads on these missiles would be destroyed than on single-warhead missiles. In other words, MIRVing ballistic missiles increases the exchange rate of warheads in a first strike and make it more favorable to the attacker. To avoid losing more warheads, a country has to either use these weapons first or launch them on warning. The existence of MIRVs on vulnerable missiles (for example, silo-based missiles) indicates the intention of an early use of nuclear weapons—in other words, first use or

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launch on warning. The strategy of launch on warning could avoid a large loss of MIRVs in absorbing a first strike and therefore would make the retaliation more credible. But the strategy of launch on warning is risky in initiating a first use of nuclear weapons because the weapons on alert are very close to the point of launch.5 Therefore, because neither China nor India deploys MIRVs on its land-based ballistic missiles, this suggests that both their nuclear postures are consistent with their NFU commitments. And even if they were to choose decoys as countermeasures against missile defense, this does not suggest that they are going to change their nuclear strategies. An NFU posture may also be observed in non-nuclear elements, such as the strength of a country’s conventional weapons force. If a country adopts an unconditional NFU strategy, it must be confident that it is unnecessary to use nuclear weapons to defend its national security unless it is in danger of receiving a nuclear attack. In this case, the country must have a sufficient conventional force that can defend against all possible large-scale attacks except nuclear ones. If a country’s conventional force is weak and is constantly in danger of facing a debilitating conventional strike, it should consider other approaches to defend its security. These could include collective security as a means of defense, rather than development of nuclear weapons. Otherwise, such a country would always have an incentive to use nuclear weapons as a last resort. Neither India nor China is vulnerable to annihilation by conventional means, so neither country needs nuclear weapons as a last resort in conventional conflicts. NFU commitments are not only diplomatic statements, but also core elements of China’s and India’s nuclear strategies. The two countries’ NFU commitments rule out the possibility for them to exercise nuclear coercion in conventional conflicts and are very helpful in mitigating nuclear escalation in crises. As a result, their commitments are politically and strategically important and exhibit the above-mentioned characteristics, which build confidence in their pledges. If China and India were to begin their nuclear engagements with mutual reassurance of NFU, they would not need to address the issue of their differing identities under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Both countries could reiterate in a joint statement that they do not

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intend to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons first against any country. This reassurance would not only significantly reduce the danger of nuclear confrontation between the two countries, but would also rule out any coercive nuclear effect between them. Following this line, China and India could also develop confidencebuilding measures, convincing the other side that they are serious about their NFU commitments. India and China could also work together in advocating NFU in global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. NFU, if undertaken by all other countries that have nuclear weapons, would dramatically change the size, composition, and operation of their nuclear forces in the direction of nuclear disarmament.

The View from India Srikanth Kondapalli

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n recent years, India and China have witnessed a number of nuclearrelated developments. Among these were the United States’ and India’s announcement of plans for civil nuclear cooperation in 2005, followed by China’s criticism of U.S. moves to provide a “clean waiver” for India at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). In March 2011, the IAEA gave its nod to the Chinese plan to build the Chashma 3 and Chashma 4 projects in Pakistan. And by May, it was reported that Pakistan had plans to substantially expand its nuclear stockpile. Coinciding with these regional events, the United States and Russia have progressed in their strategic arms reduction talks, while China and India have not shown any signs of reductions, arguing that they have only a minimal number of nuclear weapons. These various regional and

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global trends provide the context for revisiting the minimum nuclear deterrence and NFU pledges of China and India to see whether there is any change in their perceptions regarding their doctrine, inventory, deployment, targeting, and training practices. India and China possess a number of similarities in their nuclear doctrines. Both countries follow a claim of “minimum” nuclear deterrence. Both have also declared policies of NFU and advocate global nuclear disarmament. Both support several nuclear-weapon–free zones, such as under the Bangkok Treaty, which legalizes the idea of such a zone for Southeast Asia. China and India also share the view that nuclear weapons are last-resort defensive political weapons that can only be used for nuclear retaliation efforts. According to reports, both have not placed their respective strategic forces on launch on warning and hence exhibit strategic restraint.6 Despite these commonalities, differences in nuclear status, approach, and programs remain. China began its nuclear program with an explicit military dimension,7 whereas India’s program predated that of China and emphasized civil use from the start.8 Although China has joined international arms control and disarmament treaties such as the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, India has not been a party to any of these treaties and labels them as discriminatory—a discourse that China also used during its opposition to the Partial Test Ban Treaty in the 1960s. India’s program only acquired military dimensions by the 1980s and openly in 1998, given China’s proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missiles and technologies to Pakistan.9 India explicitly adopted a posture of “credible minimum deterrence” in August 1999, whereas reports indicate that China has been increasing its nuclear stockpile to graduate toward “limited” deterrence and more sophisticated targeting practices.10 Indications have also emerged that China is engaged in providing ongoing assistance to Pakistan in the strategic field. To overcome the threat of two-theater war, there are voices in the Indian establishment urging India to depart from its NFU commitment. Yet, there are already questions regarding China’s NFU pledge. There have been assertions that the Chinese NFU commitment is not applicable to perceived claims on territories. Additionally, if an adversary attacks

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China’s intercontinental ballistic missile silos or strategic hubs, China could possibly retaliate with nuclear weapons. Given the military technological advances currently being made in lasers, precision-guided weapons, and information warfare, China’s NFU position needs to be revised. According to Shen Dingli at Fudan University, Chinese strategists need “to analyze the new threat situation and reassess the logic of sitting idle after absorbing a first attack by non-nuclear unconventional attack, either by a state actor or a non-state actor.”11 Similarly, China’s operational doctrine at the conventional levels appears to have graduated from a defensive to a preemptive strike (xianfazhiren), whereas in the strategic spheres it remains counter-retaliation (houfazhiren). Some have argued that China is currently moving toward greater flexibility in its operational doctrine.12 China is not alone. India’s draft nuclear doctrine, released in August 1999, mentioned that credible minimum deterrence is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives, and the needs of national security. The actual size of components, deployment, and the employment of nuclear forces will be decided in light of these factors. By January 2003, India had added attacks on it by an adversary with chemical and biological weapons as a trigger for nuclear retaliation. If such revisions in Indian and Chinese unconditional NFU policy are occurring, these two Asian countries could hypothetically resort to nuclear war.13 One significant lacuna is that there remains little if any bilateral interaction on these very real issues and threats. China does not recognize the de jure nature of the Indian nuclear program, following its support for United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172, which condemned India’s nuclear weapons tests in the spring of 1998. However, from a military operational perspective, China’s Second Artillery Forces have reportedly been targeting Indian cities and strategic hubs since about the 1980s.14 Furthermore, both China and India have been spending enormous resources—human, financial, and technological—to enhance their strategic weapons programs. At Beijing’s national day parade on October 1, 2009, China displayed a newer series of missiles. In the case of India, Agni-II and Agni-III missiles have been successful and are being deployed and operationalized.15 Moreover, both countries are developing ballistic missile defense systems, which could neutralize each other’s strategic capability.

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Despite denials, both countries may also be acquiring tactical nuclear weapons, which offer local commanders an enhanced role and heighten the possibility of nuclear escalation in a bilateral context.16 Both countries are actively modernizing their nuclear arsenals in pursuit of miniaturization, and their ballistic missiles are moving toward solid-fueled and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle capabilities.17 They have also been reported to be acquiring permissive action links necessary for the automation of command-and-control systems in rocket forces.18 Although both countries have made NFU pledges as bilateral tensions have grown in the past few years,19 there has been no single effective mechanism between the two countries to address nuclear accidents and strategic misperceptions. Though conventional confidence-building measures have existed between the two since 1996, there has been no agreement between India and China on de-targeting/non-targeting or other de-escalation and risk reduction methods. Therefore, even though China and India have initiated a strategic dialogue mechanism, have agreed to cooperate on civil nuclear energy, and have operationalized a hotline, the chances for accidental nuclear fallout between them have not been institutionally addressed. These points elicit concern and highlight the nuclear and ballistic missile issues between these two countries and the need for greater nuclear-related confidencebuilding measures to achieve greater strategic stability.

Notes 1 Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 5–49. 2 For example, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice is that “… in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.” International Court of Justice, “Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders: Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996,” 44, www.icj-cij.org/docket/ files/95/7495.pdf. 3 Harold A. Feiveson, ed., The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 52.

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4 Li Bin, “China’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy,” in Nuclear Turning Point, edited by Harold A. Feiveson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 327. 5 Decoys are considered to be useful countermeasures against missile defense, but they do not increase the exchange rate of warheads, so decoys are irrelevant to the question of first use. 6 Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007), 15–16, 18. In the case of India, a long gap between the development of ballistic missile systems (Agni series, etc.) and their operationalization and deployment is evident. 7 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988); Mark A. Ryan, Chinese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons: China and the United States During the Korean War (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1989); Lin Chong-pin, China’s Nuclear Strategy: Tradition Within Evolution (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988). 8 Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002); Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and a Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2001); and Raju G. C. Thomas and Amit Gupta, eds., India’s Nuclear Security (New Delhi: Sage, 2000). 9 As Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said in a letter to the then–U.S. president Bill Clinton, the “deteriorating security environment” in the neighborhood drove India to test nuclear weapons. “Indian Prime Minister’s Letter to the U.S. President,” May 13, 1998, available at http://pmindia.nic.in. 10 One of the most difficult aspects of the nuclear doctrines is that there is no universally accepted definition for “minimum,” “limited,” or “maximum” nuclear deterrence. Nevertheless, minimum deterrence is defined in Chinese parlance as “threatening the lowest level of damage necessary to prevent attack, with the fewest number of nuclear weapons possible.” English–Chinese, Chinese–English Nuclear Security Glossary (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2008), 36. 11 Shen Dingli, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century,” China Security, Autumn 2005, www.irchina.org/en/news/view.asp?id=402; Sun Xiangli, “Analysis of China’s Nuclear Strategy,” China Security, Autumn 2005, www.irchina.org/en/news/view. asp?id=401. 12 Alistair Iain Johnston, “Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Implications for Arms Control,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 2, no. 2 (June 1983): 13–28; Wang Wenmo, ed., Zhanlue xue (Science of Strategy) (Beijing: National Defense University, 1999), 347–70; Wang Houqing et al., eds., Zhanyi xue (Science of Campaigns), (Beijing: National Defense University, 2001), 367–82. In January 2001, the then– Indian Army chief suggested that the Indian Army would be changing its tactics and methods of nuclear warfare. Rahul Bedi, “General Sunderajan Padmanabhan: India’s Chief of Army Staff,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 17, 2001.

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THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS 13 However, commenting on General Zhu Zhenghu’s remarks in 2005 that China could possibly use nuclear weapons against the United States to overcome China’s conventional capability, Major General Pan Zhenqiang argued that China’s NFU pledge is a “theoretical pillar” of the country’s nuclear policy. He emphasized that General Zhu Zhenghu’s comment is “dead wrong” and that his “loose talk on the subject is very misleading and sure to do serious damage.” Pan Zhenqiang, “China Insistence on No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” China Security, Autumn 2005, http://irchina.org/en/ news/view.asp?id=403. 14 This is based on the author’s interviews in Beijing and Shanghai in June and July 1998. 15 In 1983, the Indian Defense Research and Development Organisation launched an integrated guided missile development program and developed several tactical and strategic missiles. Of these, mention should be made of—as a part of its “credible” deterrence capability—the launch of Agni-II in April 1999, which has a combat radius of about 2,000 kilometers and payload of 1 metric ton. In April 2007, India successfully tested the Agni-III intermediate-range ballistic missile with an estimated combat radius of more than 3,000 kilometers and payload carrying capacity of 1.5 metric tons, while an earlier test in July 2006 proved to be a failure. 16 In 1982, it was reported that a Chinese defense official told a French delegation that China had no tactical weapon deployed at “ground division or below,” implying that tactical nuclear weapons might be held at a higher echelon. Lewis, Minimum Means of Reprisal, 142. However, Charles Ferguson, Evan Medeiros, and Phillip C. Saunders argue that China does not possess tactical nuclear weapons. Charles Ferguson, Evan Medeiros, and Phillip C. Saunders, “Chinese Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” in Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment, edited by Brian Alexander and Alistair Millar (New York: Brassey’s, 2003), 110–28. The Indian side also emphasized the strategic nature of its nuclear program. Former foreign minister Jaswant Singh argued, “We do not see nuclear weapons as weapons of war fighting. In fact, India sees them only as strategic weapons, whose role is to deter use by an adversary. [Further], . . . we have rejected notions of ‘launch on warning postures’ that lead to maintaining hair trigger alerts, thus increasing the risks of an unauthorized launch.” “India Not to Engage in a N-Arms Race: Jaswant,” Hindu, November 29, 1999. 17 Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, eds., British, French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), chap. 6, 324–56; John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu, eds., Strategic Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain, and China (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1995); Alastair I. Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Chinese Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995–96); Naeem Salik, Minimum Deterrence and India-Pakistan Nuclear Dialogue: Case Study on Pakistan, LNCV South Asia Security Project Case Study (Como, Italy: Landau Network–Centro Volta, 2006): 24–25. 18 Lewis, Minimum Means of Reprisal, 38.

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19 The Chinese periodical Global Times published an article reminding India of the 1962 war, whereas a “Chinese strategist” recommended dividing India into 20 to 30 parts. On the Indian side, in addition to the Navy and Air Force chiefs’ comments on challenges from China, Indian Army chief General Deepak Kapoor said on October 7, 2009, that the army is preparing for a two-theater war with Pakistan and China under nuclear conditions. “Indian Army Can Counter Chinese Threat: Army Chief,” One India, October 7, 2009, http://news.oneindia.in/2009/10/07/indian-army-cancounter-chinese-threat-army-chief.-html.

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CHAPTER 5

Linking Strategic Stability and Ballistic Missile Defense THE VIEW FROM india Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

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ne of the emerging issues in Asian security is ballistic missile defense (BMD) and its impact on nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. Despite the defensive nature of missile defense systems, China continues to view them as a threat. Because an effective defense system also has the potential to serve in an offensive role against one’s adversary, Chinese concerns are legitimate to an extent. However, if China decides to respond by vastly increasing its missile strength, it could have a spiraling effect in Asia. The Chinese reaction is likely to also have long-term security implications for India. Moreover, despite its often-voiced opposition to BMD, Beijing has begun its own missile defense program, which essentially originated from its anti-satellite (ASAT) program. China’s missile defense test of January 2010 was clearly a demonstration of its nascent program. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Jiang Yu, said that China had conducted a test of ground-based midcourse missile interception technology, adding

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that “the test has achieved the expected objective. The test is defensive in nature and is not targeted at any country.”1 As for the significance of the Chinese test, although the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was forthcoming in announcing the test, it divulged no concrete information on the test. In the absence of any substantial data, other powers are left to make their own assumptions. As of now, the Chinese appear to have used the same technologies as in the ASAT test—“hit-to-kill” technologies. The missile defense test may be viewed as an extension of China’s ASAT technology. In the case of India, it has been the reverse. It is believed that India’s BMD program has been expanded to include an ASAT program. India’s policy on BMD is primarily driven by the threat of short-range missiles in Pakistan.2 Even though there are missile threats from China, these did not figure prominently in Indian calculations for a BMD shield. Nonetheless, China was an indirect factor. The Chinese transfer of M-9 and M-11 missiles in the early 1990s stirred the Indian debate on BMD. In 1995 and 1996, the Indian Ministry of Defense asked the then–scientific adviser to the defense minister, A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, whether India could ready a shield to protect itself from an incoming missile from Pakistan. By 1995, the testing of Prithvi and Agni missiles was already under way. Kalam, who had already migrated from the civilian space program to the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program, began feasibility studies as well as scouting for ingredients for a potential system.3 Thereafter, the government approved the development of a BMD program in 1998. Yet the program was kept under wraps, given its sensitivity and temporal proximity to India’s nuclear tests. India readied interceptor missiles, a mission control center, and a launch control center.4 While none of these systems are yet operational, they represent the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO’s) estimate of technological capacities. Another factor that has contributed to Indian policy on BMD is the changed international context, in which there is a greater emphasis on missile defense–related issues, particularly by the United States. This was best illustrated in India’s reaction to U.S. president George W. Bush’s speech on national missile defense on May 1, 2001. In this case, India

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chose to adopt a more nuanced position, as opposed to India’s criticism of the United States’ Space Defense Initiative in the 1980s. This position reflected India’s recognition of the utility of these systems in its neighborhood. India was one of the first countries to not only welcome the U.S. initiative, but also to express an interest in joining it. This indicated India’s interest in high-technology cooperation, along with the potential for it to be integrated into the nuclear order and to become part of the solution rather than part of the problem. Although India intends to have a multilayered defense system, its program is essentially a two-tiered system with two interceptor missiles—the Prithvi Air Defense missile for high-altitude interception (exoatmospheric) and the Advanced Air Defense missile for lower-altitude interception (endo-atmospheric). In May 2011, DRDO chief V. K. Saraswat stated, “Presently our missiles are designed to engage targets within 2,000-km range. Later on, we will be making 5,000-km range class of interceptor missiles. That will be Phase II of the MD system.”5 Nonetheless, if such predictions come to fruition—whereas Chinese missile threats have been secondary in India’s calculations—India’s missile defense plans could have implications for China. Moreover, this expanded range suggests that New Delhi has begun to factor in Chinese ballistic missiles as a potential threat from which it needs to secure itself. China, in turn, has not entirely discounted India, with the Chinese media stating that China needs a “defense against small nuclear states with intermediate-range ballistic missiles. A missile defense capability would be reasonable as a hedge against smaller nuclear powers, such as India.”6 To this end, India plans to field a multilayered missile defense system, integrating long-range tracking radar, fire control radar, a mobile communications terminal, and mobile launcher-fired interceptor missiles to make it an effective system. And though India is making progress in this area, integration is not an easy process, with DRDO’s Air Defense Program director, V. K. Saraswat, suggesting that it may take another ten to fifteen years for India to integrate all its missile defense elements. Additionally, four or five successful tests cannot ensure a perfect system for India. It is going to be some time before India will have an effective system that can tackle all the threats in its neighborhood. Dealing with

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the Pakistani situation may be relatively easy, as compared with the threat from Chinese missiles, which would require a huge satellite tracking system and much more dedicated spending. These trends indicate a broader set of issues as they pertain to strategic stability and its realization in the Asian context. The question remains as to whether strategic stability is merely the avoidance of conflict and whether it will manifest itself in the form of an arms race. Even though not much information is available on the Chinese missile defense test, one is tempted to draw out a few implications for the region and beyond. China’s BMD test will sharpen the security dilemma that already exists in Asia. Clearly, the test has upped the ante in the region, with other regional powers considering measures in reaction. Following China’s ASAT test in 2007, India announced that its BMD program would be expanded to include an ASAT program.7 A potential arms race in Asia remains well within the realm of possibility. An Indian reaction to the Chinese test is likely to touch off a response in Pakistan. This could result in Sino-Pakistani collaboration on nuclear weapons, missiles, and space, which would significantly intensify regional competition. One needs to look at history to understand China–Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation and its implications for India. And outer space is the next domain. China launched Pakistan’s advanced communications satellite, PAKSAT-1R, on board China’s Satellite Launch Vehicle from the Xichang Satellite Launch Centre in Sichuan Province on August 11, 2011.8 Pakistan is also likely to cite India’s BMD program as a “destabilizing factor” to justify qualitatively and quantitatively increasing its nuclear inventory. One could visualize a scenario in which there emerges a more robust military buildup and active deployment on a large scale and on higher alert status. This would raise the potential for accidental crises between India–Pakistan and India–China. These potentialities have major implications for the nuclear policies of all the players involved. Questions remain as to whether China and India would move away from their doctrines of no first use (NFU) or China and Pakistan might contemplate deploying more missiles to defeat India’s missile defenses. Overall, there are serious limitations to the protective capabilities of BMD. In the case of India, BMD would be likely to only cover a few

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target locations. Protection against multiple missile attacks is something with which India is still grappling. Yet there have been other unintended consequences. Although India’s BMD program has largely been an indigenous effort, there has been some foreign collaboration. Potential cooperation between India, the United States, and Israel could fuel regional suspicion, exacerbating insecurity and instability dynamics. China and Pakistan may not respond well to such developments. As one potential response, China could potentially strengthen its nuclear and BMD programs, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, adding to the preexisting security dilemma in the region. A strengthened China– Pakistan partnership could result. An Indian BMD system could compel China and Pakistan to augment their missile strike capabilities to maintain strategic deterrence. In fact, an ineffective or incomplete BMD system would increase India’s vulnerability rather than strengthen its security. One drawback is the fact that India has been using its Prithvi missile as the target missile in all of its missile defense tests. However, Prithvis are known to have slow speeds, whereas Pakistan’s missiles—Ghauri (Chinese CSS-5), or the M-9 and M-11—are known for faster speeds. There are suggestions that India should conduct BMD tests with Agni-I and Agni-II missiles to facilitate more realistic interception tests. The above-mentioned implications clearly do not contribute to strategic stability. As such, other means must be sought. Confidence-building measures would be a good starting point. Military confidence-building measures at both bilateral and regional levels would augment the case for regular communication and dialogue, which could reduce the potential for unintended crises. Establishing ground rules in the area of missile defense might also help in reining in regional BMD programs. Finally, states must move away from the trend of seeking technological solutions for geopolitical issues. Technologies and weapon systems can inadvertently contribute to accidents and misperceptions that lead to unintended crises.

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THE VIEw FROM CHINA Yao YUnZHU

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he two topics of strategic stability and BMD are frequently debated by Chinese and American defense analysts. These discussions usually focus on whether strategic stability exists in the two countries’ bilateral nuclear relationship, as well as how each side interprets strategic stability or instability. They cover destabilizing factors, along with the measures needed to maintain and even strengthen bilateral strategic stability. In doing so, BMD emerges as one of the major factors contributing to instability. However, in the context of considering China–India relations, the same issues must be perceived from a different angle. To do so, it is illustrative to compare the Sino-U.S. nuclear relationship with the Sino-Indian nuclear relationship to try to determine similarities and differences. The nuclear relationship between China and India began the moment India went nuclear in 1998. It does not matter much whether India has been recognized and accepted as a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. India’s nuclear capabilities have been playing a role in its bilateral relations with China. For China, its own nuclear policy is simple and clear-cut. It pledges not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances against non–nuclear-weapon states (NNWSs). And in the case of an NWS, it promises not to use nuclear weapons first, but it vows to retaliate if attacked with nuclear weapons. This stance poses a larger question of how China’s nuclear policy applies to India. India has not been accepted as an NWS by the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty regime on the one hand, and in reality it is no longer an NNWS on the other hand. China thus must take India as it is, a de facto NWS. Therefore, China applies NFU doctrine to India as it does to all the nuclear-weapon states. This means that China will not use nuclear weapons first against India, but will retaliate if attacked by Indian nuclear weapons.

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Although China has nuclear relations with both the United States and India, India has not caused as much concern in China as has the United States. Indian nuclear weapons have not been a frequent subject of discussion in China. This is not only because China possesses a more advanced nuclear arsenal, but also because China and India base their nuclear relationship on an NFU nuclear doctrine. China and the United States maintain strategic stability in their nuclear relations, even though they have very unbalanced nuclear capabilities. The unacceptably destructive nature of nuclear weapons has made asymmetric deterrence possible. China, insofar as it has an assured retaliatory capability, will be able to deter the United States from using nuclear weapons against it. Strategic stability is based on a tacit acceptance of mutual vulnerability. By contrast, China and India have based their strategic stability on NFU doctrine, which the Indian government declared after its tests of nuclear weapons. This means that neither side is going to use nuclear weapons unless attacked with nuclear weapons. Therefore, nuclear weapons are for the “sole purpose” of deterring nuclear weapons. This mutual acceptance of NFU doctrine minimizes the role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategies of both countries and in their bilateral relations. This NFU-based strategic stability is much more reliable than one based on asymmetric deterrence and mutual vulnerability. As a reflection of the trust deficit in overall bilateral relations, uncertainty and suspicion are distinctive features in Sino-U.S. nuclear relations. China and the United States are still wondering how to best define the relationship between them. Statesmen and academics in both countries have suggested an endless number of terms—co-stakeholders, strategic competitors, constructive cooperators, among others. The joint statement released in January 2011 after Chinese president Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States reaffirmed both countries’ commitment “to building a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship for the 21st century.”9 The Sino-U.S. relationship is described as a future one, toward which both sides should work. As China becomes the world’s second-largest economy and as it plays a greater role in international affairs and modernizes its military, the

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United States needs to assess the level of challenge posed by China and determine the level of accommodation that it can provide. There is a deeply rooted feeling of uncertainty about the future, against which both sides are undertaking hedging measures. By comparison, the China–India relationship is much better, despite the existence of a trust deficit. A careful reading of all the joint statements released after visits by Chinese and U.S. heads of state in the last decade reveals that the China–India statements are much more positive in language and reassuring in tone than the China–United States ones. India, much like China, suffered from high-handed Western colonization and gained its independence only through hard struggle following World War II. India, like China, is a developing country and also one of the successful emerging economies, and is thus grouped together with China in the Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS) framework. India and China are also longtime partners in the Non-Aligned Movement. These shared sources of identity have helped to build a more positive image of India in China. By contrast, China and the United States lack this shared identity. They also have a potential flashpoint—Taiwan—over which the two countries might find themselves engaged in combat. The United States ambiguously committed itself to the defense of Taiwan with the Taiwan Relations Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 1979. It has repeatedly sold arms to the island to boost its military capabilities. Most important, the U.S. government has made it clear that the use of nuclear weapons would not be excluded from a military conflict over Taiwan.10 Although China has insisted that it prefers peaceful means, it has not renounced the use of force to prevent independence.11 Taiwan is, and will continue to be, the biggest sore point in Sino-U.S. interactions and a source of distrust. By contrast, India was among the first to recognize the People’s Republic of China. It has adhered to this position throughout even the most difficult aspects of the bilateral relationship. Furthermore, India has made it clear that Tibet is part of China. However, there is one major issue over which China and India have a seemingly irreconcilable conflicting interest—their territorial dispute along the two countries’ 3,225-km Himalayan border. The border war of 1962 still lingers in public memory. Yet, it is very difficult for anyone to

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imagine that both sides might fight another war over territory, and much less that nuclear weapons would play a role in the conflict. Joint statements reiterate that territorial disputes will be solved through peaceful means. Given that both China and India have adopted an NFU doctrine, there is no real possibility of nuclear use in the scenario of a border war. On ballistic missile defense, China has been very vocal and consistent in opposing the development and deployment of the U.S. systems, for primarily four reasons. First, China needs a deterrent to balance the U.S. nuclear arsenal. It has to be certain that its small nuclear arsenal can deter nuclear use against its territory. Given the fact that China has adopted an NFU nuclear policy, its arsenal must be sufficient to survive a disarming first strike. China is worried that even a limited BMD system could have the ability to negate its nuclear deterrent. Unless it is reassured politically and technologically, China cannot sit idly by waiting for its retaliatory capabilities to erode. It will need to respond by developing and modernizing its own defensive and/or offensive capabilities. Second, if proclaimed objectives of U.S. military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region are at odds with China’s national security, this would inevitably be interpreted an act of containment or encirclement. Among such concerns would be inclusion of the Taiwan Strait issue among the strategic objectives of the United States–Japan alliance.12 Also, a joint or regional BMD architecture would strengthen this alliance, integrate the military command-and-control structure, enhance joint interoperability, and facilitate forward deployment and force projection. Third, BMD systems depend heavily on space sensors and, most likely in the future, on space-based weapon systems. These developments run counter to China’s long-held policy on preventing the weaponization of outer space and an arms race in space. And fourth, the United States’ sale to Taiwan of BMD systems, such as the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), is extremely provocative for China. Such actions suggest a semialliance, including a military tie, between America and the island and a commitment to intervene in the event of a military crisis. With respect to India, it has been pursuing a robust BMD program for some time. Starting in 2006, India began carrying out missile defense tests. There are several arguments for an Indian BMD program. The first relates to Pakistan. Pakistan has not adopted an NFU policy, and its

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arsenal is aimed at deterring both conventional and nuclear attacks from India. To offset a possible first strike and guard against the “loose nuke” situation from Pakistan, India wants missile defense. However, an Indian missile defense shield against Pakistan, though understandable, will prove to be financially unbearable and technologically daunting. Geographical proximity gives any Indian missile defense system only a couple of minutes to respond. Pakistan could offset an Indian missile defense by enlarging, diversifying, or improving the penetrative capabilities of its nuclear arsenals. An arms race between defense and offense is destabilizing in itself, and the effect could be magnified by possible false alarms and the demand for fast decisionmaking. Apart from Pakistan, China is more often than not cited as a factor behind India’s BMD program. Both China and India have been securely locked in a relation of mutual deterrence, and if both adhere to NFU doctrine, the nuclear threshold should be safely high. Yet, missile defense capabilities are destabilizing in a mutual deterrence situation. Moreover, the Indian BMD has also been cited for its utility in conventional confrontations with China. The question is whether it would it be desirable or wise for China and India to spend good portions of the economic resources that they have built up on defense against a very remote possibility that the two would engage in a border war. Additionally, outer space capabilities serve as another reason for India to pursue ballistic missile defense. To develop an integrated BMD system, ground-based long-range radar installations must be supplemented with space-based early warning capabilities. Space is an arena where China and India, as major space-faring nations that share an interest in its security and peaceful use, can find more opportunities for cooperation. If China and India fail to work together to stop the weaponization of space, each might need to develop its own space weapons separately. This would be a worst-case scenario. Finally, India needs its BMD program to promote cooperation with the United States. The United States in the past has offered to sell PAC-3 to India. Another source of cooperation may also include sharing early warning information. Under such conditions, China would need to determine the implications for its national security, along with peace and stability, on the subcontinent. If China turns out to be the major

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consideration in these joint United States–India missile defense efforts, it will need to react. At present, India’s missile defense effort does not seem to be a grave security concern for China, but confidence-building measures are urgently needed to reduce misperceptions and misjudgments. Nonetheless, in contrast to China and the United States, China and India coexist in a nuclear framework characterized by reliable NFU-based strategic stability, strategic trust derived from a shared identity, fewer potential flashpoints, and less reason to worry about ballistic missile defense.

Notes 1 “China Reaffirms Its Missile Interception Test Defensive,” Xinhua, January 12, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/12/content_12797459.htm. 2 However, BMD does not offer India an effective defense from Pakistan. For instance, a missile fired from Pakistan would take anywhere between 4 to 9 minutes until impact and there are difficulties in sensors picking up the signal. 3 At the time, the longest-range radar that India had was the Rajendra, which had a range of 60 kilometers and was of no use for missile defense purposes. In the process of scouting for the radar, India sought help from Russia. India subsequently turned to Israel with an eye on the Arrow-I system that used the Green Pine radar. Initially, it was unable to buy the Israeli system, given that the Israeli radar included U.S. technology. Nonetheless, Israel decided to work with India in making a long-range tracking radar—the target acquisition and fire control radar. India’s guidance radar for tracking down missiles was internally developed by the DRDO Laboratory in partnership with the French company Thales. 4 Ajai Shukla, “An Untold Story: How India Got Its Missile Defence,” Business Standard, January 29, 2008, http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2008/01/untold-story-how-indiagot-its-missile.html. 5 However, these systems are still not operational and there remain difficulties with India’s missile defense systems. Thus, such claims must be treated with caution. “India Developing Interceptor Missile with 5,000-Km Range,” Press Trust of India, May 15, 2011, www.hindustantimes.com/India-developing-interceptor-missile-with5-000-km-range/Article1-697777.aspx. 6 “China’s Missile Defense Interceptor Program: An Independent Chinese Analysis,” Taiwan Link, January 17, 2010, http://thetaiwanlink.blogspot.com/2010/01/chinasmissile-defense-interceptor.html. 7 A second cycle of arms race and competition could occur in the China–Japan context. First, given the relative decline of the United States and thereby its ability to defend

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THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS Tokyo against potential threats, Chinese military modernization, and North Korean threats might compel Japan to strengthen its own defense mechanisms. In fact, after Pyongyang’s nuclear tests and repeated ballistic missile tests, Tokyo approved $2.5 billion to develop its missile defense system. Second, a perceived potential Group of Two (G-2) arrangement between the United States and China could cause anxieties in Tokyo, weakening the extended deterrence mechanism. This again forces Japan to defend itself. Third, a new sense of nationalism, particularly among Japanese youth, raises questions as to Japan’s overdependence on the United States for its security. And fourth, an arms race could spread throughout the region and beyond if no global mechanism is established to control related technologies. Transfer of these technologies into the hands of nonstate actors and to countries of concern would be a dangerous development. 8 Salman Siddiqui, “PAKSAT-1R: China Launches Pakistan’s ‘First’ Communications Satellite,” Express Tribune, August 12, 2011, http://tribune.com.pk/story/229797/ paksat-1r-china-launches-pakistans-first-communications-satellite. 9 “China-U.S. Joint Statement,” Xinhua, January 19, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english2010/china/2011-01/20/c_13698492.htm. 10 The 2001 U.S. Department of Defense’s “Nuclear Posture Review” was submitted to the U.S. Congress and later leaked to the public cited “a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan” as an “immediate contingency” in which nuclear weapons use is possible. The leaked “Nuclear Posture Review” is available at www.globalsecurity.org/ wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm. 11 In March 2005, the Chinese National People’s Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law, which provides the State Council and the Central Military Commission with the authority to “employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” . . . “in the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.” “Full Text of Anti-Secession Law,” Renmin Wang (People’s Daily Online), March 14, 2005, http://english.peopledaily.com. cn/200503/14/eng20050314_176746.html. 12 The joint statement was released after the 2+2 United States–Japan security consultation included for the first time “the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue” into United States–Japan common strategic objectives. “Joint Statement” by United States–Japan Security Consultative Committee, Washington, D.C., February 19, 2005, www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/ scc/joint0502.html.

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CHAPTER 6

Recalibrating Deterrence Theory and Practice THE VIEW FROM china Li Deshun

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hina and India are neighbors and regional powers. Strategic stability within their deterrence relationship is not only a bedrock of regional security; it also plays an essential role in global security. Accordingly, the two countries should work toward mutually acceptable strategic stability relations. In the twenty-first century, economic interdependence has already begun to penetrate the political and military realm to become a central feature of relations between countries. This marks a significant difference with the international strategic environment surrounding the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. As such, China and India should pursue strategic stability relations that differ from those that characterized the U.S.-Soviet “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) construct. This should include building a new type of strategic stability architecture that is grounded in small, but sufficient, nuclear weapons arsenals.

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Strategic stability theory was born after the United States and the Soviet Union had already developed a considerable number of nuclear weapons. Only after the two countries came to possess the quantity of nuclear weapons necessary for MAD and the massive destructive capacity of nuclear weapons was fully recognized, did it become apparent that exceeding this number of nuclear weapons would not enhance their utility. As a result, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to conclude nuclear arms control and reduction treaties. A reduction in the number of nuclear weapons finally started to become a reality. But this was actually a belated move. The United States and the Soviet Union not only wasted huge sums on developing nuclear weapons, but also have faced an even greater price in reducing and destroying their nuclear weapons stockpiles. China and India should learn from this experience. When one re-examines strategic stability theory, MAD is actually a special case of strategic stability. It provides a basic condition for the maintenance of strategic stability between two countries. However, it only tells us that under this condition stability can be achieved and does not claim that this is the only condition. A system can achieve stability under a variety of conditions. Yet, a system that is considered unstable in theory may not necessarily be unstable in practice. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union, in their early development of nuclear weapons, did not attain the conditions necessary to reach mutually assured destruction. However, an outbreak of war did not occur between these two powers. This begs the question as to why MAD came into being and even today stands as an important measure of strategic stability between the United States and Russia. The explanation relies on history. Strategic stability theory accompanied the United States’ and the Soviet Union’s unceasing increases in their numbers of nuclear weapons. While providing a set of basic methods to measure strategic stability, the United States and the Soviet Union were already in possession of a massive number of nuclear weapons. As a result, the question that arose was how best to avoid nuclear war when strategic stability conditions called for both countries to possess a large number of nuclear weapons. People’s attention naturally focused on mutually assured destruction. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union faced

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several serious confrontations marked by hostile relations. The most dramatic and alarming instance was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when the risk of nuclear war was quite real. Both sides placed security concerns above all other issues, with the potential for nuclear attacks coming from the other side posing a “credible” and at the same time “incredible” threat. Therefore, there was a strong impetus to improve the reliability of strategic stability and a greater willingness to adopt MAD as a strict criterion of constraint on both sides. There are already great differences between the situation faced by China and India today and that of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. First, China is a medium-tier nuclear state. The nuclear weapons possessed by both China and India combined are far fewer in number that those possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union at the birth of strategic stability theory. This means that strategic stability in the Sino-Indian strategic relationship does not fit the MAD model. Second, the current strategic relationship between China and India is not as confrontational as that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This fact lays a good foundation for China and India to build a relationship based on strategic stability. There is no need for China and India to repeat the mistakes of the United States and the Soviet Union. Additionally, the world’s strategic environment has changed dramatically. A “nuclear-weapons–free world” should not be just a slogan. It should become a real goal sought by each country. Nuclear powers with the largest arsenals engaging in further nuclear weapons reductions and nuclear states seeking to minimize the number of nuclear weapons necessary to achieve strategic stability are the only means by which humanity can move toward a world free of nuclear weapons. On this path, “interdependence” can serve as an important factor in enhancing strategic stability. In fact, strategic stability theory is based upon calculations comparing the losses incurred from one country initiating a first strike and the other country retaliating. There is an implicit judgment made that one country will initiate the first strike. If the potential for one side to launch a nuclear attack is low or the anticipated losses from retaliation and a first strike are low, then the chances of one party being the first to engage in a nuclear

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strike is relatively low and strategic stability is correspondingly relatively high. In the reverse case, strategic stability would be diminished. To better explain this construct, it is necessary to calculate the losses associated with first strike and retaliation. In traditional calculations, losses were calculated in accordance with the number of direct losses caused by an attack from one’s opponent, without factoring in the indirect losses incurred from one’s own nuclear strike. In July 2007, U.S. scientists published a report on potential regional nuclear conflicts and their impact on global climate and society.1 They offered hypothetical scenarios of a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. Suppose that the two countries on each side use the equivalent of 15,000 tons of 50 nuclear warheads to strike one another. Model results show that the region will experience 20 million direct deaths. But the total losses will far exceed these numbers, such that a nuclear conflict would inflict serious environmental consequences within the region and around the globe. The study forecast that such a nuclear conflict would emit five million tons of radioactive dust into the atmosphere. This would then rise into the stratosphere and remain there for at least ten years, causing global temperatures to drop and reductions in precipitation. Global agricultural production and harvests would thereby undergo extreme losses, which would exacerbate famine and even starvation in some countries. The case would be even more severe between nuclear belligerents. This loss would be commonly caused and shared by both countries in exploding their nuclear weapons. This means that a country’s nuclear attack is not only felt by the recipient country, but also by the country launching the attack itself. Therefore, the indirect losses caused by environmental interdependence must also be recognized and included in the calculation of strategic stability. Additionally, as economic interdependence and political interdependence continue to grow, losses in these various arenas also increase their impact on strategic stability calculations. Particularly in cases of small numbers of nuclear weapons, factoring these elements into estimates of potential losses would make a significant contribution to improved strategic stability. As another aspect, the two countries in these scenarios are making a judgment that their opponent will conduct the first nuclear strike. Such

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determinations are the result of perceptual interaction. Miscalculations and misperceptions increase the chances of a country judging that its opponent will be the first to launch a nuclear attack. This, thereby, erodes bilateral strategic stability. Therefore, to improve strategic stability, it is necessary to strengthen shared perceptions. A mistaken judgment could lead to diminished strategic stability. It is more difficult to strengthen than to weaken strategic stability. Improving strategic stability requires joint efforts on the parts of both countries. China and India can look to the analysis given above to find their inspiration for establishing a secure relationship based on strategic stability. First, both sides should recognize that the number of nuclear weapons is not an essential factor for strategic stability and thus that the development of nuclear weapons should not be based on a pursuit of numbers. Second, it is important for them to acknowledge the impact of interdependence on strategic stability and to incorporate it into their calculations of losses from nuclear exchange. Third, China and India should note that misjudgment of one another’s intentions is an important factor that can damage strategic stability. To reduce the misperceptions that exacerbate instability and miscalculation, it is necessary to strengthen China’s and India’s strategic exchanges and cooperation. This is perhaps a more important factor than the number of nuclear weapons or force structure in determining strategic stability.

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THE VIEw FROM INDIA kalYan kemBURI

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he last two decades have witnessed the rise of cruise missiles as a coercive political tool and a versatile military weapon.2 The United States’ employment of Tomahawk cruise missiles to punish or retaliate for violations of international norms and to achieve national security objectives has given rise to a new strategic paradigm.3 The importance of this new dynamic, along with the ability of cruise missiles to coerce opponents and strike with precision, has not been lost in the strategic calculations of military establishments, including those of China and India. In comparison with other weapons delivery systems—aircraft and ballistic missiles—cruise missiles have certain unique technical characteristics: operational flexibility (including multiplatform launches), precision strike, an ability to penetrate air defenses, and affordability in development and deployment. As part of this force multiplier, it is beneficial to evaluate how cruise missiles would affect the strategic calculus between China and India and why this influence warrants the two countries’ including this weapon system in any strategic discussion and assessment. Currently, China and India are in the process of developing or deploying versions of land-, sea-, and air-launched land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) of varying ranges. Most of these programs had their genesis in Soviet and later Russian-derived cruise missiles. As with most military programs in China and India, information pertaining to cruise missiles is shrouded in ambiguity and secrecy, making it difficult to assess the programs’ precise scope and scale.4 Having witnessed the prowess displayed by conventionally armed Tomahawks at striking targets with precision, since the 1990s military and defense industries in China have included conventionally armed

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surface-to-surface missiles and extended-range cruise missiles as key projects in their developmental plans.5 In the last fifteen years, among several cruise missiles that entered into service in China, the three models associated with the Hong Niao series of land-attack cruise missiles warrant attention. The latest in this series, the HN-3, entered into service in 2006, with a range of 3,000 kilometers.6 The DH-10 LACM, which was first displayed during the Sixtieth Anniversary Parade in 2009, is based on the HN-2 and reportedly started trials with the Second Artillery in 2004.7 A 2008 Pentagon report on China’s military power notes that the DH-10 is nuclear capable. However, it is not certain whether the Second Artillery has utilized the option for the moment. Moreover, in 2010 Jane’s Intelligence Review reported that to differentiate between the conventionally armed DH-10 LACM and nuclear-tipped ones, the Second Artillery uses two different canisters: circular-shaped (conventional) or octupleshaped (nuclear).8 In India’s case, the Brahmos is the most prominent and publicized LACM.9 Nevertheless, recent media reports suggest that two more cruise missiles—Sagarika and Nirbhay—with ranges greater than Brahmos are under various stages of development and testing.10 Sagarika is described as India’s first submarine-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile, with a range of about 1,300 kilometers, or 700 nautical miles.11 In February 2010, the chief of the Defense Research and Development Organization reported that Nirbhay, a 800-kilometer-range cruise missile, is also under development.12 Later in the year, Aviation Week noted that this missile might be under development specifically for conventional strike missions. The impact of cruise missiles on the strategic calculi of China and India must be evaluated to address whether cruise missiles contribute to or damage deterrence stability. It is also important whether cruise missiles negate the effectiveness of missile defenses and if a conventional cruise missile attack on such defenses might result in crisis escalation. Finally, if cruise missiles facilitate preemptive counterforce attacks against an adversary’s strategic forces, would this upset stability and would their precision facilitate conventional strikes against strategic targets? To answer these questions, it is necessary to begin with the nuclear doctrines of China and India, which have three main similarities. First,

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their doctrines specify neither the contours nor the size of the nuclear arsenal. This strategy not only brings a dynamic quality to the size of the arsenal, but also makes ambiguity part of the deterrence posture. Second, although both China and India do not subscribe to nuclear war fighting, which requires arsenals and doctrines defined under MAD or limited deterrence, neither strictly follows minimum deterrence.13 This dichotomy possibly derives from their doctrinal emphasis on “credible” deterrence, which requires postures beyond minimum deterrence but below limited deterrence, resulting in a posture of “assured retaliation.” Third, both countries rely on a no-first-use posture that necessitates a secure second-strike capability, a requirement that likely drives the development of multiple delivery systems. In fact, both China and India are in the process of developing and/or deploying various segments associated with a nuclear triad. Although China surpasses India in deploying comparatively more reliable and sophisticated nuclear delivery systems, a qualitative and quantitative assessment reveals that both countries’ strategic forces currently rely more on land-based ballistic missiles for assured retaliation. For example, until the commissioning of the second-generation Type 094 strategic submarine ballistic nuclear (SSBN) (Jin-class) in 2008,14 China’s underwater deterrence was more of a “paper tiger” due to the limited operational capabilities of its first-generation SSBN Xia-class Type 092. The Type 094 SSBN reportedly carries the DF-31–derived JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles,15 which were first successfully tested in 2005.16 Although reports portray the JL-2, deployed on Jin SSBNs, as China’s “first reliable nuclear ‘second-strike’ capability,”17 it is sensible to assume that the SSBN would need more time at sea to master the full range of deterrence-related operational concepts. Moreover, lack of information limits delineating the exact operational status of Jin SSBNs and JL-2s. For India, underwater deterrence is still being developed. The launch of its first nuclear-powered submarine, Arihant, in 2009 does signal an important milestone. Nevertheless, more resources and time are needed before it assumes a deterrence role, serving as a platform for submarinelaunched missiles. China’s strategic bomber force consists of Hong-6 (B-6/Badger) and Qian-5 (A-5/Fantan) bombers. Hong-6s can deliver one or three nuclear

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bombs to a range of 3,100 kilometers, and Qian-5s can deliver one nuclear weapon to a limited distance of 400 kilometers. Although the Russian-derived Su-27s and Su-30s fighters and the indigenously developed FB-7 fighter-bomber are capable of delivering nuclear payloads, the evidence does not suggest that China has the made necessary modifications to these aircraft for nuclear missions.18 In the case of India, Jaguars and Mirages 2000H have reportedly been modified to conduct strategic bombing.19 As in the case of China, India also has Su-30s that can conduct nuclear missions, though it is not certain whether these aircraft are modified accordingly. Apart from range and payload limitations, the main challenge for these aircraft to engage in assured retaliation is not only the strategic depth, but also the difficulty in overcoming multilayered air defenses.20 Cruise missiles can supplement the above-mentioned systems and fill gaps in deterrence. The ability of cruise missiles to survive against missile defenses and counterforce operations makes them an ideal secondstrike weapon. If missile defenses are uncertain against cruise missiles, planning counterforce operations is difficult. Counterforce operations against cruise missiles during the pre-launch phase are problematic due to the size and mobility of the cruise missile transport-erector-launcher (TEL) system, along with their resemblance to other civilian and military vehicles,21 combined with the missile’s faint launch signature.22 The affordability and flexibility in developing and deploying cruise missiles also makes them an attractive weapon system. Operational cost favors cruise missiles because they do not require an elaborate logistics chain or service infrastructure, as with ballistic missiles and aircraft. In addition, cruise missiles could use aircraft, TELs, and naval vessels as launch platforms, thereby adding flexibility to the mission planning and reducing the overall cost.23 In the China–India context, it is tempting to conclude that cruise missiles could contribute to deterrence stability by strengthening the credibility of assured retaliation. Yet, a closer look at Cold War discourse weakens this argument. While the Cold War adversaries largely agreed on technical attributes, the Soviet Union considered cruise missiles a first-strike weapon. A 1979 official newsletter of the Soviet Defense Ministry, Red Star (Krasnaya Zvezda), summarizes some of the key characteristics of a

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cruise missile as follows: “difficulties of detection in flight, . . . ease of camouflaging, owing to the small size of the missiles and their launchers, concealing them from exciting means of technical detection. . . . Their numbers and basing locations are extremely difficult to verify.” This quotation ends by noting that cruise missiles would “facilitate their employment for a surprise attack.”24 This perceptual disparity between Cold War adversaries should provide a cautionary note to China and India. Nonetheless, there remains one arena in which cruise missiles have the potential to play a game-changing role: that of counterforce operations (CFOs) and strategic-strike operations (SSOs). CFOs involve attacks against nuclear forces, including delivery systems and accompanying command-and-control assets. SSOs include “disabling the enemy’s center of gravity [that] will result in the loss of his ability or will to offer further resistance to friendly forces in achieving their strategic objectives.”25 In recent years, publications pertaining to China’s nuclear strategy have increasingly paid attention to the impact of conventional strikes against nuclear assets, especially in the context of progress made by the United States in developing the new non-nuclear strategic triad: missile defenses; long-range conventional strike; and sophisticated command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).26 Scholars based in both China and the United States allude to the ability of this new triad to degrade China’s deterrence through conventional strikes aided by intelligence from C4ISR assets against nuclear forces and then to intercept the counterattack based on a small remaining nuclear force through missile defense. Although the possibility and feasibility of this scenario requires further research, there have been calls in China to consider it as a “low-yield nuclear first strike,”27 and accordingly to “employ nuclear weapons to initiate active nuclear deterrence.”28 In the context of the China–India strategic dynamic, comparable considerations heretofore have been rare due to limited C4ISR assets and a lack of conventional precision strike and missile defenses. However, the growing sophistication of China’s and India’s armed forces could change this. Both countries are modernizing their C4ISR assets and are pursuing missile defenses. The uncertainty of aircraft overcoming air defenses and

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the lack of precision for ballistic missiles had previously limited China and India in carrying out long-range conventional strikes. However, cruise missiles might potentially overcome this lacuna. In the case of conventional attacks against nuclear facilities, some scholars in China wanted to consider it as a first-strike weapon and thereby respond accordingly.29 Although the viability of the nuclear retaliation option is uncertain, at least in theoretical terms it might deter an opponent. In case of China–India strategic interaction, an additional dynamic comes into play due to their no-first-use policy, along with the nonmated status of their warheads and delivery systems. Could conventional attacks targeting only delivery systems be interpreted as a strike against nuclear forces? This complicates deterrence calculations because the delivery systems are dual-capable, that is, they are able to undertake both conventional and nuclear missions. With warheads not mated to the delivery systems, the exact classification of the latter would be problematic. In the case of South Asia, the three main protagonists—China, India, and Pakistan—not only operate under the shadow of nuclear weapons, but also have limited geopolitical aims that necessitate only limited armed engagements. In this context, strategic-strike operations only need to strike at key nodes in the local theater of conflict. With the growing sophistication and precision of conventional weapons, the protagonists might be convinced of their chances to initiate and win a conflict below the nuclear threshold, albeit without the ability to control escalation. Moreover, with both sides of a conflict procuring conventional precision weapons, the side that seizes the initiative first would garner the premium. This potential tilt toward preemptive concepts would further escalate the crisis.30 Hitherto, due to the limitations of aircraft and ballistic missiles in carrying out precision strikes, this dynamic was irrelevant. Cruise missiles might change this situation. Although the final goals of these two operations—CFOs and SSOs— differ, they share similarities in the means employed and weapons deployed to achieve these objectives. According to Barry Schneider of the U.S. Air University, “Counterforce weapons should be able to penetrate unharmed to target, maintain all weather precision, operate from extended range if necessary, or to be present continuously over likely target sets

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to reduce the sensor-to-shooter-to-target times.”31 Weapons employed for strategic-strike operations share similar characteristics. Cruise missiles have certain operational advantages that are absent from manned-aircraft and ballistic missiles.32 Although ballistic missiles can also conduct “deep attacks,” cruise missiles outclass the former in terms of precision, especially in the cases of China and India, whereas ballistic missile precision is still being perfected. Their accuracy increases the explosive power of a warhead as it detonates near the target.33 The major obstacle for the widespread use of these systems is their technological sophistication along with the requirement for an extensive and expensive mapping infrastructure, an enterprise that is beyond the reach of many developing countries.34 However, the introduction of the U.S. Global Positioning System, and the similar Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (known as GLONASS), has reduced the technical and acquisition barriers for an accurate guidance system.35 Due to the affordability and accuracy of these systems, cruise missiles have reached the effectiveness of manned aircraft and the destructive power of ballistic missiles. This marks an impending paradigm shift in South Asia that will potentially have an impact on stability and also on crisis escalation. Therefore, to maintain stability and forestall crisis, Beijing and New Delhi should explore avenues to enhance the existing confidence-building measures (CBMs). Unfortunately, CBMs related to conventional forces and ballistic missiles are difficult to replicate with regard to cruise missiles. During the 1990s, China and India agreed on a set of CBMs, agreeing to limit the size of conventional forces as well as refrain from deploying certain weapon systems very near to the line of actual control.36 Similarly, in October 2005 as part of the 1999 Lahore Declaration, India and Pakistan signed an agreement for mutual advance notification of ballistic missile tests.37 It may be attractive to undertake similar CBMs in the case of cruise missiles. However, their technical characteristics render the implementation and verification of these CBMs ineffective. Instead, other forms of CBMs must be sought. Refraining from the deployment of cruise missiles near the line of actual control could enhance stability. However, this CBM is feasible only with short-range cruise missiles. Because some of the cruise missiles that China and India

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are developing have greater standoff ranges and function with multiplatform-launch capabilities, this CBM has limitations. For example, the new Chinese H-6M bombers equipped with DH-10 cruise missiles have an ability to attack targets from a distance of more than 4,200 kilometers, a capability that allows Beijing to attack targets from deep within China without deploying cruise missiles near the border.38 Moreover, cruise missile transport-erector-launchers are not only relatively smaller than ballistic missile TELs, but also resemble civilian/ military logistics vehicles in size. Therefore, any deployment of these missiles is hard to verify. Additionally, because of the low radar and infrared signals associated with cruise missiles, pretest notifications are difficult to implement. Nevertheless, the purpose of this analysis is to be instructive, not to repudiate the utility of CBMs. Given that China and India are developing and deploying cruise missiles and associated operational concepts in an evolutionary fashion, the timing is appropriate to undertake measures that steer the related developments based on security requirements and not merely driven by technology or by their respective strategic enclaves. One viable initiative involves establishing credible modes of communication, which includes expanding the nature and scope of the current military exchanges and institutionalizing Track-1.5 and Track-2 forums. Additionally, prudence warrants defining what constitutes transparency. This is a pertinent aspect, given that both China and India rely on ambiguity and deception in safeguarding their second-strike capabilities. Before either country initiates any arms control measures or CBMs, circumstances necessitate measures to increase openness and predictability, as well as to recognize common interests.39

Notes 1 A. Robock, L. Oman, G. L. Stenchikov, O. B. Toon, C. Bardeen, and R. P. Turco, “Climatic Consequences of Regional Nuclear Conflicts,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, issue 7, 2007, www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/2003/2007. 2 Several incidents stand testimony to this development, among them the advent and success of U.S. “cruise missile diplomacy” beginning in the 1990s; the failure of coalition missile defenses during the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom against Iraqi

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THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS cruise missile attacks; and Hizbollah’s successful attack against an Israeli naval vessel in 2006 with an antiship cruise missile (ASCM). These incidents raised the profile of cruise missiles among state and nonstate actors alike. Of particular concern is that most of the cruise missile aspirants are in zones of potential conflict: the Middle East, South Asia, the Korean Peninsula, and the Taiwan Strait. David Tanks, Assessing the Cruise Missile Puzzle: How Great a Defense Challenge? (Boston: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2000), 7; Dennis M. Gormley, “Missile Defense Myopia: Lessons from the Iraq War,” Survival 45, no. 4 (Winter 2003–2004): 61–86; Dennis M. Gormley, Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010); Frank Gardner, “Hezbollah Missile Threat Assessed,” BBC News, August 3, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_ east/5242566.stm. 3 Tanks, Assessing the Cruise Missile Puzzle. 4 On cruise missiles in China, see Michael S. Chase, “Chinese Land Attack Cruise Missile Developments and Their Implications for the United States,” China Brief 8, issue 24 (December 19, 2008). On cruise missiles in India, see “Brah Mos (PJ-10), 3M55 Yakhont,” Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, March 28, 2011; Harsh V. Pant and Gopalaswamy Bharath, “India’s Emerging Missile Capability: The Science and Politics of Agni-III,” Comparative Strategy 27, issue 4 (2008): 382. 5 Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 79. 6 “C-602 (HN-1/-2/-3/YJ-62/X-600/DH-10/CJ-10/HN-2000),” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, June 1, 2010; “KD-63 (YJ-63), K/AKD-63,” Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, April 26, 2010. 7 “C-602 (HN-1/-2/-3/YJ-62/X-600/DH-10/CJ-10/HN-2000)”; “KD-63 (YJ-63), K/ AKD-63”; Martin Andrew, “China’s Conventional Cruise and Ballistic Missile Force Modernization and Deployment,” China Brief 10, issue 1 (January 7, 2010). 8 “Power Posturing: China’s Tactical Nuclear Stance Comes of Age,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 12, 2010, http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Intelligence-Review2010/Power-posturing--China-s-tactical-nuclear-stance-comes-of-age.html. 9 Brahmos can be configured to act as either an antiship or land-attack cruise missile, depending on its flight management and mission planning components. 10 Brahmos, a ramjet-powered supersonic LACM that could also be configured for ASCM missions, was reportedly derived from the Russian Yakhont ASCM. Although supersonic speeds enable Brahmos to evade most air defenses, its 290-km range and 300-kg payload impose limitations either to assume a nuclear deterrence role or to undertake conventional strikes against counterforce and strategic targets. Reports indicate that Sagarika, Shaurya, and Nirbhay could potentially overcome these limitations. 11 “Cruise Missile to Be Tested Next Year,” Times of India, November 12, 2006, http:// articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2006-11-12/india/27789888_1_cruise-missilesubmarine-launched-version-flight-trials.

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12 “India Gets Ready for ‘Nirbhay,’ the New Cruise Missile,” MSN News, February 2, 2010, http://news.in.msn.com/national/article.aspx?cp-documentid=3622928. 13 Minimum deterrence requires only a small force to deter an adversary and does not involve a triad. For a discussion pertaining to different models of nuclear posture, see Rajesh Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), 26–29. 14 Bill Gertz, “China Tests Ballistic Missile Submarine,” Washington Times, December 3, 2004. 15 Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” in China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force, edited by Andrew S. Erickson, William Murray, and Andrew R. Wilson (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 161–96. 16 Ibid., 64. 17 “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: China and Northeast Asia,” 2005, http://sentinel.​ janes.com/public/sentinel/index.shtml. 18 Jing-dong Yuan, “Effective, Reliable, and Credible: China’s Nuclear Modernization,” Nonproliferation Review 14, no. 2 (July 2007): 293. 19 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66, no. 5 (2010): 76–81. 20 Moreover, a single-strike package requires not only bombers, but also accompanying escort and electronic warfare aircraft, representing a crucial diversion of resources (aircraft that might have been employed, for example, for providing air cover for critical infrastructure) during a crisis period. 21 Dennis M. Gormley, “Missile Defense Myopia,” 71. 22 U.S. operations in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Enduring Freedom illustrate this difficulty. During Operation Desert Storm, in spite of devoting 20 percent of F-15E air sorties for “Scud hunts,” the coalition forces could not destroy even one Iraqi Scud launcher. In the case of Operation Enduring Freedom, even after the Iraqi forces use of cruise missiles, the coalition forces could locate the Seersucker cruise missiles only after the war. Gormley, “Missile Defense Myopia,” 70–71. 23 The quotation was previously cited by Raymond L. Garthoff, “Soviet Perspectives,” in Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy and Politics, edited by Richard K. Betts (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1981), 345. 24 Ibid. 25 For the purposes of this essay, both these operations are discussed only in the context of strikes carried out by conventional weapons, the difference being in the case of CFO the attacks are against nuclear forces or related assets and SSO involves strikes against non-nuclear targets that provide strategic gains. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. and Robert C. Martinage, The Transformation of Strategic-Strike Operations (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2001), 1.

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THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS 26 Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation,” International Security 35, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 80–83; Rong Yu and Peng Guangqian, “Nuclear No-First-Use Revisited,” China Security (Winter 2009): 81–90; Bruce G. Blair and Chen Yali, “The Fallacy of Nuclear Primacy,” China Security (Autumn 2006): 51–73, www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=212%3A-the-fallacy-of-nuclear-primacy&catid=61%3Aissue-4&Itemid= 1&lang=en. 27 “‘Effective, Reliable, and Credible’: China’s Nuclear Modernization,” Nonproliferation Review 14, no. 2 (2007): 288. 28 Michael Chase, Andrew S. Erickson, and Christopher Yeaw, “The Future of Chinese Deterrence Strategy,” Jamestown China Brief 9, no. 5 (March 4, 2009), www.andrewerickson.com/2009/03/the-future-of-chinese-deterrence-strategy. 29 For example, in a 2006 article published in the Chinese-language newspaper the Oriental Morning Post, Shen Dingli noted that with the advent of precision-guided conventional munitions, China’s silo-based early generation strategic nuclear weapons could face serious risks. Shen underlined that any attack on these strategic assets would be tantamount to low-yield nuclear first strikes. Shen Dingli, cited in “Effective, Reliable, and Credible,” 288. 30 The relation between conventional precision weapons and preemptive concepts is dealt with at length by Dennis M. Gormley, Double Zero and Soviet Military Strategy, (London: Tri-Service Press, 1990). Additionally, for an overview of increasing propensity in Asia toward preemptive concepts, see Gormley, Missile Contagion, 14, 69–82, 125–33, 136–45. 31 Barry R. Schneider, “Counterforce Targeting Capabilities and Challenges,” in Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series 22 (Montgomery, Ala.: U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center, Air War College, 2004), 3. 32 A commander armed with cruise missiles can strike the adversary’s targets during the night, in bad weather, or under heavy enemy antiaircraft fire, without risking the loss of aircraft or aircrew and not jeopardizing the mission. The guidance system guides the cruise missiles to their targets irrespective of weather conditions and the aerodynamic low-altitude flight can also evade the enemy’s air defenses. In addition, cruise missiles are endowed with certain operational flexibilities: versatility, small logistics chain, easy maintenance, multiplatform launch, and minimal mission planning. Ibid.; “U.S. Missiles Pound Targets in Afghanistan, Sudan.” CNN, August 21, 1998, http://edition. cnn.com/US/9808/20/us.strikes.02; Krepinevich and Martinage, Transformation of Strategic-Strike Operations; David J. Nicholls, Cruise Missiles and Modern War: Strategic and Technological Implications, Occasional Paper 13 (Montgomery, Ala.: Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, 2000): 3, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ cst/csat13.pdf. 33 Previously, cruise missile guidance systems were based only on inertial navigation systems, navigation that had a drift error over long flights. To rectify this error, the United States started to use state-of-the art Terrain Contour Matching and Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation systems.

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34 For example, during the Cold War, the United States had 5,000 different digital maps to support cruise missile operations against the Soviet Union. W. Seth Carus, Cruise Missile Proliferation in the 1990s (Washington Papers) (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982), 56. 35 Dennis M. Gormley, Dealing with the Threat of Cruise Missiles, Adelphi Paper 339 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001), 31. 36 Waheguru Pal, Singh Sidhu, and Jing-dong Yuan, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 121–36. 37 For the text of this agreement, see “Agreement Between India and Pakistan on PreNotification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles,” available at www.stimson.org/ research-pages/agreement-between-india-and-pakistan-on-pre-notification-of-flighttesting-of-ballistic-missiles. 38 Roger Cliff et al., Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth: Chinese Air Force Employment Concepts in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2011), 204–7. 39 The author derived some of these ideas from Joseph S. Nye Jr., “U.S.-Soviet Relations and Nuclear-Risk Reduction,” Political Science Quarterly 99, no. 3 (Autumn 1984): 401–14; and from discussions with William T. Tow of the Australian National University.

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CHAPTER 7

Parsing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty THE VIEW FROM india Swaran Singh

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he idea of a nuclear test ban maintains a special place of pride in India’s nuclear disarmament discourse. In April 1954, India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, proposed a global test ban by the nuclear weapons powers.1 And in the same year, India advocated a cessation of nuclear testing at the United Nations General Assembly.2 Nehru also commissioned a study, under the scientist D. S. Kothari, which resulted in a report entitled “Nuclear Explosions and Their Effects” that was published in 1956. Realizing early in its life as a country that its lone voice might not be effective, India raised the test ban issue with the major powers and in multilateral forums. It also potentially contributed to the U.S. and Soviet test ban campaign and moratoria on nuclear testing starting in the late 1950s, thus enhancing the chances of concluding the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. In fact, when India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, it used the term “peaceful nuclear explosion.”

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However, this disjunction between rhetoric and reality was to unleash a debate on India’s reluctant realism versus its pacifist leanings. India was to take another twenty-four years to conduct its next series of nuclear tests, in May 1998. Meanwhile, during the mid-1980s, India’s prime ministers, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, also launched a six-nation, five-continent campaign for nuclear disarmament, which again emphasized a nuclear test ban as a critical first step. The same premise informed the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for Disarmament, which was presented at the United Nations in December 1988. This plan sought achievement of its goal by 2010. But like most other proposals from India, the plan was largely ignored by the major powers. Indeed, this continuous marginalization of India in global disarmament debates has been cited as a factor in India’s gradual move toward nuclear weaponization.3 Even after India’s nuclear tests in May 1998, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee made unilateral announcements on (1) a moratorium on nuclear testing, (2) keeping India’s stockpiles to a minimum, and (3) promising no first use without possessing any “second” strike capability. India’s nuclear policy has become nuanced over the years. After being one of the PTBT’s enthusiastic participants and original signatories, India became disillusioned by the response from the great powers, both those that had signed the PTBT and those that stayed out and denounced it.4 Nonetheless, India’s test ban discourse was once again revived in the early 1990s, with India’s co-sponsorship of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. But once again, after about three years of intense negotiations, India felt sidelined and even that it had become the target of CTBT negotiations. Ultimately, India was to walk out of these negotiations.5 Repeated encounters with power-driven realist disarmament advocates were to catapult India from adherence to its original Gandhian-Nehruvian thesis to more pragmatic strategies. The current phase of India’s test ban debate is traceable to the early 1990s. This phase was heralded by momentous changes both in India’s domestic politics and in international politics.6 As regards its impact on India’s stance on the CTBT, New Delhi had begun by focusing only on a zero-yield treaty. It did not oppose subcritical tests and did not demand

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the closing of nuclear test sites. But soon India raised the demand for an indefinite scope for all states and indefinite validity, as opposed to the U.S. request for a ten-year treaty. Initially, India did not even make the CTBT conditional on a commitment to disarmament by the UN Security Council’s five permanent members, which are also nuclear powers that are referred to as the P-5. Until 1994, India described the CTBT as an important step toward nuclear disarmament, which had been contemplated as early as Rajiv Gandhi’s Action Plan dating to 1988. Even on the entry-into-force issue, India suggested via media outlets placing limited requirements on P-5 states and all Conference on Disarmament members, asking for a reasonable number of “responsible and representative countries.” This meant that until June 1994, India did not appear to be a country unwilling to sign the CTBT. As negotiations moved toward unconditional and indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in April 1995, India began to talk of nuclear-weapon states providing unconditional security assurances to non–nuclear-weapon states. It did not yet call, however, for making signature of the CTBT conditional on such nuclear assurances by P-5 countries. Yet, because the “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear NonProliferation and Disarmament” document that accompanied the NPT’s extension in May 1995 failed to contain a strong commitment to disarmament, India began to push for a strengthening of the CTBT’s agenda. India even sought to go beyond the difficult-to-verify zero-yield requirement by seeking to ban laboratory and simulation testing. Indeed, the May 1995 unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT became another significant watershed in the evolution of India’s stance toward the nuclear test ban. It is well known today that in August 1995, India sought to undertake nuclear tests, but it was dissuaded from doing so by the United States.7 This occurred in the wake of the extension of the NPT, which was preceded by a series of nuclear tests by France and China. Together, these events triggered a visible and sharp change in India’s stance toward CTBT negotiations. As late as March 1996, the Indian foreign secretary, Salman Haidar, stated that “we do not believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons

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is essential for our national security and we have followed [a] conscious decision in this regard.”8 However, introduction of Clause XIV on June 28, 1996, pushed India to make its opposition to the CTBT public. This clause stipulated that the CTBT would come into force, provided that all 44 states in possession of nuclear reactor technologies had signed and ratified it.9 In the event that the requisite parties had not signed and ratified the CTBT and that it had not come into force by September 1999, the parties to the treaty were to have a review meeting and to adopt “measures” against defaulting countries. In the context of the first Persian Gulf War of 1991 and North Korea’s alleged nuclear program and withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, the expression “measures” had come to imply harsh censure by the major powers, including sanctions, challenge inspections, and even regime change. All these were important considerations in New Delhi’s reaching the decision to exercise its nuclear option rather than allowing it to be closed from the outside. If India would be prohibited from testing, it would not be able to weaponize. It would be in effect forced to cap its nuclear weapons capability. Soon thereafter, India’s ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Arundhati Ghose, rejected the CTBT, saying that the current draft was not “in India’s national security interest” and “our national security considerations (have) become a key factor in our decisionmaking.”10 As India’s chief test ban negotiator, Ghose almost sounded prophetic as she declared that India would “never sign this unequal treaty, not now, not later.”11 India’s denunciation of the CTBT was followed by its conducting of five nuclear tests in May 1998, which emerged as another watershed in the evolution of its stance on the test ban. The rationale for India’s nuclear tests lies in multiple explanations in terms of threat perceptions, security assessments, internal politics, and prestige. However, the timing of India’s tests may be best explained in no small part by how nuclearweapon states were mobilizing their power to press for a conclusion of the CTBT negotiations.12 Nonetheless, even after India conducted its nuclear tests, it continued to demonstrate a strong interest in establishing a test ban. This was reflected in its immediate unilateral commitment to a moratorium on nuclear tests and its “adherence” to all the provisions of the CTBT draft. Prime

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Minister Vajpayee’s paper, “The Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy,” presented to the Indian Parliament on May 27, 1998, noted that “India will now observe a voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground nuclear test explosions” and even indicated its “willingness to move towards a de jure formalization of this declaration.”13 On the operational side of Indian diplomacy, India’s nuclear tests were followed by vigorous damage-limitation diplomacy in the form of India opening several strategic dialogues with all the major powers, including all five nuclear-weapon states. The fourteen rounds of these Jaswant Singh– Strobe Talbott talks, as well as Brajesh Mishra’s dialogue with representatives of the other major powers, were accompanied by experts exploring India’s new position in the global security architecture. These interlocutors reportedly had worked out the details whereby India would have signed the CTBT and maintained a small nuclear stockpile in exchange for the United States acknowledging India’s nuclear deterrent. This also promised a qualitatively better Indo-U.S. relationship, accompanied by a lifting of all U.S. sanctions. It was under this new orientation that the commitment to a moratorium on nuclear tests was reiterated by India, and finally, in August 2008, was included in the Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. This realpolitik approach by India, which entails engaging from a position of strength, while at the same time being open to hard bargaining, has transformed India’s profile from being a target to becoming a stakeholder, if not yet partner, in most of the world’s nuclear nonproliferation discourses and regimes. India’s engagement with the United States— especially against the backdrop of the U.S. Senate’s refusal to ratify the CTBT—has played a significant role in India’s transformation. India has been seeking to persuade the United States to allow transfers of nuclear and space technologies in return for India agreeing to participate in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and reconsider its position on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is in this context that U.S. president Barack Obama’s endorsement of India as an “indispensable,” “rising,” “nuclear power” has accelerated the evolution of India’s stance on the CTBT.14 At the same time, pressures on India to restrain or even roll back its nuclear program have not relented. Details on harsh U.S. posturing on such issues in closed-door

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meetings continue to alert India to always err on the side of caution.15 The cycle of India’s policy on the nuclear test ban debate seems to have come full circle. The sequence of events from Nehru’s initial enthusiasm through the signature of the CTBT can be seen as constituting the age of India’s nuclear innocence—the first phase of its approach to the test ban. India’s disarmament policy during this first phase was driven generally by moral and normative considerations about building international peace. This began to tilt toward a discourse driven by national security starting in the early 1960s, with this shift accelerating due to rumors about China’s nuclear tests that had coincided with deteriorating Sino-Indian ties. This was followed by the emergence of the China–Pakistan axis confronting India.16 The second phase of India’s approach to the test ban reached its height in June 1996, when India walked out of the CTBT negotiations and then went on to conduct its first nuclear tests. Prima facie, this is the exact opposite of India’s policies during its initial years, when Prime Minister Nehru repeatedly asserted on behalf of his government, and even future governments of India, that India would not weaponize its nuclear technologies.17 For understandable reasons, this was not to be. Although India managed to skirt the issue by calling its 1974 test a peaceful nuclear explosion, the tests in 1998 were officially described as nuclear weapons tests. The third phase of India’s stance toward the CTBT emerged following the U.S. Senate’s vote against ratification of the CTBT on October 13, 1999. This dramatically changed the context and took pressure off India. It resulted in India’s Ministry of External Affairs describing the CTBT as a complicated issue that required “building a national consensus” in India, as well as in other concerned countries.18 Since then, several critics have continued to question the urgency in India’s response to the CTBT, while U.S. administrations have continued to struggle with its ratification. The fourth phase emerged from the July 18, 2005, joint statement between India’s prime minister, Manmohan Singh, and U.S. president George W. Bush and the subsequent negotiations for the Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. This period marked a reversal of the two countries’ mutual policies, with the United States shifting from preventing India from obtaining nuclear fuel and reactors to supporting India’s pursuit of nuclear technologies. For its part, India moved from

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its condemnation of Western disarmament efforts to seeking to garner a seat at the table where the United States sits as the leader.19 This changing equation has since opened doors for India’s nuclear commerce with most other nuclear-weapon states. The fifth and final phase is still taking shape. The last two years have revived the much-neglected debate on the CTBT and India’s stance— against the backdrop of (1) media pieces by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, (2) speeches by U.S. president Obama on arms control and disarmament, and (3) the December 2009 visit of Japanese premier Yukio Hatoyama to India and his request that India sign and ratify the CTBT draft.20 It will be interesting to see how the CTBT debate continues to be intertwined with the NPT, given that most of India’s difficulties with the CTBT stem from this linkage. Additionally, the future direction of India’s policy stance toward the CTBT will depend on resolving the lingering doubts over India’s nuclear tests and their sufficiency. Questions have been cast on the effectiveness of India’s hydrogen bomb test, along with its relevance for India’s security indices.21 In the end, India has clearly moved away from its initial faith in complete disarmament and evolved far more complex strategies that focus on its national interest and the feasibility of its policies. Most importantly, India has clearly climbed down from its outright rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Recent arguments suggest that India is working on building a national consensus and that Chinese and U.S. ratification will present a new reality and thus play a significant role in compelling India toward rethinking its stance on the CTBT.

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THE VIEw FROM CHINA Fan jIsHe

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hile in office, U.S. president Bill Clinton described the CTBT as “the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control,” and he was right.22 In 1958 and 1959, and again in 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to negotiate a treaty to ban nuclear tests, which resulted in the CTBT. But it was not until 1994 that the United States and post-Soviet Russia launched multilateral negotiations that would result in the CTBT, which was opened for signature in 1996. Although 182 countries have signed the treaty, with 153 ratifications, a number of essential signatures and ratifications remain absent, with the former led by India, Pakistan, and North Korea and the latter led by the United States, China, Israel, Indonesia, Iran, and Egypt. In a world where 2,053 nuclear tests have been carried out since 1945 and North Korea has been the most recent to conduct nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, the CTBT remains as relevant as ever. Given that India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests followed the opening of the CTBT for signature in 1996, their role in the treaty’s future cannot be ignored—nor can the role of the United States, which failed to ratify the CTBT in October 1999. Although the five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT, along with India and Pakistan, observe a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing, a new consensus must be built. Toward this end, in April 2009, U.S. president Barack Obama made an international appeal in his speech in Prague: “To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”23 At the international level, in May 2010, the NPT Review Conference successfully concluded a 64-point action plan.

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As part of this effort to garner domestic support, the Obama administration’s $85 billion, ten-year plan for upgrading the nuclear weapons complex is intended to give senators greater confidence that there are both a long-term strategy and more than enough funding to continue to maintain an effective U.S. arsenal. The administration’s $7.6 billion request for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s weapons activities for fiscal year 2012 is almost 9 percent more than the 2011 request and 19 percent more than the funding approved by Congress for 2010. Furthermore, U.S. undersecretary of state Ellen Tauscher’s announcement in May 2011 that the United States would launch an education campaign for U.S. senators on the CTBT indicates that the goal is to avoid a repeat of the 1999 negative vote in the Senate. Added to this educational campaign, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on International Security and Arms Control have jointly sponsored a “Review and Update of Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.”24 Overall, the changing environment in the United States for supporting the CTBT indicates that there is a renewed momentum to pass the treaty. The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review that was released in its entirety in April 2010 was just one indication of this shift in U.S. priorities, with its focus squarely set on nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, a diminished role for nuclear weapons, and the ruling out of the development of new types of nuclear warheads. Beyond political will, technical progress also indicates a positive direction for the CTBT. Globally, several measures can effectively detect and deter militarily significant cheating; these include (1) the International Monitoring System, for which approximately 280 of the planned 321 global monitoring stations have now been built, (2) onsite inspections, and (3) transparency measures as specified in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Domestically, the Stockpile Stewardship Program in the United States has significantly increased confidence in the reliability of the existing nuclear arsenal over the past decade. The United States’ development of military alternatives to nuclear weapons, such as precision-guided munitions and long-range conventional strike capability, also demonstrate its

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interest in heading in a direction in which nuclear weapons are not as central to its security. But in the end, it comes down to ratification of the CTBT by the United States. Whether U.S. ratification can compel countries like India and Israel to also sign and ratify the treaty remains to be seen. There also remains a large question mark as to whether the CTBT would be a key factor in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Nonetheless, the United States’ stance on the CTBT remains central to how other countries that have not yet signed or ratified the treaty decide to proceed. With respect to China’s and India’s nuclear policies, the United States’ policy regarding the CTBT will be a significant part of their own decisionmaking calculus. With the U.S. presidential election in 2012, the question of whether the United States will sustain its momentum to ratify the CTBT remains paramount for the treaty’s international future. It also remains a major factor for China and India.

Notes 1 President Eisenhower referred Nehru’s proposal to the United Nations Disarmament Committee, raising the larger debate about legality of nuclear weapons. Benjamin P. Green, Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the Nuclear Test-Ban Debate, 1945–1963 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007), 60–61. 2 Thomas George Weiss and Ramesh Chandra Thakur, Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 104. 3 Maharajkrishna Rasgotra, “Countering Nuclear Threats,” in Securing India’s Future in the New Millennium, edited by Brahma Chellaney (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1999), 232. 4 Indian elites gradually became conscious of the discriminatory nature of arms control processes. This disillusionment was reinforced by India’s wars with China and Pakistan, China’s atomic test in October 1964, along with China’s “all weather” friendship and strategic cooperation with Pakistan. These factors pushed India closer to the Soviet Union and shaped New Delhi’s reluctance in signing the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). As a result, in the 1980s, India developed a self-image of being the target of nonproliferation and the idea of the discriminatory nature of the NPT, which was to become the hallmark of India’s nuclear policy. See Swaran Singh, ed., China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation: Indian Perspectives (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007); C. Raja Mohan, India and the Nonproliferation Institutions (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010), 3; and Jita Mishra, The NPT and the Developing Countries (New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 2008), 23.

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5 Karsten Frey, India’s Nuclear Bomb and National Security (New York: Routledge, 2006), 182–86. 6 In addition to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc—which forever transformed the global security architecture—these events included the first Persian Gulf War and the unprecedented rise of China’s and Pakistan’s sustained use of terrorism and its nuclear tests of 1998. Internally for India, this period heralded the balance-of-trade crisis of 1991, forcing India to open up its economy and undertake economic restructuring guided by the International Monetary Fund to lower tariff and nontariff barriers on free trade. In politics, the 1990s heralded the beginning of non–Nehru-Gandhi family leaders leading the Congress Party, the Congress Party shrinking in its power base and becoming circumscribed by coalition politics, and the rise of new forces of regionalism and communal and caste politics that moved from the margins to the center stage of national life. 7 Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 1998), 176; ​ R. Jeffrey Smith, “Possible Nuclear Arms Test by India Concerns U.S.,” Washington Post, December 16, 1995; Tim Weiner, “India Suspected of Preparing for A-Bomb Test,” New York Times, December 15, 1995. 8 Quoted by Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, New Nukes: India, Pakistan and Global Nuclear Disarmament (Oxford: Signal Books, 2002), 65. 9 Listed in annex 2 of the draft. 10 M. V. Ramana, “‘La Trahison des Clercs’: Scientists and India’s Nuclear Bomb,” in Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream, edited by M. V. Ramana and C. Rammanohar Reddy (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2003), 235; Eric H. Arnett, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia After the Test Ban (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 29. 11 Ronald E. Powaski, Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981–1999 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 220. 12 The fact that Prime Minister Vajpayee’s May 11, 1998, letter to President Clinton, which was leaked to the New York Times, explained India’s tests in the context of Chinese and Pakistani nuclear capabilities was apparently aimed at mitigating the backlash from the nonproliferation regime. The same was also partly the reason for India’s unilateral offer of a moratorium on further nuclear testing, which also demonstrated India’s commitment to a test ban. 13 “The Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy,” paper laid on the table of the House on May 27, 1998, available at Embassy of India in Washington website, www.indianembassy. org/pic/nuclearpolicy.htm. 14 Swaran Singh, “Sino-U.S. Issues May Crash India’s Washington Party,” Global Times, November 30, 2009. 15 President Clinton—a great friend of India—opened a meeting on India’s tests on May 12, 1998, in the Oval Office with the following words: “We’re going to come down on those guys like a ton of bricks.” The run-up to the NPT Review Conference in May 2010 witnessed several such initiatives. Articles written by four U.S. senior officials,

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THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS global zero conferences in Paris in February 2010, and the international security conference in Washington in April 2010 were all aimed at generating a consensus for an effective outcome from the May 2010 NPT Review Conference. Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 52. 16 Only recently did India gain the confidence to deal with both these countries separately. 17 T. S. Subramanian, “The Research Facility Has Fulfilled Homi Bhabha’s ‘Vision of Abundant Economic Nuclear Power,’” Special Feature: BARC at 50, Frontline (Chennai) 24, issue 8 (April 21–May 4, 2007). 18 Dinshaw Mistry, “Diplomacy, Sanctions, and the U.S. Nonproliferation Dialogue with India and Pakistan,” Asian Survey 39, no. 5 (September–October 1999): 753–71. 19 Harsh V. Pant, “The U.S.-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics,” Asian Security 5, issue 3 (September 2009): 273–95. 20 According to reports following the New Delhi visit by the Japanese prime minister, India’s prime minister, Manmohan Singh, is believed to have told him that if China and the United States were to ratify the CTBT, it would “create a new situation.” This briefly unleashed a debate on what would qualify India to sign the CTBT, in the event that the United States and China were to ratify it. Siddharth Varadarajan and K. V. Prasad, “Manmohan Signals Return to Vajpayee Line on CTBT,” Hindu, December 30, 2009; Ashwani Talwar, “India Shrugs Off CTBT,” Indian Express, December 30, 2009, www.expressbuzz.com/edition/story.aspx?Title=India+shrugs+off+CTBT&artid =Dc2uUJtVTaY=&SectionID=b7ziAYMenjw=&MainSectionID=b7ziAYMenjw= &SectionName=pWehHe7IsSU=&SEO=. 21 This debate resurfaced in August 2009, when K. Santhanam—who had been a key member of the team that had supervised the nuclear tests of 1998—declared that the hydrogen bomb had been a “fizzle.” The vigorous media debate that followed involved India’s top scientists and policymakers and cast doubt not only on the 1998 tests, but also on the 1974 test, because the latter was used as a comparative baseline in the seismic estimates of the 1998 tests. Bharath Gopalaswamy, “India and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: To Sign or Not to Sign?” SIPRI Policy Brief (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010): 5. 22 “Clinton Sends CTB Treaty to Senate: Hearing Set to Begin in October,” Arms Control Association, September 1997, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/244. 23 White House, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Hradcany Square, Prague, April 5, 2009, www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-BarackObama-In-Prague-As-Delivered. 24 “Review and Update of Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academies, June 10, 2009, www.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=49131.

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CHAPTER 8

Verifying Fissile Material Futures THE VIEW FROM china Zou Yunhua

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he international community maintains that a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) would contribute to both nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. A verifiable ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes is seen as one of the most effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world and to put a cap on the accumulation of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes. In December 1993, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution (48/75L) recommending the negotiation of a nondiscriminatory, multilateral, and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In 1995, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) agreed by consensus to establish an ad hoc committee on the FMCT with a negotiation mandate based on this General Assembly resolution. Three years later, an ad hoc committee was set up in the CD, yet no substantial work commenced. From informal external consultations and

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two meetings held in 1998, there was an obvious diversity of opinions among member states. However, since the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, the CD has not been able to resume substantive work and has remained deadlocked. As one of the CD’s agenda items, the FMCT faces two core issues: verification and stockpiles. Fortunately, verification has recently become less of an issue. Although the U.S. delegation claimed at the CD in 2004 that an FMCT would not be verifiable, the Barack Obama administration has changed tack by agreeing that verification would be included in the FMCT. The primary remaining issue has become one of existing stockpiles. Some states—like Brazil, Pakistan, Norway, Cuba, and Egypt—believe that a cut-off level should include fissile materials already produced and stockpiled. Advocates of this approach, however, take no account of the complications and difficulties of verifying the stockpiles of the nucleararmed states. They insist that an FMCT should include stockpiles’ transparency, constraints, reduction, and international control. Other countries—that include the UN Security Council’s five permanent members, Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States, as well as India and Israel—favor an approach that would cut off production of new fissile material for weapons. According to their logic, this method can be verified without requiring the disclosure of numbers of weapons, the amount of fissile material in each type of weapon, and access by international inspectors for verification. In light of these various issues and stands, in early 2010 the Pakistani position on the FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament hardened and became a central factor in this debate. Pakistan has argued that an FMCT, which does not address existing stockpiles, will “freeze existing asymmetries,” threatening Pakistan’s security. This is a manifestation of Pakistan’s concern with regional rival India, because India has a larger stockpile of weapons-grade nuclear material than Pakistan. Moreover, it is reported that Pakistan is displeased with the 2008 United States–India nuclear cooperation agreement, which allows India to import nuclear fuel from the United States for energy purposes. Pakistan fears that more fissile material produced by India could be potentially used for military purposes.

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Despite these obstacles, China continues to support the early conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. For this purpose, the foreign minister of China and the secretary of state of the United States issued a joint statement in October 1994 saying that the two countries would make joint efforts to promote an early conclusion of a multilateral, nondiscriminatory, and effectively verifiable FMCT. In April 1997, China and four other nuclear-weapon states—the United States, Russia, Britain, and France—issued a statement reiterating their stand for concluding, through negotiation, an FMCT as soon as possible on the basis of the mandate contained in the Shannon Report.1 China supports the purposes and objectives of the FMCT, as well as relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. China continues to advocate negotiation and conclusion at an early date of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Nonetheless, there remain several key issues relating to the FMCT that merit further attention. The first of these is the scope of prohibition. The Chinese delegation to the CD emphasized that the scope should be delimited by “production purposes.” Civil and military (including nuclear propulsion) fissile material production should be clearly distinguished. The future treaty should limit its ban to fissile material production for nuclear weapons purposes, not prohibit production for military or civil uses. The treaty should not cover stockpiled fissile materials, however, which is contrary to Pakistan’s expressed preference. Otherwise, the international community would face insurmountable verification problems. As just one indication of this challenge, according to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research’s view, existing stockpiles cover three categories: military stockpiles, transition stockpiles, and civilian stockpiles. Military stockpiles include fissile materials that are to meet present and future military demands, including those maintained in deployed nuclear weapons and naval reactors, production systems, and strategic stocks or weapon components. These stockpiles are not subject to IAEA safeguards. Seeking to include these materials in a ban would require verification procedures entailing declarations of stocks in weapons and some intrusive means to verify such declarations, perhaps by allowing inspectors into military facilities. Such warhead verification has never been

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done, even in U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reduction agreements. By omitting existing stocks of military fissile material from verification, concluding the FMCT would be less burdensome. Moreover, the stockpile issue might significantly postpone the commencement of the negotiations. Second, because the goal of an FMCT is to promote nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation, the future treaty should include not only all nuclear weapons states, but also de facto nuclear countries. It should also feature those countries that are potentially capable of producing nuclear explosive devices and that possess appropriate installations for uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel. At the very beginning of the CTBT negotiations, a delegation from the United Kingdom insisted that all actors must be present. FMCT negotiations should follow the model for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Third, in terms of verification measures, the Chinese delegation to the CD expressed its basic stand that verification measures should: • strictly follow the scope of prohibition of the treaty; • be reasonable and effective, affording each state party equal rights

and responsibilities; • reduce intrusiveness to the lowest possible level, while at the same time preventing abuse; • not hinder state parties from carrying out normal scientific research and production for peaceful purposes; and • make full consideration of cost-effectiveness, so that they may be financially borne by state parties. However, a future FMCT must also be coupled with verification plans to halt the production of fissile material, so as to enhance the confidence of other countries. Verification is an important factor to ensure the effectiveness of an FMCT and will require a verification regime to address the purpose, scope, arrangements, measures, and techniques of verification. A future FMCT is both a political and technical agreement. Therefore, negotiating parties face challenges of both political will and scientific investments. Reaching a consensus on a “program of work” is the key issue and will require joint efforts. However, from the speech by the Pakistani delegation to the CD in early 2010, one can see that Pakistan has its own

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security concerns regarding the FMCT. The core issue remains deeply rooted India–Pakistan animosity and continual conflicts between the two countries, which have influenced Pakistan’s position toward negotiation of the FMCT. As a result, it is crucial to seek peaceful settlement of the IndoPakistani disputes first, in conjunction with more bilateral and regional confidence-building measures. Both India and Pakistan are China’s good neighbors. In December 2010, China’s premier Wen Jiabao visited both India and Pakistan to advance its ties with the two countries. Both countries have many common interests and opinions on a variety of international security issues. Maintaining the steady momentum of development in the Sino-Indian strategic cooperative partnership will benefit not only their populations, but also the region and the world.

The View from India M. S. Prathibha

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hina’s participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference held in May 2010 portrayed its growing confidence in handling arms control regimes. At the conference, China addressed its concerns by urging states to sign and ratify the CTBT and to start negotiations on the FMCT within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.2 Beijing’s diplomacy primarily aims at promoting its image as a responsible stakeholder that contributes to international security cooperation. It has also recognized the advantage of negotiating new regimes such as the FMCT at an earlier stage, when it can aid in constructing norms to suit its own interests. In the CD forum, which operates on a consensus basis,

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China can put forth an agenda reflecting its own security concerns and can resist pressure to negotiate treaties outside this framework. China’s stance has evolved from that of a staunch supporter of global nuclear disarmament to that of a country with a greater concentration on export control mechanisms and safeguards. This points to its changing commercial interests and market-oriented approach to nuclear energy and technology. Beijing’s entry into the global nuclear nonproliferation regime is driven by realpolitik and its rethinking of conflict and cooperation within the international order. China has realized that it can benefit from mutual cooperation and common security interests within multilateral institutions. According to this view, the mainstream international political order is leaning toward cooperation, rather than conflict.3 However, China has been quite successful in promoting selective disarmament goals, whether at the CD or at the NPT Review Conference. One significant aspect of Chinese support for these aims is to link them with its own security concerns. For instance, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, China linked the FMCT to the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). And at the CD, China has linked disarmament proposals to U.S. missile defense plans, which in its view undermine its nuclear retaliatory capability. Although in 2003, after intense negotiations, China dropped the demand of linking PAROS and the FMCT, its promotion of selective disarmament goals in forums such as the CD and the NPT Review Conference demonstrate that realpolitik motives still underlie its disarmament commitments.4 However, multilateral diplomacy has favored China for having a distinct quality of fitting in with both non–nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon states. In doing so, China makes commitments that do not pose any major constraints on its nuclear weapons program, military transparency, or modernization. For example, the 2005 NPT Review Conference supported indefinite extension of the treaty. While implementing several of its commitments, China faced few constraints except placing its civilian reactors under safeguards, while leaving out its military installations. Though China has taken a series of steps in controlling its export of nuclear materials to unsafeguarded facilities, its major nonproliferation

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commitments have come through reciprocal arrangements with the United States. Most of its nonproliferation pledges have occurred under sanctions and negotiations.5 For example, in 1995, after it was found that a Chinese company sold 5,000 ring magnets to Pakistan and the United States subsequently withheld Export-Import Bank loans, China pledged that it would not give any more assistance to any unsafeguarded facilities. Reciprocal arrangements are still an effective way to influence China’s arms control behavior, as many revised guidelines for domestic export control between 2006 and 2008 came about after repeated sanctions posed by the George W. Bush administration on Chinese companies, including China North Industries Corporation and China Great Wall Industry Corporation, for likely transfers to Iran.6 These developments show that the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship can influence China’s political will to enforce domestic export controls and in return lead to greater cooperation with the United States. Due to its continued integration into the arms control regimes, China has garnered cooperation with many countries on nuclear technology, including the United States. In July 1985, China and the United States signed a nuclear cooperation agreement later implemented in 1998 in return for China’s nonproliferation promises.7 China’s 1998 “Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology Agreement” with the United States facilitated bilateral cooperation in the field of civil nuclear energy and nonproliferation, offering China vast scientific and technological expertise. China has also signed intergovernmental agreements with 20 countries on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.8 Nuclear commerce coupled with its own energy needs has made China focus its research on reactor technology and advanced fuel cycles.9 It currently has 13 reactors and has plans for 34, of which 26 are already under construction. China claims that it has now succeeded in reprocessing spent fuel in its experimental reactor in a China National Nuclear Corporation plant, which would help expand China’s proven uranium deposits to 3,000 years from the current forecast of fifty to seventy years.10 If successful, this fourth-generation technology could greatly reduce China’s reliance on uranium imports and could potentially contribute to fueling third-generation reactors being built by Areva and Westinghouse Electric.

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These advances have prompted China to support certain policies. For instance, at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, China supported a multilaterally controlled nuclear fuel cycle.11 This would expand its commercial interests in nuclear technology cooperation and trade with other signatories to the regime. China has also been allowed to engage in cooperation that would improve its nuclear security. This can be seen in a U.S. Department of Energy and China Atomic Energy Authority agreement to establish Centers of Excellence for Nuclear Security.12 With this agreement, the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration and the U.S. Department of Defense can exchange information and training with the China Atomic Energy Authority in the field of nuclear security. Because the National Nuclear Security Administration is instrumental in maintaining and enhancing the safety, security, reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing, this assistance promises to bear fruit for China. The two sides have agreed to establish a new joint working group on radioactive source security and to pursue additional areas of cooperation in new technology.13 Thus, China can engage in nuclear trade as its nuclear reactor technology becomes increasingly sophisticated and in turn can attain technical expertise by cooperating with countries like the United States. This is an example of and could result in further nonproliferation behavior modified to suit China’s commercial interests. Nonetheless, when it comes to the noncommercial aspects of the international nonproliferation regime, China remains behind the curve. Although transparency in nuclear arsenals is a step toward disarmament, China has successfully deflected calls for this transparency. Instead, China continues to argue that transparency is governed by intentions and claims that it has made its peaceful intentions clear, citing the following factors: • China’s modest nuclear arsenal does not in any way pose a challenge

to the goal of nuclear disarmament, which has been reaffirmed in public statements, white papers, and various international forums; • China only maintains nuclear weapons against nuclear blackmail and only as a second-strike capability; and

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• China’s nuclear retaliatory strike relies on the secrecy of its nuclear

arsenal, and as such it would be counterproductive to reveal the details of its nuclear arsenal.14

In fact, at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, China blocked calls for the world’s nuclear powers to uphold the fissile material moratorium to halt highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes.15 Moreover, disarmament commitments rarely bind China to any major changes to its nuclear arsenal or missile forces. For example, whereas China’s signing of the CTBT incurred some political costs, it nonetheless chose to conduct 45 nuclear tests before signing the treaty. In the area of nuclear disarmament, China will continue to maintain a position of valuing secrecy over military transparency and safeguarding its nuclear arsenal over nuclear disarmament, as long as its nuclear arsenal can maintain a viable and credible deterrent capability. Within this discussion of disarmament, the two treaties that have gained renewed attention are the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Of these two, the FMCT merits special consideration. China has pushed back efforts to negotiate the FMCT outside the CD’s framework. This stands in contrast to the wishes of other nuclear powers to work outside the CD, so as to facilitate negotiations.16 China intends to keep the FMCT within the CD framework, because it would then require a consensus to pass. This approach stems from the belief that the nuclear powers will then be unable to push China into signing the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Moreover, while negotiating the FMCT, China demanded that the nonNPT states—India, Pakistan, and Israel—should be included. Pakistan also asserted that the FMCT should include existing stocks and has further dragged out negotiations of the FMCT, frustrating countries that wish to negotiate it outside the Conference on Disarmament. Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the CD has renewed its efforts on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. However, China’s nuclear strategy plays an effective role in exercising its options for FMCT negotiations. The option of producing fissile material for weapons purposes will matter if the United States fields a missile defense shield

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that in China’s view threatens its retaliatory strike capability. As a result, China supports the view that further production of fissile material (cessation), not existing stocks (stockpile), should be considered,17 but it disagrees on issues of verification.18 Negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty will require taking into consideration both China’s security concerns and its preference for multilateral forums. The future trajectory and confidence of China in its nuclear deterrence strategy and security is paramount, whether in terms of ratification of the CTBT or support for FMCT negotiations. While China has been engaging in nuclear nonproliferation regimes, India has taken a step back from the nuclear nonproliferation arena, in particular after its 1998 test and subsequent nuclear isolation.19 This was until a joint statement by U.S. president George W. Bush and Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh on civil nuclear cooperation pulled India out of isolation. This deal had China raising the issue of “double standards” and the legitimacy of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.20 Although these developments might not jeopardize overall India–China relations, they nonetheless have complicated nuclear relations between the two, for China has decided to provide two more nuclear reactors— Chashma 3 and Chashma 4—to Pakistan. Although Pakistan remains a factor in India–China relations, areas of cooperation can be identified with respect to nonproliferation. India will be increasingly pulled into negotiations, especially with regard to the FMCT and CTBT, as it seeks entry into multilateral groupings, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. As a result, there remain areas in which India and China could synchronize their policy objectives. With respect to the FMCT, both states could work on improving the verification process, because both countries’ interests lie in an international and nondiscriminatory process. India’s energy needs are expanding, and it can enter into the arena of nuclear trade with China. In negotiating the FMCT, India and China can cooperate on the basis of their mutual opposition to national technical means of discriminatory verification in seeking to establish an agreement that does not impinge upon the rights of states.

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Notes 1 This document is also known as the “Shannon Mandate.” On January 25, 1994, the Conference on Disarmament appointed a Special Coordinator, Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, to investigate the views of member states on the most effective way to negotiate a treaty on fissile materials. The resulting report, CD/1229, came to be known as the “Shannon Mandate.” It proposed that an ad hoc committee be convened to pursue negotiations and settle such issues as whether existing stocks should be included in the treaty or not. While efforts to establish the committee ultimately failed, a number of states continue to refer to the Shannon Mandate as the basis for future negotiations. “Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT),” Reaching Critical Will, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/fmct.html. 2 China signed the CTBT in 1996, but did not ratify it, following the failure of the U.S. Senate to do so. However, China has urged states that have not signed the treaty to sign it. With regard to the FMCT, China has emphasized the necessity of threshold states to be added to the fold, which makes it difficult for the U.S. administration to bring in states like India, Pakistan, and Israel. 3 China’s white papers repeatedly emphasize this point. 4 China has also shown a tendency to link U.S. arms sales to Taiwan with its bilateral commitments with the United States. This remains an irritant in United States– China bilateral relations, often affecting Chinese sensitivity toward U.S. concerns on nonproliferation. On the issue of enforcing nonproliferation commitments on Iran and North Korea, China has shown resilience to American pressure on sanctions with stalling tactics at UN Security Council meetings. With respect to Iran, China placed its emphasis on a P5+1 (Germany) forum of the Security Council’s permanent five members, which are nuclear powers, plus Germany, rather than an NPT Review Conference; by contrast, the United States has been eager to get China to push sanctions. On North Korea, China has often defended the Six-Party Talks as an effective forum for persuading North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Zhang Yan, “General Debate in the First Session of the Preparatory Commission for the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” Iran Watch, May 2007, Vienna, 4, www.iranwatch.org/government/ China/china-mfa-review2010-050107.pdf. 5 For instance, China entered into a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States in 1985, and in return gave formal assurances that it would curtail its nuclear and missile exports. In January, May, and July 2002 and May and June 2003, many Chinese entities were sanctioned for chemical- and missile-related exports to Iran. Robert J. Einhorn, “China’s Proliferation Policies and Practices,” statement to Commission on U.S.-China Economic and Security Review, July 24, 2003. 6 Some of these revisions have included China’s “Regulations on Export Control Over Nuclear Materials,” amended in December 2006, and its “Regulations on Export Control Over Dual-Use Nuclear Materials and the Related Technologies,” amended in February 2007. Jing-dong Yuan, “China’s Proliferation and the Impact of Trade Policy on Defense Industries in the United States and China,” Testimony before

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THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS the U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission, July 12, 2007, www.uscc.gov/ pressreleases/2007/testimony/Yuan.htm. 7 Shirley Kan and Mark Holt, “U.S.-China Nuclear Agreement,” September 6, 2007, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ RL33192.pdf. 8 Zhang Van, statement by head of the Delegation in the General Debate at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/statements/npt03china.pdf. 9 The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative has helped China in improving safeguards for advanced fuel cycle facilities. 10 Though there is little public data to authenticate this claim, it suggests that China plans to use its experimental fast-breeder reactor to play a significant role. “China Announces Nuclear Fuel Breakthrough,” Xinhua, January 3, 2011, http://news. xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-01/03/c_13675169.htm. 11 The Multilateral Fuel Supply Mechanism provides countries with enriched fuel without their having to develop facilities for enrichment facilities. The countries that have enrichment facilities can supply the fuel bank with enriched fuel for nuclear commerce. 12 White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S., China Sign Agreement to Establish Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security,” January 19, 2011, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 2011/01/19/fact-sheet-us-china-sign-agreement-establish-center-excellence-nuclear-s. 13 White House, “US. China Expand Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology,” press release, National Nuclear Security Administration, March 20, 2011, www.nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/punt33011. 14 In the 2010 Review Conference, China specifically resisted calls on reporting its nuclear and missile stockpiles to the United Nations. 15 William Potter, Patricia Lewis, Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, and Miles Pomper, “The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Deconstructing Consensus,” CNS Special Report, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, June 17, 2010, http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/100617_npt_2010_summary.pdf. 16 Wang Qun (ambassador), “Reaching Critical Will,” Conference on Disarmament, unofficial transcript, February 3, 2011, www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/2011/ statements/part1/3Feb_China.pdf. 17 Cheng Jingye (ambassador), “Statement at the Plenary Session of the Conference on Disarmament,” Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, May 17, 2006, www.china-un.ch/eng/xwdt/t253342.htm. 18 With regard to verification, the difference between centrifuge enrichment plants in non-NPT states and gaseous diffusion plants can result in different verification requirements. Satellite imaging that is workable in gaseous diffusion plants states does little in non-NPT states where onsite verification might work better. Gaseous diffusion plants have larger facilities that can be easily identified through satellite

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imagery, compared with centrifuge plants, which are smaller and can be verified using methods such as environmental sampling. Thus, verification on such occasions would be considered intrusive compared with most countries that use gaseous diffusion methods, including China. And, in turn, if these military nuclear sites are closed after the conclusion of an FMCT and converted to civilian purposes, this would not be verifiable by satellite imagery and would instead require onsite inspection. Moreover, satellite imagery taken from these commercial sites and their dual capacity of providing images to both military and industrial rivals could result in the denial of such technology and images. Hui Zhang, “China and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard. edu/files/inmm2002_zhang.pdf. 19 India, conversely, did not attend the 1995 NPT Review Conference and was dismayed when the NPT was extended indefinitely. The subsequent 2000 and 2005 NPT review conferences also saw India’s absence. 20 Xia Liping, Nuclear Non-Proliferation: From a Chinese Perspective, FES Briefing Paper 8 (Shanghai: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2008), 1–8, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/ global/05653.pdf.

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CHAPTER 9

Shoring Up the Nonproliferation Regime THE VIEW FROM india Rajesh Rajagopalan

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ndia’s relationship with the global nonproliferation regime has been antagonistic for much of the last four decades. But there are indications that this relationship is changing. India has sought membership in a number of technology control regimes that are linked to the nonproliferation regime, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group (AG), the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).1 India’s attempt to seek a modus vivendi with the nonproliferation regime also has implications for India–China relations. China—as a global power, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—has an important voice and role in the process of developing a constructive relationship between India and the nonproliferation regime. New Delhi can be expected to watch how Beijing deals with this process and to draw appropriate conclusions about how China views India

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and the kind of relationship that China wants with India. New Delhi has expressed unhappiness at China’s role during previous Nuclear Suppliers Group deliberations on India.2 A better working relationship between India and the NPT regime is also important because of the current troubles that the nonproliferation regime is facing. Though the regime has faced various challenges since the 1970s, the situation today is quite serious. If the compliance issues with regard to cases such as North Korea and Iran are not resolved, the regime could potentially unravel. Given the seriousness of these trends, the nonproliferation regime is diverting valuable time and resources by focusing on India. Far from being a threat to the regime, India might actually be able to help shore it up in a few different ways. First, if a consistent critic and a major emerging power, such as India, supports the nonproliferation regime, it significantly improves the legitimacy of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This was the rationale behind Mohamed ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supporting the United States–India nuclear deal. New Delhi’s insistence that those nations that have signed the NPT voluntarily should live up to their commitments could help in dealing with cases of noncompliance, such as North Korea and Iran. Second, harmonization of India’s export control laws should also add to the legitimacy of technology controls that India itself had fought for decades. It would also reduce the risk of technology leaking out of India’s fairly large and sophisticated nuclear industry. There is an increasing recognition of these potentialities, and the slow dance to integrate India into the various technology control arrangements is an indication of these changes. A key question New Delhi has been asking is how Beijing views this process. Despite their different statuses today, there were strong similarities between Indian and Chinese attitudes toward the nuclear nonproliferation regime in the 1970s and 1980s. India took part in the NPT negotiations and indeed came close to signing the treaty in 1968 but decided, almost at the last minute, that it could not. The rationale at the time was the treaty did not entail firm commitments to nuclear disarmament and would have constrained India’s own nuclear options.3 Over the next three decades, India finely honed its arguments against the nonproliferation regime. These included such criticisms as the

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discrimination inherent in the regime between the nuclear “haves” and “have-nots,” combined with the continuing U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race, and refusal to live up to the NPT Article VI requirement to make progress on nuclear disarmament. India also raised objections to the slow but steady constriction of the Article IV obligation on the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to developing countries that needed it. Other initiatives have included India’s questioning of the conduct of the custodians of the nonproliferation regime with their dual command-andcontrol of nuclear weapons in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Of course, none of this rhetoric supported proliferation. India was content to show the internal inconsistencies of the practice of nuclear nonproliferation without necessarily supporting the idea of proliferation itself. Such Indian rhetorical arguments mirrored Chinese policy and attitudes toward the nuclear nonproliferation regime in the 1970s and 1980s. China saw much of the nuclear arms control process in the 1960s as designed by the existing nuclear powers to maintain their nuclear hegemony. Indeed, this was the case. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty was clearly a U.S.-Soviet move to prevent the looming Chinese nuclear test by outlawing atmospheric nuclear tests. Though secret at that time, Washington and Moscow appeared to have discussed their concerns about a Chinese nuclear arsenal and ways to counter it, though without any result. China was also in the throes of the Cultural Revolution, which radicalized not only domestic, but also foreign policy. Thus, China dismissed the basic purpose of nonproliferation, which was the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. Despite all this, the NPT accepted Chinese nuclear weapons as legitimate because it had already conducted nuclear tests. A key difference needs to be noted. Unlike India, China not only saw the NPT system as discriminatory, but also saw the building of nuclear weapons as the inherent right of any developing country.4 Another similarity is that after a period of estrangement, both sides sought to integrate themselves into the regime. This estrangement was somewhat different in the Chinese case, of course, because China’s status as an NWS under the NPT made the task much easier. All it required was a change of view in Beijing, which happened by 1992, as Chinese officials increasingly began to regard the NPT as in China’s security interest.5

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In India’s case, its de facto status of possessing nuclear weapons and its official status as a non–nuclear-weapon state under the NPT mean that this path is a much more difficult one, and this contradiction will probably be unbridgeable in the near future. Thus, what India pursues is not a change in its NPT status, but rather a useful, less contentious working relationship with the NPT system. But despite the difficulty that faces India, Beijing and New Delhi have traversed a somewhat similar path in their relationship with the nonproliferation regime. These similarities, however, cannot mask some significant differences. For one, despite all the acrimony in India’s relationship with the NPT regime, India has always been anti-proliferationist. It accepted the essential logic of nuclear nonproliferation—that the spread of nuclear weapons to more hands was inherently dangerous—refusing to accept the Waltzian “more may be better” logic.6 India’s antiproliferation stance has never received the attention it deserves. This is because so much of the nonproliferation debate has been led by ideologues. These figures see India purely through the black-andwhite nonproliferation lens, whereby India is black because it refused to sign the NPT, insisted on maintaining the option to build nuclear weapons, and ultimately did so. However, the fact that India refused to support other states in their pursuit of nuclear weapons is often glossed over. Indeed, India’s refusal was not just toward helping others materially—which could be explained as risk aversion, as anything else—but also diplomatically. Unlike China, India never argued that developing countries had the right to build nuclear weapons. Indeed, India’s position has been that even though it would not itself sign the NPT, those states that did sign the treaty had an obligation to live up to its terms because they had voluntarily signed it.7 India’s refusal to help others build nuclear weapons should also not be minimized. Many of the accusations about India’s transgressions of the norms of the nonproliferation regime are about Indian behavior with regard to the development of its own nuclear weapons technology, rather than with helping others. As far as the transfer of technology from India to other entities is concerned, the most serious accusation that has been made so far is that the Indian atomic establishment has sometimes been

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careless in providing technical information when it puts out tenders.8 China’s position and behavior have been significantly different. Unlike India, which never supported the idea of a “right to nuclear weapons,” China originally disagreed with the very idea of nuclear nonproliferation. Additionally, although China has always denied it, there have been repeated and consistent accusations of Chinese complicity in nuclear weapons technology and material transfer. China’s record here is more than mixed. For example, China’s history of nuclear assistance to Pakistan is well known.9 Though Pakistan would probably have been able to manufacture nuclear weapons even without Chinese assistance, Beijing nonetheless helped Islamabad speed up its program. Moreover, the Chinese nuclear warhead design that was supplied to Islamabad was eventually found in Libya.10 China’s position on both North Korea and Iran has also been less than helpful to the international community in its efforts to deal with these problems. Though India has also taken the middle path on these cases, especially Iran, the Indian decision has domestic rather than international roots.11 In the Chinese case, Beijing almost appears to see Iran and North Korea in asymmetrical warfare terms vis-à-vis the United States. The long-term consequences of such tactical maneuvers for the nonproliferation regime are serious. The historical similarities and differences between India’s and China’s perspectives toward the nuclear nonproliferation regime are obviously important in understanding their respective positions, but their current approaches to the regime are just as important. To this end, what role does India seek in the regime? It is clear that India is unlikely to join as a non–nuclear-weapon state member of the NPT. Senior Indian officials continue to reject the treaty.12 Even though there has been some speculation in New Delhi about whether India should join if offered NWS status, this is highly unlikely.13 But if actual NPT membership is not likely, India and the nonproliferation regime can still cooperate in a variety of other ways. India has had a long and fruitful relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency. And India’s large nuclear power and technology infrastructure can be helpful for the promotion of peaceful use of nuclear energy.

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Any such cooperation requires India to join the other four key institutions associated with the nuclear nonproliferation regime—the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. As extensions of the NPT system that work in tandem to prevent technology transfers, India has had rocky relations with all of these groups, particularly the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Thus, a review of India’s and China’s relationships with the NSG, as in the following chapter, is a fitting place to start in evaluating India’s long-term relationship with the nonproliferation regime.

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ith the advent of new technologies and strategic dynamics, the nuclear issue remains an integral component of international security relations. However, it is often omitted or ignored in the case of relations between China and India. These two countries engage in very limited dialogue on nuclear affairs, particularly on nuclear doctrine or nonproliferation. The differing status of the two countries’ nuclear weapons programs is one factor preventing them from approaching one another, but there are other underlying reasons. Chinese publications contain few studies or research papers on India’s nuclear strategy and nonproliferation policies. However, the case is the exact opposite when it comes to India’s focus on China. This asymmetry leads to significant bilateral misunderstandings and misperceptions. Strengthening dialogue on nuclear issues would be conducive to reducing quarrels and misgivings between the two powers and would contribute substantively to improving their bilateral relations.

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The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is widely regarded as the cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regime because it has greatly slowed down the pace of nuclear proliferation and minimized the number of nuclear-weapon states over the past forty years.14 It is even considered as part of the overall international order that helps to maintain the nonuse of force between states. In a challenge to this international order, India conducted nuclear tests in May 1998 and Pakistan followed suit. Such tests were not only against the spirit of the NPT, but they also served as a deathblow to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s entry into force. The United Nations Security Council quickly passed Resolution 1172 condemning the tests. The United States imposed severe economic sanctions on India. Australia, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, and others participated in the levying of sanctions in other ways. Since then, India has been repeatedly pressured in multilateral forums to join the NPT as a non–nuclear-weapon state. However, India has rejected these pleas repeatedly and strongly. Such a scenario has placed India in a unique position vis-à-vis the international nonproliferation mainstream. At the same time, India has contributed to the regime through its actions that led to the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. India’s relations with the NSG date back to the organization’s inception.15 In 1974, India conducted its so-called peaceful explosion and its nuclear ambitions were exposed to the world. It was discovered that India had diverted Canadian-origin and U.S.-origin civil nuclear reactors to conduct the explosion. This finding led the United States and other Western countries to undertake stricter control over dual-use items. It was in this environment that the NSG was established, with India becoming one of the major targets for the organization from its very birth. Staying outside the nuclear nonproliferation regime imposed great constraints on India’s nuclear cooperation with other countries and also set hurdles for India’s pursuit of its role as a global power in the international arena. Coming out from under the shadow of the NPT and ridding itself of these NSG restrictions on nuclear cooperation has been one of the major diplomatic tasks for India since 1998. Although public discussions of the nuclear statuses of India and Pakistan has occurred on different occasions, the majority view has

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remained non-acceptance of the legal or even de facto nuclear weapon status of India or Pakistan. The latest NPT Review Conference in 2010 still called upon India and other outsiders to join the NPT as “non– nuclear-weapon states.”16 Entering the new century, the global balance of power has experienced profound changes. China’s fast rise in Asia has served as a source of anxiety for conservatives in the United States and some other Asian countries. The United States started to redefine the role of India within Asia’s geopolitical system, expecting it to be a counterweight to a rising China. India’s rapidly growing domestic market, including in nuclear energy, has also increased its attractiveness to other countries. This new scenario has given India the opportunity to redefine its nuclear status, with the United States serving as one of its major public relations proponents in breaking through the international nuclear blockade. Negotiations with the United States began late during the Bill Clinton administration and culminated under the George W. Bush administration in 2005. After two years of intensive congressional debates, India reached its goal with a decision on the part of the United States to allow India to obtain nuclear technology from the United States. This U.S. decision quickly led to an agreement in the NSG to accept nuclear cooperation with India as an exception to the NSG’s nuclear export guidelines. Countries that attempted to stop the agreement faced strong political pressure from the U.S. government and had to step aside. The agreement paved the way for India to enter the international nuclear market. Since then, India has signed bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia, France, Canada, and potentially Japan, in addition to the United States. Eliminating nuclear cooperation constraints served as the first step for India to pull itself out from under the NPT’s shadow. After this initial breakthrough, India quickly began its second step. In 2010, U.S. president Barack Obama visited India and announced that the United States would help India to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group. However, just months earlier, the NSG plenary in the Netherlands in June 2010 had passed a new resolution that set signing the NPT as a prerequisite for enrichment and reprocessing technology transfer. Although this should have been a signal to India that the NPT is still relevant, its expanding role in regional and global affairs has diminished

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the chances that this 46-country group will prevent India’s accession. Nor has the NSG been able to attach many conditions or limitations to India’s participation. It is likely that India will become an NSG member in the near future. In fact, it is reported that India is now cooperating with the United States via the Working Group on an Expanded Nonproliferation System, which was formed in the summer of 2009. The objective of this group is to identify and develop “a workable road map for a revived nonproliferation system that could integrate India.”17 This could be read as a process of U.S. assistance to permanently resolve India’s nuclear status. The nuclear issue remains one of the negative elements in bilateral relations between China and India. India persists in its public discussion of the so-called Chinese nuclear threat. After its nuclear tests in 1998, India said on a variety of occasions that its pursuit of nuclear weapons is due to the nuclear threat from China. By contrast, the Chinese community seldom talks about an Indian nuclear threat. This is perhaps because both countries have adopted a nofirst-use nuclear policy, leading Chinese scholars to estimate the threat as low or nonexistent. India’s accusation of a “Chinese nuclear threat” and description of its nuclear tests as a means to “address the Chinese threat” have greatly annoyed the Chinese government and people. This has had a negative impact on the environment for conducting bilateral dialogue and has damaged mutual trust. The role of third countries is another central element that complicates nuclear relations between China and India. China has deep strategic considerations when it comes to United States–India nuclear and missile defense cooperation. There is a domestic concern that the United States is using India as leverage to contain the development and rise of China. Chinese experts often ignore the fact that India has a tradition of independent diplomacy in making such assessments. Similarly, India is very alert to China–Pakistan cooperation in the nuclear and missile field. Indians attribute Pakistan’s nuclear weapons acquisitions to China as the source and ignore the fact that Pakistan received the key nuclear technology for nuclear weapons from European intermediaries. Indians also regard cooperation between China and Pakistan on nuclear power as an effort on the part of China to constrain India’s

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development. Such misgivings are the core reasons for mistrust between the two countries. Another obstacle is the different status of the two countries’ nuclear programs. China’s NWS status is accepted by international law and it remains a signatory of the NPT, whereas India has long existed outside the NPT. The international community had repeatedly asked India to relinquish its nuclear weapons and to join the NPT as a non–nuclear-weapon state. India’s blunt refusal to heed such a call leads to a confrontational atmosphere between NPT and non-NPT states. As a permanent member of United Nations Security Council and NPT signatory, China’s support for and adherence to the NPT is normal. But such a stance on the part of China has often been erroneously connected with bilateral disputes and competition between India and China. In fact, China’s responses have been moderate and reasonable, whether in reaction to India conducting nuclear tests or to the United States–India nuclear deal. As a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, China could have easily blocked the NSG decision, either on principle or due to procedural arguments. Instead, China joined the NSG consensus in granting the waiver for India, but in return was blamed by Indians for attempting to block the deal. A friendly bilateral gesture to facilitate cooperation resulted in the opposite outcome. Apart from the above-mentioned bilateral differences, there are a number of common bases for China and India to expand nuclear dialogue and cooperation. First, both countries are rising powers and share increasingly important international responsibility for global affairs, including regional and global security. Second, China and India are eager to represent the interests of the developing countries. Third, both powers support the fundamental objective of nuclear nonproliferation. Fourth, China and India have rapidly growing nuclear power industries and face similar nuclear safety and security challenges. China and India also have mutual demands of one another. China does not want to see India join the United States–led circle to contain China. India needs China to exert influence on Pakistan on many issues. India also needs China to cooperate on multilateral nonproliferation regimes, including support for its membership in the Nuclear Suppliers

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Group. Common bases and mutual demands provide the foundation for dialogue and cooperation. In multilateral mechanisms—such as the Conference on Disarmament, International Atomic Energy Agency, and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons—there is often close coordination between China and India. But bilateral arms control dialogues or consultations are quite rare. Such a situation is not compatible with bilateral relations. Promoting communication between the two countries on arms control is necessary and could contribute to mutual understanding and trust. For China, dialogue or cooperation with India in the nuclear field has three basic considerations: (1) adherence to the principles of the accepted nonproliferation regime, (2) maintenance of stability and strategic balance in South Asia, and (3) bilateral relations with India. Because India is not a member of the NPT, there would be some difficulties for the two to initiate official dialogue on nuclear strategy. Such dialogue might be started through Track-2 engagement. India should initiate official dialogue and consultation with China on issues related to its NSG membership. Such an initiative might show India’s respect for China’s role in and support of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Entirely counting on the United States to clear the way for India’s NSG membership is not a wise approach and might meet with more resistance from other member states. India should work with other member states of the NSG, including China, to demonstrate its good practices and high standards of export controls on nuclear items and technology. Nuclear power is a common aspiration for both China and India. The two countries should be more open-minded to nuclear cooperation with third countries. Including such topics in bilateral consultations may also mitigate misperceptions and misgivings. Nuclear security and safety are also challenges for both countries and might be a suitable area for bilateral dialogue and cooperation. More broadly, the current nonproliferation regime is not perfect. China and India, as the two biggest developing countries, could find many common arenas for cooperation to improve the system. Dialogue on nuclear issues between the two giants might also help to stabilize bilateral relations and to ensure security and stability in South Asia.

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Nonproliferation dialogue and cooperation should be accorded greater importance in China–India bilateral relations. However, China has shown little interest in negotiating a nuclear linkage with India since New Delhi openly declared its nuclear status with the Pokhran II tests in May 1998. While realizing the significance of strategic engagement with India in stabilizing bilateral relations and improving the regional security environment, China seems less interested in discussing nuclear concerns. Beijing’s reluctance may be explained by the recognized asymmetry of the two countries’ nuclear arsenals and their different roles in the existing global nuclear framework. For China and India, there remain different perceptions of the urgency and necessity of achieving strategic nuclear security at the bilateral as well as regional level. As an often-cited reminder, the United States’ and the Soviet Union’s nuclear bargaining in the 1970s was driven by their rough nuclear parity in both quantity and quality of warheads and launching systems, which offered a firm base for the two superpowers to engage in serious negotiations. To some extent, a more favorable Chinese response needs to be encouraged by a realistic expression of what Beijing could gain from readjusting its strategy. Under present circumstances, there are not enough incentives to induce China to change its approach and launch a substantive program with India to clarify their nuclear relationship. China has been one of the major critics of India’s aspiration to become a legitimate NWS since its nuclear tests in May 1998. Beijing’s persistent opposition is grounded in several identifiable reasons, among which are its stated adherence to the principles of global nonproliferation, an attempt to prolong the status quo of Asian nuclear asymmetry, and New Delhi’s using a “China threat” to justify its 1998 nuclear tests and subsequent nuclear modernization. The United States and China were not always out of sync on the question of India’s nuclear weapons program. America imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan as punishment for their 1998 nuclear tests. U.S. president Bill Clinton, during his visit to Beijing in October 1998, proposed a concerted effort by China and the United States to curb South Asian nuclear weaponization. But there seemed little room for both sides to coordinate their efforts, let alone a joint action plan.

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Unlike Washington, which conducted rounds of dialogue with New Delhi on the nuclear tests and had a diplomatic volte-face, Beijing has basically declined to negotiate over nuclear relevance with India. At the same time, China has kept an eye on the unfolding India–United States bargaining, which culminated in the finalization of a civil nuclear deal. Throughout, Beijing has reacted to these developments in a cautious way. Politically, India’s persistent refusal to sign the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has posed a daunting obstacle for China to enter into substantial negotiations with New Delhi on strategic nuclear confidence and stability, which is stated to be one of the prerequisites for seeking meaningful cooperation on nuclear-related issues. India’s refusal considerably limits an opportunity to negotiate on nuclear relations. This includes how to validate formative deterrence, enhance the nuclear security threshold, and achieve strategic stability. As a result of the political impediment, along with a lack of equilib­ rium in nuclear assets, there is no mutually acceptable and reliable bilateral, regional, or multilateral framework to accommodate Sino-Indian synergy on the nuclear issue.18 In a strategic sense, however, China is increasingly interested in knowing more about India’s nuclear doctrine and nuclear capability. There is consistent concern—albeit expressed in a tempered fashion— in Beijing about New Delhi’s nuclear weapons programs and strategic implications. This growing concern covers the very nature of Indian nuclear doctrine and the medium- and long-term trajectories of its nuclear capability development. Many in China doubt the loosely defined and inconclusive Indian concept of credible minimum deterrence, which allows India to develop its strategic nuclear muscle without misgivings. Some believe that India’s thinly veiled but evident intercontinental ballistic missile and strategic nuclear triad programs move beyond the limits of a minimum deterrent. Chinese strategic circles have also observed that India’s strategic elite articulates an ambivalent understanding of its declared no-first-use posture in addressing regional security challenges. Moreover, Beijing is known to oppose the overseas deployment of missile defense installations by any country and sees it as an undermining factor for global and regional security. China’s strong reaction to India’s

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expression of support for the U.S. global missile defense program in 2002 also highlights Beijing’s growing concern about a nuclear-capable India. For China, India’s position on global missile defense remains one of uncertainty and ambiguity in the current context. Any New Delhi– Washington cooperation on ballistic missile defense can greatly affect China’s perception of its own strategic security and nuclear stability. At the bilateral level, India’s effort to upgrade its own missile defense capability is also a significant factor in China’s security assessments, albeit to a lesser degree. To take a positive view, these concerns could be reasonably addressed or moderated through direct bilateral engagement between Beijing and New Delhi, despite the given impediments. A pioneering bilateral dialogue on nuclear-related issues will prove to be a helpful platform for both sides in bridging the gap of understanding of nuclear developments and in moving back to strategic pragmatism. New Delhi should evolve a sober view of China’s preponderance of national strength and nuclear capability in framing its national security policy. And the so-called “China threat” should not always be used as the main pretext for achieving India’s nuclear aspirations. Conversely, the idea of stopping, capping, and rolling back India’s nuclear programs has proven unrealistic. For China, though India’s status as an NWS is far from being formally recognized by the global nuclear regimes, a nuclear South Asia has become an irreversible reality that requires a pragmatic approach and deserves proactive treatment. Nevertheless, it would be equally unrealistic to expect an easy bilateral consensus on the two Asian powers’ nuclear relationship, given their evident perception gap and prolonged strategic discord. Pragmatism should dominate the two countries’ diplomatic and security options. Their differences should not be allowed to block the path of constructive engagement and potential cooperation. In this regard, some signs have suggested Beijing’s interest in relaxing its tough posture on nuclear engagement with New Delhi, including its increasingly accommodating attitude toward the issue in multilateral forums. Responding to New Delhi’s repeated requests, Beijing agreed to insert the nuclear issue into the proceedings of its second round of strategic dialogue with India in January 2006.

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Apart from a flexible approach to the controversial Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal, Beijing has hinted about the need for nuclear energy cooperation between the two Asian neighbors on several high-profile occasions. A shared interest in tapping into nuclear energy cooperation was highlighted during Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to China in January 2008. A forward-looking bilateral document signed during this visit stated that both China and India pledge to upgrade civil nuclear energy cooperation, while adhering to their respective international commitments for multilateral arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. Both governments also agreed to jointly launch an international thermonuclear experimental reactor project to strengthen global energy security. Such agreements illustrate that the emerging nuclear reality in South Asia enlarges the Chinese strategic stake in dealing with India and offers a possibility of reducing their differences and reaching a consensus on nuclear stability in the region and beyond.

Notes 1 It is important to note that India’s relationship with the nonproliferation regime was not always as fraught with disagreement. Contention tends to mask strong commonalities in objectives and thinking between India and the regime. 2 “India Conveys Displeasure to China Over NSG Role,” Rediff.com, September 8, 2008, www.rediff.com/news/2008/sep/08chin1.htm. 3 Leonard Weiss, “India and the NPT,” Strategic Analysis 34, no. 2 (March 2010): 255–71. 4 On Chinese nuclear nonproliferation policy, see Mingquan Zhu, “The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy,” Nonproliferation Review 4, no. 2 (Winter 1997): 40–48. 5 Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control,” International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995–1996): 43–78. 6 Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper 171 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1981). 7 Indrani Bagchi, “India Votes Against Iran at IAEA,” Times of India, November 28, 2009, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-11-28/india/28074607_1_ india-votes-iaea-resolution-nuclear-programme.

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THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS 8 David Albright and Paul Brennan, India’s Nuclear Export Controls and Information Security: Important Questions Remain (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, 2008), http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/ India_18September2008.pdf. 9 R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, “Pakistani Nuclear Scientist’s Accounts Tell of Chinese Proliferation,” Washington Post, November 13, 2009, www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/12/AR2009111211060.html. 10 Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, “Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China: Pakistanis Resold Chinese-Provided Plans,” Washington Post, February 15, 2004, www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A42692-2004Feb14?language=printer. 11 This remains tied to the political importance of Muslim opinion in India along with perceptions of the government being too beholden to Washington. 12 “Nuclear Group Guidelines Aimed at Forcing India to Sign NPT: Kakodkar,” Indian Express, July 10, 2011, www.indianexpress.com/news/Nuclear-group-guidelinesaimed-at-forcing-India-to-sign-NPT--Kakodkar/815284. 13 Rajiv Nayan, “Is NPT Membership as a Nuclear-Weapon State an Option for India?” Strategic Analysis 31, no. 6 (November 2006): 869–87. 14 Mohamed ElBaradei, “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The Road Ahead,” International Atomic Energy Agency, January 15, 2001, www.iaea.org/newscenter/ statements/2001/ebsp2001n001.shtml. 15 Tom Thornley, “India’s Nuclear Restraint and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion,” International Relations, August 11, 2011, http://www.e-ir.info/?p=12215. 16 “Final Documents of the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” NPT/CONF.2010/50 (vol. I), 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 3–28, 2010, www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/confdocs.shtml. 17 Neal Urwitz, “India’s Integration into an Expanded Nonproliferation System,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 30, 2010, http://csis.org/press/ press-release/indias-integration-expanded-nonproliferation-system. 18 This may be contrasted with the classic example of the U.S.-Soviet and later Russian talks under the highly endorsed regime of limiting and reducing strategic nuclear weapons.

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Sizing Up the Nuclear Suppliers Group The View from China Liu Siwei

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iven the fact that the international nuclear nonproliferation regime is currently facing a series of challenges, China’s domestic circles— think tanks, academia, and the media—have steadily increased their discussion of nonproliferation mechanisms and related export controls. A number of these studies focus on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and this discussion is primarily linked to Indo-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation. Nonetheless, a literature survey reveals that Chinese attitudes toward this issue are not uniform. The more serious papers tend to introduce two schools of opinion, that of the optimists and that of the pessimists. Optimistic scholars generally do not wish to hype the negative impact of Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation on the NSG mechanism. This school of thought tends to recognize the long-standing defects and discriminatory nature of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.1 Conversely, the pessimistic scholars worry that India’s “exceptionalism” will have a negative impact on the NSG’s authority as a nuclear

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nonproliferation mechanism. It is worth noting that members of this school of thought express understanding of India’s energy demands. Yet, they are also quick to note that with the current unresolved Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues, such developments may worsen the situation. As a result, the NSG’s move to provide India with a waiver could undermine the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Analysts such as Zhu Minquan have pointed out that “U.S. actions violate the spirit of the NPT, the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and have seriously weakened international security. It could be said that North Korea’s nuclear tests and Iran’s insistence on pursuing its own nuclear program are related to the United States’ double standards and relaxed attitude on the Indian nuclear proliferation issue.”2 Overall, domestic studies take into account a number of factors, including a country’s sovereign right to the peaceful use of civilian nuclear energy, along with the demands of international nonproliferation. Perhaps it is because of the balance of such considerations that Chinese official statements have expressed the hope that the NSG would strike a balanced approach between nuclear nonproliferation and each country’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Obviously, views within India diverge greatly from those in China, as Indian media reports and think tank articles have expressed marked distrust and suspicion toward the official Chinese position. They have alleged that China tried to stop the NSG from lifting its nuclear export restrictions on India.3 Since the negotiations on Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation began, discussion of the NSG in India has significantly increased. Given that the NSG has already agreed to grant India immunity, the current topic of discussion in India is mainly concentrating on the following areas: (1) whether India should join the NSG, (2) the feasibility of and conditions for India becoming an NSG member, and (3) the potential hidden impact of new NSG requirements on India. A survey of these views reveals that India’s think tanks have already begun to attach conditions to the country joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group. For example, one of the articles available at India’s Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses makes it clear that India cannot join the nonproliferation regime and the NPT as a non–nuclear-weapon state.4

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Additionally, cooperation between China and Pakistan on nuclear energy has become a relatively hot topic in India. A number of Indian experts have asserted that China’s intention to build two more nuclear power plants at Chashma (Chashma 3 and Chashma 4) violates NSG rules. Those in the Indian media and some experts believe that China and Pakistan’s decision to cooperate on nuclear energy is directed as a “countermeasure” against United States–India nuclear cooperation. They have also expressed “security” concerns about Sino-Pakistani civil nuclear cooperation. In fact, Kanwal Sibal, the former foreign secretary of India, wrote in India Today that The June meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group has legitimised the supply of two additional nuclear reactors to Pakistan by China in violation of its own NSG commitments. This is a blow to our security interests. China presented the NSG with a frontal challenge, and the NSG has buckled. . . . The political signal is that it will continue to instrumentalise Pakistan to balance India, and that if the U.S. can favour India, it will favour Pakistan. That some Chinese and U.S. circles view the India-U.S. deal as integral to the strategic alignment of the two countries against China, to which China has reacted by strengthening its strategic links with Pakistan, only makes the antiIndian thrust of China’s step more manifest.5 An Indian Express editorial further emphasized that Beijing does not respect New Delhi’s security concerns. In the author’s view, this would severely circumscribe the domestic political space in India for expanding mutually beneficial exchanges with China. The article reiterated that Beijing is oblivious to India’s security concerns vis-à-vis Pakistan, and in this regard the “China threat theory” will increasingly have a market within India, to the detriment of the future Sino-Indian partnership. A research officer at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Siddharth Ramana, in his article “China–Pakistan Nuclear Alliance: An Analysis” adds: During the height of the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement, China firmly opposed it on grounds of inequitable approach to the region, thereby

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arguing that Pakistan too should be given the same exemptions, which India had qualified for. While Chinese opposition waned during the important Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver to India in August 2008, a sting in the tail soon followed. In April 2008, China assured Pakistan all help and support to set up at least four new nuclear power plants to meet its growing energy demands. The nuclear agreement with Pakistan has created serious ripples in the non-proliferation regime, and holds important geo-strategic implications.6 Of course, domestic opinion within China about Sino-Pakistan energy cooperation differs from that within India. The domestic argument in China maintains that China and Pakistan have a long history of cooperation. Moreover, given that Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation remains under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, China will not cease its cooperation with Pakistan simply because of India’s opposition.7 Currently, the Sino-Pakistani agreement remains one of cooperative intent. Actual implementation in providing nuclear materials and nuclear power generation capabilities is a few years away. Moreover, China does not have to abandon established practice because of the views of others.8 By comparison, the Chinese nuclear strategy expert Yang Chengjun has argued that since the inception of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal in 2005 and its realization in 2008, cooperation has entered a substantive stage. The United States has already begun to provide India with nuclear material. And Russia and France have already committed to nuclear cooperation with India, demonstrating a strong international precedent. From articles and news reports, it is evident that China and India maintain different views on nuclear issues, the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and related international cooperation. Moreover, both maintain a lack of understanding and trust. From the vantage point of domestic discussions within India, particularly on the issue of IndoU.S. civil nuclear cooperation, India maintains a strongly defensive and apprehensive attitude toward China. Objectively speaking, it is understandable that China maintains concerns regarding the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear agreement. In fact, many of the NSG member countries—including Ireland, Switzerland, Austria, Norway,

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and the Netherlands—have expressed similar concerns, with U.S. domestic nonproliferation activists voicing even more intense criticism.9 However, some of China’s concerns about India stem from a lack of understanding. Over the years, because its primary nuclear threat comes from the United States, China’s nuclear security field has concentrated its attention on America. As a result, China has paid insufficient attention to problems with Sino-Indian nuclear relations. In recent years, the Chinese and Indian governments have recognized the importance of improving political relations and eliminating distrust. They have made positive efforts to this end, including strengthening high-level visits and contacts. Still, though strategic dialogues include such topics as counterproliferation and energy security, there remain trust deficiencies between the two countries on these issues. Overall, one particular systemic security dilemma continues to have an adverse impact on India’s healthy development. To wit, the development of normal, friendly relations between China and Pakistan has often been identified within India as directed against it. To a large extent, this is due to the animosity between India and Pakistan, which results in an indirect security dilemma between China and India. In other words, this security dilemma is brought on by the system of relations between these three powers. China’s nuclear cooperation with Pakistan is not entirely directed against India, but instead is shaped by a number of considerations, such as addressing Pakistan’s growing energy needs. Pakistan continues to face a national energy shortage. Crude oil occupies approximately 30 percent of Pakistan’s total energy consumption, and the country primarily depends on imports. Although Pakistan has its own natural gas reserves, its rate of consumption is also great, accounting for 50 percent of overall energy consumption.10 Given Pakistan’s economic development and population growth, its demand for energy will grow. However, under the current international situation, in which there is a general shortage of crude oil, to expand the proportion of total energy occupied by civil nuclear energy has become a realistic choice within Pakistan. Additionally, China’s emphasis on nuclear cooperation with Pakistan is civilian in nature and will accept international nuclear safeguards. However, India’s emphasis on the security aspects of this cooperation, shifting its hostility from Pakistan to China, will no doubt have an

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impact on long-term Sino-Indian cooperation. By contrast, Chinese experts have actually encouraged the strengthening of Sino-Indian civil nuclear energy cooperation. The executive director of the National Security Strategy at the University of International Relations Research Center, Zhang Minqian, has stated that China’s peaceful use of nuclear energy technology has already attained relative maturity.11 As a result, strengthening of nuclear cooperation between India and China could deepen mutual trust, expand areas of cooperation, and avoid putting all India’s eggs into the U.S. basket.12 Of course, China should also express, to a degree, its understanding of India’s security concerns. And it should also give some consideration to how to avoid Sino-Pakistani relations having a negative impact on the sound development of those between China and India. China and India should emphasize and strengthen bilateral Track-2 diplomacy and be wary of speculation and public opinion. Particularly when it comes to the “China factor” in Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation and the “India factor” in Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation, media outlets and scholars seem intent on exaggerating China’s and India’s differences and conflicts.13 There has been a profusion of media articles on the issue of China’s and India’s border dispute, water resources, Indian Ocean competition, and so on that merit greater attention for their future trajectory.14 Of course, one must also not ignore the level of conjecture present in the Western media during the past few years, which to a certain degree has also had an impact on the strategic decisionmaking of China and India, such as the Washington Post article “Rivalry Between China and India Will Continue Through 2025” and the Christian Science Monitor article “Indian Ocean Becomes Battleground for India and China.”15 Articles suggesting that “China and India will fight a battle for control of the Indian Ocean” and that the “Indian army is ill equipped to confront the People’s Liberation Army” do little to assuage the “China threat theory” and lend themselves to strategic miscalculations between China and India. A calm balance needs to be achieved when one evaluates points of cooperation and competition in the Sino-Indian relationship. It is important not to allow negative public opinion to affect these two countries’ interactions. To this end, China and India can strengthen Track-2 diplomacy to promote mutual understanding. In recent years, interaction

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has grown between China and Indian experts and scholars on international issues. The topics of discussion have also diversified to even include sensitive questions, such as the nuclear issue. This marks an exciting new trajectory for Sino-Indian confidence building. China’s reflection on India–United States civil nuclear cooperation thus far has been moderate, restrained, and flexible. This is even more visible at an official level. China’s restraint on the issue may be ascribed to a number of considerations, including Beijing’s (1) political will to manage its relations with India, (2) ongoing civil nuclear assistance to Pakistan, (3) prospect of reorganizing the international arms control and nonproliferation regimes, and (4) attempts to coordinate its interests with those of the United States in envisioning broader global security and stability. Also, China has been among the high-profile supporters of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which requires elasticity in approach. Nonetheless, China has never concealed its concern over Indo-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation. Several visible reasons justify those growing concerns. The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, along with the India-specific safeguards agreement signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the waiver of the NSG, are seen as apparent anomalies within existing international nonproliferation practices. Indo-U.S. cooperation on nuclear items challenges the core principles of the global nonproliferation and arms control regimes. The United States–India nuclear deal is arguably helpful in supporting New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program in different ways, weakening its pledge of pursuing credible minimum deterrence. India’s chance to access the global nuclear market will significantly increase its nuclear material stockpiles and enable it to expend its indigenous materials for its existing nuclear weapons programs. Beijing also doubts the very intention behind the nuclear deal, fearing that it is a part of Washington’s grand strategy of enabling New Delhi to balance against Beijing’s rise. Indeed, there is wide speculation that America’s nuclear cooperation with India might have a negative impact on China’s security interests. In addition, as many believe, the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and India’s exclusive right as a non-party to the NPT to engage in nuclear trade will further the force imbalance in South Asia, given no comparable arrangement for Pakistan.

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Pragmatism influences China’s policy behavior in global nuclear institutions. To realize the emerging reality and balance its interests, Beijing has preferred in recent years to undertake a flexible stance when it comes to India’s role, identity, and opportunities. For example, at the International Atomic Energy Agency conference in August 2008, China joined other member states in endorsing an India-specific nuclear safeguards agreement. Despite its obvious reservations and hesitance, China eventually agreed to support a U.S. endeavor at the NSG a month later in Vienna, enabling it to secure India’s exemption from the NSG’s criteria for nuclear trade. These agreements smoothed the process of the India-U.S. nuclear deal and India’s access to the global nuclear market. Partially, as its response to the United States–India nuclear deal, Beijing has tried to enhance its stake in cooperating with Islamabad on civil nuclear energy by providing additional reactors and related technologies. This cooperation is believed to be helpful in meeting Pakistan’s worsening energy shortage and mitigating frustration in the country. China maintains that the additional provision is part of the 1992 cooperative agreement when Beijing was not a party to the NSG and, thus, should be grandfathered in. China’s decision to build two more 300-megawatt reactors in Pakistan’s Chashma nuclear complex did not result in a dispute at the NSG Council conference in June 2010. Nonetheless, Beijing has, thus far, refrained from striking a comprehensive civil nuclear deal with Islamabad, despite widespread speculation. Overall, it is crucial not to undertake an attitude of blind optimism when it comes to Sino-Indian bilateral relations. There remains a need to address difficulties in bilateral relations. In fact, given the unresolved Sino-Indian border dispute and international competition, instability in Sino-Indian relations can be anticipated. As a result, China and India should begin to confront their differences and contradictions to work toward solving their problems. Both before and after India’s 1998 nuclear tests, the country’s political leaders declared that China was the primary threat to India and the main reason for India’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. Under the impact of India’s tests and stance toward China, official contacts between China and India were suspended and bilateral relations reached a low point.

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Now, however, after joint efforts by China and India, the process of building strategic mutual trust is back on track.16 A healthy and cooperative Sino-Indian relationship will rely on strengthening contact, communication, understanding, and mutual trust. Sino-Indian cooperation in the arenas of nuclear safety, energy, and arms control is worth the wait.

The View from India Rajesh Rajagopalan

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he Nuclear Suppliers Group, which was organized in the aftermath and as a consequence of India’s 1974 nuclear test, is an important entity within the nonproliferation regime. It was the change in the NSG’s rule regarding full-scope safeguards in 1992 that upset India’s finely balanced relationship with the global nuclear regime. Until this point, India could both criticize the many inequities of the nonproliferation regime while also having commercial relations with key members of the regime. But once full-scope safeguards became the rule, this was no longer possible. Fittingly, the NSG played an important part in reopening the door between India and the nonproliferation regime in 2008, when it granted India a waiver so that India could once again engage in nuclear commerce without actually signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or accepting full-scope safeguards. Though there has been some hyperventilating in India about the recent change in NSG rules with regard to enrichment and reprocessing technologies, this is unlikely to have any immediate impact because India can always rely on its indigenously developed versions of these technologies. Instead, New Delhi’s attention has been more focused on the discussions with regard to India’s membership in the NSG.

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China’s role in this transformation and its position on India’s NSG membership are critical. There is a strong sense in New Delhi that Beijing is opposing India’s integration into the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. There are several indicators of this. To begin with, China’s long association and unprecedented nuclear weapons cooperation with Pakistan had always aroused suspicion in New Delhi that this was designed to balance India. More recently, China’s reaction to the United States–India nuclear deal was quite unfavorable. China’s constant refrain about the necessity of a broader approach to address non-NPT states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel was seen in New Delhi not so much as an attempt to bolster Pakistan’s case, but as a way of trying to sabotage India’s. Yet, because the nuclear deal was primarily the result of a United States–India dialogue, there was only so much that China could do. When the deal came up for approval at the NSG meeting in 2008, China worked through other smaller states to try and scuttle the waiver that the NSG was considering for nuclear commerce between member states and India. Ultimately, China’s objections and obstructionism were insufficient to deny India NSG approval. Though China did not actually block India’s waiver, the perception in New Delhi is that Beijing backed off from such attempts only when it became clear that they would fail. In the end, all that Beijing accomplished was heightening New Delhi’s suspicions about Beijing’s motivations. As the question of India’s membership in the NSG continues to be debated, China’s attitudes are again going to be an issue. China has already suggested that it would like to play the same hand as in 2008 and attempt to undermine India’s membership proposal by diversions such as a criterion-based approach. New Delhi does not appear to be opposed to this approach, but the argument that is generally made in New Delhi is that China only talks about a criterion-based approach, but does not actually propose any criteria. Some nonproliferation activists have suggested such criteria. Pierre Goldschmidt, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has proposed a 14-point set of criteria.17 And though most of the criteria proposed are likely to be acceptable to India, some Indian analysts—such as Rajiv Nayan, of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses—have objected to some of the proposed criteria,

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arguing that India will not accept additional obligations.18 Nevertheless, such proposals are at least a starting point. The problem with China’s approach is that aside from suggesting the need for a criteria-based approach, Beijing, as noted above, has not actually proposed any criteria to be included. If China does want a criteria-based approach rather than a stand-alone decision on India, then it should propose such criteria to the other members of the NSG and have such a proposal accepted by the NSG as a whole. As a state that is not yet a member of the NSG, India will need to make its decision about whether such criteria are acceptable and thus whether it is worth joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group. But these steps will be possible only if Beijing first proposes the criteria it thinks should be necessary for new NSG members. Suggesting the need for criteria without making any proposals appears to be an attempt to prevent Indian membership on specious grounds. In New Delhi, the suspicion is that Beijing would rather see India continue to stay outside the regime, as a pariah state, than have New Delhi within the nonproliferation tent. Another problem with Chinese proposals for a criteria-based approach is Chinese behavior with regard to the NSG on other issues, such as the “grandfathering in” of China’s sale of additional nuclear power reactors to Pakistan. China’s plan to sell more nuclear reactors to Pakistan appears to go against commitments that China made when it joined the NSG in 2004 that it would not supply additional nuclear reactors to Pakistan because the latter does not accept full-scope safeguards.19 According to this view, China’s focus on principles and criteria, while blithely ignoring existing criteria for NSG members on civil nuclear transfers, is hypocritical. India and China have traversed similar ground in their relationship with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Given the serious challenges that the regime currently faces, it is in the interest of the regime to have India within the tent. In the aftermath of the United States–India nuclear deal and the 2008 NSG waiver on nuclear commerce with India, New Delhi has most of what it needs from the regime. India is likely to suffer little because it is kept out of the regime and its institutions such as the NSG. What India and the global community stand to gain from India’s participation are the common benefits of a stronger and more secure nonproliferation regime. China can either aid in this process or, as it has been

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doing over the last decade, become a hindrance. New Delhi is likely to draw appropriate lessons from Beijing’s behavior about Chinese attitudes, not just toward the nonproliferation regime, but also toward India.

Notes 1 Although it is rare for Chinese experts within China to specifically write academic papers on the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a number of Chinese experts have written pieces that analyze achievements in foreign studies, such as Seema Gahlaut and Victor Zaborksky, “Do Export Control Regimes Have Members They Really Need?” Comparative Strategy, vol. 23, no. 1 (January–March 2004): 73–91; and Richard T. Cupitt and Igor Khripunov, “New Strategies for the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 16, no. 3 (July–September): 1997, 305–15. Liu Hongsong, “Guoji fangkuosan tixi zhong de fei zhengshi jizhi” (Informal Mechanisms of the International Non-Proliferation System), dissertation, Fudan University, 2007, 7. 2 Zhu Minquan, International Security and Arms Control (Shanghai: People’s Press, 2011), 266. 3 “China Reacts Cautiously to India’s NSG Aspirations,” Rediff News, May 26, 2011, www.rediff.com/news/report/china-reacts-cautiously-to-indias-nsg-aspirations/ 20110526.htm; “India Conveys Displeasure to China Over NSG Role,” Rediff News, September 8, 2008, www.rediff.com/news/2008/sep/08chin1.htm; “China Plays Spoilsport in India’s NSG Dream,” Zeenews, July 17, 2011, http://zeenews.india.com/ news/nation/china-plays-spoilsport-in-india-s-nsg-dream_720181.html. 4 G. Balachandran, “India’s Membership of the NSG: Possible Options,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, June 16, 2011, www.idsa.in/issuebrief/IndiasMembershipoftheNSG. 5 Kanwal Sibal, “NSG Stamp for Sino-Pak Pact a Blow to India,” India Today, July 12, 2011, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/nsg-stamp-for-sino-pak-pact-a-blow-toindia/1/144445.html. 6 Siddharth Ramana, China–Pakistan Nuclear Alliance: An Analysis (New Delhi: Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2011), www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR109.pdf. 7 Gui Lin and Xiao Da, “Indian Media Admonishes Scholars for Not Having Paid Attention to China and Pakistan’s Nuclear Agreement,” Huanqiu shibao (Global Times), June 24, 2010. 8 Ibid. 9 George Perkovich, Faulty Promises: The U.S.–India Nuclear Deal, Policy Outlook 21 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). 10 Liu Wei, “Bajisitan nengyuan zhuangkuang ji zhengce” (Pakistan’s Energy Situation and Policies), Guotu ziyuan qingbao (Land and Resources Journal), issue 5 (2006): 39.

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11 This is as cited by Li Gang, Li Tao, and Yu Tao, “Mei danxin zhongguo he yinba gao heneng” (U.S. Worries that China will Engage in Nuclear Cooperation with India and Pakistan), Shijie xinwen bao (World News Report), November 23, 2006, http:// gb.cri.cn/12764/2006/11/23/[email protected]. 12 Yin Zi, “You yi juezhu pingtai: Mei danxin zhongguo he yinba gao heneng” (Another Competing Platform: U.S. Worries that China Will Engage in Nuclear Cooperation with India and Pakistan), Zhongguo jingji wang (China Economic Website), November 24, 2006, www.ce.cn/xwzx/gjss/gdxw/200611/24/t20061124_9563252_1.shtml. 13 In recent years, some Chinese media outlets have started to utilize “extreme terminology” (pianji yanci), such as the newspaper Huanqiu shibao (Global Times), which has referred to India’s “provocative actions” (tiaoxin xingwei) at the Sino-Indian border. However, it is worth noting that most of this newspaper reporting comes from direct translations from foreign media. 14 Saira Kurup, “Water Wars: India, China and the Great Thirst,” Times of India, July 25, 2010, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-07-25/special-report/​ 28308457_1_water-wars-water-resources-water-deficit; “India: Chinese String of Pearls Could Choke India,” Rediff News, September 8, 2010, http://news.rediff.com/ column/​2010/sep/08/chinese-string-of-pearls-could-choke-india.htm. 15 Allen McDuffee, “Rivalry Between China and India Will Continue Through 2025,” Washington Post, August 22, 2011, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/think-tanked/​ post/rivalry-between-china-and-india-will-continue-through-2025/2011/08/22/ gIQAVFWlWJ_blog.hml; Stephen Kurczy, “Robert Kaplan: Indian Ocean Becomes Battleground for India and China,” Christian Science Monitor, October 26, 2010, www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2010/1026/Robert-Kaplan-Indian-Oceanbecomes-battleground-for-India-and-China; “Zhongyin yao jianshao ‘xinren chizi’: Liang guo ying xieshou hezuo huli gongying” (China and India want to reduce their ‘trust deficit’: Two Countries Should Work Together to Achieve Mutual Benefit and Win–Win), China News.com, December 17, 2010, www.chinanews.com/gj/2010/ 12-17/​2728145.shtml. 16 Zhang Li, “Zhongyin zhanlue duihua: Tansuo zhongyin zhanlue hudong jizhi ji qi zhiyue” (China and India’s Strategic Dialogue: Exploring China-India’s Strategic Interactive Mechanisms and Constraints), Nanya yanjiu jikan (South Asian Studies Quarterly), issue 3 (2009): 1. 17 Pierre Goldschmidt, “NSG Membership: A Criteria-Based Approach for Non-NPT States,” Proliferation Analysis, May 24, 2011, carnegieendowment.org/2011/05/24/ nsg-membership-criteria-based-approach-for-non-npt-states/11bn. 18 Rajiv Nayan, “India’s NSG Membership,” IDSA Comment, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, June 18, 2011, www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasNSGMembership_rnayan_180611. 19 Mark Hibbs, “Condi Rice and FRG on Sino-Pak Deal,” Armscontrolwonk.com, July 17, 2011, hibbs.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/265/condi-rice-and-germany-on-sinopakistan-deal.

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Converging Nuclear Energy Programs The View from india V. S. Arunachalam, Meera Sudhakar, S. Rajgopal, and Dipak Sundaram

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ndia did not have access to nuclear technology, equipment, and fuel in the global market for several decades due to its refusal to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The recent Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement has dramatically changed this embargoed status by opening up fuel, equipment, and technology access options for India. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has instituted a special safeguards agreement for India, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has given India a clean waiver for trade. These measures have been a major success, providing access to uranium and reflected in the high capacity of several Indian nuclear plants. However, there remains a case to pursue long-term self-reliance. A severance of fuel supply could have a potentially crippling impact on India. Thus, in moving toward the country’s strategic goal of self-sufficiency, nuclear power has an important role to play.

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The uranium-fueled pressurized heavy-water reactor (PHWR) has heretofore been the mainstay of the Indian nuclear program. But India’s current uranium reserves of 61,000 metric tons provide an electricity potential of only 328 GW per year when used in a pressurized heavy-water reactor. Although a recent discovery of uranium stores in Andhra Pradesh may alter some of these supply predictions, plutonium derived by reprocessing the spent fuel of PHWR offers a massive potential of 42,231 GW per year, when used in a fast-breeder reactor (FBR).1 Additionally, breeder reactors open up a path for exploiting India’s extensive thorium reserves, which are capable of offering an electricity potential of 155,502 GW per year. This is why the success of India’s breeder program is crucial to its energy security. Fast-breeder reactors, which produce more fuel than they consume, were conceptualized as early as the 1950s to extend the world’s uranium resources. By contrast, once-through reactors utilize less than one percent of the energy potential of uranium. However, FBRs are currently not popular in the global community for several reasons—threats of nuclear proliferation, concerns regarding operational safety, and high costs. Additionally, uranium has proved to be more abundant than original estimates suggested. Due to these various factors, the urgency of testing comparatively uneconomical breeder reactors has abated. Although several countries have suspended their breeder programs, India, China, and Russia have continued with their active breeder programs. China was a late starter in this space and aims to have a commercial-scale breeder reactor by 2035, whereas India aims to have a 500 MW prototype FBR operational by 2012. The main concern regarding the safety of breeder reactors is due to sodium being a major fire hazard. However, Russia has successfully experimented with molten lead and lead-bismuth cooling in several designs. India’s justification for persisting with the FBR program has always been to exploit its huge thorium reserves and reduce dependence on its scarce uranium. As part of this, India has envisaged a three-phase strategy. In the first phase, PHWRs use uranium fuel and their spent fuel rods are reprocessed to extract plutonium. In the second phase, the FBR uses a plutonium core and depleted uranium blanket to breed more plutonium than the original output. In phase three, the plutonium core and thorium blanket yield U-233, and further uses the U-233 core and the thorium blanket.

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On the basis of assumptions for the success of its FBR program, India’s Planning Commission has targeted an installed nuclear capacity of at least 21,000 MW by 2020—almost five times the current operational nuclear capacity. The success of India’s three-phase program, however, cannot be taken for granted. There are several challenges facing India— the most immediate one being the lack of adequate reprocessing capacity. Reprocessing spent fuel from uranium-fueled reactors is essential for the FBR fuel cycle. The availability of adequate start-up plutonium for more breeder reactors, due to the limited throughput of the existing reprocessing plant, has been a mounting concern for India. Recent studies suggest that India needs to increase its reprocessing capacity by more than ten times the current capacity of 200 metric tons per year to achieve its capacity targets for 2020.2 In addition, reprocessing plants have a short life span of fifteen years due to the highly corrosive chemicals used in them. Therefore, there is an urgent need for large investments. Although India has successfully tested a small-capacity FBR, the prototype FBR of 500 MW, expected to be operational in 2012, will need to validate India’s ability to operate a large-capacity fast-breeder reactor. There are also challenges further down the road in the nuclear program. Globally, there have been very few experiments using the thorium cycle. Irradiated thorium is known to be highly radioactive, and the know-how for handling these fuels can pose a big challenge for India. There are several such unknowns to be solved, while at the same time averting catastrophes using fundamental design and risk management principles. From the outset, there was an awareness of the risks, and this has prompted several safety-in-design features like defense in depth to be made an integral part of FBR design. Nuclear reactors typically have several barriers, with each designed to withstand likely stresses and backup systems to ensure power. Lessons from accidents reveal that these barriers might still be broken due to several external factors. For example, an analysis of the recent Fukushima reactor accident suggests that both the intensity of the earthquake and tide levels went above its design basis, and backup systems thus proved inadequate. Although there was no way to have predicted the occurrence of these failures, safety in nuclear reactors, in situations like these, can be ensured

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if the safety systems have sufficient redundancy to ensure the continuous control of both radioactivity and heat removal, at all times. A breakdown of one of these control systems has been the cause of all nuclear disasters. Designs that adopt passive control measures, eliminating the need for any active intervention, can preempt catastrophic accidents. These design measures are already being implemented in new-generation reactors. Along with implementing traditional safety-in-design principles, there is also a need to anticipate unpredictable failures and plan for ways to minimize their impact. Analyses of several accidents like the Three Mile Island nuclear plant and the Challenger explosion have revealed that modern systems are extremely complex and that high-technology accidents often may not have a single clear cause. An unanticipated combination of seemingly trivial and discrete events can cause major accidents. Training stakeholders and personnel to follow set procedures in case of these unpredictable failures is a crucial element of disaster planning in the context of nuclear reactors. Considering the large-capacity additions required over a short time frame, nuclear power is the only non-fossil, large-scale, and accelerated addition option available for India. Much depends on the successful operation of the prototype fast-breeder reactor. Further, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology study reveals that the costs of nuclear reactors doubled from $2,000 to $4,000 per kilowatt between 2003 and 2009. Developing countries like India that depend on imported reactors need to constantly monitor the cost of energy from these reactors. Having invested in the development of competence in technology manufacture and construction in the nuclear domain, India will benefit by increasing the share of indigenous equipment used in these reactors, keeping in view safety requirements. Also, learning from past failures and moving toward passive control systems instead of active interventions in case of future challenges can significantly reduce the risks posed by nuclear reactors. Still, the Fukushima disaster has not had a great impact on India’s expansion plans. The current rectors in operation are newer by design, and India has already learned from its experiences with previous accidents. As many as six minor accidents have occurred in the past with respect to nuclear power plants in India—the most recent also being caused by

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the December 2004 tsunami, which hit the south of India, affecting the Kalpakkam power plant in the state of Tamil Nadu.3 Some concerns remain. Among these, India’s plans for the Jaitapur nuclear power project will require the dedication of 931 hectares for new reactors. Such a project is estimated to affect the livelihood of approximately 10,000 people living in that area. The Fukushima accident further fueled anti-nuclear energy project protests. Residents who were opposing the Jaitapur project against displacement and inadequate compensation pointed to its vulnerability to seismic activity. Even in other parts of India, development projects have faced hurdles and state governments have also declined to host nuclear energy projects for fear of negative consequences in the regions. Nonetheless, unlike countries such as Germany, which with its far smaller population and energy needs is planning to move away from nuclear reactors for safety reasons, countries as vast as India and China will continue to expand their number of nuclear power plants. Nations must invest in research and development and the further prospects for using alternative and sustainable energy sources and for the responsible disposal of nuclear waste. To this end, the further establishment and enhancement of international safety standards and international cooperation is essential.

The View from China Gu Zhongmao and Zhou Zhiwei

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ith the drastic increase in China’s oil and gas consumption since the mid-1990s, the country is becoming increasingly dependent on imports of oil and gas, with the major source of oil imports being the Middle East, the most unstable region of the world. China’s energy security is thus facing a major challenge and contradiction. The

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challenge remains the ever-increasing domestic demands and insufficient fossil fuel reserves. The contradiction is that despite this reliance on the rest of the world, the general principle of China’s energy policy is to insist on self-reliance to ensure energy security. Presently, China’s per capita energy consumption is 84 percent of the world average. The country’s energy supply must be significantly increased in the coming decades to support rapid development of its national economy. However, its per capita reserves of fossil fuels are much lower than the world average. The primary means of meeting its energy demands after 2020 will be to further increase the share of nuclear energy, so as to ensure both the country’s energy security and environmental safety. To achieve these goals, China has built three bases of nuclear power plants—Qingshan, Daya Bay, and Tianwan—with a total nuclear power capacity of 11 gigawatts electric (GWe) spread among 13 units. With the aim of nuclear capacity up to 70 GWe by 2020, in September 2010, 34 new units (36.9 GWe) were approved, and 25 units have been under construction. This accounts for approximately 30 percent of the nuclear power plant units under construction in the world. For the large-scale development of nuclear power, China has selected pressurized water reactors (PWRs) as the main reactor types for the coming decades. Until now, China has established its ability to design and build 600 MWe nuclear power plants. It has the basic ability to design larger-scale plants with PWRs through cooperation with the industry’s advanced foreign companies, while primarily relying on domestic efforts. Considering China’s pressing need to continue to construct nuclear power plants, there is a need to improve the existing second-generation (Gen-2) nuclear power plants with PWRs and to primarily deploy secondgeneration-plus (Gen-2+) plants with PWRs before 2020. After 2020, China should be capable of designing and constructing third-generation (Gen-3) plants with PWRs, which will become the leading units of nuclear power until the commercialization of the fast reactor system in China. China’s nuclear energy development will transition from PWRs to fast reactors gradually, with the total process requiring about fifty years. Considering that the economically exploitable uranium reserves in the Earth’s crust are limited (4.7 metric tons for the cost of less than $130 per kilogram), the sustainable development of nuclear fission energy depends

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on the fast reactor energy system, which is based on the closed fuel cycle. By contrast, less than one percent of uranium resources are usable in the once-through fuel cycle. If reprocessed plutonium (Pu) and uranium (U) are recycled in the present PWRs, the resource base can be extended by 20 to 30 percent (uranium utilization is still less than one percent). With the introduction of fast reactors and the closed fuel cycle, it is possible to multiply by 50 to 60 times the energy produced from a given amount of uranium. This would significantly reduce—by a factor of 10—the amount of highly radioactive waste for disposal. China’s experimental fast reactor (CEFR) reached criticality in July 2010. The near-term work will include the trial operation and power enhancement of the system. Experimental studies will be carried out to obtain data on basic processes, performance, and safety and to accumulate experience. With the aim of building a demonstration fast reactor (CFR 1000) by about 2020, a great deal of research and development must occur to gain the necessary design parameters based on the CEFR. Considering the relatively limited reserves of the low-cost uranium resources in the Earth as well as in China, it is hoped that the fast reactor energy system will be commercialized by approximately 2035. To reach this goal, research and development work on a closed fuel cycle must be carried out simultaneously. The fast reactor fuel cycle includes PWR spent fuel reprocessing, fuel fabrication, spent fuel reprocessing, highlevel waste treatment, and disposal. China’s PWR spent fuel reprocessing pilot plant was tasked with processing 50 metric tons of spent fuel and completed hot testing in December 2010. A commercial reprocessing plant is under consideration and is expected to be built by about 2020. This large reprocessing plant will be based on the experience of pilot plant operations and the experience gained in developed countries. As a result, international cooperation will be very important for designing and building China’s commercial reprocessing plant. The development of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication is now at its early stages in China. It is expected that MOX fuel pellets will be fabricated for irradiation tests by 2012 and the MOX fuel assembly will be fabricated for irradiation tests by 2015. MOX fuel will be first used in

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CEFRs to gain experience and will eventually be replaced by U-Pu-Zr4 metal alloy fuel so as to improve the breeding performance of the fuel in fast reactors. Therefore, the metal fuel should also be developed in the coming years. To achieve this ambitious goal, the central government must pay special attention to the fast reactor program and organize it in a careful and unified manner. A development road map of China’s fast reactor nuclear energy system, including the closed fuel cycle, needs to be worked out as soon as possible for the better implementation of the program. So while Japan’s disastrous earthquake-tsunami Fukushima nuclear accident on March 11, 2011, shocked the global nuclear energy industry, it will do little to alter the fundamentals of the world’s nuclear power development, especially in Asian countries like India and China. In addition to learning from the Fukushima disaster, these two countries’ nuclear industries will pay greater attention to further improvements in nuclear safety to ensure the reliability of nuclear energy. In this regard, the State Council of China made four important decisions on March 16: 1. Examine nuclear facility safety; 2. Strengthen safety management of all operational nuclear facilities; 3. Conduct comprehensive review of all nuclear facilities under construction; 4. Suspend review and approval of all new projects until new safety criteria and regulations are issued. In the future, the siting, designing, and building of nuclear power plants within China will be stricter, but its nuclear energy program will be firmly pursued. We must learn from Fukushima and other such disasters, paying greater attention to nuclear safety, in order to guarantee China’s path toward a safe and reliable supply of nuclear energy.

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Notes 1 “A Strategy for Growth of Electrical Energy in India,” document 10, August 2004, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India. 2 Anshu Bharadwaj, L. V. Krishnan, and S. Rajgopal, “Nuclear Power in India: The Road Ahead,” Center for Study of Science, Technology, and Policy, 2008, www.cstep. in/docs/CSTEP percent20Nuclear percent20Report.pdf. 3 Almost 100 kilograms of radioactive sodium at a fast breeder reactor leaked into a purification cabin, ruining a number of valves and operating systems. Although no deaths have been reported in these cases, the personnel involved were in danger of exposure to hazardous radiation levels, and the cost of these accidents has amounted to approximately $910 million. To avoid recurrences of such issues, India takes into account siting issues and proximity to seismic zones. 4 U = uranium; Pu = plutonium; Zr = zirconium.

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CHAPTER 12

Building Mutual Confidence The View from China Cheng Ruisheng, Zhang Li, and Ma Jiali

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n recent years, Sino-Indian relations have witnessed a peculiar trend. While bilateral relations between the two countries have developed rapidly, with the leaders of both countries conducting frequent goodwill visits, counterproductive developments have emerged. Among the positive trends, Indian president Pratibha Patil’s visit to China in May 2010 and Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in December 2010 were both successful, as was the meeting between Chinese president Hu Jintao and Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS) meeting in April 2011. However, there is also a negative side to Sino-Indian relations, marked by deficiencies in mutual trust. Some of the contributing factors are related to questions left over from history, and some derive from current politics. Among these, the “China threat” theory has been on the rise again in India in recent years, reflecting inadequate mutual trust between

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the two countries. Unless this question is resolved, the strategic partnership between the same two countries cannot be consolidated. Despite numerous rounds of talks, no major breakthrough has been achieved on the China-India boundary question. Wen Jiabao, during a speech at the World Affairs Council in December 2010, noted that resolution remains a long way off.1 India remains concerned that confrontation might resume, leading it to strengthen military preparedness at the Sino-Indian border. This situation, combined with increases in the anti-China activities of some Tibetans within India’s borders, has contributed to China’s concerns. The Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang in November 2009 and his remarks assigning this region to India have complicated the situation even further. The economic gap between China and India has also been widening in recent decades, as the rate of growth of China has been higher than that of India. The military strength of China has concomitantly developed, exacerbating India’s apprehension that it might not be able to cope if there were a military conflict. And though overall improvements to SinoIndian relations have mitigated the impact of geopolitical factors, they continue to play a role. India harbors suspicions toward China’s relations with India’s neighbors, especially Pakistan. China has its own concerns over India’s military and security cooperation with countries like the United States and Japan. And all these factors are interwoven, leading to considerable difficulty in disentangling and resolving them. Nonetheless, ten measures within the nuclear realm provide a clear foundation for improving bilateral relations. First, China and India maintain a number of identical stands on the issue of nuclear arms control and disarmament. These are reflected by the joint communiqué issued during Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in December 2010, in which both countries expressed a commitment to multilateral arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation processes, including the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons. Both sides also “reaffirmed their firm opposition to the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space.”2 Enhanced cooperation on points of synergy should be explored. Second, on the question of India’s nuclear status, China articulated a flexible attitude in 2008, so that the resolution to lift the nuclear embargo

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against India could be passed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. At present, among all the nuclear-weapon states, only China and India have announced a no-first-use policy. With new thinking on both sides, cooperation between the two countries on this question could be explored. Third, there is a pressing need for China and India to build up nuclear confidence and nuclear stability given their decades-old unstable bilateral relations and the lack of strategic trust between them. Both sides should coordinate their efforts to expand the existing engagement mechanisms such as the Sino-Indian Strategic Dialogue and to make proper arrangements in due course for consulting on nuclear-related issues, ranging from bilateral/transregional nuclear security to nuclear confidence building, nuclear doctrines, and strategic cultures to related technological developments. Fourth, bilateral interaction on nuclear-related subjects should be aimed at bridging perceptual differences on nuclear security and strategic stability. Although Beijing and New Delhi must base their nuclear relationship on their respective national interests and strategic concerns, reciprocal restraint and accommodation need to be exercised to achieve a mutually acceptable result. Greater transparency, clarity, and predictability of nuclear doctrines and behaviors will be of special significance for managing the bilateral relationship and securing long-term regional stability. Fifth, at the regional level, it is worth trying to adopt a less confrontational mind-set about the potential for regional coordination and cooperation as far as nuclear stability is concerned. Apart from the bilateral engagement with both India and Pakistan on strategic security, on China’s part, there is a growing interest in helping to strengthen the rudimentary nuclear confidence-building measures that are being attempted by New Delhi and Islamabad. Credible rapprochement and a sustainable peace process in South Asia, after all, will greatly heighten China’s interest in doing this. Sixth, at the multilateral level, China and India should learn to reconcile their respective arms control efforts and develop regular consultation on the norms, functions, and emerging trends of arms control and nonproliferation, as well as both binding and nonbinding governing global regimes. Effective and efficient Sino-Indian communication will greatly

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increase mutual strategic trust and confidence. This move may also apply to their policies and attitudes toward the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Missile Technology Control Regime, and anticipated Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Seventh, preliminary cooperation between China and India on nuclear issues should start with less sensitive issues. Potential areas of cooperation include preventing nuclear accidents, expanding civil nuclear energy, and removing the menace of nuclear terrorism. Since the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s 2008 waiver, there are no longer tangible political bottlenecks for China to move toward civil nuclear cooperation with India, at least in principle. The availability of cooperation should also touch upon its economic and technical parameters, apart from political and legal dimensions. Eighth, China and India should support each other’s initiatives aimed at improving the multilateral nonproliferation regime, including China’s emphasis on balancing nuclear security concerns and the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy, as well as India’s call for launching a multinational nuclear energy partnership program. For civil nuclear safety, the recent Fukushima nuclear accident caused by both by an earthquake and tsunami should prompt both China and India to explore more reliable and more risk-averse means of operating their nuclear plants in terms of their ambitious nuclear energy development programs. There should be recognized opportunities for scientists and concerned agencies from the two countries to pursue such cooperation. Ninth, Sino-Indian cooperation in the field of nuclear energy would enhance bilateral mutual trust. In the 1980s, China once supplied heavy water to India. And in the 1990s, China supplied low-enriched uranium to India. During Chinese president Hu Jintao’s visit to India in 2006, the two countries issued a joint declaration advocating civil nuclear cooperation.3 However, only limited progress has been achieved until now. Both sides could start with technical exchanges in areas of mutual interest, such as breeder reactors, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, thorium development, and nuclear reactor security and safety. Tenth and finally, in view of the difficulty of an early kick-start of formal negotiations and physical cooperation, either a bilateral or multilateral Track-2 discussion is an appropriate starting point. Intensive dialogue, involving think tanks and strategic experts, will greatly contribute to

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narrowing the identified gaps in perception and securing reasonable options for policymakers. Such a Track-2 dialogue should be frank, realistic, all-inclusive, constructive, and sustainable. This form of brainstorming will create favorable conditions for results-oriented negotiations between the Chinese and Indian governments and strategic establishments under the umbrella of a stronger nuclear relationship.

The View from India Dipankar Banerjee, Rukmani Gupta, Avinash Godbole, and Gunjan Singh

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ndia has long been a reluctant nuclear-weapon power. Even though it had the capability to conduct a nuclear test explosion before the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force, it showed no inclination to do so and remained outside the treaty. When it did conduct a “peaceful nuclear test” explosion in May 1974, it did not make any attempt at weaponization. It was only much later, when Pakistan had announced its nuclear weapons capability by the mid-1980s that Indian leaders were left with no other option.4 The “China threat” theory expounded by the Indian defense minister before the test and in a letter to the U.S. president afterward was not the most compelling reason for the action. The primary motives consisted of a genuine perception of security demands, along with aspirations of great-power status. Nonetheless, a demand for the abolition of nuclear weapons has been a constant and compelling part of India’s nuclear policy. In more concrete terms, a firm proposal for this emerged at the Third Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly in 1988, when

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Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi put forward his Action Plan for Disarmament to eliminate nuclear weapons by 2010.5 On the twentieth anniversary of this speech, India’s prime minister, Manmohan Singh, reiterated this call.6 In India, there remains strong public support for nuclear weapons elimination in a universal and nondiscriminatory manner. In the case of China, similar sentiments characterized the country’s policy toward nuclear weaponization, even though in practice it was ahead of India by several decades. Chairman Mao Zedong declared, as early as September 1961, the inutility of nuclear weapons. Yet, he sanctioned the nuclear weapons program under the belief that unless China had nuclear weapons of its own, it would constantly be under the threat of nuclear blackmail from others. Even when China tested a nuclear weapon in October 1964, Mao immediately announced a policy of no first use (NFU) and nonuse against non–nuclear-weapon states. China continued to view nuclear weapons entirely as tools of deterrence. In China’s 2010 paper on national defense, released in March 2011 at Beijing, it also restated its commitment to long-standing nuclear policies.7 Overall, there are more points of compatibility in the Indo-Chinese nuclear relationship and hence potential cooperation. This has become apparent in several Track-2 dialogues undertaken between the two countries at senior former official levels.8 Both China and India agree that the only conceivable purpose for possessing nuclear weapons is to deter others from using these weapons. Any other use would be an utter failure of policy, with the possible danger of mutual annihilation. The two countries share many common approaches toward nuclear weapons, such as a belief in its universal elimination through verifiable and nondiscriminatory measures and in eliminating fissile material production for nuclear weapons. China and India maintain postures of NFU and nonuse against nonnuclear powers. Indeed, they are the only nuclear-weapon powers that currently maintain this as declared policy. However, it is equally true that in the absence of a concrete set of actions that would lend greater credibility to this policy, it loses much of its actual potential for confidence building. Both countries have comparably limited arsenals, yet possess increasingly effective delivery capabilities. These common positions should allow both countries to deliberate and agree upon a set of

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confidence-building measures in the nuclear domain that could include the following: • Conclusion of a treaty or statement on bilateral NFU or threat of

use;

• Development of effective risk reduction measures to prevent acciden-

tal use;

• Implementation of enhanced confidence building in the border

areas;

• Pursuit of joint research and development projects on nuclear energy

efficiency at all levels, from production to the end-user stage; • Establishment of sister city projects to learn best practices, with project-to-project cooperation to enhance technical cooperation and education; • Increased robustness of environmental impact assessments for energy projects; • Signature of a bilateral agreement on non-attack of nuclear facilities; • Examination and exchange ideas on specifics of each other’s nuclear doctrines; • Increased interaction on nuclear guidelines and NFU policy; • Engagement in discussions on the Nuclear Suppliers Group and civil nuclear energy; • Discussion of proliferation threats in South Asia and East Asia; • Coordination of input at the Conference on Disarmament with respect to the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and the peaceful use of space; • Exchange on China’s military and nuclear assistance to Pakistan; • Coordination of a global call for reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines; • Negotiation of an agreement on NFU among all countries possessing nuclear weapons; • Formulation of additional measures by nuclear-weapon states to reduce accidental use; • Initiation of negotiations for a nuclear convention prohibiting the development, stockpiling, and production of nuclear weapons, moving toward their global, nondiscriminatory, and verifiable elimination.

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China and India have much in common. However, their cooperation at the global level has been largely characterized by each country’s wariness about the other’s intentions. This is in large measure due to a bilateral trust deficit arising out of a long-standing border dispute. Unlike China’s relationship with the United States, which necessitates cooperation while managing threat perceptions, the India-China relationship has largely remained captive to perceived threats. This is amply evident in the nuclear arena. The first challenge to the creation of a dialogue on nuclear issues between India and China therefore seems to lie in bringing the Chinese side to accept the need for a bilateral dialogue. Indian concerns on bilateral nuclear issues can be seen as an opportunity to deepen understanding between the two countries. A dialogue between China and India on these issues would not only help bring an element of trust into the bilateral relationship, but also enable the two countries to exchange information on the networks and groups involved in proliferation. The overlapping linkages between proliferation, money laundering, small arms, and terrorism necessitate a regional dialogue to tackle problems that cannot be dealt with by a single state. The rationale for a nuclear dialogue between China and India lies in the realization that threat perceptions, if not mitigated, would result in the continuation of the security dilemma that has held the bilateral relationship hostage so far. To enable the creation of a lasting partnership on global issues, it is the irritants in the bilateral relationship that must first be addressed. The nuclear domain is an ideal starting point for trust creation. It is a high-visibility issue and a dialogue about it could promote deeper understanding on all security-related aspects in the bilateral relationship.

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Notes 1 “The China-India boundary question is a historical legacy. It will not be easy to completely resolve this question. It requires patience and will take a fairly long period of time. Only with sincerity, mutual trust and perseverance can we eventually find a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution.” Shubhajit Roy, “Boundary Issue a Historical Legacy, Will Take Long Time to Resolve: Wen,” Indian Express.com, December 17, 2010, www.indianexpress.com/news/boundary-issue-a-historical-legacy-will-takelong-time-to-resolve-wen/725959. 2 Ministry of External Affairs, “Joint Communiqué of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China,” Government of India, December 16, 2010, www.mea. gov.in/myprint.php?id=530516879&d=06&m=&y=&pg=&flg=&searchdata1=. 3 “Considering that for both China and India, expansion of civilian nuclear energy program is an essential and important component of their national energy plans to ensure energy security, the two sides agree to promote cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, consistent with their respective international commitments. As two countries with advanced scientific capabilities, they stress the importance of further deepening cooperation bilaterally as well as through multilateral projects, such as an ITER [international thermonuclear experimental reactor], and enhance exchanges in the related academic fields.” Press Information Bureau, “Joint Declaration by the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China,” Government of India, November 21, 2006, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=22168. 4 The most important of these was the interview with the Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan by the Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyar on January 3, 1987, responding to a major Indian military exercise on its western border known as “Operation Brasstacks.” This was taken in India as the final confirmation of Pakistan’s capability to detonate nuclear weapons. 5 Mani Shankar Iyer, “Towards a Nuclear-Weapons–Free and Non-Violent World Order,” Global Security Institute, 2010, www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/pubs/AIYAR_ RajivGandhi.pdf. 6 India is still “fully committed to nuclear disarmament that is global, universal and non-discriminatory in nature.” For India, “the only effective form of nuclear disarmament is global nuclear disarmament;” nuclear disarmament cannot be “regionalized.” Dipankar Banerjee, “The Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, June 2, 2011, www.ipcs.org/article/india/the-future-of-nuclearnonproliferation-3395.html. 7 Information Office of the State Council, “China’s National Defense in 2010,” March 31, 2011, available at news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/​ 31/c_13806851.htm. 8 Five rounds of these have been held since December 2008 between India, China, and Pakistan. Extracts of these can be found on the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies website at www.ipcs.org.

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conclusion: comparing the comparable LORA SAALMAN

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or the past decade, China and India have been compared as rising powers due to their rapid economic growth. Yet, the story of their economic trajectories has been over-interpreted and their similarities have been frequently exaggerated. As demonstrated in this volume, what merits greater attention is China’s and India’s overlap in nuclear policy and practice. Understanding these similarities not only contributes to improving these two powers’ overall security relationship, but it also has the potential to benefit the global nuclear order as a whole. One of the biggest gaps in current research into China and India’s strategic relationship is the lack of a framework for identifying the arenas of convergence and divergence when it comes to nuclear issues. Within China, there is a tendency to look at India through an abstractionoriented, principles-based prism that is skewed by its heavy focus on the United States. Within India, there is a tendency to look at China through an incident-oriented, history-based prism that is skewed by heavy focus on Pakistan. Heretofore, in spite of their similarities in the nuclear realm, these two different approaches have left China and India without a

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common platform for direct communication. This conclusion seeks to provide a framework for integrating these two styles and to offer suggestions as to next steps in bridging perceptual gaps. It may be surprising that China, a country inside the nonproliferation regime, and India, a country outside the regime, would have similar postures and practices when it comes to their nuclear arsenals. Yet, both China and India were long dubious about the regime, citing its discriminatory nature. Although China began to accede to the nonproliferation regime in the early 1990s, India has maintained its criticism. Only in recent years have the United States and the Nuclear Suppliers Group begun to exempt India from the rules that once distanced it from China in the international nuclear order.1 Sino-Indian similarities persist even as these two nations grow to compete with one another. In fact, in the nuclear realm, it could be argued that this friction has compelled India to keep apace of China’s development and posture. China’s nuclear program and nuclear assistance to Pakistan are widely believed to have set India on its course toward developing nuclear weapons.2 Meanwhile, India’s expanding ballistic missile ranges able to reach China’s power centers of Beijing and Shanghai, particularly following the successful Agni-V test, elicit new nuclear dynamics and sources of tension. Despite this mutual unease, as shown throughout the Chinese and Indian analyses in this book, intersections between China and India abound on nuclear policy. These two countries, with their relatively small nuclear arsenals, provide a window into a world in which nuclear arsenals are lean and nuclear postures are restrained, in other words a low-numbers world.3 Moreover, they do so in a dynamic and strained regional environment tested by unresolved border disputes and increasing maritime frictions. When contrasted with a simulated generic scenario of what it would take for countries to sustain a posture of low numbers, China and India provide for a more realistic assessment of the feasibility of maintaining postures of minimum nuclear deterrence, no first use, and non-mating of nuclear warheads in a tense political, economic, and military environment. If China and India can build on these and other commonalities discussed in this volume, they will be poised to initiate a new nuclear paradigm and not simply react to the existing one.

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Nuclear Policy No First use Since the inception of their nuclear weapons programs, China and India have both instituted no first use (NFU) as a cornerstone of their declaratory policies. Both countries place an emphasis on survivability, credibility, and retaliation. They have both earmarked nuclear weapons as a defensive means to deter a first strike from another actor. Both maintain small nuclear arsenals at low alert levels, and neither is believed to keep its nuclear warheads mated to its delivery systems. China and India claim to have relinquished nuclear coercion as a policy option due to their acceptance of NFU, while at the same time expressing concerns that other powers may use nuclear coercion against them.4 Yet, though Chinese experts argue that China’s commitment to NFU remains unconditional and verifiable,5 some Indian experts question whether there is a hidden conditionality in China’s NFU pledge.6 They point to China’s potential for nuclear retaliation if its strategic facilities were to be targeted by conventional systems.7 Despite the tendency for Chinese experts to accept India’s NFU declaration at face value, Indian experts’ own admissions that India might use the nuclear option in response to a biological or chemical weapons attack do little to solidify confidence that India’s pledge will hold.8 In the face of uncertainties over the true meaning and implications of both countries’ declarations of NFU, Chinese and Indian experts at the unofficial level have the opportunity to clarify their country’s NFU positions.9 One method would be to work together to create a list of concrete markers that define nuclear force structures and postures that are, or would be, consistent with NFU, as well as structures and postures that cast doubt on the applicability of no first use. This would place Chinese and Indian experts in a position to assess whether conditionality exists in each other’s, and even their own, nuclear posture. A focused effort to explore similarities and differences in each other’s nuclear trajectory would serve as a stepping-stone to enhanced mutual confidence between China and India. Such efforts at the unofficial level could be used to generate momentum for officials to issue a bilateral joint

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statement that neither party will be the first to use nuclear weapons to attack the other.10 It would also set an example for other countries to follow in establishing strategic postures based on either a declaration of NFU or sole purpose.11 If these two countries, with their lingering border disputes and distrust, are able to take this first step, other countries will find it harder to justify first use.

credible Minimum Deterrence China’s and India’s stances of credible minimum deterrence reinforce their commitment to no first use. These two elements have led both states to prize opacity in terms of the amounts of fissile materials they possess, their numbers of nuclear weapons, and their future force development plans. For if the number and location of weapons in one’s own nuclear arsenal are unknown, one’s opponent will not have confidence that it could successfully target and destroy its deterrent. This enhances stability and makes one’s own NFU policy feasible, even as it frustrates demands in some quarters for transparency. An opaque minimum deterrent can be based on a relatively small nuclear force. In making this argument, however, Chinese and Indian experts argue that credible minimum deterrence should not be reduced to a simple calculation of numbers,12 but rather should be defined by a broader set of conditions reflecting a country’s survivability and retaliatory capabilities. Despite these similarities, the tendency of some Chinese experts to conflate the terms “minimum deterrent” and “limited deterrent” in their writings, and India’s alleged ongoing production of fissile material for weapons, elicit mutual suspicions of intent.13 Some Indian experts argue that China’s Second Artillery maintains a two-level doctrine that employs “credible minimum deterrence” vis-à-vis the United States and Russia and “limited deterrence” against India, which is further evidence of mistrust.14 This argument suggests that Indian assessments frequently take China’s method of deterrence as being applied unevenly and selectively. Despite China’s official assertions to the contrary, Indian experts tend to see Chinese nuclear posture in flux. For example, there are still concerns in India that as Mainland China improves its relations with Taiwan, rather

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than decommissioning its ballistic missiles in Fujian, it will transfer them to Tibet and regions adjacent to its other territorial disputes, namely, the border with India.15 This perceptual fungibility is mirrored by Indian analysts’ references to their country’s “dynamic” deterrence, which is subject to the ever-changing demands of strategic environment, technological imperatives, and the needs of national security.16 India’s own alleged fissile material production—which a number of Chinese experts suggest will be enhanced by “freed-up” civil nuclear fuel supplies, access to enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy-water-related technology and equipment,17 along with advances in ballistic missile capabilities—also elicits larger questions within China about the long-term prognosis for Indian claims of minimum deterrence. As the international community continues to debate the steps necessary to significantly reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and the challenges of maintaining deterrence at low numbers of weapons, China and India provide a realistic test case for evaluating this dynamic. Both countries offer a window into a low-numbers world. At the conventional and strategic weapons levels, China remains ahead of India, but the magnitude of its advantage is nowhere near the quantitative and qualitative deficit it faces relative to the United States. China and India also maintain a stance of nuclear restraint compared with the Soviet-U.S. arms race during the Cold War. The experience of two countries with unresolved security issues and relatively low numbers of nuclear weapons could provide insights into how two states with large arsenals—the United States and Russia—could address conventional and strategic asymmetries as they undertake deeper reductions of their nuclear arsenals. Chinese and Indian analysts already apply a relatively holistic view of minimum deterrence, which is purposely not fixated on the number of warheads, but rather on the policies and weapons systems that surround the arsenal. As such, much as in the U.S. and Russian case, which is increasingly driven by concerns over conventional prompt global strike and ballistic missile defense, analysis in the Sino-Indian context must also squarely address how conventional military capabilities fit into strategic doctrine.18 A joint Sino-Indian study into how their nuclear dynamic functions could be pertinent for other nuclear powers would also propel Sino-Indian

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relations forward. Such discussions would enhance efforts to delineate what a low-numbers world would look like.

Disarmament Support for global, verifiable, nondiscriminatory disarmament is another stance to which China and India both subscribe. Yet, each also harbors questions as to the other’s commitment to this goal. Some Indian experts question the sincerity of China’s linkage of nuclear and conventional disarmament and the practicality of setting regional and international peace as preconditions.19 Chinese experts pinpoint India’s ongoing fissile material production, seen as bolstered by the aftereffects of the United States–India civil nuclear deal, and question at what point India and Pakistan will be able to forgo their one-upmanship to sign onto the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), much less the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).20 Overall concerns remain as to whether China and India can, given current regional and global security concerns, embark upon a path toward nuclear disarmament. China has considerations regarding both U.S. strategic and conventional superiority. India must take into account Pakistan’s expanding fissile material stockpile, possible pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons, and cooperation with China. Moreover, India has the added task of interpreting China’s strategic decisionmaking vis-à-vis the United States and what impact this might have on India’s own security. China tends not to do the same for India and Pakistan, but it should. Despite the fact that China and India possess two of the longeststanding commitments to nuclear disarmament, they have been conspicuously absent in the global push for zero nuclear weapons since U.S. president Barack Obama’s Prague speech in 2009. Although this has been attributed to waiting for the United States and Russia to undertake the first significant steps,21 it also belies the fact that both countries apply their rhetoric in a reactive and ultimately passive fashion. This is unfortunate given the fact that these two countries have long underlined the morality of nuclear disarmament and could play an integral role in pushing it forward. In fact, without China’s and India’s participation, U.S. and Russian disarmament efforts will never succeed,

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given that concerns over racing to parity and nuclear weapons powers outside the NPT continue to stymie current efforts. To retain their moral high ground, China and India have the unique opportunity to convert their international discourse into an action plan for nuclear disarmament. As two countries in possession of what are arguably some of the lowest nuclear weapons numbers and recessed nuclear postures among states with nuclear weapons, they are well placed to take the lead in creating joint studies on what it would take for countries to emulate their low numbers and disarmament stance. Until they do so, their disarmament rhetoric will remain subject to questions about sincerity, intent, and a possible “sprint to parity.”

Negative security assurances Bolstered by their similar pasts as champions of nonaligned and disenfranchised nations, China and India remain committed to negative security assurances (NSAs). China unconditionally forswears the use or threat to use nuclear weapons against non–nuclear-weapon states and zones free of nuclear weapons. India is a bit more oblique in its declarations, for example in saying that its NSA pledge will apply to non–nuclear-weapon states and countries “not aligned with nuclear weapons powers.”22 However, both subscribe to NSAs in principle. India’s mincing of words, however, is paired with its own suspicions over whether China’s declared policy is matched in practice. Although some Chinese experts seek to clarify the Sino-Indian nuclear relationship,23 China has not officially defined how it views countries outside the NPT in its binary framework of nuclear-weapon states versus non– nuclear-weapon states. India and others also doubt whether China’s NSAs or assurances of NFU would apply in conflicts over territories like Taiwan or Arunachal Pradesh, to which it still lays claim. This is largely because an attack on these regions could be claimed not to constitute an attack against another “country.”24 Given such lingering perceptions and misperceptions, a clarification of terms would be one of the most basic ways in which to elucidate the nuances in China and India’s declarations. This could either enhance stability or identify differences that must be addressed. Both NSAs and

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NFU provide salient examples, for they are terms that are inextricably linked and yet are only proven by the absence of action or attack.25 Given that such pledges provide little solace to those concerned over the revocability of such declaratory postures, the burden of proof remains on those claiming to abide by no first use and negative security assurances. To this end, creating a glossary of such terms would go beyond basic meanings to differentiating practices in the Chinese and Indian cases.26 It would also facilitate the direct interaction of Chinese and Indian experts, such that the process of negotiating terms and definitions would be just as beneficial if not more so than the final publication.

Non-Mating/De-Mating Both China and India maintain “recessed deterrent” postures that do not include the mating of nuclear warheads to their delivery systems. This has an impact on their command-and-control system and retaliation time, and it is consistent with a stance of no first use. This being said, both countries are in varying stages of pursuing nuclear submarines to be armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). This advance has significant implications not only for China’s and India’s strategic reaches and second-strike capabilities but also for keeping their nuclear warheads separate from their delivery systems. On a nuclear submarine, there is no such luxury, because the mating of these systems would be automatic.27 This could portend instability, with shifts in determinations on launch on warning and crisis management. The pursuit of certain weapons systems, in this case nuclear submarines and SLBMs, creates a foundation upon which it would be difficult to maintain a stance of non-mating of nuclear warheads. Despite the fact that the maritime realm has far-reaching implications in terms of shipping routes, energy exploration, and second-strike capability, Sino-Indian dialogue mechanisms remain firmly fixated on the border. Creating space for a discussion of maritime issues would extricate them from a matrix of United States–dominated structures. A Sino-Indian maritime forum would likely be well received by both parties, and it would provide opportunities to discuss not only conventional advances at sea, but also strategic ones.

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There is already a commonly heard view in China that India’s naval and aviation capabilities exceed those of China.28 And, as India’s nuclear forces go to sea, Chinese experts are likely to become more interested in Indian participation in forums to address maritime security.29 Such a forum would provide a much-needed context for exploring the interplay between both countries’ strategic and conventional naval advances. In light of a growing profusion of reports on Sino-Indian contention over India’s resource exploration, military presence, and relations with countries bordering the South China Sea, and given ongoing concerns over Chinese engagement with countries in the Indian Ocean region, dubbed the “String of Pearls,” such a mechanism is indispensable for ensuring future maritime stability.30

strategic stability “Strategic stability” is a term born from the U.S.-Soviet nuclear dynamic, and more recently employed by the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review to describe relations between the United States and China.31 This term has also been applied to the Indo-Pakistan nuclear dynamic.32 Yet, Chinese experts often critique the use of this construct due to gross inequities between China’s and the United States’ nuclear and conventional capabilities. India and Pakistan also have different doctrines and weapon suites, as Pakistan appears to be developing tactical nuclear weapons.33 China’s and India’s asymmetries are not so severe. Given that China and India have managed to avoid many of the pitfalls of nuclear arms racing and strategic instability, they are much better positioned to explore a world governed by economic and strategic interdependence, rather than by prototypical “security dilemmas.” In fact, a growing number of Chinese experts are already engaged in an inquiry into what the force structure of two powers that maintain strategic stability would look like.34 One need not look any further than China and India to explore such a dynamic. Joint studies on strategic stability should factor in all the abovementioned elements of nuclear policy and the factors of nuclear practice outlined in the next section to arrive at a more precise vision of strategic stability. No matter how the nuclear chain of United States–China–India– Pakistan is arranged or where China and India fit into these relations, they

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are far from static.35 Moreover, whereas the United States is often viewed as the catalyst, it should not be assumed that fluctuations along other links in the strategic stability chain, such as India–Pakistan or China–India, would not radiate upward and have an impact on U.S. security and interests.36

Nuclear Practice Missile Modernization China and India’s missile modernization and diversification efforts continue apace. For China, given its early attainment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the focus is on enhancing mobility and precision rather than range. From its DF-21 and DF-31 land-based systems to its JL-2 SLBMs, China is expanding the variety and survivability of its retaliatory capability. India’s own strides in the operationalization and deployment of its Agni-II and Agni-III systems, matched with its successes in Agni-IV and Agni-V testing, have put it on a path toward an increased range that places Beijing within reach. Like China’s developing sea-based systems, India’s SLBMs are intended to undertake a greater role in its future retaliatory capabilities, aimed at enhancing survivability and second-strike capabilities. Precisely because India’s missile development programs are largely geared toward China, greater aerospace-related interaction between the two sides is essential to mitigate the unwanted consequences of security dilemmas. However, the best conduit for enhanced understanding is one of the least explored, namely, the scientific community. Scientific experts remain untapped in virtually every aspect of Sino-Indian ties.37 Bilateral conferences frequently feature experts with military and academic backgrounds, but rarely if ever scientific expertise. Yet, one needs only to read through the Chinese journal Hangtian dianzi duikang (Aerospace Electronic Countermeasures)38 to discover that the Chinese scientific community is keeping itself apprised of India’s aerospace advances in both offensive and defensive systems—namely, missiles, ballistic missile defense, satellites, and anti-satellite capabilities. Despite this fact, Chinese strategic analyses are frequently laden with abstract discussions of Indian advances without suggestions of concrete

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methods to enhance real understanding of the two countries’ relationship and strategic programs. Meanwhile, Indian analyses often lack a conceptual framework for interpreting China’s developments, even as they cite emerging Chinese capabilities in great, though not always accurate, detail.39 Involving the scientific communities of both countries in bilateral strategic discussions would serve as the bridge to connect these two divergent styles of analysis.

BMD and asat Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is an arena in which both China and India are accelerating their efforts, but remain largely focused on other adversaries, namely the United States and Pakistan, and not each other. This has as much to do with the origins of these programs as with their function. In the view of some Indian experts, China’s hit-to-kill technology and later BMD pursuits stem from its anti-satellite (ASAT) program.40 This contrasts with India, whose ASAT program is derived from its BMD pursuits and remains recessed rather than overt.41 China and India’s ASAT and BMD programs will affect each country’s threat perceptions, even if each is also driven by concerns over third parties. As much as China’s ASAT and BMD programs may be targeting U.S. capabilities, China’s efforts in both realms, particularly anti-satellite, have increasingly become a driving force behind India’s military pursuits. Moreover, whereas India’s BMD efforts are geared toward achieving intercepts at a range up to 2,000 kilometers and its efforts largely target Pakistan, attempts to expand into longer-range 5,000-kilometer intercepts would have implications for China. There remain doubts over the feasibility and effectiveness of India’s BMD program, but Chinese experts are starting to take notice.42 As both countries’ BMD programs are on an upward ascent, but have yet to directly affect the security of either country, this is an ideal time to investigate and compare them. Moreover, the vast stores of information on both successes and failures within each program, and even on one another’s BMD pursuits, allow for ample sources to begin to dissect where perception and reality diverge. There is enough information within opensource technical journals to analyze the successes and failures of these

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programs and to gauge the timing and potential extent of their impact on deterrence stability. Joint Sino-Indian studies would facilitate understanding of the cause-and-effect relationship between system advances on the part of one country and the response triggered within the other. It would once again serve to elucidate the above-mentioned strategic stability chain, given that China’s BMD and ASAT programs are largely seen to be in response to those of the United States. The same could be alleged in the case of India’s programs vis-à-vis China and Pakistan. For this reason, the China– India dynamic constitutes an essential, but often missed, component of a larger series of emerging ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite-driven relations.

civil Nuclear energy Civil nuclear energy is arguably the area with the greatest potential for Sino-Indian consensus and cooperation. Not only are China and India both engaged in major nuclear energy drives, they also share similar aspirations in fast-breeder reactor programs and reprocessing. In a postFukushima world, the scope and contents of their programs are undergoing review and upheaval. On questions ranging from the independence of regulatory oversight to the viability of future nuclear projects, external pressures have forced both countries to look inward. When we review the five-year plans of both countries, it becomes apparent that India’s domestic programs are often framed in comparison with those of China.43 Similarly, both countries have recently engaged in a series of review measures and task forces to evaluate which aspects of their nuclear programs pose the greatest dangers in terms of siting, safety, and security.44 They are also undergoing sweeping discussions about reforming their legal and regulatory systems. Despite such similarities, China and India have yet to engage in any real bilateral discussion of their nuclear energy programs. This points to a mismatch between rhetoric and cooperation, notwithstanding a bilateral statement on civil nuclear cooperation made during Chinese president Hu Jintao’s visit to India in 2006. To this end, the Fukushima nuclear reactor catastrophe in the wake of the 2010 earthquake provides a unique

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opportunity for both countries to not only look inward, but also to turn their sights outward toward their neighbor for potential points of comparison. The fact that both countries are pursuing nuclear programs that are characterized by many of the same features suggests that they are poised to learn from each other’s successes and failures, whether in fast-breeder reactors, reprocessing, nuclear safety, or regulatory reforms. This could go a long way toward realizing a degree of coordination that was first advocated nearly half a decade ago. Given the sensitivities associated with the current nuclear review processes in both China and India, a joint study may not be feasible at the upper levels of government and industry in the near term. Yet, there remain a vast number of opportunities for Chinese and Indian nuclear scientists to engage at the unofficial level to begin setting up a framework to learn from the Fukushima disaster. And if the strong Chinese nuclear industry attendance and participation for speakers from India’s nuclear establishment at June and October 2011 events in Beijing related to nuclear fuel cycles on Fukushima are any indication, a nascent effort has begun to occur.45 However, this needs to be expanded and regularized between both countries’ industrial, scientific, political, and regulatory communities. China and India, for all their differences in governance, could still benefit from a better understanding of each other’s civil nuclear past and future.

creatiNg ForuMs For cooPeratioN From no-first-use policy to civil nuclear energy practice, the policies and practices of China and India overlap much more than is widely appreciated or analyzed. While China cites India’s non-membership in the NPT as a basis for avoiding bilateral nuclear dialogues at the official level, India chooses to eschew the multilateral NPT Review Conference format in which China is most comfortable. Nonetheless, Track-1.5 and Track-2 initiatives would provide platforms upon which open and honest exchange can occur. This is not to argue that official-level interaction should be ignored, but given China’s

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reluctance to deal with India as a non-NPT signatory, the nonofficial route is the most practical way to begin dispelling misperceptions and seeking common ground for cooperation.46 To this end, Sino-Indian dialogue and cooperative research projects could include: 1. No first use: Composition of a list of technical characteristics in nuclear force structure and policies that define NFU verifiability; conclusion of a bilateral NFU statement or agreement. 2. Minimum deterrence: Studies into the elements of minimum deterrence and low-number nuclear dynamics, using the Sino-Indian case to explore its impact on conventional and strategic force structures. 3. Disarmament: Utilization of the moral high ground on disarmament to offer a global agenda, steps, sequencing, and engagement necessary to facilitate nuclear reductions and disarmament. 4. Negative security assurances: Creation of a working group to compose a glossary of Chinese and Indian nuclear posture terms and specifics on their applications in practice. 5. Strategic stability: Establishment of a seminar series on Sino-Indian strategic stability, which links China–United States and India– Pakistan dynamics. 6. Non-mating: Founding of a Sino-Indian maritime forum to explore, among other issues, how China and India’s nuclear submarine and SLBM pursuits could affect their policies for the non-mating of nuclear warheads. 7. Missile modernization: Invitation of the Chinese and Indian scientific communities, particularly in aerospace, to engage in bilateral strategic discussions and negotiations. 8. Ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite programs: Initiation of a joint comparative study on BMD and ASAT programs to determine whether China and India factor into one another’s calculations and reach. 9. Civil nuclear energy: Creation of a joint working group to explore the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear disaster and to delineate the similarities and differences between China’s and India’s civil nuclear programs, such as in regulatory systems and fast-breeder reactor development.

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By making such cooperative measures and discussions bilateral, representatives from both countries will have the opportunity to engage one another on thorny issues that quickly become polarized when other actors are in the room, particularly the United States, Pakistan, and the media. This is not to argue that such discussions should ignore third parties, but third-party issues must not be allowed to hijack the conversation. The United States already plays a substantial role in India’s understanding of China, as well as Chinese perspectives on nuclear issues. Similarly, China perceives South Asia through its active involvement in Pakistan and through India’s buildup of strategic power which is motivated by balancing China. Sino-Indian bilateral relations are already muddied enough with multilateral concerns. It is time for direct bilateral discussions and initiatives to expand. To facilitate frank and open discussion and to remove some of the inherent asymmetries, it is essential to begin with bilateral discussion on both similarities and differences. Nuclear issues provide the one arena in which the former, for once, dominates the latter. Even in exploring subtle nuances in application of the same terms, greater communication and ultimately cooperation can be achieved. Despite the ample examples of crossover in nuclear ties, there remains a central arena of divergence. India has made the nuclear issue central to Sino-Indian relations, whereas China has not. The United States–India civil nuclear deal altered this dynamic to a degree. Yet, this situation stemmed more from China’s obsession with the United States than from an overt concern about India. This dynamic results in a lack of proper signaling. One actor, India, finds everything China does to contain a signal, while the other actor, China, misses all the signals. China and India coexist in an environment in which the former’s dogged preoccupation with the United States and the latter’s fixation on China create a nuclear chain in which any shock radiates throughout the links. Ironically, when it comes to nuclear issues, China and India have numerous bases of comparison. Yet, their position within the United States–China–India–Pakistan strategic stability continuum receives the least attention. Chinese and Indian analysts continue to focus on illusory economic similarities and perceived security differences. This leads to a

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tendency to ignore the inherent symmetries of China’s and India’s nuclear postures and practices. In sum, the United States–China–India–Pakistan nuclear chain is missing a vital link. A series of bilateral nuclear initiatives to explore their relationship will provide the necessary platform to compare the comparable and propel China’s and India’s nuclear relations and the nonproliferation regime forward.

Notes 1 Since the announcement of intended United States–India nuclear cooperation in 2005, the United States has altered its domestic laws regarding nuclear transfer to accommodate India, specially the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has also issued a waiver for nuclear trade that does not require India to accept full-scope safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors has approved an India-specific safeguards agreement. 2 See Arun Prakash’s essay in chapter 1 of this volume. 3 James M. Acton, Low Numbers: A Practical Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011). 4 See Arun Prakash’s essay in chapter 1 and Li Bin’s essay in chapter 4. 5 Chinese experts increasingly point to means of verifying no first use, such as small arsenal size, non-mating of nuclear warheads to delivery systems, the pace and scale of nuclear modernization, the lack of tactical nuclear weapons, and non-deployment of nuclear weapons abroad. See Pan Zhenqiang’s essay in chapter 2 and Li Bin’s essay in chapter 4. 6 See Srikanth Kondapalli’s essay in chapter 4. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 See Pan Zhenqiang’s essay in chapter 2, Li Bin’s and Srikanth Kondapalli’s essays in chapter 4, and Yao Yunzhu’s essay in chapter 5. 10 See Dipankar Banerjee, Rukmani Gupta, Avinash Godbole, and Gunjan Singh’s essays in chapter 12. 11 The inherent meaning of the terms “sole purpose” and “no first use” remains a source of debate. While it could be argued that the two are essentially the same in intent, there are distinctions. “Sole purpose” is often assumed to provide less clarity than a no-first-use declaration. This is because it declares the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack, while no first use categorically declares that a country will not be the first to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against another party.

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SAALMAN 12 See Nie Hongyi’s essay in chapter 3 and P. K. Singh’s essay in chapter 2. 13 Ibid. 14 See Srikanth Kondapalli’s essay in chapter 4. 15 See P. K. Singh’s essay in chapter 2. 16 Ibid. 17 Fan Jishe, “Fan jishe: Mei yin he xieyi nanyu shunli changguan” (Fan Jishe: U.S.India Nuclear Cooperation has difficulties in passing), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) via Sina xinwen zhongxin (Sina News Center), September 1, 2008, http://news.sina. com.cn/pl/2008-09-01/100516209818.shtml. 18 This is not to argue that China and India are, as of yet, facing mutual concerns over conventional prompt global strike or ballistic missile defense. Nonetheless, both countries are engaged in conventional military modernization programs that could have a bearing on their nuclear deterrence. 19 See P. K. Singh’s essay in chapter 2. 20 See Li Hong’s essay in chapter 9. 21 See Yang Yi’s essay in chapter 1. 22 “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, August 17, 1999, www.pugwash. org/reports/nw/nw7a.htm. 23 See Yao Yunzhu’s essay in chapter 5. 24 According to this argument, China might launch or threaten to launch a nuclear first strike in areas it deems to be Chinese territory, as this would not violate its NFU pledge. Bhartendu Kumar Singh, “Fearing a Chinese Nuclear Attack in Arunachal Pradesh,” Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, July 25, 2001, www.ipcs.org/ article/nuclear/fearing-a-chinese-nuclear-attack-in-arunachal-pradesh-530.html. 25 See Li Bin’s essay in chapter 4. 26 A preexisting glossary explores these terms in the Sino-U.S. context. See Srikanth Kondapalli’s essay in chapter 4; Lora Saalman, “Sino-Indian Relations: Divergence, Similarity and Symmetry in Sino-Indian Threat Perceptions,” Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 2 (Spring–Summer 2011): 169–94. 27 From a logistical standpoint, deploying nuclear warheads and submarine-launched ballistic missiles at separate sites would not be tenable for a nuclear submarine deployed at sea. Mating the warhead and missile only in the event of a crisis would require the vessel to return to a weapons loading jetty, which would be time consuming and reveal its location. This would defeat the purpose of using nuclear submarines for nuclear weapons deployment and nuclear deterrence. John Ainslie, “Trident: Nowhere to Go,” report published by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 2012, www.cnduk.org; Chief of Naval Operations Submarine Warfare Division, “Submarine Frequently Asked Questions,” United States Navy, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/faq.html.

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THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS 28 Saalman, “Sino-Indian Relations.” 29 Ibid. 30 See Liu Siwei’s essay in chapter 10; Ananth Krishnan, “China Warns India on South China Sea Exploration Projects,” Hindu, September 15, 2011, www.thehindu.com/ news/international/article2455647.ece; Ying Mengzhe and Wang Shaowei, “Yindu la yindu dao nanhai kangheng zhongguo yin haijun chujiao yi kaojin zhongguo sanya” (Vietnam Pulls India into the South China Sea to Balance China, India’s Navy Already Has Its Tentacles near China’s Sanya), Huanqiu shibao (Global Times), August 1, 2011, http://world.huanqiu.com/roll/2011-08/1863661.html; “Chinese Military Base in Indian Ocean?” Times of India, December 13, 2011, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-12-13/china/30511052_1_seychelles-drone-base-china. 31 Lora Saalman, “China and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review,” Carnegie Paper, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 2011, carnegieendowment.org/2011/ 02/28/china-and-u.s.-nuclear-posture-review/1ci; see forthcoming book chapter: Lora Saalman, “Placing a Renminbi Sign on Strategic Stability,” in a book from Center for Naval Analyses, edited by Elbridge Colby and Michael Gerson, Center for Naval Analyses, 2012. 32 Rodney W. Jones, “Conventional Military Imbalance and Strategic Stability in South Asia,” SASSU Research Paper 1, March 2005, available at www.policyarchitects.org/ pdf/Conventional_imbalance_RJones.pdf. 33 Ruhee Neog, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Posturing: Is Hatf-9 a Response to Cold Start?” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, June 20, 2011, www.ipcs.org/article/india/ pakistans-nuclear-posturing-is-hatf-9-a-response-to-cold-3408.html. 34 See Li Deshun’s essay in chapter 6. 35 Lora Saalman, Li Deshun, Zhang Xinying, Lin Yunzhi, Li Hui, and Ma Jie, “The Nuclear Chain: U.S.–China, China–India, India–Pakistan, and Strategic Stability,” Event Summary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 10, 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/07/10/nuclear-chain-u-s-china-china-india-indiapakistan-and-strategic-stability/57ia. 36 Ibid. 37 This is slowly beginning to change, in part, through such events as the “2011 Beijing Space Sustainability Conference,” hosted in conjunction with Secure World Foundation, Beihang University, and International Space University, Beijing, October 13–14, 2011. However, greater interaction is merited in a number of other scientific fields. 38 For more information, see Lora Saalman, “Between ‘China Threat’ and ‘Chindia’: Chinese Responses to India’s Military Modernization,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 64, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 87–114. 39 Limitations in accuracy result most frequently from the relative lack of Chinese transparency. 40 See Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan’s essay in chapter 5. 41 Ibid.

188

SAALMAN 42 In conducting research for the following book chapter, the author found that out of 997 articles on missile defense, 240 made some mention of India. The author also located over 2,334 Chinese articles on missile defense, revealing the large stores of information available for further research. See forthcoming: Lora Saalman, “China and Missile Defense: Creating Comity from Countermeasures,” in Missile Defense: Confrontation and Cooperation, edited by Alexei Arbatov (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2012). 43 Planning Commission, “Eleventh Five-Year Plan 2007–2012: Volume I, Inclusive Growth,” Government of India, 25, 76, 87, 165, 207, 265. 44 A. Gopalakrishnan, “Recent Developments in the Indian Nuclear Safety Regulatory Structure,” Regional Seminar on Nuclear Fuel Supply, Reprocessing and Disposal in Asia, China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, October 17–18, 2011; A. Gopalakrishnan, “India: Post-Fukushima Concerns and Actions Taken,” International Workshop on Nuclear Energy Safety: Improving Safety in the Aftermath of the Fukushima Crisis, Natural Resources Defense Council, June 29–30, 2011. 45 A. Gopalakrishnan is the former chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, Government of India. Gopalakrishnan, “India: Post-Fukushima Concerns and Actions Taken.” 46 This logic is also visible in the Sino-U.S. military dialogues that, when suspended following U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, occur at a Track-2 or Track-1.5 level, until Track-1 level talks resume.

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appendix

T

his compilation of essays and excerpts is based on an event titled “China and India: Nuclear Doctrine and Dynamics,” held on June 2 and 3, 2011, by the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy. This event was a milestone in a number of respects. It was the first bilateral conference of its kind to bring together Chinese and Indian experts to share their views on entirely nuclear-related issues. It also served as the culmination of a year of four seminar series—two tracks on arms control and two tracks on China–South Asia—devoted to giving both senior and junior Chinese and Indian experts a voice and platform to further common understanding and communication.1 The event was divided into five sessions, each with two panels, with an introduction by Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy director Paul Haenle and associate Lora Saalman serving as event organizer and moderator. The first session covered China and India’s strategic relationship, nuclear strategy and doctrine, as well as credible minimum deterrence and no first use, featuring presentations and commentary from the following experts: • Admiral Arun Prakash (retired), former chief of naval staff of the

Indian Navy and chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee; • Major General Pan Zhenqiang (retired), senior adviser to the China Reform Forum and former director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at China’s National Defense University;

191

THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS • Lieutenant General P. K. Singh (retired), director of the United

Service Institution of India;

• Srikanth Kondapalli, professor and chairperson of Jawaharlal Nehru

University’s East Asian Studies Department; • Li Bin, professor and director of the Arms Control Program of the Department of International Relations and Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University; • Gu Guoliang, director of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; • Nie Hongyi, Ph.D. graduate of the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University; • Reshmi Kazi, associate fellow of the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses. The second session covered China and India’s missile defense and strategic stability, as well as nuclear modernization on land and sea, featuring presentations and commentary from the following experts: • Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, senior fellow of the Observer Research

Foundation and former assistant director within India’s National Security Council Secretariat; • Major General Yao Yunzhu, senior researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences; • Admiral Yang Yi (retired), former director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at China’s National Defense University; • Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar (retired), director of the National Maritime Foundation; • Atul Kumar, Ph.D. candidate at Monash Asia Institute at Australia’s Monash University; • Kalyan Kemburi, research analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies; • Han Hua, associate professor and director of the Center for Arms Control and Disarmament within the School of International Studies at Peking University; • Li Deshun, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University.

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appendix

The third session covered China and India’s nuclear energy and future, as well as nuclear safety and security, featuring presentations and commentary from the following experts: • V. S. Arunachalam, chairman of the Center for Study of Science,

Technology, and Policy and former scientific adviser to India’s defense minister and secretary of the Defence Research and Development Organization; • Gu Zhongmao, former vice chair of the Sciences and Technology Committee at the China Institute of Atomic Energy; • Zhou Zhiwei, professor in the Institute of Nuclear Energy and Technology at Tsinghua University; • R. Rajaraman, professor emeritus at Jawaharlal Nehru University; • Avinash Godbole, Ph.D. candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University and research assistant at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses; • Dipak Sundaram, master’s degree student in international business at Tsinghua University; • Su Hao, professor within the Department of Diplomacy and director of the Center for Strategic and Conflict Management within China Foreign Affairs University; • Wang Haibin, postdoctoral candidate and assistant professor within the Institute of Public Policy at Tsinghua University. The fourth session covered China’s and India’s views on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, featuring presentations and commentary from the following experts: • Li Hong, secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disar-

mament Association; • Rajesh Rajagopalan, professor at the Center for International Politics, Organization, and Disarmament of Jawaharlal Nehru University; • Swaran Singh, professor and chairman of the Center for International Politics, Organization, and Disarmament, School of International Studies of Jawaharlal Nehru University;

193

THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS • Senior Colonel Zou Yunhua (retired), former coordinator on the

Program on Arms Control within the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the former Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense; • Fan Jishe, senior associate within the Institute of American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; • Liu Siwei, Ph.D. candidate at Sichuan University; • Wang Jun, master’s degree student at Sichuan University; • M. S. Prathibha, Ph.D. candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University; • Mangunath Tagadi, Ph.D. candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

The fifth session covered China and India’s bilateral and multilateral cooperation and cooperative nuclear action agenda, as well as their strategic future, featuring presentations and commentary from the following experts: • Major General Dipankar Banerjee (retired), mentor at the Institute

of Peace and Conflict Studies; • Zhang Li, professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies at Sichuan University; • Ma Jiali, executive deputy director of the Center for Strategic Studies at the China Reform Forum; • Mao Jikang, assistant researcher at the Hainan Institute for World Watch; • Long Xingchun, Ph.D. candidate at Beijing Foreign Studies University; • Rukmani Gupta, Ph.D. candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University and associate fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses; • Gunjan Singh, Ph.D. candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University and research assistant at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses; • Ambassador Cheng Ruisheng (retired), former Chinese ambassador to India and former deputy director-general of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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note 1 These event series included two series for senior experts—Arms Control Seminar Series and China–South Asia Dialogues—as well as two series for more junior experts—Arms Control’s Future and China and South Asia’s Future. Summaries of these events are available at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy website, http://carnegietsinghua.org/events.

195

index

A

arms control, promoting communication, 131 arms control and non-proliferation, developing regular consultation, 163 arms control processes, discriminatory nature of, 104n4 arms race, potential, 68 arms reduction talks, United States and Russia in strategic, 57 Arunachalam, V. S., 193 ASAT (anti-satellite) program, 65, 68, 181, 184 ASCM (antiship cruise missile), 90n2 asymmetric deterrence, possible, 71 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, altered to accommodate India, 186n1 Atomic Energy Commission, India’s created in 1948, 30 Australia Group, 126

Action Plan for Disarmament, 166 Advanced Air Defense (AAD), 67 Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL), 6 Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) nuclear-powered submarine, 6 Aerospace Electronic Countermeasures (Hangtian dianzi duikang), 180 Agni series missiles, 5, 66, 172 Agni-I ballistic missile, 5 Agni-II ballistic missile, 5, 180 Agni-III ballistic missile, 5, 42, 61n15, 180 Agni-IV ballistic missile, 5, 180 Agni-V ballistic missile, 5, 6, 13n20, 172, 180 agricultural production and harvests, after a nuclear conflict, 80 Aksai Chin, China occupying, 19 Akula-class attack submarine, nuclearpowered, 6 animosity, between India and Pakistan, 141 anti-proliferation stance, India’s, 124 anti-satellite (ASAT) program, 65, 68, 181, 184 Anti-Secession Law, passed by Chinese National People’s Congress, 75n11 antiship cruise missile (ASCM), 90n2 antiship nuclear missiles, 55 anxiety, in India about China’s intent, 18 Arihant nuclear-powered submarine, 84

B

balance of power, global, 128 “balance of power” politics, Asia on the threshold of, 15 ballistic missile defense (BMD) ability to negate nuclear deterrent, 73 both China and India accelerating their efforts, 181 both countries developing, 59

197

THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 191 CD. See Conference on Disarmament (CD) Centers of Excellence for Nuclear Security, 114 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 31 centrifuge enrichment plants, 118n18 Chashma nuclear complex, in Pakistan, 139, 144 chemical and biological weapons, as a trigger for nuclear retaliation, 59 Cheng Ruisheng, 194 China building of nuclear weapons as inherent right of any developing country, 123 concerns about India stemming from lack of understanding, 141 continuing active breeder programs, 152 defense against small nuclear states such as India, 67 deflecting calls for transparency, 114 dependent on imports of oil and gas, 19, 155 dialogue or cooperation with India, 131 extant capabilities, 2 first nuclear test in 1964, 16 focusing research on reactor technology and advanced fuel cycles, 113 forced down the nuclear path by threat from United States, 39 forced to seek and maintain its nuclear option, 26 on India’s NSG membership as critical, 146 India’s nuclear weapons development, 42 interest in negotiating a nuclear linkage with India, 132 joining NSG consensus granting waiver for India, 130 looking at India with focus on the United States, 171 major critic of India’s aspiration to become a legitimate NWS, 132 medium-tier nuclear state, 79 Ministry of Defense white paper (2010), 2 MIRVs on land-based ballistic missiles, not deploying, 56 national security strategy and military strategy, 23

China opposing development and deployment of U.S. systems, 73 China’s test, sharpening security dilemma, 68 cooperative research project, 184 depending heavily on space sensors, 73 impact of, 65 India’s expanded to include an ASAT program, 66 ineffective or incomplete, increasing India’s vulnerability, 69 as major factor contributing to instability, 70 New Delhi-Washington cooperation on, 134 serious limitations to protective capabilities of, 68–69 United States’ sale to Taiwan of, 73 ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), 4, 84 ballistic missiles, 2, 84, 175 Banerjee, Dipankar, 194 Bangkok Treaty, 58 battlefield use, nuclear weapons designed for, 54–55 Bhaskar, C. Uday, 192 bilateral dialogue, bringing Chinese to accept, 168 bilateral engagement, between Beijing and New Delhi, 134 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, signed by India, 128 biological weapons, as a trigger for nuclear retaliation, 59 BMD. See ballistic missile defense (BMD) bomber force, China’s strategic, 3, 85, 89 Brahmos cruise missile, 83, 90n9, 90n10 Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), 72, 161 Britain, refusing to make a clear commitment to NFU, 44n4 bullying neighbor, China as, 19 Bush, George W., 66, 100, 116

c

C4ISR assets, both countries modernizing, 86 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 146

198

index Chinese arsenal, modernization of, 37 Chinese experts, conflating terms “minimum deterrent” and “limited deterrent,” 174 Chinese nuclear threat, India persisting in public discussion of, 129 Christian Science Monitor, “Indian Ocean Becomes Battleground for India and China,” 142 circular error probability (CEP), 6 civil nuclear cooperation, 57, 164 civil nuclear energy cooperative research project, 184 essential for both China and India, 169n3 potential for Sino-Indian consensus and cooperation, 182–183 civil use, emphasized by India’s nuclear program, 58 clean waiver, for India, 57 Clinton, Bill, 61n9, 102, 105n12, 105n15, 132 closed fuel cycle, 157 coalition missile defenses, during 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 90n2 collective security, as a means of defense, 56 command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), 86 command-and-control systems, automation of, 60 commercial reprocessing plant, designing and building China’s, 157 communication, establishing credible modes of, 89 competition, not zero-sum, 43 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) China advocating, 21 deathblow to, 127 India labeling as discriminatory, 58 India not unwilling to sign until June 1994, 97 India’s co-sponsorship of, 96 India’s persistent refusal to sign, 133 India’s public opposition to, 98 ratification of by the United States, 104 ratifications remaining absent, 102 rejected by India, 98 United States’ environment for supporting, 103

on North Korea and Iran, 125 nuclear first strike in areas deemed to be Chinese territory, 187n23 nuclear policy simple and clear-cut, 70 perceiving South Asia through active involvement in Pakistan, 185 preoccupation with the United States, 185 promoting selective disarmament goals, 112 reluctance to deal with India as a non-NPT signatory, 183–184 role in developing a constructive relationship between India and nonproliferation regime, 121 seeking hydrocarbons, 19 suffered from high-handed Western colonization, 72 supporting FMCT, 109 taking India as a de facto NWS, 70 as threat number one for India, 41 using Pakistan as a nuclear proxy, 37 wariness about India’s intentions, 168 “China and India: Nuclear Doctrine and Dynamics,” 191 China Atomic Energy Authority, 114 China factor, in Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation, 142 China Great Wall Industry Corporation, 113 China National Nuclear Corporation, 113 China North Industries Corporation, 113 China threat theory increasingly having a market within India, 139 India’s claim of, 24 not the most compelling reason for action, 165 not using as main pretext for achieving India’s nuclear aspiration, 134 on the rise again in India, 161–162 China–India boundary question, 162, 169n1 China–India relationship, trust deficit, 72 China–Japan context, second cycle of arms race and competition, 75n7 China–Pakistan axis, emergence of, 100 China–Pakistan cooperation, 36, 68, 69, 129 China’s experimental fast reactor (CEFR), 157

199

THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS supplementing bombers, 85 unique technical characteristics, 82 Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, 79 Cultural Revolution, China in the throes of in 1963, 123

verification, 52 Conference on Disarmament (CD), 107–108, 115 confidence, building mutual, 161–168 confidence-building measures (CBMs), 43, 57, 69, 88 conventional annihilation, deterring, 49 conventional attacks, against nuclear facilities, 87 conventional conflicts, giving up nuclear coercion in, 51 conventional disarmament, hand in hand with nuclear disarmament, 32 conventional forces, fending off intimidation and coercion, 20 conventional levels, China’s operational doctrine at, 59 conventional loss, to non–nuclear-weapon states, 48 conventional military capabilities, 33, 175 conventional precision weapons, 87, 92n32 conventional weapons force, strength of, 56 cooperation, creating forums for, 183–186 cooperative relations, maintaining between China and India, 23 counterforce operations (CFOs), 85, 86 counter-nuclear deterrence ( fan weishe), 39 counter-retaliation (houfazhiren), 59 credibility, of nuclear deterrence against conventional threats, 50 credible minimum deterrence, 6, 18, 58, 59, 133, 174–175 criterion-based approach, in regard to India’s NSG membership, 146–147 cruise missile transport-erector-launchers (TEL) systems, size and mobility of, 85, 89 cruise missiles capabilities of, 92n34 coercive political tool and versatile military weapon, 82 in development and testing for India, 83 effect of, 82 effectiveness of, 88 ideal second-strike weapons, 85 impact on strategic calculi of China and India, 83 key characteristics of, 86 operational advantages, 88

D

Dalai Lama, 162 decommissioning, of nuclear weapons, 33 decoys, useful countermeasures against missile defense, 61n5 Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), estimate of technological capacities, 66 defense system, India intending to have a multilayered, 67 delivery systems impacting China’s neighbors’ security, 3 multidimensionality of, 21 delivery vehicles, aircraft for India, 5 demonstration fast reactor (CFR 1000), China building by about 2020, 157 deterrence, 39, 133 deterrence posture, ambiguity part of, 84 deterrence stability, effect of cruise missiles on, 83 DF-3A (CSS-2) ballistic missile, 3 DF-4 (CSS-3) ballistic missile, 3 DF-5 (CSS-4) ballistic missile, 2 DF-21 (CSS-5) ballistic missile, 3 DF-21 and DF-31 land-based systems, 18, 180 DF-31 (CSS-10) ballistic missile, 3 DF-31A (CSS-10 Mods 1 and 2), 3 DH-10 LACM, 3, 83 Dhanush missile, 350 km range, 6 disarmament. See also nuclear disarmament cooperative research project, 184 paradox of, 32 support for global, verifiable, nondiscriminatory, 176–177 disaster planning, in context of nuclear reactors, 154 doctrine, 25, 26 Dong Feng ballistic missiles. See DF entries Dong Hai (DH-10). See DH-10 LACM dynamic deterrence, Indian analysts’ references to, 175

200

index

E

Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster, 154, 182–183 full-scope safeguards, change in the NSG’s rule regarding, 145

East Asia, impact of China and India, 45n12 economic and strategic interdependence, world governed by, 179 economic gap, between China and India, 162 economic interdependence, penetrating political and military realm, 77 ElBaradei, Mohamed, 122 energy policy, China insisting on selfreliance, 156 energy security, China’s, 155–156 engagement mechanisms, expanding existing, 163 “The Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy,” 98–99, 105n13 exceptionalism, India’s having a negative impact on NSG’s authority, 137–138 export control laws, harmonization of India’s, 122 extreme terminology, utilized by some Chinese media outlets, 149n13

G

Gandhi, Indira, 96 Gandhi, Rajiv, 96, 166 gaseous diffusion plants, 118n18 geography, almost irrelevant, 16 Ghose, Arundhati, 98 global missile defense, India’s position on, 134 global NFU, joint proposal for, 37 global nuclear nonproliferation regime, 112, 146. See also nuclear nonproliferation regime globalization, reaping developmental benefits, 43 glossary of terms, creating, 178 Godbole, Avinash, 193 Goldschmidt, Pierre, 146 Gopalakrishnan, A., 189n44 gradual aggression, countering, 50 “Great Wall Engineering” (changcheng gongcheng) project, 40 Group of Two (G-2) arrangement, between United States and China, 75n7 Gu Guoliang, 192 Gu Zhongmao, 193 guidance radar, India’s, 75n3 guidance system, technical and acquisition barriers for an accurate, 88 Gupta, Rukmani, 194 Gwadar port in Pakistan, China’s interest in, 4

F

Fan Jishe, 194 fast breeder reactors (FBRs), 152, 159n3, 182 fast reactor fuel cycle, described, 157 fast reactor nuclear energy system, China’s, 158 Federation of American Scientists, 2, 5 Fernandes, George, 41 fire hazard, sodium being a major, 152 first to use nuclear weapons, China under no circumstances being, 21 first use of nuclear weapons constrained by nuclear taboo, 54 ways of claiming, 49 Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), 107, 108, 109, 110, 115–116 fissile material production, 107, 109, 175, 176 fissile plutonium-239, production of, 18 formative deterrence, validating, 133 forums, creating for cooperation, 183–186 framework, identifying convergence and divergence in regard to nuclear issues, 171 France, 44n4, 140

H

H-6M bombers, equipped with DH-10 cruise missiles, 89 Haenle, Paul, 191 Haider, Salman, 97–98 Han Hua, 192 Han-class (Type 091), second-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, 4 Hangtian dianzi duikang (Aerospace Electronic Countermeasures), 180

201

THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS nuclear tests, a challenge to international order, 127 official dialogue and consultation with China on NSG membership, 131 official status as a non–nuclear-weapon state under the NPT, 124 pressured to join the NPT as a non– nuclear-weapon state, 127 seeking hydrocarbons, 19 stockpile of weapons-grade nuclear material, 108 suffered from Western colonization, 72 tarnished its image as a responsible power, 30 unlikely to join as a non–nuclear-weapon state member of the NPT, 125 wariness about China’s intentions, 168 India factor, in Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation, 142 India–China relationship, 68, 168 Indian analyses, lacking a conceptual framework for interpreting China’s developments, 181 Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation, 61n15 Indian nuclear program, China not recognizing the de jure nature of, 59 Indian nuclear threat, Chinese community seldom talking about, 129 Indian Ocean strategy, China’s, 19 India–Pakistan relations, 42, 68 India-specific nuclear safeguards, China joining other member states in endorsing, 144 India–United States bargaining, China keeping an eye on, 133 indigenous equipment, increasing share of, 154 indirect losses, incurred from one’s own nuclear strike, 80 indirect security dilemma, between China and India, 141 Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, 31 of 1971, 31 Indo-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation, 57, 140, 143, 151. See also United States–India civil nuclear deal

Hatoyama, Yukio, 101 hegemon, China as the new, 20 hegemonic dominance, in a series of long cycles, 19 Hezbollah, successful attack against Israeli naval vessel with antiship cruise missile (ASCM), 90n2 hidden conditionality, in China’s NFU pledge, 173 Himalayan border, territorial dispute between China and India, 72 Himalayan ranges, as a natural barrier, 15 Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai, slogan of, 16 “hit-to-kill” technologies, 66 Hong Niao (HN) series, of land-attack cruise missiles, 83 Hong-6 (B-6/Badger) nuclear-capable bombers, 3, 85 Hu Jintao, 71, 161, 164, 182

i

India active breeder programs, 152 among first to recognize People’s Republic of China, 72 anti-proliferationist, 124 BMD program, 73–74 concern over “two-front” scenarios, 5 domestic programs framed in comparison with those of China, 182 extant capabilities, 2 first nuclear test in 1974, 16 fixation on China, 185 focusing on China, 126 interest in high-technology cooperation, 67 inventory of nuclear weapons, 5 looking at China with focus on Pakistan, 171 marginalization in global disarmament debates, 96 never faced with an immediate major military or nuclear threat requiring a nuclear option, 29 not a factor in China’s development of nuclear weapons, 23–24 not accepted as an NWS, 70 not deploying MIRVs on land-based ballistic missiles, 56

202

index Kazi, Reshmi, 192 Kemburi, Kalyan, 192 Khan, A. Q., 169n4 Kissinger, Henry, 101 Kondapalli, Srikanth, 192 Kothari, D. S., 95 Kumar, Atul, 192

Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, 99, 100 institutions, associated with nuclear nonproliferation regime, 126 Integrated Guided Missile Development Program, 66 integration, of missile defense system components, 67 intent, questions of Chinese, 37 interception tests, validity of, 69 interdependence, factor in enhancing strategic stability, 79 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 57, 125, 151, 186n1 International Court of Justice, 60n2 International Monitoring System, 103 international nonproliferation regime, 114. See also nuclear nonproliferation regime international regime, China outside from the start of its nuclear program, 31 intimidation, China maintaining a form of, 19 Iran, China’s position on, 125 Iraqi Scud launcher, 91n24 irradiated thorium, highly radioactive, 153

L

LACM missiles, deploying, 82, 83 last resort, use of nuclear weapons by, 49 launch on warning, strategy of, 56 Li Bin, 192 Li Deshun, 192 Li Hong, 193 limited deterrence, 58, 174 limited deterrent, 174 Liu Siwei, 194 Long Xingchun, 194 “Look East” policy, India’s, 45n12 loose nuke situation from Pakistan, India guarding against, 74 losses, calculating associated with first strike and retaliation, 80 low-yield nuclear first strike, 86

J

M

Jaguar IS/IB aircraft, 5 Jaguars, modified to conduct strategic bombing, 85 Jaitapur nuclear power project, India’s plans for, 155 Japan, 73, 75n7, 162 Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbot talks, 99 Jiang Yu, 65 Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN, 4 JL-1 (CSS-N-3) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 4 JL-2 (CSS-N-4) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 4, 18, 180 Johnston, Alastair Iain, 12n1 joint studies, on strategic stability, 179

M-9 missiles, Chinese transfer of, 66 M-11 missiles, Chinese transfer of, 66 Ma Jiali, 194 Mao Jikang, 194 Mao Zedong, 166 maritime issues, creating space for a discussion of, 178 maritime security, Chinese interest in Indian participation in forums to address, 179 MD system, Phase II of, 67 MiG-27 aircraft, 5 military, traditionally apolitical in India, 16 military dimension, China’s nuclear program with an explicit, 58 military stockpiles, of fissile materials, 109 military strength, of China, 162 military threat, India’s concept of, 42 minimum deterrence Chinese and Indian analysts applying a relatively holistic view of, 175 cooperative research project, 184

K

Kalam, A. P. J. Abdul, 66 Kalpakkam power plant, in state of Tamil Nadu, 155 Kapoor, Deepak, 61n19

203

THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS

N

neither strictly following, 84 requiring only a small force, 91n15 shifting toward limited deterrence, 28 minimum deterrent, 174 minimum nuclear deterrence, 32, 39, 40, 58 Mirage 2000H aircraft, 5, 85 MIRVs, 3, 55 Mishra, Brajesh, 41, 99 misperceptions, reducing, 81 missile attacks, protection against multiple, 69 missile defense China viewing systems as a threat, 65 Chinese-style of, 40 destabilizing capabilities, 74 ground rules for, 69 installations, 133 plans, 67 shield against Pakistan, 74 missile modernization, 180–181, 184 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 121, 126, 164 missiles and nuclear weapons, disposition of replaced, 33 mistrust, overcoming, 43 mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication, 157–158 Modelski, George, 19 moratorium, India’s unilateral commitment to, 98 MRV-Mk.2 maneuverable re-entry vehicle, 6 Multilateral Fuel Supply Mechanism, 118n11 multilateral mechanisms, close coordination between China and India evident, 131 multilateral nonproliferation regimes, 130–131, 164 multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV), 3, 55, 60 Musharraf, Pervez, 37 mutual confidence, building, 161–168 mutual deterrence, China and India securely locked in a relation of, 74 mutual trust deficiencies in, 161 low level between China and India’s militaries, 42 “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) construct, 77, 78

National Nuclear Security Administration, 114 National Security Advisory Board, 41 National Security Strategy, at Institute of International Relations Research Center, 142 nationalism among Japanese youths, 75n7 rising above extreme, 43 natural resources, economic ambitions fueled by, 18 naval and aviation capabilities, India’s exceeding China’s, 178 Nayan, Rajiv, 146 Nayyar, Kuldip, 169n4 negative security assurances (NSAs), 6, 177–178, 184 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 95 New Delhi. See India new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), 21 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, 118n9 NFU (no first use) acknowledging nuclear weapons use as legitimate, 27 announced by China in 1964, 166 attaching early warning mechanisms to, 52 of both China and India, 71, 84, 166, 173–174 China’s commitment to questioned, 173 China’s position on, needing to be revised, 59 commitment, components of, 48 compared to asymmetric deterrence and mutual vulnerability, 71 consistent principle for both countries, 24 cooperative research project, 184 as core principle limiting role of China’s nuclear weapons, 39 doctrine applied by China, 70 as element of China’s and India’s nuclear strategies, 56 global, 37 India declaring, 18, 30, 32, 96 meaning of, 186n10 methods of clarifying positions, 173

204

index India’s continuing to expand and modernize, 24 nuclear arsenals, lean, 172 nuclear artillery, 55 nuclear assets, conventional strikes against, 86 nuclear balance, compared to nuclear stability, 32 nuclear ballistic missiles. See also ballistic missiles, India’s, 5 nuclear coercion, 20, 51, 54 nuclear conflict, scenarios between India and Pakistan, 80 nuclear cooperation with Pakistan as civilian in nature, 141 with Pakistan by China, 141 strengthening between India and China, 142 nuclear cooperation agreement, China and United States signed, 113 nuclear cooperation constraints, eliminating for India, 128 nuclear deterrence definition for “minimum,” “limited,” or “maximum,” 61n10 fending off intimidation and coercion, 20 maintaining postures of minimum, 172 nuclear capability required, 28–29 source of global arms race, 29 nuclear devices, Indian scientists commencing work on, 16 nuclear dialogue and cooperation, common bases for China and India to expand, 130 nuclear disarmament. See also disarmament campaign for, 96 commitments to, 176 unique opportunity to convert international discourse into an action plan, 177 nuclear doctrines, 25, 58, 84 nuclear domain, 167, 168 nuclear energy China among supporters of peaceful use of, 143 China’s agreements on peaceful uses of, 113 cooperation tapping into, 135 programs, 151–158, 182

nuclear deterrence based on, 6 nuclear policy, 129 of nuclear weapons, 26 political and strategic differences between, 49 political importance of, 48, 51–52 questions regarding China’s pledge of, 58 remaining unverifiable, 52 verifying, 27, 186n4 weaknesses of, 27 Nie Hongyi, 192 Nirbhay intermediate-range land-attack cruise missile, 6, 83 Non-Aligned Movement, India and China partners in, 72 non-mating/de-mating cooperative research project, 184 nuclear deterrence based on, 6 of nuclear warheads, 178–179 non-NPT states, including in FMCT negotiations, 115 non‒nuclear-weapon states (NNWSs), China pledged not to use nuclear weapons against, 70 nonproliferation pledges, Chinese occuring under sanctions and negotiations, 113 nonproliferation regime. See nuclear nonproliferation regime nonstate actors, possession and use of nuclear weapons by, 28 “non-targeting” agreement, 20 nonviolence, success of Gandhi’s strategy of, 16 North Korea, China’s position on, 125 NPT. See Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) NSG. See Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) nuclear affairs, China’s and India’s limited dialogue on, 126 nuclear arms control and disarmament, identical stands on, 162 nuclear arms control process, designed by existing nuclear powers to maintain nuclear hegemony, 123 nuclear arms race, India not getting into, 33 nuclear arsenal China’s extensive modernization of, 18 China’s modest, 114

205

THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS China signatory to, 130 China’s views of countries outside, 177 cornerstone of international nonproliferation regime, 127 CTBT debate intertwined with, 101 extension of, 97 improving legitimacy of, 122 India labeling as discriminatory, 58 India long existing outside, 130 India’s persistent refusal to sign, 133 India’s refusal to accede to, 151 nuclear-weapon state defined by, 47 Review Conference, 102, 111, 128 U.S. actions violating the spirit of, 138 nuclear option decision to exercise, 98 India paying a big price for achieving, 29 India’s use in response to a biological or chemical weapons attack, 173 nuclear parity, driving United States’ and Soviet Union’s nuclear bargaining in 1970s, 132 nuclear penetration warheads, 55 nuclear policy, similarities, 173–180 nuclear policy and practice, China’s and India’s overlap in, 171 nuclear posture, 27, 172 Nuclear Posture Review, U.S. Department of Defense, 75n10, 103, 179 nuclear power common aspiration for both China and India, 131 generation program, 17 large-scale development of in China, 156 only non-fossil option available for India, 154 nuclear power plants bases of in China, 156 exploring more reliable and more riskadverse means of operating, 164 minor accidents in India, 154–155 nuclear practice, by India and China, 180–183 nuclear proliferation lattice, 36 nuclear reactors China providing to Pakistan, 116 costs of doubling between 2003 and 2009, 154 ensuring safety in, 153–154, 158

Sino-Indian cooperation in the field of, 164 transitioning China from PWRs to fast reactors gradually, 156 nuclear energy and technology, China’s market-oriented approach to, 112 nuclear escalation, in a bilateral context, 60 “Nuclear Explosions and Their Effects,” 95 nuclear fallout, accidental, 60 nuclear fission energy, sustainable development of, 156–157 nuclear force, 2, 40, 53 nuclear fuel cycle, 114 nuclear innocence, age of India’s, 100 nuclear issues accommodating Sino-Indian synergy on, 133 central to Sino-Indian relations for India but not China, 185 lack of an official dialogue on, between India and China, 20 preliminary cooperation starting with less sensitive issues, 164 nuclear landscape, complexity of, 28 nuclear nonproliferation, internal inconsistencies, 123 nuclear nonproliferation regime. See also global nuclear nonproliferation regime; multilateral nonproliferation regimes both China and India dubious about, 172 China engaging in while India has taken a step back, 116 currently not perfect, 131 current troubles, 122 focusing on India, 122 India’s and China’s perspectives toward, 125 India’s arguments against, 122–123 India’s attempt to seek a modus vivendi with, 121 India’s relationship with, 135n1 relationship with India and China, 147 staying outside, imposing constraints on India, 127 strong similarities between Indian and Chinese attitudes, 122 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) accepting Chinese nuclear weapons as legitimate, 123

206

index as a consequence of India’s 1974 nuclear test, 145 discussion of in India, 138 giving India a clean waiver for trade, 151 granting India a waiver, 145 India seeking entry into, 116 India’s rocky relations with, 126 waiver for nuclear trade to India, 186n1 waiver to India in August 2008, 140 nuclear taboo (he jinji), 39, 48 nuclear terrorism, issue of mutual interest, 33–34 nuclear test ban, 95 nuclear tests China’s first in 1964, 16 by India in May 1998, 98 India’s first in 1974, 16, 95 nuclear threat, to China two decades after end of Cold War, 26 nuclear threshold, chances to initiate and win a conflict below, 87 nuclear trade, China engaging in, 114 “nuclear umbrellas,” providing to nonnuclear-weapon states, 34 nuclear warheads deploying on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 187n26 not mating to delivery systems, 178 nuclear weapon states, distinction between de jure and de facto, 31 nuclear weapons aircraft-based, 23 attaching a coercive role to, 51 basic characteristic of, 38 China and India sharing many common approaches toward, 166 China’s not targeted against India, 24 China’s total inventory of, 2 as a defensive means, 173 demand for abolition of, 165–166 demarcation between strategic and tactical, 54 detection of preparations for launch of, 52 development not based on a pursuit of numbers, 81 divergent views on roles of, 48 India’s refusal to help others build, 124 on international stage, 21 modernization of, 21

“grandfathering in” of China’s sale of additional to Pakistan, 147 nuclear realm, improving bilateral relations, 162 nuclear response, flexible, 50 nuclear restraint, China and India maintaining, 175 nuclear retaliation China’s potential for, 173 strategy, 26, 53 nuclear retaliatory strike, China’s relying on secrecy, 115 nuclear review processes, in both China and India, 183 nuclear safety, further improvements in, 158 nuclear self-defense, strategy of, 26 nuclear stability, compared to nuclear balance, 32 nuclear state, China striving to be a responsible, 26 nuclear status China refusing to acknowledge India’s, 36 question of India’s, 162–163 nuclear strategic guidelines, Beijing’s preferred term, 26 nuclear strategy characteristics or principles of China’s, 39 China and India sharing common principles, 38 difficulties initiating official dialogue on, 131 issues addressed by, 25 main points of India’s, 41 nuclear submarine-based ballistic missiles, dual advantages of, 22 nuclear submarines, varying stages of pursuing, 178 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) agreed to grant India immunity, 138 attaching conditions to India’s joining, 138 China as member of, 130 China’s objections and obstructionism insufficient to deny India NSG approval, 146 Chinese studies focusing on, 137 clean waiver for India at, 57 clearing way for India’s membership, 131 concluding India’s nuclear status, 36

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o

number of not enhancing utility, 78 purposes served by, 53 right of developing countries to build, 124 “sole purpose” of deterring nuclear weapons, 71 spreading of as inherently dangerous, 124 survivability of, 55 tactical, 54–55 United States and Soviet Union wasting huge sums on developing, 78 nuclear weapons tests, by India, 100 nuclear-armed states, difficulties of verifying stockpiles of, 108 nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, India’s ability to strike China with, 42 nuclear-capable bombers, 3 nuclear-powered submarines Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV), 6 Akula-class attack, 6 Arihant, 84 Beijing’s efforts to produce a new class of, 3 Han-class (Type 091), 4 Shang-class (Type 093), 4 U.S. Ohio-class, 22 Xia-class, 4 nuclear-related subjects, bilateral interaction aimed at bridging perceptual differences, 163 nuclear-weapon power, India a reluctant, 165 nuclear-weapon–free zones, 58 nuclear-weapon states (NWSs) China fifth country to become, 35 China’s status as, 1, 47, 130 limiting role of, 26 minimizing number of, 127 only China and India announcing nofirst-use policy, 163 providing unconditional security assurances to non–nuclear-weapon states, 97 supporting nuclear disarmament, 32 nuclear-weapons-enabled terror, 37 “nuclear-weapons–free world,” not just a slogan, 79 Nunn, Sam, 101 NWS status, of China, 1, 35, 47, 130

Obama, Barack, 99, 101, 102, 128, 176 Obama administration, plan for upgrading nuclear weapons complex, 103 Ohio-class ballistic missile nuclear submarine, 22 once-through fuel cycle, 157 opacity, 37, 174 Operation Brasstacks, 169n4 operational cost, favoring cruise missiles, 85 operational flexibility, of cruise missiles, 82 optimistic Chinese scholars, in regard to nonproliferation mechanisms, 137 outer space, preventing weaponization of, 73 “overkill” (chaosha), capacity for, 38

P

P5+1 (Germany) forum, of the Security Council, 117n4 PADSAT-1R, 68 Pakistan addressing growing energy needs, 141 China’s arming of, 17 China’s nuclear assistance to, 125, 172 China’s nuclear cooperation with, 141, 146 credible status as a “state with nuclear weapons,” 36 desire to possess a nuclear weapon, 31 developing tactical nuclear weapons, 179 friendly relations between China and, 141 India needing China to exert influence on, 130 India’s suspicions toward China’s relations with, 162 not adopting an NFU policy, 74 nuclear tests in a challenge to international order, 127 nuclear weapons capability, 165 nuclear weapons, Indians attributing to China, 129 quest to checkmate India, 18 security concerns regarding the FMCT, 111 seeking to acquire parity with India, 17 Pan Zhenqiang, 61n13, 191 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), 31, 95, 123

208

index

Q

passive control measures, for nuclear reactors, 154 passivity, posture of, 27 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), 73 peaceful explosion, conducted by India in 1974, 127 peaceful intentions, factors making China’s clear, 114–115 “peaceful nuclear test” explosion, in May 1974, 95, 165 “Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology Agreement,” 113 People’s Liberation Army, 16 People’s Liberation Army Navy, 4 per capita energy consumption, China’s, 156 Perry, William, 101 pessimistic scholars, in regard to nonproliferation mechanisms, 137–138 PHWR (pressurized heavy-water reactor), 152, 156 plutonium, 152, 153 plutonium reprocessing plant, 17 position of strength, engaging from, 99 posture and intent, ambiguity of Chinese, 2 power shift, from West to East, 15 Prakash, Arun, 191 Prathibha, M. S., 194 precision strike, of cruise missiles, 82, 88 preemptive concepts, potential tilt toward, 87 preemptive strike (xianfazhiren), 59 pressurized heavy-water reactor (PHWR), 152, 156 pressurized water reactors (PWRs), 156, 157 Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), China linking FMCT to, 112 “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” document, 97 Prithvi Air Defense (PAD), 67 Prithvi missiles, 66, 67, 69 Prithvi-I ballistic missile, 150 km range, 5 “program of work,” reaching a consensus on for FMCT, 110 prohibition, scope of for FMCT, 109 publications, Chinese containing few studies or research papers on India’s nuclear strategy and nonproliferation policies, 126 PWR spent fuel reprocessing pilot plant, 157

Qian-5 (A-5/Fantan) bombers, 85 Qian-5 nuclear-capable bomber, 3

R

radioactive sodium, 159n3 raid precision strike weapons systems and missile defense, 40 Rajagopalan, Rajesh, 193 Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai, 192 Rajaraman, R., 193 Rajendra radar, 75n3 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for Disarmament, 37, 96 Ramana, Siddharth, 139 realpolitik approach, by India, 99 realpolitik motives, underlying China’s disarmament commitments, 112 recessed deterrent postures, maintained by both China and India, 178 reciprocal arrangements with China, influencing China’s arms control behavior, 113 regional coordination and cooperation, 163 reluctant realism, India’s, 96 reprocessed plutonium (Pu), recycling in present PWRs, 157 reprocessing capacity, India’s lack of adequate, 153 reprocessing plants, short life span, 153 retaliatory capability, China’s, 180 retaliatory warheads, number of, 53 “Review and Update of Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” 103 “right to nuclear weapons,” China and India differences on, 125 Russia committed to nuclear cooperation with India, 140 continuing active breeder programs, 152 nuclear arsenal maintained by, 29 Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), 88

209

THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS

s

similarities of nuclear doctrines of China and India, 84 in nuclear policy, 173–180 Singh, Gunjan, 194 Singh, Manmohan, 18, 100, 106n20, 116, 161, 166 Singh, P. K., 192 Singh, Swaran, 193 single-strike package, 91n22 Sino-Indian bilateral relations, 144, 185 Sino-Indian border, 42, 162 Sino-Indian civil nuclear energy cooperation, 142 Sino-Indian conflict, of 1962, 16, 31 Sino-Indian dialogue and cooperative research projects, suggested subjects for, 184 Sino-Indian dialogue mechanisms, 178 Sino-Indian relations, counter-productive developments emerging, 161 Sino-Indian similarities, persisting, 172 Sino-Indian Strategic Dialogue, 163 Sino-Indian strategic relationship, 79 Sino-Indian ties, scientific experts remaining untapped, 180 Sino-Indian War, of 1962, 16, 31 Sino-Pakistani agreement, one of cooperative intent, 140 Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship, influencing China’s political will, 113 Sino-U.S. military dialogues, 189n45 Sino-U.S. nuclear relations, 70, 71 social norm, nuclear taboo as a prohibitive, 49 sole purpose, meaning of, 186n10 South Asia emergence of two nuclear states in, 29 impact of China and India, 45n12 Indo-U.S. nuclear deal forcing imbalance in, 143 South China Sea, China’s area of “undisputed sovereignty,” 19 Southeast Asia, impact of China and India, 45n12 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 31 Soviet Union cruise missiles as a first-strike weapon, 85 nuclear weapons development, 78

Saalman, Lora, 191 safety-in-design features, for FBR program, 153 Sagarika cruise missile, 6, 83 Santhanam, K., 106n21 Saraswat, V. K., 67 Satellite Launch Vehicle, China’s, 68 Schneider, Barry, 87 scientific community, as best conduit for enhanced understanding, 180 sea-based nuclear arsenal, expanding scale of China’s, 23 sea-based systems, China’s slowly developing, 180 sea-based weapons, important position of, 22 Second Artillery Forces (China), 59, 83, 174 second-generation (Gen-2) nuclear power plants with PWRs, in China, 156 second-generation-plus (Gen-2+) plants, with PWRs, 156 second-strike capability China’s nuclear weapons maintained for, 115 essential for China, 22 necessitated, 84 retaining only, 39 securing for China, 4 security concerns, about Sino-Pakistani civil nuclear cooperation, 139 security dilemma, brought on by system of relations among China, India, and Pakistan, 141 security perceptions, of India and China, 16 seismic activity, vulnerability of Jaitapur project to, 155 Seychelles, Chinese cooperation with, 4 Shang-class (Type 093), second-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, 4 Shannon, Gerald, 117n1 “Shannon Mandate,” 117n1 Shannon Report, mandate contained in, 109 Shaurya cruise missile, 83 Shen Dingli, 59, 92n31 Shultz, George, 101 Sibal, Kanwal, 139

210

index strategic-strike operations (SSOs), 86 strategy compared to doctrine, 26 of last resort, 54 “String of Pearls,” 179 Su Hao, 193 Su-30 fighters, 85 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 4, 178, 180 submarines. See nuclear-powered submarines subsonic cruise missile, 6 Sundaram, Dipak, 193 survivability, 6, 40, 55 survivability and retaliatory capabilities, 174

Soviet-U.S. dynamic, evolution of nuclear strategy from, 39 space, stopping the weaponization of, 74 space-based early warning capabilities, in an integrated BMD system, 74 spent fuel, reprocessing, 113 SSBN (ballistic missile submarine), 4, 84 state with nuclear weapons (SNW), 35. See also nuclear-weapon states (NWSs) states, India refusing to support pursuit of nuclear mapping, 124 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2 Stockpile Stewardship Program, in the United States, 103 stockpiles categories of, 109–110 India keeping to a minimum, 96 issue of existing, 108 strategic analyses, Chinese laden with abstract discussions of Indian advances, 180–181 strategic calculus, between India and China, 82 strategic choices, Beijing’s ability to be pragmatic and flexible in making, 37 strategic doctrine, 25 strategic environment, 31, 79 strategic excesses, China and India avoiding, 37 strategic missile bases, variety of types of, 40 strategic mutual trust, process of building, 145 strategic nuclear deterrence, China and United States relations marked by, 22 strategic nuclear force, lean and effective for China, 23 strategic stability, 179–180 based on acceptance of mutual vulnerability, 71 China and United States maintaining, 71 cooperative research project, 184 improving by strengthening shared perceptions, 81 realization of, 68 theory, 78, 79 strategic strikes, 28 strategic weapons, nuclear weapons only as, 61n16

T

tactical doctrine, 25 tactical nuclear weapons, 55, 60 Tagadi, Mangunath, 194 Taiwan, 4, 22, 72 Taiwan Strait issue, 73 Tauscher, Ellen, 103 technology control arrangements, integrating India into, 122 terms, clarification of, 177–178 Terrain Contour Matching and Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation systems, in cruise missiles, 93n35 territorial boundary disputes, not properly resolved, 43 terror deterrence (kongbu weishe), 43 test ban debate, current phase of India’s, 96 thermonuclear experimental reactor project, 135 third countries, role of complicating nuclear relations between China and India, 129 third-generation (Gen-3) plants with PWRs, 156 thorium cycle, very few experiments globally, 153 thorium reserves, exploiting India’s extensive, 152 threat perceptions, resulting in continuation of security dilemma, 168 threatening, to use nuclear weapons, 54, 187n23 Tibet, China’s actions in, 31

211

THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS China maintaining nuclear stability and nuclear balance with, 32 as China’s primary nuclear threat, 141 cruise missile diplomacy, 89n2 decline in ability to defend Tokyo, 75n7 double standards and relaxed attitude on Indian nuclear proliferation, 138 failed to ratify CTBT in October 1999, 102 India an “unthinking appendage” of, 38 India needing BMD program to promote cooperation with, 74 India obtaining nuclear technology from, 128 India’s engagement with, 99 lacking shared identity with China, 72 nuclear arsenal maintained by, 29 preventing a nuclear attack from, 22 providing India with nuclear material, 140 reciprocal arrangements with China, 113 redefining role of India as a counterweight to a rising China, 128 refusing to make a clear commitment to NFU, 44n4 resolving India’s nuclear status, 129 role in India’s understanding of China, 185 sanctions on India and Pakistan, 132 tilting toward Pakistan, 31 viewed as a catalyst, 179–180 United States–China–India–Pakistan nuclear chain, 186 strategic stability continuum, 185 United States–India civil nuclear deal, 122, 176 China’s reaction to, 146 China’s response, enhancing it stake in cooperating with Islamabad, 144 countermeasures against, 139 helpful in supporting New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program, 143 United States–India nuclear and missile defense cooperation, concerning China, 129 United States–led circle, to contain China, 130 unsafeguarded facilities, assistance to, 113 U-Pu-Zr4 metal alloy fuel, 158

Tibetans within India’s borders, antiChina activities of, 162 Tomahawk cruise missiles, U.S. use of, 82 Track-1.5 and Track-2 diplomacy, 89, 183 Track-2 diplomacy an appropriate starting point, 164–165 China and India emphasizing and strengthening bilateral, 142 between China and the United States, 22 initiating and sustaining, 38 points of compatibility in the Indo-Chinese nuclear relationship, 166 strengthening to promote mutual understanding, 142 transparency defining, 89 lack of in inventory and capability, 36 measures specified in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 103 in nuclear arsenals, 114 transport-erector-launchers (TELs), for cruise missiles resembling civilian/military logistics vehicles, 85, 89 Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile, 22 tsunami, hitting south of India, 155 “two-front” scenarios, for India, 5 two-theater war, 58, 61n19

u

UN Security Council meetings, China’s tactics at, 117n4 uncertainty, nuclear strategy based on, 50–51 underwater deterrence, still being developed for India, 84 United Nations General Assembly, resolution (48/75L), 107 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 109 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) China permanent member of, 130 nuclear-weapon states, 23 Resolution 1172, 127 United States China having concerns over India’s military and security cooperation with, 162

212

index

Y

uranium (U), recycling in present PWRs, 157 uranium stores, in Andhra Pradesh, 152 uranium-fueled reactors, reprocessing spent fuel from, 153 U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, 114 U.S. Global Positioning System, 88 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, 75n10, 103, 179 U.S. Senate, vote against ratification of the CTBT, 100

Yakhont ASCM, Brahmos derived from, 90n10 Yan Chengjun, 140 Yang Yi, 192 Yao Yunzhu, 192 Yulin naval base, on Hainan Island, 4

Z

zero nuclear weapons, global push for, 176 zero-yield requirement, going beyond, 97 zero-yield treaty, 96 Zhang Li, 194 Zhang Minqian, 142 Zhou Zhiwei, 193 Zhu Minquan, 138 Zhu Zhenghu, 61n13 Zou Yunhua, 194

V

Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 30, 44n9, 61n9, 96, 105n12 verification, 108, 110

W

Wang Haibin, 193 Wang Jun, 194 war-fighting (zhanzheng duikang) strategy, 39 warheads, types of for minimum nuclear deterrence, 53 Washington Post, “Rivalry Between China and India Will Continue Through 2025,” 142 Wassenaar Group, 126 weapons of mass destruction capabilities, apprehension and mistrust about, 36 Wen Jiabao, 111, 161, 162 Western media, impact on strategic decisionmaking of China and India, 142 Western powers, deterrence offensive strategy of, 28 Working Group on an Expanded Nonproliferation System, India working with United States via, 129 world power, India’s explicit strategic goal to be accepted as, 29

X

Xia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), 4

213

contributors

V. S. Arunachalam, Ph.D., is the chairman of the Center for the Study of Science, Technology, and Policy and a former scientific adviser to the defense minister of India and secretary of the Defense Research and Development Organization. Dipankar Banerjee (major general, retired) is a mentor at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. C. Uday Bhaskar (commodore, retired) is the director of the National Maritime Foundation in India. Cheng Ruisheng (ambassador, retired) is the former Chinese ambassador to India and Myanmar and the former deputy director-general of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Fan Jishe, Ph.D., is the deputy director of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Studies and a senior fellow at the Institute of American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Avinash Godbole is a Ph.D. candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University and a research assistant at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses.

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THE china-india NUCLEAR CROSSROADS

ruKMaNi guPta is a Ph.D. candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University and an associate fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. gu ZHoNgMao is the former vice chair of the Sciences and Technology Committee of the China Institute of Atomic Energy. KalyaN KeMBuri is a research analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. sriKaNtH KoNDaPalli, Ph.D., is a professor in and the chairperson of Jawaharlal Nehru University’s East Asian Studies Department. li BiN, Ph.D., is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a professor in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University, where he serves as director of the Arms Control Program. li DesHuN is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University. li HoNg is secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and a former engineer within the Arms Control Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. liu siWei is a Ph.D. candidate at Sichuan University. Ma Jiali is the executive deputy director of the Center for Strategic Studies of the China Reform Forum. Nie HoNgyi, Ph.D., is a graduate of Tsinghua University with a Ph.D. from its Department of International Relations. PaN ZHeNQiaNg (major general, retired) is a senior adviser at the China Reform Forum and formerly served as the director of the Institute of Strategic Studies of China’s National Defense University.

216

contributors

Arun Prakash (admiral, retired) formerly served as chief of Naval Staff of the Indian Navy and chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. M. S. Prathibha is a Ph.D. candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Rajesh Rajagopalan, Ph.D., is a professor at the Centre for International Politics, Organization, and Disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and the former assistant director of India’s National Security Council Secretariat. S. Rajgopal, Ph.D., is a professor at the Center for the Study of Science, Technology, and Policy and a former secretary within India’s Atomic Energy Commission. Lora Saalman, Ph.D., is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and is based at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. Gunjan Singh is a Ph.D. candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University and a research assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. P. K. Singh (lieutenant general, retired) is the director of the United Service Institution of India. Swaran Singh, Ph.D., is a professor and chairperson of the Centre for International Politics, Organization, and Disarmament at the School of International Studies in Jawaharlal Nehru University. Meera Sudhakar is a project analyst at the Center for the Study of Science, Technology, and Policy. Dipak Sundaram is a graduate of Tsinghua University with a master’s degree in international business.

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YAng Yi (admiral, retired) formerly served as the director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. YAo Yunzhu, Ph.D., is a major general and a senior researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences. zhAng Li, Ph.D., is a professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies of Sichuan University. zhou zhiwei, Ph.D., is a professor in the Institute of Nuclear Energy and Technology at Tsinghua University. zou YunhuA (senior colonel, retired) served as a former coordinator at the Program on Arms Control, Foreign Affairs Bureau, Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense. All essays contained in this book were written in a personal capacity and do not represent the views of any official government agency or body.

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Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy The Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, through its partnership with Tsinghua University, brings together top experts from China and the international community to engage in collaborative dialogue and research in order to identify constructive solutions to today’s common global challenges. *** The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States. Founded in 1910, its work is nonpartisan and dedicated to achieving practical results. Carnegie is pioneering the first global think tank, with flourishing offices now in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Beirut, and Brussels. These five locations include the centers of world governance and the places whose political evolution and international policies will most determine the near-term possibilities for international peace and economic advance.

GLOBAL POWER IS SHIFTING TO ASIA. The U.S. military is embarking on an American “pivot” to the Indo-Pacific region, and the bulk of global arms spending is directed toward Asian theaters. India and Pakistan are thought to be building up their nuclear arsenals while questions persist about China’s potential to “sprint to parity.” China remains by far the world’s largest market for new nuclear energy production, and India aspires to be on a similar trajectory. Despite these trends, The China-India Nuclear Crossroads is the first serious book by leading Chinese and Indian experts to examine the political, military, and technical factors that affect Sino-Indian nuclear relations. In this book, editor and translator Lora Saalman presents a comprehensive framework through which China and India can pursue enhanced cooperation and minimize the unintended consequences of their security dilemmas.

“The place to start for anyone interested in the atomic dimension of the China-India relationship and its profound impact on Asian security and the global nuclear order.” —C. Raja Mohan, Member of India’s National Security Advisory Board and Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation

“A first and crucial attempt to comprehensively compare Chinese and Indian nuclear perspectives.” —Shen Dingli, Executive Dean of the Institute of International Studies and Director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University

“Provides a better understanding of the security perceptions driving China and India’s nuclear strategies ... a must read.” —Shyam Saran, Senior Fellow at the Center for Policy Research and former counselor in the Embassy of India in Beijing, China

“Serves as a communication bridge between Chinese and Indian scholars.” —Zheng Ruixiang, Senior Researcher at the China Institute of International Studies and China’s former consul general in Mumbai, India

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE